# NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
# COUNTERDRUG TASK FORCE

## *NATIONAL GUARD COUNTERDRUG LESSONS III*
11 July 1993





*Compiled by*: The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute

**DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE**
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
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This is the third edition of *National Guard Counterdrug Lessons* compiled by the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute. The Institute developed these lessons through the analysis of more than 2,500 documents submitted to the National Guard Bureau's Counterdrug Task Force. Numerous after action reports from active component and law enforcement organizations were also reviewed and contributed to the lessons contained in this bulletin.

While we have made great progress in fighting the scourge of illegal drugs, much more remains to be accomplished. In order to provide the best support possible and add the greatest value to America, we must continue to critically examine the counterdrug support program and seek ways to improve it. *National Guard Counterdrug Lessons* are intended to facilitate the exchange of information necessary to develop more efficient and effective ways of conducting counterdrug operations. The participation of the entire counterdrug community is essential to the success of these bulletins.

These bulletins should receive the greatest dissemination possible. Please share them with your counterdrug team members. (The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute will provide as many additional copies as you request, see the back page for more information.) The intent of these bulletins is to help organizations and individuals learn from the mistakes of others. A number of the after action reports recently submitted by National Guard organizations reported making errors that had been addressed in previous issues of *National Guard Counterdrug Lessons*.

I wish to thank the many states and organizations, especially those from law enforcement, the active component, and the Army reserve, that have contributed their lessons to this publication. By sharing your counterdrug techniques, tactics, and procedures, you have helped to enhance the quality of support provided by the National Guard and its active component, reserve component, and law enforcement counterparts.

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## Mission #1, Surface Reconnaissance

**Observation.** A counterdrug task force performed marijuana eradication in a remote area where civilian emergency medical services were not available in a timely manner. The task force used a National Guard medevac helicopter to insert and extract the eradication teams as well as provide standby emergency medical evacuation in case it was necessary. This action resulted in a substantial savings in blade time.

**Lesson(s).** Using appropriately configured medevac aircraft to perform "double duty" by providing the routine lift to begin and end certain missions may be an efficient method of conserving blade time. However, commanders should be careful not to violate AR 40-2, Army Medical Treatment Facilities, which states that aerial ambulances are not to be used to transport troops other than patients and medical personnel. Also, planners must recognize that the extraction of remaining (uninjured) team members may be delayed if an emergency medical evacuation is required.

**Observation.** An aircraft assigned to a marijuana eradication mission arrived late, without a crew chief, and without the proper equipment for sling load operations. The aircraft was also due for a required service and had to return for scheduled maintenance almost immediately after arriving in the mission area.

**Lesson(s).**

--Air crews should be identified early enough to ensure all personnel will be available for the mission.

--Ensure air crews are fully briefed on the mission and any special requirements (such as sling load operations); give them enough time to prepare the aircraft and fully plan the mission.

--Plan for loiter time when determining flight hour requirements.

**Observation.** An aircraft arrived at the mission site for an eradication lift without having communication with the ground team. Personnel on the ground did not know proper hand and arm signals to direct the aircraft to where they wanted it.

**Lesson(s).** Plan for communications between air and ground teams. (This will usually be as simple as making sure the aircraft's military FM works and the ground team has an AN/PRC-77). Also, plan for an alternate means of communication (such as visual). Train ground teams in visual signals.

**Observation.** During sling operations for marijuana eradication, a ground team member was nearly struck in the head by a sling hook.

**Lesson(s).**

--Ensure both ground and air crews have proper training in sling operations.

--Ground personnel involved in sling load operations must wear kevlar helmets and eye protection.

--Keep extraneous people away from the downwash area.

**Observation.** A local LEA requested military support to perform thermal imaging to detect indications of a suspected indoor marijuana growing operation. However, the LEA was not sufficiently familiar with thermographic techniques or the capabilities of military thermal imagers to ensure a valid case.

**Lesson(s).** Ensure a qualified thermographer is present before conducting thermal imaging on suspected indoor grows. (Thermal imaging operations must be consistent with state and federal law as determined by the supported LEA.)

Mission #2, Surface Surveillance

**Observation.** At the request of a LEA, a listening post/ observation post (LP/OP) team was assigned to perform area surveillance on a marijuana growing area. The team members felt that operations security (OPSEC) was compromised by the use of two identical, brand new blazers, each with four guys and filled with green gear.

