

Euphoria on the Rocks: Understanding Crack Addiction *Edward M. Read*

The Costs and Effects of Intensive Supervision for Drug Offenders *Joan Petersilia*
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A Day in the Life of a Federal Probation Officer—Revisited *E. Jane Pierson*
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Personality Types of Probation Officers *Richard D. Sluder*
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This Issue in Brief

Euphoria on the Rocks: Understanding Crack Addiction.—A certain mystique surrounds crack cocaine and makes supervision of crack addicts a real challenge for even the most seasoned probation officer. Stressing the importance of knowing the facts about this drug, author Edward M. Read focuses on helping the officer understand the drug itself, the dynamics of addiction to it, and how to assess a person's dependence on it.

The Costs and Effects of Intensive Supervision for Drug Offenders.—Authors Joan Petersilia, Susan Turner, and Elizabeth Piper Deschenes report the results of a randomized field experiment testing the effects of an intensive supervision probation/parole project for drug-involved offenders. Among the findings were that intensive supervision apparently did not affect drug use, did not reduce recidivism, and cost more than routine supervision.

A Day in the Life of a Federal Probation Officer—Revisited.—Six United States probation officers update an article published in *Federal Probation* more than 20 years ago by describing what might come up in a typical workday. The authors—E. Jane Pierson, Thomas L. Densmore, John M. Shevlin, Omar Madruga, Jay F. Meyer, and Terry D. Childers—all of whom serve in specialist positions—offer commentaries about their work that range from philosophical to highly creative.

Personality Types of Probation Officers.—Are there personality characteristics common to probation officers? Authors Richard D. Sluder and Robert A. Shearer address the question, reporting findings from a study of 202 probation officers using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). The authors discuss the patterns of MBTI personality characteristics among the officers studied, reviewing the strengths and potential weaknesses of the personality types.

When Do Probation and Parole Officers Enjoy the Same Immunity as Judges?—Authors Mark Jones and Rolando V. del Carmen examine the types of defenses a probation or parole officer enjoys in civil liability suits, focusing on the concepts of absolute, quasi-judicial, and qualified immunity. The authors

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The Privatization of Prisons: The Wardens' Views

BY PATRICK T. KINKADE AND MATTHEW C. LEONE*

THE HISTORY of the privatization movement in corrections extends far back into antiquity. Durham (1989) notes precursors to the modern movement that existed in the times of ancient Rome and through the Renaissance. Transportation in the early colonial times of America is a clear example of the privatization of a faltering correctional system. Selling the services of serious felons to work in the colonies was a practice common to the times and outside the general dominion of the established governance (Feeley, 1991). Further, throughout this history policymakers' almost cyclical recognition of the virtues and dilemmas created by massive privatization emerged (see Durham, 1989, for a comparison of privatization movements in the 19th and 20th centuries). Then, as now, allowing privateers to take responsibility for the management of convicts seems an opportune way to deal with burgeoning prison populations while mediating the expense of incarceration. Dependence on the private sector for state incarcerates, however, can create immense dilemmas should the privateer unilaterally decide to end the contract. The political implications of such arrangements between the public and private sectors are also of great consequence. Undue influence on public policy by an economic concern is not without precedent and can subvert the underlying correctional philosophies of a criminal justice system.

The nature of the problems that are associated with the current movement have been enumerated and debated extensively in both academic and popular literature (e.g., Camp & Camp, 1984; Cikas, 1986; Geis, 1986; Borna, 1986; Bowditch & Everett, 1987; Robbins, 1988; Donahue, 1988; DiIulio, 1988; Belkin, 1989; Lampkin, 1991). Mullen, Chabotar, and Carrow (1985), however, provide definitive description of the problems associated with the movement. These authors divide the privatization movement into three distinct areas of enterprise: (1) prison industries, (2) management contracting, and (3) private financing alternatives. They then define the "administrative," "political," "legal," and "financial" issues that face each of the components of the identified typology.

