REPORTING OF DRUG-RELATED CRIMES: RESIDENT AND POLICE PERSPECTIVES

A Study of the
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Increasingly, police officials and other experts on law enforcement are acknowledging that police cannot hope to clean up drug activity in neighborhoods without a strong commitment from residents (Kelling and Stewart, 1989). Resident reports are needed to identify problem areas within a community and to provide information that can lead to enhanced police surveillance, search warrants, and arrests of drug dealers and users.

But there are serious obstacles to resident cooperation. Story after story in newspapers, magazines, radio, and television tells of destruction and fear which drugs and drug dealers are inflicting on neighborhoods across the country (see, for example, Newsweek 3/28/88, "The Drug Gangs: Waging War in America's Cities" or U.S. News and World Report 4/10/89, "Murder Zones: America is Full of its Own Beiruts Where Drug Lords Reign and No Cops Tread"). The clear message is that drug sellers have taken over many inner city neighborhoods, in part because residents are too afraid to report drug activity to authorities but also in part because residents have been coopted by financial incentives or familial ties with those involved with drugs (Washington Post, 8/13/89 a&b). Police admit that threats against residents who interfere with drug trafficking are common but contend that retaliation is the exception rather than the rule (Washington Post, 8/13/89b; 6/4/89). Still, it is not unheard of for people who report drug activity or agree to testify in court to be gunned down (Washington Post 8/20/89). And

even one such incident can have a chilling effect on the community.

How much of a problem is really posed by citizen reluctance to report drug avtivity? Are the dealers able to operate largely with impunity because residents are unwilling to provide evidence to the police? Why are residents reluctant? What could change the situation? No one knows, because empirical evidence is lacking. We set out to examine those issues and to explore what practical steps could be taken to increase the willingness of residents to report drug activity in their neighborhoods.

In trying to gain some perspective on these issues, it is useful to look at the problem on both an individual level and on a collective level. To better understand the decision process of individuals who witness drug activity we will examine the literatures on reporting of crimes by victims and bystanders. From those literatures we will try to gain insight into situational, social, and personal factors that inhibit reporting of crimes to the police. Then we will turn to literature on collective responses to crime, in particular studies of community anti-crime programs and of other programs specifically designed to increase crime reports. This literature will provide some insight into the problems involved in trying to increase reporting, especially in poor, inner-city neighborhoods where reporting is most needed.

Victim and Bystander Reporting of Crime

We are not aware of any previous studies that directly investigated citizen reporting of drug activity. But there are literatures on victim reporting and on intervention of bystanders in crime situations that clearly are relevant to understanding the decision process of residents who witness drug activity. In order

to gauge the relevance of studies in these areas, it is important to be clear about the similarities and differences between the problem we are studying and those addressed by these two literatures.

Unlike studies of victim reporting, we are concerned in our work with a so-called victimless crime. Research on victim reporting deals with people who have been exposed to personal crimes in which respondents have suffered material, medical, or immediate psychological costs. Their stake in reporting is arguably more direct than people who live in neighborhoods that are being victimized by drug activity. In fact, Skogan (1987), Wilson and Kelling (1982) and others consider drug activity to be an indicator of neighborhood "incivility" (along with graffiti, trash in the street, or gangs of teens hanging out on streetcorners), as distinct from crime. People exposed to drug activity in their neighborhoods fall somewhere between bystanders and victims, in the sense that the latter term is normally used. With that understanding, we will review the literatures on victim reporting and bystander intervention, and attempt to apply their findings to the problem of reporting drug activity.

Victim Reporting of Crimes

Since the first large-scale victimization surveys begun by the federal government in the 1960s, it has been well-known that many crimes go unreported. This finding at first raised an alarm, and policy-makers worried that people had lost faith in the American criminal justice system. But the large volume of research now available suggests that underreporting occurs all over the world and that victims follow quite rational courses of action in deciding what to report (Skogan, 1984). For example, the primary determinant

of calling the police has been found to be the seriousness of the crime as measured by whether the crime was actually completed, whether the victim sustained injuries or financial losses, and whether the victim had insurance coverage (e.g., Gottfredson and Hindelang, 1979; Waller and Okihiro, 1978). The fact that people are less likely to report crimes in which they lost little or nothing shouldn't surprise or alarm anyone.

Researchers have found that the other major reason for failure to report crime is victims' belief that authorities could do little to help (U.S. Department of Justice, 1981; Schneider, et. al., 1976). Rather than indicating a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system, such responses seem to reflect an objective assessment of whether or not anything can, in fact, be done. Sparks, et. al. (1977) and Skogan and Antunes (1979) report that, when victims fail to report crimes because they believe that authorities can do little to help, it is usually in cases which actually have a low likelihood of being solved.

Failure to report crimes has also been linked to victim culpability. Victims who report committing illegal acts themselves are less likely to report a crime (Sparks, et. al., 1977). The same is true in assaults in which victims may be partially at fault (Block, 1974).

The big surprise in this literature is that victim reporting has little to do with demographic variables or attitudes toward the police. Only minor variations in reporting rates have been found according to victims' sex, race, income, or place of residence (Skogan, 1984). Schneider, et. al. (1976) found little difference in reporting according to whether respondents felt well-treated by

the police or whether they felt that the police were responsive. And Garofalo (1977) found only minor variation in reporting according to satisfaction with past police performance. Yet victim reporting may still be sensitive to what the police do or fail to do. Van Dijk (1982) argues that reporting behavior is sensitive to police policies, citing data from the Netherlands which showed a drop in reports of petty thefts and minor assaults following a police decision to ignore these crimes.

A couple of papers have been written that approach the problem of victim non-reporting from a psychological perspective. Kidd and Chayet (1984) relate non-reporting to the feelings of fear and powerlessness that victims have been shown to experience. Ruback, Greenberg, and Westcott (1984) try to understand non-reporting in terms of social influence exerted by others on victim decision-making. Neither paper offers much in the way of data to substantiate their conceptualizations, but they do add a different perspective to a literature otherwise devoid of theoretical approaches.

Bystander Intervention

The literature on bystander intervention is quite different from the literature on victim reporting of crimes. In both literatures, the question is the same: Why do people fail to take action in response to crimes? But, while victim reporting studies are usually based on interviews with victims of crime, bystander intervention research is often done in a laboratory setting: Subjects are not witnesses to actual crimes, but to simulated incidents. The outcome measure studied may be direct intervention by the witness, as well as reporting to authorities (Shotland and

Goodstein, 1984). And the research is often grounded in social psychological theory on small group processes. For these reasons, researchers of bystander intervention tend to explain non-involvement in different terms than researchers in victim reporting studies, which typically are atheoretical and where reasons for non-involvement are based simply on self-report of respondents.

For our purposes, the most relevant part of the bystander literature is that portion that deals with reasons for non-intervention that stem from the nature of the situation. Researchers have found that ambiguity of the situation is one determinant of whether bystanders will intervene: The surer witnesses are that an incident constitutes a crime, the more likely they are to intervene (Mayhew, 1978; Shotland and Stebbins, 1980). And relatedly, the more serious people perceive a situation to be, the more likely they are to intervene (Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Clark, 1981). Situations may also be seen as more ambiguous when other bystanders are present. Research has shown that when people believe they are the sole witness to a crime, they feel a greater responsibility to intervene than when other bystanders are present (Latane and Darley, 1969; Bickman and Rosenbaum, 1977). There may be two processes at work here. First, people rely on others to help define situations for them. If a person sees others not reacting, he or she tends to believe that the situation is not a dangerous one. Second, witnesses may believe that their intervention is unnecessary because others may have acted already to notify authorities.

Another situational variable that predicts whether bystanders

intervene is the perceived cost of intervention. Where costs are high -- as in situations where people strongly fear retaliation -- intervention is less likely (Rosenbaum Lurigio and Lavrakas, 1986; Piliavin, et. al., 1981).

There has also been a good deal of research on characteristics of bystanders that account for their willingness to intervene. Most of it deals with personality variables, and is not of consequence to our study. One finding that is relevant to our work comes from a study by Huston, Ruggerio, Conner, and Geis (1981), who found that a sample of people who had intervened in crimes had witnessed more crime and had been more often personally victimized than people in a matched control sample. Similarly, Shotland (1976) found that incidents of spontaneous vigilantism occurred most often in precincts charcterized by high robbery rates and poverty.

Synthesis

What lessons can be drawn from the literatures on crime reporting and bystander intervention about the decision process of people who witness drug activity in their neighborhoods? Most of the factors identified in these literatures as contributing to inaction would seem to work against reporting of drug activity. Because drug activity is a victimless crime, neighborhood residents do not normally directly sustain injuries or property loss as a result. Authorities may be perceived as being able to do little to help because it is difficult to catch dealers or users in the act and because courts are breaking under the strain of an avalanche of drug cases. People may perceive the costs of intervention as high because of threats by drug dealers and extensive media coverage of violence perpetrated by drug dealers. People may feel only a

limited personal responsibility to report because other residents also have knowledge of the problem. Finally, in high crime, low income neighborhoods residents may be reluctant to report because they themselves have been involved in drugs or other criminal activity.

On the other hand, a couple of the factors identified in the literature as affecting willingness to act work in favor of reporting drug activity. Because residents may have an opportunity to observe drug activity at a location on repeated occasions, ambiguity is likely to be low; there may be little doubt in residents' minds that there is drug activity occurring. Also, residents in low income neighborhoods where most drug activity occurs have been exposed to crime as victims, a factor that has been found to increase bystander intervention.

The suggestion from Van Dijk's (1982) study that citizen willingness to report can be influenced by police and prosecutorial policies toward certain crimes is hopeful. That may mean that where police make efforts to recruit citizen cooperation and demonstrate reponsiveness to citizen reports, reporting of drug activity will be enhanced.

Collective Responses

Also relevant to understanding resident reporting of drug activity is the literature on community crime prevention. Although this literature is often understood to include individual responses to crime (such as property marking, security surveys, and avoidance of situations perceived to be risky), most relevant to our work is the part which deals with collective actions, such as neighborhood watch, citizen patrols, and the like. This literature is relevant

in two ways: First, it provides insight into the difficulties in organizing collective responses to crime and the conditions which promote and inhibit collective responses. In this regard, it helps us predict how successful efforts by the police and others to organize residents to report drug activity are likely to be. Second, the community crime prevention literature has something to say about the conditions under which neighborhood residents may get together to conduct surveillance and intervene in drug activity.

Community crime prevention in the U.S. is a recent phenomenon, dating back only to the mid-1970s. Since that time, it has become generally accepted that communities share responsibility with the police for "co-producing" public safety (Rosenbaum, 1988).

The theoretical rationale for community crime prevention is based upon a 70-year history of research examining the effects of community on crime. That research has shown that crime is most prevalent in areas characterized by social disorganization. In such places, a lack of shared norms and values make it difficult for neighborhood social structures to govern the actions of residents (e.g., Shaw and McKay, 1942).

Community crime prevention programs represent an attempt to reverse social disorganization by restoring a sense of community and enhancing informal social control (Rosenbaum, 1988). Programs may try to increase social interaction, increase surveillance of the neighborhood, and increase residents' willingness to intervene in or report criminal incidents. These immediate outcomes should, according to theory, reduce opportunities for crime.

There is correlational evidence to support the assumptions of community crime prevention programs. Studies have shown that a high

amount of social interaction among area residents contributes to informal social control (Fischer, Jackson, Steuve, Gerson, and Jones, 1977). And, there is evidence that crime is lower in neighborhoods where social control is high, as indicated by residents' sense of responsibility for goings on in the neighborhood (Taylor, Gottfredson, and Brower, 1981); by residents' willingness to intervene in criminal acts (Maccoby, Johnson, and Church, 1958); and by residents' belief that their neighbors are willing to intervene (Newman and Franck, 1980).

But there is a good deal of skepticism about whether such processes can be made to operate in neighborhoods which lack them, most notably high-crime, low income, and culturally heterogeneous neighborhoods (see Greenberg, Rohe, and Williams, 1985; Hackler, Ho, and Urquhart-Ross, 1974; Taub, Taylor, and Dunham, 1981; Taylor, Gottfredson, and Brower, 1981). Correlational studies have consistently shown that participation in community organizations in general, and in Neighborhood Watch programs in particular, is more frequent in communities where residents are middle-income, well educated, and own their own homes (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Lavrakas and Lewis, 1980; Skogan, 1989) and in communities which are racially and culturally homogeneous and/or relatively crime-free (Greenberg, Rohe, and Williams, 1982; Garofalo and McLeod, 1988; Henig, 1982).

(It is important to note that there is an opposite argument as well about the effects of crime rates on organizing. Earlier theorists, as far back as Durkeim (1933), believed that crime served to unite people and actually strengthened community ties. Moreover, in one of the most carefully conducted empirical studies of

community characteristics associated with anti-crime organizing, Skogan (1989) found -- contrary to his expectation -- that organizing was more prevalent in communities with high crime levels. Nonetheless, the preponderance of evidence currently available suggests that community organizations are less frequent in neighborhoods characterized by low incomes, cultural heterogeneity and high crime).

The crucial question in community crime prevention, as framed by Rosenbaum (1986), is whether community anti-crime programs like Neighborhood Watch can be implanted in high crime, low income, heterogeneous communities where they are needed most, but where they are least likely to have arisen spontaneously. The most carefully conducted experiments have shown that even when vigorous efforts are made to recruit area residents to join Neighborhood Watch groups, overall participation levels are low -- ranging from 10% of households in Portland, Oregon (Schneider, 1986) to 16% in Chicago (Rosenbaum, Lewis, and Grant, 1986), to 18% in Minneapolis (McPherson and Silloway, 1987). In the Minneapolis experiment, which included a broad mix of neighborhoods, participation was lowest in low income and heterogeneous neighborhoods even though organizers focused more efforts on these areas. Moreover, these organizing efforts generally showed little effect upon development of informal social control in targeted neighborhoods, as indexed by social interaction, surveillance, crime reporting or social cohesion.

There is also a general recognition in the community crime prevention literature that, even once started, community organizations that focus exclusively on crime have a difficult time sustaining themselves. In part, this is because it is difficult to

produce demonstrable reductions in crime (Dubow and Podolefsky, 1981). Some researchers have observed (Garofalo and McCleod, 1986; Yin, 1986) that crime-focused groups begin and persist more readily when they receive support from the police. But Skogan (1987) has noted that cooperation with the police is likely to be difficult in poor and minority communities where relationships with the police are often strained.

Synthesis

The community crime prevention literature suggests that efforts to organize residents to increase surveillance of drug activity are likely to prove difficult to initiate in low income, high crime, culturally homogeneous areas. However, it is also true that media accounts suggest that the crack epidemic has so devastated inner-city areas that residents, perhaps for the first time, are organizing to fight for their neighborhoods. Thus, traditional community anti-crime generalizations may not apply.

The community anti-crime literature also suggests that (across all kinds of neighborhoods) efforts to organize surveillance of drug activity are likely to be more successful if the police are involved. Thus, it is significant that efforts to enlist residents in surveilling drug activity often seem to occur in close cooperation with the police. In fact, the community policing concept that many police departments are currently embracing seems likely to encourage much more police involvement in organizing citizens against drug trafficking. The significance of community policing to reporting of drug activity is further discussed below.

Purposes and Organization of the Report

Our project was designed to take a careful look at citizen reporting of drug activity. We wanted to know first how heavily the police rely on resident reports of drug activity. Are reports from the community an important source of information, or are they often telling the police what they already know? What can police do on the basis of such reports? Second, we wanted to find out the extent to which residents are reluctant to report drug activity. Are they more reluctant to report drug activity than other criminal incidents? Are they more willing to report now that so much public attention has been paid to the drug problem than they were in years past? Third, we wanted to uncover the reasons for failing to report. Is it primarily due to fear of retaliation? To a belief that the police won't or can't do anything with the information?

The second chapter of this report describes the methods we used to answer these questions. Briefly, those methods were: (a) interviews with the supervisors of police narcotics units in 46 cities, (b) site visits and in-depth interviews with officials in four of these cities, and (c) interviews with 100 residents in high drug activity neighborhoods in each of the four cities. The third chapter describes our findings from the police interviews. The fourth chapter discusses how sites were selected and describes the four sites chosen. The fifth chapter discusses results of the resident interviews. The concluding chapter summarizes what we learned from our investigation, and includes recommendations to improve citizen reporting of drug activity.

II. METHOD

Our initial data collection effort entailed conducting a telephone survey of police representatives in the 50 largest U.S. cities. The interviews were intended to shed light on whether citizen reports of drug activity are useful to police, what kinds of reports police find most useful, and what police do based on such reports.

Based on our 46 interviews (we were unsuccessful in 4 of the 50 cities attempted), we chose four cities for intensive study. During site visits to each, we examined the various systems for citizen reporting (911, drug hotlines, calls directly to local police districts) -- how extensively each was used and how they responded to the calls received. In each city, we also conducted structured in-person interviews with 50 residents in each of two neighborhoods with serious drug problems. We asked the residents how willing they were to report drug activity, what their experience with the police had been when they or their neighbors made reports, and what they thought the biggest obstacles to reporting were for people in the area. We asked a similar set of questions to a minimum of three patrol officers in each area in order to contrast their responses with those of citizens in the neighborhood.

Each of our sources of data contains an element of bias, reflecting the different viewpoints of police administrators, local police personnel, and citizens on the issue of reporting drug activity. By synthesizing data from all of these sources, however, we believed that we could arrive at an accurate representation of problems involved in reporting drug activity. And, as it turned

out, there were more similarities than differences in the answers of the three sets of respondents.

National Survey of Police Department Representatives

We sought interviews with police departments in the nation's 50 largest cities. We began by sending a letter to the chief of police with a copy of the questionnaire attached, and asked the chief to nominate an appropriate person in the department for us to interview. Most often, the chiefs selected the head of their narcotics unit, although in a few cases we interviewed the chief or a non-narcotics designee. Several weeks after the letters were sent, we scheduled the interviews.

We were successful in 46 of the 50 cities. The telephone interviews lasted 30 to 45 minutes, and were designed to elicit information on the usefulness to the police of citizen reports. The respondent was initially asked to name a neighborhood in their city where drugs posed a serious problem and to describe that neighborhood in terms of socio-economic status, stability and cohesion, and the nature of the drug problem (the kinds of drugs being sold, where they were sold, who controlled the trafficking). The respondent was then asked to keep that neighborhood in mind when answering the rest of the survey. We did this because when we pretested the survey, respondents often said that the answer to particular questions varied from one neighborhood to the next in their city.

Once a neighborhood had been identified, the survey went on to ask:

- What kinds of reports (indoor versus outdoor locations, sales versus use, etc.) police found most useful;
- What kinds of reports were most often received by police;

- What kinds of actions police took in response to reports of drug activity;
- What police did to encourage reports;
- What police believed were the major obstacles to reporting by citizens; and
- Whether progress was being made in the war on drugs and what else police felt was needed to win.

Selection of Sites for Intensive Study

From the 46 cities in which we obtained interviews with police representatives, we ultimately chose four for closer scrutiny. The sites were selected based on a number of considerations, including cooperativeness of police departments, travel costs, and geographic diversity. In the end, we chose Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Chicago, Illinois; Newark, New Jersey; and El Paso, Texas as our sites.

Site Visits

Teams of two project staff spent three to four days in two neighborhoods at each of the sites selected for intensive study. At the sites, we tried to gain an understanding of how citizen reports of drug activity were taken and routed and how they were used by those who received them.

To get a perspective on systems for receiving citizen reports, we spoke to administrators of 911 operations and special hotlines. We asked them how many calls they received, what they did with the reports (and what criteria they used to route them), and what kind of feedback on the results of their call was available to citizens who made reports.

To understand how citizen reports are utilized, we spoke to central narcotics supervisors and officers from the two districts we

visited in each city -- captains, neighborhood relations officers, narcotics officers and their supervisors. We also administered a structured interview to at least three patrol officers in each district we visited. We asked police personnel how many of their drug reports came from central command and how many from people calling the district station directly; how useful reports of various types of drug activity were and what action was usually taken by police; and how reporting systems could be designed to make calls more useful to police.

In each district, we also spent one to two hours driving around the neighborhood with the police. These rides helped immensely to give us a feel for the neighborhood and a first-hand look at the pervasiveness of drug activity. Most often, we were accompanied by plainclothes officers responsible for street-level narcotics enforcement who were quite willing to offer candid appraisals of how the police were handling the drug problem.

Finally, we spoke to people active in community groups who had been referred to us by the police. These interviews helped us to gain insight into how responsive citizens felt the police were to reports of drug activity and what they thought about various systems for reporting that were available to them.

All the interviews were unstructured with the exception of interviews with uniformed patrol officers. For them, we used an abbreviated version of the structured interview administered to neighborhood residents (see below). This enabled us to contrast the responses of patrol officers with those of area residents on issues including dimensions of the drug problem, neighborhood cohesiveness,

extent to which police tried to work with area residents, willingness of people to report drug activity, and obstacles to reporting.

We supplemented our on-site interviews by driving with district police officers through each of the eight neighborhoods where we observed first-hand certain population, cultural, and physical characteristics, as well as blatant drug trafficking practices.

