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The National Evaluation of Delinquency Prevention FINAL REPORT

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SEPTEMBER, 1981

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THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

FINAL REPORT

NCJRS

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NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

This report presents findings of the national evaluation of the delinquency prevention projects funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). Over twenty million dollars were expended in this national-level effort, which included sixteen grants to provide youth services as well as grants for a national evaluation and for technical assistance to the service providers. In all, over 168 agencies received funds as part of this federal delinquency prevention effort. Services were provided to over 20,000 youths in 118 target areas in 68 cities. The OJJDP program constitutes the largest single federal delinquency prevention effort in American history. The purpose of this report is to profile and evaluate these delinquency prevention activities and to examine their results in light of contemporary theory and research, and previous delinquency prevention strategies.

Data presented cover nearly two full years of program operations. (Many of the grantees received funds to continue some of their activities into a third year of operation.) Consistent with the research design, the findings are heavily weighted toward descriptions of how the delinquency prevention grantees organized their youth service efforts and the different theoretical and practical problems they confronted. Analysis is provided revealing the urgent need for clarification of federal

policy in the delinquency prevention area. The national evaluation also suggests principles or guidelines for those planning future delinquency prevention efforts.

Program To Prevent Juvenile Delinquency

In the fall of 1977, OJJDP awarded sixteen grants to private not-for-profit agencies to develop delinquency prevention programs. Funded agencies were to develop and implement new approaches and techniques to prevent juvenile delinquency in communities where youth are in greatest danger of becoming delinquent. OJJDP wanted to increase or expand the availability of a wide variety of youth services in communities characterized by high rates of crime and delinquency, high rates of unemployment, and other indices of poverty.

The national-level effort constitutes a discretionary program designed to determine whether private, not-for-profit, youth-serving organizations offer methods and resources which will enable them to address broad delinquency prevention goals.

The projects as well as the research were exploratory in nature. OJJDP desired to learn about basic features of prevention programming that may inform national policy in the area. These youth-serving agencies may provide an opportunity for the rapid and inexpensive expansion of services to youth by effectively utilizing volunteer staff. Many private service agencies have community ties and collaborative arrangements with other service agencies which may mobilize and expand resources. Of immediate interest to OJJDP are data concerning the most

efficient service delivery systems for disadvantaged youth.

The youth service agencies, the technical assistance provider, and the national evaluator were selected through national competitions. OJJDP developed separate requests for proposals (RFPs) for the research, technical assistance, and service delivery components of the national delinquency prevention program. Applicants responded to the objectives set forth by OJJDP in terms of their own understanding of the program goals and their view of appropriate methods. Agencies that received grants to launch delinquency prevention programs are listed below.

Akron

United Neighborhood Centers of America
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Project
intensive site: Akron, Ohio

Boston

Alliance for Community Youth Development Services, Inc.
Positive Youth Development Project
Boston, Massachusetts

Chicago

YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago
Chicago Youth Alliance
Chicago, Illinois
[The original grantee was the City of Chicago, Department of Human Services. This project received a local evaluation conducted by the Institute for Social Action and was not part of the NCCD study.]

Dallas

Dallas County and Dallas YMCA
Youth Services Network
Dallas, Texas

Fort Peck

Fort Peck Tribes
Fort Peck Bureau of Youth Services
Fort Peck Indian Reservation, Montana

Marietta

The Salvation Army
Program to Prevent Juvenile Delinquency
intensive site: Marietta, Georgia

New Haven

United Way of Greater New Haven, Inc.
The Consortium for Youth of South Central Connecticut
New Haven, Connecticut

New Jersey

Aspira of America, Inc.
Proyecto Amanece
intensive site: Jersey City/Hoboken, New Jersey

New York

United Neighborhood Houses of New York, Inc.
New Options for Youth Project
New York, New York

Philadelphia

Girls' Coalition
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Richmond

Boys' Clubs of America
National Project on Juvenile Delinquency Prevention
intensive site: Richmond, California

Santa Barbara

Girls Clubs of America, Inc.

Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Project
intensive site: Santa Barbara, California

Seattle

Neighborhood House, Inc.
Seattle-King County Delinquency Prevention Collaboration
Seattle, Washington

Tulare

Operation Helping Hand, Inc.
Tulare Youth Service Bureau Delinquency Prevention Project
Tulare, California

Tuskegee

Tuskegee Institute Human Resources Development Center
Youth Services Program
Tuskegee, Alabama

Venice

Venice Drug Coalition, Inc.
Venice-West Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Prevention
Project
Venice, California

Brief descriptions of the youth service grantees are presented in Appendix A of this report. Technical assistance was provided by the National Issues Center of the Westinghouse Corporation. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) was selected to perform the national evaluation, which included assessment of program impact and documentation of processes leading to successful expansion of services to youth residing in impoverished areas. NCCD's research efforts began in November 1976, enabling the research team to develop and field test a detailed plan for national data collection, which

is presented in Volume II of this report.

Program Strategies and Expected Results

The OJJDP Program Announcement listed the following objectives of the national delinquency prevention program:

- (a) To increase the number of youth from target communities utilizing the services of private and public not-for-profit youth-serving agencies and organizations;
- (b) To increase the number and types of services available to youth in target communities through coordinative efforts among private and public youth-serving agencies;
- (c) To increase the capacity of target communities to respond more effectively to the social, economic and familial needs of youth residing in target communities;
- (d) To increase the capacity of national, regional and local youth-serving agencies to implement and sustain effective services to youth in target communities;
- (e) To increase volunteer participation and broaden community support for delinquency prevention activities; and
- (f) To disseminate information regarding successful prevention projects for replication through national youth-serving agencies and organizations.

The program objectives aimed at several different levels of action. Direct services to youth emerged as the principal focus of the national program, but OJJDP related this objective to issues such as inter-agency coordination, expanded community resources to deal with youth needs, and the increased utilization of volunteers. An important target for improvement appeared to be the potential grantees themselves, who were to increase their own organizational capacities to implement and sustain services to target area youth. Overall, these

objectives were quite broad and permitted potential grantees wide discretion in formulating their programs. Interestingly, OJJDP's list of the results sought did not include reducing rates of delinquency, although the Program Announcement did mandate that evaluation plans attempt measures of program impact on delinquency.

Acceptable program strategies, according to the federal Program Announcement, included direct services, community development, and projects to "improve the delivery of services to youth." Applicants could separately pursue direct services or community development or combine the two strategies. Projects attempting to improve service delivery had to integrate this focus with the first two program strategies. Each of these categories is briefly described below.

Direct Services

OJJDP provided no specific definition of direct services, but the Program Announcement set forth clear expectations for the content of direct service strategies. Grantees were expected to provide for a significant increase in the number of youth served in target communities. Youth and community residents were to be involved in project planning and youth were to be employed in project implementation. OJJDP emphasized youth service models focusing on skill building in social, educational, recreational, and vocational areas. Grantees had to demonstrate their ability to include youth who normally underutilize private agency services because of the location of

services or agency policies regarding eligibility for services. The Program Announcement also asked grantees to "address organizational policies, procedures, and practices which limit accessibility and restrict utilization of services by youth and families in target communities." Finally, direct service projects were to provide training of staff, residents, and youth, and support services necessary to launch and maintain viable programs.

Community Development

OJJDP defines community development as the "process through which target area residents participate in and influence those activities which reflect their lives." This extremely broad conception of community development is accompanied by OJJDP's list of objectives for these sorts of projects. Potential grantees were directed to improve and increase youth services through involvement of community adults and youth in project planning and implementation. Community development projects were also to "address those community conditions and organizational/institutional policies, practices and procedures [emphasis added]" limiting availability and use of services. As in the direct service approaches, OJJDP called for the provision of appropriate training and support services in community development programs. Community strategies were expected to facilitate the community's ability to support and sustain expanded services to youth.

Improving Delivery of Services to Youth -- Capacity Building

OJJDP and grantees often referred to these projects as "capacity building." Projects within this category were to focus on institutional/organizational problems known to interfere with maximum utilization of services (similar to objectives of both direct service and community development strategies). Grantees were encouraged to propose methods of expanding resources for youth that are applicable to diverse geographic locations and a wide range of public and private youth-serving agencies. According to OJJDP, capacity building projects had to show in specific and measurable terms how the capacity to serve youth would be improved. National youth agencies were to focus on improvement of their affiliates located in target communities.

Comparing the three program strategies reveals little difference among them. This lack of clarity in the Program Announcement is reflected in the proposals submitted by successful applicants. Most grantees proposed to accomplish all three strategies; rarely did proposals specify which project activities were components of direct service, community development, or capacity building strategies.

The open-endedness of OJJDP's Program Announcement is further highlighted by the definition of "prevention" presented to potential applicants:

Prevention is the sum total of activities which create a constructive environment designed to promote positive patterns of youth development and growth. The

process includes direct services to youth and indirect activities which address community and institutional conditions that hinder positive youth development and lead to youth involvement with the juvenile justice system.

The ubiquity of OJJDP's concept of prevention is illustrated by a Background Paper included in the Program Announcement. OJJDP recognized the need to provide potential grantees with information about delinquency prevention. Although the Background Paper may not reflect OJJDP's official position about delinquency prevention, it is nonetheless a policy statement. It provides a theoretical structure which many agencies used to fashion their prevention programs.

The Background Paper emphasizes a "positive youth development" approach to delinquency prevention that "cuts across the three categories of causality previously reviewed (individual, environmental, and definitional) (p. 7)." Authors of the Background Paper use the concept of "positive youth development" to promote a grand synthesis of most previous theorizing about delinquency. Moreover, the paper subsumes a diverse array of psychological, educational, recreational, employment, and vocational services under the category of positive youth development:

In all these cases, an explicit rationale linking the service to delinquency-preventing influences can be developed even if it also is true for all of the cases, that a single delinquency-preventing influence may not be adequate to prevent delinquency. The underlying logic may be most directly expressed the following way: Until that time when we know how to fine-tune programs to prevent delinquency, let us at least provide the services which are known to be important to the normal, positive development of the child. (p. 6)

Potential grantees were to provide services that fill gaps and compensate for disadvantages in the lives of youth. More fundamental problems like unemployment, inadequate housing, and racial discrimination are mentioned in the Background Paper, but the potential applicant is clearly directed to make concrete improvements in children's lives through the human resources of private agencies.

OJJDP received over 400 grant applications in response to its Program Announcement. At the first conference of successful applicants, one federal official stated that only 25 to 40 of these proposals were judged as "representing a clear effort or thrust towards prevention." OJJDP made it clear that even the "best proposals possessed serious deficiencies needing immediate remedies and revisions." The proposals exhibited an uneven quality that might be expected given the vague and overlapping definitions provided in the Program Announcement. Federal program planners had faced a difficult task in drafting clear and precise guidelines for delinquency prevention programs. OJJDP's national prevention program must be placed within a context of an ambiguous history of prevention efforts, ill-defined federal policy, and competing claims about virtually all theoretical and practical aspects of prevention programming. These conceptual and policy problems in the prevention field are discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 2

PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE OF DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

It is worthwhile to begin the assessment of the OJJDP National Prevention Program with an examination of the theoretical and practical context of the federal effort. An exploration of issues in context assists in understanding the origins of program ideas and how these concepts were translated into practice. We begin with an overview of delinquency prevention in America and briefly chronicle the rapidly growing federal role in prevention during the last two decades. Included is a review of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 in terms of the definitions of prevention and insights into the direction of federal policy. Of particular importance to the national evaluation are the ideas and organizational issues shaping national decision-making for this programmatic effort.

Brief Overview of Delinquency Prevention in America

As early as 1817, Americans became concerned about the apparent connection between increased pauperism and the rise of delinquency. Prominent reformers in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia conducted investigations, drew up legislation, and lobbied actively to gain acceptance of their ideas. Their labors resulted in the founding of houses of refuge conceived as "new prisons for juvenile offenders." A report of the New York

Society for the Prevention of Pauperism suggested the following principles for such prisons:

These prisons should be rather schools for instruction, than places of punishment, like in present state prisons where the young and the old are confined indiscriminately. The youth confined there should be placed under a course of discipline, severe and unchanging, but alike calculated to subdue and conciliate. (Mennel, 1973, p. 11)

These new institutions accepted both children convicted of crimes and destitute children. Since they were founded as preventive institutions, early houses of refuge accepted children who "live an idle or dissolute life, whose parents are dead, or if living, from drunkenness or other vices, neglect to provide any suitable employment, or exercise any salutary control over said children." (Bremner, 1970, p. 681)

In the second half of the nineteenth century, another group of reformers including Lewis Pease, Samuel Gridley Howe and Charles Loring Brace founded societies to "save" children from depraved and criminal lives. While these later child savers shared many of the social and political views of the founders of the houses of refuge, there were crucial distinctions between the two groups. The later reformers held a far more optimistic view than their precursors about the possibilities of reforming youth. Further, they advocated community-based services against the proponents of incarceration. Centers were established in urban areas to distribute food and clothing, provide temporary shelter for homeless youth and to introduce contract systems of shirt manufacture to destitute youth. Reformers such as Pease

and Brace established missions concerned with teaching the Christian gospel to the children living in urban poverty. Brace and his followers knew from their first-hand experiences in the city missions that the problems of poverty were widespread and growing more serious. They formed the strong belief that the impoverished urban youth were victims of degrading social conditions. At least one solution, from their vantage point, involved removing youth from this environment. Delinquency and vagrancy could be solved by gathering up children and placing them with farm families on the Western frontier.

Another prevention experiment during the middle part of the nineteenth century was the result of a Boston shoemaker, John Augustus. In 1841, Augustus began putting up bail for men charged with drunkenness, although he had no official connection with the court. Soon after, he began working with youth -- providing them with bail, clothing and shelter. Augustus sometimes assisted youth in finding jobs and paid court costs to keep them out of jail. This early probation system was later adopted by various child saving groups, and in 1869, Massachusetts expanded probation by permitting delinquents to be released under the supervision of the Board of State Charities.

For the next half century, the advocates of juvenile institutions and community-based prevention engaged in pitched ideological battle. Each group highlighted the "evils" of the other's approach. Partially in response to attacks by Brace and his followers, many juvenile institutions implemented a cottage or family system. Despite well-publicized scandals and stories

of violence within the prisons for children, the practice of locking up wayward youth expanded throughout the entire nineteenth century.

Delinquency prevention efforts were vastly expanded during the period from 1880 to 1920, often referred to by historians as the Progressive Era. During these four decades of major social structural change in America, organizations such as Settlement Houses and Boys' Clubs developed youth services in many urban areas. For example, Settlement Houses were established in New York in 1886 and in Chicago in 1887. Perhaps the most famous settlement was Hull House founded by Jane Addams. Settlement workers were typically the sons and daughters of the wealthy who sought to bring their educational and cultural values to the urban poor. Often the settlement house workers, who took up residence in impoverished areas, combined the qualities of teacher and missionary. These reformers perceived their role as disinterested mediators standing between uneducated urban workers and powerful but irresponsible capitalists and politicians.

The growing number of youth service workers (who were overwhelmingly volunteers) formed an important lobbying group which advocated protective child welfare legislation, and Juvenile Court legislation. The new juvenile court seemed to them a logical extension of their prevention program.

Progressive Era reformers conducted social surveys to gauge the extent of poverty and youth crime in their communities. They supported social experiments to develop new behavior

patterns among the poor. Increasingly, this cadre of volunteers developed an ideological commitment to the growth of a profession of social and child welfare activities. The growth of this profession was closely tied to the emerging scientific discipline of psychiatry, psychology and criminology. Moreover, influential reformers such as Jane Addams and Julia Lathrop were convinced of the value of individual study and case analysis of troublesome youth.

Efforts of the Progressive Era child savers were enhanced by the research and theoretical contributions of William Healy. The legacy of Healy's research can still be discerned in delinquency prevention efforts. He stressed a wide range of possible causes of delinquency including the influence of bad companions, the love of adventure, early sex experiences, and mental conflicts. In 1917, Healy advanced the thesis that youthful misconduct resulted from acute mental conflicts. These ideas were heavily influenced by the work of Adolf Meyer, whose interpretations of Freud exerted a significant impact on American psychiatry. Healy agreed with Meyer that the family was a crucial factor in delinquency.

The basis for much prevention of mental conflict is to be found in close comfortable relations between parents and children. (Hawes, 1971, p. 255)

Healy's emphasis on the family echoed the early sentiment of Charles Loring Brace that the family was "God's reformatory."

Healy became a proselytizer for the child guidance clinic idea. Working with the Commonwealth Fund and the National

Committee for Mental Hygiene, Healy aided the development of clinics across the nation devoted to the study and psychological treatment of children. By 1931, there were 232 such clinics in operation, including a traveling child guidance clinic that visited rural communities in the West to examine children. Healy's ideas and the child guidance clinic movement emphasized the individual treatment model which dominated prevention thinking and practice throughout most of the twentieth century.

Research and social programming developed by a group of Chicago social scientists of the 1920's and 1930's offered a different approach to prevention than Healy's work. Sociologists, including Robert Park, Frederick Thrasher and Clifford Shaw, focused prevention theory upon social and environmental influences on youth. What evolved was a theory on urban transition and decay as contributing factors to the breakdown in the strength of community institutions. Delinquency was viewed as one outcome of the social disintegration produced by modern industrial society. The Chicago school believed that severe social disorganization produced cultural values sustaining crime and delinquency as "more or less traditional aspects of life." Thrasher argued for "a definitely organized and thoroughgoing preventive program in the local community." (Mennel, 1973, p. 194)

The Chicago approach was translated into the Chicago Area Project of the early 1930's. The project used a sociological (as opposed to psychological) theory to launch its prevention programs. Community organizing efforts formed the core of the

Area Project's efforts. In several years, 12 community committees were developed to plan and administer youth service programs. Emphasis was placed on maximum community input and local resident participation in the delivery of services.

Despite signs of positive results in Chicago, the Area Project model of community organizing was set aside for nearly three decades. Through the 1940's and 1950's, prevention programs continued to focus on the psychological perspective, but added the concepts of group dynamics as a therapeutic approach. For example, the New York City Youth Board developed programs which placed workers in communities that were attempting to redirect the activities of delinquent youth. Detached worker programs extended the psychological model of Healy to the street corner setting. Moreover, the detached worker concentrated on reaching members of delinquent gangs.

Until the end of the 1950's, prevention programs were generally small-scale, highly fragmented and largely supported through private funding. Private youth service agencies working with low paid, part-time staff and large numbers of volunteers carried the bulk of community-based prevention efforts. Funds were usually supplied by wealthy benefactors, locally organized charities, and private foundations. This picture would change radically in the 1960s. Beginning with the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency created by Executive Order 10940 in May 1961, the federal government began to invest ever-increasing funds towards improving delinquency prevention practice. It is important to briefly chronicle the rapid

development of the federal government's role in delinquency prevention.

Federal Role in Delinquency Prevention

Concern about juvenile delinquency as a national problem was expressed by the first White House Conference on Children in 1909. Three years later, the U.S. Children's Bureau studied the effects of wartime conditions on delinquency. This pioneering federal effort was hampered by severely restricted funds and limited staff. It was not until 1936 that a separate delinquency division of the Children's Bureau was established to assist states in planning for child welfare grants authorized by the Social Security Act of 1935.

In the 1940's, other federal agencies joined the Children's Bureau in the delinquency field. For example, in 1946 the Department of Justice convened a National Conference on the Prevention and Control of Juvenile Delinquency. By 1948, amendments to the Public Health Services Act permitted the National Institute of Mental Health to administer grants to states for improved community mental health programs which were often aimed at delinquent youth. Also, in 1948 the Interdepartmental Committee on Children and Youth was created to foster close ties among various federal agencies working with youth. The committee, however, failed to meet until 1952.

Increasing public alarm about the apparent increase in youth crime in the early 1950's led to the establishment of a United States Senate Subcommittee to investigate juvenile

delinquency. It is interesting to note that Congress allocated only \$44,000 to study juvenile delinquency nationwide. In 1954, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), convened a national conference on juvenile delinquency and the Children's Bureau's activities in the delinquency field. By 1955, President Eisenhower requested legislation to help reduce delinquency. The Eisenhower plan envisioned grants-in-aid to states for training and special projects. But Congress failed to pass requested legislation in 1955, 1956 and 1957.

Until 1960, the federal role in delinquency prevention remained limited in scope and intensity. Beginning in 1961, the United States government's involvement grew to five agencies and 15 programs in 1965. By 1971, there were 16 federal agencies administering 197 juvenile delinquency programs with annual expenditures of \$11.5 billion.

A primary vehicle for expansion of the federal effort was the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime. The Committee helped enact the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961 and developed many large-scale delinquency prevention programs. Most famous among the programs sponsored by the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency were the Mobilization for Youth (MFY) and Haryou Act (Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited), both were developed in New York City. The MFY and Haryou-Act received large amounts of federal operating funds. The MFY received about \$2 million a year; Haryou-Act received about \$1 million a year; and 14

similar projects received over \$7 million from the federal government.

Perhaps the most striking feature of these new programs was their focus on changing the social conditions affecting the lives of inner-city youth. These programs stressed the importance of empowering the poor, as well as encouraging maximum community participation in the planning and execution of social welfare programs. Moreover, the MFY and Haryou-Act programs assumed the necessity of conflict with established bureaucracies as part of their advocacy for the needs of youth. Despite intense resistance to these efforts in most cities, the basic models of MFY and the Haryou-Act were incorporated into the community action component of the War on Poverty.

In 1967, when social scientists and practitioners reviewed theories of delinquency prevention for President Johnson's Crime Commission, the MFY and Haryou-Act were basic to their thinking. The President's Crime Commission underscored the need for broad social reform to prevent delinquency. Further, the Commission articulated the need to encourage diversion from the justice system as a prevention approach. One mechanism of prevention highly recommended by the President's Crime Commission, was the Youth Service Bureau incorporating the joint objectives of diversion and advocacy on behalf of troubled youth.

Shortly after the report of the President's Crime Commission, Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation which further expanded the federal role in the delinquency field. In 1968 the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,

administered by the Department of Justice, and the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act, administered by HEW, mandated federal assistance to the states in planning innovative community-based programs for prevention, diagnosis, diversion and treatment of delinquent youth. An amendment to the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act in 1971 created the Interdepartmental Council to Coordinate All Federal Juvenile Delinquency Programs. The HEW effort through the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration expended \$23.8 million in fiscal years 1971 and 1972. Of this total, \$12.6 million (52.9 percent) was budgeted for prevention programs. The HEW program emphasized the establishment of youth service networks and adopted a broad theoretical model focusing on the need to promote change in social institutions seen as contributing to delinquency. By contrast, the Department of Justice program, administered by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), expended \$225.4 million for delinquency programs in 1971 and 1972. Approximately \$37.6 million (16.7 percent) of this was specifically earmarked for juvenile delinquency prevention.

In 1974, Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act to further strengthen the national delinquency effort. Since the current national prevention program is funded under the auspices of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention created by the 1974 Act, a review of that Act in terms of delinquency prevention provides an important contextual base for the national evaluation.

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 established the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention within the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. As evidenced by the title of the 1974 Act, "prevention" came to be looked upon as a viable strategy for forestalling anti-social behavior among adolescents and young adults. The specific provisions of the Act are contained in its stated "purpose", and include the following:

- (1) to provide for the thorough and prompt evaluation of all federally assisted juvenile delinquency programs;
- (2) to provide technical assistance to private agencies, institutions, and individuals in developing and implementing juvenile delinquency programs;
- (3) to establish training programs for persons, including professionals, paraprofessionals, and volunteers, who work with delinquents or potential delinquents or whose work or activities relate to juvenile delinquency programs;
- (4) to establish a centralized research effort on the problems of juvenile delinquency, including an information clearinghouse to disseminate the findings of such research and all data related to juvenile delinquency;
- (5) to develop and encourage the implementation of national standards for the administration of juvenile justice, including recommendations for administrative, budgetary, and legislative action at the Federal, State and local level to facilitate the adoption of such standards.
- (6) to assist States and local communities with resources to develop and implement programs to keep students in elementary and secondary schools and to prevent unwarranted and

- arbitrary suspensions and expulsions; and
- (7) to establish a Federal assistance program to deal with the problems of runaway youth.

To accomplish these activities, the Act further states that:

It is therefore the further declared policy of Congress to provide the necessary resources, leadership, and coordination (1) to develop and implement effective methods of preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency; (2) to develop and conduct effective programs to prevent delinquency, to divert juveniles from the traditional juvenile system and to provide critically needed alternatives to institutionalization; (3) to improve the quality of juvenile justice in the United States, and (4) to increase the capacity of state and local governments and public and private agencies to conduct effective juvenile justice and delinquency prevention and rehabilitation programs and to provide research, evaluation, and training services in the field of juvenile delinquency prevention.

Although the Act clearly emphasizes the importance of "prevention" in forestalling and controlling the onset and persistence of delinquency, it does not at any time provide a definition of "prevention". In fact, nowhere in the legislative process that resulted in the passage of The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 is the concept of prevention defined. The separate bills presented to the House and Senate, the debate in both Houses surrounding the bills, the committee reports, the Conference Committee reports, the amendments to the Act of 1977, and the reports supporting it all failed to clearly define the term, "prevention."

A review of the Congressional debate surrounding the passage of the 1974 Act reveals a deep concern among legislators

regarding the problems of juvenile delinquency. The prevention of delinquency stands out as the single most important concern. The only clarification comes from the discussions of several members of Congress who saw the causes of delinquency as a complex set of interactions among social factors.

Representative Hawkins, the floor manager of the Bill in the House, noted:

[P]rograms to be truly preventative must deal with the strengths of the youths and those of their families and the communities in which they live. (CR-H, July 1, 1974, p.H6049)

The co-manager of the Act in the House, Representative Steiger, stated:

[I]n order to accomplish anything through prevention the factors that cause delinquency must be addressed. (CR-H, July 1, 1974, p. H6050)

The speech that most directly addresses the nature of delinquency prevention is that of Representative Chisholm who argued for the need to support community-based groups to do advocacy and counseling. She specifically identified the school as a key social institution in creating problems of delinquency through "pushing out" students:

... the push out is the student who through discriminatory treatment and arbitrary actions of school authorities is excluded from school, or else is so alienated by the hostility of his or her school environment that he or she leaves school. A solution to the problem of student push out is central to the effort to reduce juvenile delinquency ... (CR-H, July 1, 1974, p. H6057)

A number of federal legislators recognized the broad social issues involved in delinquency causation and some, like Representative Chisolm, even specify what some of those issues are. Nowhere does a comprehensive definition of the concept of prevention emerge.

Two issues dominated the legislative campaign to pass the Act. On one issue, which could be termed the "motivational" issue, there was almost complete unanimity. The members of both Houses were alarmed at what they saw as the growing rate of youth crime and felt a pressing need to address the problem. Speaker after speaker enumerated statistics portraying a rising youth crime rate and arguments about the debilitating effects of such a condition in our society. (A summary of the "motivational" component of the act can be found in the very beginning of the Legislation Findings, Section 101.)

The other major issue, the "organizational" question, was quite divisive. This issue pertained to which department in the federal structure should be the location of the Office of Juvenile Justice. The House of Representatives favored the placement of OJJDP in HEW. In the Senate version it was to be located in LEAA. Proponents of the HEW location argued that a broad prevention initiative ought to be placed in the larger context of social issues. They felt HEW was the proper body to address such broad-based social problems. Proponents of HEW placement argued that LEAA had a "cops and robbers" approach to criminal justice, and that a prevention measure must occur outside this realm.

Those legislators who felt LEAA was the proper location for OJJDP argued that HEW had not done well with previous delinquency prevention programs and that LEAA had shown some success in the area. They argued that LEAA had more experience in delinquency prevention and was more eager to do the job. It was also argued that the State Planning Agency (SPA) network, already part of the LEAA structure, would provide the best mechanism for state involvement and that the SPAs' ongoing relationship with LEAA would be superior to any new arrangements established by HEW.

Both issues, motivational and organizational, touched on topics relevant to defining prevention. The causes of delinquency as residing in a complex of social structural problems was an assumption of both arguments. The assumptions, however, were never fully articulated. Thus, the legislation completely left open the direction of federal policy in the prevention field. While some sections of the 1974 Act as well as the 1977 amendments offer listings of "advanced techniques", including a wide range of youth services, these diverse services are not integrated into a cohesive strategy of delinquency prevention.

Without a clear definition of prevention or a general sense of legislative intent, one might reasonably expect further ambiguity to surround the already existing confusion about the nature and scope of prevention at the local level. Further, the absence of even a broad definition of prevention contributes to the continuous utilization of ineffective and inappropriate

strategies to deal with the problems of youth. The need to establish an operational definition of prevention will become clear when one examines the difficulties faced by the grantees in determining the appropriate clientele for their service efforts.

The problems of drafting effective federal guidelines to encourage quality proposals were further complicated by a generally confusing "state of the art" within the delinquency prevention field.

The "State of the Art" in Delinquency Prevention

An early review of delinquency prevention programs, Witmer and Tufts, (1954), points to three major conceptions of prevention that dominated the field of delinquency up to the 1950's. The first category includes efforts aimed at promoting the "healthy personality development" of all children. Within this broad conceptual level, the prevention (and/or control) of delinquency was directed toward improving those aspects of society that affect the personality development of children. Obviously, the range of such activities is extremely broad and encompassing, and while commendable, they include a greater array of behavior than just delinquency. A second category envisions delinquency prevention as those efforts directed primarily toward potential delinquents before they become involved in delinquent behavior. Proponents of this viewpoint not only believe that community resources can be more effectively utilized with predelinquents, but further argue that

such individuals can be identified through the use of predictive devices. The third category includes programs stressing the reduction of recidivism by lessening the possibility of serious offenses being committed. Prevention efforts under this orientation are directed toward preventing the "continuance" of delinquency rather than its "onset" as is characteristic in the second category.

After reviewing the efforts made under each of these conceptions, the authors argue for a definition of prevention as follows:

Prevention refers to both the forestalling of delinquency behavior and also to the reduction in its frequency and seriousness. (Witmer and Tufts, 1954, p. 5)

In this way, they include the essential elements of all three definitions above as opposed to arriving at a more precise definition.

In another critique of delinquency prevention programs prior to the 1960's, John Martin supports the contentions of Witmer and Tufts regarding the variety of meanings associated with prevention. Martin found that delinquency prevention programs correspond to one of the following definitions:

- Delinquency prevention is the sum total of all activities that contribute to the adjustment of children and to healthy personalities in children.
- Delinquency prevention is the attempt to deal with particular environmental conditions that are believed to contribute to delinquency.
- Delinquency prevention consists of specific preventive services provided to individual children or groups of

children. (Martin, 1968, pp. 161-164)

Although the first category is a restatement of Witmer and Tufts' classification, the addition of the second definition emphasizing "environmental conditions" reflects increasing attention paid to the importance of the social system as a causal factor in promoting delinquency.

The last definition indicates a growing recognition of the varied types of behavior classified as "delinquency" and the search for differential treatment strategies. As with Witmer and Tufts, each of Martin's program orientations can be traced to varied theoretical perspectives about the etiology of delinquency.

In elaborating on the above approaches, Martin points out that the largest proportion of efforts aimed at preventing juvenile delinquency have been based on psychological principles.

We must not be so carried away by our desire to rehabilitate delinquents that we fail to see individual treatment in a proper perspective, lose sight of its limitations, and ignore the fundamental proposition that the prevention of delinquency should include both individual treatment and general or social prevention. (Emphasis added) To a truly remarkable degree public and private delinquency prevention agencies have spent comparatively little money or energy on community centered programs of social prevention. For decades most of these agencies have put their effort into establishing various kinds of facilities for rehabilitating delinquents on a case by case basis, with the "model" and most prestigious approach in recent years being that of a psychiatrically oriented child guidance clinic. (Martin, 1968, p. 163)

Martin's critique of the psychological approach is further

highlighted with the following statement:

Basically, the problem of delinquency prevention is a problem of social organization or reorganization and other approaches have merit only to the degree that they contribute to such reorganization. (Emphasis added) (Martin, 1968, p. 168)

Martin's comments anticipate a major shift in the emphasis from individual treatment to community organization that was prevalent during the 1960s.

The confusion in delinquency prevention that was dominant in the 1950's and early 1960's led Lejins to write in 1967 that:

... the field of prevention is by far the least developed area of criminology. Current popular views are naive, vague, mostly erroneous, and for the most part devoid of any awareness of research findings; there is a demand for action on the basis of bygone days, and other equally invalid opinions and reasons. In scientific and professional circles the subject of prevention has received remarkably little attention. Even the basic concepts in the field of prevention lack precision. There has been very little theory-building, and attempted research under such circumstances has failed to produce any significant results. (Lejins, 1967, p. 1)

In his review of the field of prevention, Lejins argued for the need to distinguish between "prevention" and "control". For Lejins:

Prevention is a measure taken before a criminal or delinquent act has actually occurred for the purpose of forestalling such an act; control is a measure taken after a criminal or delinquent act has been committed. (Lejins, 1967, p. 2)

Since "control measures" may also help to forestall further criminal offenses, Lejins argues that there is difficulty and

confusion in separating the difference between control and prevention, unless the concept of control is restricted to:

... any action concerning an offender taken as a result of his having committed an offense ... even if it interrupts the continuation of criminal behavior and thereby forestalls future criminal acts. (Lejins, 1967, p. 3)

Using this distinction as a base, Lejins describes three types of prevention: punitive, corrective and mechanical. Punitive prevention, he notes, relies on the threat of punishment to forestall criminal behavior and is based on the premise that a potential offender's awareness of the prospective punishment for an offense will deter him from committing criminal acts. Corrective prevention, on the other hand, is based on the premise that conditions "lead to" or "cause" criminal behavior and it is these conditions which must be eliminated if delinquency is to be prevented. It is this type of preventive activity that is most common in society today. The last category, that of mechanical prevention, is directed toward making it difficult or impossible for an individual to successfully commit a limited range of offenses. Emphasis is not on the individual's background or personality, but rather on the development and expansion of such activities as police surveillance, improved security, and anti-theft devices. Under this orientation the primary goal is to "harden the target" so as to make it inaccessible to the offender. While this type of preventive activity has become more prominent in recent years, its major focus is on the behavior of the offender rather than

the reasons for the behavior.

The attempt by Lejins to develop a typology of prevention is also noted by Harlow (1969), who distinguished three major meanings associated with prevention.

- Primary Prevention is directed toward the criminogenic environment without distinguishing between those persons who have responded criminally and those who have not.
- Secondary Prevention includes programs concerned with delinquency-prone individuals and emphasizing early identification and treatment of predelinquents.
- Tertiary Prevention is corrective in that it is concerned with preventing recidivism.

An examination of Harlow's categories indicates little difference from the early classification by Witmer and Tufts. Both authors interpret prevention as being directed at three types of youth: general population, pre-delinquent, and delinquent. The use of the term "prevention" to include activities associated with all three categories of youth only adds to the confusion associated with the concept.

In a recent critical analysis of prevention, Polk and Kobrin, (1972), argue that the tendency in the past has been to search for the "causes" of crime and then to define prevention in terms of the programs that seek to ameliorate these causes. In their analysis Polk and Kobrin argue for an approach that specifies why law-abiding rather than delinquent activities are pursued. Delinquency prevention, they argue, should give priority to social institutional reform rather than individual change. For them, both from a practical and strategic matter:

... the approach to the problem of adolescent deviance, and to delinquency prevention and control, must focus on institutional malfunction. (Polk and Kobrin, 1972)

Based on this approach, efforts would be directed toward restructuring the existing social institutions and discarding those features that tend to foster delinquent behavior and identities.

Polk and Kobrin go on to argue that prevention consists of activities developed to reduce the incidence of those behaviors leading to the label of delinquency. In their view, the most appropriate manner to accomplish prevention is through the restructuring of the present social institutions or creating new ones.

Growing attention to youth development is also noted by Empey, who asserts:

... any serious effort at crime prevention would have to consider ways by which socialization per se might be made more effective. (Empey, 1974, p. 1106)

Given this direction, Empey argues that, if socializing institutions are to be made more effective, then delinquency prevention programs should consider the following assumptions as crucial to prevention:

1. the primary focus of prevention efforts should be upon the establishment among young people of a legitimate identity;
2. a legitimate identity among young people is most likely to occur if they have a stake in conformity;

3. the cultivation in young people of a legitimate identity and a stake in conformity requires that they be provided with socially acceptable, responsible, and personally gratifying roles;
4. a rational strategy of delinquency reduction and control must address the task of institutional change. (Polk and Kobrin, 1972, pp. 2-3)

In a recent attempt to clarify the definition of prevention, and to suggest the most appropriate strategies to accomplish delinquency prevention, a task force of the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended the following definition:

Delinquency prevention is a process of problem identification, resource analysis and strategy building aimed at lowering rates of delinquency through the provision of services to persons or groups with specific and demonstrated needs. (Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1976, p. 25)

While the above definition indicates the importance of comprehensive planning in delinquency prevention, the emphasis remains on the provision of services to individuals as the major strategy for accomplishing prevention. It is not clear whether this includes such strategies as community development, advocacy as a class action strategy, or legislative changes concerned with the inclusion or exclusion of behaviors from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

This federal delinquency prevention effort emerged within a theoretical and practical context that desperately requires conceptual and policy clarity. An overview of delinquency prevention in the United States points to its ambiguous history.

A diverse array of social experiments have been launched based on disparate and often competing views of delinquency causation. The federal role in the delinquency field has expanded tremendously during the last two decades but the increased level of federal delinquency prevention expenditures neither clarified the proper definition, nor signalled the direction of federal policy in the prevention field. Moreover, the present "state of the art" in delinquency prevention is marked by theoretical ambiguities and conflicts. Few clear guidelines exist for those planning and implementing prevention programs at the local or national level. This underdeveloped "state of the art" in delinquency prevention theory and practice plagues all aspects of the OJJDP national prevention programs.

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Chapter 3

DEVELOPING AN EVALUATION MODEL FOR THE NATIONAL DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PROGRAM

Introduction

The OJJDP selected NCCD to design and conduct the evaluation of its national delinquency prevention program. The two major responsibilities of the national evaluator were to (1) design a process evaluation that could be implemented at all project sites, and (2) design and implement an impact evaluation of a more limited number of projects. An evaluation of this largest of federal efforts in delinquency prevention would be a formidable challenge under ideal circumstances, but a variety of additional constraints made the national evaluation a nearly impossible undertaking.

The federal program for evaluation was not well defined, as illustrated by the broad and ambiguous program objectives presented in the OJJDP Program Announcement. Federal concerns regarding the evaluation were of equally wide latitude. The projects selected for this delinquency prevention program were not structured to facilitate research. A key difficulty with the evaluation was the overwhelming scope, magnitude, and diversity of the national program.

The constraining factors had important consequences for research. For example, the design of most grantee programs precluded use of randomization or even quasi-experimental designs. Many of the grantees collected minimal client data,

which made baseline comparison difficult. Evaluation criteria were not a significant factor in choosing grantees. NCCD held modest expectations regarding its ability to effectively determine project impacts because of traditional difficulties of successfully implementing rigorous assessments of delinquency prevention programs and the particular problems of this national program. At best, NCCD's attempt at impact evaluation was intended to yield some insights to improve future efforts in impact evaluations of delinquency prevention programs.

Recognizing the problems of impact analysis, OJJDP emphasized process-level evaluation of its prevention program. The focus on process evaluation required the development of a strategy that could be uniformly implemented at the many diverse project sites. While models for impact analysis are relatively clear, few analytic frameworks existed for collecting and interpreting process evaluation data, (Krisberg, 1980). Since process data can fill important gaps in knowledge of how delinquency prevention programs actively operate, the national evaluation focused on documenting program development and operating forces. Process evaluation is not a well-defined area of research, and NCCD's approach must be regarded as tentative and experimental.

Once the evaluation design was refined and finalized, a multitude of implementation issues emerged. The problem was fitting an idealized evaluation design to real-life projects.

The Program and the Evaluation

Planning for evaluation requires a careful understanding of the program to be evaluated so that appropriate and feasible research designs and data collection procedures can be developed. Typically, evaluation planning involves understanding the goals of the evaluation as well as the parameters defining the program to be evaluated. Approaches to delineating program-specific information for evaluation planning vary, but at a minimum, categories of information must include:

1. articulation of the program (the intended program activities and inputs);
2. specification of the program goals or expected results; and
3. specification of antecedent and intervening variables and statement of assumed causal relationships between the program and the goals and the effects.
(Rutman, 1977)

Without such prerequisite data, the program is not conceptually clear or practically measurable. The evaluator would be on unsure footing developing program-relevant impact measures, defining key intervening variables, or identifying appropriate variables to be controlled (Hudson, 1977).

As discussed in Chapter 2, the philosophy and practice of delinquency prevention in the United States has been generally characterized by competing claims and definitional ambiguities. The OJJDP program guidelines were consistent with this history. Neither OJJDP documents nor grantee proposals contained much information that was useful for evaluation planning. Even early

site visits revealed that many grantees had not reached firm decisions about their goals and methods. Some projects' basic service components were in flux throughout the entire study period. Further, the projects varied greatly. For example, some projects emphasized mass service activities (disco dances), while others stressed intensive counseling and tutoring. It proved difficult to arrive at basic definitions of clients, services, and project processes that were relevant to all grantees.

The goals of the national evaluation were defined in a separate OJJDP research solicitation. Unfortunately, the listed research objectives were as diffuse as the program goals. Numerous and wide-ranging evaluation concerns regarding the OJJDP prevention program were presented. For example, the eighteen impact and process evaluation objectives OJJDP lists suggest a formidable research task:

1. Impact Evaluation (three projects)

- a. To determine the effects of program participation on the behavior of youth as measured by official and self-reported involvement in delinquency.
- b. To determine the effects of program participation on the attitudes of youth toward: (1) him/herself; (2) their peers; (3) their family; (4) the action project (including program components, project personnel and participating youth); (5) social service agencies; (6) juvenile justice agencies; and (7) law in general.
- c. To determine the effects of the program on the attitudes and behavior of adult residents of the target community toward youth, the juvenile justice system, the project, and the community in general.
- d. To determine the effects of the program on the attitudes and behavior of personnel from affected juvenile justice and social agencies toward youth from

the target community (especially those participating in the action program), residents of the target community in general, the project and its relationship to the juvenile justice system and related social agencies.

e. To develop a data collection system to be implemented on a permanent basis to determine long-term impact of the project on the target community in terms of eventual reduction of delinquent behavior.

f. To determine whether changes in the rates of delinquency in the target community are due to geographic displacement of delinquency.

g. To determine how attitudes, policies, decision-making structures, and behaviors of juvenile justice and social agencies, including the grantee agency, change as a result of the project.

h. To determine what changes in the delinquent behavior of youth residing in adjacent, non-participating communities are observable and the extent to which such changes could be construed as a "spinoff effect" of the project.

2. Process Evaluation (all projects)

a. To determine the numbers and types of youth utilizing project services.

b. To describe the major types of services that are actually delivered by the projects, as they evolve over time.

c. To determine the extent of utilization of each major type of project service.

d. To determine the frequency and intensity of involvement of youth and adult residents of the target community in: (1) the assessment of community needs for service; (2) the development of services to meet those needs; and (3) the delivery of such services on a volunteer basis.

e. To determine the extent to which the policies and procedures of the youth-serving agency are modified to address more effectively the needs of the target community.

f. To determine the extent to which the social and juvenile justice agencies in the target community support the project, including the extent to which non-grantee agencies increase their services to the target community as a "spinoff" effect of the project

itself.

- g. To provide useful and periodic feedback on project performance to the action grantees.
- h. To provide routine cost-effectiveness measures in terms of cost per unit of delivered service for all projects and, if possible, a more highly developed system for assessing the costs and benefits, both fiscal and psycho-social, of the projects undergoing impact evaluation.
- i. To determine the "critical events" in the life of the project such as significant policy decisions, structural changes, major problems in relations with other organizations and groups, and unrelated changes in the socio-political environment of the project which affect its operation.
- j. To describe and determine how the project organizational structure, operational practices and program changes affect the delivery of services to target youth including: the approach to establishing the project as a viable program with the police, courts, social service agencies, target youth and other community residents; personnel selection and utilization; management practices; and the roles of such groups as Boards of Directors, etc., vis-a-vis project staff and juvenile justice agencies. (OJJDP, 1976)

It was difficult to organize evaluation plans around these objectives. An enormous number and variety of variables were intended for study, but neither causal linkages nor theoretical relevance of specific variables were articulated. While the OJJDP evaluation solicitation enumerates contextual "working assumptions" of the national delinquency prevention program, the relationship between working assumptions and evaluation objectives is not clearly defined. Many of these evaluation concerns are stated in vague terms; several are overlapping. Evaluation objectives were often difficult to achieve because of the nature of the funded projects. For example, the ability to measure cost per unit of delivered service was limited because

grantees offered such a diverse array of services, and client attendance at specific activities was not closely monitored. Moreover, the nature and intensity of several projects' services continued to change throughout the grant period.

A broader problem plagued the design and implementation of the national study: evaluation objectives did not mirror the program goals of grantees. OJJDP failed to list delinquency reduction as a specific result to be sought by grantees, but the evaluator was expected to measure changes in individual and area rates of delinquency. OJJDP's interest in delinquency reduction was reflected in research objectives concerning the impact on delinquent behavior of program participants and on youth residing in adjacent non-participating communities, as well as rates of delinquency in target communities.

This task required measuring issues that project staffs did not consider to be their primary mandate. Most grantees wanted to be held accountable to their plans to deliver services to a large number of target area youth; few believed that they really could reduce delinquency. When research staff requested clarification about how client selection and services related to the goal of delinquency prevention, project staff said they felt they were being unfairly evaluated. Lack of accord among OJJDP, project staff, and the evaluators on basic program research goals produced constant tension that undermined the entire research effort.

The unwieldy scope of the evaluation was compounded by the magnitude and diversity of the projects. For example, the 16

grants included 166 participating agencies, as well as numerous nongrant agencies with a variety of working relationships with the prevention projects. A wide array of complex organizational arrangements characterized the grantees, who launched a vast assortment of direct service, capacity building, and community development activities. Client populations were very diverse, and the 118 target areas overlapped local definitions of communities. For example, one urban grantee's target area was one contiguous geographic area representing many communities that were ethnically diverse but economically similar. Another grantee's target area spanned nine different police jurisdictions.

The scope of the program effort, the diversity of the clients and services, and the potential permutations of program variables made standard evaluation approaches and methods inapplicable to the national delinquency prevention program. The complex issues raised by the OJJDP prevention effort dictated that the process and impact research would have to be exploratory. In practical terms, this meant the need for an evaluation approach flexible enough to respond to the unique aspects of the grantees. The tension between the need for flexibility and the requirement of standardized data collection plagued the evaluation effort throughout the study period.

The Impact Evaluation

Impact evaluation commonly refers to the measurement and assessment of program outcomes. Its key purpose is to assess the relative extent to which a program achieves its specified goals, and to demonstrate whether movement toward the program goals actually resulted from the program in question.

Impact studies traditionally rely on relatively simple cause-effect models. The program consists of some innovative action or treatment to be tested on its relation to a set of desired goals. Goals are the results hypothesized to follow from program activities. Program success or failure is usually conceptualized as the measurable and theoretically predicted changes in the target population which was exposed to program interventions.

To test the causal relationship between program interventions and hypothesized outcomes, experimental or quasi-experimental procedures are applied to control the influence of extraneous factors on any observed changes in target populations. Groups of program participants and nonparticipants are selected for repeated observation during the course of the program.

Program goals are translated into measurable indicators. Ideally, relevant measures are taken for each of those who receive services (treatment group) and those who do not receive services (control group) before and after the program treatment. The pre- and post-measurement of treatment and control groups allows for observation of whether changes in indices of program

outcomes took place and analysis of whether the measured changes are attributable to the program intervention or something else.

Problems associated with implementing traditional impact designs in social programs are well known. (1) To make such impact assessments the researcher must assume that the research design closely adheres to a well-defined program. Measurable goals and an explicit theoretical rationale linking program activities to desired change must exist. These elementary requirements of impact designs are rarely met. (2) Even if these conditions are met, the flexibility of most impact designs is limited and cannot tolerate severe changes in program strategies. (3) Practical problems of measuring change are posed by multiple program interventions, unanticipated program shifts, and the validity and reliability of available impact measures (Hudson, 1977). (4) Establishing true control or comparison groups has proven difficult in most social program situations (Zetterberg, 1977).

Few delinquency prevention program efforts have received rigorous evaluation. The difficulties of evaluating program impacts and the need for empirical knowledge in delinquency prevention are well known to researchers. Over a decade ago, Burns and Stern concluded:

... there is little in the way of research or evaluation to back claims of success for any programs designed specifically to prevent delinquency ... there is a paucity of support or evidence for the effectiveness of programs which have been implemented. (Burns and Stern, 1967, p. 354)

A more recent study found that the level of research on

delinquency prevention did not permit reliable assessment of the impact of most programs (Lundman, McFarlane, and Scarpitti, 1976). Of the few careful evaluations conducted, the results have been conflicting and inconclusive. An extensive review of evaluation studies in the delinquency prevention area concluded:

In summary, these 95 empirical studies confirm that an extremely small percentage of delinquency and youth development efforts are ever evaluated even minimally. Furthermore, even when adequate evaluation is performed, few studies show significant results. (Wright and Dixon, 1975, p. 34)

Constraints on impact evaluations of delinquency prevention programs typically center on two key issues: the measurement of the dependent variable (delinquency reduction) and the ability to interpret the measured findings (i.e., relate delinquency reduction to the program activities).

Measurement Issues

Measurement problems are common in impact evaluations of delinquency prevention programs. The greatest source of difficulty is that delinquency is a general concept spanning many different kinds of behavior. Further, research on self-reported delinquency reveals large discrepancies between official rates of delinquency and the actual incidence of delinquent behavior in a youth population (Williams and Gold, 1972). Without a clear conception of the nature and scope of "prevention," the criteria of success or measurable indicators of impact remain equally inscrutable.

Use of inappropriate impact criteria has been common.

Lundman, McFarlane, and Scarpitti describe the prevalence of cases in which some variable other than delinquency was used as the measure of effectiveness:

... although all of the efforts examined involved the prevention of delinquent behavior, many relied on observation of processes or behaviors other than delinquency as their measure of effectiveness. Thus, it was not uncommon to find projects wherein it was assumed that delinquency has been prevented if the project was operationally successful (i.e., reached fruition). In other projects it appears to have been assumed reduction of behavior such as truancy, dropping-out or gang involvement means that delinquency was prevented. As a result of these assumptions, actual rates of delinquent behavior were not measured. (Lundman, McFarlane, and Scarpitti, 1976, p. 304)

Whether delinquency is defined as acts in conflict with official legal norms or as acts that have incurred official justice system response, has different implications for measurable strategies and will produce different results. Wright and Dixon note the significance for impact assessments of how delinquency is conceptualized:

The question of whether delinquency is the behavior of an individual, or the behavior of various levels of the socio-legal systems which detects and interprets the behavior of individuals is not resolved. More than one report showed different outcomes when data were gathered at the police stations and at the courts, e.g., no reduction in police records but a positive effect on court records. (Wright and Dixon, 1977, p. 57)

Many researchers have noted that official records do not record all acts in conflict with the law, only those which a justice system agency has responded to as being "delinquent." These official responses are affected by many factors including changes in law enforcement policy and public attitudes. Others

note problems associated with measuring delinquency impact through use of official records because of the variety of ways official data can be selected and interpreted, depending, for example, on one's definition of delinquency. In one study, informal police contacts with youth are considered pertinent indicators of delinquency. In another, only court adjudication is employed as an indicator of delinquency:

The amounts and rates of recidivism and delinquency for the sample clearly depended on selection of a particular record source and delinquency definition. Only 9% of youths in the sample who were referred to juvenile court for delinquencies were adjudicated delinquent. Similarly, only half of the 56.7% of the sample who had officially recorded police contact of some kind were, in fact, arrested. Using all court referrals as the indicator, 17.5% of the youths in the sample were delinquent. However, when delinquency was measured by the number of youths actually adjudicated delinquent, only 1.2% of the clients were delinquent. Even when records of a single institution were used, different conclusions regarding the delinquent behavior of clients were possible, depending upon how the records were interpreted. (Hawkins et al., 1977, p. 408)

The national study encompassed two distinct levels of impact analysis. OJJDP wished to learn about changes in rates of individual and target area delinquency.

Self-Reported Delinquency

Because of the problems of official data, the evaluator attempted to administer questionnaires to program clients to gauge the extent of their self-reported delinquency. NCCD developed a Client Impact Questionnaire (CIQ) that measured attitudes thought to be associated with delinquency causation as well as thirty-eight self-reported delinquency items. The

original intent was to utilize an experimental design to administer the client impact study. All project directors were contacted to explain the CIQ and the proposed data collection procedures. All were asked to state whether they would voluntarily participate in the client impact design. Only four projects formally stated that they wanted the impact design; three of these later withdrew because of community opposition to the questionnaire or lack of sufficient numbers of youth to complete it.

Projects were hesitant to participate in the CIQ survey for three basic reasons. First, there was concern that filling out the questionnaire would damage youth attitudes and cause some youth to become delinquent. This concern was aroused specifically because of the self-report items questioning youth on their delinquent behavior for the previous six months. Grantees regarded such questions (often included as measures of delinquency reduction in previous prevention studies) as inappropriate in a prevention program and as having potential to cause negative labeling of youth. Project administrators never clarified how they thought the questionnaire items could cause such labeling, and there is, of course, no evidence suggesting that respondents of self-reported delinquency surveys have higher rates of reported delinquency. But there was little NCCD could do to allay these concerns.

A second reason given by project staff was that impact evaluation was not as important as providing service to youth or providing process evaluation data. Priority was placed on

implementing youth services with secondary attention given to evaluating the effects of services:

Our agency stand is that we want to do all we can to provide meaningful data for evaluation purposes, yet we must remember our prime purpose is to serve youth in need. They are the most important part of our program goals. (Salvation Army Project Correspondence, 3/27/78, p. 2)

At this point in time, it is felt that Evaluation priority should be placed on programmatic and management information issues. (Dallas Project Correspondence 3/29/78)

Finally, project staff felt that collecting such data would jeopardize the project's standing in the community. In general, social surveys are regarded with suspicion and distrust by many project personnel and community residents, making it extremely difficult to gain necessary cooperation:

Our belief is that there would be substantial confusion and distrust generated by [the impact questionnaire], and that the damage thus created would outweigh the benefits of knowledge to be potentially gained. (Seattle Project Correspondence, 4/25/78, p. 1)

The CIQ survey, a critical part of the client impact study, could only be successfully conducted at one site where cooperation was given and sufficient numbers of project youth and a matched group were surveyed. These problems substantially reduced our ability to arrive at meaningful conclusions about the national prevention program's possible impact on youth attitudes or delinquent behavior.

Official Records on Delinquency

Ideally, a second data source for measuring delinquency

reduction would be official police arrest records. But because prevention project youth were not under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, searching police files for youth who were participating in general services would have raised ethical and legal issues. It was assumed that parents, youth, and juvenile justice officials would resist any attempts to search law enforcement files for individual arrest data. Given the extremely negative reaction to the CIQ, we expected even greater project opposition to records checks.

In lieu of using individual arrest data, NCCD attempted to measure the impact of prevention on official delinquency rates through interrupted time-series analysis. This quasi-experimental design involved the collection of data for rates of juvenile arrests for a number of years prior to the introduction of the experimental variable (the prevention program). Significant variations in preproject trends could be attributed to the experimental variable only if rival hypotheses could be explained.

$0_1 \ 0_2 \ 0_3 \ 0_4 \ 0_5 \ 0_6 \ 0_7 \ 0_8 \ 0_9 \ 0_{10} \ 0_{11} \ 0_{12} \ 0_{13} \ 0_{14}$

For example, a target area might reflect a youth arrest rate of 35 per 1,000 population in the three years prior to project implementation. After the project has begun, the rate might decrease to 25 per 1,000. However, fluctuations in these arrest rates might be attributed to a host of historical, maturational,

or regression artifacts such as changes in arrest policies or decreases in youth population.

NCCD encountered problems at every project site while attempting to gather official delinquency data. The five most common problems were law and policy changes, inconsistent record-keeping procedures, jurisdictional overlaps, lack of adequate data, and incomparability of project sites.

Changes in police policies and laws accounted for variations in arrest statistics for many project sites. For example, in Seattle, a Washington state law requiring deinstitutionalization of status offenders was said to account for variations in arrest statistics. After the law was passed (during the prevention period) juvenile arrest rates dropped. In Marietta, Georgia, the police department had a great deal of discretion in how they handled juvenile contacts prior to 1976. After that, officers were no longer allowed to exercise discretion to release juveniles, and all dispositions were decided by the officer of the shift. Consequently, a large increase in juvenile arrests followed.

NCCD's attempts to collect arrest data over extended periods of time were hampered by changes in record keeping procedures. In some cases data records previously kept by hand were computerized. Fort Peck reported a sharp drop in the number of arrests between 1976 and 1977 (from 1,017 to 439). When asked about this drop, officials stated that changes in their methods of collecting and recording data produced an artificial decline in the arrest rate.

A further problem was that boundaries of police reporting jurisdictions (e.g., precincts and wards) were different from the projects' target area boundaries. For example, the Venice community is under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Police Department. However, arrest data applying to Venice are not isolated and compiled yearly. Data for the neighboring city of Santa Monica were available, but only a few of the youth participating in the Venice project came from that community. The lack of arrest data for smaller target areas within cities was also a problem for affiliate sites in Akron, Richmond, and Santa Barbara. In Boston there are five independent police departments that each compile arrest rates for sections of the target areas served by the project. There are significant overlaps in jurisdictions and many differences in record keeping between the five agencies. Of the cities studied, only Seattle's police department keeps juvenile arrest data by census tract. Without census tract breakdown, it is nearly impossible to isolate the target areas affected by the prevention projects. Attempts to draw conclusions concerning official rates of delinquency based on city-wide figures would tend to mask possible changes in specific target areas served by the projects.

The most widespread reason for a lack of official data was that most police departments do not collect them. The reasons for this vary, but usually include a lack of manpower and inability to separate juvenile and adult arrests and reported offenses.

When data were available, the absence of standardized juvenile justice definitions and statistics proved to be an obstacle to comparative research. Definitions of arrest and categories of offenses vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Available arrest data could not be changed into official rates of delinquency comparable between sites because matching juvenile population information was missing.

Three sites were finally selected for time-series analysis: Boston, Dallas, and Seattle. Of the three, Seattle was the only site where detailed analysis was possible because of its census-tract-based reporting system. These analyses are presented in Appendix B. In each case, confounding factors made the time-series data difficult to interpret.

Design Issues and Availability of Data

Linking observed changes to program activities is another major difficulty characterizing past impact studies of prevention programs. For example, one review of evaluations disclosed a widespread use of inadequate designs which cannot possibly produce reliable data on the programs' outcomes (Lundman, McFarlane, and Scarpitti, 1976). Experimental designs are ideal for testing program effects because a multitude of nonprogrammatic effects can be controlled through randomization procedures. However, delinquency prevention programs rarely agree to strict experimental design conditions.

Hackler, (1978), contends that evaluators of delinquency or crime prevention programs are rarely able to take advantage of experimental techniques that are theoretically available. The

political context of evaluations, community pressures, and possible lack of cooperation from project staff and others prevent evaluators from carrying out complex research designs using experimental and control groups from the community. Ethical objections to the research design are not unusual when the need to establish a control group dictates the denial of program treatment to youths considered to need program activities. Even control groups successfully formed are known to have been contaminated during the research period by well-intentioned staff who did not want to deprive a child of program benefits. Wright and Dixon, (1977), also suggest that generating knowledge that could attribute outcomes to program activities would require using outcome research strategies that pose programmatic constraints to which programs may be unwilling to submit.

NCCD originally planned to utilize a rigorous experimental design for the client impact study. Implementing a classical experimental design would only have been possible if client intake procedures had included a decision point where randomization could occur. Since evaluation potential was not a heavily weighted criterion for selection of grantees, the possibilities of conducting a rigorous analysis were weakened, and project staff were not forewarned that a client impact analysis would levy such exacting demands. Further, many project staff were ethically opposed to the concept of randomization:

It is my understanding that Randomization of clients as

described by NCCD ... is in violation of the Grant guidelines, as set forth by the Juvenile Justice Section of LEAA. I might add this is also against the principles of [this agency] to select clients for services in this manner. (Salvation Army Project Correspondence 3/27/78, p. 1)

As projects were unable or unwilling to use randomization, NCCD selected a quasi-experimental design which is less rigorous than the ideal model. The Non-equivalent Control Group design is graphically portrayed below:

	6 months	
Project Youth	0_1	0_2
	X	
Non-Project Youth	0_1	0_2

The design calls for administration of impact measures to youth as they enter the program (either in groups or as individuals) and after they leave the program. It also required administration of impact measures to a demographically matched (age, sex, education, ethnic background, geographical location, and family characteristics) youth population not participating in the program. As noted earlier, the implementation of even a quasi-experimental design proved infeasible.

Problems of design also plagued efforts to assess community impacts. To determine impacts on the target community, NCCD originally proposed to collect selected data for the target community and to contrast that data with a nearby "control" community. This objective turned out to be impractical for two

reasons. Locating comparable control communities proved difficult. In large urban areas, projects chose to target several "disadvantaged" areas, in many cases eliminating all potential comparison communities. National agency affiliates and rural projects in middle-sized towns also exhausted all potential comparison areas. The Fort Peck grantee provided services to an entire Native American reservation; to perform comparisons NCCD would have had to locate another reservation with similar population characteristics. Comparisons were also impractical because data on community variables were often out of date (i.e., based on 1970 census figures) or data units failed to correspond to definitions of target service areas (e.g., police reporting units differed from program service areas).

Discovering projects' impacts on the target communities proved difficult for other reasons as well. A key measurement difficulty involved the lack of definitional clarity in the grantees' conceptions of "community," goals for community change, and strategies for effecting the changes. Project staff often stated that the goals of the projects' community development components were so long-range in character that it would have been difficult to give an analysis of program impact within the time frame of the evaluation. In other cases, community-focused intervention strategies were developed so late in the grant period that it was not feasible for evaluation plans to anticipate the types of impacts that would be attempted. In these instances, important baseline data upon

which program strategy and performance were based was not collected and was lost.

Another impact research area involved the determination of how youth agencies and social institutions interact and are affected by prevention grantees' efforts. The ability of grantees to coordinate and affect youth development policies was a key research issue. Youth service agencies and relevant institutional sectors must be willing to document their activities and organizational values for evaluators to collect data on this issue. NCCD's success was limited. For example, a Community Resources Questionnaire (CRQ) was mailed to key youth service agencies in the target areas. The few that were returned were missing such statistics as the number of youth served each year, age and ethnic characteristics, cost of service, and percent of youth participating in each service activity. The lack of such data precludes the assessment of the operation of youth service networks in the target area before the grant was implemented. Further, NCCD's process data suggested that few grantees had specific or measurable goals, or operated program components specifically designed to alter policies and procedures of social institutions or the abilities of other youth-serving agencies.

The Demise of the Impact Design

Generic problems of delinquency prevention impact evaluations were apparent early in this OJJDP effort. Many of the issues concerned the feasibility of measuring the dependent variable -- delinquency reduction. As already mentioned, the

evaluation was required to measure program impact on delinquent behaviors, but program guidelines did not clearly direct grantees toward delinquency reduction as a pressing priority. Many grantees set broader and often unmeasurable goals. Whether the programs were to prevent "official" or "unofficial" delinquency was another question; its answer could have helped the grantees. In general, grantees did not interpret their mandate to include accountability for official delinquency reduction.

Official crime data were one measure of delinquency OJJDP recommended for use in the evaluation, but the projects' choices of target area boundaries raised doubt about the usefulness of official measures. Most projects served youth from target areas that did not correspond to local police reporting jurisdictions, which complicated our efforts. Other grantees served multiple target areas encompassing several police jurisdictions whose statistical compilation practices varied, creating more problems.

The operation of the projects failed to provide some of the basic conditions needed to make valid connections between program interventions and observed results. In this evaluation, the usual difficulties of impact evaluation were compounded by the task of assessing multiple levels of impact. Measuring each level of impact requires specification of separate comparison groups -- either individuals or communities. The stringent requirements needed to achieve those conditions were not built into the OJJDP program. Where NCCD could not establish

comparison groups, the possibility of rigorous analysis was lost.

Another problem for the evaluation was that program inputs such as resources and activities were not clearly defined, nor were the types of clients to be served or the intensity of interventions offered. Criteria of success were ambiguous. In general, the grantees' direct service, capacity building, and community development efforts fell short of meeting crucial conditions for careful impact analysis.

Finally, the absence of an explicit theoretical base for the OJJDP program and grantees' de-emphasis of theoretical constructs suggested that even rigorous designs would not have permitted simple explanations of findings (Elliot, 1979). For example, OJJDP was interested in the effect of program participation on youths' attitudes toward themselves, their peers and families, the prevention project, social service agencies, juvenile justice agencies, and the law. Even if some attitudinal change in youth were observed in these areas, no theoretical guidance was offered to determine which attitudes were critical for preventing delinquency, and how program interventions were to transform these attitudes. Given the weight of these problems, impact analysis of the OJJDP program must be regarded more as an exercise to clarify what not to do if future prevention programs are to produce meaningful research results.

The Process Study

The scarcity of meaningful evaluations as well as uneven

results of past delinquency prevention programs, has produced tremendous gaps in knowledge about the content, operations, and outcomes of delinquency prevention programs. Many researchers and policymakers have acknowledged the potential for improving delinquency prevention studies by including the analysis of these program factors. They underscore the need to examine the planning, implementation, and developmental processes of programs as well as forces that impinge upon program operations (Walker, Cardarelli, and Billingsley, 1976; Wright and Dixon, 1977).

Both OJJDP's emphasis on process evaluation and the recognized need in the field for process data suggested that the national evaluation emphasize its process study.

The potential of process evaluation for improving social programming is being more and more widely recognized. A principal value of process research is to guide interpretations of impact research findings. Basic limitations of traditional evaluation designs discussed earlier, guarantee that information lacunae render impact findings tentative and uncertain. Process data can improve our abilities to interpret the results of impact research.

Experimental and quasi-experimental studies are inherently goal oriented and seek to measure the attainment of specified goals. The preselection of other key variables for study also largely determines and confines the scope of inquiry of the research. These designs rarely provide the opportunity to explore the influence of other critical factors not originally

articulated in program planning. Indeed, traditional impact designs assume that program variables will remain relatively constant throughout the life of the project and complexities of the program's operating milieu can be experimentally or statistically controlled.

Social action programs are not static and typically do not hold still long enough to be subject to accurate "snapshot" measurements of their progress. The content and methods of programs are particularly complex and dynamic; goals may be transformed in the course of efforts to attain them. Even basic premises or theories underlying programs' operations may evolve.

Rigid impact research designs will always be out of synchronism with real programs because they assume that measurements taken at fixed points in time are reliable indicators of measured objects over time. Under such circumstances, the risks of obtaining invalid measurements and overlooking emergent intervening variables and other unanticipated events are high. Neglect of these program factors limits the ability to interpret impact findings, whether they suggest positive program impact or the lack of it: information on how and why a program works or does not work is crucial.

Process evaluation consists of a comprehensive description and analysis of how programs are conceptualized, planned, implemented, modified, and terminated. It attempts to assess the quality and purpose of program activities relative to desired results of programs. Process studies also explore interactions of the program with its surrounding social milieu

to comprehend the quality and meaning of program activities.

Process evaluation involves close observation, documentation, and analysis of day-to-day functioning of programs and the influences on those operations. Significant factors not anticipated when research plans were constructed can be identified, alerting researchers when impact designs become less valid. This approach makes possible exploration of a greater variety of explanations for program outcomes and prediction of circumstances under which program successes or failures are likely to occur.

While the potential value of process studies has been noted by many evaluation specialists, process research is still largely underutilized and in need of both conceptual and methodological development. Few analytic rules and little structure exist to guide process inquiries (Krisberg, 1980). Some critics note that the range of data pertinent to process studies is vast. Without a conceptual model to structure the process study, it is difficult to determine whether the most important program elements are being investigated.

A Conceptual Model for Process Research on Delinquency Prevention Programs

The need for a conceptual model for data collection and analysis was paramount in the national delinquency prevention evaluation because of the scope and complexity of the study. A major focus of NCCD's evaluation effort was the testing of an analytic model to guide process research in the area of delinquency prevention. NCCD adapted an existing conceptual framework to structure its evaluation plans. The model represents a refinement of the work of Walker, Cardarelli, and Billingsley (1976), who employed this approach in a national assessment of delinquency prevention programs. This conceptual approach was selected for adaptation because it seemed heuristic and capable of specification into realistic data collection tasks. NCCD also wished to build upon other recent governmental efforts in the delinquency prevention field.

Process data are organized around a paradigm consisting of elements of program development. The five components of this analytic model are described as follows:

Context: the set of conditions and assumptions that operationally and conceptually define the distinctive features of the program. Included are the theoretical assumptions guiding service programs as well as physical, financial, historical, and organizational characteristics of the program.

Identification: the combination of techniques, procedures, and criteria employed to define, select, and admit clients to various decision alternatives within the program.

Intervention: the full range of activities and services provided by the project.

Goals: the measurable outcomes of program activities employed to assess the effectiveness of the project.

Linkages: those formal and informal conditions and relationships that may hinder or support program operations. Linkages may include relations with external agencies or organizations, or may involve issues of coordination within programs.

This paradigm provided the basic structure for data collection and analysis. Individual program elements are examined, as well as the relationships among program elements. Theoretically, programs should have a high level of internal consistency among program elements. For example, methods of client recruitment (Identification) should be logically related to both the program's key assumptions (Context) and the services offered (Intervention). Observing incongruities among program elements directs the researcher to examine reasons for these apparent contradictions. Analysis of factors leading to the variance of program elements from their proposed structure helps explain how particular variables influence the outcomes of prevention programs. Systematic data collection on changes in program elements over time allows for a dynamic analysis of internal and external program forces throughout the life of a program.

Figure 3-1 depicts the process of sorting program observations over time into program elements. The symbols within the table refer to periodic descriptions of program elements at several time intervals. This technique of data aggregation suggests an analogy to analysis of variance. Program variation (change in program elements) can be

Figure 3-1

Sorting of Program Observations
Over Time Into Program Elements

<u>Program Elements</u>	<u>Periodic Description of Program</u>			
	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_n
Context (C)	C_1	C_2	C_3	C_n
Identification (I)	I_1	I_2	I_3	I_n
Intervention (S)	S_1	S_2	S_3	S_n
Linkages (L)	L_1	L_2	L_3	L_n
Goals (G)	G_1	G_2	G_3	G_n

partitioned into two components:

Within Variation: variation among different program elements at the same point in time (i.e., internal consistency).

Between Variation: variation among the same program elements across time (i.e., changing program content).

Extended data collection periods permitted NCCD to observe changes in program elements of context, identification, intervention, goals, and linkages during the grant period. Explanations of differences in these program elements between various projects and the changes in elements of single projects over time constituted the major analytic model of NCCD's process evaluation.

If better impact data were available, the proposed process study could be employed to account for differing program outcomes. Particular program outcomes are shaped by many contingencies, events, and intervening variables. By recording conditions under which program events occur and assessing program content changes over time, process evaluation permits systematic interpretation of observed program goal attainment. Combining process and impact data requires theoretical models permitting the analyst to sort through a wide variety of plausible explanations to find the single causal chain best fitting the observed data. Unfortunately, the field of delinquency prevention exhibits a paucity of theory. Few fully elaborated discussions exist that link prevention services to delinquency reduction. Similarly lacking are compelling explanations about how environmental factors impinge upon youth

service programs or the organizational problems that must be solved by project staff.

Faced with a largely atheoretical field of human service, NCCD adopted the stance that theory development be grounded in empirical observations and should proceed modestly. Put simply, a little theory goes a long way. At the core of this theory-building strategy was identifying uniformities in data and making connections between research observations and relevant social science literature. For example, suppose one should discover that virtually all projects suffered from ambiguous and poorly defined lines of authority. Previous research on private service agencies would be surveyed for similar or dissimilar observations. Then we would probe clients, project staff, and other knowledgeable observers for their explanations; these observations would be juxtaposed with the research literature findings. Where tentative conclusions seem warranted (e.g., ambiguous lines of authority occur most often in projects comprised of many different types of youth agencies), interpretations are checked to find both confirmations and contradictions. The theory is elaborated by sequentially building a logical set of propositions derived from carefully developed studies of particular projects.

Refining Research Questions

The process model was employed to restructure OJJDP's evaluation concerns (discussed above). Program elements were converted into research questions to direct data collection and for deriving practical measurement techniques. It should be

noted that CJJDP's impact concerns were incorporated into the element of Goals (B through G). Listed by program element, the research questions guiding this evaluation are:

I. Goals

- A. What are the numbers and types of youth served by grantee agencies?
- B. What changes have occurred in target area rates of delinquency?
- C. What changes have occurred in self-reported delinquent behavior?
- D. What changes have occurred in the attitudes of project youth?
- E. In what manners have the abilities of youth-serving agencies to provide services for purposes of delinquency prevention been improved?
- F. In what manners have the abilities of communities to utilize and support delinquency prevention efforts been improved?
- G. In what manner have the policies and procedures of social institutions been altered as a result of grantee project activities?

II. Context

- A. To what degree do program contextual factors effect delinquency prevention efforts?
 1. To what degree are projects organized around theoretical perspectives on delinquency causation or delinquency prevention and what is the import of utilization of theory?
 2. To what extent do project organizational features affect delinquency prevention efforts?
 3. To what extent do staff and administrative factors affect delinquency prevention efforts?
 4. What is the effect of involving youth and other target area residents in policy decision-making in prevention programming?

5. To what extent do community characteristics affect delinquency prevention efforts?

6. To what extent do social, economic and political factors affect delinquency prevention efforts?

III. Identification

A. By what manner are youth identified to be clients in delinquency prevention programs?

1. What are the methods of recruitment used to attract youth into prevention projects? What are the results of differing methods?

2. What screening methods are employed by projects in processing youths for services? What are the results of differing methods?

IV. Intervention

A. What is the nature of services being provided for purposes of delinquency prevention?

1. What are the types of direct services to youth being provided by grantees?

2. What levels of service quality are maintained in direct services provided by grantees?

3. What are the activities of grantees that attempt to change policies and procedures of social institutions?

4. What are the activities of grantees that are directed towards community development?

B. In what manner and to what degree are direct services utilized by youth?

C. To what extent do project services fill service gaps in the target area?

V. Linkages

A. In what manner and to what degree do grantee agencies interact with other youth-related agencies?

B. What factors limit or enhance effective linkages between grantee agencies and other youth-related agencies?

The research questions correspond to OJJDP's research interests and also reflect factors identified in previous research as relevant to delinquency prevention. Figure 3-2 depicts the conceptual model as well as major data collection concerns in each program element category.

Since process evaluation attempts to approximate a naturalistic appreciation of programs, methods allowing researchers to get as close to the social action as possible were suggested. Qualitative research techniques such as open-ended interviews, field observations, and document reviews comprised major sources of data. Quantitative data from survey questionnaires and a management information system were also employed. Our strategy was to triangulate multiple sources of data to arrive at viable research conclusions. The complete listing of data needs, collection methods, and data sources, as well as the timing of data gathering, are presented in Volume II of this report.


Strategies for Conducting the Evaluation

Not all project sites were evaluated at the same level of intensity; the scope of data collection and the amount of on-site work conducted by NCCD were limited at some sites. While all projects were subject to some data collection, NCCD attempted full analyses at eleven projects designated by OJJDP as "intensive" sites. The evaluation efforts were thus divided into two levels: intensive and non-intensive.

Programmatic diversity, research concerns, and

Figure 3-2

RELATION OF DATA DIMENSIONS TO PROGRAM ELEMENTS



geographic/client population diversity were key criteria used to select projects for intensive study. Findings in this report are principally derived from the following project sites:

- o Boston, Massachusetts
- o Dallas, Texas
- o Fort Peck, Montana
- o Seattle, Washington
- o Tuskegee, Alabama
- o Venice, California

Evaluation of five national youth agencies centered on the activities of national office staff and an intensive study of one affiliate site for each national project. Research on the selected national affiliates emphasized relationships and organizational styles of the various national youth agencies and their affiliates. The national affiliates selected for intensive status were:

- o Aspira of America--Hoboken/Jersey City, New Jersey
- o Boys' Club of America--Richmond, California
- o Girls Clubs of America, Inc.--Santa Barbara, California
- o Salvation Army--Marietta, Georgia
- o United Neighborhood Centers of America--Akron, Ohio

Evaluators gathered data on all research questions at intensive sites, which required staff of those projects to produce a wide variety of observational and interview data, as well as management information data. NCCD staff made quarterly visits to intensive sites to provide feedback on national evaluation findings, conduct supplemental data collection, and provide training for the on-site data collectors assisting the national evaluator.

The five sites not intensively evaluated were:

- o Chicago, Illinois
- o New Haven, Connecticut
- o New York, New York
- o Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- o Tulare, California

Research activities at these sites were concentrated on producing Management Information System (MIS) data and other descriptive data to supplement data from the intensive sites. Evaluators routinely requested client data and weekly narrative reports on project activities from nonintensive staff. Occasional visits were made to these sites as specific research needs arose.

Evaluation Staffing

A condition of program awards to each of the sixteen grantees was that they set aside up to ten percent of their funds to support the national evaluation. These funds were to be used primarily to hire and administratively support Local Data Collectors (LDCs). Their tasks as on-site researchers included collecting quantitative and qualitative data under the supervision of NCCD. Although LDCs received instructions and training from NCCD, they were under the administrative and fiscal control of grantee project directors. Problems flowing from this system of dual supervision of the LDCs will be discussed later.

To properly supervise and monitor LDC activities, individual NCCD staff were assigned to individual projects. These staff positions were designated Primary Site Evaluators (PSEs). Typically, a full-time PSE was assigned responsibility

for supervising LDCs at two sites.

The primary forms of communication between LDCs and PSEs were weekly telephone conferences and monthly written assignments mailed to LDCs. PSEs visited their sites every three months to provide evaluation feedback to staff, upgrade skills of LDCs, and complete specialized data collection tasks.

Protection of Research Subjects and Confidentiality

NCCD took necessary precautions to protect participants in the projects and to maintain the confidentiality of research information that was either collected by NCCD personnel or otherwise received at NCCD offices. All research subjects were informed of the purposes and potential benefits of the research and that the data received would be used for research purposes only. In keeping with the voluntary nature of their participation, subjects' rights to terminate participation in the study at any time were respected. Consent forms were used for youth and/or legal guardian when appropriate. For example, signed parental consent was required from respondents to the Client Impact Questionnaire because of its sensitive content.

NCCD staff and the on-site LDCs complied with stringent guidelines to protect the confidentiality of all data secured for the evaluation, particularly if data could be traced to a specific person. Any information collected during the evaluation identifiable to specific persons was kept confidential. The guidelines on confidentiality applied to project records, client participation data (Management Information System), questionnaires, other written forms of

information, and observations and verbal communications with research staff that occurred as a result of NCCD's activities.

Implementation Issues

In any evaluation, the development of a research design is a small accomplishment compared to the challenge of actually activating research plans. During the two years of the national evaluation, NCCD collected an enormous amount of information, following the plans discussed above. Implementation of the national evaluation design, however, presented several problems.

Practical issues that often developed as rifts between research and service staffs, created obstacles to conducting the national delinquency prevention evaluation. For example, fundamental differences in perspectives between program administrators and researchers were everpresent. Expressed as conflicts over "service versus research" and "practical versus academic experience," these differences sometimes interfered with effective communication. In this study the evaluator was cast in the traditional role of an outsider whose motives were suspect and whose demands were perceived as burdensome by project staff.

Sources of Conflict

Other features of the national program aggravated an admittedly tenuous collaboration between research and service staff. Conflicts centered around "fitting the evaluation onto the projects," as well as establishing the legitimacy of evaluation activities as part of the national demonstration

program.

Relations between the projects and the national evaluator had inauspicious beginnings. The first contacts with the grantees to establish plans for participating in the national evaluation uncovered basic tensions between the two parties. Early in the program, confusion over the exact requirements for the grantees to participate in the national evaluation generated unnecessary conflict.

