Drugs and Violence in Maryland

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DRUGS AND VIOLENCE IN MARYLAND About the Author

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DRUGS AND VIOLENCE IN MARYLAND

INTRODUCTION

"Violence...is as American as cherry pie," explained H. Rap Brown when urban ghettos were erupting in riots in the 1960s. There is at least a grain of truth, and perhaps more, in what he said. The slightest acquaintance with American history will reveal a strain of violence running uninterruptedly through our past. We have known forcible repression of segments of our population, wars among our states and against our native peoples, frontier brawling, kangaroo courts, lynchings, murder for hire, gang warfare, labor riots, and civil violence -- to name only a few obvious examples. It is quite true that violence, both official and private, has been prevalent in America from the earliest settlements to the present day (Hofstadter and Lallace, 1971).

Violence, however, is not peculiar to America. Continents, as well as nations, have waged war against one another and oppressed their own as well as neighboring peoples for thousands of years. No continent, no nation, no people is free of guilt. Man's inhumanity to man stretches as far back in time as we can see; despite the advances of civilization it continues today, whether it be refined and legalized or brutal and unlawful.

Some of this violence seems to be a result of man's condition in life (his environment if you will), but some seems to be ingrained in his nature. Cain, envious of his brother Abel, murdered him. For this, God cursed Cain and branded him so that all men would recognize the murderer. Cain and Abel were sons of Adam. This story is told immediately after the story of Adam and Eve's fall from Eden, thus emphasizing God's and man's rejection of the ultimate violence. This rejection has been central to western civilization and is thus one of the strongest examples of the war within man between his two natures. While man's nature

may urge him to murder his fellow man, his better nature and all other men deny him the right to do so. This proscription has been reasonably, but only partly, successful throughout history.

Only reasonably successful and only partly successful. At times and places among various groups society's grip has weakened. Today in Maryland is such a time and place.

A study released by the National Research Council and reported on in *The Washington Post* on November 13, 1992 suggested that violent crime results from many different kinds of behavior in many different settings, citing "ten or twenty different kinds of behavior" that result in homicide alone. While there are many influences on violence, there is no real consensus on why or how an individual becomes violent. Many factors are involved. We do know, however, that there is a definite link between drugs and violence and that linkage is discussed in this report.

It would be helpful to the people of Maryland to determine with some precision the nature and extent and the causes of the violence that confronts us today. Perhaps this would be a step toward determining how much of the violence could be brought quickly under some degree of control.

While much of the violence facing this nation and this state is of kinds familiar to law enforcement and to the public, a significant part of it is a new type of violence -- a type of violence previously unknown in this country and, at this time, still largely unrecognized and little understood.

Since it appears that crack cocaine has had a unique impact on this new violence some understanding of crack and of the role that Colombian drug traffickers have played in the introduction of cocaine and in its marketing would be helpful. Some effort has been made, therefore, to sketch in the background of crack

and of the Colombian Connection.

Violence of all sorts is of vital public concern, since it affects all living persons. It would take an extensive document to deal with all the many kinds of violence. There is a lot of violence, for example, that is not necessarily criminal violence: suicide, automobile accidents, other accidents that result in serious or fatal injury. Alcohol, more than any of the other substances of abuse, seems to predispose its users to violent behavior. The considerable amount of death and violence associated with the abuse of alcohol is well documented and could be the sole subject of another report. The Governor's Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Committee is focused on the problems associated with alcohol, and is especially concerned with underage drinking and the myriad of problems that arise from this phenomenon. This examination, however, will be limited more toward the violence associated with illegal drugs, and to the new violence which they have spawned.

PART I The Problem

The growing extent of violent crime at both the national and state levels is clearly demonstrated by statistics. On the national level, more than 1.9 million violent crime offenses were reported in 1991 to law enforcement. That was the highest annual total ever recorded -- five percent higher than in 1990, 29 percent higher than in 1987, and 45 percent above 1980. Cities bear the brunt of this burden in absolute numbers but violent crime is also increasing in suburban and rural areas throughout the country (FBI, 1991).

It should also be noted that persons from certain demographic and economic groups are more likely to become victims of crime. In 1991, blacks were more likely than whites or persons of other races to be victims of violent crime; the rate of victimization was higher among individuals under age 25; the poor were more likely to become victims than persons from wealthier households; and inner city residents had higher victimization rates than did rural and suburban residents (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992).

These national trends are reflected in Maryland, where 46,425 violent crimes were reported in 1991, compared with 40,703 in 1990. Baltimore City, which now ranks fifth in the nation in homicide rates, climbed from a rate of 11.4 per 100,000 in 1960 to 25.5 in 1970, to 27.5 in 1980, to 41.4 in 1990 (Maryland State Police, 1991).

The following comparative statewide statistics for selected violent crime categories show an increase in Maryland in all categories over the past ten years.

Crime	1982	1991
Aggravated assault	18,845	23,846
Robbery	15,377	19,781
Rape	1,590	2,229
Murder	431	569
Totals	36,243	46,425

In 1991 the crime rate for Maryland was 6,209 victims for every 100,000 persons -- that is, one out of every 16 persons was the victim of some sort of crime. The rate for victims of violent crime was 955.2, or one of every 105.

Included under the heading of violent crime are murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. A comparison of the relative percentages of these violent crimes reported in 1991 follows.

Crime	National	Maryland
Aggravated assault	57%	51%
Robbery	36%	43%
Rape	6%	5%
Murder	1%	1%

Because of the statistical importance of aggravated assault and robbery, a further word on those crimes is necessary.

As used here, aggravated assault means unlawful assault by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury. Twenty-three percent of the aggravated assaults committed in Maryland were committed with firearms, 21 percent with knives, and 39 percent with some other weapon. The following is a break down by percentage of those arrested for aggravated assault in 1991.

Male	I		•		82%
Black					56%
White					44%
Juvenile					22%

Robbery is described as an attempt to take anything from another person by force or threat of force. During 1991, in Maryland 62 percent of robberies were committed on the street, 23 percent in business establishments, and ten percent in people's homes. A breakdown of those arrested for robbery follows.

Male				93%
Black				83%
White				16%
Juvenile				22%

The numbers given above have focused on the nature of violent crime in general. It is now time to turn to another aspect of the problem. It seems clear that there is some sort of relationship between violence and illegal drugs. Violence was committed, of course, before drugs became a problem, and much murder, robbery, and assault today are in no way related to drugs. Taking that into account, it is widely and reasonably accepted that there remains a substantial body of violent criminal offenses that are committed in one way or another as a result of drug use.