Resident Surveys

In each of the two neighborhoods targeted in the four cities, 50 residents were interviewed about their experiences with reporting drug activity and their willingness to report currently. The interviews were conducted by the firm of Schulman, Ronca & Bucuvalis, Inc. by a door-to-door sampling plan. (See Appendix A for a discussion of the plan and attrition rates). Surveys were about 20 minutes in length. Provision was made for interviews to be conducted in Spanish where appropriate.

Topics covered in the resident surveys included:

- Perceptions of drugs as a neighborhood problem;
- Cohesiveness of the neighborhood;
- Perceptions of the police;
- Willingness of neighborhood residents to report drug activity;
- Obstacles to reporting by neighborhood residents; and
- Personal experiences with reporting drug activity.

III. RESULTS OF POLICE REPRESENTATIVE SURVEY

We attempted interviews with the 50 largest police departments in the country and completed interviews with 46 departments. The chief of police was sent a letter explaining the study and was asked either to participate himself in a telephone survey (to be scheduled at his convenience) or to designate a representative in the department. For the most part, chiefs identified the head of their narcotic units to answer the survey, although a couple of police chiefs were surveyed directly and a few identified other representatives (such as someone from their research department or community relations office). The telephone surveys focused on citizen reporting of drug activities and averaged 30-45 minutes.

At the start of the survey, respondents were asked to identify a typical neighborhood in their city where drugs and drug-related crimes had exerted a serious adverse affect on the quality of life for residents. After providing a general description of that neighborhood, police representatives were asked to answer the remainder of the survey with that neighborhood in mind. We took this approach because our pretest results indicated that asking questions about the entire city was confusing to respondents. They said that their answers would depend on which neighborhoods we were referring to within their city. Therefore, we decided to allow the respondent to answer the survey by thinking about an area of the city with which he was familiar and which had a serious drug problem.

When asked to focus on an area with a serious drug problem, what types of neighborhoods came into the minds of our police representatives? The neighborhoods described by respondents varied

considerably in some respects but not others. The most consistent features were the ethnic/racial and economic make-ups of the neighborhoods. The vast majority of the police said the neighborhood they were referring to throughout the survey was comprised of primary Black residents, although a few respondents noted Hispanic/Mexican, or mixed racial backgrounds. Almost all the neighborhoods were depicted as consisting of largely low (or low-to-middle) income families. Some of the neighborhoods were described as very stable with a strong sense of community, while others were viewed as very transient with little or no sense of community. The primary drugs being sold included crack, cocaine, heroine (these types of drugs were named about equally among respondents as the types most frequently sold in the neighborhoods under description), and, to a slightly lesser extent, marijuana. When asked what types of sellers controlled the drug trade in the neighborhoods under question, neighborhood residents, independent dealers (unorganized or loosely organized), and gang members were mentioned with equal frequency. Levels of violence were estimated to be high by about three-fourths of the respondents, moderate by about one-eighth the sample, and low by about one-eighth the sample. Despite differences in the types of neighborhoods respondents chose to focus on when addressing our survey, all the neighborhoods shared one unfortunate feature: Drugs have had a serious adverse impact on the quality of life of the residents, according to the police interviewed.

Importance of Citizen Reports

Police representatives were asked whether citizens are more, less, or just as likely to report drug activities today as they were

five years ago. Most respondents, 78%, said that citizens were more likely to report such activities today, but 15% said they were less likely and 7% said they were just as likely (N=46). It is interesting to note that so many police thought individuals are more willing to report. We asked why they thought this is the case. The primary reason given was that the drug problem has become so bad in the neighborhoods under question that individuals are speaking out and cooperating with the police, sometimes due to "sheer desperation". Police who stated that individuals were less likely to report drug activities primarily thought this was due to fear of retaliation, although a few respondents mentioned public apathy and assorted other reasons.

One of the key questions in our research was whether citizen reports generally are helpful to the police, and if so, what types of reports are most helpful. Arguments have been raised that citizen reports merely duplicate information already known to the police and are not very useful for police intelligence purposes. Others contend that such reports often contain either new information or at least some piece of evidence not previously known which can help "shape" an investigation or provide "cumulative" information necessary to justify undercover or surveillance operations. We asked our respondents about the importance of citizen reports. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being not very important and 5 being very important, respondents were asked how important citizen reports are to their department's overall strategy for controlling drug activities in neighborhoods. The mean response was very high -- 4.42 -- and thus provides support to the argument that citizen reports are critical to the police.

Do the police think that citizen reports about some types of drug activities are more valuable than reports about other drug activities? Yes, according to those surveyed. Police representatives were asked how valuable citizen reports are for learning about various types of drug activities. Specifically, eleven types of activities were queried, again on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not very valuable to 5 being very valuable. As depicted in Table III-1, mean scores ranged from a high of 4.83 to a low of 3.22. In descending order, from more to less valuable, were reports of: Locations of major suppliers, information about operations of major drug sales, location of indoor sales, individuals who are major suppliers, location of street sales, individuals selling small quantities, information about operations of minor drug sales, location of indoor drug use, location of street use of drugs, and individuals using drugs. As we might expect, the police said reports about major suppliers, major drug sales and indoor sales were more valuable, most likely because these activities are usually less well known to the police than are minor drug sales and street operations and users. It certainly makes sense that information which does not duplicate what is already known would be more valuable, especially when such information relates to major distributors and sellers. Police are understandably very interested in apprehending major drug operators since police action to disrupt these operations impacts more significantly on the overall drug situation than police action aimed at the more minor street dealers.

Unfortunately, according to the police surveyed, the types of calls they would most like to receive from citizens about drug

TABLE III-1

How Valuable Are Citizen Reports About The Following Activities?*

Reports of:	MEAN	N
Locations of Major Suppliers	4.83	(46)
Information About Operations of Major Drug Sales	4.63	(46)
Location of Indoor Sales	4.57	(46)
Individuals Who Are Major Suppliers	4.50	(46)
Location of Street Sales	4.17	(46)
Individuals Selling Small Quantities	3.85	(46)
Information About Operations of Minor Drug Sales	3.74	(46)
Location of Indoor Drug Use	3.37	(46)
Location of Street Use of Drugs	3.24	(46)
Individuals Using Drugs	3.22	(46)

* On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being not very valuable and 5 being very valuable.

activities are not the types of calls they actually receive. Nearly half the calls received by the police concern street dealers, while approximately one-quarter involve indoor sales and another quarter are about individuals using drugs Table III-2. As reported above, police told us that these types of reports are less important to them than are reports of major drug operators. Like the police themselves, citizens are more likely to observe "obvious" street sales than the more clandestine work of major operators and thus it makes sense that more reports of the former are received (also people are probably more disturbed by, and anxious to report, "obvious" drug activity they can see than they are to report what might be transpiring out of eye view).

TABLE III-2

Most Common Type of Reports Received By Citizens*

Reports of:	
Street Dealers	45%
Indoor Sales	27%
Users	22%
Other Types of Reports	6%

(N=82)

* A maximum of three responses were coded for each respondent for this open-ended question.

Reporting Behavior of Citizens

What are the most common ways citizens report drug activities? In order of frequency, we were told the most common ways are by telephoning the police via a special drug hotline, Crime Stopper type-programs, the main police number or 911, Table III-3.

Police were asked why they believe citizens are reluctant to report drug activities. Specifically, on a scale of 1 to 5, we asked respondents, with 1 being almost never and 5 being almost always, to estimate how often citizens fail to report drug crimes based on a list of 11 reasons. Mean scores are displayed on Table III-4. The most important reason given was fear of retaliation. Also important, but less so, was the desire not to testify in court; belief that it would be a waste of time; belief that the police already know about the activity; fear of getting into trouble with the police; mistrust of the police; belief that drugs are none of their business; and media accounts of retaliation. Not very important, in the opinion of the police interviewed, was the belief that drugs are not a crime (it is interesting that this was not seen as an important reason as some commentators have suggested that this is a primary reason for non-reporting), that drugs are not a problem or that drugs are an economic benefit to the community. In addition to the items we listed, police were asked whether they believed any other factors were important in deterring citizens from calling the police. Only 4% volunteered additional factors (mentioned, for example, was the undesirable location of the precinct, feelings that police cannot do anything about the problem, and a fear that the police are recording their calls and tracing their identity).

TABLE III-3

Most Common Way Citizens Report*

Drug Hotline	36%
Crime Stoppers	15%
Telephone Main Police Number	20%
Telephone 911 Number	14%

(N=88)

* A maximum of three responses were coded for each respondent for this open-ended question.

TABLE III-4

Why Are Citizens Reluctant to Report Drug Activities?*

Citizens Do Not Report Due To:	Mean	N
Fear of Retaliation	4.00	(46)
Desire Not To Testify	3.43	(46)
Belief That It Would Be Waste of Time	3.11	(46)
Belief That the Police Already Know	2.89	(45)
Fear of Getting Into Trouble With Police	2.72	(46)
Mistrust of the Police	2.64	(45)
Belief That Drugs Are None of Their Business	2.64	(45)
Media Accounts of Retaliation	2.64	(45)
Belief That Drugs Are Not a Crime	1.52	(46)
Belief That Drugs Are Not a Problem	1.51	(45)
Belief That Drugs Are an Economic Benefit to Community	1.42	(45)

* On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not very important to 5 being a very important reason why citizens are reluctant to report drug activities.

Police Encouragement of Citizen Reports

When asked, 91% of those interviewed said that they have a special hotline number for citizens to call to report drug activities (N=46). In response to our open-ended question which followed, we were told they publicize the number most frequently via the media, presentations at public meetings, or through Crime Stopper-type programs. Of the 3I respondents who could estimate the number of calls received a month through this number, 23% estimated 100 calls or fewer; 13% 101-200 calls; 13% 201-300 calls; 10% 301-400 calls; 16% 401-500 calls, and 25% over 500 calls per month.

On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being not very important and 5 being very important, we asked how important various approaches to encourage citizen reports were to the police. Table III-5 presents the mean scores. Most important were the following approaches: Police visibility, police interaction with community groups, use of confidential telephone numbers, rewards, sting operations, and giving feedback to citizens on drug reports (all these activities were ranked in the range from 4.44 to 4.02). Fairly important approaches were publicity efforts, the provision of police protection, door-to-door efforts, the use of non-English speaking personnel or police, and the use of call-in talk shows (means ranged for 3.71 to 3.07). Less important was the use of alternatives to the criminal justice system, such as treatment programs.

How do the police motivate citizens to report drug crimes? This open-ended question yielded some common answers. Nearly three-fifths said that they convince individuals that their reports are important and are needed to help the police do theirjob effectively. Three additional techniques (each named by about

TABLE III-5

How Important Are the Following Approaches in Encouraging Citizen Reports?*

Police Encourage Through:	Mean	N
Police Visibility	4.44	(45)
Police Interaction With Community Groups	4.31	(45)
Use of Confidential Phone Number	4.20	(45)
Rewards	4.13	(45)
Sting Operations	4.07	(45)
Feedback to Citizens on Drug Reports	4.02	(45)
Publicity	3.71	(45)
Police Protection	3.59	(44)
Door-to-Door Efforts	3.53	(45)
Use of Non-English Speaking Personnel/Police	3.07	(42)
Call-In Talk Shows	3.00	(43)
Use of Alternative Sanctions	2.69	(45)

* On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being not very important and 5 being very important.

one-tenth the sample) were: Providing rewards, keeping reports anonymous, and building cooperation between the police and citizens Table III-6.

We were interested in learning whether departments had tried any approaches to encourage citizen reports that they felt were ineffective so that we might learn from these bad experiences as well as from their good experiences. Twenty-three percent of the respondents told us about ineffective approaches (N=43). What were some examples of ineffective approaches? A variety of responses were given, for example:

> People were advised to call 911 -- but, because the public knows that 911 operators trace the location of the phone call, individuals were reluctant to call (others, however, had told us 911 was an effective technique they were using with success and that the public reported many drug activities via 911).
>
> The public was advised that the police would take immediate action when they called. This led to unrealistic expectations and disillusionment among the public when police are unable to respond immediately.
>
> Patrol officers visibly talked to residents in the immediate vicinity of crackhouses. This put the people in danger of retaliation.
>
> Telephone answering machines used to take drug information discouraged callers because the machines depersonalize the response by the police.
>
> Too much information was given back to the public. This led to leaks.
>
> Relied on increased patrols solely--citizen involvement is also needed.
>
> Requirement that police had to have five reports to investigate reported drug houses led to public apathy.
>
> Use of Crime Stopper-type programs and anonymous drug hotlines led to "bogus" reports and did not allow the investigator to follow-up for more information.

TABLE III-6

Ways Police Motivate Citizens To Report*

Motivate Through:

Convincing Citizens Reports Are Important	59%
Rewards	13%
Providing Feedback to Community	9%
Keeping Reports Anonymous	11%
Building Cooperation Between Police and Citizens	7%
Other Ways	1%
	(N=46)

* A maximum of three responses were coded for each respondent for this open-ended question.

(Ironically, these programs were hailed by many of our respondents as very helpful in encouraging callers and were listed as a primary source of calls. But some police reported that they were ineffective and therefore had been discontinued).

Because much attention has been given to the concept of community-oriented policing, and in particular to its potential effect on improving the cooperative relationship between police and citizens, we asked respondents whether their department has community-oriented policing. Over half -- 59% -- said that they did (N=46), but caution is advised in interpreting this figure. The concept of community-oriented policing is not well defined in the literature (nor does it mean the same thing to police across the country, which is not surprising since it is an academic concept without a tight definition). Despite our efforts to provide a common framework for the concept, we believe that many respondents were often eager to say that their department had community-oriented policing, perhaps thinking it "sounded" more progressive than traditional policing. When asked if their use of community-oriented policing was having an impact on the severity of the drug problem, 30% said it was having a large impact, 60% some impact, and 10% little impact (N=20 -- the remaining 7 respondents answered "don't know"). Thus, at least in the opinion of those surveyed, community-oriented policing appears to have some positive results on reducing the drug problem.

Winning the War on Drugs

When asked whether their city is "winning the war on drugs", 72% responded no, but 14% said they were winning and another 13% said they were making headway or moving in that direction. Many suggestions were offered by the police to help win the war as can be seen in Table III-7. It is interesting that the two most commonly

named suggestions -- more citizen involvement and more attention to the underlying problem -- are outside of the traditional domain of law enforcement. Other suggestions, such as more resources, more police, and more punitive sanctions/prisons, might have been more predictable, and indeed, these were named by many of those interviewed. Many of the police were intrigued by this question and gave some insightful responses not easily captured by collapsing the responses into categories. A selection of their comments demonstrates an over-riding attitude that the police alone cannot resolve the problem and a clear recognition of the limitations of the police (an attitude we would not have expected to hear in the distant past but an emerging point of discussion among police professionals today):

> Yes, we are winning the war. It's a slow battle but the violence is decreasing. But the police are being asked to assume responsibility for cleaning up the drug problem in drug-infested parts of the city which is draining resources and is working to the detriment of the middle-class neighborhoods where services have been cut. We need more resources, more police, and more community-based groups working on this problem.
>
> We are winning the war in terms of making arrests and prosecuting these cases, but we are probably not changing the attitudes of users and sellers.
>
> We are not winning the war on drugs. It's a social problem and we need more resources from the state and federal governments and more substance abuse treatment facilities.
>
> We're not winning. Local police cannot do it alone -- it's the government's problem. The police need more resources and citizens don't want to provide the money to pay for more police.
>
> Not winning -- we need a system approach. We need resources throughout the system, not just at the law enforcement level -- we need jail space and education and treatment programs.
>
> To win the war on drugs we need more money to buy equipment, more manpower. We need a realization from administrators, citizens, and law enforcement that we are in a crisis situation.

TABLE III-7

What Is Needed To Win The War On Drugs?*

Need:

More Citizen Involvement	16%
More Attention To Underlying Problems	16%
More Resources	15%
More Police	14%
More Punishment/Prisons	13%
More Prevention Programs	7%
More Help From Federal Government	6%
Better Cooperation Among Agencies	3%
Other	10%

(N=86)

* A maximum of three responses were coded for each respondent for this open-ended question.

> We are making some progress, but the problem is not going away. We need to get more people involved. It takes more than law enforcement. We need more resources, more education, and rehabilitation coordinated within a multidimensional approach.

* * *

Without exception, the police representatives we surveyed reported that citizen reports of drug activities are important (and most said very important) to law enforcement. While reports of street sales were listed as important to police, they were rated less important than were reports of major dealers, distributors, and suppliers who do not work visibly on the street. Presumably, this is because major drug operators are less well known to the police and keep a much lower profile than minor street operators and because police are particularly interested in closing down major operators. Most reports, however, concern activities more well known and of lower priority to the police.

The police perceive that citizens are reluctant to report drug activities primarily due to fear of retaliation, but a variety of other reasons were also rated as important reasons for their reluctance. Police say they are making considerable efforts to encourage citizen reports primarily through community outreach efforts aimed at convincing the public that their reports are needed and that their cooperation is essential in tackling the drug problem. While most respondents felt that their city was not winning the war on drugs, a few thought that they were either winning or were moving in that direction.

IV. DESCRIPTION OF SITES

The four cities where we conducted on-site research were Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Newark, New Jersey; Chicago, Illinois; and El Paso, Texas. In each of these cities, police identified for us two neighborhoods where drug trafficking was impacting adversely on residents' lives. The site descriptions that follow were compiled primarily from interviews with headquarters and district level police personnel and citizen representatives, as well as from our own observations in riding around with district officers in the eight neighborhoods. For each city, they address:

- The police department;
- Police/community interaction;
- The two neighborhoods visited;
- Nature of drug activity in the neighborhoods; and
- Reporting options and police response.

Newark, New Jersey

Newark Police Department

The Newark Police Department's 1,084 employees provide police services to the city's 330,000 residents. Personnel include some 600 patrol and tactical officers assigned to the city's four patrol districts, 33 individuals assigned to the Narcotics Unit, and 110 police and civilian employees in the Communications Bureau -- the three entities most directly concerned with residential reporting of drug-related crimes. In 1987, nearly 40,000 Part I offenses were reported to the police who achieved a 15% clearance rate. An estimated 6,000 arrests per year are narcotics-related.

Police/Community Interaction

Newark's "community-oriented policing" practices are particularly evident in its two "mini-stations" located in high crime areas of the South and West districts. The mini-stations serve as sites for community meetings and crime prevention seminars as well as distribution centers for information of interest to residents. Four to five-year assignments to the mini-stations provide patrol officers ample opportunity to know and become known in the neighborhoods they patrol on foot or by car, taking complaints, and making follow-up investigations and arrests.

West District

Approximately 20% of the reported major offenses in Newark occur in the West District. The District has approximately 96,700 residents and 124 assigned officers. The South Orange Storefront encompasses two of the seven District sectors. It is staffed by a sergeant and four officers and is open approximately twelve hours a day.

Formerly, residents of the South Orange Storefront neighborhood were mostly white ethnics (German, Irish, and Italian). Today, only a few white residents (mostly seniors who have lived in the area for years) remain, although many of the neighborhood's businesses are owned by whites. Most of the approximately 10,000 residents are now black or Hispanic. A growing number of Haitians and other Caribbean immigrants are also settling here. While the area is still a viable working-class neighborhood of private single and double family homes (about half resident-owned), the trend seems to be toward fewer homeowners, more single-parent families, greater reliance on government assistance, and increased crime.

The sergeant in charge of the storefront described neighborhood residents as "pretty upset" about drugs. Yet, a recent anti-drug rally drew only 40 to 50 marchers. A community organizer's statement that it was hard to get local residents mobilized to do something about the drug situation was given credence by the poor attendance at a police-sponsored community meeting which the project staff observed at the storefront one evening. Still, there are some active block associations conducting surveillance and reporting drug activity to the police, either directly or through independent block watchers who have been provided special telephone numbers to make anonymous police reports. While these activities had not provoked any serious retaliation by drug sellers, verbal confrontations were not uncommon, and one woman had a cherry bomb exploded in her mailbox.

South District

Just under 20% of the reported major offenses in Newark occur in the South District. The District Police Station has 126 assigned officers to provide police services to the area's 87,000 residents.

The Bergen Street mini-station provides a neighborhood police presence for two of the district's seven sectors. It is staffed by a sergeant and six officers who patrol the neighborhood during an approximately twelve-hour day.

At one time, the Weequahic, or 513 sector, of Newark's South District was a mix of large, exclusive homes, luxury apartment buildings, and middle-class private homes. Now approximately 80% black, 20% white, it remains the city's fanciest neighborhood, and is home to Newark's mayor and other political leaders. Concerted efforts by residents with strong cooperation from the police have

been relatively successful in keeping drug dealers off residential streets.

In contrast, drug sales are common in the 511 sector which is a mixed residential and commercial area, populated largely by blacks. In addition to single and double family homes, there are high rise public and private apartment buildings. Residents are not well-organized and reporting is not common. But the story of a man from the 511 section who had come to district headquarters with yet another complaint for the captain illustrates the dangers of standing up to drug sellers alone. This man had recently bought a building, and soon found that some of the tenants he inherited were selling drugs from their apartment. The landlord evicted the tenants from the building, only to find that they moved to the building next door. The man continues to report the activities of his former tenants to the police. But, in return, he has been the target of harrasment, his property has been damaged, and he has received death threats. He regrets buying the building, but believes that he will be unable to sell it with all the drug activity on the block. He was at his wits end. His last words to the visiting project staff were, "I really need some help. I really need some help."