OJJDP program guidelines regarding evaluation requirements stated:

This program will be subject to a national evaluation. Applicants must include in their proposed budgets up to 10% of the total project costs for project evaluation. An evaluation plan must be included with the application; the evaluation plan must be designed to.... (OJJDP, 1976)

The phrase, "budgets up to 10% ... for project evaluation," left unclear whether OJJDP intended evaluation budgets to be as near as possible to ten percent, or was simply a directive not to exceed ten percent. More importantly, it was not clear whether the funds were for local evaluations, the national evaluation, or both. Some grantees were ready to commit or had already committed these funds for local evaluations. The national evaluation had been designed with the understanding that grantees would set aside funds adequate to support national data collection at the local sites.

This early confusion did little to encourage projects to support efforts to meet national evaluation needs. For example, this misunderstanding interfered with the expeditious hiring of

local data collectors to begin on-site work for the national evaluation. As a result, grantee start-up activities could not be thoroughly documented at some sites.

OJJDP's initial lack of clarity about the objectives and role of the national evaluation created great difficulties. Confusion raised local suspicions about the evaluator's motives and intentions at some sites. For instance, some grantees did not fully appreciate that NCCD was contractually obligated to conduct an across site evaluation of the national prevention program. A number of grantees felt that local evaluations of individual projects would have been more appropriate and valuable for their purposes. This remained a source of tension and resentment well into the evaluation period; grantees pressed NCCD for types of individualized feedback on their activities that were impossible to meet with our design and resources.

The national evaluation effort was funded early to facilitate research planning cued to the processes of program planning and development, but few opportunities for such coordination existed. Because of a long delay in awarding the grants to youth service agencies, the research design was developed largely without specific knowledge of the grantee program designs. Grantees were selected with minor consideration for their evaluation potential. Combined with the discrepancies already noted between research and program goals, this situation made inevitable a poor fit of evaluation design to the projects' plans. The consequences of this for the evaluation ranged from minor obstacles that were corrected by

modifying the design, to major research constraints that we could not overcome, such as the barriers to measuring program impacts.

In general, data collection and analysis was more successful in the process study than in the impact research. An impressive volume of information about the grantees at all sites was gathered and analyzed to generate insights into their planning, implementation, and operation. Yet the process study was also hampered by some basic research constraints.

Underestimating the Scope of Needed Research Resources

Process evaluation inherently requires a continuous and concentrated level of effort throughout the research period to adequately document project processes. Relying heavily on qualitative research methods, process research entails close-to-the-subject documentation, field observations of a variety of situations over extended periods of time, and in-depth interviewing. This kind of research demands much greater personnel resources than required in traditional impact evaluation designs. NCCD's process evaluation plans were overly ambitious given the magnitude and complexity of the national delinquency prevention program. Our task was made more difficult by the long-distance logistics of the data collection structure.

NCCD's staffing pattern was insufficient to support the level of effort required for consistency in the quality of data collection and analysis. One full-time NCCD staff member should have been assigned to each grantee, with LDCs acting as research

assistants. Given the number of evaluation sites and available resources, NCCD staff were often over-extended. Most NCCD field staff were simultaneously responsible for directing qualitative and quantitative research at two distinct complex projects that were great distances from each other.

Process evaluation suggested the need to place full-time researchers at local sites. Under ideal circumstances, these local researchers would have had some experience or interest in research, and would have been hired by and remained under the administrative and technical supervision of NCCD. In fact, the LDCs were under the administrative control of project directors -- the result of OJJDP's decision to fund part of the national evaluation through the program grantees' budgets. In most cases, NCCD's input in the hiring of LDCs was limited. One result of this was that LDCs were inadequately prepared to complete NCCD's research assignments. Some grantees, despite NCCD's advice to the contrary, hired consulting firms who were uncomfortable in the limited role of collecting data for NCCD. NCCD's lack of administrative control led many LDCs to be confused about where their "loyalties" should lie, which may have affected the objectivity of their research. LDCs at some projects were pressured to report and observe only certain aspects of project activities. Significant turnover among LDCs created additional training demands on NCCD and interrupted the continuity of process data. The problems of incomplete data and uneven quality of reports were also attributed to the shortcomings of this administrative arrangement.

Effective process analysis depends on the concurrence of data collection and analysis; as tentative hypotheses emerge from data analysis, new data collection directions are needed to test relationships. This method requires that an equal amount of time be expended in data collection and data analysis. During the first year of the evaluation period, most of NCCD's energy was required to establish and manage the data collection effort, as well as to react to crisis situations that would have jeopardized data collection. These preoccupations increased the chances of our neglecting to collect relevant data, as new data directions suggested by emerging hypotheses could not be immediately noted and pursued. The data collection system was more routinized by the second year of research, and data collection became more interdependent with ongoing data analysis.

Problems in Establishing Basic Project Records

In most cases, the service programs being evaluated were themselves constraints on the process research. Participation in the evaluation called for the collection of types of data that many of these agencies had never gathered, were ill-equipped to collect due to their agency procedures, or were not immediately willing to collect. To cope with these difficulties, NCCD changed some data requests. In other cases, problems of noncompliance with evaluation requirements resulted in grantees changing their practices. These issues can be illustrated by our attempt to obtain data on client participation through a management information system (MIS).

A rudimentary MIS containing 50 variables was developed to document the socio-demographic characteristics of the project participants and the nature of services they received from grantees. The MIS consisted of two precoded forms to be completed. The first form sought entry-level data regarding the age, sex, race, school status, family characteristics, and source of referral of youth who sought project services. These intake-level data provided profiles of the types of youth admitted and rejected for services during the course of project operations. The second form was completed when youths terminated their participation in project services. Termination data included service data as well as a later assessment of youths' socio-demographic characteristics. Merging the data from the two forms completed the MIS data set for youth. The merged MIS data file described case flow and facilitated observation of the relation between services received and client characteristics. MIS permitted us to monitor changes in client socio-demographic indicators as projects evolved their service strategies.

Collecting MIS data is facilitated by certain elements of a program's structure, such as defined client flow systems where intake and termination points are clear and program processes can be traced. For most grantees, MIS represented their first comprehensive attempts to systematically monitor the flow of the clients through their agencies. The following statements illustrate the informal nature of client flow systems found at many of the agencies when we attempted to chart MIS

implementation plans:

Q: Is the intake screening decision kept on paper?

A: They [staff] will fill out some kind of intake sheet and some kind of health record form.

Q: How do you plan to identify and select clients?

A: We have some ideas but I think they need a lot more development ... this is one of the more fuzzy things about the project.

Q: What formal criteria are used in termination?

A: I don't know what termination is. We don't turn anyone away ... we are not really planning to terminate anyone.

In addition to the informal nature of client flow systems, some projects resisted collecting basic demographic data necessary to describe the "type" of youth entering programs and the services provided. Some staff doubted the appropriateness of collecting this type of data because of the public image of their agencies' activities; others objected to the "personal nature" of the data collected.

I am writing to express my concern over the "Client Intake Sheet" ... When a girl joins [this agency], neither she nor her parent regards that membership as "entering treatment." She will view it as joining something that is fun; a group, something to do on Thursday afternoons! Consequently, a parent's estimated income, highest school grade completed and status regarding public assistance is not going to seem to be natural information for us to be collecting (~~This was never an evaluation requirement~~) emphasis added. (Philadelphia Project Correspondence, 11/15/77)

The reaction to the [MIS] form has been generally bad because of the personal nature of the questions. Ethnic Background -- some agencies feel this is a touchy question because of the high percentage of racially mixed children;

Marital Status of Parents -- many agencies feel this is an invasion of privacy (Project Correspondence, 10/26/77)

Each project was required to participate in the MIS and this data system was implemented at each project site. It is important to note that this requirement of the evaluation led grantees to change traditional agency practices and procedures to accommodate MIS needs. Where client data files did not previously exist, some grantees adopted forms derived from NCCD's MIS forms for assessing intake and client progress. In some agencies, the MIS produced greater attention to monitoring clients than was previously the agency practice.

Over the two-year period, the grantees generated a large number of documented client cases -- 23,980 intake; 16,929 termination; and 13,754 merged data files. Factors that limited MIS process data collection warrant discussion here, as MIS contributed the basic client and service data.

There is considerable variation in the completeness of data reported. MIS included several optional items that were not required to be asked of youth. For example, grantees varied in whether they completed the items asking (1) marital status of parents, (2) youth's residence at intake and termination, (3) number of youth residing at residence, (4) parents' education, and (5) parents' housing. The net results of missing data are discussed in the chapters on Identification and Intervention.

Due to the nature of the project services, MIS did not document all clients. Projects provided some large-scale, informally structured activities, such as recreation, that

precluded compilation of detailed youth characteristics. The evaluator allowed grantees to define for themselves which youths were to have MIS forms completed. This policy resulted in some unevenness in MIS reporting but avoided imposing an arbitrary definition of service unit on grantees. Some grantees were more ambitious than others and placed strong emphasis on completing MIS. Others reported only youths that received an intensive level of project contact.

The amount of termination data obtained was diminished by a lack of rules for terminating services to clients at numerous grantee sites. Before the end of the data collection period, NCCD requested that projects "administratively terminate" their existing project clientele to provide client service data. This follow-up information on client socio-demographic characteristics and service data for youth remaining in projects was to be merged with intake data. However, many youths for whom MIS intake forms had been completed had already left the projects and could not be located to obtain the termination data. In other cases, termination forms were completed on youths for whom intake data did not exist. These circumstances varied by site but accounted for the discrepancies between the number of merged MIS cases and intake and termination cases.

Summary

The evaluation of OJJDP's national delinquency prevention program was designed and conducted under circumstances that were far from ideal. The overall objectives of the program as well as OJJDP's goals for research were ambiguous. Evaluation

objectives did not entirely correspond with the programmatic goals. Taken together, the grantees formed too diverse a group to permit an entirely coherent evaluation. Prospects for research were limited because grantees were not selected to facilitate rigorous assessments of outcomes.

The "state of the art" in delinquency prevention research offered little guidance as NCCD coped with this evaluation nightmare. Few meaningful evaluations of delinquency prevention programs have ever been conducted (Hackler, 1978). Impact designs that can effectively assess prevention programs await further development. The state of process evaluation is similarly underdeveloped.

Not surprisingly, the national evaluation met with many failures, particularly in determining program impact. However, a model of process evaluation was applied in this study and, despite numerous constraining factors, process research was conducted at a large number of grantee sites. The value of this effort must be judged by the richness of data and policy analysis summarized in this report.

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Chapter 4

CONTEXTUAL ISSUES

Contextual issues were critical to the prevention grantees. Contextual factors determine the agency's image in the community, which, in turn, affects client recruitment service strategies and cooperative arrangements with other youth service agencies. We have organized the data on context into three broad areas: (1) agency context, (2) community setting, and (3) theoretical assumptions of the prevention approach.

The historical backgrounds and organizational settings of the agencies that received OJJDP funds constituted an important influence on project operations. Most agencies involved in the OJJDP effort had little previous experience operating projects specifically designed to prevent delinquency. While many had long been involved in the youth service field, this background did not provide sufficient preparation to confront the specific operation of delinquency prevention projects. Traditions and public images carried by the grantee agencies and their general lack of organizational resources constrained the effectiveness of their programs. Perhaps the most important problem facing the grantees was their limited staff resources.

Characteristics of target communities represented another set of critical contextual forces that impinged on the grantees' project activities. While OJJDP program planners regarded target communities as important units for project service, the

grantees gave insufficient consideration to the concept of community in the development of their service programs. Project components aimed at changing community conditions were an inconsequential aspect of grantee activities. Many of the grantees felt the great weight of the social and economic problems in the target communities, but project staff could rarely devise strategies to confront those issues.

Theoretical principles are usually considered strong sources of guidance in planning and developing human service projects, but in the case of the prevention grantees, delinquency theory played a very minor role in project design and implementation. Without theoretical guidance or established agency policy to fit the new delinquency prevention mandate, grantees relied heavily on traditional service models. Grantee activities evolved on a trial-and-error basis, which often produced large shifts in program content.

The Agency Context

Ambiguities and misunderstandings surrounding the field of delinquency prevention were critical factors for the agencies involved in the OJJDP initiative. Although some grantees were agencies with the most recognizable names in the field of youth services, few had experience in operating programs specifically designed to prevent or reduce delinquency. Of the few agencies that had previously operated formally designed delinquency prevention projects, none could claim a long history in such efforts. None of the grantees could draw upon a rich source of

readily applicable agency operating procedures to guide their daily activities. Thus the OJJDP particularly suffered from the general lack of direction in the delinquency prevention field discussed in Chapter 2.

It would be unfair to characterize all of the OJJDP grantees as completely new to the field of delinquency prevention. A number of the organizations have, for many years, made clear their interest in their impact on delinquency. The Boys' Clubs, for example, have sponsored research projects providing evidence of a Boys' Club's influence on an area's delinquent activity.

Quite often these agencies have cited high rates of delinquency as an indicator of service need in a given area. Although "keeping kids out of trouble" was often a major goal of these agencies, any delinquency prevention that occurred arose as a by-product of services rather than as a result of specialized program planning. Using the Boys' Clubs as an example again, literature from one affiliate is illustrative:

We fight boredom and get to kids before the streets do by offering them a place to go and a way to grow! The most important thing to know about a Boys' Club is that youngsters attend because they want to! And, that's because they desire the fun, the sense of belonging, and the interesting new pursuits to be found there.... We have an Open-Door policy. (Boy's Club of Omaha)

While this statement may not indicate the wide variety of services offered by Boys' Clubs, it captures the traditional image developed by the Boys' Clubs, and many of the other grantees as well, as places where any youth can go for

recreation -- for fun. Operating programs within this framework did not give grantees adequate preparation for many of the service delivery problems they would face in the delinquency prevention projects. These difficulties included: (1) offering services to prevent a particular set of illegal behaviors, (2) identification and recruitment of youth most in need of prevention services, (3) collecting systematic information on clients served, and (4) steering programs toward short-term impact measures such as reduction of official delinquency rates.

Although the grantees uniformly lacked experience in delinquency prevention programming, the backgrounds of the participating agencies provided extremely diverse settings for the prevention projects. It was believed that these different settings would produce radically different service strategies. For example, OJJDP program planners assumed that there were primarily two types of grantees; traditional agencies, including organizations with lengthy histories and national affiliations and community-based agencies that were locally organized and more recently established. But this dichotomy had little impact on types of clients and communities served, or interactions with community organizations. Older agencies with national affiliations were no more or less prone to offer nonrecreational services or to be integrated into the community than were "community-based" agencies. The wide range of similarities in the projects was surprising in view of the varied historical backgrounds of the grantees. In fact, so different were their histories that one might have assumed that

this factor alone would have shaped a national program that was extremely diverse in terms of service types, service delivery methods, clients, and project objectives.

Perhaps the only generic categorization of grantees possible is the separation of the agencies into youth recreation agencies and social development agencies. Although no common historical patterns among these groups were apparent, there were a number of agencies primarily identified as providing recreational opportunities for youth. Offering recreational programs was thought to be generally beneficial because they offered "healthy" alternatives to youthful idleness. No specific social problems were a focus for recreational activities. These organizations usually followed the "open door" policy about client recruitment. Services were mostly oriented toward pre-teen and early teen youth.

Social development of agencies showed a much wider array of missions and histories. This group includes agencies with missions aimed at the development of communities, ethnic groups, or regions of the country. Youth services are geared to fit into broader agency strategies for social uplift. Delinquency is viewed as one of a set of social pathologies that these agencies seek to combat. As with the recreational agencies, social development agencies have little experience in identifying youth specifically for delinquency-related services.

For many grantees, especially the more established recreation-based agencies, the decision to engage in a formal delinquency prevention effort in the applicable target

communities, was made with some apprehension. Grantees worried about the possibility of jeopardizing the continuing participation of traditional clients, changing the agency's reputation in the broader community, and threatening conventional sources of funding.

Concern over changing traditional clientele by entering new communities, or refocusing recruitment targets away from existing service communities was observed at many sites. In Dallas, for example, one neighborhood branch of an established youth-serving organization did not want to participate in the program because this would have resulted in a radical change in clientele (the agency would have been required to serve large numbers of minority youth). At Aspira's Jersey City/Hoboken site, an established type of client (college-bound youth) worked to constrain the agency's plans to build a new program and recruit and sustain new types of clients (high school dropouts). Staff were conflicted about the possibility of turning away traditional clients, and in some cases consciously resisted methods of client recruitment established for the OJJDP grantees. In other cases, agencies were unprepared to accommodate a mixture of client types within the agency's service framework. Concern about potentially alienating existing youth clientele was widespread.

A new client population might also require revision of service strategies. In many cases, agency activities were previously centered on communities less impoverished than those now included in the prevention efforts. These agencies

attempted to apply their existing repertoire of services to an untried and more diverse clientele without new service methods. Such major organizational changes required substantial project resources to retrain staff to improve their skills in working with or recruiting the new target population.

The more established agencies clearly viewed the OJJDP program as an opportunity to demonstrate that their "traditional" methods were relevant to troubled youth. For some grantees, being labelled a "long-established" agency was a nagging problem. In Dallas, Seattle, and Santa Barbara, for example, project staff found their efforts confounded by community resident perceptions of the organizations with which they were affiliated. As one staff member remarked:

One of the things that I wanted to bring up, because I think it has a lot of implications for what they have been doing, is that the Camp Fire program in Seattle is a very old program, an old organization and has a lot of trappings about it. It's thought of as an upper-middle-class White organization basically. And it used to be a very prestigious organization and I don't know if that's what people still think. But it used to be. But just because it's thought of as kind of upper-middle-class, White -- that's one of the things that they had to contend with all the time. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Some grantees viewed the OJJDP project as experimental and awaited results confirming whether the focus on delinquency would benefit their agencies in the long run.

Other historical factors influenced grantees' prevention operations. For example, receiving federal funds was a relatively new experience for a large number of the grantee

agencies. Participation in this OJJDP-sponsored program reflected in part, genuine and pervasive concern among agencies about the constriction of funds from more traditional private sources. Successful performance in this national delinquency prevention program was regarded by many grantees as a means of demonstrating agency capabilities and thus buttressing claims for financial support from public and private sources. Developing program models, demonstrating collaboration or networking mechanisms, and working in varied community settings represented possible expansion of future funding options in a period marked by severe cutbacks of human service funds.

Some grantees expressed uneasiness about receiving federal monies for fear of compromising their community-support because of negative community sentiments about federally sponsored programs. Nonetheless, alternative funding sources were scarce and the OJJDP grant was soon regarded as a welcome opportunity.

Agency Resources

While grantee agencies were equally aware of declining funds, their funding bases, resources, and assets varied tremendously. National youth-serving organizations are generally larger and more financially secure than regional or local agencies, but their individual financial circumstances are not always comparable. For example, there exist vast differences between the annual operating budgets of the Salvation Army and Aspira of America. Girls Clubs of America, Inc. has documented its financial disadvantage in comparison to

some other national youth organizations in publications on discriminatory funding patterns for female and male service organizations. Agencies differ, too, in the extent of their public recognition and ability to generate funds. A key issue in UNCA's recent name change was described by an agency executive as enhancing public visibility relative to other national youth agencies -- a critical factor in eliciting financial and other support.

At the local level, agencies' financial characteristics varied: an agency in the Seattle collaboration was in a period of expansion in 1978, operating with an annual budget of about \$3 million; at the same time, a Boston agency was in fiscal crisis. This variation in financial stability resulted in different degrees of dependence upon OJJDP funds to carry out prevention project activities, whether agencies worked as single projects or as members within national or local collaborations.

In spite of different financial statuses, prevention staff often stated that insufficient funds were provided to properly operate their projects. Staff were skeptical from the outset about their ability to achieve significant impacts on their target area's delinquency problem with the limited funds being provided by OJJDP. One administrator in Boston observed:

There are millions of dollars in different kinds of programs pumped into Columbia Point (just one of the project's target communities) every year and they show no effect. We have a Teen Center out there and there is only one thing I hope that Center can do. That is get to a few of those kids and say "look you can get out of here" and show them how to do that. We have to be realistic about this thing. We could take the entire (project budget) and

dump it into Columbia Point and it will have little effect in comparison to the needs of the people. I am content to do something for a few kids. It won't show up as impressive statistics, but I wonder what any programs are going to be able to show in terms of turning kids around and giving a kid the ability to take control of his own life. (Boston, Field Notes)

The mismatch of expected outcomes and available project resources is dramatically illustrated by one national affiliate. The overall project goal was to reduce by at least 3 percent the delinquency rate in a target area that included over 300,000 people. Among project tasks associated with this goal were (1) hiring full-time staff, (2) entering a city where the agency previously possessed no facilities, (3) recruiting a new service clientele, (4) establishing linkages with other target area organizations, (5) paying for staff travel to training sessions offered by the national office and, (6) offering a multi-service program to target area youth. Disillusionment quickly set in among the affiliate agency staff at this site due to lack of resources. As a monthly report from the affiliate to the national office revealed:

The month of January has been one of frustration because our program goals were not reached, although they were initiated in the latter part of the month. We became carpenters, movers and all around fixers in order to get our new office ready. There were several days when we were extremely cold due to the fact that the heater had not been installed. As I write this, there still is a gush of cold air which is coming through the wall. (New Jersey Monthly Report to Aspira, February 1978)

Such deficiencies in resources might have been partially avoided through more realistic planning. Other problems,

however, could not have been anticipated. For example, the closing of LEAA regional offices in mid-1977, resulted in grantees receiving their initial grant funds much later than they had expected. In some cases, grantee agencies had hired staff, made subcontracts, rented facilities, arranged support services, and promised to begin service delivery on a date prior to their actual receipt of funds. Grantees were thus committed to begin program operations without grant resources.

Larger agencies with well-established budgets were better able to begin services prior to receiving OJJDP funds. Staff at an affiliate of one national agency stated that a decision was made to use available agency funds in lieu of OJJDP monies to deliver services and provide transportation for target area youth. It was felt that relationships and credibility with schools, other referral agencies, and the community-at-large would have been jeopardized had services not been implemented on schedule.

The option of using existing agency funds to begin services was not available to other grantees. Many grantees were already experiencing financial difficulties and could not stand the strain of supporting a new set of services without additional resources. In such cases, not only were services delayed, but persons designated to fill key staff positions were forced to go elsewhere to find employment. Urban coalition projects newly established for the OJJDP effort, were shaken because funds were not flowing as had been originally planned. A great deal of anxiety was generated by the delay of funds at the less

financially stable agencies.

For some projects the delay of initial funds had a more lasting effect than just difficulty during the start-up period. Planned staff training sessions at some sites were eliminated or substantially reduced. Reduced staff training caused project services to suffer. The project director of one national agency stated that one result of the project being delayed was a lack of optimal national-level guidance in program development at affiliate sites.

The financial instability of some agencies continued to be a problem for some grantees throughout the program period. Federal grant regulations and the procedures to get OJJDP funds to agencies were more complex than those to which some agencies were accustomed. In some instances, grant funds were released through state criminal justice planning agencies to the grantees. In multi-agency projects, funds often passed through yet another layer -- an administering agency. Bureaucratic delays in the dispensing of funds often resulted in belated paychecks and waiting periods of up to four weeks for program equipment purchases. Gaps in the flow of funds between annual funding periods in this program also posed difficulties for grantee agencies that were almost exclusively dependent on OJJDP funds. As one project administrator asserted, disruptive funding periods created "a great deal of uncertainty among project staff" and it was "extremely difficult to make definite plans for the new period with such uncertainty in funding procedures." In at least two projects, resignations of

important staff occurred during the project's second year directly as a result of uncertainty over third-year funding.

Limited resources for project operation were also problematic for agencies in relatively more stable financial positions. Many of these agencies felt that the demands of the prevention projects consumed far more agency resources than compensated for by the OJJDP grants. Staff believed well-established service programs were being jeopardized to underwrite the prevention project. For example, the Boys' Club affiliate was operating in a city that had the eighth highest crime rate in the United States. The target area selected for the prevention project had a significantly higher crime rate than for Richmond as a whole. Goals for the project included developing a replicable program model that provided direct services to hundreds of previously unserved target area youth and establishing a network of community agencies, advisory councils, and parents to facilitate better youth services in the target area. The site budget allocated to accomplish these objectives was only \$20,000. Delegates from a number of OJJDP project sites to the 1978 Boys' Clubs National Convention voiced their displeasure at the heavy performance expectations placed on them with their modest resources. The delegates also complained that administrative procedures such as strict documentation of all expenditures and rules for regulating transportation expenditure were unnecessarily stringent for their small projects. Administrative procedures often consumed an inordinate amount of time for the agencies' part-time

administrative staffs.

Insufficient agency resources and limited OJJDP grant funds forced grantees to become heavily dependent on other agencies for basic project needs. A large number of the OJJDP grantees depended on outside agencies for operating facilities. Without the public school system's cooperation, one rural project would have been without a physical facility to conduct activities. A similar condition existed at the affiliate of one national agency, where the agency's executive director was extremely aware of the leverage that the local housing authority held over his project. Understating his situation, he pointed out: "I think that if the housing authority would not let us use this facility we are using now, it would hurt us" (Richmond, Field Notes).

Staff Resources

Human service projects often depend on high-quality interpersonal relationships formed between staff and clients. Skills of project staff carry great weight in a project designed to bring about important attitudinal and behavioral changes. Formal agency philosophies and strategies are meaningful only to the degree that service staff make them so. Agency policy is often elaborated by service staff almost on a case-by-case basis. In such situations, staff characteristics, capabilities, and motivations become extremely important variables for project processes and outputs.

The vast majority of the direct service activities offered

by the prevention grantees employed service staff in the role of individual change agents. (See Chapter 7) Because of the significance of staff skills to the grantee projects, the national evaluator emphasized obtaining as much detailed information as possible on project staff. For instance, project directors were mailed a questionnaire designed to obtain information on a number of characteristics representing background data on staff among all the prevention grantees. The questionnaire sought information concerning (1) the total number of project staff, (2) the number of staff paid with OJJDP funds, (3) the number of staff paid with other funds, (4) the sex, (5) race, and (6) age of staff, (7) continuity of staff within grantee agency, and (8) project staff turnover. Data on volunteers were also requested.

In addition to the questionnaire seeking aggregate staff data for each project, another survey, intended to obtain more in-depth information was administered to individual project staff members. The staff questionnaire covered areas such as sexual and ethnic identity, job title, occupation, occupational experience, educational background, job activity, job satisfaction, and personal philosophy about delinquency prevention.

Although NCCD assumed that background data on staff would be readily available, many project directors found it difficult to produce figures about staff specific enough for evaluation purposes. For example, analysis of staff age data was limited because many projects reported only an overall average staff

age, or reported in general categories (e.g., 20-35 years old). For some grantees there was a great deal of ambiguity over who should be considered members of project staff. For national projects, we attempted to collect data on staff in the national office and staff at all the project affiliate sites. In one case, however, data were reported for only the national office. In another case, only characteristics of staff from the affiliates were reported. For two collaboration projects, the project directors did not have information on the project staff working in the collaboration member agencies and could only report on the central office personnel. As a result, a number of information categories from the project directors' questionnaire could not be analyzed due to inadequate data.

Questionnaires given to individual staff members met with a high level of resistance. Although complete anonymity was promised to respondents, project staff held the general opinion that the questionnaires were an invasion of their privacy. The return rate on the individual staff surveys was extremely low.

In spite of these problems in collecting staffing data, NCCD developed a composite picture of project staff by combining observational and open-ended interview data with information from these survey efforts.

Perhaps the most significant staff characteristic was the total number of part-time staff reported as working in the OJJDP projects. (Summary data on employment characteristics of staff are presented in Table 4-1) The total number of paid staff working on the prevention projects was 697. A little less than

TABLE 4-1*

Employment Characteristics By General Agency Type

Staff Characteristics	AGENCY TYPE					
	National		Urban		Rural	Totals
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
<u>Level of Employment</u>						
Full-time	146	(49%)	139	(43%)	39	(54%)
Part-time	149	(51%)	184	(57%)	34	(46%)
Total	295	(100%)	323	(100%)	73	(100%)
<u>Funding Sources**</u>						
OJJDP Funded (total)	193	(65%)	247	(75%)	71	(97%)
Full-time	117	(39%)	96	(29%)	39	(53%)
Part-time	76	(25%)	151	(45%)	32	(43%)
Other Funds (total)	102	(34%)	82	(24%)	2	(2%)
Full-time	22	(7%)	45	(13%)	0	(0%)
Part-time	80	(27%)	37	(11%)	2	(2%)
Total	295	(100%)	329	(100%)	73	(100%)
<u>Volunteers</u>						
Full-time	5	(1%)	3	(5%)	0	(0%)
Part-time	398	(99%)	518	(95%)	156	(100%)
Total	403	(100%)	521	(100%)	156	(100%)

*Statistics hand-tabulated by NCCD staff. Percentage totals do not always equal 100% due to rounding-off computation. Differences in totals with funding categories are due to discrepancies in project self-report data.

**Percentages reflect proportions of total employees (N=697).

one-half (324) were reported as full-time employees. The remainder (367) were part-time. The total number of prevention staff paid by OJJDP funds was 511. Thus, a little less than one-half (252) of the OJJDP employees were full-time employees. The remainder (259) of OJJDP funded staff were part-time.

Site observations by evaluation staff offered strong confirmation that projects suffered from lack of staff. Moreover, most project directors identified understaffing as a key program constraint. Most often, "inadequate funds" was given as the reason additional staff were not hired. In some cases, lack of funding for staff caused significant deviation from projects' planned service strategies. For example, the Aspira project emphasized the peer guidance and counseling components of its service design. Aspira proposed to hire student aides on a part-time basis, providing them with sufficient training to take leadership roles in project operations. When staff learned that the student aide positions could not be funded, their planned project activities were assumed by adult staff and potentially beneficial peer-client relationships were lost. Aspira's youth volunteers performed student aide duties admirably, but project services relying on volunteers were more difficult to consistently sustain.

At the Venice site, plans for a community development component - the formation of Block Clubs - called for equal participation in its operation by staff of each collaboration member agency. Each agency had responsibility for organizing block clubs in parts of the community known for high rates of

crime. Most of the collaboration agencies, could not spare scarce staff to operate the block clubs. To do so would stretch staff so thin that agency direct services would be jeopardized. Venice made efforts to revise plans for the block clubs to overcome the staffing dilemma, but eventually the lack of staff led to discontinuing the block clubs concept.

Inadequate numbers of staff meant that youth workers were required to perform extra duties so that services would be preserved. For example, in Tuskegee, unexpected budget cut-backs precluded subcontracting of some project services to other agencies. The staff decided to offer virtually all of the project's proposed direct services, which greatly increased the demands on field staff. Tuskegee's "Community Coordinators," in addition to their administrative duties, assumed a wide range of service delivery roles (recreation leader, tutor, counselor, transportation provider, community organizer, etc.). This staff position ultimately included the jobs of client recruiter, service deliverer, project advocate, and community relations expert among other functions. The more successful community coordinators were at recruiting youth clients and getting community residents involved in project activities, the greater were their workloads. Grant resources were insufficient to hire additional staff to help with increased responsibilities. Many community coordinators expressed uncertainty about prioritizing project activities. Some coordinators complained about the difficulties of being a "jack-of-all-trades" that the job seemed to demand. Over time, project staff realized that original

service goals were overly ambitious with limited staff resources.

The Tuskegee example is far from unique. Understaffing also plagued administrative workers at many sites. The Santa Barbara site illustrates this problem. Initial budget allocations for Santa Barbara did not include allocations for management duties. The administrator observed:

...they did not give us enough money to do what's needed in the way it was developed ... by lacking of funding for either a project director, or part-time director or any of my time. Some of my other duties are suffering now ... because I have things to do for LEAA(Santa Barbara, Field Notes)

During Santa Barbara's first year of operation, the agency program director took over project management as well as her existing responsibilities. She also substituted for project staff who missed assignments. This situation, among other sources of tension and frustration, finally led to her resignation.

In Boston, an internal project monitor was responsible for fiscal and programmatic monitoring of all ten subgrantee agencies, as well as serving as co-trainer in another program. At the same site, the project's program specialists expressed concern of "burnout" because of their many responsibilities. Yet after one staff member left the project, the position was unfilled for the following eighteen months. Staff burnout is a common problem in human service agencies, but for the prevention projects it became a chronic condition.

Recognizing the constraints of limited staff, many project directors sought alternative means of increasing their personnel resources. Many grantees hired supplemental staff through other funding sources, most notably CETA. Eleven of the fifteen projects reported that CETA-funded employees were working as project staff. Of the total number of project staff reported, twenty-six percent were paid by funds from sources other than OJJDP (Table 4-1). United Way was the second most frequent non-OJJDP funding source. For grantees located near universities or colleges, staff was extended by hiring work-study students.

CETA and student staff often made valuable contributions to project operations but this was not always true. Many supplemental personnel were inexperienced in youth work and lacked a consistent commitment to project activities. Time invested by core project staff to train and direct supplemental staff sometimes outweighed benefits accrued from additional staff.

Student staff (and student volunteers), for example, tended to be short-term and unreliable and placed priority on their school-related needs over their project responsibilities. Students responsible for specific services sometimes did not give advance warning when other commitments prevented them from meeting project assignments. Turnover rate among students was high, particularly at the end of a school year, creating periodic crises among permanent staff who absorbed many extra duties. Finding replacements for student supplemental staff and

starting new training sessions for them presented additional hardships for project staff.

At several sites, CETA staff required more training, direction, and guidance than other project staff were able or willing to provide. For example, at the Fort Peck site, several three-month CETA slots were acquired to fill newly created positions such as career education assistants, arts and crafts personnel, and youth worker aides. The CETA staff needed immediate training and supervision but often had to settle for on-the-job learning. One CETA staff member asserted: "I feel I could have done a better job if I had the training or help from my co-worker" (Fort Peck Weekly Report, 14 August 1978). Their specific duties were left undefined and this created confusion among other project staff about how CETA staff fit into overall project plans.

In Richmond, CETA-supported project staff were hired to assist existing project staff in recruiting youth, implementing program activities, and organizing parent groups. Difficulties soon surfaced among staff. CETA staff contended they received little direction or training from the agency's regular staff members. The agency administrator expressed dissatisfaction about reliance on CETA staff because of conflicts between agency and CETA regulations. Problems surfaced over job descriptions, overtime work and pay, and school attendance for CETA workers at the Richmond site.

While many volunteers were reported working in the prevention projects (Table 4-1), volunteers supplemented the

resources of OJJDP-funded staff to a much lesser extent than did the project employees paid through other funds. There were 1,080 volunteers reported, almost 400 more volunteers than paid staff. A Salvation Army affiliate acquired volunteers from a central agency that contracted volunteers for the entire county. Other grantees had access to professional volunteer bureaus. Some volunteers were recruited from board membership and still others from among target community residents. In general, the volunteers did not alleviate the projects' staffing problems because most volunteers performed only minor staffing duties. Only eight volunteers were reported as working full-time. Most volunteers functioned in auxiliary roles, such as field trip chaperones.

Staff Characteristics

Considerably more females than males were employed by grantees (Table 4-2). There were 272 (39 percent) male and 421 (61 percent) female employees in the projects. These percentages are quite similar for project volunteers.

The highest proportion of female staff was found among the national affiliate grantees (68 percent), the next highest in the urban projects (56 percent), and the lowest proportion in the rural projects (50 percent). This may only reflect the presence of two female youth service projects, almost exclusively staffed by women, in the national and urban categories.

There were also proportionally more female volunteers in

TABLE 4-2*

Staff Characteristics By General Agency Type
and By Sex

Staff Characteristics	AGENCY TYPE							
	National		Urban		Rural		Totals	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Total Employed**	299	(43%)	323	(46%)	71	(10%)	693	(100%)
Male	95	(32%)	142	(44%)	35	(50%)	272	(39%)
Female	204	(68%)	181	(56%)	36	(50%)	421	(61%)
Volunteers**	414	(39%)	521	(47%)	151	(13%)	1086	(100%)
Male	139	(34%)	233	(45%)	41	(27%)	413	(38%)
Female	275	(66%)	288	(55%)	110	(73%)	673	(62%)

* Statistics hand-tabulated by NCCD staff. Percentage totals do not always equal 100% due to rounding-off computations. Discrepancies within categories and between Tables 9, 10 & 11 are due to discrepancies in project self-report data.

** Reflects Row percent only.

the national (66 percent) than the urban projects (55 percent). The rural projects had the highest proportion of female volunteers. These results are skewed by the high number of volunteers in one rural program who were predominantly female.

At the female delinquency prevention projects, there was a great deal of staff sentiment that young women are subjected to sexist practices in traditional youth service agencies. Special services for young women offered by female staff, were needed to offset this legacy. Female staff were considered positive role models in helping clients combat negative self-images.

Prejudicial attitudes toward female youth workers were illustrated at one site where a traditionally male service agency refused to hire women as group leaders. A representative from that agency announced in a project meeting:

When a boy reaches age 11, [we] feel it is time to cut the apron strings and, consequently, women are not permitted as [leaders]. (Seattle, Field Notes)

This agency eventually withdrew from the OJJDP project. A few other staffing problems related to sexist attitudes surfaced at other sites. In general, the sex of youth workers did not emerge as a major issue in terms of service delivery or employment.

Project staff in the OJJDP delinquency prevention program comprised an ethnic mixture with Whites accounting for 41 percent of the staff, Blacks 40 percent, Hispanic-Americans 14 percent, Native Americans 3 percent, Asian-Americans 1 percent, and others 1 percent (Table 4-3).

TABLE 4-3*

Ethnic Background and Employment Continuity By Grantee Type

Ethnic Background	National		Urban		Rural		Totals	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Ethnic Background Totals**	295	(41%)	341	(48%)	70	(9%)	706	(100%)
Black	98	(33%)	133	(39%)	50	(71%)	281	(40%)
White	145	(49%)	143	(42%)	2	(3%)	240	(41%)
Hispanic-American	39	(13%)	59	(17%)	2	(3%)	100	(14%)
Native American	8	(3%)	0	(0%)	15	(21%)	23	(3%)
Asian	0	(0%)	1	(0%)	0	(0%)	1	(0%)
Other	5	(1%)	5	(1%)	1	(1%)	11	(1%)
Number of staff no longer with project***	91	(31%)	47	(13%)	19	(26%)	157	(23%)
Number of staff previously employed by grantee***	37	(13%)	78	(22%)	0	(0%)	98	(14%)
Number of staff working on other agency programs***	43	(15%)	50	(15%)	4	(6%)	105	(15%)

* Statistics hand-tabulated by NCCD staff. Percentage totals do not always equal 100% due to rounding-off computations. Discrepancies within categories and between Tables 9, 10, 11 due to discrepancies in agency self-report data.

** Reflects Row percent only.

*** Reflects percent of column totals only.

Considering ethnic composition by grantee type, one finds a slightly higher proportion of Whites (49 percent) employed by the national affiliate projects than in the urban projects (42 percent). Data on rural projects reflect the characteristics of one rural project, with 70 percent Black staff, and another rural project, on a Native American reservation.

The highest proportions of Hispanic-Americans are found in the national and urban projects. National projects employed 13 percent Hispanic-American staff and urban projects 17 percent. Rural projects employed only 3 percent Hispanic Americans. Asian-Americans and other minority groups were found in extremely small proportions at all sites.

Many claims were made that the ethnicity of project staff is a crucial factor in the success of prevention projects. Project staff argued, that in the past, services controlled by Whites could not or would not relate to the life experiences of minority youth. Minority youth felt uncomfortable in agencies employing predominantly white staff and did not utilize their services.

In comparing ethnic backgrounds of staff and clients served for each project, none of the projects illustrated that ethnic characteristics of staff and clients were significantly different. For some grantees, ethnic and cultural differences persisted as a problem in service delivery. At the Akron site, the majority of tutors recruited from a local university were White. Black clients tended to avoid White tutors in favor of Black staff and tutors. Difficulties also arose in Dallas in

obtaining participation of minorities in one particular program. A White counselor at this agency admitted that lack of familiarity with Mexican-American and Black cultures caused serious difficulties in serving project youth. At another grantee site, a staff member observed:

... I don't have as much impact as a Chicana woman would, coming from the same place, doing the same thing that I am trying to do. (Santa Barbara, Field Notes)

Several agencies acknowledged the need to hire more minority staff who might possess greater knowledge of and sensitivity to their ethnically and culturally diverse client populations:

The staff of these various branches need to become more familiar with the special problems of these minority kids. (Seattle, Field Notes)

I'd really like some minority staff. I don't know what to think ... it must be really hard for the girls to relate a lot of times to White, female staff ... I'm coming from a whole different background ... it's important to have a more mixed group here, staff-wise. (Santa Barbara, Field Notes)

At the Richmond site, the grantee worked in a public housing complex experiencing an influx of Spanish-speaking residents into a predominately Black community. Few Mexican-American youth initially attended project activities. But, hiring a Spanish-speaking staff member helped increase participation of Mexican-American youth from the target community. In another example, youth workers of a New York grantee met to resolve communication and cultural gaps between

agency staff and Chinese-speaking clients. Staff in Dallas, Santa Barbara, and Seattle, among other sites, affirmed the need for greater minority staff representation.

Staff Age and Experience

As noted earlier, meaningful analysis of staff age data was precluded due to uneven reporting categories. Available data indicate that few staff members were as old as 40. The vast majority of staff were between 25-35 years old. One hundred and sixty-four (164) youth aged 15 and 20 were employed by the prevention projects. Youth employees accounted for 22 percent of total project staff. Greater specificity in reporting staffs' ages might have yielded an even higher percentage of youth employees. NCCD's on-site observations substantiate the extensive use of youth as project staff.

Site observations and interviews revealed that staff were often inexperienced in the duties assigned to them. Survey data reported that staff possessed an average of less than one year's experience in youth work. Limited funds was frequently cited by project administrators to account for hiring many admittedly underqualified staff.

Lack of youth work experience among staff produced heavy demands for in-service training. Project administrators readily acknowledged their critical need for staff training. Grantees requested technical assistance for a wide range of training needs including job development, community organizing, volunteer recruitment, client outreach and counseling. Typically, staff

training needs were never adequately covered. Other factors, such as geographic location, further complicated staff training. For example, in Fort Peck, key project staff had to attend conferences and training seminars off the reservation. Traveling long distances to centralized training sessions was also a problem for staff at the Tuskegee and Aspira projects.

Staff Continuity

The staff turnover rate at prevention projects was very high in their first year of operation. Twenty-three percent (23%) of employees working for grantees were no longer with them after one year. Staff turnover was especially high among project administrators. In one urban project, management changed hands several times during the first year. Several project directors left their jobs feeling disillusioned, discouraged and discredited.

Changes of project administrators continued to occur during the second year of project operations. Changes in line staff also frequently occurred for the vast majority of grantees. High staff turnover meant suitable replacements had to be recruited, hired, and trained. In the interim, pressures increased for other staff members forced to add the assignments of vacant positions to their own workloads.

Services were often interrupted and rapport with clients also had to be renewed. Sometimes replacements were never hired and projects functioned at less than maximum staff capacities. Prolonged staffing problems diminished the extent and quality of

service delivery. Newly hired staff were sometimes not provided with adequate job orientations and were not fully cognizant of all grant requirements. Many staff, for example, had never read their project's proposal or known its contents.

Staff changes were recognized by grantees as a serious constraint on service quality. One project director noted:

The lack of staff continuity can have a deleterious effect on service delivery, and every effort will be made to encourage the lowest possible rate of turnover. (UNCA, Second Year Program Narrative, p. 1)

Some project directors viewed staff turnover as a predictable problem because of low salaries and heavy responsibilities associated with youth work. According to the grantees' original budgets, the salary range of OJJDP-funded service delivery staff was approximately \$7,000 to \$15,000 per annum. The average salary of full-time staff was around \$9,830. Further, the temporary nature of most grant-supported positions and personnel practices of their agencies guaranteed few fringe benefits. Concerns expressed throughout the grant period about refunding and locating new sources of financial support were all-too-constant reminders to staff of their tenuous jobs.

Community Characteristics

Organizational features represent only one dimension of context. Equally important are the influences of the community that hosted project activities.

Although direct services to youth became the grantees' primary mode of delinquency prevention, program planners

believed that serving communities was at least as important as serving individual youth.

Criminology contains a long theoretical tradition emphasizing the importance of community in the causation, prevention, and treatment of crime and delinquency. The experiences of community-focused delinquency prevention efforts have produced volumes of materials testifying to the difficulty of such ventures. While many of the OJJDP grantees had extensive experience dealing with community issues in their previous programs, this experience did not carry over to their delinquency prevention projects. Inattention to community variables contributed to the remarkable similarity among services despite substantial diversity in target areas where projects operated. Further, since the community was not generally perceived as a service unit, project activities to change community conditions were limited.

Based on the delinquency literature, the OJJDP community focus was sound. Attempts to alter "the offender's social and physical environment" represents one broad class of past delinquency prevention projects. According to an OJJDP Background Paper:

The environmental approach views situational conditions as the dominant factor in stimulating and perpetuating delinquency activity. This approach assumes that their cultural and social systems produce reactions in individuals which cause them either to conform to, or deviate from, legitimate standards. It further assumes that the delinquent behavior of youth living in "high-risk" settings can be reduced by remodeling and reorganizing the community so that potential offenders can find positive alternatives to delinquent activity.

(OJJDP, 1976)

Numerous prevention efforts, including some of the largest projects, have stressed the importance of changing community conditions in areas with high delinquency rates. For example, the Chicago Area Project of the 1930s, one of the earliest community-focused projects, followed this premise:

The Chicago Area Project operates on the assumption that much of the delinquency of slum areas is to be attributed to lack of neighborhood cohesiveness and to the consequent lack of concern on the part of many residents about the welfare of children. The Project strives to counteract this situation through encouraging local self-help enterprises through which a sense of neighborliness and mutual responsibility will develop. It is expected that delinquency will decline as youngsters become better integrated into community life and thereby influenced by the values of conventional society rather than those of the underworld. (Witmer and Tufts, 1954, p. 11)

The Mobilization for Youth of the 1960s adhered to a similar philosophy:

One of the dominant orienting themes of Mobilization for Youth was that lower class youngsters must be provided with genuine opportunities to behave in nondeviant ways if they are to be prevented from engaging in delinquent behavior. Mobilization for Youth was also predicated upon the assumption that local residents must be implicated in delinquency prevention. Effective control of delinquent behavior cannot take place solely through the operation of programs imposed upon the community from the outside. In short, the view was that an organized, anticriminal community must be developed in order to create pressures toward non-delinquent juvenile behavior. (Gibbons, 1976, p. 278)

Evaluation difficulties leave uncertain the precise impacts of projects employing a community change strategy. This approach

still enjoys high regard by many delinquency theorists.

Community change strategies posit the prominence of well-defined cultural or social systems that can be remodeled and reorganized. The change process requires indigenous individuals who band together in common thought or action to affect the environmental forces prompting youth crime.

The OJJDP Program Announcement made clear that OJJDP wished to alter target communities. The term "community" usually implies a well-defined social system exhibiting highly interdependent human relationships and communal interests. But the target areas selected by grantees did not always meet these conditions. These were service areas rather than real communities. Tenuous social ties among target area inhabitants rendered project activities premised on community change highly problematical.

OJJDP's grant application procedures did not require applicants to define their concept of community. OJJDP's description of acceptable target populations was the only clue to defining appropriate communities:

Youth in greatest danger of becoming delinquent are living in communities characterized by high rates of crime and delinquency, high infant mortality rates, high unemployment and underemployment, sub-standard housing, physical deterioration and low median incomes.

Not surprisingly, applicants illustrated the suitability of their target areas by citing demographic factors that might increase rates of delinquency. Almost all grantees provided sketchy data on community problems. For many grantees, data for

surrounding areas were provided in lieu of or in greater detail than for their target areas. Indicators of community conditions were often outdated by eight years. Typically, applicants offered a string of statistics on population, housing, health, employment, and juvenile arrests with little explanation of their relevance to delinquency causation.

Time constraints posed by the OJJDP application deadline led many grantees to report uneven and incomplete data. One administrator gave the following account of selecting target areas:

Aspira sent in its proposal identifying health districts corresponding to barrios within major cities as communities in which this project would work. A notification came back from LEAA saying we like the proposal's ideas, we like the methodology, we like the goals, but we will not accept the health districts as communities. You've got two weeks to come up with communities that fit the demographic requirements called for in the RFP. We called up the associate offices and said you've got to find cities that meet the requirements and get back to us within two weeks.

The associates chose the present target communities based strictly on whatever demographic data they were able to gather quickly. They never really studied the communities. In some cases they had never been there. With possibly two exceptions, there was never any intention to go into these towns. We did not know what we were getting into with these communities.
(New Jersey, Field Notes)

The Salvation Army was also given a short period of time to come up with a completely new set of target areas to replace those originally proposed.

Lack of statistical data corresponding to grantee target areas, as well as staff inexperience in data collection, were

problems noted by project directors. A project director observed:

One major recommendation that you [NCCD] could make here is that the expectation on OJJDP's part that the data they ask for actually exists is often mistaken. Even in the larger cities like Chicago or Dallas, it would appear that good, useful demographic data is often spread across the map, hard to get, inconsistent and difficult to coincide with a given service area of an applicant agency. (NCCD Evaluation Review, July 1980)

No standard set of demographic data was actually required of applicants by OJJDP. Table 4-4 illustrates applicant attempts to describe their proposed target communities. Data are taken from grant applications. Many grantees could not supply all categories of community data. Some data provided showed areas with high indices of presumed criminogenic factors (high unemployment, low income, high crime), but other target areas do not possess high indices of these factors. The most consistent finding is the lack of information to support community-focused strategies.

Realizing that demographic data was sparse, some applicants provided short descriptions of target areas:

The physical status of the neighborhood is poor. The streets and sidewalks are chronically plagued by litter and debris, since garbage collection is infrequent and inadequate, and there is a high rate of vandalism and continuing deterioration of the properties within the area. Police and fire services are adequate to cover the area, although response is sometimes slow. (UNCA, First Year Proposal, p. 15)

or:

These neighborhoods are almost always among the oldest and most run down. Furthermore, they tend to be inhabited in

TABLE 4-4
Reported Target Area Characteristics per General Category by Project Site* (*Source of Data: Projects' first year proposals)

Target Area Characteristics as Reported per General Category

	Total Target Area Population	Total Youth Under 18 pop.	Ethnic Comp.	Income	Unemployment Data Listed		% Receiving Public Assistance	% Residing in Public Housing	Infant Mortality per 1,000 live births	Crime and Delinquency
					Adult	Youth				
Akron (UNCA)	30,479	4,726	-	\$6000	10%	23.6%	-	1,046 units	.04%	4th highest rate in city
Boston	subgrantees unknown and target communities not yet determined									
Dallas	557,267	188,417	-	\$8,126	3.8%	14.5%	7.29%	-	18.4%	15.26% of total arrests
Fort Peck	6,800	3,600	100% Native American	\$2,410	(total of 49.7%)		48%	-	-	-
Jersey City/Hoboken (Aspira)	305,922	95,414	-	\$8,547	(total of 5.4%)		8.3%	-	18	1:30 ration of serious crime to # of residents
Marietta (SA)	12,919	5,098	-	\$8,024	(total of 11.3%)		11.2%	-	total of 13 infant deaths	150 juvenile offenses
Richmond' (BCA)	1,206	445	96% Black 4% Hispanic	\$3,828	Only 26 persons employed	100%	91%	100%	greater than 15	8,259 per 100,000 pop.
Santa Barbara (GCA)	12,302	4,054	-	\$4,275 to \$8,838	(total of 7.24% to 9.87%)		63%	-	-	-
Seattle	93,057	27.6% (25,662)	26.8% Blk. 1.3% Hisp. 3.2 Asian 2.3 N. Am. 1.2 other	less than \$8,000	-	-	16.7%	public housing primary focus	20.3	some data given for selected years indicated higher incidences of certain offenses for the target areas than for city
Tuskegee	69,675	9,287	predominantly Black	41% of families blow pov. level	(total of 8.2%)		27.6%	-	27	total of 672 delinquent cases disposed by courts in 1975
Venice	280,229	-	***	18% "	(14% of Black 18% Sp, surname over 16 years)		-	-	-	100 increase in 1966-1974 for both reported crime and for juvenile arrests

***Compared w/ Los Angeles County, target areas have higher proportions of Blacks and persons w/ Spanish surnames

Project Sites (for Intensive Evaluation)

overwhelming proportion by populations manifesting significant deprivation with respect to income, purchasing power, job stability, job skills, occupational prestige, educational attainment, health and hygienic standards, institutional influence and political power. The people who live in these communities ... tend to have large families with consistently high birth rates, to be members of racial or ethnic minority groups, and often they are recent arrivals from highly rural and agrarian environments. In most instances they are victims of misunderstanding, prejudice and resentment from members of the surrounding community. In short, they are conspicuously deprived in terms of almost all the fundamental goals of our society, and more often than not, they are only tangentially or negatively related to the basic public and private institutions designed to foster those goals. (Aspira of America, First Year Proposal, pp. 21-22)

Even these subjective sketches of target areas fail to link community characteristics with a plan of community-focused delinquency prevention.

Mistakes in target area selection had negative consequences for a wide variety of program operations. In the case of Aspira's hastily chosen target areas, one project administrator stated:

The Waukegan site may not have been a good site for us to go into based on the demographic data we have now. The unemployment rate appears to be low. There are a lot of blue collar workers, but the jobs pay well. The Puerto Rican community may be poor in relation to the majority community, but objectively they are not poor. That is the only community even close to that ... the vast majority of kids are in school. The group of kids that are appropriate for our programs is very small.
(New Jersey, Field Notes)

There is evidence that some grantees chose target communities to suit their funding strategies. Whether these grantees ever held high expectations of improving their proposed

target areas is questionable. One project director admitted:

Our experience would indicate that agencies frequently define a broad area being their community primarily to address the needs of grant-making institutions while actually serving a much smaller area -- perhaps a few blocks. This is often true for urban drop-in programs and recreational-based agencies. (NCCD Evaluation Review, July 1980)

Another director opined:

Yes, we will have some positive impact in some local communities, but I doubt whether much change will occur in one community because it is a large community and the politics are more intense compared to the other areas. (Seattle, Field Notes)

There is no evidence that any grantee actually changed community conditions in even the smallest target areas.

Diversity in Community Settings

Urban multi-agency collaborations found it difficult to describe with great specificity the numerous communities served by member agencies that formed a youth service network. Collaboration administrators relied on member agency staff to develop well-thought-out conceptions of community units. Further, individual agency staff were thought better situated to plan unique community strategies for their service areas.

No evidence exists that a significant number of individual agencies had better success at community impact than the collaborations. Moreover, it appears the wide variety of communities served by urban collaborations may have greatly reduced the chances of establishing viable interagency networks. Diversity of target areas within urban collaborations should

have signaled differences in community and youth needs. Rarely did urban grantees explain how they band together these diverse community components into one organizational structure. Differences between communities and the lack of plans to deal with resulting conflicts often put strains on collaborative ventures.

The most notable community variation was the ethnic composition of residents. Distinct target areas within projects were derived, in part, from long-standing territorialism observed between neighborhoods (See Suttles, 1968 for a discussion of related issues). Typically, territorial boundaries are delineated along ethnic lines, forming entrenched ethnic enclaves minimizing interactions with other groups or outside areas. For instance, in some communities of Philadelphia, residents rarely venture beyond the boundaries of their ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods where cultural traditions are practiced. Successive family generations remain within neighborhood confines, thus preserving ethnic integrity. Related to territorialism are attempts to resist the infringement on neighborhood boundaries by other ethnic groups. As grantee staff explained:

...the boundaries are getting narrower as the Hispanics move in, the communities become smaller and smaller and that area is cut out of the white community.
(Philadelphia, Field Notes)

These residents of German and Irish and other ethnic origins purposely seek anonymity from outsiders, even denying the

presence of social problems and social service needs. While these neighborhoods are extremely poor, residents believe that their situations are superior to those of racial minority groups residing in adjacent neighborhoods. As project staff indicated:

The parents say to the youth, "It was good enough for me, it's good enough for you," ... they feel they don't have problems. Problems are not discussed ... They maintain a superior White value attitude trying to show they're one notch better than Blacks even though they make the same money ... (Philadelphia, Field Notes)

Youth residing in these communities infrequently travel outside narrow neighborhood boundaries. Crossing neighborhood boundaries risks encountering unknown cultures. Risk to physical safety is also a poignant issue for youth. Very often, coterminous neighborhoods have histories of antagonistic relations. A Boston staff member observed:

Each neighborhood generally keeps to itself and they don't really have too much to do with each other; they are usually fighting with each other. (Boston, Field Notes)

Patterns of community isolation constrained grantees who attempted to recruit youth from all ethnic backgrounds into their service activities. At the Venice site, project staff viewed teaching intergroup harmony as an integral part of its delinquency prevention strategy. Target areas were frequently the settings of violent conflicts between Black and Hispanic residents. These incidents included shootings resulting in at least four killings and four serious woundings. Prevention agencies assumed prominent roles in trying to avoid further

racial conflicts. One agency was directly involved in forestalling possible retaliation plans among its youth clients. Others functioned as community liaisons with local media sources and coordinated action groups within the community. Communities within urban collaborations competed for territorial rights ranging from residential space to scarce social services.

The New York grantee sought expansion of its capacity to reach previously unserved youth in surrounding neighborhoods. An agency in East Harlem serving primarily Black youth, tried to recruit Puerto Rican youth into its delinquency prevention project. The agency hoped to eventually integrate these youth into its overall service program.

Early in recruitment efforts, it became apparent that newly recruited Hispanic youth were not returning to the program. Claims were made that the new ethnic clientele was resisted by agency staff who were more accustomed to working with Blacks. Puerto Rican youth asserted that a climate of inter-ethnic strife as well as certain agency procedures discouraged the participation of Hispanic youth. Youth felt unwelcome at agency facilities where they were closely scrutinized by door guards who had to be alerted before admitting unfamiliar persons. Efforts at expanding ethnic clientele were extremely sensitive and called for diplomacy and patience from project staff. Similar situations existed at two other New York sites where member agencies traditionally served particular ethnic groups. The New York grantee originally planned large-scale events to recruit clients across target community boundaries, but it

acquiesced to more limited recruitment activities in individual areas corresponding to turf boundaries recognized by community youth.

Difficulties fostered by community and youth territorial conflicts were often resolved through revisions of program plans. Project activities were sometimes relocated to areas closer to where youth lived. Alternative facilities closer to youths' territorial grounds were employed rather than designated project sites. The significance of youths' definitions of turf is illustrated by these staff comments:

... territorialism. Trying to locate activities in a multi-racial area. Hispanics will not go into a Black area and vice-versa. Some of the agencies are fortunate enough to be located in a multi-racial area. Some other agencies are not and there is a tendency to attract only members of one racial group dependent on where they are located. (Philadelphia, Field Notes)

The White kids don't like the Black kids. The Black kids don't like Whites. The Brown kids don't like the Whites or the Blacks and everyone goes in their little circles. (Venice, Field Notes)

In some cases, communities originally selected for project services were eliminated to avert potential conflicts between youth from different target areas.

Besides ethnic differences, target areas varied in the extent of socio-economic ills. For example, the Venice project serves five Los Angeles communities. The Venice area is described as "having the most serious economic problems in the West Los Angeles area," but in Venice, the community of Oakwood is considered the poorest. The value of owner-occupied housing

in Oakwood is substantially lower than in other parts of Venice.

Another apparent aspect of community variation involves the availability of youth services in project target areas. Some communities enjoyed a wide range of service programs while others were virtually bereft of youth services. Communities served in Dallas illustrate this variation which has parallels at other projects. All three of the suburban target areas reported a severe lack of youth services. In one suburban area, there were no private agencies offering youth programs. Some public recreational facilities were located in more affluent parts of town or were inaccessible to those lacking private transportation. By contrast, the remaining four project target areas encompassed neighborhoods in the city of Dallas. The urban neighborhoods hosted a greater number of service programs than the suburban communities.

Community differences exert varied influences on youth. As one staff noted:

The causes for delinquency in Harlem or Westchester are not necessarily those causes for delinquency in West Dallas, and youth in west Dallas face different difficulties from youth of East Dallas or a Dallas suburb. (Dallas, First Year Proposal, p. 148)

In general, the OJJDP grantees failed to design programs responsive to the nuances of community and neighborhood variation.

Grantee agencies served some 68 targeted cities or towns, encompassing 118 target areas. The broad OJJDP program guidelines assured variation in the size of communities served

by grantees. The five national youth-serving agencies, through local affiliates, operated in medium-sized cities with populations of 350,000 or fewer. Other projects, representing multiagency collaborations, served huge target areas with populations ranging from 2,011,704 in New York City to 70,467 in Dallas. By contrast, rural projects served target communities with populations as small as 5,807. The youth populations in target areas ranged from New York City's 633,179 to Tulare's 3,100. Beyond variations in size, there existed other contrasting features of target communities served by the prevention grantees. After spending substantial periods of time in selected target areas, NCCD research staff began to appreciate the historical, cultural, and geographic uniqueness of communities represented in the national OJJDP prevention program. Brief profiles of the target areas of evaluated projects are provided in Appendix A.

Community settings, although generally neglected in project planning, influence both the lives of the clients and the direction of the prevention projects. Prevention grantees reported that harsh social conditions frustrated even the best well-designed projects. As explained by one director:

... We may be able to effect some changes in the individuals we work with but again there is a host of factors beyond our control ... it may not be enough when the youth exit the program and deal with the real world. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Attempts to alleviate the broad social problems such as poverty or racism were not envisioned by the OJJDP program.

Given limited OJJDP resources, efforts to attack these far-reaching issues would be ineffective. No grantee adopted an approach that directly confronted basic social issues as their major strategy of delinquency prevention although virtually all staff acknowledged the connections between inequality and delinquency. This dilemma was succinctly expressed by one project director:

We know we are working with symptoms, but if you are facing a starving person, do you feed the person or try to fight the cause? (Prevention Project Directors' Meeting, San Francisco, NCCD, 1979)

Nevertheless, for many projects broad community social problems often unexpectedly played a large role in shaping project activities. The following issues were raised most consistently by project staff as community conditions exerting significant effects on projects.

Racism

Earlier we discussed how community turf boundaries established by racial antagonism limited projects' abilities to recruit youth. In some cases, racial attitudes provided the *raison d'etre* of prevention projects. Racism created the need for some projects because traditional community patterns made services unavailable to particular ethnic groups. Some poignant illustrations of these environments are drawn from experiences in Tuskegee and Fort Peck.

Racial discrimination was important in shaping the Tuskegee project. Political power in the region served by the Tuskegee

project depends on the Black vote, but most elective offices are held by White politicians. These officials have often shown indifference to problems experienced by Black residents. This political atmosphere has fostered the continued development of patterns of residential, educational, and employment of segregation along racial lines. Such racial separation produces a denial of services to Black communities. For example, the effects of segregation policies are evident in the types of social and recreational outlets available to youth.

Access to social and recreational outlets in the Tuskegee region is often structured through the public schools. Rather than comply with court orders to integrate public schools some White parents have removed their children from public schools and enrolled them in private schools, known as "academies." While social and recreational facilities are readily available in these private schools, public schools offer limited sources of extracurricular activities for Black Youth. Although there are very few White Youth in the public school system in Tuskegee's target area, the vast majority of the senior school officials are White. According to project staff, these school officials have not understood the need for additional programs and services for Black Youth.

Well-established racial attitudes in the area also blocked project attempts to create alternative avenues for access to social and recreational facilities. This issue was starkly presented by a high-ranking public official in one of the project's target areas. Discussing why Black Youth lacked

facilities and why the prevention project was facing difficulty in securing such facilities, this official claimed that White residents who controlled the land, buildings, and most other area resources were not interested in making these facilities available to Blacks. He explained that to open recreational facilities to the general public would ensure they would be used only by Blacks. White parents would not permit their children to frequent integrated facilities. White Youth in the community had "their own" recreational facility, complete with swimming pool, tennis courts, and gymnasium. The official added that:

... facilities are only available to members and in order to be a member, one must be White ... After all this is the deep, deep South, and changes are slow to come. It will probably be another 20 years before Blacks can join this club. (Tuskegee, Field Notes)

Many project activities that intended to narrow the gap in services between White and Black Youth were severely hindered.

Parallel examples of the impact of racial separation and discrimination were found at the Fort Peck site where the vast majority (82 percent) of reservation land is either owned or leased by non-Indians. Traditional community patterns have resulted in limited social and recreational opportunities for Indian youth. In any rural area, activities like 4-H clubs are popular and natural parts of youth interests. In Fort Peck, local 4-H Club membership is restricted to non-Indian youths, requiring Indian organizations to establish counterpart 4-H Clubs for Indian Youth. Local schools are the setting through which organized sports activities take place in the Fort Peck

area, but schools were said to systematically exclude Indian Youth from extracurricular activities. These factors created a need for the OJJDP grantee project to develop parallel opportunities for Native American Youth.

In an isolated area such as the Fort Peck reservation, forming linkages with other organizations is of substantial importance due to the limited resources and facilities near the reservation. While the responsibility of providing services to Indian youth falls primarily on Indian organizations, the subordinate status of reservation Indians results in marked obstruction of Indian social service programs to establish viable linkages with other groups.

An incident involving the project and the local school board illustrates the intricate web of power relations between Indians and non-Indians, the sensitivity of racial issues, and the climate surrounding project activities. The Johnson O'Malley Act (JOM), passed in 1934 by the U.S. Congress, mandated the award of supplemental educational funds to public schools with high enrollments of Indian Youth. The JOM funds were intended to supplement school curricula by providing Indian-oriented activities. Allocation of funds for JOM programs in the schools is flexible and at the discretionary control of the JOM program's director. Where JOM monies are desired for activities outside of the school system, approval of the school board may be in order.

During the Fort Peck project, the JOM program offered some surplus funds to the prevention project's youth club to help

finance a field trip for which the youth had raised substantial, but insufficient, funds. School board approval of the proposed transaction was requested by the school principal. The school board, comprised entirely of non-Indians, denied allocation of the JOM end-of-school-year surplus funds, preferring that the monies revert back to the government as surplus. The overriding rationale for the school board's denial of the JOM funds was that there were no non-Indian members of the project's youth club. One school board official even called into issue the potential for higher governmental taxes if surpluses of the special program's fund to benefit Indian Youth were released.

Blatantly racist discriminatory practices did not surface at projects located in urban communities to the level exhibited in preceding examples. There is no question that racism was an ever-present issue that many projects had to face. Comments from project youth, such as the following, suggest that for some communities delinquency reduction should be pursued through strategies that alter the communities' racial attitudes.

Whites of the city of Akron don't give the Blacks a chance to make it, and the only way to get by at times is to make it the best way you can, and if that means someone ripping someone off, then that's what's going to happen.
(Akron, Field Notes)

Unemployment

Consistent with OJJDP's assertion that youth from poor communities are subject to greater pressures to become delinquent, most of the target communities were economically depressed. Unemployment and income data from these areas (see

Table 4-4) indicate that grantees were serving communities more economically disadvantaged than the general United States population. MIS data on clients show that 23.4 percent of the youths' fathers were listed as unemployed. Unemployment of mothers was listed as 39.8 percent. (The response "housewife" was not included in the unemployment figure.) In contrast to these figures, 5.2 percent of the fathers and 7.2 percent of mothers in the U.S. labor force are reported as unemployed. MIS data on clients receiving public financial assistance further illustrate dire economic conditions. Fifty-one percent of the prevention clients are from families receiving some form of public assistance (welfare, unemployment, disability, rent assistance, and combinations of the foregoing categories).

Prevention grantees attempting youth employment components have encountered the immediate effects of severe economic conditions. Lack of job opportunities for youth was cited by many grantees as a prominent cause of delinquency in their target areas. Client data reveal that 81.8 percent of those over 16 years and not attending school were unemployed. That so many prevention projects included employment placement and skills development services illustrated the concern among target area youth about their grim prospects for entering the labor force.

Client interest in the employment placement services of the grantees was high. But employment programs of grantees had trouble locating enough job positions to match the number of youth who wanted jobs. Inability to fully meet youth employment

goals often led to client disenchantment with project services. In Dallas and Tuskegee, where job placement was among the most commonly requested services, an erosion of client participation was reported when youth were assigned to job readiness and preparation services in lieu of actual job placements. In Akron, staff observed that the inability to secure sufficient job placements discouraged the enrollment of youth in the project. One Akron youth underscored interest in employment incentives:

Don't nobody want to come down and hear about stuff if they can't get no money, because that's what it's all about. (Akron, Field Notes)

Youth at other prevention projects also expressed the view that creating employment opportunities is integral to recruiting clients. One youth employed by a grantee indicated the attraction of employment benefits:

... I really like what I'm doing in this program. I'd still be coming back without getting paid, but I wouldn't have come in the first place without it. (Venice, Field Notes)

Many grantees could not escape structural barriers limiting youth employment prospects. For example, youth under 16 years of age were found ineligible for most jobs. In Dallas and Tuskegee, job placement programs were constrained by child-labor laws preventing businesses from hiring youth younger than 16 years. Depressed local economic conditions offered powerful impediments to youth employment efforts of the grantees. For

instance, major employers in Akron and Marietta had recently executed massive lay-offs of employees. The Venice area has engaged in a long-standing battle with land speculators and commercial developers of an adjacent city, Marina del Rey. Commercial expansion has worked to squeeze out the small businesses that employed youth in the Venice community. In Tuskegee, employment opportunities are extremely limited in target area counties, due to the decline of the traditionally agriculture-based economy:

This service [Job Bank] experienced considerable difficulty in locating jobs for many of the youth. This is attributed to the fact that there are few businesses and little in the way of industry in rural communities. (Tuskegee, Field Notes)

Most jobs obtained for youth were temporary positions, often subsidized by government programs such as CETA. Publicly subsidized job placements for youth were often limited to summer months and were substantially reduced during the school year. Grantees relying on public funds such as CETA can expect these employment options to disappear. With a national climate of fiscal conservatism, one can expect dramatic decreases in public funds available to create youth job placements. For example, Proposition 13 in California reduced the level of overall state revenue and portends sweeping reduction of state spending. While the full effects of Proposition 13 are just now being felt by social service agencies, the prevention grantees in California are already in deep financial trouble. Grantees have already received reduced CETA allocations. In Venice,

decreasing funds adversely affected two member agencies relying on CETA to employ youth. In Seattle, even though the official unemployment rate is down, grantee staff contended that unemployment rates within the target areas will increase as "CETA counter-cyclical funds are accordingly reduced."

Employment booms in Seattle are seen as primarily benefitting the technologically skilled, few of which live in the prevention target areas. If CETA monies are reduced or eliminated, other sources of funds for youth job placements are desperately required.

In general, the OJJDP grantees could not alleviate the pressures of unemployment impacting the lives of their client youth. Staff at most sites acknowledged the limited ability of grantee youth employment services to significantly increase youth employability. Furthermore, NCCD found little indication of private sector activity to assist target area youth, despite grantee efforts to encourage privately supported youth employment efforts. Trends of unemployment of the sort described above are likely to worsen far beyond that which the modest resources of the OJJDP grantees can address.

Housing

The OJJDP's description of the prevention program suggested that substandard housing is a key factor leading to delinquency. The condition of housing in target communities varies, ranging from fully adequate housing to situations where 100 percent of the houses are substandard. Roughly one quarter of the youth

(25.1 percent) reported living in public housing. Data from grantee sites suggest that public housing residents generally possess little faith in local government services. They report that their housing environment contains units that show signs of deterioration from neglect, vandalism, and arson. A primary concern of several delinquency prevention projects was introducing new services to youth residents of public housing communities that were previously overlooked by other service programs. As one project administrator stated:

We've identified the need for additional services for kids in public housing for a long time. We have tried to get other agencies into public housing areas and expand their services for a long time. This goes back for 10 to 15 years and it is very consistent with the type of project we are engaged in now. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Target communities comprised of public housing complexes are often physically separated from surrounding communities and symbolically isolated by public stigma and neglect. Not all public housing served by the grantees showed severe signs of isolation, but the kinds of problems faced were sharply illustrated at the Richmond site. The Easter Hill Village is physically isolated, although located in an urban area adjacent to a main freeway. Easter Hill Village is not easily visible from the heavily traveled street, being blocked from view by the arrangement of other structures nearby. The negative effects of psychological isolation engendered by low income levels and poor living conditions was mentioned by members of the housing authority, youth and adult residents and grantee staff. Housing

authority personnel explained that residents lacked self-esteem, adding that:

There's not enough awareness about what's available to them here in the community ... Some just won't reach out because they are so wrapped up in their own problems.
(Richmond, Field Notes)

Stigmatization of the youth living in the public housing community was evident. Other youth refer to the public housing youth as "rock people" or "hillies," suggesting well-worn labels of isolation.

The housing authority, a local government unit responsible for administering public housing, exerts considerable influence over those residing in the housing projects. Housing authority staff can accept or evict residents, determine upkeep standards of the units, restrict parking and other facilities, and even move residents from one housing project to another. For grantees serving primarily public housing communities, the command of the housing authority over residents may dictate several aspects of project operations. For example, housing authority policies can regulate population characteristics of the projects and define the nature of grantee's client population. At the site in Richmond, the housing authority had recently instituted a policy of moving more Spanish-speaking families into the target area populated predominantly by Black families. Increased friction between the two groups of public housing residents, at times, manifested in gang fights and vandalism. The OJJDP project was called upon to solve these

problems. The long-range goal of the housing authority was to locate middle-income families and include a wider mix of ethnic groups in the public housing community, thus, the nature of the future client population remains unknown.

Another community housing factor is the decreasing availability of low-income housing stock to residents in the prevention target communities:

Even more disturbing is the increasing demand for low-income housing while the units available continue to decline. The city estimated in 1974 that 15,000 low-income housing units were removed from the market. Although it is hard to determine where the affected people are living, one suspects that they are forced to live in overcrowded circumstances damaging to physical and mental health. (Mitchell, 1978, p. 1)

The decrease in low-cost housing related to another significant housing issue: the displacement of large numbers of inner-city residents from project target areas. This displacement restricted project grantees' abilities to plan activities for a stable client population. Displacement was a function of urban renewal projects or the result of land speculation where relatively cheap lands were bought to renovate buildings, build new apartment complexes, or construct shopping centers. Residents forced to move held few expectations of ever returning to the areas they were forced to vacate. In Dallas, large redevelopment plans were carried out in a number of target communities, with little planning for the relocation of the displaced residents. In Seattle, residents who organized a coalition group to resist displacement were cautioned about the

effects on area residents of the higher rents to be charged for replacement housing:

Finally the city must take some responsibility to stop rent gouging that is taking place. Rent increases have gotten out of hand and they must be stabilized before all low-income people are forced out of Seattle. (Seattle Urban Displacement Coalition, 1979, p. 3)

Similarly, residents in Venice expressed the feeling of being overpowered by the redevelopment of the bordering city of Marina del Rey into a largely commercial setting. Expensive condominiums built there contrasted with the low rent apartments and multi-family housing units of Venice. Residents of Venice, apprehensive about inevitable rent increases and skyrocketing values of land, engaged in a prolonged battle against expansion of condominium and commercial development. Concern about the changing land use patterns in the Venice area was shared by the grantee project. Within the prevention project, attempts were made to sensitize project youth to issues of redevelopment and how it affected their own living situations.

While the various influences of housing-related factors affected grantee projects operations, the grantees did not focus their efforts on these housing conditions. While some grantees sponsored neighborhood beautification or building-renovation activities or recruited public housing residents, most of the grantees did not specifically address the area of housing in their prevention efforts. As a Seattle project administrator pointed out:

If this was a Model City or OEO-sponsored project, housing strategies would be considered. On the other hand, if that were one of the major focuses, we would be in a very frustrating situation. Within four years, ordinary houses have doubled in price. There have been city-wide coalitions and the Mayor's priority is on housing but little improvement has occurred. (Seattle Project Correspondence, 18 June 1979, p. 2)

Transportation

A common feature of many target communities is their physical isolation from neighboring communities and from service centers. Rural communities offer the most striking examples of this problem. Typically, these projects served several small communities spread over wide expanses. In Tuskegee, target communities are as far as 120 miles apart. Other rural projects sites are as far as 80 miles apart; one was 50 miles away from the grantee's central administrative office.

Rural grantees often cited lack of transportation as a critical problem for project operations because of the wide territory to be covered. Staff members were often placed in the position of using their own vehicles to transport youth. Even when vans or buses were procured by grantees to provide transportation as part of project services, funds for mileage and gasoline were limited, as were staff resources.

Very often towns are accessible only by poorly constructed or unpaved roads that were difficult, if not impossible, to cross during inclement weather. In poverty conditions where few residents own cars, the lack of public transportation aggravates the mobility problem. In Fort Peck, for example, only in 1977 was a limited bus system finally acquired, where two buses

traverse the 70-mile reservation.

Various program components of rural grantees were affected by transportation difficulties. In Fort Peck, where youth are isolated and have little opportunity for outside exposure, one program strategy sought to broaden youths' perspectives by taking them outside their communities. The critical importance of instilling cultural and ethnic pride in project youth necessitated exposing youth to Indian culture and historical sites at other Indian reservations. Transportation costs to provide youth with exposure to areas outside their communities were often prohibitive.

Transportation resources of the OJJDP projects were limited. Conflicts in demand for means of transportation sometimes meant cancellation of planned service activities. In Tuskegee, where some target communities were one and a half hours away from each other, the occurrence of joint community youth activities severely taxed the project because of necessary staff time to provide transportation for youth from the many remote target communities. Failing to provide extensive transportation services would have eliminated possibilities for some key project components.

Lack of transportation was a key problem for clients of urban projects as well. For example, a number of Dallas target communities were difficult to reach. One Dallas community was inaccessible by public transportation. Another agency's facility was located some distance from a bus stop. Youth from the West Dallas community had to take a city bus to downtown

Dallas, transfer to another bus taking them to the community where the project was located, and then walk to the service facility. Where public transportation was deficient, grantees often provided transportation to bring youth from outside locations to sites of project activities. In Marietta, where public transportation was unavailable, youth participation in service activities would have been unlikely without transportation services provided by the grantee.

The sorts of physical barriers contributing to transportation needs are, ironically, sometimes a function of the design or locations of major transportation arteries. A major physical boundary that isolates West Dallas from the downtown area is a freeway loop (and a large river bed). The town of Marietta is surrounded by an extensive highway system that one can easily use to travel to the nearest large city by car, but there are no buses or trains for public use. The lack of public transportation severely handicapped poor Black community residents of Marietta who required transportation in order to acquire jobs, gain job skills, or secure needed social services.

Certain transportation-related issues emerged as a result of mandatory school busing involving youth from the projects' target communities. The effects of busing on client attendance in program activities was a key issue. Implementation of new busing plans or changes in old ones meant that expected youth clients would not spend much time in their own communities. Grantee staff believed that the transportation time involved in

busing youth from schools back to their home communities kept youth away from service facilities during prime service periods. Staff at the Seattle site contended that youth were travelling home from schools in other areas instead of participating in grantee activities. Busing of youth also raised questions regarding the appropriate clients to be served by the projects. In Dallas, appropriate client eligibility criteria were expanded to accommodate changes brought about by busing.

Despite the grantees' general inattention to community variables in their original program designs, the community settings of the projects were highly dynamic and deeply influenced project operations and community youth. In fact, social and economic problems in the target communities were regarded by numerous grantees as contributing to the occurrence of delinquency among youth in those communities. Whether theoretical or strategic principles were formulated to connect these or other variables to delinquency among community youth represents a final contextual issue.

Theories and Technologies

Chapter Two of this report calls attention to the extremely unsettled state of delinquency theory and the numerous competing claims about prevention practices, that provided grantees little direction for structuring project activities. The field of delinquency prevention is, of course, not alone in having seriously underdeveloped theories. Many writers about human services point out similar problems which prevent real advances

in practice. For example, in his text Managing the Human Service Organization, Steiner discusses the scarcity of reliable information:

... the body of knowledge about cause-effect relations available to most human service organizations is at best partial and inconclusive. This is particularly the case when a body of knowledge relates to the nonphysical attributes of the persons being processed and changed. Although the "technological revolution" has increased this body of knowledge, human service organizations still grope very much in darkness when their task is to change the attributes and behavior of people. This is due not only to the partial and fragmented development of reliable and valid knowledge, but also to the problems of translating abstract and complex principles into actual operating procedures.... Moreover, many of these principles or change models assume that the organization can control and neutralize so-called "exogenous" variables, which it rarely can. (Steiner, 1977, p. 14)

Even in the face of uncertain knowledge and intervention practices, it is crucial, as Steiner points out, that an "organization develop a series of working assumptions ... that are then reified in its technology, although the factual validity of these assumptions may vary considerably." The adoption by agencies of a set of working assumptions should dictate what services will be offered. In addition, clarity about underlying premises facilitates systematic decision making for almost all aspects of agency functioning. » .