**Lesson(s).** Avoid renting identical vehicles. Use civilian blankets, etc., to cover "alice" packs and other military equipment in the back of vehicles.

**Observation.** A LP/OP departed for a short notice mission in an urban area. Once on location, they found they forgot to bring back-up equipment (such as extra batteries) that they normally would take to a mission in a "field" environment.

**Lesson(s).** Develop a standard "mission box" with necessary supplies that can be easily issued for short notice missions. Consider creating a SOP load list and have a supervisor check-off all items prior to departure.

**Observation.** A LP/OP was located in a position where it could be observed from a barn loft one thousand meters away. OPSEC was also compromised when the drop vehicle was sighted.

**Lesson(s).** Consider the possibility of long-range countersurveillance when selecting positions. Also, consider cover from aerial observation if drug traffickers have access to aircraft.

**Observation.** Before conducting counterdrug support operations on

private land, the National Guard member in charge of a counterdrug team delayed an operation while waiting for proof that the supported LEA had the landowner's permission to be on the property. The supported LEA did in fact have written permission, but none of the law enforcement officers on the mission brought a copy with them. The Guard member also had questions about the civil liability on the part of Guard members conducting the operation.

**Lesson(s).**

--Assurance that the LEA has obtained all legally required permissions, warrants, etc., should be included in the mission approval process at the counterdrug coordinator's level. If the supported LEA will need to provide written proof of compliance or show a warrant to National Guard support personnel, the requirement should be identified and resolved prior to initiating support.

--National Guard personnel in a Title 32 status are protected from certain claims by the Federal Tort Claims Act. Detailed information on liability is provided in NGR (AR) 500-2/NGR (AF) 55-6, paragraph 2-1f.

## Mission #3, Surface Transportation Support

**Observation.** A National Guard unit assisted a LEA by moving an evidence safe. The safe was tall, narrow, and did not have rollers. Using military channels, it took more than 60 days to obtain the special equipment necessary to move the safe.

**Lesson(s).** Tell LEAs how long it will take to provide requested support. In some cases, LEAs may find it better to use a private contractor for support if a rapid response is necessary.

## Mission #4, Aerial Reconnaissance

**Observation.** An Air National Guard unit used a C-12F to provide aerial reconnaissance support to a LEA. The crew found that the low wing and engine configuration created a visibility problem for ground reconnaissance and surveillance. The aircraft lacked communications between the flight crew and LEA passengers. Communications from the aircraft to vessels was also absent. (An unsuccessful attempt was made to use hand-held radios.)

**Lesson(s).**

--If a C-12F is used for aerial recon or surveillance, recognize that passenger visibility of the ground is restricted.

--Use an aircraft removeable intercom system to provide communications between the flight crew and LEA passengers.

**Observation.** Some marijuana growers are making considerable effort to camouflage their plants. Techniques

include using greater dispersion within growing areas and planting cannabis next to natural vegetation. These techniques make it difficult to spot marijuana from 500' AGL.

**Lesson(s).** Where safe, legal, and in accordance with NGR 95-1 (which addresses flight altitudes), and in compliance with local safety regulations to do so, aircraft may have to descend to confirm suspected marijuana sightings.

**Observation.** A nighttime aerial reconnaissance mission was delayed due to a lack of coordination for aircraft fueling. Many aviation fuel suppliers shut down at night.

**Lesson(s).** If night fueling arrangements cannot be confirmed, fuel-up during the day to prepare for nighttime aviation missions.

## Mission #5, Aerial Surveillance

**Observation.** A National Guard aircraft conducted aerial surveillance with only the sectional aeronautical chart they would typically use during military missions. Because of this, the law enforcement officer in the aircraft was unable to communicate target locations to the supported LEA element on the ground.

**Lesson(s).** National Guard and LEA personnel must coordinate the use of common maps to effectively identify specific locations. For aircraft conducting aerial surveillance this will usually require the use of street or road maps.

**Observation.** While flying in a military helicopter for the first time, a passenger on a counterdrug mission experienced sudden air sickness.

**Lesson(s).** Have air sickness bags available for passengers who might need them.

## Mission #6, Aerial Transportation Support.

**Observation.** On short notice, a National Guard aircraft was used to transport a LEA chemist to a suspected methamphetamine lab. The pilot and aircraft were available because they had been scheduled for an Additional Flight Training Period (AFTP).

