Community Oriented Policing & Problem Solving

California Department of Justice
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
Crime Prevention Center
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General

COPPS

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

November 1992

Message From The Attorney General

As the struggle to reclaim our streets and neighborhoods from crime, violence and hopelessness continues, one lesson, repeatedly taught and frequently ignored is apparent: law enforcement cannot do the job alone.

That is why Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS) is a concept whose time has come. This movement holds tremendous promise for creating effective police-community partnerships to reclaim our communities and keep our streets safe.

The COPPS approach is a better way to create safer communities with existing resources. It mobilizes and empowers people to work with the police to effectively address crime and other social problems confronting our communities.

It is important to stress that community policing still involves straightforward law enforcement. It is not "soft" on crime — in fact, it is tougher on crime because it is smarter and more creative. Community input focuses police activities; and, with better information, officers are able to respond more effectively with arrests or other appropriate actions.

The COPPS approach can instill us with hope for our future, unite our communities and promote pride in our police forces. It creates a harness in which public agencies and community members can pull together to focus their energies and resolve the substantive issues that are eroding our society's health and well-being.

I thank each member of our COPPS Advisory Committee for their assistance on this important issue. Their input has been invaluable in helping my office define how we should assist California communities find solutions to the problems they face.

Ultimately, it is up to you. I urge you, as police and local government officials, educators, community organizers and residents, to take up this challenge. Review this book; tailor these ideas to fit the specific needs of your own communities. Join with me in this effort. Working together we can make a genuine difference in our communities . . . now and in the future.

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attorney General

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SOMETHING NEW . . . OR IS IT OLD?

COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING AND PROBLEM SOLVING

Crime, drugs, gang warfare and burgeoning prison populations continue to drain community, state and national resources. It has become clear that police agencies alone, employing traditional law enforcement methods, cannot turn this tide. We need an approach that addresses the causes of crime, encourages community participation and makes better use of existing resources.

We call this approach Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS). Is it new? Some community policing program strategies, such as foot patrol, resemble policing of years past. But COPPS is not just a "tack-on" program that requires new resources. It is a philosophy, a management style, and an organizational strategy that promotes police-community partnerships and problem-solving strategies. It is a different way of looking at policing.

Community policing acknowledges that the whole community is responsible for public safety — not just the police. Police officers are encouraged to get to know the community, listen to their concerns and get them involved in problem-solving efforts. The COPPS approach goes beyond surface symptoms to develop comprehensive and effective responses, not "quick-fix" solutions.

Community policing and problem solving shifts the role of the police officer from incident-driven law enforcer to problem-solver and facilitator. Enforcement tactics are not eliminated; rather, the selection of tools officers have to do their job is greatly expanded.

We have gathered together a range of conceptual discussions on this subject, as well as concrete examples of what many communities are doing. These examples are not an exhaustive compilation; nor are they intended to be blueprints, because community policing and problem solving applications are unique to each community.

We welcome your responses. In the near future other activities and support for the COPPS concept are planned. These include workshops, videos, model training curriculum, statewide coordination and evaluation proposals. For more information, please contact:

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SECTION I

"COPPS"
COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING & PROBLEM SOLVING

A DISCUSSION

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING & PROBLEM SOLVING (COPPS)

DEFINITION AND PRINCIPLES

Community policing challenges police and civic officials to provide the leadership necessary to address the issues facing communities in the nineties. Fundamental to the community policing philosophy is the hope for a better tomorrow. It provides a framework to examine and pro-actively respond to changing demographics, social disorder and physical decay. It focuses on neighborhood maintenance and revitalization where necessary; and advances creative and comprehensive interventions for insidious social epidemics such as gangs, drugs and hate crimes. Most important, community policing is tough on crime; it provides a more comprehensive and creative, and thus more effective approach to policing.

Definition:

Community policing is a philosophy, management style, and organizational strategy that promotes pro-active problem-solving and police-community partnerships to address the causes of crime and fear as well as other community issues.

Community partnership is a flexible term referring to any combination of neighborhood residents, schools, churches, businesses, community-based organizations, elected officials, and government agencies who are working cooperatively with the police to resolve identified problems that impact or interest them.

Problem-solving refers to a process of *identifying problems/priorities* through coordinated community/police needs assessments; *collecting and analyzing* information concerning the problem in a thorough, though not necessarily complicated manner; *developing or facilitating responses* that are innovative and tailor-made with the best potential for eliminating or reducing the problem; and finally *evaluating* the response to determine its effectiveness and modifying it as necessary.

Principles:

Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving:

1) Reassesses who is responsible for public safety and redefines the roles and relationships between the police and the community.

2) Requires shared ownership, decision making, and accountability, as well as sustained commitment from both the police and the community.

3) Establishes new public expectations of and measurement standards for police effectiveness (e.g., from solely 911 response time and arrest/crime statistics . . . to include quality of service, customer

(community) satisfaction, responsiveness to community defined issues, and cultural sensitivity).

4) Increases understanding and trust between police and community members.

5) Empowers and strengthens community-based efforts.

6) Requires constant flexibility to respond to all emerging issues.

7) Requires an on-going commitment to developing long-term and pro-active programs/strategies to address the underlying conditions that cause community problems.

8) Requires knowledge of available community resources and how to access and mobilize them, as well as the ability to develop new resources within the community.

9) Requires buy-in of the top management of the police and other local government agencies, as well as a sustained personal commitment from all levels of management and other key personnel.

10) Decentralizes police services/operations/management, relaxes the traditional "chain of command," and encourages innovative and creative problem solving by all — thereby making greater use of the knowledge, skill and expertise throughout the organization without regard to rank.

11) Shifts the focus of police work from responding to individual incidents to addressing *problems* identified by the community as well as the police, emphasizing the use of problem-solving approaches to supplement traditional law-enforcement methods.

12) Requires commitment to developing new skills through training (e.g., problem-solving, networking, mediation, facilitation, conflict resolution, cultural competency/literacy).

Discussion of Principles:

1) Reassesses who is responsible for public safety and redefines the roles and relationships between the police and the community.

Over the years, maintaining public order has shifted from being primarily the responsibility of families, communities and individuals — assisted by police officers — to being primarily the responsibility of the police alone. In the process, enforcing laws and exacting penalties have become the principal, if not sole response to public order and safety issues.

Community Policing reverses this trend by recognizing that the community at large is responsible for the conditions that generate crime. Deterrence, law enforcement and incarceration, by themselves, cannot resolve the underlying conditions that cause crime and social disorder. In fact, specific *responsible people* in the community — e.g., teachers, principals, clergy, elected officials, directors of service and community-based organizations, business people, parents — have as much to do with the overall policing of the community and the regulation of conduct as uniformed officers.

This is not to diminish the role of the police who are in a unique position to facilitate resolving the root causes of crime. Available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, they have ready opportunity for direct interaction with the community. They witness first-hand many of the symptoms and underlying issues that need to be addressed, are mandated by law to protect and serve the community, and can identify the relevant and responsible parties and bring them to the problem-solving process.

To cultivate this transition, an educational process and heightening of awareness must take place. The community must accept and share responsibility with the police for social order, and both must work cooperatively to identify problems and develop pro-active community-wide solutions.

2) Requires shared ownership, decision making and accountability, as well as sustained commitment from both the police and the community.

These new roles and relationships between the police and the community demand major shifts for both. The police must acknowledge they cannot do the job alone, recognize they have valuable resources available to them in the community, and understand the need to share power and decision making to solve community problems. Management styles must be adjusted to include diverse public feedback and representative community teams who provide input into the decision-making process. Conducted properly, the value of this creative process becomes clearly evident to everyone involved. The process builds upon itself. Community problem-solving takes on dimensions beyond the scope of any one individual agency or executive.

In turn, the community — neighborhoods, families, individuals, schools, elected officials, local government agencies, organizations, churches and businesses — must become empowered to accept the challenge and responsibility to assume ownership of their community's safety and well-being. *Empowerment* occurs when individuals or groups have a sustained commitment, appropriate information and skills, and the influence necessary to affect policies and share accountability for outcomes.

Shared ownership does not mean that individual residents *take the law into their own hands* or attempt to enforce the law on their own. It does mean that community members work with the police, for example, to:

- Identify and prioritize the problems that plague their communities.
- Develop and implement innovative and effective responses to the problems.
- Determine appropriate resource allocations.
- Evaluate and modify responses, as necessary, to achieve the desired results.

3) Establishes new public expectations of and measurement standards for police effectiveness.

With the current incident driven system of policing — especially since the implementation of the 911 Emergency System — a majority of officers' time is spent responding to calls for service. Preventive (random) patrol, rapid response time, and increased arrests have become the widely accepted and practiced tactics of law enforcement and the primary basis for evaluation.

Emerging research suggests more effective ways in which police officers can deal with increasingly serious and complex social problems. First, the police must include the community in identifying and prioritizing problems to be addressed. Second, the public must have realistic expectations of exactly what the police can *and cannot* do, as well as what the community must do to achieve health and well-being.

The community policing approach reprioritizes police efforts to focus on customer service and satisfaction. Facilitating problem-solving partnerships, instituting innovative responses to crime related problems, addressing social disorder and physical decay — issues that often concern communities even more than specific crime incidents — and responding constructively to the needs of special populations are examples. These deal with qualitative rather than simply quantitative factors and effectiveness as well as efficiency.

Implementing new practices and strategies requires establishing new measurements of success. The response time and arrest level criteria must be augmented with more qualitative standards measured by customer (community) satisfaction surveys, quality of life assessments, problem-solving successes, and levels of community participation. Moreover, effective pro-active planning and preventive programs must be justly credited when new problems are averted before they develop.

4) Increases understanding and trust between police and community members.

Development of mutual trust between the police and the community is essential for effective partnerships to occur. Inherent in any successful partnership is a sense of equality and mutual respect. With the quickly changing demographics in our communities, the police must become culturally competent/literate for the neighborhoods they work in; they must be aware of and sensitive to the multicultural populations they serve, and be capable of engaging in meaningful interaction and partnership with them. Further, police administrators must develop organizations that reflect the cultural and ethnic diversity of the communities they serve.

Assigning officers to one beat for extended time periods *(beat integrity)*, and promoting daily, direct and positive contact between the police and community residents fosters friendship and understanding. Consistent follow-up and feedback to community members acknowledges their integral role and reinforces their involvement. Through such increased police-community interaction, police officers become real people with individual faces rather than stereotypes.

Beat integrity creates opportunities for the police to get to know the public as individuals as well. Community police officers learn who they can trust, who is only acting out and who is genuinely dangerous, who is likely to be armed, who is feared by others, who is in school, who has been rejected by their families, who is employed and who is not, who has a criminal record. . . . With such knowledge, police officers are able to tailor their actions to the individual rather than reacting to general characteristics of age, race, speech or dress. Like everyone else, police officers may feel fear in unfamiliar situations. Knowing the community reduces this fear, and also assists officers to handle incidents with the minimal level of force necessary.

When a community knows and supports their beat officer, the police are viewed as upholders of community values and thus are able to act with the authorization of the community, as well as the law.

5) Empowers and strengthens community-based efforts.

Community policing strongly advocates and invites community partnerships. It challenges community members to take charge of their own destiny by enlisting them in their own defense. Individuals can be taught how to effectively work through the mystifying maze of government regulations that affect their daily lives: for example, how to deal with utilities, streets, lighting or housing departments; understand the legal system; or obtain veterans' or social security benefits. The police can be instrumental in directly providing or advocating for the availability of guidance, contact persons, phone numbers, or even brochures explaining the different criminal justice and government systems, in appropriate languages. Such services close the gap between the police and the community, and between the people and government as a whole. All community members, including the poor, the uneducated, the non-English speaking and the otherwise excluded individuals, are empowered with a confidence that the system can work.

The community policing approach provides the ingredients necessary for the community to become *empowered.* It supplies community members with appropriate information and skills, reinforces their courage and strength, and ensures them the influence necessary to impact policies and share accountability for outcomes. Community involvement may include, for example, active neighborhood watch groups, "safe" houses for children going to and from schools, senior citizens' escort services, safe recreation facilities for teenagers to use during non-school hours, anti-drugs and gang intervention programs for *at-risk* youth, and civilian foot patrols. Police can support community initiative by strengthening

community-based programs through service on boards, or as volunteers in community programs.

No longer feeling helpless in the face of social chaos and disorder, community members accept responsibility for enforcing community norms. "A mobilized community can send messages about how people are to behave that will be more powerful in constraining inconsiderate, ill-considered, abusive and criminal behavior than anything the police can do on their own." The neighborhood watch approach that created more eyes and ears for the police, expands to create "additional frowns, smiles, admonitions, compliments, lectures, homilies, sarcasm and pats on the back by everyone, especially adults, in communities." (Bayley, *"The Best Defense"*)

6) Requires constant flexibility to respond to all emerging issues.

By most estimates, only 25% of the work of police officers actually involves *enforcing the law* or *arresting* people. That means that 75% of police work involves such things as responding to non-arrest citizen calls and complaints, providing aid and assistance, and random patrol. Yet, under the traditional model, police are equipped with very few tools, other than their authority to arrest and incarcerate based on the criminal law, to handle the broad nature of police business. For example, police will often respond repeatedly to one location (for a domestic disturbance or neighbor conflict), only to leave it unresolved because *no law has been broken* — yet. These situations often escalate into incidents that eventually require a *law enforcement* response.

Developing new and alternative authority (i.e., new policies, regulations or ordinances) to respond to specific situations, is often more effective or more suitable than using the criminal law, and also allows for a more discreet use of the criminal justice system. For example: authorizing mandatory mediation counseling for domestic or neighborhood disputes — on the first call; authorizing police to remove or order persons to leave situations such as bar fights — without making arrests; authority to deal with "homeless" individuals by taking them into custody and transporting them to a shelter; responding to public drunks by taking the incapacitated individual into custody for transportation to a detoxification facility; and using civil abatement procedures to close down drug houses.

Among other benefits, non-arrest strategies reduce the overload on the criminal justice system. This becomes crucial, for as the criminal justice system reaches the saturation point, the public is recognizing that many "minor" infractions are not being prosecuted. This undercuts both the authority and effectiveness of the police and the entire criminal justice system.

Community policing and problem solving also greatly expands the prevention and intervention alternatives available to police. The focus is on developing creative, tailor-made responses to specific problems. While innovative efforts to address issues such as school safety, street lighting and neighborhood organizing have occurred through crime prevention programs, the COPPS approach incorporates such prevention and intervention efforts into the mainstream of policing. In short, COPPS requires a consistent, agency-wide commitment to the full-scale search for effective solutions to community problems.

7) Requires an on-going commitment to developing long-term and pro-active strategies and programs to address the underlying conditions that cause community problems.

To resolve underlying public safety problems rather than just treat the surface symptoms requires a pro-active stance towards crime and disorder. The police and the community must collectively commit themselves to the long-term struggle of addressing the complex and chronic underlying issues that plague our society and communities. This requires:

- ❑ Accurate community needs assessments that are sensitive to all cultural and ethnic populations within the community.

- Participation of all appropriate players (e.g., elected officials, local agencies, organizations, schools, business, and diverse community representatives) to collect data and brainstorm strategies.
- Review of existing community resource allocations and resetting priorities where necessary.
- Collaborative, comprehensive programs that address the underlying issues and causal factors in question.
- Evaluation and modification as necessary.

In short, communities, including the police, must be willing to do whatever it takes to turn this tide around.

Cooperative police-community activities have the additional benefit of demonstrating a commitment to overcome chronic neglect. This can reduce the bitterness that affects so many neighborhoods, especially in the inner cities.

8) Requires knowledge of available community resources and how to access and mobilize them, as well as the ability to develop new resources within the community.

Successful community policing and problem solving efforts depend on recognizing and mobilizing the untapped resources available within a community. As facilitators, the police must know the resources within their own agency, other city and county agencies, the private sector and the community. They must become adept at intra- and interagency collaboration, community mobilization, and open-ended problem solving.

Increased communication and cooperation among local government agencies enhances problem-solving by providing diverse perspectives. This collaborative process also reduces duplication of efforts and aids in setting appropriate and realistic priorities for the resources available.

Mobilizing the community includes both broad-based partnerships designed to decrease tensions and create a reservoir of good will between the community and the police, and more focused efforts designed to analyze and respond to specific problems. Consulting with the community on identifying problems, setting priorities and developing responses must become institutionalized as part of policing.

Being "resource knowledgeable" is a unique skill that will enhance any community-based policing effort. Linking up people in need of services with those service providers within a community can become an integral part of resolving community concerns. Where necessary, the empowered community then can be mobilized to pressure other government agencies into buying into the COPPS philosophy and processes.

9) Requires buy-in of the top management of the police and other local government agencies; as well as a sustained personal commitment from all levels of management and other key personnel.

Community-oriented policing and problem solving requires a leadership style that makes more effective use of the latent human resources within the agencies and the community by encouraging creativity and risk-taking. It is a value-driven rather than rule-driven management approach. Called "quality leadership" in the private sector, this style focuses on actively modifying and improving the systems that serve us.

Briefly, the principles of quality leadership include:

- Maintaining a vision and managing through values rather than rules.
- Focusing on teamwork.
- Commitment to the problem-solving process with focus on data.
- Seeking input before decisions are made.
- Asking the people who do the work about ways to improve the process.

- ❑ Avoiding "top-down" decision-making.
- ❑ A customer-orientation.
- ❑ Focusing on improving systems and processes before blaming individuals.
- ❑ Encouraging creativity and risk-taking, and tolerance of honest mistakes.
- ❑ Creating an open climate that encourages providing and accepting feedback.
- ❑ Developing goals and a plan to achieve them.
  (Couper and Lobitz, *Quality Policing: the Madison Experience.*)

The first step is to train the management team in the new style of leadership. A successful transition to the COPPS model is directly linked to the commitment and understanding of management and all supervisory personnel. The change that is envisioned will not become a reality if the values and concepts are not assimilated and lived organizationally from the top down. Leadership and management must consistently model, with their employees, the behaviors that the employees are expected to exhibit with their customers.

Police executives must have the support and cooperation of local government — both elected officials and management — to effectively transform a community's policing practices. The endorsement of elected officials and city/county management does much to promote sincere interagency collaborative efforts, support coordinated pro-active community problem solving, and reduce competitive turf issues. The transition to quality leadership entails training elected officials, directors and department heads, and developing interagency memorandum of understanding detailing cooperative relationships and processes. All must share the vision of truly participatory government and be committed to the long-term problem solving processes that address root problems. And, resources must be committed accordingly.

10) Decentralizes police services/operations/ management, relaxes the traditional "chain of command," and encourages innovation and creative problem solving.

The police reform movement to professionalism produced a highly centralized, paramilitary command-and-control approach to management. The community policing and problem-solving approach, on the other hand, is based on decentralized, community-based services driven from the bottom up, making full use of the knowledge, skill and expertise throughout the organization. The officers on the beat, as the direct service providers, become the most important persons in the department, and the managers of their areas. They not only answer the calls, but do problem analysis, know the people and are accessible.

Correspondingly, the role of the first line supervisor on up to the chief is to provide the beat officers with the resources they need to solve the problems in their areas. The message to department managers is to create an entrepreneurial atmosphere with conditions that make it possible for individuals to experiment, create, develop and test their intellectual and creative capacities. Calculated risk-taking is encouraged and innocent mistakes are not punished.

This approach also requires reducing the bureaucratic roadblocks that hamper getting the job done. Furthermore, the internal reward and performance evaluation systems must be revised so that people are evaluated for community development and problem solving in addition to enforcement activities.

11) Shifts the focus of police work from responding to individual incidents to addressing problems identified by the community as well as by the police.

The vast majority of police time is spent reacting to citizens' requests for services. The public's expectations of the police have perpetuated this posture. Thus, individual incidents have become the

primary work of the police, with the goal being to respond to these incidents with increased speed and efficiency. While this approach has largely served us well over the last decade, in most cases it has allowed officers to deal only with the surface manifestations of crime.

Shifting from an *incident* orientation to a problem orientation requires analyzing and identifying patterns or common factors that may contribute to individual incidents, and then addressing such factors as problematic issues. The *problem* then becomes the main unit of police work. A careful analysis of the problem precedes the development of specific responses, just as a careful investigation precedes an arrest.

Further, through regular consultation, follow-up and feedback between the police and the community, police action is more closely aligned with the actual needs of the community. Studies and surveys done with Neighborhood Watch groups, for example, show that the problems people are most concerned with are *quality of life* issues that are perhaps more mundane than the high visibility serious crimes, but are also more intrusive into their everyday lives. Matters such as cultural and ethnic awareness and sensitivity, drug dealing in the park, noisy adolescents loitering on the corner or in the shopping malls, abandoned cars and buildings, aggressive panhandling, inconsiderate neighbors, and squealing tires are the things that often make people feel unsafe and are seen as the most important problems to deal with. Community policing synchronizes the agenda of the police with that of the community, ensuring that what the police do is perceived as useful and thereby augmenting the police authority to act with community support.

It is important to stress that community policing is still law enforcement. It is not *soft* on crime — in fact, it is tougher on crime than traditional policing because it provides a more comprehensive, creative approach. Consulting the community focuses police activities more effectively; with community involvement, officers receive more information and are able to respond more effectively, either with arrests, or other appropriate actions.

12) Requires commitment to developing new skills through training.

To expand the police function, as described above, training will also have to be expanded. Additional training must be provided from top to bottom of the department. As noted, management must be trained in a new style of leadership so that they are modeling the philosophy of community policing and providing the environment that will allow this customer-oriented, problem-solving approach to flourish. This *consensus management* approach is significantly different from the *manager as decision-maker* approach of traditional police organizations. It requires skill, an investment of energy, and a goal orientation that emphasize brainstorming, facilitation, mediation, and the ability to work towards common objectives as a team.

While shifting the philosophy of the rank and file to a community-oriented, customer-service approach may take some time, there are a number of concrete skills officers must be taught to make the transition viable; for example:

- problem analysis and problem solving
- facilitation
- community organization
- communication
- mediation and conflict resolution
- resource awareness and development
- networking and linkages
- cultural competency/literacy

Training in the COPPS approach must be comprehensive and ongoing to bring about a transition in skills, attitudes and values that reflect community policing and problem solving approaches. Basic

academies, advanced officer training, roll call training and field officer training will all have to incorporate the philosophy, strategies and skills in their training models. Two- and four-year administration of justice and public administration programs in colleges will also have to begin incorporating the approach and teaching the necessary skills. The educational and social service fields have curriculum and classes (in management, communications, mediation, facilitation, etc.) that can be readily adapted to the police community and incorporated into the law enforcement training model to accomplish these ends.

Throughout this process, other local government agency employees and community members must also be trained to understand and participate in the COPPS process, including many of the skills noted above. The police cannot do community-policing in a vacuum. They can lead the way, but a successful effort requires the buy-in and participation of the entire community.

These *Definition and Principles* were developed with the assistance of the Attorney General's COPPS Advisory Committee. We also want to acknowledge the academicians and practitioners who have written extensively on this subject and who have provided a literature base from which we were able to draw. Specifically, we credit the following authors who have contributed to or been quoted in this document:

Dr. Herman Goldstein, Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law at University of Wisconsin School of Law, and author of *Problem-Oriented Policing* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990). In addition to his ground-breaking book which has largely laid the foundation for this paradigm shift in modern policing, Dr. Goldstein provided us with personal consultation and continuous feedback during the development of this document.

David H. Bayley (State University of New York at Albany), "The Best Defense," *Fresh Perspectives*, Police Executive Research Forum, 1992.

David C. Couper and Sabine H. Lobitz, *Quality Policing: the Madison Experience*, a Police Executive Research Forum Discussion Paper.

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COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING & PROBLEM SOLVING

A RESPONSE TO OUR CULTURE OF VIOLENCE

CALIFORNIA

Attorney General Daniel E. Lungren

Introduction

Attorney General Daniel E. Lungren is a strong supporter of the COPPS concept. With the riots of April 1992 as a background, the Attorney General addressed the Rotary Club of Los Angeles on July 24, 1992 and called attention to the increasing violence in our culture, and the central role of the police in bringing the community together to solve its critical problems. The following article is drawn from that address.

"I see that black gun. I hear the shot. I hear my baby screaming — every night, every day. She was in my hands, and there was nothing I could do. It happened so fast."

Those words were uttered by the father of Denise Silva, who was walking to the market in East Los Angeles hand-in-hand with her father when shots rang out from a car as it sped by. Denise was struck in the heart and died on the operating table. She was three years old.

Now listen to the words of another Southern Californian, a Crips gang member who calls himself G-Roc. "I don't really like to do drive-bys, because innocent people might get hit, you know? My homeboy shot a baby in the head. He felt bad about it, you know, but he was like, 'That's how it happens sometimes.' He felt bad but wasn't nothing he could do about it."

"That's how it happens sometimes." It happened that way to Sabrina Haley, who was caught in gang cross-fire and killed in South Los Angeles last April. Sabrina was 18 months old. It happened to Thomas Regalado who was playing with his new tricycle in front of his home in El Sereno in June. He was shot through the neck by gang members and died in surgery at the age of 2 and a half.

"That's how it happens sometimes." Last year, in Los Angeles County alone, it happened 771 times — 771 dead bodies as a result of gang warfare. We were all riveted to our televisions last year with the Persian Gulf action known as Desert Storm. But too many of us ignored the carnage here at home!

Last Sunday, in a front page article, the New York Times declared that the truce among gangs in Southern California appears to be working. Well, if the New York Times says so, it must be true.

We may be seeing some progress in some parts of our communities. But that is little solace to those who have lost their lives, their limbs, their families or their friends to recent gang violence. While

gang leaders are flown back to New York, driven around in limousines and put up in luxury hotels so that they can appear on talk shows, the body count here at home, while mercifully not matching last year's pace, nonetheless continues to rise.

As Attorney General, my highest priority, my most important responsibility, is leading the fight against this kind of vicious, gratuitous violence. We have redirected the resources and energies of the California Department of Justice to where they belong — to the men and women of law enforcement. We have developed the very best programs, best services and best strategies in the world, using the latest technological advances in computers, chemistry and communications. We have put these tools to work very effectively to find missing children, close down drug labs, track down and convict criminals, and, yes, to clear those who have been falsely accused.

Yet as proud as I am of our Department, law enforcement cannot do the job alone. The numbers tell part of the story. They tell us that in 1991, violent crime in California increased 3.8 percent and rose 6 percent in Los Angeles; that nearly 331,000 violent crimes were reported in our state last year, 1,080 for every 100,000 residents. Add up all the reported crimes in California last year and the sorry total is 1,073,613 crimes.

But raw numbers only tell a part of the story. This is really a story of human suffering. There are countless broken families, destroyed lives and row upon row of tombstones behind those numbers. During my years of public service, I've tried never to forget the victim who suffers behind the clean and seemingly antiseptic crime statistics. But never has this reality hit me harder than since I became Attorney General.

Something else has hit home as well. Just as I know there is real human suffering behind the crime statistics, I have also come to believe that behind the frightening rise in crime there is a culture of violence that permeates our entire society.

I used to reject the notion that there was a relationship between the prevalence of violence in sports and entertainment and what happens on our streets. But my thinking has changed. I have come to see that a culture of violence can in fact become so pervasive and so numbing that it has to have an impact.

A recent book called *Boys Will Be Boys* makes a convincing case that there is a linkage between the kind of aggressive, violent and rule-breaking behavior that is too often encouraged in sports, music, film and T.V., and the predilection towards violence by males — adults and juveniles — which is often directed at women.

None of us can ever forget the brutal beating and gang rape of a woman jogging in New York's Central Park in April, 1990. More than 30 boys, most under the age of 16, were arrested in this so-called "wilding" incident. When asked why they did it, one of the boys said, "It was something to do. It was fun."

George Will wrote an insightful article juxtaposing some of the testimony in the trial involved in that case with the lyrics from a "song" performed by a successful rap group at that time. While not suggesting any direct cause and effect relationship, he made the case that those lyrics seemed to celebrate what took place in the Central Park incident.

Unfortunately we have heard too many so-called songs which denigrate women. They treat women as no more than the sum of their body parts — to be cast aside after they have been used, often in brutal ways. Could there be a worse message?

Now I love sports and especially football as much as anyone, probably more than most. But I am disturbed by the level of violence and physical

humiliation which is now considered acceptable — even preferable — in the stadium or the arena.

It's not enough to compete with and beat your opponent. You have to humiliate him, knock him to the ground, stand over him and scream at him, and rob him of his manhood. And in case you missed all those great hits, you can always count on seeing them rerun on TV that night as the sportscasters chuckle and chortle. You are more likely to see the most brutal hits than you are the most brilliant plays.

What is the message thus transmitted? What kinds of values are being enforced or reinforced? Obviously, sports are not alone in conveying a sense of acceptability if not glorification of violence. The news and entertainment media play a role as well.

One study has estimated that by the age of 18, the average child has seen ***26,000 murders*** on television. Does this mean that a potential murderer lurks in every child who watches television? Of course not. But it is equally hard to suggest that this level of gratuitous violence has no impact.

Advertisers spend billions of dollars on the strong assumption that television influences consumer behavior. Why should we reject the notion that other kinds of behavior, behavior more destructive and possibly violent, could be influenced by television or movies as well?

At times, the reveling in violence defies virtually all standards of common sense and responsibility. Instead of baseball trading cards, several companies are now marketing trading cards which display the pictures and gruesome scorecards of serial killers and mass murderers such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Ted Bundy, Charles Manson and David Berkowitz. When asked to justify his product, one of these entrepreneurs reached deep into his social conscience and said, "If they say you can't sell cards that depict convicted felons, then what are you going to do about Pete Rose?".

Ladies and gentlemen, the Los Angeles riots did not occur in a cultural vacuum. Neither did the riots in Chicago after the Chicago Bulls won the NBA Championship. Nor do the numerous hate crimes we see around the country, nor the prevalence of ever younger gang members involving themselves in ever increasing patterns of gratuitous violence throughout our state.

And if we acknowledge that there is something larger at work here that explains our violence as a society, then we must also acknowledge that addressing crime and violence is not a problem that is confined to the inner city, or to any particular group of Californians. It is ***our problem,*** yours and mine, and the solution rests with every member of our society, from the home to the place of worship. From the classroom to the corporate boardroom.

I am not pessimistic! No, these are problems created by men and women and they can be solved by men and women of good will. But first, we must rid ourselves of the state of denial. Once we acknowledge the challenge we can act!

Let's learn from what works. There is hope out there. The most successful efforts at taking back neighborhoods from drugs and gangs and violence have been those which have marshalled an entire community response. The success stories are out there to be seen and emulated, whether we are talking about Neighborhood Watch programs, Drug Free Zone programs or the efforts of groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving. These programs prove that to change criminal behavior you have to begin by changing the community's values or, more accurately, reinforcing its commitment to time-honored values. Trust must replace suspicion. Involvement must replace apathy. Responsibility must replace excuses.

Law enforcement can and must play a special part in this restoration of community values. We can debate whether community based policing is a

new idea or an old one, an expensive scheme or a cost-efficient one, but surely it is a concept whose time has come.

Last year, I formed a statewide advisory committee representing law enforcement, criminal justice, local government, schools and communities. We call it our COPPS Committee — Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving — and the mission of this group is to devise a statewide strategy to support community based policing activities that can be implemented in individual plans all over our state. We believe that the police can serve as a focal point for bringing neighborhoods together, to unite them against the gangs and drug dealers which now terrorize them.

The violence we see must be addressed at the grass roots level, but in order to make a change we must take responsibility at the top. As leaders in your community, I am asking you to become personally involved in helping to break the cycle of violence in which California finds itself trapped.

We must not retreat from the tough response we fashioned against the criminal element in the 1980s — severe penalties, strict judges, more prison cells and more prison time, and restoration of the death penalty. But it is time to look at crime and move our response to rampant violence to a higher plane. It is only when our leaders in business, education, government and law enforcement get together to work out solutions that we can expect to see a change in our communities.

We live in the greatest state in the greatest nation of the only earth we know. There is no excuse for the kind of vicious, gratuitous violence which scars our beautiful California landscape today. How can those of us lucky enough not to have our families victimized by crime be satisfied when young children — not far from here — will be told by their parents tonight to sleep on the floor, under their beds, because it is too dangerous to sleep ***on*** the beds? Or that it is too dangerous to be in the front part of the house at night because of bullets from the street? Don't those children deserve more?

We can do better. We must do better. Take a look at the situation from where you sit, what can you contribute to helping your community? What can you do to strengthen partnerships in your community? Look at the successes of neighborhoods where the police and citizens have worked together to create a safer environment. We ***will*** do better if we all take responsibility beginning today. We can wean our society — and particularly our children away from California's culture of violence.

COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING & PROBLEM SOLVING
A Response to Our Culture of Violence
Speech by California Attorney General Daniel E. Lungren

COMMUNITY POLICING:

NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN

EDMONTON, ALBERTA, CANADA

By Superintendent Chris Braiden

Introduction

Mind-set influences everything in our lives; politics, religion, life-style, the clothes we wear, even our hairstyles. Mind-sets, in turn, are fashioned by our perceptions of life. But perceptions can become self-fulfilling prophesies. As one very bright person commented, "We're not what we think we are, but what we think — we are."

And so it is with policing: the mind-set of the leaders dictates what the reality of policing will be for the doers. Today's generation of police managers, myself included, grew up in a policing mind-set that saw us molded as functionaries of the criminal justice system, and apart from the community-at-large.

This was not planned or brought about by any one individual. It simply evolved over time. And because the criminal justice system's sole product is crime, in the pure sense, so too has the police product become so narrowed. Indeed, many of us proudly refer to ourselves as law enforcement officers. There seems to be strong signals that the entire system has come adrift of its original mandate.

I believe that a return to the basic principles and philosophy that spawned public policing in the first place is needed. In its simplest terms, this means pushing out the edges of what we do and how we do it. We must wean ourselves from the criminal justice system so that is becomes one of, rather than our sole customer.

It also means a return to our original mandate, that of peace officers in the broad sense versus law enforcement officers in the narrow sense. Those of us who are charged with the responsibility of molding the future of policing need to develop a new vision of why and how we police our communities. I believe that mind-set must be constructed around the fundamental philosophy of Community Policing. But what is it?

The Origin of Community Policing

Someone once observed "There is nothing new under the sun." Though often touted as the "latest and newest thing" in policing, Community Policing is neither new nor is it a "thing." It's much deeper than that. I believe it is a re-emergence of the founding philosophy on which Sir Robert Peel built his public police in 1829. I submit that the philosophy of what we term *Community Policing* today can be found in item seven of Peel's original principles:

> *To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police: the police being only the members of the public that are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.*

I believe that when this passage is analyzed for its total message, it is the most accurate, concise, definitive statement of Community Policing.

The often heard statement, "The police are the public and the public are the police . . ." by itself, has become almost trite, and I believe, misunderstood. It is presumed to be talking about the status of the people involved in policing, rather than about the work they do. It is the second part of the principle that gives full meaning to the first statement and qualifies what Peel had in mind for his day, "...the police being only the members of the public that are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen . . ."

It was Peel's contention that a community must literally police itself, with certain members paid to do it full time in uniform while the rest did it part-time as they went about their daily work.

Moreover, the last phrase of the passage, "in the interests of community welfare and existence," demonstrates that Peel's thinking was clearly not limited to crime, criminals, criminal investigations or law enforcement. On the contrary, his phrase embraces the myriad of social issues that surround and are inextricably linked with policing — poverty, illiteracy, greed, racism, narcissism, etc.

I believe that Peel intended to position the new police as social catalytic agents, not the aloof, law enforcement, trade-craft journeymen we have fashioned ourselves into.

Let us use the medical profession to illustrate this point more clearly. For a long time, it was thought that doctors controlled health. We now know that doctors have very little control over health. For sure they have some control over sickness and disease, but these things happen only after health has broken down. History has taught us that such non-medical things as diet, life-style and heredity, which have nothing to do with doctors, have a much greater impact on health than the entire medical profession and its gadgetry.

This is the same type of broad perspective that must find a central place in our thinking on the evolution of policing. We must police in the interests of community welfare and existence. We must look to the total community around us for early signs of problems and then act as community team leaders to seek and apply solutions. Indeed, the original dictionary definition of policing is embarrassingly simple and revealing. It describes policing as, "A better state of society." I have no doubt that this is the definition that was guiding Peel's thinking as he put the Metropolitan Police together 160 years ago.

Thus it is my contention, that what Peel was describing in 1829 is now being called "Community Policing." In his day, the only descriptive term used was "Policing." Nothing else was necessary. But in our time, we have gone through a litany of double-barrelled terms that could be referred to collectively as "Adjective Policing." We've had team policing, zone policing, proactive policing and reactive policing, hard policing and soft policing, and the list goes on. I think all these terms have largely served only to confuse most of us.

In fact, the mandate of policing has not changed. Our perception of what policing should be has changed, however, and this perception has become a self-fulfilled prophecy: policing has come to be a narrow and aloof effort at crime fighting and law enforcement that employs trade-craft journeymen to conduct its business. Unfortunately — or fortunately — this system isn't working. To quote George Kelling and others who have captured Peel's thoughts in modern terms:

> *Assigning the police responsibility for the maintenance of order, the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals constitutes far too great a burden on far too few. Primary responsibility rests with families, the community and its individual members. The police can only facilitate and assist members of the community in the maintenance of order, and no more.*

What is Community Policing?

"Police others as you would have others police you." That really says it all. What follows will not add to nor take away from that golden statement of life as well as policing, but will simply serve to explain and illustrate it.

Community Policing is a philosophy, a mind-set, the reason why we do things in policing. It is the strategic vision that must precede strategic planning; otherwise we have planning for planning's sake. The Community Policing philosophy is constant, it doesn't change from police department to police department or police officer to police officer, though how it gets done may change constantly.

Community Policing will never work as an "add-on" to the conventional policing model. Unfortunately, many police departments have tried to simply stick a new box on the edge of their organizational chart, put a few people in it and announce the birth of Community Policing. It's not an hors d'oeuvre, or dessert; it's the main course. It's the meat and spuds of what policing was supposed to be from the beginning.

Community Policing has more to do with why we do things rather than what those things are. It has to do with the classic definition of effectiveness and efficiency captured by Warren Bennis who put it this way: "Effectiveness is doing the right things. Efficiency is doing things right." No matter how well we do things, if they are the wrong things in the first place then we're spinning our wheels. No amount of efficiency replaces effectiveness. We have become very efficient at the routine things but never even question whether they should be done. Community Policing is the vision that tells us the right things to do.

In addition, over the past several decades, we have "done to" people in terms of policing. Community Policing would have us "do with" people. It embodies the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson who said, "Go often to the home of thy friend for weeds choke the unused path." Conventionally, the only paths we walk are those to the bad guy's house. Weeds choke the path between us and the common people. "Only want the facts ma'am, we'll do the rest."

This tendency is evident in the discrepancy that exists between what the police think is important and what the public thinks is important. Traditionally, police have unilaterally decided what is important. As a consequence, because we have a monopoly over our work, because policing has a very nebulous job description, and mostly because we are human, to a large degree we have ended up doing the things we like to do and that are quantifiable (an hour spent on radar is measurable, not so with a bunch of snotty-nosed kids bent on mischief) as opposed to what is best for the community.

Let me use an everyday example to make this point. A bank is robbed and a wino is mugged. In our criminal code these crimes are equal, they are

both robberies. There is no special category for banks. Police reaction to them, however, is not equal. On the Richter scale of police priorities, the bank job is an eight, the wino doesn't register. Why? It all has to do with mind-set. It has to do with the evolution of police thinking of what is important. That thinking has been predicated upon the actions of the criminal rather the social damage of the criminal's action upon the community. It has to do with such things as the amount of money involved, the status of the crime in the criminal code, and in some cases, the status of the victim. Our conventional reaction is influenced more by its legal damage versus community damage.

The Community Policing mind-set would require we ask the following questions before we decide what our reactions would be: What is the community damage to the banking community specifically? Well, in terms of money, it is infinitesimal. It is simply part of doing business just as doctors are bloodied once in a while. All banks are insured and they can cover the cost of this insurance in the rates that they charge their customers. Also, people of the banking community go home every night to suburbia where they can feel secure from the type of people who rob banks. In short, they can get away from it. Bank robberies are not the crimes that fuel the perceptions people have that crime is rampant. In short, the social damage to the "community" most affected by this crime is slight, and transitory.

Looking at the wino's mugging, on the other hand, the damage to his "community" is considerable and his financial loss is total. It may be his last $5.00. Worse still, the crime is perpetrated in the neighborhood where he is destined to live as are the people who may have witnessed the crime or learned of it from the other people who live in that neighborhood. Also, a person as opposed to an institution is the victim. Often these people know who committed the crime and may have been victimized before, but because of their fear of retribution, may not have reported these crimes. These are types of street-level predatory crimes that feed the perpetual fear of victimization these people must endure; the feeling of helplessness they have in their own neighborhood grows inexorably because they cannot get away from it. In this case, the social damage to the immediate community is significant, and everlasting. From a pure survival point of view, who do you think needs us the most?

Community Policing, in its purest form, requires that we use this *Community Damage Criteria* as a central factor in predicating our response to crime. It does not mean an abdication of one for the other but rather that the bank robbery perhaps comes down to a six on the Richter scale and the wino moves up to a two. It does not change what we do so much as why we do it. It simply broadens our vision of what our work is and who our customers are. Wealth must never be a factor in police services rendered. This is precisely why we enjoy the freedom we do from the elected branch of government. We must not be manipulated.

I have used the crime of robbery as an example; the rationale can be applied to any crime or piece of work we do. Whether the scene of the crime be the main branch of the Bank of Montreal or the Urban House, it must not influence our decision-making as much as it has in the past. You see, there is no difference between a bank robbery and a wino mugging except in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), and in our heads. And that is as clear as I can explain the basic philosophy of Community Policing.

How Do You Do Community Policing?

If Community Policing is the vision that tells us the right things to do, Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) is how we get those things done right. And while the concept of Community Policing is an intangible, though constant, philosophy and mind-set; Problem-Oriented Policing represents tangible strategies and tactics that are in a constant state of flux, dependent upon the problem being faced.

So what exactly is Problem-Oriented Policing? Problem-Oriented Policing "walks the talk" of Community Policing. Its engine is imagination and its motto is, "there's more than one way to skin a cat."

Traditionally, the only way we've tried to prevent crime is by catching the person in the act. We believed if we caught enough people in the act, we'd eventually lock up all the criminals or at least scare off the un-caught ones. And if directly enforcing the law didn't solve the problem, then, by definition, the problem was not a police problem. "Surely it must belong to someone else. . . . We're not social workers . . . are we?"

Problem-Oriented Policing accepts the reality that everyday police work goes far beyond crime in the pure sense and that the range of tools we have at our disposal goes far beyond law enforcement. It models the medical profession's strategies of learning to use the early stage symptoms of illness to indicate the onset of an impending disease; attempting to recognize and treat things that cause sickness and disease; and promoting habits that prevent disease in the first place. As much time and money goes into preventive medicine today, as into active medical treatments.

Problem-Oriented Policing, grounded on a similar preventive philosophy, recognizes that we, as the police, must get beyond controlling the bad, to organizing the good, to help us control the bad. Moreover, POP recognizes that, like the doctor, we as police need to know what the sickness is before we can provide the right medicine or intervention.

The police cannot know what the most community-damaging problems are without working with that community, which is the patient. Problem-Oriented Policing casts the police officer as a "pilot fish" using the Community Damage Criteria to spot the problems. Sometimes the officers can spot the problem and solve it all by themselves. Often an officer will have to get help within policing, the community, or both, to find a solution.

The POP process is simple. It has four steps:

1) Identify the problem.
2) Examine the problem.
3) Decide on a solution.
4) Monitor the solution to see if it's working and adjust accordingly.

Imagination and innovation greatly enhance the ticket-book and legal powers to get the job done.

Once again, it is useful to use a medical analogy to make the point. The doctor (police officer) talks to the patient (community) to identify the problem. Sometimes the solution lies solely with the patient (community); i.e., change of diet (owner agrees to remove eye-sore abandoned auto). Sometimes it calls for the doctor (police officer) and the patient (community) to work together; i.e., change of diet plus medicine (organize the neighborhood to help shut down a "blight" establishment). Sometimes only the doctor (police) alone can solve the problem; i.e., surgery (heavy law enforcement). Sometimes we have to accept the fact that the problem simply cannot be solved; i.e., terminal illness (poverty).

So, you might say, Braiden still hasn't told us how to do Community-Oriented Policing, and you're right. I have tried to describe the essential ingredients, but the imagination and innovation to apply these concepts has to come from each individual/department implementing this type of policing. To do otherwise would be a contradiction in terms. There are, however, examples that will perhaps illustrate the idea further.

Problem-Oriented Policing Examples

Numerous examples of effective Problem-Oriented Policing interventions are already happening here and throughout the United States. The following

are examples taken from my own organization, the Edmonton Police Department:

- Project O.W.E. (Outstanding Warrant Execution) uses imagination, technology and the media to get thousands of people to come forward every year and clear up outstanding warrants.
- Our mobile trailer police office was plunked right in the middle of the prostitution stroll at 107 Street and Jasper Avenue giving the message "Wherever you go, we're coming with you."
- The Strathcona Division operation in 1986 targeted the Convention Inn South as a "blight" establishment and brought together various police and government agencies to shut it down; and a similar operation targeted Arizona Pizza and Texas Games at 106 Street and Jasper Avenue as another "blight" establishment.

In other words, sometimes conventional law enforcement, no matter how much of it we do, doesn't always get the job done. Literally hundreds of charges had been leveled against the two establishments described above, but they continued to operate. When our approach expanded beyond traditional policing methods, the objective became "shut them down," and the problems were solved. The types of problems are not new, but the solutions are.