Examples abound in the delinquency literature of the consequences for programs lacking theory to guide their practices. (Elliot, 1979) Such programs produced no appreciable impact on delinquency, and their services were often inappropriate for their targeted clients. As discussed in

Chapter Two, the lack of prevention theory has negatively affected the functioning of specific projects and has hindered development of the field as a whole. Only through careful testing of intervention practices based on available knowledge will fruitless approaches be abandoned and useful strategies be perfected. As Elliot has observed:

Traditional descriptions of the developmental process for delinquency prevention or treatment programs (CAR, 1976; Klein, 1979; Stanford Research Consortium, 1976; VanMaanen, 1979; Riecken and Boruch, 1974; Cain and Hollister, 1972) typically involve something like the following sequence:

- (1) a causal model or theoretical paradigm which identifies a set of variables (attributes, relationships or circumstances) connected by some logical process to delinquent behavior;
- (2) the identification of a set of program activities or interventions which are designed to manipulate these causal variables;
- (3) the implementation of the program with these manipulations operationalized as program objectives;
- (4) information feedback during operation to determine if the program activities are, in fact, occurring and the objectives being met (process evaluation);
- (5) feedback to determine if the realization of these program objectives is having the theoretically expected effect on delinquency (impact evaluation); and
- (6) the modification of the theoretical paradigm and/or the program activities and objectives as suggested by the process and impact evaluations so as to increase the program's effectiveness in reducing delinquency.

This process involves an experimental approach to program development and evaluation. This approach provides a logic for interpreting specific impact results, accumulating evidence relative to the validity and utility of the theoretical paradigm employed, and documenting the utility of specific program activities or interventions. If one or more of the first four of these elements is missing, the interpretation of impact evaluation results

becomes problematic, there is no accumulated knowledge concerning the validity of the theoretical paradigm, and the utility of specific program activities remains unknown. (Elliot, 1979, pp. 1-2)

Unfortunately, adherence or even attention to theoretical formulations about delinquency was not part of project operations for the OJJDP grantees in this initiative. Inattention to theory was further complicated for most grantees because they were not experienced in operating delinquency prevention programs and possessed few developed agency technologies to fit the demands of their new projects. Projects had serious difficulties in identifying clients, making service decisions, setting goals, and making needed program alterations. For most grantees, the lack of theory resulted in their return to traditional services rather than the innovative techniques hoped for by OJJDP.

Confusion Over the Role of Theory

The major objective of the OJJDP program was, "to develop and implement new approaches, techniques, and methods to prevent juvenile delinquency." This could be considered a subtle suggestion that only small degrees of progress were made by past efforts. Far from suggesting the abandonment of theory in project development, OJJDP appeared to encourage applicants to incorporate existing theoretical and empirical data in their proposals. The Background Paper that supplemented OJJDP's program guidelines suggested that:

In order to achieve a useful degree of success [in

prevention of delinquency], ways must be found to deal with the causes of delinquency among contemporary youth and disrupt the sequence of events that result in wrongdoing. The design of prevention strategies to do this can be guided by our knowledge of the origins of delinquency behavior. (OJJDP Program Announcement, 1976)

The Background Paper offered 11 pages of discussion of current knowledge upon which applicants could build.

In spite of this seeming recognition of the import of delinquency theory, OJJDP's guidelines did not require applicants to explicate or even identify the theoretical basis of their proposed projects. That the OJJDP guidelines failed to require applicants to spell out their theoretical assumptions was largely responsible for proposals that contained no articulated theories of delinquency causation. Grantees rarely developed their rationales for services or types of clients to be reached. Nor did they explain how their project components were designed to intervene in processes leading to delinquent behavior. The national technical assistance provider for the OJJDP prevention program has suggested what might be a preferable framework for these projects:

In light of the current state of delinquency theory and practice and the intent to advance practice, we propose that delinquency prevention inherently is an experimental undertaking, to which experimental procedures should be applied. Experimentation is not a permissive idea. While a deliberate diversity often is desirable in the experimental mode, experimentation is not a call for attempting every sort of thing that someone can think of in the hope of finding something that works. Moreover, there are lines of programming that still are being supported by significant resources, that have been found both theoretically and practically fruitless in repeated trials, and that ought to be abandoned promptly in favor of more promising approaches.

In contrast to the prevalent pattern of widely diverse practice and minimal evaluation, experimentation calls for repeated, systematic attempts to assess the current theory and evidence, to choose a few of the most promising approaches, to apply those approaches methodically in programs, to evaluate them well and thoroughly, and to use information about processes and outcomes to decide whether what was tried should be abandoned, refined and tried again, or expanded. In contrast to diverse repetitious, unevaluated practice, the object is to try a few approaches rigorously enough to find out what works and what does not. (OJJDP, April 1979, p. 25)

Given that national program guidelines were drawn broadly to accommodate a wide variety of project approaches, the underlying assumptions of the individual projects and not the overall program strategies should have constituted the primary subjects of testing. Since the theoretical basis for projects was not articulated, it was often unclear what a project was demonstrating.

The minor role played by delinquency theory in project development cannot be totally explained by the fact that OJJDP did not explicitly ask for theoretical statements. It might be expected that agencies with such extensive experience in youth services would have structured their projects around some theoretical stance on their own volition.

Most of these agencies were entering an area that was outside their direct realm of service experience. They were largely unfamiliar with the literature in the delinquency field and possessed only cursory familiarity with past delinquency prevention practices. Many grantees felt it was not their role to supply detailed theoretical statements that might have

required employing academic expertise. When questioned about program theory, project directors repeatedly responded that theoretical guidance for the projects was the responsibility of OJJDP. Some directors saw the OJJDP prevention program as a whole, constituting OJJDP's philosophical approach to prevention. For example, one project director pointed out:

Within the RFP they mentioned virtually every prominent delinquency theory ever but the bottom line to OJJDP very clearly was that youth within certain target areas were "high risk" youth; OJJDP wanted a practical, non-theoretical approach. (Boston Project Correspondence, 9 April 1979)

Most prominent among the explanations given for lack of theory proposals was that many grantees interpreted the Background Paper (appended to the OJJDP Program Announcement) as a statement of OJJDP's official delinquency prevention theory. These grantees felt confident that grant application implied agreement with the theoretical statements presented in the Background Paper. Typical of comments from grantees were:

Well, to be quite honest, we simply accepted the theory that LEAA gave us. (Dallas, Field Notes)

In this case, the program announcement from LEAA contained 11 pages on theoretical assumptions related to juvenile delinquency. It was our impression that by applying for a grant based on these regulations, we were stating that we subscribed to these assumptions and no additional theoretical treatment was therefore necessary. (UNCA Project Correspondence, 5 July 1979)

The Background Paper

In its "Background Paper" OJJDP was not attempting to present its official position on delinquency theory nor trying to prescribe a particular set of prevention techniques emanating from one theoretical stance. The document represented OJJDP's recognition of the need to provide delinquency prevention information to the types of agencies expected to apply for this program. But, in reading the document, it is easy to imagine how applicants could have interpreted the paper's contents as a brief for the author's concept of the positive youth development approach to delinquency prevention. As noted earlier, a number of agency administrators fashioned their prevention projects around the concepts and ideas contained in the paper.

A paper attempting to encapsulate a vast amount of delinquency literature in 11 pages will inevitably omit some important points and misstate others. Despite the extensive literature research done for the Background Paper, it did indeed contain misinterpretations and omissions of key delinquency concepts. This was especially critical because agencies with little prior experience in delinquency prevention depended on this document for project development. It is plausible that some of the distorted theoretical perspectives about prevention may have contributed to inadequacies in grantee projects.

In a section titled "Delinquency Prevention Overview," the Background Paper classifies past prevention efforts according to three major foci:

1) The individual approach "focuses on the pathology of the individual as a contributing factor; it includes the identification of emotional, motivational, and attitudinal factors that could explain delinquency ... in general, advocates of prevention from the individual perspective see psychotherapy, social casework, individual counseling, or behavior therapy as the means by which clients will be able to resolve their personality conflicts and assume a positive orientation toward society."

2) The environmental approach "views situational conditions as the dominant factor in stimulating and perpetuating delinquent activity. This approach assumes that their cultural and social systems produce reactions in individuals which cause them either to conform to, or deviate from, legitimate standards. It further assumes that the delinquent behavior of youth ... can be reduced by remodeling and reorganizing " Examples of past programs mentioned in this category included: (a) community-wide mobilizations to offset social and family disorganizations and to get community service providers to better meet the needs of youth, (b) enhancing the opportunities for youth to gain access to jobs and educational programs, and (c) increasing community tolerance of youthful acting-out behavior and increasing a youth's attachment to social norms through concerted community action.

3) The third theoretical approach emphasized the labeling process which contends that "criminal careers develop because youth are stigmatized as deviant by social control agencies. This negative experience itself stimulates youth offenses and perpetuates a cycle that frequently carries into adulthood. Advocates of this position favor changes in social policies which would minimize intervention in the lives of so-called delinquents and increase equity in the dispensation of justice.

This overview offered a fair representation of major delinquency prevention approaches and the rationales for each. The remainder of the paper, however, could best be characterized as advocating the benefits of the individual approach. The paper appropriately points out that no prevention approach has been documented as having an impact on delinquency. The paper goes on to state that "many programs were nonetheless concerned

with filling in gaps and deficiencies in youth lives which are highly correlated with delinquency. Programs of this sort at least appear to be aimed at the right targets." The author offers no support for this assertion. Moreover, while the statement is open to numerous interpretations, there is no further explanation of this highly influential remark. Readers are given no clue to the types of programs or gaps and deficiencies in youths' lives or how these are highly correlated with delinquency. The focus was placed on services consistent with the individual approach. Agencies whose work was primarily oriented toward direct services to youth found this a comfortable premise.

The primacy of the individual approach to prevention is further strengthened in a subsequent section called "Program Considerations." Here the author notes that no single approach has been "demonstratively successful" in preventing delinquency. The author goes on to suggest:

This does not mean, however, that action should be deferred until high-confidence solutions have been found. Rather, it means that modest expectations are in order: if we are as yet unable to solve the problem, we can at least provide services that are going to be part of the eventual solution, and which have the added virtue of being intrinsically valuable services for children in high-risk communities. (OJJDP, 1976)

Again, the readers are told that services exist that contribute to delinquency prevention and that these services are of intrinsic value to youth. Examples of these direct services are provided by the author. No examples are given that illustrate

the value of community strategies or programs oriented towards institutional change. The focus on direct services to individuals is further reinforced by the author's insinuation that correcting major social structural and institutional problems are not of direct concern:

The examples of pertinent services just cited point to a third major consideration: that there are many important improvements which can be made in high-risk environments without massive infusions of dollars. Even while fundamental problems like unemployment, inadequate housing, and racial discrimination are being addressed on a much broader scale, it is possible to make concrete improvements in the life of a child in a high-risk environment. Human resources are the indispensable ingredient for many of these services, not buildings or equipment. (OJJDP, 1976)

The Background Paper implies that by attempting to offer valuable services to youth, agencies can transcend the competing claims surrounding theoretical and practical aspects of prevention programming:

In all these cases, an explicit rationale linking the service to delinquency-preventing influences can be developed even if it is also true for all these cases, that a single delinquency-preventing influence may not be adequate to prevent delinquency. The underlying logic may be most directly expressed in the following way: Until that time when we know how to fine-tune programs to prevent delinquency, let us at least provide the services which are known to be important to the normal, positive development of the child. (Original emphasis) (OJJDP, 1976)

It may have been valuable for uninformed applicants to know that this position is itself a competing claim that should be balanced against other widely held opinions such as the following:

... we join with others who have recently argued fairly pessimistically about juvenile correctional endeavors. A basic fact of life which is of crucial import to efforts of this kind is that the causes of delinquency are not entirely understood, so that current treatment or prevention activities are a form of "tinkering" rather than skilled social engineering. Also, some serious ethical issues arise when we propose to intervene in the lives of many misbehaving youths, thus the best approach to delinquency would appear to be "conservative," in at least one sense. There may be little warrant for efforts to expand the size of the target population for intervention efforts. (Gibbons, 1976, p. 8)

Under the banner of "positive development of the child," almost any service can be offered to youth and an "explicit rationale linking the services to delinquency-preventing influences can be developed." Such a position relegates delinquency theory to an afterthought. Moreover, such an approach raises serious questions about delinquency prevention as a concept, since almost any activity done with youth that is not patently harmful fits within this conception. Interviews with project staffs revealed that little significance was placed on developing a clear concept of delinquency prevention. Comments such as the following were frequently heard:

I don't do delinquency prevention. I do positive youth development however I can. (Boston, Field Notes)

The Background Paper hinged its position on the "positive youth development approach." As explained in the paper: "'Positive youth development' is an approach that cuts across the three categories of causality previously reviewed (individual, environmental, and definitional)." The paper

points out the several formulations of positive youth development which includes activities such as providing youth with socially acceptable, responsible, and personally gratifying roles, as well as encouraging social institutions to assist to create these roles by changing standard practices. But in a section entitled Positive Youth Services Approaches, intended to suggest service techniques, there is a return to the focus on individually-oriented direct services:

Many elements of the positive approach to delinquency prevention can be fostered by providing a variety of direct services to youth. These services may be grouped into two subcategories: those focusing on adolescents, and those focusing on providing youth with marketable skills and increased opportunity in society so that they have some stake in conformity. (OJJDP, 1976)

In presenting the case for direct services, the paper takes elements of environmental change theories out of context and employs them to support programs focused on the individual. For example, the Background Paper cites Polk and Schafer (1972) who found delinquency to be highly correlated with school failure. Polk and Schafer also contend that delinquency is due, in large part, to negative school experiences for nonachieving youth. Their theory supports positive youth development notions for change in educational systems for all youth. The Polk and Schafer position does not support remedial education for only those youth considered to have educational problems. The Background Paper, however, gives the following as examples of school-focused programs: "Remedial programs for youth with learning disabilities, enrichment programs for cultural

groups,... peer tutoring programs for low achievers... intensive summer enrichment courses designed to improve the self-concept, school attitude, achievement, and socialization/maturation of youth."

To reiterate earlier observations, the Background Paper presents a review of a substantial amount of delinquency prevention literature. However, much of the material is only briefly discussed and gives little direction for project developers attempting to structure coherent and theory-based programs. More importantly, several important perspectives on delinquency prevention are not sufficiently explained to warrant consideration by agencies as worthwhile prevention strategies. In fact, the policy position appears heavily weighted towards individual approaches to delinquency prevention. While the paper calls attention to Lemert's (1971) contention that labelling theory implies change in the policies and practices of social control institutions, the Background Paper neglects to translate this theoretical position into concrete project examples. There is no mention of prevention activities structured as social advocacy and/or change strategies to alter the public policy of law enforcement agencies and juvenile court systems. Community development, youth advocacy, and approaches geared to reform education and employment institutions are not included. These broader structural interventions have consistently appeared in the writing of advocates for a positive youth development position.

Overall the Background Paper presented an unofficial

delinquency prevention policy position that was subject to misinterpretation and misunderstanding. The paper may have constituted a subtle brief for private youth-serving agencies to maintain their current service models. Most agencies never moved beyond their past direct service practices.

Theoretical Contributions of Grantees

The OJJDP program guidelines called for documentation of target area demographics but did not require applicants to explicate how these statistics related to their proposed projects. Most grantees accepted on faith that the variables included in proposals had some relationship to delinquency causation. Details about intervening processes connecting these factors to delinquency were not supplied. For example, a few grantees mentioned neighborhood characteristics but offered little explanation about how neighborhood features were linked to youth problems in their target areas.

A few grantees did offer greater elaboration of their view on the etiology of delinquency. For instance, the project proposal of Aspira of America presented a set of interconnected assumptions about delinquency causation and prevention in Hispanic communities which emphasized social forces in these communities. Delinquency in Hispanic communities is viewed as part of a cyclical process. Aspira argues that conventional social institutions (especially employment and educational sectors) have failed to meet the needs of Puerto Rican youth. In particular, urban social institutions have not bridged

cultural and linguistic gaps between mainstream American society and Puerto Rican communities. This inability to close these gaps leads to systematic failure among Puerto Ricans. Failure in one sector, such as schools, often leads directly to further failures, especially in the job market. The consequence of continued failure is the alienation of Hispanic youth from established institutions and norms. Youth marginally connected with conventional social institutions are more prone to become involved in illegitimate (delinquent) groups. Youthful alienation and the frequency of illegitimate behavior reduces the likelihood that conventional institutions will provide needed support. The cycle of failure and alienation becomes self perpetuating.

Some grantees de-emphasized socio-economic variables and instead focused on the absence of youth services. Delinquency is viewed as a more likely outcome in areas where accessibility, availability, or coordination of services are deficient. They propose, through capacity-building efforts, to improve the level and quality of services to decrease the likelihood of delinquency. Few explanations are provided about which criminogenic factors such services would deflect.

Project directors were interviewed to explore whether some unstated theoretical structures were guiding project operations. Some directors doubted the utility of any existing delinquency theory for their purposes. A project administrator explained:

There is no universal theory of delinquency causation. You're talking about a number of theories that get at

aspects of the whole picture. None of them have the whole picture. (Boston, Field Notes)

Another director reported:

The major fallacy is that delinquency-related theoretical construction has not adequately been tested and validated, yet sociologists push for such use as though such refinements actually existed. (Seattle Project Correspondence, 18 June 1979)

Most project directors felt there existed no single causal explanation for delinquency. An assortment of environmental and personal-psychological factors were believed to either contribute to delinquency or coexist with delinquent behavior. Principal etiologic factors cited by project staff were reminiscent of the strain and social control theories of delinquency (For discussion of theories, see Hirschi, 1969). Variables critical to the labelling perspective and culture conflict theory were mentioned less frequently (See Empey, 1978). Unemployment, lack of opportunities, poverty, difficulties in school, boredom, idleness, poor self-image, alienation, powerlessness, negative value systems in the communities, peer pressures, and negative labelling constituted a standard menu of etiologic factors cited by project administrators. The following excerpts illustrate grantees' statements on delinquency causation and prevention.

Project A

NCCD:

What do you think causes delinquency and how closely related are your programs to those ideas?

Respondent 1:

Economics is definitely a major factor that contributes.

Thirty percent of our budget is directed towards [employing] youth. Lack of parental involvement is another. We want youth to learn coping skills which enable them to deal with a hostile environment, and with stressful situations.

Respondent 2:

It would be erroneous to say that there would be one thing that causes delinquency. Clearly it's a variety of things. As a consequence, there is a variety of attacks we can make. By the end of the first year we may want to reorient our emphasis.

Maladaptive behavior may result from a lack of money for some, for some a lack of coping skills which is especially evident in schools and for others an inability to deal with stressful situations such as a death in the family. So I think what we are trying to do is address all of these things.

NCCD:

Why did you start focusing on the issues of usefulness and competency as fundamental assumptions guiding the development of the program?

Respondent 2:

There is a pervasive feeling among 'em that there's nothing they can do that's useful.

(Venice, Field Notes)

Project BNCCD:

What are the fundamental ideas and assumptions that guided the development of this program?

Respondent 1:

There is a lack of services in those counties. First we had the adult programs. Those had the parents, school administrators, etc. They pointed out the vandalism and the fact that the kids had nothing to do. Since then we have worked with youth in prevention. This emerged from the school administrators, the media, and the PTA. We got together with them to talk about the proposal...

We plan to provide positive alternatives to negative acts and hope to have some effect on somebody's child in the next few years.

As for specific causes, there is nothing to do ... zero out there. The communities consist of houses and a school. Integration closed all the theaters. The program is to improve the delivery of existing services and provide services where none exist. The larceny, etc. comes from having nothing to do.

(Tuskegee, Field Notes)

Project CRespondent 1:

... we want to focus in on environmental factors. I mean environmental in a large sense of the word. We identified five service areas each of which was alluded to in the background paper that LEAA gave us ... employment, education, family support, individual counseling, and recreation.

NCCD:

Of the five which do you personally feel are most important?

Respondent 1:

Of the five I think I could summarize them under two general factors. One is self-esteem and another is constructive use of time. I think both are important and that they feed each other. Most of the kids we see now

have low self-esteem and have had problems at a very early age. Learning disabilities is a big factor. I think the values that are inculcated in schools and environment plays a very big part. And when they reach the age where they can participate in employment and education activities, the lack of opportunities plays a very big part there. And if they can't find anything to do constructively with their time they are going to get into trouble.

NCCD:

What about the negative labeling factor you mentioned in the proposal?

Respondent 1:

Well, I think it's part of the self-esteem problem. If kids are told they are bad enough there's going to be a self-fulfilling prophecy there. They are told they are dumb--there is a formal process of that in the schools and we also adjudicate kids as delinquent.

NCCD:

Do you see delinquency as a progressive type of thing?

Respondent 1:

I see it as both episodic and progressive. And I think the episodic type has to do with environmental factors. Running away does not happen because of increasing severity--it happens because something is wrong in the youngster's life, and he needs to correct but doesn't know how. But it's progressive in that the older a person gets the larger the opportunities are and the more there is at stake, causing severe consequences to themselves.

NCCD:

Is there any one thing that really stands out above everything else?

Respondent 2:

The thing that stands out the most is the lack of coordination among the various youth-serving agencies.

Respondent 1:

I think so too. There are lots of resources here and connections are not being made. Every service that we have talked about is being provided in some form here in

Dallas. But I don't think it's always serving the right people or the people who need it the most.

(Dallas, Field Notes)

Project D

Respondent 1:

Well, there are a number of things that can cause delinquency. We concluded that a lot of the young people have a low or wrong set of values. Too, there is a great deal of lack of family stability and parental discipline. I am not talking about abuse! I am talking about the ability of the family to steer their children in the right direction. We have had extensive work moving into the problems of a community, let us say in the city of Washington, where 600 units were put up adjacent to where our neighborhood center was. There was one family out of 600, or 599 one-parent families. We knew from our experience there, that the breakup of a family was a major contributing factor to juvenile delinquency. Other deficiencies in education -- maybe no motivation, there may be a deficiency in family training in religious training. There may be many contributing factors, but the fact of the matter is the behavior appears, and the inducement to drugs and the behavior that is foreign to proper citizenship in under-adult-aged people.

A combination of things have been brought to bear on delinquents which have been a cause -- of course, not in every community are the causes identical, but there are some kinds of factors. Given these factors, we felt that because we were relating to people with various kinds of activities and as a consequence of that and getting to know the families and helping in the family situation, that we were ideally structured to involve ourselves in this particular project because what you are trying to do is reduce the incidents that involve the juvenile with the court.

(Marietta, Field Notes)

There is no evidence that grantees consistently applied any set of theoretical assumptions about delinquency, either explicit or implicit, to guide program planning or day-to-day operations. Few staff were aware of, or necessarily shared,

theoretical assumptions held by project administrators. In some cases, general agreement among staff about the causes of delinquency provided some unifying guidance. For instance, given severe poverty conditions and near total lack of social and recreational services in the Tuskegee communities, project staff overwhelmingly emphasized youth idleness or lack of constructive use of time as the major contributors to delinquency. Staff were in almost total agreement that providing "wholesome" activities for youth would help prevent delinquency.

In Fort Peck, where a change in project administrators occurred, the lack of a theoretical framework left the new administrator with the task of inferring the original project assumptions. During his new administration staff relied heavily on their personal views of delinquency. Staff conceptions about prevention ranged from preventing idleness, to instilling discipline and instructing youth on setting life goals.

An exception to the lack of theoretical direction occurred at a number of projects serving primarily clients from a single ethnic minority group. While none of these projects articulated a position explicitly connecting delinquency to the effects of racism on target area youth, such a position was clearly at the root of most of their activities. Services at these projects did not differ greatly from other projects, but service delivery methods emphasized the need to prepare youths to cope with life situations structured by racism. Programming at projects such as those of Aspira and El Centro in Boston were guided by the

need to counteract specific educational, employment, family, and other problems experienced by Hispanics as an ethnic minority. In other cases, service approaches were deliberately structured to help counteract the effects of racism on youth self-perceptions and attitudes. In the youth leadership development component of the Tuskegee project, service activities for youth resonate with the following maxim youth were encouraged to recite:

I am somebody
I believe in myself
and
I believe in you
We are all brothers and sisters.

Group counseling or rap sessions often have as their themes the problems minorities will face in the majority culture or how to deal with practical problems such as discrimination in employment, education, or housing. The Marietta site and agencies in the Seattle sought through informal counseling to dispel common racial stereotypes that nurtured hostilities between project youth of different races. Employment-related service used at Fort Peck were couched in terms aimed at instructing youth about non-Indian perspectives regarding on-the-job responsibilities and codes of conduct. Teens-In-Leadership-Training (TILT) of the Boston project chose mandatory racial integration of housing projects as the social issue to focus on in its first youth leadership training series. Project events designed to foster cultural awareness and ethnic pride were often interspersed with regular project

activities. Project administrators and staff argued that such events were needed to raise self-esteem among youth clients. At Tuskegee, a mixture of entertainment and instruction was offered as cultural enrichment for project youth. Field trips, historical tours and speaking engagements by Georgia State Senator Julian Bond and Roots author, Alex Haley, were employed to enhance youth awareness of Black culture and sense of ethnic pride. In one Tuskegee community, a parent club had senior citizens relate personal experiences and community history in an attempt to expose youth to their heritage. Numerous other grantee sites with a predominantly Black clientele highlighted Black History week activities. Many of the New Jersey project activities taught youth about Puerto Rican history and culture, to combat what Aspira saw as a negative self-image among many Puerto Rican youth. Learning of and reviving lost Puerto Rican-Latino traditions was encouraged.

In most multiple-agency projects, no uniform set of theoretical assumptions on delinquency causation was shared by member agencies. Any differences in theoretical assumptions between participating agencies co-existed and appeared to have little effect on working relationships or program operations.

In regional collaboration projects, member agencies were bound by contractual agreements to achieve certain programmatic goals and standards of performance but did not adhere to a specific theory. For multi-agency projects, issues of program implementation and organizational relations were of more immediate concern than matters of delinquency theory. Member

agencies tended to operate their own programs based on disparate views of delinquency causation or prevention. Little time was spent discussing or trying to reconcile differences of "theory" between them.

Three national youth agencies formulated standardized programs to be implemented by each affiliate. But for these agencies (Aspira, Salvation Army, and UNCA) there was little evidence of strong agreement or disagreement between the national and the selected affiliate staffs' assumptions about delinquency causation. For the most part, theory was not important to the operation of service programs at the local level. Girls Clubs of America Inc. promised in its proposal a conceptual base in programs at all sites, advocating the inculcation of positive self-image in its target population. Both national and local project staff subscribed to the notion that raising self-esteem or self-image among project clients would help prevent delinquency. National and local staffs' opinions of what factors contributed to low self-esteem varied only slightly. The national project administrator, however, discounted the role of theory in directing the affiliates' programs by contrasting the relevance of theory with the more pressing need to deliver services to youth.

In its proposal, the Boys' Club discussed concepts outlined in HEW's publication, "Delinquency Prevention Through Youth Development," calling for programs giving youth access to socially acceptable, responsible, and personally gratifying roles. The Boys' Club proposal lacked a detailed specification

of this theoretical model connecting positive youth development to programming. But, during the second year of the project, national staff (along with consultants) developed a theoretical framework outlining the causes of delinquency (lack of opportunity), the preferred prevention strategies, interventions, and expected outcomes. In Richmond, notwithstanding agreement with national staff that they were engaged in "positive youth development" and "primary prevention," the logistics of service delivery remained more central to local staff than the implications of this theory.

Grantee staff possessed scattered approaches to delinquency prevention programs because clear rationales connecting project activities to delinquency reduction were not of immediate interest to them. Consistent with the disinterest among grantees in delinquency theory was the virtual absence of clear delinquency reduction goals. Some grantees cited percentage reductions in delinquency rates in their target areas. Such percentages were neither well-reasoned estimates of the projects' prevention potentials nor were they objectives that project administrators felt could be met. As one project developer stated:

What is known by the staff is that they have to go and go for the worst and do as much as they can with what they have and whatever figures that turn out to be is actual change and that is impossible to document forever.
(Marietta, Field Notes)

The delinquency reduction goals were often included as goals because the potential funding source gave instructions that such

projection be made.

Most grantees felt that they were engaged in primary prevention. They defined primary prevention as the provision of services to youth without previous or existing contact with the juvenile justice system, whose immediate environment renders them at risk of becoming delinquent. Program activities were geared to counteract a range of environmental influences on youth. A large number of grantees contended that "delinquency prevention" was too narrow a characterization of their efforts. Positive youth development projects were primarily committed to providing youth positive, socially conforming experiences and constructive skills. Reducing delinquent behavior was viewed as incidental or a by-product of their projects. Since project staff could not accurately forecast if youth in their projects would ever engage in delinquency, some staff argued it would be difficult if not impossible to specify concrete delinquency reduction goals. Instead, the program goals and objectives of the majority of the grantees centered around expanding services to youth, increasing utilization of services by youth and enlarging their own agency capacities for service provision.

Grantees' views about the causes of delinquency highlighted the role of broad social and economic problems (poverty, unemployment, etc.) but these opinions were translated into prevention strategies that provided counter-influences on youth rather than attempting to alter the criminogenic conditions in their communities. For most grantees, environmental factors helped to identify populations of youth in need of services and

to rationalize the need to expand their services. Project activities were primarily aimed at changing personal attitudes of youth such as instilling increased senses of self-esteem, belonging and control over their lives. Services also worked to upgrade educational and employment leadership skills.

Few intervention strategies tried to change social institutions or community factors that related to delinquency. For example, a few grantees discussed the relationship of negative labelling to delinquency. The findings of criminological research in the area suggest intervention strategies likely to influence policies, procedures, and practices of various socially controlled institutions (especially schools and the juvenile justice system). But, a number of grantees chose to impact negative labelling by adhering to recruitment or service procedures that de-emphasized the reality that youth were participating in a delinquency prevention project. Common was the expectation that youth services would strengthen youth self-concepts and thus counteract the effects of negative labelling by others.

In sum, grantee service priorities and goals were to provide individually based services that they believed would buffer youths' life experiences in areas beset by harsh social and economic problems. Delinquency causation or prevention theory exerted an insignificant impact on grantee program development or functioning. The effects of scarce agency resources and grim community conditions forced grantee attention to the basics of delivering services. Theory was viewed as a

luxury although the absence of clear project rationales reduced project planning to a process of trial and error. This resulted in limited project resources not being effectively employed.

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Chapter 5

GOALS

The ultimate aims of human service agencies, such as the OJJDP grantees, are rarely as straightforward as those of profit-making organizations. Goals such as mental health, social welfare, or the productivity of youth are broadly construed and subject to various interpretations. The goals themselves often fail to serve as sufficient guideposts for projects undertaken in their pursuit. This situation certainly applies to the broad goal of delinquency prevention.

The ambiguities and lack of focused activity in tasks that are observed in many human services cannot be totally eliminated by establishing a more precise set of agency goals. But sound goal-setting procedures can improve the performance of human service agencies. For example, well-defined agency goals clarify for staff the tasks to be performed for clients as well as expected work products. While total consensus on goals may be unrealistic, staff ability to work together in concerted and purposeful efforts depend on shared expectations about ultimate objectives.

Administrators commonly establish agency output goals and assess agency accomplishments against these standards.

Agency goals can also serve important ideological functions. Clearly articulated goals provide a common value system by which staff may judge the appropriateness of their

work. Agency ideology, as expressed through agency goals, helps staff decide if a particular agency can best satisfy a prospective client's needs. Moreover, formal goals announce an agency's purposes which may help to secure the cooperation of related agencies, community residents, and potential funders.

Well-conceived agency goals provide a basis for interpreting feedback on agency operations. When stated in specific and measurable terms, goals provide administrators with tools for determining whether agency operations are proceeding toward success or failure. Precise goals assist administrators to determine program areas needing improvements including the need to refocus the agency goals themselves to better fit organizational capabilities.

Unfortunately, the OJJDP failed to sufficiently articulate project goals that would have advanced their efforts to prevent delinquency. Overall, the goals established by the prevention projects were too broad to guide activities towards the problem of juvenile delinquency. In some cases project goals did not even indicate an agency interest in reducing youth crime. The need to establish clear agency direction was especially acute because most staff were new to the delinquency field.

Most projects made clear their goal to provide more services to youth. Such service objectives, however, were rarely explicitly linked to delinquency prevention. The fact that few grantees articulated a theory as the basis for their project activities resulted in goals that were little more than free floating objectives irrelevant to preventing delinquency.

Staff were generally not encouraged to develop a perspective on delinquency causation and persons outside the grantee agencies were often confused about project purposes.

Most grantee goals increased the difficulties of measuring project achievement. Many project goals were simply unmeasurable. Chapter 3 discussed the problems this caused for the national evaluation. Equally important, the lack of measureable project goals removed an effective management tool for project directors.

There is evidence that the staff and/or administrators at a number of grantees were never committed to many of their formal project goals. Project directors admitted that the goals statements were designed primarily to appeal to OJJDP as a matter of grantsmanship strategy; they never expected their projects to achieve these outcomes. Project goals were not given a great deal of attention even as broad and generalized guidelines of project direction. For example, despite the tremendous changes occurring in program context, expected clients, and anticipated community support during the first two years of grantee operations, their original goals were not significantly altered in second and third-year funding proposals.

Other sections of this report portray the context in which grantees were required to establish delinquency prevention goals for their projects. Chapter 2, for example, emphasizes the existence of a number of competing definitions of delinquency prevention. Also discussed are the inconsistencies and

contradictions found when reviewing the past efforts at prevention. Most directly affecting the goal-setting processes of grantees were the ambiguities created by information contained in OJJDP's Program Announcement and the attached Background Paper. Given this setting, establishing well-formulated and precise goals may have been a task beyond the capabilities of most grantees. Grantees needed assistance in developing firmer conceptions of delinquency prevention goals. Lacking direct experience in the delinquency field, most grantees were ill-equipped to formulate sophisticated blueprints for their prevention projects.

OJJDP Goals for the Delinquency Prevention Program

There are always difficulties in attempting to impose uniform goals on projects that must respond to vastly different environmental conditions. The OJJDP prevention program effort was expended to ensure a wide variety of community and organizational settings among grantees. What might be sensible goals for a well-established youth-serving agency in New York City might be inappropriate for a university serving rural Alabama or a youth service bureau on a Montana Native American reservation.

An equally significant justification for allowing grantees to set their own specific goals can be inferred from the OJJDP Program Announcement:

The objective of this program is to develop and implement new approaches, techniques, and methods to prevent juvenile delinquency in communities where youth are in greatest

danger of becoming delinquent through improving the abilities of not-for-profit private youth-serving agencies and organizations to implement programs which increase or expand social, cultural, educational, vocational, recreational and health services to youth.

Perhaps OJJDP assumed that the development and implementation of "new approaches, techniques, and methods to prevent juvenile delinquency" might best be encouraged by allowing diversity in intended project outcomes. The soundness of this assumption must be weighed against the kinds of agencies who received grants to operate prevention programs. They were not knowledgeable about past delinquency prevention efforts; almost all of the grantees were relatively unfamiliar with the field of delinquency prevention. These agencies possessed a tremendous amount of experience in providing services to youth but they could draw on only limited experiences that linked their services to delinquency prevention aims. Many grantees expected leadership and technical assistance from OJJDP to improve the impact of their programs. Definitive statements from OJJDP about the goals for prevention programs would have limited the scope of grantee activities from global concerns about youth to issues directly relevant to delinquency prevention. With this sharper focus, grantees would have been in a better position to structure their projects towards definite and achievable outcomes. Diversity in project design could still be encouraged among grantees attempting to reach a uniform set of specific program goals.

In the Program Announcement, OJJDP noted that the program

would seek the following results:

- a. To increase the number of youth from target communities utilizing the services of private and public not-for-profit youth-serving agencies and organizations;
- b. To increase the number and types of services available to youth in target communities through coordinative efforts among private and public youth-serving agencies;
- c. To increase the capacity of target communities to respond more effectively to the social, economic and familial needs of youth residing in target communities;
- d. To increase the capacity of national, regional and local youth-serving agencies to implement and sustain effective services to youth in target communities;
- e. To increase volunteer participation and broaden community support for delinquency prevention activities; and,
- f. To disseminate information regarding successful prevention projects for replication through national youth-serving agencies and organizations.

The Program Announcement implies that a major premise of OJJDP was that if these results were attained, delinquency could be prevented. The major concern for project operators was achieving the specific results listed by OJJDP: increasing the numbers of youth in their service populations, increasing their organizational capacities to provide youth services, and increasing the numbers of volunteers that worked in their programs. The connection of these activities to delinquency prevention was interpreted by project administrators to be mostly the concern of OJJDP and of project evaluators. As noted earlier, many project directors and staff did not view delinquency prevention as a major program consideration.

Measuring the Achievement of OJJDP Goals

During the first year of the program, OJJDP had few means to assess whether grantees were reaching the goals of the national prevention effort. Almost all grantees experienced extreme difficulties during the early stages of their projects, which resulted in delays in initiating proposed services. Also, budget restrictions in OJJDP made adequate monitoring of project activities problematic. There was an uneven amount of detail about project activities included in the regular quarterly reports submitted to OJJDP. Most quarterly reports were exceedingly brief and announced only isolated project highlights or problems in project activity. Information available to OJJDP about grantee project activity was limited from the very beginning of the national program. Although OJJDP received regular reports on client characteristics from the national evaluation, these data were not routinely employed in the monitoring process.

The earliest opportunity for comprehensive assessment of grantee progress toward OJJDP goals came with the submission of proposals for second-year funding. But these second-year proposals did not contain detailed discussions of the projects' first-year impacts. The most important function of these proposals was to provide itemized justifications for second-year budgets. OJJDP did require grantees to provide discussion of first-year objectives, including changes, progress, and remaining problems in these objectives. Grantees were required to discuss their impact on delinquency prevention, youth-serving

agencies, and youth participating in their projects.

Statistical summaries of youth participants, including the sex, race, and age of clients, were also to be contained in second-year proposals.

Responses to OJJDP's informational requests would have allowed OJJDP to judge the degree to which grantees were achieving the national program goals. In general, projects submitted information only tangentially related to assessing how project activities were directed towards their objectives. Many projects were simply unresponsive to OJJDP's request for data. None of the grantees provided a direct discussion of how first-year activities contributed to achieving the program results sought by OJJDP. The following excerpts from the second-year proposals were among the most responsive to OJJDP's informational requests:

Seattle

Demonstrated Capability Of Collaboration: Collaboration agencies, in proposing first-year programs, estimated that 1,497 youth would be served by delegate agency projects. As of May 31, 1978, over 2,200 youth had been served, and figures should increase substantially by the end of the project's first year of operation. There is no doubt that juvenile delinquency has been deterred in many instances, but the real successes of Collaboration programs will be measured in terms of enriched lives in the years to come, as the young people who have participated in these programs become productive citizens and rise above the restrictive environments in which they were reared. The Collaboration has evolved from a loose aggregation of competing agencies to an interlocking consortium of agencies with a common goal: providing services to youth that will combat juvenile delinquency in its formative stages, and this development has proven that it has the capability to struggle with and overcome sizable obstacles that interfere with youth service delivery. The Collaboration is optimistic about second-year project

results, and views the special problems that are innate in the Seattle metropolitan environment, such as transportation difficulties posed by the mandatory busing program, as challenging opportunities that are to be met head-on and solved by the group as a whole.

Boys' Clubs of America

Adjustments, Progress, and Problems for First Year: The first seven months have seen significant progress, a need for routine problem solving, and few project adjustments.

Progress has been measured by the reality that all nine local sites are now operational and nearly 800 boys and girls are being served -- the emphasis on outreach has resulted in over half the youth served being new recruits from target areas. In all but one site the numerous program elements are offered on a regular basis; many of the programs show a local capability to be innovative so we observe a blending of new programs with the more traditional activities. For example, specific programs to increase self-esteem are offered in the sites, as well as the more conventional "rap groups" and job counseling. A high calibre of committed professional, para-professional, youth and community volunteer staff is in place, but we project a need for additional training of these new "staff teams."

The local Clubs' staff and boards have shown a marked increase in their knowledge of juvenile delinquency and are initiating strategy approaches as opposed to single issue approaches witnessed in the past; most Clubs now see clearly the relationship between the project and the problem of delinquency and are constantly upgrading programs to better meet the identifiable needs of youth at risk.

Lastly, client selection has been managed well and the Clubs, in every case, are reaching out to youth at risk in an enthusiastic and successful attempt to attract problem prone teenagers.

Dallas

Impact on Participating Youth

One of the identified problems of youth services in Dallas County is the fact that there are many youth serving agencies, but no real system or mechanism exist in order

to insure that youth in need of services are provided quality services.

The Youth Services Network project is designed to serve as a clearinghouse of information regarding youth services and to "broker" youth services to troubled youth. Therefore, a youth in need of services or an agency or individual making a referral can contact the central office to obtain information regarding the services he or she needs instead of being shuffled from agency to agency. The project also utilizes a tracking system which monitors the youth being served as well as the agency providing the service. As a result, the project's staff directly impacts upon the pre-delinquent youth by acting as a youth advocate to insure that youth serving agencies are meeting the youths' needs.

Most projects documented that certain service components were initiated during the first year and provided figures on the total numbers of youth served by these components. Many projects had difficulty in presenting data about the characteristics of the clients. Even the figures for the total number of youth served are difficult to interpret because each grantee used different definitions of a unit of service. Some projects counted mass events such as disco dances or field trips to increase their estimates of clients served. Other than client data, the grantees failed to submit any other data on project progress. Most notably, grantees rarely mentioned the impact of their projects upon delinquency prevention.

The inability to evaluate their own programs in terms of concrete production measures should have alerted OJJDP that the prevention projects were not sufficiently focused to achieve the expected results established by federal officials. This finding was explicitly presented to OJJDP by the Westinghouse National Issues Center in its Six-Month Technical Assistance Plan

(August, 1978). Based on reviews of project documents and on site discussions with project staff, Westinghouse staff concluded:

A review of the information generated during the technical assistance needs assessment process indicates that many of the Special Emphasis Grant projects do not have clear goal and objective statements to guide them in project planning and implementation. Moreover, in many instances, goals and objectives do not reflect a clear understanding or conscious incorporation of delinquency prevention theory.

Further findings of Westinghouse were:

Formal project goal statements often are vague; in many instances they simply repeat the language contained in the Special Emphasis Grant announcement.

The implicit goals of project staff often are at variance with the goal statements contained in the grant application; in several instances, implicit goals and objectives extend beyond the scope of the workplans formally approved by OJJDP.

Frequently, objective statements are not clearly related to project goals; few reflect levels of accomplishment that can be realistically attained; many are not measurable.

Such findings indicate that grantees were having difficulty working towards goals they had established for themselves let alone that their activities were reaching the more demanding objectives set by OJJDP.

Unfortunately, the information from both the Westinghouse report and, of course, the projects' second-year proposals were received by OJJDP after instructions were sent to grantees for the submission of second-year proposals. If OJJDP had known the extent of grantees difficulties with program and individual

project goals, the reapplication process could have been employed to sharpen the focus of all grantees on the OJJDP's objectives. In its instructions to grantees, OJJDP could have (1) restated its program goals, (2) clarified the performance objectives that projects were expected to meet, and (3) specified how projects should document their progress toward OJJDP goals and objectives. The reapplication period was an appropriate time to demand that grantees assess their directions and reanalyse these directions toward suitable goals.

There were other ways OJJDP might have indicated its concern with project compliance with OJJDP objectives. For example, communication between OJJDP project monitors and project administrators should have made grantees aware that their projects were not demonstrating an ability to meet OJJDP's national program objectives. The national technical assistance contractor could have helped establish well-specified project goals relating to the aims of OJJDP. There is little evidence that OJJDP monitors raised issues of project goal statements or the relationship of project activities to OJJDP objectives during the program's first year. Only three grantees made formal requests for technical assistance to clarify project goals and objectives. Goal setting did not materialize as a major technical assistance offering.

Midway into the second year of the prevention program, grantees received materials from OJJDP that should have removed any doubts that they were accountable for achieving the original OJJDP program objectives. For example, a letter sent in March,

1979, by the Director of the Special Emphasis Division contained the following:

As you know, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Program Announcement "Programs to Prevent Juvenile Delinquency" issued in November, 1976, provided for two year funding in annual increments. In the interest of facilitating institutionalization of successful programs, we have set aside a small amount of money for a third year for those programs which have been most successful in meeting the program's objective.

This objective was to develop and implement new approaches, techniques and methods to prevent juvenile delinquency in communities where youth are in greatest danger of becoming delinquent through improving the abilities of not-for-profit private youth-serving agencies and organizations to implement programs which increase or expand social, cultural, educational, vocational, recreational and health services to youth.

Program funds for a third year will be allocated on a competitive basis, and projects will be assessed in relation to the extent to which the program objectives have been met and the results sought have been achieved.

Based upon each project's work schedule and stated objectives, projects will be assessed in relation to the degree to which the results outlined in the Program Announcement have been achieved.

It should not have surprised grantees that their funding agency wanted its own objectives met. For many grantees, the above letter brought the first realization that their project activities were closely tied to the OJJDP objectives listed in the original Program Announcement. Most grantees had not even geared their activities to measure the degree the OJJDP objectives were being met.

Instructions given to grantees for applications for third-year funding gave ample evidence that prior vague descriptions of goals achievement were not unnoticed by OJJDP.

The instructions strongly urged grantees to provide much more detailed information about past accomplishments and goals for future activities. Applications for third-year funding must include:

A description of the achievements in the previous program years which details the degree to which the project has met the specific results sought in the Program Announcement (Programs to Prevent Juvenile Delinquency, November, 1976), and presented according to the following outline. The attached table should be used for summary purposes.

A. Increase in the number of youth from target communities utilizing the services of private and public not-for-profit youth-serving agencies and organizations.

This should include specific information regarding the number of youth projected to be served in the original proposal and numbers actually served. Provide an explanation if there is a variance in these figures. Identify and discuss the characteristics of the youth population served during the first two years of the project. Refer to the Program Announcement for a description of the intended target population and discuss whether or not your project has deviated from this target population requirement. Describe the out-reach mechanisms used in involving the target population.

B. Increase in the number and types of services available to youth in target communities through coordinated efforts among private and public youth-serving agencies.

This should include information regarding implementation and utilization of components. Indicate by whom and how they were implemented, i.e., contracts, and memoranda of agreement. Provide specifics about the number of youth served by each component, date when each component became operational, and staffing changes. Discuss management of the components which were new or expanded.

Discuss corresponding successes or problems.

C. Increase in the capacity of target communities to respond more effectively to the social, economic and

familial needs of youth residing in the target communities.

This should include information regarding specific community involvement in project activities and organizational activities carried out. Describe those activities specifically designed to facilitate the communities' ability to support and sustain improved and expanded services to youth. Identify and describe any changes in the ways in which community human services agencies plan and respond to youth needs, ways in which justice system agencies process youth from the target community, ways in which relationships between human services agencies and justice system agencies may have changed since the projects were initiated.

D. Increase in the capacity of national, regional and local youth-serving agencies to implement and sustain effective services in the target communities.

This should include information regarding changes in policies and operating procedures of participating and related agencies. Identify resources now available at the national or local levels which support more effective services delivered which were not previously available. Describe performance for each site and fully discuss activities at the national or local level which have focused upon increasing capacity to deliver services to the target population for this program.

E. Increase in volunteer participation and broadened community support for delinquency prevention activities.

Provide specifics regarding numbers, training, technical assistance and utilization of volunteers in your project site(s).

F. Dissemination of information regarding successful prevention projects for replication through national youth serving agencies and organizations. (national organizations only)

Include samples of informational releases, descriptions of program models which you anticipate replicating.

It is difficult to imagine a more explicit request for grantees to provide detailed information about accomplishments

sought by OJJDP. Still, many grantees submitted only brief and very general discussions of how their project activities related to OJJDP objectives. Other grantees gave extensive detail about project activities, but often failed to provide any assessments of how activities related to OJJDP's goals.

As with the second-year proposals, the third-year applications contained specific data about client totals for their projects. Most grantees reported they met or greatly exceeded the number of youth they had originally proposed to serve. The OJJDP's ability to use client totals to measure project performance was severely diminished because few projects possessed standard definitions of what constituted a client or a unit of service. For some grantees, a presentation by a project staff member before a high school audience containing 400 youth was counted as 400 clients added to the project's service population. Other projects required only slightly more active participation, such as playing in one basketball game, to count as youth served. But, some projects would only consider youth who were actively participating in a fairly well-defined intervention program as their clients. A few grantees attempted to define mandatory participation in certain services for youth to be considered clients although youth who were less involved were routinely included in client totals. There was a mixture of all types of client participation among the grantees' service populations. Grantees largely neglected discussions of service intensity in their reports to OJJDP.

Grantees varied in the amounts of information provided to

OJJDP to describe their progress. Some grantees provided only barebones descriptions of activities. For example, the Salvation Army gave the following account of achievements in project years 1 and 2 about how the project increased the capacity of target communities to respond to social, economic, and familial needs of youth.

This project has increased the capacity of target communities to respond more effectively to the social, economic and familial needs of youth residing in target communities. Community residents and youth participate as members of a community council established especially for each site. Target area youth of the project participate as members of a youth council at each site. The Peer Expressive and Volunteer Familial Interaction components are designed for, and have allowed community youth and families, direct input into the site programming and activities. Target site youth and adults along with site staff work together and have advocated for community change with success. Changes in the way community human service and justice system agencies plan and respond to youth needs have been facilitated by each site. Non-funded affiliative agreements and inter-agency referral systems have been established.

The Gulfport site organized a coalition of agencies working with youth. The Ponca City site in response to community desires opened a Teen Center when the local recreation center was closed. The Pensacola site has recently opened a vocational activities center which will provide alternative learning experiences and settings for school age children (ages 13-15) who are either not functioning or not attending the traditional school system. They also are playing an important part in a community based program. All of these examples were responses to the voice of the community as to what needs that particular target site had at that time.

Responses from other grantees did provide the specific data requested by OJJDP. These responses accounted for a substantial portion of the grantees' third-year proposals. The descriptive information provided often presented vivid pictures of project

activities, but less detail was offered about goal attainment.

Formally Stated Goals of Delinquency Prevention

Statements made by project administrators throughout the course of the national evaluation raise serious doubt that formal impact goals of any type were of great significance to the daily operations of grantees. For example, when asked if the proposed project objectives seemed feasible, an administrator at the Venice site responded:

In one way I don't think they were ever feasible. There's a very practical problem with writing objectives in proposals. No matter what you write, it's always "pie in the sky." When you're talking about a two-year primary prevention program, there's no way in the amount of time with the amount of [limited] access we have to young people, that we can change them around. The amount of time that we have and the impact that we are trying to make in assisting people are really inconsistent. It's possible that there will be an "appearance" of fulfillment of objectives. I just feel that the real objectives are the process objectives; the methodology, the interface. That we're working with the young people and they know that we care about them, given the amount of time that we have, may be the most important thing. (Venice, Field Notes)

There is a great deal of evidence that few grantees gave serious consideration to achieving delinquency prevention objectives. As noted earlier, it cannot be assumed that delinquency reduction was an objective of each grantee. A number of grantees, did formally list delinquency prevention among their proposed goals and objectives. In a review of grantee technical assistance needs, Westinghouse found:

Crime reduction objectives appear primarily to have been placed in the applications as a formality; many projects

expressed concern about being held accountable for reducing community delinquency levels.

NCCD's interviews with project staff substantiate the Westinghouse finding.

Of the eleven intensively evaluated sites, seven made explicit statements concerning delinquency reduction in their proposals (New Jersey, Richmond, Dallas, Fort Peck, Marietta, Akron, and Venice). In the Dallas proposal, reference to delinquency reduction is clearly more an ideological value than an attempt to set a project performance goal. No percentage figures for delinquency reduction or other standards are offered. Dallas simply proposed "to reduce the number of delinquent types of behavior committed by juveniles in the target communities." Although this statement on delinquency reduction was first among the list of the Dallas project's goals, it was never a focal point of project activities. Dallas staff often pointed out that the primary purpose of their project was to build a youth service network in the Dallas area:

I think that if we are successful in bringing agencies together and achieving a coordinated mechanism in providing services to kids that even if we are not successful in reducing significantly the delinquency rate we will still achieve local support. I think that most people who are acquainted with that factor know that there are so many variables that no agency could possibly claim credit for reducing delinquency just because they provided some services. (Dallas, Field Notes)

This comment by a Dallas project administrator about the difficulty of establishing the causal links for changes in delinquency rates expressed sentiments shared by most project

staffs. Since they felt that the impact of project services on delinquency could not be determined, project staff believed that delinquency prevention would always remain an elusive goal. Staff demanded more tangible and achievable objectives in their daily work.

With the exception of Dallas, grantees listing the goal of delinquency reduction specified percentages by which delinquency among project youth or target community youth would be reduced. No grantee explained how its projection of project impact was developed. There appeared to be no relationship between target community characteristics and proposed reduction in delinquency rates. For example national youth agencies proposed uniform figures as goals for each of their project sites, despite great variations in community contexts. Likewise, no relationship existed between the types of intervention and the delinquency reduction goals. No grantee offered any explanation of how project services would lead to their projected decrease in delinquency rates. Interviews with project staff revealed that no grantees possessed concrete plans for measuring delinquent reduction.

The Aspira and Fort Peck grantees were quite candid that delinquency reduction goals were included in their proposals only to satisfy the requirements of the funders. These agencies never intended delinquency prevention goals to guide the development of project activities.

Aspira proposed "to reduce the extent of juvenile delinquency in target areas by 3% in the project's first year

and by a further 5% in the second year." When asked to explain how these figures were derived, an Aspira official responded:

Those figures don't mean anything. We put them in the proposal because LEAA said we had to put some figures in. The figures could just as well have been 10% and 20%. I don't know how we could tell how much delinquency is going up or down. The work we do with [project youth] is not geared to producing an impact in the short run. (Aspira, Field Notes)

The first-year proposal for Fort Peck stated:

The planned impact goal of the Bureau of Youth Services is to reduce incidence of charged Juvenile Delinquency processed in Tribal or Federal court by 15% this first projected program year. This shall mean overall reduction in incidence after 12 months of services from this program of 15% juvenile delinquency on the reservation, in comparison to a previous year rate in which the Bureau of Youth Services did not exist.

The following exchange between NCCD staff and a Fort Peck administrator illustrate the meaning of this proposed goal:

NCCD: In the proposal you say you will decrease delinquency by 15 percent. Are you going to keep that figure in the revised version of the proposal?

Ft. Peck: We're not certain about that yet. I question that. To measure over a long period of time is feasible. But to measure next year how many kids go into the law and order department is not feasible. I question how you're going to do that.

NCCD: How would you measure?

Fort Peck: It wouldn't be very scientific; we did it primarily for the granter's convenience.

The Salvation Army's staff felt their project had established sound, justifiable, and feasible performance objectives. They were far less comfortable with their proposed impact goal to "decrease the percentage of juvenile delinquency

in the target areas at the project: an average decrease of 4 percent the first year and 6 percent the second year."

When asked if any of the project's proposed goals and objectives had subsequently seemed inappropriate, a Salvation Army administrator stated:

There are no objectives I would like to see excluded. There is an objective that states a decrease in [delinquency] percentage ... we may not [now] be talking about the same rate in percentage ... the percentage figure I am referring to has to do with the element impact goal which sets a figure ... we had no control over that and addressed that almost immediately because there were so many variables in determining if the program is successful or it isn't. We could have an importation of a gang of teenagers from the west coast dropped off in Winston-Salem by someone and just change the whole picture. We could have crime rising to such a degree and involvement of people who were native to the area that the whole thing is thrown out. So we did question the advisability [of the goal] ... I did contact [an OJJDP staff member] and indicated that I wasn't there to influence or get information that she couldn't give me as an advantage over anybody else, but just how strictly was she holding proposing agencies to a figure such as 5%? She said that is a loose example, and that we should not restrict ourselves to a figure like that We still believe that establishing an impact goal figure is not the best way to go.... (Salvation Army, Field Notes)

The Venice grantee not only gave percentage figures as goals for delinquency reduction, but also selected specific crimes upon which the project would have impact. Venice proposed "to reduce the rates of increase for the following crimes, by the following proportions: purse-snatching by 10 percent, house burglaries by 5 percent, assaults (gang related) by 10 percent."

One agency within the Venice project did propose to concentrate on gang-related activity. But it is unclear why the

her specific crimes were selected for project impact. It is also unclear how any of the percentage figures for delinquency reduction were calculated. Persons who wrote the Venice project proposal suggested that the delinquency figures were realistic estimates:

Sure, they're realistic to the degree that there are changing patterns. There will be an impact to the degree that a youngster is involved on an ongoing basis. The chances of such a kid being involved in trouble during the life of our project are immeasurably reduced because the time spent in project activities lessens the amount of involvement they could spend in illegal activities.
(Venice, Field Notes)

Other discussions with a Venice project director indicated that achieving formally stated delinquency reduction goals was not a major concern of the project:

[Our project] will be as effective as anybody can expect for this kind of activity. Prevention is a vague and nebulous area and you literally will never know if our program played a role in somebody not doing something.

We will certainly meet the spirit of our goals if not the letter of our goals. The letter of our goals are designed for record keeping purposes, not for actual results, so the actual results, the tangibles are, I believe, undefinable and I really believe they are unmeasurable ... but I believe that the spirit of what we're trying to do ... I believe the fundamental idea behind each of the objectives is going to be achieved.

The more the young people become involved with our project people the less likely they are to be involved in deviant behavior. Our people are concerned about their welfare and help them have a better life. (Venice, Field Notes)

Given the ill-defined nature of the delinquency prevention field, it is understandable that grantees would be very reluctant to be strictly held to hard numerical goals for

project output. Many comments by project staff indicate reluctance to be accountable in any measurable way for producing an impact on delinquency prevention -- OJJDP's primary purpose. Moreover, some grantees believed that it was unfair that they be accountable for any type of measurable impact. The goals of the grantees were overwhelmingly process-oriented, as the following data suggest.

Direct Service Goals

Reading OJJDP's Program Announcement leaves little doubt that the major purpose of the direct service strategy was to "provide for a significant increase in youth served from target communities," especially among those youth who traditionally "under-utilize private youth-serving agency services." Consequently both OJJDP and the grantees paid significant attention to the total numbers of youth served. The high level of concern about numbers of youth served was apparent at the project stage. Grantees were far more specific in projecting their number of clients than any other aspect of their proposed prevention projects. Many grantees included target figures for clients in their goal statements:

Objective: A minimum of 100 new target youth not affiliated with any national youth serving agency shall be introduced into the program at the Easter Hill Village site.

A minimum of 100 target youth who are marginal members of the Boys' Club of Richmond shall experience increased participation in a wide variety of activities that fill the needs and meet the interests of the target group.
(Richmond)

Objective: Organization of New Clubs

The purpose of this component is to organize 300 youngsters per affiliate, per year into the Clubs' Federation. Each new club will have not less than 15 and not more than 25 members. (Aspira)

Goal: To enroll 200 girls from the target communities who are not now reached by the Girls Club. (Santa Barbara)

Objective: To prevent delinquency among youth in the community for Venice, California by effectively reaching and involving 300 pre-adolescent youth (4th, 5th, and 6th grade) to participate in varied program activities. To select a minimum of 32 children each year for intensive services including counseling through contacts made by the liaison workers with teachers at the Broadway school. (Venice, Neighborhood Youth Association)

Grantees such as Seattle and Tuskegee indicated only that services in the target areas would be increased; later their proposals presented specific target figures for constituent agencies or service components.

Few grantees provided any explanation about why the figures proposed represented "significant increases" in the youth provided services in their target communities. Rural projects did mention the almost complete absence of social services within their target communities. Under such circumstances almost any service represented a significant increase. Urban projects usually discussed the problems of insufficient youth services in their target areas, but left unstated how their plans would significantly reduce this deficiency. The grantees proposed serving and actually did serve a very small percentage of eligible target community youth.

Few grantees made clear that they intended to concentrate services on youth who did not normally use the services of private agencies. Even fewer established plans for identifying and recruiting such youth. Lacking this specific objective, grantees often found themselves in competition with other community agencies for project clients.

For almost all grantees, the only measurable standards of project performance were their goals to serve certain numbers of youth, except for the arbitrary figures proposed for delinquency reduction. Other direct service objectives were difficult to measure and their vagueness rendered them only rhetorical. In addition, without realistic and verifiable project goals, project directors could not determine if project activities were properly directed. For example, the following broad and ambiguous goals were proposed:

To provide those services that specifically address themselves to the basic needs, and rights of youth, and that directly counter a complex set of urban and institutional conditions that encourage alienation, frustration, and delinquency and criminal behaviors.

To generate a sense of competence, belonging, usefulness among youth faced with a complex set of urban and societal deficiencies characteristic of institutions within the community.

To develop positive and viable alternatives to delinquent activity and negative patterns of development.

To respond to and insure children's legal rights to a healthful environment, a formal education, access to a broad knowledge of choices and opportunities for the future, participation as productive members of society, special attention and fulfillment of basic needs, and particularly -- the right to benefit from well-functioning organizational systems with sufficient and effective manpower to provide a broad spectrum of services. (Venice)

Provide girls with an environment with sustained impact where they can build self-confidence, experience success and practice decision-making and the acceptance of responsibility. (Girls Clubs of America, Inc.)

To develop and implement two distinctive programs aimed at encouraging positive youth development and refocusing life goals and aspirations. (Santa Barbara)

Provide youth in danger of becoming delinquent, opportunities to develop skills for living and to experience socially acceptable roles. (sense of usefulness, and socially acceptable and meaningful role development)

Enable youth to improve their self-worth, competence and develop an awareness that they are and can be successful contributors to society. (Sense of competence)

Enable youth to achieve a sense of personal control over the direction of their own lives, and reduce feelings of powerlessness. (sense of potency) (Richmond)

To initiate meaningful social, cultural, and recreational group activities that encourage a constructive use of leisure time (Akron)

Establish positive patterns of youth development and growth by month 6 day 30 with substantiating data collected by the site project directors and forwarded to the territorial project director. (Marietta)

Most often grantees presented no criteria for ascertaining success in these endeavors. While objectives such as these may serve as statements of agency ideology, by themselves they possess little value for project staff who are seeking services that lead to fulfillment of agency goals. Often when particular service areas were mentioned as project goals, these goals were products not connected to particular intervention strategies. The expected outcome of any single service was often left

unclear; staff were left without guides to prioritize service offerings. The Boys' Clubs of America, for example, listed as an objective:

Involve each youth participant in three or more activities or services such as: leadership development, social development, vocational development, cultural development, values clarification, education for parenthood, youth effectiveness training.

A goal in Tuskegee:

To provide a variety of social, cultural, educational, counseling and referral services to a substantial number of children and families not being served in the project areas.

A few grantees did provide some guidelines for implementing project activities. These grantees outlined at least an implicit delinquency prevention strategy. In Venice, for example, the DiDi Hirsch agency set the following goal and objectives:

Goal: To prevent juvenile delinquency by providing stress management training for youth and parents, and by providing career development for youth by training in a specific skill, such as photography.

Objectives: To provide a training program for both youth and parents in responding to stress.

To provide training in the following areas:

a) concepts of stress and coping, b) how to handle anger and frustration, c) decision-making and problem solving, d) concept of power and control, e) communication systems, f) sex roles and identities, g) criminal justice systems, h) specialized groups - crisis of old age, parents, minority groups.

To employ youth as trainers of other youth and parents.

To utilize consultants from other systems such as criminal justice systems and educational institutions, in order to break the maladaptive cycle.

To provide training and experience in photography for youth in order to increase career mobility.

The national project of the United Neighborhood Centers of America, established specific milestones for affiliate performance. Among listed objectives were the following:

To equip an Information Center with pamphlets, application forms, journals, etc.; to acquaint youth with a broad picture of career opportunities.

Per Site: contact with 25 youth per week by month 5.

To organize field trips that would enrich youth's experience with the world of work (to begin by month 4).

Per Site:

a. trips to see individuals on-the-job, once a month = 10 youth;

b. trips to local colleges, municipal buildings, museums, etc., one each quarter = 25 youth.

To hold discussions featuring different types of visual aids and guest speakers that focus on employment concerns, to begin by month 5.

Per Site: a minimum of one each quarter = 25 youth.

To provide youth with paid and volunteer work experience within the prevention program as a means of developing some marketable skills and good work habits.

Per Site:

a. paid experience, to begin by month 4 = 15 youth;

b. community projects, to begin by month 5 = 20 youth.

It appears that at least some grantees deliberated about their abilities to deliver direct services to precise numbers of target community youth, but these deliberations failed to define potential impacts of these services.

Community Development Goals

Similarities among the three program strategies of direct service, community development and capacity building made it difficult to attribute single goals to particular strategies. For example, under each strategy, grantees were required to change organizational policies restricting the utilization of services within target communities. Under both direct service and community development strategies, grantees were to involve youth and community residents in program planning and implementation. Also under both direct service and community development, grantees were to provide appropriate training and other support services to allow development and maintenance of "viable programs."

Several grantees established project goals that easily fit under more than one intervention category. For example:

Directly involve 100 target youth in planning and operation of programs and activities.

Employ 50 peer leaders from the target group as paid part-time staff aides.

Recruit 150 volunteers from youth, parents and leaders from target communities to help provide support and service to youth. (Boys' Clubs of America).

Increase the capacity of boards, paid and volunteer staff to reach out to and serve more effectively the high risk of youth of the community. (Girls Clubs of America, Inc.)

To increase participation of target community youth in services through reducing the impact of organizational and/or community problems which have traditionally inhibited utilization, or through the direct removal of barriers to participation. (Seattle)

Project staff claimed in retrospect that activities that were related to such goals were part of the project's community development approach. Almost any instance of project involvement by adult community residents or minor interactions with other community agencies were employed to support project claims that community development was occurring. It was true that project staff could not identify their systematic approach to such activities, or to the particular project components responsible for managing community development. Grantees' "community development" activities were, in fact, not rooted within any identifiable project structure. Only after the fact could project activities be said to pursue community development goals.

The ease with which project staff fit a wide range of activities under the community development label was enhanced by the broad definition of community development. Without exception, grantees saw target area resident participation as critical to their success, and many project activities were designed to appeal for community support. Few projects established impact goals for community development activity (such as producing a change in some specific community condition). A majority of grantees explicitly aimed at initiating some process of community resident participation in their delinquency prevention efforts.

Community development goals expressed only a general intent to integrate the community with the projects, usually through

some type of advisory board or through use of volunteers. For example:

To establish advisory groups, including youth and adults, at each project site as vehicles for broader input into program development and implementation in order to expand the level of community participation and support.

To organize a comprehensive volunteer corps made up of parents and other concerned adults to ensure direct community involvement in the prevention program while presenting a full range of appropriate role models for the program participants. (UNCA)

To organize and effectively utilize at each site a Community Advisory Group or Council that will assist in planning and implementation and evaluation of the program. (Girls Clubs of America, Inc.)

To increase volunteer participation and broaden community support for prevention programs.

Develop a model that shall be characterized by: (a) the involvement of target youth in planning and operation of programs activities, and (b) use of peer leaders from the target group as paid part-time staff leaders. (Boys' Clubs of America)

The sincerity of these objectives was made evident by the enormous staff efforts to make community involvement a reality. In spite of good intentions, these community involvement objectives were not products of well-conceived community development or participation strategies. Project staff often attempted to establish community advisory boards without definite ideas about appropriate organizational structures or about the most important types of community representation. Moreover, the purposes, responsibilities, and authorities of the advisory bodies were often ill-defined. Project volunteers also

found that their role in project activities was ambiguous. Poorly conceptualized objectives for community involvement activities were largely responsible for the near abandonment of these efforts at several sites.

A few projects cast their community development within a fairly well-thought-out strategy and plan of action. The Venice and Tuskegee sites proposed the most ambitious and probably the best designed community development programs. Venice, in its Block Club program, proposed the following:

Goal: To prevent juvenile delinquency by organizing residents directly affected, into small problem-solving groups from which collective strategies can be planned, developed, and implemented jointly with youth-serving agencies and others.

Objectives:

To select ten blocks with the highest incidence of juvenile crime.

To have target area residents (adults and youths) participate in and influence the social patterns of youth (peer group pressure).

To identify children, youth, and parents for referral to direct service components.

To facilitate communications between residents and youth-serving agencies staff.

To employ parents and youth as part-time organizers.

To provide education and information useful in preventing juvenile crime.

To increase the utilization of youth-serving agencies by residents.

To identify potential volunteers interested in working with high risk youth.

To improve communications between law enforcement and

residents, especially in relation to the use of crime prevention techniques.

To prevent specific crimes: (a) reduce personal robberies (i.e., purse-snatching) by 10%; (b) reduce house burglaries by 5%; (c) reduce assaults by 10%.

To increase the use of a youth 24-hour hotline.

To establish a network of communications between the selected ten blocks aimed at pro-active steps of intervention.

A separate project component was established to carry out these objectives, with project staff being given specific responsibilities for the component. Tuskegee also established community involvement as a major goal:

To establish youth and adult organizations in the target communities designed to carry out activities and functions that will continue to achieve the objectives of juvenile delinquency prevention beyond the life of the project period.

To involve youth, families, and concerned citizens in the planning, implementation and evaluation of program activities of a youth service agency system.

To help achieve community development goals Tuskegee designed a tri-level network of adult and youth community resident boards that was implemented uniformly in each target community.

As discussed later in this report, a combination of contextual factors resulted in preventing even these better structured efforts from being able to achieve all their objectives. Projects with better-specified objectives were more able to translate these goals into program strategies and structures.

Other than promoting community resident involvement, few

grantees identified other goals related to community development. Although many grantees indicated that target area socio-economic conditions were at the root of their delinquency problems, only one grantee articulated an approach to alter these conditions. The Salvation Army posed the problem and listed relevant goals and objectives as follows:

Problem: Often socio-economic community conditions and institutional/organizational policy adversely affect positive youth development and utilization of service. The socio-economic conditions which have high correlation to juvenile delinquency are characteristic of the target communities, demonstrating a need for change. As stated in the Pensacola data, "There is need for extended youth agency activity in the following areas: ... social action experiences".

Performance Goal: Provide a channel for class and case advocacy by community residents by month 4 day 30 by the attainment of the following validated by data collected by the site project director and forwarded to the territorial project director.

Objectives:

- a) Establish Community Council to provide;
 - i) intra-agency complaint mechanism by month 4 day 30 as evidenced by meeting minutes.
 - ii) community and class advocacy by month 4 day 30 as evidenced by meeting minutes.
- b) Provide consultant assistance in developing advocacy strategy. Services will be obtained upon first advocacy issue and evidenced by minutes.

This ambitious community strategy was difficult to implement due to limited project resources and the priority placed on direct services to youth. The lack of elaborated community development goals does not reflect the wide variety of community-oriented activities at project sites. Rather, the

Lack of these goals illustrated the absence of strategic planning for community development in most projects.

Capacity Building Goals

The most significant capacity-building activities were as much products of OJJDP's eligibility criteria for grantees as of the individual grantees' goals. For example, one grant category included national not-for-profit agencies implementing their projects at five to ten local affiliates. Another OJJDP provision encouraged multi-agency collaborations of youth-serving agencies from well-populated areas. All but three of the funded projects came from these two categories. The creation, strengthening, and manipulation of administrative structures at these kinds of projects accounted for most of the capacity-building effort of the national program.

A major objective of the national youth-serving agencies was to increase their own capacity to provide local affiliates with technical assistance in implementing and operating delinquency prevention programs. This purpose is reflected in the statement of goals in their proposals:

Increase the capacity of the national organization to serve its affiliates by: (1) developing and validating an effective training course on juvenile delinquency prevention to prepare Boys' Club professionals to replicate the program models. This course will be tested in four locations by a minimum of 120 professionals; (2) publishing three or more program resources detailing the program models and other findings; and (3) training 40 Boys' Club of America staff and key local professionals to provide technical assistance and consultation with local affiliates to help them replicate the program models.
(Boys' Clubs of America)

To design and implement a plan that will increase the capacity of the organization to provide services in the target communities, and to extend this capacity-building to non-participating clubs when feasible. (Girls Clubs of America, Inc.)

To increase the capacity of [UNCA] to provide more effective support and guidance to its affiliates in the areas of:

- a. technical assistance
- b. staff training
- c. board training
- d. evaluation and monitoring procedures
- e. financial development in order to enable these agencies to better serve the target populations.
(UNCA)

OJJDP's plans for national agencies strongly encouraged testing methods of transferring expertise between national offices and local affiliates. National offices were awarded grant funds, but did not deliver youth services. National offices possessed a major stake in the success of their local affiliates because most impact measures could only be assessed at the local level. Providing a constant flow of technical assistance to affiliates was one way national offices could maximize the success of local operations and thus accomplish overall national agency goals.

Local affiliates acting as service providers with the national offices offering technical assistance was not a new organizational arrangement. The unique aspect of this project was that national offices would administer and distribute funds to the affiliates for specified programmatic purposes. Normally affiliates of national agencies operate with a high level of

autonomy. The prevention project created new obligations that affiliates operate under national office control; this resulted in the need for increased communication, cooperation, and interdependence. National offices could develop their perspective on delinquency prevention not isolated from the service providers, this OJJDP effort required constant interaction with affiliates. Continuous feedback about local needs was transmitted to national offices as plans for technical expertise were developed. Local affiliate participation in the OJJDP program increased their receptivity to national office technical assistance offerings in areas beyond delinquency prevention. Although the OJJDP program by itself did not completely change traditional patterns of inter-agency relationships (see Chapter 8), the abilities of national agencies to increase youth services through joint action with affiliates received a significant test.

In the case of urban multi-agency collaborations, formation of the collaborations themselves contributed greatly to specified capacity-building goals and objectives of the grantees. A major purpose of most collaborations was to increase coordination of youth services within target areas. Seattle, for example, sought the following:

To make better use of public and private youth-serving agency resources through collaborative improvements in inter-agency planning and coordination.

Objectives: To improve inter-agency planning and coordination, thus making better use of existing resources.

Formation of the Seattle collaboration for the OJJDP prevention program represented the first attempt by a large number of local youth-serving agencies to formally participate in a joint effort to improve youth services. At the least, the collaboration's formation created a mechanism through which other project objectives could be pursued. A goal of the Dallas project was:

To operate and maintain a coordinated mechanism for establishing a county-wide delinquency prevention youth development system through the creation, promotion and utilization of a data collection system which will facilitate coordination, planning, research and evaluation of youth service while protecting the rights of all youth.

The Dallas collaboration was an important step toward achieving this goal. By uniting a major private youth-serving agency (YMCA) with the county government, the chances for cooperation and mutual benefits to both types of agencies were increased.

Increasing coordination of target area youth services was an important goal of the rural as well as the urban projects.

For example, Tuskegee's goal:

To establish a service delivery system in each of the four target counties which will function to coordinate existing youth service resources and to create new service structures to fill gaps in the existing youth service resources.

Many grantees, especially national projects, argued that the development and sharing of program models was a major project objective:

Develop nine or more different, replicable delinquency prevention models. (Boys' Clubs of America)

To develop several replicable, cost effective models for outreach/expansion to high risk communities.

To disseminate information about and assist in replication of successful program models.

To share successful collaborative models with Girls Club and youth groups not included in this project. (Girls Clubs of America, Inc.)

Test a prevention program for implementation and encourage replication of same by month 6 day 30 with the following supporting data, collected by the site project director and forwarded to the territorial project director. (Salvation Army)

To disseminate program information to all member agencies in order to encourage them to develop similar prevention initiatives with their own local support. (UNCA)

Demonstrate effective models of youth participation in youth service programming. (Boston)

Staff and volunteer training were also frequently mentioned among project capacity building goals. By and large, most projects did not evolve sophisticated approaches to accomplishing their capacity building goals. For most grantees, capacity building was viewed as any effort to alleviate problems in daily operations. Project staff claimed they spent a great deal of time in activities aimed at the general purpose of making project or agency-wide services "better." Rarely, however, did such staff activity appear to fit OJJDP's position that grantees "show in specific and measurable terms how the capacity to serve youth in target communities will be improved." (OJJDP Program Announcement, 1976)

Did Grantee Goals Change Over Time?

The difficulties most grantees faced during the first year in implementing their proposed projects did not permit them to accurately gauge if their original goals were correct. By the time proposals for second-year funding were due, few projects had really tested the adequacy of their initial project designs. Also, as noted earlier, OJJDP gave grantees no special instructions concerning goals and objectives for the second year. It is therefore not surprising that grantees made no significant changes in the goals listed in their second-year proposals. Grantees generally proposed to continue trying to achieve their original goals.

When proposals for third-year funding were due (after at least 18 months of project operations), grantees should have possessed sufficient experience to make comprehensive judgements about the directions their projects were taking, to assess the appropriateness of project goals and to make necessary revisions based on practical experience. Moreover, grantees were given explicit instructions by OJJDP for the submission of third-year proposals that signaled a greater concentration on project goals. A requirement for third-year applications was to:

State goals and objectives in measurable terms. Specifically indicate the number of new youth the program will serve, and the number recruited from the previous year who were expected to continue in the program. Specifically indicate how the project expects to reduce reported delinquency, and describe the methods for monitoring reported delinquency.

Grantees, as was their pattern, did offer estimates about the numbers of youth they expected to serve. The drastic reduction in funds available for the third year forced most projects to promise service to fewer clients. Otherwise, there were few significant changes in the grantees' goals in these third-year proposals. Without referencing their success in achieving originally proposed goals, grantees in their third-year proposals made announcements such as:

The project goals, which are listed below, will remain largely the same as for the previous period. (Boston)

and

The goals of the two-year National Project on Juvenile Justice, which ends November 14, 1979, will be continued during the requested third year. (Boys' Clubs of America)

The goals grantees proposed for their third-year were no more measurable than were those of the first year proposals. Also, as with initial goals, grantee third-year proposals lacked accompanying explanations of how delinquency would be reduced in the target communities if their stated goals were achieved.

Some grantees, without any data about previous success at preventing delinquency, continued their projections for reductions in delinquency percentage from their original proposals into third-year applications. In general, grantees showed even more reluctance to be held to delinquency reduction as a measure of project success. Dallas, for example, in its original proposal listed as a goal:

To reduce the number of delinquent types of behavior

committed by juveniles in the target communities.

In the third-year proposal this goal was modified to a less measurable objective:

To increase the number of youths who participate in alternatives to juvenile crime.

The third-year proposal of Aspira states what had become a widely held opinion among grantees:

The goal of reducing the rate of juvenile delinquency is more easily stated than measured and/or attained. Our experience during the first two years of operations demonstrated clearly that the social phenomena of juvenile crime is exactly that, social. 'It's roots lie deep in the social fabric of the society. Approaches short of programs that will overhaul school systems, generate full employment, establish long-term supportive social services will continue only to have limited impact. These problems become even more complex when dealing with a minority population such as the majority of the young people with whom Proyecto Amanece has dealt. Additionally, even the impact and effect that has been achieved, and which can be furthered by the continuation of the project for another year, is not readily measurable. Expensive and elaborate research methodologies would have to be developed, implemented and then maintained for a period of years, in order to measure effectively the impact and effect of a particular program. Proyecto Amanece states as its goal the reduction of juvenile delinquency within the target communities where it operates. A specific goal would be 3%. More measurable indices of the program are the stated goals in terms of population, clubs and activities. The preceding discussion does not even consider the complex question of what is the target community within which any measuring is to take place.

An approach similar to Aspira was taken by most OJJDP grantees in setting their third-year goals. The number of youth to be served (population) was indicated and a wide variety of project activities were listed. Few grantees demonstrated

through their goals any growth towards an agency strategy specifically geared towards preventing delinquency.

Conclusion

"If you don't know where you're going, any path will get you there." This popular phrase captures the dilemma of the OJJDP prevention grantees. Projects lacked clear and measurable goals to assess agency and staff performance. There was confusion over exactly which goals were most important to OJJDP. In particular, grantees had difficulty with the goal of delinquency prevention. Some agencies never accepted delinquency prevention as their project goal; others doubted that their projects could deliver tangible results in terms of reduced delinquency rates.