**Lesson(s).** An excellent example of missions that are incidental to training, AFTPs are valuable resources for short-notice counterdrug missions.

## Mission #7, Ground Radar Support

**Observation.** A unit assigned to a ground radar mission in support of law enforcement was unable to provide effective area coverage due to excessive and uncoordinated taskings. The military headquarters had one concept of the operation while multiple law enforcement officers had different concepts of where to place the radars. The unit received conflicting guidance from several law enforcement officers who each believed he or she was in charge of designating areas to be covered. The radar operators believed OPSEC may have been compromised because the equipment was left in the same position for more than a week. Also, contrary to expectations it appeared illicit air traffic may have been more active during nights with a full moon as opposed to a new moon.

**Lesson(s).**

--Follow the principle of unity of command; each element should receive its orders from a single headquarters. The supported law enforcement agency should identify a single point of contact within their agency to determine required support and provide direction to military personnel providing support.

--Try to place radar sites in terrain that will help to enhance OPSEC.

--Consider periodic movement of equipment in order to alter the radar footprint and spread it over a larger area.

--Plan for operations throughout the moon's phases. Smugglers flying below terrain contours without night vision goggles will require a full or nearly full moon for navigation. Even air smugglers using goggles will usually require some lunar illumination.

## Mission #8, Cargo Inspection

**Observation.** A LEA received information that an in-bound commercial aircraft was carrying a package suspected of containing drugs. The LEA had X-ray equipment at the airport, but the operator was not available. On short notice, the state's National Guard was able to provide a soldier experienced as a civilian X-ray technician who was qualified to operate the equipment. This quick action resulted in a seizure.

**Lesson(s).** Counterdrug coordinators should maintain a list of available National Guard personnel with skills (civilian as well as military) that may have counterdrug applications.

**Observation.** National Guard members assisted a LEA with inspections of commercial vehicles in a cold climate. Personnel wore cold weather clothing; however, the manual dexterity requirements of thorough inspections necessitated the frequent removal of gloves and mittens. The threat of frostbite thus severely limited inspection capability.

**Lesson(s).** Consider the use of a maintenance shelter or a warming tent with heaters to support inspections in extreme cold weather.

**Observation.** Word of increased cargo inspection operations spreads quickly through the smuggling community. Many smugglers use spotters and other countersurveillance techniques. Drug traffickers may try to go around ports of entry or wait-out cargo inspection operations.

**Lesson(s).**

--Try to include surface surveillance missions between ports of entry to complement increases in cargo inspections.

--LEAs may find that maintaining a steady level of cargo inspections for at least a month may produce more effective results than "pulsed" operations over a short period of time.

## Mission #9, Training Program

**Observation.** A National Guard element supported a LEA in conducting a cannabis eradication seminar. The copy machine at the classroom site broke before enough handouts could be made for all students. When students arrived, the classroom was not set-up properly with enough chairs for the number of students. Equipment for showing visual aids was not set-up. Searching for restaurants at meal time took up additional training time. Some students didn't receive their certificates because administrative personnel didn't have their correct address.

**Lesson(s).** Use troop leading procedures when planning training presentations, just as you would any other mission.

--Use backward planning to ensure enough time is available to perform required tasks. Don't wait until the last minute to make copies of student handouts.

--Conduct a reconnaissance of the training site early enough to make necessary changes, arrange classroom layout, etc. If meals won't be provided, recon restaurants (make sure they are open when your meals are planned, find out type of food and prices) and provide strip maps for students.

--Also, have students fill-out the sign in roster exactly the way they want their completion certificates to read. Have them verify their complete addresses and phone numbers at sign-in.

## Mission #10, Aerial Photo Reconnaissance

**Observation.** A National Guard unit provided a LEA with photo interpretation and aerial photos of a suspected clandestine lab site prior to execution of a search warrant. The photographs identified a danger area not readily visible from the ground, causing the LEA to modify their original plan.

**Lesson(s).** LEAs may use aerial photographs to locate obstacles, identify the distances between structures, show fields of fire and dead space, and find openings such as windows and doors. They should be considered as tool for planning raids and the execution of search warrants.

