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A R E S P O N S E T O Y O U T H G A N G S
F O R M I D - S I Z E
L A W E N F O R C E M E N T A G E N C I E S

by

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COMMAND COLLEGE CLASS IX

PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING (POST)

147629

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SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

1990

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This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future--creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in this Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

PART I
DEFINING THE FUTURE

How should a mid-size law enforcement agency respond to youth gangs in the 1990's?

PART II
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN

A model plan that details a response to youth gangs for mid-size law enforcement.

PART III
TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN

A description of a management structure for a planned transition from a community with a gang problem to a community without.

A RESPONSE TO YOUTH GANGS
FOR MID-SIZE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the past few years, the issue of youth gangs has been featured on the national agenda. Most media coverage has focused attention on large cities, such as Los Angeles, Chicago and New York. In California, Los Angeles seems to be the hub of youth gang activity. Hardly a day goes by without network news coverage of another drive-by shooting or some other form of gang violence.

The State of California has assembled a number of task forces to address the issue of youth gangs. Their focus has primarily been on youth gang activities in large population centers, such as Los Angeles and the Bay Area.

As we enter the 1990's, mid-size cities not located in a population center are discovering the emergence of youth gangs in their communities. In the context of these mid-size cities, the body of research dealing with police roles and responsibilities is inadequate. Thus, this report will fill the void by focussing on responses that are apropos to mid-size cities.

A futures study was completed to serve as the foundation upon which a strategic plan was built. Through personal interviews conducted in twenty mid-size cities, it was learned that most of the cities had either recently experienced the emergence of a youth gang issue in their community or feared they might. In order to further define the future, a nominal group panel was assembled. It identified five trends and events that would have the most impact on the issue area. Based on an analysis of those trends and events and their cross-impact, two themes became clear. First, communities, especially mid-size ones, will need to treat youth gangs as not just a police problem but a community issue. Secondly, those communities will need to act immediately at the first sign of an emerging youth gang issue in their community. To that end, a strategic plan has been developed.

The strategic plan provides a multi-level comprehensive approach. This approach would emphasize proactively dealing with an emerging youth gang issue in a given community. The three levels of strategy elements are intended to be applied incrementally as the severity and intensity of the problem dictates. They include, graffiti abatement (at public expense in Level II), gang unit deployment (increasing ratio of officers per 100 gang members through Level III), City Council commitment/involvement, education of school officials, zero-tolerance law enforcement, gang activity reporting, parent contact, Criminal Justice System coordination, department top priority, news media involvement, community advisory board, G.I.A.R.Y. program, and a multi-agency task force.

The selection of this strategy was based, not only on the input from the modified policy delphi panel, but, also, on the information obtained in the futures study portion of this report. Law enforcement officials and gang experts emphasized time and again that youth gangs in mid-size California cities require a comprehensive strategic approach, and that any one single method is likely doomed to failure. The multi-level comprehensive plan is extensively described in the strategic management plan portion of this report.

This report concludes with a transition management plan. Through this transition management plan, movement from the present state to the desired future will be accomplished. The transition management plan identifies the critical mass, whose commitment is necessary for the strategic plan to succeed. The transition management plan also describes responsibilities, management structure and supporting technologies. In order to demonstrate that the strategic plan is possible to achieve, the Bard Police Department (pseudonym) is used as a framework upon which the transition management plan is developed. The Bard Police Department is a typical mid-size California law enforcement agency, located anywhere outside the major population centers.

Having completed a futures study and a strategic and transition management plan, the question, "How should a mid-size law enforcement agency respond to youth gangs in the 1990's?" is answered. The youth gang issue will likely be with us for a decade or more. It is hoped that when and if a youth gang issue emerges in a mid-size city, the chief of that law enforcement agency can review this plan, and with few local modifications proceed to implement it. Every attempt has been made to make it practical and realistic. The multi-level strategy is designed to maximize resources and minimize cost. It allows for immediate and quick response, with low level strategy elements that are expedient and highly visible. However, should the youth gang issue intensify, more sophisticated strategy elements can be implemented.

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A RESPONSE TO YOUTH GANGS
FOR MID-SIZE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

ISSUE

HOW SHOULD A MID-SIZE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
RESPOND TO YOUTH GANGS IN THE 1990'S?

I S S U E

HOW SHOULD A MID-SIZE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY RESPOND TO YOUTH GANGS IN THE 1990's?

INTRODUCTION

In the past few years the issue of youth gangs has been featured on the national agenda. Most media coverage has focused attention on large cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago and New York (Newsweek, March 28, 1988, pp. 20-27). On the West Coast, California, and in particular Los Angeles, seems to be the hub of youth gang activity (Western City, April 1989, 5-9). As a public policy issue youth gangs have, in large part, consumed the attention of both law enforcement and public officials. The League of California Cities' monthly publication, Western City, devoted its entire April 1989 issue to the subject of youth gangs. This issue has stimulated renewed research efforts across the country.