Grantee goals overwhelmingly reflected their focus on direct services to youth. The most specific goals involved estimates of the number of potential clients. Community development goals emphasized resident participation, while capacity building objectives aimed at technical assistance (from the nationals to their affiliates) and better coordination of services (among urban coalition member agencies). Goals changed little over the life of the OJJDP projects, suggesting that these were largely "paper goals" not terribly useful for project administration or planning.

Neither OJJDP nor the grantees spelled out causal processes connecting interim goals to reduced rates of delinquency. The goal of delinquency prevention, while never formally abandoned

by OJJDP, did not play a major role at most sites.

Without precise guidelines to gauge project accomplishments (other than client counts), grantee staff relied on intuition and trial and error methods to direct project operations. In the absence of obvious new paths, they chose familiar and comfortable ones.

Chapter 6

IDENTIFICATION

Introduction

Identification refers to the processes of defining appropriate clientele as well as recruitment and selection for those meeting entry criteria. Types of clients often shaped the nature of projects and greatly contributed to project success. The criteria for client identification should derive from a program's theory and should complement modes of intervention. Thus if a project emphasizes unemployment as a causal influence in delinquency, its intake procedures should identify and select youth with employment needs likely to be met by its intervention methods.

Seen sociologically, identification processes reflect the ideologies and values of those selecting clients for the program. Undoubtedly youth themselves also influence identification decisions made by staff. Characteristics of youth entering projects under these conditions take on a distinctive pattern which must be explained as part of the process.

The major empirical findings of the Identification chapter can be summarized as follows:

1. Projects employed imprecise and exceedingly broad criteria for screening purposes.

2. Techniques and procedures for recruiting youth were informal and created a passive system where youth became the real decision-makers in terms of project acceptance and delivery services.
3. Few and/or weak referral linkages were established with school systems and the juvenile court. Most youth were self-referrals.
4. Small percentages of the total target area youth populations were served by the projects.
5. The dominant client characteristics of youth served were:
 - a. primarily pre-adolescent
 - b. not-referred from the juvenile justice system or the schools
 - c. attending school full-time
 - d. at or above their appropriate school level
 - e. from low socio-economic family backgrounds
 - f. not previously serviced by the grantee
 - g. not under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system
6. Considerable variations existed among and within projects and their affiliated agencies in terms of client characteristics. These differences reflect demographic differences in target areas chosen and not biases in agency identification criteria.
7. When compared to the characteristics of youth arrested and referred to juvenile courts, the prevention project youth are disproportionately young, female, and black. These data suggest prevention youth are unlikely candidates to be arrested and referred to the juvenile justice system.

The three OJJDP program strategies -- direct services, community development and capacity building -- created possibilities for three kinds of project clients: 1) community

youth; 2) the target community itself; and 3) target area youth service agencies. As indicated in the Context chapter, the concept of target community was not well conceptualized. While some project activities were done for the benefit of "the community," in only rare instances were whole communities considered as units for significant project services.

Likewise, the explicit focus on agencies as units of change was limited. Technical assistance was offered in both national and urban collaboration projects, but only Boston had a highly-structured project component of capacity-building activities that defined participating youth service agencies as the primary clients. An overwhelming majority of grantees identified youth as the primary clients of their services. Even when project proposals suggested the importance of socio-economic/structural factors in delinquency causation, projects shifted this social structural perspective towards a focus on individual attitudes and behaviors.

Youth, not social conditions, became the targets for change. When agency service impediments were identified the most frequent solutions involved providing more or different services to youth. The choice by projects to engage primarily in direct service modes of intervention made client identification a more critical issue for project operations. Grantees rarely narrowed their selection criteria beyond youth residing in target areas. This decision was unwise in light of empirical research on delinquency.

Studies by Wolfgang et al., (1972), and Murray and Cox,

(1979), indicate that delinquency is frequently an episodic and unpredictable phenomenon. Only a small percentage of youth within urban areas are chronically involved in delinquent offenses. Moreover, these few youth account for a large proportion of the more serious delinquent acts. These findings led Wolfgang et al., to conclude that intervention programs attempting to serve all youth in a given area would be exceedingly wasteful because over 80 percent of the youth who commit delinquent acts would naturally cease to engage in such activities due to maturation alone. Direct service programs, therefore, would be more effective if directed toward those repeat offenders who account for most of the serious delinquent acts within a given target area.

It is doubtful that most grantees ever intended to serve anything more than a small percentage of the eligible youth in their target areas. It is evident as measured by data collected by NCCD or grantee reports to OJJDP, that the projects served a minute proportion of target area youth (Table 6-1). Limited resources, for the most part, prohibited projects from serving significantly more youth than they did. Based on the awareness of these limited resources, projects should have initiated processes of identifying those youth who more appropriately served in a delinquency prevention program.

Most projects proceeded as if they were providing a mass immunization of prevention services to target area youth, even though the delinquency literature and their limited resources made the wisdom and practicality of the method questionable.

TABLE 6-1

PERCENTAGE OF ELIGIBLE YOUTH
SERVED BY DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PROJECTS*

PROJECT SITE	TARGET AREA YOUTH		MIS DATA		OJJDP DATA	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>National</u>						
Marietta	25,414	100%	620	2.4	719	2.8
Akron	13,914	100%	334	2.4	454	3.3
<u>Urban</u>						
Dallas	205,936	100%	3,172	1.5	2,893	1.4
New York	633,179	100%	1,637	0.3	1,811	0.3
<u>Rural</u>						
Tuskegee	11,011	100%	1,467	13.3	1,802	16.4
Tulare	3,100	100%	600	19.4	761	24.5
TOTAL	892,554	100%	7,830	0.9	8,440	0.9

* Based on six projects for which MIS, OJJDP, and target area data were available. OJJDP data reflect self-reported project estimates of number of youth served as published in their Quarterly Reports. Target area youth figures are based on the total number of youths residing in project target areas as reported in proposals submitted to OJJDP for funding purposes.

The projects established broad and ambiguous client definitions to guide their identification of those few youth who were actually served among the many thousands that resided in large and diverse target areas. Intake procedures were loosely structured and little systematic client screening was conducted. In general, grantees also had tenuous linkages with major public and private youth-serving agencies (juvenile court, police, mental health facilities, and schools, among others) who might have referred youth who would have benefited most from prevention services. Weaknesses of project design and absence of linkages with potential referral sources created informal and "passive" client intake processes; youth largely decided for themselves whether they were the appropriate beneficiaries of project services.

Although most projects lacked a deliberate structure to select clients, it is important to observe that client selectivity was still occurring. That so few target area youth were served by projects indicates that some manner of selection screening, albeit informal was taking place. Comments by our site observers suggested that target area youth did not enter projects at random. One local data collector stated:

I asked them [youth congregating outside of project facilities] about the programs that they could get in the project. The response I got was, "They are cool for the right people."

A staff member at one national affiliate noted:

Basically, good kids come here. A few are trouble makers.

The real hard core are not in the program.

Another staff member stated:

Yeah, I think the worst kids are still out on the streets. They have no reason, have no desire to be here.

One national project director admitted that certain types of youth were not prime candidates for service. He stated:

...the heavy hard-core kid, which we're not going after in any unit because we're not equipped, exists in our communities. We can't deal with them so we don't go after them. (Aspira, Field Notes)

Few agencies participated in active outreach programs to attract youth. It was community youth that selected projects to obtain their service offerings rather than the projects recruiting youth. These were mostly new agency projects, and images and service histories of grantees played a major role in how youths decided if an agency was a proper place for them. Many agencies had reputations for serving very young age groups and primarily offered recreational activities. Youth in the OJJDP prevention project were also very young. The fact that grantees' past services were not geared to delinquency problems made them unlikely places for youth exhibiting serious school problems and who had been involved in the juvenile system. Data in this chapter will show that the youth who chose to participate in projects shared few characteristics of officially delinquent youth. Empirical findings presented by Wolfgang (1972), and Elliot (1979), suggest that the unfocused provision

of direct services to a broadly defined youth population significantly reduced their chances of preventing juvenile delinquency.

Client Identification Criteria

Client identification was minimally discussed in grantee proposals. Most projects believed that defining a target area from which youth could be identified as "at risk" sufficiently completed the process of client identification. Reviews of project proposals by evaluation staff consistently pointed out the lack of any criteria other than target area residence for recruiting youth:

The original YSN proposal was vague about client identification. It said little about the type of youth who were to be identified as clients, other than that they were to live in a target area, be under the age of 18, and have no formal involvement with the juvenile justice system. These criteria were modified only slightly over the next two years.

(Dallas, Field Notes)

The Richmond Outreach Project identifies youth to be served as those living in the target area of Easter Hill between the ages of 16-18. A major project goal involves providing direct services to "youth in danger of becoming delinquent." The proposal does not define who these youth are or offer a means of identification.

(Richmond, Field Notes)

The YSP proposal states the desire of HRDC to "initiate and develop" a pre-delinquency prevention program" ... it is apparent that YSP has chosen to use the term pre-delinquency to reflect the status of youth in general within the target communities rather than the attributes of particular youth ... The fact that a youth resides in one of the project areas is the major criterion for admission to the project.

(Tuskegee, Field Notes)

In the UNCA proposal and in other materials produced by the national office, client identification is minimally

discussed. The population to be served is objectively defined by "eligibility for the program will be determined by age and by residence within the target community."
(Akron, Field Notes)

What client definitions that were developed were not specific enough to serve as a basis for client recruitment activities. Youth were often described as being in "danger of becoming delinquent" or as "needing services", identification criteria seldom outlined the specific characteristics of these youth or how they could be identified within the general target area population.

Shortly after the projects began, some agencies attempted to better identify potential clients, and in a few cases, to set up different levels of service intensity for various types of youth. For example, both the Fort Peck and Venice projects created categories of primary and secondary program service recipients. In a report to OJJDP, Fort Peck staff explained that the primary beneficiaries of the project would be youth with special needs for juvenile delinquency prevention on the reservation. They would be young boys and girls having problems coping with society and who had direct contact with law enforcement offices on one or more occasions. In addition to those with informal police contacts, the project also sought those charged with status offenses, misdemeanors and felonies. Referrals on these individuals come from the juvenile court systems, law and order officers, mental health services, schools, and other youth-serving social agencies.

Secondary project beneficiaries represented a larger group.

These young people would come from economically and socially deprived homes. A majority of the community recreation and education activities would be geared towards these young people.

Venice placed its youth in two categories. The primary group would receive continuous services by sustained contact with program staff and were accepted as paid participants.

These youth were to meet the following criteria:

- 1) reside or attend school in the target area;
- 2) be from a low income family;
- 3) be from families characterized as single or absent; parents and have a family history of involvement with institutions such as welfare, law enforcement, etc.;
- 4) have school related problems such as truancy poor performance, suspensions, behavior problems, etc.;
- 5) show high interest in the program and willingness to be trained;
- 6) have no current court status.

In addition, for youth considered as primary clients, various agencies in the Venice coalition included other criteria such as age, gang associations, and ethnic characteristics. Secondary clients received less intensive services, were not paid, and generally were referred to other agencies or were only permitted to participate in group activities.

Few grantees achieved even the level of specificity of the Fort Peck and Venice sites in establishing identification criteria. Grantees that possessed clearer theoretical assumptions about delinquency causation and prevention

experienced better success in narrowing the population of their target areas to specific types of youth to be served. Although these agencies' classifications were vague, they were based on more specific notions about youth likely to become delinquent, and focused their priority service on this group. For example, Aspira, in its Jersey City/Hoboken site, based its assumptions that the failure of Hispanic youth in conventional institutions, especially schools, produced delinquency in Hispanic communities, and established the following priorities for providing project services:

- (1) drop-out youth between the ages of 14 and 18;
- (2) youth referred by the Board of Education Special Services (special classes, "low achievers");
- (3) youth referred by schools as having been suspended or expelled due to truancy;
- (4) youth referred by the juvenile court;
- (5) youth referred by other social agencies.

Specific identification criteria, did not guarantee that agencies would attract the clients they wanted. Agency image remained a strong determinant of which youth participated in project services, despite clear project preferences for certain kinds of clients. Community youth possessed stereotypes about youth who participated in the programs of Boy's Clubs, YMCA's or Girls Clubs. In some cases, traditional agency staff were reluctant to alter the composition of their clients even though the OJJDP grants required expanding services to new populations. It is questionable whether, without a strong outreach effort to

select youth, many agencies could recruit clients most appropriate for prevention programs (if such clients differed from the agencies' traditional service group) or whether staff really wanted to change their traditional clients.

Recruitment Techniques

The absence of precise client definitions made unnecessary detailed recruitment procedures to produce the highly select clients to be served. Because client eligibility was limited only by target area residence, recruitment techniques primarily involved publicizing project services or activities throughout the target area. The great diversity of agency and community settings produced wide variation in how that publicity was conducted. Some activities were often part of project recruitment efforts. For example, a popular recruitment method was distributing flyers in the project areas. Flyers were posted in well-known youth congregating areas, or passed along by project youth to their friends.

Another method of recruitment involved sending staff to public meetings to advocate the value of project services. Appeals were made to youth at such meetings to participate in the projects. Parents were also encouraged to send their children to project activities. Meetings of community-based agencies, of local governmental bodies, and of churches were utilized by project staff to publicize their prevention efforts. Often, staff would appear at local schools to explain the purposes and activities of the OJJDP project. In most cases,

projects did not establish any type of formal referral agreements with school officials. According to prevention staff, speaking to groups of students at schools accounted for the overwhelming majority of youths eventually entering their projects. Special community events were also a common method of attracting youth to projects. For example, disco dances, Halloween parties, and project-sponsored field trips were often structured into project recruitment drives. Other events involved community-wide participation. Included in this category would be community clean-up projects, community carnivals, ethnic pride activities and project-sponsored plays and other cultural events. A few projects obtained free radio and television coverage of project activities. At least one project used the media as a primary means of project recruitment.

No project had a well developed system of outreach, but a number of staff members were committed to attracting specific youth they felt most in need of project services. These staff went door to door in their target areas talking to youth and parents about their participation in the project. Without standards to guide their efforts, it was sometimes difficult to ascertain why staff chose certain youth for vigorous outreach efforts. When asked by NCCD to explain their recruitment procedures, project staff typically gave answers no more explanatory than "we go and get them, we look for them."

Referrals From Other Agencies

Imprecise client identification criteria also frustrated grantees who tried to develop client referral arrangements with other agencies. Many grantees anticipated a large number of client referrals to their projects from other agencies in their target areas. Lacking clear conceptions about prospective client profiles made it difficult to determine which agencies could produce the youth that should participate in their prevention projects. More importantly, even when potential referral sources were identified, grantees often could not adequately describe the type of youth they wanted referred to their projects. As one grantee's third-year funding proposal noted, "It was difficult originally to define for referral sources what particular young people should be recruited."

Another difficulty in establishing referral agreements with other agencies was the tremendous competition over clients among youth-service providers. Budgets of many agencies are established according to the number of clients that utilize their services. Thus, agencies have a tendency to retain youths within their own client populations rather than refer them to other agencies with whom they might compete for the limited overall youth-service dollars. Sharing case loads among many youth service agencies is simply not an accepted practice.

MIS data (Table 6-2) show that 52.1 percent of all youth were self-referrals (walk-ins) or referrals by parents and relatives. School and social service agency referrals were the

TABLE 6-2

SOURCES OF REFERRALS TO DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PROJECTS

REFERRAL SOURCE	N	Absolute Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
<u>Non-Institutional Sources</u>			
Self-Referrals	6,652	42.0	42.0
Parents & Relatives	1,600	10.1	52.1
<u>Institutional Sources</u>			
School Systems	3,818	24.1	76.2
Social Service Agencies	2,927	18.5	94.7
Juvenile Justice Agencies*	332	2.1	96.8
Other	491	3.1	99.9
TOTAL	15,820	99.9	99.9

Missing Cases = 184

* Police (N=125), Sheriff (N=4), State Police (N=3), Probation (N=78), and Juvenile Court (N=122) Agencies.

next most frequent client source. However, comparisons by project site show that a few large projects contributed disproportionate numbers of youth from these two referral sources (Table 6-3). For example, New Haven and Dallas contributed 67 percent (2,543 of 3,818) of all school referrals.

Similarly, four projects (Dallas, New Haven, New York and Seattle) accounted for 82 percent of all social service agency referrals. Except for a few urban projects, few referrals came from schools or social agencies. Given that many grantees asserted that school problems were strong indicators of probable delinquency, one might expect that more projects would have sought the help of school officials to identify and refer those youth with serious school-related difficulties.

It is noteworthy that only 2 percent of all referrals (N=332) came from juvenile justice agencies. Of these, 71 percent were in four projects (Dallas, Seattle, New Haven and Boston). If the findings of Wolfgang and other studies are accepted, those youth already involved in delinquent activity should account for a major portion of a community's future delinquency problems. Since juvenile agencies already have contact with these youth, prevention projects should seek referrals from these agencies. But, a combination of influences contributed to the scarcity of juvenile justice referrals among project clients. Among these factors were the problems of agency image, the lack of project resources, and confusion about the meaning and scope of "prevention."

A number of project directors explained that it was never

TABLE 6-3
SOURCES OF REFERRALS BY PROJECT SITE

REFERRAL SOURCE	URBAN COALITION PROJECTS							NATIONAL PROJECTS					RURAL PROJECTS			TOTALS
	Venice	Phila- delphia	New York	Dallas	Seattle	New Haven	Boston	Santa Barbara	New Jersey	Richmond	Akron	Marietta	Tulare	Fort Peck	Tuske- gee	
	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	%/(N)	
SELF-REFERRALS	47.0 (277)	54.4 (712)	17.7 (289)	13.6 (431)	48.6 (1083)	18.2 (372)	59.5 (543)	19.7 (50)	49.6 (132)	26.8 (19)	92.7 (305)	40.5 (251)	89.1 (534)	58.5 (189)	99.9 (1465)	42.0 (6652)
SCHOOL SYSTEM	21.6 (127)	13.2 (173)	12.4 (202)	50.8 (1610)	16.6 (370)	45.6 (933)	11.9 (109)	28.3 (72)	47.4 (126)	4.2 (3)	0.0 (0)	3.9 (24)	3.7 (22)	14.2 (46)	0.1 (1)	24.1 (3818)
SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES	4.1 (24)	10.2 (133)	59.6 (974)	22.5 (714)	15.4 (344)	18.0 (369)	10.1 (92)	30.3 (77)	0.4 (1)	29.6 (21)	3.3 (11)	22.1 (137)	3.8 (23)	2.2 (7)	0.0 (0)	18.4 (2927)
PARENTS AND RELATIVES	20.9 (123)	17.5 (229)	6.1 (100)	7.5 (238)	14.8 (330)	12.5 (255)	7.2 (66)	16.9 (43)	0.8 (2)	25.4 (18)	1.2 (4)	18.5 (115)	2.3 (14)	19.5 (63)	0.0 (0)	10.1 (1600)
JUVENILE JUSTICE AGENCIES	1.9 (11)	1.2 (16)	1.4 (23)	2.4 (75)	2.3 (51)	2.5 (52)	6.2 (57)	0.0 (0)	0.4 (1)	1.4 (1)	1.2 (4)	3.5 (22)	0.7 (4)	4.6 (15)	0.0 (0)	2.1 (332)
OTHER	4.6 (27)	3.6 (47)	2.8 (45)	3.3 (104)	2.2 (49)	3.3 (67)	5.0 (46)	4.7 (12)	1.5 (4)	12.7 (9)	1.5 (5)	11.5 (71)	0.3 (2)	0.9 (3)	0.0 (0)	3.1 (491)
TOTAL	100.0 (589)	100.0 (1310)	100.0 (1633)	100.0 (3172)	100.0 (2327)	100.0 (2048)	100.0 (913)	100.0 (254)	100.0 (266)	100.0 (71)	100.0 (329)	100.0 (620)	100.0 (599)	100.0 (123)	100.0 (1466)	100.0 (15,820)

their intention to attempt to serve youth who were already involved with the justice system. A common sentiment was that these youth possessed special needs that might quickly exhaust limited project resources. Moreover, project staff felt that delinquent youth had the resources of the justice system at their disposal. Prevention resources would be much better spent serving the larger number of youth with less serious problems not yet brought to the attention of juvenile justice officials.

There was always reluctance on the part of most grantees to serve youth officially identified as delinquents and, perhaps unintentionally, OJJDP staff reinforced these inclinations. At the first project directors' meeting convened by OJJDP in November of 1977, federal officials attempted in a short space of time to discuss a number of issues to serve as guiding principles for the entire national program. One OJJDP representative stated that grantees should avoid heavy reliance on the justice system as a source of client referrals. To do so, it was explained, would turn the projects into a "diversion" program rather than prevention projects. Diversion, it was announced, was not the purpose of this OJJDP program.

There was little discussion of this issue at the prevention directors' meeting. It was relatively clear, that the OJJDP official's statement left a major impression on the grantees. Soon after this meeting, a number of grantees developed identification criteria with little specificity except that justice system youth were excluded from the projects or were no longer a priority for recruitment. When asked about client

identification, project directors would respond as follows:

We want to attract kids who are not now taking advantage of our services no matter what their identities might be. We are going to be working with anybody who is not entering the justice system if they need attention. If they are in the justice system it is no longer a matter of prevention, it is diversion.... Kids who are caught are diversion -- kids who don't get caught are prevention.
(Dallas, Field Notes)

Some grantees took a less restrictive position:

NCCD: Will you work with kids already in the juvenile justice system?

Project Director: We see prevention as a very elastic concept. We see it as preventing delinquency from the first-, second-, and third-time offender. So if we have a youngster who went back to the community and who comes to the program, we will accept him even though he has been adjudicated. We are not going to actively solicit from the juvenile justice system, but on the other hand we are not going to turn kids away.

Many project directors felt that OJJDP was very explicit in telling projects to stay away from youth currently involved in the justice system. Others, felt just as strongly that statements made by OJJDP about the type of clients were simply advisory. A few grantees decided to solicit justice system referrals in spite of OJJDP's advise. Fort Peck, one project making special efforts to obtain referrals from juvenile justice agencies, experienced only limited success:

BYS has attempted to improve the referral system by developing a network of agencies that could serve as referral sources and encouraging the courts to refer youth to BYS.... Courts, jails, probation officers, and law enforcement officers were contacted early by youthworkers in reference to referrals.
(Fort Peck, Field Notes)

Despite these efforts, MIS data show that only 4.6 percent of Fort Peck referrals came from juvenile justice agencies (Table 6-3). This occurred despite the fact that Fort Peck's MIS data shows that 21 percent of its clients had some contact with juvenile justice agencies.

At the Marietta site, attempts were made to establish a referral system between the project and juvenile justice authorities. Formal presentations were made by project staff to local juvenile probation staff to familiarize them with the project's goals and activities. Project staff contacted probation officers informally to pursue referrals. Some ongoing communication did develop between the two staffs, but few referrals resulted. Intake data reveal that only 3.5 percent of Marietta's caseload was referred from the juvenile court. Staff from projects that did make special appeals to the justice system expressed the belief that justice system officials were reluctant to make referrals to agencies without an established track record of dealing with juvenile offenders.

Referral Trends

Significant differences existed among national, rural and urban projects with regard to how youth clients were referred. Self-referrals (or walk-ins) were by far the dominant way youth entered rural projects (Table 6-4). National projects also had many self-referrals, but attracted more than half their youth from other sources including schools, parents, and social service agencies. By contrast, only a third of these youth from

TABLE 6-4

SOURCES OF REFERRAL BY NATIONAL,
URBAN COALITION AND RURAL DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PROJECTS

SOURCE OF REFERRAL	TYPE OF PROJECT		
	National (N=1540)	Urban Coalition (N=9844)	Rural (N=2388)
School	14.6	29.6	2.9
Parents/Relatives	11.8	11.3	3.2
Self	49.2	31.2	91.6
Social Service Agencies	16.0	22.3	1.3
Juvenile Justice System	1.8	2.4	0.8
Other	6.6	3.2	0.2
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Missing Cases = 2232

urban projects were "walk-ins." High proportions of urban youth were referred by schools and social service agencies.

These differences in sources of referrals are attributable to the varying levels of social services in the target areas served by the grantees. Urban projects (both national affiliates and coalitions) are located in cities where numerous social service agencies operate. Rural grantees served in target areas virtually devoid of other youth-serving agencies.

"Source of referral" proved a useful discriminating variable among projects. The dominant form of entry for ten projects was "self-referral" (Table 6-5). Schools and social service agencies referred the majority for six agencies. Apparently, these six agencies had developed some degree of networking or collaboration with other youth agencies.

One important difference between these two clusters was that self-referral projects had significantly more Black youth (57.8 percent compared to 48.1 percent) and fewer White youth (21.7 percent compared to 31.5 percent). There were no differences between the two clusters in terms of school attendance, school type, sex, age, or employment.

Interestingly, a higher proportion of youth "self-referral" projects had some juvenile court status (5.7 percent) than other projects (2.3 percent), although these percentage differences are small and the vast majority of all youth were not under court jurisdiction. Projects receiving referrals from schools or social service agencies did not necessarily recruit youth with serious legal difficulties. On the contrary, they received

TABLE 6-5

CLUSTERING OF PROJECTS BY MAJOR SOURCE OF REFERRAL

SELF-REFERRAL	OTHER DOMINANT REFERRAL SOURCE
Tulare	New Haven
Philadelphia	New York
Fort Peck	Dallas
Venice	Santa Barbara
Seattle	Richmond
Akron	
Tuskegee	
Boston	
Marietta	
New Jersey	

less of such youth.

There were also differences in the client family economic characteristics between the two clusters. Self-referral projects attracted youth in more economic difficulties. Self-referral project youth came from families where 30.8 percent of parents were unemployed compared to an unemployment rate of 22.5 percent for other projects. Over 62 percent of the self-referral youth came from families receiving some form of public assistance compared to 39.9 percent for the others. In sum, projects serving "walk-ins" rather than referrals from other youth-serving agencies recruited clients requiring a somewhat greater level of family economic services.

Screening and Diagnosis

Few projects outlined procedures for accepting or rejecting youth who sought project services. Screening efforts, when performed, were informal in nature. It is likely that inexperience in providing delinquency prevention services had contributed to the absence of screening mechanisms among grantees. Moreover, grantees possessed little expertise to draw upon in solving their problems about how to appropriately channel clients into particular services. A discussion by staff members of one agency points out this situation:

One thing, too, I have to point out ... is we asked LEAA to define at-risk. They never did. And they didn't know what it was....

[Our] at-risk criteria has come from some research we have done on national statistics and local ones, from information at the probation department, people working

with children, schools, and the Advisory Board has had a say on it. Everyone had their own little -- "this is what at-risk means." Look at [our] list of at-risk [youth], and you're looking at 80 percent of the children in the areas that we serve ... maybe 100 percent.

Those definitions alone don't mean that that person ... is going to become a juvenile delinquent.... The decision as to who is actually going to fall right within the project would ultimately rest with [the Outreach Director] and myself.

NCCD: And that decision can happen almost at any time, from the beginning, or through watching a girl's participation, or at the point of getting more information about her and seeing how she does?

Obviously there are certain situations where a child would be immediately placed ... as an at-risk girl.
(Santa Barbara, Field Notes)

Factors such as established patterns of agency service delivery, lack of project resources, and agency philosophy also came into play to retard the development of more specific screening and diagnostic procedures. These comments by agency directors are illustrative:

It's not a highly defined selection process. It's just what we do regularly in Camp Fire. There's a group of kids and you match adults up to that group of kids. And usually their kid is in the group too. (Seattle, Field Notes)

If a boy comes in to the program, and he can adjust to the program as it is designed by the leaders and the parents, then his chance of surviving that program is in his favor. But if he comes in and is constantly bucking the system as it is set up, he usually doesn't last very long and he moves on. Maybe another agency picks him up, maybe he becomes a delinquency statistic I know that for a lot of the troops that are in the system, they don't have the time to try to cater to everybody's needs. They take the program as is, and if people can relate to that program, then fine. (Seattle, Field Notes)

NCCD: How do you identify and select clients for your

programs, for the activities? How do you decide that one girl needs one kind of thing or needs some other kind of thing?

Staff: The basic philosophy here at the Club is that the girls are here because they want to be here, and we're providing a wide range of opportunities. They have the choice of what they want to sign up for.... We try to always educate and encourage if we think that a particular individual would benefit by a particular class, or might have an interest in it. Our policy of membership and of accepting girls is that if you come in and are interested and want to be here - that's it. You're automatically accepted. You have your parents fill out the necessary registration forms ... we never turn anyone away.
(Santa Barbara, Field Notes)

The result of failing to establish screening procedures for clients was that, almost uniformly, projects accepted every youth that walked through their doors. The rate of client acceptance reported by projects was 99.3 percent. No project reported a rejection rate higher than 4 percent, and only three projects reported more than 10 rejections. Of the 106 cases reported as rejected, three projects (Philadelphia, Venice, and Seattle) accounted for 79 percent (Table 6-6). No difference emerged in the level of screening between national, urban and rural projects; each accepted over 99 percent of the youth.

A few projects established diagnostic measures to complement particular service components. The Tuskegee project tested large numbers of project youth to determine their needs for the project's tutoring service. Aspira offered both educational and vocational interest testing to better identify the needs of its project youth. Some agencies within the Venice and Seattle collaborations also did educational and attitudinal testing for diagnostic purposes. The most common case was that

TABLE 6-6

NUMBER OF YOUTH REJECTED AT INTAKE BY PROJECT SITE

PROJECT SITE	Rejected	
	N	%
<u>NATIONAL AFFILIATES</u>		
Marietta	0	0.0
Akron	0	0.0
Richmond	0	0.0
Santa Barbara	5	2.0
New Jersey	0	0.0
Total National	5	
<u>URBAN</u>		
Venice	25	4.0
Philadelphia	44	3.4
New York	1	0.1
Dallas	1	0.0
New Haven	4	0.2
Boston	9	1.0
Seattle	15	0.7
Total Urban	99	
<u>RURAL</u>		
Tuskegee	0	0.0
Fort Peck	0	0.0
Tulare	2	0.3
Total Rural	2	
TOTAL	106	

Missing Cases = 47

methods for placing project youth into particular services were not developed. Youth usually chose for themselves the project activities in which they participated.

Certain factors served indirectly as screening devices for grantees. The target areas of some projects spanned many miles from boundary to boundary. In these cases, the availability of transportation had a major effect on which target area youth participated in project activities. Youth who lived near project facilities were much more likely to be project clients. (See Context chapter for discussion of transportation problems.)

The ethnic identity of staff also had the effect of selecting youth, in one case producing a client population disproportionate to its numbers in the surrounding community:

In East Dallas, where the largest group of Mexican-Americans live, the primary subcontractors are a Black agency, Washington Street Presbyterian Mission, and a White agency, the YMCA.
(Dallas, Field Notes)

As discussed in the Context chapter, language and cultural differences were barriers to the selection of some groups. Staff inability to speak Spanish often limited their ability to work with Hispanic youth. Lack of understanding of Black, Hispanic and other minority group cultures also affected recruiting, screening, and provision of services.

Reaching Out to New Clients

One goal of OJJDP that grantees appeared to achieve was the provision of service to youth not previously served by the

grantee agencies. All projects were expected by OJJDP to identify and serve youth traditionally missed by youth programs in their target areas. There is little to explain why projects were so successful at attracting such new client populations for their projects. However, Table 6-7 shows 89 percent of the project youth had not been served previously by grantee agencies. Tulare had previously served 52.7 percent and Santa Barbara served 30.7 percent, but no other agency previously served more than 20 percent. As a group, the national affiliates served 88 percent of their prevention clients for the first time, apparently demonstrating the ability of these agencies to attract new clientele. Although all projects seemed successful in recruiting youth not served previously, the validity of the 89 percent rate has to be interpreted in light of two facts. First, some project service components did not exist as agencies prior to the OJJDP prevention grants, and secondly, many agencies had no records to check past client involvement. Thus, many projects had no means for verifying the rate of new versus old clients.

Characteristics of Prevention Project Youth

Informal and unintentional screening mechanisms, such as agency image, transportation problems, and cultural differences, may have worked to keep certain types of youth away from the prevention projects (for some sites there is evidence that the more delinquency prone youth were discouraged from participating). The open recruitment of all target area youth

TABLE 6-7

NUMBER OF PROJECT YOUTH PREVIOUSLY SERVED BY GRANTEE AGENCIES

PROJECT SITE	PREVIOUSLY SERVED	
	N	%
<u>NATIONAL AFFILIATES</u>		
Marietta	21	3.4
Akron	26	7.8
Richmond	10	14.1
Santa Barbara	78	30.7
New Jersey	11	4.0
Total National	146	
<u>URBAN</u>		
Venice	115	18.8
Philadelphia	130	10.0
New York	48	2.9
Dallas	253	9.0
New Haven	134	7.0
Boston	138	15.2
Seattle	406	18.2
Total Urban	1,224	
<u>RURAL</u>		
Tuskegee	2	0.1
Fort Peck	3	0.9
Tulare	316	52.7
Total Rural	321	
TOTAL	1,691	11.0

Missing Cases = 660

and informal selection procedures produced, predictably, a client population indistinguishable from youth within the target areas at large. The types of youth that grantees worked with varied considerably. But, with the exception of client age, such variation was explained by the grantees' choices of target areas rather than deliberate choices based on programmatic decisions. There were some projects that purposely chose to work with a very young age group. These projects assumed that early intervention in a child's life produced greatest benefit in terms of preventing delinquent behavior. Little empirical support was offered for this notion.

Problems of Missing Data

Tables in this section present personal and family background characteristics of clients from each grantee as reported at intake. One should note the levels of missing data for each variable. Virtually complete data was collected for seven variables that are readily available from youth (age, sex, ethnic background, school attendance, school type, and juvenile court status). However, significant proportions of data were not collected on family-related information (Table 6-8). Several reasons explain why staff did not collect basic data on their clients' family characteristics. Youth were reluctant or unable to disclose such data for fear that it would not remain confidential. In some instances, the questions were never asked by staff due to a variety of fears they held about the types of data being collected and their eventual use.

TABLE 6-8

RANKING OF INTAKE VARIABLES BY PROPORTION OF MISSING DATA*

	N	%
Sex	21	0.0
Age	34	0.0
Ethnic Background	73	0.0
School Attendance	200	1.2
School Grades Completed	660	4.1
School Type	912	5.6
Juvenile Court Status	1061	6.6
Parent's Public Assistance	2959	18.4
Youth's Residence	4152	25.9
Youth's Employment Status**	861	26.1
Mother's Occupation	4409	27.5
Parent's Marital Status	4483	28.0
Parent's Housing	4667	29.1
Number of Children at Home	5614	35.0
School Grade of Parents	7631	47.6
Father's Occupation	9158	57.2

* Missing data ratios based on total N of 16,004.

** Youth's employment status ratio based on N of 3,296 which reflects number of youth 16 years or older.

The high number of background variables with large percentages of missing data raises the question of the appropriateness of their use for analyzing patterns in prevention youth characteristics. For example, is it appropriate to use a father's occupational level as an analytic variable when over half of the cases report no data? It may be that those with complete data represent a different type of client and are not typical of most clients served by the project. Comparisons were made of cases where family data were complete with cases where such data were missing. No significant differences existed between the missing data and complete data groups in terms of the youth's age, sex, ethnic background, school attendance, and current school grade. Thus, no systematic biases in data collection occurred that would differentiate these two groups. Cases with complete family related data appear to be representative of cases where such data do not exist. Generalizations of findings using these variables where large proportions of data are missing seem warranted and appropriate.

Age

Project youth were predominantly pre- or early adolescents with an average age of 13.3 years (Table 6-13). Over half the youth (52.4 percent) were 13 or younger (Table 6-9). The average age for males was slightly higher than for females (13.4 years compared to 13.2). As Table 6-10 shows, females made up a slightly higher percentage of the youth under 10 years, while

TABLE 6-9

PREVENTION YOUTH CHARACTERISTICS AT INTAKE

BACKGROUND VARIABLE	N	%	BACKGROUND VARIABLE	N	%
<u>Ethnic Background</u>			<u>School Type</u>		
Black	8323	52.2	Public	14,310	94.8
White	4124	25.9	Private	534	3.5
Puerto Rican	1453	9.1	Other	248	1.6
Mexican-American	1138	7.1	Missing = 912		
Native American	450	2.8			
Asian-American	171	1.1	<u>Public Assistance</u>		
Other	272	1.7	Welfare only	3893	29.8
Missing = 73			Social Security	928	7.1
<u>Sex</u>			Rent Assistance	789	6.0
Male	7882	49.3	Disability	225	1.7
Female	8101	50.7	Combination	711	5.5
Missing = 21			No Public Assistance	6374	48.9
<u>Present School Attendance</u>			Missing=2959		
Attend full-time	14,155	89.6	<u>Parent's Marital Status</u>		
Attend part-time	429	2.7	Married - both parents	5447	47.3
Attend continuation school	105	0.7	Widowed parent	900	7.8
Withdrawn	725	4.6	Parents not married	866	7.5
Expelled	63	0.4	Divorced	2455	21.3
Graduated	243	1.5	Separated	1726	15.0
Other	83	0.5	Other	127	1.1
Missing = 200			Missing = 4483		

TABLE 6-9 (Continued)

BACKGROUND VARIABLE	N	%	BACKGROUND VARIABLE	N	%
<u>Youth's Residence</u>			<u>Mother's Occupation</u>		
Both parents	5937	50.1	Unemployed	4619	39.8
Mother only	4709	39.7	Blue Collar jobs	5548	47.8
Father only	234	2.0	White Collar jobs	1428	12.3
Other relative	510	4.3	Missing = 4409		
Foster/Group home	129	1.0			
Other	333	2.8	<u>Number of Children</u>		
Missing = 4152			<u>Residing at Residence</u>		
<u>Youth's Employment*</u>			Zero	1035	10.0
Unemployed	1999	81.8	One	1969	19.0
Employed full-time	92	3.8	Two	2230	21.5
Employed part-time	344	14.1	Three	1875	18.0
Missing = 861			Four	1307	12.6
			Five	849	8.2
			Six	1125	10.8
<u>Parent's Housing</u>			Mean: 2.87		
Own	4029	35.5	<u>Juvenile Court Status</u>		
Rent	4396	38.8	No Court Status	14,327	95.9
Public housing	2846	25.1	Diversion/Probation/ Other	616	4.1
Other	66	0.6	Missing = 1061		
Missing = 861					

* Youth Employment status based on N of 2,435 representing those youths 16 years and older and not attending school full-time.

TABLE 6-9 (Continued)

BACKGROUND VARIABLE	N	%	BACKGROUND VARIABLE	N	%
<u>School Grades Completed</u>			<u>Age of Youth</u>		
zero - third	2455	16.0	Under 10 years	2960	18.7
fourth - fifth	2426	15.8	" 11 "	1172	7.4
sixth	1447	9.4	" 12 "	1237	7.8
seventh	1674	10.9	" 13 "	1409	8.9
eighth	1943	12.7	" 14 "	1579	10.0
ninth	1737	11.3	" 15 "	1768	11.2
tenth	1477	9.6	" 16 "	1668	10.5
eleventh	1637	10.7	" 17 "	1596	10.1
twelfth +	548	3.5	" 18 "	1637	10.4
Missing = 5614			Over 18 years	295	1.9
			Missing = 188		
<u>Father's Occupation</u>					
Unemployed	1603	23.4			
Blue Collar jobs	3764	55.1			
White Collar jobs	1479	21.6			
Missing = 9158					
<u>School Grade of Parents</u>					
Less than high school	3014	35.9			
High school	4221	50.4			
College and above	1138	13.5			
Missing = 7631					

males were slightly more common in the 18-and-over age groups. There were slight variations in the ages of youth from different ethnic backgrounds (Table 6-11). Native American youth, as a group, were older than the average whereas White youth were younger.

Recruitment and screening practices are related to client age. As noted earlier, the majority of youth came to projects from non-agency sources. Table 6-12 reveals that the average age for self-referrals (walk-ins) was slightly above the mean (13.5 years). Youth referred to programs by parents and relatives were significantly below the mean age (11.9 years). Very few referrals (2 percent) came from juvenile justice agencies. However, these youth were significantly older than the average (14.3 years). Youth under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court at intake were also significantly older than project youth in general (mean age of 15.3 years.) These data suggest that for projects to serve youth through referrals from the juvenile justice system, grantees would have to accept an older client group than they actually served.

Older youth were viewed by some project managers as a more difficult clientele to work with and control. According to some administrators, youth 14 to 18 are those most likely to disrupt project activities and are less amenable to positive change in attitudes and behavior. One project director explained:

You have to realize that older adolescent youth are those youth these agencies have always found difficult to attract and work with. They are the ones that cause many of the disciplinary problems.... For example, the

TABLE 6-10

AGES OF PROJECT YOUTH AT INTAKE BY SEX

AGE	SEX	
	Male (N = 7795)	Female (N = 8021)
Under 10 years	17.0%	20.3%
10 years	7.4	7.4
11 years	8.2	7.4
12 years	9.3	8.5
13 years	10.7	9.3
14 years	11.9	10.5
15 years	10.4	10.7
16 years	9.7	10.4
17 years	9.8	10.9
18 years	3.3	3.0
Over 18 years	2.2	1.2

Missing Cases = 188

TABLE 6-11

MEAN AGE OF PROJECT YOUTH BY ETHNIC BACKGROUND AT INTAKE

ETHNIC BACKGROUND	MEAN AGE
Black	13.5
Mexican-American	13.3
Puerto Rican	13.5
Asian-American	13.5
White	12.7
Native American	15.3
Other	13.1

Missing Cases = 79

TABLE 6-12

MEAN AGE OF PROJECT YOUTH BY SOURCE OF REFERRAL,
INTAKE DECISION, AND JUVENILE COURT STATUS AT INTAKE

	MEAN AGE
<u>Source of Referral</u>	
Juvenile Justice System	14.3
School	13.7
Parents/Relatives	11.9
Self	13.5
Social Service Organizations	13.0
Other	13.7
Missing cases = 189	
<u>Project Intake Decision</u>	
Accept	13.3
Reject	13.9
Missing cases = 58	
<u>Juvenile Court Status</u>	
No Court Status	13.3
Diversion/Probation/Other	15.3
Missing cases = 1054	

detached worker program in Chicago started because the older youth were tearing up the facilities and administrators had to find a way to get them away from the buildings.

The age of youth selected for delinquency prevention services poses a major dilemma for project policy. Working with older youth means that projects increase their chances for affecting rates of delinquency -- working with youth who are likely to be actively involved in delinquent activity. From their view, older youth increase the difficulty of client behavior which presents a greater challenge of reaching these youth in the first place. This is especially true for agencies that have traditionally not worked with older adolescents. Recruiting older youth might require restructuring their intervention services towards activities that appeal to older clients. The next chapter on Intervention reports that recreational services were most appealing to younger clients who were less concerned with employment, vocational, or educational service needs than older youth.

There was great variation in the average youth age among projects (Table 13). Boston, Dallas, Fort Peck, New Jersey, Akron, and Venice all attracted youth significantly older than the average, while Marietta, Richmond, Philadelphia, Santa Barbara, and New Haven attracted youth significantly younger than the average.

There were no significant differences between these two clusters of projects in the dominant sources of client referral. Client characteristics varied considerably between the two

TABLE 6-13

PERSONAL AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUTH PER PROJECT

PERSONAL AND FAMILY VARIABLES	URBAN COALITION PROJECTS							NATIONAL PROJECTS					RURAL PROJECTS			TOTALS
	Venice	Phila- delphia	New York	Dallas	Seattle	New Haven	Boston	Santa Barbara	New Jersey	Richmond	Akron	Marietta	Tulare	Fort Peck	Tuske- gee	
	N=621	N=1310	N=1637	N=3172	N=2240	N=2159	N=916	N=254	N=280	N=71	N=334	N=620	N=600	N=323	N=1467	
ETHNIC BACKGROUND																
Black	55.0%	52.5%	51.8%	65.2%	52.7%	26.2%	35.2%	11.0%	4.9%	88.7%	79.3%	74.8%	11.6%	0.9%	97.0%	52.2%
Mexican-American	37.1	0.0	0.2	14.0	4.1	0.4	0.1	32.3	0.0	9.9	0.0	0.2	45.1	0.0	0.1	7.1
Puerto Rican	0.6	25.5	21.9	0.1	0.2	11.8	29.8	1.2	82.4	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	9.1
Asian-American	0.2	0.2	4.7	0.2	2.2	0.5	0.2	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.3	0.3	1.1
White	6.3	21.5	20.6	19.6	31.2	59.0	29.7	49.2	1.5	0.0	19.8	24.8	40.0	0.3	2.5	25.9
Native-American	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.7	3.6	0.8	0.5	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	98.5	0.1	2.8
Other	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.3	5.9	1.3	4.4	1.2	11.2	0.0	0.6	0.2	1.5	0.0	0.0	1.7
SEX																
Male	54.0%	0.0%	62.0%	52.5%	55.4%	46.5%	58.3%	0.0%	50.5%	70.4%	54.2%	53.7%	59.4%	55.3%	58.6%	49.3%
Female	46.0	100.0	38.0	47.5	44.6	53.5	41.7	100.0	49.5	29.6	45.8	46.3	40.6	44.7	41.4	50.7
AVERAGE AGE (In years)																
	14.8	12.1	12.9	14.5	12.5	12.1	15.5	10.5	16.4	11.5	15.5	11.2	12.4	16.1	13.7	13.3
AVERAGE SCHOOL GRADE COMPLETED (In years)																
	8.3	5.9	6.7	7.7	6.2	5.8	8.5	4.5	9.8	5.0	9.1	4.3	6.4	9.2	7.9	6.9

TABLE 6-13 (Continued)

PERSONAL AND FAMILY VARIABLES	URBAN COALITION PROJECTS							NATIONAL PROJECTS					RURAL PROJECTS			TOTALS
	Venice	Phila- delphia	New York	Dallas	Seattle	New Haven	Boston	Santa Barbara	New Jersey	Richmond	Akron	Marietta	Tulare	Fort Peck	Tuske- gee	
<u>SCHOOL ATTENDANCE</u>																
Attending Full-time	72.5%	97.5%	98.0%	90.3%	84.0%	87.5%	78.1%	99.2%	75.0%	91.5%	92.1%	92.4%	87.3%	77.1%	99.7%	89.9%
Attending Part-time	3.3	0.2	0.7	6.2	3.5	2.1	5.5	0.8	0.4	1.4	0.9	1.1	0.8	1.9	0.2	2.7
Attending Cont. School	5.1	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.4	0.1	1.4	0.0	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.6	0.0	0.7
Withdrawn/Expelled	15.2	1.7	0.5	2.6	8.3	7.1	8.0	0.0	21.6	1.4	4.5	5.5	3.9	14.8	0.1	5.0
Graduated	3.3	0.2	0.2	0.5	2.3	2.0	5.6	0.0	2.9	0.0	2.4	0.0	4.8	4.6	0.0	1.5
<u>TYPE OF SCHOOL ATTENDING</u>																
Public Schools	95.1%	90.4%	86.7%	99.1%	96.6%	95.0%	84.3%	92.4%	82.8%	100.0%	97.8%	99.2%	99.6%	93.2%	99.9%	94.8%
Private Schools	2.0	8.9	11.1	0.6	1.9	3.1	10.0	7.6	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	1.6	0.1	3.5
<u>PARENT'S COMPLETE SCHOOL GRADE</u>																
	11.0	11.0	12.5	11.2	12.0	10.2	10.4	13.7	N/A	12.0	11.6	10.9	11.0	10.9	10.6	11.2
<u>NUMBER OF CHILDREN RESIDING AT HOME</u>																
	3.5	3.2	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.7	1.7	N/A	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.6	3.6	4.6	2.9

TABLE 6-13 (Continued)

PERSONAL AND FAMILY VARIABLES	URBAN COALITION PROJECTS							NATIONAL PROJECTS					RURAL PROJECTS			TOTALS
	Venice	Phila- delphia	New York	Dallas	Seattle	New Haven	Boston	Santa Barbara	New Jersey	Richmond	Akron	Marietta	Tulare	Fort Peck	Tuske- gee	
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE																
None	16.3%	29.9%	63.3%	66.9%	24.2%	52.9%	35.5%	63.7%	36.2%	12.5%	42.8%	32.8%	46.7%	17.5%	64.7%	48.9%
Welfare Only	44.0	62.3	28.0	15.6	27.9	35.8	48.2	22.4	56.4	62.5	36.5	39.3	33.6	27.5	16.5	29.8
Social Security	13.0	3.9	4.1	9.7	2.8	2.9	3.5	3.0	6.4	17.9	13.7	4.4	6.2	21.0	14.3	7.1
Unemployment	1.7	0.3	0.7	0.8	0.3	2.0	1.2	1.3	0.9	0.0	1.8	0.2	1.2	7.5	0.5	1.0
Disability	3.1	1.3	0.5	2.4	0.7	1.7	2.7	2.5	0.0	5.4	2.6	0.3	1.9	4.0	1.9	1.7
Rent Assistance	0.5	0.1	1.6	0.4	35.7	1.2	5.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.3	1.0	0.0	6.0
Combinations of the Above	21.4	2.1	1.9	4.2	8.4	3.5	3.7	6.8	0.0	1.8	2.6	11.8	10.1	21.5	2.1	5.5
PARENT'S HOUSING																
Own Home	23.4%	6.0%	4.3%	45.3%	17.9%	21.5%	20.2%	40.7%	N/A%	13.6%	43.1%	15.8%	63.8%	41.7%	75.3%	35.5%
Rent	73.3	66.0	43.0	36.1	28.8	64.8	49.5	56.0	N/A	15.2	49.3	21.7	33.8	48.6	21.1	38.8
Public Housing	3.0	28.8	51.8	18.3	52.2	13.5	30.2	2.1	N/A	71.2	7.2	61.9	0.9	9.3	2.9	25.1
PARENT'S MARITAL STATUS																
Legally Married	38.3%	37.9%	60.4%	41.4%	33.3%	48.6%	46.6%	49.0%	80.5%*	30.3%	41.7%	33.0%	66.6%	49.7%	58.3%	47.3%
Not Legally Married	9.6	3.3	3.2	6.3	7.6	5.8	3.0	2.8	0.0*	27.3	4.1	8.8	2.4	5.6	20.4	7.5
Divorced	21.6	8.1	11.8	26.4	39.3	28.6	15.7	37.8	7.3*	16.7	22.9	26.3	16.4	23.4	3.9	21.3
Separated	20.7	27.5	20.0	15.5	11.3	11.0	23.4	6.0	2.4*	13.6	20.7	24.7	9.0	3.4	8.4	15.0
Father Deceased	4.5	12.3	3.2	8.2	5.1	3.9	6.2	2.4	7.3*	7.6	9.2	4.1	3.4	13.1	6.8	6.1
Mother Deceased	3.8	5.7	1.4	1.4	2.1	1.1	2.1	1.2	2.4*	1.5	1.1	0.8	1.4	3.1	1.5	1.7
Both Parents Deceased	0.9	5.2	0.1	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.0*	0.0	0.4	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.4	7.5

* Indicates instances where project's N>50. Computed percentages are extremely unstable and should be cautiously interpreted.

TABLE 6-13 (Continued)

PERSONAL AND FAMILY VARIABLES	URBAN COALITION PROJECTS							NATIONAL PROJECTS					RURAL PROJECTS			TOTALS
	Venice	Phila- delphia	New York	Dallas	Seattle	New Haven	Boston	Santa Barbara	New Jersey	Richmond	Akron	Marietta	Tulare	Fort Peck	Tuske- gee	
<u>YOUTH'S EMPLOYMENT**</u>																
Unemployed	94.7%	85.0%	*	44.8%	89.4%	83.9%	*	*	78.9%	*	95.8%	*	44.2%	65.6%	*	
Employed Part-time	0.1	0.0	*	51.3	4.9	8.1	*	*	15.8	*	0.0	*	12.6	29.7	*	
Employed Full-time	6.2	15.0	*	3.9	5.7	8.1	*	*	5.3	*	4.2	*	44.2	4.7	*	
<u>MOTHER'S OCCUPATION</u>																
Unemployed	33.9%	81.2%	34.2%	28.0%	38.5%	51.3%	38.8%	29.8%	28.8%	22.6%	59.3%	43.3%	17.8%	53.4%	45.8%	39.8%
Blue Collar Jobs	44.7	9.2	28.4	45.0	36.7	26.6	44.5	25.8	60.7	69.3	20.5	33.2	67.2	13.8	37.3	36.9
White Collar Jobs	21.3	9.5	37.4	27.0	24.8	22.1	16.7	44.3	10.6	9.4	21.8	23.6	15.0	31.7	16.9	23.7
<u>FATHER'S OCCUPATION</u>																
Unemployed	18.8%	45.3%	13.8%	15.3%	31.1%	27.8%	47.1%	15.3%	39.6%	37.5%	28.2%	26.2%	10.9%	37.4%	21.1%	23.4%
Blue Collar Jobs	47.5	33.3	37.9	43.3	35.9	37.4	30.6	28.6	24.3	29.2	56.3	43.1	56.8	33.5	57.6	42.9
White Collar Jobs	33.8	21.4	48.1	41.4	32.9	34.8	22.3	56.1	36.0	33.3	15.4	30.7	32.3	29.0	21.2	33.8

** Employed status controls for youth 16 and over and not attending school full-time.

groups. Projects with older youth attracted more Blacks (53.5 percent compared to 41.1 percent for projects with younger youth), while projects with younger clients attracted significantly more White youth (41.4 percent compared to 17.8 percent for projects with older youth).

Projects with younger clients had far more females than males (68.6 percent female and 31.4 percent male), while projects with older clients had slightly more males than females (53.7 percent male and 46.3 percent female).

As one might expect, projects with younger clients had fewer youth out of school (5.7 percent) than projects with older clientele (8.7 percent). There was no significant difference in the percentage of youth with juvenile court status (4.8 percent and 4.9 percent) or type of school attended.

Projects with older clients attracted youth from families with slightly higher socio-economic positions. Fewer families were receiving welfare (26.6 percent compared to 42.7 percent), and less families lived in public housing (17.2 percent compared to 31.7 percent). There were no significant differences in the size of families, marital status or youth residence patterns of youth in these groupings of grantees based on client ages.

Education

School grade completed by the youth at intake produced variation across sites. Obviously school grade is interrelated with age of clients. The youngest client population was found at Santa Barbara with a mean age of 10.5 years and an average

completed school grade level of 4.5 years (Table 6-13). This youthful population is in marked contrast to the New Jersey site where the mean age was 16.4 years and the average completed school grade level was 9.8. In Santa Barbara a heavy focus was placed on recruiting project youth from local elementary schools. Outreach staff in Santa Barbara considered activities such as dressing up in clown costumes and performing for the lower school grades as valuable methods of client recruitment. Aspira's New Jersey affiliate organized clubs within high schools as a primary means of agency service delivery prior to the prevention project. This tradition was carried over to the prevention project and accounted for the older average age of their clients.

A number of grantees indicated in one manner or another their belief that problems at school were prime indicators of the need for delinquency prevention services. Some grantees listed youth with educational difficulties as priorities for project recruitment. To determine the degree of grantee success in recruiting youth with school problems, NCCD examined the correlation of age and completed grade level (Table 6-14). This analysis showed that most youth (71.6 percent) fell within their appropriate grade level in relation to their age. A significant percentage of youth were above their modal grade level (17 percent) with fewer youth below their modal level (11.3 percent). Some project directors claimed that grade levels of project youth failed to indicate the extent of client education problems. Very often, it was explained, youth are advanced to

TABLE 6-14

PROPORTION OF PROJECT YOUTH IN MODAL SCHOOL GRADE LEVEL AT INTAKE*

MODAL GRADE RANKING	N	Percentage
2 Years below grade level	382	2.7
1 Year below grade level	1,222	8.6
Appropriate Grade Level	10,139	71.6
1 Year above grade level	2,011	14.2
2 Years above grade level	403	2.8

Missing Cases = 732

* Modal Grade level computed by using the following

$$\text{equation: Modal Grade Level} = \frac{\text{(Highest Reported School Grade Completed)}}{\text{(Age - 6.5 Years)}}$$

the next grade in spite of their lack of mastery of necessary skills. More than one project director gave examples of youth in their projects who were in high school but could not read.

Other school performance characteristics of project youth did not suggest that grantees recruited clients with school problems. Projects did not attract significant numbers of drop-outs, or suspended or expelled students -- usually thought of as the "hard-to-reach youth." Almost all of the prevention youth, 97.2 percent, were either attending school or had graduated, including 92.8 percent attending school full time, 2.8 percent attending part-time or attending continuation school, and 1.6 percent who had graduated. Only 2.2 percent of the youth had withdrawn from school or had been expelled. Excluding those who had graduated and "other," 97.7 were attending school and 2.3 percent were not (Table 6-9).

School attendance figures were definitely related to age, as seen earlier. Of youth 16 or older, 15.4 percent were not attending school, five times greater than the 2.3 percent of all project youth not attending school. The vast majority of youth in school were attending public schools. Only 3.5 percent of the youth attended private schools.

Sex

Males and females were generally represented equally among project youth. Two projects were exclusively female (Philadelphia and Santa Barbara), and three were predominantly male (Richmond, New York, and Tuskegee). For Richmond,

Philadelphia, and Santa Barbara, sex differences reflect the traditional populations served by the grantee agencies. In the case of Tuskegee, observational data on intervention services suggest that male-oriented recreational services (baseball, football, basketball) and a predominantly male staff explain the attraction of males to the project. This is another example of how perceptions of specific intervention services influence the type of youth attracted to a prevention program. Insufficient data exist about the New York project to explain the predominant male population.

Puerto Rican and White clients were more likely to be female while other ethnic groups had slightly more males than females. There was no variation in program acceptance or type of referral among boys and girls.

Female-serving projects differed slightly from other projects in screening and referral sources of youth. They were slightly more likely to reject youth (3.2 percent compared to 0.4 percent), and recruited more youth served previously (13.4 percent compared to 10.8 percent). Self-referrals and referrals from parents were more common among female-serving projects, while the other projects relied more on agency referrals from schools and social service agencies (Table 6-15).

Female-serving projects possessed a much younger clientele (average age 11.8 years) than the other projects (13.5 years). This age difference explains the high full-time school attendance rate (97.8 percent compared to 88.7 percent of the youth from other agencies). Female-serving projects had the

same high percentages of Black youth as other projects (45 percent for female-serving projects and 52.9 for the others).

There were no differences between female projects and others in terms of the juvenile court status of youth or the percentages of youth attending public school. A higher percentage of youth 16 or over were unemployed among female-serving agencies than other grantees (92.4 percent to 78.8 percent).

When female-serving projects are compared to other projects in relation to youths' family structure, two important differences are noted. Over half the families of youth in female-serving projects were receiving welfare (52.9 percent) compared to 27.9 percent of the families of youth from other projects. Furthermore, more than half the parents of youth in female-serving projects were unemployed (50.5 percent) compared to an unemployment rate of 24.8 percent for parents of youth in other projects. There were no significant differences in youth residence patterns, but there is little doubt that clients in female projects came from worse family economic situations than those of other projects.

Ethnic Background

Ethnic composition was another of the major client variables differentiating projects. Some projects' clients were from a single ethnic group, some included only two ethnic groups, and some had sizeable proportions of three groups (Tables 6-13, 6-16). Asian-American youth were rarely seen as

TABLE 6-15

SOURCE OF REFERRAL BY FEMALE-ONLY PREVENTION PROJECTS
VERSUS ALL OTHER PREVENTION PROJECTS

SOURCE OF REFERRAL	FEMALE-ONLY PROJECTS	OTHER PROJECTS
Juvenile Justice System	1.1%	2.2%
Schools	15.7	25.1
Parents	17.4	9.3
Self-referral	48.7	41.3
Social Service Agencies	13.4	19.1
Other	3.8	3.0

TABLE 6-16
 MOST FREQUENT ETHNIC GROUPS
 BY PROJECT SITE

PROJECT SITE	PRIMARY GROUP	SECONDARY GROUP
<u>Black</u>		
Tuskegee	97% Black	2.5% White, 0.5% Other
Richmond	89% Black	10.0% Mexican-American
Akron	79% Black	20.0% White
Marietta	75% Black	25.0% White
Dallas	65% Black	20.0% White, 14.0% Mexican-American
Venice	55% Black	37.0% Mexican-American
Seattle	53% Black	31.0% White, 16.0% Other
Philadelphia	53% Black	26.0% Puerto Rican, 22.0% White
New York	52% Black	22.0% Puerto Rican, 21.0% White
Boston	35% Black	30.0% Puerto Rican, 30.0% White
<u>White</u>		
New Haven	59% White	26.0% Black, 12.0% Puerto Rican
Santa Barbara	49% White	32.0% Mexican-American, 11.0% Black, 7.5% Other
<u>Mexican American</u>		
Tulare	45% Mexican-American	40.0% White, 12.0% Black, 3.0% Other
<u>Puerto Rican</u>		
New Jersey	82.4% Puerto Rican	11.0% Other, 5.0% Black
<u>Native American</u>		
Ft. Peck	98.5% Native American	

participants at any project. Nine of the 15 projects were composed of predominantly Black youth clients. One project, New Haven, had a majority of Whites, and Santa Barbara's single largest ethnic group, although not a majority, was White. Tulare's largest youth group was Mexican-American (45 percent), which was almost equalled by Whites (40 percent). New Jersey was predominantly Puerto Rican, (92.4 percent), and Fort Peck was almost exclusively Native-American (98.5 percent).

A majority of all youth served in the prevention program was Black (52.2 percent), followed by White (25.9 percent), Puerto Rican (9.1 percent), Mexican-American (7.1 percent), Native American (2.8 percent), and Asian-American youth (1.1 percent) (Table 6-9). Black youth were more likely to be attending school full-time than any other ethnic group, while Native-American youth had the highest percentage of youth out of school. However, ethnic group differences in school attendance are confounded by the age differential between ethnic groups noted previously in Table 6-11. Native American youth are significantly older than the rest of the program participants and, thus, more likely to be out of school.

Although most youth had not been served by grantees prior to the OJJDP prevention program, nearly one quarter (24.5 percent) of the Mexican-American youth and 15.8 percent of White Youth had previously been clients (Table 6-17). Only a small percentage of Black, Puerto Rican, Asian-American, and Native-American youth were previously served by grantees.

Recruitment procedures were inconsistent for the different

TABLE 6-17
SELECTED INTAKE VARIABLES BY ETHNIC BACKGROUND

	ETHNIC BACKGROUND					
	Black	Mex. Amer.	Puerto Rican	Asian Amer.	White	Native Amer.
<u>Sex</u>						
Male	50.1%	55.1%	40.9%	55.0%	47.7%	53.9%
Female	49.9	44.9	59.1	45.0	52.3	46.1
Missing Cases = 88						
<u>Present School Attendance</u>						
Attend full- or part-time	92.4	86.0	86.4	90.6	87.7	76.3
Continuation school	3.5	4.9	2.6	3.5	2.6	3.6
Withdrawn	2.4	6.1	8.3	2.4	6.3	14.7
Expelled	0.2	0.4	1.1	0.0	0.4	0.4
Graduated	1.1	2.2	1.4	2.4	1.9	4.0
Other	0.4	0.3	0.2	1.2	0.9	0.9
Missing Cases = 256						
<u>Was Youth Previously Served?</u>						
Yes	7.7	24.5	6.7	8.8	15.8	7.5
No	92.3	75.5	93.3	91.2	84.2	92.5
Missing Cases = 721						
<u>Source of Referral</u>						
Self	45.7	40.4	34.6	43.3	35.5	55.6
School System	22.2	30.8	25.9	15.8	26.9	16.0
School Service Agencies	17.9	14.3	23.7	29.8	20.2	5.8
Parents/relatives	9.6	10.4	9.8	7.0	10.8	16.4
Juvenile Justice Agencies	1.8	1.0	1.4	1.8	3.0	3.9
Missing Cases = 248						
<u>Intake Decision</u>						
Accept	99.3	99.4	99.3	100.0	99.3	100.0
Reject	0.7	0.6	0.7	0	0.7	0
Missing Cases = 120						

ethnic groups. Self-referral was the dominant means of project entry for all ethnic groups (Table 6-17). However, schools referred 30.8 percent of the Mexican-American youth and 26.9 percent of the White youth, compared to 15.8 percent of the Asian-Americans and 16 percent of the Native Americans. Only a handful of youth from any ethnic group was referred to projects by agents of the juvenile justice system. There was no variation in screening procedures between ethnic groups. Over 99 percent of each ethnic group's members were accepted by grantees (Table 6-17).

Employment Status

Only a small number of the total prevention cohort was affected directly by unemployment. Two factors, a high proportion of youth below age 16 (64.0 percent) and a high proportion of youth attending school full-time (87.6 percent), meant that most prevention youth were ineligible for the labor force (Table 6-18).

Of the few youth eligible for work (16 years and older and not attending school), 82.8 percent were unemployed (Table 6-18). Those attending school part-time or attending a continuation school were less likely to be unemployed (47.3 percent and 76.1 percent respectively).

Family Structures

The living situations from which these youth came were generally associated with lower socio-economic status positions. Less than half the youth came from families with intact

TABLE 6-18

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PROGRAM YOUTH BY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AT INTAKE*

EMPLOYMENT STATUS	SCHOOL ATTENDANCE							TOTAL
	Attending School			Not Attending School				
	Full- Time	Part- Time	Contin. School	Voluntary	Temporary	Expelled	Graduated	
Unemployed	82.8%	47.3%	76.1%	83.9%	88.9%	93.0%	71.8%	80.0%
Employed Full-Time	1.8	3.4	4.2	7.9	1.6	4.7	19.1	3.6
Employed Part-Time	15.4	49.3	18.3	8.2	9.5	2.3	9.1	16.4
Total (N)	(2786)	(294)	(71)	(404)	(126)	(43)	(220)	(3978)

Missing Cases = 222

* Percentages based on N of 3978 reflecting youth 16 years and older.

marriages (47.3 percent) (Table 6-9). A large number of youth came from families of divorced parents (21.3 percent) or separated parents (15 percent). As might be expected from these figures, half the youth (50.1 percent) were living with both parents, 39.7 percent with mother alone, 2 percent with father alone, 4.3 percent with other relatives, and 1 percent in foster or group homes. The average number of children residing in the same home with project youth was 2.9 and over 71 percent of the youth lived with two or more children (Table 6-9).

Family Economic Status

A majority of the female parents or guardians of project youth were receiving some form of public assistance (51.1 percent; 29.8 percent received welfare and 21.3 percent other forms of assistance). A quarter of all youth lived in public housing while 38.8 percent lived in rented housing. This high level of public assistance is no doubt directly related to the high rates of unemployment among the youths' parents; 39.8 percent of the mothers and 23.4 percent of fathers were unemployed (Table 6-9). Questions about family income were not asked, but job titles that youth listed for their parents indicated that families with working parents were likely to be of lower socio-economic status. Blue collar jobs were held by 39.8 percent of youths' mothers, and only 12.3 percent had white collar jobs. Among employed fathers, 55.1 percent had blue collar and only 21.6 percent white collar jobs (Table 6-9).

A more detailed examination of parents' occupations was

conducted by taking the highest occupational status achieved by either of the youths' parents. When this computation was performed, more than a quarter (26.9 percent) of the youth served by the projects resided in families where the breadwinner is unemployed while 51.8 percent of the breadwinners are blue collar, and the remaining 21.4 percent white collar.

Family Characteristics by Ethnic Background

Significant variations in family background existed between ethnic groups despite the general finding that most project youth came from lower socio-economic status backgrounds. Groups with the highest percentage of intact families were Asian-Americans and Mexican Americans. Black and Native-American project youth were least likely to have parents with intact marriages. Whites were most likely to have divorced parents (29.9 percent), followed by Native Americans with 26.6 percent.

Youths' living arrangements also varied by ethnic group. The proportion living with both parents was highest for Asian-American and Mexican-American youth, while Black and Native-American youth were least likely to live with both parents. There were large differences in the numbers of youth living with their mothers: 10.4 percent for Asian-American, 18.5 percent for Mexican American, and 48.5 percent for Black youth.

Aside from Puerto Rican youth, distributions of youth whose parents own or rent varied little. The largest percentage of youth living in public housing were Puerto Ricans, followed by

Blacks. The number of children living with project youth also varied by ethnic groups; Native Americans had the highest average (3.4 children), followed by Blacks (3.2 children). Whites had the lowest average number of children living with them (1.98).

Finally, there are wide variations between ethnic groups in terms of the highest occupational level achieved by parents. Puerto Rican youth came from families with the highest rate of unemployment for the breadwinner (44.6 percent) followed by Blacks (30 percent), Native Americans (25.9 percent), and Whites (20 percent). Native Americans had the lowest percentage of unemployed parents, but a very high percentage of parents with blue collar jobs.

While there is significant variation by ethnicity in family characteristics of prevention youth, it should be noted that these differences are never extreme enough to warrant any conclusion other than that clients tended to be of lower socio-economic status. Families of White project youth, although having lower welfare and unemployment percentages than minority youth, still showed far higher percentages of economic dependency than national averages.

The assumption that prevention project youth were generally of lower socio-economic status is supported by comparing the characteristics of prevention youth and the nation's youth as a whole. Table 6-19 summarizes these comparisons using a variety of sources on the nation's youth and their families. The data illustrate that youth served by the prevention projects differed

TABLE 6-19

NATIONAL AND PREVENTION YOUTH CHARACTERISTICS

BACKGROUND VARIABLE	NATIONAL	PREVENTION	BACKGROUND VARIABLE	NATIONAL	PREVENTION
<u>Sex</u>			<u>Residence</u>		
Male	49.3%	48.8%	<u>Status</u>		
Female	50.7%	51.2	Two parents	79.2%	52.4%
<u>Ethnic</u>			Mother only	16.3	37.9
<u>Background</u>			Father only	1.4	1.9
White	86.7	25.9	Other		
Black	11.5	52.2	relative	2.5	4.2
Other	5.3	16.2	Not in		
<u>Age</u>			family	0.6	5.0
0-10	57.7	27.5	<u>Mother's</u>		
11-12	12.5	17.5	<u>Occupation</u>		
13-14	13.0	22.2	Unemployed	7.2	37.1
15	6.6	11.0	Blue collar	14.9	49.9
16	6.0	10.6	White collar	64.5	12.9
17	3.9	10.8	<u>Father's</u>		
<u>Enrolled</u>			<u>Occupation</u>		
<u>in School</u>			Unemployed	5.2	20.8
Public	87.5	94.9	Blue collar	45.9	55.8
Private	12.5	3.2	White collar	41.8	23.5
<u>Public</u>			<u>Parent's</u>		
<u>Assistance</u>			<u>Housing</u>		
Welfare	6.0	28.6	Own	69.5	36.3
Social			Rent	30.5	41.4
Security	25.4	6.6	Public		
<u>Parent's</u>			housing	N/A	25.1
<u>Education</u>			<u>Children Under</u>		
Less than HS	35.1	35.9	<u>Age 18 at Home</u>		
HS diploma	36.1	50.4	one	38.3	10.0
1-3 yrs.			two	35.7	19.0
college	13.4	6.8	three	16.5	23.0
4+ yrs.			four	6.2	19.0
college	15.4	6.8	five	2.1	12.0
<u>Parents</u>			six or more	1.2	17.0
<u>Married</u>	81.1	47.3	<u>Grade Level</u>		
			<u>Achievement</u>		
			Two yrs. and		
			more under	3.4	2.7
			One yr. under	18.6	8.6
			At grade	68.2	71.6
			Above grade	9.7	17.1

significantly from the "typical" youth and family in the following areas:

- o higher proportion of ethnic minority youth
- o higher proportion of older youth
- o higher proportion attending public schools
- o lower proportion with married parents or living with both parents
- o higher proportions of mother and fathers unemployed or working in blue collar occupations
- o lower proportion of parents able to own their own homes
- o higher proportion of parents receiving welfare assistance
- o higher proportion of parents with a high school or less education
- o higher proportion of families with three or more children living at home

Socio-Economic Differences

The above findings tend to confirm that, compared to the nation's youth population, the youth attracted to these prevention programs largely came from the lower socio-economic levels of American society. The one major exception to this trend was in school attendance. Here, prevention youth were only slightly below the nation's 94.6 percent school attendance rate.

Perhaps a plausible assumption would be that the low socio-economic status (SES) of the prevention cohort is largely attributable to the inclusion of large numbers of ethnic minorities (who tend to be from lower SES positions). To test

this hypothesis, several variables were selected for which we could control for race for both national and prevention youth populations. This analysis (shown in Table 6-20) shows that Black prevention youth characteristics are somewhat similar to those of the nation's Black youth population. In fact, their characteristics indicate a slightly lower SES than the national Black youth population. From this, one might conclude that the original assumption is confirmed, and the large numbers of Blacks and other minority ethnic groups account for the low SES of the prevention youth cohort. This is not the case. White prevention youth, although rated consistently higher than their Black counterparts in each of these background characteristics, were significantly lower than their White counterparts in the nation's population. Ethnic background alone does not adequately explain the lower class status of the prevention cohort. Both White and Black prevention project youth were "disadvantaged" in terms of socio-economic status.

Juvenile Justice Status

The very low percentage of OJJDP project youth with any juvenile court involvement is evidence of most grantees' policies of avoiding referrals from the juvenile justice system or otherwise discouraging participation of youth heavily involved with that system. Only 616 youths of 14,280 (4.1 percent) were under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court at the time of intake (Table 6-9). Of these 616 youth, 35.2 percent were under informal probation, 25.2 percent formal

TABLE 6-20

NATIONAL AND PREVENTION YOUTH CHARACTERISTICS
CONTROLLING FOR ETHNIC BACKGROUND

	NATIONAL YOUTH		PREVENTION YOUTH	
	White	Black	White	Black
Percent Attending School	96.3	96.3	90.3	95.9
Percent Attending Public School	N/A	N/A	89.8	97.9
Percent at Modal School Grade	73.8	62.5	71.5	72.3
Percent Married	85.0	52.2	53.8	40.4
<u>Youth's Residence</u>				
Both parents	84.8	46.8	47.8	34.2
Mother only	11.9	41.7	31.5	48.5
<u>Parent's Housing</u>				
Own	73.3	44.0	40.8	35.8
Rent	26.7	56.0	40.4	33.9
<u>Number of Children at Home</u>				
One	38.5	37.2	16.3	7.4
Two	36.6	29.7	15.9	27.9
Three or more	24.9	33.1	64.7	67.8
Percent Youth Unemployed	12.3	25.5	74.1	83.6

probation, 22.6 percent diversion, and 17 percent had other types of court status.

The fact that the juvenile justice system had dealt with only very few of the youth in the prevention project brings up the question of whether grantees were actually working with youth who were likely never to be officially identified as delinquents. Project staff assertions that they were serving a population at risk of becoming delinquent would be supported if the characteristics of prevention youth in any way mirrored the characteristics of youth who actually are identified officially as delinquents.

In exploring this question, we compared prevention youth with those arrested by law enforcement agencies and those referred to juvenile court. Only four variables were available for direct comparisons of all populations (Table 6-21). The data show prevention youth, albeit impoverished and of low socio-economic status, do not resemble delinquent youth in some important characteristics. Specifically, prevention youth revealed high proportions of females, Blacks, and youth under the age of 13, and a lower proportion of youth over the age of 14. The youths' current living arrangements was the only variable that approximated the two delinquent youth population figures.

A hypothesis easily justified is that grantees would serve a population more comparable to officially labeled delinquent youth if they relied more heavily on justice system agencies for referrals and served more youth under the juvenile court's

TABLE 6-21

YOUTH CHARACTERISTICS BY NATIONAL, PREVENTION,
POLICE ARRESTS, AND JUVENILE COURT REFERRAL POPULATIONS

BACKGROUND VARIABLE	National ¹	Prevention	Arrests ²	Juvenile Court ³
<u>Sex</u>				
Male	49.3%	48.8%	78.3%	76.3%
Female	50.7	51.2	21.4	23.7
<u>Ethnic Background</u>				
White	86.7	25.9	74.3	71.3
Black	11.5	52.2	23.2	21.3
Other	5.3	16.2	2.5	7.4
<u>Age</u>				
zero - ten	57.7	27.5	3.7	2.5
eleven - twelve	12.5	17.5	7.5	6.5
thirteen - fourteen	13.0	22.2	23.2	23.7
fifteen	6.6	11.0	19.5	21.6
sixteen	6.0	10.6	23.0	23.3
seventeen	3.9	10.8	22.8	22.2
<u>Living Arrangements</u>				
Two parents	79.2	52.4	N/A	45.1
Mother only	16.3	37.9	N/A	21.6
Father only	1.4	1.9	N/A	4.3
Other relative	2.5	4.2	N/A	3.9
Not in family	0.6	5.0	N/A	7.7
<u>Source of Referrals</u>				
Police	N/A	0.8	N/A	82.7
Parents/relative	N/A	10.1	N/A	4.1
School	N/A	24.1	N/A	3.2
Probation	N/A	0.5	N/A	2.6
Social service				
agency	N/A	18.5	N/A	0.7
Juvenile court	N/A	0.8	N/A	2.1
Self	N/A	42.0	N/A	0.0
Other	N/A	3.1	N/A	4.6

¹ Based on a variety of federal agency reports.

² FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United States, 1977.
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 1978.

³ Delinquency 1976: United States Estimates of Cases Processed by Courts With Juvenile Jurisdiction. National Center for Juvenile Justice, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, 1980.

jurisdiction. To test this hypothesis NCCD cross-tabulated the characteristics of prevention project participants who were either referred by or were under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system with the characteristics of other prevention youth.

Data presented in Table 6-22 provide support for this thesis and shows that prevention youth identified by the juvenile justice system are indeed more like the national cohort of officially delinquent youths than are other prevention project participants. Among the youth who were referred to the projects by juvenile justice agencies or under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, MIS data report a greater proportion of Whites, older youth, and unemployed youth than among other prevention youth. Youth involved with the juvenile justice system also represent a greater proportion of youth not attending school full-time or part-time and a greater proportion of youth with divorced or separated parents. These youth resemble the national officially delinquent cohort to a greater extent than the overall prevention cohort.

Conclusion

For the most part, grantees lacked formal intake or screening procedures to decide which youth should receive which services. Grantees did not distinguish between "hard to reach" youth or those with characteristics most common to youth who become officially labeled as delinquent. The lack of intake screening resulted in services being essentially self-selected

TABLE 6-22

CHARACTERISTICS OF PREVENTION YOUTH BY REFERRAL SOURCE
AND JJS STATUS COMPARED WITH ARREST AND COURT REFERRAL POPULATIONS

	PREVENTION YOUTH				DELINQUENTS	
	Referral Source		JJS Status		Arrests	Court Referrals
	Non-JJS	JJS	No	Yes		
<u>Sex</u>						
Male	47.5%	66.5%	48.5%	68.3%	78.3%	76.3%
Female	52.5	33.5	51.5	31.7	21.4	23.7
<u>Ethnic Background</u>						
White	24.7	37.8	23.9	37.0	74.3	71.3
Black	52.8	46.5	53.5	35.6	23.2	21.3
Other	22.5	15.7	22.6	27.4	2.5	7.4
<u>Age</u>						
Zero - ten	27.9	12.6	28.2	4.8	3.7	2.5
Eleven - twelve	16.8	16.1	17.7	10.0	7.5	6.5
Thirteen - fourteen	21.0	31.9	22.0	29.6	23.2	23.7
Fifteen	10.9	17.4	10.6	21.8	19.5	21.6
Sixteen	11.1	15.5	10.5	19.4	23.0	23.3
Seventeen	12.3	6.6	10.9	14.4	22.8	22.2
<u>Living Arrangements</u>						
Two parents	51.3	45.0	50.9	35.8	N/A	45.1
Mother only	39.2	40.8	39.8	39.0	N/A	31.6
Father only	1.8	2.1	1.9	3.6	N/A	4.3
Other relative	4.1	4.2	4.2	6.6	N/A	3.9
Not in family	3.6	8.0	3.1	15.1	N/A	7.7
<u>School Attendance</u>						
Attend full/part	93.6	79.3	94.0	74.8	N/A	N/A
Not attending	4.3	16.6	4.0	25.8	N/A	N/A
<u>Parent's Marital Status</u>						
Married	48.3	39.9	47.9	33.2	N/A	N/A
Divorced/Separated	33.9	48.9	35.6	47.8	N/A	N/A
<u>Youth's Employment</u>						
Unemployed	79.2	84.6	79.7	78.1	N/A	N/A
Employed full-time	2.5	1.5	2.4	4.0	N/A	N/A
Employed part-time	18.3	13.6	17.9	17.9	N/A	N/A

by youth. Projects served only a small proportion of youth from their target areas, but these services were not well targeted so that project resources were directed at many youth with low chances of becoming delinquent even without services. The clients of the OJJDP prevention program were primarily younger adolescents (mean age 13.3 years) in school full-time and from low SES backgrounds. Most clients were walk-ins; very few youth were referred from juvenile justice agencies. Agency traditions and reputations largely determined who they would service, although there is some evidence that grantees reached out to new client populations.

