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An Empirical Examination of Rural
Law Enforcement's Efforts
to Combat Marijuana Production
and the Need for an Increased
Awareness of the Problems
Rural Areas Continually Encounter

by

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ACQUISITIONS

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ABSTRACT

The original intent of this research paper was to examine how rural law enforcement is combating marijuana production and trafficking in their respected jurisdictions and some of the problems that they faced. Using the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports of 1991 as a basis for defining a rural county, the researcher interviewed, via the phone, nine county sheriff department's, geographically situated across the country which were classified as "rural", and having a full-time staff of around fifteen full-time officers. The interviews were used as a supplement to government and private research documents which were also used as research data in this report. Through discussion with the county sheriffs' departments, and through analysis of the research data, the researcher discovered a much larger issue that needed to be addressed and that also was relevant to the original topic intended. The researcher was puzzled about the lack of available hard data in not only marijuana statistics but the majority of rural criminal justice statistics as well. After researching further, the researcher found that the lack of available hard data was slowly becoming the focus of legislative initiative in the political spectrum. Observing that rural counties are under increasing financial and resource constraints, the researcher investigated how rural law enforcement combats one aspect of the drug war, marijuana production and trafficking. This research was used as an example of how federal funding and initiatives are utilized by rural law enforcement officials, the methods rural law enforcement officials employ themselves in combatting marijuana production and trafficking, and the constraints rural law enforcement agencies face in their efforts, and ways that they overcome these constraints. Drawing upon the constraints rural law enforcement agencies face, this research paper examined why there existed a lack of information on rural law enforcement statistics. The researcher found that due to a lack of funding, and "Diseconomies of scale" rural law enforcement agencies are in a Catch-22 in effectively combating drugs and crime in their jurisdictions. Based upon this data, the researcher further investigated efforts by the federal government in helping rural law enforcement agencies combat their not only crime and drugs, but their economic and resource constraints as well.

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

<u>BJA</u>	Bureau of Justice Assistance
<u>CAMP</u>	Campaign Against Marijuana Planting
<u>DCE/SP</u>	Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program
<u>DEA</u>	Drug Enforcement Administration
<u>DER</u>	Drug Enforcement Report
<u>FBI</u>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<u>GAO</u>	General Accounting Office
<u>LOA</u>	Letters of Agreement
<u>NIJ</u>	National Institute of Justice
<u>ONDCP</u>	Office of National Drug Control Policy
<u>TALON</u>	Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Network]
<u>THC</u>	Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol
<u>UCR</u>	Uniform Crime Reports

This, my first major work, is
dedicated in the memory of:

George Herbert Luhr

May he know that I am going to make it.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

I. BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY: Introduction and the Carter Administration

It has been declared a war. Though it is a war without a definitive enemy, its battle grounds have cost thousands of lives and consumed billions of dollars. The war is being fought not in a foreign land but in our streets, our homes, our country. The war is on illegal narcotics, and the war's ramifications affect every member of the United State's community. The war on illegal narcotics causes more than 600,000 people to be arrested every year, and costs over 10 billion dollars a year in administrative, judicial, penal, and rehabilitative expenses.¹

The war on narcotics came to the forefront of attention in both the political and social spectrums of society under the Reagan Administration. It was during the Reagan Administration, a policy that has since carried over to the Bush Administration, that an all-out effort on curbing drug trafficking and drug abuse has taken place. This policy initiative marked an increase in effort and monetary funding to curb both trafficking and abuse than the Carter Administration.

Under the Carter Administration, there was emphasis placed on trying to reduce the amount of illegal narcotics crossing the

¹ Chester Mitchell, The Drug Solution, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), XIII.

border from Mexico, there was also increased efforts to gain cooperation with Columbia, Peru, and other Latin American countries to reduce the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States, as well.² The Carter Administration also signed into legislation a bill that would improve the Coast Guard's ability to enforce laws to halt illegal narcotic trafficking on the high seas. According to the bill, any United State's citizen, any person aboard any United State's vessel regardless of nationality, and all persons aboard vessels within the 12-mile territorial limits of the United States, who illegally possess or attempt to distribute drugs will be prosecuted.³ On the domestic front, the Carter Administration chose a passive position, focusing their efforts on reducing the number of heroin addicts, and relying on past programs and present initiatives which, "Have proven to be successful in the past year and which serve as building blocks for future programs."⁴ In his Farewell Address to the nation, President Carter cited four challenges that Congress and the New Administration would have to face regarding illegal narcotics in America:

² U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1980), Jimmy Carter, 1979, 1860.

³ Ibid., 1722.

⁴ Ibid., 135.

- (1) To attack illegal narcotic trafficking at its source through joint crop destruction programs domestically, overseas through cooperation with foreign nations, increased law enforcement, and border interdiction.
- (2) Increase awareness on the part of citizens and parents across the nation to the dangers of drug abuse and addiction and to help educate the youth regarding those dangers.
- (3) Focus attention upon curbing the presence of drugs in the work-place.
- (4) Change societal attitude, from an attitude that condones casual use of drugs to one that condemns the inappropriate and harmful abuse of drugs.

(Transcribed from the Administration of President Jimmy Carter)⁵

II. BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY: President Reagan and President Bush Administrations

After the Carter Administration left office, the Reagan Administration, in 1982, instituted their strategy for ending drug abuse and the subsequent trafficking of illegal narcotics in the United States. President Reagan's "War on Drugs" slogan came from the 1972 Congressional decree that institutionalized National Drug Strategy Program and subsequent revisions and updations were promulgated by a concerted effort from the Reagan Administration and various law enforcement agencies. Under President Reagan's National Drug Strategy Program, the Congress and Senate has

⁵ U.S., Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1981), Jimmy Carter, 1980, 2945.

increased spending on anti-drug legislation 250 percent since 1981.⁶ The Bush Administration, in 1989, published their first comprehensive National Drug Control Strategy implementation plan. The Bush Administration refocused the objectives upon the drug war, by measuring progress by the actual reduction in drug use, instead of the amounts seized, arrests made, or the number of addicts treated.⁷ Over the past ten years, the National Drug Strategy has undergone refinement to accommodate increased public and political pressure to combat the drug trade. On the legislative side, Congress, in 1990, passed legislation setting minimum standards for sentencing convicted narcotic offenders. Entitled "**Mandatory Minimum Statutes**", they are a one dimensional approach that is concerned solely with the quantity of drugs in possession.⁸ In 1991, Congress and the House debated the Crime Bill which would have established the death penalty for major drug king-pins; however, due to many facets contained within the bill that were heavily argued and debated, the legislation stalled.

Along with passing legislation on narcotic convictions,

⁶ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, The National Drug Strategy and Implementation Plans, ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, 1988), I.

⁷ The Executive Department, The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: 1992, President George Bush, annual report, Office of the President, 2.

⁸ Paul Martin, "Federal Sentencing Commission Guidelines," interview by Christopher Luhr, "Class Discussion," 17 February 1992.

Congress, under both the Reagan and Bush Administrations, has also passed legislation dealing with countering production and trafficking of narcotics. The target of most of this legislation has been in increase in federal monies for law enforcement, prevention, and rehabilitation. Since the Bush administration has taken office, federal drug monies have increased 93 percent or over \$6.1 billion.⁹ Most of this legislation has been allocated towards increasing support for state and local law enforcement agencies. President Bush's 1993 Fiscal Year Budget includes allocating \$12.7 billion for Federal Drug Control Funds, with \$3.5 billion being given to assist state and local governments.¹⁰

III. PRESCRIBED INITIATIVES OF THE NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLANS IN RURAL AREAS

Outlined in the National Drug Strategy: 1988, is a program that involves the use of task forces and inter-agency cooperation.¹¹ The focus of this program is to assist state and local law enforcement agencies in combatting the production and trafficking of narcotics within their jurisdictions or, in some cases, multijurisdictional areas. Through the use of the Drug

⁹ Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: 1992, 8.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Office of the Attorney General, National Drug Control Strategy and Implementation Plans, 117.

Enforcement Administration (DEA), the federal government has been branching out into the rural areas of the United States to aid state and local authorities who may lack, "The depth of resources needed to target an entire drug trafficking organization."¹² To symbolized this increased assistance, the federal government has increased the number of federal task forces from seventy-one in 1991 to eighty-six in 1992; furthermore, the Bush administration is requesting an increase in monetary aid for this area, bringing the total to nearly \$63 million for Fiscal Year 1993.¹³

IV. MARIJUANA PRODUCTION: RURAL AGENCIES AND DOMESTIC OUTPUT

Under the National Drug Strategy and Implementation Plans: 1988, local law enforcement agencies were asked to increase their investigations into narcotic trafficking in their jurisdictions. One of the areas of investigation that local law enforcement agencies are encouraged to target is marijuana production.¹⁴ According to the report, approximately 25 percent of the marijuana consumed in the United States is grown domestically.¹⁵ (This figure has been cited as low as 18 percent in a 1992 National Drug

¹² Ibid., 118.

¹³ Office of the President, National Drug Control Strategy 1992, 62.

¹⁴ Office of the Attorney General, National Drug Control Strategy and Implementation Plans: 1988, 34.

¹⁵ Ibid., 8.

Strategy Report, but because of a number of factors issued by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report, estimates of marijuana production are often revised; thus, producing accurate figures is difficult.)¹⁶

V. NEED FOR A RURAL STATISTICAL DATABASE

This problem, of gathering and understanding information about rural drug and crime statistics, has been plaguing the criminal justice system for years. The United States General Accounting Office, issued a 1990 report on rural Drug Abuse, and within it cited, "Little information exists on the effectiveness of drug programs...and law enforcement efforts in the United States."¹⁷ main problem plaguing these rural areas, in addressing their needs, has been a lack of a comprehensive, efficient, modern, system of pooling and coordinating data. Without this system, federal and state funding to rural areas cannot be allocated to needy and deserving rural law enforcement programs. As part of the 1991 Crime Bill, Honorable Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., proposed a bill entitled "Rising Casualties: Violent Crime and Drugs in Rural America," in this bill he addressed the needs of rural law enforcement to have more adequate funding in combatting drugs and

¹⁶ Office of the President, National Drug Control Strategy 1992, 26,27.

¹⁷ General Accounting Office, Rural Drug Abuse: Prevalence Relation to Crime, and Programs, (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1990), 37.

crime in their jurisdictions if they are to be effective. Also, included within the report, was a listing of statistics from rural areas highlighting the drastic increases in drug and crime rural areas are facing across the nation.¹⁸

One might wonder, by the publishing of this report, if there is really a problem in retrieving data from rural areas, since this report was able to obtain statistical information. But one of the people, the researcher interview, who wished not to use a name or occupation in reference to this matter, stated that the Biden report is meant to be passed as legislation; therefore, it is 'beefed-up' to make it attractive and passable. Generalizations, and statistical bending were used in the report, to emphasize the problem. But the question still remains is there a problem? According to this interviewee, there is definitely a problem in gathering and analyzing rural criminal justice information. Greater attention needs to be given in this area if there is to be an adequate, efficient, and effective effort by rural law enforcement agencies in combatting drugs and crime.

VI. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH PAPER

The purpose of this research paper was to initially examine how rural law enforcement agencies are combating the "drug war" in their jurisdictions given the known problems of funding, man-power,

¹⁸ Congress, House. Rising Casualties: Violent Crime and Drugs in Rural America, 102 Cong., 1st sess., June 1991, 12,13, 18,19.

and large, geographically challenging jurisdictions to cover. Since the expanse of the "drug war" is so great, the purpose of this paper was to explore rural law enforcement's efforts and problems in combatting marijuana production. The emphasis on marijuana production was based upon evidence from the GAO Report that show marijuana as the leading illegal narcotic problem plaguing rural counties. It is also known, that given the remote, and lightly populated rural areas and the disadvantages rural law enforcement agencies face, marijuana producers, as well as clandestine drug manufactures prefer rural areas as compared to their urban and suburban counterparts.

However, as the research progressed, it became apparent to the researcher that a more pressing, and larger problem was developing from the information gathered about marijuana production and trafficking in rural areas, and rural law enforcement's efforts to combat this original problem. The researcher found that there was a lack of hard statistical data in obtaining marijuana statistics. After investigating further, the researcher found that this was more than just a locally based problem contained solely to those departments the researcher questioned, it was a nation-wide dilemma. The researcher, upon learning this new development, decided to do a two-fold observational analysis of the data that was correlated. This paper will examine rural law enforcement's efforts in combatting marijuana (and drug) production and trafficking in their jurisdictions, and the related problems they face in their law enforcement capacities, and second, the paper

will also examine, in relation to the marijuana topic, the need for attention to be given to the area of rural law enforcement in trying to develop and institute a comprehensive, efficient, and effective way of dealing with the drug and crime problems they face without over-burdening themselves or the rural tax-payer.

VII. EXAMINATION OF LIMITATIONS THE RESEARCHER FACED

The researcher would like to add, that though he has complete faith in the validity of his work, it is by no means complete and omni-comprehensive. Due to the fact that this research was not conducted by a full-time researcher, but on the part of a college student working on his own time, and through his two-day internship at the National Institute of Justice, was this research completed. Due to time constraints, and lack of funding the information obtained was limited. But this fact, is the hope of the researcher, that would prompt someone with the time and resources to investigate further into this very problematic, but nonetheless, correctable area of criminal justice. In fact, it is the hope of the researcher, that through this paper, that someone will investigate further into the problems rural law enforcement faces in combatting drug and crime, and begin to draft remedies or legislation relevant to this problem, that will aid rural areas in their law enforcement and criminal justice efforts.

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

I. EMPIRICAL THEORIES ON MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN RURAL COUNTIES

The predominance of marijuana production takes place in rural areas of the United States for a number of reasons. First, the low population density gives marijuana growers the necessary land they need to cultivate their crops. ~~Second~~, in association with low density populations, rural counties are at a disadvantage due to small tax bases and the lack of any developed industry. This dilemma filters over to local law enforcement departments as they are not able or find themselves hard-pressed to afford the manpower and the equipment to combat marijuana trafficking in their jurisdictions. Marijuana growers, by taking advantage of remote areas of rural counties, enjoy smaller risks as compared to urban and suburban areas, of being discovered due to the relative inaccessibility of their plots, away from public highways and other property owners. Thus, due to the smaller tax bases, diverse geographical terrain, and small staffs, rural law enforcement departments face an innate and distinct disadvantage in combating drug trafficking, particularly marijuana trafficking, in their jurisdictions compared to their urban and suburban counterparts.

II. ANALYSIS OF PURPOSE

Given the observation that rural law enforcement agencies are

at a disadvantage in combating the drug war due to a variety of reasons, this purpose of the research will be to conduct an empirical observation of federal aid to state and local governments in the area of narcotic law enforcement, particularly marijuana trafficking. By utilizing this observational method, the research will attempt to determine if a correlation exists between an increase in federal funding for law enforcement concerning the war on drugs and an increase in marijuana arrests and seizures. If a correlation does exist the research will attempt to determine if that research is due to an increase in aid, through the step-upped efforts of local law enforcement officials only, or by an increase in the number of people engaging in marijuana trafficking.

Because the drug war is so complex and diffuse with the availability of so many drugs, different methods of enforcement, and the permeability of drugs into every facet of society, the researcher chose one area of the drug war to examine and the combative methods and efforts of law enforcement personnel in that said area. For this research, the focus of this paper will be on marijuana enforcement and trafficking. The rationale of choosing marijuana over other illegal narcotics is due to the fact that marijuana seems to be a prevalent drug problem in most rural counties.¹⁹ This is due to the demographic and geographic features that make marijuana production and trafficking an attractive incentive for narcotic entreapenuers to conduct their business in

¹⁹ This information was compiled from reviewing several source materials and contacting nine rural county law enforcement officials.

rural counties. Further evidence that was used to support the theory that marijuana trafficking and abuse is problematic in rural areas was obtained from the United State's General Accounting Office's 1990 "Rural Drug Abuse" report, and from the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the 1988 High School Survey. In the 1988 high school survey, marijuana abuse was the third leading abused drug among high school seniors behind alcohol and cigarettes, in rural counties. In a citation, by the GAO, in response to these reports,

"These tables show that marijuana is well behind alcohol and cigarettes in extent and frequency of use. More than 40 percent of rural seniors have tried marijuana, almost 30 percent using it in the previous year and over 14 percent the past month. One in a hundred seniors smoke marijuana daily."²⁰

This information is by no means flawless, as the GAO report states that "Problems do exist with the 'quality, completeness, and consistency of the state criminal history systems used to gather (the) data."²¹ But the emphasis of this data is to show that marijuana usage, though consistent with that of non-rural statistics,²² is nevertheless sufficient enough to warrant an examination into marijuana abuse in rural areas stemming from

²⁰ GAO, Rural Drug Abuse: Prevalence, Relation to Crime, and Programs, 20.

²¹ Ibid., 22.

²² Ibid., 20.

production and trafficking. The researcher was not able to find any information on the type of marijuana smoked by rural abusers, such as was it grown domestically or foreign, but the purpose here is to identify that marijuana is a significant problem in rural areas, and as the information provides, warrants the researcher's examination into this area of rural law enforcement.