These are only isolated incidents; with a Community Policing mind-set, they would be the norm. Primary to this mind-set is the recognition that our greatest asset lies in the human minds we have in our sworn and civilian ranks. Conventional policing has *programmed and procedured* these minds to death. Community Policing takes the shackles off these minds and provides inspiration and a work environment within which they can flower.

Conclusion

One final thought; life never stops changing, rearranging itself. To respond effectively, there is a need to advance the fundamentals of policing state-of-the-art. Policing is at a significant crossroads in its evolution. It falls to our lot, today's police managers, to see it through the intersection safely. If a conventional police agency is to adopt the Community Policing way of doing things, then there first has to be a re-tooling of the heads of the brass before you can re-tool the feet of the grunts.

In the past, we looked to technological things to see us through difficult times. Sometimes we tried to buy our way out of trouble. We must stop looking for quick fixes. Imagination and ingenuity are things that will see us through that crossroads. The adjustments we have to make, however, do not have to happen overnight. If we try to bring about Community Policing without creating the strategic vision first, then whatever planning we do will be aimless and Community Policing will go the way of all other adjective policing efforts in the past.

Whatever the future holds for us, it seems clear that quality policing cannot be bought; it will come only through the minds, talents, skills, and sweat glands of the human beings in and around policing. And, since it is true that the reality of policing is ordinary people in uniform dealing with ordinary people's problems "in the interests of community welfare and existence," then that is as it should be.

COMMUNITY POLICING:
Nothing New Under The Sun
Edmonton, Canada
By Superintendent Chris Braiden, Edmonton Police Service
Adapted from *Nothing New Under the Sun.* First published in the Problem Solving Quarterly, Summer 1990.

Crime & Management:

An Interview with New York City Police Commissioner Lee P. Brown

New York City

By Alan M. Webber

As Commissioner of the New York City Police Department, Lee P. Brown faces two enormous challenges. The first is crime. In 1989 in New York City, 712,419 crimes were reported, including 1,905 murders, 93,377 robberies, and 3,254 rapes. As Brown is quick to point out, the situation has grown so severe that people in cities are afraid. It is, Brown says, comparable to a national health emergency, with causes deeply rooted in U.S. social and economic systems and with solutions beyond the capacity of the police to provide alone.

Brown's second challenge is management. The New York City Police Department consists of 26,756 uniformed and 9,483 non-uniformed personnel and is more than twice the size of the Chicago Police Department, the nation's next largest. Its assets include more than 2,000 police cars, 625 scooters, 83 motorcycles, 10 boats, 5 helicopters, 107 horses, 26 dogs, and 4 robots. Its 1990 budget was $1.6 billion, 94 percent of which went directly into salaries and personnel services.

Lee Brown has determined to combine these two challenges by totally redefining the mission and operating style of the department. According to Brown, "traditional" policing — where officers respond to 911 calls and patrol in cars — is both inadequate to the challenge of crime and a mismanagement of police resources.

Instead, Brown advocates a new approach — "community policing." The concept is simple in some respects, a throwback to the days of the cop on the beat. But in practice, Brown's shift to community policing represents as ambitious — and risky — an undertaking as any major corporate turnaround or restructuring effort. The move to community policing requires a change in operations — cops walking beats, getting to know people in the community, and solving problems rather than riding in patrol cars and responding to 911 calls. But more fundamentally, it entails the creation of a new culture for the police department, new human resource practices, including hiring, promotion, recognition, and extensive training and retraining of officers and managers. It will mean a change in the command-and-control, paramilitary model of police management and the forging of a new

partnership between the police and the people in the neighborhoods they protect, the private sector, and other departments in the city government.

Lee Brown comes to the challenge with a master's degree in sociology, a doctorate in criminology, and a record of accomplishment in police administration and teaching. Prior to his appointment in January 1990 by New York City Mayor David Dinkins, Brown had served as Public Safety Commissioner in Atlanta, Georgia, Chief of Police in Houston, Texas, and Director of the Department of Justice Services in Multnomah County, Oregon. He is currently president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

The interview was conducted in Commissioner Brown's office by HBR Editorial Director Alan M. Webber.

HBR: ***How do you assess the performance of police departments in U.S. cities today?***

Lee P. Brown: Our traditional role is to arrest and incarcerate people, and we are very good at that. We're arresting people in record numbers. In fact, prison overcrowding is the biggest problem in most states. In New York City, we arrest over 300,000 people a year. A few years ago, the New York City jail system had a capacity of 6,000 inmates. Today we have over 21,000 inmates in our jails and more than 55,000 in our state prisons.

The fact is, crime is higher now than ever before, and the police know that things aren't working. If you ask police officers around America, "Are you happy with what you're doing?" Anyone who's honest will answer, "no." The marketplace knows it too. If we were a business, you'd have to say that our market share is declining. People who can afford it are hiring private security; there are more private security personnel today than there are public-sector police. The reason is simple. People are not satisfied with the police service they're receiving.

Any logical, thinking person would tell you that traditional approaches are not solving the problem. Our legacy should not be more prisons. We must look at the underlying factors that produce crime. And if we're serious, we must make a commitment to deal with them. That means meaningful employment for all Americans. That means an educational system that produces people who can read and write, so they can get a job. Education is critical, and yet a large number of our young people are estranged and alienated from the school system. We're still educating people with a mass-production mentality. But the United States is not a mass-production society anymore.

If we don't address the causes of crime, I fully expect that 20 years from now we will still have a major problem. We'll still have prison overcrowding. People will still be losing their lives. And not to the levels that we have reached with those problems now, but worse.

You say that you're losing market share. How does the public, your customer, look at the crime situation?

Fear of crime is a huge problem in America today. In the large cities, people are afraid. They're afraid to walk the streets. Twenty years ago, if you talked to business people about what concerned them,

they'd say internal theft. Now they're concerned about the safety of their employees on the way to work, at work, and on the way home.

Why have things deteriorated so badly?

We are abandoning our cities to the truly disadvantaged. The unemployment rate for young blacks is still twice that of whites. And that's deeply related to our serious crime problem. The leading cause of death of young black males between the ages of 15 and 24 is homicide. The Center for Disease Control has called it an epidemic. Young black males are more likely to be killed than our soldiers were during a tour of duty in the Vietnam War.

Over 2,000 homicides occurred in New York City last year. Over 20,000 homicides in America. If that many people lost their lives to a single disease in one year, we'd consider it an emergency, a national health problem. We would start to examine the factors behind the statistics to isolate them and find a solution. For example, what the mosquito was to malaria, the gun and the young black man's environment are to homicide. Now, you don't just keep swatting the mosquito, you drain the swamp. We need to drain the swamp of guns. We need to teach conflict resolution in our schools. We need to use city emergency wards to intervene early in the lives of regular victims of violence and abuse.

Why isn't this simply a police problem?

This country's social problems are well beyond the ability of the police to deal with on their own. In the United States, we don't have a full employment policy where every American willing and able to work can get a job. In fact, as a matter of policy this country believes that it's necessary always to have a certain percentage of unemployed. As a result, we have an underclass in our cities that is generally made up of minorities.

In addition, we've suffered a moral decline as a result of fundamental changes in the U.S. family structure. Today the home is more like a dormitory. You come in, you eat, you sleep, and you go about your own way.

In the United States, we deal with social failures by using the criminal justice system to sweep the debris under the rug. We sweep the debris into jail. We imprison more of our citizens than any other country in the world. But that only makes the problem more difficult to solve. Social problems are the real causes of crime that we all must work on if we are concerned about our future.

You are currently the president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. How does the United States compare with the rest of the world?

There's an enormous difference between crime and violence in the United States and in other countries. Other countries don't create an underclass. In Japan, for example, the private sector cushions the callousness of the marketplace. You don't have the kind of unemployment in Japan that we see in the United States. The government takes care of people in Scandinavian countries.

I was in Japan. They had not seen crack cocaine in the whole country. The homicide rate for Tokyo was .8 per 100,000 in 1989 compared with 22.7 per 100,000 in New York City. There are more murders each year in New York than in all of Japan. Guns are not available. In their culture, people obey the law. Their family structure is still intact.

You don't have to go to Japan to see national differences. Go to Toronto. Go to Germany. Their educational systems are much more advanced and, again, you don't see the proliferation of guns or the link between drugs and violence that we experience.

What do you think makes the difference?

The United States has three serious problems. First, in most large cities, 40% to 50% of those who start school never finish. Of those who do finish, 25% are functional illiterates. They can't read, they can't write. Second, the workplace is changing. We have a significant decline in manufacturing jobs. Some 80% of Americans earn their living at a service occupation, often linked to high tech. When you tie these two points together, you get an educational system that is not producing people with the knowledge and skills to enter the new workplace. Third, we have an epidemic of drugs in America. Drugs are America's number one domestic problem. Unless we get a handle on the drug problem, it will continue to change America as we know it today.

What is the impact of drugs?

Drugs have changed the complexion of crime in America. We are developing a culture that tolerates violence. We have a society that is increasingly insensitive to violence in the minority community. The public is aroused when violence affects the middle class directly.

The crack epidemic has precipitated an explosion of violent crime, unlike anything we've ever experienced. We have a proliferation of illegal guns on the streets. In New York City, we confiscated over 17,000 illegal guns last year. Now we even have small children terrified, seriously injured, and losing their lives.

But the future implications of widespread crack use are even more frightening. In New York City, for example, 50% of crack users today are female. They're having babies, and those babies are now entering the school system. We don't know all the implications for the health and education of these children. But we do know that they are born smaller than other babies, the circumference of their heads is smaller, their brains are smaller. We don't know just how far the damage is going to go.

What will it take to get a handle on the drug problem? Is it a question of hiring more police officers?

Yes, we do need adequately staffed police departments, but we need much more. We must do no less in addressing the crime problem than we have done in winning the war in the Middle East. We must commit all the resources necessary to make a difference. But it isn't feasible or desirable to think about continually increasing the number of police officers. First, we couldn't afford it. We simply don't have the money. No matter how many officers you had, you could never have enough to use traditional policing techniques to deter crime.

Why do you think that traditional policing won't get the job done?

You have to understand the two key tenets of traditional policing. The first is to put police officers in patrol cars and have them respond to incidents, to 911 calls. The second is to have officers randomly patrol their beats so that the potential criminals never know where the officers will show up. That is supposed to act as a deterrent to crime.

What really happens is quite different. First, we end up with police officers being managed by the telephone. They only respond to incidents, rather than taking action to solve the underlying problems.

Police officers are always under pressure to get back into their cars, to be available for another call. As a result, a small percentage of the population, the people who keep making 911 calls, consumes a vast majority of police resources.

Second, random patrol only produces random results. It's logical: if you don't have a police officer to cover every part of the city all the time, the chance of an officer on patrol coming across a crime in progress is very small. Research supports

this conclusion. There are several decades of studies that show that random patrol makes no difference. The most dramatic is a Kansas City study that analyzed three areas of the city. In one area, they intensified the patrol. In another, they used the regular level of patrol. In the third, they did no patrolling at all. There was no difference in terms of the actual crime level or the perception of crime by the residents of the three areas.

But 911 was supposed to provide better service. Why are 911 calls a problem now?

Unfortunately, 911 has become the public's access point to all government services, not just true emergencies. The assumption in most cities is that there should be a rapid response to every 911 call. Now police officers in regular patrol cars spend 90% of their time just responding to 911 calls. In 1989 in New York City, we took nearly 8.3 million 911 calls. That turned into almost 4.3 million radio runs for our officers to make, or more than 11,700 runs per day. And the public has begun to exaggerate the problems they report, thinking it will get a cop there faster. If they want an officer because there's a loud argument in the apartment next door, they'll call 911 and report a shooting, thinking that makes us come faster. The result of all these calls is that the police have no time to do anything else, to get to know people in their area, to solve problems. But there are actually very few calls that need a rapid response; a life-threatening situation, for example, or if there's the potential to catch someone when a crime is in progress.

If this approach to policing isn't working and won't work, how has it become accepted in every U.S. city?

When we first started having police in America, we actually had more of a community-oriented policing style, exemplified by the old cop on the beat who knew people. He was an integral part of the community. He was able to maintain order, and most parts of the community respected him. Perhaps not in the black community, where the police were part of a system of discrimination and segregation, but in most parts of the community, the cop was respected.

That changed because of corruption, because politicians interfered in the operations of the police, and because of mobilization, putting cops in cars. We adopted the professional model of policing, an approach that intentionally detached the police from the community. It's the old "Dragnet" mentality that you used to see on television: "All we want are the facts, ma'am, just the facts." We don't want to know anything about you. We just pulled up in our cars, and we only want the facts. Along with that mentality came a move toward management based on command-and-control, a paramilitary approach to management.

How does the command-and-control approach operate in policing?

Managers in companies know all about organizational pyramids and rigid lines of reporting. As paramilitary organizations, police departments follow that same model but to an even greater extent. The command-and-control culture of the police department doesn't treat officers as intelligent, creative, and trustworthy people. It allows them very little discretion. It's designed to make sure that they don't get into trouble, don't embarrass the department, and don't get their supervisors into trouble.

I remember when I was a cop on the beat back in 1962. I was so frustrated, I even wrote an article called "College-Educated Police Officers: An Unforeseen Problem." Here I was, a college-educated person, a pretty intelligent person, and I thought I had a lot to offer. But there was no opportunity for me to use any of it. Anything I did was prescribed for me. I couldn't use my training in any meaningful way. That's the paramilitary model. Everything should be predictable. We need rules and regulations that cover everything. And if a police officer violates one, then the

system catches him or her. It's an approach that doesn't allow officers to be creative, to use their intelligence, or to take a risk in solving problems.

What do you advocate as an alternative management approach?

I look at the police mission in a context broader than what the textbooks say about protecting life and property by making arrests. The police are a service organization for the city that doesn't close at 5:00 p.m. We have a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week service. So my mission is to use the resources of the department to improve the quality of life of the citizens of this city. To me that means community policing. It means a cop back on the beat, the way it used to be.

There are two major tenets to community policing. The first is problem solving. It's the same principle that companies are using, empowering workers. Officers are trained and empowered to solve problems, rather than merely responding to incidents over and over again. The second is citizens' involvement, expanding the resource that the police have at their disposal. Again, just as companies are finding new ways for customers to participate in improvement, we have a virtually untapped resource of community groups, the private sector, and other city agencies, all of which can help us do community problem solving.

People today are more concerned about what happens in the neighborhoods and, at the same time, relying less on government and doing more themselves to improve the quality of life. They realize that crime is a community problem, not just a police problem. And if crime is a community problem, then it's logical that the whole community has a responsibility to address it.

So far, what's been the experience with community policy around the country?

Community policing has never been tried, not the way we're trying it. Not many police chiefs have tried to change the culture of their organization. Most of them are products of their own departments. Success is based on their ability to conform. So change has not been a top priority. In fact, coming in as an outsider, I think I have a better chance to succeed with community policing. I have more experience with other police departments. I know what a police agency should be and what's been tried elsewhere. And I don't have any baggage. I can protect the operational integrity of the department from political interference. One of the good things about the police commissioner's job in New York is that it is an independent position. The mayor does not try to interfere in running the department, and nobody else can. Regardless of what anyone may think, there's no politician who can reassign an officer, discipline an officer, promote an officer. Officers should never have to worry about the politics of doing their jobs.

Haven't there been experiments to implement community policing?

Up to now, community policing has been viewed as a program. A few years back, New York tried "team policing." Under it, a small number of people were doing community policing. But the whole rest of the organization went about its business, doing everything else exactly the way it had been done before. We've also had "Park, Walk, and Talk," where officers park their cars, get out, and walk and talk with people. We've also initiated a program we call "Cops Block," where each officer is assigned one or more blocks.

But like any change program in any company, you can't keep the same training system, evaluation system, reward system, and expect to change the way you police the city. My goal is to change all those systems to be supportive of community policing and not supportive of our traditional way of doing business.

What would you point to if you wanted people to have some idea of what community policing looks like and how it works?

The Community Patrol Officer Program, or CPOP, has come the closest to community policing. It was first tried out in 1984 in one precinct, and when I got here every precinct had 10 CPOP officers. CPOP is viewed as a foot patrol program.

Now, I don't intend to take CPOP as it is and say that is community policing. I want every officer in this department to operate under the concept of community policing, not just those on patrol. That means detectives, it means Narcotics. It means abandoning and eliminating many of the specialized units. In fact, by reassigning people from special units and restructuring the entire patrol force, we will increase the number of officers engaged in community policing by more than 30 times from where it was when I started.

Have you got a plan for implementing community policing in New York?

We recently completed a staffing plan that calls for 17,400 officers and 3,999 detectives to provide services with community policing as our dominant style. But we won't reach that level for four years, and I don't intend to wait four years to implement community policing. For that reason, I initiated a strategic planning process and in January produced a report entitled "Policing New York City in the 1990s: The Strategy for Community Policing."

Our plan is to take one precinct - the 72nd, which is located in the Sunset Park section of the Bronx, and make it a model precinct. It's where we started the pilot project of CPOP, so we'll just go back to where we started. We'll staff it up to the level that we will have citywide in four years and fully implement community policing in that precinct. That means training, new roles, and looking at different performance evaluation systems. That means integrating everything in the precinct into the community policing philosophy and getting a snapshot now of what the whole thing will look like in four years. In the other 74 precincts, we will implement all aspects of community policing possible with existing resources.

There really is no manual that describes how to implement community policing. We're writing the manual here in New York. We're changing everything, from the role of the police officer to the role of the commissioner.

The police culture is a very powerful one that places a premium on making arrests. How do you answer the criticism leveled by some officers that community policing isn't "real" police work?

Community policing is not soft on crime. Community policing is tougher on crime than traditional policing because it's smarter. A good community police officer will make more arrests than the regular beat officer because he or she will get more information.

Let me give you an example from Houston. We had an officer who tried community policing in a neighborhood where there wasn't even a sense of community. He pulled people together so successfully that they even gave their neighborhood a name. In a way, he created the community.

In this area, there was a rash of break-ins where the burglars were armed and showed no hesitancy to shoot. Under traditional policing, the neighborhood would have blamed the police: "What's wrong with you? Why can't you catch these guys?" Instead, the community organized itself. People handed out flyers describing the pattern of the crimes and what to look for. As a result, one citizen called in because of some suspicious circumstances, and we caught the burglars. Instead of blaming the police, the citizens joined the police.

That would never have happened under traditional policing. Under traditional policing, there would

have been a lot of scared people, a lot of finger pointing, but no progress toward solving the problem. Community policing is based on the realization that most crimes are solved with information that comes from people. The better your relationship with the people, the more information you get.

Where do you begin the process of moving to community policing?

In policing, as in business, change always starts with a vision. My vision is community policing as our dominant style. Then, we must change our culture to match our vision. Values play an important role in that. Every organization has values. In police agencies, they usually develop without any managerial input. I want everyone in our organization to understand what our values are. So I'll be writing them down and distributing them throughout the department. They'll become the basis for everything that follows.

After that, we'll start at the top to make these changes. You can't expect cops on the beat to be successful if their supervisors and managers don't understand and support the change. So my strategy has been to start with my executive staff, to change its mind-set. Each member of my executive staff has responsibility for a piece of the organization. One has patrol, another Narcotics, another detectives, another human resources. I want them all to have a corporate mind-set, so they will be responsible for the well-being of the whole department, not just their particular area.

For example, when I became commissioner, I called them all together for weekly meetings of the executive staff. It was the first time they regularly met as a group. As we implement community policing, they will keep their areas of responsibility, but already they're beginning to ask how new initiatives in any area will fit in with the departmentwide shift to community policing.

What's the next step in the change process?

We have to change our recruiting system. We hire today by elimination. We don't select; we eliminate. We put people through tests designed to eliminate candidates. At the end, whoever's left, we hire. I want to change that so we select people who have characteristics that fit with community policing.

I want to bring in people who are better educated, people who are better equipped to deal with the problems that often defy easy solutions. Someone who understands sociology can understand the dynamics of groups and community problems. Someone who understands psychology is better able to understand the complexities of the human mind. Those skills are good for police work. I also want to bring in people who come to policing more with the spirit of service and less with the spirit of adventure. We are not looking for people who are simply looking for action.

Do you intend to change the makeup of the force?

The composition of the police should reflect the ethnic composition of the community. Any citizen should be able to look at the police department and say, "That reflects me." That should be true in ranks and all the way up. And it should be true for Hispanics, Asians, blacks, Jews, women; there should be wide diversity. We don't have that now. One of my goals is to bring people in who historically have not been sought after. Another goal is to make sure that every New York police officer has the ability to work anyplace in the city. To do that, we must provide cultural training and sensitivity training. We can't expect that someone who comes from Upper New York State, grew up in an all white neighborhood, and went to an all white school will understand what it's like to live in Harlem. We have to give them the training they need to do their job.

How do you respond to the concern expressed by some that standards may suffer in an attempt to bring more minorities into the department?

I reject absolutely the notion that you have to lower standards to get minorities. In fact, if you look at the education levels of our people, the minorities are better educated than the whites. The real question is, how do you raise your standards for everyone? Can I say that everyone who enters the New York City Police Department must have a four-year degree? Probably not. But I can probably say that anyone who wants to be a New York City police officer must have two years of college.

My goal is to create a continuous flow of people going through the college system here in New York and going on to become police officers. We have a cadet program that hires young college students and gives them a stipend so that when they finish college they can become police officers. I want to expand that to two-year college programs where there are more minorities and increase the number of students in the program from a couple of hundred to 1,000. I'm also supporting federal legislation that gives students loans for college. After four years of service as police officers, the loan is forgiven.

In addition to hiring changes, do you plan other personnel shifts as a part of community policing?

We have to change completely how we train people, both at the entrance level and also in-service. One of my first moves was to bring in a new director of training because as we move to community policing, training is critical. We have to unprogram people from where they are and reprogram them to where we're going. The cops are doing now what we've taught them to do, what we've trained them to do. They don't know anything different. Under our traditional training, we spend 90% of our time training officers to do what they spend 15% of their time doing, that is, making arrests, enforcing the law.

We don't teach young officers the techniques of problem analysis, of identifying and coming up with strategies to solve problems. We don't teach them how to organize a neighborhood in order to deal with neighborhood problems. We don't teach officers how to help neighborhoods develop their own capacity to improve the quality of life.

We have to make this part of everyone's training. I'm going to every one of our 75 precincts to explain community policing. I'm regularly sending out video tapes that will be played at every roll call, explaining different aspects of community policing. I'm talking to every new class that enters the Police Academy. When officers are promoted to sergeant, I talk to the sergeants' class. When they're promoted to lieutenant, I talk to the lieutenants' class. When they're promoted to captain, I talk to the captains' class. As we implement community policing, we'll use the people who are actually doing it as advocates and experts. They're the ones who know that it works. They're the ones who will spread the message. They are the ones who will improve our current understanding of how to do it.

If the change is top down, how will you carry it down into the ranks?

We will take it down into the ranks by intensive training. I am running executive sessions where we bring in people from all ranks to assist in the process. We're doing this right now to design a training program. We bring in the cop on the beat. We bring in his or her supervisor, the manager, and my executive staff, and we ask, "What knowledge, skills, and abilities does one need to serve as a police officer in this department under our new style of policing?" When we have an answer, we'll give it to our training people to use in revising the curriculum. Ultimately, everybody will be trained in community policing.

You've talked about hiring and training. Are there other fundamental changes in the management of the department?

We also have to change the reward system. In most police agencies, rewards are based on valor. If you're in a shoot-out, if you're shot or you shoot someone else, if you capture a dangerous person, you get special recognition. Usually a lot of danger and excitement go along with achieving a reward.

What about rewarding people for thinking and being creative? We recently gave an award to an officer who made a suggestion about licensing unlicensed livery cabs that will save the city a few million dollars in the short run. That officer didn't have to do that. But he was a thinking, creative person. He saw a problem and came up with a solution. Our reward system should recognize people who solve problems, who use their minds, who think.

We will also change our entire performance evaluation system. Under our traditional system, we evaluate officers on how many arrests they make, how many summonses they issue. But the ultimate evaluation should not be the arrests but the absence of arrests, when there's no crime. If you have no crime on your beat, then you are doing the job you should be doing. There's peace of mind in the community.

Under community policing, what kind of a cop do you want?

I want officers who are generalists, who will be responsible for a small area of the city. Everything possible should be handled at this neighborhood level. Even detectives should be assigned neighborhood responsibilities, rather than just to special units. The police officer becomes a manager of an area. And the role of the first-line supervisor all the way up to the commissioner is to make sure that police officers have the resources to solve the problems in their areas.

That means we're going to minimize the number of layers between the officer on the beat and the commissioner. We're going to cut down on bureaucracy and specialization. We don't want a lot of bureaucratic layers that only hamper us from getting the job done. Overall, our emphasis will be on enhancing the role of the officers out there on the beat, giving them responsibility and authority, allowing them to take risks, and not punishing them for making innocent mistakes.

You talked earlier about the command-and-control management style. Will that change under community policing?

We have to trust our cops. We hire intelligent people, people who are creative. But we don't give them the ability to use that creativity and initiative because of our great concern for command-and-control. We have to give them the opportunity to do the right thing and at the same time understand that they will sometimes make mistakes. But there are two different kinds of mistakes — mistakes of the mind and mistakes of the heart. If you're doing something out of malice, then you've got a problem with me. But if you're trying to do your job and you make an innocent mistake that may violate a rule, the entire circumstance should be taken into account. If we want people to take risks, we have to tolerate mistakes. Ultimately, we want our officers to recognize that they are professionals, and we want the organization to treat them as professionals.

What would you say is the central focus of all these changes?

Community policing empowers the officer on patrol. Under community policing, the officer becomes the most important person in the neighborhood. I see the cop on the beat as a manager, not just answering calls, not just walking the beat, but being able to do problem analysis, knowing the people, being accessible. It means taking ownership of the area.

The backbone of the police department is out there in patrol. Yet today everyone wants to get out of patrol. All the perks come from other places, in special assignments, in detectives. To get monetary rewards, you have to get promoted. Under community policing, we will enhance the patrol officer's status to make it equal to any other in the department. There will be a career path in patrol so that people can spend whole careers in patrol.

How do you expect your customers, the people of New York City, to respond to these changes and to community policing?

People in neighborhoods like community policing because they get to know their police officers. They see something happen. There's a different level of accountability. The officer is not only accountable to the police department but also to the community. Officers will be responsible for knowing the quality-of-life issues and crime problems of a specific area or neighborhood and accountable for doing something about them and reporting back to the people what they've done. The community will be able to see an actual difference in terms of problem solving, rather than being confronted with the same problems over and over again.

How will patrol officers know what problems the community wants them to go after?

Historically, when the police have tried to define what people are concerned about, we've missed the boat. Police think that citizens are exclusively preoccupied with serious crime, like murders, rapes, and robberies. They are concerned about those crimes, but they are also concerned about quality-of-life issues. The drug dealing in the park, noisy kids hanging out on the street corner, the problems of homeless people in the neighborhood. These things can be signs of crime, they can create the incivility that exists on the street corners of the city, they can make people feel unsafe. These are the things that are important to people.

Now if we were to make the judgment, we would miss the mark. We've always missed the mark. That's why we have to empower the people to help us define what's important and to define how to deal with it. Who knows more about what's going on in the community than the people who live there? They not only know what causes the crimes, but they probably know who commits them as well.

Why can't you just use data, such as official crime statistics to determine police priorities?

Just as businesses today are looking for new measurements of performance, the Uniform Crime Reports don't have much meaning for a police department. All they tell us is how many crimes were reported. Two or three times more crimes are probably committed than are ever reported. In reality, the Uniform Crime Reports measure the degree to which the people in a city respect their police and criminal justice system. Take the example of Portland, Oregon and Newark, New Jersey. It used to be that Portland always reported much more crime than Newark. But all that meant was that there was a much higher level of confidence in Portland about its police and criminal justice system. More people believed that it mattered if they actually reported crimes that were committed. In fact, victimization studies that ask people if they have been victims of a crime give a much more accurate picture. But again, you have to go to people and ask them, rather than simply relying on internally generated numbers.

How do you think community policing should be evaluated?

Crime is clearly important, but I don't want the police department to be judged solely on crime. To begin with, we don't control the factors that produce criminal behavior. As we implement community policing, with different neighborhoods having different needs, different priorities, and different problems, customer satisfaction will depend on how well we deliver our services to

match the characteristics of each neighborhood. Ultimately, if we want to measure customer satisfaction with the police, we will have to create new measurements.

What is your toughest management challenge in implementing community policing?

The police, more than any other agency, have always looked at themselves as being an independent entity. In some cities, they don't even consider themselves part of government. I believe that the police are an integral part of government, a resource that the taxpayers pay for, a resource that should be used for the larger benefit of the community.

That doesn't mean that police officers become social workers. It does mean that we need to make sure that police officers can become advocates for neighborhoods and help them develop their own ability to deal with their problems. It does mean that we expand the role of the police beyond the narrow focus of simply responding to calls and making arrests. It does mean that we empower people to work with us.

What is your own measure of success?

At some point in the future, I want everybody in New York to know who their police officer is. Literally, to be able to say, "Officer Jones is my police officer. He's responsible for taking care of me." I want people, when they see a police officer, whether he or she is in a car, on a motor scooter, or on foot, to look to see if that's their police officer. And I want every police officer to develop an ownership of his or her community. I want them to say, "I'm not going to let something happen to this neighborhood because it's my neighborhood. I'm responsible for it." I want ownership both ways. Once that happens, everything else will fall into place.

CRIME & MANAGEMENT:
An Interview with New York City Police Commissioner Lee P. Brown
by Alan M. Webber
First published in the Harvard Business Review, May-June 1991

Lee Brown submitted his resignation as New York City Police Commissioner in July 1992. He has accepted a position at Texas Southern University in Houston Texas. For contact information, see Lee P. Brown under Noted Experts in the Resources Section.

PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING

AN INTRODUCTION

By Herman Goldstein

Introduction

Policing is an extraordinarily complex endeavor requiring an in-depth understanding not only of the current social, political, and behavioral problems and the rapid changes that are occurring in our society — but also of the multitude of factors that influence the day-to-day behavior of police officers.

*"Numerous conflicts continue to haunt the police: conflicts, for example, between public expectations and the reality of what the police can do; between the authority and resources that are needed and those that are provided; and between traditional practices and those that may be more effective." (p. xiii)**

So just what is the role of police? Traditional law enforcement is largely a ***reactive*** *process with its primary focus on emergency response rather than the* ***solution*** *or* ***prevention*** *of underlying problems. Though law enforcement agencies have become increasingly efficient in their reactive operating procedures, this preoccupation with operating efficiency has resulted in a troublesome imbalance between procedural and substantive concerns.*

Moreover, the police, unlike other professions (e.g., medical), "do not have an established body of knowledge about the various behaviors and conditions that they are expected to prevent and treat." To move beyond this present state of struggling to contain crime, the police "must devote more effort to understanding the conditions and behaviors they are expected to prevent and treat and, using this knowledge, develop and improve methods for dealing effectively with them." (p. 17)

What is needed is a broad conceptual framework "that helps the police build a strong, sensitive institution, with refined methods of operating, that can better transcend the crisis of the day, whether that crisis be labor-management strife, racial conflict, political protest, drugs, or some yet-to-be-identified social problem." (p. xiii) Democracy demands that we strive "for a form of policing that is not only effective, but humane and civil; that not only protects individual rights, equality, and other values basic to a democracy, but strengthens our commitment to them." (p. xiii)

* All page number references correspond to the original publication, *Problem-Oriented Policing* by Herman Goldstein.

Problem Oriented Policing

Problem Oriented Policing (POP) involves a whole new way of thinking about policing that has implications for every aspect of the police organization: It redefines police crime problems, redesigns police response strategies to crime problems, and reassesses who is responsible for public safety. "An ever-present concern about the end product of policing" (p. 3) is its central theme — as it seeks to tie together the elements involved in effecting change so that the changes are coordinated and mutually supportive. "It connects with the current move to redefine relationships between the police and the community. . . . it has the potential to reshape the way in which police services are delivered." (p. 3)

In its narrowest sense, POP involves implementing a new and innovative strategy to address a particular problem, with a focus on achieving an *effective resolution* to that problem. In addition, the strategy is designed to create a better balance between reactive and pro-active aspects of policing; and to make better use (effective vs. efficient) of rank and file officers, as well as the community, to get the job done.

In its broadest sense, POP "is a comprehensive plan for improving policing in which the high priority attached to addressing substantive problems shapes the police agency, influencing all changes in personnel, organization and procedures." (p. 32) It pushes policing beyond current improvement efforts — calling for a major change in direction.

With either approach, officers must become more involved with and aware of the characteristics and nuances of the communities they are policing. Specifically, to engage most productively with the community for any purpose, the police must:

1) Assign officers to areas long enough to enable them to identify the problems of concern to the community.
2) Develop the capacity of both officers and the department to analyze community problems.
3) Learn when greater community involvement has the potential for significantly reducing the problem.
4) In such situations, work with those specific segments of the community that are in a position to assist in reducing or eliminating the problem. (p. 27)

POP is an open-ended, process orientation that invites criticism, alterations, additions, and subtractions. Nevertheless, there are some basic elements that are critical to its successful application.

The Basic Elements

Redefining Police Issues/Problems

Shifting the Focus From "Incidents"

The vast majority of police time is spent reacting to citizen requests for services. The public's expectations of police have perpetuated this posture. Responding quickly to citizen calls has become "a way to give citizens a feeling of increased security." (p. 19) Thus, individual *incidents* have become the primary work of the police, with the goal being to respond to these incidents with increased speed and efficiency. In most cases, however, officers deal only with the surface manifestation, not the underlying conditions or causes of the problem. Also, incidents are dealt with individually; connections are made only when it may lead to the identification of an offender.

Shifting from an "incident" orientation requires moving beyond handling individual incidents and instead recognizing them as symptoms of larger problems. This requires:

1) Determining relationships between incidents (similarities in behavior, locations, persons involved, etc.).

2) Taking a more in-depth interest in incidents, becoming acquainted with the conditions and factors that give rise to them. (p. 33)

Focusing on Substantive Community Problems

The emphasis on *community problems* implies two things: that the community participate in defining the problems that should be of concern to the police; and that each problem be defined to include an understanding of all the dimensions of the problem in the total community. The focus on *substantive* problems means dealing with the conditions and root causes that create the problems rather than seeking quick Band-Aid fixes.

The police role in this process is to serve as catalysts who bring the necessary resources to bear on specific community safety problems throughout a community. Police work then becomes *problem solving* as opposed to solely *law enforcement.*

Promoting Effectiveness vs. Efficiency

Shifting to a substantive problem orientation that attempts to solve problems by addressing the root causes and conditions of crime and disorder demands a corresponding shift to focusing on effectiveness of police work versus efficiency of reactive response procedures. Because many of the problems police deal with are intractable, it makes no sense to equate effectiveness with *solving* a problem. "Eck and Spelman, having struggled with the meaning of *effectiveness* in the context of problem-oriented policing, developed a helpful formulation by identifying five varying degrees of impact that the police might have on a problem:

1) Totally eliminating it.
2) Reducing the number of incidents it creates.
3) Reducing the seriousness of the incidents it creates.
4) Designing methods for better handling the incidents.
5) Removing the problem from police consideration.*

Obviously, number five is only valid if another agency can address the problem more effectively.

Designing Pro-active Problem-Solving Responses

Adopting a Pro-active Stance

To resolve public safety issues rather than treat the surface symptoms demands that the police adopt a pro-active stance towards crime problems rather than employ traditional reactive arrest and emergency response modes. The police can take greater initiative to address problems in a variety of ways:

1) Initial identification of problems — rather than waiting for the community to express concern, the police can, *based on careful inquiry and analysis,* offer proposals by which the community may more effectively deal with specific problems.
2) Management of police resources — rather than simply responding to citizen demands for service, the police can actively place choices before the community, demonstrating how specifically targeted responses based on systematic analysis can, in the end, have a greater potential for addressing problems.
3) Assuming an advocacy role for the community with other agencies such as garbage collection, street repair, building maintenance, etc. (p. 46-47)

Systematic Inquiry

To develop innovative and effective solutions, the police must routinely and systematically investigate problems before trying to solve them, just as they routinely and systematically investigate

* Eck, John E., William Spelman et al., (1987) Problem Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News. Washington D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum R5-6. (pg 36)

crimes before making an arrest. Procedures must be adopted to facilitate a thorough — though not necessarily complicated — assessment of problems.

An in-depth probe of all of the characteristics of a problem and the factors that contribute to it includes acquiring detailed information about, for example, offenders, victims, others; times of occurrence; locations and other particulars about physical environment; history of the problem; the motivations, gains, losses of all involved; apparent and not so apparent causes and competing interests; results of current responses. (p. 36-37)

Existing crime analysis procedures are a starting point. So far, however, they are generally used only "to identify offenders and interrupt crime patterns rather than to gain the kind of knowledge and insight that might be used to affect the underlying conditions that accounted for the criminal conduct." (p. 37) POP would make much more use of data collected and expand objectives of such analysis. This would require:

1) Focusing more broadly on all problems police deal with vs. traditional crime categories.
2) Trying to understand the nature of the problem vs. the operational goal.
3) Using more sources of information than police reports such as research literature, telephone and door to door surveys, interviewing those with most direct knowledge (citizens, officers, representatives of government agencies, private services, and ex-offenders), data collected by other agencies.
4) Placing a high value on accuracy of data and conclusions reached.
5) A commitment to the value of systematic inquiry as a prerequisite to developing an intelligent response . . . (p. 38).

Accurate Labeling

In addition, problems must be described *(labeled)* precisely and accurately, and broken down into specific segments. The use of statutory labels, for example, to describe substantive problems may mask important distinctions that are necessary to develop appropriate responses to specific forms of behavior. Moreover, the use of statutory labels suggests traditional interest in arrest vs. resolution of the problem. (p. 39)

The process of systematic inquiry — *thorough investigation and accurate labeling* of a problem — often reveals that the problem may be very different from its first description. An accurate assessment of the problem is necessary to develop appropriate and effective responses.

Understanding Multiple Interests

Another prerequisite to developing effective solutions is to understand problems in terms of the various interests at stake. Individuals and groups of people are affected in different ways by a problem and have different ideas about what should be done about the problem.

For example, prostitution is a problem in many cities — and is clearly illegal. Nevertheless, it often is not high on the police priority list for enforcement — and enforcement is difficult. "The challenge to the police is to develop a program that will deal with the most troubling aspects of prostitution in the fairest and most effective manner." (p. 40) This requires careful analysis of questions such as: Why is the community concerned? What are the social costs? Who is being harmed and to what degree? Responses to these inquiries might reveal different, competing interests including:

- ❑ It offends moral standards of some.
- ❑ It creates a nuisance to passerby and adjacent residents and businesses.

- Uninvolved people may be offended if solicited.
- Juveniles may become prostitutes.
- Prostitutes may be harmed by customers.
- Patrons may be assaulted, robbed or defrauded.
- Prostitutes may be financially exploited and physically abused by their pimps.
- Organized crime might be involved.
- Drugs may be involved — prostitutes may be users, buyers, sellers.
- Prostitutes, as citizens, have rights that must be protected.
- Street prostitutes create street traffic and parking problems where they congregate.
- Presence of prostitutes can devalue property values.
- Prostitutes may transmit AIDS and other sexually communicable diseases. (p. 40-41)

Careful analysis should be able to quantify and qualify these concerns so their significance can be better assessed. Are juveniles involved? Is organized crime present? To what degree are drugs intertwined? Are prostitutes injured? Are diseases being spread?

Identifying the competing social interests and gathering facts to make an accurate assessment of the importance of each concern — with the consensus of the community — will assist police to develop the most effective response that will address the most crucial concerns.

Capture and Critique the Current Response

In specific and accurate terms, the responses currently being used to address the problem must be determined. This data must be collected from street officers who may be reluctant to share; but it is a necessary step and may reveal many creative and insightful responses. Once collected, the effectiveness of each response should be evaluated as to its appropriateness as part of the new response plan. (p. 42)

Brainstorm Possible Responses

Within the POP framework, responses are not limited to arrest, prosecution — or even to the more recently applied strategy of making referrals to appropriate agencies. The goal is to fashion a tailor-made response with the best potential for eliminating or reducing the problem. POP encourages an imaginative, far-reaching search for alternative ways in which to respond to commonly occurring problems, uncurtailed by prior thinking. (p. 44)

"It should be anticipated that mobilizing the community will be among the most common measures included in the development of a tailor made response. . . . the community is among the major untapped resources available to the police for dealing with problems, and engaging the community holds the potential for invoking informal controls that are more permanent and more effective than any measures the police themselves are in a position to implement." (p. 45)

It is unlikely that a tailor-made response would consist of a single strategy — though that could be the case. More often it would consist of a blend of different alternatives. For example, an effort to deal with a rash of burglaries in a low-income housing project might, depending upon the results of an analysis, consist of any or all of the following:

- Efforts to apprehend those responsible for the burglaries.
- Counseling management regarding traditional crime prevention practices including lighting, lock systems, landscaping that

provides hiding places for burglars, fencing, etc.

- ❑ Referring uncorrected conditions that are in violation of the law to building inspectors, zoning authorities, or health authorities.
- ❑ Working with tenants, informing them of their rights vis-a-vis management, of various government services that are available to them, and of measures they can take to prevent crimes.
- ❑ Working with school authorities regarding any problem of truancy that may be related to burglaries, and with recreation and park authorities regarding any problem of idle youth.
- ❑ Working with various services for the elderly to deal with problems of fear that may exist among the tenants. (p. 44-45)

Evaluation and Modification

The effectiveness of new responses must be evaluated so that the results can be shared with the department and the community, and so that the department can systematically determine what works and what does not. POP calls for police to develop "the skills, procedures and research techniques to analyze problems and evaluate police effectiveness, as an integral continuing part of management." (p. 49) It involves an open-ended, process orientation that invites criticism, alterations, additions, and subtractions.

Reassessing Who Is Responsible

Expanding Decision Making Authority/ Accountability

POP models encourage and facilitate greater accountability on the part of the police in general by pushing them to think through, systematically and comprehensively, how they will respond to a problem. The bases for police decisions are articulated and supported by relevant facts; arbitrariness and value judgments are reduced. Policy choices involve community representatives and decisions are carried out in the form of specific written policies and guidelines where necessary.

Inherent in the POP approach is making greater use of the skills, brains and time of rank and file officers, the people who directly provide police services to the public. Historically, management has worked to make the best use of officers' time but not necessarily their knowledge, skills and talents. Rank and file officers must be encouraged to think and be creative in their daily work to develop better ways to deal with community problems. The rank and file must have more freedom to participate in important decisions and be held accountable to their decision-making.

Police officers on the beat — especially if they are permanently assigned to an area — are in the best position to identify problems. ". . . whether officers identify a problem for attention will depend not only on whether they have developed *antennae* for doing so, but also on whether their actions will be viewed positively by their peers and supervisor." (p. 75)

Such initiative was demonstrated by a neighborhood patrol officer who responded to a report that thieves had just removed a hot water heater from a vacant home. A sign on the house indicated that it was owned by HUD (Housing and Urban Development), a federal agency that makes low-cost mortgages available to eligible citizens. The citizen making the report told the officer that the home had been listed in the newspaper that morning for the first time, and wondered if the thieves were targeting new listings of HUD-owned homes, knowing they would have been repossessed and thus vacant. The officer, at this point, had two options: simply report the theft in the required manner, ending his handling of the case; or alert someone at a higher level of the need to review theft-from-residence reports and to contact a HUD representative to determine if thefts from vacant HUD homes was, in fact, a problem. (p.75)

The officer's response and willingness to increase his involvement in identifying problems and responding accordingly depends on whether the environment within the organization promotes and/or supports problem-oriented policing.

Expanding the Role of the Community

It is increasingly evident that law enforcement agencies alone, employing traditional policing methods, cannot turn the tide of crime. "A community must police itself. The police can, at best, only assist in that task." (p. 21) For too long, the police have erred in pretending that they could do it all.

During the era of police *professionalism,* the police "not only relieved the citizenry of responsibility for policing themselves, . . . they adopted operating procedures that had the effect of divorcing them from the communities they policed." (p.22) In the name of objectivity and treating everyone equally, police officers largely lost their understanding of and interaction with people.

The racial disturbances of the '60s brought this dilemma to the forefront. Numerous studies were done from 1972-82, which showed that traditional policing methods (random patrol, etc.) were not as effective as thought. Police began to realize that they needed to enlist the community in preventing and controlling crime — beyond the old crime prevention campaigns of property control (locks) and blockwatch programs.

In short, "the police were going to have to cultivate an entirely different type of relationship with the citizens they served. . . . With a goal that went well beyond reducing tensions and being liked, it was recognized that getting the police job done required the greater involvement of all citizens." (p. 23)

While the need for greater community involvement in crime prevention and intervention is clear, the question remaining is how to best accomplish this task. The term "community policing" has gained wide use to refer to an entire category of police operations inciuding such tactics as greater use of foot patrols, storefront offices, and sponsorship of recreational programs.

More extensive efforts have attempted to mobilize communities to increase reporting of certain crimes, correct annoying conditions in neighborhoods, and make demands on absentee landlords, employers, businesses and government agencies. Some police agencies have launched ambitious community-oriented policing projects that have made communities *co-producers* of police services.

Two basic patterns are emerging from these programs designed to engage the community: **1)** a broad, ambitious, but somewhat amorphous effort to develop a new relationship with all or designated parts of the total community, to reduce tensions, create reservoir of good will, and ultimately assist the community and police to work together to solve community problems; and **2)** a narrower effort designed to deal with a specific problem that may determine the need for some form of community involvement, in which case, they then set out to bring about such involvement. (p. 24)

The first approach, being generic and comprehensive, raises a number of complex issues such as: What constitutes a *community?* Are the police prepared to share decision making and power with the *community?* Is this desirable? Once again, the focus is on the *means* of policing as opposed to the *results.*

The second approach, a more limited pattern of police-community engagement, does not raise such complex issues. The citizenry is engaged in a very pragmatic and relaxed manner. *Community* refers to anyone/everyone that is affected in any way by the problem being addressed, or the program being launched to resolve the problem. There is no expectation that the *community* has *shared values,* in fact it is often a conflict that

brings them together to discuss the issue. Also, *community* is not necessarily synonymous with *law-abiding*. And, while the police are extending themselves into the community to come up with solutions, they are *not* agreeing to share decision-making power, reserving for themselves the ultimate decision of how to handle a situation.

