PERCEIVED RISK OF ARREST AND BEHAVIORAL EXPERIENCE
IN A SAMPLE OF INCARCERATED FELONS

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ABSTRACT

Previous research on perceived certainty of punishment has found that individuals with experience in committing crimes perceive arrest as less certain than those without prior experience. Results on how experience with formal sanctions affects those perceptions have been mixed. Most studies, however, have not considered the experience of sanctions in conjunction with the frequency of criminal behavior. With a sample of 1103 incarcerated felons, we examined relationships among perceived risk of arrest, arrest history, and frequency of committing crimes. The findings suggest that it is important to measure the ratio of arrests to crimes, and that risk perceptions are formed in a rational manner, even in a sample of serious offenders.
INTRODUCTION

Numerous studies have found that individuals with little prior experience in committing an offense have higher estimates of the certainty of punishment than those with experience (Claster, 1967; Jensen, 1969; Jensen, et al., 1978; Silberman, 1976; Tittle, 1977; Waldo and Chiricos, 1972). This negative correlation has been traditionally viewed as evidence for a deterrence effect; more recently, researchers using panel studies to look at causal ordering have interpreted it as an experiential effect (Saltzman, Paternoster, Waldo, and Chiricos, 1982; Minor and Harry, 1982; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, and Chiricos, 1985).

The interpretation of the negative correlation between perceived risk and self-reported criminality as an experiential effect rests on the assumption that "people who commit illegal acts and get away with it (as most do) tend to lower their perceptions of the risks involved" (Saltzman, et al., 1982). If, on the other hand, people commit illegal acts and do not get away with it, we might expect that this experiential effect would be negated; people whose deviant behavior results in negative sanctions would perceive punishment as more certain than those who violate the law with impunity. It is thus important to consider not only whether individuals have engaged in the particular criminal behavior, but also whether formal sanctions have been experienced as a result of that behavior.
THE ROLE OF FORMAL SANCTIONS

Several studies have considered the influence of formal sanctions on perceptions of risk; the results have been mixed. Cohen (1978) predicted that speeding violators who avoided detection would perceive punishment as less certain than would those who had received citations, but his data from 105 military personnel did not support this expectation. Cohen suggested that since so many people violate speeding laws without being cited, a violator who is cited may assume that his citation was the result of a random process, and that he is no more likely than anyone else to be detected in the future.

Richards and Tittle (1981, 1982), in a survey of the population aged 15 and over in three states found no significant relationship between arrest experience and estimates of chances of arrest for minor theft, major theft, marijuana use, illegal gambling, assault, and tax fraud. Similarly, Lanza-Kaduce (1985), in a study of college students, found no significant correlation between whether students had ever been stopped by police when driving while intoxicated and their perceptions of risk of arrest at two different times.

Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, and Matsueda (1986) tested a rational-choice model of crime, using longitudinal data collected from three different samples of individuals with high risk of being sanctioned. With a composite measure of risk of sanction that involved estimates of probabilities associated with five different outcomes if the respondent committed a crime earning
$1000, they found that the number of prior arrests affected risk perception ("formal risk") significantly for their youth sample but not for their offender or addict samples. Risk perception was affected by prior convictions only for the addict sample. They also found that changes in risk perceptions over the nine months between the waves of their study were not significantly affected by whether or not they had been arrested during that time. When Paternoster, et al., (1985) measured changes in formal sanctions and changes in perceptions of risk of arrest in a sample of college students, they found a significant and positive relationship between the two for petty theft and writing bad checks but not for marijuana use.