Prison industries are efforts by the private sector to utilize captive work forces in the manufacture and marketing of made-for-profit goods. This type of pri-

vatization has occurred in many forms throughout the country. In Arizona, for example, 25 inmates from a women's correctional center have been hired by a major hotel chain to handle overflow calls to its reservation system (Best Western International Corporation Communications Department, 1985). In the first 5 years of the program's operation it generated over 30 million in reservations and handled about 6 percent of the company's national call volume. An even more comprehensive program exists in Florida. This prisoner-operated industry (PRIDE) includes an optical lab, print shops, and furniture manufacturing, and even maintains its own marketing division (Mullen et al., 1985, p. 22).

Several fundamental concerns exist in relation to this type of privatization. For instance, in that inmates will work for only a small percentage of the pay that might be demanded in the outside labor markets, it has been pointed out that such activity might threaten labor unions. It is also noted that the economic concerns of maintaining such enterprise might come into conflict with penal purpose and institutional routine. Production schedules, in other words, may be difficult to keep in light of security problems that may occasionally arise. Moreover, the training that one might receive to work in a prison-based industry may not, itself, make one qualified for outside employment. Rehabilitation as approached through vocational training may then be sacrificed in an effort to maintain adequate supplies of laborers (See Lightman, 1982, or Mullen et al., 1985, pp. 24-27, for a more comprehensive discussion of these and other related issues.)

Management contracting is an effort by the private sector to manage, on a per diem basis, state-placed inmates. Again, as with the prison industries, this type of privatization can take on many forms. A well established example of management contracting is Behavioral System Southwest's alternative sentencing program for those convicted of drunk driving (Behavioral Systems Southwest, 1986). In the early 1980's, it became legal for private facilities in California to house and treat multiple D.U.I.s for up to one-third of their mandated sentence. As of 1990, a total of 38 prisons and jails were being operated by the private sector (United States General Accounting Office, 1991). This type of facility is

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now in operation in 11 states (Calvert-Hansen, 1991). The concerns about management contracting are many and involve both larger legal issues concerning the constitutionality of turning state social control functions over to private parties, and the many pragmatic issues surrounding institutional operation. The most obvious examples of the former include the use of discipline, including deadly force, in an institutional environment and the policing involved in the prohibition of escape. The most salient operational issue concerns the basic conflict between profit and conditions of confinement. Many feel that institutional security and the prisoner's right to humane living conditions may be at odds with the profit motive. In other words, the privateer, in order to maximize profits, may economize at the prisoner's expense (food, recreational equipment, etc.) or at the expense of public safety (staffing and surveillance equipment) (see Becker & Stanley, 1985, for information on many of the problems facing management contracting arrangements).

Private sector financing entails the use of private funds to quickly finance publicly run institutions. In a typical arrangement the government will lease a facility that has been built by a private firm, thereby eliminating the need for voter approval of government general obligation bonds. A good example of this type of privatization occurred in Colorado. Although not always the case, this attempt at private financing met with a great deal of success. Here, county supervisors issued 30.2 million in jail bonds to the private sector and quickly financed the construction of a new county jail (Cory & Gettinger, 1984).

A large number of issues surround the use of alternative financing. In many states, for example, there are legal barriers that prohibit the use of such arrangements. In addition, the costs involved in this type of financing can be greater to the state than would traditional bond funding. This is particularly the case in straight lease arrangements whereby the leaser does not build equity in the property leased. (Brona, 1986, and Palumbo, 1986, discuss many of the issues confronting this type of privatization.)

Academic evaluation of the viability of each of these types of privatization has abounded in recent years (e.g., Crants, 1991; Belkin, 1989; National Institute of Correction, 1985; Levinson, 1985). Geis (1986) in his discussion of all three types of privatization suggests their relative viability in relation to each other. Of the three types of private sector involvement, he concludes, prison industries seem to be the most viable. The inclusion of work programs into penal programming is thought to be one of the few reforms which could gain broad-based political support. Traditionally, such programs have been stifled by legislative

acts designed to narrow the market for prison-produced goods. But, the laws are changing.

