DRUGS AND PUBLIC HOUSING: TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE POLICE RESPONSE

Draft Final Report
submitted to
The National Institute of Justice

by

Sampson Annan
Police Foundation
Washington, DC

Wesley G. Skogan
Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL

August 13, 1991

Prepared under Grant 89-DD-CX-0054 from the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S.Department of Justice.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to express our sincere appreciation to those who provided assistance and guidance for the successful completion of this evaluation. The individuals who played important roles in the two-site evaluation include, police administrators and detectives; government officials, researchers and residents of public housing developments in Denver and New Orleans. Without attempting to cite each one individually, we would like to mention those whose help, at one point or another, was indispensable.

Our first acknowledgments are to the project staff of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), particularly to Program Manager, Craig Uchida, for his guidance, contributions and active participation, throughout the course of the study.

We also want to thank Fred Heinzelmann, Frank Vaccarella, and Edwin Zedlewski for their inputs at different stages of the evaluation, particularly during the working meetings.

We would like to thank the men and women of the Denver and New Orleans Police Departments who made it all happen. Chief Aristedes Zavaras of DPD and Superintendent Warren Woodfork of NOPD allowed us complete and unrestricted access to their departments. Their command staffs gave us full cooperation throughout the evaluation period.

In Denver, Division Chief C. Jerry Kennedy, Captain Rudy Sandoval, Lt. Fred Carter, Sgt. Joe Black and Sgt. Rick Castricone (now a Lieutenant), were always available for informal discussions. We thank the four NEPHU detectives who patiently put up with our evaluation efforts and shared their thoughts and experiences with us throughout the year.

In the Denver Department of Safety, we are grateful to Steve Brown, Research Director, who offered the department's computer capabilities for our research efforts. Working tirelessly and without complaint, Chris Eiss did the programming for the computer mapping of recorded crime and arrests for all the housing developments and the city as a whole. She also provided the data for our independent analysis. Her contribution to this report should not be overlooked.

A special thanks is also extended to the Denver Public Housing Authority (DHA) staff, particularly, the then security director, Bill Martinez, for sharing his knowledge and expertise with us. The contributions of the Resident Managers, Paul Goldman and Esther Campbell made all the difference in our survey efforts. Paul Goldman deserve our special thanks, providing the office space and telephone for our research assistant during the three waves of surveys.

In New Orleans, Ellen McKinnon, Senior Planner for the Department, gave us valuable information about the development and implementation of NEPHU and assisted us in recruitment and hiring of site observers. Lt. Robert Williams, the initial commander of NEPHU, was always there when we needed him, regardless of how demanding or inopportune our requests. His knowledge and understanding of our evaluation goal was critical in getting the Department's approval for our initial design.

We also thank Lt. James Eaton, who later assumed the responsibility of unit commander, for his cooperation and understanding during the evaluation period. His insights about enforcement narcotics strategies left us with lasting impressions. The two sergeants, Ronald Johnson and Jimmy Scott, and their detectives were very helpful to us throughout the evaluation period; accommodating our schedules during the numerous site visits and making sure of our safety during the ride-alongs. They were always available for informal chats and discussions. We also owe special gratitude to the Det. Barry Fletcher, the office administrator, for freely sharing his knowledge and understanding of the operations of the unit and for providing us with reports that contributed to this draft report.

The staff of the Police Foundation provided wholehearted assistance. Jo Anna Besseghini, our research assistant in Denver, was the eyes and ears of the research team. She documented all the program implementation, went on ride-alongs and raids; interviewed local knowledgeables; assisted in hiring and training and supervised interviewers for the resident surveys. Her final report on program implementation contributed greatly to this report.

We also thank Hattie Matthews for assisting in interviewer training and supervising all data collection and preparation activities; Teresa Bishop for helping with coding and machine editing; and Virginia Burke, Kenneth Brunk, Linda Edwards, Connie Uchida for their spirit of cooperation when they were called upon to help with the tedious task of data cleaning. Virginia Burke deserves extra special thanks for putting up with inconsistencies in report format and producing this document.

Finally, we want to express our gratitude to the many residents of public housing developments in Denver and New Orleans who gave us interviews and spoke candidly about the drug and crime problems in their neighborhood. They remain anonymous but not unappreciated.

Sampson O. Annan
Wesley Skogan

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

DRUGS AND PUBLIC HOUSING

This report describes two police programs that tackled drug problems in public housing. The programs were fielded in housing developments in Denver and New Orleans, by special Narcotics Enforcement in Public Housing Units (NEPHUs). Their efforts were supported by grants from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). Both developments were primary enforcement oriented and employed traditional policing methods, but the special units focused new energy and resources on a problem that otherwise was not being squarely addressed in the two cities. In both cities it was apparent that the police were not devoting sufficient attention to drug sale and use in public housing, and that they were not working in cooperation with the management of those developments to help residents deal with their problems.

The drug problem takes on an added dimension in the special environment created by public housing. The people who live there are especially poor and particularly vulnerable to exploitation by narcotics traffickers. Their community is difficult to defend, especially on their own, and crime rates often are very high. The government has special responsibility for protecting them, for it builds and manages the developments, decides who can live there, and plays a large role in shaping the quality of residents' daily lives (Weisel, 1990). The programs described here represent a new attempt by the government to shoulder this responsibility.

This assessment of these special programs was conducted by the Police Foundation, under the sponsorship of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). The assessment involved observations by local evaluators, site visits by professional experts, and the collection of quantitative data on both the progress of the programs and their consequences for the lives of residents in the target housing developments. The evaluation had both a *process* and an *outcome* focus. The process evaluation examined the way in which the programs were *implemented* and *the extent of program activity* over the course of the year-long evaluation. The outcome evaluation addressed two questions: *did drug availability in the target housing developments decline, and were there ancillary benefits of targeting drug trafficking* (e.g., did this also reduce levels of crime, disorder, and fear in the developments)? This report describes what we learned about drug enforcement in public housing.

Trends in Drugs and Public Housing

There is some evidence of progress in the fight against drugs. Indicators of the extent of use, such as hospital emergency room visits for drug-related episodes and responses to selfreport studies of drug use, all suggest that society as a whole may be "over the hump." Reports of hospital emergency room visits for cocain-e-related treatment passed their peak in January, 1989, and have been trending downward since that time. National studies of self-reported drug use indicate that drug use has been trending down, most sharply among persons under 26 years of

age and since about 1985. The latest (1990) Monitoring the Future study of high school seniors shows a significant downturn in the use of drugs of all kinds, and steady yearly declines in self-reported use since 1985. The same series of surveys points to sharp increases in the perception that drug use is harmful, beginning in 1986. However, they also show a general increase during the 1980s in the percentage of high school seniors who say that drugs are "fairly easy" or "very easy" to get, a figure that now stands near its all-time high of about 60 percent. This suggests that the apparent decline in drug use among high school seniors may be attributable to reduced demand rather than and constriction in supply (ISR Newsletter, 1991).

However, there is also disturbing evidence that drug use has become even more concentrated among hard-core users, and that their levels of drug use have been increasing rather than declining. This has paralleled a large jump in the drug related homicide count in many cities. Also, while self-reported drug use has declined among all racial groups since 1985, these declines recently have slowed for blacks. The Monitoring the Future surveys which suggest declining drug use include only high school seniors, but most observers would agree that the highest--risk youths have already dropped out of that category. Drug use rates are also higher among blacks than whites, and perhaps as a result, drug <u>arrests</u> have become increasingly concentrated in black communities. In 1989, FBI figures indicate that 41 percent of those arrested on drug charges were black, up from 38 percent in 1988. Drug use is also endemic among those who are arrested;

depending upon the city, between 55 and 80 percent of arrestees test positive for some form of drug use (National institute of Justice, 1990a).

Public housing is an arena in which government has particular responsibility for order maintenance and crime control. Government, in the form of the local Public Housing Authority (PHA), is "the landlord." It has a responsibility to use its powers to ensure the health and safety of public housing residents. In many respects, public housing developments—and in particular relatively small, low-rise developments like those in Denver—also can be treated as residential neighborhoods. As such, it makes sense to try to mobilize community residents to try to do things on their own to combat drug use and crime, and to cooperate with the police to regain control over conditions there.

Generally the residents of public housing are very poor. There are local and state-level variations in income requirements, but nonelderly public housing residents usually must be single, unemployed, and have children in order to qualify for public housing. In reality this means that the vast bulk of family heads are female, and they are disproportionately racial and cultural minorities. This pattern intensified during the 1980s, for Department of Housing and Urban Development (DHUD) policies have kept out all but the poorest new tenants.

In a period during the late 1950s and early 1960s, DHUD also permitted the construction of high-rise housing for these poor families. It was quickly obvious that the concentration of large numbers of young families under such circumstances had untoward outcomes, and by 1980 most public housing units for families

(more than 75 percent) were in low-rise buildings of less than 5 stories. Only 7 percent of family public housing complexes are composed of highrise buildings (Bratt, 1986). Generally, highrise public housing is reserved for the elderly and other special populations. While nation-wide slightly more than half of public housing developments are small (including fewer than 200 units), some can be quite large even if they are not highrise in character. Two of the developrnents involved in our New Orleans evaluation had over 8,000 official residents, and sprawled over vast tracts of land.

Too much public housing is also seriously deteriorated. Many developments were not well constructed at the outset, and financial constraints have prevented many local PHAs from properly maintaining their buildings. Despite two waves of modernization by HUD during the 1970s and 1980s, many public housing developments are visibly decayed and marred by vandalism. Trash-strewn grounds and broken windows signal that the buildings are out of anyone's control, and invite troublemakers in.

Also, few public housing developments were constructed with security in mind. They often were built in neighborhoods that were poor to start with, with already high rates of crime. Even highrise buildings were constructed with multiple access points, making them difficult to close to unwanted traffic; in low-rise units like those in Denver and New Orleans it is effectively impossible to keep out nonresidents. Criminals can work with virtual impunity in the stairwells and breezeways; doors are often flimsy and windows easy to crawl through. Residents

lack the capacity to defend themselves, be it against predators, gangs looking for revenge, or drug dealers engaged in turf wars or intimidation.

Enforcement as a Prevention Strategy

There are a number of potential policy responses to the problem of drugs in public housing. The enforcement efforts that are being evaluated in New Orleans and Denver are but one of a number of possible approaches to the issue. (We review some of these nonenforcement strategies in Chapter 4, which places the Denver and New Orleans efforts in perspective.) Even in the enforcement category there are a number of specific strategies that can be brought to bear on the problem. It is useful to categorize them by their role in the "program theory" underlying this approach. One element of the program theory is that enforcement may *increase the real and perceived risk of punishment* that is associated with involvement in drugs. Another element is that enforcement may *increase the price and decrease the availability* of drugs. Enforcement may play a role in *breaking the cycle of peer and role-model support* for drug involvement that plagues too many communities. Finally, enforcement may *reestablish the authority of rules of conduct*, a factor that may have multiple benefits for affected communities. While they are obviously related, this division of the theoretical foundations of drug enforcement policy provides a useful way of organizing and examining the potential impact of various enforcement strategies.

Increasing Real and Perceived Risk of Punishment

Deterrence theory recommends that society could attack drug problems by raising the potential cost of involvement. This includes raising the risk of apprehension, conviction, and punishment for being involved in the supply side of the drug trade or as a consumer, so that the potential costs of this involvement outweigh the potential benefits. Presumably, a number of the tactics employed by police to raise these risks will spill over into general crime prevention as well. Thus, neighborhood oriented drug enforcement may simultaneously serve to control crime as well as suppress the drug trade.

There are a number of specific tactics that police employ to raise the risks associated with involvement in drug cultures. The real and perceived risk associated with drug involvement might be enhanced by high visibility patrols. "Drive-by" customers might be deterred from making purchases, or even from coming to the area, by frequent motorized and foot patrols. Street dealers might feel threatened as well, but they are more likely to be affected by more vigorous tactics. These could include sweeping stop-and-search operations, car-search roadblocks, enforcement of nuisance ordinances (for example, curfew laws or ordinances against blocking the sidewalk), and making disorderly conduct arrests. Highly visible drug arrests during raids on apartments involved in dealing and by "jump-out" teams can also help spread the message locally that drug dealing is a risky enterprise. Some jurisdictions have experimented with "reverse stings" in which undercover police pose as drug dealers and make arrests of customers, but these

are of doubtful legality. The stakes involved may be further enhanced by a program of vigorous prosecution of drug arrestees. The specialized nature of NEPHUs may help them make both more and highly credible drug arrests, and the emphasis that their existence signals may encourage prosecutors to pursue their cases with special energy.

Increasing Prices and Decreasing Availability

Enforcement and a related series of strategies presumably could make drugs both more expensive and more difficult to obtain. They rely upon the fact that the drug business is indeed a market. As such, drug dealers share a great deal in common with other kinds of businesses. They need to find reliable suppliers of goods, set up and staff local distribution networks, monitor the honesty of their sales force, organize their cash flow, keep their costs under control, set prices at levels that maximize gain, guard the quality of their product (and perhaps some brand loyalty by naming it), keep customers satisfied at a price-quality sales point, respond to competition, and whenever possible use new technology (eg, beepers and cellular car phones) to achieve these ends. They also have a high need to avoid excessive regulation and becoming ensnared in legal problems (National Institute of Justice, 1990b; Ward, 1990).

Police and the rest of the criminal justice system can attack drug problems by disrupting the efficiency of this market through enforcement programs that increase the price and decrease the availability of illicit drugs. This can be partially

accomplished by an aggressive campaign against street-level drug retailers. This includes "buy-bust" arrests by undercover officers, who purchase drugs and then immediately make an arrest. Off the street, most police departments rely on "controlled buys" by informants (usually themselves addicts) that are then used to gain search warrants. In both cases, dealers are arrested, drugs and some money are seized, and sometimes vehicles, weapons, and other kinds of contraband are confiscated. Sometimes warrant and on-view drug arrests are preceded by efforts to building intelligence files on suspected drug traffickers that identify their place of residence, sources of supply, and mode of doing business. The New Orleans Narcotics Enforcement in Public Housing Unit did just this, as described in Chapter 3.

When private dwellings are being employed in the drug trade, police can also urge prosecutors to use asset forfeiture, nuisance laws, and even health and safety codes to threaten their owners with fines and even confiscation of their property. Presumably this will encourage them to exert more control over the use of their property, and will make it more difficult for dealers to find save havens from which to operate. In public housing, management can threaten to evict leaseholders of apartments associated with the drug business, although as we learned in Denver and New Orleans, in practice this can be very difficult.

Most police narcotics units would like to use the information that they gather in their operations, and the informants that they can develop, to move upward in the drug distribution chain. To do so requires significant commitments

by their departments, however. Officers must be released from other duties for considerable amounts of time, and departments must be willing to forego a significant number of retail-level dealer arrests in the mean time. These operations also require a great deal of operating capital to pay informants and make large drug purchases, they cannot count on it being recovered.

In addition to making drugs more expensive, enforcement presumably increases the aggravation and time involved in finding suppliers; economists call this "search time." It also may drive away outsiders who commute into enforcement areas to buy drugs, although, of course, they may simply go somewhere else. This kind of deterrence or displacement is most likely to deter causal users without deep roots in the drug culture.

Breaking the Cycle of Support for Involvement

The cycle of support for drug use involves the cultural and peer group norms that characterize a community. Research on adolescent involvement in drugs suggests the importance of intervening in local cultures which appear to support drug involvement. That research suggests several conclusions. First, the onset of drug use is "contagious;" that is, it flows through the community via social contacts with current users. Patterns of substance abuse onset (for example, how youths may move from cigarettes and alcohol to marijuana or cocaine) depend upon the structure of local drug markets. The progressive development of substance abuse habits depends on what is available on the local market. This sug-

gests that even moderate-term constrictions on the availability of drugs may undercut contagion processes, and delay—and perhaps forestall—the onset of drug use. Generally, early adoption of drugs predicts longer and more serious patterns of drug use and criminality, so making it more difficult for younger cohorts to obtain drugs may have aggregate benefits even if no ban can ever be completely successful.

Second, the perceived standards and behaviors of other youths are by far the strongest predictor of the nature and extent of drug involvement. Youths mimic behavior that they see being rewarded in others, both peers and adults. They perceive the community's "moral climate" through their beliefs about how their friends and family members behave, and what they seemingly can get away with. Association with drug-using peers socializes new entrants into that subculture, and weakens the effects of conventional social control. Research also indicates that drug use is a group activity, and that the sharing and bonding involved provides a significant proportion of the psychic satisfaction involved. Again, the earlier that youths are initiated into this culture, the longer and more serious their anticipated criminal career.

These propositions suggest that aggressive enforcement efforts may help break the self-reinforcing cycle by which apparently rewarding involvement with drugs begets further abuse. This will not be easy, for the drug economy can permeate a public housing development. The most affluent adult males in the housing development may be involved in drug sales. Mothers lend out their apart-

ments to shelter dealing. Youths find it easy to make money as order-takers, runners and drug holders. Dealers distribute jackets and gym shoes to younger children, to build their popularity and garner cooperation. Finally, the threat of retaliation holds back potential informants and witnesses, and makes people fearful of cooperating with the authorities. To be sure, most efforts to break this self--reinforcing cycle probably will not involve the police at all; they are more properly the domain of schools, families, youth and treatment programs, and social welfare agencies.

Obviously, interventions that successfully raise the risk of punishment, raise the cost of drugs, and reduce their availability, could contribute to breaking the cycle of support for involvement in the drug culture. However, recognizing the importance and complexity of intervening in the self-reinforcing nature of local drug cultures, the Bureau of Justice Assistance called for departments to include community outreach and drug education program in their NEPHU proposals, and both Denver and New Orleans did. One of the best-known drug education programs—DARE—was originated by the Los Angeles Police Department, and it is common for local police departments to sponsor similar programs. Both Denver and New Orleans applied for money to purchase audiovisual equipment to show drug education videos, for similar educational purposes.

Most research on drug education has focused on school-based programs. Programs that *disseminate information* on the harmful effects of involvement in drugs, and sometimes appeal to moral or religious objections to illicit drug use,

stress the health and social hazards of drug use. Many of these programs aim at enhancing the fears of potential users by dramatizing the potential dangers of drug use. They are based on the assumption that if people know what the dangers of drug use are, they will act lawfully out of self-interest. Evaluations indicate that informational campaigns can be very successful at communicating new and accurate information; however, there is no evidence that they prevent or even reduce substance abuse. Knowledge has no impact on self-reports of drug use, nor on stated intentions to avoid drug use.

Other prevention programs involve *affective education*. They assume that substance abuse is encouraged by low self esteem and poor personal decision-making skills. These programs attempt to enrich the personal lives of participants by helping them develop interpersonal skills, self-understanding, and supportive friendships. They emphasize helping participants think about their own attitudes and values, and encouraging them to act upon these standards of personal conduct. Although they seem attractive, evaluations of these programs also indicate that they do not affect substance abuse. They can improve self-esteem, personal confidence, and knowledge about drug risks, but they do not change self-reported behavior patterns.

A third group of programs focus on a factor that research indicates lies at the heart of drug-related activity, peer groups. These *social pressures competence* programs teach participants how to evaluate peer and media pressures to become involved in drugs, the importance of building friendship networks of like-minded

people, how to recognize situations in which they will be expected by peers to use drugs, and how to counter those social pressures. These have been the most successful programs. Evaluations indicate that they can reduce levels of participation in drug use and that those effects persist over time. They have also proved effective among special groups of particularly high-risk youths. (For a detailed analysis of drug education programs, see Botvin, 1990).

Reestablishing Community Authority

The final piece of the drug enforcement puzzle involves communities. Enforcement may help reestablish the authority of communities over the conduct of their members, and in doing so provide an important supplement to the efforts of enforcement agencies. Problems with drugs and crime undercut traditional sources of authority in neighborhoods, including family and neighborly relationships, schools, and churches. The flagrant marketing of drugs and the lavish lifestyles of those on the business end of it challenge the legitimacy of their messages. Open trafficking and gang activity undermines community morale. Neighbor is pitted against neighbor as addiction spreads and youths are drawn into the business. People grow anxious yet apathetic, they do not know who to trust, and they withdraw from community affairs. Slowly the capacity of the community to respond to problems on its own diminishes.

Kelling (1988) and others argue that the police, working in concert with local groups, can help revitalize these communities and help them devise their own

defenses against drugs and crime. They can do so by adopting problem-oriented policing and community policing strategies which involve working with local residents to identify and solve problems, and build local problem-solving organizations. Moreover, because drug problems are so widespread (recall that nearly 60 percent of high school seniors thought drugs were easily available), communities must develop internal controls; the police simply cannot do it on their own.

> ... [S]uccess in confronting drug trafficking depends as much (and perhaps more) on the community's self defense than on official police effort. Where community will and capacity for self-defense are strong, a little official policing goes a long way to keep the neighborhood free of drugs. Where it is weak, even heavy doses of official policing will not get the job done (Moore, 1989: 4).

The Challenge of Research on Enforcement

Research on the efficacy of drug enforcement tactics is mixed. In general, research on police "crackdowns" suggests that they can successfully deter target behaviors during the special enforcement period; there is also some evidence of "residual" deterrence which persists after the program ends or those special efforts are shifted elsewhere (Sherman, 1990). However, evaluations of drug crackdowns suggest that they have some limits. At first, drug sweeps generally push up arrest rates and lower crime rates in target areas. However, there is evidence that the initial deterrent effects of drug crackdowns subside fairly rapidly, even while the programs are still in operation. Where levels of street sales continue to be low, it is not clear whether this is because there is less drug activity, or if it is because dealers and their potential customers have adapted successfully to new conditions.

One significant form of adaptation is displacement, and it may be that some or almost all of the activity in a drug market may simply move somewhere else. Dealers may set up shop in new locations, although they may find this dangerous if the new locations are already staked out by someone else. Alternately, many customers may simply migrate from impacted areas to markets elsewhere. This recommends that crackdowns encompass a broad market area, which may be impossible in metropolitan jurisdictions. It also appears that drug activity quickly reverts to normal at the conclusion of special enforcement programs. The underlying demand for drugs has not gone away, and new suppliers emerge quickly to supply it; the strength of the drug market is such that there is no apparent residual deterrence from transient crackdowns.

There is also evidence that some drug crackdowns have increased levels of predatory crime. This is one foreseeable effect of successfully increasing the market price of drugs, for very large proportions of those arrested for predatory street crimes are drug users; in the two cities examined in this report it was about 60 percent (National Institute of Justice, 1990a). An increase in burglary and robbery rates has been observed in several evaluations of drug crackdowns, while others have found the opposite (Sherman, 1990; Moore, 1988). In addition, police disruption of established distribution systems may have sparked some of the wave of drug-related homicide that has swept many large cities; some of the most visible of these killings reflect wars to recapture control of lucrative sales areas (Reuter, et al, 1988). Of course, this is not the presumed long run effect of narcotics enforce-

ment. Moore and Kleiman (1989) argue that effective drug enforcement "... *opens an avenue* for reducing the robberies, burglaries, and petty thefts that have long been the focus of the police" (our emphasis). They are not specific about the causal linkage between drugs and predatory crime, but imply that is because drug users are driven to crime (or, more likely, to more crime) to support their proclivity. The preventive link may be through the general deterrent effects of special police attention to an area, combined with the incapacitative effect of netting significant numbers of local criminals.

One problem with an enforcement emphasis in drug control policy is that there is evidence the deterrence model that underlines much of it—reducing levels of drug dealing and use by inflicting appropriate levels of pain—does not work very well (or at least very easily) for many people in high-risk populations. The benefits of participation can be very great, and the often lavish lifestyles of successful dealers advertise this point widely in poor communities. Those involved in the trade may not be very "risk averse," and alternative forms of criminality may in fact be riskier. Their opportunities for legitimate alternative employment may be slim as well as unappealing. The "opportunity costs" born by those caught up in the arms of the law—including lost jobs, expulsion from school, and stained reputations—may not be very substantial. All of this suggests that enforcement is more likely to significantly threaten middleclass people with something to lose, but not America's urban underclass. This is consonant with the changing patterns of

drug use that we observed above—in the aggregate, those who do have something to lose have already changed their behavior markedly.

Police departments historically have wavered between aggressive campaigns against street sales and long-term investigations aimed at wholesale and importer-level operators. However, it appears that the drug business is much more heterogeneous and decentralized than "Mr. Big" theories suggested; the business is not dominated by drug kingpins whose arrest would cause large scale distribution networks to fall apart. Many people are involved, and there are many alternative sources of supply even for the same kind of drugs. Most drugs are supplied by numerous small and transitory groups, and it is very difficult to conduct the kind of extensive (and expensive) surveillance operations that would be required to prosecute them successfully (Moore, 1988). These operations also require a considerable amount of operating capital; narcotics units can be expected to recover a substantial percentage of this investment on occasion, but like any form of venture capital, their confidential funds are at risk. In a cash-strapped city like New Orleans, NEPHU's federally-supplied confidential funds played an important role in helping them to operate effectively, and to occasionally penetrate middle-level drug markets. Many local police departments also find attempts to penetrate higher-level drug operations resource intensive, time consuming, and not very productive.