Nature of Drug-Related Crimes in the Neighborhoods Visited

In both districts visited, the major drugs are rock cocaine ("crack") and marijuana. Even in mid-afternoon, we observed drug dealers on many corners of major commercial strips. Corners with pay telephones are especially popular (although we observed one enterprising individual carrying his onw mobile telephone!). Sellers tend to be local youths working independently within their

own neighborhoods, and, to the extent transactions take place off the main strip, in their own blocks. Transactions generally involve several individuals including the dealer, a "runner" (who retrieves the "stash" once a sale is made), and often a youngster who acts a "watcher." While there are occasional drive-by shootings between sellers, guns are not usually involved in street sales which typically involve small amounts of drugs. Buyers reportedly come into the area from the suburbs as well as from the neighborhoods themselves.

Citizen Reporting Options and Police Response

Newark has neither a Crime Stoppers-type program nor a special drug hotline. Reports about drug-related crimes are made to headquarters through calls to 911, the main headquarters number, or the number for the Narcotics Bureau; to the district or mini-station either by phone or in person; and, occasionally, in person to patrol officers.

The Communications Bureau receives and processes 2,000 to 2,700 emergency (911) calls and non-emergency calls a day. Each incoming call is taped and a log is kept of the time and date of the report and where it was referred. (While calls are not currently traceable, they will be once the new computer assisted dispatch system is fully in place). The six to ten civilian employees receiving calls record information on color-coded cards based on priority. Most drug calls are accorded a low priority because the reported activity is not currently "in progress," because the quality of the information is too vague to warrant immediate response, or because there is little or no immediate danger. A lieutenant decides whether drug-related calls are referred to the

Narcotics Unit or dispatched to patrol units. If surveillance or undercover investigation is deemed necessary, the report is forwarded to the Narcotics Unit (which may refer the case back to Communications if it cannot handle it). A patrol unit will generally respond to referred-back calls and other non-priority narcotics-related calls as time allows (i.e., when they have no higher priority calls).

Calls directly to the Narcotics Unit are not traced or taped. The Unit's response depends on the quality and type of information provided. "New" information generally receives at least a cursory investigation while the more typical "confirming" information generally does not.

Calls to the District station (or mini-stations) are not traced or taped. The District captain exercises discretion about whether or not to refer these calls and those received by individual patrol officers to the Narcotics Unit or the Patrol Division.

Chicago, Illinois

Chicago Police Department

Chicago has a population of three million residents. Emergency reports of narcotics-related crimes as well as other crimes are dispatched to patrol units in the city's 25 patrol districts. In 1988, the Police Department received over three and a half million incoming telephone calls and dispatched well over two million patrol units. Non-emergency reports of narcotics activity are investigated by the citywide Organized Crime Bureau Narcotics Unit, the area-based Street Narcotics Involvement Program, or tactical officers in the individual patrol districts. In 1988, the city

reported nearly 298,000 UCR Part I offenses, with a 25.2% clearance rate. In the same year, over 33,000 persons were arrested for drug abuse violations.

Police/Community Interaction

The 25 District Commanders are encouraged to be involved with their communities and are provided Community Relations personnel for this purpose. In the two areas visited for this project, there appeared to be considerable police/community interaction through police participation at community meetings, assistance with organizing block watch groups, and providing interested citizens and groups direct telephone numbers of the commander or his Community Relations personnel. Nevertheless, the Police Department does not consider itself "community-oriented" as that term is currently understood since it neither assigns patrol officers to long-term "beats" in particular neighborhoods nor expects its patrol officers to deal with the symptoms and root causes of drug-related crimes.

Seventh District

The 300-block Seventh District has a population of approximately 130,000 residents within a six and a half mile area. Within the past 20 years, the neighborhood has changed from nearly all-white to virtually all-black. Unemployment is very high (at least 40%), and those who are employed typically earn less than $10,000. There are many single family homes, some of which have been subdivided into multi-family homes. There are also a number of apartment buildings.

The Seventh District has one of the highests incidences of crime in the city -- nearly 15,000 index crimes in 1988.

Approximately 300 officers handle over 130,000 dispatched calls a year. At any given time, 23 uniformed patrol vehicles and four Tactical Unit vehicles are on the street. The 28-member non-uniform Tactical Unit which spends approximately 80% of its time on narcotic-related cases reported some 2,500 arrests in 1989.

The neighborhood relations officer estimated that about half of the area was organized into block associations. Although the community had recently sponsored an antidrug march (which the police helped organize), turnout was poor. The neighborhood relations officer concluded, "some people care, but most don't".

Fourteenth District

The 14th District covers a six-mile area. The population of 138,000 is diverse, being primarily Hispanic, but also including considerable numbers of white ethnics and blacks. While most residents are on welfare, recently, "yuppies" have begun renovating and moving into old homes in one section of the neighborhood. Similar to the 7th District, the 14th has a mixture of single family/multi-family homes and apartment buildings. It also has a large public housing complex and borders on a large public park.

The 14th District has more gang activity than any other district in the city. The gangs are entrenched -- some are third generation -- and most residents identify with one gang or another, even if they are not formal members. The area's two major gangs are primarily Hispanic, but both have white and black members as well.

The 14th District has 260 uniformed patrol officers and a 24-person non-uniformed Tactical Unit. In 1989, the area accounted for over 12,000 reports of Part I crimes and the Division received nearly 120,000 dispatched calls. The same year, it made some 1,500 narcotics-related arrests.

Although some police complained about apathy toward the drug problem, residents in the area appear to have a good working relationship with the police and to be fairly well-organized. Block associations and church groups have organized marches and surveillance in a number of areas. Nevertheless community leaders told project staff they were not optimistic about overcoming the drug problem. One described their efforts as "trying to empty Lake Michigan with a teaspoon".

Drug-Related Activity in the Neighborhoods Visited

The most prevalent drugs in the two Chicago neighborhoods visited are cocaine and marijuana. There is also some heroin (mostly for older users), but very little crack. (Crack apparently sells for considerably less than cocaine, so dealers do not want to handle it).

Although there is some dealing on commercial "strips," most curbside dealing takes place on residential side streets. Outdoor dealers are quite visible, with two to three dealers and young lookouts to a block. Transactions also take place in houses or rooms rented from residents on a short-term (e.g., 12 hours) basis. Most dealers are also users, although probably not while they are selling. Most buyers are from outside the neighborhood, many from the Chicago suburbs.

Particularly in the 14th District, gangs play a major role in retail street sales. (Indoor sales tend to be larger and conducted more independently). Drug dealers may or may not live in the immediate area in which they deal, but even those who work in their own neighborhoods usually "rent" their sidewalk space and buy the drugs they sell from the gang. The locally-based gangs bring

substantial violence to the drug trade, characterized by considerable numbers of indiscriminate "drive-by" shootings.

Reporting Options and Police Response

Options for citizens to report drug-related crimes to the Chicago police include the Superintendent's Hotline, 911, the relatively new Crack Hotline, and the Narcotics Unit of the Organized Crime Bureau. Indirect reports may be channelled through the Office of the State's Attorney, the Chicago Crime Commission, the Cook County Crimestoppers program, or WeTip (a national 800 number hotline, like Crimestoppers characterized by anonymity and financial rewards for information resulting in arrests or indictments). However, in the two districts visited, citizen reports frequently -- and in one district usually -- come directly to district headquarters. Both Commanders freely give citizens their direct telephone numbers. The Tactical Unit, the Community Relations Officer, or, occasionally, the general switchboard also receive direct calls.

Through newspaper advertisements and presentations at community meetings and on talk shows, the Police Department encourages citizens to report non-emergency incidents to the Superintendent's Hotline, a 24-hour confidential line into the Organized Crime Division. The Superintendent's Hotline is answered by specially-trained former Narcotics Unit employees. These individuals refer "in progress" calls directly to the Patrol Division. Information from all other calls -- including those which have been referred to the Superintendent's Hotline by the Chicago Crime Commission, WeTips, etc. -- is entered into a computer, "screened," and referred for action, a several-day process. The new

information plus any relevant background information is provided as "Information For Action" to whomever handles the case. Each "IFA" requires a written response about the action taken and the results.

The Narcotics Unit itself handles the relatively few Superintendent Hotline reports of complex, serious incidents requiring major investigation or transcending the jurisdiction of any one district. In 1989, for example, the Narcotic Bureau handled some 1,800 of these reports, resulting in 338 arrests. Some of the other reports are passed along to one of the six area-based Street Narcotics Involvement Program (SNIP) teams concentrating on street-level "buy busts". Most, however, are referred to the Tactical Unit of a specific division within the area.

Calls received by 911 are referred similarly to those received over the Superintendent's Hotline, i.e., those requiring an immediate response are dispatched to the Patrol Division and others are referred either to the Narcotics Unit or to a particular Division's Tactical Unit. (While the source of 911 calls may be determined, 911 calls are considered confidential and communications personnel dispatching calls to patrol units generally honor callers' requests for anonymity).

El Paso, Texas

El Paso Police Department

A well-travelled foot and car bridge across the Rio Grande separates El Paso's core population of over 600,000 residents from more than a million residents of Mexico's Juarez Ciudad. El Paso police services are provided by approximately 750 sworn officers (1.5 per 1,000 population) and 190 civilian employees. The city is

divided into four police areas, each with its own patrol substation and tactical "impact team" of plainclothes officers. The citywide Narcotics Unit has 14 detectives. In 1988, the Department reported over 50,000 index crime offenses with a clearance rate of over 17%. It also reported some 1700 adult and juvenile arrests for drug abuse violations.

Police/Community Interaction

The El Paso Police Department does not consider itself to be practicing "community-oriented policing," as the term is currently defined. While efforts are being made to smooth acknowledged past frictions between the Department and the community, official police outreach activities are limited to those undertaken by Community Relations personnel. (Such personnel include five uniformed Community Relations officers assigned to the Department's five neighborhood "storefronts" located in high crime areas of the city. The storefronts offer a variety of services, from counseling residents about family disputes to providing income tax assistance). Other patrol officers are encouraged to concentrate on traditional law enforcement responsibilities.

East Valley Substation

Approximately 100 police personnel work out of the East Valley Substation. The substation's 64 square mile jurisdiction has approximately 224,000 residents. The majority are unemployed Hispanics and many are illegal aliens. Several halfway houses account for large numbers of probationers and parolees. Small, single-family homes and one to two story public housing projects comprise most of the population's housing. Evidence of gang presence is vividly portrayed by large, elaborately painted murals on building walls.

The neighborhood was described as by one police officer as relatively stable, but not well-organized. Recently, he noted, residents have shown unusual interest in starting block watch groups and activities for youths.

Central Substation

The Central Substation has jurisdiction over 143,000 residents (virtually all Hispanic) and covers a geographical area of 25.2 miles. This includes the downtown section of El Paso, with the entrance to the highly-trafficked bridge to Juarez, Mexico on its southern border. The officer/resident ratio is less than 1:1000, lower than for the city as a whole.

The area is very poor. Most of the residents are on welfare and live in crowded one-family homes or low-rise public housing complexes. While many are second or third generation residents, the area has become increasingly transient, with many Mexican nationals using relatives' homes as stopping off points on their way to other U.S. cities. According to one neighborhood leader, higher rents occasioned by increased numbers of relatively wealthy drug dealers and recent gentrification efforts are beginning to displace long-time residents, thereby contributing to the area's instability. Not even long-term residents are well-organized. In light of this fact, combined with residents' deep-seated and historic mistrust of the police, it is not surprising that there are few neighborhood watch organizations in the area. One exception to the neighborhood's disorganization is gangs; as in the East Valley neighborhood, these are becoming more entrenched and more assertive as territory is claimed and proclaimed by large, colorful murals.

Nature of Drug Activity in the Neighborhoods Visited

While large quantities of drugs come into El Paso from Mexico, for the most part El Paso is only a stopover point on the way to ultimate distribution areas. The most prevalent drugs bought and sold in El Paso itself are marijuana, heroin (particularly in the Central District) and, to a lesser extent, cocaine, which relative to marijuana and heroin is expensive. To date, there has been little crack.

The city is divided by a freeway which cuts across both of the neighborhoods included in the study. "Stashhouses" where large caches of drugs from Mexico are stored until transported out of the area are usually in the more affluent section north of the freeway. Retail sales which involve frequent (e.g., daily) purchases of small amounts of drugs for personal use generally take place in the poorer section south of the freeway.

Drug trafficking usually takes place in or in the vicinity of the dealers' own neighborhoods and buyers and sellers typically know each other (although in the Central District, buyers include transients and Fort Bliss Military Base personnel). In the less dense East Valley, transactions are likely to take place in shopping centers and parks or in public housing complexes where "enforcers" oversee who sells where, what, and to whom. In the more compact Central District, sales are likely to take place in the residential side streets or public housing complexes. In both districts, drug dealers and their transactions are reportedly becoming increasingly visible. Still, open-air drug sales in El Paso are far less obvious than in the other sites visited by project staff.

Religious and familial traditions which in the past served to

inhibit drug-related activities by Hispanics appear to be breaking down. Gangs have existed in the area for sometime, but are more involved in drugs and violence than previously. While relatively few residents are gang members, gangs today are larger than they have been in the past and have more non-member followers, many in their 30's and 40's.

Reporting Options and Police Response

The city's widely-publicized Crime Stoppers program is attached to the Police Department's Criminal Investigation Bureau and is located within police headquarters. The 24-hour, 7-day a week program is overseen by a Police Coordinator and a civilian Board of Directors. It offers anonymity and the potential for financial rewards of up to $1,000 for reports resulting in felony arrests and indictments. During working hours, the telephone is answered by a Police Department civilian employee; after hours by a police officer. Crimestoppers receives approximately 100 calls per month, at least half of them drug-related. From November 15, 1978 when it began through February 13, 1990, reports to Crime Stoppers have accounted for 641 narcotics arrests (578 clearances) and over $13,500,000 in confiscated narcotics.

Unlike many other cities, El Paso does not attempt to restrict its 911 line to emergencies. It receives from 1,500 to 1,700 calls a day (and dispatches 800 to 1,200 service calls per day). However, relatively few of these -- probably no more than 20 a month -- are directly drug-related. 911 calls are traced and tapped.

Reports of drug-related crimes are also made to the substations or storefronts or, occasionally, directly to the Narcotics Unit.

Such calls are not traced or tapped, although callers sometimes identify themselves, particularly if they know the individual they are calling.

Whatever their source, "in progress" calls are directed to patrol officers in the appropriate substation. Reports of street level drug dealing are generally referred to the relevant substation's "impact team." However, "impact team" personnel are rarely available to conduct even short-term investigations. (At the time of the study, the "impact teams" were focusing their investigations on burglaries, most of which were presumed to be drug-motivated. Burglary arrests and convictions are easier to obtain than drug trafficking arrests and convictions. However, with the recent increase in and public concern about gang activity -- including gang involvement in drug activity -- the "impact team" focus was about to be shifted to gang-related incidents.) Because of other "impact team" priorities and the Narcotic Unit's concentration on the supply side of the narcotics trade, as a practical matter street level dealing has been conducted with relative impunity. To address this situation, plans were underway for a Street Level Narcotics Unit to target individual consumers.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Philadelphia Police Department

Philadelphia's Police Department provides police services to some 1,688,000 residents. In 1988, the city had a crime rate of 62.7 major crimes per 1,000 residents. The same year, the Department made slightly over 13,000 drug-related arrests.

Police/Community Interaction

For the past several years, one of Philadelphia's nine police

divisions -- the South Division -- has been incorporating community-oriented and problem-oriented principles. In this connection, it is sponsoring a two-year experiement in one of its neighborhoods. (See Queens Village neighborhood description, below). If successful, the project is expected to serve as a model for the Philadelphia Police Department.South Police Division

The South Police Division covers 13 square miles of inner city space and has approximately 250,000 residents. Six hundred thirty-five sworn officers are assigned to the Division's four district areas. Each of the district captains meets regularly with an advisory neighborhood commission of non-elected community leaders. It is estimated that a third of the residents are organized and work with the police in South Philadelphia -- the organization is very intense and covers about two-thirds of the South Philadelphia area. Drug-related efforts are concentrated on street-level transactions.

Queens Village Neighborhood

The South Police Division's Third District has a neighborhood mini-station staffed by five uniformed officers. Within the mini-station's jurisdiction is Queen Village Neighborhood, a six-square-block area which includes a thriving business section, an artesan community, private residences, and a large public housing complex. The population is diverse socio-economically, ethnically, and racially.

Since March, 1988, the Police Executive Research Forum has been providing technical assistance aimed at instituting a problem-oriented and community-oriented policing approach to drug and crime problems in Queens Village Neighborhood. Five uniformed

patrol officers have been trained to go beyond merely responding to calls for service by addressing underlying problems prompting calls to request service or to report incidents. The police work closely with a management team consisting of "stakeholders" in Queen Village such as civic, business, and religious leaders, private and city agencies, and residents.

Martin Luther King Neighborhood

The Martin Luther King neighborhood mini-station covers a diverse lower-middle class, racially-mixed area of 55,000 to 60,000 white, Puerto Rican, Asian, and black residents. The primary drug area is concentrated within several square blocks and has been the target of intensified police and citizen efforts to move the drug dealers out of the neighborhood. These efforts have proven quite successful, and at the time of our site visit, many of the dealers either had been shut down or forced to sell indoors. Police were quick to note the importance of citizen efforts (such as town watches, drug vigils and marches) and the general emphasis on police-community interaction and cooperation in accomplishing these goals.

The field commander in the district decides how to handle calls referred from the downtown central narcotics division. He may decide to send out a uniformed patrol unit to "stabilize" the area or he may assign it to a field undercover burglary unit. It may seem surprising that a "burglary" unit is used, but because the Philadelphia Police Department has a centralized narcotics unit, the district commanders' only undercover plainsclothes unit is the burglary unit. As a result, these burglary units have taken on primary responsibility within districts for undercover drug work.

In the Martin Luther King neighborhood, four officers are assigned to the burglary unit and operate in teams of two officers.

Nature of Drug-Related Crimes in the Neighborhoods Visited

Cocaine, crack and marijuana are the drugs of choice in both the neighborhoods we visited. In Queen Village, the police have identified six main drug dealers, each with several street dealers working under him. The dealers are long-time neighborhood residents who appear to be "independents", without ties to major drug organizations. Buyers frequently use their newly-purchased drugs in well-known crackhouses. There is little violence associated with drug trafficking in this neighborhood. Of the 52 people arrested in Queens Village for drugs in 1988, 67% were black males, 13% were white males, and 7% were black females. Half were between 16 and 30 years of age. Half were neighborhood residents.

In the Martin Luther King neighborhood, dealers are primarily "bubble-gum" gangs of kids and independent dealers. Some violence is associated with drug sales, but is rather minimal compared with other parts of the city. In this neighborhood, the primary drug sold to white customers by Puerto Rican dealers is cocaine while black dealers more often sell crack to black customers.

Reporting Options

Philadelphia's centralized 911 emergency number received 3.8 million calls for service in 1988; approximately 10% of these were crime-related. The Department does not keep a separate code for narcotics calls which are usually assigned a priority code of "3" on a "6" point scale.

A Crimestoppers program in effect since 1986 logged 1,143 calls in 1989, 406 of which were drug-related. The few "emergency"

drug-related calls are referred to 911 and the few non-emergency calls where speed may nonetheless important to an investigation are referred immediately to the central Narcotics Unit. Most narcotics-related calls, however, are summarized in a written report which is sent to the Narcotics Unit on a monthly basis.

A special 24-hour Narcotics Hotline is also available for citizen to report drug activity. Calls received via the Hotline are referred to the field units in each district.

Citizens in the South Division's Third District may request a special code number which enables them to have their non-emergency calls "beamed" by radio to a patrol officer in the neighborhood. (To date, there has been little use of this number).

Referral/Response Options

Whatever its source (911, Crime Stoppers, Division headquarters), each call that comes into the South Police Division results in the completion of a form containing the address of the alleged activity, names (if available) of alleged dealers/buyers, and other relevant information. (Crime Stoppers completes forms for the calls it receives and forwards them to the Division; the Division completes forms for calls it receives either directly or through referral from 911). Arrest information is added as it becomes available. Each call is rated on a 1 to 8 scale, reflecting the quality of the information reported and the number of previous complaints about the locale or individual subject of the report. All information is entered into a computer. Approximately once a month, printouts by address are run to pinpoint major areas of activity.

* * *

Site visits were made to Newark, New Jersey; Chicago, Illinois, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and El Paso, Texas. The four cities ranged in population from a low of 330,000 (Newark) to a high of 3 million (Chicago). The lowest number of reported index crime offenses was 40,000 (Newark) and the highest 298,000 (Chicago). Drug abuse arrests ranged from 1,700 in El Paso to 33,000 in Chicago.

Police identified for us two neighborhoods in each city where drugs had had an adverse affect on neighborhood life. These were examined in some depth.

Although a few of the neighborhoods were low to middle income working-class areas, most were characterized by high rates of unemployment or underemployment. The extent to which residents were organized to look after their community's interests varied considerably. Whether or not the police department had a city-wide commitment to community-oriented policing, police/community communication channels existed in varying ways and to varying degrees in each of the eight neighborhoods. These included neighborhood mini-stations, networking between district community relations personnel and community leaders, police-sponsored meetings with community groups, and police participation in meetings called by the community.