Several problems with the previous research may have produced misleading results on the impact of sanctions on perceptions of arrest probability. First, the experience of formal sanctions is extremely limited. With the notable exception of Piliavin, et al., (1986), studies of perceptual risk have typically involved samples of college students; a few have been based on general population surveys. The studies have focused on fairly minor crimes for which actual clearance and arrest rates would be especially low, and thus very few respondents have ever experienced formal sanctions. Paternoster, et al. (1983), for example, provide figures indicating that among 169 people in their study who reported committing an offense during the previous year, only eight reported being arrested during that year (p. 477, footnote 19).
A second problem is that some studies have used very general measures of formal sanctions. Richards and Tittle (1982) and Piliavin, et al. (1986), for example, measured the number of lifetime arrests for any crime, and Paternoster, et al. (1985) employed a scale of formal sanctions for any crime that ranged from being taken to the police station to being sent to prison. If any arrest makes the risk of arrest for all crimes a more credible threat, then these measures should be related to perceptions of risk for each crime. If, however, an arrest for writing a bad check changes the estimates of likelihood of an arrest for writing a bad check but does not change the perceived risk of using marijuana, predicted relationships may go undetected when measures of general sanctions rather than crime-specific sanctions are used.

Finally, the most serious problem is that the studies of how an individual's experience of sanctions influences perceptions of risk have had to rely on measures of the absolute number of sanctions. As Richards and Tittle (1981, 1982) noted, a better measure would be the number of times arrested relative to the number of offenses committed. If the perceived risk of arrest is based on objective sanctions, it is reasonable to assume that an individual's estimate of arrest probability would be based on the most salient information available—that person's own experience of arrest probability, which would be reflected in the ratio of arrests to offenses committed. Knowing only the absolute number of sanctions a person has experienced tells us nothing about that
person's success rate in committing crimes--how often he is able to commit the crime and get away with it. Who should have the higher estimate of the likelihood of arrest--the person who has written hundreds of bad checks and has been arrested twice, or the person who has written one bad check and was arrested once for that offense?

Parker and Grasmick (1979) explored this notion of relative sanctions with their "experienced arrest rate" (EAR). They suggested that people's perceptions of arrest certainty should be based on personal and interpersonal sources of information about crimes, and they described how EAR would be calculated for burglary:

the denominator is the sum of burglaries committed (1) by the individual, (2) against the individual, (3) by the individual's acquaintances (and about which the individual has learned via interpersonal communication), and (4) against the individual's personal acquaintances. The numerator is the number of all these burglaries for which an arrest was made.

Because the probability of encountering a person who has committed a burglary or knows someone who has committed burglary in a random sample of adults is very low, Parker and Grasmick asked only about victimization of the respondents and their acquaintances. They found that among respondents who had experienced at least one burglary, the correlation between EAR and their estimates of the official arrest rates was positive and significant.

Because of data limitations, Parker and Grasmick (1979) were not able to test the specific deterrence notion that the
sanctions applied to an individual should influence that person's perceptions of risk. None of the studies of perceived risk conducted to date has had data adequate to allow calculating the ratio of crime-specific sanctions to offenses for people actually engaging in the criminal behavior. Thus the hypothesis that sanction experience affects risk assessments may not have been effectively tested.

GENERALIZABILITY OF PERCEPTUAL DETERRENCE STUDIES

Because most studies on perceptions of risk have involved either student populations or general populations and have focused on fairly minor crimes, generalizations of the results to more serious crimes and more serious offenders are problematic. Paternoster and Iovanni (1986), commenting on the trivial nature of criminal acts examined in most of the perceptual deterrence literature, suggested that

More serious offenses and those which more clearly involve rational premeditation (breaking and entering for theft, convenience store robbery, narcotic trafficking) may be more responsive to sanction threats than the kinds of offenses traditionally looked at by perceptual deterrence researchers. The generalizability of the findings from this body of research is, therefore, severely limited, and deterrence researchers would be well-served to consider more serious, calculative offenses in their studies (p. 769-770).

Even among the studies of relatively minor crimes, results have varied across the different crime types. Minor and Harry (1983), for example, who asked college students about a number of deviant and criminal behaviors found significant experiential
effects (the path between behavior at time two and perceptions of risk at time two) for cocaine use, being drunk and disorderly, cheating on exams, and shoplifting, but not for fighting and marijuana use. Similarly, in a multivariate analysis of the experiential/deterrence process, Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, and Chiricos (1985) found a significant relationship between behavioral and perceptual change for petty theft and writing checks with insufficient funds, but not for marijuana use. They suggested that their findings were consistent with Chambliss's (1967: 708) idea that the relationship between perceptions and behavior may be stronger for instrumental crimes (an act that is "instrumental to the attainment of some other goal") than for expressive crimes (an act "committed because it is pleasurable in and of itself").