In an attempt to assess political support for privatization the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has completed a national survey on private sector involvement in prison-based industries (Criminal Justice Associates, 1985). The survey measured involvement and perspectives of corrections administrators on a state level. These included state governors, legislators, and directors of corrections. The completion rates for the surveys ranged from a low of 39 percent to a high of 69 percent. Although for the most part, the survey measured current involvement rather than theoretical perspectives on such involvement it did touch upon one of the issues to be addressed in the current work. It assessed the relative interests of each of the mentioned populations in the possible inclusion of the private sector in their respective corrections systems. Directors showed the most interest with 69 percent of the population suggesting they would be "very interested" in such involvement. Governors and legislators were less enthusiastic but still seemed amenable to the prospect, 38 percent and 43 percent of the populations respectively rating themselves as "very interested." The vast majorities of all of the populations proved themselves to be at least "somewhat interested" (directors - 92 percent; governors - 88 percent; legislators - 90 percent).

The current research effort adds to both the work of Geis (1986) and to the NIJ study (Criminal Justice Associates, 1985). Like the NIJ study, it will assess the relative interest of policymakers in privatization. Rather than using state level officials, however, a national census of prison warden and superintendent attitude was compiled. Researchers who have used a similar approach to analyze correctional policy point out that the perceptions of these administrators are the appropriate unit of analysis when one seeks to determine how policies are actually formulated, initiated, and carried out by those with the power to do so. As Baker et al. (1973, p. 459) argue:

It is on the basis of information seen from the administrator's perspective that decisions are made, determining correctional policy which affects not only the lives of employees and inmates within the system, but also the manner in which the correctional system functions within society.

However, unlike the NIJ study, perspectives on all of the three major areas of privatization (Mullens et al., 1985) will be measured rather than just focusing on prison industries. Further, Geis' assessment of the relative political viability of each of these three types of involvement will be evaluated from a practitioner's perspective.

Finally, the attitudinal and demographic characteristics that drive the formation of such perceptions in the policymaker will also be assessed in the current

work. Sigler and Stough (1991) begin to identify such factors by isolating attitudes which associate with the acceptance of a model for the use of inmate labor by mid-level correctional administrators. The authors suggest three factors which seem to mediate such receptivity: (1) "orientation toward rehabilitation/treatment"; (2) "orientation toward policy"; and (3) "receptivity to input." The first of these factors is defined as "the perceived potential of inmates to prepare for successful reintegration into society." The second is conceptualized as the administrator's "acceptance of existing policy," its perceived effectiveness and his or her openness to policy change. And, the third is a measure of the administrator's willingness to "accept information" from outside sources (e.g., superiors, the media, inmates, etc.). All of the three mentioned factors had a significant positive correlation with the administrator's willingness to accept prison industry as viable within modern corrections. The current research will look for differences in acceptance for each of the three types of privatization in relation to: (1) institutional pressures (prison crowding, pending litigation, poor conditions of confinement); (2) personal experience (private sector involvement, years in corrections); and (3) personal ideology (political affiliation, philosophy of corrections).

Methodology

To ensure a high response rate, Dillman's (1978) "total design method" (TDM) will be utilized. Dillman's method is based on social exchange theory and requires three things to maximize survey response. These are: 1) minimized cost for responding; 2) maximized reward for doing so; and 3) established trust that those rewards will be delivered. These three criteria will be achieved by keeping the survey short, offering information on the survey's results and policy implications, and obtaining an endorsement for the project from a pertinent sponsoring agency.

Fifty studies based on the TDM have been reviewed by Dillman (1978). The response rates for these efforts range from a low of 53 percent to a high of 96 percent. TDM requires multiple mailings to achieve its high response rates. Although the results of individual surveys were kept confidential in this study, each survey was numbered so that the instrument's return could be tracked. The survey was initiated by the mailing of a cover letter, an endorsement letter, and a survey instrument to each respondent. At the end of 1 week a postcard reminder was sent to all respondents. This served as both a thank you for those who had returned the survey and a reminder for those who had not. At the end of 3 weeks a followup letter and a replacement questionnaire were sent to nonrespondents. The letter reminded individuals that their questionnaires had

not been received and appealed for return of the questionnaires.

