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SOURCE BOOK

Community-Oriented Policing:

An Alternative Strategy

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INTRODUCTION

The Community-Oriented Policing (COPS) pilot workshop series has been developed by ICMA through a grant from the National Institute of Justice. The purpose is to provide municipal executives with an overview of policing that emphasizes COPS. It has been approximately ten years since COPS was recognized as a viable alternative to what is now called traditional policing. Much has been learned in these past ten years. This workshop is a composite of information based upon the experiences of this nation's most progressive law enforcement agencies.

This source book is provided as a supplemental text for workshop participants. It complements the work book which serves as the foundation for the workshop. In this manual are selected readings from various distinguished researchers, authors and practitioners. All the materials have been carefully selected on the basis of their relevance to police work and, more specifically, their insights into community-oriented policing.

We are grateful to each of the authors whose work appears in this manual. Also, we wish to acknowledge the advisors, trainers and staff listed on page vi, who assisted in the development of this pilot training. We thank each and every one of them for their vision, concern, and courage as they contribute to the incremental, but fundamental changes occurring in the delivery of a critical public service, policing.

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September, 1991

ABOUT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

The National Institute of Justice is the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice established to improve the criminal justice system and to prevent and reduce crime.

Specific mandates established by Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690) direct the National Institute of Justice to:

- Sponsor special projects and research and development programs that will improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and reduce or prevent crime;

- Conduct national demonstration projects that employ innovative or promising approaches for improving criminal . justice;

- Develop new technologies to fight crime and improve criminal justice;

- Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs, identify programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated, and recommend actions that can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments, and private organizations and individuals to improve criminal justice;

- Develop new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and delinquency, and test and demonstrate new and improved approaches to strengthen the justice system;

- Provide to the Nation's justice agencies information from research, demonstration, evaluations, and special projects;

- Serve as a domestic and international clearinghouse of justice information for Federal, State, and local government; and

- Deliver training and technical assistance to justice officials about new information and innovations developed as a result of Institute programs.

The Director of the Institute is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Director establishes the objectives of the Institute, guided by the priorities of the Department of Justice and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice professionals to identify the most critical problems confronting them and to develop projects that can help resolve them. Through research and development, the National Institute of Justice will search for answers to what works and why in the Nation's war on drugs and crime.

Charles B. DeWitt
Director
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ABOUT ICMA

Founded in 1914, ICMA is the professional and educational organization for more than 7,500 appointed administrators and assistant administrators serving cities, counties, regions, and other local governments. The membership also includes directors of state associations of local governments, other local government employees, members of the academic community, and concerned citizens who share the goal of improving local government. ICMA members serve local governments in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and other countries.

Mission and Goals

The purposes of ICMA are to enhance the quality of local government through professional management and to support and assist professional local government administrators internationally. The specific goals that support this mission are to

1. Support and actively promote council-manager government and professional management in all forms of local government

2. Provide training and development programs and publications for local government professionals that improve their skills, increase their knowledge of local government, and strengthen their commitment to the ethics, values, and ideals of the profession

3. Support members in their efforts to meet professional, partnership, and personal needs

4. Serve as a clearinghouse for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of local government information and data to enhance current practices and to serve as a resource to public interest groups in the formation of public policy

5. Provide a strong association capable of accomplishing these goals.

Program and Activities

To meet its goals, ICMA has developed and implemented a number of programs, including member publications, professional activities, books and other publications, and management information services. Activities include but are not limited to annual awards program, annual conference, citizenship education, contract and grant research, international management exchange program, local government consortia and special interest programs, public policy, survey research, and training institute.

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COMMUNITY POLICING

The New Model for the Way the Police Do Their Job

Camille Cates Barnett and Robert A. Bowers

Some police have begun to think differently about how they do their job. The results could be significant for those of us who manage local governments and see substantial resources going to police forces (often at the expense of funding other services). No longer can we assume that our colleagues in policing will deploy resources and do their jobs in familiar patterns. Consider the following.

Some police have begun to think differently about how they do their job. The results could be significant for those of us who manage local governments. ...

In Austin, police educate citizens about police practices through a 12-week academy. Police are walking beats, working out of neighborhood centers, organizing crime-watch programs, and working with school children—all to build better partnerships with the community.

In Tulsa, under the banner of community policing, patrol officers organize an apartment complex to reduce thefts and burglar-

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ies, work closely with public housing tenants to combat drug trafficking, and form a sophisticated task force to end assaults by hate groups.

In Baltimore County, Maryland, the banner is Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement, or COPE. There, a task force of four dozen police officers works with citizens to combat the fear of crime. Research shows that fear is spawned not only by the incidence of actual felonies but also by such signs of disorder in a neighborhood as vandalism, bands of rowdy youths, graffiti, and abandoned cars. So the police work to prevent or reverse cycles of neighborhood deterioration that invite crime, added decay, and apathy.

In San Diego, using what is called problem-oriented policing, the police are moving department-wide to have street officers seek out the underlying causes of crime and disorder problems and alleviate them. For example, the police are seeking ways to prevent small groups of recent migrants both from being victims of fires in nearby canyons and from turning to drunkenness at a neighborhood shopping center when they don't find day work.

In Newport News, Virginia, where the term *problem-oriented policing* first came to prominence, the police have used the approach to address problems ranging from spouse abuse to street prostitution. For example, the police attacked prostitution in a neighborhood by striking a deal with a local judge. The judge put prostitutes arrested in the neighborhood on probation with the proviso that they no longer frequent the area. If they did so, their probation would be immedi-

ately revoked and they would go straight to jail. Problem solved. Prostitution was eliminated in the neighborhood. (For more information on Newport News, see William Mitchell's article beginning on page 13.)

In New York City, the department has CPOP teams in each of the city's 75 precincts. The acronym stands for the Community Patrol Officer Program; like the other programs, its goals include building solid, sustained police-community relations, restoring citizens' sense of safety, and getting the police to identify and attack the problems that underlie groups of criminal incidents.

A New Model of Policing

These programs should not be mistaken for tinkering at the edges of police tactics or being short-term public relations efforts. They are the result of attempts by some of the nation's most innovative police departments and leaders to respond to real and chronically persistent problems of crime, fear, drugs, and urban decay. The programs represent a wave of police thinking and experimenting that is developing a new model of policing.

The new model could mean a watershed change in how the police are trained, managed, and deployed, and in how they deal with citizens. *Could* because perhaps only a few score departments as yet have begun to examine and adopt parts or most of what is most frequently called *community policing.*

The community policing model—a new paradigm of policing—has these principal elements: (1) partnership with the community, (2) participative management, (3) problem solving, and (4) visionary leadership. But it is still in its formative stage, and no single definition of community policing is generally accepted. Because the Houston Police Department helped to pioneer development of neighborhood-oriented policing (the local name for community policing) in the early 1980s, the department's definition is cited frequently.

Neighborhood-oriented policing is an interactive process between police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats to mutually develop ways to identify problems and concerns and then to assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police departments and the community to address the problems and/or concerns.[1]

What does all this mean? Several years ago, a police chief gave this example of how he interprets community policing.

When there's a disturbance on the street and we're arresting someone, we don't disperse the crowd. We no longer tell those who've gathered to go back to their business and let us take care of ours. We say, "Don't leave. Stay here. This is your community and we want you to know what's going on. This is why we're arresting this person. If you know anything that would help us to solve these problems, please let us know."

A Major Break with Police Custom

This chief's remarks denote a major break with the ways the police customarily operate. Most of us in local government management are familiar with police departments that behave along traditional lines. They are centralized and bureaucratic; there is a division of labor and unity of control. Police officers assume a measured distance from citizens. This remoteness is caricatured as necessary to obtain "Just the facts, Ma'am." On the streets, police perform routine patrol while waiting to respond to 911 calls for service. The police function is seen overwhelmingly in terms of crime control.

The new community policing model provides marked contrasts, nowhere more so than in organizational design. The traditional style of policing relies on a strong chain of command. The assumption is that those in the higher ranks of a police department know more than those in the lower ranks. At best, only lip service is given to the notion that "patrol officers are the backbone of policing."

Community policing not just calls for but, if it is to be successful, demands decentralization of authority. To a considerable degree, patrol officers are to be freed from the fetters of down-the-line control. They are told to think for themselves, be generalists, seek the underlying reasons for crime and disorder problems in a neighborhood, devise solutions, and apply them.

The Three Eras of Policing

An historical perspective is helpful in understanding what is meant by community policing. George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, leading criminal justice scholars and colleagues at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, distinguish the emerging era of community and problem-solving policing from earlier eras. In a paper prepared for the John F. Kennedy School's Executive Session on Policing, they write:

The political era, so named because of the

close ties between police and politics, dated from the introduction of police into municipalities during the 1840s, continued through the Progressive period, and ended during the early 1900s. The reform era developed in reaction to the political. It took hold during the 1930s, thrived during the 1950s and 1960s, began to erode during the late 1970s. The reform era now seems to be giving way to an era emphasizing community problem solving.[2]

The accompanying table notes the attributes that Kelling and Moore assign to each era. The reform era stressed a "professional" crime-fighting style of policing that relied heavily on routine patrol in cars, rapid response to calls for service, and criminal investigations. But research published during the past 15 years has shown that doubling the number of cars patrolling the streets did not affect the levels of serious crime or fear of crime; that rapid police response did not affect the probability of making an arrest; and that forensic technology contributed less to the investigative process than the stories of crime victims and witnesses.

Evidence such as this served to undermine the beliefs and practices of the reform era. So did such other factors as rates of crime and the fear of crime that started to spiral in the 1960s; choruses of complaints from minorities that the police did not treat them fairly or with adequate protection; the civil rights and antiwar movements that challenged the police; and myths of the reform era that could not be supported. One myth was that police officers had and exercised little discretion. Another portrayed the police as solitary crime fighters needing little help from the community.

As Kelling and Moore note, the police strategy of the reform era "was unable to adjust to the changing social circumstances of the 1960s and 1970s." So emerged community policing with its four elements of partnership with the community, participative management, problem solving, and visionary leadership.

Partnership with the Community

Partnership with the community is a basic tenet of community policing. It is a principle

	Political Era	Reform Era	Community Problem-Solving Era
Legitimacy and authorization	Primarily political	Law and police professionalism	Community support (political) law, professionalism
The police function	Crime control, order maintenance, broad social services	Crime control	Crime control, crime prevention, problem solving
Organizational design	Decentralized and geographical	Centralized, classical scientific management: division of labor and unity of control, bureaucratic	Decentralized, task forces, matrices
External relationships	Close and personal	Professionally remote	Consultative, police defend values of law and professionalism, but listen to community concerns
Demand management	Managed through links between politicians and precinct commanders and face-to-face contacts between citizens and foot patrol officers	Channelled through central dispatching activities	Channelled through analysis of underlying problems
Principal programs and technologies	Foot patrol, call boxes, and rudimentary investigations	Automotive preventative patrol calls for service, telephones, radios	Foot patrol, problem solving, team policing, crime watch groups
Measured outcomes	Maintaining citizen and political satisfaction with social order	Crime control (Uniformed Crime Reports)	Quality of life and citizen satisfaction

Adapted from: "The Evolving Strategy of Policing," Kelling and Moore[2]

that acknowledges that the police alone cannot solve the complex problems of crime, fear, drugs, and urban decay that so afflict our municipal life. So police must create partnerships with communities.

These partnerships imply shared power and require changing relationships between the police and citizens and within police departments. They mean that the police must ask communities what they want and what they think of the police. Consulting communities means that the police:

- do not alone define the problems facing communities or devise tactics for resolving them
- may lead or initiate, but not unilaterally control, the process of partnership
- support and encourage citizen self-help
- accept that their effectiveness depends on cooperation with the community and that a main measure of their performance is community satisfaction.

The police begin to see themselves not just as enforcing law and maintaining order—the traditional police missions—but also as serving a mediative role in communities and providing service. In a sense, citizens are not just criminals, victims, and witnesses, but also customers.

Participative Management

Police departments typically are organized in classic bureaucratic hierarchy that is reinforced by military trappings of rank and chain of command. Community policing suggests significant modifications in bureaucratic organizational structures by encouraging collaboration among the ranks and by using task forces and temporary organizations to deal with specific problems. Problem definitions and strategies come from the bottom up as well as from the top down. For police departments that are implementing community policing, there can be changes in organizational structure, reward and evaluation systems, recruiting, training, job descriptions, and deployment strategies.

The matter of police discretion illustrates how community policing encourages participative management. It not only acknowledges that police officers have a wide range of discretion, but calls on them to use it. Patrol officers are in the best position to see problems first hand and, with proper training and guidance, are in the best position to obtain information vital to analyzing problems. If the information they gather is to be used effectively, patrol officers must participate in the police department's decision making that addresses problems. Their job must not be

viewed narrowly as responding to calls and making arrests to reduce crime but viewed broadly as using their discretion to help solve problems that produce or contribute to crime.

The community policing model implies changes in how police departments are evaluated. Traditional measures include reported crime and arrest rates, response times to calls for service, the number of traffic citations, and crime clearance rates. Criteria for evaluating a department dedicated to community policing include citizen satisfaction with police service, the rate of citizen complaints against the police, and quality-of-life factors.

Criteria change also for evaluating individual officers. They include the ability to assess and solve problems and officer effectiveness in relationships with diverse groups and individuals and in participation within the department. A chief who is moving his department into community policing says, "I no longer reward acts of valor, but rather for going the second mile."

Community policing also suggests changes in recruiting police officers. "I recruit for service, not for adventure," says a police chief dedicated to community policing. Training is also affected. In one department, both sworn and civilian personnel were required to take 40 hours of community policing-related in-service training.

And community policing provides new roles for administrators and managers. The emerging model calls for them to spend less time in command and control functions and more time in assisting officers as they work with the community to identify and solve problems.

Problem Solving

Solving problems is an essential element of community policing. It reflects an attitude captured in *In Search of Excellence* by Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr.

Treat people as adults. Treat them as partners; treat them with dignity; treat them with respect. Treat them—not capital spending or automation—as the primary source of productivity gains.[3]

Thus, in community policing, officers on the street are expected to do more than run from call to call. They are trained and expected to see patterns, not just a series of unrelated events. The patterns of events that make up the problem, the analysis, and potential solutions to the problem are discussed with police management and the community.

An example of the type of problem solving that community policing can foster occurred

in Houston during implementation of Project Oasis, a precursor of the department's neighborhood-oriented policing effort. Project Oasis was a program designed to address quality-of-life issues, including crime problems. A low-income housing project was chosen. The police department and other city agencies, working with community residents, analyzed problems confronting housing project residents. The department focused on drug dealing. Patrol officers worked their normally assigned beats and shifts, but were allowed out of service for as long as needed to work in the housing project. Increased community contact combined with more traditional enforcement tactics led to a dramatic reduction for calls for service and in shifting drug trafficking out of the neighborhood.

Visionary Leadership

Perhaps the most significant implication of community policing is the type of leadership it demands. To the extent that it is growing, community policing is taking hold because of a group of police leaders who share a vision and are working hard to impart that vision to others. These leaders are seeking to transform the organizational cultures of police departments by managing through a set of values. Values can set the direction of an organization, give it purpose, and unite its members in a common purpose.

Mark Moore and Robert Wasserman, another Kennedy School colleague, distinguish the values of community policing from those of traditional policing.

Traditional Policing
- Police authority is based solely in the law. Professional police organizations are committed to enforcement of that law as their primary objective.
- Communities can provide police with assistance in enforcing the law. Helpful communities will provide the police with information to assist them in carrying out their mission.
- Responding to calls for service is the highest police priority. All calls must receive the fastest response possible.
- Social problems and other neighborhood issues are not the concern of the police unless they threaten the breakdown of the social order.
- Police, being experts in crime control, are best suited to develop police priorities and strategies.

Community Policing
- Community policing is committed to a problem-solving partnership: dealing with crime, disorder, and the quality of life.
- Under community policing, police service delivery is decentralized to the neighborhood level.
- The highest commitment of the community policing organization is respect for and sensitivity to all citizens and their problems. Community policing values the skills of positive social interaction, rather than simply technical application of procedures to situations, whether dealing with crime, disorder, or other problem solving.
- The community-oriented police department views both the community and the law as the source of the department's authority.
- The community-oriented police department is committed to furthering democratic values. Every action of the agency reflects the importance of protecting constitutional rights and ensuring basic personal freedoms of all citizens.[4]

The values of a community policing organization are not those of elite law enforcers isolated from citizens and neighborhoods. They are values that are inclusive and supportive, based on respect and interdependence between the police and the community. They convey a sense that communities do not have to be victims, that a partnership between police and citizens can make a marked difference in reducing the problems of crime, drugs, fear, and urban decay.

Relatively few police leaders scattered around the nation have incorporated these values into a vision that is establishing the new community policing model for the nation. They are experimenting with ideas that seem to work. What police are doing is applying some management concepts that focus on the *customer*. Where their still-evolving model leads them could determine the nature, goals, and effectiveness of municipal policing for decades to come. For the rest of us in local government, this new way of policing could play a principal role in determining how government affects the quality of urban life.

[1] "Developing a Policing Style for Neighborhood-Oriented Policing: Executive Session #1," T. N. Oettmeier and W. H. Bieck, Houston Police Department, 1987, p. 8.

[2] Kelling, George L., and Mark H. Moore, "The Evolving Strategy of Policing," *Perspectives on Policing*, No. 4, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 1988.

[3] Peters, Thomas J., and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., *In Search of Excellence*, Harper and Row, New York, 1982, p. 238.

[4] Wasserman, Robert, and Mark H. Moore, "Values in Policing," *Perspectives on Policing*, No. 8, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 1988.

Community Policing:
A Practical Guide for Police Officials

By Lee P. Brown

Like many other social institutions, American police departments are responding to rapid social change and emerging problems by rethinking their basic strategies. In response to problems such as crime, drugs, fear, and urban decay, the police have begun experimenting with new approaches to their tasks.

Among the most prominent new approaches is the concept of community policing. Viewed from one perspective, it is not a new concept; the principles can be traced back to some of policing's oldest traditions. More recently, some of the important principles of community policing have been reflected in particular programs initiated in a variety of places within police departments.

What is new is the idea that community policing is not a particular program within a department, but instead should become the dominant philosophy throughout the department. Exactly what it means for community policing to become a department-wide philosophy and how a police executive can shift an organization from a more traditional philosophy to a community-policing philosophy has been unclear.

Our experience in Houston is beginning to clarify these issues. We are developing a clear, concrete picture of what it means to operate a police department committed to a philosophy of community policing. We have also learned how to manage the process of evolution towards a philosophy of community policing. And we are learning how the basic administrative and managerial systems of the department

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

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must be changed to accommodate and encourage community policing. The purpose of this paper is to make this experience available to the field, and to give concrete, operational content to what are otherwise mere abstractions and possibilities.

The origins of community policing

Houston's interest in community policing as an overall philosophy of policing did not spring full-blown from any particular person's mind. Instead, it has emerged from the evolution of police thought. That police leaders are challenging the assumptions they have held for several decades should not be construed as an attempt to debunk all that has worked well for many years. Rather the rethinking should be seen as a sign of police leaders' commitment to ensuring that the strategies they adopt will be viable not only now but in the future as well. Only by refining what works well and scrapping or reshaping what no longer meets the community's needs can police departments face up to the problems and deliver the services that citizens deserve and should expect.

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66 *... police leaders are challenging the assumptions they have held for several decades ...* **99**

The evolution to community policing is not complete. What is commonly called traditional policing remains this country's dominant policing style. From its introduction in the 1930's through the 1970's, when it reached its peak of popularity, traditional policing has developed a number of identifying characteristics, such as the following:

- The police are *reactive* to incidents. The organization is driven by calls for police service.

- *Information* from and about the community is limited. Planning efforts focus on internally generated police data.

- *Planning* is narrow in its focus and centers on internal operations such as policies, procedures, rules, and regulations.

- *Recruitment* focuses on the spirit of adventure rather than the spirit of service.

- *Patrol officers* are restrained in their role. They are not encouraged or expected to be creative in addressing problems and are not rewarded for undertaking innovative approaches.

- *Training* is geared toward the law enforcement role of the police even though officers spend only 15 to 20 percent of their time on such activities.

- *Management* uses an authoritative style and adheres to the military model of command and control.

- *Supervision* is control-oriented as it reflects and reinforces the organization's management style.

- *Rewards* are associated with participating in daring events rather than conducting service activities.

- *Performance evaluations* are based not on outcomes but on activities. The number of arrests made and the number of citations issued are of paramount importance.

- *Agency effectiveness* is based on data—particularly crime and clearance rates—from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports.

- *Police departments* operate as entities unto themselves, with few collaborative links to the community.

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66 *Traditional policing gave citizens a false sense of security ... Fortunately for the police profession, the 1970's fostered a full-scale attempt to analyze a host of policing issues.* **99**

For 40 years, traditional policing ostensibly served the public well, primarily because it was seen as a marked improvement over the policing style it had replaced—one that was characterized by negative political control and widespread corruption. Traditional policing gave citizens a false sense of security about police officers' ability to ensure the safety of the community. That the policing style might not be as effective as it seemed came into sharp focus by the middle 1960's and early 1970's when riots and protests exploded with rampant regularity across America. As citizens and police officials alike watched the scenario unfold, probing

questions were raised about the apparent inability of the police to prevent—or at least control—such outbreaks.

By the time the 1960's arrived, it was increasingly clear that both elected officials and the public knew little about the police and their operations. The situation called for decisive action and led to the formation of a number of commissions to examine the events surrounding the riots and to offer recommendations for improving police operations. The commissions' discussions included topics ranging from violence in cities and on college campuses to criminal justice standards and goals.

The attempts to remedy what was seen as an intolerable situation, however, were not confined to meeting-room discussions. Massive amounts of money for police operations and research were funneled through the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration as part of the Government's response to the concern.

Fortunately for the police profession, the 1970's fostered a full-scale attempt to analyze a host of policing issues. The extensive research effort, which continued into the 1980's, produced findings that prompted many thoughtful police professionals to rethink how best to use police resources. Some of the more significant findings are described below:[1]

- *Increasing the number of police officers* does not necessarily reduce the incidence of crime nor increase the proportion of crimes that are solved. The relationship that does exist is between crime and adverse social conditions, such as poverty, illiteracy, illegal drugs, unemployment, population density, and social heterogeneity.

- *Random patrol* produces inconsistent results. It does not necessarily reduce crime nor enhance an officer's chances of apprehending a criminal suspect. It also does not bring the police closer to the public or reduce citizens' fear of crime.

The use of foot patrols (a popular tactic of community policing), on the other hand, has been shown to reduce the fear of crime though not necessarily the actual number of crimes that are committed.

- The assignment of *one officer per patrol car* is just as effective and just as safe as the assignment of two officers per car. The number of crimes committed does not rise, and the number of criminals apprehended does not fall when officers patrol solo. Nor do officers face a greater risk of injury or death when they travel alone.

- *Saturation patrol* reduces crime by temporarily suppressing the illegal activities or displacing them to other areas.

- Seldom do patrol officers encounter a *serious crime in progress.*

- *Rapid response* is not as important as previously believed because there generally is an extended delay before citizens call the police. A rapid police response is important only in the small percentage of cases where a life is being threatened or apprehension of the suspect is possible. Citizens are satisfied instead with a *predetermined response time* upon which they can depend. For incidents that are minor and do not require an officer's presence at the scene, citizens are satisfied with *alternative* methods, such as having the incident report taken over the telephone.

- *Criminal investigations* are not as successful as previously believed. Because crimes are more likely to be resolved if the suspect is apprehended immediately or a witness can supply the person's name, address, or license-plate number or recognizes him in a photograph, successful investigations occur when the suspect is known and when corroborating evidence can be obtained for arrest and prosecution. A key source of information about crimes and criminal suspects is the public.

Additional proof—beyond the reams of data generated by researchers—that time-honored policing strategies were ineffective came in the form of a widespread fear of crime among citizens, record-high crime rates, and record-high prison populations despite the availability of more officers and more funds for law enforcement efforts. As a result, progressive police administrators soon began to question the efficacy of traditional policing strategies. Their review of the situation heralded the beginning of an incremental transition to community-oriented programs and thus the beginning of Phase I of community policing.

Two phases in community policing: from programs to style

The growing awareness of the limitations of the traditional model of policing stimulated police departments across America to experiment with new approaches to reducing crime, stilling fears, improving police community relations, and restoring community confidence in the police. For the most part, these experiments were conceived and executed as discrete programs within traditional departments. That is, the

programs were typically initiated as a response to a particular problem, involved only a small fraction of the organization, were time-limited, were explicitly identified as experiments, and were subject to particularly close scrutiny by researchers. Often the programs had their own champions and command structures within the departments.

Examples of these programs include the foot patrol experiments in Newark, New Jersey, and Flint, Michigan; the problem-solving project in Newport News, Virginia; the fear reduction programs in Houston, Texas, and Newark; the Community Patrol Officer Program in New York City; the Directed Area Responsibility Team experiment in Houston; the community policing experiment in Santa Ana, California; the Basic Car Plan and Senior Lead-Officer programs in Los Angeles; and the Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement program in Baltimore County, Maryland. Often these programs had a curious fate. They were begun with fanfare, they produced important results, and then they faded within the departments that had initiated them. These programs, and their fates, constituted Phase I of the field's experience with community policing. They taught two important lessons.

First, the programs taken together pointed toward some new frontiers for policing. They taught the field that if it viewed incidents as emerging from problems, then new avenues for contributing to the solutions of the underlying problems opened up. They taught the field that fear was an important problem in its own right, and there were things that police departments could do to reduce fear quite apart from reducing actual criminal victimization. They taught the field that the community could be an important partner in dealing with the problems of crime, fear, and drugs and that to build that partnership with the community, the police had to find more effective ways of interacting with the community and responding to their needs. These basic ideas provided the intellectual foundations for the emerging new conceptions of community policing.

Second, the ultimate demise of many of the programs showed the difficulty of trying to operate programs that embodied some of the important principles of community policing in the context of organizations whose administrative systems and managerial styles were designed for more traditional models of policing. It seemed clear that if the field as a whole or any police department within the field were to succeed in implementing community policing, it would have to be as an overall philosophy of the department.

The development of community policing in Houston

Houston took these lessons to heart. We were tempted by the potential of community policing, but worried about the tendency of individual programs to collapse after they had been operating for a while. It was also hard to see how one could move from a department committed to traditional policing to a department that had adopted community policing as a philosophy. Our solution to these problems was to follow the experience of the field and to understand that the implementation of community policing in Houston would also have to have two phases.

Phase I of community policing is the implementation of programs designed to provide the public with meaningful ways to participate in policing efforts. The initial phase does *not* require a complete change in the organization's operating style. Phase II, on the other hand, *does* require the organization to make such a change.

Because Phase I involves only the implementation of individual programs, the systems that support the organization's policing style—such as recruitment, training, performance evaluation, rewards, and discipline—do not change. In other words, the individual *programs* are separate entities that do not involve the entire department or affect the entire community.

❝ Phase II, however, involves more sweeping and more comprehensive changes. ❞

Phase II, however, involves more sweeping and more comprehensive changes. It is not merely programs that are being implemented—it is the department's *style* that is being revamped. Unlike individual programs, style affects the entire department and the entire community.

The Houston Police Department evolved from Phase I to Phase II over a 5-year period starting in 1982. The department operated under a set of values that emphasized problem solving and collaboration with the community. It also redesigned its patrol beats to reflect natural neighborhood boundaries. Most important, though, were its experiments with a variety of community-oriented programs that resulted in greater community involvement with the department. At the end of the 5-year evolutionary period, the department made an organizational commitment to adopt community

policing as its dominant operating style. The department's experiences during Phase I were invaluable and made the transition to Phase II much easier, for the individual programs enabled the department to accomplish the following:[2]

● Break down barriers to change.

● Educate its leaders and rank-and-file members on the merits of community policing.

● Reassure the rank-and-file that the community policing concepts being adopted had not been imported from outside the department but instead were an outgrowth of programs already in place.

● Address problems on a small scale before making the full transition to community policing.

● Reduce the likelihood that members of the department would reject the concepts of community policing as "foreign" or not appropriate for the department and the community.

● Demonstrate to the public and elected officials the benefits of community policing.

● Provide a training ground for community policing concepts and strategies.

● Create advocates among those persons who would become community-policing trainers.

● Demonstrate its willingness to experiment with new ideas.

Based on Houston's experience, it is clear that organizations that have not operated Phase I community policing programs will have to begin Phase II with a clear understanding of what community policing is and how it differs from traditional policing.

Although it is an operating style, community policing also is a *philosophy* of policing that contains several interrelated components. All are essential to the community policing concept and help distinguish it from traditional policing.

Results vs. process. The first component of the community policing philosophy is an orientation toward *problem solving*. Embracing the pioneering work of Herman Goldstein,[3] community policing focuses on *results* as well as process. Incorporated into routine operations are the techniques of problem identification, problem analysis, and problem resolution.

Values. Community policing also relies heavily on the articulation of policing values that incorporate citizen involvement in matters that directly affect the safety and quality of neighborhood life. The culture of the police department therefore becomes one that not only recognizes the merits of community involvement but also seeks to organize and manage departmental affairs in ways that are consistent with such beliefs.

Accountability. Because different neighborhoods have different concerns, desires, and priorities, it is necessary to have an adequate understanding of what is important to a particular neighborhood. To acquire such an understanding, officers must interact with residents on a routine basis and keep them informed of police efforts to fight and prevent neighborhood crime. As the communication continues, a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship develops between the police and the community. Inherent in this relationship is the requirement that officers keep residents abreast of their activities. This ensures accountability to the community, as well as to the department.

Decentralization. The decentralization of authority and structure is another component of community policing. Roles are changed as the authority to participate in the decisionmaking process expands significantly. The expansion of such authority in turn makes it necessary to alter organizational functions throughout the department.

Power sharing. Responsibility for making decisions is shared by the police and the community after a legitimate *partnership*—one that not only enables but also encourages *active* citizen involvement in policing efforts—between the two groups has been established. *Passive* citizen involvement will not suffice. Active participation is essential because citizens possess a vast amount of information that the police can use to solve and prevent neighborhood crime. Power sharing means that the community is allowed to participate in the decisionmaking process unless the law specifically grants that authority to the police alone.

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66 *Individual neighborhoods are not placed in multiple beats.* 99

Beat redesign. Beat boundaries are drawn to coincide with natural neighborhood boundaries rather than in an arbitrary fashion that meets the needs of the police department. Individual neighborhoods are not placed in multiple beats. If questions arise about the neighborhood to which a citizen belongs, that person is asked to help the police determine the neighborhood with which he identifies.

Permanent assignments. Under community policing, shift and beat assignments are issued on a permanent, rather than a rotating, basis. This allows the beat officer to become an integral part of the community that he has been assigned to protect. When a beat officer is reassigned to another area, his replacement is required to participate in an orientation period with the outgoing officer. During this time the outgoing officer briefs his replacement on the contacts he has made and the knowledge he has gained over the past several months or years, thus providing a continuity of service to the community's citizens.

❝....beat officers ... must be given the authority to make decisions ... ❞

Empowerment of beat officers. Rather than simply patrolling the streets, beat officers are encouraged to initiate creative responses to neighborhood problems. To do so, beat officers must become actively involved in the affairs of the community. In addition, they must be given the authority to make decisions as they see fit, based on the circumstances of the situation. This empowerment reflects the trust that police leaders have in their officers' ability to make appropriate decisions and to perform their duties in a professional, productive, and efficient manner.

Investigations. The premise that neighborhood crime is best solved with information provided by residents is an aspect of community policing that makes it necessary to decentralize the investigative function and focus on neighborhood, or area-specific, investigations. Centralized investigations, however, cannot be eliminated entirely as these are needed to conduct pattern- or suspect-specific *citywide* investigations. Both levels, despite their different focus, are responsible for developing a knowledge base about crime in their area and for developing and carrying out strategies designed to resolve crime problems. Investigations under community policing, however, are viewed from a problem-solving perspective.[*]

Supervision and management. Under community policing, the role of persons at all levels within the organization changes. For example, the patrol officer becomes the "manager" of his beat, while the first-line supervisor assumes responsibility for facilitating the problem-solving process by training, coaching, coordinating, and evaluating the officers under him. Management's role is to support the process by mobilizing the resources needed to address citizen concerns and problems. In carrying out this role, management needs to be not only flexible but also willing to allow officers to take necessary and reasonable risks in their efforts to resolve neighborhood problems and concerns.

Training. Also changed under community policing are all aspects of officer training. At the recruit level, cadets are provided information about the complexities and dynamics of the community and how the police fit into the larger picture. Cadet training also enables the future officer to develop community-organizing skills, leadership abilities, and a problem-solving perspective based on the understanding that such efforts will be more effective if departmental and community resources are used in concert.

Supervisory training, on the other hand, is designed to provide the skills needed to facilitate the problem-solving process. This is accomplished by training officers to solve problems, coordinating officers' activities, planning community-organizing activities, and mapping out criminal investigations.

Because they must be the leaders of the changed roles that characterize community policing, management personnel's training includes the further development of leadership skills, including the ability to excite people about the concept of community policing.

❝ ... management personnel's training includes ... the ability to excite people about the concept of community policing. ❞

Performance evaluation. With the changed roles for all personnel comes the need for a revised system for evaluating officer performance. Rather than simply counting numbers (e.g., number of citations issued, number of arrests made, number of calls handled), performance quality is based on the officer's ability to solve problems and involve the community in the department's crime-fighting efforts. The criterion then becomes the *absence* of incidents such as criminal offenses, traffic accidents, and repeat calls-for-service.

Managing calls-for-service. Inherent in the community policing philosophy is the understanding that all police resources will be managed, organized, and directed in a manner that facilitates problem solving. For example, rather than directing a patrol car to each request for police service, alternative response methods are used whenever possible and appropriate. Such alternative techniques include the taking of incident reports over the telephone, by mail, or in person at police facilities; holding lower-priority calls; and having officers make appointments with an individual or a group. The result is more time available for officers to engage in problem-solving and community-organizing activities that

lead to improvements in the quality of neighborhood life. Equally important, officers will be able to remain in their beats and handle those calls that require an on-scene response.

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66 *Officers now are expected to develop innovative ways of solving neighborhood problems.* 99

The Houston Police Department is committed to community policing and is in the process of implementing it with the name of "neighborhood-oriented policing." It is a policing *style* that is responsive to the needs of the community and involves the redesigning of roles and functions for all departmental personnel.

One significant role change is that of the beat officer. No longer is his job structured solely around random patrols and rapid response to routine calls-for-service. Officers now are expected to develop innovative ways of solving neighborhood problems. Inherent in this expanded role is the need for increased communication and interaction with the people who live or work in the officer's beat.

For more than a full year now, the department has been engaged in its version of community policing, resulting in a wealth of experience and insights that can be used to construct a definition of community policing. By definition then, community policing is *an interactive process between the police and the community to mutually identify and resolve community problems.*

Inherent in this definition is a rather dramatic change in the traditional orientation of the police toward the public. The formal separation of the police from the public no longer suffices. What is called for under community policing is the formation of a union between officers and citizens mutually committed to improving the quality of neighborhood life. The formation of such a partnership requires the police to develop appropriate management systems, use available resources more effectively, and work with the community to resolve problems and prevent and control crime.

When considered in light of the necessary reorientation of management attitudes toward the public, community policing also can be thought of as a *management philosophy*. As such, community policing provides a conceptual framework for directing an array of departmental functions and requires management personnel to do the following:

- Ensure cooperative interaction among various departmental functions.

- Ensure collaborative interaction between officers and citizens so that a consensus can be reached on what needs to be done to improve the quality of neighborhood life.

- Integrate the desires and expectations of citizens with the actions taken by the police to identify and address conditions that have a negative effect on the quality of neighborhood life.

- Ensure that all actions are designed to produce planned results.

- Begin addressing a number of organizational issues (such as determining the exact nature of management's responsibilities, deciding which activities best enable management to carry out its responsibilities, and establishing an accountability system for monitoring progress and documenting results).

The Houston experience has shown that community policing is a better, smarter, and more cost-effective means of using police resources and that a new culture in which officers, supervisors, and managers strive to become a part *of* and not apart *from* the community is needed as well. These findings serve to illustrate the dual nature of community policing. That is, it embodies both an operational philosophy and a management philosophy, and each benefits not only the police but also the community. The benefits to the community are as follows:[5]

- *A commitment to crime prevention.* Unlike traditional policing, which focuses on the development of efficient means of *reacting* to incidents, community policing strives to reaffirm Sir Robert Peel's premise that the basic mission of the police is to *prevent* crime and disorder.

- *Public scrutiny of police operations.* Because citizens will be involved with the police, they will be exposed to the "what," "why," and "how" of police work. Such involvement is almost certain to prompt critical examinations and discussions about the responsiveness and efficiency of police operations in addressing the community's problems.

- *Accountability to the public.* Until the advent of community policing, officers were accountable for their actions only to police management. Now officers also will be accountable to the public with whom they have formed a cooperative partnership. Because citizens will be involved in activities such as strategic planning, tactic implementation, and policy development, police

personnel will need to become more aware of and more concerned about the consequences of their actions.

- *Customized police service.* Because police services will be localized, officers will be required to increase their · responsiveness to neighborhood problems and citizens' concerns. As police-citizen partnerships are formed and nurtured, the two groups will be better equipped to work together to identify and address problems that affect the quality of neighborhood life. For their part, police officers will develop a sense of obligation or commitment to resolving neighborhood problems. The philosophy underlying traditional policing does not provide for such a commitment.

- *Community organization.* The degree to which the community is involved in police efforts to address neighborhood problems has a significant bearing on the effectiveness of those efforts. In other words, the success of any crime-prevention strategy or tactic depends on the police and citizens working in concert—not on one or the other carrying the entire load alone. Citizens therefore must learn what they can do to help themselves and their neighbors. The police, in turn, should take an active role in helping citizens achieve that objective.

The benefits of community policing to the police are as follows:[6]

- *Greater citizen support.* As citizens spend more time working with the police, they learn more about the police function. Experience has shown that as citizens' knowledge of the police function increases, their respect for the police increases as well. This increased respect, in turn, leads to greater support for the police. Such support is important not only because it helps officers address issues of community safety but also because it cultivates the belief that the police honestly care about the people they serve and are willing to work with all citizens in an attempt to address their concerns.

- *Shared responsibility.* Historically the police have accepted the responsibility for resolving the problem of crime in the community. Under community policing, however, citizens develop a sense of *shared* responsibility. They come to understand that the police alone cannot eradicate crime from the community—that they themselves must play an active role in the crime-fighting effort.

- *Greater job satisfaction.* Because officers are able to resolve issues and problems within a reasonable amount of time, they see the results of their efforts

fairly quickly. The net result for the officer is enhanced job satisfaction.

- *Better internal relationships.* Communication problems among units and shifts have been a long-standing problem in police agencies. Because community policing focuses on problem solving and accountability, it also enhances communication and cooperation among the various segments of the department that are mutually responsible for addressing neighborhood problems. This shared responsibility facilitates interaction and cooperative relationships among the different groups.

- *Support for organizational change.* The implementation of community policing necessitates a change in traditional policing roles and in turn a change in functional responsibilities. Both modifications require a restructuring of the department's organizational structure to ensure the efficient integration of various functions, such as patrol and investigations. The changes that are needed include new management systems, new training curriculums and delivery mechanisms, a new performance-evaluation system, a new disciplinary process, a new reward system, and new ways of managing calls-for-service.

Questions asked and answered

In their book *Community Policing: Issues and Practices Around the World,* David Bayley and Jerome Skolnick urge police leaders to be cautious about the success of community policing. It is advice well taken. The process of going from a traditional style of policing to a community-oriented style is not an easy task. It therefore is essential to identify, acknowledge, and address any obstacles or legitimate concerns that might impede the transition. Some of the questions most often raised about community policing are discussed below.[7]

- *Is community policing social work?*

Community policing calls for an expansion of the role of the police in that it focuses on problems from the citizen's point of view. Experience has shown that the concerns of citizens often are different from what the police would say they are. For example, before listening to citizens' concerns became routine, officers assumed that the public worried most about major crimes such as rape, robbery, and burglary. After talking with the people who live and work in their beat, officers found that the community's main concerns were quality-of-life issues such as abandoned cars and houses, loud noises, and rowdy youngsters.

It is for this reason—the need to address citizen concerns—that the role of the police has been expanded. This is not

> **❝ Rather than being soft on crime, community policing is a more effective method . . . ❞**

meant to imply, however, that the police are expected to solve the problems by themselves. On the contrary, it means that the police should be able to do at least one of two things: mobilize the community to solve the problem (e.g., organize a neighborhood clean-up program) or enlist the services of the appropriate agency to address the problem (e.g., the city Public Works Department to clean away debris).

Concerns that such activities are akin to social work are ill-founded. The police officer's expanded role does not even come close to meeting the definition of social work. As a profession, social work is an ongoing and often long-term relationship between the social worker and the client. This is in contrast to the *usually* short-term, problem-focused relationship that develops under community policing.

- *Will community policing result in less safe neighborhoods?*

By any standard, the police working alone have been unable to control crime effectively. Experience has shown that increased citizen involvement results in more efficient crime-control efforts. The success of Neighborhood Watch groups is but one example of the effectiveness of making crime fighting a joint effort. Other programs, such as Crime Stoppers, have led to the solution of many serious offenses. Because community policing includes the public as a full partner in the provision of crime-prevention and crime-fighting services, it stands to reason that public safety will *increase* rather than decrease.

- *Will officers be reluctant to enforce the law under community policing?*

Among the tenets of community policing is the need to develop a close relationship between beat officers and the people who live and work in that area. In most neighborhoods only a small percentage of the population commits illegal acts. The goal of community policing is to become a part of the law-abiding majority and thereby develop a partnership to effectively deal with the law-violating minority.

Experience has shown that if police work closely with the "good" citizens, the "bad" ones are either displaced or driven out of the area. It therefore is incorrect to suggest that as the police develop close relationships with the citizens in their beat, law violators will not be arrested.

- *Is community policing soft on crime?*

The police always will have as one of their primary roles the enforcement of laws. Under community policing, police officers not only will have an expanded skills-base at their disposal, but they also will have access to a previously untapped resource—input from members of the community. The two resources together provide officers with a most effective means of enforcing the laws and should eliminate any concerns that community policing will weaken officers' ability to perform this task. Rather than being soft on crime, community policing is a more effective method for fighting crime.

> **❝ Will community policing result in unequal services to minority communities? ❞**

Because community policing calls for the tailoring of police services to meet the unique needs of each neighborhood, minority communities can expect to receive better, rather than unequal, services. This is not to imply that one community will receive preferential treatment at the expense of another. Rather, it means that each community will receive services that are *appropriate* to its particular problems, concerns, and priorities.

- *Will community policing result in police corruption?*

Experience has not shown nor even suggested that community policing leads to corruption. For corruption to arise, there must be a culture ripe for its development, and such certainly is not the case with community policing and its emphasis on police officer professionalism, expanded discretionary decisionmaking authority, trust in officers' sound judgment and good intentions, and officers' accountability to law-abiding citizens. This does not mean, however, that the police can ignore their responsibility to detect and respond to corruptive influences and incidents should they occur.

- *Will access to community policing be distributed fairly?*

This question would be appropriate only if community policing were no more than a program; however, it is an overall operating *style* and philosophy of policing. Nowhere among the tenets of community policing is there anything that would, in and of itself, result in the unequal distribution of services between the poor and the affluent. By its very nature, community policing calls for the appropriate delivery of services to all neighborhoods.

- *Will community policing require more resources?*

Because community policing is an operating style and not a new program, no additional officers are needed. More pertinent is the issue of how the agency's resources will be used. Experience has shown that community policing is a more cost-effective means of using available resources than is traditional policing for two reasons: community participation in the crime-control function expands the amount of available resources, and the solving of problems (rather than responding again and again to the same ones) makes for a more efficient deployment of combined police and community resources.

- *Is community policing antitechnology?*

The use of high-technology equipment and applications is essential to the efficient practice of community policing. Without high technology, officers would find it difficult to provide the level and quality of services the community deserves. Computer-aided dispatching, computers in patrol cars, automated fingerprint systems, and on-line offense-reporting systems are but a few examples of the pervasiveness of technology in agencies that practice community policing.

- *Will older officers resist community policing?*

Experience with both community-oriented *programs* and community policing as an operating *style* has shown that older officers are *more likely* to accept community policing than are younger officers. The maturation that comes with

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age plays a significant role in older officers' greater willingness to adopt the new policing style. Research has shown that younger officers tend to become police officers because they are looking for adventure. As officers grow older, they become less interested in action and more interested in providing services.

Conclusion

As an operating style, community policing evolves and exists in two phases. Phase I involves the implementation of community-oriented programs designed to improve the ability of the police to address problems such as crime, drugs, fear, and urban decay. These programs, however, are not intended to involve all members of the department or all members of the community. Phase I also is marked by a continuity in the organization's operating style and the systems that support it.

❝❝ Because community policing becomes the dominant service-delivery style, the corresponding support systems must change as well. ❞❞

Phase II involves significant changes in the police mission and the organization's operational and management philosophies. Because community policing becomes the dominant service-delivery style, the corresponding support systems must change as well.

The transition, however, is not instantaneous; rather, it is evolutionary. An institution that traditionally has delivered services on the basis of time-honored conventional wisdom cannot be expected to easily or quickly adopt a new method of operating.

The phase of community policing in which an agency finds itself should not be used as a criterion for evaluating the agency. Experience has shown, however, that implementing Phase II is easier if the agency has had experience with individual community-oriented programs.

Because community policing is relatively new as a style of policing, questions have been raised about its effectiveness. Any doubts, however, should be put to rest. Experience has shown that community policing as a dominant policing style is a better, more efficient, and more cost-effective means of using police resources. In the final analysis, community policing is emerging as the most appropriate means of using police resources to improve the quality of life in neighborhoods throughout the country.

Notes

1. Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley, *The New Blue Line: Police Innovations in Six American Cities*. New York, The Free Press, 1986: 4–5.

2. See for example. Lee P. Brown et al.. *Developing Neighborhood Oriented Policing in the Houston Police Department*. Arlington, Virginia. International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1988; and Timothy N. Oettmeier and William H. Bieck. *Developing a Policing Style for Neighborhood Oriented Policing:* Executive Session #1, The Houston Police Department. February 1987.

3. Herman Goldstein. "Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach," *Journal of Crime and Delinquency* 25 (April 1979): 236–258.

4. Timothy N. Oettmeier and William H. Bieck. *Integrating Investigative Operations Through Neighborhood Oriented Policing:* Executive Session #2. The Houston Police Department. January 1989.

5. Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley. *Community Policing: Issues and Practices Around the World*. Washington, D.C.. National Institute of Justice, May 1988: 67–70.

6. Ibid.: 70–73.

7. Ibid.: 81–87.

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How Local Governments Are Providing For Our Safety

Public safety is a crucial service that local governments provide for their citizens. Public safety services cover a wide range, from lifesaving emergency medical services to seemingly unimportant parking enforcement. These services are highly visible, and because they are funded by taxes, the public demands they be provided efficiently and effectively. Local government officials are continuously searching for the best methods to provide these services for their citizens.

To study the various ways that local government officials are providing public services, ICMA conducted the survey "Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches" in February and March of 1988. The results show that cities and counties are using a variety of innovative, cost-saving programs to meet the particular needs of their communities. Public safety is one of the service areas that is rapidly changing, in part because more efficient and manageable programs are being created.

Comprehensive Crime Prevention Programs

Although trained law enforcement officials are the core of any local government's crime prevention program, citizen awareness and involvement are important components of successful crime prevention programs.

Dover, Delaware. This city, with a population of 28,000, has a comprehensive program for crime prevention. Corp. Robin Case, who heads the city's crime prevention unit, implements the various community programs sponsored by the Dover Police Department. Dover has eight public high schools, three nursing homes, four colleges, the Dover Air Force Base, and countless civic and youth organizations. Due to the diversity of the Dover residents and the unit's strong commitment to crime prevention, the main focus of many of the programs is on personal safety. To achieve the personal safety goals that the police department has identified, numerous educational and victim assistance programs and neighborhood watch groups have been formed.

For the younger people in Dover, the crime prevention unit offers bicycle safety, pedestrian safety, buckleup, and drug and alcohol awareness programs. When the officers speak at these programs, they arrive in full police uniform, which helps reinforce in the childrens' minds that police officers are friendly and the ones to look to when children find themselves in a crisis situation.

In the Dover community there are 16 very active neighborhood watch groups. The crime prevention unit provides them with information on burglary prevention, home security measures, and occupant protection plans. City funds cover the expenses of neighborhood watch signs, and private donations from companies and businesses in the city meet the other expenses of running the programs. In addition to setting up and

administering the watch groups, the police publish a list of the crimes that are committed in the watch areas, to further heighten citizen crime awareness.

The most unusual tool that the crime prevention unit uses to communicate its crime prevention message is a five-foot computerized robot named Sgt. Safety. Corp. Case operates Sgt. Safety by remote control; she relays voice messages to children in malls and to the elderly in nursing homes. Often shopping malls are targeted as a place for Sgt. Safety to broadcast its message. Corp. Case hides and directs the robot by remote control toward the people she thinks should hear the city's crime prevention information. She often quizzes children on what to do when talking to strangers and tells them the importance of wearing seat belts. Sgt. Safety has also been known to race wheelchairs for fun at nursing homes, an application the city surely did not foresee.

Kansas City, Kansas. An extensive crime prevention program in Kansas City (Pop. 162,000) includes neighborhood watch programs, youth block watch, victim assistance programs, and community crime prevention packages that are given out to lower income residents and paid for by the city. With its own funds and contributions from the Department of Justice, Kansas City has $90,000 in its budget for this purpose. One of the special approaches taken by Kansas City is to provide security devices to low-income families that actively attend the neighborhood watch programs. The city has had great success with this method of getting neigh-

borhoods and families involved in crime prevention. The city also provides free safety lighting for dangerous areas that do not have adequate lighting such as alleys and the backs of houses. After residents apply for the free lighting for their homes and the community, the city evaluates the various needs. Approximately 40 to 50 lights are provided each year in unsafe areas as a result of this program.

Kansas City's Youth Block Watch is a program that educates children on the dangers of city living and shows them whom to look for when searching for safety. The police officers who run this program emphasize to the children that they notice many things that adults do not, and for this reason children can help the city by identifying suspicious persons and activities. Children in Kansas City are learning through the police department that they must take care of and look out for one another when going to and from school and at other times when they are not closely supervised.

On February 1, 1989, the city established a drug hotline in the police department enabling citizens to anonymously call in information about drug dealers and drug-related activities. Since the hotline was created, the city has received approximately 100 calls each week. The city emphasizes that this program alone cannot stop the flow of drugs into the community, but it can rattle the established drug markets by forcing the dealers to change locations, cutting into their profits, and discourag-

Figure 1 *Most frequently used alternative service delivery approaches for public safety functions*

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ing overall use. The program's intent has been to discourage the irate citizen's vigilante activity against drug dealers by providing a system to report drug users and dealers.

Largo, Florida. A unique crime prevention program called "business watch" has been implemented in Largo, Florida (Pop. 62,000). It is offered through the police department as an educational tool for local businesses in the war on crime. The program is funded and staffed by the city. Due to a small but efficient staff, the program has resulted in a high crime apprehension rate in participating shopping districts. The officers target malls and other high profile shopping areas that are good locations for different types of crime; then police provide the store employees with training to identify shoplifters, spot credit card fraud, and handle these situations when they have been identified. The philosophy of the training staff is to cover extensively one shopping area at a time.

Emergency Services

There are many types of emergencies that fall under the public safety domain: medical, criminal, and fire. Frequently an emergency comprises all of these elements, such as a fire in a crack house with the inhabitants suffering from burns. Consequently, some local governments involve several departments in providing emergency services.

Lincoln County, Oregon. A public-private agreement that greatly enhances the city's ability to respond to emergencies has been developed by Lincoln County, Oregon (Pop. 37,000) and the Pacific Power and Light Company. To assist law enforcement agencies in combatting crime, reporting medical and fire emergencies, and identifying suspicious persons, all radio-equipped vehicles from the county's public works department and the power company's numerous service vehicles report such activities to their respective dispatchers who then relay the messsage to the local police authorities. Gary Donnelly of Pacific Power says it is the "most successful public-private venture initiated in this area in the last 15 years." The

program has resulted in the police averaging two calls a day from "radio help," and it has increased cooperation between the police department and the local utility company and renewed citizen commitment to fighting crime.

Ashland, Kentucky. Recently Ashland (Pop. 27,000) implemented an automated emergency-alert system, called the Public Emergency Alert System. PEAS, as this system is known, electronically notifies key personnel in an emergency situation directing their initial movements to rapid response and recovery. The system alerts the news media, disaster and emergency service agencies, and off-duty public safety personnel. Only one employee is required to activate and monitor PEAS, and the alert system can cover several geographic areas. In addition to emergency situations, the system provides a crime alert to businesses and checks on the welfare of elderly and home-bound citizens who live alone. PEAS is expected to save the city thousands of dollars by streamlining emergency and crime alert procedures.

Wake County, North Carolina. In providing emergency medical services for its citizens, Wake County (Pop. 365,000) combines its own paid EMS staff with the nine volunteer rescue squads that exist throughout the county. Wake County provides a large subsidy for the rescue squads and helps maintain the highest level of expertise possible in the paramedic positions. To accomplish this, the county offers major assistance in training and developing the paramedics into highly skilled workers. In addition, the county funds and helps maintain half of the equipment needed by the volunteer squads.

Largo, Florida. Dedicated to providing the best, most inexpensive emergency medical services for its citizens, Largo, Florida (Pop. 62,000), decided that to continue its high caliber performance, it must look at alternatives to the traditional manner of providing these services. As a result, in 1985 the city decided to create Advanced Life Support Systems (ALS), which combines the city's paramedic and fire personnel into one force. Since the city was going to provide these services anyway, the

administrators felt that to minimize labor costs and to provide the best possible emergency medical service (EMS), they would include the paramedics with the firefighters on one piece of equipment. Typically there are five crew members on the ALS vehicles—three firefighters who are also emergency medical technicians and two paramedics who provide the technical life-saving assistance. Largo has five such vehicles, each capable of carrying up to six persons at a time. Phil Davis, administrative assistant for the police department, remarked that this system has created much more productive firefighters since they now respond to EMS calls as well. Of all the calls the ALS units respond to, 70% are EMS related. The public safety personnel are kept busy and productive. In addition to their responsibilities with the ALS vehicles, the firefighters of course respond to emergency fire situations.

Mesa, Arizona. In order to make better use of its resources, the Mesa (Pop. 152,000) fire department started serving its citizens with special emergency response vehicles. The program began in 1976 with the primary purpose of providing the community with highly visible multi-purpose fire patrol units. The patrol units carry out various duties, but the most frequent task is assisting motorists with disabled vehicles. Capt. Bruce Weimer, training officer in the Mesa fire department, said that one of the unit's goals is to stop stranded vehicles from becoming a hazard to other vehicles. To do this, the trucks carry five gallons of gas and some basic tools to assist stranded vehicles. The operators of these vehicles are not concerned with major repair jobs, only with providing enough assistance to get the vehicle off the streets and into a garage. When motorists need minor repairs or gasoline in order to get to a service station, the fire patrol units are right on the spot to assist.

In addition to standard vehicle service, the multi-purpose units' duties include rapid response to fire and medical emergencies, fire prevention inspections, inclement weather patrol, and many other public service programs. The community service vehicle program uses readily available departmental resources,

including five Chevy S-10 pickups that normally would be underused. Station personnel are used to staff these vehicles, but staffing at the station does not suffer because of these vehicles' emergency response capabilities. Many emergency scenes are reached more quickly by having the community service vehicles out on patrol.

Wake County, North Carolina. Mentioned earlier, this county provides fire services to its citizens through the use of twenty-one volunteer fire departments. The county has no paid firefighters. Each district provides operating funds for its fire department through local taxes and other methods. But to ensure that the firefighters are provided with proper and up-to-date training, the county offers each district the opportunity to attend numerous training sessions free of charge and provides the department with a small subsidy for operations. In doing so the county spends little on the actual programs yet is helping provide quality service for its citizens.

Marion County, West Virginia. Ambulance service needs have changed in the past 18 months for Marion County (Pop. 64,000). Recently the county's Cooperative Ambulance Service expanded its function to convalescent centers. The patients in private residences and in the convalescent centers throughout the county are transported in emergency situations through a cooperative effort between the regular county ambulance service and the centers. The county has arranged for special phone numbers for these individuals to call when assistance is needed from the paramedics who have training in aiding the elderly. These paramedics are the same volunteers who are a part of the county's regular EMS program.

Downey, California. Downey (Pop. 86,000) finances a second paramedic unit without using additional tax dollars. The city has an innovative way of providing this service by charging a fee for emergency transportation to the hospital. Residents can be billed after the service has been used or can pay an annual subscription fee of $14 per household. Over 14,000 households are now involved with this program, and it has

been a huge success. High school service clubs and other youth groups helped the city distribute information about the program. The revenue generated by the program pays for approximately 90% of the cost of the second paramedic unit.

Prisons

A great deal of media publicity is given to prison overcrowding. However, special programs that allow prisoners to go back into the community before their sentences have been served have also generated negative media attention. Some local governments have established successful prerelease programs that meet several goals.

Worcester County, Massachusetts. Like many other jurisdictions around the country, Worcester County (Pop. 661,000) is having difficulties with

prison overcrowding. To help relieve the stress of overcrowding, the county has developed the correctional opportunity advancement program, COAP. This is a prerelease program that is targeted to individuals who can pass the strict classification criteria, which include a stipulation that the crimes the individual committed were not violent or sexual crimes. When the individuals are chosen for this program, they are issued an electronic wrist band that enables a computer to track their movements and allows social workers assigned to their case to keep in constant contact. The COAP participant must create a daily itinerary and is allowed to work and have some mobility under strict program rules. There are 26 individuals participating in this program. They are not only expected to behave in an exemplary manner, but they must also pass drug and alcohol urine tests.

Table 1   SURVEY RESPONSE

Classification	No. of cities surveyed (A)	Cities reporting No.	Cities reporting %of (A)	No. of counties surveyed (B)	Counties reporting No.	Counties reporting %of (B)
Total, all cities and counties 3,259		1,311	40.2	1,611	370	22.9
Population group						
250,000 and over 59		27	45.8	167	54	32.3
50,000 - 249,999 417		203	48.7	612	177	28.9
10,000 - 49,999 2,239		893	39.9	744	118	15.9
Under 10,000 544		188	34.6	88	21	23.9
Geographic region¹						
Northeast 914		262	28.7	180	44	24.4
North Central 924		385	41.7	499	101	20.4
South 877		382	43.6	731	167	22.8
West 544		282	51.8	200	58	28.9
Metro status²						
Metro 2,372		945	39.8	644	187	29.0
Nonmetro.................................887		366	37.9	967	183	18.9

¹*Geographic regions: Northeast* - the New England and Mid-Atlantic Divisions, which include the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont; *North Central* - the East and West North Central Divisions, which include the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin; *South* - the South Atlantic and the East and West South Central Divisions, which include the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,

Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, plus the District of Columbia; *West* - the Mountain and Pacific Coast Divisions, which include the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
² *Metro status: Metro* - those cities and counties located within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA); *Nonmetro* - those cities and counties that are located outside of an MSA.

Parking Enforcement

Although parking enforcement is not an urgent priority when weighed against life-threatening public safety issues, parking regulation monitoring and enforcement may bring in welcome revenue for local governments.

West Valley City, Utah. In West Valley (Pop. 92,000) handicapped citizens often complained about people misusing handicapped parking zones at area shopping locations. Due to staffing shortages in the police department, enforcement in these shopping areas was often neglected. Previously citations could only be issued for violations on public property like municipal parking lots, but a strengthened state law allows citations to be written for violations of handicapped parking on private prop-

erty. The city decided to train handicapped persons who were enthusiastic about issuing parking citations on a volunteer basis. Officer Dan Campion says there are 22 participants in the program, and they write about 500 tickets a year generating $22,500 for the city. The participants patrol, write citations, and attend quarterly training meetings. They also coordinate with service organizations to encourage more handicapped parking zones where they are needed.

Summary

It is evident from the cases described that local governments are creating more efficient and cost-effective public safety programs. In this effort, public officials

are experimenting and involving citizens who depend on these services— together public employees and citizens are putting safety first.

Appendix: Methodology

The "Profile of The Alternative Service Delivery Approaches—1988" survey instrument was mailed to all municipalities 10,000 and over in population. A random sample of every eighth municipality was selected from those municipalities under 10,000 in population. All counties over 25,000 in population received the survey instrument and a random sample of every eighth county was selected from those counties under 25,000 in population. Table 1 shows the survey response rate.

Table 2   LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY APPROACHES—PUBLIC SAFETY

Survey respondents are included in the table only if the particular data shown in the table are applicable to the responding municipality or county. Those jurisdictions that deliver all services by local government employees are not listed. The term municipality refers to cities, towns, boroughs, villages, and townships.

Population estimate: The population estimates are based on 1986 figures reported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census for municipalities and 1985 figures for counties. The amounts are reflected in thousands.

FTEs: The actual number of full-time equivalent personnel is shown in this column. This number was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and reflects 1986 data.

Total general expenditures: The amount, which is reflected in $ millions, comprises all expenditures of the local government, excluding utility, liquor stores, intergovernmental payments, and insurance trust expenditures.

Key

m Municipality
c County
E Service delivered entirely by local government employees
g Contact with another local government for service delivery—intergovernmental agreements
p Private firm
f Franchise
s Subsidy
v Voucher
l Volunteer
h Self-help
i Incentive
.. Service not provided or data not available

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
ALABAMA													
AUBURN .... m	30	291	11	h	E	E	E	..	E	..	E	E	E
BIRMINGHAM .... m	278	3,460	218	l	E	..	p	..	..	p	..	p	p
CULLMAN .... m	13	227	12	p,l	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
EUFAULA .... m	13	117	4	E	E	E	l	l	E	..	E	E	E
FAIRFIELD .... m	13	103	9	E	E	E	p	..	E	p	E	..	..
HUNTSVILLE .... m	163	3,486	172	g,l	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	E	p
MADISON c	234	626	29	l	E	E	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
OXFORD .... m	11	99	5	..	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
PRATTVILLE .... m	21	..	..	s,l	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	E	E
VESTAVIA HILLS .... m	16	..	..	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	g	E	E
ALASKA													
MATANUSKA SUSITNA c	39	842	108	..	g	l	l	l	..	..	..	E	E
ARIZONA													
APACHE c	59	223	29	E	E	E	g	g	..	..	E	E	E
COCHISE c	92	627	37	E	E	..	g	g	E	..	E	p	E
GLENDALE .... m	114	985	68	s	g	E	E	..	..	..	..	p	E
LAKE HAVASU CITY .... m	18	198	11	p	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	..	..
MARICOPA c	1,885	8,511	636	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	E	p
PEORIA .... m	17	..	..	E	g	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	E
PHOENIX .... m	853	9,230	794	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	p
PIMA c	594	4,423	388	p	E	..	E	p	E	p	E	g,p,i	p
PINAL c	99	1,106	50	..	g,p,l	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
PRESCOTT .... m	22	317	12	h	E	E	E	..	E	..	g	p	E
SCOTTSDALE .... m	99	970	124	E	p	p	p	p	E	..	..	E	p

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
ARIZONA (CONTINUED)													
TUCSON.................m	359	4,447	291	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	p	p
YUMA...................m	47	474	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	g	E	..
ARKANSAS													
CAMDEN.................m	17	150	5	p	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
FAYETTEVILLE...........m	40	336	22	l	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	p	E
HOPE...................m	10	106	3	h	E	E	p,f,s	p,f,s	E	p	..	g,i	..
JACKSONVILLE...........m	30	434	17	l	l	l	E	f	E	p,f	E	E	E
MILLER.................c	39	..	..	E	l	l	l	g	..	..	g	..	..
OSCEOLA................m	9	115	4	l	l	l	g,l	g,l	v	..	..	E	E
PULASKI................c	356	778	59	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
SHERWOOD...............m	15	93	3	E	E	..	..	..	E	..	g	p	E
CALIFORNIA													
ADELANTO...............m	4	..	..	E	E	E	E	f	E	E	..	E	E
AGOURA HILLS...........m	17	13	6	h	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
ALAMEDA................c	1,209	9,108	688	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	E	p
ANAHEIM................m	241	2,092	175	l	g	E	E	p	E	p	g	E	E
ARCADIA................m	48	313	25	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	..
ARCATA.................m	14	88	8	E	E	..	..	p	E	p	..	E	E
ARTESIA................m	15	..	..	g	g	g	g	..	g	..	..	p	g,i
ATWATER................m	20	79	5	l	E	g,l	..	..	E	E	..	p	E
BELL GARDENS...........m	37	89	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	E
BELLFLOWER.............m	59	100	12	g	g	g	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
BELMONT................m	25	120	8	l	l	..	..	..	l	..	..	E	E
BERKELEY...............m	104	1,498	91	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	E	E	E
BEVERLY HILLS..........m	34	708	85	l,h	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	p	p
BRENTWOOD..............m	6	..	..	E	g	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
BUENA PARK.............m	66	381	31	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	E
BURBANK................m	89	1,064	93	l,h	g	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
BUTTE..................c	167	1,551	105	E	E	g	g	g	..	..	E	E	..
CAMPBELL...............m	34	174	12	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	..
CARPINTERIA............m	12	..	..	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
CARSON.................m	88	356	42	g	..	..	..	..	p	..	..	E	E
CERES..................m	18	70	5	l,h	g	l	p,l	..	E	..	..	l	E
CHINO..................m	51	208	18	E	..	..	g	..	E	..	..	E	E
CHULA VISTA............m	119	480	36	E	E	E	f	f	E	p	..	E	E
CLAREMONT..............m	35	155	12	E	E	..	..	..	E	..	..	p	..
CLOVIS.................m	41	249	15	E	E	E	p	..	E	f	..	p	E
COLTON.................m	29	252	23	l,h	g	E	E	..	E	p	g	E	..
COLUSA.................m	5	..	..	E	g	E	..	..	E	p	g	E	E
CORONADO...............m	21	..	..	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	p	p

Table 2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY APPROACHES—PUBLIC SAFETY
continued

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
CALIFORNIA (CONTINUED)													
CULVER CITY...........m	40	532	53	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
DALY CITY.............m	83	448	30	h	E	E	g	..	E	p	..	p	..
DAVIS.................m	41	278	..	..	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	E
DINUBA................m	11	66	5	l,h	E	E	l	p,l	E	p	..	E	E
DOWNEY................m	85	434	33	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	p	..
DUARTE................m	21	44	14	g,l	g	g	g,p,l	p	g	p	g	E	E
DUBLIN................m	19	..	..	g	g	..	..	..	g	p	..	p	p
EL CENTRO.............m	28	565	33	l,h	..	E	p	..	..	..	..	E	E
EL CERRITO............m	23	109	8	l,h	..	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	..
EL MONTE..............m	97	386	26	E	E	E	f	f	E	p	..	E	..
EL PASO DE ROBLES.....m	14	92	7	E	E	l	..	..	E	f	..	E	E
EL SEGUNDO............m	15	..	..	l,h	g	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	E
ESCONDIDO.............m	84	511	38	E	E	E	E	f	..	s	..	E	..
EUREKA................m	25	229	17	l,h	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	E	E
FAIRFIELD.............m	69	350	43	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
FOLSOM................m	18	110	9	l	E	l	E	E	l	l	..	E	p
FONTANA...............m	55	244	20	l	g	g	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
FORT BRAGG............m	6	47	3	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	E	..
FREMONT...............m	154	637	160	E	E	E	f	..	E	..	..	p	E
FULLERTON.............m	109	718	49	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	E	..	p
GARDEN GROVE..........m	135	622	45	E	g	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	..
GARDENA...............m	49	375	..	E	g	E	E	E	E	f	g	E	E
GLENDALE..............m	154	1,414	82	l	E	E	p	p	E	p	g	p	p
GLENDORA..............m	41	190	15	h	E	..	..	..	E	..	g	p	..
HAWTHORNE.............m	61	331	31	E	g	E	..	p	E	p	..	E	..
IMPERIAL..............c	107	1,121	68	E	E	E	p	..	..	..	E	E	E
INGLEWOOD.............m	103	790	76	E	E	E	E	..	E	E	E	p	E
IRVINE................m	88	583	54	E	g	g	g	p	E	p	..	p	E
LA HABRA..............m	48	265	20	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	g	E	..
LA PUENTE.............m	34	32	5	g	g	..	..	..	g	..	..	p	..
LAFAYETTE.............m	23	..	..	g	g	..	..	..	E	..	..	..	..
LANCASTER.............m	64	71	34	g	..	..	..	..	g	..	..	E	..
LARKSPUR..............m	11	44	5	E	E	E	g	g,p	E	p	..	p	E
LAWNDALE..............m	26	66	..	g,p	g	g	g	p	g	g	..	E	g,p,i
LEMON GROVE...........m	22	..	..	g	g	E	E	p	g	..	..	E	..
LEMOORE...............m	12	55	4	..	g	l	l	..	..	..	g	E	E
LODI..................m	44	321	20	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	f	..
LOMITA................m	20	..	..	g	g	g	g	g	E	p	..	E	..
LONG BEACH............m	396	4,795	452	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E
LOS ALAMITOS..........m	12	57	..	E	E	g	g	g	E	..	..	p	E
LOS GATOS.............m	28	172	22	E	E	..	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
MADERA................m	26	171	8	E	E	E	..	p	E	p	..	E	E
MANHATTAN BEACH.......m	35	222	18	p	..	E	p	p	E	p,f	g	p	E
MODESTO...............m	133	881	76	E	..	..	..	..	E	..	..	p	E

CALIFORNIA (CONTINUED)

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
MONTEREY ...m	30	277	24	E	..	E	..	..	E	..	g	g,i	..
MOORPARK ...m	16	11	..	g	..	..	..	..	g	..	..	p	..
MORGAN HILL ...m	21	97	10	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	E
NAPA ...C	105	981	59	..	..	g,l	g,p,l	p,s	g	..	E	E	..
NEVADA ...C	71	688	43	g	g	g	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
NEWARK ...m	37	167	17	p	E	E	g,p	g,p	E	p	..	p	..
NORWALK ...m	90	242	19	g	g	g	g	g	g	..	..	E	E
NOVATO ...m	46	149	9	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
OCEANSIDE ...m	99	643	57	h	E	E	E	E	E	f	..	p	E
ONTARIO ...m	114	677	53	E	E	E	..	p	E	p	..	E	..
ORANGE ...m	101	627	39	l	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	..
ORINDA ...m	17	..	..	l,h	..	..	..	..	E	p	..	p	..
OXNARD ...m	127	919	73	l	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	E
PACIFICA ...m	37	184	12	E	E	E	E	p,f	E	..	..	E	p
PALM SPRINGS ...m	31	494	44	h	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	..
PALMDALE ...m	27	78	25	g,l	g	g	..	..	g	g	..	E	..
PALO ALTO ...m	56	973	66	l	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	p	p
PARADISE ...m	25	90	5	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	E
PARAMOUNT ...m	43	123	22	g	..	..	..	..	g	g	..	p	E
PETALUMA ...m	39	218	19	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	..
PISMO BEACH ...m	7	49	4	E	E	E	p	..	E	p	..	p	E
PLACENTIA ...m	38	140	10	E	g	..	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
PLACER ...C	143	1,485	93	E	E	g	p	p	E	p	E	p	p
PLEASANT HILL ...m	28	111	12	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
PORTERVILLE ...m	24	169	10	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	E
POWAY ...m	38	176	12	g	g	E	p	p	g	..	..	p	g,i
RANCHO CUCAMONGA ...m	76	120	28	g	g	..	..	..	g	..	..	p	..
RANCHO MIRAGE ...m	8	38	..	g	g	g	g	g	g	p	..	p	p
RANCHO PALOS VERDES ...m	47	35	..	..	..	..	..	..	g	p	..	p	..
REDDING ...m	51	509	28	E	E	E	p	..	E	p	..	p	E
REEDLEY ...m	14	68	4	l	E	g	..	..	E	p	g	E	p
RIALTO ...m	54	245	20	E	g	E	E	p	E	..	..	p	E
ROLLING HILLS ESTATES ...m	8	..	..	g	g	g	..	..	g	g	..	p	g,i
ROSEMEAD ...m	48	44	9	g	g	g	g	g	..	..	..	p	..
ROSEVILLE ...m	30	356	19	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	E	f	f
SALINAS ...m	97	577	40	E	..	E	p,f	p,f	E	..	..	E	E
SAN BUENAVENTURA ...m	83	564	46	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	g	p	p
SAN CLEMENTE ...m	33	239	16	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	..	..
SAN DIEGO ...m	1,015	7,963	584	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	p
SAN FERNANDO ...m	20	..	..	E	E	g	g	..	E	p	g	E	E
SAN GABRIEL ...m	33	155	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
SAN JOSE ...m	712	4,453	478	E	g	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	p
SAN MARINO ...m	14	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	E
SAN MATEO ...m	81	595	48	E	E	E	p,f	..	E	..	..	p	p

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
CALIFORNIA (CONTINUED)													
SAN PABLO..............m	22	106	21	l	g	..	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
SANGER.................m	14	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	..
SANTA MONICA...........m	93	1,346	81	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	E	E	E
SARATOGA...............m	30	55	6	g	g	..	..	..	g	g	..	p	..
SEAL BEACH.............m	27	128	11	F	E	g	g,p,f	g,p	E	p,f	E	p	E
SEASIDE................m	37	138	8	E	g	E	..	E	E	p	E	p	E
SOUTH LAKE TAHOE.......m	21	239	15	l	E	E	g,p	p	g	p	..	E	..
SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO....m	52	395	34	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	..	E	E
STOCKTON...............m	183	1,372	92	E	E	E	E	..	g	p	..	p	E
SUISUN CITY............m	17	63	3	E	g	l	l	..	E	..	..	..	..
SUTTER.................c	59	699	43	l	..	l	l	..	..	p	E	E	..
TEHAMA.................c	45	594	36	l,h	g	g	g,p,s	p,s	E	p	E	E	E
THOUSAND OAKS..........m	93	363	33	g	g	..	..	..	g	g,p	..	p	p
TULARE.................c	287	2,693	218	h	g	g,l	..	g,p	E	p	E	p	E
UNION CITY.............m	51	172	15	E	E	E	g,p	..	E	p	..	p	..
UPLAND.................m	57	299	25	l	g	E	p,i	..	E	p,i	..	E	E
VISTA..................m	48	186	19	g	g	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
WALNUT.................m	21	..	..	g	g	g	..	..	g	..	..	E	..
WASCO..................m	12	..	..	g,l	..	..	..	..	g	..	..	p,v	..
WHITTIER...............m	73	379	25	v,l	E	..	..	..	E	..	g	p	..
WOODLAND...............m	34	209	..	E	g	E	p	..	E	p	..	p	..
COLORADO													
ADAMS..................c	278	1,285	..	p,l	g	..	..	..	..	..	p	..	p
BOULDER................m	76	852	58	E	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	p	E
CHAFFEE................c	13	..	..	E	E	..	..	..	..	p	E	E	E
COLORADO SPRINGS.......m	273	4,424	155	p,l	E	E	p	..	l	..	..	p	..
DENVER.................m	505	11,232	711	l,h	E	E	E	p	E	p,f	E	p	p
DOUGLAS................c	39	267	..	E	g	..	..	..	g	p	g	p	E
DURANGO................m	13	..	..	E	g	E	E	..	E	..	g	p	E
ENGLEWOOD..............m	31	465	39	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	g	E	p
ESTES PARK.............m	3	76	..	E	E	v	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
FORT COLLINS...........m	74	924	69	E	E	..	..	..	..	f	..	p,s	p
GARFIELD...............c	27	220	..	E	E	g,p	..	..	g	..	E	p	E
GLENWOOD SPRINGS.......m	5	104	..	E	..	v	v	v	E	p	..	E	..
JEFFERSON..............c	427	1,631	132	E	E	..	..	..	E	..	E	p	E
LAFAYETTE..............m	12	84	..	E	..	..	..	..	E	..	..	p	..
LITTLETON..............m	32	322	24	g	E	E	E	f	E	..	..	..	E
LONGMONT...............m	49	488	41	E	E	E	p	p	E	..	E	E	..
NORTHGLENN.............m	30	208	..	f	g	..	..	..	E	p	g	E	f
PUEBLO.................m	101	874	..	E	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	E	..
TELLER.................c	12	102	..	E	E	l	..	..	E	..	E	E	E
THORNTON...............m	46	405	..	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	p	E

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
COLORADO (CONTINUED)													
WESTMINSTER............m	67	493	..	l,h	E	l	p,l	p	E	p	E	p	E
YUMA..................m	3	35	2	..	E	l	g	g	..	..	..	p	..
CONNECTICUT													
AVON..................m	13	380	16	l,h	E	s,l	E	f	E	p	..	p,l	..
BERLIN................m	16	397	19	E	E	l	p,l	..	E	p	..	E	E
BLOOMFIELD............m	20	617	23	l	l	..	l	l	E	p	..	E	E
CHESHIRE..............m	24	578	27	h	E	l	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
DARIEN................m	18	530	27	p,l	E	l	..	..	E	p	..	p	p
EAST HARTFORD.........m	49	1,393	51	E	E	E	l	..	E	p	g	E	p
ENFIELD...............m	43	1,109	39	E	E	g,l	E	E	E	p	g	p	..
GLASTONBURY...........m	26	948	27	E	E	s,l	p	s,l	E	p	..	E	..
HAMDEN................m	52	1,254	55	E	E	l	p	..	E	p	..	E	E
MADISON...............m	16	403	16	E	E	..	p,s	..	E	..	..	p	..
MANCHESTER............m	50	1,382	50	E	E	l	E	p	E	p	..	E	E
MANSFIELD.............m	20	222	14	..	g,s	g,s	g,s	g,s	g	..	..	E	..
NEW BRITAIN...........m	72	1,635	77	l	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
NEW HAVEN.............m	123	4,177	228	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	..
NEWTOWN...............m	21	534	20	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	..	E	E
NORTH HAVEN...........m	22	653	29	E	p	l	l	p	E	p	..	p	..
NORWALK...............m	77	2,021	101	..	E	E	..	..	p	p	..	..	p
PLAINVILLE............m	17	373	15	..	E	l	..	..	E	p	E	..	..
PRESTON...............m	5	87	3	l	p	l	l	l	..	p	..	p	..
ROCKY HILL............m	16	346	17	E	E	l	p,l	p,l	E	p	E	p	E
TOLLAND...............m	11	287	10	g	g	E	l	..	..	..	..	E	..
WATERTOWN.............m	20	513	20	E	E	E	g	..	E	..	..	p	E
WEST HARTFORD.........m	58	1,618	79	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	p	..
WETHERSFIELD..........m	26	604	25	E	E	l	p,l	p,l	E	p	..	E	E
WILLINGTON............m	5	90	4	..	l	l	v	v	..	..	..	E	..
WINDSOR...............m	26	717	28	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	..	E	E
DELAWARE													
DOVER.................m	23	318	9	p,l	E	p,v	E	..	E	..	..	E	E
KENT..................C	105	197	12	..	g	g,s,l	g,l	g,p,s,l	..	..	..	p	E
NEWARK................m	24	228	9	g	g	..	..	..	g	..	E	p	..
SUSSEX................C	110	226	13	..	g	..	..	..	..	..	..	E	E
WILMINGTON............m	70	1,362	84	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	g	p	..
FLORIDA													
ALTAMONTE SPRINGS.....m	29	343	..	l	E	..	..	p,f	E	..	..	p	..
BOCA RATON............m	59	886	..	E	E	E	E	..	E	f	..	p	p

FLORIDA (CONTINUED)

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
BROWARD...............C	1,142	6,517	526	E	E	l	p,s	..	E	..	E	E	p
CASSELBERRY...........m	19	166	..	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	p	E
CLEARWATER............m	98	1,371	69	E	g	E	E	..	E	f	..	E	..
COCOA.................m	19	250	..	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	h
COCOA BEACH...........m	12	173	..	E	E	E	g	..	E	..	..	E	E
COLLIER...............C	121	1,227	64	E	E	g	E	E	E	p	E	E	..
COOPER CITY...........m	16	..	..	E	g	E	..	..	g	f	..	E	E
DAYTONA BEACH.........m	58	808	33	E	E	E	E	..	E	f	..	E	E
DE LAND...............m	18	234	7	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	E
GREENACRES CITY.......m	24	..	..	E	E	E	..	p	E	p	g	E	E
GULF BREEZE...........m	6	..	..	E	g,l	l	l	..	E	p	..	p	p
GULFPORT..............m	12	127	..	E	E	l	E	..	E	..	..	E	E
HALLANDALE............m	37	436	20	v	g	E	E	E	E	p,f	..	E	p
HERNANDO..............C	78	212	36	E	E	E	p	p	..	p	p	p	E
HILLSBOROUGH..........C	776	8,744	562	l,h	g	s,v	g,p	g,p	g,l	g,p	g	p	p
HOMESTEAD.............m	22	638	..	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	l	..
INDIAN RIVER..........C	81	527	27	h	E	g	g,l	g,p,l	E	p	E	E	E
JACKSONVILLE..........m	610	..	434	g	g,p	E	E	E	g	E	g,p	E	E
JACKSONVILLE BEACH....m	19	284	..	l	..	E	g	g	..	p,f	..	p	E
KEY WEST..............m	25	316	16	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
KISSIMMEE.............m	26	499	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	E	p
LAK...................C	133	588	23	E	E	E	p,s	p,s	E	p	E	p	E
LAKE WORTH............m	27	520	17	E	E	E	p	p	E	..	..	E	E
LARGO.................m	62	581	29	g,p,l,h	g	g,p,h	g,f	..	E	f	..	E	E
LAUDERHILL............m	43	267	..	g	E	E	p	p	g	p	..	E	p
LEESBURG..............m	14	288	..	p,h	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	..
LEON..................C	173	678	38	E	g	g	..	..	E	p	E	E	..
MARION................C	171	627	37	E	E	l	g	g	..	..	E	E	E
MIAMI BEACH...........m	95	1,443	102	E	E	E	E	..	E	f	..	p	E
MONROE................C	73	574	39	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	E	E	E
NASSAU................C	42	269	..	..	E	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	E
NORTH LAUDERDALE......m	23	158	..	E	g	E	g	g	E	f	..	E	..
NORTH MIAMI...........m	43	448	..	g,l	g	..	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
NORTH PALM BEACH......m	12	..	..	l	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	..
OCOEE.................m	12	100	..	l	E	..	g	g	..	..	g	E	E
OKALOOSA..............C	141	618	..	l	g	..	E	E	g	..	l	p	E
OPA-LOCKA.............m	15	142	..	l,h	g	..	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
PALATKA...............m	10	..	..	E	E	E	g	g	E	..	..	E	..
PALM BAY..............m	46	281	10	E	E	E	g,p	..	E	..	..	E	E
PALM BEACH............m	11	349	..	l,h	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	E
PANAMA CITY...........m	36	449	19	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	..
PARKLAND..............m	1	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
PINELLAS..............C	815	3,805	424	E	E	..	p	p	E	p	E	p	p
PINELLAS PARK.........m	41	360	..	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	..

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
FLORIDA (CONTINUED)													
POLK.................C	377	2,749	134	g,h	g	g,h	E	..	..	..	E	E	E
PORT ORANGE...........m	30	284	10	E	E	E	g	..	E	p	..	p	E
PORT ST. LUCIE........m	35	143	5	E	g	..	..	..	E	p	..	..	E
RIVIERA BEACH.........m	28	372	..	h	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	..
ST. AUGUSTINE.........m	12	233	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
ST. JOHNS.............C	73	492	29	l	E	l	E	E	E	..	E	E	E
ST. PETERSBURG........m	239	2,791	127	p	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	p	p
SANFORD...............m	30	302	12	E	E	E	p	..	E	p	..	E	E
SARASOTA..............C	248	1,348	75	E	g	g,l	g,l	g,l	E	..	g	p	g,i
SUNRISE...............m	53	544	32	E	E	E	E	E	E	p,f	..	E	E
TAMPA.................m	278	3,870	265	h	E	E	p	p	E	p	g	p	p
TEMPLE TERRACE........m	12	160	..	h	E	l	g	g,f	E	p	g	E	E
VENICE................m	14	205	10	..	E	..	..	..	E	E	g	g,i	g,i
VERO BEACH............m	18	473	..	E	E	g	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
WILTON MANORS.........m	12	72	..	E	g	E	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
GEORGIA													
ALBANY................m	85	1,162	33	E	E	E	g	g	..	..	..	g,i	E
AMERICUS..............m	16	182	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	g,i	..
CARROLL...............C	65	172	..	E	E	l	f	f	..	..	E	E	E
CLAYTON...............C	171	1,081	58	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	E	E
COLQUITT..............C	37	109	..	l	l	..	g	g	E	..	E	E	E
FAYETTE...............C	47	190	..	l,h	E	l	l	..	E	p	E	E	E
FOREST PARK...........m	18	218	6	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	E
FORSYTH...............C	38	140	..	..	E	E	p	p	..	..	E	E	..
FULTON................C	623	3,892	309	p,l	E	E	g,p	g,p	..	..	p	E	p
GARDEN CITY...........m	9	45	..	E	g	l	l	l	E	f	E	E	p
GORDON................C	33	137	..	E	E	E	p	p	..	..	E	..	p
HINESVILLE............m	16	154	4	l,h	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
LA GRANGE.............m	27	378	45	E	E	E	p	p	E	..	E	p	..
LIBERTY...............C	42	160	..	..	E	g	E	..	..	..	E	p	E
LOWNDES...............C	74	252	14	E	E	l	s	..	..	p	E	E	p
PERRY.................m	11	..	..	E	E	E	g	..	E	..	g	E	..
ROME..................m	31	576	16	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	g,s	E	..
SAVANNAH..............m	147	1,729	80	E	E	p	..	..	g	..	g	p	p
TERRELL...............C	12	..	..	E	g	g,l	g	g	..	..	E	E	..
THOMAS................C	38	..	..	..	g,l	..	E	E	..	..	E	E	E
WILKES................C	11	..	..	E	g	l	g	g	..	p	E	E	E
IDAHO													
BANNOCK C	68	627	32	E	E	..	..	s	E	..	E	E	E
BOISE CITY............m	108	727	49	l	..	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	E

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/ suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/ parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
IDAHO (CONTINUED)													
COEUR D'ALENE..........m	25	173	10	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
POCATELLO..............m	44	380	15	E	E	E	g	g	E	..	..	p	..
TWIN FALLS.............m	28	168	8	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	p	..
ILLINOIS													
ADDISON................m	31	190	12	E	g	..	..	..	E	p	g	p	E
ARCOLA.................m	3	..	..	E	..	..	..	f	E	..	..	E	E
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS......m	70	457	25	E	g	E	E	E	E	..	E	E	E
BARTLETT...............m	16	63	5	E	p	..	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
BLOOMINGDALE...........m	13	91	6	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
BUFFALO GROVE..........m	27	138	..	E	g	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
CHAMPAIGN..............c	171	562	22	E	g	..	..	..	..	..	E	..	..
CRYSTAL LAKE...........m	20	139	13	E	E	v	v	v	E	..	..	E	..
DEERFIELD..............m	17	116	5	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	g,i	..
DOWNERS GROVE..........m	42	283	21	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
ELGIN..................m	72	442	25	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
ELK GROVE VILLAGE......m	32	310	..	g	g	g	p	E	E	p	E	p	E
ELMHURST...............m	44	297	19	l	..	E	p	p	E	p	..	p	p
EUREKA.................m	4	17	..	E	g	..	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
FULTON.................m	4	..	..	E	g	..	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
GLENWOOD...............m	10	..	..	E	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	E	E
HAZEL CREST............m	14	..	..	E	E	l	E	l	l	p	..	p,l	E
HOMEWOOD...............m	19	..	..	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	..	p	..
JACKSONVILLE...........m	20	178	7	p	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
JOLIET.................m	76	598	50	h	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
KANKAKEE...............c	98	264	9	E	g	..	..	..	l	..	E	p	E
LA GRANGE PARK.........m	13	..	..	l	E	l	g,p	g,p	E	..	..	E	E
LIBERTYVILLE...........m	17	106	8	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	..
LINCOLN................m	15	..	..	E	E	E	p	..	E	p	..	p	E
LINCOLNSHIRE...........m	5	35	..	h	g	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	h
LOMBARD................m	38	224	18	E	g	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	..
MOLINE.................m	45	905	46	l	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	E
MORTON GROVE...........m	23	185	12	l	g	g	E	E	E	f	E	p	E
MOUNT MORRIS...........m	3	..	..	E	E	..	..	l	..	..	..	E	..
MOUNT PROSPECT.........m	53	289	22	E	g	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	E
MOUNT VERNON...........m	17	155	9	l,h	E	..	E	..	E	..	..	E	..
NORTHBROOK.............m	32	247	20	E	g	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	p
O'FALLON...............m	15	56	3	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	g	E	E
OAK FOREST.............m	27	92	5	g	E	E	E	E	E	p,f	..	E	p
ORLAND PARK............m	26	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	p
PALATINE...............m	32	206	18	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E
PARK RIDGE.............m	38	235	14	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
PEORIA.................m	117	910	65	E	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	E	E

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
ILLINOIS (CONTINUED)													
PEORIA ...C	183	720	36	E	g	..	..	..	..	p	E	g,i	g,i
PLAINFIELD ...m	4	30	..	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	..
QUINCY ...m	40	402	19	p,l	E	E	p	..	l	p	..	g,i	E
RANDOLPH ...C	35	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	..	..	E	..	..
RANTOUL ...m	21	101	10	E	E	E	E	E	E	f	E	E	E
RIVER FOREST ...m	12	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	E
RIVERWOODS ...m	3	1	..	g	g	g	g	..	g	..	..	p	g,i
ROCK ISLAND ...m	45	462	31	l	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
ROCKFORD ...m	136	1,044	69	l	g	E	E	..	l	p	..	p	E
ROLLING MEADOWS ...m	22	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
ROUND LAKE BEACH ...m	14	69	2	E	g	..	..	..	E	g,P	E	E	E
ST. CHARLES ...m	18	163	8	l	g	E	E	g	E	..	..	..	..
SCHAUMBURG ...m	60	414	20	E	E	E	E	E	E	p,f	E	E	E
SKOKIE ...m	60	518	28	..	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	..
STEPHENSON ...C	49	223	8	E	g,l	g,l	l	l	..	p	E	E	E
STONE PARK ...m	4	..	..	E	g	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	E
STREAMWOOD ...m	25	..	..	E	E	..	E	E	E	p	g	p	p
TAYLORVILLE ...m	11	106	4	..	l	..	l	..	E	p	g	E	E
TINLEY PARK ...m	28	94	7	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	p	..	..
VERNON HILLS ...m	12	..	..	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	p
WEST CHICAGO ...m	13	80	14	E	g	..	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
WESTCHESTER ...m	17	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
WHEATON ...m	46	226	14	E	g	E	p	p	E	..	..	p	p
WILMETTE ...m	27	220	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	..
WINNETKA ...m	13	170	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	E
WOOD DALE ...m	11	67	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	..
WOODRIDGE ...m	24	109	12	E	E	..	..	..	E	..	..	g,i	..
INDIANA													
BEDFORD ...m	14	172	5	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
BLOOMINGTON ...m	53	513	20	l	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
CRAWFORDSVILLE ...m	14	201	6	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	E
ELKHART ...C	146	691	45	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
EVANSVILLE ...m	129	1,180	56	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	..	..
FRANKFORT ...m	15	200	6	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	g,i	E
HAMILTON ...C	94	616	32	g,p	g	..	g,P	g,P	g	..	E	..	E
HENRY ...C	50	704	24	E	E	..	g	g	..	..	E	..	..
HOBART ...m	22	149	7	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..
LOGANSPORT ...m	17	260	..	E	E	E	g	..	E	p	..	E	E
MARION ...m	36	302	12	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	g	p	E
MISHAWAKA ...m	41	426	13	..	E	E	E	E	l	p	g	E	..
MUNSTER ...m	173	113	8	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	..
NOBLESVILLE ...m	15	95	4	l	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	..	..

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
INDIANA (CONTINUED)													
TIPPECANOE............C	124	410	18	E	E	..	..	s	..	..	E	p,l	E
IOWA													
ANKENY................m	17	91	9	E	E	l	l	l	E	p	..	p	..
AUDUBON...............m	3	..	..	E	g	l	l	..	E	..	..	p	..
BOONE.................m	12	..	..	h	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	..
BREMER................C	24	..	..	E	E	s	s	s	E	..	E	E	E
BURLINGTON............m	28	247	14	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E
CLINTON...............m	30	217	15	E	g	g	E	E	E	..	..	p	..
DAVENPORT.............m	99	905	64	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
DUBUQUE...............C	91	375	20	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E	E	..
FORT MADISON..........m	12	135	8	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	E	E
IOWA CITY.............m	50	472	27	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
KNOXVILLE.............m	8	52	..	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	..	..	..
MARION................m	21	106	..	l,h	E	l	p	p	E	p	..	g,p,i	E
MARSHALL..............C	41	234	12	E	E	..	p	p	..	..	E	..	..
MARSHALLTOWN..........m	26	213	13	E	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	E	E
MUSCATINE.............m	24	487	18	p	E	E	..	..	E	p	g	p	p
OSKALOOSA.............m	11	100	15	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E
POTTAWATTAMIE.........C	88	265	17	l	l	..	..	g	g	..	E	..	..
RED OAK...............m	6	48	6	E	g	l	E	E	E	..	..	..	..
SCOTT.................C	157	442	27	E	E	..	..	p,f,l	E	p	E	p	E
SHELDON...............m	5	31	2	E	E	v	v	v	E	..	..	E	E
SIOUX CITY............m	80	767	56	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	E
STORM LAKE............m	9	..	..	E	g	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	p
URBANDALE.............m	20	102	6	E	E	E	p	E	E	p	E	g,i	E
WAVERLY...............m	8	..	..	E	g	l	l	g	E	p	..	..	..
KANSAS													
ATCHISON..............m	11	109	6	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	i	E	E
BUTLER................C	48	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	g,i	..
DODGE CITY............m	20	152	10	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
FAIRWAY...............m	5	..	..	h	g	..	..	..	..	p	..	p	..
GARDEN CITY...........m	23	209	27	p	E	E	..	..	..	p	..	h	p
GREAT BEND............m	17	162	9	l	E	l	E	E	E	p	..	E	..
HESSTON...............m	3	..	..	E	g	l	l	l	E	p	..	p	..
JOHNSON...............C	318	1,389	75	g	g	g	g	g	..	p	E	E	E
JUNCTION CITY.........m	20	227	8	p,v	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	p	E
KANSAS CITY...........m	162	1,940	164	s,l,h	E	E	E	..	p	p	g	E	E
LABETTE...............C	25	366	24	E	E	l	l	p,s	..	..	E	..	..
LAWRENCE..............m	56	781	42	g	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	..
LIBERAL...............m	17	138	8	l,h	E	l	E	..	E	p	g	E	E

Table 2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY APPROACHES—PUBLIC SAFETY
continued

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
KANSAS (CONTINUED)													
MC PHERSON.............m	12	150	17	E	E	E	g	g	E	..	..	E	..
MC PHERSON.............C	28	122	9	E	E	g,v	g,p	..	E	p	E	g,p,i	..
MANHATTAN.............m	34	238	26	g	g	E	..	..	g	p	g	E	..
MERRIAM...............m	11	69	5	E	..	l	g,l	g,l	E	p	..	p	E
OLATHE................m	47	353	45	l	g	E	g	g	E	p	E	E	p
OTTAWA................m	11	136	7	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	g,s	E	..
PARSONS...............m	13	144	5	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	E	E
RENO..................C	65	258	15	E	E	E	p,l	p,l	E	p	E	E	E
SABETHA...............m	2	..	..	E	E	v	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
SHAWNEE...............m	30	108	6	E	g	E	g	g	E	..	..	E	E
SMITH.................C	6	57	2	E	E	g	P	P	..	..	E	E	E
TOPEKA................m	119	1,424	86	E	E	E	g,p	..	g	p	..	..	..
WINFIELD..............m	12	373	17	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	E
WOODSON...............C	4	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
KENTUCKY													
ASHLAND...............m	26	380	..	E	g,s	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
BEREA.................m	9	60	..	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	..
BOWLING GREEN.........m	41	479	25	l,h	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	E
CARTER................C	25	66	..	..	E	g	..	E	..	..	E	..	..
DANVILLE..............m	13	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
ERLANGER..............m	15	36	2	E	E	l	l	..	E	p	..	E	E
FLORENCE..............m	18	52	10	E	g	l	g,l	l	E	p	g	p	E
FORT THOMAS...........m	16	71	3	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	E
GALLATIN..............C	5	..	..	..	E	l	l	l	..	..	E	..	..
HENDERSON.............m	26	406	11	E	E	E	s	s	E	..	..	E	E
HOPKINSVILLE..........m	29	322	9	E	g	E	..	..	E	f	g	E	E
NEWPORT...............m	20	..	..	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	..	..	..
OWENSBORO.............m	56	1,976	62	E	E	E	g	g	E	p	..	E	E
SPRINGFIELD...........m	3	..	..	E	E	l	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
WARREN................C	82	108	9	..	E	h	..	..	..	..	E	..	..
WEBSTER...............C	15	51	..	g	g,l	g,l	l	l	..	..	g	p	..
LOUISIANA													
ALEXANDRIA............m	51	860	27	l	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	E	E
BEAUREGARD............C	33	195	15	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	g	g,i	..
DENHAM SPRINGS........m	11	133	5	..	E	E	..	..	..	p	E	..	E
GRETNA................m	21	230	11	E	..	l	E	E	E	p	..	p	..
JENNINGS..............m	13	..	..	E	E	E	g,p	..	E	p	E	E	..
KENNER................m	76	572	36	E	E	l	..	..	E	p	E	p	..
LAFAYETTE.............C	172	736	45	..	..	p	..	..	..	..	g	p	..
RAPIDES...............C	140	548	27	..	l	l	..	..	..	..	g	E	..

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
LOUISIANA (CONTINUED)													
ST. CHARLES.............C	44	253	42	E	E	..	g	g	..	..	E	E	E
SHREVEPORT.............m	220	2,884	134	l,h	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	E	p
SLIDELL................m	36	243	10	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	E	E	E
THIBODAUX..............m	17	159	8	l	..	..	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
MAINE													
BANGOR.................m	30	1,069	37	l,h	E	E	p	p	E	..	..	E	E
BRUNSWICK..............m	18	506	15	E	E	l	E	p	E	p	..	E	..
HERMON.................m	3	114	3	..	..	..	p,l	l	g	..	..	l	g,i
MADAWASKA..............m	5	178	6	E	..	..	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
MOUNT DESERT...........m	2	97	2	E	E	l	l	l	E	p	..	E	E
PORTLAND...............m	63	2,246	87	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	..
SANFORD................m	19	534	18	h	E	E	E	E	E	E	g	E	E
SOUTH PORTLAND.........m	22	718	23	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E
STOCKHOLM..............m	0	10	..	..	..	v	..	p	..	..	..	E	..
WASHINGTON.............C	34	28	1	..	E	g·	..	g,p,l	..	..	E	E	..
WINDHAM................m	13	366	10	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	E	p
MARYLAND													
BOWIE..................m	36	123	7	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	..	p	p
CALVERT................C	44	1,105	50	g	E	l	l	l	g	g	E	E	E
CARROLL................C	112	2,251	99	g,p	g,p	g,p	..	..	g,p	..	g	p	E
CECIL..................C	68	1,574	58	..	E	..	..	..	E	..	E	p	E
COLLEGE PARK...........m	22	68	4	g	g	g	..	..	E	p	..	p	p
CUMBERLAND.............m	23	295	11	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	E
FREDERICK..............m	34	334	27	E	g	g,l	l	..	E	..	..	E	E
HOWARD.................C	151	4,327	218	l	E	l	l	l	E	p	E	p	E
MONTGOMERY.............C	665	18,381	1,020	p,h	E	l	l	l	E	p	E	p	p
PRINCE GEORGE'S........C	681	17,865	815	l	E	l	E	p	E	p	E	p	p
ROCKVILLE..............m	47	352	23	h	..	..	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
SALISBURY..............m	18	230	10	l	E	l	E	..	E	p	..	p	E
TAKOMA PARK............m	14	111	7	g	E	g	..	..	g	p	..	E	E
WASHINGTON.............C	114	2,537	94	E	E	..	..	..	E	..	E	p	E
MASSACHUSETTS													
AGAWAM.................m	27	566	23	l	E	l	E	E	E	p	..	E	..
AMESBURY...............m	15	611	26	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	p
ANDOVER................m	27	738	39	E	E	E	p	E	E	p	..	E	p
ASHLAND................m	11	246	11	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	..
AUBURN.................m	15	365	16	E	E	E	..	p	..	p	..	p	p
BARNSTABLE.............m	37	906	66	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	..

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
MASSACHUSETTS (CONTINUED)													
BARNSTABLE............C	171	337	11	g,p	g	..	..	..	..	..	..	g,i	p
BELMONT..............m	25	686	28	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	..
BILLERICA............m	38	967	42	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	..
BRIDGEWATER..........m	18	321	14	..	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	g,i	g,i
CAMBRIDGE............m	91	3,452	173	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	E	E
CANTON...............m	18	472	21	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
EASTHAMPTON..........m	16	350	12	E	E	E	E	E	E	f	E	E	E
GREENFIELD...........m	18	533	17	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	g	E	E
HOPKINTON............m	8	187	6	l	E	E	E	E	l	..	g	E	E
LAWRENCE.............m	63	2,035	87	l	..	..	..	..	g	..	..	E	E
LEXINGTON............m	29	846	42	E	E	E	E	E	E	f	..	p	E
MILLBURY.............m	12	270	11	..	E	..	p	p	E	p	..	E	E
NEEDHAM..............m	27	1,093	46	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	..
READING..............m	23	680	25	E	E	E	p	E	E	..	g	p	..
REHOBOTH.............m	8	178	6	E	E	E	l	l	..	..	..	..	..
ROCKLAND.............m	15	427	17	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
SHREWSBURY...........m	23	559	23	..	E	z	p	..	..	..	..	E	..
SOMERSET.............m	18	538	22	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	..
SOUTHBRIDGE..........m	17	351	26	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
SUTTON...............m	7	144	5	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	E	p	..
TOWNSEND.............m	9	46	5	v,h	E	v	v	v	v	..	E	E	E
WALPOLE..............m	20	488	25	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	g,i	E
WESTWOOD.............m	13	369	23	E	E	E	g	g	p	..	..	p	p
WORCESTER............m	158	6,080	251	p,l,h	E	E	p	p	E	f	..	p	p
WORCESTER............C	661	647	20	..	..	g	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
YARMOUTH.............m	20	198	21	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	..
MICHIGAN													
ALBION...............m	10	310	13	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	..
ALMA.................m	9	87	4	E	E	l	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
ANN ARBOR............m	108	1,063	67	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	p	p
ARENAC...............C	15	..	..	..	..	..	..	l	..	..	E	E	..
BAD AXE..............m	3	..	..	E	g	l	g	g	E	p	..	E	..
BARRY................C	48	327	14	E	E	..	..	..	..	p	E	p	..
BAY CITY.............m	40	416	31	E	..	E	..	..	E	p	..	p	..
BERRIEN..............C	164	1,218	69	E	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
BIRMINGHAM...........m	21	202	16	l	E	l	p	..	E	p	E	E	..
CADILLAC.............m	11	102	5	h	E	l	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
DEARBORN.............m	86	913	70	l,h	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	p
DETROIT..............m	1,086	19,487	1,194	g,p,l	E	E	p	p	E	p	g	p	p
EATON................C	91	295	20	h	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	E	..
FARMINGTON...........m	10	57	4	E	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	p	E
FERNDALE.............m	25	182	13	l	E	E	p	p	g	..	E	..	..