**Observation.** During a multi-state, Air National Guard operation, a C-130 provided aerial photography. Using KA-87 and KA-91 cameras mounted on the tail ramp, the crew was able to change film and make repairs inflight. This allowed a single C-130 to accomplish the equivalent of seven RF-4C sorties. The results were judged very successful; however, improved navigation accuracy is required for many photo recce missions. Photo reconnaissance is a special mission with specific training requirements--it can't be effectively performed by just any crew with a camera. Mission planning per sortie is a significant time requirement, as is post mission analysis. (Trained photo interpreters are the key to successful photo recce missions regardless of the type of aircraft used.)

**Lesson(s).**

--Consider the use of specially equipped C-130 aircraft to perform photo reconnaissance.

--Have personnel from photo reconnaissance units (such as RF-4C units) train C-130 crews and staff in proper techniques. (For further information, you may wish to contact Lt Col Dave Bennett, California Air National Guard, at (805) 986-7540.)

**Observation.** Shadows can distort images and make photo interpretation difficult.

**Lesson(s).** During mission planning, the supported LEA and unit providing support shoud together consider position of the sun when planning time of day for photo recce missions. (Approximately 1000-1400 may be the best time.)

**Observation.** Air recce photos were taken at an altitude too high to be useful for the supported LEAs needs.

**Lesson(s).** Units providing support should get specifics from the LEA regarding the details required in aerial photos. Also, personnel trained in air recce should assist in developing the appropriate flight profile.

## Mission #14, Administration, Information, Logistics, and Maintenance Support

**Observation.** Personnel assigned to provide administrative and information support to an investigative operation were required to use computers and new software with which they were unfamiliar. Individuals had to train for

four hours a day, reducing their availability for mission support.

**Lesson(s).** If necessary, plan for a train-up period before beginning a mission with new equipment or personnel.

**Observation.** A National Guard counterdrug element supported a LEA by providing light carts to illuminate certain urban areas at night. The lighting of these areas appeared to deter and help detect drug trafficking activities.

**Lesson(s).** Providing additional illumination may help to reduce drug trafficking in certain areas at night.

**Observation.** While performing translation in support of a LEA, a military linguist was exposed to several new dialects. This exposure helped to expand his vocabulary and understanding of colloquial phrases, thus improving his skills as a military linguist.

**Lesson(s).** Translation support can be excellent training for military linguists.

**Observation.** LEAs often need large, relatively secure locations with plenty of parking as a rally point to conduct briefings for large-scale operations. Many National Guard armories are ideal for this purpose.

**Lesson(s).** Consider making armories (offices, drill floors, and/or parking lots) available to LEAs for pre-raid briefings.

**Observation.** A Guard member was brought on ADSW to provide administrative support to a LEA for a period of less then 30 days. Because it was a "short tour," the member was not subjected to urinalysis or background checks. The LEA mission requirement included the processing of sensitive material.

**Lesson(s).** Administrative support may include the processing of sensitive material. Personnel who have not completed urinalysis or background checks must be carefully managed to avoid the possible compromise of sensitive material. (Some LEAs will want to conduct their own checks, allow time for this process if necessary.)

**Observation.** Many local LEAs have information related to illegal drug trafficking within a region. Often, no effective mechanism exists to gather the information, collate data, and provide analysis to support LEA investigative

efforts. In one area, a federal LEA used a National Guard intelligence analyst operating out of a central LEA office to act as a focal point to gather/receive information from local LEAs. In concert with the supported LEA, the analyst developed a standard survey format. Use of this format facilitated collection. A single point of contact and a standard collection methodology with follow-up at regular intervals seemed to encourage local LEAs to provide information. Sensitive information was collected in person by the Guard intelligence analyst or a law enforcement officer. (Military organizations may not possess or maintain files on private citizens. In certain instances however, specifically assigned military personnel ["augmentees"] can assist law enforcement agencies with analysis and filing of information on suspects if the supported LEA retains the information. This work is permissible only if the military personnel are providing direct support to a law enforcement agency and the results are not passed on to a military entity.)

**Lesson(s).** LEAs may find that:

--A proactive collection effort may result in additional information that will be useful to drug enforcement efforts.

--A military intelligence analyst can provide a law enforcement agency or task force with trained analysis skills while freeing law enforcement officers to perform law enforcement-specific functions.

--Establishing personal contacts between agencies, using a standard information collection methodology, and conducting periodic follow-ups can encourage the exchange of information between agencies. Assigning a specific individual to collect information from other agencies can enhance the perception that efforts will be ongoing and mutually beneficial, thus further encouraging cooperation and the contribution of information.