This implies that municipal enforcement operations should be aimed at street-level dealers. Enforcement work at this level can generate large numbers of

easy arrests; the small NEPHU in New Orleans made more than 800 arrests in less that a year of active operations. However, street dealers are very numerous and fast-moving, and easily replaced. It may be the case that aggressive campaigns against the lowest-level street dealers increase the number of people involved in the drug business, because the market so effectively induces others to quickly step in to fill their shoes. As a result, it may be that street-level crackdowns can only hope to temporarily disrupt local supply lines, perhaps largely by displacing sales elsewhere. Kleiman (1989), Hayeslip (1989), and others argue that aggressive street-level enforcement does increase the expense and inconvenience involved in the business sufficiently to deter casual users, and that drug enforcement programs may have "spill-over" effect that help reduce on other kinds of street crime and disorder. Kleiman has argued that targeting drug networks may reduce other kinds of crime as a side-effect of incapacitating high-rate property criminals. However, the mixed results of evaluations of enforcement programs to date do not enable us to make a judgment about any of these claims.

There are limits to the efficacy of general sweeps and area crackdowns. As we learned in Denver (see Chapter 2), it can be difficult to press charges against those caught up in them without demonstrating very specific "probable cause" for doing so. The legality of the stop and search is the largest issue deciding the disposition of drug cases, and roadblocks, jump-out squads, and other crackdowns may be doubtful on this score. By their nature, area crackdowns also involve a transient investment in policing an area; they typically involve more officers than a

department could possibly commit there on a long-term basis. As we saw above, research suggests that there is little evidence of long-term effects of temporary crackdowns on the drug trade. Transient crackdowns also can lead to political problems when highly visible patrols must be removed from an area, as New York City found when it tried to take Operation Pressure Point teams out of drug-infested areas (National Institute of Justice, 1990b).

It is partly for this reason that Moore (1989) and others call for involving communities in their own defense against drugs. When special operations teams eventually move on, the residents remain behind to face the future. However, it will be difficult to mobilize community participation in the challenging environment presented by public housing. Moore (1989), Uchida, Forst & Annan (1990), and others have written persuasively about the need to involve the community in the war against drugs. "Indeed, without the community's own efforts at self-defense, it is hard to see how the police can possibly succeed" (Moore, 1989: 3). However, residents of public housing have few of the resources that seem to drive successful community organizing. There are no home owners; many residents are highly transient; there are few intact families; and an extremely large proportion of the residents of public housing are high-risk youths. Many residents are isolated (relatively few have cars), and it often is very dangerous to be outside after dark (Skogan, 1988). All of these factors would lead us to predict low levels of resident participation in community affairs, and this was in accord with our site ob-

servers' reports from Denver and New Orleans; the turnout at Resident Council and general meetings was generally slim.

Residents of public housing also are often distrustful of the police, whom they usually encounter only under stressful circumstances—when they call for assistance or when they are the targets of police investigations. Part of this tension dates to the period when racial rioting pitted Africa-Americans against mostly white police officers, and police were criticized by non-rioters for their aggressive actions (Weisel, 1990). It also stems partly from bad service. Police officers often are suspicious, or even fearful, of project residents, and often enter PHAs only in armed convoys. When they enter the developments, "police encounter unwilling or absent witnesses... and face difficulties of physical access and lack of knowledge about the property. Officers, easily identifiable, often encounter... elusive dealers being assisted, whether voluntarily or through coercion, by nearby residents" (Weisel, 1990: 50). Both of the programs that we evaluated principally got "community input" from anonymous calls to special drug hotlines. Hotlines provided safe and nonconfrontational ways for PHA residents to pass along information to the police, and our evaluation will consider what role they played in enforcement operations in the two cities.

It is also clear that the operation of the rest of the criminal justice system plays an important role in enhancing or muting the impact of special crackdowns. Currently, crowded conditions in jails, courtrooms, and prisons are working against enforcement policies. In many jurisdictions prosecutors are swamped with cases,

prisons are filled to over-capacity, and the jails are so full that arrestees for non-violent offenses cannot be held until their case is disposed of. For example, the latest figures available for Louisiana indicate that in 1987 the state's prisons were 99 percent full, and that Louisiana let out 1541 prisoners under "emergency release" provisions in order to make room for new ones. In 1988, Louisiana housed 25 percent of its convicted felons in local jails because there was no room for them in state institutions. Colorado did not make any emergency releases in 1987, but that state's prisons stood at 109 percent of their rated capacity (Skogan, 1990a: Table 10.3; Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1989: Table 6.4). These factors limit the effectiveness of the "arrest-prosecute-convict" model of deterrence which underlies crackdown strategies for controlling drug markets.

Drug treatment programs are at least as overloaded as the criminal justice system, and it is unlikely that large numbers of arrestees produced by enforcement programs will be diverted there, whatever their real needs. In 1987, Louisiana was utilizing 97 percent of the budgeted capacity of its drug treatment units (Sourcebook, 1989: Table 6.60).

In addition, the problem of corruption plagues drug enforcement efforts. Plainclothes operations draw police officers into close and potentially corrupting association with drug distributors. It is difficult to supervise their operations closely, and successful narcotics detectives encounter ample opportunities to steal cash and drugs from dealers, and to go into the business themselves. The business is awash with money, and some of the most vigorous arguments of the

proponents of a policy of drug legalization have focused on the corrosive effects of corruption on law enforcement and the political system. Corruption is also fueled by frustration and cynicism among narcotics officers. They feel handcuffed by the rules of criminal procedure, that they do not get the support they deserve from prosecutors and judges, and that very little happens to those they arrest. They do not get paid very much, while the criminals they deal with have lots of money. Concern about corruption also extends to the Housing Authorities, where staff members and security personnel can be tempted into participation in the drug business. Corruption problems were quick to emerge in some of the Housing Authorities and NEPHUs involved in this evaluation.

Finally, police drug enforcement in public housing takes place in an emotionally charged and potentially volatile environment. Even if they are conducted in strictly legal fashion, street sweeps, aggressive stop-and-frisk operations, car stops, apartment searches, and other enforcement tactics involve abrasive contacts between project residents and police. They take place in an environment where people too frequently believe that they are already not getting fair treatment by police, and where the police often come expecting trouble. Tactics like these triggered riots in American cities during the 1970s, and in Britain in the 1980s (Sherman, 1983). A balance must be maintained between the apparent law abidingness that the police can hope to impose on a community and the disturbance they may create while doing so. As Lawrence Sherman (1983) notes, "less law may produce more order."

This Evaluation

This evaluation examined the operation of NEPHUs in Denver and New Orleans. The two cities proposed programs touching on most of the major enforcement strategies described earlier.

The goal of the Denver NEPHU program was to reduce the availability of narcotics in public housing areas, and reduce levels of crime and fear. The program's goals included an increase in drug arrests in public housing and reductions in both violent and property crime. In Denver, NEPHU involved six fulltime officers. NEPHU used traditional enforcement methods—they made investigations and gathered intelligence leading to on-street arrests and search warrants. The Department also proposed to increase levels of uniformed patrol, to maintain high visibility in the project areas in order to deter conventional crime. NEPHU also proposed to conduct drug awareness programs within the developments; one of their goals was to "educate citizens in... tenant responsibility, crime prevention, and drug identification and suppression." The unit was to meet regularly with Tenant Councils in the developments to improve community relations, and they operated a special telephone drug hotline. They also planned to cooperate with the Denver Housing Authority and the uniformed patrol division of the Denver Police Department.

The New Orleans program also had as its goals the reduction of violent crime and narcotics dealing in public housing. The unit hoped to increase the sense of security among public housing residents, increase the risk of apprehension

among potential offenders in and around the developments, and increase residents' understanding of the severity of the narcotics problem and the ability of the police to tackle it. The unit also planned to develop intelligence files on individuals and gangs engaged in narcotics trafficking in public housing developments. The unit planned to seek resident input into their program through Tenant Advisory Councils that represent each development. They also advertised a special drug hotline, to encourage information sharing by the community. The police department proposed to augment the deterrent impact of undercover narcotics operations in the developments by assigning special uniformed patrols to those areas.

In both sites we conducted a process evaluation. We monitored the implementation of the program and observed it in operation. On-site observers gathered extensive information on levels of program effort, and on the activities that took place in and around the developments. We made extensive site visits and gathered quantitative indicators of the extent of program activity. In Denver our site observer logged the progress of all drug-related arrests made by NEPHU during the evaluation period. We also examined and coded the Denver NEPHU's daily activity reports to document the kind and extent of activity by NEPHU in selected housing developments. In New Orleans we tracked monthly levels of program activity using data produced by NEPHU's computerized intelligence files.

In Denver the evaluation also closely monitored several measures of possible program effects, including reported levels of drug availability in the developments and trends in levels of victimization, fear of crime, and residents' confi-

dence in the police. There we were able to field three waves of survey interviews that gathered independent information on these issues. In Denver the Department of Safety provided a great deal of archival data on recorded crimes and arrests, both for selected target developments and their surrounding areas. In New Orleans we conducted interviews with a panel of key local informants in three developments, once at the beginning of the NEPHU project and again a year later. These informants were positioned to be knowledgeable about the activities and experiences of many project residents.

Chapter 2 describes NEPHU activities in Denver, and Chapter 3 reviews events in New Orleans. Chapter 4 summarizes our conclusions, and remaining questions about enforcement as a strategy for responding to drug problems in public housing.

CHAPTER 2

DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN DENVER

The City and County of Denver, with a population of about 470,000, is on the western rim of the great plains directly in front of the looming wall of the Rocky Mountains. Because of its high location above sea level, Denver proudly calls itself The Mile-High City. The metropolitan area as a whole, has a population of about 1,623,00. The economy of Denver is based on government, high-tech industry, and services. The residents are mostly young, upscale professionals. According to the 1990 Census about 23 percent of the population is Hispanic, and about 13 percent is African-American.

The Denver Housing Authority provides shelter for about 25,000 people, half of whom live in distinct housing projects, one-quarter in scatter-site family housing, and one-quarter in senior or handicapped highrises. Overall, about two-thirds of DHA residents are of Hispanic origin, one-quarter are black, 7 percent are white non-Hispanics, and a small fraction are Asian or Native American in origin. As in other cities, they are poor and vulnerable to exploitation by narcotics traffickers, and unable to defend their special communities on their own.

Before the formation of its special housing project unit, narcotics enforcement in public housing was the responsibility of Denver's two regular drug units: the Street Narcotics Unit and the Crack Task Force, both under the command of the Vice and Drug Control Bureau. In addition, each police district had a tactical squad—or Special Crime Attack Team (SCAT)—that could be called

in to deal with specific situations. However, as in many cities, uniformed police and officers on narcotics assignments preferred to avoid working in public housing areas. As our field observer noted:

> Public housing residents are an object of scorn in the eyes of most narcotics officers, who shun working among these "low of the lowest." Hence, any unit whose activities are dedicated to this populace commands little departmental respect. In addition, because public housing residents normally occupy the lowest rung on the drug distribution ladder and infrequently deal large quantities of drugs, the "haul" in public housing rarely equals the vaunted seizures of other narcotics units. In narcotics work, where worth is measured in terms of impressive seizure statistics, policing in public housing couldn't compete. NEPHU was formed to lodge special responsibility for enforcement in those areas in the hands of a special unit, to overcome these obstacles.

Thus NEPHU was created to signal recognition of the importance of drug problems in public housing, to focus new energy and resources on it, and to affix responsibility for dealing with those problems to a distinct unit.

Denver's Program

The Plan

The goal of the Denver NEPHU program was to reduce the availability of narcotics in and around the City's public housing areas. It was anticipated this effort would have a number of "spin-off" consequences, including decreased levels of crime and fear, and increased confidence in police. The program goal stated in the City's original proposal included (1) a 48 percent increase in drug arrests in public housing; and (2) 10 percent reductions in both violent and property crime. These statistical goals were casually formed, however, and no one took them

seriously.

In their proposal, the City of Denver promised to implement a number of drug-reduction strategies. Some were to be carried out only by NEPHU; others were to involve the cooperation of the Denver Housing Authority (DHA), and sections of the uniformed patrol division of the Denver Police Department.

NEPHU was to involve six full-time officers, including a lieutenant, a sergeant, and four detectives. Grant funds paid their salaries and for overtime work in the unit, and paid other officers brought in to augment the team for specific investigations. NEPHU was to focus on traditional enforcement methods—making investigations and gathering intelligence leading to warrant searches and on-view arrests. Denver proposed to use confidential informants to purchase drugs, in order to develop information about drug availability. Grant funds were to be used both to purchase drugs and to compensate informants. This information then would be used to request search warrants from a judge, and searches and arrests would be made at target locations. NEPHU also planned to use unit officers to make street purchases of drugs, sometimes to immediately arrest sellers and sometimes to develop confidential informants. The unit was to work in unmarked cars (leased using project funds), wearing civilian clothes. They also proposed to purchase binoculars and night vision equipment for surveillance purposes, and a video camera for documenting team activities. While the evaluation involved only two developments, their responsibility would extend to all 10 major DHA projects and scatter-site public housing in the city. At the same

time, the Department proposed to increase levels of uniformed patrol, to maintain high visibility in the project areas in order to deter conventional crime.

NEPHU also proposed to conduct public education programs. They planned to conduct drug awareness programs within the housing developments. One of their proposed goals was to "educate citizens in .. tenant responsibility, crime prevention, and drug identification and suppression." For this purpose, they purchased a portable television/VCR system for showing video tapes. The unit also was to meet regularly with tenants of the projects and members of Tenant Councils, to "improve community relations between citizens of public housing and the Denver Police Department." They also operated a special Drug Hot Line, which was installed in the Vice and Drug Control Bureau's office. NEPHU also proposed to develop youth programs in the projects.

The Denver Housing Authority took on several project responsibilities. They took stepped-up measures to repair and repaint vandalized DHA units, and they also agreed to cooperate with NEPHU in an active eviction program that would eject arrestees on drug-related charges from the projects.

Program Startup

Denver's NEPHU plan was funded beginning in August, 1989. During August and September, unit members were selected and equipment (leased cars, phones, binoculars, computer/printer, and TV/VCR set) was procured. The grant included salaries for one lieutenant, one sergeant, and four detectives. The selection of the team relied heavily on volunteers. The lieutenant chosen to run

the unit was already working in the Drug Bureau, having commanded two existing 6-man Street Narcotics teams for 1½ years. He was a 29-year Department veteran who had previously served for thirteen years as a Patrol lieutenant, 4 years as a Burglary detective and a sergeant, three years in Internal Investigations, and six years in the Special Crime Attack Team (SCAT) as a sergeant and a detective. The sergeant volunteered from the ranks of the patrol division, but he had 2½ years prior narcotics experience as an officer and detective.

Four officers were selected from a list of twenty volunteers that was generated when word of the team's formation spread to the districts: three patrolmen from different districts and a fourth detective who transferred from the Fencing Unit within the Drug and Vice Bureau. The lieutenant and the sergeant wished to staff the unit with at least one female and one black officer, but no qualified applicants surfaced. Denver has relatively few black police officers, and NEPHU's inability to recruit one of them greatly hampered their undercover operations in some of the housing developments and the surrounding areas. In the end, the team consisted of one Hispanic and three Anglo (non-Hispanic white) officers, and a white sergeant. The Lieutenant was black, but he did not participate in field operations.

The first task of the unit was training. The staff attended a two-day drug training session designed and conducted primarily for beat patrolmen. There, they were taught the basics about writing search warrants, conducting interrogations, and entering buildings. After this class, the team members were turned loose to

do their learning in the field. During the year, each detective attended a DEA-sponsored Narcotics Identification School. In addition, three officers attended a Clandestine Laboratory School to become familiar with speedy lab operations. All the detectives took a 3-day wire-tapping course and attended a hands-on weapons training course taught by a Crack Task Force sergeant. One of the officers traveled to Chicago for an undercover officer techniques seminar.

However, adapting from patrol-oriented thinking to successful undercover work did not occur overnight. Top-flight narcotics officers spend years learning how to write incontestible warrants, how to develop and control dependable informants, how to perform fruitful surveillance, how to conduct productive interrogations, and how to piece together seemingly disjointed information to build tight, defensible cases. Many aspirants to narcotics work never attain that "sixth sense" which allows them to successfully second-guess "the dopers." Not surprisingly, NEPHU's effort to transform ordinary patrol officer into narcotics investigators took some time. Only after the unit hit its stride could its attention then turn to other aspects of the grant.

In addition, there were problems with the NEPHU staffing plan. The Denver Police Department's sick and vacation policy allows an officer a minimum of 36 days off per year, and all of the officers carried into their NEPHU assignment a great deal of accrued vacation and sick time. Furthermore, NEPHU overtime work was compensated only up to $500 per month, for approximately 25 hours of overtime work. Any duty time above that figure was converted to compensatory

time, which had to be taken off during the current quarter. Officers frequently reached their $500 overtime limit by mid-month, but as the team did not curtail its activities on this schedule they scrambled to take their compensatory time off.. Faced with the difficult administrative task of accommodating different time-off constraints while maintaining program effort, NEPHU management simply gave up. No effort was made to coordinate schedules in order to minimize this manpower problem, which was a tremendous one in such a small unit. Consequently, the unit rarely worked as a team for long stretches of time. After April, 1990, the team's cohesiveness was severely compromised by time-off considerations; NEPHU customarily was at full strength only two days each week. This staffing problem made development of confidential informants and pursuit of outstanding cases difficult. The unit often canceled scheduled warrant searches and undercover work when short-staffed.

There were also internal and leadership problems within the unit. The team manager was not very effective at routine administrative tasks. This led to difficulties in getting equipment and property leased, working schedules coordinated, and overtime pay properly calculated. Another leader was personally curt and abrasive, and was prone to blurting out injudicious opinions about his officers and his bosses. His detectives avoided dealing with him when they had problems or bad news to deliver. He and the top team leader did not get along well, and there were constant bickering and power struggles between them. Other units in the department were in a quandary about which to contact when they

needed something done. Neither got along with DHA staff members or project managers, either. As a result, during the evaluation period the unit rarely jelled as a team. It was, rather, two 2-officer partnerships functioning autonomously of their frustrated and somewhat distant leaders.

The Program in Action

NEPHU employed the most basic undercover narcotics strategies. One was the controlled-buy/warrant-arrest approach to drug enforcement. This involves developing and managing informants who purchase evidentiary drugs from suspected dealers. NEPHU members then swooped down upon the apartments with search warrants that were issued in advance on the basis of this information. During the first year, NEPHU developed four or five informants that they used extensively. These informants were all initially apprehended on drug-related charges and offered a deal; they were convinced to work for the unit by a promise of NEPHU intercession with the District Attorney on their part if they "turned" in three drug dealers. Occasionally, the team dropped potential cases because an informant simply appeared to be linked to a major supplier, and seemed particularly valuable.

For example, the unit's most active informant was a male illegal alien who was apprehended with his girlfriend in the Quigg Newton development. This informant's buys led to arrests of several major dealers. To encourage this informant's cooperation, NEPHU never filed their case against him or his girlfriend,

and they asked the Quigg Newton Homes manager to forego eviction proceedings against them. One officer secured special immigration papers from Immigration and Naturalization Service for this informant. However, with these papers in hand, the informant promptly accepted a job with the City of Denver, thereby reducing his availability to the unit.

The procedures employed in "working" this informant typified the process. He dictated his own hours, paging his controlling officer when he felt like working. This officer routinely interrogated him on the details of each case (how he knew the dealer, how much the dealer could supply, the selling price, etc.). The officer then arranged to meet the informant to supply him with marked purchase money and instructions about how to execute the buy. Typically, the controlling officer drove the informant to a drop-off spot several blocks from the suspected dealer's home. Before releasing him on the street, the officer patted down the informant to document that he had no drugs or any other money on his person. Other team members observed the suspected apartment from a distance, watching the i-nformant's approach, entry and retreat. After the informant safely returned to the officer's car he was searched again to establish that he now had drugs and that the marked money was gone.

The NEPHU team could request search warrants on the basis of this kind of intelligence, and use these to force entry into suspect homes. This can be an exciting and sometimes dangerous enterprise. Bowing to their superior training and expertise, whenever possible, NEPHU relied on Denver's Metro SWAT unit to

make forced entries. They briefed SWAT, telling what they had learned about weapons, dogs and children that they might encounter. In practice, suspects usually were not subjected to any physical violence, except for an occasional flurry of blows at the door. Our site observer noted the care that the units took with regard to children that they encountered during these forays:

> Concern for childrens' trauma and safety assumed paramount importance. It was amusing yet heartening to watch a "gentle giant" in his intimidating raid gear seat a sobbing child on his lap, cooing and conversing in baby talk. Furious with parental stupidity, no team member let an opportunity escape to hammer home to the adults their culpability for the child's fear and anguish. Care was taken quickly to remove children from the crime scene, preferably to other family members rather than to Social Services. Sometimes this effort backfired, when those relatives expressed more animosity and belligerence towards the police than the handcuffed parents. Nevertheless, to a man, members of all units expressed heartfelt distress over the plight of children caught in the ugly reality of drug-dealing.

One officer worked with particular eagerness to produce leads and identify sites for investigation. He carefully detailed his activities, including surveillance periods, conversations with informants, and exact names, dates and times. He was the only team member to work with such methodical precision, and when he took the time to accumulate accurate information without rushing the team into premature action, his investigations generally led to prosecutable filings. This officer's organizational skills showed during a March, 1990, warrant execution in the Curtis Park development. He spent many hours systematically researching police files and watching addresses to write warrants on three apartments that were inter-connected by dealing activities. This operation posed a particularly troublesome problem to development management, as the dealers had all but taken

over one block in the project and dealt drugs openly and freely at all hours of the day and night. To handle this large operation, the team relied upon Metro SWAT to ram into two units; NEPHU officers rammed the third. A major drug supplier to the Curtis Park development, who had commandeered units throughout the block for distribution points, was surprised in one of the units. While not enough drugs were found to press felony charges against the suspects, these three busts marked the first time that NEPHU executed simultaneous operations. This demanded excellent investigative work from the warrant-writing officer and superb planning, coordination and execution from the entry teams. These investigations did culminate in evictions from all three units.

Another operation during a very active August evening highlighted the cooperative effort and support which normally earmarked the various narcotics units' interaction. The previous evening the NEPHU team had "borrowed" a rookie black district policeman to make undercover purchases of drugs. Armed with warrants, NEPHU returned the next night to three addresses where the rookie had made successful buys -- one in the Quigg Newton development and two in scatter-site Section 8 homes. Metro SWAT was again used to make each initial entry. As soon as an entry was completed, SWAT moved to the next address without delay. While NEPHU officers remained to conduct searches and wait for patrol cars to transport suspects to jail, the Crack Task Force teams moved in tandem with SWAT to secure the next house until NEPHU officers arrived to

search. The three addresses, across town from one another, took less than 1 ½ hours to enter and search.

NEPHU officers also pursued buy-bust tactics to generate narcotics arrests, especially later in the evaluation period. This involved officers making direct purchases, and then more-or-less immediately arresting the seller. Buy-busts were always conducted within the view of other team members, and the officer involved wore a small radio so that the surveillance team could monitor the encounter. The code words, "That's no way to do business," warned those listening if the undercover agent was in trouble and the surveillance car should move in quickly. NEPHU initially had difficulty securing this kind of equipment. As the team moved away from using informants to executing undercover buys themselves, a team leader requested the purchase of a body transmitter set. The Bureau Captain denied the request, arguing that NEPHU should borrow another unit's equipment. Since this equipment was often unavailable when the need arose, team members went undercover without communication with their surveillance cars, or canceled operations. Only a concerted lobbying among top managers by the team's sergeant finally got them authorization to buy the equipment from grant funds.

This kind of undercover work demanded a great deal of patience from unit members. "Dopers" time," to a large extent, dictated the unit's minute-to-minute activity. For example, one officer tried at least six times to buy large amounts from a dealer who consistently failed to appear at pre-arranged times or, when appearing, never produced the drugs. Hours of surveillance time were spent in

accommodating this dealer's whims. Exasperated after four months of contact with this dealer, the officer finally secured a warrant for an earlier minor purchase and arrested him.

The team actually executed more "buy-walks" than "buy-busts." Colorado state law stipulates mandatory sentencing for anyone selling 28 grams (1 ounce) of cocaine. Hence, it was strategic to make several purchases, each increasing in quantity, to build dealer confidence in the buyer so that he could request to purchase a full ounce. In addition, the Denver District Attorney's Office preferred and accepted more readily case filings involving multiple purchases from the same dealer.

One tactic which NEPHU choose not to pursue was "crackdowns" like those described in Chapter 1. As the Summer of 1990 approached, dealing moved outdoors and on to the street. This made it difficult to link informants' drug purchases to a particular address, so that search warrants could be requested. Yet NEPHU made no concerted effort to crack down on the gang-affiliated loiterers and troublemakers hanging around the projects. The team cited the futility of jumping loiterers in the hopes of making prosecutable arrests, deeming such action a waste of time. The team initiated "group jumps" on only five occasions during the Summer of 1990. They did this reluctantly and with much grousing, and only because the Narcotics Division Chief decreed a once-a-month blitzkrieg on street loiterers. He was responding to a public outcry to do something about blatant street sales of drugs in Denver that Summer. All narcotics units were supposed to

join ranks in hitting this kind of activity, but within a few months the Chief's command was all but forgotten.