III. METHODOLOGY USED FOR EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION

To examine the area of inquiry, the researcher will concentrate upon using primary documentation as source material from a variety of government agencies, private informational organizations and warehouses, and university researchers. To complement the numeric data, nine rural sheriff departments were contacted by the researcher to identify particular problem areas or areas of concern that the numeric data may not have been able to identify. Furthermore, the sheriff departments were also contacted to provide a rural law enforcement perspective on the effects of the drug war on their individual municipalities, and to shed some light on how successful rural law enforcement officials have been in combating marijuana trafficking in the jurisdictions.²³

The nine rural sheriff departments were selected as to represent the varying geographical areas of the continental United States. The criteria used in the selection process was based upon

²³ Refer to the copy of the questions asked of the sheriff departments in the appendices section.

the Uniform Crime Report's basis for a rural county, which had populations of 25,000 and over. From this pool of counties, the researcher reviewed the data and under the using the statistics provided under the title of "full-time law enforcement employees", found counties that had numbers of these said officers of between fourteen and sixteen officers per department to compute an overall average of on or near fifteen officers per department.²⁴ By using this quality of a data pool, the researcher believes that the two constants, the categorization of rural counties and full-time officer man-power on or near the fifteen person mark, will provide an adequate and consistent base for inquiry. The researcher first attempted to limit the population of the county to under 25,000 people; however, limiting the populous of the county proved to be a hindering factor in determining the selection of rural county sheriff departments. The reason for this hinderance stemmed from the fact the many counties that are classified as rural have a large number of square mile area. Given this fact, what may constitute an urban county based upon population figures may not be necessarily so. For a county may have over 50,000 inhabitants, but have enough land area to diffuse and population concentration, and thus, still be considered rural. Thus, to limit confusion over the data base selection, the researcher used the rural county methodology employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Report.

6 Federal Bureau of Investigations, Uniform Crime Report: 1990, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991).

IV. DATA BASE FOR RESEARCH PROJECT

After determining the sheriff departments that met these requirements, the researcher set about contacting the offices through utilizing the resources of the National Sheriffs Association and their 1991 County Sheriff's Directory. The following is a list of the nine departments contacted and their addresses and phone numbers:

DeKalb County
Sheriff Harold Richards
300 Grand Avenue South
Fort Payne, Alabama 36701
(205) 845-3801

Dodge County
Sheriff Bill Weber
P.O. Box 86
Mantorville, Minnesota 55955
(507) 635-6200

Greenlee County
Sheriff Robert Gomez
P.O. Box 998
Clifton, Arizona 85533
(602) 865-4149

Jefferson County
Sheriff Roy G. Dunnaway
P.O. Box 342
Oskaloosa, Kansas 66066
(913) 863-2351

Logan County
Sheriff Donald E. Bollish
Fourth and Ash Streets
P.O. Box 749
Sterling, Colorado 80751
(303) 522-1373

Madison County
Sheriff Vernon J. Hjorth
County Courthouse; Box 209
Madison, Nebraska 68748
(402) 454-2110

Penobscot County
Sheriff Edward J. Renynolds
85 Hammer Street
Bangor, Maine 04401
(207) 947-4585

Schoharie County
Sheriff Harvey E. Stoddard
Main Street; P.O. Box 332
Schoharie, New York 12157
(518) 295-8114

Tillamook County
Sheriff David A. Wilson
201 Laurel Avenue
Tillamook, Oregon 97141
(503) 842-2561

(National Sheriff's Association)²⁵

V. LIMITATIONS REVIEWED

The determination to select the nine sheriff's departments was made on the behalf of the researcher, who after surveying the said nine sheriff departments, obtained enough similar data that these nine sheriff departments reflected an accurate and equatable representation of rural sheriff departments across the nation. The researcher would like to acknowledge that this survey is by no means conclusive; however, it is the hope of the researcher that further reading of the text will prompt others to do a more in

²⁵ "Directory of Sheriffs," Sheriff, July 1991, 43-115.

depth and detailed survey of the subject matter. Due to time and monetary constraints imposed upon the author, he was limited in his research capabilities, but the researcher believes that the information found and provided will be invaluable in addressing later issues of the war on drugs, particularly in the spectrum of rural law enforcement and the National Drug Control Strategy, and to also examine what methods can be utilized to gain a better understanding of the trends that are occurring in rural criminal justice statistics.

CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND RESEARCH

I. MARIJUANA OBJECTIVES OF THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

The U.S. Department of Justice has increased expenditure for county and local governments through-out the nineteen eighties and nineties. Since 1971 state and local justice expenditures have increased 475.3 percent from \$9.3 million to \$53.5 million, according to 1988 statistics.²⁶ (The 1988 statistics are the most current statistics available, to date.) A significant portion of this expenditure has gone to police protection, with the remaining monies being allocated to judicial and legal services and corrections.²⁷ According to the 1992 National Drug Control Strategy Report, the monthly use of illegal narcotics has decreased, consistently, since 1985.²⁸ This report also includes marijuana use as well as cocaine.²⁹ In combating domestic marijuana production, the 1992 National Drug Control Strategy Report states the following:

"The first National Drug Control Strategy established goals for reductions in domestic marijuana production. Subsequently, however, the data and methodology used to estimate production were determined to need revision.

²⁶ Bureau of Justice Statistics, Justice Expenditure and Employment in the U.S., 1988 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), XIII.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Office of the President, National Drug Control Strategy, .5

²⁹ Ibid.

The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report estimates the net marijuana available in the United States, but the past year estimates are often revised based upon new intelligence, thus making year-to-year comparisons difficult. Other information, such as the amount of marijuana eradicated, street prices, and anecdotal evidence of availability are readily available, but are more indicative of the effectiveness of law enforcement activities than of gross marijuana production.

Because reductions in the availability of domestically-grown marijuana remain a bench-mark of national anti-drug resolve, efforts continue to obtain a more precise measure of our progress in this area and will be reported in the 1993 Strategy."³⁰

This statement; however, is rather vague. In order to identify the intent of the administration in combating marijuana production and trafficking, one must look at the 1990 and 1991 reports published by the National Drug Control Strategy and the Bush Administration. In the 1991 report, the Bush Administration outlined the following policy in regards to domestic marijuana production:

"Domestic marijuana now supplies 10 percent of the marijuana available in the United States, and in absolute quantity it has been growing in recent years—up 20 percent from 1988 to 1989, for example. Necessary American anti-drug initiatives overseas were undercut by the growth in domestic marijuana production. We cannot expect foreign countries to undertake vigorous anti-drug efforts inside their borders if we fail to do so at home.

The first National Drug Control Strategy established the following goals for reductions in domestic marijuana production (below 1988 estimates of 4,600 metric tons):

- 10 percent reduction in two years
 - down to 4,150 metric tons production
- 50 percent reduction in ten years
 - down to 2,300 metric tons production

Because further reductions in domestic marijuana production remain a bench-mark of national anti-drug resolve, this Strategy (1991) carries forward its existing goals for an additional year at the same rate as follows:

- 1993 Strategy Objective: a 20 percent reduction below the 1988 level in estimated domestic marijuana production.
- 2001 Strategy Objective: a 65 percent reduction below the 1988 level in estimated domestic marijuana production."³¹

The 1991 Report also suggests that local governments continue to improve efforts to halt illegal narcotic trafficking and production in their jurisdictions, and that all levels of government must proceed in this manner by,

"Providing the resources that the criminal justice system requires, by effectively managing the resources they already have, and by devising creative ways of enforcing the law."³²

According to the report, the Federal government, to ease the burden on state and local governments, provides assistance in the form of grants for criminal justice initiatives through the U.S.

³¹ Office of the President, National Drug Control Strategy 1992, 16.

³² Ibid.

Department of Justice. For Fiscal Year 1991, the Federal government provided nearly \$490 million to the Bureau of Justice Assistance to be distributed to state and local law enforcement agencies.³³ The administration cited that this was a 10 percent increase over the 1990 Fiscal Year and over 230 percent more than the Reagan Administration and a 228 percent increase in just the past two years.³⁴ The majority of these funds are awarded to states in the form of block grants, which in turn, are to be passed along to local municipalities that are in need.

It has now been shown that there has been significant increases in the amount of funding being given to the National Drug Control Strategy. But the question remains, "What has all this monetary aid done in reducing the numbers of people engaging in drug production, trafficking, and usage?" To answer these questions, one must look at the statistics available for the number of arrests, seizures, and trends of illegal narcotics (focusing upon marijuana) across the country. To accomplish this, the author contacted nine rural county sheriff departments located regionally across the United States. By doing so, the researcher hoped that using first-hand information would lend a bit more credence to the findings.

³³ Office of the President, National Drug Control Strategy 1991, 6.

³⁴ Ibid.

II. ASPECTS OF THE RURAL COUNTY: marijuana arrest trends on the local and federal levels

The researcher examined several aspects of rural county sheriff departments to determine how effective the National Drug Strategy was upon these municipalities. What the researcher found proved to be quite revealing and emphasized the need for further investigation into this area.

The first question asked of the sheriff agencies was whether their department had seen an increase in the number of marijuana arrests and seizures since 1987 as compared to the four years previous to 1987. The reason the year 1987 was chose as a variable was to show a reflective trend of the past four years of the Nation Drug Control Strategy. Seeing that the most recent data available is circa 1991, the researcher believed that assessing the data in two consecutive four year periods, 1984-1987 and 1988-1991, the data would provide a more comprehensive and accurate measurement of rural county law enforcement capabilities. The response to the question proved to be quite interesting.

All nine counties reported an increase in both the number of arrests and seizures related to marijuana production and trafficking in the four year preceding 1987 than the four years previous to 1987. This data is consistent with the national trends in marijuana arrests and seizures as well. The 1990 Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program reported an increase in

the number of seizures of indoor marijuana operations, from 1,240 in 1988 to 1,669 in 1990. The value of assets seized increased from \$29.5 million in 1989 to \$38.6 million in 1990. The number of marijuana plants eradicated has increased from 2,590,388 in 1982 to 125,876,752 in 1990. Arrests have increased since 1982 from 2,512 to 5,729 in 1990. This figure is down; however, from a high of 6,502 arrests in 1987.³⁵ This decline can be attributed to an increase in the number of outdoor growers moving into indoor growing houses, which are much more harder to detect than outdoor growing plots.³⁶ The following is a recapitulation of statistics from 1982 to 1990 from the DCE/SP program.³⁷

	Total Plants Eradicated	Arrests	Weapons Seized
1982	2,590,388	2,512	785
1983	3,793,943	4,318	984
1984	12,981,210	4,941	1,424
1985	39,231,479	5,151	1,768
1986	129,686,033	5,537	1,646
1987	113,274,824	6,052	1,728
1988	107,276,308	6,062	2,034
1989	129,924,695	5,767	2,320
1990	125,876,752	5,279	3,210

Note: States Participating: 1982-25; 1983-40; 1984-50
1985-50; 1986-49; 1987-46; 1988-47; 1989-49; and 1990-50.³⁸

³⁵ Cannabis Investigations Section, 1990 Report, 7, 10.

³⁶ Mike O'Connor, DEA Cannabis Investigations Section, interviewed by author, 2 April 1992, Alexandria, VA, scribe interview, DEA Headquarters, Alexandria, VA.

³⁷ DEA, Cannabis Investigations Section, 1990 Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program, 7,10.

³⁸ Ibid., 10.

For the nine sheriff departments contacted, all respondents reported that the increase in marijuana arrests and seizures was due to two things, first, was the increased efforts of the department in combatting marijuana production and trafficking in their jurisdictions and second, was an increase in the number of people participating in the illegal marijuana trade. This latter figure is interesting to note for it signifies the possibility of two phenomena: first, that due to present economic conditions, more people are turning to the illegal drug trade as a means of supporting themselves, and second, that somewhere, if this increase is true, there is an increase in usage that has yet to be accounted for.

What is interesting to note is that all the rural county sheriff departments reported an increase in the both the amount of marijuana production and trafficking taking place in and through their counties, and an increase in the number of arrests and seizures, but the federal government has cited a decrease in the number of marijuana users. According to NIDA National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 1991, Marijuana use has declined from a 1979 high of 12.7 percent to its current rate of 4.8 percent.³⁹⁴⁰ Retail sales of marijuana fell an estimated 24 percent between 1988

³⁹ See Appendices for graph

⁴⁰ Office of the President, National Drug Control Strategy 1992, 5.

and 1990.⁴¹⁴² According to Bush Administration, Drug use among adolescents is down substantially from previous years, and according to the administration, "Showing that our efforts are, in effect, shutting down the pipeline and preventing the entry of new drug users."⁴³ Subsequently, however, the administration cites that drug usage among people aged 35 and over has increased.⁴⁴ The administration cites as a rationale to this trend the following:

"The increase in this group may reflect a cohort effect: a significant group of aging drug users seems to be gradually making its way through society and is migrating through various age categories in the surveys. In addition, this increase may be occurring not among new users, but among those who were previous drug users and have relapsed."⁴⁵

Yet, despite these decreases in marijuana usage, marijuana production and trafficking continues to increase. This seems like a paradox. To those who believe that the increase in marijuana production and trafficking could be attributed to an increase in exportation, the researcher would like to state that this rationale is very unlikely. First, according to data already cited by the administration, domestic production of marijuana accounts only for

⁴¹ Office of the President, National Drug Control Strategy 1991, 4.

⁴² Refer to Appendices for table of street and wholesale value of marijuana.

⁴³ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

approximately 18 to 25 percent of the marijuana consumed on the United States.⁴⁶ (This figures varies, from the initial figures given by the Bush Administration, to the 10 percent figures cited by the DEC/SP)⁴⁷ Depending on the figures used, this leaves roughly a little over 75 percent of the marijuana to be imported into the country. Production of marijuana in Mexico accounts for an estimated 79 percent of United State's marijuana demand. The Caribbean and Latin America is the other major distributor of marijuana to the United States, with 5 percent of production shares.⁴⁸ As these figures thus show, that current domestically grown marijuana cannot keep up with the demand in the United States obviously then, domestic growers of marijuana are not shipping their contraband overseas when there is an adequate and arguably a gold mine of economic opportunity here in the United States. Thus, marijuana growers would be foolish to export their product, thus increasing the amount of exposure to themselves and their product; furthermore, it would cost the producer needed resources to hire personnel to ship the marijuana, and given marijuana's diffuse availability and relatively low market value as compared to other narcotics, the domestic marijuana producer can ill afford to reduce his profit.

Thus, despite the stepped-up efforts of law enforcement to curb marijuana production and trafficking, and the increase in

⁴⁶ Ibid., 26.

⁴⁷ Cannabis Investigations Program, 1990 Report, 42.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

sentencing for marijuana convictions in the federal level, more and more people are becoming involved in the marijuana trade. Why is this? According to the government, there are less users of illicit drugs over-all, so where is the increase in marijuana going? This question needs to be further investigated.

According to Marilyn Mosses, Rural Researcher, National Institute of Justice, these discrepancies are probable, given the limitations of the surveys used in indicating trends for usage.⁴⁹ Ms. Mosses states that the surveys used concentrate upon a particular segment of the populations. For instance, the Household Survey, uses only people designated in Households, the UCR is volunteer, what these surveys as many others report is indeed true, but true to a particular section of the populous. Ms. Mosses states that you cannot use a specific section of the populous and apply it the whole. Ms. Mosses reported that mainstream drug use, marijuana use is down, but high risk usage is up. She believes that in order to obtain an accurate measurement of drug usage, it would be best to either conduct a massive survey of the entire populous, or conduct a study to review all the surveys which have been done on this subject, recently, and publish them in a report. Until either one of these methods is employed, the surveys conducted will remain inaccurate in predicting drug trends for the

⁴⁹ Marilyn Moses, NIJ researcher, interviewed by author, 9,15 April 1992, Washington, D.C., scribe interview. Indiana Building, Washington, D.C.

United State's population.⁵⁰

III. PROBLEMS RURAL LAW ENFORCEMENT FACE IN THEIR DRUG AND CRIME
COMBATTING EFFORTS; with an emphasis on marijuana production

The second question asked to the respondents was, in their opinion, was their department hindered in their law enforcement efforts in combatting marijuana production by a lack of man-power, money, or large jurisdiction to cover, and what methods they employed to offset this problem. Every department interviewed, cited that their major hinderance to their enforcement efforts was due to a lack of funds. All the departments stated that they lack the tax-base to purchase new, modern equipment and to increase their staffs. Mr. Phillips of the DeKalb County Sheriff's Department, Alabama, stated that they have second highest amount of highway to patrol in Alabama, and they simply do not have the staff available to patrol their entire jurisdiction and still concentrate their efforts upon other areas such as law enforcement.⁵¹ Penobscot County Sheriff's Department, Maine is at an even larger disadvantage when it comes to law enforcement efforts as they have a very large jurisdiction that is 200 miles wide and 300 miles long. To patrol this area, the county employs two deputies from a full-time staff of fifteen. The remaining officers are allocated

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Jim Phillips, Dekalb County Sheriff's Department, interview by author, 12 March 1992, Washington, D.C., phone interview, Fort Payne, Alabama.

to performing various duties, including combatting marijuana production and trafficking. But the sheer expanse of the county alone is enough to even plague the most modern and best staffed sheriff departments. Penobscot County does its best with the resources and man-power that they currently have, but the department admits that they cannot be expect to fully combat the problem given their inherent disadvantages.⁵²

Undersheriff John Bates of the Schoharie County Sheriff's Department noted that the primary problem plaguing rural counties is the lack of a substantial tax-base.⁵³ Without the advantage of major industry or population from which to draw financial resources, rural counties are limited to what the are able to do, given the need of larger staffs and modern equipment to effectively combat marijuana trafficking as well as illegal narcotic trafficking over-all. Worse yet, was the fact that due to the economic recession, counties are seeing cut-backs in aid from the states. State mandates upon social programs are forcing rural counties to place their already dwindling budgets into these social programs to comply with federal and state mandates. This allocation of resources is; thus, limiting what sheriff departments can do in not only combatting the marijuana problem, but in combatting the trafficking of drugs through-out the county.