This type of police-community relationships are not necessarily permanent — but rather last as long as the problem exists. The *community* continues to shift its identity as new problems are identified and addressed in a similar manner. Over time, the whole community, however, will come to view the police differently — more positively — and also come to recognize that police effectiveness is intertwined with community involvement. This is an *ends* or *results* oriented process. (p. 25-26)

Conclusion

"Where most progress has been made in implementing problem-oriented policing, one finds that it is taken for granted that:

- Policing consists of dealing with a wide range of quite different problems, not just crime.
- These problems are interrelated, and the priority given them must be reassessed rather than ranked in traditional ways.
- Each problem requires a different response, not a generic response that is applied equally to all problems.
- Use of criminal law is but one means of responding to a problem; it is not the only means.
- Police can accomplish much in working to prevent problems rather than simply responding efficiently to an endless number of incidents that are merely the manifestations of problems.
- Developing an effective response to a problem requires prior analysis rather than simply invoking traditional practices.
- The capacity of the police is extremely limited, despite the impression of omnipotence that the police cultivate and others believe.
- The police role is more akin to that of facilitators, enabling and encouraging the community to maintain its norms governing behavior, rather than the agency that assumes total responsibility for doing so." (p.179)

Such an approach creates a clean slate — inviting the police, the community and elected officials to adopt "a fresh, more forthright agreement about what the police do, how they do it, and their potential for success." (p. 179) And all parties welcome the productive shift in focus from simply attempting to improve the police, to effectively solving community problems.

PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING
An Introduction
Adapted From *Problem-Oriented Policing*
by Herman Goldstein
New York: McGraw Hill, 1990.

A Change In Policing Philosophy

Hayward, California

By Police Chief Joseph E. Brann, Lieutenant Craig Calhoun &
Lieutenant Paul Wallace

Introduction

The past decade has been punctuated by numerous social changes affecting our citizens. Increases in crime, drugs, gangs, and traffic are only a few of the problems that have drained police resources. Increasing the size of police forces is not necessarily synonymous with a decrease in crime. Alternative resources and new strategies must be developed if we are to enhance the quality of life in our communities.

Media coverage of events tends to magnify and broaden the fear of crime and social disorder. The fear of crime alone can be very detrimental to communities. People become not only suspicious and distrusting of each other, but of the police who they feel are ineffective in their responsibility to maintain order. Sometimes the simple knowledge of another person's victimization has as much impact on levels of fear as being an actual victim. This level of fear also directly affects the City's image, an often overlooked factor in maintaining the economic health of the community.

People often talk less of crime than they do of other signs of social disorder and physical decay. Complaints of abandoned cars, gang activity, panhandling, drunkenness, trash, parking problems and loitering are more important to many people because they affect the City's image and add to the fear of crime.

Incident-driven Policing

Unfortunately, the growing social ills have contributed to the evolution of a policing system that is largely incident driven. This system has forced officers to dedicate a majority of their time to responding to calls for service. At the same time, traditional policing concepts of preventative patrol and rapid response have become widely accepted tactics. They have offered certain appeals; research, however, has shown these measures to be largely ineffective.

Random patrol can only produce random results and does not directly increase an officer's chances of arresting a criminal. Additionally, it does not bring police officers closer to the public or encourage the development of partnerships and shared problem-solving strategies.

Rapid response has been a key police priority for many years. It has been suggested that rapid response is paramount to the apprehension of

criminals. Research has shown, however, that rapid response is only effective in a small percentage of cases where a life is being threatened or a crime is in progress. Many law enforcement professionals know that public cooperation with a police officer is more often responsible for solving crimes than are officer-initiated activities. Police administrators have also found that citizens are extremely receptive to alternative response methods by the police.

Emerging research suggests new ways in which police officers can be more effective and efficient in dealing with social problems and community concerns. Prominent concepts have been termed **Community Based Policing and Problem Oriented Policing.** While traditional styles of policing have served us well for several decades, there is considerable room for improving the delivery of services. Social problems continue to change. The limits of traditional policing may have already been extended to its maximum efficiency. Our response to problems is largely reactive. We have distanced ourselves from the community by placing officers in vehicles and emphasizing rapid response. Authority is centralized and stifles the creativity of employees and our insistence on measuring effectiveness quantitatively rather than qualitatively has been short-sighted.

A New Approach is Needed

It is time for law enforcement to change. By capitalizing on proven practices and combining them with innovative policing philosophies, law enforcement can meet present and future challenges.

Community Policing is a new way of addressing community concerns and priorities. It is an interactive process involving police officers with the citizens who work with and live in the area they patrol. Instead of merely reacting to incidents as they occur, the Police Department places its emphasis on identifying and responding to community issues.

Problem-solving is a key strategy of Community Policing. It challenges officers to think creatively and support the use of innovative measures not traditionally used by the police. Problem-solving, while still employing strong enforcement tactics, also relies upon increased cooperation from other governmental and private resources.

Often, a disproportionate number of calls for service come from a relatively small number of locations throughout a city. In the past, the police all too often simply responded to those repeat locations and moved on to the next call. Attempts to examine patterns in those calls to address the underlying problems were rare. As a result, the problems proliferated. Through problem-solving strategies, the underlying causes can be identified and solutions can be developed to abate the underlying issues.

C.O.P.P.S. - The Hayward Plan

Hayward Police Department has adopted a new mission statement that embraces the City's Statement of Organizational Values and incorporates the principles of *S.E.R.V.I.C.E.* (see next page). Employees are now trained to use the Mission Statement as a guide to their thinking and behavior in the delivery of police services.

Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (C.O.P.P.S.) is being incorporated into the routine police functions in Hayward. The strategic plan that has been developed to guide the implementation of C.O.P.P.S. is designed to be a flexible, evolutionary document that outlines specific goals, objectives, and tasks, and builds a solid foundation for the future. It addresses many changes projected over the next five years and beyond. Specifically, the plan is to:

- Develop a service area structure that fixes responsibility for problem-solving and the delivery of quality services with every member of the organization.

- ❑ Organize shift schedules and deploy manpower in a manner that not only responds to calls for service but facilitates problem-solving and partnerships with the community.
- ❑ Encourage Department-wide support for this philosophy which is based on service to the community through partnerships.
- ❑ Decentralize many traditional services and distribute responsibilities to those who provide direct services.
- ❑ Provide training for all employees in Community Policing, problem-solving, extraordinary service delivery, networking with various community groups, and the use of all available resources.

Communities are concerned with their future and want to reduce the incidence of crime and social disorder. In the past, the public has not always been afforded that opportunity. Community relations responsibilities have typically been delegated to specialized bureaus. This will now be a Department-wide responsibility.

It is the intent of the police department to reduce the professional distance fostered by traditional policing practices and to ensure the community perceives a sense of social order. Officers will become the managers of their beats and will be encouraged to engage in responsible, creative ways of bringing about problem resolution. They will meet and talk with residents in an attempt to build and nurture partnership and commitment as

Statement of Organizational Values

We, the employees of the City of Hayward, believe that providing superior service to the citizens of Hayward is our primary responsibility and that all of our work should be structured with that goal in mind. We further believe that in meeting this goal we should be responsible to decisions made by the City Council and the citizens of the community. In order to achieve and maintain superior standards in both our work product and our work performance, we are committed to the following values:

S trong planning and decision making involving employee participation to the greatest extent possible.

E xcellence in delivery of service to the public.

R espect for dignity of the employee and recognition of individual contributions and initiative.

V igorous pursuit of competency and responsibility in the performance of our work.

I ntegrity and honesty in all aspects of service.

C ommunication achieved and information shared in a constructive open and supportive manner.

E quitable treatment and opportunity for all employees.

Mission Statement

We, the members of the *Hayward Police Department,* are committed to being responsive to our community in the delivery of quality services. Recognizing our responsibility to maintain order, while affording dignity and respect to every individual, our objective is to improve the quality of life through a community partnership which promotes safe, secure neighborhoods.

well as explore viable solutions and seek out available resources. The responsibility for problem-solving will be shared through such community partnerships.

The department will become results oriented rather than incident driven. New means of responding to calls for service must be developed in order to free up officer time for problem solving. It is recognized that the necessary changes will not occur overnight. There is a need for the transition plan to effectively manage a smooth implementation and provide for a continuing evaluation of the delivery of police services. Long term solutions are required that are responsive to community needs.

There is no one best model for implementing Community Policing. To be successful, Community Policing must be tailored to the particular community in question. The Hayward model includes values and traditions that are important to the community of Hayward. The approach developed is intended to be flexible, effective and responsive to the needs of this community — stressing the importance of partnerships, participative management, problem-solving and visionary leadership. The process requires considerable time, planning and cooperation by everyone. Such comprehensive changes in philosophy dictate a new policing style and usher in an exciting era.

A CHANGE IN POLICING PHILOSOPHY
Hayward, California
By Police Chief Joseph E. Brann, Lieutenant Craig Calhoun & Lieutenant Paul Wallace, Hayward Police Department
Adapted from the Hayward Police Department *Community Oriented Police and Problem Solving "C.O.P.P.S." Implementation Plan.*

SECTION II

IMPLEMENTING COPPS

IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING

By Malcom K. Sparrow

Introduction

A simple lesson, well understood by truck drivers, helps to frame the problem for this paper: greater momentum means less maneuverability. The professional truck driver does not drive his 50-ton trailer-truck the same way that he drives his sports car. He avoids braking sharply. He treats corners with far greater respect. And he generally does not expect the same instant response from the trailer, with its load, that he enjoys in his car. The driver's failure to understand the implications and responsibilities of driving such a massive vehicle inevitably produces tragedy: if the driver tries to turn too sharply, the cab loses traction as the trailer's momentum overturns or jackknifes the vehicle.

Police organizations also have considerable momentum. Having a strong personal commitment to the values with which they have "grown up," police officers will find any hint of proposed change in the police culture extremely threatening. Moreover, those values are reflected in many apparently technical aspects of their jobs — systems for dispatching patrols, patrol officers constantly striving to be available for the next call, incident-logging criteria, etc. The chief executive who simply announces that community policing is now the order of the day, without a carefully designed plan for bringing about that change, stands in danger both of "losing traction" and of throwing his entire force into confusion.

The concept of community policing envisages a police department striving for an absence of crime and disorder and concerned with, and sensitive to, the quality of life in the community. It perceives the community as an agent and partner in promoting security rather than as a passive audience. This is in contrast to the traditional concept of policing that measures its successes chiefly through response times, the number of calls handled, and detection rates for serious crime. A more complete comparison between traditional and community policing models is given in "Traditional vs. Community Policing" question-and-answer format on p. 51.

The task here is to focus attention upon some of the difficulties inherent in a change of policing style, rather than to defend or advocate community policing. So we will address some general problems of institutional change, albeit within the context of a discussion of policing styles.

Those who accept the desirability of introducing community policing confront a host of difficult issues: What structural changes are necessary, if any? How do we get the people on the beat to behave differently? Can the people we have now be forced into the new mold, or do we need to recruit a new kind of person? What should we tell the public, and when? How fast can we bring about this change? Do we have enough external support?

These are the problems of implementation. The aim of this paper is to assist in their resolution. You will find here, however, no particular prescription — no organizational chart, no list of objectives, no sample press releases. Such a prescription could not satisfy any but the most particular of circumstances. The intent here is to explore some general concepts in organizational behavior, to uncover particular obstacles to desired change that might be found within police departments, and then to find the most effective means for overcoming the obstacles.

Dangers of Underestimating the Task: Changing A Culture

Even the superficial review of community policing in the table on the next page, indicates the magnitude of the task facing a chief executive. Implementing community policing is not a simple policy change that can be effected by issuing a directive through the normal channels. It is not a mere restructuring of the force to provide the same service more efficiently. Nor is it a cosmetic decoration designed to impress the public and promote greater cooperation.

For the police, it is an entirely different way of life. It is a new way for police officers to see themselves and to understand their role in society. The task facing the police chief is nothing less than to change the fundamental culture of the organization. This is especially difficult because of the unusual strength of police cultures and their great resistance to change.

The unusual strength of the police culture is largely attributable to two factors. First, the stressful and apparently dangerous nature of the police role produces collegiate bonds of considerable strength, as officers feel themselves besieged in an essentially hostile world. Second, the long hours and the rotating shifts kill most prospects for a normal (wider) social life; thus, the majority of an officer's social life is confined to his or her own professional circle.

Altering an organizational philosophy may be helpful: the greater the momentum of a ship, the longer it takes to turn. One comforting observation is that a huge ship can nevertheless be turned by a small rudder. It just takes time, and it requires the rudder to be set steadfastly for the turn throughout the whole turning period.

It is worth pointing out, also, that there will be constant turbulence around a rudder when it is turning the ship — and no turbulence at all when it is not. This analogy teaches us something if the office of the chief executive is seen as the rudder responsible for turning the whole organization. The lessons are simple. First, the bigger the organization the longer it will take to change. Second, throughout the period of change the office of the chief executive is going to be surrounded by turbulence, like it or not. It will require personal leadership of considerable strength and perseverance.

Traditional vs. Community Policing: Questions and Answers

Question	Traditional	Community Policing
Who are the police?	A government agency principally responsible for law enforcement.	Police are the public and the public are the police: the police officers are those who are paid to give full-time attention to the duties of every citizen.
What is the relationship of the police force to other public service departments?	Priorities often conflict.	The police are one department among many responsible for improving the quality of life.
What is the role of the police?	Focusing on solving crimes.	A broader problem-solving approach.
How is police efficiency measured?	By detection and arrest rates.	By the absence of crime and disorder.
What are the highest priorities?	Crimes that are high value (e.g., bank robberies) and those involving violence.	Whatever problems disturb the community most.
What, specifically, do police deal with?	Incidents.	Citizen's problems and concerns.
What determines the effectiveness of police?	Response times.	Public cooperation.
What view do police take of service calls?	Deal with them only if there is no real police work to do.	Vital function and great opportunity.
What is police professionalism?	Swift effective response to serious crime.	Keeping close to the community.
What kind of intelligence is most important?	Crime intelligence (study of particular crimes or series of crimes).	Criminal intelligence (information about the activities of individuals or groups).
What is the essential nature of police accountability?	Highly centralized; governed by rules, regulations, and policy directives; accountable to the law.	Emphasis on local accountability to community needs.
What is the role of headquarters?	To provide the necessary rules and policy directives.	To preach organizational values.
What is the role of the press liaison department?	To keep the "heat" off operational officers so they can get on with the job.	To coordinate an essential channel of communication with the community.
How do the police regard prosecutions?	As an important goal.	As one tool among many.

Rendering Susceptible to Change

A chief executive may be fortunate enough to inherit an organization that is already susceptible to change. For instance, he may arrive shortly after some major corruption scandal or during a period when external confidence in the police department is at rock bottom. In such a case the chief executive is fortunate, in that leadership is required and expected of him. His organization is posed to respond quickly to his leadership on the grounds that the new chief, or his new policies, may represent the best or only hopes of rescue.

A chief executive who inherits a smoothly running bureaucracy, complacent in the status quo, has a tougher job. The values and aspirations of the traditional policy style will be embodied in the bureaucratic mechanisms — all of which superficially appear to be functioning well. The need for change is less apparent.

The task of the chief executive, in such a situation, is to expose the defects that exist within the present system. That will involve challenging the fundamental assumptions of the organization, its aspirations and objectives, the effectiveness of the department's current technologies, and even its view of itself. The difficulty for the chief is that raising such questions, and questioning well-entrenched police practices, may look and feel destructive rather than constructive. Managers within the department will feel uneasy and insecure, as they see principles and assertions for which they have stood for many years being subjected to unaccustomed scrutiny.

The process of generating a questioning, curious, and ultimately innovative spirit within the department seems to necessarily involve this awkward stage. It looks like an attempt by the chief to deliberately upset his organization. The ensuing uncertainty will have a detrimental effect upon morale within the department, and the chief has to pay particular attention to that problem. Police officers do not like uncertainty within their own organization; they already face enough of that on the streets.

The remedy lies in the personal commitment of the chief and his senior managers. Morale improves once it is clear that the change in direction and style is taking root rather than a fleeting fancy, that the chief's policies have some longevity, and that what initially appeared to be destructive cynicism about police accomplishments is, in fact, a healthy, progressive, and forgiving open-mindedness.

The chief executive is also going to require outside help in changing the organization. For instance, the chief may be able to make a public commitment to a new kind of policing long before he can convince his organization to adopt it. He may be able to create a public consensus that many of the serious policing problems of the day are direct results of the fact that the new kind of policing was not practiced in the past. He may be able to educate the public, or the mayor, about the shortcomings of existing practices even before his staff is prepared to face up to them.

He may identify pressure groups that he can use to his advantage by eliciting from them public enunciation of particular concerns. He may be able to foster and empower the work of commissions, committees, or inquiries that help to make his organization vulnerable to change. He can then approach his own organization backed by a public mandate — and police of all ranks will, in due course, face questions from the public itself that make life very uncomfortable for them if they cling to old values.

The chief may even accentuate his staff's vulnerability to external pressures by removing the protection provided by a public information officer and insisting that the news media be handled by subordinate officers. In so doing the chief would have to accept that some mistakes will inevitably be made by officers inexperienced

in media affairs. High-level tolerance of those early errors will be critical to middle management's acceptance of the new openness. They will need to feel that they are working within a supportive, challenging, coaching environment — not that they are being needlessly exposed to personal risk.

Two Kinds of Imbalance

Two different types of imbalance within the organization may help render it susceptible to change: "directed imbalance" and "experimental imbalance."

Directed Imbalance: Return for a moment to physical analogies, and consider the process of turning a corner on a bicycle. Without thinking, the rider prepares for the turn by leaning over to the appropriate side. Small children learning to ride a bicycle quickly discover the perils of not leaning enough, or too much, for the desired turn. The characteristics of the imbalance, in this instance, are that it is necessary and that it only makes sense in the context of the anticipated change in direction. It is, nevertheless, imbalance — because the machine will fall over if the turn is not subsequently made. Inevitable disaster follows, conversely, from making the turn without the preparatory leaning.

Directed imbalances within a police organization will be those imbalances that are created in anticipation of the proposed change in orientation. They will be the changes that make sense only under the assumption that the whole project will be implemented, and that it will radically alter organizational priorities.

Examples of such directed imbalance would be the movement of the most talented and promising personnel into the newly defined jobs, making it clear that the route to promotion lies within such jobs; disbanding those squads that embody and add weight to the traditional values; recategorizing the crime statistics according to their effect on the community; redesigning the staff evaluation system to take account of contributions to the nature and quality of community life; providing inservice training in problem-solving skills for veteran officers and managers; altering the nature of the training given to new recruits to include problem-solving skills; establishing new communication channels with other public services; and contracting for annual community surveys for a period of years.

Experimental Imbalance: This differs from directed imbalance in its incorporation of trial and error — lots of trials and a tolerance of error. The benefits of running many different experiments in different parts of the organization are more numerous than they might, at first sight, appear. There is the obvious result of obtaining experimental data, to be used in planning for the future. There is also the effect of creating a greater willingness to challenge old assumptions and hence a greater susceptibility to change, at a time when the organization needs to change most rapidly.

There is also the effect of involving lots of officers in a closer and more personal way. It does not matter so much what it is that they are involved in — it is more important that they feel involved, and that they feel they are subject to the attention of headquarters. They will then be much more disposed to try to understand what the values of headquarters really are.

Also, officers will see lots of apparently crazy ideas being tried and may, in time, realize that they have some ideas of their own that are slightly less crazy. Perhaps for the first time they will be willing to put their ideas forward, knowing that they will not be summarily dismissed. The resourcefulness of police officers, so long apparent in their unofficial behavior, can at last be put to the service of the department. Creativity blossoms in an experimental environment that is tolerant of unusual ideas.

Managing Through Values

Existing police structures tend to be mechanistic and highly centralized. Headquarters is the brain that does the thinking for the whole organization. Headquarters, having thought, disseminates rules and regulations in order to control practice throughout the organization. Headquarters must issue a phenomenal volume of policy, as it seeks to cover every new and possible situation. A new problem, new legislation, or new idea eventually produces a new wave of instructions sent out to divisions from headquarters.

The 1984 publication in Britain of the "Attorney General's New Guidelines on Prosecution and Cautioning Practice" provides a useful example. The purpose of the guidelines was to introduce the idea that prosecutions should be undertaken when and only when, prosecution best serves the public interest. As such, the guidelines represent a broadening of police discretion. In the past, police were authorized to caution only juveniles and senior citizens. Under the new guidelines offenders of any age may be cautioned in appropriate circumstances. Unfortunately, the order was issued in some county forces through some 30 pages of detailed, case-by-case, instructions distributed from headquarters. The mass of instructions virtually obscured the fact that broader discretion was being granted.

Police officers have long been accustomed to doing their jobs "by the book." Detailed instruction manuals, sometimes running into hundreds, even thousands, of pages have been designed to prescribe action in every eventuality. Police officers feel that they are not required to exercise judgment so much as to know what they are supposed to do in a particular situation. There is little incentive and little time to think, or to have ideas. There is little creativity and very little problem solving. Most of the day is taken up just trying not to make mistakes. And it is the voluminous instruction manuals which define what is, and what is not, a mistake. Consequently heavy reliance is placed upon the prescriptions of the manuals during disciplinary investigations and hearings.

How does the traditional management process feel from the receiving (operation) end? Something like this: "It all comes from headquarters; it is all imposed; it is all what somebody else has thought up — probably somebody who has time to sit and think these things up." New ideas are never conceived, evaluated, and implemented in the same place, so they are seldom "owned" or pursued enthusiastically by those in contact with the community.

Why is the state of affairs a hindrance to the ideals of community policing? Because it allows for no sensitivity either on a district level (i.e., to the special needs of the community) or on an individual level (i.e., to the particular considerations of one case). It operates on the assumption that wealthy suburban districts need to be policed in much the same way as public housing apartments. While patrol officers may be asked to behave sensitively to the needs of the community and to the individuals with whom they deal, there is little organizational support for such behavior.

Of course, there remains a need for some standing orders, some prepared contingency plans, and some set procedures. But such instructions can come to be regarded as a resource, rather than as constraining directives. In the past, instruction manuals have been used as much to allocate blame retrospectively after some error has come to light, as to facilitate the difficult work of patrol officers. Many departments, in implementing community policing (which normally involves a less militaristic and more participatory management style), have de-emphasized their instruction manuals.

The instruction manual of the West Midlands Police Force, in England, had grown to 4 volumes, each one over 3 inches thick, totaling more than 2,000 pages of instructions. In June 1987, under

the direction of Chief Constable Geoffrey Dear, they scrapped it. They replaced it with a single-page "Policy Statement" which gave 11 brief "commandments." These commandments spoke more about initiative and "reasonableness of action" than about rules or regulations. All officers were issued pocket-size laminated copies of this policy statement so that, at any time, they could remind themselves of the basic tenets of their department.

The old manual had contained some useful information that could not be found elsewhere. This was extracted, condensed, and preserved in a new, smaller, "advice manual." It was only one-third the size of the old manual and, significantly, was distributed with an explicit promise that it would never be used in the course of disciplinary investigations or hearings. The ground-level officers were able to accept it as a valuable resource, whereas they had regarded the old manual as a constant threat, omniscient but unfeeling.

The Chief Constable had set up a small team to be responsible for introducing the new policy statement and advice manual. One year after the first distribution of these two documents to the force, the feelings of that team were that the ground-level officers accepted the change and appreciated it, but that some of the mid-level managers found the implied management style harder to accept and were reluctant to discard their old manuals.[1]

Another trend in the management of policing is for procedures "set in stone" to be played down in favor of accumulated experience. There are growing repositories of professional experience, either in the form of available discussion forums for officers trying new techniques, or in the form of case studies where innovations and their results are described.[2] One difficulty here is that police officers have to be persuaded that it is helpful, rather than harmful, to record their failures as well as their successes — and for that they will need a lot of reassurance.

Senior managers have begun to emphasize the ideals, ethics, and motivations that underlie the new image of policing, as opposed to the correctness or incorrectness of procedures. Disciplinary inquiries, therefore, come to rest less firmly on the cold facts of an officer's conduct and more upon his intentions, his motivations, and the reasonableness and acceptability of his judgment in the particular situation.

The relationship between headquarters and district commands may also need to change. The role of headquarters will be to preach the values and state the principles and broad objectives, and then allow the districts a great deal of discretion in deciding on particular programs suited to their geographical area. Similarly, management within any one division or district should be, as far as possible, through values and principles rather than rules and regulations; individual officers can then be encouraged to use their own judgment in specific cases.

The nature of the rank structure itself can be a principal obstacle to the effective communication of new values throughout the organization, primarily because it consists of many thin layers. A typical British police force (say of 3,000 officers) has nine layers of ranks. The larger Metropolitan forces have even more. In the larger American forces, the number of ranks can vary from 9 to 13 depending on the size of the department. This is in contrast to the worldwide Roman Catholic Church (with over 600 million members), which does a fairly good job of disseminating values with only five layers. We know from physics that many thin layers is the best formula for effective insulation;

[1] The Metropolitan Police Department (London) is in the process of making a similar change, moving away from a comprehensive instruction manual and toward clear, brief statements of the principles for action.

[2] Much of this work stemmed from initiatives funded by the National Institute of Justice, the Police Executive Research Forum, the Police Foundation, and concerned philanthropic foundations.

for instance, we are told that the best protection from cold weather is to wear lots of thin layers of clothing, rather than a few thick ones.

Certainly such a deep rank structure provides a very effective natural barrier, insulating the chief officer from his patrol force. It makes it possible for the police chief to believe that all his officers are busily implementing the ideas which, last month, he asked his deputy to ask his assistants to implement — while, in fact, the sergeant is telling his officers that the latest missive from those cookies at headquarters, "who have forgotten what this job is all about," shouldn't actually affect them at all.

During a period of organizational reorientation the communication between the chief and the rank and file needs to be more effective than that — and so will need to be more direct. The insulating effects of the rank structure will need to be overcome, if there is to be any hope of the rank and file understanding what their chief officers are trying to get them to think about. It means that the chief must talk to the officers, and must do so at length. Some chiefs have found it valuable to publish their own value statements and give all patrol officers personal copies. Alternatively, the chief may choose to call meetings and address the officers himself.

This is not proposed as a permanent state of affairs, as clearly the rank structure has its own value and is not to be lightly discarded. During the period of accelerated change, however, the communication between the top and the bottom of the organization has to be unusually effective. Hence, it is necessary to ensure that the message is not filtered, doctored, or suppressed (either by accident or as an act of deliberate sabotage) by intermediate ranks during such times.

The likelihood of a change in policy and style surviving, in the long term, probably depends as much on its acceptance by middle management as on anything else. The middle managers, therefore, have to be coached and reeducated; they have to be given the opportunity and incentive for critical self-examination and the chance to participate in the reappraisal of the organization. Some chiefs have invested heavily in management retraining, seminars, and retreats, taking great care to show their personal commitment to those enterprises.

Territorial Responsibility

One of the most obvious structural changes that has normally accompanied a move toward community policing is the assignment of officers to beats. It is important to understand how such a move fits into the general scheme of things. At first sight it appears that patrol officers who drive cars on shift work have territorial responsibility; for 8 hours a day they each cover an area. In fact, there are two senses in which that particular area is not the officer's professional territory. First, officers know that they may be dispatched to another area at any time, should the need arise. Second, they are not responsible for anything that occurs in their area when they are off duty. The boundaries of their professional territories are more clearly defined by the time periods when they are on duty than by a geographical area. The fact that a professional territory spans a period of time rather than an area clearly has the effect of forcing the officer's concern to be largely focused on incidents rather than on the long-term problems of which the incidents may be symptoms. The patrol officers are bound to remain reactive rather than pro-active. Long-term problems remain outside their responsibility.

In contrast, when patrol officers are given an area and told "this is yours, and nobody else's," their professional territory immediately becomes geographical. The 24-hour demand on police resources requires that some calls in their area will be dealt with by other personnel. But the beat officers know that they have principal responsibility for a street or streets. They have the opportunity and obligation to have an impact on difficult problems. The more committed beat officers demand to know what happened on their beat while they were off duty; they tend to make unsolicited follow up visits, and struggle to find

causes of incidents that would otherwise be regarded as haphazard. It is fairly easy to see how the chief officer, district commanders, and individual beat officers can have a clear territorial responsibility. What about the remainder in middle management? There is a danger that community contact and concern will be the preserve of the highest and lowest ranks of the service, with the middle ranks living a cozy internal life of administration.

Middle-ranking officers can continue to be a barrier to the dissemination of the new values unless they too are made to live by them. This is perhaps best accomplished by making each rank correspond to some level of aggregation of beats or of community concerns. Thus middle managers should interact as fully with the community as the most senior and most junior officers. They thereby become a meaningful resource for the patrol officers rather than just one more level of supervision. They then can provide contextual frameworks, at successively higher levels, to assist subordinates in the understanding and resolution of particular community problems.

Resistance and Sabotage

The most robust resistance to any change in values within an organization will come from those parts that stand to benefit most by the perpetuation of the old set of values. In introducing the ideals of community policing, the chief should anticipate substantial resistance from particular areas, the first of which is the detective branch.

The idea that crime investigation is the single most important function of the police makes the criminal investigation division the single most important unit within the organization; it gives a detective higher status than a patrol officer. Should we expect the detective branch to applaud an absence of crime? It seems that their values are sometimes shaped to prefer an abundance of crime, provided it is all solved. It seems that special attention may have to be given to dismantling the detectives' view of what is, and what is not, important. Certainly the detective branch typically views the introduction of community policing as a matter for the patrol officers — "our job is still to solve crime."

Detectives' perception of their job will remain "my job is to solve crime" until they are removed from the group that reinforces that perception. Their goals will remain the same until their professional territory is redefined. Their professional territories, if the detectives are to adopt and understand the ideals of community policing, should be defined segments of the community.

The detectives may, or may not, share their segments with uniformed officers; they may, or may not, retain the title of detective. Such considerations will depend, to an extent, on the particular constraints imposed by union power. But they have to be incorporated into the community policing system. They have to be encouraged to work closely within neighborhood policing units. Thus the valuable intelligence that detectives gain through crime investigation can be fed back into the patrol operation. Also, the detectives are made to feel that crime prevention is their principal obligation, and not the preserve either of the patrol force or of a dedicated, but peripheral, unit.

The essential change, whatever the prevailing circumstances, is that the detectives' professional territory has to be extended some considerable distance beyond the instances of reported crime. The detectives may end up looking more like "district investigators" than members of an elite, and separate, unit.

A second area of resistance will probably be the bureaucratic administration. It will include many key personnel who have been able to do their jobs comfortably and mechanically for many years. Such jobs will include the purchase of equipment and supplies, the recruiting and training of staff, and, perhaps most importantly, the preparation and administration of annual budgets. The chief officers may have the authority to allocate police

resources as they think best, but they are frequently frustrated by administrators who find some bureaucratic reason for not releasing funds for particular purposes, or by the creation of other bureaucratic obstacles.

A fundamental reappraisal of organizational priorities is likely to "upset the apple cart" in these areas in a manner that bureaucrats will find difficult to tolerate. Such staff members need to be converted. The practical implication is that such personnel must be included in the audience when the new organizational values are being loudly proclaimed. If they are left out at the beginning, they may well become a significant stumbling block at some later stage.

Conclusion

One final cautionary note: the principal task facing police leaders in changing the orientation of their organization has been identified as the task of communicating new values. In order to stand a chance of communicating values effectively, you need to believe in them yourself, and to be part of a community that believes in them, too.

IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING

By Malcom K. Sparrow

First appeared in *Perspectives on Policing*, National Institute of Justice, November 1988:

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This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policy-makers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

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The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialogue between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates. Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

STRATEGIC PLANNING & COMMUNITY POLICING

PORTLAND, OREGON

By Police Bureau Chief Tom Potter

Introduction

Over the five year period from 1985 to 1989, sharp increases in crime, gangs and drugs severely impacted the quality of life for the citizens, neighborhoods, institutions and businesses of Portland, and strained the resources of the Portland Police Bureau.

Since Police resources could not expand, they were redeployed as officers were moved from support functions to patrol activities. Detectives were demoted; Crime Analysis was eliminated; Crime Prevention and Planning and Research units were pared to skeleton crews; and tactical units that had addressed specific problems were eliminated or cut back to almost nothing. Civilian positions, the almost invisible life support of the street officer, were drastically reduced, and those dollars used to "put more police on the streets." But even as more officers hit the streets, the number of radio calls answered by each one continually increased (up 44% from 1984 to 1988) and the response time to the highest priority radio calls increased to an average of over nine minutes. So, although there were more officers on the street, they could seldom stop and talk with citizens who were not in immediate crisis. The trend toward separation that began when officers were placed in patrol cars, years ago, was accelerated by the dramatically increasing work load that kept them rushing from one radio call to the next.

Worse than the physical separation from citizens was the separation of purpose and loss of unity. Citizens and police were no longer partners in maintaining their neighborhoods, but separate components with different roles. Citizens saw the police as special responders who could be called upon only to deal with major problems. The police often gave the impression that they didn't have time to hear about citizens' general concerns and day-to-day public safety problems — even though these problems often become major when not attended to. Citizens did not want to bother overburdened officers and risk drawing them away from more important business.

Officers came to regard citizens as complainants who called the police and then got out of the way so the police could fight crime — alone. They lost the awareness of the many day-to-day activities that residents of an area perform to make it a safe and secure place. Officers often developed a distorted picture of the true

problems and concerns of an area. When police only contact a neighborhood at its crisis points, it is natural to assume that those are the most important ongoing issues. Thus, officers tended to see a drug house as a problem of periodic customer robberies that produced shoot-outs, while the neighborhood saw the drug house as a constant aggravation of loud traffic, late night noise, minor harassment of residents, and a place that drew undesirable outsiders into the neighborhood.

These separate viewpoints also meant that many officers lost sight of the tremendous resources the community could provide to help them and, worse yet, they lost awareness of the community's tremendous desire to help. The pressure was on to provide a quick fix and move on to the next call, so most officers stuck with the traditional reactive approach. But the traditional approach did not control crime or the incapacitating fear it brings. Portland continued to show up near the top of every nationwide measure of crime. The City's feeling of vulnerability and fear of crime rose, while confidence in the Police and City government plummeted. Officers' morale crumbled as they continued to fight crime but saw few successes, even as their efforts increased.

In response to this situation, hundreds of citizens and police personnel presented their ideas and concerns to the City Council. The ultimate result was the adoption of a City Council resolution, in July 1989, outlining an approach to policing that would better align police resources with the public safety concerns of neighborhoods and businesses. A second resolution, passed in October 1989, defined organizational issues and expected outcomes for a mandated Police Bureau implementation of Community Policing over a five-year period.

Developing a Transition Plan

In response to the Portland City Council resolutions, the Chief of Police established a Community Policing Division and directed it to fully involve the community, the Police and other City Bureaus, and outside agencies to develop a comprehensive plan for the transition. A multi-bureau Transition Committee, composed of citizens, City Bureau managers, police personnel and Police Bureau Commanders, came together to examine the host of issues involved in converting the philosophy and operation of a major City bureau. Twelve committees, several focus groups, attendees at many public meetings, and individual experts from the academic, business and law enforcement arenas worked together to formulate goals and objectives, develop strategies from those recommendations, assign priorities and responsibilities and prepare an implementation schedule and budget. These ideas were combined into a first draft of a transition plan. Almost five hundred copies of that draft were then circulated throughout the community for response and criticism. That feedback was then incorporated into the final *Community Policing Transition Plan* document.

The five-year (1990-1994) transition plan outlines the initial steps to adopting Community Policing as the operational philosophy of the entire Police Bureau. Community Policing, however, is an ongoing planning and evaluation process that views change as critical to success. The core element of the plan, therefore, is its flexibility to incorporate new information and make positive changes at any point in the process. It sets in motion a community-driven process to create a new, dynamic organization. Specifically, the plan:

- Defines the new mission of the Police Bureau and fixes the goals and objectives to fulfill that mission.
- Identifies the first year priorities to be implemented; sets out a developmental process to achieve measurable progress towards a fully functional Community Policing philosophy.
- Specifies outcomes to be achieved or at least started in the first year as well as the activities, who is responsible for implementation, and resource requirements necessary.
- Provides estimated resource projections (the unpredictable variations of a major transition made definite statements of long term resource requirements impossible).
- Shows the progressive steps to occur during year two and beyond to institutionalize the major components of the community-police partnership.

Beginning the Transition

The initial planning effort identified three strategic components to guide the five year implementation period:

Rebuilding the Organization

The Police Bureau's resources had been greatly reduced over the past few years by the urgent need to redirect all available sworn personnel to battle the rapidly growing gang and drug problems. Yet, the precinct patrol officers were still understaffed to handle the work load. Many essential support functions and units needed to be restored. Like an athlete, the Bureau must have a base level of fitness before it can pursue its new goal of Community Policing.

Refining the Organization

The Police Bureau must maximize the operating efficiency of existing resources so additional resources for Community Policing will be wisely deployed. The Bureau must revise its direction as a result of the continuing internal and external input of the strategic planning process. Like a ship, the Bureau must take frequent navigational sightings and make occasional course corrections to safely reach its destination of Community Policing.

Retooling the Organization

While rebuilding and refining the organization, the Police Bureau will begin laying the foundation for Community Policing. The vision of Community Policing will not become reality by merely reorganizing the Bureau. It requires a total transformation of the organizational culture to a service orientation. It calls for direct commitment at every level and in every activity of the organization. Like the U.S. auto industry, the Bureau must retool to convert its product line to be more streamlined, efficient, and responsive to its customers — the community.

Each of these components is being addressed as the Police Bureau realigns the organization to its new mission statement. During the first year, the concentration was focused largely on rebuilding the organization while identifying operating efficiencies, and beginning the processes and projects that lay the foundation for Community Policing. During subsequent years, resources and effort are being increasingly shifted to the refining and retooling components as Community Policing is incrementally implemented.

The additional resources required to fully implement the Community Policing plan are expected to be provided by a combination of new resources, increased internal efficiency, reduced work load, and ultimately greater citizen control over their environment.

Mission and Goals

Throughout the transition period, the Police Bureau is continuing to deploy uniformed police, respond to emergencies, investigate crimes, staff specialized investigative and detective units, participate in multi-agency task forces (e.g., gangs and drugs), and perform many other traditional police activities. While retaining its basic mission and traditional police functions, the Bureau is shifting to a different mode of policing. The focus is changing from enforcing laws to solving problems as the Bureau becomes increasingly sensitive and responsive to community desires and expectations.

Old Mission Statement: *The Bureau of Police is responsible for the preservation of the public peace, protection of the rights of persons and property, the prevention of crime, and the enforcement of all Federal laws, Oregon state statutes and city ordinances within the boundaries of the City of Portland.*

New Mission Statement: *The mission of the Portland Police Bureau is to work with all citizens to preserve life, maintain human rights, protect property, and promote individual responsibility and community commitment.*

Goals:

1) ***Partnership:*** Develop a partnership with the community, City Council, other Bureaus, service agencies and the criminal justice system.
2) ***Empowerment:*** Develop an organizational structure and environment that reflects community values and facilitates joint citizen and employee empowerment.
3) ***Problem Solving:*** Enhance community livability through use of pro-active, problem-solving approaches for reduction of incidence and fear of crime.
4) ***Accountability:*** Foster mutual accountability for Public Safety resources and strategies among Bureau management and employees, the community and the City Council.
5) ***Service Orientation:*** Develop a customer orientation in our service to citizens and our Bureau members.
6) ***Project Management and Direction:*** Develop a process for overall management and direction of the Community Policing transition.

First Year Priorities

Year One implemented key steps to rebuild the police organization, increase operating efficiencies, and continue the strategic planning process to more fully involve the Police Bureau and citizens in the organizational changes required to support Community Policing.

The major functional activity categories for Year One include: increased staffing, new recruitment and hiring practices, new training programs, demonstration projects, improving resources to support Community Policing, interagency communication, and review and analysis of Police Bureau internal operations.

Rebuilding

The prior precinct staffing levels did not allow for the uninterrupted blocks of time required for uniformed patrol officers to focus on problem-solving activities. Restaffing the precincts was critical for transitioning to Community Policing. Fifty-four of the sixty new police officer positions provided by Operation Jumpstart were allocated to

restaffing the precincts, approximately a 20% increase in patrol resources. Essential support units such as planning and crime analysis were also staffed. Due to hiring, classroom and field training delays, however, the full impact of the new recruits was not realized immediately. (Preliminary forecasts estimate the eventual need for an additional 140-170 personnel over the next five fiscal years.)

Refining

The Bureau reviewed recommendations from the Institute of Law and Justice (ILJ) organizational analysis, the City Auditor's reports, and the Work load/Productivity Committee for ideas to improve operating efficiency of the department, and then began developing plans to implement suggested changes.

The Community Policing Division continues to coordinate and facilitate the strategic planning process and the Transition Committee meets monthly to provide on-going community oversight of the process. A dozen other working committees were integrated into the Police Bureau's structure along functional lines to assist in the process of building organizational commitment and involvement in Community Policing.

Each of the first-year activities was assigned to a Branch of the Police Bureau to ensure accountability. Unit Commanders and the appropriate work committees then developed specific work plans for activities in their functional areas. Significant communication and coordination was initiated among the Police Bureau, City Bureaus, neighborhoods, criminal justice agencies and social service providers.

Base line data was collected during the first year to evaluate the Bureau's transition to Community Policing and the subsequent impact on community problems.

Retooling

In-service training during fiscal year 1990-91 was significantly expanded and 60% of the training content was targeted to address the interpersonal communication, problem-solving, information and referral customer service skills needed for a Community Policing orientation. These skills and attributes were also emphasized in recruitment and hiring for Operation Jumpstart.

The Police Bureau also began making specific changes in its structure including promotion systems, employee reward systems, neighborhood officer assignments, decentralized decision making and operations, and related management and supervision issues.

Year One also included Community Policing demonstration projects in each of the precincts as well as the start-up of a Police Activities League (P.A.L.) for at-risk youth diversion and positive role modeling.

Strategic Planning – Years Two to Five

Building on the foundation laid in Year One, the Police Bureau is continuing to rebuild the organization, refine its processes through internal review and program development, and intensify Community Policing activities. The two major thrusts guiding Years Two to Five are: Institutionalizing the Community Policing values of community and employee participation, initiative, and empowerment; and increasing coordination and networking with other City Bureaus, social services providers, and the criminal justice system. The key for Year Two to Five activities is the Strategic Planning Process adopted by the Police Bureau (see table on next page).

The Strategic Planning Process in Year One resulted in a detailed plan for the subsequent years. Also during Year One, Police Bureau Unit Commanders were provided with specific training in the preparation and development of work plans. They learned new techniques for planning, scheduling, and management of activities assigned to them. Thus, each successive year the planning

Community Policing Strategic Planning Process

Throughout the process of developing the strategies and programs for Community Policing, community and other outside input have played a key role. A Strategic Planning Process has been developed to formulate future strategies and programs. The Planning Process is a loop that starts and continues with outside input. We can only broadly suggest the direction and needs for future years based upon the input received thus far. As each year approaches and the planning cycle continues, desired outcomes and activities will change as the needs of the community change. This process allows for greater accountability to the community for any additional resources. *Resource needs evolve, not from the Police Bureau, but from the expectations of the community.*

Step 1. ***Input:*** The foundation for the planning consists of extensive input from all segments of the community. Citizens, outside agencies, various City and State government, and the Police Bureau all have opportunities to contribute to future planning.

Step 2. ***Outcomes:*** Desired or expected outcomes from Community Policing are identified based upon the input received in Step 1.

Step 3. ***Activities and Strategies:*** Activities and strategies needed to achieve desired outcomes are developed. Community input is still a key component because *activities and strategies may evolve from many sources,* not just the Police Bureau.

Step 4. ***Current Resources:*** After the determination of activities and strategies, a thorough examination of current resources is done. Are we using current resources in the best way to meet community need? Do we need to move resources from current activities and strategies that are no longer needed? Only after this is done do we look at additional needs to implement new strategies and activities.

Step 5. ***New Resources:*** New resource needs that are necessary to accomplish collectively identified strategies are identified and prioritized. *New needs of lower priority may be moved to future years,* depending upon available funds. These are not discarded but only suspended until resources are available.

Step 6. ***Implementation:*** Strategies and activities are implemented. This implementation may be a program of short duration (one year or less), long duration (one to five years), or indefinite duration (beyond five years).

Step 7. ***Measurement:*** Actual outcomes of strategies and activities are measured for evaluation.

Step 8. ***Program Evaluation:*** The actual and expected outcomes and strategies are compared and evaluated. Did the strategies accomplish the desired outcomes, or something else? Was the program effective, or should it be changed? This evaluation information becomes just one piece of the input for the next year's planning cycle. The strategic planning process then repeats in order to accurately determine the next year's needs.

cycle will yield an updated comprehensive work plan to guide the Bureau-wide Community Implementation in the following fiscal year.

The ongoing strategic planning process will enable the Police Bureau to change according to community expectations and conditions. With community and Police Bureau input, yearly outcomes will be identified, activities and strategies initiated, resource requirements specified, outcomes measured, and programs evaluated. Internal and external reporting procedures and feedback insure accountability and continuing input. As the City's strategic planning process gathers momentum, the Police Bureau planning process will be folded in as part of the overall strategy for the delivery of city services.