The sampling frame was compiled by the American Correctional Association (1990) and is published as *The National Directory of Prison Administrators*. This volume provides a current list of the names, addresses, and phone numbers of all of the prison administrators in the United States. The population surveyed included all wardens and superintendents of adult minimum, medium, maximum, community, and camp facilities at both the state and Federal levels. Of the 50 states, only one declined to participate in the study. Comparisons between those that returned the survey and known characteristics of the population as a whole suggested that the two groups were demographically comparable. The total potential population of respondents was 980. The response rate was 71.3 percent.

Results

The first three sets of questions deal with the relative support of the population for the variations of each of the identified types of privatization. The first set dealt specifically with prison industries, the use of captive work forces to supply goods or services in an open or limited market economy. Six examples of prison industry were utilized, reflecting all of the possible combinations of company ownership and market.

The second set of questions dealt with private sector financing in corrections. The population was asked to indicate their relative support for two types of financing. The first is a straight lease option whereby the state releases its interests in the financed facility after a set period of time. The second is a lease purchase option whereby the property passes to the state upon completion of the lease contract.

Tables 3 and 4 deal with the population's perception of management contracting, the use of private sector administrators to manage select inmate populations. The first table shows responses regarding the privatization of each of the three board security levels in American corrections. The second asks the respondent to indicate his or her support for various specific populations that have come under the control of the private sector at various times across the country. Table 5 compares the population's general support for each of the three types of privatization (prison industries, private sector financing, and management contracting).

Respondents were categorized according to the problems facing their institution, their personal experiences, and their personal ideology. A chi square statistic was used to test for differences between categories of respondents on their general acceptance of the three forms of privatization. Of the three types of

TABLE 1. SURVEY QUESTION: I SUPPORT THE USE OF PRISON INDUSTRIES IN OUR CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM. (ANSWER FOR EACH IDENTIFIED TYPE)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Privately Owned/Sells Public	18.9	28.3	10.5	19.8	21.0
Privately Owned/Sells State	24.4	32.4	9.3	17.7	14.8
Prison Owned/Sells Public	28.9	35.9	11.1	13.1	9.6
Prison Owned/Sells State	55.4	35.8	3.2	2.4	2.3
Prisoner Owned/Sells Public	5.6	10.7	8.2	20.7	53.4
Prisoner Owned/Sells State	9.3	10.2	7.0	19.2	53.0

N=660

(numbers in percents)

TABLE 2. SURVEY QUESTION: I SUPPORT THE USE OF PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCING IN OUR CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM. (ANSWER FOR EACH IDENTIFIED TYPE)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Straight Lease	18.7	38.5	18.9	10.8	11.3
Lease Purchase	20.9	48.7	7.6	11.4	10.7

N=660

(numbers in percents)

privatization, the personal characteristics selected only affected the individual's acceptance of prison industries. In relation to prison industries, both measures of personal experience (years in corrections, experience with the private sector) were significantly related to general acceptance but in opposing manners. If the warden had experience with the private sector in relation to prison industries he or she was more likely to be in favor of this type of privatization ($X^2=13.3, p<.001$) (see table 6). However, as the warden's measured experience in corrections increased he or she was, on the other hand, less likely to be in favor of prison industries ($X^2=16.9, p<.05$).

Discussion

In assessing the data which were gathered, several overriding themes emerged. The first, simply stated, was that the administrator population did have very real preferences about the potential variations for each type of privatization, especially when comparing across major types. Table 1 summarizes the relative interest this population has in the various forms of prison industry. The form which was most acceptable (over 90 percent of the respondents would either support or strongly support its use) involves a prison-owned shop that sells its goods or service to the state. It is also apparent that the

TABLE 3. SURVEY QUESTION: I SUPPORT THE USE OF MANAGEMENT CONTRACTING IN OUR CORRECTIONS SYSTEM. (ANSWER FOR EACH IDENTIFIED TYPE)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Minimum Security	9.6	33.5	13.1	26.3	16.9
Medium Security	2.4	14.5	11.7	39.1	31.8
Maximum Security	1.7	5.8	8.4	25.7	58.3

N=660

(numbers in percents)