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Chapter 7

INTERVENTION: DIRECT SERVICES

Intervention activities represent the focal point of delinquency prevention programs. They are the techniques and strategies used to prevent delinquent behavior. The vast proportion of grantee resources was devoted to delivering quality services to positively affect youth, community residents, and youth serving organizations. OJJDP defined a range of intervention strategies from which grantees could choose: (1) Direct Services, (2) Community Development, and (3) Capacity Building. Despite this range, grantees chose to reinforce and expand their traditional direct service approaches rather than depart into new and perhaps more difficult intervention strategies. The dominant service provided was recreation with limited resources directed toward other services such as counseling, employment, education and transportation. Community-development and capacity-building activities, when attempted, were used to augment direct services instead of confronting socio-economic and structural correlates of youth crime such as unemployment and poor housing conditions, law enforcement policies, and lack of community resources.

This chapter explains why grantees continued to provide traditional direct services and describes in detail the extent of these services as well as those factors influencing the distribution of services. We also examine how patterns of

intervention activities effect and were affected by other program elements such as (1) attracting a very young client population, (2) establishing minimal relationships with the juvenile justice system, (3) adhering to delinquency theory of positive youth development and character building, (4) fiscal constraints limiting the quality of staff and agency resources to deliver direct services, and (5) the absence of well-defined objectives.

The Range of Intervention Strategies

The OJJDP Program Announcement outlined the major types of program strategies to be attempted by agencies applying for the federal funds. Emphasis was placed on three generic intervention strategies: (1) direct services, (2) community development, and a broadly defined category (3) "improving the delivery of services to youth." Each of the three categories and the associated program activities as defined by OJJDP are described below.

Direct Services

No specific definition of direct service was provided in the OJJDP program announcement. Program applicants, however, could choose to engage in the following activities as part of a direct service approach:

- (a) Provide for a significant increase in youth served from target communities.
- (b) Involve youth and community residents in planning.
- (c) Employ youth in project implementation.

(d) Utilize service models which result in new or improved social, educational, physical and vocational skills of youth.

(e) Demonstrate an ability to include those youths in the target community who do not normally use or underutilize private youth-serving agency services because of location of services and criteria for eligibility or termination of services.

(f) Address organizational policies, procedures, and practices which limit accessibility and restrict utilization of services by youth and families in target communities.

(g) Provide for appropriate training of staff, residence, and youth, as well as other support services essential to developing and maintaining viable programs.

Community Development

In contrast to direct services, OJJDP defined community development as the "process through which target area residents participate in and influence those activities which reflect their lives". The specific strategies deemed appropriate under this category were listed as:

(a) Improving and increasing services for youth through involvement of residents and youth from target communities in planning and implementation of youth service programs.

(b) Address those community conditions and organizational/institutional policies which limit accessibility and restrict utilization of services within target communities.

(c) Facilitate the community's ability to support and sustain improved and expanded services to youth.

(d) Provide for appropriate training of staff, residents and youth, as well as other support services essential to developing and sustaining viable programs.

Capacity Building

This strategy was defined as improving the agencies' ability or capacity to deliver services or perform community development activities.

(a) Address one or more institutional/organizational problems known to interfere with maximum utilization of private agency/organizational resources by youth in target communities.

(b) Propose solutions which have potential for ameliorating problems and providing needed resources in diverse geographic locations across the full spectrum of public and private not-for-profit youth-serving agencies.

(c) Focus improvements upon those affiliates located in communities of target populations.

(d) Show in specific and measurable terms how the capacity to serve youth in target communities will be improved.

Implications of Ambiguous Intervention Strategies

Comparisons among these major types of intervention strategies show considerable overlap and ambiguity in the wording of specific program activities. Figure 7-1 illustrates the similarity among the OJJDP-recommended program activities.

Furthermore, the wording of each program type activity was left quite general. No specific intervention programmatic approaches, such as basketball programs, peer tutoring, reality therapy or vocational training activities were listed. Agencies were allowed to choose for themselves what types of programs fit within OJJDP's broad guidelines.

The absence of narrowly constructed and mutually exclusive categories of intervention had important consequences for the development of program intervention systems. Broadly defined

FIGURE 7-1

COMPARISON OF SPECIFIC INTERVENTION ACTIVITIES BY PROGRAM TYPE

PROGRAM TYPES

OJJDP INTERVENTION ACTIVITIES

	Direct Service	Community Development	Capacity Building
Direct Service	<p>(a) Provide for a significant increase of youth serviced from target areas.</p> <p>(b) Involve youth and community residents in planning.</p> <p>(c) Employ youth in project implementation.</p>	<p>(a) Improving and increasing services for youth through involvement of residents and youth from target communities in planning an implementation of youth service programs.</p>	<p>(No Overlapping Activities)</p>
Community Development	<p>(f) Address organizational policies, procedures, and practices which limit accessibility and restrict utilization of services by youth and families in target areas.</p>	<p>(b) Address those community conditions and organizational/institutional policies which limit accessibility and restrict utilization of services within target communities.</p>	<p>(a) Address one or more institutional/organizational problems known to interfere with maximum utilization of private/organizational resources by youth in target communities.</p>
Capacity Building	<p>(g) Provide for appropriate training of staff, residents, and youth, as well as other support services essential to developing and maintaining viable programs.</p>	<p>(d) Provide for appropriate training of staff, residents, and youth, as well as other support services essential to developing and sustaining viable programs.</p>	<p>(No Overlapping Activities)</p>

strategies placed greater responsibility on grantees to define and select their own intervention strategies. Frequently these choices were made according to agency ideologies of delinquency prevention and organizational interests. The OJJDP Program Announcement did not dictate a specific federal policy to local organizations. Consequently, what was evaluated represents what grantee organizations chose as their most effective and efficient delinquency prevention approaches.

Grantees initially reported "confusion" over this range of intervention choices. With little direction from OJJDP they were unsure how to structure their activities and, more importantly, they were uncertain whether their approaches would satisfy federal objectives. OJJDP monitoring reports contributed to grantee confusion by implicitly emphasizing the direct-service approach and giving little attention to capacity-building and community-development strategies.

Projects appear concerned at what they perceive as "double messages" from OJJDP regarding both national goals and objectives, and types of youth to be served within the projects. The stated national goals are seen to emphasize capacity building and community development, yet OJJDP planning and reporting requirements are viewed as reinforcing the more traditional direct services approach (e.g. numbers of youth served). In addition, projects appear confused in that they view the OJJDP emphasis in this initiative on primary prevention (i.e., serving all youth on a target basis), yet perceive data reporting requirements as more relevant to a secondary prevention model (i.e., serving "at risk" youth on a target group basis). (Westinghouse National Issues Center, 1978: 4-2)

To facilitate evaluation of what types of intervention strategies were most effective in preventing delinquency, NCCD

refined the OJJDP definitions. As originally construed by OJJDP, establishing a summer basketball program might be defined as direct services, capacity building or community development. NCCD established the following definitions to better conceptualize the grantee intervention activities.

(1) Direct Services: Intervention strategies delivered to individual youth or groups of youth aimed at reducing the possibility of their involvement in delinquent behavior through the provision of skills, knowledge, or activities that may serve as positive alternatives to delinquent behavior.

(2) Community Development: Activities directed toward facilitating the ability of communities to support and sustain improved and expanded services to youth, or to reduce the prevalence of social and economic factors within the community associated with the occurrence of delinquent behavior. These activities address community and institutional issues restricting the utilization of youth services or promoting delinquency.

(3) Capacity Building: Activities to alter organizational aspects of youth-serving agencies limiting the quantity and/or quality of services delivered to youth.

These definitions differ from each other in terms of their target(s) for change. Direct services focus on target area youth. Community development activities are directed towards community residents and those organizations and institutions (both community-based and external organizations) that are associated with delinquency. Organizing neighborhood block

clubs to prevent burglaries is one example of a community development strategy. Capacity building involves activities directed towards youth service agencies themselves to improve their ability to deliver direct services. For example, staff training, acquisition of new or improved facilities, and establishing cooperative relationships with other youth service agencies are examples of capacity building activities. The direct service strategy is analyzed below. Community development and capacity building are discussed in Chapter 8. Data presented include (1) what services were provided to whom, (2) the content of these services, (3) explanations of why some services were favored by youth, staff, and youth-serving organizations, and (4) factors constraining or facilitating each intervention strategy.

The major finding emerging from this chapter on direct services is that the grantees delivered the same types of services they had been providing for many years -- under the new rubric of delinquency prevention. Traditional service activities focusing on producing changes in individual youth accounted for the vast majority of services provided by grantees. Few needs assessments of target area youth were conducted prior to the initiation of grantee services. Instead, projects commonly offered a range of services and allowed youths to voluntarily participate in any services the youths selected. Younger clients often selected recreational services while older youth chose to participate in employment programs. Overall, recreational activities were, by far, the dominant form of

direct service provided to youth.

Introduction to the Data on Services

With direct services accounting for the greatest allocation of funds and staff effort, the national evaluation likewise committed a great amount of resources toward collecting quantitative data in this area. Sources of data included: Management Information System termination data collected as youth left projects (although many of these were "administrative terminations" because project records showed the youth still enrolled in the project at the end of the study period) and a follow-up survey of a random sample of youth administered one year after the projects. NCCD conducted extensive interviews with project directors and staff. The national evaluation also analyzed service observation notes collected by on-site data collectors and NCCD research staff.

During the national evaluation, NCCD collected a large amount of data on direct services to target area youth. Specific quantitative data were compiled from MIS termination forms coded by the local data collectors as youth ended project involvement. A total of 16,928 termination forms were received by NCCD. Of this total, 15,260 contained valid identifying information. (The 1,668 invalid forms represented instances of duplicate forms for the same youth. The MIS processing system included computer checks to ensure all forms contained unique identities.) This Termination File contains the most complete direct service information produced by the projects.

Valid MIS termination forms along with MIS intake records were merged into one file, pairing intake and exit data. This Paired File is a subset of the termination file containing 13,754 matched intake and termination cases. It allows for analysis of intervention strategies, coded at termination, combined with client characteristics, coded at intake.

Although the paired file is a subset of the termination file, it contains a sufficient number of cases to be reported with confidence. Furthermore, there is a very high level of statistical correspondence between common variables included on the Paired and Termination files. As Table 7-1 shows, few differences in the percentages of youth characteristics appear between the two files. All differences are smaller than one percent.

A follow-up survey was administered to a sample of youth one year after they entered in the various projects. A random 10 percent sample was chosen using the MIS intake file. A total of 1707 youth were thus selected to be interviewed. Table 7-2 summarizes the outcomes of attempts to interview these youth. Only a third of the sample was interviewed in the follow-up survey. In all but three projects (Fort Peck, Dallas, and Santa Barbara), less than half of the interviews were conducted. In Boston, Seattle, New York, and Venice, less than 20 percent of the interviews were completed. Reasons for not completing interviews varied by project. At the Venice site, 42 percent of the youth refused to be interviewed; in New York, 59.1 percent of the youth could not be located by letter or telephone. In

TABLE 7-1

COMPARISONS OF SELECTED YOUTH CHARACTERISTICS
APPEARING ON MIS PAIRED AND TERMINATION FILES

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS	Paired File	Termination File
<u>School Attendance</u>		
Full Time	86.1%	85.6%
Part Time	1.4%	1.5%
Continuation	0.7%	0.7%
Out of School	11.8%	12.3%
<u>Parent's Marital Status</u>		
Married	52.7%	52.0%
Divorced	21.9%	22.2%
Separated	12.7%	13.1%
Other	12.6%	12.8%
<u>Youth Employment Status</u>		
Unemployed	85.4%	85.0%
Employed Full Time	6.6%	6.7%
Employed Part Time	7.7%	7.9%
Other	0.3%	0.3%
<u>Level of Youth Improvement</u>		
None	8.5%	8.9%
Minimal	22.2%	22.3%
Moderate	45.3%	44.9%
Significant	24.1%	24.0%

Source: MIS Paired and Termination Files

TABLE 7-2
 OUTCOME OF ATTEMPTS TO INTERVIEW
 A RANDOM SAMPLE OF PROJECT YOUTH

INTERVIEW RESULTS	N	Percent
1. Youth Interviewed	565	33.1%
2. Youth refused to be interviewed	99	5.8%
3. Youth could not be identified for interview by MIS	75	4.4%
4. Youth could not be located by mail	90	5.3%
5. Youth did not respond to letter requesting interview	108	6.3%
6. Youth could not be located for interview by phone or letter	366	21.4%
7. Youth reported to have moved	193	11.3%
8. Other	211	12.3%
TOTAL	1,707	100.0%

Missing Cases = 8
 Source: Follow-up Survey

Boston and Seattle there were many reasons for not interviewing youth, especially youth who had moved or could not be located by letter or telephone.

While these factors diminished the quantity of data collected in the follow-up survey, the successful interviews furnish a rich source of material on youths' own reactions to the quality and quantity of services received. Youth responses can be directly compared to data collected from interviews with project staff and administrators, and MIS data coded by project research staff.

In this discussion on direct services a number of Management Information System (MIS) tables present statistics on rates of service. These data may prove confusing to some readers and require a brief explanation. Since most youth could participate in more than one type of direct service, it was necessary to compute the number of specific types of services provided per youth. Thus, when data are presented on a specific service type such as educational services, a service is employed. For example, a service rate of .721 reflects an average of .721 educational services per youth in the project; a rate of 1.21 for recreational activities would suggest that an average of 1.21 recreational services were delivered to youth. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences' (SPSS) Multiple Response subprogram was used to compute these rates.

The Multiple-Service Approach of Direct Services

Service strategies of many grantee proposals envisioned a


multi-service approach. Rather than focusing on any one service aimed at eliminating delinquent behaviors, grantees intended to offer a wide variety of services and activities, to counter a wide range of service deficiencies contributing to delinquent activity. Rural projects, due to the relative lack of social services in their areas, were especially sensitive to the numerous gaps in youth services:

In attempting to fill the void created by a lack of youth serving agencies, BYS has often felt compelled to address all needs of youth. (Fort Peck, Field Notes)

Probably the most striking attribute of the YSP services is the comprehensive nature of the program that the project has attempted to implement. ... If a question were asked about which types of services community youth need most, a legitimate answer might have been -- everything. (Tuskegee, Field Notes)

However, based on MIS data it appears that youth received a limited range of services. Of all youth, 58.8 percent received a single service type while 41.2 percent received multiple service types (e.g., recreation plus education services) (Figure 7-2). Of those youth receiving a single service type, 55.5 percent received a recreational service and among these youth, 92.7 percent received only one type of recreation activity. For the entire client population in the MIS termination file 30.3 percent received only one recreational activity. Of the 41.2 percent who received multiple services, 69.4 percent received only two service types (Figure 7-3). Only 12.6 percent of all prevention clients received more than two service types (11.3 percent received three service types; 1.3 percent received four

FIGURE 7-2
BREAKDOWN OF SINGLE SERVICE TYPES RECEIVED BY YOUTH




* percentage of single service type

() figures within parenthesis designate percentages of total youth

Source: MIS Termination File

FIGURE 7-3
BREAKDOWN OF MULTIPLE SERVICE TYPES
RECEIVED BY YOUTH



() figures within parentheses designate percentages of total youth

* percentages of multiple service types

** percentages of multiple service categories

Source: MIS Termination File

service types).

The most common multiple service combinations were: (1) recreation and education (14.5 percent); (2) recreation and counseling (6.9 percent); and (3) recreation, employment, and education (6.0 percent). Conversely, the least common service combinations were: (1) recreation and employment (1.5 percent); (2) employment, recreation and counseling (0.8 percent); (3) employment, education and counseling (1.3 percent); and (4) all four service types (1.3 percent) (Figure 7-3).

Avoiding Service Duplication

One expected outcome from forming agency collaborations was to control duplication of services and channel youth in need of services to the most appropriate agency. Coalitions hoped they could eliminate the problem of many agencies providing the same services to youth. To a large extent, the problem of duplication was not really a problem for the OJJDP grantees since different agencies within the coalitions often served different target areas. However, with increased availability of transportation services, it was assumed that youth in need of a particular service would be assigned to the agency best equipped to provide that service.

The linking of youth to the most appropriate service type and provider did not materialize for the collaboration grantees. In the Seattle collaboration which provided the most comprehensive data on collaboration interactions, virtually all youth received their services from the agency they initially

entered. In nine of Seattle's fifteen agencies, 100 percent of the services youth received were delivered by the agency of first referral (Table 7-3). In the remaining six agencies, percentages of sole agency serviced youth were nearly as high.

As noted previously, the absence of client exchange among agencies resulted partly from their competing over service populations in the target community areas. Secondly, considerable organizational conflict hampered efforts to develop close relationships among the collaboration members. A third factor resulting in the few cross-referrals was the lack of diversity among the agencies in the types of services they offered to youth. In most instances, these agencies provided similar arrays of service types to their clients.

Using Seattle as an example, Table 7-4 shows that 11 out of 15 agencies provided at least a .90 rate of recreational services per youth. Three agencies delivered employment services to large percentages of their youth, two delivered educational services and three delivered counseling services. In nine agencies, recreation was the only service delivered on a large scale to youth. Without agency specialization in a service type, there was little reason for youth to seek alternative service providers or for agencies to share their youth with other agencies.

Dominant Forms of Direct Services

Lacking systematic assessments of youth needs or well developed theoretical strategies, it appears that grantees were

TABLE 7-3

PERCENT OF SERVICE PROVIDED BY INTAKE AGENCY
IN THE SEATTLE COLLABORATION

AGENCY OF INITIAL REFERRAL AND INTAKE	PERCENT OF SERVICE RECEIVED FROM INTAKE AGENCY
<u>Neighborhood Houses</u>	
Park Lake	97.5%
High Point	99.6%
Holly Park	100.0%
Ranier Vista	100.0%
Yesler	99.6%
Town House	88.3%
<u>Other Agencies</u>	
Highline Youth Service Bureau	100.0%
CIHD	100.0%
Boys Club	100.0%
Camp Fire Girls	95.5%
YWCA	100.0%
Boy Scouts	100.0%
Girls Club	92.5%
Atlantic Street Center	100.0%
YMCA	100.0%

Source: MIS Termination File

TABLE 7-4
RATE OF SERVICES PER YOUTH IN SEATTLE COLLABORATION AGENCIES

SERVICES	NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSE AGENCIES						NON-NEIGHBORHOOD AFFILIATED AGENCIES								
	Park Lane	High Point	Holly Park	Ranier Vista	Yesler	Town House	High Line	CIHD	Camp Fire Girls	YWCA	Boy Scouts	Girls Club	Boys Club	Atlantic Street Center	YMCA
Recreation	1.004	1.004	.967	.985	.934	1.191	.005	.000	1.017	1.000	.978	.847	.000	.012	1.103
Employment/ Vocational Training	.017	.057	.098	.015	.088	.228	1.198	1.032	.000	.000	.000	.241	1.000	1.363	.000
Education	.000	.273	.233	.115	.298	.432	.142	.517	.099	1.000	.000	.866	.000	.842	.167
Counseling/ Therapy	.000	.147	.325	.000	.839	.921	.000	.108	.136	.000	.022	.381	.000	.842	.000
Other	.004	.588	.282	.023	.757	.155	.233	.167	1.045	1.067	.022	.000	.000	.077	.000
Total Respondents	238	245	305	130	272	303	197	414	294	266	46	320	38	342	156
Total Responses	244	507	581	148	793	887	311	755	675	816	47	747	38	1072	198

Note: Statistics represent the ratio of services received per youth, or: $\frac{\text{Number of services received}}{\text{Number of youth}} = \text{Service ratio}$

Source: MIS Termination File

guided by some tacit understanding about the needs of their respective client groups. Although most projects proposed to offer a wide variety of services, no two projects shared the same emphases in delivered services. Table 7-5 summarizes the direct service categories and their level of usage. One can observe wide diversity in the rates of delivered direct services for each grantee.

For instance, the employment service rate per youth in Fort Peck was .962 compared to Tulare's rate of .010 and Marietta's rate of .022. Similarly, the Akron site had a .249 service rate in the educational category, while Richmond was as high as .625 in this category and the New Jersey site was between these extremes with an educational service rate of .405.

Despite this diversity in service intensity, four service types dominate all the others and recreation emerges as the primary service type. Table 7-6 shows that 36.9 percent of all delivered services were recreational. Following recreational services are educational activities (20.7 percent), employment or vocational services (16.6 percent), and family, psychological, drug, or alcohol counseling (14.1 percent). Collectively these four direct service types account for 88.3 percent of all direct services.

The popularity of these services was confirmed by other data sources. Project staff were requested to submit an inventory of all services offered. Recreation was again ranked first with 461 separate recreational components or activities listed by staff. Education was second with 309 components

TABLE 7-5

RATE OF SERVICES BY PROJECTS BY SERVICE TYPE

SERVICE	URBAN PROJECTS						
	New York	Dallas	Seattle	New Haven	Boston	Venice	Philadelphia
Employment	.013	.443	.287	.016	.604	.189	.120
Educational	.432	.284	.255	.565	.348	.619	.623
Vocational Training	.004	.004	.047	.165	.078	.254	.121
Transportation	.006	.000	.169	.053	.158	.030	.211
Lodging	.000	.001	.004	.008	.001	.000	.003
Financial	.000	.075	.007	.049	.003	.008	.110
Family Counseling	.004	.016	.040	.206	.097	.151	.006
Psychological Counseling/Therapy	.114	.003	.093	.105	.133	.632	.140
Drug Therapy	.000	.001	.049	.042	.059	.019	.030
Alcohol Therapy	.000	.002	.000	.003	.000	.000	.028
Medical	.000	.000	.004	.131	.001	.019	.001
Legal	.002	.000	.004	.009	.007	.016	.002
Religious	.000	.000	.010	.005	.000	.000	.000
Recreational	1.183	.280	.679	.787	.356	.570	.835
Number of Respondents	542	1670	2171	1720	862	370	1270
Number of Responses	952	1847	3577	3688	1592	928	2830

TABLE 7-5 (Continued)

SERVICE	RURAL PROJECTS			NATIONAL PROJECTS				
	Tuskegee	Ft. Peck	Tulare	Santa Barbara	Marietta	Akron	Richmond	New Jersey
Employment	.027	.962	.010	.119	.022	.370	.083	.000
Educational	.602	.951	.010	.703	.182	.249	.625	.405
Vocational Training	.067	.886	.014	.059	.003	.036	.028	.281
Transportation	.078	.032	.449	.317	.572	.014	.014	.000
Lodging	.000	.000	.000	.000	.006	.000	.000	.000
Financial	.000	.896	.000	.000	.010	.025	.000	.000
Family Counseling	.008	.000	.000	.000	.284	.028	.111	.000
Psychological Counseling/Therapy	.000	.000	.072	.257	.966	.485	.014	.490
Drug Therapy	.042	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000
Alcohol Therapy	.025	.009	.000	.000	.000	.000	.014	.000
Medical	.000	.003	.002	.000	.004	.000	.000	.000
Legal	.001	.006	.002	.000	.009	.003	.000	.000
Religious	.000	.000	.002	.000	.004	.000	.000	.000
Recreational	1.239	.959	.992	.931	.808	.406	.931	.948
Number of Respondents	731	317	626	101	677	357	72	210
Number of Responses	1528	1491	971	241	1944	577	131	446

NOTE: Figures represent the ratio of services received per youth or:

$$\frac{\text{Number of services received}}{\text{Number of youth}} = \text{Service Ratio}$$

SOURCE: MIS Termination File

TABLE 7-6
TOTAL DIRECT SERVICES PROVIDED

SERVICE TYPE	Services Provided	Percent of Services Provided	Service Rates
Employment	2,636	11.6%	.225
Educational	4,172	20.7%	.403
Vocational Training	1,128	5.0%	.096
Transportation	1,648	7.2%	.144
Lodging	31	0.1%	.003
Financial	670	2.9%	.057
Family Counseling	832	3.7%	.071
Psychological Counseling/Therapy	1,978	8.7%	.169
Drug Therapy	309	1.4%	.026
Alcohol Therapy	67	0.3%	.006
Medical	249	1.1%	.021
Legal	51	0.2%	.004
Religious	35	0.2%	.003
Recreational	8,397	36.9%	.718
Total Responses	22,743	100.0%	N/A

Total Respondents = 11,696
Missing Cases = 136

Source: MIS Termination File

followed by employment and vocational (147) and counseling (115).

Project Directors were also asked to identify their "three to five best and most important services" to gain a better understanding of the quality of services as perceived by those administering the services. Their responses reveal that the most frequently provided services (the direct service variety) are also judged to be the best and most important services (Table 7-7).

Youth were also asked to identify the most important service they received in the follow-up survey (Table 7-8). In these data the most widely offered service, recreation, was again selected as the most important. Employment was chosen more often than education, although educational services were more prevalent among project offerings. The fewest number of youth chose counseling as most important.

The client follow-up survey made it possible to calculate the average number of services received per month and the average length of stay in each activity as reported by youth. These data show that, on the average, youth attended 9.0 service activities per month. The average length of stay per service activity was approximately two hours (127.3 minutes) (Table 7-9).

Employment services were reported to be attended most frequently per month, and involved the longest period of service contact, (Table 7-9). Youth involved with educational services attended the fewest average number of services per month, followed closely by counseling services. The average number of

TABLE 7-7

PROJECT DIRECTOR NOMINATION OF THE
 "3-5 BEST AND MOST IMPORTANT SERVICES" PROVIDED BY PROJECTS

SERVICE TYPE	N	%
Direct Service Category	31	77.5%
Recreation	11	27.5
Education	9	22.5
Employment/Vocational	7	17.5
Counseling	4	10.0
Capacity Building Services	5	12.5%
Community Development Services	4	10.0%
TOTAL NOMINATIONS	40	100.0%

Source: Project Directors Interview

TABLE 7-8"MOST IMPORTANT SERVICE RECEIVED"
AS REPORTED BY PROJECT YOUTH

NOMINATED SERVICE TYPE	Number of Cases	Percent
Recreation	253	49.7%
Employment/Vocational	117	23.0%
Education	91	17.9%
Counseling/Therapy	40	7.9%
Other	8	1.5%
TOTAL	509	100.0%

Missing Cases = 56

Source: Follow-up Survey

TABLE 7-9

FREQUENCY AND INTENSITY OF DIRECT SERVICES RECEIVED AS REPORTED BY YOUTH

SERVICE TYPE	FREQUENCY		INTENSITY	
	Average Number of Services per Month	Number of Cases	Average Number of Minutes	Number of Cases
Recreation	9.0	905	131.7	917
Employment/Vocational Training	13.6	226	175.7	228
Education	6.4	294	119.8	295
Counseling/Therapy	6.8	123	74.6	123
Other	9.7	88	66.5	104
All Services	9.0	1636	127.3	1667

Source: Follow-up Survey

minutes spent in counseling was the lowest of the four major service types.

Content and Nature of Direct Services

It is important to understand the content and nature of direct services before reaching conclusions based solely on quantitative data. What follows is a detailed description of the primary direct service types: (1) recreation, (2) education, (3) employment (4) vocational training, and (5) counseling. While these descriptions may at times appear excessively tedious, they allow the reader to become intimate with the content of these services to better understand what these direct services actually represented.

Recreation Services

Recreation constituted what many local observers considered the backbone of project services. It was the primary means for attracting and sustaining youth interest and involvement. The diverse array of these recreational services are summarized in Exhibit 7-1.

The following two excerpts from field observation give a portrayal of recreation services as they occurred at the projects. The first is an observation about organized instructional activity including the various distractions and horse-play typical of recreational activities. The second observation is of activities of another often-delivered recreational service, a Drop-In Center.

EXHIBIT 7-1RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES

summer camp	disco dance	wrestling
day camp	racketball	belly dancing
fishing	tennis	pinball
picnics	tumbling	boxing
basketball	drill team	bowling
baseball	creative exercise	sewing
football	"A New You"	chess
soccer	"A Night Out"	weaving
track	"Super Supper"	macrame
team tournaments	"Anything Can Happen."	Foosball
individual tournaments	"Fiber Fun"	snacks
bike riding	tap dance	photography
open games	jewelry art	drama
hiking	cooking	bus outings
swimming	baking	"Farm Vacation"
back packing	ballet	weight lifting
arts and crafts	puppetry	model airplanes
field trips	kick ball	holiday parties
sports workshops	"Clay Play"	air hockey
evening recreation	jazz dance	checkers
parties	"Mother Goose Story Time	yatzee
dances	jump rope	password
drop-in activities	"Tell Your Story"	badminton
gold	"Sing a Song"	
table tennis	improvisation	
calisthenics	sledding	
canoeing	movies	
volleyball	bingo	
gymnastics	bowling	
karate	ice skating	
guitar lessons	talent shows	
modern dance	roller skating	

Gymnastics Class

There are now 12 girls on the mats, four more are on the mats on stage attempting back flips. There are a Black, two Chicano, and 13 White girls in the class. A work study student, Joanne, is aiding the instructor, Denise. A couple of girls have been watching the warm-up sessions from the stage. Denise asks the girls to join the class which they do immediately. The age breakdown appears to be between 6-7 years old.

Girls line up at the ends of the mats and begin to tumble. Denise and Joanne each watch one group. Denise demonstrates the proper way to do a cartwheel, then supervises both groups simultaneously as Joanne talks with another work study student.

Three girls remain on the stage practicing flips and spotting one another to offer support (literally) during the attempts.

There is a high noise and energy level as the girls shout to one another. Denise occasionally glances at the girls on stage. One older girl about 12, is not doing as well as some of the younger girls in the class. However, she adopts a helping role by correcting the girls and spotting them through the routines. This girl always takes her turn last.

The girls are becoming louder and Denise intervenes with "I want you guys to cool it." The words are spoken in a quiet, non-threatening manner. In a similar manner, Denise calls a girl who is running on the benches along the wall back to the group using the child's name and then beckoning her with a wave of the hand.

The tumbling portion ends and the horse is brought into the room by the instructor. Two young boys help her with the equipment. The mats are rearranged to form a runway in front of the jumping board which has been placed at the base of the horse.

Denise gathers the girls about her in a semi-circle and cautions them that they are making too much noise. The group lines up at the end of the long mat and begins a series of leaps over the horse. The three boys previously jumping on the stage mats come on the floor. Denise offers them the opportunity to try the jumps if they will take their shoes off. No one wants to remove their shoes so instead the boys sit on the benches against the wall close to the horse.

Denise and Joanne are standing on either side of the horse assisting the girls in clearing their jumps. One youth falls over the top of the horse and the boys laugh. The instructor reprimands them and asks whether they can do any better. The girl, the only Black in the class, appears to nod her head and

then walks over to the stage and sits next to me.

A second girl, one who is overweight, misses the horse and the group of boys, now five in number, laugh uproariously. The rest of the class is angered by the response and taunt the boys demanding to know if they "can do any better."

Two younger girls, about six or seven, join the group upon the stage and begin to attempt backflips. Seeing this, the instructor quickly runs and jumps on the stage. She forbids the girls to practice without her supervision. The girls protest quietly, but obey.

The class is instructed to jump over the horse on their own. Denise and Joanne move away to indicate they will not assist the girls. One small girl runs and clears the horse. The class applauds, following Denise's lead. Two more girls successfully execute the routine and the applause continues. The small girl for whom everyone clapped the first time is the most enthusiastic "applauder" in the group.

The next instruction is for "everyone to make it breaking the connection." Denise begins to clap in rhythm as does the rest of the class. The girls shout, "yeah" after each successful jump and the energy level of the group rises.

One girl slips and falls, breaking the connection. The instructor leans over to examine the girl, who quickly rejoins the group. The exercise continues.

The class is told to rearrange the mats to their former parallel position at the base of the stage. The session ends with a sit-up exercise done in a rapid motion. The heavier girls in the class have difficulty although they appear coordinated throughout the class.

There was a great deal of energy and enthusiasm demonstrated by the girls during this hour, in addition to a lot of noise. Even though some girls missed the horse or did not perform well in the tumbling session, there was never any discouragement or disinterest shown. The girls were pleased with themselves after the successful completion of an exercise routine and were supportive of one another when attempts met with little success. (Santa Barbara, Field Notes)

Drop-in Center

We were led into the Center and walked down the stairs and the Drop-in Program was in full swing. There were between 25-35 youths spread throughout the basement, which is roughly divided into three rooms. There is a kitchen area, a play area which includes a bumper pool table and a ping pong table and a TV, and

another area where there are chairs around the sides and a sofa where the youths are talking.

The youth worker and director of this center, Johnny O'Sheen, greeted us.

Youths were playing ping pong; they were playing bumper pool; they were watching TV. There was occasional good-natured wrestling going on and some talk.

Of the youths who were present, there seemed to be close to an equal number of boys and girls. As Charlestown is almost entirely an Irish neighborhood, all of the youths were White, presumably Irish, except for one boy who was Black.

On one side of the room was a lovely, very lush, deep blue rug, of which both youth and staff were very proud and which had been donated to the Center. They all take great pains to keep food off the rug and to take care of it. They had some food which was being sold in the kitchen area. Two girls were running this small enterprise and they were selling soft drinks, potato chips, corn chips and pretzels. Johnny mentioned that they had started this fairly recently. Previously, kids had run in and out of the Teen Center to go across the street to a small grocery store to buy these munchies and now they can buy them right there in the teen center.

There was music going on most of the time, but it wasn't too loud because there was a group watching TV.

Despite the number of activities going on, there was no one activity which dominated the room. There was a small office between the two larger rooms where the female staff person was sitting and counseling with two teenage girls. These youths were teenagers probably between the ages of 14 and 16. That seemed to be the predominant age group involved.

The children were fairly busy with what they were doing. There was movement all around, but not incessantly. The group stayed relatively attentive with their own particular area of the room and games. A number of the youths wanted to get Johnny's attention. A few girls started throwing pillows at him to get his attention. His response was to laugh and go grab them or tickle them or pick them up or tousle their hair. With the boys also he was playing physically, teasing and laughing. He is a large man, with red hair and a bushy red beard, and rosy red checks. He is very warm and affectionate and a very physical person. He is in his late 20's, maybe 30 years old. It was obvious that the youths there really adored him and they loved to play with him and have his emotional and physical attention.

Sandy and I stayed and observed for about an hour and 15

minutes. There was someone coming into the Center every five minutes or so and someone leaving about as frequently. The games were in use the entire time. There was no loud arguments or fights, although there was some bickering going on. In general Johnny would respond to that by shouting "Knock it off over there!" to which the youths usually responded affably and quit arguing. It was clear that Johnny's presence was central at the Teen Center and the youths looked to him for direction and guidance and to get permission for whatever special requests they had. They checked in with him and said hello when they came in and said goodbye when they left. (Boston, Field Notes)

Recreation As a Drawing Card

Projects saw recreation as a means of attracting youth to the project. Once attracted, youth would become involved in less popular but more important activities such as educational tutoring, counseling, and employment development:

By far, there was more interest and activity in the recreational and social (R&S) component than in any other YSP service. This was a development that was fully anticipated by YSP staff. Recreation was intended to be a "drawing card" for youth to join the program and then become involved in other services. (Tuskegee, Field Notes)

Recreation is seen as a major strategy for attracting and retaining youths' interests in the components. Four of the components provide ongoing recreational activities ... (Dallas, Field Notes)

MIS data can be used in a limited fashion to determine whether this strategy of using recreation as a "drawing card" was successful (Table 7-5).

Tuskegee offered a range of services in addition to recreation within which youth could participate. For example, one of their main services was the tutorial program.

Every participant must sign up for tutoring and we have a schedule about which they are informed and must follow ...

tutoring is compulsory. (Tuskegee, Field Notes)

Other programs offered in Tuskegee included vocational education and a job bank, counseling and referral, cultural enrichment, leadership development, and others. However, very few youth became involved in some of these non-recreational services and at a much lower rate than recreational services. The service rates per youth for counseling, employment, and vocational training service were .075, .027, and .067 respectively (Table 7-5). Tutoring was considered a "mandatory" educational service requirement for all youth who entered the Tuskegee project. However, the rate of the Tuskegee youth per educational services was .602. This figure suggests a fairly high rate of youth may have received tutoring, although it proved to be less than "mandatory." For Tuskegee, recreation was useful in exposing youth to educational services, but unsuccessful in attracting them to other service areas.

Youth participating in the Fort Peck program were also offered a number of different services including youth employment, career counseling, employment training, language courses, and others. At Fort Peck, the recreational service rate per youth was .959. MIS data show that they had greater success than Tuskegee in involving youth in other service components with services rates of .962 for employment, .951 for educational, .886 for vocational training and .896 for financial services.

Among the urban projects, Dallas had a .280 service rate

for recreational activities. Youth were involved more with employment services (.443) and educational services (.284). Conversely, among Seattle's coalition agencies, the service rates were .679 for recreational services, .287 for employment services, .255 for educational services, and .169 for transportation.

Using recreational services as a means for attracting youth and then providing more intensive services had mixed results. One of the reasons for this finding can be traced to youth age level. Data presented in the following sections show recreation was favored most by youth under the age of 14 years. If a program used recreation as a drawing card, it attracted younger clients who are uninterested in employment and educational services. Moreover, even for younger clients, recreation should have been followed up with an intensive effort to engage youth in these other services. The mere presence of these services did not guarantee their utilization.

Explaining the Reliance on Recreation

There are strong organizational pressures explaining why recreation was the primary service offered. First, recreation has been the traditional youth development activity for private non-profit youth service organizations. Secondly, from an administrative perspective, recreation is the least troublesome service to organize and deliver. It requires minimal staff training and a low-paid work force. Recreation also attracts the least troublesome youth as shown in the Identification

chapter. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the youth themselves desire, even demand, such services:

Observations indicate that youth often perceive the BYS role as a recreation provider. During one observation, youth left notes at the youth workers office requesting that BYS organize a basketball game for 10-12 year old boys, stating "...and do it soon because we want to play ball." (Fort Peck, Field Notes)

and

Recreation was not viewed as a major component of the program. Through affiliate monthly reports national office staff became aware that many project youth had expressed interest in recreational activities. Each project youth had participated in swimming and field trips. National office staff hired a consultant to prepare training materials to assist affiliate sites in providing "a structured, goal-oriented approach to leadership development through recreation." (Akron, Field Notes)

Results from the follow-up survey strongly support youth interest in recreation. When youth were asked what service was not provided to them, but that they wanted, 81.5 percent named recreation (Table 7-10). Interestingly, when asked which service they perceived as the least important, 65.9 percent of the youth listed recreation (Table 7-11).

Organization and pre-planning play an important role in the quality of recreational services. This type of activity can easily degenerate into a service that "runs itself." Recreational activities were particularly characterized by lack of careful planning and limited agency resources. Sports games and dances often were cancelled at the last minute due to a transportation or facility problem. Some agencies began to use recreation as a time-filler for youth when planned activities

TABLE 7-10

SERVICES WANTED BUT NOT PROVIDED
AS REPORTED BY PROJECT YOUTH

NOMINATED SERVICE TYPE	NUMBER OF CASES	PERCENT
Recreation	190	81.5%
Employment/Vocational	18	7.7%
Education	12	5.2%
Counseling/Therapy	5	2.1%
Other	8	3.4%
TOTAL	233	100.0%

Missing Cases = 332

Source: Follow-Up Survey

TABLE 7-11

"LEAST IMPORTANT SERVICE RECEIVED"
AS REPORTED BY PROJECT YOUTH

NOMINATED SERVICE TYPE	NUMBER OF CASES	PERCENT
Recreation	243	65.9%
Employment/Vocational	41	11.1%
Education	53	14.4%
Counseling/Therapy	16	4.3%
Other	16	4.3%
TOTAL	369	100.0%

Missing Cases = 196

Source: Follow-Up Survey

were cancelled.

The philosophy of "giving kids something to do" is a questionable practice for delinquency prevention when it becomes the sole service offered to youths. The desire and demand for recreational services by youth within an integrated service package however, is more reasonable. One parent's concern, expressed below, questions the delivery of recreational services alone as delinquency prevention:

The outreach has good ideas but participating in flag football isn't offering anything. I told my son he wasn't going to play. Let me tell you what I think about your project. It should help prepare youths for the future, like being responsible. Help them develop some true values. Teach them honesty. Teach them something besides playing football.

The lack of recreational activities for youth in economically depressed areas has been duly noted in this report. In many cases local governments refuse to provide or do not possess the funds for recreational activities; and many national organizations once flourishing in old neighborhoods have moved to newer neighborhoods in the suburbs following the youth whose parents provided financial support for these organizations. (Lutzin and Orem, 1967) While there may be a great need for recreational services in these target areas, research shows no causal relationship between the provision of recreational services and the prevention of delinquency. Lutzin and Orem summarize early research pertinent to the evaluation of the effectiveness of recreation in delinquency prevention as follows:

"... in no case could a reduction in juvenile delinquency be clearly ascribed to the preventative influence of organized recreation projects." (Lutzin and Orem, 1967)

After reviewing 95 delinquency prevention evaluations, Dixon and Wright conclude that recreational programs have:

"... not demonstrated any effects on official delinquency rates. Such programs are often cited as positive examples of delinquency control, indicating the large number of youth enrolled, the number of events participated in and so forth. The physical well-being of youth represents a valid reason for funding recreational programs. However, there is no evidence that these programs in any way alter delinquency." (Wright and Dixon, 1974)

Agencies who implement direct service programs aimed at reducing delinquency through the sole vehicle of recreational services are unlikely to realize success. These services are likely to attract a youth population which, as shown in the Identification chapter, are unlikely to be arrested and referred to the juvenile court.

Educational Services

Educational services were the second most commonly offered direct service type. Twenty percent of all services offered were educationally related, (a .403 service rate per youth, see Table 7-6). While education was not the dominant service delivered at any one project, it ranked as the second most dominant service for eight of fifteen OJJDP grantees.

Rates of services per youth receiving educational services varied greatly among the grantees, ranging from a high of .951 percent at Fort Peck to a low of .010 at Tulare. In seven

grantees, the service rates for educational services exceeded .500 (Table 7-5) including two rural projects (Tuskegee and Fort Peck), three urban projects (New Haven, Venice and Philadelphia), and two national affiliates, (Santa Barbara and Richmond).

Several grantees saw educational services as the most important service to youth. At Richmond, tutoring was selected by the project director as one of the best and most important services and was offered for several months on a regular basis until tutoring sessions ended with the termination of CETA staff. Akron, using the EDGE model, placed a high value on educational services, life skills programs, money management class, and parenting classes.

Forms of Educational Services

The wide variety of educational services offered are listed in Exhibit 7-2. Educational services may generally be summarized as falling into the following categories:

- o tutoring and remedial instruction
- o classrooms and workshops in specific subject areas
- o youth clubs and leadership training
- o special activities with an educational goal

Tutoring and Remedial Instruction

Tutoring and remedial instruction were the most widely offered form of educational service. Examples of tutoring programs intended to hold client interest, further their skills, and increase their ability to perform in school can be found

EXHIBIT 7-2
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

youth effectiveness training	family planning	Keystone Club
Torch Club	Cub Scouts	Boy Scouts
youth advisory boards	tours to businesses	Campfire Girls
youth agency visits	field trips	health education
national conferences	Junior Leadership Group Club	Help-A-Kid
discussion groups	speakers on day care	birth control
individual tutoring	group tutoring	help in locating and applying for financial aid
nature studies	weekly discussion groups	cooking/nutrition
practical living skills	Hispanic class	therapeutic lab
family life/sex education	gardening	In Lieu of Suspension Program
sex education	Funky furniture	personal development
library	Cooking with Ms. Natural	Order in the Court
Future Explorers	family affaird	piano
Magic Merchants	Getting to Know	sewing
nightly news	Mother Earh recorder	making musical instruments
critters and creatures	What's Looking	patchwork
writing	needle crafts	Spanish
stage crafts	ceramics/sculpture	Becoming you
tie dye/batik	cultural lectures	parent effective-ness training
newsletter	grooming and hygiene	horticulture
beadwork	graphic art	leadership training
bilingual reading program	typing	film series
photography	self-defense classes	homework help
G.E.D. - E.S.L. training	educational counseling	dance
wood-working	silkscreen	etching
music	pottery	fiction writing
drawing	English class	GED referral
poetry workshop	modern African Dance	cultural aware-ness
college information	budgeting	film processing training
presentation/skits	psycho. vocabulary	reading skill development
community resources use	concept training	media training
testing	resume writing	skills
socialization	consumer educations	camping skills
self-confidence skills	personal growth work-shops	

throughout NCCD's observational data:

After the door was closed I could see the rapport that had been established between the tutor and student in their interaction. Toni had been tutoring Deana for four months and Deana trusted her as was apparent and it seemed that because of this trust for Toni she trusted me too. Toni was very gentle with her in her tone of voice and in all the positive reinforcement she was giving her. Deana had read a book and was going to tell Toni the story and Toni was recording it on tape. Deana seemed enthusiastic that she was being taped. Toni asked her questions about the plot and the characters in the story. Deana answered the questions about the plot very clearly and with a lot of detail. This story telling went on for 45 minutes and then the three of us went downstairs to make popcorn. This popcorn ritual I soon learned was the reward that each of Toni's students got at the end of a tutoring session. (Seattle, Field Notes)

While most projects attempted some form of tutoring, lack of sufficient staff resources often caused problems in service delivery of these project components. For example, the tutoring component in Tuskegee was stated to be a mandatory activity for youth in that project. This statement was made at a time when it was assumed that large numbers of volunteers from Tuskegee Institute would give the project sufficient personnel to undertake such a massive tutorial program. Unfortunately this assumption did not materialize. While there was some participation by Tuskegee volunteers, the major responsibility for providing tutoring fell on project staff who worked as community coordinators.

Two major problems resulted from the community coordinators being the primary tutors. First, some community coordinators expressed inability to supervise and tutor the large number of youth who attend tutorial sessions. Often there were 25 to 30

youth being tutored and only one or two staff members. This staff/youth ratio restricted the level of individual attention needed for tutoring and required a degree of classroom discipline for a structured learning process to occur.

Second, some community coordinators felt that they lacked an adequate background to tutor youth in some subject areas. For the younger youth, whose tutoring needs involved basic reading and math, lack of training was a less serious problem for the coordinators. With older youth needing help in specialized fields, many coordinators questioned their ability to provide sufficient assistance. Both of these problems were common at other sites offering tutoring.

At most projects, tutoring was given on the basis of client self-selection. Almost nowhere were professional assessments made to determine the educational needs of clients so that effective tutorial programs could be specifically tailored to individual youth. Grantees seldom had the resources for such a diagnostic approach, but its absence diminished the usefulness of tutoring and remedial instruction efforts.

Classroom/Workshops

The second most prevalent type of instructional service was offered in a classroom format in which instructors presented information to youth. Many grantees offered continuous classes on a routine basis with the most popular topics being health and nutrition, life skills, parenting, and leadership. Neither intake assessments nor evaluations were conducted to determine

whether these classes met the youth needs.

Other grantees conducted one-shot workshops that employed guest speakers and films. The most popular topics were vocational education and the justice system. Occasionally films and speakers were not previewed, resulting in staff being as surprised as youth at the contents of the presentation (for example the use of the film Scared Straight by numerous grantees).

Continuous classes tended to be somewhat better organized than one-time presentations. However, staff were often observed developing impromptu exercises to fill class time -- giving youth something to do.

Youth Clubs/Leadership Training

Many grantees developed youth clubs with the goal of teaching youth leadership skills and responsibility. Some projects reported a high degree of success with youth planning and implementing recreational and fundraising events. Other clubs fell by the wayside after a few meetings.

The popularity and duration of these youth clubs appears to be less related to staff ability than to the type of youth involved. Many of the youth were clearly "project kids," ones affiliated with the project for some time. These youth had a strong commitment and took an active leadership role to make success of the clubs.

The following example of a Youth Club/Leadership Training meeting at one agency in Boston illustrates the nature of these

meetings and the importance of youth assertiveness in affecting the quality of these services. Our point is that these are "good kids" who already demonstrate positive leadership qualities. Involving these kinds of youth in these meetings may enhance their leadership skills, but may have little to do with delinquency reduction unless more "troublesome" youth are brought into the process.

At 7:35 the meeting was called to order. There were three girls and five boys present. Two of the girls were taking notes and Pat was also taking notes. The meeting took place in the kitchen around the kitchen table. The meeting itself was run by the youths. The first item on the agenda was a disco dance. The youth council was planning this dance to raise funds. They discussed where the dance should be held. They discussed the size of the facility, the floor, transportation, the reputation of the place, and brought up many issues that were relevant to planning a disco. While this discussion went on, Pat (the agency administrator) was obviously not enamoured of the youths' first choice for a place where the dance should be held. She brought up a few issues such as the fact that she thought the particular room they wanted was too small and that it was far from the bus. Most of the youths felt that these were not strong enough reasons to decide against this place. They overruled her suggestions and she made no complaint about that. They never came to a final conclusion about where they would hold the dance but they did decide on three possible places out further and come to a decision at their next meeting. They went on to discuss publicity for the dance. One teen said, "I'll take care of the radio publicity." One of the girls volunteered to draw up a poster and agreed to attach a map of whatever place they finally decided on.

While the meeting was in progress, two of the boys were walking in and out between the kitchen and the game room. When they heard a conversation that seemed interesting to them, they popped back into the kitchen to take part. As soon as it became less important to them, they went back to play school.

The youths talked about interviewing staff members who would be part-time staff working at the center. The Teen Council takes an active role in interviewing potential employees. They have a primary input into who will be

hired to help with the crafts, photography, and other programming. They discussed some of the people they had interviewed recently and discussed the timetable Pat had set up for hiring part-time staff.

The next topic that was raised was another ski trip. The youths were planning to use the money they raised from the disco dance to take another ski trip. They were all in agreement about using the money in this way. They also agreed about where they wanted to go. They fixed a time and Pat agreed to make the necessary arrangements.

One of the boys brought up the fact that he wanted the agency to buy a bus. He said that one of the neighborhood schools had a bus and the Teen Center could use one also.

Pat listened and made no judgemental statements. She mentioned the financial problems in buying a bus, but didn't say that it was an impossible idea.

As the meeting went on, one of the boys said that he wanted to go out and shovel snow in the next snowstorm. He said "We should go and shovel the snow of some old people, people alone, and do it and leave. We don't have to tell them that we did it. Then they'd come out and see. How do you think they'd feel? Maybe they'd do a favor for someone else." The other teens expressed agreement that this was a good idea, but no definite plans were made to follow up on it.

The meeting continued until 8:30. During this time, the discussion had gone on without any arguments or strong disagreements. The youths made all the decisions. Pat brought up points of reality and actual constraints that affected their plan, but she didn't lead the conversation and she didn't make decisions. She listened to all the points made and gave them all her attention. During the entire meeting there was no swearing. Each person treated the others like members of their own family. There was mutual respect, but there was also openness, joking and teasing and a very informal atmosphere. (Boston, Field Notes)

Special Educational Activities

Some educational activities, such as cultural enrichment, plays, newspapers, acting projects, and ethnically oriented educational events, were cited by observers as exemplary services. These activities were intended to help youth develop

a sense of "self worth," regarded as invaluable for facing the difficulties presented by their social and physical environments:

The Peer-Expressiveness component of the community-center program appears to be quite successful with regular twice a week meetings. The participating youth have produced a number of tangible, well finished work products in the form of a newspaper and theatrical presentations. One staff member spoke of the value of this group to the youths in the following way.

"The kids like to write about themselves. It's easier for some to write it than to say it. They get a lot out that way. One boy wrote, 'I'm mean sometimes, but I'm a nice guy.' That's a step toward understanding himself and communicating it to others." (Marietta, Field Notes)

Another special education activity was a Black History Month play presented by one agency in the Venice project. An observational report filed by an NCCD staff member is presented in full to illustrate the unpredictable character of some of these events:

7:30 - About 200 persons are in the audience. About 50 percent are between 14-19 years old. 25 percent are pre-teens and about 15 percent are adults. 98 percent are Black. Temporary chairs have been set up in the auditorium. Pre-teens and adults occupy the first 8-10 rows. Teenagers are seated in bleachers which are along the sides of the auditorium. There is a shortage of places to sit and some people wander around.

In the stage area, people are setting up accoustics and stage setting. Most of the adults present seem to be associated with the production.

There does not seem to be any staff from the other coalition agencies present. The entire VDC research staff and one other VDC staffer are present.

7:45 - Youth are becoming very restless. Lights begin to go off and on and then off for about three minutes. Youth become more restless while waiting in the dark. A fight

breaks out in the back of the room, lights come on. Many youth on bleachers run to back and encourage fight. Fight is quickly broken up and youth return to seats.

7:50 - Program director stands at the side of stage and sings the Black National Anthem. Youth settle down to watch but view of people on the side is cut off. A player peeks out of the curtain and reads a lengthy monologue. Audience begins to get restless again, especially teens on the sidelines who can't see. Someone continues to turn lights on and off.

7:55 - Stage curtain opens. Set is toward back of stage and curtain blocks view of persons on side. It is very difficult to hear. The brother (adult) of the executive director recites. The script is very poetic; good. However, poor view and poor acoustics distract much of the teenage audience. A female adult (wife of executive director) continues to recite. Five teenage girls in colored leotards which represent different races begin to dance. Some giggling among dancers. The music is slow and the dancing is rather poor.

Some youth in audience complain about not being able to see. Pre-teens in front demonstrate most interest in the production.

Tempo of the music quickens, lights lower, dancers become more enthusiastic, dancing is better. Audience quiets down, shows more interest.

Program director begins to recite. Much clearer and easier to understand than previous readers. The theme of the script is largely about brotherhood and unity of the races. However, the variation in the style of the readers and the somewhat complexity of the piece make it difficult for this observer to follow. Players on stage begin a chant. Curtain closes.

8:10 - There is a lull between scenes. Many youth in the audience begin to leave - very restless. Executive director comes on stage and chastises youth for fighting and encouraging fight. Relates youths' lack of interest to KKK - too hard to follow logic of what he is saying. Nonetheless youth seem to understand and quiet. Although youth continue to leave, several adults come in.

8:15 - Curtain opens, each dancer begins to recite. Audience heckles some dancers. Lull on stage, someone missed a cue. Several actors and stage hands are standing offstage but in audience's view. Their movements are very distracting.

Black teenager in white suit enters stage and begins to do a skit interacting with each dancer. The youth is very dynamic and audience seems to enjoy performance. The youth acting very slick, derides each race; yellow, brown, red, especially white, and closes "It's all about Black." This draws a big response of cheers from audience.

A Barrios Unidos female staffer comes onstage to evidently give a similar, albeit Chicano, perspective but her dialogue is unheard because of the audience's continued response toward previous performer.

Black teenager resumes message that all the races fall but the Black man cannot fall - "who else has survived 200 years of murder - not even a Jew." Another player responds "What about the love?"

There's another lull, adult male begins to sing "I believe the children are the future." He is very talented and draws the biggest audience response thus far - big applause.

8:25 - Six little girls, 8-12 years old, do a disco dance routine. They appear to know the routines better than the older dancers. Anyway they appear to show more enthusiasm. Program director takes the stage to read about the "generation gap" stressing "put the unity back in the family." There is some restlessness on the stage sideline that distracts from the reading. Microphone goes out and this draws jeers from the audience.

A teenage girl takes the stage and recites another poem on the family, "won't you come home." She sings acapella. The girl is very talented with a good voice. She perseveres in spite of the audience. The poetry stresses themes such as "life is people," not material things. The teenage dancers who had been motionless in the background begin to move. The audience heckles.

8:35 - The curtain closes. There is a lot of confusion and members of the audience ask "Is it over?" Several youth leave. The program director comes out and announces the program is not over.

During this intermission, youth wander around. There is a lot of activity as people move about the room. Without notice, the play resumes. The audience is caught off-guard as the director begins to recite. In the middle of the reading, the player calls out "Can we have your attention?" The audience quiets down and returns to their seats.

8:40 - The curtain opens and the one little girl (eight

years) does a solo dance to the record. "Life is a song worth singing." The audience is encouraging and soon is joined by the other little girls who together do a disco routine.

8:47 - The female teenage singer recites "Lost Times," and solo dances. This girl thus far has demonstrated the most talent of the youth participating. However, she does not elicit as positive a response as the little girls.

Two boys (14 yrs) walk across stage carrying an African flag and another unidentified flag. One boy reads poorly off a paper. The audience is showing high interest nonetheless. The boy stops reading and fishes in his pocket for the rest of the script. It doesn't appear the boy has read the script before. Evidently they are supposed to exchange flags and take turns reading, but one boy wants to continue to read. He digs in his pocket again. The audience laughs and he hams it up.

8:55 - The teenage dancers do a well-rehearsed routine to Stevie Wonder record, "Black Man." The idea of unity among the races begins to emerge.

9:00 - The executive director takes the stage and demands attention. He begins to recite the rest of the song, interjecting "hear me out." This is supposed to be a history lesson involving the audience. However, the director doesn't seem to know the script too well and makes some errors. He closes with "everybody contributed a lot to the building of this community."

9:05 - The little girls begin to dance to "Masquerade." The audience participates with handclaps although soon they begin to get restless. The record stops abruptly. People are filing out. About 2/3 of the original group remains.

The Black male in the white suit struts on stage and begins an angry monologue about what Blacks have taught "Whitie." The "hate-whitie" rhetoric comes across loud and clear. The boy states "The Christ, and the Buddha and the Mohammed were Black."

The boy chains the dancers representing Brown, Red, White and Yellow together, and proclaims no love among the races because the Black man is superior! The boy is definitely a very dynamic speaker.

The Barrios Unidos staff worker comes on stage and argues with the boy but she can't be heard. The curtain closes on the Chicano and Black arguing.

The curtain closes and half the audience leaves.

9:15 - The curtain opens and the program director recites "Message is Music." A female adult staffer sings "Let My People Go." The boy in white says "never."

(A girl in the audience seated near me comments, "this is a nice thing that they're doing but this won't change tomorrow.")

The boy in white says something that can't be heard. In what appeared to be (and should have been) the finale, everyone in the cast except for the Chicano and the boy in white, sang "All God's Children Got Shoes."

The program director recites, "We're all in this together, we're all Brothers and Sisters." Other individuals begin reciting. The momentum slows down and begins to get dull.

There is a lull and alot of distraction on stage as well as off. The audience is getting restless again.

The executive director plays guitar while the little girls sing "It's a Small World." One of the boys with the flag sings very loud, off-key and doesn't know the lyrics.

There is another lull and the audience begins to wonder, "Is it over?" Alot of people begin to leave. The program director begins to do a solo dance. People continue to leave.

9:40 - The lights come on and people continue to leave. The cast regroups for another song "Touch Somebody's Hand." Only a few remain, mostly adults in the front rows.

9:50 - Curtain.

These examples illustrate how the scope and quality of educational services varied considerably among and within projects. In the proper situation educational services may be of benefit to youth. But these services were often delivered as part of all-encompassing, across-the-board actions rather than specialized services to those in need. Furthermore, the data suggests that tutoring and similar services were often provided

by staff or volunteers inadequately trained to handle the special needs of youth, particularly older and more troublesome youth.

Employment and Vocational Services

Employment and vocational training, considered important intervention strategies by many grantees, ran the gamut of vocational counseling, skill development, job training and job placement. These services were regarded by many projects as critical components within their overall delinquency prevention program.

Both rural projects (Tuskegee and Fort Peck) placed a strong emphasis on employment as an intervention strategy:

Youth have an immediate need for employment so that they can earn money to develop skills needed in the procurement of goods and services required for wholesome living.
(Tuskegee, Field Notes)

Providing jobs for youth is one of the major services maintained by the BYS.... In addition to directly employing youth, the BYS collaborated with the Department of Labor in implementing the summer work program funded by CETA. (Fort Peck, Field Notes)

However, both projects also reported serious problems with their employment programs. Among Fort Peck youth, there was a respectable .962 service rate for employment services. Yet many of the youth in the Fort Peck program disliked their jobs, resulting in a large number of youth eventually quitting these placements. Tuskegee had a difficult time finding employment for youth in an area with a very high unemployment rate and few opportunities for employment. Their difficulties are reflected

in the MIS data in which the rate of youth receiving employment services was only .027.

The urban projects also considered employment to be of primary importance as an intervention strategy:

Providing youth with employment is considered to be one of the most important services offered by the agencies. While many agency staff have indicated in interviews that employment is secondary to positive youth reinforcement, youth have stated that employment is integral to their involvement with the agency. (Venice, Field Notes)

Each grantee was required to ... set aside at least 10 percent of the grant, unless the grant is primarily for an employment-related program, to be used to actively help their kids find jobs particularly during the summer months. (Boston, Field Notes)

Throughout both years, employment services were given top priority. They were considered to be a vital factor in delinquency prevention. (Dallas, Field Notes)

Despite a high regard for employment as an effective intervention strategy, MIS data reveal that most of the urban projects failed to provide the level of service originally envisioned. (Table 7-5). Dallas and Boston had employment services rates of .604 and .443. The New York, New Haven, Venice, and Philadelphia sites did not provide much in the way of employment services despite the high rates of youth unemployment reported in their target areas.

Among national agency affiliate sites, employment was not viewed as a major intervention strategy. Marietta did not consider employment to be a major intervention strategy. Akron considered employment to be important but instituted a limited employment program with a .370 rate of employment services.

Richmond also offered a limited employment training program (.083 employment service rate). New Jersey considered the employment field as important to the development of youth, but did not record any employment services for project youth.

Despite these problems in service delivery, employment/vocational services stood out as the best designed and best executed services in many of the projects' service packages. The following example from Dallas exhibits such a well-structured effort:

Employment Program: The project has been sensitive to employment needs of youth and has made services to fill these needs its number one priority. Two full-time staff members run the program. It has proven to be a major drawing card for clients. Job placement is the service most requested by youth. It is in such demand that the program has not needed to actively recruit clients.

This component has offered two types of employment services. First is job readiness counseling. Weekly job seminars are held in each of the seven target areas. These include instruction on filling out job applications and interviewing for positions. This counseling is sometimes given to individuals seeking jobs, and the same topics covered a group presentation.

The other service is the actual placement in jobs. Program staff have spent a great deal of time recruiting employers for youth. Staff members keep potential job positions on file in a job bank, and match youth who want a job with an appropriate placement. They provide preemployment counseling and follow-up interviews to those youth who are placed....

YSN reports that 543 clients requested employment services. Of these, 283 were placed in jobs. The program had a placement rate of 52 percent. In the second year, the project reports that 624 youths requested these services and 448 were placed in jobs. The placement rate rose to 72 percent. (Dallas, Field Notes)

Forms of Employment/Vocational Services

Exhibit 7-3 lists all the services included under employment and vocational training, showing the wide range of activities provided by projects. While a few projects concentrated on one kind of employment service, most employment components provided a number of services. The major service types are listed below:

- 1) Job development (an indirect service)
- 2) Job placement
 - a) Matching youth with appropriate job
 - b) Follow-up services to help youth keep job
- 3) Career orientations, information (this service can also be considered instructional)
- 4) Job training classes or workshops
 - a) Process oriented (how to be a good employee, to fill out an application, act during an interview, etc.)
 - b) Task oriented (actual job skills taught)
- 5) Work crews, supervised by project staff
 - a) CETA or other public funded job positions
 - b) Rent-a-Kid programs
- 6) Individual job/career counseling

The employment components had a number of objectives, both explicit and implicit. Some of these objectives which emerged from NCCD observations were to:

- 1) provide jobs and money for youth;
- 2) provide information about and generate enthusiasm for careers;
- 3) build job skills;
- 4) provide training in getting and keeping job;
- 5) increase youths' awareness of self and their job potentials;
- 6) give youth something to do, keeping them busy and out of trouble;

EXHIBIT 7-3EMPLOYMENT/VOCATIONAL SERVICES

Youth Community Conservation
 Improvement Project
 employment acquisition training
 Building Employment Skills Today
 discussions on reading a payroll
 checkstub
 what an employer expects of an
 employee
 how to get along with other
 workers
 lawn mowing
 dog walking
 babysitting
 jobs with neighborhood
 residents
 job readiness workshops
 job placement
 African fabric design
 Career for Peers
 ethnic cooking
 modeling
 sewing
 Career Exploration
 typing
 vocational counseling
 seed, card, and pen sales
 on-the-job training
 Junior Achievement Project
 job referrals
 career kits
 Project Discovery
 applying for social security
 number
 resume preparation

job interview techniques
 career awareness counseling
 job training
 field trips for career planning
 Tee-Shirt Company
 Hispanic World of Work
 set construction
 Renovation Program
 Security Program
 Construction Program
 Environment Program
 Rent-A-Kid Program
 pay for tutoring
 Home Repair Project
 summer jobs
 "Talent Search"
 photography
 cosmetology
 work incentive workshops
 clerical practices
 newsletter
 miscellaneous chores on the farm
 jobs in stores
 CETA jobs
 careers in forestry
 Occupation Interest Test

- 7) build a sense of self-sufficiency, independence and responsibility;
- 8) build self-esteem; and
- 9) promote community development, by helping other resident groups such as the elderly and children and by beautifying the environment.

The average group size for employment services was relatively small. Most activities included ten or fewer youth, most of whom were male. Employment services offering youth the prospect of actually getting a job were among the most popular and most requested services. Some grantees had long waiting lists for job openings. The majority of youth placed in jobs filled positions that were publicly funded. CETA positions or job slots provided by special city or state youth employment programs were the mainstay for job placements. Private sector jobs were extremely difficult to locate.

Another difficult area was the provision of follow-up employment services. Sometimes it is easier to find a job than to keep one, and many clients required additional support and counseling to retain their jobs. Program funds were limited and follow-up services consumed a great deal of staff time. This crucial service was often the first one cut out by overworked staff.

The job training programs providing regular classroom sessions were often very well organized. The topics covered were, in general, well planned and the study materials were gathered and prepared in advance.

The following is an example of a job orientation workshop, demonstrating the kind of procedures employed in the delivery of

this service:

At this time the workshop convened. Each youth was given a Youth Employee Application to complete. Upon completion, the applications were exchanged among the participants. Each participant presented the application and gave his personal opinion about the manner in which it was completed.

The first participant stated that the application was neatly completed. All blanks were filled in. The employer would be impressed. The second youth stated that the applicant was not impressive. The answers were incomplete; therefore, the employer might assume she did not know how to fill out forms. The third youth noticed that there were blanks -- zip code and date of birth information were incomplete.

After completing this task, the counselor gave some pointers on the correct methods in completing an application. Mrs. Morse told the youth if they made a mistake to be sure and ask the employer for another application form, to be fully prepared, and to bring a pen.

Then, the youth were asked if they had ever completed an application form prior to this task. Did the application ask for references? The youth were asked whom they would write down as a reference. One girl stated, "my parents."

Morse said, "What could a teacher say about you?" Youth, "attendance." MacLaren, "Good thing to remember is what you are doing in school could affect your chances of being hired?" The counselors stressed the importance of being honest on an application. Morse, "Be sure and follow directions carefully."

The next task was a vocabulary lesson relating to employment. Each youth was given two vocabulary words to define. A counselor worked with each youth. The youth presented their definitions.

Youth I:

Union -- "A club of people who work in some job. A union looks out for the workers' interest."

MacLaren: "do you know a job which requires you to belong to a union?" There was no answer, so MacLaren gave some examples.

Youth II:

Job Description -- "What you have to do, duties."

Morse, "Why is it important?" Girl, "to know what you are going to do."

Youth III:

Take Home Pay -- "After they take out everything (e.g., social security) it is whatever is left."

Then the counselors role-played a dispute between employer/employee. The counselors asked for the youths' reactions. One girl stated, "You acted like children and made threats." The counselors informed the youth, "when a dispute occurs, stay calm. It does not help to argue with the person. If you are having a problem talk it over with your boss. Go to him and say, 'Look, I'm having a problem'." (Dallas, Field Notes)

Services such as career orientation classes stressed important aspects of employment, such as creating favorable impressions with one's employer and maintaining positive work attitudes. These services encouraged participation by the youth and employed role-playing techniques and peer feedback. The curriculum was personalized and almost everyone present was actively involved.

Constraints on Employment/Vocational Services

Employment and vocational services, though generally of high quality, suffered three main constraints. First, the range of opportunities for placing youth in jobs was usually limited to short-term, low-paying, menial work. These jobs were seldom career-track positions. Fast food and clean-up work were typical forms of job placement.

The local researcher in Venice, after discussing the many positive attributes of the employment programs, noted the

following:

However, not all youth feel that they are doing something worthwhile. In discussions with youth and program staff, it appears that youth sometimes perceive their role as different from that identified by the project. What one agency calls "positive peer contacts," some youth have called "babysitting." (Venice, Field Notes)

One agency described a maintenance crew as not only teaching youth skills but providing a service to the community by refurbishing housing units. The crew was observed mopping hallways and picking up garbage. When a youth was asked what he learned from his involvement, he stated that "he wanted to finish school and get a better job because he didn't want to do this the rest of his life." (Venice, Field Notes)

This problem is even more pointedly stated by a Seattle staff member discussing her interaction with a youth placed in one such job:

She talked about her frustration of placing a youth at Taco Time, and a week later they would be back saying it was a dumb job or they could not make any money at it (Seattle, Field Notes)

The second major problem in employment and vocational services was the lack of skill training in fields allowing entry into career-track occupations. Although job training was provided by projects, seldom were marketable skills for well-paying jobs taught. The majority of job preparation services were about job-seeking skills such as how to locate jobs, application procedures, and proper interview techniques. These are important skills, but without actual job skills, they

did not take youth very far toward securing well-paying and rewarding jobs with career possibilities.

The final constraint pertains to the individual focus orientation dominating the prevention projects instead of confronting socio-economic policies. The strategy of employment services was to give the individual client a competitive edge among other unemployed youth in the battle for scarce jobs. Little could be done to address the structural-level problem of the paucity of positions available to youth. As a result, employment and vocational programs could not alter socio-economic policies that fueled youth unemployment in the target communities.

Within projects, the small number of jobs available for youth was a constant problem. Often there were not enough jobs available for the number of project clients seeking job placement services meaning that some clients had to be left out:

Despite large amounts of time spent by two job developers in seeking potential jobs in the community for youth, many youth could not be matched with a job. There were not enough jobs for all who wanted one. (Dallas, Field Notes)

In comparison to the number of available job listings, there were an overwhelming number of youth looking for work. Employment, in general, was in a very depressed sites like Tuskegee's target counties. It is therefore not surprising that locating jobs for youth in such a setting was extremely problematic:

This service [Job Bank] experienced considerable

difficulty in locating jobs for many of the youth. This is attributed to the fact that there are few businesses and little in the way of industry in the rural communities. (Tuskegee, Field Notes)

Some Tuskegee staff observed that the inability to secure jobs for youth resulted in a lessening of enthusiasm and a loss of faith in the vocational component as a whole:

In general, project youth are equally disadvantaged and have comparable skills and work experiences. These similarities make decisions on who should get the few available jobs not only difficult to make, but also very hard to justify. (Tuskegee, Field Notes)

These problem areas are not the fault of the projects themselves. Projects were offering employment and vocational services at the level of intensity which their resources allowed. However, (1) without providing youth with marketable job skills, (2) without expanding the limited number of youth job slots in the community, and (3) without selective recruitment of youth who require employment services and who are likely to be arrested and processed by the juvenile court, it is difficult for the employment and vocational services strategies to have a community-wide impact on delinquency.

Counseling Services

Rural grantees provided the least amount of counseling services. The Tuskegee project set up a "crisis hot line" to give aid to anonymous callers, but few formal counseling sessions took place at the center. Similarly, at Fort Peck there was a service called "crisis intervention." While this

activity may have been extensive, it was informal and frequently undocumented in the MIS.

At urban sites, only a small amount of counseling services was delivered. MIS data show that Venice, the exception, provided the largest number of counseling services (.783 service rate) (Table 7-5). These services included a "crisis intervention" component which "included such services as organizing community meetings in response to violent incidents, or acting as advocates for youth at school or with law enforcement."

Counseling was more common among national affiliates. The Marietta site relied heavily on psychological counseling (.966 service rate) and family counseling (.284 service rate). Marietta counselors worked with individuals, families, and groups on both a short-term-crisis basis and an ongoing basis. Akron also relied heavily on individual and group counseling (.485 service rate). Richmond delivered the lowest amount of counseling services per youth.

Exhibit 7-4 lists the names grantees gave to services they defined as counseling. From this list it is clear that counseling assumed a wide diversity in form and style. Counseling was the one service category that most grantees would not allow NCCD to observe. Staff considered these services private and privileged sessions. Consequently, only a limited amount of observational data were collected relative to this service category.

A great deal of variation in the quality and type of counseling services provided by the grantees was noted in our

EXHIBIT 7-4COUNSELING SERVICES

family conseling sessions
individual conseling
consultation on severe problems and assessment
group counseling
big sister
big brother
peer expressiveness
rap sessions
child abuse counseling/education
drug therapy/education
family and child activities/counseling
peer counseling
home visits to counsel
socanic life skills
psychological counseling
crisis counseling
drug rehabilitation
personal problems
informal raps
values class
caring for children
socialization
telephone hot line counseling
rape clinic
parent counseling
psychological testing
group therapy in schools
home visitation
single parent family conseling
referral to counseling
individual alcohol counseling
casework

limited data. To illustrate counseling services as they unfolded for the youth who received them, the following two lengthy excerpts from field observations are presented. The first observation describes a structured group session, a values clarification group designed to assist participants to develop their sense of values. The second observation is a home visit family counseling session in which the counselor discusses the problems experienced by a single mother of four whose children are in the prevention project. The counselor's assistant works individually with one of the children.

The Group

Wesley Rankin Center consists of a group of sprawling, one-story wooden homes. The front house, set back from the street, in a residential neighborhood, is painted a bright and cheery yellow. Behind this house are two other houses, one of which is used as a day care center and the other, by the elderly.

I entered the first house and was met by the director of the program. She showed me around to the back where the awareness group was to meet. I arrived at 5 o'clock and no one was yet present in the room where the session would be held. The director unlocked the door and we went in. It was a rather small cottage tucked behind the two houses and was divided into two rooms. Both the rooms were like small-scale school classrooms, with some small sized chairs, books and magazines, pillows to sit on, an old phonograph, shelves, toys, various arts and crafts supplies scattered around, a very warm rug on the floor. It was a well used area and had obviously been used over time by a number of children.

At approximately 5:15, Laura, the youth worker, came in with several youths. Another youth worker, a middle-aged Mexican-American man, came in with her.

There were six youths in the group, all Mexican-American, three boys and three girls. They were 5th and 6th graders, so that their ages were between 9 and 11. They had been together for at least half the sessions already. This is their sixth meeting.

The youths sat down and were quite open with me. While they had been getting ready to start, the male youth worker had been playing very affectionately with them, teasing them, some physical play. But the teasing was very light and he was really very soft and very gentle with them. They were very familiar with one another. There was a great deal of body contact and touching. A couple of the girls were very shy and looked down a great deal. They too were part of the group and were talking and quite open. There was, it seemed, a high level of acceptance within the whole group.

We sat down and Laura went to get some of the class materials. She had carefully filed away the materials that had been used and generated by each of them during the group sessions. So she pulled the papers out and distributed them to the individuals who had created them. She passed out the drawings and papers to each person. When all the kids had all their materials, which really were a physical representation of their awareness group, they started showing me some of the things that they had done.

They started off by showing me collages of magazine pictures. This was an activity of the first group session and they were to just cut out any picture that appealed to them. One little girl had cut out a baby picture and she started talking about babysitting an infant sibling. There was another very sad picture of a child. Laura told me, when the children weren't listening, that this particular girl had been abused by her parents and indeed sometimes abused younger siblings herself.

Then the youth started showing me the more personal work. They had done a great deal of work talking about feelings and emotions. Laura had said that one of her primary goals was to help these youth to articulate their feelings, something that often didn't happen or that they weren't helped with. They would write on a piece of paper what they thought about other people and they had a choice of whether they wanted to share that or not. Eventually they came to a point where they could be rather open and really quite supportive of one another, writing true feelings about each other and sharing it openly with that person and the whole group. They shared some of these things with me: "She's a good friend; she's a lot of fun to be with," or "He's kind of stuck up." Most of them were positive. There were only a few rather negative comments.

The youth seemed to get along with one another. There was some teasing, but no real hostility that I could pick up on.

When we talked about what they had learned, all of the youth said that they had learned a great deal from this group. They all said that they liked it very much. One young girl said, "It's helped me to get along with people I don't like."

One-nine-year old boy said, "It helped me deep down inside." The testimonies that the children made of the value of the program were really very touching. It was clear that it had reached all of them at a level that they felt was very, very important and precious.

Each child said that they wanted the program to continue. Although the program will end soon, they said that they are all going to keep going to other activities here at the center. Some said that they had gone to center activities before they had joined the awareness group. Some said that this was a new place for them to come. All of the children again said that they felt that they had been changed through coming to the group.

During this time most of the youth were talking to me and Laura had a chair set just a few feet apart from the group. She made quite warm and supportive statements occasionally, and seemed to be quite desirous of having constructive criticism from the group as well as praise. Several times she asked them in what way they felt things could have been better. She sometimes questioned statements that seemed to have sounded a little too idealistic to her and maybe didn't represent the real situation. She was very sensitive to where each child was coming from and how they were feeling. She recognized the restlessness of one young boy; she recognized when one of the girls started to withdraw from the group; and she was emotionally tuned in to all of the children. (Dallas, Field Notes)

Home Visit Family Counseling Session

On the ride over to the Marston's house, a family of a mother and four children, Dorothy (the Counselor) gave Corrie (the volunteer assistant) some background on the family situation and on the girl Sharon with whom Corrie was going to do individual counseling.

D: "It is a very violent family. The mother doesn't know how to be a parent. She just allows them to run wild or beats up on them. Sharon feels very neglected. The father lives in Atlanta and never wants to see the kids. The one day a month he comes to drop off a check, he makes sure to avoid the kids. Her teacher noticed she kept rubbing herself against the desk in class. She notified the social worker who called me. The mother is very resentful that she has four kids, no money and no help. She tries to explain to the kids about their daddy, but they won't listen. It's a constant source of tension."

C: "What kind of things do you want me to work with her

on?"

D: Appropriate social reactions. How to make requests so people will listen and take her seriously. This stuff about rubbing up and masturbating has to be addressed. In general, behavior stuff. They go from no affect to anger and that's it."

We park in front of a duplex house that is being worked on (fixed up by the landlord) and enter the house. The front room is crowded because of the house repairs with sofa and bed. The mother and four kids are all there, happy to see Dorothy and greet her warmly. They act like old friends, each knowing little intimate details about each other which they humorously bring up at different points in the conversation.

D: "How's it going?"

Mom: "It's been tough. The kids have been fighting and the neighbors are upset. He's threatening to call the police."

D: "What kind of fight?"

Mom: "Terry threatened to cut somebody."

D: "Why?"

Mom goes on to explain the specifics.

D: "What are the kids doing this summer?"

Mom: "Nothing. I can't cope with Terry."

D: "Well, I've been working on getting our other counselor Van to see him and spend a little time with him. That might help."

Mom: "I've whooped that boy until I'm blue in the face, but it doesn't do any good."

Dorothy inquires about the problem with the neighbors. She advises not to get in a fight with them about it. "Don't get mad and do something you'll be sorry for later. You don't want to get thrown out of this house. It's too nice, and too hard to find another place."

The mother agrees and says she'll try that approach.

D: "When are you going to start classes again? Could you leave the kids? The two hour break from them might be good for you. Look at it as something you do for yourself."

Lots of laughing, easy friendly exchanges.

Dorothy inquires if the mother has had to fill out a new food stamp form and if it gave her any trouble: "How often do you have to do it?"

Mom: "Every three months."

D: "Any hassles? Did they increase it? It's going to be harder now to spread that money with the kids out of school and home for lunch?"

Dorothy inquires about the other children the mom watches during daytime. "You only have so much patience and strength you don't need to be looking after even more kids. When things get to be too much, get off by yourself."