Table 2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY APPROACHES—PUBLIC SAFETY
continued

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
MICHIGAN (CONTINUED)													
FRASER.................m	14	94	6	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	..
FREMONT................m	4	..	..	E	g	E	E	..	..	..	..	E	E
GRAND TRAVERSE.........c	59	486	26	E	E	..	p	p	E	..	E	E	..
GRANDVILLE.............m	14	67	5	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	E
GREENVILLE.............m	9	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	f	..	E	p
HARPER WOODS...........m	15	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	p	E
ISABELLA...............c	54	171	24	E	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	p
JACKSON................m	38	398	22	E	..	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
KALAMAZOO..............c	218	822	62	p	p	..	..	..	E	p	p	p	p
KENTWOOD...............m	36	109	8	E	..	E	E	..	E	p	..	p	E
LENAWEE................c	89	572	23	E	g	..	p	..	..	p	E	E	E
MADISON HEIGHTS........m	34	221	21	l,h	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	p	..
MARINE CITY............m	4	34	2	E	..	..	..	p	..	..	..	E	E
MECOSTA................c	38	..	..	l	E	..	l	l	..	..	E	E	..
MIDLAND................m	36	357	18	l,h	E	E	g,p	g,p	..	p	g	E	E
MONROE.................m	22	272	17	E	g	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	..
MOUNT CLEMENS..........m	19	163	13	E	E	E	..	p	E	p	..	p	..
NORTHVILLE.............m	6	53	3	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	E	..	..
NORTON SHORES..........m	21	82	6	E	g	E	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
OAK PARK...............m	31	204	18	l	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	p	E
OTSEGO.................c	16	..	..	E	E	..	..	g	..	..	E	E	..
PLYMOUTH...............m	10	78	7	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	p	p
ROYAL OAK..............m	67	383	32	l,h	E	E	E	..	l	p,f	g	p	p
SAGINAW................m	72	660	44	E	g	E	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
SAGINAW................m	37	106	8	E	g	E	..	..	..	p	..	E	E
ST. CLAIR..............c	141	751	68	E	E	..	p	..	..	..	E	p	E
TRENTON................m	21	199	11	l	..	E	E	E	E	..	E	E	p
TROY...................m	67	380	39	l	E	l	p	p	E	p	E	p	p
WASHTENAW..............c	266	1,218	87	E	E	..	g	f	E	f	p	p	E
WAYNE..................m	21	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	E
WESTLAND...............m	81	403	24	E	E	E	..	E	E	..	E	p	..
YPSILANTI..............m	23	139	9	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	p	E
MINNESOTA													
ANOKA..................m	15	135	7	l	E	..	l	..	E	p	..	p	E
ANOKA..................c	221	1,040	71	g	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	..
APPLE VALLEY...........m	28	103	12	E	E	v	s	s	E	p	..	p	E
BLAINE.................m	34	103	10	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	..
BLOOMINGTON............m	86	491	50	l	l	l	p,l	..	E	p	E	p	E
BROWN..................c	28	130	9	E	E	..	..	..	g	..	E	E	..
BURNSVILLE.............m	41	172	42	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	E
CARVER.................c	41	239	17	E	E	..	p	p	E	E	E	E	E
CASS...................c	22	219	18	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
COON RAPIDS............m	41	201	34	g,l,h	..	l	..	..	E	..	..	E	E

Table 2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY APPROACHES—PUBLIC SAFETY
continued

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
MINNESOTA (CONTINUED)													
COTTAGE GROVE..........m	21	86	9	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
CRYSTAL...............m	25	103	11	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	p	p
EAGAN.................m	32	89	20	E	E	l	p,l	p	E	p	g	E	E
FAIRMONT..............m	12	121	7	p	g	E	..	p	E	p	g	g,p,i	..
FERGUS FALLS..........m	12	105	11	E	E	E	s	..	E	p	..	E	E
FRIDLEY...............m	29	145	22	g	g	E	..	..	E	p	g	E	E
HENNEPIN..............c	988	7,705	606	..	E	..	E	E	E	..	E	p	p
HOPKINS...............m	14	96	7	E	E	l	l	g	E	p	g	E	E
INVER GROVE HEIGHTS....m	18	66	9	E	..	..	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
MANKATO...............m	30	247	14	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	..
MINNEAPOLIS...........m	358	4,557	451	l,h	E	l	g	..	h	f	..	p	p
MOUNDS VIEW...........m	13	..	..	E	g	p	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
NEW HOPE..............m	23	77	9	E	g	E	g	..	E	..	g	p	E
NEW ULM...............m	14	160	10	E	E	E	p	p	g	..	..	E	E
NORTH ST. PAUL........m	12	60	3	E	g	E	..	E	E	..	..	E	E
NORTHFIELD............m	13	219	16	E	E	..	l	p	E	p	..	p	..
PIPESTONE.............m	5	..	..	E	..	..	..	..	E	p	g	..	..
RAMSEY................m	11	21	3	E	g	g	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
RICHFIELD.............m	37	270	16	E	E	E	p	..	E	p	..	E	..
ROSEVILLE.............m	35	131	561	h	g	l	p	p	E	p	..	E	E
ST. CLOUD.............m	43	326	28	g,l,h	g	E	p	..	E	..	..	..	E
ST. JOSEPH............m	3	11	..	g	l	l	l	..	E	p	..	E	..
ST. LOUIS.............c	202	2,663	150	E	E	..	..	..	E	..	g	p	E
ST. LOUIS PARK........m	43	233	21	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
WEST ST. PAUL.........m	18	86	7	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	E
WILLMAR...............m	16	596	29	E	E	l	l	l	E	p	g	E	..
WOODBURY..............m	14	51	9	E	g	E	E	E	E	..	..	E	E
MISSISSIPPI													
BILOXI................m	48	449	21	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	g	p	..
CLEVELAND.............m	15	99	7	l	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
CLINTON...............m	19	109	4	l	l	l	l	l	E	..	E	E	p
FRANKLIN..............c	9	134	5	E	E	l	g	g	E	..	E	..	E
GULFPORT..............m	43	1,297	55	p,h	E	E	g,p,s	..	..	..	..	p	E
HINDS.................c	260	1,608	63	E	E	E	l	g	E	..	E	E	E
LAMAR.................c	27	..	..	E	E	s	s	s	E	..	E	E	E
LAUREL................m	21	369	10	l	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
MC COMB...............m	12	571	19	l	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
MADISON...............c	50	207	8	E	E	l	p	..	..	..	E	..	..
MERIDIAN..............m	43	604	17	p,l,h	E	E	g	g	E	..	g	E	p
MORTON................m	3	..	..	E	E	l	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
PASCAGOULA............m	31	320	13	l	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
VICKSBURG.............m	26	396	9	E	E	E	E	E	'E	p	g	E	p
WARREN................c	51	198	10	E	g	..	..	g,s	E	p	E	E	E

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
MISSISSIPPI (CONTINUED)													
WAYNE c	20	260	10	l	l	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
MISSOURI													
ARNOLD .... m	20	93	5	E	g	..	..	..	E	p	g	E	E
BELTON .... m	15	88	6	E	E	g	g	g	E	E	g	p	..
BERKELEY .... m	17	136	6	l	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	E
BRIDGETON .... m	18	134	7	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
CARTHAGE .... m	11	316	9	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
COLE c	63	140	5	l,h	..	..	..	..	g	..	E	E	E
CRESTWOOD .... m	12	105	4	E	g	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	E
CREVE COEUR .... m	9	..	..	E	E	..	..	..	g	..	..	E	E
FULTON .... m	10	150	3	l,h	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p,v	g,p,i
INDEPENDENCE .... m	113	967	39	l	E	E	p	..	E	p	g	E	E
JEFFERSON CITY .... m	36	318	17	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	..	..	..
JOPLIN .... m	40	352	17	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
KANSAS CITY .... m	441	7,408	425	E	E	E	g,p	g,p	E	p	g	p	E
KIRKSVILLE .... m	17	128	5	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	E	E
LEE'S SUMMIT .... m	36	213	11	E	E	E	E	E	E	f	E	E	..
MAPLEWOOD .... m	10	80	3	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
MOBERLY .... m	13	146	5	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
O'FALLON .... m	12	60	8	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	g	E	E
PETTIS c	36	111	4	E	E	..	E	..	..	..	E	g,i	g,i
POPLAR BLUFF .... m	17	222	5	h	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	p	p
RICHMOND HEIGHTS .... m	11	..	..	p	..	..	..	..	..	..	g	E	E
ROLLA .... m	13	167	6	g,p	E	E	g	..	E	..	..	E	E
ST. CHARLES .... m	42	300	15	E	E	E	g	g	E	p	E	E	E
ST. JOSEPH .... m	75	633	30	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
ST. LOUIS .... m	429	7,928	434	s,l,h	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	p
SPRINGFIELD .... m	137	2,134	75	l,h	E	E	..	..	g,l,h	p	E	p	p
UNIVERSITY CITY .... m	43	309	12	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	..	E	E
MONTANA													
BILLINGS .... m	80	669	50	p	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	..
DANIELS c	3	..	..	E	E	l	l	l	..	..	g	E	..
GREAT FALLS .... m	57	432	22	E	E	E	..	..	p	p	E	E	E
HELENA .... m	25	228	13	E	g	E	p	..	E	..	..	E	E
MISSOULA .... m	34	248	..	l	g	E	p	..	g	..	..	..	g,i
MISSOULA c	78	425	36	l	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
YELLOWSTONE c	120	496	48	..	g	E	..	..	E	g	p	E	E

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
NEBRASKA													
CHERRY........C	7	125	4	g	..	..	g,l	g,l	..	..	E	E	..
FREMONT........m	24	275	..	E	E	E	..	E	E	p	..	..	E
HALL........C	49	193	9	l	..	..	..	g	..	..	E	E	..
KEARNEY........m	23	148	..	E	E	l	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
LINCOLN........m	183	2,865	88	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
O'NEILL........m	4	26	..	E	g	E	l	l	E	p	g	E	E
SCOTTSBLUFF........m	14	132	..	E	E	l	..	..	E	p	..	p,l	E
NEVADA													
CARSON CITY-ORMSBY.....m	36	737	..	..	E	E	..	p	E	p	E	E	E
CHURCHILL........C	15	193	..	E	E	l	..	..	..	..	E	p,l	..
CLARK........C	570	6,751	527	g	g	l	E	..	g	p,i	p	g,p,i	p
NORTH LAS VEGAS........m	50	435	23	l	g	E	E	..	E	..	E	p	E
SPARKS........m	52	379	..	p	E	E	E	..	E	..	g	p	E
NEW HAMPSHIRE													
BERLIN........m	12	348	15	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	g	..	..
CLAREMONT........m	14	122	11	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	E
CONCORD........m	33	459	24	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E
EXETER........m	12	103	5	E	E	E	E	p	E	..	g	p	p
HAMPTON........m	12	122	8	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
KEENE........m	22	202	11	E	g	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
LACONIA........m	17	478	16	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
MEREDITH........m	5	..	..	E	E	l	p	..	..	..	..	E	..
ROCKINGHAM........C	222	482	14	..	E	..	..	..	..	..	g	..	..
SOMERSWORTH........m	11	265	14	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	p	..
NEW JERSEY													
ATLANTIC CITY........m	36	2,632	85	E	E	E	p	p	E	E	E	E	E
BERNARDS........m	15	108	8	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	..	E	..
BLOOMFIELD........m	48	482	20	E	E	E	l	..	E	f	..	E	E
BRIDGEWATER........m	29	193	10	E	E	..	..	..	l	p	..	p	..
CINNAMINSON........m	16	..	..	E	E	l	..	l	E	p	..	p	E
CLIFTON........m	76	1,267	61	E	E	E	E	E	E	f	E	p	E
DUMONT........m	18	78	5	E	l	l	..	l	E	..	..	E	E
EATONTOWN........m	13	94	4	E	E	..	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
EDISON........m	82	1,745	94	E	E	..	l,h	..	E	..	g	E	E
ESSEX........C	842	8,018	538	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	p	E

NEW JERSEY (CONTINUED)

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
EWING.................m	35	201	11	E	l	E	g,l	g,l	E	..	..	E	E
GARWOOD...............m	5	..	..	..	l	..	..	..	..	..	g	E	E
GLEN ROCK.............m	11	..	..	..	E	l	l	l	E	..	..	..	E
GLOUCESTER............c	212	1,518	75	..	..	g	..	..	..	..	..	E	E
HACKENSACK............m	36	1,015	44	E	E	E	l	l	E	f	..	E	E
HADDONFIELD...........m	12	111	5	h	E	E	E	E	E	f	..	p	E
HAMILTON..............m	87	650	37	E	E	..	p,l	p,l	E	f	..	E	E
HAZLET................m	23	83	5	E	E	g	..	..	E	p	E	E	p
HILLSDALE.............m	10	69	4	E	E	l	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
MAPLE SHADE...........m	20	74	4	E	g	g	p,l	p,l	E	p	..	E	E
ABERDEEN..............m	19	103	5	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
MEDFORD...............m	20	99	4	E	g	l	l	p,l	E	..	..	E	..
MIDDLESEX.............c	638	4,915	230	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
MIDDLETOWN............m	69	357	22	s,l	s,l	s,l	s,l	s,l	E	p	g	p	p
MONTCLAIR.............m	38	1,218	42	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	p	p
MOORESTOWN............m	16	152	7	E	g	..	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
MORRISTOWN............m	17	187	15	l,h	E	v	v	v	..	p	..	E	..
MOUNT HOLLY...........m	11	..	..	l	..	..	..	..	E	..	g	E	..
MOUNT LAUREL..........m	25	114	5	l	..	..	l	l	E	p	..	E	E
MOUNT OLIVE...........m	19	123	6	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	..	E	E
NEW MILFORD...........m	16	..	..	E	E	E	g	..	g	..	..	p	g,p,i
NEWARK................m	316	4,882	280	p	E	E	E	g	E	p	..	p	p
OAKLAND...............m	13	99	6	E	E	l	..	l	E	p	..	p	..
OCEAN CITY............m	15	265	16	E	E	E	l	..	E	p	..	E	E
PEQUANNOCK............m	13	102	4	E	E	E	p	p	..	..	..	E	E
PISCATAWAY............m	43	266	14	l	E	l	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
RAMSEY................m	13	96	6	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
RANDOLPH..............m	19	105	5	E	E	E	l	l	E	..	..	p	E
RINGWOOD..............m	13	90	5	E	E	E	s,l	l	E	p	g	E	E
ROCKAWAY..............m	20	110	7	g	E	E	v	p,v	E	p	..	E	E
SADDLE BROOK..........m	14	77	5	E	E	E	v	v	E	p	..	E	..
SADDLE RIVER..........m	3	..	..	E	E	l	..	..	E	p,v	..	p,v	..
SECAUCUS..............m	15	157	13	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	..
SOMERVILLE............m	12	102	6	E	E	l	..	..	E	p	..	..	..
SOUTH BRUNSWICK.......m	22	203	11	..	E	l	l	l	..	..	..	p	p
SOUTH ORANGE VILLAGE...m	16	199	9	E	E	E	l	l	g	..	..	p	E
TEANECK...............m	38	376	16	..	..	..	l	l	g	p	E	p	E
TENAFLY...............m	13	121	6	..	E	l	..	E	E	f	g	E	..
TRENTON...............m	91	1,635	137	l	E	E	g,l	g,l	E	p	..	p	p
UNION CITY............m	56	655	26	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
VERONA................m	14	113	5	E	E	E	l	l	E	p	E	p	E
VINELAND..............m	54	1,766	16	E	E	E	l	l	E	..	E	E	p
WALDWICK..............m	10	55	5	E	E	l	l	l	E	p	..	E	..
WALL..................m	20	140	5	..	..	l	l	l	E	p	..	E	E

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
NEW JERSEY (CONTINUED)													
WOODBURY.............m	10	99	3	E	g	E	g	..	E	..	g	E	E
WYCKOFF..............m	16	103	6	E	E	E	l	l	E	p	..	E	E
NEW MEXICO													
ALBUQUERQUE..........m	367	5,227	360	E	E	E	p	..	E	..	E	g,i	g,i
AZTEC................m	7	63	2	E	g	v	..	..	E	..	..	s	E
CARLSBAD.............m	28	288	11	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	E
DONA ANA.............c	123	934	42	E	E	E	s	..	..	..	E	p	E
EDDY.................c	52	142	8	g,l	g	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	..
FARMINGTON...........m	39	688	96	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	g	E	E
LAS CRUCES...........m	54	715	41	E	E	E	p	p,s	E	p	g,s	E	..
LAS VEGAS............m	16	177	6	g,l	g	E	p,s	..	E	..	g	g,i	..
LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQRQ.m	3	6	1	g	l	..	l	..	g	g	..	E	..
ROSWELL..............m	44	510	27	p	E	l	g,p,f,s	g,p,s	E	..	s	f	..
NEW YORK													
AMSTERDAM............m	21	..	..	E	E	E	l	..	E	p	E	E	E
CANANDAIGUA..........m	12	104	..	E	E	v	..	s,v	E	..	E	E	E
CAYUGA...............c	80	801	58	E	g,l	g,l	g,l	..	..	..	E	E	E
CHESTNUT RIDGE.......m	8	..	..	g	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
CLINTON..............c	81	814	55	..	g	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	f
CORNING..............m	12	..	..	E	E	E	s	s	E	p	E	E	E
EAST ROCKAWAY........m	11	..	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	E	p
FAYETTEVILLE.........m	5	..	..	..	..	l	l	l	..	..	..	E	..
FULTON...............c	55	557	32	E	E	E	..	p,s	..	..	g,v	E	E
GENESEE..............c	59	848	47	h	E	g,l	..	..	g,l	..	g	p	p
GENEVA...............m	16	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	g	E	E
ILION................m	9	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p,v	E	E	E
JAMESTOWN............m	35	1,135	52	p,l	E	E	p	..	E	..	g	p	E
JEFFERSON............c	91	774	60	..	g	g	g	..	..	..	E	p	E
LANCASTER............m	13	..	..	E	E	..	E	..	E	p	..	E	..
LINDENHURST..........m	27	81	..	..	..	..	g,l	l	g	p	..	..	..
LIVINGSTON...........c	59	572	33	..	g	..	..	..	..	..	g	E	E
LOCKPORT.............m	25	286	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E
MAMARONECK...........m	17	188	8	E	E	E	l	l	E	p	..	E	E
MONTGOMERY...........c	52	711	38	E	E	g	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
NEW PALTZ............m	5	21	..	..	l	h	h	E	..	..	p	..	
NEW ROCHELLE.........m	69	794	..	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	p
NEWBURGH.............m	24	281	15	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	..	..	..
NIAGARA FALLS........m	65	937	68	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	g	E	p
NORTHPORT............m	8	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	..	..
ONEIDA...............c	249	2,027	152	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
NEW YORK (CONTINUED)													
ONEONTA................m	14	107	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	p	E
ONONDAGA..............C	463	5,659	422	p,l,h	E	..	l	..	..	..	E	E	E
ORANGE................C	282	2,220	155	g,p	l	l	..	..	E	E	E	p	E
OSSINING..............m	21	145	..	..	..	l	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
OSWEGO................m	19	366	23	E	g	E	..	E	E	p	E	E	E
OTSEGO................C	59	570	..	..	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
PALMYRA...............m	4	..	..	g	..	E	p,l	p,l	g	..	..	p	E
PLATTSBURGH...........m	21	261	..	E	g	E	p	p	E	..	..	E	..
POUGHKEEPSIE..........m	30	406	..	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	E	p
ROCHESTER.............m	236	7,698	407	l	E	E	p	p	E	f	..	p	p.
SCARSDALE.............m	18	250	15	E	g	g	..	..	E	..	..	p,f	E
SCHENECTADY...........m	67	895	..	l	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	E
SOLVAY................m	7	79	3	E	E	l	l	..	E	..	..	E	E
STEUBEN...............C	97	811	55	p	g,l	l	..	..	..	..	E	p	p
SYRACUSE..............m	161	5,498	268	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	g	g,i	..
TOMPKINS..............C	88	763	47	..	E	g,l	g,l	p,l	..	..	E	p	..
TUCKAHOE..............m	6	62	..	..	E	..	..	l	E	p	..	E	..
ULSTER................C	164	1,728	103	E	l,h	l,h	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
WHITE PLAINS..........m	45	967	64	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	E
WYOMING...............C	41	676	..	..	E	g	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
NORTH CAROLINA													
ALAMANCE..............C	102	2,434	79	..	E	l	l	l	..	..	E	E	E
ALBEMARLE.............m	15	246	..	E	g	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
BEAUFORT..............C	44	1,264	37	E	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
BRUNSWICK.............C	48	1,288	45	E	E	..	..	l	E	..	..	E	..
BURLINGTON............m	37	502	15	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	..
CALDWELL..............C	?0	1,999	55	l,h	E	..	E	E	..	..	E	E	..
CARTERET..............C	51	1,083	37	..	E	..	s,h	s,h	..	..	E	E	E
CARY..................m	31	272	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p,f	..	E	..
CATAWBA...............C	115	3,363	111	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	E	E	..
CHAPEL HILL...........m	34	360	..	h	..	p	g,s	..	E	p	..	p	E
CHARLOTTE.............m	352	3,930	217	l,h	E	E	g	..	E	p,f	..	p	p
CLEVELAND.............C	87	2,383	74	g	g	g	E	E	g	..	E	E	E
CONCORD...............m	20	386	17	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
CUMBERLAND............C	259	8,673	205	E	E	g	l	E	..	..	E	E	E
DURHAM................m	114	1,415	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
DURHAM................C	167	4,589	147	E	g	l	s,l	s,l	p	p	F	E	p
FORSYTH...............C	260	5,946	198	E	E	l	E	l	..	..	p	E	p
FRANKLIN..............C	34	909	27	l	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	..
GOLDSBORO.............m	35	384	..	E	E	g	E	..	E	p	..	E	E
GREENSBORO............m	159	2,185	80	g,p,l	E	E	g	..	E	p	..	E	p
GREENVILLE............m	39	729	..	E	E	l	E	..	E	p	..	..	..
GUILFORD..............C	328	8,226	287	E	E	l	E	p	E	..	E	p	p

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
NORTH CAROLINA (CONTINUED)													
HALIFAX....C	56	1,824	57	g,p	g	g,l	g,l	g,l	g	..	E	E	g,i
HENDERSON....C	67	1,917	64	E	..	..	l	g,l	..	..	E	E	..
HICKORY....m	26	449	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
HIGH POINT....m	67	1,093	40	l	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	p	p
HILLSBOROUGH....m	4	..	..	E	..	v	..	..	E	p	..	E	..
JACKSONVILLE....m	29	334	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	f	E
JOHNSTON....C	78	2,311	72	E	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
KANNAPOLIS....m	32	68	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	..
LAURINBURG....m	12	..	..	E	E	E	l	..	E	E	..	E	E
LENOIR....m	14	254	..	E	E	E	g	..	E	..	..	E	E
LINCOLN....C	46	1,078	36	l	E	s,l	l	E	..	..	E	p,l	g,i
MECKLENBURG....C	451	11,667	431	g	g	g,p,l	g,p,f	g,p,f	..	p	E	p	E
MONTGOMERY....C	24	663	19	E	E	l	l	l	..	..	E	E	..
NAGS HEAD....m	1	..	..	E	..	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
NEW BERN....m	19	251	..	l,h	E	l	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
ONSLOW....C	127	2,355	71	E	E	h	f	f	..	..	E	E	..
ROCKINGHAM....m	9	122	4	..	g	E	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
ROCKY MOUNT....m	48	722	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
SANFORD....m	18	205	6	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
SCOTLAND....C	34	1,046	30	E	g,l	..	l	E	..	..	E	E	E
STANLY....C	50	1,243	41	..	E	..	p,f	p,f	..	..	E	E	E
STATESVILLE....m	19	351	11	E	g	E	..	..	E	..	..	..	..
TARBORO....m	10	172	..	l	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
TRANSYLVANIA....C	26	651	19	E	g	l	E	l	..	..	E	E	..
VANCE....C	39	1,170	36	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..
WAKE....C	366	8,234	311	h	g	s,l	s,l	f,s,l	..	p	E	p	p
WILKES....C	61	1,629	48	l	E	..	E	E	..	..	E	..	..
WILSON....m	35	588	..	E	g	E	g	..	E	p	..	E	p
WINSTON-SALEM....m	148	2,119	91	l	E	E	..	..	E	E	..	p	E
NORTH DAKOTA													
BISMARCK....m	48	415	21	p	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	p	E
DICKINSON....m	17	111	7	..	E	E	p	p	E	..	g	E	..
MANDAN....m	16	87	4	..	E	E	v	s	g	p,v	..	E	E
VALLEY CITY....m	8	66	3	E	E	..	..	..	E	g	..	E	E
WILLISTON....m	16	151	11	..	E	..	E	E	E	E	g	E	..
OHIO													
ALLIANCE....m	23	172	16	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	E	..
BEAVERCREEK....m	34	75	4	l	E	g	g	g	E	p	g	E	E
BEDFORD....m	15	150	9	E	g	E	p	E	E	..	g	..	..
BELLEFONTAINE....m	12	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
BLUE ASH....m	10	126	13	E	g	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	p

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
OHIO (CONTINUED)													
BRUNSWICK m	29	76	5	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	p	E
CANTON m	89	1,021	48	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	..
CIRCLEVILLE m	12	193	4	E	E	E	l	..	E	p	g	l	..
COLUMBUS m	566	6,471	350	l	E	E	E	..	E	p	p	E	E
CONNEAUT m	13	141	4	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
CUYAHOGA c	1,445	13,791	689	..	E	..	..	..	..	..	g	E	E
DAYTON m	181	2,615	148	l	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
DELAWARE m	19	..	..	h	E	E	E	..	E	..	g	E	E
DELTA m	3	..	..	E	g	E	E	E	E	..	..	E	E
FAIRBORN m	28	220	10	v	..	..	E	E	E	p	g	p	E
FOREST PARK m	18	62	7	l	g	l	l	p,l	E	..	g	E	E
FREMONT m	17	151	6	E	E	E	g	..	E	..	..	E	E
GARFIELD HEIGHTS m	33	232	12	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	..
GOLF MANOR m	4	..	..	E	E	l	l	..	E	v	..	E	E
HAMILTON m	64	696	33	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	p
KNOX c	48	277	14	g	g,l	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	..
LEIPSIC m	2	..	..	g	g	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
LUCAS c	462	2,773	143	E	g	..	g,p	..	E	p	E	E	E
LYNDHURST m	17	115	8	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	E
MANSFIELD m	51	534	33	l,h	E	E	E	..	E	..	E	E	E
MAPLE HEIGHTS m	29	234	11	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	p
MARIETTA m	16	..	..	p,l	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E
MASON m	11	..	..	E	g	p	p	p	E	p	g	p	E
MAYFIELD HEIGHTS m	20	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	g	..	E
MEDINA c	117	600	29	..	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	p
MIDDLETOWN m	46	484	30	l	E	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	p
MONTGOMERY c	566	3,691	246	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	g	p	E
NEWARK m	41	345	16	l	E	E	E	..	E	f	g	E	p
NORTH OLMSTED m	36	368	22	..	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
OREGON m	18	157	9	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	E	E
ORRVILLE m	8	146	5	E	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	E	E
OTTAWA c	40	443	15	E	l	..	..	..	E	..	E	p	E
OTTAWA HILLS m	4	..	..	g	g	g	g	..	E	..	E	p	..
PARMA HEIGHTS m	23	127	6	..	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
SHARONVILLE m	11	75	6	E	g	E	g	E	E	..	..	E	E
SHEFFIELD LAKE m	10	44	2	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
SPRINGDALE m	11	72	4	E	g	E	p	p	E	..	..	p	E
SYLVANIA m	16	107	7	E	g	..	..	..	E	p	g	p	E
TALLMADGE m	14	101	5	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	g	E	..
TOLEDO m	344	3,204	181	l,h	E	E	..	..	E	p	g	p	g,p,i
TWINSBURG m	8	66	5	l	E	E	l	l	E	p	E	p	..
UNION m	5	..	..	E	g	g	g	g	E	..	..	p	..
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS m	15	..	..	l,h	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
URBANA m	11	105	4	E	E	v	v	v	E	p	g	E	E
WARREN m	53	516	22	s,l	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	E	E

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
OHIO (CONTINUED)													
WASHINGTON............m	13	..	..	l,h	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	E	..
WEST CARROLLTON........m	13	78	5	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	E
WESTERVILLE...........m	27	195	8	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	E	E
WHITEHALL.............m	23	..	..	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	g	E	..
WICKLIFFE.............m	15	105	7	l,h	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
WILLOUGHBY............m	19	216	13	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	p
WYANDOT..............c	23	..	..	..	E	..	E	E	E	..	E	p	E
XENIA................m	24	188	8	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	E
OKLAHOMA													
ARDMORE...............m	25	624	..	E	E	E	s	s	E	..	E	E	E
BARTLESVILLE..........m	30	397	18	p,l	E	E	E	..	E	..	E	g,i	g,i
DEL CITY..............m	26	196	7	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	E	E
DUNCAN................m	22	276	8	h	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
EDMOND................m	51	494	24	E	E	E	p	..	E	..	E	E	E
EL RENO...............m	17	268	8	l	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
GUTHRIE...............m	12	131	5	..	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
MC ALESTER............m	19	697	..	E	E	E	E	E	i	..	..	E	E
MIDWEST CITY..........m	53	987	64	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
NEWKIRK...............m	3	32	1	l	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
SAPULPA...............m	18	168	..	l,h	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	E	E
TAHLEQUAH.............m	13	358	9	E	E	E	g	g	E	..	E	E	E
TULSA.................m	374	4,149	336	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	g	p	E
WARR ACRES............m	10	..	..	E	E	E	E	..	E	p,f	g	..	..
OREGON													
ALBANY................m	29	226	13	E	g	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..
ASHLAND...............m	16	251	11	p,l	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	E
BROOKINGS.............m	3	35	..	v	E	v	v	v	E	..	E	E	E
CORVALLIS.............m	40	322	23	E	E	l	l	l	E	p	..	p	E
FOREST GROVE..........m	12	105	6	..	..	l	..	..	..	p	..	p	..
GRANTS PASS...........m	17	109	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	..
GRESHAM...............m	39	199	14	E	g	E	E	..	E	p	..	p	E
HERMISTON.............m	10	73	..	E	E	E	E	l	E	p	E	E	p
HILLSBORO.............m	31	173	10	g,l	..	g	g,p	..	E	..	..	..	..
JACKSON...............c	140	570	30	E	E	..	p	p	..	..	E	..	..
JOSEPHINE.............c	68	355	18	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
KEIZER................m	20	27	..	E	g	..	..	..	E	p	..	p	..
LAKE OSWEGO...........m	26	232	..	E	E	E	f	f	E	p	..	p	p
LANE..................c	263	959	81	l	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	E	..
LEBANON...............m	10	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	..	..
LINCOLN...............c	37	321	15	g,l,h	..	..	..	..	E	..	E	p	E
LINCOLN CITY..........m	6	65	..	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	E

Jurisdiction		Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
OREGON (CONTINUED)														
MARION	C	215	744	42	l	g	..	..	..	E	p	E	p	E
MEDFORD	m	44	337	..	E	E	E	..	..	p	..	g	E	p
OAKRIDGE	m	3	..	..	l	E	l	l	l	E	..	g	p	E
ONTARIO	m	10	90	..	l,h	E	E	p	..	E	..	..	p	..
PENDLETON	m	14	130	..	h	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	..
PORTLAND	m	388	4,281	308	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	p	p
SALEM	m	94	965	..	p,l,h	E	E	E	E	p	..	..	E	..
SPRINGFIELD	m	38	422	..	l	g	E	E	E	..	..	g	E	E
TIGARD	m	19	74	9	l	g	..	..	..	E	..	..	l	..
TUALATIN	m	11	56	5	E	..	..	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
WOODBURN	m	11	103	4	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
PENNSYLVANIA														
ALLENTOWN	m	104	901	57	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	g,i	E
AMBLER	m	7	41	1	E	g	..	g	g	E	..	E	..	..
ARMSTRONG	C	79	379	13	..	g	..	g	..	..	..	..	E	E
ASTON	m	15	..	..	E	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	..
BEAVER	C	193	494	39	..	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
BENSALEM	m	57	129	9	E	g	s,l	s,l	s,l	E	..	..	E	E
BETHEL PARK	m	34	125	7	E	E	l	g	g	E	p	g	p	E
BETHLEHEM	m	70	644	24	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
BLAIRSVILLE	m	4	26	1	E	E	..	p	p	E	..	..	E	E
CHELTENHAM	m	36	200	14	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	g	l	g,i
CHESTER	m	44	379	20	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
CUMRU	m	12	30	3	l	g	l	..	..	..	p	..	E	p
DERRY	m	18	65	4	E	E	g,l	g,l	g,l	E	p	..	E	E
DOVER	m	15	15	2	..	..	l	l	p	..	..	..	E	..
EAST NORRITON	m	13	42	4	E	g	s	..	..	E	..	..	E	p
EPHRATA	m	11	72	4	E	g	l	l	l	E	g	..	E	p
ERIE	m	115	1,109	50	E	E	E	p	..	g	P	..	E	E
FAIRVIEW	m	13	33	2	E	..	..	l	l	..	..	..	E	E
MURRYSVILLE	m	16	48	3	h	E	l	l	l	E	p	..	E	E
GIRARD	m	3	15	1	E	p	E	..	..	E	..	..	..	..
GROVE CITY	m	8	47	2	E	E	l	..	..	E	..	E	..	..
HARRISBURG	m	52	741	34	E	E	l	s	s	E	p	..	p	E
HARRISON	m	12	32	2	..	E	l	..	..	E	..	E	E	..
JIM THORPE	m	5	..	..	..	E	..	l	l	E	..	..	E	..
KINGSTON	m	15	77	3	p	E	l	..	..	E	p	g	g,l,h,i	g,i
LOWER MERION	m	60	413	27	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
MEADVILLE	m	14	150	6	E	E	l	..	..	E	f	g	E	E
MIDDLETOWN	m	12	..	..	l	..	l	l	l	..	..	..	p	E
MONESSEN	m	10	52	2	E	E	l	..	p	E	p	g	E	E
MONROE	C	83	278	10	..	s	..	s	..	..	..	E	E	E
MONTGOMERY	m	6	..	..	h	g	l	..	..	E	..	..	p	..

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
PENNSYLVANIA (CONTINUED)													
MOON ....m	20	53	3	E	E	g	g	g	E	p	g	E	E
NEW KENSINGTON ....m	18	71	6	E	l	l	l	..	E	..	E	E	..
NORTHAMPTON c	234	1,235	49	..	p	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
PETERS ....m	14	48	3	E	E	g,l	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
PLYMOUTH ....m	17	..	..	E	l	E	l	l	E	p	..	E	E
PORT CARBON ....m	3	..	..	E	l	l	l	..	E	..	..	E	..
RADNOR ....m	29	147	9	E	E	s,l	..	s,l	E	p	..	E	E
RIDLEY ....m	34	127	6	E	E	l	l	l	..	..	..	E	E
SCOTT ....m	19	..	..	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	E	..	E
SPRINGFIELD ....m	20	77	4	v,i	g	i	..	..	i	p	..	E	E
STATE COLLEGE ....m	34	176	8	E	E	..	p,l	l	E	..	..	E	E
STOWE ....m	9	..	..	E	E	l	..	..	E	p	..	p	E
SUNBURY ....m	12	43	2	l	E	..	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
TOWAMENCIN ....m	13	..	..	..	E	l	..	..	..	..	..	E	E
TREDYFFRIN ....m	25	89	8	l	g	l	p,l	..	..	p	..	E	..
UPPER GWYNEDD ....m	10	..	..	..	E	l	..	..	..	..	..	p	..
UPPER MERION ....m	26	148	9	g,p	g	l	..	..	E	p	..	p	..
UPPER PROVIDENCE ....m	10	17	1	E	..	l	..	..	E	..	..	p	..
UPPER ST. CLAIR ....m	19	..	..	E	E	l	l	l	E	p	..	p	E
WARRINGTON ....m	11	..	..	E	v	v	v	v	E	..	..	..	..
WASHINGTON c	213	686	35	..	..	..	g	..	..	..	E	..	..
WEST CHESTER ....m	19	96	12	E	E	l	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
WEST MANCHESTER ....m	13	31	3	E	..	l	..	..	E	..	..	..	E
WESTMORELAND c	381	1,304	64	..	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	p
WHITEHALL ....m	22	97	5	E	E	l	f,l	f,s,l	p	..	..	p	E
WHITEMARSH ....m	15	61	4	E	E	l	l	l	..	..	..	E	E
RHODE ISLAND													
CRANSTON ....m	74	1,895	76	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	..	E
LINCOLN ....m	18	393	16	E	E	..	l	l	p,l	..	..	E	..
NEWPORT ....m	29	853	33	E	E	E	E	E	E	f	..	E	E
PAWTUCKET ....m	73	1,582	74	E	E	E	p	..	E	p,f,v	E	E	p
SOUTH CAROLINA													
ANDERSON c	141	357	17	l	..	..	p,l	p,l	..	..	E	p	E
CHARLESTON ....m	69	1,320	71	E	E	E	..	..	E	f	..	E	E
CONWAY ....m	14	92	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	..
GREENVILLE ....m	57	847	28	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	g	E	E
HORRY c	131	520	27	E	E	E	E	E	E	f	..	f,h	g,i
LANCASTER ....m	10	121	4	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	p	..
LEXINGTON c	170	1,593	67	E	E	E	p	p	E	..	E	E	E
MYRTLE BEACH ....m	28	361	..	E	E	l	E	g,l	E	..	E	p	..
NORTH AUGUSTA ....m	15	124	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	g	E	..

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
SOUTH CAROLINA (CONTINUED)													
ORANGEBURG............C	87	1,123	40	g,l,h	g,l	..	l	l	..	p	g	g,i	E
ROCK HILL..............m	42	516	..	l	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	E	p
SALUDA................m	3	..	..	E	..	l	..	..	E	..	g	E	..
SIMPSONVILLE..........m	11	58	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
SPARTANBURG...........C	213	2,817	..	E	E	l	l	l	..	..	E	E	E
WEST COLUMBIA.........m	11	99	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
YORK..................C	121	258	30	E	E	l	..	..	..	..	E	E	..
SOUTH DAKOTA													
BROOKINGS.............m	15	386	22	..	E	l	E	E	E	..	..	..	..
HURON.................m	12	112	6	g	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	..	..
LYMAN.................C	4	30	1	E	E	E	l	l	E	p	..	E	..
MOODY.................C	7	37	1	..	s	..	..	s	..	..	..	E	..
PIERRE................m	13	119	4	E	E	l	p,s	s	E	..	..	E	..
VERMILLION............m	10	87	4	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
YANKTON...............m	12	121	6	l	E	l	g,l	..	E	..	E	E	E
TENNESSEE													
BRENTWOOD.............m	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	..
BRISTOL...............m	23	672	21	g,p	E	E	v	..	E	p	g	E	E
CLAIBORNE.............C	27	803	20	E	..	..	..	g	..	..	E	p	..
CLARKSVILLE...........m	61	476	17	E	E	E	g	g	g	p	g	E	E
COFFEE................C	41	478	15	p,v	v	v	E	E	v	p	E	E	E
ELIZABETHTON..........m	12	462	13	E	p	E	g	g	E	p	..	E	E
GERMANTOWN............m	29	188	..	E	E	E	E	g	E	..	E	E	E
HENDERSON.............m	4	..	..	E	g	E	..	..	E	..	g	E	..
HENRY.................C	29	791	26	..	..	..	s	E	..	.	E	..	..
KINGSPORT.............m	31	1,101	41	p,l,h	E	E	l	l	E	p	E	p	E
KNOX..................C	330	3,325	148	..	g	..	p,s	..	E	..	E	E	p
MC MINN...............C	43	792	24	E	g	l	..	..	..	..	E	E	..
OAK RIDGE.............m	27	821	32	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	p	E
PARIS.................m	11	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
ROBERTSON.............C	40	1,000	31	..	E	..	E	E	..	..	g	E	..
SEVIERVILLE...........m	5	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
WILLIAMSON............C	72	1,428	69	l	g	l	..	..	l	..	E	g,p,l,h	p
TEXAS													
ALLEN.................m	15	87	7	l	E	l	..	..	E	p	..	..	E
AMARILLO..............m	166	2,811	111	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	g	E	E
ANDREWS...............m	14	..	..	l	E	l	E	E	E	..	..	E	..
ARANSAS PASS..........m	8	..	..	g,p,l	E	l	p	p	E	p	E	E	p

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
TEXAS (CONTINUED)													
ARLINGTON...........m	250	1,886	120	g	E	E	E	p	E	..	E	p	p
ATHENS..............m	11	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	..	..
AUSTIN..............m	467	9,778	472	E	E	g	E	f	E	p	..	p	p
BASTROP.............c	37	..	..	E	E	..	s	s	..	..	E	E	..
BAYTOWN.............m	63	494	30	p	E	E	p	p	E	..	E	p	..
BEAUMONT............m	120	1,278	67	g	E	E	p	p	g	..	..	p	p
BELL................c	175	480	23	E	E	g	g	g	E	p	E	E	E
BELLAIRE............m	15	176	11	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	E
BENBROOK............m	17	79	4	h	..	E	l	l	E	p	E	E	E
BROWNWOOD...........m	19	..	..	p	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	E	E
BRYAN...............m	62	755	27	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	E
BURLESON............m	17	..	..	E	E	l	..	..	E	E	..	E	E
CALDWELL............m	4	..	..	E	g	E	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
CISCO...............m	4	..	..	E	f	E	..	..	E	..	..	E	E
CLARKSVILLE.........m	5	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	p	E
CONROE..............m	21	280	16	l	E	E	..	..	E	..	E	E	..
CORPUS CHRISTI......m	264	3,089	143	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	..	p	p
CORSICANA...........m	24	244	7	E	E	E	p,s	p,s	E	..	E	p	E
DALLAS..............m	1,004	14,500	619	i	l,i	l,i	i	p,i	i	p,i	i	..	..
DEER PARK...........m	25	190	11	E	l	l	E	E	E	..	..	E	E
DENISON.............m	25	269	10	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
DENTON..............m	46	1,076	44	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	..
ECTOR...............c	133	1,518	66	E	E	g,l	g	g	E	p	E	..	E
EL LAGO.............m	3	..	..	E	E	p,l	p,l	p,l	E	p	g	p	E
EULESS..............m	28	226	10	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	E	..
FAIRFIELD...........m	4	..	..	E	E	E	g	g	E	E	..	p	E
FOREST HILL.........m	13	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	E	E
FORT WORTH..........m	415	4,915	258	l	E	E	E	..	..	..	..	p	..
GAINESVILLE.........m	14	..	..	h	E	E	..	..	E	p	g	E	E
GARLAND.............m	177	1,461	86	h	E	E	E	p	E	p	E	E	E
GRAND PRAIRIE.......m	96	663	41	E	E	E	p,f,s	p,f,s	E	p	..	E	E
GRAPEVINE...........m	21	230	25	E	E	E	p	p	E	..	g	E	E
GRAYSON.............c	98	324	12	E	E	g	g,f,i	g,f,i	g	g	E	p	..
GREENVILLE..........m	25	297	11	E	E	E	g	..	E	f	..	..	E
GROVES..............m	16	106	5	E	g	E	..	..	E	p	g	E	E
GUADALUPE...........c	57	172	7	E	g,l	l	g	g	..	..	E	E	E
HAYS................c	61	..	..	l	l	g,l	g,l	g	E	..	E	E	h
HEDWIG VILLAGE......m	3	..	..	..	..	g	g	g	E	p	E	p	E
HENDERSON...........m	12	..	..	E	E	E	p	p,s	E	p	g	g,i	g,i
HILL................c	27	..	..	l	E	l	..	..	E	..	E	p,l	E
HURST...............m	34	267	13	l	l	l	..	p	l	p	..	l	E
JACKSBORO...........m	4	..	..	E	g	l	g,l	g,l	E	..	..	E	E
JEFF DAVIS..........c	2	..	..	l	l	l	l	l	g	g,p	g	E	E
KERRVILLE...........m	20	..	..	p,l	E	E	p	p	E	p	g	p	p

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
TEXAS (CONTINUED)													
LA PORTE.............m	24	..	..	E	E	l	E	E	..	p	E	p	p
LAMESA...............m	12	..	..	l,h	E	E	..	..	E	p	E	p	E
LAREDO...............m	117	1,172	39	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
LEAGUE CITY..........m	23	170	8	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	E	E	..
LEWISVILLE...........m	28	327	15	l,h	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	E	E
LIBERTY..............C	55	227	10	l,h	s,l	..	p,l	p	..	..	E	p	E
LONGVIEW.............m	74	751	28	E	E	E	E	E	E	f	E	E	E
MC ALLEN.............m	83	805	38	l,h	g	E	p,s	p,s	g	..	..	p,l	..
MC KINNEY............m	18	189	13	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	p	..
MARBLE FALLS.........m	5	..	..	l	E	l	l	l	l	..	g	p	E
MARTIN...............C	5	..	..	E	E	l	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
MESQUITE.............m	77	732	40	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	p	E
MIDLAND..............m	98	922	58	p,l,h	E	E	E	..	E	..	E	E	..
MINERAL WELLS........m	16	..	..	E	E	l	E	E	E	..	E	E	E
MISSION..............m	31	218	6	l	E	E	..	p,s	..	..	..	E	E
PAMPA................m	22	..	..	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	E	p	..
PARKER...............C	60	..	..	h	E	s,l	s,l	..	g	f	E	f	E
PLANO................m	111	901	50	l	E	E	E	E	E	p,f	E	E	E
PORTLAND.............m	12	..	..	l	E	l	E	E	E	p	g	f	E
REAL.................C	3	..	..	E	l	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
RICHWOOD.............m	3	..	..	g	..	g	..	..	..	..	..	E	E
SAN BENITO...........m	22	156	4	E	E	l	s	..	E	..	..	E	..
SMITH................C	152	419	20	E	E	l	s	s	..	..	E	E	E
SNYDER...............m	14	..	..	E	l	l	p,s	p,s	E	p	..	E	E
SULPHUR SPRINGS......m	14	..	..	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
TERRELL..............m	14	116	6	E	E	l	p	p	E	..	E	E	E
TOM GREEN............C	98	293	12	E	E	l	..	l	..	..	E	E	..
TRAVIS...............C	551	1,541	107	E	g	..	..	E	E	p	E	E	E
TYLER................m	73	890	46	p	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	..
UNIVERSAL CITY.......m	12	82	3	E	E	E	g	g	E	p	g	p	p
UNIVERSITY PARK......m	23	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	..	..
VICTORIA.............C	76	992	33	E	E	..	g	g	..	p	E	p	E
VIDOR................m	12	..	..	E	E	..	..	..	E	..	..	E	p
WALKER...............C	54	181	5	l	g	g,l	g	g	..	p	E	p	..
WEATHERFORD..........m	14	180	8	E	E	l	E	g,s	E	f	..	E	E
WEIMAR...............m	2	..	..	E	l	l	..	..	E	..	..	..	..
WEST UNIVERSITY PLACE..m	13	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	E
WHITE SETTLEMENT.....m	16	87	3	E	E	E	f	f	E	..	E	E	..
WICHITA FALLS........m	100	991	38	..	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	..
UTAH													
CEDAR CITY...........m	12	66	5	g	..	g	..	..	g	..	..	..	..
KAYSVILLE............m	12	44	2	E	g	l	..	..	E	p	..	E	E

Table 2   LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY APPROACHES—PUBLIC SAFETY
continued

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/ suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/ parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
UTAH (CONTINUED)													
LAYTON.............m	35	106	10	E	E	E	g	..	E	p	..	p	..
LOGAN..............m	29	229	14	E	g	E	E	E	E	..	..	E	E
NEPHI..............m	4	30	..	l	g	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	..
OREM...............m	62	304	17	p	E	E	E	p	E	p	g	p	..
PAYSON.............m	10	66	3	..	..	v	v	v	E	p	g	p	..
ROY................m	24	81	7	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	E
SALT LAKE..........c	703	3,322	232	l,h	l	g,l	p	..	..	..	l	l	E
SPANISH FORK.......m	11	73	7	E	g	E	E	E	E	..	..	E	..
SPRINGVILLE........m	13	105	6	E	E	E	v	v	E	..	..	E	E
TOOELE.............c	29	133	12	l	l	l	l	E	l	..	E	E	E
UINTAH.............c	24	176	18	E	g	g	..	..	..	..	E	p	..
WASHINGTON.........c	39	77	4	..	E	l	..	..	..	..	E	p	p
WEST JORDAN........m	44	144	9	E	..	E	p	..	E	..	g	E	..
VIRGINIA													
ALEXANDRIA.........m	107	3,387	208	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	..	p	p
ARLINGTON..........m	154	4,918	245	l,h	E	l	l	l	E	p	E	p	p
ARLINGTON..........c	159	..	245	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	E
AUGUSTA............c	52	1,278	41	E	E	s,l	s,l	l	E	p	E	E	p
BEDFORD............c	39	963	25	E	E	..	..	..	g	g	E	E	E
BUCHANAN...........c	36	1,177	45	E	E	l	..	p,l	..	..	E	E	E
CHRISTIANSBURG.....m	12	93	3	E	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	..	..
DANVILLE...........m	45	1,775	59	E	E	E	s,l	..	E	..	g	E	E
DINWIDDIE..........c	21	549	18	E	E	..	l	..	.	..	E	E	..
FAIRFAX............m	20	298	31	E	g	g	g	g	E	p	g	p	E
FALLS CHURCH.......m	10	431	18	E	g	g	g	g	E	p	g	p	E
FAUQUIER...........c	42	830	28	E	E	l	l	..	..	..	E	l	..
FRONT ROYAL........m	12	115	6	E	g	g,l	g,l	..	E	p	..	E	F
HAMPTON............c	126	..	156	l	E	E	l	l	l	p	E	p	p
HARRISONBURG.......m	26	689	19	E	E	E	l	..	E	..	..	E	E
HENRICO............c	196	5,641	249	l,h	E	E	l	l	E	..	E	E	E
LYNCHBURG..........m	67	2,219	84	l,h	E	E	E	E	E	p	E	..	..
MANASSAS...........m	17	630	22	E	E	v	v	..	E	p	E	p	E
MONTGOMERY.........c	66	1,215	39	E	g	l	l	l	..	..	E	E	E
PETERSBURG.........m	41	1,579	52	l	E	E	l	..	E	..	E	..	..
PORTSMOUTH.........c	111	..	162	p,l,h	E	E	p	p	E	p	E	E	E
PRINCE EDWARD......c	17	374	7	l	g	l	l	..	..	..	E	E	..
RAPPAHANNOCK.......c	6	188	4	..	l	..	l	l	..	..	E	E	E
SPOTSYLVANIA.......c	39	999	40	h	E	s,l	s,l	s,l	E	..	g	E	E
STAFFORD...........c	50	1,284	46	E	E	l	l	l	E	..	E	E	E
STRASBURG..........m	2	22	1	l	E	l	l	l	E	p	..	E	..
SUFFOLK............m	49	1,617	51	l	E	l	l	l	E	..	E	p	E
VIENNA.............m	17	152	7	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	..	E	E

Jurisdiction	Population estimates (000)	FTEs actual no.	Gen. expenditures in $ millions	Crime prevention/patrol	Police/fire communication	Fire prevention/suppression	Emergency medical service	Ambulance service	Traffic control/parking enforcement	Vehicle towing/storage	Prisons/jails	Building/grounds maintenance	Building security
VIRGINIA (CONTINUED)													
VIRGINIA BEACH.........m	309	9,957	386	l,h	E	l	l	l	l,h	p,f	g,p,l	g,p,i	g,p,i
WAYNESBORO.............m	15	558	26	E	E	l	l	..	E	..	g	E	..
WISE..................c	45	1,124	45	g	E	..	..	..	..	..	E	E	g,i
WASHINGTON													
ABERDEEN..............m	17	184	9	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	..	..
BELLEVUE..............m	81	851	53	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	p	p
BELLINGHAM............m	45	552	30	f,l	E	E	g,f	f	f	..	g	E	E
CENTRALIA.............m	12	131	5	g,p,l	..	E	E	p	E	p	g	g,i	E
CHENEY................m	8	61	3	l,h	..	l,h	p,l	p,l	E	..	g	E	E
CLARK.................c	211	988	48	E	g	..	..	..	E	f	E	p	p
CLARKSTON.............m	7	..	..	E	E	E	E	..	E	..	..	p	E
DES MOINES............m	13	54	3	E	E	g	g	..	E	p	E	E	E
GRANT.................c	53	322	18	l,h	..	..	..	..	l	..	..	..	..
ISLAND................c	50	240	12	..	g,p	l	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
KENNEWICK.............m	39	229	15	l,h	..	g	E	p	E	..	..	p	E
KENT..................m	26	390	29	p,l	g	E	g,p	g,p	E	p	g	p	E
LACEY.................m	16	95	7	E	g	g	g	..	E	p	g	E	E
MASON.................c	36	218	10	E	..	l	..	..	..	..	E	E	E
MEDINA................m	3	..	..	E	..	..	..	..	E	..	..	p	E
MERCER ISLAND.........m	21	151	11	l	E	l	l	..	E	..	..	p	E
MOUNTLAKE TERRACE......m	16	109	8	g	..	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	E
NORMANDY PARK.........m	6	..	..	E	g	g	g	..	E	..	g	p	..
OAK HARBOR............m	13	82	4	E	E	l	..	..	E	..	E	..	..
OLYMPIA...............m	30	324	..	E	..	E	g	..	E	..	g	E	E
PASCO.................m	19	131	8	E	g	E	E	E	E	..	g	p	..
PULLMAN...............m	23	123	8	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	g	E	E
QUINCY................m	4	30	2	E	g	g,l	g,l	..	E	..	..'	E	p
REDMOND...............m	27	197	18	E	g	..	g,p	..	E	..	g	E	E
RENTON................m	33	407	36	l	g	E	g	..	E	..	g	p,v	p,v
SHELTON...............m	8	75	3	E	E	E	p	p	E	p	..	E	E
SNOHOMISH.............c	389	1,349	95	..	..	..	..	..	E	..	E	p	g,i
SPOKANE...............m	173	1,783	107	l,h	g	E	p,f	p,f	E	p	..	E	..
WEST VIRGINIA													
CHARLESTON............m	58	932	42	E	g	E	l	p,l	E	..	g	p	E
MARION................c	64	136	8	h	E	l	l	p,l	s	..	E	E	E
MINGO.................c	37	94	..	..	E	..	p	p	..	..	..	p	E
ST. ALBANS............m	12	160	..	l	E	l	..	..	E	..	E	E	E

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WEST VIRGINIA (CONTINUED)													
VIENNA .... m	11	55	2	E	E	l	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
WEIRTON .... m	24	247	13	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	g	..	..
WISCONSIN													
BELOIT .... m	34	375	20	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	p	E
BOSCOBEL .... m	3	..	..	..	..	l	..	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
BROOKFIELD .... m	33	258	18	l	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
BROWN c	187	1,078	60	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	p	p
COLUMBIA c	45	367	15	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	E	E
CUDAHY .... m	19	150	9	E	E	E	..	E	E	p	..	E	E
DANE c	345	1,552	124	..	E	..	l,i	l,i	E	..	E	g,i	g,i
DE PERE .... m	16	154	16	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E
EAU CLAIRE .... m	55	601	31	E	E	..	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
EAU CLAIRE c	83	465	26	E	g	..	..	..	..	p	E	E	E
FOND DU LAC .... m	37	412	30	E	g	E	E	E	E	..	..	g,i	g,i
FOND DU LAC c	90	640	32	E	E	..	..	g	E	..	E	E	p
FRANKLIN .... m	19	90	11	E	E	E	g	E	E	p	..	E	E
GERMANTOWN .... m	12	..	..	E	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E
GRANT c	51	423	14	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	E	p	E
JANESVILLE .... m	52	454	31	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	p	E
KENOSHA .... m	75	718	46	E	..	E	E	..	E	..	..	E	p
MANITOWOC .... m	33	419	19	..	..	E	..	..	..	..	g	E	E
MANITOWOC c	82	703	30	E	g	..	..	..	..	..	E	v	E
MARINETTE c	41	543	..	g	g	..	..	..	g	g	g	E	E
MARSHFIELD .... m	20	246	16	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
MENASHA .... m	15	175	12	E	g	E	..	..	E	..	..	E	..
MENOMONIE .... m	13	117	8	E	E	E	..	..	E	..	..	p	..
MEQUON .... m	16	..	..	l	E	E	..	..	E	p	..	E	E
MERRILL .... m	10	114	5	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	g	E	E
MIDDLETON .... m	13	63	6	E	E	..	l	E	E	p	g	E	E
NEENAH .... m	23	237	14	l,h	g	E	p,s	p,s	..	..	..	E	E
NEW BERLIN .... m	31	165	18	l	E	l	l	l	E	p	..	E	E
OSHKOSH .... m	50	560	32	E	E	E	E	p	E	p	..	E	E
PEWAUKEE .... m	5	33	4	E	g	E	E	..	E	p	..	p	E
RACINE c	172	1,012	63	p,l	E	..	..	..	E	..	E	p	E
RIVER FALLS .... m	10	72	5	E	g	l	f	f	E	p	..	E	..
ROCK c	138	1,015	48	p	E	..	..	..	E	p	E	p	p
SAUK c	46	480	21	..	E	g	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
SHOREWOOD .... m	15	106	6	E	E	E	E	E	E	p	..	E	E
STEVENS POINT ..... m	22	203	16	..	E	E	E	E	E	..	..	g,i	E

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WISCONSIN (CONTINUED)													
SUN PRAIRIE............m	14	77	8	E	E	l	l	l	E	p	..	E	E
WASHINGTON............c	89	583	..	E	E	..	g	..	..	..	E	E	E
WAUWATOSA.............m	51	556	32	l	E	E	E	E	E	..	E	p	E
WEST ALLIS............m	65	684	42	l,h	E	E	E	p	E	p	E	E	E
WEST BEND.............m	22	197	13	l	E	E	..	E	E	p	..	p	..
WYOMING													
CAMPBELL..............c	37	312	42	E	E	l	..	..	..	..	i	E	E
CHEYENNE..............m	54	645	38	E	E	E	p	p,f	E	..	..	..	E
GILLETTE..............m	23	172	16	E	E	..	..	..	E	p	g	E	..
LARAMIE...............m	25	194	9	h	g	E	E	E	E	..	..	..	..
NATRONA...............c	71	1,090	..	E	E	E	E	..	..	p	E	..	..

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- Recreation services and facility maintenance
- Programs for the elderly
- Public health programs
- Homeless shelters and related food programs
- Drug, alcohol, and mental health programs and facilities

- Parks landscaping and maintenance
- Library services
- Cultural/arts programs
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- Management and maintenance of heavy equipment, emergency equipment, and other vehicles

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Community Involvement Brochure
Tucson, AZ Police Department

TEAM
TUCSON

TEAM TUCSON ... Together, we're better!
We can make Tucson better. Think about it!

We Can:
- Take an extra minute to help a neighbor
- Share our time and talents with charitable organizations
- Help out 2 hours each week at our neighborhood schools

- Work with neighbors to clean up our homes and streets...making them safer and more attractive
- Call on City government to assist with neighborhood projects
- Learn to fight crime and drug abuse...making our homes, schools and neighborhood parks safer

Don't put it off any longer...Join TEAM TUCSON today with a telephone call to CIVICS at 791-4655 or to the Volunteer Center at 327-6207. If you wish to volunteer with the Tucson Police Department, call them directly at 791-4404.

TEAM TUCSON Needs You! When everyone plays a part, we all win!

Community-Oriented Policing

The author of this month's report is Michael A.
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Service and an MPA candidate at George Washington
University.

When Professor Herman Goldstein of the University of Wisconsin Law School developed the concept of problem-oriented policing (also known as community policing and neighborhood-policing), he must have envisioned what an important role this theory would have on the future of police work. Professor Goldstein's theory is based mostly on what seems to be a common-sense way of approaching crime problems in the community, that is, to address the problems that cause or encourage criminal activity, not merely to enforce the laws that prohibit such activities. At the heart of every community-oriented policing program is this concept.

In theory community-oriented policing is straight-forward and easy to understand, but in many places implementing such a program has proven difficult and time consuming because for decades police work has generally focused on highly traditional and rigid law enforcement tactics. These traditional tactics generally include the police officer responding to a call from help from a citizen, then recording all the relevant data surrounding the case, then attempting to solve the individual crime. "But if responding to incidents is all that the police do, the community problems that cause or explain many of these incidents will never be addressed, and so the incidents will continue and their number will perhaps increase."[1]

Three elements must be present before a crime can be committed: someone must be motivated to commit the crime; a suitable target must be present; the target must be (relatively) unguarded.[2] Community-oriented policing works to eliminate one or more of those elements, reducing motivation or opportunities for individuals to commit crimes. Indepth analysis of the factors that encourage crime can lead to a successful crime reduction program. For example, in community-

Getting to know community residents is one of the strategies community-oriented departments use to gain citizen support. (Alexandria Police Department, Alexandria, Virginia)

oriented policing, after responding to many requests for service in a particularly dark alley, the police might take steps to improve the lighting to reduce the opportunity that exists for thieves and robbers to attack people.

Community-oriented policing is easily linked to the "broken window" theory (invented by well-known police theorist James Q. Wilson), which holds that simply fixing broken windows, improving lighting, and cleaning up an area that is associated with high crime has a much greater impact on reducing crime and the opportunity to commit crime than merely assigning more police personnel to the area. By fixing these "broken windows," whatever they may be, the community slowly regains pride in living in the area. As a result, citizens who once feared the streets begin to come out and use them again, reinforcing the community's support for the police and community-

Private citizens become the eyes and ears of the police department when good relations exist between police officers and neighborhood residents. (Alexandria Police Department, Alexandria, Virginia)

oriented policing. In the past several years many communities have experienced tremendous benefits from community-oriented police programs.

The benefits that come with community-oriented policing are numerous. Almost immediately the police department establishes a better rapport with the community. Police officers enter an area that is experiencing high rates of crime and become not only law enforcers, but social agents who are really concerned about the community's problems and the reduction of crime and fear. When police officers become involved in the community at this level, they become community organizers, planners, and educators. This not only benefits the community but it gives the individual police officer increased job satisfaction. It does away with some of the frustrations commonly associated with the public's image of the police as unresponsive and the feeling that traditional police tactics have no lasting effect on crime. Community-oriented policing introduces philosophical changes in the nature of police work that allow police executives to implement more modern management practices that would be ineffective in the traditional highly centralized, bureaucratic organizational structures existing in many police departments. These practices include allowing lower ranking officers to become

more involved in crime reduction programs and "mid-level managers can further encourage effective and innovative efforts by rewarding the officers who undertake them." Instead of concentrating on ticket writing and responding to calls, officers become problem solvers and innovators who are seen by citizens as community leaders. The entire police department must shift its focus from "internal efficiency to external effectiveness."[3] The end result is that police officers and departments learn how to work together with the citizens they serve, within the department and with other police departments and other local government agencies. United police efforts benefit society and the department, as citizens begin to wholeheartedly support the efforts of the police department.

Crime is often concentrated in minority sections of cities and in public housing. A community-oriented method for dealing with crime can be helpful in these particular areas because community-oriented policing generally improves strained relations between minority citizens and the police. With time, these areas gradually begin to become more participatory in community events and planning. This approach makes perfect sense because undoubtably the citizens living in these high crime areas KNOW what the local problems are and have good ideas about how to deal with them, and community-oriented policing gives these citizens an outlet for their suggestions and fears.

The city manager, county manager, or elected officials can provide the impetus for community-oriented policing programs. Community-oriented policing should not be an initiative of the police department alone. It takes a coordinated effort to successfully plan and implement such a program. The role of the local government administrator is often a unique one: he or she must have the "vision" and dedication to see that the program is planned and enacted in a manner that will be substantive and meaningful. The administrator must orient the employees to think in a totally new way and provide them with the time and resources to act in accordance with the new program. Ultimately the chief administrator must be the risk taker.

> Undoubtably the citizens living in these high crime areas know what the local problems are and have good ideas about how to deal with them...

To succeed in community-oriented policing, the local government administrator, with support from the police department, must first introduce the idea to the mayor and the council as a program that is needed and can be successfully run in the community. Often this selling job consists of merely introducing the idea to the right council member or the mayor, who will shepherd it through the council's agenda. When the time is right,

the administrator then begins the planning process, which includes recruiting key personnel to plan for the implementation of the program. Identifying key personnel is one crucial aspect of planning for community-oriented policing; another is creating a realistic time table to work from and mandating that certain changes are going to be made by certain dates. Lieutenant Bill Smith, San Bernardino Police Department, a veteran of community-oriented policing, tells local government officials that are considering such a program to "just do it—don't waste time studying the problem forever, set a time table and stick to it, delegate tasks to responsible parties: you either pay now or you pay later with interest." He is saying that government officials should not waste time studying and analyzing the problem to the point of ineffectiveness. He suggests that they look to other communities for assistance and guidance and, above all, learn from others' mistakes. There are many cities that are experimenting with community-oriented policing, and there is a great deal of information on the subject. Instead of recreating what has already been done, a local government can look at what these communities who are experienced in community-oriented policing have achieved and take a lesson from their failures.

It is crucial in implementing a community-oriented approach that all of the various local government departments become involved. The local government administrator's job does not end when the police department becomes interested in community-oriented policing; the administrator must include influential and interested personnel from the fire department, the code enforcement department, the building and safety department, and the planning department in the design and implementation stage to create a successful program. The police are the most visible entity in community-oriented policing, but the other departments can be just as important in reducing the opportunities for criminal activity. For example, if the task is to rid an area of vacant housing that has become a haven for drug users and sellers, it is equally important to include the powers of the fire and code enforcement departments in condemning and razing these structures.

At the core of community-oriented policing is developing a problem-solving process that all employees in the department can use. In developing their problem-solving process the Police Department in Newport News, Virginia, came up with a four-step process:

Scanning: As part of their daily routine, officers are expected to look for possible problems.
Analysis: When they notice a problem, officers then collect information about it. They rely on a problem analysis guide developed by the task force, which directs officers to examine offenders, victims, the social and physical environment, and previous responses to the problem. The goal is to understand the scope, nature, and causes of the problem.
Response: The knowledge gained in the analysis stage

is then used to develop and implement solutions. Officers seek the assistance of other police units, other public and private organizations, and anyone else who can help.
Assessment: Finally, officers evaluate the effectiveness of their response. They may use the results to revise the response, collect more data, or even redefine the problem.[4]

MORGANTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT: The Community Action Committee

Morgantown, West Virginia (population 26,000), is a unique community made up of permanent citizens and businesses as well as the University of West Virginia. The police department must be as responsive as possible to both the permanent residents as well as the students. In 1984 Chief John H. Cease and then Vice President Dr. George Taylor of West Virginia University founded the Community Action Committee (CAC). The CAC is a facilitating body that strives to keep the communication lines open between the police, the university, local government officials, local businesses, and the student population. It is an informal group that sees its informality as a crucial element in the problem-solving process. The meetings remain open to all interested parties and are regularly attended by the press. Typically the meetings attract 15 to 20 committee mem-

The local business community shows its appreciation for an officer on the downtown beat. (Morgantown Police Department, Morgantown, West Virginia)

bers. The group meets twice a month from mid-August thru April and monthly during the summer—the schedule corresponds with the University calendar. The meetings are held in the student union from 8:00 a.m. to around 9:15 a.m. and refreshments are provided.

During each meeting new members are introduced and are allowed to voice their concerns to the committee. Some of the topics are merely informational while some are introduced with the intention that the committee should act. When problems are introduced in this committee, the attendees act as problem solvers, expressing their opinions and proposing possible solutions. When unusual or special problems arise the group may decide to hold a special meeting. Examples of problems that have been discussed in these circumstances are the proposed building of a major power plant in the center of the city and how to deal with rowdy and often destructive students at a yearly celebration held in the city. Chief Cease stresses the importance of having all the groups that can influence community problem solving represented at the CAC meetings; it is a mistake, he says, to assume that business interests are radically different from those of the students and the university—he feels that effective problem solving should be a joint effort of many seemingly unrelated parties.

> "We gradually get to know each other and establish levels of trust that are advantageous to all when a crisis occurs."

"Perhaps the single most important benefit to local government officials has been the establishment of on-going communications and relations with our counterparts in the business, student, and academic community. We gradually get to know each other and establish levels of trust that are advantageous to all when a crisis occurs," says Chief Cease. The CAC has done an excellent job of remaining cohesive despite many changes in membership due to office changes, students graduating, or key community leaders relocating. Chief Cease says that the media has played a key role in relaying to the public what issues are potential problems for the community and what types of solutions are being looked at. An important aspect of Morgantown's dedication to community-oriented policing has been their willingness to share their experiences with other cities experiencing the same problems.

Police Ride-Along Program: The Inter Fraternity Council

The police ride-along program started as a general ride-along program for university news media writers who reported problems that students caused in the town. Many of the responses the police were making were to fraternity houses on the university property. These offenses were usually the results of parties: underage drinking, noise, and disorder. After repeated offenses and displays of tempers on the part of students and police, some members of the inter-fraternity council (IFC) volunteered to join in on the ride-along program to witness firsthand what the police officers had to deal with on typical weekend nights. This began during the 1984–1985 school year.

The approach was simply to take an IFC officer in the police car whose beat included the majority of the fraternity houses where many of the problems were arising. The interaction between the officer and the volunteer did a great deal in breaking down the stereotype that many of the officers had about the university students and vice versa. This interaction greatly reduced much of the tension. More important, the IFC officer acts in an official capacity in easing relations between the police and the fraternities: when an incident is reported, the IFC officer initiates the contact with the "offending" fraternity and requests the assistance of that fraternity to solve the problem without the use of police intervention. If the fraternity refuses to heed this warning from their peer, the police will intervene. At this point, the IFC officer maintains the role of witness in the further proceeding between the frat and the police, to judge whether the fraternity is treated fairly by the police. Often the IFC officer uses this information when the IFC decides to issue a sanction against the fraternity for violations of university policies.

In addition to the ride-along program, the police work with the fraternities and sororities in an educational program designed to make the students aware of the laws that particularly apply to them, the local criminal process, their responsibilities, and the services available to them through the Morgantown Police Department. Volunteers sign a written waiver of liability and are given some basic informational training on the department and get to know the personnel. Baseball hats for the IFC officers with a police-fraternity logo on it help publicize the partnership.

The Police Beat Program

In downtown Morgantown large numbers of students coexist with non-university residents and retail businesses. There are also several recreational strips, which include restaurants and bars and other student-oriented businesses. Some of these neighborhoods were identified by police department computers as high activity areas ideally suited to patrol by officers on foot. During football weekends and other periods of heavy activity especially, extra police presence is needed. The police department decided to bring back the beat officer to help keep order in these areas.

The department currently has an extensive "beat" officer program. The downtown beat officers follow specific job requirements that are different from those

for the ordinary police officer. The requirements specify that the officer must attend mainstreet business meetings, meet his constituents, and become heavily involved in the numerous activities in the area.

The beat concept allows the officers to become familiar with the area, its business owners, the residents and the particular problems that arise in that area, and the beat officers are there before the outbreak of problems. "A long history of benign neglect and the practice of sending in the troops after the problems began made the program difficult to sell in the beginning," says Chief Cease. After hand-picked officers were chosen and late night activities gradually became more peaceful the program really began to take off.

In the beginning of the "beat" program, the officers participated in a media walk-along: the officers interacted with students, attended classes and parties and generally made the community aware that they were going to be around to help on these busy nights. In addition, the police department lobbied hard to improve lighting in the neighborhood, improve street cleaning, install decorative lamp posts, and install chains to channel pedestrian traffic along safe routes. The beat officers have also become very involved with the community business groups. They regularly attend their meetings and are often extremely helpful in solving problems.

"Students now come to expect the beat officer with the coming of the fall semester. By the end of the first year, it is interesting to note how many students know the officers by name and vice versa," says Chief Cease. Overall the program has worked extremely well and the city is very pleased with the program.

MADISON POLICE DEPARTMENT: The Process of Implementation

(This section is based on material supplied by the Madison Police Department, including "Planning Report for the Experimental Police District," 1988.)

During the past seven years, the police department in Madison, Wisconsin (population 170,000), has gone through an organizational transformation, particularly in the areas of service delivery and management. The first step in implementing the change was the creation of the officer advisory council, which makes decisions on matters such as the selection of semiautomatic weapons, choice of patrol vehicles, uniform apparel, and so on. With the establishment of this decision-making body, Madison began to create a participatory environment and it now has considerable employee input into decisions affecting the police organization and its work force. Recently the police department undertook an extensive examination of the citizen complaint system and the promotional process.

In addition, Madison has slowly integrated community-oriented policing and problem-solving into its

EXHIBIT 1—Mission Statement and Leadership Principles—Madison, Wisconsin

VISION OF THE MADISON POLICE DEPARTMENT

We are a dynamic organization devoted to improvement, excellence, maintaining customer satisfaction, and operating on the Principles of Quality Leadership.

MISSION STATEMENT

We believe in the DIGNITY and WORTH of ALL PEOPLE.

We are committed to:

- PROVIDING HIGH-QUALITY, COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICE SERVICES WITH SENSITIVITY;
- PROTECTING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
- PROBLEM SOLVING;
- TEAMWORK;
- OPENNESS;
- PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE;
- PROVIDING LEADERSHIP TO THE POLICE PROFESSION.

We are proud of the DIVERSITY of our work force which permits us to GROW and which RESPECTS each of us as individuals, and we strive for a HEALTHFUL workplace.

PRINCIPLES OF QUALITY LEADERSHIP

1. Believe in, foster, and support TEAMWORK.
2. Be committed to the PROBLEM-SOLVING process; use it and let DATA, not emotions, drive decisions.
3. Seek employees INPUT before you make key decisions.
4. Believe that the best way to improve the quality of work or service is to ASK and LISTEN to employees who are doing the work.
5. Strive to develop mutual RESPECT and TRUST among employees.
6. Have a CUSTOMER orientation and focus toward employees and citizens.
7. Manage on the BEHAVIOR of 95% of employees and not on the 5% who cause problems. Deal with the 5% PROMPTLY and FAIRLY.
8. IMPROVE SYSTEMS and examine processes before blaming people.
9. Avoid "top-down," POWER-ORIENTED decison-making whenever possible.
10. Encourage CREATIVITY through RISK-TAKING and be tolerant of honest MISTAKES.
11. Be a FACILITATOR and COACH. Develop an OPEN atmosphere that encourages providing and accepting FEEDBACK.
12. With teamwork, develop with employees agreed-upon GOALS and a PLAN to achieve them.

services. In 1984 a planning group was formed that consisted of both commissioned and civilian members of the department who had at least 15 years of service remaining with the department. This group examined events, developments, and trends in the Madison social setting that could effect the delivery of police services in the future. After a year of study, the committee submitted a report outlining three primary themes, citing the need to:

- Get closer to the people they serve
- Make better use of available technology
- Develop and improve health and wellness in the work place.

In 1985, the department announced the decision to initiate a community-oriented policing style. Integrating such a new program into the operations of a police staff of more than 400 would be an overwhelming task, so Madison decided to initiate a small, visible program to begin with. In the fall of 1985, the experimental police district project (EPD) was formed by reassigning personnel from more traditional areas. In the beginning eight police officers were assigned to small geographic areas to answer calls for service, conduct follow-up investigations on non-assigned criminal investigations, and maintain neighborhood order on top of their primary duties of providing community organizing, problem-solving, and other "high-touch" services. Madison Police Chief Couper's definition of the EPD staff provides the best insight into Madison's philosophy of community-oriented policing: "Police who function as community workers and organizers, and work alongside citizens to help them prevent, resist, and eliminate crime and disorder in their neighborhoods."

It was very coincidental and helpful that the city government had simultaneously launched a program called the City of Madison's Quality and Productivity Program. The basic goal of the QP program is to improve the quality of services to the city's citizens. By interacting with their "customers," city staff identify where the quality of service needs improvement. Behind the QP program is the understanding that the people who are most closely involved with work processes are in the best position to identify and develop ways to improve these processes. The QP project brings together key personnel who work with each other to identify problems with work processes, to clarify causes of these problems, and to recommend actions to improve the work processes. After discussion, the police reached a consensus that the newly created experimental police district project would greatly benefit from the city's QP program.

The next task the planning group undertook was establishing criteria for selection of members for the EPD team. Using a nominal group process, the group identified selection criteria (Exhibit 3). After deciding what characteristics would be most desirable in the candidates applying for positions in the experimental

police district, the next task was determining eligibility for selection to the project team. There was debate over whether to consider only candidates who had expressed interest in the department's community-policing efforts from the beginning, or to expand the selection process to include all departmental personnel. After considerable discussion there was still no consensus on this

EXHIBIT 2—EPD Project Steps—Madison, Wisconsin

1986	1.0	**Develop Mission Statement**
	1.1	Define overall purpose
	1.2	Identify the decisions and tasks already known to us
	1.3	Identify future areas of decision-making
1986	2.0	**Identify Target Patrol District**
	2.1	Develop criteria for selection
	2.2	Research all of the possibilities utilizing developed criteria
	2.3	Presentations, discussions, decision
1987	3.0	**Analysis of Area**
	3.1	Calls for service
	3.2	Crime profile
	3.3	Other service providers: neighborhood associations and other organized groups
Ongoing	4.0	**Customer Research**
	4.1	Identify internal customers and create a mechanism to get their input on an ongoing basis
	4.2	Identify external customers and their needs
	4.3	Identify vendors and their impact
Ongoing	5.0	**Decision-Making**
	5.1	Develop agenda of decisions to be made
	5.2	Develop criteria for and select a suitable station
Ongoing	6.0	**Implementation**
	6.1	Selection of personnel
	6.2	Orientation of personnel
	6.3	Start-up
Constant	7.0	**Evaluation**
	7.1	Plan
	7.2	Do
	7.3	Check
	7.4	Act

issue, so a vote was called and the group voted to open up the selection process to all Madison police personnel.

Next a selection committee was formed, which then developed five potential methods for selecting project team members. Again after much debate and a vote by the participating officers, the planning group designated a selection committee consisting of three persons: one captain, a union representative, and one planning group member. A memo was circulated throughout the department announcing plans for the formulation of a project team to develop the EPD concept. The memo provided an overview of the EPD concept and specified target dates for planning and research, as well as for implementation. The memo addressed the relationship between the EPD project and the city's QP program and described the role of project team members were expected to play. The memo also announced that all interested personnel were eligible to submit an application for consideration as a project team member.

The selection committee reviewed resumes and letters of interest from each applicant, looking for experience, education or relevant outside interests and activities. A Likert scale was developed (5—excellent; 4—good; etc.) to rank each applicant's paper qualifications. The second part of the selection process was an interview to assess each candidate's reasons for wanting to participate. At the conclusion of the interview process, the selection committee combined the scores from both portions and then ranked them, to select 11 project team members.

A separate project coordinating team was designated by Chief Couper to provide leadership and support to the project team. In addition to Chief Couper, the coordinating team included other top management personnel, but it was a radical departure from other coordinating teams, most of which are the "natural" or existing departmental management team or a group that includes only managers directly affected by the project.

Responsibilities of the coordinating team were described as follows:

- Work with the project team to develop and refine a written project mission statement
- Assist with the development of and approve the project team's general plans
- Provide the project team with the resources it needs
- Regularly meet with the project team leader to discuss progress reports
- Remove barriers to the project team's progress
- Approve and facilitate changes recommended by the project team.

Now that the personnel had been chosen for the project, the next step was to formulate a plan for the direction of the project. This included a self-evaluation of the police department, noting its negative and unresponsive aspects. The project team came up with a list of problems they planned to change in the new community-oriented policing program. They found that many of these problems were common to all organizational structures, and although the problems were not unique or surprising, the exercise provided the officers an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with the

EXHIBIT 3—Project Team Criteria—Madison, Wisconsin

Criteria	Total Score	Votes Received
1. Members committees —flexible	128	15
2. Representatives of all work groups within department—commissioned and non-commissioned	118	17
3. Demonstrated skill level in group process and inter-personal skills	98	16
4. Broad range of experience (time-on) from most senior to least senior	97	16
5. Prior demonstrated interest in change	89	15
6. Prior training/knowledge in project development and research	84	14
7. Maximum number in project team of 8–10 persons	80	14
8. Representative of work force composition	61	11
9. Someone familiar with manpower allocation, budget, and operational logistics	54	13
10. Someone familiar with city's QP program	41	9
11. Writing ability	34	8
12. Willing to accept staff assignments	30	8
13. Account for individual talents	24	9
13a Statistical background	24	6
14. People involved in project remain willing to stay with experiment during implementation if needed	21	6
15. Union input	11	4
16. Volunteers from work areas affected by project	10	2

current system. It was the first step in moving to introduce a formula for successful change.

After much debate and study, the members choose an area of town with a wide variety of cultural and ethnic groups, including Caucasians, African Americans, Native Americans, Asians, and Hispanic Americans. The upper region of the district contains a large, off-campus student population from the University of Wisconsin. The area is represented by eleven neighborhood groups and three business groups.

In April and May of 1987, the project team conducted an "external customer" research effort designed to solicit citizen input to identify problems or concerns of the neighborhoods. Eight community meetings were held, two meetings in each of the four EPD districts. Project team members served as facilitators for each group and recorded their responses. In each meeting, the facilitator solicited ideas by going around the table several times in brainstorm fashion, and then condensed the list of problems and concerns by having the citizens combine similar problems. After the problem identification exercise, the group was asked how the police can work with the citizens to solve the specific problems they had identified. Some suggestions were for patrol officers to get out of their cars more, to get to know the neighborhood children better, and to focus on drug and alcohol problems more. As important as these suggestions were, the acceptance the citizens showed for the police officers was even

Police officers on horseback and on foot build relationships of mutual trust with community residents. (Madison Police Department, Madison, Wisconsin)

EXHIBIT 4—Customer Survey—Madison, Wisconsin

The Madison Police Department's Experimental Police District was established in January 1988. One of our goals is to achieve a closer relationship with the community we service. Recently an officer or detective from the Experimental Police District handled or did follow up on a case in which you were involved. The officers or detectives would now like to receive feedback from you on the quality of service you experience. Please take a moment to complete the questions below and return in the enclosed postage paid envelope.

1. NUMBER OF CONTACTS WITH THE MADISON POLICE IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS:

_____ one   _____ two   _____ three or more

2. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF YOUR MOST RECENT CONTACT?

_____ I called to report a problem or incident.
_____ I was the victim of a crime or offense.
_____ I was a witness to a crime or incident.
_____ I was involved in a motor vehicle accident.
_____ I requested information from the Department.
_____ I was arrested or issued a citation.
_____ I was contacted about a problem or disturbance.
_____ I was involved in another way with the Department (please specify the nature of your other contacts)

3. PLEASE RATE YOUR MOST RECENT CONTACT IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS OF SERVICE:

	EXCELLENT	GOOD	FAIR	POOR	VERY POOR
a. Concern					
b. Helpfulness					
c. Knowledge					
d. Fairness					
e. Solving the Problem					
f. Putting you at ease					
g. Professional Conduct					
h. Response Time					

4. PLEASE CHECK THOSE THAT APPLY TO YOU:

I AM: _____ male   _____ female
MY RACE IS: _____ white   _____ black
               _____ Hispanic   _____ other
MY AGE IS: _____ under 17   _____ 18–20
               _____ 21–24   _____ 25–39
               _____ 40+
I EARN: _____ under $5,000 _____ $5–19,000
               _____ $20–34,000   _____ $35,000 or more

Thank you for your feedback!

more important: they invited the officers to neighborhood block parties for the first time; nearly every person offered to help and expressed the support for the police that until then they could only assume existed. Many successful programs have come out of Madison's community-oriented policing program. The development of a customer survey to monitor the quality of service citizens are receiving from the police and a "neighborly" warning program for speeders that was a joint effort by the police department and a neighborhood watch group.

HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT:
Neighborhood-Oriented Policing

(This section was written by Lee P. Brown, Chief of Police, Houston Police Department, Houston, Texas.)

Located in the southwestern United States, Houston ranks as the country's fourth most populous city. It also is perhaps one of the most diverse in terms of ethnic composition. Of the city's 1.7 million residents (3.5 million in the Houston metropolitan area), 28 percent are black, and 23 percent are Hispanic. Because of the city's proximity to Mexico, most members of the Hispanic community are of Mexican heritage. Houston also is home for an increasingly large number of Asians, particularly Vietnamese immigrants.

Values

To provide police services to the Houston community, which spans a land area of approximately 600 square miles, the Houston Police Department has roughly 4,300 officers. Since 1982 the nature of the services they provide has been based on needs as expressed by citizens themselves.

A departmental assessment was launched in 1982. Individuals and community groups were asked to discuss their concerns about policing in Houston. *Based on the data collected,* the department prepared a plan of action that not only outlined the reforms needed to improve the delivery of police services but also articulated a set of ten values the department would use to guide the revamping of current programs and policies and the formulation of new ones. At the time, the documentation of a set of values was unprecedented among U.S. law enforcement agencies.

The department's values were designed to be consistent with its mission of enhancing the quality of life in Houston: by forging cooperative working relationships with the community and working within the framework of the Constitution to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide for a safe environment.

Taken as a whole or individually, the ten documented values represent ideals that the department believes will benefit not only itself but also the citizens of Houston. Because these values are the basis upon which the department's policing decisions are made and because an increasing number of American cities are developing values of their own, three of the Houston Police Department's values will be discussed here. Each should help illuminate the department's philosophy of policing and highlight the trend toward community-oriented policing.

Value 1: Police/citizen cooperation. One of the keys to controlling crime is the development of cooperative working relationships between the police and the citizens they serve. The department's message to the citizens of Houston is that crime is not a problem the police alone can solve—that the community has an extremely important role to play in efforts to fight neighborhood crime.

Such a strategy, however, differs from the norm of traditional policing, which considered police officers to be professional crime fighters who saw no need to involve citizens in crime-fighting efforts to any great degree. The department's decision to change course indicates its recognition of crime as a problem that cannot be solved without the active involvement of both the police and citizens.

Why people commit crime, however, is still open to debate. Some theorists believe that biological factors cause crime—that criminal behavior is an inborn characteristic. This is known as the "born-criminal" theory. Other theorists believe that social and economic conditions cause crime. Between these two extremes are many variations with varying degrees of emphasis on sociological, psychological, or economic factors as the causes of crime.

What is certain is that no one individual or group—not even the police—can control the causes of crime. The problem of crime therefore must be addressed by a partnership between the police and the community.

Value 2: Crime prevention as the first priority. For any organization to meet its goals, it must set priorities. In Houston, the number one priority is crime prevention. The rationale for such a choice is obvious: It is more efficient to prevent a crime from occurring than to set the police machinery into motion after a citizen has been victimized. The focus on crime prevention, however, does not mean that the department has abandoned its efforts to enforce the laws and solve those crimes that do occur. An aggressive law enforcement program designed to apprehend those persons who choose to violate the law will continue unabated.

Value 3: Use of police resources to reinforce the concept of community and neighborhoods. Social analysts in the United States have said that citizens of this country are concerned about what goes on in their community and that they are relying less on government and more on themselves to improve the quality of life at the neighborhood level. The Houston Police Department believes the self-help movement is a positive trend and

has pledged to use its resources to reinforce the concept of *community* and enhance the quality of neighborhood life.

Programs

With the department's values now in place, the next step was to translate these concepts into actions (i.e., the delivery of police services on the streets of Houston) and into a comprehensive policing style. Over the past six years, the department has experimented with a variety of programs to determine what works and what does not work. In the area of decentralization, four of these programs have proven to be highly successful: the Directed Area Responsibility Team, the Fear Reduction Project, the Positive Interaction Project, and Project Oasis.

Because the city of Houston encompasses such a vast land area, one of the police department's major efforts has been the decentralization of police services. This has been done by dividing the city into four districts. A new police station will be built in each of these districts by the mid 1990s, and this network of regional police facilities will function in conjunction with a central facility in downtown Houston. Each station's deputy chief will be responsible for delivering police services to his particular area.

Directed Area Responsibility Team. The preparation for decentralization began in 1983 with the implementation of several innovative programs. The first of these was the Directed Area Responsibility Team (DART), a pilot project based on the concept of team policing. Used briefly during the 1970s, team policing relies on the expertise of more than just patrol officers to address

Officers and community residents discuss mutual problems.
(Houston Police Department, Houston, Texas)

citizens' concerns and fight crime. The department's adaptation of the team-policing concept brought together the expertise of patrol officers, detectives, crime analysts and crime-prevention specialists. As a group they worked to address the concerns of Houston citizens as identified in the department's 1982 assessment of community needs.

An evaluation of the three-year experiment found the DART program to be extremely effective in responding to citizen concerns such as fear of crime. Comments from Houston citizens about feeling more at ease within their neighborhood provided convincing evidence that the strategies employed brought positive results. Some examples:

- The use of one-officer cars rather than two-officer cars not only doubled the number of cars in circulation within the DART area but also shortened response times to calls-for-service since more units were available to respond.
- The crime rate went down, and the clearance rate went up because officers were able to remove law violators from the streets of Houston.
- Citizens' ratings of the quality of life in their neighborhood improved greatly.
- Officers' attitudes toward their job improved as the gains accomplished through the DART program reinforced the positive image of the police in the minds of the community and the officers themselves.

Fear reduction project. In 1983, the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored a national research study to determine what police agencies could do to reduce citizens' fear of crime. Two police departments—Houston and Newark (New Jersey)—were selected as the demonstration sites.

Each department independently developed a complement of programs to meet the city's unique needs. In Houston, there were five: Victim Recontact, Community Organizing Response Team, Direct Citizen Contact Program, Neighborhood Information Network, and Police Community Centers. Each is described below:

- The Victim Recontact program was implemented to determine whether citizens' fears would be lessened if the police tended to the needs of crime *victims* in addition to targeting the resources of the criminal justice system on the offender. Police officers were instructed to call recent crime victims and ask them if they had any problems the police could handle and whether they had any additional information about their case.
- Another strategy the department tested was the use of a Community Organizing Response Team (CORT). Officers were taught how to organize neighborhood residents around quality-of-life issues. What these officers found was surprising. Residents were more concerned about the signs of crime (e.g., juveniles loitering on street corners,

abandoned buildings, vacant lots filled with weeds and uncut grass) than they were about major crimes (e.g., burglary, robbery). CORT officers therefore focused their attention on helping residents find and use city and community services designed to address the problems identified.

- The Direct Citizen Contact program allowed officers to use their uncommitted time (i.e., the time when officers are not responding to calls for service) to meet and talk with the people on their beat. Officers knocked on residents' and business owners' doors and said, "I am Officer Brown. I am your police officer for this neighborhood. What concerns do you have?"
- The Neighborhood Information Network provided residents with firsthand information about crime in their community. The department distributed a newsletter to the approximately 2,000 people living within a designated communi!;' Each month, residents were given tips on how to prevent crime and a block-by-block listings of ·crimes committed in their neighborhood. No longer were area citizens forced to rely on secondary sources, such as the news media and other citizens. With information received directly from the police department, they were able to develop an accurate and balanced picture of crime and the measures being taken to combat problems.
- The final strategy involved the use of a community center, or storefront, patterned on the Japanese Koban system. Officers assigned to the center provided a variety of police services designed to meet the specific needs of the target neighborhood's 2,000 to 3,000 residents. A number of other community centers have since been established throughout Houston.

Each center is strategically located to provide residents with maximum accessibility. Officers assigned to the centers take complaints, write reports, give crime-prevention tips, and answer residents' questions about city services. These officers also serve as a backup unit when an arrest is made and a prisoner must be transported.

> **The Direct Citizen Contact program proved to be the most successful in reducing citizens' fear of crime.**

At the end of the test period, each strategy was evaluated by the Police Foundation, a research organization with headquarters in Washington, D.C. Results of the evaluation showed that some of the strategies were successful in reducing citizens' fear of crime while others were not. It is important to note, however, that most of the programs implemented required no additional expenditure of financial resources.

Neighborhood policing includes helping residents find and use community services. (Houston Police Department, Houston, Texas)

Of the strategies tested in Houston, the Direct Citizen Contact program proved to be the most successful in reducing citiz·ns' fear of crime. Also highly successful was the community-center strategy. The study showed that citizens were less fearful of crime because the officers assigned to the center interacted with the persons who lived and worked in the area.

Positive Interaction Program. The Positive Interaction Program (PIP) also seeks to involve citizens in policing efforts. Cited by the Police Foundation as one of 18 exemplary programs around the country, the PIP helps citizens and police officers forge a working relationship geared toward the identification and resolution of neighborhood problems. Each substation captain is required to organize his neighborhood and to meet monthly with area leaders, such as civic club presidents, business owners, and religious officials. During the meetings, citizens can discuss neighborhood problems with the police captain responsible for that area. The captain then assumes responsibility for addressing the problems with available police resources.

For their part, beat officers attend meetings of neighborhood associations. They try to stay as long as possible, but even a five-minute appearance makes a significant difference if the citizens attending the meeting get to know their officers and the officers get to know the citizens in their beat. The result is better police/citizen relationships.

The PIP, however, is more than a problem-solving vehicle. It also has an educational function as com-

EXHIBIT 5—Traditional vs. Community Policing:
Questions and Answers

	Traditional	Community policing
Question: Who are the police?	A government agency principally responsible for law enforcement.	Police are the public and the public are the police; the police offiers are those who are paid to give full-time attention to the duties of every citizen.
Question: What is the relationship of the police force to other public service departments?	Priorities often conflict.	The police are one department among many responsible for improving the quality of life.
Question: What is the role of the police?	Focusing on solving crimes.	A broader problem-solving approach.
Question: How is police efficiency measured?	By detection and arrest rates.	By the absence of crime and disorder.
Question: What are the highest priorities?	Crimes that are high value (e.g., bank robberies) and those involving violence.	Whatever problems disturb the community most.
Question: What, specifically, do police deal with?	Incidents.	Citizens' problems and concerns.
Question: What determines the effectiveness of police?	Response times.	Public cooperation.
Question: What view do police take of service calls?	Deal with them only if there is no real police work to do.	Vital function and great opportunity.
Question: What is police professionalism?	Swift effective response to serious crime.	Keeping close to the community.
Question: What kind of intelligence is most important?	Crime intelligence (study of particular crimes or series of crimes).	Criminal intelligence (information about the activities of individuals or groups).
Question: What is the essential nature of police accountability?	Highly centralized; governed by rules, regulations, and policy directives; accountable to the law.	Emphasis on local accountability to community needs.
Question: What is the role of headquarters?	To provide the necessary rules and policy directives.	To preach organizational values.
Question: What is the role of the press liaison department?	To keep the "heat" off operational officers so they can get on with the job.	To coordinate an essential channel of communication with the community.
Question: How do the police regard prosecutions?	As an important goal.	As one tool among many.

Source: "Implementing Community Policing," Perspectives on Policing series, published by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 1988.

munity leaders take what they have learned about police activities back to their organizations. This allows the department to reach thousands of people who would be missed if officers tried to speak with each person individually.

Project Oasis. Another project undertaken to meet the department's goals is Project Oasis. Central to the project is the oasis technique, a comprehensive system for improving living conditions and the quality of life in neighborhoods blighted by vandalism, illegal drugs, burglary, theft, assault and other crimes.

The technique was developed by the Oasis Institute in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The theory behind the technique is that if "good" things are placed in blighted areas, the "good" things can infiltrate the "bad" things and transform the area into something better.

The project's target area was one of Houston's worst public housing projects—an area where crime and drugs were such serious problems that even police officers did not want to go into the neighborhood. For the people who lived there, it was a grim situation. Application of the oasis technique meant marshaling the resources of the Houston Housing Authority and other government agencies to install locks on doors and put up lamps on the area's streets.

By working with area residents to devise solutions to the problems, the police enhanced their presence in the area (with no increase in personnel). The crime problem was reduced, drug dealing was curtailed, and the number of calls for service coming from the target area dropped by 60 percent. Many of the resources that once had to be funneled into the project could now be used in other areas.

Policing Style

The programs discussed above all share two common traits: they are neither citywide nor departmentwide in scope. However, they serve as a key element in the development of an overall operating style known in Houston as neighborhood oriented policing. The process of adopting a new policing style began in October 1986 when the first of several executive session meetings was convened. Approximately 30 members of the department—from patrol officers to police chief—met for two months to review the department's experience with community-oriented programs and to determine the feasibility of developing a new style of policing.

Committee members also looked at the department's mission and values, at what was being done in other parts of the nation and the world, and at two decades worth of police research. By raising questions, debating the issues, and bringing in consultants, the committee was able to determine how the city of Houston should be policed in the future. "Neighborhood oriented policing" was selected as the name for the department's new policing style and management philosophy.

In the Direct Citizen Contact program, officers knock on residents' doors and introduce themselves. (Houston Police Department, Houston, Texas)

Neighborhood oriented policing. The new style is rooted in the belief that effective prevention and control of crime is dependent upon interaction between citizens and police officers as they work to identify and resolve the neighborhood's crime and noncrime problems. As an active partner in the struggle to improve the quality of neighborhood life, citizens combine their resources with those of the police to attack crime and the fear of victimization.

The following elements of the neighborhood policing philosophy distinguish it from more traditional styles of policing:

- Joint police/community efforts to achieve common goals
- Joint identification of the neighborhood's crime and crime-related problems
- Joint identification of solutions to the neighborhood's crime and crime-related problems
- Use of both police and community resources to address identified problems.

This philosophy challenges many of the theories associated with traditional policing practices. For example, the notion that random preventive patrols effectively control crime is replaced by the acknowledgement that random patrols produce random results. Houston

police officers therefore are expected to devote their uncommitted time to performing self-directed and structured activities that attempt to address neighborhood problems.

Neighborhood-oriented policing also requires police officers to assume a multiplicity of roles rather than the single role of crime fighter or keeper of the peace. Because of the uniqueness of individual neighborhoods, officers must learn to become neighborhood managers, crime prevention specialists, planners, problem solvers, community organizers and skilled communicators. Development of these skills is essential to the officer's ability to form working partnerships with the citizens in his or her beat.

The roles of sergeants and lieutenants must change as well. Instead of spending all their time on the traditional task of controlling their officers' activities and their working environment, sergeants must encourage participatory management, facilitate group cohesiveness, become resource allocation specialists, and above all else, become coaches capable of developing each officer's maximum potential.

As shift managers, lieutenants must work to eliminate bottlenecks that impede the attainment of results. They also must learn how to manage multifunctional teams, assume more responsibility for strategic planning, and become more actively involved in mobilizing community participation toward the prevention and control of neighborhood crime.

Neighborhood-oriented policing is a results-oriented management process with an explicit focus—namely, to integrate the desires and expectations of citizens with actions taken by the police department to identify and address conditions that have a negative effect on the city's neighborhoods. Meaningful interaction between police officers and citizens is essential if consensus is to be reached on what needs to be done to improve a particular neighborhood.

Neighborhood-oriented policing therefore requires administrators to be more flexible in providing officers with opportunities to interact with neighborhood citizens. The Houston Police Department facilitated the interaction process by organizing its districts and beats along neighborhood boundaries. Officers are responsible for providing services to a particular neighborhood and then become accountable to that community's residents.

[1]James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, "Making Neighborhoods Safe," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1989.

[2]Lawrence E. Cohen and Marcus Felson, "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach," *American Sociological Review* August 1979, pp. 588–608.

[3]John E. Eck and William Spelman, "The Police and the Delivery of Local Government Services: A Problem-Oriented Approach," working draft, 1989, p. 17.

[4]Eck and Spelman, p. 9.

Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach
by Herman Goldstein

Abstract

The police have been particularly susceptible to the "means over ends" syndrome, placing more emphasis in their improvement efforts on organization and operating methods than on the substantive outcome of their work. This condition has been fed by the professional movement within the police field, with its concentration on the staffing, management, and organization of police agencies. More and more persons are questioning the widely held assumption that improvements in the internal management of police departments will enable the police to deal more effectively with the problems they are called upon to handle. If the police are to realize a greater return on the investment made in improving their operations, and if they are to mature as a profession, they must concern themselves more directly with the end product of their efforts.

Meeting this need requires that the police develop a more systematic process for examining and addressing the problems that the public expects them to handle. It requires identifying these problems in more precise terms, researching each problem, documenting the nature of the current police response, assessing its adequacy and the adequacy of existing authority and resources, engaging in a broad exploration of alternatives to present responses, weighing the merits of these alternatives, and choosing from among them.

Improvements in staffing, organization, and management remain important, but they should be achieved--and may, in fact, be more achievable--within the context of a more direct concern with the outcome of policing.

Complaints from passengers wishing to use the Bagnall to Greenfields bus service that "the drivers were speeding past queues of up to 30 people with a smile and a wave of a hand" have been met by a statement pointing out that "it is impossible for the drivers to keep their timetable if they have to stop for passengers".[1]

All bureaucracies risk becoming so preoccupied with running their organizations and getting so involved in their methods of operating that they lose sight of the primary purposes for which they were created. The police seem unusually susceptible to this phenomenon.

One of the most popular new developments in policing is the use of officers as decoys to apprehend offenders in high-crime areas. A speaker at a recent conference for police administrators, when asked to summarize new developments in the field, reported on a sixteen-week experiment in his agency with the use of decoys, aimed at reducing street robberies.

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One major value of the project, the speaker claimed, was its contribution to the police department's public image. Apparently, the public was intrigued by the clever, seductive character of the project, especially by the widely publicized demonstrations of the makeup artists' ability to disguise burly officers. The speaker also claimed that the project greatly increased the morale of the personnel working in the unit. The officers found the assignment exciting and challenging, a welcome change from the tedious routine that characterizes so much of regular police work, and they developed a high *esprit de corps*.

The effect on robberies, however, was much less clear. The methodology used and the problems in measuring crime apparently prevented the project staff from reaching any firm conclusions. But it was reported that, of the 216 persons arrested by the unit for robbery during the experiment, more than half would not have committed a robbery, in the judgment of the unit members, if they had not been tempted by the situation presented by the police decoys. Thus, while the total impact of the project remains unclear, it can be said with certainty that the experiment actually increased the number of robberies by over 100 in the sixteen weeks of the experiment.

The account of this particular decoy project (others have claimed greater success) is an especially poignant reminder of just how serious an imbalance there is within the police field between the interest in organizational and procedural matters and the concern for the substance of policing. The assumption, of course, is that the two are related, that improvements in internal management will eventually increase the capacity of the police to meet the objectives for which police agencies are created. But the relationship is not that clear and direct and is increasingly being questioned.

Perhaps the best example of such questioning relates to response time. Tremendous resources were invested during the past decade in personnel, vehicles, communications equipment, and new procedures in order to increase the speed with which the police respond to calls for assistance. Much less attention was given in this same period to what the officer does in handling the variety of problems he confronts on arriving, albeit fast, where he is summoned. Now, ironically, even the value of a quick response is being questioned.[2]

This article summarizes the nature of the "means over ends" syndrome in policing and explores ways of focusing greater attention on the results of policing--on the effect that police efforts have on the problems that the police are expected to handle.

The "Means over Ends" Syndrome

Until the late 1960s, efforts to improve policing in this country concentrated almost exclusively on internal management: streamlining the organization, upgrading personnel, modernizing equipment, and establishing more businesslike operating procedures. All of the major commentators on the police since the beginning of the century--Leonhard F. Fuld (1909), Raymond B. Fosdick (1915),

August Vollmer (1936), Bruce Smith (1940), and O. W. Wilson (1950)--stressed the need to improve the organization and management of police agencies. Indeed, the emphasis on internal management was so strong that professional policing was defined primarily as the application of modern management concepts to the running of a police department.

The sharp increase in the demands on the police in the late 1960s (increased crime, civil rights demonstrations, and political protest) led to several national assessments of the state of policing.[3] The published findings contained some criticism of the professional model of police organization, primarily because of its impersonal character and failure to respond to legitimate pressures from within the community.[4] Many recommendations were made for introducing a greater concern for the human factors in policing, but the vast majority of the recommendations that emerged from the reassessments demonstrated a continuing belief that the way to improve the police was to improve the organization. Higher recruitment standards, college education for police personnel, reassignment and reallocation of personnel, additional training, and greater mobility were proposed. Thus the management-dominated concept of police reform spread and gained greater stature.

The emphasis on secondary goals--on improving the organization--continues to this day, reflected in the prevailing interests of police administrators, in the factors considered in the selection of police chiefs and the promotion of subordinates, in the subject matter of police periodicals and texts, in the content of recently developed educational programs for the police, and even in the focus of major research projects.

At one time this emphasis was appropriate. When Vollmer, Smith, and Wilson formulated their prescriptions for improved policing, the state of the vast majority of police agencies was chaotic. Personnel were disorganized, poorly equipped, poorly trained, inefficient, lacking accountability, and often corrupt. The first priority was putting the police house in order. Otherwise, the endless crises that are produced by an organization out of control would be totally consuming. Without a minimum level of order and accountability, an agency cannot be redirected--however committed its administrators may be to addressing more substantive matters.

What is troubling is that administrators of those agencies that have succeeded in developing a high level of operating efficiency have not gone on to concern themselves with the end results of their efforts--with the actual impact that their streamlined organizations have on the problems the police are called upon to handle.

The police seem to have reached a plateau at which the highest objective to which they aspire is administrative competence. And, with some scattered exceptions, they seem reluctant to move beyond this plateau--toward creating a more systematic concern for the end product of their efforts. But strong pressures generated by several new developments may now force them to do so. .

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1. *The Financial Crisis*

The growing cost of police services and the financial plight of most city governments, especially those under threat of Proposition 13 movements, are making municipal officials increasingly reluctant to appropriate still more money for police service without greater assurance that that their investment will have an impact on the problems that the police are expected to handle. Those cities that are already reducing their budgets are being forced to make some of the hard choices that must be made in weighing the impact of such cuts on the nature of the service rendered to the public.

2. *Research Findings*

Recently completed research questions the value of two major aspects of police operations--preventive patrol and investigations conducted by detectives.[5] Some police administrators have challenged the findings;[5] others are awaiting the results of replication.[7] But those who concur with the results have begun to search for alternatives, aware of the need to measure the effectiveness of a new response before making a substantial investment in it.

3. *Growth of a Consumer Orientation*

Policing has not yet felt the full impact of consumer advocacy. As citizens press for improvement in police service, improvement will increasingly be measured in terms of results. Those concerned about battered wives, for example, could not care less whether the police who respond to such calls operate with one or two officers in a car, whether the officers are short or tall, or whether they have a college education. Their attention is on what the police do for the battered wife.