In this community-driven process of organizational development, the specific form that the Police Bureau assumes depends upon how the community and Police Bureau jointly determine what is needed and what demonstration projects work. At the early stage, it was estimated that 140-170 police personnel, both officers and support, in addition to the 60 Jumpstart positions, would be required for Community Policing. As these resources are incrementally added, the Bureau anticipates reduced patrol officer work load, increased operating efficiencies, and more blocks of time available for meaningful community policing activities.

Extensive involvement, energy, enthusiasm, and creativity have generated an unprecedented commitment to change. This momentum must be sustained by bold actions and concrete steps to make the vision of Community Policing a reality.

All are stakeholders and all share equally in the process of shaping this new mission — citizens, the Police Bureau, other agencies, and City government. Each has been willing to get involved, take initiative and cooperate. Building good working relationships is helping build a new organization to significantly improve the safety and livability of Portland.

STRATEGIC PLANNING & COMMUNITY POLICING
Portland, Oregon
By Police Bureau Chief Tom Potter, Portland Police Bureau
Adapted from the Portland Police Bureau *Community Policing Transition Plan.*

For contact information, see Portland Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources Section.

Organizational Change Through Leadership & Training

Madison, Wisconsin

By David C. Couper and Sabine H. Lobitz

Introduction

The following article has been adapted from sections of the book, Quality Policing: The Madison Experience, by Madison Police Chief David C. Couper and Sobine Lobitz (a former MPD officer and currently a sergeant with the Wisconsin Capitol Police). The book documents the "long, often painful, and still continuing transformation of the Madison Police Department" to community (i.e., "Quality") policing. This article focuses on leadership, training and promotional policies — crucial elements to achieving the substantive organizational change that has, and is still occurring in the Madison Police Department.

The Old and New Leadership Styles

Why haven't leaders in the public and private sectors been willing to initiate a new style of leadership in order to put to effective use the latent human resources in their organizations? Simply stated, it is because it is safer not to. The authoritarian management style does not encourage creativity or risk-taking. It has no tolerance for even honest mistakes and no room for experimentation. The attractiveness and comfort of the existing organizational structure — the bureaucracy — are overwhelming.

Police organizations that change the way they lead men and women can achieve quality in policing. Further, the new model of leadership complements the current movement to community-oriented and problem-solving policing.[1]

What does the new leadership style mean in terms of practice?

- It means a shift from telling and controlling employees to helping them develop their skills and abilities. This includes asking for their input before making critical decisions that affect them and making a commitment to listen to them and ask them about policing strategies in the community.
- It means listening to the customers, the citizens, in new and more open ways.
- It means solving problems, not reacting to incidents.
- It means trying new things, experimenting. Risk-taking and honest mistakes must be tolerated in order to encourage creativity and achieve innovation. Ideas must be permitted to "bubble up" within the organization.

[1]As described by Goldstein (1979), Skolnick and Bayley (1986), Trojanowicz (undated), Kelling and Moore (1987), and others.

- It means avoiding, whenever possible, the use of coercive power to bring about change. When change is implemented from the top of the organization, either by coercive power or without real employee input, it will surely fail. It is only by first changing the "inside" of our police organizations that police leaders will be able to implement the new "outside" strategies of policing.

The establishment of the new philosophy and style of leadership will ensure the achievement of quality police services, a more community-oriented policing style, and the use of new approaches to problem-solving. It sets up an organizational culture that not only permits adoption of these new policing concepts, but also provides the capability and flexibility to move beyond them. The new style is oriented not only to the community's changing needs, but also to the changing needs of the police employees. Thus, there is a built-in survival mechanism that is attuned to the "inside" as well as the "outside" of the organization — employees and citizens.

This approach makes use of the term "leadership," and not "management," because leadership is active. It means rolling up your shirt sleeves and working to help employees succeed by improving things they identify as needing improvement. Leadership is doing; constantly working to improve existing systems. It is creative work.

Principles of Quality Leadership[2]

1) Believe in, foster, and support **team work.**
2) Be committed to the **problem-solving** process: use it, and let **data**, not emotions, drive decisions.
3) Seek employees' **input** before making key decisions.
4) Believe that the best way to improve the quality of work or service is to **ask** and **listen** to employees who are doing the work.
5) Strive to develop mutual **respect** and **trust** among employees.
6) Have a **customer** orientation and focus toward employees and citizens.
7) Manage on the **behavior** of 95 percent of employees, and not on the 5 percent who cause problems. Deal with the 5 percent **promptly** and **fairly.**
8) Improve **systems** and examine **processes** before placing blame on people.
9) Avoid "top-down," **power-oriented** decision making whenever possible.
10) Encourage **creativity** through **risk-taking**, and be **tolerant** of honest **mistakes.**
11) Be a **facilitator** and **coach**. Develop an **open** atmosphere that encourages providing and accepting **feedback.**
12) With **teamwork**, develop with employees agreed upon **goals** and a **plan** to achieve them.

Training and Education

One of the important steps in putting theory into action is training. The training that is done must be properly planned and meet the employees' highest standard of quality. The employee is the customer of an organization's training services. If leaders care about their employee-customers, employees will take care of their citizen-customers. Leaders should always model with their employees the behaviors they expect their employees to exhibit with their customers.

The first step is to train the management team in the new style of leadership. Early in 1987, the

[2]The 12 principles of Quality Leadership were synthesized from the works of Tom Peters (Passion for Excellence), W. Edwards Deming, John Naisbitt (Reinventing the Corporation), and others.

management team of the Madison Police Department completed seven days of Quality and Productivity/Quality Leadership training. The training was conducted by an interdepartmental training team and addressed the following subjects:

- Introduction to quality and productivity principles.
- Systems thinking.
- Leadership systems: thinking and planning.
- Running and conducting effective groups.
- Interpersonal skills.
- Community-organizing techniques.
- Representing and graphing data.
- The nature and variability of statistics.

By the fall of that year, all lieutenants of the department had completed six days of similar training. The last hour of each training day the chief was available to answer questions and address concerns to help "bridge" the gap between theory and practice by role-modeling what he believed the new leadership style to be.

The lieutenants training was followed by three similar six-day sessions for sergeants. The chief, again, attended the last hour of each training day to discuss expectations and illustrate practices.

By the end of January 1988, the department had trained 60 police supervisors and managers and conducted 31 full days of instruction. The department then started quality improvement training for all employees, civilian and commissioned. The department established a three-day training session which covered systems thinking, group skills, interpersonal skills, and quality leadership.

For the first time, the department reserved four or five seats in each of the training sessions for other city employees. Although the majority of the participants were police employees, this carried important messages about the importance of teamwork between city agencies.

At the close of the final day, the chief and deputy chief appeared to answer questions and clarify some of the principles of quality leadership. Prior to the chief's arrival, the trainees used a nominal group process to rank order the questions they wanted to ask the chief. The questions were candid, direct and sometimes incisive, and helped to provide important feedback on how the process was going and what the chief needed to do to ensure the transformation to quality improvement and leadership.

To further practice what was being preached, written evaluations were requested after each day's training in order to identify areas of instruction that needed more work. The evaluations gave immediate feedback on how the training was being received. Some veteran police sergeants and lieutenants called it the "best training" they had received during their careers.

By the spring of 1989, a major step had been completed. All 380 employees, civilian and commissioned, had been given training in quality improvement and Quality Leadership. All the employees had a good understanding of the theory and value of the quality movement, and most supported the effort.

Promotions

Another primary issue the department had to face is how promotions would relate to the move towards Quality Leadership. Promotions are the lifeblood of an organization and have tremendous symbolic as well as actual impact. Who gets promoted sends a louder message than any words from management. It sends a strong message throughout the organization as to the direction of the department and the values of top management. Promotion decisions can affect the department for years to come through the people who are selected.

The employees of the department, seeing the strong effort the chief was making for Quality Leadership, expected he would make a strong statement and take strong action on this subject. He did, in a memorandum issued in March 1987 to all personnel. The essence of that memorandum is contained in the paragraph quoted below:

> *I strongly believe that if we are to "practice what we preach" in our Mission Statement (e.g., teamwork, respect, problem-solving, openness, sensitive and community-oriented policing) to achieve excellence in policing and provide leadership to the police profession, we will have to alter the way in which we lead. We must adjust and adapt to the needs of our employees in the workplace and the community we serve. The promotions I make from now on are going to people who have strong interpersonal and facilitative skills, and who can adjust and adapt to these new needs and demands. In order to lead effectively, tomorrow's supervisors and managers, in addition to being totally committed to the Mission of the organization, will have to be able to work in a team, be a coach, accept feedback, ask and listen to others in the team, and facilitate their employees' input and growth in the workplace.*

This new promotion policy was the department's first effort, beyond training, to start running the department in accordance with the new philosophy. Subsequent promotions went to officers who strongly supported Quality Leadership, who were peer group leaders, and who wished to adopt the Quality Leadership style. The department now had a cadre of new leadership to help in the transformation.

In May 1988, three lieutenants and four sergeants were promoted to permanent positions after serving 14 months in an "acting" capacity. They were held in that acting status so that the chief could be sure he was promoting officers who had a commitment to quality.

Conclusion

Based on the experiences of the Madison Police Department, the most important ingredients for successful organizational change are the following:

- ❑ Having a clear vision of where you are going.
- ❑ Having a strong, unyielding commitment from the chief executive.
- ❑ Empowering employees and permitting them to participate in the direction and decisions of the organization.
- ❑ Developing the skills and abilities of leaders as well as employees in the organization and continually training them.
- ❑ Operating the organization for the long-term with persistence and patience.

Organizational change is not easy. If it were, there would be no need for discussions such as this. Constant, on-going improvement would be something all organizations did naturally. Some things about change can be learned beforehand; other things can only be learned by experience. Focusing on the ingredients listed above will give an organization the opportunity to make changes. There are no guarantees, no fool-proof method, however, when it comes to implementing organizational change. It will always be risky business.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THROUGH LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING
Madison Wisconsin
By Chief David C. Couper, Madison Police Department, and Sabine H. Lobitz
Adapted from *Quality Policing: The Madison Experience.* A Police Executive Research Forum Discussion Paper.

COPPS

The Transformation of Police Organizations

Hayward, California

By Chief Joseph E. Brann & Lieutenant Suzanne Whalley

Introduction

Police organizations and their underlying police culture tend to be highly traditional, resistant to change and slow to adapt. Organizational efforts are frequently focused on maintaining traditional police values which support the existing culture. Historically, police evolvement has been largely incremental.

Prior to the introduction of Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS), the policing style or philosophy of the Hayward Police Department had been rooted in a belief that maintaining police efficiency and professionalism was tied to insulating police personnel from politics and community pressures. As with most law enforcement agencies, an emphasis on mobility, improved communication systems and response times had encouraged this trend. Due to population increases, patrol areas had increased in size and the importance of centralization and specialization had been stressed to meet the increased demand for services. One result of such ***improvements*** *was the gradual isolation of the police department from the public it served. Police contacts with the community were limited to calls for service and responses to criminal incidents. The department had become incident driven, response-time oriented, reactive, and responsive to the symptoms rather than the core of the community's problems. The following article is a description of how the Hayward Police Department has undertaken the transformation process of becoming a fully integrated COPPS agency.*

Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving

COPPS is a philosophy that recognizes the importance of participative management, problem solving, visionary leadership and establishing a partnership between the police and the community to share the responsibility for policing. Regular and meaningful contact between the police and the community must be established and maintained to effectively address street conditions and other crimes that lower the quality of life in neighborhoods and communities. The COPPS approach facilitates this interaction by forming a functional partnership between the police, the community, and other public and private service organizations to mutually identify and resolve community problems that impact the quality of community life.

Different than the traditional **programmatic** approach — that witnesses the coming and going of various innovative programs designed to impact crime — COPPS is an overall philosophy which has to be ingrained into the value system of every individual within the department. Fine tuning the value system of the personnel within a highly structured organization such as a police agency is a gradual process that requires continual reinforcement by command and supervisory personnel. Critical to the successful implementation of COPPS is a management understanding that Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving requires embracing the values of and committing to an entirely new philosophy and perspective on policing.

At the very core of the Hayward transition was the recognition that COPPS is a value-oriented rather than a rule-driven philosophy. It required a systems change impacting the very foundation and greatest strength of the organization — the personnel. A systems reappraisal was initiated to facilitate the department's evolution towards COPPS. The initial focus was on personnel systems such as recruiting, hiring, training, performance appraisal evaluations, and promotability guidelines — with the objective being to incorporate and reflect the organizational values in all personnel practices.

Recruiting and Hiring

Normal law enforcement recruitment efforts test for traditional skills, rather than looking towards new outcomes or the development of new skills. For this reason, recruiting and hiring processes were the first targeted. Hayward's testing had been self-limiting — concentrating on a candidate's pre-existing knowledge, physical capabilities and technical skills. The Hayward Police Department had taken a secondary role to the City Personnel Department in determining which qualities to measure. Deemed effective in the past, the city's personnel department focused its energy on candidates who had the best "qualifications" for the job, namely weight in proportion to height, ability to read and write basic English, and physical agility.

To transform the recruiting and hiring processes, the City Personnel Department and the Police Department began jointly exploring the following questions:

1) Overall, what type of candidate, possessing what types of skills is being recruited?
2) What specific knowledge, skills and abilities reflect the COPPS philosophy — particularly problem solving abilities and sensitivity to the needs of the community?
3) How can these attributes best be identified through the initial screening process?

Before answering these questions, an analysis of Hayward's population was conducted. Not surprisingly, this process revealed that the city has a diverse ethnic make-up. To promote sensitivity to the needs of the community, it was acknowledged that the city's work force needed to reflect the community's diversity. In addition, the command staff of the police department worked closely with the entrance hiring psychologist to develop a profile of an effective Hayward COPPS officer. This information was then incorporated into the screening criteria for hiring.

These issues had not previously been an integral part of the hiring process. The previous stereotypical testing had evaluated traditional policing skills, but had not explored a candidate's ability to learn, problem-solve or appraise situations for long-term solutions. While the profile of the ideal COPPS officer and employee continues to evolve — the new recruitment perspective, coupled with mandated traditional policing skills, has begun to glean individuals who possess both a conceptual understanding and applicable skills for problem solving and dealing with the complexities of human behavior.

Training and Appraisal Evaluations

A true organizational transition to community oriented service requires both recruitment of personnel who possess values consistent with the COPPS philosophy, as well as training and reinforcement efforts directed to existing sworn and non-sworn personnel. Thus, the training and performance evaluation systems were next to be reappraised. It is imperative that both sworn and civilian personnel receive COPPS training to provide a clear and thorough understanding of the history, philosophy, and transition process to Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving. It is the COPPS perspective that all employees — non-sworn, sworn, clerical and command staff — are involved in delivering services to the community. The roles, responsibilities and expectations of each employee in the organization must be addressed.

Hayward Police Department's initial training was directed to management and supervisory personnel. A successful transition is directly linked to the commitment and understanding of management and supervisory personnel. The change that is envisioned will not become a reality if the values and concepts are not assimilated and lived organizationally from the top down. Training was designed to assist management and supervisory personnel accomplish the department's goal of reinforcing COPPS values, modifying the existing police culture and strategically transitioning the organization from traditional policing to a COPPS philosophy. Specifically, *Management Leadership Training* promoted a management and leadership philosophy consistent with the City of Hayward's Values Statement. This statement (see article, ***A Change In Policing Philosophy,*** in Section I) emphasizes the delivery of quality service to the city's residents and recognizes and values the contributions of city employees in the delivery of such services. In addition, *KASET Training,* which focused on *coaching extraordinary customer relations, and creating satisfied citizens and customers for local government,* provided all employees with an understanding of, as well as additional skills in creating positive outcomes.

There was also extensive discussion and consideration of the various organizational changes necessary to implement the COPPS philosophy. Changes desired throughout the organization, and specifically at the line-level, required a different management and supervisory perspective. In addition to the previously noted changes needed in the selection process, training focus and performance appraisals, promotional and reward practices for personnel also had to be modified to reflect the new criteria.

In short, reinforcement and institutionalization efforts had to be implemented to transform long held perceptions and attitudes about what constitutes *real* police work. This internal organizational change process is expected to be laborious and slow. Crucial to a successful transition, however, is creating an organizational environment that utilizes the Department's values as a guide for the delivery of police services.

The annual Advanced Officers 40 hour Training provided the initial line and staff training. The concepts of COPPS, based on research and theories of such notables as Goldstein, Eck, Spelman and others, were presented in conjunction with police agency site visits to Fresno, Portland, San Diego and Santa Ana. All employees of the Hayward Police Department attended the training. In addition to the general concepts of community policing, the specific refinements that were necessary to the core functions of the department such as management and supervision, service delivery, problem-solving and involvement with the community were covered. Capitalizing on the talent within the department, the training segments were delivered by in-house personnel who could effectively translate this philosophy into the manner that would meet the unique needs of the employees and the community of Hayward. A clear benefit of utilizing in-house instructors was that employees were able to hear command

personnel sincerely support the concepts of *decentralization of authority* and *risk taking.*

To insure that new employees understand COPPS concepts, the in-house academy and the Field Training Officer's programs now provide training in COPPS. In addition, the police chief and staff are working with police academies to refine course content to include community oriented policing for recruits during the Basic Academy.

Evaluation and Reward Systems

The introductory training courses are merely the beginning of the total transition effort. It is recognized that continuous reinforcement is required if the COPPS philosophy is to ultimately mold the basic value system of all Hayward Police Department employees — and of the organization itself. To meet this need, the evaluation process and reward systems also needed to be changed to continually encourage and support the community oriented policing approach.

Emphasizing quality over quantity represents a major difference between traditional policing and community oriented policing. Previously, Hayward's performance appraisal evaluations placed emphasis on quantitative measurements such as arrest stats, numbers of citations, response times and number of calls for service. These measures do not provide a basis for recognizing or rewarding behavior or performance that is consistent with community oriented policing efforts.

To promote and validate the COPPS commitment to the delivery of quality service and creative problem solving, an evaluation process is necessary that allows for realistic, subjective assessments of how well a call for service is handled and what type of problem solving approaches were used to reach a solution for the problem. The performance evaluation process must heavily rely on the input of the employee. Identified significant events, performance and new goals (personal or departmental) that further the department's commitment to community policing and problem solving are recognized. The evaluation process is intended to be of benefit not only to the employees, but to the Department as a whole, and to the Hayward Community.

True to the philosophy of valuing the employee, recommendations for refinement of the evaluation process were solicited from managers, supervisors and line personnel. Consistent with the new decentralized organizational focus, all work units are devising their own evaluation instruments and processes. Each is being designed around the specific services the work unit provides, emphasizing creative solutions and problem solving approaches.

Other reward systems which promote COPPS and reinforce employees' community oriented and problem solving approaches include broadcasting and communicating such efforts through supervisors' logs, a COPPS newsletter, city-wide recognition of extraordinary customer service efforts, and commendations for creative problem solving approaches taken by employees. Public acknowledgments are not limited to just the activities of sworn personnel — recognition is given to all levels of the organization for excellence in adopting the COPPS philosophy.

Promotional Practices

To validate and complement the COPPS philosophy, and provide recognition and reward to employees who demonstrate commitment to the values and understanding of COPPS, the promotional practices and policies of the department have also been retooled. Working with the city's personnel department, new rating instruments — for both the written and oral exams — have been developed to reflect COPPS concepts and values. These rating instruments contain guidelines which help the evaluators understand the shift in values and behaviors which are necessary for a police agency to move from a traditional policing style towards one that embraces the COPPS philosophy.

Knowledgeable evaluators are critical to this process. Every possible effort is made to select promotional board representatives who are from agencies actively engaged in community policing. Evaluators who possess an understanding of community policing theory and concepts and problem solving strategies are more likely to be effective in screening candidates in a manner that is consistent with our organizational expectations.

One of the best indicators of a candidate's potential for future performance is their prior performance and behavior. Recognizing this, a new phase was added to the department's promotional test. Labeled the *promotability* phase, this process focuses on the candidate's performance as it relates to key organizational values and behavioral dimensions.

This assessment process is conducted by in-house personnel and is designed to evaluate the candidate's present and past experience and performance, both on and off the job, as they relate to the particular promotional position. The promotability assessment is based on documentation and materials submitted by the candidate to an internal assessment panel. The rating panel is comprised of experienced supervisors or managers from the rank that is being tested for, in addition to raters from the next higher rank in the organization. Typical of the dimensions being assessed are leadership, analytical skills, decision-making abilities, communication skills, interpersonal skills, and professional contributions.

The benefits of having a promotability phase extend to both the employee and the organization. Employees recognize that they are being acknowledged for their performance efforts sustained throughout the course of their careers, while the organization is afforded another perspective (one that is based upon individuals who have worked with, supervised, or managed the candidate) in assessing the employee's ability and desire to further the organizational vision.

As a result of these modifications in promotional testing, the rating emphasis has moved beyond the simple evaluation of traditional policing techniques and skills and now considers the organization's vision for the future as well as the new expectations and standards that are attached to the various roles within the department. This redesign of the promotional process reflects the organization's commitment to a future based on those values which support community policing and problem solving.

Involving Other City Departments

The involvement, understanding and commitment of other city departments is critical to the successful implementation of the COPPS philosophy. Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving is not only a police department commitment, but a city-wide commitment to the community. The foundation for involving all city departments was the direct result of the commitment of the Hayward City Manager, Lou Garcia, as well as the willingness of other department heads and their staff to involve themselves in the development of COPPS in Hayward. Together, the police department and all of city government are involved in charting a new course for the community's future.

Initially, Police Chief Joseph Brann made COPPS an integral piece of all department head meetings, discussing the progress of the effort and continually expanding information on the philosophical approach. Ultimately, other department heads began to visualize how their own individual departments could become a stronger part of a community oriented service philosophy for the city. Increased understanding of and excitement about the concept by department heads has resulted in a city-wide commitment to the extent that most departments have now incorporated this philosophy into their own work units.

Conclusion

Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving makes a statement not only to the community, but to the employees of the police department as well. The philosophy embodies who and what the department is all about, and how it intends to deliver services. The success of the organizational introduction and ultimate transition to the COPPS philosophy is dependent on the understanding, involvement, and commitment exhibited at all levels in the department. The foundation that has been laid is solid, but it will be necessary to build on that foundation through further modifications as the experience base with COPPS develops and evolves.

The members of the Hayward Police Department have joined in a partnership with their community. Through collaboration, drawing on their respective strengths and engaging in joint problem solving, a "win-win" situation becomes feasible. Continual redefinition, growth and development of the COPPS philosophy will promote an improved quality of life for the entire community.

COPPS
The Transformation Of Police Organizations
Hayward, California
By Chief Joseph E. Brann & Lieutenant Suzanne Whalley, Hayward Police Department

For contact information, see Hayward Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

IMPLEMENTING POP

THE SAN DIEGO EXPERIENCE

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

By Chief Bob Burgreen and Nancy McPherson, Project Consultant

Introduction

In police organizations, credibility is the basis for building a trusting relationship between the leader and the officers. Credibility is developed from words supported by actions. Police officers have long memories when assessing the merit of a leader's words. We were reminded of the impact of words spoken but not forgotten when two officers of the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) recently went through their old academy files and found a quote that the chief had made to their graduating class: "Random patrol is little better than sleeping on duty."

In light of a decision in the fall of 1989 to implement a problem-oriented approach to policing in all uniformed divisions, the officers who uncovered this statement found congruency in those words. The message given to patrol officers from a command that is supporting and guiding problem-oriented policing (POP) is that officers are expected to use uncommitted time to look for and solve existing beat problems. They are encouraged — indeed, expected — to make decisions about how to analyze problems, develop appropriate responses and interact responsibly with the community in a partnership aimed at solving community problems.

Patrol — The Backbone of Policing

Police executives tout the patrol officer as the "backbone" of the organization, but experience teaches officers that their performance is often measured using numbers — of arrests, contacts, citations — as indicators of efficiency. They are encouraged to seek investigative or specialized assignments as a sign of a progressive career. Any officer who errs or fails elsewhere in the organization goes "back to patrol."

POP acknowledges the patrol officer as a valued member of the organization, the expert on his beat. It is the decentralization of decision making to the beat officer, supported by supervisors who are unthreatened by an officer who uses creativity and innovation to solve beat problems, that reinforces the patrol officer as the hero of the police agency. In San Diego, patrol officers are becoming knowledgeable about the communities they serve, and they are developing previously untapped resources to solve problems that have plagued the community for over 20 years.

SDPD officers are not asked to become social engineers, solving problems that belong to other agencies or individuals. Rather, they use a simple problem-solving model to facilitate the exchange of information between public and private agen-

cies and community groups, and to follow up on actions taken by those who become part of the problem-solving process. In this way, the officers are drawn into a close relationship with communities and government agencies, working together on problematic conditions.

The fostering of effective partnerships to solve problems is crucial as administrators, managers and first-line supervisors deal with the scarcity of new resources and the lack of coordination and awareness of existing resources. POP is very much in its infancy in the SDPD, but our history and commitment to community policing and our experiences with developing and implementing problem-oriented policing lead us to believe that the allocation of time and resources to support problem solving will evoke positive results. Results are visible in officers who enjoy their work and find satisfaction in solving recurring problems, and in community members who are pleased with the effectiveness of police services in San Diego.

Implementing POP means an administrative commitment to the long-term process of building a flexible and dynamic support structure, capable of changing to meet the needs of the organization. Implementation is difficult because it requires scrutiny of virtually every part of the operation, from management style to organizational structure. Additionally, the SDPD has one of the lowest officer per capita ratios of any major metropolitan city, resulting in heavy work loads for the officers. In spite of these challenges, our officers have found time not only to handle beat responsibilities, but to polish their problem-solving skills.

A Commitment to Community Policing

In 1973, the Police Foundation sponsored the Community Profile Development Project (CPDP) in San Diego. This experiment in police innovation was directed by Lt. Norm Stamper (now assistant chief of the SDPD) at the Northern Division. The goal of the experiment was to improve police patrol practices by requiring each participating officer to systematically "profile" his beat to develop knowledge about problems and resources, and to develop patrol strategies to solve beat problems.

The project team developed the CPDP with the rationale that the patrol officer with beat knowledge and accountability is in the best position to make decisions concerning beat problems. The officer's knowledge and ability to solve beat problems were the basis for promoting involvement between the community and the officer.

Following this successful field experiment, the SDPD conducted a week-long training program for all officers in the department. The purpose of the training was to provide a transitional experience to help officers develop a mind-set that would enable them to work effectively within a community policing framework. From its inception, community policing in San Diego has never been a public relations program aimed at making the community feel good about police officers. The CPDP experiment — and community policing as it subsequently evolved — attempted to promote an analytical, thoughtful process of police-community interaction directed toward problem solving.

From the mid-1970s community policing has been the philosophy that guides the attitudes of our officers when interacting with the community. The missing ingredient has been analysis. Problem solving is a tool that supports community policing by encouraging the analysis of problems as its fundamental strategy. POP in San Diego was developed from the ideas and experiences of patrol officers currently in the field, and supervisors and managers who participated in our community policing training.

What is in place is a visible and effective problem-solving structure that promotes the use of a simple model, SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment), to guide patrol officers in solving recurring beat problems.

Introducing POP to the SDPD

In April 1988, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) selected five cities as sites for a field experiment in POP. Funding was provided by the Bureau of Justice Assistance for technical support and equipment. The cities involved in the Problem-Oriented Approach to Drug Enforcement were Tampa, Atlanta, Philadelphia, Tulsa and San Diego. The link between the cities and PERF was a field technical assistance coordinator (FTAC), a local person hired by PERF to work with the agency in a POP program. The FTAC, as an outsider, was not responsible to follow the department chain of command and could communicate project goals or barriers at any level either within or outside the agency.

Each city was asked to develop a problem-oriented strategy to tackle neighborhood drug problems. In San Diego, a management team comprised of personnel from all levels of the organization was formed to address issues relating to the project. Team members knew very little about POP or what was expected from the project at the beginning, and the team meetings were used to share information and ideas about how to implement POP.

Team members and leaders changed often due to transfers and promotions, but the changes actually had a positive effect, since more department personnel were exposed to the project, generating more support and interest for POP efforts.

An advisory board consisting of a cross-section of community institutions and professionals was developed. The purpose of the advisory board was to bring people with agency authority into the project to provide resources and community support for POP. The board met regularly for the first three months of the project and then dissolved to become part of the newly formed Problem Analysis Advisory Committee (PAAC).

Two management team members made a site visit to Newport News, where the National Institute of Justice had sponsored the first field test in POP in 1985. Borrowing from that city's experiences, the team members suggested that San Diego create a PAAC similar to one at Newport News, but including agency representatives from outside the department. The PAAC was designed to serve as a monthly forum to educate officers about public, private and community agencies that could assist them in solving problems. The PAAC also sponsors brainstorming sessions with patrol officers in various stages of problem solving. Chaired by a field operations commander, the PAAC's format is very informal. Feedback from officers who attend the monthly meetings is that the information is both interesting and valuable.

In July 1988, PERF's Washington project team conducted an eight-hour training session in POP for the management team, nine officers from the Southeast Division (site of the field experiment) and four officers and two sergeants from a proactive unit, the Walking Enforcement Campaign Against Narcotics (WECAN). Two WECAN officers who attended this training worked the first successful POP project, which resulted in a new working relationship between the San Diego Housing Commission and the SDPD. For the first time in the history of the Housing Commission, a Section 8 tenant involved in illegal narcotic activity was disqualified for Section 8 benefits on the basis of a police officer's report.

In October 1988, the FTAC moved her office from headquarters, where she had been less accessible to WECAN officers, to Southeast, where she could work more closely with the nine patrol officers assigned to a POP target area. Officers outside the target area began to ask for training after observing the activity and resources offered to the target officers. The eight-hour training course was shortened to a two-and-one-half-hour "nuts and bolts" training session using group instruction and case studies to introduce POP concepts and encourage the officers to apply them. Feedback from participants and observers of both training courses supported the belief that the short course provided the necessary tools for officers to learn

about and use POP. Overtime and time out-of-service were also minimized with the shorter course. POP began to receive attention at the command office when two second watch patrol officers, who had not completed training, asked for assistance in applying POP to an 80-unit apartment complex infested with narcotic activity.

The officers' efforts resulted in five search warrants being served simultaneously at the complex, eviction of problem tenants, new resident management and a management company that cooperated fully with the police to clean up the complex. The officers received commanding officer's citations and were recognized for their work not only in the department newspaper but in several outside publications. More officers requested POP training, with the eventual result that all patrol officers and investigators at the command office completed training.

As a grass roots program, POP flourished as Southeast officers identified beat problems and initiated POP projects themselves. In May 1989, their effectiveness in creatively solving beat problems was recognized by the National League of Cities, which awarded the San Diego Police Department a 1989 Innovations Award for being one of the nation's top three drug enforcement programs.

In July 1989, it was decided to implement POP in all uniformed divisions and an implementation plan was developed. The FTAC was hired by the department as a private contractor to coordinate the implementation process. To ensure continuity of the program and to support the coordinator's role of identifying and removing barriers to implementation without discomfort over chain-of-command issues, the coordinator position was made a civilian one.

Implementation Strategies

Taking a program that was successfully coordinated and managed by a few people at one division and implementing it department-wide is a major challenge for any organization. The SDPD has seven divisions, each a unique entity serving a variety of community needs and demographics. Ensuring the viability of POP means recognizing and enhancing the diversity in our own agency as well as in the community. A viable program must also acknowledge that existing organizational practices may not encourage problem solving by officers. Officers who are not rewarded or recognized for investing time and energy in using creativity and innovation to solve problems will doubt the department's commitment to POP. Implementing change in any organization must be done thoughtfully and carefully as there are rarely shortcuts in the process of working through resistance and fears.

In January 1990, 22 administrators, managers, first-line supervisors, officers and civilians from SDPD were invited to attend an all-day workshop to brainstorm strategies for an Implementation Advisory Group (IAG). The purpose of the workshop was to address steps that must be taken by the department to ensure that POP is *flexible*, changing to fit the needs of the department and the community; *viable*, continually used by officers to address beat problems; and *interesting*, increasing job satisfaction for officers.

A slower pace was adopted for the workshop, specifically to allow time for thoughtful, analytical discussions. From this group of creative and progressive thinkers came a myriad of ideas to guide the work of implementation. Then the challenge began as the newly formed IAG, a committee of 13, evaluated the results of the workshop and began to translate ideas into actions — actions that supported the department's commitment to problem solving.

Summary

POP is not a short-term anesthetic to appease dissatisfied citizens or camouflage serious police and community problems. It requires an ongoing process of education, training and resource devel-

opment, which the SDPD command staff supports as a viable method of policing in our community.

The educational process includes community members and city officials who must understand that POP is a strategy that leads officers toward finding long-term solutions to community problems. If the people we serve expect us to make arrests for every problem, we must explain the theory of problem solving and ask them to work with us as partners to address the conditions that generate problems. Our community has shown support for POP, as demonstrated by requests from individuals and groups to make neighborhood problems POP projects. City officials, able to see the results of problems being solved in their districts, have also shown interest in and support for the program.

Five years from now, members of the SDPD will not be asking — as we have with other good programs — "Whatever happened to POP?" The interest and enthusiasm shown by our officers will be bolstered by an agency that encourages and rewards initiative and creativity in solving community problems.

IMPLEMENTING POP
The San Diego Experience
San Diego, California
By Chief Bob Burgreen and Nancy McPherson, Project Consultant Problem-Oriented Policing Program, San Diego Police Department
First appeared in *The Police Chief Magazine*, October, 1990.

For contact information, see San Diego Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Problem-Oriented Policing

Sacramento, California

By Sergeant Rickey Jones and Sergeant Steve Segura

Introduction

Sacramento, the capitol of California, is a beautiful city located in the heart of the state, approximately 90 miles east of San Francisco. This multi-racial community is made up of diverse ethnic groups and socio-economic conditions. Like many California cities, Sacramento is experiencing a period of rapid population growth, (381,000 within city limits; approximately 1 million including surrounding areas) resulting in a dramatic increase in the associated problems of crime and social disorder. Also, like many other cities, Sacramento's police department has not kept pace with the population or crime increases in terms of hiring more police officers (police staffing ratio: less then 1.5 per 1,000 citizens; 610 officers).

Because of this situation, calls for police services in Sacramento are at an all time high. The police department's ability to respond quickly to these calls, however, is increasingly hindered because the available cars are continually "tied up" with a few particular problems in the districts that consume all of the time and resources.

Faced with the dilemmas of rapid population growth, increasing crime rates, more calls for service, a poor officer-to-citizen ratio, and the growing inability to cure community ills, the Sacramento Police Department sought answers. Aware that they could not hire enough officers to keep up with the steady increase in community related problems, they looked for other approaches that could more effectively address crime issues.

Problem-Oriented Policing

After researching innovative policing approaches being implemented by various law enforcement agencies throughout the nation, Sacramento Police Department officials concluded that the concepts of Community Policing and Problem-Oriented-Policing (POP) could effectively be used to address many of Sacramento's problems.

The Department adopted a five year plan that will eventually affect the entire department including the command officers (chief of police, captains, lieutenants, etc.), sergeants, patrol officers, administrative analysts, and clerical support; and will ultimately extend to community-based policing. Problem-Oriented Policing is one of the key concepts being used to achieve the goals of establishing Community-Oriented Policing.

During the initial phase, the Department is seeking strategies to eliminate chronic problems such as drug houses and prostitution, so that patrol offic-

ers' time will no longer be totally dominated by these problems. The primary objective of POP interventions is to reduce drug-related crimes in neighborhoods where intense traditional enforcement has met with limited success by introducing effective, long-term strategies to reduce the demand for drugs.

Problem-Oriented Policing Implementation Strategies

A POP coordinator, POP field supervisor and eight POP (resource) officers have been committed to the POP program, and currently form the backbone of the Department's strategy. The coordinator oversees the full department and city-wide implementation of the POP program, to assure conformity with the Department's overall five-year plan to become a community-based policing agency. In addition, the coordinator oversees the POP training of police department personnel and coordinates with other resources to develop strategies and solutions to neighborhood and police problems. The coordinator also provides feedback to the community to build and maintain a high level of interest in this non-traditional policing approach.

The eight POP officers, chosen from the patrol division, are assigned to the POP field supervisor and operate out of the patrol division. They were provided with a 160 hour comprehensive training program regarding the POP philosophy and approach to policing, and also including "training for trainers." The POP officers train other officers, as well as local government employers, community groups, and target area community representatives. A major component of the Sacramento POP program is to directly involve patrol officers in community problem-solving rather than creating selected special units for this purpose.

Upon completion of the training program, the eight officers began working on target area projects. The Sacramento Police Department is using a concept of district integrity, wherein the resource officer always involves the district officer with the project. The resource officers assist with the S.A.R.A. (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) strategy for selection of area projects and with preparing and presenting a plan of action. As a resource to the district officers, they also conduct project surveys, and evaluate the success of the projects.

To strengthen POP efforts, the Police Department has enhanced its communications networks and cooperation with a host of city and county agencies which include: the City Council, City Manager's Office, City Attorney, Probation and Parole Departments, District Attorney, Sacramento Housing and Redevelopment Agency, Sacramento Fire Department, Parks and Community Services Department, Planning and Development Department, City Finance, Domestic Relations, and Sacramento area school districts. Additionally, the Department is supporting the development of police, general government, and public and private community partnerships, especially to combat drug problems within the communities.

Community-Oriented Policing

Sacramento Police Department officials are also developing plans to ultimately adopt community-oriented policing. Historically, the police have accepted the responsibility for resolving the problem of crime in the community. Under Community-Oriented Policing/Problem Oriented Policing, Sacramento citizens are being asked to develop a sense of shared responsibility with the police, and to develop neighborhood groups committed to preserving the quality of life within their own areas.

These neighborhood associations will work with the police to develop and maintain a communications network that can provide the necessary information and resources to address and resolve specific neighborhood problems such as drugs and the accompanying fear of crime. Through community interaction and COP and POP approaches,

the department will fashion cooperative efforts to combat mutually identified neighborhood problems, primarily through demand reduction plans and strategies. The goal is to reduce the demand for drugs and thus thwart the drug supply activities that are eroding and threatening the quality of life in affected neighborhoods throughout the city.

Early experiences with neighborhood-oriented policing intervention has shown that such collaboration results in greater community support for the police department. It promotes and sustains a systematic approach for information exchange and the development and implementation of innovative strategies. Ongoing monitoring and evaluations determine the success of resolving the major drug and other crime related neighborhood complaints requiring police intervention.

POP's success continues to manifest in two ways: It is of great assistance in helping officers address issues of community safety; and it restores the belief that the police honestly care.

Through the POP program, the Sacramento Police Department intends to change how the police department, local government, and the community address community problems; and develop non-traditional resources to accomplish problem-solving efforts. The police department must be aware of the various resources and know how to use them — with the common goal being to solve underlying problems and thereby end the repeat calls that drain personnel resources.

PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING
Sacramento, California
By Sergeant Rickey Jones and Sergeant Steve Segura, Sacramento Police Department

For contact information, see Sacramento Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Evaluating Community Policing

New York, New York

Introduction

One of the key questions being asked about the community policing approach is what criteria should be used to judge its success or failure. The following are excerpts from articles adapted from testimony given by three experts on the topic.

Focus on Implementation

Community-oriented, problem-solving policing is a strategy for focusing, organizing, delivering and assessing police services. Basically, community policing aims to: correct problems of street crime, drug dealing and disorder at the neighborhood level; reduce mutual ignorance, suspicion and perceptions of unresponsiveness between the police and citizenry on the neighborhood level; reduce the sense of fear and insecurity that people experience; and assist communities in using their own resources to control crime and disorder.

While indicators of these achievements are obviously pertinent, exaggerated expectations and a premature emphasis on their importance will distort implementation of the strategy and limit the city's opportunity to learn about its potential.

Implementation Questions

In the early stages of implementation, it is not logical to assume that traditional outcome indicators (e.g., crime and clearance rates, calls for service, citizen complaints, corruption complaints) are going to change radically, or that, if they do change, the change can be attributed to community policing. To make that claim, it must first be established that community policing has, in fact, been successfully implemented — thus the focus must be on assessing the implementation process itself.

1) Have the police engaged local residents, merchants and organizations in a problem-solving process?

2) Are neighborhood people participating in a meaningful process of problem identification, analysis and strategy planning?

3) Are the police implementing problem-solving strategies that involve specific roles for local groups and residents, as well as other public and private agencies in the community?

4) What are the working relationships between police and citizens; what has and has not been accomplished by the problem-solving strategies; are police officials listening to this feedback?

5) Are implemented problem-solving strategies being monitored? If not, why not? If so, what obstacles to effective problem-solving are there? What are the police department and/or other public agencies doing to overcome those obstacles?

6) Do the various problem-solving strategies work? If not, why not? What can be

learned from the implementation processes; how can they be modified to improve their effectiveness?

7) Has the engagement between the police and the community been effective? Do residents, merchants and organizations see the police as accessible and responsive to their concerns? Do they have some understanding of what the police are doing to address community conditions that are of concern? Are they themselves involved in efforts to correct the problems?

Using Traditional Data

When and where community policing is successfully implemented, it is appropriate to expect changes in some of the conventional indicators of police activity. But dramatic changes should not be expected until a sufficient amount of time has passed (three to five years) for significant implementation to have been achieved. Assessment efforts should look carefully at correlations, if any, between these conventional outcome measurements and the levels of progress achieved in implementing community policing.

(Adapted from "Focus on Implementation" by Jerome E. McElroy, Executive Director, New York City Criminal Justice Agency)

Analyzing Multiple Factors

Given the degree of change represented by community policing, it is reasonable to assume that traditional measures of performance will not alone be sufficient to gauge success and by themselves might be misleading. A new approach to measurement and new indicators of success will have to be introduced and become understood by policy makers and the public.

Valid evaluation of community policing will depend in part on the development of base-line data for before and after comparisons. Specifying now how success will be measured will stabilize expectations about what will happen, and when. Community policing will not be implemented overnight, nor will some of its most promising outcomes be realized in the short term. It would be unreasonable and even dangerous to expect too much too soon. But it is not unreasonable to establish a picture of the route to be followed, a timetable for reaching various milestones and intermediate feedback that enables the governing body and the public to assess progress made.

New Measures

It is vitally important that new measures believed to capture the progress toward and success of community policing be defined operationally, so that base-line data can be collected before implementation begins or is very far along. Close attention must be paid to the way the specific measures, like community involvement, are put into effect by the department, because this will determine the kind of specific information about the present that will be available in the future.

Further, "community level" needs to be defined. For purposes of both managerial control and public accountability, community policing requires the specifications of community-level data that will routinely be collected and reported. Even if for some purposes, precincts are the community unit used, data related to new measures should be collected and coded so that sub-areas of precincts can be analyzed in other aggregations, such as community planning districts or city council districts.

Obtaining systematic feedback from residents in each community is a central, not peripheral, part of community policing. Some of the measure of community policing success can best be obtained from periodic random sample surveys, patterned after national victimization surveys, but tailored to the particular concerns of community policing.

Resident Surveys

Resident survey data are both operationally useful information at a given time and, by comparing

responses over time, a significant measure of the impact of community policing. Resident surveys need to be developed and administered which measure factors such as:

- Resident satisfaction with services rendered (e.g., response time, courtesy, thoroughness, efficiency and appearance, and aspects of station house operations).
- Residents' feelings of safety in their community.
- Whether concerns about safety affect residents' mobility within their community.
- Whether residents perceive greater police presence.
- Whether residents have talked to police officers in their community outside of reporting victimizations or other traditional encounters.
- Whether residents know any officers serving in their community by name.
- Whether residents have participated in any public safety-related community organizations or activities.
- Whether residents know who to call if they have a problem or suggestion.
- Whether residents observe persistent law-breaking, such as street drug sales or disorderly situations in their community.
- Resident perceptions of police integrity, fairness and restraint in using force.

Police Officer Surveys

In addition to resident surveys, there should be periodic surveys of officers involved in implementing community policing. The dispositions of implementers has been identified as a key factor affecting the success of community policing implementation. The challenge of overcoming cynicism and resistance within the ranks is crucial. Similarly, there is a need to change traditional organizational practices and reward systems to support the new values and emphasis of community policing.

Surveys of officers at all levels, with the ability to aggregate responses by community, would provide essential feedback on the progress being made, including the success of the substantial investments made in training for community policing.

Other Indicators

Other indicators to measure that will prove useful in evaluating performance involve the category "beat coverage" and include such factors, reported at the community level, as:

- Total police officers on patrol each day.
- Number of beats covered per tour and daily.
- Number of radio cars deployed per day.
- Percentage of time responding to calls.
- Dispatch and response time data for crimes and emergencies.
- Arrest-to-arraignment elapsed time.

Some additional measures that directly reflect improvements expected from community policing include:

- As a measure of problem-solving, tracking the 911 calls from the same address (studies have shown that a significant percentage of 911 calls come from repeat locations suggesting that problems were responded to but not solved).
- The number of officers on foot patrol, and the stability of assignments of specific officers to specific beats.
- The scale of private security investments in each community over time.

Analyzing Many Factors

The comprehensive character of community policing, the complex set of factors that needs to occur en route to full implementation, and the

dramatic increase in the number of regularly observed units of analysis ("communities") make it desirable and feasible to develop a multi-factor model of police performance. This model, called multivariate analysis, would take into account resources deployed, trends in crime and demand for service, social and economic conditions and various intermediate and ultimate measures of the progress and success of community policing. It would represent a quantum leap in the quality of feedback available to decision-makers and the public.

Multivariate analysis, using historical experience with traditional measures, would enable police planners to predict patterns of calls for service, reported crimes, clearance rates, citizen complaints and other traditional measures, and compare actual with predicted levels, as community policing is introduced and becomes established. New measures would lack historical trends at the outset, but the gradual introduction of community policing in successive precincts would allow predictions and comparisons to be developed from statistically similar communities.