⁵² Secretary (anonymous), Penobscot County Sheriffs Department, interviewed by author, 12 March 1992, Washington, D.C., phone interview, Bangor, Maine.

⁵³ Undersheriff John Bates, Schoharie County Sheriff's Department, interviewed by author, 19 March 1992, Washington, D.C., phone interview, Schoharie, New York.

To emphasize the problems rural counties are facing in combatting new techniques employed by the marijuana producers, examine the Drug Enforcement Report December 10, 1990 issue in which drug enforcement authorities seized one of the largest and most sophisticated indoor marijuana growing operations.⁵⁴ According to the report, local sheriffs' deputies and DEA agents seized five different facilities, two in Arizona and three in California, that were believed to be run by the same organization of producers. The growing rooms were built underground, beneath structures that resembled ordinary homes, in which 23,000 plants were found.

"Officials estimated that the over-all operation was capable of producing 46 tons of marijuana per year."⁵⁵

Authorities cite a growing use of indoor operations by marijuana producers to help reduce the risk of discovery by law enforcement officials.⁵⁶ Marijuana plants can often be easily discovered in outdoor growing plots by aircraft as the plant color appears to be a darker green than the surrounding foliage, or being stumbled upon by passing hunters, outdoors people, or DEC officers. Mr. Stowell, a DEA agent in Sacramento noted,

⁵⁴ "Record-Breaking Underground Marijuana Farms Seized in Southwest," Drug Enforcement Report, 10 December 1990, 1.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

"That effective eradication campaigns making extensive use of aerial surveillance have hampered growers outdoors, forcing many of them to move inside and adapt their techniques to the new environment."⁵⁷

Nationwide, seizures of indoor operations have nearly doubled from 649 in 1984 to 1,240 in 1988, according to DEA statistics.⁵⁸ According to the report, the five facilities were all located in remote desert areas, miles from the highway, where the underground growing chambers had thick concrete roofs the limited the amount of heat given off from the growing lamps that could have been detected by infrared radar by passing drug enforcement aircraft.⁵⁹ The growing facilities were even equipped with wells and generators, to keep utility bills low to avoid suspicion. This example just emphasizes the highly technological uses that current marijuana producers are employing, and they are always seeking new methods and have the financial resources to pursue these new methods. But for the rural sheriff departments who must face this burden of advanced technology, they can only offer the resources that they currently have. And by no fault of their own, they are hampered by low man-power and lack of sophisticated equipment.

IV. RURAL HAZARDS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Cannabis Investigations Section, 1990 Report, 7.

⁵⁹ DER, 10 December 1990, 1.

Rural officers, like their urban counterparts, face a constant danger in their daily law enforcement routine. This danger is compounded by the fact that many rural police officers patrol alone, and there are great distances to overcome when an emergency situation arises. Of the 66 law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty in 1989, 10 were from rural areas, as compared to the 15 who were killed in cities of 250,000 people or more.⁶⁰ The concern in rural areas, however, is that with the heightened sophistication of the drug war, and the lack of funds in rural counties to train their officers in regards to this new technology, many rural officers are at increased risks of injury and death.

Marijuana growers are infamous for their many "booby-trap" devices to protect their plots.

- Humboldt County, California, marijuana growers encircle their plots with numerous booby-traps and defense mechanisms.⁶¹
- A Pennsylvania game warden, in Chester County, found a 12-gauge firing device and several pipe bombs loaded with C-4 attached to trip wires on a path adjoining a marijuana plot.⁶²

These are just two examples, of the many situations that rural law enforcement officers encounter in patrolling their jurisdictions. But times have changed, through stepped-up law

⁶⁰ Tony Lesce, "Rural Officers Face Real Hazards," Law and Order, June 1991, 28.

⁶¹ Ibid., 29.

⁶² Ibid.

enforcement marijuana producers have gone indoors, as well as clandestine drug labs have move into rural areas as well. This influx has created a whole new set of problems for rural law enforcement officers. Not only must they now contend in trying to detect these in the dwellings themselves, but they must also be aware of the increased risks of safety when it comes to raiding or dismantling these operations. The new technology out there is utilized by the vast majority of drug dealers who have bountiful resources to purchase them, but the rural officer who is bound by limited budgets, he probably lacks the necessary training to recognize and handle potentially dangerous situations created by this technology.

"The Rural Crime and Drug Control Act of 1991"⁶³ outlines the danger that rural officers face in handling the new technologies of the drug dealers. The report stresses that new funds must be made available to train rural law enforcement officers in handling clandestine drug labs (methamphetamine), to avoid further fatalities and injury as a result of being unaware of the dangers that these facilities pose. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in drafting this report, held a hearing in which several law enforcement officers testified as to the dangers of these clandestine drug laboratories.

⁶³ Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr., Rising Casualties: Violent Crime and Drugs in Rural America, 9,10.

- An officer contracted pneumonia after being exposed to a methamphetamine laboratory for only ten seconds.
- At another clandestine drug facility that had been raided, a chemist uncorked a bottle of hidrotic acid and the fumes from a gust of wind blew the fumes into the face of a near-by officer. Though exposed for only a few seconds, the officer's lungs collapsed and he contracted chemical bronchitis and pneumonia. The officer could not return to his duties for two years.
- Other officers told the committee of the long-term damages caused by their work. One officer developed liver problems from contact with these drug laboratories, that he will have to under-go a liver transplant.⁶⁴
- Indoor marijuana growing facilities also pose significant dangers, as there is the presence of large amounts of electricity to power the heaters and lighting, in union with water and humidity. With the flick of a wrong switch of an inadvertent step into a pool of water could have disastrous results for the unaware officer.⁶⁵
- Outdoor marijuana plots are just as dangerous, in its 1990 report, the DCE/SP cited the following as a list of devices encountered in outdoor drug raids:

Guard dogs
Armed guards
Boards with exposed nails
Steel animal traps
Electric fences
Sound alarms
Monofilament line strung with fish hooks
Explosive device ranging from blasting cap to
1-1/2 pounds of dynamite
Rat trap devices designed to fire shotgun shells
or small arms ammunition.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Ibid., 10.

⁶⁵ Tony Lesce, "Rural Officers Face Real Hazards," 29.

⁶⁶ Cannabis Investigations Section, 1990 Report, 17.

The training that is required in educating officers how to properly handle these drug labs costs money. The respirators, protective equipment, and removal equipment that officers must have in handling the chemicals involved in clandestine drug labs or even in indoor marijuana growing operations costs money. Such things most rural police departments cannot simply afford. Though through the DEA, FBI, state and local task forces, such equipment has been made available, but many rural counties are still without such necessities. Through the "Rural Crime and Drug Control Bill" there has been an allocation of \$1 million dollars to begin to train rural officers in the handling of such chemicals.⁶⁷ It is hoped that rural agencies take advantage of this, and send their officers to this training, so that they may return and pass along the information to other officers. If this cannot be done, a brochure should be sent to all law enforcement agencies on either where to go to learn about the hazards of these facilities, or things to watch-out for in handling chemicals commonly used in the facilities. Use of volunteer reserve officers⁶⁸ could also come into use here, as rural police departments could acquire the knowledge of local chemists, who be invaluable in knowledge of how to handle such chemicals and dispose of them properly.

V. RURAL COUNTIES FACE CUTBACKS

⁶⁷ Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr., Rising Casualties Violent Crime and Drugs in Rural America, 36.

⁶⁸ Volunteer officers will be discussed later on

To compound the problem, rural counties, as noted before, are facing cut-backs from the states as their counties and the states try to offset large deficit windfalls. Take, as an example, California's Campaign Against Marijuana Planting, the nation's longest running eradication program. The program is facing massive cut-backs at the county level forcing many of the local sheriffs to strain resources to keep their heads above water. David Renner, the sheriff of Humboldt County, in an interview with Drug Enforcement Report stated,

"Humboldt County has one of the finest marijuana eradication programs in the state, if not the country, but we can seem to get the financial resources to keep this program surviving in the manner that it should."⁶⁹

Mark Thompson, a writer for Drug Enforcement Report, noted that "Growers keep close tabs on the fiscal health of the law enforcement agencies and set their growing plans accordingly."⁷⁰ Sheriff Renner was quoted, "If we are have sufficient funding, they (marijuana producers) aren't so aggressive. If we don't have much funding, they plant a lot of plants."⁷¹ This creates a Catch-22 for the sheriff's department. For not only must they contend with less available funding and man-power, the producers are planting more marijuana plants. This phenomena could partly explain the reason why marijuana arrests and seizures have increased, as there

⁶⁹ DER, "CAMP Program Faces Cutbacks", 1.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

are simply more plants to be found. But this is up to debate as the report went on to further state that outdoor marijuana growers, "Are now forced to keep their plants smaller and to plant them in the shade of larger plants, techniques that help growers avoid detection."⁷² With these new methods of averting detection being employed by the marijuana producers, how will law enforcement combat these new trends? What type of added strain will these new methods place upon an already burdened rural law enforcement system? To shed so light upon these issues, and to examine how the federal government is helping in the cause to fight the marijuana problem, the researcher interview Mr. Mike O'Connor of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program.⁷³ In the discussion a number of important facts were discovered and are noted in the following sub-chapter.

VI. FEDERAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PROBLEM

The present marijuana eradication program sponsored by the DEA, is the Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program. The DEA funds state and local agencies in the combatting of marijuana production and trafficking through this program which is a joint effort between the DEA and the various state and local agencies

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Mike O'Connor, DEA Cannabis Investigations Section, Interview by author, 2 April 1992, Alexandria, VA scribe interview, DEA Headquarters, Alexandria, VA.

involved. The program has been in place since 1987, and has proven itself effective in the eradication of marijuana through-out the country in the ninety-two jurisdictions which have accepted the LOA documents. The LOA's stand for Letters of Agreement, these documents are presented by the DEA to the local or state jurisdictions which have been approved for a DCE/SP program to be implemented in their area. The program utilizes several aspects of law enforcement capacities in its marijuana combative efforts. The implementation of surveillance for suspected indoor growing houses, the use of aircraft equipped with infrared sensors, and feelers sent out into the area to act upon tips and gather evidence of suspected indoor growing houses.

The program has proven itself invaluable in aiding state and local agencies in ridding areas of marijuana production and trafficking. Mr. O'Connor attributes the success of the program to two factors: the first, is the reduction in the number of outdoor marijuana producers.⁷⁴ Through the efforts of the DCE/SP marijuana producers have been forced to move their operations indoors, to reduce the risks associated with outdoor production. The producers who have continued to grow marijuana in outdoor plots, are reducing the size of their plots from 2-3,000 plants to between 25 and 100 plants per plot to minimize the risk of detection. The second factor Mr. O'Connor attributes to the success of the DCE/SP program is the amount of plants confiscated within the past two years.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

In 1990, the DEC/SP estimated that there was between 5,000-6,000 metric tons of marijuana produced in the United States, of which, 3,318 metric tons were confiscated. In 1991, the DCE/SP estimated that there was between 5,000 and 6,000 metric tons of marijuana produced in the United States, of which, 2,363 metric tons were confiscated. Mr. O'Connor attributes the decrease in metric tons confiscated to the shift to indoor growing operations. Indoor growing operations are much harder to detect, due to the insulation factors of a closed environment, the ability to use generators to power the heat lamps, and thus reduce the wattage consumed from the electric company which could be a tip-off to a marijuana operation, and the use of thick concrete roofs and walls and insulation to limit the amount of heat escaping from the heating lamps which could be detected through the use of infrared surveillance equipment.⁷⁶

VI. GOING RATES FOR MARIJUANA PER POUND

The following is a list of the current prices of marijuana per pound:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PRICE</u>
• Indoor Grow Domestic Marijuana	\$3-5,000 per/lbs.
• Outdoor Cultivated Domestic Marijuana	\$2-3,000 per/lbs.
• Mexican Grown Marijuana	\$7-900 per/lbs.
.....	\$500 per/lbs. bulk
• Ditchweed (marijuana grown wild)	\$4-800 per/lbs.

(reproduced from the 1990
DCE/SP report)⁷⁷

⁷⁶ DER, "Record Breaking Underground Marijuana Farms Seized in Southwest," 1.

⁷⁷ Cannabis Investigations Section, 1990 Report, 34.

This list is subject to change dependent upon the time of the year, the amount of THC (the higher the percentage of THC up to 20 percent, the increase in worth of the plant), and geographical area of the country where purchased. For example, if a person from New York State were to travel to Arizona and purchase grade A Mexican marijuana, that person could expect to pay upwards of \$1400 per/lbs because the person would be able to return to New York State and sell the marijuana for as much as \$1600-2000 per/lbs.⁷⁸

VII. WHY MARIJUANA PRODUCTION TAKES PLACE IN RURAL COUNTIES

The majority of marijuana growing takes place in rural counties or areas due to the need of marijuana dealers to produce their product in secluded areas. Marijuana growers prefer not to advertise their trade, and thus, dislike urban areas where "watchdog" neighbors may reveal their business. Rural counties offer the convenience of increased privacy, the ability to traffick their marijuana without detection, and utilizing the disadvantages of rural county sheriff departments with their lack of man-power and resources.

VIII. DEA FACES CUTBACKS AS WELL

For fiscal year 1992 the DEA cut DCE/SP's budget by 27 percent

⁷⁸ Mike O' Connor, interview by author, 2 April 1992.

from \$13.3 million in 1991 to \$10.0 million in 1992.⁷⁹ This cut came during a time when all ninety-two of the LOA's asked for increases in their financial allotments. The DCE/SP was forced to cut allotments to the LOAs by almost 25 percent.⁸⁰ This budget cut is consistent with cuts made through-out the law enforcement system right through from state and county agencies down to the smallest localities. The advice from the DEA to those agencies feeling the pinch of lost funding is to "Make the best of what we have."⁸¹ All agencies are feeling the cut-backs in resources, why still having to maintain a sufficient level of performance equivalent to years past, when more money and resources were available. The DEA recognizes the financial straits some law enforcement departments are in, but they admit that there is little they can do until more funding is approved for operations and increases in aid.

IX. FEDERAL ASSESSMENT OF RURAL COUNTY OPERATIONS

The DEA is satisfied with the progress of the marijuana eradication program, overall. There are a number of isolated problems which still hinder the progress being made. One of these problems cited by Mr. O'Connor is the "homeboy" attitude of some departments. This attitude is allowing some marijuana producers to skirt the arm of the law because of close ties to local officials,

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ anonymous source in the DEA

who see the marijuana producers as economic boosters of the local economy either through property taxes, or the helping of indebted people, who the marijuana producer has paid off in exchange for "over-looking" their business. The multijurisdictional task forces have been very effective on the county level in aiding the marijuana eradication program, as well as for all illegal narcotics. It is the DEA's aim that more counties and rural areas participate in the multijurisdictional task forces to take advantage of the benefits that are accorded to them, such as sharing of resources and intelligence information. The DEA through federal, state, and local agencies is actively seeking participants in either multijurisdictional programs or in its own DCE/SP program.

X. HOW AGENCIES MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE DEC/SP PROGRAM

Those counties or agencies interested in participating in the DEA's DCE/SP program must first contact their local DEA field office for more information. Once this has been done, the law enforcement in question must present evidence of a marijuana problem in their area, and provide sufficient evidence that indicates such. After this initial hearing, a LOA is filed and past along to a DEA coordinator with the amount of money requested by the department seeking aid attached to the LOA. The application is then examined and reviewed by the coordinator and DEA headquarters in Washington, D.C. If approved, the LOA is signed,

or the amount requested is modified, and a check is sent to the requesting agency. This process is a direct federal to individual law enforcement agency transaction. There is no state involvement, and the funds given cannot be used for any purpose except but for the one outlined in the LOA. Through by-passing the state bureaucracy, the law enforcement agency can obtain their needed funding in a timely and efficient manner, a concern many local law enforcement agencies voiced in the researcher's interviews with them.

A further incentive for law enforcement agencies to participate in this program is, if the marijuana production or trafficking institution is stopped, the agency in concern may request a percentage of the asset/forfeiture. That request cannot exceed 80 percent of the total gross worth of the property sold, or monies seized. The DEA guarantees itself at least 20 percent to cover expenses. The request on the part of the law enforcement agency can be altered by the DEA. The basis for alteration include the amount of resources, man-power, and time consumed by the local law enforcement agency. For example, if the law enforcement agency participating in the DCE/SP program contributes three officers compared to the DEA who contributed 10 officers, the local agency cannot expect to claim 80 percent of the seizure, they will receive a percentage the is in proportion to the resources they gave as compared to the DEA, and in the amount of resources they are capable of lending.