Others, focusing on the presumed deterrent effect reflected in the inverse correlation between perceived risk and participation in the crime, have suggested that the deterrability of an offense depends on whether it is a mala in se offense or a mala prohibita offense (Waldo and Chiricos, 1972; Silberman, 1976) or on the seriousness of the offense (Jensen, et al., 1978). At least partly because of the limited range of offenses studied, this issue remains unresolved.

In sum, because of the focus on relatively trivial offenses and offenders, the generalizability of current research findings remains questionable. We need to examine whether the hypothesized relationships among perceived risk of sanctions,
experience of formal sanctions, and participation in crime also hold for serious crimes and serious offenders.

THE CURRENT STUDY

In this paper, we explore these relationships with a population of incarcerated adult offenders, considering nine different felonies: burglary, business robbery, personal robbery, theft, auto theft, forgery, fraud, assault, and drug dealing. We thus attempt to replicate previous findings on the experiential effect with a population of more serious offenders and with questions about major crimes. We look not only at the relationship of perceived risk to participation in the crime, but also at its relationship to frequency of offending.

We focus specifically here on the role of formal sanctions in determining perceptions of risk of arrest. Because we obtained detailed information about offending experience and arrest experience during a three-year reference period, we were able to derive a relative sanctions measure—the ratio of arrests for a particular crime to the number of times that crime was committed. We compare that measure with two other sanctions measures that have been used in other studies—the number of lifetime arrests for all crimes and the absolute number of crime specific arrests during the reference period. We predict that use of the ratio measure will reveal a stronger relationship between sanctions experience and perceived likelihood of arrest than will the use of the two absolute measures.
METHODOLOGY

The data presented here come from two self-report studies (Horney and Marshall, 1991; Horney and Marshall, 1992). They are based on interviews conducted with a total of 1061 convicted male offenders sentenced to the Nebraska Department of Corrections.\(^1\) The sample of inmates was 61.1% white with a mean age of 28.

Usually within one week of the time inmates were admitted to the Diagnostic and Evaluation Unit, they were brought to a private visiting room to meet with an interviewer to have the study explained. The interviewer gave a brief explanation of the study and then read aloud an informed consent form, after which the inmate could either sign the form and proceed with the interview or return to his unit or other activity.\(^2\)

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Criminal Involvement: Part of each interview was a modified version of the instrument used in the RAND Corporation's Second Inmate Survey (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982). Our modifications, which included a three-year reference period, a more detailed calendar system, and month-by-month reporting of criminal behavior were intended to produce more accurate estimates of \(\lambda\)--the individual frequency of committing criminal offenses (Horney and Marshall, 1991). We asked respondents to consider a three-year reference period immediately preceding the arrest for the offense from which the current incarceration followed. For that
period we asked them about the frequency of criminal activity for nine different crimes: burglary, business robbery, personal robbery, assault, theft, auto theft, forgery/bad checks, fraud, and drug dealing. These crimes were defined as in Chaiken and Chaiken (1982). Respondents were considered active in a given crime category if they reported committing that offense at least once during the three-year period.

The frequency of offending (λ) was determined through responses to a calendar with each crime category listed for each of 36 months. The procedures for asking about crimes committed and for calculating λ are given in the Appendix.

**Perceived Risk:** To measure perceived certainty of sanction, we asked the respondents, for each crime, to estimate the likelihood that they would be arrested if they committed that crime. Previous research has shown stronger relationships between self-reported criminal activity and perceived certainty of punishment to self than to a "generalized other" (Jensen, Erickson, and Gibbs, 1978; Paternoster, et al., 1983). Respondents answered on an 11-point scale ranging from 0% to 100%, with 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% labelled respectively, no chance, low chance, some chance, good chance, high chance, and completely certain.