TABLE 4. SURVEY QUESTION: I SUPPORT THE USE OF MANAGEMENT CONTRACTING IN OUR CORRECTIONS SYSTEM. (ANSWER FOR EACH IDENTIFIED TYPE)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Drunk Drivers	20.9	48.7	7.6	11.4	10.7
Illegal Immigrants	14.2	39.6	15.7	14.8	14.8
Juveniles	10.5	32.3	17.4	23.6	15.4
Nonviolent Sex Offenders	5.3	16.9	10.7	32.9	33.5

N=660

(numbers in percents)

TABLE 5. SURVEY QUESTION: I SUPPORT THE USE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN OUR CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM. (ANSWER FOR EACH IDENTIFIED TYPE)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Prison Industries	3.8	23.4	43.9	27.0	1.9
Alternative Financing	3.2	13.0	51.7	19.5	12.6
Management Contracting	1.6	8.7	24.8	41.0	23.9

N=660

(numbers in percents)

TABLE 6. SURVEY QUESTION: I SUPPORT THE USE OF PRISON INDUSTRIES IN OUR CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM.

			Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Institutional pressure	Prison crowding	Yes	3.8	20.8	48.1	25.9	1.4
		No	3.9	25.6	40.2	28.0	2.4
	Pending litigation	Yes	3.4	23.3	45.9	26.0	1.4
		No	4.4	24.1	42.8	26.3	2.5
	Poor conditions	Yes	4.0	22.8	43.3	27.9	2.0
		No	3.6	26.8	53.6	14.3	1.8
Personal experience	Private sector ¹	Yes	4.3	31.9	40.4	20.7	2.7
		No	3.6	20.0	45.6	29.3	1.6
	Years experience ²	0-10	5.7	25.7	41.4	25.7	1.1
		11-20	3.1	26.6	46.6	22.3	1.4
		21+	4.2	16.9	41.3	34.7	2.8
Personal ideology	Political affiliation	Republican	2.3	25.6	44.9	26.1	1.1
		Democrat	4.3	21.4	44.3	26.7	3.3
	Punishment philosophy	Retribution	6.0	17.1	47.0	29.1	.9
		Rehabilitation	3.1	25.8	44.1	24.9	2.2

¹significant at p<.001

²significant at p<.05

N=660

(numbers in percents)

respondent group was not in favor of any entrepreneurship on the part of the prisoners. Little support was indicated for shops owned by incarcerates, irrespective of the potential market for the items produced. Table 2 summarized the relative support for each of the commonly identified forms of alternative financing. The general adamance that was apparent in the comparisons of the other types of privatization was not present in relation to this particular form. Of the two, however, there was clearly more support for lease/purchase financing as opposed to straight lease.

Tables 3 and 4 both deal with management contracting. Table 3 summarizes the support for the use of this type of arrangement for each of the three levels of security. As one might expect, the greatest amount of support is for the use of private management for minimum security incarcerates; there is significantly less support for medium security prisoners and little support for private control of those offenders classified as maximum security. It is interesting to note that there is no clear majority of support for private management of any of the general security levels. This is not to say, however, that there is no support for management contracting within this population. Indeed,

when asked about their interest in using the private sector to manage certain specific types of inmate, majorities of support were demonstrated for both "drunk drivers" (69.6 percent either supported or strongly supported such involvement) and "illegal immigrants" (53.8 percent either supported or strongly supported such involvement).

Table 5 compares the overall support for each of the primary types of privatization. As Geis (1986) posited, the form which received the broadest base of acceptance was prison industry. The acceptability of this particular form of private sector involvement, Geis continues, would come about for several reasons. The "work ethic" has, since the time of the European workhouses, been a cornerstone philosophy of most Western correctional systems. Teaching offenders the "habits of industry," many believe, would allow offenders to adjust to civilian life in socially appropriate ways and thereby lower recidivism rates. Even at the legislative level, few policymakers would open themselves to political attack by supporting the idea of inmates being asked to work (Cullen & Travis, 1984). Moreover, Geis continues, the concerns about institutional tedium and its potentially explosive results can