This has been one of the most thoroughly examined relationships in criminology over the past several years (U.S. Department of Justice, 1988). Research seems to show that a large percentage of persons arrested are drug users and that drug use appears to increase and sustain criminal behavior. Concurrent with the growth of the drug epidemic that began in the 1960s and 1970s, there has been an enormous increase in violent crime. In all likelihood, the connection between the growth and the increase is

fluid. That is, while to some extent a cause and effect relationship can be established (increased drug use is the cause of crime) the extent to which that can be established is severely limited. Drugs and crime are now irrevocably linked in our consciousness, but it would seem likely that in their origins the growth of drug use and the increase in crime arose from common historical/sociological roots before they became selfreinforcing.

Since the work of P.J. Goldstein in 1985, researchers have focused on a three-part relationship between drugs and crime:

- **Psychopharmacological** -- violence committed under the short- or long-term chemical influence of drugs.
- Economic-compulsive -- violence committed to obtain money to buy drugs for one's own use.
- Systemic -- violence committed in connection with drug trafficking, as a part of the interaction among those buying and selling drugs for profit.

The motives for systemic murders most commonly mentioned involve: power struggles, such as territorial disputes among groups or individuals, the forming and restructuring of alliances and agreements among groups, and struggles for position within groups; money problems, such as the theft or hijacking of drugs, disputes over money thought to be owed, the inability to deliver drugs or money; quasi-personal motives such as envy, revenge, retaliation, or the need to establish one's position, reputation, or sense of self-respect; and the punishment or silencing of witnesses, informers, or disloyal group members.

In addition to the three-part relationship, it would seem that now possibly a fourth might be added. The atmosphere created by

drug-related violence can in itself lead to violence that is not directly drug-related. For example, some persons in a neighborhood heavily infested with drugs and violence may become enured to violence and conditioned by the crime that surrounds They may become impressed by the material goods and them. lifestyle of the drug traffickers they see every day. While not using drugs or trafficking in them, such persons may be inspired to commit robberies and engage in acts of violence as a way of This would be a secondary or derivative, or an atmospheric life. relationship. No matter what it is called, the fact is that some criminal violence has been brought into being that is not itself drug-related, but which has a causal link with and is a direct result of previously existing criminal drug violence.

Research among prisoners in state facilities throughout the country shows that between 1974 and 1986 the proportion of offenders under the influence of an illegal drug at the time of the offense for which they were arrested grew from 25 percent to 35 percent. Fifty-four percent of state prison inmates in 1986 reported that they were under the influence of drugs or alcohol or both at the time they committed the crime for which they were sentenced.

In studies of all jail inmates in 1983 and 1989, prisoners reported having used drugs as follows at some time in their lives (U.S. Department of Justice, 1989):

Drug	1983	1989
Any drug	76.1	77.7
Cannabis	73.0	70.7
Cocaine or crack	38.0	50.4
Amphetamines	32.8	22.1
Barbiturates	27.8	17.2
Methaqualone	23.0	14.7
Heroin	22.4	18.2

LSD	22.3	18.6
PCP	15.6	13,9
Methadone	6.9	4.8

A point to note is that reported use of all drugs declined, except for the dramatic increase in cocaine or crack.

The high-rate criminal offender is frequently described as a young urban male who begins committing crime and using drugs at an early age, who does not like school and leaves it early, has a poor employment record, commits many of his crimes in the company of his peers, and comes from a dysfunctional, low-income family in which at least one parent is involved in some sort of crime (De La Rosa et al., 1990). The offender himself may or may not have a personality disorder.

Among the underlying factors said to contribute to the delinquency of this offender are frequently listed: decline in family and spiritual values in the community; the pervasiveness of a materialistic society; the deterioration of the sense of a larger community; the tolerance of violence among certain groups; the perception that the popular media condone a criminal way of life; the choking of the criminal justice system; poverty/hopelessness/urban decay and crowding/poor housing/limited access to well-paying jobs; machismo; the pleasure of excitement and action; and racial discrimination.

PART II Cocaine and Crack

Soon after crack cocaine appeared on city streets, the first crack babies appeared in city hospitals. Mothers who had used crack heavily during pregnancy gave birth to babies with perforated lungs, lost brain tissue, or damaged nerves. It has been conservatively estimated that about 2,200 crack babies were born in Maryland in 1989. These babies became addicted to cocaine in their mothers' wombs. Separated from their mothers at birth, they went into cocaine withdrawal. These babies came into this world screaming in agony for cocaine.

The drug situation in 1960 was vastly different from what it is today (Bacon, 1989). Heroin addiction was the important social and law enforcement concern, and it was largely confined to the black ghettos of a few large cities, with half the 45,000 registered addicts living in New York City. Opium, which earlier in the century had been a plaque, was still around, but it was used by a greatly reduced addict population. Cocaine was rarely heard of, and marijuana was unknown to most Americans. During the Second World War and the Korean Conflict, military services freely dispensed a new wonder drug, amphetamine, a central nervous stimulant, to soldiers, sailors, and airmen who had to stay awake for long hours. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (an early predecessor to DEA) reported in 1960 that an eight-year study indicated a continuing, gradual decline in the incidence of narcotics addiction.

By the mid-sixties, however, a social revolution was in fullswing, notably identified with various aspects of the Civil Rights Movement (including the Free Speech Movement and the Sexual Revolution). The social changes also took the form of a broader social protest increasingly directed against the Vietnam War. The drug explosion followed in the wake of these developments, with cannabis and chemical drugs taking the lead.

By 1970, the problem of heroin addiction was worsening; dangerous drugs and marijuana were used by strata of society, both working and middle class, never before affected by drugs; drug use and street crime were combining to emerge as a new phenomenon; and the use of cocaine was becoming fashionable among trendy, affluent groups. At that time researchers generally believed that most drug-related crime was committed by heroin users and, that before using heroin, most addicts already had a record of criminal activity. The crimes they committed were thought to be the petty crimes of street hustlers, generally against property rather than violent crimes.

In the seventies and early eighties, aggressive marketing by Colombian traffickers increased the availability of cocaine and drove down the price, making it accessible to more people. Cocaine is usually made in primitive conditions of a dried leaf subjected to kerosene, sulfuric acid, and ether; nevertheless, glamour attached to this drug, possibly because it was a novelty and certainly because of favorable publicity given it through association with the sports and entertainment industries, and because of the undoubted sense of euphoria it induced. Also, it was well suited to social occasions. Being widely thought at that time to be a harmless drug, it was publicized as such in the media; the government for part of the period looked on it as a relatively benign drug. The National Institute on Drug Abuse, in fact, referred to its use as being of little consequence, either to the user or to society.