An example illustrates the inefficacy of pursuing warrantless arrests in Denver. While cruising the Curtis Park development, the team confronted a group of loiterers in front of a known drug-dealing apartment. One individual wearing gang colors broke from the group and ran. He tossed drugs from his pocket, which were later recovered, and during the ensuing foot and car chase by NEPHU officers, he threw a gun to the ground (also later recovered). The suspect was arrested on drug and weapon possession charges. However, the Denver District Attorney's office refused to file this case. They found no irrefutable evidence to link the drugs and/or the weapon to the suspect. Furthermore, because it is not unlawful to run from a law enforcement officer, the suspect committed no crime in leaving the scene. After receiving this rebuke, the NEPHU team avoided making further spur-of-the-moment arrests.

Unit statistics support the wisdom of concentrating on warrant searches rather than executing quick and easy harassment arrests. Because care was taken not to indiscriminately arrest loiterers, NEPHU received not one Internal Affairs complaint during the evaluation period. NEPHU activity resulted in a large number of "quality" (District Attorney-accepted) cases. Of these, most were solid enough to prompt pleas for reduced charges. The prosecution won the only two NEPHU cases which went to trial during the monitored period. In meeting the original program objectives set out in their grant application, the delivery of strong cases to

the District Attorney must rank as NEPHU's greatest success. For the first several months of field operations, the sergeant worked closely with his officers, criticizing each search warrant they wrote and accompanying them on all field operations. As he saw them learning their job he relaxed his hold on the warrant process, but his initial supervision paid a div-idend when NEPHU members approached judges with warrant requests.

The team also never employed prolonged surveillance tactics to gather information or identify suspicious individuals, claiming that they did not have time for what they perceived to be a fruitless endeavor. At least five managers of DHA projects offered vacant units to the team for the surveillance of suspected drug-dealing addresses. However, these offers were rejected until a new sergeant took advantage of them in January, 1991. Then, surveillance began from a Quigg Newton unit.

Monitoring the Program

The goal of the NEPHU evaluation was to monitor the progress of Denver's enforcement program. This involved both tracking the actual implementation of the program and assessing trends in the targets of that effort. The evaluation had a strong process orientation. We monitored the implementation of the program and watched it in operation. An on-site observer gathered extensive information on levels of program effort, and on the activities that took place in and around the developments. The evaluation also closely monitored the most proximate target of

the program: a reduction in the level of drug availability in the projects. We also monitored trends in longer-term goals of the effort, including reducing levels of crime, fear of crime, and residents' confidence in the Denver police.

Survey Interviews

Several kinds of quantitative data were collected for the evaluation. First, survey interviews were conducted in the target developments at three points in time. The three waves allowed us to examine both the onset and persistence of any apparent program effects. The survey was conducted using a panel design. The first wave of the survey was conducted in December, 1989. This survey attempted to contact all 751 households in the two target developments. Interviews were completed with residents in 520 households. The second wave of interviews was conducted in June, 1999. At this time, interviewers revisited units in which an interview was successfully conducted at wave 1. They reinterviewed the original respondents if they still lived there, and selected new respondents if the first had moved from the household. Just over 400 residents were interviewed during this wave. The third wave of the survey was conducted in December, 1990. This time, interviewers revisited all the units in which an intereview was completed at Wave 1, again selecting replacement respondents if those interviewed in the past had left the household. There were 423 respondents to the wave 3 survey. In each household the lease holder was the designated respondent. In households with two lease holders, the interviewer randomly

selected one of them for the interview. In all, 642 different people were questioned, 283 of them on all three occasions. A total of 1366 interviews were conducted. Forty-seven percent of the respondents lived in Curtis Park, and 53 percent in Quigg Newton.

The evaluation surveys play a critical role in our analysis of Denver's program. Most of the questionnaire was aimed at using respondents as informants concerning conditions and events in and around their homes, especially with regard to drugs and crime. Given the furtive character of the drug market, survey-based measures of the availability of drugs and the frequency of their use are probably superior to police-based indicators of the extent of drug market activity, and probably are superior to any other way of assessing the actual availability of narcotics to residents of the target developments. The surveys also played a key role in assessing crime trends because the vagaries of victim reporting and police recording practices make it difficult to interpret short-term fluctuations in crime rates for small areas.

The survey also included a number of questions about the extent of visible police activity in and around the projects. Respondents were asked if they had seen or been involved in any of a number of drug-enforcement activities that were being planned for the areas. These included foot patrols, vehicle stops, stake-out units, intensive field interrogations, and police searches of apartments. They were also asked if they had been stopped by the police, either on foot or in a car.

The evaluation surveys included other special items on drug-related programs that were instituted in the target projects. Respondent were asked about their knowledge of evictions of drug dealers from the project by the DHA and about their awareness of a special DHA drug hot-line. We also asked whether residents had received brochures or flyers, and if they had heard about or attended any meetings to discuss drug problems.

Because of its design, the evaluation survey can be analyzed in two different ways. First, responses by the 283 respondents who were interviewed on all three occasions can be tracked to reveal individual-level changes in experiences and opinions during 1990. This is a particularly powerful aspect of the study, and the illustrative figures presented in this chapter are based on these panel respondents.

However, as noted above, there was a great deal of coming and going in these projects during the course of the year; 359 "new" persons living in the sample apartments were interviewed during the course of the evaluation. Including them, each wave of interviewing also produced more representative crosssections of the residents of Curtis Park and Quigg Newton at each point in time. Of course, the aggregate responses of these larger samples will vary from wave to wave because their composition varies as well as because people's views and experiences change. However, including them in the analysis helps to control for the reasons why respondents may have moved in and out of the projects, and thus in and out of our panel. Research on housing decisions suggests that the bulk of these moves probably stemmed from factors that had noting to do with NEPHU or

the levels of crime and drug problems in these individual projects; moving probably was more affected by changes in the income, marital status, and household composition of these families, for example. But some residents doubtless moved away because they were fearful, either for themselves or their children, and thus the subset of consistent panel respondents might underestimate the magnitude or the impact of those problems. For this reason, the detailed statistical tables presented at the end of this chapter duplicate all of the analysis for both the survey panel and the representative crosssections. And even though the latter samples contained many more and different respondents, the conclusions suggested by the panel respondents were always consistent with the patterns revealed by the crosssections.

Official Records

In addition to the evaluation surveys, we also gathered a great deal of archival data from the two project areas and their surrounding neighborhoods. This included data on recorded crimes and arrests for both the target projects and their surrounding areas. The Denver Department of Safety produced computer-generated maps identifying the location of crimes, drug-related arrests, and other incidents, in and around the two projects. They also supplied the original data for independent analysis. In addition, our site observer in Denver logged the progress of all drug-related arrests made by NEPHU during the evaluation period. This enabled us to track the rate of "prosecution quality" arrests.

We also examined and coded NEPHU's daily activity reports. These filed whenever a warrant is requested or executed, a drug purchase is arranged by a confidential informant or undercover officer, or an arrest is made and drugs or money is confiscated. The reports note the location and duration of various activities, the team members involved, and information about arrestee and drug and currency seizures. Along with departmental information on officer assignments, this enabled us to document the kind and extent of activity by NEPHU in the target projects.

The evaluation's on-site observer monitored the community relations aspect of the program. She attended all of the meetings that NEPHU arranged with DHA tenant council members. She also conducted interviews with school officials, business leaders, the resident managers of the projects, and other local informants, to gauge their perceptions of the NEPHU program. In addition, with the cooperation of the DHA, we monitored occupancy and turnover rates in the developments, vandalism repairs, tenant evictions, and other indicators of drug and crime-related problems.

The Target Housing Developments

The Denver program was conducted in partnership with the Denver Housing Authority. With DHA assistance, we selected two matched housing developments in which to monitor the progress of the NEPHU program. One project was the

home primarily of Mexican-Americans, while residents of the other were predominately African-American.

The Curtis Park Homes project is located in a neighborhood of the same name. It was at first an independent suburb, and is now located in Northeast Denver. It was developed during the late 1800s, and its many large Victorian homes attest to the neighborhoods past affluence. The population of the area is now predominately American born, of Mexican ancestry, although the residents of Curtis Park Homes are overwhelmingly African-American. Before the mid-1950s the area was stable and multi-racial in character. Then large tracts of Victorian homes were razed to make way for the construction of Curtis Park Homes. African-American moved into the project in large numbers, and at that point "white flight" began in earnest. During the 1960s, large numbers of illegal Mexican aliens found refuge in the depopulating neighborhood. Within a few years, the Curtis Park neighborhood became poverty-stricken. Drug dealing became visible in the area during the 1970s; they were predominately "Mexican Nationals" (A Denver term) and Chicanos (American-born Mexicans). Because many dealers had good connections to drug producers below the Rio Grande, Curtis Park became one of the easiest places to buy drugs (principally marijuana and heroin) in Denver during the 1970s. There was a brief spurt of gentrification near Curtis Park during the mid-1970s, when middle class home-seekers discovered the areas' abandoned Victorian homes. However, when Denver's economy hit the skids with the collapse of oil prices during the early 1980s, this period of renovation ceased.

During the 1980s, the Northeast section of Denver became a magnet for two Los Angeles gangs, the Crips and The Bloods; they brought crack to the Curtis Park area. Currently, crack distribution in the area is concentrated in the hands of black dealers, while illegal Mexican immigrants still concentrate on heroin sales in the Homes and around the park.

In response to this influx of drugs, the Denver Police Department pulled in officers from other sections of the city to concentrate their forces in the Northeast section. The city formed a special Crack Task Force in 1988, with funds from the federal government; the majority of its efforts have been focused in Northeast Denver. The city also formed a special Gang Task Force, in response to the rise of local Hispanic gangs and the arrival of black gangs from Los Angeles.

The Quigg Newton Homes area of North Denver was first settled by immigrant Italian families. As they became more affluent, they moved to nicer areas of the city, leaving a void into which Denver's growing Chicano population quickly moved. The Quigg Newton neighborhood has been predominately Hispanic since the 1950s. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Denver's Chicano neighborhoods spawned several strong gangs. More territorial than criminal in character (see Skolnick, 1990), they primarily engaged in disputes over turf; they were not much involved in the distribution of drugs, or even in drug use. However, when the Denver Police Department shifted its resources to the Northeastern quadrant of the city, the Quigg Newton area suffered from a lack of police attention. Many illegal Mexican immigrants moved into the area, and began to form gangs that

were actively involved in the drug business. Local Chicano youth gangs strengthened themselves in the face of this invasion, and also tried to get into the drug business. Today, Mexican Nationals predominate in the heroin trade, while Chicano gangs both sell drugs and conduct organized burglary and auto theft operations.

Despite these problems, visitors to the two housing developments from other cities might be surprised by their physical layout and condition. The target developments feature low-rise rather than high-rise buildings. Individual units are located in relatively small row-house buildings, and none of the building is more than two stories high. The two developments are also small: neither has more than about 400 units. Their population density is low; in 1985, several buildings were demolished in the Curtis Park project to further reduce the density of that area. Apartments are clustered in small groupings, and there are trees and sidewalks between the buildings. In Quigg Newton, some buildings are entirely off the street and surrounded by lawns; these would be easily accessible only to foot patrols. Parking appears to be easy in both areas (although the first survey indicates that a majority of residents do not have a car). There are large, well-lit, off-street parking lots in the Curtis Park complex. Each project has an on-site manager, and they are apparently well-managed. By-and-large, lawns are well-kept and buildings are free of graffiti (which is not true of buildings in the surrounding areas). There are few abandoned cars in the parking lots, and no broken glass. In Curtis Park, fences close off direct access to rear areas of the buildings from the

street, and "no loitering" signs are prominently displayed in potential gathering places on the sidewalks ringing the project area. Tenant turnover is slow and vacancy rates are low, averaging less than 10 percent; there is a waiting list for both projects, and units usually are empty only while they are being renovated.

On the other hand, the residents of the projects closely resemble the national profile of public housing residents—families living in the projects were predominately poor and female-headed. The first survey of the two project areas drew a profile of the residents of the two target projects that is presented in Table 2-1. The designated respondents were the lease holders of each unit in the developments. With the exception of their racial background, the two groups of residents proved to be strikingly similar, indicating the power of our initial matching procedure. Residents of the largely Hispanic project reported less formal education than the largely black residents of Curtis Park, but otherwise there were few differences between them (we did not ask about national origin, but the Hispanic residents of Quigg Newton are reputedly predominately American born, of Mexican descent).

These data thus suggest that although the target projects look fairly pleasant, their residents match the general profile of public housing projects in many cities. These are poor, single mothers without much education and with few prospects for a job. Overall, 90 percent of the adults interviewed were not married, 68 percent had children, and 93 percent were women. Only about 15 percent of them reported having a job, and 87 percent said they made less than

$6,000 in cash the previous year. Some residents were elderly, but most were young and officially lived alone with their children. Levels of crime and fear in the two projects were also high. As Table 2-1 indicates, rates for residential burglary were particularly high; almost one-quarter of those interviewed were victims of attempted or successful burglary in the past six months.[1] Vandalism rates were also particularly high, while robbery rates stood at about the national urban average.

Monitoring Program Activity

The evaluation involved several measures of the extent of drug enforcement activity in and around the target housing projects. These included:

- daily activity reports by NEPHU
- Denver Police Department arrest reports
- reports of visible enforcement efforts by residents of the target housing projects

These measures all point to the same general conclusions: the police were much more active in Curtis Park than in Quigg Newton, they made the bulk of their arrests in the neighborhoods surrounding the projects rather than within their boundaries, and the general level of enforcement activity in and around the projects seems to have been higher before the program got underway than after.

---

[1] This is the highest neighborhood burglary victimization rate registered in 8 years of Police Foundation evaluation surveys of largely high-crime cities.

Table 2-1

Demographic Profile of Project Residents

	Curtis Park	Quigg Newton
Percent black	70	4
Percent hispanic	26	86
Percent have a job	15	14
Percent income under $6,000	85	88
Percent not high school graduate	56	79
Perent with children	69	67
Percent one-adult families	77	83
Percent unmarried	93	87
Percent female	94	92
Percent under 40	55	54
Percent 60 and older	20	24
Percent recent victim of:		
burglary	25	22
robbery	6	2
vandalism	21	15
Number of interviews	251	268

NEPHU successfully focused many of its energies on DHA projects, and in Curtis Park there was a very strong emphasis on narcotics enforcement.

NEPHU Activity

During the period October, 1989, through November, 1990, NEPHU submitted 120 daily activity reports. These reports were examined and a number of data elements were coded that help describe the unit's efforts and effectiveness. They indicate that over 90 percent of the unit's reportable routine patrol activity (eg, something happened) was concentrated in DHA project areas. Roughly half of NEPHU's surveillance or undercover activities were in DHA projects, and about half of the unit's contacts with suspects during surveillance and controlled buy efforts were in DHA projects. About half of all buy-bust attempts were in DHA projects, as were 65 percent of NEPHU's actual drug purchases. NEPHU did slightly more work outside DHA projects when they attempted to execute search or arrest warrants; DHA projects were the site of only 42 percent of those operations.

Of course, there were many reasons for NEPHU to stray outside of the boundaries of DHA projects. Their responsibilities included Denver's scatter-site Section 8 housing as well as the projects, and these were nestled in residential communities in many parts of the city. The projects themselves were set in often-troubled communities, and drug houses serving DHA residents often were located in near-by areas. Both dealers and their suppliers also do not necessarily

live in the projects where they do business, and warrant searches will catch up with them elsewhere. The unit received its greatest publicity from such a case. In January, 1990, an informant living in a housing project revealed his drug supplier. This information led to a NEPHU raid on a home located in a distant upper-class neighborhood. This raid spotlighted NEPHU in the media because the unit arrested a well-known female sportswriter from a leading Denver daily newspaper at the scene with cocaine in her purse.

In addition, the inter-team cooperation described above demanded reciprocal action by NEPHU. Its detectives contributed time and effort to other units' activities. In fact, NEPHU's role occasionally extended well beyond the Denver Police Department units, and included repeated outings with neighboring jurisdictions' police forces. In addition, NEPHU established and maintained working relations with Federal agencies such as the FBI, INS, DEA, ATF and IRS. In particular, NEPHU members spent half of September, 1990, and all of October and November working on a federal wiretap operation that had no direct bearing on public housing drug problems. Not until December, 1990, did the unit return to genuine NEPHU duties.

During the evaluation period NEPHU arrested 176 persons. The bulk (114) of these arrests were made on the basis of search or arrest warrants that were obtained following investigations. Another 44 persons were arrested without warrants during field interrogations or vehicular stops. Eighteen persons were arrested in the course of street-level buy-busts. As detailed below, these arrests

were concentrated in the early part of the evaluation year, and slacked off considerably by the Summer of 1990. An analysis of the team's arrests suggests that they met a high legal standard; over the evaluation period, the Denver District Attorney's offices accepted 89.5 percent of the cases that NEPHU turned over for prosecution.

In addition to making these arrests, NEPHU seized 35 weapons, 6 vehicles, and approximately $133,000 in cash. Slightly more than 40 percent of all drugs seized came from DHA projects, as did 35 percent of the currency, 42 percent of the weapons, and 54 percent of the drug paraphernalia.

Some of NEPHU's efforts were fairly evenly distributed between the two target projects for this evaluation, Curtis Park and Quigg Newton. The two areas were patrolled at about the same rate, counting the shifts in which NEPHU officers visited the projects. Surveillance and undercover activity was more frequent in and around Quigg Newton (26 percent of all shifts) than Curtis Park (12 percent of all shifts); on the other hand, contacts with suspects and controlled buy efforts associated with that surveillance were distributed about equally across the two target projects. Otherwise, NEPHU focused its efforts on Curtis Park. Search and arrest warrants were much more frequently served in Curtis Park (24 percent of the NEPHU total) than in Quigg Newton (2 percent of the total). Half or more of all the drug, currency, weapon, vehicle, and paraphernalia seizures made by NEPHU in DHA projects were from Curtis Park. Similarly, 86 percent of warrant-based

arrests made in the two projects were in Curtis Park. In the end, NEPHU made a total of 36 arrests in Curtis Park and 20 in Quigg Newton.

In summary, the team's daily activity reports indicate that NEPHU largely remained faithful to its mandate -- to focus its energies to the practical extent possible on public housing projects in Denver. This was important, for other specialized drug units in the city openly avoided making investigations in the projects. NEPHU was formed to plug this gap in the city's anti-drug efforts, and by-and-large it focused on its assigned task. Its major problem was the way in which the Department's time-off demands and poor management of the resulting staffing problems undermined continuity in the unit's fieldwork and crippled efficient utilization of its resources.

The unit's efforts also were disproportionately aimed at Curtis Park, an emphasis which turns out to be paralleled by other indicators of enforcement activity in the projects and in the impact of the program. As measured by the ratio of drug arrests to arrests for Part I offenses, police activity in Curtis Park was also very disproportionately aimed at narcotics enforcement.

Department Arrest Reports

While daily activity logs and our site observer can document the extent of NEPHU-related anti-drug efforts in Denver, other uniformed and plainclothes police units were active to a certain extent in and around the projects. Data on arrests in Curtis Park and Quigg Newton, and in the areas immediately surrounding them, can

indicate more about the sum of the enforcement efforts that took place there before and during the NEPHU evaluation period. To examine this, the Denver Department of Safety mapped data on recorded crime and arrests in the immediate project areas and for a one-half mile radius around them. The data on arrests begin in January, 1989, about 10 months before the official start of the NEPHU program and 12 months before the first survey of residents of the target projects. The crime analysis unit of the Department of Safety also generated comparable information on all 10 major DHA projects, and for the City of Denver as a whole.

The most dramatic aspect of the portrait of enforcement activity painted by these data is that *the most intensive police activity in and around these projects took place before the NEPHU program began in earnest, and then subsided during the evaluation period.* This can be seen in Figure 2-1, which charts both drug arrests and total arrests by month, beginning in January, 1989. A solid vertical line depicts the start-date for the NEPHU program. Figure 2-1 also uses a dashed vertical line to depict the date of the first evaluation survey of residents of the target areas, to illustrate how this planned "pretest" survey immediately followed the most intensive level of enforcement of the entire evaluation period. There was a large jump in both general and drug arrests in September, 1989, while the first recorded NEPHU arrest was not logged until October. A Police Department internal memorandum indicates that these were generated by the Crack Task Force, a citywide unit with 12 detectives. There was another, smaller upturn in arrests in December, while the first survey was being conducted, and then drug arrests went

Figure 2-1

Trends in Arrests 1989-1990

Combined Projects and Surrounding Areas



"downhill" for most of the remaining period. Most of the later arrests were generated by NEPHU, which replaced the Crack Task Force in and around DHA projects but had only 4 detectives rather than 12. Measured by arrests, there was more police activity in and around the target projects before this aspect of the evaluation began than after it was underway.

After NEPHU was formed, the arrests it made were also concentrated early in the evaluation period; 50 percent of all unit arrests were made by March, 1990. As noted above, when the residents of Denver moved outdoors for the Summer it became more difficult to make controlled buys and secure search warrants. NEPHU also slid into a lull. Our site observer reported that, night after night during the Summer the team cruised the city in search of something to do. Without checking current validity of information, they tried to make undercover buys at addresses which had been phoned in to their drug hotline months before. Or they waited at police headquarters for hours hoping that an informant would call to work. During these extended lulls, the unit did not contact development managers or DHA investigators to try to determine possible new drug-dealing addresses. Nor, during these spells, did members plan any new kinds of community outreach programs. Instead, during this period the team's focus slowly drifted from public housing areas to almost any case that would occupy their time. Financial considerations may have also undercut the team's effectiveness. Drug seizure money normally replenished the unit's coffers. By June, 1990, however, both NEPHU's grant operating and seizure funds were low. Consequently, more lucra-

tive non-DHA cases beckoned. And, as noted above, during part of September and all of October and November, NEPHU was almost completely involved in a federal wiretap case and did little on-street enforcement.

The unit also made only a total of 4 arrests in and around Quigg Newton during the last six months of the evaluation, although other police units contributed a few more. Quigg Newton presented a problem for NEPHU. Until the point that NEPHU activity peaked, it had placed its emphasis on Curtis Park. There, African-American residents seemed willing to sell to almost any potential customer, even an unknown Caucasian or Hispanic. Dealers hung out around the nearby park which gave the develpment its name in order to make "drive-by" sales to suburbanites. Occasionally the unit borrowed a rookie black patrol officer to infiltrate drug networks in the Curtis Park project, and NEPHU enjoyed most its visible successes in this development. However, in the Quigg Newton development, buys were more difficult to make. Hispanic dealers typically confined their dealings to known and trusted -- and Hispanic -- customers.

Figure 2-2 illustrates that *most drug arrests before and during the evaluation period were concentrated in and around Curtis Park*; the "spike" of drug arrests recorded between August and December, 1989, were overwhelmingly located there. Other analyses (not shown) indicate that about 60 percent of Curtis Park drug arrests were in the surrounding area, and about 40 percent in the project itself. This pattern persisted throughout 1989 and 1990. Figure 2-2 also illustrates a second important fact: there simply were few *drug arrests in and*

Figure 2-2

Trends in Drug Arrests 1989-1990

Combined Projects and Surrounding Areas



Table 2-2
Police Crime and Arrest Data

	Curtis Park	Quigg Newton	All Projects	City of Denver
Part I Crimes				
Jan-June '89	39	31	189	18953
July-Dec '89	39	30	237	18964
Jan-June '90	28	35	202	18010
July-Dec '90	33	35	210	16730
Part I Arrests				
Jan-June '89	18	15	74	4412
July-Dec '89	18	13	78	4339
Jan-June '90	13	21	74	4313
July-Dec '90	8	8	66	4352
Drug Arrests				
Jan-June '89	33	6	61	1639
July-Dec '89	31	4	57	1618
Jan-June '90	11	4	41	1361
July-Dec '90	4	5	21	1313
Part I - Drugs Ratio				
Jan-June '89	1.8	.40	.82	.37
July-Dec '89	1.7	.31	.73	.37
Jan-June '90	.85	.19	.55	.32
July-Dec '90	.50	.62	.32	.30

around Quigg Newton, either before or after the program began. Again, about two-thirds of the arrests in Quigg Newton were in the surrounding neighborhood and one-third in the project itself, but the numbers were so small that the difference each month was only 2-3 arrests.

Arrest data for Denver also suggest that *police enforcement activity in public housing emphasized drug cases*, and that *this emphasis was particularly strong in Curtis Park*. This is documented in Table 2-2. It presents the ratio of narcotics arrests to Part I arrests, for the target projects, all major public housing developments, and Denver as a whole. This number goes up when there is more narcotics enforcement relative to other kinds of police arrests. For the four times periods of interest here, this measure of police emphasis on drug enforcement in DHA projects was 1½-to-2 times higher in Denver public housing than for the city as a whole. However, this went down substantially in public housing during the evaluation year, compared to only a mild decline in emphasis on drug enforcement activity for the city as a whole. Compared to the city as a whole, or even to public housing in Denver, the emphasis on drug enforcement in Curtis Park was striking, but it too dropped (by 72 percent) during the evaluation year. The ratios for Quigg Newton are dependent on very small numbers, but show the same general pattern.