This approach is particularly relevant to measuring the success of community policing because of its emphasis on prevention. Multivariate models that are rigorously developed and refined can provide inferential evidence of effectiveness by comparing what is to what would be expected if there had been no intervention. It should also enable the police department and others to see the relative impact on the progress and success of community policing of such factors as implementation delays or changing social or economic factors included in the model. While no agency would want to report publicly the early results from the development of a planning and performance measurement tool such as described here, within a year or two of its development and use, the public should be made privy to the more powerful picture of performance and understanding of performance it provides.

(Adapted from "Analyzing Multiple Factors" by Dennis C. Smith, Associate Professor, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Services at New York University)

Linking Effort and Effect

Community policing focuses on impact and effect, rather than on the traditional public sector obsession with measuring and defending effort. Neither the community nor the police can rest with statements like "50 arrests were made in this area over the past six months" or "we have assigned 10 more officers to this side of the city." The question of central importance is, "What impact do police and neighborhood efforts have on crime, fear of crime and the quality of life in the neighborhood?" — in short, are neighborhoods getting safer?

Measurement Issues

To know if and when changes are coming about under community policing, there must be measurement and evaluation in four broad areas:

Internal institutional processes: In order for community policing to take root in traditional police departments, many internal institutional arrangements must be altered. Changes in institutional processes can be measured by examining plans for and the implementation of new systems that address the institutional matters.

Project implementation: Monitoring project implementation is another way of getting an idea of the success or failure of the changes brought about by community policing. There should be a systematic assessment of how the various elements of community policing are implemented including whether the project personnel understood the goals and objectives of the change, how the community was involved in planning and implementation, whether the necessary resources were available to support the project, and how the "treatment" was delivered. Such implementation questions provide information that helps reveal how a project is unfolding, allows for monitoring and correcting problems before they get out of control, and links efforts directly to effects.

Police and community outputs: The measurement of police and community outputs is also fundamental to understanding community policing. Traditional measures of success, however, (e.g., calls for service, types of crime reported, manpower levels) are inappropriate as they speak only to effort and not to effects. These levels of outputs must be linked to effects to determine success levels.

Quantitative and qualitative impacts: Impact assessments is perhaps the area of greatest void in police measurement. Impact used to be assumed in crime statistics, but no longer is. By impact, we mean a quantitative and/or qualitative change in the object of change. Are communities safer? Is there more or less fear of crime? Has the real victimization rate gone up or down? Are citizens more or less satisfied with the services they are receiving? Is the community becoming more or less stabilized, or able to resist criminal invasion?

These are the questions about the ultimate changes expected from community policing. They are difficult to measure, but without their measurement, we won't have a clue whether anything has changed.

(Adapted from "Linking Effort and Effect" by Jack R. Greene, Professor of Criminal Justice and Director of the Center for Public Policy, Temple University)

EVALUATING COMMUNITY POLICING

New York, New York

In November 1991, the public safety committee of the City Council of New York City heard testimony from several experts about how to measure the success of Police Commissioner Lee Brown's Safe Streets/Safe City community policing program in New York. The original articles, from which the above excerpts were derived, were adapted from testimony given by three of those experts and were first presented in the article, "Judging community policing: Three views." Reprinted with permission from Law Enforcement News, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York City, January 15, 1992.

SECTION III

PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGIES AND SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY

Key Elements of Problem-Oriented Policing

- A problem is the basic unit of police work rather than a crime, a case, a call, or an incident. A problem is a group or pattern of crimes, cases, calls, or incidents.

- A problem is something that concerns or causes harm to citizens, not just the police. Things that concern only police officers are important, but they are not problems in this sense of the term.

- Addressing problems means more than quick fixes; it means dealing with conditions that create problems.

- Police officers must routinely and systematically investigate problems before trying to solve them, just as they routinely and systematically investigate crimes before making an arrest. Individual officers and the department as a whole must develop routines and systems for investigating problems.

- The investigation of problems must be thorough even though it may not need to be complicated. This principle is as true for problem investigation as it is for criminal investigation.

- Problems must be described precisely and accurately and broken down into specific aspects of the problem. Problems often aren't what they first appear to be.

- Problems must be understood in terms of the various interests at stake. Individuals and groups of people are affected in different ways by a problem and have different ideas about what should be done about the problem.

- The way the problem is currently being handled must be understood and the limits of effectiveness must be openly acknowledged in order to come up with a better response.

- Initially, any and all possible responses to a problem should be considered so as not to cut short potentially effective responses. Suggested responses should follow from what is learned during the investigation. They should not be limited to, nor rule out, the use of arrest.

- The police must pro-actively try to solve problems rather than just react to the harmful consequences of problems.

- The police department must increase police officers' and detectives' freedom to make or participate in important decisions. At the same time, officers must be accountable for their decision-making.

- The effectiveness of new responses must be evaluated so these results can be shared with other police officers and so the department can systematically learn what does and does not work.

Systematic Inquiry Through "S.A.R.A."

Scanning, Analysis, Response & Assessment

Introduction

Problem-oriented policing is the outgrowth of 20 years of research into police operations that converged into three main themes: ***increased effectiveness*** *by attacking underlying problems that give rise to incidents that consume patrol and detective time;* ***reliance on the expertise and creativity of line officers*** *to study problems carefully and develop innovative solutions; and* ***closer involvement with the public*** *to make sure that the police are addressing the needs of citizens. The strategy known by the acronym "S.A.R.A.," consists of four parts.*

Scanning — Identify Problems

Scanning entails taking a broad and intensive view, over time, of a particular area (a beat patrol, neighborhood or community) or series of crimes, to accurately define the problems to be addressed. This process involves identifying the underlying patterns and conditions seen by the community as problems — rather than continuously responding to individual crime incidents as separate, unrelated events.

Problems are defined as multiple (two or more) incidents that are similar in nature, that are causing harm or have the potential to cause harm, and that the public expects or desires the police agency to resolve. Problems are identified through site visits to observe activities and locations, or through discussions with residents and/or other officers.

Instead of relying upon broad, offense categories — such as robbery or burglary, for example — officers are encouraged to group individual related incidents that come to their attention as particular types of "problems" and define these problems in more precise and therefore useful terms. For example, an incident that typically would be classified simply as a "robbery" might be seen as part of a pattern of *prostitution-related robberies committed by transvestites in center-city hotels.*

Possible classifications might include:

- ❑ Crime problems (drugs, theft, burglary, robbery, auto theft, vice).
- ❑ Environmental problems (litter, trash, abandoned autos, abandoned buildings, etc.).
- ❑ Locations and time periods.
- ❑ Individuals involved.

Analysis — Collect and Analyze Information

Reflecting the emergency response mode of traditional law enforcement, crime *analysis* has often been left out of police work. Typically,

police go straight from scanning to response. The *Analysis stage,* however is the heart of the problem-solving process and must be as thorough, creative, and innovative as the response because the characteristics of each problem vary. If an officer understands all the components of a problem, it is more likely that a custom-made response can be developed to fit the problem.

To effectively address any given problem, officers must collect information from a variety of public and private sources — not just police data — about the actors, incidents, and responses already tried to deal with the problem. Possible sources might include:

- ❑ Complainant/victim/defendant/ witness interviews.
- ❑ Formal/informal surveys of area residents.
- ❑ Personal observations.
- ❑ Conversations with other fellow officers.
- ❑ Interviews with other social service agencies.
- ❑ Interviews with private agencies.
- ❑ Community/business association meetings.
- ❑ Crime analysis reports.
- ❑ Arrest reports.
- ❑ Criminal extracts & photos for a defendant book.

The analysis model below breaks the problem data into three components — actors, incidents, and current responses — and provides a checklist to consider when studying a problem.

Actors	Incidents	Current Responses
Victims Life-style Security measures taken Victimization history **Offenders** Identity and physical description Life-style, education, employment history Criminal history **Third parties** Personal data Connection to victimization	**Sequence of events** Events preceding act Event itself Events following criminal act **Physical contact** Time Location Access control and surveillance **Social context** Likelihood and probable actions of witnesses Apparent attitude of residents toward neighborhood	**Community** Neighborhood affected by problem City as a whole People outside the city **Institutional** Criminal justice agencies Other public agencies Mass media Business sector

Response — Cooperatively Develop and Implement Solutions With Other Agencies and the Public

A complete analysis will provide data that reveals the underlying nature of the problem, perhaps clarifying or redefining it. Before initiating a response (action plan), all the components of the community who are affected should be in agreement as to the nature of the problem.

Working with citizens, businesses, and public and private agencies, officers can tailor an action plan to the specific characteristics of the problem. Goals and objectives are determined, as well as whether there is a need for further data collection.

Solutions may go beyond traditional criminal justice system remedies to include other community agencies or organizations. Possible actions to be considered might include:

- ❑ High visibility patrol.
- ❑ Community meetings.
- ❑ Crime prevention meetings.
- ❑ Storefront referrals.
- ❑ Confrontational problem solving meetings.
- ❑ Block or Neighborhood Watch programs.
- ❑ Obtaining assistance from other police division units/social/governmental/private agencies:

  The Mayor's Office
  The Court System
  The District Attorney's Office
  The City Attorney's Office
  The School System
  Department of Human Services
  Department of Health
  Department of Public Welfare
  Department of Recreation
  Housing Commission
  Licenses and Inspection
  Better Business Bureau
  Utility Companies
  Private Business sector
  Media

- ❑ Arrests.
- ❑ Initiating an eviction process.
- ❑ Asset Forfeiture.
- ❑ Developing a Tactical Action Plan.
- ❑ Involving the Drug Abatement Task Force.

Some responses may remove the problem from police consideration altogether and assign the problem to an agency that can provide a more effective response.

Assessment — Evaluate Strategy Effectiveness

Finally, the impact of the intervention efforts must be evaluated to see if the desired goals and objectives were achieved, and if the problems were actually solved or alleviated. Findings should address why the problem was or was not solved or reduced in scope. Effective assessments might involve:

- ❑ Comparing crime reports and calls for service statistics for the time periods before, during, and after intervention.
- ❑ Comparing resident or complainant attitudes and perceptions before and after intervention.
- ❑ Maintaining a rapport with the original complainant to keep abreast of any further problems.
- ❑ Maintaining contact with those agencies providing assistance.

- ❑ Ongoing monitoring (response has been initiated and the problem needs further assessment).

Assessments should also consider any positive and negative *effects* (by-product outcomes that were not included in the specific goals or objectives). If not considered, such effects may produce major unintended consequences.

Accurate assessment allows officers to determine if the solution is working. If it isn't, the results of the assessment may be used to revise the response, collect more data, or even redefine the problem. In addition, the officer responsible for devising the solution can take credit for a successful outcome.

SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY THROUGH "S.A.R.A."
Scanning, Analysis, Response & Assessment
Adapted in part from *Problem-Oriented Policing* by William Spelman and John E. Eck.
First appeared in *Research in Brief*, January 1987, National Institute of Justice.

THE BROKEN-WINDOW THEORY OF URBAN DECAY

By John Leo

Introduction

Question: *Graffiti is a big issue in Los Angeles, litter is a major issue in downtown Philadelphia, and panhandling is emerging as a dominant issue in a dozen cities. Why should this be so? Aren't most of these cities swamped with far more urgent social problems?*

Likely answer: *The cities are displaying a significant shift in public attitudes. This shift is strongly in the direction of the "broken window" theory of social decay.*

The theory was outlined in a 1982 article in ***The Atlantic*** *by political scientist James Q. Wilson and criminologist George Kelling. It says this: The key to social decay is a rising level of disorder that residents fail to challenge in time. When broken windows are not fixed, when graffiti and uncollected garbage become regular features and winos begin to doze off on stoops and sidewalks, a powerful signal goes out that the residents of the area have ceased to care about conditions. This leads to a break in morale and a feeling that events are out of control. Landlords don't make repairs. Vandalism spreads. The stage is set for prostitutes, druggies and criminals to drift in, and the neighborhood goes under.*

Disorder and Decline

The broken-window theory is largely upheld by a book *Disorder and Decline*, a study of 40 urban neighborhoods by Wesly Skogan, professor of political science at Northwestern. But mayors and councilmen and city administrators haven't needed to wait for academic proof. More and more, they grasp the idea intuitively. That's why Los Angeles is trying to keep up with the flood of graffiti, why Philadelphia businessmen spent so much money to get the litter out of an 80-block downtown area, and why New York spent tens of millions of dollars to wipe graffiti from its subway system and keep it out.

Minor battles. The major lesson of the broken-window theory is that the crucial battles to save a neighborhood must be fought over apparently minor social infractions, well below the threshold of police response. By the time the offenses are great enough to justify police time and effort, the struggle is often lost.

This is the real reason — not "the new war on the poor" or "compassion fatigue" — why panhandling has mushroomed into a sizable political issue. In many cities, the life of downtown areas and the remaining stable residential neighborhoods is clearly at stake. Shoppers are increasingly afraid of going downtown, for fear of being

hassled. Polls in cities such as Nashville and San Francisco show that large numbers of people are beginning to feel intimidated and coerced by panhandlers. Even in cities where almost nobody walks, such as Miami, the drifters who clean windshields at red lights have become a serious issue. . . . There is the growing gut feeling, often confused and inarticulated, that things have gone too far and that the quarter given to a panhandler is helping to finance the downward spiral of cities.

A study by social scientists at Columbia University shows that 69 percent of Americans think the homeless should not be allowed to panhandle. This appears to be broken-window sentiment: The study also shows that most people are willing to pay more taxes to solve the problem.

The New York City Transit Authority banned beggars from the subways, lost the right to do so in district court, and then won back the right on appeal. This was an important victory. It was not a triumph of the well-to-do over the poor. A large percentage of riders are blue-collar or poor themselves. It was not a victory for compassion fatigue — polls showed that sympathy for the plight of beggars and the homeless actually increased among the ridership after the court decision. Felonies decreased 15 percent. . . .

The Transit Authority acted on the proposition that the majority is right in claiming that public spaces must be kept open for orderly public use, free of hassles or coercion. Ten years ago, the suit probably could not have been filed in New York. It would have been out of bounds politically as an attack on social victims or individual freedoms.

But time marches on. I think we are coming to the end of a 25-year experiment to see whether we can tolerate the consequences of social policies based entirely on individual rights and compassion. In my opinion, the answer is in: We can't.

The disaster of deinstitutionalization is part of this. So is the gradual surrender of parks, bus depots, train stations and other public spaces. There is now a drive to reclaim those spaces and to find a better balance between the rights of the community and the rights of the individual. No one knows how this will develop, but the impatience with the old policies is all around us and it is starting to flow into the political mainstream.

THE BROKEN-WINDOW THEORY OF URBAN DECAY
By John Leo
Adapted from *"The Broken-Window Theory of Urban Decay"*
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SECTION IV

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

CASE STUDIES

COMMUNITY-LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERSHIPS

By the National Crime Prevention Council

Introduction

In many large cities, suburbs, and rural towns across the country, community leaders are organizing projects and programs that prevent community and family breakdown caused by the use of alcohol and other drugs.

And in many American communities, municipal, county, state, and federal law enforcement officers are successfully working with others to implement programs to reduce the demand for drugs. These programs are providing alternative activities for young boys and girls, drug education and peer pressure resistance courses in schools and youth groups, code enforcement action in drug-filled neighborhoods, clean-up and fix-up projects, and drug awareness forums.

The drug problem will not abate unless community leaders and law enforcement work in close partnership against the use of alcohol and drugs.

Police Working With the Community

The goal of police-community partnerships is generally fourfold:

1) To reduce drug and crime activity in the community.
2) To establish and reinforce anti-drug attitudes, social norms, and behaviors.
3) To establish a community-wide network by which common concerns can be effectively addressed.
4) To enable a community to assume responsibility and take control so that their neighborhood will not collapse from the burden of drugs and related crime.

Sometimes a whole community, or large segments of it, can identify a broad range of needs, design a plan, and make wide-sweeping changes. More likely, a neighborhood will achieve a two-block success, pushing drug activity away from a small section of a larger community. Two-block successes are not to be sneezed at. Small-scale successes are the foundation of long-term victories. A collection of clean, drug-free blocks adds up to a clean housing area, or a clean subdivision, or a clean school district — and a community where residents feel pride in their achievement.

Cleveland, Ohio

The Union Miles Development Corporation, an association formed in the heart of the toughest crime district in Cleveland, Ohio, decided to shut down drug sale sites by combining the efforts of residents, law enforcement, churches, and repre-

sentatives of city agencies. Members of the corporation turned in "hot spot" reports to the police, conducted open air prayer services in known drug trafficking areas, and organized residents into neighborhood street clubs. The police cleaned up two drug trafficking sites, and the residents are planning to convert former crack houses into urgently needed drug rehabilitation centers.

Newport News, Virginia

Newport News, Virginia, has restructured its policing approach to problem-oriented policing (POP). They now focus on four basic principles:

1) Grouping individual incidents into categories that are related and carefully defined. An individual robbery, for example, could be connected to a pattern of drug-related robberies in neighborhood convenience stores.

2) Collecting specific information from a wide variety of police and non-police sources about the problem. The information suggests solutions for this specific pattern of crimes.

3) Working with citizens, businesses, and public and private agencies to devise a program of action to address the problem. Solutions may not be limited to criminal justice system action.

4) Evaluating the efforts to see if they made an impact on the problem.

The benefits of problem-oriented policing extend beyond decreased crime rates. Newport News police officers have found that they could respond to a wide variety of neighborhood problems, including fear of crime. They also found that they could help communities create conditions that would prevent incidents that otherwise would lead to crime and disorder. Additionally, the department has been able to make more efficient use of its resources by solving patterns of crimes instead of individual incidents.

Systems Approach to Community Crime and Drug Prevention

A concept called the Systems Approach to Community Crime and Drug Prevention incorporates the problem-oriented approach in its design. The Systems Approach emphasizes community and interagency partnerships as key to the goals of improving quality of life and reducing crime, the fear of crime, and drug use. Under a project funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice), the approach has been demonstrated in Jacksonville, Florida; New Haven, Connecticut; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Tucson, Arizona.

The Systems Approach is a multi-phase process through which law enforcement agencies work cooperatively with other city and county agencies and the community to collect and analyze local descriptive and crime data, identify and resolve problems or potential problems, and coordinate the delivery of services to meet specific neighborhood or community needs. Planning teams composed of law enforcement, church leaders, citizens groups, business and school representatives, health professionals, municipal agency heads, elected officials, and residents evaluate the data and design pro-active and intervention strategies. These strategies have included programs such as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, drug prevention awareness and education courses, media campaigns, drug-free school zones, and the development of crime prevention coalitions.

Preliminary reports show that this approach has resulted in a better flow of information, increased citizen interest in actively addressing crime and drug problems, decreased "hot spots" of crime and drug activity, and decreased fear of crime.

Tucson, Arizona

In Tucson, elderly minority residents in the neighborhood surrounding Mirasol Park were afraid to use the recreation area because it had been claimed by drug dealers and gangs. The

residents appealed for help to the Tucson Police Department. A planning team formed with representatives from law enforcement, the county Council on Aging, the county Board of Supervisors, La Frontera (a nonprofit drug treatment organization), the Urban League, the state government, and the community. The team first designated the park a "High Drug Traffic Area," subject to vigorous surveillance. When drug activity decreased, the team reclaimed the park with legitimate activities — teen programs, activities for the elderly, and sports events. The drug dealers have moved out of Mirasol Park because of the persistence and determination of this neighborhood partnership.

Police Working With Young People

The greatest untapped resource for preventing drug use is also the most vulnerable victim: a child. Young people reach other young people. They understand each other. They are in the same community — that is, they set the rules for each other by demonstrating approval or disapproval.

Teenagers have ideas and plans and energy. They may have a different perspective from that of adults, but their contributions are valuable and can make a measurable difference. They can see a problem clearly, cut right to the core, and move on to solutions. Historically, communities have thought of young people mostly in terms of whether they need to be "fixed" — ministered to because of pregnancy, truancy, rebelliousness, delinquency, or abuse. In recent years, a number of communities have begun to see young people as "fixers," capable of planning, designing, and implementing programs for themselves, their peers, and their neighborhoods and schools. They organize and perform in anti-drug concerts; they counsel peers; they act as mediators. One group of young people in New York City organizes entire neighborhoods to reclaim their parks from drug dealers and users by devising, publicizing, and carrying out an appealing variety of recreation programs throughout the summer — which also provides a positive activity for other youth.

Young people can help law enforcement in drug prevention by getting the word out — credibly — to other youth. They also help by recruiting their friends into activities that spread the no-drug message.

Law enforcement can help a community's young residents through friendship and support and by lending direction to their creative and constructive efforts to keep themselves safe. Police can serve as mentors, coaches, club counselors, and educators. In a youth-police partnership, the young people should be involved in determining what needs to be done to prevent drugs in the community. They should be allowed to design projects and programs, execute their plans, and evaluate the results. When they are solving community problems, young people have the opportunity to develop skills that will help them as they grow up.

The beneficiaries of a youth-law enforcement partnership are many: the criminal justice system benefits because young people who are engaged in community-building projects are less likely to become involved in illegal activity. The community benefits because young people can work with others to address real needs in the community, such as the safety of a playground. Most important, the young people benefit because they learn that they are responsible and essential members of society.

New York City

In the New York City boroughs of Queens and Brooklyn, police, teenagers, and volunteer adults staff the MAD Unit — a fully equipped Mobile Anti-Drug van that travels to schools, churches, and community centers with anti-drug displays and handouts donated by local businesses. The teens and adults perform original skits for their student audiences and provide counseling to young people who just want to talk or who need referrals for special assistance. Packets of drug prevention materials are distributed, and the police officers and teens are available to answer

questions and help neighborhoods with anti-drug programs.

This mobile prevention program, called Project Life, has been very successful with teens reaching out to teens with the support of law enforcement; the MAD unit has received many invitations for repeat performances. The police officer who founded the program, says: "I wanted to let the kids know that you can come from the worst neighborhoods and still be someone."

Police Working With Schools

The curriculums vary, but across the nation, law enforcement and school personnel are working together in successful partnerships to influence and change attitudes about drug use among school children. In some programs law enforcement is sharing the teaching responsibility with the classroom teacher. The result is that most students have the opportunity to learn about the dangers of drug use at some point during their education. Some of them also learn how to resist social pressures to use alcohol or other drugs or to engage in other unhealthy activities.

In addition to adopting a drug prevention curriculum, school administrators should work with law enforcement, concerned parents, and other community resources to develop — with input from students — some clear policy statements that explain the school's stand on drugs. The policy must state a zero tolerance of drug use or sale; how the school will deal with drug use and sale offenses in or near school that involve or affect its students; the role of police in prevention, intervention, and apprehension; the kinds of help that are available to students facing personal problems that involve drug use; and the roles that parents can and should play in working with schools to prevent drug use and to be informed by schools of general concerns as well as students' specific concerns about drugs.

By coming into the classroom, police officers can help students make healthy choices by demonstrating life skills and coping techniques, serving as role models, and developing friendships with young students. In addition to the 80,000 or more teachers using the McGruff Child Protection and Drug Prevention Curriculum (K-6) in classrooms around the country, thousands of police officers use McGruff to bring anti-drug messages to students. They have built upon McGruff's popularity in various forms — puppet, robot, humanette costume, video, brochure, and others — to demonstrate the dangers of drug use. An evaluation of the McGruff K-6 Curriculum has shown that the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of the participants generally improve to a significant degree.

The Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program, developed by the Los Angeles Police Department and Unified School District, is a program through which uniformed police officers function as classroom instructors to deliver a 17-part curriculum to elementary and middle-school students. This semester-long effort equips students with accurate drug information, methods to enhance self-esteem, specific analytical and decision-making skills, and the motivation to employ the skills they have learned.

Police officers can also lend guidance to student out-of-school projects and sponsor leadership or athletic clubs. This may involve a formal sponsorship or informal advice and expertise. The activity may not even be directly related to police work.

Students benefit from a partnership with trained drug prevention officers by having them in the classroom as friends and instructors. School systems benefit from a school-police partnership by having access to a resource with expertise in drugs and the law. Law enforcement benefits from the partnership by having young people think of them as friends who can help, rather than enforcers who are there only in time of trouble.

San Diego

Students in San Diego, California, play ball with the Police Athletic League, a drug-free sports program for kids age 8 and over. Police officers

organize teams at neighborhood recreation centers or school sites and incorporate drug prevention activities. They serve as role models as well as mentors and teachers. Education ranges from catching fly balls to learning how to tell an older kid that you don't want to share his wine cooler. The traditional Police Athletic League concept provides a positive alternative and role models; adding specific drug prevention information strengthens this effort.

Police Working With Parents

Parents are waking up to find that drugs are in their neighborhoods, or in their houses, or even in their children. Many parents don't know how to prevent their children from using drugs, how to determine whether they are on drugs, or what to do if they are using drugs. Across the country, parents are forming support groups in urban, suburban, and rural neighborhoods, enabling them to band together to protect their children through shared information, cooperation, support, and watch-dogging.

One way parents can help police in drug prevention is to promote, sponsor, and chaperone substance-free social activities. Police can help parents by meeting with parent groups to answer questions about drugs, drug paraphernalia, the signs and symptoms of the use of alcohol and other drugs, and the resources that are available to families with drug problems.

Following the pattern of national parent organizations such as PRIDE (National Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education, Inc.), parents in a neighborhood or within a school district or an apartment floor can get to know the parents of their children's friends, learn about youth activities in the area, learn how to identify children who may be trying drugs, and set common social rules that avoid the use of alcohol and other drugs. Neighborhoods In Action, an initiative of the Scott Newman Center, brings parent education into the community on a neighborhood by neighborhood approach.

Parent partnerships can be enhanced by the expertise of others in the community: school staff, local businessmen, medical professionals, senior citizens, fire fighters, and police officers. Many of them are parents too.

Chicago, Illinois

As an outgrowth of the growing numbers of teens who are victims of crime, much of which is drug-related, parents are cooperating with local law enforcement to reduce violence against teenagers. In Chicago, Illinois, the Logan Square Neighborhood Association, spurred by parental concern about drugs and violence near neighborhood schools, encourages parents (and other residents) to fill out anonymous "hot spot" cards that identify for police the specific locations of drug and criminal activities. The program has identified more than 60 drug "hot spots" and drug activity has begun to decrease in some areas. Parents organized a "Safe School Zone" rally to show support for Logan Square youth who are frequently faced with pressure from street gangs to get involved in use and distribution of drugs. The signs for Safe School Zone were made by inmates in the Illinois Department of Corrections.

Police Working With Business

The majority of illegal drug users in the United States are 18 to 40 years old and employed, according to the National Drug Control Strategy, which encourages employers to:

1) Develop and communicate to all employees a clear drug policy, establishing expectations of behavior, employee rights and responsibilities, and actions to be taken when an employee is found using drugs.

2) Establish an Employee Assistance Program.

3) Train supervisors to identify and deal with employees who are using drugs.

4) Educate employees about the company plan.

5) Provide careful means to identify employees who use drugs, including drug testing where appropriate.

Most workplace policies focus on the need to intervene with and help employees who exhibit or admit to problems with the use of alcohol and other drugs. However, business owners must clearly understand that when drug transactions or other illegal drug-related activity occurs, a cooperative partnership with law enforcement will benefit individual employees as well as the company as a whole.

A truck driver who sells cocaine to a colleague may need treatment for his own drug use, but the transaction itself is a crime. Before a workplace policy is written, company executives and representatives from law enforcement should meet to determine how such cases will be handled to comply with the requirements of law.

To prevent criminal activity in the workplace, superintendents, managers, and others in positions of responsibility can benefit from the expertise of drug prevention officers. Officers are available to provide factual and accurate information on the dangers of specific drugs and on resources within the community. Police personnel can participate in family drug awareness events such as brown-bag lunch seminars sponsored by business. They can work with private security personnel to ensure drug-free safety standards at the plant or factory.

By working in partnership with police and other members of the community, business can serve as a resource for manpower, skilled services, materials, and funds to promote drug-free attitudes in the communities from which they draw their labor pool. It is a win-win situation: the community profits from the high-profile support of business in drug-free activities. And business profits by the absence of drug-related accidents, lower health costs, less theft, less absenteeism and greater productivity.

Maryland

In a community in suburban Maryland, one 1988 survey of business owners revealed that:

- 36% of respondents believed that drug abuse is prevalent in the workplace.
- 87% said a written policy about drug abuse is important, but only 37% said their company had such a policy.
- 75% said their companies had no formal programs to educate employees about substance abuse.

The survey was conducted by B.A.D., Inc. — Business Against Drugs — established as a partnership between the Montgomery County business community and the county government to encourage and support drug and alcohol use prevention efforts in the workplace.

B.A.D. met with county businessmen and developed a three-pronged approach to devising a substance use policy, emphasizing:

- Policy content, including a definition of prohibited behavior and a clear statement of consequences for failure to comply.
- Legal issues, such as drug testing, employee confidentiality, and conforming with union contracts.
- Workplace needs and resources, including Employee Assistance Programs, health insurance benefits, and community resources.

Police Working With Media

Although a community is made up of many industries, professions, businesses, and services, one industry wields tremendous power and influence over what the general public thinks about and believes: the media.

Executives of print journals, television, and radio have the power to shape attitudes by the informa-

tion they convey to the community and by the way they choose to convey it. They can influence opinions even by what they decide not to report. The communications media are a prime vehicle for educating residents about the need for and success of crime prevention.

Many of these trained communicators are parents. They share with other community residents the same fears and concerns about the future of their children. And they should be part of any effort to clean drugs out of a community.

The police and the media are often shoulder to shoulder. Usually, they are both present at the scene of a crime. The media relies on police to provide facts about a case. The police often enlists the media to help with suspect identification, elusive crime details, or dramatic depiction of conditions inside crack houses. A partnership exists between the two — a partnership which offers a solid foundation for success in drug prevention programs.

Public recognition — via newspaper, radio, and television accounts — both celebrates and rewards the efforts of community groups. That recognition is within the control of the media. Some community actions and activities are in themselves excellent news stories. Police personnel can often alert the media to these events. News coverage of such successes as "a drug house closed" because of evidence resulting from community surveillance can reward those residents who took part, encourage those who were dubious about community action, and reinforce the message to drug dealers to "keep out."

Police in many communities have supported the McGruff crime and drug prevention public education campaign, conducted on behalf of the Crime Prevention Coalition by the National Crime Prevention Council, Inc., and the U.S. Department of Justice (Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance). Almost every young person and three-quarters of the adults in America are familiar with McGruff the Crime Dog and his message that "Winners Don't Use Drugs."

Local media have contributed to the success of police-community efforts in other ways as well — developing special local public service announcements, displaying transit placards and outdoor advertising boards with the drug prevention message, and putting prevention messages in the pages of newspapers and magazines. They have trained residents of communities to use video equipment, graphics, desktop publishing, and other specialized services to enhance local drug prevention campaigns.

Albuquerque, New Mexico

KOAT-TV in Albuquerque, New Mexico, has the distinction of airing the McGruff "Winners Don't Use Drugs" tape so many times that the tape wore out. The station, which is rated highest in its market in Albuquerque, not only reports on crime and drug-related incidents, it also tells its audiences how to keep themselves safe. Over an 18-month period, KOAT-TV donated $160,000 in air time and production costs to crime and drug prevention, alerted residents to seasonal fluctuations in crime rates, sponsored three "Crime Stoppers" telethons, and featured a two-hour prime-time program on self-protection. The station has been honored by the Crime Prevention Coalition for its public service in the area of crime and drug prevention programming.

Conclusion

Law enforcement agencies are sharing with other members of the community the responsibility for reducing the demand for alcohol and other drugs. Police officers are moving beyond their enforcement role to become part of a community action partnership in drug prevention. Community residents and police know that the best time to attack the problem of substance use is before it happens. By working as cooperative partners, each individual community member can effectively reduce crime and drug activity and protect property and lives.

Suggestions For Action in Your Community

Here are suggestions for drug prevention strategies that are successful when police and the community work in partnership:

Police and Communities — develop community anti-drug policies; participate on neighborhood planning teams; set up Neighborhood or Business Watch programs.

Police and Other Municipal Agencies — work with city, county, or state regulatory groups to enforce housing codes, abatement ordinances and violations on utility meters, health standards, garbage disposal, abandoned cars, broken sidewalks, and illegal fences; develop a system of interagency referral policies.

Police and Youth — sponsor drug-free sports leagues, leadership clubs, crime and drug prevention plays and skits, and teen-led community service projects.

Police and Schools — serve as educators, advisors, and club sponsors; help develop school policies on drugs; be a resource for health curriculum or in-service drug education training; enforce drug-free zones around school; establish school/law enforcement committees.

Police and Parents/Neighborhoods — hold special meetings on drugs and drug paraphernalia; inform parents about intervention techniques and drug laws; sponsor drug-free social activities for students.

Police and the Workplace — be an information resource; provide supervisor and manager training on signs of drug use; educate parents through their places of employment; help develop drug-free work-place policies.

Police and Media — celebrate community successes, educate residents, consult with media on public service announcements, billboards, placards, and other public awareness advertisements; encourage publicity about successes in drug prevention efforts; enlist media participation in community-wide Substance Abuse Councils.

COMMUNITY-LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERSHIPS

Adapted from "Seven Ways to Partner," *Achieving Success in Drug Prevention*, National Crime Prevention Council.

A Police-Community Partnership

Seattle, Washington

Introduction

The population of Seattle is about 500,000 and the city is in the center of a metropolitan area of about 1,483,000 people. The main economic base of the area includes the Boeing Company, the Port of Seattle, the fishing industry, the University of Washington, and the lumber industry; Seattle is the regional headquarters for a variety of firms. The area has been growing economically over the past ten years, a trend that has accelerated in the past year or two (1990-91). Surrounded by Puget Sound, lakes and mountains, the city contains many cultural and recreational facilities and consistently receives high ratings for livability when compared to other cities. In 1980, the average family income was $24,730, ranking Seattle second in per capita income of the 35 largest metropolitan areas in the country. The population is 67 percent White, 10 percent Black, 9 percent Asian/Pacific Islander, 3 percent Hispanic and 1.4 percent Native American (1987 data). The racial atmosphere is generally good, as indicated by the recent election of a Black mayor despite Blacks making up a relatively small proportion of the population.

Seattle Crime Reduction Project Background

The South Seattle Crime Prevention Committee (SSCPC) was created through the efforts of citizens in the area encompassed by the South Precinct of the Seattle Police Department. Specifically, the SSCPC covers the southeast part of the city, loosely referred to as the Rainier Valley. The Rainier Valley runs north-south with two main commercial thorough-fares. The businesses in this area are mostly oriented to lower middle class and working class people. These businesses are loosely clustered in a series of groups, especially along one of the thoroughfares, roughly corresponding to neighborhoods. Many of these clusters, or neighborhoods have local business or residential organizations, and some are seen as distinct neighborhoods.

The area of southeast Seattle is quite heterogeneous as reflected by the range of racial composition — 40 percent White, 30 percent Black, 5 percent Hispanic, and 25 percent Asian and other minorities — and income levels comparative to the entire city. The area experiences a generally higher incidence of crime than other parts of Seattle. The southeast area constitutes about two-thirds of the South Precinct, one of four precincts of the Seattle Police Department. The other one-third of the South Precinct is a distinct area called West Seattle, which lies to the west of the industrialized valley and is connected to the rest of the city mostly by causeways and bridges. The precinct headquarters is located in southeast Seattle across from a public housing project.

During the '70s and '80s, the southeast area experienced surges and declines in crime and police/community cooperation. In 1987, a group of capable and dedicated citizens of the area organized to *reclaim* their neighborhoods from the criminal element and the effects of urban decay. This group persevered through numerous meetings and early resistance by police personnel, and their efforts ultimately led to the development of a 15 Point Plan (see next page) which the group proposed to the police department and city mayor. The Plan emphasized close collaborative relationships between the South Precinct and the community; decentralizing the police department, especially the detective functions; more aggressive work by police officers; more dedication to the community and its organizations; increased uniformed personnel levels (15 additional minimum); and the development of a broader base within the community by the community organization, as well as better coordination of the efforts of local social service agencies.

In mid-October of 1987, the police chief publicly announced acceptance of the proposal in concept — except for the increased personnel — and stated that negotiations on details of the program would begin immediately with the program being implemented in January 1988. As specified in the agreement between the police department and the community group, the core group became the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council (SSCPC). The incorporated body was designed as a council of organizations and community representatives, not as an open-membership group. Membership was by invitation only and the regular meetings were not widely publicized. The organization was able to hire a half-time staff person with funds raised through private donations, fund-raisers, and a block grant from the city.

The restriction of attendance aided in the development of trust with the police department, who always had a captain or lieutenant in attendance as a full participating member. Twice a year, public meetings were held to report back to the community as implicitly required by the 15 Point Plan.

SSCPC Program Components

From the outset, there was a "problem-orientation" to the cooperative arrangement between the organization and the police. A number of programs or components were established as part of SSCPC, including:

Targeting: Targeting is a unique form of collaboration between SSCPC and police that identifies *targets,* (public safety and crime problems) which the police are to address. The decisions are made largely by consensus, with extensive police input. Nevertheless, having decisions as to where the police are to concentrate their efforts made at official meetings of the SSCPC — a community group with no formal governmental status — is truly a radical step in American policing. When, or if, targets are resolved is also determined by the committee. So-called resolved targets are labeled "pending" so they continue to be monitored.

A major benefit of the targeting procedure is the opportunity for police to interact with the community around specific public safety issues, and to discuss responses and tactics that the police employ against them. The process also provides a means for the community to aid police abatement actions by putting community pressure on landlords. In addition, the targeting approach assists officers to focus their attention away from simply responding to calls and begin to view their districts in terms of the problems it has, and coordinate their responses with officers from different watches.

The only complaints by police supervisors about the targeting program — which is largely perceived as successful and worthwhile — are that officers should have more input into the designation of targets so that they assume more ownership of their own districts; that the required paperwork is too onerous and should be done by clerks; and that

Ranier Chamber of Commerce 15 Point Plan for South Seattle

While this project calls for deployment of resources from other units, they are services which are already utilized locally. However, they are currently neither easily accessible nor coordinated with the South Precinct. Localization of all personnel, appropriate services and equipment is essential to streamline communications and produce results.

1) The South Precinct Commander shall head the project. This person must be pro-active and community oriented, a motivator, creative and committed to community participation in the program. He/she must have total support from the Chief of Police, the Mayor and the Community Advisory Committee to effectively implement the program.

2) A Community Advisory Committee shall be established to work directly with the South Precinct to develop community support and monitor the program and establish guidelines. This Advisory Committee shall work closely with the Precinct Commander on all aspects relative to the reduction of crime in Southeast Seattle, understanding, of course, the confidential nature of police work. Members of the committee shall be selected from a cross section of Southeast residents and business people. The committee shall be representative of the socioeconomic diversity of the area.

3) Three lieutenants (watch commanders) shall be assigned to the Project at the South Precinct. These lieutenants must have a working knowledge of the Program, must be able to work closely with the community, and must be committed to the basic concepts of the Program. Six patrol sergeants (three Robert and three Sam sector sergeants for three shifts) shall be assigned. The sergeants should have the ability to motivate and aggressively lead officers in a pro-active effort.

4) These sectors shall be staffed with officers dedicated to the spirit of the Program.

5) Staffing: Eight patrol officers shall be reallocated from other police functions. This assignment is intended to increase the number of two-officer patrol units, directly accountable to the South Precinct Commander.

6) The staffing level of the anti-crime team shall be maintained. A clerk shall be assigned to the team.

7) The following staff shall be assigned to the South Precinct: Two detectives from the Narcotics Unit, one detective from the Commercial Unit, two juvenile detectives, two officers from the Special Patrol Unit (SPU), and an officer from the Crime Prevention Unit. All of these individuals shall be accountable to the Precinct Commander to be used as needed in this pilot project.

8) An incentive program shall be an option to be implemented at the South Precinct, at the discretion of the Captain.

9) Additional clerical assistance shall be provided from officers on limited duty, such as the CSO Unit, to free up, as possible, professional staff time from clerical duties.

10) Reasonable funds shall be committed for confidential informants and controlled narcotics buys.

11) The community will assist in recruiting "loaned" clerical workers, in purchasing equipment, and in locating space where the Police Department budget will not provide needed resources. This support activity will further include, but not be limited to, enlisting community support to work in and organize trouble areas as identified by police, secure office space if needed and be available, as needed, to coordinate with the Seattle Public Schools and local social services agencies.

12) Precinct personnel shall be trained to deal with selected problem areas in cooperation with the Community Advisory Committee to provide liaison between the community, the Committee, and the South Precinct.

13) A computer and software for tracking data from the two sectors, plus approximately $2,000 for miscellaneous equipment such as surveillance gear, shall be provided to the Program. If the Department has insufficient funds, the community shall undertake a fund-raising campaign to pay for this equipment.

14) A total commitment to this Program from the Mayor and the Chief of Police is ***critical*** to the Program's success.

15) A total commitment from the Southeast community throughout the term of the Program is also essential to the Program's success.

some targets remain on the active list too long requiring more police time than the problem warrants.

Narcotics Activity Reports (NARs): Narcotics Activity Reports are complaints received from citizens concerning narcotics trafficking and use in the community. These complaints are received in person, by mail or telephone, by a police officer on the street, or at the precinct. In addition, they can be received through the hotline set up by the community. Each NAR is recorded on a special form and then forwarded to the Narcotics Division, where it is numbered and dated. The narcotics unit then decides where to assign it for follow-up investigation — to patrol, the Anticrime Team (ACT), the Narcotics Street Team or narcotics detectives. Information on the NARs, including their adjudications, is reported back to the community through the joint police/community meetings.

The response of police supervisors to the NARs program has been varied. Many feel that even with its limitations, NARs is an excellent source of intelligence and provides justification for civil abatement proceedings against particular properties. Complaints about the program include that internal processing of the reports is too slow (all reports go through the central office); and the follow-up tracking process to report back to the community is paperwork intensive, placing a high demand on officers and supervisors. It was felt that if only those NARs that contained sufficient information for follow-up were assigned to officers for surveillance, then a more effective, less burdensome use of officer time could be achieved.

Criminal Trespass Program: The criminal trespass program consists of agreements between private property owners and the police department, giving police officers the right to enter portions of private property (particularly parking lots and exterior stairs and lobbies) in order to question individuals who may be trespassers. With the agreement, the officers have a new tool to cite and arrest individuals who may have been engaging in loitering for the purpose of drug transactions (even though the actual drug transaction may not have been observed). The trespass program requires that individuals first be warned that trespassing is illegal — which is accomplished either in person (by the officer) or by posting signs throughout the property that trespassing is illegal and violators will be cited.

Police supervisors believe the trespass program is very effective, providing the police with an effective tool to pro-actively address street narcotic sales on private property. It was noted, however, that care had to be taken by officers to carefully observe persons in or around the property before confronting them to insure they were not there for legitimate reasons.

Pay Telephone Program: The pay telephone program involves eliminating the ability to receive phone calls at standard pay telephone locations where drug dealing is being carried out with the phone used to arrange deliveries. The police department places such requests directly to the telephone company. In 1988, 13 phones were converted to "call-out" only, and in some cases the phones were simply removed. The program has successfully frustrated the efforts of individual drug dealers attempting to carry out their drug transactions on public phones.

Owner Notification Program (Abatement process): The owner notification program is a process of notifying property owners that illegal activities are being carried out on their premises. The process was incorporated into Abatement Law in 1988 and is called the Drug Trafficking Civil Abatement Program. As presently administered, two warnings are given to the owner of property where narcotics activity has been observed and documented through search warrants. If a second search warrant is served, without the problem being corrected by the owner, a final abatement notice (signed by the police chief and city

attorney) is mailed, and abatement proceedings are initiated.

The City of Seattle currently has an "expedited eviction" law that allows landlords to "speedily" evict tenants for a variety of reasons, including any type of illegal activity such as drug-related crimes. The law does, however, allow the tenant to postpone eviction if a bond is posted; whereas the abatement program does not allow for the posting of a bond to delay an eviction notice.

The formal notification process is typically preceded by numerous contacts by both police personnel and SSCPC representatives. Ninety percent of owners have been responsive to the informal contacts or to the formal written notifications. Only a handful of premises actually go through the entire abatement process.

Another component of the abatement program is a "landlord" education process. Usually offered prior, or concurrently with abatement notification, the SSCPC sponsors a series of training sessions for apartment owners and managers on how to keep their property drug-free. Information includes how to legally screen renters for previous drug involvement and conduct credit checks; ways to make maintaining a drug-fee apartment a condition for renting; ways to expedite eviction of drug traffickers; ways to cooperate with police (criminal trespass agreements and eviction processes); and use of housing code violations to pressure some tenants and give police access to main entrances of apartment complexes.

Anti-graffiti Program: Through this program, initiated originally by the Rainier Chamber of Commerce, the area has been able to maintain graffiti-free streets throughout the South Precinct with purely volunteer efforts. Organizing clean-up and "paint-out" parties two Saturdays a month, volunteers paint over any graffiti found on structures throughout the area. Business owners have also been involved to clean-up and paint-out their own business districts. The SSCPC distributed an information packet about the program to many organizations looking for volunteer projects. Originally paint was donated or purchased with chamber funds. In 1989, the Seattle Engineering Department received funding for a full time antigraffiti coordinator on a city-wide basis. Paint and supplies were then provided free of charge by the city making it even easier to coordinate the paint-out projects. In addition, a graffiti hotline was established by a central area citizen with calls relayed to the Engineering Department coordinator for follow-up. In the summer of 1989, the SSCPC obtained city assistance from the Summer Youth Employment program which provided a supervisor and seven staff, allowing the program to expand beyond the initial community effort.