**Formal Sanctions:** Each respondent was asked how many times he had been arrested in his life (excepting traffic violations). Response categories were once, 2-3 times, 4-6 times, 7-10 times, 11-15 times, 16-25 times, and more than 25 times. To measure
crime-specific arrests, we asked, for each crime in which the respondent reported being active, how many of the offenses had resulted in an arrest during the "street months" on the calendar. For arrest to crime ratio, for each offense category, we divided that crime-specific number of arrests during the street months by the total number of offenses he reported during the reference period.

FINDINGS

PERCEPTIONS OF RISK AND PARTICIPATION IN CRIME

First, in Table 1, we present the zero-order correlations between perceived likelihood of arrest for a particular crime and participation in that crime. Significant inverse relationships were found for every one of the nine crimes. This inverse relationship between experience and perceived risk has been found many times among students or general adult populations when relatively minor crimes were studied. Our results demonstrate that this basic experiential/deterrence effect can be generalized to a sample of serious offenders and to major felonies.

(Table 1 About Here)

Demonstrating the generality of the experiential/deterrence effect is important for any theory of deterrence which rests on the assumption that objective sanctions in a political unit are translated into deterrence through perceptions of sanctions. It is necessary to know whether these perceptions are formed through
the same processes for serious offenders and minor law-breakers. Although, with our data, we are not able to untangle deterrence and experiential effects (see Paternoster, et al, 1982; Paternoster, et al, 1985; Minor and Harry, 1985; Lundman, 1986; Paternoster, 1988), the replication of the basic inverse correlations is a necessary first step in extending the generalizability of this body of literature.

The replication with serious offenders is also important for determining whether experiential effects are truly crime-specific. In student or general adult population samples, the group of people who report being inactive in a particular crime category is probably composed mostly of individuals who have no prior criminal involvement at all. The experiential effects found with those samples may thus reflect differences in overall criminal experience between offenders and non-offenders rather than differences due to experience or lack of experience with a particular crime. Because the respondents in our study had all been sentenced to prison for commission of felonies, and because many had extensive criminal records, the inactive group for each crime category consisted of people who had committed other serious offenses, but were not active in committing that particular crime. The fact that we still found significant negative correlations suggests that the experiential effect is crime-specific.

PERCEPTIONS OF RISK AND FREQUENCY OF OFFENDING
Saltzman, et al. (1982) suggested that "it may not be the simple, or even frequent, occurrence of the behavior that is most effective in the experiential process, but instead the novelty of that behavior in an actor's experience." They found in their panel study of college students that the correlations between perceptions and behavior at the second period were stronger for the offense of bad checks than marijuana use even though there were more marijuana users than bad check writers during the one year they asked about. They concluded that their finding represented a novelty effect because there were more new bad check writers than new marijuana users during that interval, and they reasoned that a stronger experiential effect for marijuana use might have been found when the students first used marijuana—probably when they were in high school.

This novelty explanation (later interpreted as a naivete effect by Minor and Harry, 1985, and then as a combined novelty-naivete effect by Paternoster, et al., 1985) suggests that the important factor in determining one's assessment of arrest probability is whether or not a person has engaged in the particular crime, and that how often one commits the crime would be of little importance. Most previous studies have either not had an available measure of the frequency of offending (λ in the criminal careers literature), or have had a very restricted range of λ because of the populations being studied. Researchers have therefore tended to collapse any measures of frequency into simple dichotomous participation variables.
Because we asked detailed questions about frequency of offending and because we studied a sample with considerable variability in λ, we were able to assess the contribution of λ to subjective arrest probabilities. In Table 2 we look at the group of people active in each crime category to see whether the frequency of offending (λ) is related to perceptions of risk. We have already found that people who commit a particular crime view the likelihood of arrest for that crime as lower than do those who do not commit that crime. Now we ask whether, among those who participate, those who commit the crime more often see the probability of arrest as less likely than those who commit it less frequently. Table 2 shows that negative correlations were obtained for every crime, and that these correlations were significant at the .01 level for burglary, assault, and forgery/bad checks. Thus it appears there is some tendency for additional involvement in the crime to further lower the estimates of arrest likelihood. In other words, at least for some crimes, the experiential effect reflects frequency of offending as well as participation in the crime.