XI. ANALYSIS OF THE DEC/SP PROGRAM

The DCE/SP program was established to provide interaction and coordination in actively reducing, and ultimately eradicating, the domestic marijuana production and trafficking. In conjunction with the U.S. Department of Agriculture/ U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Department of the Interior/ Bureau of Land Management/ Fish and Wildlife/National Park Service/Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. Department of Defense/National Guard/Civil Air Patrol, and ninety-two local and state law enforcement agencies the DCE/SP program has provided a invaluable service in combatting the war on drugs.⁸² The program is not limited to any type law enforcement agency. Departments as large as the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and as small as the fifteen manned rural county sheriff's department participate in the program from Florida to Hawaii. More importantly, the DCE/SP program provides a valuable service for those law enforcement agencies who have marijuana problems within their jurisdictions but lack the man-power or resources to actively pursue the marijuana producers and/or traffickers. Rural county sheriff agencies who are strained financially or otherwise, are encouraged to utilize this program in helping to control marijuana production and trafficking on a local as well as on a national level, but it is forewarned that they must also recognize that the DCE/SP program has also been financial strapped by the recent down-

⁸²Cannabis Investigations Section, 1990 Report, 12-14.

turn in the economy as well, and this could effect the amount of funding received, or even if any funding is granted at all.

XII. THE GAO PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW

In 1990, the United States General Accounting Office, conducted research into the area of rural drug abuse. Entitled, "Rural Drug Abuse: Prevalence, Relation to Crime, and Programs," the report found that very little information is available on the effectiveness of rural law enforcement's ability to reduce drug abuse. That drug education programs can, "Modestly reduce drug abuse", but that evaluations of the effectiveness of these programs is very limited.⁸³ Most drug treatment programs reports do not focus upon rural areas. A noted mention of this is the Drug Usage Forecasting report, which though very effective in monitoring drug abuse, only concentrates upon twenty-four cities in its reporting data base, there are no rural inputs.⁸⁴

The GAO report cites an important factor in the problem rural counties face in meeting financial and resourceful expectations. Known as "diseconomies of scale"⁸⁵ this term refers to the economic

⁸³ GAO, Rural Drug Abuse: Prevalence, Relation to Crime and Programs, 47.

⁸⁴ National Institute of Justice, Drug Use Forecasting Report 1990, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1991).

⁸⁵ GAO, "Rural Drug Abuse: Prevalence, Relation to Crime, and Programs," 48.

disadvantages rural counties face because of their innate shortcomings, such as small tax-bases, small population density, and large geographical areas. The GAO report states that the major problem of rural areas is the demands and expectations placed upon them by our criminal justice system.⁸⁶ These demands and expectations are geared towards metropolitan standards which possess the necessary resources to implement them. Rural counties, unlike their urban counterparts, do not possess the necessary financial resources to implement these initiatives; thus, the diseconomies of scale" come into play.

"The defining characteristic of rural states is their low population density. This makes it difficult to have high program intensity: a rural county unlikely to be able to afford drug program specialists. Rural police must handle the full range of law enforcement problems rural teachers must perform a wide variety of educational services, and rural health care workers must provide a broad array of health care services... (despite the lack of adequate funding and resources to augment these services)"⁸⁷

The GAO solution to this problem, as been the standard rural trend in recent years, to pool resources and coordinate efforts.⁸⁸ But there are underlying problems to this answer as well. For example, is Sheriff X of a rural county, has spent the past ten years to purchase and maintain a helicopter for his county, he is expected by the tax-payers of the county to utilize that helicopter

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

for the good of the county. If he were to loan the helicopter to another county, as part of a multijurisdictional task cooperation, and while in that county, the helicopter were to crash, or because it was in another county, a person were to die because the helicopter was not available to air-lift him to a hospital, one can plainly see the political thicket that arises.⁸⁹ The problem rural counties face, cannot be easily answered by forming multi-jurisdictional task forces. Counties who part-take in this endeavor, must be fully aware of the ramifications that might arise. Tax-payers must be kept informed of intents and exchanges of equipment between the participants of the task forces, in order to minimize public back-lash which could develop from one of the incidents described above, as an example. Pooling resources and coordinating efforts can help ease the burden upon rural counties in meeting the needs of combating drugs and crime, but counties must be sure such endeavors are beneficial for all parties concerned, and that if accidents do arise, there is plan of action that calls for the immediate and direct response to the problem. Otherwise, the destruction of a well-intended and effective program could be imminent.

XIII. WHAT IS HAPPENING ON THE LOCAL LEVEL WITH FUNDING

The emphasis of the on financial straits must not be

⁸⁹ Marilyn Moses, interview by author, 9 April 1992.

underscored. Humboldt County, one of the largest marijuana producing counties in the country, has in its eradication efforts CAMP (Campaign Against Marijuana Planting), aerial surveillance, and Operation Greensweep.⁹⁰ Yet, all these efforts have been hindered by governmental cut-backs, and by no fault of Sheriff Renner, have hindered his enforcement capabilities as well. If such cut-backs and pit-falls have plagued one of the most advanced marijuana eradication programs in the country,⁹¹ what of the thousands of rural sheriff departments out there that do not have these amenities? What strains are being placed upon them? Many will respond by saying that these counties should not be strained, due to increases by the federal government in drug eradication and anti-trafficking programs. To test this statement, the researcher asked the sheriff departments interviewed,

"How much, if any, federal or state assistance has your department received in combating narcotic production and trafficking in your jurisdiction, particularly in the area of marijuana eradication?"⁹²

The response to this question was astounding. All the sheriff agencies responded that they had received no federal aid either in

⁹⁰ Operation Greensweep, was federal government sponsored attempt to aid county-level eradication efforts. The eradication drive was led by members of the U.S. Army and the California National Guard on Bureau of Land Management property in Humboldt County.

⁹¹ DER, "CAMP Program Faces Cut Backs," 1.

⁹² Refer to the questionnaire asked of the sheriff departments, located in the appendices.

the area of combating narcotic production and trafficking or in their marijuana eradication efforts. The federal aid that was given was put into the federal task forces which had little bearing upon the rural sheriff departments concerned. One of the sheriffs, whose requested his name be withheld on this matter, stated that there was "friction" between many of the sheriff departments and the Task Forces. This friction came from the task forces becoming dominant in county eradication and anti-trafficking efforts. The sheriff felt that his department was in a constant competition with the task force, instead of a cooperating nature. He also stated that this was not an isolated problem, that he knew of several sheriff departments who felt uncomfortable with the some of the task forces and their methods. One sheriff's department, Schoharie County, reported receiving \$24,000 in state grants for the Fiscal Year 1991 for surveillance equipment, three other agencies reported receiving some state aid. The Federal funding that was received for many of the rural counties was for project DARE, which received many compliments of praise from among the sheriffs and spokespersons who felt that the program was effective in instructing children of the dangers of drug use.

Much of the funding for the rural sheriff departments came from the county budgets, state sheriff's associations, and through the Federal Task Forces. On the federal level, the administration on behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration is requesting \$748 million in monetary budget monies, an increase of \$53.6 million over last year's fiscal budget. As part of this new budgetary

increase 10 agents would be hired as full-time coordinators in the states that are most actively involved in the Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Program.⁹³ The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) reported that the allocation of nearly \$4.5 billion in anti-drug grants that the federal government has made to state and local agencies since 1987, it also acknowledged that states have been sluggish in spending the money Congress has appropriated to them.⁹⁴ Bruce Carnes, director of ONDCP's Office of Planning, Budget, and Administration said,

"That from the first quarter of the Fiscal Year 1987 through the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1990, the states have only spent an average of only 40 percent of the law enforcement money granted to them by the federal government...the federal government is doing its job in getting the grants to the states in a timely manner."⁹⁵

This hold-up in state distribution of funds could be an important factor in the reason why counties, especially rural counties are under a severe amount of strain in meeting the expectations of the National Drug Control Strategy. Undersheriff John Bates stated that part of the problem lies in that the majority of funding goes to the urban and suburban counties of the state.⁹⁶ These counties are seen as the primary areas of

⁹³ "Administration Proposes 11-Percent Increase in Funding for Drug War," Drug Enforcement Report, 8 February 1992, 1.

⁹⁴ ONDCP, 1990 Report.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Undersheriff John Bates, interviewed by author, 19 March 1992.

concentration for funding given their high populations and high incidents of illegal drug activities. But one of the things the people who distribute the funding do not take into consideration, is that the predominance of urban and suburban counties have very large tax bases, compared with those of their fellow rural counties. Granted that the extent of the problems are more prominent than in the rural counties, nevertheless, rural counties themselves contain significant amounts of illegal drug activities themselves. Rural counties are even beginning to see an influx of urban and suburban county traffickers into their rural jurisdictions because of the known lack of law enforcement manpower and resources; thus, increasing the burden further upon rural counties. But even the urban areas themselves are facing problems with the federal anti-drug funding system. Mayor Robert Isaac of Colorado Springs, in an interview with reporters at the 1990 U.S. Conference of Mayors, stated that in thirty American cities survey, 27 percent have yet to receive any grants for drug enforcement. Only 6 percent of Fiscal Year 1990 funding has been given to cities, and almost 50 percent of the 1990 funds remain unspent. In a statement, Mayor Issac said,

"That four years into the nation's official anti-drug effort, the system, as currently designed, is not capable of doing what it was intended to do. It is not capable of getting the federal anti-drug funds through the states to the cities where the drug war is the hottest."⁹⁷

⁹⁷ "Mayors Say Nation is Losing Drug War," Drug Enforcement Report, 24 September 1990, 1.

This statement definitely sheds some light upon the problem of the rural counties struggling for financial aid. If the major cities in America, that carry the weight of population and the strength of economic industry, have a problem trying to secure funding for their anti-drug efforts, how are the rural counties able to secure enough monetary aid for themselves? What makes matters even worse, is the fact that though the amount of federal aid that is available is not getting through to the urban areas, these areas at least have the ability to utilize their tax-bases, smaller geographical areas of coverage, and the ability to institute and utilize community policing to help curb the drug problem. Rural counties simply do not have the luxury of either using or implementing these programs given their small tax-bases, large and diverse geographical terrain, and their diffuse population which makes community policing impractical or at the very least, a problematic task.

One cannot help but to rationalize why the urban and suburban areas receive substantially more aid than the rural law enforcement agencies, theoretically, they should have higher rates of illegal narcotic incidents than in rural counties.⁹⁸ But are these incidents necessarily higher? Could it be that the ratio of incidents between rural and urban and suburban counties be closer

⁹⁸ According to the 1990 GAO report on "Rural Drug Abuse", statistics on related drug trends are about equal for rural and non-rural areas. The report; however, cites a pressing need for rural counties as they do not possess the necessary and sufficient resources to deal effectively with this problem.

than speculated? To determine this hypothesis, one needs to turn to statistics, hard data. Part of the purpose of this research was to explore how rural counties are combating the drug war, the research focusing upon marijuana production and trafficking, using statistics of monetary aid and expenditures versus the amount of seizures and number of arrests by rural county agencies acting alone or in conjunction with other local, state or federal agencies. The data which was correlated, as stated earlier in the paper, proved to be quite revealing.

The majority of the rural sheriff departments did not have access to or possession of computers in which to compile criminal related information into a data base or bank. This deficiency poses a major problem in tabulating data to predict national drug production, trafficking, and use trends from either a national or state level perspective. A recent study was done by the University of Indiana by Kip Schlegel and Edmund F. McGarrell upon the impact of multijurisdictional task forces. The article's findings are of a 2-year evaluation of two multijurisdictional task forces currently operating in Indiana, upon their operation and impact on drug enforcement efforts.⁹⁹ In an interview with one of the researchers, Ed McGarrell, the researcher discussed his findings of a lack of a modern data base for criminal justice statistics in many rural county sheriff departments. For their research, Mr. McGarrell acknowledged that the researchers had to pains-takenly

⁹⁹ Kip Schlegel and Edmund F. McGarrell, "An Examination of Arrest Practices in Regions Served by Multijurisdictional Drug Task Forces," Crime and Delinquency, July 1991, 408.

review each and every one of the court records manually, to determine which cases were drug related. This process took a considerable amount of time and energy upon the part of the researchers.¹⁰⁰

Mr. McGarrell acknowledged the lack of computerized data bases for rural counties causes considerable problems for researchers who are interested in investigating rural county trends.¹⁰¹ The amount of extra time and money needed to review cases upon cases of arrests and court decisions makes examining this data a very costly affair, something very few researchers have the luxury of enjoying. The lack of a computerized system not only hinders the work of researchers, but for the local sheriff and other law enforcement agencies as well. Take for instance the Uniform Crime Report published by the Federal Bureau of Investigations, under the rural crime trends section, there is not a listing of rural drug abuse violations.¹⁰² The reason for this is the fact, that there does not exist an adequate and efficient data base for local sheriff departments to funnel their data to the state and federal levels. This makes predicting trends in drug production and trafficking particularly hard to predict, especially in the area of marijuana production and trafficking. This fact best represents itself in

¹⁰⁰ Professor Edmund F. McGarrell, Indiana University, interviewed by author, 19 March 1992, Washington, D.C., phone interview, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² FBI, UCR Crime Report 1990,

the 1992 National Drug Strategy, which is forced to estimate the net amount of marijuana available in the United States, because of the need to revise their information continually, based upon new intelligence that arises.¹⁰³

There are, however, some rural sheriff departments that are currently updating their manual file systems into a computerized data base. They are receiving the funds for the automation upgrade through the appropriation of county funds. In Penobscot, Maine, the county sheriff's department jointly shares the use of a computer data base with six other agencies. These agencies include the city of Bangor, towns of Brewer, Hampton, Orno, Oldtown, and the University of Maine at Orno. The financing of this computer network was shared jointly by all seven agencies and it has been reported a success, for it not only makes the filing of cases easier, but it allows the varying agencies to pool information and examine it for trends or for other methods that are needed.¹⁰⁴

The use of the multijurisdictional in Maine, was created out of need to update the system to keep in tune with the advancing technology. The county of Penobscot is, like many other rural counties around the country, in financial hardship, lacking a strong tax-base from which to derive funds, the county utilized its predicament with that of six other agencies in creating the computerized network. This not only prevented the diversion of

¹⁰³ National Drug Strategy Report 1992, 26-27.

¹⁰⁴ Penobscot County Sheriff's Department, interview by author, 12 March 1992.

funds from other needed areas in the budget, but broadened the data base to allow an increased number of agencies to incorporate their data; thus, allowing for a agencies to compare their statistics with one another and identify possible weaknesses within the system and move to correct them.

The other option for rural sheriff departments, if a multijurisdictional approach to purchasing a computerized data base is not acceptable, is to allocate a certain percentage of their budgets per annum to the development of a computerized data base. This method requires the utilization of two methods: the department must be willing to either allocate sufficient funding per annum to the construction of a computerized data base, or they must raise funding either through an increase in the tax base or through the use of county grants. By instituting one of these methods, the rural sheriff department will be able to actively record and maintain an active data base that could be networked to other agencies within the state and beyond.

XIV. BJA GRANTS AND EVALUATION METHODS

The U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance distributes funds to state and local governments to aid in law enforcement, judicial, and incarceration efforts against drug dealers. These funds are administered through the Federal Drug Control and System Improvement Grant program which was created by the Anti-Abuse Drug Act of 1988. These grants can be used in a

variety of methods, but the grants must be made in one of the twenty-one BJA authorized programs, or by the discretion of the BJA director.

One of the programs that the grants fund, is an evaluation of current justice programs within the state that they are allocated. "Arkansas, Iowa, Montana, and North Dakota all contain evaluation programs as part of their drug control strategies."¹⁰⁵

These evaluation programs, allow administrators to assess local police efforts, identifying areas that need improvement and in areas that are proving effective, and then passing that information along to other departments so that they may utilize those successes in their department's law enforcement efforts.

Through these grants, there may come a better understanding of what is occurring in the rural law enforcement sector. By passing along funding to the states to conduct assessments in their own areas, the state grants reduce the complexity of a federal assessment were a multitude of rural areas would have to be examined. However, these evaluation programs have only been in effect since mid 1990, so the analysis of their evaluation efforts has yet to be determined. But through the use of these grants, it is hoped that some of the mystery regarding rural criminal justice statistics can be removed.

¹⁰⁵ GAO, Rural Drug Abuse: Prevalence, Relation to Crime, and Programs, 37.

XV. USE OF RESERVE OFFICERS

In addition to multijurisdictional task forces, pooling of resources, and appeals for federal and state aid, rural counties have another option in combating marijuana trafficking and production as well as that for other drugs and crime. The use of volunteer officers is becoming an increasingly used tool among law enforcement agencies.¹⁰⁶ From Los Angeles to New York City volunteer officers are becoming an increasingly used force by police in the combatting of drugs and crime in the United States. The use of volunteers provides for a number of advantages, departments which utilize the volunteer program "Receive the benefit of a visible, uniformed deterrence".¹⁰⁷ The City of Anchorage, Alaska uses volunteers in their police program to include road patrol, and in vice and prostitution assignments. In Harris County, Texas, volunteers are used in the as undercover agents, as dealers know who the current deputies are from prior sting operations.¹⁰⁸

Volunteer officers receive the same training as their paid counter-parts, and through experience and time served are allowed to continue training in other specialized police areas. The use of

¹⁰⁶ Richard B. Weinblatt, "The Use of Reserve Officers in the War on Drugs," Sheriff, March-April 1991, 48.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

volunteer officers allows those people who wish to serve their community, yet choose to remain in their present occupational position. It is important to note that reserve officers must be given the same degree of training as regular, full-time officers, if they are to be considered effective. The dangerous tasks they must face, require such training, but the benefits of the training are numerous and advantageous to the department that utilizes these officers.