However, coincident with the increased use of cocaine there was a marked increase in drug-related violence, whether because of cocaine or as a reflection of society in general cannot at this time be known.

By the early eighties there appeared to be a general downward trend in the use of most drugs, cocaine excepted. However, by the mid-eighties the glamour had worn off as middle class values changed and as the devastating physical and psychological and the excruciatingly addictive effects of cocaine became more widely known.

Cocaine is a powerful central nervous system stimulant. Occasional, so-called recreational use produces euphoria and increased alertness and self-confidence. In the sixties and early seventies, it was believed that while heavy use might result in psychological dependence, cocaine was not physically It was, therefore, thought to be a relatively safe addictive. With more experience, however; it was observed that drug. chronic cocaine users do in fact experience withdrawal symptoms and physical tolerance, the two symptoms of physical dependency. At the same time the first rush of euphoria becomes briefer and less intense, and depression, anxiety, paranoia, listlessness, and aggressiveness become more common. As these characteristics became more widely known, as affluent cocaine users saw their friends becoming impoverished to support their addictions, as the nation's economic and societal changes resulted in a new set of national values, the former upper and middle class users began abandoning cocaine in droves. It was at this juncture that a fateful development was taking place.

Crack cocaine was first reported by law enforcement in Los Angeles, San Diego, and Houston in 1981 (DEA, 1989). By middecade it was available in most major cities. The National Cocaine Hotline estimated in 1986 that a million persons in 25 states had tried crack. Five years later it was readily available everywhere.

Originally, crack cocaine was manufactured by converting cocaine powder back into cocaine base through the use of water and baking soda or ammonia. It could thus be packaged and sold more cheaply than cocaine powder and could be smoked rather than inhaled through the nose or injected intravenously, as was the practice with powder. (Smoking gives a faster, stronger rush.) Later, Colombian traffickers introduced the raw base, saving themselves the trouble and expense of processing the base into powder. This drove down the cost even further.

Ten dollars worth of crack provides an intense high in a matter of seconds. It is supplied to the consumer as a ready-to-use product that can be purchased quickly, easily, and relatively cheaply. For these reasons, it has been called the fast food of the drug world. The use of crack spread like wildfire, above all in the inner cities.

As attractive as this new product may be, it has none of the glamour and all the health problems associated with cocaine powder. Worse, since smoked cocaine is more addictive than snorted powder, a higher proportion of social users develop more severe addictions in shorter periods of time, sometimes in a period as short as a few weeks. The stronger the habit the greater the cost. The greater the cost the more likely it is that the addict will commit serious crimes to obtain the money to support his habit.

A vicious cycle has now set in. Wide availability has driven down the price of cocaine to the user, making more of it available to more people, increasing the rate of addiction, making it imperative for users to obtain more money to support an ever more demanding habit.

In Maryland in 1990 cocaine, marijuana, and heroin (in that order) were the most frequently used drugs. The preference for cocaine increased dramatically since the introduction of crack cocaine in the late 1980s. According to Maryland treatment data,

the typical cocaine user was male (79 percent), between 18 and 30 years of age (67 percent), black (56 percent), working class (64 percent), with an income of less than \$20,000 a year (58 percent). Urinalysis of offenders in Maryland also showed cocaine to be the drug of choice. More persons were admitted to Baltimore hospitals for emergency medical treatment for cocaine (2,145) in 1989 than for any other cause, including alcohol. Also, more people have been admitted to treatment centers in Maryland because of cocaine than because of any other drug, excluding alcohol, since 1989. County by county surveys show that cocaine, again excluding alcohol, is the drug of choice in all parts of Maryland, rural as well as urban (Maryland State Police, 1991).

In summary, an exploding market for crack cocaine and an abundant supply made existing drug distribution systems inadequate to meet the insistent demand. Homegrown distribution systems independent of existing organizations sprang up. Groups from out of state, mostly New York and Washington, D.C., set up shop to sell their wares. Jamaicans, Colombians, Haitians and others achieved market influence.

In these unsettled conditions, an enterprising individual would be able to develop suppliers and customers with little capital. Unrestrained free enterprise quickly produced an overabundance of suppliers in hot and eager pursuit of what was for them fabulous amounts of money to be made quickly and easily. The stage was set for disaster.

PART III

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Smuggling, Drugs, and Violence

An important part of understanding the relationship between cocaine and violence lies in an examination of the market issues that exist on an international scale (Weisheit, 1992).

I remember well the deflated atmosphere of a secondary school in Medellin that I visited in 1988, where schoolteachers were doing their best to maintain a semblance of normality, but where the rector, a Catholic priest, had been murdered two weeks before in his office while the children were in class. The murder had occurred because the priest had tried to expel drug dealers from the school playground (Abel, 1991).

The great majority of illegal drugs used in America come from abroad. Often, nationals of the various countries where these drugs originate, and/or transit, are criminally active in the drug trade in the United States. This involvement is reflected in data showing that approximately 25 percent of our current federal prison population is foreign born. Clearly, drug entrepreneurs from other countries significantly impact our domestic environment where illegal drugs are marketed. For example, a large portion of today's drug supply and the violence associated with wholesale trafficking have been influenced by Colombian traffickers and events in Colombia. The roots of smuggling, drugs, and violence run deep in Colombia.

When colonial Spain tried to monopolize trade with its American colonies, it instead guaranteed a flourishing trade in smuggled goods. Because of its geographic position, Colombia took the lead in this trade. The smuggling of contraband goods -- to evade taxes and to provide consumer goods that would not otherwise be available -- already established in the sixteenth century became firmly entrenched in the seventeenth. It expanded with independence from Spain. The small tropical port of Maicao, in the Caribbean, became and remains one of the world's great smuggling centers. Here, a full range of untaxed liquors, electronic appliances, and other consumer goods are available to purchasers in Colombia and throughout the Caribbean.

Colombian smugglers also managed to transport hundreds of thousands of cattle out of the country into neighboring Venezuela, to the detriment of the latter's protected cattle industry. Coffee export taxes were evaded by smuggling out coffee both in small fishing vessels and by the shipload. Small amounts of marijuana grown in Colombia were smuggled out for many years. And emerald smugglers provided some of the early links in the establishment of drug ties between Colombia and the United States.

The income generated from this smuggling paled in significance when the vast profits from large-scale marijuana and cocaine smuggling began flowing into Colombia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But such profits would not have been possible if smuggling routes, personnel experienced in evading the law, and above all an attitude of contempt for authority that expressed itself in savage violence were not already well grounded in the psyche of the criminal element.

But if Colombian criminals were experienced smugglers, if they were sharp enough to take timely advantage of burgeoning business opportunities, still their most salient characteristic was a willingness to employ savage violence to achieve their objectives.