(Table 2 About Here)

The findings on the relationship between frequency of offending and estimates of arrest likelihood may be misleading if offending experience and sanctions experience interact as we have suggested they do. In other words, if the critical experience influencing risk perceptions is the ratio of sanctions to offenses, then considering the absolute number of offenses would
result in weaker relationships. Thus we next explore the role of sanctions in determining risk perceptions. In Table 3 we compare the correlations between three different measures of formal sanctions and estimates of likelihood of arrest.

(Table 3 About Here)

PERCEPTIONS OF RISK AND EXPERIENCE OF FORMAL SANCTIONS

With lifetime total arrests as the measure of formal sanctions, we find inverse correlations with risk perceptions for every crime. Only one of those correlations, however, is significant at the .05 level. When the number of crime-specific arrests is considered as the measure of formal sanctions, the correlations are positive for some crimes and negative for others, and only three of the correlations are significant at the .05 level. When the measure of formal sanctions is the ratio of arrests to crimes committed, every correlation is positive, and correlations for seven of the crimes—burglary, business robbery, personal robbery, theft, auto theft, forgery/bad checks, and drug dealing—are significant. The only crimes for which the correlations between estimates of arrest likelihood and actual experienced arrest ratio are not significant are assault and fraud.

The negative correlations between lifetime arrests and perceived certainty of arrest for specific crimes were not even in the direction that would be predicted for sanction variables. Richards and Tittle (1982) also found negative, although non-
significant correlations, between perceived arrest chances and their measure of lifetime arrests. We suspect that the lifetime arrests variable is closely related to overall depth of criminal involvement, and thus actually reflects a general lowering of perceptions of arrest certainty by those who commit extensive crimes. These results indicate that, in order to effectively test hypotheses regarding deterrent or experiential effects, sanctions variables as well as offending variables need to be crime-specific.

Our comparison of different measures of sanctions experience clearly demonstrates that frequency of offending and frequency of sanctions must be considered together in order to fully understand how one's personal history of sanctions affects perceptions of risk. Being arrested a greater number of times does not necessarily lead an individual to increase the assessment of arrest risk. An increased number of arrests raises estimates of arrest likelihood only if that number is large relative to the number of crimes committed. In the same manner, committing an offense more frequently does not continue to lower the perceptions of risk unless the number of offenses is large relative to the number of sanctions.

LEVEL OF RISK PERCEPTION

At this point we consider how the risk perceptions of people inactive in a crime compare to those of active participants with different sanction experiences. Participation in the crime
lowers perceptions of risk, and experience of sanctions raises the perceptions, but do arrest experiences bring perceptions back to the level of the inactive group—or perhaps to a higher level? Table 4 presents the mean ratings of arrest probability by crime type for four groups: active offenders who did not experience an arrest; active offenders whose arrest ratio was lower than .50, active offenders with an arrest ratio higher than .50, and those individuals inactive in the particular crime. Thus we compare the inactive group with three groups that were active but varied in how successful they were in offending.

(The Table 4 About Here)

The general pattern seen is that those who have committed the crime without being arrested have the lowest estimates of arrest probability, that estimates of risk increase as the arrest ratio increases, and that the inactive group still has the highest estimates of arrest likelihood. Offenders apparently have to be sanctioned for at least half of the crimes they commit for their estimates of arrest probability to even return to a level approaching that of the estimates made by those who do not participate in the crime.

CONCLUSION

The findings on sanctions variables indicate that it is necessary to use a relative measure that takes into account the number of crimes being committed. The data indicate, at least
for certain crimes, that perceptions are formed in a rational manner, with likelihood of arrest being judged on the basis of how many times a person has been able to commit the crime without being arrested.