XVI. ANALYSIS OF THE BIDEN REPORT

Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary drafted a staff report of the increasing trends of violent crime and drug production, trafficking, and usage in rural counties. The report states,

"That the latest crime figures show that the violent crime toll is growing faster in rural America than in large urban states; faster in rural states than even in America's largest cities."¹⁰⁹

In the report, Senator Biden addresses several of the issues regarding rural law enforcement that have been discussed within this research work. More importantly, the "Rural Crime and Drug Control Act of 1991" includes several proposals to help rural counties combat drug trafficking and crime in their jurisdictions.

¹⁰⁹ Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Rising Casualties: Violent Crime and Drugs in Rural America, 1.

The following is a list of these proposals:

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT:

- \$45 million to hire 350 Drug Enforcement Agents and support personnel, all targeting rural drug trafficking;
- Establish rural drug enforcement task forces in federal judicial districts with rural areas using 100 cross-designated federal agents;
- Increase penalties for "ice" trafficking and environment crimes due to drug production in rural areas.

STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT:

- \$50 million in aid to state and local law enforcement officials in rural areas;
- \$1 million for specialized course for law enforcement personnel from rural agencies. (This legislation would be allocated through Fiscal Year 1993 towards a special training program at the "Federal Law Enforcement Training Center" in Glynco, Georgia. The program would train officers from rural areas in the investigation of drug production and trafficking.)¹¹⁰

TREATMENT AND PREVENTION:

- Office for treatment improvement to devote \$25 million to establish drug treatment programs in rural areas;
- Office of substance abuse prevention to devote \$25 million to establish drug prevention programs in rural areas;
- Existing clearinghouse will collect and disseminate information about rural drug treatment and prevention.¹¹¹

The "Rural Crime and Drug Control Act of 1991" gives much

¹¹⁰ "Rural Crime Bill on the War on Drugs", Drug Enforcement Report, 19 November 1991, 1.

¹¹¹ Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr., Rising Casualties: Violent Crime and Drugs in Rural America, 36,37.

needed attention to rural drug trafficking and crime. It provides for funds to be distributed directly to rural counties, through bypassing the bureaucracy of the state legislatures, and to increase the amount of federal DEA agents, and allocate them directly towards rural counties. Yet, despite the boost for awareness of rural law enforcement problems, the "Rural Crime and Drug Control Act of 1991" does have its short-comings. In the report, it states that "Most rural states suffered greater increases in violent crime over the past year than did New York City."¹¹² Though this state is probably true, nevertheless, one must remember the context in which it needs to be addressed. For example, according to the 1991 UCR 2,245 people were murdered in New York City in 1990.¹¹³ If seventy more people were murdered in 1991 than in 1990 this would only represent an increase of 3.1 percent; however, in Montana, there were 39 murders in the year 1990¹¹⁴, if ten more people were murdered in 1991 than in 1990 this would represent an increase of 12.5 percent. Three times the amount of increase in murder than in New York City, but with 60 fewer murders actually taking place. When comparing rural county trends with those of there urban counterparts, one must remember to try an examine the constants, in this case rates per 100,000 inhabitants. For Montana, the rate was 4.9 percent as compared to a rate of 14.5 percent for New York

¹¹² Ibid., II.

¹¹³ FBI, UCR Report 1990, 349.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 65.

State.¹¹⁵

This is not to dismiss the severity of crime in the rural areas, however. On the contrary, it is merely trying to point out that if we are going to examine rural county criminal trends, we must examine them in their actuality, an appropriate funds and aid that are consistent and in proportion to those figures. Another area of concern, that needs the political attention of the bill, is to allocate funds for rural counties to modernize. The bill appropriates \$50 million for aid to state and local law enforcement officials in rural areas, but is this enough? According to UCR figures, there are nearly 2000 rural counties across the United States.¹¹⁶ If the funding was to be distributed equally among these rural agencies, each agency would receive approximately \$25,000. This is not a paltry sum, but given the fact that computerized systems run into the tens of thousands of dollars, surveillance equipment into the thousands of dollars, plus manpower \$25,000 dollars really does not go that far. However it is a start, and given the funding, rural counties would be able to apply it towards modernization methods which are consistent to their urban counterparts. Through this modernization, rural counties would be able to analyze areas that need further attention. By addressing these problem areas, rural counties would be better able to combat crime and drugs within their respected jurisdictions, and effectively begin to combat the amount of crime

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 65,66.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 260-272.

that occurs, and reduce the amount of drug production and trafficking that is prevalent in their respected jurisdictions.

XVII. SUMMATION OF RURAL COUNTY STATISTICAL PROBLEM BY MARILYN MOSES AND SUBSEQUENT GRASS ROOTS ACTION

Marijuana is a continuing problem in America, and it has its invested holdings in the rural county level. Rural counties are also seeing an increase in clandestine drug laboratories. These drug laboratories manufacture various chemical drugs such as PCP, LSD to name a couple. Marijuana producers and clandestine drug manufacturers prefer rural settings for a number of reasons, such as increased privacy, ability to conduct their operation in relative seclusion, and the availability of large tracts of property or houses at relatively low prices as compared to urban settings. But the problem that marijuana production and trafficking pose to rural counties is just the tip of the iceberg to a more compelling and complex underlying problem. The paper has already established that rural counties face a problem when it comes to raising resources to combat the marijuana and/or drug problems in their areas. Reason as to why this problem exists, is due in part, to a lack of substantial tax bases. But the problem also rests in the fact that there exists a lack of understanding on the part of federal and state officials as to how what extent rural counties are in need of financial or resourceful aid. This,

is however, in no way to place the blame on federal and state officials for a lack of appreciation for rural county problems. The blame lies in effect, on the lack of a modern, sophisticated system of collecting, compiling, and analyzing rural crime trends, amount of disposable resources these rural counties have, and the void that needs to be filled by federal and state aid to help counties not only combat marijuana trafficking, but the whole gambit of drug and crime that occurs.

There does exist a problem in collecting and correlating data from rural counties across the United States. This problem is a direct result of the inability of rural counties to fund up-dation of their statistical data bases, and this lack of funding can be attributed to a lack of understanding that rural counties have this problem. Attributed to this lack of understanding can be seen that the last piece of investigative or observational research done at the rural county level was down over ten years ago, and that research was directed at investigating the high rate of accidents in rural county car chases. This research offered very little in indicating the amount or the degree of rural crime, trends, or funding rural law enforcement is receiving. And this factor is true across the boards. There exists very little hard statistical data for rural counties. Miss Mosses admits that, "There exists a lack of ability to determine, what is going on at the rural, county level." ¹¹⁷

This does not, however, mean that there has not been recent

¹¹⁷ Marilyn Moses, interviewed by author, 15 April 1992.

attempts to determine what exactly is going on the rural county level. There are a number of grass roots operations that are attempting to compile rural data statistics. One of these grass roots organizations was begun in Texas a few years ago, by a policeman from Dallas, Texas. Called TALON (Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Network) what began as a compiling of criminal justice data from one county, quickly spread to neighboring counties.¹¹⁸ As his coverage spread, so did the number of counties wishing to provide him their data from compiling. His program now covers eight states, with more requesting that their data be recorded as well. However, he is finding the task increasingly difficult as he has to appeal for volunteers to program the data, and funding to subsidized his program is limited.

But it is the grass roots programs such as this which are beginning to make a small, but noticeable dent in compiling and correlating rural criminal justice statistics. More funding needs to be given to these organizations, in order to spawn others in rural counties and areas across the United States. Through the building of these programs, a network could be established that would someday link nearly all rural counties with each other and with other agencies. By doing this, the agencies and departments which are in charge of analyzing data could have easy and highly accurate data on which to base analysis for trends, funding, and areas of concern that need to be enhanced or rectified.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSION

This research paper is an attempt to bring to light some of the aspects of rural law enforcement departments, practices, problems, and possible solutions to those problems. A lot of information has been covered in the text, but I feel that each and every piece of it is relevant to the two topics of this research paper. I have attempted to show, by the use of a specific example of law enforcement duty, that effort to combat of marijuana production, trafficking, and use, that rural criminal justice has a much larger, and diffuse problem to tackle. That problem is the institution of an accurate, comprehensive, and computerized data base that would allow various law enforcement, research, and administrative agencies to obtain rural criminal justice statistics. From those statistics, various empirical observations could be made with a high degree of accuracy. These observations, in turn, would lend themselves highly useful in identifying areas of concern that are plaguing rural law enforcement departments. From here, various remedies or initiatives could be applied to help rectify some of these problem areas.

I believe that I have adequately shown that marijuana poses unique problems for rural agencies. These problems are not inherent of only marijuana, but for many types of crime and drugs

that are continually being seen in the rural sector. But since the effects and analysis of these various drug and crime problems are so diffuse, I chose to focus upon one aspect of the overall problem: law enforcement's efforts in combatting marijuana production and use in their jurisdictions. I believe, based upon the material in the text, that the reader can conclude that marijuana plays an important role in rural law enforcement efforts. That role is of such an extent, compounded by the many other duties rural law enforcement agencies must face, that it causes a significant amount of strain upon the rural law enforcement agencies, in regards to man-power, morale, and resources. Further compounding the problem, is the increase in technological expertise of the marijuana growers and various other illegal drug production practitioners. As these people have utilized technology to their advantage, and having the luxury of having the connections and resources to afford it, sadly, many rural law enforcement agencies do not.

The main reason behind this dilemma for the rural law enforcement agency, is the fact that most of these agencies are in areas where there is no industry, no sufficient tax-base, or population in which to procure funds. This problem is then compounded by the fact that many rural counties have very large and geographically challenging terrain, which strains man-power in covering these areas. Lastly, drug producers and traffickers recognize these problems that rural counties face, and thus, establish their production facilities and trafficking lanes in

these rural areas. The rural law enforcement agency, already hampered by a lack of adequate resources, is now faced with the highly technological drug producer and trafficker. Because of his sophistication, the rural sheriff must now allocate a large proportion of his resources to combat this problem, if he wishes to avoid more of these drug producers and traffickers entering and establishing themselves within his jurisdiction. Using the term of "diseconomies of scale"¹¹⁹ the reader can further identify with the problem rural law enforcement agencies face, because of their innate characteristics, rural counties are at a sustained, economic disadvantage when it comes to providing the same services as their suburban and urban counterparts.

After identifying the problem, I then chose to examine what methods are being undertaken to help ease this burden. Through my research, I found that most counties are on their own as far as funding law enforcement programs, with the exception of the DARE program. Some counties receive help through state grants, and through the federal government in certain program such as the DEC/SP, but these programs only begin to touch the tip of the iceberg, and are not comprehensive in either their funding or in access to all rural counties. I have also identified that many federal monies allocated to states to be distributed to local law enforcement officials have been tied up in state bureaucracy for one reason or the other. But the main area of concern is the fact

¹¹⁹ GAO, Rural Drug Abuse: Prevalence, Relation to Crime and Programs, 48.

the much of the problem rural counties face is due to a lack of an understanding about the problems rural counties face. This lack of understanding can be attributed to the fact that no one really has a comprehensive understanding of what is going on in the rural law enforcement sector. This problem is due to the fact that there does not exist a comprehensive, data base that can be accessed by the majority of rural counties, and through higher level administrative agencies.

Rural counties do not have a data base in which to place their statistics so they can identify areas of concern, and compare themselves with other counties. This lack of a data base then replicates itself, in the fact that state and federal agencies cannot analyze comprehensive and accurate data from the rural sector to get a sense of what funding and aid is needed by the rural sector, and to designate what areas in which to begin to distribute that aid. Thus, we find the chain the promulgates the problem rural counties face and that is adequate funding for their law enforcement agencies. and in turn, we see that state and federal governments lack a clear, comprehensive understanding of rural crime and drug trends, and rural law enforcement needs.

From this, I have attempted to show some initiatives that are being undertaken by various agencies and people, in an attempt to begin to grasp this rural problem. From the Honorable Joseph R. Biden's 1991 Rural Crime Bill, to the TALON grass-roots organization, an awareness of the problems plaguing rural law enforcement is beginning to come to light, to be understood, and to

be rectified. The GAO 1990 Rural Drug Abuse Report, was the first comprehensive analysis done of the rural sector in quite some time, and it recognized many of the problems that rural counties face, the subsequent short-comings of those problems in research conducted in rural areas, such as the GAO report. The significance of these precedents, must not be thrown to the way-side. A recognition of the problems rural counties face in their law enforcement efforts is beginning to be understood. However, I believe that there is a considerable distance yet to traverse, before an long-term solutions can be instituted.

In light of this, I have also attempted to provide some solutions for rural counties to implement in the interim. The use of volunteer officers should be of interest, as well as how to enter the DCE/SP program¹²⁰. The use of multijurisdictional efforts has been a recent method employed by many rural law enforcement departments, but the effectiveness of these efforts has yet to really be determined, partly due to the very problem this paper deals with. Rural county sheriffs do have the ability to implement a variety of initiatives to help in alleviating some of the burdens that they face. But to provide any long-term solutions, requires a joint effort between rural sheriffs across the nation, state agencies, the Justice Department, and Congress. Distribution of large amounts of funding and aid is not the answer, in this author's opinion. First, because of present economic conditions such aid is not readily, and largely available, the

¹²⁰ Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program.

problems rural counties face must be dealt with now. Furthermore, without direction to the funding, bureaucracy and mismanagement could divert the funds from their intended purposes, and thus, nothing is gained. Second, because of the cost of living, funding would have to be continually increased over the long-term, thus draining resources from other agencies, or generating funds through other means which could cause problems, politically, if it requires tax increases in order to be supplemented.

This author believes that an effective, long term solution to part of the problem would be for a fund to be established that would allow rural agencies to develop computerized data bases that could be networked with one another. Monies from this fund would go solely to this area. Once an effective data base had been constructed, agencies such as the National Institute of Justice could begin to analyze the data to gain insight to what rural law enforcement needs as far as funding and appropriate just amounts for it, this would greatly reduce side-tracking of funding; and thus, wasting money. An analysis of rural criminal justice trends, would allow for a comprehensive, government initiative to be implemented that would have a direct bearing on the problems to be solved. This would eliminate legislation that would be passed, but could not be implemented effectively, because of a lack of direction on what areas need the most amount of aid, or the degree in which to assist.

In conclusion, I hope that this paper has shed some light on the problems rural law enforcement faces. If nothing else is

gotten from this paper, I hope that someone who reads it, is sparked by its content into beginning a plan of action that would tackle some of the problems rural law enforcement faces. Again, the purpose of this paper was to show that a rural law enforcement agencies have been placed under a considerable amount of strain in regards to resources, due to the escalation of crime and criminal technology in their areas. I believe that this hypothesis has been adequately proven to be correct, but a greater intent of this paper was to show the expanse of this problem, and the difficulty it is in solving. Short-term solutions to the problems rural law enforcement faces, is not the answer. What is need is a long-term comprehensive plan of action, that is equitable and can be accomplished. This can only happen if certain measures are taken first. . A building-block model is the key here, as successive short-term goals will provide the necessary impetus for completion of the long-term call to action. The first brick that must be laid, is the establishment of an accurate, comprehensive, computerized data base that can be easily networked. From this block, will the foundations be laid for successive short-term goals. And from there, a positive trend can hopefully be established in beginning to not only alleviate the many burdens rural counties face, but to also begin to reduce the amount of crime that occurs in our rural counties and towns.

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
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APPENDICES

Past Month Use of Illicit Drugs, 1979-1991



Source: NIDA National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 1991




Table (A.3)

Substance	Population density		
	Non-SMSA	Medium SMSA	Large SMSA
Alcohol	63.8%	64.1%	63.8%
Cigarettes	31.4	28.3	26.9
Marijuana	14.3	19.3	19.4
Cocaine ^a	2.1	3.8	4.2
"Crack"	1.1	1.7	1.9
Other	2.2	3.5	3.4
Stimulants	4.8	5.1	3.5
Inhalants ^b	3.4	2.4	2.0
Amyl/butyl nitrites	0.9	0.5	0.7
Sedatives ^c	1.5	1.6	1.0
Barbiturates	1.3	1.4	0.9
Methaqualone	0.7	0.5	0.2
Tranquilizers ^c	1.4	1.7	1.3
Hallucinogens ^b	1.4	2.6	2.2
LSD	1.2	2.3	1.6
PCP	0.1	0.3	0.5
Heroin	0.2	0.2	0.1
Other opiates	1.6	1.8	1.2

^aAll surveys contained questions about cocaine use; questions about "crack" and "other cocaine" were listed on 40 and 20 percent of the surveys, respectively. (See Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, 1989, p. 31.)

^bUnadjusted for known underreporting of certain drugs. (See Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, 1989, p. 31.)

^cPrescription drugs are included only if they are taken for nonmedicinal purposes.

Source: L. D. Johnston, P. M. O'Malley, and J. G. Bachman, Drug Use, Drinking, and Smoking: National Survey Results from High School, College, and Young Adults Populations, 1975-1988 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1989), table 8, p. 46.