From 1849 to the 1880s Colombia under military rule was

characterized by chaos. The turn of the century saw a civil war in which 100,000 lives were lost. What distinguished Colombia from its neighbors at this time was not political instability or military rule, but the savagery that flourished in these circumstances.

Despite the turbulence and violence of the nineteenth century, the worst was yet to come.

"La Violencia," as the Colombians refer to the period, began with the looting and burning of the capital city, Bogota, in 1948, after a popular political leader was murdered. It was to continue until 1964. During those years, La Violencia took the lives of between 100,000 and 200,000 Colombians in addition to an inestimable number of maimed. At one time or another La Violencia affected almost every part of the country.

Originating as a political struggle between Conservatives and Liberals, between the Government and guerrilla groups of both parties, from the beginning economic opportunism was inextricably mixed with political motivation. La Violencia almost immediately degenerated into robbery, land-grabbing, the settling of personal disputes, and wanton terror. A generation of young men grew up seeing its parents killed, its homes burned, its villages destroyed, its friends tortured, and its sisters raped. That generation became the drug traffickers of the seventies, eighties, and nineties.

Three sociological factors are pertinent. One is the separation of the criminal bands from any larger society, or from any allegiance beyond their immediate circle of criminal associates. Another is the grudging acceptance of these gangs by the poor, despite the fierce, often pathological behavior of the gangs, as representatives of rebellion against the social grievances of the poor. (This is similar to the kind of acceptance given the Viet Cong by Vietnamese peasants.)

The third is at the heart of La Violencia. The most striking characteristic of La Violencia is sadism of an intensity and pervasiveness abnormal at any time, in any place, in any circumstances. The following examples, picked at random, have all been reported reliably as common occurrences:

- A bus carrying a full load of peasants is stopped, the bus is looted, the peasants are robbed, and all are killed.
- Pointless torture was common. Victims were often tortured slowly to death.
- Victims were frequently beaten to death or hacked to pieces. Scalping was a common practice, as was the mutilation of corpses.
- The practice of destroying "even the seed" of one's enemies included ripping fetuses from pregnant women, castrating men, and murdering whole families, including infants.

This savage sadism remains alive today. It has become, perhaps, more practical among Colombian drug traffickers, who have leaped into the boiling cauldron of Colombia's social and political hatreds. That is, sadism has been channeled; murder and torture have been made to have a point, to serve a purpose. They are reserved for special cases, such as silencing informants or making an example of those who dare to try to cheat the traffickers or in any way interfere with their business. In spite of the channeling, however, widespread, intense, ruthless, wholesale and, at times, indiscriminate slaughter is common business practice today among Colombian drug traffickers. The pattern of murder and violence as a normal, day-to-day business practice has been exported to the United States, most notably to Miami and New York. Although more than a dozen Colombians were killed in those two cities in 1988, a majority of such murders were committed when Colombians were establishing their dominance over the American market in the late seventies and early eighties.

A 1975 special report prepared by DEA entitled International Cocaine Traffic noted that as early as 1972, Colombia was the major supplier of cocaine to the North American market. Initially, Colombians engaged in the drug traffick primarily as couriers, transporting cocaine between the sources of supply in South America and wholesale level customers within the United States. For the most part, these Colombian couriers were experienced international criminals with impressive INTERPOL records for shoplifting and pickpocketing offenses throughout Europe and the western hemisphere. As the demand for cocaine grew in the United States, however, many Colombian criminals aggressively traded the mantle of courier for that of source of supply.

In time, Colombia established itself as a reliable source for high-quality marijuana, capturing a large part of the market formerly dominated by Mexico. Colombia was the primary source country for marijuana during the late 1970s and early 1980s. During this period, they also dominated the market in methaqualone (in the form of counterfeit Quaalude tablets). The drug wars that ended in the early eighties represented the efforts of the Colombians to increase profits by controlling distribution of their Quaaludes, marijuana, and cocaine in the United States. The wars peaked in 1981 with 101 murders attributed to them. It is clear that by then the Colombians had won control over much of the distribution of drugs in various areas within the United States.

Currently, the Colombians are making a major effort to enter the American heroin market. According to an article in *The Baltimore Sun* on December 6, 1992, an increase in the purity of street heroin from four-to-seven percent to about 70 percent was due in large part to the emergence of Colombian heroin in Baltimore. The Colombians are growing their own opium poppy and have taken into Colombia experienced heroin chemists from other countries. Not only is the heroin in Baltimore of a higher purity than it had been, but it is also cheaper. Its ready availability has contributed to Baltimore being second only to New York in heroin overdose cases.

It would be untenable to draw conclusions as to cause and effect between Colombian violence and the growing street level drugrelated violence in our cities. Nor would it be fair to see in Colombian violence a harbinger of the future of our country (although it might be prudent to see in Colombia an object lesson of what can happen when violence becomes institutionalized). It is also abundantly clear that drug violence in the United States, or in Maryland, is not the domain of any group or culture. Well brought up middle class suburban and rural whites have committed their share of atrocities, as have African-Americans and others in our inner cities.

With regard to the impact that Colombian criminals have had on drug violence in Maryland, one need only read the newspapers, listen to the radio or watch TV to know that armed and volatile Jamaican posse members and profit seeking members of New York, Detroit, and Philadelphia drug gangs have had a more direct and profound impact than have the Colombians. It should be considered, however, that through the miracle of modern communications and transportation, drug-related violence in Maryland, elsewhere in the United States, and even abroad, acts as a ready model and sets a tone for similar violence wherever criminal drug activity takes place. Furthermore, as such violence becomes commonplace -- is accepted and practiced, it spreads and no longer remains confined solely to a drug environment.

PART IV A New Kind of Crime

Buying and selling drugs is an economic activity in that it is a way of making money. Buying and selling drugs potentially can make a lot of money very quickly, a fact not lost on those with limited earning power. The fact that drug trafficking is an economic activity means that while it has its special characteristics it has much in common with any other way of making money. For example, it can be described as free enterprise operating in a market economy in which prices are set largely by supply and demand.

Similarly, certain economic rules apply to all forms of drug trafficking. Among them are:

- The business is illegal and is therefore conducted essentially in a clandestine manner and within certain boundaries set by law enforcement.
- Pricing is highly sensitive to laws of supply and demand, which operate more freely than in a taxed, regulated business that is strongly influenced by other, competing businesses operating under similar constraints.
- It is dangerous to the drug trafficker in terms of his mental health, possible economic disaster, and deprivation of liberty or of life.
- It can be highly profitable, although it more often isn't, for those involved in it. It can potentially produce more money faster than virtually any other form of economic activity, especially for the low-income persons most often attracted to it.