In an early study comparing the self-perceived likelihood of arrest between delinquents and non-delinquents, Claster (1967) concluded that the delinquents' lower estimates of arrest probability were evidence for the "magical immunity" mechanism posited by psychoanalytic ego psychology. The lower estimates were thus seen as a reflection of the delinquent's distorted self-perception—a "delusion of arrest immunity." More recently, the lower estimates of certainty of punishment by individuals with experience in committing the crime have been viewed in quite a different light. Instead of being viewed as delusional, the risk perceptions of active offenders are likely to be viewed as realistic reflections of actual arrest rates, and the higher estimates of non-offenders are viewed as exaggerated estimates of certainty of punishment. Thus Jensen (1969) and Minor and Harry (1982) refer to the "naivete" of inexperienced individuals who judge arrest to be highly likely, and Paternoster, et al. (1983) suggest that people who engage in illegal acts without getting caught may be expected to lower their estimates of the probability of getting caught because, by engaging in forbidden behavior without being sanctioned, they may empirically refute their earlier estimates of the risks involved (p. 458, footnote 3).

Similarly, Parker and Grasmick (1979) reason that

If burglars and potential burglars in a community tend
to interact with one another and share their experiences, these people should have accurate estimates of the certainty of arrest (p. 377).

Our orderly findings on how offending experience and individual sanctioning experience affect subjective estimates certainly suggest a rational process at work rather than a delusional process. Those individuals who committed an offense and were not arrested had the lowest estimates of arrest certainty. As the ratio of arrests to offenses increased, so did estimates of arrest certainty, with the estimates of those with arrest ratios greater than .50 being very close to those who were not active in the crime. This evidence of the rational formation of risk perceptions is important for any deterrence theory that assumes perceived sanctions to be an important mechanism linking objective sanctions to criminal behavior. Further research is needed to determine how other factors contribute to the formation of risk perceptions within and across individuals.
APPENDIX

Measurement of $A^4$

The respondent was shown a 36-month calendar with nine crimes listed for each month. The interviewer marked out any months during which the respondent had been locked up and all months after the arrest that led to the current incarceration, and then asked for each target crime, whether during the remaining "street months" the respondent had done any ________ (burglaries, for example). If the answer was "no," the interviewer skipped to the next target crime. If "yes," then we asked the respondent to indicate whether he had done 1 to 10 or 11 or more. If he answered "1 to 10," he specified how many, and then indicated on the calendar during which months he did those burglaries.

If the respondent reported having committed 11 or more burglaries during the reference period, the interview proceeded in a different manner. The interviewer showed him the crime calendar and first asked him to point to the months during which he did no burglaries. The interviewer then entered a "0" in the space beside "burglary" for those months. Next, the interviewer asked the respondent to think about months when he was doing burglaries at low, medium, or high rates, and told him to define those rates with any numbers he wanted. First the respondent was asked to indicate the months when he was doing burglaries at a "low" rate; the interviewer entered a "1" in the space next to "burglary" for those months. At that point the respondent's
The definition of "low" rate was established by asking him how often he usually did burglaries during those "low" rate months. He was given choices that led to specifying how many burglaries per day, week, or month he committed.

The interviewer then proceeded in the same manner to have the respondent identify months with "medium" and "high" rates of committing burglaries. Respondents were not forced to use all levels of responding, but they were asked to specify either zero or a "low," "medium," or "high" rate for every month.

For those who reported committing 11 or more crimes, the computation of $\lambda$ was fairly complex. Let us take an example of a respondent who has a 32 month measurement period, of which 6 months were spent in jail, giving him 26 street months. Of those 26 months, he identified 16 months during which he did no burglaries, 3 as months during which he did burglaries at a "low" rate, 5 as "medium" rate months, and 2 as months during which he did burglaries at a "high" rate. In the follow-up questions, we determined that, to him, doing burglaries at a "low" rate meant 2 per month, a "medium" rate meant 1 per week, and a "high" rate meant 2 per day and usually 4 days per week. Thus we will calculate his "low" rate as 2 per month, his "medium" rate as 4.3 per month (1/week x 4.3 weeks), and his "high" rate at 34.4 per month (2/day x 4 days/week x 4.3 weeks). We can then calculate his annualized burglary rate as:

$$\lambda = \text{total burglaries} \times \frac{12 \text{ months/year}}{\text{street months}}$$

$$= ((6 \times 0) + (3 \times 2) + (5 \times 4.3) + (2 \times 34.4)) \times \frac{12}{26}$$