Most of these arrests were for drug possession rather than trafficking. In 1990, 93 percent of those arrested in Curtis Park and 89 percent of those arrested in Quigg Newton were apprehended for simple possession. The citywide figure was 93 percent, and there was very little trend in any of them. By this measure,

NEPHU was no more successful than any other police effort at targeting and arresting drug dealers.

In summary, the level of arrests generally—and drug arrests in particular—was as high or higher before the program (and the resident surveys) began than they were later in the program's life. Most of those arrests took place outside of project boundaries, where they were less likely to be immediately visible to project residents and where their effect on life in the projects would be somewhat more indirect. Most drug arrests were for simple possession. Finally, almost all of this activity was concentrated in the Curtis Park area; few arrests were made in or around Quigg Newton, throughout the period. A rough measure of the relative emphasis police put into crime fighting versus drug enforcement indicates that there was relatively more drug enforcement in public housing than in the city generally, and especially in Curtis Park.

We can only speculate about <u>why</u> drug arrests and the emphasis on drug enforcement went down in the projects during the course of the program, for units other than NEPHU potentially were involved in this activity. Some of the reasons might be internal to the workings of the Denver Police Department, and have little to do with crime at all. First, it may be that once NEPHU was created, other units in the Department could more freely pursue their natural inclination, which was to avoid working in public housing projects. As noted at the outset of this chapter, this seems to be a generic problem in policing, and was an important reason for BJA to sponsor independent NEPHU operations. This might account in particular

for the extremely small number of arrests that took place within project boundaries, as compared to the surrounding areas. Alternately, this decline might be attributable to the "specialized unit problem" identified by Sparrow, et al (1990), Guyot (1991), and others. That is, the creation of a specialized policing unit sends a message to other members of the Department that the unit's task is no longer their problem. As Sparrow, et al, note:

> [T]he rest of the force often quietly gives up whatever part it had previously played. If it is an investigative problem, the patrol force lets the detectives do the work. If it is a drug problem, it lets the narcotics squad do the work... [I]f much of the Department stops attending to major aspects of the police function, a great deal is lost (p. 116).

Alternately, NEPHU may have just stopped working effectively during the middle and end of the evaluation period. Drug arrests and an emphasis on drug arrests were both down for the city as a whole, but they were down much more in DHA projects. The Summer slump described above, plus NEPHU involvement in a federal wiretap case for 2½ months at the end of the year, may have produced the dramatic drop in arrests of all kinds in DHA areas during the last half of 1990. This interpretation is consistent with the data presented in Table 2-2 indicating that reported crimes did not decline in parallel with declines in arrests in the same Part 1 category. This supports a decline-in-effort interpretation of plunging arrests of all kinds.

On the other hand, the decline in arrests that we observed during the closing months of the projects might signal the success of the NEPHU program. As we noted above, it is difficult to use police statistics as indicators of the magnitude of

drug problems. Unlike garden-variety "crimes with victims," there are virtually no reported offenses in the drug category except those that are chalked up along with an arrest. If they are working an area hard, a decline in arrests by police could be taken as evidence that open drug dealing is getting more difficult to uncover. This in turn might mean that there is indeed less of it, or that buyer-and-seller networks have adapted to new enforcement conditions and have been driven further underground. The former interpretation—that there was less drug activity to intervene in—gains some credibility from evidence to be presented later in this report that resident reports of the availability of drugs also showed a significant drop in the heavily-police Curtis Park project. This issue will be taken up again at the conclusion of this chapter.

Resident Awareness and Contact

Our third source of information on the extent of enforcement activity in the target projects is three waves of interviews conducted with residents of Curtis Park and Quigg Newton, in December, 1989, June, 1990, and December, 1990. The surveys included a number of questions about resident awareness of anti-drug programs, the visibility of policing activity in the projects, and personal contacts with police. The questions in each wave focused on events that took place during the past six months. The responses of the 283 people who were interviewed at all three points in time give us an independent measure of both the level and the degree of change in visible policing in the target projects.

To measure the level of visible police activity in and around the target projects, residents were asked:

> Here are a few specific situations in which you may have seen a police officer here in the development or somewhere in this neighborhood. During the past six months, have you seen a police officer here ...
>
> - Pull someone over who was driving around in the development?
> - Stop someone who was walking through the development?
> - Tell anybody here to move along, or tell them to get out of the development?
> - Break up any groups or try to keep groups from hanging around in the development area?
> - Searching or frisking anyone here in this area, or making an arrest?

Responses to these questions were correlated an average of +.35, and an index number summing the number of these situations that each respondent recalled was used to measure general police visibility in each project area.

The survey was also used to assess the extent to which the respondents themselves had been the targets of policing in and around the projects. During the interviews, residents were asked:

- In the past six months, have you been in a car which was stopped by the police? [And, "Did this happen in or close to this development?]

- In the past six months, have you been stopped and asked questions by the police when you were out walking? [And, "Did this happen in or close to this development?]

Roughly the same proportion of people were involved in both kinds of police-initiated stops, and responses to the two questions were combined to produce a single index of the extent of their involvement in those encounters.

Figures 2-3 and 2-4 illustrate the extent of police-initiated contacts and the visibility of policing in the two projects, based on these survey reports. The findings generally parallel the pattern of enforcement suggested by arrest data for these areas. First, there was more attention given to Curtis Park than to Quigg Newton. Policing was more visible there during the months preceding each of the surveys, awareness of apartment searches was about a third more frequent, and in two of the three periods residents of Curtis Park were more likely to be stopped by police in the area. Second, several of the measures went down again during the course of the evaluation. In Curtis Park, both police visibility and proactive patrol was highest before the first wave of interviews, and then declined. The pattern of police activity in and around Quigg Newton was more varied, but -- measured by pedestrian and vehicle stops—it changed significantly (upward) only between July and December, 1990. In both areas, awareness of apartment searches declined steadily during the evaluation.

Finally, to measure more directly the visibility of NEPHU warrant searches, residents were also asked, "Have you heard of the police searching any apartments here in this development during the past six months?" The results of this are also depicted in Figure 2-4.

Figure 2-3


Awareness of Policing
Curtis Park and Quigg Newton
percent stopped
average police visibility score
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
December
June
December
visibility and police-initiated contact
CP visibility
QN visibility
CP stopped
QN stopped

Figure 2-4

Awareness of DHA Anti-Drug Program

Curtis Park and Quigg Newton Projects



It is not surprising that visible enforcement activity did not go up in the target projects between December, 1989, and December, 1990, for NEPHU deliberately chose not to undertake high visibility crackdowns. Instead, they emphasized undercover operations and the use of informants to gather information, both low visibility tactics. The original NEPHU application proposed to use the patrol division to increase the level of high-visibility uniformed patrol in and around the projects. On several occasions the team attempted to secure this kind of cooperation by the patrol division, but they were rebuffed. When the team sergeant proposed to pay for district patrols from grant funds, his superiors scoffed at the idea.

The inability of NEPHU to secure the cooperation of district commanders in increasing the level of visible patrol in DHA projects was indicative of the more general problem of the unit's relationship with the rest of the department. It was not good. Many other narcotics officers and the upper echelons of the Narcotics Bureau's management took a derisive attitude toward NEPHU and its task. There were a number of reasons for this, mostly organizational. One was jealousy over the unit's paid overtime. NEPHU's federal grant provided its officers with overtime compensation, something that was denied other narcotics units. The grant also included vehicle leasing, thereby equipping NEPHU with new, serviceable cars instead of the low-quality "clunkers" available to other units. In the first week of October 1989, the entire NEPHU team was invited to a Bureau of Justice Cluster Conference in Washington D.C. Other units seized on this as an example of

NEPHU "extravagance." As the "rich kids" were progressively unable to produce large cash and drug seizures, these "perks" became objects of contempt in the eyes of other narcotics officers. This hurt NEPHU, particularly because it frequently needed help when it was short-staffed. The Street Narcotics Unit's open hostility to NEPHU was particularly unsettling in light of the common goals shared by both.

Upper-level management rebuffs to NEPHU special requests underscored the unit's low status. When a NEPHU officer asked for increased staffing, the Bureau Captain bluntly told him that no such increase would occur because "NEPHU was the most expendable of all narcotics units." This disparaging attitude toward the unit at high levels sapped its detectives' enthusiasm. Later, however, when the continuation of NEPHU's federal grant into 1991 was renegotiated, the Narcotics Bureau realized they could make use of it. The Bureau had been planning to fold the unit, but instead grant's extension expanded NEPHU to sixteen detectives and three sergeants by incorporating two Street Narcotics teams into its structure. By so doing, the Bureau could use NEPHU funds to pay overtime compensation to the Street Narcotics officers, who did not customarily receive overtime pay.

Joint Programs

In addition to enforcement efforts by the police, the Denver Housing Authority which co-sponsored the application, was supposed to assist NEPHU with several anti-drug programs in Quigg Newton and Curtis Park. The first was an

eviction effort aimed at expelling residents accused of drug-related offenses from DHA projects. To assess the visibility of this program, residents were asked, "Have you heard of the Housing Authority evicting or trying to evict anyone because they were dealing with drugs?"

As presented in Figure 2-4, awareness of evictions was particularly high in Curtis Park, standing at almost 90 percent in the first interview. The comparable figure in Quigg Newton was about 60 percent. However, in both cases insignificant changes between December, 1989, and June, 1990 were followed by significant declines in awareness of evictions by the following December. This did not mirror the actual pattern of evictions, which remained fairly stable over the course of the evaluation year. Between January and June, 1990, ten leaseholders were evicted from Curtis Park for drug-related incidents and three for being involved in gangs. Eight of these 13 cases were initiated by NEPHU. Between July and December, 1990, an additional 11 leaseholders were evicted from Curtis park for drug-related activity, four of them following NEPHU warrant searches. Most of the evictions were initiated by the managers, independent of DHA endorsement.

Evictions were not effectively used by NEPHU or by DHA. An initial meeting between DHA managers and NEPHU officers to discuss their eviction strategy resulted in only the police showing up. A further attempt by NEPHU officers to consult DHA personnel about the eviction process proved equally fruitless. The officers did not fully understand the legal points required by DHA to make a

criminal eviction filing, but they were unable to get legal advice from the DHA counsel's office on this point. Disparaging comments by several DHA project managers about the staff lawyer only fueled the unit's already negative impression about the joint effort. Neither the Curtis Park nor Quigg Newton manager expressed confidence in the lawyer's tenacity in pursuing eviction proceedings. Rather, they viewed him as not possessing the will to prosecute lease offenders. They repeatedly railed against his insistence on airtight criminal cases when, in fact, the managers had clearly presented him with enough evidence to evict residents on civil grounds. Our monitor once observed the Quigg Newton manager yell at the lawyer to "do something about this case because I'm going to evict with or without your help. Then you will have a problem on your hands."

Legally, conviction on a narcotics-related charge represented but one of many legal avenues open to DHA managers to evict resident troublemakers. NEPHU members, however, remained ignorant about these other kinds of lease violations which, discovered during their investigations, they could have easily relayed to the managers. A detective later took initiative in reading and discussing lease provisions with a manager; after he understood that the actions of residents who were not included on the lease constituted grounds for eviction, the team begin to question suspects about their place of residence. Employing this simple tactic, NEPHU helped several managers build civil eviction cases against longtime troublemakers—but only very near the end of the evaluation period.

Aggressive action against tenants involved in drug activities was not universally popular in DHA developments, at least among some vocal groups of residents. For example, the Quigg Newton Homes manager was a champion of get-tough tactics. Assigned to the project early in 1989, she vowed to re-establish safety and security in the development. Her reputation as a hardliner spread quickly when she evicted blatant lease violators without a second chance. In support of her actions, District 1 patrol cars increased the frequency of their patrols in the area and introduced limited late-night foot patrol in the development during the summer months. The Gang Task Force and Motorcycle Patrol Units also assigned several officers to the area. (Note that all this activity took place before the formation of NEPHU.) As her interventions took hold, heartened residents joined to form a stronger Resident Council. They established and staffed their own office in one of the apartments, where they organized a food and clothing bank. These efforts were led primarily by one couple who served as president and vice president of the Resident Council.

This effort was not without cost, however. Threatened by the apparent success of the Resident Council in galvanizing resident concern, and frightened by the manager's no-nonsense approach, several residents already facing eviction mounted a hate campaign against the Resident Council officers and initiated a petition drive to oust the manager. Quigg Newton was a divided camp during the Summer of 1989; some residents sided with management and others were determined to destroy her authority. By October, the active couple had received

enough death threats to drive them from the development. The manager was transferred to another DHA position, ostensibly as a promotion.

A second joint program between DHA and NEPHU was a telephone hotline that residents could call to report drug-related problems. To evaluate its visibility, residents were asked in the survey, "Have you heard of the drug hotline for public housing residents?" The surveys indicate that awareness of a drug hotline was initially fairly high (it was recognized by almost 70 percent of the respondents in Curtis Park), apparently rose throughout the evaluation period. Again, it was about a third higher in Curtis Park than in Quigg Newton, but in both projects awareness of the hotline was up significantly by the end of the evaluation. However, more than one drug hotline was being publicized in Denver, and awareness of the one sponsored by the Crack Task Force confounds our findings; there is no reason to assume that ordinary citizens could distinguish between the sponsors of such similar outreach efforts. In addition, the fact that hotlines were widely recognized does not mean that they were widely used by the public, or effectively used by NEPHU.

The NEPHU drug hotline was one of their few community outreach tools. However, since the Crack Task Force had been operating a similar hotline for two years, the new NEPHU program had to struggle for recognition. Fliers announcing the NEPHU hotline number, however, were printed only in February, 1990. Our site monitor distributed them immediately to the managers of the Curtis Park and Quigg Newton developments. In July she overheard a NEPHU officer comment

that he had just delivered some to Stapleton Homes, another large DHA project. What the managers who received fliers did with them remains unknown. NEPHU never gave definite instructions to the managers concerning flier distribution. The Quigg Newton manager delivered them to each housing unit while the Curtis Park manager merely stacked them on the front counter in the development's office in hope that residents would pick them up. The first call to the hotline was recorded on February 20, 1990—five months into the field operation. This was partly because the answering machine connected to the hotline did not work, until it was finally repaired in January. In our surveys, about 3.2 percent of those interviewed at wave 1 indicated that they had called a drug hotline sometime in the past; by wave 3 this figure had risen to 5.7 percent. These figures seem too high relative to the volume of calls received by the drug hotlines that we monitored, but perhaps other programs were involved as well.

An examination of the calls to the Crack Task Force's hotline revealed that it was used extensively by public housing resident, rather than NEPHU's line. While most public housing calls appeared on the Crack Task Force's hotline, for political reasons NEPHU rarely exploited this resource. Shy to cross territorial unit boundaries, NEPHU waited until a Crack Task Force detective brought a phone call to NEPHU's attention. This generally occurred when the Crack Tack Force detective had previous knowledge about the particular address cited. Depending on this detective's interest in the case (usually reflective of the strength of his

informant's participation), the units then decided which team would pursue the lead.

In addition to a hotline, NEPHU also planned to participate in community affairs in the target projects. One of their initial goals was drug education, and they purchased video equipment for this effort. The unit also was to meet regularly with tenants of the projects to improve police-community relations, and they hoped to gain support for their efforts from the elected Tenant Councils in each project.

The evaluation surveys included questions assessing residents' awareness of this kind of activity. They were asked:

- During the past six months or so, have you heard about people trying to get meetings started up in this development to do something about drugs and crime?
- Do you know if anyone from the police department was at any of these meetings?

Initially, more than 70 percent of those interviewed indicated they had heard about such meetings, a percentage that then stayed constant throughout the evaluation year. The fraction of Curtis park residents who had heard about such meetings and thought that police were involved in such meetings remained at about 20 percent over the course of the year, but that figure jumped significantly from about 20 percent to over 30 percent in the second and third surveys in Quigg Newton.

Like most aspects of the NEPHU program that involved community outreach, this kind of community participation floundered in confusion over its purpose and for lack of coordination, this time with the Housing Authority's project managers.

At the outset, the team leader decided to mold NEPHU into traditional strict narcotics unit. This was an easy choice, in part because he personally was not particularly comfortable interacting with the public. The feeling that the public had no role to play in their activities progressively grew in the unit. Fearful that public involvement would compromise their undercover work, the detectives felt that civilians only "got in the way." Given the initial lack of knowledge about drug enforcement among his men (several had never seen tar heroin before their new assignment), the sergeant's initial focus on training and unit organization was a necessary one, but this emphasis on traditional enforcement persisted through the course of the evaluation year. One officer bucked this orientation, but he was not able to turn the tide. The team leader reasoned that, by definition of the program grant, his unit was a "drug elimination" unit. Civic involvement by members of NEPHU also seemed to run counter to its undercover orientation. The unit focused on making drug purchases in order to justify subsequent warrant searches. Since informants were not always available, the detectives themselves conducted undercover operations. This seemed to rule out participation in high visibility public relations efforts in the projects, for a choice had to be made between maintaining the anonymity of undercover officers and their public "unmasking." Team members did propose that grant money be used to pay the Department's own DARE unit to deliver drug education sessions in the projects, but that was rejected at the Bureau level. No program was created to educate residents about drug elimination. Furthermore, no effort was expended to help residents with truancy

issues or other crime-related problems, as promised in the grant proposal. The television/VCR unit, purchased to present drug education videos to DHA residents, saw use once during the year—by another narcotics unit.

One unit officer did attend several Youth Council meetings at the Westwood Project, and spoke often with its manager for about two months. Another officer faithfully attended Resident Council meetings at the Curtis Park and Quigg Newton developments from March through July, because they were involved in the evaluation. Since neither detective received any direction about the role they were to play at these meetings, they sat in silence or answered a few desultory questions about drugs. Our site monitor attended one Central Resident Council meeting where a team leader was asked to make a presentation; he began his speech by berating the residents for not using the NEPHU hotline to report drug dealings. His diatribe fell on deaf ears because NEPHU had done nothing to advertise the existence of the hotline in this project. Four irate DHA staff members approached the monitor after the meeting to complain about this attack on the residents.

Relations with DHA

At the outset of the grant period, a team leader visited each development manager to identify specific addresses where suspected drug dealers could be found. During the first two months of field operations (October and November), the team concentrated their efforts on these locations. To introduce the NEPHU unit, a team leader also attended one Resident Council meeting at each of the

developments. However, since most Resident Council meetings are sparsely attended, this effort failed to spread the word about NEPHU. A team leader also attended one general managers' meeting, at which he explained NEPHU's mission and gave the managers his telephone number. He expected the managers to climb on the bandwagon, but his phone did not ring often. Presuming that no news was good news, the unit did not pursuing manager involvement any further.

After these initial contacts, the unit did little to foster NEPHU/resident and manager relations. Each unit member was asked to work somehow (the actual tasks were never defined) with the managers of two projects. At best this evolved into a monthly call to the managers, and as time passed, even these contacts trailed off. Given this limited effort on behalf of NEPHU, it was inevitable that the unit would not receive much cooperation from the managers. DHA's official liaison to NEPHU estimated that he called a member of the unit at least once a week to share or ask for information. NEPHU's responses to his overtures were typically very tardy, however.

On their part, the managers were most annoyed by NEPHU's failure to alert them concerning raids in their projects. Frequently, embarrassed managers received the first word about major raids from the residents, who expressed surprise at their ignorance. This was a NEPHU management problem, for officers had been instructed to contact managers about planned raids yet no one ever monitored their compliance. The manager's tempers flared when even their inquiring phone calls went unreturned. Since they were unable to initiate criminal

eviction proceedings without NEPHU's help, yet were under pressure to quickly rid their developments of known drug dealers, it was little wonder that some managers resented NEPHU's apparent indifference. On their part, NEPHU officers were extremely reluctant to give any civilian (even a project manager) advance information about their activities. Instead of explaining how their intelligence gathering activities and search-and-seizure requirements sometimes kept them from discussing their plans, the officers simply failed to communicate with the managers entirely.

There was a great deal of potential in building stronger relationships between the project managers and the police, but NEPHU never succeeded in establishing them. For example, during the winter of 1989-90, the Curtis Park Homes manager established a good working relationship with the District 2 and Gang Task Force Captains and some District 2 patrol officers. He worked closely with two 2-officer roving patrol car units known as the "post cars." Cooperation between the manager and a post car closed a crack house located across from the development in December, 1989. The manager also convinced the post car officers to arrest loiterers, and increased his own efforts at evicting rent non-payers and other lease violators.

Drug Markets

The direct target of all of these programs was drug market activity in Curtis Park and Quigg Newton. Because arrest or drug seizure data are better indicators

of police effectiveness than of the extent of the underlying drug problem, our best independent measures of the impact of these programs on drug markets in Curtis Park and Quigg Newton come from the resident survey. Respondents to the survey served as *informants* about the frequency of drug use by residents of the projects and how easy it was to buy drugs there.

To measure the frequency of drug use by project residents, survey respondents were asked:

- How frequently do you think kids and young adults actually use drugs in this development? Do you think kids and young adults in this development use drugs? Is it very frequently, fairly frequently, not very frequently? or not at all.

To measure the availability of drugs in the target projects, residents of Curtis Park and Quigg Newton were asked two questions:

- How easy do you think it is for people who want drugs to buy them here in this immediate area? Do you think that it is very easy for them, fairly easy for them, or not very easy for them?

- How easy would it be for someone to find an apartment where drugs could be bought here in this development. Would you say that this would be very easy, fairly easy, or not very easy?

The index means to these questions are presented in Table 2-3. Responses to these questions pointed to a relatively high frequency of use and an easy availability of drugs before the inception of NEPHU. In response to the question about frequency of use by youths, 56 percent of those interviewed at the

Table 2-3
Drug Problems Index Means

	Panel Respondents		Pooled Waves	
Interview	Curtis Park	Quigg Newton	Curtis Park	Quigg Newton
December 1989	2.48	2.33	2.50	2.32
June 1990	2.34	2.23	2.36	2.21
December 1990	2.21	2.14	2.25	2.10
Significance of the changes				
Wave 1-2	.01	.12	.02	.06
Wave 1-3	.01	.02	.01	.01
Wave 2-3	.01	.01	.05	.09
Average number of cases	136	125	204	218

beginning of the evaluation thought that youthful drug use was "very frequent." When asked how easy it would be to buy drugs in the area, 54 percent thought it would be "very easy." Fully 42 percent of those interviewed also thought it would be very easy to find a drug apartment in the project.

Our respondents were clearly concerned about these problems as well. In response to a question about the role of drugs in crime, 64 percent thought drugs were a "big factor" in causing crime in the development. And when asked about "... pressure on the youths who live in this development to get involved in the drug business," one third thought there was pressure on most youths and an additional 40 percent thought there was pressure on at least some of them (these data are summarized in Table 2-4).

Figure 2-5 illustrates the trend in response to these drug market indicators over the life of the evaluation. Across these and other measures in the survey, *there was clear evidence of a decline in drug market activity in both Quigg Newton and Curtis Park.*

First, the frequency of drug use (as reported by our respondents) was down in both areas. The percentage who reported that drug use was very frequent declined from 59 percent at wave 1 to 41 percent at wave 3 in Curtis Park, and from 58 percent to 46 percent in Quigg Newton. These declines were virtually uniform over the three waves of interviews, and they were statistically significant. Likewise, the proportion rating drug availability in the area as very easy dropped from 60 percent to 41 percent in Curtis Park and from 52 percent to 31 percent in

Table 2-4
Detailed Drug Market Questions

Drug Market Measures and Interview	Panel Respondents: Curtis Park	Panel Respondents: Quigg Newton	Pooled Waves: Curtis Park	Pooled Waves: Quigg Newton
Drugs a big factor in crime				
December 1989	69.4	60.9	70.0	59.0
June 1990	59.4	53.1	59.6	51.9
December 1990	47.2●	53.7	49.5●	47.6●
Drug use by youths rated very frequent				
December 1989	58.7	57.9	59.9	53.0
June 1990	53.6	44.2	52.7	45.4
December 1990	40.7●	45.8●	43.8●	45.7●
Pressure on most youths to be involved in drug sales				
December 1989	35.9	29.4	34.9	31.1
June 1990	35.9	35.3	36.3	33.7
December 1990	22.2	16.8	22.4	15.2●
Drug use by adults rated very frequent				
December 1989	54.8	46.2	53.7	43.2
June 1990	43.5	39.8	46.5	40.2
December 1990	32.6●	39.1	33.7●	35.5●
Drug availability in the area rated very easy				
December 1989	60.4	52.2	60.4	47.4
June 1990	49.6	48.7	51.5	47.3
December 1990	40.9●	31.4●	42.1●	31.7●
Drug availability on the street very easy				
December 1989	68.9	45.9	68.9	45.2
June 1990	60.5	48.8	61.1	47.3
December 1990	43.8●	41.5	45.7●	40.8
Finding a project drug apartment very easy				
December 1989	46.2	37.5	47.7	36.9
June 1990	33.6	31.9	35.8	31.3
December 1990	33.6●	30.6●	36.2●	30.6●
Approximate number of cases				
December 1989	135	128	233	251
June 1990	135	128	178	212
December 1990	135	128	204	208

NOTE: ● indicates wave 1 to wave 3 change was significant p>.05 using a two-tailed test.