4. *Questioning the Effectiveness of the Best-Managed Agencies*

A number of police departments have carried out most, if not all, of the numerous recommendations for strengthening a police organization and enjoy a national reputation for their efficiency, their high standards of personnel selection and training, and their application of modern technology to their operations. Nevertheless, their communities apparently continue to have the same problems as do others with less advanced police agencies.[3]

5. *Increased Resistance to Organizational Change*

Intended improvements that are primarily in the form of organizational change, such as team policing, almost invariably run into resistance from rank-and-file personnel. Stronger and more militant unions have engaged some police administrators in bitter and prolonged fights over such changes.[3] Because the costs in terms of disruption and discontent are so great, pol: administrators initiating change will be under increasing pressure to demonstr: in advance that the results of their efforts will make the struggle worthwhile.

Against this background, the exceptions to the dominant concern with the police organization and its personnel take on greater significance. Although scattered and quite modest, a number of projects and training programs carried out in recent years have focused on a single problem that the public expects the police to handle, such as child abuse, sexual assault, arson, or the drunk driver. These projects and programs, by their very nature, subordinate the customary priorities of police reform, such as staffing, management, and equipment, to a concern about a specific problem and the police response to it.

Some of the earliest support for this type of effort was reflected in the crime-specific projects funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.[11] Communities--not just the police--were encouraged to direct their attention to a specific type of crime and to make those changes in existing operations that were deemed necessary to reduce its incidence. The widespread move to fashion a more effective police response to domestic disturbances is probably the best example of a major reform that has, as its principal objective, improvement in the quality of service delivered, and that calls for changes in organization, staffing, and training only as these are necessary to achieve the primary goal.

Are these scattered efforts a harbinger of things to come? Are they a natural development in the steadily evolving search for ways to improve police operations? Or are they, like the programs dealing with sexual assault and child abuse, simply the result of the sudden availability of funds because of intensified citizen concern about a specific problem? Whatever their origin, those projects that do subordinate administrative considerations to the task of improving police effectiveness in dealing with a specific problem have a refreshing quality to them.

WHAT IS THE END PRODUCT OF POLICING?

To urge a more direct focus on the primary objectives of a police agency requires spelling out these objectives more clearly. But this is no easy task, given the conglomeration of unrelated, ill-defined, and often inseparable jobs that the police are expected to handle.

The task is complicated further because so many people believe that the job of the police is, first and foremost, to enforce the law: to regulate conduct by applying the criminal law of the jurisdiction. One commentator on the police recently claimed: "We do not say to the police: 'Here is the problem. Deal with it.' We say: 'Here is a detailed code. Enforce it.'"[12] In reality, the police job is perhaps most accurately described as dealing with problems.[13] Moreover, enforcing the criminal code is itself only a means to an end--one of several that the police employ in getting their job done.[14] The emphasis on law enforcement, therefore, is nothing more than a continuing preoccupation with means.

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Considerable effort has been invested in recent years in attempting to define the police function: inventorying the wide range of police responsibilities, categorizing various aspects of policing, and identifying some of the characteristics common to all police tasks.[15] This work will be of great value in refocusing attention on the end product of policing, but the fact that it is still going on is not cause to delay giving greater attention to substantive matters. It is sufficient, for our purposes here, simply to acknowledge that the police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral and social problems that arise in a community--that the end product of policing consists of dealing with these problems.

By problems, I mean the incredibly broad range of troublesome situations that prompt citizens to turn to the police, such as street robberies, residential burglaries, battered wives, vandalism, speeding cars, runaway children, accidents, acts of terrorism, even fear. These and other similar problems are the essence of police work. They are the reason for having a police agency.

Problems of this nature are to be distinguished from those that frequently occupy police administrators, such as lack of manpower, inadequate supervision, inadequate training, or strained relations with police unions. They differ from those most often identified by operating personnel, such as lack of adequate equipment, frustrations in the prosecution of criminal cases, or inequities in working conditions. And they differ, too, from the problems that have occupied those advocating police reform, such as the multiplicity of police agencies, the lack of lateral entry, and the absence of effective controls over police conduct.

Many of the problems coming to the attention of the police become their responsibility because no other means has been found to solve them. They are the residual problems of society. It follows that expecting the police to solve or eliminate them is expecting too much. It is more realistic to aim at reducing their volume, preventing repetition, alleviating suffering, and minimizing the other adverse effects they produce.

Developing the Overall Process

To address the substantive problems of the police requires developing a commitment to a more systematic process for inquiring into these problems. Initially, this calls for identifying in precise terms the problems that citizens look to the police to handle. Once identified, each problem must be explored in great detail. What do we know about the problem? Has it been researched? If so, with what results? What more should we know? Is it a proper concern of government? What authority and resources are available for dealing with it? What is the current police response? In the broadest-ranging search for solutions, what would constitute the most intelligent response? What factors should be considered in choosing from among alternatives? If a new response is adopted, how does one go about evaluating its effectiveness? And finally, what changes, if any, does implementation of a more effective response require in the police organization?

This type of inquiry is not foreign to the police. Many departments conduct rigorous studies of administrative and operational problems. A police agency may undertake a detailed study of the relative merits of adopting one of several different types of uniforms. And it may regularly develop military-like plans for handling special events that require the assignment of large numbers of personnel.[16] However, systematic analysis and planning have rarely been applied to the specific behavioral and social problems that constitute the agency's routine business. The situation is somewhat like that of a private industry that studies the speed of its assembly line, the productivity of its employees, and the nature of its public relations program, but does not examine the quality of its product.

Perhaps the closest police agencies have come to developing a system for addressing substantive problems has been their work in crime analysis. Police routinely analyze information on reported crimes to identify patterns of criminal conduct, with the goal of enabling operating personnel to apprehend specific offenders or develop strategies to prevent similar offenses from occurring. Some police departments have, through the use of computers, developed sophisticated programs to analyze reported crimes.[17] Unfortunately, these analyses are almost always put to very limited use--to apprehend a professional car thief or to deter a well-known cat burglar--rather than serving as a basis for rethinking the overall police response to the problem of car theft or cat burglaries. Nevertheless, the practice of planning operational responses based on an analysis of hard data, now a familiar concept to the police, is a helpful point of reference in advocating development of more broadly based research and planning.

The most significant effort to use a problem orientation for improving police responses was embodied in the crime-specific concept initiated in California in 1971[18] and later promoted with LEAA funds throughout the country. The concept was made an integral part of the anti-crime program launched in eight cities in January 1972, aimed at bringing about reductions in five crime categories: murder, rape, assault, robbery, and burglary.[19] This would have provided an excellent opportunity to develop and test the concept, were it not for the commitment that this politically motivated program carried to achieving fast and dramatic results: a 5 percent reduction in each category in two years and a 20 percent reduction in five years. These rather naive, unrealistic goals and the emphasis on quantifying the results placed a heavy shadow over the program from the outset. With the eventual abandonment of the projects, the crime-specific concept seems to have lost ground as well. However, the national evaluation of the program makes it clear that progress was made, despite the various pressures, in planning a community's approach to the five general crime categories. The "crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation" process employed in all eight cities had many of the elements one would want to include in a problem-oriented approach to improving police service.[20]

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Defining Problems with Greater Specificity

The importance of defining problems more precisely becomes apparent when one reflects on the long-standing practice of using overly broad categories to describe police business. Attacking police problems under a categorical heading--"crime" or "disorder," "delinquency," or even "violence"--is bound to be futile. While police business is often further subdivided by means of the labels tied to the criminal code, such as robbery, burglary, and theft, these are not adequate, for several reasons.

First, they frequently mask diverse forms of behavior. Thus, for example, incidents classified under "arson" might include fires set by teenagers as a form of vandalism, fires set by persons suffering severe psychological problems, fires set for the purpose of destroying evidence of a crime, fires set by persons (or their hired agents) to collect insurance, and fires set by organized criminal interests to intimidate. Each type of incident poses a radically different problem for the police.

Second, if police depend heavily on categories of criminal offenses to define problems of concern to them, others may be misled to believe that, if a given form of behavior is not criminal, it is of no concern to the police. This is perhaps best reflected in the proposals for decriminalizing prostitution, gambling, narcotic use, vagrancy, and public intoxication. The argument, made over and over again, is that removing the criminal label will reduce the magnitude and complexity of the police function, freeing personnel to work on more serious matters and ridding the police of some of the negative side effects, such as corruption, that these problems produce. But decriminalization does not relieve the police of responsibility. The public expects drunks to be picked up if only because they find their presence on the street annoying or because they feel that the government has an obligation to care for persons who cannot care for themselves. The public expects prostitutes who solicit openly on the streets to be stopped, because such conduct is offensive to innocent passersby, blocks pedestrian or motor traffic, and contributes to the deterioration of a neighborhood. The problem is a problem for the police whether or not it is defined as a criminal offense.

Finally, use of offense categories as descriptive of police problems implies that the police role is restricted to arresting and prosecuting offenders. In fact, the police job is much broader, extending, in the case of burglary, to encouraging citizens to lock their premises more securely, to eliminating some of the conditions that might attract potential burglars, to counseling burglary victims on ways they can avoid similar attacks in the future, and to recovering and returning burglarized property.

Until recently, the police role in regard to the crime of rape was perceived primarily as responding quickly when a report of a rape was received, determining whether a rape had really occurred (given current legal definitions), and then attempting to identify and apprehend the perpetrator. Today, the police role has been radically redefined to include teaching women how to avoid attack,

organizing transit programs to provide safe movements in areas where there is a high risk of attack, dealing with the full range of sexual assault not previously covered by the narrowly drawn rape statutes, and--perhaps most important--providing needed care and support to the rape victim to minimize the physical and mental damage resulting from such an attack. Police are now concerned with sexual assault not simply because they have a direct role in the arrest and prosecution of violators, but also because sexual assault is a community problem which the police and others can affect in a variety of ways.

It seems desirable, at least initially in the development of problem-solving approach to improved policing, to press for as detailed a breakdown of problems as possible. In addition to distinguishing different forms of behavior and the apparent motivation, as in the case of incidents commonly grouped under the heading of "arson," it is helpful to be much more precise regarding locale and time of day, the type of people involved, and the type of people victimized. Different combinations of these variables may present different problems, posing different policy questions and calling for radically different solutions.[21]

For example, most police agencies already separate the problem of purse snatching in which force is used from the various other forms of conduct commonly grouped under robbery. But an agency is likely to find it much more helpful to go further--to pinpoint, for example, the problem of teenagers snatching the purses of elderly women waiting for buses in the downtown section of the city during the hours of early darkness. Likewise, a police agency might find it helpful to isolate the robberies of grocery stores that are open all night and are typically staffed by a lone attendant: or the theft of vehicles by a highly organized group engaged in the business of transporting them for sale in another jurisdiction; or the problem posed by teenagers who gather around hamburger stands each evening to the annoyance of neighbors, customers, and management. Eventually, similar problems calling for similar responses may be grouped together, but one cannot be certain that they are similar until they have been analyzed.

In the analysis of a given problem, one may find, for example, that the concern of the citizenry is primarily fear of attack, but the fear is not warranted, given the pattern of actual offenses. Where this situation becomes apparent, the police have two quite different problems: to deal more effectively with the actual incidents where they occur, and to respond to the groundless fears. Each calls for a different response.

The importance of subdividing problems was dramatically illustrated by the recent experience of the New York City Police Department in its effort to deal more constructively with domestic disturbances. An experimental program, in which police were trained to use mediation techniques, was undertaken with obvious public support. But, in applying the mediation techniques, the department apparently failed to distinguish sufficiently those cases in which wives were repeatedly subject to physical abuse. The aggravated nature of the latter cases resulted in a suit against the department in which the plaintiffs argued that the police are mandated to enforce the law when any violation comes

to their attention. In the settlement, the department agreed that its personnel would not attempt to reconcile the parties or to mediate when a felony was committed.[22] However, the net effect of the suit is likely to be more far reaching. The vulnerability of the department to criticism for not having dealt more aggressively with the aggravated cases has dampened support--in New York and elsewhere--for the use of alternatives to arrest in less serious cases, even though alternatives still appear to represent the more intelligent response.

One of the major values in subdividing police business is that it gives visibility to some problems which have traditionally been given short shrift, but which warrant more careful attention. The seemingly minor problem of noise, for example, is typically buried in the mass of police business lumped   other under such headings as "complaints," "miscellaneous," "non-criminal inc   its," or "disturbances." Both police officers and unaffected citizens would mos .kely be inclined to rank it at the bottom in any list of problems. Yet the number of complaints about noise is high in many communities--in fact, noise is probably among the most common problems brought by the public to the police.[23] While some of those complaining may be petty or unreasonable, many are seriously aggrieved and justified in their appeal for relief. Sleep is lost, schedules are disrupted, mental and emotional problems are aggravated. Apartments may become uninhabitable. The elderly woman living alone, whose life has been made miserable by inconsiderate neighbors, is not easily convinced that the daily intrusion into her life of their noise is any less serious than other forms of intrusion. For this person, and for many like her, improved policing would mean a more effective response to the problem of the noise created by her neighbors.

Researching the Problem

Without a tradition for viewing in sufficiently discrete terms the various problems making up the police job, gathering even the most basic information about a specific problem--such as complaints about noise--can be extremely difficult.

First, the magnitude of the problem and the various forms in which it surfaces must be established. One is inclined to turn initially to police reports for such information. But overgeneralization in categorizing incidents, the impossibility of separating some problems, variations in the reporting practices of the community, and inadequacies in report writing seriously limit their value for purposes of obtaining a full picture of the problem. However, if used cautiously, some of the information in police files may be helpful. Police agencies routinely collect and store large amounts of data, even though they may not use them to evaluate the effectiveness of their responses. Moreover, if needed information is not available, often it can be collected expeditiously in a well-managed department, owing to the high degree of centralized control of field operations.

How does one discover the nature of the current police response? Administrators and their immediate subordinates are not a good source. Quite naturally, they have a desire to provide an answer that reflects well on the

agency, is consistent with legal requirements, and meets the formal expectations of both the public and other agencies that might have a responsibility relating to the problem. But even if these concerns did not color their answers, top administrators are often so far removed from street operations, in both distance and time, that they would have great difficulty describing current responses accurately.

Inquiry, then, must focus on the operating level. But mere questioning of line officers is not likely to be any more productive. We know from the various efforts to document police activity in the field that there is often tremendous variation in the way in which different officers respond to the same type of incident.[24] Yet the high value placed on uniformity and on adhering to formal requirements and the pressures from peers inhibit officers from candidly discussing the manner in which they respond to the multitude of problems they handle--especially if the inquiry comes from outside the agency. But one cannot afford to give up at this point, for the individualized practices of police officers and the vast amount of knowledge they acquire about the situations they handle, taken together, are an extremely rich resource that is too often overlooked by those concerned about improving the quality of police services. Serious research into the problems police handle requires observing police officers over a period of time. This means accompanying them as they perform their regular assignments and cultivating the kind of relationship that enables them to talk candidly about the way in which they handle specific aspects of their job.

The differences in the way in which police respond, even in dealing with relatively simple matters, may be significant. When a runaway child is reported, one officer may limit himself to obtaining the basic facts. Another officer, sensing as much of a responsibility for dealing with the parents' fears as for finding the child and looking out for the child's interests, may endeavor to relieve the parents' anxiety by providing information about the runaway problem and about what they might expect. From the standpoint of the consumers--in this case, the parents--the response of the second officer is vastly superior to that of the first.

In handling more complicated matters, the need to improvise has prompted some officers to develop what appear to be unusually effective ways of dealing with specific problems. Many officers develop a unique understanding of problems that frequently come to their attention, learning to make important distinctions among different forms of the same problem and becoming familiar with the many complicating factors that are often present. And they develop a feel for what, under the circumstances, constitute the most effective responses. After careful evaluation, these types of responses might profitably be adopted as standard for an entire police agency. If the knowledge of officers at the operating level were more readily available, it might be useful to those responsible for drafting crime-related legislation. Many of the difficulties in implementing recent changes in statutes relating to sexual assault, public drunkenness, drunk driving, and child abuse could have been avoided had police expertise been tapped.

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By way of example, if a police agency were to decide to explore the problem of noise, the following questions might be asked. What is the magnitude of the problem as reflected by the number of complaints received? What is the source of the complaints: industry, traffic, groups of people gathered outdoors, or neighbors? How do noise complaints from residents break down between private dwellings and apartment houses? How often are the police summoned to the same location? How often are other forms of misconduct, such as fights, attributable to conflicts over noise? What is the responsibility of a landlord or an apartment house manager regarding noise complaints? What do the police now do in responding to such complaints? How much of the police procedure has been thought through and formalized? What is the authority of the police in such situations? Is it directly applicable or must they lean on somewhat nebulous authority, such as threatening to arrest for disorderly conduct or for failure to obey a lawful order, if the parties fail to quiet down? What works in police practice and what does not work? Are specific officers recognized as more capable of handling such complaints? If so, what makes them more effective? Do factors outside the control of a police agency influence the frequency with which complaints are received? Are noise complaints from apartment dwellers related to the manner in which the buildings are constructed? And what influence, if any, does the relative effectiveness of the police in handling noise complaints have on the complaining citizen's willingness to cooperate with the police in dealing with other problems, including criminal conduct traditionally defined as much more serious?

Considerable knowledge about some of the problems with which the police struggle has been generated outside police agencies by criminologists, sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists. But as has been pointed out frequently, relatively few of these findings have influenced the formal policies and operating decisions of practitioners.[25] Admittedly, the quality of many such studies is poor. Often the practitioner finds it difficult to draw out from the research its significance for his operations. But most important, the police have not needed to employ these studies because they have not been expected to address specific problems in a systematic manner. If the police were pressured to examine in great detail the problems they are expected to handle, a review of the literature would become routine. If convinced that research findings had practical value, police administrators would develop into more sophisticated users of such research; their responsible criticism could, in turn, contribute to upgrading the quality and usefulness of future research efforts.

Exploring Alternatives

After the information assembled about a specific problem is analyzed, a fresh, uninhibited search should be made for alternative responses that might be an improvement over what is currently being done. The nature of such a search will differ from past efforts in that, presumably, the problem itself will be better defined and understood, the commitment to past approaches (such as focusing primarily on the identification and prosecution of offenders) will be shelved temporarily, and the search will be much broader, extending well beyond the present or future potential of just the police.

But caution is in order. Those intent on improving the operations of the criminal justice system (by divesting it of some of its current burdens) and those who are principally occupied with improving the operating efficiency of police agencies frequently recommend that the problem simply be shifted to some other agency of government or to the private sector. Such recommendations often glibly imply that a health department or a social work agency, for example, is better equipped to handle the problem. Experience over the past decade, however, shows that this is rarely the case.[26] Merely shifting responsibility for the problem, without some assurance that more adequate provisions have been made for dealing with it, achieves nothing.

Police in many jurisdictions, in a commendable effort to employ alternatives to the criminal justice system, have arranged to make referrals to various social, health, and legal agencies. By tying into the services provided by the whole range of other helping agencies in the community, the police in these cities have taken a giant step toward improving the quality of their response. But there is a great danger that referral will come to be an end in itself, that the police and others advocating the use of such a system will not concern themselves adequately with the consequences of referral. If referral does not lead to reducing the citizens' problem, nothing will have been gained by this change. It may even cause harm. Expectations that are raised and not fulfilled may lead to further frustration; the original problem may, as a consequence, be compounded; and the resulting bitterness about government services may feed the tensions that develop in urban areas.

The search for alternatives obviously need not start from scratch. There is much to build on. Crime prevention efforts of some police agencies and experiments with developing alternatives to the criminal justice system and with diverting cases from the system should be reassessed for their impact on specific problems; those that appear to have the greatest potential should be developed and promoted.[27] Several alternatives should be explored for each problem.

1. Physical and Technical Changes

Can the problem be reduced or eliminated through physical or technical changes? Some refer to this as part of a program of "reducing opportunities" or "target hardening." Extensive effort has already gone into reducing, through urban design, factors that contribute to behavior requiring police attention.[28] Improved locks on homes and cars, the requirement of exact fares on buses,[29] and the provision for mailing social security checks directly to the recipients' banks exemplify recent efforts to control crime through this alternative.

What additional physical or technical changes might be made that would have an effect on the problem? Should such changes be mandatory, or can they be voluntary? What incentives might be offered to encourage their implementation?

2. Changes in the Provision of Government Services

Can the problem be alleviated by changes in other government services? Some of the most petty but annoying problems the police must handle originate in the policies, operating practices, and inadequacies of other public agencies: the scattering of garbage because of delays in collection, poor housing conditions because of lax code enforcement, the interference with traffic by children playing because they have not been provided with adequate playground facilities, the uncapping of hydrants on hot summer nights because available pools are closed. Most police agencies long ago developed procedures for relaying reports on such conditions to the appropriate government service. But relatively few police agencies see their role as pressing for changes in policies and operations that would eliminate the recurrence of the same problems. Yet the police are the only people who see and who must become responsible for the collective negative consequences of current policies.

3. Conveying Reliable Information

What many people want, when they turn to the police with their problems, is simply reliable information.[30] The tenant who is locked out by his landlord for failure to pay the rent wants to know his rights to his property. The car owner whose license plates are lost or stolen wants to know what reporting obligations he has, how he goes about replacing the plates, and whether he can drive his car in the meantime. The person who suspects his neighbors of abusing their child wants to know whether he is warranted in reporting the matter to the police. And the person who receives a series of obscene telephone calls wants to know what can be done about them. Even if citizens do not ask specific questions, the best response the police can make to many requests for help is to provide accurate, concise information.

4. Developing New Skills among Police Officers

The greatest potential for improvement in the handling of some problems is in providing police officers with new forms of specialized training. This is illustrated by several recent developments. For example, the major component in the family-crisis intervention projects launched all over the country is instruction of police officers in the peculiar skills required to de-escalate highly emotional family quarrel's. First aid training for police is being expanded, consistent with the current trend toward greater use of paramedics. One unpleasant task faced by the police, seldom noted by outsiders, is notifying families of the death of a family member. Often, this problem is handled poorly. In 1976, a film was made specifically to demonstrate how police should carry out this responsibility.[31] Against this background of recent developments, one should ask whether specialized training can bring about needed improvement in the handling of each specific problem.

5. *New Forms of Authority*

Dó the police need a specific, limited form of authority which they do not now have? If the most intelligent response to a problem, such as a person causing a disturbance in a bar, is to order the person to leave, should the police be authorized to issue such an order, or should they be compelled to arrest the individual in order to stop the disturbance? The same question can be asked about the estranged husband who has returned to his wife's apartment or about the group of teenagers annoying passersby at a street corner. Police are called upon to resolve these common problems, but their authority is questionable unless the behavior constitutes a criminal offense. And even then, it may not be desirable to prosecute the offender. Another type of problem is presented by the intoxicated person who is not sufficiently incapacitated to warrant being taken into protective custody, but who apparently intends to drive his car. Should a police officer have the authority to prevent the person from driving by temporarily confiscating the car keys or, as a last resort, by taking him into protective custody? Or must the officer wait for the individual to get behind the wheel and actually attempt to drive and then make an arrest? Limited specific authority may enable the police to deal more directly and intelligently with a number of comparable situations.

6. *Developing New Community Resources*

Analysis of a problem may lead to the conclusion that assistance is needed from another government agency. But often the problem is not clearly within the province of an existing agency, or the agency may be unaware of the problem or, if aware, without the resources to do anything about it. In such cases, since the problem is likely to be of little concern to the community as a whole, it will probably remain the responsibility of the police, unless they themselves take the initiative, as a sort of community ombudsman, in getting others to address it.

A substantial percentage of all police business involves dealing with persons suffering from mental illness. In the most acute cases, where the individual may cause immediate harm to himself or others, the police are usually authorized to initiate an emergency commitment. Many other cases that do not warrant hospitalization nevertheless require some form of attention. The number of these situations has increased dramatically as the mental health system has begun treating more and more of its patients in the community. If the conduct of these persons, who are being taught to cope with the world around them, creates problems for others or exceeds community tolerance, should they be referred back to a mental health agency? Or, because they are being encouraged to adjust to the reality of the community, should they be arrested if their behavior constitutes a criminal offense? How are the police to distinguish between those who have never received any assistance, and who should therefore be referred to a mental health agency, and those who are in community treatment? Should a community agency establish services for these persons comparable to the crisis-intervention services now offered by specially organized units operating in some communities?

The Problem-Oriented Approach

Such crisis-intervention units are among a number of new resources that have been established in the past few years for dealing with several long-neglected problems: detoxification centers for those incapacitated by alcohol, shelters and counseling for runaways, shelters for battered wives, and support services for the victims of sexual assault. Programs are now being designed to provide a better response to citizen disputes and grievances, another long-neglected problem. Variously labeled, these programs set up quasi-judicial forums that are intended to be inexpensive, easily accessible, and geared to the specific needs of their neighborhoods. LEAA has recently funded three such experimental programs, which they call Neighborhood Justice Centers.[32] These centers will receive many of their cases from the police.

Thus, the pattern of creating new services that bear a relationship with police operations is now well established, and one would expect that problem-oriented policing will lead to more services in greater variety.

7. *Increased Regulation*

Can the problem be handled through a tightening of regulatory codes? Where easy access to private premises is a factor, should city building codes be amended to require improved lock systems? To reduce the noise problem, should more soundproofing be required in construction? The incidence of shoplifting is determined, in part, by the number of salespeople employed, the manner in which merchandise is displayed, and the use made of various antishoplifting devices. Should the police be expected to combat shoplifting without regard to the merchandising practices by a given merchant, or should merchants be required by a "merchandising code" to meet some minimum standards before they can turn to the police for assistance?

8. *Increased Use of City Ordinances*

Does the problem call for some community sanction less drastic than a criminal sanction? Many small communities process through their local courts, as ordinance violations, as many cases of minor misconduct as possible. Of course, this requires that the community have written ordinances, usually patterned after the state statutes, that define such misconduct. Several factors make this form of processing desirable for certain offenses: It is less formal than criminal action; physical detention is not necessary; cases may be disposed of without a court appearance; the judge may select from a wide range of alternative penalties; and the offender is spared the burden of a criminal record. Some jurisdictions now use a system of civil forfeitures in proceeding against persons found to be in possession of marijuana, though the legal status of the procedure is unclear in those states whose statutes define possession as criminal and call for a more severe fine or for imprisonment.

9. Use of Zoning

Much policing involves resolving disputes between those who have competing interests in the use made of a given sidewalk, street, park, or neighborhood. Bigger and more basic conflicts in land use were resolved long ago by zoning, a concept that is now firmly established. Recently, zoning has been used by a number of cities to limit the pornography stores and adult movie houses in a given area. And at least one city has experimented with the opposite approach, creating an adult entertainment zone with the hope of curtailing the spread of such establishments and simplifying the management of attendant problems. Much more experimentation is needed before any judgment can be made as to the value of zoning in such situations.

Implementing the Process

A fully developed process for systematically addressing the problems that make up police business would call for more than the three steps just explored—defining the problem, researching it, and exploring alternatives. I have focused on these three because describing them may be the most effective way of communicating the nature of a problem-oriented approach to improving police service. A number of intervening steps are required to fill out the processes: methods for evaluating the effectiveness of current responses, procedures for choosing from among available alternatives, means of involving the community in the decision making, procedures for obtaining the approval of the municipal officials to whom the police are formally accountable, methods for obtaining any additional funding that may be necessary, adjustments in the organization and staffing of the agency that may be required to implement an agreed-upon change, and methods for evaluating the effectivenes of the change.

How does a police agency make the shift to problem-oriented policing? Ideally, the initiative will come from police administrators. What is needed is not a single decision implementing a specific program or a single memorandum announcing a unique way of running the organization. The concept represents a new way of looking at the process of improving police functioning. It is a way of thinking about the police and their function that, carried out over an extended period, would be reflected in all that the administrator does: in the relationship with personnel, in the priorities he sets in his own work schedule, in what he focuses on in addressing community groups, in the choice of training curriculums, and in the questions raised with local and state legislators. Once introduced, this orientation would affect subordinates, gradually filter through the rest of the organization, and reach other administrators and agencies as well.

An administrator's success will depend heavily, in particular, on the use made of planning staff, for systematic analysis of substantive problems requires developing a capacity within the organization to collect and analyze data and to conduct evaluations of the effectiveness of police operations. Police planners (now employed in significant numbers) will have to move beyond their traditional concern with operating procedures into what might best be characterized as "product research."

The Problem-Oriented Approach

The police administrator who focuses on the substance of policing should be able to count on support from others in key positions ·in the police field. Colleges with programs especially designed for police personnel may exert considerable leadership through their choice of offerings and through the subject matter of individual courses. In an occupation in which so much deference is paid to the value of a college education, if college instructors reinforce the impression that purely administrative matters are the most important issues in policing, police personnel understandably will not develop their interests beyond this concern.

Likewise, the LEAA, its state and local offspring, and other grant-making organizations have a unique opportunity to draw the attention of operating personnel to the importance of addressing substantive problems. The manner in which these organizations invest their funds sends a strong message to the police about what is thought to be worthwhile.

Effect on the Organization

In the context of this reordering of police priorities, efforts to improve the staffing, management, and procedures of police agencies must continue.

Those who have been strongly committed to improving policy through better administration and organization may be disturbed by any move to ·subordinate their interests to a broader concern with the end product of policing. However, a problem-oriented approach to police improvement may actually contribute in several important ways to achieving their objectives.

The approach calls for the police to take greater initiative in attempting to deal with problems rather than resign themselves to living with them. It calls for tapping police expertise. It calls for the police to be more aggressive partners with other public agencies. These changes, which would place the police in a much more positive light in the community, would also contribute significantly to improving the working environment within a police agency—an environment that suffers much from the tendency of the police to assume responsibility for problems which are insolvable or ignored by others. And an improved working environment increases, in turn, the potential for recruiting and keeping qualified personnel and for bringing about needed organizational change.

Focusing on problems, because it is a practical and concrete approach, is attractive to both citizens and the police. By contrast, some of the most frequent proposals for improving police operations, because they do not produce immediate and specifically identifiable results, have no such attraction. A problem-oriented approach, with its greater appeal, has the potential for becoming a vehicle through which long-sought organizational change might be more effectively and more rapidly achieved.

Administrative rule making, for example, has gained considerable support from policy makers and some police administrators as a way of structuring police discretion, with the expectation that applying the concept would improve the quality of the decisions made by the police in the field. Yet many police ·administrators regard administrative rule making as an idea without practical

significance. By contrast, police administrators are usually enthusiastic if invited to explore the problem of car theft or vandalism. And within such exploration, there is the opportunity to demonstrate the value of structuring police discretion in responding to reports of vandalism and car theft. Approached from this practical point of view, the concept of administrative rule making is more likely to be implemented.

Long-advocated changes in the structure and operations of police agencies have been achieved because of a concentrated concern with a given problem. The focus on the domestic disturbance, orginally in New York and now elsewhere, introduced the generalist-specialist concept that has enabled many police agencies to make more effective use of their personnel; the problem in controlling narcotics and the high mobility of drug sellers motivated police agencies in many metropolitan areas to pool their resources in special investigative units, thereby achieving in a limited way one of the objectives of those who have urged consolidation of police agencies; and the recent interest in the crime of rape has resulted in widespread backing for the establishment of victim-support programs. Probably the support for any of these changes could not have been generated without the problem-oriented context in which they have been advocated.

An important factor contributing to these successes is that a problem-oriented approach to improvement is less likely to be seen as a direct challenge to the police establishment and the prevailing police value system. As a consequence, rank-and-file personnel do not resist and subvert the resulting changes. Traditional programs to improve the police--labeled as efforts to "change," "upgrade," or "reform" the police or to "achieve minimum standards"--require that police officers openly acknowledge their own deficiencies. Rank-and-file officers are much more likely to support an innovation that is cast in the form of a new response to an old problem--a problem with which they have struggled for many years and which they would like to see handled more effectively. It may be that addressing the quality of the police product will turn out to be the most efective way of achieving the objectives that have for so long been the goal of police reform.

Notes

The authors extend their thanks to Herman Goldstein for permission to reproduce this seminal article.

Herman Goldstein is Professor, Law School, University of Wisconsin at Madison. [He] is indebted to the University of Wisconsin Extension Department of Law for making the time available to produce this article as part of a larger effort to reexamine the university's role in research and training for the police.

1. Newspaper report from Midlands of England, cited in Patrick Ryan, "Get Rid of the People, and the System Runs Fine," Smithsonian (September 1977), 140.

2. The recent study in Kansas City found that the effect of response time on the capacity of the police to deal with crime was negligible, primarily because delays by citizens in reporting crimes make the minutes saved by the police insignificant. See Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, Response Time Analysis, Executive Summary (Kansas City, Mo.: 1977).

3. See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968); National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, To Establish Justice, to Insure Domestic Tranquility, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969); President's Commission on Campus Unrest, Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970); and National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

4. See, for example, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report, 158.

5. George L. Kelling, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles E. Brown, The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974); and Peter W. Greenwood and others, The Criminal Investigation Process, 3 vols. (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1976).

6. For questioning by a police administrator of the findings of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Project, see Edward M. Davis and Lyle Knowles, "A Critique of the Report: An Evaluation of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment," Police Chief (June 1975), 22-27. For a review of the Rand Study on detectives, see Daryl F. Gates and Lyle Knowles," An Evaluation of the Rand Corporation's Analysis and the Criminal Investigation Process," Police Chief (July 1976), 20. Each of the two papers is followed by a response from the authors of the original studies. In addition, for the position of the International Association of Chiefs

of Police on the results of the Kansas City project. see "IACP Position Paper on the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment," Police Chief (September 1975), 16.

7. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice is sponsoring a replication of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment and is supporting further explorations of the criminal investigation process. See National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Program Plan, Fiscal Year 1978 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 12.

8. Admittedly, precise appraisals and comparisons are difficult. For a recent example of an examination by the press of one department that has enjoyed a reputation for good management, see "The LAPD: How Good is It?" Los Angeles Times (Dec. 18, 1977).

9. Examples of cities in which police unions recently have fought vigorously to oppose innovations introduced by police administrators are Boston, Massachusetts, and Troy, New York.

10. These programs are reflected in the training opportunities routinely listed in such publications as Police Chief, Criminal Law Reporter, Law Enforcement News, and Crime Control Digest, and by the abstracting service of the National Criminal Justice Reference Center.

11. See, for example, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, "Planning Guidelines and Program to Reduce Crime," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: 1972), vi-xiii. For a discussion of the concept, see Paul K. Wormeli and Steve E. Kolodney, "The Crime-Specific Model: A New Criminal Justice Perspective," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 9 (1972), 54-65.

12. Ronald J. Allen, "The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency," University of Pennsylvania Law Review (November 1976), 97.

13. Egon Bittner comes close to this point of view when he describes police functioning as applying immediate solutions to an endless array of problems. See Egon Bittner, "Florence Nighingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton," in The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice, edited by Herbert Jacob (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage, 1974), 30. James Q. Wilson does also when he describes policing as handling situations. See James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order In Eight Communities (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 31.

14. I develop this point in an earlier work. See Herman Goldstein, Policing a Free Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), 30, 34-35.

15. In the 1977 book I presented a brief summary of these studies. Goldstein, Policing a Free Society, 26-28.

16. For an up-to-date description of the concept of planning and research as it has evolved in police agencies, see O. W. Wilson and Roy C. McLaren, Police Administration, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), 157-81.

17. For examples, see National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Police Crime Analysis Unit Handbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 90-92, 113-21.

18. For a brief description, see Joanne W. Rockwell, "Crime Specific...An Answer?" Police Chief (September 1972), 38.

19. The program is described in Eleanor Chelimsky, High Impact Anti-Crime Program, Final Report, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 19-38.

20. Chelimsky, Anti-Crime Program, 145-50, 418-21.

21. For an excellent example of what is needed, see the typology of vandalism developed by the British sociologist, Stanley Cohen, quoted in Albert M. Williams, Jr., "Vandalism," Management Information Service Report (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, May 1976), 1-2. Another excellent example of an effort to break down a problem of concern to the police--in this case, heroin--is found in Mark Harrison Moore, Buy and Bust: The Effective Regulation of an Illicit Market in Heroin (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1977), 83.

22. See Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 974 (1977), finding a cause of action against the New York City Police Department for failing to protect battered wives. On June 26, 1978, the city agreed to a settlement with the plaintiffs in which it committed the police to arrest in all cases in which "there is reasonable cause to believe that a husband has committed a felony against his wife and/or has violated an Order of Protection or Temporary Order of Protection." See Consent Decree, Bruno against McGuire, New York State Supreme Court, index #21946/76. (Recognizing the consent decree, the New York Appellate Court, First Department, in July of 1978 (#3020) dismissed an appeal in the case as moot in so far as it involved the police department. From a reading of the court's reversal as to the other parts of the case, however, it appears that it would also have reversed the decision of the lower court in sustaining the action against the police department if there had not been a consent decree.)

23. It was reported that, on a recent three-day holiday weekend in Madison, Wisconsin, police handled slightly more than 1,000 calls of which 118 were loud parties and other types of noise disturbance. See "Over 1,000 Calls Made to Police on Weekend," Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, WI: June 1, 1978).

24. See, for example, the detailed accounts of police functioning in Minneapolis, in Joseph M. Livermore, "Policing," Minnesota Law Review (March 1971), 649-729. Among the works describing the police officers' varying styles in responding to similar situations are Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior; Albert

J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971); Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966); and Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970).

25. See, for example, the comments of Marvin Wolfgang in a Congressionally sponsored discussion of federal support for criminal justice research, reported in the U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, New Directions for Federal Involvement in Crime Control (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977). Wolfgang claims that research in criminology and criminal justice has had little impact on the administration of justice or on major decision makers.

26. For further discussion of this point, see American Bar Association, The Urban Police Function, Approved Draft (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1973), 41-42.

27. Many of these programs are summarized in David E. Aaronson et al., The New Justice: Alternatives to Conventional Criminal Adjudication (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1977); and David E. Aaronson et al., Alternatives to Conventional Criminal Adjudication: Guidelook for Planners and Practitioners, Caroline S. Cooper, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1977).

28. The leading work on the subject is Oscar Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design (New York: Macmillan, 1972). See also Westinghouse National Issues Center, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design: A Special Report (Washington, D.C.: National League of Cities, 1977).

29. For a summary of a survey designed to assess the effect of this change, see Russell Grindle and Thomas Aceituno, "Innovations in Robbery Control," in The Prevention and Control of Robbery, vol. 1, Floyd Feeney and Adrianne Weir, eds. (Davis, Calif.: University of California, 1973), 315-20.

30. In one of the most recent of a growing number of studies of how police spend their time, it was reported that, of the 18,012 calls made to the police serving a community of 24,000 people in a four-month period, 59.98 percent were requests for information. Police responded to 65 percent of the calls they received by providing information by telephone. See J. Robert Lilly, "What Are the Police Now Doing?" Journal of Police Science and Administration (January 1978), 56.

31. Death Notification (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).

32. The concept is described in Daniel McGillis and Joan Mullen, Neighborhood Justice Centers: An Analysis of Potential Models (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1977). See also R.F. Conner and R. Surette, The Citizen Dispute Settlement Program: Resolving Disputes outside the Courts—Orlando, Florida (Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association, 1977).

Perspectives on Policing

Debating the Evolution of American Policing

An edited transcript to accompany
"The Evolving Strategy of Policing"

Edited by Francis X. Hartmann

Editor's note: The following is an edited transcript reflecting strongly held opinions by members of the Kennedy School's Executive Session on Policing about "The Evolving Strategy of Policing," a companion piece to this transcript in the Perspectives on Policing *series. Excerpts from "The Evolving Strategy of Policing" are included to clarify parts of the discussion; they appear in large, indented type such as that following this note.*

> We have found it useful to divide the history of policing into three different eras. These eras are distinguished from one another by the apparent dominance of a particular strategy of policing. The political era, so named because of the close ties between police and politics, dated from the introduction of police into municipalities during the 1840's, continued through the Progressive period, and ended during the early 1900's. The reform era developed in reaction to the political. It took hold during the 1930's, thrived during the 1950's and 1960's, began to erode during the late 1970's. The reform era now seems to be giving way to an era emphasizing community problem solving.
>
> By dividing policing into these three eras dominated by a particular strategy of policing, we do not mean to imply that there were clear boundaries between the eras. Nor do we mean

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

that in those eras everyone policed in the same way. Obviously, the real history is far more complex than that. Nonetheless, we believe that there is a certain professional ethos that defines standards of competence, professionalism, and excellence in policing; that at any given time, one set of concepts is more powerful, more widely shared, and better understood than others; and that this ethos changes over time.

Mark Moore: This paper analyzes stages in the evolution of the concept of policing. It is both an analytic framework and a historical analysis. When we last presented the paper, people had difficulty with the distinction between the community policing of the future and the political policing that we imagine as a relic of the past.

Jim Wilson described the central challenge of community policing as protecting the gains that resulted from professionalism, and the separation of the police from political influence without expanding the distance between the police and the community.

Kenneth Newman: As a police chief who sat on top of policing in London, I think it leaves out very important dimensions of policing—for example, the way in which policing problems have evolved over the last two decades, particularly in relation to terrorism and organized crime. It seems to me that we are ignoring a whole superstructure of crime which is at the base of policing. We are talking about fundamentals, but are virtually ignoring many of the evolutionary factors about policing.

I am not sure the paper catches the full weight of the "sea change" that is taking place. If you are looking for a rubric for the change, it is something like the "mobilization of the citizenry in their own defense." It is receiving expression in the whole range of activities like neighborhood watch and business watch. I have no doubt the whole concept has extended in America as it is extending in Europe, that you are getting areas of functional surveillance like cab watch, where you harness the eyes and ears of the cab trade to the purposes of crime prevention.

You have hospital watch; you have programs like crime stoppers, where you mobilize the business community to support policing. Now, this has a very deep political significance, too, because in England these neighborhood watch groupings, although they began as local units, are aggregating to regional and national units. You now have the formation, I believe with the sponsorship of the Home

Secretary, of a national crime prevention organization which will actively encourage these aggregations of citizens' mobilization.

Now, that is a very important, evolutionary "sea change" that is not captured in what we are saying here about policing.

Mark Moore: Chips Stewart has often articulated that there is a frontier of policing that demands regional consolidation or the creation of specialized capability to take on more serious kinds of problems.

Kenneth Newman: Now, about terrorism and organized crime. You must deal with those matters because there is an intimate relationship between the superstructure of organized crime and what happens in communities.

In some of those communities you find that condominiums are owned by organized crime, as are shopping parades. You can find a substantial part of the economic infrastructure is dominated by organized crime. We have to spell out how the organization for community policing interacts with the different kind of organization, the more highly centralized organization, that you need for dealing with those matters.

Michael Smith: When Sir Kenneth was speaking, I was thinking about a paper that Zach Tumin presented[1] to this group. In that paper, he reached for a way of lodging the authority, and to some extent the strategy, of law enforcement in ideas of "community" that were different from the political forces at play at a given moment in a given locale.

It struck me, when Sir Kenneth was talking, that organized crime and terrorism are indeed properly encompassed within the community policing idea because it is the restoration, maintenance, and nurturing of the institutions that are important to community life, which is law enforcement's function. Described that way, "community" lends both authority to what is done and strategic content to the way in which it is to be done.

It does not suggest that patrol officers in beats ought to be handling the terrorism function. To that extent this paper may be misleading. But the idea of community goes well beyond the idea of the beat officer or the idea that community organizing can lend authority to the police. One might argue that it is the vision of community life, held by the larger society, that lends authority to the community policing idea.

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1. Zachary Tumin, "Managing Relations with the Community," Working Paper #86–05–06, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 1986.

In retrospect, the reform strategy was impressive. It successfully integrated its strategic elements into a coherent paradigm that was internally consistent and logically appealing. Narrowing police functions to crime fighting made sense. If police could concentrate their efforts on prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals, it followed that they could be more effective than if they dissipated their efforts on other problems. The model of police as impartial, professional law enforcers was attractive because it minimized the discretionary excesses which developed during the political era. Preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service were intuitively appealing tactics, as well as means to both control officers and shape and control citizen demands for service. Further, the strategy provided a comprehensive, yet simple, vision of policing around which police leaders could rally. The metaphor of the thin blue line reinforced their need to create isolated independence and autonomy in terms that were acceptable to the public. The patrol car became the symbol of policing during the 1930's and 1940's; when equipped with a radio, it was at the limits of technology. It represented mobility, power, conspicuous presence, control of officers, and professional distance from citizens. .

Patrick Murphy: It troubles me that on the very first page, it says: One, political; two, reform; and three, community. I do not think there was a reform era in policing, except for California, where they were and still are so far ahead. During the era that is labeled reform, there were a lot of other things happening. Vollmer, Wilson, and Parker's effect on American policing was a major happening.

You cannot talk about American policing without talking about J. Edgar Hoover and his enormous contributions. I attended the FBI National Academy in 1957, and for the first time in my career, I had the opportunity to spend 12 weeks with people from other police departments. The exchange of knowledge that went on was so eye-opening to me, after 10 or 12 years in the greatest police department in the world, that it was almost shocking to find out about how advanced some departments were.

If we are talking about the history of policing in the United States, we have to talk about Federal assistance. We have to talk about the crime commissions.

Edwin Meese III: I think the paper is good, but perhaps a shade grandiose. Suggesting that we have "a whole new era" to be compared with the reform era is too grand an approach. It is only one component of the whole picture.

I like the term "strategic policing" because we have been talking about the deployment of field forces. However, a very important aspect that Ken has repeatedly mentioned is the idea of analysis and intelligence as explaining how you use these people and how you use the information that they get.

We have not talked very much about how to support these deployed field forces in the community, with specialist services that are going to focus on homicide, citywide burglary rings, car theft rings, and organized crime and terrorism. We have neglected to talk about these except when we said, "If we do not have the other resources of the department readily available to those people in the community, the citizens are not going to be happy."

If we talked about community-involved policing as a part of a new era of policing, rather than being the total denomination, many of the concerns raised here would disappear. Everybody would realize that this is a very important contribution which, along with other things happening in the police field, marks a new era of strategic policing in which people are thinking about what they are doing.

Herman Goldstein: There should be some additional acknowledgment of these other concerns. Having deliberated for several years, we are now in a position in which papers that reflect the views of some members can be issued. I certainly do not agree with everything in this paper, but I assume that there will be a caption that will say that not everyone buys into this. While it reflects the benefits of these deliberations, it is the work of the authors and not the total product of this group's work.

Hoover wanted the FBI to represent a new force for law and order, and saw that such an organization could capture a permanent constituency that wanted an agency to take a stand against lawlessness, immorality, and crime. By raising eligibility standards and changing patterns of recruitment and training, Hoover gave the FBI agents stature as upstanding moral crusaders. By committing the organization to attacks on crimes such as kidnapping, bank robbery, and espionage—crimes that attracted wide

publicity and required technical sophistication, doggedness, and a national jurisdiction to solve—Hoover established the organization's reputation for professional competence and power. By establishing tight central control over his agents, limiting their use of controversial investigation procedures (such as undercover operations), and keeping them out of narcotics enforcement, Hoover was also able to maintain an unparalleled record of integrity. That, too, fitted the image of a dogged, incorruptible crime-fighting organization. Finally, lest anyone fail to notice the important developments within the Bureau, Hoover developed impressive public relations programs that presented the FBI and its agents in the most favorable light. (For those of us who remember the 1940's, for example, one of the most popular radio phrases was, "The FBI in peace and war"—the introductory line in a radio program that portrayed a vigilant FBI protecting us from foreign enemies as well as villains on the "10 Most Wanted" list, another Hoover/FBI invention.)

Struggling as they were with reputations for corruption, brutality, unfairness, and downright incompetence, municipal police reformers found Hoover's path a compelling one.

Oliver "Buck" Revell: The myth has grown up that J. Edgar Hoover in particular, and the Bureau in general, sought to limit itself to simple crimes in order to gain positive publicity. That myth is inaccurate. The Bureau of Investigation was founded in 1908 with 32 people, so that the Attorney General would not have to use Secret Service agents. Congress had prohibited the Attorney General from using Secret Service agents to conduct investigations for the Justice Department. Its jurisdiction was essentially the Mann Act, prostitution, and various crimes that the Attorney General designated. When Hoover came in, in 1924, as a young attorney, the FBI had grown to about 200 people and was primarily conducting investigations for which no other entity had a particular responsibility. Very rapidly, as laws were passed, and the Interstate Acts were among the first, the Dyer Act and so forth, they were given to the Bureau.

I have done quite a bit of research in Bureau files and archives, and I do not know that any Federal offense was ever declined or shunted off to another agency, with one

exception. Back in the sixties, Hoover was asked if he wanted to take on the Bureau of Narcotics. He indicated that the FBI and the Bureau of Narcotics should not be combined because drug offenses are crimes of a very different type and require a single dedicated agency. That was in an era when we did not have the mixture of drugs throughout criminal activity. And second, he did not want the corrupting influence of drugs on FBI agents. That is how this myth has grown up.

The role of the National FBI Academy as a force within American policing has been raised by Pat Murphy. The Academy brought police together for the first time, allowed them to exchange ideas, and created the awareness that experimentation was taking place in various departments. The Academy made it appropriate for law enforcement officers to pursue academic review of their activities and established that law enforcement could learn from the example of other organizations.

The IACP (International Association of Chiefs of Police) made a very important contribution in centralizing certain police services, such as the identification process, which became the Identification Division of the FBI, the National Laboratory, and so forth. And UCR (*Uniform Crime Reports*) is another contribution, of course.

If you are going to talk about the evolution of law enforcement in the United States, these themes are very important to the overall progress.

James "Chips" Stewart: I want to compliment George because he captured the essence of the issues in one of his other articles better than anybody else has. However, I think that this particular paper is flawed in the way it characterizes policing.

Lee Brown handed out a pamphlet about his new police substation. In it, a paragraph says, "What has happened here is not a revolution but an evolution that will change policing and the management involved in providing that policing." That captures more of what we are doing than George Kelling's statement of community policing does.

One theme of the evolution in policing might be the use of force and the law. The political era's concept of force could characterize police as 800-pound gorillas who sit where they want to sit. Political era police are the law and they manage through intimidation, selective use of force, and harassment.

In the reform era, there is a reaction to this personal and arbitrary use of force. The police become very defensive about their use of force; they use the rule of law as authority for their actions. They did not use the rule of law during the political era at all. In fact, they very rarely appealed to the courts when policing the community.

The reform era saw a tremendous movement of the courts into the arena of policing. The courts' impact on reform policing has been enormous and it is neglected in this paper. The law authorized police actions and courts reviewed them in the context of the law, not the community nor politicians. This influence ought to be included.

The civil rights and antiwar demonstrations can be seen as an extension of the reform movement. They are an effort to extend legalistic control over the police. The police and their use of force had to be authorized by the rule of law, not politics.

Now we are moving into what George characterizes as the community era. I would describe it as problem oriented. Ed Meese articulates it as strategic policing as does Sir Kenneth, I believe. I look at it as an era when police took a proactive approach to their work, in terms of seeking out problems in the community so that they can have impact on them.

The reform era, I believe, directed police to rely exclusively on the criminal justice system and to operate within a narrow, legalistic frame of reference. This coincided with an explosion in crime that overloaded and overburdened the criminal justice system.

The police believed they could not do much because they were not empowered by law and the courts to do it. The public began to say "no, we want more from our police," and the demands of the public forced us out of this legalistic envelope.

Community or strategic policing relies not just on the law to solve crime problems, but on a spectrum of solutions, some of which lie in the criminal justice system. Other solutions are in the community, the private sector, volunteers, and a whole host of resources beyond the justice system.

Another thread that goes through this evolution in policing is the use of discretion, who controls it, and how it is informed.

These themes—discretion, the use of force, and the law— are better ways to approach the description of this evolution. They capture what the group really has in mind and address a number of the areas of concern that have been brought up. In continuing to use the term "community policing," we unnecessarily narrow the evolution that we all perceive is taking place.

I agree with Sir Kenneth that there has been a sea change in public attitudes and the police are part of that change. I think the paper falls short of reflecting that change accurately.

Mark Moore: These are very articulate criticisms. Let me say why we keep talking about this phrase "community policing."

Let us imagine, for a moment, that there are two different fronts on which new investments in policing are likely to be made. One lies in the direction of more thoughtful, more information-guided, more active attacks on particular crime problems. Some are local crime problems like robbery and burglary, and some turn out to be much bigger problems for which additional resources need to be brought to bear. These would include organized crime, terrorism, and sophisticated frauds.

That is one frontier. In many respects it is a continuation of an increasingly thoughtful, professionalized, forensic, tactical-minded police department.

The other front is the developing theme of how to strike up a relationship with the community so that we can enlist their aid, focus on the problems that turn out to be important, and figure out a way to be accountable in a world in which the story about being accountable for the full and fair application of the law is no longer a plausible story. And we want the freedom to deploy a variety of remedies in addition to the simple application of the law and we want to be able to talk to somebody about whether we are doing that satisfactorily.

The first strand is captured by notions of strategic and problem-solving policing. The second strand is captured by the concept of community policing.

We all know that when you try to move an organization, only a certain amount of energy can go into new investments and the construction of new capabilities. My judgment is that the problem solving–strategic thing will take care of itself because it is much more of a natural development in policing. If you are going to make a difference, you ought to describe a strategy that challenges the police in the areas in which they are least likely to make investments in repositioning themselves. That is this far more problematic area of fashioning a relationship with the community.

Given the opportunities for improvements and advancement along both fronts, that would be the argument why one front might be described in a slightly exaggerated way compared with the other. The other front is going to take care of itself. The one that you want to talk about is the hard one.

The paper is not a whole description of what is going on, it is naming the most problematic thing that needs to be worked out.

Allen Andrews: Then the paper needs to say that, and I hope that it would not be exaggerated, but emphasized.

I have several concerns about the history. "The thin blue line," to my recollection, arose in the sixties, as crime almost

exploded about our ears and, to be perfectly frank, you academics were at war with us as to whether there was a real crime increase. The police felt that they were standing alone, talking about a crime increase that everybody said was not happening. And then, of course, we had disorder to boot, unprecedented in the careers of most of us in service at that time.

I have a concern about the statement "the community need for rapid response to calls sometimes is largely the consequence of police selling the service." I do not recall it that way and I have been mixing with police chiefs for nearly 30 years. The fact is that you have had an evolution here.

> Learning from Hoover, police reformers vigorously set out to sell their brand of urban policing. They, too, performed on radio talk shows, consulted with media representatives about how to present police, engaged in public relations campaigns, and in other ways presented an image of police as crimefighters. In a sense, they began with an organizational capacity—anticrime police tactics—and intensively promoted it.

Allen Andrews: The advent of the motor car permitted police to get to some places with the speed that they could not before. As the motor car developed, it became inevitable that the public wanted more response, asked for it, and police responded. It just makes common sense. There are a lot of incidents occurring; you are expected to get there. The impact of the Depression arrived in American cities and on police. There was not a reform movement demand for efficiency to abolish foot patrol—these things developed because of money pressures. Police chiefs went down fighting over the issue of abolishing and retracting foot patrol. In 1954, New York City had Operation Twenty-Five, a major experiment to demonstrate that foot patrol was still valuable and that cutting back foot patrol was a costly mistake in results, although it saved money.

Yet the paper portrays the reform police chief calling foot patrol "an outmoded, expensive frill." Ultimately it got that way, and I have said it myself. But, by then, it was an issue of reversing the tide.

Daryl Gates: Well, I have to agree with Allen. Those of us who are older read this and find it just does not fit the history. For example, our response time has always been

poor principally because we have a very small police department and an awful lot of area to cover and we found that there are many other things that need to be done besides answering calls. We try very hard to answer emergency calls quickly, but it is difficult.

I have a hard time fitting the history of policing, as I know it, to the pattern that I see in this paper. The eras carved out in the paper are not precise at all. For example, in 1969 we began the basic car plan. In 1970 we were fully implementing the basic car plan—that was community-oriented policing. The neighborhood watch—we were meeting with the people. In the early 1970's the entire operation went to team policing. Three thousand people were involved in team policing—detectives, traffic, everything that we did. In 1973, we decentralized our department.

Also, when we talk about these reform areas, we talk about ridding the police of political control. If anyone here believes today that political influence does not prevail in major cities in this country, you are deluding yourselves.

Chiefs today are unfortunately deeply tied to politics and politicians. It's a very sad commentary on local policing. How do chiefs refer to their mayor? "My mayor." "Is your mayor going to win this election? Yes, I think she is going to win; yes, I think he is going to win." And if they do not, that is the last time we see that commissioner or that chief. Gone, because of political whim, not his or her performance as a chief. So, if you do not think politics are tied into policing today, you are being very, very foolish.

George Kelling: Let me respond: little has been said that I disagree with. Allen and I would interpret some things differently. Because I look at it from the outside, I interpret the role of the FBI differently from Buck Revell and maybe Ed Meese.

What we are talking about is a model. To the extent that a model is adhered to or not is of less concern than the extent to which it is a model which the profession identifies with and presents as its ideology. Of course, there are wide variations. Certainly, the reform era did not get politics out of policing.

Yet, we all believe that it is heresy to say that politics should influence the decisions of police and the allocation of personnel, or anything else. But we all know that happens.

What I tried to examine was the development of a set of myths that dominate the profession and against which the profession measures itself, the central beliefs of the occupation.

You may not have had 911, but did have rapid response to calls for service; 911 has come to symbolize that. The paper is an attempt to characterize stages of history by the ideology which dominated.

Edwin Meese III: I think that you are trying to reduce this to an academic definition which is not helpful for either the public or for the people working in the field. Some of us are concerned that these definitions are too rigidly compartmentalized.

You suggested that it is "heresy" to say that politics guides police decisions. Well, it is not heresy, because in our discussions we are substituting new political forces—the community and the people in the community—for the old political forces, which at one time were the mayor or the party leaders. More recently, after reform, the political influences are the people in police work themselves. Mayors and others still have a great deal to say, but the police professionals have a firmer grasp of implementation. This is an evolution of understanding rather than strictly compartmentalized periods.

Francis X. "Frank" Hartmann: George, what do you hear in this conversation?

George Latimer: I hear two levels of criticism. One concerns the historical accuracy of the facts. The more fatal criticism is related to the model itself, that it is not as encompassing as the current challenges. And I hear the mixing of words, for different purposes. Daryl Gates describes politics of a kind which will always play a role. Ed Meese has introduced the notion of a different kind of politics, a good kind of politics, if you will. Not that a minority cannot threaten you with violations of people's rights, but it is different from the "ward heeling" system. That is what Ed is saying.

James "Chips" Stewart: During the sixties, seventies, and eighties, the police have been aligned with the crime victims, while academia, the courts, and the press have seemed more concerned with defendants' rights. In the eighties, however, the courts and the press are talking about a new partnership with the victims movement. This is where the police have been all along.

New legislation talks about greater penalties and the rights of both the accused and the innocent are promoted. Our efforts to work on DNA, our efforts to work on better forensics, to improve the police delivery of service, are all part of this very important change in police and community. That has not been mentioned in the paper. The characteristics that you have identified miss important characterizations of what was going on in the past.

Daniel Whitehurst: What I hear is the same thing that happens when a politician is being labeled either liberal or conservative. They always resist the label. There is resistance to being pigeonholed.

The purpose of the paper is to put today's policing in a box. A model has to be created, which everyone will resist, yet it is a helpful and useful methodology.

I agree with the gist of the paper and buy into the idea of several different eras and yet see that you can find things today that still reflect the political or reform era. There are no neat, carefully drawn lines. But, maybe I do not resist the labeling because I am not the one being labeled.

George Kelling: Let me say that Pat Murphy and Chips Stewart are absolutely right that when I evaluate the changes, I have not included a section on the legal changes, like Miranda. That should be added, because you are right about that.

Mark Moore: The other thing that I keep hearing is that we missed the civil rights movement.

George Kelling: Yes. I believe that several things need redoing: the section on environment is wrong. When I am talking about environment I emphasize the level of intimacy between police and citizens. The concept of environment generally also includes an organization's relationship to technological, social, demographic, and cultural changes and the occupation's response to it.

Allen Andrews: If the history could be elaborated, as George has already indicated, that is well on the way to satisfying my principal concern. In terms of Sir Kenneth's concerns, I think the fact we are zeroing in on the role of the uniformed police officer and the basic police function in the neighborhood needs to be acknowledged.

George Kelling: Well, in England, Sir Kenneth has responsibilities for organized crime and for terrorism, which is much less of a condition here.

Oliver "Buck" Revell: Perhaps the empirical data do not support the conceptualization itself, on the community era response and results. That is as troubling as what I see as inaccuracies in the history which may or may not have a significant impact on the model itself. I do not believe, when we talk about the quality of life and citizen satisfaction, that foot patrol and problem solving and team policing have been demonstrated as successful by the empirical data.

Robert Kliesmet: I came on the police department in 1955, when cops beat confessions out of people. I stood outside

while hired guns in the department who were deft at beating the truth out of people got it.

I saw Miranda come and I saw police executives go screaming out of the era of beating confessions out saying that we are going to continue doing what we have always done. Yet, in fact, there was a drastic change in the way police dealt with the community.

I then went through the 1960's, the war, LEAA, and I saw all kinds of new concepts coming into being, team policing being one of them. It was a damn good idea, but the chiefs did not buy it, because academics proposed it. I see the labor relations era of the 1970's differently than you do. We won some major court cases in terms of the rights of police officers. This made them more satisfied and, hopefully, they performed their duties better.

Now, I read a paper that delves into history, and I think it is accurate. I believe that the reform era is not gone; we are still in the reform era. However, I do believe that politics overrides, and that anything that we do here will ultimately come down to the political issue.

I have talked to Daryl Gates at length. He has a good system but that is Los Angeles, California. I can go to Burbank, which is in Los Angeles County, or Redondo Beach, or Sacramento, and they do not have a similar situation.

I travel the whole country talking to police officers who talk about joining our union, or who belong to our union. They are nowhere near where you are. How do we get them to this plateau? Is this group going to put them there?

Nothing is going to happen unless we actively talk about what we intend to do 2, 3, 5 years down the road. History does not mean a damn thing to the cop on the street. He will have to suffer until we implement the real solution to job satisfaction.

Patrick Murphy: The great heroes of policing in the United States are the cops who have to put up with the terrible management and the terrible organization. How can you expect to have decent organization and management when a Philadelphia captain will not spend a day going up the road 90 miles to see what happens in New York, or down to Baltimore, or to Washington? They are all closed institutions. Middle management is the big problem.

You cannot grapple with the problem of American policing at all if you do not start with the fact that we have 17,000 police departments. We have a nonsystem of local policing, but out there among those 17,000 police departments are some gems of departments, and we have had outstanding chiefs. Unfortunately, chiefs come along and bring about reform or upgrading, and that is lost when they leave.

George Kelling: This paper was my attempt, on the basis of a lot of experience in many police departments, to get way back from the occupation and take a very long view, through binoculars. I suspect that when you do that, you see it differently from somebody who worked inside the field for a long period of time. This long view identifies what I consider to be the central tendencies of the occupation.

Now, in the paper, I deliberately put them in very stark terms. It is intended as a polemic. It is meant to raise issues for discussion.

There was always movement toward community, toward problem solving, that did not fit with the general direction of the organization. Police officers were always problem solving. The Kansas City experiment was a problem-solving exercise by Bob Wasserman. A group decided that the main problem was teenagers around schools. Then came the reaction, "We have to keep doing preventive patrol; we cannot concentrate on that problem because if we depart from preventive patrol the community might be torn apart by the bad people of the community." The rhetoric and the organization did not change.

Why are we making this transition now, and making it faster and with more ease than one would expect? Because there are people with weight now in the organization who have always thought in terms of community and addressing problems. And now, as we go through an evolution or a revolution or whatever, the organization is utilizing these capacities and making them part of the central tendencies of the organization.

Mark Moore: So the fraction of problem-solving or community-oriented things that were sanctioned as opposed to done illicitly is gradually changing.

George Latimer: The model is just crude enough to be perfect for a mayor and for a police chief. It is very helpful from a political standpoint, but that is just one use. I am prepared to simplify, because I am comfortable with it and the voters understand it.

It really does not matter whether the reform era ever ended. What does matter is that, conceptually, it is quite different to approach policing this way than the way we would in the hierarchical operation of a department. Most of the country, and this group of people, believe we ought to move away from the traditional hierarchical management system of operating police.

The rest of our deliberations are about how to connect it up with the community.

Daryl Gates: George [Kelling], when you started to describe what you were doing here as stepping back, from a viewpoint outside the police profession, and looking at the profession with binoculars, that put this paper in a different perspective. But the paper should say that in a preamble. Then the paper begins to make more sense to me. It is not history as such.

I have been sitting with major city chiefs for 19 years and have noted how policing in America is different from city to city. While there are great similarities, there is also a great deal of dissimilarity, even in community-oriented policing or community-based policing. The most interesting aspect of attending a major city chiefs' meeting is listening to the great diversity as expressed by each chief, yet noting how similar some of the problems are.

George Kelling: The existence of a unifying strategy does not mean that there were not regional and other variations among police departments during the reform era. Yet a model developed, and the model shaped how police thought about the business they were in and the kind of organizations police departments ought to be.

Oliver "Buck" Revell: A small elite did, but most police did not.

George Kelling: I think Buck is wrong, and I think Daryl is wrong about this, too. The characteristics of policing during the forties, fifties, and sixties are important issues for this group.

Hubert Williams: I liked the paper. The question in part is one of comprehensiveness. Outside of a few questions related to accuracy, the issues that are raised go largely to comprehensiveness. I have watched police for over 25 years, in departments and in pursuit of degrees in policing and criminal justice.

I see policing primarily as a reaction to the conditions that exist in our society at various times. America was once a very segregated society. A separate set of laws was enforced on the black community, the only significant minority. That has changed. We now have communities with a number of minorities, many of them at each other's throats.

We had, in 1967, a presidential commission on law enforcement, which was followed by the Kerner Commission Report. Both reported on the differences within our society.

The civil rights movement brought about an empowerment, it brought about greater democratization. It brought about a significant change in American life, both in terms of perceptions, and in terms of the acceptance by the minority community of what police and government do. Today there are minority chiefs in many of the major cities.

Unless we include the effect that the civil rights movement had on policing, we are not really dealing with the various movements that have changed policing. Before the riots occurred in this country, the salaries of police and the attention given to police by government officials was negligible. They just did not care about cops. The riots came, and suddenly everybody realized that the police are the ones that protect us out there. The police became important. Then, LEAA came about and there was a tremendous infusion of money into the system.

Patrick Murphy: The police were changed from the villains to the critical role of making this thing happen. The thin blue line of law and order is related to race.

Richard Larson: We have focused on a number of issues primarily because this is an advocacy piece. If I were to write such a piece, it would differ markedly from the current one on such issues as costs and feasibility of implementing these kinds of procedures in today's "tax cap" environments and the role of technology, to name two.

James "Chips" Stewart: My criticism from the beginning is that the community era is not distinguishable from the political era in this conceptualization. Decentralization is present in both, both have intimate relationships with community, both have foot patrol, both have political satisfaction, citizen satisfaction, both have law, both have politics.

Our discussions have reflected the evolution of police accountability and the paper should do that as well. Police accountability in the political era simply maintained the status quo. As Hubert indicated, accountability in the reform era was different. It evolved because police were not providing the sort of justice expected by society. When that happens, other institutions, such as the courts, will intrude on police discretion and hold the police accountable to new standards.

We are now moving out of the reform or legalistic era of accountability and trying to push to a new level of accountability responsive to the broader community. That is what is forcing this issue, a concern with crime and fear that merges

the victims movement, the civil rights movement, and the larger interests of the society. We have talked about how we integrate the notion of accountability with responsiveness to the community. The word "community" can be used as a code word for special interests.

We have taken that community idea and homogenized it and we think that we have a new community out there, not a community of special interests but the community of many interests concerned about crime and disorder.

George Latimer: Buck, you made the point that a correlation between community satisfaction and community policing has not been demonstrated by the evidence. In the so-called reform era, was community satisfaction considered a primary good and objective?

Oliver "Buck" Revell: Yes, but I have trouble with the concept of reform movement because as a participant observer of 25 years, I have probably dealt with four or five hundred police departments. August Vollmer, O.W. Wilson, and Bill Parker were not even known to the majority of these police departments. They had no concept of a reform movement. Most of them had heard of Hoover but they had not read him.

The things that really led to reform are Miranda, Mapp versus Ohio, the civil rights movement, bringing police into the modern era.

In response to your question, though, my point was that I do not think empirical data have proven that community satisfaction and quality of life are in fact improved by the models presented. I hope that we can find a model, because the police and the community need to be integrated on a much more specific and supportive basis.

George Kelling: Buck, you are thinking about the current era. I am talking about the reform that occurred at the beginning of the century. It was an extension of the progressive reform movement, professional management . . .

Oliver "Buck" Revell: Scientific management, machine theory was working its way into police ideology.

George Kelling: Yes, but that is not the 1960's. The 1960's begins the shattering, the unraveling of that.

Hubert Williams: We should take a look at the history and write further on this. I will take some responsibility for that. Pat Murphy and I have had the same perspectives on these issues, so Pat and I can write one together.

Mark Moore: We do not want to proclaim an answer; we want to have a conversation. George and I both feel this very strongly—that papers should reflect the deliberations of the group and genuinely emerge from the group, sometimes in opposition, sometimes in concert with the group. That is our publishing philosophy. The audience that we are trying to find is an audience of people who might be having this conversation at the FBI National Academy, at the PERF (Police Executive Research Forum) Executive Program, at the U.S. Conference of Mayors, at the New Mayors Meetings at the Kennedy School, and in discussions between mayors and police chiefs.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

Perspectives on Policing

The Evolving Strategy of Policing

By George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore

Policing. like all professions. learns from experience.
It follows. then. that as modern police executives search
for more effective strategies of policing. they will be guided
by the lessons of police history. The difficulty is that police
history is incoherent. its lessons hard to read. After all.
that history was produced by thousands of local departments
pursuing their own visions and responding to local condi-
tions. Although that varied experience is potentially a rich
source of lessons. departments have left few records that
reveal the trends shaping modern policing. Interpretation
is necessary.

Methodology

This essay presents an interpretation of police history that
may help police executives considering alternative future
strategies of policing. Our reading of police history has
led us to adopt a particular point of view. We find that a
dominant trend guiding today's police executives—a trend
that encourages the pursuit of independent. professional
autonomy for police departments—is carrying the police
away from achieving their maximum potential. especially
in effective crime fighting. We are also convinced that this
trend in policing is weakening *public* policing relative to
private security as the primary institution providing security
to society. We believe that this has dangerous long-term
implications not only for police departments but also for
society. We think that this trend is shrinking rather than
enlarging police capacity to help create civil communities.
Our judgment is that this trend can be reversed only by
refocusing police attention from the pursuit of professional
autonomy to the establishment of effective problem-solving
partnerships with the communities they police.

Community policing is quite different: it is not incident- or technology-driven; officers operate on a decentralized basis, it emphasizes officers being in regular contact with citizens, and it allocates police on the basis of neighborhoods. The question is, how reconcilable are these two strategies? Some (Lawrence Sherman of the University of Maryland is one example) have taken a strong stance that radical alterations will be required if police are to respond more effectively to community problems. Others (Richard Larson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example) disagree, believing that community policing is reconcilable with rapid response technology—indeed Professor Larson would emphasize that current computer technology can facilitate community policing.

Will the community policing strategy lead to increased police corruption and misbehavior?

The initial news from Houston, New York, Flint, Newark, Los Angeles, Baltimore County, and other police departments which have experimented with community policing is good. Community policing has not led to increased problems of corruption or misbehavior.

Why is it, however, that policymakers fear that community policing has the potential to increase the incidents of police running amok? The answer? Community policing radically decentralizes police authority; officers must create for themselves the best responses to problems; and, police become intimately involved with citizens.

These ingredients may not sound so troublesome in themselves—after all, many private and public sector organizations radically decentralize authority, encourage creativity, and are characterized by relative intimacy between service providers and consumers. Nevertheless, in police circles such ingredients violate the orthodox means of controlling corruption. For a generation, police have believed that to eliminate corruption it is necessary to centralize authority, limit discretion, and reduce intimacy between police and citizens. They had good reason to: Early policing in the United States had been characterized by financial corruption, failure of police to protect the rights of all citizens, and zealotry.

But just as it is possible to squander police resources in the name of efficiency, it is also possible to squander police resources in the quest for integrity. Centralization, standardization, and remoteness may preclude many opportunities for corruption, but they may also preclude the possibility of good policing. For example, street-level cocaine and heroin enforcement by patrol officers, now known to have crime reduction value, has been banned in cities because of fear of corruption. It is almost as if the purpose of police was to be corruption free, rather than to do essential work. If, as it appears to be, it is necessary to take risks to solve problems, then so be it: police will have to learn to manage risks as well as do managers in other enterprises.

Does this imply softening on the issue of police corruption? Absolutely not. Police and city managers will have to continue to be vigilant: community policing exposes officers to more opportunities for traditional financial corruption; in many neighborhoods police will be faced with demands to protect communities from the incursions of minorities; and, police will be tempted to become overzealous when they see citizens' problems being ignored by other agencies.

These dangers mean, however, that police executives will have to manage through values, rather than merely policies and procedures, and by establishing regular neighborhood and community institution reporting mechanisms, rather than through centralized command and control systems.

Each of these issues—use of police resources, organizational compatibility, and corruption—is complicated. Some will be the subject of debate. Others will require research and experimentation to resolve. But most police chiefs will begin to address these issues in a new way. They will not attempt to resolve them in the ways of the past: in secret, behind closed doors. Their approach will reflect the values of the individual neighborhoods as well as the community as a whole.

Policing is changing dramatically. On the one hand, we wish policing to retain the old values of police integrity, equitable distribution of police resources throughout a community, and police efficiency which characterized the old model of police. But the challenge of contemporary police and city executives is to redefine these concepts in light of the resurgence of neighborhood vitality, consumerism, and more realistic assessments of the institutional capacity of police.

The quiet revolution is beginning to make itself heard: citizens and police are joining together to defend communities.

Legitimacy and authorization

Early American police were authorized by local municipalities. Unlike their English counterparts, American police departments lacked the powerful, central authority of the crown to establish a legitimate, unifying mandate for their enterprise. Instead, American police derived both their authorization and resources from local political leaders, often ward politicians. They were, of course, guided by the law as to what tasks to undertake and what powers to utilize. But their link to neighborhoods and local politicians was so tight that both Jordan[4] and Fogelson[5] refer to the early police as adjuncts to local political machines. The relationship was often reciprocal: political machines recruited and maintained police in office and on the beat, while police helped ward political leaders maintain their political offices by encouraging citizens to vote for certain candidates, discouraging them from voting for others, and, at times, by assisting in rigging elections.

The police function

Partly because of their close connection to politicians, police during the political era provided a wide array of services to citizens. Inevitably police departments were involved in crime prevention and control and order maintenance, but they also provided a wide variety of social services. In the late 19th century, municipal police departments ran soup lines; provided temporary lodging for newly arrived immigrant workers in station houses;[6] and assisted ward leaders in finding work for immigrants, both in police and other forms of work.

Organizational design

Although ostensibly organized as a centralized, quasi-military organization with a unified chain of command, police departments of the political era were nevertheless decentralized. Cities were divided into precincts, and precinct-level managers often, in concert with the ward leaders, ran precincts as small-scale departments—hiring, firing, managing, and assigning personnel as they deemed appropriate. In addition, decentralization combined with primitive communications and transportation to give police officers substantial discretion in handling their individual beats. At best, officer contact with central command was maintained through the call box.

External relationships

During the political era, police departments were intimately connected to the social and political world of the ward. Police officers often were recruited from the same ethnic stock as the dominant political groups in the localities, and continued to live in the neighborhoods they patrolled.

Precinct commanders consulted often with local political representatives about police priorities and progress.

Demand management

Demand for police services came primarily from two sources: ward politicians making demands on the organization and citizens making demands directly on beat officers. Decentralization and political authorization encouraged the first; foot patrol, lack of other means of transportation, and poor communications produced the latter. Basically, the demand for police services was received, interpreted, and responded to at the precinct and street levels.

Principal programs and technologies

The primary tactic of police during the political era was foot patrol. Most police officers walked beats and dealt with crime, disorder, and other problems as they arose, or as they were guided by citizens and precinct superiors. The technological tools available to police were limited. However, when call boxes became available, police administrators used them for supervisory and managerial purposes; and, when early automobiles became available, police used them to transport officers from one beat to another.[7] The new technology thereby increased the range, but did not change the mode, of patrol officers.

Detective divisions existed but without their current prestige. Operating from a caseload of "persons" rather than offenses, detectives relied on their caseload to inform on other criminals.[8] The "third degree" was a common means of interviewing criminals to solve crimes. Detectives were often especially valuable to local politicians for gathering information on individuals for political or personal, rather than offense-related, purposes.

❝ Most police officers walked beats and dealt with crime, disorder, and other problems as they arose ... ❞

Measured outcomes

The expected outcomes of police work included crime and riot control, maintenance of order, and relief from many of the other problems of an industrializing society (hunger and temporary homelessness, for example). Consistent with their

political mandate, police emphasized maintaining citizen and political satisfaction with police services as an important goal of police departments.

In sum, the organizational strategy of the political era of policing included the following elements:

- Authorization—primarily political.

- Function—crime control, order maintenance, broad social services.

- Organizational design—decentralized and geographical.

- Relationship to environment—close and personal.

- Demand—managed through links between politicians and precinct commanders, and face-to-face contacts between citizens and foot patrol officers.

- Tactics and technology—foot patrol and rudimentary investigations.

- Outcome—political and citizen satisfaction with social order.

The political strategy of early American policing had strengths. First, police were integrated into neighborhoods and enjoyed the support of citizens—at least the support of the dominant and political interests of an area. Second, and probably as a result of the first, the strategy provided useful services to communities. There is evidence that it helped contain riots. Many citizens believed that police prevented crimes or solved crimes when they occurred.[9] And the police assisted immigrants in establishing themselves in communities and finding jobs.

❝ Officers were often required to enforce unpopular laws foisted on immigrant ethnic neighborhoods by crusading reformers ... ❞

The political strategy also had weaknesses. First, intimacy with community, closeness to political leaders, and a decentralized organizational structure, with its inability to provide supervision of officers, gave rise to police corruption. Officers were often required to enforce unpopu-

lar laws foisted on immigrant ethnic neighborhoods by crusading reformers (primarily of English and Dutch background) who objected to ethnic values.[10] Because of their intimacy with the community, the officers were vulnerable to being bribed in return for nonenforcement or lax enforcement of laws. Moreover, police closeness to politicians created such forms of political corruption as patronage and police interference in elections.[11] Even those few departments that managed to avoid serious financial or political corruption during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Boston for example, succumbed to large-scale corruption during and after Prohibition.[12]

Second, close identification of police with neighborhoods and neighborhood norms often resulted in discrimination against strangers and others who violated those norms, especially minority ethnic and racial groups. Often ruling their beats with the "ends of their nightsticks," police regularly targeted outsiders and strangers for rousting and "curbstone justice."[13]

Finally, the lack of organizational control over officers resulting from both decentralization and the political nature of many appointments to police positions caused inefficiencies and disorganization. The image of Keystone Cops—police as clumsy bunglers—was widespread and often descriptive of realities in American policing.

The reform era

Control over police by local politicians, conflict between urban reformers and local ward leaders over the enforcement of laws regulating the morality of urban migrants, and abuses (corruption, for example) that resulted from the intimacy between police and political leaders and citizens produced a continuous struggle for control over police during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[14] Nineteenth-century attempts by civilians to reform police organizations by applying external pressures largely failed; 20th-century attempts at reform, originating from both internal and external forces, shaped contemporary policing as we knew it through the 1970's.[15]

Berkeley's police chief, August Vollmer, first rallied police executives around the idea of reform during the 1920's and early 1930's. Vollmer's vision of policing was the trumpet call: police in the post-flapper generation were to remind American citizens and institutions of the moral vision that had made America great and of their responsibilities to maintain that vision.[16] It was Vollmer's protege, O.W. Wilson, however, who taking guidance from J. Edgar Hoover's shrewd transformation of the corrupt and discredited Bureau of Investigation into the honest

and prestigious Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), became the principal administrative architect of the police reform organizational strategy.[17]

Hoover wanted the FBI to represent a new force for law and order, and saw that such an organization could capture a permanent constituency that wanted an agency to take a stand against lawlessness, immorality, and crime. By raising eligibility standards and changing patterns of recruitment and training, Hoover gave the FBI agents stature as upstanding moral crusaders. By committing the organization to attacks on crimes such as kidnapping, bank robbery, and espionage—crimes that attracted wide publicity and required technical sophistication, doggedness, and a national jurisdiction to solve—Hoover established the organization's reputation for professional competence and power. By establishing tight central control over his agents, limiting their use of controversial investigation procedures (such as undercover operations), and keeping them out of narcotics enforcement, Hoover was also able to maintain an unparalleled record of integrity. That, too, fitted the image of a dogged, incorruptible crime-fighting organization. Finally, lest anyone fail to notice the important developments within the Bureau, Hoover developed impressive public relations programs that presented the FBI and its agents in the most favorable light. (For those of us who remember the 1940's, for example, one of the most popular radio phrases was, "The FBI in peace and war"—the introductory line in a radio program that portrayed a vigilant FBI protecting us from foreign enemies as well as villains on the "10 Most Wanted" list, another Hoover/FBI invention.)

❝ 20th-century attempts at reform, originating from both internal and external forces, shaped ... policing as we knew it through the 1970's. ❞

Struggling as they were with reputations for corruption, brutality, unfairness, and downright incompetence, municipal police reformers found Hoover's path a compelling one. Instructed by O.W. Wilson's texts on police administration, they began to shape an organizational strategy for urban police analogous to the one pursued by the FBI.

Legitimacy and authorization

Reformers rejected politics as the basis of police legitimacy. In their view, politics and political involvement was the *problem* in American policing. Police reformers therefore allied themselves with Progressives. They moved to end the close ties between local political leaders and police. In some states, control over police was usurped by state government. Civil service eliminated patronage and ward influences in hiring and firing police officers. In some cities (Los Angeles and Cincinnati, for example), even the position of chief of police became a civil service position to be attained through examination. In others (such as Milwaukee), chiefs were given lifetime tenure by a police commission, to be removed from office only for cause. In yet others (Boston, for example), contracts for chiefs were staggered so as not to coincide with the mayor's tenure. Concern for separation of police from politics did not focus only on chiefs, however. In some cities, such as Philadelphia, it became illegal for patrol officers to live in the beats they patrolled. The purpose of all these changes was to isolate police as completely as possible from political influences.

Law, especially criminal law, and police professionalism were established as the principal bases of police legitimacy. When police were asked why they performed as they did, the most common answer was that they enforced the law. When they chose not to enforce the law—for instance, in a riot when police isolated an area rather than arrested looters—police justification for such action was found in their claim to professional knowledge, skills, and values which uniquely qualified them to make such tactical decisions. Even in riot situations, police rejected the idea that political leaders should make tactical decisions; that was a police responsibility.[18]

So persuasive was the argument of reformers to remove political influences from policing, that police departments became one of the most autonomous public organizations in urban government.[19] Under such circumstances, policing a city became a legal and technical matter left to the discretion of professional police executives under the guidance of law. Political influence of any kind on a police department came to be seen as not merely a failure of police leadership but as corruption in policing.

The police function

Using the focus on criminal law as a basic source of police legitimacy, police in the reform era moved to narrow their functioning to crime control and criminal apprehension. Police agencies became *law enforcement* agencies. Their goal was to control crime. Their principal means was the use of criminal law to apprehend and deter offenders. Activities that drew the police into solving other kinds of community problems and relied on other kinds of responses were

identified as "social work," and became the object of derision. A common line in police circles during the 1950's and 1960's was, "If only we didn't have to do social work, we could really do something about crime." Police retreated from providing emergency medical services as well— ambulance and emergency medical services were transferred to medical, private, or firefighting organizations.[20] The 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice ratified this orientation: heretofore, police had been conceptualized as an agency of urban government; the President's Commission reconceptualized them as part of the criminal justice system.

Organizational design

The organization form adopted by police reformers generally reflected the *scientific* or *classical* theory of administration advocated by Frederick W. Taylor during the early 20th century. At least two assumptions attended classical theory. First, workers are inherently uninterested in work and, if left to their own devices, are prone to avoid it. Second, since workers have little or no interest in the substance of their work, the sole common interest between workers and management is found in economic incentives for workers. Thus, both workers and management benefit economically when management arranges work in ways that increase workers' productivity and link productivity to economic rewards.

Two central principles followed from these assumptions: division of labor and unity of control. The former posited that if tasks can be broken into components, workers can become highly skilled in particular components and thus more efficient in carrying out their tasks. The latter posited that the workers' activities are best managed by a *pyramid of control*, with all authority finally resting in one central office.

❝ . . . a generation of police officers was raised with the idea that they merely enforced the law . . . ❞

Using this classical theory, police leaders moved to routinize and standardize police work, especially patrol work. Police work became a form of crimefighting in which police enforced the law and arrested criminals if the opportunity presented itself. Attempts were made to limit discretion in patrol work: a generation of police officers was raised with the idea that they merely enforced the law.

If special problems arose, the typical response was to create special units (e.g., vice, juvenile, drugs, tactical) rather than to assign them to patrol. The creation of these special units, under central rather than precinct command, served to further centralize command and control and weaken precinct commanders.[21]

Moreover, police organizations emphasized control over workers through bureaucratic means of control: supervision, limited span of control, flow of instructions downward and information upward in the organization, establishment of elaborate record-keeping systems requiring additional layers of middle managers, and coordination of activities between various production units (e.g., patrol and detectives), which also required additional middle managers.

External relationships

Police leaders in the reform era redefined the nature of a proper relationship between police officers and citizens. Heretofore, police had been intimately linked to citizens. During the era of reform policing, the new model demanded an impartial law enforcer who related to citizens in professionally neutral and distant terms. No better characterization of this model can be found than television's Sergeant Friday, whose response, "Just the facts, ma'am," typified the idea: impersonal and oriented toward crime solving rather than responsive to the emotional crisis of a victim.

The professional model also shaped the police view of the role of citizens in crime control. Police redefined the citizen role during an era when there was heady confidence about the ability of professionals to manage physical and social problems. Physicians would care for health problems, dentists for dental problems, teachers for educational problems, social workers for social adjustment problems, and police for crime problems. The proper role of citizens in crime control was to be relatively passive recipients of professional crime control services. Citizens' actions on their own behalf to defend themselves or their communities came to be seen as inappropriate, smacking of vigilantism. Citizens met their responsibilities when a crime occurred by calling police, deferring to police actions, and being good witnesses if called upon to give evidence. The metaphor that expressed this orientation to the community was that of the police as the "thin blue line." It connotes the existence of dangerous external threats to communities, portrays police as standing between that danger and good citizens, and implies both police heroism and loneliness.

Demand management

Learning from Hoover, police reformers vigorously set out to sell their brand of urban policing.[22] They, too, performed on radio talk shows, consulted with media representatives

about how to present police, engaged in public relations campaigns, and in other ways presented this image of police as crime fighters. In a sense, they began with an organizational capacity—anticrime police tactics—and intensively promoted it. This approach was more like selling than marketing. Marketing refers to the process of carefully identifying consumer needs and then developing goods and services that meet those needs. Selling refers to having a stock of products or goods on hand irrespective of need and selling them. The reform strategy had as its starting point a set of police tactics (services) that police promulgated as much for the purpose of establishing internal control of police officers and enhancing the status of urban police as for responding to community needs or market demands.[23] The community "need" for rapid response to calls for service, for instance, was largely the consequence of police selling the service as efficacious in crime control rather than a direct demand from citizens.

> ❝ *Foot patrol, when demanded by citizens, was rejected as an outmoded, expensive frill.* ❞

Consistent with this attempt to sell particular tactics, police worked to shape and control demand for police services. Foot patrol, when demanded by citizens, was rejected as an outmoded, expensive frill. Social and emergency services were terminated or given to other agencies. Receipt of demand for police services was centralized. No longer were citizens encouraged to go to "their" neighborhood police officers or districts; all calls went to a central communications facility. When 911 systems were installed, police aggressively sold 911 and rapid response to calls for service as effective police service. If citizens continued to use district, or precinct, telephone numbers, some police departments disconnected those telephones or got new telephone numbers.[24]

Principal programs and technologies

The principal programs and tactics of the reform strategy were preventive patrol by automobile and rapid response to calls for service. Foot patrol, characterized as outmoded and inefficient, was abandoned as rapidly as police administrators could obtain cars.[25] The initial tactical reasons for putting police in cars had been to increase the size of the areas police officers could patrol and to take the advantage away from criminals who began to use automobiles. Under reform policing, a new theory about how to make the best tactical use of automobiles appeared.

O.W. Wilson developed the theory of preventive patrol by automobile as an anticrime tactic.[26] He theorized that if police drove conspicuously marked cars randomly through city streets and gave special attention to certain "hazards" (bars and schools, for example), a feeling of police omnipresence would be developed. In turn, that sense of omnipresence would both deter criminals and reassure good citizens. Moreover, it was hypothesized that vigilant patrol officers moving rapidly through city streets would happen upon criminals in action and be able to apprehend them.

As telephones and radios became ubiquitous, the availability of cruising police came to be seen as even more valuable: if citizens could be encouraged to call the police via telephone as soon as problems developed, police could respond rapidly to calls and establish control over situations, identify wrong-doers, and make arrests. To this end, 911 systems and computer-aided dispatch were developed throughout the country. Detective units continued, although with some modifications. The "person" approach ended and was replaced by the case approach. In addition, forensic techniques were upgraded and began to replace the old "third degree" or reliance on informants for the solution of crimes. Like other special units, most investigative units were controlled by central headquarters.

Measured outcomes

The primary desired outcomes of the reform strategy were crime control and criminal apprehension.[27] To measure achievement of these outcomes, August Vollmer, working through the newly vitalized International Association of Chiefs of Police, developed and implemented a uniform system of crime classification and reporting. Later, the system was taken over and administered by the FBI and the *Uniform Crime Reports* became the primary standard by which police organizations measured their effectiveness. Additionally, individual officers' effectiveness in dealing with crime was judged by the number of arrests they made; other measures of police effectiveness included response time (the time it takes for a police car to arrive at the location of a call for service) and "number of passings" (the number of times a police car passes a given point on a city street). Regardless of all other indicators, however, the primary measure of police effectiveness was the crime rate as measured by the *Uniform Crime Reports*.

In sum, the reform organizational strategy contained the following elements:

- Authorization—law and professionalism.

- Function—crime control.

- Organizational design—centralized, classical.

- Relationship to environment—professionally remote.

- Demand—channeled through central dispatching activities.

- Tactics and technology—preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service.

- Outcome—crime control.

" . . . officers' effectiveness in dealing with crime was judged by the number of arrests they made . . . "

In retrospect, the reform strategy was impressive. It successfully integrated its strategic elements into a coherent paradigm that was internally consistent and logically appealing. Narrowing police functions to crime fighting made sense. If police could concentrate their efforts on prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals, it followed that they could be more effective than if they dissipated their efforts on other problems. The model of police as impartial, professional law enforcers was attractive because it minimized the discretionary excesses which developed during the political era. Preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service were intuitively appealing tactics, as well as means to control officers and shape and control citizen demands for service. Further, the strategy provided a comprehensive, yet simple, vision of policing around which police leaders could rally.

The metaphor of the thin blue line reinforced their need to create isolated independence and autonomy in terms that were acceptable to the public. The patrol car became the symbol of policing during the 1930's and 1940's; when equipped with a radio, it was at the limits of technology. It represented mobility, power, conspicuous presence, control of officers, and professional distance from citizens.

During the late 1960's and 1970's, however, the reform strategy ran into difficulty. First, regardless of how police effectiveness in dealing with crime was measured, police failed to substantially improve their record. During the

1960's, crime began to rise. Despite large increases in the size of police departments and in expenditures for new forms of equipment (911 systems, computer-aided dispatch, etc.), police failed to meet their own or public expectations about their capacity to control crime or prevent its increase. Moreover, research conducted during the 1970's on preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service suggested that neither was an effective crime control or apprehension tactic.[28]

Second, fear rose rapidly during this era. The consequences of this fear were dramatic for cities. Citizens abandoned parks, public transportation, neighborhood shopping centers, churches, as well as entire neighborhoods. What puzzled police and researchers was that levels of fear and crime did not always correspond: crime levels were low in some areas, but fear high. Conversely, in other areas levels of crime were high, but fear low. Not until the early 1980's did researchers discover that fear is more closely correlated with disorder than with crime.[29] Ironically, order maintenance was one of those functions that police had been downplaying over the years. They collected no data on it, provided no training to officers in order maintenance activities, and did not reward officers for successfully conducting order maintenance tasks.

Third, despite attempts by police departments to create equitable police allocation systems and to provide impartial policing to all citizens, many minority citizens, especially blacks during the 1960's and 1970's, did not perceive their treatment as equitable or adequate. They protested not only police mistreatment, but lack of treatment—inadequate or insufficient services—as well.

" Not until the early 1980's did researchers discover that fear is more closely correlated with disorder than with crime. "

Fourth, the civil rights and antiwar movements challenged police. This challenge took several forms. The legitimacy of police was questioned: students resisted police, minorities rioted against them, and the public, observing police via live television for the first time, questioned their tactics. Moreover, despite police attempts to upgrade personnel through improved recruitment, training, and supervision, minorities and then women insisted that they had to be adequately represented in policing if police were to be legitimate.

· Fifth, some of the myths that undergirded the reform strategy—police officers use little or no discretion and

the primary activity of police is law enforcement—simply proved to be too far from reality to be sustained. Over and over again research showed that use of discretion characterized policing at all levels and that law enforcement comprised but a small portion of police officers' activities.[30]

Sixth, although the reform ideology could rally police chiefs and executives, it failed to rally line police officers. During the reform era, police executives had moved to professionalize their ranks. Line officers, however, were managed in ways that were antithetical to professionalization. Despite pious testimony from police executives that "patrol is the backbone of policing," police executives behaved in ways that were consistent with classical organizational theory—patrol officers continued to have low status; their work was treated as if it were routinized and standardized; and petty rules governed issues such as hair length and off-duty behavior. Meanwhile, line officers received little guidance in use of discretion and were given few, if any, opportunities to make suggestions about their work. Under such circumstances, the increasing "grumpiness" of officers in many cities is not surprising, nor is the rise of militant unionism.

Seventh, police lost a significant portion of their financial support, which had been increasing or at least constant over the years, as cities found themselves in fiscal difficulties. In city after city, police departments were reduced in size. In some cities, New York for example, financial cutbacks resulted in losses of up to one-third of departmental personnel. Some, noting that crime did not increase more rapidly or arrests decrease during the cutbacks, suggested that New York City had been overpoliced when at maximum strength. For those concerned about levels of disorder and fear in New York City, not to mention other problems, · that came as a dismaying conclusion. Yet it emphasizes the erosion of confidence that citizens, politicians, and academicians had in urban police—an erosion that was translated into lack of political and financial support.

Finally, urban police departments began to acquire competition: private security and the community crime control movement. Despite the inherent value of these developments, the fact that businesses, industries, and private citizens began to search for alternative means of protecting their property and persons suggests a decreasing confidence in either the capability or the intent of the police to provide the services that citizens want.

In retrospect, the police reform strategy has characteristics similar to those that Miles and Snow[31] ascribe to a defensive strategy in the private sector. Some of the characteristics of an organization with a defensive strategy are (with specific characteristics of reform policing added in parentheses):

- Its market is stable and narrow (crime victims).

- Its success is dependent on maintaining dominance in a narrow, chosen market (crime control).

- It tends to ignore developments outside its domain (isolation).

- It tends to establish a single core technology (patrol).

- New technology is used to improve its current product or service rather than to expand its product or service line (use of computers to enhance patrol).

- Its management is centralized (command and control).

- Promotions generally are from within (with the exception of chiefs, virtually all promotions are from within).

- There is a tendency toward a functional structure with high degrees of specialization and formalization.

A defensive strategy is successful for an organization when market conditions remain stable and few competitors enter the field. Such strategies are vulnerable, however, in unstable market conditions and when competitors are aggressive.

❝ . . . the reform strategy was unable to adjust to the changing social circumstances of the 1960's and 1970's.❞

The reform strategy was a successful strategy for police during the relatively stable period of the 1940's and 1950's. Police were able to sell a relatively narrow service line and maintain dominance in the crime control market. The social changes of the 1960's and 1970's, however, created unstable conditions. Some of the more significant changes included: the civil rights movement; migration of minorities into cities; the changing age of the population (more youths and teenagers); increases in crime and fear; increased oversight of police actions by courts; and the decriminalization and deinstitutionalization movements. Whether or not the private sector defensive strategy properly applies to police, it is clear that the reform strategy was unable to adjust to the changing social circumstances of the 1960's and 1970's.

The community problem-solving era

All was not negative for police during the late 1970's and early 1980's, however. Police began to score victories which they barely noticed. Foot patrol remained popular, and in many cities citizen and political demands for it intensified. In New Jersey, the state funded the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program, which funded foot patrol in cities, often over the opposition of local chiefs of police.[32] In Boston, foot patrol was so popular with citizens that when neighborhoods were selected for foot patrol, politicians often made the announcements, especially during election years. Flint, Michigan, became the first city in memory to return to foot patrol on a citywide basis. It proved so popular there that citizens twice voted to increase their taxes to fund foot patrol—most recently by a two-thirds majority. Political and citizen demands for foot patrol continued to expand in cities throughout the United States. Research into foot patrol suggested it was more than just politically popular, it contributed to city life: it reduced fear, increased citizen satisfaction with police, improved police attitudes toward citizens, and increased the morale and job satisfaction of police.[33]

Additionally, research conducted during the 1970's suggested that one factor could help police improve their record in dealing with crime: information. If information about crimes and criminals could be obtained from citizens by police, primarily patrol officers, and could be properly managed by police departments, investigative and other units could significantly increase their effect on crime.[34]

Moreover, research into foot patrol suggested that at least part of the fear reduction potential was linked to the order maintenance activities of foot patrol officers.[35] Subsequent work in Houston and Newark indicated that tactics other than foot patrol that, like foot patrol, emphasized increasing the quantity and improving the quality of police-citizen interactions had outcomes similar to those of foot patrol (fear reduction, etc.).[36] Meanwhile, many other cities were developing programs, though not evaluated, similar to those in the foot patrol, Flint, and fear reduction experiments.[37]

The findings of foot patrol and fear reduction experiments, when coupled with the research on the relationship between fear and disorder, created new opportunities for police to understand the increasing concerns of citizens' groups about disorder (gangs, prostitutes, etc.) and to work with citizens to do something about it. Police discovered that when they asked citizens about their priorities, citizens appreciated the inquiry and also provided useful information—often about

problems that beat officers might have been aware of, but about which departments had little or no official data (e.g., disorder). Moreover, given the ambiguities that surround both the definitions of disorder and the authority of police to do something about it, police learned that they had to seek authorization from local citizens to intervene in disorderly situations.[38]

❝ . . . foot patrol and fear reduction experiments [helped] police to understand the increasing concerns of citizens . . . ❞

Simultaneously, Goldstein's problem-oriented approach to policing[39] was being tested in several communities: Madison, Wisconsin; Baltimore County, Maryland; and Newport News, Virginia. Problem-oriented policing rejects the fragmented approach in which police deal with each incident, whether citizen- or police-initiated, as an isolated event with neither history nor future. Pierce's findings about calls for service illustrate Goldstein's point: 60 percent of the calls for service in any given year in Boston originated from 10 percent of the households calling the police.[40] Furthermore, Goldstein and his colleagues in Madison, Newport News, and Baltimore County discovered the following: police officers enjoy operating with a holistic approach to their work; they have the capacity to do it successfully; they can work with citizens and other agencies to solve problems; and citizens seem to appreciate working with police—findings similar to those of the foot patrol experiments (Newark and Flint)[41] and the fear reduction experiments (Houston and Newark).[42]

The problem confronting police, policymakers, and academicians is that these trends and findings seem to contradict many of the tenets that dominated police thinking for a generation. Foot patrol creates new intimacy between citizens and police. Problem solving is hardly the routinized and standardized patrol modality that reformers thought was necessary to maintain control of police and limit their discretion. Indeed, use of discretion is the *sine qua non* of problem-solving policing. Relying on citizen endorsement of order maintenance activities to justify police action acknowledges a continued or new reliance on political authorization for police work in general. And, accepting the quality of urban life as an outcome of good police service emphasizes a wider definition of the police function and the desired effects of police work.

These changes in policing are not merely new police tactics, however. Rather, they represent a new organizational

approach, properly called a community strategy. The elements of that strategy are:

Legitimacy and authorization

There is renewed emphasis on community, or political, authorization for many police tasks, along with law and professionalism. Law continues to be the major legitimating basis of the police function. It defines basic police powers, but it does not fully direct police activities in efforts to maintain order, negotiate conflicts, or solve community problems. It becomes one tool among many others. Neighborhood, or community, support and involvement are required to accomplish those tasks. Professional and bureaucratic authority, especially that which tends to isolate police and insulate them from neighborhood influences, is lessened as citizens contribute more to definitions of problems and identification of solutions. Although in some respects similar to the authorization of policing's political era, community authorization exists in a different political context. The civil service movement, the political centralization that grew out of the Progressive era, and the bureaucratization, professionalization, and unionization of police stand as counterbalances to the possible recurrence of the corrupting influences of ward politics that existed prior to the reform movement.

The police function

As indicated above, the definition of police function broadens in the community strategy. It includes order maintenance, conflict resolution, problem solving through the organization, and provision of services, as well as other activities. Crime control remains an important function, with an important difference, however. The reform strategy attempts to control crime directly through preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service. The community strategy emphasizes crime control *and prevention* as an indirect result of, or an equal partner to, the other activities.

❝ ... police function ... includes order maintenance, conflict resolution, problem solving ... , and provision of services ... ❞

Organizational design

Community policing operates from organizational assumptions different from those of reform policing. The idea that workers have no legitimate, substantive interest in their work

is untenable when programs such as those in Flint, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, Baltimore County, Newport News, and others are examined. Consulting with community groups, problem solving, maintaining order, and other such activities are antithetical to the reform ideal of eliminating officer discretion through routinization and standardization of police activities. Moreover, organizational decentralization is inherent in community policing: the involvement of police officers in diagnosing and responding to neighborhood and community problems necessarily pushes operational and tactical decisionmaking to the lower levels of the organization. The creation of neighborhood police stations (storefronts, for example), reopening of precinct stations, and establishment of beat offices (in schools, churches, etc.) are concrete examples of such decentralization.

Decentralization of tactical decisionmaking to precinct or beat level does not imply abdication of executive obligations and functions, however. Developing, articulating, and monitoring organizational strategy remain the responsibility of management. Within this strategy, operational and tactical decisionmaking is decentralized. This implies what may at first appear to be a paradox: while the number of managerial levels may decrease, the number of managers may increase. Sergeants in a decentralized regime, for example, have managerial responsibilities that exceed those they would have in a centralized organization.

At least two other elements attend this decentralization: increased participative management and increased involvement of top police executives in planning and implementation. Chiefs have discovered that programs are easier to conceive and implement if officers themselves are involved in their development through task forces, temporary matrix-like organizational units, and other organizational innovations that tap the wisdom and experience of sergeants and patrol officers. Additionally, police executives have learned that good ideas do not translate themselves into successful programs without extensive involvement of the chief executive and his close agents in every stage of planning and implementation, a lesson learned in the private sector as well.[43]

One consequence of decentralized decisionmaking, participative planning and management, and executive involvement in planning is that fewer levels of authority are required to administer police organizations. Some police organizations, including the London Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard), have begun to reduce the number of middle-management layers, while others are contemplating doing so. Moreover, as in the private sector, as computerized

information gathering systems reach their potential in police departments, the need for middle managers whose primary function is data collection will be further reduced.

External relationships

Community policing relies on an intimate relationship between police and citizens. This is accomplished in a variety of ways: relatively long-term assignment of officers to beats, programs that emphasize familiarity between citizens and police (police knocking on doors, consultations, crime control meetings for police and citizens, assignment to officers of "caseloads" of households with ongoing problems, problem solving, etc.), revitalization or development of Police Athletic League programs, educational programs in grade and high schools, and other programs. Moreover, police are encouraged to respond to the feelings and fears of citizens that result from a variety of social problems or from victimization.

❝ Community policing relies on an intimate relationship between police and citizens. ❞

Further, the police are restructuring their relationship with neighborhood groups and institutions. Earlier, during the reform era, police had claimed a monopolistic responsibility for crime control in cities, communities, and neighborhoods; now they recognize serious competitors in the "industry" of crime control, especially private security and the community crime control movement. Whereas in the past police had dismissed these sources of competition or, as in the case of community crime control, had attempted to coopt the movement for their own purposes,[44] now police in many cities (Boston, New York, Houston, and Los Angeles, to name a few) are moving to structure working relationships or strategic alliances with neighborhood and community crime control groups. Although there is less evidence of attempts to develop alliances with the private security industry, a recent proposal to the National Institute of Justice envisioned an experimental alliance between the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Police Department and the Wackenhut Corporation in which the two organizations would share responses to calls for service.