Street-level drug activity in the neighborhoods was often visible -- and sometimes seemed ubiquitous. Cocaine and marijuana were most commonly mentioned as the "drugs of choice". Heroin was also common in El Paso and crack in Philadelphia. Sellers were usually neighborhood residents.

The level of violence varied from neighborhood to neighborhood. To the extent it existed, it tended to be between

dealers, rather than between dealers and uninvolved residents (though innocent bystanders were sometimes hurt). Gang-related activities were reported on the rise in several of the neighborhoods, causing considerable concern to residents.

In addition to the usual reporting options -- 911, the Narcotics Unit, police headquarters main number -- residents in most of the neighborhoods visited were encouraged to report to district police commanders or their staff at the district station or in neighborhood mini-stations. Residents of some cities had additional options, such as Crimestoppers or a special hotline.

V. FINDINGS FROM ON-SITE INTERVIEWS WITH POLICE AND CITIZEN REPRESENTATIVES

In this chapter, we discuss the information gained in the eight neighborhoods visited by project staff in Philadelphia, Newark, Chicago, and El Paso. At each site, our interviews came to focus on five issues:

1. Importance to the Police of Citizen Reports
   To what extent are citizen reports useful to the police in identifying drug dealers or drug locations? In making arrests? In ridding neighborhoods of serious drug problems?

2. Reporting Modalities
   What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of different reporting modalities?

3. Obstacles to Citizen Reporting
   What role do fear of retaliation, problems in reporting systems, and criminal justice constraints play in inhibiting reporting?

4. Incentives to Citizen Reporting
   Are there things the police can do to encourage people to report drug activity?

5. Effects of Reporting
   Do reports by citizens encourage police to increase anti-drug activities in a neighborhood? Can citizen reports make a significant difference in arrests of street dealers or displacement of drug activity?

For each of these issues, we sought to obtain the perspectives of central police administrators, district-level police officers, and community leaders. Opinions and beliefs often varied, sometimes dramatically. What follows is our attempt to synthesize the comments of those people who gave their time to help us at each site.

Importance to the Police of Citizen Reports

In the national telephone survey we conducted, police representatives told us that all types of citizen reports of drug activity were important to their work. Our site visits, however, left us with far more complex impressions about the importance of

these reports. To examine the extent to which citizen reports are important, it is necessary to ask, "Reports of what kind of drug activity? Made by whom? And made to whom?"

The first thing to understand is that police in major cities are overwhelmed with citizen reports of drug activity. (Of the sites we visited, El Paso was an exception, but it is probably less representative of major U.S. cities than our other three sites). Police simply receive many more drug reports than they can handle effectively. In Newark, we were told by the captain in charge of the 911 system that the central narcotics unit -- which fields only half a dozen men per shift to cover the entire city -- is inundated with reports of drug activity that come mostly through 911: "Each shift comes in to a stack of reports. There's no way they can follow up on them all".

In Chicago, the administrator of a crime hotline told us that an overworked central narcotics unit kept fewer than four percent of drug-related calls that come through the hotline, referring the rest out to district tactical squads or (rarely) to patrol units. Interviews with members of tactical squads disclosed that they were unfortunately little better-equipped than the central narcotics squad to follow up on the massive volume of reports.

Moreover, most reports from the general citizenry do not seem to provide the police with any novel information. We heard time and time again comments like the one from the Newark captain in charge of 911: "[The police] know exactly where drugs are sold throughout the city. Of the reports of locations we get, we already know about 99% of them".

Central narcotics units often get better information from informants than from the general public for the work they do -- going after drug wholesalers and inside locations. Citizen reports are often passed along to local patrol commanders, who at best have only a limited capacity to carry out undercover surveillance of reported locations and frequently have no plainclothes staff at all to dispatch.

In what sense, then, are citizen reports useful to the police? They are used by the police to identify "hot spots" of drug activity, and to allocate their resources accordingly. This is probably most true at the local level, where district commanders are concerned about responding to community needs and interests. In most of the districts we visited, drugs are ubiquitous. Complaints by residents alert commanders about which neighborhoods people were willing to stand up and do something about the problem. We heard many variants of the axiom, "the squeaky wheel gets the grease". District commanders welcomed efforts by community groups to organize residents to conduct surveillance of their neighborhoods and report drug activity, and responded by giving those neighborhoods whatever help they could from undercover surveillance, to increased uniformed patrols, to pressuring landlords to evict sellers, to help in organizing anti-drug rallies.

Often, the district commanders tried to encourage residents to report in ways that were maximally useful. An inspector in charge of several districts in Philadelphia stated, "I don't need more reports. I need better information". This inspector and other local administrators we encountered made strenuous efforts to train members of community groups to report specific information including

the identities of individuals involved, their methods of operation, and the locations of their drugs.

To obtain this sort of specific information often meant that district police personnel encouraged reporters to conduct further observation to get additional information and call again, or to provide their identities so the police could contact them after making an initial check of the drug location.

Most valued by the police were reports by reliable individuals with whom they worked on a continuing basis. The inspector in Philadelphia, for example, has organized and trained a select group of residents, and given them access to police radios so they can report non-emergency activities directly to local mini-station personnel. Such direct contact provides responding officers the opportunity to request follow-up information from callers and increases the chances that police will arrive at the scene in time to apprehend suspects and seize evidence before both disappear.

Citizen reports, then, are one way to help determine how to allocate scarce police resources to drug enforcement. And, to the extent that they are based on specific information from known reliable sources, they may also give police useful data to carry out enforcement efforts.

Reporting Modalities

In the sites visited, there were four basic ways that citizens report drug activity to the police:

- Call 911;
- Call a central hotline or citywide narcotics unit;
- Call Crimestoppers; and
- Call the local police district.

Each of these methods of reporting had strengths and weaknesses.

Calls to 911

The 911 number is easy for people to remember and can be dialed quickly. In most, if not all, cities we visited, it is the most common means of reporting drug activity. Its chief advantage is that -- when response time is quick -- there is a chance to catch a seller in action. And, since it is usually a marked patrol unit that responds, reporters can see a tangible response to their call.

But we also encountered a multitude of problems associated with 911 calls. Depending on how busy police departments were, response time might be lengthy, even up to several hours on a Friday or Saturday night. Calls concerning drug activity were assigned medium to low priority and, accordingly, response was delayed when officers were busy answering calls of higher priority. Lengthy response times were a cause of anger among community leaders we spoke to in Chicago, which probably had one of the quicker 911 responses among the cities we visited.

Concern was widely expressed that people wishing to remain anonymous were afraid to call 911 because their identities might be discovered. That fear was generated for several reasons. In all cities, 911 calls were recorded and that alone caused people concerns. Worse, Texas has an Open Records Act, which makes 911 conversations available to the media or, for that matter, to anyone requesting access. We heard reports that after complainants had called 911 police officers had come to their homes (presumably to obtain further information), tipping off drug sellers who made the report. And, in Chicago and El Paso, police told us that some drug sellers monitor 911 calls using inexpensive radios purchased at Radio Shack.

Some district police also questioned the quality of reports received through 911. They argued that the 911 operators did not know the right questions to ask callers and that the information they obtained was therefore less specific than information district personnel were able to elicit from reporters. Moreover, district personnel complained that the sources of such information were of unknown reliability relative to sources in the community who had been cultivated to report directly to the local districts.

Finally, some police believed that 911 should be reserved for emergency calls, and that large numbers of calls about drug activity -- few of which are true emergencies -- simply clog the system.

Calls to a Central Narcotics Unit or Hotline

Reporting to a city's central narcotics unit or drug hotline (which typically feeds non-emergency reports to central narcotics units) has some advantages. Foremost is accountability. Reports received are typically logged -- often using a computer system -- and a note made of where they are routed for action. The action, once taken, must be recorded in the log as well. That process tends to ensure that reports will not get lost in the shuffle and it allows easy access to information requested by citizen reporters who call back at a later time to find out how police responded to their calls.

Headquarters personnel also noted that central reporting provides the citywide perspective of drug activity necessary for responsible department-wide allocation of resources. Moreover, it provides baseline data against which to compare and evaluate the various districts' drug-related efforts. And at least in Chicago --

where all reports to the Superintendent's Hotline are computer-searched before being passed along for action -- central reporting ensures that whoever is responsible for investigating the report is aware of all related police department information regardless of where in the city it emanated.

Reporting to central narcotics or through a hotline probably is advantageous for people reporting major selling or wholesaling operations or stashes of large quantities of drugs. These cases -- which not only are potentially high impact but often involve more than one police district -- are the kinds of cases narcotics units that we visited preferred to handle themselves.

But most reports are of less consequence, and narcotics units pass these along to patrol divisions. Usually they wind up in the hands of local districts, but by then several days may have passed. Since the reports are usually anonymous, local police have no way to refresh the now-outdated information. We heard complaints by tactical officers assigned to a local district in Chicago that these calls generate a lot of work for them -- the reports have to be responded to and the response passed back up the chain of command -- with little return.

Crimestoppers Calls

While Crimestoppers is similar to police hotlines in that it is citywide and offers anonymity, it differs in several important respects. Since it is a private entity rather than a public agency, it is not subject to open record laws which may jeopardize the anonymity of residents who report directly to police departments. Moreover, Crimestoppers holds out a "carrot" to potential reporters

in the form of financial rewards. Because rewards are contingent on arrests or convictions, callers interested in rewards are usually receptive to requests for further, follow-up information. (It is suspected that a number of these reporters are themselves involved in drug trafficking and therefore have relatively easy access to such information). In fact, since it is not unusual for the same individuals to report on repeated occasions, many become quite well-trained in ascertaining and reporting the type of information police find useful. Finally, since the value of the narcotics involved in arrests or convictions determines the amount of the reward, it is advantageous for reporters to provide information about high-level dealers and wholesalers.

However, the Crimestoppers programs we reviewed in El Paso and Philadelphia did not receive large numbers of drug-related calls. The El Paso program averages about 600 such calls a year (out of a total number of approximately 1,200 calls), and the Philadelphia program only about 400 per year (out of a total number of approximately 1,100 calls). Moreover, the "success" rate of drug-related calls in terms of arrests was probably lower than for calls about other types of crimes (e.g., in the first six months of 1990, the El Paso program resulted in average arrests of only two per month).

Calls to Local Police Districts

Reporting to local districts has much to recommend it. Our site visits suggested that reports can often be made directly to district commanders sensitive to residents' concerns about stability in their neighborhoods, or to particular officers (uniformed or

undercover) who are in a position to investigate the report themselves. This method of reporting can foster a relationship between the caller and district officers. The relationship can encourage the reporter's confidence that the police can be relied on to do something and can encourage police confidence that the reporter is a reliable source of information. The relationship also means that the police can contact a reporter to get more information or make a request to use the reporter's home to conduct surveillance of a location. And it means that police can train citizens in collecting the specific information they find useful.

There are, however, drawbacks to this reporting modality as well. We heard some concerns voiced by police and citizens that reporters who had made their identities known to local police had been subsequently exposed to drug sellers, presumably by officers who are "on the take" from drug dealers. (Acknowledging this problem in his own district, one commander in Chicago said he urged citizens who wanted absolute anonymity to call 911 even though reports to the district were preferable from his perspective and, as noted above, 911 presents its own security risks). Moreover, citizens who see no immediate or effective response to their report may feel even more disillusioned with police if they reported to a presumably sympathetic community officer rather than to a faceless bureaucrat "downtown."

* * *

In most cities we visited, there appeared to be disagreement between police personnel assigned to districts and central administrators about where reports of drug activity should be

initiated. Citywide policies seem to encourage citizens to call central drug or crime hotlines and at least not to discourage them from calling 911 with reports of drug activity. Local officers, on the other hand, usually encourage citizens in their districts to call them directly, for the reasons stated above.

Different kinds of reports are probably best handled through different calling modalities. Reports of large-scale operations are best made to narcotics units (directly or through a hotline), since they have the resources to follow up most effectively and since such calls are usually "non-emergency". At the other extreme, people wanting just to get the sellers off their front stoop may be satisfied by a patrol car dispatched by a call to 911. People between these two extremes, however, may be best off reporting to their local police.

Obstacles to Citizen Reporting

During the course of our site visits, we tried to obtain the perspectives of police officers and community leaders on factors that discouraged residents from reporting drug activity.

Our interviews with police seemed to point to slow police response time as the most immediate disincentive to citizen reporting of drug activities. Most citizen representatives concurred in this perception but some also noted citizen skepticism that police would make <u>any response at all</u> to their reports. For example, in Chicago, community leaders complained that response to 911 calls was sometimes slow and that calls to special hotlines often produced no visible response. In El Paso, a community affairs lieutenant and a community organizer both complained that slow 911

response time had aggravated already-damaged police/community relations. And in Newark, the head of communications acknowledged that during peak times, response to reports of drug activity could take up to several hours.

Slow response times to calls about drug activity are the result of assigning these calls a low-priority status. During busy hours when many emergency calls come in, reports of drug dealing (as well as most other calls) must wait to receive attention until there is a lull in emergency calls. Adding more patrol units would help this problem (and, to the extent it exists, the problem of no response). But even if that were done, there would always be times when reports of drug activity would wait for units to be freed up from responding to emergencies.

Related to the issue of slow (or no) police response is the issue of the response of prosecutors and judges to the relatively few cases in which police make arrests based on citizen reports. Both police and citizen representatives repeatedly mentioned how discouraging it is to residents (as well as some police) that such arrests appear to do little more than get the individual off the streets for a few hours. There seemed little doubt that in all of the cities visited the courts <u>are</u> so overburdened with drug cases that lesser cases (such as arrests for low-level dealers and users) were treated lightly or simply thrown out. This complaint seemed an especially sore point in Chicago, where we heard it from community leaders, patrol officers, and police administrators. We were told that judges were throwing out cases involving possession of small amounts of drugs, and that this practice was about to be formalized

into a State's Attorney policy to nolle such cases. (The problem with this policy, according to patrol officers, was that possession was often the only charge officers could level against dealers who were hard to catch in the act of selling. They argued that several minor convictions of such individuals were useful in establishing a criminal history which, eventually, could result in a lengthy prison sentence). In Philadelphia, we heard similar resentment expressed by officers against prison caps imposed by a court decision. These caps were seen as responsible for a reluctance to prosecute and convict those involved with drugs.

People we interviewed in all cities mentioned fear of reprisal as a major disincentive to reporting drug activity. If we had taken a poll, this probably would have topped most respondents' list of reasons for not reporting.

Although fear of reprisal is a primary concern, the extent of actual intimidation is impossible to measure. By definition, truly intimidated citizens will not report. Complaints of intimidation are rarely investigated by police since they tend to be anonymous and constitute hearsay which cannot be prosecuted without the testimony of complaining witnesses. Nevertheless, we heard no shortage of instances where threats were made against residents who cooperated with the police. And we heard of instances where tires were slashed, windows broken, and other property damaged by dealers giving a message to residents who had called the police. Not all intimidation efforts are successful, however. One incident we heard of in Chicago actually backfired against the drug dealers. Residents were so incensed by threats and property damage against a

family who signed a complaint against sellers on their block that they went to court en masse to show support for the family.

It is significant that no one we spoke to in any of the four cities was able to recall one incident of someone assaulted or killed for reporting drug activity. We did, however, hear of incidents where dealers had shot each other and, in one instance, an innocent bystander was injured. Such incidents may be enough to plant in the minds of would-be-reporters that those selling drugs are capable of extreme violence. This alone may be sufficient to discourage many individuals from cooperating with the police.

Closely related to fear of reprisal is people's fear that if they tried to report anonymously, their names would be revealed anyhow. Apparently this fear is not unwarranted. Lack of anonymity is a real possibility in the cities visited. In Chicago, several police officials told us that drug dealers monitored 911 calls using inexpensive radios. In El Paso, a state Open Records Act made records of 911 calls accessible to the media and others. In Newark, we heard concerns expressed that drug dealers had been given names of reporters by corrupt police officers. (It was also suggested to us that this might be a ploy used by dealers to get residents to admit that they had reported).

Incentives to Citizen Reporting

During our site visits, we also tried to understand what types of incentives might be effective in encouraging citizens to report drug activities. Police told us that taking steps to protect anonymity and to show people that their calls were being responded to were important. A district commander in Chicago repeated several

times to a community group, "Just look out your window after you call and see [that the police do respond]".

But the thing we heard the most from police was that they needed to reach out to residents to win their trust and cooperation. The inspector we talked to in charge of several districts in South Philadelphia was a strong advocate of trying to win the community over to the side of the police. He had established neighborhood advisory councils in each district under his command, frequently attended meetings of community groups, worked to coordinate police efforts with block watch groups, and held seminars teaching people what to include in reports to the police. We heard very similar accounts of community activities from both district commanders in Chicago, from a district captain in El Paso, and from sergeants in charge of storefront offices in Newark. All emphasized the necessity of building bridges to the community in order to win better community cooperation, including reporting drug activity. This strategy's success was reflected in the comments of several Newark citizens who told us they frequently report to their mini-station police because these officers have convinced them that their reports are important even when they do not result in an immediate or visible police response.

Effects of Reporting

We asked the opinions of police and community officials about whether neighborhoods where drug activity was reported could expect to see a reduction of such activity. The answers were mixed.

Clearly, one effect that reporting can have is to move drug sellers out of a small geographic area temporarily. Patrol cars

dispatched in response to a citizen report -- and this is based on our own observations -- often have the effect of dispersing sellers. If police presence alone is not sufficient, police may talk to the sellers to convince them to leave. Of course, there is little to stop the sellers from returning in short order to the same location. Even under the best of circumstances, drug activity may simply move indoors or onto the next block.

Organized residents who call the police repeatedly to complain about drug activity may be able to achieve another effect. They may increase their neighborhood's allocation of police resources in the form of patrols, sweeps, surveillance activities, or "buy and bust" operations. Police district commanders are sensitive to pressure from community groups. Most we met were quite eager to meet with neighborhood residents who were willing to report and to plan a joint police-citizen strategy to tackle the neighborhood's drug problem.

When residents are willing to report and police are willing to make a commitment of resources, there is little doubt that drug sellers and buyers can be affected. We certainly saw evidence of police ability to make considerable numbers of arrests. But these arrests may not result in significant action by the criminal justice system. Because of prison and court overcrowding and the evidentiary weaknesses of many drug arrests, most of those apprehended may spend little or no time in jail, before or after the case is disposed. This certainly can be discouraging to police and residents alike. But we were told several times by those making the arrests that there is a cumulative effect. After a number of

arrests, offenders eventually do receive substantial penalties from the courts. Thus arrests that apparently produce little action may ultimately result in establishing a pattern of criminal behavior and, as a consequence, may not be as futile as they appear at first blush.

In all of the cities we visited, we heard examples of how residents and police were able to raise the costs of drug activity enough to cause those involved to relocate or at least become more circumspect. There are exceptions. In Chicago's west side, where drugs are controlled by gangs, each dealer is assigned a location in which to sell. We were told that unless the gang "reassigns" the dealer, getting him to move is very difficult because he may not move into a location assigned to another member.

But, even if drug activity can be reduced in an area, the effect often seems to be temporary. We did hear of neighborhoods where drug selling had been nearly eliminated and did not reappear. However, this outcome seems most likely in more middle-class residential areas where drug sellers came from outside the neighborhood. More often we heard of instances where selling had been displaced temporarily and then reinstated within a few weeks or months. In neighborhoods where those selling drugs are neighborhood kids -- which is often the case in poor neighborhoods -- stopping sales permanently seems to be quite difficult. Ironically, residents in these neighborhoods who band together when drug trafficking becomes unbearable tend to dissolve their association once they succeed in getting the trafficking reduced. After they disband, the area may once again be infested by drug dealers.

VI. RESULTS OF RESIDENT AND PATROL OFFICER SURVEYS

In this chapter, we examine the results of our surveys with 400 residents in the eight police districts selected for intensive study. Through the interviews, we tried to learn more about the kinds of neighborhoods we had selected, about the experiences of people who had reported drug activity, and about the reasons why people didn't report more.

We also interviewed a minimum of three patrol officers in each of the eight districts (33 officers total), using a structured form similar to the resident interview. Although the numbers are small, the patrol officer interviews do corroborate resident responses about factors that inhibit reporting of drug activity.

Characteristics of Respondents

Residents we spoke to in the eight districts visited were a diverse group in a number of ways. We achieved a good mixture of men and women -- 42% and 68%, respectively. We also achieved a good mixture of age groups: Twenty-two percent were young adults (18-25), 58% were middle-aged (26-59), and 20% were seniors (60 years and over). Ethnically, the sample was also varied, with Blacks being the most common (44%), but with good representations of Hispanics (30%) and Whites (26%).

Socioeconomically the sample was also varied, though it tended toward lower to lower-middle class. Three in ten respondents (31%) reported household incomes of $10,000 or below, and the median fell at about $15,000. At the other end of the spectrum, 21% earned $30,000 or more. Schooling showed a similar pattern: 38% of the respondents had not completed high school and, conversely, just 11%

had received a college degree. Nearly four in ten households (37%) had more than two adult members.

Community Descriptors

In each city we visited, we asked police administrators to nominate for us two districts that had serious drug problems, but which were still viable neighborhoods. As described in Chapter IV, all the areas nominated were economically disadvantaged and had a lot of drug activity. Still, there were considerable differences in ethnic make-up, social cohesion, and other characteristics of the areas we studied. An understanding of the kinds of districts we included is important in considering the range of communities that our findings can be applied to. Also, as discussed below, the willingness of residents to report drug activity varied considerably from one community to the next, and this variation is linked to community characteristics.