Figure 2-5

Drug Market Conditions

Curtis Park and Quigg Newton Projects



Quigg Newton. Both declines were steady over the three waves, and again were statistically significant. Finally, the proportion indicating that it would be very easy to find a drug apartment in their development declined from 46 to 34 percent in Curtis Park and 38 to 31 percent in Quigg Newton; these declines were also statistically significant.

As a further check on the generality of these apparent declines, we created an index combining responses to 7 questions about local drug problems. In addition to the items discussed above, it included a separate question about the frequency of drug use by adults and a question concerning the ease with which drugs could be bought on the street. Responses to the 7 questions were consistent, and the reliability of the resulting index was .83. An analysis of this scale score indicated that in Curtis Park declines in drug problems from wave 1 to wave 2 and from wave 2 to wave 3 were statistically significant. In Quigg Newton declines from wave 2 to wave 3 and from wave 1 to wave 3 were statistically significant (see Table 2-3). Further, responses to virtually every individual question in the index followed this pattern, and 21 of 28 wave 1-wave 3 comparisons showed statistically significant declines (this is detailed in Table 2-4).

As a final check, these analyses were repeated after pooling the responses of all 642 persons who were interviewed during any wave of the evaluation surveys. The same pattern was apparent: reports of drug problems declined in both projects in each successive wave of interviews, and declines in the level of

drug problems between December, 1989, and December, 1990, were statistically significant (this is also detailed in Table 2-4).

In summary, to the extent to which survey respondents can be relied on as informants concerning the activity of drug markets in and around their homes, there is evidence in a decline in the availability and frequency of use of drugs in both projects over the course of the evaluation. This is true even considering the responses of persons who later dropped out of the panel. They did so principally because they left the projects, for there were relatively few refusals to participate in the survey. However, because it may have been concern about drug problems that propelled them to move away, the fact that their reports point in the same direction as panel respondents is further evidence of the decline in drug problems in the target projects.

This decline is also consistent with the apparent difficulty that NEPHU had in making drug arrests after mid-1990. Drug arrests paralleled assessments of drug market activity over time, especially in Curtis Park. As documented in Table 2-2, during the six months before the first survey there were 31 drug arrests in that project; during the intervening six months before the second survey there were 11 arrests, and during the final six-month interval there were 4. The paucity of arrests in Quigg Newton make it more difficult to track any trends there; there were no more than five drug arrests in any of the six-month periods described above.

Crime

The resident surveys also included items assessing the extent of crime problems in the target projects. They revealed that both victimization and fear clearly declined in Curtis Park. Both indicators of crime problems dropped somewhat less robustly and consistently in Quigg Newton, on the other hand. This pattern generally parallels the results of the analyses of both levels of policing and trends in drug markets in the two projects.

Figure 2-6 examines trends in victimization in the two projects, as measured by the evaluation surveys. Respondents were questioned about their experiences with a variety of crimes. The personal victimization measure combines their responses to questions concerning robbery, purse snatching and pickpocketing, actual assaults and threatened harm, and rape. The property crime measure combines their responses to questions concerning actual and attempted burglary, thefts from inside or outside their unit, mailbox theft, vandalism, car and motorcycle theft, and theft from or vandalism of their cars. Levels of victimization in the two projects were quite high. For example, in the first wave of interviews, 26 percent of the panel members from Curtis Park recalled a recent successful or attempted burglary, as did 14 percent of those from Quigg Newton. Overall in Curtis Park, 60 percent of those interviewed were victims of property crime and 23 percent were victims of personal crime; the comparable figures for Quigg Newton were 35 percent and 7 percent. The parallel figures for all of those who were interviewed were strikingly similar, suggesting that the panel subset of respondents

Figure 2-6

Victimization within the Projects

Curtis Park and Quigg Newton Projects



may not be biased toward those who were less likely to be victimized and perhaps more likely to remain in the projects as a consequence.

Figure 2-6 also illustrates substantial reductions in levels of victimization in Curtis Park over the course of the evaluation. The percentage victimized by personal crime fell from 26 percent to 13 percent, and by property crime from 60 percent to 34 percent. These are very large declines, and they are statistically quite reliable. On the other hand, there was a slight upward shift in both measures of victimization in Quigg Newton; these changes were not statistically reliable, however, and it would be more accurate to say that they simply did not change very much over the course of the year. Like overall levels of victimization, these trends were also virtually identical in the pooled set of all interviews. The similarity of the victimization trends in the two sets of data is detailed in Table 2-5.

It is difficult to compare these trends in victimization with comparable trends in reported crime, for officially there was very little crime in these projects. As noted in Table 2-2, during the six months before the first survey, residents of Curtis Park reported (and the police recorded as verified) 12 personal crimes and 27 property crimes. In Quigg Newton the comparable figures were 9 and 21. These figures went down a bit in Curtis Park during 1990, and went up a little in Quigg Newton, but the numbers involved make it hard to extract any trend.

Table 2-5
Victimization

	Panel Respondents		Pooled Waves	
	Curtis Park	Quigg Newton	Curtis Park	Quigg Newton
December 1989				
Personal	23.3	6.6	24.3	12.7
Property	59.6	35.0	59.0	40.7
June 1990				
Personal	12.3	8.8	11.2	10.2
Property	39.0	36.5	40.8	40.3
December 1990				
Personal	11.0	12.4	11.5	12.6
Property	34.2	41.6	31.6	37.9
Average number of cases	146	137	219	236
Significance:				
Personal: W1-2	.01	.47	.01	.38
W1-3	.01	.09	.01	.98
W2-3	.68	.20	.93	.42
Significance:				
Property: W1-2	.01	.75	.01	.93
W1-3	.01	.23	.01	.53
W2-3	.30	.29	.05	.60

Figure 2-7 examines another indicator of the extent of crime problems in the two projects—fear. It plots responses to two questions:

- Is there any particular place in this development where you would be afraid to go alone either during the day or after dark? [Yes or no]

- How safe would you feel being alone outside around this development at night? Would you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?

The results generally parallel those of actual victimization. By both measures, fear of crime went down substantially and significantly in Curtis Park during the course of the evaluation, and each wave-to-wave decline was statistically significant. On the other hand, levels of fear were essentially stable in Quigg Newton; the small fluctuations up and down in measures of fear were not statistically significant. The same pattern characterized a seven-question fear of crime index that was created by combining responses to the questions above and others covering worry about being robbed, assaulted, burglarized, vandalized, and being the victim of car theft. This index had a reliability of .82. As Table 2-6 documents, there was a significant decline in the Curtis Park fear index between December, 1989, and June, 1990, while fear levels remained stable in Quigg Newton. All of these patterns were duplicated among the complete pool of persons interviewed during the course of the evaluation.

Figure 2-7

Fear of Crime

Curtis Park and Quigg Newton Projects



Table 2-6

Fear of Crime Index Means

	Panel Respondents		Pooled Waves	
Interview	Curtis Park	Quigg Newton	Curtis Park	Quigg Newton
December 1989	1.95	1.88	1.94	1.87
June 1990	1.72	1.82	1.75	1.81
December 1990	1.72	1.84	1.76	1.82
Average number of cases	146	137	218	236
Significance of changes: W1-2	.00	.23	.01	.20
W1-3	.00	.47	.01	.34
W2-3	.90	.65	.95	.80

Assessments of Police

The evaluation surveys also included measures of the perceived quality of police service in the target projects. It was particularly important to monitor residents' assessments of the police, for the strong enforcement orientation of NEPHU greatly increased the potential for abrasive contacts between police and ordinary citizens in the target projects. At the extreme, a program that successfully targeted drug problems at heavy expense to civil relations between police and the community might not be worth the cost. As we argued in Chapter 1, this can undermine public cooperation with police, increase the level of danger to police working in the area, and in the past has sparked riots.

Police service was assessed along two dimensions: police responsiveness to community concerns and how police treated residents. Each dimension was measured by several questions.

Figure 2-8 illustrates the pattern of responses to three questions about police reactions to community concerns. Residents of Curtis Park and Quigg Newton were asked:

- How responsive are the police in this area to community concerns? Are they very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?
- How good a job are the police doing in working together with residents of this development to solve local problems? Would you say they are doing a very good job, a good job, fair job, or poor job?
- How good a job do you think they are doing to prevent crime in this development? Would you say they are doing a very good job, a good job, fair job, or poor job?

Figure 2-8


Police Responsiveness
Curtis Park and Quigg Newton Projects
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
percent doing a good job
December
June
December
percent good or very good job
CP responsiveness
QN responsiveness
CP work with people
QN work with people
CP police effective
QN police effective

Two general trends are evident in Figure 2-8. First, the police were somewhat more highly regarded in Quigg Newton than in Curtis Park, especially as the year wore on. Moreover, on two of three measures the opinions of residents of Curtis Park grew significantly more negative over time: between June and December of 1990, their perceptions of police responsiveness plummeted, and there was a steady decline in their rating of how well police worked with community residents that also was statistically significant. Their perceptions of police effectiveness against crime remained unchanged. On the other hand, the views of residents of Quigg Newton grew more positive between December, 1989, and June, 1990, but then shifted again. None of the changes in Quigg Newton were statistically significant, however.

Residents of the two target projects were also asked about <u>how the police behaved</u> toward them and their neighbors. In the survey, respondents were asked:

- In general, how polite are the police when dealing with people in this development? Are they very polite, somewhat polite, somewhat impolite, or very impolite?
- When dealing with people's problems in this develop- ment, are the police generally very concerned, some what concerned, not very concerned, not concerned at all about their problems?
- In general, how fair are the police when dealing with people in this development? Are they very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, or very unfair?

Figure 2-9 illustrates trends in responses to these three questions. As above, it is apparent that Curtis Park residents generally were less sanguine about the police and that their views grew more negative over time. The pattern in Quigg Newton

Figure 2-9


Police Demeanor
Curtis Park and Quigg Newton Projects
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
percent in highest category
December
June
December
percent highly regarded
CP police polite
QN police polite
CP police concerned
QN police concerned
CP police fair
QN police fair

was more mixed: positive responses to the "concern" question grew steadily (and significantly) more positive, while others declined between June and December, 1991.

Finally, Figure 2-10 plots responses to a direct question about the police and drugs:

- How good a job are the police in this development doing in dealing with the drug problem? Would you say they are doing a very good job, good job, fair job, or poor job?

As Figure 2-10 indicates, only a slim majority of those questioned thought the police were doing either a "very good" or "good" job, and this reading did not change over the course of the program.

In summary, assessments of the quality of police service did not change dramatically during the course of the NEPHU evaluation. Residents of Curtis Park were more negative toward the police than those in Quigg Newton, and on several measures they became more negative over the course of the year. The views of the police among residents of Quigg Newton were more varied; slight early gains were lost during the latter months of the project.

Summary and Conclusions

An analysis of team reports indicates that NEPHU substantially remained faithful to its mandate—to focus its energies on public housing in Denver. This alone was a significant accomplishment, given the general disdain with which this sort of work was viewed by other special units and the patrol division. Between

Figure 2-10

Police Drug Enforcement Effectiveness

Curtis Park and Quigg Newton Projects



the two projects that we monitored in some detail, the unit's efforts were disproportionately aimed at Curtis Park rather than Quigg Newton. This emphasis was paralleled by indicators of the extent of enforcement activity generally in the projects. Compared to the city as a whole, NEPHU and other police units also succeeded at maintaining a larger emphasis on drug enforcement relative to other kinds of crime-fighting in DHA projects, and in particular in Curtis Park. NEPHU's arrests overwhelmingly passed scrutiny by the District Attorney's office. This was also to their considerable credit, for evidentiary matters loom large in narcotics enforcement and it is often difficult for police to make solid arrests. However, NEPHU worked under several organizational handicaps. Departmental personnel policies ensured that the team was chronically understaffed and its personnel were difficult to schedule. In addition, the unit was held in low esteem by top managers and members of other key drug enforcement units in the city.

As measured by arrests—and drug arrests in particular—police enforcement activity was as high or higher before the NEPHU program began than they were later. In Curtis Park this was attributed to the efforts of the Crack Task Force, which NEPHU supplanted in DHA areas. However, the Crack Task Force was much larger than NEPHU, and its focus on public housing could reap larger rewards. More drug arrests took place in wide bands around project boundaries, where their effects on life in Denver's public housing might be more muted. Almost all of these arrests were concentrated in the area surrounding Curtis Park; few arrests were made in <u>or</u> around Quigg Newton. There was also a dramatic

fall-off in drug arrests during the course of the evaluation. Both NEPHU arrests and drug arrests as a whole declined, especially during the last half of 1990. A decline in narcotics arrests—and a declining emphasis on narcotics arrests as opposed to other kinds of crime-fighting—could be observed for the city as a whole, but it was much more substantial for DHA developments.

Survey measures of the awareness of residents of the target projects of anti-drug programs, the visibility of policing in the two areas, and actual contacts with police followed the same general pattern—they were highest at the beginning of the evaluation period, and then declined over the course of the following year. The decline in levels of visible policing is consistent with the inability of NEPHU to secure the cooperation of the patrol division in mounting high visibility police activities in DHA areas. Declining awareness of drug-related evictions in the two projects paralleled the inability of NEPHU to generate many of them. The only clear counter trend was awareness of a drug hotline, which rose steadily over time. However, there is evidence that NEPHU did not make very good use of hotline information. NEPHU's plan to participate in community affairs through drug education and involvement of Resident Councils in anti-drug programs never was realized.

There is evidence in the resident surveys in a decline in the availability and frequency of use of drugs in both projects over the course of the evaluation. This could be observed across several measures, and both among the panel of respondents who were interviewed three times and in the three separate waves of

more representative respondents. There were sharper declines in Curtis Park than in Quigg Newton, but by the end of the evaluation period scores on a drug problems index stood at about the same low level in both housing developments.

Both victimization and fear of crime dropped in Curtis Park. The prevalence of both personal and property crime declined significantly, as did several measures of fear of crime. Levels of victimization and fear were essentially stable in Quigg Newton.

The perceived quality of police service did not change dramatically during the course of the NEPHU evaluation. Residents of Curtis Park felt more negatively about the police than those in Quigg Newton, and on several measures they became more negative over the course of the year. Their perceptions of police effectiveness did not change, however. The views of the police among residents of Quigg Newton were more varied; slight early gains were lost during the latter months of the project.

Was This an Effect of the Program?

Something happened in each of the housing projects. Victimization went down in Curtis Park, and many measures of drug market activity declined in both Curtis Park and Quigg Newton. This may have been due to NEPHU's enforcement efforts, but it is difficult to support this conclusion. The research design employed in this evaluation makes it hard to interpret its findings causally. There was no real "control group," and it is not clear that there could have been one. NEPHU worked

The Program in Action

NOPD was awarded the NEPHU grant in August, 1989. In a bureaucratic coup that infuriated the Chief of Detectives, the Chief of Field Operations kept the responsibility for administering the grant (and the money) within the Field Operations Bureau. Unofficially, the Detective Bureau was directed to not cooperate with NEPHU, which was to make operations very difficult later on. The lieutenant who drafted the proposal was appointed the NEPHU Commander and authorized to take the necessary personnel, equipment, and vehicles from various sections of Field Operations Bureau to create the new unit. He had expected to be named Commander of NEPHU, and knowing that the grant's prospects were good, he had been recruiting likely candidates for the unit prior to the grant award. He looked for experienced officers with good reputations who would be willing to work hard in NEPHU for the duration of the grant. He also wanted mostly African-American officers, for white police officers would find it difficult to blend in with the population in public housing developments. He tried to recruit officers in their 30s who would not have grown up in an environment where cocaine abuse was common. The Commander was generally successful in his recruiting efforts. However, he was not able to recruit anyone with narcotics experience; all of them were either already in the Narcotics Division and unwilling to transfer, did not want to work in the developments or had "burned out" on that type of investigation. In addition, two members of a headquarters unit that was being disbanded were involuntarily transferred to NEPHU, creating a morale problem.

New Orleans' special drug enforcement unit consisted of twelve officers: a lieutenant, two sergeants, and nine investigators. The lieutenant and one of the sergeants were white, while six of the nine investigators were black (and two were black females). One investigator devoted a great deal of his time to internal administrative matters. The others worked in two teams of four under the direct supervision of a sergeant. The two teams operated with very different philosophy.

One team was supervised by a hands-on sergeant who went out with the detectives most of the time. They practiced the most common narcotics enforcement strategy which Moore and Kleiman (1989) have described as "expressive law enforcement". The team members believed in making lots of narcotics arrests. They would often drive through the housing development in their unmarked cars and "jump" suspected dealers who were hanging out on the street corners and breezeways. On a typical evening in March, 1990, the team made 5 arrests during the first hour of ride-along with the evaluator. The team conducted most of the buy-bust and jump-out operations and they were proud for producing most of the 800 arrest made by NEPHU at the end of the evaluation period. The other team was supervised by a sergeant who rarely went out with the detectives. They conducted most of the controlled buy and surveillance operations that resulted in warrant search. The team often netted larger quantities of narcotics and currency seizures. The team members often boasted of making "quality" arrests. Even though the two teams seemed to have been in competition

of some sort, in the end, they complemented each other in meeting the program objectives of making large numbers of quality narcotics arrests.

The NOPD proposal allocated most of the project funds in four categories. The largest category was to be overtime pay for the officers involved in the unit; during the course of the project, most worked 12-hour shifts. Project funds were also used to make drug purchases, and to compensate informants. These budgetary decisions played a large role in whatever NEPHU may have accomplished. It was initially estimated that the budgeted overtime would allow each officer to work an extra four hours per day, five days per week, given the normal incidence of sick time, vacation, and other time off. That estimate was quite accurate, and the sixty-hour weeks worked by the unit allowed intensive investigations that were the key to NEPHU's operations. Planning to operate on perpetual sixty-hour weeks may seem excessive, but most New Orleans police work a second job because they are very poorly paid. NEPHU overtime allowed officers to concentrate on their investigations without having to handle private security jobs at odd hours.

Initially, NEPHU officers worked from noon to midnight. However, police officers who make numerous narcotics arrests spend a great deal of time in court. Criminal District Court in New Orleans begins at 8:00 a.m., so an officer who had a court appearance would have to work more than sixteen hours that day. NEPHU's hours therefore were adjusted to 10:00am to 10:00pm, with officers having the option of working only eight hours in any day. Most police agencies

provide a substantial number of vacation and sick days for their employees. Also, police officers often receive reportable job-related injuries each year, allowing those who wish an opportunity to be "out injured" without using their annual leave. However, NEPHU did not have any problems with abuse of leave policies. This was partly because the officers in the unit had been chosen for their good reputations, but mainly because an officer who was not at work did not make any overtime pay. Unlike Denver, New Orleans' NEPHU was virtually at full strength at all times during the evaluation period.

The unit's first priority was training, for none of the officers in NEPHU had any experience in narcotics operations. Five days of training was conducted by an NOPD sergeant who was the Department's liaison with the Drug Enforcement Administration. The training included a history of drug trafficking, drug identification, legal issues, investigative techniques, confidential informants, raid tactics, evidence handling, and safety. Unit supervisors were briefed on integrity issues they were likely to face at an Institute for Law and Justice seminar on supervising narcotics investigations. NEPHU members were also given supplemental weapons training at the Police Academy. They all were issued Beretta 9mm semi-automatic pistols and trained in using the weapon. Most members of NEPHU also took the opportunity to qualify with 12-gauge shotguns, which normally are not carried by New Orleans police officers.

NEPHU continued to look for office space, vehicles, and equipment during this training phase. At first there was no suitable office space for the unit, so the

officers worked out of their cars. Later they had to repair and paint their office on their own, and obtain a corporate donation of furniture. During this stage there was constant conflict between the administrators of NEPHU and the rest of City government (including the Police Department's Fiscal Management Division) regarding the unit's budget. The first problem was the mistaken impression held by many that the grant would pay for everything NEPHU did. However, personnel, weapons, vehicles, and office rent and furniture were the responsibility of the City as part of the in-kind match. The grant budget included money for many other items needed by the unit, such as typewriters, so the City refused to provide them. Eventually, members of the unit "scrounged" the necessary office space and equipment, but at a high cost to morale. They had to do so informally because the City's Finance Office works at a glacially slow pace. It took almost two months for the Finance Office to create a budget code for NEPHU, which was required for spending money on anything but payroll. It also took the unit months to get the City Communications Department to authorize a telephone for the unit's office.

The grant included funds for enough equipment, so that once the funds were available, the unit had what it needed. However, purchases over $5,000 had to be processed through City Hall and the Finance Office via formal bids. This meant that the more expensive items authorized in the grant were not available for almost a year. Eventually, the administrators of the grant became adept at shepherding the necessary paperwork through the purchasing process. In the end the unit purchased a great deal of enforcement-related equipment, including raid

jackets, pagers and transmitters (used to "wire" informants), binoculars and night-vision telescopes, cameras, and video equipment. Project funds were spent to automate NEPHU record keeping. The unit was able to obtain ten unmarked police cars, all in very poor condition and not very suitable for narcotics investigations (they were plain, white Fords with blackwall tires—classic "police cars").[2] In one way or another, NEPHU was able to obtain much of the equipment and facilities it needed by the end of September, 1989. Some of the funds awarded in the grant became available in October (as did a telephone), allowing normal operations to begin. The program began in earnest on November 1, 1989.

Despite the classroom training given to the members of NEPHU, learning to conduct narcotics investigations was a long process. This process was extended because there were no experienced narcotics officers in the unit. However, NEPHU members learned their trade through trial and error, and become fairly proficient at this kind of work by December, 1989. By then, most of the technical and surveillance equipment authorized in the grant had been obtained and put in use.

In retrospect, it is obvious that the Commander and the administrative assistant should have been assigned to NEPHU about eight weeks ahead of the rest of the unit; this would have allowed the creation of the Unit's infrastructure

---

[2] NEPHU received its vehicles only after the Chief of Field Operations directed that each of the Bureau's divisions contribute one car to NEPHU. Of course, they received the worst vehicles in the fleet.

before it was needed and avoided much frustration on the part of the street detectives. On the other hand, initially forming NEPHU within the Field Operations Bureau probably was a good thing. Had the NEPHU grant been given to the Detectives Bureau to administer, NEPHU easily could have been a paper organization. Personnel could have been moved around on paper within the 50-strong Narcotics Division to create an official NEPHU Unit, and the equipment purchased with grant funds would have gone into the general supply room. The personnel assigned to NEPHU would have been directed to "concentrate" on public housing, but in reality would probably continue the investigations they had been working on before.

The grant proposal anticipated that NEPHU would concentrate on three public housing developments in New Orleans. The Mayor of New Orleans directed that the three developments be the St. Thomas and B.W. Cooper Projects in uptown New Orleans on the east bank of the Mississippi river, and the Fischer Project on the West Bank. B.W. Cooper was replaced with the St. Bernard development for the evaluation purposes. Many other developments were already the focus of some kind of grant. For example, HANO also had federal grant money to hire off-duty officers from the NOPD to provide extra uniformed patrols in some developments. These were usually two-officer patrols by car in the Desire, Florida and St. Bernard developments. However, as NEPHU realized at the outset, it is difficult for uniformed officers to successfully conduct drug investigations.

Relations With the Housing Authority

Written into the NEPHU grant proposal was an expectation that NEPHU would work closely with HANO. The Housing Authority had been publicly calling for help with drug problems for almost a decade, since the breakup of the Urban Squad. The Unit was welcomed by the HANO Executive Director, who met with its commander as soon as the Unit was formed. However, the Executive Director of HANO apparently believed that NEPHU would fall under his direct supervision. HANO refused to cooperate with the Unit when it was made clear that NEPHU would be administered by the Police Department. The HANO Board was particularly upset when they were informed that NEPHU would conduct investigations without consulting them first. It was initially assumed that this attitude was normal bureaucratic behavior, but other motivations came to light when HANO's Deputy Executive Director of Security was arrested for selling cocaine from his office.

The Housing Authority did have several anti-drug policies that affected NEPHU's operations. One was to evict leaseholders who were caught selling drugs from their apartments. This was a very limited policy: the program did not target drug users, residents who sold drugs somewhere else, or even people other than the lessee who sold drugs from a HANO apartment. An eviction would occur only if the leaseholder personally sold drugs from their own apartment and was arrested for doing so. If a family member was arrested for selling drugs from the

apartment, only that family member would be evicted. Very few people were evicted by HANO once everyone learned those rules.

Another HANO effort that affected NEPHU was their "Drug Free Zone" policy. Apart from anti-drug publicity, this program paid for high fences to be erected in some of the developments. The fences were supposed to restrict the drug dealers' freedom of movement. However, dealers quickly adjusted to the new obstacles and used them to minimize the number of directions from which the police could approach their operations. They also frequently sported Drug-Free Zone stickers on their cars.

The grant plan described a combination of undercover investigations and uniformed patrols in the targeted developments, but experience quickly showed this to be impractical. There was no way for a unit as small as NEPHU to be able to safely do both. Throughout the evaluation period the unit used disguises, worked mostly at night, and planned their operations to conceal the identity of team members. This was important, for they worked undercover, making drug purchases much more frequently than NEPHU in Denver. The decision was made to concentrate on plainclothes operations; given the layout of the projects, it was impossible for uniformed officers to get close enough to traffickers to conduct successful drug investigations. Also, it rapidly became clear it would be impossible to restrict NEPHU's activities to only three developments, as the city's drug trade was too linked to other projects and residential neighborhoods.