--Multiagency task forces and information centers should reward cooperative LEAs with a letter or follow-up phone call when information they provide results in a seizure or arrest. LEAs should consider establishing a task force awards program to recognize other LEAs that have been particularly helpful.

## Mission #15, Engineer Support

**Observation.** A National Guard unit was requested to provide a civil engineering section to pour a concrete pad for the installation of two radio communications towers. The plan was to have the supported LEA arrange for a cement truck to mix and pour the concrete at the site, then National Guard personnel would form the pad. The cement truck was unable to make the grade to the pad site. Guard personnel were required to haul the cement up the hill, then mix and pour it by hand. If the unit providing support would have performed a reconnaissance before the mission, they probably would have recognized that the grade was too steep for a cement truck and could have advised the supported LEA. Prior to the mission, the unit did not plan for an alternate means of pouring the cement.

**Lesson(s).**

--Appropriate individuals should perform a reconnaissance prior to every counterdrug mission.

--Habitually plan for contingencies such as vehicle failure, poor weather, etc.

**Observation.** A planned dismantling of a crack house had to be delayed because of safety concerns over utility hook-ups. The delay caused some of the demolition to be completed after the landfill had closed for the day.

**Lesson(s).** The LEA receiving support should arrange for a utility representative to be present at the site before beginning dismantling. Cut off services at the property line rather than the structure. Also, consider landfill hours of operation when planning for disposal of debris.

**Observation.** Engineer units provided support for one week to clear a building. During the week, several individuals were rotated to other duties and replaced by newcomers. The new personnel had to receive a detailed briefing on the dismantling plan and procedures, thus slowing completion of the project.

**Lesson(s).** If possible, use the same personnel throughout short duration projects.

**Observation.** A National Guard engineer unit provided support to demolish a crack house. No restrooms were available in the area. Movement of heavy equipment interfered with rush hour traffic. Effective coordination did not take place between all agencies concerned.

**Lesson(s).**

--Plan for restroom breaks when conducting support operations in urban areas. Consider renting portable latrines.

--Consider use of a police escort for moving heavy equipment. Plan movement outside of peak traffic hours.

--Conduct a pre-mission brief for all agencies concerned. When planning crack house dismantling, be sure to include utility companies and waste management agencies.

## Other Missions/Issues

**Observation.** Counterdrug forces conducted a large-scale, multi-agency operation. The operation included a federal LEA supported by active component military units and both the Army and Air National Guards. Some equipment promised by the leaders of National Guard subordinate units was apparently not authorized by higher headquarters. (This perception may have been created because law enforcement personnel--and perhaps

even supporting National Guard members--didn't understand the difference between Air National Guard and Army National Guard command channels.) Confusion over call signs and frequencies, and their repeated use without daily changes, may have compromised OPSEC. Several senior personnel involved in the execution of the operation had not been present during planning and wanted to make last-minute changes. The mission took place within the area of operation of an agency that was not included in its planning or execution.

**Lesson(s).**

--National Guard personnel supporting law enforcement agencies must understand their state's approval procedures for counterdrug support and know the limits to their own authority.

--At echelons below the office of the Adjutant General, the Air Guard and Army Guard are virtually separate entities. Without proper authority, leaders of one branch shouldn't presume to make commitments for the other branch.

--The supported agency should take the lead for communications planning. Consider the use of a signal operating instruction (SOI) and change frequencies and call signs daily.

--A joint operations rehearsal may be useful to "work out the bugs" prior to conducting a large-scale, intelligence-driven operation. Consider using a "sand table"-type rehearsal to ensure all agencies understand their roles within the mission and appropriate actions to take in situations they are likely to encounter. A command post exercise for key leaders is also a useful, cost-effective method to prepare for large-scale operations.

--Key personnel who will be involved in the actual operation should be involved in the planning. Leaders who delegate the authority to commit assets and to plan should equally delegate the authority to execute that plan. If you must change commitments made on the behalf of your agency or organization, make the changes early enough to minimize the impact on the other agencies/organizations involved in the operation.

--Be sure to coordinate with all agencies that may have responsibilities within the area of operations. Don't overlook any agency that may have resources (including intelligence and information) that might contribute to the operation.