be moderated, at least, with the potential for gainful employment. Finally, he concludes, money earned by prisoners and the prison in such activity could be used in a variety of manners to reduce the ever burgeoning costs of corrections and criminal justice. Currently, such arrangements are in operation in most states, and their use is on the increase (Sexton, Farrow, & Auerbach, 1985). On the other hand, although governmental interest in management contracting seems firmly entrenched (see Calvert-Hansen, 1991, for a complete discussion of the trends in management contracting), firms involved with it are beginning to experience financial trouble. Mason (1991) points out that many privateers overbuilt in anticipation of governmental need. The result has been "a glut of 'rent-a-cell' facilities" (p. A-1) without prisoners to fill the spaces. The economic recession, the author continues, is causing state governments to use lower cost alternatives (e.g., electronic monitoring and work-release centers), further aggravating the problems facing those private agencies involved. The enthusiasm for alternative financing also has, in recent years, begun to falter. These arrangements are being evaluated as methods for jurisdictions to "evade debt limits" (Mullen et al., 1985, p. 9) and circumvent the will of the voting public rather than attempt to deal with the costs of corrections in a fiscally responsible manner.

When the present data are looked at as a whole, another theme emerges and can be understood in the context of organizational theory. Aldrich (1979) suggests that similar organizations are often in competition with each other. "Domain consensus/dissensus" reflects the amount of agreement that exists between competing agencies about the territorial stakes each has for a particular resource. Organizations maintain their domains by differentiating themselves from competitors and by maintaining autonomous control over their respective areas. In this particular instance, the competition from the private sector represents an encroachment on a domain long held by public sector correctional officials. The attitudes of public sector officials emerging in light of such a threat should, according to this theory of organizations, reflect both the desire to differentiate public sector corrections from private sector and a desire to maintain autonomy. Mullen et al. (1985, p. 74) allude to this problem in a discussion of "strategic political issues" surrounding private sector contract management. Evidence of a "territorial" concern can be inferred in several ways from the current data. The level of enthusiasm for using contracted managers for any minimum security prisoner is relatively high when compared to general populations of prisoners at other security levels (medium, maximum) but relatively low when placed into comparison to specialized population of incarcerates (DUI, illegal immigrants, etc.). Acknowledging that

privateers may be able to successfully manage general populations of offenders threatens the domain of traditional public sector corrections; suggesting that such arrangements could work in unique circumstances differentiates between public and private sector corrections, while maintaining the autonomy of the former. Moreover, the wardens' reactions to the two other types of privatization further indicate their desire to maintain autonomy and control. Each of the variations statistically identified as most acceptable by this population was the selection reflecting the greatest degree of retained authority. The wardens were most willing to allow industries if they were prison-owned and sold to controlled markets and would accept financing alternatives if such financing would result in the facility being turned over to the state.

Those variables which were found to predict public sector administrative support of prison industries can also be understood from organizational theory. Entrenchment in an organization reflects the degree to which one is committed to its purpose and structure. An index of such dedication may be years of service to the given organization. The current work finds that the number of years one has spent in service to public sector correctional organizations is inversely related to one's acceptance of the private sector. The more entrenched an individual is in the organization's domain, in other words, the less likely that individual will be to release any organizational territory. However, it was also found that if the individual has experience with the private sector, he or she is more likely to support its continued integration into the public sector domain. This might also be expected from domain dissensus/consensus. Those who have been or are involved with the private sector are more likely to perceive the boundaries of public sector correctional responsibility as blurred and be more supportive of outside incursion.

The implications of this research are clear. Those administrators who are most involved with the day-to-day functioning of the American correctional system have clear preferences and opinions regarding private sector involvement. Considering the insight this population has into the reality of running this system, these feelings should be taken into account in policy development. More research, however, needs to be done to isolate the motives behind these preferences so that such development may be rational in its base. This is particularly important in that these preferences may come from organizational territoriality rather than the desire for absolute efficiency in corrections. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that if the organizational barriers between the public and private sector can be breached, satisfactory mergers can be achieved. Experience with the private sector did predict a positive response to it as an option in corrections.

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