Program in Action

NEPHU standardized on the following investigative approach. Possible drug trafficking location would be identified through intelligence sources, and NEPHU officers would conduct a surveillance to determine if drug sales were actually taking place. This might be done driving through the area or by using the unit's high-powered binoculars. Once trafficking was confirmed, a confidential informant (usually wearing a concealed transmitter) would attempt to make a controlled purchase of illegal drugs; plainclothes officers usually only made street buys where the transactions could be conducted more safely. The confidential informant ("CI") or plainclothes officer would use marked money. If the purchase was successful, street corner dealers were usually arrested immediately, while sales from a residence usually generated an application for a search warrant. The confidential informants were usually addicts. They either came to NEPHU officers with information to sell, or they were initially arrested and then "turned" with an offer to drop the charge. In either case, CIs were paid for the value of their information, and it was implicitly assumed by unit members that they used this money to buy drugs.

In the summer of 1990, the police department assigned a recruit, who was waiting to go to the Police Academy, to NEPHU as part of the city in-kind match. The recruit, an African-American male, worked undercover for about two months during which period he made several controlled buys. His assignment was not a complete success, however, because he had problem following instructions and as

a result he was robbed a couple of times. This often happened when he was sent to an apartment to make a buy. He had been instructed to attempt the buy only at a designated apartment. This was important to make sure that the backup unit knew where he was and could go to his aid if necessary. Each time he was robbed it happened when the residents in the designated apartment told him they did not have any drugs but that a guy around the corner had some. Instead of checking in with the unit as he had been instructed to do, he tried to follow the "lead" from the residents who apparently had set him up for the armed robbery.

NEPHU became more effective at this kind of work with each passing month, and soon was making more arrests per officer than the Narcotics Division. This embarrassed the Chief of Detectives, who also still wanted control of NEPHU's budget. In January, 1990, when the Chief of Field Operations retired and while the unit's commander was off duty, NEPHU was transferred to the Detective Bureau. Officially this was done to consolidate and better coordinate the activities of the Department's narcotics efforts that were scattered. A new Commander was appointed and two of the detectives were transferred out; otherwise, the unit was left mainly intact and continued to occupy the office that it had secured in the Union Passenger Terminal in downtown New Orleans.[3] NEPHU's tactics also

---

[3] The Union Passenger Terminal (both an AMTRAK and Greyhound station) was a good location for the team. It is centrally located and open all night, and the roughly-dressed members of NEPHU did not stand out in the crowd.

remained effectively unchanged, although liaison with the Narcotics Division became easier once the unofficial ban on cooperation between the units was lifted.

In the beginning, NEPHU tried to avoid making massive street-corner arrests, and instead tried to target upper-level dealers. That turned out to be unrealistic. Municipal police departments usually do not have the resources or expertise to undertake investigations of high level drug traffickers; this must be left to DEA and the FBI. The unit found that they could not penetrate even middle-level dealer networks without first becoming familiar with street corner operations. After some frustration, the officers learned what did work and concentrated on that. Prosecuting lower-level dealers eventually led to middle level investigations, and their morale improved drastically with this success.

NEPHU used its budgeted confidential funds for two purposes: to pay informants and buy drugs. Informants were paid varying amounts on the basis of their performance, at the conclusion of an operation. For example, an informant who actively worked with NEPHU to introduce an officer to a dealer as a "player" in the drug business might be paid several hundred dollars if the operation resulted in arrests with a substantial seizure of narcotics. An informant who merely provided useful information might receive $5 or $10, unless the information was particularly valuable.

Confidential funds were also used to buy drugs in order to establish probable cause for an arrest or a search warrant. An officer, either personally or through an informant, might spend as little as $20 for one rock of crack or thousands of

aggressively in all DHA sites and in low-income scatter-site housing areas. In addition, very similar units (the Crack Task Force, SCAT, and SWAT) were working nearby areas and poor neighborhoods throughout the city. It would have been hard to isolate comparable populations from this kind of scrutiny, anywhere in Denver. The two housing developments that we observed intensively also were not comparable to each other in one fundamental way, race. While they were very similar in many other ways, in Denver race was related to patterns of enforcement. NEPHU and other police units found it much harder to penetrate Hispanic drug networks in Quigg Newton than black dealer networks in Curtis Park. As a result, it is chancy to compare the two in terms of the proximate and general objectives of the program.

Measures of program activity in the target housing developments also did not clearly parallel the changes in victimization and drug market activity that we observed. Drug arrests went down somewhat for the city as a whole, but they collapsed in Curtis Park where the outcome measures evidenced the clearest decline. Likewise, our measure of the emphasis that police were giving drug arrests showed a substantial decline, one much larger in the target housing developments than for the city as a whole and much larger for Curtis Park than Quigg Newton. There were several reasons to suspect that this was not due to declining opportunities to make drug arrests, but rather to a decline in NEPHU effectiveness in the target housing developments. Drug arrests may have declined because other, larger units withdrew from drug enforcement in DHA areas. This

"curse of special units" can be observed in any department, and it was apparent in the decline between 1989 and 1990 in arrest rates for Curtis Park, when the Crack Task Force pulled out. Alternately, NEPHU may have been effective at the outset, but then the program may have bogged down. The slump of the Summer of 1990, plus the unit's heavy involvement in a wiretap case, could have accounted for the sharp drop in arrests of all kinds during the last six months of the program. Neither of these explanations for the observed decline in drug arrests in Curtis Park is consonant with the deterrence hypothesis.

In addition, few of the survey-based measures of program awareness or contact are congruent with apparent declines in drug markets and victimization. Awareness of the hotline was up in both housing developments, but there is no good evidence it was put to any substantial use. Police patrol visibility and the frequency of proactive stops of residents mostly went down (but not significantly) between the first two waves of surveys, and a declining awareness of apartment searches was significant in Curtis Park.

****

NOTE THAT THE FINAL REPORT WILL ALSO INCLUDE PLOTS

OF MONTHLY ACTIVITY INDICATORS FOR DENVER

****

CHAPTER 3

DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN NEW ORLEANS

The City of New Orleans, with a population of about 500,000, is situated in a metropolitan area of about 1.2 million people. The area's primary industries are tourism, oil, transportation (mainly the Port of New Orleans), and light manufacturing. With the exception of tourism, all of its industries were in a severe recession between 1985 and 1990. New Orleans is a very poor city. The 17 to 20 percent unemployment levels of the late 1980s have fallen to about 8 percent, but underemployment is still a major problem. A family needs an annual income of only $55,000 to be in the top 1 percent of the city's income distribution. This situation is not likely to change soon, as the City's economic plan anticipates an increasing reliance on tourism, which produces jobs that rarely pay much more than the minimum wage. According to the 1990 census the City was about 65 percent black, 30 percent white, and 5 percent of other races. In 1990, the State of Louisiana and the metropolitan area as a whole were about 70 percent white and 30 percent black. In 1980, the City was about 51 percent black and 45 percent white.

In terms of sheer numbers, New Orleans has the nation's fifth largest stock of public housing units. However, New Orleans has one of the highest <u>rates</u> of public housing in the nation—more than 10 percent of the city's population (a total of almost 55,000 people) lives in one of nine large housing complexes. It should be noted that this only includes people who are legal residents. It is nearly

impossible to estimate how many unattached males live in different apartments, unaccounted for in official statistics. Some of the developments are very large; two of the developments have over 8,000 official residents and sprawl over vast areas of land. More than 98 percent of public housing residents in New Orleans are black, about 60 percent of the officially registered residents are women, and more than 50 percent are under 18 years of age.

The conditions under which residents live vary, but differ tremendously from those in the housing developments in Denver. Like Denver, New Orleans' projects consist predominately of low-rise (2-3 story) brick buildings. Many of the two-story buildings are constructed in row-house fashion, while the three-story buildings have separate dwelling units on each floor. However, living conditions within the buildings are deplorable. In some developments, 50 percent of the apartments stand gutted and uninhabitable, and probably are beyond salvage. In those developments virtually every building is at least partially abandoned. Some of this is attributable to shoddy construction, but most is due to poor management. Most of the developments are low-rise, have large "green" areas, and are laid out for low density living. However, there are few recreational facilities for young people, the grounds are not cared for, and the overall atmosphere in all of the developments is one of nearly complete neglect and decay.

Another factor that contributes to maintenance problems and the aura of despair is that there is no control over the density or composition of the public housing population in New Orleans. Many apartments in the projects are grossly

overcrowded with undocumented residents, at the same time that other units stand gutted. These overcrowded conditions contribute to the violence and vandalism that is endemic in the housing developments. Unlike Denver, public house buildings in New Orleans are marked with graffiti and the lawns around them have been destroyed. In the worst areas, metal window frames have been ripped from vacant units and carried away for resale. Gaping holes have been ripped in the walls at ground level so that anyone can gain access to crawl spaces beneath the row-house apartments.

The projects are managed by the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), which is governed by a Board whose members are primarily appointed by the Mayor of New Orleans. The system is financed by a combination of federal, state, and local funding. Recently, the HANO Board was forced by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (DHUD) to hire an independent management team after incidents of managerial incompetence came to light (such as spending millions to put new roofs on condemned, abandoned buildings). The management team that was selected by HANO also came under fire from DHUD and was replaced. Under pressure from DHUD, the Executive Director resigned in July, 1991.

Drug traffickers have invaded most of New Orleans' projects, and they have become dangerous places to live. Reputedly, many dealers do not live in the projects; rather, they appropriate street corners, breezeways opening through the buildings, and apartments to use during "business hours." These provide them places to store and vend drugs, and safe havens to which to scurry when pursued

by undercover officers. They intimidate those who oppose their presence in the buildings, and they routinely use violence to protect their individual "turf" from encroachment by competitors. Project residents are the targets of addicts who steal to support their lifestyle. The arrival of "crack" cocaine around 1986 shocked all parts of the criminal justice system with a wild increase in crime in public housing, particularly homicides and robberies. The physical structure of public housing in New Orleans makes it impossible to restrict access to the developments, and residents resist the imposition of any controls on their movement, such as identification cards. In any event, HANO is extremely reluctant to evict the tenants when a lease violation is discovered, arguing that public housing is all that stands between most residents and complete homelessness.

New Orleans is a participant in the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) project sponsored by NIJ, and quarterly urine analyses and interviews with arrestees there give us an overview of the nature of drug-related problems in that city (National Institute of Justice, 1990a). In 1989, about 69 percent of male arrestees tested positive for any drug; this placed New Orleans near the middle of the 21 cities that participated in the program that year. About 60 percent of male arrestees tested positive for cocaine, 6 percent for heroin, 28 percent for marijuana, and 28 percent for multiple drug use. Again, these figures were typical for DUF cities. As in other cities, drug use was most common among arrestees in their twenties and early thirties, and among blacks.

Because New Orleans has been a DUF participant since January, 1988, there is a modest quarterly time series on the extent of drug use among arrestees there as well. Since the second quarter of 1988, the percentage of arrestees in New Orleans testing positive for any drug has varied between about 60 to 75 percent. There is no clear trend, although the percentage of males testing positive for any drug declined in four of the last 5 quarters (through the first quarter of 1991). However, over a longer period there is no doubt that drug problems have been on the upswing in New Orleans. Perhaps the best indicator of that is the extent of drug-related homicides in the city. Drug-related homicides rose precipitously in New Orleans during the 1980s. While in 1984 they constituted one-third of all murders, by 1988 that proportion had risen to 75 percent.

New Orleans' projects have not been effectively policed. During the 1960s, a special Urban Squad was assigned to patrol public housing areas, and they maintained a visible presence. The 110-officer unit was disbanded in the early 1980s as a result of budget constraints, and now it is much less common to see uniformed patrols in the projects. The department's Narcotics Section reputedly has avoided concentrating its efforts in the projects because of the dangerous and unsavory conditions there. In the worst projects, the new Narcotics Enforcement in Public Housing Unit (NEPHU) conducts operations only in teams of 4 or 5 officers, and only with backup cars on hand.

New Orleans' Program

The Plan

In 1989, when the Bureau of Justice Assistance announced the availability of two $250,000 grants for Narcotics Enforcement in Public Housing, the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) applied for one. The department provided an in-kind match of $250,000. The Research and Planning section of NOPD coordinates all grant applications made by the Department. This division also works closely with the Bureau that would implement the grant so that the application is professionally written and realistic. The Detective Bureau would normally originate applications for a grant like NEPHU, for narcotics investigation is one of its responsibilities. However, Detective Bureau staff members who normally author applications were already occupied with another grant application. Therefore, responsibility for the NEPHU grant was given to the Field Operations Bureau, which is primarily responsible for uniformed patrols using marked police vehicles.

The lieutenant who was assigned to handle the grant application was not an expert in drug investigations. He researched problems in public housing, reviewed previous applications for similar grants, and consulted frequently about it with the Narcotics Division. The Narcotics Division cooperated, thinking that the Field Operations Bureau would write the grant application, but that they would get the money. The initial plan envisioned a large unit composed of undercover, plainclothes, and uniformed officers that would be capable of attacking crime and drugs in public housing in force. However, the reality was that the New Orleans

Police Department did not have the personnel to staff such a large project, and in the final plan the unit was restricted to only twelve officers. The application proposed a substantial overtime budget to make up for the limited personnel the NOPD could assign to NEPHU, and a considerable amount of technical and surveillance equipment to support investigations.

The New Orleans project had as its principal goal "to reduce the incidence of violent crime in public housing developments by focusing project activities on the reduction of street narcotics trafficking." The unit hoped to increase the sense of security among the residents, increase the risk of apprehension among potential offenders in and around the developments, and increase residents' understanding of the severity of the narcotics problem and the ability of the police to tackle it. The proposal anticipated that the unit would make 700 drug-related arrests, a number which they actually surpassed. NOPD proposed a two-pronged approach to these goals. First, NEPHU would conduct traditional but intensive narcotics field operations. These included:

- on-view arrests following surveillance. Surveillance was to be conducted from passing vehicles or at a distance; probable cause for making arrests would stem from the observation of "furtive transactions," allowing evidence from the search to be admissible in Louisiana courts.

- buy-bust arrests. This involved having an undercover officer make a drug purchase, and then an immediate arrest. These cases could be prosecuted, or used to encourage perpetrators to serve as informants in other cases.

- warrant-search arrests. In these cases, confidential informants were given money to make one or more drug purchases in an apartment. A search warrant would then be requested on the basis of this

information. As in Denver, NEPHU teams were backed up by special uniformed personnel when they conducted those searches and made arrests.

The unit also planned to develop computerized, geographically-based intelligence files on individuals and gangs engaged in narcotics trafficking in housing projects, and to share this data with other agencies.

In addition to apprehending drug dealers, these tactics were intended to spread a more general, deterrent message in the target projects. The city proposed to augment the potential deterrent impact of undercover narcotics operations in the projects by assigning special uniformed patrols to those areas. The proposal suggested that regular patrols and intensive arrests would "... increase public awareness of law enforcement's ability to impact criminal conduct."

The NEPHU proposal also envisioned a modest community outreach effort. Part of this was to stem from increased police presence in the projects, which might "restore the self confidence of the residents in their ability to carry on a normal lifestyle." In addition, the unit planned to seek resident input into their program through the Tenant Advisory Councils that represent each project to HANO. The unit also planned to advertise a special Drug Hotline, to encourage information sharing by the community.

Finally, HANO agreed,in principle, to cooperate in a more aggressive eviction program. Local statutes and HANO regulations limited their authority to make drug-related evictions, but the agency agreed to do what it could to cooperate with the NEPHU.

dollars for several ounces of cocaine. Drug traffickers are very aware that the police are perpetually running operations against them and normally street salesmen transfer their cash to someone else as quickly as possible. This protects the money in the event salesmen are arrested, much like convenience stores that make numerous bank deposits to minimize losses in the event of a robbery.

However, this habit of the drug traffickers also creates a situation where confidential funds used to buy drugs are almost never recovered unless the arrest is made immediately after the purchase. This creates two problems. First, a unit like NEPHU requires a considerable amount of operating capital. It can be expected to recover a substantial percentage of this investment on occasion, but like any venture capital the unit's confidential funds are at risk. In a cash-strapped city like New Orleans, NEPHU's federally-supplied confidential funds played an important role in helping them to operate effectively, and to occasionally penetrate middle-level drug markets. The second problem generated by confidential financial arrangements is corruption.

Managing Covert Operations

Plainclothes and undercover drug operations present difficult management issues. Some of these include "normal" problems like complaints of police brutality. During its year of active operation, New Orleans' NEPHU did not have a single complaint of brutality or discourtesy lodged against it, despite making more than 800 felony arrests and often becoming involved in struggles with arrestees.

This was in part because of the firm stance against unauthorized conduct taken at the time the unit was formed. However, NEPHU was also immunized against many of these complaints because they operated out of uniform -- and thus were not identifiable by many civilians -- and because the focus of their operations involved subjects of dubious reputation who want as little to do with police as possible.

Police officers are also routinely accused of theft, although no sustained theft complaints were lodged against NEPHU during the evaluation period. A standard accusation is one that comes after an officer visits a residence in the course of his duties and, after he leaves, residents are unable to find some item (often a small piece of jewelry). They presume that the item must have been stolen by the officer and they make a complaint. In these cases they almost always call back to later report that the missing item has been found. There were a few complaints of this type against NEPHU, usually following the serving of a search warrant where the contents of a home were turned upside-down.

Perhaps the unit's most difficult management issue was corruption. This is a particularly hard problem for any organization that targets drug trafficking, and it is redoubled in New Orleans where police officers are very poorly paid and the Department as a whole has a reputation for corruption. The drug business involves a great deal of cash, and it is impossible to supervise narcotics investigators as closely as (for example) traffic control officers. Some officers inevitably are unable to resist the lure of the money that can be made illegally and may begin stealing money from drug dealers, or even stealing and selling drugs themselves. Two

officers were transferred out of NEPHU in January of 1990 because there were hints that they were involved in stealing money from drug dealers. The two were later indicted in Federal Court on charges that they were involved in selling cocaine by the kilogram. The indictments indicate they began their illegal activities in October of 1989, while they were assigned to NEPHU. DEA initiated the investigation, a pattern that is typical, as we were told, in New Orleans; NOPD administrators generally have refused to address the problem of drug-related corruption within the Department.

In addition to stealing drugs and money from dealers, an officer could easily pocket several hundred dollars per month by falsifying his drug-buy expense reports. On the other hand, NOPD's regulations concerning payments to "cooperating individuals" are very concrete and there is not much opportunity for misconduct on this score.

We examined how NEPHU supervisors tried to deal with the threat of corruption in their unit. Their tactics were not complex. Their first line of defense was to attempt to recruit good officers with no rumored taint of corruption. The sergeants also paid a great deal of attention to the dress and lifestyles of squad members. They kept an eye out for gold chains and expensive shoes, and talk about new cars and expensive vacation plans. They occasionally searched squad vehicles for contraband. As in many other departments, most narcotics detectives are routinely reassigned after a period of time in order to break ties that they might

develop with the underworld. Narcotics detectives in New Orleans also are subject to routine urine testing.

Relations with Other Units

The Chief of Detectives' unofficial order directing the Detective Bureau to not cooperate with NEPHU was indirectly passed on to federal agencies that the Narcotics Division worked with, primarily DEA, US Customs, and the FBI. As a result, NEPHU had almost no contact with these agencies, even after the Unit was transferred to the Detective Bureau. The unit did work with Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Border Patrol, on some cases, but these agencies investigated narcotics only when drugs lapped over into their primary areas of responsibility. NEPHU had the most success in cooperative investigations with the Sheriff's Office of a neighboring parish (county), and the City of Gretna Police Department. Gretna is a suburban community bordering the Fischer Project, which sits just on the New Orleans side of a small canal. The project was a major source of drugs in Gretna as well as for the West Bank area of New Orleans. The two agencies conducted numerous joint operations. The unit's relationship with Gretna was so close that the two cities cross-commissioned NEPHU and Gretna's Narcotics Squad. This eliminated jurisdictional issues when investigating dealers who moved across the border between New Orleans and Gretna.

NEPHU had good relations with its own department, except for the Detective Bureau. The primary departmental issues NEPHU faced were those

associated with any new unit within a very traditional organization, and those went away with time. Many initially assumed that the unit was working for the Housing Authority, and few police wanted to trust anything associated with HANO, but this problem also disappeared as the unit became better known. The unit worked closely with uniformed officers in the Special Operations Division (SOD), especially before NEPHU was transferred to the Detective Bureau (SOD is part of Field Operations). NEPHU called SOD whenever they had an arrest or search warrant to be served, and members of both units would carry out the warrant. There were no shooting incidents during any of the numerous warrants served by NEPHU, apparently because the show of force that NEPHU and SOD could muster (15 to 25 officers armed with shotguns and machine pistols) was quite intimidating. After executing a number warrant searches in the Fischer development, residents started referring to NEPHU as the "shot gun squad". NEPHU also experimented with using SOD teams as the "uniformed" presence described in the original grant application. However, SOD had its own priorities and could not dedicate enough officers to routine patrol. NEPHU also had good relationships with the various police districts in which they worked, and patrol units routinely cooperated in the surveillance operations described below. The uniformed division also stepped up its patrols in two special NEPHU targets, the Fischer and St. Thomas projects.

Developing Criminal Intelligence

One promise of grant application was that NEPHU would establish and maintain a criminal intelligence database in one of the unit's microcomputers. This was done using software called the "Criminal Intelligence System (CIS)," produced by the Institute for Intergovernmental Research in Florida. The software itself was very good, although the data entry process was lengthy. The main problem NEPHU had with the database requirement was that the information was duplicated by the Department's computer system. NEPHU's microcomputer database was made superfluous by the computerized database operated by the City on its mainframe computer. However, had there not already been a computerized database available (such as in a small police department) CIS would have been invaluable. NEPHU ceased entering data into the microcomputer system on the day the grant ended.

Unlike the unit in Denver, New Orleans' NEPHU relied upon surveillance to gather information about drug market operations. Early in the evaluation period the unit focused on two housing projects, Fischer and St. Thomas. For several weeks they focused on understanding how street-corner markets worked in those two projects. They made both undercover drive-throughs of the projects and conducted long-range surveillance, using high-powered binoculars from nearby high-rise buildings and trees. They covertly made photographs of suspected dealers and actual narcotics transactions, and began identifying and documenting visible participants in the drug markets of the two projects. For example, in

Fischer they learned that the business was partly dominated by two very loosely organized gangs that provided drugs to street dealers, but that other dealers seemed to be operating independently. They also found that most dealers did not live in the project, but commuted each day from elsewhere in the city. Through the course of the year, NEPHU members came to support the view that the drug business is quite decentralized, with multiple sources of supply, many small-scale wholesale distributors, and no overarching organization among the hundreds of fairly autonomous street dealers who struggle to maintain control of their small patch of turf. This made them feel better about their ability to target only "lower-level" dealers, for that appeared to be most of the business.

The unit also used its long-range surveillance capacity to make arrests. For example, in the Fischer project they observed "drive-through" sales on street corners and in building breezeways, and radioed the information to uniformed officers waiting nearby. The uniformed teams would then follow the suspected cars and make traffic stops and arrests some distance from the project area. In other instances officers would disguise themselves, drive to the driveways and breezeways that had been identified through surveillance as the site of numerous drug transactions, and make rapid purchases and arrests. By the end of December, 1989, NEPHU had generated 115 narcotics arrests just from its operations in Fischer and St. Thomas developments.

One form of record system that NEPHU found essential was the manilla folder. They opened a file on every person who came to their attention as a likely

drug trafficker, and as bits and pieces of information came their way they were added to the folder. Suspects' scars, aliases, and vehicle plate numbers were noted. When the unit could identify suspects by name, the file also included arrest histories and NCIC data. A copy of all the documents generated by an arrest were placed in the file, along with a mug shot of the suspect. The files also included information gathered during surveillance operations, field interrogations, and the covert photographs described above. Basic information on each subject was duplicated in a computerized database which was used to index and cross--reference the folders. Each file was reviewed by a supervisor whenever substantial new material appeared, and corrections to old information were continually added to the folders and computerized files. The 1000+ files collected by NEPHU by the end of the grant represented a comprehensive intelligence source on drug dealers operating in public housing. NEPHU became well known for it's ability to track down individual criminals operating in that environment. NEPHU shared this information with other units on occasion; however, police tend to guard their best information even from one another. Most police officers derive a great deal of satisfaction from catching criminals, and giving away information seems to run counter to this goal. This could be observed in meetings between NEPHU and representatives from other units or agencies; they often resembled bartering sessions, with no one willing to give away anything for free.

NEPHU was fortunate to have included two microcomputers in its grant budget. Like any police agency, NOPD keeps detailed records of its activities.

However, the documentation and evaluation requirements of the NEPHU grant went beyond the statistical data normally collected by the Department. One of the computers was dedicated to a database program that was configured to capture the data needed for the grant's quarterly statistical reports. The data was collected directly from reports that were written whenever an officer made an arrest or seized contraband, weapons, money, or vehicles. The data entry process was tiresome, but made the production of accurate quarterly reports very easy. On a moment's notice the unit could report on its arrest patterns, drug seizures, the place of residence of suspects, and the status of NEPHU cases in the District Attorney's office. The microcomputers also linked into the City's criminal history file and NCIC, so that unit members could access state and national information on suspects and auto license plates. In addition, the NEPHU administrative assistant kept track of the grant budget on a microcomputer.