**Observation.** Personnel performing counterdrug support planned exclusively on cellular telephones as a means of communications. In several remote areas, the cellular phones were ineffective due to a lack of cells.

**Lesson(s).**

--Bring an individual experienced in communications into the planning process.

--Plan for alternative means of communication.

**Observation.** A National Guard member was performing counterdrug duty assisting in cargo inspections.

Almost by coincidence, it was discovered he had a background in accounting. The Guard member was transferred to assist in a money laundering investigation where he helped obtain a multi-million dollar seizure.

**Lesson(s).** Look beyond military MOS when determining what counterdrug-related skills an individual may possess.

**Observation.** In order to develop planning factors, members of the Wisconsin National Guard conducted tests of several night vision devices to determine their effectiveness and noise signature.

**Lesson(s).** For planning purposes:

--AN/TAS-4A operation can be heard from up to 350m away. It cannot observe an IR chemlight from 10m. It can discern a standing person from up to 880m. It can detect a person as a heat source up to 2200m, but cannot distinguish the person from an animal or other heat source. It can observe a M998 ("Hummvee") as a heat signature, but cannot identify the vehicle type at 1320m.

--AN/TVS-4 operation can be heard from up to 25m away. It can observe an IR chemlight from up to 700m. It can identify a vehicle by type from up to 3960m.

--AN/PVS-5 and AN/PVS-7b have silent operation. They can observe an IR chemlight, discern individuals, and identify vehicle types up to 350m.

## Logistics Issues

**Observation.** Maps for many areas are not readily available through military channels.

**Lesson(s).** Although it is planning to discontinue the service in the near future, law enforcement and military organizations can obtain up to ten maps from the U.S. Geological Survey (U.S.G.S.) mapping department. For more information, call U.S.G.S. at (415) 853-8300. Also, many Bureau of Land Management offices have oversize copiers available to make map copies.

**Observation.** A National Guard element participated in thermal imagery training over a three-day period using a PAS-5. Personnel experienced problems due to depressurization of the $CO^2$ tubes used to cool the device. The tubes were new and at full operating pressure when the operator left home station. When the training missions began, however, it was discovered that all three tubes were reading low.

**Lesson(s).** When using thermal imagers that require pressurized gas cooling, bring extra gas tubes or plan for their refill.

## Battlefield Area Evaluation in Counterdrug Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (CDIPB)

**Observation.** (*This subject is continued from "Terrain Analysis in Counterdrug Preparation of the Battlefield (CDIPB)" in National Guard Counterdrug Lessons II, dated 7 Jan 93.*) Military intelligence analytical techniques, such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), often prove useful in counterdrug operations. However, the traditional process of IPB may require modification to suit the specific needs of counterdrug operations.

Counterdrug intelligence preparation of the battlefield can help LEAs to employ their limited resources more effectively. Through the CDIPB process (or better yet, training law enforcement personnel how to perform CDIPB themselves), intelligence analysts providing military support can be an important force multiplier in the "war on drugs" by assisting/training LEAs in the process.

Many elements of the information used in the CDIPB process must come from LEA sources. CDIPB is performed in support of law enforcement and is not an independent National Guard operation.

**Lesson(s).** Counterdrug preparation of the battlefield (CDIPB) is a modified form of IPB that can effectively link operations and intelligence during counterdrug efforts. Because the basic IPB process is readily explained in FM 34-130 and other sources, the focus of this section is on those elements that are specific to counterdrug operations.

The first step in CDIPB is **Battlefield Area Evaluation.** This procedure assesses the drug trafficking area in regard to the counterdrug forces and drug traffickers. Like the conventional battlefield, the counterdrug battlefield consists of the area of operations (AO) and the area of interest (AI). The AO is usually the area in which the supported LEA expects to conduct operations. It may coincide with all or part of a LEA's jurisdiction.

Extending beyond the AO, the AI consists of areas in which information on smuggling may be developed or in which activity affecting the operation may occur. For example, an interdiction operation along the southwest border would be concerned with nearby clandestine airfield activity in Mexico even though interdiction efforts would take place only in the U.S. In this instance, potential drug trafficking airfields south of the U.S./Mexico border would be in the AI.

On a smaller scale, an operation may be intended to eradicate a particular marijuana growing area in a rural area. The AO in this case might consist of the marijuana growing area itself. Surrounding road networks that might be used for either counterdrug forces or growers to enter or leave the cultivation site could comprise the AI.