Substance	Population density		
	Non-SMSA	Medium SMSA	Large SMSA
Alcohol	83.9%	85.7%	86.1%
Cigarettes	a	a	
Marijuana	29.0	34.7	34.3
Cocaine ^b	5.3	8.5	9.1
"Crack"	2.0	3.3	3.9
Other	4.5	7.8	9.8
Stimulants	11.3	11.9	8.8
Inhalants ^c	7.5	6.0	6.9
Amyl/butyl nitrites	2.1	1.4	1.9
Sedatives ^d	3.5	3.8	3.6
Barbiturates	3.2	3.4	2.8
Methaqualone	1.2	1.2	1.8
Tranquilizers ^d	4.5	5.0	4.7
Hallucinogens ^c	3.5	6.0	6.5
LSD	3.1	5.6	5.2
PCP	0.5	0.6	2.8
Heroin	0.5	0.5	0.4
Other opiates	4.4	5.2	4.0

^aNot available.

^bAll surveys contained questions about cocaine use; questions about "crack" and "other cocaine" were listed on 40 and 20 percent of the surveys, respectively. (See Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, 1989, p. 31.)

^cUnadjusted for known underreporting of certain drugs. (See Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, 1989, p. 31.)

^dPrescription drugs are included only if they are taken for nonmedicinal purposes.

Source: L. D. Johnston, P. M. O'Malley, and J. G. Bachman, *Drug Use, Drinking, and Smoking: National Survey Results from High School, College, and Young Adults Populations, 1975-1988* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1989), table 7, p. 44.

Table (A.5)

VA

Substance	Population density		
	Non-SMSA	Medium SMSA	Large SMSA
Alcohol	91.3%	92.3%	92.2%
Cigarettes	68.7	66.9	63.3
Marijuana	41.9	49.7	47.8
Cocaine ^a	8.6	12.8	14.3
"Crack"	3.2	5.1	5.8
Other	9.0	13.1	13.7
Stimulants	20.3	21.3	16.7
Inhalants ^b	17.8	16.1	16.8
Amyl/butyl nitrites	2.9	3.2	3.5
Sedatives ^c	7.5	8.0	7.9
Barbiturates	6.6	7.0	6.3
Methaqualone	2.9	3.3	3.6
Tranquilizers ^c	9.3	9.4	9.4
Hallucinogens ^b	5.8	9.8	10.2
LSD	5.2	8.8	8.2
PCP	1.2	2.6	5.3
Heroin	1.2	1.2	1.0
Other opiates	7.9	9.3	8.1

^aAll surveys contained questions about cocaine use; questions about "crack" and "other cocaine" were listed on 40 and 20 percent of the surveys, respectively. (See Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, 1989, p. 31.)

^bUnadjusted for known underreporting of certain drugs. (See Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, 1989, p. 31.)

^cPrescription drugs are included only if they are taken for nonmedicinal purposes.

Source: L. D. Johnston, P. M. O'Malley, and J. G. Bachman, *Drug Use, Drinking, and Smoking: National Survey Results from High School, College, and Young Adults Populations, 1975-1988* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1989), table 6, p. 42.

Table (A.6)

VIA

Substance	Population density		
	Non-SMSA	Medium SMSA	Large SMSA
Alcohol	4.5%	4.5%	3.5
Marijuana	1.4	3.4	2.6
Cigarettes			
One or more	18.8	17.7	18.0
Half-pack or more	10.7	10.4	10.8
Number of students surveyed	4,200	7,000	4,400

*Thirty-day daily use prevalence rates were unavailable for other drugs.

Source: L. D. Johnston, P. M. O'Malley, and J. G. Bachman, *Drug Use, Drinking, and Smoking: National Survey Results from High School, College, and Young Adults Populations, 1975-1988* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1989), table 9, p. 48.

STATES	ERADICATED PLOTS OUTDOOR	CULTIVATED PLANTS OUTDOOR	SINSEMILLA* PLANTS OUTDOOR	DITCHWEED ERADICATED	INDOOR GROWS SEIZED	INDOOR PLANTS	TOTAL PLANTS ERADICATED	BULK-PROCESSED MARIJUANA	NUMBER OF ARRESTS	WEAPON SEIZURES	ASSETS SEIZED (VALUE)
ALABAMA	2,284	163,294	40,884	0	20	1,600	164,894	5	122	13	\$234,699
ALASKA	0	21	21	0	98	6,583	6,604	39	71	21	\$2,721,902
ARIZONA	50	4,839	1,554	8	11	1,544	6,391	3,847	67	40	\$117,522
ARKANSAS	1,733	106,405	56,314	0	44	4,138	110,543	379	192	128	\$1,134,484
CALIFORNIA	1,059	151,529	151,529	50	303	45,562	197,141	2,651	966	687	\$6,833,463
COLORADO	58	13,211	11,811	17,022	53	9,888	40,121	107	105	16	\$1,883,080
CONNECTICUT	60	2,404	2,075	0	4	787	3,191	100	9	13	\$88,430
DELAWARE	100	13,365	0	0	27	26	13,391	0	3	0	\$500
FLORIDA	2,023	92,190	10,140	0	156	12,147	104,337	474	661	99	\$2,912,734
GEORGIA	1,411	300,583	238,186	0	12	1,763	302,346	3	153	60	\$965,287
HAWAII	3,351	528,755	348,978	0	9	3,235	531,990	0	501	34	\$1,675,707
IDAHO	26	1,675	1,210	0	30	3,039	4,714	0	39	16	\$195,042
ILLINOIS	1,141	337,730	27,749	9,080,937	49	2,900	9,421,557	990	239	35	\$1,118,830
INDIANA	2,313	206,494	13,052	69,930,512	86	19,025	70,156,031	2,891	474	96	\$1,339,668
IOWA	55	62,917	0	627,080	7	799	690,796	136	35	12	\$42,080
KANSAS	509	21,751	7,217	10,774,960	21	3,795	10,800,506	1,183	109	54	\$1,361,269
KENTUCKY	8,380	809,366	728,339	8,000	58	6,722	824,088	0	439	141	\$1,496,039
LOUISIANA	466	79,009	70	0	38	11,877	90,886	34	195	25	\$377,267
MAINE	382	20,794	2,388	0	65	3,648	24,442	49	163	82	\$404,404
MARYLAND	608	11,210	2,631	0	13	803	12,013	15,696	108	74	\$997,950
MASSACHUSETTS	313	9,185	9,088	296	122	3,336	12,817	0	305	143	\$1,807,870
MICHIGAN	2,131	50,871	8,646	2,325	62	3,053	56,249	396	125	99	\$565,795
MINNESOTA	74	191,790	18,020	2,221,450	58	7,664	2,420,904	982	159	92	\$1,170,900
MISSISSIPPI	683	72,947	7,290	0	8	846	73,793	112	77	23	\$340,350
MISSOURI	1,163	104,693	49,074	13,012,323	34	2,003	13,119,019	4,814	436	126	\$1,271,074
MONTANA	6	710	0	100	23	1,469	2,279	71	188	26	\$1,431,782
NEBRASKA	11	2,960	10	9,299,298	47	2,130	9,304,388	219	142	12	\$23,102
NEVADA	10	365	365	0	20	2,159	2,524	106	44	28	\$1,029,060
NEW HAMPSHIRE	94	2,418	322	1,101	24	623	4,142	0	67	29	\$370,434
NEW JERSEY	54	1411	230	0	11	605	2016	338	45	56	\$256,000
NEW MEXICO	50	4,208	1,660	0	30	1,132	5,340	41	93	78	\$102,406
NEW YORK	201	11,693	7,316	0	41	3,314	15,007	247	114	85	\$3,018,966
NORTH CAROLINA	4,048	198,470	20,294	0	26	18,188	216,658	0	244	64	\$139,000
NORTH DAKOTA	4	23,020	0	3,480,000	6	324	3,503,344	0	10	1	\$100
OHIO	961	56,684	16,972	0	156	7,355	64,039	153	271	296	\$1,902,183
OKLAHOMA	1,464	790,623	13,985	4,845,429	41	2,175	5,638,227	117	143	63	\$368,374
OREGON	609	16,311	12,714	0	415	36,227	52,538	267	648	1225	\$2,807,280
PENNSYLVANIA	427	12,703	1,533	35	35	895	13,633	20	38	13	\$132,550
RHODE ISLAND	26	1,113	0	0	7	448	1,561	0	13	9	\$2,250
SOUTH CAROLINA	961	22,801	0	0	32	1,600	24,401	300	162	23	\$1,523,204
SOUTH DAKOTA	99	56,508	85	3,676,431	9	270	3,733,209	50	22	1	\$226,706
TENNESSEE	1,357	508,816	366,208	0	70	2,539	511,355	117	325	103	\$1,198,775
TEXAS	96	22,997	13,540	608,559	17	2,738	634,294	59	25	26	\$334,268
UTAH	17	1,434	851	19	6	280	1,733	201	27	8	\$41,420
VERMONT	119	6,422	6,422	6,741	11	3,187	16,350	106	74	55	\$86,880
VIRGINIA	687	27,610	525	0	51	1,856	29,466	113	127	69	\$63,315
WASHINGTON	120	5,751	5,751	0	262	30,104	35,855	266	416	290	\$5,043,716
WEST VIRGINIA	398	47,229	41,244	227,352	12	2,078	276,659	563	96	29	\$417,248
WISCONSIN	464	78,076	5,442	5,964,331	100	3,446	6,045,853	759	266	112	\$1,011,089
WYOMING	4	125	0	1,700	8	983	2,808	40	11	18	\$244,021
TOTAL	42,660	5,257,486	2,251,735	133,786,059	2,848	282,908	139,326,453	39,041	9,364	4,848	\$52,830,475
TOTAL 1990 FINAL FIGURES	29,469	7,328,769	2,039,597	118,547,983	1,669		125,876,752		5,729	3,210	\$38,691,584
TOTAL 1989 FINAL FIGURES	46,699	5,635,696	2,084,921	124,288,999	1,398		129,924,695		5,761	2,320	\$29,545,033

*NUMBER OF SINSEMILLA IS PART OF CULTIVATED PLANTS OUTDOOR

Table (A.7)

Federal Trafficking Penalties - Marijuana

Quantity	Description	First Offense	Second Offense
1,000 kg or more; or 1,000 or more plants	Marijuana Mixture containing detectable quantity*	Not less than 10 years, not more than life. If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years, not more than life. Fine not more than \$4 million individual, \$10 million other than individual	Not less than 20 years, not more than life. If death or serious injury, not less than life. Fine not more than \$8 million individual, \$20 million other than individual.
100 kg to 1,000 kg; or 100-999 plants	Marijuana Mixture containing detectable quantity*	Not less than 5 years, not more than 40 years. If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years, not more than life. Fine not more than \$2 million individual, \$5 million other than individual.	Not less than 10 years, not more than life. If death or serious injury, not less than life. Fine not more than \$4 million individual, \$10 million other than individual.
50 to 100 kg	Marijuana	Not more than 20 years. If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years, not more than life. Fine \$1 million individual, \$5 million other than individual.	Not more than 30 years. If death or serious injury, life. Fine \$2 million individual, \$10 million other than individual.
10 to 100 kg	Hashish		
1 to 100 kg	Hashish Oil		
50-99 plants	Marijuana		
Less than 50 kg	Marijuana	Not more than 5 years. Fine not more than \$250,000, \$1 million other than individual.	Not more than 10 years. Fine \$500,000 individual, \$2 million other than individual.
Less than 10 kg	Hashish		
Less than 1 kg	Hashish Oil		

*Includes Hashish and Hashish Oil

(Marijuana is a Schedule I Controlled Substance)

Federal Trafficking Penalties - Marijuana

Quantity	Description	First Offense	Second Offense
1,000 kg or more; or 1,000 or more plants	Marijuana Mixture containing detectable quantity*	Not less than 10 years, not more than life. If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years, not more than life. Fine not more than \$4 million individual, \$10 million other than individual	Not less than 20 years, not more than life. If death or serious injury, not less than life. Fine not more than \$8 million individual, \$20 million other than individual.
100 kg to 1,000 kg; or 100-999 plants	Marijuana Mixture containing detectable quantity*	Not less than 5 years, not more than 40 years. If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years, not more than life. Fine not more than \$2 million individual, \$5 million other than individual.	Not less than 10 years, not more than life. If death or serious injury, not less than life. Fine not more than \$4 million individual, \$10 million other than individual.
50 to 100 kg	Marijuana	Not more than 20 years. If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years, not more than life. Fine \$1 million individual, \$5 million other than individual.	Not more than 30 years. If death or serious injury, life. Fine \$2 million individual, \$10 million other than individual.
10 to 100 kg	Hashish		
1 to 100 kg	Hashish Oil		
50-99 plants	Marijuana		
Less than 50 kg	Marijuana	Not more than 5 years. Fine not more than \$250,000, \$1 million other than individual.	Not more than 10 years. Fine \$500,000 individual, \$2 million other than individual.
Less than 10 kg	Hashish		
Less than 1 kg	Hashish Oil		

*includes Hashish and Hashish Oil

(Marijuana is a Schedule I Controlled Substance)

Wholesale and Retail Prices Marijuana July - Sept 1990

Area	Primary Sources	Wholesale Price (Per Pound)		Retail Price (Per Ounce)	
		Commercial	Sinsemilla	Commercial	Sinsemilla
National	MEX/COL/DOM	\$300-\$2,000	\$500-\$4,000	\$25-\$200	\$80-\$300
Atlanta	DOM/MEX	\$800-\$1,000	N/A	\$100	N/A
Boston	COL/MEX/DOM	\$1,000	\$2,300	\$180-\$200	\$125-\$250
Chicago	COL/MEX	\$800-\$1,200	\$2,500-\$3,000	\$110-\$130	\$155-\$185
Dallas	MEX	\$700-\$1,200	\$850-\$2,000	\$100-\$125	\$125-\$175
Denver	DOM/MEX/COL	\$900-\$2,000	\$1,000-\$2,600	\$40-\$100	\$135-\$250
Detroit	DOM/COL	\$850-\$1,300	\$1,100-\$3,600	\$80-\$120	\$150-\$250
Houston	MEX/DOM	\$300-\$600	\$500-\$800	\$25-\$75	\$80-\$100
Los Angeles	MEX/DOM/THAI	\$800-\$1,500	\$1,500-\$2,500	\$80-\$200	\$250-\$300
Miami	DOM/COL/JAM	\$300-\$600	\$800-\$2,000	\$60-\$100	\$150-\$250
New Orleans	MEX/COL/DOM	\$600-\$1,200	N/A	\$80-\$150	N/A
New York	DOM/MEX	\$1,200-\$1,600	\$1,600-\$2,200	\$125-\$175	\$150-\$200
Newark	MEX/JAM	\$1,000-\$2,000	\$1,500-\$2,100	\$140-\$200	N/A
Philadelphia	MEX/JAM	\$1,100-\$2,000	\$2,500-\$3,000	\$100-\$140	N/A
Phoenix	MEX/DOM	\$500-\$1,000	\$800-\$1,000	N/A	N/A
San Diego	MEX	\$800-\$950	N/A	\$75-\$200	N/A
San Francisco	DOM	\$900-\$1,500	\$3,200-\$4,100	\$60-\$100	\$300
Seattle	DOM/MEX	\$400-\$1,500	\$1,500-\$3,000	\$50-\$125	\$100-\$250
St. Louis	DOM	\$400-\$1,400	\$700-\$2,500	\$40-\$160	\$150-\$300
Washington, D.C.	DOM/MEX/COL	\$500-\$1,600	\$1,200-\$3,200	\$50-\$160	\$150-\$250

Hashish Note: Because of U.S. preference for marijuana, hashish prices are unavailable in many regions. When encountered, however, retail price per lb. averages between \$1,200-\$2,000 and \$80-\$400 per ounce. THC content of hashish seized in the U.S. during 1990 averaged 6.8%, while the THC content of hashish oil in 1990 averaged 21.1%. Hashish oil sells for \$35-\$45 per gram.

Marijuana Summary Data

Type	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990 (Sept)
Commercial Grade					
Wholesale (pound)	\$350-\$700	\$350-\$1,450	\$350-\$1,800	\$350-\$2,000	\$300-\$2,000
Retail (ounce)	\$45-\$120	\$60-\$130	\$30-\$250	\$30-\$250	\$25-\$300
Sinsemilla					
Wholesale (pound)	\$800-\$2,000	\$1,400-\$2,100	\$800-\$3,000	\$700-\$3,000	\$400-\$4,100
Retail (ounce)	\$100-\$200	\$160-\$210	\$120-\$300	\$100-\$300	\$80-\$350

Prepared by DEA, Office of Intelligence, OISD

Number of Indoor Cultivation Operations Seized During CY 1985-CY 1990





Table (A.10)

Ranking of Marijuana Source Countries 1989*



*1990 FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE

Marijuana Production Estimate			
(U.S. Customary)			
	Year	Net Cultivation (acres)	Net Production (tons)
Mexico	1989	133,133	33,220
	1990	86,574	21,687
Colombia	1989	5,607	3,080
	1990	3,705	1,650
Jamaica	1989	692	209
	1990	3,013	908
Belize	1989	185	72
	1990	161	66
Others	1989	na	3,850
	1990	na	3,850
United States	1989	na	5,500 - 6,600
	1990	na	5,500 - 6,600
Marijuana Availability			
(Tons)			
		<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>
Gross Marijuana Available:		45,931 - 47,031	33,660 - 34,760
LESS Seizures*, seizures in transit and losses:		< 3,850 - 4,950 >	< 3,850 - 4,950 >
Net Marijuana Available:		40,981 - 43,181	28,710 - 30,910
<i>Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1991</i>			

See following page for metric.