• The quality of danger in tension with the attraction of potentially high earnings determines to a large extent the personality traits of the participants.

The economic rules outlined above apply equally to coca growers in Peru, opium smugglers in Burma, and crack cocaine dealers in Maryland. Each form of trafficking, however, has its own peculiarities. Among those for crack at this time are:

• A high degree of decentralization, more than in most other drug trafficking activities. A comparison of the French Connection in heroin with the practices of Colombian cocaine traffickers illustrates this point. The traffic in heroin was dominated by French Corsican criminals in Europe in agreement with members of the Sicilian Mafia in the United States. Each controlled his own area tightly in a manner consistent with the "compartmentation" of a well-run intelligence agency. The Corsicans smuggled the heroin into the United States, delivering it to the Mafia in New York. In its turn, the Mafia exercised absolute control over its customers, determining who could and who would not enter the business, meanwhile exercising strict control and discipline over members of its own organization.

In the 1970s the Colombians attempted to exercise vertical control over the cocaine business, controlling every facet of it from coca leaf production, through manufacture and smuggling, to street distribution. As the market increased dramatically, however, the Colombians faced some of the growth problems familiar in any expanding business, in particular personnel problems. The market at that time demanded vast quantities of cocaine. The Colombians were able to meet the demand, making huge profits in the process, but only at the expense of giving up their aspirations of controlling distribution in the United States. With the explosion of demand that came when crack flooded the market, the Colombians relinquished control. The field for distribution was wide open.

Limited control over supply to the Maryland market has been gained by New Yorkers, out-of-state Jamaicans, and to a lesser extent Dominicans, but on the whole, street dealers can control their own territories because they are able to find suppliers independent of the intruders (Maryland State Police, 1991). Thus, there does not seem to be any such monopolistic control as existed in the French Connection.

The discipline and training existing in criminal groups in monopolistic conditions is lacking in crack cocaine distribution in Maryland at the street level. This undoubtedly is a major factor in the current level of violence and a major cause of the decentralization of the business, distinguishing the crack business, at least in this early phase, from all other drug businesses.

Openness. While "shooting galleries" and on-the-street dealing have been hallmarks of the heroin trade for some time, "crack houses" and "open air markets" operate so freely and openly and with such impunity, using a variety of techniques such as pre-teen holders, as to constitute a new phenomenon characteristic of the crack trade.

Clogging the Criminal Justice System. The judicial system at the federal, state, and local levels, was already swamped when arrests, detentions, and prosecutions took a quantum leap with the flood of new cases that came with crack. All branches of the system -- police, juvenile authorities, the courts, the prisons -- are now faced with the problem of setting priorities on who is to go to trial and who is to go to jail. One result of this clogging is that the threat of swift and sure punishment for violating the law has all but vanished. The deterrent value of law enforcement has thus been severely weakened. The crack criminal fears other criminals more than he fears the law. As Scott Shane, a staff writer for *The Baltimore Sun*, put it in November 1992, "the police become bystanders, a mere nuisance, increasingly irrelevant in an atmosphere of lawlessness."

• A drug that demands violence. It was pointed out earlier that, by and large, most drug users who resort to criminal activity to pay for their habit commit for the most part crimes against property, such as petty theft and confidence games. Crack, on the other hand, as a powerful central nervous stimulant, encourages violent action. Also, because of its highly addictive nature, the short time a dose is effective, and the intense craving that cocaine addiction induces, the crack habit becomes more and more expensive. The higher the cost and the more intense the need, the greater the possibility the addict will resort to crimes of violence against persons, such as robbery, to produce quickly the large amount of cash he needs. This, of course, is a statement of the economic relationship between crack and crime. The systemic relationship is lethal.

The potential for profit is so high and alternatives for making money in inner cities is so low, that more would-be dealers are attracted than distribution systems can accommodate, resulting in struggles among competitors for existence -- "turf wars." Thus, the high degree of decentralization, and the concomitant loss of control have resulted in a high level of street violence.

A new kind of criminal. It is obvious that buying and selling crack cocaine on the streets of an American city is not for the squeamish. Few among inner city residents are

willing or able to run the risks or even consider the potential rewards in any way attractive. The violence is more widespread, more intense, more matter-of-fact than ever before known in any type of criminal activity. This violence and the unusual demands it makes on the human being suggest not just more of the same, not just a simple but natural increase; rather, it suggests that we are now facing a new kind of criminal.

PART V

A New Kind of Criminal

Each year the FBI publishes a document called Crime in the United Crime statistics are collected, analyzed, and published States. under the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports program based on reporting from more than 16,000 law enforcement agencies across the The 1990 statistics showed that murders had reached an country. all-time high across the nation, increasing in 18 of the nation's 20 largest cities, including Baltimore. Records for numbers of murders in a year were set in eight of the 20. Mid-size cities, such as Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Louisville, Kentucky, also showed an increase. Homicide was increasing fastest among young blacks 15 through 18 years of age. At the same time that murder and other violent crimes were increasing, drug crimes were down. The growth in murder and other violent crimes continued in 1991 at a rate of four percent higher than 1990 and 33 percent higher than in 1982. Seventy percent of all homicides were committed with firearms. The proportion of such crimes increased from 26 percent in 1987 to 31 percent in 1991.

While preparing the 1990 reports, FBI statisticians noticed sharply higher numbers of violent crimes committed by juveniles (persons between 10 and 17 years of age). While the overall violent crime arrest rate for juveniles increased 27 percent from 1980 to 1990, the murder rate for young whites jumped 48 percent and for young blacks 145 percent, the biggest jump occurring in the second half of the decade. Another finding of this grim report is the increasing use by juveniles of guns to commit violent crimes; the number of juveniles who shot a victim to death increased 79 percent in the ten-year period. The increases in violent crime, while higher among blacks, were evident in all races and in all social classes and lifestyles, as well as in all parts of the country. The FBI reported that before 1980 marijuana was the drug most abused by juveniles of all racial groups. During the 1980s, however, heroin and cocaine arrests of juveniles rose drastically by 713 percent. The increase among blacks was even more drastic -- 2,373 percent, while arrests for marijuana offenses dropped 66 percent for all races.

The statistics documented on a national level what police officials already knew about their own jurisdictions.