In this section, we describe the districts studied, on a number of dimensions including:

- Socioeconomic status;
- Stability;
- Social cohesion;
- Quality of municipal services;
- Community organization;
- Extent of drug problems;
- District problems other than drugs; and
- Relations with the police.

In defining the districts, we will be relying mainly on the interviews with 400 residents. Some of the same items asked of residents were also asked of the 33 patrol officers we interviewed, and, where possible, we will compare the responses of residents to

those given by police officers.

Given the nature of the districts we visited, a surprisingly high number of respondents rated them as satisfactory places to live. Just over half of the residents rated their districts as at least a 'pretty good' place to live, see Table VI-1. Roughly the same proportions believed that most people were concerned about their community and that most people in the district watched out for each other. A partial explanation of why residents felt fairly good about their communities may be that they had had a lot of time to get to know people: 66% of respondents had lived in their communities for five years or longer. In contrast, patrol officers were far more negative about the districts: 40% of the officers felt that most residents were concerned about their communities and just 12% felt that residents watched out for each other.

Residents were also fairly satisfied with municipal services, rating police services, garbage collection, fire protection, schools, and health services each between 'fair' and 'good' (see Figure 1). Of all services, however, police received the lowest rating.

Residents were less than enthusiastic in responding to another series of questions about police-community relations. A majority (58%) believed that the police treated district residents with respect most of the time. But less than half of the people we spoke to believed that the police were doing the best they could to work with residents (37%); that the police were doing the best they could to fight crime (41%); or that the police were doing the best they could to fight drugs (37%). And the patrol officers we interviewed were clearly unimpressed with residents' role in police-community

TABLE VI-1

Resident and Police Views of Social Cohesion

	Residents (N=402)	Patrol Officers (N=33)
Concern About Community		
Most residents concerned	52%	39%
Some residents concerned	25%	49%
Few residents concerned	23%	12%
Watch Out For Others		
Most residents watch out	45%	12%
Some residents watch out	30%	42%
Few residents watch out	25%	46%
Feelings About Community		
Great place	16%	
Pretty good place	35%	
Fair place	35%	
Pretty bad place	8%	
Really bad place	6%	

FIGURE 1

Resident Ratings of Municipal Services



relations, see Table VI-2. Fewer than one in three patrol officers interviewed believed that residents treated police with respect most of the time. Just 6% of the officers thought that residents were doing the best they could to work with police. The same proportion thought that residents were doing their best to fight crime, and none of the 33 officers surveyed thought that residents were doing the best they could to fight drugs.

We asked respondents about the extent to which drugs posed a problem for their community within the context of other problems, including housing, dirty streets and sidewalks, vacant buildings, fires, crime, lack of recreation areas, and abandoned cars. Drugs were considered a worse problem than the others listed, including crime in general (see Figure 2). Nearly half of the residents (47%) rated drugs as a 'serious' problem. We also asked residents and police directly whether their communities had any problems worse than drugs. About half of the patrol officers (49%) did not think that any problems were more serious than drugs; all those who did think other problems were more serious named the related issue of crime or fear of crime as the most significant problem. Residents overwhelmingly felt that drugs were the big issue: Fully 80% named drugs as their neighborhood's most serious problem.

According to both residents and patrol officers, drug activity in the districts we visited was often quite open. Thirty-two percent of residents, and 46% of police, said that drug sales were highly visible. Similar proportions -- 25% of residents and 39% of police -- said that drug use was highly visible.

To understand what effects drugs have on communities, we queried residents about potential harmful -- and helpful -- effects. The results, displayed in Table VI-3, show that the most

TABLE VI-2

Resident and Police Views of Police-Community Relations

	Residents (N=402)	Patrol Officers (N=33)
Police Respect Residents/ Residents Respect Police		
Most of the time	58%	30%
Some of the time	24%	49%
Little of the time	18%	21%
Police Work With Residents/ Residents Work with Police		
Doing best they can	37%	6%
Making some effort	33%	70%
Not doing much	30%	24%
Police (Respondents) Doing Best to Fight Crime		
Doing best they can	41%	6%
Making some effort	35%	73%
Not doing much	24%	21%
Police (Respondents) Doing Best to Fight Drugs		
Doing best they can	37%	--
Making some effort	36%	67%
Not doing much	27%	33%

FIGURE 2

Resident Ratings of Community Problems



TABLE VI-3

Effects of Drugs on Communities According to Residents

	% who answer 'a lot' (N=402)
Negative Effects of Drugs	
People more worried about getting mugged	40%
People more worried about break-ins	53%
People more worried about getting shot	44%
People less likely to go to parks	32%
People less willing for kids to play outside	29%
People more willing to keep to themselves	33%
Increased gang violence	22%
Positive Effects of Drugs	
People more willing to watch out for each other	37%
Brought people together to fight drugs	26%
Improved local economy	4%

significant harmful effect of drugs is to heighten fear of crime: 53% of respondents reported that drug activity had made them a lot more concerned about break-ins; 44% reported being a lot more worried about getting killed or shot; and 40% were a lot more concerned about getting mugged. About a third of respondents reported that drug activity had isolated people in their communities more by making them a lot more afraid to use recreation spaces, a lot less willing to allow kids to play outdoors, and/or a lot more likely to keep to themselves. A smaller number of respondents (22%) said that drugs had had a major effect on gang violence. A few respondents mentioned other harmful effects of drugs, ranging from lowering property values to vandalism to setting a bad example for kids.

In some ways, it seems that the drug problem has awakened people to the need for neighbors to form bonds in order to protect themselves. This is good news for those worried that drugs maybe drive people apart. Thirty-seven percent of respondents said that drug activity had made residents of their communities a lot more willing to watch out for each other, and 26% said that drug activity had brought residents together to fight drugs. We also asked whether people saw drugs as improving the local economy by bringing in more cash, but this idea was soundly rejected by 96% of respondents.

About a quarter of respondents (29%) were aware of organized efforts in their communities -- most often through churches or block associations -- to do something about the drug problem. Eleven percent had themselves participated in anti-drug efforts, about half of these through blockwatch activities. In general, the communities seemed poorly organized, with only 7% of respondents reporting that

they belonged to a block association, and 4% to any sort of anti-crime group.

Reporting Drug Activity

Community Data

We were concerned about losing respondents by asking them about their personal reporting of drug activity up front. So, we tried to ease them into discussing their own experiences by first asking them about the behavior of people in the district generally. We asked both residents and patrol officers about the willingness of people in the district to report drug activity. About one in five citizen respondents told us that most residents in their community reported drug sales or use when they observed it, see Table VI-4. About the same proportion told us that some residents reported drug sales or use. Not surprisingly, Table VI-4 also shows that patrol officers were far more pessimistic than residents about the willingness of people in their patrol areas to report drug activity: Only 6% of the officers believed that most residents reported observed activity. Still, citizen respondents and police officers agreed fairly well (Spearman's rho = .47) about in which of the eight districts residents were most and least likely to report to the police.

In sharp contrast, 64% of respondents told us that most residents in their neighborhood reported crimes other than drug activity. Thus it appears that drug sales and use are a seriously underreported crime.

We asked residents and patrol officers what they thought might prevent people in their community from reporting drug activity. We

TABLE VI-4

Resident and Police Views of People's Willingness to Report Drug Activity

	Residents (N=402)	Patrol Officers (N=33)
Percent who stated that most people in community report drug sales	22%	6%
Percent who stated that most people in community report drug use	21%	6%

asked them to respond to a list of possible reasons, and then allowed them to name any other reasons that we might have left out. The results are displayed in Table VI-5. The rank order for each item was remarkably similar for residents and police officers. At the top of the lists of both groups was fear of revenge by drug sellers/users and worry about having to go to court and testify. Other reasons ranked highly included believing that reporting is a waste of time and worry that reporting might might get residents in trouble with the police. It is worthwhile noting that these were also the reasons that topped the lists of police administrators, as reported in Chapter 3.

Neither citizen respondents nor police believed that residents failed to report because they thought drugs were not harmful to the community or because drugs actually helped the area economically. Almost no one added other reasons to our prepared list.

Individual Respondent Data

As the interview progressed, we began to query respondents about their own experiences. We asked them whether they had seen various types of drug activity in their community, ranging from people taking or selling drugs on the streets to people selling drugs from residences to people moving or delivering quantities of drugs. We then asked them how often they reported drug-related activities they had seen and what means they used to report it.

As Figure 3 shows, the most common activities witnessed by residents of the eight districts were people selling or taking drugs on the streets, both of which were observed by about half the sample. Not surprisingly, the least-witnessed form of drug activity was delivering or moving quantities of narcotics: Only 8% of the

TABLE VI-5

Views of Citizen Respondents and Patrol Officers on What Stops Community Residents From Reporting Drug Activity (Percent Who Respond "Often" to Each Item)

	Residents (N=402)	Patrol Officers (N=33)
Fear revenge	45% (1)*	76% (1)
Belief that reporting a waste of time	32% (4)	49% (3)
Worry about going to court and testifying	42% (2)	67% (2)
Worry that reporting could get them into trouble with police	34% (3)	39% (4)
Belief that drugs don't hurt community	8% (8)	9% (8)
Belief that police are already aware of drug activity observed	27% (5)	24% (6.5)
Belief that drugs help community economically	2% (9)	6% (9)
Mistrust of the police	19% (6)	24% (6.5)
Belief that drug activity is none of their business	17% (7)	33% (5)

Spearman's rho = .95

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* Numbers in parentheses are rank orderings of each item.

sample reported ever seeing it happen. However, it was also the activity people were most likely to report if they saw it. Of those who had witnessed quantities of drugs being moved, 27% said they had reported it to the authorities. Next most likely to be reported was people selling drugs from homes or stores, reported by 23% of respondents who had witnessed it.

Recall from a previous chapter that police administrators told us that street sales and use were the drug activities most often reported by residents, and transport of large quantities of narcotics and indoor sales the least reported. The interviews with residents confirm these beliefs, and they further suggest that the latter two activities are infrequently reported only because they are seldom seen. When people do witness indoor sales or movement of drugs in quantity, they are (relative to other activities) willing to report them.

Fourteen percent of respondents told us that they had reported drug activity to the police on at least one occasion. It is worthwhile noting that, in spite of people's fear of retaliation, few respondents knew of threats against reporters having been made in their districts. Only 2% of the sample said that they had been threatened for reporting, and 3% said that neighbors had been threatened. But neither should the problem of threats and retaliation be minimized: Our data suggest that 1 in 9 respondents who reported drug activity was threatened as a result. In a few cases, the incidents were serious, one involving property damage, two involving assaults, and two involving shootings.

We asked respondents who had reported drug activity how they had reported it. By far the most common mode of reporting was to

call 911, accounting for more than half of the reports by respondents in our sample, see Table VI-6. All together, reports to central police numbers -- including 911, hotlines, central narcotics units, and the main police number -- accounted for 84% of all reports made by repondents. Calls to local police districts (including local narcotics enforcement units) comprised only 16% of the total.

Most people who reported drug activity had a positive experience with the police. More than two-thirds (68%) felt that the police were interested in their report. Fewer respondents, but still a majority (54%) believed that the police had acted on their report. But only 21% told us that the police told them how to find out what action was taken as a result of their report. Nonetheless, 67% of the sample viewed reporting as a worthwhile experience.

We wanted to look at how police responded to reports according to the method residents used to report. It would have been especially interesting to see whether the experience of those who called their local police district differed from those who called a number at police headquarters. Unfortunately, we just did not have enough respondents who reported drug activity to do that. We did note that those who reported through 911 were only half as likely as those who reported through other means to receive feedback from the police on what happened as a result of their report, 14% versus 29%. (Because of the small numbers, however, this result cannot be regarded as statistically reliable).

According to respondents, there is no shortage of initiatives police could take that might succeed in encouraging people to report more. Leading the list, see Table VI-7, was assurances of

TABLE VI-6

Where Respondents Called When Reporting Drug Activity

	Percent of All Calls (N=60)
Calls Made to Central Numbers	
911	53%
Main police number	13%
Hotline	12%
Central narcotics	5%
Calls Made to Local Numbers	
District	13%
Local narcotics	3%

TABLE VI-7

Responses to Ideas for Increasing Reporting

Would You Report More If:	(N=402)
You could be sure no one would find out who you are	81%
The police would respond faster	79%
The police would investigate reports more thoroughly	76%
You thought the police really needed your help	75%
The police would train you about how and what to report	68%
The police would give you feedback about what action your report generated	68%
You would receive a monetary reward for reports leading to arrests and convictions	42%

anonymity: 81% of respondents said that they would be more likely to report drug activity if they could be sure that no one would discover their identities. Two-thirds of respondents also said that they would be more willing to report if the police encouraged them in other ways, including faster response time; more thorough investigations of citizen reports; training by the police in how and what to report; and feedback on actions taken based on citizen reports. Surprisingly, residents' responses indicated that providing financial incentives was the least important thing police could do to increase reports: Less than half of respondents said that rewards would make a difference in their willingness to report.

Ads are one way to try to influence people to report, and our data suggest that they may have some effect. Forty-nine percent of respondents told us that they had seen ads, and those who recalled where they saw them most often mentioned TV as the source. Fifty-nine percent of those who had seen ads said that the ads had made them more willing to report drug activity, mostly because they found out about a way to report anonymously or had been convinced by the ad that reporting was good for their community.

Reporting Drug Activity as a Function of Community Type

Here we consider differences between the eight districts studied along the dimensions we discussed earlier in this chapter. These include socioeconomic status, social cohesion, quality of municipal services, police-community relations, severity of drug problems, and severity of other community problems. Later, we will relate these differences to the respondents' propensity to report drug activity to the police.

We begin by creating summary measures of community functioning to reduce the multitude of individual items in the resident questionaire and to reduce potential problems with multicollinearity. For example, we created a Community Problem Index simply by summing responses to the list of eight (non-drug) problems presented in Figure 2. Similarly, we created a Community Service Index by summing over responses to residents' ratings of municipal services contained in Figure 1. Other summary measures included a Drug Activity Index, a Police-Community Relations Index, a Social Cohesion Index and a Community Organization Index. The composition of these summary measures is presented in Table VI-8.

Table VI-9 shows that these different indices of community functioning are interrelated. For example, people who rate the drug problem in their community as serious also report their district as having other types of problems, report that their community lacks cohesion, and report that residents have poor relations with local police. Surprisingly, however, these indicators of community viability have little to do with income or education levels of the district. (Remember, though, that the income range of the eight communities is quite restricted: In a broader sample of communities, we would expect to see an inverse relationship between socioeconomic indicators and community viability). Within the kinds of poor communities we studied that were hit hard by drugs, relative socioeconomic status appears to have little to do with the relative health of neighborhoods.

This result was confirmed by a factor analysis of community indicators. (Because it correlated with none of the other indicators, the index of community organization was dropped in the

TABLE VI-8

Construction of Summary Measures

Summary Measure	Components	Range	Intercorrelation
Community Problem Index	o Condition of housing	1-4	Range from .23 to .58 (Table C.1)
	o Dirty streets/sidewalks	1-4	
	o Vacant buildings	1-4	
	o Too many fires	1-4	
	o Crime	1-4	
	o Gangs	1-4	
	o Lack of recreational space	1-4	
	o Abandoned cars	1-4	
Municipal Service Index	o Police services	1-4	Range from .26 to .51 (Table C.2)
	o Garbage collection	1-4	
	o Fire protection	1-4	
	o Schools	1-4	
	o Health Services	1-4	
Social Cohesion Index	o Feelings about community as a place to live	1-4	Range from .21 to .49 (Table C.3)
	o People concerned about community	1-3	
	o People in community watch out for each other	1-3	
Drug Activity Index	o How much of a problem is drug use	1-3	Range from .56 to .83 (Table C.4)
	o How much of a problem are drug sales	1-3	
	o How visible are drug sales	1-3	
	o How visible is drug use		

Table VI-8 cont'd

Summary Measure	Components	Range	Intercorrelation
Police-Community Relations Index	o Police treat people with respect	1-3	Range from .46 to .75 (Table C.5)
	o Police tried to work together with residents	1-3	
	o Police doing best to fight crime	1-3	
	o Police doing best to fight drugs	1-3	
Community Organization Index	o Sum of times/month respondents attended church, PTA, block association and anti-crime group meetings	N/A	N/A

factor analysis). Two factors were extracted, accounting for 61% of the variance, see Table VI-10. The first factor contains high loadings of the community problem index, the drug activity index, the social cohesion index, and the police-community relations index. We label this dimension "community viability". The second dimension contains high loadings of income and education. This appears to be a socioeconomic status dimension. Since the two factors are uncorrelated, the factor analysis reinforces the idea that community viability is unrelated to socioeconomic status.

Figure 4 locates each of the eight districts on these two dimensions. According to our indicators, the two El Paso communities and Newark's West District are the most viable -- even though El Paso's Central District is by far the poorest community of the eight. Chicago's two communities come out the worst on the viability dimension. In the next section, we will consider how this typology of communities relates to reporting of drug activity.

We noted large differences between the eight districts in residents' willingness to report drug activity. In El Paso's Central District and Chicago's 7th District, for example, only 9% and 12%, respectively of respondents told us that most people report drug sales. In sharp contrast, 51% of respondents in Newark's West District and 31% of respondents in El Paso's East Valley District told us that most people reported drug activity when it was observed. These differences were linked to the community typology developed above. In Table VI-11, it is apparent that those communities in which residents are most likely to report drug

FIGURE 3

Frequency of People Witnessing and Reporting Various Forms of Drug Activity



TABLE VI-10

Loadings of Community Indicators on Factors Derived from (Varimax) Rotated Factor Matrix

	Factor 1 (Community Viability)	Factor 2 (SES Status)
Community Problem Index	.69	-.31
Municipal Service Index	.68	.20
Social Cohesion Index	.63	-.47
Drug Activity Index	.79	-.10
Police-Community Relations Index	.73	-.07
Education	.03	.84
Income	-.06	.83
% of variance accounted for	39%	23%

FIGURE 4

Location of 8 Districts on Dimensions of Community Viability and Socioeconomic Status



KEY:

N(W) = Newark West District
N(S) = Newark South District
E(E) = El Paso East Valley District
E(C) = El Paso Central District
P(3) = Philadelphia 3rd District
P(4) = Philadelphia 4th District
C(7) = Chicago 7th District
C(14) = Chicago 14th District

TABLE VI-11

Community Rankings on Reporting Drug Activity, Community Viability and Socioeconomic Status

	Ranking on Reporting Drug Activity	Ranking on Viability Dimension	Ranking on SES Dimension
El Paso-East	2	1	4
El Paso-Central	6.5	3	8
Chicago-7th	8	8	5
Chicago-14th	4	7	7
Newark-West	1	2	2
Newark-South	4	5	1
Philadelphia-3rd	4	4	3
Philadelphia-4th	6.5	6	6

Spearman's rho = .71 between reporting and community viability
Spearman's rho = .29 between reporting and SES

activity are also those which scored high on our construct of community viability. The socioeconomic dimension is also linked to reporting, but only weakly.

These results were verified using regression analysis to predict drug reporting based on the community viability and SES dimensions extracted in factor analysis. That analysis, displayed in Table VI-12, showed that socioeconomic status alone explains about 5% of the variance in neighborhood reporting behavior. When community viability is added to the equation, the percentage of variance explains jumps to 27%. Clearly, then, willingness to report is less in places where municipal services, police-community relations, and social ties between neighbors have deteriorated. Unfortunately, these are also the districts which tend to have the worst problems with drugs.

Residents' Feelings About Progress

Residents of the eight neighborhoods surveyed were somewhat more optimistic than the police about progress in the war on drugs. Thirty-one of the 33 patrol officers interviewed believed that the war on drugs was not being won, and the other two expressed skepticism that a war was even being waged. In contrast, 20% of residents believed that the war was being won, 70% believed that it was not being won, and 10% were not sure.

Both residents and patrol officers had a lot of ideas on how to solve the drug problem. About half of the residents' ideas centered on improving law enforcement, most commonly more police, higher police visibility in drug-infested neighborhoods, and quicker police

TABLE VI-12

Results of Hierarchical Regression Predicting Community Reporting of Drug Activity from Community Viability and SES Constructs

Dimension		Increase in % variance explained	Beta	Significance
SES	5%	-.21	p< .01	
Community viability		22%	.47	p< .0001

Total R-square for model (=27%) F (2,157) = 28.59, p< .0001

response time. Residents also suggested that police develop more programs to work with kids and that they spend more effort on going after drug king-pins and money men.

About one-quarter of the residents had ideas on how the community could help. Many felt that residents ought to be more willing to report drug activity and/or that residents ought to organize patrols in their neighborhoods. A number of respondents felt that parents needed to take more responsibility for their kids and that parents ought to teach kids better values.

About a quarter of the residents suggested the need for greater help from other parts of society. Most frequently, residents suggested that the courts needed to deal with people involved in dealing drugs more harshly. But they also emphasized the need to reach out to youth, through drug education programs and to develop more activities for children and teens. Surprisingly, few people mentioned the need to expand treatment programs.