(Mother, when it come to listening to advice, often seems to turn herself off a bit.)

Dorothy inquires about mother's teeth and gums which she has had continuing problems with. Mom explains she's seeing a dentist but the transportation problems are difficult. Dorothy asks how her man friend is and they exchange some humorous pleasantries about the subject. Mom brings up subject of expensive vacuum a salesman sold her. Dorothy advises she get out of the deal and Mom says she has already decided she will.

Dorothy inquires about how remodeling is going. When will it be finished? How is relationship with landlord? Mom says she has good relations with landlord, and that he will give her some cleaning work for other places if she wants. Dorothy advises her to do that. Talks it up, enthusiastically supports her working. Tells her all the advantages she would gain through it. She suggests Mom tell landlord while he's remodeling to put a partition in one of the bedrooms to give more privacy.

During this time, Corrie had left for a walk with Sharon to get acquainted and arrange for further contact. She returns and other kids who had gradually left return. A festive atmosphere.

Mom: "All the kids want to know when we'll go on a picnic together again. They're always asking."

D: "We'll see. We have to go now. I'll be in touch soon, about our next visit." (Marietta, Field Notes)

Most observational data found these sessions to be informal and delivered by unskilled staff. Staff often considered counseling to consist of informal interactions with youth where staff members gave "casual" advice and direction to the youth. This type of counseling provided by a skilled counselor, one who is trained or extensively experienced, may be of great value to the clients. But casual advice, offered by an untrained staff, constituted a significant proportion of what was called counseling at most projects.

Constraints on Counseling Services

Three constraints on the counseling service components were observed among the grantees. The first was the resistance of many clients and their families to commit themselves to involvement in a long-term counseling program. The client resistance to continued therapeutic involvement was apparent at many sites. The problem as analyzed below is instructive:

Many target area families have come to adopt a "fix it" attitude toward social service personnel. They are so accustomed to the public assistance style of "being given to and being gone" that they are not prepared to get involved in and committed to an ongoing counseling program. Without involvement and commitment on the part of the client and family, successful counseling is impossible. (Marietta, Field Notes)

Second, we have already noted the lack of staff with professional training in counseling techniques. To improve in this area would require substantial changes in personnel recruitment procedures as well as substantial increases in

agency budgets.

Third, it may be that given the economic status of these youth and their families, counseling services may not be the most pressing service need for these communities.

Given the obstacles to economic advancement many families feel no hope for themselves or their children. They do not believe it is possible for their children to "get ahead" and do not support YA staff members' efforts to help them do so. "What do you do when a girl has five sisters and her mother washes floors? How do you tell her you can be what you want to be?" (Marietta, Field Notes)

These people have so many more pressing problems than the need for counseling. They need jobs and money before they will feel ready to begin "opening channels of communication." At this point, there are more basic needs to meet. (Boston, Field Notes)

Direct Services and Youth Characteristics

Chapter 6 demonstrated that grantees lacked formal intake screening procedures to decide which youth should receive what types of direct services. Grantees were unable to distinguish the "hard to reach" youth or those at the greatest risk of becoming official delinquents from those youth unlikely to be arrested or adjudicated delinquent. Furthermore, there was little basis (or information) for determining if youth should be placed in recreation, counseling, educational, vocational, or employment services or some combination thereof.

Grantees implicitly held an individual model of delinquency causation and prevention. Based on this model, one would anticipate a project structure in which detailed needs assessments are performed by staff to fit services to individual

client needs. Comprehensive needs assessments and individually structured service plans were not the normal means for assigning youth to services. Instead, much like the intake process, youth decided for themselves the services in which to participate. In part, their decisions were influenced by the quality and range of services offered by grantees. Since recreation was the traditional and most prevalent intervention, grantees attracted a largely pre-adolescent clientele who were attracted to such activities as basketball, swimming, field trips, and camping.

Two levels of data analysis were performed here to determine the relative effects of personal, family, and programmatic variables on the distribution of direct services. Cross-tabulations of these variables by the type and number of services provided are presented first. This descriptive analysis permits selected review of variables related to prevention efforts. For example, one would anticipate a strong relationship between the youths' employment status at intake and the receipt of employment services. Conversely, one would expect no relationship between ethnic background and the provision of employment services.

The second level of data analysis involved multiple regression analysis to assess the relative strength of intake variables on services delivered. This analysis shows what variables best predicted what services youth received.

Ethnicity and Services Delivered

Table 7-12 presents the rate of services delivered for each ethnic group. All youth ethnic groups received high levels of recreational services, ranging from .703 for Blacks to .895 for Native American youth. Native American youth stand out not only as having participated in the highest percentages of recreational, but also employment and educational services. However, these service rates reflect the Fort Peck project which served the vast majority of Native American youth in the OJJDP program. Therefore, the data for Native American youth reflect the unique efforts of a particular grantee.

Blacks received the second highest rate of employment services (.323) while Asian Americans received the lowest rate (.189). This finding is interesting because all ethnic groups reported equally high levels of unemployment at the time of project intake. Other than Native Americans, Puerto Rican youth received the highest rate of educational services (.557) while Mexican American youth had the lowest rate (.188). This large difference in service delivery is notable, since these two latter ethnic groups did not differ greatly in school status characteristics at intake. In general racial differences in service delivery reflect differences in project delivery systems and not youth characteristics.

School Attendance Status and Services Delivered

The lack of fit between youth needs and services delivered is further substantiated by a comparison of services with the

TABLE 7-12

RATES OF SERVICE PROVIDED BY ETHNIC BACKGROUND

SERVICE TYPE	ETHNIC BACKGROUND						
	Black	Mexican American	Puerto Rican	Asian American	White	Native American	Other
Recreation	.703	.743	.733	.853	.708	.895	.743
Employment / Vocational Training	.323	.221	.236	.189	.215	1.456	.248
Education	.409	.188	.557	.474	.356	.772	.290
Counseling/ Therapy	.241	.126	.216	.380	.356	.061	.187
Other	.188	.217	.214	.170	.271	.721	.112
Average Number of Services	1.8	1.5	2.8	2.0	1.9	3.9	1.6
Total Responses	9632	1106	1819	193	5555	1525	338
Total Respondents	5169	740	929	95	2914	390	214

Source: MIS Paired File

youths' school attendance statuses at intake. Regardless of whether youth were attending school full-time, part-time, or had dropped out, the data reveal similar rates of delivered educational services. However, this lack of fit does not hold if we examine employment and vocational services. Youth not attending school full time did receive higher proportions of employment services. A good argument could be made that youth attending school full time were much younger and were thus not attracted to these services. Youth not attending school (drop-outs and youth expelled) were older and more in need of educational and employment services. It appears that the out of school youth selected those services they felt would be of most immediate benefit to them (employment and financial assistance) rather than services that might have gotten them back into school.

Employment Status and Employment Services Delivered

Youth who were unemployed at intake received the lowest rate of employment services (.308) while the highest rate of these services went to youth employed part-time (.660) (Table 7-13). However, because the average age of youth in the prevention program was so low, a much better indicator of the grantees' employment activity is found by looking at the youth most eligible to work (age 15 or over). Table 7-13 shows that the employment service rate for unemployed youth received was .605. Looking at the 15 and over group as a whole, the rates of employment services per youth seem high, but within the group,

TABLE 7-13

RATES OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS

SERVICE TYPE	EMPLOYMENT STATUS					
	All Youth			Youth 15 Years and Older		
	Unemployed	Part-time	Full-time	Unemployed	Part-time	Full-time
	(9184)	(575)	(141)	(4101)	(515)	(119)
Recreation	.711	.581	.702	.479	.544	.672
Employment/ Vocational Training	.308	.660	.383	.605	.446	.716
Education	.400	.628	.255	.378	.235	.660
Counseling	.259	.227	.092	.263	.215	.084
Other	.231	.416	.256	.201	.425	.269

Source: MIS Paired File

the highest proportion of employment services were allocated to youth who were employed full time at intake. Most projects did not appear to match unemployed youth with jobs or job training. Rather, the majority of older youth, employed or not, selected employment or vocational training services.

Age and Services Delivered

The most consistent differences in the types of services delivered appear when age is partitioned (Table 7-14). As age increases, the rate of employment services per youth rises from .020 for youth under 11 to .686 for youth 17 years old and .689 for youth 18 and older. Conversely, the level of recreational services received by youth declines with older youth. While the recreational service rate for the youth under 11 years of age was .941, the rate for youth 18 and above was .364.

Age does not seem to have an impact on the level of educational services received by youth. The very young and the very old youth both received similar levels of education services. The delivery of counseling services appears to peak for youth age 15 and 16. The level of counseling services delivered to younger and older youth was lower.

In general, these data reveal a consistent and strong pattern in the delivery of services associated with client's age. As discussed previously, service decisions were primarily made by the youth themselves. Pre-adolescent youth chose recreational services while older youth chose employment services. Adolescent youth received more counseling services

TABLE 7-14

RATES OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY AGE OF YOUTH

SERVICE TYPES	YOUTH'S AGE AT INTAKE								
	0-10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Recreation	.941	.972	.950	.912	.785	.658	.555	.445	.364
Employment/Vocational Training	.020	.025	.052	.091	.178	.444	.576	.686	.689
Education	.425	.401	.372	.364	.381	.378	.370	.386	.474
Counseling/Therapy	.221	.229	.240	.281	.343	.311	.294	.237	.195
Other	.318	.234	.201	.158	.188	.177	.187	.189	.320
Total Responses	4246	1347	1377	1637	1848	2282	2233	2105	3013
Total Respondents	2211	724	759	887	1001	1142	1133	1083	1475

Source: MIS Paired File

than either pre- or post-adolescents. Since grantees attracted a predominantly pre-adolescent clientele, they provided much more recreational services as opposed to employment and vocational services.

Juvenile Court Status and Services Delivered

Youth under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court received fewer recreational services and more employment, vocational training, and counseling services (Table 7-15). The tentative explanation for this pattern is again that juvenile court youth tend to be older and not that youth under the court's jurisdiction were being denied access to recreational services.

Referral Source and Direct Services

Table 7-16 shows the relationship between source of referral and services delivered. There were slight differences between the services received by youth who were previously served and those not previously served. There was a higher rate of recreational services for youth previously served while new referrals received higher rates of employment, educational, and counseling services. Youth entering the program as self-referrals (walk-ins) and referrals from parents received the highest rates of recreational services compared to youth referred by schools and the juvenile court. However, the age factor again seems to produce these differences in rates of recreation services.

TABLE 7-15

RATES OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY YOUTH'S JUVENILE COURT STATUS

SERVICE TYPE	JUVENILE COURT STATUS AT INTAKE			
	None	Diversion	Probation	Other
Recreation	.720	.413	.255	.207
Employment/Vocational Training	.304	.500	.704	.341
Education	.397	.317	.471	.232
Counseling/Therapy	.244	.692	.339	.670
Other	.225	.241	.281	.232
Total Responses	17506	225	660	138
Total Respondents	9266	104	274	82

Source: MIS Paired File

TABLE 7-16

RATES OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY REFERRAL CHARACTERISTICS

SERVICE TYPE PROVIDED	YOUTH PREVIOUSLY SERVED		SOURCE OF REFERRAL					
	Yes	No	Self	Parents	School	Social Service	Juvenile Justice	Other
Recreation	.800	.714	.801	.837	.476	.756	.545	.630
Employment/Vocational Training	.205	.339	.335	.271	.339	.245	.479	.361
Education	.303	.405	.392	.393	.550	.278	.360	.253
Counseling/Therapy	.204	.265	.225	.337	.252	.218	.517	.463
Other	.297	.228	.241	.370	.179	.193	.208	.265
Total Responses	2162	17553	9521	2571	4049	2810	445	639
Total Respondents	1195	8990	4776	1164	2253	1162	211	329

Source: MIS Paired File

Regression Analysis

A number of intake variables are associated with types of services provided. Thus far, age appears to be the strongest and most consistent variable in predicting recreational and employment services delivered to youth.

To further substantiate this finding, multiple regression analyses were performed separately for recreation, education, employment and counseling. This multi-variate approach allows us to determine the relative effect of all intake variables on service provision. (Dummy variable transformations were applied to nominal level intake variables.)

Significant R squares were detected only for regressions on employment and recreational services. No background variable or group of background variables had any significant predictive value for counseling or educational services.

Summary regression tables presented in Tables 7-17 and 7-18 report which youth characteristics best predict the delivery of employment services. Here, the pattern of younger clients receiving recreational services and older youth receiving employment and vocational services is affirmed. A particularly interesting finding about employment services is that the youth's employment status has little predictive value (R square change of .006). This analysis substantiates the cross-tabulation data presented above showing that age and not employment status was the best predictive variable of receiving employment services. If programs hope to increase the provision

TABLE 7-17

STEPWISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
WITH EMPLOYMENT/VOCATIONAL SERVICES

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	Multiple R	R Square	R Square Change
Age	.468	.219	.219
Native American	.510	.261	.042
Employment Status	.516	.266	.006
Black	.522	.272	.006
White	.522	.273	.001
Sex	.523	.274	.000
Asian American	.523	.274	.000
Mexican American	.523	.274	.000
Puerto Rican	.524	.275	.001

TABLE 7-18

STEPWISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS WITH RECREATIONAL SERVICES

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	Multiple R	R Square	R Square Change
Age	.411	.169	.169
Native American	.449	.202	.032
White	.451	.203	.001
Sex	.452	.204	.001
Employment Status	.453	.205	.001
Asian American	.454	.206	.001
Black	.454	.206	.000
Mexican American	.454	.206	.000

of employment services they must attract older youth.

How Youth Exited Projects - The Termination Process

The majority of youth were terminated from programs for "administrative reasons". Most of these youth remained active in the projects after the evaluation period ended. This type of termination, accounting for 53.5 percent of all terminations, was generally a bookkeeping function necessitated by such factors as the end of a fiscal year or national evaluation reporting requirements.

The reasons for termination of project involvement for "non-administrative reasons" were:

- (1) successful completion programs (22 percent);
- (2) youths' lack of cooperation with the agency (10.8 percent);
- (3) voluntary withdrawal from projects (4.2 percent);
- (4) and youth moving away from the target area (3.3 percent).

There was wide variation between projects in the way youth left the projects. Both Fort Peck and Dallas coded high percentages of youth successfully completing the program (74.6 percent for Fort Peck and 76.2 percent for Dallas). On the other hand, Tulare, Akron, Richmond, Tuskegee, and New York which reported less than 3 percent of the youth successfully completing the program also showed high percentages (over 75 percent) of youth being "administratively terminated."

Three variables possess a strong relationship with

termination decisions. Table 7-19 shows that youth who received employment services were more than twice as likely to be successfully terminated as youth who received recreational services. Conversely, youth who received recreational services were about twice as likely to be administratively terminated as youth who received employment services. Observational data suggest that these services were not highly structured and of indefinite duration. Youth who received recreational services tended to be recycled through the agency and administratively terminated at the end of a fiscal year. Employment services were shorter in duration and geared towards specific goals such as job placements, or skill development. These youth were more likely to be successfully terminated after a specific goal was achieved.

A second variable related to termination decisions is the age of youth. As Figure 7-4 demonstrates, older youth were more likely to be successfully terminated than younger clients, while younger clients were far more likely to be administratively terminated. It was previously shown that age is strongly related to type of service received by youth. Type of termination is also strongly related to the type of service. But the extent to which age influences type of termination suggests that age is exerting an independent effect on termination decisions as well as an indirect effect through the intervening variable of service type.

The third variable related to type of termination is referral source of youth. Youth referred to projects by the

TABLE 7-19


PROJECT'S REASON FOR TERMINATION BY SERVICE TYPE RECEIVED

PROJECT'S REASON FOR TERMINATION	SERVICE TYPE				
	Recreation	Employment/ Vocational	Education	Counseling/ Therapy	Other
	%	%	%	%	%
Case Successfully Completed	15.1	35.8	22.9	14.9	27.1
Agency Not Equipped	0.1	3.1	0.2	0.6	0.1
Lack of Youth Cooperation	8.6	12.0	8.2	17.8	9.8
Client Needs Changed	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6	0.4
Voluntary Withdrawal	3.6	6.0	6.4	5.3	5.1
Youth Moved	3.2	2.0	2.6	5.7	3.5
Administrative Termination *	64.9	36.2	54.7	51.8	53.3
Other	2.8	3.4	3.3	2.4	0.6
Total	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.1	99.9
Total Responses	7556	3258	4215	2678	2441

Source: MIS Paired File

FIGURE 7-4

TERMINATION REASON AND AGE



Source: MIS Paired File

justice system (courts, police, probation) and by schools were less likely to be administratively terminated than self referrals (walk-ins), youth referred by parents, and youth referred by other social service agencies (Table 7-26). Referrals from the justice system and schools were more likely to be made with specific goals about services needed and thus may have produced a greater percentage of successful completions.

While the data presented above are open to a range of interpretation, it does appear that a certain group of youth (older, provided with employment services, referred by schools and justice system agencies) experienced different types of prevention projects than other youth. The older group received employment services which, once were finished, the youth left the projects. Younger clients and youth who received recreational services were more likely to remain in the program and be administratively terminated. For them, prevention goals were more diffuse and they remained in the project as long as they were well behaved or until they lost interest or moved out of the target area.

These conclusions are supported by data from the follow-up survey. Youth who received recreation, education, or counseling services were about equally likely to have left a project because they had lost interest or had completed the program. Youth who had received employment services were more than twice as likely to have left because they completed the program rather than because they lost interest (Table 7-21).

TABLE 7-20

PROJECT TERMINATION REASON BY REFERRAL SOURCE

PROJECT REASON FOR TERMINATION	SOURCE OF REFERRAL						
	Justice System	School	Parents	Self	Social Service	Other	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Administrative termination	37.4	38.2	53.1	63.8	52.0	46.2	54.1
Case successfully completed	26.2	34.0	24.9	12.6	29.6	22.8	21.9
Lack of youth cooperation	18.0	8.4	10.2	12.3	9.0	16.1	10.9
Youth voluntarily withdrew	3.9	5.4	4.9	4.0	1.0	3.3	3.9
Youth moved	9.7	2.2	3.8	2.9	4.0	3.6	3.2
Clients needs changed	1.0	4.9	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.9	1.6
Agency not equipped to handle case	1.0	1.7	0.6	1.0	1.2	4.0	1.2
Age limit exceeded	1.0	1.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.9	0.6
Youth expelled	0	0.1	0.2	0	0	0	0.1
Other	1.9	3.6	1.1	2.1	2.4	2.1	2.4
Total.	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0
Number of cases	(206)	(2267)	(1175)	(4803)	(1160)	(329)	(10,440)

Missing Cases: 166
Source: MIS Paired File

TABLE 7-21

YOUTH REASONS FOR TERMINATION BY SERVICE TYPE RECEIVED

YOUTH REASONS FOR TERMINATION	SERVICE TYPE					
	Total	Recreation	Employment Vocational Training	Education	Counseling Therapy	Other
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Completed Program	26.3%	22.3%	47.0%	21.4%	21.8%	36.4%
Loss of Interest	21.5	21.6	16.9	21.4	20.0	25.0
Employment reasons	11.0	11.0	4.8	6.1	14.5	6.8
Educational reasons	11.4	12.4	19.9	20.6	7.3	20.5
No longer required services	9.6	8.1	1.8	13.7	10.9	2.3
Moved from area	3.9	3.2	1.8	6.1	10.9	2.3
Transportation difficulties	2.2	3.5	0.6	1.5	5.5	0
Never heard from program	2.2	1.1	3.0	0.8	0	0
Other	11.8	17.0	4.2	8.4	9.1	6.8
Total	99.9	100.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1
Number of Cases	(228)*	(283)*	(166)*	(131)*	(55)*	(44)*

Missing cases = 337

*Numbers based on responses

Source: Follow-Up Survey

Staff and Youth Assessments of Client Progress

Both project staff and their clients were requested to rate the level of improvement that resulted from youths' participation in the prevention project. Some differences are revealed when staff assessments of youth's improvement are compared to the youths' own views of their improvement. While staff rated 26.9 percent of the youth as having made "significant" improvement, only 19.0 percent of the youth stated that they had made "a lot" of improvement. Conversely, staff claimed only 7.9 percent of the youth showed no improvement while 38.1 percent of the youth reported they made no improvement (Table 7-22).

This gap between staff and youth assessments may be interpreted in several ways. It could mean that staff consistently overrated the improvements made by youth, or it might also mean that youth consistently underrated their own level of improvement. Analysis of these data is further complicated by the ambiguity of the item itself. Interpretation of the "improvement" was left to the discretion of the coder (staff coded level of improvement on the termination form and clients coded it on the follow-up survey). The following excerpts from field notes reveal the differences in how this measure was interpreted by staff:

As there are ten grantees [this is an urban coalition] with a different service program, the term, "improvement" can be interpreted in many different ways. For a straight-forward employment program such as ESAC, improvement can be based on either getting or not getting

TABLE 7-22

LEVEL OF YOUTH IMPROVEMENT
REPORTED BY PROJECT STAFF AND YOUTH

YOUTH IMPROVEMENT LEVEL	STAFF ASSESSMENT	YOUTH ASSESSMENT
	%	%
None/No	7.9%	38.1%
Minimal/A Little	22.7	17.8
Moderate/Some	42.5	24.9
Significant/A Lot	26.9	19.0
Total	100.0	99.8
Number of Cases	9829	526

Sources: MIS Paired File and Follow-up Survey

a job. For a multi-service program, such as Hawthorne House, a client's improvement can be much less visible and more difficult to assess. (Boston, Field Notes)

and

Agencies define significant [improvement]) to include youth who demonstrate high attendance, interest, and growth. Moderate youth are defined as less attendance or only for some special activities. Only staff of one agency used the category "none" and then only to reflect youth who dropped out. Other agencies felt that the fact that the youth came to the program showed some improvement and were then rated by staff as showing minimal improvement. (Venice, Field Notes)

and further:

Staff had very subjective definitions for improvement levels:

None:

Youth exhibited no change in behavior, displayed a poor attitude or got into trouble with law enforcement.

Minimum:

Youth continued poor behavior patterns, attended activities infrequently generally low participation.

Moderate:

Youth showed better participation, but some remnants of poor attitudes and negative behavior remained.

Significant:

Attitude of youth improved; participation project activities improved.

(Fort Peck, Field Notes)

Youth were also permitted discretion in how they interpreted "improvement" on the follow-up survey.

Nevertheless, the differences between staff and youth assessments are significantly large enough to conclude that staff regarded the degree of youth improvement to be far greater than client perceptions of their own improvement.

When assessments of client improvement are compared

project-by-project, the large differential between staff assessments and client assessments remains. As Table 7-23 shows, only in Tuskegee, Philadelphia, and New Jersey did project staff rate youth as having improved less than the clients' own ratings. In these projects staff appeared to employ stricter criteria for improvement than did their clients. In the other projects, the differences in ratings always showed staff assessments exceeding clients' own ratings. These differences were not related to the types of services delivered to clients. Regardless of the service type delivered, project staff rated youth as having made more improvement than clients' self-ratings (see Table 7-24).

Clients were also requested to assess the degree of importance of services they had received from the projects. Recreation was listed as the most important service by 50.7 percent of the youth, employment by 22.5 percent, education by 18.4 percent, and counseling by 7.8 percent. On the other hand, recreation was listed as the least important service by 66.7 percent of the youth, followed by educational services, 14.6 percent, employment, 11.7 percent, and counseling, 4.7 percent.

The apparent contradiction of a majority of youth listing recreation as the most important and least important service received is resolved by comparing the reasons for its selection as most or least important service tabulated in Tables 7-25 and 7-26. The vast majority of youth stated that "enjoyment" was the reason why recreation was the most important service (68.5 percent). The main reasons why recreation was listed as least

TABLE 7-23

PROJECT STAFF AND YOUTH RATINGS OF
LEVEL OF YOUTH'S IMPROVEMENT BY PROJECT

		RURAL PROJECTS				NATIONAL PROJECTS					
PROJECT STAFF	LEVEL OF IMPROVEMENT	Tuskegee	Ft. Peck	Tulare	All Rural Projects	Santa Barbara	Marietta	Akron	Richmond	New Jersey	All National Projects
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
PROJECT STAFF	None	18.1%	6.9%	16.5%	15.5%	1.6%	27.6%	1.4%	3.6%	48.4%	16.9%
	Minimal	6.3	25.3	52.7	26.7	22.2	0	22.6	26.8	25.8	22.9
	Moderate	48.5	58.0	25.1	41.7	49.2	48.3	62.2	42.9	21.1	46.2
	Significant	27.2	9.7	5.7	16.2	27.0	24.1	13.9	26.8	4.7	14.0
Number of Cases		720	288	581	1589	63	29	296	56	190	634
YOUTH	No	15.8%	47.4%	41.5%	41.3%	6.5%	59.6%	64.7%	25.6%	26.1%	43.1%
	A Little	15.8	15.8	24.6	19.4	19.4	12.8	8.8	27.9	13.0	16.0
	Some	26.3	30.3	26.2	28.1	38.7	16.0	20.6	20.9	43.5	23.6
	A Lot	42.1	6.6	7.7	11.3	35.5	11.7	5.9	25.6	17.4	17.3
Number of Cases		19	76	65	160	31	94	34	43	23	225

Source: MIS Paired File and Follow-up Survey

TABLE 7-23 (Continued)

URBAN PROJECTS

LEVEL OF IMPROVEMENT	New York	Dallas	Seattle	New Haven	Boston	Venice	Philadelphia	All Urban Projects	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	1.5%	4.6%	7.0%	4.5%	4.2%	0.5%	9.4%	5.6%	7.9%
Minimal	15.9	15.0	21.2	21.6	32.4	5.3	30.2	21.8	22.7
Moderate	70.7	32.6	48.7	42.1	36.7	60.9	36.1	42.3	42.5
Significant	12.0	47.8	23.2	31.8	26.6	33.3	24.3	30.2	26.9
Number of Cases	410	1557	1843	1628	732	207	1229	7606	9829
No	*	42.6%	37.9%	27.8%	8.3%	0	5.9%	27.5%	38.3%
A Little	*	29.8	10.3	16.7	8.3	26.7	5.9	18.8	17.9
Some	*	10.6	24.1	11.1	41.7	26.7	52.9	23.2	25.0
A Lot	*	17.0	27.6	44.4	41.7	46.7	35.3	30.4	18.9
Number of Cases	*	47	29	18	12	15	17	138	525

Source: MIS Paired File and Follow-up Survey

TABLE 7-24

STAFF AND YOUTH RATINGS OF YOUTH IMPROVEMENT BY SERVICE TYPE

LEVEL OF IMPROVEMENT	RECREATION		EMPLOYMENT/ VOCATIONAL		EDUCATION		COUNSELING/ THERAPY		OTHER	
	Staff	Youth	Staff	Youth	Staff	Youth	Staff	Youth	Staff	Youth
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
None/No	7.2%	34.4%	4.7%	39.5%	4.2%	22.2%	5.2%	39.7%	3.7%	40.2%
Minimal/A Little	21.9	18.5	24.2	13.9	18.0	15.2	20.1	11.6	23.1	15.7
Moderate/ Some	45.1	26.7	42.2	30.9	43.6	29.3	44.7	31.4	43.1	28.4
Significant/ A Lot	25.7	20.2	28.9	15.7	34.2	33.0	30.0	17.3	30.1	15.7
Total	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.7	100.0	99.3	100.0	100.0
Number of Respondents	6972	929	3252	230	4038	297	1950	121	2061	102

Sources: MIS Paired File and Follow-up Survey

TABLE 7-25

MOST IMPORTANT SERVICE BY REASON FOR IMPORTANCE

REASON FOR MOST IMPORTANT SERVICE	MOST IMPORTANT SERVICE RECEIVED				
	Recreation	Employment/ Vocational	Education	Counseling/ Therapy	Other
	%	%	%	%	%
Enjoyment	68.5%	2.7%	20.0%	42.1%	0
Skill Development	18.1	11.8	12.2	0	0
Improve Self-Image	1.2	0.9	1.1	21.1	0
Provides Employment	0.4	66.4	0	0	0
Interesting or Educational	9.3	6.4	18.9	13.2	0
Counseling or Tutoring Good	0	4.5	44.4	13.2	0
A Place to Go	1.2	0	0	0	0
Other	1.2	7.3	3.3	10.5	66.6
Number of Cases	248	110	90	38	3
Percent of Nominated Services	50.7	22.5	18.4	7.8	0.6

Source: Follow-up Survey

TABLE 7-26

LEAST IMPORTANT SERVICE BY REASON FOR LEAST IMPORTANCE

REASON FOR LEAST IMPORTANT SERVICE	LEAST IMPORTANT SERVICE RECEIVED				
	Recreation	Employment/ Vocational	Education	Counseling/ Therapy	Other
Boring-Don't Like it	44.3%	30.0%	42.0%	68.7%	25.0%
Bad Facilities	11.8	22.5	12.0	6.2	25.0
No Benefits - a Waste of Time	18.4	17.5	20.0	18.8	12.5
Intimidated by Other Youth	1.3	0	0	0	0
Not Needed - Duplication of Services	4.8	5.0	10.0	6.2	37.5
Unaware Service was Offered	0.9	2.5	6.0	0	0
Not a Good Service	8.8	0	6.0	0	0
Too Many Young Kids	3.5	0	0	0	0
Other	6.1	22.5	4.0	0	0
Number of Cases	228	40	50	16	8
Percent of Nominated Services	66.7	11.7	14.6	4.7	2.4

Source: Follow-up Survey

important included that it was "boring" (44.3 percent) or a waste of time (18.4 percent). In other words youth liked recreational services because they were enjoyable, not because of more tangible benefits derived from these services. Youth disliked recreation services when they ceased to be enjoyable and became in their view, boring or a waste of time.

While recreation was selected as the most important service because it was enjoyable, employment services were chosen as most important because they provided employment (66.4 percent). Youth apparently had a clear understanding of their needs and the importance of services geared toward their needs. Employment services may not have been enjoyable, but that is not what the older youth wanted to gain from participation in these type of services. Rather, they wanted jobs. To the extent employment services satisfied that need, clients felt these services were important. Of those who stated that employment was the least important service, 30 percent cited "boring" as the reason, 40 percent listed "bad facilities" and "no benefit" as reasons why employment services were the least important service they received. When employment services did not result in jobs, they were regarded as of no benefit.

Education was chosen as most important for a variety of reasons including that youth liked the tutoring they received (44.4 percent), found the services enjoyable (20 percent), or found the services interesting (18.9 percent). Educational services were chosen as least important because youth perceived the services as boring (42 percent), a waste of time (20

percent), took place in bad facilities (12 percent), or was a duplication of services received elsewhere (10 percent).

Counseling was chosen as the most important service because it was enjoyable (42.1 percent) and because it helped youth improve their self image (21.1 percent). It is interesting that more youth perceived counseling services to be the most important service they received because it was enjoyable than because it improved their self-image. Youth regarded counseling as the least important service because it was boring (68.7 percent) or a waste of time (18.8 percent).

Finally, youth were asked questions about the importance of the projects themselves. A majority of youth (59.9 percent) agreed that the project had changed their neighborhoods (Table 7-27). Of these youth, 77.0 percent reasoned that the project kept youth off the streets and out of trouble. This reason was cited by many project directors as the rationale behind their delinquency prevention effort, especially those projects that concentrated services in the recreational areas.

Many youth stated that the project did not change their neighborhood. 40.1 percent of these youth less than five percent felt that the projects were too short in duration to make changes, 16 percent claimed their project did not change their neighborhood because of a lack of community interest or involvement, thirty percent had no opinion or no specific reason why the projects did not change their neighborhoods. Nearly half (48.9 percent) reasoned that projects did not change their neighborhoods simply because the activities were ineffective.

TABLE 7-27

YOUTH RATINGS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGES

HAS THE PROGRAM CHANGED THE NEIGHBORHOOD			
Yes 59.9%		No 40.1%	
How did the Program Change the Neighborhood?		Why Didn't the Program Change the Neighborhood?	
	%		%
Kept kids off the street/ Out of Trouble	77.0%	Had no Effect	48.9%
Cleaned up Neighborhood	6.6	Lack of Community Interest or Involvement	15.8
Employed Youth	5.2	Program too Short to Make Change	4.7
Pride-Unity Instilled	4.9	No Opinion	30.5
Education or Counseling	4.3		
Only Changed Young Kids	0.7		
No Opinion	1.3		
Number of Cases	305	Number of Cases	190
		No Response	14

Source: Follow-up Survey

Conclusion

Several patterns emerge from the analysis of direct service data. Virtually all grantees provided recreational services and it was the major intervention strategy employed. Some projects used recreation as a means of attracting youth with varying levels of success. Other projects believed that recreation by itself gave youth positive attitudes and role models.

Educational services were also delivered at most sites but frequently suffered in quality due to staff with no specialized training in tutoring or special activities. Employment services were common and popular in sites where high rates of youth unemployment were persistent problems. Attempts to locate jobs for youth met with mixed results. Some projects switched to vocational training or job preparedness training because they could not locate job opportunities. Counseling services were primarily informal and delivered by untrained staff.

Youth essentially self-selected their services. Few projects systematically fitted youth needs to available services. Age of client was the strongest predictor of type of service received. Younger clients chose recreation, while older clients opted for employment services. The data suggest that many youth did not receive services geared to their unique circumstances. For example, out of school unemployed youth did not necessarily get predominantly educational services. Moreover, despite the tenuous family situations of clients, there were very few services aimed at family assistance. Youth

were more guarded in their judgements of their own progress than prevention staff. Data on how youth left programs suggest two different intervention tracks: (1) those who received services of short duration with very specific goals, especially employment services and (2) those who received primarily recreational services and continued project involvement for extended time periods.

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Chapter 8

Intervention: Community Development and Capacity Building

The following chapter is based on considerably less data than the previous discussion of direct services. While this lack of data is unfortunate, it reflects the extremely limited programmatic effort invested by the OJJDP grantees in community development and capacity building activities. Further, these types of intervention were often difficult to describe because projects never elaborated them as consistent program components. Documenting community development and capacity building activities within a massive nation-wide direct service program was like searching for the proverbial "needle-in-the haystack", except no one could tell us what the needle looked like, even if we pricked our finger on it. In Volume III of this report, NCCD attempted to gather better data on these areas by focusing intensively on 3 projects. The reader is referred therein for further guidance.

Community Development

None of the grantees proposed a project of delinquency prevention utilizing community development as the project's primary intervention strategy, although this was an option open to them. Moreover, none of the grantees proposed as a component of their project a well-structured set of activities consistent with the better known previous prevention attempts based on

community development (for example the Chicago Area Project) or with definitions of community development commonly used in social science literature. For example:

... a process of social action in which the people of a community organize themselves for planning and action; define their common and individual needs and problems; make group and individual plans to meet their needs and solve their problems; execute these plans with a maximum of reliance upon community resources; and supplement these resources when necessary with services and material from governmental and nongovernmental agencies outside the community. (International Cooperation Administration, Community Development Review, December 1956)

Grantees did, however, acknowledge within their proposals the critical importance of gaining community support for their programs from the outset of project operations. Community acceptance was perceived to be dependent on whether, or not, residents felt they possessed a vested interest in setting program directions. Their direct involvement in project planning processes and service delivery was considered by some grantees as integral to project success. The Dallas project director predicted that the envisioned program "will not function unless there is total community involvement from the residents..." (Dallas, Field Notes).

Most grantees channelled community adult and/or youth participation into some aspect of their prevention projects, either in program planning, service delivery, or auxiliary supportive activities such as fundraising. These forms of community involvement were generally viewed as key components of grantee "community development" efforts. In their original

proposals, most grantees did not identify community development goals or specify how community involvement elements related to other prevention project goals. Any identified goals pertinent to community participation were stated in broad terms:

To develop and involve committees composed of youths, representatives of governmental and voluntary agencies, the corporate community, and community volunteer programs in carrying out all phases of the program.

To operationalize a systematic decision-making planning mechanism through the establishment of a community youth council (composed of youth and adult residents at a ratio of two youth for each adult) in each of the seven target communities by the end of the sixth month of the initial year of funding.

Demonstrate effective models of youth participation in youth-service programming.

To organize and effectively utilize at each site a Community Advisory Group or Council that will assist in planning, implementation, and evaluation program.

Full explanations were rarely provided about the significance of particular community involvement strategies relative to delinquency prevention, how these strategies would be accomplished or the specific roles to be played by community residents within the projects. Two categories of community participation emerged: (1) adult participation approaches; and (2) youth participation approaches. The former consisted of adult advisory boards and volunteers. Youth participation was realized through youth advisory boards, youth clubs, and project employment of youth. Attempting either or both approaches, few grantees were able to develop and sustain desired levels of community participation during the 24-month study period. Most

fell far short of their expectations, experienced great difficulties, or never seriously attempted to implement proposal promises.

ADULT PARTICIPATION APPROACHES Advisory Boards

Most grantees sought to involve target area residents in project planning and operations by establishing formal structures for participation. Advisory boards were the most common mechanisms. While exact purposes of the advisory boards were often left unclear, such boards were expected to serve as overseers of the projects, sounding boards for project staff ideas, or contributors of ideas for future program direction.

The composition of the advisory boards varied by project and over time. A number of grantees originally set their sights on forming boards composed primarily of target area residents not previously affiliated with their youth-serving agencies. Limited interest by community residents and parents of project youth forced a shift in advisory board composition to include many more representatives from target area youth-related agencies, such as the schools and juvenile justice agencies.

Techniques used to urge member attendance at board meetings also varied by site. Most commonly, grantees relied on a mixture of phone solicitation, and mailed letters and flyers to gain adult participation. At some sites there were door-to-door visits to obtain attendance at meetings. For a few projects, recruitment efforts were initially successful. The first advisory board meetings for these grantees commanded high levels

of enthusiasm and attendance, but high levels of participation and attendance eventually declined. At most projects, and even among those that were initially successful in recruiting parents of project youth, advisory group meetings were inconsistently attended at the outset requiring frequent cancellations of scheduled meetings. As a result, most projects enjoyed little resident input in project planning processes. Advisory panels failed to function at all, or where they were convened, they exerted little influence in shaping project prevention policies:

There has been very little community development work done by the YSN. In the project's proposal, one of the objectives was to develop community councils in the target areas. This didn't happen. In the second-year plans it revised this objective, saying that the project would work with already existing councils in the target areas. This has actually happened in only one area, Mesquite. (Dallas, Field Notes)

Much effort has been expended by staff in soliciting and sustaining interest and support of parents. Yet, telephone calls, door-to-door solicitation, and flyer distribution have yielded limited success. Meetings have often been cancelled due to lack of attendance or attendance has been quite low. One meeting in January, 1979, offers an exception. Many Black, Mexican-American, male and female residents, attended a potluck supper. Enthusiasm ran high as parents volunteered to be officers. However, the level of attendance was not sustained and dropped sharply in the following months. (Richmond, Field Notes)

When advisory boards met on a regular basis they were often isolated from real policy development:

The activities of the Program Advisory Council appear to be mainly restricted to daily operations of the project. There is no evidence to suggest that the program advisory council has played a significant role in the on-going project's decisions affecting the overall prevention approach. (Akron, Field Notes)

The Community Council is not into the crux of things. It deals only with issues such as whether the gym should be open on Saturdays. (Marietta, Field Notes)

There were some notable exceptions to this picture of community disinterest and agency frustration. In Tuskegee, a tri-level network of community boards was conceptualized in its proposal to inform project personnel of target area resident concerns. Community advisory councils were comprised of two parents, two youth, two interested citizens, and two business representatives from each of the rural target communities. For each county, a county advisory council was formed, comprised of four representatives from each county council. Finally, parent clubs were established at each community to facilitate community input and participation.

The efforts of both the advisory councils and the parents clubs were devoted to developing means for assuming the financial responsibilities and sustaining project services once federal funds ceased. Plans to sponsor project activities for this purpose were forged and implemented by community residents.

A notable fund-raising activity by a Tuskegee community group was a Community Fair; similar activities included a Halloween Carnival. Even in target communities where there was the least community input, a "solicitation contest" was conducted, small amounts of funds raised, a financial committee established, and a bank was selected to handle whatever funds could be generated in the future.

Boston also established a project-wide advisory structure

across its many target areas. Many project staff felt that major project successes resulted from community participation facilitated by this structure:

Parents, teens and concerned community residents have benefitted directly from [TCA's] funding and in turn have continued to work to support the center in its endeavors. (HYCC Evaluation Questionnaire, p. 6: Boston.)

With enthusiastic support from the community, and no particular political connections, Hawthorne House won a \$25,000 Community Development Block grant. It has a good chance of getting another grant next year as well. The Project Director considers this grant to be a direct result of the program's community development efforts. (Boston, Field Notes)

They really worked hard. The fact that they developed their resources within their community may be the greatest achievement of all the grantees. (Boston, Field Notes)

Factors Constraining Advisory Boards

Despite these exceptional successes in Tuskegee and Boston, most grantees experienced difficulties maintaining effective adult advisory boards. Disinterest in project activities on the part of community residents, lack of project/community resources, and staff inexperience emerged as the three most important factors constraining advisory board activities.

Grantees often attributed difficulties in maintaining community participation to "resident apathy", "ghetto mentality", and "preoccupation with survival needs". Project staff felt that community residents who worked all day saw few incentives to attend advisory board meetings in the evenings or on weekends.

Project administrators contended that the target areas had

been inundated with government services that were short-term and ineffective. Introducing new government programs elicits cynical, indifferent or unfavorable responses from residents wary of enthusiastic schemes for improving the community. Too often the promising programs disappear shortly after their funding expires without having left tangible impacts on community life:

The people will not participate if they have a feeling this is another token given by the feds. (Dallas, Field Notes)

This legacy contributed to long delays in gaining local support. In Fort Peck, the project sought to involve the community in program development so residents would feel a commitment to bring about project success. The entire Fort Peck program concept was dependent upon developing community advisory groups in each target community. The boards, comprised of community adults and youth, were to serve as the nucleus of project prevention strategies by identifying youth needs and service priorities. Residents were hesitant to devote time to a new project that could well be "just another government program". After a year and a half of project operations, the visibility of project activities and concerted staff efforts to elicit community participation, produced greater levels of resident participation.

OJJD's prevention program enabled many grantee agencies to expand their services to new target communities. This required grantees to quickly establish themselves within the target

community and cultivate community acceptance in an often unreceptive milieu. Some project directors questioned the possibility of building strong community cooperation within the limited grant period:

Most programs are of short duration and they never show any fruits because they are cut off before they can do it. It's going to take three to five years [for any agency] to gain community acceptance and no program is funded for that long a period. (Fort Peck, Field Notes)

Scarcity of certain resources in target communities also worked against community participation. In rural projects, lack of transportation hindered efforts to convene advisory group meetings. Grantees were able to raise interest in advisory group meetings but were unable to provide transportation for residents to meetings. In other instances, grantees borrowed facilities from other organizations to hold meetings. When the lending organizations needed the facilities for their own use, prevention project meetings had to be moved or cancelled. Inconsistencies in scheduled meeting times and places discouraged consistent community resident and other advisory board members' attendance.

Grantees allocated few resources to mobilize residents of their target communities because staff were pessimistic about their ability to effectively organize community residents. In Seattle, community advisory groups were formed in all but one of the target communities. However, only a total of \$5,000 was set aside to support these activities. The Seattle site, attempting to circumvent resource limitations, decided to utilize community

groups already in existence as a base for obtaining resident input. In one target community, the grantee's strategy met with difficult conditions:

In other communities, there was some structure to plug into. We didn't have to try to create something out of old cloth. In the central area, there were no particular citizen groups to plug into.... Well, the central area is much larger and diverse an area, too. Look at the public housing neighborhoods. They are geographically more compact, they are smaller. There's more common denominators than in the central area. It really is a tremendous mix there, ethnic groups, socio-economic groups, etc. It's just a difficult community to organize. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Staff and administrative inexperience also loomed large as constraints on bringing about community resident participation. Project staff plans for advisory boards were often ill-defined and highly ambitious given community and resources limitations:

I think our mistake was in having too broad a latitude and not identifying more clearly what these groups [could] accomplish and what activities they could legitimately engage in. (Akron, Field Notes)

Other project administrators doubted the feasibility of their community involvement plans and resisted significant project commitments to community organizing activities.

Where specific plans were formulated, grantees were ill-prepared to implement ideas for community advisory boards. During the first year of operations, seven grantees identified technical assistance needs pertaining to community/resident participation through advisory board structures (Westinghouse, 1978: 4-4). Requests for assistance to recruit and work with

advisory boards were very common. The planned boards generally lacked operating procedures to guide their activities as well as approaches to ensure their stability (Westinghouse, 1978: 4-16,17).

Project staff lacked the conceptual foundation, experience and repertoire of techniques to organize and facilitate community advisory group meetings or sustain the interest of recruited members. One project director's assessment of necessary ingredients to improve community participation highlighted issues common to other sites:

I think it takes a lot more commitment to it. I think it takes some training on the part of staff, where they have kind of a conceptual understanding of why that type of activity is important. Some specific skills in terms of working with groups [of] adults in issue areas. Some specific skills in terms of being trainers and supporters rather than always being initiators. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Another administrator commented:

I think that if we had another full person on it with some real goals of what that person wants to accomplish with the group ... it would be very useful. But without that one person in charge of it, I think the apathy will still exist. (Richmond, Field Notes)

Staff responsible for coordinating advisory board activities constantly requested more administrative support and direction. Lacking such administrative guidance and support, organizing community advisory meetings gradually became a lower priority in staff efforts. Energy was diverted to the provision of direct services where both need and success seemed more

immediate.

Cumulative Effects of Apathy and Limited Resources

Even projects with originally well-planned and defined strategies for community involvement were frustrated by the combination of limited staff experience and resources, and by low interest from administrators and residents. In Venice, the project carefully outlined complex community development plans to develop block clubs. Residents from high crime areas within the target communities were to be approached door-to-door and invited to attend community meetings to discuss crime prevention. Once residents became familiar with one another, they would meet to plan or identify prevention activities that could involve the entire neighborhood.

The complex plan was encumbered early on by insufficient allocations of funds and staff resources to support the plans. This strategy of community organizing was also hurt by the unforeseen departure of a key administrator who had intended to oversee the development of the block club component. Venice's member agencies felt they could not spare staff time to implement the original approach. Staff that eventually acquired responsibility for the block clubs were either part-time or volunteers and lacked the necessary skills, experience, and guidance to implement the neighborhood based strategy. Numerous revisions of the block club concept were attempted to accommodate resource limitations and minimize community reluctance to participate, but the block clubs never got off the

ground and were finally dropped in third-year project plans.

At other sites, revisions of proposed community advisory groups occurred to circumvent shortcomings and constraints in original plans. Some advisory groups utilized only a few interested residents or parents, while others combined youth and adult advisory groups to allow more staff time for these efforts. Still other projects reconciled their failure by changing the types of advisory board members sought -- concentrating on middle- and upper-class professionals who worked or resided in the target communities:

... it's been very difficult for us to get [parents] adults from the clients in the community who are willing to come and help us make decisions about needs. We do have ... the Advisory Board who come from the community. Now they come from the business and professional side. One is the assistant chief of police; two of them are doctors; several are in business and professional fields related to meeting the needs of the community and they are sensitive to the needs. (Field Notes)

While still sensitive to community needs, agency representatives are different from community residents previously targeted for advisory board membership in terms of their interests, areas of specialization and life situations. It is less likely, for example, that these professional advisory board members are subject to the same socio-economic pressures experienced by project youth and their parents.

One grantee decided in the project's third year to change not only the composition of the advisory board, but its authority as well. From the first to second years, the advisory council changed from an advisory group that met monthly to

discuss program components to one that functioned on an ad hoc basis. Project administrators would consult with selected members of the advisory group individually. The function of the advisory board was narrowed to focus on plans for client recruitment in the third year. Previously comprised of representatives from area youth agencies and community residents, the advisory board composition included only school personnel under the new structure. It was felt that school personnel would be the most knowledgeable about at-risk youth in the target communities and possess the greatest access to youth to refer to the project. The client-recruitment-focused advisory board also assumed certain tasks of the outreach specialist who resigned during the second year.

Owing to community conditions and agency-related factors, there is little indication that grantees were able to engage citizens in substantive planning of the projects through advisory groups. Some grantees, particularly in rural areas, fostered community participation by hiring project staff who were residents of the target communities. Thus, even if other residents were not extensively involved in project planning, project activities would reflect community concerns through these staff members.

Grantees viewed the recruitment and use of volunteers to augment the delivery of direct services as both capacity building and community development. The problems and successes of volunteer work are discussed in detail in the next (Capacity Building) section. We want to emphasize that adult volunteers

constituted an important aspect of what grantees defined as their community development work.

YOUTH PARTICIPATION

The participation of youth in planning and implementing prevention programs was identified by grantees as even more important than adult involvement. That youth would be the primary beneficiaries of grantee services underscored the importance of providing opportunities for youth to infuse their ideas into programming. For example, the Boston grantee required member agencies "to effect the participation of youthful clients in decision making", as well as stating that it "will not refund a program which has not succeeded in accomplishing this goal". (Boston First Year Proposal, 1977).

Youth participation was viewed as helping to shape program services to best meet target area needs and to increase the utilization of direct services. Additionally, grantees saw youth participation as a critical element of character building (e.g., fostering leadership development and promoting self-esteem among target area youth).

Grantees varied on the importance of youth participation in adult-controlled programs. Some directors consistently believed that "...teens should have as much input in these centers and programs as possible" (Boston HYCC Evaluation Questionnaire:3). Others took a more moderate view on the role of youth. One national agency director explained:

Youth should never be given carte blanche authority to

organize and implement programs which in their view seem appropriate. Instead, adult guidance and supervision should be provided in order to assure that these projects conform to program and agency policy. (Akron, Field Notes)

Those favoring the moderate position argued that youth lacked the background and skills to assume policy making roles for overall project operations. Instead, the appropriate role for youth would be limited to making decisions about the service activities in which they were currently enrolled.

Advisory board membership, youth clubs, and youth employment within the projects were the most common approaches adopted to incorporate youth participation into prevention efforts. Carefully thought-out strategies for implementing these approaches were lacking from the outset. As with community adults many well-intentioned grantee hopes for youth participation encountered obstacles in implementation.

Youths Advisory Boards

During the first year, involving youth in planning was a high priority of grantees. Advisory board membership was a popular method to gather youth input. Most grantees did not attempt to create joint youth and adult advisory boards. Separate youth and adult boards were usually developed, with perhaps a youth representative attending adult advisory board meetings.

Youth advisory boards rarely operated to assist youth to exercise their planning or decision-making skills. Youth advisory board meetings were often facilitated by adult project

staff. Although adult staff guidance of the youth board proceedings can be helpful, their role often became dominant. In such situations, youth soon became disinterested and uninvolved, frequently dropping out of attending meetings. At one site, a youth elected president of the youth board soon resigned his position stating, "It was more of an adult program than it was a youth one." (Venice, Field Notes) Meetings operated solely by youth without guidance from adults were often not productive. Meetings in which authority was completely turned over to youth lacked specific agendas and were quite disorganized. Youth were equally dissatisfied with these meetings, claiming they were a waste of time. At a number of sites, youth-run groups disbanded or ceased to meet. Even those youth advisory groups with a balance of youth and adult control were not overwhelmingly effective at involving youth participants in project operations or planning. Typically, advisory groups produced written behavior codes for project youth and little else. All grantees, regardless of geographic location, client characteristics, staffing, and administrative structures experienced problems in trying to encourage youth participation. Observers linked these difficulties to insufficient staff training and lack of detailed agency planning to implement meaningful youth involvement.

Staff complained about insufficient time to recruit youth, organize meetings and set agendas. They lacked the necessary training to carry out the range of responsibilities associated with facilitating the youth boards. Youth expressed frustration

over limited advisory board accomplishments and staff un-responsiveness to their suggestions. Enthusiasm declined over time and youth boards lost many members. During the second year, boards and councils met infrequently and became lower priorities compared to direct services. Most third-year grantee proposals included new plans for the reorganization of youth advisory groups, indicating their continued interest in youth participation.

It is not surprising that youth advisory boards made little headway, particularly in the first year, in light of broader problems faced by grantees. Some projects had not resolved structural issues about the composition of advisory boards, whether they should include only youth or a proper mix of adults and youth on youth advisory boards. Grantees in Seattle, Dallas, and Fort Peck requested assistance to develop strategies and procedures for youth councils or other mechanisms to encourage youth participation (Westinghouse, 1978). The appropriate roles for youth in setting policy or in project decision-making was another issue encountered by Boys' Clubs of America and Fort Peck (Westinghouse, 1978). Requests for technical assistance frequently centered on training both youth and staff to increase youth effectiveness as board members.

Youth Clubs

Grantees were more successful in cultivating youth involvement through youth clubs. In general, youth clubs differed from advisory boards in that club members were not

expected to provide input into general project operations. With few exceptions, youth clubs planned and implemented only those activities involving club members.

One exception to this more limited focus was the youth clubs in New Jersey. They began with member participation in planning activities within narrow areas (e.g., recreation) but gradually shifted toward broader planning activities with a strong community service focus. For example, youth club members helped to plan and execute a neighborhood block party and a workshop on community action concerning the city recreation budget (New Jersey, Field Notes). Youth club activities not only served to increase the members' general knowledge but also enhanced their ability to work in groups, and learn to become useful members of their communities.

Tuskegee stands out as a notable example of involving youth in project planning and operations. This was accomplished by a variety of techniques including the formation of youth clubs. These clubs functioned as an advisory mechanism for overall project operations. There are factors relevant to Tuskegee's success that are worth noting. Tuskegee's staff at the outset expressed strong concerns that youth participation was crucial to the project and the communities:

... they aren't going to be youths forever. They will become adults in their communities, so it will be their responsibility to create a better community. That's why in setting up my recreation advisory councils, I specifically wanted to involve at least three or four participants on that board so that they ... could advise me on the kinds of services they need. (Tuskegee, Field Notes)

Tuskegee offered a wide array of services, many of which were oriented toward leadership development. Youth were required to enroll in youth clubs located in each target community prior to participation in other project services. Club officers were elected and clubs met on a regular basis. The youth clubs developed and submitted recommendations to the project for implementation in different service components. For example, youth clubs made recommendations regarding recreation tournaments and schedules, as well as the health education curriculum.

In Tuskegee, youth participated in other ways. Older teens were employed as project aides and some youth participated as volunteers. Staff utilized certain screening criteria to identify clients as candidates for project employment. Many youth, active in planning activities, were recommended by school personnel. Through an interview process, youth were selected for program aide positions based on judgements about their leadership potential. Youth with previous juvenile justice contacts or youth with persistent problems in school tended not to be selected. Staff felt these youths were often disruptive and uninterested in youth meetings.

Thus, Tuskegee was able to secure youth involvement in project planning and operations through a combination of: 1) requiring youth to join a youth club before receiving services, 2) careful selection of some youth participants for leadership roles, 3) project responsiveness to youth recommendations, and

4) a strong commitment by all staff to involve youth participants as part of the project's leadership development philosophy. However, the fact that youth processed by juvenile court or those frequently arrested were purposefully excluded from leadership roles in these clubs, limited their usefulness to directly impact delinquency. "Law abiding" and "mature" youth are selected to effectively lead such youth clubs. As such, the clubs were reserved for youth not likely to contribute to Tuskegee's youth crime problem.

Project Employment of Youth

Many projects involved youth directly in program operations by employing youth with grant monies. Projects also supplemented these funds by using CETA (Comprehensive Employment and Training Administration) or SPEDY (Summer Program for Employment of Disadvantaged Youth) monies locally secured.

Project-employed youth tended to be in their mid-teens and held part-time positions. Youth employment positions varied by project, but included peer tutors, maintenance workers, clerical staff, and recreation and group leaders. Among those employed, a mixture of sentiments were expressed regarding their project jobs. Some youth indicated a general positive feeling about their project positions and specifically stated they enjoyed a comfortable amount of input into program direction through their jobs. Other youth felt their work did not influence project operations in any concrete manner. Some youth resented performing clerical and maintenance jobs and only marginally

participated in other project activities. The fact that projects employed youth is significant, given the high youth unemployment characterizing the target communities, but substantial participation in program planning and decision-making through employment did not materialize at most sites.

The Venice Integrated Model

The Venice site implemented a unique plan combining both employment and youth clubs. A group of 15 youth was carefully selected and hired by the project as club organizers. Many of the youth had histories of behavior problems and poor grades, but in the employment interviews they showed high leadership potential.

Once hired, training was provided to the youth. They met daily and received instruction in group organization and facilitation techniques as preparation for their project responsibilities including peer recruitment and developing youth clubs among target area youth. While the financial incentive encouraged youth to stay in the project for the nine-month employment period, other facets of their activities increased their motivation to continue as project employees. Many youth enjoyed their jobs and derived satisfaction from their own abilities to organize the clubs. Youth club success was viewed by the paid youth as a direct reflection on their own job performance. Furthermore, the employed youth had daily access to project staff for assistance with school work. Over time, it

appeared that school behavior and performance records showed improvement for many of the youth employed by the project.

The members of clubs organized by these youths also took an active part in project planning. Club members for example, planned and organized several fundraising events, field trips, and community dances. For Venice, a strong emphasis on (1) developing youth leadership, (2) the willingness to delegate program responsibilities to youth, (3) provision of job preparatory training, and (4) actual employment combined to produce high levels of youth participation.

Youth Volunteers

Some projects attempted to further youth participation through attracting youth volunteers for roles other than those already discussed, but only a small number of youth volunteered for program service delivery. Volunteers assisted staff usually during special events or recreational activities. By and large, youth volunteers participated on a short-term and sporadic basis and were not significantly involved in program planning activities.

CAPACITY BUILDING

Capacity building activities were seen by the projects as methods to deliver more and better direct services (recreation, counseling, employment opportunities, vocational training, and educational service) to their target communities. With the exception of the urban collaborations, few grantees developed separate project components specifically geared to build agency

service capacity. Most often, capacity building activities evolved from needs produced by grantee direct service programming. Capacity building was pursued through four separate approaches: 1) coalition building, 2) transportation services, 3) volunteer recruitment, and 4) staff training.

Coalition Building

Coalition building involved efforts to create and maintain networks or confederations of individual youth service agencies to advance common interests. For example, it was assumed that coalitions could better coordinate the delivery of direct services by eliminating duplicative efforts, reduce interagency conflicts over scarce funds and clients, and minimize agency conflicts over jurisdiction or turf. Coalitions increasingly aimed at the power of individual agencies to advocate the needs of their respective target communities.

With the exception of Boston, other coalition projects (Venice, Seattle, and Dallas) were principally created for purposes of applying for the OJJDP funds. Boston also represented a fiscally-based collaboration, although it existed before implementation of the OJJDP grant. A fiscal collaboration is one formulated primarily for purposes of acquiring funds for coalition agencies. Although the coalition agencies may espouse additional common purposes, the principal function of fiscal collaborations is fundraising. Consequently, these coalitions possessed brief organizational histories and fragile decision-making structures. Interagency conflict and

organizational protectiveness frequently surfaced within these agency networks. Administrators spent considerable time and resources resolving conflicts such as allocation of funds, coalition management policies, and differing service delivery strategies. One of the greatest constraints on networking proved to be the competitive attitude of many youth-serving agencies who feared coalition involvement might rob them of their clients or their prestige and power in narrow spheres of influence. The diversity of the agencies within coalitions in terms of clients served, staff, and historical traditions made these conflicts inevitable.

Transportation

Transportation problems greatly impaired the capacity of grantee agencies to attract youth. Youth in rural areas were often required to travel great distances to attend project functions. Public transportation systems in these areas were virtually nonexistent. In urban areas, public transportation existed, but was inadequate in terms of transporting youth to and from agency facilities, especially during evening hours.

In some instances, agencies were using university or public facilities, located a considerable distance from the target community for specialized services. It was often unreasonable to expect pre-adolescent youth to find their way to places outside their neighborhoods. There was parental concern expressed over the safety of children traveling alone on public transit systems. Providing transportation for youth to attend

direct service activities was seen as a crucial capacity-building service:

The purpose of the project is very simple. We wish to save non-profit agencies money on one of their most costly yet necessary items -- transportation.

In all the needs assessments that we have made, transportation has come out as the number one program, most needed by youth-service agencies. (Boston, Field Notes)

Transportation services constituted the second most frequent form of capacity building activity engaged in by the projects. Table 7-5 in the previous chapter shows that projects varied considerably in the extent that they used transportation. Marietta (.572), Tulare (.449) and Santa Barbara (.317) reported the highest rates of youth receiving transportation services. Dallas, New Jersey, Akron, New York and Richmond reported negligible use of transportation services. In total, transportation was provided at a .144 service rate per youth. Those projects reporting the highest use rate of transportation services typically used vans to pick up and deposit youth attending direct service activities. In general, agencies reported transportation to be successful in recruiting youth, subsidizing project costs, and maintaining networks with other participating agencies.

Interestingly, two projects that provided high levels of transportation for project youth, Tuskegee and Fort Peck, recorded relatively low rates of transportation services utilization (.078 and .032 service rates respectively). Fort

Peck did not have a formal system of transportation for its project. Project staff, often used their own cars to transport project youth to and from project activities. The Tuskegee project did purchase vans anticipating the necessity of transporting youth to almost every project function. Even with the use of the vans, project staff were required to use their own vehicles for client transportation purposes. Staff at each of these sites indicated that they considered transportation to be an essential part of their services. Without bringing the youth to the services, there would be no clients.

The Boston collaboration also recorded relatively low MIS figures for transportation services (.158 service rate). Field observations suggest that Boston had a well-structured and highly successful transportation service. A low-cost van rental service was operated by the grantee. Numerous youth service agencies made use of the service, but the low MIS figures recorded for transportation services reflect uneven record-keeping as well as staff confusion over whether transportation itself was a service. Comments by NCCD staff reflect the degree to which transportation services were an integral part of project efforts in Boston:

TCA leases three vans and charges agencies a \$15 fee, plus gasoline, for each day's use. As well as offering an economic benefit, "some joint programming has come as a result of the transportation component." It has proven to be a "great recruitment mechanism" to contact and draw more youth-serving agencies into the TCA coalition.

And,

The success of the program has been astronomical. During

some months capacity usage runs at over 100 percent, through careful yet hectic scheduling. In addition to the 40 Teen Center Alliance which use the program, there are now an additional 30 non-profits in the area that regularly rent the vans. (Boston, Field Notes)

Volunteers

The use of community youth and adults as project volunteers was a widely employed method for supplementing grantees' capacity to provide direct services. Some grantees did not rely heavily on volunteers and placed less emphasis and few resources toward their recruitment. Low volunteer participation in such cases was perceived as of little consequence to reaching project goals. Grantees also hoped that the presence of volunteers would provide positive role models for youth and discourage delinquent behavior. Finally, agencies felt that recruited volunteers would become more informed about youth problems in their community. This new-found awareness would lead to more active community development activities and greater support for youth service agencies. These objective purposes of volunteer recruitment were summarized in a special publication of one national agency:

To supplement services provided by paid staff, to furnish additional talents and resources beyond the present capacities of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Program, to enhance the personal growth of program participants through exposure to positive adult images, and to promote a deeper understanding of prevention, in general, and this program in particular, in the larger community. (UNCA National Office Paper, The Creative Case of Volunteers: Establishing an Effective Program.)

Recruiting volunteers from target communities to support

project operations frequently met with less than anticipated results. Successful efforts at recruiting and sustaining volunteer participation were associated not only with the willingness of community members to participate but also the existence of full-time volunteer recruiters and training provided for volunteers. Volunteers complained that agencies were ill-prepared to train them, making their work more difficult and inefficient. Tutoring and recreational volunteer staff were questioned about the training they had received and their responses indicate that little specialized training was provided prior to their project involvement. For example:

The only thing we have is an orientation where we have a basic ... well, I meet with them, and we have a role playing in case there's any problems. Just a communication kind of role playing. It was a kind of like on-the-spot. We were, how do you say, oriented into the program. Now understand, this is what the kids are about, this is what facilities we have for them, these are the different things that instructors in the past have run into, you know. These are the avenues you can take, this is how much leeway you have. (Akron, Field Notes)

Agencies were well aware of the problems faced in volunteer recruitment and training and actively sought assistance from the Westinghouse Technical Assistance team. Grantees requested assistance in training their staff in recruitment techniques and creating volunteer positions appealing to community residents. For example, many agencies were concerned about making volunteerism attractive for low-income and minority neighborhoods. Others sought help in establishing support services for volunteers such as day care and transportation.

Community residents, particularly parents of project youth, provided volunteer assistance in a number of ways. Parents often served as chaperones for special events and field trips. Community adults served as group leaders or supervisors and generally assisted in a wide range of recreational activities. Because of pervasive transportation needs, parents of project youth frequently provided supplemental transportation services. Other community residents shared their knowledge and skills by volunteering as tutors or guest speakers.

A few grantees used adult volunteers as fundraisers. In Boston, residents planned and conducted fundraising events. This agency enjoyed acceptance, support, and a high degree of participation from youth and adults in most aspects of its prevention program. High levels of community support and volunteer participation derived from an array of factors, to create a special relationship between community members and agency staff. It was a project conducted by a small agency in a small community. Agency staff had a strong commitment to involving residents, particularly youth, in decision-making processes and established mechanisms for community input. Community resident representation was available on the agency's board of directors as well as its personnel committee. Community members viewed the agency as their own and possessed strong confidence in the staff's commitment to meet community needs.

If this example from Boston is valid, several necessary factors for sustaining adult interest and participation can be

identified. First, agencies must demonstrate a willingness to extend themselves on behalf of the community concerns beyond traditional and normative routines. Second, agencies must become more receptive to community demands for better and more relevant services. Third, the physical location of the agency's facilities must be set in the immediate community area rather than in marginal areas when neighborhood-community affiliation is unclear. Finally, the image and past performance of the agency plays an important role in shaping the level of community resistance or support to be encountered. It is unlikely increased funds alone could neutralize a tradition of insensitivity to community needs or exclusion of residents from shaping agency policies: funding agencies should give considerable weight to these factors in grantee selection processes.

Staff Training

Staff training was the least-employed capacity building activity. Administrators recognized the need for staff training but infrequently set aside funds for this purpose. Only one project, Boston, allocated funds for a well-structured and continually operating component to improve staff skills through training. A telephone survey conducted at the end of the first year of the OJJDP prevention program indicated that little training had occurred at most sites. Project administrators explained that their projects were experiencing tremendous management difficulties getting their basic service systems

operational and they could ill-afford the luxury of training.

This view was noted by Westinghouse:

Projects appear to have had great difficulties with start-up, with management skills and techniques appearing to be the most general problem area. Projects appear concerned that they are unable to focus on program quality, due to their over-burdening concerns with daily operations. (Westinghouse, 1978: 4-2)

and:

Most of the time grantees did not have a comprehensive plan for staff training, nor did they regularly assess their training needs. (Westinghouse, 1978: 4:21)

Perhaps the lack of attention to training can be explained by the overall OJJDP program structure. A separate technical assistance grant was awarded to the Westinghouse National Issues Center to:

- 1) Transfer the skills, information, and resources necessary to improve the practice of delinquency prevention and, thereby, reduce the number of delinquent acts;
- 2) Develop the capabilities of the technical assistance recipients to serve as resources for their communities or for similar projects. (Westinghouse, 1978:1-1)

Unfortunately, the technical assistance grant was awarded 6 months after the prevention agencies had begun their operations. Thus, regardless of the quality of technical assistance offered, its timing precluded early modifications in staff capabilities. Interestingly, of all the technical assistance requests made to Westinghouse, only five involved technical assistance in staff

training. Most requests made by grantees centered on issues concerning direct services (12), establishing organizational linkages (11), community participation (14), and project organization (11). Only one project, Fort Peck, listed staff training as a high priority for technical assistance.

Limited staff training became increasingly significant since the quality of direct services was often limited by inadequately trained staff:

After the first year of funding the agency withdrew from collaboration. Unanticipated problems of training youth for jobs and placing them in the private sector labor force arose. By their own admission the Boys' Club felt that their staff was not adequately prepared to operate such an employment program. (Richmond, Field Notes)

Observations reveal varied levels of effectiveness. In some instances, staff appeared unfamiliar with the subject matter and unsure how to generate a discussion among youth. Youth tended to answer questions "Yes-No" without much interest. Although in most cases the filmstrips appeared relevant to youth by their use of Indian actors in reservation environments, they were less effective in generating discussion due to staff's need for training in presenting materials. Activity reports indicate that sometimes the kits were well-received and other times youth were bored and disinterested. Staff logs indicate that in many instances kits were simply turned over to youth without explanation because staff had been instructed to use kits but not how. (Fort Peck, Field Notes)

Conversely, where staff are better trained, positive results were noted:

Supervisors, conversely of the summer employment programs participated in intensive and well-structured training before the programs were implemented. In addition to administrative details, equipment and other issues, these supervisors freely discussed potential tactics to minimize trouble should it occur after youth began to work.

Observation of the final training session indicated that the supervisors were fully prepared to implement the employment program. (New Jersey, Field Notes)

These data suggest a need for agencies to increase their present levels of ongoing staff training if quality services are to be delivered.

There were two staff training services offered by the Boston site worthy of mention. The Professional Development Program was developed jointly by the Boston grantee and the Collège of Public and Community Service of the University of Massachusetts. The program was aimed at teaching youth working skills, and professionalizing the occupation of youth work through a degree program. The curriculum included courses in sociology, psychology, law, and management, as well as other specially developed courses in the substantive area of youth work. In November 1978 the program sponsored a youth workers conference. Over 200 youth workers from the Boston area attended, and 17 workshops were offered:

The project director not only considers this program to be one of the five best of the project, but he considers its creation and continuation to be the biggest accomplishment of the entire project. He views this component as new and innovative. (Boston, Field Notes)

The other service was the training and technical assistance component of the Boston site. Two full-time program specialists in this component provided training and technical assistance to Boston coalition member agencies. The program specialists were experienced and skilled professionals who received high praise

from the agencies they serviced. The training and technical assistance component sponsored workshops for member agencies in "Issues in Juvenile Law", "Financial Records for Community Agencies", as well as focusing on such key issues as fund raising and program design. The Boston experience offers evidence that quality training programs do not magically appear without costs. It is no accident that the project with the most promising training components was the only project that set aside funds for such purposes.

Conclusions

Community development and capacity-building were extremely minor aspects of the total intervention strategies of the prevention grantees. Community development mostly consisted of efforts to form advisory groups of target area adults and youth. Other activities involved the recruitment of volunteers. Efforts to draw community adults or youth into meaningful program roles proved ineffectual. Community apathy, agency traditions and lack of community organizing expertise frustrated grantee hopes for active target area resident participation. Capacity-building consisted of efforts to improve direct service components. Capacity-building was pursued through coalition building, transportation services, and volunteer recruitment and staff training. Each of these approaches showed promise but agencies allocated too little of grant resources to obtain significant results through capacity-building efforts.

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Chapter 9

LINKAGES

Introduction

The formal or informal relationships between organizations, agencies, and community groups constitute key linkages. The importance of linkages lies in their ability to support or hinder organizations in meeting their objectives. The youth service sector is characterized by a fragmentation of linkages. Programs are often disjointed and isolated from one another. Different agencies in a community often offer similar services to the same youth. Youth may go from agency to agency and receive services in each while many important needs are still unmet. These common conditions describe a "system" of youth services that is often duplicative and ineffective.

Delinquency prevention projects often possess the fragmentation of linkages common to youth services. A national assessment of delinquency prevention programs undertaken by the Center for Vocational Education at Ohio State University concluded:

Overall, the current status of linkages of delinquency prevention programs to external agencies, community resources, and other prevention programs can best be characterized as: a) substantially lacking in cooperation for referral, feedback and follow-up purposes; b) riddled by mistrust and suspicion; c) competitive (for both clients and funding); and d) ill-conceived and haphazardly maintained. Program linkages with the juvenile justice system are typically contractual arrangements; serve to "widen the net" of the juvenile justice system; and serve

only as a referral channel since little or no subsequent information flows between the system and the program. (Cardarelli, 1977)

Others have noted the lack of interagency or organizational linkages and their implications for combatting community problems:

Thus, each organization is designed to perform its special set of activities, without primary reference to other organizations. Meanwhile, the community problem which the organization sets out to solve is not segmented, and the fragmentation of programs and services intensifies social ills. The dilemma is that no organization by itself possesses the resources to solve a community problem such as delinquency. In its attempts to, however, the agency must deflect its energies from a holistic and effective attack on the problem to a struggle for scarce resources with the very organizations with which it needs to cooperate. The struggle produces consequences which, although functional for agency purposes and sometimes for partial solution of community problems, is dysfunctional for genuine community problem solving. (Spergel, 1969, pp. 227-28)

Spergel adds that competition does not increase the availability of services, because lack of coordination of programs leads to duplication of services where resources could be used to fill service gaps instead.

Increased communication, cooperation, and coordination among agencies in the youth service sector are commonly cited as remedies for badly disjointed youth service systems. Among the more important benefits flowing from better agency linkages are: 1) the development of interagency programs to ensure that youth are treated in a holistic manner; 2) the development of referral networks to ensure that youth having problems not appropriately treated by one agency will get help elsewhere; 3) the avoidance

of substantial service overlaps between agencies; and 4) the development of information-sharing networks. But optimism about coordinative linkages among agencies and organizations must be tempered:

Coordination in its prevalent and elementary or "market form" is powered by "diverse self-interests." It assumes that organizations can be efficiently related to each other without resort to the imposition of external controls, "without a dominant common purpose, and without rules that fully prescribe their relations to each other." But in the extreme competitive, market sense, coordination tends to break down. (Spergel, 1969, p. 214)

Establishing stronger linkages among delinquency prevention programs was one of the major goals of the OJJDP prevention program. Coordination was to occur among private and public youth-serving agencies.

Many grantees attempted interagency coordination as part of project operations by creating coalitions of youth-serving agencies. Of these grantees, Boston, Dallas, Seattle, and the Venice projects were intensively evaluated. One basic purpose of these collaborations was to reduce competition for federal funds. But coming together to receive a grant did not facilitate the development of interagency coordinative planning and action for delinquency prevention in systematic or sustained ways.

Formal collaboration efforts were new experiences for many of these agencies. In the absence of foundations for collaboration and specific guidelines to define operating procedures and relationships, agencies struggled to change prior

competitive patterns. Adjusting to new administrative structures was also a problem. Particularly during the first year, issues of agency autonomy conflicted with collaborative arrangements of power, authority, and responsibility. During the two-year study period, the collaborations exhibited little coordinated inter-agency activity aimed at reducing service gaps and duplications, and no referral network was established effectively by any collaboration.

Another strategy to improve coordination of delinquency in prevention efforts was the initiation of projects administered by central offices of national youth service agencies, their local affiliates acting as service outlets. OJJDP specifically called for the dissemination of "information regarding successful prevention projects for replication through national youth-serving agencies and organizations." A well-defined purpose for the national-affiliate arrangement was the development of prevention models for possible replication.

National grantees experienced many of the identical management problems as collaboration projects. They also confronted issues arising from traditional relationships between national offices and their largely autonomous affiliates. Neither the national offices nor the local affiliates desired to alter significantly the traditional independence of local units. Avoiding conflict meant that national offices played tempered roles when attempting to influence local prevention operations.

There was some evidence that national offices improved their expertise in the area of juvenile delinquency and

increased their capacity to offer technical assistance to their affiliates in delinquency prevention programming. Local affiliates were able to provide some delinquency prevention services they might not have been able to offer without the prevention funds.

Other grantees did not have interagency network building as a specific feature of their projects but did make attempts at collaboration. All prevention grantees recognized the need to establish linkages with nongrant agencies and institutions relevant to youth in their target communities, but the formation of purposeful and sustained external linkages was one of the least developed aspects of the projects. For example, even where systematic and deliberate methods were employed to establish youth policy or advocacy groups, insufficient staff resources or other unfavorable conditions hindered these embryonic efforts. Prominent among projects were linkages developed to acquire operating facilities and to gain client referrals.

INTRAPROJECT LINKAGES

Urban Collaborations (Boston, Dallas, Venice, Seattle)

Project Coalescence and Organization

While there were some variations in the organizational forms of multi-agency urban projects, OJJDP grant requirements dictated similar administrative structures. OJJDP required of collaborative arrangements that "a single agency must be designated as the primary applicant." Therefore, the formal

administrative structures of multi-agency projects consisted of one agency acting as the implementing agency and the others being subcontractors to the primary applicant.

There were, no doubt, valid management reasons necessitating the award of grant funds to one agency within collaboration projects, but the contractual designation of one agency with direct accountability to OJJDP placed the primary agencies in such a dominant position compared to subcontractors, that one precondition of collaborative efforts may have been compromised as a result. As explained by a collaboration administrator:

The proposal had to be a collaboration in the development and management. The key principal undergirding the project was that, in order to have collaboration, power needed to be shared equally among the agencies. Typically, the grantee agency managed the power and others were subservient. This kind of relationship would not enhance mutual trust which was crucial. (Seattle, Project Correspondence)

For some multi-agency projects, the predominance of primary applicants was established from the outset, not only by their control of funds, but by their power to select which other agencies would participate in the collaboration. Selecting collaboration members gave the prime grantee a different status and was viewed by other agencies as lessening the chances for democratic decision-making processes. In addition, the selection of prime grantees sometimes created immediate controversy for project administrators.

In Dallas, the YMCA was contracted to be the implementing

agency of the Dallas County Youth Services Network. The YMCA was criticized by a number of staff members for selecting subcontractors that were predominantly White and middle-class service agencies for a proposed target group that was largely minority. Few agencies described as "community-based" were funded. This issue contributed to low staff morale from which the Dallas network never fully recovered.

In Boston, the selection of agencies to participate in the new prevention project not only created competitive feelings among subcontractors, but also damaged existing collaboration relationships in the Boston Teen Center Alliance. According to an executive on the Boston staff, "the first thing alliance members came in contact with around the grant was competition." Twenty-one members of the Alliance submitted proposals for possible funding as subcontractors. Only eight proposals were selected. A staff member observed:

Thirteen people were unhappy. The board meeting -- [when the awards were to be announced] the tension was incredible. I thought "this is going to be a disaster"; and it was. We lost a Board member over it. He made a poor reception for the other thing we wanted to do [under the prevention grant]. (Boston, Field Notes)

Additional tensions were caused within multi-agency projects by commonly accepted images of the primary agencies. These images caused other agencies entering the collaboration to be skeptical about the intentions of the dominant agency. For example, in Dallas some of the antagonism directed toward the YMCA derived from preconceived notions about the agency as

serving a White middle-class population and offering types of services not particularly relevant to minority youth.

An official of the primary grantee in Seattle realized prior to project startup that his agency's reputation was a stumbling block to effective collaboration building:

Neighborhood House is known as a big, ambitious, aggressive agency. We are running close to \$3 million of programs this year. Five years ago it was three-quarters of a million dollars. We have grown tremendously at a time when other social service agencies have not tended to grow. Some agencies are suspicious and there is some degree of open hostility at times. These are problems we were aware of before getting into the collaboration.
(Seattle, Field Notes)

Apart from ill feelings arising from the selection processes and the image problems of primary grantees, the management systems commonly utilized for coalition projects may have worsened interagency contacts. The systems adopted gave the appearance that the primary grantee was both the main contractor and the monitor judging other agencies' performances. Rather than attempting to engage in building collaboration efforts, many subgrantee agencies interacted with the prime agency solely to maintain legal grant compliance. This kind of relationship was not only what actually developed, but also suited many primary grantees. In Dallas, there was little question of the intent "that a collaboration of the YMCA of Metropolitan Dallas and Dallas County share the responsibilities for the Project." (Dallas, Original Proposal) Committee and council structures were developed so that subcontracted youth-serving agencies might have an advisory capacity in

project planning and implementation. There was little doubt, however, that real decision making in the project was the almost exclusive prerogative of the central administrative staff. The proposed Interagency Advisory Council, to be composed of representatives of the subcontracted youth-serving agencies, the YMCA, and Dallas County, was never created. Other advisory bodies were routinely circumvented.

In Boston, the prospects for subcontractor agency participation in project decision making were somewhat better. Each of these agencies was represented on the board of directors of the primary grantee. Board representation should have afforded substantial influence, even if indirectly, on overall project direction. In the years prior to the OJJDP prevention funds, however, only a small number of board members took an active role in the routine workings of the Alliance. With the exception of choosing agencies to receive OJJDP funding, the board was nearly inactive. The prevention project was the creation of the Alliance's staff. Staff independently developed an extensive list of operational criteria to which subcontracting agencies were required to adhere. Board participation of member agencies could not compete with this extremely centralized administrative system.