- The people using these weapons have no regard for life. (Chief Michael Markman, New York City Police Department, quoted in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 1990, December 8).
 - In Philadelphia people are getting killed for the flimsiest of reasons.... Life has little value. (Capt. Lawton Connelly, commander, homicide division, Philadelphia, quoted in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 1990, December 8).
 - The idea is to survive and prosper in a hostile environment.... A gang member willing to commit a gun crime is sometimes looked up to by other members. (Lt. Bruce Meyer, Los Angeles P.D., quoted in *The Washington Post*, 1990, October 14).
 - It's unusual that in one year we have so many juveniles involved in homicides. (Sgt. Ray Lachapelle, Homicide, Colorado Springs P.D., quoted in the *Rocky Mountain News*, 1991, September 18).
 - St. Paul is not a violent town, but we're seeing more violence.... There's more of a meanness on the streets. (Paul Adelmann, St. Paul police official, quoted in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 1990, December 8).

In my personal conversations with young people who have been involved in violence, there is no remorse, there is not the first tear, there is no sense that this is wrong. (Police Chief Isaac Fulwood, Jr., Washington, D.C. Police, quoted in *The Washington Post*, 1991, January 2).

David Simon, writing in *The Baltimore Sun* on December 3, 1991, gave a somewhat different but equally valid perspective on juvenile violence. He was writing of a specific incident, but his remarks have wider application.

> That's the clean version -- the one replete with utterly evil, utterly dangerous criminals.... But the truth is more equivocal than that. The truth has a collection of incompetent teen-agers firing wildly into a crowd, oblivious to the notion that a massacre of customers and bystanders alike is not synonymous with a well-executed drug slaying. The truth is about young men lacking the sense and self-control of a common criminal, firing so many rounds on a crowded corner that one of the gunmen himself was wounded -- and later arrested at a county hospital.

In April 1992, the Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis released a study of homicides that took place in Washington, D.C. from 1986 to 1991. The following chart shows that as the number of murders increased the age of the victims decreased.

Homicide Victims in Washington, D.C.

Age Group		1986		1991
17 and under	12	(6%)	56	(11%)
18-24	43	(22%)	185	(38%)
25-34	60	(30%)	135	(28%)

35-44	33	(17%)	, ,	66	(14%)
45 and over	26	(13%)		47	(9%)
Unknown age	20	(10%)		0	(0%)
Total		194			489

The percentage of victims who were white males decreased from eight percent in 1986 to three percent in 1991. By 1990 white females, never a large percentage, had fallen below one percent. Black males constituted the largest proportion of homicide victims, peaking in 1989 at 83 percent. In 1991 they comprised 79 percent. Female black victims increased in these years from eight percent in 1989 to 14 percent in 1991.

The age of those arrested for homicide, as with victims, lowered. In 1986, 38 percent of those arrested were 24 or younger. By 1990 that age group accounted for the majority (64 percent). It was 60 percent in 1991. By race, 83 percent of those arrested in 1986 were black, 90 percent in 1991. The use of guns in homicides increased from 55 percent in 1986 to 78 percent in 1991. While .38 caliber revolvers are still used, the most commonly used gun is the nine millimeter semi-automatic loaded with 15 and 32 round magazines.

The District of Columbia study showed the following motives for homicide:

Motive	1987	1991
Drugs	103 (46%)	169 (35%)
Robbery	17 (8%)	46 (9%)
Domestic	29 (13%)	18 (4%)
Argument	27 (12%)	96 (20%)
Retaliation		65 (13%)
All Other	21 (11%)	50 (11%)
Unknown	28 (12%)	45 (9%)
	225	489

Having set forth these statistics, among others, the study goes on to give a report based on insights gained from interviews of 17 juveniles serving commitments for homicide at a District of Columbia youth center during June and July 1991. All were black males and had previous involvement with the juvenile justice Each had seen violence as a regular part of their system. environment. Eight said they did not attend school regularly; the others did not attend at all. When asked "Who raised you?" nine said their mother, three said their grandmother, three said both parents, one an aunt, and two said they raised themselves. Thirteen said they had relatives in prison. Six said they were exposed to physical violence among family members. Twelve said they had received disciplinary beatings, but felt that the beatings were justified. They liked movies and music. When asked about their favorite movies, eight listed for all three choices movies that feature excessive violence and killing and four listed such movies for two of their choices. As to music, most preferred rap music, about half mentioning rap artists noted for violent and antisocial messages. Of the 17, 11 were committed for first degree murder, four for second degree, and two for manslaughter. Among them they were charged with having killed 22 people, 19 with guns, two with knives, and one with Twelve of the killings were considered by the juveniles hands. to have been drug-related. Several said that they had committed more murders than those they had been convicted of.

A common theme among these young people was drugs. All of them denied using drugs, but all except one said they sold drugs. All of them spoke of drugs as if their involvement in them was a foregone conclusion; there seemed to be little thought whether there was something else in which to be involved. One said he got involved for the money, because his family could not afford the things he wanted. Another said it was not a desire for money but for fun and for the camaraderie he saw among members of the drug trade. Yet another explained that people get so

preoccupied with making money that they don't stop to think of the reasons for making it or of the consequences.

The absence of alternatives also emerged as a reason for killing. All but one of the juveniles, when asked why they had killed, said that they did what they had to do. When pressed as to alternatives they replied, in effect, "kill or be killed." Even when the perceived threat was not of imminent danger, almost all believed that if they let their enemy live he would kill them some other time.

Reputation was also an important factor to these young people. The 16 involved in drug trafficking carried guns for protection. Several killed when others tried to rob them of drugs or drug money or while they were trying to collect money owed them for drugs. To be robbed or to permit someone not to pay a debt reflected negatively on one's reputation and had serious longterm implications. Thus, killing was to them the ultimate message to others that they would not allow themselves to be robbed or to be treated with disrespect. One, who shot someone for attempting to rob him, said, "I had to kill him or people would have thought I was soft."

When asked if he had killed because he wanted to or felt he had to, each replied that he did not want to kill but felt he had no choice. They simply could see no alternative to killing. In answer to the question what he considered an alternative to killing his victim, one replied that he could have stabbed or burned his victim to death instead of shooting him.

Most of the young offenders felt no sense of legal or moral guilt. Most charged with first degree murder felt they should have been charged instead with manslaughter for reasons of selfdefense. Their admission of guilt was simply an admission that they had not gotten away with the crime. Their sense of criminal justice was similar. One, while admitting to the fact of his homicide, felt that his conviction was not fair because no one had actually witnessed the murder. This inability to perceive guilt precluded any remorse or sympathy for their victims or their victims' families. One said his only thought about his victim's family was to prepare for their revenge. The authors of the report commented: "They do not seem to exist beyond their own needs and they do not seem to perceive the world other than in its immediate impact on them."