21
= 96.3 \times 12/26
= 44.45 \text{ burglaries/year}

If the same respondent had reported doing a total of 8 burglaries (his original response was "1 to 10"), then his \( \lambda \) would be 8 \times 12/26 or 3.69 burglaries/year.
Table 1. Relationship Between Perceived Likelihood of Arrest and Participation in Specific Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business robbery</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal robbery</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto theft</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery/bad checks</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug dealing</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05    **p<.01
Table 2. Relationship Between Perceived Likelihood of Arrest and Frequency of Offending for Those Active in Specific Crimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>r</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business robbery</td>
<td>-.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal robbery</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto theft</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forgery/bad checks</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug dealing</td>
<td>-.08</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05  **p<.01
Table 3. Relationship Between Perceived Likelihood of Arrest and Experienced Sanctions for Those Active in Crime Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Lifetime Arrests</th>
<th>Crime Specific # Arrests</th>
<th>Crime Specific Arrest Ratio</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.26**</td>
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<td>Business robbery</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.44**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal robbery</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.36*</td>
<td>.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.19**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auto theft</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.30**</td>
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<td>Forgery/bad checks</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
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<td>Fraud</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug dealing</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05    **p<.01
Table 4. Mean Ratings of Likelihood of Arrest for Specific Crimes by Groups with Different Crime and Sanction Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Active-Arrest Not Arrested &lt; .50</th>
<th>Active-Arrest Ratio &gt; .50</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>34.92</td>
<td>33.62</td>
<td>51.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business robbery</td>
<td>26.17</td>
<td>51.25</td>
<td>63.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal robbery</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>63.75</td>
<td>53.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>64.32</td>
<td>59.42</td>
<td>68.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>29.62</td>
<td>34.77</td>
<td>50.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto theft</td>
<td>29.52</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>49.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery/bad checks</td>
<td>54.13</td>
<td>59.07</td>
<td>71.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>56.79</td>
<td>57.50</td>
<td>73.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug dealing</td>
<td>41.09</td>
<td>53.73</td>
<td>77.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05    **p<.01
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NOTES

1. The first study (Horney and Marshall, 1991) tested a new method of asking about frequency of criminal offending. Interviews were conducted with 403 newly sentenced inmates during 1988-89. In the second study (Horney and Marshall, 1992) that new method was experimentally compared with the method used in the RAND Second Inmate Survey. In addition, the experimental method was used to ask again about offending frequencies after those in the control condition had answered questions asked in the RAND method. A total of 700 respondents were interviewed in the second study during 1989-90. For this analysis we have combined the data sets since the variables we are considering were measured in the same way. Complete data were available for 1061 respondents out of the total 1103 interviewed (42 inmates in the control group were not asked the supplemental crime rate questions in addition to the RAND questions).

2. The 403 respondents from the first study represent 77% of the inmates admitted to the state Diagnostic and Evaluation Unit during a nine month period. Some admissions were missed because they did not come when the correctional officer conveyed our request that they report to the visiting room (they may or may not have known the reason for the request), and some were transferred out of the institution before we could interview them. The response rate among the inmates who met with an interviewer to have the study explained was 98.5%. In the second study, improved procedures for requesting a meeting with the inmate resulted in our being able to interview 90% of all males admitted to the Department of Corrections during the second nine-month period. Our interviewers met with a total of 746 inmates to explain the study and invite participation; 94% of that group completed the interviews.

3. We also asked about rape. The overall number of respondents who admitted to committing rapes was so small that the results are not presented here.

4. The procedures for determining frequency of offending are described more fully in Horney and Marshall, 1991.