In Seattle the clear intent was that "the primary coordination mechanism for the Project will be the Delinquency Prevention Collaboration, consisting of all participating agencies" (Seattle, Original Proposal) In centralizing administrative functions to minimize overhead costs, the primary

grantee retained broad powers over most aspects of the collaboration:

Project-wide administrative functions will be the responsibility of Neighborhood House, Inc., and are typical of a federal program grantee: assessment and planning; coordination and liaison; contract development and contract compliance monitoring; and stewardship of federal funds.

The primary applicant will be responsible for developing and sustaining coordinative relationships with other [non-project] area-wide youth-serving agencies and organizations, and for developing effective liaison with various law and justice planning, administrative, and operational agencies.... (Seattle, Original Proposal)

The major element of management for the collaboration was the maintenance of contract provisions between Neighborhood House and individual collaboration agencies.

At the Venice site the goal of operating on a collaborative decision making model was most explicit, but the issue of project management appeared most problematic:

The most time-consuming and difficult issue which we have had to deal with during the first year and three-fourths of the Venice West Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Project (VWCJDPP) is focused wholly on the structure chosen for the project, i.e., a coalition. VDC had chosen a bold and precarious modality. (Venice, Second Year Proposal)

In Venice, as with other collaborations, many administrative functions rested in the hands of the primary grantee, the Venice Drug Coalition. There was also a strong commitment to define the prevention project as a coalition effort. To reach this goal, a body called the Project Board was created and integrated into the organizational structure. By

design, the Project Board, comprised of representatives from each project agency, was to meet, share information on resources, and hear reports on individual agency activity. The board's major function was to encourage member agencies to identify and respond to community needs collaboratively rather than as individual agencies. But even with this strong commitment to coalition, the board was not successful at getting member agencies to act in concert or to reduce the dominance of the primary grantee.

Purposes and Functions of Linkage Formations

One of OJJDP's basic assumptions was that youth-serving coalitions could accomplish more in prevention programming than individual agencies. A test of this assumption would result if collaboration agencies truly shared a commonality of purpose, but there were few examples of agency consensus in the OJJDP program. NCCD found little evidence that agencies formed collaborations because of consensus over substantive aspects of delinquency prevention programming. Agencies were not drawn together on the basis of some agreements about delinquency theory, client identification, proper services, service delivery methods, or specific results of service provision.

To become part of collaborations agencies usually needed to adhere to no more than an agreement to a very general philosophical stance such as "positive youth development." There was little evidence that collaborations formed to further particular theoretical perspectives, and conflicts over specific

theoretical approaches of member agencies were common. For example, the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) had a strong theoretical orientation favoring psychological counseling as the most effective tool for preventing delinquency. DISD insisted that the Dallas prevention project invest heavily in subcontracts for counseling services. This approach conflicted with the programmatic, multi-service approach of the YMCA. The DISD temporarily withheld referrals from the project because it felt that inappropriate services were being offered. This occurred at a time when the prevention project was dependent on receiving DISD referrals as clients.

An official of Neighborhood House expressed his view of the diverse theoretical bases of agencies in the Seattle collaboration:

I would not want to make an assumption that they have total and complete confidence in one another's approaches. I have some reservations about the ultimate effectiveness of some approaches. Some are more consistent with my own theoretical assumptions. (Seattle, Field Notes)

The absence of philosophical agreements about delinquency prevention almost guaranteed a lack of unified approaches to project services. Collaborations exerted little effort to ensure that participating agencies would provide compatible services. Direct services of the collaborations were to a large degree developed in isolation by individual member agencies.

For the Venice site, youth unemployment was commonly seen as a major factor causing juvenile delinquency. Thus, each Venice member agency employed youth as service workers. With

the exception of youth employment, individual agency services in Venice were notably dissimilar. Venice's five participating service agencies had distinct service emphases consisting of (1) educational and vocational services to out-of-school youth, (2) health information and college preparation, (3) career education, (4) cultural and recreational activities, and (5) stress management. While these strategies are not necessarily contradictory, no attempt was made to explicate how services might complement one another to benefit youth.

In Dallas, eighteen different service programs were offered to youth during the project's first year. One subcontracted agency ran "awareness groups" designed to improve youths' self-concepts. Another agency sought to teach slow learners how to read, still another to make grants and scholarships available to youth who might not otherwise be able to attend college. No standard criteria for selecting subcontractor services most appropriate for delinquency prevention were ever established. Furthermore, no procedures were implemented to determine how youth in different programs benefited so that the best components could be emphasized in the future.

The Boston site was an exception to the pattern of other collaboration agencies. The primary grantee subcontracted with ten youth-serving agencies to provide direct service programs. Central staff took extremely active roles in structuring the services to fit the goals of the collaboration. A limited philosophical approach to prevention was established for the Boston collaboration by having each agency satisfy a set of

specific service criteria. Projects were required: (1) to serve youth at "high risk" of becoming delinquent, (2) to serve youth not already being served by a social service agency, (3) to operate on a multi-service model, (4) to offer services other than traditional recreation programs, (5) to designate 10 percent of their budgets for the location and provision of jobs for youth, and (6) to conduct a local needs assessment to select target populations and services to be offered.

Some coalition administrators explained that time constraints during proposal development inhibited a more unified approach among collaboration agencies. Without time to conduct more extensive interagency discussions, reaching agreement on philosophies or even broadly defined directions was impossible. The experiences of at least two collaborations give some evidence to this claim. After the Venice Drug Coalition received the grant announcement, a meeting was held to discuss the possibilities of a community response. Approximately twelve community and governmental agencies were involved in initial meetings to discuss community needs, service approaches, and allocation of funds. The government agencies and a number of community agencies chose not to participate. An administrator involved in these early meetings explained their withdrawal as follows:

Although all of the groups had ideas about the service needs, some of them did not have either well-formulated programs to address that need or they did not have the time or the resources to develop the proposal. (Venice, Field Notes)

When asked how agencies became involved in the collaboration, a Seattle project administrator responded:

There was not a selection process, per se, other than a self-selection. Neighborhood House initially approached United Way in convening an initial meeting. All United Way and youth-serving agencies that had a recognized relationship with city, county or state government were invited. About 30-35 groups came to the first meeting and 12-15 to the second. The second group was based upon those who were interested in participating. Big Brothers, Big Sisters and Girl Scouts then dropped out because they were not able to put together their program in time. One organization wanted to participate, but for some reason they didn't hear about it until it was too late. (Seattle, Field Notes)

At least for Venice and Seattle, meetings were held and consideration was given to common strategies. But the ability to put together a proposal within the tight time constraints became a major criterion for agency inclusion in collaborations.

The main basis for collaboration was to increase the potential for funding by OJJDP. An administrator at Seattle explained that his agency decided on the collaboration strategy because "the guidelines made it pretty clear that they (OJJDP) were interested in a collaborative effort." (Seattle, Field Notes)

Reduction of funding competition was cited by most collaboration officials as a strong motivation for forming and sustaining collaborations. This was true for pre-existing collaborations as well as those newly formed specifically for the OJJDP prevention program. Boston's central staff asserted that their agency's creation was a product of drastic cutbacks

in funding faced by that city's youth-service agencies in the early 1970s. It became clear that there was a need to participate in joint efforts to create new funding sources and to reduce unnecessary competition for existing funds to maximize chances for their survival. As one Boston project official stated:

This particular project is a natural outgrowth of things that the BTCA has been attempting to do since it started. The fundamental purpose of the BTCA has always been to act as a coordinating base and fund developer for the member agencies. Conceptually everything we have done in the last five years has been toward this end.... The alliance is built on the premise that projects have two kinds of problems--those that are solvable by money and those that are not. We have always been concerned primarily with the real money issues. (Boston, Field Notes)

At Venice, too, one of the stronger influences on the coalition was the need to reduce agency competition for funding. According to a Venice administrator:

Out of the coalition experience of working on the problem of drug abuse a ready-made model which reduced competitiveness among different agencies arose. In 1971-1972 the Venice Drug Coalition became officially incorporated and it is considered that such a coalition enabled the community agencies to overcome money problems and power conflicts which arise out of funding struggles. (Venice, Field Notes)

Two of the agencies that created this earlier coalition were part of the Venice delinquency prevention collaboration.

In Dallas, the desire to avoid agency competition for grant funds was a prime factor in the formation of the prevention collaboration. A statement from an official of the Community Council of Greater Dallas reveals the importance of this issue:

After the LEAA announcement, I was aware that the YMCA and Dallas County were both interested in applying for the grant. A primary job responsibility of the Community Council of Greater Dallas in the coordinating effort is not to have individuals or groups competing for such funds. I called other organizations to establish exactly what organizations were interested in bidding for this project. There were no other groups interested in the project except for the YMCA and Dallas County. Therefore I called the YMCA and Dallas County to see if both parties would be agreeable to discuss the possibility of applying jointly for the grant. The group met in December 1976 to examine the specs of the program to see who was eligible. The group agreed that Dallas County standing by itself would not stand a good chance of receiving the funding since the grant was aimed at community-based organizations as opposed to units of government. Whereas a combined effort with Dallas County being the prime grantee as a unit of government funding a community-based organization such as the YMCA to actually operate the program would be an excellent partnership. Both organizations agreed to this combination. Furthermore, this partnership enhanced the possibility of Dallas receiving the grant. (Dallas, Field Notes)

While securing funding was a primary motivation to form collaborations, member agencies were sincere about attempting to achieve collaboration goals. During project start-up, directors of subcontracting agencies expressed their full support of the formally stated purposes of their collaborations, even when it was clear they had played no role in establishing these goals.

Each of the collaborations proposed that an expansion of services available to target area youth would result from its efforts. No project made clear how the new services or expansion of existing services would derive from inter-agency collaborative arrangements. Expansion of services was based largely on the ability of individual subcontracting agencies to increase their services with the prevention funds channeled

through the primary grantee.

Reducing gaps or duplications in target area youth services was another objective common in collaboration projects. The Dallas project proposed that the "Youth Service Network will coordinate plans to fill 20 percent of the service gaps by the end of the second full year of funding." A goal "to reduce youth-service gaps and duplications in target communities" was also explicitly stated in the Seattle proposal. In Boston, two agencies were funded with the express purpose "to fill service gaps in a particular target area which has been identified as having few available services for youth." A general belief of these projects was that sufficient service resources existed to meet the needs of target area youth, but that client recruitment patterns were inefficient. Coordination through collaborations was intended to alter both traditional agency patterns of client recruitment and the types of services delivered.

Participation in inter-agency referral of clients was at least implied in most collaboration projects. One objective in Boston was for all grantees to develop formal referral mechanisms so that youth could take advantage of programs and services in other agencies. Dallas listed as one of its primary objectives:

To provide easier access to community-based youth services through multiple referral sources, including self-referral, in each of the seven target communities. The primary source of referral into the youth service system will be through the use of school identification and intervention centers, staffed by community volunteers and youth service agency personnel. (Dallas, Original Proposal)

The emphasis on building a referral network in Dallas resulted from the the YMCA's previous grant involvement in attempts to develop a city-wide youth service system. Needs assessments conducted in Dallas had also indicated a need for a youth service system. Directing youth to appropriate services was the primary means of reducing service gaps. According to Dallas staff:

Staff 1: The thing that stands out most is the lack of coordination among the various youth-serving agencies ... any agency will tell youth that. I think that is the greatest problem in Dallas.

Staff 2: I think so too. There are lots of resources here and connections are not being made. Every service that we have talked about is being provided in some form here in Dallas. But I don't think it's always serving the right people or the people who need it the most. (Dallas, Field Notes)

Another strong intent of collaboration projects was to implement inter-agency planning of delinquency prevention services. A goal of the Seattle project was:

To make better use of private and public youth-serving agency resources through collaborative improvements in interagency planning and coordination. (Seattle, Original Proposal)

Dallas sought to:

... create and maintain a coordinated mechanism for establishing a county-wide delinquency prevention youth development system through the creation, promotion, and utilization of a data collection system which will facilitate coordination, planning, research and evaluation of youth services while protecting the rights of all youth. (Dallas, Original Proposal)

The Venice site suggested that inter-agency planning would be accomplished by collaboration structures that would "provide the community with mechanisms for responding together to the needs of youth, through a citizen advisory board and community development projects." (Venice, Original Proposal) The agencies involved in the Boston project had already established a mechanism for inter-agency planning through the creation of the Alliance for Community Youth Development Services.

Developing avenues to future funding for delinquency prevention services was an important goal of all collaborations. Note the Venice project's goal "to create new funding bases for delinquency prevention programs" (Venice, Original Proposal) and Boston's objective to "explore innovative ways of developing and maintaining Community Support, Adequate Budgets, Varied and Qualitative Programming, and Competent, Professional Personnel for Youth Serving Agencies." (Boston, Original Proposal)

Only Dallas stated explicitly that collaboration participation might result in "modification of agencies' policies and program designs", though this was implicit in most collaborations. (Dallas Original Proposal) Interviews with collaboration project directors revealed that influencing the policies of subcontracting agencies was often an important objective.

Working Relationships Within Collaborations

During the early phases of the grants, the fact that agencies were bound together only by contracts broadly defining responsibilities proved to be a problem for most collaborations. Few formal controls were instituted in collaboration management structures. Agencies responsible for grant administration often found they possessed no real power to compel desired levels of subgrantee compliance. Even where the authority of one agency appeared clear, there was often a great deal of conflict. For most agencies, formalized inter-agency arrangements were new experiences. Agencies accustomed to dealing with administrative issues only within their own organizations found it difficult to adjust to new lines of authority.

In Dallas, conflict over the division of authority between the YMCA and Dallas County was a central issue during the project's first two years. In the original proposal, there was no delineation of lines of authority among the principal agencies. The resultant ambiguities of management authority produced constant tension within the Dallas collaboration. Management conflicts arose soon after the project began. In January 1978, the YMCA outlined its perceptions of roles and responsibilities for itself and Dallas County. YMCA staff designed a new organizational chart significantly altering the original authority structure. The new chart placed the YMCA in a horizontal rather than a vertical management relationship with the county, giving itself power equal to that of the county, the

prime grantee agency. The county eventually accepted this relationship with the YMCA. Conflict continued over which agency could establish project policy and how much the YMCA had to account to the county for its programs and procedures. The YMCA tried to maintain its organizational independence as much as possible.

Except for satisfying subcontractors' requirements established by the Alliance, there were few central policies or procedures in the Boston collaboration. Boston's design called for decentralized management over agency operations. The Alliance held an historical position of noninterference in member agencies operations and decided not to break this tradition because of the OJJDP prevention grant.

Alliance staff argued that a decentralized management structure produced many benefits. By allowing subcontractors to operate independently, by not constructing policies and procedures demanding cooperative efforts, possible conflicts between participating organizations were minimized. And, in Boston, where agencies operated in diverse and self-contained neighborhoods, agencies needed to be free to develop management styles responsive to their constituencies. The Alliance felt that imposing a minimum of directive administration allowed subcontractors to maintain their community-based integrity. The goal of agency autonomy, however, did not always balance well with the Alliance's responsibility to meet grant requirements. For example, it was often difficult for central staff to monitor the subcontractors' compliance with overall project goals.

The Boston site, initially instituted a system of agency accountability requiring quarterly reports from each subcontracting agency. When the agencies complained they were overburdened with paperwork and staffs spent disproportionate amounts of time away from service provision, the reports were abandoned. In their place, an informal monitoring system was created which relied primarily on site visits by Alliance staff to gather information.

The lack of an explicit system of accountability meant that at times the Boston Alliance was without basic management information such as the number of clients served by subcontracting agencies. The Alliance relied to a large extent on its knowledge of and relationship with staff members of subcontractors to determine if agencies were achieving project goals.

The inability of the prime grantee to enforce proper monitoring systems was also a problem in Venice where several agencies had no previous experience operating under a central administration agency. Complying with the monitoring requirements established by the Venice Drug Coalition, OJJDP reporting requests, and requests for data for the National Evaluation was viewed as a hardship for these agencies. Venice member agencies constantly questioned the value of these data. Paperwork necessitated by reporting requirements received a low priority by staff. In many cases, information was not collected, presenting grave problems for the prime grantee. A number of abbreviated data forms were tested to minimize report

writing for member agencies. Still, reporting problems and inability to formulate monitoring controls continued to plague the Venice coalition.

Organizational arrangements established between Neighborhood House and other collaboration agencies generated difficulties at the Seattle site. Neighborhood House attempted to define relationships and lines of authority in the contracts that each agency signed. However, subcontracting agencies remained confused about procedures and responsibilities among the various project components. Quarrels over member agency authority were frequent. Issues of responsibilities for budget allocations, collaboration contracting, and autonomy of agencies in policy making sometimes seriously threatened the existence of the Seattle collaboration. As at other sites, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with reporting requirements. Attitudes resulting from these problems were expressed by a staff member:

My feeling is that we were handed one hell of a mess that we had to deal with, without any background and without any real understanding given to us of what this collaboration meant. It was only, and I think this was probably the attitude that many agencies had at the very beginning was, "ah, this is free money." And it wasn't. The strings almost strangled us. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Several Seattle agencies contended that Neighborhood House should have provided more guidance to their programming efforts. In an effort to clarify the structure of the collaboration, a paper entitled "Roles and Responsibilities" was disseminated by the project director. Together with the service subcontracts this paper provided a description of how the collaboration was

supposed to function.

At all collaboration sites, member agencies sought a high degree of autonomy and operated in almost complete isolation from each other during the first year, except for occasional administrative meetings. These meetings were dominated by discussions of grant compliance issues such as OJJDP reporting requirements, evaluation data needs, and proper reimbursement procedures. Ideological differences between collaboration members, overlooked during collaboration formation, became significant during the operational phase. Once projects began, the staff of collaborating agencies often stated that differences in their clients and target communities made cooperation unlikely.

One agency administrator in Venice asserted that while there was some "peer dependency," agency directors preferred to not let their agencies get too close to others. Interviews with youth workers suggest that there was little interaction among participating agencies during the first year. Speaking of other coalition agencies, a youth worker explained:

We get along. I don't really deal with them. I just consider them being there. They do their thing, and we do ours. We don't really compete and we don't really compare ourselves with them. I can only tell you what I see. I don't think they really know what our job is about. Maybe the supervisors do, but the workers and co-workers, I don't really think so. (Venice, Field Notes)

There was, however, a great deal of initial interest in developing collaborative efforts. As noted earlier, the Venice Drug Coalition attempted to implement democratic decision making

through structures created specifically for that purpose (i.e., the Project Board, Youth Coordinating Council, and Block Clubs), and made some early attempts to promote agency interactions through these bodies, but joint activities were routinely poorly organized. It soon became apparent that coalition agencies possessed a low level of investment in collaborative efforts. Accomplishment of individual agency objectives was paramount, as agencies tended to view themselves as independent of the coalition.

Several reasons were offered for limited interagency contacts in Venice. For example, a rift between professionals and para-professionals was said to exist among project directors. Some agencies had professional staff with degrees in specialized areas while other agencies held a more "grass-roots" orientation utilizing para-professionals from the community. There was also a split in terms of what one administrator called "softcore" versus "hardcore" prevention. Some felt prevention should involve only those youth who were "good" -- with no previous contacts with the juvenile justice system. Other staff believed that prevention should be directed at youth with some minor justice system contacts to prevent them from escalating to more serious delinquent activity. This difference in philosophy resulted in different types of youth being recruited for project services in the various Venice agencies.

Some Venice staff believed that impacts in delinquency patterns would result from changing important institutions such as schools, family, and employment. Staff in other agencies

based their prevention services on the importance of bringing about changes in individual youth.

Successful joint ventures did occasionally occur on an informal level. Some agencies assisted each other in staff training, providing technical assistance, and sharing resource information. Some inter-agency referrals were also made. These relationships, however, were clustered among a few coalition agencies and no systematic processes to expand on these attempts were ever developed. Agency directors often expressed a desire to formalize schemes for joint actions at project board meetings. Only minimal resources were committed to organizing shared efforts, and there was little follow-through on suggested collaborative activities.

Of the collaborations intensively studied, the Seattle project appeared most committed to maintaining high levels of agency interaction. There were numerous examples of resource sharing between agencies in areas such as transportation, facilities, and staff expertise. Also, while Neighborhood House, the primary grantee, did dominate collaboration management, there were persistent attempts to settle conflicts through democratic means. The Seattle Delinquency Prevention Collaboration, an official body comprised of one delegate from each agency, met throughout the project to (1) make final decisions regarding specific components of the projects, (2) provide final approval for negotiated contracts, and (3) serve as final arbitrator of intra-project disputes. In general, there were sincere efforts at joint policy making among Seattle

collaboration agencies.

A striking example of a conflict that threatened the Seattle collaboration was a debate over a national policy of the Boy Scouts that Neighborhood House believed was discriminatory against female volunteers. Neighborhood House viewed this policy as an infraction of grant guidelines. Consequently, Neighborhood House asked that either the policy be changed or the local Boy Scouts organization side-step the policy for the duration of the grant. Furthermore, Neighborhood House contended that inaction would result in the Boy Scouts being asked to discontinue their participation for the second year of funding. This issue raised a storm among collaboration members and prompted them to challenge Neighborhood House's authority to make decisions affecting the entire collaboration. During a coalition-run grievance hearing, the Boy Scouts and Neighborhood House stated their positions, and then a majority of collaboration members voted in favor of continuing the Boy Scouts in the project. Member agencies believed that Neighborhood House did not have the authority to expell another agency even though many members considered the Boy Scouts' policy to be discriminatory.

As efforts to formulate a truly collaborative response to youth services in Seattle increased, differing philosophies and service traditions of member agencies loomed large. The director of one project agency explained:

... it was a subject of a great deal of discussion, almost argument, between some of the traditional youth agencies

like Camp Fire Girls and Boy Scouts and Neighborhood House. Neighborhood House was insisting that we were doing these things for low income underprivileged youngsters and let's give them everything. The other agencies had taken the position that young people are like adults. They value what they work for, or what they pay for and while they (other agencies) didn't have any objection to making it easy for the kids to get something, and they certainly wanted to provide for these youngsters who haven't had it before, to just hand them something was not changing their attitude towards the world, which we were trying to do. That's a philosophical point and one of the reasons that we got into trouble with Neighborhood House is our philosophy. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Philosophical and procedural debates within collaborations at times created divisiveness. At other times these conflicts increased agency determination to reduce counterproductive conflicts in the interest of serving target area youth. Not surprisingly, the attitudes among participants on the success of their joint ventures in bringing agencies closer were mixed. At least two agency directors had firm opinions about the collaboration's failure:

Director 1: In the true sense of collaboration, I don't think it's worked ... in my experience with ... the collaboration I think there were too many things going on and also just the fact that all the projects involved in the collaboration are struggling so much that they were struggling to keep going and they couldn't deal with doing something with somebody else.

Director 2: Right, I think that's very true, that it's just been too much an individual struggle you know, to interrelate ... our struggles. (Seattle, Field Notes)

At the other extreme, some directors were convinced of the correctness and success of the collaboration strategy:

Director: The collaboration fits perfectly in the scheme of things, for instance, Neighborhood House has units in

practically every housing unit in the city so immediately we can identify people in those areas to work with us. Immediately we can identify youngsters in those areas....

NCCD staff: And facilities?

Director: Right, and facilities in those various areas and immediately we can look towards an Atlantic Street House for crisis counseling if we can see a situation that for some reason or another we happen to know that this kid needs crisis counseling but no one knows where to send him. We do know, so we have those kinds of resources in our collaboration alone. If we see younger kids who don't fit into our scale, we know that we can tie them into some parts of that collaboration along with other agencies. I think the collaboration just makes the network better. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Interagency contacts never occurred with enough frequency to become important aspects of collaborative prevention projects. There was evidence of significant growth in the number and types of inter-agency activities among collaboration members, but contacts continued to be episodic and unsystematically developed.

The promise of collaboration development progressed toward the latter stages of the evaluation period. Late second-year observations of the Venice project revealed limited increases in member agency linkages, and some examples of more established agencies providing technical assistance to newer agencies. Interagency referrals were usually attempts to find employment for youth. One agency provided health and career information to other coalition agencies through special presentations. Another that served Black youth collaborated with a Chicano youth-serving agency to hold a joint baseball game. Participants felt that, given the history of poor relationships

between Blacks and Browns in the community, staging this sporting event was a significant accomplishment.

During the second year in Dallas, the tension between the YMCA and the county decreased. The relationship appeared more harmonious and cooperative. The improvement was at least partially due to accommodations made by both agencies. It is also possible, however, that conflict was reduced because the county assumed a more detached and passive role in the project. A key county administrator for the project said she was increasingly "out of" project affairs and less in touch with ongoing activities and that the YMCA management was "running" the project.

The YMCA did appear to overcome some of the barriers to network building that existed during the first year. The percentage of subcontract funds going to YMCA programs was reduced, and more effort was made to subcontract with more diverse types of agencies.

A project administrator in Seattle thought that early conflicts were a natural part of coalition building:

One result of the protracted negotiations was the knowledge of the working reality that has arisen between the Grantee and the delegate agencies, as the collaboration flexed its collective muscles and became more of a forum for voicing and discussing conflicting ideas. The process of compromise and conciliation, which is sometimes painful, was indeed a learning process for the staffs of the respective agencies involved, and the collaboration has now moved from mere debate to actual implementation of the project proposals. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Even an agency director who expressed unequivocal

dissatisfaction with the collaboration's early efforts saw hope for future collaborative activities in Seattle:

But I feel, currently with the collaboration, it's becoming stronger and people are feeling more committed to interrelate with resources and hopefully, I am looking very positively to the third year in association with the collaboration and sharing the resource and being more of a unity, you know, one body, rather than everybody going their own separate ways and looking out for themselves first. (Seattle, Field Notes)

The Impact of Collaborations

Participants in collaborations claimed that the evaluation period was too brief to assess the full impact their projects made on member agencies and on delinquency in the targeted communities. The more important impacts, could only be judged by the long-term relationships maintained by collaboration agencies and by the future delinquency prevention directions taken by private youth-serving agencies. The improvement in some collaboration efforts during the second year lends some weight to this view.

OJJDP expected that coordinated efforts would lead to increases in the number and types of services available to youth in target communities. Funds from the OJJDP prevention grants did allow some collaboration agencies to provide services to youth not otherwise served (in some cases the funds permitted agencies to survive). It is probable that these increases in services could have been accomplished by funding the agencies directly, without the pass-through of the collaboration structure. There is no evidence that the number of services

increased as a direct result of the coordinative efforts of collaborations. Because collaboration activities rarely transcended the level of concern over individual agency operations, interagency programming was almost nonexistent. Pooling of resources by two or more collaboration members to create new services was rare.

There is little evidence that the range of services was increased as a result of collaborative efforts. Agencies within coalitions provided the same types of services they had traditionally offered. Interagency contacts increased during the second year, but collaboration never reached the level to sustain new interagency services. The Seattle collaboration did result in services such as employment and career awareness being incorporated into agencies that had not previously provided them, but in general, agency service offerings did not change. One staff member observed:

All they're doing is counting the programs they have run. I know, I've lived there, I know what kind of programs they run. They have always run their program. Because delinquency prevention money came along doesn't change one little thing. I can safely say in no Neighborhood House has a new program really been developed. They're doing the same things now that they were doing before LEAA came along. (Seattle, Field Notes)

There were isolated examples of inter-agency referral of clients, but no system of referrals was well established by any collaboration. In Dallas, where building a referral network was a primary objective, project managers admitted they were not successful in this endeavor. It was alleged that youth "got

lost in the cracks" rather than directed to appropriate services in other agencies because the intended referral system was never coordinated.

Despite the Boston subcontractors' requirement to develop formal referral mechanisms, there were very few referrals between agencies, even those in the same communities. As in other collaborations, Boston agencies referred only youth they were totally unsuited to serve. In most collaborations, agencies were admittedly too protective of their caseloads to share clients with other agencies, even for better services.

Reduction of service gaps was not a major issue in collaboration deliberations. That an agency might reduce its operations in a particular area because of service overlaps seemed out of the question. Collaboration agencies were subcontracted to provide specific services and, in general, provided those services independently of other agencies. Agency autonomy was too well maintained to allow collective decision making about appropriate service emphases. No collaboration developed a dynamic process whereby joint agency decisions were made about service needs, followed by individual agency action based on these decisions.

Overall, collaborations did not have a significant impact on the service operations of member agencies. Interagency unity never influenced individual agencies to alter service decisions. Moreover, even primary grantee control of funding was insufficient to change the independently established policies and procedures of collaboration agencies.

While changes in service patterns were minor, many small community-based agencies felt that they benefited from collaboration membership. These agencies believed that involvement in the larger collaboration gave them much more exposure to target community residents, social institutions, and other service agencies. Not only were their services better publicized, but belonging to collaborations also gave them legitimacy as providers of delinquency prevention services. Delinquency prevention was not a traditional mandate of most collaboration agencies, and new identification with delinquency prevention promoted greater community-wide acceptance and better relationships with local funding sources.

National Agency Projects

Five grants were awarded to national youth-service agencies to implement delinquency prevention projects. Central administration was carried out by national offices (a regional office for the Salvation Army), with services provided to youth through various affiliates throughout the country. NCCD gathered data on relationships between one affiliate and its national office for each national grantee.

With the exception of the Salvation Army, the organizational structure of most national youth organizations can best be described as loose federations. National affiliation usually required compliance with minimal basic rules and payment of dues to the national office. But in many respects, affiliates were autonomous organizations. Some

national agencies had extensive histories of interaction with affiliates. Local affiliates, however, were responsible for their own site administration, financial resource development, and service decision making. The affiliates were generally not accountable to the national offices for operating procedures within their local areas.

By contrast the Salvation Army operated in a quasi-military structure. But even the Salvation Army noted it's organization "is not structured to mandate adoption by local units of ideas or projects desired by territorial headquarters", (Salvation Army Original Proposal). Though the local units were not completely autonomous, there existed few historical precedents for local services to be determined by the central office via a direct chain of command. For the Salvation Army and other national agencies, novel administrative relationships were tested by the OJJDP prevention projects. The following excerpt indicates a commonly held attitude regarding the national/affiliate relationship:

G.C. Staff: How we relate to the national organization, yes. I guess that one of the written and unwritten rules of the Girls Clubs is that each Girls Club is to be what meets the needs of the community. We have no definite programs such as an organization like the Girl Scouts does, where everybody works at getting a certain badge or something like that. We have to assess the needs of the community and present the types of programs that will answer the needs.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of an organizational chart that depicts the formal relationships between this agency and Girls Clubs of America?

G.C. Staff: There probably is in the manual, something I read a number of years ago and haven't reviewed recently.

But I see the national organization as mainly a support structure, not a ruling structure. They never have been ruling to us; they've been more support, training, advocacy, things like that. (Santa Barbara, Field Notes)

Neither national offices nor affiliates desired to radically alter the traditional independence of local units. Given this atmosphere, national offices did not create new structures for direct supervision of project operations. Instead, formal agreements between nationals and affiliates about joint project operations were established by contracts, or grant agreements, with provisions that set out the responsibilities of local units. For example:

The Associate shall provide those services specified in the Proposal as being the responsibility of the Associate participating in the proposal, and shall implement those services according to the deadline dates determined by the Project Director, and as indicated in the revised project workplan to be submitted to LEAA in January, 1978.
(Aspira Subcontract with Associates)

While there was little variation in the legal structures linking national offices with affiliates for the prevention projects, there were major differences in how the national/affiliate relationships were played out.

Linkages between the national offices and affiliates followed two basic models. In the first, the national office provided overall administration and offered technical assistance and support to affiliates. Each local affiliate had almost complete autonomy to design its own service program. For example, a major goal of Boys' Clubs of America was "to identify, develop and replicate prevention approaches that are

successful in reaching the hard-to-reach youth." Each participating affiliate was to develop a replicable program model to be shared with all other Boys' Clubs developing their own programs. Affiliates were guided by the overall project objective that sites would involve "each youth participant in three or more activities or services such as: leadership development, social development, values clarification, education for parenthood, and youth effectiveness training." Responsibility for implementing service programs resided with local staff while the national office monitored and evaluated the progress of the service programs.

Similarly, the Girls Clubs of America also chose not to design specific service programs at the national level:

Girls Clubs of America proposes to develop and/or expand direct service programs in the target communities to address the identified needs. Each site, because of the uniqueness of that community, has developed a program that will approach female delinquency prevention in a somewhat different way. There will be variations in outreach methods, staffing patterns, program focus, budget, and the techniques of community involvement. This will provide several different models for replication in the wide variety of cities served by Girls Clubs. (Girls Clubs, Original Proposal)

The Girls Clubs did attempt to incorporate some common characteristics at all sites, such as outreach methods to attract girls not traditionally served and the use of the "Self-Structured Way," a method of working with youth.

The Girls Clubs national office engaged in technical assistance, information sharing, and maintaining a continuous overview of developments at project sites. A national staff

member felt it inappropriate to become too heavily involved in local site administration. She perceived that local priorities were different than national priorities and that one set of interests should not dominate the other. She explained that affiliates' priorities were recruitment of youth and service delivery. Nationals' priorities, on the other hand, were in record keeping and grant accountability. She felt that record keeping and grant accountability was "less important to locals because they don't have to sell the program." (Girls Clubs, Field Notes)

The second model of linkages formed between national offices and their affiliates involved technical assistance and other support as well as the design of a standardized delinquency prevention service program at all participating affiliate sites. Local units gave suggestions about the development of these service packages but program models were largely products of national offices.

The United Neighborhood Centers of America (UNCA) designed a service model that included "a comprehensive battery of direct services to meet educational, vocational, social, recreational, and cultural needs." (UNCA, Original Proposal) The focal point was a program called Educational Development and Guidance for Employment (EDGE). This program included a wide range of services and specific components for service delivery. Life skills programs, mothers' clubs, and recreational activities were other features of the UNCA service program. In addition to the direct service component, each local affiliate was required

to establish an advisory council, a youth council, and a volunteer program.

In spite of this highly structured approach, UNCA's national office stressed the importance of not attempting to completely direct programming at the local level.

Then again, we work on the nature of affiliate relationships ... these are autonomous agencies and it would be entirely inappropriate for us to say, "this is how you must do it, this what you must do." We can give guidelines and, if necessary, even educate them or teach them and train them in techniques but the actual contacts have to come from them, they're the ones on the local level. (Akron, Field Notes)

The UNCA national staff saw its role as providing technical assistance, financial development, staff and board training, and evaluation and monitoring.

The Salvation Army also developed a service model for its affiliates. According to the Salvation Army proposal:

The Salvation Army is acutely aware of the present limitations in financial and human resources and, therefore, is proposing to multiply the effects of the allocated funds and efforts by developing a standard program design which has the potentiality for easy replication in the majority of Salvation Army units. (Salvation Army, Original Proposal)

The standard program of the Salvation Army included components for crisis intervention, long-term intervention, outreach, and community involvement. Even with this structured approach, most administration tasks were delegated to local site directors. The director for the overall program was responsible for monitoring and trouble-shooting.

The Aspira of America (Proyecto Amanece) project design called for service components in the areas of leadership development, self-awareness, reading skills development, vocational counseling and placement, career awareness, educational counseling, and community service to be offered by each project affiliate. Uniform implementation of service components was required and project staffing patterns were also standardized. Moreover, there was an attempt to achieve parallel development of the program at all sites.

Local affiliate autonomy was at least as big an issue with Aspira as with other national youth-serving agencies. While the designs of the national projects followed two distinct organizational models, in practice the linkages between nationals and affiliates entities were similar in all the projects.

The OJJDP grant structure dictated that the projects would focus primarily on direct services to youth. Direct service provision was, of course, the main and immediate concern of local units. The financial resources from the prevention grants, although relatively small, were viewed as an important way to increase local ability to engage in prevention work. For the national offices, administering a direct service project involved linking with affiliates in areas traditionally considered local concerns.

Accomplishing local direct service objectives was essential to major goals of the national offices, which hoped to develop models for delinquency prevention services that could be

replicated organization-wide, to firmly establish their prevention capabilities. Documented success of prevention approaches could have tremendous impact on the national offices' abilities to seek funding. The following type of comments are typical:

UNCA: I think there are two major functions. One is replication. We have a network of over 100 affiliates in the country. We are trying to see if we can come up with, from the demonstration project, a working model of programming that can be initiated at some of our other sites. One of the things we hope to get out of the evaluation is data supportive of replication.

The second thing is future funding of other programs we hope to develop at the national level. If we can show funding sources that we can accomplish our goals and have the capacity to put out a program of this complexity and make it work, I think our credibility will be vastly improved. (Akron, Field Notes)

Girls Clubs: Replication and future program directions. This is the first government grant the national agency has had. Some of it will impact on whether they will feel this is where Girls Clubs ought to go. Is it an appropriate thing for a national agency to be doing? Can we do a good job? Do we need more resources than we can provide? Can a program really function if it doesn't have a bigger structure to relate to? (Santa Barbara, Field Notes)

For national offices, demonstration of successful prevention approaches could only be achieved through successful linkages with affiliates. The working relationships between national offices and affiliates were crucial for the realization of national objectives.

National Affiliate Working Relationships

The relationship of this project to the local unit and its

program is quite simple. While the site director is responsible for the organization and operation of the site and reports directly to the Territorial Headquarters Direction Component, the Corp officer is ultimately responsible for and in control of the project. (Salvation Army, Script of Slide Presentation)

This statement typifies the opinion of national staff that inter-agency linkages were fairly straight-forward. In practice, national/affiliate linkages were rarely so uncomplicated. The "simple" relationship articulated by Salvation Army staff was viewed by local staff as the single most important factor inhibiting their ability to construct and deliver quality services.

National projects experienced the same problems of ambiguous lines of authority as did collaboration projects. Service staff were torn between conflicting directives from site directors and national office project directors. Most national project directors found that, although they had formal administrative control over the project, they actually had little power to compel local staff to comply with project guidelines. No national project director was willing to engage in power struggles with agency affiliates over the proper operation of the prevention effort. Even where clear authority rested with the national director by contract, there were few guarantees of affiliate compliance. It was clear to almost everyone that national offices would not attempt to control sites by enforcing contract provisions. National offices feared becoming embroiled in law suits with affiliates over project management that would irreparably hurt their agencies.

In some instances by design, and in others to avoid conflict, national directors played increasingly minor roles in their affiliates site activities. Some local staff believed that their national offices did little to help them in their prevention efforts. At other sites, where national staff became involved in local operations upon request, site staff expressed gratitude for the assistance national staff provided.

Some national staff saw their primary purpose as serving as liaison between the affiliate sites and OJJDP. As one central administrator stated:

Supporting the sites' programming and service delivery functions is a secondary role for us; mainly we are dealing with paper -- administrative work. And because this is an experimental program there is even more of it than usual. (Marietta, Field Notes)

Site visits were made to local units by Salvation Army staff providing technical assistance in the areas of client information management, financial management, and fund raising. But, administrative details such as gathering statistics and collating site data, interpreting grant demands and OJJDP policy, and monitoring site functions for grant compliance, were the major tasks of national staff, who thought site personnel did not appreciate the responsibilities of the central office.

I know some of our site people feel the national office does nothing. They don't realize the effort involved in just putting the grant proposal together. Maybe it's because they don't see us personally enough.... We're constantly asking them for data. There are time limits and we're on them to get these things in. They don't appreciate the needs we face. (Marietta, Field Notes)

At the Marietta site many service staff held negative opinions about the central office. Site staff indicated that the central office imposed many demands, but provided little support. According to a site administrator:

My basic philosophy is I don't deal with the direction component unless I have to. Every time we deal with them it's one frustration after another. I just have as little to do with them as possible. (Marietta, Field Notes)

Interestingly, the major complaint by site staff was that the administrative component did not appreciate their work and that central office demands were unreasonable in light of the need to deliver good quality services.

The prevention projects were often placed in a local structure of existing and well-established programs. Predictably, competition for site resources arose. Confusion developed over whether prevention project staff were primarily responsible to local agency administrators or to national staff. Project staff in Marietta felt that central staff did not intervene with sufficient authority to resolve disputes, and failed to act as advocates for the prevention program with local agency officials:

At first we had a honeymoon period, where people were very enthusiastic and worked hard. Then came the conflict with the community center in trying to impose our program on top of community center's recreational program. He [local affiliate director] resisted us continually. The Corp supported him and we eventually yielded to apathy. (Marietta, Field Notes)

We sit around and sink into this thing where we are afraid to act independently because of the reactions we know we

will get, and the problems the reaction will make. We need a clear framework, so we know what we're doing. Not just sitting around waiting to be told to do something by someone else. (Marietta, Field Notes)

The Boys' Clubs of America national office staff spent great effort during the first year on local project development. It was recognized that some site proposals needed further clarification and restatement of objectives. Several site visits were made to offer technical assistance concerning these issues. Assessment of further site technical assistance needs and monitoring were accomplished through additional site visits, which were sometimes initiated by special request of the affiliates. Technical assistance covered a wide range of areas, such as services, maintaining service quality, management, and inter-agency networking. Local staff training was often provided by national staff during their visits.

Discussions with staff of several participating Boys' Clubs indicated a positive relationship with national staff. They spoke highly of assistance received, and in two particular instances, felt their projects would not have survived without this aid. Another Boys' Club's staff member stated that accountability by locals to the national office helped assure better service quality.

Accountability of locals to the Boys' Clubs national office was also controversial at several sites. Many clubs did not share the perspective that national office intervention to maintain service quality was desirable. For some clubs the receipt of special prevention funding through the national

office heightened the issue of local autonomy in operations. A conference of Boys' Clubs project personnel in late 1978 was a result of this issue and an attempt to directly respond to concerns of local staff. National staff spoke of having to "soft peddle" assistance and of doing a great deal of "stroking" of project personnel.

Boys' Clubs' local staff also claimed that the administrative demands made by the national office were too great. They felt that rules set by the national office concerning documentation of expenditures and collection of evaluation data, among other policies, were unnecessary, difficult to carry out, and required too much staff time for the limited grant funds they received. One local project director expressed anger at this, saying that he was "one of the suckers" participating in the prevention program.

Aspira's was the one national project where, from the outset, the national office made clear its intention to play a major role in directing local site activities. Aspira's national staff offered affiliates technical assistance in a wide range of areas through site visits, project-wide conferences, and publications. In addition, Aspira's national office developed an extensive and strict monitoring system aimed at directing compliance to the project's goals and uniform procedures. A list of priorities was developed "that the National Office would follow in order to determine flagrant and/or unjustified violations of the contracted agreements." (Aspira, Internal Quarterly Report, 1978) A system for rating

the performance of local units according to the project priorities was also developed. The overall attempt was for affiliates to "achieve programmatic compliance." (Aspira, Internal Quarterly Report, April, May, June 1978)

The efforts of national staff to build a strong central administration faced initial resistance. Aspira had a strong tradition of allowing state organizations to independently manage affairs within their jurisdictions. Some of these state organizations predated Aspira of America and had grown extremely sensitive to alleged attempts by the national office to impinge upon their autonomy. Aspira staff mentioned that the national office was unable to have its "mandates" carried out by state affiliates. Given this organizational history, it is understandable that Aspira of America did not provide for direct control over service staff in the project's original management plan. Instead, the executive directors of each Aspira affiliate retained complete authority over Proyecto Amanece staff within their respective states.

The weakness of this administrative structure was apparent early in the project's start-up period. Staff at the local sites were unfamiliar with project strategies and objectives and needed continual direction to fulfill project plans. Affiliate directors responded to attempts of national staff to direct local staff by insisting on compliance with the interagency protocol established for the prevention project. Formally, the Proyecto Amanece director from Aspira of America could not communicate directly with local service staff. The project

director was required to submit his directives for service staff to the director of the technical assistance unit and to the executive director of Aspira of America. His communication would be reviewed and, if approved, would be transmitted to the executive directors of the affiliates. If the state executive director approved, the directive would be transmitted to service staff. This rigid bureaucratic structure was further complicated because the prevention project was not a major component in most states, and executive directors were sometimes less than prompt in reviewing and making decisions about project communications. At a time when project success necessitated a free flow of information and firm decision making from the national office, protocol nearly halted communication and made every decision a crisis.

Proyecto Amanece probably would have deteriorated into chaos if staff had strictly followed formal communications procedures. Fortunately, the project director was able to offer some assistance to local staff through informal channels.

Informal communications worked well in situations lacking conflict. But the need for a more straightforward system of administrative control was apparent when service staff did not comply with directions from national staff. For example, it became evident early in the project that some of the sites were enrolling youth who were not among the proposed target population. According to Proyecto Amanece administrative staff:

At those sites where previously employed Aspira personnel were manning the program, there existed, at a conscious or

unconscious level, resistance to the recruitment of this new type of Aspira clientele. At these same units there existed simultaneously a resistance, again on a conscious or an unconscious level, to the methodology, goals, and objectives of this new type Aspira program. (Aspira Internal Quarterly Report, April, May, June 1978)

Although Aspira of America staff could identify the source of these problems, they could not take direct action. The result was that even when observations "indicated clearly that they [service staff] either were experiencing difficulty implementing the program as written, or were implementing the program in a manner other than that prescribed by the proposal," it took a long time to correct the problem. (Aspira Internal Quarterly Report, April, May, June 1978)

Many aspects of the relationships between national offices and their affiliates became more complex than expected by national grantees. The dilemmas posed by these strained linkages may have offset the intended benefits of this new collaborative arrangement.

Impact of National/Affiliate Linkages

With OJJDP funding, national offices were able to upgrade their expertise on juvenile delinquency and thereby increase their capacity to offer technical assistance and support to their affiliates in delinquency prevention programming. Even with the modest grant funds received by the affiliates, the local units offered services to youth who otherwise would not have been served. But it is unclear whether the administrative linkages between national offices and affiliates played a major

role in producing these benefits.

The technical assistance capabilities of the national offices were mostly developed independently from activities of local affiliates. Rather than drawing from analyses of their affiliates' experiences to develop "how-to" materials on delinquency prevention, national staff relied on existing publications and expert consultants.

There was little evidence that the involvement of national offices with affiliates significantly enhanced national agencies' abilities to provide the types of technical assistance expertise developed through this prevention effort.

Most national offices did provide their affiliates with technical aides for prevention programming and, as mentioned, many project staff believed this technical assistance to be essential to site operations. Yet the most significant ways national offices increased the capacity of their affiliates to conduct prevention programming was to channel grant funds to them.

Whether affiliates will sustain their special emphases on delinquency prevention when grant funding ceases is less certain. In most cases, prevention activities were treated as special projects and not routinely incorporated into the affiliates' regular service programs. Some affiliates announced their intentions to discontinue prevention project activities when grant funds ran out. Some national offices were able to delay such actions by providing aid to affiliates in seeking alternative funding. During the two-year evaluation period

little evidence was obtained to suggest that national offices would institutionalize specific delinquency prevention approaches at affiliate sites. The leadership of national offices relied heavily on their provision of funds. As one national administrator said:

There is a great deal of autonomy, but we control the purse strings so they follow us. (Richmond, Field Notes)

Some national grantees considered their local program models to be highly successful. The Salvation Army, for example, developed a slide show dramatically portraying their prevention program as an example for other groups within and outside of their organization. The slide show was often presented at national conferences and to local groups.

Replication of selected site models was initially a major goal of the Boys' Clubs. Their idea of replicating one specific model per site, however, was eventually modified. Staff explained that each project could actually include several different models, each unique. Replication of each site's program was determined to be unfeasible, although national staff were still investigating replicable aspects of all affiliate projects. The early idea of designing a basic program model evolved until the Boys' Clubs of America decided that the typical Boys' Club was the "model." With some qualifications, Boys Clubs asserted that the traditional core services offered by local clubs could include recruitment of hard-to-reach youth and positive youth development and thus constitute effective

delinquency prevention.

Notwithstanding the optimism of the Salvation Army and Boys' Clubs, the general consensus of national staff was that models worthy of nationwide replication were not produced by the OJJDP prevention program. According to one national administrator, after two years of concentrated effort, her agency still has "no idea whether we have the right answers or that anyone has them." (Girls Clubs, Field Notes)

EXTERNAL LINKAGES

Intra-project linkages, both national offices with their affiliates and urban collaborations, were fraught with enough difficulties to seriously impede their progress toward improving youth services through coordinative efforts. Grantees also attempted to form linkages with youth-serving agencies and institutions not receiving funds from OJJDP's prevention program to improve youth services in the target communities.

Types and Purposes of Interagency Linkages

Establishing linkages between OJJDP grantee agencies and other agencies was one of the least developed aspects of the prevention projects. In general, contacts between grantees and other agencies in pursuit of delinquency prevention purposes were infrequent. Linkages between grantees and other agencies assumed a variety of forms ranging from casual acquaintance among staffs to formal contracts. Most interactions were unsystematically developed, informal, and not sustained over time. Agencies that had developed interagency linkages prior to

the prevention grant maintained them, but there is little evidence that these relationships were strengthened as a result of project activities.

Grantees acknowledged the need to strengthen ties between youth-serving agencies and other institutions relevant to youth within their target communities. Some projects proposed developing a system for interagency cooperation to improve youth services. For example, an important aspect of the UNCA prevention project was:

The establishment of a formal network of local community agencies to collaborate on referrals and meet regularly to plan improvements and eliminate duplications and gaps in local youth services. (Westinghouse, NFS Project Summary and Analysis of Technical Assistance Needs, p. 9)

Even where improving interagency linkages was not an explicit goal, project administrators claimed that progress in this area was an important objective. For example, one project administrator noted the lack of interagency linkages in his target area and viewed his project as a catalyst:

...other agencies haven't done anything. I feel that it [the project] will force a lot of people to recognize the need. We need to get agencies more involved to have more impact on people. (Venice, Field Notes)

Despite grantees' attempts to build external linkages with nonproject agencies, serious external constraints significantly retarded project efforts toward this objective.

An important obstacle of inter-agency linkages was the fact that project administrators were unsure about exactly why or how

linkages should be formed. Explicit strategies for developing external linkages were rarely implemented. While inter-agency involvement was often a topic for conversation, discussions rarely progressed to action:

We discussed outside agency participation. We are not quite sure of what we are going to do, but we want suggestions as to how we can work together. (Venice, Project Board Minutes, 1/24/78)

There were exceptions to the general lack of systematic approaches to external linkage formation among the prevention projects. In Richmond project staff played the role of facilitators and helped revitalize an organization known as the Easter Hill Youth Services Coalition. Although only a few agencies ever regularly attended coalition meetings, the membership roster of the organization listed many of the agencies serving target area youth. The coalition aimed to increase the capacity of member agencies to expand and sustain effective youth services in Easter Hill.

Staff in Akron convened a group of six nongrantee agencies and created an interagency network which held quarterly meetings. The Akron project director was in constant telephone contact with network agency personnel. Various topics, such as how to integrate different approaches to service provision, were raised in network meetings. Each agency prepared a brief outline of its youth services to assist the discussion. Interagency referral agreements were reached, although these verbal commitments were never put in writing. As a result of

networking efforts, these agencies produced a joint newsletter titled, "Summer Happenings!". The newsletter was distributed to clients of all agencies to inform youth and the community of available services in the summer of 1978. Satisfaction with the joint venture was expressed by one administrator:

I believe that the meeting met and surpassed most of your expectations. It provided those agency representatives an opportunity to meet together. It became very apparent that this was the first time such a meeting had been convened. Some people met each other for the first time and found out the location, hours of operation, and types of programs offered by each agency. There was a sense of excitement about having come together and a general recognition of the need to communicate with each other. There was an agreement that a Community Network was necessary. (Akron, Field Notes)

Several agencies of the Seattle collaboration formed a steering committee with nonmember agencies to coordinate youth service in the central area of Seattle. Joint endeavors with nonmember agencies included efforts to secure funding, establish service linkages, and develop other cooperative working arrangements. These external linkages had a prominent effect on public policy. The Department of Social and Health Services in Seattle was responding to HB 371, a bill mandating compliance with federal regulations requiring the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. This legislation provided for services for status offenders identified by police and public social welfare agencies. Such youth would be referred to private, nonprofit community agencies for a range of services including health, counseling and educational tutoring. After input from many Seattle agencies, public authorities adopted a service model

based on the Seattle delinquency prevention collaboration.

With the exception of Seattle, insufficient staff interest or other unfavorable circumstances discouraged these interagency groups from evolving into policy-oriented advocacy bodies. By the end of the second year the efforts in Richmond and Akron were floundering.

Besides making policy-oriented linkages, grantees reached out to groups to acquire operating facilities and client referrals. From the outset some grantees knew that their agencies did not possess sufficient facilities to operate their proposed services. Agencies had to arrange quickly to share other agencies' physical space. Grantees were not as dependent on other agencies for client referrals as for facilities.

Schools, because of their ability to provide facilities as well as referrals, emerged as the most important external linkage for prevention grantees. For many projects the school linkage was a sine qua non for project operations.

The extremely powerful influence of the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) on the Dallas prevention project has been noted. Headquarters for the Dallas project were in a school, many project services were operated on school grounds, and most clients were referred by school personnel. In fact, when DISD withheld referrals during a dispute about program policy, the project's activities were severely restricted. The DISD actually financially supported as well as operated at least one service of the prevention project. Although the project was a collaboration between Dallas County and the YMCA, the DISD was

often referred to as "an informal third party" or "the hidden partner." The school district's influence was so strong that one project staff member declared, "this is a school project." (Dallas, Field Notes) Many youth agencies within the target community shared this opinion.

Dallas was not the only site where schools played such a prominent role. The Tuskegee project could not have operated without the cooperation of target area schools. In most Tuskegee target communities, the public schools had the only facilities where prevention services could be conducted. The ability of Tuskegee administrators to arrange low cost lease arrangements with local public schools was essential to the project's performance.

Schools also played an important role in client recruitment in Tuskegee. The most important method of reaching clients was holding "recruitment drives" in the local schools at the beginning of semesters when youth were often looking for new activities. In many ways, the Tuskegee project appeared to be an extra-curricular school activity rather than a separate entity.

In Fort Peck, schools set aside class time and permitted project staff to make presentations on vocational and career alternatives. Project staff were allowed to establish temporary work sites in schools where they recruited youth into summer employment activities. Some schools also cooperated by allowing use of facilities for other prevention project services.

Developments at the New Jersey affiliate of Aspira of

America highlighted the impact of school resources on the prevention projects. Aspira had traditionally operated college-preparatory-type projects within the high schools, and staff anticipated that they would continue to use school facilities for prevention project operating space. During most of the project's first year this arrangement worked well, but late in the year, Aspira decided to focus recruitment efforts on drop-out and other out-of-school youth. Aspira staff believed that in order to attract these youth, recruitment efforts and project services must take place in the community, not on school grounds. At the same time, project facilities in the community consisted of only a small administrative office. The inability of staff to immediately find other operating facilities had serious repercussions for service activities. Reports by project staff attest to these problems:

In my opinion, the clubs are having problems in terms of meeting attendance and club development due to the fact that they need a larger facility in which to meet and perform activities. During the week, some club facilitators expressed similar feelings about this situation. The club facilitator of the Photography Club suggested having a space large enough so that every club could meet, perform its activities, and interchange ideas. (Aspira, Field Notes)

The Sports Club, the one whose members are drop-outs and gang members, is not holding their meetings, but they visit the offices regularly. I interviewed their club facilitator ... and he told me that the main reason for not holding meetings is that they do not have a place where they can feel comfortable and discuss their problems. Also, they do not have facilities to practice some sports. (Aspira, Field Notes)

For many projects the public schools offered the most

convenient, if not only, means of identifying clients for project services. Projects offered services such as tutoring, remedial education, and support in helping potential drop-outs stay in school. In many cases, project staff could not have identified appropriate clients without aid from school personnel. Projects often found schools not initially supportive of their efforts, but in several cases, progress was achieved in establishing better working relationships. As one project administrator stated:

The schools are beginning to accept. Actually they are beginning to be more cooperative. We have really been able to establish a good relationship with the attendance counselors to the point that they are beginning to follow-up with us around particular kids who they identify as presenting difficulties. (Venice, Field Notes)

Some agencies in the Seattle collaboration initiated services based on the interaction of school practices and client needs. For example, a program to desegregate public schools affected youth in the target area. Youth participation in project activities was hindered because youth spent considerable time in transit between home and their assigned schools. Seattle collaboration agencies responded by providing shared transportation to enable younger children to participate in programs even if this meant getting home after dark.

Due to a six-week teachers' strike, Seattle schools were closed in the fall of 1978. School-based programs of the collaboration could not be implemented. Project agencies provided youth counseling and other program services at agency

facilities with some difficulty. Despite staffing and funding problems, Neighborhood House centers in public housing communities responded to the delayed opening of schools by extending their services for youth. Project staff also contacted school staff to discuss implementing a tutoring program to counteract educational problems caused by the closed schools.

Despite numerous examples of close working relationships with schools, most projects steered away from advocating changes in school policies. The Tuskegee project acknowledged a need for educational "innovations not previously utilized in this area with the socio-economically disadvantaged rural child," but staff did not act as advocates to implement such innovations in the local school systems. There seemed to be little coordination between the educational services offered by Tuskegee, such as the tutoring program, and school curriculum. Few other prevention projects attempted to expand linkages with schools into areas such as integrating project services with normal school curriculum or altering educational policies.

It may be that project administrators were reluctant to risk loss of school resources by conflicting with school policy. Comments from staff indicated that linkages between projects and schools were tenuous; for example, project efforts were confounded by resistance from school personnel who viewed the project as "threatening" to their profession.

...the administrators at this school hadn't been very supportive of their tutoring program because it implied

that the school wasn't doing its job if the kids needed additional tutoring. (Seattle, Field Notes)

In Seattle, schools insisted that the collaboration agencies operate their in-school programs using personnel with teacher accreditation. As project staff noted:

Also, the Seattle schools have been faced with rapidly declining enrollments and so there were a number of teachers that there was really no place for on the staff, so they did not want an outside agency to come in there equally and serve like teachers during the program. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Akron was a notable exception for its willingness to combat school policies. The project there was party to a lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union against the board of education about the school district's desegregation plans. Although Akron staff were optimistic about cooperation with local school counselors, the lawsuit caused a setback to this intended linkage. According to a project staff member:

...schools probably see the East Akron Community House in two different manners. One is being a friend of the school system; on the other hand, as being an adversary. And any time we're talking about change in relation with the schools, we're going to be in opposition. If it's a project we're implementing that supports -- then we get the school's support. So unfortunately, you know, that's the situation. (Akron, Field Notes)

Linkages with public housing agencies also provided significant resources to the prevention projects. One of the major objectives of the Richmond site was to create outreach services to youth from a nearby community that had traditionally not used Boys' Clubs facilities. The project needed operating.

space within that community, and arranged to use a housing authority community center in a public housing project. The Richmond site's \$20,000 budget allowed no means of compensating the housing authority for use of the building, so the housing authority retained enormous leverage over prevention program operations. Staff realized this dependence and stated that the project would have been "a flop" without housing authority support.

Relations with public housing authorities were also important to the Seattle collaboration's programs:

Public housing is important to us because they provide the space and are a very good referral network. We have a good working relationship with them. (Seattle, Field Notes)

Neighborhood House leased virtually all facilities from the Seattle Housing Authority. This contract was renewed annually, but according to the project director, it was not a formal review. In exchange for facilities, Neighborhood House provided direct services to public housing residents.

In the rural projects especially, churches were a major source of project support. Community churches gave a great deal of support to the Tuskegee project. In at least one Tuskegee target community, church facilities were used for meetings of an advisory council, and project activities were announced at church services. Recruitment of parents to serve on advisory councils was conducted through the churches. Also, a "Gospel-A-Rama" was held to raise funds for the Tuskegee

project. The traditional role of the church as a major influence in the communities served by Tuskegee cannot be overemphasized. Acceptance of the project by church congregations was tantamount to community-wide acceptance.

In Fort Peck, churches provided the only examples of successful collaboration with non-Indian organizations (although linkages also included Indian churches). In some small Fort Peck communities, churches allowed use of facilities for a small fee. Several religious leaders served on project community advisory groups and as volunteers for special activities. Churches also showed a willingness to work with the project on behalf of individual youth. In some instances, Fort Peck provided services for churches. During the first year of the program, a religious conference was held in the community and prevention staff supervised activities for congregation youth so parents could participate in the meetings.

The prevention projects also established external linkages to find employment for youth. A number of projects identified youth unemployment as a significant factor in delinquency causation, but grant funds did not permit projects to directly employ youth as a major strategy. Many projects acted as liaisons between project youth and employers.

Staff members in the projects reported little success in finding employment for youth in the private sector. For this reason, developing linkages with government-funded employment agencies became an important part of the employment strategies. Tuskegee's efforts to obtain job listings from private industry

and business were unsuccessful, but the project worked closely and profitably with the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA). Staff reported that about 85 percent of the jobs found for Tuskegee's clients came from the CETA program. In effect, Tuskegee served as an unofficial screening agency for youth CETA jobs in many communities. Prevention staff reviewed applications to ensure youth provided all necessary information and met the criteria stipulated by CETA. Tuskegee staff then tried to match youth to available CETA jobs.

While these external linkages were generally productive, they also presented certain dilemmas. Projects' dependence on other agencies for facilities, referrals, and job placements caused problems for many grantees, and staff said that serious compromises of project procedures were made to accommodate the policies of resource-providing agencies.

Most grantees developed, at best, only peripheral relationships with the juvenile justice systems in their target communities. Staff from several projects reported absolutely no dealings with police, sheriff, or probation departments. This isolation existed even where justice system personnel expressed interest in establishing closer ties. In Seattle, a juvenile justice official commented to prevention staff:

We are not allowed the time to learn about all the things that are happening in the community. I certainly would like more information concerning youth programs. It might be helpful in our work if we knew more about what was going on. (Seattle, Field Notes)

No follow-up on this suggestion to develop better linkages was

ever made.

Some prevention projects purposely avoided contact with the juvenile justice system because they interpreted their mandate to prevent delinquency as being incompatible with accepting clients from the justice system. A number of project administrators said they understood that OJJDP had expressly forbidden substantial grantee involvement with juvenile justice agencies. The claim was that OJJDP did not want prevention efforts to become diversion projects. This paradoxical belief blocked potentially valuable linkages for the prevention projects. For example, a county juvenile probation department was experiencing trouble getting local agencies to work with minority youth and requested the OJJDP delinquency prevention project to provide services to these youth. The project director, based on his belief of OJJDP directives, responded:

I see that as a touchy area for us to get involved in. We might be able to link them to something but I don't see it [probation] as something we can really work in. (Dallas, Field Notes)

Some projects avoided juvenile justice contact on the basis of agency philosophy. For example, Boys' Club staff contended that their focus on primary prevention negated the need to establish referral agreements or other linkages with juvenile justice agencies.

Staff of some projects expressed the view that police and the prevention projects often worked at conflicting purposes. Such attitudes created an atmosphere of distrust between project

agencies and police. A project administrator stated:

... we knew that the funding was forthcoming, we immediately had a meeting with the local division chief and discussed some of the ideas that we were going to be doing. The reception from the police certainly wasn't hostile, but it was definitely lukewarm. There was an expressed feeling on the part of two of the officers that we weren't really talking about a solution to anything. They were very discouraging and they weren't very optimistic. (Venice, Field Notes)

Venice staff were not optimistic that police relations with the project would improve.

I think that the only way we could ever really become good buddies with the police is if we were to tell them, if something happened, like if there was a robbery, we tell them who did it, and then we could become friends. Because their job is law enforcement, and they don't perceive their job as being preventative. Now clearly, there are a lot of people on the force who are of a mind that they could do more if they could do more prevention. But that is not the impetus of the force and they don't see themselves as being social workers. They see themselves as being enforcers of the law. (Venice, Field Notes)

Some justice system officials were reluctant to make referrals to the prevention projects due to their temporary funding and the untested nature of their programs. A probation official in Marietta stated that the two-year federal grant did not allow his department to consider the project a long-term, dependable resource for referrals. A probation department official in Akron did not express confidence in the prevention project's ability to work with potential or adjudicated delinquents. He further explained that more specific feedback about referred youths' progress in the project was necessary

before he could judge the project's worth. Without documented successes probation officials did not wish to refer clients to the Akron project.

Notwithstanding difficulties faced by most projects in linking with the justice system, important connections were forged at some sites. In Fort Peck, a judge newly elected for the West Reservation thought the prevention project had potential for helping youth in trouble. The judge routinely referred youth to the Fort Peck project. As part of probation sentences, youth attended project activities and received personal counseling and employment services. An interview with the judge revealed that she believed the prevention project was instrumental in providing alternatives for youth and changing negative behavior patterns.

At the New Jersey site where the project's office was only a half-block away from the main police station, the police department's juvenile division was unaware of the delinquency prevention project for several months. During the project's second year, prevention staff initiated a great deal of interaction between the police and themselves. Police held discussions with project youth explaining youth crime problems and justice system operation. Project staff also held a series of meetings between police officials and leaders of youth gangs in the target area. The meetings were intended to promote mutual understanding between the two groups and find methods for improving relationships.

In Tuskegee, while no formal relationships were developed,

the project enjoyed strong support from individual juvenile justice officials. In many project communities, justice officials publicly expressed their support for the project. In one county, the juvenile court judge served as chairman of the community advisory council. The police chief in another community was an active advisory council member. Other local judges, sheriffs, and police officials expressed satisfaction with the project and their desire that prevention activities expand. Justice officials were often speakers at Tuskegee project events. One sheriff even offered his land for a Tuskegee service component. The active project participation by justice officials also gave local citizens greater incentive to become involved. Citizens were able to discuss their views on the justice system directly with agency officials and in some cases saw these discussions reflected in policy changes. No forums for community/justice system discussions were available before the Tuskegee prevention project.

Other projects invited justice system personnel to speak before youth groups, and there were isolated examples of client referrals from justice system agencies. But no strategies were developed for maintaining or expanding these relationships.

Constraints on External Linkages

Project staff cited the same difficulties in linking with other agencies with surprising regularity. Limited development of linkages was attributed to the many organizational and personnel changes that projects experienced and the ensuing

administrative readjustments made during the early stages of the program. Staff felt that early confusion made it difficult to establish an identity among other agencies. Difficulties in discerning the nature and objectives of these new prevention efforts caused other agencies to stay away.

Many service staff asserted that the demands of direct service provision were so great and staff resources so limited that making contacts outside their own agencies was virtually precluded. Staff were so busy gearing up service delivery, especially during the first year, that there was little time to develop linkages.

In Fort Peck, staff activity logs and field observations indicated that considerable staff time and energy were expended to construct inter-agency collaborations. But staff at other sites appeared less committed to inter-agency connections. Often they failed to show up for appointments, were unreachable, or did not follow-up on promises to assist other agencies. Staff expressed frustration that implementation of some of their ideas relied on other agency resources.

By far the major roadblock to linkages between youth-serving agencies was competition for either funding or clients. The director of a project component in Venice expressed her view about linkages: "We are a threat. We're reaching a population that's in everybody's catchment area ... we get their kids." (Venice, Field Notes) Another Venice agency director also admitted that the potential for establishing linkages was not great: "It becomes a matter of

territorial competition because we are all in the same funding locale." (Venice, Field Notes)

Inter-agency competition was reported to be a major reason why Richmond staff were not successful in more fully developing their inter-agency youth services coalition. Plans to incorporate the coalition to solicit funds were dropped because of opposition by the directors of the constituent agencies who feared yet another competitor for scarce youth service funds.

In Marietta, other agencies did not refer youths to the prevention project because they thought they might be lost from their own client counts, and place their agency and jobs in jeopardy. A prevention project staff member reported:

The director of an agency called the other day and complained we were taking their kids. (Marietta, Field Notes)

Almost all sites suffered from the problem of inter-agency competition.

Conclusion

The world of youth-serving agencies suffers from fragmentation; programs are run in isolation from one another, with little sharing of clients, ideas, facilities, or services. In fact, agencies often are in competition with one another for funds and clients. It was hoped that the OJJDP delinquency prevention effort would help the grantees overcome these trends by encouraging grantees to set up better linkages with other agencies.

Two kinds of linkages were dealt with: (1) intra-project linkages between member agencies of collaborations, or between local affiliates and their national-level agencies; and (2) external linkages, between grantees and other agencies or social institutions working with target area youth.

In most cases, grantees fell prey to old patterns of fragmentation. Although all the projects saw the need to set up relationships with other agencies, few formed systematic connections that were sustained. Little was done to reduce duplication of services or to develop ways of sending youths with particular needs to agencies best suited to fill those needs. The OJJDP program left little legacy of better understanding and cooperation among agencies.

Ambiguous or untenable management structures of coalitions receiving funding and OJJDP's funding structure were the main factors leading to power struggles, disagreements, and misunderstandings within coalitions. These barriers were difficult to overcome. OJJDP funded a number of coalitions or youth-serving agencies on the assumption that their working together would accomplish more than separate efforts. The projects never really tested this assumption. Agencies had joined together mainly to secure funding, and their very general consensus as to philosophy, goals, and strategies often broke down in practice. The haste with which the new collaborations were formed to qualify for grants may partially account for this dilemma.

Each of the collaborations proposed that an expansion of

services available to target area youth should result from project operations, without making clear how this would come about. Some service gaps for target area youth were filled by the OJJDP effort because grantees recruited clients for their standard services from youth populations they had not previously reached. However, it appears that these results stemmed more from the influx of money to the agencies than from increased cooperation among agencies. Overall, collaborations did not have a significant impact on the service operations of their members.

Another means of improving coordination was the development of model programs by national agencies for replication at local sites with technical assistance by the national. In addition to funding local affiliates' program activities, OJJDP provided the national agencies with an opportunity to establish an explicit delinquency prevention function.

The national offices were able to upgrade their expertise in juvenile delinquency, and increase their ability to give technical assistance to their local affiliates. This new expertise appeared to stem from exposure to research and consultants rather than as an outgrowth of close work with the experimental projects at local affiliates.

Establishing links between grantees and other organizations dealing with youth was one of the least developed aspects of the projects. Contacts were quite scarce and mostly informal; few were developed systematically or sustained over time. Most of the links were made to obtain facilities or to gain client

referrals. Schools were of critical importance in both areas; they supplied space and resources to many projects, a means to publicize the program to youth, and often helped foster community acceptance.

Important links were made with other organizations such as public housing agencies, churches, and government-funded employment agencies. Such linkages were not without costs to the programs; some staff reported making serious compromises to accommodate policies of other agencies that were central to project success.

Few projects made more than peripheral linkages with the juvenile justice system, as they were reluctant to serve youth from that system. Many staff were under the impression that OJJDP did not want them to deal with already delinquent youth, and that their limited resources would be used up by the more extensive needs of delinquent youth. Ironically, staff believed that delinquent youth had access to services through the juvenile justice system. Other staff were concerned that working with delinquent youth would hurt their agency's image.

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Chapter 10

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

The ideology of preventing crime and delinquency can be traced to the writings of Beccaria and Bentham and more generally to the rise of classical penology. The early classical views identified prevention with deterrence, to be achieved by designing punishments to provoke individuals to recognize their self-interest in conforming with the law. Classical views assumed the potential for crime already existed in persons and had to be balanced by the fear of being punished. In France for example, attempts to administer penal codes based on this philosophy did not work very well and revealed that children could not be held responsible in the same way as adults for criminal offenses. As a result a revised neo-classical philosophy emerged making exceptions for children as well as for the insane and certain other disabled persons.

The classical notion of crime prevention was attacked by the first positivists. Lombroso and Ferri, respectively, proposed individual pathology and social pathology as causes of crime and delinquency. Ferri (1967) in particular advocated preventing crime, proposing "penal substitutes" for repressive punishments and making the prevention of crime "a principle guarantee of social order" rather than a residual consideration. Such substitutes necessarily were to be activated before and not after criminal acts. As a socialist Ferri advocated broad

state-promoted social changes to prevent the growth of crime and delinquency, among them foundling homes, public recreation and better street lighting.

American conceptions of delinquency and its prevention were strongly infused with Puritan theology and practice. Central to the American ideology of prevention was the extirpation of evils and sin from the education of children through communal intervention. In early New England colonies parents were held responsible by magistrates for the religious indoctrination of children, who could if necessary be removed from their parents and apprenticed to other families. The imperative of moral indoctrination of children sanctioned by public authority has been an influential force in the growth of social control over children in America.

It is difficult to trace the idea of delinquency prevention in 18th century America other than to say that indenture, "farming out" and placing children in almshouses and jails under the Poor Laws were common. Laws were designed to control such things as begging, idleness, vagrancy and destitution. By the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, the idea gained popularity that Houses of Refuge and Reformatories could best carry out the socialization of wayward children.

The ideas of delinquency and its prevention were greatly affected by reform movements of the middle and late nineteenth century, when the temptations besetting children corrupting their moral education became identified with the evils of city

life. By the close of the nineteenth century the idea of social pathology began to replace that of the evils of urban life. In the early twentieth century scientific social work replaced the charity activities of religious agencies dealing with problem children, heralded by child guidance clinics, visiting teacher programs, mental hygiene movements and above all, the juvenile court. By this time the conception of juvenile delinquency was well established and individual treatment the accepted way to respond to youth crime as well as to prevent its emergence. The medical model linking childhood neglect and delinquency originating with Lombroso's positivism now came into full force.

A different viewpoint ushering in community and state organized delinquency prevention appeared in the 1930's with the Chicago Area Project. This was an offspring of the University of Chicago sociological thought. Sponsors of the project believed that the bureaucratized and professionalized procedures of the juvenile court and repressive correctional institutions alienated youth and made them hostile to efforts at rehabilitation. The prevention of delinquency was viewed as depending on utilizing the natural forces at work in community areas, particularly informal, "indigenous" leadership and implicit neighborhood social controls. But this sociological approach to prevention did little to supplant the popularity of the medical model until the 1960's.

By the 1960's the emphasis in delinquency prevention and control had shifted to a more macroscopic level reminiscent of Ferri's call for government-based measures to alter the

criminogenic features of the society. A perceived rising youth crime rate called into question the ability of local communities to combat delinquency and brought the federal government into the field of delinquency prevention. Problems of poverty and racial segregation loomed large in public consciousness as causes of crime and delinquency. New federal policies were justified by reference to opportunity theory, which assumed that delinquency might be prevented or diminished by removing impediments to upward mobility in the American social system.

Direct involvement of the federal government in the prevention and control of delinquency received further impetus from the reports of the President's Crime Commission of 1967 and subsequent generous funding of state and local projects by LEAA. The federal commitment to delinquency prevention was crystallized by establishment of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in 1974. Meanwhile faith had weakened in the longstanding thesis that delinquency could be successfully treated, and efforts to divert youth from the juvenile justice system and to deinstitutionalize non-criminal juvenile offenders gained support. The central premise behind these diversionary programs was that a good deal of delinquency could be prevented by decreasing the amount of contact that youth had with juvenile justice agencies.

The Persistence of Delinquency Prevention Ideology

Although the belief that delinquency can be successfully treated has been considerably effaced, the conviction that youth crime can be prevented remains very much alive and perhaps strengthened by recent developments. Evidence for this can be discerned in the changing program content of conferences of the International Congress of Criminology. Whereas in 1955 the Congress proceedings showed 45.6 percent devoted to treatment and 28.8 percent to prevention, by 1975 this had changed to a bare 7.9 percent focusing on treatment with 75.3 percent of program content dealing with prevention. At the same time the meaning of delinquency prevention was undergoing change from concern with individuals to "macro-criminological analysis" of social systems (Burkhard and Hasenpusch, 1978). These trends suggest that there may be a strong argument to critically examine traditional thinking about delinquency prevention.

Difficulties with the Conception of Delinquency Prevention

Close scrutiny of the notion of preventing delinquency discloses a number of problems complicating its translation into workable public policy and effective programs. Among these are:

(1) confusion about the meaning of what is to be prevented, i.e., delinquency, (2) confusion or lack of agreement on the meaning of prevention, and (3) the failure to conduct rigorous evaluations of prevention programs and inconclusive results of those evaluations.

While the idea of delinquency is well established in the

public mind, there exists wide variation in the behaviors and conditions designated as delinquency in various jurisdictions throughout the nation. The values and laws serving as the basis for defining delinquency in America have derived from its Puritan ethos, the Poor Laws, and of course, criminal laws. Early statutes giving courts authority over children included such broad behavioral categories as fornication, lewd and lascivious conduct, being in moral danger, association with criminal or immoral persons, gambling, drinking alcoholic beverages, smoking, profanity, incorrigibility, idleness, vagrancy, truancy, riding freight trains, playing pool and loitering. Most of these behaviors tend to be offenses that are only applied to children (status offenses). While some delinquent offenses may become criminal charges capable of proof most are vague and subject to variable interpretation. Even when status offenses are collapsed into the three modern categories of incorrigibility, truancy, and running away, their meaning is subject to highly discretionary judgements of police and court officials.

The latitude for wide and arbitrary definitions of delinquency was greatly increased after 1900 by the diffusion of juvenile court laws making dependent, neglected and abused children subject to the same authority as those classifiable as delinquent. The assumed relationship between poverty, parental neglect, broken homes and the growth of delinquent proclivities was officially incorporated in the omnibus authority of juvenile judges who in many jurisdictions were not even legally trained.

Lack of resources common or even typical of most early juvenile courts often made designations of delinquency a highly contingent matter. While narrowing of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the movement to deinstitutionalize status offenders have altered the historic picture of delinquency, there remains a great deal of inconsistency between jurisdiction in its effective definition.

Prevention and Predelinquency

Confusion and definitional ambiguity about delinquency has been compounded by programs directed not to delinquency per se but to behaviors or conditions designated as predelinquent. Some believe that there are verifiable precursors or predictors of delinquency. This notion owes a good deal to the Lombrosian theory of innate, constitutional or pathological dispositions to commit crimes. Probably more important to the idea of predelinquency was the advent of Freudian psychology and its influence on American psychiatry and social work. Freudian concepts together with early ideas about moral contagion and preventive hygiene converged in what is commonly referred to as the medical model of delinquency. A tendency to rely upon clinical criteria to identify predelinquency often leads to the untenable position that almost any kind of behavior may be an indicator of future delinquency. The signs, behaviors and conditions employed by some psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers as promontories of delinquency are so many, varied, and contradictory as to be questionable on their face.

One study found that a Child Guidance program in St. Paul listed seventy types of behavior indicative of future delinquency, including such contradictions as "bashfulness" and "showing off," "indolence," and "overactivity" (Katkin, Hyman and Kramer, 1976). Earlier, Hakeem (1958) reported similar findings in his research on clinical predictions of delinquency.

Referrals to child treatment agencies from teachers, ministers, physicians, police and probation officers also reveal a wide range of the behaviors they regard as prognosticators of delinquency. Referrals by private agencies and by individuals show a dominant concern with aggression, defiance, and academic problems. Underlying these concerns are somewhat more central anxieties about attitudes of the young towards authority, particularly authority delegated to the schools.

An idea integral to the American philosophy of delinquency prevention is that unless checked, the difficulties of children will lead to criminal behavior, and such behavior, will become progressively more serious and give rise to delinquent careers -- movement from mischief to minor crime to serious offenses and ultimate graduation into adult criminality. However attractive this idea may be, there is very little evidence that ineluctable delinquent careers do in fact occur; at best delinquent careers can be observed and reconstructed in retrospect. Much youthful deviance is adventitious and episodic and follows no particular line of development (Wolfgang, Sellin and Figlio, 1972).

Closer to the facts than a natural history of increasing seriousness is the tendency for delinquency to diminish or

disappear through maturation or "phasing out" in later teen years. Most youth who engage in criminal deviance reach an age when they give up their aberrant activities or modify them in ways that leave them no longer "at risk" of being arrested. Consequently predictions or extrapolations about delinquency rates or recidivism may be greatly affected by the age compositions of the populations in question.

Since the advent of labeling and societal reaction theories of deviance, it has become pretty well accepted that many or even most of the deviant actions of youths do not result in arrests. Most youthful misconduct goes unreported and does not even enter into official delinquency statistics. A high percentage of high school age youth have committed acts which might, given the right circumstances, result in arrest and processing through juvenile court. Plainly something more than the behavior of youths is involved in producing delinquency, namely selective and discretionary practices of control agents as well as the acts and circumstances bringing youth to their attention. What actually may be more predictable than recurring deviance by youth is the tendency for preventive or treatment agencies to define youth as in need of services if they have been already so categorized in prior contacts. Thus the helpers may create careers in deviance through their own well intentioned treatment strategies.