Community Outreach

The NEPHU proposal also envisioned a community outreach effort. The unit planned to seek resident input into their program through the Tenant Advisory Councils that represent each project. These small councils are made up of unpaid elected representatives who are given an office and a small budget by HANO. They generally are in touch with their constituents and try to represent their interests to HANO, but usually they are ineffective. The NEPHU grant application anticipated that NEPHU and the Tenant Councils could create an environment

where police and the residents could work together to make public housing a better place to live.

This never happened. In practice, unit members believed that public housing residents were not really interested in halting the drug trade. Rather, they believed that many residents have friends or relatives who are involved in trafficking and they do not want to see them go to jail. They believed that some residents have found ways to profit from the trade; for example, by subletting their apartments to dealers, or acting as runners. They also recognized that many residents lived in terror of well-armed and dangerous dealers, and that they could not effectively protect them. NEPHU members reported occasional evidence of community resistance to their enforcement efforts. In the Fischer development, for example, crowds more than once formed to shout at patrol units and throw firecrackers at police in protest during a large "bust." In the St. Bernard project, other dealers would fire into the air to distract police while they were making arrests. Rather than seeing the projects as communities that needed to be defended, NEPHU members saw them as hostile territory. They never went there without team support and backup cars on hand.

NEPHU members did make overtures to HANO and the Tenant Councils at the outset of the program. They met with senior HANO officials, including the Executive Director and the Director of Security, who gave general promises of support. They also met with some project managers and Tenant Council leaders in the three developments chosen for the evaluation. However, they felt that

residents and some Council members were uncooperative; did not return their messages or respond to requests, and did not show up for appointments. They also reported a high degree of cynicism among Council members, who had seen other programs come and (quickly) go without living up to their promises.

The unit also advertised a special drug hotline, to encourage information sharing by the community. They distributed leaflets describing the hotline and they asked Tenant Council members to support the program. During the course of the evaluation period, New Orleans television stations highlighted drug problems in the city, and this seemed to increase the flow of information to police via the various drug hotlines that were being advertised. Some calls came directly to NEPHU's own hotline, but HANO and the Department's Narcotics Division also forwarded calls which came to them concerning public housing. A listing of the hotline calls made or referred to NEPHU between January and May, 1990, indicates that of the 79 calls, 62 seemed worth following up. Of this group, 26 did not lead to much, 8 quickly led to arrests, and 28 were still on the unit's active list a month later. NEPHU reported that by the end of 1990 the information that they received from hotlines was increasingly specific and useful, but that virtually everyone who called continued to remain anonymous.

Evaluation Design and Data

We planned to employ a field quasi-experimental design to evaluate the impact of NEPHU. The city decided on which three of the nine housing

developments would be used for this purpose. After meetings with the Superintendent of Police and his staff, it was agreed that one of the developments would be limited to "normal" levels of enforcement by the New Orleans Police Department, while NEPHU gave the two others special attention. Unfortunately, two youths were shot in the control project soon after NEPHU began, and in ensuing months the level of police activity in that "control area" was abnormally high. NEPHU also started operating in the control development. As a result, our analysis of New Orleans' NEPHU shifted its focus to (a) documenting the nature of the program and its activities, and (b) describing time-series data on crime, arrests, and policing efforts in all nine of New Orleans' major housing developments.

READER NOTE

WE ARE STILL MODERATELY HOPEFUL OF RECEIVING THE CRIME AND ARRESTS DATA FROM THE DATA SYSTEMS BRANCH IN NEW ORLEANS IF WE DO, IT WILL BE PRESENTED IN THE FINAL REPORT

Several kinds of quantitative data are available for the New Orleans evaluation. The Data Systems Branch of the New Orleans Police Department provided listings of the following data elements, separately for each housing project and as city-wide totals:

- crimes known to police, by detailed Part I categories
- arrests, by detailed Part I categories
- drug-related arrests
- drug-related homicide counts

We are working with HANO to secure detailed yearly (and perhaps monthly) counts of occupied dwelling units and residents for each of the projects. Because of the

visible depopulation of some of the projects, it will be necessary to assemble estimates of the base population of each over time in order to interpret properly the project-level data.

The Data Systems Branch also supplied listings of the hours worked (regular and overtime) and court-time assignments of each NEPHU officer from their payroll accounting system. This was combined with data managed by NEPHU itself to produce estimates of the level of the units activity over the life of the project. NEPHU records detailed project-level data on all drug purchases, arrests and confiscations, and on the results of all requests for warrants and warrant searches. They also separately accounted for some officer hours by project (for example, hours on surveillance), and we tapped their data base for this information. In addition, NEPHU tracked the action of the District Attorney on each of its cases. The District Attorney can accept, modify, or reject the charges that are brought to him. Currently he accepts about two-thirds of all drug arrests in the city; we used NEPHU records to compare their performance against this standard.

Two quantitative indicators of the pattern of NEPHU activity are summarized in Figure 3-1. It charts the monthly distribution of NEPHU arrests and drug seizures from January, 1990 until January, 1991. The drug seizure figures represent total seizures -- in grams -- of cocaine, crack, heroin, and PCP. NEPHU also separately accounted for marijuana seizures, but the volume of marijuana taken was so much larger and so variable by month that it would swamp the patterns presented here. Figure 3-1 describes fairly uniformly high levels of

Figure 3-1


New Orleans NEPHU Activity
Arrests and Grams of Drugs Seized
total arrests
grams seized
total arrests
grams of drugs seized
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Jan'90
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Jan'91
drug total cocaine, crack, pcp & heroin

activity through the grant period, except for the holiday period in December (when several unit members also took their vacations). Table 3-1 details these and other quantitative indicators of NEPHU activity during the evaluation period. Finally, we conducted interviews with a panel of key local informants, once at the beginning of the NEPHU project and again a year later. These informants were positioned to aggregate the reports of many other individuals and organizations. A discussion of the results of these interviews is presented below.

Key Informant Interviews

In addition to the quantitative data presented above, we also conducted interviews with 22 key informants in three projects that we originally planned to observe in detail, St. Bernard, Fischer, and St. Thomas. The key informants included the president and members of the Tenant Council Association in each of the three target developments. Arrangements were made to interview them individually at the offices of the Tenant council Association. In a few cases, the interviews were conducted by telephone. We found these individuals very knowledgeable about the conditions of their housing development in general and about the drug problem in particular. We also interviewed a few of the businesses that were located within the boundaries of the housing developments. Even though we had some problem locating all the wave 1 informants for the wave 2 interview, we did not experience any outright refusals.

Table 3-1
Monthly NEPHU Activity Measures

	Cash $	Vehicles	Weapons	Arrests	Warrants	Under-cover Purchases	Sei-zures (grams)
Jan'90	3135	2	11	74	6	18	168
Feb'90	2153	3	13	78	7	6	143
Mar'90	2782	3	12	86	0	1	175
Apr'90	3219	1	10	55	14	13	104
May'90	3600	2	14	90	4	11	174
Jun'90	2042	1	2	54	9	4	48
Jul'90	3258	2	4	63	7	2	195
Aug'90	1693	0	5	56	9	1	222
Spt'90	6133	0	0	53	10	8	228
Oct'90	3288	2	5	64	12	6	320
Nov'90							
Dec'90	622	0	3	22	4	2	230
Jan'91	1890	0	4	45	22	9	111

NOTE: data from NEPHU records system. November is missing.

The systematic use of informants to generate quantitative data on small areas is a somewhat unusual research technique. However, there is emerging evidence that the reports of small groups of informants can be congruent with similar data collected in large and expensive sample surveys. Anderson, Jesswein, and Fleischman (1990) compared the results of using population surveys and smaller samples of informants to assess human service needs and service delivery in Duluth. Each group was asked to rank a list of problems, and the rank order correlation between the two lists was +.79. Ward, Bertrand and Brown (1991) compared the results of sample surveys with the findings of focus group discussions of voluntary sterilization, in three different studies conducted in Central America and Africa. They found that both methods would lead to the same conclusions.

In related research, Skogan, Lurigio and Davis (1991) conducted a validation study of the use of key informants to identify neighborhoods facing drug problems. They conducted telephone surveys with 198 key informants for 36 neighborhoods in six cities: Chicago, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Houston, and Newark. The respondents were positionally defined: interviews were conducted with city council members and their staffs, police district commanders and neighborhood relations officers, and leaders of community organizations or activists in neighborhood affairs. Five or six informant interviews were conducted for most of the areas. Each interview began with a careful description of the boundaries of the area under examination. The informants were asked to characterize the current

socioeconomic make-up of the communities, the nature of local crime, drug, and gang problems, and whether or not organized anti-drug activities had been mounted there. The responses of all of the informants for each community were averaged to produce quantitative profiles for each of the 36 areas. The validation study involved comparing these community profiles with the results of large sample surveys that had been conducted in the same areas. The study found, for example, that informant ratings of local drug problems were correlated +.72 with the results of those large and expensive surveys.

In St. Bernard we interviewed 10 key informants at wave 1, and 5 at wave 2; in St. Thomas we interviewed 5 informants at wave 1, and 7 at wave 2; at Fischer we interviewed 7 informants at wave 1, and 9 at wave 2. Whenever possible, we attempted to interview the same individual interviewed twice. Some of the respondents at wave 2 were new tenant council members.

These key informants were quizzed about several topics. They were asked about the extent of crime, disorder, and drug problems in their project, and the quality of police service there. They were also asked about the extent of local organizing efforts around drug problems, and whether conditions in the area were getting better or worse. There were obviously only a small number of respondents in each project, so their reports of changes in living conditions after a year of NEPHU should only be taken as suggestive. To assess changes in conditions in the projects we employed two standards; we looked for shifts of <u>20 percentage points or more</u> in responses to our questions, and those changes had to be <u>consistent</u>

across multiple questions. Table 3-2 details those patterns of change, using the 20-percentage-point criterion. In summary, they suggest that:

- in St. Thomas, there was an improvement in crime, disorder and drug problems, but assessments of policing worsened
- in St. Bernard, there were few changes, but perceptions of the police improved somewhat
- in Fischer, perceptions of the police improved, crime problems got better, and drug conditions improved somewhat

Table 3-3 details responses the questions on drug availability and use that were given by our key informants.

Table 3-2
Responses to Key Informant Interviews

	St. Bernard	Fischer	St. Thomas
Program Awareness			
resident meetings	+	0	-
drug organizing	0	0	+
apartment searches	0	0	0
drug evictions	0	+	-
Drug Problems			
drugs a factor in crime	0	0	+
frequency of use	0	+	+
pressure on youths	0	-	-
drug use by adults	0	+	+
drug availability	+	0	0
street availability	0	0	+
drug apartment	+	+	0
residents sell drugs	0	0	+
Crime Problems			
safety at night	-	0	+
unsafe place in area	-	+	0
insiders commit crime	-	+	+
Disorder Problems			
groups hanging out	0	0	+
public drinking	-	0	+
street harassment	0	0	+
organized gangs	0	0	+
Assessments of Police			
police responsive	+	0	-
work with residents	-	+	-
prevent crime	+	+	0
deal with drugs	0	+	-
police honesty	+	+	+
Area Trends			
see positive change in past six months	-	+	+

NOTE: + indicates positive change; - indicates negative change; 0 indicates no change greater than about 20 percentage points.

Table 3-3

Key Informant Responses to Questions About Drugs

How important a factor are drugs in causing crime here in this development? Are drugs a ...

	St. Bernard %	Fischer %	St. Thomas %
Wave 1			
some factor	10	14	17
big factor	90	86	83
Wave 2			
some factor	0	22	57
big factor	100	78	43

How frequently do you think kids and young adults actually use drugs in this development? Do you think kids and young adults in this development use drugs

	St. Bernard %	Fischer %	St. Thomas %
Wave 1			
fairly frequently	12	0	20
very frequently	88	100	80
Wave 2			
not very frequent	0	11	14
fairly frequently	20	33	43
very frequently	80	56	43

What about pressure on the youths who live in this development to get involved in the drug business? Do you think there is pressure on...

	St. Bernard %	Fischer %	St. Thomas %
Wave 1			
hardly any youths	25	40	0
some youths	12	40	60
most youths here	62	20	40
Wave 2			
some youths	40	56	29
most youths here	60	44	71

How about drug use by the adults who live here? Do you think drug use by adults here actually is...

	St. Bernard %	Fischer %	St. Thomas %
Wave 1			
not very frequent	14	29	33
fairly frequent	0	0	17
very frequent	86	71	50
Wave 2			
fairly frequent	0	67	71
very frequent	100	33	29

(Table 3-3 continued)

How easy do you think it is for people who want drugs to buy them here in this immediate area? Do you think that it is...

	St. Bernard	Fischer	St. Thomas
	%	%	%
Wave 1			
not very easy	0	14	17
fairly easy	0	0	33
very easy	100	86	50
Wave 2			
not very easy	0	0	29
fairly easy	20	11	14
very easy	80	89	57

How easily would you say drugs can be bought out on the street in the immediate area of this development. Would you say that this is...

	St. Bernard	Fischer	St. Thomas
	%	%	%
Wave 1			
not very easy	0	14	17
fairly easy	0	0	33
very easy	100	86	50
Wave 2			
not very easy	0	0	29
fairly easy	20	11	14
very easy	80	89	57

How easy would it be for someone to find an apartment where drugs could be bought here in this development. Would you say that this would be...

	St. Bernard	Fischer	St. Thomas
	%	%	%
Wave 1			
not very easy	14	0	20
fairly easy	0	17	20
very easy	86	83	60
Wave 2			
not very easy	0	12	43
fairly easy	60	25	0
very easy	40	62	57

What kinds of people do you think sell drugs here? Would you say it's costly...

	St. Bernard	Fischer	St. Thomas
	%	%	%
Wave 1			
people who live here	10	0	0
people from outside	20	57	17
both inside-outside	70	43	83
Wave 2			
people who live here	0	11	14
people from outside	20	44	57
both inside-outside	80	44	28

CHAPTER 4

TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE POLICY RESPONSE

This chapter reviews some of the major findings of our investigations in Denver and New Orleans. It summarizes a number of lessons that we learned about effective NEPHU operations, and it raises some questions about enforcement as a response to drug and crime problems in public housing.

Some Lessons About Enforcement

NEPHU is necessary.

In both cities, the NEPHUs remained substantially faithful to their mandate -- to focus their energies on public housing. This was easier in New Orleans than in Denver because of the huge number of people living in HANO developments and—sadly—because of the deplorable living conditions there. Sustaining their focus on public housing was a significant accomplishment, given the general disdain with which this sort of work was viewed by other special units and the patrol division. In neither city were public housing developments effectively policed before NEPHU. Most of the drug and non-drug arrests that we logged in Denver for the period before the program began were from the generally poor areas surrounding Curtis Park and Quigg Newton; there were very few arrests actually made in the projects. Denver's NEPHU was continually rebuffed when they attempted to arrange for more frequent uniformed patrols in the projects, even when they proposed to pay for district patrols from grant funds. New Orleans' projects have not been

effectively policed since the Urban Squad was disbanded in the early 1980s. Special narcotics units in New Orleans avoided the projects because of the dangerous and unsavory conditions there, and the seeming hopelessness of the task.

The NEPHUs in both cities operated relatively independently of their departments' narcotics divisions and top brass, reflecting local bureaucratic politics and the low repute with which this kind of work seemed to be held. This was probably a good thing, although it caused them various problems in securing equipment, office space, and support from uniformed patrols. It is unlikely that their focus could have been maintained if the NEPHUs were more closely tied to city-wide narcotics operations. They could have easily become paper organizations, officially charged with "concentrating" on public housing, but in reality ranging widely in search of opportunities for action elsewhere.

It would have been unrealistic to insist that they hew even more closely to public housing boundaries, however. There were many good reasons for the NEPHUs to work elsewhere. Their job naturally expanded to include crack houses and dealers working in nearby neighborhoods, to scatter-site Section 8 housing as well as the projects, and to dealers and their suppliers who lived elsewhere but commuted daily into the projects. The inter-team cooperation that they needed from various SWAT, Crack, DEA, and nearby suburban jurisdictions also demanded reciprocal action by the NEPHUs, and they did a good job when they were called upon.

Federal funding made a difference.

Federal funds made a difference in the effectiveness of these units in several ways. Confidential funds were needed to pay informants and buy drugs; the teams needed vehicles and sophisticated equipment; and the money for overtime work enabled them to focus their energies in a sustained way while compensating for the unwillingness of the cities to contribute more personnel to the NEPHU mission.

Informants were paid varying amounts, depending on the productivity of their leads and the value of the purchases that they made. This compensation was in addition to whatever arrangements they could make with regard to their initial arrest; although NEPHU in Denver made occasional use of a "revenge" informant, officers in both cities preferred to work with informants whose motives were more concrete. Everyone we discussed the matter with agreed that their informants probably used the money to buy drugs themselves, but dismissed that issue as a reality of the world in which they worked. Both cities were generally strapped for cash during the evaluation period, and our informants judged it would have been difficult for the NEPHUs (and other narcotics teams) to secure adequate funding for informant compensation without federal support. We saw how in Denver financial considerations undercut NEPHU's effectiveness during the Summer slump of 1990, when (due to mismanagement) the grant's confidential fund seemed to be running low on money. NEPHU began to range widely in search of more lucrative non-DHA cases in order to generate more currency seizures to finance their operations. In

cash-strapped New Orleans, NEPHU's confidential funds played an important role in helping them to operate effectively, and to occasionally penetrate middle-level drug markets.

It is important to note the alternative to adequately funding narcotics operations. In other cities and at other times it has been the practice of narcotics detectives to generate informant compensation on their own, by withholding money and drugs that they seize in the course of their operations, and then using that stockpile to reward informants (Manning, 1980; Moore, 1977). This is a dangerous practice, fraught with illegalities and opportunities for corruption. Moore and others have noted the importance of adequate confidential funds in particular for keeping narcotics operations free from corruption and financial abuse. Units like NEPHU require considerable operating capital. They generally can be expected to recover a substantial percentage of this investment. For example, between September, 1989, and October, 1990, New Orleans' NEPHU seized $34,000 in currency, while spending about $13,000 of their budgeted confidential funds. However, their confidential funds were always at risk on a monthly basis, and "it takes money to make money" in narcotics operations.

Both units made good use of their equipment, and would have had difficulty in securing any of it without their federal grant. Undercover officers need body transmitters to allow their partners to monitor the safety of street buys. New Orleans made good use of cameras, long-range binoculars, and other gear for conducting their surveillance operations. The officers all used sophisticated pagers to

keep in contact with one another, and with selected informants. Undercover operations depend on unrecognizeable vehicles, which are an expensive item. Denver's NEPHU leased Japanese cars, which were not stock police issue, but by the end of the evaluation period they felt that their vehicles were "burned" in a number of projects. New Orleans did not include vehicle leases in their grant budget, and it was only after some struggle that they got terrible cars, most of them were easily recognizable as police vehicles.

Organizational matters counted.

Several seemingly mundane but extremely important organizational considerations seemed to play an important role in the effectiveness of NEPHUs in Denver and New Orleans.

It was exceedingly difficult for Denver's NEPHU to sustain its activities because of the way in which it was organized. The officers all had accrued a great deal of vacation and sick leave before they joined the unit, and they were forced to use it during the evaluation year. Their overtime pay was limited to 25 hours per month, and they hit that limit by the middle of each month. The unit was too small to deal with the constant on-and-off-again scheduling this required, so operations were frequently canceled. The size of the unit also exacerbated its leadership and personality problems. The unit could not be subdivided so that sergeants were teamed with detectives they could work with, and so that partnerships could be formed of detectives that respected and trusted one another.

In New Orleans, on the other hand, the budget was carefully crafted so that each officer could work an extra four hours each day, every day, given the normal incidence of time off. Because New Orleans police typically work a second job, this allowed the unit to focus its energies without demanding much more from the officers than they were already doing, and they could short circuit these long days if they desired. Most delayed their vacations until after the end of the grant period because they could make steady overtime money each week, and unlike Denver, New Orleans' NEPHU was virtually at full strength at all times. In addition, the unit's structure of a lieutenant, two sergeants, and nine detectives, let officers form into working parties of various sizes. The team could easily adjust to the absence of several officers and still be at sufficient strength to conduct substantial operations, and partners and sergeants could be sorted out with the latitude that a 12-person team afforded. As some sort of "bottom line" (which we do not want to push very far, for conditions varied enormously in the two cities), the 6-person team in Denver generated 176 arrests during the evaluation year, while the 12-person team in New Orleans generated 804.

NEPHU-PHA Cooperation Was Nonexistent.

While the proposals submitted by both cities envisioned close cooperation between NEPHU and local PHAs, they did not get along well. Some of their failure to cooperate may have reflected personality conflicts between NEPHU leaders and

PHA personnel, especially in Denver. However, it is apparent that the obstacles to cooperation were multiple and complex.

Both PHAs were plagued by internal organizational problems. During the evaluation period DHA was a besieged institution. Its director was forced to resign after media investigations revealed widespread mismanagement and favoritism in hiring. The mayor replaced him with an extremely political appointee, and DHA employees were fearful and off balance during much of 1990. (One of the new Acting Director's actions was to abolish DHA's security operations and lay off the security director and his staff). The field managers of DHA projects often disparaged their own top administrators to NEPHU members. To work with NEPHU they sometimes had to conceal their actions from DHA's central administration. For example, when the unit requested a computer listings of the residents of each development so that they could check the names of arrestees and their addresses against it, the DHA administration categorically refused to give them the list because it would include residents' social security numbers. (Our site monitor later discovered that resident listings are generally easy to obtain and are often printed without social security numbers.) At the risk of losing his job, a DHA employee gave her a list.

In New Orleans, HANO faced continual charges of mismanagement, and its board was unable to find a management team that could capture control of the agency. During the evaluation period DHUD forced HANO to hire an independent management team following further revelations of managerial incompetence. That

team then came under fire itself from DHUD, and was in turn replaced. Corruption was endemic among HANO's highly politicized administrators, and shortly after our evaluation began the Director of Security was arrested for cocaine trafficking.

Not surprisingly, none of this endeared PHA management to NEPHU members. They had some initial problems explaining their mission to other police officers, who assumed that they worked for the Housing Authority and would not trust anything associated with HANO. Denver's NEPHU had continual problems scheduling meetings with DHA staff (who on key occasions failed to show up for them), and found the staff attorney uncooperative when they tried to mount an eviction program.

There were also turf problems. The Executive Director of HANO initially believed that NEPHU would fall under his supervision, and refused to cooperate once that mistake was clarified. The HANO Board was upset when they learned that NEPHU would conduct investigations without consulting them. The security director of DHA was a former Denver police officer, but NEPHU members still found ways to dismiss his opinions and information, and believed that he did not understand "real police work."

Finally, there was a conflict in the eyes of many DHA employees between their mission of providing low-cost housing for the poor and the expectation that they would become involved in enforcement activities. In Denver, this was compounded by the fact that DHUD requirements were read to require high monthly occupancy rates in order to justify DHUD rent subsidies. Project

the issue were driven from the project by threats to their life and property, and the project manager came under considerable pressure from vocal members of the community who did not like her aggressive anti-drug policies. Drug users, their families, and to a varying extent those involved in the trade are too often members of the community as well. Research also suggests other ways in which drug problems undercut the capacity of neighborhoods to solve their problems. In addition to setting neighbor against neighbor, they undermine community morale, reinforce gang activity, draw youths into the fringes of the trade, and the threat of violence cows more public-minded residents into submission.

Instead of focusing on drugs and crime, most strong community organizations have multi-issue agendas emphasizing housing, land use, and property values. They are concerned with maintenance of established local interests, customs, and values. Such groups typically arise in stable, better-off areas and represent the interests of long-term residents, home owners, small businesses, and local institutions in preserving the status quo. Surveys indicate that it is better off, more educated, home-owning, and long-term community residents who know of opportunities to participate in anti-crime organization and are more likely to join in when they have the opportunity. The irony, of course, is that better-off, racially dominant city neighborhoods usually enjoy the lowest rates of crime.

Our Denver site observer noted a perhaps typical example of the potential effectiveness of such groups. In October, 1989, the neighbors surrounding a DHA-owned 9-unit building successfully banded together to demand that it be

the issue were driven from the project by threats to their life and property, and the project manager came under considerable pressure from vocal members of the community who did not like her aggressive anti-drug policies. Drug users, their families, and to a varying extent those involved in the trade are too often members of the community as well. Research also suggests other ways in which drug problems undercut the capacity of neighborhoods to solve their problems. In addition to setting neighbor against neighbor, they undermine community morale, reinforce gang activity, draw youths into the fringes of the trade, and the threat of violence cows more public-minded residents into submission.

Instead of focusing on drugs and crime, most strong community organizations have multi-issue agendas emphasizing housing, land use, and property values. They are concerned with maintenance of established local interests, customs, and values. Such groups typically arise in stable, better-off areas and represent the interests of long-term residents, home owners, small businesses, and local institutions in preserving the status quo. Surveys indicate that it is better off, more educated, home-owning, and long-term community residents who know of opportunities to participate in anti-crime organization and are more likely to join in when they have the opportunity. The irony, of course, is that better-off, racially dominant city neighborhoods usually enjoy the lowest rates of crime.