Patrol officers tended to show a good deal more unanimity than residents in their ideas on how to make inroads into the drug problem. Like residents, many patrol officers saw a need for more police and higher visibility of police in high-crime neighborhoods. Some officers also suggested specific tactics needed to combat drugs, such as more undercover and surveillance work, and using dogs to locate narcotics stashes. From residents, police wanted more willingness to report drug activity and testify in drug cases. And, while a few officers mentioned the need for drug education and youth programs, what officers wanted most from other parts of society was tougher treatment of drug offenders by the courts. As one officer complained, "Sellers know their chances of going to jail are slim".

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We started the project with three key questions. First, we wanted to know whether reports of drug activity were important to the police. Second, we wanted to know the extent to which people who live in high-drug neighborhoods are reluctant to make reports to the police. Third, to the extent that people were reluctant to report to the police, we wanted to understand why. Answers to these questions were expected to guide us in recommending steps which might be taken by the police to increase the quantity or quality of citizen reports.

Conclusions

(1) Are reports of drug activity useful to police?

The most basic question we hoped to answer in our study is how heavily police rely on resident reports of drug activity. If reports are not useful to the police, the other questions we planned to address -- are residents reluctant to report, and if so, why? -- are moot.

We found that most departments are overwhelmed with what we call "Type A" reports -- reports of street sales with little specific information. People call about what they most often witness, but the street sales that are most visible to residents are visible to the police as well. Most of the time, therefore, such reports tell police what they already know. Still, Type A reports do serve at least one valuable functon: they identify to district commanders where they should direct

resources. Lots of calls from residents of a particular neighborhood tell district commanders that people there are fed up, and likely to cooperate with police anti-drug efforts.

Unfortunately, few departments have effective mechanisms for receiving and utilizing Type A reports. These calls may come in via several routes. If they are made to 911, the usual police response is to dispatch a patrol car. But, during a busy period, the response time may be several hours, or no car may be dispatched at all. When Type A calls are made to central narcotics units (either directly or indirectly through a hotline), they are almost always passed along to local police districts for action and, in the process, become hopelessly outdated. Thus, Type A reports are frustrating, not only to the police, but also to residents who want to see action taken.

Reports containing detailed information, especially about sales or distribution of narcotics from indoor locations are more valued by the police. These "Type B" reports are considerably less common than Type A reports. They may supply novel information (e.g., that drugs are being warehoused at a particular location), and/or the detail needed for police to make an arrest (the identity of a seller, the location of his stash, and so forth). Type B reports typically are acted on by central narcotics units (or, less commonly, by district level tactical units) which have the staff, equipment, and the informant network to confirm the reports and take appropriate action.

(2) Are people reluctant to report drug activity?

Residents in neighborhoods with high levels of drug activity are often reluctant to report it to police; compared to other crimes, drug activity is seriusly underreported. Yet, it is reported with greater frequency than we might have expected. About 20% of the residents surveyed said that most of their neighbors report drug sales or use when they see it, and 14% said they themselves had reported drug activity to the police. The fact that many people do report may be linked to the high degree of concern expressed about drugs in the neighborhoods we visited: Drug activity was named as the number one neighborhood problem by four in five residents.

Levels of reporting varied dramatically from neighborhood to neighborhood. In one neighborhood we visited, more than half of respondents said that most of their neighbors reported drug activity, while in other neighborhoods, less than one in ten respondents saidd that most of their neighbors reported. Differences in reporting drug activity were linked to neighborhood characteristics. We identified two independent dimensions of neighborhood functioning: socioeconomic status and viability. The viability factor was strongly linked to reporting levels in neighborhoods: Reporting was more common in neighborhoods characterized as viable, (that is those with less serious drug problems, less serious non-drug problems, better municipal services, better police-community relations, and stronger social cohesion).

(3) Why are citizens reluctant to report drug activities?

The number one deterrent to reporting drug activities is fear of reprisal from the drug dealers. We heard this response from the citizens interviewed as well as from the patrol officers and central police representatives. Also frequently mentioned was concern about having to go to court and testify, belief that reporting is a waste of time, and fear that reporting might get residents in trouble with the police. It is important to consider what factors residents said did not impact on decisions to report. Relatively unimportant were reasons such as the belief that drugs are not a crime, that drugs are not a problem, and that drugs have an economic benefit on the community. People are apparently not apathetic to the drug problem but they are fearful of retaliation and court testimony.

Whether residents' fear of retaliation is warranted is difficult to assess. We found during our survey with the 400 residents that about one in seven who reported drug activities were threatened as a result, but very few were physically harmed, or were the targets of vandalism. What was eminently clear from our findings is that fear of reprisal is strong, and that many people are concerned about having their anonymity protected when they call.

Recommendations

Our exploratory study yielded interesting, and some surprising, findings. As expected, we found that drug use and sales are rated as serious, and often very serious, problems by

police administrators, patrol officers, and citizens. In light of considerable media attention on the devastation drugs have wrought on neighborhoods, it is surprising, and hopeful, that so many residents reported that the severity of the drug problem has made them more willing to watch out for their neighbors. And a majority of residents indicated that they would be willing to report drug activities if they witnessed them. Despite this, patrol officers interviewed were less optimistic about citizens' willingness to report. They generally underrated the willingness of citizens to cooperate with the police to reduce drug-related activities. These contrasting findings suggest that there is considerable room to improve the communication and cooperation between these two groups.

But a commitment by citizens to report drug problems to the police is not enough. The reports need to be optimally useful to the police and our findings suggest they often are not. Police repeatedly told us that they need better quality reports and a greater commitment on the part of the reporter to cooperate with the often needed follow-up investigation. Based on our findings, we recommend the following.

1. **Police need to explore innovative ways of improving the quality of citizen reports and communicating their needs to the public.**

In the last section, we discussed the differences between what we called "Type A" and "Type B" reports of drug activity. Type A include commonplace reports of outdoor drug sales and use. These reports often repeat or add minimally to

information the police already have about activity at a particular site. Currently, such reports often become part of a "vast wasteland" of low priority jobs that sit indefinitely in the response queue at 911, at a narcotics unit, or at a local district.

Police departments need to develp new methods of handling such calls that will provide greater benefits to the departments and to the callers. Individual Type A calls have little value to anyone at police headquarters. But a pattern of such calls in a district does have potential value to inform district commanders of areas of unusually high drug activity and/or unusually high resident concern about drug activity. Therefore, it makes sense that Type A reports be routed to the local districts, either by switching the live calls that come into 911 or by timely routing of call slips made up by 911 operators.

As these reports are fed into local districts, the information ought to be collated to detect patterns of drug activity emanating from particular locations within the district (see, for example, Sherman, et al's 1988 work on the utility of focusing police resources on crime "hot spots"). The most efficient way to do this is with a computer, which could also merge reports of drug activity with information about other criminal activity at specified locations. (Such a system has been developed by Philadelphia's South Division commander.) Rather than sending a patrol car to respond to each report that comes in, departments might want to consider

waiting until a patterns is observed and then considering whether to conduct surveillance, interview residents, or set up a buy-and-bust operation.

In order for this system to work, police would have to limit callers' expectations that their particular report would be responded to by a patrol car. Rather, the police would need to tell callers that their reports would be used to generate a picture of criminal activity in the area, which the police would watch closely and act on using appropriate means. This kind of response might actually improve police/community relations that are now damaged when callers expecting a response receive a long-delayed response from a patrol unit or no response at all. (For example, McEwen et al's 1986 evaluation of differential police responses shows that citizen satisfaction levels are directly related to police efforts to inform callers that a delay may occur.)

2. **Police should explore ways to improve the quality of citizen reports.**

Police we spoke to in all cities were unanimous in expressing the need for more specific and detailed information about drug activity from citizens. But our resident survey showed that citizens may not really appreciate the extent to which police need them to provide specific, detailed information. We saw many laudible efforts by district commanders to improve relations with their communities. Still, our study suggests that even more police effort needs to go into letting members of the community know that they can become partners in fighting drugs by providing the most comprehensive

information possible. And, we believe that these efforts should be made only after police have developed better mechanisms for handling citizen reports.

As part of their community outreach efforts, local police should recruit small numbers of residents living in drug hot spots who are willing to forsake anonymity and become more heavily involved in reporting. These volunteers would receive special training in how to spot different aspects of drug trafficking (especially production, storage, and distribution centers) and in how to record the specific types of information local police need to make arrests and/or initiate actions by narcotics officers. Efforts like these are underway in New York (the Drug Busters program) and in Philadelphia's South Division. Other departments might wish to take a close look at these models to see how they might be adapted in their cities.

3. **Police need to reassure citizens who report that they can remain anonymous if they wish and to safeguard those willing to provide their identifies.**

We found that citizens' greatest concern in reporting drug activity is fear of retaliation. Accordingly, many are very worried about maintaining anonymity when reporting to the police. Police departments that do not trace calls need to get that message out through community leaders to allay citizens' concerns that the police will have access to the callers' phone numbers. Further, citizens should be told that the likelihood of their being required to testify in court is very slim in these kinds of cases. Many citizens indicated they were very concerned that their court testimony would be routinely required -- an ungrounded fear according to many police experts.

At the same time, police need to encourage calls from people willing to provide their identities since such calls are often more valuable than calls from people wishing to remain anonymous. Once people give their identities, they can, if necessary, be contacted for more information about their reports, and efforts can be made to establish ongoing relationships based on mutual trust. A percentage of callers willing to identify themselves may eventually be recruited into cadres of citizens who receive special training, as described above.

Departments should make procedural changes to safeguard callers who are willing to identify themselves. In two of the cities we visited, drug dealers used inexpensive radios to monitor conversations between 911 dispatchers and patrol units, often picking up complainants' names and addresses. We also heard of instances where marked patrol units parked in front of complainants' homes (presumably to obtain follow-up information), thereby tipping off drug dealers that the residents had complained. Police who are sensitive to such problems can implement procedures to safeguard people. For example, 911 dispatchers could routinely omit names and addresses of callers in radio conversations with patrol units. When dispatchers believe these would be useful to responding officers, the officers could be asked to telephone 911 for further information. Police who need to talk to complainants could be required to telephone them or to send plaincloths officers in unmarked cars to their homes.

4. **Police should give residents who report drug activity the opportunity to find out what happened as a result of their calls.**

A large majority of residents surveyed said that they would be more willing to report if the police would let them know what was done with their complaints. Up front, police should tell callers that not every call will result in the dispatch of a patrol call, but that aggregate information from several citizens may help identify "trouble spots." Whether they report anonymously or give their identities, callers could also be given a control number to use if they wish to call back to find out more specifically what action had been taken on their call. This system, of course, presumes that the police have a way to record actions taken as a result of particular calls -- a presumption which currently is seldom true.

5. **Police should maintain statistics about the numbers of complaints about drug activity.**

We were amazed to learn that many police departments do not know how many complaints of drug activity they receive city-wide or in particular districts. Of the departments we visited, only Philadelphia's 911 system included a special code to record a call as a drug complaint. It would be an easy matter for 911 systems to code drug calls as such so that they could be counted. It would be somewhat harder to get a complete picture of drug complaints since calls also are taken by local districts, which likewise do not track their numbers. (Philadelphia's South Division is an exception.) But if drug

calls to 911 were routinely rerouted to local districts (as suggested in our first recommendation above), comprehensive record-keeping could be done at the district level. It was suggested to us by district police in one city that district commanders will not take drugs seriously as a problem until drug complaints are counted and used as part of the standard with which to evaluate their overall performance.

6. **Further research is needed to test ways of maximizing the usefulness of all types of citiezen reports of drug activity.**

Police departments could do much to improve their use of the more commonplace Type A reports and encourage more thorough Type B reports, as suggested above. Rigorous field tests of such efforts are needed to determine their viability and practicality for departments across the country. For example, studies of channelling Type A reports quickly and reliably from centralized numbers to patrol divisions are needed if departments are to fully utilize these reports. Tests of experimental efforts by departments to train citizens to provide the much valued Type B reports are much needed. Like other explatory studies, we are left with many unanswered questions but our findings suggest some intriguing avenues to pursue.

* * *

Finally, we began this research with a narrow focus on citizen reporting of drug activity. But the drug problem is far from a narrowly-focused issue and any study dealing with

one aspect of the problem necessarily has to recognize other complex drug-related issues as well. Police encouragement of increasing the number of quality reports must be incorporated into a larger overall plan for tackling drug issues. Any over-all plan is undoubtedly doomed to failure if it does not incorporate the concerns, goals, and responsibilities of citizens, the criminal justice system, other city and county agencies, and private agencies in addressing solutions to the problems.

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APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY REPORT

(Selected Sections)

A NATIONAL SURVEY ON NEIGHBORHOOD REPORTING OF DRUG CRIMES

Methodology Report

Submitted to:

The American Bar Association
Section of Criminal Justice
funded by the
National Institute of Justice

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VII. FIELD OUTCOMES

Overview

The goal of this research was to collect accurate information about neighborhood quality of life, neighborhood residents' crime reporting practices and their suggestions for improving or increasing reporting by themselves or their neighbors. This was achieved by collecting the opinions and attitudes of a national sample of city residents in high crime areas. A highly structured in-person interview was used to elicit the reported opinions of the sample.

There were three simple steps which reduced interviewer variability in the ABA survey. First, a highly structured interview format with very explicit interviewer instructions was developed. Second, interviewers were instructed that they were only permitted to read the questionnaire script and that they were not permitted to say anything else. Indeed, word emphasis was indicated by underlining and the number and manner of probes was indicated on the questionnaire. Finally, only interviewers who could read a script in an intelligent and interesting manner, time after time, without shifting intonation or inflection were assigned. In short, we created a very tight script, used experienced professional interviewers to read the script, and showed them exactly how it was to be done.

Because of the sample limitations and the precautions that were necessary, the National Survey on Neighborhood Reporting of Drug Crimes could have been a difficult survey to complete according to study specifications. To attain the highest response rate achievable, the best efforts of the ABA project team, the SRBI staff, and the interviewers were required. The following factors contributed to the difficulty of the project:

- The sampling method, random area sampling, was conducted by the interviewers. Although random area sampling is an easy and effective sampling method, it can be confusing at first for an interviewer not familiar with the method.

- The areas targeted for sampling were expected to be high crime, inner city areas. These areas can be dangerous for an interviewer and the respondents may be hesitant or fearful of talking to or opening the door to strangers. The areas targeted for the survey were also expected to be project housing with a high population of spanish-speaking respondents and black respondents. This called for special interviewers who were spanish-speaking and black interviewers, which helped decrease respondents' apprehension.

- The subject matter of the survey was perceived, by some survey respondents, as focusing on private opinions which could get them into trouble for talking to "outsiders". Surveys dealing with sensitive subjects are generally viewed as objectionable.

These problems, coupled with the relatively short field period made the goal of a high response rate very difficult to achieve. However, SRBI went to special lengths to reach respondents and complete interviews. We held on-site interviewer training in each city which included a field training exercise of listing residential blocks, and supervision of two interviews conducted by each interviewer. Safety precautions were discussed with the interviewers, including not interviewing after dark. We provided interviewers with a $5.00 escort fee per completed interview, so that interviewers could bring along a friend or relative if he or she was uncomfortable. We used bilingual interviewers in all cities except Philadelphia (we expected a low incidence of non-english speaking respondents in Philadelphia).

These procedures were highly successful in increasing the number of residents who were contacted and agreed to be interviewed.

Sample Disposition

Under ideal conditions, the achieved sample in a list survey would include every contact attempted. Unfortunately, no survey ever achieves this objective.

The summary disposition of the sample is given in Figure 12. The categories used in the sample disposition tables are:

No one over 18 -- There was no one at home at the time of the interviewers' visits that was over 18 years of age (the designated respondent must be over 18 years old;

No one at home -- There was no one at home at the time of the interviewers' visits (interviewers were required to try the unit at least three times);

Call back -- The designated respondent was at home at the time of the initial visit but was unable to conduct the interview at that time (interviewers were required to call back at least three times to conduct the interview);

Language -- The interview could not be completed because of language barrier;

Incapacitated -- The designated respondent was physically or mentally unable to conduct the interview, due to illness or incapacity;

Unoccupied -- The housing unit was temporarily unoccupied, vacant or not used as a residence;

Refused before screen -- The person answering the door refused to identify the designated respondent or conduct the survey;

Refused after screen -- The designated respondent was identified but refused to conduct the survey;

Terminated -- The respondent began the interview but refused to finish;

Complete -- an interview was completed with the designated respondent.

Detailed sample dispositions are presented in Figure 12 so that the reader can analyze the sample disposition in the manner most useful for his or her purposes. These tables were calculated from the interviewers' listing sheets which were returned to SRBI at the end of the field period. Unfortunately, two listing sheets were not available for this report and to avoid biasing the response rates, these two interviewers' outcomes are not included in the disposition. Therefore, the total number of interviews completed shown in the disposition is not the same as the total number actually completed. Ten completes were removed from the disposition in Chicago and four in El Paso to avoid a bias in the response rates. There are 100 actual completes in Chicago,

100 actual completes in El Paso, 100 in Newark and 102 actual completes in Philadelphia.

Response Rate

Response rates are a critical issue in any sample survey because they may indicate a serious source of sampling error. Although the initial sample was drawn according to systematic and unbiased procedures, the achieved sample is determined by the proportion of the drawn sample who are eligible and who agree to participate. To the extent that those who are eligible and those who agree to participate are different from those who are ineligible or refuse to participate, the achieved sample will differ from the population it represents.

The response rates differed by city in part due to some unusual circumstances encountered on this project. El Paso had the highest response rate of 80.0% despite the large number of territorial youth gangs in that city. Interviewers were told that many of the hispanic residents were pleased that their views were being asked and that the survey was translated into spanish so that they could participate. Chicago also had a high response rate of 73.8%. The 14th District was mostly a Polish neighborhood, with some hispanic residents. There were few problems with respondents. The 7th District was a housing project area. Interviewers felt they were being watched by "lookouts" and had to take an escort along for safety.

Newark was a more difficult city to interview in with a response rate of 60.2%. Two experienced black female interviewers working together were chased by a vicious dog and were harassed by white residents. A white male interviewer was assigned these areas and did not receive any harassment. He was informed by some residents of a "scam" which had been conducted by some black females and that the residents were wary of strangers in the neighborhood.

The lowest response rates resulted in Philadelphia. All of the

interviewers were black females with many years of interviewing experience. The areas were predominantly Italian neighborhoods and many residents mentioned their fear of the mafia gangs in the areas. In one block there had been a recent mafia killing and the interviewer was told that a $5.00 incentive fee was "not nearly enough to talk." In one instance a member of the neighborhood block council approached an interviewer and questioned her about what was going on. The resident made a xerox copy of the interviewers' letter of introduction and her SRBI ID card. Our New York office was called to verify the authenticity of the survey.

Philadelphia residents were the most hesitant to talk to our interviewers. Many felt they would be in danger. One interviewer was informed that two elderly people on their block were recently robbed by "interviewers" who claimed they were from the Census Bureau. Many of the elderly residents would not open the door for the interviewers.

We feel that Philadelphia and Newark were especially difficult to get high response rates because of these three problems: fear of strangers among the elderly; fear of black interviewers in white or transitional neighborhoods; and fear of outsiders and talking to people in high crime areas.

A total of 402 interviews were completed among the interviewable cases that reached final status in the field period. This is an overall response rate for all four cities of 64.1%. This participation rate is reasonable for an in-person interview (20 minutes on average) in which the subject matter was likely to be sensitive or even upsetting to the respondent and that had no refusal conversion. This means that more than three out of five eligible respondents were willing to discuss their experiences with drug related crime and their crime reporting habits. Overall, this was a respectable response rate for door-to-door interviewing in high crime, inner-city neighborhoods.

We believe that these completion and participation rates achieved among the sample of eligible respondents in this survey provides a great deal of assurances of the unbiased nature of the achieved sample, and increases our confidence in the findings of the study population.

FIGURE 12

SUMMARY SAMPLE DISPOSITION:

	NEWARK	EL PASO	PHILA.	CHICAGO	TOTAL
Pending	49	32	66	35	182
No one over 18 at home	1	1	7	3	12
No one at home	41	30	44	20	135
Call back	7	1	15	12	35
Ineligible	8	5	21	23	55
Language Barrier	1	0	2	11	14
Incapacitated	3	0	7	2	12
Unoccupied Unit	3	2	11	3	17
No access to building	1	3	1	7	12
Failed	66	24	95	32	217
Refused before screen	60	15	93	21	189
Refused after screen	5	9	2	11	27
Terminated	1	0	0	0	1
Complete	100	96	102	90	388
Response Rate (complete/complete + failed)	60.2%	80.0%	51.8%	73.8%	64.1%

IV. SAMPLE DESIGN

Overview

The four geographic samples for the Drug Crime Reporting Survey were chosen by ABA -- Newark, New Jersey; El Paso, Texas; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Chicago, Illinois. The police officials in each of these four cities selected two police precincts within each city which had high incidences of drug related crime. SRBI received highlighted maps of these precincts from the ABA in which our interviewers were to conduct in-person interviews of residents.

Using a selection grid, SRBI randomly chose five neighborhood blocks and two alternate blocks from each police precinct as our Primary Sampling Units. SRBI interviewers in each of these cities were instructed how to systematically select housing units for interviewing in the Primary Sampling Unit they were assigned by using a random sampling technique known as area probability sampling.