Hotline: The telephone hotline idea was initiated immediately after the establishment of the SSCPC. Its purpose was to provide a mechanism to collect target/problem information from the community, as well as to serve as another avenue of outreach to other community areas and groups. A police lieutenant with communications experience assisted the SSCPC in setting up the program including preparing forms and establishing procedures about how information would be forwarded to the South Precinct. Local papers and radios began advertising the availability of the hotline to address issues that were not emergencies. In the beginning, the phones were covered by volunteers a few hours a day. Eventually, an answering machine was set up to take the calls. Once a week, volunteers took all the calls off the machine and typed up reports. Narcotics and prostitution related calls were forwarded to the South Precinct. Calls were anonymous unless the caller wanted feedback about what was done about the problem.

Initially, 40 percent of the calls were complaints about abandoned cars, which was an issue that had also been targeted by the SSCPC. The police department arranged for the removal of so many cars that the program had to been suspended for

two weeks until the towing company could find more space. The visibility and success of the program encouraged citizens to begin calling in about other issues.

Though the hotline program became quite well known, and was replicated in West Seattle, a number of problems were encountered: how to insure that the hotline availability was well-known to all residents, and that calls could address more than crime issues (flyers were eventually distributed to all apartment buildings); how to overcome the impersonal nature, incomplete information given, and time-lag created by the use of the answering machine (eventually, the program went back to volunteers answering the phones whenever possible).

Garden Police Car: The Garden Police Car project involved the assignment of a special two-officer patrol car to concentrate on the problems in the two public housing projects located in the South Precinct. The officers functioned as conventional neighborhood-oriented police, checked on drug-activity, and made arrests when needed. The rapport between the officers and the residents was tremendous. Periodically, when crime rates in the projects would drop "too low," the program would be suspended for a time. Nevertheless, the precinct sergeants and other officers continued to cooperate with both the management of the housing projects and the residents with respect to clean-up, reporting drug-activity, keeping unwanted guests out, and "standing by" during evictions.

Community Outreach: In addition to the components described above, the SSCPC developed a number of other activities that became part of the police-community partnership. One of the most important was community outreach. As agreed upon with the Police Department, the SSCPC began to expand its base in the community by seeking representatives of all segments of the southeast Seattle area (including geographic, ethnic and economic). Through formal letters to organizations (fairly unsuccessful), and informal personal contacts by SSCPC members, the council grew to a full membership of 17. Most members represented organizations, groups or institutions including the school system, public housing tenants, a "middle class" community council, and a local merchants group. For the next year, however, there was ongoing conflict and concern as to the underrepresentation of minorities — especially Blacks. Finally, through public meetings, and the leadership of the SSCPC personally and systematically seeking out representation from various groups in the unrepresented neighborhoods and strengthening relationships with other groups, the situation changed remarkably for the better. The developing breadth of representation resulted from not only the active outreach of the SSCPC council members, but more basically, from the atmosphere of empowerment and self respect which the SSCPC inspired in the community. The council currently believes that it has good relations with all geographic segments of the southeast Seattle community.

From this process, the police learned that it is not necessarily true that police have to limit their interactions with organizations that are representative of the entire community. It may be appropriate to begin with existing organizations that have an interest in crime reduction. Broader representation may evolve as the partnership develops. The police can serve a role of encouraging the organizations' continued outreach to the community.

In addition, it is important that community groups establish clear procedures, rules and responsibilities for members so that expansion can occur easily with new members understanding their roles.

Other SSCPC activities included the *Seattle Housing Authority programs* which encouraged the project residents to become active in crime

prevention within their housing projects; *lobbying and political pressure* efforts directed at the legislative branches and the non-police divisions of the city government to increase police resources and take other crime-prevention appropriate actions; *program publicity* that reported SSCPC activities and events through newsletters, local weekly newspapers, and citywide papers; *police-liaison* efforts that worked to establish direct ties between SSCPC and all levels of the South Precinct including the commander (captain), lieutenants, sector sergeants, watch commanders, and patrol officers; *shared management arrangements* which evolved into implicit guidelines concerning the acceptable involvement by the community in the actions of the SPD — specifically targeting, patrol priorities, and special programs (citizen involvement was resisted by SPD at all levels of the department in issues concerning personnel assignments); and *relations with the Crime Prevention Division of SPD* so that SSCPC activities would strengthen and facilitate crime prevention efforts in the community.

Citywide Partnerships

The seed of community activism planted in the South area, coupled with cooperation with the SPD, eventually led to a new direction in the provision of police services in all areas of the City of Seattle. The East and West Precincts began organizations modeled after the SSCPC after observing the initial positive effects on crime. While there is no formal citywide coordination, groups from all over the city come together in an ad hoc capacity to support issues that cross jurisdictional lines.

In the Spring of 1989, a comprehensive study of the SPD was conducted by a management consulting firm brought in by the city and the police department. Two community representatives were included on the steering committee for this study, and comments and suggestions were collected from the public during the course of the study.

This study produced almost 100 recommendations, including the addition of 147 sworn and civilian positions to be added to the department. It also encouraged the decentralization of SPD units and creation of "precinct advisory councils" to further police and community communications and cooperation. Ultimately, a major funding initiative was passed by the City of Seattle in 1989 which changed the structure of community policing in the city and added major funding to the police department.

The initiative specifically provided for police personnel in each precinct assigned full-time to community/police duties. In addition, there is some formal funding of existing community organizations. Citizen-based advisory councils are being created in every precinct and a central advisory council has been created to advise the Chief. Community/police teams (CPT's) composed of five officers and one sergeant have been added to each precinct to focus on special problem solving efforts; and youth anti-gang intervention programs are being developed to intervene with high risk youth including a geographically targeted system to provide intervention, diversion and support.

Conclusion

In Seattle and within the Seattle Police Department, the community policing approach has become a vital and important part of the evolution toward an improved department-wide professional quality-oriented concept of providing police services. This evolution has occurred over approximately five years and has not been without dissension within the department itself and tension between citizens and the police department.

Over the last five years, a number of actions and events occurred — not necessarily planned or coordinated: the availability of articles and

resources about community policing; the establishment of the SSCPC — a group of capable and dedicated citizens; the innovative and cooperative stance of the SPD South Precinct command; the recommendations of two management consultant studies; the increased level of police training made a high priority by the mayor's office, the city council, the Seattle Women's Commission, and the department itself; and the mayor's office involvement in strategic planning efforts for the City of Seattle. All of these factors have combined to provide the needed atmosphere for the growth of a department-wide approach to the implementation of the community-policing strategy in Seattle. This atmosphere appears to have facilitated the growth of committed problem-solving behavior between the police and citizens and an orientation for improvement in police services.

A POLICE-COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP

Seattle, Washington

Adapted from Community Policing in Seattle; *A Descriptive Study of the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project.**

For contact information, see Seattle Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

* The final report of the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project Program, a descriptive research project, funded by the National Institute of Justice, documenting the Seattle experience in police/community partnerships.

SAFE SCHOOLS

ANTI-GANG & DRUG PROGRAMS

SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

By Tracy Bunz

Introduction

There has been considerable interest in what school districts are doing about gang activity and drug abuse problems on campuses. This article outlines the steps taken by one district — San Bernardino City Unified School District — to acknowledge and address the problem.

The possible solutions and programs identified and explored by the district were all based on the concept that children generally look for ways to get attention and to "be" someone. Moreover, it was recognized that young people join gangs for a number of reasons: protection, acceptance, excitement, monetary gain, peer pressure, family tradition, and a lack of realization of the hazards involved.

Anti-Gang Stance

Gangs, left unchecked, are a threat to the safety not only of other gang members, but of everyone within the area they seek to control — especially students within the school system. Gangs are a further problem in that they encourage the use of drugs and lure young people into illegal and anti-social behavior.

Sensing the urgency of the significant increase in gang activity near the district schools, the San Bernardino City Unified Board of Education directed the superintendent and staff to adopt safe school programs to ensure that all students, employees and visiting community members are provided a safe learning and working environment. The district has worked closely with city and county government and police agencies to provide programs to intervene as well as prevent this negative influence from affecting the schools.

If gangs threaten the safety of students or encourage criminal activities they must be stopped. The district has no intention of surrendering the safety and order of its school campuses to any gang, no matter what its ethnic make-up. While some concern has been expressed that active anti-gang programs may create discrimination against minority students who may be identified or misidentified as gang members by school personnel, the school district does not discriminate against minority students. Rather, they seek to protect all students from the illegal or anti-social behavior of all gangs. Furthermore, the district intends to cooperate fully with police to ensure that the neighborhoods are not relinquished to gang control.

Attacking the Problem Where it Starts

A district-wide school security committee recommended a four point program that calls for:

- Development of an early identification and intervention program concerning gangs.
- Monitoring gang activities. While not "branding" students as gang members, School Police are attempting to keep track of who is or may be a gang member, as well as gang activities. This information will not remain in a student's permanent school file, but will remain in the files of the School Police for the purpose of monitoring and deterring the occurrence of gang activities — violence, drug abuse, and disorder. School Police will also exchange such information with other police agencies to further their cooperative efforts towards these same ends.
- Participation of school sites in an area law enforcement "gang task force." A major recommendation is that a "school-based gang/narcotic prevention program" be implemented to operate cooperatively with local law enforcement agencies.
- Development of an appropriate curriculum to assist students to resist joining local gangs.

Alternatives to Gangs/Drugs Task Force

Establishing a task force of concerned citizens is one way to expand the community's knowledge of gangs, their activities, their tactics and their membership. An effective anti-gangs/drugs task force must have representatives from city government, schools, police, the business community, parents, former gang members, and all ethnic groups within the city. The goal of the group is to provide a forum where people from different ethnic and economic groups can engage in open dialogue to share concerns and information, and to develop strategies to confront the growing threat of gangs, drug activity, and violence that threaten schools and neighborhoods.

"Smash" Gangs and Drugs

Most research indicates that the decision to join a gang is most often made during the fifth grade. This information prompted the school district to develop its innovative Alternatives to Gang Membership Program, "SMASH." (A similar program being implemented by the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department is called "CHOICES" — see article.) The basic premise is simple — if you stop kids from making the decision to join a gang, eventually there will be no gangs.

Toward this end, the school district has adopted a two-prong approach. First, cooperating target schools have developed a 13-week program taught by classroom teachers. The program is set up in elementary schools where gang influence is the heaviest. Weekly one-hour programs consisting of slide shows, videotapes, thought interpretation exercises, puppet shows, class discussions and realistic graphics are presented to all fifth grade students in the target schools. Topics for the programs explicitly tell kids that joining a gang means becoming involved with drugs and alcohol, destroying property with graffiti, endangering the lives of their families, possibly ending up in prison, and ruining their chances of becoming successful when they grow up — if they do not end up dead.

The second part of the program is designed to reinforce what is taught in the classroom. Neighborhood meetings are held throughout the community to educate families on what will happen to their children if they join gangs, what behaviors may indicate they are becoming involved in gangs, and what alternative activities are available to their children. Support from other

families attending these meetings helps parents to recognize that they can influence their children to seek alternatives to gang involvement.

Junior Police Academy

A program that offers an alternative to gang involvement is the Junior Police Academy (JPA), a jointly sponsored program between the San Bernardino City Unified school district and the San Bernardino Police Department. Modeled after a program in Pomona, California, the JPA offers children, who might be affected by gang and/or drug influences, a better choice — something to belong to that is positive and productive.

The program, which was piloted to 5th and 6th graders at a year-round magnet elementary school with a high Hispanic population and obvious local gang influence, was initially funded from $28,000 of forfeiture funds. Using the teaching experience of D.A.R.E. officers, and the joint input of the school principal and the coordinating police lieutenant, a curriculum was developed. Patches were designed and uniforms ordered and fitted for participating students.

Prior to being accepted into the JPA, each student must accept the challenge of becoming a JPA cadet. Cadets must adopt the goals of the program which are: to help cadets build self-confidence and self-esteem; to improve physically, mentally and academically; to practice honesty and learn to have pride in themselves and their community; to learn responsibility to themselves and others; and to learn self-discipline.

Every Wednesday, the designated JPA day, cadets wear their uniforms, and receive instruction in police procedures, drug prevention, safety and anti-gang information. They also receive introductions to the responsibilities of many other agencies such as Animal Control, County Parks, Juvenile Probation, the Sheriff's Department and the Highway Patrol. Cadets are also instructed in drill and physical fitness. They attend school until 5:00 p.m. each day to allow time for drill instruction and to practice pull-ups, sit-ups, push-ups and running.

As cadets, the students perform tasks such as school safety patrol, breakfast and lunch patrols, restroom and hall monitoring. They appear in civic functions and parades; and they frequently serve lunch to the blind at the Lighthouse for the Blind facility. Parents are encouraged to participate with the school and the police department in promoting the goals of the JPA; information is exchanged during monthly meetings at the school.

At last count, there were 49 children enrolled in the program. The effect on the school in general has been positive. Attendance is up. Children in lower grades are adopting more conservative hairstyles and apparel in an effort to emulate the uniform-clad cadets. Some cadets even come to school when they are off-track (on year-around school breaks) so they won't miss drill instruction.

Through this joint police-school effort, the children have a chance to divert their energies into positive everyday group associations. They have a chance to develop relationships with people from different branches of law enforcement whom they might otherwise view as enemies. They have a chance to make their lives better, and perhaps, do something to improve the lives of others as well.

The first JPA class graduated May 17, 1991 with a resounding cheer of their own class slogan: "JPA ALL THE WAY — TOMORROW'S FUTURE HERE TODAY."

SAFE SCHOOLS
Anti-Gang & Drug Programs

San Bernardino, California
By Tracy Bunz, Coordinator of Substance Abuse Prevention for the San Bernardino City Unified School District.

For contact information, see San Bernardino City USD under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

CHOICES YOUTH PROGRAM

SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

By Sr. Deputy Bill Lenew

Introduction

Community crime problems can be solved in three very basic methods: ***1) Suppression, 2) Prevention,*** *and* ***3) Intervention.*** *Historically, law enforcement's role has been in the suppression side of the continuum; that is, the investigation of criminal activity and the arrest of offenders. The past decade, however, has seen increased emphasis in the prevention of crime through public education efforts. Whether it's through the local crime prevention officer's Neighborhood Watch programs, DARE programs in the schools, or the department's STAR program for target community groups, preventing crime has become a significant responsibility for law enforcement agencies everywhere.*

What's left is the intervention side of the coin — a side law enforcement can no longer ignore. This is the side which the Choices Youth Program addresses.

Intervention

So what's intervention? Think of it as putting up a roadblock for tomorrow's criminals. It's a fact: the same 8 percent of our population commits nearly all of the crimes we investigate. Adult or juvenile, this represents a lot of paperwork for police, and a significant piece of the state's budget ($4 billion annually) to house them. If this 8 percent could be identified early on in life and some kind of roadblock put up for them to deal with, then chances are, the level of crime in our communities could be further impacted.

"CHOICES" Program Description

By identifying youths at the junior high school level who demonstrate criminal tendencies through gang association, substance abuse, truancy or academic failure, school officials can recommend enrollment in the **Choices' 17 Week In-class Curriculum.** Here, some 12 to 15 students — per school — will interact with Choices Officers in the development of critical thinking skills, problem solving strategies, emotional control, positive leadership, cooperation and collaboration, pro-social values, increased self-awareness, academic success strategies, trusting of self and others, and self-empowerment vs. self-destruction.

These concepts may then be practiced through a **Youth at Risk Wilderness Adventure** where camping, climbing, rappelling and similar experiences help students grasp and transform their new-found values into positive and socially useful realizations.



But Choices is more than a lot of talk and camping — both of which have proven successful with troubled youths. This early intervention program is also designed to *support* the new life-style students have chosen through community-based **Choices Clubs.** Here, students are encouraged to participate in positive alternative community programs and pro-social recreational activities. The Choices Club may also provide support for children from dysfunctional families and explore career training or local job opportunities.

And, contrary to what most officers believe, neither Choices or DARE Officer positions take slots away from patrol. They are, instead, funded by school districts and/or local communities in order to create a new position.

Conclusion

So, like the three-pronged approach to reducing crime, the Choices Youth Program also offers three phases of intervention strategies. School districts throughout the state — and the nation — are anxiously waiting for our department's first reports on this innovative program's progress.

CHOICES YOUTH PROGRAM
San Bernardino, California
By Sr. Deputy Bill Lenew, San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department

For contact information, see San Bernardino County Sheriffs Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Oakland Crack Task Force

A Portrait Of Community Mobilization

Oakland, California

In The Beginning

The City of Oakland has been in crisis for some time. The abuse of drugs and alcohol — especially that of crack cocaine — has risen to an alarming rate. In the past ten years Oakland has experienced a 2200% increase in the number of drug-related cases in Juvenile Court. The drug culture has affected over 70% of the students in grades 7-12 in some form.

Substance abuse problems are not, however, limited to youth. Of the estimated 36,000 drug users in the city of Oakland, 40% are estimated to be women. Thirty percent of women who deliver babies at Highland County Hospital test positive for drugs. In addition, 70% of all emergency room cases at Highland involve acts of violence that are drug-related. Arrest for narcotics use surged to almost 13,000 in 1989. Eighty percent of those arrested involved cocaine. Presently, there are no publicly funded treatment services for adolescents, and the need for massive education and prevention services is critical.

Oakland Crack Task Force

It was from this problem ridden community that, in April 1989, some 35 citizens attended the "Death of a Race," national conference on crack cocaine, co-sponsored by Glide Memorial Methodist Church and the Office of Substance Abuse Prevention in San Francisco. At the end of this three-day conference, participants were challenged to return to their communities and "spread the word against drugs and crack." Overcoming the variety of circumstances that often cause such ad hoc groups to self-destruct, the group of 35 Oaklanders returned from the San Francisco crack conference and formed the Oakland Crack Task Force (OCTF) exactly one week later.

The OCTF was born out of a need to address problems related to crack cocaine and to help insure the future existence of the family structure, particularly within Oakland's inner city. The mission of the OCTF was set, not so much by the membership, but by the dire circumstances that existed within the city.

The organizing citizens rejected the notion that a problem solving task force was unfeasible or impossible to create. From a broad-based pool of talent, expertise and enthusiasm, this group brought all the significant players in the community to the table.

The Task Force's initial meeting was held on April 29, 1989 and was attended by approximately 79 people. Those in attendance included educators, people in recovery, health care personnel, social workers, journalists, business professionals, local politicians, parents, and just "plain folks," including some who were unemployed and homeless. While there were no financial resources for the group in the beginning, human resources were abundant. Everyone was eager to talk, listen, learn, and work.

Participants at the first meeting quickly agreed to address problems related to crack cocaine — from infants born addicted, neglected children, battered wives and loved ones, to the spread of AIDS to teenagers. It was acknowledged that all segments of the community had to be involved, including law enforcement, educational and religious institutions, prevention programs, health services and treatment facilities, elected officials, senior citizens and youth. The task force also affirmed that the problem stemmed from the family base and that their focus would, therefore, be on the family. Community awareness was identified as a top priority. Using knowledge as a primary weapon, the group wanted to provide broad based education and prevention programs to the citizens of Oakland.

Community Seminars

The OCTF planned a series of community seminars in each of the seven city council districts, to be followed by a city-wide "summit." Recognizing the community churches as influential and neutral meeting places, OCTF was able to obtain church space, free of charge, to hold the seminars. The seminars were organized around a series of workshops. OCTF committee members secured workshop facilitators who recruited local citizens to participate on their particular workshop panels. Topics included: The Role of the Church in Fighting Addiction; Addiction, a Family Problem; Peer Pressure and Drug Use; Crack: History, Symptoms, Effects and Treatment; The Black Male Problems, Potential, Solutions; Crack Babies; AIDS in the Black Community; and Legal Issues on the War on Crack. The seminars concluded with panel discussion of possible solutions and ideas for future action. At each event, a resource fair, providing information about existing prevention, intervention, treatment and recovery resources throughout the city, was featured.

The first seminar drew 400 people and each subsequent event grew in attendance. The seminars' popularity resulted from their community problem-solving approach, and their very high visibility. The group staged press conferences, radio and television appearances, and presentations to the Oakland City Council, Alameda County Board of Supervisors and state Legislative Committees. OCTF members spoke at churches, senior groups, businesses, the chamber of commerce, recovery homes, treatment centers, homeless centers, and wherever else they were asked. Members also distributed fliers to neighborhood groups and walked the streets and shopping areas asking people to join their efforts.

Determined to make youth a major part of their substance abuse solution, OCTF recruited young people from elementary and high schools, colleges and street academies, and then matched them with the adults who were planning events. At each of the seminars, youths were given specific tasks to ensure strong participation, including strong co-facilitation of workshops.

The Crack Summit

After the series of successful seminars, the "Crack Summit" was arranged. The OCTF Summit committee decided to enlarge the focus to "crack, family addiction and AIDS." To publicize the event, a newsletter was developed with endorsements from elected officials and church and

community leaders. Over 100,000 fliers were distributed. Information packets were sent home to parents of all children in the Oakland schools. Another series of press conferences, radio broadcasts and television appearances were held and community billboards also highlighted the event. Both the Oakland City Council and the Alameda County Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs contributed funding. Private corporations donated printing for over 5,000 programs. It was a fantastic example of many factions of the Oakland community mobilizing to eliminate a common problem, "Crack."

The Summit, held on March 10, 1990 in Oakland, drew more than 6,000 people. The keynote speaker was actor Louis Gossett, Jr. Other speakers included California Lieutenant Governor Leo T. McCarthy and Oakland Mayor Lional Wilson. A total of 18 workshops were available, each generating many ideas for the future ranging from increased community backing for treatment programs to more anti-drug education and alternative activities for young people. More than 75 health care organizations, drug rehabilitation programs and churches had representatives present to answer questions and offer help. Over twelve different groups provided entertainment varying from rap to gospel music; and there were awards given to senior citizens.

Community Support Groups

Another key element in OCTF's plan was the formation of community support groups including: recovery addicts; grandparents and relatives of addicts; seniors; women; pregnant women; mental health; youth; and Spanish speaking groups. OCTF members were trained by the Support Group committee to lead groups. Given a safe forum to discuss personal issues, people began to feel less isolated and became open to new ways of handling old problems. As of May, 1990, 22 groups were meeting in churches, community centers and private homes. This support group network has been a cornerstone in the OCTF's struggle to educate and sensitize the community to recovery.

Conclusion

In a mere 11 months, OCTF accomplished what others have taken years to complete. They reached over 8,000 Oakland citizens with information on substance abuse, AIDS, family addiction how to access services, support groups and treatment. They showed people how to join in a real community effort to strengthen and enhance the family structure.

With the success of their first few months encouraging them on, the OCTF has identified broader goals for the future. These goals included continuing to provide broad-based prevention and education services to Oakland citizens; developing and promoting further solutions to crack and other substance abuse, family addiction, and AIDS, within every segment of the Oakland community; promoting and advocating changes in social policies that will provide a better quality of life for all citizens; and providing a network for collaboration of community groups, government agencies, law enforcement, private sector, religious institutions, and private individuals.

Everyone realizes that no one can do it alone — there is a need for collaborative action. This task force is working. It is a ideal example of different agencies and individuals working together. The reason it works is because OCTF members want to be members; they are interested in what they are doing; they are both learning and teaching; and they believe they are making a difference. Some call this process empowerment. The members of the Oakland Crack Task Force call it progress.

OAKLAND CRACK TASK FORCE*

A Portrait of Community Mobilization

Oakland, California

Adapted from a report of the same title published by the Western Center for Drug-Free Schools and Communities, June 1990.

*OCTF is now called Community Partnerships

For contact information, see Community Partnerships under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

SECTION V

DRUG CONTROL

Problem Solving

Drug Control in Public Housing

Tulsa, Oklahoma & Tampa, Florida

By Deborah Lamm Weisel

Introduction

The crack cocaine epidemic and drug problems that emerged in the mid-1980s have created an organizational challenge that is testing the resources and ingenuity of American law enforcement agencies. This dilemma has demanded new skills, long-range strategies and coordinated responses of police to make the best use of scarce human and financial resources. The immediate response by many police agencies was to put more officers on the streets, severely straining urban budgets.

But the drug problems of the 1980s have endured despite the resilient efforts of traditional law enforcement. The enduring nature of the drug problem has caused increasing numbers of law enforcement personnel to question the efficacy of their drug-fighting methods. Important questions have been raised about the wisdom of relying on a criminal justice system — the judiciary, prisons, probation/parole and law enforcement — which is overloaded with drug business.

Indeed, some criminal justice experts have suggested that making more arrests and pumping more offenders into the clogged criminal justice system will not reduce the drug problem. Instead of criminal justice and law enforcement strategies, these experts advocate other methods that should be explored, including developing a thorough understanding of drug problems and enlisting the support of other public and private groups.

A substantial amount of research has already been done on improving the efficiency of American police. The most promising research points to the use of a problem-oriented approach to policing, an analytical strategy that can be used by line officers.

This article discusses and examines how the problem-solving approach has been applied in two jurisdictions, placing particular emphasis on drugs and crime in public housing.

Tulsa

To implement the Problem-Oriented Approach to Drug Enforcement project in Tulsa, nine foot patrol officers were assigned to five public housing complexes. These complexes were areas where drug dealing was particularly visible and where tenants were victimized by drug dealers. The intimidation by dealers had resulted in a lack of communication between tenants and police and created high levels of fear in the community, which in turn hampered the ability of police to be knowledgeable and respond to problems. Following assignment to this project, foot patrol officers began to develop programs to help the residents. Many of the programs were social events, such as outings and athletic activities. Other programs were designed to help tenants improve their self-image and assist them with finding jobs. Supporting these program developments was an aggressive enforcement effort. The goal of the police was to rid the areas of drug dealers so that residents, police and housing officials could reclaim and maintain control of the troubled neighborhoods.

One method to rid the area of drug dealers was to evict tenants who were engaged in illegal activities. Since the foot patrol officers were permanently assigned to the housing complexes, they developed a familiarity with the residents and the housing authority. Knowing residents by sight aided officers in monitoring illegal activity and identifying outsiders who came into the complexes to sell drugs.

Officers also devoted time to evaluating quality of life problems such as deteriorated buildings, lack of adequate lighting, and prevalence of trash-ridden areas. Officers determined that these environmental problems were linked to drug problems. The efforts of these officers caught the attention of the city's mayor who, along with a group of advisors, endorsed the goal of empowering the residents.

At one of the target public housing complexes in Tulsa, violent crime (homicide, rape, armed robbery, and felony and misdemeanor assault) fell by 55 percent within six months. Police officials have attributed the decline to the use of the problem-oriented approach adopted by the foot patrol officers. These officers are not patroling only to make arrests or prevent crime; they are also charged with responsibility for dealing with problems that may be linked with crime.

The Tulsa Police Department is a good example of the scope of creativity of patrol officers who use the problem-oriented policing strategy. These foot patrol officers began their efforts by trying to understand the conditions which gave rise to drug problems in the five target public housing complexes.

In researching the drug problem, police discovered that youths seemed to play an important role in the drug-dealing activity that occurred in these predominantly black neighborhoods. Police conducted community surveys in the target area and learned that 54 percent of the residents felt the troublemakers in the complexes were between the ages of 14 and 24. The survey also revealed that the residents feared their children (or children of friends) getting involved with drugs more than they feared being victimized by a crime in their community.

Police learned from the housing authority that many of the residents in the city's public housing were below 18 years old. Reviewing the city's arrest statistics, they learned that during a ten-year period (from 1978 to 1988), arrests of black juveniles had increased 736 percent. Citywide arrests of blacks had jumped from 15 to 43 percent during the same period.

Police also collected information about the suspension and dropout rates for the high school that served the target areas, finding that the school had the highest suspension and dropout rates of any school in the city. It became more and more clear that police should focus their efforts on the black male juveniles in the target area.

As foot patrol officers continued their work in these neighborhoods, they developed relationships with many of the residents. Police noted that most of the youths came from households headed by a single mother — a fact verified by the information from the housing agency and the community survey; there were few recreational or programmed activities for these youth; and they were often jobless. The officers determined that the absence of positive male role models and the limited constructive activities were having a deleterious effect on the youths. Acting upon these findings, the officers developed a response to address these needs.

First, officers implemented an effort to deter non-residents from using the complexes as a marketplace to sell drugs. Field interrogations, enforcement of trespassing laws, and requiring identification and verification of addresses from unfamiliar individuals allowed officers to reduce the number of non-residents using the apartments.

Second, officers developed a number of programs to provide positive role models for the youths, and to assist them in finding jobs. These included Boy Scout troops, and having the Private Industry Training Council Program begin teaching goal setting to build self-esteem. Officers also regularly distributed information about job programs, job fairs, training and reentry programs, and Job Corps. (Representatives from various job and education-related organizations regularly make presentations to officers at line-up to keep them informed.) One officer organized driver's training programs to be held in the area. Informally, officers reached out to parents in the community to urge them to keep their youths in school. A female officer in the target area launched a program called "The Young Ladies Awareness Group" which teaches job-related skills including dressing for interviews, personal hygiene as well as other self-care skills.

Police also developed a youth program at a ranch property that was seized from a convicted drug dealer. Officers created an agriculture project where each youth has an opportunity to plant, cultivate and harvest crops for their own and their families' use. Officers and community volunteers counsel the youths as well as provide encouragement in this non-urban environment.

These police-initiated programs have brought a number of community resources into the target area and provided a number of alternative activities for juveniles. In addition, police believe that their efforts are evidence to the youth that someone cares about their well-being. The officers also cite that relations with all the residents in the community have been enhanced and that a greater level of cooperation among the people who live in the area is being experienced.

Since the problem-oriented program began, police have observed that blatant street sales have fallen dramatically in the target housing complexes. Because this youth-focused effort is a long-term initiative by police, officers will continue to monitor the project and respond to changing needs. Officers already have plans to start a number of other related activities. The North Division of the police station is developing a program, in conjunction with the high school in the area, to combat high dropout and suspension rates. Police are working with social service agencies to coordinate the provision of programs in the area; and police are also actively lobbying for the establishment of satellite offices to serve the community.

The success of the foot patrol officers led Police Chief Drew Diamond to make a department-wide commitment to problem-oriented policing. All sworn and non-sworn personnel in the agency have been trained in problem-solving, both through in-service training and at the police academy. The department has also been developing policies and procedures to fully incorporate the problem-oriented approach into the department's day-to-day operations. Already, officers are tested on their knowledge of problem-oriented policing concepts when they take

promotion exams. A key proponent of problem-oriented policing earned a high-profile promotion partially because of the success of the program. Officers throughout the department are taking the initiative to get involved in solving problems.

With the leadership of the chief, commitment of mid-level managers, and thorough training of all officers, the agency is making positive strides in refining police application of problem-oriented policing.

Tampa

Police in this south Florida city are using the problem-oriented approach to tackle drug and drug-linked problems in College Hill Homes, a 710-unit public housing complex. The neighborhood, which was the scene of a civil disturbance in 1986, is adjacent to another public housing complex of similar size. In 1988, six percent of the department's patrol force was assigned to the College Hill area, yet the complex represents just 0.9 percent of the city's population.

Recognizing that the residents are a good source of information about problems in their community, police officers conducted a survey of the housing complex. They learned that residents considered drug dealing to be the major problem in College Hill. In addition, both the survey and arrest statistics revealed that much of the illegal activity is apparently conducted by non-residents. In the survey, 48 percent of those who said they knew where the troublemakers live, indicated they do not live in the complex; and 52 percent of individuals arrested for narcotics violations during 1988 lived outside College Hill. (It is useful to note, however, that 90 percent of arrestees lived within 3 kilometers, or about two miles, of the community.)

To respond to this issue, police sought ways to beef up enforcement of trespassing laws to limit the role of outsiders. Tampa police began using their authority as designated agents of the housing agency to strictly enforce trespassing laws; violators are targeted and frequently arrested. But arrests are not the only tool the police use to control ingress and egress. They also worked in conjunction with the housing authority on a parking control program. A key feature of this program involved striping the parking lots and assigning designated parking spaces to residents. Each resident with a vehicle was given a decal so that police could more readily identify non-residents' vehicles. Visitor parking is limited and controlled. Illegally parked cars are ticketed and towed at the owner's expense.

As a second strategy, the Tampa police developed a Housing Violation Form to improve communication between themselves and local housing officials about non-residents. Police report lease violations that come to their attention to housing officials. In particular, police report people living in the complex who are not supposed to be there. Occupation of an apartment by people not specified on the lease is a clear violation of the housing agency's lease agreement with its tenants. The housing violation form aids police in separating legitimate and law-abiding residents from other individuals who frequent the community. It also helps limit unwarranted intrusion upon residents by non-residents. A similar form, developed by police, is also being used to communicate criminal violations to the housing agency. Once those violations are reported, the housing agency takes action (which may include eviction) against these troublemakers in the community. Police believe that these practices have aided them in returning control of the complex to the residents.

During their community assessment, the police recognized that many of the residents in the area were fearful, and that their fears were partially due to the environmental conditions within the area. The community survey also revealed that residents were concerned about poor living conditions. In addition, nearly all the residents (88 percent) said they stayed in their homes during the evening

hours to avoid trouble and/or protect themselves against crime. Police determined that poor and inadequate lighting, particularly in known drug-dealing locations, was a key contributor to these concerns.

Tampa officer John Quicci became interested in the problem of poor lighting in the College Hill community when he realized that dark corners provided shelter for street-level drug dealing in the area. Obtaining assistance from the Tampa Electric Co., he conducted an informal survey of the lighting in the apartment complex. Quicci learned that the utility company has a staff person responsible for monitoring the condition of lights; however, this staff person worked only during daylight hours. The utility company was persuaded to allow the staff person to shift his working hours to participate in the project.

A formal lighting survey was conducted to map the location of every street light and pole in the area. Each light was recorded by a specific pole number and location. During the survey, the officers and the utility company representative came to the conclusion that the current wattage (100 watts) per light in the area was inadequate to fully light the area. Quicci also verified his suspicion that a number of lights were being shot out to cloak illegal activity. He researched the possibility of installing bullet-resistant lights, and learned that plexiglass covers previously installed over the 100-watt bulbs melted from the heat of the bulb.

Officer Quicci learned that the utility company actually owns and operates all the street lights within the city; the Tampa Housing Authority (THA), however, pays for the use of these lights on THA property. Thus, the officers recognized that they should include the housing officials in discussions with Tampa Electric Co. Working together, a proposal was developed to upgrade all existing light fixtures to 400 watts and to install an additional 50 light poles in College Hill. The proposal was approved by the City Council and some of the new fixtures were subsequently installed. Officer Quicci also developed an agreement with the utility company that they would replace lights reported out within 48 hours of notification.

The result of Officer Quicci's efforts is an apartment complex that is boldly lit. The officers believe that the improved lighting deters dealers from openly selling their wares, and also improves the feeling of security that residents have in the neighborhood. In addition, the enhanced lighting contributes to the ability of officers to observe illegal activity occurring within the community, rather than guessing about actions obscured by shadows. A follow-up survey has shown that residents are pleased with the lighting.

Future plans for problem-oriented policing in Tampa include expanding use of the strategy throughout the department's First District, which covers half of the city. The officers who worked on the College Hill effort have been transferred to other squads, where they are working to increase other patrol officers' knowledge of problem-oriented policing. The agency is also discussing development of a policy and procedures statement to fully incorporate the notion of problem-oriented policing into the agency's normal procedures.

Preliminary Conclusions

The long-term effects of using a problem-oriented approach to battle complex drug problems in the nation's cities cannot yet be predicted. What can be reported at this time, however, is that police in the cities where this approach has been applied are showing admirable enthusiasm and creativity in tackling these problems. By combining innovative, interagency tactics with traditional law enforcement approaches, officers feel as if they are making an impact on long-standing problems rather than only "shoveling sand against the tide." Indeed, in the short run, there have been some apparent successes in the ability of officers to reduce drug activity.

Another important outcome is that the officers using problem-solving techniques have an enhanced level of job satisfaction. By attacking problems that are linked with drug and crime problems — although the problems themselves may not be strictly law enforcement problems — police in these projects are recognizing that their efforts can have a lasting impact on the quality of people's lives.

Several preliminary conclusions are beginning to emerge from the continuing research on applying problem-solving efforts to enduring drug problems.

1) Police efforts to deal with drug problems must exceed the narrow definition of police responsibility for illegal sales of drugs. That is, police cannot focus only on arresting sellers of illegal drugs.

To effectively deal with the problems, police must take a broader perspective and look beyond individual sellers; drug-related incidents must be grouped together. This broader view may involve grouping sellers, or identifying types and patterns of buyers and buying behaviors, or pinpointing locations and environmental conditions that are attractive for dealing. There are a number of different approaches police may use that may be equally effective; which approach to use partially depends upon the desire of individual officers to use one strategy instead of another. Indeed, by applying problem-solving strategies to a much broader class of problems than just drug-sales, the police have addressed a wide variety of social issues from problems with abandoned cars to incidents of domestic violence; from shutting down illegal drinking establishments to identifying repeat patterns of drug-related property crime. As they have worked on solving problems, officers have variously learned the nuances of landlord-tenant law, trespassing laws, details of public housing policies and procedures, as well as about the wide variety of community resources available. Responses implemented by officers have ranged from making referrals for drug treatment to launching community programs; from dealing with delinquent youths to making high-volume arrests. These natural expansions of the problem-solving process follow precisely because the nature of drug-dealing is so broad, and affects so many dimensions of people's lives.

2) The scale of drug problems can appear huge to residents, city officials, and police. Each of these groups must determine reasonable goals to tackle.

Progress will likely take the shape of small incremental improvements in the quality of life in a particular community. These accomplishments are no small feat and should be saluted. In the long run, it will be the accumulation of these many small hard-fought victories that will constitute substantial progress against drug-related problems.

3) Cooperation and collaboration in the police effort to deal with drug-related problems is an important but difficult component of the law enforcement effort.

There is some resistance by the community, and public and private agencies, to contribute to the police effort. Although there are notable exceptions — some of which have been described earlier in this article — police historically work alone rather than in concert. This independence hinders the ability of any organization to effectively handle complex and enduring problems.

The examples of successful collaboration of police with other public and private agencies provide ample evidence of the potential impact of multi-agency involvement. For example, the experience of San Diego police in working with housing officials to have subsidized tenants evicted is a clear illustration of the results possible when agencies team up to tackle problems.

Collaboration between police and the community requires a steady hand. Police efforts to deal with drug problems on a community basis may either enhance or inflame the relationship that police

have with the community. In those communities where police make a legitimate and sustained attempt to obtain community involvement, residents have been supportive and offered assistance. In those neighborhoods where no sustained effort is made to overcome antagonism between police and community members, drug enforcement efforts can increase the antagonism.

4) Problem-oriented policing can be implemented more quickly and problem-solving efforts made easier in agencies where strong leadership and an organizational culture encourages independent thought and action by officers.

It is also clear that the process of problem-oriented policing can be used successfully in many different settings. Training officers in the approach and giving them the flexibility to apply it has demonstrated that patrol officers can easily learn the process and productively apply the strategy to a variety of problems in their communities. An effort to implement problem-oriented policy, however, can also point out organizational difficulties in police agencies. These difficulties can contribute to the inability of police agencies to respond effectively to drug problems. Weak links in the chain of command, lack of autonomy at supervisory levels, and a crisis-driven orientation all contribute to difficulties in implementing problem-oriented policing. Conversely, stronger organizations are able to quickly adapt to change, and have used that change process to foster a creativity that produces enhanced problem-solving efforts.

Some of the problem-solving efforts being used by police agencies in the Problem-Oriented Approach to Drug Enforcement project are working better than others. Even the most successful problem-solving techniques apparently work only on specific problems, and often only in specific locations. Thus, even more important than the development of generalizable results of problem-solving initiatives, is the development of a thought process for police that fosters both creative and collaborative solutions to specific problems. This development stands in stark contrast to the application of global measures for all drug problems. For this reason, a problem-oriented approach has a good chance for making a long-term impact on neighborhood drug problems.

PROBLEM SOLVING
Drug Control in Public Housing
By Deborah Lamm Weisel
Police Executive Research Forum
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BEAT HEALTH... & CRACK HOUSE ABATEMENT

OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

By Sergeant Robert Crawford

Introduction

With the explosion over the past few years in the use of cheap crack cocaine, the crime challenge facing many communities is dealing with abandoned buildings that have become nests for users and drug dealers as well as safe places for related criminal activities. One such building in a neighborhood can act as the proverbial rotten apple in spoiling a whole area. Crack houses present situations where time is not on the side of the police, and the leisurely pace of normal bureaucratic activity cannot be afforded.

In 1988, the Oakland Police Department developed a coordinated program with city, county, and state regulatory agencies and certain areas of the Oakland community to close down crack houses and other illegal businesses. Since the beginning of the program, more than 200 crime- and drug-inviting sites have been eliminated or turned into clean, occupied, safe buildings.

The Police Department calls this approach to drug prevention and control "Beat Health," a program that responds to the needs of persons residing, visiting, and doing business in a community. It operates by reporting to other municipal agencies about situations that contribute to neighborhood blight, such as unsanitary conditions, boarded up buildings, illegal wiring and plumbing, and street hazards. In response to the condition, an Oakland sergeant takes measures to secure the premises.

This partnership among the police department, other city agencies, community organizations, and residents makes drug activity non-viable. Drug dealers and users are systematically and personally weeded out, and other neighborhood problems that continue to cause crime are resolved. The neighborhood is revitalized and has easier access to the law enforcement process that contributes to its safety. A neighborhood with a close partnership with law enforcement is a neighborhood that can become a safe oasis, an area that is inhospitable to drug dealers.

The Beat Health Approach

The *Beat Health* approach brings the forces of as many city, county, and state agencies as possible to bear in bringing a property or an area up to standard. The idea is to render the *nests* uninhabitable for the criminal element. The services of every involved agency or government bureau are assembled into one force focussed on the problem location. This action can make the premises so difficult to use for criminal activity that the criminals move on. The process involves the following steps:

1) ***Identification:*** Complaints are received from neighbors, citizens groups or associated agencies. Beat officers know their trouble spots and houses.

2) ***Investigation and Intelligence Gathering:*** Alleged activity must be verified and persons involved identified before any action is taken. Specifically note:

   Police Information: The beat officer is the best source of information (a simple card or report can gather information from all shifts). A records statistical run of the location and a review of crime reports by type; a report from communications on types and frequency of calls; and a check of a Drug Hot Line, if one exists, will also aid the investigation.

   Citizens: Organized neighborhood watch groups can sometimes provide detailed information on criminal activity patterns, history, and related details, though the facts must be scrutinized carefully.

   The Owner: The property owner must be identified and located. Any formal action on a property must include the due process element of owner notification. Property ownership information is public record and can be obtained through the county assessor's records, or through various on-line computer services such as those used by real estate agents. Intelligence background on any owners of large amounts of property in a jurisdiction might also be useful.

   Utilities: Local power and/or water companies can advise as to whether their service has been discontinued and to whom the service is billed; as well as any information about problems, threats or tampering. (The best contact is someone who works with fraud or theft, such as a revenue protection agent or field supervisor.) If there is no water service, or water has been shut off, the building is uninhabitable and must be posted and vacated (under a quick civil process) for health and safety reasons.

3) ***Inspection of the Premises:*** Visits should be documented and include notations of anything or anyone observed in or around the premises. Take photographs. Specifically note:

   Occupants: Who lives there or is on the premises?

   Status of Occupants: Who is the owner, what is the status of the occupants (owner, legal tenant, trespassers)?

   Exterior Appearance: Are there signs of deterioration, or abatement action indicators such as utility theft or tampering (gas and electric meters, water meters), rats (indicating broken or open sewers), garbage or junk piled around, inoperative vehicles, broken or cracked sidewalks or curbs, illegal fences (height or location)?

   Interior Appearance: Are there signs of remodeling or modifications done without permits (such as garage or basement living conversions), rickety narrow stairways, electrical hazards, fire hazards, broken windows, faulty plumbing, clogged or inoperative toilets? Any "unfit home" situations (filth, health hazards, etc.) should be taken care of immediately, especially if there are children present.

Search Warrants: All the rules of search and seizure apply and a search warrant may be required to enter a house or building. Nevertheless, if there are reports of unfit conditions, and the surroundings at the property confirms them, and there are children present, law enforcement officers have a duty to investigate and remove the children immediately, if appropriate.

Search warrants for building inspections are easily obtained by a housing or building inspector but their purpose is specific and they require 24 hour notice. The inspectors can request police presence during an inspection.

4) ***Specialized Multi-Agency Response Team (SMART):*** In cases where enough information has been provided by some preliminary inspections or by beat officers' observations, it is desirable to orchestrate a SMART response with as many relevant agencies as possible at a pre-determined time. The presence of many inspectors and non-sworn agents from civilian regulatory agencies at one time can be extremely effective.

Agencies that are usually available for field responses and can be relied upon to appear during normal business hours if an appointment is made in advance include:

City or county housing and building inspectors
Fire department and/or Fire Marshall
Local gas & electric company (energy theft or hazards)
Local water district (theft or hazard)
City or county public works, sewer, maintenance
City or county health department (Vector Control unit)
Probation*
State parole*
Alcohol Beverage Control*
County welfare*
Department of social services*

*have field investigators

Enforcement: While at the scene it is important to bring as much enforcement action as possible to any criminal element in the area. Anybody in or around the site who is asking questions about police presence should be identified and checked for warrants. If they have cars, the cars should be checked for current registration and strict compliance with the vehicle code. Action should be taken in full view of the neighbors, setting a tone.

Follow-up: To coordinate the response of all agencies involved, copies of all reports should be obtained by the police officer so that compliance and progress can be monitored.

5) ***The Removal of Occupants:*** The removal of anyone from the premises can range from simple to complex. When criminal activities or hazards are present, however, anyone can be removed from any property through due process. The following is a rule of thumb:

Trespassers: Traditional approach of immediate removal under the state penal code sections that apply; citizen's arrest by an owner or agent is the most desirable. (Police intervention in complex landlord/tenant disputes requires the utmost caution. Most states require police officers to receive an arrested person from citizen to relieve the officer from any liability.)

Legal Tenant or an Eviction Pending: If the building is declared sub-standard by the housing official and confirmed by board action, it must be vacated within 30 days after notice is given. Action must be taken by property owner — without using the police as an eviction agent.