* U.S. seizures in this table and the table which follows include coastal, border, and internal (not domestic eradicated sites): seizures in transit include those on the high seas, in transit countries, from aircraft, etc. The loss factor includes marijuana lost because of abandoned shipments, undistributed stockpiles, and inefficient handling and transport, etc.

Marijuana Production Estimate			
(Metric)			
	Year	Net Cultivation (hectares)	Net Production (metric tons)
Mexico	1989	53,900	30,200
	1990	35,050	19,715
Colombia	1989	2,270	2,800
	1990	1,500	1,500
Jamaica	1989	280	190
	1990	1,220	825
Belize	1989	75	65
	1990	65	60
Others	1989	na	3,500
	1990	na	3,500
U.S.	1989	na	5,000 - 6,000
	1990	na	5,000 - 6,000
Marijuana Availability			
(metric tons)			
		<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>
Gross Marijuana Available:		41,755 - 42,755	30,600 - 31,600
LESS Seizures, seizures in transit and losses:		< 3,500 - 4,500 >	< 3,500 - 4,500 >
Net Marijuana Available:		38,255 - 39,255	26,100 - 28,100

Source: *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1991*

APPENDIX II
Rural Crime and Drug Control
Act of 1991

102D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

DRAFT

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. BIDEN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to
the Committee on _____

A BILL

To improve crime and drug control in rural areas, and for
other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assem-*
3 *bled,*

4 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

5 This Act may be cited as the "Rural Crime and Drug
6 Control Act of 1991".

1 **TITLE I—FIGHTING DRUG**
2 **TRAFFICKING IN RURAL AREAS**
3 **SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATIONS FOR RURAL LAW ENFORCEMENT**
4 **AGENCIES.**

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5 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—Section
6 1001(a) of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
7 Streets Act of 1968 is amended by adding at the end there-
8 of the following new paragraph:

9 “(7) There are authorized to be appropriated
10 \$50,000,000 for fiscal year 1992 and such sums as
11 may be necessary for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 to
12 carry out part O of this title.”.

13 (b) **AMENDMENT TO BASE ALLOCATION.**—Section
14 1501(a)(2)(A) of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and
15 Safe Streets Act of 1968 is amended by striking
16 “\$100,000” and inserting in lieu thereof “\$250,000”.

17 **SEC. 102. RURAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCES.**

18 (a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—Not later than 90 days after the
19 date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General, in
20 consultation with the Governors, mayors, and chief execu-
21 tive officers of State and local law enforcement agencies,
22 shall establish a Rural Drug Enforcement Task Force in
23 each of the Federal judicial districts which encompass sig-
24 nificant rural lands.

1 (b) TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP.—The task forces estab-
2 lished under subsection (a) shall be chaired by the United
3 States Attorney for the respective Federal judicial district.
4 The task forces shall include representatives from—

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- 5 (1) State and local law enforcement agencies;
6 (2) the Drug Enforcement Administration;
7 (3) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
8 (4) the Immigration and Naturalization Service;
9 and
10 (5) law enforcement officers from the United
11 States Park Police, United States Forest Service and
12 Bureau of Land Management, and such other Federal
13 law enforcement agencies as the Attorney General
14 may direct.

15 **SEC. 103. CROSS-DESIGNATION OF FEDERAL OFFICERS.**

16 The Attorney General shall cross-designate up to 100
17 law enforcement officers from each of the agencies speci-
18 fied under section 102(b)(5) with jurisdiction to enforce
19 the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act on non-
20 Federal lands to the extent necessary to effect the purposes
21 of this title.

22 **SEC. 104. RURAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT TRAINING.**

23 (a) SPECIALIZED TRAINING FOR RURAL OFFICERS.—The
24 Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
25 shall develop a specialized course of instruction devoted to

1 training law enforcement officers from rural agencies in
2 the investigation of drug trafficking and related crimes.

3 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is au-
4 thorized to be appropriated \$1,000,000 in each of the fiscal
5 years 1992, 1993, and 1994 to carry out the purposes of
6 subsection (a).

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7 **TITLE II—FEDERAL LAW**
8 **ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES**

9 **SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT**
10 **AGENCIES.**

11 There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year
12 1992, in addition to any other appropriations for the Drug
13 Enforcement Administration, \$45,000,000 to hire, equip
14 and train not less than 350 agents and necessary support
15 personnel to expand DEA investigations and operations
16 against drug trafficking organizations in rural areas.

17 **TITLE III—INCREASING PENALTIES**
18 **FOR CERTAIN DRUG TRAFFICK-**
19 **ING OFFENSES**

20 **SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.**

21 This subtitle may be cited as the “Ice Enforcement
22 Act of 1991”.

1 SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING FEDERAL PENALTIES.

2 (a) LARGE AMOUNT.—Section 401(b)(1)(A) of the
3 Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)) is
4 amended—

5 (1) in clause (vii) by striking “or” at the end
6 thereof;

7 (2) by inserting “or” at the end of clause (viii);
8 and

9 (3) by adding at the end thereof the following
10 new clause:

11 “(ix) 25 grams or more of methamphet-
12 amine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its iso-
13 mers, that is 80 percent pure and crystalline in
14 form.”.

15 (b) SMALLER AMOUNT.—Section 401(b)(1)(B) of the
16 Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)) is
17 amended as follows:

18 (1) at the end of clause (vii) by striking “or”;

19 (2) by inserting at the end of clause (viii) the
20 word “or”; and

21 (3) by adding at the end thereof the following
22 new clause:

23 “(ix) 5 grams or more of methamphet-
24 amine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its iso-
25 mers, that is 80 percent pure and crystalline in
26 form.”.

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1 **TITLE IV—RURAL DRUG**
2 **TREATMENT**

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3 **SEC. 401. RURAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT.**

4 Part A of title V of the Public Health Service Act (42
5 U.S.C. 290aa et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
6 thereof the following new section:

7 **“SEC. 509H. RURAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT.**

8 **“(a) IN GENERAL.—**The Secretary, acting through the
9 Administrator, shall establish a program to provide grants
10 to hospitals, community health centers, migrant health cen-
11 ters, health entities of Indian tribes and tribal organizations
12 (as defined in section 1913(b)(5)), and other appropriate
13 entities that serve nonmetropolitan areas to assist such en-
14 tities in developing and implementing projects that pro-
15 vide, or expand the availability of, substance abuse treat-
16 ment services.

17 **“(b) REQUIREMENTS.—**To receive a grant under this
18 section a hospital, community health center, or treatment
19 facility shall—

20 **“(1)** serve a nonmetropolitan area or have a
21 substance abuse treatment program that is designed
22 to serve a nonmetropolitan area;

23 **“(2)** operate, or have a plan to operate, an ap-
24 proved substance abuse treatment program;

1 “(3) agree to coordinate the project assisted
2 under this section with substance abuse treatment ac-
3 tivities within the State and local agencies responsi-
4 ble for substance abuse treatment; and

5 “(4) prepare and submit an application in ac-
6 cordance with subsection (c).

7 “(c) APPLICATION.—

8 “(1) IN GENERAL.—To be eligible to receive a
9 grant under this section an entity shall submit an ap-
10 plication to the Administrator at such time, in such
11 manner, and containing such information as the Ad-
12 ministrator shall require.

13 “(2) COORDINATED APPLICATIONS.—State agen-
14 cies that are responsible for substance abuse treat-
15 ment may submit coordinated grant applications on
16 behalf of entities that are eligible for grants pursuant
17 to subsection (b).

18 “(d) SPECIAL CONSIDERATION.—In awarding grants
19 under this section the Administrator shall give priority
20 to—

21 “(1) projects sponsored by rural hospitals that
22 are qualified to receive rural health care transition
23 grants as provided for in section 4005(e) of the Om-
24 nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987;

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1 “(2) projects serving nonmetropolitan areas that
2 establish links and coordinate activities between hos-
3 pitals, community health centers, community mental
4 health centers, and substance abuse treatment cen-
5 ters; and

6 “(3) projects that are designed to serve areas
7 that have no available existing treatment facilities.

8 “(e) DURATION.—Grants awarded under subsection
9 (a) shall be for a period not to exceed 3 years, except that
10 the Administrator may establish a procedure for renewal of
11 grants under subsection (a).

12 “(f) GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION.—To the extent prac-
13 ticable, the Administrator shall provide grants to fund at
14 least one project in each State.

15 “(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—For the
16 purpose of carrying out this section there are authorized to
17 be appropriated \$25,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
18 1992, 1993, and 1994.”.

19 **TITLE V—RURAL DRUG**
20 **PREVENTION**

21 **SEC. 501. RURAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE PREVENTION.**

22 Part A of title V of the Public Health Service Act (42
23 U.S.C. 290aa et seq.), as amended by section 401, is
24 amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
25 section:

DRAFT

1 "SEC. 509I. RURAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE PREVENTION.

2 "(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, acting through the
3 Administrator, shall make grants to public and nonprofit
4 private entities that serve nonmetropolitan areas to assist
5 such entities in developing and implementing projects that
6 provide, or expand the availability of, substance abuse pre-
7 vention services.

8 "(b) REQUIREMENTS.—To receive a grant under this
9 section an entity shall—

10 "(1) serve a nonmetropolitan area or have a
11 substance abuse treatment program that is designed
12 to serve a nonmetropolitan area;

13 "(2) agree to coordinate the project assisted
14 under this section with substance abuse prevention
15 activities within the State and local agencies respon-
16 sible for substance abuse prevention; and

17 "(3) prepare and submit an application in ac-
18 cordance with subsection (c).

19 "(c) APPLICATION.—

20 "(1) IN GENERAL.—To be eligible to receive a
21 grant under this section an entity shall submit an ap-
22 plication to the Administrator as such time, in such
23 manner, and containing such information as the Ad-
24 ministrator shall require.

25 "(2) COORDINATED APPLICATIONS.—State or
26 local agencies that are responsible for substance

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1 abuse prevention may submit coordinated grant ap-
2 plications on behalf of entities that are eligible for
3 grants pursuant to subsection (b).

4 “(d) SPECIAL CONSIDERATION.—In awarding grants
5 under this section the Administrator shall give priority
6 to—

7 “(1) applications from community based orga-
8 nizations with experience serving nonmetropolitan
9 areas;

10 “(2) projects that are designed to serve areas
11 that have no available existing treatment facilities.

12 “(e) DURATION.—Grants awarded under this section
13 shall be for a period not to exceed 3 years, except that the
14 Administrator may establish a procedure for renewal of
15 grants under subsection (a).

16 “(f) GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION.—To the extent prac-
17 ticable, the Administrator shall provide grants to fund at
18 least 1 project in each State.

19 “(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—For the
20 purpose of carrying out this section, there are authorized to
21 be appropriated \$25,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
22 1992, 1993, and 1994.”

23 SEC. 502. CLEARINGHOUSE PROGRAM.

24 Section 509 of the Public Health Service Act (42
25 U.S.C. 290aa-7) is amended—

DRAFT

1 (1) in paragraph (3), by striking "and" at the
2 end thereof;

3 (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at
4 the end thereof and inserting a semicolon; and

5 (3) by adding at the end thereof the following
6 new paragraphs—

7 " (5) gather information pertaining to rural drug
8 abuse treatment and education projects funded by the
9 Administrator and other such projects throughout the
10 United States; and

11 " (6) disseminate such information to rural hos-
12 pitals, community health centers, community mental
13 health centers, treatment facilities, community orga-
14 nizations, and other interested persons."

15 **TITLE VI—RURAL LAND RECOVERY** 16 **ACT**

17 **SEC. 601. DIRECTOR OF RURAL LAND RECOVERY.**

18 Each of the task forces established under section
19 102(a) shall include one Director of Rural Land Recovery
20 whose duties shall include the coordination of all activities
21 described in section 102.

22 **SEC. 602. PROSECUTION OF CLANDESTINE LABORATORY OPERA-** 23 **TORS.**

24 (a) **INCLUSION OF INDICTMENTS OF ADDITIONAL COUNTS**
25 **FOR VIOLATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW.—State and Fed-**

DRAFT

1 eral prosecutors, when bringing charges against the opera-
2 tors of clandestine methamphetamine and other dangerous
3 drug laboratories shall, to the fullest extent possible, in-
4 clude, in addition to drug-related counts, counts involving
5 infringements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
6 Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.) or any other environ-
7 mental protection Act, including—

- 8 (1) illegal disposal of hazardous waste; and
9 (2) knowing endangerment of the environment.

10 (b) **SUITS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH-RELATED**
11 **DAMAGES.**—State and Federal prosecutors and private citi-
12 zens may bring suit against the operators of clandestine
13 methamphetamine and other dangerous drug laboratories
14 for environmental and health-related damages caused by
15 the operators in their manufacture of illicit substances.

DRAFT

APPENDIX III

Draft of Second Rural Crime Bill

102D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

DRAFT

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. KASTEN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To establish a rural crime prevention strategy, to address the problem of crime against the elderly, to combat child abuse, sexual violence, and violence against women, to enhance the rights of law enforcement officers, to enhance the rights of crime victims, to address the problem of gangs and serious juvenile offenders, to restore an enforceable Federal death penalty, to impose minimum mandatory sentences without release, to establish mandatory judicial reforms, to reform the lives of prisoners and the prison system, and for other purposes:

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1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assem-*
3 *bled,*

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the "Strategy to Eliminate
3 Crime in the Urban and Rural Environment Act of 1991".

4 SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

5 The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title.
- Sec. 2. Table of contents.

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TITLE I--RURAL CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY

- Sec. 101. Findings.
- Sec. 102. Strategy to address rural crime.
- Sec. 103. National Institute of Justice national assessment.
- Sec. 104. Pilot programs.
- Sec. 105. Funding.

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1 **TITLE I—RURAL CRIME PREVENTION**

2 **STRATEGY**

3 **TITLE I—RURAL CRIME**

4 **PREVENTION STRATEGY**

5 **SEC. 101. FINDINGS.**

6 **The Congress makes the following findings:**

7 **(1) The traditional supportive roles of the**
8 **family, church, school, and community have declined**
9 **in importance as a positive social factor influencing**
10 **the prevention and control of crime in rural areas. As**
11 **a result in recent years rural areas have experienced**
12 **a marked increase in crime rates. This increase is**
13 **taking its toll on rural law enforcement practitioners**

1 who are already encumbered by numerous character-
2 istics that are unique to their rural circumstances.

3 (2) Compounding the increase in crime rates,
4 rural police unlike their urban counterparts, are likely
5 to encounter a multitude of nontraditional police
6 tasks such as fire and railroad emergencies, search
7 and rescue missions, animal control problems, live-
8 stock theft, wildlife enforcement, illegal distilleries,
9 illegal crop farming and drug manufacturing, rural
10 drug trafficking, and toxic dumping.

11 (3) These problems are further exacerbated by
12 the rural officer's distinct disadvantage with respect
13 to the lack of adequate training to manage these
14 varied assignments, the low degree of specialization
15 of job tasks, unique job stress factors, and inad-
16 equate data resources. Inadequate rural crime statics
17 and data analysis capabilities further frustrate the
18 rural police organization's ability to cope with the
19 nature, extent, and trends of rural crime.

20 (4) Rural law enforcement agencies are at a
21 critical juncture, and strategic planning and action
22 are imperative. The Domestic Chemical Action
23 Group as convened by the National Institute of Jus-
24 tice in October 1990 has recommended that rural
25 police receive training in various safety issues relat-

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1 ed to the identification, investigation, and seizure of
2 illicit drug and chemical laboratories located in rural
3 areas. Without such specialized training officials will
4 face a high probability of explosions endangering
5 police personnel and the community. National Insti-
6 tute of Justice sponsored research of environmental
7 crime in major urban areas, including Los Angeles,
8 has revealed the lack of police training in the identi-
9 fication, investigation, and clean-up of toxic and haz-
10 ardous waste areas. It can be said with certainty that
11 this recognized need for hazardous materials training
12 is equally critical for rural police organizations.

DRAF

13 **SEC. 102. STRATEGY TO ADDRESS RURAL CRIME.**

14 The purpose of this title is to address the growing
15 problems of rural crime in a systematic and effective
16 manner with a program of practical and focused research,
17 development, and dissemination designed to assist States
18 and units of local government in rural areas throughout the
19 country in implementing specific programs and strategies
20 which offer a high probability of improving the function-
21 ing of their criminal justice systems.