Demand management

In the community problem-solving strategy, a major portion of demand is decentralized, with citizens encouraged to bring problems directly to beat officers or precinct offices. Use of 911 is discouraged, except for dire emergencies. Whether tactics include aggressive foot patrol as in Flint or problem solving as in Newport News, the emphasis is on police officers' interacting with citizens to determine the types of problems they are confronting and to devise solutions to those problems. In contrast to reform policing with its selling orientation, this approach is more like marketing: customer preferences are sought, and satisfying customer needs and wants, rather than selling a previously packaged product or service, is emphasized. In the case of police, they gather information about citizens' wants, diagnose the nature of the problem, devise possible solutions, and then determine which segments of the community they can best serve and which can be best served by other agencies and institutions that provide services, including crime control.

Additionally, many cities are involved in the development of demarketing programs.[45] The most noteworthy example of demarketing is in the area of rapid response to calls for service. Whether through the development of alternatives to calls for service, educational programs designed to discourage citizens from using the 911 system, or, as in a few cities, simply not responding to many calls for service, police actively attempt to demarket a program that had been actively sold earlier. Often demarketing 911 is thought of as a negative process. It need not be so, however. It is an attempt by police to change social, political, and fiscal circumstances to bring consumers' wants in line with police resources and to accumulate evidence about the value of particular police tactics.

❝ ... demarketing 911 ... is an attempt by police to ... bring consumers' wants in line with police resources ... ❞

Tactics and technology

Community policing tactics include foot patrol, problem solving, information gathering, victim counseling and services, community organizing and consultation, education, walk-and-ride and knock-on-door programs, as well as regular patrol, specialized forms of patrol, and rapid response to emergency calls for service. Emphasis is placed on

information sharing between patrol and detectives to increase the possibility of crime solution and clearance.

Measured outcomes

The measures of success in the community strategy are broad: quality of life in neighborhoods, problem solution, reduction of fear, increased order, citizen satisfaction with police services, as well as crime control. In sum, the elements of the community strategy include:

- Authorization—community support (political), law, professionalism.

- Function—crime control, crime prevention, problem solving.

- Organizational design—decentralized, task forces, matrices.

- Relationship to environment—consultative, police defend values of law and professionalism, but listen to community concerns.

- Demand—channelled through analysis of underlying problems.

- Tactics and technology—foot patrol, problem solving, etc.

- Outcomes—quality of life and citizen satisfaction.

Conclusion

We have argued that there were two stages of policing in the past, political and reform, and that we are now moving into a third, the community era. To carefully examine the dimensions of policing during each of these eras, we have used the concept of organizational strategy. We believe that this concept can be used not only to describe the different styles of policing in the past and the present, but also to sharpen the understanding of police policymakers of the future.

For example, the concept helps explain policing's perplexing experience with team policing during the 1960's and 1970's. Despite the popularity of team policing with officers involved in it and with citizens, it generally did not remain in police departments for very long. It was usually planned and implemented with enthusiasm and maintained for several years. Then, with little fanfare, it would vanish— with everyone associated with it saying regretfully that for some reason it just did not work as a police tactic. However, a close examination of team policing reveals that it was a

strategy that innovators mistakenly approached as a tactic. It had implications for authorization (police turned to neighborhoods for support), organizational design (tactical decisions were made at lower levels of the organization), definition of function (police broadened their service role), relationship to environment (permanent team members responded to the needs of small geographical areas), demand (wants and needs came to team members directly from citizens), tactics (consultation with citizens, etc.), and outcomes (citizen satisfaction, etc.). What becomes clear, though, is that team policing was a competing strategy with different assumptions about every element of police business. It was no wonder that it expired under such circumstances. Team and reform policing were strategically incompatible—one did not fit into the other. A police department could have a small team policing unit or conduct a team policing experiment, but business as usual was reform policing.

Likewise, although foot patrol symbolizes the new strategy for many citizens, it is a mistake to equate the two. Foot patrol is a tactic, a way of delivering police services. In Flint, its inauguration has been accompanied by implementation of most of the elements of a community strategy, which has become business as usual. In most places, foot patrol is not accompanied by the other elements. It is outside the mainstream of "real" policing and often provided only as a sop to citizens and politicians who are demanding the development of different policing styles. This certainly was the case in New Jersey when foot patrol was evaluated by the Police Foundation.[46] Another example is in Milwaukee, where two police budgets are passed: the first is the police budget; the second, a supplementary budget for modest levels of foot patrol. In both cases, foot patrol is outside the mainstream of police activities and conducted primarily as a result of external pressures placed on departments.

❝ ... team policing ... was usually planned and implemented with enthusiasm. ... Then, with little fanfare, it would vanish ... ❞

It is also a mistake to equate problem solving or increased order maintenance activities with the new strategy. Both are tactics. They can be implemented either as part of a new

organizational strategy, as foot patrol was in Flint, or as an "add-on," as foot patrol was in most of the cities in New Jersey. Drawing a distinction between organizational add-ons and a change in strategy is not an academic quibble; it gets to the heart of the current situation in policing. We are arguing that policing is in a period of transition from a reform strategy to what we call a community strategy. The change involves more than making tactical or organizational adjustments and accommodations. Just as policing went through a basic change when it moved from the political to the reform strategy, it is going through a similar change now. If elements of the emerging organizational strategy are identified and the policing institution is guided through the change rather than left blindly thrashing about, we expect that the public will be better served, policymakers and police administrators more effective, and the profession of policing revitalized.

> **❝ If ... policing .. is guided through the change rather than left blindly thrashing about, ... the public will be better served ... ❞**

A final point: the classical theory of organization that continues to dominate police administration in most American cities is alien to most of the elements of the new strategy. The new strategy will not accommodate to the classical theory: the latter denies too much of the real nature of police work, promulgates unsustainable myths about the nature and quality of police supervision, and creates too much cynicism in officers attempting to do creative problem solving. Its assumptions about workers are simply wrong.

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Organizational theory has developed well beyond the stage it was at during the early 1900's, and policing does have organizational options that are consistent with the newly developing organizational strategy. Arguably, policing, which was moribund during the 1970's, is beginning a resurgence. It is overthrowing a strategy that was remarkable in its time, but which could not adjust to the changes of recent decades. Risks attend the new strategy and its implementation. The risks, however, for the community and the profession of policing, are not as great as attempting to maintain a strategy that faltered on its own terms during the 1960's and 1970's.

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The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

Police and Communities: the Quiet Revolution

By George L. Kelling

Introduction

A quiet revolution is reshaping American policing.

Police in dozens of communities are returning to foot patrol. In many communities, police are surveying citizens to learn what they believe to be their most serious neighborhood problems. Many police departments are finding alternatives to rapidly responding to the majority of calls for service. Many departments are targeting resources on citizen fear of crime by concentrating on disorder. Organizing citizens' groups has become a priority in many departments. Increasingly, police departments are looking for means to evaluate themselves on their contribution to the quality of neighborhood life, not just crime statistics. Are such activities the business of policing? In a crescendo, police are answering yes.

True, such activities contrast with popular images of police: the "thin blue line" separating plundering villains from peaceful residents and storekeepers, and racing through city streets in high-powered cars with sirens wailing and lights flashing. Yet, in city after city, a new vision of policing is taking hold of the imagination of progressive police and gratified citizens. Note the 1987 report of the Philadelphia Task Force. Dismissing the notion of police as Philadelphia's professional defense against crime, and its residents as passive recipients of police ministrations, the report affirms new police values:

> Because the current strategy for policing Philadelphia emphasizes crime control and neglects the Department's need to be accountable to the public and for a partnership with it, the task force recommends: The police commissioner should formulate an explicit mission statement for the Department that will guide planning and operations toward a strategy of *"community"*

or "*problem solving*" policing. Such a statement should be developed in consultation with the citizens of Philadelphia and should reflect their views.(Emphases added.)

These themes—problem solving, community policing, consultation, partnership, accountability—have swept through American policing so swiftly that Harvard University's Professor Mark H. Moore has noted that "We in academe have to scramble to keep track of developments in policing." Professor Herman Goldstein of the University of Wisconsin sees police as "having turned a corner" by emphasizing community accountability and problem solving.

The new model of policing

What corner has been turned? What are these changes that are advancing through policing?

Broken windows

In February 1982, James Q. Wilson and I published an article in *Atlantic* known popularly as "Broken Windows." We made three points.

1. **Neighborhood disorder**—drunks, panhandling, youth gangs, prostitution, and other urban incivilities—creates citizen fear.

2. **Just as unrepaired** broken windows can signal to people that nobody cares about a building and lead to more serious vandalism, untended disorderly behavior can also signal that nobody cares about the community and lead to more serious disorder and crime. Such signals—untended property, disorderly persons. drunks, obstreperous youth, etc.—both create fear in citizens and attract predators.

3. **If police are to deal** with disorder to reduce fear and crime, they must rely on citizens for legitimacy and assistance.

"Broken Windows" gave voice to sentiments felt both by citizens and police. It recognized a major change in the focus of police. Police had believed that they should deal with serious crime, yet were frustrated by lack of success. Citizens conceded to police that crime was a problem, but were more concerned about daily incivilities that disrupted and often destroyed neighborhood social. commercial, and political life. "We were trying to get people to be concerned about crime problems." says Darrel Stephens, former Chief in Newport News and now Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum. "never understanding that daily living issues had a much greater impact on citizens and commanded their time and attention."

Many police officials, however. believed the broken windows metaphor went further. For them. it not only suggested changes in the focus of police work (disorder, for example), it also suggested major modifications in

the overall strategy of police departments. What are some of these strategic changes?

❝ Citizens conceded to police that crime was a problem, but were more concerned about daily incivilities that disrupted and often destroyed neighborhood social, commercial, and political life ❞

Defense of a community

Police are a neighborhood's primary defense against disorder and crime, right? This orthodoxy has been the basis of police strategy for a generation. What is the police job? Fighting crime. How do they do this? Patrolling in cars, responding to calls for service, and investigating crimes. What is the role of citizens in all of this? Supporting police by calling them if trouble occurs and by being good witnesses.

But using our metaphor, let us again ask the question of whether police are the primary defense against crime and disorder. Are police the "thin blue line" defending neighborhoods and communities? Considering a specific example might help us answer this question. For example, should police have primary responsibility for controlling a neighborhood youth who, say, is bullying other children?

Of course not. The first line of defense in a neighborhood against a troublesome youth is the youth's family. Even if the family is failing, our immediate answer would not be to involve police. Extended family—aunts. uncles, grandparents—might become involved. Neighbors and friends (of both the parents and youth) often offer assistance. The youth's church or school might become involved.

On occasion police will be called: Suppose that the youth is severely bullying other children to the point of injuring them. A bullied child's parents call the police. Is the bully's family then relieved of responsibility? Are neighbors? The school? Once police are called, are neighbors relieved of their duty to be vigilant and protect their own or other neighbors' children? Does calling police relieve teachers of their obligation to be alert and protect children from assault? The answer to all these questions is no. We expect families, neighbors, teachers, and others to be responsible and prudent.

If we believe that community institutions are the first line of defense against disorder and crime, and the source of strength for maintaining the quality of life, what should the strategy of police be? The old view was that they were a community's professional defense against crime and disorder. Citizens should leave control of crime and maintenance of order to police. The new strategy is that. police are to stimulate and buttress a community's ability to produce attractive neighborhoods and protect them

against predators. Moreover, in communities that are wary of strangers, police serve to help citizens tolerate and protect outsiders who come into their neighborhoods for social or commercial purposes.

But what about neighborhoods in which things have gotten out of hand—where, for example, predators like drug dealers take over and openly and outrageously deal drugs and threaten citizens? Clearly, police must play a leading role defending such communities. Should they do so on their own, however?

Police have tried in the past to control neighborhoods plagued by predators without involving residents. Concerned, for example, about serious street crime, police made youths, especially minority youths, the targets of aggressive field interrogations. The results, in the United States during the 1960's and more recently in England during the early 1980's, were disastrous. Crime was largely unaffected. Youths already hostile to police became even more so. Worst of all, good citizens became estranged from police.

Citizens in neighborhoods plagued by crime and disorder were disaffected because they simply would not have police they neither knew nor authorized whizzing in and out of their neighborhoods "takin' names and kickin' ass." Community relations programs were beside the point. Citizens were in no mood to surrender control of their neighborhoods to remote and officious police who showed them little respect. Police are the first line of defense in a neighborhood? Wrong—citizens are!

Defending communities—from incidents to problems

The strategy of assisting citizens maintain the quality of life in their neighborhoods dramatically improves on the former police strategy. To understand why, one has to understand in some detail how police work has been conducted in the past. Generally, the business of police for the past 30 years has been responding to calls for service.

❝ Beat officers . . . have known intuitively what researchers . . . have confirmed . . . : fewer than 10 percent of the addresses calling for police service generate over 60 percent of the total calls for service during a given year ❞

For example, a concerned and frightened citizen calls police about a neighbor husband and wife who are fighting. Police come and intervene. They might separate the couple, urge them to get help, or, if violence has occurred, arrest the perpetrator. But basically, police try to resolve the incident and get back into their patrol cars so they are available for the next call. Beat officers may well know that this household has been the subject of 50 or 100 calls to the police department during the past year. In fact, they have known intuitively what researchers Glenn Pierce in Boston and Lawrence Sherman in Minneapolis have confirmed through research: fewer than 10 percent of the addresses calling for police service generate over 60 percent of the total calls for service during a given year.

Indeed, it is very likely that the domestic dispute described above is nothing new for the disputing couple, the neighbors, or police. More likely than not, citizens have previously called police and they have responded. And, with each call to police, it becomes more likely that there will be another.

This atomistic response to incidents acutely frustrates patrol officers. Herman Goldstein describes this frustration: "Although the public looks at the average officer as a powerful authority figure, the officer very often feels impotent because he or she is dealing with things for which he or she has no solution. Officers believe this makes them look silly in the eyes of the public." But, given the routine of police work, officers have had no alternative to their typical response: Go to a call, pacify things, and leave to get ready for another call. To deal with the problem of atomistic responses to incidents, Goldstein has proposed what he calls "problem-oriented policing."

❝ Stated simply, problem-oriented policing is a method of working with citizens to help them identify and solve problems ❞

Stated simply, problem-oriented policing is a method of working with citizens to help them identify and solve problems. Darrel Stephens, along with Chief David Couper of Madison, Wisconsin, and Chief Neil Behan of Baltimore County, Maryland, has pioneered in problem-oriented policing. Problems approached via problem-oriented policing include sexual assault and drunk driving in Madison, auto theft, spouse abuse, and burglary in Newport News, and street robbery and burglary in Baltimore County.

Stephens's goal is for "police officers to take the time to stop and think about what they were doing." Mark Moore echoes Stephens: "In the past there were a small number of guys in the police chief's office who did the thinking and everybody else just carried out their ideas. Problem solving gets thousands of brains working on problems."

The drive to change

Why are these changes taking place now? There are three reasons:

1. Citizen disenchantment with police services;

2. Research conducted during the 1970's; and,

3. Frustration with the traditional role of the police officer.

1. Disenchantment with police services—At first, it seems too strong to say "disenchantment" when referring to citizens' attitudes towards police. Certainly citizens admire and respect most police officers. Citizens enjoy contact with police. Moreover, research shows that most citizens do not find the limited capability of police to prevent or solve crimes either surprising or of particular concern. Nevertheless, there is widespread disenchantment with police tactics that continue to keep police officers remote and distant from citizens.

Minority citizens in inner cities continue to be frustrated by police who whisk in and out of their neighborhoods with little sensitivity to community norms and values. Regardless of where one asks, minorities want both the familiarity and accountability that characterize foot patrol. Working- and middle-class communities of all races are demanding increased collaboration with police in the determination of police priorities in their neighborhoods. Community crime control has become a mainstay of their sense of neighborhood security and a means of lobbying for different police services. And many merchants and affluent citizens have felt so vulnerable that they have turned to private security for service and protection. In private sector terms, police are losing to the competition—private security and community crime control.

2. Research—The 1970's research about police effectiveness was another stimulus to change. Research about preventive patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and investigative work—the three mainstays of police tactics—was uniformly discouraging.

Research demonstrated that preventive patrol in automobiles had little effect on crime, citizen levels of fear, or citizen satisfaction with police. Rapid response to calls for service likewise had little impact on arrests, citizen satisfaction with police, or levels of citizen fear. Also, research into criminal investigation effectiveness suggested that detective units were so poorly administered that they had little chance of being effective.

3. Role of the patrol officer—Finally, patrol officers have been frustrated with their traditional role. Despite pieties that patrol has been the backbone of policing, every police executive has known that, at best, patrol has been what officers do until they become detectives or are promoted.

At worst, patrol has been the dumping ground for officers who are incompetent, suffering from alcoholism or other problems, or simply burned out. High status for police practitioners went to detectives. Getting "busted to patrol" has been a constant threat to police managers or detectives who fail to perform by some standard of judgment. (It is doubtful that failing patrol officers ever get threatened with being busted to the detective unit.)

Never mind that patrol officers have the most important mission in police departments: They handle the public's most pressing problems and must make complex decisions almost instantaneously. Moreover, they do this with little supervision or training. Despite this, police administrators treat patrol officers as if they did little to advance the organization's mission. The salaries of patrol officers also reflect their demeaned status. No wonder many officers have grown cynical and have turned to unions for leadership rather than to police executives. "Stupid management made unions," says Robert Kliesmet, the President of the International Union of Police Associations AFL-CIO.

The basis for new optimism

Given these circumstances, what is the basis of current optimism of police leaders that they have turned a corner? Optimism arises from four factors:

1. Citizen response to the new strategy;

2. Ongoing research on police effectiveness;

3. Past experiences police have had with innovation; and

4. The values of the new generation of police leaders.

1. Citizen response—The overwhelming public response to community and problem-solving policing has been positive, regardless of where it has been instituted. When queried about how he knows community policing works in New York City, Lt. Jerry Simpson responds: "The District Commanders' phones stop ringing." Simpson continues: "Commanders' phones stop ringing because problems have been solved. Even skeptical commanders soon learn that most of their troubles go away with community policing." Citizens like the cop on the beat and enjoy working with him/her to solve problems. Crisley Wood, Executive Director of the Neighborhood Justice Network in Boston—an agency that has established a network of neighborhood crime control organizations—puts it this way: "The cop on the beat, who meets regularly with citizen groups, is the single most important service that the Boston Police Department can provide."

❝ The cop on the beat, who meets regularly with citizen groups, is the single most important service that the Boston Police Department can provide ❞

Testimonies aside, perhaps the single most compelling evidence of the popularity of community or problem-solving policing is found in Flint, Michigan, where, it will be recalled, citizens have twice voted to increase their taxes to maintain neighborhood foot patrols—the second time by a two-to-one margin.

2. New research on effectiveness—Research conducted during the early and mid-1970's frustrated police executives. It generally showed what did not work. Research conducted during the late 1970's and early 1980's was different. By beginning to demonstrate that new tactics

did work, it fueled the move to rejuvenate policing. This research provided police with the following guidance:

Foot patrol can reduce citizen fear of crime, improve the relationship between police and citizens, and increase citizen satisfaction with police. This was discovered in Newark, New Jersey, and Flint. In Flint, foot patrol also reduced crime and calls for service. Moreover, in both cities, it increased officer satisfaction with police work.

The productivity of detectives can be enhanced if patrol officers carefully interview neighborhood residents about criminal events, get the information to detectives, and detectives use it wisely, according to John Eck of PERF.

Citizen fear can be substantially reduced, researcher Tony Pate of the Police Foundation discovered in Newark, by police tactics that emphasize increasing the quantity and improving the quality of citizen-police interaction.

Police anti-fear tactics can also reduce household burglaries, according to research conducted by Mary Ann Wycoff, also of the Police Foundation.

Street-level enforcement of heroin and cocaine laws can reduce serious crime in the area of enforcement, without being displaced to adjacent areas, according to an experiment conducted by Mark Kleiman of Harvard University's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management.

Problem-oriented policing can be used to reduce thefts from cars, problems associated with prostitution, and household burglaries, according to William Spelman and John Eck of PERF.

These positive findings about new police tactics provide police with both the motive and justification for continued efforts to rejuvenate policing.

3. Experience with innovation—The desire to improve policing is not new with this generation of reformers. The 1960's and 1970's had their share of reformers as well. Robert Eichelberger of Dayton innovated with team policing (tactics akin in many ways to problem solving) and public policymaking; Frank Dyson of Dallas with team policing and generalist/specialist patrol officers; Carl Gooden with team policing in Cincinnati; and there were many other innovators.

But innovators of this earlier era were handicapped by a lack of documented successes and failures of implementation. Those who experimented with team policing were not aware that elements of team policing were simply incompatible with preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service. As a result, implementation of team policing followed a discouraging pattern. It would be implemented, officers and citizens would like it, it would have an initial impact on crime, and then business as usual would overwhelm it—the program would simply vanish.

Moreover, the lessons about innovation and excellence that Peters and Waterman brought together in *In Search*

of Excellence were not available to police administrators. The current generation of reformers has an edge: They have availed themselves of the opportunity to learn from the documented successes and failures of the past. Not content with merely studying innovation and management in policing, Houston's Chief Lee Brown is having key personnel spend internships in private sector corporations noted for excellence in management.

4. New breed of police leadership —The new breed of police leadership is unique in the history of American policing. Unlike the tendency in the past for chiefs to be local and inbred, chiefs of this generation are urbane and cosmopolitan.

Chief Lee Brown of Houston received a Ph.D. in criminology from the University of California–Berkeley; Chief Joseph McNamara of San Jose, California, has a Ph.D from Harvard University, and is a published novelist; Hubert Williams, formerly Director of the Newark Police Department and now President of the Police Foundation, is a lawyer and has studied criminology in the Law School at Harvard University; Benjamin Ward, Commissioner of the New York City Police Department, is an attorney and was Commissioner of Corrections in New York State.

These are merely a sample. The point is, members of this generation of police leadership are well educated and of diverse backgrounds. All of those noted above, as well as many others, have sponsored research and experimentation to improve policing.

Problems

We have looked at the benefits of community policing. What is the down side? What are the risks?

These questions led to the creation of the Executive Session on Community Policing in the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Funded by the National Institute of Justice and the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations, the Executive Session has convened police and political elites with a small number of academics around the issue of community policing. Francis X. Hartmann, moderator of the Executive Session, describes the purpose of the meetings: "These persons with a special and important relationship to contemporary policing have evolved into a real working group, which is addressing the gap between the realities and aspirations of American policing. Community policing is a significant effort to fill this gap."

Among the questions the Executive Session has raised are the following:

1. Police are a valuable resource in a community. Does community policing squander that resource by concentrating on the wrong priorities?

2. How will community policing fit into police departments given how they are now organized? and,

3. Will community policing open the door to increased police corruption or other inappropriate behavior by line officers?

Will community policing squander police resources?

This question worries police. They understand that police are a valuable but sparse resource in a community. Hubert Williams, a pioneer in community policing, expresses his concern. "Are police now being put in the role of providing services that are statutorily the responsibilities of some other agencies?" Los Angeles's Chief Gates echoes Williams: "Hubie's (Williams is) right—you can't solve all the problems in the world and shouldn't try." Both worry that if police are spread too thin, by problem-solving activities for example, that they will not be able to properly protect the community from serious crime.

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66 It is simply wrong to propose abandoning foot patrol in the name of short response time and visibility vis-a-vis patrolling in cars 99

This issue is now being heatedly debated in Flint. There, it will be recalled, citizens have passed two bills funding foot patrol—the second by a two-to-one majority. A report commissioned by city government, however, concludes: "The Cost of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program Exceeds the Benefit It Provides the Citizens of Flint," and recommends abandoning the program when funding expires in 1988.

Why, according to the report, should foot patrol be abandoned? So more "effective" police work can be done. What is effective police work? Quick response to calls for service, taking reports, and increased visibility by putting police officers in cars. "It is simply wrong," says Robert Wasserman, noted police tactician and Research Fellow in the Program in Criminal Justice at Harvard,

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"to propose abandoning foot patrol in the name of short response time and visibility vis-a-vis patrolling in cars. Every shred of evidence is that rapid response and patrolling in cars doesn't reduce crime, increase citizen satisfaction, or reduce fear. Which is the luxury," Wasserman concludes, "a tactic like foot patrol that gives you two, and maybe three, of your goals, or a tactic like riding around in cars going from call to call that gives you none?" Experienced police executives share Wasserman's concerns. Almost without exception, they are attempting to find ways to get out of the morass that myths of the efficacy of rapid response have created for large-city police departments. It was Commissioner Ben Ward of New York City, for example, who put a cap on resources that can be used to respond to calls for service and is attempting to find improved means of responding to calls. Commissioner Francis "Mickey" Roache expresses the deep frustration felt by so many police: "I hate to say this, but in Boston we run from one call to another. We don't accomplish anything. We're just running all over the place. It's absolutely insane."

A politician's response to the recommendation to end Flint's foot patrol program is interesting. Daniel Whitehurst, former Mayor of Fresno, California, reflects: "I find it hard to imagine ending a program that citizens not only find popular but are willing to pay for as well."

"The overwhelming danger," Mark Moore concludes, "is that, in the name of efficiency, police and city officials will be tempted to maintain old patterns. They will think they are doing good, but will be squandering police resources." "Chips" Stewart emphasizes the need to move ahead: "As comfortable as old tactics might feel, police must continue to experiment with methods that have shown promise to improve police effectiveness and efficiency."

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66 As comfortable as old tactics might feel, police must continue to experiment with methods that have shown promise to improve police effectiveness and efficiency 99

Will community policing fit within policing as it is now organized?

Many police and academics believe this to be the most serious problem facing cities implementing community policing. Modern police departments have achieved an impressive capacity to respond quickly to calls for service. This has been accomplished by acquiring and linking elaborate automobile, telephone, radio, and computer technologies, by centralizing control and dispatch of officers, by pressing officers to be "in service" (rather than "out of service" dealing with citizens), and by allocating police in cars throughout the city on the basis of expected calls for service.

Community policing is quite different: it is not incident- or technology-driven; officers operate on a decentralized basis, it emphasizes officers being in regular contact with citizens, and it allocates police on the basis of neighborhoods. The question is, how reconcilable are these two strategies? Some (Lawrence Sherman of the University of Maryland is one example) have taken a strong stance that radical alterations will be required if police are to respond more effectively to community problems. Others (Richard Larson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example) disagree, believing that community policing is reconcilable with rapid response technology—indeed Professor Larson would emphasize that current computer technology can facilitate community policing.

Will the community policing strategy lead to increased police corruption and misbehavior?

The initial news from Houston, New York, Flint, Newark, Los Angeles, Baltimore County, and other police departments which have experimented with community policing is good. Community policing has not led to increased problems of corruption or misbehavior.

Why is it, however, that policymakers fear that community policing has the potential to increase the incidents of police running amok? The answer? Community policing radically decentralizes police authority; officers must create for themselves the best responses to problems; and, police become intimately involved with citizens.

These ingredients may not sound so troublesome in themselves—after all, many private and public sector organizations radically decentralize authority, encourage creativity, and are characterized by relative intimacy between service providers and consumers. Nevertheless, in police circles such ingredients violate the orthodox means of controlling corruption. For a generation, police have believed that to eliminate corruption it is necessary to centralize authority, limit discretion, and reduce intimacy between police and citizens. They had good reason to: Early policing in the United States had been characterized by financial corruption, failure of police to protect the rights of all citizens, and zealotry.

But just as it is possible to squander police resources in the name of efficiency, it is also possible to squander police resources in the quest for integrity. Centralization, standardization, and remoteness may preclude many opportunities for corruption, but they may also preclude the possibility of good policing. For example, street-level cocaine and heroin enforcement by patrol officers, now known to have crime reduction value, has been banned in cities because of fear of corruption. It is almost as if the purpose of police was to be corruption free, rather than do essential work. If, as it appears to be, it is necessary to take risks to solve problems, then so be it: police will have to learn to manage risks as well as do managers in other enterprises.

Does this imply softening on the issue of police corruption? Absolutely not. Police and city managers will have to continue to be vigilant: community policing exposes officers to more opportunities for traditional financial corruption; in many neighborhoods police will be faced with demands to protect communities from the incursions of minorities; and, police will be tempted to become overzealous when they see citizens' problems being ignored by other agencies.

These dangers mean, however, that police executives will have to manage through values, rather than merely policies and procedures, and by establishing regular neighborhood and community institution reporting mechanisms, rather than through centralized command and control systems.

Each of these issues—use of police resources, organizational compatibility, and corruption—is complicated. Some will be the subject of debate. Others will require research and experimentation to resolve. But most police chiefs will begin to address these issues in a new way. They will not attempt to resolve them in the ways of the past: in secret, behind closed doors. Their approach will reflect the values of the individual neighborhoods as well as the community as a whole.

Policing is changing dramatically. On the one hand, we wish policing to retain the old values of police integrity, equitable distribution of police resources throughout a community, and police efficiency which characterized the old model of police. But the challenge of contemporary police and city executives is to redefine these concepts in light of the resurgence of neighborhood vitality, consumerism, and more realistic assessments of the institutional capacity of police.

The quiet revolution is beginning to make itself heard: citizens and police are joining together to defend communities.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met six times. During the 3-day meetings, the 30 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

Community-Oriented Police Services

by DONALD H. VANDREY, Public Information Officer, Rockville

❑ Community-oriented policing is how Rockville's 50-member police agency has responded to citizen concerns that police officers are too remote and out of touch with the people they serve. In brief, community-oriented policing means removing barriers that separate police officers and individual citizens, promoting direct, positive contact with citizens and neighborhood groups, and turning the police officer into a community resource, rather than just an enforcer of the law.

Rockville, like many growing suburban communities, discovered that its police officers had become isolated from the citizens by both physical and psychological barriers. This isolation resulted in tension, mistrust, misunderstanding, and a poor public image, which in turn produced low morale, high turnover, and difficulty with recruitment.

Community-oriented policing is not a project or a program within the police department. Rather, it is a philosophy of law enforcement that embraces all police activities. It produces spin-offs in the form of ideas and initiatives by individual officers that become new programs directly impacting the delivery of services to the community.

In Rockville these ideas have included two that are receiving nationwide attention. One is Officer Tuttle, a mannequin that sits in a police car along roads where speeding has been identified as a problem. A coffee can hangs outside the rear window to mimic a radar device. This program helps the department respond to neighborhood speeding complaints without always placing an officer at the scene.

Another community-oriented policing initiative is the implementation of bicycle patrols. In 1990, it was determined that the police could have a closer rapport with citizens and maneuver better in crowded areas on bicycle. A local bike shop and bicycle manufacturer donated the bikes, and two officers spent part of the summer of 1990 patrolling Rockville's Town Center area, several parks, as well as special events, on two wheels. The impact was immediate. The officers found it easy to strike up a conversation with people of all ages. Movement through congested traffic was much easier within the Town Center. The bicycle patrol gained broad publicity and reflected positively on the Rockville police.

Community-oriented policing does not occur overnight. It begins with the commitment of top police administrators and elected officials. But it can be implemented only through the efforts of the officer on the street. Training and equipping of officers cannot be overlooked. While the Rockville Police Department changed its focus to community oriented policing, its officers were also among the first in the suburban area to switch to 9mm semiautomatic weapons.

The measurable results of community-oriented policing in terms of crime reduction take several years to appear. In the short term, results are better reflected in public opinion toward the police, the interest and enthusiasm of police officers for their work as reflected by recruitment and retention of officers, and the degree of individual officer involvement in neighborhood or community activities. In Rockville, these short-term results are all very positive.

Community-oriented policing requires no specific additions to the police budget. It may result in resources being allocated in new ways, or new resources being requested for special initiatives. For example, the Montgomery County Police were responsible for bringing DARE, Drug Abuse Resistance. Education, to the county elementary schools, including those in Rockville. In traditional policing, Rockville officers would have had little or no involvement with or concern about the program. But our community-oriented officers recognized that very few elementary schools in Rockville would receive the benefits of the program in a timely manner. This resulted in a request to commit one full-time officer to bring DARE to every city elementary school within this school year. The Mayor and Council approved the reallocation of resources. To date, five out of nine schools have completed the program.

Community-oriented policing is rapidly evolving as the police technique of the future. The Montgomery County and District of Columbia police departments have recently announced plans to implement the concept. Small, rural communities may already have many aspects of community-oriented policing and will find the transition easy or, perhaps, unnecessary. Community-oriented policing requires all of the skill, training, and equipment required for handling serious crime, but it places a priority on policing with people, not policing of people. ∎

Neighborhoods and Police:
The Maintenance of Civil Authority

By George L. Kelling and James K. Stewart

A cardinal tenet of community policing is that a new relationship between police and neighborhoods is required if the quality of residential and commercial life is to be protected or improved in cities. This assertion raises several questions. What are neighborhoods? Do they exist, or are they largely a concoction of nostalgic policymakers, police reformers, and revisionists who perpetuate ideals that may or may not have existed in the past, but certainly are outside of current urban experience? Assuming that neighborhoods exist, what should their relationship be with police? What opportunities are offered both to neighborhoods and to police by restructuring their relationship? How should police resolve the potential conflict between the rule of law and neighborhood standards of conduct which they might be asked to uphold?

This paper addresses these questions by focusing upon three aspects of neighborhoods: (1) the neighborhood as polity; (2) the ability of a neighborhood to defend itself against crime and disorder without eliminating civility and justice from social relations there; and (3) alternate visions of the role of municipal police in neighborhoods.

Neighborhood as polity

At a minimum, neighborhoods are places in which people live or work near each other, recognize their recurring proximity, and signal this recognition to each other.[1] As Suttles[2] notes, residents of cities construct "cognitive maps" in which they allocate distinctive places as "theirs"—their neighborhood. Moreover, neighbors are not just the residents of a special geographical area but also include shopkeepers and their employees, other workers who frequent areas regularly (postal workers, for example), and even the homeless.[3]

The *intensity* of neighboring relationships depends on many factors, including geographical and physical characteristics of the community, ethnic and kinship networks, affective attachment of residents to the neighborhood, home and business ownership, building construction features, local facility usage, pedestrian and automotive traffic patterns, the amount of time neighbors spend in the area, as well as demographic patterns (e.g., the number of children, non-working adults, and aged who live in a community). The *content* of neighboring can range from curt nods of the head ("good fences make good neighbors") to regularly scheduled neighborhood meetings ("strength through unity").[4]

Periodicity characterizes both the intensity and content of neighboring. Citizens live in time, as well as area, zones. Periodicity has two sets of implications.

> ❝ ... *neighboring can range from curt nods of the head ('good fences make good neighbors') to regular ... meetings ('strength through unity').* ❞

First, many residents abandon their neighborhoods during the day: workers may commute to their workplaces and children may be bused to schools outside their immediate neighborhood. Other people use neighborhoods during particular times: merchants arrive for the opening of their shops and depart after closing; shoppers arrive and depart; postal workers move through a neighborhood on a relatively predictable schedule. During particular times, the homeless can comprise the residents of a neighborhood. Traffic on major thoroughfares ebbs and flows daily. Bars open and close.

Second, citizen perceptions about areas change depending on the time of the day or day of the week. During rush hour while awaiting transportation, citizens can view a neighborhood as being theirs, in a sense, and a comfortable place in which to be. The same area at another time of day or week (midnight or Saturday) may be perceived as extraordinarily alien and threatening.

Citizen participation in neighborhood activities and governance has long been perceived in this country as central to the formation of an individual's character, the inculcation of traditional values, and the maintenance of freedom. Integral parts of this participation have been self-help and self-governance. Despite this political philosophy, the aim or the consequence of American urban *policy* during the last hundred years has been to decrease the influence of neighborhoods in American life. What factors have contributed to this decline?

First, the progressive reform movement that centralized city government has contributed to a decline in neighborhood influence. As Glazer notes:

> All during the twentieth century, indeed until the mid-1960s, proposals for city reform generally followed ... progressive tradition: make the mayor or the board of supervisors stronger.[5]

The consequence of strengthening centralized city government has been the reduction of the political strength and capacity for self-help of neighborhoods.

Second, congruent with the centralization of political power were the professionalization and bureaucratization of services, especially social and police services. Problem solving and the provision of services not only came under the political and administrative control of executives, but also were provided by newly developing bureaucracies with full-time staff recruited and promoted on the basis of achieved qualifications, professional or otherwise.[6] Within neighborhoods, self-help in many areas, such as education, was eliminated or, in the case of police, denigrated and discouraged.

Third, during the 1950's and 1960's, urban renewal policies decimated many neighborhoods in the name of eliminating slums, improving the urban housing stock, and integrating ethnic groups into America's "melting pot." It seems ironic that many neighborhood self-help groups organized in resistance to the implementation of such policies in their immediate locales.

> ❝ *The consequence of strengthening centralized city government has been the reduction of the political strength and capacity for self-help of neighborhoods.* ❞

Fourth, low-income housing developments concentrated on the construction of high-rise apartments rather than on low-rise or single-dwelling residences. Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman have written persuasively about the largely negative consequences of such building practices on neighborhoods and cities.[7]

Fifth, transportation policies concentrated on facilitating the movement of automobiles into and out of cities, at the expense of the public building, improvement, or even maintenance of transportation into and within cities. Such policies encouraged the abandonment of cities for suburbs and left isolated those citizens who did remain in urban neighborhoods.[8]

Sixth, during the twentieth century, public spaces have been redefined. The street traditionally was a diversified place enjoyed and used for its own sake—a place to congregate, meet others, enjoy human-scaled architecture. But during the midcentury the tower-block—high-rise buildings surrounded by open spaces—came to symbolize the new use of public space: segregated by purpose, with the street serving primarily as a means of transportation between facilities. Thus, streets became public areas through which people pass to gain easy access to specific facilities: quasi-public and quasi-private shopping, recreational, residential, and work areas in which internal control is privatized.[9]

Finally, for good or ill, social policies that relied on busing to ensure equality of educational opportunity eroded the strengths of neighborhoods.

To be sure, these trends did not operate uniformly across cities. Moreover, these forces notwithstanding, destruction of neighborhood life and polity has not been uniform within individual cities or throughout the country. In some cities such as Chicago, at least through the administration of the late-Mayor Daley, neighborhoods and wards maintain considerable power over the provision of city services and the allocation of political goods and services. Likewise, in Boston for example, some neighborhoods have considerably more power and access to goods and services than others.[10] One neighborhood, for example, not only garnered its own foot patrol officer who patrolled the area regularly at a time when neither foot patrol nor regular beat assignments characterized police tactics, but successfully lobbied to restrict the types of off-duty assignments police could accept.[11] These variations in neighborhoods are explained by factors such as the political culture of the city, the form of city government, the demographic composition of the given neighborhood, the extent to which neighbors feel threatened and have been able to mobilize.

❝ ... for good or ill, social policies that relied on busing ... eroded the strengths of neighborhoods. ❞

Moreover, contemporary trends rejected the centralization of governmental power. During the 1960's, dissatisfaction with centralization had its inchoate beginnings.

> At the local level, in the 1960s for the first time the intellectual elite and the liberal national media abandoned the argument of progressive reformers and supported demands for *decentralization* of city functions.[12]

Although support of decentralization was initiated by advocates from the political left, by the late 1970's it had become as popular with the political right.[13]

Today the call for devolution of power and control over services, indeed, the call for a self-help approach to problem solving, has spread from the intellectual and political elite to residents within communities and neighborhoods. No longer are citizens in many communities willing to hear from remote politicians what government *cannot* do and citizens *should not* do; citizens are demanding new kinds of accountability and responsibility; and neighborhoods are becoming sources of polity rather than mere locales in which people live and work.

❝ No longer are citizens in many communities willing to hear from remote politicians what government cannot *do* and citizens should not *do* ... ❞

Yet there is one important dimension in which neighborhoods, even those that actually function as political units, do not operate as a true political system: the exercise of lawful coercive force. Neighborhoods can serve as a polity, whose citizens lobby, unofficially govern in many dimensions, indeed even patrol streets and parks. But the exercise of official coercive force is reserved for city hall, for government. This is not to say that neighborhoods do not use coercion. Most often it takes the form of social persuasion, threats, and informal means of approval and disapproval. Sometimes, however, illegal force is used in neighborhoods by criminal gangs, for example, who may use threats, vandalism, extortion, and other forms of coercion.[14] Regardless, "official" government largely maintains a monopoly on legitimate use of force, primarily through its police departments.[15]

Neighborhoods defending themselves

Six factors in neighborhoods may contribute to the defense of a neighborhood against crime and disorder:

1. Individual citizens in association with police and criminal justice agencies. Individuals may act on their own to notify police of something untoward in their neighborhood or elsewhere. Moreover, citizens can become involved in other elements of the criminal justice system in other ways, for example as witnesses in court hearings.

2. Individual citizens acting alone. Individuals may act on their own to protect themselves, others, and their neighbor-

hood from crime, disorder, and fear. These actions include: buying locks, weapons, alarm systems, and other hardware; avoiding certain locations; restricting activities; assisting, or not assisting, other persons who have difficulty; moving out of the neighborhood; and hiring protection from private security firms.

3. Private groups. Groups of citizens may act on their own behalf to protect the neighborhood, its residents, and users. Their actions include holding meetings; organizing neighborhood watch groups; patrolling, lobbying, creating telephone trees and "safe houses" for children; and monitoring courts. Further, they may purchase private security to protect their homes, streets, entranceways, or lobbies.

❝ Groups of citizens may act on their own behalf to protect the neighborhood, its residents, and users. ❞

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4. Formal private organizations. Organizations such as funded community activist and community development organizations implement and maintain neighborhood programs that may include recreation for youths, victim assistance, gang and other forms of youth work, and community organization. (These organizations are different from traditional social agencies that operate citywide.)

5. Commercial firms. Small shopkeepers and large corporations such as hospitals, universities, shopping malls, and other institutions may purchase, or in some cases provide their own, proprietary protective services.

6. Public criminal justice agencies. Police, as well as the other elements of the criminal justice system, may operate on their own to defend the safety of neighborhoods.

Several observations can be made about these elements of a community's self-defense capacity. First, in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, crime control was a private, community responsibility that only recently has become primarily a public responsibility. Most public organizations of social control are barely 150 years old.[16] Moreover, American political ideology still holds that private solutions to problems, whether the problems are related to health, education, welfare, or crime and disorder, are preferable to public solutions. Just as neighborhoods provide the informal political infrastructure that keeps urban government afloat,[17] neighborhood and private social control provide the underpinnings on which public institutions of control build.

Second, the impact of the elements of neighborhood social control is not necessarily cumulative. As the following

examples suggest, each element can detract or contribute to the competence of a neighborhood to defend itself against crime and disorder:

- A person who withdraws behind heavy doors and substantial locks, armed with a guard dog and weapons, and who refuses to interact with neighbors, even to the extent of observing behavior in the street, may be detracting from the self-defense of the community rather than contributing to it. Such behavior may well be an example of poor citizenship and irresponsibility rather than prudent civil behavior.

- A neighborhood anticrime group that consists exclusively of homeowning whites in a racially mixed neighborhood with many renters may detract from community order by increasing the level of racial antagonism between groups.

- A community agency that sponsors a food program for homeless persons may increase the level of citizen fear as a result of the increasing number of homeless persons who frequent the area.

- A large food chain that develops a neighborhood shopping center that includes a record-video store and a video-game parlor may attract many youths to the facility. Moreover, if the chain retains substantial numbers of off-duty police officers, it may keep order and control youths in the facility. Nevertheless, although the facility might be secure with more police in the neighborhood, the police might define their responsibility as protecting the assets of the food chain. Increased numbers of youths, who now congregate in areas adjacent to the shopping center, might engage in horseplay, commit minor acts of vandalism on nearby residences, and, as a consequence, significantly increase the level of disorder and fear in the neighborhood.

❝ ... the more police tend to solve problems, the less likely it is that people will resort to their own devices. ❞

- Black and Baumgartner[18] raise the interesting point that the relationship between the intensity of police presence in neighborhoods and the amount of citizen self-help in solving problems might be inverse: that is, the more police tend to solve problems, the less likely it is that people will resort to their own devices. A consequence of increased police presence

and activity might be just the opposite of desired results—the weakening, rather than the strengthening, of a neighborhood.

Note that the forms that neighborhood defense take can not only increase or decrease the capacity of neighborhoods to defend themselves, but also can influence the quality of neighborhood life in other ways as well. Purchasing guns and locks does little or nothing to create or sustain community relationships; they might even interfere with their development or maintenance. Similarly, calling police to deal with incidents does little to create relationships within neighborhoods. Citizen patrols, neighborhood watch, neighborhood meetings with police to discuss problems, on the other hand, all foster the development of neighborhood relationships and sense of community.

There are legitimate reasons to be concerned about fairness and equity in the supply of resources for community defense. The poor are in need of as much protection as the rich—at times, more. Moreover, there are reasons to fear that the actions of the well-to-do to defend themselves might increase the jeopardy of the less well-off. Thus, we are concerned about the public quality of individual and organizational responses to crime, disorder, and fear. Guns and locks might protect individuals but do nothing for neighborhood security. Walling off corporations from communities by architectural and security measures can secure those organizations but further erode community bonds and safety.[19]

> ** ❝ The poor are in need of as much protection as the rich—at times, more. ❞ **

Also, ensuring the rights of those who have a different sense of public morality and the rights of offenders is an important part of the public quality of a community's self-defense efforts. We will discuss these issues in some detail later.

In sum, although we are developing some knowledge about the ecology of crime in cities and neighborhoods,[20] we know practically nothing about the ecology of neighborhood or city self-defense. Depending on circumstances, elements of control (1) complement each other and thereby improve overall neighborhood self-defense; (2) neutralize each other and cancel out their impact; or (3) interact to make problems worse. We simply do not know how to take the different circumstances into account.

Both critics and supporters of the idea of neighborhood primacy in efforts to control crime, fear, and disorder have been troubled by the limited evidence of the success of community crime control efforts and by the limited number of citizens who participate in such efforts. Although we hope that such efforts will meet with success (and believe that over the long term they will) and wish that many more citizens would involve themselves in such efforts, we do not share the concerns mentioned above.

> ** ❝ . . . many neighborhoods appear to be in the hands of 'caretakers' . . . Their numbers may not be large . . . but their influence and potential are. ❞ **

Regarding the issue of effectiveness, we agree with Nathan Glazer:

> Whatever the failures of community control and community participation, whatever the modification of the new procedures built on the slogan of more power to the people, the thesis that had characterized the old progressivism, with its enthronement of the strong mayor; the single powerful board, the strong federal government, and the wisdom of the experts they selected, a thesis that had been dominant for sixty years or more among liberal experts on government, never returned. Community control and participation may not have been a great success, but it led to no desire to return to a situation that was seen as even less desirable.[21]

Given the continuing intolerably high levels of crime, fear, and disorder, and the inability of police and other criminal justice agencies to manage it effectively, this is as true in community self-defense as in other areas Glazer may have in mind.

Moreover, we do not despair at the number of citizens who actively participate in neighborhood governance. Elsewhere, one of the authors (Kelling) has discussed this issue and noted that many neighborhoods appear to be in the hands of "caretakers"—persons who meet regularly, note neighborhood conditions, schedule a few annual events, maintain liaison with other neighborhood groups and "official government," and rally neighborhood forces in the face of some threat.[22] Their numbers may not be large (often six to ten persons), but their influence and potential are. Suttles describes a similar situation:

> Protest groups, conservation committees, landowners' groups, and realty associations spring into existence,

thrive, and then decline, as the issue which brought them into existence waxes and wanes. All this tends to give the defended neighborhood an ephemeral and transient appearance, as if it were a social artifact. But these social forms are real enough, and they leave at least a residue of a formula for subsequent cohesion.[23]

.What is clear is that just as neighborhoods vary in their ability to obtain goods and services, they also vary in their competence to defend themselves against predators. Defining neighborhood competence, however, is difficult. Peter Hunt, a member of the Executive Session on Community Policing and former executive director of the Chicago Area Project, uses such phrases as "problem-solving community," "self-regulating," "organized," and "able to exert power on behalf of its interests" to describe neighborhood competence.[24] Crenson[25] would add others: "rich in civility," "able to respond to crises," and "well governed." Suttles[26] identifies strong communities as places in which "communion" of personal thoughts and feelings can take place among others with whom one has chosen to live or work.

❝ Stripped of working- and middle-class residents—the skills they possess, the values they represent, and the institutions they support—such neighborhoods and their residents experience massive problems. ❞

The issue of neighborhood competence is of enormous significance. Current discussions of extraordinarily troubled neighborhood areas, such as the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, raise basic issues of the competence of neighborhoods to defend themselves.[27] Stripped of working- and middle-class residents—the skills they possess, the values they represent, and the institutions they support—such neighborhoods and their residents experience massive problems. As Wilson notes:

> ... the communities of the underclass are plagued by massive joblessness, flagrant and open lawlessness, and low-achieving schools, and therefore tend to be avoided by outsiders. Consequently, the residents of these areas, whether women and children of welfare families or aggressive street criminals, have increasingly been socially isolated from mainstream patterns of behavior.[28]

It is widely believed that a key element of the vitality, or competence, of neighborhoods is commerce, especially small shops that appear to have a substantial stake in the civil

functioning of neighborhoods. Yet little is known, beyond narrative discussions, about the contribution of commerce to neighborhoods, especially commerce's contribution to the capacity of a neighborhood to defend itself against crime, fear, and disorder.[29, 30] However, as one of the authors of this paper points out:

> Reducing crime and its disruptive effect on community .ties eliminates the largest and most devastating obstacle to development in many poor neighborhoods. And where businesses can develop, they encourage further growth and help create a community's cohesiveness and identity.[31]

Neighborhoods and their self-help activities also have their dark side. By their very nature, cities, and neighborhoods within them, are pluralistic places in which strangers routinely meet. These characteristics, pluralism and the interaction among strangers, present latitude for civil and moral injustices.

Pluralism characterizes neighborhoods in two dimensions: the relationship of different groups (often ethnic or racial) *between* neighborhoods, and the relationship of different groups *within* neighborhoods. Interneighborhood pluralism needs little discussion—it is widely accepted as descriptive of cities. Intraneighborhood pluralism, however, has not been as readily apparent.

The ethnic, racial, and cultural homogeneity of neighborhoods has been emphasized in popular images of neighborhoods as well as in scholarly work.[32] Yet, contemporary research has demonstrated that neighborhoods, even those that appear to be homogeneous on some basis, are characterized by considerable heterogeneity. A particular group might culturally *dominate* an area; yet as Suttles[33] and Merry[34] have demonstrated, neighborhoods are characterized by extensive internal diversity—individuals and groups move into and out of neighborhoods, differing groups share space, and boundaries (cognitive, as well as physical) shift over time.

❝ ... neighborhoods, even those that appear to be homogeneous on some basis, are characterized by considerable heterogeneity. ❞

Intra- and interneighborhood pluralism and the use of neighborhoods by strangers create the possibility for conflict between groups and individuals who maintain different lifestyles, define neighborhood civility in different ways, or wish to impose their standards on others—either in terms of how they behave or how they wish others to behave.

Most transactions between members of different groups or strangers occur with little difficulty. Goffman[35] demonstrates clearly that even strangers meet in patterned uncommitted interactions. That is, a traffic relationship is maintained, the purpose of which is to avoid untoward physical contact, achieve satisfactory spatial distance, avoid eye contact, and manage civilly the numerous contacts that occur as strangers negotiate cities.

❝ When an offense occurs between strangers, the incident itself and the behaviors signifying offense are generally minor—part of the cost of living a cosmopolitan life. ❞

Within or between neighborhoods, problems develop when individuals, groups, or residents of a neighborhood either take or give offense.[36,37] When an offense occurs between strangers, the incident itself and the behaviors signifying offense are generally minor—part of the cost of living a cosmopolitan life. Feelings may be ruffled, demeanor turned grumpy, but all of meager consequence.

When, however, the offense is major (prostitutes haranguing pedestrian and automotive traffic) or neighbors become aggrieved too easily (neighborhood residents resenting minorities passing through their neighborhood), civility is shattered and the possibility of serious conflict erupting is created. In the case of prostitutes haranguing citizens, almost everyone in the neighborhood would agree that something should be done, if necessary by police.

The case of minorities in neighborhoods, however, is an example of the potential tyranny of neighborhoods, indeed, the potential tyranny of democracy—the suppression of persons who for one reason or another are considered objectionable.[38] This is the dark side of intimate neighborhoods: just as neighborhoods can be places of congeniality, sociability, and safety, they can also be places of smallness, meanness, and tyranny.

The role of police in neighborhoods

Police have been depicted as a community's bastion against crime, disorder, and fear: the "thin blue line" fortifying a community against predators and wrongdoers.[39] This notion, if not promulgated by the current generation of police leaders, at least has not been denied by most police. In this view, police are a city's professional defense against crime and disorder; the responsibility of citizens is to report crimes

quickly to police via 911 systems, provide information to police about criminal events, and to cooperate with prosecutors and courts in the adjudication of offenders.

This is a troubling and deeply mistaken metaphor for police. First, it suggests that police are out there alone fighting evil misdoers. This is specious. We know that citizens, groups, and organizations are deeply involved in dealing with community problems. Second, the imagery of the thin blue line misrepresents the origins of crime and disorder. True, some predators do enter neighborhoods from outside, but a significant portion of neighborhood problems, even serious crime problems such as assault, child abuse, burglary, date-rape, and others have their origins within a neighborhood as well as from without. Third, it misrepresents the objectives of the majority of police work. The imagery suggests isolating persons who are dangerous from the good people of the community. This might be true for some serious and repeat offenders. If, however, we believe that the origins of many problems are within neighborhoods and involve disputes, disorder, and conflicts, as well as serious crime, a more proper representation of police is that of problem identifiers, dispute resolvers, and managers of relations—not merely persons authorized to arrest criminals.[40]

❝ . . . the imagery of the thin blue line misrepresents the origins of crime and disorder. ❞

The metaphor of the thin blue line is *deeply* mistaken not just because it misrepresents police business, but because it has largely determined how police have shaped their relationship to neighborhoods and communities in the past. Moreover, it has often put them in conflict with neighborhoods.

- Police saw their primary responsibility as crime control and solving crimes; citizens wanted police to improve the quality of urban life and create feelings of personal security, as well as to control crime.

- Police wanted to be independent of political and neighborhood control—they viewed such accountability as tantamount to corruption; citizens wanted police to be accountable to neighborhoods—inevitably a form of political accountability.

- Police wanted to structure impersonal relations with citizens and neighborhoods; citizens wanted intimate relations with police.

- Police tactics emphasized automobile preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service; citizens

wanted foot patrol or other tactics that would increase the quantity and improve the quality of police/citizen interaction (as well as rapid response).

- Police saw themselves as the thin blue line between order and chaos: citizens often saw themselves as the primary source of control, backed up by police.

- Police emphasized centralized efficiency: citizens desired decentralized operations and local decisionmaking. An expression of this is participation in meetings: police send community relations or crime prevention personnel outside the decisionmaking chain of command for the neighborhood: citizens prefer personnel empowered to make decisions.[41]

Police are starting to modify their positions, however, and in doing so have begun to change the nature of their relationship to communities.[42] We believe that the following principles are now shaping the relationship between police and neighborhoods in many cities and should shape the position of police in most communities.

1. Community self-defense against crime and disorder is primarily a matter of private social control supported, but never supplanted, by public police.

2. Because neighborhoods vary in the nature of their problems and in their capacity for self-help (their ecology of self-defense), police tactics must be tailored to specific neighborhoods.

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66 Deprived of community authorization, police are vulnerable to charges of both neglect and abuse. 99

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3. Tailoring tactics to neighborhoods will require decentralization of police authority and tactical decisionmaking to lower levels of the organization and the empowerment of sergeants and patrol officers to make decisions about the types of problems with which they will deal and the tactics they will employ to deal with them.

4. Precinct and beat configuration must be changed to reflect community and neighborhood form.

5. In the most troubled neighborhoods, especially those now being ravaged by the problems associated with drugs, police must at least seek authority from residents to act on their behalf. In neighborhoods that are most bereft of self-help

capacities, in inner-city underclass areas, and in neighborhoods most plagued by lawlessness, it is tempting for police to operate independently and without community consultations. The problems are so acute and the resources so meager that consultations may appear inefficient and needlessly time-consuming. This serves neither police nor residents well. Deprived of community authorization, police are vulnerable to charges of both neglect and abuse. Moreover, the willingness of police to fill in the gap and "do it themselves" deprives citizens of the very kinds of experiences that American political philosophy suggests will lead them to "acquire a taste for order" and develop their capacities as citizens.

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66 Police, like other agencies of government, should not do for citizens what citizens can do for themselves. 99

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6. If it is believed that the function of police is to support and increase the inherent strengths and self-governing capacities of neighborhoods that enable them to defend themselves against crime and disorder, it follows that a priority of police in bereft neighborhoods is not only to gain authorization for police action but also to help develop capacities for community self-defense. Given the desperate circumstances of some inner-city neighborhoods, this will be an extremely difficult task. It will, at times, be extraordinarily risky for citizens to attempt to defend their neighborhoods. The risk can be justified only if police commit themselves to pervasive presence for long durations of time. Such presence must always support and encourage self-help.

7. In neighborhoods that are capable of self-help and governance, police activities should be designed and implemented for the purpose of strengthening neighborhoods. Police, like other agencies of government, should not do for citizens what citizens can do for themselves. There are reasons to believe that when government does supplant self-help, the capacity of citizens for self-help diminishes.

8. Because different neighborhoods have different interests, interests that at times conflict with each other, police will have to manage interneighborhood, as well as intraneighborhood, relations. Neighborhoods require free commerce and penetration by strangers and other groups if they are to thrive.

9. Police must understand that just as their task is to support the self-help capacities of neighborhoods when those capacities are used for appropriate ends, they must thwart

self-help capacities of neighborhoods when they turn petty, mean, and tyrannical. Police are well-equipped for this. During the past two decades "constitutional policing," at first resisted by many police but later embraced and incorporated by the great chiefs and police leaders of the era, has empowered police to withstand parochial pressure.[3] This does not mean that police will not have to be vigilant in resisting inappropriate pressures; it means that police executives have moved to instill the values and policies that will help them maintain constitutional practice. Justice is as important as security in policing.

Conclusion

Police are now adapting to changes taking place in American society. One of those changes is the reversal in the trend to centralization in government and the reemergence of neighborhoods as a source of governance. This change raises a hot issue for police. Are they agents or servants of neighborhoods?

While we have emphasized restructuring police and increasing their accountability to neighborhoods, we do not see them as servants of neighborhoods. Police protect other values, as well as neighborhood values. What are those values? At least three.

First, public police must be distributed fairly across cities on the basis of neighborhood need, not neighborhood political clout.

Second, police must be able to maintain organizational integrity. Police departments must have the right to develop and maintain their own personnel, administrative, and technological capacities without political interference.

Finally, they must defend minority interests and civil rights against the more parochial interests of some neighborhoods.

" . . . police must view their role in neighborhoods as a means of reestablishing the neighboring relationships and strengthening the institutions that make a community competent . . . "

Neighborhoods need police for assistance in the control of crime, fear, and disorder. Some neighborhoods need police only rarely; in other neighborhoods pervasive police presence is required to assure the simplest of rights—shopping,

keeping one's property, even keeping one's life or physical well-being. Regardless of the severity of neighborhood problems or the competence of neighborhoods in dealing with them, the police monopoly over legitimate use of force requires that police assist neighborhoods when force might be required to settle neighborhood problems.

To respond appropriately police must view their role in neighborhoods as a means of reestablishing the neighboring relationships and strengthening the institutions that make a community competent and able to deal with its problems. Zachary Tumin has summarized the role of a police officer in carrying through such a function:

> The role of the professional police officer as a professional is therefore to know the status of his local institutions; to understand how, when, and why they work; to understand their strengths and their vulnerabilities; to know their members or users, that is, to know the people whose relationships comprise the institutions, and why they participate or don't.[4]

Police are now attempting to create a world in which they are more responsive to neighborhoods and communities. Their task is not just to serve; it is also to lead by helping to foster wider tolerance of strangers, minorities, and differing definitions of morality. How will this be accomplished? Many tactics will be used. But, at a minimum, it will require setting firm control over their own conduct and embodying a civil approach.

Notes

1. Ulf Hannerz, *Exploring the City*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980.

2. Gerald D. Suttles, *The Social Construction of Communities*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972: 22.

3. In a Boston neighborhood observed by one of this paper's authors, George Kelling, residents who organized a community anticrime effort that included both regular meetings and citizen patrol invited a homeless woman who lived in a corner park to a special meeting on rape prevention. She not only attended the meeting, she recounted her own rape. Subsequent citizen patrols always checked the park to ensure her safety. In fact, it could be argued that there are times in some areas of cities when the homeless comprise the residency of the neighborhood—downtown areas, for example, which other citizens abandon during the evenings for their own residential neighborhoods.

4. See, for example, Stephanie W. Greenberg, William M. Rohe, and Jay R. Williams, *Informal Citizen Action and Crime Prevention at the Neighborhood Level: Synthesis and Assessment of the Research*, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, Research Triangle Institute, March 1984; Hannerz, *Exploring the City*.

5. Nathan Glazer, *The Limits of Social Policy*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1988: 120.

6. Andrew J. Polsky, "Welfare policy: Why the past has no future," *Democracy* 3, 1 (Winter 1983): 21–33.

7. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, New York, Random House, 1961; Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design*, New York, Macmillan, 1972.

8. Glenn Yago, "Sick transit," *Democracy* 3, 1 (Winter 1983): 43–55.

9. Marcus Felson, "Routine activities and crime prevention in the developing metropolis," *Criminology* 25, 4 (1987).

10. Research on neighborhood groups recounted in this paper was conducted during 1982 and 1983 and reported in George L. Kelling, "Neighborhoods and police," Occasional Paper, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, August 1985.

11. This neighborhood was laced with many nightclubs and bars. Police were employed off-duty as security personnel. When conflicts arose between establishment owners and residents over the noise at bar-closing time, residents believed that public police, employed off-duty by owners, took the side of owners against residents.

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12. Glazer, *Limits of Social Policy*: 121.

13. Ibid.: 122.

14. An interesting account of neighbors using physical force was recounted in the *New York Times*, October 8, 1988. Two citizens in a Detroit neighborhood burned down a building alleged to be used by drug dealers, admitted it, and blamed their need to do it on the failure of city and police officials to heed their requests for assistance. Tried, the two were found innocent by their peers. The jury foreman was quoted: "I imagine the verdict does set out a message in two directions—to the Mayor and the Chief of Police that more has to be done about crack houses." Another juror said he would have done the same thing, but then added: "No, I would have been more violent." The Wayne County Prosecutor said after the verdict: "Vigilantism simply will not be tolerated."

15. Egon Bittner, *The Function of Police in Modern Society*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

16. See, for example, Leon Radzinowicz, *A History of English Criminal Law, V. 2: The Enforcement of the Law*, London, Stevens & Sons, 1956.

17. Matthew B. Crenson, *Neighborhood Politics*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University, 1982: 19.

18. Donald Black and M.P. Baumgartner, "On self help in modern society," in Donald Black, *The Manners and Customs of the Police*, New York, Academic Press, 1980: 193–208.

19. See, for example, James K. Stewart, "The urban strangler: How crime causes poverty in the inner city," *Policy Review* 37 (Summer 1986), for examples of corporations that have done just the opposite and contributed to community life through the forms that their security efforts took.

20. See, for example, Lawrence E. Cohen and Marcus Felson, "Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach," *American Sociological Review* 44 (1979): 588–608.

21. Glazer, *Limits of Social Policy*: 123.

22. Kelling, "Neighborhoods and police."

23. Suttles, *Social Construction of Communities*: 36.

24. Peter Hunt, "Community development—should it be included as part of the police mission," note drafted for Executive Session on Community Policing, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987.

25. Crenson, *Neighborhood Politics*: 18.

26. Suttles, *Social Construction of Communities*: 265.

27. See, for example, Gerald D. Suttles, *The Social Order of the Slum*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968; William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: the Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987.

28. W. J. Wilson, *Truly Disadvantaged*: 58.

29. See, for example, Jane Jacobs, *Death and Life of . . . Cities*, for a discussion of the importance of local commerce in the mainte-nance of neighborhood safety.

30. Ulf Hannerz notes both the importance and lack of research about the role of commerce in neighborhoods. "One also finds neighborhoods more or less wholly recruited on a work basis, such as shopping streets with shopkeepers and their employees as daytime neighbors. Of their kind of neighboring there is hardly any ethnography." *Exploring the City*: 264.

31. Stewart, "Urban strangler": 6.

32. See, for example, Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Robert D. McKenzie, *The City*, 4th edition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967.

33. Suttles, *Social Construction of Communities*: 25.

34. Sally Engle Merry, *Urban Danger: Life in a Neighborhood of Strangers*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1981: 93–124.

35. Erving Goffman, *Relations in Public*, New York, Basic Books, 1971.

36. This is based on Mark H. Moore's definition of civility: "Neither to give nor take offense easily." Personal conversation.

37. Marcus Felson suggests that the problem of dealing with strangers is becoming even more complicated in contemporary American cities, characterized as they are by large numbers of highly mobile untended youths (the source of the majority of the problems of crime, disorder, and fear) and untended neighborhoods (two-career marriages). N. 9 above, "Routine activities and crime prevention in the developing metropolis."

38. This fear was expressed early in America's history by Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, V. 1 [1833], New York, Vintage Books, 1954.

39. See, for example, Anthony V. Bouza, "Police unions: paper tigers or roaring lions?" in William A. Geller, ed., *Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity*, New York, Praeger, 1985.

40. For a discussion of the erosion of this belief, see George L. Kelling, "Police and Communities: the Quiet Revolution," *Perspectives on Policing* No. 1, National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, Washington, D.C., February 1988.

41. This is adapted from Kelling, "Neighborhoods and police," p. 22.

42. For a discussion of the reasons behind this change, see Kelling, "Police and Communities: the Quiet Revolution."

43. James K. Stewart, one of this paper's authors, has pointed out that the period 1960–1980 is likely to be remembered as the "constitutional era"—the era when chiefs of police like Patrick V. Murphy, Clarence Kelley, Robert Igleburger, and many others embraced, rather than resisted, many of the major constitutional and legal decisions that affected police practice (*Miranda*, the exclusionary rule, etc.).

44. Zachary Tumin, "Managing relations with the community," Working Paper #86–05–06, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, November 1986, final page.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

POLICING IN THE '90s

TRENDS, ISSUES & CONCERNS

esponding to a Changing Environment

By Commissioner Lee P. Brown, New York City Police Department, New York

KNOWLEDGE. INFOR-
mation. Perspective. Each one leads to and supports the others. If any one is absent or deficient, then the picture one draws of reality is necessarily inaccurate—an intolerable situation for police administrators, who must deal on a daily basis with the needs of a diverse population. Responding to present needs, however, requires more than an understanding of the way things are today. It also requires an understanding of the past and a perspective of the future.

Society, for example, is not the same today as it was in the past; nor will it be the same tomorrow or years from now. The variety of interest groups that com-

prise the country's heterogeneous communities all have a specific reason, or rallying point, for existing. Some have a short-lived existence, lasting only until a specific objective has been met; others are more enduring, preferring instead to champion ongoing causes. Police administrators therefore must recognize and be able to deal with the local community's fragmentation as it presents itself on any given day. The old ways of making decisions and delivering police services and programs will no longer suffice. Centralization must yield to decentralization, and the myth that all knowledge and information resides in the office of the chief of police must be dispelled. Prescient police administrators must take the many management concepts once believed to be sacred and challenge them vigorously, yielding more appropriate approaches to law enforcement activities of the future.

One of these so-called sacred concepts is the notion of a chain of command in which a person has many subordinates but reports to only one superior. As new and better ways of delivering police services are analyzed, the chain-of-command concept may well crumble. Replacing the old system may be one in which police officers become generalists, reporting to different superiors for different purposes. During an investigation, for example, the officer may report to a detective with

expertise in criminal investigations. When his duties lead him to crime-prevention activities, the officer then may report to a specialist in that area for guidance. For administrative purposes, the officer would report to still another individual. Supervision thus becomes task-specific. Officers benefit from the specialized knowledge at their disposal while the department maximizes the use of its resources and becomes more responsive to the changes occurring in society.

THE ABILITY OF LAW enforcement administrators to respond appropriately to these changes rests in large part on their willingness to receive and act upon citizen input. In the past, police administrators have assumed they were the experts and therefore knew what police services the community needed and how these services should be provided. To a large extent, however, it is the citizens themselves who know best what the community's problems are and how they can be solved. They are on the front lines. They are the ones who know the pain of victimization, who see relatives and friends die at the hands of criminals, who clearly understand that one does not have to be a police officer to know what actions should be taken.

This is not to suggest, however, that police decision making should be turned over to the community. Police departments of the future can be expected to retain some of their traditional paramilitary characteristics while accepting a greater role for the citizen and greater flexibility within their own organizational structures.

The new rallying cry will be teamwork—police and citizens working jointly to achieve a particular goal. For the most part, individual officers will assume greater responsibility for the areas to which they have been assigned. In doing so, they will take on multiple roles, such as planner, problem solver, community activist, community organizer and community leader. Such a scenario is not unlike that found within the Japanese policing system, where the police officer becomes the leader rather than the follower in the community.

Because the goal is teamwork, police administrators must develop mechanisms for encouraging citizen involvement in the policing effort. This can be done in part by stressing to the community that crime is not solely a police problem—that if crime is to be brought under control and neighborhoods made safer places to live, then both the police and individual citizens must join the fight, since no one person or group can win the battle alone. The garnering of community involvement in the fight against crime is a significant challenge facing contemporary police administrators, but one that can be accomplished through determination and hard work. Those police agencies that have successfully involved citizens in the decision-making, problem-solving and strategy-development processes continue to reap the rewards of their efforts in the form of more effective responses to citizens' needs and greater public support for policing efforts.

POLICE ADMINISTRATORS must recognize and address the unique challenges precipitated by the monumental changes occurring both in this country and around the world. The key to meeting these challenges is strong leadership. Without it, police administrators are likely to flounder as the dynamics of change sweep over them, leaving in their wake old and ineffective ways of dealing with a rapidly changing society.

Some of the main problems confronting police administrators at the start of the new decade include the following:

● Perpetual change will be the byword of the 1990s. The status quo will be the exception rather than the rule.

● As citizens ask for more services, the demands on police will increase.

● Police agencies will be under increasing pressure from the community, their own employees and elected officials to bring about desired changes.

● The public's demands will be voiced by special interest groups, particularly those at the neighborhood level.

● The public and elected officials will continually demand greater accountability from police agencies.

● Tighter fiscal controls will be placed upon police agencies, and budgets submitted by police chiefs will be scrutinized more closely.

To meet these challenges, police chiefs of the 1990s must assume a leadership role in executing the following seven-point plan of action:

● *Strategic planning.* The police chief must implement a strategic planning process that will enable the department to influence the future. Strategic planning is a tool that can help an agency to both guide and shape its delivery of services. It is a means of facilitating participation, communication and systematic decision making.

● *Multilevel perspective.* The police chief must develop a multilevel perspective for the delivery of police services. Among the components of this perspective are neighborhoods, individuals and special interest groups. Each component has its own particular needs, and the police chief must be flexible enough to deal with such competing demands.

● *Awareness.* The police chief must keep abreast of what is happening not only in the community but also within his own agency. He cannot allow himself to become isolated from either constituency and must develop mechanisms to ensure that he does not lose touch with reality. The key to accomplishing this goal is twofold: listening to what officers and citizens (from individuals to civic leaders to elected officials) have to say and giving such input careful consideration. The more voices that are heard, the broader the perspective the police chief can develop and the more accurate picture of reality he can draw. When police chiefs choose not to listen to either citizens or their own officers, they deprive themselves of valuable firsthand information—information that could be used to refine strategies, programs and policies, and possibly avert problems before they arise.

● *Service partners.* The police chief must include the community as a partner in the agency's efforts to deliver police services and acknowledge that the police are not the only ones qualified to determine which services would be most beneficial to the persons who need them. A successful partnership requires a commitment by the police chief to include

the community in everything from the development of policy to the identification and resolution of neighborhood problems. In effect, the police chief becomes not only a community leader but also an agent of positive change.

● *Community resources.* Because local budget constraints will not disappear any time soon, the police chief must tap community resources to achieve his objectives. He must recognize that. corporations fully understand and increasingly are fulfilling their commitment to the public, in the form of both financial assistance and in-kind contributions (e.g., printing services, use of facilities). ·

● *Development of confidence.* The police chief must be capable of nurturing the community's confidence in the police department. No police agency can be successful without the understanding, support and cooperation of the people it serves. As the key figure in the development of such support, the chief must display a willingness to listen to all persons and groups and show a genuine concern for each citizen's safety and wellbeing.

● *Demilitarization.* Police chiefs must facilitate a change in the organizational structure of their agencies. They must move away from the paramilitary model and adopt an appropriate corporate model that will result in a flattening of the organization.

Responding to the challenges of the future presents formidable obstacles, particularly for the police administrator who fails to take the pulse of his community today and use that information to gauge its needs for tomorrow and the years to come. But for the police administrator who leads his agency into the future by becoming an integral part of the community, the challenges are not insurmountable.

Neighborhood policing, in all of its many applications, is the key to success. Centralized efforts no longer will suffice. The responsibility for positive change must be spread among the participants and the beneficiaries. The landscape of society has changed and will continue to change. Unless the providers of services to the community change as well, they risk being swept aside and consumed by the rising tide of change.

Community Oriented Policing

in Small Agencies

*By V. Lavoyed Hudgins
Deputy Chief
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Many large police departments in the United States are aggressively pursuing a community-oriented policing concept (COP). These programs are attempting to link police officers and citizens together in crime prevention techniques and tactics that stress a more personal interaction between the two groups.

The Face in the Car

Over the years, in large and small communities alike, police officers have become what has been referred to as a "face in a car." This perception by citizens, real in some cases. imagined in others. has tended to isolate law officers from the very individuals who could provide useful information for our agencies. Police managers and administrators, clinging to the "we know best" philosophy, alienated entire segments of a populace by ramrodding "solutions" to a problem down the collective throats of the citizenry.

Fortunately, for the benefit of all of us, some far-sighted administrators saw fit to begin to read the public by close interaction with formal and informal groups of citizens. What they discovered was that the public seemed to have a better grasp of the problems facing a particular area and usually had some solid ideas on a coping strategy. Channels of communication were re-opened with the neglected masses, and new options were developed for dealing with problems for which traditional solutions had been mostly unsuccessful.

For large agencies, COP has become a major thrust (as it should be) with great resources and effort placed toward this worthwhile endeavor. For smaller agencies, this re-direction of priorities has created some difficulties. Most smaller agencies are strapped for resources and feel they cannot commit to anything except ordinary functions. Or can they?

The Orange Beach Experience

The Orange Beach Department of Public Safety has undergone phenomenal growth in the last 18 months. Sworn personnel have increased from 5 to 17. with a total of 22 employees. The city has been recognized as the fastest-growing community in Alabama with a growth rate of some 647 percent over the past 8 years.

The area is gaining in popularity as a resort and, therefore, the problems of policing in a location such as this are unique. For example, the city has some 2,500 permanent residents and about 4,500 residences, which lends itself to problems inherent in having a large number of unoccupied dwellings, such as burglaries and vandalism. It is also difficult for an agency to get a handle on permanent members of the community due to a highly transient population. Additionally, the department has reorganized from a police department to a fully-consolidated department of public safety. With growth and change such as this, how can an agency manage its growth while moving toward a COP concept as well?

Commitment at the Top

The answers lie in several areas. First, top management has a commitment to the COP concept. This has proven to be one of the most effective and important "pieces of the pie." As any traditional or non-traditional management theory will state, leadership by example is highly effective. The director and deputy director of the Orange Beach Department of Public Safety attempt to have a great deal of one-on-one contact with all personnel. The mechanics of a small agency serves to enhance this activity. However, in many locations, chief administrators become caught up in normal day-to-day operations and neglect this important management tool.

We take advantage of this close contact with line and supervisory personnel to continually re-state our

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objectives and vision for the agency, while reinforcing the basic methods of achieving these goals. i.e., increasing the number of positive public contacts and being open with the public concerning department functions. Officers are encouraged to make one-on-one contacts with citizens by exiting vehicles and foot patrolling high density business districts and personally introducing themselves to business owners and employees.

The institution of this dialogue has resulted in increased information from these individuals. Also, the department follows up on all complaints regardless of the severity. All victims are contacted after the initial reporting of an incident. This makes victims aware that there are no "write the report and forget 'em" calls. It must be said. however, that a sincere effort should be made to suitably resolve all complaints so as not to give the impression that the department is concerned about P.R. only.

Many officers are being reprogrammed by these interactions and finding the "us versus them" mentality is no longer a functional theory.

Another integral part of any COP program is that personnel never give the impression to citizenry that "there is nothing we can do." These words can do more to damage a program that virtually anything an officer or agency can say or do. In private industry it has long been accepted that the best advertising is by word of mouth. The same holds true in our field. The negative impression of a citizen most surely translates into negative feedback from that person to other community members and slowly erodes support for the agency. We believe a basic education for personnel in community relations is imperative to the success of the COP program.

Active Citizen Involvement Needed ·

Programs must be launched that encourage the active involvement of residents. As a public entity, we must also be aware of the various agendas of different organizations in the community. both formal and informal, and tailor programs to address those agendas and concerns.

For instance. one of our first efforts focused on a Neighborhood Watch program in a large residential area. The program was resoundingly rejected by these citizens. It was later learned that the concerns of the residents actually centered on basic services not normally delivered by the Department of Public Safety.

The traditional bureaucratic response would have been to refer these complaints to the proper department. But we in the Department of Public Safety chose to act as a vehicle of information for the citizens to make certain the concerns were carried to the proper authority. Personnel are advised about which departments in the city perform various functions and

they know key individuals in each department to contact to attempt to solve citizen problems. Continued efforts have been made to work with this particular [residential] group to define their concerns and problems as they perceive them.

In any COP program, it is imperative that the agency act as a conduit of information and assist all requests for aid whether the request is for a normal police function or not. The benefits and rewards of this strategy will ultimately result in an improved flow of information from citizens to police. thereby allowing us to not only solve more offenses, but to anticipate potential problem areas as well.

Current police management theories abound with a plethora of programs, some of which may or may not be suited to a particular agency. Some of the programs that have been. or are being implemented. in our area include Realtor Watch, Fleet Watch, Operation I.D. and the training of officers to serve as D.A.R.E instructors.

The Realtor Watch and Fleet Watch programs have involved working with realtors and other organizations in the area. i.e., utilities. etc.. that maintain a fleet of vehicles. These individuals have been schooled by our department in basic observational skills in an attempt to add additional eyes and ears to our limited resources. Our department has also committed two officers to the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program and has received positive community support with the receipt of a $2.500 donation before the program was even officially begun. Other traditional and non-traditional programs are also being considered.

The COP Concept Can Work in Communities of All Sizes

In summary, small agency COP programs do not differ greatly from larger agency programs with the possible exception of the amount of resources allocated to the task. However, all programs. large or small. require the following:

• Commitment from the top. Management must not be reluctant to experiment with new concepts and ideas. They must remember that many solutions can come from line personnel and citizens as well.

• Proper education of officers regarding the plan of implementation and how the efforts of individual officers relate to the big picture.

• Proper education of the public concerning the benefits they will derive from the program. while encouraging feedback regarding their concerns.

• Old fashioned hard work.

As with any task humans undertake. success can only be measured by the attainment of goals set and an undying persistence in reaching those goals. Not only do we owe our best efforts to the public we serve, we also owe it to ourselves. ◻

Police Accountability and Community Policing

By George L. Kelling, Robert Wasserman, and Hubert Williams

The accountability of individual police officers is a fundamental issue for police executives. This is fitting: police officers are the public officials society has authorized, even obliged, to use force. Ensuring that police officers use that warrant equitably, legally, and economically on behalf of citizens is at the core of police administration. The enduring concern of police executives to ensure accountability in American policing is a reflection of their professional commitment.

Not only is it fitting that a police executive give high priority to ensuring the accountability of police officers, it is essential to surviving as the leader of a police department. Police chiefs continually worry about abuse of authority: brutality; misuse of force, especially deadly force; over-enforcement of the law; bribery; manufacture of evidence in the name of efficiency or success; failure to apply the law because of personal interests; and discrimination against particular individuals or groups. These issues are grist for the mill of persistent and influential watchdog groups concerned about impartial enforcement under the law—the media, civil rights groups, and lawyers. Rising crime or fear of crime may be problematic for police administrators, but rarely does either threaten their survival. Scandals associated with abuse of authority, however, do jeopardize organizational stability and continuity of leadership.

As a consequence, it is not surprising that police leaders have developed organizational mechanisms of control that seek to ensure police accountability to both the law and the policies and procedures of police departments. This paper reviews the ways police administrators try to control the accountability of individual police officers and examines the relationship between accountability procedures and community policing.

The paper's focus on accountability and community policing results from the concerns of many police executives and policymakers that certain characteristics of community policing threaten police officer accountability. These characteristics of community policing include organizational decentralization; increased intimacy between police officers and citizens and neighborhoods; receipt and interpretation of citizen demand for service by individual patrol officers; and development of patrol and policing tactics (problem solving, for example) by patrol officers at a neighborhood or community level. All of these characteristics require increased officer use of discretion and empowerment of patrol officers. Advocates of community policing who call for empowerment of officers should be extraordinarily scrupulous about ensuring that officers are held accountable for their actions.

Police organizations, like all organizations, rely on distinctive structural forms and management processes to maintain accountability. Characteristically, their structures are centralized with functionally defined bureaus, and their management processes emphasize preservice training and elaborate command and control mechanisms. In many respects, police organizations have typified the classical command and control organization that emphasizes top-level decisionmaking: flow of orders from executives down to line personnel, flow of information up from line personnel to executives, layers of dense supervision, unity of command, elaborate rules and regulations, elimination of discretion, and simplification of work tasks.

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66 ... command and control systems ... resolved many of the inherent tensions of policing ... 99

Command and control management has met two sets of needs in American policing. First, command and control systems have strengthened the ability of police to respond to civil disturbances, riots, labor disputes, and other problems for which coordinating large numbers of police was required.

Second, command and control systems have resolved many of the inherent tensions of policing—tensions, for example, between constraints imposed on police by law and the opportunities for effectiveness provided by their warrant to use force. There are other tensions as well—tensions between efficient processing of offenders and protection of their constitutional guarantees; between conflicting definitions of morality in communities and neighborhoods; between competing political interests.

Command and control systems have appeared to resolve these tensions by (1) instituting rules that prescribe the

behavior of officers; (2) creating dense patterns of command and supervision to enforce these rules; (3) establishing the principle of unity of command to eliminate ambiguity in the chain of authority; and (4) routinizing the job of police officers by defining it as law enforcement.

This strategy has its successes. These successes include reduced political control of officers; reduced corruption; improvement in qualifications and training of police officers; constraints on police officer use of force, especially deadly force; production of more equitable police service; and arguably, enhancement of the tenure of police chiefs. Additionally, command and control management has improved the capacity of police to respond to riots and other disturbances that require coordinated group responses.

But there are strains in this strategy as well. As logically appealing as the command and control organization seems, many aspects of police work are not compatible with classical command and control organizations. First, patrol work is not amenable to attempts to simplify or routinize it. The types and multiplicity of problems with which police deal preclude the simplification or routinization of patrol work.[1] The metaphor of the assembly line, basic to classical management theories, has proved to be inapplicable to the realities of patrol. Second, police officers, unlike assembly-line workers or military troops, do not work under the direct scrutiny of supervisors. Even when sergeants are in the field, the unpredictable timing and location of police activities thwart ordinary supervision of performance. Consequently, although serious attempts have been made to eliminate or structure discretion, it has remained an integral and pervasive feature of police work,[2] especially at the level of patrol officer.

This strain between the realities of police work and the command and control systems of departments creates problems for administrators. First, the mechanisms of command and control are elaborate and expensive to maintain; layers of command, extensive training, and the maintenance of multitudinous rules and procedures obligate time, personnel, and money. Second, the discontinuities between organizational prescriptions and work realities are not lost on police officers. The results? At least two: (1) considerable role strain on officers who are portrayed as professionals on one hand but treated as recalcitrant semi-skilled workers on the other and (2) the rise of the union movement, which, at times, fosters acrid labor-management relationships.

Further, there are additional, more subtle costs to police departments. First, use of individual discretion has been driven underground; creativity and productive adaptations go unrecognized and unrewarded. Second, police departments often fail to tap the potential abilities of their officers. An ethos of "stay out of trouble," which has developed in many departments, stifles officers who are otherwise resourceful and abets officers who "perch" in their positions. Finally, a

police culture has developed that maintains values that are alien to both police departments and communities. This police culture is characterized by suspiciousness, perceptions of great danger, isolation from citizens, and internal solidarity (the "blue curtain").

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6 6 An ethos of 'stay out of trouble'. . . stifles officers who are otherwise resourceful . . . 9 9

Managing police culture

Are there alternatives to command and control for managing police culture and improving accountability?

It is generally acknowledged that a primary determinant of police officer behavior is the culture within which officers find themselves. This is true not only in policing, but also in most other types of organizations. Good management is often described as the management of organizational culture.[3]

The tendency in policing, however, is to emphasize the importance of the formal elements of the organization and ignore the informal elements (organizational myths, heroes and villains, informal patterns of communication, the norms and mores of the organization, etc.). The point, however, is not whether culture is influenced, but who influences it. To the extent that management has not worked to shape police culture, other forces have.

Often, management's attempt to manage culture through command and control merely fosters suspicion, isolation, insularity, demeaning perception of citizens, grumpiness, the "blue curtain," and cynicism.[4] The result is an attitude on the part of police officers that says: "Management, leave me alone—let me do my work." In the worst of circumstances, police culture implies: "I am being paid for being a police officer. Beyond staying out of trouble, if you want me to do anything, bring me in on overtime."

The traditional approach has been to work against culture through the use of command and control. That workers do not like work and have little to contribute to its substance or conduct are basic tenets of classical organizational theory. Alternate managerial approaches recognize the importance of informal leadership and peer influences, assume that workers do care about the substance of their work, and strive to use informal leadership and peer influences on behalf of the mission of the organization. We believe that successful management of culture is achieved in three ways:

- Leadership through values.
- Accountability to the community.
- Administrative mechanisms of control.

Leadership through values

All organizations have values. They are implicit in every action of organizational incumbents. When explicit, statements of values attempt to set forth the beliefs of an organization, the standards that are to be maintained by its members, and the broader mission expected to be achieved through their activities. Most often, values operate at several levels of individual and organizational awareness. At times, workers make decisions by considering and selecting from alternatives—well aware of their value implications. At other times, workers make decisions without conscious recourse to their value dimensions. Often the values that undergird routine decisions and practices are so deeply ingrained as to make them automatic.[5]

Values, even those we consider positive, can conflict. For example, loyalty to peers can conflict with the maintenance of high standards of professional practice. When police officers decide to close their eyes to the incompetence or corruption of colleagues and draw the "blue curtain" around them, they choose the value of loyalty to peers over other values, such as quality service to the community. In many police departments, other values, some explicit and others implicit, can be identified that shape and drive police performance: "stay out of trouble," "we are the finest," "machismo," "serve and protect," and many others.

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6 6 Often the values that undergird routine decisions . . . are so deeply ingrained as to make them automatic. 9 9

The responsibility of police managers is to (1) identify values that flow from the law and the Constitution, that represent the highest norms of the profession, and that are consistent with the ideals of communities and neighborhoods, and (2) enunciate them persuasively and unambiguously.

How are a department's values properly enunciated? First, many departments make their values explicit through the development of concise value statements. Such practices are not new in policing: O.W. Wilson developed visionary value statements both in Wichita and Chicago; the Los Angeles Police Department's statement of values had its origins in the administration of Chief Ed Davis. More recently, such statements have been developed in departments in Houston, Texas; Madison, Wisconsin; Dayton, Ohio; and many others.

Second, statements of policy, on issues such as use of deadly force for example, are derived from departmental values and inform and guide police officers and citizens—

whether the department maintains a clear-cut value statement or not—about values of the department. Equally important, the absence of policy statements in crucial areas such as use of deadly force expresses values and creates policy as well through administrative inaction.[6] In turn, procedures (methods of performance that direct action in distinct situations) and rules (specific prohibitions or requirements stated to prevent deviance) are derived from value-based policies.[7]

Without rejecting all procedures and rules, the primary focus in value-based administration and leadership is not on prohibitions constraining officers but rather on encouraging police officers to weigh their actions constantly in light of departmental values. This switch in emphasis from rule conformity alone to quality action and outcome empowers officers to select appropriate courses of action from within a range of options rather than in the rote fashion too often prescribed by advocates of command and control. Leadership by values addresses the issue of accountability by attempting to link the nature of police work (application of discretionary judgments to a wide range of problems) with mechanisms of control that emphasize professional self-regulation rather than mere obligatory accommodation to rules.

Accountability to the community

Two familiar forms of police accountability to communities are community relations units and civilian review boards. Community relations units are supposed to carry the message of police departments to communities but have proven to be insufficiently responsive to community definitions of problems and solutions. In the few places where they exist, civilian review boards focus primarily on the performance of individual police officers, particularly on mistakes and incompetence.

The difference between the role of citizens in community policing and in civilian review boards is that civilian review boards concentrate on perceived or real abuses while community policing focuses on the substantive issues of problems, crime, and quality of life in neighborhoods. Citizens bring to the relationship their sense of community, knowledge about the problems in their neighborhoods, their own capacities to solve problems, and the potential to support or authorize police action. Police bring to communities concerns not only for their welfare but for the constitutional rights and the welfare of all individuals and the community-at-large—thus countervailing the tendencies of neighborhood residents to be overly parochial or opposed to the legitimate interests of strangers or particular subgroups.

To us, accountability to the community means something different. It implies a new relationship to the community in which police departments establish an understanding with communities. This can take several forms. One form is for the community to be brought into policy-setting procedures—a practice pioneered during the 1960's by Chief

Robert Igleburger of Dayton, Ohio. A second form of new relationship to the community, but not necessarily exclusive of the first, is for both police and citizens to nominate the problems with which police and citizens will deal, the tactics that each will use to address those problems, and the outcomes that are desired.

The understanding between police and community, more or less explicit, establishes a mutual accountability. It provides measures against which each can evaluate the other. This understanding does not abrogate police officers' responsibility for their professional knowledge, skills, or values. Likewise, it does not free citizens from their responsibility for their own safety. To use a medical analogy, it makes physician and patient accountable to each other.

> **❝ ... understanding between police and community ... establishes a mutual accountability. ❞**

Administrative mechanisms of control

The list of administrative mechanisms of control that are available to managers is conventional: education, training, rewards, discipline, peer influence, direction, supervision, recognition, and career opportunities. Use of, and emphases on, these mechanisms varies across occupations. Police in the past, using classical organizational principles, have emphasized direction, supervision, discipline, and preservice training. (This does not mean that other mechanisms were not used as well. The primary mechanisms, however, were those we identified.) These mechanisms can be adapted by police to improve accountability, just as they have been adapted by many other professional and private sector organizations. In the section that follows we shall briefly discuss the adaptation of control mechanisms to contemporary policing: supervision, training, program auditing, discipline, reward, and peer control.

Supervision

Supervision of police is essential to improving the quality of police services. Typically, police administration portrays supervisors as directors who oversee workers who perform specific activities laid out in advance by management. Given the conditions of police activity, however—officers work alone, events occur in locations and at times that make them unavailable for direct oversight, the problems citizens present to police require novel solutions—different forms of supervision are required. These forms of supervision are more akin to coaching than directing. They include teaching, reviewing, considering alternatives, training, and other similar techniques.

A special function of supervisors is to empower officers. By empower we mean providing officers with the authority to use their knowledge, skill, and values to identify problems and work toward their solution. Empowerment of officers is the opposite of encouraging them to "stay out of trouble" or "not bother" their sergeants. Confronted with ambiguous problems not responsive to standard solutions, police officers can be empowered by sergeants to search for creative solutions to problems rather than respond in some rote fashion. Organizational policies should be sufficiently pliable to accommodate the breadth of discretion that officers will be expected to exercise under this arrangement.

It is our contention that as departments shift away from the authoritarian model of policing to a more flexible community-oriented approach, a reexamination of the structure of the bureaucracy will be essential to the efficient performance of the officer on the beat as well as the effectiveness of the department's operations.

We recognize that the complexity of this issue mandates far more thought and consideration than can be given in this paper. Departments cannot expect to eliminate an entire structure one day and begin with a new one the next. But they must begin to address the question of whether or not the existing rank structure and its functioning lend themselves to the type of police performance required to meet the needs and expectations of the communities served by the department.

This is particularly true in cities with a diverse ethnic and cultural mix. In these jurisdictions, the varying interests and demands of neighborhoods necessitate flexibility at the point of contact through which the department provides the services. This means that patrol officers need greater discretion and flexibility and less rigid adherence to monolithic rules and procedures. Thus, it might be possible to eliminate some of the tiers of authority within the bureaucracy while at the same time being more cost effective.

We should begin with the establishment of a career track for patrol officers that would provide incentives for meeting specialized goals. Many of these goals could be the result of an accord between neighborhoods and department representatives in which the line officer is an active participant, provided with sufficient authority to draw upon required departmental resources to achieve objectives. This requires more functional supervision than direct line authority over the officer. Therefore, it would be possible under this configuration to reduce the number of sergeants and increase the opportunities for advancement within the patrol officers' line. Thus, promotions based upon abstract examinations could be replaced by a more practical system of performance measures that link community needs with departmental objectives.

Training

Police recruit training is organizationally based, preservice training that emphasizes law, rules and procedures, and officer discipline.[8] This is consistent with the thrust of earlier reform to enhance the lawfulness and eliminate the discretion of police officers. It can be argued that this training serves its purpose very well, at least as far as it goes. It does emphasize important values: adherence to law and discipline.

The difficulty with training that concentrates primarily on law and discipline is that it fails to take into account the workaday circumstances of police officer activity: dealing with unpredictable events, most often when alone and without available supervision. Knowledge of law in such circumstances is important, but insufficient. More often than not it tells officers what they cannot do rather than what they can or should do. Military discipline is almost irrelevant under conditions in which a police officer confronts a situation alone, diagnoses it, selects one set of responses from a range of alternatives, and develops followup plans.

For routine circumstances, officers require basic knowledge about the kinds of events they encounter, skills that are applicable in such encounters, and values that inspire and constrain officers in their practice.[9] Moreover, the knowledge, skills, and values that are required to shape officer' discretion in the handling of events must be internalized into the professional self of each officer. This can come about only through prolonged socialization that emphasizes discretionary application of a range of skills to a variety of real-world circumstances. Yet, academy training is notoriously deficient in the provision of such training.

There are models from other disciplines for the acquisition of such knowledge, skills, and values: engineering, education, and others. They offer possibilities for police leaders for the future.

> ** 66 ... managers will have to be ever vigilant. 99**

Audit mechanisms

No matter how good the training, how instrumental management has been in shaping the culture, and how positive supervision has been, the circumstances of police work will continue to allow for corruption, malfeasance, and incompetence. Policing is not unique in this respect, but stakes are higher when lethal governmental power is involved. There are reasons to believe that skillful administration will reduce such problems. Even so, managers will have to be ever vigilant.

One form of vigilance is auditing. An analogy is found in a financial audit of a business. It is conceded that a financial audit cannot be universal; indeed, attempts to audit everything may result in auditing nothing. Audits, instead, sample a representative number of transactions (events) from the relevant universe. There is nothing to prevent police from adopting similar schemes. An example: undercover decoy squads are often valuable anticrime units. They can be problematic, however. It is not uncommon for enthusiasm to become zealotry. Auditing a given sample of arrests by interviewing witnesses, defendants, and other interested parties is one way of maintaining control of such units. Another example is found in departments that routinely send postcards to a sample of "customers" to determine how satisfied they were with police service. Other departments routinely monitor samples of citizen complaints to determine whether they are being properly handled.

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66 We are concerned about quality over quantity. 99

Three additional points should be made about audits. Typically, audits tend to become inspections of production quantity rather than quality. We are concerned about quality over quantity. It is well known that the number of arrests is a measure subject to enormous manipulation if not carefully monitored to ensure that the arrests are legitimate, properly conducted, appropriate, and fair. If arrests are to be a measure of individual or unit effectiveness, the only systematic means of ensuring their quality is through careful auditing of each step of the process that led to the arrest.

Second, audits are a form of after-the-fact accountability. They are no substitute for other mechanisms of administrative control, like leadership, education, and training, that attempt to ensure quality performance in advance rather than discover mistakes after they occur.

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Finally, audits can be administered in a variety of ways. They can be carried out by high-level inspectors as well as by sergeants who are responsible for units. In some circumstances, they can be carried out by specially charged task forces comprised of officers of varying ranks, including patrol.

Discipline

Discipline will always be an important mechanism to ensure officer accountability: every organization, no matter how well managed, will have a small number of officers who perform irresponsibly or incompetently. Because the stakes are so high in policing, strong messages must be given to officers at all levels that incompetent performance—brutality and corruption, for example—is intolerable. We believe that if supervision and audits are well performed and documented, discipline can be exercised in ways that are both fair and perceived as fair.

One caveat, however. Line officers are understandably sensitive about how discipline is exercised in many departments. In a world in which staying out of trouble is a primary measure of officer adequacy, it should be no wonder that discipline is seen as arbitrary and unjust. Too often discipline follows the commission of mistakes, rather than officer incompetence or irresponsibility. Mistakes, incompetence, and irresponsibility are different issues. Mistakes, which are bound to occur in all work, should routinely evoke coaching, consideration of options, training, and other such control options. Incompetence and irresponsibility should result in discipline. Managers cannot have it both ways. They cannot ask officers to be risk-takers and then discipline them when occasional mistakes occur. Those who take risks on behalf of an organization—if they use methods and have goals that are within the values of that organization—and then make mistakes, need support and assistance, not discipline.

Rewards

Rewards continue to be powerful motivators for workers. Rewards can take the form of increased pay, job perks, promotion, special assignments, recognition, and other forms. Police agencies have used every conceivable form. The questions that arise in policing about rewards are not whether they are used fairly and appropriately. Questions about the fairness and propriety of police reward systems are based on the concern that only a small range of police officer activities is reflected in current measures of police performance. A good many areas—dispute resolution, crime prevention, problem solving, and order maintenance, for example—are rarely reflected in the data collected about officer performance. Given the importance of these activ... in community policing, ways of evaluating the quality with which officers perform these functions and then linking these evaluative measures to rewards will have to be developed. A research project funded by the National Institute of Justice

now underway in Houston will attempt to develop performance measurement criteria consistent with the priorities of community policing.

66 Mistakes, incompetence, and irresponsibility are different issues. 99

Two innovative ways of recognizing and rewarding officers, methods compatible with other elements of community policing, would be peer review of performance and performance contracts. Peer review of performance is discussed below. Performance contracts, a method of supervision in which a supervisor or colleagues negotiate a set of performance goals over a distinct period of time, are now being experimented with in Madison, Wisconsin. There, in an experiment in community policing and organizational decentralization, officers and their supervisors are negotiating personal performance contracts for the purpose of evaluating the performance of patrol officers.

Peer control

Peer control is an important means of achieving accountability. Although heavy reliance on peer control has been traditional in the professions of medicine, law, and science, it has not always ensured the desired quality of performance. However, when combined with other mechanisms of control, it will continue to be an important means of maintaining the standards of professional performance for police.

Despite the potential of peer review, police administrators have been reluctant to use methods of control that exploit opportunities for collegial or peer review. There have been exceptions to this generalization: the Peer Review Project in Kansas City during the mid-1970's (which focused on excessive use of force) and stress and alcohol-abuse programs in other departments. Other exceptions that come to mind are the Home Beat Officer program in the London Metropolitan Police, the Senior Lead Officer program in the Los Angeles Police Department, and the current experiment in decentralization in Madison where officers have elected their own lieutenants. For the most part, however, collegial review of basic police practice has been extremely limited.

Conclusion

The concern of this paper is not the reduction of police accountability but rather its increase and strengthening. In a sense, there is a paradox. Those mechanisms that have seemed most certain to ensure control (command and control systems) have created the illusion of control, but often little more than that. Other mechanisms of control recognize and promote the use of discretion by police

officers. These mechanisms, such as auditing, rewards, and peer control, offer significant opportunities for increasing officer accountability.

From this brief discussion of managing police culture and accountability, it is clear that we do not believe that community policing threatens police accountability. Rather, the proper management of community policing adds additional opportunities for the maintenance of accountability in police organizations.

Notes

1. Mary Ann Wycoff, *The Role of Municipal Police: Research as Prelude to Changing It*, Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1982.

2. Herman Goldstein, *Policing a Free Society*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Ballinger, 1977.

3. See, for example, Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1985.

4. For a discussion of police culture see, for example. Peter K. Manning, *Police Work*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1979.

5. For an extended discussion of values in police departments, see "Values in Policing" by Robert Wasserman in this same series.

6. See, for example, *City of Canton, Ohio v. Geraldine Harris, Willie G. Harris, Bernadette Harris*, Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of Ohio in Support of Respondents in the Supreme Court of the United States. October term, 1987.

7. The authors thank Los Angeles Chief of Police Daryl Gates for helping us think through the relationship between values, policies, procedures, and rules, although he is in no way responsible for our conclusions.

8. For a discussion of recruit training and socialization, see John Van Maanen, "Observations on the making of policemen," *Human Organization* 32, 4 (Winter 1973): 407–418.

9. An extreme example of the role of values is found in police use of deadly force. As important as rules and procedures may be, no set of rules about its use will ever be able to take into account all of the exigencies that occur in real-world situations. As a consequence, even in life-threatening circumstances, use of deadly force will always be discretionary, guided, at best, by values expressed through departmental policies.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

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Corporate Strategies for Policing

By Mark H. Moore and Robert C. Trojanowicz

Police departments embody a substantial public investment. Each year, the nation spends more than $20 billion to keep police departments on the street and vigilant.[1] More important, each year society puts its freedoms in the hands of the police by empowering them to use force to compel obedience to the nation's laws. That, too, is an investment, for the grant of legitimate authority is a resource granted to police by the citizens. As the Philadelphia Study Task Force explained:

> The police are entrusted with important public resources. The most obvious is money; $230 million a year flows through the police department. Far more important, the public grants the police another resource—the use of force and authority. These are deployed when a citizen is arrested or handcuffed, when an officer fires his weapon at a citizen, or even when an officer claims exclusive use of the streets with his siren.[2]

These resources—money and authority—potentially have great value to society. If wisely deployed, they can substantially reduce the level of criminal victimization. They can restore a sense of security to the nation's neighborhoods. They can guarantee civility and tolerance in ordinary social interactions. They can provide a first-line response to various medical and social emergencies such as traffic accidents, drunkenness, domestic disputes, and runaway youths.

Stewardship over these resources is entrusted to the nation's police executives. They largely decide how best to use these assets. They make such decisions every time they beef up a narcotics unit, or establish priorities for the dispatching of calls, or write new policies governing the use of deadly force

or the proper use of high-speed auto chases. At such moments, the police executives redeploy the money and authority entrusted to them in hopes that their organizations will produce greater value for society.

Judging how best to use the assets and capabilities of a police department is the principal task of police executives. As Professor Kenneth Andrews of the Harvard Business School says:

> The highest function of the executive is ... leading the continuous process of determining the nature of the enterprise, and setting, revising, and achieving its goals.[3]

Performing this function well is no trivial task. It requires vision, judgment, and imagination, as well as disciplined analytical capabilities.

❝ ... to use the assets and capabilities of a police department ... requires vision, judgment, and imagination, as well as disciplined analytical capabilities. ❞

In the private sector, executives seek to perform this function through the development of a "corporate strategy." A "corporate strategy" defines the principal financial and social goals the organization will pursue, and the principal products, technologies, and production processes on which it will rely to achieve its goals. It also defines how the organization will relate to its employees and to its other constituencies such as shareholders, creditors, suppliers, and customers. In short, a corporate strategy seeks to define for the organization how the organization will pursue value and what sort of organization it will be.[4]

A corporate strategy is developed through an iterative process that examines how the organization's capabilities fit the current and future environment. The executive surveys the environment to see what customers want to buy, what competitors are likely to sell, and what investors are willing to stake money on. He analyzes what his own organization is able to do, what new technologies and products are becoming available, and what investments could be made to widen current capabilities. A strategy is defined when the executive discovers the best way to use his organization to meet the challenges or exploit the opportunities in the environment.

In the public sector, executives often consider the question of how best to use their assets much more narrowly. They tend to assume that basic purposes and operating objectives of the organization were set long ago and now remain fixed. Their job is to optimize performance with respect to these objectives, not to consider new challenges, threats or opportunities, nor to discover new capabilities within their own organizations. They also often assume that in conducting their organization's business, they are restricted to orthodox policies and programs. While public sector executives might field a few innovative programs to deal with special problems, the innovative programs are rarely seen as part of a sustained, staged effort to change the organization's basic strategy.

Recently, some police executives have begun considering different corporate strategies of policing. While these executives see enormous value in the knowledge and skill that have accumulated within police departments over the last 50 years, they are increasingly aware of the limitations of the past conceptions. They are reaching out for new ideas about how police departments should define their basic goals, deploy their assets, and garner support and legitimacy in the communities they now police.