Area probability samples for in-person surveys are designed to give each housing unit or household in the area a chance of being interviewed. The final stage in this type of sample was the systematic listing of all or a portion of the housing units (HUs) in the Primary Sampling Unit. This was performed by our interviewers in the field.

Using their sample point map and specially designed listing sheets, the interviewer began at a designated point in the area and listed the housing units. Our Primary Sampling Units consisted of one or two residential blocks which contained at least 60 Housing Units (if the Primary Sampling Unit did not contain 60 units interviewers contacted SRBI for additional sample). The interviewers counted the total number of housing units on the blocks and divided this total number by 30. This number (rounded down to the lowest whole number) was used as the listing interval. The interviewers then listed 30 housing units

according to this interval (usually every second or third house) on the Household Unit Listing Sheets. These listed households then became the interviewer's assignment. Out of the 30 listed units (ten designated household and twenty alternate households), interviewers conducted ten interviews.

The Housing Unit

Because this survey was designed to use an area probability sample, it was necessary for the field interviewer to complete the respondent selection process begun by the SRBI Sampling Department. SRBI and our interviewers used the following definition as to exactly what constitutes a housing unit (HU).

The definition of a housing unit used by SRBI follows that of the U.S. Bureau of the Census:

> "A housing unit is a single room or group of rooms that is intended for separate living quarters. This means that the people who live there must live and eat separately from everyone else in the building (or apartment), and the room or group of rooms must have either a separate entrance directly from the outside of the building or through a common hall, or complete kitchen facilities for the use of this household only."

Only residential units that fit this definition were sampled. Businesses and other non-residential buildings, such as churches and schools, were not included in the sample. Vacant or temporarily unoccupied units that were habitable and therefore met the definition of a HU were listed along with all occupied HUs.

Listing Materials

All interviewer materials necessary for listing were provided to interviewers by SRBI. These included:

- Specific listing instructions for the survey;
- A map of the designated area for that sample point;
- Building Sketch Sheets;
- Building Listing Sheets; and
- Primary Sample Housing Units Listing Sheet.;

The information recorded in the Area Sampling Packet is an integral part of

the survey. The listing sheets serve as a record of both the sample selected for the survey and the number and nature of the contacts made at each HU listed. At the end of the survey, each interviewer returned the completed Area Sampling Packet and the information was tabulated along with the questionnaires.

Working Around the Area

Interviewers were provided with maps of their assigned Primary Sample Point. These maps indicated the blocks they were to list and interview. On the map, starting points and interviewing sequence were indicated. Listing all areas began in the direction of the arrow (* --->) drawn by the Sampling Department, and proceeded in this manner. The housing units were always to the interviewers' right as they approach.

When the boundary of an area was a street or road, the actual boundary was the middle of that street or road. The HUs on the side of the street that fell within the segment were listed, but not those across the street. If two or more adjacent blocks were listed, both sides of the internal streets were listed, but only one side of the perimeters. Only one side of a street at a time was listed, so that HUs were listed in their natural order for each side.

Sample Assignment

The Primary Sampling Units for the Survey of Neighborhood Reporting of Drug Crimes were assigned to interviewers upon the successful completion of the training session. The Primary Sampling Units were numbered by City and Precinct and assigned to interviewers as a listing packet. The PSU contained a map of the blocks selected for listing with the starting point designated, a Building Sketch Sheet, a Building Listing Sheet to calculate the sampling interval, a Household Unit Listing Sheet, and a Reporting Sheet.

Field Sampling for an Area Probability Sample

A listing procedure was used to compile an actual list or record of housing units in the Primary Sampling Units. Interviewers walked through the selected blocks and recorded information about each housing unit. The list for each area identified the location of each housing unit by its address or by some other unique description.

The listing process began with the Building Sketch. Interviewers located the defined block or blocks and made a Building Sketch of the area indicated on the map provided by SRBI. The interviewer made a good sketch of the residential buildings which were or contained Housing Units and their addresses on the illustrated streets. The SRBI map indicated the starting point for the interviewer. The interviewer then transferred the starting point from the SRBI map to their Building Sketch.

From the Building Sketch, a Building Listing was made. The interviewer first listed the building address, starting from the map's indicated beginning point. As the interviewer listed the addresses, he also made an approximation of the number of floors in the building. By looking at the mailboxes or checking one of the floors in the building, he recorded the number of Housing Units within the entire building (the number of floors was also verified by checking the mailboxes). The interviewer continued this process for the entire block indicated on the SRBI map.

At the completion of the Building Listing, the total number of housing units on the block was calculated. This number represented the total number of housing units in the selected area. However, since only 10 interviews were to be COMPLETED in this selected area, they ONLY LISTED 30 eligible housing units for interviewing.

To determine the pattern used to designate units eligible for interviewing, the TOTAL number of Housing Units was divided by 30. This number provided the

interviewer with the selection pattern to sample the units. This pattern was then used to determine which units were listed.

Whenever a designated area did not contain AT LEAST 60 TOTAL HUs a supervisor at SRBI was contacted for an expanded area. The listing area was not expanded without approval from SRBI field supervisors. If approval was given to expand the area, additional sample blocks were drawn and labeled on the map.

Four Primary Sampling Units were removed from the sample by SRBI. Three blocks in El Paso were removed because there were no residential units on that block or in the area. One block in Philadelphia was removed because no residents would agree to be interviewed (apparently there had been a recent "Mafia" killing and the residents were very fearful). New blocks were assigned to the interviewers from the alternate blocks selected by SRBI's sampling staff.

Completing the Household Listing Sheet

After the Building Listing was completed and the selection pattern was determined, a Household Listing Sheet was to be compiled. Using the SRBI area map, interviewers began listing at the specified starting point indicated with an asterisk (*) and followed the direction indicated on the map by the arrow (----->) as he or she canvassed the buildings within the interviewing area. Using the selection pattern, the interviewer recorded every "x" Housing Unit on the Household Listing Sheet.

There was always thirty (30) Housing Units listed on the Household Listing Sheet. Of these 30 units, every third unit was selected for interviewing for a total of 10 complete interviews. The alternating two units were used as substitute sample in the case of an ineligible household or a refusal. All maps, sketches, and lists were kept by interviewers and returned at the end of the field period for documentation purposes.

FIGURE 1

PRIMARY SAMPLING UNIT: BLOCK MAP
AND BUILDING SKETCH



FIGURE 2

PRIMARY SAMPLING UNIT: BUILDING LISTING

Building Address	Approximate # Floors	Approximate # Units	Eligible Units Per Building
	TOTAL UNITS	______	30

Indicate starting point with an asterisk (*).

Interval = (Total / 30)

PRIMARY SAMPLE UNIT: HOUSEHOLD LISTING SHEET

Interviewer Name: _____
Sample Point Number: ____ ____
City: _____

**Every third eligible unit of the thirty sampled will be selected for the survey.
The other twenty units will be used as substitute and replacement sample for the initial ten units.

Household #	Address	Results of Attempts and Contacts 1st call Time/date	2nd call Time/date	3rd call Time/date	Final Screening Status	Designated Respondent Name	Final Interview Status
1							
2 A							
3 A							
4							
5 A							
6 A							
7							
8 A							
9 A							
10							
11 A							
12 A							
13							
14 A							
15 A							

PRIMARY SAMPLE UNIT: HOUSEHOLD LISTING SHEET

Use these abbreviations to record Results of Calls, final screening status, and final interview status.

UN - Unoccupied Housing Unit
NAB - No Access to Building
LB - Language Barrier
IE - No One In Household 18 +
NH - No one-at-Home
I - Incapacitated by Illness or Infirmity
CB - Callback, Respondent not Available
R - Refused before Screen
SC - Screen Complete
DRR - Refused after Screen
T - Terminated Interview
FNH - Final No one-at-Home
FNA - 3 Callbacks, Still not Available
C - Interview Complete

Interviewer Name: _____
Sample Point Number: ____ ____
City: _____

House-hold #	Address	Results of Attempts and Contacts 1st call Time/date	2nd call Time/date	3rd call Time/date	Final Screening Status	Designated Respondent Name	Final Interview Status
16							
17 A							
18 A							
19							
20 A							
21 A							
22							
23 A							
24 A							
25							
26 A							
27 A							
28							
29 A							
30 A							

Use these abbreviations to record Results of Calls, final screening status, and final interview status.

UN - Unoccupied Housing Unit
NAB - No Access to Building
LB - Language Barrier
IE - No One In Household 18 +
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I - Incapacitated by Illness or Infirmity
CB - Callback, Respondent not Available
R - Refused before Screen
SC - Screen Complete
DRR - Refused after Screen
T - Terminated Interview
FNH - Final No one-at-Home
FNA - 3 Callbacks, Still not Available
C - Interview Complete

APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENTS

Interviewer Version of
Police Representative Survey

Respondent: _____ City/State: _____

This is _____ from the American Bar Association. I am calling to follow up on our recent letter about our research project on neighborhood reporting of drug crimes. As you know, we would like you to participate in a 20-25 minute telephone survey on this topic. Is this a good time to do the survey? If not, can we schedule a time in the near future?

Date: _____ Time: _____

Before we start, I would like you to identify a typical neighborhood in your city where drugs and drug-related crimes have had a serious adverse affect on the quality of life for the residents. [INTERVIEWER: If respondent says there is no "typical" neighborhood, ask him to identify the neighborhood which presents the most serious drug-related problems for its residents. If he still cannot respond, ask him to identify a neighborhood which presents serious drug-related problems for its residents.]

1. Neighborhood: _____
   [INTERVIEWER: Circle one of following: Typical
   The most serious
   Serious]

2. Could you briefly describe the neighborhood for me, starting with:

   a. Ethnic make-up: _____

   _____

   _____

   b. Economic make-up:
   [INTERVIEWER USE: Low Low/Middle Middle]

   _____

   _____

   c. Type of housing:
   [INTERVIEWER USE: Single family High rise Public]

   _____

   _____

d. Transitional nature of neighborhood:
[INTERVIEWER USE: Low Low/Medium Moderate]

e. Sense of community
[INTERVIEWER: Are residents "joiners", e.g. of churches, community organizations]

f. Kind of drugs:
[INTERVIEWER USE: Cocaine Crack Heroin PCP
Amphetam. Marijuana Alcohol]

g. Drug users:
[INTERVIEWER USE: Everyone Juveniles Non-Residents]

h. Controllers of drug traffic:

i. Location of drug activity
[INTERVIEWER USE: Behind closed doors Outdoors]

j. Level of violence associated with drug trafficking

k. Level of violence directed against residents who have reported

1. Other special features of the neighborhood: _____

_____

_____

Please keep this neighborhood in mind and use it as a reference when answering the rest of the questions in this interview.

3. Priorities to control drug activities may vary from police department to police department--for example, arrests of high level or low level buyers, sellers, or manufacturers. What are your department's priorities?

_____

_____

_____

3.a. What strategies or tactics do you use to address these priorities?

_____

_____

_____

4. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being not very important and 5 being very important, how important are citizen reports to your department's overall strategy for controlling drug activities in neighborhoods?

1 2 3 4 5 DK

5. In your opinion, are citizens who witness drug activities today:

(1) just as likely, (Skip to 6)
(2) more likely, or
(3) less likely
(4) DK (Skip to 6)

to report such crimes than citizen witnesses in the same neighborhoods five years ago?

5a. Why do you think this is? _____

_____

_____

6. What is the most common way citizens report drug activities to the police?

[INTERVIEWER USE:

"Crime solvers/tipsters" number

911 or other emergency police number

In-person, to patrol officer

Through third party

Through written communication]

_____

6.a. What, if any, special procedures does the department have for encouraging citizen reports of drug activities?

_____

_____

INTERVIEWER: IF EITHER OF ABOVE RESPONSES INCLUDES "HOTLINE" OR SPECIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER ASK 6.b

6.b. Approximately how many reports per month do the police receive through this special number?

_____

7. I'd like to find out what kinds of citizen reports you consider most valuable. I'm going to read a list of different kinds of information citizens might provide to the police. Please rate each on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being <u>not</u> very valuable and 5 being <u>very</u> valuable.

a.	Location of street drug use . . .	1	2	3	4	5
b.	Location of indoor drug use . . .	1	2	3	4	5
c.	Location of street drug sales . .	1	2	3	4	5
d.	Location of indoor drug sales . .	1	2	3	4	5
e.	Location of places where large amounts of drugs are packaged or stored .	1	2	3	4	5
f.	Individuals involved in drug use .	1	2	3	4	5
g.	Individuals involved in low-level sales	1	2	3	4	5
h.	Individuals who are major suppliers	1	2	3	4	5
i.	Information about how low-level sellers operate	1	2	3	4	5
j.	Information about how major suppliers operate	1	2	3	4	5

8. Of the kinds of reports I have just mentioned, what kinds do you most commonly receive?

_____

9. Could you briefly describe what action is usually taken in response to citizen reports, e.g., are they used for covert surveillance, undercover investigations, seeking search warrants? [INTERVIEWER: PROBE FOR SPECIFICS]

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

10. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being almost never and 5 being almost always, in your opinion how often are each of the following factors responsible for citizens' <u>failure</u> to report drug crimes:

a. Fear of retaliation to reporter, reporter's family/friends . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

b. Belief that report would be a waste of time because police or the courts wouldn't do anything . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

c. Concern that if they reported, they would have to go to court and testify . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

d. Concern that the report might result in getting the reporter or reporter's family or friends into trouble with police . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

e. Belief that drugs are not a problem in the neighborhood . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

f. Belief that drug activities benefit the neighborhood economically . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

g. Belief that drug activities shouldn't be a crime . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

h. Belief that the police already know about drug activities so there is no reason to report . . . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

i. Mistrust of the police . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

j. Belief that drug activities are none of their business . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

k. Sensational media coverage of threats or violence against people who report drug activity . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 DK

l. Other: _____ 1 2 3 4 5 DK

11. I'm going to list a number of ways various jurisdictions try to encourage citizen reports. Whether or not they are used in the neighborhood you mentioned at the beginning of the interview, how important do you think they might be in encouraging citizen reports, using a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 being <u>not</u> very important and 5 being <u>very</u> important?

a. Well-publicized "sting" operations to assure citizens of an active police presence

1 2 3 4 5 DK

b. "Call-in" television shows

1 2 3 4 5 DK

c. Financial rewards for information leading to arrests/convictions

1 2 3 4 5 DK

d. Confidential telephone numbers

1 2 3 4 5 DK

e. Publicizing existing reporting procedures

1 2 3 4 5 DK

f. Police protections for citizens who report

1 2 3 4 5 DK

g. Alternatives to criminal sanctions for youth and first-time offenders (e.g., diversion to treatment programs)

1 2 3 4 5 DK

h. Ready availability of foreign-speaking individuals to whom non-English-speaking residents can report

1 2 3 4 5 DK

i. Police visibility in the neighborhood

1 2 3 4 5 DK

j. Door-to-door efforts to enlist neighborhood support

1 2 3 4 5 DK

k. Interaction between police and church groups, youth groups, schools or other neighborhood organizations

1 2 3 4 5 DK

l. Giving citizens who report drug activity feedback about what was done with their report?

1 2 3 4 5 DK

12. Does the narcotics unit or any other police agency publicize the need for citizens to report drug crimes to the police?

Yes (Ask 12.a.)

No DK (Skip to 13)

12.a. How is this publicized?

[INTERVIEWER USE ONLY:

T.V. Public transportation

Radio Community forums

Newspaper Schools

Billboards]

_____

12.b. How do you motivate people to report by these efforts?

_____

_____

_____

13. In your opinion, what are the most effective practices your department uses to increase the number of useful citizen reports about drug activities?

_____

_____

_____

14. In your opinion, are there practices your department has used which have proven ineffective in increasing the number of useful citizen reports about drugs activities in these neighborhoods?

Yes (Ask 14.a.)

No DK

14.a. What are these and why are they ineffective?

_____

_____

15. Do you have any suggestions we haven't discussed for increasing or improving citizen reports of drug activities? If so, what are they?

_____

_____

_____

16. Do you think your city is winning the war against drugs?

Yes No _____

17. What else needs to happen at the local level? (INTERVIEWER PROBE: How much more can the police do? What is the residents' role?)

_____

_____

_____

18. Recently there has been a lot of interest in "community-oriented policing" and "problem-oriented policing." Does your department employ either of these in any of the neighborhoods in your city?

Yes (Ask 18b)

No

18b. How much of a difference have they made with respect to the drug problem?

_____

_____

We very much appreciate your time and assistance. Thank you.

5046A/(9/2/89

POLICE SURVEY

We are working on a project to get information about how drugs are affecting neighborhoods and to learn how willing people who live in those neighborhoods are to report drug activity to the police. To get this information, we are interviewing a number of patrol officers from four cities. Information from the interviews will be kept strictly confidential, and will be used only in aggregate form.

First, we'd like to ask you some questions about the neighborhood you patrol:

A1) In some places, people feel very concerned about what happens in their neighborhood and, in other places, people stick pretty much to their own business. In general, how concerned are people in the area you patrol about their neighborhood. Would you say that.....

1. most are concerned
2. some are concerned
3. very few are concerned
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

A2) Is the neighborhood you patrol one in which people watch out for each other? Would you say that....

1. most people watch out for each other
2. some people watch out for each other
3. very few pwople watch out for each other
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

B1) How would you compare the neighborhood you patrol now to what it was like 2 years ago. Would you say it's a....

1. better place to live ----> Why?_____
2. worse place to live
3. same sort of place to live _____
8. don't know
9. refused to answer _____

_____

B2) How much of a problem are drug sales in the neighborhood you patrol? Are they....

1. a serious problem
2. some problem
3. no problem
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

B3) How much of a problem is drug use in the neighborhood you patrol? Is it....

1. a serious problem
2. some problem
3. no problem
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

B4) Are there problems in the neighborhood you patrol which you think are more serious than drugs?

1. yes ---------> What are they? _____
2. no
8. don't know _____
9. refused

_____

B5) Below are some ways in which drugs might affect a neighborhood. Please tell me whether drugs have affected the neighborhood where you patrol in these ways very much (V), somewhat (S), or not at all (N):

	V	S	N	DK	RA
a) Made people more worried about getting mugged?	1	2	3	8	9
b) Made people more worried about having their homes broken into?	1	2	3	8	9
c) Made people more worried about getting shot or killed?	1	2	3	8	9
d) Made people more concerned about goings on in the neighborhood?	1	2	3	8	9

e) Made people more afraid to go out? 1 2 3 8 9
IF YES: Always, or at certain times? _____
_____

f) Made people less likely to go to playgrounds, parks or other open areas? 1 2 3 8 9
IF YES: Always, or at certain times? _____
_____

g) Made people less willing to let their kids play outside? 1 2 3 8 9

h) Made people more willing to watch out for each other? 1 2 3 8 9

i) Brought people together to fight against drugs? 1 2 3 8 9

j) Made people more likely to keep to themselves and mind their own business? 1 2 3 8 9

k) Improved the neighborhood economy by bringing more cash into the area? 1 2 3 8 9

l) Increased gang activity? 1 2 3 8 9

B8) How visible are drug sales in this neighborhood? Are they....

1. very visible
2. somewhat visible
3. not very visible
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

B9) How visible is drug use in this neighborhood? Is it....

1. very visible
2. somewhat visible
3. not very visible
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

C1) Do the residents usually treat the police here with respect? Would you say they treat the police with respect....

1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. little or none of the time
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

C2) Do you think the residents have really tried to work together with the police? Have they been....

1. doing the best they can
2. making some effort
3. not doing much at all
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

C3) Do you think the residents are doing their best to fight crime in general? Are they....

1. doing the best they can
2. making some effort
3. not doing much at all
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

C4) Do you think residents are doing their best to fight drug activity in this neighborhood? Are they....

1. doing the best they can
2. making some effort
3. not doing much at all
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

E1) Do you think people in the neighborhood usually report drug sales to the police when they see them? Do ....

1. most people report it
2. some people report it -------> Why not? _____
3. very few people report it --
8. don't know _____
9. refused to answer _____

E2) Do you think people in the neighborhood usually report drug use to the police when they see it? Do ....

1. most people report it
2. some people report it -------> Why not? _____
3. very few people report it --
8. don't know _____
9. refused to answer _____

E3) Do you think people in the neighborhood usually report muggings or break-ins to the police when they see them? Do they....

1. usually report them
2. sometimes report them
3. seldom/never report them
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

E4) Below is a list of reasons why people might not report drug activity to the police. Please tell me whether each of the following reasons might stop people in the neighborhood you patrol from reporting drug activity often (O) sometimes (S) or not at all (N). Your answers will be kept strictly confidential.

	O	S	N	DK	RA
a) Fear of revenge	1	2	3	8	9
b) Belief that reporting is a waste of time because the police & courts can't do much anyhow	1	2	3	8	9
c) Worry that they would have to go to court and testify	1	2	3	8	9
d) Worry that reporting might get them or their families into trouble with	1	2	3	8	9

the police

e) Thinking that drugs aren't a problem in this neighborhood	1	2	3		8	9
f) Thinking that drugs help the neighborhood economically	1	2	3		8	9
g) Thinking that drug activity shouldn't be a crime	1	2	3		8	9
h) Thinking that the police already know about drug activity, so there is no reason to report	1	2	3		8	9
i) Mistrust of the police	1	2	3		8	9
j) Thinking that drug activity is none of their business	1	2	3		8	9
k) Other _____	1	2	3	4	5 8	9

E15) Do you think your city is winning the war on drugs?