The Practice of Delinquency Prevention

Despite the wealth of experience embodied in several

thousand delinquency prevention and treatment projects instituted since 1965 no definitive pattern of preventive practice has emerged (Lundman, McFarlane, and Scarpitti, 1976). Survey materials show that delinquency prevention programs seldom take the preliminary steps of defining the nature of the youth crime problem with which they are concerned. Staff rarely state explicitly the assumptions or theory underlying the programs they pursue. Indeed many staff do not even consider theory to be a relevant issue. Prevention practitioners are even less likely to try to link their interventions with conceptions about the causes of delinquency. Program personnel may refer to family breakdowns as a cause of delinquency but the means of intervention they adopt often have little or no connection with such problems. Where general principles of delinquency prevention are recognized these are usually given lip service. In a number of instances it is obvious that clarifying generic principles of prevention is simply a step in obtaining funding for the traditional programs.

One consequence of the failure to clarify the purposes of delinquency programs is confusion between prevention and treatment. Even though administrators and program staff may be able to separate prevention and treatment in theory, the distinction gets lost in practice. It is not uncommon for agencies purporting to engage in prevention to be actively treating youths who have been processed through law enforcement agencies and officially tagged as delinquent. While this may reflect contingencies and dependence on other agencies for

referrals it also may indicate a loose or nonexistent conception of the kinds of behavior thought to be problematical by intake workers. It is also true that some youth-serving agency people are reluctant to inquire too closely into prior histories of the referrals they receive, or they may even believe that such inquiries violate their professional ethics.

Client Selection

Another dilemma encountered in delinquency prevention enterprises is that of selecting clients best suited to particular kinds of intervention strategies. As already noted, those operating delinquency prevention programs usually play a passive role with respect to client referrals; at most, prevention staff can screen out cases they believe inappropriate for their agencies. Those making decisions at the point of referral are apt to form judgements about what kinds of youth will best fit into a given program. Moreover, if a program acquires a good reputation, court personnel, for example, may insist that certain youth be accepted regardless of formal selection criteria.

Some prevention agencies perform no screening, or client selection is haphazard at best. The necessity to meet grant deadlines or to fill client quotas may undercut efforts at screening. There is a fairly widespread tendency to "skim selection of clients with less serious problems or those whose background and attitudes more or less guarantee frequent successes for any kind of intervention.

Some parenthetical comment is due on the idea of client targeting, which has gained some credence as a method for controlling or at least influencing client selection. While this notion may be attractive for achieving some degree of uniformity in nation-wide replications of delinquency prevention programs, problems arise with its application. If the criteria for selecting clients are too narrowly drawn they may run contrary to diversified procedures established in different court jurisdictions or agency areas. On the other hand, simply to designate an area or a population according to general demographic attributes may beget a wholly unanticipated class of clients. Generally speaking, regardless of what plans or efforts are made to control client selection, delinquency treatment and prevention programs tend to fill with disproportionate numbers of minorities and youths with lower socioeconomic status.

Results of Evaluation Studies of Prevention Programs

Large numbers of delinquency prevention and treatment programs have been initiated in recent years but rigorous evaluations of their results have lagged far behind the scope of program funding and operations. It has been estimated that less than 3 percent of the 6500 prevention projects referred to earlier produced accessible reports of their accomplishments. During a period when the federal government spent over 11 billion dollars on delinquency and youth programs 57 percent of these programs had no evaluations. Of those programs that were

evaluated only 18 percent included descriptive or statistical materials in their reports. Even when results of evaluations of such programs are published it is difficult to examine them because they appeared at different stages of completion and often have been published in a variety of articles, monographs, and edited readers whose findings are not easy to collate.

According to one survey the most commonly occurring type of prevention program involves contact and interaction between a client and an adult agent, counselor, social worker, community worker or detached street worker (Lundman, McFarlane, and Scarpitti, 1976). This kind of program assumes the existence of a psychogenic basis for delinquency. The second most frequent type of prevention program attempts to change or modify aspects of the educational process, based on the belief that tardiness, truancy, and poor classroom performance are predictive of delinquency. Beyond these are programs providing recreation, employment training and opportunities, cultural enrichment, and a few more exotic experiences such as mountain-climbing and oceanographic ventures.

In the main, regardless of what type of programs or intervention techniques are employed, there is little positive evidence that they are effective in preventing delinquency. This is not to echo the more extreme conclusion that "nothing works" in the vast array of correctional undertakings. Rather the conclusion must be that not a great deal is known about what actually happens in delinquency programs. What little knowledge has accumulated about their effects in preventing delinquency is

either suspect on methodological grounds or it points to inconclusive results. In a technical research sense this usually means that differences found between a group selected for intervention and a control group were not statistically significant.

Outside evaluations or those made independently of program staff are not very common. As a consequence, many past evaluations rest on subjective judgments of counselors and administrators who frequently have good reasons for suppressing negative findings, particularly if continued funding or community support is contingent on the program's success. It is not unusual to find prevention projects in which staff assumed that intended goals were reached if the project got organized and was carried through to completion. Likewise, conclusions have been reached that achieving intermediate goals necessarily means that delinquency was prevented. Many projects claim success based on increased school attendance, completing remedial or tutorial courses or obtaining employment for clients. Without additional data on arrests or court processing or even data on self-reported delinquency it is not possible to accept such interim goal attainment as a surrogate for delinquency prevention.

In those few instances in which rigorous evaluation have been conducted, including random assignment of youthful subjects to experimental and control groups, no significant differences between the two have been found. Three better known examples of such projects were the New York City Youth Board Intensive

Treatment project, the Cambridge Somerville project and a study conducted by Reckless and his associates in Columbus, Ohio. The first was an intensive psychiatric treatment program for boys predicted to become delinquent by the original Glueck scale. After four years there was no difference in outcome for this group and a control group also predicted to become delinquent. The Cambridge Somerville project involved the use of social work techniques but again no important differences emerged between treated subjects and untreated controls. The Reckless study utilized classes with special male teacher role models. In this project the subjective evaluations of outcomes by subjects and teachers were uniformly good or even enthusiastic. Unfortunately, objective data did not support these assessments. On measures of arrests, drop outs, attendance, grades, school achievement and self attitudes the experimental and control groups could not be differentiated (Lundman, McFarlane, and Scarpitti, 1976).

The field of delinquency treatment and prevention programs, of course, is not a totally dismal one. Here and there projects have been mounted showing some positive outcomes. In the Los Angeles Probation Subsidy program of the early 1970's youths in some but not all of the small caseloads possessed lower arrest rates than the controls. Unfortunately these positive results were short lived as the better record of the experimentals disappeared or "washed out" after one year to 18 months (Lemert and Dill, 1978). By contrast the Sacramento Diversion Experiment showed status offenders to have significantly fewer

court appearances after counseling than controls, and these differences persisted through several follow-up evaluations (Baron, Feeney, and Thornton, 1973).

The relatively meager output of sound evaluations of delinquency programs is, in part, due to the sheer difficulties of carrying out the requisite research. Research is clouded by disagreements as to evaluation goals. Evaluators and administrators of delinquency prevention projects typically hold differing views of the purposes of evaluation, and their respective tasks are assumed to have no connection with one another. Evaluators may be seen as outsiders or "project busters", or they may make demands on the time and resources of the program not easily met. Finally, asking staff people to collect client or service data may provoke evasion or resistance.

Recently there has been increasing disagreement among social scientists about the form evaluation should take. At least some researchers now recognize that the classic experimental model must be supplemented with process evaluations. For example, a project may prevent delinquency despite a poor program design or it might fail for reasons unrelated to its design. Among these external factors might be confused, ambiguous or conflicting directives from funding agencies. This becomes a relevant issue when attention is turned to the role of the federal government in delinquency prevention and to the policies of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

The Federal Government and Delinquency Prevention

As noted in Chapter 2, the expansion of delinquency control at the national level grew out of child welfare concerns and was largely confined to the U.S. Children's Bureau. In the 1940's other federal agencies developed interests and programs directed at delinquency control, most notable was the National Institute of Mental Health. Growing alarm over rising rates of juvenile delinquency greatly enlarged federal efforts beginning in 1960 with the recommendations of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime. These led to the creation of several large scale delinquency prevention programs, namely the Mobilization for Youth and the Harlem Youth Opportunity Unlimited. These enterprises were among the very first to shift to a strategy of preventing delinquency through social reform or changing institutions rather than through individual counseling and psychotherapy; at least this was true in their beginnings. A new dimension of delinquency prevention was added by recommendations of the President's Crime Commission of 1967 which recommended diversion and the establishment of Youth Service Bureaus. Subsequently the federal delinquency prevention efforts bifurcated organizationally between the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Justice. After the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, the Justice Department took over major responsibility for delinquency prevention along with other justice concerns.

Unfortunately the 1974 legislation establishing the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention or subsequent amendments has not sufficiently clarified the scope and nature of prevention activities. Congressional debates on the legislation largely revolved around the issue of whether OJJDP should be located in HEW or in LEAA, reflecting an old antithesis between a welfare conception of delinquency prevention and one established in the context of the justice system. Further, the JJDP Act has been embroiled in controversies over the treatment of status offenders, violent youth, and the removal of children from secure detention facilities. In this context, prevention has not always enjoyed a high political or bureaucratic priority, despite ubiquitous support for the concept of prevention.

The absence of a clear delineation of delinquency prevention in federal policy statements and the continued confusion over its meaning were perpetuated in the 1976 OJJDP announcement of grants for the development of delinquency prevention programs. The guidelines for grant applications were far from clear and in some cases redundant, signalling insufficient resources applied to national program development. The definition, if it can be so called, of delinquency prevention submitted in the OJJDP program announcement was diffuse at best, mainly a reference to "positive patterns of youth development." This in turn was stated to be a process of direct services and indirect activities which address community and institutional conditions that hinder positive youth

development and lead to youth involvement in the juvenile justice system. Ambiguity and circularity are rampant here; it is anyone's guess as to whether these statements enjoin reforming social institutions or merely providing services.

A Background Paper attached to the OJJDP program announcement did little to specify the intent of federal policymakers. The meaning of positive youth development remained vague. Strategies for attaining such development came out mainly as individual approaches to provide youth with coping skills, positive self concepts and marketable job skills. While there was passing reference in the background paper to increasing youth opportunities in society, such things as community organizing, youth advocacy and institutional change in education and in the workplace are barely mentioned. There is a good deal of unreality in the paper's easy assumptions that private agencies can "expand their services, mobilize their resources and enlist volunteers". The paper certainly could not be regarded as a call to agencies to strike out in new and uncharted directions. Its net effect was to provide a rather bland justification for agencies to maintain their existing service modes.

Conclusions

Data from this national study together with past research suggest that the idea of preventing delinquency remains excessively ambitious if not pretentious. There is a large gap between policy makers' hopes and what can be accomplished by

prevention programs funded under this broad notion. As yet, social scientists have not isolated the causes of juvenile delinquency, but even if they were known it is not obvious that anything could be done about them. Many writers would agree that delinquency is generally associated with the growth of industrialism and social trends (e.g., poverty and racism) of such scope and complexity that they cannot be easily sorted out and remedied. Among these are the growing sociocultural gulf between adolescents and adults, the greatly lengthened educational period for youth, growing dissatisfaction with economic deprivation, plus the declining influence of traditional agencies of socialization and social control, such as the family, the schools and the community (Toby, 1963).

Given this perspective on delinquency it becomes fruitless or even naive to believe that highly generalized and often unclear directives to introduce prevention programs into heterogeneous target areas can curtail delinquency. At best this becomes a broad, scatter-gun attack on the problem, which here and there may produce some desired results. However, the difficulties and hindrances to carrying out effective evaluations are such that random successes, if they occur, will not be well understood and will hold little value for policy making and further government action.

What are needed more than jumbo federal programs are policy and administrative procedures to encourage innovations in delinquency control through research and development on a modest scale at the state and local levels. Such research and

development should aspire to more precise conceptions of the problems that can be realistically affected by social action. OJJDP should support more small-scale and well designed prevention programs that include rigorous research components. Large national demonstration projects should be avoided until key theoretical and practical aspects of prevention are better understood and tested. The purpose of future OJJDP prevention efforts should be to develop new knowledge on the impact and processes of various delinquency prevention strategies. The development of models for replication and staff training must be intimately linked to reliable research findings. OJJDP can play a unique national leadership role in reconciling the findings of the best theory and research with delinquency prevention practice.

Future prevention efforts should be tied to the goal of reducing rates of official delinquency in clearly defined target populations. Emphasis should be placed on reducing serious and repetitive acts of youth crime rather than status offenses or other forms of youthful behavior that are simply troublesome to adults. Prevention programs cannot succeed if premised on the false assumption of escalating delinquent careers. Further, we should be aware that even benevolent social interventions can harm their intended beneficiaries.

The focus on reducing serious youth crime could go far to reduce tendencies of prevention programs towards "skimming." Linking prevention efforts to actual reductions in youth crime rates provides a crucial mechanism of accountability for

agencies who should be serving youth in real danger of juvenile court processing. This position also implies identification strategies aimed at youth already enmeshed in the juvenile justice system. The accumulated research evidence suggests that a small proportion of the youth population commits the vast majority of serious offenses. This group usually has experienced early and extensive contacts with the juvenile justice system. Prevention programs must develop better systems of referrals with the juvenile justice system, schools, and family service agencies who are already working with severely troubled youth. Agencies must also critically examine their images as well as their staff and program resources to determine how these can be modified to attract delinquent youth.

Data from this national study revealed that even tens of millions of dollars provided limited services to a small proportion of youth residing in project target areas. This suggests that prevention resources must be highly focused. Primary prevention is too vast a goal for OJJDP to accomplish via its own direct funding. OJJDP should organize its primary prevention program around the Concentration of a Federal Effort role set forth in its legislation. OJJDP's role would be to conduct research and disseminate results to help other federal agencies understand how best to direct their resources and policies to impact youth crime.

Future delinquency prevention programs should test the abilities of a more diverse array of public and private organizations to operate prevention programs. The program

evaluated here focused too narrowly on traditional youth service organizations. OJJDP should conduct small research and development prevention programs utilizing more neighborhood-based groups, perhaps those organizations already successfully engaged in community-wide crime prevention programs. Next steps for OJJDP should include a fuller examination of community development strategies of delinquency prevention. Community-focused strategies could refine planning and advocacy approaches that leverage a greater share of existing youth service resources to delinquent youth. Community-focused programs must attempt to alter policies, procedures, and practices that negatively affect youth and propel them towards justice system processing. Police and schools are obvious target institutions for community led change strategies.

Capacity building efforts should emphasize training and staff development among youth workers. Complex organizational forms or networking among private sector agencies seems to produce few tangible outcomes for delinquency prevention. A much more needed area of improvement for private agencies involves increasing the involvement of community residents and youth in program planning and operations. All future OJJDP prevention programs should mandate such involvement and provide sufficient time and resources for its development.

A final observation is reserved for the concept of positive youth development and small-scale programs to provide economic and cultural opportunities for underprivileged youth. Such

efforts render obvious benefits for their clients but there is scant evidence that they actually prevent delinquency. But it is a sad commentary on our society that such programs have to be justified as a means of preventing delinquency. A far better rationale is that all children and youth are entitled to positive growing-up experiences.

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APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PROJECTS

Profiles of the evaluated delinquency prevention projects are presented here to familiarize readers with basic features of the grantees and target communities. These descriptions are based primarily on information from first-year grant applications and do not reflect changes that may have occurred during subsequent development and implementation of projects. Those findings are addressed in the text of the national evaluation report.

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AKRON

United Neighborhood Centers of America
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Program
Akron, Ohio

The United Neighborhood Centers of America (UNCA) was awarded a first-year grant of \$469,323 to implement a delinquency prevention project. The UNCA network of settlement houses and centers has traditionally been involved in youth service, ranging from street work to public advocacy and education on youth issues. In recent years UNCA has explored juvenile justice and delinquency prevention concerns through educational conferences and a special national task force.

UNCA set the following two broad performance goals for the prevention project:

- o To increase and expand direct services to youth at risk and their families, with particular attention to those areas in which services are now inadequate, limited, or nonexistent.
- o To increase the capacity of the local agency to deliver more relevant, effective youth development services to the target community.

The national office and affiliated centers were to meet a number of more specific performance objectives related to youth, families, the community, and community institutions.

A program of direct services and community development activities was uniformly implemented by six UNCA affiliates in Rochester, New York; Richmond, Virginia; Hamtramack, Michigan; Lincoln, Nebraska; Davenport, Iowa; and Akron, Ohio. The Akron affiliate, East Akron Community House, was selected for

intensive evaluation.

Through the project, UNCA sought to increase its capacity to provide support and guidance to the affiliates, to disseminate program information for replication purposes, and to develop closer relations with other national youth-serving agencies. A national project director and assistant monitored the services offered by the affiliates, provided technical assistance, coordinated information transfer among the affiliates, conducted staff training, and developed materials on prevention programming for use by the affiliates.

Group work, casework, recreation, and community development activities were components of the service package designed for implementation by the affiliates. The Education Development and Guidance for Employment program (EDGE), a key service, was described by the agency as follows:

EDGE is basically a group work model incorporating attitude building and values clarification, educational supports, and exposure to career opportunities as part of a total process for setting future-oriented goals.

At the Akron site a project director, two group workers, and volunteers were the key project staff. The direct services offered included tutoring, individual counseling, recreation, cultural events, field trips, weekly group sessions focusing on life management skills, paid employment, employment support services, and family support services. Each of the project affiliates established a program advisory council to enhance project awareness of neighborhood concerns and foster community

involvement. East Akron Community House also developed a network of youth-serving agencies within the community to improve services to youth in Akron.

East Akron Community House's service area encompassed nine square miles with a population of 30,479. The target community, one of the oldest sections of the city, was a mixed residential and business area with three major rubber industries.

The adverse physical conditions of the community included rat infestation (at one time the area contained landfill), litter and overflowing rubbish containers, abandoned buildings, zoning violations (industrial noise, pollution, etc.), and backed-up sewers. Poor streetlighting remained problematic, while improved relations with the local fire departments had resulted in more dependable fire protection service.

A quarter of the single-family homes in the area fell below the standards of Akron's housing code, and rehabilitation programs were in demand. Home owners encountered great difficulty in attempting to obtain loans for housing improvement because of "redlining" by banking and lending institutions.

The East Akron area had the fourth highest crime rate in the city. Of the youth involved with the law in 1975, a quarter were target area residents. Concern about the significance of target area youth involvement in delinquency had increased in light of a youth unemployment rate of 23.6 percent, a school drop-out rate of 13 percent, and a 15 percent rate of single-parent families.

Several obstacles limited East Akron youths' access to

services. Very few of the agencies in the area had effective outreach programs, and particularly lacked outreach for youth at risk of becoming delinquent. There was only one other major youth-serving agency in the target community, and most programming, with the exception of two special programs for youth already labeled incorrigible and referred by the juvenile court, was oriented toward a middle-class population.

BOSTON

Alliance for Community Youth Development Services, Inc.
Positive Youth Development Project
Boston, Massachusetts

The Alliance for Community Youth Development Services was awarded \$373,228 to operate the first year of its Positive Youth Development Project. The alliance was incorporated in August 1973 by several leaders of Boston youth agencies who saw a need to reduce competition between agencies for increasingly scarce funds, and to create a unified vehicle for advocating the improvement of services to youth. The alliance served as a coordinating base and fund developer for its member agencies, and offered technical assistance to their staffs to strengthen youth programs. When applying for the delinquency prevention grant in 1977, the alliance had a membership of more than thirty-five agencies.

The project's goals were as follows:

- o To provide creative, growth-enhancing services to high-risk, delinquency-vulnerable youth in certain social and economically depressed neighborhoods in the city of Boston which have very few youth services, particularly Mission Hill and Mattapan.
- o To assist member agencies in other disadvantaged communities to expand their services to high risk, delinquency-vulnerable youth.
- o To explore innovative ways of developing and maintaining community support, adequate budgets, varied and qualitative programming, and competent, professional personnel for youth-serving agencies.
- o To demonstrate effective models of youth participation in youth-service programming.
- o To provide employment opportunities for youth in

services developed under this proposal.

- o To provide for appropriate monitoring and evaluation of all activities undertaken in this proposal.

The alliance administered the grant and offered three capacity-building programs: TILT, a teen leadership program; the Transportation Program, providing vans for collaborating agencies to transport their clients; and Professional Development, a professional degree program in youth work offered in conjunction with the University of Massachusetts. Through its staff of program specialists, the alliance provided training and technical assistance to participating agencies.

Ten member agencies were chosen and subcontracted to operate programs in the target communities based on their responses to a request for proposals issued by the alliance. Each grantee agency was required to identify a specific target population of youth, assess their service needs, and develop services to meet those needs.

In two target communities with particularly few services available to youth, agencies carried out "model services" programs to fill service gaps. Eight agencies' "supplemental services" programs were to meet specific needs of local youth by supplementing teen centers' existing services.

While the subgrantee agencies did engage in some capacity building and community development activities, direct services were slated to constitute the largest part of their programs. Employment, recreation, education, and counseling services were provided in disadvantaged neighborhoods with large proportions

of Black, Hispanic, Irish, or Italian residents.

The city of Boston, the overall target area, was described as suffering from high rates of unemployment, deteriorated housing, infant mortality, teenage pregnancy, crime, and delinquency. In 1975 about two thirds of the city's population earned less than \$7,000 a year. About 20 percent of the population (over 100,000 persons) either received some form of public assistance or did not earn wages above the poverty level. Ten percent of the city's residents lived in public housing. Unemployment in Boston had increased by 233 percent after 1970, resulting in 11 percent unemployment by 1975. Youth and minorities in Boston had by far the highest rates of unemployment at 33 and 18 percent respectively.

The project proposal made special note of the significance of recent changes in the composition of Boston's population. The proportion of white residents dropped from 90 percent in 1960 to 78 percent in 1975, while the Black population increased from 9.8 percent to 17.8 percent. The Hispanic population tripled between 1960 and 1975. These increases in the minority population were expected to increase the level of social and economic problems in Boston, as minorities had lower average incomes and higher unemployment rates than whites. Almost three quarters of Boston's nonwhite families lived in low-income areas.

Several of the project's target areas were neighborhoods which contributed the largest numbers to the total of juvenile arrests in Boston. The police department reported 4,188 arrests

of juveniles in 1975, the largest number being for property-related offenses (including auto-related crimes). About half of those cases were referred to juvenile court. Police also reported arrests of increasing numbers of young females, often at younger ages, for a greater variety of offense types.

DALLAS

Dallas County and Dallas YMCA
Youth Services Network
Dallas, Texas

The Dallas County Youth Services Network (YSN) delinquency prevention project was funded for operation with a first-year grant of \$400,350. Dallas County was the grantee and the YMCA of Metropolitan Dallas the primary contractor and implementing agency responsible for developing, coordinating, and monitoring all service programs. The YMCA of Metropolitan Dallas is part of the national YMCA network, traditionally concerned with alleviating problems among youth. The metropolitan office directs branch facilities in Dallas County.

The goals of the delinquency prevention project were as follows:

- o To reduce the number of delinquent types of behavior committed by juveniles in the target communities.
- o To improve the availability of and access to services for endangered youth in the target communities by increasing the ability of the target communities to respond to the needs of the endangered youth.
- o To improve the quality and quantity of needed services for endangered youth in the target communities.
- o To create and maintain a coordinated mechanism for establishing a county-wide delinquency prevention youth development system through the creation of a data collection system which will facilitate coordinating, planning research, and evaluation of youth services while protecting the rights of all youth.

The project was planned to establish an information and referral network among youth, their families, and local social service agencies. The YSN was concerned with building the capacities of youth-serving agencies to reach more youth with more appropriate services. A major strategy was to provide financial support to existing and new service programs to enable them to serve youth referred to the network. Eighteen such service programs received contracts and offered services to YSN clients during the first year.

The YMCA and YSN program director managed the YSN staff of seven youth service coordinators, each assigned to work in one of the seven target communities. Coordinators were responsible for recruiting and screening, then placing youth in the appropriate services. The YSN also operated an employment service staffed by two job developers.

Four types of direct services were provided through YSN: employment, education, counseling, and recreation. The employment component involved employment of youth in staff positions, education of youth for employment, and development of jobs by a staff job developer. Educational programs included educational opportunity counseling, tutorials, and several programs operated by the YMCA. The Dallas Independent School District operated programs to identify and refer youth needing services, to provide special services for youth with academic and behavioral problems, and to provide alternative education settings and curricula. Individual and family counseling and a variety of recreational services were made available by the YMCA

branches and other private agencies.

The project served youth who either lived or attended school in seven target areas within Dallas County. Four target communities were within city limits; three were suburban communities adjacent to Dallas. These areas were chosen on the basis of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, low levels of youth participation in existing youth service programs, lack of coordination among existing youth services, or lack of sufficient youth services.

Target community characteristics, abstracted from the project proposal, are as follows:

West Dallas-Jefferson

This target community was located west of the central business district. The population of West Dallas was 38,907; Jefferson's was 62,670. Of the total population of 101,577, 37 percent were youth under 18. Statistics from the Dallas Police Department showed that 14.4 percent of all arrests in 1976 were of juveniles. The median income was \$5,394 in West Dallas and \$8,783 in Jefferson. Of the families living in this community, 11 percent were receiving public assistance, and many lived in public housing or in substandard housing. Of all housing in the community, 22 percent was rated substandard.

East Dallas-Fair Park

The population of these communities east of the main business district was 70,467; 46,657 in East Dallas and 23,792 in Fair Park. Youth under the age of 18 were 33 percent of the population. In 1976, 11 percent of all arrests in East Dallas-Fair Park were of juveniles. The median income for East Dallas was \$6,849; Fair Park's was \$5,335. High unemployment rates were computed for both adults (4.9 percent) and youth (22.6 percent) of both communities. Over 10 percent of the housing in East Dallas and 18 percent in Fair Park was substandard.

South Dallas

This community at the south edge of the Dallas central business district had a total population of 41,470. Youth under 18 were 37 percent of the total. Of all arrests in 1976, 8 percent were of juveniles. The median income was

\$5,560. Unemployment rates were 36.3 percent among adults and 4.9 percent among youth. About 10 percent of the families received public assistance and 22 percent lived in substandard or deteriorated housing.

Lisbon-Trinity

Lisbon's population was 55,795 and Trinity's 34,000, 44 percent of which was under 18. These areas, immediately south of the central business district of Dallas, had population densities of 6,100 persons per square mile (Lisbon) and 2,800 per square mile (Trinity). Of arrests made in Lisbon-Trinity in 1976, 14 percent were of juveniles. The median incomes were \$7,838 in Lisbon and \$6,913 in Trinity. The adult unemployment rate for the combined communities was 4.9 percent, while the youth unemployment rate was 29.1 percent. Almost 7 percent of all residents received public assistance. Nine percent of the families in Lisbon and 13 percent in Trinity lived in substandard housing.

Grand Prairie

The population of this community was 65,600. The minority population, rapidly growing and changing, rose from 7 percent to 15 percent between 1960 and 1970. In 1960 the ratio of Blacks to Hispanics was 7:1; by 1972 the gap had disappeared and the ratio was 1:1. A quarter of the population was under 18. In 1976, 15 percent of all arrests were of juveniles, and police department statistics indicated overall percentage increases in juvenile arrests since 1971. The median income was \$9,354 and nearly 6 percent of the population received public assistance. Unemployed adults made up 3.8 percent of the population and unemployed youth 12.4 percent. Almost 5 percent of the housing units were substandard.

Mesquite

This community adjacent to the eastern boundary of the city of Dallas had a population of 69,925; 35 percent were youth under 18. The median age of Mesquite residents was 20.4 years, lower than the national average by 4.4 years. Mesquite's minority residents comprised 5 percent of the total population in 1970. Persons with Spanish surnames constituted the largest part (88 percent) of the minority residents. Mesquite appeared to be a commuters' city, as only 17 percent of its total labor force worked within the city. Of all arrests during 1976, 21 percent were of juveniles, primarily for property crimes. The median income was \$10,539. About 3 percent of adults and 82 percent of youth were unemployed. Four percent of the residents received public assistance and 3 percent of housing in Mesquite was below the standard.

Garland

With a population of 117,933, Garland was fourteen miles northeast of the Dallas central business district. Youth under 18 comprised 28 percent of the population. The Garland Police Department indicated that arrests of juveniles comprised 23 percent of the total in 1975. Median income of Garland residents was \$10,876. Unemployment rates were 3 percent among adults and 10.6 percent among youth.

FORT PECK

Fort Peck Tribes
Bureau of Youth Services
Fort Peck Reservation, Montana

The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation received a first-year grant of \$176,796 to develop and operate a program to prevent delinquency. The Bureau of Youth Services was established under the grant to curb rising delinquency rates on the reservation by involving youth in various activities. When created, the Bureau was the only nongovernment, nonprofit agency in the target area providing services solely to youth.

The overall impact goal of the Bureau of Youth Services project was to reduce the incidence of charged juvenile delinquency processed in tribal or federal courts by 15 percent in the first project year. Other objectives were to create a network of services across the reservation, establish linkages with existing agencies to facilitate prevention planning, and to provide lifeskills training, greater education and career opportunities, and organized activities for youth.

The grant was awarded to the governing Fort Peck Tribal Executive Board, and was administered by the Tribal Resource Training Center of the Fort Peck Tribal Department of Labor, within which the Bureau of Youth Services was established as an agency. A program director monitored project activities and services, and two supervisorial staff members assigned to the east and west sides of the reservation coordinated service

activities conducted by field staff in the target communities.

Community advisory groups representing youth, private and public organizations, the Fort Peck Tribal Commission, and the Tribal Resource Training Center were developed in each target community to identify individual community needs, ways in which the Bureau could respond, and programs to be implemented.

The Bureau offered recreation, tutoring, individual and group counseling, referral, vocational, and job placement services, and integrated a strong cultural emphasis to support the ethnic identity and personal growth of Indian youth. In addition to providing direct services, the project developed an agency referral network on the reservation and a clearinghouse of information on youth program activities, and provided technical assistance to local youth groups and organizations.

The Fort Peck Reservation, in extreme northeastern Montana, is 110 miles long and 40 miles wide. Assiniboine and Sioux Indians make up 45 percent of the reservation's population. All seven communities of the reservation were project target areas and all reservation youth were eligible for project services. The population of the areas to be served by the project was 6,800, 3,600 of whom were youth under 18.

The Fort Peck Reservation is geographically isolated from centers of population, manufacturing, and marketing. The project proposal indicated that 2,921 Indians on the reservation were unemployed and that the unemployment rate had been over 54 percent for a "significant period of time." Approximately 29 percent of the target population had less than an eighth grade

education; 51 percent had not completed high school. The average income of a Fort Peck family of four was \$2,410 a year; almost half received some sort of public assistance. Housing on the reservation was in need of rehabilitation, improvement, and weatherization. The target communities lacked adequate recreational facilities for youth, as those in the area did not meet the needs of youth or were prohibitively expensive to use.

MARIETTA

The Salvation Army
Program to Prevent Juvenile Delinquency
Intensive Site: Marietta, Georgia

The Southern Territorial office of the Salvation Army in Atlanta, Georgia, was awarded a first-year grant of \$508,307 to institute a delinquency prevention project. The Salvation Army operates 3,038 social service institutions throughout the world. Homes and centers for alcoholics, homes for unwed mothers, correctional services for exoffenders, food distribution centers, hostels for the homeless, occupational centers, residential centers for the elderly, day nurseries, camps, convalescent homes, and family welfare programs are among the types of social services provided by the Army.

Five middle-size cities within the jurisdiction of Southern Territorial Headquarters were selected for participation in the Army's program to prevent delinquency. The sites were in Gulfport, Mississippi; Marietta, Georgia; Pensacola, Florida; Ponca City, Oklahoma; and Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

The broad impact goal formulated for the local sites was to decrease the percentage of juvenile delinquency in the target areas by 4 percent during the first year and 6 percent in the second year of project operation. Performance goals were as follows:

- o To increase the focus of the Salvation Army's programs on those individuals deemed to be in the greatest danger of becoming delinquent.
- o To increase the number of youth served by 7.5 percent.

- o To increase access to and information about youth services available in the community.
- o To decrease conflicting and inhibiting interagency policies and procedures.
- o To increase intra-agency service integration.
- o To establish positive patterns of youth development and growth.
- o To increase community awareness and support of prevention programs and its affiliated youth services.
- o To provide a channel for class/case advocacy for community residents.
- o To test a prevention program for implementation and encourage replication of same.

The Southern Territorial office, as implementing agency and administrative center for the grant, served as liaison between its project sites and the Office of Juvenile Justice, and monitored sites for grant compliance. Developing and disseminating educational materials describing the project and providing technical assistance to the affiliates were other principal functions of the Southern Territorial office.

Project affiliates were to implement a standardized service delivery package that called for the institutionalization of three components: (1) crisis intervention; (2) long-term intervention; and (3) outreach. The crisis intervention component was designed to include a youth "hotline," counseling, advocacy, and emergency residential assistance. Long-term intervention was designed with a peer social interaction facet that included recreation, arts and crafts, clubs, cultural, remedial education, and community involvement programs.

Volunteer Familial Interaction (a family therapy service) and Peer Expressiveness (an expression-oriented writing and performance activity) were other features of this program component. The outreach component was responsible for recruiting youth, generating referrals, and serving as liaison to the community and its institutions.

The Youth Awareness project at the Salvation Army's Marietta, Georgia, site was selected for intensive evaluation. This project incorporated the standard service delivery package outlined above, with adaptations to the local community situation. The project's target area was composed of two census tracts in Marietta; the target population was mainly composed of Black residents of public housing. Of Marietta's total population of 27,216, 9,537 residents were youth under 18. Socioeconomic information for the city as a whole showed an 11.3 percent youth and adult unemployment rate; 11 percent of the families in Marietta had incomes below the poverty level. About 15 percent of the city's housing was overcrowded or lacked plumbing facilities. Median incomes of the target area census tracts were \$8,305 and \$7,745, about half that of Marietta as a whole at \$15,200.

NEW JERSEY

Aspira of America, Inc.
Proyecto Amanece
Intensive Site: Jersey City/Hoboken, New Jersey

Aspira of America, Inc. is regarded as the country's largest Puerto Rican agency working on behalf of youth. The organization was awarded a first-year grant of \$518,000 to operate Proyecto Amanece (Project Dawning). Since Aspira was established in 1968 the national office and state-level associates have focused their activities on enhancing educational opportunities for youth, especially at the post-secondary level. Through working with its associates, Aspira became aware of the many Hispanic youth who did not benefit from Aspira services. These youth were not college bound, and appeared likely to exhibit serious social problems including delinquent activity.

Aspira's delinquency prevention project was concerned with offsetting a wide range of delinquency causational factors, including the detrimental influences resulting from youths' membership in a minority culture likely to lead to failure in traditional societal institutions and contribute to deviant behavior patterns. The primary goal of the project was to reduce juvenile delinquency in the designated target areas by 3 percent in the first year and 5 percent in the second year of project operations.

The national office developed a service program for Proyecto Amanece to be uniformly implemented by five associate

agencies. Project sites of associates which contracted to carry out the project design were in Yonkers, New York; Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; Waukegan, Illinois; Carolina, Puerto Rico; and Jersey City and Hoboken, New Jersey.

Aspira of America administered the project. A project director, under the supervision of the director of technical assistance, was responsible for the general guidance, coordination, and monitoring of the service program and the dissemination of information on project activities. National office trainers provided technical assistance and staff training to the associates.

The Proyecto Amanece intervention strategy was implemented at each site by a vocational counselor and a youth advocate. The service approach incorporated components of leadership development, vocational counseling, educational counseling, cultural enrichment, recreation, literary development, cultural awareness, and community services. Youth groups known as Aspira Clubs were organized by site staff and were an integral part of the project. These clubs were vehicles for youth involvement in responsible group action, in shaping project activities, and identifying educational and vocational interests, and in developing leadership potential.

In their project proposal, Aspira described the social conditions characteristic of Hispanic barrios from which many youth would be recruited as follows:

A general pattern of institutional problems is common to most urban high crime neighborhoods. These neighborhoods

are almost always among the oldest and most run-down. Furthermore, they tend to be inhabited in overwhelming proportions by populations manifesting significant deprivation with respect to income, purchasing power, job stability, job skills, occupational prestige, educational attainment, health and hygienic standards, institutional influence and political power... They are conspicuously deprived in terms of almost all the fundamental goals of our society, and more often than not, they are only tangentially or negatively related to the basic public and private institutions designed to foster these goals.

The Jersey City/Hoboken site was selected for intensive evaluation. The population of the low-income target area in Hoboken was 9,344, of which 4,288 were youth under 18. The median income of Hoboken was \$7,786, higher than that for either Black (\$4,931) or Puerto Rican (\$5,154) residents. Almost 10 percent of the families in Hoboken received public assistance. The unemployment rate of youth or adults was 6.7 percent, and the school drop-out rate was 23.8 percent. The ratio of serious crimes to residents in the Hoboken target area was 1:25.

The Jersey City target area population was 35,395, of which 14,618 were youth under 18. The median income for Jersey City (\$9,305) was again higher than median incomes of Black and Puerto Rican residents (\$7,494 and \$5,476). Eight percent of the families in Jersey City received public assistance; the same proportion of adults or youth was unemployed. Jersey City had a 15.8 percent school drop-out rate, and the ratio of serious crimes to residents in the target area was 1:34.

RICHMOND

Boys' Clubs of America
National Project on Juvenile Delinquency Prevention
Intensive Site: Richmond, California

The Boys' Clubs of America (BCA) was awarded \$372,800 to operate a delinquency prevention project at nine of its affiliated sites. Founded in 1906, the BCA has long shown an interest in juvenile justice issues. For example, in 1973 the organization created a national task force on youth development and delinquency prevention to study the problem of juvenile delinquency and recommend guidelines for its efforts to decrease youth involvement with the juvenile justice system. The delinquency prevention project funded by OJJDP sought to build the capacity of both the national and local levels of the BCA to coordinate programs and provide services to youth in danger of becoming delinquent. Information and experience gained through the project would be shared with over 1080 affiliates.

The goals of the project were as follows:

- o To increase the capacity of the national organization and its local affiliates to reach and serve more youth in danger of becoming delinquent.
- o To identify, develop, and replicate approaches that are successful in reaching the hard-to-reach youth.
- o To test and replicate activities and services which sustain the interest of the target group and at the same time help develop skills for living and a sense of usefulness, competence, belonging, and potency.
- o To increase volunteer participation and broaden community support for prevention programs.
- o To make an impact on juvenile delinquency by providing viable alternatives for youth.

The nine affiliate sites selected for project participation were in Binghamton, New York; Hollywood, California; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Omaha, Nebraska; Richmond, California; Las Cruces, New Mexico; Ashbury Park, New Jersey; Schnectady, New York; and Waco, Texas. Each of these sites was funded to demonstrate a prevention program model which was relevant to the needs of its target community and had potential for replication.

Overall administration of the grant was the responsibility of the national office. National project staff, consisting of a project director and assistant, provided technical assistance and training to affiliate sites in addition to coordinating the information dissemination effort.

The Boys's Club Outreach Project of the Richmond club was selected for intensive evaluation. The Richmond program aimed to provide youth at risk of becoming delinquent with opportunities to experience socially acceptable roles and to develop skills and a sense of self-worth and competence.

The outreach project expanded its service capacity by providing an on-site office at the community center of a predominantly black housing project, Easter Hill Village. Group activities, referral information services, resident camps, and field trips were among the activities introduced by the new office. A variety of educational, counseling, and vocational services, group clubs, and leadership development activities at the Boys' Club facility were made available to Easter Hill youth through the project's transportation services. The Richmond

affiliate also organized a consortium of the community's youth-serving agencies to help identify problems preventing services from reaching youth at risk of becoming delinquent.

The 300 apartments housing 1,206 residents of Easter Hill Village were in 48 separate buildings on five blocks. Built in 1950, the housing project showed significant physical deterioration due to vandalism, arson, and neglect. The high cost of repairing vandalism damage had prevented the housing authority from making many other needed repairs.

Among the 445 youth living in the target area, males slightly outnumbered females, 236 to 209. Almost all residents were Black; only 4 percent were Spanish-surnamed or other races. The median income of resident families was about \$3,800 a year, and 91 percent received public assistance. Very few of those occupying the 300 apartments were employed; 274 households reported having no employed members.

Easter Hill Village was considered a major crime area of the city of Richmond because of a prevalence of drugs, assaults, vandalism, burglaries, and juvenile delinquency.

SANTA BARBARA

Girls Clubs of America, Inc.
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Project
Intensive Site: Santa Barbara, California

The Girls Clubs of America (GCA) was awarded a \$304,974 first-year grant to implement a delinquency prevention project. GCA was founded in 1945 to promote the cultural, social, vocational, and personal development of girls. Recently this organization has strongly emphasized advocacy for girls' rights, provision of opportunities for girls, and expansion of GCA's capacity to meet the needs of girls.

The conceptual basis of GCA's project was that low self-esteem and negative self-image are characteristics of juvenile offenders. Through the implementation of a variety of educational, recreational, and counseling services in the areas of career, leadership, and lifeskills development, the project sought to develop positive self-image among girls who may have been at risk of becoming delinquent.

The primary purposes of the project were to expand services to girls residing in targeted high risk communities and to enhance the capabilities of the GCA to conduct delinquency prevention programming.

The seven affiliate Girls Clubs selected by the GCA to participate in this effort were in Allentown, Pennsylvania; Birmingham, Alabama; Chattanooga, Tennessee; Lynn, Massachusetts; Omaha, Nebraska; Santa Barbara, California; and Worcester, Massachusetts.

The goals of the GCA project were as follows:

- o To alter the way youth, especially girls in the target communities who may be distrustful of agencies, perceive Girls Clubs.
- o To provide girls with an environment with sustained impact where they can build self-confidence, experience success, and practice decision making and the acceptance of responsibility.
- o To increase the capacity of boards and paid volunteer staff to reach out to and serve more effectively the high-risk youth of the community.
- o To demonstrate appropriate models for addressing the needs of girls in high-risk communities.

GCA administered the delinquency prevention project. National-level project staff, a director and an assistant, monitored the program's progress and direction and provided resource and technical assistance at the seven affiliate sites. They also distributed information concerning the project (including materials concerning replicable program models) to all affiliate clubs.

The Girls Club of Santa Barbara was selected to participate in the national evaluation. The club offered the direct service components of leadership and career development and lifeskills training and, like the other affiliates, employed the "Self Structured Way" method of youth involvement in programming. A review of juvenile delinquency referrals in Santa Barbara County had indicated that most referrals of females were for incorrigibility, sexual delinquency, and running away among 14, 15, and 16 year-old girls. A major focus of Santa Barbara's project was to serve young women in that age bracket.

All GCA affiliates demonstrated specific client outreach measures to build replicable models for outreach in high-risk communities. In Santa Barbara, the club concentrated its efforts on recruitment from local schools and also provided transportation from schools to the club several times a week. The capacity building effort focused on staff training and development of staff resources such as a library. Staff also attempted to establish collaborative linkages with other agencies in the Santa Barbara area.

The project expanded the club's services within the most disadvantaged areas of Santa Barbara, areas with high percentages of families living on incomes below the poverty level and many residents receiving some form of public assistance. Unemployment in the target areas in 1975 ranged from 7.2 percent to 9.9 percent. Median incomes within the target areas ranged from \$4,275 to \$8,838. The majority of a set of housing units identified as substandard by the city zoning department was within the target area.

SEATTLE

Neighborhood House, Inc.
Seattle-King County Delinquency Prevention Collaboration
Seattle, Washington

The Delinquency Prevention Collaboration of Seattle-King County was awarded \$400,350 for first-year operation of a prevention project to develop coordination of youth services in the Seattle metropolitan area. Neighborhood House, the primary grantee of the ten-member collaboration, was the first settlement house in Seattle. It had provided services to the urban poor since 1906, particularly to low-income residents of public housing since 1956.

The collaboration's delinquency prevention project was structured to achieve the following goals:

- o To expand the number of target community youth who utilize the services of the private youth-serving agencies which constitute the collaboration.
- o To expand youth services so that they are more accessible to target community youth who do not normally use or who under-utilize private, youth-serving agency programs.
- o To make better use of private and public youth-serving agency resources through collaborative improvements in interagency planning and coordination.
- o To reduce the impact of significant organizational and institutional problems which have traditionally interfered with maximum utilization of services by youth in target communities.
- o To reduce youth service gaps and duplications in target communities, and to appropriately redirect resources.
- o To make existing youth services more accessible to target community youth through the reduction of eligibility requirements or conditions which

interfere with youth participation.

As primary grantee, Neighborhood House performed all project-wide administrative functions including contract development, contract compliance monitoring, and fiscal management. The project director and staff had responsibility for day-to-day management of the project.

The collaboration, with delegates representing each member agency, was the primary coordination mechanism of the project.

All collaboration agencies including Neighborhood House operated direct service programs. Contracts with Neighborhood House specified activities to be conducted in the target communities and performance standards to be met, including numbers of youth to be served and types of services.

To fill service gaps, some agencies implemented new types of programs or expanded existing programs into previously unserved neighborhoods. Most agencies offered some combination of services such as counseling, cultural awareness, recreation, education, vocational training, and work experience. One agency provided advocacy services.

The community development component of the project developed several strategies, including special recruitment and training programs for low-income volunteers and the involvement of citizen advisory groups in program development and implementation.

The delinquency prevention approaches of the collaboration primarily targeted public housing communities in four distinct

geographical areas of Seattle (one target area lying just outside the city limit). The communities were described as being more severely plagued by economic and social problems than other areas of Seattle or King County.

High crime rates characterized each of the target areas. The overall rate for Part I criminal offenses in the combined target areas was 1.5 times the city rate. Violent crimes were also more prevalent there; the incidence of murder and rape was almost three times higher than in the rest of the city. Juvenile crime statistics showed that a high rate of juvenile contacts occurred within these communities. Part I crime juvenile contacts were 2.5 times as high and Part II contacts were twice as high in the target communities as in other Seattle communities.

The target communities included some areas with the worst housing conditions in Seattle, and a population density nearly twice that of the city as a whole. Greater proportions of residents under 18 lived in the target communities than in any other areas of Seattle or King County. The high percentage of youth under 18 in public housing was particularly significant, given that 72 percent of the families there were single-parent families.

Economic indicators identified significant differences between the target communities and other Seattle communities. The median income of the county was over \$11,000, of the target areas was less than \$8,000, and of public housing communities alone, \$3,434. Almost half of the families in the Seattle area

with incomes lower than \$4,000 lived in the target areas. Of all families living in the target areas, 17 percent received public assistance, a figure twice that of the city and three times that of the county.

TUSKEGEE

Tuskegee Institute Human Resources Development Center
Youth Services Program
Tuskegee, Alabama

The Tuskegee Institute was awarded a first-year grant of \$431,413 for the Youth Services Program to prevent delinquency. The Youth Services Program was created within the Institute's Human Development Center, which was established in 1968 primarily to serve underprivileged rural families. Continuing in Tuskegee Institute's outreach tradition supporting rural development, the Center has operated programs in the areas of food and nutrition, home economics, health career opportunities, manpower training, farming techniques, community education, and veterinary medicine. The OJJDP grant enabled the Center to establish the Youth Services Program as a distinctly youth-oriented component to expand program areas and reach more youth. The program was intended to reduce delinquency by keeping youth busy in constructive activities.

The goals of the project were the following:

- o Establish a service delivery system in each of the four target counties which will function to coordinate existing youth service resources and to create new service structures to fill gaps in the existing youth service resources.
- o Significantly alleviate the problem of juvenile crime through delinquency prevention measures.
- o Provide a variety of social, cultural, educational, counseling and referral services to a substantial number of children and families not being served in the project areas.
- o To provide in-service training and beginning

professional training at the bachelors degree level for youth corrections workers.

- o To establish youth and adult organizations in the target communities to carry out activities and functions that will continue to carry out the main objectives of juvenile delinquency prevention beyond the life of the project period.
- o To involve youths, families, and concerned citizens in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of program activities of a youth service agency system.
- o To significantly reduce socio-cultural barriers that traditionally hinder relationships between disadvantaged populations and human services systems involved in youth corrections work.
- o To effectively appraise (assess) the extent of juvenile delinquency in the target area beyond present capabilities.

Administrative staff at Tuskegee Institute were responsible for coordination, management, and implementation of the project design. In addition to a director and assistant director there were staff specializing in vocational, recreational, and counseling services, and an audio-visual specialist. Two satellite coordinators acted as liaisons between specialists and staff who provided services in eight target communities in four counties.

The project's service population, primarily youth ages 9 to 18, came from the rural areas surrounding the town where project staff organized youth clubs. Youth were required to join the clubs to participate in project activities. Services, mostly conducted at local school facilities included recreation, tutoring, vocational education and career awareness, employment, counseling, and cultural enrichment activities. To encourage

adult participation, parent clubs, citizen clubs, and advisory councils were organized.

The four counties served by the program (Bullock, Lowndes, Macon, and Russell) are within the Alabama Black Belt, an agricultural region covering fifteen counties in southeast and central Alabama. Formerly a major source of employment, agriculture in the Black Belt has undergone a decline, and a comparatively low level of economic growth in non-agricultural sectors has not been able to absorb all the newly unemployed in the region. This and other social and economic problems have contributed to widespread unemployment and a rapid out-migration.

Characteristics of the targeted counties varied. Bullock and Lowndes were described as being among counties with the highest proportions of poor families with the greatest number of related children under 18. About half the families in those two counties lived on incomes below the poverty level; a somewhat lower proportion of families in Macon and Russell counties, 37 and 28 percent respectively, were below that cut-off. Inadequate housing conditions were indicated by the lack of completed plumbing. Lowndes County had the highest rates of both unemployment (11.7 percent). Other counties' rates of unemployment were 7.7 percent in Bullock, 5.5 percent in Macon, and 7.8 percent in Russell. A quarter of all families in Bullock County, 32 percent in Macon County, and 17 percent in Russell County received public assistance. Russell was the most densely populated county, with 72 persons per square mile, and

Lowndes the least, with 18 per square mile. Macon County had 40 residents per square mile.

VENICE

Venice Drug Coalition, Inc.
Venice-West Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Prevention
Project
Venice, California

Six youth-serving agencies collaborated to form the Venice-West prevention project that was awarded \$500,000 for its first year of operation. The funds were administered through the Venice Drug Coalition (VDC), an agency which had provided treatment and training services to counteract the problems of drug abuse in its community since 1969.

The overall performance goals for the Venice-West project were as follows:

- o To increase existing service utilization by youth.
- o To increase the type and availability of service.
- o To provide the community with mechanisms for responding together to the needs of youth.
- o To create new funding bases for delinquency prevention programs.
- o To integrally involve youth in decision making, planning, implementation, and evaluation of all project components at all stages (i.e., idea, policy formulation, program development).
- o To provide children and youth with the opportunity to meaningfully express themselves and develop the three basic elements of the socialization process: social competence, belongingness, usefulness (i.e., completion of task, skill development, employability, self-determination, and communication skills).
- o To reduce the rates of increase of the crimes of purse-snatching by 10 percent, house burglaries by 5 percent, and assaults (gang related) by 10 percent.

The VDC, in addition to managing and administering the

project, also provided collaborating agencies with technical assistance in program development, evaluation, and grantsmanship. One program, the Block Club Linkage System, was run jointly by the VDC and its member agencies. In this community development strategy, ten city blocks with high juvenile crime rates were to be identified, block club meetings initiated, and residents organized to develop activities leading to delinquency prevention. Block clubs served as client identification and referral mechanisms, as well as facilitating communication between youth-serving agencies and residents.

The individual agencies developed and operated a variety of other programs. Project agencies provided an array of activities including stress management training, career development, counseling, tutoring, venereal disease and birth control education, job preparation and tutoring for drop-outs and potential drop-outs, and recreation. A common strategy was employing youth for a period of time. The service plan typically entailed training the employed youths, who would in turn share what they had learned with other youth.

Five densely populated urban neighborhoods in Los Angeles County were selected as target communities, with Venice as the principal focus. The coalition's proposal described the Venice community as follows:

Venice, a beachfront poverty community belonging to the City of Los Angeles, suffers not only from the common deficiencies of most "inner city" communities, but also from a set of its own unique and highly complex problems. Venice is a community of contrasts. Venice has one and a half times the rate of poor residents of Los Angeles

County. Proportions of Black people and those with Spanish surnames are higher in Venice than anywhere else in the entire Santa Monica West Mental Health Region (SMWMHR) and also exceed the Los Angeles County average by ratios of 12 to 11 percent for Blacks and 24 to 18 percent for persons with Spanish surnames. Nine percent of the SMWMHR's population is composed of immigrants and first-generation Americans of Latino and Asian descent.

Fourteen percent of the Black population and 18 percent of the Spanish surnamed population in Venice over 16 is unemployed. This frequency is the highest in the SMWMHR and is way above the county-wide average of 6 percent. Eighteen percent of Venice residents have incomes below the poverty level. Only 42 percent of the families have incomes three times greater than the poverty level cut-off, as compared to a 56 percent county-wide average in this bracket. Forty-seven percent of the area's poor people live alone, which indicates a much lower rate of family unity than for the county as a whole, where 91 percent of the population lives within a family structure.

Eighteen percent of the adults in Venice have not completed the eighth grade, compared to a county average of 11 percent. Twenty-two percent of Black adults and 24 percent of Spanish surnamed adults have less than eight years of formal education. Venice is an extremely dense community. Close to 25 percent of the population lives in 12 percent of the housing. In addition to all of these problems, Venice residents must also adjust to the "future shock" of urban renewal. Though designated a poverty-level community, Venice has seen nearly the greatest rate of appreciation of real property values in Los Angeles County. Land inflation approached 15 percent in FY 1975-76 and taxes were in many cases reassessed as much as 200 to 500 percent higher. These changes are due to the influx of transient profiteers and have resulted in tremendous rent hikes, the loss of homes by minority and senior citizens, and increased property crime rates.

NEW HAVEN

United Way of Greater New Haven, Inc.
The Consortium for Youth of South Central Connecticut
New Haven, Connecticut

The Consortium for Youth of South Central Connecticut delinquency prevention project was granted \$402,951 for its first year of operation. The project was a collaborative effort of four United Way chapters and nine municipalities' local governments. Public and private youth-service sources from the nine target municipalities participated in planning direct service and capacity building activities to prevent delinquency in high-risk neighborhoods.

The Consortium set three broad goals:

- o To provide direct services to youth and families within identified target communities.
- o To enhance the capacity for interagency coordination and collaboration in the planning, programming, and delivery of youth services in South Central Connecticut.
- o To develop active community participation and input by both youth and adults in the planning and implementation of youth programs.

United Way of Greater New Haven served as the implementing agency, made contracts with agencies to provide direct services in the target municipalities, and provided administrative and fiscal controls. Day-to-day administration of the project's nine sites was performed by the Consortium's program coordinator, who was supervised by United Way's director of social planning and allocation.

A regional coordinating board* and local coordinating committees** in each of the target areas were established to support ongoing collaboration and joint programming, as well as to serve several administrative functions. The regional board was responsible for project administration, coordination, and supervision. The board set guidelines for programming, then reviewed and approved local-level plans for services and activities. Local coordinating committees, along with thirty-three agencies contracted to provide direct services, planned and implemented the service programs in the target neighborhoods.

The project's wide range of direct service concerns was largely determined by a needs assessment conducted during the program development process. The project was planned to expand and improve vocational, educational, health, recreational and cultural services to youth. The needs survey also identified certain subpopulations of youth in need of special service programs, including children under 12, truants, youth from single-parent families, adolescent parents, and Spanish-speaking youth. Among measures developed to improve youth's access to

*The regional coordinating board was composed of representatives from the United Way chapters of the target areas, chairpersons of the local coordinating committees, and mayoral appointees from the target municipalities.

**The local coordinating committees' representatives were drawn from agencies receiving grant funds, local United Way chapters, chief elected officials, agency and school personnel, and local youth and parents.

services were transportation services, donations for youth memberships, use of outreach workers, and expanded hours of program operations.

The target area was expansive, encompassing urban and suburban communities in nine independent municipalities. These areas were selected according to their rankings on a socioeconomic status (SES) index using 1970 census measures of income, population density, overcrowded and substandard housing, single-parent families, unemployment, and levels of education. A brief description of each municipality selected for project focus follows. (The number of census tracts within each municipality targeted by the project is indicated in parentheses.)

Ansonia-Derby (3) has a combined population of 33,759 and a large ethnic, blue-collar population. These towns have also experienced net population losses since 1970. In spite of their reputations as old industrial towns, these two areas have a high unemployment rate among youth (15.5 percent in November 1975).

East Haven (3) is a blue-collar, ethnic town of 28,000 residents, over half of whom are Italian and 15 percent Irish. East Haven has distinct subcommunities with strong individual identities. This parochialism is increased by a lack of public transportation connecting north and south sections of town. There is little industry in East Haven but the tax rate is one of the highest in the state. Faced with the tax burden, residents are reluctant to support any additional municipal services that might increase the tax rate.

Hamden (2), with a population of 50,000, has changed from a rural to a suburban community in the past two decades. The ethnic make-up of the community is predominantly Italian; nonwhites are 3.5 percent of the total population. Recent racial disturbances have occurred in the area's high schools due to an increased percentage of nonwhite enrollment.

Meriden (3) is an old New England mill town with a population of 56,400. Between 1960 and 1970 the population increased by 7.9 percent. While the population of Hispanics is increasing, particularly in the target neighborhoods, most social and youth-service agencies in the area do not have outreach or Spanish-speaking workers to recruit Spanish-speaking youth needing services.

Milford (4) is a middle-class community of 55,000 that is developing a strong industrial base although many residents are employed elsewhere. The community's youth population increases seasonally due to the many beaches in the area. There are many single-parent families and also families where both parents must work.

New Haven (9), a central city of the South Central Connecticut region, is a commercial, manufacturing, and educational center with a population of 137,707. Nearly 20 percent of its families have a single female head of the household. Compared to other towns in the SMSA, New Haven has the highest concentration of minority persons. A large proportion of the city's population is economically depressed with 17 percent of individuals and 13 percent of families living on incomes below the poverty level. Juvenile crime in New Haven has been the most severe in the state.

Wallingford (4) has a population of 35,900 of which 36.3 percent is under 18. Silver manufacturing is a major economic activity of the area, and a considerable amount of industrial park land is available for new development. Unemployment, however, fluctuates between 9 and 11 percent.

West Haven (4) has changed from a bedroom community for neighboring New Haven into a blue-collar city of 56,000. The transition that changed the character of the community resulted from the high annual growth rate of over 12 percent and an influx of retail and industrial concerns. Rapid growth has brought increased numbers of apartments that overshadow the once predominant single-family homes.

NEW YORK

United Neighborhood Houses of New York, Inc.
New Options for Youth Project
New York, New York

United Neighborhood Houses of New York (UNH) received \$324,125 to implement its prevention project, New Options for Youth. The organization's federation of settlement houses has provided services to low-income areas of New York for the past century. UNH develops and administers grant programs; its affiliated neighborhood-based settlement houses provide educational, health, housing, employment, cultural, and recreational services to clients of all ages.

The New Options for Youth Project focused on recruiting previously uninvolved youth between the ages of 10 and 15 from six areas of New York: the Bronx, Brooklyn, Lower East Side, Lower West Side, Upper East Side, East Harlem, and Queens. Twenty-two affiliated settlement houses participated in the project by making their services available to recruited youth.

The project proposal listed the following goals:

- o To recruit 900 uninvolved youth and integrate them into existing youth programs.
- o To provide youth with marketable skills and positive attitudes.
- o To provide specific opportunities through which youth will gain an increased investment in the nondelinquent society.
- o To develop modifications in existing local youth-service programs to better meet the needs of youths who want to participate.
- o To develop a model of collaboration among diverse

organizations to achieve better service delivery for youth.

- o To develop a model of successful outreach approaches that stimulate youth to participate in organized activity.
- o To involve volunteers of all ages and with varied expertise in carrying out the project.
- o To create an atmosphere of communication among youths, volunteers, and professional staff on a peer basis.
- o To provide organizations at the local, state, and national levels with materials describing successful approaches so that they can replicate the program in other locales.

Overall project administration was performed by a UNH project director. Six program coordinators, one in each targeted area, provided orientation to key program staff, supervised and trained youth workers, and assisted in developing volunteer resources. Coordinators also helped organize advisory committees which were to assist participating agencies to identify and obtain resources to support programs. Several part-time youth workers received a monthly stipend to help recruit project youth and conduct project activities.

Specific components of the New Options for Youth Project were (1) outreach for uninvolved and under-involved youth; (2) development of special program activities to attract these youth; (3) modification of existing services at the settlement houses to meet the needs of the youth; and (4) involvement of project staff, youth leaders, and community and corporate volunteers in program implementation.

To attract new clients, each group of agencies in the six

target areas publicized the project on local radio stations and held special entertainment, sports, and fashion events featuring well-known professionals or celebrities. Once recruited into the project, youth were offered settlement house services including tutoring, career counseling, recreation, health, and employment programs.

Numerous ethnic groups -- Blacks, Chinese, Eastern Europeans, Haitians, Hispanics, Italians, Jews, and others -- were represented in the target communities, where they lived in ethnically mixed, densely populated housing projects, or in substandard housing in ethnic barrios. About 36 percent of all families in the target communities had incomes at or below the poverty level. Incidence of infant mortality, tuberculosis, syphilis, and gonorrhea was higher in the target areas than in the city as a whole.

Youth between the ages of 10 and 19 constituted 15 percent of the target communities' population. In New York City, 13.2 percent of all high school students dropped out of school in 1974-75. The unemployment rate of youth 16 to 19 years old was 27 percent in 1975 -- 7 percent higher than the national average for this age group. New York's rate of juvenile felony arrests was much higher than comparable figures for persons 21 years and older in 1974.

PHILADELPHIA

Girls' Coalition
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The Girls' Coalition, with the City of Philadelphia as conduit of funds, received a first-year grant of \$401,715 to operate a delinquency prevention project. The Girls' Coalition was founded in January 1976 by Philadelphia's major girl-serving agencies which shared a concern for the unique and unmet needs of girls. Since then the Coalition has made efforts to examine problems and needs of young women and to advocate on behalf of young women and the organizations serving them. Sexism in education and unemployment among teen women are among the issues the Coalition had confronted.

Four members of the Girls' Coalition participated in this delinquency prevention project: the Girls Clubs of Philadelphia, the Girl Scouts of Greater Philadelphia, Teen Aid, Inc., and the YWCA of Metropolitan Philadelphia. The project focused its services on girls at risk of delinquency due to environmental and personal factors that, according to project theory, affect their self-concepts and expectations for the future. Through the project, the Coalition hoped to provide girls with better abilities to cope with adverse situations without turning to delinquency.

The services offered by the Coalition were to fulfill the following goals:

- o Increase the opportunities for positive companionship, recreation, vocational guidance, and individual

development for girls within the target area.

- o Increase the number of girls in the target area who participate in available service and social programs.
- o Increase the capacity of the four participating organizations to offer expanded and new services, train staff, and implement projects specifically designed for the target area.
- o Provide nonsexist career counseling and exploration for girls in the target area.
- o Coordinate the activities of the four girl-serving agencies for collaborating on projects, assessing the value of approaches, and advocating issues of importance to women and girls.
- o Increase the opportunities for volunteerism, both for adults and female juveniles, in the target community, either in service or as part of social and career development.
- o Increase the capacity of Coalition members to recruit, train, support, and supervise volunteers.

Project policy was set by a board of managers composed of directors, staff, and volunteers from participating agencies. The Coalition's central unit staff was responsible for project administration and coordination of program activities with the assistance of liaison members from each agency. The central unit also served as a clearinghouse for recruitment of clients and volunteers and as a structure for the development of specialized services. An advisory board was formed to provide local community input into project planning.

The participating agencies made their programs available to "all teenage women who have either never had access to such programs or who have underutilized the few existing programs." Each Coalition member developed its own set of goals and

services. The Girl Scouts sought to increase the participation of young adults and adult volunteers in programs, as well as to organize new troops and other activities for target area girls. The Girls Clubs offered a variety of activities including sewing, tutoring, family life and sex education, fashion design, sports, field trips, and referral services in order to enhance the supportive environment for the girls' development. Teen Aid extended its Big Sister services to a population without prior contact with law enforcement officials. Teen Aid offered counseling, job training, and work experience. The YWCA offered an array of services such as counseling, referral, career awareness and exploration, tutoring, leadership training and self development, a drop-in center, and recreation.

Targeted for project service were the Philadelphia communities bounded east and west by the Delaware River and Broad Street, and north and south by Wingohocking and Vine Streets. The total population of the area was 275,954, of which 94,576 were youth under 18. Large concentrations of Black, Spanish-speaking, and blue-collar white populations resided in the target area.

The median family income was \$7,868 in the target area, compared to \$9,366 in the city as a whole. Almost 15 percent of the families in the target area had incomes below the poverty level, and 26 percent of all active income assistance cases city-wide were in the target area in 1976. Unemployment there was described as being worse for youth than for adults and worse for females than for males.

Youths' dropping out of school, a city-wide problem, was especially evident among young women in the target area. The aggregate school drop-out rate for girls in the target area was 46 percent. The all-girl high school in the target area had the second highest drop-out rate in the city, at 28 percent. Delinquency statistics indicated that the incidence and severity of female delinquency had recently increased significantly in Philadelphia, and that female offenders were younger than in the past. Despite obvious service needs, girls in the city were beneficiaries of fewer services and educational opportunities than were boys.

TULARE

Operation Helping Hand, Inc.
Tulare Youth Service Bureau Delinquency Prevention Project
Tulare, California

The Youth Service Bureau (YSB) received a first-year grant of \$76,000 for a project to extend the reach of its services to youth living in rural southern Tulare County. Administered by the executive director of the YSB, the project was an extension of the Tulare County Youth Service Bureau of Operation Helping Hand, Inc., a private, nonprofit agency. Incorporated in 1971, the agency had expanded its services to youth by 1975, emphasizing drug abuse and delinquency prevention programs.

The project's goal was to prevent juvenile delinquency among adolescents in four rural communities where access to the very few existing agencies was limited by factors such as the lack of any public transportation. The project was designed to provide public education on youths' needs, to perform youth advocacy, and to offer direct services through three drop-in centers.

Existing programs run by the YSB and a community counseling agency were expanded into drop-in centers which offered counseling, recreation, legal assistance, and referral services. Counseling staff assisted by part-time and volunteer staff organized center activities. Each center also had an advisory board to suggest program ideas and monitor services. The community education component of the project included the development of informational pamphlets and in-service training

for teachers and youth workers on methods of dealing with youth.

The target communities of Tipton, Pixley, Teviston, and Earlimart are clustered about five miles from one another in the lower San Joaquin Valley. The sparsely populated area was about 20 miles from the nearest population centers, and more than half of its 5,807 residents were youth under 18. The racial composition of the combined target areas was 51 percent white, 41 percent Mexican-American, 4 percent Black, and 4 percent other.

Available statistics indicated that the target areas were even less prosperous than the generally poor areas surrounding them. Tulare County then had California's highest rate of public assistance dependency at 9 percent; the target area's rate was 10 percent. The percentage of county residents whose incomes fell below the poverty level, 19 percent, far exceeded the state rate of 11 percent, and the target area's rate was even higher at 28 percent.

More than half the housing in rural Tulare County was substandard; 68 percent of the housing in Pixley, 62 percent in Earlimart, 61 percent in Tipton, and 100 percent in Teviston was substandard.

Seven percent of the target area's residents over 26 had no formal education, 42 percent had not completed elementary school, and 76 percent had not finished high school.

Agriculture was the dominant type of employment in these communities. In 1970, 42 percent of those employed in the target area were hired farm workers. The unemployment rate of

7.7 percent in 1970 doubled to 15.7 percent by 1977.

APPENDIX B

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Impact in Target Area Crime Rates

Projects were asked by OJJDP to indicate some quantitative measure of the amount of delinquent behavior to be reduced within their target communities. In response to this request, project administrators developed specific delinquency reduction goals that varied considerably from site to site. For example, Fort Peck claimed they would reduce all delinquent incidents processed by Tribal and Federal Courts by 15 percent. The Venice Drug Coalition selectively planned to reduce purse snatching by 10 percent, house burglary by 5 percent, and gang-related assaults by 10 percent. Why projects expected to impact all types of delinquent behaviors or just a few was left unclear. Equally unclear was how projects expected to measure official delinquency to determine if crime rates had indeed been reduced. For example, in the case of Venice data on "gang-related assaults" are not collected by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) or Los Angeles Sheriff's Department.

Due to a variety of data collection constraints, interrupted time-series analysis was performed in only three sites: Boston, Dallas, and Seattle. What follows is each site's analysis, the limits of interpretation, and conclusions concerning how effective these three projects were in impacting arrest rates. Seattle represents the only site where adequate data existed. The other two sites are presented to illustrate difficulties encountered in analysis.


Boston

In its first and second year proposals, Boston did not include delinquency reduction as one of its goals. Staff were quite candid about the possibility of their program having a significant impact on the delinquency rate:

(If) success of the project is measured by the rate of reduction in the delinquency rate, I doubt if the results will be statistically significant. Yet, it also said that the project can, does, and will have an impact on delinquency prevention in a number of ways. (Boston, Field Notes)

Data collected from the Boston Police Department show the number of arrests in each year between 1973 and 1978. These figures may be misleading since no comparable juvenile population data are available. Drops in arrests may be the result of a decline in the juvenile population rather than decreases in per capita arrest rates. Nevertheless, the data are presented because they illustrate difficulties in interpretation. Note the fluctuations in Figure B-1 between the peak arrest total of 3,291 in 1975 and the low point of 2,679 arrests in 1977. Within the scale, the rates are highly irregular. Using regression analysis, the arrest rates were fitted to a standard regression line. However, the rates had a very poor fit to this linear model. Because of the very low R^2 of .30, it is impossible to determine what future arrest rates would be. The regression analysis demonstrates that there is no established pattern of increase or decrease, making it impossible to determine whether the implementation of the

FIGURE B-1
NUMBER OF ARRESTS
AS REPORTED BY
THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT¹



1. Source: Boston Police Department
2. Mission Hill area is not included

delinquency prevention program impacted the number of juvenile arrests.

Between 1977 and 1978, the period in which the project was in operation, there was a 7.1 percent increase in total juvenile arrests. However, between 1973 and 1978, the overall number of juvenile arrests decreased by 6.5 percent. This might lead one to believe that the prevention program actually had an effect on juvenile arrest rates, causing them to grow rather than decline. However, because individual target areas could not be analyzed separately, and the juvenile arrest data is so erratic, no causality can be established. No conclusions can be made that the program either had a positive or negative impact on delinquent behavior.

Dallas

Dallas was the only project that listed delinquency reduction as one of its goals where time-series analysis was attempted. However, it did not specify what types of delinquent acts would be targeted or the quantity of delinquency reduction expected.

- Goal 1. To reduce the number of delinquent types of behavior committed by juveniles in the target communities. (First Year Proposal:1)

Dallas arrest data represented a slight improvement for purposes of analysis. Arrest data were computed on a per capita basis. Furthermore, arrest rates were available dating back to 1972 for the city of Dallas and two suburban target areas

(Garland and Mesquite). The major limitation for Dallas was an inability to separate out arrest rates for the targeted communities within Dallas and the two suburban areas. Any reductions within these target communities could be cancelled out by increases in surrounding areas not affected by project intervention.


Figures B-2 and B-3 summarize the arrest data for Dallas, Mesquite, and Garland. Dallas' arrest rates, after dramatic fluctuations between 1972 and 1973, stabilized in 1974 and began a downward trend which bottomed out in 1977. In 1978, the arrest rate reversed this trend and increased an insignificant 2.4 percent. This increase coincided with the introduction of the delinquency program which was fully operational during that calendar year in three communities in Dallas. However, because arrest rates cannot be separated out according to these three communities, no causality can be inferred.

Garland's arrest rate (Figure B-3) was also stable during pre-project years with the noted exception of a 1975 increase of 36.4 percent when followed in 1976 by a similar decrease. If one excludes this "bumper year" crop of arrests, a rather clear pattern of decreasing arrests emerges through 1977. Here again, the trend reverses itself as project services are introduced (4.7 percent increase in arrest rate).

Mesquite's arrest rate was extremely unstable from 1972 through 1977. If one only compares 1976 - 1978 data, there is a dramatic increase of 43.2 percent. From 1977 - 1978, one notes a continued increasing rate of arrest (7.1 percent) although it

FIGURE B-2


JUVENILE ARREST RATE, CITY OF DALLAS, 1972-1978 ¹



1. Source: Number of juvenile arrests Dallas Police Department

2. Source: Juvenile population: City of Dallas, Urban Planning Department

FIGURE B-3
JUVENILE ARREST RATE, 1972-1978
CITY OF GARLAND AND CITY OF MESQUITE¹



1. Sources for numbers of juvenile arrests: Garland and Mesquite Police Departments
 2. Source: city population of City of Garland and City of Mesquite

appears to have leveled off from the 1976 - 1977 increase (18.3 percent). A possible interpretation would be the project reduced the rate of increase from the prior year. However, because previous rates were so unstable, plus, the inability to separate out data for the target communities within both of these suburban areas, no inferences can be made.

Seattle

There were several advantages in using Seattle's arrest data. First, data can be compiled by census tract. Fortunately, the Seattle project had selected target areas that corresponded to census tracts, permitting direct comparisons between target area(s) and citywide arrest data. Furthermore, Seattle police collect their data according to (1) arrests per census tract and (2) arrests of census tract residents. This breakdown permits more detailed examinations. For example, although the total number of arrests per census tract may have increased, the number of arrests of residents within that census tract may have decreased. The latter indicator would be extremely important for prevention projects that provide services to target area residents. Finally, arrest data are available from 1973 - 1978 on a quarterly basis.

The major disadvantage with Seattle's data is the unavailability of per capita arrest rates. No accurate population data of the number of youth (under age 18) who resided in each of the four target areas during these years are presently available. Target area delinquency is reported by

volume of arrests at each period. Thus, shifts in volume may be due to population changes rather than project intervention. Even if it were possible to compute target area rates, caution would still need to be exercised. Changes in the Seattle police department's arrest policies and the legislation of Washington State requiring deinstitutionalization of juvenile status offenders are historical confounding variables that account for fluctuations in arrest statistics prior to project intervention (both overall volumes and specific offense category volumes).

Seattle did not list delinquency reduction as one of its goals. However, in its third year OJJDP proposal, Seattle included an analysis of arrest data for the years 1976 - 1978 as evidence that the project had reduced delinquency. The following is a review and critique of the project's claim.

Project staff used the Uniform Crime Report's Part I Offense category to compare 1976-1978 juvenile arrests for the city of Seattle and its target communities. These data show increases for the city compared to decreases within the target areas.

During 1977, we witnessed a sharp increase in the number of juvenile arrests, both city-wide (13.7%) and within the project target areas (18.3%). Comparing the 1978 juvenile arrest data with that for 1977, we see that the rate of increase city-wide dropped off substantially (4.54%), but there was still an overall increase in the number of juvenile arrests within the city of Seattle as a whole.


However, when we compare the same two years (1977 and 1978) for the Target Project Areas, we see that there was a decrease in the number of juvenile arrest among this population during the period which comprised the fifth through the sixteenth months of project operation.

Based on these data, the project contended that programs have had some impact on target area delinquency. Qualitative data indicated some staff also believed the project had reduced juvenile delinquency:

"...the year before the LEAA program started, there were certain kids in those projects that were raising hell and getting into a lot of trouble. And they affected the crime rate. Like when kids would go out and steal 10 cars, you know. Or one kid would go out and do 20 burglaries. Or three or four kids would be responsible for a dozen crimes ... after the LEAA program came around, some of those very same kids got into some of the programs, some got jobs, some went to the YMCA for the first time in their lives, some of them went to camp, and he thinks that there is no doubt that the LEAA program helped reduce crime in the Northend Town houses."
(Seattle, Field Notes)


An examination of Figure B-4 arrests reveals that what they say is partially correct. [These arrest data were compiled from computer printouts obtained from the Seattle Police Department. Target area offense volumes were computed from these records and correspond to the U.S. Census Tracts of the city of Seattle, and were designated by the project as areas to be served. Note that the volumes of Part I offenses are consistently higher than volumes for Part II offenses. The reason for these discrepancies is due to the inclusion of Larceny as a Part I offense. Curfew and Runaway offenses (i.e., juvenile status offenses) are not included in arrest volumes reported.] While the city-wide juvenile arrests for Part I crimes increased by 4.5 percent, the arrests for Part I crimes in project target areas decreased by 2.7 percent. However, when these figures are

FIGURE B-4a
PART I OFFENSES:
TOTAL JUVENILE ARRESTS IN SEATTLE
AND CHANGES OVER TIME




<u>Year</u>	<u>Percent Increase(+) or Decrease(-)</u>
1973-1974	+19.8%
1974-1975	- 8.5%
1975-1976	-11.4%
1976-1977	+13.8%
1977-1978	+ 4.5%
Overall 1973- 1978	+15.6%

FIGURE B-4b
PART I OFFENSES:
JUVENILE ARRESTS OF TARGET AREA RESIDENTS
AND CHANGES OVER TIME



<u>Year</u>	<u>Percent Increase(+) or Decrease(-)</u>
1973-1974	- 3.0%
1974-1975	- 0.7%
1975-1976	-17.5%
1976-1977	+ 7.9%
1977-1978	+14.7%
Overall 1973-1978	- 1.7%

FIGURE B-4c
PART I OFFENSES:
JUVENILE ARRESTS IN PROJECT TARGET AREAS
AND CHANGES OVER TIME




Year	Percent Increase(+) or Decrease(-)
1973-1974	+ 7.5%
1974-1975	- 7.6%
1975-1976	- 8.2%
1976-1977	+19.0%
1977-1978	- 2.7%
Overall 1973-1978	+ 5.5%

compared to the arrests of target area residents, a different picture emerges. Although total juveniles arrested increased 4.5 percent between 1977 and 1978, the number of juveniles arrested who resided in target areas rose 14.6 percent. Thus, while the arrest rate in target areas declined, the number of target area juvenile residents arrested increased substantially.

When Part II, (Figure B-5) arrests are examined, target area residents are seen to be arrested at a greater rate even after project startup, while city-wide the number of arrests was declining. In Figure B-5 the number of juveniles arrested city-wide decreased 10 percent between 1977 and 1978. During the same period, the number of juveniles arrested in the target area declined only 5.1 percent. The number of juvenile residents of the target area arrested during this time rose by 7.1 percent.

These two Figures, B-4 and B-5 provide a substantial data base to ascertain the impact of the project on official delinquency. Arrest statistics, when controlled for arrestee residence, seem to throw some doubt on the project assertion that delinquency was reduced in target areas. Analysis that does not take residence (measured by U.S. Census Tracts) of youth into account might prematurely lead to invalid conclusions. For Seattle, evidence of "success" is a function of the type and time period of arrest data one chooses for analysis. No clear evidence exists to support claims that delinquency has or has not been reduced due to project intervention.

FIGURE B-5a
PART II OFFENSES
TOTAL JUVENILE ARRESTS IN SEATTLE
AND CHANGES OVER TIME




<u>Year</u>	<u>Percent Increase(+) or Decrease(-)</u>
1973-1974	+39.3%
1974-1975	+ 6.8%
1975-1976	- 8.7%
1976-1977	+10.1%
1977-1978	-10.0%
Overall 1973- 1978	+34.5%

Before the Project


During the Project

FIGURE B-5b
PART II OFFENSES:
JUVENILE ARRESTS OF TARGET AREA RESIDENTS
AND CHANGES OVER TIME



<u>Year</u>	<u>Percent Increase(+)</u> <u>or Decrease(-)</u>
1973-1974	+78.9%
1974-1975	+ 1.6%
1975-1976	-16.9%
1976-1977	+29.5%
1977-1978	+ 7.1%
Overall 1973-1978	+109.5%

FIGURE B-5c
PART II OFFENSES:
JUVENILE ARRESTS IN PROJECT TARGET AREAS



<u>Year</u>	<u>Percent Increase (+) or Decrease (-)</u>
1973-1974	+60.4%
1974-1975	-20.2%
1975-1976	- 4.2%
1976-1977	+24.8%
1977-1978	- 5.1%
Overall 1973- 1978	+45.0%

Before the Project

During the Project

APPENDIX C

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