The purpose of this paper is to facilitate the search for a corporate strategy of policing that can deal with the principal problems now besetting urban communities: crime, fear, drugs, and urban decay. The paper first explores the strengths and limitations of the corporate strategy that has guided policing for the last 50 years—a strategy that has been characterized (perhaps caricatured) as "professional crime fighting."[5] It then contrasts this concept with three other concepts that have been discussed, and to some degree developed, within Harvard's Executive Session on Policing. The other concepts are "strategic policing," "problem-solving policing," and "community policing."

❝ ... the corporate strategy that has guided policing for the last 50 years ... has been characterized (perhaps caricatured) as 'professional crime fighting.' ❞

The concept of corporate strategy

Defining a corporate strategy helps an organization, its employees, and its executives. An explicit corporate strategy tells outsiders who invest in the organization what the organization proposes to do and how it proposes to do it.

It explains to employees what counts as important contributions to the organization. It helps managers maintain a consistent focus in sifting the material that comes through their in-boxes. It directs their attention to the few activities, programs, and investments that are critical to the implementation of the proposed strategy.

For any organization, many possible strategies exist. Three criteria are useful for evaluating and choosing among them. The first is the value of the strategy if successfully implemented. The second test is feasibility—whether the strategy is internally consistent in terms of the products, programs, and administrative arrangements emphasized, and whether it is based upon solid information and proven technologies. Feasibility is related to distance from current operating practice; greater distance makes the proposed changes more costly and difficult. The final criterion involves the degree of risk associated with a given strategy. Those strategies that lie close to existing expectations and capabilities involve little risk for the manager to pursue. Those that stretch expectations and capabilities, that are founded on experiments and hunches, involve much greater risk and often depend on substantial investments for their success.

The development of a corporate strategy is a complex matter. Often, however, complex corporate strategies can be captured in relatively simple phrases or slogans. William Ruckelshaus defined the mission of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as "pollution abatement."[6] Michael Pertschuk declared that his goal for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was to make it "the largest public interest law firm in the U.S."[7] These apparently simple slogans embodied complex judgments that important changes in the operations of these organizations were both valuable and feasible. "Pollution abatement" focused EPA's efforts on finding sources of pollution and restricting them, not on monitoring levels of pollution or estimating damages. Challenging the FTC to become the "largest public interest law firm" not only raised professional standards in the organization, but also redefined the principal clients of the FTC to be consumers who needed protection from businesses rather than businesses that wanted protection from other businesses.

Simplicity in defining corporate strategies is a virtue for several reasons. First, a simple concept is easy to remember and repeat and therefore more likely to guide discretionary decisions throughout a large organization. Second, a simple concept helps to focus an organization's attention by what it explicitly emphasizes, or implicitly excludes, or the way in which it contrasts with previous strategic concepts. Third, a simple phrase has the virtue of openness. Its very lack of detail allows improvisation, innovation, and evolution in the operations of the organization. Because there is no detailed plan, only general guidance, employees with new ideas can

find sanction for their efforts. And because the corporate strategy sets out purposes in broad language, many outside the organization can find reasons to support the organization's efforts.

Labels and corporate strategies of policing

The simple phrases that came to stand for complex ideas about corporate strategies of policing within the discussions of Harvard's Executive Session on Policing included "professional crime fighting," "strategic policing," "problem-solving policing," and "community policing."[8] At the outset, the discussion treated these concepts as nothing more than labels to be attached to the same elements of a future strategy of policing.

Indeed, many participants thought that the elements emphasized by these new concepts had already been incorporated in contemporary versions of the professional crime-fighting model. Others saw little difference between the concepts of problem-solving policing and community policing. Since there was little substantive difference among these concepts, the only issue in choosing among them appeared to be a marketing question: how powerful were the labels in attracting support from the public, in dignifying the work of the police, and in mobilizing them to action?

> **❝ . . . a simple phrase has the virtue of openness. . . . [allowing] improvisation, innovation, and evolution . . .❞**

In later discussions the words seemed to acquire important substantive significance, reflecting real differences in judgments about such crucial matters as:

- The fundamental purposes of the police.

- The scope of their responsibilities.

- The range of contributions they could make to society.

- The distinctive competences they had to deploy.

- The most effective programmatic and technical means for achieving their purposes.

- The most suitable administrative arrangements for directing and controlling the activities of a police department.

- The proper or most useful way to manage the relationship between the police and the communities for whom they worked.

*** *... while ... crime control [remains] a central purpose of policing, ...:* *problem-solving policing and community policing accord greater significance to the order-maintenance and fear-reducing functions ... ***

For example, while all the concepts make crime control a central purpose of policing, the concepts of problem-solving policing and community policing accord greater significance to the order-maintenance and fear-reducing functions of the police than they hold in the concept of professional crime fighting.

Similarly, while professional crime fighting encourages the police to maintain their distance from the community to ensure the fair and impartial enforcement of the laws, community policing emphasizes a close embrace with the community to achieve more effective crime control and to ensure that the police respond to the issues that concern the community. Such differences seemed large enough for some participants to advocate adopting one concept and dismissing the others.

Still later, it seemed that the concepts were valuable because each highlighted a different challenge or defined a different frontier for police executives to explore in managing their departments for increased value and effectiveness in deploying the police against the principal problems of the cities. Many departments, for example, are still working at the frontiers defined by professional crime fighting, such as enhanced technical capacities to respond to serious street crimes, greater discipline and skill in the use of force and authority, and greater independence from inappropriate political influence.[9]

Other departments have already realized the value associated with the strategy of professional crime fighting and now face the new challenges defined by these other strategic concepts.[10] Strategic policing highlights the technical challenges of dealing with the most difficult sorts of crimes and offenders: for example, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, political corruption, and sophisticated white collar crimes.[11] Problem-solving policing emphasizes the value of being able to diagnose the continuing problems that lie behind the repeated incidents that are reported to police dispatchers and to design and implement solutions to those problems.[12] Community policing stresses the key role that a working partnership between the police and the community can play in solving crimes, reducing fear, and resolving situations that lead to crimes.[13] According to our Executive Session discussions, these are the challenges that define the frontiers of policing in the next generation.

It is possible that these challenges can all be met simultaneously by a new, integrated corporate strategy of policing. In that case, police executives would not have to choose among competing strategic conceptions. They could meet all the diverse challenges.

Alternatively, it might prove impossible to pursue all the different conceptions simultaneously. The challenges might be sufficiently diverse that, at least in the short run, managerial attention, the public's willingness to invest, and the officers' tolerance for experimentation are too limited to allow simultaneous advances on all fronts. In that case, police executives would have to decide which path to pursue first.

Or, it could be that the different strategies are somehow fundamentally incompatible—that the pursuit of one strategy makes it virtually impossible for the police agency to pursue another. This could occur if the different strategies require fundamentally different value orientations or cultures within the organization, too many different kinds of personnel and capabilities, or inconsistent administrative arrangements. In that case, police executives might have to make difficult choices among corporate strategies.

Whether executives must choose among these strategies, or whether some synthesis is possible, remains an important question. This paper seeks to help police executives answer that question. These different conceptions will be developed first as relatively complete, competing corporate strategies of policing. Then, in a concluding section, the paper will consider how, and to what degree, the apparently competing conceptions may be synthesized in an overall corporate strategy of policing.

Professional crime fighting

The corporate strategy that guided policing during the last half-century is captured by the phrase professional crime fighting. This strategy achieved a great deal for the police. It carried them from a world of amateurism, lawlessness,

and political vulnerability to a world of professionalism, integrity, and political independence.[14] The principal engines of this transformation include:

(1) a sharpened focus on crime control as the central mission of the police;

(2) a shift in organizational structure from decentralized, geographically defined units to a centralized structure with subordinate units defined by function rather than by geography; and

(3) substantial investments in modern technology and training of officers.

The aim of the professional crime-fighting strategy was to create a disciplined, technically sophisticated, quasi-military crime-fighting force. Crime control and crime solving became the dominant goals in policing. Those goals, as well as the common views about the best way to achieve them, are embedded in the current standards of accreditation and form the basic assumptions underlying both the majority of police training and the deployment of police resources throughout the country.

❝ . . . professional crime fighting . . . carried [police] from a world of amateurism, lawlessness, and political vulnerability to a world of professionalism, integrity, and political independence. ❞

The principal operating technologies of this strategy include (1) patrol forces equipped with cars and radios to create an impression of omnipresence and to respond rapidly to incidents of crime; and (2) investigative units trained in sophisticated methods of criminal investigation, such as automated fingerprint identification and the use of criminal histories.

In addition, this strategy emphasizes accountability to the law by seeking to eliminate police discretion through increased centralization, written policies and procedures, dense supervision, and separation of the police from the corrupting influence of local politicians.

This conception of professional crime-fighting policing embodies powerful values: crime control as an important objective, investment in police training, enhanced status and autonomy for the police, and the elimination of corruption and brutality. With the close connection to all these important values, it is no wonder that the concept of professional crime-fighting policing has been popular and endures as a

corporate strategy of policing. There is much that citizens and police can rally around and great value to be claimed in pursuing this ideal.

❝ Several decades of . . . experience with these basic crime-fighting tactics . . . revealed some unexpected weaknesses. ❞

Still, there are some obvious (and not so obvious) weaknesses of this strategy. The most significant is the limitations of professional policing in controlling crime.[15] Initially, it seemed that patrolling officers and skilled detectives would constitute an effective crime-fighting force. Several decades of operating experience with these basic crime-fighting tactics have revealed some unexpected weaknesses.

One is that the tactics are essentially reactive. They depend on someone noticing a crime and calling the police. That leaves many crimes—those "invisible others" that do not produce victims or witnesses who are willing to mobilize—beyond the reach of the police.[16] Such crimes include consensual crimes (such as drug dealing and bribery, in which the participants do not perceive themselves as victimized), extortionate crimes (such as organized criminal extortion, often rape, and child and spouse abuse, in which the victims are too afraid to come forward), dispersed crimes (such as embezzlement and fraud, in which victimization is diffused so broadly that people do not know that they have been victimized), and inchoate crimes (such as conspiracies, which do not have victims because the crimes have not yet occurred). Note that this list includes offenses which are committed by sophisticated, determined, and powerful criminal offenders. Thus, there is a gap in police capacities to deal with certain kinds of offenses and certain kinds of offenders.

A second problem with these tactics is that they fail to prevent crimes, except through the mechanisms of deterrence and incapacitation. In the professional strategy of policing, crime prevention is de-emphasized in favor of reacting after the fact. Little emphasis is given to mobilizing citizens to defend themselves. Indeed, the help of amateurs is discouraged as inconsistent with the image of a disciplined professional force that can deal with all the problems. Nor is any emphasis placed on analyzing and eliminating the proximate causes of crime. That is viewed as social work rather than crime fighting.

A less obvious weakness of this strategy lies in its discouragement of a close working relationship with the community. The concept of professional policing encourages distance between the police and the community in the interests of ensuring impartiality and avoiding corruption. That distance, useful as it is in pursuing these values, comes at a price. The police lose their intimate link to the communities. This hurts their crime-fighting capability because it cuts them off from valuable information about the people and conditions that are causing crimes.[17]

Another effect of maintaining professional distance from the community is that the police appear less accessible. Consequently the police become a less frequent recourse, even for fearful or crime-ridden communities. It is not that the police become unpopular; they remain extremely important to the community.[18] It is just that they seem less present, and therefore less able to meet the pressing needs and particular worries of citizens.

In some big cities, professional distance became particularly problematic, for just as police departments were seeking to insulate themselves from the communities and set higher professional standards, the cities began to change. In the 1960's, cities absorbed new migrant populations from the rural South, the Caribbean, Mexico, and Asia. Few police came from these immigrant populations and had little knowledge of these cultures. The result was that while the police thought of themselves as professionally distanced, the communities began to think of them as unresponsive and indifferent to their concerns. In extreme cases, communities saw the police as an alien, occupying army.[19] The political legitimacy of the police began to erode along with their operational value.

❝ . . . cities absorbed new migrant populations from the rural South, the Caribbean, Mexico, and Asia. Few police came from these immigrant populations. . . . while the police thought of themselves as professionally distanced, the communities [thought] them unresponsive and indifferent . . . ❞

Newer conceptions of policing have developed in response to these weaknesses in professional crime fighting, just as professional crime fighting arose in response to the weak-

nesses of the older political conception of policing. The new conceptions differ from one another in that they respond to different weaknesses and offer different ways to eliminate the weaknesses of professional crime fighting.

Strategic policing

The concept of strategic policing seeks to improve on professional crime-fighting policing by adding thoughtfulness and toughness to the basic mission of crime fighting and crime control.[20] In strategic policing the basic goal remains the effective control of crime. The administrative style remains centralized. And the police retain the initiative in defining and acting on the crime problems of the community. In fact their initiative is enhanced as enforcement capabilities are improved—capabilities that allow them not only to deal more effectively with ordinary street crime but also to confront sophisticated offenders who lie behind the invisible offenses described above.

❝ . . . strategic policing emphasizes an increased capacity to deal with crimes that are not well controlled by traditional methods. ❞

With respect to ordinary street crime, strategic policing seeks improvements through directed patrol,[21] decoy operations to catch street robbers, and sting operations to disrupt burglary and fencing operations. Strategic policing recognizes that the community can be an important instrument aiding the police. Hence, block watch associations are emphasized, citizens are urged to mark their property, and the police are available to offer advice on security to businesses and private homeowners.[22] Such programs embody a strategic rather than a reactive approach to street crime.

In addition, strategic policing emphasizes an increased capacity to deal with crimes that are not well controlled by traditional methods. Two kinds of crimes are particularly salient. First are crimes committed by sophisticated, individual offenders, such as career criminals or serial murderers, who operate beyond local boundaries. Second are offenses committed by criminal associations, organized crime families, drug distribution networks, gangs, sophisticated white-collar offenders engaged in computer and credit card frauds, and even corrupt politicians—the so-called superstructure of crime.[23]

To attack the first kind of crime, more sophisticated investigative capabilities are necessary. To attack the second,

the police have to employ more intrusive investigative procedures, such as informants, undercover operations, electronic surveillance, and sophisticated intelligence analysis. It is also important that the police gain some independence from their local political base. They need to widen their jurisdiction to attack the sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional criminal offender. They need to separate themselves from the influence of the local political community to be able to attack the superstructure of crime. Unless they can do this, they find themselves subject to its control, and thus occasionally hamstrung.

These points have important implications for the administrative arrangements and organizational alignments of police departments. For strategic policing in big-city departments, the need for sophisticated skills and wide jurisdictions necessitates the establishment of specialized, central investigative units. Such units are necessary to develop and sustain the appropriate skills, files, and equipment to carry out complex investigations. Centralized control of these units is also often considered essential to ensure an appropriate degree of supervision over the use of relatively controversial investigative methods.

Strategic policing in suburban and rural areas requires these smaller departments to band together in regional associations. Otherwise, they cannot afford the investments in the required specialized capabilities. Nor do they have a wide enough jurisdiction to deal with offenders operating across community boundaries.

To get out from under the influence of powerful criminal elements, local police departments in both metropolitan and suburban areas form alliances with and establish operational ties to Federal enforcement agencies and the judiciary, rather than with local politicians. Such alliances enhance investigative sophistication, effectively widen jurisdictions, and ensure that powerful allies are available when locally powerful offenders are the focus of investigation.

In sum, in strategic policing the police response to crime becomes broader, more proactive, and more sophisticated. The range of investigative and patrol methods is expanded to include intelligence operations, undercover stings, electronic surveillance, and sophisticated forensic methods. The range of targets is enlarged to include sophisticated offenders and inchoate crimes. The key new investments involve the creation of specialized investigative capabilities and improved criminal intelligence functions. Patrol operations are generally reduced as a share of police operations to make room for the specialized investigative units. The community is seen as an important auxiliary to the police in dealing with crime, but the police retain the initiative in defining and acting upon crime problems. The principal value claimed by strategic policing is improved

crime control. The old values of political independence, lawfulness, and technical sophistication are also protected—even promoted—as police departments form alliances with Federal law enforcement agencies rather than with local politicians. In an important sense, strategic policing represents the next step along the path marked out by professional crime fighting.

❝ *The principal value claimed by strategic policing is improved crime control. The old values of political independence, lawfulness, and technical sophistication are also protected . . .* ❞

Problem-solving policing

Like strategic policing, the concept of problem-solving policing seeks to improve upon the older, professional strategy of policing by adding proactiveness and thoughtfulness. It differs from strategic policing in the focus of the analytic effort.

In professional and strategic policing, the underlying assumption is that crime is successfully controlled by discovering offenses and prosecuting the offenders. Such efforts control crime directly by incapacitating offenders. They also prevent crime by increasing the probability of arrest and successful prosecution (i.e., through general and specific deterrence). Thus, they prescribe tactics that position the police to see offenses and respond to them.

Problem-solving policing takes a different view of crime and its effective control. In problem-solving policing, one does not naturally assume that crimes are caused by predatory offenders. True, in all crimes there will be an offender vulnerable to prosecution under the law. But problem-solving policing makes the assumption that crimes could be caused by particular, continuing problems in a community, such as frustrating relationships or a disorderly milieu.[24] It follows, then, that crimes might be controlled, or even prevented, by actions other than the arrest of particular individuals. For example, the police might be able to resolve a chronic dispute or restore order to a disorderly street. Arrest and prosecution remain crucially important tools of policing. But ideas about the causes of crime and methods for controlling it are substantially widened.

This basic change in perspective requires police departments to widen their repertoire of responses to crime far beyond patrol, investigation, and arrests. For example, the police can use negotiating and conflict-resolving skills to sort out disputes before they become crime problems.[25] Disputes (between parents and children, landlords and tenants, merchants and customers, and between neighbors) might be mediated without waiting for a fight to occur and without immediate recourse to the criminal law, arrests, and prosecutions. Moreover, the police, with a heightened awareness of such underlying problems, might take such corrective action the 2d time they are called to the scene rather than the 6th or 10th time, thus making substantial savings in the use of police resources.

The police can make use of the civil powers vested in their licensing authority and other municipal ordinances to enhance neighborhood security. Bars can be cautioned on excessive noise,[26] merchants urged to comply with traffic regulations, and children cautioned on curfew violations to reduce occasions in which fear and disputes arise.

Community residents may be mobilized to deal with specific problems. They can replace lights in hallways, clean up playgrounds so that parents and young children no longer feel excluded from the park by teenagers,[27] and accompany the elderly and the vulnerable on errands.

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6 6 Bars can be cautioned on excessive noise, merchants urged to comply with traffic regulations, and children cautioned on curfew violations to reduce occasions in which fear and disputes arise. 9 9

Finally, other government organizations may be mobilized to deal with situations leading to crimes. The Public Housing Authority can be asked to repair fences to prevent incursions by predatory offenders and to seal vacant apartments to eliminate shooting galleries for drug addicts and club houses for juvenile gangs. The Public Works Department can be encouraged to haul away abandoned cars and other debris.

This change in tactics has ramifications for the organizational structure of the police department. To the extent that problem solving depends on the initiative and skill of officers in defining problems and devising solutions, the administrative style of the organization must change. Since much more depends on individual initiative, the department must become more decentralized. Otherwise, the advantages of local knowledge and adaptiveness are lost. A further implication is that generalist patrol officers, knowledgeable about the communities they serve, become the new heroes of the organization (traditionally, the heroes have been the specialist investigators).

The focus of police action is widened in a different way from that of strategic policing. Strategic policing challenges the police to deal with sophisticated crimes and powerful offenders in addition to the street crimes such as robbery, rape, and burglary that are the main focus of professional crime fighting. Problem-solving policing challenges the police to deal with the disputes and conditions that make life feel disorderly and frightening to citizens and therefore breed crime and underlie later demands on the police department.

In sum, like strategic policing, problem-solving policing seeks enhanced crime control. The means, however, are quite different. They include diagnosing underlying problems which give rise to crime (rather than identifying offenders) and mobilizing the community and governmental agencies to act on the problems (rather than arresting and prosecuting offenders). Reliance on these means naturally encourages geographic decentralization and dependence on resourceful generalist patrol officers, rather than on the centralized functional specialist units. The problem-solving approach also draws the police into a different relationship with the communities—one in which the communities and other government agencies help the police work on underlying problems. Because many of those problems are not, strictly speaking, problems of crime and criminal victimization, a police department pursuing a strategy of problem solving will end up pursuing a broader set of objectives than the effective control of street crime. It will pursue order maintenance and fear reduction objectives as well as crime control.

Community policing

The third new concept, community policing, goes even further in its efforts to improve the crime control capacities of the police. To achieve that goal, it emphasizes the creation of an effective working partnership between the community and the police.

Many of the participants in the Executive Session see little difference between the strategy of problem-solving policing and community policing. They think of problem solving as a technique to be used in community policing rather than a different corporate strategy for policing. If there is a difference between the strategy of problem solving and the strategy of community policing, however, it lies in a different view of the status and role of the community institutions, and in the organizational arrangements constructed to enhance community involvement.

❝ . . . families, schools, neighborhood associations, and merchant groups, are . . . partners to the police in the creation of safe, secure communities. The success of the police depends . . . on the creation of competent communities. ❞

In community policing, community institutions such as families, schools, neighborhood associations, and merchant groups are seen as key partners to the police in the creation of safe, secure communities. The success of the police depends not only on the development of their own skills and capabilities, but also on the creation of competent communities. Community policing acknowledges that police cannot succeed in achieving their basic goals without both the operational assistance and political support of the community. Conversely, the community cannot succeed in constructing decent, open, and orderly communities without a professional and responsive police force.

To construct the working partnership and build competent communities, a police agency must view the community institutions as more than useful political allies and operational partners in the pursuit of police-defined objectives. They must see the development and protection of the institutions as partly an end as well as a means. Moreover, the police must recognize that they work for the community, as well as for the law and their professional development.

Partly to recognize the status of the community institutions and partly to develop the working partnership, police agencies pursuing the strategy of community policing must become more open to community definitions and priorities of problems to be solved. In problem-solving policing, the police retain much of the initiative in identifying problems and proposing solutions to the community. They are the experts. They know what crimes are being committed. They know what citizens have been calling to complain about. They know how police resources can be deployed to deal with the problem. In community policing, the community's views have a greater status. Their views about what constitutes a serious problem count. So do their views about what would be an appropriate police response. In short, the police seek a wider consultation and more information from the community.

Consistent with that philosophy, a police agency pursuing a strategy of community policing relies on many different organizational devices to open the department to the community. Police executives direct their officers to make face-to-face contact with citizens in their areas of responsibility.[28]

Where feasible, police executives establish foot patrols to enhance the citizens' sense of access to the department.[29] The executives restructure the organization in decentralized, geographic commands, symbolized by neighborhood police stations.[30] Community consultative groups are established and their views about police priorities are taken seriously. Community surveys, as well as crime statistics, are incorporated in evaluating the overall effectiveness of the police.

Opening police departments to community concerns inevitably changes their operational focus, at least to some degree. As in problem-solving policing, the focus widens beyond incidents of criminal victimization to include lesser disorders that stimulate fears and conditions that suggest a general deterioration of community standards; for it is these things that are often of greatest concern to citizens. The inevitable police involvement in social and medical emergencies is also viewed differently in community policing. While the police role in handling domestic disputes, runaway children, and traffic accidents is viewed as a dangerous distraction in professional crime fighting, these activities are viewed more positively in the strategy of community policing, since they provide a basis for developing the working relationship with the community. With community policing, a police executive might see value in deploying police resources for such activities as school-based drug education programs, programs to punish and educate drunk drivers, or a joint program with schools and the juvenile justice system to stop school violence and reduce truancy.[31]

❝ While the police role in handling domestic disputes, runaway children, and traffic accidents is viewed as a dangerous distraction in professional crime fighting, . . . in community policing, . . . they [develop] the working relationship with the community. ❞

The close relationship with the community also raises important questions about political interference that must be resolved with new understandings of police accountability.[32] From one perspective, creating close links with local communities increases the risk that the police will be unduly influenced by illegitimate political demands. The police might be used by powerful local interests to undermine the interests and rights of less powerful citizen groups.

From another perspective, however, the relationship enhances police accountability by making the police more responsive to community concerns as expressed in meetings, surveys, and face-to-face and telephone contacts. The issue here is whether the police are accountable to the law and its impartial enforcement, or to the community and its representatives who pass the laws.and consent to be policed in a particular way. .

This tension, between legal impartiality and political responsiveness as the basis of police legitimacy, can be theoretically resolved by saying that the police are strictly accountable to the law except where discretion exists. In those areas for discretion, the police may properly be guided by the desire to be responsive to legitimate expressions of neighborhood concerns. What this theoretical perspective leaves unacknowledged is that many of the most important questions facing police executives remain unanswered by the law. The criminal law simply distributes a set of liabilities through the society which the police are duty bound to act on if requested by a citizen. It does not tell police executives how they ought to deploy their resources in response to citizen complaints, nor what offenses they should emphasize as enforcement targets, nor the extent to which the police should feel responsible for preventing crime, reducing fears, or offering emergency services as well as enforcing the law.

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6 6 ... what the police must take from their legal foundation is the obligation to say no ... when the community asks them to do something ... unfair, discriminatory, or illegal ... 9 9

As a practical matter, what the police must take from their legal foundation is the obligation to say no to the community when the community asks them to do something that is unfair, discriminatory, or illegal. In the end, although it is valuable for the police to seek a close working relationship with the community by being responsive to community concerns, the police must also stand for the values of fairness, lawfulness, and the protection of constitutional rights. Indeed, they must defend those interests from the interests of the politically powerful. That crucial lesson is the hard-won legacy of the strategy of professional crime fighting.

Overall, under the community policing concept, the ends, means, administrative style, and relationship with the community all change. The ends expand beyond crime fighting to include fear reduction, order maintenance, and some kinds of emergency social and medical services. The means incorporate all of the wisdom developed in problem-solving approaches to situations that stimulate calls to the police. The administrative style shifts from centralized and specialized to decentralized and generalized. The role of the community is not merely to alert the police to crimes and other problems, but to help control crime and keep communities secure. While the department remains confident in its professional expertise and committed to the fair application of the law, it is more open to discussions with local communities about its priorities, its operating procedures, and its past performances.

Excellence in policing: a synthesis

The frontiers marked out for development by these different strategies of policing add up to a major challenge for police executives. If pursued simultaneously and aggressively, the different strategies would require significant changes in the mission, primary programs and technologies, and basic administrative arrangements of police departments. They would also require important changes in the relationship with the community. In some cases, the cumulative challenges merely stretch the organization to incorporate new capabilities. In other cases, however, the different challenges seem to twist the organization in opposite directions.

With respect to the mission of policing, the cumulative impact of these corporate strategies is to broaden more than to twist. The mission is no longer limited to the effective control of street crime. It also includes: (1) a strengthened attack on dangerous offenders, organized criminal groups, and white collar offenders; (2) a more determined effort to resolve the problems that underlie incidents reported to police dispatchers; and (3) a heightened concern for fear, disorder, and other problems that communities designate as high priority issues, or that the police choose to handle as the basis for forming a more effective partnership with the community. The mission might even widen to include police action on community problems such as drugs in schools, drunk driving, public drunkenness, unsupervised children, and other medical and social crises. While it is by no means easy for an executive to create an organization that can accommodate these diverse purposes, there does not seem to be any fundamental tension among these missions. Indeed, most police departments are already pursuing these diverse missions with reasonable degrees of success.

With respect to the principal programs and technologies, the cumulative impact of the challenges is once again primarily to stretch and widen, not to twist. To deal with the broader

mission, new functions and programs must be created. Strategic policing demands much more effective intelligence and investigative techniques than are commonly used in professional crime fighting. Problem-solving policing demands greater diagnostic skills and a far broader repertoire of responses to problems than arrest and prosecution. Community policing demands a more varied set of interactions with individuals and groups within the community, as well as the development of new capacities to deal with community-designated problems such as teenage drug use, violence in schools, or public drunkenness.

❝ Strategic policing demands much more effective intelligence and investigative techniques than are commonly used in professional crime fighting. ❞

With respect to the administrative organization of the police department, the combined set of challenges twists police organizations in opposite directions. Strategic policing requires (1) centralization (to ensure tight administrative control over sensitive intelligence and investigative functions); (2) the establishment of specialized functional units (to ensure the development and maintenance of expertise in key areas); and (3) independence from local communities (to ensure a platform from which to attack powerful local interests if they are committing crimes). Problem-solving and community policing, however, require (1) decentralization (to encourage officer initiative and the effective use of local knowledge); (2) geographically defined rather than functionally defined subordinate units (to encourage the development of local knowledge); and (3) close interactions with local communities (to facilitate responsiveness to and cooperation with the community).

Perhaps the greatest torque created by the cumulative weight of these challenges exists in the domain of community relations. It is a deep philosophical divide as well as an administrative issue. In strategic policing, the community is seen as a potential threat insofar as it conceals, even nourishes, the superstructure of crime. In community policing, the community is seen as a crucial aid in dealing with crime and fear. In strategic policing, the community is to be held at arm's length and worked on by the police department. In community policing, the community is to be embraced and worked with.

These contradictions may be more apparent than real: a product of the stylized way in which the alternative strategies are presented. But as police executives contemplate the demanding challenges envisioned in these strategies, two important conclusions emerge.

First, if police departments are to stake out the frontiers marked for exploration by these different corporate strategies, they will have to become more capacious, flexible, and innovative than they now commonly are. They will have to contain within the organization a wider and more complicated set of functional capabilities than now exists. For example, they will need:

- Sophisticated answering and call-screening capabilities to preserve time for activities other than responding to calls for service.

- Generalist patrol officers who are as comfortable outside their cars as in, and as capable of organizing meetings and mediating disputes as of making arrests.

- Analytical and intelligence capabilities that can discern both nagging community problems and activities of dangerous, sophisticated offenders.

- Sufficient flexibility in deployment and capability to deal with different sizes and kinds of problems.

Indeed, police departments might well have to shift from a relatively inflexible organizational structure based on stable, fixed chains of command to a structure based on projects and programs of different sizes and duration, led by people of many different ranks. That will cut deeply into traditional organizational structures and command relationships.

❝ It seems relatively simple, for example, to resolve the question of whether the police will seek to deal with street crime, sophisticated crimes, problems giving rise to incidents that trigger calls, or community-designated priorities. They have to deal with all of them. ❞

Second, if police organizations of the future are to respond to the various challenges posed by the different strategic concepts, police executives must face up to the apparent contradictions and be able to resolve them. In some cases, this will not be hard. It seems relatively simple, for example, to resolve the question of whether the police will seek to deal with street crime, sophisticated crimes, problems giving rise to incidents that trigger calls, or community-designated

priorities. They have to deal with all of them. None can safely be neglected. The only thing necessary to incorporate all of these within the mission of policing is to keep reminding the officers and others that the mission properly includes all these features. No single front represents "real police work."

It also seems relatively easy to resolve the question of whether the police are responsible for managing fear and disorder as well as serious criminal victimization. The answer is clearly yes; certainly no other government agency regards itself as specifically responsible for it. Without doubt, the police are responsible for these matters not only as an important approach to crime prevention, but also as important value-creating activities in their own right.

It is a bit more difficult to resolve the apparent tension between the further development of sophisticated investigative techniques to deal with complex offenses and powerful offenders on the one hand, and, on the other, the development of the diagnostic capabilities and working community partnerships that can solve nagging community problems. There seems to be a cultural stumbling block in confronting these challenges. The crucial difference seems to be that professional crime fighting and strategic policing focus on "serious crime," view the cause of such crimes as the bad motivations of offenders, and seek to deal with the problem by arresting and prosecuting offenders. Problem-solving policing and community policing, on the other hand, focus on anything that is named as a community problem and seek to handle the problem with any means available—not simply arrest and prosecution.

❝ The long-ignored reality, however, is that [detectives and patrol officers] have a great deal in common. ❞

Part of the reason that these distinctions strike a sensitive nerve in police departments is that the differences are enshrined in an organizational distinction between detectives and investigative units on the one hand, and patrol officers and community relations units on the other. The long-ignored reality, however, is that these apparently diverse functions have a great deal in common. Both depend on being able to see behind the surface manifestations of a problem. The attack on sophisticated crimes and dangerous offenders requires an ability to discern a common mecha-

nism behind apparently unrelated incidents. The attack on community problems similarly requires the officers to see behind sets of incident-driven calls, widespread community fears, or persistent crime problems, and to understand and deal with the deeper causes.

Both also require a great deal of imagination and initiative on the part of the officer in devising and executing a solution to the operational problems they encounter. In both countering sophisticated crimes and problem solving in the community, the investigative approaches must be invented and tailored to individual cases.

In short, the investigative-detective style of operating needs to be applied to a wider range of problems than investigators now handle. It is therefore important that the investigative style (without the narrow focus on crimes and offenders) seep into the rest of the organization. The manager has to be aware that the same imagination and resourcefulness, which is invoked in combatting high-tech crime, can also be profitably spent on more common and more nagging problems facing the community.

Perhaps the most difficult contradictions to resolve are those related to organizational structure and to the relationship between the department and the community. These are firmly linked because the structure of the organization has strong implications for whether and how community institutions can have access to the police. Centralized structures tend to make midlevel managers responsive to the administrative demands of headquarters, rather than to the interests of local communities. Decentralized structures do the opposite. A functional organization (in which the subordinate units are based on technical specialties) tends to be unresponsive to local demands; a geographic organization (in which technical specialties are lumped together in units that are coterminous with organized communities) is much more responsive to local concerns.

Initially, the tension between the centralized, functional structures suited to professional crime-fighting policing and strategic policing, and the decentralized, geographic structures suited to problem-solving and community policing seems irreconcilable. Professional crime-fighting policing needs the tight discipline and control that centralization seems to promise. Strategic policing requires the development of specialized skills that can be produced only by committing a portion of the force to the development of those skills, and by protecting it from ordinary demands. Problem-solving and community policing, on the other hand, need decentralization to encourage the initiative of the officers. They require geographically based units to encourage the creation of working partnerships. And they need generalists to ensure that diverse skills can be combined to produce solutions to community problems.

> **❝ ... one could create a narcotics squad to develop specialists who would be knowledgeable about drug problems ... But ... their principal assignment would be to equip and assist the generalist units as narcotics problems arose. ❞**

One possible resolution of this conflict is to create specialist units, but to keep them small, and use them as consultants to the generalist units rather than rely on them for all operations within their sphere of competence. For example, one could create a narcotics squad to develop specialists who would be knowledgeable about drug problems and the complex investigative techniques they require. But they would not be responsible for all narcotics operations. Their principal assignment would be to equip and assist the generalist units as narcotics problems arose. They might also function as program managers for narcotics enforcement throughout the department as a whole. The program would not be executed by the narcotics unit alone, but instead by many officers outside the unit's command.

An alternative would be to organize primarily around geographic commands, which would include officers qualified by training and experience in specialized functions. Assignments of officers would be created from projects and programs that varied in terms of scale and longevity. When a problem arises that requires the services of an officer skilled in, say, juvenile matters, officers would be drawn from the geographic commands to resolve the problem. When a citywide program in narcotics enforcement is needed, officers skilled in narcotics enforcement would be called on to work on the problem.

In short, instead of organizing by relatively large, durable commands, police departments would organize (and frequently reorganize) on the basis of specific problems and programs that are identified as being important. These would vary in terms of scale and longevity. This would require the police to shift from managing through specialized operational commands to managing through a combination of program managers and general geographical commands— a change that challenges traditional conceptions of responsible police management.

Even harder than creating flexible responses to specific problems is the issue of how to properly structure community relations. In professional crime fighting, the community is operationally important as an aid to solving crimes. Calls from individual citizens alert the police to crimes being committed. Victims and witnesses supply the evidence necessary to convict offenders. Thus, the community is a key operational component of professional crime fighting. But a key imperative of professional crime fighting is separation from community demands lest law enforcement integrity be compromised.

Strategic policing goes even further in seeking police independence as it tries to find a secure platform from which to launch attacks on powerful offenders. Problem-solving and community policing, on the other hand, seek a closer embrace with the community. In the interests of building effective working partnerships, both problem-solving policing and community policing reach out for a close relationship and respond to community concerns.

The resolution of this paradox is conceptually simple, but exceedingly difficult to implement and to explain to outsiders. The police must remain loyal to the values that they have pursued for so long in professional policing: a commitment to the fair and impartial enforcement of the law; a capacity to use force and authority economically and fairly; a determination to defend constitutional rights, particularly those of minorities; a kind of discipline that allows them to resist both the desires of powerful people to use them for their purposes and their own impulse to use the powers of their office for expressing their own angers, fears, and prejudices; etc. At the same time, they must recognize that while these values might be tested in seeking a close connection with the community, they need not be compromised.

> **❝ The police must remain loyal to the values that they have pursued for so long in professional policing ... At the same time, ... in seeking a close connection with the community, [these values] need not be compromised. ❞**

Indeed, to assume that the only way these values can be protected is by separating the police from the community is to give too little credit to the achievements that have been made in professionalizing the police. A true professional is one who can hold to his values (and exercise his skills) when they are tested in use. In practical terms, this means constant affirmation of these professional values throughout the

organization, especially as members of the force at all levels are urged to do more to respond to the public's concerns.

These conclusions suggest the shape of a future corporate strategy of policing. It might be called "professional, strategic, community, problem-solving policing." It is a challenging task for police executives to realize such a vision. They must overcome the powerful claims of tradition in articulating the mission and organizing their departments. They must override the desires and expectations of many of their employees who have different visions of policing. They must cope with powerful external pressures to produce the illusion of accountability through rigid, centralized management. And, most important, they must cope with their own uncertainties about the best way to use the assets of their organization to produce decent, civil, tolerant communities. It is up to today's police executives to find the solution.

Notes

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6. "William Ruckelshaus and the Environmental Protection Agency," John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program #C16–74–027, 1974.

7. "Mike Pertschuk and the Federal Trade Commission," John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program #C16–81–387.0, 1981: 5.

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11. This idea was most thoughtfully articulated in the Executive Session on Policing by Edwin Meese III, former Attorney General

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12. John E. Eck and William Spelman, "Solving Problems: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News," Washington, D.C., Police Executive Research Forum, January 1987; Herman Goldstein, "Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach," *Crime and Delinquency*, April 1979: 236–58.

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17. Wesley G. Skogan and George E. Antunes, "Information, Apprehension, and Deterrence: Exploring the Limits of Police Productivity," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 7, 1979: 217–42.

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The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

Policing and the Fear of Crime

By Mark H. Moore and Robert C. Trojanowicz

When crimes occur—when a ghetto teenager is shot to death in a gang war, when an elderly woman is mugged for her social security check, when a nurse is raped in a hospital parking lot, when one driver is punched by another in a dispute over a parking place, when a black family's new home is vandalized— society's attention is naturally focused on the victims and their material losses. Their wounds, bruises, lost property, and inconvenience can be seen, touched, and counted. These are the concrete signs of criminal victimization.

Behind the immediate, concrete losses of crime victims, however, is a different, more abstract crime problem—that of fear. For victims, fear is often the largest and most enduring legacy of their victimization. The raped nurse will feel vulnerable long after her cuts and bruises heal. The harassed black family suffers far more from the fear of neighborhood hostility than the inconvenience of repairing their property.

For the rest of us—the not-recently, or not-yet victimized—fear becomes a contagious agent spreading the injuriousness of criminal victimization. The gang member's death makes parents despair of their children's future. The mugging of the elderly woman teaches elderly residents to fear the streets and the teenagers who roam them. The fight over the parking place confirms the general fear of strangers. The harassment of the black family makes other minorities reluctant to claim their rights. In these ways, fear extends the damage of criminal victimization.

Of course, fear is not totally unproductive. It prompts caution among citizens and thereby reduces criminal opportunities. Too, it motivates citizens to shoulder some of the burdens of crime control by buying locks and dogs, thereby adding to general deterrence. And fear kindles enthusiasm for publicly supported crime control measures. Thus, reasonable fears, channeled in constructive directions, prepare society to deal with crime. It is only when fear is unreasonable, or generates

counterproductive responses, that it becomes a social problem.

This paper explores fear as a problem to be addressed by the police. It examines current levels and recent trends in the fear of crime; analyzes how fear is linked to criminal victimization; considers the extent to which fear is a distinct problem that invites separate control strategies; and assesses the positive and negative social consequences of fear. It then turns to what is known about the efficacy of police strategies for managing fear; i.e., for reducing fear when it is irrational and destructive, and for channeling fear along constructive paths when it is reasonable and helpful in controlling crime.

The fear of crime

Society does not yet systematically collect data on fear. Consequently, our map of fear—its levels, trends, and social location—is sketchy. Nonetheless, its main features are easily identified.

First, fear is widespread. The broadest impact was registered by "The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime" released in 1980. Two-fifths of Americans surveyed reported that they were "highly fearful" they would become victims of violent crime.[1] Similar results were reported by the Harris poll of 1975, which found that 55 percent of all adults said they felt "uneasy" walking their own streets.[2] The Gallup poll of 1977 found that about 45 percent of the population (61 percent of the women and 28 percent of the men) were afraid to walk alone at night.[3] An eight-city victimization survey published in 1977 found that 45 percent of all respondents limited their activities because of fear of crime.[4] A statewide study in Michigan reported that 66 percent of respondents avoided certain places because of fear of crime.[5] Interviews with a random sample of Texans in 1978 found that more than half said that they feared becoming a serious crime victim within a year.[6]

Second, fear of crime increased from the late 1960's to the mid-1970's, then began decreasing during the mid-1970's. According to the 1968 Gallup poll, 44 percent of the women and 16 percent of the men said that they were afraid to walk alone at night. In 1977, when a similar question was asked, 61 percent of the women and 28 percent of the men reported they were afraid to walk alone at night—an increase of 17 percent for women and 12 percent for men.[7] In 1975, a Harris poll found that 55 percent of all adults felt "uneasy" walking their own streets. In 1985, this number had fallen to 32 percent—a significant decline.[8]

Third, fear is not evenly distributed across the population. Predictably, those who feel themselves most vulnerable are also the most fearful. Looking at the distribution of fear across age and sex categories, the greatest levels of fear are reported by elderly women. The next most frightened group seems to be all other women. The least afraid are young men.

Looking at race, class, and residence variables, blacks are more afraid of crime than whites, the poor more afraid than the middle class or wealthy, and inner-city dwellers more afraid than suburbanites.[9]

Indeed, while the current national trend may show a decline in fear, anecdotal evidence suggests that this trend has not yet reached America's ghettos. There, fear has become a condition of life. Claude Brown describes Harlem's problem in 1985:

> ...In any Harlem building, ... every door has at least three locks on it. Nobody opens a door without first finding out who's there. In the early evening, ... you see people ... lingering outside nice apartment houses, peeking in the lobbies. They seem to be casing the joint. They are actually trying to figure out who is in the lobby of *their* building. "Is this someone waiting to mug me? Should I risk going in, or should I wait for someone else to come?"
>
> If you live in Harlem, USA, you don't park your automobile two blocks from your apartment house because that gives potential muggers an opportunity to get a fix on you. You'd better find a parking space within a block of your house, because if you have to walk two blocks you're not going to make it. ...
>
> In Harlem, elderly people walking their dogs in the morning cross the street when they see some young people coming. ... And what those elderly men and women have in the paper bags they're carrying is not just a pooper scooper—it's a gun. And if those youngsters cross the street, somebody's going to get hurt.[10]

These findings suggest that one of the most important privileges one acquires as one gains wealth and status in American society is the opportunity to leave the fear of crime behind. The unjust irony is that "criminals walk city streets, while fear virtually imprisons groups like women and the elderly in their homes."[11] James K. Stewart, Director of the National Institute of Justice, traces the important long-run consequence of this uneven distribution of fear for the economic development of our cities: if the inner-city populations are afraid of crime, then commerce and investment essentially disappear, and with them, the chance for upward social mobility.[12] If Hobbes is correct in asserting that the most fundamental purpose of civil government is to establish order and protect citizens from the fear of criminal attack that made life "nasty, brutish and short" in the "state of nature," then the current level and distribution of fear indicate an important governmental failure.[13]

The causes of fear

In the past, fear was viewed as primarily caused by criminal victimization. Hence, the principal strategy for controlling crime was reducing criminal victimization. More recently, we have learned that while fear of crime is associated with criminal victimization, the relationship is less close than originally assumed.[14]

The association between victimization and fear is seen most closely in the aggregate patterns across time and space. Those who live in areas with high crime rates are more afraid and take more preventive action than people living in areas where the risk of victimization is lower.[15] The trends in levels of fear seem to mirror (perhaps with a lag) trends in levels of crime.

Yet, the groups that are most fearful are not necessarily those with the highest victimization rates; indeed, the order is exactly reversed. Elderly women, who are most afraid, are the least frequently victimized. Young men, who are least afraid, are most often victimized.[16] Even more surprisingly, past victimization has only a small impact on levels of fear; people who have heard about others' victimizations are almost as fearful as those who have actually been victimized.[17] And when citizens are asked about the things that frighten them, there is little talk about "real crimes" such as robbery, rape, and murder. More often there is talk about other signs of physical decay and social disorganization such as "junk and trash in vacant lots, boarded-up buildings, stripped and abandoned cars, bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, street prostitution, panhandling, public drinking, verbal harassment of women, open gambling and drug use, and other incivilities."[18]

In accounting for levels of fear in communities, Wesley Skogan divides the contributing causes into five broad categories: (1) actual criminal victimization; (2) second-hand information about criminal victimization distributed through social networks; (3) physical deterioration and social disorder; (4) the characteristics of the built environment (i.e., the physical composition of the housing stock); and (5) group conflict.[19] He finds the strongest effects on fear arising from physical deterioration, social disorder, and group conflict.[20] The impact of the built environment is hard to detect once one has subtracted the effects of other variables influencing levels of fear. A review article by Charles Murray also found little evidence of a separate effect of the built environment on fear. The only exception to this general conclusion is evidence indicating that improved street lighting can sometimes produce significant fear reductions.[21]

The important implication of these research results is that fear might be attacked by strategies other than those that directly reduce criminal victimization. Fear might be reduced even without changes in levels of victimization by using the communications within social networks to provide accurate information about risks of criminal victimization and advice about constructive responses to the risk of crime; by eliminating the external signs of physical decay and social disorder; and by more effectively regulating group conflict between young and old, whites and minority groups, rich and poor. The more intriguing possibility, however, is that if fear could be rationalized and constructively channeled, not only would fear and its adverse consequences be ameliorated, but also real levels of victimization reduced. In this sense, the conventional understanding of this problem would be reversed: instead of controlling victimization to control fear, we would manage fear to reduce victimization. To understand this possibility, we must explore the consequences of fear—not only as ends in themselves, but also as means for helping society deal with crime.

The economic and societal consequences of fear: costs and benefits

Fear is a more or less rational response to crime. It produces social consequences through two different mechanisms. First, people are uncomfortable emotionally. Instead of luxuriating in the peace and safety of their homes, they feel vulnerable and isolated. Instead of enjoying the camaraderie of trips to school, grocery stores, and work, they feel anxious and afraid. Since these are less happy conditions than feeling secure, fear produces an immediate loss in personal well-being.

Second, fear motivates people to invest time and money in defensive measures to reduce their vulnerability. They stay indoors more than they would wish, avoid certain places, buy extra locks, and ask for special protection to make bank deposits. Since this time, effort, and money could presumably be spent on other things that make people happier, such expenditures must also be counted as personal costs which, in turn, become social costs as they are aggregated.

These are far from trivial issues. The fact that two-fifths of the population is afraid and that the Nation continues to nominate crime as one of its greatest concerns means that society is living less securely and happily than is desirable. And if 45 percent of the population restricts its daily behavior to minimize vulnerability, and the Nation spends more than $20 billion on private security protection, then private expenditures on reducing fear constitute a significant component of the national economy.[22] All this is in addition to the $40 billion that society spends publicly on crime control efforts.[23] In short, fear of crime claims a noticeable share of the Nation's welfare and resources.

Fear has a further effect. Individual responses to fear aggregate in a way that erodes the overall quality of community life and, paradoxically, the overall capacity of society to deal with crime.[24] This occurs when the defensive reactions of individuals essentially compromise community life, or when they exacerbate the disparities between rich and poor by relying too much on private rather than public security.

Skogan has described in detail the mechanisms that erode community life:

> Fear . . . can work in conjunction with other factors to stimulate more rapid neighborhood decline. Together, the spread of fear and other local problems provide a form of positive feedback that can further increase levels of crime. These feedback processes include (1) physical and psychological withdrawal from community life; (2) a weakening of the informal social control processes that inhibit crime and disorder; (3) a decline in the organizational life and mobilization capacity of

the neighborhood; (4) deteriorating business conditions; (5) the importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance; and (6) further dramatic changes in the composition of the population. At the end lies a stage characterized by demographic collapse.[25]

Even if fear does not destroy neighborhood life, it can damage it by prompting responses which protect some citizens at the expense of others, thereby leading to greater social disparities between rich and poor, resourceful and dependent, well-organized and anomic communities. For example, when individuals retreat behind closed doors and shuttered windows, they make their own homes safer. But they make the streets more dangerous, for there are fewer people watching and intervening on the streets. Or, when individuals invest in burglar alarms or private security guards rather than spending more on public police forces, they may make themselves safer, but leave others worse off because crime is deflected onto others.

Similarly, neighborhood patrols can make residents feel safe. But they may threaten and injure other law-abiding citizens who want to use the public thoroughfares. Private security guards sometimes bring guns and violence to situations that would otherwise be more peaceably settled. Private efforts may transform our cities from communities now linked to one another through transportation, commerce, and recreation, to collections of isolated armed camps, shocking not only for their apparent indifference to one another, but also ultimately for their failure to control crime and reduce fear. In fact, such constant reminders of potential threats may actually increase fear.

Whether fear produces these results or not depends a great deal on how citizens respond to their fears. If they adopt defensive, individualistic solutions, then the risks of neighborhood collapse and injustice are increased. If they adopt constructive, community-based responses, then the community will be strengthened not only in terms of its ability to defend itself, but also as an image of civilized society. Societies built on communal crime control efforts have more order, justice, and freedom than those based on individualistic responses. Indeed, it is for these reasons that social control and the administration of justice became public rather than private functions.

Police strategies for reducing fear

If it is true that fear is a problem in its own right, then it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of police strategies not only in terms of their capacity to control crime, but also in terms of their capacity to reduce fear. And if fear is affected by more factors than just criminal victimization, then there might be some special police strategies other than controlling victimization that could be effective in controlling the fear of crime.

Over the last 30 years, the dominant police strategy has emphasized three operational components: motorized patrol,

rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigation of crimes.[26] The principal aim has been to solve crimes and capture criminals rather than reduce fear. The assumption has been that if victimization could be reduced, fear would decrease as well. Insofar as fear was considered a separate problem, police strategists assumed that motorized patrol and rapid response would provide a reassuring police omnipresence.[27]

To the extent that the police thought about managing citizens' individual responses to crime, they visualized a relationship in which citizens detected crime and mobilized the police to deal with it—not one in which the citizens played an important crime control role. The police advised shopkeepers and citizens about self-defense. They created 911 telephone systems to insure that citizens could reach them easily. And they encouraged citizens to mark their property to aid the police in recovering stolen property. But their primary objective was to make themselves society's principal response to crime. Everything else was seen as auxiliary.

As near monopolists in supplying enhanced security and crime control, police managers and union leaders were ambivalent about the issue of fear. On the one hand, as those responsible for security, they felt some obligation to enhance security and reduce fear. That was by far the predominant view. On the other hand, if citizens were afraid of crime and the police were the solution, the police department would benefit in the fight for scarce municipal funds. This fact has tempted some police executives and some unions to emphasize the risks of crime.[28]

The strategy that emphasized motorized patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation of crimes was not designed to reduce fear other than by a reduction in crime. Indeed, insofar as the principal objective of this strategy was to reduce crime, and insofar as citizens were viewed as operational auxiliaries of the police, the police could increase citizens' vigilance by warning of the risks of crime. Nevertheless, to the extent that reduced fear was considered an important objective, it was assumed that the presence and availability of police through motorized patrols and response to calls would achieve that objective.

The anticipated effects of this strategy on levels of fear have not materialized. There have been some occasions, of course, when effective police action against a serial murderer or rapist has reassured a terrorized community. Under ordinary circumstances, however, success of the police in calming fears has been hard to show. The Kansas City experiment showed that citizens were unaware of the level of patrol that occurred in their area. Consequently, they were neither reassured by increased patrolling nor frightened by reduced levels of patrol.[29] Subsequent work on response times revealed that fast responses did not necessarily reassure victims. Before victims even called the police, they often sought assistance and comfort from friends or relatives. Once they called, their satisfaction was related more to their expectations of when the police would arrive than to actual response time. Response time alone was not a significant

factor in citizen satisfaction.[30] Thus, the dominant strategy of policing has not performed particularly well in reducing or channeling citizens' fears.

In contrast to the Kansas City study of *motorized* patrol, two field experiments have now shown that citizens are aware of increases or decreases in levels of *foot* patrol, and that increased foot patrol reduces citizens' fears. After reviewing surveys of citizens' assessments of crime problems in neighborhoods that had enhanced, constant, or reduced levels of foot patrol, the authors of *The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment* concluded:

> ... persons living in areas where foot patrol was created perceived a notable decrease in the severity of crime-related problems.[31]

And:

> Consistently, residents in beats where foot patrol was added see the severity of crime problems diminishing in their neighborhoods at levels greater than the other two [kinds of] areas.[32]

Similarly, a foot patrol experiment in Flint, Michigan, found the following:

> Almost 70 percent of the citizens interviewed during the final year of the study felt safer because of the Foot Patrol Program. Moreover, many qualified their response by saying that they felt especially safe when the foot patrol officer was well known and highly visible.[33]

Whether foot patrol can work in less dense cities, and whether it is worth the cost, remain arguable questions. But the experimental evidence clearly supports the hypothesis that fear is reduced among citizens exposed to foot patrol.

Even more significantly, complex experiments in Newark and Houston with a varied mix of fear reduction programs showed that at least some programs could successfully reduce citizens' fears. In Houston, the principal program elements included:

(1) a police community newsletter designed to give accurate crime information to citizens;

(2) a community organizing response team designed to build a community organization in an area where none had existed;

(3) a citizen contact program that kept the same officer patrolling in a particular area of the city and directed him to make individual contacts with citizens in the area;

(4) a program directing officers to re-contact victims of crime in the days following their victimization to reassure them of the police presence; and

(5) establishing a police community contact center staffed by two patrol officers, a civilian coordinator, and three police aids, within which a school program aimed at reducing truancy and a park program designed to reduce vandalism and increase use of a local park were discussed, designed, and operated.[34]

In Newark, some program elements were similar, but some were unique. Newark's programs included the following:

(1) a police community newsletter;

(2) a coordinated community policing program that included a directed police citizen contact program, a neighborhood community police center, neighborhood cleanup activities, and intensified law enforcement and order maintenance;

(3) a program to reduce the signs of crime that included: a) a directed patrol task force committed to foot patrol, radar checks on busy roads, bus checks to enforce city ordinances on buses, and enforcement of disorderly conduct laws; and b) a neighborhood cleanup effort that used police auspices to pressure city service agencies to clean up neighborhoods, and to establish a community work program for juveniles that made their labor available for cleanup details.[35]

Evaluations of these different program elements revealed that programs "designed to increase the quantity and improve the quality of contacts between citizens and police" were generally successful in reducing citizens' fears.[36] This meant that the Houston Citizen Contact Patrol, the Houston Community Organizing Response Team, the Houston Police Community Station, and the Newark Coordinated Community Policing Program were all successful in reducing fear.

Other approaches which encouraged close contact, such as newsletters, the victim re-contact program, and the signs-of-crime program, did not produce clear evidence of fear reduction in these experiments. The reasons that these programs did not work, however, may have been specific to the particular situations rather than inherent in the programs themselves. The victim re-contact program ran into severe operating problems in transmitting information about victimization from the reporting officers to the beat patrol officers responsible for the re-contacts. As a result, the contacts came far too long after the victimization. Newsletters might be valuable if they were published and distributed in the context of ongoing conversations with the community about crime problems. And efforts to eliminate the signs of crime through order maintenance and neighborhood cleanup might succeed if the programs were aimed at problems identified by the community. So, the initial failures of these particular program elements need not condemn them forever.

The one clear implication of both the foot patrol and fear reduction experiments is that closer contact between citizens and police officers reduces fear. As James Q. Wilson concludes in his foreword to the summary report of the fear reduction experiment:

> In Houston, ... opening a neighborhood police station, contacting the citizens about their problems, and stimulating the formation of neighborhood organizations where none had existed can help reduce the fear of crime and even reduce the actual level of victimization.[37]

In Newark, many of the same steps—including opening a storefront police office and directing the police to make con-

tacts with the citizens in their homes—also had beneficial effects.

The success of these police tactics in reducing fear, along with the observation that fear is a separate and important problem, suggests a new area in which police can make a substantial contribution to the quality of life in the Nation's cities. However, it seems likely that programs like those tried in Flint, Newark, and Houston will not be tried elsewhere unless mayors and police administrators begin to take fear seriously as a separate problem. Such programs are expensive and take patrol resources and managerial attention away from the traditional functions of patrol and retrospective investigation of crimes. Unless their effects are valued, they will disappear as expensive luxuries.

On the other hand, mayors and police executives could view fear as a problem in its own right and as something that inhibits rather than aids effective crime control by forcing people off the streets and narrowing their sense of control and responsibility. If that were the case, not only would these special tactics become important, but the overall strategy of the department might change. That idea has led to wider and more sustained attacks on fear in Baltimore County and Newport News.

In Baltimore County, a substantial portion of the police department was committed to the Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit—a program designed to improve the quantity and quality of contacts between citizens and the police and to work on problems of concern to citizens.[38] A major objective was to reduce fear. The effort succeeded. Measured levels of fear dropped an average of 10 percent for the various projects during a 6 month period.[39] In Newport News, the entire department shifted to a style of policing that emphasized problem–solving over traditional reactive methods.[40] This approach, like COPE, took citizens' fears and concerns seriously, as well as serious crime and calls for service.

These examples illustrate the security-enhancing potential of problem–solving and community approaches to policing. By incorporating fear reduction as an important objective of policing, by changing the activities of the police to include more frequent, more sustained contacts with citizens, and by consultation and joint planning, police departments seem to be able not only to reduce fear, but to transform it into something that helps to build strong social institutions. That is the promise of these approaches.

Conclusion

Fear of crime is an important problem in its own right. Although levels of fear are related to levels of criminal victimization, fear is influenced by other factors, such as a general sense of vulnerability, signs of physical and social decay, and inter-group conflict. Consequently, there is both a reason for fear and an opportunity to work directly on that fear, rather than indirectly through attempts to reduce criminal victimization.

The current police strategy, which relies on motorized patrol, rapid responses to calls for service, and retrospective investigations of crime, seems to produce little reassurance to frightened citizens, except in unusual circumstances when the police arrest a violent offender in the middle of a crime spree. Moreover, a focus on controlling crime rather than, increasing security (analogous to the medical profession's focus on curing disease rather than promoting health) leads the police to miss opportunities to take steps that would reduce fear independently of reducing crime. Consequently, the current strategy of policing does not result in reduced fear. Nor does it leave much room for fear reduction programs in the police department.

This is unfortunate, because some fear reduction programs have succeeded in reducing citizens' fears. Two field experiments showed that foot patrol can reduce fear and promote security. Programs which enhance the quantity and quality of police contacts with citizens through neighborhood police stations and through required regular contacts between citizens and police have been successful in reducing fear in Houston and Newark.

The success of these particular programs points to the potential of a more general change in the strategy of policing that (1) would make fear reduction an important objective · and (2) would concentrate on improving the quantity and quality of contacts between citizens and police at all levels of the department. The success of these approaches has been demonstrated in Baltimore County and Newport News.

Based on this discussion, it is apparent that a shift in strategy would probably be successful in reducing fear, and that that would be an important accomplishment. What is more speculative (but quite plausible) is that community policing would also be successful in channeling the remaining fear along constructive rather than destructive paths. Criminal victimization would be reduced, and the overall quality of community life enhanced beyond the mere reduction in fear.

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The Police and Drugs

By Mark H. Moore and Mark A.R. Kleiman

Many urban communities are now besieged by illegal drugs. Fears of gang violence and muggings keep frightened residents at home. Even at home. citizens feel insecure, for drug-related break-ins and burglaries threaten. Open dealing on the street stirs the community's fears for its children.

The police sometimes seem overwhelmed. Occasionally they are outgunned. More often, they are simply overmatched by the resilience of the drug commerce. Furthermore, their potential impact is neutralized by the incapacity of the courts and penal system to mete out deserved punishments.

Urgent problems and limited resources demand managerial thought for their resolution. Thus, police executives facing the drug problem might usefully consider four strategic questions:

- What goals might reasonably be set for drug enforcement?

- What parts of the police department engage the drug problem and to what effect?

- What role can citizens and community groups usefully (and properly) play in coping with the problem?

- What basic strategies might the police department consider as alternative attacks on the problem?

The goals of drug enforcement

From a police chief's perspective, the drug problem presents distinguishable threats to community security. Most pressing is the violence associated with street-level drug dealing—

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars. and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

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particularly crack cocaine.[1] Much of this violence involves youth gangs.[2] Often the violence spills over into the general population, leaving innocent victims in its wake. There is also the worry that the practice in armed, organized violence is spawning the next generation of organized crime.[3]

Also salient is the close link between drug use and street crime.[4] Criminal activity is known to vary directly with levels of heroin consumption.[5] Many of those arrested for robberies and burglaries use cocaine during the commission of their crimes or steal to support drug habits.[6] Among the small group of the most active and dangerous offenders, drug users are overrepresented.[7] Thus, controlling drug use (and *drug users*) opens an avenue for reducing the robberies, burglaries, and petty thefts that have long been the focus of the police.

A third problem is that drug use undermines the health, economic well-being, and social responsibility of drug users. It is hard to stay in school, hold onto a job, or care for a child when one is spending all one's money and attention on getting stoned.[8] The families and friends of drug users are also undermined as their resources are strained by obligations to care for the drug user or to assume responsibilities that the drug user has abandoned.

Fourth, drug trafficking threatens the civility of city life and undermines parenting. While parents can set rules for conduct in their own homes, the rules are hard to extend to city streets and urban classrooms where drug trafficking has become a way of life. Although these threats affect all city neighborhoods, they are perhaps worst for those in the most deprived areas. There, the capacity of the community for self-defense and the ability of parents to guide their children are not only the weakest, but also the most in need of public support and assistance.[9]

> 66 ... *drug trafficking threatens the civility of city life and undermines parenting.* 99

Fifth, the police executive knows, even before he commits his troops, that the police can accomplish little by themselves. Drug arrests and prosecutions are exceedingly difficult, owing to the absence of complaining victims and witnesses.[10] Even with these limitations, the police can make many more arrests than prosecutors can prosecute, courts can adjudicate, and prisons can hold.[11] Furthermore, drug distribution systems, held together by the prospect of drug profits, will adapt quickly rather than collapse in the face of police action.

Finally, the police executive knows from bitter experience that in committing his force to attack drug trafficking and drug use, he risks corruption and abuses of authority.[12] Informants and undercover operations—so essential to effective drug enforcement—inevitably draw police officers into close, potentially corrupting relationships with the offenders they are pledged to control. The frustrations of the task lead some officers to cynicism or desperate anger. As the police become more cynical or more angry, the dealers will be standing there with cash in their pockets, ready to make a deal. Or they will mock the police with apparent invulnerability and provoke indignant officers to plant evidence or pursue justice through other illegal means.

> 66 *As the police become more cynical or more angry, the dealers will be standing there ... ready to make a deal.* 99

These threats define the goals of police action against drug trafficking and use. The goals are:

(1) reduce the gang violence associated with drug trafficking and prevent the emergence of powerful organized criminal groups;

(2) control the street crimes committed by drug users;

(3) improve the health and economic and social well-being of drug users;

(4) restore the quality of life in urban communities by ending street-level drug dealing;

(5) help to prevent children from experimenting with drugs; and

(6) protect the integrity of criminal justice institutions.

The operational question, of course, is how best to accomplish these goals. Or put somewhat differently, the question is how best to deploy police resources to produce the maximum contribution to the achievement of these goals.

Police organization and deployment

The narcotics bureau is generally considered the center of the police response to drug trafficking and use. That operational unit aims directly at the source of the problem and mounts the most sophisticated investigations against drug traffickers. It also accumulates the greatest substantive knowledge about drugs in general and in the local community.

Although the narcotics bureau is at the center of the attack, police strategists must recognize that other operating elements of the police department also confront drug trafficking and use. For example, many police departments have established specialized units to attack organized crime or criminal gangs. These units deal with narcotics trafficking because (1) the organized crime groups or gangs that are their central targets are involved in drug dealing; or (2) they have access to informants who can usefully guide narcotics investigations; or (3) they have specialized equipment that can be used in sophisticated drug investigations.

Regular patrol and investigative units also inevitably attack drug trafficking, use, and related violence. Insofar as their efforts are focused generally on street crime, and insofar as drug users commit a large portion of these crimes, patrol units and detectives wind up arresting a great many drug users. Regular patrol and investigative units also end up arresting some drug users for narcotics offenses such as illegal possession and use of drugs.[13] In most cases, the person arrested will not be on probation or parole and must be tried to be punished. In other cases, however, the drug offenses will constitute probation or parole violations that could result in immediate incarceration if the local court system took such offenses seriously.

> ❝ . . . as drug users commit a large portion of these crimes, patrol units and detectives [arrest] many drug users.❞

The patrol bureau will also be engaged in the fight against drugs as a result of calls from citizens complaining about drug dealing in specific locations. Often, in response to citizen complaints or at the initiative of the chief, special drug task forces will be formed to deal with a particularly threatening or flagrant drug market.[14] These operations draw on patrol forces as well as detective units. Typically, they last for a while and then go out of existence.

Somewhat more specialized are those units committed to drug education. Although drug education seems like a significant departure from the usual objectives and methods of policing, increasingly police departments are establishing such programs to fill a perceived void in this important demand-reducing function.[15]

The point of reviewing these different lines of attack is not only to remind enforcement strategists that a police department's overall strategy against drugs includes far more than the activities of the narcotics bureau, but also to raise an important managerial question: who in the police department will be responsible for designing, executing, and evaluating the department-wide drug control strategy? In some cases, the department will make the head of the narcotics bureau responsible for the broad strategy as well as the narrower operational tasks of the narcotics bureau itself. That has the advantage of aligning responsibility for the strategy with substantive expertise. It has the potential disadvantage of focusing too much of the organization's actions against drugs in the narcotics bureau itself, and of limiting the department's imagination about how it can and should engage the problem.

In other cases, a special staff officer might be assigned the responsibility of coordinating department-wide efforts without necessarily being given any line responsibility over the activities. This has the advantage of drawing more widely on the department's operational capabilities. It has the disadvantages of failing to establish clear operational responsibility and of requiring the collection of additional information throughout the department.

In still other cases, the chief might assume that responsibility himself. That has the advantages of elevating concern for the problem throughout the organization, of giving the department a powerful representative in dealing with other city departments and community groups, and of aligning operational responsibility with authority. It has the disadvantages of focusing the attention of the chief on only one aspect of the organization's fight against crime and disorder and of moving command further from operations.

The community's resources

Police strategists must also consider that the assets available to attack the drug problem are not limited to the money and legal powers channelled through the police department. The community itself has resources to deploy against drug trafficking and use. Indeed, without the community's own efforts at self-defense, it is hard to see how the police can possibly succeed.

> ❝ . . . assets . . . to attack the drug problem are not limited to the money and legal powers [of] the police . . . The community itself has resources . . .❞

The importance of community self-defense is evident in a review of the spatial distribution of drug dealing across a city. In some areas, drug dealers cannot gain a foothold.

There are too few users to make dealing profitable and too many vigilant people ready to expose and resist the enterprise. Other parts of a city seem to have yielded to the drug trade. Drug users are plentiful. Drug dealers are an influential social and economic force. Local residents and merchants have lost heart.

> **" . . . little policing sometimes produces safe communities while heavy policing sometimes fails to do so . . . "**

Often, these conditions bear no relationship to the distribution of police resources. The areas that are safe rarely hear a police siren. Those that have yielded to the drug trade are criss-crossed by racing patrol cars with sirens blaring. The reason that little policing sometimes produces safe communities while heavy policing sometimes fails to do so is simply that success in confronting drug trafficking depends as much (or perhaps more) on the community's self-defense than on official police effort. Where community will and capacity for self-defense are strong, a little official policing goes a long way to keep the neighborhood free of drugs. Where it is weak, even heavy doses of official policing will not get the job done.

Exactly what communities do to defend themselves varies greatly according to their character and resources.[16] Most communities start trying to control the drug problem by calling the police to complain about drug dealing. Such calls, if they come through the regular 911 dispatch system rather than a dedicated hotline. are very difficult for the police, as currently organized. to handle. They cannot be handled like robberies and burglaries, for those directly involved in the offense (and therefore able to give useful testimony) are reluctant to do so. Moreover, by the time the police arrive, the activity has ceased or moved to a new location. Because a response to these calls rarely produces a successful case, the calls tend to get shifted back and forth between the patrol division and the narcotics unit.

When citizens cannot command police attention through telephone calls, they do what they can to defend themselves individually. They stay in their houses, buy locks and shutters, and fret about their children. This, of course, makes their neighborhoods more vulnerable to the drug users and dealers.

Sometimes citizens take more aggressive action against drug dealers. They harass drug users and sellers at some risk to themselves. They demonstrate against drug dealing in their neighborhoods to rally others to their cause. They invite groups such as the Guardian Angels or the Nation of Islam to help them regain the upper hand against the dealers.[17] On some occasions, they burn down crack houses.[18]

From the perspective of effectively controlling drug trafficking and use, the police must be enthusiastic about direct citizen action against drug dealing. Such efforts extend the reach of social control over more terrain and longer periods of time than the police could sustain by themselves.

On the other hand, direct citizen action poses new problems for the police. Citizens who directly confront drug dealers and users might be attacked and injured. If this occurs, the failure of the police to protect the community becomes manifest. Fearful of this result and solicitous of the welfare of citizens, the police often advise citizens not to take direct action against dealers and, instead, to leave enforcement to the police.

Another risk is that sharp conflict between drug dealers and citizens escalates into large-scale violence. Part of this risk is that the rights of citizens who are suspected by the community of being drug dealers and users will be abused; that is, they will be beaten, their property taken, their freedom of movement and expression limited. Although such threats are rarely taken as seriously as the physical threats to citizen activists, there comes a point when direct citizen action becomes vigilantism, and when the police, as officers of the law and defenders of the Constitution, must defend the rights of suspected drug dealers against mob hostility.

Finally, the police have an interest in maintaining their position as independent experts in controlling crime problems and as the principal suppliers of security services to the communities they police. To a degree, this can be understood as nothing more than an expression of professional pride and bureaucratic self-interest. But, insofar as the community prefers the restraint, expertise, and professionalism of policing to the risks of direct citizen action, the desire of the police to retain most of the responsibility and initiative for crime control is consistent with the public interest as well as their parochial interests.

> **" . . . the police must find a way of accommodating, regulating, and using citizen indignation . . . "**

While such concerns about the consequences of community action against drugs are entirely appropriate, they cannot lead to the simple conclusion that the police should suppress all such action. They particularly cannot justify this conclusion in a situation where the police have nothing else to provide to the communities that feel outraged and frightened. Instead, the police must find a way of accommodating, regulating, and using citizen indignation to help them manage the drug problem.

A crucial first step in managing the potential partnership with the community is to learn how to diagnose the community's capacity for self-defense. This diagnosis begins with a community's own attitudes and practices regarding drug use.

Although it is discouraging, an enforcement strategist must recognize that parts of communities are interested in continuing and facilitating drug use.[19] They include at least the users and the dealers. They may also include people who make accommodations with drug dealing, such as those who run shooting galleries, landlords who milk the economic value of deteriorating properties by renting to drug users who are indifferent to their living arrangements, and local merchants or police who earn money from drug dealers to provide safe havens for drug dealing.

Others in the community do not profit from drug dealing, but nonetheless have stopped fighting it. This group includes ordinary people who no longer use local parks and streets because they are intimidated by drug dealers and users. It could also include local police officers who conclude that dealing with the local drug trade is like shovelling sand against the tide and turn their attention to less frustrating problems.

❝ . . . behind the shuttered windows . . . and in the apartments off the streets, many citizens are outraged and afraid . . . ❞

Nevertheless, however widespread support for drug use seems to be, every community also contains some significant elements opposed to at least some aspects of drug use. This is particularly hard to keep in mind when the public face of the community—what is occurring on its streets and public places of business—seems openly tolerant. The reality is, however, that behind the shuttered windows of local merchants and in the apartments off the streets, many citizens are outraged and afraid of the drug use in the community. What outrages them may not be the same things that outrage the police or violate the laws, but there is some level of opposition to drug use. That opposition is the asset that needs to be assessed and mobilized.

In thinking about how the police and citizens might reclaim territory from drug trafficking and use, police strategists must anticipate a special problem in helping neighborhoods make transitions from one condition to another. A community that has had a long tradition of being clean may find it relatively easy to maintain its tradition.[20] Such a community is likely to discover a drug problem early because the community is vigilant and the drug problem sticks out. It is

likely to respond quickly and aggressively because the problem is both outrageous and small. Drug dealers and users, confirming their prior expectation that the community is inhospitable, will go somewhere else. The probe will be quickly routed.

❝ It may be more effective to organize and support citizen patrols than to chase the drug dealers from one block to another. ❞

A community that has had a long tradition of being tolerant of drug dealing has the opposite problem. It may have difficulty in changing its image and condition to one of intolerance. Changes in the level of drug dealing may be difficult to notice because it is so commonplace. The response to a campaign against drugs may be ambivalent because of active opposition by some elements of the community and a sense of despair and futility among the others. Even if an attack is successfully mounted, the dealers and users may view it as a temporary state of affairs. Thus, sustained efforts will not necessarily discourage the dealers and the users.

In confronting drug trafficking and use, then, the task of a police department is often to find a way to prime the community's own capacities for self-defense so that police efforts may be effectively leveraged through community self-help. This involves learning enough about the community to know the sources of support for drug dealing and use in the neighborhoods and the potential opposition. It also means finding ways to reach out to those people in the community who are hostile to drug dealing and to strengthen their hand in dealing with the problem. For example, it may be as important to organize community meetings as to make it easier for individuals to call the police over the phone. It may be more effective to organize and support citizen patrols than to chase the drug dealers from one block to another. It may be more effective to organize groups of parents, educators, and youth leaders to resist drug dealing in and around schools than to increase arrests of drug dealers by 20 percent. In short, drug enforcement may be as much a *political* struggle to get neighborhoods to oppose drug use in small, informal ways every day as it is a technical law enforcement problem that can be solved by more resources or more sophisticated investigations.

Alternative strategies

Police departments rely on many different activities to deal with the drug problem. They conduct sophisticated investigations of trafficking networks. They mount buy and bust

operations to suppress open drug dealing. They arrest robbers and burglars who also happen to be drug users. They arrest drug users for illegal possession. They conduct drug education programs in schools.

Most departments do all of these things to some degree. In this sense, departments generally have "comprehensive" approaches to the problem. Departments differ, however, in the overall level of activities they sustain and in the relative emphasis they give to each. Some place greater emphasis on sophisticated investigations, while others stress "user accountability." Departments may also differ in terms of how much thought they have given to deciding on their most important objectives, and in terms of the relationship between the overall objectives and the distribution of the activities.

> ## " 'expressive law enforcement' . . . is what police departments know how to do—namely, enforce the law. "

To help police executives think about how to confront the narcotics problem, we describe seven alternative strategies. The strategies are different from activities not only because they typically involve bundles of activities, but also because each strategy is built upon its own assumption of why the effort is appropriate and valuable to pursue.

Expressive law enforcement: maximum arrests for narcotics offenses

The most common narcotics enforcement strategy could be described as "expressive law enforcement." This differs from other strategies in that it takes all the activities in which the department is engaged and increases them by a factor of two or three. If a city's drug problem is getting worse, the response is simply to increase the resources devoted to the problem. The operational task is to increase the total number of narcotics arrests. The narcotics bureau is expanded and driven to higher levels of productivity. Special task forces are created to deal with brazen street dealing. The patrol force is equipped and encouraged to make more drug arrests. There is much to commend this strategy. First, it is a straight-forward approach that citizens, politicians, and police officers understand. It relies on common sense for its justification. It avoids the trap of being too cute, subtle, or sophisticated.

Second, it is what police departments know how to do— namely, enforce the law. It does not make them responsible for outcomes that they cannot control or for activities that they do not do well.

Third, to the extent that the courts and corrections system do their part, the strategy may succeed in bringing drug trafficking and use under control through the mechanisms of incapacitation and deterrence.

Fourth, the all-out, direct attack on the problem sustains and animates a general social norm hostile to drug use. That emboldens and strengthens the hand of those within the community opposed to drug use.

This strategy also has weaknesses. First, it does not admit that police resources, even when multiplied, may not control the problem. It ignores whether the rest of the system can deliver deserved punishments; disregards the scale and resilience of the drug markets; and fails to establish any benchmarks for success other than the promise of a valiant effort to increase arrests.

Second, this strategy rarely examines its impact on the community's own capacities for self-defense. There is a plausible argument that a strong police commitment to aggressive narcotics law enforcement will strengthen the community's resolve to deal with the problem. Under the expressive enforcement strategy, however, no organizational means are created to build community opposition to drugs. Without such efforts, there is the risk that the police action will weaken rather than strengthen community efforts by suggesting that the community has no role to play. Even worse, unilaterally designed and executed drug enforcement efforts may alienate communities from the police rather than build effective partnerships to control drugs.[21] In short, there is the risk that the expressive law enforcement strategy, effective as it may be in its own terms, will fail to develop, and may even inhibit, the development of the self-defense capacities of the communities that must, in the long run, be the route to success.

> ## " . . . the impact . . . would be greater if it could reach the source of the problem, the criminal entrepreneur . . . "

Mr. Big: Emphasis on high-level distributors

A second common strategy to deal with drug trafficking and use is the "Mr. Big" strategy. Its principal operational objective is to reach high levels of the drug distribution systems. The primary tactics are sophisticated investigative procedures using wiretaps, informants, and undercover activities. Often these investigations also depend on "loose" money to purchase evidence and information. The "story" that makes this a plausibly effective attack on the problem is

that the immobilization of high-level traffickers will produce larger and more permanent results on the drug trafficking networks than arrests of lower-level, easily replaced figures.

Again, there is much to commend this strategy. It is common sense that the impact of drug enforcement would be greater if it could reach the source of the problem, the criminal entrepreneur whose energy, intelligence, greed, and ruthlessness animate and sustain the drug trade. This seems particularly true if enforcement and punishment capacity is limited, and must therefore be focused on high-priority targets.

> 66 *There may be almost as many potential Mr. Bigs as there are street-level dealers. There may also be a great deal of turnover...* 99

It also seems more just to focus society's efforts on those who are becoming rich and powerful through the trade rather than on those lower-level figures. While lower-level dealers are hardly blameless, they are arguably less culpable and less deserving of punishment than the high-level traffickers who are the focus of the Mr. Big strategy.

Finally, the Mr. Big strategy is consistent with the development of professionalism within police departments. The strategy challenges the departments to develop their investigative and intelligence capabilities.

There are reasons to worry about the overall effectiveness of the Mr. Big strategy, however. First, it is not clear that current investigative techniques are powerful enough to reach Mr. Big. The time, resources, and luck needed to arrest him are much greater than those needed to reach intermediate targets; therefore, the admittedly greater impact of arresting Mr. Big may turn out not to be worth the special effort.

A related point concerns overestimating the significance of Mr. Big. There may be almost as many potential Mr. Bigs as there are street-level dealers. There may also be a great deal of turnover in the ranks of drug entrepreneurs. The implication is that the value associated with arresting any given Mr. Big in terms of supply reduction impact may be much less than is usually considered. A further implication is that no one may know who Mr. Big is. Or, if we knew who he was 6 months ago, the situation may now be different. Thus, the greater difficulty of arresting Mr. Big may not be offset by any larger, long-term impact.

The final point is organizational. While it is true that the Mr. Big strategy will challenge the police to develop professionalism in dealing with drug traffickers and thus increase the overall capabilities of the narcotics bureau, it is also true that this particular focus may lead to the atrophy of narcotics enforcement efforts in other parts of the agency. Other units may decide to leave drug enforcement to the narcotics bureau.

Gang strategies

Among the most urgent and oppressive aspects of the current drug problem is the violence of gangs engaged in street-level drug distribution. Some of these groups, like the various "Crip" and "Blood" factions now spreading out from Los Angeles, are formed from traditional youth gangs of the type once romanticized in "West Side Story."[22] Others, like the "posses" of New York's Jamaican neighborhoods, simply began gang life as drug-dealing organizations.[23]

Although violence has always been a feature of drug trafficking, to many observers the current level of violence seems unprecedented. As *The New York Times* reported:

> Older drug rings, wary of drawing police attention, generally avoided conspicuous violence. New York's new gangs, like similar groups in Los Angeles and Washington, are composed mainly of undisciplined teen-agers and youths in their early twenties. They engage in gun battles on the street and have been known to execute customers for not leaving a crack den quickly enough.[24]

Indeed, these gangs are held responsible for significant increases in homicide rates in the cities in which they operate.[25] They use violence not only to discipline their own employees and to intimidate and rob their competitors but also to intimidate individual citizens and groups of citizens who resist their intrusion.[26]

> 66 *[These gangs] use violence not only to discipline their own employees and to intimidate and rob their competitors but also to intimidate individual citizens...* 99

Exactly how the police can best deal with this aspect of the drug problem remains uncertain. One approach is to view drug gangs as similar to the youth gangs of the past and to use the same strategies that proved effective in the past.[27] That older strategy was designed primarily to reduce intergang violence, to prevent the extortion of neighborhood citizens and merchants by the gangs and to minimize the seriousness of the crimes committed by gang members. It was not designed to eliminate the gangs, although some efforts were made to turn them to legitimate and constructive

activities. It depended for its success on such activities as establishing liaison with the gangs to communicate police expectations and aggressive police action against gang members, their clubhouses, and their activities when the gangs stepped out of line.

Such a strategy does not seem suitable for dealing with the new drug gangs, however. After all, the old gangs were viewed as threatening to society principally through their violence towards one another. Thus, it was possible for the police to make an accommodation: the gangs could remain intact so long as they refrained from violence. No such accommodation seems appropriate with the drug gangs—particularly not with those that are making places for drug distribution through intimidation of local citizens and merchants. Such conduct requires a sterner response.

> **“What seems to be needed . . . once the gangs have been wounded is the willingness of citizens to resist gang intimidation . . . ”**

A second approach is to view the drug gangs as organized criminal enterprises and to use all of the techniques that have been developed to deal with more traditional organized crime. These include: (1) the development of informants through criminal prosecutions, payments, and witness protection programs; (2) heavy reliance on electronic surveillance and long-term undercover investigations; and (3) the use of special statutes that create criminal liabilities for conspiracy, extortion, or engaging in criminal enterprises.

Such tactics work. They can, if executed consistently, destroy the capacities of organized criminal enterprises.[28] However, such efforts are also time-consuming and expensive. Perhaps these elaborate efforts are not required to deal with the relatively unsophisticated street-level drug gangs. Indeed, in the past, relatively superficial undercover approaches seem to have been successful,[29] as were large-scale sweeps targeted on gang members. What seems to be needed to make police efforts succeed once the gangs have been wounded is the willingness of citizens to resist gang intimidation after the police return to ordinary operations.

Citywide street-level drug enforcement

A fourth narcotics enforcement strategy, now widely discussed, can be described as "citywide, street-level drug enforcement." The principal objective is to disrupt open drug dealing by driving it back indoors, or by forcing the markets to move so frequently that buyers and sellers have difficulty finding one another. The primary tactics include buy-and-bust operations, observation sale arrests, and arrests of users

who appear in the market to buy drugs.[30] The major reasons to engage in such activities include: (1) enhancing the quality of life in the communities for residents who are discomfited by the presence of drug dealers; and (2) discouraging young, experimental users from continuing to use drugs by making it harder for them to score.[31]

At first glance, the limitations and hazards of this strategy seem more apparent than its strengths. To many law enforcement professionals and commentators, the idea that one would invest the enormous amount of time and effort that continuing street-level enforcement requires for nothing more than increased inconvenience to buyers and sellers of drugs seems absurd. It hardly seems worthwhile to send the police out daily to battle street-level drug dealers to achieve nothing other than market disruptions.[32]

Second, the police know that they have nowhere near enough manpower to work at street levels across the city. Moreover, they are reluctant to begin doing this job in any particular place because they know that once they have committed police to a given area, it will be hard to withdraw them.

Third, police executives know from much prior experience that street-level narcotics enforcement is extremely vulnerable to various forms of corruption. Bribery, perjured testimony, faked evidence, and abused rights in the past have accompanied street-level narcotics enforcement. Indeed, it was partly to avoid such abuses that many police departments began concentrating on higher-level traffickers and restricted drug enforcement efforts to special units.

> **“ . . . most street-level arrests [bring] several weeks in jail . . ., a bargained guilty plea, a sentence to time served, and . . . inadequately supervised probation. ”**

Fourth, the police know that they can arrest many more drug traffickers and users than the rest of the criminal justice system can process. If the practical value and moral vindication of arrests for drug offenses only come with successful prosecutions and suitable punishment, then street-level enforcement is undermined from the beginning, for there is no reasonable prospect for such results. The likely outcome of most street-level arrests is several weeks in jail prior to trial, a bargained guilty plea, a sentence to time served, and a long period of inadequately supervised probation.[33]

Knowing this, the police can take one of two stances: (1) they can recognize that, for narcotics offenses, the process is the only punishment that offenders are likely to receive and

choose to load into the process what they consider a reasonable level of punishment; or (2) they can grow cynical and refuse to make street-level arrests. In either case, a kind of corruption sets in. The least likely response is the only proper one: namely, to continue to maintain discipline and poise in making narcotics arrests on the street.

❝ ... young, experimental users ... have less experience with drugs, hence ... less motivation to keep searching ...❞

Against these disadvantages, the advantages of street-level enforcement seem small and speculative. The most certain and concrete is that street-level enforcement can succeed in restoring the quality of life in a community and bring a feeling of hope to the residents. It can regain, for those citizens, merchants, and parents who disapprove of drug use, a measure of control over their immediate environment. It can reassure them that they have not been abandoned in their struggles against drug dealers. It can provide a shield that protects them from the intimidating tactics of aggressive drug dealers. That is no small effect, though it might be hard to quantify.[34]

A second benefit, somewhat more speculative, is that the strategy might well succeed in discouraging experimental drug use, particularly among those teenagers who are not yet deeply involved in drugs.[35] Merely increasing the inconvenience to drug buyers may be little deterrent to experienced and committed drug users. They will have enough connections in the drug trade and enough determination to find alternative sources. This same effect may be a significant deterrent for young, experimental users, however. They have less experience with drugs, hence fewer alternative sources of supply and less motivation to keep searching when open drug markets are no longer available. It is also possible that with open drug bazaars effectively closed, parents and neighbors may feel sufficiently emboldened to exercise greater efforts at home and on the street.

A third benefit is that street-level drug enforcement has, on occasion, been effective in controlling street crimes such as robbery and burglary.[36] A crackdown on heroin markets in Lynn, Massachusetts, seems to have substantially reduced levels of robbery and burglary. Operation Pressure Point, directed at drug markets on New York's Lower East Side, also seems to have reduced robbery and burglary. A similar effort in Lawrence, Massachusetts, however, failed to produce the expected effects. This benefit must be treated as uncertain partly because of measurement problems in identifying the effect, and partly because it seems that the tactic produces this effect only under some special circum-

stances.[37] On the other hand, it does provide an additional reason for considering the potential value of street-level drug enforcement.

Neighborhood crackdowns

A fifth strategy that the police might consider could be called "neighborhood crackdowns." Instead of committing themselves to citywide street-level enforcement, the police might decide to leverage their resources by cracking down on drug offenses in those neighborhoods that are willing to join the police in resisting drug use. Some of these neighborhoods might be those that are just beginning to be invaded by drug dealers. Others might be those that have long been occupied, but have finally reached a stage where they are now determined to rid their area of drugs. Police resources would be attracted to these areas precisely because there is some prospect that the impact of police crackdowns would be prolonged and widened by determined citizens.

News media coverage of the drug problem, particularly the violence associated with drug dealing, suggests that society is handicapped in dealing with the drug problem by a breakdown in the police-community partnership. Wherever there is an opening in a community's self-defense, aggressive young drug dealers seem to find a niche to develop the demand for crack. Sometimes it is a park that the police do not patrol frequently enough and from which other citizens can be driven. Other times it is an abandoned house that can be turned into a shelter for both dealing and using drugs. Still other times it is an all-but-abandoned building whose owner is willing to have anyone pay the rent, and who does not notice that the new tenants arrive with no furniture or clothes, but lots of guns.

❝ The violence accelerates the process of intimidation. Eventually, the drug dealers operate alone.❞

Once established, drug dealers send a message that draws customers and other dealers. Many citizens, finding the company no longer to their liking, begin avoiding crack-dealing locales. Citizens who resist are intimidated. Citizens' groups that complain are also threatened. Occasionally violence breaks out among customers, between dealers and customers, or between competing dealers. The violence accelerates the process of intimidation. Eventually, the drug dealers operate alone.[38]

Citizens cannot deal with these situations by themselves. They need laws and law enforcement to oppose the actions of the drug dealers and consumers and to take action against the landlords (both public and private) who allow the drug

dealers to operate in their buildings. They need the police to respond to their calls for assistance—including crackdowns designed to break the backs of the drug dealers and reclaim the territory for those not using drugs. They need the police to offer assurances that citizens who resist the drug dealers will be protected from attacks.

It is also clear, however, that the police cannot do this job alone. They have only a certain number of officers and many other duties. Drug cases are hard to make and vulnerable to legal challenges. Police can conduct special operations, but eventually they must leave neighborhoods in the hands of citizens. At that time, whether the drug dealers return or not depends a great deal on what citizens do.

If this analysis is correct, a strategy that uses police crackdowns to break the hold of drug dealing in communities that are prepared to assume some responsibility for holding onto the gains might make sense. The police could conserve resources by focusing on only a limited number of areas for relatively short periods of time. The community, working with the police, could shape a police intervention that would be most effective in helping them reclaim their streets. Each would know what would be expected of the other. The results would be the same as those anticipated in a citywide, street-level drug enforcement strategy: namely, an improved quality of life in the city, reduced experimentation with drugs among young people, and conceivably even reduced street crime in those neighborhoods that succeeded in keeping drugs out.

" *The community, working with the police, could shape a police intervention that would be most effective in helping them reclaim their streets.* "

Just such efforts seem to lie behind the most successful cases of drug enforcement. In one particular case in Brooklyn, a neighborhood invaded by drugs managed to drive out the drug dealing by enlisting police efforts to close the buildings that were used for drug dealing, and then mounting patrols through a local branch of the Nation of Islam.[39] The police were willing to put resources on the line to go after the problem with an aggressive approach that was discussed in advance with the community. The community was prepared to try to hold onto the gains by taking disciplined action on their own that stopped well short of vigilantism. The police promised to back up the citizen groups in the future if their vigilance, now refined by prior experience, revealed a major new incursion of drug dealers.

The nature of the strategy is captured well by the testimony of two participants. The local police commander commented:

> I think the patrols are going well. We now have almost nonexistent drug activity in the locations that had been hard-core drug areas. This is a good example of what the police and the community can do together.[40]

One of the patrolling citizens also gave grudging support to the concept:

> We still believe there are problems with the police, with racism and corruption within the department. But we feel we can solve the problems together. We learned a lot of lessons during this. The price you have to pay to fight against drugs is ongoing struggle. We had to pay the price by standing in the cold and rain without pay. But the most interesting thing, I think, is that this has given people hope. Apparently, partnerships are hard and chancy enterprises, but when they succeed, they are worth a great deal.[41]

Controlling drug-using dangerous offenders

The drug strategies that have been discussed so far have been primarily focused on drug trafficking and use. They are designed to produce arrests for narcotics offenses rather than for street crimes such as robbery, burglary, and assault. This is not to say that drug enforcement strategies have no effect on these crimes. Relationships between drug use and crime are so strong that when the police affect drug trafficking and use, they probably affect street crimes as well. The effect is indirect rather than direct, however.

This suggests a drug enforcement strategy designed to achieve *crime control* rather than *drug control* objectives. Such a strategy would focus enforcement attention on those drug users who are committing large numbers of robberies and burglaries.[42] Studies show that drug users account for a large proportion of those arrested for these crimes and that they are among the most active and dangerous offenders.[43] Further, levels of criminal activity among heroin users are known to be higher when they are using heroin than when they are not.[44] It stands to reason, then, that the police might affect a significant portion of the crime problem by controlling the drug use of those active offenders who are heavily involved with drugs.

The principal operational objectives of this strategy would be: (1) to arrest and convict drug-using criminal offenders for either narcotics offenses or street crimes such as robbery and burglary; (2) to identify such offenders after arrest through a combination of criminal record searches, physical examination for needle marks, urinalysis in the jails, and interviews; and (3) to sentence these offenders to dispositions that work directly on their drug consumption such as

intensive probation with mandatory regular urinalysis or compulsory drug treatment.

> ❝ ... *coerced abstinence, imposed as a condition of probation ... and enforced through ... mandatory urinalysis, can .... [reduce] street crime.* ❞

The primary activities of the police department would be to continue making arrests for narcotics and street offenses, improve the records that would allow them to identify the dangerous offenders among the arrested population, and lobby for the development of urinalysis, intensive probation, and mandatory treatment capabilities. The important claim that can be made for this strategy is that it would address the primary reason that citizens worry about drugs, namely drug-related crime, and would do so more effectively, cheaply, and humanely than approaches that rely only on repeated arrests and costly jails to produce the same effects.

There is a reasonable amount of evidence indicating that this approach would work. In California, mandatory treatment programs for drug users are effective in controlling both crime and drug use, both while the person remains under supervision and afterwards.[45] There are also some reasons to believe that coerced abstinence, imposed as a condition of probation and parole and enforced through a system of mandatory urinalysis, can be effective in reducing street crime.[46]

The strategy would also have benefits for organizational development. It would challenge police departments to reach outside their own boundaries, and outside the boundaries of the criminal justice system, to produce the desired effects. Prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials would have to be persuaded of the merits of the strategy.[47] The drug treatment community would also have to be mobilized, their capacity expanded, and their attention focused on the objective of crime control as well as improving the health of users. Perhaps the most challenging aspect of this strategy, however, is that it would require the police to consider the possibility that their primary interest in controlling drug-related street crime could be achieved more directly, surely, and inexpensively by close supervision on the street rather than by the enormously expensive process of repeated arrests, jail, and imprisonment.

The limitations of this strategy are the opposite sides of its strengths. It does little by itself to suppress drug trafficking or to discourage the spread of drug use, except insofar as it

succeeds in suppressing the demand for drugs among those users brought into the network of coerced treatment. Moreover, it seems to reduce police control over the problem by forcing them to rely on cooperation with others to produce the desired effects. Finally, it does not seem like a suitable law enforcement approach to the problem. There is not enough punishment and jail to satisfy those who think that effective law enforcement by itself will be enough to deal with the problem. For these reasons, the police have generally neither adopted nor supported such strategies.

Protect and insulate the youth

A final police strategy for dealing with drugs could be built around the objective of drug abuse prevention. Instead of generally attacking drug trafficking, a police department might concentrate on trying to halt the spread of drug abuse to the next cohort of 16-year-olds. Part of this effort would consist of enforcement operations to suppress drug trafficking around and within schools. Another part might consist of police-sponsored drug education designed not only to impart information about drugs and discourage drug use, but also to create a favorable climate for police efforts to suppress drug trafficking. A third part might consist of police-sponsored efforts to create partnerships among parents, schools, and the police to define the outer limits of acceptable drug use and to establish a predictable community response to drugs.

> ❝ *Instead of generally attacking drug trafficking, a police department might concentrate on trying to halt the spread of drug abuse to the next cohort of 16-year-olds.* ❞

The country now has operating experience with each of these elements. New Jersey has made a concerted effort to mount enforcement operations in and around schools to disrupt the trafficking networks that serve high school students.[48] The Los Angeles Police Department's DARE program has shown the potential of involving police in drug education programs in the schools and has been widely emulated throughout the country.[49] Massachusetts has experimented with establishing community partnerships to confront children with a consistent set of messages about drug use. None of these approaches has been systematically evaluated, however. Nor do we have any documented experience with combining the different approaches in a concerted strategy to prevent new drug use. Thus, the potential of this strategy remains uncertain.

Conclusion

Drug trafficking, use, and associated violence challenge today's police executives to find ways of using the limited resources and capabilities of their departments to reduce the violence, halt the spread of drug use, and control drug-related crime. Moreover, they must do so while protecting the integrity of their own organizations and the legal system.

Past approaches that have relied only on police resources seem to be limited in their ability to achieve any of society's important goals in this domain. To reclaim neighborhoods now yielding to drug use, police must find ways to mobilize and use community opposition to drugs. That the opposition to drugs exists is evident in the willingness of many citizens to take direct action against drug dealers. This adds urgency to the task of thinking through a strategy that builds effective partnerships, for it suggests not only that a resource is available to the police, but also that failing to harness it effectively may compound the problem by inciting vigilantism.

It also seems clear that successful approaches to the problem will rely on enlisting the assistance of other public agencies. For dealing with drug-related crime, the urinalysis and supervisory capacities of out-patient drug treatment programs might turn out to be valuable. To prevent the spread of drugs to new cohorts of teenagers, cooperation with schools and parents is essential.

❝ ... investigative sophistication, and no small amount of force, are required to deal with ... organized crime ... and the emergent gangs ... ❞

Thus, to a degree, the drug problem requires first-rate professional law enforcement. Quality arrests for drug offenses are an important part of all police strategies. Great investigative sophistication, and no small amount of force, are required to deal with the traditional organized crime groups and the emergent gangs that now dominate the trade.

Yet it is also true that drug trafficking and use represent a problem that must be addressed through remedies other than arrests and through agencies other than police. The police can play an important role in strengthening neighborhood

self-defense capacities by cooperating with local demands rather than suppressing or ignoring them. They can play an important role in mobilizing parents and schools. And they might even succeed in focusing the attention of drug treatment programs on their great opportunity to reduce crime as well as achieve other purposes.

In this domain, as well as in dealing with crime and fear, the methods of problem-solving and community policing combine with the methods of professional law enforcement to produce a perspective and a set of results that neither can produce by itself.

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The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

42. International Association of Chiefs of Police and Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Reducing Crime by Reducing Drug Abuse: A Manual for Police Chiefs and Sheriffs*, Washington, D.C., Bureau of Justice Assistance and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, June 1988.

43. National Institute of Justice, *Drug Use Forecasting* (DUF), Jan Chaiken and Marcia Chaiken, *Varieties of Criminal Behavior*, n. 7 above.

44. Ball et al., "Criminality of heroin addicts . . .," n. 5 above.

45. Carl Lukefield and Frank Tims, eds., *Compulsory Treatment of Drug Abuse: Research and Clinical Practice*, NIDA Research Monograph #86, Washington, D.C., National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1988.

46. For discussions of experiences and problems with implementing drug testing, see: John A. Carver, "Drugs and crime," *Research in Action*, n. 4; Mark A.R. Kleiman, "Heroin crackdowns in two Massachusetts cities: executive summary," Working Paper #89–01–15, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, March 1989. For a proposal to control crime through the use of intensively supervised probation and urine testing, see: Mark A.R. Kleiman, Mary Ellen Lawrence, and Aaron Saiger, "A drug enforcement program for Santa Cruz County," Working Paper #88–01–13, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, August 1987.

47. IACP/BJA, *Manual for Police Chiefs and Sheriffs*, n. 42 above.

48. Joseph F. Sullivan, "Jersey takes drug effort into schools," *The New York Times*, January 3, 1988.

49. Gates, "Project DARE"; Evaluation and Training Institute, "DARE longitudinal evaluation," both n. 15.

Implementing Community Policing

By Malcolm K. Sparrow

A simple lesson, well understood by truck drivers, helps to frame the problem for this paper: greater momentum means less maneuverability. The professional truck driver does not drive his 50-ton trailer-truck the same way that he drives his sports car. He avoids braking sharply. He treats corners with far greater respect. And he generally does not expect the same instant response from the trailer, with its load, that he enjoys in his car. The driver's failure to understand the implications and responsibilities of driving such a massive vehicle inevitably produces tragedy: if the driver tries to turn too sharply, the cab loses traction as the trailer's momentum overturns or jackknifes the vehicle.

Police organizations also have considerable momentum. Having a strong personal commitment to the values with which they have "grown up," police officers will find any hint of proposed change in the police culture extremely threatening. Moreover, those values are reflected in many apparently technical aspects of their jobs—systems for dispatching patrols, patrol officers constantly striving to be available for the next call, incident-logging criteria, etc. The chief executive who simply announces that community policing is now the order of the day, without a carefully designed plan for bringing about that change, stands in danger both of "losing traction" and of throwing his entire force into confusion.

The concept of community policing envisages a police department striving for an absence of crime and disorder and concerned with, and sensitive to, the quality of life in the community. It perceives the community as an agent and partner in promoting security rather than as a passive audience. This is in contrast to the traditional concept of policing that measures its successes chiefly through response

times, the number of calls handled, and detection rates for serious crime. A fuller comparison between traditional and community policing models is given in the appendix in a question-and-answer format.

The task here is to focus attention upon some of the difficulties inherent in a change of policing style, rather than to defend or advocate community policing. So we will address some general problems of institutional change, albeit within the context of a discussion of policing styles.

Those who accept the desirability of introducing community policing confront a host of difficult issues: What structural changes are necessary, if any? How do we get the people on the beat to behave differently? Can the people we have now be forced into the new mold, or do we need to recruit a new kind of person? What should we tell the public, and when? How fast can we bring about this change? Do we have enough external support?

These are the problems of implementation. The aim of this paper is to assist in their resolution. You will find here, however, no particular prescription—no organizational chart, no list of objectives, no sample press releases. Such a prescription could not satisfy any but the most particular of circumstances. The intent here is to explore some general concepts in organizational behavior, to uncover particular obstacles to desired change that might be found within police departments, and then to find the most effective means for overcoming the obstacles.

Dangers of underestimating the task: changing a culture

Even the superficial review of community policing in the appendix indicates the magnitude of the task facing a chief executive. Implementing community policing is not a simple policy change that can be effected by issuing a directive through the normal channels. It is not a mere restructuring of the force to provide the same service more efficiently. Nor is it a cosmetic decoration designed to impress the public and promote greater cooperation.

For the police it is an entirely different way of life. It is a new way for police officers to see themselves and to understand their role in society. The task facing the police chief is nothing less than to change the fundamental culture of the organization. This is especially difficult because of the unusual strength of police cultures and their great resistance to change.

The unusual strength of the police culture is largely attributable to two factors. First, the stressful and apparently dangerous nature of the police role produces collegiate bonds of considerable strength, as officers feel themselves besieged in an essentially hostile world. Second, the long hours and the rotating shifts kill most prospects for a normal (wider) social life; thus, the majority of an officer's social life is confined to his or her own professional circle.

> **   _" ... a huge ship can ... be turned by a small rudder. It just takes time ... "_**

Altering an organizational philosophy is bound to take considerable time. Another analogy may be helpful: the greater the momentum of a ship, the longer it takes to turn. One comforting observation is that a huge ship can nevertheless be turned by a small rudder. It just takes time, and it requires the rudder to be set steadfastly for the turn throughout the whole turning period.

It is worth pointing out, also, that there will be constant turbulence around a rudder when it is turning the ship— and no turbulence at all when it is not. This analogy teaches us something if the office of the chief executive is seen as the rudder responsible for turning the whole organization. The lessons are simple. First, the bigger the organization the longer it will take to change. Second, throughout the period of change the office of the chief executive is going to be surrounded by turbulence, like it or not. It will require personal leadership of considerable strength and perseverance.

Rendering susceptible to change

A chief executive may be fortunate enough to inherit an organization that is already susceptible to change. For instance, he may arrive shortly after some major corruption scandal or during a period when external confidence in the police department is at rock bottom. In such a case the chief executive is fortunate, in that leadership is required and expected of him. His organization is poised to respond quickly to his leadership on the grounds that the new chief, or his new policies, may represent the best or only hopes of rescue.

A chief executive who inherits a smoothly running bureaucracy, complacent in the status quo, has a tougher job. The values and aspirations of the traditional policing style will be embodied in the bureaucratic mechanisms—all of which superficially appear to be functioning well. The need for change is less apparent.

The task of the chief executive, in such a situation, is to expose the defects that exist within the present system. That will involve challenging the fundamental assumptions of the organization, its aspirations and objectives, the effectiveness

of the department's current technologies, and even its view of itself. The difficulty for the chief is that raising such questions, and questioning well-entrenched police practices, may look and feel destructive rather than constructive. Managers within the department will feel uneasy and insecure, as they see principles and assertions for which they have stood for many years being subject to unaccustomed scrutiny.