1. yes
2. no
3. other (don't believe there is a war)
8. don't know
9. refused to answer

E16) What else can or should be done to reduce drugs in this neighborhood? (What can police do? What can residents do?)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Thank you for your help.

ABA RESIDENT QUESTIONNAIRE

SCHULMAN, RONCA AND BUCUVALAS, INC.
444 PARK AVENUE SOUTH
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016

STUDY NO. 2839
APRIL 2, 1990

Sample Point Number: _____ (1 - 2 - 3)

Questionnaire No._____ (4 - 5 - 6)

Interviewer:_____ Date: _____

Time started: _____ Time completed: _____

Hello, I'm _____ from SRBI, the national public opinion research company. We are conducting a national survey of people's opinions about the problems in their neighborhoods and what they would like to see done about them. We would like to interview some residents of this neighborhood and get their opinions as part of the study. The interview will only take half an hour and we are paying respondents $5 for their time.

A. In order to know who I should interview from this household, would you tell me how many persons aged 18 and older live here?

_____ TOTAL ADULTS
(7 - 8)

B. How many of those are males?

_____ TOTAL MALES
(9 - 10)

None .....00 -- SKIP TO D

C. Could I speak with the youngest adult male who is home right now?

IF NO MALE HOME, SAY:

D. Could I speak with the youngest adult female who is home right now?

REPEAT INTRO IF NEW RESPONDENT, THEN SAY TO ALL:

The purpose of the survey is to help communities better understand what people think about crime, drugs, and other neighborhood problems. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and no one will be told who participated in the study.

First, I'd like to ask you some questions about your neighborhood:

1. How long have you lived in this neighborhood?

Less than 1 year.....(11(_____-1
1-2 years.....-2
2-5 years.....-3
5 years or more.....-4
Refused to answer.....-8

2. Overall, how do you feel about this neighborhood as a place to live? Would you say it is a great place to live, a pretty good place to live, only fair, pretty bad or a really bad place to live?

Great place.....(12(_____-1
Pretty good.....-2
Only fair.....-3
Pretty bad.....-4
Really bad.....-5
Don't know (VOL.)....-9
Refused to answer....-8

CARD ONE

3. I am going to read you some problems facing people in some neighborhoods. I'd like to know how bad a problem each of the following is in your neighborhood. In your neighborhood would you say that (READ ITEM) is a serious problem, a moderate problem, only a minor problem or not a problem.

	Serious Problem	Moderate Problem	Only Minor Problem	Not a Problem
a. Condition of housing.....(13(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4
b. Dirty streets and sidewalks.(14(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4
c. Vacant buildings.....(15(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4
d. Too many fires.....(16(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4
e. Crime.....(17(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4
f. Drugs.....(18(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4
g. Gangs.....(19(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4
h. Lack of parks.....(20(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4
i. Abandoned cars.....(21(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4

4. I'd like your opinion on the quality of city services that you receive in this neighborhood. Would you rate the (READ ITEM) in this neighborhood as excellent, pretty good, only fair or poor?

	Excellent	Pretty Good	Only Fair	Poor	None (vol.)
a. Police protection.....(22(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-5
b. Garbage collection.....(23(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-5
c. Fire protection.....(24(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-5
d. Public schools.....(25(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-5
e. Public health services....(26(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-5

5. In some places, people feel very concerned about what happens in their neighborhood and, in other places, people stick pretty much to their own business. In general, how many people around here are concerned about their neighborhood. Would you say that.....

Most are concerned.....(27(_____-1
Some are concerned.....____-2
Very few are concerned.....____-3
Don't know (VOL.).....____-9
Refused to answer.....____-8

6. Is this neighborhood one in which people watch out for each other? Would you say that in this neighborhood....

Most people watch out for each other.....(28(_____-1
Some people watch out for each other.....____-2
Very few people watch out for each other.....____-3
Don't know (VOL.) .....____-9
Refused to answer.....____-8

7. How would you compare this neighborhood now to what it was like 2 years ago. Would you say it's a....

Better place to live now.....(29(_____-1
Worse place to live now.....____-2
About the same.....____-3 \
Don't know (VOL.).....____-9 - SKIP TO Q8
Refused to answer.....____-8 /

7a. Why is it a (better/worse) place to live now?

_____(30-31)

_____(32-33)

_____(34-35)

8. How much of a problem is drug use in this neighborhood? Is it....

A serious problem.....(36(_____-1
Some problem....._____-2
No problem....._____-3
Don't know (VOL.)....._____-9
Refused to answer....._____-8

9. How much of a problem are drug sales in this neighborhood? Are they....

A serious problem.....(37(_____-1
Some problem....._____-2
No problem....._____-3
Don't know (VOL.)....._____-9
Refused to answer....._____-8

10. Are there problems in this neighborhood which you think are more serious than drugs?

Yes.....(38(_____-1
No....._____-2 \
Don't know (VOL.)....._____-9 - SKIP TO Q11
Refused to answer....._____-8 /

10a. What are these problems?

_____(39-40)

_____(41-42)

_____(43-44)

11. What about crime in your neighborhood? How afraid are you about being attacked or robbed -- are you very fearful, somewhat fearful, just a little fearful or not really fearful at all?

Very fearful.....(45(____-1
Somewhat fearful.....____-2
Just a little fearful....____-3
Not fearful at all.....____-4
Don't know (VOL.)...____-9
Refused to answer...____-8

12. I am going to read to you some ways in which drugs might affect a neighborhood. Please tell me whether drugs have affected your neighborhood in these ways a lot, somewhat, or not at all. Have drugs in your neighborhood (READ ITEM)?

	A lot	Some-what	Not at all	Don't Know	Refused
a. Made people more worried about getting mugged?	(46(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8
b. Made people more worried about having their homes broken into?	(47(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8
c. Made people more worried about getting shot or killed?	(48(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8
d. Made people less likely to go to playgrounds, parks or other open areas?	(49(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8

IF "A LOT" OR "SOMEWHAT" IN Q12d, ASK:
12d1. Are people less likely to go to these areas at all times or only at certain times?
All times.....(50(_____-1
Certain times.....(_____-2

e. Made people less willing to let their kids play outside?	(51(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8
f. Made people more willing to watch out for each other?	(52(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8
g. Brought people together to fight against drugs?	(53(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8
h. Made people more likely to keep to themselves and mind their own business?	(54(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8
i. Improved the neighborhood economy by bringing more cash into the area?	(55(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8
j. Increased gang violence?	(56(_____-1	_____-2	_____-3	_____-9	_____-8

13. Are there any other ways, either good or bad, in which drugs have affected life in this neighborhood?

_____(57-58)

_____(59-60)

_____(61-62)

14. Do you know of any groups, churches or other organizations in this neighborhood which have tried to do something about drugs?

Yes.....(63(_____-1
No.....(_____-2 \
Don't know (VOL.).....(_____-9 - SKIP TO Q15
Refused to answer.....(_____-8 /

14a. Which groups are those?

_____(64-65)

_____(66-67)

_____(68-69)

CARD ONE

14b. Have you participated in any of these activities?

Yes.....(70(_____-1
No.....-2 \
Don't know (VOL.).....-9 - SKIP TO Q15
Refused to answer.....-8 /

14c. In which activities have you participated?

_____(71-72)

_____(73-74)

_____(75-76)

15. How visible are drug sales in this neighborhood? Are they....

Very visible.....(77(_____-1
Somewhat visible.....-2
Not very visible.....-3
Don't know (VOL.).....-9
Refused to answer.....-8

16. How visible is drug use in this neighborhood? Is it....

Very visible.....(78(_____-1
Somewhat visible.....-2
Not very visible.....-3
Don't know (VOL.).....-9
Refused to answer.....-8

CARD TWO

Now, I'd like to ask you how you feel about what the police are doing in this neighborhood:

17. Do the police usually treat the people in this neighborhood with respect? Would you say the police treat people with respect....

Most of the time.....(1(_____-1
Some of the time.....-2
Little/none of the time....-3
Don't know (VOL.).....-9
Refused to answer.....-8

18. Do you think the police have really tried to work together with residents of this neighborhood? Have they been....

Doing the best they can.(2(_____-1
Making some effort.....-2
Not doing much at all.....-3
Don't know (VOL.).....-9
Refused to answer.....-8

19. Do you think the police are doing their best to fight crime in general in this neighborhood? Are they....

Doing the best they can.(3(_____-1
Making some effort.....-2
Not doing much at all.....-3
Don't know (VOL.).....-9
Refused to answer.....-8

20. Do you think the police are doing their best to fight drug activity in this neighborhood? Are they....

Doing the best they can.(4(_____-1
Making some effort.....____-2
Not doing much at all.....____-3
Don't know (VOL.).....____-9
Refused to answer.....____-8

Now, I'd like to ask a few general questions about yourself:

21. How old are you?

_____ AGE
(5-6)
Refused to answer.....____-98

22. What was the highest grade of school that you actually completed?

8th grade or less.....(7(_____-1
Some high school.....____-2
High School graduate.....____-3
Some college.....____-4
College degree.....____-5
Refused to answer.....____-8

23. We would also like to get an idea about your household income in 1989. Please tell me which of the following categories includes your total household income -- what everyone in this household made last year?

Less than $5,000.....(8(_____-1
$5,000-9,999.....____-2
$10,000-14,999.....____-3
$15,000-19,999.....____-4
$20,000-29,999.....____-5
$30,000 or more.....____-6
Don't know (VOL.).....____-9
Refused to answer.....____-8

24. How many people live on that income?

_____ NUMBER OF PEOPLE
(9-10)
Don't know.....____-9
Refused to answer.....____-8

25A. I'd like to know about community organizations you may belong to. Do you belong to (READ ITEM)?

	----Q25A----		-----Q25B-----
	No	Yes	How often participate?
a. Tenant council/block assoc.	(11(____-1	____-2	_____times/month (12-13)
b. PTA/other school group	(14(____-1	____-2	_____times/month (15-16)
c. Church or religious group	(17(____-1	____-2	_____times/month (18-19)
d. Anti-crime group (SPECIFY:)	(20(____-1	____-2	_____times/month (21-22)

_____(23-24)
_____(25-26)
_____(27-28)
_____(29-30)

FOR EACH "YES" IN 25A, ASK 25B AND RECORD ABOVE.

25B. About how many times a month do you participate in (READ ITEM)?

Now, I'd like to ask you some final questions about drugs in the neighborhood and what people are doing about them:

26. Do you think people in the neighborhood usually report drug sales to the police when they see them? Do ....

Most people report it..(31(_____-1 SKIP TO Q27
Some people report it.....____-2
Very few people report it..____-3
Don't know (VOL.).....____-9 \
Refused to answer.....____-8 / SKIP TO Q27

26a. Why do you think most people don't report drug sales?

_____(32-33)

_____(34-35)

_____(36-37)

27. Do you think people in the neighborhood usually report drug use to the police when they see it? Do ....

Most people report it..(38(_____-1 SKIP TO Q28
Some people report it.....____-2
Very few people report it..____-3
Don't know (VOL.).....____-9 \
Refused to answer.....____-8 / SKIP TO Q28

27a. Why do you think most people don't report drug use?

_____(39-40)

_____(41-42)

_____(43-44)

28. Do you think people in the neighborhood usually report muggings or break-ins to the police when they see them? Do they....

Usually report them....(45(_____-1
Sometimes report them.....____-2
Seldom/never report them...____-3
Don't know (VOL.).....____-9
Refused to answer.....____-8

29. I'm going to read a list of reasons why people might not report drug activity to the police. I'd like to know whether each of the following reasons has stopped you or other people around here from reporting drug activity -- often, sometimes, or not at all. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential. Have you or other people around here been stopped from reporting drug activity by (READ ITEM) -- often, sometimes, or not at all? (INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT IS RELUCTANT TO ANSWER FOR HIMSELF, ASK HIM/HER TO ANSWER FOR HIS/HER NEIGHBORS):

	Often	Some-times	Not at all	Don't know	Refused
a. Fear of revenge.....(46(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8
b. Belief that reporting is a waste of time because the police and courts don't do much anyhow.....(47(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8
c. Worry that they would have to go to court and testify..(48(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8
d. Worry that reporting might get them or their families into trouble with police....(49(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8
e. Thinking that drugs don't really hurt the neighborhood.....(50(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8
f. Thinking that drugs help the neighborhood economically.....(51(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8
g. Thinking that the police already know about drug activity, so there is no reason to report.....(52(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8
h. Mistrust of the police.....(53(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8
i. Thinking that drug activity is none of their business...(54(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8
j. Anything else (SPECIFY:)....(55(	____-1	____-2	____-3	____-9	____-8

_____(56-57)

30. Have you or any of your neighbors have been threatened or harmed because they reported drug activity to the police?

Yes, respondent or family...(58(_____-1
Yes, neighbors.....-2
No.....-3 \
Don't know (VOL.).....-9 - SKIP TO Q31
Refused to answer.....-8 /

30a. What happened?

_____(59-60)

_____(61-62)

_____(63-64)

30b. Has this affected people's willingness to report drug activity to the police?

More willing.....(65(_____-1
No change.....-2
Less willing.....-3
Don't know (VOL.).....-9

31. Do you ever see or hear ads telling you how you can report drug activity to the police?

Yes.....(66(_____-1
No....._____-2 \
Don't know (VOL.)....._____-9 - SKIP TO Q32A
Refused to answer....._____-8 /

31a. Can you tell me about those ads?

_____(67-68)

_____(69-70)

_____(71-72)

31b. Have they made you more willing to report?

Yes.....(73(_____-1
No....._____-2
Don't know (VOL.)....._____-9
Refused to answer....._____-8

31c. Why is that?

_____(74-75)

_____(76-77)

_____(78-79)

CARD THREE

32A. How often have you actually seen each of the following kinds of drug activity in this neighborhood? Have you seen (READ ITEM) never, occasionally, fairly often, or nearly every day?

IF EVER SEEN, ASK:
32B. Have you ever reported it to the police?

IF EVER REPORTED, ASK:
32C. How many times in the past month have you reported it?

	Q32A					Q32B		Q32C
	Never	Occasionally	Fairly often	Nearly every day	Don't know	No	Yes	Number of times
a. People taking drugs on the streets	(1 ____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-9	(2 ____-1	____-2	(3-4) ____
b. People taking drugs in buildings or apartments	(5 ____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-9	(6 ____-1	____-2	(7-8) ____
c. People going into shooting galleries.	(9 ____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-9	(10 ____-1	____-2	(11-12) ____
d. School kids buying/ selling drugs	(13 ____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-9	(14 ____-1	____-2	(15-16) ____
e. People selling drugs on the streets	(17 ____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-9	(18 ____-1	____-2	(19-20) ____
f. People selling drugs around schools	(21 ____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-9	(22 ____-1	____-2	(23-24) ____
g. People selling drugs from homes/stores	(25 ____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-9	(26 ____-1	____-2	(27-28) ____
h. People delivering or moving large quantities of drugs	(29 ____-1	____-2	____-3	____-4	____-9	(30 ____-1	____-2	(31-32) ____

INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT REPORTED NEVER IN Q32A TO ALL OF THE ABOVE ACTIVITIES, SKIP TO Q40.
IF RESPONDENT REPORTED NO IN Q32B TO ALL OF THE ABOVE ACTIVITIES, SKIP TO Q38.

33. When was the most recent time that you reported any of these things to the police?

In the last week.....(33(_____-1
In the last month.....(_____-2
In the last six months.....(_____-3
In the last year .....(_____-4
More than a year ago.....(_____-5
Don't know (VOL.).....(_____-9
Refused to answer.....(_____-8

34. How did you report? (INTERVIEWER: MARK ALL THAT APPLY)

Phoned 911 .....(34(_____-1
Phoned police headquarters main number.....(35(_____-1
Phoned special drug or crime hotline.....(36(_____-1
Phoned narcotics unit - headquarters.....(37(_____-1
Phoned narcotics unit - local station.....(38(_____-1
Phoned narcotics unit - don't know.....(39(_____-1
Phoned local police station - specific person.....(40(_____-1
Phoned local police station - no one in particular..(41(_____-1
Other:(SPECIFY)
_____ (42(_____-1
Refused to answer.....(43(_____-1

35. Do you think the police were interested in your report(s)?

Yes.....(44(_____-1
No.....(_____-2
Don't know (VOL.).....(_____-9
Refused to answer.....(_____-8

36. Do you know if the police did anything as a result of your report(s)?

Yes.....(45(_____-1
No.....(_____-2 \
Don't know (VOL.).....(_____-9 - SKIP TO Q37
Refused to answer.....(_____-8 /

36a. Did they tell you how to get more information about what happened as a result of your report?

Yes.....(46(_____-1
No.....(_____-2
Don't know (VOL.).....(_____-9
Refused to answer.....(_____-8

37. Looking back on the time(s) you called the police, how worthwhile was it reporting to the police? Was it....

Very worthwhile.....(47(_____-1
Somewhat worthwhile.....(_____-2
Not at all worthwhile.....(_____-3
Don't know (VOL.).....(_____-9
Refused to answer.....(_____-8

CARD THREE

38. Do you think you would be more likely to report drug activities when you see them if (READ ITEM)?

	Yes	No	Don't know	Refused
a. You would get a reward such as $500 if your report resulted in an arrest or conviction.....(48(	_____-1	_____-2	_____-9	_____-8
b. You could be absolutely certain that no one could find out who you are.....(49(	_____-1	_____-2	_____-9	_____-8
c. The police would train you about what to report and how to report.....(50(	_____-1	_____-2	_____-9	_____-8
d. The police would respond faster to your reports.....(51(	_____-1	_____-2	_____-9	_____-8
e. The police would investigate your reports more thoroughly...(52(	_____-1	_____-2	_____-9	_____-8
f. The police would give you feedback about what they did as a result of your report.....(53(	_____-1	_____-2	_____-9	_____-8
g. You thought the police really needed your help.....(54(	_____-1	_____-2	_____-9	_____-8

39. Is there anything else that might make you more willing to report drug activities in your neighborhood? What is that? Anything else?

_____(55-56)

_____(57-58)

_____(59-60)

40. Do you think your city is winning the war on drugs?

Yes.....(61(_____-1
No.....-2
Other (respondent does not believe there is a war)....-3
Don't know (VOL.).....-9
Refused to answer.....-8

41. What else can or should be done to reduce drugs in this neighborhood? (INTERVIEWER: PROBE -- HOW MUCH MORE CAN THE POLICE DO? WHAT IS RESIDENTS' ROLE?)

_____(62-63)

_____(64-65)

_____(66-67)

42. Has anything happened in your neighborhood recently that has affected your opinion on these issues, a lot?

Yes.....(68(_____-1
No.....-2 SKIP TO Q43

42a. What was that?

_____(69-70)

_____(71-72)

Interviewer Rating Form

43. Respondent's sex

Male.....(73(_____-1
Female....._____-2

44. Respondent's race

Black.....(74(_____-1
Hispanic....._____-2
White....._____-3
Oriental....._____-4
Other....._____-5

45. How well did the respondent understand the questions?

No problems understanding.....(75(_____-1
Some problems understanding....._____-2
Serious problems understanding...._____-3

46. How honest do you think the respondent was during the interview?

Very honest.....(76(_____-1
Somewhat honest....._____-2
Not at all honest....._____-3

47. Interview language

English.....(77(_____-1
Spanish....._____-2

APPENDIX C

INTERCORRELATIONS OF COMPONENTS OF COMMUNITY INDICES

TABLE C.1

Intercorrelations ofCommunity Problem Index

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	1.00	.50	.50	.44	.34	.40	.33	.34
2		1.00	.52	.39	.39	.43	.25	.37
3			1.00	.58	.45	.44	.24	.46
4				1.00	.41	.48	.24	.48
5					1.00	.52	.23	.50
6						1.00	.29	.50
7							1.00	.30
8								1.00

KEY:

1 Condition of housing
2 Dirty streets/sidewalks
3 Vacant buildings
4 Too many fires
5 Crime
6 Gangs
7 Lack of recreational space
8 Abandoned cars

TABLE C.2

Intercorrelations of Community Service Index

	1	2	3	4	5
1	1.00	.29	.34	.31	.32
2		1.00	.42	.26	.30
3			1.00	.26	.31
4				1.00	.51
5					1.00

KEY:

1 Police services
2 Garbage collection
3 Fire protection
4 Public schools
5 Health services

TABLE C.3

Intercorrelations of Social Cohesion Index

	1	2	3
1	1.00	.21	.37
2		1.00	.49
3			1.00

KEY:

1 Community as a place to live
2 People concerned about community
3 People watch out for each other

TABLE C.4

Intercorrelations of Drug Activity Index

	1	2	3	4
1	1.00	.83	.56	.61
2		1.00	.58	.68
3			1.00	.70
4				1.00

KEY:

1 Drug use a problem
2 Drug sales a problem
3 Drug use visible
4 Drug sales visible

TABLE C.5

Intercorrelations of Police-Community Relations Index

	1	2	3	4
1	1.00	.55	.51	.46
2		1.00	.75	.65
3			1.00	.71
4				1.00

KEY:

1 Police treat people with respect
2 Police work together with respondents
3 Police doing best to fight crime
4 Police doing best to fight drugs