Owner Occupied: Property owners must follow generally the same rules for occupancy of a dwelling as anybody else. If a building is declared uninhabitable, no one

can legally occupy it. Provisions can be made for security (e.g., a guard in the building at night), but this must be specified and approved.

Enforcement of illegal occupation of uninhabitable dwellings or buildings (by other than trespassers) is usually by citation for infractions. It is costly to a property-owner to be fined several hundred dollars a day for noncompliance. The fines can be placed as a tax lien on the property.

6) ***Close and Secure:*** Beyond a simple board-up, due process consists of a housing board notice advising the owner to clean-up and secure the property within a specified time period (usually 10 days), or the government agency will do it and place a lien against the property. In cases of serious health, fire or safety hazards, the clean-up must begin immediately!

   An effective approach is to have the city/county retain a group of insured/bonded independent contractors who bid on clean-ups and board-ups. This entails cleaning out the premises and securing all windows and doors with 5/8 inch plywood and carriage bolts from behind to 2x4 struts (known as a HUD board-up). Signs are then placed warning that it is a criminal violation to enter the building or remove the sign. (Housing Code infractions with fines for owner, state penal code misdemeanors for transients.)

7) ***Compliance or Demolition:*** The final time consuming process involves hearings, notices, bids on the demolition, then more hearings if there is an appeal. If the property is not suitable for reconstruction, the only option is demolition (which may take up to a year). Nevertheless, a securely boarded up house that a trespasser cannot re-enter is no longer a police problem. Usually good buildings are sold or rehabilitated before this process runs its course.

8) ***Secured Properties:*** Secured properties need some follow-up such as drive-bys and an occasional contact with neighbors. If any illegal activity on the property starts, immediate action should be taken. Neighbors will respect police effectiveness and will assist by calling in whenever they observe suspicious activity.

The whole purpose of the project approach to *Beat Health* is to concentrate effort and increase bureaucratic effectiveness. A side benefit is to make it as uncomfortable as possible for those people who bring crime into the community. Traditional enforcement action is significantly enhanced by the support functions that eliminate the undesirable locations that attract the criminal element.

Drug Noise Abatement

Two years ago, California's Drug Abatement Act (CA Health and Safety Code 11570, et seq) was amended to allow private citizens, city attorneys and district attorneys to bring suit in civil court against property owners who allow drugs to be used or placed on their property. This statute can be devastating to a property owner because it authorizes the court to:

- ❑ Shut the building down for one year.
- ❑ Assess damages equal to the rental value of the property.
- ❑ Levy a civil penalty up to $25,000.
- ❑ Seize all fixtures and personal property to pay for law enforcement costs.

In addition, the statute allows the city or county to collect court and investigation costs.

While the Beat Health approach described above, in addition to traditional law enforcement activities, will usually cause the problem to end before lengthy court action is required, the *Drug Nuisance Abatement* process can absolutely prevent the property from returning to use as a drug house.

What follows is a very general guide to the drug abatement process. It is by no means complete or all encompassing because each case is unique. The city attorney, county counsel or your department legal advisor should be contacted before any actions are taken. In general, to be effective, the following information must be gathered:

1) All police reports (and copies of search warrant affidavits) of drug offenses, prostitution and felonies for previous two years.

2) A record of all calls to, or adjacent to, the location regarding drugs, disturbances or felony crimes.

3) Declarations from each officer making any drug arrest or finding drugs on or connected with the location, and from the investigating officers of the abatement action.

4) Declarations from neighboring or knowledgeable citizens regarding the property and the activity. (These are extremely valuable, but very difficult to obtain due to fear of reprisals. The court will proceed without them.)

5) A report from the criminologist or crime lab technician on the actual amount of an illegal drug and its street value listed for each report.

6) Certified property owner and description information obtained from the County Assessor (not your own computer print- out). This includes a copy of the assessor's map of the property with its location described. You must also do a title search.

This package is submitted to the city attorney (or district attorney) for review. In most cases, the city attorney will then notify the property owner(s) by certified mail of the existence of the nuisance on their property. The letter also sets out in detail the conditions constituting the nuisance and recommends ways of abatement. (In cases where pre-suit notification is not prudent, the city attorney will bring a lawsuit without prior notification.)

If voluntary action is not taken to abate the problem, the city may bring a civil suit naming the owner and occupant as defendants. After a complaint has been filed, the city attorney may record a notice of pending action (or *Lis Pendens*) against the property which alerts potential buyers of the property that a case is pending.

The first step in the legal process is an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO). Ordinarily, a defendant must be notified in advance of such an application, but the court may not require such advance notification in drug abatement cases if convinced the defendant may try to evade service or take moveable property from the premises.

If granted, the TRO may bar the owner or anyone else from using the premises for the purposes of selling or providing drugs; require signs to be posted stating such; and prohibit the removal of property from the premises. The court will usually set a hearing to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be issued within 15 days. Defendants must be personally served with notice of the court proceedings before the "show cause" hearing.

If a preliminary injunction is granted, the defendants may request a court trial. If the existence of a nuisance is established at the trial, the court will order the nuisance abated and order other possible penalties as described above. The city's costs will be considered a lien against the property.

Violations of any court orders during the proceedings may be considered contempt of court, punishable by up to six months in jail or a

$10,000 fine, or both. A nuisance action is completely independent of, and in addition to, any criminal prosecution.

The procedures can take from 30 days to several months before filing in court. The status of the property may suggest different courses of action. For example:

Owner occupied/owner involved
Proceed with court action. Owner first knows of action when served with a summons.

Owner occupied/not involved
Eg., elderly parents or grandparents in a house taken over by dope-dealing children. A certified letter of notification over the city attorney's signature summarizing the problem and advising of impending legal action. This letter should ask for a response within 15 days from the owner or his/her attorney. In some cases, it may be advisable to go directly to court.

Tenant occupied, or business where owner is not on property
A certified letter of notification *to the property owner(s)* over the city attorney's signature summarizing the problem and advising of impending legal action.

BEAT HEALTH . . . AND CRACK HOUSE ABATEMENT
Oakland, California
By Sergeant Robert Crawford, Oakland Police Department

For contact information, see Oakland Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Drug Free Zones

Madera County, California

What Is A Drug Free Zone?

A Drug Free Zone (DFZ) is any specific location in the community, especially areas where children congregate (e.g., schools, parks), that the citizens perceive as a place where drug trafficking and alcohol availability problems exist, but the citizens decide such problems will no longer be tolerated.

Citizens have realized that to eliminate these problems the entire community must join forces to clean up the neighborhood and create a better, safer, and healthier place to live. The police cannot do it alone.

Historically, drug free zones have been associated with schools. Federal and state laws provide enhanced penalties for those convicted of particular drug offenses on or near school grounds, in public parks or facilities where children play, and near churches. The creation of a drug free zone, however, is not dependent upon the existence of such laws. Rather, the key to drug free zones is community residents bonding together to form partnerships with the police, schools, treatment programs, local government, businesses, and community organizations. Together they:

- ❑ *Take charge and decide what action is needed*
- ❑ *Form liaisons with government*
- ❑ *Convince government to listen and respond to the community needs*
- ❑ *Target specific problem areas*
- ❑ *Develop realistic goals*
- ❑ *Monitor their progress*
- ❑ *Celebrate their successes!*

Madera County DFZ

Madera County consists of several small communities. The county seat of Madera is the largest with a population of 35,000. The area is divided between large agricultural sections and the Sierra Nevada mountain range.

On October 17, 1990 several members of the Madera Unified School District advisory board attended the California Attorney General's Drug Free Zones Challenge Seminar in Oakland, California. This panel consisted of police officers from different agencies, a minister, a victim rights advocate and two school counselors.

Motivated by the DFZ seminar, Madera County Sheriff's Department Sergeant Hibbens, who already sat on the school advisory board, took the lead and began meeting with the law enforcement

department heads and administrators to explain the Drug Free Zones concept and address their concerns. Once law enforcement support was secured, Sergeant Hibbens drafted resolutions for adoption by local government and school districts. This drive was successful, and resolutions claiming all schools and parks as Drug Free Zones were passed by all governing bodies and school districts.

In addition to local law enforcement, several other government agencies joined the fight. In the mountain areas of Madera County, the U.S. Forest Service, the California Department of Parks and Recreation, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers all became involved. This resulted in the mountain recreation areas all being adopted as Drug Free Zones. The purpose behind this move was to show that drug problems are not limited to cities, but also exist at recreation areas where people go to get away from the pace of city life.

By working with local sponsors, such as businesses, service clubs and even student clubs, enough money was raised to purchase "DRUG FREE ZONE" signs. The signs were ordered from a company that makes signs for Cal Trans (California Department of Transportation) to insure that they would conform with state requirements for road signs and that they could stand up to the environmental elements. The signs were posted around all schools countywide as well as at the recreation areas in the mountains.

A new, invigorated DFZ Advisory Board was subsequently created consisting of a Deputy District Attorney as chairperson, a secretary, and representatives from the local law enforcement agencies in the area, school officials, clergy, and local residents. Certain board members serve as contact persons for their geographical areas. Citizens can bring their concerns to their contact person without having to go before the board. The Board then acts on these requests.

The first small success of the Madera DFZ effort was a joint venture with the City Fire Department and local utilities company to burn down an abandoned house which had been a haven to gang and drug activity. The property owners were contacted by DFZ committee members in conjunction with the fire department about the problems, and the offer made to burn down the building so that the owner could rebuild. The owner was very receptive.

The DFZ Board then went to a local city park that had been the scene of many violent crimes and drug abuse. Children could no longer play in the park because of the excessive abuse problems. The Madera City Council declared the McNally Park a Drug Fee Zone, and set a kick-off day as its reclamation celebration. At the ceremony, local, state and federal legislators appeared and joined in. The celebration was further enhanced by visits from Ronald McDonald, Smokey the Bear and the Fresno State University Mascot. The park was full of children from the nearby school and a new relationship began between the residents, the children and the city government. Since that day, the citizens from the McNally Park area meet regularly with officials to plan events for the children and discuss any concerns. The people successfully reclaimed their park!

At the McNally Park DFZ Rally, the Madera County DFZ Board received commendations from State Attorney General Dan Lungren and the California Assembly. Previous support was also received from President George Bush. The Madera County Drug Free Zone program is an example of what small communities can do. It demonstrates that drug problems exist, not only in the cities, but in agricultural and recreational areas as well. The program was funded entirely through donations and many volunteer hours.

DRUG FREE ZONES
Madera, California
For contact information, see Madera County Sheriffs Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Drug Abatement Institute

Safe Streets Project

Oakland, California

Introduction

"We look at a drug house as a property management problem and drug use as anti-social, anti-moral behavior that creates a public nuisance," says Molly Wetzel of the Drug Abatement Institute in Oakland, California. "If the property owners won't evict the drug dealers, then the neighbors go to small claims court and sue for damages for emotional and mental distress. And they win, every time."

The Drug Abatement Institute (DAI), a citizens group based in Oakland, California, has adopted a non-traditional strategy to rid Oakland neighborhoods of drugs and drug associated crime. The emphasis of the program, which was pioneered by community organizer, Molly Wetzel, is to mobilize neighborhoods to use the civil court system against the neighborhood ***nuisance*** *of drugs. The primary targets are residences where criminal activity has occurred over a period of time and thus have become a* ***nuisance*** *to the neighborhood. Such residents might include motels, single family dwellings, apartments and private, as well as public housing.*

California ***Civil Code Section 3479,*** *defines a nuisance as: anything which is* ***injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any public street.***

The First Case

The 1100 block of Francisco Street (Berkeley, CA) is a mix of public housing and 200,000 dollar homes. It was a quiet, multi-racial neighborhood until the traffic started. Drug deals were made on the street. Prostitutes plied their wares on picnic tables in an abandoned school yard. Passers-by littered streets with used condoms and syringes. Something as simple as walking down the street became very scary. And, all of this illicit activity originated from one apartment building on Francisco Street.

Neighbors last year formed a crime watch group and began documenting suspicious activity in the apartment building. They met with the landlord, kept records of calls to police and appealed to city officials. Nothing happened, the problems remained. They met with a city council member, the police chief and representatives of the housing

authority and city attorney's office. The residents were praised for their diligence and encouraged to persist in trying to clean up their neighborhood. Still nothing happened.

The neighbors then decided to group together and use the law. Based upon the fact the landlords were allowing the conditions permitting the drug dealers and prostitutes to frequent the area, the neighbors sued these landlords in small claims court for public nuisance. In August 1989, 18 neighbors (including Wetzel) won $1,500 each, plus court costs, in a judgement against the landlord who had not responded to pleas to evict problem tenants.

Calling itself "Safe Streets Now!," this group shares the expertise gained from its precedent-setting case with people looking for nonviolent, nonconfrontational ways to rid their communities of drugs and gang houses. "Safe Streets Now!," through the DAI, teaches others how to use California's state nuisance abatement laws — originally enacted to protect neighborhood peace and harmony — to sue in small claims court, which charges a $4 filing fee, prohibits lawyers, and guarantees a hearing in 30 days. Because a plaintiff can sue for up to $5,000, lawsuits filed by every family member in neighboring households seriously threaten a landlord's profits.

Small Claims Court Process — Simple and Inexpensive In California

The small claims court route is nonconfrontational, simple, and "very empowering" to individuals, according to Molly Wetzel. First, concerned residents form a neighborhood team composed of neighbors, the beat police officer, and a city council representative. After identifying the property owner through city records, team members document the public nuisance impact of the drug house. They maintain activity logs on customers and deliveries, prostitution, and incidents of loud noise and fights. Involved residents call the police whenever they suspect drug trafficking or prostitution; they also phone neighbors who may have observed the same situation and ask them to document the activity and call the police. These reports lay a paper trail for use in court. Collecting data involves all ages of residents. In one case, children playing jacks and skipping rope on the street counted the drug deals on one corner and went inside homes to record hourly totals. At no time does a neighbor or the team confront the drug dealer.

After gathering the evidence, the neighborhood team — using a group name or DAI to insure privacy — sends a letter to the rental unit's owner notifying him of the public nuisance. The owner also gets copies of activity logs and press clippings describing successful anti-nuisance lawsuits in small claims court. The letter offers support of the neighborhood team and the police in any eviction efforts. If significant action is not taken within two weeks, the neighborhood team sues the property owner. A hearing is scheduled within 30 days. Under this pressure, many landlords move rapidly to deal with problem tenants.

If a case does go to court, maps, activity logs, and bags of debris bring the drug house vividly into the courtroom. The group describes the business of drugs in their neighborhood and how they have "bent over backwards" to fight it. Claimants each take a few minutes to tell the judge how the drug house has changed their lives and the mental and emotional distress they have suffered.

After a successful lawsuit that closes a drug house, DAI works with owners, neighbors, and community agencies to help repair the property and clean up the streets. About half the drug house entrepreneurs move elsewhere, and half leave the business. DAI finds that many drug dealers who grew up in the neighborhood go into treatment or find another livelihood once collective community action has closed a drug house and re-established certain standards of conduct.

DAI has helped close about 60 drug houses in California and trained more than 1,000 people here and in other states. "There's been no retaliation or threats," comments Wetzel. "It's the power of people and it's amazing." She also stresses the impact on neighborhood children. "Kids are transformed. They help collect evidence, and they testify. We don't realize how a drug house impacts children. They have no choice to be good, because they take their lives in their hands when walking to school or to the store. Closing a drug house gives them a choice. We also teach them to use the laws and introduce them to the police and courts in a positive way."

Conclusion

Of course this strategy is somewhat more involved and complex than it appears. Molly Wetzel, one of the primary experts in the field, is also a fantastic motivator and mobilizer — two major components necessary for making a program such as this work. Other key elements include keeping accurate logs, consistently reporting and actively working with the police, and having a thorough understanding of citizens' rights in the civil court system.

This procedure, which has been successfully employed all over the San Francisco Bay Area and in Southern California as well, is one example of how citizens and law enforcement can use problem solving strategies to help resolve community crime and disruption.

DRUG ABATEMENT INSTITUTE
Safe Streets Project
Oakland, California
Adapted from *"Want to Close A Drug House on Your Block? The $4 Solution."*
First Printed in the NCPC Catalyst, May 1991.

For contact information, see Drug Abatement Institute under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Drug Abatement Response Team - D.A.R.T.

San Diego, California

Introduction

Over the past several years, growing concerns have been expressed regarding drug and vice problems which affect the quality of life throughout the City of San Diego. The Drug Abatement Response Team (D.A.R.T.) is an innovative tool that the City of San Diego has committed to addressing these problems. The following describes the guidelines used in preparing a D.A.R.T. case.

History

In May of 1989, an abatement unit was formed in San Diego. It was comprised of representatives from the San Diego City Attorney's Office, Police Department, Fire Department, Building Inspection Department, Zoning Department and the County Health Department. These departments target properties with numerous narcotic or vice related violations as abatement cases. Past experience had shown that mere arrests did not insure that future illegal activity would be eliminated from these properties.

The relationship between crime and dilapidated property is well established. Social psychologists have documented this connection as the "Broken Window Theory." Dilapidated buildings send a message to the community that no one cares. This in turn attracts the criminal element to the dilapidated property. Knowing this, these departments collectively use their individual enforcement roles to eliminate the narcotic or vice violations. The team has found they can rehabilitate the property and eliminate the illegal activity by placing responsibility on the property owner(s) to comply with code regulations.

On October 16, 1990, San Diego City Council increased funding for D.A.R.T. to ensure that this valuable resource for attacking neighborhood deterioration continues.

Who Does the Abatement?

The investigating officer, who could be a police officer or a detective, works an abatement project from beginning to end. A D.A.R.T. Detective is assigned to coordinate the investigation and assist the investigating officer in overcoming any obstacles. The DART Detective is also responsible for ensuring that the abatement package (prepared by the investigating officer) fulfills the requirements outlined by the City Attorney.

What is an Abatement?

The abatement process seeks to rid nuisances from properties that are maintained for the purpose of narcotic/vice activity. In order for a property to be abated, the illegal activity must be prolonged and ongoing. The abatement procedures include an extensive investigation into the illegal activities followed by civil court proceedings (if the problem cannot be resolved through cooperation with the owner).

The abatement package consists, in part, of declarations by officers concerning investigations and/or arrests made at the property. In order to end the nuisance, instead of relying solely on individual arrests made at such properties, the abatement process includes as defendants the owner(s) of the property. As this is a civil action, a judge sitting without a jury decides, based on a "preponderance of the evidence" rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt," whether the defendants are guilty of creating or allowing a nuisance to continue.

When a nuisance is proven to exist to the satisfaction of the court, the judge issues a temporary injunction pending trial. Often, specific conditions which are aimed at ending the existing nuisance will be included in the court's order. Any violation of the injunction constitutes contempt of court and carries substantial penalties, including up to a $1000 fine and/or six months in county jail.

What is a Nuisance?

A nuisance is defined generally as any activity which interferes with the quality of life within the community. Indications that a nuisance exists include any documented activity commonly associated with narcotic/vice violations.

Abatement cases must meet certain criteria based on numerous factors including the number of arrests on the property. Many properties are considered narcotic/vice hot spots. At times, however, department resources may reveal very few arrests on the property, making a traditional abatement virtually impossible.

The abatement detective, investigating officer and the City Attorney coordinate their efforts in establishing the evidence needed to show a narcotic/vice "hot spot." This could include narcotic/vice related arrests on property, surveillance videos and declarations from members of the surrounding community.

Once the evidence is established and it appears the activity will not stop despite the number of arrests made, the next phase of the investigation takes place. In this phase, D.A.R.T. has the option of taking enforcement action on other observed violations (zoning, building, fire, health, etc.) on the property.

The owner is then called in to a City Attorney hearing to be advised of the findings by the unit. The property owner is given a list of all the violations and must agree upon a specific compliance deadline. Thirty to forty-five days is a reasonable time period. The owner is also given a list of improvements (such as fencing, lighting, graffiti removal, proper rental agreements, etc.) that will assist in deterring the illegal activity. If a tenant is suspected of being a drug dealer/user, the owner may be advised of any evidence which could facilitate a possible eviction action against the tenant. Only evidence that would otherwise be available to the landlord (such as a record of convictions) will be revealed.

The property is monitored throughout the compliance period to assure that the owner has taken the proper steps to correct the violations identified. Police officers continue to make arrests on the property throughout this period. These arrests may be used as evidence in court to prove that a nuisance still exists. All evidence and information collected during the investigation is maintained in a single investigative file located in the D.A.R.T. office at the San Diego Police Department.

What if an Owner Attempts to Sell the Property?

If the property owner attempts to sell the property, disclosure must be made to prospective buyer(s) of the facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property. This would include all violations that the owner was made aware of as a result of the abatement process.

Abatement Procedures

Conducting the Investigation

In order to provide proof of nuisance activity, there needs to be extensive documentation. An investigative file should be started when the investigating officer has begun documenting the activity and collecting the evidence. This file will be maintained by the D.A.R.T. Detective. The following documents need to be collected and/or completed by the investigating officer and included in the investigative file:

Case Summary: Property location, type of activity, the type of violations, the suspects involved (if known), and the types of improvements that can be made by the property owner to deter the activity. A case summary overview provides everyone involved with a basic understanding of the problems and type of property being investigated.

Property Owner Information: At a minimum, residence address, telephone number, criminal records and other information available regarding property owner(s) involved.

Property Information: Real estate information including a description of the subject property, legal ownership, tract numbers, zoning numbers and any other information available.

Photos: Photos of the exterior and interior of the property as well as an aerial photo. If surveillance videos are made, a copy must be given to the D.A.R.T. unit. (The original should be impounded by the film maker.)

Arrest Reports: Certified copies of all on-property arrest reports for the past year.

Officer Summary: The investigating officer keeps accurate and articulate up to date records as the case progresses.

City Attorney Office Hearing

The D.A.R.T. detective is responsible for notifying the property owner(s) of the City Attorney Office Hearing. All pertinent information that has been gathered by the investigating officer, as well as suggested improvements, should be presented to the owner at this hearing.

The City Attorney documents that the owner has been advised of the narcotic/vice activity on the property; as well as all agreements made between the property owner and the City. The original is maintained by the City Attorney's office, and copies of this document are given to the D.A.R.T. Detective and the property owner.

Self Abatement Follow-Up

If the owner complies with the agreements, the investigative officer should document follow-up visits to insure that the property does not become a recurring problem. If compliance does not occur, the D.A.R.T. investigation continues.

Declarations

The investigating officer prepares a lead declaration. Officers who have assisted in the D.A.R.T. investigation also are responsible for preparing declarations. The investigating officer contacts citizens who live or work in the area and prepares citizen declarations that include all suspicious activity occurring on the subject property.

The D.A.R.T. Detective and City Attorney provide assistance in preparing declarations. Declarations minimally include officers' expertise, case investigation, past and present illegal activity and arrests observed.

Police officers working such cases should have a strong working knowledge of, and be considered expert in the field of narcotics. The officers will be testifying as experts in both criminal and civil courts in both written and oral statements. The

investigation is initiated when, in the officer's expert opinion, the activity observed is consistent with *narcotic* activity. If the activity is consistent with prostitution or gangs, the officer will need to be prepared to testify to such activity.

Community Support

In order for the unit to be successful in stopping the narcotic activity at a particular property, it is essential that the unit receive community support. Involvement from community groups can be of the utmost help in obtaining pertinent information regarding narcotic activities in their respective areas.

Interagency Coordination

Agencies (building, zoning, fire, county health, etc.) involved in the unit should be prepared to meet on a regular basis to discuss cases and upcoming investigations.

Note: City Attorney hearings are coordinated with all the entities involved so that as much information as possible is given to the concerned owner. Because of the criminal element involved in these types of properties, caution should always be taken when agency representatives investigate on their own.

DRUG ABATEMENT RESPONSE TEAM-D.A.R.T.
San Diego, California

For contact information, see San Diego City Attorney's Office under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

SECTION VI

GANGS

CASE STUDIES

Community Policing Gains New Impetus

Los Angeles, California

By Kenneth Reich and Jesse Katz

Introduction

The concept of community policing has been around the Los Angeles Police Department for 25 years, however during the last decade it had largely fallen into disuse. Not all officers have been supportive of such policing efforts because they believe they take away from the response to emergency calls, viewed as the "meat-and-potatoes" of policing. Recently, however, the community approach has gained a new impetus in response to increased public criticism about police use of excessive force.

The Christopher Commission, formed in the wake of the now famous Rodney King incident (March 3, 1991) to conduct a sweeping review of the LAPD's policies and practices, strongly encouraged the widespread use of community-based policing in its final report issued July 1991 (Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department).

Commission Chairman Warren Christopher declared that expert testimony given to the commission indicated "that where there is a relationship between the officer and the community there is less chance for excessive resort to force." He suggested that such a policing technique is one way to establish better rapport between the LAPD and the various communities it serves. The report further states:

> *. . . The community policing model places service to the public and prevention of crime as the primary role of police in society and emphasizes problem solving, with active citizen involvement in defining those matters that are important to the community, rather than arrest statistics. Officers at the patrol level are required to spend less time in their cars communicating with other officers and more time on the street communicating with citizens. Proponents of this style of policing insist that addressing the causes of crime makes police officers more effective crime fighters, and at the same time enhances the quality of life in the neighborhood.*
>
> *. . . Community policing concepts, if successfully implemented, offer the prospect of effective crime prevention and substantially improved community relations. Although community-based policing is not a panacea for the problem of crime in society, the LAPD should carefully implement*

this model on a City-wide basis. This will require a fundamental change in values. The Department must recognize the merits of community involvement in matters that affect local neighborhoods, develop programs to gain an adequate understanding of what is important to particular communities, and learn to manage departmental affairs in ways that are consistent with the community views expressed. Above all, the Department must understand that it is accountable to all segments of the community. (Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, Summary, p. 9.)

As noted above, the LAPD made early efforts to incorporate community policing principles and has continued to experiment with those concepts. For example, the LAPD's nationally recognized DARE program has been viewed by officers and the public alike as a major achievement. Other community-based policing projects currently operating are described below.

Operation Cul-De-Sac

February 1, 1990, a community policing program was launched in the Newton Division in South-Central Los Angeles under the nickname "Operation Cul-De-Sac." Spending more than $250,000 in overtime pay, officials at the LAPD Newton Street Division, the rough-and-tumble area known as "Shootin Newton," initially assigned 70 officers to the troubled neighborhood. Police say the number has now been trimmed to about 10 — still a sizable boost over the lone patrol car that used to pass through.

Unlike most crackdowns, however, the squads were assigned to small sectors of the community, where they were instructed to meet the neighbors, make friends and try to ease fears. Although officers continued to hunt down suspected criminals, they were told the number of arrests was not the focus.

In this gritty South-Central neighborhood that reported more drive-by shootings last year than any other in the city, the police moved away from hammer like tactics that have characterized recent anti-gang sweeps, and instead began painting over graffiti, hauling away trash, attending high school dances and even hosting picnics, complete with piñatas and pony rides.

Hoping to coax weary residents back onto streets they had abandoned in fear, officers on foot, bicycle and horseback flooded the 30 square blocks surrounding Hooper Avenue and 41st Street, ringing doorbells, leaving business cards and inviting nervous families on evening strolls.

Officers say that in the first ten months of the program, crime in the neighborhood was cut 12% compared to the same period in 1989, from 483 major felonies to 425. Drive-by shootings dropped 64%, from 14 to 5. This drop is in a city where the drive-by shooting and homicide rate has increased steadily over the last few years.

Residents — many of whom lived behind barred windows, slept on the floor as protection against nighttime shootings and made sure their cars, clothing and houses were of a gang-neutral hues — have gradually begun to unchain their doors and reclaim the streets.

So far, the program's success has been borne out by a study conducted to gauge its effectiveness. "It's been a real psychological transformation — both for the police and for the residents," said James R. Lasley, the criminologist who conducted the study with a $30,000 grant from the John Randolph and Dora Haynes Foundation, a Los Angeles organization that funds social science research. Lasley, a Cal State Fullerton criminal justice professor, commented, "The people had become captive of their own fear, and the police, instead of perpetuating the fear environment, tried to make them feel at home again."

Officers acknowledge that their new tack may seem unlikely for a department not exactly known for its down-home geniality. But faced with a 1/2-square-mile neighborhood that last year reported 37 drive-by shootings, they decided it was time to get back to some basics.

Some skeptics fear the gang-banging and crack-dealing will return as soon as the police pull out. Others have complained that drug dealers are eluding the beefed-up patrols simply by strolling outside the boundaries of the targeted area — 33rd Street and Central, Compton and Vernon avenues. And a few residents point out that even increased police attention does not address other needs, such as jobs, economic development and a major supermarket.

Officers say they want to intensify and expand the program. In 1991, they plan to begin running an after-school tutoring and athletic program for about 250 youths, funded by a $150,000 grant from the state's Office of Criminal Justice Planning. The two concrete barriers for which the operation is named — creating dead-end streets on Central at 34th Street and 40th Place — will be landscaped. Eight more cul-de-sacs, designed to limit access to the area and foster a sense of community on once noisy thoroughfares, are also planned.

Finally, officials, who call the neighborhood: Reporting District No. 1345, are going to ask residents to select a name for the community and post it on signs. "Rancho Jefferson," in honor of the local school, Jefferson High, has been suggested.

"This is definitely a prototype," said Assistant Police Chief Robert L. Vernon, who also added that the program is not expensive to operate once initial start-up costs are funded. "If it turns out as good as some think it will, this could revolutionize law enforcement."

Harbor Division

Meanwhile, six of about 200 officers in the Harbor Division are free from regular assignments to work with community leaders on alleviating a host of problems ranging from graffiti and abandoned cars to gangs and the dumping of refuse in such quantities that some East Wilmington streets have had to be closed.

The Harbor commander, Captain Joe DeLaduranty, is perhaps more identified with this kind of policing than any other LAPD officer at this level. "This is not a program," he remarks. "It's an attitude, a management style and a way of doing business. . . . It's finding out what the priorities of the community are, not what ours are." (DeLaduranty became Police Chief of Torrance, CA in 1992.)

All six men assigned to community-based policing in the Harbor Division are senior lead officers, the top-most patrol position. On a given Tuesday, officers Dale Saas and Phil Gasca, assigned to Wilmington:

- Stopped by a 4-year-old apartment project, where they have been helping a new owner paint out graffiti and evict tenants involved in drug peddling. Some walls in the neighborhood, Saas said, have been repainted 30 times to discourage those painting graffiti.

- Visited Hawaiian Avenue Elementary School, where they have been helping in an effort to discourage students from joining gangs. As part of this effort, Saas and Gasca have assisted in a $6,000 fund-raising effort to send sixth-graders to a three-day camp at a Boy Scout Center in nearby San Pedro. They also take students on ride-alongs and talk to classes about gangs.

  The principal of the school, Tommye Kennan, noted that students may become involved with gangs at a very young age. She displayed a class picture in which one 6-year old in the first grade was flashing a local gang's sign.

- Paid a call on Susan Pritchard, field deputy to Los Angeles Councilwoman Joan Milke Flores. The three discussed plans for the next weekly Friday morning breakfast at Maya restaurant, which brings together 35 community leaders and the officers to discuss crime and other problems confronting the Wilmington community. Pritchard explained, "The breakfast group has become a family."

- Visited Manual Louis, head of the Far East Wilmington Improvement Association, in a neighborhood where many of the streets, within the city of Los Angeles, are unpaved and clogged with refuse — including hazardous wastes — dumped by people from outside the neighborhood.

  Some streets, which are buried as much as 25 feet deep in trash have had to be closed and police are helping Louis to seek municipal action to clear and reopen them. Louis is effusive in his praise of the help given his association by Saas and Gasca. "These two gentlemen are our right arm and left arm," he said.

On the same day, a tour of San Pedro with Officer Don Jenks displayed other elements of community-based policing. Jenks is proudest of his success in helping to convert a number of small apartment houses, where he says calls to the police often ran 25 to 30 a month, to drug and alcohol rehabilitation houses where the number of police calls "have dropped to zero."

Conclusion

Recognizing the promise of community policing concepts, the chiefs of police of 10 major metropolitan departments, including New York, Chicago, Boston, and Dallas, issued a position paper endorsing community-based policing on April 16, 1991:

> Police agencies across America are moving toward a community-based style of policing. This style of policing values partnerships, problem-solving, accountability, and a service orientation to our citizens. Our hope is for the Los Angeles tragedy to have a positive outcome by accelerating change toward this new form of policing, in order to better serve our diverse communities.
>
> *(Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, p.104.)*

COMMUNITY POLICING GAINS NEW IMPETUS
Los Angeles, California
Adapted from: *"Unconventional Policing Gains New Impetus"* by Kenneth Reich
Originally published in the Los Angeles Times (6/3/91); and *"Officers' Folksy Tactics Pay Off in Gang Domain"* by Jesse Katz, originally published in the Los Angeles Times (11/90).

Community Youth Gang Services Project

Los Angeles, California

By Anne Thomas Sulton

Problem Addressed

Los Angeles frequently is called the gang capital of the world. Police estimate that 70,000 children and young adults belong to over 600 gangs. Unofficial estimates indicate that over 100,000 young people belong to gangs and that 150,000 more are at risk of joining gangs (Valdivia 1989).

In Los Angeles, gang members represent all the major ethnic groups including African-Americans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Filipinos, Hondurans, Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, Guatemalans, Samoans, Tongans, and whites. Some gangs operate lucrative gambling emporiums. Others run sophisticated drug distribution networks having retailers located along the western seaboard and stretching eastward to several midwestern and eastern cities.

The gang culture is firmly entrenched in Los Angeles. Some mothers even dress their small children in gang colors and call them "baby gangsters." According to the Los Angeles Police Department, over 400 hundred youth were killed last year and thousands more were maimed in gang-related incidents. Graffiti covers the walls of hundreds of thousands of residences, businesses, and public buildings. Millions of area residents are terrorized.

Law enforcement officials and many community residents are proposing that drastic measures be taken to stem the rising tide of youth gang violence. Police "sweep" areas frequented by gangs, arresting hundreds of individuals at a time. Parents of gang members area being prosecuted on a theory that they are criminally liable for their children's illegal behavior. The District Attorney's Office has been requesting lengthy prison terms for those convicted of gang-related crimes.

The Community Youth Gang Services Project (CYGS) acknowledges that a law enforcement response is necessary. It maintains, however, that criminal justice agencies cannot reduce gang violence without a high level of community involvement directed toward eradicating its causes. CYGS contends that the best hope for reducing youth gang violence lies in a strategy of attrition — one that prevents youths from joining gangs and encourages gang members to abandon their gang affiliations.

Program Approach

CYGS is a grass roots community-based organization. It believes that the keys to reducing youth gang violence at the individual level are education, employment, and involvement in positive activities. At the community level, the keys include community mobilization, coordination of social services, and crisis intervention.

The organization maintains that the most effective approach to youth gang violence is one that seeks to remedy the underlying causes of the problem. According to this perspective, youth, parents, teachers, the clergy, business people, and news media must be actively involved in a comprehensive community-wide effort. Because these groups of individuals must first be taught how to deal with youth gangs, the program focuses on education — disseminating knowledge about gangs and how their violence can be reduced. CYGS also works to diffuse potentially dangerous situations before they require a police response.

Program Development

In 1980, over 350 gang-related homicides occurred in Los Angeles. In response to the increasing number of these types of crimes and community members' fear, CYGS was established in 1981. Its primary goal was to reduce the number of gang-related homicides.

During its formative stages, CYGS essentially was a replication of Philadelphia's Crisis Intervention Network. This program had been very successful in reducing Philadelphia's youth gang violence problem and its approach seemed applicable to Los Angeles. Shortly after CYGS's formation, however, this approach was modified, expanded, and specifically tailored to suit the Los Angeles problem.

Program Implementation

CYGS has a board of directors comprised of law enforcement officials, politicians, corporate executives, community leaders, and members of the clergy. The program is administered by Steve Valdivia who serves as its executive director. CYGS has a paid staff of 75 individuals; many of them are former gang members. Nearly 500 children work in its summer employment program, and over 400 volunteers work with CYGS, including law enforcement officials, business people, and teachers.

CYGS's 1989 budget was $2.1 million. Funding sources include state, county and city governments, foundations, the United Way, and profits from its graffiti removal project.

CYGS operates a number of projects, including Crisis Intervention Teams, Career Paths, Parent-Teacher Education, and Graffiti Removal. In 1988, over 30,000 individuals were served through the following projects:

1) **Crisis Intervention Teams.** These teams are comprised of two or more staff members, many of whom are former gang members. Using CYGS marked cars, the teams patrol "hot spots" where gang violence frequently occurs. When the potential for violence is high, the teams intervene and attempt to mediate disputes among warring gangs. In cases where violence already has occurred, they engage in street counseling and rumor control. Street counseling includes comforting bereaved family members; while on rumor patrols, the teams also serve an outreach function, advising gang members of educational, employment, and recreational opportunities.

   The teams also provide "security gang watches," by patrolling before and after school, in the vicinity of 20 elementary, 60 junior high, and 45 senior high schools. In addition, the teams patrol special events

such as dances, concerts, athletic events, and other occasions where youth gang violence is likely to occur. Last year, over 12,000 youth were contacted by the teams.

2) **Career Paths.** This project served over 10,000 youth in 1988. Using a CYGS-developed curriculum, program staff visit schools and teach youngsters about the dangers of gang membership, discuss the importance and relevance of education, and recruit youth for CYGS sports challenge clubs. A foundation provided a $75,000 grant for CYGS to develop a comic book series for children that will emphasize these messages in an entertaining format.

3) **Parent-Teacher Education.** This project is designed to teach parents and teachers how to identify the early signs of gang membership and train them in methods to curtail recruitment of new gang members. It also teaches parents positive parenting skills. In 1988, over 5,500 parents and 5,000 teachers participated.

4) **Graffiti Removal.** Scrawled across the exterior and interior walls of thousands of buildings, graffiti is an important means of communication for gang members. Those able to decipher the coded messages can learn which areas are claimed as a particular gang's "turf," the names of gang members killed on a certain date in a particular location, and what drugs a gang is marketing.

   CYGS operates a graffiti removal business and contracts with public agencies and private businesses. The primary purpose of graffiti removal is to disrupt gangs' communication systems, but it also provides legitimate employment opportunities for youth and improves the aesthetic qualities of the community.

5) **Other Projects.** In addition to the above-mentioned projects, CYGS also operates a college mentor project, based on the Big Brothers/Big Sisters concept, that matches college students with youngsters "at-risk" of joining gangs; a hospital emergency personnel training program that enables them to deal with gang members flocking to emergency rooms in search of information on a fellow gang member or on rival gang members; and a summer youth employment program that employs 500 youths, 100 of whom are gang members. According to summer youth employment staff, only two conflicts erupted between rival gang members.

CYGS holds a series of "town hall meetings" designed to facilitate communication among others involved in gang-violence reduction activities and to mobilize community members. It also coordinates other citizen neighborhood patrols, and provides pre-release counseling to gang members in detention centers.

CYGS monitors program performance through community feedback and research reports. The community's response has been very positive, particularly that of parents and teachers. Findings of a CYGS study on the career paths project indicate that three years after exposure to the project, 85 percent of the children stayed out of gangs.

The number of gang-related homicides remains high, however, homicides are not the only indicator of gang activity. Therefore, program success is not solely measured by the homicide rate. According to program staff, the homicide rate is influenced by gang drug trafficking and the availability of semi-automatic weapons. Program staff estimate 25 percent of the gang-related homicides are caused by drug dealing. The same number of incidents produces more deaths because the weapons used shoot more bullets in less time – increasing the likelihood of individuals being fatally injured.

Case example

Ex-gang members are hired for many staff positions because their knowledge of gangs and gang members is crucial to the program's success. The case of one of these ex-gang members illustrates how the program works.

As a young child, an ex-gang member, who is now a crisis intervention team member, was forced to join a gang. He essentially was given two choices:

1) Join the gang and enjoy its protection, or
2) Refuse to join the gang and have no protection from gang-related intimidation and violence.

As a member, he was involved in gang-related crimes, convicted, and sent to prison. While in prison he heard about CYGS and applied for a job with it after his release. He was hired as a crisis intervention team member.

He patrols those areas frequented by gangs, and when disputes arise, he attempts to mediate a settlement. On one occasion, his intervention efforts were unsuccessful. He was shot in the face, but survived.

He continues his patrols, stopping on street corners crowded with gang members, encouraging them to avoid violence and participate in CYGS's sports challenge program. A national magazine recently featured him as one of the nation's 50 heroes.

Replication

Although the program began as a replication of another model, CYGS modified that model to address the specific needs of the Los Angeles area. Elements of this program can probably be replicated and adapted in other cities experiencing youth gang violence.

Staff recruitment methods that place ex-gang members on the frontline to work with gangs and their members may be an impediment to replication and program success. CYGS staff stated that it took several years to convince police patrol officers to work with ex-gang members. Programmatic and staff personnel changes were instituted in order to overcome this problem.

CYGS also found it difficult to raise funds. Its graffiti removal project may be an important factor for those experiencing difficulty in raising funds for program activities.

CYGS involves every major ethnic group and community institution. It uses a multifaceted approach to gang violence reduction. The program and the problem it addresses are complex. Therefore, those attempting replication should carefully plan program activities and be prepared to make a long-term commitment. Changes may not be evident until several years after the program commences.

COMMUNITY YOUTH GANG SERVICES PROJECT
Steve Valdivia, Executive Director
Los Angeles, California
By Anne Thomas Sulton
First Published in *Inner City Crime Control,* a Police Foundation Publication.

For contact information, see Los Angeles Community Youth Gang Services Project under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Community Policing & Gang Intervention

Sacramento County, California

By Bob Blattner

Introduction

Community policing and problem solving efforts are not new. Many officers have been working with communities to solve problems for years without having a label to describe what they are doing. The following article is about two Sacramento County Sheriff Department officers who, on their own initiative, implemented some community policing and problem solving strategies that have had a major impact on a developing gang problem in one community within the county. As the article suggests, the strategies used could be duplicated in other communities with similar situations.

The Lichen Boys Posse

The Lichen Boys Posse sprouted up around 1982, according to Phil Henderson, a Sacramento sheriff's deputy who came to play a leading role in the past year's battle to face down the thriving gang in the north county area. Over the years, the gang grew from a small group of young teens to at least 40 strong, with three-quarters of the members white and the remaining quarter a mix of blacks and Hispanics. Ranging in age from early teens to early '20s, they began carrying guns, breaking into homes and dealing drugs.

Graffiti, proclaiming the LBP's prowess in fights, suddenly flourished on virtually every vertical surface in the neighborhood, a comfortable middle-class community of ranch-style houses, complete with vans, boats and pickups in driveways. In retrospect, Henderson estimates that 50 percent of the assaults and 50 percent of the burglaries taking place at the time in the Lichen tract area were gang-related.

Not an uncommon story in contemporary California. But what followed was.

Henderson, a patrol officer in the north county, began noting the graffiti and the crime reports pouring in from the Lichen neighborhood. He started compiling the burglary and assault reports.

"I assigned myself to the Lichen tract," he said, "and followed up street and activity reports. I told the residents to let me know if it happens again. When you have a group of people that intimidates a neighborhood, the community feels lost, so lost they can't do anything."

When Vicki Wright, a crime prevention specialist with the Sheriff's Department Community Resources unit, organized a Neighborhood Watch meeting for the Lichen tract, Henderson showed up as well to try and rally the homesteaders.

Rally they did!

More than 300 residents turned out at the first meeting in April 1991; about 250 at another one just weeks later. They formed neighborhood watches, and nighttime community patrols. They put together phone trees and block organizations;

formed painting parties 50-strong to wipe out the gang graffiti as soon as it appeared, and scrupulously monitored all traffic in and out of their neighborhoods, recording license plate numbers and descriptions for sheriff's deputies.

At the time, Wright said she had never seen anything like it in her three-and-a-half years in community work. And they got results, but it took more behind-the-scenes work than most Lichen homesteaders are aware of.

In addition to his normal patrol work, Henderson, a father of five, wrote up more than 100 reports of gang activity, which led in turn to more than 70 arrests. He followed up citizens' reports and searched out unreported incidents.

And he took a job moonlighting as an officer for the San Juan Unified School District, which covers the Lichen tract.

"That's community policing, basically," he says. "You handle everything, and after a while, it all blends together, it all interacts." Meanwhile, another ally to the Lichen homesteaders' cause was toiling anonymously in the eastern reaches of the county.

Developing Problem Solving Strategies

Sheriff's Deputy Steve Sanford, 37, was assigned to the county's juvenile court on Kiefer Boulevard so he could be close to his children, of whom he has custody. His assignment, bailiff, is a laid-back one, usually reserved for veterans who have paid their dues on patrol and are ready to take it easy. But Sanford was not ready for any such thing — he started puttering around the juvenile court system, a mystery and an affliction to most peace officers.

He learned that arrest reports often take up to a month to trickle through the system, so judges often make rulings without full knowledge of a youth's criminal record. He learned judges often slap imaginative probation orders on juveniles — such as "no association" clauses that make it illegal for youths on probation to associate with other known gang members, or orders banning drug dealers from carrying pagers.

Sanford also learned that judges and deputy district attorneys, although they are big fans of such specialized probation orders, seldom knew when they should be levied. And patrol officers were almost always ignorant of the specialized orders that could allow them to arrest troublemakers.

Sanford moonlighted as a private security guard in a Lichen-area shopping center. He saw the increase in gang graffiti and activity and asked Henderson, a long-time friend, if he would like any help clearing it out.

Henderson wanted the help. And he got it.

Sanford traced down and copied the probation reports for names on Henderson's list of suspects. That information gave Henderson far more flexibility in cracking down on the gang members.

The knowledge that the McMillin youths were on searchable probation, for instance, hit pay dirt when a search of their residence turned up an illegal switchblade knife and two illegal sawed-off shotguns — one in each bedroom.