In Maryland, LaMont Flanagan, Commissioner of the Division of Pretrial Detention and Services (formerly City Jail) similarly interviewed juveniles arrested for murder. During 1992 the Commissioner held weekly meetings with 60 juveniles who had been waived for trial as adults. Most of them were repeat offenders who had previously served time at a youth facility, which they said was "fun." (Contrary to the Washington offenders, who felt that incarceration had "inconvenienced" them.) The Commissioner felt that few demonstrated the ability to obtain employment commensurate with their educational levels or intellectual capabilities.

When asked "Who are you trying to be?" they said they wanted to be "bad" people. Their primary problem was not being successful at it. For role models they embraced the images of athletes, entertainers, and cartoon characters. Nearly all considered themselves victims of society, of the judicial system, and specifically of the corrections system.

Among the group interviewed were middle class boys, poor boys from single parent homes, boys reared at institutions, and some who had been self-supporting from age 12. This group of juveniles had highly developed rationalization systems regarding their crimes. Few had any problems justifying heinous acts done in the name of self-survival, or the survival of family or close associates. Consideration was rarely, if ever, given to their victims, who were seen as people who "probably" have an easier life. One said, "After the first victim I can't sleep at night; but my conscience is neutral with the rest of them."

These juveniles had no allegiance to any established social group, including the black community. Thus, they did not bind themselves by any social contracts that do not reinforce the criminal code by which they lived -- one never informs on another or betrays knowledge of criminal acts.

Most of those interviewed felt that they had no hope of improving their lives by traditional, lawful means, that their disfranchisement in some way justified their actions, that the people and communities they victimized were no better nor worse off for their acts and behavior, that, if they had not committed the crimes they had, someone else would have. They see the mass media as reinforcing their belief that the "white man" can and does get away with greater crimes than theirs and that they, black and brown men, are fodder for the corrections industry. Some said their contribution to society was creating the need for correctional officer jobs.

They said that the death penalty is not a deterrent for them. "We already have a death penalty on the street," said one. If they are careless with the drug dealer's money or drugs they will be killed. They prefer to kill before they are killed. They say that violence is a result of the abundance of drugs and their desire for money. Money, they say, is their life, because it gives them status in the community, provides support for their families, and it provides them with the means to buy the things they want. Being able to buy ninety dollar tennis shoes for themselves and gold earrings for their girlfriends is vital to their reputations.

The juveniles in this group said that guns are too readily available. They added that if guns were not available, they would use whatever weapons they could lay their hands on such as knives or baseball bats. That innocent bystanders are sometimes killed is a result of the circumstance that the juvenile criminals are not able to practice at target ranges, they assert.

Those interviewed said they do not perceive education as the key to success. They assert that they have a strong desire to work but only for a good income. The idea of menial work for minimum wage is totally unacceptable to them. They said that once started in the life of crime it is hard to get out of it, explaining that, like drug addiction, the criminal life is a habit hard to kick.

Nearly all hold women in low esteem while feeling some affection for individual women. Overwhelmingly, they were raised in fatherless homes. The tacit rejection by their fathers and the compensatory efforts of their mothers were extremely sensitive issues. Their mother is loved and protected, but they avoided any discussion of their fathers. About two-thirds of the group interviewed had children of their own whom they professed to love and protect. Most of them opposed legalization of drugs, saying that if they were legal they would destroy the younger generation, including their own children.

Most said they do not fear the police. Rather, they have no respect for them and detest them. They feel the police are dishonest, and they have no compunction in defending themselves against them. While despising the violence that goes on constantly in their communities, they see it as part of life. They say they do not fear death, since death is inevitable for everyone. They live in a permanent present. (The editors of the Washington study commented: "They seem to have no working understanding of the future.") With these juveniles, the Commissioner believes, there is no thought of tomorrow or of the coming week. For them the future means imprisonment or death by violence.

In further comment on their lack of contact with reality, the Commissioner believes that the sense of alienation and despair of the juveniles he interviewed led them to consider their crimes unreal and as having no concrete effect on the victim or on the communities in which they live. He believes the alienation is compounded by the absence of positive, credible African-American rele models and by the absence of male figures in their upbringing.

It is interesting to note the similarities in the comments of the juveniles interviewed in the Washington, D.C. study and the Baltimore study -- comments made by two comparable populations in two different areas. Both groups express similar dispositions and similar value systems. They express unconventional motivations for doing things, display a lack of regard for human life, and convey little hope of any prospects for a future. While government agencies that are examining the issue of violence and looking for programs and strategies to address the problem should be aware that these are only these juveniles' opinions and perceptions on life, it is an opportunity to try to understand the motivation of the population that is practicing some of the violence that we are seeing today.

PART VI The Cycle of Violence

The inference to be drawn from the FBI statistics, the comments of the police officers, and from the Washington and Baltimore studies of juvenile murderers is that all who attempt to describe criminal violence in the nineties seem to feel themselves in the presence of an entirely new kind of crime and an entirely new kind of criminal. Another inference is that the children who are murderers are not psychopaths with bizarre mental disturbances (although some may be), but rather relatively normal children caught up in circumstances they cannot deal with successfully.

There is a chilling implication in the fact that the number of drug crimes seems to be dropping while the number of violent crimes seems to be increasing. This phenomenon has led many analysts to express their concern that even if the nation stems the flow of drugs, the guns would still be on the streets and available for other crimes. Disputes that arise out of rivalry over a girl or a traffic problem can be settled with guns. We have seen how quickly people with guns use them to avenge perceived slights or to acquire something as insignificant as a new pair of sport shoes. The point of the new violence is that whereas most violence in the past was a last resort seldom appealed to, now violence is routinely used as the first recourse. This violence proceeds from a complex of attitudes: One is that its practitioners can see no alternative to violence. Another is the subculture that determines a person's standing by his power, assuming that power is equivalent to strength, which is equivalent to violence. One simply must be prepared to use violence to thrive in this subculture. Still another attitude is that no authority other than one's own matters, not in the home, not in the community, not in the law. As a result of this complex of attitudes, the elaborate system developed by human beings over thousands of years to deal with conflicting rights

and with the disputes of passion is simply inoperative.

Another chilling thought is that in the coming decade the population of ten to 17 year olds will increase significantly. Many of those still too young to hold a gun see violence all around them and absorb the brutal complex of attitudes of their teen-age elders. What will happen when they are old enough to hold a gun? The toughs among the current generation seem to want to be outrageous, to be tougher than their predecessors. Will the coming generation feel a need to be even tougher and even more outrageous?

But these assumptions about life and these attitudes are not new. They appear new only because the crack epidemic and the violence of the Colombian-dominated international drug traffic have given the new kind of criminal an outlet in his own brand of violence. For many years the causes of aberrant behavior in the cities have been sought by a variety of interested parties. In the mid-1980s, Ralph B. Taylor and Jeanette Covington undertook a study of Baltimore neighborhoods showing that the mobility of the city's population caused a striking instability in the life of neighborhoods, resulting in increased crime.