Our Denver site observer noted a perhaps typical example of the potential effectiveness of such groups. In October, 1989, the neighbors surrounding a DHA-owned 9-unit building successfully banded together to demand that it be

closed, because it was a notorious crack house. With some help, a neighborhood organization was incorporated to purchase the unit from DHA and manage the building as a Montessori day-care center. Note that for these neighbors the DHA project and its inhabitants were the problem, and success was registered when they were forced to leave.

On the other hand, community organizations with a focus on crime problems generally are less common in poorer, renting, high-turnover, high-crime areas. Groups representing poor neighborhoods frequently have a stake in upsetting the current distribution of status and property, they are critical of society's institutions, and they are not prone to picking organizing issues which raise questions of self-blame. They cannot solve their problems by forcing poorer people out. Faced with crime problems, the first resource to which organizations in better-off areas lay claim is policing; they would favor NEPHUs. They are also more likely to form civilian patrols and Neighborhood Watch groups. The constituents of groups representing the poor often fear the police and resent the way they exercise their authority. They may be as interested in monitoring police misconduct and pressing for police accountability as they are in increasing police presence in their community. Many residents of poor and minority neighborhoods have had antagonistic encounters with the police. The police are another of their problems; they frequently are perceived to be arrogant, brutal, racist, and corrupt. Groups representing these neighborhoods will not automatically look to the police for legitimacy and guidance, or extend a welcome hand of cooperation.

However, there is also counter evidence that poor and minority communities may not have as much difficulty in organizing around drug and crime problems as past research has suggested. Skogan (1989) found to his surprise that high-crime areas were more organized than safer communities when other important determinants of organizing were taken into account, and that this substantially offset the "middle class bias" supporting community organizations.[5] In addition, Davis, Lurigio and Skogan (1991) found that various measures of neighborhood "confrontational activism" (eg, marches, patrols, efforts to evict drug dealers, and attempts to renovate or demolish drug houses) were substantially correlated with the level of drug problems. Vigorous community responses were more readily apparent in places plagued by drugs. Confrontational activism was also more apparent in less affluent, higher-crime, and black or Hispanic neighborhoods, and in a multivariate analysis, poverty remained a persistent correlate of higher levels of anti-drug activism even when poverty-related levels of the problem were taken into account. However, anti-drug activism also was more common in areas with higher levels of established organizational capacity, indexed by the strength of local block clubs.

With our data we can explore the question of whether there is something distinctive about poor and minority residents of public housing developments that

---

[5] One apparent stimulant of organizing efforts turned out to be poor police service; net of other factors, neighborhoods in which large proportions of people thought they got bad service were more likely to take matters into their own hands.

further undercuts the potential effectiveness of community outreach efforts by the police. There is reason to suspect that this may be the case. Most of the social and economic factors that are related to low levels of community participation are multiplied there, ranging from poverty and low levels of education to not having an automobile. There are no homeowners at all, and home ownership is typically the strongest predictor of neighborhood commitment and activism. As we noted in Chapter 1, residents of public housing may also have extra reasons to be distrustful of the police. Officers often are suspicious and fearful of the projects, and enter only in armed groups. They do not like to patrol there, and they do not appear to be very effective at their job.

To examine some of these claims about the distinctively alienated character of public housing residents, Table 4-1 summarizes the results of Police Foundation surveys in a number of cities. It compares indicators of community commitment among residents of public housing in Denver to the responses of residents of "conventional" low-income and largely minority neighborhoods. With the exception of Houston these comparison groups were at least 50 percent black or Hispanic (51 percent of the respondents in Houston were Anglos). They were predominately low-income (ranging from 41 to 87 percent), and with the exception of Baltimore (at 27 percent) they were overwhelmingly renters rather than homeowners.

Table 4-1 suggests that, in the main, PHA residents in Denver were at least as committed to their community and to their neighbors as people elsewhere.

Table 4-1

Community Commitment in Denver and Other Cities

	Very satisfied as a place to live	Feel a part of the neighborhood	Residents help each other	Will get better in the future	Very likely to stay here
Curtis Park	26	53	45	41	49
Quigg Newton	41	59	49	39	56
Houston	31	na	52	na	na
Newark	11	na	42	na	na
Birmingham	19	47	51	22	45
Oakland	20	51	51	20	57
Baltimore	41	na	65	17	na

NOTE: Based on neighborhood surveys conducted by the Police Foundation between 1983 and 1990; "na" indicates question not asked in a particular survey.

Residents of Quigg Newton were somewhat more committed to their community than those in Curtis Park, especially in terms of neighborhood satisfaction, but even then they stood above those who were interviewed in Newark, Burmingham, and Oakland. This may be related to ethnicity of the residents (Quigg Newton is predominantly Hispanic, 86 percent while the other areas are predominantly African-American). Compared to residents of more conventional city neighborhoods both groups in Denver scored near the top on most measures. They were more likely to feel a part of their neighborhood than were respondents in the three Burmingham and four Oakland neighborhoods that were surveyed. They were just about as likely as residents of every area outside of Baltimore (represented by six areas) to report that neighbors tend to help each other "... rather than go their own way." They were just as likely as residents of Birmingham and Oakland to think they would stay where they were rather than move. On the other hand, residents of Quigg Newton and Curtis park both were distinctively more optimistic than others about the future of their communities.

Table 4-2 presents parallel data on the distribution of opinions about the police. Table 4-2 benchmarks the views of PHA residents in Denver against largely poor and minority neighborhoods elsewhere. Residents of both Denver projects fell near the middle of the distribution in terms of the perceived fairness of police, and above the norm in terms of their ratings of police responsiveness and concern. They fell in roughly the same range as others in terms of the perceived politeness of police. However, compared to residents of several other cities they were

Table 4-2

Assessments of Police in Denver and Other Cities

	Very fair	Very responsive	Very polite	Very Concerned	Good job preventing crime	Good job dealing with drugs
Curtis Park	27	42	32	28	19	20
Quigg Newton	22	38	32	26	13	15
Houston	30	na	39	na	9	na
Newark	10	na	17	na	3	na
Birmingham	29	38	39	24	na	11
Oakland	20	24	32	17	na	6
Baltimore	41	na	52	18	14	na

NOTE: Based on neighborhood surveys conducted by the Police Foundation between 1983 and 1990; "na" indicates question not asked in a particular survey.

distinctly more optimistic about the effectiveness of Denver police in preventing crime and dealing with drug problems even though their assessment of the quality of police services did not change during the evaluation period.

In sum, our data from Denver do not suggest that there are extra impediments to community outreach efforts by the police in public housing. To be sure, the fact that only 25 percent of residents thought they were "very fair," and less than a third rated them as "very polite" does not bode well for the effort.[6] But residents of Curtis Park and Quigg Newton did not appear to be distinctively alienated, and compared to poor and minority neighborhoods elsewhere there seemed to be a firm basis for community involvement, and at least as much support for the police.

Can PHA's Do More "Self-Help"?

PHAs doubtless could do more in their role as "landlord" to deal with crime and drug problems. However, we observed a number of physical, financial, and organizational obstacles to their taking action that seemed to inhibit the translation of seemingly good ideas in this regard into effective programs.

One widely discussed strategy would be to improve tenant management. This involves policies and procedures for screening initial applicants for housing

---

[6] In overwhelmingly white and well-off Madison, Wisconsin, by contrast, 55 percent of all city residents rated the police as "very fair" and 65 percent thought they were "very polite."

and evicting those who later break the rules. Around the nation there has been an increasing emphasis on enforcing the terms of PHA leases, and changes in HUD regulations have made it easier in many jurisdictions to evict tenants whose apartments have been involved in drug-related activities. However, we saw in Denver and New Orleans how difficult it can be to implement this resolve. In New Orleans, HANO officials attributed their reluctance to evict residents to the belief that public housing was their last resort before homelessness. They took a narrow legal position—that only actual leaseholders who were convicted of drug offenses could be evicted—to forestall taking action. In Denver, DHA was somewhat more successful in taking action against tenants whose units were involved in drug activities, but this was due more to the resolve of individual development managers than the Authority's attorney charged with monitoring this policy. Further, the adverse reaction by a vocal faction of residents to attempts by Quigg Newton's activist manager to take the initiative against drugs in that development illustrates how intensely political this kind of management tactic can be. In the end, she was "booted upstairs" and out of the project, and her chief supporters among the residents fled the development in the face of threats to their life.

The reality of life in many public housing developments also makes it difficult to impose draconian tenant management policies. It is hard to monitor exactly who is living in the units, which in New Orleans often are overcrowded with long-term "guests." In addition, while tenant rosters and even our household surveys indicate that the bulk of the adults living there are single women, there

appeared to be no shortage of males in and around the projects we monitored, either in Denver or New Orleans. This floating population of undocumented quasi-residents makes it more difficult to affix responsibility for drug involvement in the projects. Finally, at least in New Orleans it was clear that many, and perhaps most, adults involved in the drug trade did not live in the projects at all; rather, they were commuters who returned home on their off hours.

To deal with these problems, there have been efforts to regain control of the apartments and corridors of PHA buildings; one example would be Chicago's "Operation Clean Sweep," which has been endorsed by DHUD Secretary Jack Kemp. Sweeps involve locking all exits to a building and conducting unannounced warrantless searches of apartments. Then, while the building remains interdicted, new security doors and fences are thrown up, guard booths are erected in the central entrance area, legal residents are photographed and given identification cards, undocumented residents are evicted, and a special pass system is put in place to ensure that outsiders cannot stay in the building past midnight. In Chicago, these sweeps are proceeding methodically, building by building, through the worst of the City's public housing areas. Similar sweeps are being conducted in New York City, Washington, DC, Charleston, North Carolina, and other cities.

Clean Sweep and similar programs have proceeded with the full support of DHUD Secretary Jack Kemp, with unevaluated effectiveness. However, they assume a style of physical design which does not characterize most public housing for poor families. PHA buildings in Denver and New Orleans are more typical; they

are low-rise, many apartments have separate front and back doors (particularly in Denver), and they sprawl over large areas intersected by streets and parking lots. Research by Newman and Franck (1980), a modest evaluation of an early access control experiment in Chicago's Cabrini-Green project (Chicago Department of Planning, 1978), surveys by Burby and Rohe (1989), and related research, lead us to believe that one of the most significant sources of the breakdown of social control in public housing is in fact its "public" character; anyone can enter, and no one has any particular legitimacy to challenge their presence. In this light, Clean Sweep-type programs indeed speak to a real problem. However, short of creating huge walled compounds within which poor families must live, we cannot envision how they apply to most family public housing developments.

On the other hand, the dispersed, low-rise character of the family housing that we observed (especially in Denver) provides a better fit with other elements of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) theories of crime control. In brief, CPTED recommends erecting real and symbolic barriers (fences, bushes, gates) that extend people's watchfulness and sense of territoriality beyond their front door and into the "semi-public" space that they create in the vicinity. CPTED also calls for design features that enhance the surveillance capacity of residents (i.e., their ability to watch what is going on around them through strategically places windows and visually accessible building corridors), and thus enhances their capacity to intervene in untoward situations. CPTED also strongly endorses the kinds of access control described above. A thorough-going crime prevention

program in public housing areas could involve the physical redesign of buildings to enhance their security by improving opportunities for surveillance and intervention, and to control access to the building by nonresidents. In some cases this might involve downsizing large projects and individual highrises in order to reduce their density, encourage a sense of community in the area, and increase the manageability of project. At the extreme, large and unrentable buildings have been demolished, most visibly in Newark in 1987.

However, more fundamental problems of deterioration dominate the construction budget of most PHAs, and few contemplate demolishing buildings when they have long lists of applicants for the space. Afflicted with buildings that often were poorly built and frequently have been ill-maintained, it would be difficult to convince most PHAs to invest in these subtle redesign efforts. In light of their generally deteriorating character, it can easily seem more important for PHAs to respond to vandalism and disrepair in timely fashion. Moreover, it is not clear how much effect these redesign plans might have, compared to other forces that are at work in public housing areas. Even Newman and Franck (1980) concluded that most of the explained variance in measures of tenant victimization, fear, and residential satisfaction among public housing residents was accounted for by their economic and family status rather than management, design, or building height factors; in the end, the fact that PHAs frequently are the source of housing of last resort for the poor predominated.

There is evidence that the physical deconcentration of public housing can reap positive returns. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, PHAs placed almost all public housing in poor and minority neighborhoods. Since 1968 there has been legislative and judicial pressure to site this housing elsewhere, but a combination of local resistance and a dramatic decline in the rate at which new public housing has been constructed has limited the impact of this effort (Burby and Rohe, 1989). Research on both public housing placements and court-mandated moves by inner-city black families suggests that living in smaller, less dense, suburban developments or Section 8 housing leads to lower levels of victimization and fear (Burby and Rohe, 1989; Peroff et al, 1979). However, given the resistance of many city and suburban communities even to scatter-site public housing, it would be a bold move to pursue a deconcentration policy.

Finally, we are uncertain how much of a difference management policies can make, absent radical deconcentration or draconian management measures that are unlikely to be politically sustainable. For all of the problems in DHA's top management structure, the projects that we observed were seemingly well managed at the local level. They were well laid out and well maintained; they were small (none had more than about 400 units) and had solid doors and visible security arrangements. Broken windows got fixed, and there were not many of them because the leaseholders had to pay for the repair. The density of the projects approximated that of many private residential areas of Denver, and project managers generally were aggressive in enforcing DHA rules of conduct and keeping

people who were not listed on the lease out of the apartments. And in our surveys in Curtis Park and Quigg Newton, about 70 percent of those interviewed said it was fairly easy or very easy to find a drug apartment in their development.[7]

Can Enforcement Work Absent of System Reform?

The effectiveness of the rest of the criminal justice system plays an important role in enhancing or limiting the impact of special drug enforcement efforts. Significant policy changes have already been made in this regard by the states, including imposing longer sentences for drug offenses, making many of those sentences mandatory, limiting early release from prison on probation, and trying to constrain plea-bargaining practices that allow accused persons seemingly to be charged with "lesser" offenses in return for guilty pleas. However, in many jurisdictions prosecutors are overwhelmed with cases, and the jails are so full that arrestees for non-violent offenses cannot be held until their case is disposed of. There is great pressure to dispose of cases involving non-violent offenses and persons with short criminal histories with sentences short of prison, for most state prisons are also at or above their capacity as well (cf, Skogan, 1990a). These factors all limit the effectiveness of the deterrence model which underlies enforcement strategies for controlling drug markets. We pointed out the

---

[7] This conclusion is in line with Newman and Franck's (1980) finding that the population composition of public housing dominates the physical design and management of the buildings in shaping patterns of victimization and fear.

overloaded condition of the criminal justice system in some detail in Chapter 1, especially in Louisiana.

The enforcement end of the punishment cycle is also not inexpensive. In order to estimate how much it cost to move a "typical" case through the courts, our site observer in Denver followed the November, 1989, NEPHU arrest of an illegal alien from Mexico. He was arrested for possession and sale of both cocaine and marijuana, tried before a jury, and found guilty on two possession and one sale (cocaine) charges; this took one full year. Table 4-3 summarizes what it cost the City and County of Denver to move this case through the sentencing stage of the process; it does not include the eventual cost of the accused's anticipated five-year stay in the Colorado State Penitentiary, which certainly runs at or above the national average of about $15,000 per year. These are conservative estimates, usually based on the direct hourly wages of the persons involved.

Drug treatment programs are at least as overloaded as the criminal justice system, and it is unlikely that large numbers of arrestees produced by enforcement programs will be diverted there, whatever their real needs. In Louisiana, the most recent figures set the utilization rate of drug and alcohol treatment units at 97 percent of budgeted capacity; in Colorado it stood at 72 percent, which was well below the national average. (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1989: Table 6.60). The limited availability of drug treatment programs for sentenced offenders is ironic, for they have been demonstrated to be effective. Drug treatment programs have been shown to inhibit drug use, reduce the likelihood that participants will be rearrested,

Table 4-3

Estimated Cost of Arresting and Trying a Drug Case

	$ 337
Police preparation for court	80
Police time in court	1,610
Advisement and preliminary hearing	200
Motions hearing	150
District attorney and public defender's time on the case	2,000
Jury costs	600
Bailiff's time	200
Judge's time	800
Court reporter fee	400
Court transcript	200
Interpreter	680
Victim advocate	300
Print jury instructions	25
Sentencing hearing	200
Jail time before bond release	405
Jail time trial to sentencing	1,760
TOTAL	$9,947

and increase their ability to find and hold a job. The longer patients are involved in these programs the more successful they are, although the programs are plagued by high drop-out rates. Later relapse into drug use is common, but both methadone maintenance (in conjunction with drug education, counseling, and other social services) and residential treatment are more successful than traditional incarceration in treating underlying addiction problems.

Are There Viable Adjuncts to Enforcement?

This report has focused almost exclusively on supply side factors determining the size of drug markets. (One exception is the discussion in Chapter 1 of research on DARE and other education programs.) There are a number of viable adjuncts to enforcement which were not part of the enforcement programs proposed by Denver and New Orleans, but which must play an important role in any demand side approaches to drug abuse.[7]

Rehabilitation. Drug rehabilitation programs aim at identifying drug users and intervening in their behavior. They have been thoroughly evaluated in terms of their success in treating heroin addiction, and a number of successful approaches

[7] Recall our conclusion in Chapter 1 that declining self-reported drug use among high school seniors must be attributable to demand side rather than supply side programs, given the tremendous perceived availability of drugs. This inference is in line with the increasing perceived risk associated with drug use that is being reported by high school seniors.

have been identified. *Drug detoxification* programs medically manage the initial withdrawal of addicts. Their effects are short term if they are not combined with further treatment, but they are a first step in any heroin program. *Drug education and counseling* programs are best used in combination with other efforts; they are inexpensive and easy to organize, but have no evaluated effectiveness on their own. *Methadone maintenance* programs distribute this controlled opiate as a substitute for heroin. This is the most common way of treating addicts. *Therapeutic residential centers* are community-based facilities where addicts engage in group and individual treatment exercises aimed at building their self-control. These centers are increasingly popular, and are being used to deal with cocaine addiction. As noted above, combinations of these programs have been shown to inhibit drug use, reduce the likelihood that participants will be rearrested, and increase their ability to find and hold a job.

Youth Programs and Policies. A number of social and organizational approaches to drug problems are youth programs. Although this is a broad category, most youth programs are aimed at keeping young people from getting involved in drugs in the first place. This can involve drug education programs, and perhaps police-related programs like DARE. Sports and school-related activities can provide youths with an outlet for their energies, and employment and placement programs can provide opportunities for extra income and a path away from home. Successful youth programs also frequently involve in mentoring, tutoring, and family

counseling and parent education. Drug treatment programs typically are aimed at keeping youthful occasional users from progressing to heavy drug use. The treatment typically involve medical and nutrition education, activities to build their self-esteem, and training in personal decision-making skills.

There is good reason for focusing on youths and young adults, for they are responsible for a large proportion of all criminal offenses -- perhaps one-third of the total. In the US, the typical age of arrest lies between 15 and 21, depending upon the type of crime; those arrested for theft are most frequently 16 years of age, and for serious assault the most at-risk group is males who are 18 years of age. The best evidence is that some of this is predictable at a very early age. If at age 7 or 8, children are asked to rate the aggressiveness of their playmates, those ratings are highly predictive of later offending; the same holds true of predictions from ratings of aggressive play made by adults conducting concealed observations. Further, later criminality is highly related to poor performance in school among children not much older. David Farrington's London study identified seven variables that at age 10 successfully predicted later heavy criminal involvement. Many of the factors that predict later misfortune are school or family related. They include poverty and child abuse. Parental factors are very important; later criminality is related to neglect and lack of parental supervision, poor nurturing, family disruption and marital discord, and having criminal parents. Doing badly and misbehaving in school is also symptomatic of later difficulties.

The policy implications of these findings are both fairly clear and untested. All of them call for an emphasis on primary prevention rather than later intervention by the criminal justice system. An economic policy aimed at ensuring a basic level of support for childrens' families could alleviate some of the risk factors. It would be especially important to combine this with parenthood education programs targeted at families with poor child rearing skills. Counseling to assist parents who are experiencing crises with their children could be important. Likewise, special schooling programs aimed at large groups of high risk youths could -- without seemingly selecting for special attention "the criminally inclined" -- have positive benefits. None of these approaches have been rigorously validated in terms of their impact on later criminal offending. Further experimentation is needed to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of interventions in parenting practices, in particular. However, their general social benefits seem clear enough that impediments to them in the United States clearly are political rather than substantive. Findings like these on the consequences—and predictability—of youthful deprivation have been available for years.

REFERENCES

Anderson, C.L., Jesswein, and Fleischman. 1990. "Needs Assessment Based on Household and Key Informant Surveys." Evaluation Review, 14:2, 182-191.

Botvin, Gilbert J. 1990. "Substance Abuse Prevention: Theory, Practice, and Effectiveness." In Michael Tonrey and James Q. Wilson (eds.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 13. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 461-520.

Burby, Raymond J. and William M. Rohe. 1989. "Deconcentration of Public Housing: Effects on Residents' Satisfaction with Their Living Environments and Their Fear of Crime." Urban Affairs Quarterly, 25:1 (September), pp. 117-141.

Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1989. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

Chicago Department of Planning. 1978. The Cabrini-Green High Impact Program." Victimology, 3:3-4, pp. 334-338.

Davis, Robert C., Arthur Lurigio, and Wesley G. Skogan. 1991. Community Responses to Crack. New York: New York City Victim Services Agency (report to the National Institute of Justice).

Guyot, Dorothy. 1991. Policing as Though People Matter. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Hayeslip, David W., Jr. 1989. "Local-level Drug Enforcement: New Strategies." NIJ Research in Action, No. 213 (March/April), pp. 2-7.

ISR Newsletter. 1991. "Drug Awareness Rises." Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan (Summer).

Kelling George L. 1988. Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice (June).

Kleiman, Mark A., and Kerry D. Smith. 1990. "State and Local Drug Enforcement: In Search of a Strategy." In Michael Tonrey and James Q. Wilson (eds.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 13. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 69-108.

Manning, Peter. 1980. The Narcs' Game. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Moore, Mark H. 1977. Buy and Bust. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.

Moore, Mark H. 1988. "Drug Trafficking." Crime File Study Guide. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice (NCJ 104555).

Moore, Mark H., and Mark A. Kleiman 1989. "The Police and Drugs." Perspectives on Policing, vol 11. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.

Moore, Mark H. 1990. "Supply Reduction and Drug Law Enforcement." In Michael Tonrey and James Q. Wilson (eds.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 13. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 109-158.

National Institute of Justice. 1990a. DUF: 1989 Drug Use Forecasting Annual Report. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.

National Institute of Justice. 1990b. Searching for Answers: Research and Evaluation on Drugs and Crime. Washington, DC; US Department of Justice.

Newman, Oscar, and Karen Franck. 1980. Factors Influencing Crime and Instability in Urban Housing Developments. New York: Institute for Community Design Analysis.

Peroff, K.A., C.L. Davis and R. Jones. 1979. Gautreaux Housing Demonstration: An Evaluation of Its Impact on Participating Households. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

Reuter, Peter, et al. 1988. Drug Use and Drug Programs in the Washington Metropolitan Area. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.

Sherman, Lawrence W. 1983. "After the Riots: Police and Minorities in the U.S., 1970-1980." In Nathan Glazer and Kenneth Young (eds.), Ethnic Pluralism and Public Police. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 212-235.

Sherman, Lawrence W. 1990. "Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence." In Michael Tonrey and Norval Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 12. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-48.

Skogan, Wesley G. 1988. "Community Organizations and Crime" In Michael Tonrey and Norval Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 10. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 39-78.

Skogan, Wesley G. 1989. "Communities, Crime and Neighborhood Organization." Crime and Delinquency, 35:3, 437-457.

Skogan, Wesley G. 1990a. "Crime and Punishment." In Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob and Robert Albritton (eds.), Politics in the American States (fifth edition). Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, pp. 378-410.

Skogan, Wesley G. 1990b. Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Cities. New York: The Free Press.

Skolnick, Jerome H. 1990. "Gangs and Crime Old as Time; But Drugs Change Gang Culture," in Drugs and Violence: Police Departments Under Siege. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Sparrow, Malcolm K, Mark H. Moore and David M. Kennedy. 1990. Beyond 911. New York: Basic Books.

Uchida, Craig D., Brian Forst, and Sampson Annan. 1990. Modern Policing and the Control of Illegal Drugs: Testing New Strategies in Two American Cities. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Ward, Benjamin. 1990. "Business by Any Other Name Still Business." Presentation to the 1989 Conference on Drugs and Violence. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Ward, V.M., J.Y. Bertrand, and L.F. Brown. 1991. "The Comparability of Focus Group and Survey Results: Three Case Studies." Evaluation Review, 15:2, 266-283.

Weisel, Deborah L. 1990. Tackling Drug Problems in Public Housing: A Guide for Police. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Williams, Jay, Lawrence Redlinger, and Peter Manning. 1979. Police Narcotics Control: Patterns and Strategies. Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.