The process of generating a questioning, curious, and ultimately innovative spirit within the department seems to necessarily involve this awkward stage. It looks like an attempt by the chief to deliberately upset his organization. The ensuing uncertainty will have a detrimental effect upon morale within the department, and the chief has to pay particular attention to that problem. Police officers do not like uncertainty within their own organization; they already face enough of that on the streets.

The remedy lies in the personal commitment of the chief and his senior managers. Morale improves once it is clear that the change in direction and style is taking root rather than a fleeting fancy, that the chief's policies have some longevity, and that what initially appeared to be destructive cynicism about police accomplishments is, in fact, a healthy, progressive, and forgiving openmindedness.

❝ Morale improves once it is clear that the change in direction and style is taking root rather than a fleeting fancy... ❞

The chief executive is also going to require outside help in changing the organization. For instance, the chief may be able to make a public commitment to a new kind of policing long before he can convince his organization to adopt it. He may be able to create a public consensus that many of the serious policing problems of the day are direct results of the fact that the new kind of policing was not practiced in the past. He may be able to educate the public, or the mayor, about the shortcomings of existing practices even before his staff is prepared to face up to them.

He may identify pressure groups that he can use to his advantage by eliciting from them public enunciation of particular concerns. He may be able to foster and empower the work of commissions, committees, or inquiries that help to make his organization vulnerable to change. He can then approach his own organization backed by a public mandate—and police of all ranks will, in due course, face questions from the public itself that make life very uncomfortable for them if they cling to old values.

The chief may even accentuate his staff's vulnerability to external pressures by removing the protection provided by a public information officer and insisting that the news media be handled by subordinate officers. In so doing the chief would have to accept that some mistakes will inevitably be made by officers inexperienced in media affairs. High-level tolerance of those early errors will be critical to middle management's acceptance of the new openness. They will need to feel that they are working within a supportive, challenging, coaching environment—not that they are being needlessly exposed to personal risk.

Two kinds of imbalance

Two different types of imbalance within the organization may help render it susceptible to change: "directed imbalance" and "experimental imbalance."

Directed imbalance: Return for a moment to physical analogies, and consider the process of turning a corner on a bicycle. Without thinking, the rider prepares for the turn by leaning over to the appropriate side. Small children learning to ride a bicycle quickly discover the perils of not leaning enough, or too much, for the desired turn. The characteristics of the imbalance, in this instance, are that it is necessary and that it only makes sense in the context of the anticipated change in direction. It is, nevertheless, imbalance—because the machine will fall over if the turn is not subsequently made. Inevitable disaster follows, conversely, from making the turn without the preparatory leaning.

Directed imbalances within a police organization will be those imbalances that are created in anticipation of the proposed change in orientation. They will be the changes that make sense only under the assumption that the whole project will be implemented, and that it will radically alter organizational priorities.

Examples of such directed imbalance would be the movement of the most talented and promising personnel into the newly defined jobs; making it clear that the route to promotion lies within such jobs; disbanding those squads that embody and add weight to the traditional values; recategorizing the crime statistics according to their effect on the community; redesigning the staff evaluation system to take account of contributions to the nature and quality of community life; providing inservice training in problem-solving skills for veteran officers and managers; altering the nature of the training given to new recruits to include problem-solving skills; establishing new communication channels with other public services; and contracting for annual community surveys for a period of years.

Experimental imbalance: This differs from directed imbalance in its incorporation of trial and error—lots of trials and a tolerance of error. The benefits of running many different experiments in different parts of the organization are more numerous than they might, at first sight, appear. There is the obvious result of obtaining experimental data, to be used in planning for the future. There is also the effect of creating a greater willingness to challenge old assumptions and hence a greater susceptibility to change, at a time when the organization needs to change most rapidly.

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66 *The resourcefulness of police officers . . . can at last be put to the service of the department.* **99**

There is also the effect of involving lots of officers in a closer and more personal way. It does not matter so much what it is that they are involved in—it is more important that they feel involved, and that they feel they are subject to the attention of headquarters. They will then be much more disposed to try to understand what the values of headquarters really are.

Also, officers will see lots of apparently crazy ideas being tried and may, in time, realize that they have some ideas of their own that are slightly less crazy. Perhaps for the first time they will be willing to put their ideas forward, knowing that they will not be summarily dismissed. The resourcefulness of police officers, so long apparent in their unofficial behavior, can at last be put to the service of the department. Creativity blossoms in an experimental environment that is tolerant of unusual ideas.

Managing through values

Existing police structures tend to be mechanistic and highly centralized. Headquarters is the brain that does the thinking for the whole organization. Headquarters, having thought, disseminates rules and regulations in order to control practice throughout the organization. Headquarters must issue a phenomenal volume of policy, as it seeks to cover every new and possible situation. A new problem, new legislation, or new idea eventually produces a new wave of instructions sent out to divisions from headquarters.

The 1984 publication in Britain of the "Attorney General's New Guidelines on Prosecution and Cautioning Practice" provides a useful example. The purpose of the guidelines was to introduce the idea that prosecutions should be undertaken when, and only when, prosecution best serves the public interest. As such, the guidelines represent a broadening of police discretion. In the past, police were authorized to caution only juveniles and senior citizens. Under the new guidelines offenders of any age may be cautioned in appropriate circumstances. Unfortunately, the order was issued in some county forces through some 30 pages of detailed, case-by-case, instructions distributed from headquarters. The mass of instructions virtually obscured the fact that broader discretion was being granted.

Police officers have long been accustomed to doing their jobs "by the book." Detailed instruction manuals, sometimes running into hundreds, even thousands, of pages have been designed to prescribe action in every eventuality. Police officers feel that they are not required to exercise judgment so much as to know what they are supposed to do in a particular situation. There is little incentive and little time to think, or to have ideas. There is little creativity and very little problem solving. Most of the day is taken up just trying not to make mistakes. And it is the voluminous instruction manuals which define what is, and what is not, a mistake. Consequently heavy reliance is placed upon the prescriptions of the manuals during disciplinary investigations and hearings.

How does the traditional management process feel from the receiving (operational) end? Something like this: "It all comes from headquarters; it is all imposed; it is all what somebody else has thought up—probably somebody who has time to sit and think these things up." New ideas are never conceived, evaluated, and implemented in the same place, so they are seldom "owned" or pursued enthusiastically by those in contact with the community.

Why is this state of affairs a hindrance to the ideals of community policing? Because it allows for no sensitivity either on a district level (i.e., to the special needs of the community) or on an individual level (i.e., to the particular considerations of one case). It operates on the assumption that wealthy suburban districts need to be policed in much the same way as public housing apartments. While patrol officers may be asked to behave sensitively to the needs of the community and to the individuals with whom they deal, there is little organizational support for such behavior.

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66 *There is . . . little time to think, or to have ideas. . . . Most of the day is taken up just trying not to make mistakes.* **99**

Of course, there remains a need for some standing orders, some prepared contingency plans, and some set procedures. But such instructions can come to be regarded as a resource.

rather than as constraining directives. In the past, instruction manuals have been used as much to allocate blame retrospectively after some error has come to light, as to facilitate the difficult work of patrol officers. Many departments, in implementing community policing (which normally involves a less militaristic and more participatory management style), have deemphasized their instruction manuals.

The instruction manual of the West Midlands Police Force, in England, had grown to 4 volumes, each one over 3 inches thick, totaling more than 2,000 pages of instructions. In June 1987, under the direction of Chief Constable Geoffrey Dear, they scrapped it. They replaced it with a single-page "Policy Statement" which gave 11 brief "commandments." These commandments spoke more about initiative and "reasonableness of action" than about rules or regulations. All officers were issued pocket-size laminated copies of this policy statement so that, at any time, they could remind themselves of the basic tenets of their department.

The old manual had contained some useful information that could not be found elsewhere. This was extracted, condensed, and preserved in a new, smaller, "advice manual." It was only one-third the size of the old manual and, significantly, was distributed with an explicit promise that it would never be used in the course of disciplinary investigations or hearings. The ground-level officers were able to accept it as a valuable resource, whereas they had regarded the old manual as a constant threat, omniscient but unfeeling.

The Chief Constable had set up a small team to be responsible for introducing the new policy statement and advice manual. One year after the first distribution of these two documents to the force, the feelings of that team were that the ground-level officers accepted the change and appreciated it, but that some of the mid-level managers found the implied management style harder to accept and were reluctant to discard their old manuals.[1]

Another trend in the management of policing is for procedures "set in stone" to be played down in favor of accumulated experience. There are growing repositories of professional experience, either in the form of available discussion forums for officers trying new techniques, or in the form of case studies where innovations and their results are described.[2] One difficulty here is that police officers have to be persuaded that it is helpful, rather than harmful, to record their failures as well as their successes—and for that they will need a lot of reassurance.

Senior managers have begun to emphasize the ideals, ethics, and motivations that underlie the new image of policing, as opposed to the correctness or incorrectness of procedures. Disciplinary inquiries, therefore, come to rest less firmly on the cold facts of an officer's conduct and more upon his intentions, his motivations, and the reasonableness and acceptability of his judgment in the particular situation.

The relationship between headquarters and district commands may also need to change. The role of headquarters will be to preach the values and state the principles and broad objectives, and then allow the districts a great deal of discretion in deciding on particular programs suited to their geographical area. Similarly, management within any one division or district should be, as far as possible, through values and principles rather than rules and regulations; individual officers can then be encouraged to use their own judgment in specific cases.

❝ [A] police force . . . of 3,000 . . . has nine layers of ranks. . . . [The] Roman Catholic Church . . . does a fairly good job of disseminating values with only five layers. ❞

The nature of the rank structure itself can be a principal obstacle to the effective communication of new values throughout the organization, primarily because it consists of many thin layers. A typical British police force (say of 3,000 officers) has nine layers of ranks. The larger Metropolitan forces have even more. In the larger American forces, the number of ranks can vary from 9 to 13 depending on the size of the department. This is in contrast to the worldwide Roman Catholic Church (with over 600 million members), which does a fairly good job of disseminating values with only five layers. We know from physics that many thin layers is the best formula for effective insulation; for instance, we are told that the best protection from cold weather is to wear lots of thin layers of clothing, rather than a few thick ones.

Certainly such a deep rank structure provides a very effective natural barrier, insulating the chief officer from his patrol force. It makes it possible for the police chief to believe that all his officers are busily implementing the ideas which, last month, he asked his deputy to ask his assistants to implement—while, in fact, the sergeant is telling his officers that the latest missive from those cookies at headquarters "who have forgotten what this job is all about" shouldn't actually affect them at all.

During a period of organizational reorientation the communication between the chief and the rank and file needs to be more effective than that—and so will need to be more direct. The insulating effects of the rank structure will need to be overcome, if there is to be any hope of the rank and file understanding what their chief officers are trying to get them to think about. It means that the chief must talk to the

officers, and must do so at length. Some chiefs have found it valuable to publish their own value statements and give all patrol officers personal copies. Alternatively, the chief may choose to call meetings and address the officers himself.

This is not proposed as a permanent state of affairs, as clearly the rank structure has its own value and is not to be lightly discarded. During the period of accelerated change, however, the communication between the top and the bottom of the organization has to be unusually effective. Hence, it is necessary to ensure that the message is not filtered, doctored, or suppressed (either by accident or as an act of deliberate sabotage) by intermediate ranks during such times.

The likelihood of a change in policy and style surviving, in the long term, probably depends as much on its acceptance by middle management as on anything else. The middle managers, therefore, have to be coached and reeducated; they have to be given the opportunity and incentive for critical self-examination and the chance to participate in the reappraisal of the organization. Some chiefs have invested heavily in management retraining, seminars, and retreats, taking great care to show their personal commitment to those enterprises.

Territorial responsibility

One of the most obvious structural changes that has normally accompanied a move toward community policing is the assignment of officers to beats. It is important to understand how such a move fits into the general scheme of things. At first sight it appears that patrol officers who drive cars on shift work have territorial responsibility; for 8 hours a day they each cover an area. In fact, there are two senses in which that particular area is not the officer's professional territory. First, officers know that they may be dispatched to another area at any time, should the need arise. Second, they are not responsible for anything that occurs in their area when they are off duty. The boundaries of their professional territories are more clearly defined by the time periods when

they are on duty than by a geographical area. The fact that a professional territory spans a period of time rather than an area clearly has the effect of forcing the officer's concern to be largely focused on incidents rather than on the long-term problems of which the incidents may be symptoms. The patrol officers are bound to remain reactive rather than proactive. Long-term problems remain outside their responsibility.

> **❝ ... beat officers know ... the opportunity and obligation to have an impact ... ❞**

In contrast, when patrol officers are given an area and told "this is yours, and nobody else's," their professional territory immediately becomes geographical. The 24-hour demand on police resources requires that some calls in their area will be dealt with by other personnel. But the beat officers know that they have principal responsibility for a street or streets. They have the opportunity and obligation to have an impact on difficult problems. The more committed beat officers demand to know what happened on their beat while they were off duty; they tend to make unsolicited followup visits, and struggle to find causes of incidents that would otherwise be regarded as haphazard.

It is fairly easy to see how the chief officer, district commanders, and individual beat officers can have a clear territorial responsibility. What about the remainder in middle management? There is a danger that community contact and concern will be the preserve of the highest and lowest ranks of the service, with the middle ranks living a cozy internal life of administration.

Middle-ranking officers can continue to be a barrier to the dissemination of the new values unless they too are made to live by them. This is perhaps best accomplished by making each rank correspond to some level of aggregation of beats or of community concerns. Thus middle managers should interact as fully with the community as the most senior and most junior officers. They thereby become a meaningful resource for the patrol officers rather than just one more level of supervision. They then can provide contextual frameworks, at successively higher levels, to assist subordinates in the understanding and resolution of particular community problems.

Resistance and sabotage

The most robust resistance to any change in values within an organization will come from those parts that stand to benefit most by the perpetuation of the old set of values.

In introducing the ideals of community policing, the chief should anticipate substantial resistance from particular areas, the first of which is the detective branch.

The idea that crime investigation is the single most important function of the police makes the criminal investigation division the single most important unit within the organization; it gives a detective higher status than a patrol officer. Should we expect the detective branch to applaud an absence of crime? It seems that their values are sometimes shaped to prefer an abundance of crime, provided it is all solved. It seems that special attention may have to be given to dismantling the detectives' view of what is, and what is not, important. Certainly the detective branch typically views the introduction of community policing as a matter for the patrol officers—"our job is still to solve crime."

Detectives' perception of their job will remain "my job is to solve crime" until they are removed from the group that reinforces that perception. Their goals will remain the same until their professional territory is redefined. Their professional territories, if the detectives are to adopt and understand the ideals of community policing, should be defined segments of the community.

The detectives may, or may not, share their segments with uniformed officers; they may, or may not, retain the title of detective. Such considerations will depend. to an extent, on the particular constraints imposed by union power. But they have to be incorporated into the community policing system. They have to be encouraged to work closely within neighborhood policing units. Thus the valuable intelligence that detectives gain through crime investigation can be fed back into the patrol operation. Also, the detectives are made to feel that crime prevention is their principal obligation, and not the preserve either of the patrol force or of a dedicated, but peripheral, unit.

❝ ... chief officers may have the authority ... but they are frequently frustrated by administrators ... ❞

The essential change, whatever the prevailing circumstances, is that the detectives' professional territory has to be extended some considerable distance beyond the instances of reported crime. The detectives may end up looking more like "district investigators" than members of an elite, and separate, unit.

A second area of resistance will probably be the bureaucratic administration. It will include many key personnel who have been able to do their jobs comfortably and mechanically for many years. Such jobs will include the purchase of equipment and supplies, the recruiting and training of staff, and, perhaps most importantly, the preparation and administration of annual budgets. The chief officers may have the authority to allocate police resources as they think best, but they are frequently frustrated by administrators who find some bureaucratic reason for not releasing funds for particular purposes, or by the creation of other bureaucratic obstacles.

A fundamental reappraisal of organizational priorities is likely to "upset the apple cart" in these areas in a manner that bureaucrats will find difficult to tolerate. Such staff members need to be converted. The practical implication is that such personnel must be included in the audience when the new organizational values are being loudly proclaimed. If they are left out at the beginning, they may well become a significant stumbling block at some later stage.

Conclusion

One final cautionary note: the principal task facing police leaders in changing the orientation of their organizations has been identified as the task of communicating new values. In order to stand a chance of communicating values effectively, you need to believe in them yourself, and to be part of a community that believes in them, too.

Notes

1. The Metropolitan Police Department (London) is in the process of making a similar change, moving away from a comprehensive instruction manual and toward clear, brief statements of the principles for action.

2. Much of this work stemmed from initiatives funded by the National Institute of Justice, the Police Executive Research Forum, the Police Foundation, and concerned philanthropic foundations.

NCJ 114217

Appendix

Traditional vs. community policing: Questions and answers

	Traditional	Community policing
Question: Who are the police?	A government agency principally responsible for law enforcement.	Police are the public and the public are the police: the police officers are those who are paid to give full-time attention to the duties of every citizen.
Question: What is the relationship of the police force to other public service departments?	Priorities often conflict.	The police are one department among many responsible for improving the quality of life.
Question: What is the role of the police?	Focusing on solving crimes.	A broader problem-solving approach.
Question: How is police efficiency measured?	By detection and arrest rates.	By the absence of crime and disorder.
Question: What are the highest priorities?	Crimes that are high value (e.g., bank robberies) and those involving violence.	Whatever problems disturb the community most.
Question: What, specifically, do police deal with?	Incidents.	Citizens' problems and concerns.
Question: What determines the effectiveness of police?	Response times.	Public cooperation.

Appendix (continued)

Traditional vs. community policing: Questions and answers

	Traditional	Community policing
Question: What view do police take of service calls?	Deal with them only if there is no real police work to do.	Vital function and great opportunity.
Question: What is police professionalism?	Swift effective response to serious crime.	Keeping close to the community.
Question: What kind of intelligence is most important?	Crime intelligence (study of particular crimes or series of crimes).	Criminal intelligence (information about the activities of individuals or groups).
Question: What is the essential nature of police accountability?	Highly centralized: governed by rules, regulations, and policy directives: accountable to the law.	Emphasis on local accountability to community needs.
Question: What is the role of headquarters?	To provide the necessary rules and policy directives.	To preach organizational values.
Question: What is the role of the press liaison department?	To keep the "heat" off operational officers so they can get on with the job.	To coordinate an essential channel of communication with the community.
Question: How do the police regard prosecutions?	As an important goal.	As one tool among many.

Problem-Oriented Policing

William Spelman and John E. Eck

At 1:32 a.m. a man we will call Fred Snyder dials 911 from a downtown corner phone booth. The dispatcher notes his location and calls the nearest patrol unit. Officer Knox arrives 4 minutes later.

Snyder says he was beaten and robbed 20 minutes before but didn't see the robber. Under persistent questioning Snyder admits he was with a prosti-

tute, picked up in a bar. Later, in a hotel room, he discovered the prostitute was actually a man, who then beat Snyder and took his wallet.

Snyder wants to let the whole matter drop. He refuses medical treatment for his injuries. Knox finishes his report and lets Snyder go home. Later that day Knox's report reaches Detec-

tive Alexander's desk. She knows from experience the case will go nowhere but she calls Snyder at work.

Snyder confirms the report but refuses to cooperate further. Knox and Alexander go on to other cases. Months later, reviewing crime statistics, the city council deplores the difficulty of attracting businesses or people downtown.

From the Director

Many calls to police are repeated requests for help. They have a history and a future—sometimes tragic. Rather than treat the call as a 30-minute event and go on to the next incident, police need to intervene in the cycle and try to eliminate the source of the problem.

A wealth of research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice has led to an approach that does just that.

The problem-solving approach to policing described in this *Research in Brief* represents a significant evolutionary step in helping law enforcement work smarter not harder. Rather than approaching calls for help or service as separate, individual events to be processed by traditional methods, problem-oriented policing emphasizes analyzing groups of incidents and deriving solutions that draw upon a wide variety of public and private resources.

Careful followup and assessment of police performance in dealing with the problem completes the systematic process.

But problem-oriented policing is as much a philosophy of policing as a set of techniques and procedures. The approach can be applied to whatever type of problem is consuming police time and resources.

While many problems are likely to be crime-oriented, disorderly behavior, situations that contribute to neighborhood deterioration, and other incidents that contribute to fear and insecurity in urban neighborhoods are also targets for the problem-solving approach.

In devising research to test the idea, the National Institute wanted to move crime analysis beyond pin-maps. We were fortunate to find a receptive collaborator in Darrel Stephens, then Chief of Police in Newport News, Virginia.

The National Institute is indebted to the Newport News Police Department for serving as a laboratory for testing problem-oriented policing. The results achieved in solving problems and reducing target crimes are encouraging.

Problem-oriented policing integrates knowledge from past research on police operations that has converged on two main themes: increased operational effectiveness and closer involvement

with the community. The evolution of ideas will go on.

Under the Institute's sponsorship, the Police Executive Research Forum will implement problem-oriented policing in three other cities. The test will enable us to learn whether the results are the same under different management styles and in dealing with different local problems. This is how national research benefits local communities—by providing tested new options they can consider.

The full potential of problem-oriented policing still must be assessed. For now, the approach offers promise. It doesn't cost a fortune but can be developed within the resources of most police departments.

Problem-oriented policing suggests that police can realize a new dimension of effectiveness. By coordinating a wide range of information, police administrators are in a unique leadership position in their communities, helping to improve the quality of life for the citizens they serve.

James K. Stewart
Director
National Institute of Justice

The problem-oriented approach

Midnight-watch patrol officers are tired of taking calls like Snyder's. They and their sergeant, James Hogan, decide to reduce prostitution-related robberies, and Officer James Boswell volunteers to lead the effort.

First, Boswell interviews the 28 prostitutes who work the downtown area to learn how they solicit, what happens when they get caught, and why they are not deterred.

They work downtown bars, they tell him, because customers are easy to find and police patrols don't spot them soliciting. Arrests, the prostitutes tell Boswell, are just an inconvenience: Judges routinely sentence them to probation, and probation conditions are not enforced.

Based on what he has learned from the interviews and his previous experience, Boswell devises a response. He works with the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board and local barowners to move the prostitutes into the street. At police request, the Commonwealth's Attorney agrees to ask the judges to put stiffer conditions on probation: Convicted prostitutes would be given a map of the city and told to stay out of the downtown area or go to jail for 3 months.

Boswell then works with the vice unit to make sure that downtown prostitutes are arrested and convicted, and that patrol officers know which prostitutes are on probation. Probation violators *are* sent to jail, and within weeks all

but a few of the prostitutes have left downtown.

Then Boswell talks to the prostitutes' customers, most of whom don't know that almost half the prostitutes working the street are actually men, posing as women. He intervenes in street transactions, formally introducing the customers to their male dates. The Navy sets up talks for him with incoming sailors to tell them about the male prostitutes and the associated safety and health risks.

In 3 months, the number of prostitutes working downtown drops from 28 to 6 and robbery rates are cut in half. After 18 months neither robbery nor prostitution show signs of returning to their earlier levels.

Reacting to incidents reported by citizens—as this hypothetical example illustrates—is the standard method for delivering police services today. But there is growing recognition that standard "incident-driven" policing methods do not have a substantial impact on many of the problems that citizens want police to help solve. Equally important, enforcing the law is but one of many ways that police can cope with citizens' problems.

This *Research in Brief* describes an alternative approach to policing. Called problem-oriented policing, it grew out of an awareness of the limitations of standard practices described in the opening vignette.

Police officers, detectives, and their supervisors can use the problem-oriented approach to identify, analyze, and respond, on a routine basis, to the underlying circumstances that create the incidents that prompt citizens to call the police.

Although alternative methods of handling problems have long been available, the police have made relatively little use of them. Or they

have been used only sporadically, more often by a special unit or an informal group of innovative officers.

Problem-oriented policing is the outgrowth of 20 years of research into police operations that converged on three main themes: *increased effectiveness* by attacking underlying problems that give rise to incidents that consume patrol and detective time; *reliance on the expertise and creativity of line officers* to study problems carefully and develop innovative solutions; and *closer involvement with the public* to make sure that the police are addressing the needs of citizens. The strategy consists of four parts.

1. *Scanning*. Instead of relying upon broad, law-related concepts—robbery, burglary, for example—officers are encouraged to group individual related incidents that come to their attention as "problems" and define these problems in more precise and therefore useful terms. For example, an incident that typically would be classified simply as a "robbery" might be seen as part of a pattern of prostitution-related robberies committed by transvestites in center-city hotels.

2. *Analysis*. Officers working on a well-defined "problem" then collect

information from a variety of public and private sources—not just police data. They use the information to illuminate the underlying nature of the problem, suggesting its causes and a variety of options for its resolution.

3. *Response*. Working with citizens, businesses, and public and private agencies, officers tailor a program of action suitable to the characteristics of the problem. Solutions may go beyond traditional criminal justice system remedies to include other community agencies or organizations.

4. *Assessment*. Finally, the officers evaluate the impact of these efforts to see if the problems were actually solved or alleviated.

To test the value of this approach, the National Institute of Justice sponsored the Problem-Oriented Policing Project, conducted by the Newport News (Virginia) Police Department and the Police Executive Research Forum. Results of the project are encouraging:

● Downtown robberies were reduced by 39 percent (see boxed account above).

● Burglaries in an apartment complex were reduced 35 percent.

● Thefts from parked vehicles outside a manufacturing plant dropped 53 percent.

This *Research in Brief* describes the research that led to problem-oriented policing, the approach used in Newport News, and some of the problems officers there solved. It shows that police can link a detailed understanding of specific local problems and a commitment to using a wide array of community resources in solving them. By so doing, they increase the effectiveness of their operations.

The present system

Under incident-driven policing, police departments typically deliver service by

● reacting to individual events reported by citizens;

● gathering information from victims, witnesses, and offenders;

● invoking the criminal justice process; and

● using aggregate crime statistics to evaluate performance.

No department operates solely in this reactive fashion, but all do it to some extent almost all the time. The way that Newport News tackled prostitution-related robbery (see box) illustrates how problem-oriented policing minimizes the limitations of traditional concepts and conduct of police work.

The focus on underlying causes—*problems*—is not new. Many police officers do it from time to time. The new approach, however, requires *all* officers to implement problem-solving techniques on a routine basis.

Problem-oriented policing pushes beyond the limits of the usual police methods. The keystone of the approach is the "crime-analysis model."

This checklist includes many of the usual factors familiar to police investigators—actors, locations, motives. But it goes further, prompting officers to ask far more questions than usual and in a more logical sequence. The results give a more comprehensive picture of a problem.

The process also requires officers to collect information from a wide variety of sources beyond the police department and enlist support from

public and private organizations and groups—initially to describe the problem and later to fashion solutions that meet public needs as well as those of the criminal justice system.

The research basis

Problem-oriented policing has as its foundation five areas of research conducted during the past two decades.

Discretion. In the 1960's, researchers pointed out the great discretion police officers exercise and concerns about the effects of discretion on the equity and efficiency of police service delivery. Although some discretion appeared necessary, research suggested that police could prevent abuses by structuring discretion. Through guidelines and policies, police agencies guided their officers on the best means of handling sensitive incidents.[1]

But where should the policies come from? In 1979 Herman Goldstein described what he called the "problem-oriented approach" as a means of developing such guidelines for a more effective and efficient method of policing.[2]

Problem studies. A number of studies over the past 20 years aimed at developing a deeper understanding of the nature and causes of crime and disorder problems in order to lead to better police responses.

Research of the late 1960's and early 1970's focused on burglary, robbery, and other street crimes.[3] In the later 1970's and 1980's, research turned to other problems not earlier considered

central to police work: domestic violence, drunk driving, mental illness, and the fear of crime, for example.[4]

Researchers and practitioners learned through these studies that they would have to collect more information to understand problems, and involve other organizations if responses were to be effective. Police needed to consider seriously many issues besides crime alone.

Management. Meanwhile the characteristics of American police officers were changing. More were getting college degrees and thinking of themselves as professionals. Like industrial workers, officers began to demand a greater role in decisionmaking.

Many police managers, recognizing that job satisfaction and participation in decisions influence job performance, made better use of officers' skills and talents. Managers made the work more interesting through job enrichment, and they made working conditions more flexible.[5] Many departments established task forces, quality circles, or management-by-objectives programs.[6]

1. Gerald M. Caplan. "Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 36 (1971): 500–514; Kenneth Culp Davis. "Approach to Legal Control of the Police." *Texas Law Review* 52 (1974): 715; Herman Goldstein. *Policing a Free Society* (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Ballinger. 1977) 93–130.

2. Herman Goldstein. "Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach." *Crime and Delinquency* 25 (1979): 236–258.

3. Thomas Reppetto. *Residential Crimes* (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Ballinger. 1974); Harry A. Scarr. *Patterns of Burglary*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973); Floyd Feeney and Adrianne Weir. *Prevention and Control of Robbery*, summary volume (Davis: University of California. 1974); Andre Normandeau. *Crimes of Robbery*, unpublished diss. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. 1968).

4. Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard A. Berk. "Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault." *American Sociological Review* 49 (1984): 261–272; Fred Heinzelmann et al., *Jailing Drunk Drivers: Impact on the Criminal Justice System* (Washington. D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1984); Gerard R. Murphy. *Special Care: Improving the Police Response to the Mentally Disabled* (Washington. D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum. 1986); Antony M. Pate et al., *Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark: A Summary Report* (Washington. D.C.: Police Foundation. 1966).

5. The best example was the Managing Criminal Investigations program. which gave patrol officers authority to conduct many of their own followup investigations. Ilene Greenberg and Robert Wasserman. *Managing Criminal Investigations* (Washington. D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1979). More generally, see James Q. Wilson. "Future Policeman." in *Issues in Police Patrol* ed. Thomas J. Sweeney and William Ellingsworth (Kansas City. Missouri: Kansas City Police Department, 1973) 207–221.

6. G.F. Carvalho. "Installing Management by Objectives: A New Perspective on Organizational Change" in *Police Administration: Selected Readings* ed. William J. Bopp (Boston: Holbrook, 1975); Michael D. Norman. "Quality Circles: A Program To Improve Employee Attitudes and the Quality of Police Services." *The Police Chief* (November 1984): 48–49. For a more radical proposal, see John E. Angell. "Toward an Alternative to the Classic Police Organizational Arrangements: A Democratic Model." *Criminology* 19 (1971): 186–206. Henry P. Hatry and John M. Greiner. *Improving the Use of Quality Circles in Police Departments* and *Improving the Use of Management by Objectives in Police Departments*. The Urban Institute (Washington. D.C.: National Institute of Justice. both forthcoming).

Community relations. The riots of the 1960's made police aware of their strained relations with minority communities. Community relations units, stringent restrictions on shooting, and civilian review boards attempted to reduce dissatisfaction with police among minorities.[7]

By the mid-1970's, departments provided storefront police stations and foot patrols to improve public attitudes through increased personal contact between the police and citizens.[8] As the police began to recognize how vital citizen action is to crime control, some agencies began to work closely with citizens to reduce crime and fear.[9]

Effectiveness. An important impetus toward problem-oriented policing came finally when research on preventive patrol, response time, and investigations showed that merely reacting to incidents had, at best, limited effects on crime and public satisfaction.[10] Rapid response and lengthy followup investigations were not needed for many incidents, suggesting that police managers could deploy their officers more flexibly without reducing effectiveness.

Experiments in flexible deployment such as split force, investigative case screening, and differential response to calls confirmed that time could be freed for other activities.[11] Managers turned to crime analysis to use this time, focusing on groups of events rather than isolated incidents. By identifying crime-prone locations, crime analysis hoped to use patrol and detective time more effectively.[12] Although crime analysis was restricted to crime problems, traditional police data sources, and criminal justice responses, it marked the first attempt at problem-oriented policing.

Designing problem-oriented policing

Some departments had previously applied problem-solving approaches in special units or projects.[13] None before Newport News had taken a problem-solving approach agency-wide. The National Institute of Justice and Police Chief Darrel Stephens required that the experimental approach follow four basic principles:

● **Participation.** Officers of all ranks, from all units, should be able to use the procedures as part of their daily routine.

● **Information.** The system must encourage use of a broad range of information not limited to conventional police data.

7. Lee P. Brown and Hubert Locke, "Police and the Community" in *Progress in Policing: Essays on Change* ed. Richard A. Staufenberger (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1980): 85–102.

8. Storefronts and foot patrols were important elements in many team policing schemes. See, for example, Lawrence W. Sherman, Catherine H. Milton, and Thomas V. Kelly, *Team Policing: Seven Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1973).

9. See, especially, Lawrence H. Holland, "Police and the Community: The Detroit Ministation Experience," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 54 (February 1985). 1–6; Police Foundation, *Newark Foot Patrol Experiment* (Washington, D.C.: 1981); Robert C. Trojanowicz, *Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, n.d.); Antony Pate et al , *Reducing Fear of Crime*.

10. George L. Kelling et al., *Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Technical Report* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974); William Spelman and Dale K. Brown, *Calling the Police: Citizen Reporting of Serious Crime* (reprint. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); John E. Eck, *Solving Crimes: The Investigation of Burglary and Robbery* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1982).

11. James M. Tien, James W. Simon, and Richard C. Larsen, *Alternative Approach in Police Patrol: The Wilmington Split-Force Experiment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978); John E. Eck, *Managing Case Assignments: The Burglary Investigation Decision Model Replication* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1979); J. Thomas McEwen, Edward F. Connors, and Marcia I. Cohen, *Evaluation of the Differential Police Response Field Test* (Alexandria, Virginia: Research Management Associates, 1984).

12. G. Hobart Reinier, M.R. Greenlee, and M.H. Gibbons, *Crime Analysis in Support of Patrol,* National Evaluation Program Phase I Report (Washington, D.C.: University City Science Center, 1984).

13 Among the most notable examples: John P Bales and Timothy N Oettmeier, "Houston's DART Program—A Transition to the Future," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 54 (December 1985): 13–17; William DeJong, "Project DARE: Teaching Kids To Say 'No' to Drugs and Alcohol," *NIJ Reports* 196 (March 1986): 2–5 (Los Angeles Police Department); Philip B. Taft, Jr., *Fighting Fear: The Baltimore County C.O.P.E. Program* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1986). The New York City Police Department's Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP) is by far the largest problem-oriented unit implemented to date. More information on CPOP is available from the New York City Police or the Vera Institute of Justice.

The problem-solving process

● **Response.** The system should encourage a broad range of solutions not limited to the criminal justice process.

● **Reproducibility.** The system must be one that any large police agency could apply.

The Newport News Police Department named 12 members, from all ranks and units, to a task force to design the process. Having no experience with routine problem solving, the task force decided to test the process it was designing on two persistent problems: burglaries from an apartment complex and thefts from vehicles. All subsequent problems, including the prostitution-related robbery problem described on page 2, were handled by patrol officers, detectives, and supervisors on their normal assignments.

As stated above, the process has four stages. Officers identify problems during the *scanning* stage, collect and analyze information during the *analysis* stage, work with other agencies and the public to develop and implement solutions in the *response* stage, and evaluate their effectiveness in the *assessment* stage. The results of assessment may be used to revise the response, collect more data, or even redefine the problem.

The heart of the process is the analysis stage. The task force designed a problem analysis model, breaking the events that constitute a problem into three components—actors, incidents, and responses—with a checklist of issues that officers should consider when they study a problem.

All sergeants and higher ranks were trained in the model, the use of the systematic process, and the research background. The training also emphasized encouraging officer initiative in uncovering problems, collecting information, and developing responses. Officers throughout the department then began to apply the process.

Problem-oriented policing at work

By June 1986, some two dozen problems had been identified and were in various stages of analysis, response, and assessment. Some problems affected citizens throughout the city; others were confined to neighborhoods. Some problems related to crime, others to the order maintenance, regulatory, or service roles of the police.

In addition to the prostitution-related robberies, Newport News selected apartment burglaries and thefts from parked vehicles as test problems.

Burglaries in the New Briarfield Apartments. Built as temporary housing for shipyard workers in 1942, the 450 wood-frame units called the New Briarfield Apartments remained

in use during the postwar housing shortage—and into the present.

By 1984, New Briarfield was known as the worst housing in the city. It also had the highest crime rate: burglars hit 23 percent of the occupied units each year. The task force assigned Detective Tony Duke of the Crime Analysis Unit to study the problem.

Duke had patrol and auxiliary officers survey a random one-third sample of the household in January 1985. The residents confirmed that burglary was a serious problem, but they were equally upset by the physical deterioration of the complex. Duke then

interviewed employees of other city departments and found that the burglaries were related in part to the general deterioration of the housing.

The Fire Department called New Briarfield a firetrap. Public Works worried about flooding; the complex had no storm sewers. Standing water rotted the floors, noted the Department of Codes Compliance. Cracks around doors and windows made it easier for burglars to force their way in. Vacant units, unfit to rent, sheltered burglars and drug addicts.

Officer Barry Haddix, responsible for patrolling the area, decided to clean

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Some problems being considered by Newport News Police

Citywide
  Assaults on police officers
  Thefts of gasoline from self-service filling stations
  Domestic violence
  Drunk driving
  Repeat runaway youths

In neighborhoods
  Commercial burglaries, Jefferson Avenue business district
  Heroin dealing, 32d and Chestnut
  Residential burglaries, New Briarfield Apartments
  Residential burglaries, Glenn Gardens Apartments
  Thefts from automobiles, downtown parking area
  Dirt bikes, Newmarket Creek
  Rowdy youths, Peninsula Skating Rink
  Rowdy youths, Marshall Avenue 7-Eleven
  Robbery and prostitution, Washington Avenue
  Vacant buildings, central business area
  Larcenies, Beachmont Gardens Apartments
  Unlicensed drinking places, Aqua Vista Apartments
  Disorders and larcenies, Village Square Shopping Center

. **The problem analysis model**

Actors	Incidents	Responses
Victims	Sequence of events	Community
Lifestyle	Events preceding act	Neighborhood affected by
Security measures taken	Event itself	problem
Victimization history	Events following criminal act	City as a whole
Offenders	Physical contact	People outside the city
Identity and physical description	Time	Institutional
Lifestyle, education,	Location	Criminal justice agencies
employment history	Access control and surveillance	Other public agencies
Criminal history	Social context	Mass media
Third parties	Likelihood and probable actions	Business sector
Personal data	of witnesses	
Connection to victimization	Apparent attitude of residents	
	toward neighborhood	

up the grounds. Working with the apartment manager and city agencies, he arranged to have trash and abandoned appliances removed, abandoned cars towed, potholes filled, and streets swept.

Detective Duke meanwhile learned that the complex owners were in default on a loan and that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was about to foreclose. Duke wrote a report describing the crime problem, the tenants' discouragement, and the views of other city agencies.

Police Chief Stephens used the report to enlist other departments in a joint recommendation to the city manager: Help the tenants find better housing and demolish New Briarfield. The city manager approved. In June 1986, he proposed replacing Briarfield with a new 220-unit complex, a middle school, and a small shopping center. Negotiations are underway with HUD.

The long-range solution will take time to implement. For now, the police force assigned Officer Vernon Lyons full-time to organize the neighborhood residents. Since January 1986 the New Briarfield Community Association has been persuading residents to take better care of the neighborhood and lobbying the resident manager and city agencies to keep the complex properly maintained.

Visibly better living conditions have resulted—and the burglary rate has dropped by 35 percent.

Thefts from vehicles in shipyard parking lots. Newport News Shipbuilding employs 36,000 people. Most drive to work and park in nearby lots. In 1984, thefts from these cars amounted to $180,000 in losses, not counting vehicle damage—a total that accounted for 10 percent of all serious, reported crime.

Police were frustrated. They answered many calls but made few arrests. The task force chose Officer Paul Swartz to analyze the issues.

Personal robberies: An average reduction of 39 percent in downtown area

Household burglaries: An average reduction of 35 percent in New Briarfield

Larcenies from autos: An average reduction of 53 percent in downtown area

Month and year

In these three graphs, all time series have been exponentially smoothed to account for short-term fluctuations, long-term trends, and seasonal variations. Estimated crime reductions due to police action are statistically significant at the .01 level or lower

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He tracked current cases and reviewed offense and arrest records for the previous 3 years. He interviewed patrol officers and detectives who knew the area, and talked with shipyard security officers. This led to identification of theft-prone lots—and of a small group of frequent offenders who might be committing most of the thefts.

As a result, one person was arrested in the act of breaking into a car, and Swartz interviewed the offender after he was convicted, promising that nothing he said would bring extra punishment. Swartz learned that drugs were a prime target of the thieves, who looked for "muscle" cars, rock-and-roll bumper stickers, or other hints that the car owner used marijuana or cocaine.

The information led to more arrests and convictions, further interviews, and still further arrests.

The police department is still developing a long-term solution, working with parking lot owners and shipyard workers to develop a prevention program. In the interim, however, the arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the most frequent offenders has reduced thefts by 53 percent since April 1985.

New information, new responses

One reason for these successes has been the police use of information from a wider variety of sources. A survey of residents is an example, like interviews with thieves and prostitutes, but so are literature reviews, interviews with runaways and their parents, business surveys, photographing of problem sites, and searches of tax and title records.

The responses to prostitution-related robberies and parking-lot thefts are standard tactics, but in these cases the involvement of people outside the criminal justice system was important. The resources used are as diverse as the problems themselves.

Problem-oriented policing helps ensure that police respond to a wide variety of problems affecting the quality of life, not just crime. It lets line officers use their experience and knowledge to improve the communities they serve.

The Newport News Police Department—and other departments that adopt and refine this approach—will continue to respond to specific criminal events. But they will go beyond this step, preventing future incidents by solving the problems that would otherwise lead to crime and disorder.

The problem-oriented police department thus will be able to take the initiative in working with other agencies on community problems when those problems touch on police responsibilities. Such a department can make more efficient use of its resources when, for example, it reduces the number of prostitutes and thus needs fewer officers to patrol downtown.

This police force will be more responsive to citizen needs, enjoying better community relations when citizens see the police demonstrating concern for their day-to-day needs.

The result will be a more effective response to crime and other troubling conditions in our cities.

Sitting Ducks, Ravenous Wolves, and Helping Hands: New Approaches to Urban Policing*

by William Spelman and John E. Eck†

Drug dealers have taken over a park. Neighborhood residents, afraid to use the park, feel helpless. Foot patrols and drug raids fail to roust the dealers.

A city is hit with a rash of convenience store robberies. Stakeouts, fast response to robbery calls, and enhanced investigations lead to some arrests—but do not solve the robbery problem.

Disorderly kids invade a peaceful residential neighborhood. Although they have committed no serious crimes, they are noisy and unpredictable: some acts of vandalism have been reported. The kids are black and the residents white—and the police fear a racial incident.

Problems like these plague cities everywhere. Social incivilities, drug dealing and abuse, and violent crime hurt more than the immediate victims: they create fears among the rest of us. We wonder who will be next, but feel incapable of taking action.

Until recently, there was little the criminal justice system could do to help. Police continued to respond to calls for service, and attempted (usually without success) to arrest and punish the most serious criminals. Sometimes they tried to organize a neighborhood watch. But research conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s showed repeatedly that these strategies were severely limited in their effectiveness.

Since the mid-1980s, some innovative police departments have begun to test a new approach to these problems. This "problem-oriented" approach differs from the traditional methods in several ways:

- Police actively seek ways to prevent crime and better the quality of neighborhood life rather than simply react to calls for service and reported crimes.
- Police recognize that crime and disorder problems arise from a variety of conditions and that thorough analysis is needed before they can tailor effective responses to these conditions.
- Police understand that many crime and disorder problems stem from factors beyond the control of any single public or private agency. If these problems are to be

solved, they must be attacked on many different fronts, with the police, other agencies, and the public "coproducing" neighborhood security.

Recent research shows that when police adopt a proactive stance, analyze local conditions, and recognize the value of coproduction in framing and implementing a response, they can reduce crime and fear of crime. This new approach has profound implications for the management and operations of police agencies, and for the relationship between the police and the communities they serve.

THE PROBLEM: THE INCIDENT-DRIVEN APPROACH

Problem-oriented policing is the culmination of more than two decades of research into the nature of crime and the effectiveness of police response. Many strands of research led to the new approach, but three basic findings were particularly important:

- Additional police resources, if applied in response to individual incidents of crime and disorder, will be ineffective at controlling crime.
- Few incidents are isolated; most are symptoms of some recurring, underlying problem. Problem analysis can help police develop effective, proactive tactics.

- Crime problems are integrally linked to other urban problems, and so the most effective responses require coordinating the activities of private citizens, the business sector, and government agencies outside the criminal justice system.

In short, "incident-driven policing," the prevailing method of delivering police services, consistently treats symptoms, not diseases. By working with others to identify, analyze, and treat the diseases, police can hope to make headway against crime and disorder.

Adding Police Resources Will Be Ineffective

Most police work is reactive—a response to crimes and disorders reported by the public. And current reactive tactics may be effective at controlling crime, to a point. For example, by maintaining some threat of apprehension and punishment, current police actions may deter many would-be offenders.[1]

Nevertheless, twenty years of research into police operations suggest that the marginal value of additional police resources, if applied in the traditional, reactive ways, will be very small.[2] For example, preventive patrol tactics probably will not deter offenders unless the patrol force can be increased dramatically—perhaps by a factor of thirty or more.[3] Only 10 percent of crimes are reported to the police within five minutes of their being committed; thus even the fastest police response to the scene will not result in apprehension of a suspect for the vast majority of crimes.[4] And case solution rates are low because detectives rarely have many leads to work with; even if the number of detectives could be doubled or tripled, it would have virtually no effect on the number of cases solved.[5]

Research has also revealed that alternative deployment methods—split force, investigative case screening, differential response to calls—can succeed in shifting scarce resources to those incidents where they are most needed.[6] In the cases studied, these schemes, often directed by crime analysis, made police operations more efficient and freed up resources for other activities. But they did not make operations more effective.

Crime Analysis Can Lead to More Effective Tactics

Three elements must generally be present before a crime will be committed:

someone must be motivated to commit the crime; a suitable target must be present; and the target must be (relatively) unguarded, providing the offender with an opportunity to commit the crime.[7] These elements are more likely to be present at some times and places than at others, forming crime patterns and recurring crime problems. The removal of just one of the elements can alter a crime pattern. Thus, by identifying the elements that are easiest to remove and working to remove them, police can make crime prevention tactics more efficient and effective.

The most obvious crime patterns are spatial. Since the 1930s, researchers have shown that crime types and offender methods of operation—not to mention gross crime rates—differed substantially among neighborhoods.[8] One reason for these differences is that some kinds of neighborhoods have fewer unguarded targets than others. For example, neighborhoods with diverse land uses, single-family houses and garden apartment buildings, and intense street lighting provide criminals with fewer opportunities and incur lower crime rates.[9] Social characteristics such as residential stability, homogeneity of lifestyle, and family orientation empower residents of a neighborhood to "handle" bad actors without calling the police.[10]

Another reason crime rates differ between neighborhoods is that some areas have more potential offenders and victims than others. Adolescents, the poor, and members of minority groups commit property crimes at higher rates. Also, poor youths have few sources of transportation, so it is not surprising that burglary and robbery rates are highest in neighborhoods with many poor Black and Hispanic youths. Some neighborhoods attract more than their share of offenders because open-air drug markets or bars that cater to the especially rowdy or criminal are located there. Potential victims who have the money to do so can make themselves unattractive to offenders by keeping valuables in safe deposit boxes or safes, garaging their cars, and buying houses with sturdy locks and alarms.

Thus neighborhood crime patterns differ in predictable ways, for comprehensible reasons. The implications for crime prevention policies are obvious: if our aim is to reduce the crime rate in a given neighborhood, it is clearly important to know what crimes are committed there, and what might be done either to reduce the number of available offenders or victims or to increase the number of willing and able guardians. Since neighborhoods differ, the best crime prevention strategies will differ from one neighborhood to the next. Officers assigned to an area must study the social and physical conditions there before developing and implementing strategies.

These strategies are given a focus by one regularity that seems to hold for crime problems in all neighborhoods: crime is concentrated. Suppose we took all the criminals active in a community and lined them up in order of the frequency with which they committed crimes. Those who committed crimes most often would go to the head of the line; those who committed crimes only occasionally would go to the end. If all offenders were alike, then it would not matter much where we lined the offenders up; the offenders at the front of the line would commit about as many crimes as those at the end. For example, the "worst" 10 percent of criminals would account for

Figure 1

Ducks, Wolves, and Dens: Crime is Concentrated

about 10 percent of all crimes. But if there were significant differences among offenders, those at the head of the line would account for far more than their share of all crimes committed; the worst 10 percent would account for much more than 10 percent of all crimes. Analysis of arrest records and offender interviews shows that offenders differ substantially, and that the worst 10 percent of criminals commit about 55 percent of the crimes (see figure 1).[11]

The same principle applies to victims and places. A few particularly vulnerable people run risks of victimization that are much higher than average—the most vulnerable 10 percent of victims are involved in about 40 percent of all crimes.[12] And over 60 percent of crimes are committed at a few particularly dangerous locations.[13] Research suggests that there are usually good reasons why these offenders, victims, and locations account for so many crimes. If something can be done about these "ravenous wolves," "sitting ducks," and "dens of iniquity," the crime problem can, in theory, be reduced dramatically.

This is all the more true because current police policies systematically overlook the most crime-prone people and places. For example, until recently, police gave little attention to cases of family violence—even though abused family members suffer particularly high risks of being abused again.[14] If repeat calls to a single

location are made at different times of the day, they will be distributed over several shifts; thus even the beat officers may not recognize the continuing nature of the problem. The most frequent offenders are also the most successful at evading arrest.[15]

These concentrations of crimes among victims, locations, and offenders are important handles for proactive crime-prevention activity. They are the "problems" that are the focus of problem-oriented policing. Government and private agencies have mounted a wide variety of programs aimed at preventing these most predictable of crimes. For example, police, prosecutors, judges, and parole boards have adopted programs and policies aimed at deterrence and incapacitation of frequent, serious offenders.[16] Especially vulnerable people—abused spouses and children, the elderly, the mentally disabled—have been the subject of many recent crime prevention efforts. Through directed patrols[17] and environmental and situational crime prevention,[18] police and other agencies have begun to deal with crime-prone locations as well.

But because the nature of these concentrations is different for every problem, standardized responses will not generally succeed. Previous experience can be a guide, but police must study and create a somewhat different response for each problem they take on.

Neighborhood Problems Are Linked to Other Urban Problems

Knowing whether a given crime or disorder problem results from frequent offenders, high-risk victims, vulnerable locations, or some combination of the three may be helpful, but it is often insufficient to allow the police to identify a workable solution. To solve many problems, the police need the help of outside agencies, the business sector, or the public.

Often this cooperation is necessary because the police lack the authority to remove the offending conditions. If a rowdy bar produces many assaults, it can be closed down—by the state alcoholic beverage control board. If a blind corner produces many automobile accidents, a stop light can be installed—by the city traffic department. If a woman is continually beaten by her husband, she can move out—by her own volition, perhaps with the assistance of a battered women's shelter; the police cannot force her to do so, however.

Perhaps a more important reason for cooperative solutions is that recurring problems have many parts, and no single agency is responsible for all of them. A run-down apartment complex may look like a serious burglary problem to the police. But the fire department sees burnt-out, vacant apartments and a high risk of fire. The housing

department sees code violations and the health department sees an abundance of trash and rats. The bank sees a bad risk and refuses to loan the apartment owner the money needed to renovate the vacant apartments taken over by the drug addicts who commit the burglaries. The residents, beset on all sides, see no hope—they cannot afford cleaner and safer housing.

Clearly, no single agency will be able to solve this problem, because the various parts feed off one another. On the other hand, if all the parts could be addressed at the same time, it is possible that the conditions could be removed and the problem solved. This would require the cooperation of the police, fire, housing, and health departments, the bank, and the apartment owner. It might also require the help of the residents, to ensure that the appropriate agencies are notified should the problems start to return.

There is evidence that citizens in particular "coproduce" crime control with public agencies. In addition to cooperating with the police and pressuring public and private agencies to deliver the goods and services the neighborhood needs, citizens sometimes intervene directly in disorderly or criminal incidents. Although some experts maintain that these informal interventions are the most important determinants of a neighborhood's crime rate, they are difficult to maintain in high-crime areas. The physical design of urban neighborhoods—public housing, in particular—discourages surveillance and intervention by neighbors.[19] Often the residents of these poor neighborhoods are fearful of cooperating with the police; they have little in common with one another; they do not expect to stay long; and they do not even recognize one another. These characteristics make it hard for neighbors to control the minor disorders that may contribute to crime. When families are headed by single parents who must work, parents may not even be able to control their own children.[20] On the other hand, the physical and social environment of high-crime neighborhoods can be improved by governments and businesses, in turn increasing the prospects for intervention and cooperation.

All this suggests that crime prevention strategies are incomplete and possibly ineffective unless they recognize the close links between crime, the physical environment, neighborhood culture, and other factors. In general, these links require that the public

and outside agencies work with the police to eliminate or ameliorate the conditions that cause the problem.

A SOLUTION: PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

Police could be more effective if they reduced their reliance on traditional methods and instead relied on tailor-made responses that coordinate the activities of people and agencies both inside and outside the criminal justice system. How would such a police department work? How would it be structured? How well would it control crime and disorder? The problem-oriented approach is new, but the experiences of innovative departments suggest some intriguing answers.

Designing Problem-Oriented Policing

The heart of problem-oriented policing is systematic thinking. Although problem solving has been conducted in very different ways in different departments, the most methodical approach has been adopted in Newport News, Virginia.

The Newport News Police Department based its problem-solving system on three principles. First, officers of all ranks, from all units, should be able to use the procedures as part of their daily routine. Second, the system must encourage officers to collect information from a broad range of sources and not limit themselves to conventional police data. Finally, the system should encourage "coproduction" solutions not limited to the criminal justice process.

After several months of work, a department task force developed a problem-solving process that fit these criteria. It consists of four parts:

• Scanning. As part of their daily routine, officers are expected to look for possible problems.

• Analysis. Officers then collect information about the problem. They rely on a Problem Analysis Guide, developed by the task force, which directs officers to examine offenders, victims, the social and physical environment, and previous responses to the problem. The goal is to understand the scope, nature, and causes of the problem.

• Response. The knowledge gained in the analysis stage is then used to develop and implement solutions. Officers seek the assistance of other police units, public and private organizations, and anyone else who can help.

• Assessment. Finally, officers evaluate the effectiveness of their response. They may use the results to revise the response, collect more data, or even redefine the problem.

Newport News's systematic process has since been adopted by other agencies interested in problem solving, including San Diego, Tulsa, Madison, and New York City. Similar approaches have been adopted, although less explicitly, by other police agencies that have experimented with problem-oriented policing.

Problem Solving in Practice

Since the early 1980s, police agencies have applied the problem-solving approach to a wide variety of problems. To illustrate the breadth of problems and solutions that are possible, three case studies are described here. The first two are serious and complex problems—one affecting a residential neighborhood, the other an entire city—that succumbed to careful analysis and comprehensive responses. The third case is an apparently difficult neighborhood problem that was solved in only a few hours through careful observation and a little thought.

New York Retirees Sting Drug Dealers. When out-of-towners think of New York City, they think first of the Empire State Building, Wall Street, and Broadway—the glitz and glitter of Manhattan. But New Yorkers tend to think first of districts like Sunset Park in Brooklyn, a neighborhood of row houses and small businesses peopled by a mix of working- and middle-class Irish, Italians, Puerto Ricans, and Blacks. Contrary to the national stereotype, Sunset Park is clean. Many streets are lined with trees. The district is dotted with vest-pocket parks containing such amenities as handball and basketball courts for the vigorous; sandboxes and swings for the young, and sunny benches for the relaxed.

Chief Clifton knew that he could not stop the robberies with police presence unless he assigned his officers to stand guard at every convenience store in the city. Instead, he directed his officers to search for another way of mandating crime prevention measures. Their research revealed that the cities of Akron, Ohio, and Coral Gables, Florida, had passed ordinances requiring merchants to take certain crime prevention measures, and that these ordinances had reduced the incidence of robbery. Clifton and his officers began drafting such an ordinance for Gainesville.

By the summer of 1986, the department was ready to present its findings to the City Commission. The proposed ordinance would require convenience stores to remove window advertising, place cash registers in full view of the street, install security cameras and outside lighting, and limit the amount of cash available in the register. Most important, it would require two or more employees, trained in crime prevention techniques, to work late at night. In July, the City Commission overruled the objections of the convenience store owners and passed the ordinance.

The stores fought the ordinance in court, arguing that the crime prevention measures would be costly and ineffective. But the judge found the police department's research to be persuasive. The store owners' injunction was denied, and the ordinance took effect on schedule.

The first year after the adoption of the new ordinance brought encouraging results: convenience store robberies were down by 65 percent overall, and by 75 percent at night. Best of all, the robbery rate was reduced far below its pre-1985 levels. Convenience stores continue to do a land-office business in Gainesville, and many store owners now admit—a bit grudgingly—that the police department's citywide approach has solved a difficult problem.

Persistent problems are natural targets of problem solving. It is easy to see how time-consuming research and complex crime prevention measures can be worth the effort if they will help to remove a longstanding problem. But many crime and disorder problems are temporary and nagging, rather than persistent and severe; they do not merit lengthy analysis and complicated responses. Still, thinking systematically about even a minor problem can often reveal quick solutions that are easy to implement.

Newport News Skates out of Trouble. The quiet nights of a middle-class Newport News neighborhood were spoiled when groups of rowdy teenagers began to frequent the area on Fridays and Saturdays. There had been no violence, and the kids' primary offenses were loud music, horseplay, and occasional vandalism. But residents felt the teenagers were unpredictable, particularly since they came from the city's mostly Black southeast side, several miles away. The neighborhood became a regular stop for officers working the evening shift.

Sergeant Jim Hogan recognized that responding to these calls took time but accomplished little except to irritate everyone involved. One Friday night he asked the beat officer, Paul Summerfield, to look into the problem and develop a better solution.

Summerfield suspected that the source of the problem might be a roller skating rink. The rink had been trying to increase business by offering reduced rates and transportation on Friday and Saturday nights. As he drove north toward the rink later that night, Summerfield saw several large groups of youths walking south. Other kids were still hanging around the rink, which had closed shortly before. Summerfield talked to several of them and found that they were waiting for a bus. The others, he was told, had become impatient and begun the three-mile walk home. Then Summerfield talked to the rink owner. The owner told him he had leased the bus to pick up and drop off kids who lived far from the rink. But he said there were always more kids needing rides at the end of the night than the bus had picked up earlier.

When Officer Summerfield returned to the skating rink early the next evening, he saw about fifty youngsters get out of the bus rented by the skating rink. But he saw others get out of the public transit buses that stopped running at midnight, and he saw parents in pajamas drop their kids off, then turn around and go home. Clearly the rink's bus would be unable to take home all the kids who would be stranded at closing time.

Summerfield consulted Sergeant Hogan. They agreed that the skating rink owner should be asked to bus the kids home. Summerfield returned to the rink Monday and spoke with the owner. When informed of the size of the problem he had unwittingly created, the owner agreed to lease more buses. By the next weekend, the buses were in use and Summerfield and Hogan saw no kids walking home.

Elapsed time from problem identification to problem solution: one week. Resources used: about four hours of an officer's time. Results: fewer calls, happier kids, satisfied homeowners.

Institutionalizing Problem-oriented Policing

Problem-oriented policing is a state of mind, not a program, technique, or procedure. Problem-solving procedures and analysis guides can be helpful, but only if they encourage clear-headed analysis of problems and an uninhibited search for solutions. Moreover, there are any number of ways of implementing the approach. The New York Police Department established a special unit to focus on neighborhood problems full time; in Newport News, all officers are obliged to spend some of their time identifying and working out problems. There is a place for problem solving in any agency's standard operating procedures. In the long run, however, it is likely that the problem-oriented approach will have its most dramatic impact on the management structure of American policing and on the relationship between the police, other city agencies, and the public.

Changes in Management Structure. As the case studies considered above suggest, crime and disorder problems are fundamentally local and specialized in nature. As a result, they are best analyzed and responded to on a case-by-case basis by the line officers and detectives assigned to the problem neighborhood or crime type. Implementing this approach will require changes in the centralized, control-oriented organizational structure and management style of most police agencies. Command staff and mid-level managers can structure problem-solving efforts by creating standard operating procedures, such as the problem-solving process created in Newport News. They can also encourage effective and innovative efforts by rewarding the officers who undertake them. But they cannot make the many individual decisions that are required to identify, analyze, and solve problems.

Despite these amenities, for years the neighborhood park at the corner of 49th Street and 5th Avenue had lured only drug users looking for a quick score. Respectable residents avoided the park, fearing confrontations with the drug traffickers. The New York Police Department tried to respond to the problem, directing its officers to patrol the park and issue loitering citations to apparent dealers. This dispersed the dealers and users—until the patrol car had turned the corner and disappeared from view. Then business returned to normal. Not surprisingly, the problem persisted.

In May 1986, Officer Vinny Esposito was assigned to the 49th Street beat. As one of the first members of New York's innovative Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP), Esposito was expected to do more than just handle individual incidents on his beat. His job was to identify and solve recurring problems. The drug-ridden 49th Street park clearly fit the bill, and Esposito went to work.

At first, Esposito used the old tactics. He spent as much time in the park as he could, dispersing dealers and making arrests whenever possible. Unfortunately, his beat was large and the time he could spend in the park was limited. Worse yet, every arrest took him away from the park for an hour or more—and whenever he left, the junkies returned. Weeks passed with no apparent effect on the drug trade. Esposito considered the problem further, and decided to take a different tack.

He began by recognizing that loitering citations and even drug arrests were at worst minor inconveniences to the dealers and users, since few arrests led to jail or prison terms. On the other hand, Esposito reasoned, the threat of losing hundreds or thousands of dollars worth of drugs could be a serious deterrent. Dealers, recognizing their vulnerability in the event of a police field stop, typically hid their stashes in the park. Esposito could seize the dope if he knew where it was hidden—but that required the assistance of local residents.

Esposito held meetings of the tenants in the apartment buildings that overlooked the park. Many tenants were elderly and spent most of their days at home. Esposito asked them to watch the dealers from their windows and report the locations of any drug stashes they saw to the local precinct station. Reassured that their tips would remain completely anonymous, the frustrated tenants readily agreed to help.

Calls began coming in. For each one, a CPOP officer at the precinct station took down the information and radioed the location of the stash to Officer Esposito, who then confiscated the drugs and took them to the station. Within twenty minutes of each tip, Esposito was back on the beat and the dealers were a little bit poorer.

This new strategy had several effects. Some dealers found themselves having to explain to unsympathetic suppliers where their goods had gone. Others began keeping their stashes on their person, making them more vulnerable to arrest. Others simply quit the park. Within one month, all the dealers had gotten the message—and the park was free of drugs.

Today, the park is a different place. Children play on the swings, youths play basketball. Many of the older residents who once sat at home, phoning in anonymous tips, now spend their days sunning themselves on the benches of "their" park. They show no signs of giving it back to the dealers.

The actions taken by Officer Esposito and local residents may not work as well anywhere else. But the thinking that led to their actions can. Like the Sunset Park case, many persistent problems affect residents of small neighborhoods the most. As Officer Esposito's actions illustrate, these problems can often be solved with the resident's help. But other such problems are not restricted to small localities—they affect residents throughout the city. For problems like these, citywide changes in policies and practices are necessary. Sometimes there is a citywide "community of interest" that can be relied upon to assist the police in much the same way that the elderly residents of Sunset Park helped clear the drug dealers out of their vest-pocket park. Merchant associations, chain retail stores, and citywide community groups may all be of assistance. Even when these communities are uncooperative, however, the police may still be able to solve the problem.

Gainesville Puts the Brakes on QuikStop Crime. When the university town of Gainesville, Florida, was hit with a rash of convenience store robberies in spring 1985, the police recognized that they were dealing with more than just a series of unrelated incidents. The department's crime analysts expected to find that one or two repeat offenders were responsible for the robberies, but suspect descriptions provided by the victims proved otherwise—many different offenders were responsible. Word had apparently spread that convenience stores were an easy target. Police Chief Wayland Clifton, Jr., wondered why, and detailed several members of his department to find out.[21]

Gainesville police officers compared the stores that were robbed to others that were not. Their conclusions were revealing. Many of the stores that had been robbed had posted large advertisements in their front windows, blocking the view from the street. Often, the checkout stand could not be seen by a passing car or pedestrian. Many stores failed to light their parking lots, further limiting visibility. Others kept large sums of money in the cash register, and some provided only one inexperienced employee during the late night hours. The stores that had not been robbed tended to provide better visibility, limit the amount of cash in the register, and train their employees in crime prevention techniques. Thus the criminals seemed to be focusing on the most lucrative and vulnerable targets.

To confirm their findings, the Gainesville Police arranged for a psychologist at a local university to interview sixty-five offenders who were serving sentences for convenience store robberies. This independent analysis provided even clearer results: would-be robbers avoided stores staffed by two clerks. Many of the robbers were simply taking advantage of available opportunities; if they had had trouble finding stores with only one clerk on duty, many of the robberies might never have been committed at all.

The police department presented these findings to an association of local merchants that had been established to develop a response to the problem. The police asked for a commitment to change the conditions that made robberies easy to commit. They were disappointed: the merchants felt that the solution lay in more frequent police patrols, and they refused to agree to voluntary crime prevention standards. In effect, the merchants argued that the costs of convenience store crime prevention should be borne by the public as a whole rather than by the stores themselves.

Inevitably, the changes in structure and style will affect line supervisors—sergeants—the most. Problem solving puts a dual burden on supervisors. On the one hand, they must make many of the tough, operational decisions: setting priorities among different problems, facilitating communication and cooperation with other divisions of the police department and outside agencies, and making sure their officers solve the problems they are assigned. On the other hand, sergeants must also provide leadership, encouraging creative analysis and response. As the sergeant's role shifts from taskmaster to team leader, police agencies must take greater care in selecting, training, and rewarding their line supervisors.

As the structure and style of police agencies change, managers must also shift their focus from internal management problems to the external problems of the public. When a few routine procedures such as preventive patrol, rapid response, and follow-up investigations formed the bulk of an agency's activity, the manager's job was mostly to remove barriers to efficient execution of these routines. Good managers streamlined administrative procedures and reduced paperwork; they implemented new resource deployment schemes; they structured officer discretion.[22] They did not need to emphasize crime and disorder reduction, since crimes and disorders would presumably take care of themselves if the routines were implemented properly.

On the other hand, problem-solving activities are inherently nonroutine; it is far more important to choose the correct response from among many possibilities—to "do the right thing"—than it is to "do things right." Thus managers must shift their attention from internal efficiency measures to external effectiveness measures. And they must shift from global, city- and precinct-wide measures to carefully defined, problem-specific measures. Instead of citywide clearance and arrest rates, police must emphasize neighborhood crime rates; instead of counting the number of tickets written by all officers, they must count the number of auto accidents on particular stretches of road. Implicitly, police must recognize that problem-specific crime rates, accident rates, and the like are partly within their control. Whereas no agency can be held accountable for citywide crime and accident rates, police managers and officers must accept partial responsibility for conditions in their areas.

Changes in Police Role. Of course, crime, disorder, and other evils are only partly the responsibility of the police. As the three case studies illustrate, police cannot solve these problems by themselves; they need help from other public service agencies, the business community, and the public. The need to obtain cooperation and assistance from these "coproducers" of public safety requires that the role of the police agency must change.

One fundamental change will be in the autonomy of the police relative to other public service agencies. Urban bureaucracies are currently structured along functional lines—public works maintains roads and sewers, codes compliance ensures that building codes are met, and so on. But if urban problems are interrelated and concentrated, as the research and case studies presented above suggest, then these functional distinctions begin to blur. The activities of the public works, codes, and other departments affect (and perhaps worsen) the problems of all the other departments, so at a minimum they must communicate to one another what they are doing about a problem and why. A more ambitious and effective strategy would be for them to develop and implement a common response. In the short run, each agency gives up some of its "turf"; in the long run, each agency saves itself a lot of work.

Problem-oriented police agencies have found that line personnel in other agencies can be "hidden allies," bending procedures to get the job done. For example, one police agency attempted to solve a recurring traffic accident problem at a blind corner by convincing the traffic engineer to install a stop sign. The engineer refused to comply until he had conducted his own study; unfortunately, many similar problems were already awaiting study, so the engineer would not be able to consider the corner for several months. Then a police officer discovered that the public works personnel who actually installed the signs could replace a missing or deteriorated sign within a few days, and that the roadworkers would be happy to install the "missing" stop sign. The work order was placed, and the sign was installed within a week. Now police officers in this jurisdiction regularly bypass the traffic engineer and deal directly with the traffic engineer and deal directly with public works officials.

Hidden allies may help get the job done, but in the long run turf difficulties are best surmounted when top managers—city managers and department heads—recognize the value of a cooperative, problem-solving approach and urge their managers and line personnel to comply. This puts the onus on problem-oriented police administrators to educate and lobby their colleagues, running interference for their officers. As will be discussed later, such an education effort may ultimately result in substantial changes in the city bureaucracy.

Problem-oriented policing also requires that police take on a different role with regard to the public it serves. At present, police ask little more of citizens than that they report crimes, be good witnesses, and stand aside to let the professionals do their job. As with public service agencies, however, problem solving requires that the police and the public communicate and cooperate more frequently, on a wider variety of issues. In particular, problem-oriented police agencies recognize that citizens often know their problems more intimately than the police do, and that sometimes citizens know better what must be done.

This raises many difficult questions. Just as different public service agencies see different aspects of a problem, so do different groups of citizens. If there is no consensus among the community of interest as to the nature of the problem, but public cooperation is necessary to solve it, the police must play a role in forging this consensus. Few police agencies are well equipped for such essentially political activities.

The dilemma is even more serious when the conflict is of values, not just perceptions. Quiet residents of an urban neighborhood may see nothing wrong with police harassment of their rowdier neighbors; the rowdies may legitimately claim that they have the right to be raucous so long as they end their loud parties before midnight and do not threaten other residents. In dealing with such a problem, police must balance the rights and needs of the two groups. This is hardly new—police have always had to balance the goals of serving the majority while guarding the liberties of the minority. Because the problem-oriented approach encourages police to seek such difficult situations, however, they may find themselves making such tough choices more

often. On the other hand, problem solving also emphasizes the power of information and cooperative action over the power of formal, unilateral authority. If police can develop a broader repertoire of solutions to conflicts like these, they may find that these tough choices are easier to make.

It remains to be seen how the limits on police authority will be set, but it is certain that problem solving will require a new consensus on the role, authority, and limitations of the police in each jurisdiction that adopts it.[23]

THE FUTURE: BEYOND PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

Problem-oriented policing is new. Traditional procedures die hard, problem solving methods are still under development, and no one knows for sure how successful the approach will be. As a result, no police agency has adopted the approach fully, and it will be a long time before many agencies do. On the other hand, problem-oriented policing is a realistic response to the limitations of traditional, incident-driven policing. It relies on our growing knowledge of the nature of crime and disorder, and it has been successful in a wide variety of police agencies, for a wide variety of urban crime and disorder problems. The problem-oriented approach seems to be where police work is going.

It also seems to be where other urban service agencies are going. Problem-oriented approaches have been implemented on an experimental basis in electric utilities,[24] urban transit authorities,[25] and recreation and parks departments.[26] Over the next few years, it makes sense to expect dramatic growth in the use of problem-solving techniques not only in municipal policing but in other areas as well. It is likely, then, that problem-oriented police officers will find problem-oriented firefighters, housing inspectors, and others to work with.

This seems to be the case in Madison, Wisconsin, where city agencies have been working on problem solving since 1984. The city has implemented a program of quality and productivity improvement, a form of problem solving originally developed in the private sector to improve the quality of manufactured goods. Project teams have been established within most city agencies, consisting of line personnel, supervisors, and managers, often working with a statistical consultant. They identify a recurring problem within their agency, usually an administrative bottleneck, and use methods successful in private industry to analyze and solve it.[27] Although most Madison city agencies have concentrated on administrative problems, some—including the Madison Police Department—are beginning to extend the methods to public problems. When Madison police officers take on a public problem, chances are they will find sympathetic and experienced problem solvers to work with in other agencies.

The growing use of problem-oriented approaches should help to reduce turf problems. As standard operating procedures become more flexible and decisionmaking becomes decentralized, line officials may find that they owe as much allegiance to their colleagues from other agencies as they do to their own bureaucracies. One natural method of institutionalizing these developments would be to adopt a matrix organizational structure. Neighborhood teams, consisting of members of the police, fire, public works, and other departments, would work together on a formal basis to deliver urban services. Although full implementation of a matrix is a long way off, the foundation for such a structure has already been laid in New York City. All urban service agencies are decentralized into eighty-eight districts with identical boundaries; citizens participate in agency decisionmaking through community boards, a permanent part of the city government structure.[28]

A central element of problem-oriented policing is that administrative arrangements are less important than the activities that line officers undertake. But just as the centralized, control-oriented police structure helped police administrators to institutionalize incident-driven policing, so might a decentralized, team-based matrix help city managers to institutionalize problem-oriented urban service provision.

Such an interagency team approach would also provide long-term benefits for the relationship between city government and the public. More problem solvers would be available, with different backgrounds, viewpoints, and opportunities for contact with the public; this would improve the chances of early identification and complete analysis of problems. Because they would report to different bureaucracies, members of problem-solving teams would act as a check on one another, reducing many of the potential dangers of community problem solving. Finally, the teams would provide a unified contact point for frustrated citizens who would otherwise be unable to negotiate their way through the city bureaucracy. If problem-solving teams can be linked to community organizations, the opportunities for cooperative efforts would increase dramatically.

Such benefits, like the interagency team or matrix structure, are speculative. Problem-oriented policing is not. It provides a tested, practical approach for police agencies frustrated with putting Band-Aids on symptoms. By responding to recurring problems, and by working with other agencies, businesses, and the public whenever possible, innovative police agencies have begun to develop an effective strategy for reducing crime and other troubling conditions in our cities.

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CHANGING THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
TO SERVE THE COMMUNITY
Darrel Stephens, Betsy Watson
Fort Worth, Texas
September 1990

Darrel Stephens: My name's Darrel Stephens. I'm the Executive
Director for the Police Executive Research Forum. I'm with Betsy
Watson, who is the Police Chief from the City of Houston, Texas.
I don't know how many of you sat in this morning on the session
on "The Move to Community Policing."

Betsy Watson: How many did?

Darrel Stephens: This afternoon's session is aimed at talking
about issues with respect to changing the police department and
its structure to serve this notion of community policing. We
thought this afternoon we would both hit just a couple of issues,
things we think are important with respect to changing the
structure to be more responsive, a police department that focuses
on this philosophy of community-oriented policing, and not spend
as much time with us talking about those issues, but give more
opportunity for us to have a discussion, and for people in the
audience to make comments and that type of thing, rather than
using the time for one-way communication.

There's five or six issues that we've seen in our experiences
with different communities, cities around the country, with
implementing these concepts that are going to be issues that
people have to confront. They are probably not issues that you
don't confront in some respects with the traditional kinds of
policing that you have, but they are issues that you have to
confront when you move this way.

Whenever you start talking in a police department about doing
community-oriented policing or problem-oriented policing, or
doing something that people in the organization view as extra,

you immediately confront the resource allocation issue. I've never worked in a police department or worked for a police department that when you started talking about change, that the immediate response was we don't have enough people. We can't handle the calls we've got now. We can't deal with the crime problems. We can't fill the cars that we have out there. So one of the very first things you have to confront is the staffing levels of the police department. Part of the reason that those questions are there has to do with how officers are scheduled or deployed or how the calls for service are managed, and those kind of things. Part of the reason those questions are there is because it never really occurs much to the police that if we're going to do something different that we stop doing, or handle something in a different way than we'd been doing before. The automatic assumption is, well, if you want me to meet with the community, or you want me to look at problems and issues in a different way and work on analysis, that means I have to do that in addition to whatever I've been doing before. Initially, or to a certain extent, you might, but we have had some experiences in police departments where, as they start looking at repeat calls, for example, and start looking at why the police continue to go back to these same locations over and over again, and they begin to find some solutions. They're not always law enforcement or police solutions, but they begin to find some solutions to those, and rather than accepting the idea that calls for service are something that is going to grow from now on and for the rest of our lives and into the future, they begin to have an impact on the number of calls for service. They solved the problem at the convenience store, for example, that generates 5-600 calls for the police each year. They solved the problem at the apartment complex that calls a continual stream of police officers to be responding to that place over and over and over again. Instead of making 500 calls, they may only make 100 calls, and the time that they gain from that is time that can be redirected back into other activities.

It is always a big issue in police departments as to whether or not we should start this program, and part of the problem is viewing it as a program, is whether we should start this in a special unit or we should aim at having this idea everyone in the police department involved in, officers on the street, investigators, and that type of thing. A good number of departments respond to these things by starting special units. They say, well, we are doing community policing, and here's our community policing officers over here to the side, or here's our community policing effort that's in, I mean, two weeks ago it was crime prevention and now it's community policing, but we overlay that on top of whatever structures we have, and never reach the point to where the officers on the street themselves are engaged in these kind of activities. It's okay to start as a special unit. Sometimes it's a good strategy to introduce some change into the organization, but if there's no thought given to how we transfer that idea from this special unit into the everyday operating life of the bulk of your resources in your police agency, and then you're not making as much use of this kind of philosophy, and it actually won't survive very long, because that's one of the first things that goes under the resource pressures, is some of the special units. The bulk of the resources in a police department, everybody knows, is in operations, patrol and investigations, and if whatever you do is your main thrust and your main strategy of a police department, if it doesn't affect those people, and if those people aren't doing something different than what they were doing before, then you are not going to have any real change take place in the organization and the organizational life and the way they serve the public.

This philosophy of policing that we're talking about requires some good solid, strong informational support, both from within the police department and within other aspects of city government. Many, many times as officers start to look at some

of these issues, and they search the police files, and they find out that, yeah, we're going there a lot. We're arresting a lot of people. There's a lot of crimes that occur here, but quite frequently they never realize until they start looking outward, that in addition to the police department, whatever health services are there are spending a lot of time dealing with some of those same issues; problems are over in public works, or codes people are spending a lot of time and energy all in that same location, and they don't communicate a lot until they start looking at that underlying problem and searching for the information that may have a much greater impact on this problem than just what the police issues are.

Supervisory and management roles--when you start pushing authority and responsibility and discretion down to the lowest levels of the organization and begin to ask police officers to start looking for problems and granting them wider ranges of authority to work on these issues, there begins to be some tension and some struggles with the supervisory and management parts of the police department. It's a much more complex kind of environment for a sergeant or a lieutenant or a captain to manage than it is where you view your role as making sure the officers show up, and calling roll call, and getting them out in the car, and assigning them a case to go investigate, and that type of thing. So there's a lot of issues with respect to supervision and management.

This idea of policing also pushes, in my view, to be effective in the long run, pushes you toward a more decentralized structure, and I know that we spent a lot of time in the 60s and 70s in policing in bringing things under tighter control--centralizing-- doing away with all those substations and doing away with a lot of things that we viewed as being inefficient over those times, and centralized command and centralize the decision making process within the organizations as much as it can be in

policing. But, again, when you ask officers to start working
with the community and looking for problems and looking for the
underlying causes of those problems, we've got to push that
authority back out. We've got to look for ways that they can
make decisions, and they can follow through with, and they can
deal with these issues without going--they've got to be able to
talk to the public works department and codes and compliance
without going on up to the chief of police and over to the head
of codes and back down. There's a lot of issues that police
departments encounter along those lines.

Those are a few issues that I've seen as you begin to take this
concept and operationalize it within police departments, and
Betsy is going to talk about a few more, and then we'll open up
the floor and try to address questions or talk.

Betsy Watson: As Darrel started out saying, I am chief of the
Houston Police Department and have served in that capacity only
since January of this year. I have been in the department,
however, for 18 years, having served in all of the lower ranks
before this one. For the past three years, my sole
responsibility as deputy chief was to implement this community-
based policing style, and there is no question that it involves
changing the way people think about police service, and I don't
think there's much debate over the fact that police organizations
generally tend to be very traditional, very conservative, to hold
steadfastly and proudly to this title of law enforcement officer,
and yet the research definitely has shown that we spend the vast
majority of our time doing things that are not directly related
to law enforcement. Whether it is spending time in schools on
drug education programs with the children, or finding shelter for
the homeless, or doing the myriad of public service kinds of
things we are called upon to do, it doesn't generally involve
enforcing the law. What we have come to understand about all
these other kinds of service activities is that they are somehow

a diversion, something to pull us away from the primary task at hand which is arresting criminals and putting them in prisons.

So we are kind of in a dilemma in many respects. We are victims of our own success. We have arrested so many people that the prisons are full to overflowing, and we have early release in most of the major cities, and a kind of paranoia that sets in to the community, and a sense of frustration that sets into the minds and hearts of the police officers.

What we have been trying to do is to look for creative alternatives, new ways to look at old problems, because we are in dire need of a new way of approaching old issues.

There are a number of things that happened in my experience at Westside Command that lead me to believe that no matter how many procedures we put in place, no matter how many programs we establish, and no matter how hard we try to tell our officers to be nice and to respect people and to smile when they deliver service, it's just not that simple. It is far more complex, and invariably, what comes back to management is a kind of cynicism on the part of the officers who say, yeah, you talk a good talk. You live in an idealistic world where everything is supposed to turn out right, but the fact of the matter is, we don't get any support for the kinds of things we are doing. I listened to that for a long time from the naysayers. I had in my command there at Westside, and I had only about 350 police officers, and they divided into camps. You had the ones who went out and did the job that we asked them to do, and they did a magnificent job. I mean, single officers would go into neighborhoods and make incredible changes by forming these little working coalitions with people in the neighborhoods. On the other hand, I had a whole camp of officers who not only did not believe that was the direction the department should be taking, but who undermined the efforts of the officers who were out there doing it. They would

say things like, "yeah, fine, you're out there kissing babies and shaking hands, and who do you think's carrying your call load while you're out of the car, bubba? I'm the one who's picking up the load. I'm the one who's carrying your share of the burden. And why don't you get back in the car and do what policing is all about."

So I sat down with some of these naysayers and said, "all right, tell me really what the problem is." Once we got back to things like "what's in it for me? I'm not getting paid any more. Nobody ever got fired for doing nothing. Why should I go out there and take all these risks? Where's the benefit?" When we got through the initial phase of complaints, we started zeroing. in on some areas that are incredibly important, and the common theme that runs among them is that we can't just talk about doing things differently. It isn't even enough for a few managers in the organization to start thinking differently. We really have to create a culture and an environment throughout the organization that is one which rewards activity which is over and above the norm. Activity which is indicative of initiative and problem solving and creativity, and to the extent that we don't actually do it, to the extent that we only talk about it, we create not only in the minds of the police officers, but in the community generally, a sense of frustration because there's this false expectation. Something is going to happen differently, only nothing ever does.

So as I had started talking about it this morning, what we are about in Houston is revamping and reevaluating every system, every function, every division in the department so it more clearly reflects the commitment we have to neighborhood-oriented policing.

For one thing, we have revamped our disciplinary process. Traditionally, we have had automatic discipline. If an officer,

for example, fails to attend court when he has been subpoenaed, that's a day off. No discussion; no debate; you lose a day's pay. We have a situation where officers are supposed to qualify with their firearms during their birthday month. If they don't do it, it's a day off. You don't talk about it; you lose your day. And so it is with much of the discipline where an officer is written up and penalty imposed, and there is nothing done in terms of trying to find out why the problem occurred or to keep it from happening again. It is purely negative discipline; purely punitive. We have revamped the disciplinary system so that there is a great deal more participation on the part of the officer who has actually been accused of the wrongdoing, to give his or her side of the story, and on the part of the managers in the organization to contribute what each thinks will correct the behavior in the future.

We are moving toward a value-based system as opposed to directive because for too long we have tried to manage what the officers do by written word. It seems to me that if an officer is guilty of some misconduct, it is insufficient for me as chief to pull out the rule and regulation that's been violated, and say here, here's the rule and regulation and here's your discipline, because what happens is the officers hire an attorney who then attacks the written word and says this is a really poorly written rule. The reason the officer violated it is because he didn't understand. So it becomes a debate on words, on directives, not on what it is that we value as an organiztion.

It seems to me that the burden of proof ought to fall not only on management with regard to the written rule, but also on the officer, to show that he behaved in a way that reflects what it is we believe in; that did, in fact, preserve the sanctity of human life that was intended to reinforce the strength of the neighborhood, to enhance quality of life in the community; that the officer did, indeed, exhibit professional demeanor, and if

all of those things exist, then the actual procedures are less important. It's a distinction that we haven't often made in policing, and certainly not in Houston.

We are taking a look at our calls for service management, because one of the frequent complaints is I don't have time to problem solve; I don't have time to talk to people in the neighborhoods because there are too many calls for service. Indeed, some of that argument is correct, although none of the officers could be as busy as each says that he is; it's not possible.

There, nevertheless, is an escalating volume of calls for service and diminishing resources with which to answer them, so we have established teleserve capability as a first step. We did that a couple of years ago, and we found out when we did our workloads demand analysis, just as a result of the teleserve unit, we needed 500 fewer police officers than we would have without the teleserve unit. One officer can handle 20 reports on the phone, whereas it takes an officer in the field to handle 4.

We have to take a look at developing working relationships with the constables and the security guards and all of the private eyes, the detectives, that the communities hire to handle some of their security problems. There has been a natural animosity in the past between the public police officer and these private security guards, but there are a number of things those individuals can do that will take some of the call load off; for example, loud noise complaints, dumping, vandalism, and mischief complaints. There are some things that they can, in fact, serve to supplement what it is we are doing, and we are exploring those kinds of things.

We are taking a look at our recruiting and the kinds of training. Rather than pull officers in for classroom instruction and then turning them loose into the department, we're coming up with a

more interactive training relationship. You know, when I came through the academy in 1972, I spent four months in the classroom, and when I got out on the street, the first thing I heard was "forget all that crap you learned in the academy; I'm going to teach you what policing's really about." It is part of the culture that the officers learn very quickly. What we're doing now is pulling the officers in for classroom training and then sending them out into the field to practice what it is they have learned. Then we bring them back into the classroom and say, "okay, how was it different from what you expected?" We go on to phase two. This is something we are just now developing, but the idea is to build in a sense in the officer's mind, the young cadet's mind, that this is my neighborhood. This is where I'm going to work, and I'm responsible for what it is that happens there. If it's good, I'm responsible, and if it's bad, I'm responsible.

We have changed the way in which we prioritize calls for service, and we have transferred the management of the calls for service from the central dispatch function to the first line supervisor in the field. I don't know how it's done in police departments across the country, but generally speaking, you have a centralized dispatch unit that classifies the calls for service, then you have a dispatcher that decides who is going to run what call and when. What we have done in Houston is had a shared responsibility. We have the dispatchers classify the call and announce the call, but seeing to it that it gets answered and when is the responsibility of the officer and his first line supervisor. Now the sergeants have resisted that. They keep saying it's not their job; it's the dispatcher's job to handle those calls for service, to manage them. When I go back to them, as I have, and said, okay, so tell me exactly what your job is, they say, well, you know. Well, I do know, and I know that it could be more than it is.

So I guess what I'm saying to you is there's not one system or function in the department that is not being completely revamped. We have, fortunately, enormous support from the people in the organization, because when we attack some of these problems, we're not attacking them because we are dissatisfied, but because the officers themselves are dissatisfied. The officers don't like the fact that there's no reward for doing good. They don't like the fact that there's no penalty for doing nothing. They don't like the fact that there's so many calls for service they can't answer them all. When we offer them an opportunity to come together with management and say, all right, let's troubleshoot this thing and come up with a strategy that might work differently and better, and let's bounce it off some members of the community, they like it. They like the idea of having input, and.I think the product that we achieve as a result is a better product than many that we have had up until now.

At this point, I guess we can open it for questions.

Audience: Could you be a little more specific on what you have done to counter the attitude that there's no penalty to doing nothing?

Betsy Watson: Okay. The pervasive mentality about no penalty for doing nothing is one that I think is more talked about than actually perceived. One of the reasons I say that is because one of the officers at a roll call that I made recently said that he was just going to find himself a shade tree because there is no penalty for doing nothing. He wasn't going to go out there and expose himself to any kind of risk. An hour later, I saw that same officer furiously working at the computer and barking orders out to some of his compadres saying, well, you know, you need to contact Ms. Jones and tell her we're going to be out there, and you need to have the surveillance over here, etc. What had h pened is that he had been dispatched to a burglary call first

thing out of the gun, and at the burglary scene he had found a slip of paper that had a series of addresses on, and when he went back and checked them in the computer, seven of the addresses had been burglarized. There were five more that had been spotted, including the one at that location, so he knew he had a shopping list, and he just really went to town. When I walked up to him and saw all that, I said, "is this what a shade tree looks like?" He looked at me, and he said, "Yeah, but this is different." Okay? So the fact of the matter is, we are dealing with, in my view, a very small proportion. It's not a pervasive thing. Most of the officers talk about not wanting to do anything, but very few actually carry it out.

In order to deal with that particular dilemma, what I have done is pulled some of the brightest and the best officers and said, "okay, you tell me what makes a good officer a good officer, and how it is I reward a good officer for being that. What we are developing this fiscal year, as a matter of fact, which ends in June, is what we are calling a master police officer alternate career path. We have never had one. I don't know if you have them in your cities. In Houston we have a system where all police officers get paid the same. It's governed by state law. You cannot pay an officer any kind of a bonus or any kind of an incentive for doing something extraordinary. We are this year creating an alternate career path where officers have a choice of doing one of several different things. One, they can take the written examination to be a sergeant and proceed up the administrative and supervisory ladder. Alternatively, they have increased opportunities to go into some of the specialized units in the department. That's number two. Number three, they can stay in patrol in the uniformed component and get paid extra for it. In order to get paid extra, we're establishing criteria whereby you have to be involved in community activity off and on duty. You have to have completed so many extracurricular hours of training, which is available both at the police academy and in

some of the local universities. Other criteria are being developed by police officers, by those officers who recognize that there are some individuals who create more, and by extrapolating those qualities and then paying extra for them, we have an opportunity to reward the high performers.

One of the things that's coming about as a result of just their preliminary discussions is that some of the people who haven't been doing anything for years are saying, "well, now wait. If there's money attached here, maybe I can take another look at this."

Audience: To what extent did you get employee participation and consensus building in order to support this change?

Betsy Watson: All right. Initially we did too little. Initially what we had is a group of academics who came up with a training program, and we administered it to our officers and said this is what we want you to do differently. We also told the supervisors, this is what your officers are going to be doing differently, so you will know. Okay? And it just didn't work. It didn't work at all. What we are doing differently now: several months ago we established what we call an employee council. The employee council consists of a representative from every shift of every division in the department, and we meet on a monthly basis. There's 142 people that are represented in that way, and they come together monthly to meet with the chief and the members of the command staff, the assistant and deputy chiefs. The first session that we had was to identify all of the gripes that everybody has, and I'm telling you, there were pages. Then we had the people prioritize them, assign a score. What we are doing now is we're going down methodically dealing with the primary issues first, and we developed task forces of like ten people each, and say, okay, here is the problem. It is not sufficient for you to identify a problem and tell management it's

management's fault it's not fixed because we don't know how to fix it any better than you do, but together we probably can work it out. So we get this task force of ten people, and we assign an assistant chief to the group to make sure that they have the resources that they need to do the research, etc. Every month they go back in written form and orally and give a briefing to the larger group. Each member of that group then goes back to his own roll call and delivers the message, and just Thursday I was in a meeting with my employee group leaders. Now I have four employee groups in Houston. I meet with them monthly. The chief has always done that, I mean, for years, as far as I can remember. Certainly since Lee Brown was there, these meetings occurred. So one of the employee group leaders said he didn't think it was fair that I was meeting with all of these people throughout the organization, and why couldn't they go to this employee council and deal with some of the issues. So I think it's getting a whole lot better. Initially when I first did it, there was a lot of resentment. People said, "well, you know the Economic Summit is coming to Houston, and the chief is concerned we're going to make fools of ourselves. She's just trying to throw some oil on the water here." But it has evolved into something really good.

Audience: (couldn't hear)

Betsy Watson: Did everybody hear the question? How critical to the change process are the supervisors and mid-level managers? What have we done to try to deal with that issue? That is one of the things that I look back now and realize was wrong, because by taking our message to the patrolmen, we left out the middle managers, and we had to pay a very dear price for it, because when the patrolmen tried to create new strategies, they would go to the sergeant with things like, "look, I've got a burglary problem. All I need is a plainclothes unit for three days," and the sergeant would say, "oh, so now you are a detective," and you

know, discourage this kind of activity. So what we did is we started kind of again at ground zero. The assistant chiefs developed an educational platform for the deputy chiefs and administered the training, because it seems to me the best way to learn something is to teach it. The assistant chiefs taught the deputy chiefs. The deputy chiefs then developed and administered a training component to the captains. The captains to the lieutenants, and next week we start the first session for sergeants. Now we have almost 600 sergeants in the organization, so it's going to take us a while to get through the curriculum, but every time we do it, it gets better, because every time we do it, we draw from an experience at each of the area stations where some officer has done something that reflects what we have been talking about all these years. Then we have these particular individuals get up and tell their story. It sounds different when you have sergeants hearing from another sergeant something that they have done versus hearing it from the chief. You know, it kind of hurts my ego, but sergeants have more credibility among sergeants than I do or than any chief. So it seems to be working very much better, and we're getting closer.

Darrel Stephens: If I could comment on that just a second, there have been different approaches in different communities around the country in dealing with the middle management, sergeant/lieutenant/captain area. While I was still in Newport News, and we went in this direction, because of some prior experience with change we focused pretty heavily on middle management level people. We brought them in in the very beginning in planning. They were the people that were guiding the direction in terms of the thinking of the officers, and we spent a lot of time with training and retreats, and still ended up with not a very good response from that group. It was still a struggle for us, and it's a struggle that six years from when we started, they are still struggling with middle managers.

A couple of activities that I participate in where we have two different groups that come together that talk about these issues, middle management is a struggle for almost every police department that I've been associated with or heard about, trying to wrestle through these issues.

I'm getting more and more to believe that in policing we need to step back a little bit and ask ourselves if we need a sergeant and a lieutenant and a captain and an inspector and a major and an assistant chief and a deputy chief, and however many others names they are called, and in some places corporals and supersergeants and just lots and lots of levels of organization. We keep struggling with defining roles at those levels, and I think it's fair for us to ask if there is a role for all of those levels, and maybe we need to redefine some of those jobs.

Audience: Are there any strategies for building better relationships between community groups and particular minorities?

Betsy Watson: We have a lot of different organizations throughout the city, and many of them are minority groups that are designed to have that kind of rapport. We emphasize in the minority community the churches, because both in the Hispanic and the black communities the ministers have a great deal of influence and prestige over the community at large. We meet with the ministers on a monthly basis, and hear their input and attend functions, go to the various churches, etc. We also endeavor to involve some of the community leaders into these problem solving sessions that we have to just talk through some of the issues. I find that it's not surprising there is no such thing as one voice. There isn't one Hispanic community; there isn't one black community; or one white community. It's a bunch of individuals with a bunch of different agendas that are trying to be played out, and the best thing from my perspective, what seems to work is really getting the officers and the managers, everybody, into

the community for the various functions that are going on, being seen and known, and then bringing the information back. It seems to work the best.

Darrel Stephens: One of the biggest issues is to focus on substance. I think you can only show your canines and you can only show your horse patrols, and you can only show your robot and those kinds of things at community meetings so many times. People get tired of that after a while. The departments that are most effective at dealing with neighborhoods and community groups are those that once they begin to establish this relationship, they focus on the problems of that neighborhood, and they become a partner in understanding the nature of those problems and trying to resolve them. One of the big issues that a lot of police departments are wrestling with that are moving toward a strategy is what's the proper role for them in community organizing, or is there a role?

END OF TAPE

....police departments are making conscious decisions to provide training to people in that skill and in that area, but dealing with substantive problems are the best relations.

Audience: I'd like to take it from a little different perspective. What have you done in the way of tying the city councils into this process? It seems to me if you're talking about a culture change and values here that these are the values that city council ties into, and it also seems to me that if you've got a problem or a serious problem in the police department buying into a new initiative, it won't be long before that surfaces politically, and the city council likes to take quick action in the public safety sector, in terms of dealing with serious crime or serious problems. I'm just wondering--I've heard a lot about the internal structure--I'm kind of wondering

what you've done with the city councils in pulling them into the process.

Audience: May I add to that question? From a personal perspective, not only are you a woman, but you don't have gray hair. You don't meet the expectation of what a police chief is supposed to look like.

Betsy Watson: Well, it's interesting. When the mayor first became serious about offering me this job, and I first became serious about saying no, I really don't want that job, I thought there was going to be a great deal of resistance from the community at large because I don't fit the mold. And also from the department, not only because I don't fit the mold, but because I have been known to take some pretty unpopular stands through the years. I'm a known commodity, and I thought I'm going to have resistance on that scale. It didn't happen, oddly enough. I have widespread support (knock on wood), I might find it different when I get back, in the community and in the department. I spend a great deal of time talking to the individual councilmembers, more than I would like, but really it just sometimes requires that on the various issues. What the councilmembers really want to know is not the way the department runs, but that the problems of their constituencies that are being raised on an individual basis are being addressed. To the extent that there is a problem with their constituency, then they want to know all the ins and outs about that particular thing, so it does take a lot of time and energy.

I have introduced the command level people into that process, because it used to be only the chief. I have the commanders also developing relationships with the various councilmembers, so that each knows that he or she can call not only me, but can call one of the commanders that they've learned to get to know, and get answers to their questions. We also have a very rapid turnaround

on any issue that the council raises. It's treated as a priority so they know they can get an answer out to whoever it is that's complaining to them, and it seems to go well.

In terms of my being a female, etc., in many respects it has worked to my advantage; not to say that I haven't taken on some political controversy. I have. I was talking to one of the leaders in the community, and I said, "you know, what's interesting here is that there's a lot of opposition for my particular view on this, but before someone gets up and speaks out against me, he starts by saying, 'now don't take this personally; we still want you to be chief.'" I said, "why is this? Why is it everybody keeps apologizing before they say something bad?" He said, "well, you know, you don't beat up on Uncle Sam, you don't beat up on apple pie, and you don't beat up on motherhood." So, you know, well, it works.

Darrel Stephens: I think city council is an area where most of the introduction to these concepts in communities around the country has been in the normal processes of your interaction with them. At budget time you may need additional money for training or additional money to do a certain thing, and you may have some discussions there. When you get a complaint about response time on a particular issue, you take that opportunity to try to educate city council people if the complaint happens to come from there, and you are involved in that response. It's more in the day-to-day interaction and work of the police department in trying to respond to those issues rather than sitting down and talking about the values that people are talking about in police departments, or an overall shift in strategy from a reactive focus on incidents to a more proactive focus on problems. It's probably not the best way to do it, but in my experience the council's got a lot of things on their plate, and it's hard to get them to focus, even though they deal a lot with police issues and complaints and things, it's hard to get them to focus and

step back and talk about philosophical issues and philosophical changes in the way you police a community, and the police role vis-a-vis the neighborhoods and the community themselves. It's just not something that seems to grab their attention long enough to where you can make a real substantive discussion.

Another thing is, a lot of these things are developing as they go. There is a sense that we want to focus on effectiveness. There's a sense and some of our research tells us that if we've got a stronger relationship with the community, we're better even in the traditional sense at solving crimes and dealing with these issues, but a lot of these things are developing, and they have been developing with people like Betsy and Reuben and some other chiefs around the country that have an idea, and they are pursuing it, but it's developing along the way, so it's hard to say here's exactly what we are talking about in some coherent way, and they are not able to take the time to sort of work through these things with you.

Audience: You talk about middle management and city councils, some of us might have problems with the police themselves. How popular is this concept of (unable to hear)

Darrel Stephens: I would estimate that of the, and I don't know whose numbers, you get numbers of 12-14 to 16-17,000 and sometimes higher police departments in the country. My estimation is there's probably 250-300 of them that are really giving some serious attention to these issues and trying to figure out how to handle the workload and the drugs and the violence and the crime at the same time you want to restructure and redirect the energies of your organizations. I've been doing these workshops in police groups while I was a police chief and since then for the past five or six years. Betsy and I have done a number of them together. Surprisingly enough, the rooms are usually full. There's a lot of challenges about whether or not

this is the right way to go. People say how can you get friendly
with the community when you've got all this crime and drugs and
violence? How can you find the time and resources? The chiefs
themselves struggle with the idea of being able to do all of
those things and want more people to do it, but there have been
some major changes that have taken place over the past year or
two versus what it was two or three or four or even five years
ago. Today you've got a lot more people that are willing to
accept the idea that the police can be much more effective if
they're closer with the community, if they work with other parts
of government, and other parts of business, and the issues are
not arguing and debating those points. It's more how do you go
about doing that? I've seen some real shifts in that. To say
that the majority are engaged in these kind of activities, even
though they may have a community policing unit or problem solving
thing, that's really not the case, but I think that by the end of
the decade you will see from the experiences of people who are
wrestling through these, and communities who are wrestling
through these, those will be the models, and citizens will begin
to expect a different kind of police service than they experience
right now.

Audience: (couldn't hear).

Darrel Stephens: Yes, sir. We first started doing them about
five years ago, and it has been on all the time.

Audience: How do you achieve this working in a community where
(can't hear)

Betsy Watson: Well, that's one of the most--did everybody hear?
How do you see this in a community of 7-10,000 citizens where
you've got 20-40 police officers? Well, the same argument holds,
really, city after city after city. In Houston, we have two
million people; we have 4,000 officers; and only half of those

are actually assigned to street duty, and that includes the commanders. So I think the problems change only by magnitude. No matter what chief you talk to in what city, the issues are the same. Only the size seems to change. Would you differ with that, Darrel?

Darrel: No.

Audience: (couldn't hear).

Betsy Watson: Well, you know my view has always been, the question is if you've got 4,000 officers you can do all this sophisticated training, but if you've only got 20 or 40, how do you do this? You know, it's so interesting, because when I started out doing this thing in Houston, I thought, my God, I've got 4,000 officers; that's unmanageable. I can't possibly handle 4,000 officers. I had to take off a piece of the organization, so I got only 350 because anybody can manage that many, I thought. It seems to me that the smaller the number, the easier it is to manage, and yet I was talking to a high police official from Sydney, Australia, who said when they started doing it, I think they had 18,000 officers, and so they decided to deal with a small group of only 4,000, because that was more manageable.

Darrel: I think in many ways in a smaller community you may not need the same kind of training program because in a lot of ways smaller communities behave this way to begin with. They don't have the special units and the resource bag that is available to a city like Houston, so there's a natural tendency to go to other parts of the government, and for people to be more willing to help each other out. There's a lot of times a greater level of knowledge of neighborhoods and people in the community, so there's probably some things that are happening by accident that we work very hard at introducing into some of our larger cities.

Audience: You were talking earlier about value-based management where you had been the chief; how do you get your values down in the organization?

Betsy Watson: What we're doing is revamping the directive system, and once again, every change that we are making involves police officers. We're talking about values for those of you in the back of the room. Making sure that values get instilled within the organization. The values are not new. We have had values for years, but what we have done is we have written them on a piece of paper and hung them on a wall. Every division you go into has the values printed. You walk up to a police officer and say, "what are our values? Recite them." And they say, "Huh?" So it seems to me what we have to do is go back to the hundreds of rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures that we have; eliminate those that are extraneous, because many have been written one on top of another, and those that conflict, and start each one out saying here's the intent. This is what we believe in as an organization. This is what the intent is. Forget the words here; this is the intent of what we are trying to do. The intent here is to enhance quality of life in the community, for example, through thus and such. Then we go through the procedure which is meant to be guidance. The real hard, binding value is what it is that the officer's accountable for fulfilling, and procedure is meant to be a guideline on here in the majority of cases are ways we think you can probably carry this out, but it's the actual value that he's held accountable for explaining. It's very much more difficult for them. It's very much more difficult for an officer to defend his actions that are based on values than if it's based on a written word.

Audience: So the object is (unclear); assuming that you've had 18 years in the organization and now you're getting a chance to put your imprint on that group. How are your values getting implemented in the department? Are you rewriting, doing it by

task force, or meet in small groups. What's the implementation of this?

Betsy Watson: All of those things. There is no one way to implement values. Values have to be stated over and over again in everything that is done, whether it is a task force, whether it's my employee council that's meeting, whether it's a command staff, when we rewrite our directive system, when we take a look at our recruiting, it all begins with a statement of values. This is what we are doing, because it's not a procedure. I can't mandate values. I have to live them, and I have to make the people in the organization do it. So no matter what it is we do, it starts with a statement of values.

Darrel Stephens: For police officers it's living the part. It's easy for police, and we've done it for years, to produce nice flowery statements and procedures and policies, but they've seen them forever, and what happens is that if the chief, new or old, continuing to develop, doesn't live by those values, if you say we have a respect for human life and then overlook a shooting situation or look the other way when you've got a real fuzzy policy issue and don't talk about that within the organization, then the police officer's say, "aha, that's just that scroll that's on the wall, and it really doesn't mean anything to a police department." Have you all changed your basic values? Probably for Betsy it's going to be testing. People are going to say, well, even though she was involved in that, developing them, they are going to wait to see if she lives by those values as a police chief, and that's probably the day-to-day stuff.