The National Crime Analysis Project at Northeastern University at Boston recently completed a study pointing to the major conclusion that the unraveling of the American family is a principal cause of the violence. As a result of the unraveling there is a generation of "callous kids who reject traditional concepts of right and wrong, who glean their values from violent TV shows and movies, who often care nothing for their victims, and who aren't scared of prison, or even execution, since they face death every day on dangerous streets."

The Program of Human Development and Criminal Behavior has undertaken an eight-year study to determine the factors that lead people to delinquency, antisocial behavior, and crime. Without prejudging the results of the study, the researchers are looking into such areas as: the prenatal effects of smoking, alcohol, and drug use; why IQ testing shows consistently that criminals score seven to eight points lower than the rest of the population; the effects of the absence of a male presence in the earliest years of a child; the effects of the size of classrooms on the development of children; and which is more important in the development of criminal behavior, the earliest years of childhood or adolescence.

Over and over the role of the popular media in the new kind of violence is stressed. George Gerbner, of the University of Pennsylvania, has reported that in all networks combined there is an average of six to eight acts of violence each hour in prime time and an average of two murders each night. More than half of all major characters in network prime time shows, he reports, are involved in some violence every week. A study commissioned by *TV Guide* showed that on a typical day in April, 1992, from 6:00 a.m. to midnight there were, over ten of the most popular channels, 1846 individual acts of violence; 175 scenes in which violence resulted in one or more fatalities; 389 scenes depicting serious assaults; 362 scenes involving gunplay; 673 depictions of punching, pushing, slapping, dragging, and other physically hostile acts; and 226 scenes of menacing threats with a weapon.

The Northeastern College researchers, mentioned above, assert:

We have a generation of kids that are being raised on slasher films, a generation of kids whose first view of sex is a rape scene in a movie... at a minimum, film violence, seems to reinforce a child's own personal sense of violence. And the most dangerous movies and TV programs are those that fuse sex and violence, since pleasure comes

to be associated in the teen-ager's mind with the concept of doing harm.

In commenting on the Northeastern study, the president of the American Society of Criminology said, as reported in the October 19, 1992 edition of *The New York Times*: "The glorification of violence on television ... has a powerful effect on kids who are poorly socialized. It dehumanizes them...."

According to the American Psychological Association, extensive research over a period of decades is conclusive: television viewing influences behavior and exposure to violent programming, in particular, can manifest itself in acts of physical aggression.

Dr. Deborah Prothrow-Stith, author of Deadly Consequences: How Violence is Destroying our Teen-Age Population, said recently: "There is an epidemic of adolescent violence. We see it in the movies -- the super-hero, macho, 'gonna-blow-you-away' kind of violence." As a member of a blue ribbon panel on television violence, she also said: "I think one of the things that came through quite clearly in the Los Angeles revolt was that teens have learned that if you think you have a cause to justify, violence is the way to do it. When characters like Rambo get angry, they blow people away. So children have learned that violence is the way to solve problems."

In a recent best-seller, Hollywood versus America, movie critic Michael Medved makes a case that not only violence but also the values promoted by the entertainment industry debase and undermine the values of American society. A similar case is made in Timothy Jay's Cursing in America.

The violence on television and in the movies and popular music reinforces H. Rap Brown's dictum: Violence is as American as

cherry pie.

The role of child abuse cannot be overlooked in the question of violent crime. Studies have indicated that abused children often turn into abusers themselves. A psychiatric study published in 1988 of 14 juveniles condemned to death found that 12 had been "brutally, physically abused" in their homes. This study, based on psychiatric testing and interviews indicated that all but one of the juveniles had grown up in a household "rife with violence." (Reported in *The Baltimore Sun*, 1992, August 18) Although not echoed in the Washington and Baltimore studies, this study and similar studies show that child abuse frequently results in the perpetuation of abuse and of antisocial behavior by the abused child.

Ken Magid and Carole McKelvey, in their book *High Risk: Children Without a Conscience*, conclude that very young children who do not receive affectionate attention from a consistent someone, run the risk of growing up hostile and unable to care for others.

CONCLUSION

In summary, a child brought up in a hostile and dangerous world, alienated by social and economic causes from a society that seems to him to espouse possessing material goods as the highest value in life, while denying them to him; whose family can teach him no values because it has become unraveled; who is brought up in a home where the members practice violence; where he watches violence on television for hours on end, listens to it in his favorite music, and sees it in his unstable, poverty-stricken, run-down neighborhood; and who receives no social values nor countervailing message against violence from any other source --what hope is there for such a child?

The only hope society provides for such a child is that of an inward-turning, physical self-gratification and the pursuit of material goods. The way toward those goals might seem to lie in the companionship of drug dealers and in the possession of egobuilding, security-providing firearms.

In these terms, the problem is relatively easy to understand. Ordinary children growing up with nothing but negative influences in their lives, who do not learn social values, are turning to the only means they believe available to satisfy their human cravings.

The problem is clear; it is the solution that has so far evaded us. How can public policy makers address a myriad of factors that contribute to our youth turning to crime and, at the same time, make a positive impact on escalating drug activity and the violent crime associated with it? Up to now there has been a lack of consistency in the allocation of resources and in the approach to dealing with the problem. On the one hand there have been advocates for putting more resources into law enforcement, the justice system, and punishment, while, on the other hand,

others have been arguing the need for more funds for prevention and treatment. This has been a dilemma and it has shown itself in various failed government policies and strategies.

At a time when a major concern of government is how to tighten its belt, it is faced with a new and serious menace to public health and to the safety of its citizens. One thing is clear: Despite the concentrated and at times gallant efforts of thousands of dedicated civil servants, health professionals, researchers, and volunteers, the traditional remedies of society have not worked, are not working, and apparently cannot be made The criminal justice system is swamped -- but more to work. police, more judges, more prisons alone will not answer the If, as the National Center on Institutions and problem. Alternatives asserts, more than half of Baltimore's 60,000 black men between 18 and 35 are under criminal justice supervision on any given day, there is something very, very wrong. In effect, our criminal justice system, through no fault of its own and with the best will in the world, in carrying out the mandate given it by society is inadvertently and unwillingly defeating its own purposes and ending up playing a role in criminalizing a generation of young people. Society must find a way to prevent crime rather than just punish more offenders.

Despite the vast sums spent on them and all the good will and hard work in the world, social programs and projects have been equally disappointing. The new kind of crime and the new kind of criminal demand a new kind of response.

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