Sanford worked all the arrest reports through the juvenile court system in a matter of days instead of weeks; he made sure deputy DAs and judges knew the particulars about Lichen Boys appearing in court before them.

"Overkill would be a way to put it," says Sanford. "We treated them like an entrenched Blood or Crip gang, and we rolled right over them."

His partner agrees. "They know," Henderson says, "if they screw up things, they're going to have to answer, maybe not today or tomorrow. But I'll

find them if it takes months. I've got a couple hiding out on me right now."

Coordinated Efforts Pay Off

Henderson is the first to emphasize the interrelationship between his work and that of Sanford and the Lichen tract residents. All, he says, were necessary, none sufficient in itself.

Henderson estimates, for instance, that the community area patrol, made up of neighbors patrolling by car with CB radios, led directly to about one quarter of the more than 70 arrests he's made of gang members or associates.

It was citizen patrol units, for instance, that led Henderson to the arrest of Jeff McMillin several months ago when the youth was breaking his parole orders by visiting the Lichen tract.

And Sanford was behind the Lichen-area ban in the first place. "They beeped me on my pager, and then guided me in by CB until I saw him," says Henderson.

The citizens patrol worked under strict orders to avoid contact with the suspected gang members they shadowed. But not all neighbors in the Lichen tract were so laissez-faire.

"In our neighborhood," Chris, a resident said, "we have a lot of ex-Hell's Angels. The Hell's Angels told some of the Lichen boys, "You come in our neighborhood, you'll find out what a real gang's like. This is our territory. This is where we're raising our kids."

Following the LBP crisis, the neighborhood is far closer than ever before. Residents now know and trust their neighbors. "It's like being back home in Missoula, Montana," Chris says.

Some Lichen tract residents fear that summer will bring a new rash of gang violence. Jerri Daley, who led the community through the last campaign, says she will soon be circulating a letter saying, "Don't fall asleep, it's not over." Chris isn't so skeptical. "I personally think it's died down a lot," she says. And her husband, Andy, adds, "But if it starts up again, we're ready for it."

To be sure, the Lichen homesteaders know despite the death threats, the 2-by-4s and shotguns, the beatings and car chases, the smashed windows and smashed cars, that the graffiti proclaiming the Lichen Boys Posse as the toughest gang in town was an exaggeration.

One deputy district attorney described the Lichen Boys as a "bunch of wanna-bes." But while admitting there are more formidable foes than the Lichen Boys, the Lichen tract residents say they believe the tactics and togetherness that worked for them would be successful even against entrenched gangs such as the Oak Park Bloods. "I think the risks are probably greater (taking on an inner-city gang)," says Brian, head of the Lichen tract's residents patrol. "But I think they would have a much easier time to put something like this together because there are a lot of people down there who want to do something but are afraid to do it on their own. "You've got to look at the overall picture. There are more good people than bad. You can't allow the bad to take over."

Brian, Chris and the other Lichen homesteaders may at some point find out for themselves what it's like to deal with other gangs. "There's no such thing as the Lichen Boys Posse anymore," says a black-capped pool shooter at a billiards hall once fancied by the Lichen boys. "I grew up here, lived for 17 years, knew most of them, and most are in jail."

But Henderson, largely responsible for sending those Lichen boys to jail, says many others are still on the street, along with the Citrus Heights Crips, battling for turf with the weakened Posse. "I would say," predicts Henderson, "things could get pretty darn hot this summer."

Community COPS — Two Who Helped Expel the LBP

"Blind luck, basically."

That's Sacramento County Sheriffs Deputy Steve Sanford's explanation for the success of the Lichen Boys Posse campaign.

If he hadn't been working off-hours at a Lichen-area mall and seen the gang activity . . . If he hadn't been a longtime friend of Sheriff's Deputy Phil Henderson, who had seen the same graffiti, fights and fear while on patrol . . . If they hadn't talked to each other about that problem, and if their positions with the Sheriff's Department — Sanford's out at the Juvenile Court, Henderson's in North Area patrol — hadn't been perfect fits . . . "Do you believe in karma?" asks Henderson. He shrugs and adds, "I don't."

COPS and POPS — Is There a Future for Problem-Oriented Policing?

The new emphasis on "community" (also called "problem-oriented," "pro-active" or "strategic") policing, is by no means just a Sacramento — or a California, or even a United States — phenomenon.

Sir Kenneth Hall, former chief of the London police force, has called the movement, which he describes as "the mobilization of the citizenry in their own defense," a "sea change."

On London streets, taxicab drivers in "cab watch" work as a sort of Baker Street Irregulars, lending thousands of additional eyes and ears to aid bobbies in crime prevention. London hospital workers belong to a similar group, as do neighborhood residents in "neighborhood watches" like those common in America.

This active alliance between citizens and police is a far cry from the "thin blue line" ideal that characterized policing through much of the 20th century. In the "thin blue line," police were an impersonal shield between citizens and predators, a shield whose detachment and effectiveness found its personification in Dragnet's Sgt. Joe Friday: "Just the facts, ma'am."

That impersonality of the thin blue line was introduced as one of the cornerstones of the "reform" movement that swept American police forces in the years after World War I. Previously, police forces had been intimately linked with the life — particularly the political life — of the communities they served. But that close contact and lack of centralized authority led to widespread corruption, influence peddling and selective enforcement.

The highly centralized, impersonal character of the reform movement did much to solve those shortcomings, critics admit, but also begat shortcomings of its own.

Researchers in the 1970s and '80s concluded that, reform or no, the crime rate was increasing, as was the citizens' level of insecurity. Studies showed citizens weren't satisfied with the narrow, legalistic scope of policing that characterized the reform era. The citizens were anxious for increased quantity and improved quality of contact with police officers, such as that provided by the beat officer on foot. Community Oriented Policing might just be the answer.

COMMUNITY POLICING AND GANG INTERVENTION
Sacramento, California
by Bob Blattner
Adapted from *Ganging Up On A Gang. How Citrus Heights banished the LBPs.*
First published in Sacramento News & Review May 2,1991.

SECTION VII

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS & APPROACHES

CASE STUDIES



Cruising Boise

Boise, Idaho

Introduction

For years, during warm weather months, teenagers have tied up traffic with their slow cruising cars on Friday and Saturday nights. Originally, drive-in restaurants often anchored each end of the route that cruisers would "drag." But long after drive-ins lost their popularity, the cruising continued. If you were young, had a car and friends, you cruised; it was the accepted American pastime. Cruising seemed to be harmless and innocent fun, so most adults tolerated it. Such was the situation in Boise, the capital and largest city in Idaho, until the late 1980s.

Then Boise started an ambitious renovation of its downtown to revitalize business in the city's core. Some civic leaders and citizens voiced their worries that the large number of cruisers would cause customers to shy away from downtown stores. Finally, in 1988, the downtown merchants and public decided a change was needed. Reports against cruising ranged from youths harassing people, littering, and vandalizing parking lots and private property, to illegal drinking of alcohol, and urinating in public.

In response, Boise police increased downtown patrols during high cruising times and added motorcycle and foot patrols. This did not stop the cruising but it did curb some of the related problems and limited congestion. With budget limitations, however, it became difficult to keep enforcement manpower at the increased levels. They needed an alternative response and solution to the cruising problem.

*Boise turned to **problem-oriented policing (POP)** to resolve the situation. City officials and Boise citizens have tackled the cruising problem together and the results have given valuable insights into the benefits of police department interaction with the community to address community concerns.*

Problem-Oriented Policing Strategies

The goal of problem-oriented policing strategies is not to propose the ultimate solution to the "cruising problem" or any other problem; but to demonstrate how representatives from city administration, law enforcement, citizens, judges and young people can join together to look at community problems from all sides and arrive at consensus solutions.

The Boise anti-cruising strategy had three main phases:

- ***Phase I*** — A comprehensive national survey of other communities' anti-cruising solutions; and a survey of local Boise cruisers.
- ***Phase II*** — A public hearing and a citizens' task force appointed by Boise's mayor to review the problem and recommend solutions.
- ***Phase III*** — Implementation of the recommendations.

Phase I

National survey

In July 1988, the Boise Police Department mailed out a questionnaire to the police departments of 435 cities, with populations of more than 50,000, to solicit solutions that other cities used to deal with their cruising problems. About 53 percent or 229 departments replied, returning envelopes brimming with information including copies of their ordinances, laws and alternative plans.

A review of the survey results showed that responses to cruising varied widely. Some cities didn't consider cruising a problem. Most cities that dealt with cruising had increased their manpower to handle cruisers and related problems, but admitted that it was at a high cost.

The only cities that appeared to have made a permanent change in cruising were those that were willing to attempt something new. These cities viewed cruising as a community problem rather than just a law enforcement problem. Many of these cities had created a problem-solving team that included representatives from city administration, law enforcement, judiciary, the public and young people.

Local survey of Boise cruisers

Volunteers from Boise State University interviewed about 80 cruisers, whose ages ranged from 19-21, during two separate weekend nights in October, 1988. The survey revealed that young people cruised for the following reasons:

- They like an unsupervised environment.
- They are too young for local bars.
- It gives them a place to socialize with friends.
- They can display driving ability.
- They can compare vehicles.

Further, the cruisers said they would like to see:

- Availability of public restrooms.
- More trash cans in the downtown.
- Opened parking lots.
- Better lighting in parking lots.
- Supervised drag strip.

Those surveyed admitted they could help the situation they created in the downtown area and would be willing to meet the city half way to resolve the problems. They also made it quite clear that if an ordinance were enacted making it unlawful to cruise the downtown area, cruising would simply move to another part of town.

Phase II

Cruising Task Force

After a public hearing in November 1988, the mayor appointed a task force to consider the problem and suggest solutions. Members included downtown merchants, cruisers (both high school age and older), law enforcement, juvenile probation, and others with direct knowledge of or input into the issue. The task force members delved into possible causes, including the dearth of activities in Boise, particularly for the young; and the attraction of cars which provide a focal point for the socialization that occurs during cruising. Other issues discussed included:

- Vandalism suffered by downtown businesses that sometimes ran into

hundreds of dollars in expenses each weekend.

- Noise generated by cruising, a major concern of some businesses, especially the downtown hotels.
- Littering and urination/defecation on private and public property.
- Citizen reluctance to venture into the downtown area due to intimidating behavior of some cruisers.
- Traffic congestion in the area.
- The insufficiency of police officers to enforce existing laws, and the need to select the "right type" of officers to patrol the areas.

Task Force Recommendations

After much discussion, and exchange with a similar task force in Fort Collins, Colorado, the task force came up with the following recommendations in their report, May 1989:

- Establish a standing advisory committee, ("Cruising Cabinet") to aid in the implementation and monitoring of task force recommendations; and to act as a continuing liaison on the cruise and other potential downtown problems. This committee will be made up of young people, parents, representatives from the police, business, media, and schools. (See ***Recommendations not implemented*** section.)
- Sanction a cruising area with many of the amenities thought necessary to the cruise, but in a location less disruptive to nighttime businesses and traffic flow. (See ***Recommendations not implemented*** section.)
- Establish a storefront police station in the cruise area to enforce laws, educate the cruisers and monitor their activities. The task force also proposed there could be a "team approach" of young people and adults to help police the area — liability and logistical issues to be addressed.
- Review existing noise ordinances and purchase decibel meters for police to aid in enforcement.
- Re-establish a program of community service sentencing for offenders, that allows judges to sentence defendants convicted of violations in the downtown area to community service. Details of how violators are to be supervised to be determined and monitoring of the program to be conducted by the "Cruise Cabinet."
- Increase street lighting and lighting in Capitol Park to establish the park as a focal point of cruise activity. In addition, provide restrooms and garbage cans.
- Initiate a juvenile citation to allow officers to more quickly handle juvenile status offenders.
- Host activities designed to appeal to cruisers, such as car shows with entry fees and prizes, "car of the week" competitions, and monthly street dances chaperoned by volunteers, private security or off-duty police officers. Consideration to be given to establishing a "Teen Club" or other gathering place for youth.

Phase III

Implementation of Recommendations

Boise city and community leaders wholly or partially implemented the following task force recommendations:

- The police substation was approved and set up in a former bank located in the heart of the cruise. It also serves as an information center, meeting place and a convenient holding facility for youths, who are taken into custody for release to their parents. Due to budget constraints,

however, the substation is only manned during cruise hours.

- Funding was approved for an analysis of Boise's noise problems and development of a comprehensive noise ordinance. In addition, $6,000 was approved for the purchase of new decibel meters for the police department.
- Sentencing violators to community service received wide support. A private concern has contracted with the Downtown Boise Association to provide supervision of offenders. Most of the community service will center on the beautification of Boise's downtown.
- Increased funding was approved for downtown street lighting.
- A juvenile citation, which allows officers to cite for minor offenses, was developed by the police department.
- The local YMCA and YWCA started sponsoring fun alternatives to cruising including youth dances and other activities scheduled during cruising hours. This recommendation has the greatest potential to curb the problem of cruising, but the community must organize its efforts to provide the social activities that will attract young people.

Recommendations not implemented

Boise did not implement two of the task force's recommendations. The first, establishing a "Cruise Cabinet," did not receive significant momentum from the task force. While the committee believed the idea had merit, they as a group did not wish to become the recommended cabinet, and thus no further action was taken on this issue.

The second recommendation, to officially sanction and relocate the cruise, generated much controversy and opposition, both within the task force and the community. Liability issues were raised about a formal sanction of cruising by the city council, and the matter of relocation created strong opposition from the business people in the proposed area. Several citizens expressed the view that relocation would only move a problem from one area to another, without really solving it. Thus, no action was taken on this recommendation.

Evaluation/Update

As of June, 1991, the cruise route remains the same in Boise. Newly developed cross-town thoroughfares, however, have eased the overall traffic congestion in the cruise area. In addition, the city is currently considering adopting a comprehensive noise ordinance drafted from the findings of the study conducted during the Task Force tenure.

CRUISING BOISE*
Boise, Idaho

* Cruising is only one of several successful community interaction projects undertaken by the Boise Police Department over the last two decades. The department has prepared a lengthy report detailing the research results and implementation processes for this program. If you would like a copy of the report (at a cost of $5.00), or information on this or other programs, please contact the department.

For contact information, see Boise Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Problem Solving Strategies

Nuisance Abatement & Domestic Violence Related Homicides

Newport News, Virginia

Introduction

The Newport News Police Department is committed to the active involvement and participation of citizens, officers, employees, city departments, community agencies and various institutions in the resolution of crime, disorder, and service problems. This philosophy is part of an overall value system that guides the organization.

Moreover, the use of the problem solving system ***(Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment)*** *in the analysis of community issues, concerns and problems has become an integral part of the daily operation of the entire police agency. The problem oriented approach to policing is as much a philosophy as a set of procedures and methodology for accomplishing the goal and objective of effective and efficient service delivery. As stated by Professor Herman Goldstein, the father of problem oriented policing, "It is not merely another way of doing the job; its a whole new way of thinking."*

In practical terms, adopting a problem solving approach means a commitment to studying the department's response to major recurring problems and altering the response based on these studies. It also involves encouraging every officer on the beat to apply the same process to recurring problems they are experiencing.

Since its inception in 1984, the approach has been successfully applied to a variety of crime and disorder problems occurring in specific neighborhoods and/or city-wide. Newport News Police Department has demonstrated that problem solving can be implemented on a routine basis and innovative approaches developed, providing officers with the freedom to examine underlying causes and the personal satisfaction of accomplishing quality results.

Problem Solving Epitomized- The Borrow Pit

At the northern end of Newport News, there is a large crater shaped "borrow pit" that was created during the construction of the Interstate 64 freeway. Over the years, the area became an informal target range, resulting in numerous calls to the police by surrounding neighbors complaining of "gunshots being fired." Although discharging a weapon within city limits was illegal, officers typically let offenders off with a warning.

Officer Ron Hendrickson, fresh off probation and just released for independent patrol by his Field Training Officer, was assigned to the district where the borrow pit was located. He found himself being dispatched to the location several times each week (45 times over a six month period) on complaints of gunshots being fired. Each call took 30-45 minutes (along with a second officer as required for all firearm discharge calls) and required the officers to hike through the woods to get to the pit, never being certain in which direction the shots were being fired. Officer Hendrickson got permission from his sergeant to work the problem as a formal POP project.

Upon visiting the couple who lived right across from the site and who had made most of the complaints, Hendrickson got pictures of the area including trees in their yard that had died of lead poisoning and holes in their house. He documented stories of bullets bouncing off their roof while the man was working on it; and of the couple being chased away by shooters firing shots at their feet one time when they had approached the pit to ask the shooters to stop. He collected evidence such as spent cartridges, including some from an elephant gun.

Officer Hendrickson then made an appointment with the municipal court judge and explained the problem and his proposed solution. The judge agreed to assess a small fine on the first conviction and warn people that if they came before him a second time on the same charge, he would confiscate their weapon and give them a jail sentence.

Additionally, Hendrickson took the following steps:

- He had a pamphlet printed up and distributed to local military bases (interviewing shooters had revealed that most were military) advising that discharging a weapon at the borrow pit was illegal and would result in prosecution.
- He warned all local gun dealers to stop sending customers to the borrow pit to test fire their weapons.
- He got power of arrest from the owners of the property and the C & O Railroad, who owned the property most of the shooters were crossing to get to the borrow pit.
- He had "no parking — tow away" signs erected along the pulloff where many of the shooters were parking.

Enforcement began on September 1, 1987. During September, Hendrickson wrote about 35 summons and towed about a dozen vehicles. During October, those numbers decreased by about 50 percent. Newport News P.D. received the last call on November 12, 1987. Since that time the borrow pit has become so over grown from lack of use that it will most likely never be used for that purpose again.

Domestic Violence-Related Homicides

The defined problem was homicide. In the beginning, it was assumed that the problem was homicides in a specific, isolated geographic location in the city. After extensive analysis, however, it was found that the problem was city-wide and that the precise problem was domestic violence.

Determining that the actual nature of the problem was domestic violence — and thus more of a public health issue rather than criminal justice — the department contacted a number of outside professional agencies who could assist them to develop a program to deal with domestic violence in a positive manner (e.g., the Viriginia Council on Domestic Violence, Riverside Hospital, Riverside Mental Health, The Unity Way — Family Services Division, the United States Army — Conflict Confinement Program, private psychologists and sociologists, area college professors, local newspapers, and victims and abusers of domestic violence).

As a result of the studies using the problem solving model, the Newport News Police Department developed and implemented the Police Response to Incidents of Domestic Emergencies (P.R.I.D.E.) policy and procedure. The focus of the policy and procedure was directed to intervention in acts of domestic violence which, if left unabated, might escalate in both frequency and severity and result in serious injury or death. Specifically, P.R.I.D.E. offers guidelines to patrol officers so that they might effectively intervene in acts of domestic violence. It directs officers to use a pro-arrest attitude and, in fact, mandates arrests in a number of the more critical situations.

Prior to the development and implementation of the Police Response to Incidents of Domestic Emergencies (P.R.I.D.E.) policy and procedure, 50 percent of the annual homicides in Newport News were directly attributable to domestic violence (1985 — 8 of 14 homicides or 57 percent). During 1986, the first full year of implementation, 4 of 15 total homicides (27 percent) were domestic related. In 1987, only 3 of the 16 total homicides (19 percent) were domestic related.

By involving the local newspapers, the public awareness of the P.R.I.D.E. policy and procedure has been overwhelming. It has been endorsed by the local papers as an innovative and effective means of dealing with the phenomenon of domestic violence. The department has received a number of awards, as well as statewide and national recognition for being a model program for effective intervention into domestic violence.

PROBLEM SOLVING STRATEGIES
Nuisance Abatement & Domestic Violence Related Homicides
Newport News, Virginia
Adapted from: *Annual Report on Problem Solving. "An Evaluation of Problem Oriented Policing"* in the Newport News Police Department, Newport News, Virginia. January 1988.

For contact information, see Newport News Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Hotel Environment Crime

Edmonton, Alberta

Introduction

Edmonton, located in the Canadian province of Alberta, is a beautiful city with very advanced concepts regarding modern day policing. With a 1990 population of 605,000, Edmonton has one police officer for every 556 citizens — a total of 1088 officers in all. Like many other large cities, Edmonton has its share of crime. Incidents of robberies, vandalism and drugs have been predominant in the downtown area especially. The following are examples of how the Edmonton Police Service approached these problems with non-traditional interventions.

Problem-Solving Approaches

The Police first noted that most of the downtown crime occurred in or around the area hotels. With the cooperation of hotel management, police instituted policies to address the source of the high crime rates in the neighborhood. For example, robberies at one hotel were a common occurrence, particularly in the hotel washrooms. With police advice, the hotel restructured the layout of the washrooms to increase visibility while insuring privacy.

Drug use and dealing also often took place in the rear of the hotel bar in a dark secluded area. Again on police advice, the hotel was willing to make an initial investment to reduce crime by placing bright lights in that area, and the payoff was high. Says Edmonton Police Sergeant Mike Bradshaw, "They have that area lit up like football stadium now. We've seen a significant decrease in crime already."

Not all police recommendations were initially well-received by the hotels. One hotel bar was often the scene of violent brawls, with weapons taking the form of glasses and pool cues. Police suggested that the hotel institute a policy of checking out numbered pool cues in exchange for the customer's picture I.D. This process would make the customer more responsible for the cue and discourage the use of it as a weapon. Hotel management was hesitant to make this change, arguing that the process was too inconvenient. On the Friday evening after the police recommended the policy, however, the hotel manager was struck in the head by a pool cue. Not surprisingly, by Monday the hotel had changed its policy — the bartender began giving numbered cues for picture I.D.'s. Since then, the number of assaults has declined.

Drinking glasses and bottles also readily become weapons, encouraging violence as well as exacerbating the severity of injuries. It should be noted that according to a study conducted in five large city hospitals in Great Britain, four out of five injuries from assault are caused by beer glasses and bottles. Surgeons who surveyed emergency centers said the use of safety glass or plastic

containers could cut the number of injuries considerably. Edmonton police are currently working with the Alberta Liquor Control Board to mandate the use of plastic and safety glass.

Community-Based Policing Project

The Edmonton Police have fashioned their policing tactics around the idea that most community problems are not city-wide phenomena, but rather unique to individual neighborhoods. Police have divided Edmonton into twenty-three "villages" based on geographical location as well as unique neighborhood needs. To tackle neighborhood problems, each of the twenty-three vicinities has its own foot patrol, store-front police office, and formal and/or informal neighborhood liaison committees. By giving individualized attention to each area and orchestrating efforts with neighborhood residents, officers hope to create a police service that is truly community-based.

Edmonton police are using these problem solving strategies to address the underlying sources of crime. "The bottom line is cooperation," says Sergeant Bradshaw. "Once you get the commitment and participation of the local merchants and residents, you're well on your way toward implementing strategies that make a long term impact in reducing criminal activity."

HOTEL ENVIRONMENT CRIME
Edmonton, Alberta

For contact information, see Edmonton Police Service under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

East Dallas Community-Police & Refugee Affairs Office

Dallas, Texas

By Anne Thomas Sulton

Problem Addressed

The United States is seen as a refuge, a place that provides protection from danger or distress. Thousands of refugees enter the United States each year, but for many, the streets of American inner cities are often as terrifying as their homelands.

Refugees are the newest and often the neediest members of inner-city neighborhoods. Most are unfamiliar with the language, culture, and values of American society. They frequently have little money, no American education, and few marketable skills to help them become self-sufficient. And many fear the police. Consequently, they often are more vulnerable to crime and less likely to report crimes to the police than other inner-city residents. The East Dallas Community-Police and Refugee Affairs Office was developed in response to the needs of refugees living in Dallas.

Program Approach

The primary goal of the East Dallas Community-Police and Refugee Affairs office is to reduce crime by decreasing refugees' fear of police, easing their transition into American society, and increasing area residents' willingness to cooperate with police. Although the program targets refugees, it also serves longer-term inner-city residents, including African-Americans, Hispanics, and whites.

According to Ron Cowart, founder of the East Dallas Community-Police and Refugee Affairs office, the program operates on the assumption that police officers must "interweave themselves into the fabric of the community" and become advocates for those they are charged to serve. He argues that police services should be tailored to meet the needs of the particular community served and that police should assume a pro-active and preventive approach to crime control. In Cowart's view, police officers should work with other public agencies and private organizations to address the underlying causes of crime, such as poverty, illiteracy, inadequate housing, absence of child care facilities, and lack of recreational opportunities for youths.

Cowart also believes that police are in the best position to operate initiatives that address the underlying causes of crime — not because police are available 365 days per year, but rather because: 1) inner-city residents depend on the police for protection from negative community influences, and 2) police departments are specifically designed to respond to crime. In his view, police agencies play a leading role in crime reduction. The police role, however, is

complementary to that played by other established social service agencies. The program, therefore, is designed to facilitate and encourage the development of a comprehensive public-private sector partnership that enhances the delivery of social services.

Program Development

Ron Cowart, a corporal with the Dallas Police Department, was assigned to patrol East Dallas. Cowart was an experienced officer, having served 15 years on the Dallas police force. He was familiar with East Dallas and its residents, but when he was transferred to patrol the neighborhood on a full-time basis, he was astonished by the massive social and economic problems plaguing this community.

The community was in turmoil. It was crime ridden and gang infested. Buildings were dilapidated. The ethnic composition of the neighborhood was rapidly changing as thousands of refugees from Asian and South and Central American countries moved into East Dallas. Many of them did not speak English, were unfamiliar with American culture, did not know how to seek assistance from social service agencies, and were fearful of the police. No social services agency had offices located in this community.

Cowart began helping the refugees during his off-duty hours. He advised the police chief of the situation and requested permission to establish a storefront that would allow him to provide assistance during his work hours. The chief agreed. Cowart wrote a grant proposal requesting funds to open the storefront, he then went to local charitable organizations asking for their support so that he could hire refugees to work with him. He also requested donations of food, clothing, and blankets. The response was very positive.

In 1985, Cowart opened the storefront, initially to serve refugees. It quickly expanded its focus, however, to serve the needs of all of the ethnic groups residing in East Dallas, including African-American, Hispanics, and whites.

Program Implementation

The storefront is operated by the Dallas Police Department, which sets the program's policy. An independent non-profit corporation, entitled "Friends of the East Dallas Storefront," raises money, purchases items needed by residents served (e.g., shoes), and provides advice.

The storefront is staffed by two police officers, six public service officers, and 75 volunteers. Cowart essentially serves as the storefront's director. He makes certain that services are provided and administrative tasks are completed. He also patrols the community, usually on foot rather than by squad car.

The public service officers are Asian, African-American, and Hispanic. They are not sworn police officers, but assist the two police officers with providing services. One of the most important services provided is translation, because many of the residents do not speak English.

In 1989, the police department budgeted $197,000 to operate the storefront. Of this, the sum of $15,000 is allocated for office rent; the remainder is spent on staff salaries.

The "Friends of the East Dallas Storefront" raises about $80,000 per year. This money is used to purchase food commodities (over 90 tons of rice were given to area residents in 1988), shoes and clothing. Tons of clothing, over 3,000 blankets, 700 oscillating fans, and 60 window air conditioners have been donated by individuals, churches, local businesses and philanthropic organizations. The program's success in receiving donations is largely due to the local news media, which provides ample coverage of program activities and events.

The East Dallas program has been recognized by area residents. Flags of many nations adorn the storefront's walls. These flags were given to the program in appreciation for its work. The program was selected as the best volunteer organization by the Volunteer Center of Dallas. In 1987, Cowart was selected as "runner-up" for the International Association of Chiefs of Police Officer of the Year award, and he has received the law enforcement commendation medal from the National Sons of the American Revolution.

The program provides refugees, recent immigrants and long-time inner-city residents with improved access to the criminal justice system and with an opportunity to become part of the American mainstream. Program staff help locate housing, employment, and educational opportunities. They distribute food and clothing, visit homes, make referrals to other social service agencies, and hold weekly crime prevention meetings in several languages. They also provide activities for youth, including a Law Enforcement Explorer Boy Scout Troop that serves as a positive alternative to street gangs, encourages youth to remain in school, and teaches them good citizenship. The troop installs locks on apartments, operates a community co-op garden and participates in sporting activities. It was recently recognized by the city council and school board for its community service work.

Over 500 individuals currently receive goods or services from the program each month. Previously, it served over 1,200 individuals per month. As the community recognized the need for a program to provide goods and services to refugees, other non-police programs were established, and many people turned to those for assistance.

Cowart believes that this type of program does reduce crime. During the first year of the program's operation, very few community residents trusted him enough to provide details on crime and were fearful of being identified as police informants. A year after the storefront opened, residents began offering unsolicited details about crimes and offenders. Because hundreds of people were visiting the storefront to obtain goods and services, those wishing to provide police with information about crimes could do so without raising suspicion and risking retaliation by offenders. Cowart reports that the police department computer printouts on crime indicate that during the program's existence the number of crimes reported increased, then stabilized, and now have decreased. He argues that the current decrease is due to: **1)** an increase in the number of community residents providing police information on crimes and offenders; **2)** many refugees and longer-term residents are moved more quickly into the mainstream of society, making them less vulnerable to criminogenic influences; and **3)** the program encourages community residents, particularly youngsters, to be more law abiding.

Case Example

Many of the East Dallas apartment buildings occupied by refugees provide substandard housing; some apartments do not even have door locks. A tenant in one of these apartment buildings organized a small group of neighbors to stand watch at night in an attempt to prevent burglaries and robberies. While walking his beat, Cowart discovered this man and learned that he was also escorting children to school to prevent their victimization.

A refugee from Vietnam, this man had spent a considerable amount of time as a prisoner of war. He did not speak English and was unemployed. Cowart told him about the storefront and helped him find an English tutor and a job. The man continues to assist his neighbors and now reports crimes to the police.

Replication

According to Jerie H. Tang Powell, a member of the site visit team:

> This program is built upon an enduring spirit of cooperation and caring that transcends racial and cultural barriers and

affirms the belief that in a democracy police are more than guardians of law and order.

The site visit team reports that this program probably can be replicated across geographical areas and ethnic groups. Refugees and other recent immigrants from other countries are present in large numbers in every major urban area. The challenges they face are similar to those faced by Southeast Asians.

Because this program requires police department approval, those attempting replication must convince the police: **1)** of the program's potential value; **2)** to allocate sufficient personnel and budgetary resources; and **3)** to provide patrol officers with the flexibility needed to develop creative responses to difficult social problems. The cooperation of other government agencies and private organizations is also essential. Perhaps the most difficult program feature to replicate is the leadership provided by the program's founder and director.

Cowart is a lower-ranking patrol officer, yet, he was able to convince the police chief that there was a need for the program and that the police department should allocate scarce resources to operate it. He also convinced thousands of Dallas residents to support his idea. Most of all, he was able to endear himself to the targeted population. His lack of fluency in the population's native languages was not a barrier because of his personal charm and caring attitude.

Replication of this program will also require identification of refugees willing to participate so that communication lines between the police department and the refugee population can be established. Fluency in the language and familiarity with the future, and challenges refugees face will enhance program effectiveness.

This program does not require police to abandon their traditional order maintenance and crime control functions, but enhances their ability to detect crime and make arrests through mutual cooperation. According to Cowart:

> The program must target the community in greatest need of services and work hand-in-hand with other community institutions that address the oppression of inadequate housing, unemployment, illiteracy, lack of recreational opportunities for youth and other social problems. Every squad car does not have to be a rolling social service agency . . . but some of the officers should be especially sensitive to varying needs of a multi-cultural population. You need experienced officers willing to aggressively work to improve the community and advocate on its behalf. The community must know that the police care. The storefront must be more than a tourist booth which simply directs needy residents to some other agency. And it cannot be centralized; each storefront must be tailored to the neighborhood in which it is located.

EAST DALLAS COMMUNITY-POLICE AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS OFFICE
Dallas, Texas
By Anne Thomas Sulton
First published in Inner City Crime Control, a Police Foundation Publication.

For contact information, see Dallas Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

Community Policing

Focus on Youth, Graffiti and Drugs

Vallejo, California

By Chief Gerald T. Galvin

Introduction

A blue-collar urban community of 112,000 population, the City of Vallejo lies north of San Francisco on San Pablo Bay. Its history dates back to the 1850s with the establishment of the Mare Island Naval Shipyard, the oldest U.S. Navy facility on the West Coast. Vallejo's latest claim to fame came in 1986 when Vallejo became home to Marine World-Africa USA, a large entertainment and educational theme park. Vallejo's cultural diversity became apparent in the 1990 census. Once a mostly white community, the city now has a population that is more than 50 percent minorities including Asian and African American segments. The city's Mission Statement reflects both the past and present: "The City of Vallejo celebrates its cultural and ethnic diversity, preserves its history and maritime heritage, cares for its children and their future, and provides quality service second to none."

Community Policing in Vallejo

Community Policing is, first and foremost, a philosophy of how police services are to be delivered. The approach is based on a partnership between citizens and their police officers. It acknowledges the citizen's inherent right to participate in the policy decisions affecting police services. This partnership between citizens and the police officer is the key to the success of Community Policing.

Community policing is pro-active rather than reactive, and value-driven rather than rule-driven. Mutual trust between police and the community is essential, and ongoing and direct daily contact between citizens and officers is the most fundamental way to develop it; decentralized, personalized service is essential. Officers need to be territorial. That means they must work the same area for an extended period of time and approach their beats as if they were their own turf. In addition, there must be a sense of equality and belonging for all. Police personnel must reflect the cultural diversity of the community, and have a reputation for supporting the rights and well-being of *all* members of the community.

Police administrators must empower their officers with the means to solve community problems. Department organizational structures must become flattened and decentralized. Community policing is driven bottom up rather than top down within the organization. Not only are the beat

officers responsible for implementing community policing, but all the support functions of the agency must be integrated to support these field officers who are the basic providers of police services. The department must also be committed to directing the resources necessary to the officer to solve the identified problem and, at the same time, involve the officer in the solution.

The Vallejo Police Department began to provide police services based on this community policing philosophy in 1987. The principles and strategies inherent to this policing model were adopted department-wide. Training was provided on the philosophy as well as the techniques of this partnership-oriented, problem-solving approach to policing. The city was divided into four areas with a lieutenant assigned to each area as an area commander. Taking into consideration their preferences, patrol officers were assigned to specific beats for an extended time, so they could get to know the residents and begin developing strategies with the community members to resolve neighborhood problems.

To further facilitate the community policing model, interagency linkages were made with other city departments, utility companies, and public and private social service providers to ensure the development of effective multidisciplinary response plans.

Focus on Juveniles

Fundamental to the community policing philosophy is the hope for a better tomorrow. To ensure the future, the enhancement of our children's lives is essential. Thus, services are directed to accomplish this. Early accountability, community service, and treatment programs are the approaches used with juvenile offenders rather than incarceration and exposure to a juvenile justice system that promotes criminal activity rather than deters it.

The Department created an innovative Police Probation Team in which a police officer, senior probation officer, and a clinical psychologist meet with almost all arrested juveniles and their parents. First time and minor offenders are diverted from the juvenile court system to the Youth Probation Program. Offenders are held accountable for their actions through a variety of responsibilities, e.g., community services and restitution. They are also afforded treatment for emotional problems or substance abuse at a cost determined by family income. The recidivism rate for juveniles who receive Police Probation Team supervision is only 15 percent.

Graffiti Removal

One example of community service work performed by the youths on probation is the *Graffiti Removal Program.* Initiated in 1990, the program is responsible for removing graffiti from several sites in the city in direct response to community member reports. Some of the graffiti is gang-type graffiti--though the department has refrained from identifying which is or is not so as not to glorify the gangs in the newspapers. The graffiti is being removed, not only to improve the appearance of the neighborhoods, but also to diminish the gangs' sense of territory and make a community statement that gang-type activities will not be tolerated.

Drug Abatement Efforts

Drug abatement is another major focus of the community policing problem solving strategies. Drug traffickers have been removed from neighborhoods through a variety of approaches. Some have been as simple as getting an agreement from a landlord to evict the offender, in exchange for police support of the eviction process; or convincing a mother to evict her two adult male sons who were trafficking narcotics from their mutual residence rather than face eviction herself. More complex cases are handled by a

Multi-agency Enforcement Team, comprised of personnel from the fire and police departments, PG&E, City Building Inspector Division, Animal Control and Corporation Yard. After a briefing regarding the respective roles of each agency in the closure of "crack houses" where drug trafficking and disorderly conduct have disrupted a Vallejo neighborhood, the Team responds. Residents are arrested or evicted, and windows and doors of the residence are boarded up until legal proceedings are completed.

CONCLUSION

Community Policing is a philosophy — and therefore, in and of itself, does not generate costs. A department of 100 or 1000 employees can embrace this concept without generating increased costs for the taxpayer. Unfortunately, some police administrators have associated this approach with an increase in personnel and thus increased costs at a time when cities across the nation are facing budget deficits. Rather than requiring additional personnel, however, implementing community policing requires commitment, acceptance of the philosophy, and the understanding that the police are only one of several public and private agencies responsible for the safety and quality of life in a community.

It has been Vallejo's experience that citizens have overwhelmingly supported community policing. Police services have been increasingly personalized, citizens' problems resolved, and the quality of life in the neighborhoods improved. Between the years of 1987 and 1991, Vallejo's Part I crime rate per 100,000 went down 26%; rock cocaine sales and associated violence have been virtually eliminated; and violent crime, including murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assaults, went down 32%.

Some in the law enforcement profession have argued that community policing is social work and that cops are not social workers. But, with overcrowded prisons and a stagnated criminal justice system, simply arresting individuals does not necessarily solve crime problems. Cleaning up a neighborhood, freeing it from drug pushers and prostitutes, and restoring a safe, healthy environment does solve crime problems.

Community-Based-Policing does not mean a "tip toe" approach to enforcement. It simply brings together all of the elements necessary to *solve* crime problems: enforcement, education and treatment. This three-pronged strategy requires the involvement of the police, both as enforcer and educator. It also means police must establish positive working relationships with those who provide treatment.

Neither a lack of support from citizens nor too few tax dollars are impediments to community policing. Traditional law enforcement itself is the greatest threat.

It is reasonable to expect that from now into the next century, the battle lines will be drawn between police traditionalists and those who support community policing. But, American policing cannot continue its stop-gap approach to crime fighting. A rigid and reactive law enforcement community cannot begin to cope effectively with contemporary social ills. Our only hope lies in a strong partnership with our citizens, the essence of Community Policing. Community Policing is more than a philosophy. It is the road to travel for a better tomorrow.

COMMUNITY POLICING
Focus On Youth, Graffiti and Drugs

Vallejo, California
By Chief Gerald T. Galvin, Vallejo Police Department
Adapted in part from "Community Policing: Replacing Despair With Hope." First published in *Western City,* the League of California Cities monthly magazine, March 1992.

For contact information, see Vallejo Police Department under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

A Rural Perspective On COPPS

California Avocado Theft Prevention Program

California

By Robert Verloop

Introduction

In 1989, it was estimated that California avocado growers experienced a 10 million dollar loss due to avocado fruit theft. In response to this increasing problem, the California Avocado Commission, through grower assessments, sponsored and funded the development and implementation of a pro-active theft prevention program. Administered by the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), the program involves CDFA, growers, county sheriff departments, farm bureau representatives, and district attorney offices. The goal of the program is to deter avocado theft through an organized effort that reduces the demand for stolen fruit at the market level, and the supply of stolen fruit from the growers' fields.

Demand Reduction

Reducing the demand for stolen fruit has proven to be the easier of the two objectives. Market inspectors, enforcing the Food and Agriculture Code, go to market locations where avocados are sold. Inspectors check the boxes of avocados for the CDFA certification stamp to determine whether the load has been properly certified. In addition, the person in possession is required to show ownership of the fruit by means of a sales document, or bill of lading. If either is missing, the fruit is held from sale and a non-compliance order issued. The owner has 48 hours to bring the fruit into compliance or risk confiscation of the avocados. The success of this approach has been evidenced by the improved sales of legitimate fruit by established packers to locations that were previously suspect of selling stolen fruit, and by a continued decrease in the number of pounds confiscated.

Supply Reduction

To address the supply side of the problem, Grower Field Teams — made up of growers, sheriff deputies, farm bureau representatives, and in some cases, district attorney representatives — began meeting on a weekly basis to discuss issues and problem areas and collectively develop solutions. A Field Manager was hired to serve as an industry-wide crime prevention coordinator and function as a liaison/ombudsman for the growers and various sheriffs' departments. The result of this coordinated effort was the establishment of goal-oriented partnerships. The participants were able to learn about each other, and understand the problems in detail.

Systematic Response

Recognizing the personnel constraints that often don't allow rural police agencies to focus intensive manpower on specific issues, special service contracts were developed with four sheriffs' departments (San Diego, Ventura, Riverside and Santa Barbara). In San Diego, a full time avocado detail

was organized; in other counties, funds were used for special investigations, surveillance, and directed patrols. In Riverside County (Temecula area), additional funding was provided by a Community Service District for a full time deputy who was assigned to work the residential areas and avocado groves within the district boundaries (approximately 20,000 acres). With the increased patrol, avocado theft was greatly reduced and other crimes similarly decreased.

The development of these special assignment programs has resulted in a cadre of trained deputies who understand the issues, and who serve as the internal resource/experts on avocado theft for their departments. Cross training of other deputies through internal bulletins has increased overall awareness of the problems and solutions, and thus the deputies' responsiveness to growers' concerns.

In 1992, the Sheriff's Departments, the Farm Bureau and avocado growers implemented another new program, the Grove Identification program, that utilizes the Owner Applied Number system. Growers register their groves with the Sheriffs' Dispatch/Communication Centers, providing them with information about the grove location and ownership — two factors which have previously hampered law enforcement response to theft related calls and investigations.

Community Awareness

A primary goal of the overall program has been to make the grower community more involved with the protection of their own industry. To raise the awareness level of growers, the avocado industry in general, and the public at large, several strategies have been developed and implemented:

- Quarterly newsletter - updating growers about theft related topics.
- Reward program.
- Brochures, employee paycheck inserts, reward signs (like neighborhood watch signs but specific to avocados).
- Publicity campaign - newsprint, radio, television.
- Toll free Avocado Theft Hotline - (1 800 835-1008) including refrigerator magnets with number for all growers.
- Grower seminars and speaking engagements.
- T-shirt sales with the Avocado Theft Prevention logo.

Conclusion

While the avocado theft problem has not been completely eradicated, the success of the coordinated response has been significant.* In fact, the problem has subsided to the degree that maintaining grower interest and involvement now requires a specific effort. The apathy is not due to failure, however, but success — the urgency has faded and the program has moved into a maintenance mode.

*Grower confidence in the Sheriff's departments has been strengthened, and the enforcement officers are more informed about agricultural theft.

A RURAL PERSPECTIVE ON COPPS
California Avocado Theft Prevention Program
California
By Robert Verloop

For contact information, see California Avocado Commission under Local Community Policing Efforts in the Resources section.

RESOURCES

Resource List

State Agencies

Office of the Attorney General
Crime Prevention Center, Ste. 100
Post Office Box 944255
Sacramento, California 94244-2550
(916) 324-7863

The School/Law Enforcement Partnership Cadre
c/o Office of the Attorney General
Post Office Box 944255
Sacramento, California 94244-2550
(916) 324-7863

California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training
1601 Alhambra Boulevard
Sacramento, CA 95816
(916) 739-3864

Office of Criminal Justice Planning
1130 K Street, Suite 300
Sacramento, California 95814
(916) 324-9100

Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs
1700 K Street
Sacramento, California 95814
(916) 445-0834

Statewide Organizations and Associations

California Crime Prevention Officers Association
P.O. Box 329
Los Angeles, CA 90053
(213) 485-3134

California Peace Officers Association and California Police Chiefs Association
1485 River Park Drive
Sacramento, California 95815
(916) 923-1825

California State Sheriffs Association
2125 19th Street, Suite 103
Sacramento, CA 95818
(916) 448-4242

League of California Cities
1400 K Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 444-5790

Federal Agencies

U.S. Department of Justice
Bureau of Justice Assistance
633 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20531
(202) 514-6638

National Institute of Justice
Office of Communication and Research Utilization
Washington, D.C. 20531
(202) 724-2492

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Training Academy
Behavioral Sciences Unit
Quantico, Virginia 22135
(703) 640-6131

HUD Drug Information and Strategy Clearinghouse
Office for Drug Free Neighborhoods
P.O. Box 6424
Rockville, Maryland 20850
(800) 245-2691

Office for Substance Abuse Prevention
Division of Community Prevention and Training
5600 Fishers Lane, Rockwall II
Rockville, Maryland 20857
(301) 443-0369

Office of National Drug Control Policy
Executive Office of the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
(202) 673-2520

National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information
6000 Executive Boulevard, Suite 402
Rockville, Maryland 20852
(800) 729-6686

National Organizations and Associations

Police Executive Research Forum
2300 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 466-7820

National Center for Community Policing
School of Criminal Justice
560 Baker Hall
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824-1118
1-800-892-9051/(517) 355-2322

National Crime Prevention Council
1700 K Street, N.W.
Second Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 466-6272

National Coalition for Drug Free School Zones
c/o Chiefs of Police National Drug Task Force
1514 P Street, N.W., Rear
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 328-0100

International City/County Management Association
777 North Capitol St., N.W., Ste. 500
Washington, D.C. 20002-4201
(202) 289-4262

International Association of Chiefs of Police
1110 North Glebe, Suite 200
Arlington, Virginia 22201
(800) 843-4227

Law Enforcement Assistance Foundation (LEAF)
Seymour F. Malkin
Executive Director
National Law Enforcement Council
24 Wyndham Court
Nanuet, New York 10954-3845

National Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education, Inc. (PRIDE)
50 Hurt Plaza, Suite 210
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(800) 677-7433 or (800) 67PRIDE

Noted Experts

Superintendent Chris Braiden
Edmonton Police Service
9620 103A Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Post Code T5H0H7
(403) 421-2357

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