Audience: As far as your structural issues, your police officers, or maybe in other communities, is it incompatible, this philosophy, with requiring officers to meet certain minimum stats, x number of arrests, x number of anything, and also what did you do structurally with rotation and assigning officers

permanently to some beats, and is that really something that is essential to this community-based thing, and can you apply this same philosophy to smaller communities where it's difficult to keep somebody to one area for more than weeks at a time without having to move them somewhere else, and if you've got shift rotation problems, trying to establish a rapport, person, officer works one shift of the day, and doesn't return in the daytime, 120 days or 90 days.

Darrel Stephens: I didn't plant that question, but that's a great one. I think that really gets at the heart of a lot of implementation issues. First, the number things are not incompatible with community policing. It's the emphasis that you place on them. What you really want to focus on is the identification of problems and the resolution of those problems. If you identify a burglary problem in the neighborhood, for example, and you measure the result of that effort based on arrests and the burglaries continue, you know, you haven't really done much, and a police department historically would stop with the arrest issue. They would say, well, we've had 50 burglaries in the neighborhood, and we've made lots of arrests, and what else do you want us to do, but the burglaries continue to go on. That's one aspect of that measurement, but you would also want to look to see what the department has done, or the officer in that particular neighborhood has done to resolve that larger issue of burglaries.

If you want to look at the number of tickets, citations that an officer writes, that's not as important as is the number of accidents at a particular intersection, or maybe even the number of injuries from pedestrians, or maybe the kinds of complaints that you get from a particular community for speeding or that kind of thing. If you continue to get the complaints, it doesn't make any difference the number of tickets an officer writes.

What you want to focus on is whether or not the problem is resolved.

It's a useful measure, but it's not the measure of your results in dealing with the problem.

Audience: Special officers are not meeting the stats.

Darrel Stephens: I think that's absurd. I don't think that's a good approach because it again focuses on means over ends. What we want to try to do in policing and what some of these people are working on is trying to focus on the ends. What is it that you want a police department and a police officer to do?

Betsy Watson: I've got to run catch a flight, but I don't want to leave without having one final thing here. On this particular issue, we used to have years ago a quota of three tickets a day. You've got to have your three tickets or a day, or you're in trouble. Okay? So when we started this NOP thing, we said, all right, no more quotas; you're going to focus on results. Well, one of the sergeants, two of the sergeants, came to me and said, "you are a crazy woman because now they are going to write zippetydoodah, zero, and you're going to be on me because they are not productive," and I said, "no, because you see, the officers are assigned individual neighborhoods, and if the officer is not writing any traffic, what he is telling you is there's no traffic problem in his neighborhood, and you have statistics that tell you if there's accidents, so if there's no traffic problem, then he shouldn't be writing tickets." The sergeant said, "well, of course, there's traffic problems." "Well," I said, "that's your answer. Three a day probably won't correct it."   I've got to run.

Darrel Stephens: The other part was the beat assignments and the shift rotation. Shift rotation, depending on how frequently it's

done (there's a lot of police departments that rotate on a
monthly basis, some rotate every week, and that's probably one of
the worst things you can do if you want to try to introduce your
officers into the community and get them to know them), so you
have to have some consistency in assignment both in time and in
location. I don't think it's unreasonable for an officer to work
a particular area of the community for a couple of years before
you move them. It takes that long to really get to know the
people that you're working with. In the rotational aspect, if
you want to not have accountability of officers, then one of the
best ways to do it is to rotate your shifts.

Audience: What your talking about in many ways sounds like what
is happening to the educational system in this country. We
decided twenty years ago that teachers were not only going to
teach, but they were going to worry about nutrition and physical
fitness, family counseling, and pregnancy problems and all the
rest of it. We have essentially destroyed the educational system
in the United States, and when you talk to high school principals
or grammar school principals and teachers, and we ask them why
can't our kids read and write any more, they say we don't get to
teach any more. We're doing all these other things. I'm
concerned that is what we might be talking about happening to law
enforcement here; it's easy to lose track of what our initial
focus is in law enforcement. The underlying focus is to protect
property, arrest the bad guys, and put them in jail.

Darrel Stephens: Well, see, I don't agree with you at all on
that being the focus. I'm not even sure I like using the term
any more of law enforcement. I think policing is a better term
because the reality is what the citizens we serve call on us to
do. The majority of what they call on us to do is not law
enforcement kinds of activities; it's policing kind of
activities, and this philosophy of policing that the people are
taking to is directing the police towards solving those problems,

the crime situations and difficulties in a way looking at it
broader than just arrest. Arrest is a good deal, sometimes, and
it's an appropriate thing sometimes. More often than not, if you
start to change your lens a little bit and broaden it and ask
yourselves, and the police contribute to asking and contribute to
working toward a solution that looks toward resolution beyond law
enforcement, there's a lot of possibilities that open up, not
necessarily that police have to do themselves, but in working
with others, a lot of possibilities that open up that doesn't
just rely on the criminal justice system. If you force the
police and everything they do into the criminal justice system,
and that doesn't work, then you're pretty much through, and I
think that's what we've done. That's what we've done for years,
and I don't think by any stretch of the imagination we could say
that everything's working just fine. One more question and then
we'll close.

Audience: I just have a question on what is being done in
dealing with the cynicism and ? that police officers tend to
develop over time. They become suspicious because of the work
and the nature of the work, then it finds its way into dealing
with their own forces internally, and I think you referred to
that, and something's got to be done in communication; if it's
not dealt with, communications can't be open.

Darrel Stephens: The question has to do with police officer
cynicism and how you deal with that as it develops over time, and
it certainly develops after a period of years in some, if not
all, officers for a short period of time anyway. What this
philosophy of policing that I've seen in a lot of different
organizations has done has begun to basically rejuvenate officers
who had given up a long time ago. They begin to see the results
of their work, and arrest is not as satisfying an activity as
many people would want you to believe, because they see the same
people over and over again. They don't see all these people

going to jail. It's not the officer's fault. It's not the
court's fault. It's maybe even not the correctional system's
fault, because all of those things are full. As they begin to
work through some of these problems and some of these issues from
the beginning to the end, they may have some arrests. They
establish a relationship with a neighborhood or people in the
community who they didn't know before. It was an us and them
kind of environment. They saw hostility every time they looked
out the windshield of their car, but never really got to know
those people. The more that officers move into this kind of
policing, the level of cynicism begins to go down, and they begin
to feel empowered, and basically you're empowering police
officers to do some things that they'd never had the capacity or
the authority to do before, and their job takes on a much
different meaning. We've got police departments in this country,
one that I was the chief in, after we had moved in this direction
for a couple of years, and they are still working on it, we had
trouble getting people, officers on the street, to compete to be
a detective, to go through the process for detectives.
Detectives, of course, thought that was just the absolute end of
the world, that they didn't know how we were going to do this any
more, but when officers want to stay in patrol, want to work in
the neighborhoods that they were working in, and pass up
opportunities to go to the detective divisions, something has
really begun to change in those organizations, and the cynicism
begins to decline.

THE MOVE TO COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING
Darrel Stephens, Camille Cates Barnett, Reuben Greenberg, and Betsy Watson
September, 1990
Fort Worth, Texas

....throughout the nation. My name is Darrel Stephens. I'm executive director of a group called the Police Executive Research Forum that's located in Washington, DC. We're going to spend the time we have this morning talking about what we think is the strategic change taking place in policing from the perspective of experienced and thoughtful local government executives. We have three outstanding panelists that I want to introduce in the order in which they will speak, and then I want to give just a brief overview of this concept before we go to the panelists.

Our first speaker will be Chief Reuben Greenberg. He's the police chief in Charleston, South Carolina, and has been since 1982. Prior to that he was deputy director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. He served as the chief deputy sheriff in Orange County, Florida, and also as chief of police in Opalocka, Florida, and several other law enforcement positions throughout his career. He served at the state, local, and county level in law enforcement. He has recently published a book called Let's Take Back Our Streets, has spent quite a lot of time thinking about how the police should relate to and deal with the community, and on police effectiveness. He did his undergraduate work at San Francisco State University, and has two masters degrees from the University of California at Berkeley, one in public administration and one in city planning.

Our next speaker is Elizabeth Watson. She's a wife, a mother, a law enforcement professional, and the first woman police chief of a major American city. Prior to her appointment last January, she was a deputy chief of the Westside Command station for more

than two years. While she was there, she won widespread recognition and accolades for her implementation of the department's highly innovative neighborhood-oriented policing philosophy. For three years prior to that, she served as a captain, overseeing the operations of inspections and the auto theft divisions, and in 1981, she reached the rank of lieutenant, after having served five years as a detective. She's an honors graduate with a degree in psychology from Texas Tech University. She's affiliated and works closely with the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Police Executive Research Forum, and the state and county Texas Police Chiefs Associations. While she's not on the road speaking or at work, she is busy with her two children ages 9 and 4, and her husband, this is truly a law enforcement family, is also a member of the Houston Police Department.

Our final speaker is Dr. Camille Cates Barnett. She's currently the city manager of Austin, Texas. She has worked in Houston as the director of finance and administration. She served in Dallas, Texas, as the deputy city manager, and has worked in local government at various positions in Sunnyvale, California, Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Washington, DC. She has a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California, an MPA from Southern California, and a BA from Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin.

Something has been going on in policing for the past five to ten years that some have called a quiet revolution. In the face of research in the 1970s, the question, basic assumptions, on which the police dealt with crime and service demands, some police executives spent the 1980s looking for alternatives. In the face of steadily increasing violence, crime, drug abuse, calls for service, and declining resources, in many communities some police executives began to look more closely at the underlying causes of

these problems, and began to ask questions about police effectiveness.

In the face of what seemed to be increasing tension between the police and communities that they served, some police executives began to examine those police-citizen relationships and to seek ways of co-producing neighborhoods that were relatively free of crime and disorder. In the face of increasing civil litigation and police union activities, some police executives began to look at managing by values, decentralizing authority, and enhancing the role of the police officer on the street.

This quiet revolution has been called community-oriented policing, problem-oriented policing, neighborhood-oriented policing, and a variety of other names. For those interested in something besides jumping on the bandwagon and making a name change, there are some common elements in those various efforts. The police are actively working with members of the community, other departments of government, and business in the identification, analysis, and development of solutions tailored to the problems of those neighborhoods.

Police are shifting their focus on true problems rather than just responding to incidents and are placing much greater emphasis on outcome measures other than process measures like response time and arrests. Police are looking outside the criminal justice process for solutions to crime and disorder. Police are managing by values and looking for ways to fit the department structure to the service needs rather than the other way around.

As the 1990s progress, I believe that we will see even more change take place in the way the police relate to the communities that they serve, and the way that they look at the problems and issues that people look to the police for help to deal with.

This morning we have these three panelists who have spent a lot of time thinking and working on these issues, and they are going to share their experiences with you. We will have time for questions and comments and answers after they finish their presentations.

Chief Reuben Greenberg: Well, thank you very much. Probably most of you wonder what is this so-called new thing called community-oriented policing. How does it differ from neighborhood policing or team policing or a number of other different types of approaches that have been tried in this country for, I guess, the last two decades. Community-oriented policing, from my perspective, certainly isn't new. What it really is and most nearly approximates with a few little changes is the kind of policing that I had in my neighborhood when I was growing up; that is to say, not only were the police one with the community, at least so far as dealing with criminal victimization was concerned, but they were part of the community. We knew them, we saw them in various kinds of locations, churches, and various types of social events. These people were part of our lives in addition to being police officers.

But that realization for my part came, really, about the last ten years. I have been in this business getting close to a quarter of a century now, and people might ask if we had performed in a certain way for a long time, why would we want to change what we were doing in going to this community-oriented policing or whatever else fancy name you want to give it. Well, myself and probably hundreds of thousands of other officers in this country that have served during that same almost quarter of a century could never really understand why is it, particularly after the 1960s, that we risked our lives, worked hard, got shot, got beaten up, and still people hated us. Not only did they hate us not only just criminals hate us (we might expect that), but ordinary citizens, law-abiding people, certainly didn't like us

very much.

To give you an example, we are just government agents even though we wear a uniform and carry a gun, but there are a lot of other government agents that are much more familiar with the public that wear uniforms as well. Take, for example, a postal employee who delivers mail to your house. He drives up in a cruiser if you will, has a little yellow light on top of it, has a decal on the door, red and blue stripes along the sides, striped up real nicely, and he's in a uniform, and he comes to your door just about every day, and he brings good news, but he also brings bad news. Perhaps that was the reason why people look upon the mailman exactly as what he is, a public servant, someone in the community who is providing a very, very important function. But too often, the public came into contact with law enforcement officers only when something "bad" had happened. You would knock on someone's door, they would open it up, see your uniform, and immediately the hands would come in front of their face, and they would ask, "is my husband all right? Is my wife all right? Has anything happened to my son?" or whatever. Because people really didn't associate us with anything except something unpleasant. That postal employee brought notices that people were going to be audited from the IRS. In the old days he brought draft notices, and brings all kinds of bills and everything else. But nonetheless, he wasn't received, at least, with the same kind of abhorrence that we were, because he also brought good news, something positive, you know, like a check or an unexpected letter from some long-lost friend who finally found your address or whatever, or perhaps something from the Publishers' Clearing House to tell you that you could have won a million dollars.

Police officers never brought anything like that to people. It was always something negative, something bad, some injury, some shooting, some catastrophe, someone, your son, your daughter, your wife, your husband in jail. This is one of the reasons I

believe we've had such rapid turnover in police officer ranks. The people don't want to work for a long period of time without getting some kind of positive reinforcement from the people one works for. I don't just mean the people in the city government. I'm talking about the general person on the street. Many police officers in our country today ride around on their appointed rounds, and people flip them the bird, throw rocks and bottles, etc., to the extent that in some areas of our large cities the police don't even operate, even in the daytime. They simply don't go there. Not because they're afraid, but because it's too painful to come into contact with hundreds, maybe even thousands of people everyday who tell you in ways much more effective than words that they hate your guts.

We thought that perhaps there might be a better way, and that better way was right there in the minds of people who worked in the police department, people primarily in the lower ranks of the department. By that I mean the sergeants, the corporals, the pfcs., the privates, the officers, the senior patrolmen. These are the people who were the closest to the work and could see where the problems were and what things might be implemented in order to ameliorate the conditions that face them every day.

The problem is, the people on the top, that is to say the bosses, just about anybody from the rank of captain and above, were looking at law enforcement with a different eye. They weren't looking at the people relationship situation. That's the thing that really counts with the people who work on the street, is the relationships they have with individuals. Police officers are pretty much like anybody else. They like to be liked. They want to be perceived as doing something that is worthwhile in the community. They don't want to be an occupying army or perceived as such any place.

So we listened to some of these people. What can we do to make
things better? And we came to some very, very simple answers to
that. The reason why we came to simple answers is because we
didn't need any complex answers. It wasn't something that we've
never had in American society. We've had it before in this
country, so we knew that it could exist. The question was could
we make it exist again where the police and the community were
really one and the same. Where the sheriff or the police chief
or the town marshal could raise a posse, for example; say "come
on fellas, follow me. This crime has happened. We need your
assistance." Could we get back to something like that?

We decided to take a look at some of the complaints people make
against police officers. Those complaints primarily had nothing
to do with excessive force, as people might expect, had nothing
to do with shootings, no matter what the outcome of the
particular shooting was, people didn't remember those things.
They really forgot about the time the police officer was alleged
to have shot this person for no reason, or that they used
excessive force on this person. The things that they remembered
were the day-to-day contacts that they had with police officers
in which they were treated very badly.

So we had to decide to stop treating people badly. There's
really nothing complex about that. We had to act like we were
selling a product, and the product we were selling was reduced
incidents of criminal victimization in our community. That's
really the product we were selling. We were selling it to people
who were receiving it in a resentful type of mode because of the
way we were handling it.

I'll give you a perfect example. Every police chief and probably
most city managers have come across this problem--an armed
robbery or some other serious crime occurs; the police get a

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description, you might say in this case a black male, white t-shirt, blue jeans, white tennis shoes, last seen going north on Smith Street. Immediately this photo goes out, and all the police officers congregate in that area, and in the next thirty or forty minutes they will stop perhaps as many as fifteen or twenty persons who meet that general description--height, weight, race, clothing characteristics, etc., and moving in that direction. Sometimes the armed robber or other criminal is located among those fifteen or twenty persons. That's sometimes the case, and that person is apprehended as a result of that activity.

Quite often, however, that person is not located among those twenty, but nonetheless, we manage to alienate all of the other 19 if, in fact, we stop 20 people, and one guy was the one we were looking for. We alienated 19 others by the way we went about it. Or in some cases, most often, we alienated all 20 of them as we went about our task. You get something on this order, "hey, hey you, come here!" The person would hesitate, naturally. They didn't know what was going on. The officer would take out his baton or his PR 24, and he'd come over to that particular person and say, "I told you to come here." He'd check the person out, get some identification, do an NCIC check on them, a local wanteds check, pat him down, see that he wasn't the one, might even possibly bring the witness over to them, and as soon as the situation is over, they'd say something along this order, "okay, get out of here. Beat it. Get out of here." The guy would go off. The police officers were trying to do something really worthwhile--trying to find a very serious and dangerous criminal in the community. But we went about it in such a way, and we did that in such a fashion that we alienated people who had committed no crime, and you can do that in any major city where you have maybe 30-40 armed robberies a day, and you come into contact on each one of those occasions with 20 persons who were in the general area, meet the description, and you can see, after a very

short period of time, even in a small community you get large numbers of people who don't like the police. Police never struck them, never threatened them, it's simply on the basis they were treated.

We decided we were going to start a different tactic. We would stop the person, and we would be absolutely, just like all police officers, prepared to kill that person because we suspected them of being the armed robber. If we did not suspect they were the armed robber, we would not have stopped them in the first place, but we know that we are probably not going to have the person. Nonetheless, we are prepared to do away with them, if it comes to that, but we decided not to tell them so by the way we spoke to them or by our body language. We are prepared to defend ourselves. "Excuse me, sir, could you step over here, please?" Most often when we did that, the person broke and ran if it was the actual armed robber. So then the situation resolves itself. We knew who we had, and the situation is perceived in a different manner. But most often, as I indicated earlier, the person did not run, reluctantly came over, they didn't know what was going on, they could obviously see something serious, a backup officer had arrived, or whatever, and we check them out, speaking with them as if we were speaking to somebody very, very important in the community and very, very powerful in the community. In other words, we made no distinction between those who we recognized to be people who had money or influence and people who we recognized had no money or influence or wherewithal, and we would find out, just like we did before, that in most cases, he was not the right person, and we would tell them why they were stopped, which was never done before. I don't know why we never told people that. "It's a police matter." So they thought they were harassed, or as we say in South Carolina, they thought they were har<u>assed</u>, because they were black, because they were Hispanic, because they were young, white and had an earring in their ear, or whatever the reason is, they thought they were subject to harassment.

That's what they thought and that's what they took with them.
But we let them know why they were stopped, and that their
clothing matched a particular individual, and we ask them if they
see that individual in the neighborhood, we would appreciate them
dialing 911. We also tell them not to approach that particular
person; don't approach that person, because they are extremely
dangerous. The person's got a gun; stay away from them; but if
you see them contact us. They are dressed very, very similar to
what you are, you're a black male, or whatever the case would be,
and we gave them our card with our name signed on it and the time
and the date. We said, "you may be stopped by another officer in
the next half hour that you're in this area. If you are, give
him this card with my name and the time, and he can call me on
the radio and verify that I've already checked you out."

So you turn a negative situation into one that is positive for a
person you've already determined was not the one you were looking
for. You'll find that they hold to that card and that person's
name on it no matter what. So if they walked along and another
officer stopped them, they wouldn't be offended. They would know
why they were being stopped, show them the card, and he would
call in. Very, very simple thing like that.

We found out that we wound up coming to a crime scene, and the
first officer that gets there, we teach him to protect the crime
scene. That's what he's going to do. He gets out his PR 24, and
he runs everybody away from the crime scene. The other officers
arrive, the body's lying there--knife in the back, shot,
whatever, sexual assault--and we investigate the crime, and the
officer invariably writes in his report, no witnesses. I said to
myself, of course there were no witnesses. The first thing he
did when he got to the scene was run all the witnesses off down
the street. Of course there are not going to be any witnesses.
We stopped doing that. We got to the scene, and we asked people
not to leave, because there was no reason for them to leave.

Just get away from the initial crime scene, and you might even pick one or two people from the crowd to assist us in protecting the crime scene. So the people see something quite different than what they had seen before, and that is a police officer and a citizen on the same side of the line trying to keep other citizens away from this crime scene.

When we tried it in Mobile, Alabama, tried it in Charleston, South Carolina, it absolutely blew people's minds. We said, don't leave. Most of them left anyway. They thought something must be up. Something's up, we don't know what it is, because they were accustomed to being immediately shunted off. Our message was there's nothing that's going to happen in this neighborhood today that you shouldn't see. This is your neighborhood. You need to know what's happened here. Before we leave here, we might not be able to tell you right now, we are going to tell anybody who wants to know what has happened here, what information that we have, because we are depending on these individuals to help us solve this particular crime.

What happened, the long and the short of it, is that our solvability rate, our clearance rate went up tremendously--like 88 percent in the cases of sexual assault, armed robbery 60 percent. Can you imagine having it more likely to arrest an armed robber than it is for him to get away with it. It's not because we're any smarter than cops any place else. It's because criminals can successfully hide from the police. But they cannot hide from everybody. By changing our tactics, and we'll get into a number of other things we can talk about how to do that later this morning, we begin to instead of shunting people away, where people are looking at the police through the blinds and little kids are saying, "hey, momma, there's a policeman out there," people are peering at us through the blinds, they can come out on their porches and confront us and find out what's going on, and we will be very happy to tell them.

That's the kind of change that we're talking about. Instead of looking at individuals as if they are part of the criminal element themselves, taking them as individuals and ferreting out the criminals from among their midst with the assistance of the population. Thank you very much.

Betsy Watson: In Houston, we have been experimenting, if you will, with this thing that we call neighborhood-oriented policing or NOP since the early 80s, and we have evolved from what could only have been termed as a programmatic approach to policing to one that is more systemic, and the distinction is that we started out with the illusion that if we had enough community relations programs that we somehow would then have an organization that was tied to the community, and which was dependent upon the community for support. We found that simply does not occur.

What we have developed is what we call a philosophy of policing, and it permeates every function, every aspect of the organization, and it recognizes that the police department is only one part of city government, and city government is only one part of the community. If we are ever going to come to grips with the problems of drugs and crime and violence, we can no longer view those issues as police problems, and, in fact, that's what we have done. When I say we, I'm talking about we, the police and we, our society, because in policing we have done a very good job over many decades of educating the public on what policing is all about. Unfortunately, we have educated the public in many myths. For example, we have perpetuated a notion that police effectiveness is measured in terms of the crime rate. If crime goes up, then you must have a bad police department, and if crime goes down, well, the police must be really good. It fails to consider the myriad of economic and social indicators that really have far more relationship on a crime rate than what police officers are or are not doing.

We have also perpetuated a myth that police effectiveness should be gauged in terms of response time. Response time is the only criteria in many communities whereby the number of police are calculated. Every time the phone rings, a police officer is supposed to respond, and what we have done is created an endless cycle. In Houston, we handle three million calls in dispatch center every year. We respond, mobile response, to a million of them. We have at any given time about 2,000 officers that are actually assigned to uniformed patrol, and once you figure in vacation, relief factor, 24 hour coverage, maybe a couple of hundred of them in a 600 square mile radius are available to answer those calls for service. It doesn't take much to figure out that the response time on some lower priority calls for service is going to be considerable.

So we have generated a system whereby complaints are the norm. A citizen is led to believe that if they don't get a response time of less than 5 minutes there must be something wrong. We spend a lot of time answering complaints and trying to explain how difficult it is to respond rapidly every time the phone rings.

What we started about three or three and a half years ago was a process of educating our police officers, not so much to do different things, but to think differently about the things we have always done. So that instead of measuring activity for activity's sake, we begin to take a look at what we get for the time and effort that we are spending in the community. We started asking ourselves questions like why is it that we spend so much time answering the same calls for service in the same neighborhoods over and over again. It's incredibly expensive. Yet the mindset of the average police officer is to get out of the car, settle the problem as quickly as it can be settled, and get back in that car, because the calls are waiting, and if you don't get to the next call quickly, there's another complaint.

We asked our officers to begin thinking analytically, to take a look at why it is we keep responding to the same problems, and to attack the underlying cause of the problem, and as we began doing that, we found it wasn't just the police that needed to spend time and attention on a given situation; that invariably it required the city attorney, the district attorney, the public works department, city council, the schools, the hospitals, the social service agencies; that it wasn't just the police.

We have many, many stories which indicate to us that forming these coalitions with the broader sector of the community, we can have remarkable success. We have, in neighborhoods all over the city, targeted a particular crime problem, invariably narcotics, and dedicated the resources not just of the police but of the corporate sector, of the civic leaders in an area, of the schools, etc., and we have found sustained improvement in some of those areas.

In one area that comes to mind we did an analysis before our intensive efforts and eight months later, and we found out that not only had the violent crime rate dropped by one third, but our calls for service had dropped by 42 percent. Now what that means to us is that we begin to have a way out of the endless cycle where our whole response time is driven by activity indicators, how many calls are there. If we can begin to take a look at the underlying problem, then we can generate and create a reduction in the demands for service, and that likewise can then be transferred into further proactive strategies.

When the system works, it works extraordinarily well. But I have to tell you that when it works, it works in spite of the police organization and not because of it. Our organization, and I speak of Houston because we are one of many, and ours is not particularly different in terms of culture than what you will find in cities all over the country. The police culture is one

that has developed in reaction to some catastrophic events that happen in a community. I think it's pretty well acknowledged that in any large city there are going to be underlying tensions, whether they are racial tensions, social tensions, economic tensions. Invariably where there is a mix of people there is tension. A police incident, a shooting, something will happen that causes an officer to take action against a citizen that is unjustified, and that incident will then cause all of those underlying tensions and animosities to boil to the surface. The police will become the target of negative press and hostile emotion from the community.

What we have done in policing over the decades is a series of things. Number one, we have defended ourselves because we recognize that one incident that happened is the exception rather than the rule; that officers spend all of their shifts, all of their days handling the most difficult of circumstances in the most adverse circumstances admirably well, but this one incident is an aberration, and we spend a lot of time talking about the aberration.

The second thing we do is we fire the guilty party. Whichever officer committed the transgression, which we investigate and find out was improper, we terminate the employment of that individual. The third thing we do is create a policy, a rule, a regulation that is intended to control the thousands of officers in the department who did nothing wrong, who wouldn't have done anything wrong, and who may not even understand what it was the other guy did that was wrong, but nevertheless, we communicate to our society, to our citizenry that we have taken charge of the situation, that we are in control of it.

Now what has happened over years is we have developed hundreds of rules and regulations, policies and procedures, that are designed to control the police. We police the police and make sure that

every activity that is undertaken is one which is documented somewhere in a written manual.

Now that flies in the face of the message we are now giving our officers which is if you want to make a difference in the community, you have to be part of the community. You have to get out their and talk to people who live and work and play in the neighborhoods, and identify resources, not just from city government, but from the community as well that can be brought to bear on a problem. You need to be creative and imaginative and intelligent, and you need to exercise all of your initiative and talent to identify and solve problems. The officers look at these hundreds of rules and regulations, and they say, "right. As soon as I step outside the limits of policy, I will be disciplined and punished." We have a long record.

So we find that it is not sufficient to simply talk about things that the officers must do differently so much as it is important that we spend time on the infrastructure, that we develop systems and procedures within the police department and within city government that are designed to cause communication and cooperation to occur rather than to prohibit or discourage it. It means that within the police department we have to take a look at not just what we are doing, but what we are getting for the effort. The words are simple, but actually implementing it is incredibly difficult. It flies in the face of everything we have known for decades.

An example I could give you is our performance evaluation system. Everybody knows how to measure the worth of an officer, just as we know how to measure the worth of a police department. You want to know if you've got a good department? Take a look at the crime rate, the clearance rate, the response time, ipso facto. We're saying no more, and yet within the police department we deliver the same mixed message to our officer. We tell them that

quality counts. That the quality of the interaction with our citizens is most important, and yet, when we evaluate each individual's performance, what do we look to? The numbers. How many calls has the officer run? How many tickets has he issued? How many reports has he written? How many people has he arrested? We even take the time and trouble to distinguish a felony from a misdemeanor arrest, and if the numbers are high, we must have a good officer, and if the numbers are low, well, we have an officer who needs to be lectured by his sergeant. Where is it that quality counts? Where is it that an officer is evaluated not just in terms of his activity, but what the community benefited from those activities.

So we pulled a group of officers together and said, "Fine. You're criticizing us as management because we're talking about quality and counting the numbers. What should we count differently?" This group of patrolmen came up with some good ideas. They said "if you want to know whether or not an officer is contributing to the department and the city, don't just ask the sergeant for his opinion, because the sergeant isn't with us. We're out there, by ourselves, alone. Talk to the citizens that we serve. Ask them were we knowledgeable? Were we professional? Were we empathetic, and include that evaluation from the citizen's perspective back into what we get as a performance grade, and where we fall short, tell us we're short so we won't make the same mistake again."

Those kinds of changes are the kinds of changes we need not just within the police department, but within the infrastructure of city government, in my view, because to the extent that we have a police department that is at odds with other aspects of the government, to the extent that we compete for limited resources, we will continue to be frustrated; we will continue to be confounded in our efforts to deal effectively with crime, and the

ones who will suffer the most are the citizens who are in fear and who live everyday wanting to know what the answer is.

Camille Cates-Barnett: In the fall of 1969, I was driving with some of my friends down the street. We were stopped for no apparent reason by the Chicago police. They told us to get out of the car; they frisked us; they never told us what was going on. They treated us gruffly and told us to get in the car and drive off. That same fall, I watched as other members of that police department threw tear gas and beat up students who were demonstrating at the SDS Convention. That same fall, I met with Fred Hampton a few days before he was killed in his bed, asleep, in the middle of the night, by the Chicago police. Those experiences in the fall of 1969 changed my life. That's when I decided to get into the work of cities. After what I had seen, I kept saying to myself, there must be a better way to run cities. There must be a better way.

I think one of the things that made those experiences so life-changing for me was observing the abuse of force, and observing how our local governments no longer were the paragons of democracy I thought they should be. Now after being in the business for about 20 years, I'm happy to say that there are some news ways of thinking about how we use force, how we operate police departments, how we operate local governments....

END OF TAPE

....it's here. We're talking about it now in our popular press. In fact, many of you may have seen articles in _Newsweek_ or _Atlantic Monthly_. It's also not just in the professional press, but in the popular press. Several of you picked up documents as you walked in that describe what's going on. They look like this. There's even a book that talks about these ideas and police practices around the world. This seems to be an idea

whose time has come. I've had the privilege the last four years of getting together with police professionals around the country every six months at Harvard University, trying to talk about what's going on in policing, and how we can think about it, shape it, and disseminate it.

We call this new way of policing community policing. It goes by lots of other names: problem solving policing, neighborhood-oriented policing; there's lots of names for it; all the same idea.

One of the things I think we need to understand as city managers is we have an opportunity to encourage this kind of thinking in police departments as well as in the rest of local government. You see, most of us learned in city manager school that police were supposed to be professionals, just like we're supposed to be professionals. We take that seriously because we don't want to have what is known in the literature as the "political error of policing," where you have patronage and corruption, and we think that the professional response to that is what should happen, and we're trained in lots of our green books and lots of our academic orientations to think about police in terms of routine patrols in cars, of rapid response to calls for service, of criminal investigation. We're trained that way; we think that way; we reward our police chief that way, and that is despite the fact that over the past 15 years we've been doing research on whether these methods work, and we have found, for example, that doubling the number of patrol cars patrolling doesn't reduce crime and doesn't reduce the fear of crime.

We have found through the research that rapid response does not affect the probability of arrest, and we have found through research that forensic technology is much less likely to contribute to investigations than the stories of victims and witnesses and neighbors. Despite the fact that the research has

shown that the current method of policing doesn't work, we still foster it. What we're talking about up here in community-oriented policing is not a program. It is not a community relations division in your police department. It is not getting your police chief to sit down with other department heads occasionally and talk about what is going on. It's not a program; it's an attitude. It's a set of values. It's a fundamental shift of mind, much like the kind of fundamental shift of mind we experience when we use customer service as the primary value for everything that we do in local government.

To make it clearer to you what we are talking about, I'd like to tell you what I have distilled from these discussions with police chiefs and police professionals, that are the qualities of community-oriented policing. There are four of them. One is partnership with the community; second is participative management; third is problem solving; and fourth is visionary leadership. I'd like to spend just a minute on each one.

First of all, partnership with the community. I think you've heard from both of the chiefs who have spoken already that partnership with the community is something that fundamentally changes the way the police operate. It means shared power. It means that the police department, it means that the city government is no longer the sole person or sole organization that defines what it is that the community needs. It means that the community participates in the definition of the problem as well as in the devising of the solution. It means that police may lead or initiate, but not unilaterally control the process for crime prevention and protection in the community. It means that police departments and city governments will be encouraging citizen self-help. It means that one of the performance standards that we are going to use to judge the effectiveness of police is community satisfaction.

In terms of this morning's speech on managing diversity, it means that we will have diverse problem identification, diverse goals, and diverse strategies for diverse communities.

The second major component that I see in this new way of policing is participative management. I want you to know that I never thought I'd live to see the day where we were talking about participative management in police departments because police departments have been, to a greater degree, what all of government has been, mostly bureaucratic with an overlay of a military command structure. What community-oriented policing does is turn that organization upside down. You don't have a typical bureaucratic, hierarchical command structure and be able to respond to community-oriented policing. It means that in the police department there will be task forces and temporary organizations and people pulled out of rank to work on problems. It means that there will be much more decentralization and also that the problem definition comes from the bottom of the organization as well as the top, as well as the sides, as well as from without.

So partnership with the community, participative management, and I think that the third area is problem solving. One of the things that a lot of the management literature, including In Search of Excellence, says that you need for a good organization you need to treat people as adults. You need to give them the tools and the abilities to do the job, and the authority to think for themselves. That's what problem solving does. It treats officers and its treats citizens as adults. Officers, then, need different kinds of training to see patterns, not just a series of events, and they need different kinds of authority to actually act on the patterns of the problems that they see. It means in the police department that solutions come from experimentation, not from standard orders, and that there is an action orientation that's backed up by empowering the front-line officer. It means

that the manager's role changes. Mid-managers, supervisors, capitains, lieutenants, are no longer seen as bosses, controllers, those who have the problem identification, but rather as facilitators, helpers, trying to make things happen. It also means that you recruit a different type of person, and you evaluate differently. You recruit for diversity so that you can have the community represented in the police force, and, as one police chief said, "I no longer recruit for adventure. I recruit for service." So problem solving is a key component.

The last component is visionary leadership. The people who are joining me on the panel today are unusual police leaders. I think they are unusual government leaders, because they are rethinking how we do our jobs. I think that community-oriented policing has an underpinning of values which I respect, and those values are primarily respect for the individual, shared power, and interdependence. Those kinds of values applied to the organization that uses force in our community can make a big difference in the way the communities work. It also means that those leaders look at their relationship, not only in their organization, but the relationship of their organization to the rest of city government and to the community at large.

Partnership with the community, participative management, problem solving, and visionary leadership. This is a trend in policing that we can learn from. This is a trend in policing that I think we as managers need to encourage.

Darrel Stephens: Thank you very much. Interesting insight from local government executives who are looking at policing in much different ways than we have in the past. We've got time for questions. There's a microphone in the aisle towards the middle of the room. Comments, whatever you'd like to share, the floor's open.

Audience: Would you comment on the accreditation in light of what Chief Watson described as over-reliance on numbers.

Betsy Watson: Houston is an accredited law enforcement agency. The question is, could I comment on accreditation in light of the comments I made earlier with regard to an over-reliance on numbers. Houston is an accredited law enforcement agency, and there is a storm of controversy brewing within the organization with regard to what is perceived by many as an apparent conflict between a results orientation and a process orientation. I do not see, however, that accreditation is at odds with the whole notion of quality, because really, if you take a look at what it is accreditation is trying to do, it is to focus on standards and results and to improve the quality of service. We have been successful in making some changes within the organization that have been extremely beneficial. For example, one of the things that we began through accreditation was routine and regular dialogue between the first line supervisor and the police officer to talk about performance. What we used to do was once every six months we gave them a slip of paper and said, "here, this is what your performance evaluation looks like." Now largely as a result of the accreditation process, we focus more on the dialogue between the sergeant and the officer to find out what the problems are, because sometimes the reason an officer isn't able to make a quality difference in the field is because he's not getting support from the supervisor. I think there is a lot to be gained in both. We are entering a process now of self-analysis, and we are working with the accreditation board to see if there aren't some changes we can make together, understanding we're both trying to do the same things, and, you know, don't want to have a conflict.

Audience: Question for Mr. Greenberg. You spoke in your remarks about an earlier era of policing in which the police officer knew the citizens who knew the police officer by name and

saw him frequently, and there was that personal contact. In
Charleston, do you have a residency requirement for police
officers to live in Charleston? If not, what about those
communities that do not have that type of residency requirement,
and when the police officer leaves the shift, he leaves the town,
and does not shop in town; his children do not go to school in
town. He does not get his hair cut in town.

Greenberg: Were you able to hear that? Basically, what he's
asking is whether or not we have a residency requirement in
Charleston, particularly in light of the fact that I said it was
very, very important for people to see a police officer other
than when he's on duty, and, of course, when he goes to the
barber shop, to the grocery store, church, and various other
types of operations, if he does those things outside the
community, then it is not building that type of association that
I talked about. No, we do not have a residency requirement in
Charleston, and the reason why we don't have a residential
requirement is primarily because I believe, and I say I believe,
and it really essentially in that city would be up to me, I
believe that it would limit the kind and quality of people that
we could hire. For example, I believe that the quality, the
expertise of individuals that we could hire would be considerably
less. Our city is surrounded by numerous other cities, and it
really makes essentially one community. As a matter of fact,
they refer to our city as "the city." In other words, they don't
use the name, they call it the city from towns 65 miles away.
They say, "I'm going to the city," and people understand that
means Charleston. They go for entertainment and various other
kinds of things. We do get a lot of the entertainment kind of
situations, but we also make a direct effort for the police to
involve themselves in the community in ways that are community-
oriented. For example, you've heard of the "Adopt a Highway"
type programs? We have adopted a stretch of highway--the
Charleston Police Department's adopted that stretch of highway,

and we have police officers who go out there periodically to pick up paper and trash in order to say we're part of this community. We realize what the problem is.

We also have baseball teams, police athletic league, boxing teams; we have the largest boy scout troop in the area; largest Explorer post; we get involved in events like sponsoring skateboard contests. When I say the police, I don't mean the police department alone, but the Fraternal Order of Police and all the other police officer associations within the department. We also organize steam train trips, camping trips; in other words, we're trying to show we're just like anybody else in the community. Among the things we do, we are also police officers. We think that has been very, very beneficial.

But let's take a look just for a second at one kind of orientation. I gave you the example of how we approach that particular person. What we were saying to that person really is really not to help us look for the person we're looking for, because they may or may not do that because of fear or whatever. What we're saying is we recognize you as being a person who is not a criminal. You're different than the person we're looking for, and we'd like you to help us look for that person. It's for that same reason when we go on narcotic raids, for example, and we kick the doors in, as you have to do on a lot of narcotic raids or other kinds of situations, you knock on the door and say police department, search warrant, open the door, they don't open it. There's all kind of movement in the room, and they're doing everything except moving toward the door. We're going to put the foot to the door as quickly as anybody else will for any other department. But when we arrest the person inside, we also repair the door. When I introduced that idea to Charleston, they were amazed, and in Mobile, Alabama, they thought I was crazy. They said, "why in the world do we want to repair the door of a drug dealer?" The answer was very simple. The person whom we arrest

is rarely the owner of the door, and we have in effect put a cost on a third party who's done nothing against the law. The landlord, the housing authority, his grandmother, his girl friend, or someone who has committed no crime, who is not arrested, and will likely not be arrested, yet they have a cost of several hundred dollars as a result of police action. That is the reason why we do it. What that does is rather than causing people to be afraid to call us, because it's going to cost them money, because they're going to have damage to their property, or in the case of a landlord, then they, in fact, will assist us in every way that they can. We found that's part of the community-oriented policing, not for the drug dealer, but for the other innocent parties that we would be inconveniencing by not having a secure place to sleep that night.

Audience: I believe Betsy mentioned that the officers want to be evaluated by talking to the community. Was that talking to individuals or broad surveys, and what type of format and questions did you use?

Betsy Watson: What they suggested was that we have a random contacting of individuals with whom that particular officer had had contact, and that's exactly what we do. We have a computerized random sampling of community contacts which the sergeants then calls back, and we have a format, a questionnaire, "I understand that officer so-and-so was at your residence on such and such a date, and could you give me some feedback? How long did it take him to get there? Were you satisfied with what he did? What else might he have done that he didn't do?" We plug that in, and interestingly, we have found that the vast majority of the time, the citizens are delighted with the officer, even, you know, though they have been contacted on a random basis; they are not real thrilled about dispatch, so we are having to take a look at our dispatch services training, so it had an unexpected benefit in that regard.

Audience: I'm interested in the experiences you've had in terms of the training resources that have been required as you transition, how much time it takes to transition into this, what the cost is, and how successful you've been from the patrol officer up to your management types of staff.

Betsy Watson: Originally we tried training in three day blocks of time. When we pulled the officers in, we thought annually, for a three day intensive orientation of these techniques, we found out that is ineffective, particularly where it comes to middle management. The major problem that we have encountered is not in the officers. The officers are more than happy to go out and solve problems and be creative and do things differently, but the sergeants and the lieutenants do not understand how to translate this kind of training and this thinking into something that actually makes a difference in the field. When we talked about community contact and quality service, what the sergeants did initially was say, "okay, you have to have three contacts a week." So we have had to develop training now that is ongoing, and we identify particular problems that have developed form the perspective of the sergeant, from the lieutenant, from the community, and from the officer. We develop modules around it, and we go into training like every quarter. Very expensive.

Reuben Greenberg: We did it a little differently. I think the chief is right. The sergeants, the lieutenants, the captains, the majors, etc. were the ones most difficult to deal with, so what we decided is one day a week to make them patrol officers, so they actually go out into the field, answer calls for service, whatever was on that beep, put on a uniform, because they had somehow gotten the idea that they weren't police officers any more; they were police executives, whatever the hell that is. It did two things: it would relate to the community what real problems--some of these people hadn't made an arrest in ten years--put them into the street handling domestics or whatever

particular calls and not to supervise. They were riding by themselves, and they got dispatched on a call, whatever that was, just like the officers were. It also gave them a tremendous amount of credibility with the police officers, because here finally they say, "the last time I saw Major Smith, he had a gun in his hand, you know rather than setting on his fat rear end in his office, he had his gun in his hand, he was covering the back door, I was covering the front door, while we were waiting for the canine officer to arrive," and that kind of relationship gave a greater amount of credibility, so when the command staff made suggestions, "you shouldn't have fired this weapon, you shouldn't have done that," people would listen to it. People weren't listening to it before. They were laughing about it, because here was a person that hadn't made an arrest since the early 70s, and here he was judging other police behavior, and they had no respect for that.

Camille Cates Barnett: I'd also like to come in on training · outside the police department. One of the things that we do in Austin is to train citizens. We have a citizen's police academy, which is a 12-week course for any interested citizen to go through much of the same training that a police officer goes through, so that we now over the years have built up several thousand people in Austin who understand what the training is, what the job is, and can be helpful in the community, as well as understand the job that the officer is doing. But it's also important to train other departments in terms of interactions with the police, to do some things like Reuben was talking about in terms of actually getting people out on the street, in the neighborhoods, to provide different service and cooperation with the police. There's an awful lot of training that needs to go on with the council and with the news media on how to report this type of activity, because it typically can get reported as "fluff," not police duty, and if the council is still making budget decisions and evaluation decisions on response time, crime

rate, and clearance rate, then you don't have the structure
available to support this activity. So there's training that
needs to go on outside of the police department as well as inside
the police department.

Audience: Mr. Greenberg, you operate in your cities some
aggressive, tough anti-drug, anti-crime units--I think you call
them Jaguar teams? And I applaud you for that, as a police
officer myself. I think we should be doing more of that, but I'm
not sure I understand how that's compatible with some of the
things that I'm hearing up there now, and I'd like you to speak
to that a little bit. As you know, there's a lot of controversy
about those teams, and I'd like to hear a little bit about that.

Reuben Greenberg: It's very, very much compatible. I understand
the difficulty you have, because actually on first take it does
seem to be one approach for one situation, and another approach
in that same situation. We refer to them as Jaguar teams, and
Mobile refers to them as Flying Squads. Basically what they are
(I don't want to call them hunter/killer type of group), but what
they do is they orient themselves toward dealing with previously
arrested and convicted criminals. That's the only thing they do.
They would almost never come into contact with regular law-
abiding citizens. They don't write traffic citations, they are
looking for persons who are out of jail, on patrol, or on bond,
who have previous arrests and convictions. That's the sole, and
so this requires a lot of research on their part, to know people
that they see, and recognize what their crimes were, and what
these people are doing. Those particular groups confront people.
You see, people have the idea somehow that a police officer can't
stop somebody on the street and ask them a question. Well,
anybody can stop someone on the street and ask them a question.
The question is, what do you do if they don't respond to your
question. The answer to us is nothing, because we are not there
to ask them for information. We're there to give them

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information. Like if any crime occurs in that particular area, that he did it as far as we are concerned. We're there to give him information, not to take information from him, so it's very, very community oriented because it only deals, this group, with previously arrested and convicted felons.

Darrel Stephens: Part of this concept is solving problems as well. In the kind of squad that Reuben's talking about, we know from research that 10 percent of the offenders commit about 50 percent of the crimes that occur in a community. We know that 10 percent of the victims account for 40 percent of the victimizations, and about 10 percent of the locations in your communities, if you've ever analyzed it, account for about 60 percent of the calls for service that are generated in your community, so the police deal with repeat locations, repeat calls, repeat offenders, and repeat victims, so a squad like that while it doesn't sound on the surface like it's consistent, it's very much consistent with focusing in on solving problems.

Audience: The question is aimed at all three of the panel. What role, if any, do you see citizen complaints as having within community-orientated policing, and related to that, do you see a role for individuals and structures external to police departments in terms of handling those processes? Do you see that within the framework of community-orientated policing?

Camille Cates Barnett: I'll take a stab at it first. One of the things I think we've all been taught is that citizen complaints are bad, and if we are doing a good job, the complaints should go down. I think with this type of orientation toward our jobs, what we'll be interested in is more feedback, not less. If you look at the research on complaints and look at what happens in most businesses, including our own, the person who complains probably represents a very large number of people with the same complaint who never tell you about it. The other thing that

happens is that if someone has a complaint, they are much more likely to do business with you again, even if you don't resolve that complaint, than somebody who doesn't complain. That indicates that the people who are complaining care about what you are doing, and obviously if you resolve the complaint, they'll usually tell about five people that you resolved the complaint. If you don't resolve the complaint, they usually tell about 10 people that you don't resolve it, so one of the things you need to do with citizen complaints is view them as sources of information, and instead of waiting for them to come to you, you go and try to get them. That's what the survey techniques are about; that's what calling back on how officers handle their performance, and you use that as data to improve the system.

Values in Policing

By Robert Wasserman and Mark H. Moore

This paper explores the role that the explicit statement of police values can have on the pursuit of excellence within police departments. Values are the beliefs that guide an organization and the behavior of its employees. The most important beliefs are those that set forth the ultimate purposes of the organization. They provide the organization with its raison d'etre for outsiders and insiders alike and justify the continuing investment in the organization's enterprise.[1]

Often, however, the beliefs about purposes are hopelessly entangled with assumptions about the nature of the organization's environment, the principal means for achieving its purposes, and the sorts of relationships and expectations that exist within the organization. For example, in policing, the strong belief among many police officers that they stand as the front line of defense against community lawlessness—reflecting what is often a rather narrow definition of order—conditions the organizational environment within which the police operate. These beliefs can easily become the prevalent values of the force.

All organizations have values. One can see these values expressed through the actions of the organization—the things that are taken seriously and the things that are rejected as irrelevant, inappropriate, or dangerous. Jokes, solemn understandings, and internal explanations for actions also express values.

Police departments are powerfully influenced by their values. The problem is that police departments, like many organizations, are guided by implicit values that are often at odds with explicit values. This breeds confusion, distrust, and cynicism rather than clarity, commitment, and high morale.

Values in the private sector

High-performing corporations, the elite of American industry, have one thing in common. They operate with a core set of values that guides conduct throughout the organization. Companies such as Federal Express, Gore-Tex Fabrics, and Digital Equipment Corporation have all developed explicit corporate values that not only define excellence for the enterprise, but also help to achieve it.

Take Federal Express. At the broadest level, the goal is to earn returns for shareholders. More concretely, the objective is to get packages where they are going on time. In addition to these substantive goals, Federal Express has values that define relationships within the company and its markets. These values are: (1) to treat each customer and each transaction as though the entire success of the corporation rested on that transaction; (2) to make the workplace a satisfying environment for employees; and (3) to keep employees informed about company policy. Every Federal Express employee knows these values. Federal Express succeeds because all employees acknowledge them and understand that their survival in the corporation rests on embodying the values in their actions.

At Gore-Tex, the values are somewhat different. They emphasize the production of high-quality material, creativity in the design of new products and production technologies, and the cultivation of a "worker-positive" workplace. The differences in values reflect the differences in their products. However, both companies share the explicit statement and emphasis on values as an important management tool. Management of the corporations believes that workers are pressed toward excellence not by autocratic direction but rather by management through values, creating a sense of purpose, direction, and performance that is uniform throughout the organization.

Almost as bad, the explicit values articulated by some police organizations are unsuited to the challenges confronting today's police departments. Finally, there is a reluctance on the part of some police executives to rely on explicit statements of values as an important management tool for enhancing the performance of their organizations. Still, some police executives are working towards superior police performance by articulating a new set of values, and by using these as a primary management tool.

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6 6 ... *police departments, like many organizations, are guided by implicit values that are often at odds with explicit values.* 9 9

"Value orientation" has been neither the driving force nor the basis of organizational life in American policing. Should the American police organization have a set of organizational values that are explicitly acknowledged and well known throughout the organization? Should police officers recog-

nize that their survival in the police department rests on whether they embody these organizational values in their actions? This paper examines these questions.

How are values articulated or expressed? Some organizations state their values directly to clientele or employees. Even so, customers, clients, and organizational authorizers (community residents, mayors, and city council members in the municipal setting, and bankers and institutional investors in the corporate sphere) become aware of an organization's values only through the actions of members of the organization or the work of public relations officials.

American corporations are far more sophisticated in communicating values than are government organizations. In industry, values often are expressed through corporate value statements, public advertising, and management pronouncements. Yet, while public relations may create an illusion that a particular set of values is important to the corporation, actual consumer experience often determines eventually the true nature of the corporation's values.

There is often a disparity between the values explicitly established by an organization and those that are actually embraced and pursued. In such cases, corporate management focuses on one set of values while employees adopt an entirely different set. This occurs either because of the failure of management to communicate organizational values or

because stated organizational values fail to take into account the reality of the workplace.

The disparity is particularly common in American policing. Mayors and city managers often give their police executives a dual set of objectives, such as "clean up the gangs in the park" and "don't break the law in doing it." Since cleaning up the park has primary importance, and the police are unsupported in developing tools and tactics necessary to solve the underlying problems creating the situation, the mayoral concern with "don't break the law" implicitly becomes "don't tell me about it if you must break the law."

Major corporations have had to deal with the same pressures and ambiguities. In the case of a large producer of orange juice, maintaining profitability was translated by midlevel managerial employees as being more important than product quality, thus making it acceptable to water down the juice as long as it went undiscovered.

❝ . . . the mayoral concern with 'don't break the law' implicitly becomes 'don't tell me about it if you must break the law.' ❞

In many organizations, values are taken for granted until a crisis centers public attention on the disparity between the organization's stated values and those actually pursued. High-performing commercial organizations consciously strive to ensure that values expressed by employee actions and comments match the values of the organization. Many other organizations, however, function with a dual standard of public relations pronouncements and actual workplace values.

Values as a management tool. The explicit statement and frequent pronouncement of organizational values becomes an important management tool in three circumstances: first, when management's explicit values are so well incorporated in the administrative systems and culture of an organization that they become workplace values; second, when management's values seem well suited to the challenges and tasks facing the organization, and their pursuit will lead to organizational success; and third, when the organization's operations are such that management through values is superior to any other kind of management control.

Values play this important role for several reasons. To the extent that the values actually influence substantive and administrative decisions facing the organization, they lend a coherence and predictability to top management's actions and the responses to the actions of employees. This helps employees make proper decisions and use their discretion with confidence that they are contributing to rather than detracting from organizational performance. That means that the necessity for strong control is lessened. Explicit values also lend significance and meaning to the activity of employers. They transform small transactions and events into expressions of personal commitment to particular values. Finally, explicit statements of values invite broad public support and facilitate accountability. To the extent that the values are attractive to shareholders, customers, and employees in the private sector, and to constituents, clients, and employees in the public sector, a flow of resources to the organization is initiated. To the extent that the values are actually expressed in organizational actions, accountability is preserved, and the flow of resources sustained.[3]

Note that management through values is a particularly important tool for organizations that find it difficult to codify procedures or measure their performance. This occurs in organizations where outputs are hard to define, adaptations of operations to individual cases are often necessary, and technical innovations are occurring. It also occurs in organizations where operations make close supervision impossible. The reason is that in such organizations, the principal alternative methods of control are obviously infeasible.

Values in policing. Policing styles reflect a department's values. A police agency that independently adopts an aggressive tactical orientation has a far different set of values than a police agency that carefully engages neighborhood residents in planning for crime control activities. The values inherent in policing before the reform efforts of the 1930's often reflected political and personal priorities of employees or special interest groups rather than a commitment to broad principles of professionalism.

Sometimes the values of police organizations have been publicly stated. O.W. Wilson, for example, published a set of values for the Wichita Police Department when he was that city's chief of police: he did the same for Chicago when he served as that city's police superintendent.[4] It is more usual, however, for the values that drive policing to be unstated. A number of police agencies, such as Los Angeles, have carefully incorporated values into their rules and procedural directives. Other police agencies, such as Madison (Wisconsin) and Houston, have articulated individual value statements reflecting organizational commitments.

Much of the current discussion about improving police performance is concerned about the values that should guide policing. To understand that discussion, it is useful to contrast the values of professional crime-fighting policing with the values of community problem-solving policing.

The values of professional crime-fighting policing. Over the last four decades, as police departments have become increasingly professional, several key values have emerged to justify and guide the performance of police agencies. While often unstated, these values include the following:

- Police authority is based solely in the law. Professional police organizations are committed to enforcement of that law as their primary objective.

- Communities can provide police with assistance in enforcing the law. Helpful communities will provide police with information to assist them (the police) in carrying out their mission.

- Responding to citizen calls for service is the highest police priority. All calls must receive the fastest response possible.

- Social problems and other neighborhood issues are not the concern of the police unless they threaten the breakdown of public order.

- Police, being experts in crime control, are best suited to develop police priorities and strategies.

❝ [In professional crime-fighting policing] police authority is based solely in the law. ❞

Other values reflect the common belief among police officers (and some chief police executives) that police departments exist to advance the profession of policing, not to serve as an important part of maintaining democratic values and improving the quality of life in urban communities. From these perspectives, there is little interest in, or respect for, the community basis for police authority.

The values of community policing. In the ongoing dialog about community policing, there are two important new developments. A number of chiefs of police have defined a set of values reflecting internal (employee and administration) and external (community and government) consensus about the nature of the police function and operation of the police agency.

Second, from the discussion of values, these chiefs have discovered that communities are more thoughtful and receptive to discussion of police priorities and strategies if

that discussion occurs within the context of mission and value considerations. No longer is the chief of police considered out of place when he suggests to his community that public consideration of policing values and standards is in order. The experience of these chiefs has shown that the development of value statements can be illuminating to both the community and members of the police department.

❝ ... communities are ... receptive to discussion of police priorities ... within the context of mission and value considerations. ❞

In 1982, for example, Lee P. Brown, Houston's chief of police, made public a statement of the values of the Houston Police Department. This statement set forth the commitments of the police department in several critical areas such as policymaking, community access to decisionmaking, standards of integrity, and field strategy development. As Chief Brown noted, the statement established the criteria for evaluating the performance of the department.

The value statement for the Houston Police Department includes the following:

- The Houston Police Department will involve the community in all policing activities which directly impact the quality of community life.

- The Houston Police Department believes that policing strategies must preserve and advance democratic values.

- The Houston Police Department believes that it must structure service delivery in a way that will reinforce the strengths of the city's neighborhoods.

- The Houston Police Department believes that the public should have input into the development of policies which directly impact the quality of neighborhood life.

- The Houston Police Department will seek the input of employees into matters which impact employee job satisfaction and effectiveness.

By publicly stating values, the beliefs underpinning organizational actions, Chief Brown wished to have both the community and the police department focus on important issues of police authority, standards, and operational limits. Indeed, he believed public acknowledgment of community-oriented values was an important step in his move to change

the culture of the Houston Police Department from a defensive orientation designed to protect internal organizational patterns to an externally directed community-positive orientation.

The developing emphasis on community policing has generated a substantial amount of discussion about values because, by definition, community policing reflects a set of values, rather than a technical orientation toward the police function. It reflects a concern with the quality of police service delivery, the relationship between the police and the community, and the relationship within the police agency between management and employees. As opposed to the more traditional perspective of professional crime-fighting policing which emphasizes the maintenance of internal organizational controls, community policing emphasizes service output, the quality of results, and the impact of police service on the state of urban living.

❝ ... by definition, community policing reflects a set of values, rather than a technical orientation ... ❞

There have been several examples of values that reflect this orientation. In Boston, Commissioner Francis M. Roache has set forth the following commitment for the police department:

- The department is committed to the positive evolution, growth, and livability of our city.

Sir Kenneth Newman, former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in London, England, set forth the following values for that department:

- In pursuing the aim and duty of maintaining a peaceful community, members of the Metropolitan Police view their role as one involving cooperation with others in the creation and maintenance of a way of life in communities which strikes the optimum balance between the collective interests of all citizens and the personal rights of all individuals.

- The aim of the Metropolitan Police will, therefore, be to work with other agencies to develop what is known as a "situational" or "problem-solving" approach to crime prevention.

Discussions of the Executive Session on Community Policing at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government have produced a set of values that represent the

key characteristics of community policing. These characteristics are embodied in the following principles:

- Community policing is committed to a problem-solving partnership: dealing with crime, disorder, and the quality of life.

The value here is the orientation toward problem solving. In community policing, incidents (such as crime or 911 responses) are viewed from the perspective of community action which will seek to resolve the problem, not simply handle the incident.

- Under community policing, police service delivery is decentralized to the neighborhood level.

Community policing holds that policing a city's neighborhoods is best done at the individual neighborhood level, not by centralized command and control. Since the solutions to most neighborhood problems are through neighborhood action, the community policing effort concentrates on developing a cohesive neighborhood capability reflecting responsibility, self-help, and co-production of service with the police. The value of decentralization suggests that every police effort is pushed down toward the neighborhood level unless there is a specific reason for the effort to be centralized, such as a concern with a citywide problem or issue.

- The highest commitment of the community policing organization is respect for and sensitivity to all citizens and their problems. Community policing values the skills of positive social interaction, rather than simply technical application of procedures to situations, whether dealing with crime, disorder, or other problem solving.

❝ Community policing holds that policing a city's neighborhoods is best done at the individual neighborhood level, not by centralized command ... ❞

As is the case with several notable private sector companies, community policing's officers have a service orientation. Citizens are supposed to be treated with respect, regardless of the involvement of the citizens in the incident to which the police are responding.

Police officers often find this value difficult to accept. There is a widespread tendency to think of, and describe, street

criminals as maggots and other, even less endearing terms. With a service orientation, such characterizations are avoided, if for no other reason than recognition that the initial police contact may erroneously describe the true nature of the individual.

- The community-oriented police department makes the highest commitment to collaborative problem solving, bringing the neighborhoods into substantive discussions with police personnel to identify ways of dealing with neighborhood problems.

" . . . constructive action by police and community is always better than action by the police alone. "

The community-oriented police department recognizes that constructive action by police *and* community is always better than action by the police alone. Before any major action is undertaken, whether a shift in resources or implementation of a new problem-solving approach, the community-oriented police department discusses that change with the appropriate neighborhood. The willingness to discuss publicly priority setting or selection of problem-solving tactics reflects the high value the organization places on bringing the community into the business of policing. It is also recognition that the community is an important source of police authority.

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- The community-oriented police department views both the community and the law as the source of the department's authority.

Since police action is not prescribed by the law, the community empowers the police agency to deal with difficult problems of importance to neighborhood residents and accepts the actions taken as long as the police are continually careful to engage the neighborhood in selecting tactics and priorities beyond those set forth under the law. When a police agency has lost its community authority, a range of responses always occurs, from widespread dissatisfaction with the department to substantial disorder when the police apply the law in the neighborhood.

- The community-oriented police agency is committed to furthering democratic values. Every action of the agency reflects the importance of protecting constitutional rights and ensuring basic personal freedoms of all citizens.

The commitment to democratic values is a cornerstone of community policing. Placement of a high value on the democratic process provides police agencies with the shield they need to ensure that actions proposed by communities do not infringe on others' rights. Embodiment of this value by the organization, and its use as a defense against inappropriate neighborhood initiatives, will succeed only if the police themselves strictly adhere to the law in all aspects of their work.

Implementing values. While a number of police agencies have set forth written statements of their values, few have carefully considered ways of implementing their values so that the actions of agency employees will match the value orientation of the organization.

Police departments that have adopted the community policing philosophy have found it helpful to develop concise value statements that reflect these principles and commitments. The philosophy then can be understood throughout both the department and the community, and serve as the basis for the application of discretion within the department.

Written value statements are useful if for no other reason than to force management to reach agreement on the organization's values. Experience in most police agencies indicates that this debate is not an easy task. But written value statements are not sufficient, since the values eventually must be reflected in all aspects of the organization, from training to field operations.

> **Written value statements are useful if for no other reason than to force management to reach agreement on the organization's values.**

Presenting values through training must involve more than simply handing out value statements, as has occurred in some agencies. Carefully developed case materials, class discussion, tests, and field officer programs must all reflect the official values of the agency. Policy statements not only state the values explicitly but also provide explanations of the reasoning behind the derived policies.

When auditing field operations or investigative performance, the review must include careful consideration of the degree to which the actions follow stated department values. When riding in police cruisers, supervisors and managers must listen for the "talk of the department" to see if values expressed by police officers reflect those of the department.

> **... only when the formal values ... match those ... [of] the rank and file can the organization be ... 'high performing.'**

Some police administrators will claim that officers will never match the values articulated in their street talk with those of the organization as it pursues excellence. That, of course, is the greatest challenge the police administrator faces; for only when the formal values of the organization match those acted out by the rank and file can the organization be considered "high performing." Community policing requires that match of values; it provides a structure and orientation that make such a match easier.

Summary. The values of community policing are different from those of previous eras in police history. Equally important, values are no longer hidden, but serve as the basis for citizen understanding of the police function, judgments of police success, and employee understanding of what the police agency seeks to achieve.

Notes

1. In describing the characteristics of organizations, Peters and Waterman note that excellent companies "are fantastic centralists around the few core values they hold dear." Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., *In Search of Excellence*, New York, Harper & Row, 1983: 15.

2. Thomas J. Watson, Jr., the founding father of IBM, authored an early work about how values must be articulated by the successful corporation. See Thomas J. Watson, Jr., *A Business and its Beliefs The Ideas that Helped Build IBM*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1963.

3. See George L. Kelling, "Police and Communities: the Quiet Revolution," *Perspectives on Policing*, No. 1, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, June 1988; and George L. Kelling, Robert Wasserman, and Hubert Williams, "Police Accountability and Community Policing," *Perspectives on Policing* No. 7, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, November 1988, for a discussion of how management through values lessens the need for reliance on strong command and control systems.

4. Wilson published the values to provide both the police and the community with an understanding of why the police department undertook many of its actions. See Orlando W. Wilson, *On This We Stand*, Chicago Police Department, 1983.

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BROKEN WINDOWS

BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KELLING

IN THE MID-1970S, THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ANnounced a "Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program," designed to improve the quality of community life in twenty-eight cities. As part of that program, the state provided money to help cities take police officers out of their patrol cars and assign them to walking beats. The governor and other state officials were enthusiastic about using foot patrol as a way of cutting crime, but many police chiefs were skeptical. Foot patrol, in their eyes, had been pretty much discredited. It reduced the mobility of the police, who thus had difficulty responding to citizen calls for service, and it weakened headquarters control over patrol officers.

Many police officers also disliked foot patrol, but for different reasons: it was hard work, it kept them outside on cold, rainy nights, and it reduced their chances for making a "good pinch." In some departments, assigning officers to foot patrol had been used as a form of punishment. And academic experts on policing doubted that foot patrol would have any impact on crime rates: it was, in the opinion of most, little more than a sop to public opinion. But since the state was paying for it, the local authorities were willing to go along.

Five years after the program started, the Police Foundation, in Washington, D.C., published an evaluation of the foot-patrol project. Based on its analysis of a carefully controlled experiment carried out chiefly in Newark, the foundation concluded, to the surprise of hardly anyone, that foot patrol had not reduced crime rates. But residents of the foot-patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more secure than persons in other areas, tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime (staying at home with the doors locked, for example). Moreover, citizens in the foot-patrol areas had a more favorable opinion of the police than did those living elsewhere. And officers walking beats had higher morale, greater job satisfaction, and a more favorable attitude toward citizens in their neighborhoods than did officers assigned to patrol cars.

These findings may be taken as evidence that the skep-

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
tics were right—foot patrol has no effect on crime: it merely fools the citizens into thinking that they are safer. But in our view, and in the view of the authors of the Police Foundation study (of whom Kelling was one), the citizens of Newark were not fooled at all. They knew what the foot-patrol officers were doing, they knew it was different from what motorized officers do, and they knew that having officers walk beats did in fact make their neighborhoods safer.

But how can a neighborhood be "safer" when the crime rate has not gone down—in fact, may have gone up? Finding the answer requires first that we understand what most often frightens people in public places. Many citizens, of course, are primarily frightened by crime, especially crime involving a sudden, violent attack by a stranger. This risk is very real, in Newark as in many large cities. But we tend to overlook or forget another source of fear—

the fear of being bothered by disorderly people. Not violent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.

What foot-patrol officers did was to elevate, to the extent they could, the level of public order in these neighborhoods. Though the neighborhoods were predominantly black and the foot patrolmen were mostly white, this "order-maintenance" function of the police was performed to the general satisfaction of both parties.

One of us (Kelling) spent many hours walking with Newark foot-patrol officers to see how they defined "order" and what they did to maintain it. One beat was typical: a busy but dilapidated area in the heart of Newark, with many abandoned buildings, marginal shops (several of which prominently displayed knives and straight-edged razors in their windows), one large department store, and, most important, a train station and several major bus stops. Though the area was run-down, its streets were filled with people, because it was a major transportation center. The good order of this area was important not only to those who lived and worked there but also to many others, who had to move through it on their way home, to supermarkets, or to factories.

The people on the street were primarily black; the officer who walked the street was white. The people were made up of "regulars" and "strangers." Regulars included both "decent folk" and some drunks and derelicts who were always there but who "knew their place." Strangers were, well, strangers, and viewed suspiciously, sometimes apprehensively. The officer—call him Kelly—knew who the regulars were, and they knew him. As he saw his job, he was to keep an eye on strangers, and make certain that the disreputable regulars observed some informal but widely understood rules. Drunks and addicts could sit on the stoops, but could not lie down. People could drink on side streets, but not at the main intersection. Bottles had to be in paper bags. Talking to, bothering, or begging from people waiting at the bus stop was strictly forbidden. If a dispute erupted between a businessman and a customer, the businessman was assumed to be right, especially if the customer was a stranger. If a stranger loitered, Kelly would ask him if he had any means of support and what his business was; if he gave unsatisfactory answers, he was sent on his way. Persons who broke the informal rules, especially those who bothered people waiting at bus stops, were arrested for vagrancy. Noisy teenagers were told to keep quiet.

These rules were defined and enforced in collaboration with the "regulars" on the street. Another neighborhood might have different rules, but these, everybody understood, were the rules for *this* neighborhood. If someone violated them, the regulars not only turned to Kelly for

help but also ridiculed the violator. Sometimes what Kelly did could be described as "enforcing the law," but just as often it involved taking informal or extralegal steps to help protect what the neighborhood had decided was the appropriate level of public order. Some of the things he did probably would not withstand a legal challenge.

A determined skeptic might acknowledge that a skilled foot-patrol officer can maintain order but still insist that this sort of "order" has little to do with the real sources of community fear—that is, with violent crime. To a degree, that is true. But two things must be borne in mind. First, outside observers should not assume that they know how much of the anxiety now endemic in many big-city neighborhoods stems from a fear of "real" crime and how much from a sense that the street is disorderly, a source of distasteful, worrisome encounters. The people of Newark, to judge from their behavior and their remarks to interviewers, apparently assign a high value to public order, and feel relieved and reassured when the police help them maintain that order.

SECOND, AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL, DISORDER AND crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken *and is left unrepaired*, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing. (It has always been fun.)

Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist, reported in 1969 on some experiments testing the broken-window theory. He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood up on a street in the Bronx and a comparable automobile on a street in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its "abandonment." The first to arrive were a family—father, mother, and young son—who removed the radiator and battery. Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began—windows were smashed, parts torn off, upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult "vandals" were well-dressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the "vandals" appeared to be primarily respectable whites.

Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder, and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider themselves law-abiding. Because of the nature of community life in the Bronx—its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things are stolen or broken, the past experience of "no one caring"—vandalism begins much more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to believe that private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly. But vandalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers—the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility—are lowered by actions that seem to signal that "no one cares."

We suggest that "untended" behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospi-

with averted eyes, silent lips, and hurried steps. "Don't get involved." For some residents, this growing atomization will matter little, because the neighborhood is not their "home" but "the place where they live." Their interests are elsewhere; they are cosmopolitans. But it will matter greatly to other people, whose lives derive meaning and satisfaction from local attachments rather than worldly involvement; for them, the neighborhood will cease to exist except for a few reliable friends whom they arrange to meet.

Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls, drugs will change hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped. That the drunks will be robbed by boys who do it as a lark, and the prostitutes' customers will be robbed by men who do it purposefully and perhaps violently. That muggings will occur.

Among those who often find it difficult to move away from this are the elderly. Surveys of citizens suggest that the elderly are much less likely to be the victims of crime than younger persons, and some have inferred from this that the well-known fear of crime voiced by the elderly is an exaggeration: perhaps we ought not to design special programs to protect older persons; perhaps we should even try to talk them out of their mistaken fears. This argument misses the point. The prospect of a confrontation with an obstreperous teenager or a drunken panhandler can be as fear-inducing for defenseless persons as the prospect of meeting an actual robber; indeed, to a defenseless person, the two kinds of confrontation are often indistinguishable. Moreover, the lower rate at which the elderly are victimized is a measure of the steps they have already taken—chiefly, staying behind locked doors—to minimize the risks they face. Young men are more frequently attacked than older women, not because they are easier or more lucrative targets but because they are on the streets more.

Nor is the connection between disorderliness and fear made only by the elderly. Susan Estrich, of the Harvard Law School, has recently gathered together a number of surveys on the sources of public fear. One, done in Portland, Oregon, indicated that three fourths of the adults interviewed cross to the other side of a street when they see a gang of teenagers; another survey, in Baltimore, discovered that nearly half would cross the street to avoid even a single strange youth. When an interviewer asked people in a housing project where the most dangerous spot was, they mentioned a place where young persons gathered to drink and play music, despite the fact that not a single crime had occurred there. In Boston public housing projects, the greatest fear was expressed by persons living in the buildings where disorderliness and incivility, not crime, were the greatest. Knowing this helps one understand the significance of such otherwise harmless displays

table and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children: the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers.

At this point it is not inevitable that serious crime will flourish or violent attacks on strangers will occur. But many residents will think that crime, especially violent crime, is on the rise, and they will modify their behavior accordingly. They will use the streets less often, and when on the streets will stay apart from their fellows, moving

as subway graffiti. As Nathan Glazer has written, the proliferation of graffiti, even when not obscene, confronts the subway rider with the "inescapable knowledge that the environment he must endure for an hour or more a day is uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and that anyone can invade it to do whatever damage and mischief the mind suggests."

In response to fear, people avoid one another, weakening controls. Sometimes they call the police. Patrol cars arrive, an occasional arrest occurs, but crime continues and disorder is not abated. Citizens complain to the police chief, but he explains that his department is low on personnel and that the courts do not punish petty or first-time offenders. To the residents, the police who arrive in squad cars are either ineffective or uncaring; to the police, the residents are animals who deserve each other. The citizens may soon stop calling the police, because "they can't do anything."

The process we call urban decay has occurred for centuries in every city. But what is happening today is different in at least two important respects. First, in the period before, say, World War II, city dwellers—because of money costs, transportation difficulties, familial and church connections—could rarely move away from neighborhood problems. When movement did occur, it tended to be along public-transit routes. Now mobility has become exceptionally easy for all but the poorest or those who are blocked by racial prejudice. Earlier crime waves had a kind of built-in self-correcting mechanism: the determination of a neighborhood or community to reassert control over its turf. Areas in Chicago, New York, and Boston would experience crime and gang wars, and then normalcy would return, as the families for whom no alternative residences were possible reclaimed their authority over the streets.

Second, the police in this earlier period assisted in that reassertion of authority by acting, sometimes violently, on behalf of the community. Young toughs were roughed up, people were arrested "on suspicion" or for vagrancy, and prostitutes and petty thieves were routed. "Rights" were something enjoyed by decent folk, and perhaps also by the serious professional criminal, who avoided violence and could afford a lawyer.

This pattern of policing was not an aberration or the result of occasional excess. From the earliest days of the nation, the police function was seen primarily as that of a night watchman: to maintain order against the chief threats to order—fire, wild animals, and disreputable behavior. Solving crimes was viewed not as a police responsibility but as a private one. In the March, 1969, *Atlantic*, one of us (Wilson) wrote a brief account of how the police role had slowly changed from maintaining order to fighting crimes. The change began with the creation of private detectives (often ex-criminals), who worked on a contingency-fee basis for individuals who had suffered losses. In time, the detectives were absorbed into municipal police

agencies and paid a regular salary; simultaneously, the responsibility for prosecuting thieves was shifted from the aggrieved private citizen to the professional prosecutor. This process was not complete in most places until the twentieth century.

In the 1960s, when urban riots were a major problem, social scientists began to explore carefully the order-maintenance function of the police, and to suggest ways of improving it—not to make streets safer (its original function) but to reduce the incidence of mass violence. Order-maintenance became, to a degree, coterminous with "community relations." But, as the crime wave that began in the early 1960s continued without abatement throughout the decade and into the 1970s, attention shifted to the role of the police as crime-fighters. Studies of police behavior ceased, by and large, to be accounts of the order-maintenance function and became, instead, efforts to propose and test ways whereby the police could solve more crimes, make more arrests, and gather better evidence. If these things could be done, social scientists assumed, citizens would be less fearful.

A GREAT DEAL WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING THIS transition, as both police chiefs and outside experts emphasized the crime-fighting function in their plans, in the allocation of resources, and in deployment of personnel. The police may well have become better crime-fighters as a result. And doubtless they remained aware of their responsibility for order. But the link between order-maintenance and crime-prevention, so obvious to earlier generations, was forgotten.

That link is similar to the process whereby one broken window becomes many. The citizen who fears the ill-smelling drunk, the rowdy teenager, or the importuning beggar is not merely expressing his distaste for unseemly behavior; he is also giving voice to a bit of folk wisdom that happens to be a correct generalization—namely, that serious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window. Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.

Some police administrators concede that this process occurs, but argue that motorized-patrol officers can deal with it as effectively as foot-patrol officers. We are not so sure. In theory, an officer in a squad car can observe as much as an officer on foot; in theory, the former can talk to as many people as the latter. But the reality of police–citizen encounters is powerfully altered by the automobile. An officer on foot cannot separate himself from the street people; if he is approached, only his uniform and his personality can help him manage whatever is about to happen. And he can never be certain what that will be—a request for directions, a plea for help, an angry denunciation, a teasing remark, a confused babble, a threatening gesture.

In a car, an officer is more likely to deal with street people by rolling down the window and looking at them. The door and the window exclude the approaching citizen: they are a barrier. Some officers take advantage of this barrier, perhaps unconsciously, by acting differently if in the car than they would on foot. We have seen this countless times. The police car pulls up to a corner where teenagers are gathered. The window is rolled down. The officer stares at the youths. They stare back. The officer says to one, "C'mere." He saunters over, conveying to his friends by his elaborately casual style the idea that he is not intimidated by authority. "What's your name?" "Chuck." "Chuck who?" "Chuck Jones." "What'ya doing, Chuck?" "Nothin'." "Got a P.O. [parole officer]?" "Nah." "Sure?" "Yeah." "Stay out of trouble, Chuckie." Meanwhile, the other boys laugh and exchange comments among themselves, probably at the officer's expense. The officer stares

harder. He cannot be certain what is being said, nor can he join in and, by displaying his own skill at street banter, prove that he cannot be "put down." In the process, the officer has learned almost nothing, and the boys have decided the officer is an alien force who can safely be disregarded, even mocked.

Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a police officer. Such exchanges give them a sense of importance, provide them with the basis for gossip, and allow them to explain to the authorities what is worrying them (whereby they gain a modest but significant sense of having "done something" about the problem). You approach a person on foot more easily, and talk to him more readily, than you do a person in a car. Moreover, you can more easily retain some anonymity if you draw an officer aside for a private chat. Suppose you want to pass on a tip about who is stealing handbags, or who offered to sell you a stolen TV. In the inner city, the culprit, in all likelihood, lives nearby. To walk up to a marked patrol car and lean in the window is to convey a visible signal that you are a "fink."

The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself. The police cannot, without committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal control. On the other hand, to reinforce those natural forces the police must accommodate them. And therein lies the problem.

SHOULD POLICE ACTIVITY ON THE STREET BE SHAPED, in important ways, by the standards of the neighborhood rather than by the rules of the state? Over the past two decades, the shift of police from order-maintenance to law-enforcement has brought them increasingly under the influence of legal restrictions, provoked by media complaints and enforced by court decisions and departmental orders. As a consequence, the order-maintenance functions of the police are now governed by rules developed to control police relations with suspected criminals. This is, we think, an entirely new development. For centuries, the role of the police as watchmen was judged primarily not in terms of its compliance with appropriate procedures but rather in terms of its attaining a desired objective. The objective was order, an inherently ambiguous term but a condition that people in a given community recognized when they saw it. The means were the same as those the community itself would employ, if its members were sufficiently determined, courageous, and authoritative. Detecting and apprehending criminals, by contrast, was a means to an end, not an end in itself; a judicial determination of guilt or innocence was the hoped-for result of the law-enforcement mode. From the first, the police were expected to follow rules defining that process, though states differed in how stringent the rules should be. The criminal-apprehension process was always understood to involve individual rights, the violation of which was unac-

ceptable because it meant that the violating officer would be acting as a judge and jury—and that was not his job. Guilt or innocence was to be determined by universal standards under special procedures.

Ordinarily, no judge or jury ever sees the persons caught up in a dispute over the appropriate level of neighborhood order. That is true not only because most cases are handled informally on the street but also because no universal standards are available to settle arguments over disorder, and thus a judge may not be any wiser or more effective than a police officer. Until quite recently in many states, and even today in some places, the police make arrests on such charges as "suspicious person" or "vagrancy" or "public drunkenness"—charges with scarcely any legal meaning. These charges exist not because society wants judges to punish vagrants or drunks but because it wants an officer to have the legal tools to remove undesirable persons from a neighborhood when informal efforts to preserve order in the streets have failed.

Once we begin to think of all aspects of police work as involving the application of universal rules under special procedures, we inevitably ask what constitutes an "undesirable person" and why we should "criminalize" vagrancy or drunkenness. A strong and commendable desire to see that people are treated fairly makes us worry about allowing the police to rout persons who are undesirable by some vague or parochial standard. A growing and not-so-commendable utilitarianism leads us to doubt that any behavior that does not "hurt" another person should be made illegal. And thus many of us who watch over the police are reluctant to allow them to perform, in the only way they can, a function that every neighborhood desperately wants them to perform.

This wish to "decriminalize" disreputable behavior that "harms no one"—and thus remove the ultimate sanction the police can employ to maintain neighborhood order—is, we think, a mistake. Arresting a single drunk or a single vagrant who has harmed no identifiable person seems unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do anything about a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants may destroy an entire community. A particular rule that seems to make sense in the individual case makes no sense when it is made a universal rule and applied to all cases. It makes no sense because it fails to take into account the connection between one broken window left untended and a thousand broken windows. Of course, agencies other than the police could attend to the problems posed by drunks or the mentally ill, but in most communities—especially where the "deinstitutionalization" movement has been strong—they do not.

The concern about equity is more serious. We might agree that certain behavior makes one person more undesirable than another, but how do we ensure that age or skin color or national origin or harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for distinguishing the undesirable from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that

the police do not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry?

We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question. We are not confident that there is a satisfactory answer, except to hope that by their selection, training, and supervision, the police will be inculcated with a clear sense of the outer limit of their discretionary authority. That limit, roughly, is this—the police exist to help regulate behavior, not to maintain the racial or ethnic purity of a neighborhood.

Consider the case of the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, one of the largest public-housing projects in the country. It is home for nearly 20,000 people, all black, and extends over ninety-two acres along South State Street. It was named after a distinguished black who had been, during the 1940s, chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority. Not long after it opened, in 1962, relations between project residents and the police deteriorated badly. The citizens felt that the police were insensitive or brutal; the police, in turn, complained of unprovoked attacks on them. Some Chicago officers tell of times when they were afraid to enter the Homes. Crime rates soared.

Today, the atmosphere has changed. Police–citizen relations have improved—apparently, both sides learned something from the earlier experience. Recently, a boy stole a purse and ran off. Several young persons who saw the theft voluntarily passed along to the police information on the identity and residence of the thief, and they did this publicly, with friends and neighbors looking on. But problems persist, chief among them the presence of youth gangs that terrorize residents and recruit members in the project. The people expect the police to "do something" about this, and the police are determined to do just that.

But do what? Though the police can obviously make arrests whenever a gang member breaks the law, a gang can form, recruit, and congregate without breaking the law. And only a tiny fraction of gang-related crimes can be solved by an arrest; thus, if an arrest is the only recourse for the police, the residents' fears will go unassuaged. The police will soon feel helpless, and the residents will again believe that the police "do nothing." What the police in fact do is to chase known gang members out of the project. In the words of one officer, "We kick ass." Project residents both know and approve of this. The tacit police–citizen alliance in the project is reinforced by the police view that the cops and the gangs are the two rival sources of power in the area, and that the gangs are not going to win.

None of this is easily reconciled with any conception of due process or fair treatment. Since both residents and gang members are black, race is not a factor. But it could be. Suppose a white project confronted a black gang, or vice versa. We would be apprehensive about the police taking sides. But the substantive problem remains the same: how can the police strengthen the informal social-control mechanisms of natural communities in order to minimize fear in public places? Law enforcement, per se, is no an-

swer. A gang can weaken or destroy a community by standing about in a menacing fashion and speaking rudely to passersby without breaking the law.

WE HAVE DIFFICULTY THINKING ABOUT SUCH MATters, not simply because the ethical and legal issues are so complex but because we have become accustomed to thinking of the law in essentially individualistic terms. The law defines *my* rights, punishes *his* behavior, and is applied by *that* officer because of *this* harm. We assume, in thinking this way, that what is good for the individual will be good for the community, and what doesn't matter when it happens to one person won't matter if it happens to many. Ordinarily, those are plausible assumptions. But in cases where behavior that is tolerable to one person is intolerable to many others, the reactions of the others—fear, withdrawal, flight—may ultimately make matters worse for everyone, including the individual who first professed his indifference.

It may be their greater sensitivity to communal as opposed to individual needs that helps explain why the residents of small communities are more satisfied with their police than are the residents of similar neighborhoods in big cities. Elinor Ostrom and her co-workers at Indiana University compared the perception of police services in two poor, all-black Illinois towns—Phoenix and East Chicago Heights—with those of three comparable all-black neighborhoods in Chicago. The level of criminal victimization and the quality of police–community relations appeared to be about the same in the towns and the Chicago neighborhoods. But the citizens living in their own villages were much more likely than those living in the Chicago neighborhoods to say that they do not stay at home for fear of crime, to agree that the local police have "the right to take any action necessary" to deal with problems, and to agree that the police "look out for the needs of the average citizen." It is possible that the residents and the police of the small towns saw themselves as engaged in a collaborative effort to maintain a certain standard of communal life, whereas those of the big city felt themselves to be simply requesting and supplying particular services on an individual basis.

If this is true, how should a wise police chief deploy his meager forces? The first answer is that nobody knows for certain, and the most prudent course of action would be to try further variations on the Newark experiment, to see more precisely what works in what kinds of neighborhoods. The second answer is also a hedge—many aspects of order-maintenance in neighborhoods can probably best be handled in ways that involve the police minimally, if at all. A busy, bustling shopping center and a quiet, well-tended suburb may need almost no visible police presence. In both cases, the ratio of respectable to disreputable people is ordinarily so high as to make informal social control effective.

Even in areas that are in jeopardy from disorderly elements, citizen action without substantial police involvement may be sufficient. Meetings between teenagers who like to hang out on a particular corner and adults who want to use that corner might well lead to an amicable agreement on a set of rules about how many people can be allowed to congregate, where, and when.

Where no understanding is possible—or if possible, not observed—citizen patrols may be a sufficient response. There are two traditions of communal involvement in maintaining order. One, that of the "community watchmen," is as old as the first settlement of the New World. Until well into the nineteenth century, volunteer watchmen, not policemen, patrolled their communities to keep order. They did so, by and large, without taking the law into their own hands—without, that is, punishing persons or using force. Their presence deterred disorder or alerted the community to disorder that could not be deterred. There are hundreds of such efforts today in communities all across the nation. Perhaps the best known is that of the Guardian Angels, a group of unarmed young persons in distinctive berets and T-shirts, who first came to public attention when they began patrolling the New York City subways but who claim now to have chapters in more than thirty American cities. Unfortunately, we have little information about the effect of these groups on crime. It is possible, however, that whatever their effect on crime, citizens find their presence reassuring, and that they thus contribute to maintaining a sense of order and civility.

The second tradition is that of the "vigilante." Rarely a feature of the settled communities of the East, it was primarily to be found in those frontier towns that grew up in advance of the reach of government. More than 350 vigilante groups are known to have existed; their distinctive feature was that their members did take the law into their own hands, by acting as judge, jury, and often executioner as well as policeman. Today, the vigilante movement is conspicuous by its rarity, despite the great fear expressed by citizens that the older cities are becoming "urban frontiers." But some community-watchmen groups have skirted the line, and others may cross it in the future. An ambiguous case, reported in *The Wall Street Journal*, involved a citizens' patrol in the Silver Lake area of Belleville, New Jersey. A leader told the reporter, "We look for outsiders." If a few teenagers from outside the neighborhood enter it, "we ask them their business," he said. "If they say they're going down the street to see Mrs. Jones, fine, we let them pass. But then we follow them down the block to make sure they're really going to see Mrs. Jones."

THOUGH CITIZENS CAN DO A GREAT DEAL, THE POLICE are plainly the key to order-maintenance. For one thing, many communities, such as the Robert Taylor Homes, cannot do the job by themselves. For another, no citizen in a neighborhood, even an organized one, is like-

ly to feel the sense of responsibility that wearing a badge confers. Psychologists have done many studies on why people fail to go to the aid of persons being attacked or seeking help, and they have learned that the cause is not "apathy" or "selfishness" but the absence of some plausible grounds for feeling that one must personally accept responsibility. Ironically, avoiding responsibility is easier when a lot of people are standing about. On streets and in public places, where order is so important, many people are likely to be "around," a fact that reduces the chance of any one person acting as the agent of the community. The police officer's uniform singles him out as a person who must accept responsibility if asked. In addition, officers, more easily than their fellow citizens, can be expected to distinguish between what is necessary to protect the safety of the street and what merely protects its ethnic purity.

But the police forces of America are losing, not gaining, members. Some cities have suffered substantial cuts in the number of officers available for duty. These cuts are not likely to be reversed in the near future. Therefore, each department must assign its existing officers with great care. Some neighborhoods are so demoralized and crime-ridden as to make foot patrol useless: the best the police can do with limited resources is respond to the enormous number of calls for service. Other neighborhoods are so stable and serene as to make foot patrol unnecessary. The key is to identify neighborhoods at the tipping point—where the public order is deteriorating but not unreclaimable, where the streets are used frequently but by apprehensive people, where a window is likely to be broken at any time, and must quickly be fixed if all are not to be shattered.

Most police departments do not have ways of systematically identifying such areas and assigning officers to them. Officers are assigned on the basis of crime rates (meaning that marginally threatened areas are often stripped so that police can investigate crimes in areas where the situation is hopeless) or on the basis of calls for service (despite the fact that most citizens do not call the police when they are merely frightened or annoyed). To allocate patrol wisely, the department must look at the neighborhoods and decide, from first-hand evidence, where an additional officer will make the greatest difference in promoting a sense of safety.

One way to stretch limited police resources is being tried in some public-housing projects. Tenant organizations hire off-duty police officers for patrol work in their buildings. The costs are not high (at least not per resident), the offi-

cer likes the additional income, and the residents feel safer. Such arrangements are probably more successful than hiring private watchmen, and the Newark experiment helps us understand why. A private security guard may deter crime or misconduct by his presence, and he may go to the aid of persons needing help, but he may well not intervene—that is, control or drive away—someone challenging community standards. Being a sworn officer—a "real cop"—seems to give one the confidence, the sense of duty, and the aura of authority necessary to perform this difficult task.

Patrol officers might be encouraged to go to and from duty stations on public transportation and, while on the bus or subway car, enforce rules about smoking, drinking, disorderly conduct, and the like. The enforcement need involve nothing more than ejecting the offender (the offense, after all, is not one with which a booking officer or a judge wishes to be bothered). Perhaps the random but relentless maintenance of standards on buses would lead to conditions on buses that approximate the level of civility we now take for granted on airplanes.

But the most important requirement is to think that to maintain order in precarious situations is a vital job. The police know this is one of their functions, and they also believe, correctly, that it cannot be done to the exclusion of criminal investigation and responding to calls. We may have encouraged them to suppose, however, on the basis of our oft-repeated concerns about serious, violent crime, that they will be judged exclusively on their capacity as crime-fighters. To the extent that this is the case, police administrators will continue to concentrate police personnel in the highest-crime areas (though not necessarily in the areas most vulnerable to criminal invasion), emphasize their training in the law and criminal apprehension (and not their training in managing street life), and join too quickly in campaigns to decriminalize "harmless" behavior (though public drunkenness, street prostitution, and pornographic displays can destroy a community more quickly than any team of professional burglars).

Above all, we must return to our long-abandoned view that the police ought to protect communities as well as individuals. Our crime statistics and victimization surveys measure individual losses, but they do not measure communal losses. Just as physicians now recognize the importance of fostering health rather than simply treating illness, so the police—and the rest of us—ought to recognize the importance of maintaining, intact, communities without broken windows. □

Sometimes "fixing broken windows" does more
to reduce crime than conventional "incident-oriented" policing

MAKING NEIGHBORHOODS SAFE

BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KELLING

NEW BRIARFIELD APARTMENTS IS AN OLD, RUN-down collection of wooden buildings constructed in 1942 as temporary housing for shipyard workers in Newport News, Virginia. By the mid-1980s it was widely regarded as the worst housing project in the city. Many of its vacant units provided hiding places for drug users. It had the highest burglary rate in Newport News; nearly a quarter of its apartments were broken into at least once a year.

For decades the police had wearily answered calls for assistance and had investigated crimes in New Briarfield. Not much came of this police attentiveness—the buildings went on deteriorating, the burglaries went on occurring, the residents went on living in terror. Then, in 1984, Detective Tony Duke, assigned to a newly created police task force, decided to interview the residents of New

Briarfield about their problems. Not surprisingly, he found that they were worried about the burglaries—but they were just as concerned about the physical deterioration of the project. Rather than investigating only the burglaries, Duke spent some of his time investigating the *buildings*. Soon he learned that many city agencies—the fire department, the public-works department, the housing department—regarded New Briarfield as a major headache. He also discovered that its owners were in default on a federal loan and that foreclosure was imminent.

The report he wrote to Darrel Stephens, then the police chief, led Stephens to recommend to the city manager that New Briarfield be demolished and its tenants relocated. The city manager agreed. Meanwhile, Barry Haddix, the patrol officer assigned to the area, began working with members of other city agencies to fix up the project, pend-

ing its eventual replacement. Trash was carted away, abandoned cars were removed, potholes were filled in, the streets were swept. According to a study recently done by John E. Eck and William Spelman, of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the burglary rate dropped by 35 percent after Duke and Haddix began their work.

Stephens, now the executive director of PERF, tells the story of the New Briarfield project as an example of "problem-oriented policing," a concept developed by Professor Herman Goldstein, of the University of Wisconsin Law School, and sometimes also called community-oriented policing. The conventional police strategy is "incident-oriented"—a citizen calls to report an incident, such as a burglary, and the police respond by recording information relevant to the crime and then trying to solve it. Obviously, when a crime occurs, the victim is entitled to a rapid, effective police response. But if responding to incidents is all that the police do, the community problems that cause or explain many of these incidents will never be addressed, and so the incidents will continue and their number will perhaps increase.

This will happen for two reasons. One is that a lot of serious crime is adventitious, not the result of inexorable social forces or personal failings. A rash of burglaries may occur because drug users have found a back alley or an abandoned building in which to hang out. In their spare time, and in order to get money to buy drugs, they steal

from their neighbors. If the back alleys are cleaned up and the abandoned buildings torn down, the drug users will go away. They may even use fewer drugs, because they will have difficulty finding convenient dealers and soft burglary targets. By the same token, a neglected neighborhood may become the turf of a youth gang, whose members commit more crimes together in a group than they would if they were acting alone. If the gang is broken up, former members will still commit some crimes but probably not as many as before.

Most crime in most neighborhoods is local: the offenders live near their victims. Because of this, one should not assume that changing the environmental conditions conducive to crime in one area will displace the crime to other areas. For example, when the New York City police commissioner, Ben Ward, ordered Operation Pressure Point, a crackdown on drug dealing on the Lower East Side, dealing and the criminality associated with it were reduced in that neighborhood and apparently did not immediately reappear in other, contiguous neighborhoods. Suburban customers of the local drug dealers were frightened away by the sight of dozens of police officers on the streets where these customers had once shopped openly for drugs. They could not—at least not right away—find another neighborhood in which to buy drugs as easily as they once had on the Lower East Side. At the same time, the local population included some people who were willing to

aid and abet the drug dealers. When the police presence made drug dealing unattractive, the dealers could not—again, at least not for the time being—find another neighborhood that provided an equivalent social infrastructure.

The second reason that incident-oriented police work fails to discourage neighborhood crime is that law-abiding citizens who are afraid to go out onto streets filled with graffiti, winos, and loitering youths yield control of these streets to people who are not frightened by these signs of urban decay. Those not frightened turn out to be the same people who created the problem in the first place. Law-abiding citizens, already fearful, see things occurring that make them even more fearful. A vicious cycle begins of fear-induced behavior increasing the sources of that fear.

A Los Angeles police sergeant put it this way: "When people in this district see that a gang has spray-painted its initials on all the stop signs, they decide that the gang, not the people or the police, controls the streets. When they discover that the Department of Transportation needs three months to replace the stop signs, they decide that the city isn't as powerful as the gang. These people want us to help them take back the streets." Painting gang symbols on a stop sign or a storefront is not, by itself, a serious crime. As an incident, it is trivial. But as the symptom of a problem, it is very serious.

I N AN EARLIER ARTICLE IN *THE ATLANTIC* (MARCH, 1982) we called this the problem of "broken windows": If the first broken window in a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no one cares about the building and more windows will be broken. Soon the building will have no windows. Likewise, when disorderly behavior—say, rude remarks by loitering youths—is left unchallenged, the signal given is that no one cares. The disorder escalates, possibly to serious crime.

The sort of police work practiced in Newport News is an effort to fix the broken windows. Similar projects are under way in cities all over America. This pattern constitutes the beginnings of the most significant redefinition of police work in the past half century. For example:

• When a gunfight occurred at Garden Village, a low-income housing project near Baltimore, the Baltimore County police responded by investigating both the shooting and the housing project. Chief Cornelius Behan directed the officers in his Community Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit to find out what could be done to alleviate the fears of the project residents and the gang tensions that led to the shooting. COPE officers worked with members of other agencies to upgrade street lighting in the area, trim shrubbery, install door locks, repair the roads and alleys, and get money to build a playground. With police guidance, the tenants organized. At the same time, high-visibility patrols were started and gang members were questioned. When both a suspect in the shooting and a particularly troublesome parole violator were arrested, gang tensions eased. Crime rates dropped. In bringing about this change, the police dealt with eleven different public agencies.

• When local merchants in a New York City neighborhood complained to the police about homeless persons who created a mess on the streets and whose presence frightened away customers, the officer who responded did not roust the vagrants but instead suggested that the merchants hire them to clean the streets in front of their stores every morning. The merchants agreed, and now the streets are clean all day and the customers find the stores more attractive.

• When people in a Los Angeles neighborhood complained to the police about graffiti on walls and gang symbols on stop signs, officers assigned to the Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire station did more than just try to catch the gang youths who were wielding the spray cans; they also organized citizens' groups and Boy Scouts to paint over the graffiti as fast as they were put up.

• When residents of a Houston neighborhood became fearful about crime in their area, the police not only redoubled their efforts to solve the burglaries and thefts but also assigned some officers to talk with the citizens in their homes. During a nine-month period the officers visited more than a third of all the dwelling units in the area, introduced themselves, asked about any neighborhood problems, and left their business cards. When Antony Pate and Mary Ann Wycoff, researchers at the Police Foundation, evaluated the project, they found that the people in this area, unlike others living in a similar area where no citizen-contact project occurred, felt that social disorder had decreased and that the neighborhood had become a better place to live. Moreover, and quite unexpectedly, the amount of property crime was noticeably reduced.

These are all examples of community-oriented policing, whose current popularity among police chiefs is as great as the ambiguity of the idea. In a sense, the police have always been community-oriented. Every police officer knows that most crimes don't get solved if victims and witnesses do not cooperate. One way to encourage that cooperation is to cultivate the good will of both victims and witnesses. Similarly, police-citizen tensions, over racial incidents or allegations of brutality or hostility, can often be allayed, and sometimes prevented, if police officers stay in close touch with community groups. Accordingly, most departments have at least one community-relations officer.

who arranges meetings between officers and citizens' groups in church basements and other neutral locales.

But these commonplace features of police work are add-ons, and rarely alter the traditional work of most patrol officers and detectives: responding to radio calls about specific incidents. The focus on incidents works against a focus on problems. If Detective Tony Duke had focused only on incidents in New Briarfield, he would still be investigating burglaries in that housing project; meanwhile, the community-relations officer would be telling outraged residents that the police were doing all they could and urging people to call in any useful leads. If a tenant at one of those meetings had complained about stopped-up drains, rotting floorboards, and abandoned refrigerators, the community-relations officer would have patiently explained that these were not "police matters."

And of course, they are not. They are the responsibility of the landlord, the tenants themselves, and city agencies other than the police. But landlords are sometimes indifferent, tenants rarely have the resources to make needed repairs, and other city agencies do not have a twenty-four-hour emergency service. Like it or not, the police are about the only city agency that makes house calls around the clock. And like it or not, the public defines broadly what it thinks of as public order, and holds the police responsible for maintaining order.

Community-oriented policing means changing the daily work of the police to include investigating problems as well as incidents. It means defining as a problem whatever a significant body of public opinion regards as a threat to community order. It means working with the good guys, and not just against the bad guys.

The link between incidents and problems can sometimes be measured. The police know from experience what research by Glenn Pierce, in Boston, and Lawrence Sherman, in Minneapolis, has established: fewer than 10 percent of the addresses from which the police receive calls account for more than 60 percent of those calls. Many of the calls involve domestic disputes. If each call is treated as a separate incident with neither a history nor a future, then each dispute will be handled by police officers anxious to pacify the complainants and get back on patrol as quickly as possible. All too often, however, the disputants move beyond shouting insults or throwing crockery at each other. A knife or a gun may be produced, and somebody may die.

A very large proportion of all killings occur in these domestic settings. A study of domestic homicides in Kansas City showed that in eight out of ten cases the police had been called to the incident address at least once before: in half the cases they had been called *five times* or more. The police are familiar with this pattern, and they have learned how best to respond to it. An experiment in Minneapolis, conducted by the Police Foundation, showed that men who were arrested after assaulting their spouses were much less likely to commit new assaults than those who were merely pacified or asked to leave the house for a few

hours. Research is now under way in other cities to test this finding. Arrest may prove always to be the best disposition, or we may learn that some kind of intervention by a social agency also helps. What is indisputable is that a domestic fight—like many other events to which the police respond—is less an "incident" than a problem likely to have serious, long-term consequences.

Another such problem, familiar to New Yorkers, is graffiti on subway cars. What to some aesthetes is folk art is to most people a sign that an important public place is no longer under public control. If graffiti painters can attack cars with impunity, then muggers may feel they can attack the people in those cars with equal impunity. When we first wrote in these pages about the problem of broken windows, we dwelt on the graffiti problem as an example of a minor crime creating a major crisis.

The police seemed powerless to do much about it. They could arrest youths with cans of spray paint, but for every one arrested ten more went undetected, and of those arrested, few were punished. The New York Transit Authority, led by its chairman, Robert Kiley, and its president, David Gunn, decided that graffiti-free cars were a major management goal. New, easier-to-clean cars were bought. More important, key people in the Authority were held accountable for cleaning the cars and keeping them clean. Whereas in the early 1980s two out of every three cars were covered with graffiti, today fewer than one in six is. The Transit Police have played their part by arresting those who paint the cars, but they have been more successful at keeping cars from being defaced in the first place than they were at chasing people who were spraying already defaced ones.

WHILE THE PHRASE "COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICing" comes easily to the lips of police administrators, redefining the police mission is more difficult. To help the police become accustomed to fixing broken windows as well as arresting window-breakers requires doing things that are very hard for many administrators to do.

Authority over at least some patrol officers must be decentralized, so that they have a good deal of freedom to manage their time (including their paid overtime). This implies freeing them at least partly from the tyranny of the radio call. It means giving them a broad range of responsibilities: to find and understand the problems that create disorder and crime, and to deal with other public and private agencies that can help cope with these problems. It

means assigning them to a neighborhood and leaving them there for an extended period of time. It means backing them up with department support and resources.

The reason these are not easy things for police chiefs to do is not simply that chiefs are slaves to tradition, though some impatient advocates of community-oriented policing like to say so. Consider for a moment how all these changes might sound to an experienced and intelligent police executive who must defend his department against media criticisms of officer misconduct, political pressure to cut budgets, and interest-group demands for more police protection everywhere. With decentralized, authority, no one will know precisely how patrol officers spend their time. Moreover, decentralized authority means that patrol officers will spend time on things like schmoozing with citizens, instead of on quantifiable tasks like issuing tickets, making arrests, and clearing cases.

Making the community-oriented officers generalists means letting them deal with other city agencies, a responsibility for which few officers are well trained and which cuts across sensitive questions of turf and public expectations.

If officers are left in a neighborhood, some of them may start taking money from the dope dealers and after-hours joints. To prevent that, officers are frequently moved around. Moreover, the best people are usually kept in the detective squad that handles the really big cases. Few police executives want their best people settling into a neighborhood, walking around the bus stops and shopping malls.

The enthusiasts for community-oriented policing have answers for all these concerns, but sometimes in their zeal they forget that they are contending with more than mere bureaucratic foot-dragging—that the problems are real and require thoughtful solutions. Many police executives get in trouble not because the crime rate goes up but because cops are accused of graft, brutality, laziness, incivility, or indifference.

In short, police management is driven more by the constraints on the job than by the goals of the job. You cannot cope with those constraints without understanding them. This may be why some of the biggest changes toward community-oriented policing have occurred in cities where a new chief has come in from the outside with a mandate to shake up a moribund department. Lee Brown brought a community orientation to the Houston Police Department under precisely those circumstances—the reputation of the department was so bad that almost any change would have been regarded as an improvement.

What can we say to the worried police chief who is al-

SAVING MEMORY

Summer nights we put pennies on the track.
Even the station was quiet enough for crickets.
Mountains surrounded us, middling high and purple.
No matter where we stood they protected us
with perspective. People call them gentle mountains
but you can die in there; they're thick
with creeper and laurel. Like voodoo,
I drew pictures with a sparkler. A curved line
arcked across the night. Rooted in its slope,
one laurel tree big as the mountain holding it.