22 **SEC. 103. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE NATIONAL ASSESS-**
23 **MENT.**

24 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of the National Insti-
25 tute of Justice (referred to in this title as the “Director”)

1 shall conduct a national assessment of the nature and
2 extent of rural crime in the United States, the needs of law
3 enforcement and criminal justice professionals in rural
4 States and communities, and promising strategies to re-
5 spond effectively to those challenges, including—

6 (1) the problem of clandestine drug laboratories;
7 changing patterns in their location and operation;
8 safety and liability issues for both law enforcement
9 officers and the community in the identification, in-
10 vestigation, seizure, and clean-up of clandestine lab-
11 oratories;

12 (2) other environmental crimes, such as the
13 dumping of hazardous and toxic wastes; the pollu-
14 tion of streams, rivers, and ground water; and access
15 of rural communities to the expertise necessary to
16 successfully identify, investigate, and prosecute such
17 crimes;

18 (3) the cultivation of illegal crops, such as mari-
19 juana, including changing patterns in location and
20 techniques for identification, investigation, and de-
21 struction;

22 (4) the problems of drug and alcohol abuse in
23 rural communities, including law enforcement and
24 criminal justice response and access to treatment
25 services;

DRAFT

1 (5) the problems of family violence and child
2 abuse, including law enforcement and criminal jus-
3 tice response and access to services for victims of
4 such crimes;

5 (6) the problems of juvenile delinquency and
6 vandalism as they affect rural communities;

7 (7) the access of law enforcement and criminal
8 justice professionals in rural communities to the
9 services of crime laboratories, AFIS systems, and
10 other technological support;

11 (8) the access of law enforcement and criminal
12 justice professionals in rural communities to profes-
13 sional training and development and the identifica-
14 tion of models for the delivery of such training; and

15 (9) the special problems of drug abuse in juris-
16 dictions with populations of 50,000 or less.

17 (b) FINAL REPORT.—The Director shall submit the na-
18 tional assessment to the President and Congress not later
19 than 12 months after the date of enactment of this title.

20 (c) DISSEMINATION OF REPORT.—Based on the results
21 of the national assessment and analysis of successful and
22 promising strategies in these areas, the Director shall dis-
23 seminate the results not only through reports, publications,
24 and clearinghouse services, but also through programs of

DRAF

1 training and technical assistance, designed to address the
2 realities and challenges of rural law enforcement.

3 SEC. 104. PILOT PROGRAMS.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Director is authorized to make
5 grants to local law enforcement agencies for pilot pro-
6 grams and field tests of particularly promising strategies
7 and models, which could then serve as the basis for dem-
8 onstration and education programs under the Bureau of
9 Justice Assistance Discretionary Grant Program.

10 (b) TYPES OF PROGRAMS.—Pilot programs funded
11 under this section may include—

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12 (1) programs to develop and demonstrate new
13 or improved approaches or techniques for rural
14 criminal justice systems;

15 (2) programs of training and technical assistance
16 to meet the needs of rural law enforcement and
17 criminal justice professionals including safety;

18 (3) a rural initiative to study and improve the
19 response to traffic safety problems and drug interdic-
20 tion;

21 (4) an ongoing program to assist law enforce-
22 ment professionals in dealing with the hazards of
23 clandestine drug laboratories;

1 (5) victim assistance information to assist de-
2 partments in beginning and maintaining strong pro-
3 grams to assist victims and witnesses of crime;

4 (6) emergency preparedness information for
5 community groups concerned about disaster pre-
6 paredness on the family and community level; and

7 (7) a program targeted at communities of less
8 than 50,000 stressing the co-production of public
9 safety through extensive partnership efforts between
10 law enforcement, other local government agencies,
11 businesses, schools, community and social organiza-
12 tions, and citizens.

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13 **SEC. 105. FUNDING.**

14 There are authorized to be appropriated \$5,000,000 to
15 to carry out the national assessment and pilot programs
16 required by this title.

APPENDIX IV

1992 National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary

**NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET
BY FUNCTION**

(Budget Authority -- \$ Millions)	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
INTELLIGENCE													
U.S. Forest Service	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.4
Drug Enforcement Administration	20.9	23.0	21.5	23.6	25.4	25.0	36.2	34.4	32.3	39.0	43.9	54.0	62.6
Federal Bureau of Investigation	0.6	0.6	5.3	4.5	5.5	5.4	7.1	9.1	10.4	9.6	23.6	24.5	26.8
INS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.3	1.4
OCDETF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	7.8	8.4	9.7
Special Forfeiture Fund	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0
U.S. Customs	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.8	4.5	4.9	3.7	8.3	9.8	11.4	12.1	13.1	13.7
FinCEN	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.6	12.9	14.3
	23.1	25.6	29.2	30.9	35.4	35.6	47.2	52.8	53.4	64.9	104.1	114.6	128.9
STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE													
U.S. Forest Service	0.4	0.4	0.4	2.0	2.2	2.2	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.7	2.3	2.3
Department of Defense	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.6	107.4	144.0	157.8	171.3
Bureau of Indian Affairs	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	2.8	5.4	3.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6
Bureau of Land Management	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Fish and Wildlife Service	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1
Asset Forfeiture Fund	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	47.0	76.0	157.3	176.8	266.8	247.0	257.0
Bureau of Prisons (NIC)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	5.1	5.8	6.2	7.1
Drug Enforcement Administration	21.8	19.2	23.9	22.6	29.2	12.5	13.2	11.4	13.8	15.6	16.1	9.4	14.2
Office of Justice Programs	4.5	4.2	6.7	7.2	12.0	12.7	214.6	71.5	126.6	348.4	413.0	425.4	402.7
OCDETF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5	5.0	5.3	5.3
ONDCP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	32.9	36.0	0.0
Nat. Highway Traffic Safety Admin.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	5.1	6.7	7.9	8.3
Customs Forfeiture Fund	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	13.5	24.5	21.2	0.0	29.9	119.4	120.0	120.0
	27.8	25.0	32.5	33.4	51.2	61.7	307.5	186.5	334.1	696.5	1,015.5	1,020.4	991.4
REGULATORY AND COMPLIANCE													
U.S. Forest Service	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.6	1.0	2.7	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Food & Drug Administration	1.4	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	6.5	7.2	6.5	6.7	7.0
Drug Enforcement Administration	17.0	20.3	25.0	21.9	25.0	12.3	15.3	16.9	19.1	19.1	21.7	21.7	23.4
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	1.6	2.2	3.2	2.9	3.4
	18.5	21.4	26.0	23.0	25.9	14.5	17.9	21.9	29.8	28.5	31.4	31.3	33.7
OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT													
Asset Forfeiture Fund	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.0	73.0	85.0	114.3	156.5	154.3	174.0	182.0
ONDCP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	29.0	46.7	56.1	56.1
Special Forfeiture Fund	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.0	73.0	85.0	115.5	185.5	201.0	231.1	238.1
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT													
Agricultural Research Service	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.5	6.4	6.7	6.7
U.S. Forest Service	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.5
Department of Defense	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.6	61.0	97.9	69.3
Drug Enforcement Administration	1.4	1.8	3.9	2.9	2.2	1.5	4.3	3.2	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.9
Federal Bureau of Investigation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	5.1	5.6
INS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	1.0	0.4	0.4
Office of Justice Programs	0.0	0.2	2.2	0.3	0.9	2.7	4.7	9.6	11.6	14.7	17.9	16.8	21.6
OCDETF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.4
ONDCP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.5	1.5	0.9
Special Forfeiture Fund	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	10.0
FinCEN	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	1.6	3.9
U.S. Coast Guard	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	1.5	3.6	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.2	3.7
Nat. Highway Traffic Safety Admin.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.3	1.2
U.S. Customs	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.1	3.7	4.8	4.7	3.4	3.7	3.9
Pres. Com. Organized Crime	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.6	2.2	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

**NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET
BY FUNCTION**

National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary

1992

(Budget Authority -- \$ Millions)	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
INTERDICTION													
Department of Defense	0.0	4.9	9.7	14.8	54.8	105.7	405.3	94.7	329.1	543.4	751.0	901.0	889.6
Bureau of Land Management	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	2.3	2.8
OTIA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.0	1.3	0.8	0.6
Immigration and Naturalization Service	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.7	17.2	17.5	52.0	48.6	62.6	66.2	74.2
U.S. Coast Guard	227.5	328.9	359.9	508.2	506.6	397.8	553.0	509.8	628.9	661.2	714.6	666.9	675.4
Federal Aviation Administration	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.8	3.2	9.3	16.5	16.3	24.4
U.S. Customs	122.0	124.0	103.6	183.7	245.3	239.7	367.1	317.5	427.0	488.3	481.8	563.4	552.6
Payments to Puerto Rico	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.8	7.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	349.7	458.0	473.5	706.9	807.3	744.0	1,350.5	948.1	1,440.7	1,751.9	2,027.9	2,216.8	2,219.6
INVESTIGATIONS													
U.S. Forest Service	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	3.0	6.3	6.2	6.1
Bureau of Indian Affairs	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.9	1.7	3.6	2.3	7.6	11.8	11.1	18.5	15.2
Bureau of Land Management	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.7	4.9	4.9	4.7	5.5
National Park Service	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.2	1.2	1.2	0.9	5.7	10.9	10.8	10.1
Drug Enforcement Administration	124.2	140.5	143.7	178.0	211.1	252.9	325.1	327.3	375.2	338.2	433.1	467.9	530.1
Federal Bureau of Investigation	7.7	11.3	101.5	84.5	103.6	103.2	134.6	172.6	198.4	127.5	152.3	201.0	210.6
INS	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	5.5	9.8	17.1	26.5	29.3	27.6	29.9	32.6
U.S. Marshals	3.2	3.7	4.0	5.3	7.4	6.8	8.8	11.2	28.7	39.1	44.2	34.8	39.1
OCDEF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	160.5	252.6	273.3	299.8
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms	24.6	17.6	27.7	33.7	40.4	27.6	60.1	78.6	87.4	94.2	120.0	128.5	137.9
U.S. Customs	11.4	13.9	30.4	39.6	44.7	52.2	63.1	75.1	83.6	130.7	57.4	59.1	62.7
Federal Law Enforcement Training Ctr.	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.5	2.6	4.4	6.5	7.3	17.7	17.2	20.6	16.3	18.8
Internal Revenue Service	28.3	34.0	41.2	43.5	48.8	53.9	61.6	70.4	84.3	81.0	93.2	102.8	111.1
U.S. Secret Service	10.2	12.9	18.0	22.3	27.2	28.7	37.1	40.5	46.2	47.3	53.6	44.7	62.9
	211.3	235.9	369.1	410.1	489.0	537.6	712.2	804.6	959.7	1,090.4	1,288.2	1,398.5	1,542.5
INTERNATIONAL													
Agency for International Development	0.0	15.7	9.2	10.8	6.7	23.5	7.1	9.9	13.3	54.5	195.8	268.8	255.8
DoD (506(A)(2) & Excess Def. Articles)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	65.0	53.3	0.0	26.0	0.0
Drug Enforcement Administration	31.0	34.3	36.9	42.8	51.0	67.7	91.1	97.4	97.6	141.3	172.4	162.1	183.9
Federal Bureau of Investigation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.8	0.8	0.8
International Narcotics Matters	34.7	36.7	36.7	41.2	50.2	55.1	118.4	98.8	101.0	129.5	150.0	171.5	173.0
Interpol	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.8	1.9
U.S. Marshals	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.9	3.5	2.5	2.7
Bureau of Politico/Military Affairs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	21.6	114.5	107.6	121.2	140.8
Emer. in the Dip. & Consular Service	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.8
U.S. Information Agency	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.8	3.4	7.3	8.0	8.4
	66.8	87.8	83.9	95.8	109.2	147.7	220.9	209.3	304.0	500.1	639.6	763.2	767.9
PROSECUTION													
Judiciary	28.3	30.5	33.0	41.2	52.4	68.0	100.1	133.4	146.3	152.8	179.0	226.1	281.3
U.S. Attorneys	19.5	20.9	32.7	47.7	54.8	57.3	74.2	80.7	132.0	126.8	161.6	188.7	215.9
Criminal Division	1.6	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.7	2.7	3.3	9.4	13.3	10.6	18.5	17.2	17.2
U.S. Marshals	23.1	25.6	27.0	30.6	40.6	45.2	56.7	79.9	95.1	118.0	154.8	173.0	186.0
OCDEF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	46.8	68.5	78.0	83.9
Tax Division	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.2	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.5
Weed & Seed	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
	70.6	78.9	95.3	122.2	152.1	175.3	236.3	305.6	388.9	455.9	583.7	682.3	795.9
CORRECTIONS													
Judiciary	7.0	8.2	8.8	11.0	14.0	18.2	26.8	35.7	39.2	73.4	80.5	86.4	104.2
Bureau of Prisons	74.7	97.9	118.1	121.4	182.1	219.5	339.1	465.3	772.1	1,553.6	1,011.0	1,264.8	1,419.6
INS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	34.5	45.0	41.5	38.4	40.3	47.9
Support of Prisoners	5.9	8.0	13.1	16.4	19.5	21.1	27.9	53.3	77.1	112.0	135.1	153.4	167.9
Special Forfeiture Fund	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	87.6	114.1	140.0	148.8	215.6	258.8	397.6	588.8	933.4	1,780.7	1,265.1	1,544.8	1,759.7

Table (D.1)

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**NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET
BY FUNCTION**

(Budget Authority -- \$ Millions)	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (continued)													
ADAMHA -- Prevention	30.1	24.1	26.4	32.0	35.8	40.8	65.9	73.4	81.0	127.7	150.6	157.5	166.2
SBA -- Prevention	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5
ADAMHA -- Treatment	41.5	33.2	35.3	39.1	45.4	44.6	74.1	74.4	122.7	158.1	185.7	201.8	210.5
Veterans Affairs -- Treatment	0.0	2.0	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.3	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3
	76.5	64.7	73.8	81.7	93.8	99.0	157.8	171.8	230.6	327.7	450.1	524.3	510.6
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION													
ACTION	2.5	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.9	6.9	7.8	5.9	10.1	10.5	12.5	12.3	13.4
Agency for International Development	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.9	5.2	4.5	3.1	5.4	7.1	10.2	5.3
Department of Defense	21.2	36.2	46.4	49.8	63.0	63.4	77.8	83.8	69.7	66.8	71.5	77.3	78.5
Department of Education	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.9	203.0	229.8	354.5	541.7	608.9	626.8	656.9
Administration for Children and Families	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	74.6	79.4	89.0
ADAMHA	16.1	30.0	32.5	32.1	34.1	32.8	98.4	85.2	150.7	329.7	420.1	431.6	455.0
Centers for Disease Control	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	25.2	29.3	28.8	31.5
Family Support Administration	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Human Development Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	43.9	57.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Indian Health Service	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Dept. of Housing and Urban Develop.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.2	88.3	150.0	165.0	165.0
Bureau of Indian Affairs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5	0.8	2.6	2.2	3.1	3.6	3.6
Bureau of Land Management	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
National Park Service	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.7
OTIA	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.7	0.5
Drug Enforcement Administration	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.9	1.9	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Office of Justice Programs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	3.7	7.4	13.0	34.2	21.6	21.3	19.9
Department of Labor	43.4	25.9	35.8	36.0	37.3	33.1	41.1	37.5	38.8	46.0	67.6	73.2	72.6
ONDCP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	4.0	5.6	6.1	6.1
Small Business Administration	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2
Federal Aviation Administration	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.9	5.5	4.3	9.1	7.3	9.8	11.2
Department of Veterans Affairs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.7
Weed & Seed	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.4
White House Conference	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	86.4	101.9	124.9	128.1	146.0	145.0	444.3	464.7	725.4	1,238.0	1,482.7	1,549.8	1,617.0
DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT													
Department of Defense	12.4	21.4	23.3	24.1	18.5	19.6	20.9	22.1	12.4	16.6	15.0	14.6	14.7
Department of Education	6.8	7.3	9.1	11.3	12.7	15.9	20.0	24.9	22.8	61.2	74.1	88.7	94.0
Administration for Children and Families	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	31.7	31.7	32.5
ADAMHA	156.1	120.0	130.1	128.5	136.5	130.7	263.3	281.0	463.9	727.9	800.6	819.1	962.1
Health Care Financing Administration	70.0	70.0	80.0	90.0	100.0	110.0	120.0	130.0	140.0	170.0	190.5	201.5	231.5
Human Development Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Indian Health Service	1.5	1.6	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.4	21.7	16.2	18.7	30.1	35.3	35.2	37.0
Judiciary	4.2	4.9	5.3	6.6	8.3	10.8	15.9	21.2	23.3	31.9	34.6	35.2	44.4
Bureau of Prisons	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.8	4.3	4.1	8.0	10.7	22.5	27.7
Office of Justice Programs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	19.6	8.1	34.4	88.9	83.1	80.1	86.0
ONDCP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	4.0	5.6	6.1	6.1
Department of Veterans Affairs	192.1	210.6	234.0	251.5	272.6	287.0	336.3	355.3	356.2	429.5	470.9	541.3	587.5
	446.0	438.7	486.7	517.0	554.1	580.8	821.5	863.1	1,076.8	1,573.0	1,752.0	1,876.1	2,123.6
TOTAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET	1,464.0	1,651.9	1,934.7	2,298.0	2,679.6	2,826.1	4,786.7	4,702.4	6,592.3	9,693.1	10,841.4	11,953.1	12,728.7

APPENDIX V
Questionnaire

Questionnaire asked of the rural sheriff departments.

1. Has your department see in increase in the number of marijuana arrests and seizures since 1987 as comapred to the four years previous to 1987?

2. Has your department, in your opinion, been strained by a lack of man-power, money, or large jurisdiction to cover in combatting marijuana production and trafficking? What methods do you employ to combat this problem?

3. How much, if any, federal or state assistance has your department recieved in combatting drugs, particularly marijuana, in your jurisdiction?

4. If we wanted to do a more-detailed study, and realizing that it is time consuming for you to get the data, if someone were to come on site, could we obtain the necessary data?