## Threat Evaluation in CDIPB

**Threat Evaluation** entails analysis of drug traffickers using many of the same characteristics used to analyze military forces: operations, tactics, capabilities, equipment, and the areas in

which they operate. A drug trafficker data base is developed to build a picture of the drug trafficking threat. Information to be placed in the data base includes organizational structure, modes of operations, and personal data on known smugglers.

To develop the drug trafficker data base, the intelligence analyst conducts a review of the drug smuggling threat within an area of interest. Sources of information may include: state and local law enforcement data bases and apprehension/seizure reports, El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) reports, U.S. Border Patrol intelligence reports, Drug Enforcement Administration data bases (NADDIS) and reports, FBI data bases (NCIC), U.S. Customs Service data bases (TECS) and reports, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) data bases, DoD data bases (ADNET/Emerald II), open sources, and confidential informants.

**(Military personnel must be cognizant of the legal and policy restrictions that prevent them from collecting or handling some types of information or intelligence. In general, during operations within the United States military personnel cannot specifically target individuals for surveillance. Also, military organizations cannot possess or maintain files on private citizens. In certain instances however, specifically assigned military personnel ["augmentees"] can assist law enforcement agencies with analysis and filing of information on suspects if the supported LEA retains the information. This work is permissible only if the military personnel are providing direct support to a law enforcement agency and the results are not passed on to a military entity.)**

To complete the process of threat evaluation, the analyst creates a drug trafficking incident and situation map (INSITMAP). The INSITMAP provides both an analysis tool and a ready means of briefing the task force commander(s), other law enforcement officials, etc. (If the level of activity in the AI is heavy, the analyst may need to create separate maps to show incidents and the situation.)

The INSITMAP indicates all of the relatively permanent information available on drug trafficking forces, such as known drug load crossing sites, organization boundaries, covert airfields, staging areas, and established smuggling routes. Drug trafficking incidents, the transitory events that are almost always associated with the movement of drug traffickers, are also shown:

--Isolated seizures

--Cumulative seizures by LEAs in a particular area

--Surveillance and scouting by traffickers

--Drug trafficker communications

--Electronic monitoring of law enforcement by traffickers

--Suspected trafficking aircraft landings

Once drug trafficking incidents have been plotted, the INSITMAP provides cumulative historical data that facilitates the identification of smuggling trends and patterns of activity. This information allows the intelligence analyst to make judgments about the relative intensity of drug trafficking in specific areas, the amount of support traffickers receive from the local population, and potential areas for future trafficking activity. If developed properly, the INSITMAP equates to a drug trafficking situational template.

During threat integration intelligence derived from the INSITMAP helps to identify specific target areas of interest (TAI) for interdiction. The INSITMAP may also depict counterdrug force locations and operation plans. If counterdrug force information is shown on this map access should be limited as necessary to maintain OPSEC.

An INSITMAP reference chart is used to record and explain map entries. The chart includes the following information: map symbol used, entry item number, report number of source of information, date and time of activity, description, location, trafficking organization (if known), LEA case number (if applicable), and comments.

## Threat Integration in CDIPB

**Threat Integration** combines the results of threat analysis with the analysis of terrain and weather. The analyst develops a drug trafficking event template and named areas of interest (NAIs). In CDIPB, NAIs are locations where drug trafficking activity or the absence of activity will confirm or deny that trafficking forces are behaving as predicted. Drug trafficking NAIs are depicted on the event template everywhere in the area of interest where significant trafficking events are expected to occur.

Event templating analyzes significant drug trafficking activity and expected smuggling events to provide indicators to the traffickers' movements. By recognizing what the traffickers can do, and comparing it with what they are doing, the analyst can predict what they will do next.

Event templating also enables the intelligence collection manager to develop collection requirements based on probable drug trafficking behavior. Consistent with the intelligence cycle for any operation, priority information requirements (PIR) are identified and used to drive collection planning and management. The PIR for a drug interdiction mission could be:

--What locations are likely to be used by drug traffickers as lookout positions?

--What routes are drug traffickers likely to use?

--What weapons are the drug traffickers likely to possess?

--What electronic collection and countermeasures do the traffickers possess (e.g., scanners, radar detectors, etc.)?

--What threats may counterdrug forces face (e.g., booby traps, natural hazards, etc.)?