You can hear the train in the rails.
They're round, not flat, as you'd expect,
and slick. We'd walk the sound, one step, two,
slip, on purpose, in the ballast, hopscotch
and waltz on the ties, watching the big round eye
enter the curve and grow like God out of the purple,
the tracks turning mean, molten silver blazing
dead at us. We'd hula. Tango. And the first
white plume would shoot up screaming long, lonely,
vain as Mamma shooing starlings from her latticed pies.

Sing Mickey Mouse, the second scream rising long, again,
up and up. Stick our right hip out, the third
wailing. Give it a hot-cha wiggle, the fourth
surrounding us. And bidding each other fond adieux,
we'd count to three, turn our backs, flash it a moon,
and materialize, fantastic, run over with light,
the train shrieking to pieces, scared, meaning it,
short, short, short, short, pushing a noise
bigger than the valley. It sent us flying,
flattened, light as ideas, back on the platform,
the Y6B Mallet compound rolling through
southbound, steamborne, out of Roanoke.

It wasn't to make the train jump the track
but to hold the breath-edged piece of copper
grown hot with dying, thin with birth,
wiped smooth of origin and homilies.
To hold such power. As big as the eye
of the train, as big as the moon burning
like the sun. All the perspective
curved and gone.

—Mary Stewart Hammond

ready running a pretty good department? Start with corruption: For decades police executives and reformers have believed that in order to prevent corruption, you have to centralize control over personnel and discourage intimacy between police officers and citizens. Maybe. But the price one pays for this is very high. For example, many neighborhoods are being destroyed by drug dealers, who hang out on every street corner. The best way to sweep them off the streets is to have patrol officers arrest them for selling drugs and intimidate their customers by parking police cars right next to suspected drug outlets. But some police chiefs forbid their patrol officers to work drug cases, for fear they will be corrupted. When the citizens in these cities see police cars drive past scenes of open drug dealing, they assume the police have been paid off. Efforts to prevent corruption have produced the appearance of corruption.

Police Commissioner Ben Ward, in New York, decided that the price of this kind of anti-corruption strategy was too high. His Operation Pressure Point put scores of police officers on the streets to break up the drug-dealing bazaar. Police corruption is no laughing matter, especially in New York, but some chiefs now believe that it will have to be fought in ways that do not require police officers to avoid contact with people.

Consider the problem of getting police resources and managing political pressures: resources can be justified with statistics, but statistics often become ends in themselves. One police captain we interviewed said that his department was preoccupied with "stacking widgets and counting beans." He asked his superior for permission to take officers out of radio cars and have them work on community problems. The superior agreed but warned that he would be watching to see what happened to "the stats." In the short run the stats—for example, calls answered, average response time—were likely to get worse, but if community problems were solved, they would get better as citizens had fewer incidents to report. The captain worried, however, that he would not be given enough time to achieve this and that the bean counters would cut off his program.

A better way to justify getting resources from the city is to stimulate popular demand for resources devoted to problem-solving. Properly handled, community-oriented policing does generate support for the department. When Newark police officers, under orders from Hubert Williams, then the police director, began stopping city buses and boarding them to enforce city ordinances against smoking, drinking, gambling, and playing loud music, the bus patrons often applauded. When Los Angeles police officers supervised the hauling away of abandoned cars, onlookers applauded. Later, when some of the officers had their time available for problem-solving work cut back, several hundred citizens attended a meeting to complain.

In Flint, Michigan, patrol officers were taken out of their cars and assigned to foot beats. Robert Trojanowicz,

a professor at Michigan State University, analyzed the results and found big increases in citizen satisfaction and officer morale, and even a significant drop in crime (an earlier foot-patrol project in Newark had produced equivalent reductions in fear but no reductions in crime). Citizen support was not confined to statements made to pollsters, however. Voters in referenda twice approved tax increases to maintain the foot-patrol system, the second time by a two-to-one margin. New Briarfield tenants unquestionably found satisfaction in the role the police played in getting temporary improvements made on their housing project and getting a commitment for its ultimate replacement. Indeed, when a department experiments with a community-oriented project in one precinct, people in other precincts usually want one too.

POLITICIANS, LIKE POLICE CHIEFS, HEAR THESE VIEWS and respond. But they hear other views as well. One widespread political mandate is to keep the tax rate down. Many police departments are already stretched thin by sharp reductions in spending that occurred in the lean years of the 1970s. Putting *one* additional patrol car on the streets around the clock can cost a quarter of a million dollars or more a year.

Change may seem easier when resources are abundant. Ben Ward could start Operation Pressure Point because he had at his disposal a large number of new officers who could be thrown into a crackdown on street-level drug dealing. Things look a bit different in Los Angeles, where no big increases in personnel are on the horizon. As a result, only eight officers are assigned to the problem-solving Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire district—an economically and ethnically diverse area of nearly 300,000 residents.

But change does not necessarily require more resources, and the availability of new resources is no guarantee that change will be attempted. One temptation is to try to sell the public on the need for more policemen and decide later how to use them. Usually when that script is followed, either the public turns down the spending increase or the extra personnel are dumped into what one LAPD captain calls the "black hole" of existing commitments, leaving no trace and producing no effects.

What may have an effect is how the police are deployed and managed. An experiment jointly conducted by the Washington, D.C., Police Department and the Police Foundation showed that if a few experienced officers con-

centrate on known repeat offenders, the number of serious offenders taken off the streets grows substantially. The Flint and Newark experiences suggest that foot patrols in certain kinds of communities (but not all) can reduce fear. In Houston problem-oriented tactics seem clearly to have heightened a sense of citizen security.

The problem of interagency cooperation may, in the long run, be the most difficult of all. The police can bring problems to the attention of other city agencies, but the system is not always organized to respond. In his book *Neighborhood Services*, John Mudd calls it the "rat problem": "If a rat is found in an apartment, it is a housing inspection responsibility; if it runs into a restaurant, the health department has jurisdiction; if it goes outside and dies in an alley, public works takes over." A police officer who takes public complaints about rats seriously will go crazy trying to figure out what agency in the city has responsibility for rat control and then inducing it to kill the rats.

Matters are almost as bad if the public is complaining about abandoned houses or school-age children who are not in school. The housing department may prefer to concentrate on enforcing the housing code rather than go through the costly and time-consuming process of getting an abandoned house torn down. The school department may have expelled the truant children for making life miserable for the teachers and the other students; the last thing it wants is for the police to tell the school to take the kids back.

All city and county agencies have their own priorities and face their own pressures. Forcing them to cooperate by knocking heads together at the top rarely works; what department heads promise the mayor they will do may bear little relationship to what their rank-and-file employees actually do. From his experiences in New York City government Mudd discovered that if you want agencies to cooperate in solving neighborhood problems, you have to get the neighborhood-level supervisors from each agency together in a "district cabinet" that meets regularly and addresses common concerns. This is not an easy task (for one thing, police district lines often do not match the district boundaries of the school, housing, traffic, and public-works departments), but where it has been tried it has made solving the "rat problem" a lot easier. For example, Mudd reports, such interagency issues as park safety and refuse-laden vacant lots got handled more effectively when the field supervisors met to talk about them than when memos went up the chain of command of one agency and then down the chain of command of another.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF Neighborhood Watch programs may help reduce crime, but we cannot be certain. In particular, we do not know what kinds of communities are most likely to benefit from such programs. A Police Foundation study in Minneapolis found that getting effective community organizations started in the most troubled neighborhoods was very difficult. The costs and benefits of having patrol officers and sergeants influence the delivery of services from other city agencies has never been fully assessed. No way of wresting control of a neighborhood from a street gang has yet been proved effective.

And even if these questions are answered, a police department may still have difficulty accommodating two very different working cultures: the patrol officers and detectives who handle major crimes (murders, rapes, and robberies) and the cops who work on community problems and the seemingly minor incidents they generate. In every department we visited, some of the incident-oriented officers spoke disparagingly of the problem-oriented officers as "social workers," and some of the latter responded by calling the former "ghetto blasters." If a community-service officer seems to get too close to the community, he or she may be accused of "going native." The tension between the two cultures is heightened by the fact that in many departments becoming a detective is regarded as a major promotion, and detectives are often selected from among those officers who have the best record in making major arrests—in other words, from the ranks of the incident-oriented. But this pattern need not be permanent. Promotion tracks can be changed so that a patrol officer, especially one working on community problems, is no longer regarded as somebody who "hasn't made detective." Moreover, some police executives now believe that splitting the patrol force into two units—one oriented to incidents, the other to problems—is unwise. They are searching for ways to give all patrol officers the time and resources for problem-solving activities.

Because of the gaps in our knowledge about both the results and the difficulties of community-oriented policing, no chief should be urged to accept, uncritically, the community-oriented model. But the traditional model of police professionalism—devoting resources to quick radio-car response to calls about specific crime incidents—makes little sense at a time when the principal threats to public order and safety come from *collective*, not individual, sources, and from *problems*, not incidents: from well-organized gangs and drug traffickers, from uncared-for legions of the homeless, from boisterous teenagers taking advantage of their newfound freedom and affluence in congested urban settings.

Even if community-oriented policing does not produce the dramatic gains that some of its more ardent advocates expect, it has indisputably produced one that the officers who have been involved in it immediately acknowledge: it has changed their perceptions of the community. Officer Robin Kirk, of the Houston Police Department, had to be talked into becoming part of a neighborhood fear-reduction project. Once in it, he was converted. In his words, "Traditionally, police officers after about three years get to thinking that everybody's a loser. That's the only people you're dealing with. In community policing you're dealing with the good citizens, helping them solve problems." □

Crime and Policing

By Mark H. Moore, Robert C. Trojanowicz, and George L. Kelling

The core mission of the police is to control crime. No one disputes this. Indeed, professional crime fighting enjoys wide public support as the basic strategy of policing precisely because it embodies a deep commitment to this objective. In contrast, other proposed strategies such as problem-solving or community policing appear on the surface to blur this focus.[1] If these strategies were to leave the community more vulnerable to criminal victimization, they would be undesirable alternatives. In judging the value of alternative police strategies in controlling crime, however, one should not be misled by rhetoric or mere expressed commitment to the goal; one must keep one's eye on demonstrated effectiveness in achieving the goal.

Professional crime-fighting now relies predominantly on three tactics: (1) motorized patrol; (2) rapid response to calls for service; and (3) retrospective investigation of crimes.[2] Over the past few decades, police responsiveness has been enhanced by connecting police to citizens by telephones, radios, and cars, and by matching police officer schedules and locations to anticipated calls for service.[3] The police focus on serious crime has also been sharpened by screening calls for service, targeting patrol, and developing forensic technology (e.g., automated fingerprint systems, computerized criminal record files, etc.).[4]

Although these tactics have scored their successes, they have been criticized within and outside policing for being reactive rather than proactive. They have also been criticized for failing to prevent crime.[5]

Reactive tactics have some virtues, of course. The police go where crimes have occurred and when citizens have summoned them; otherwise, they do not intrude. The police keep their distance from the community, and thereby retain their impartiality. They do not develop the sorts of relationships with citizens that could bias their responses to crime incidents. These are virtues insofar as they protect citizens from an overly intrusive, too familiar police.

Moreover, the reactive tactics do have preventive effects—at least in theory. The prospect of the police arriving at a crime in progress as a result of a call or a chance observation is thought to deter crimes.[6] The successful prosecution of offenders (made possible by retrospective investigation) is also thought to deter offenders.[7] And even if it does not deter, a successfully prosecuted investigation incapacitates criminals who might otherwise go on to commit other crimes.[8]

“ Reactive tactics do have preventive effects — at least in theory ... ”

Finally, many police forces have developed proactive tactics to deal with crime problems that could not be handled through conventional reactive methods. In drug dealing, organized crime, and vice enforcement, for example, where no immediate victims exist to mobilize the police, the police have developed special units which rely on informants, covert surveillance, and undercover investigations rather than responses to calls for service.[9] In the area of juvenile offenses where society's stake in preventing crimes seems particularly great, the police have created athletic leagues, formed partnerships with schools to deal with drug abuse and truancy, and so on.[10] It is not strictly accurate, then, to characterize modern policing as entirely reactive.

Still, the criticism of the police as being too reactive has some force. It is possible that the police could do more to control serious crime than they now achieve. Perhaps research will yield technological breakthroughs that will dramatically improve the productivity of police investigation. For now, however, the greatest potential for improved crime control may not lie in the continued enhancement of response times, patrol tactics, and investigative techniques. Rather, improved crime control can be achieved by (1) diagnosing and managing problems in the community that produce serious crimes; (2) fostering closer relations with the community to facilitate crime solving; and (3) building self-defense capabilities within the community itself. Among the results may be increased apprehension of criminals. To the extent that problem-solving or community strategies of policing direct attention to and prepare the police to exploit local knowledge and capacity to control crime, they will be useful to the future of policing. To explore these possibilities, this paper examines what is known about serious crime: what it is, where and how it occurs, and natural points of intervention. Current and proposed police tactics are then examined in light of what is known about their effectiveness in fighting serious crime.

Serious crime

To individual citizens, a serious crime is an offense that happened to *them*. That is why police departments throughout the country are burdened with calls requesting responses to offenses that the police regard as minor. While there are reasons to take such calls seriously, there is also the social and administrative necessity to weigh the relative gravity of the offenses. Otherwise, there is no principle for apportioning society's indignation and determination to punish; nor is there any basis for rationing police responses. The concept of serious crime, then, is necessarily a *social* judgment—not an individual one. Moreover, it *is* a *value* judgment—not simply a technical issue. The question of what constitutes serious crime is resolved formally by the criminal code. But the criminal code often fails to give precise guidance to police administrators who must decide which crimes to emphasize. They need some concept that distinguishes the offenses that properly outrage the citizenry and require extended police attention from the many lesser offenses that pose less urgent threats to society.

Like many things that require social value judgments, the issue of what constitutes serious crime is badly neglected.[11] Rather than face a confusing public debate, society relies on convention, or administrative expertise, or some combination of the two, to set standards. Yet, if we are to assess and improve police practice in dealing with serious crime, it is necessary to devote some thought to the question of what constitutes serious crime.

“ To individual citizens, a serious crime is an offense that happened to them. That is why police departments ... are burdened with calls requesting responses to offenses that the police regard as minor. ”

Defining serious crime

The usual view of serious crime emphasizes three characteristics of offenses. The most important is physical violence or violation. Death, bloody wounds, crippling injuries, even cuts and bruises increase the severity of a crime.[12] Sexual violation also has a special urgency.[13] Crime victims often suffer property losses as well as pain and violation. Economic losses count in reckoning the seriousness of an offense. Still, society generally considers physical attacks—sexual and nonsexual—as far more serious than attacks on property.[14]

A second feature of serious crime concerns the size of the victim's losses. A robbery resulting in a murder or a permanent, disfiguring injury is considered worse than one that produces only cuts, bruises, and fears. An armored car heist netting millions is considered more serious than a purse-snatching yielding the price of a junkie's next fix.

Third, the perceived seriousness of an offense is influenced by the relationship between offenders and victims. Commonly, crimes against strangers are viewed as more serious than crimes committed in the context of ongoing relationships.[15] The reason is partly that the threat to society from indiscriminate predators is more far-reaching than the threat

from offenders who limit their targets to spouses, lovers, and friends. Moreover, society judges the evil intent of the offender to be more evident in crimes against strangers. In these crimes, there are no chronic grievances or provocations in the background to raise the issue of who attacked whom first and in what way. The crime is an out-and-out attack, not a mere dispute.[16]

These characteristics—violence, significant losses to victims, predatory strangers—capture much of what is important to societal and police images of serious crime. The intuitive appeal of these criteria is reflected in the categories of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. Murder, rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and auto theft (most presumably committed by strangers) are prominently reported as Part I Offenses. This key, national account of crime not only reflects, but anchors society's view of serious crime as predatory street crime.

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6 6 Society judges the evil intent of the offender to be more evident in crimes against strangers. 9 9

While this notion has the sanction of intuitive appeal, convention, and measurement, it also contains subtle biases which, once pointed out, might cause society and the police to adjust their traditional views. First, the accepted image of crime seems to downplay the importance of crime committed in the context of ongoing relationships. From the perspective of the general citizenry, such offenses seem less important because they do not pose a *general* threat to society. From the perspective of the police (and other criminal justice officials), such crimes are less clear-cut because the existence of the prior relationship muddies the distinction between offender and victim and increases the likelihood that a case will be dropped when the antagonists resolve the dispute that produced the offense.

From the victim's point of view, however, the fact of a relationship to the offender dramatically intensifies the seriousness of the offense. A special terror arises when one is locked into an abusive relationship with a spouse or lover. A date that turns into a rape poisons a victim's psyche much more than an attack by a stranger. And, as Boston Police Commissioner Mickey Roache found when he was heading a unit dealing with interracial violence in Boston, serious interracial intimidation and violence did not appear in crime reports as robberies or burglaries. Rather, the serious crimes appeared as vandalism. What made the vandalism terrifying was that it was directed at the same address night after night.

Second, the view of serious crime as predatory violence tends to obscure the importance of fear as a separate, pernicious aspect of the crime problem. To a degree, the issue of fear is incorporated in the conventional view of serious crime. Indeed, fear is what elevates predatory street crimes above crimes that occur within personal relationships. What the conventional view misses, however, is the empiri-

cal fact that minor offenses and incivilities trigger citizens' fears more than actual crime victimization. Rowdy youth, abandoned cars, and graffiti frighten people, force them to restrict their movements, and motivate them to buy guns, locks and dogs. To the extent that the conventional view of serious crime deflects attention from fear and the offenses that stimulate fear, it may obscure an important opportunity for the police to contribute to the solution of the serious crime problem.

Third, defining serious crime in terms of the absolute magnitude of material losses to victims (without reference to the victim's capacity to absorb the loss, or the implications of the losses for people other than the victim) introduces the potential for injustice and ineffectiveness in targeting police attention. In the conventional view, a jewel theft at a swank hotel attracts more attention than the mugging of an elderly woman for her Social Security check. Yet it is clear that the stolen Social Security check represents a larger portion of the elderly woman's wealth than the losses to the hotel's well-insured customers. The robbery of a federally insured bank would attract more attention than the robbery of an inner-city convenience store. But the robbery of the ghetto store could end the entrepreneurial career of the owner, drive the store from the area, and, with the store's departure, deprive the neighborhood of one of its few social underpinnings.

Fourth, to the extent that the conventional view of crime emphasizes the reality of individual criminal victimization, it underplays crimes that have symbolic significance. The current emphasis on child sexual abuse, for example, is important in part because it sustains a broad social commitment to the general care and protection of children. The current emphasis on domestic assault, among other things, helps to sustain a normative movement that is changing the status of women in marriages. The interest in white-collar economic crimes and political corruption can be explained by the desire to set higher standards for the conduct of those in powerful positions. The social response to these offenses is important because it strengthens, or redefines, broad social norms.

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6 6 The view of crime as predatory . . . misses the terror of the abused spouse or molested child, the wide social consequences of driving merchants out of business, the rot that drug dealing brings . . . , and the polarizing effects of fear. 9 9

In sum, the view of crime as predatory, economically significant violence stresses the substantial losses associated with street offenses. It obscures the losses to society that result from offenses that poison relationships, transform neighborhoods into isolated camps, and undermine important social institutions. It misses the terror of the abused spouse or

molested child, the wide social consequences of driving merchants out of business, the rot that drug dealing brings to an urban community, and the polarizing effects of fear.

An alternative view of serious crime would be one that acknowledged violence as a key component of serious crime but added the issues of safety within relationships, the importance of fear, and the extent to which offenses collapse individual lives and social institutions as well as inflict individual losses. This enlarged conception rests on the assumption that the police can and should defend more social terrain than the streets. Their challenge is to preserve justice and order within the institutions of the community.

Levels, trends, and social location of serious crime

It is no simple matter to represent the current levels, recent trends, and social location of serious crime. Still, several important observations can be made.

First, in any year, a noticeable fraction of American households is touched by serious crime. In 1986, 5 percent of American households experienced the violence associated with a rape, robbery, or assault. Almost 8 percent of households were touched by at least one serious crime: rape, robbery, aggravated assault, or burglary.[17] When considering the likelihood that a household will be victimized sometime in the next 5 years, these figures increase dramatically, for a household faces these risks *each year*. Thus, most American households have first- or second-hand experience with serious crime.

Second, from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's, the United States experienced a dramatic increase in the level of serious crime. In fact, the level of serious crime reached historic highs. Since the mid-seventies, the level of serious crime has remained approximately constant, or declined slightly.[18]

❝ Criminal victimization is disproportionately concentrated among minority and poor populations in the United States. ❞

Third, criminal victimization is disproportionately concentrated among minority and poor populations in the United States. Homicide is the leading cause of death for young minority males living in metropolitan areas.[19] Black households are victimized by violent crimes such as robbery, rape, and aggravated assault at one and a half times the frequency of white families. The poor are victimized at one and a half times the rate of the wealthy.[20] These numbers probably underestimate the real differences in the losses— material and psychological—experienced by rich and poor victims, since those who are black and poor have fewer resources to deal with the losses associated with victimization.

Precipitating causes of serious crime

In searching for ways to prevent or control serious crime, the police look for precipitating causes. While it may be useful to examine what some call the root causes of crime (e.g., social injustice, unequal economic opportunity, poor schooling, weak family structures, or mental illness), such things are relatively unimportant from a police perspective since the police exercise little influence over them.[21] The police operate on the surface of social life. They must handle incidents, situations, and people as they are now—not societies or people as they might have been. For these reasons, the immediately precipitating causes of serious crime are far more important to the police than are broader questions about the root causes of crime. Four precipitating causes of crime seem relevant to policing: (1) dangerous people; (2) criminogenic situations; (3) alcohol and drug use; and (4) frustrating relationships.

❝ The police ... must handle incidents, situations, and people as they are now — not societies or people as they might have been. ❞

One way the police view serious crime is to see the precipitating cause in the character of the offender. A crime occurs when a predatory offender finds a victim. One could reduce such events by teaching potential victims to avoid situations and behaviors that make them vulnerable. And, to some degree, the police do this. But the far more common and attractive path for controlling predatory crime is to identify and apprehend the predators. Thus, dangerous offenders can be seen as a precipitating cause of serious crime and an important focus of police attention.[22]

Recent research on criminal careers provides a firm empirical basis for this view.[23] Interviews with convicted criminals conducted by the Rand Corporation indicate that some criminal offenders committed crimes very frequently and sustained this activity over a long career.[24] Moreover, these violent predators accounted for a substantial amount of the serious crime.[25] Now, an investigation of the root causes of such patterns of offending might disclose strong influences of social disadvantage and psychological maltreatment in shaping the personalities of such offenders. Moreover, the influence of these factors might reasonably mitigate their guilt. One might also hold out some hope for their future rehabilitation (through the natural process of aging if nothing else). So, the criminal proclivities of violent predators need not be viewed as either inevitable or unchangeable. From the vantage point of the police, however, the presence of such offenders in the community can reasonably be viewed as an important precipitating cause of crime. Controlling such offenders through incapacitation or close surveillance thus becomes an important crime control strategy.

Having noted the role of dangerous offenders in producing serious crime, it is worth emphasizing that such offenders

account for only a portion of the total amount of serious crime—far more than their share, but still only about half of all serious crime.[26] The necessary conclusion is that a significant portion of the serious crime problem cannot be attributed to determined attacks by career criminals or to predatory offenders. These crimes arise from quite different causes.

Some of these crimes might be produced by situational effects. Darkness and congestion around a subway exit may create an attractive location for muggings. An after-hours bar may host more than its share of fights. A rock house from which crack is being sold may become a magnet for violence. Closing time in a popular disco may produce fights among teenagers leaving the scene. In sum, there are some places, times, and activities that bring people together in ways that increase the likelihood of serious crime.

The fact that this occurs is knowable to police. By analyzing calls for service, they can observe that there are repeated calls made from certain places and at certain times.[27] These "hot spots" become important targets of police attention.[28] For example, patrol units might be dispatched just to sit and observe at the appropriate times. There may also be other solutions including permanent changes in the criminogenic situations. For example, the subway area could be lighted; the attention of a neighborhood watch group could be directed to the troublespot; the after-hours bar could be put out of business; aggressive street-level enforcement could be directed against the rock house; or transportation could be arranged for the kids leaving the disco so the crowd thins out more quickly.[29]

Crimes are also significantly related to alcohol or drug abuse.[30] It is now quite clear that: (1) a surprisingly high percentage of those arrested for serious crimes are drug or alcohol users;[31] (2) many offenders have drunk alcohol or taken drugs prior to committing crimes;[32] and (3) victims as well as offenders are often intoxicated or under the influence of drugs.[33] What is unclear is exactly how alcohol and drugs produce their criminogenic effect. Four hypotheses have been advanced to explain this phenomenon.[34]

❝ Intoxicated people make particularly good victims. ❞

The first is that physiological effects stimulate or license the person to commit crimes. The theory of stimulation may be appropriate to methamphetamines or PCP, which sometimes seem to produce violent reactions among consumers. The theory of licensing or disinhibition seems more appropriate in the case of alcohol where the release of inhibitions is arguably the mechanism that permits offenses to occur.[35]

Second, dependence or addiction forces users to spend more money on purchasing drugs, and they turn to crime in a desperate effort to maintain their habits. This is a powerful

theory in the case of heroin (under conditions of prohibition), and perhaps for cocaine. It is far less powerful for alcohol or marijuana.

Third, drug use gradually demoralizes people by putting them on the wrong side of the law, bringing them into contact with criminals, and gradually weakening their commitment to the obligations of a civil society. Again, this seems more appropriate for those who become deeply involved with drugs and alcohol over a long period of time, and therefore relies more on the dependence-producing attributes of drugs rather than on the immediate intoxicating effects.

Fourth, intoxicated people make particularly good victims. In some cases, intoxication makes people vulnerable to victimization.[36] In other cases, it causes victims to provoke their attackers.[37] In either case, a serious crime can result.

Whichever theory, or theories, is correct, the close association among drugs, alcohol, and serious crime suggests that the amount of serious crime might be decreased by reducing levels of alcohol and drug use, or by identifying those offenders who use drugs intensively and reducing their consumption.[38]

❝ Many serious crimes — including murders, robberies, rapes, and burglaries — are disputes and grievances among people rather than criminal attacks. ❞

Finally, the fact that many serious offenses occur in the context of ongoing relationships suggests that some relationships may be criminogenic. Relationships can cause crime because they create expectations. If the expectations are not met, the resulting disappointment produces anger. Anger may lead to vengeance and retaliation. In such cycles, the question of who caused the ultimate crime becomes confused. Usually, the offender is the one least damaged after the fight. A court may conclude that the crime stemmed from the evil intentions of the person identified as the offender. But this may not be the best way to view the problem from the vantage point of crime control or crime prevention.

It might be more suitable to see the crimes as emerging from a set of relationships that are frustrating and provocative. The proper response might be to work on the relationship through mediation, restructuring, or dissolution. Indeed, this is often the challenge confronting the police when they encounter spouse abuse, child abuse, and other sorts of intrafamily violence. In such situations, arrests may be appropriate and effective in deterring future crime and in restructuring the relationship.[39] There are many other crimes which emerge from less obvious relationships: the personal relationships of

neighbors and friends; the economic relations of landlord and tenant or employer and employee; or transient relations that last just long enough to provoke a quarrel or seed a grudge. Seen this way, many serious crimes—including murders, robberies, rapes, and burglaries—are disputes and grievances among people rather than criminal attacks.

Controlling serious crime

Currently the police fight serious crime by developing a capacity to intercept it—to be in the right place at the right time so that the crime is thwarted, or to arrive so quickly after the fact that the offender is caught. Reactive crime fighting is intuitively appealing to both the police and those to whom the police are accountable. It is unclear, however, whether the reactive response really works. Over the last two decades, confidence in the reactive approach has been eroded by the accumulation of empirical evidence suggesting that these tactics are of only limited effectiveness. It is not that the approach fails to control crime. (It would be foolish to imagine that levels of serious crime would stay the same if police patrols and investigations were halted.) Rather, the limits of the reactive strategy are now becoming apparent. Further gains in police effectiveness in dealing with serious crime must come from different approaches. Key research findings suggesting the limitations of the reactive approach are these.

First, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Study found that levels of serious crime were not significantly influenced by doubling the number of cars patrolling the streets.[40] This cast doubt on the potential for reducing serious crime simply by increasing the level of preventive patrol.

Second, a study of the effectiveness of rapid response to calls for service (also in Kansas City) found that the probability of making an arrest for most serious crimes was unaffected by the speed with which the police responded. The crucial factor was not the speed of the police response, but the speed with which citizens raised the alarm. If citizens did not notice the crime, or did not call the police quickly, no amount of speed in the police response helped much.[41]

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66 *If citizens did not notice the crime, or did not call the police quickly, no amount of speed in the police response helped much.* 99

Third, studies of the investigative process revealed that the key factor in determining whether a crime was solved was the quality of the information contributed to the investigation by victims and witnesses about the identity of the offender.[42] If they could not be helpful, forensic wizardry generally was not up to solving the crime.

It is important to understand that these weaknesses appeared in precisely those areas of crime control where the reactive strategy should have been particularly strong: i.e., in dealing with crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, and burglary. These crimes could be expected to produce alarms; they also were interceptable and solvable by a vigilant police force waiting to be mobilized by outraged citizens.

There are, of course, many other kinds of serious crimes for which the reactive police strategy is much more obviously inappropriate.[43] It cannot, for example, deal with consensual crimes such as drug dealing behind closed doors. Nor can it deal with crimes such as extortion and loan sharking where the victims are too afraid to report the crimes. A reactive strategy cannot deal with sophisticated white collar crimes or political corruption where the losses associated with the crimes are so widely distributed that people do not notice that they have been victimized. Finally, a reactive strategy cannot deal even with traditional street crimes in those parts of cities where confidence in the police has eroded to such a degree that the citizens no longer call when they are victimized.

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66 *Confronted by high levels of crime and limited budgets, the police felt a growing need for initiative and thoughtfulness in tackling serious crime.* 99

Although these findings and intrinsic limitations of the reactive strategy have not unseated the intuitive appeal of and wide experience with the reactive crime fighting strategy, they have added to a growing sense of frustration within police departments. Confronted by high levels of crime and limited budgets, the police felt a growing need for initiative and thoughtfulness in tackling serious crime. Working within the logic of their current approaches, but reaching for additional degrees of effectiveness, during the 1970's the police developed new proactive tactics.

Developments in proactive crime fighting

To deal with serious street crime, the police developed the tactic of directed patrol. Sometimes these patrols were aimed at locations that seemed particularly vulnerable to crimes, such as branch banks, convenience stores, and crowded bars. Other times, the patrols were focused on individuals who, on the basis of past record or recent information, were thought to be particularly active offenders.[44]

The police sought to attack street robberies and muggings through anticrime squads that sent decoys into the streets to prompt active muggers into committing a crime in the full view of the police. The police also sought to control home robberies and burglaries through sting operations involving undercover officers who operate as fences to identify and gather evidence against the offenders.

Finally, the police sought to enhance the effective impact of their enforcement efforts by increasing the quality of the cases they made. Quality Investigation Programs[45] and Integrated Criminal Apprehension Programs[46] were adopted by many departments to increase the likelihood that arrests would be followed by convictions and long prison sentences.

For the most part, each of these innovations produced its successes. The perpetrator-oriented patrols, sting operations, and quality investigation efforts were a little more successful than the location-oriented directed patrols and the undercover operations directed against street robbery. Nonetheless, the police did demonstrate that concentrated efforts could increase arrests, clearances, and convictions. These efforts did not show that these programs alone—without the support of courts and corrections and the involvement of the community—could reduce aggregate levels of serious crime in the cities in which they were tried.

Moreover, insofar as each program took a more aggressive and proactive approach to crime, it also troubled those who were concerned that the police not become too intrusive. Perpetrator-oriented patrols, for example, raised the question of whether it was appropriate to target offenders rather than offenses, and if so, on what evidentiary basis.[47] The use of undercover tactics to deal with both robbery and burglary raised important questions about entrapment.[48] And the emphasis on producing convictions from arrests prompted worries that the police might be motivated to manufacture as well as simply record and preserve evidence. Arguably, these civil liberties concerns were inappropriate at a time when the police seemed unable to deal with high crime rates. The fact that these concerns arose, however, indicated that the police were, in fact, using their authority more intensively than they had when they were relying principally on reactive strategies. Such concerns must be reckoned a cost of the new efforts.

The police also made substantial investments in their ability to deal with those crimes that could not be handled through routine patrol or investigative operations, either because the crimes were too complicated to handle with ordinary arrest and investigative methods, or because the routine operations would not disclose the crime. In terms of dealing with especially demanding crimes, like hostage takings or well-armed offenders, the police developed Special Weapons and Arrest Teams. They also enhanced their capacities to deal with riots and demonstrations. And at the other end of the spectrum, the police developed special procedures for dealing with deranged and disordered offenders who often looked violent (and sometimes were) but mostly were simply mentally disturbed.

To deal with crimes that were not always revealed through the ordinary procedures of complaints by victims and witnesses, the police developed special units skilled in investigating the sensitive areas of child sexual abuse, rape, and domestic assault. They also created special investigative units to deal with high-level drug dealing, organized crime, arson, and sophisticated frauds. These units often relied on special intelligence files as well as special investigative

procedures, such as the recruitment of informants, electronic wiretaps, and sustained undercover investigations. These programs also scored their successes and enhanced the ability of the police to deal with serious crime.

Missed opportunities in crime fighting?

These innovations demonstrated the resourcefulness and creativity of the police as they faced the challenge of high crime rates with limited financial resources, diminished authority, and constrained managerial prerogatives. With the benefit of hindsight, however, some crucial oversights are apparent.

❝ Long before it was demonstrated that the success of rapid response ... depended on the willingness of victims and witnesses to report crimes ..., the police had mounted campaigns mobilizing citizens to support their local police. ❞

First, there was little appreciation of the crucial role that better information from the community could play in strengthening police performance.[49] It was not that the police were unaware of their dependency on citizens for information. Long before it was demonstrated that the success of rapid response to crime calls and retrospective investigation depended on the willingness of victims and witnesses to report crimes and aid in their solution, the police had mounted campaigns mobilizing citizens to support their local police.

The real problem was that the police did not adequately consider what was needed to attract that support. They thought that their interest and ready availability would be sufficient. They did not understand that citizens felt vulnerable to retaliation by offenders in the community and needed a closer connection with the police if they were going to help them solve the crime. Nor did the police understand that a partnership with the community could be constructed only from the material of daily encounters with the public; in particular, by taking seriously the public's concern with less serious offenses. In short, while the police knew that they were dependent on the community for information about crime, they never asked the public what was needed to obtain help beyond setting up 911 systems.

Second, the police rarely looked behind an offense to its precipitating causes. Nor did they think about crime prevention in terms of managing the precipitating causes. They knew, of course, that much crime was being produced by dangerous offenders, criminogenic situations, alcohol and drug abuse, and aggravating relationships. But they were

ambivalent about acting on that knowledge. They tended to limit their responsibilities to applying the law to incidents to which they were summoned; they did not think in terms of applying instruments of civil law or the capacities of other city agencies to work on the proximate causes of crime. Criminal investigations emphasized legal evidence of guilt or innocence—not the question of precipitating causes.

There were many reasons to maintain this narrow focus on law enforcement. To a degree, it protected police organizations from criticisms that they were lawless and out of control. The police could explain that they merely enforced the laws and that they exercised no discretion beyond this basic function. The narrow focus on law enforcement also protected the organization from failure in its basic crime control mission. If the police role was limited to applying the criminal law to offenses rather than to the more challenging goal of actually preventing and controlling crime, the police could succeed even if crime were not controlled. They could blame the other parts of the criminal justice system for their failures to deter and incapacitate the offenders whom the police had arrested. Finally, the narrow focus was consistent with the training and aspirations of the police themselves. Arresting people and using authority was real police work; mediating disputes, mobilizing communities, and badgering other city agencies for improved services was social work.

> ❝ Arresting people and using authority was real police work; mediating disputes, mobilizing communities, and badgering other city agencies for improved services was social work. ❞

Whatever the reasons, the police remained reluctant to develop the internal capabilities needed to make their anecdotal impressions of precipitating causes systematic and powerful. Crime analysis sections merely kept statistics or characterized the location of crime; they did not identify dangerous offenders or trouble spots and avoided examining the role of alcohol and drugs in the serious crime problem. Nor did they propose alternative methods for dealing with crime problems. From the perspective of the police, it was far better to stay at the surface of social life and respond to crimes as they occurred rather than to intervene more widely and actively to manage the immediate conditions that were producing crimes.

Third, the police never fully exploited the self-defense capacities of the community itself. They did offer advice to merchants and citizen groups about how they could protect themselves from criminal victimization. And they helped organize neighborhood watch groups. But the main efforts went into helping the communities become more effective operational auxiliaries to the police departments. Citizens were encouraged to mark their property not only because it helped the police solve the crime, should the item be stolen, but also because it allowed the police to return the property

to the owners. Crime watch groups were instructed to call the police rather than to intervene themselves. This was consistent with the desires of the police to maintain their monopoly on both expertise and operational capability in dealing with crime. They did not really want any growth in private security—whether it took the form of volunteer associations such as the Guardian Angels or commercial operations such as Burns Security Guards. Because of that interest, police commitment to building a community's self-defense capacities was always ambivalent. And, because they were ambivalent, the police did not think through the question of whether and how such efforts could actually help them control serious crime.

Problem-solving and community approaches to crime control

In the 1980's, police departments throughout the country have begun to explore the crime-fighting effectiveness of tactics that build on previous approaches, but seek to extend them by looking behind offenses to the precipitating causes of crimes, building closer relations with the community, and seeking to enhance the self-defense capacities of the communities themselves. These efforts are guided mostly by a theory of what might work and some illustrative examples. The theory is that the effectiveness of existing tactics can be enhanced if the police increase the quantity and quality of their contacts with citizens (both individuals and neighborhood groups), and include in their responses to crime problems thoughtful analyses of the precipitating causes of the offenses. The expectation is that this will both enhance the direct effectiveness of the police department and also enable the police department to leverage the resources of citizen groups and other public agencies to control crime.

Some examples, drawn from recent experiences, suggest the ways in which these new approaches can lead to enhanced crime control.

Enhanced police presence. From its inception, patrol has sought to prevent crime through the presence, or potential presence, of a conspicuous officer. Patrolling in cars is only one way to communicate police presence, however. Activities such as foot patrol, visiting citizens in their homes, and attending group meetings also increase the awareness of police to which all citizens respond—those intent on crime as well as those not. This presence both deters potential offenders from committing crimes and affords officers the opportunities to note criminal acts in progress.

Example: A youth walking down a street in a small business section of town sees an unlocked automobile with the key in the ignition. He is tempted to steal it. Glancing around, he notes a police officer a short distance away walking down the street. The youth decides not to enter the car for fear of being caught by the officer.

Example: An officer, through crime analysis, becomes aware of a pattern of burglaries in a neighborhood. Increasing her patrol in alleyways, she notes a youth attempting to enter the back window of a residence. She makes an arrest.

Although the success of foot patrol tactics in controlling crime is counter-intuitive to those accustomed to patrol by automobile, confidence in this approach is common in England. There, when an anticrime unit is sent in to deal with a serious crime problem, as often as not it consists of foot patrol. The approach is successful because foot patrol officers have access to areas unavailable to officers in cars: walkways and areas between houses, for example. Unpublished work by Glenn Pierce suggests that some crimes, such as burglary, tend to be patterned within limited geographical and chronological space. If this is true, when combined with what is known about how burglars enter homes and businesses, properly targeted foot patrol might be the strongest potential anticrime tactic to deal with such crimes.

Better surveillance and deterrence of dangerous offenders.
From the outset, police have sought to control crime through close surveillance of those who have committed crimes in the past. The problem has been to accurately identify those offenders. Police officers who work closely with a neighborhood are in a position to learn who behaves in criminal or delinquent ways within the community. By stationing themselves in particular locations, officers can surveil known troublemakers and forestall criminal behavior.

Example: Police investigation of a rash of robberies committed by juveniles involved house-to-house interviews of the neighborhood. In these interviews, photographs of suspects were shown to residents. While no information about the crimes was produced, the word rapidly spread through the neighborhood that the police were keeping close tabs on specific individuals. The robberies stopped without an arrest.

It is also legally and procedurally possible to consider assigning neighborhood police officers to the surveillance of probationers and parolees. Such surveillance would be more immediate and regular than that now provided by probation or parole officers. Aware that neighborhood police officers had easier access to information about their activities, people who were in the community on a conditional basis might be deterred from committing illegal acts.

Example: Paroled sexual offenders in a conservative state regularly move to a community known for its relatively open values. A plan is worked out between local police and the state correctional agency. Upon parole, all sexual offenders returning to this community are interviewed by the chief of patrol and the neighborhood officer policing the area in which the parolee is to live. An offender known for attacks on teenage girls returns to the community. Regular contacts between the officer and parolee are scheduled to enable the police officer to oversee the parolee's behavior while in the community. The police officer discovers that the parolee is

now working in the local fast food restaurant—a workplace which regularly hires teenage girls. The officer, in conjunction with the parole officer, requires that the parolee find a different job, one in which young girls are not always present.

Increased access to information. Community policing emphasizes the development of close communication between citizens and police. This communication helps police gather information for both *preventing* and *solving* crime.

Example: In an area frequented by many street people, a street person approaches a neighborhood police officer to inform him that a stranger from another neighborhood is attempting to recruit assistance to commit a street robbery. The street person describes the newcomer to the police officer. Shortly afterwards while patrolling, the officer notices a person on the street who matches the description. The officer approaches the person, questions him, tells him that he (the officer) is aware of what he is planning, and instructs him to leave the area.

Example: Shortly after leaving her church a woman is mugged on the street. She appears to be seriously injured as a result of being knocked to the ground. Police and medics are called. The neighborhood officer responds by foot. She is approached by several children and their parents. The children were playing in an open space in the public housing project across the street from the church and saw the youth mug the woman. They know the youth and where he lives. Accompanied by a neighborhood entourage, including the parents and children who identified the youth, the officer proceeds to the apartment and makes the arrest.

Familiarity with the social and physical characteristics of their beats also helps neighborhood police officers to understand linkages between various pieces of information gathered from their own observations and from other disparate sources.

Example: Parents have complained to a neighborhood police officer about an increase of drug availability in their neighborhood. Several parents have found drugs in their children's possession. In addition, the officer has noticed many youths congregating around an entrance to a second-story apartment over several stores. The officer contacts the drug unit and informs them of his suspicion that drugs are being sold to children from that apartment. The drug unit arranges an undercover "buy" and then "busts" the dealers.

Work by Pate,[50] Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilia,[51] Eck,[52] and Skogan and Antunes[53] suggests that use of information

gathered by patrol officers is one of the most important ways in which police can improve their ability to apprehend offenders. In 1982, Baltimore County, Maryland initiated a Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement unit (COPE), designed to bring the police into closer contact with the citizens and reduce their fears. A 1985 study showed that not only had COPE reduced fear, but also it had apparently produced a 12 percent reduction in the level of reported crime.[54]

Early intervention to prevent the escalation of disorder into crime. In a widely read article, Kelling and Wilson argue that there is an important causal link between minor instances of disorder and the occurrence of serious crime.[55] Disorderly behavior—youths congregating, drunks lying down, prostitutes aggressively soliciting—left untended, can escalate into serious crime. The implication is that intervention by police to stop uncivil behavior keeps it from escalating.

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66 *An important part of community policing is providing anticrime consultation to citizens, businesses, and other community institutions.* **99**

Example: Youths panhandle in a subway station. Citizens give money both out of charitable motives and because they are fearful. Youths, emboldened by citizen fear, intimidate and, finally, threaten and mug subway users. Intervention by police to end panhandling by youths reduces threatening and mugging of citizens.

Although this argument has intuitive appeal, little direct empirical evidence exists about exploiting its anticrime potential.

Crime prevention activities. An important part of community policing is providing anticrime consultation to citizens, businesses, and other community institutions. The recommendations range from home target hardening (locks, strengthened doors, etc.) to street and building design.

Example: Residents of a neighborhood have been troubled by daytime burglaries. In addition to planning a police response, police consult with homeowners about ways in which they can make their homes more secure from burglars. Suggestions include moving shrubs away from doorways, strengthening locks, securing windows, and taking other burglary prevention precautions.

A 1973 evaluation of Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program, which used this approach, found a significant reduction in burglaries.[56]

Shoring up community institutions. Institutions of neighborhood social control include families, churches, schools, local businesses, and neighborhood and community organizations.

In many communities, the corrosive effects of social disorganization have seriously weakened such organizations. Police, working with such institutions and organizations, can reinforce their normative strength in a community.

Example: Drug dealing is a serious problem in an inner-city neighborhood. Drug dealers not only have dealt drugs freely, but also have intimidated residents to the extent that they are afraid to complain to police. A local church decides that the problem is so serious that an organized effort must be made to attack the problem. Church officials contact the police and ask them to work closely with the neighborhood group. Citizens demonstrate against drug dealing, getting both police protection and great publicity. Citywide and local political leaders, as well as other public and private agencies, become concerned about the problem and develop a concerted effort to reduce drug dealing and intimidation. Sustained street-level enforcement ends drug dealing in that location.

Example: Using up-to-date technology, police are able to identify the patterns of a burglary ring which is moving through a neighborhood. Police contact the local neighborhood anticrime group and inform its members of the patterns so that they can be alert and watch their own and each others' homes.

Example: A woman who lives in public housing has been troubled by attempts of local gangs to recruit her youngest son. Up to now, his older brother has been able to protect him. Now, however, the older brother is going into the service. Approached by the mother, the neighborhood police officer now keeps an eye out for the youngster on the way to and from school as well as on the playground.

Example: A local school is plagued by dropouts who continually hang around the school intimidating both students and teachers. Crime has increased in and around the school. The principal decides to crack down on the problem. The neighborhood police officer becomes involved in the efforts. He teaches a course in youth and the law, increases his surveillance of the grounds, consults with the teachers about handling problems, and invokes other agencies to become involved with the youths who have dropped out of school.

Although promising, it is unclear what impact the strengthening of community institutions has on serious crime. It is an attractive idea, however.

Problem solving. Police have historically viewed calls for service and criminal events as individual incidents. Many such incidents are part of a chronic problem amenable to diagnosis and preventive intervention by either police or other agencies.

Example: Police and citizens note an increase in daytime burglaries in a particular neighborhood. This neighborhood has also been characterized by high rates of truancy. Suspecting that many burglaries are committed by truants, police, citizens, and school officials plan a carefully integrated anti-truancy campaign. Daytime burglaries drop.

Problem solving appears to be a promising approach to deter crime. When, in 1985, the Newport News Police Department turned to problem-oriented policing as an approach to dealing with crime, it was successful in dealing with three stubborn crime problems that had beset the community: a series of prostitution-related robberies; a rash of burglaries in a housing project; and larcenies from vehicles parked in downtown areas. In each case, the problem was solved not simply by solving the crimes and arresting offenders, nor by increasing levels of patrol (though both were done), but also by operating on the immediate conditions that were giving rise to the offenses.[57]

❝ Police have historically viewed calls for service and criminal events as individual incidents. Many such incidents are part of a chronic problem amenable to diagnosis and preventive intervention ... ❞

These ideas, examples, and results lend plausibility to the notion that problem–solving or community policing can enhance the crime control capabilities of professional crime fighting. They do not prove the case, however.

A strategic view of crime fighting

While police executives can produce increased levels of arrest and local reductions in crime through the creation of special programs, they are frustrated because they do not know how to produce reductions in citywide levels of crime. The main reason for this might be that their main force is not engaged in a serious crime-fighting effort even though it seems that it is. After all, it would be unreasonable to imagine that any single small program, typically engaging less than 5 percent of the force, could have much impact on aggregate levels of crime. The important question is what is the remaining 95 percent of the force doing? For the most part, the answer is that they are deployed in patrol cars, responding to calls for service and investigating crimes after they have occurred. These tactics have only limited effectiveness.

What remains unanswered is the consequence of shifting a whole department to a radically different style of policing. Moreover, the answer is hard to determine, since the period of transition would be quite awkward. In the short run, were officers taken from patrol and detective units to do problem-oriented or community policing, it is almost certain that response times would lengthen —at least until the problem-solving efforts reduced the demands for service by eliminating the precipitating problem that was producing the calls for service.[58] And even though an increase in response times does not necessarily indicate a real loss in crime-fighting effectiveness, it would be perceived as such because the public

and the police have learned to equate rapid response to crime calls with crime control effectiveness.

What is tempting, of course, is to avoid choosing among these strategies, and to adopt the strengths of these various approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. This would be reflected in decisions to establish special units to do problem-solving or community policing within existing organizations whose traditions and main forces remained committed to reactive patrol and retrospective investigation.

But it may not be this easy. Indeed, experience demonstrates that it is not. Previous initiatives with team policing or split-force policing succeeded in building capacities for both styles of policing within the same department, but tended to foster eventual competition and conflict.[59] The problem-solving and community policing aspects have usually eventually yielded to administrative demands to keep response times low, or to officers' desires to avoid the demanding engagement with the community. The reason seems to be partly a matter of resources—there has never been enough manpower to maximize performance in both domains at once. But it also seems to be a matter of administrative style and structure. Problem-solving and community policing both require a greater degree of decentralization than does the current policing strategy. They depend more on the initiative of the officers. And they reach out for a close rather than a distant relationship with the community. These are all quite different than the administrative emphases of the current strategy which prescribe centralization, control, and distance from the community.

❝ Problem-solving and community policing ... reach out for a close rather than a distant relationship with the community. ❞

So while logic and evidence suggest the crime control potential of adding problem-solving and community policing to the concept of rapid response and retrospective investigation, it is hard to add these functions without increasing the resources and significantly changing the administrative style of a police organization. That is hard for a police chief to decide to do without convincing evidence that it would work. The only things that make such a move easy to contemplate are: (1) a deep sense that the current strategy and tactics have reached their limits; (2) the plausibility of the idea that increased effectiveness lies in working on proximate causes and mobilizing communities; and (3) the little bit of evidence we have that the alternative approach works. A few departments, such as Houston, Newport News, Baltimore County, and Philadelphia, have committed themselves to these alternative approaches. If they succeed over the next 3 to 5 years in reducing serious crime as well as in attracting citizen support, then the field will know that it has a better strategy of policing available than is now being used.

Notes

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11. The exception is Marvin Wolfgang's work devoted to measuring crime seriousness as perceived by citizens. See Marvin E. Wolfgang and Thorsten Sellin, *The Measurement of Crime Seriousness* (New York: Wiley Publishing, 1964). See also Mark H. Moore et al., *Dangerous Offenders: The Elusive Target of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), Chapter 2.

12. Bureau of Justice Statistics, *The Severity of Crime* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, January 1984), p. 5.

13. Susan Estrich, *Real Rape* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

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Community Policing Six Years Later:

What have we learned?

by Gary Stern

When the New York City Police Department piloted a program called the Community Patrol Officers Program (CPOP) in 1984, officers knocked on neighborhood doors to introduce themselves to community members as the cop on the beat. Some startled residents called the 72nd Precinct in Sunset Park, Brooklyn, and reported that a criminal was impersonating an officer.

According to Lee Brown, New York City Police Department commissioner, community patrolling is the department's dominant strategic approach to crime-solving. "Under community policing, police officers see problems being solved. They can see they're doing something to better the lives of individuals," Brown said. CPOP, which now has 10 officers in the city's 75 precincts, will be expanded to 5,000 officers if Mayor David Dinkin's new plan is passed.

Community policing, also referred to as problem-oriented policing and community patrolling, has been implemented in cities nationwide. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) which has helped introduce community policing programs in several cities, claims that "signs are encouraging" that it can reduce the fear of crime, help organize neighborhoods to reduce crime, and affect both quality of life and more serious crime.

What effect is community policing having on crime? Can it only address quality of life crimes—rubbish in a yard or abandoned cars—or can it help decrease more violent crime? Why are so many police departments hailing community patrolling as the greatest fad since the radio car? And after six years of having it in several police precincts, what have we learned about how to make it more effective?

Proponents believe that community policing does more than involve the community and will change the face of policing nationwide. Dennis Rosenbaum, director of the Center for Research of Law and Justice based in Chicago, noted that over 80% of all police calls have nothing to do with catching criminals but involve a policeman's social skills.

Mary Ann Wycoff, project director for the Police Foundation, pointed out that in order for community policing to be effective the paramilitary structure of police departments must be transformed. Police officers must be treated like "bright, thinking people, and that means managers operating as facilitators rather than order givers."

Community policing, she said, "is the next logical evolution in policing. It enables police organizations to get back in touch with people. In so many big cities, we feel threatened, have a need for personal contact and more patrol. Community policing offers that possibility."

"Community policing is the most important new idea in policing," Dr. Samuel Walker, professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Nebraska, said.

He noted that community policing tackles "the underlying causes" of crime, encourages officers to become problem solvers, and turns them proactive rather than reactive.

But not everyone is enamored of community policing. Jack Greene, professor of criminal justice at Temple University, sees benefits to community policing but described it as "fuzzy feel good politics." Most police departments have not clearly figured out how they want to involve the community in policy making. He contended that community policing has not been effectively implemented, that too much of it transpires in "the boardroom and not on the boardwalk." While police cite proof of its effectiveness by describing colorful anecdotes of community involvement, no group has sufficiently studied its impact on minimizing or solving crimes.

Herman Goldstein, professor of law at the University of Wisconsin, stated flatly that community patrolling leads to more effective problem solving. Most experts recognize, he said, that the capacity of police to prevent serious crime like homicides and rape or apprehend criminals is extremely limited. Moreover, police have relied too much on an overwhelmed criminal justice system. However, community policing empowers officers to handle and resolve problems more effectively.

In community policing, an officer can organize the community, identify and focus on issues troubling residents, and work with appropriate agencies—law, health department, public works—to rectify these problems. A community patrol officer, Goldstein said, becomes "a diagnostician who brings along a range of different alternatives to solve a wide range of problems."

What underlies Goldstein's thesis about community policing is the belief that "the function of police is not just to solve rape but to deal with fear, to provide a sense of security." Furthermore, while many veteran police officers have turned cynical, frustrated by the revolving door criminal justice system, community policing "provides officers with satisfaction on the job, a sense of dignity and respect that they long for. They are recognized as having the brains and ability to think through solutions or problems."

Minimizing a department's reliance on patrol cars is another benefit of community policing. With patrol cars, officers became anonymous faces in blue who just

drove through neighborhoods. Former New York City Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy wrote in a New York Times op-ed article that patrol officers spent so much of their time answering 911 calls that they no longer had time to "establish community values and deter illicit drug use. It was as if physicians had abandoned preventive medicine."

Recognizing that radio car officers were repeatedly returning to the same addresses to investigate repeat offenders, Captain Jim Harrison of the Newport News, VA, Police Department introduced community

policing with the help of PERF in 1984 "to attack repeated calls for service." Community policing, Harrison said, "looks beyond a reactive approach and a Band-Aid approach. It challenges officers to look at the problem and solve it." Although its one designated unit numbers only 10 of the department's 265 officers, Harrison describes community policing as "an organizational philosophy, not just a program."

Each officer has been trained to employ community policing, using a set of guidelines focusing on scanning the problem,

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Tips To Improve Community Policing In Your Department

- If you're newly assigned to community policing, first learn who the community leaders are. Discuss with them what they consider are the primary crime issues in the neighborhood and arrange meetings to with other residents. A Madison, WI, police officer assigned to a poorer neighborhood where residents did not have the time to attend meetings arranged informal gatherings in apartment hallways at 5:30. Residents could make dinner and leave their doors open.
- Encourage residents to take an active role in community policing. A Houston officer invites different speakers each month—bankers about estate planning, school administrators—to participate in community meetings.
- Community police officers have started storefront operations where residents come for a host of services; where they publish newsletters and have their questions answered.
- For community patrolling to be effective, those who lead units must be flexible, encourage initiative by team officers, and avoid falling into the trap of becoming too controlling.
- Have a telephone number that residents can call to hear descriptions of crime suspects, and which discusses other community information.
- Training must be specifically geared to community policing to show officers how they can work with fire and health departments. Officers can learn to employ group problem solving to encourage creative thinking.
- Working with the community justice system can help stop crime. When residents of a Newport News neighborhood used an abandoned lot for target practice, the community policing officer worked with a judge and wrote 35 summonses. Target shooting quickly ended.
- The more community policing officers listen to the community, the more apt they are to solve problems.

The key to effective community policing, according to Patrick V. Murphy, director of the United States Conference of Mayors, involves fixing responsibility for one area with one person. Most community patrol sergeants are responsible for 6,000 to 8,000 residents and operate like a "chief of police" in that sector.

For more information on community policing, contact John Eck at the Police Executive Research Forum, 2301 M Street NW, Washington, DC 20006.

analyzing it, responding to it, and then assessing the result. The result has been more innovative and creative approaches to policing, Harrison said. For example, when prostitutes started working the downtown area in large numbers, a community patrol officer worked out a program with a judge to "map" how many times they were apprehended and arrest repeat offenders. Not only was prostitution reduced but so was resulting armed robbery downtown.

Violent crimes can also be addressed. When the Newport News homicide rate rose from 19 to 22 one year, community patrol officers, analyzing the data, discovered that 11 homicides were due to domestic arguments. Community patrol officers devised a special program called PRIDE to reduce such violence. Instead of making arrests, which put the abuser back on the street, the program involved court-mandated counseling, removing them from the spouse who often could be intimidated to drop charges. Homicide by domestic violence has been reduced due to this program, Harrison said.

By bringing police in closer contact with the community, the chances of solving crimes are enhanced. It breaks down the us/them barrier. When community policing is employed, citizens became an important information source to police. More access to the community, therefore, results in more arrests.

"The power of community oriented policing is officers begin to recognize that they have a major responsibility in addressing quality of life. When citizens recognize that we're not cops wearing chrome-plated sunglasses, but we're actively trying to solve problems, it gives us a new lease on life and a sense of professionalism," Chief David Couper, Madison, WI, Police Department said. Couper has conducted community surveys, a kind of police marketing research, that reveals that community policing leads to greater citizen satisfaction.

Affecting a citizen's *perception* of crime makes a major difference. "You can have the best crime rates in the world but that won't matter if citizens don't think it is so," he said.

When Sergeant Andrew McGoey, a veteran of 16 years in a radio car, was asked in 1984 to serve as sergeant of the first 10-person New York City CPOP, he admits that he was resistant and unenthused.

Although he thought he knew everything there was to know about Sunset Park, his experience with community policing changed his perception. In a radio car, he spent his time answering 911 calls, going from one job to the next, dealing with only the neighborhood's bad elements and victims. Now he interacts with the working class and middle class people in the neighborhood, working with them to solve problems.

Drug selling has been a persistent problem in Sunset Park. Rather than just arresting drug dealers, who often return to the streets within days, CPOP officers work with landlords to evict dealers from apartments, introduce drug rap sessions in schools for prevention, collaborate with block watchers to identify known dealers and with court watchers who monitor judges to insure that fair penalties are handed out.

Police officers have different reactions about whether community policing can solve crimes or just move it from one neighborhood to the next. McGoey said that community policing does not purport to erase society's problems. "We're not solving the drug problem," he admitted. "What you end up doing is solving the problem for an individual group or an individual block."

But if police continue to disperse drug dealers, criminals will no longer have a base of operations. If the community is no longer tolerant of drug dealers' activities, he suggested, crime will decrease.

Statement of Organizational Values

We, the employees of the City of Hayward, believe that providing superior service to the citizens of Hayward is our primary responsibility and that all of our work should be structured with that goal in mind. We further believe that in meeting this goal we should be responsible to decisions made by the City Council and the citizens of the community. In order to' achieve and maintain superior standards in both our work product and our work performance, we are committed to the following values:

S trong planning and decision making involving employee participation to the greatest extent possible.

E xcellence in delivery of service to the public.

R espect for dignity of the employee and recognition of individual contributions and initiative.

V igorous pursuit of competency and responsibility in the performance of our work.

I ntegrity and honesty in all aspects of service.

C ommunication achieved and information shared in a constructive open and supportive manner.

E quitable treatment and opportunity for all employees.

MISSION STATEMENT

We, the members of the *Hayward Police Department,* are committed to being responsive to our community in the delivery of quality services. Recognizing our responsibility to maintain order, while affording dignity and respect to every individual, our objective is to improve the quality of life through a community partnership which promotes safe, secure neighborhoods.

NEIGHBORHOOD
WATCH

The Customer is Always Right

Applying Vision, Leadership and the Problem-Solving Method to Community-Oriented Policing

DESPITE THE changing times, most police agencies still emphasize strict control over their employees, thus stifling the creativity so desperately needed in policing. In many jurisdictions, the community continues to be excluded from our operations as well. But these antiquated practices of control and exclusion are contrary to what we know about how successful, customer-oriented organizations operate today.

The New Era of Work

A shortage of workers entering the job market will adversely affect the American job market throughout the 1990s. At the same time, the face of America's workforce will be changing dramatically. By the end of this decade, 85 percent of the new workers will be minorities and women. Most women will have a pressing need for quality child care and many will be single parents. For organizations that have traditionally hired mostly young white men, such as the police, it will require major changes in the workplace. On top of all this, many of the new workers will introduce cultural and educational differences.

In order to keep a smaller supply of workers motivated, leaders will have to adjust to market demands by creating

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By Chief David C. Couper, Madison Police Department, Wisconsin, and Sergeant Sabine Lobitz, Wisconsin State Capitol Police, Madison

more flexible work arrangements, making sure employee training is up to the minute and moving toward systems favoring *employees*, not *employers*.

One of the major demands from new employees will be for input into work-related decisions.

It will clearly be a new era of work. Although many people believe the autocratic style was an effective method of leading workers from the industrial revolution into the 20th century, it will not have the same effect leading workers down the road to the 21st century. In today's workplace, autocratic leaders who reserve the sole right to decide not only where the organization is going, but also each step they will take along the way, have chosen a route that is difficult, if not impossible.

Today's workers, including police officers, have little in common with their counterparts at the turn of the century. Then, workers had little education and their contribution to the organizations in which they worked was mostly by the sweat of their brows.

Much of the 19th-century bureaucracy is still in place today, especially in law enforcement, but it is proving costly. Organizations that have resisted moving toward a more participative organizational model have paid for it in lost business and production; workers in those organizations paid for it with their jobs. To survive, we must come to the understanding that people are our most important product.

It is no coincidence that this concept underlies the philosophy of community-oriented policing—perhaps the most important step we can take toward effective policing in the 21st century.

Vision: The First Step

Where does a journey toward community-oriented policing start? As with most journeys, it begins with a vision of your destination. One of any leader's most important tasks is to declare the vision—a clear, understandable picture of the future. As a statement to your employees and the community of the direction in which you want your organization to go, a vision statement can be as simple as: "We will be a police department devoted to maintaining customer satisfaction and getting closer to the people we serve."

Of course, no vision is developed in a vacuum. First, an assessment of employees' needs, as well as the needs of the citizens they serve, must be made. This can be done by organizing a group to discuss the future of the department, developing problem-identification groups, conducting opinion surveys and creating other internal "listening" methods such as an elected employee council. Of course, leaders must also see that efforts are made to organize community focus groups and conduct community feedback surveys. Citizen input must be constantly solicited at community gatherings.

The next step is to set a course to meet these needs, developing agreed-upon goals and a mission statement for the department. (See Madison's vision and mission statements on page 21.)

The Madison Police Department believes its mission for today and vision for tomorrow capture the essential needs of

the department and the community and will help its members get where they want to go.

Making the vision a reality involves developing two to three visible and achievable first steps consistent with the vision and mission of the organization. These steps should be viewed by employees as indicators of progress—that something is happening for the good. Above all, employees will need to know there is a strong, unalterable commitment from the chief executive officer and other leaders to work hard and move ahead.

Not to be overlooked are the organizational "values" behind the vision and mission statements. Police organizations will benefit by identifying, defining, sharing, discussing and practicing their values. The following values were identified as important to members of the Madison Police Department, guiding hiring and promotional decisions and policies, as well as tactical and problem-solving strategies.

> *A member of the department*
> *is honest, trustworthy and courageous*
> *respects people and their diversity*
> *obeys the law and defends the Bill of Rights*
> *is physically and mentally fit*

TEAM EXCELLENCE

"A BETTER WAY"

> *views citizens as customers*
> *delivers quality service*
> *is community oriented*
> *works to identify and resolve community problems*
> *is courteous and an active listener*
> *is a leader and team player*
> *demonstrates control in the use of force*
> *continuously improves throughout his career*

The power of effective community-oriented policing comes from police organizations that are value-guided rather than rule-driven. This is a significant departure from our past.

Leadership: The Second Step

We must begin immediately to maximize the potential of our nation's police. This can most effectively be done by first improving the quality of work life for those inside our organizations and then moving to improve the service we provide citizens through the problem-oriented approach to law enforcement. The result will be effective community-oriented policing. *You cannot effectively do one without the other,* nor can you reverse the sequence and attempt to establish problem-oriented policing without first improving the workplace for your employees.

Why is this important? Managers cannot effectively lead employees who are not treated with respect and dignity and expect that they will in turn treat citizens with respect and dignity. These are important values in a free society and an important part of policing. As such, they need to be constantly modeled by police in a democratic society—both inside and outside the organization.

Few police leaders would admit they run their organizations in a manner that shows little respect or regard for their employees' dignity. Yet, many demand centralization of decision making, "top-down" inspection and an uncompromising chain of command, thus producing closed organizations with little room for openness, creativity or feedback.

What do employees want? Nationwide surveys—such as that conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation—confirm that they want these qualities in their jobs:

1. The opportunity to work with people who treat them with respect and listen to their ideas for improvement
2. Interesting work
3. Recognition for good work
4. A chance to develop their skills
5. A chance to think for themselves
6. The opportunity to work for efficient managers
7. A job that is not too easy
8. The chance to see the end results of their work
9. Knowledge about what is going on

How well do we meet these needs? Do we have an organizational and leadership

The Quality Improvement Method: What Leaders Need to Know

1. Your employees are your most important resource. They want to do a good job, but they need you to help them by training, developing and caring for them, as well as removing the obstacles that prevent them from doing the good jobs they wish to do.

2. Improvement in employee treatment will result in improvement in citizen treatment. Employee treatment must be improved before you even think about improving cit..en/customer treatment.

3. Your employees are your customers. Citizens are your employees' customers. Only a customer can define quality treatment.

4. Feedback and open, unfettered communication to and from your employees are necessary for organizational growth and your improvement as a leader. This applies to citizens/customers as well.

5. All work is accomplished through definable systems. Understanding work system variation and eliminating the causes of problems in those systems are necessary in order to remove obstacles and to improve work for employees and services to citizens.

6. Employee work teams can solve major work and service delivery problems if you empower them, encourage them and give them access to relevant information.

7. Data and graphs should be used whenever possible to make organizational decisions and show improvements.

8. Organizational improvement is constantly sought. It is a continuous journey, not a destination; it never ends. Improving things is the work of leaders.

9. Improvements are the result of a leader's focus, attention and passion for quality, as well as the involvement of—and respect for—everyone in the organization. Making work fun can also result in improvements.

10. Leaders must have a vision and the will to pursue excellence. However, in the end, what leaders believe, know or talk about has little consequence; the only consequence is that employees know their leaders have improved.

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through the late 1960s and into the early 70s. Most were introduced with police chief or mayoral fanfare, and soon died because of a lack of internal support or long-term commitment by department leaders.

Community-oriented policing is the work done by police officers assigned to specific neighborhoods or business areas. They become not only community workers, but also community organizers. They are police officers working collaboratively with citizens to prevent, control and eliminate crime and other disorder in their assigned neighborhoods. Community-oriented

policing is, however, more than just getting closer to citizens—it is a reorientation of the way in which police work with, and relate to, citizens as "customers" and a commitment to resolve community-identified problems. These efforts result in a high level of citizen satisfaction.

Trying Out the Equation

In order to try out the equation: Vision + Leadership + the Problem-Oriented

Method = Effective Community-Oriented Policing, the Madison Police Department developed and implemented a 10-square-mile Experimental Police District (EPD) in January 1988. The EPD's three goals were to implement quality leadership, increase employee participation in decision making and use the problem-oriented policing method to address citizen-identified community problems.

The first step, of course, was to develop a vision. Employees throughout the organization were trained in quality improvement methods and quality leadership and they began working closer with community members in solving specific community problems. The department's new promotional system, developed by an employee project team, required that a quality leadership academy be established to train all future leaders in the new management style *before* they were promoted. Although a department-wide initiative, quality leadership was given the greatest organizational emphasis within the EPD.

As a result, there has been real improvement in both the quality of the workplace and the service provided to citizens. Some obvious examples are a reduction in sick leave and overtime used by employees, as well as a reported increase in job satisfaction within the EPD. Externally, citizens in the EPD report increased satisfaction in their dealings with EPD employees. This satisfaction level is higher than citizens report in their contacts with other units of the department. (Over the past three years, the department has conducted an ongoing survey of persons randomly identified in department incidents—arrested persons as well as victims—to establish a base-line for the comparison of citizen satisfaction with police services from year to year.)

Our Future

Employees are entering the police profession with a different set of job expectations and values than their predecessors held. They want—and expect—to be part of a team. They want their leaders to value their ideas and suggestions and to permit them to participate in organizational decision making. If we, as police leaders, do not attempt to meet these needs, we will find ourselves out of step with our employees as well as our communities.

This is the first time we have had an effective alternative to the way in which we have conducted business for so many years. The choice is up to us in police leadership. The time is right to mesh the needs of our employees and our communities to forge a new alliance—community-oriented policing. ★

Police and Citizen Partnerships - An Alliance That Works!

Not Just Old Wine in New Bottles

The Inextricable Relationship Between Crime Prevention and Community Policing

By Peter Horne, Ph.D., Criminal Justice Progr ' Coordinator, Mercer County Co..munity College, Trenton, New Jersey

AT THE OUTset, it is important to clarify the two terms in the title of this article. The formal definition of crime prevention is fairly straightforward: "The anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it."[1] While this definition is good as far as it goes, it doesn't go far enough. Fear reduction is also a significant aspect of crime prevention. Even if crime prevention efforts are only marginally effective in diminishing crime, they may help to reduce the citizen's *fear* of crime and thus enhance his sense of security.

Crime prevention *per se* is not new; on the contrary, Sir Robert Peel, the founder of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, clearly viewed crime prevention as one of the basic tenets of policing. But the contemporary, more formalized and structured emphasis on crime prevention in American policing is a fairly recent occurrence that can be traced to the 1971 establishment of the National Crime Prevention Institute (NCPI) at the University of Louisville.

The definition of community policing is not nearly as simple and direct as that of crime prevention. *Community Policing*, an excellent new book by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, provides an in-depth examination of this complex phenome-

non. The first paragraph of the page-long definition of community policing reads as follows:

> Community policing is a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept that police officers and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve contemporary community problems related to crime, fear of crime, social and physical disorder and neighborhood decay. The philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires that police departments develop a new relationship with the law-abiding people in the community, allowing them a greater voice in setting local police priorities and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods. It shifts the focus of police work from handling random calls to solving community problems.[2]

Some law enforcement experts argue that community policing is simply a return to the 19th-century British and American systems built around officers on foot whose primary responsibility was maintaining order. But contemporary community policing is more than just "old wine in new bottles." It is really a new way of thinking about policing, suggesting that police officers are creative, intelligent individuals who can do more than just respond to incidents. By working with the people who live and work in an area, they can both identify the underlying problems and determine the best strategy to solve those problems.

Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing (POP) concept is an essential component of community policing. Basically, POP is a department-wide proactive strategy aimed at solving persistent crime-related community problems. Po-

lice are asked to identify, analyze and respond to the underlying circumstances that create incidents.[3]

Crime Prevention and Community Policing

Obviously, crime prevention and community policing are inextricably related. Crime prevention is the cornerstone of community policing. Internationally, "community-based crime prevention is the ultimate goal and centerpiece of community-oriented policing."[4]

One critical element common to both concepts is citizen input and participation; police crime prevention programs rely on the cooperation and voluntary involvement of individuals and groups in the community. True community policing acknowledges that the police cannot succeed without the community's operational and political support. The premise is that citizens will develop a sense of shared responsibility with the police to carry on an effective crime-fighting effort.[5]

What are the Weaknesses?

An in-depth examination of crime prevention and policing today reveals a number of weaknesses in the approach most police departments have taken to crime prevention. While in some departments crime prevention plays a greater role than ever before, too many agencies have erected a facade with no real substance behind it. Many police chiefs give lip service to the concept, particularly in their talks with the community, but then sabotage it (either consciously or uncon-

sciously) through poor management practices.

In practice, crime prevention units often operate as separate entities within the department, never fully integrated into the police milieu. In the organizational scheme, the crime prevention unit is usually in the service track rather than the operations bureau, meaning the jobs are manned by staff and not line officers. The result is that crime prevention often is viewed as "arts and crafts" by patrol officers and detectives. Crime prevention officers tend not to be considered "real cops" who handle crime and disorder on a daily basis. This is particularly true since the 1980s, as many police agencies have done away with separate police-community relations units and merged them and their functions into crime prevention units.

Unfortunately, crime prevention units tend to be viewed as "dumping grounds" for all kinds of programs and miscellaneous assignments. Crime prevention officers are often responsible for a whole host of functions, including crime prevention, community relations, public relations, media relations and anything else the chief can think of. Because of the structure of the crime prevention unit, the nature of its daily activities and the scope of its responsibilities, crime prevention officers are often looked upon as public relations flak-catchers.

Although community policing is in its relative infancy in American law enforcement, problems similar to those confronting crime prevention have emerged in this country and overseas. As Skolnick and Bayley note:

> *Departmental segregation has by now become an almost predictable problem of community policing. Community policing activities are assigned to newly created, specialized units—crime prevention branches, mini-station commands and community relations squads. Community police personnel do their own thing and are not integrated into traditional patrol or criminal investigation activities. Police departments are composed of jealous fiefdoms that don't want to ... share their responsibilities with community policing units ... Community policing becomes another specialized function, distinct from other ongoing department activities.*[3]

What are the Remedies?

As Dr. Forrest Moss, director of NCPI, has stated, "Crime prevention is still woefully underutilized, underappreciated and ... has not made it 'to the line' in terms of ... real organizational commitment."[7] If these shortcomings are to be overcome, then crime prevention must become totally integrated into police

agencies. Specialist positions in crime prevention have to be reduced or eliminated altogether. Just like community relations, crime prevention must become part of the repertoire of full-fledged street cops in the community.

If there are to be specialist crime prevention units, they should be kept small and used as consultants to the generalist units, rather than as staff to carry out operational activities. Crime prevention units should be part of the line organizational structure, where they can coordinate the roles of patrol officers who, in essence, act as the field staff for crime prevention. The crime prevention specialist must assume the role of a planner, trainer, evaluator and supportive resource —an "enabler" rather than a primary "doer."[8]

All officers should undergo meaningful and practical training regarding the myriad activities of crime prevention. Also, just as in POP, field officers must be trained and encouraged to identify and analyze a present or potential crime or public disorder problem and work toward its reduction or elimination. A critical analysis of problems is needed to formulate crime-specific tactics and avoid a "shotgun" approach to problem solving. This analysis should be undertaken with community members: after corrective actions (e.g., counseling, arrest) have occurred, there must be evaluation and assessment of the success or failure of the actions.

"Rule of thumb" and "gut-level" impressions have no place in crime prevention. All crime prevention efforts must undergo critical scrutiny by both the police and the public. Comprehensive evaluations should also consider crime displacement issues, as well as citizen perceptions and levels of fear.

It may be unrealistic, though, to expect the police to devise and implement new strategies, as well as evaluate their impact. This would be particularly true in small and medium-sized police departments. After all, the priorities of the police are operational and "their expertise in evaluation limited .... The responsibility for evaluating program results should be shouldered by agencies outside the police."[9]

Two other issues should be briefly noted. One has to do with the concept referred to as "crime prevention through environmental design" (CPTED). CPTED, which should become an integral part of every department's crime prevention efforts, seeks to integrate natural approaches to crime prevention into building design and neighborhood planning. The formal definition of CPTED as de-

veloped by NCPI is that the "the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in fear and the incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality of life."[10] CPTED embodies the true value of crime prevention in that it is a proactive rather than a reactive approach to the crime problem.

If crime prevention is going to become part of all officers' everyday routines, it is important to consider performance evaluation. An ongoing dilemma in policing concerns how supervisors can best measure officer performance. Traditional quantitative measures—number of arrests, tickets issued, reports written, etc.—do not directly address such activities as crime prevention, problem solving or maintaining order. If officers are going to be motivated to engage in comprehensive crime prevention actions, then qualitative as well as quantitative measures must be developed to "provide an important barometer of officer activity and success, as well as a measure of organizational goals."[11] And since rewards continue to be powerful motivators, a reward system that recognizes officer achievements in nontraditional areas such as crime prevention must be created.

Just as community policing and crime prevention share many common problems, they also share many common remedies. Police officers will have to be adequately trained in community policing for them to understand the concept and how it is to be implemented. Performance evaluation issues will have to be addressed in community policing, as will crime analysis and assessment issues.

Community policing may be viewed by many as a radical and unproven police strategy. While it is true that community policing is still in its formative stage in such communities as Houston, Texas, Madison, Wisconsin, and Baltimore County, Maryland, considerable success has been experienced with this concept in Great Britain, Japan and Singapore. Whether community policing is a radical approach depends on one's perspective and view of policing. A critical examination of community policing and full understanding of the philosophy behind it make it seem far less radical. Skolnick and Bayley note that "it is critically important to emphasize that community policing represents a change in the practices—but not the objectives—of policing. Too often, the debate about community policing is couched in terms of 'hard' versus 'soft' policing and crime fighting versus crime prevention."[12]

But what is important to understand is that community policing does not re-

quire an "either'or" choice regarding "hard" versus "soft" policing. Indeed, it is absolutely imperative that both types of police tactics coexist in the same department. Officers trained in special weapons and tactics will still be needed in the same police agency as officers trained in crime prevention and engaged in foot patrol. Centralized strategic police efforts will be needed to effectively deal with individual offenders such as serial murderers or career criminals and criminal associations such as organized crime families, gangs and drug distribution networks. Therefore, community policing represents only a change in *means* rather than *ends*—public safety and security are still the bottom line.

Conclusion

Crime prevention is here to stay; it is more than just the latest fad in policing. The contemporary police crime prevention movement is 20 years old this year, and there are no signs of it waning. But while law enforcement has increased its utilization of crime prevention programs and strategies, it is at a crucial midpoint in the process. Too many police administrators talk a good game about crime prevention, but their follow-through is inadequate at best. They are more concerned with appearances than reality.

Some administrators jump on the crime prevention bandwagon simply because to do so is "progressive" and makes for good public relations. They also recognize that crime prevention provides a rationale for urging the public to support the police. "Without necessarily being consciously cynical, such leaders tend to develop one-directional [police to the community] outreach programs. They form specialized media relations units, undertake much-publicized programs in community education and organize Neighborhood Watch groups. But these programs are tacked onto existing operations."[13] Thus, crime prevention in its typical form rarely touches operational practices, nor does it open up the police to a true partnership with the community.

Crime prevention must be seen as more than just an "add-on" to existing police operations. It must become more broadly utilized and more fully integrated into the day-to-day lives of street cops. It is important for law enforcement to move ahead regarding crime prevention. If policing remains stagnant and clings to the status quo, then neither the police nor the public will reap the complete benefits of crime prevention.

Crime prevention can and does thrive in both traditional and community-oriented police departments. Of course, one hopes that community policing catches on and becomes part of the mainstream of policing, since inherent within the notion of community policing is the concept of crime prevention. Indeed, community policing presupposes that crime prevention efforts are an integral, institutionalized part of police management and operations. But, even if community policing does not become the norm in American law enforcement, there still is a vital and productive role for crime prevention in traditional-style police agencies.

Although crime prevention has enjoyed a certain amount of success in its short life span, the potential exists for much greater success in the future. It appears that

> . . . the greatest potential for improved crime control may not be in the continued enhancement of response times, patrol tactics and investigative techniques. Rather, improved crime control can be achieved by (1) diagnosing and managing problems in the community that produce serious crimes; (2) fostering close relations with the community to facilitate crime solving; and (3) building self-defense capabilities within the community itself.[14]

Crime prevention in conjunction with community policing can help diminish crime and enhance security in the neighborhoods of our nation. American law enforcement would do well to strive toward this objective. ★

[1]National Crime Prevention Institute. *Understanding Crime Prevention* (Boston, MA: Butterworths, 1986), p. 2
[2]Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux. *Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective* (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1990), p. 5.
[3]Herman Goldstein. *Problem-Oriented Policing* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1990), pp. 3, 32.
[4]Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley, *Community Policing: Issues and Practices Around the World* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, May 1988), p. 4.
[5]Lee P. Brown. *Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials—Perspectives on Policing*, No. 12 (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice and Harvard University, September 1989), p. 8.
[6]Skolnick and Bayley, pp. 62-63.
[7]Forrest Moss, "Director's Message," *NCPI Hotline*, December 1989, pp. 1, 11.
[8]National Crime Prevention Institute, p. 34.
[9]Skolnick and Bayley, pp. 68-69
[10]Timothy Crowe, "An Ounce of Prevention: A New Role for Law Enforcement," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, October 1988, p. 19.
[11]Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, p. 178.
[12]Skolnick and Bayley, p. 90
[13]Ibid., p. 33
[14]Mark Moore, Robert Trojanowicz and George Kelling, *Crime and Policing—Perspectives on Policing*, No. 2 (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice and Harvard University, June 1988), p. 2

Problem-Oriented Policing Shines in the Stats

Dorothy Guyot

Many police departments focus on one incident at a time as they respond to calls for service. They fail to put together into a single picture the separate symptoms they treat. A neighborhood may be experiencing a flood of troubles—street fights, insults to passersby, solicitation by prostitutes, pickpocketing, and drunken driving—but the police department does not recognize their source in a single ill-managed bar. When the sole police response to a community problem is to arrest the current troublemakers, that department is not engaging in problem-oriented policing.

Herman Goldstein. one of the foremost thinkers in the police field. defines a police department as practicing problem-oriented policing when it:

* identifies substantive community problems;
* inquires systematically into their nature;
* analyzes community interest and special interests in each problem;
* assesses current responses;
* conducts an uninhibited search for tailor-made solutions;
* takes initiative in implementing solutions:
* evaluates the effectiveness of solutions.'

Murder

Let us look at a clear case of success. Domestic homicide is a problem tackled in 1985 by the police department of Newport News. Virginia. a city of 170,000 in a metropolitan area of 1,400,000. The department's systematic inquiry showed that about half of the city's 20 murders a year resulted from violence between spouses. family members, or lovers. In developing the program Police Response to Incidents of Domestic Emergencies (PRIDE), the department enlisted the cooperation of those who run shelters for battered women, judges, mental health professionals. educators. ministers. and newspaper editors. They developed a variety of police responses. including referring family members to counseling, obtaining court orders of protection. and forcing spouses who had committed assaults to undergo some form of corrective treatment in lieu of a jail term.

As shown in figure 1, the number of domestic murders fell sharply under the program. while other murder rates remained high. We can infer. therefore. that the program caused the drop in the number of domestic murders.

Local government managers interested in these results can contact Chief Jay Carey for information both on the specific efforts to prevent domestic murders and on the comprehensive departmental changes that have encouraged individual officers to take the initiative in problem-oriented policing.

Paradoxically, the initial and most obvious influence problem-oriented policing has on statistics is to create the appearance that a community is engulfed in a crime wave. Because most crime incidents are not reported

Figure 1 Domestic Murders Reduced in Newport News, Virginia

Average annual number of murders

Before the program. 1981–84: Domestic 11.5, Other 9.5
After the program. 1985–90: Domestic 4.3, Other 12.8

Source: Newport News Police Department

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to the police, they are not entered into the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).[2] Later when a department begins to identify problems, it begins to receive citizens' reports of crimes of the sort that previously had seldom been reported. Hence, the official crime rates rise. Let us take an in-depth look at two jurisdictions where solid statistics enable us to sort out true success from the appearance of failure.

Theft and Burglary

Bicycle theft was a problem tackled by the police department of Troy, New York, an old industrial town of 52,000. To reduce thefts and increase the number of stolen bicycles that are recovered, the department launched a bicycle registration program that combined tips to youngsters about traffic safety and theft prevention with registration of the ownership, description, and identification number of the bikes. The department reached children through the schools and new owners through bicycle dealers with the message to lock their bikes and report the theft if they are stolen. This type of program deals directly with some of the most common reasons citizens give for not reporting theft: lack of proof that the item was stolen, the belief that police would not want to be bothered, and lack of identification.[3]

Nationally, the average rate of reporting thefts of bicycles and bicycle parts is 40 percent.[4] In Troy, the number of stolen bicycles reported to the police increased from 69 in the year before the program to 294 during its first year. This flood of stolen bike reports

could have resulted solely from an increase in reporting if the reporting rate had risen from 10 percent to 43 percent.

The rates at which citizens report most types of crime are rather similar to the meager reporting of bicycle theft and are unlike the nearly accurate reporting of murder. Police efforts to involve citizens in reducing specific crime problems therefore almost always stimulate enough increase in reporting to make the problem appear worse.

Figure 2 shows the national rates at which people report common predatory crimes. The National Crime Survey provides annual estimates of crime trends based on a survey of 50,000 households.[5] Conducted by the Census Bureau, the survey asks all residents age 12 and up about their experiences with violence and theft during the previous six months. Each household is surveyed again at six-month intervals for three years. The rates at which people report crimes to the police have increased only slightly since the victimization surveys began to measure them in 1973. In contrast to the high rate of reporting motor vehicle theft, occurring because insurance companies require a police report, the rate is near 50 percent for robbery, rape, and assaults with serious injury or a weapon. The rate of reporting household burglary varies sharply depending upon whether the burglars got inside and whether they used force. For thefts, the average rate of reporting is quite low, only 27 percent. When police-community cooperation succeeds in increasing crime reporting faster than prevention efforts show results, the official figures show a crime wave which in fact is imaginary.


Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Criminal Victimization in the United States*, 1988 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 80. These types of crimes are similar to the categories used in the UCR, except for the exclusion of burglary and theft.

Figure 2 National Rates of Reporting Crimes to the Police

	1970–72	1973–75	1976–78	1979–81	1982–84	1985–86	Trend 1970–86
Motor Vehicle Theft	249	176	167	165	143	163	−35%
Robbery	55	73	59	70	87	89	+62%
Rape	11	15	15	18	18	23	+109%
Larceny	897	1,317	1,475	1,625	1,614	1,907	−112%

Source: Guyot. *Policing as Though People Matter* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), explains the changes in police work that brought about the substantial increase in citizen reporting of crime. The larceny figure includes all larcenies, despite the fact that during 1970–73 the UCR excluded the theft of goods valued under $50 from Part I crimes.

Figure 3   Reported Crime in Troy, New York

A local government manager facing an across the. board rise in reported crimes can look into burglary statistics to estimate what lies behind this increase and then generalize to other crimes.

Type of Burglary	1972 Before Upgrading	1977 During Upgrading	Percentage Increase
Attempts	39	170	336
Completed without Force	101	279	176
Completed Forced Entry	463	.981	112
Total Reported	602	1.430	

Source: State of New York. Division of Criminal Justice Services.

Figure 4   The Trend in Reported Burglary Showing the Likelihood of Increased Reporting

When Commissioner of Public Safety George W. O'Connor was moving the Troy, New York, Police Department to a basic form of problem-oriented policing, he explained this phenomenon in a special report to City Manager John Buckley:

> It is not rational to expect reported crime to decrease in Troy. . . . As we build ever stronger ties to the citizens we serve, their confidence will grow. With that growth come additional requests for help—requests which three or four years ago would not have been made.[o]

Troy's UCR statistics in figure 3 bear out O'Connor's assessment. The reported numbers of rapes, robberies, and larcenies jumped when O'Connor took charge of the department in 1973 and then remained continuously high through 1986, when he retired early to establish a consulting service for local government executives. The statistics are given for three-year averages in order to smooth out the normal annual fluctuations. By contrast, the number of motor vehicle thefts known to the police fell immediately and stayed at the new level in the official statistics. Figure 3 arranges the types of crimes from most reported to least, showing that the better reported the crime, the less the apparent rise.

The simplest overall explanation for the divergent trends in the incidence of crimes known to the police is that the annual number of each of these crimes actually did not rise. This stability, however, was masked by rises in reporting rates that were progressively steeper for crimes that were previously poorly reported.

Puzzling Statistics

Are rising UCR statistics the result of an actual rise in crimes or the result of increased police persuasion of the public to report more crimes? This puzzle can be solved. A local government manager facing an across the board rise in reported crimes can look into burglary statistics to estimate what lies behind this increase and then generalize to other crimes. The technique is to compare related types of crimes to see whether much faster increases occur in poorly reported crime categories. Completed crimes and attempts are combined into a single figure in the published UCR statistics, but types of burglaries are available separately from each police department and each state office of crime statistics.

Nationally, all household burglaries are reported on average about 51 percent of the time and those using force about 74 percent of the time, but those in which a burglar walks through an unlocked door about 41 percent of the time. Attempted burglary is reported only 32 percent of the time as shown in figure 2. The greater the rise in the number of attempts known to the police, compared with completed crimes, the greater the increase in citizen reporting. If the rise in citizen reporting is large enough, it could account entirely for the rise in the UCR statistics.

Figure 4 shows that for Troy, the rise in the UCR report of attempted burglary was 336 percent, but the rise in entry without force was only 176 percent, and the rise in forced entry 112 percent.

When actual increases in crime take place, completed crimes and attempts usually rise together. When the largest change occurs in the type of burglary which is most underreported and the smallest change occurs in the best-reported one, a tentative conclusion is that much of the increase was due to changes in reporting.

Because research has documented 13 years of upgrading of police service in Troy, it is possible to add two other sources of information not normally available to a government manager to confirm the conclusion that in Troy there was no increase in burglary. A major source for the jump in the official count of burglaries was that the department previously had undercounted crime reports when sending statistics to the UCR. A review of the files for six months of the year before O'Connor took leadership revealed 452 reports on completed burglaries, but only 245 had been included in the UCR. Assuming that this same proportion of buried reports held for the rest of the year, the department should have submitted 1,058 reports on completed burglary rather than the 574 it did submit.

Thus, if we take the estimate of 1,058 completed burglaries in the files, and add the 39 attempts reported to the UCR, we estimate that about 1,097 burglaries were reported by citizens in 1972. If we make the generous assumption that citizens were reporting household burglaries at the national average, 50 percent, there actually were about 2,194 burglaries in Troy in 1972.

Second, a special victimization survey of 950 households in Troy found that the rate of reporting for household burglaries had·risen to about 70 percent overall in 1977. That the reporting of commercial burglaries rose proportionately is suggested by the trivial incidents reported by a bank and a liquor store— lollipops from the parking lot kiosk and a can of deodorant from the window sill. By applying the 70 percent reporting rate to the 1,430 known burglaries, we estimate that 2,050 occurred in 1977.

Figure 5 compares the UCR figures with this estimate that takes into account departmental underreporting and increasing citizen reporting. The conservative way in which the numbers have been handled suggests that the drop in burglary rates was probably greater than this. But the size of the drop is not of consequence. What is important here is that the rise in reported attempts was 300 percent, compared with the 100 percent rise in official statistics on forcible-entry burglaries. This difference signals such a large increase in citizen reporting that there probably was no rise in the actual occurrence of burglary.

Source: The Uniform Crime Reports provide the reported number of burglaries. The 1972 estimates first correct for undercounting by the department and then assume a rate of citizen reporting of household burglary at the national average, 50 percent. No undercounting took place in 1977, and the Troy survey of 950 households provided an estimate of 70 percent of the households that experienced burglaries reported them. Reporting on commercial burglaries is assumed to have risen proportionately.

Figure 5   Troy UCR Statistics on Burglary and Estimates of Actual Occurrence

Straightforward Statistics

Problem-oriented policing routinely uses simple, straightforward statistics. Let us return to Newport News where an officer took the initiative, collected a few appropriate statistics in identifying the problem, and did a bit more counting in evaluating the solution.[10] The problem was that local hunters and other gun owners were doing target practice at a large pit where dirt had been excavated for I-64. Officer Ron Hendrickson found out that between April and September 1987, the department had been called 45 times to chase away shooters, and that the problem had existed for at least 15 years. Most of the calls had come from a couple whose nearby home was bullet-riddled and who thought the police were doing a good job because each time they chased away the shooters.

When Officer Hendrickson decided, with the support of his sergeant, to end the problem, he interviewed shooters and learned that most were soldiers from nearby Ft. Eustis and that many others were sent to the pit by gun shop owners. The officer determined that the pit was close enough to I-64 to make any firearms discharge illegal there. Deciding to use education backed by legal sanctions, he first took photographs of damage and other

evidence. These he used to persuade a judge to give anyone convicted of illegal shooting a suspended sentence and a small fine, with a warning that a second appearance would result in confiscation of the weapon and a jail sentence. The officer obtained from the property owners permission to arrest on their property and the same from the C & O Railroad for shooters crossing the tracks to reach the pit. In a crucial step, he wrote a pamphlet which defined the problem and the department's intended enforcement action. He distributed the pamphlet to the military base and to all gun shops in the area. Finally, he had no parking—tow zone signs erected on the shoulder where most shooters were parking.

The statistics on the results were simple. Officers issued 35 summonses to shooters in September, only 15 in October, and the last on November 12, 1987. The pit soon became so overgrown that it was uninviting for target practice.

What we have seen is both skilled police use of relevant statistics in handling problems and the paradoxical impact that their attention to problems has on official crime statistics. Implementing problem-oriented policing in any city or county requires the full knowledge and support of the jurisdiction executive. Because police work like this is a collaboration with other agencies to address specific local needs, it offers real prospects for long-term solutions to a wide variety of community problems.

Figures 3 and 4 and brief passages of the text are from a study that explains standards for police performance and describes a 13-year period of police upgrading. Dorothy Guyot, *Policing as though People Matter* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), a study that explains standards for police performance and describes a 13-year period of police upgrading. Passages are reprinted by permission.

[1] Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), ch. 4.

[2] U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office). Published annually.

[3] U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1988* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 86–87.

[4] The Bureau of Justice Statistics provided victimization data on the 1,706,537 bicycle thefts in 1989 estimated from the National Crime Survey, thanks to the courtesy of the director, Dr. Steven D. Dillingham.

[5] U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1989* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991). Free copies are provided on request to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 800-723-3277.

[6] George W. O'Connor, *Special Report to the City Manager: Crime in Troy—1973 vs. 1974*, 1975 (Available from Police Development Services, Inc., 1 Warren Avenue, Troy, New York 12180.)

[7] Dorothy Guyot, *Policing as though People Matter* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991) ch. 5 and 6.

[8] Unpublished Bureau of Justice Statistics data from the 1989 National Crime Survey, provided courtesy of the director, Dr. Steven D. Dillingham.

[9] Captain Jim Harrison of the Newport News, Virginia, Police Department provided the account on the barrow pit problem, letter October 25, 1990.

by George Thomas Miers

Designing Community-Oriented Police Facilities

In the aftermath of the assault charges filed against four City of Los Angeles police officers, U.S. Attorney General Richard Thomburgh has authorized an investigation of 15,000 alleged cases of police brutality with the expressed goal of finding commonalities to be identified and addressed. While the investigation undoubtedly will focus on officer training techniques and the relationship of the specific charges to demographics, one area of study which could be of surprising importance is the effect of the work environment on employee behavior. While it would be incorrect to imply that police facilities themselves are exerting so negative an influence on police personnel as to provoke such incidents, there is significant documentation to suggest that poor working conditions can contribute to and reinforce "negative" behavioral tendencies.

The relationship between environment and behavior relates not only to police facilities; but all working environments. Rather than contributing to an individual's stress level or reinforcing negative behavioral patterns, built environments should be contributing towards a healthier daily outlook. Just as the great European cathedrals have for centuries exerted a power to stir the emotions, work environments can, in perhaps less profound ways, effect similar subconscious responses. The design challenge is to insure their influence supports, rather than undermines, performance.

Throughout the 1960s and 70s, social scientists focused considerable attention on the relationship between environment and human behavior as they studied myriad environmental settings, including the effects of color on prison inmates, the impact of lighting on office productivity, and the relationship of living environments to child development. While the results varied, findings were conclusive: Environmental settings directly affect human behavior and well being. Ironically, during the last 20 years the importance of these lessons has diminished relative to more popular design preoccupations with building styles and symbolism. This is not

to say that the overall appearance and symbolism of a facility are not important; however, it is the everyday internal working environment which generally has the greatest long-term effect on users.

As state, federal and municipal employees well know, *serving* the public and *interfacing* with the public are two different issues. Those employees who interface with the public are often dealing directly with people's problems. Being able to respond effectively and sensitively to these "clients" and their problems is of the utmost importance. Yet ironically, it is generally the facilities and departments with the greatest public contact which, while interfacing with the most critical and personal of community problems, are housed in the least friendly or supportive of environments. In addition, there is often an expectation that these facilities — police departments, social service offices, housing authorities and even hospitals to mention a few — are places that are not supposed to be pleasant, either as an internal working environment or as an external public image.

Police facilities harbor many unique environmental characteristics which tend to render occupants more susceptible to the negative effects of stress and isolation. For example, notwithstanding their physical condition, public safety facilities by their nature

require above-average security, and hence, have generally been designed as self-contained, inward-oriented environments with little, if any, relationship to the outside world. While public safety buildings simply do not need to be such bastion-like environments, the reality is that they often are. Furthermore, these characteristics tend to mirror and reinforce many widely held perceptions

of the nature of law enforcement — perceptions held not only by the public but by many in the law enforcement profession as well.

By necessity police officer training tends to focus on the negative rather than the normal. From the Academy onward, their professional careers revolve around the curtailment of aberrant behavior as they focus on the thief, not the citizen, the drug dealer, not the businessman. This constant focus, combined with the underlying stress and danger inextricably linked to the job, places police officers, dispatch operators and other public safety employees in one of the most precarious psychological situations of any public service employee. The result is that all too often police officers,

Antioch Public Safety Facility
Antioch, Ca.

FIRST FLOOR

COURTYARD

Livermore Public Safety Facility
L vermore, Ca.

EXISTING FLOOR PLAN

The photo at [...] of the soon-to-be reno-
vated Hayward p[...] facility illustrates a
building whose walled [...] discourages pub-
lic contact. In the photo [...] of an old New
Orleans police station, with i[...]coming holiday
wreaths and human scale, offers a [...] friendlier face
to its neighborhood.

The old floor plan for the Livermore Publ[...] Facility,
currently undergoing redesign, shows an [...]rd facing
rectangle with no clear sense of circulation or [...]nization.
By contrast, plans for Antioch's new station o[...]ize nor-
mally windowless rooms for physical training, [...] writ-
ing, and the lounge around a landscaped c[...]yard.
Circulation accommodates the flow of police emp[...]es to
and from their specific work areas.

as well as entire police departments, find themselves entrenched in an "us against them" syndrome, perhaps best exemplified by the Hill Street Blue roll call admonition, "Let's do it to them before they do it to us." At the same time, citizens, while being served by police personnel, tend to be in stressful circumstances. Police "clients" come to the station, not to complain about growth rates or lost permits, but about the crime rate, lost children, rape, assaults and family disputes! Given the negative and often aggressive nature of these interactions, the last feature   a police facility

The City of Dublin Civic Center's Police and City Hall wings offer a welcoming entry-way that draws in visitors.

needs is an inward-focused environment which reinforces all the hostile, insular and isolated feelings which police employees may inwardly harbor.

While more sensitively planned environments will never be a panacea for overly aggressive police officers, they may significantly alleviate the stress levels under which employees operate. Imagine the psychological difference of a patrol officer leaving the roll call room, and on the way out to the passing a landscaped courtyard rather than blank walls and security cameras on the way to the patrol car. Or the effect on dispatch operators who can look up from their consoles and see the outdoors. Clearly, one of the challenges confronting the police profession is the need to balance the inherently dangerous and security-oriented aspects of police work with greater community sensitivity and openness. Within this context, the Justice Department should be asking whether police working environments are supporting or undermining efforts to integrate these concerns.

Just as the "secure" working environment affects employees, "public" areas

can significantly impact visitors to a facility. Contrary to popular belief, most visitors to a Police Department are not criminals but crime victims, their families, and average, law abiding citizens, many of whom are experiencing significant stress, anxiety and even embarrassment. Criminals and suspects are generally brought in from non-public, secure parking areas such as a patrol entry or vehicular sallyport. In communities with high multi-ethnic populations, visitors may also experience a host of other anxieties ranging from communication problems to general confusion over the nature and procedures of the institution itself. Given these circumstances, the lobby of a public safety building is a very important point of orientation and therefore should offer an inviting and informative setting, with comfortable seating areas for individuals and families to wait. Other public uses such as meeting rooms and information boards should also be encouraged as a means of providing more community-oriented services.

The exterior image of a public safety building also can be positive and reassuring rather than convey the impression of an unapproachable fortress. While many would find it difficult to describe the myriad functions and services offered by today's public safety facility, almost everyone has a fairly vivid image of how a police facility should appear. Needless to say, "secure," "windowless," "self-contained" and "hard" are words which often would be used. Unfortunately, these images are all too often correct. This problem is not only confined to older facilities; even in newer, more spacious, "state-of-the-art" facilities, the image of an inward-focused, hard and impersonal environment is generally the rule.

While specific training and counseling techniques may be the most direct way of mitigating the effects of stress and the many misinformed attitudes about police enforcement, many design issues, which, if properly addressed, can contribute towards a more positive, supportive environment. While these fea-

tures are relevant for most buildings, they are discussed herein specifically in terms of police facilities.

1. **Building Image** — While a building's image may not be the most important issue impacting employees, it may greatly influence the community's impression of the institution itself. The examples below illustrate the range of impressions a facility can impart. The Hayward Police Facility, a photograph of which appears on pages 323-24, with its minimal windows, hard materials and main public entry hidden from view behind a 10-foot high concrete bulwark, sends a very negative, protective message which discourages visitors from entering. By contrast, the second example, which is a New Orleans Precinct Facility, both conveys a friendly image and is harmonious with its neighborhood. The spirit of the holiday wreaths is further evocative of a public institution which relates positively to its community. In the photo at left, our firm's Dublin Police Facility has been organized around a central courtyard as an integral part of the Civic Center Complex. Its entry, directly adjacent to City Hall, is convenient and visually accessible to the public, while its lobby, finishes and furniture are consistent with other public departments.

2. **Public Areas** — The public uses of a police facility were once limited to a small lobby, bathrooms, and a fingerprinting area. Today's multitude of services often calls for public meeting rooms, social service offices, "soft" interview rooms for crime victims, press briefing rooms, licensing windows, etc. While each city's program requirements will vary, most facilities are generally experiencing a steady increase of "clients". This increased usage, combined with the nature of the visits, suggests a more sensitive design for the lobby, such as allowing flexibility in seating arrangements, whereby crime victims and their families can wait in semi-private areas. While security and visibility from the front desk is certainly a prime consideration, these program requirements can be satisfied within a friendlier context through the use of carefully designed counters. The judicious use of carpet rather than harder floor materials, attention to color and textures and the careful study of lighting are all essential components of a more comfortable, supportive lobby environment.

3. **Building Organization** — A building's floor plan can be extremely revealing as to a department's underlying organization and philosophy. Example 1 illustrates

the existing Livermore Police Facility, which is a simple, inward focusing rectangle with no clear sense of circulation or organization. By contrast, the new Antioch facility is arranged around a landscaped courtyard where normally windowless rooms, such as *Physical Training*, *Report Writing*, and the *Lounge*, open directly onto a garden view. In addition, the circulation has been clearly organized in a manner that accommodates the flow of police employees to and from their specific areas of work. While these features are not intended to supplant the need for proper training, they do offer a more supportive environment which should better enable police employees to provide the public with a more efficient and sensitive level of service.

4. Specific Employee Work Areas — Public safety buildings house many different employee positions and work areas. The needs of dispatch operators, for example, are quite different from those of administration and investigation employees. Similarly, the work areas of patrol officers, who may be in the facility for only short periods of time, are unique to their specific duties such as report writing, the roll call room, physical training, etc. Two important

criteria should govern the design of these areas. First, the design obviously should accommodate a given division's specific program requirements, such as careful lighting and acoustical treatment for dispatch areas. By contrast, officers in Administration and Investigations, while having clear adjacency needs, are, for the most part, similar to many other general office employees and their areas should be designed with that in mind. Individuals who need the privacy of an enclosed office should have one; and others, who work well in flexible modular partitions, should be equipped accordingly. The second criterion is the recognition that despite the different internal requirements, each of these areas should be a pleasant, supportive place to work. There is no reason, other than lack of design effort and the limitations of our own preconceived notions, why employees should not have access to natural light and exterior areas or be provided finishes and amenities commensurate with other "non-secure" working environments.

Public buildings will never offer better work environments if the standard for their design is the duplication of long-held stereotypes. While the everyday functional

needs of different organizations may vary, the psychological needs of individuals are relatively similar. As a result, the attention to both the psychological and functional needs of its users is critically important. If these goals are met, the level of public service will not only be more efficient, but will also be provided with greater sensitivity to those served.

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
APPENDIX A

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