--What are the trafficker modes of operations (cultivation methods, trafficking routes/methods, security consciousness, weapons of choice, propensity for violence)?

**Decision Support Templating** identifies areas where significant events and trafficking activities will probably occur and where interdiction targets will appear. Areas along each known trafficking route in the area of interest where drug traffickers will appear as targets for interdiction are identified as target areas of interest (TAI).

In essence, these are locations identified as a good place to make arrests/seizures. Examples include: known drug trafficking river crossing sites, transshipment points, stash sites, drug load pick up points, and clandestine airfields with a history of smuggling use.

Following the selection of TAI, decision points are identified. These relate drug trafficking events to decisions required to execute interdiction operations and indicate the deadline for making for those decisions. A decision to launch an interdiction aircraft, for example, must be made early enough for it to arrive at the traffickers' drop-off point while the traffickers and/or drugs are still there. The decision support template can thus provide the link between intelligence and required actions by the counterdrug force.

## How to Write Better After Action Reports

After actions reports (AARs) are vital to the production of *National Guard Counterdrug Lessons*. To write the most useful AARs, remember that the reader probably won't know the details of your mission.

Focus on "lessons learned"--those things you think would be useful information to other personnel performing or supporting counterdrug operations. For example, **be specific** when reporting on the after action debriefing performed by a counterdrug support element. Merely reporting that you "talked about how things could have been done better" doesn't help other units and organi-zations avoid the things you did wrong and emulate the things you did well. Tell us what those "things" were!

In accordance with NGR (AR) 500-2/NGR (AR) 55-6, National Guard Counterdrug Support Program AARs should be submitted to CNGB, ATTN: NGB-CD, Pentagon Rm 2D374, Washington, D.C. 20310-2500. See *The Counterdrug Coordinator's Handbook* for the format.

**After action reports from organizations/units outside the National Guard are extremely welcome.** An information copy of the AAR you send to your headquarters would be appreciated. Please send them directly to NICI at:

NICI
ATTN: Research & Analysis
P.O. Box 8104
San Luis Obispo, CA 93406-8104

Questions concerning National Guard AARs should be addressed to the Counterdrug Support Division (NGB-CDS) at (703) 756-5850 or DCTN 286-5850.

For questions concerning the material in this publication, please contact the NICI Research and Analysis Division at (805) 549-3968/DCTN 630-9968.

## For Further Information...

***The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI), a federally funded activity of the National Guard Bureau, was established December 12, 1990 by the California National Guard with the approval of the Department of Defense. NICI supports the National Drug Control Strategy by training representatives of law enforcement and military organizations, analyzing tactics and procedures, establishing a repository of lessons learned, and disseminating information on counterdrug-related issues, seminars, and conferences.***

The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI) provides management-level training in the planning and conduct of joint counterdrug operations to both military and law enforcement personnel. The Counterdrug Managers' Course (CMC) is a five-day course presented by NICI approximately twenty times a year. This tuition-free course is designed to enhance the interoperability of military and drug law enforcement agencies. (Students pay only for transportation, lodging, and meals.)

NICI also provides a Drug Prevention and Demand Reduction Course (DPDR) approximately four times a year. This five-day course trains military and law enforcement personnel, public officials, business and community leaders, educators, counselors, and military family support group members to develop effective counterdrug programs within their communities. There is no tuition charged to attend this course. (Students pay only for transportation, lodging, and meals.)

NICI classes are conducted at San Luis Obispo, California and various other sites across the United States. Individuals interested in attending NICI courses should contact NICI student services at (805) 549-3966 or DCTN 630-9966.

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The Research and Analysis (R&A) Division of NICI publishes *National Guard Counterdrug Lessons* approximately twice per year. They also publish a monthly *NICI Bulletin* to provide information to the counterdrug and drug prevention/demand reduction community on drug prevention/demand reduction- and counterdrug-related conferences and seminars. To be placed on the mailing list for *National Guard Counterdrug Lessons* and the *NICI Bulletin*, or to have information on your conference or seminar included in the bulletin, contact the NICI R&A Division at (805) 549-3968 or DSN 630-9968.

The NICI Research and Analysis Division also maintains an extensive library of materials on joint counterdrug operations and general drug policy issues. The Division offers a Request for Information service free of charge to the counterdrug community. Contact them to obtain copies of publications or to ask questions concerning military support to counterdrug operations.