In the State of California a number of task forces and councils have been appointed to study and report on youth gangs. Two of the premiere studies in this area are the California Council on Criminal Justice State Task Force on Youth Gang Violence Report 1986 and the California Council on Criminal Justice State Task Force on Gangs and Drugs 1989. Many hours of research and effort have gone into the study of youth gang activities in large metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles. As we enter the 1990's we find that mid-size cities that have not had a long history of gang problems and that are not consumed in densely populated urban areas, such as the Los Angeles basin, are beginning to experience youth gang violence.

In the context of mid-size cities the body of gang literature is inadequate for researching the police role and responses to youth gangs (Needle, 1983, 2).

However, in one national survey, 27 of 60 police departments reported a youth gang presence in their community (Needle, 1983, 8). That survey represented cities in population ranging from 100,000 to 1,000,000 plus. Additionally, a survey of 20 mid-size California cities was conducted. Eighteen of those 20 cities, which are not located within the confines of a large population center, reported a presence of youth gangs (Appendix A).

As evidenced by news media attention, the interest of public officials, and the violence perpetrated by youth gangs, even in mid-size cities, youth gangs are an issue of the 1990's. Mid-size California cities, which range in population from 25,000 to 125,000, will likely see the emergence of gangs in a way not formerly observed. Youth gangs are no longer a phenomenon restricted to inner-cities. Mid-size law enforcement agencies will likely be called upon by their communities to resolve the issue. Such agencies may find themselves rushed into action, but at the same time lacking the resources typically available in large urban centers. Although reports such as the California Gang Violence Suppression Program Guidelines, November 1988, and the State Task Force on Gangs and Drugs Report, January 1989, may prove useful to mid-size cities, they are by their nature and by the recommendations they contain more apropos to large urban centers. This report thus focuses on responses that are apropos to mid-size cities, taking into account their resources and limitations.

DEFINITIONS

The definition of a gang provided in Attorney General John Van de Kamp's Report on Youth Gang Violence in California, reprinted in 1988, is used.

An organization of individuals, normally between the ages of 14 and 24 years. It is loose knit, without structure, and the strongest or boldest member is usually the leader. The gang has a name, claims a territory or neighborhood, is involved in criminal activity, and its members associate on a continuing basis. Their activities include violent assaults against other gangs, as well as committing crimes against the general population. (Specifically divorced from the definition are motorcycle gangs and other highly organized gangs.)

Mid-size cities, for the purpose of the study, are defined essentially as cities ranging in population from 25,000 to 125,000 that are generally not located in a major population center, such as the Los Angeles basin or the Bay Area of California.

The term "respond to" may include such traditional activities such as intelligence and information processing, prevention, enforcement, and follow-up investigation (Huff, 1989, 5). It may also include non-traditional responses, such as graffiti removal, school liaison, community organizing, and leadership with other public agencies.

ABOUT GANGS

Gangs have historically formed according to cultural ancestry. When any ethnic group was at the bottom of the social structure, it formed gangs. The dominant ethnic gangs today are composed of Hispanic, Black and Asian youth. Less well-known, but posing an increasing problem, are White gangs (Gangs in School, 1988, 11-12).

Personal interviews were conducted in 20 mid-size California cities (Appendix A). In those cities where youth gangs were present the majority of gang membership was comprised of Hispanics. While this statistic is not particularly surprising and is typically representative of most California cities, White youth gangs are emerging in 12 of the 20 mid-size cities surveyed (Appendix A).

Gang activity is varied and complex. Youth gangs engage in social, asocial and criminal behaviors. "But even when a gang is involved in a weekend party, a fund-raising car wash, or in a family picnic, the potential for violence and criminal activity is far greater than for any other group of people." (Jackson and McBride, 1986, 20). The interviews conducted as part of this futures study all confirmed Jackson and McBride's contention. On the asocial and criminal side, the activity was generally described as menacing behavior intended to intimidate, aggravated assaults, vandalism usually in the form of graffiti, small-time drug sales, drug abuse, thefts, burglaries and robberies.

The most visible of these activities is graffiti. In addition to serving as a sign post of gang territory, it is often perceived by rival gang members as an invitation or challenge to fight. Property values are often diminished because of the presence of graffiti. It can have an overall impact on a community's economy and quality of life. Highly visible and well-publicized assaults and intimidation behaviors also dramatically affect the community's sense of well-being its quality of life.

These two behaviors alone are often sufficient to cause a significant economic loss to the community. For example, in the City of Santa Maria, California, an

entire shopping center was virtually put out of business by youth gang behaviors.

INTERVIEWS

Personal interviews were completed as one of the tools used in the futures research portion of this report. Twenty mid-size California cities were contacted. Most of the interviews were conducted with law enforcement officers, but in some cases other city officials were contacted. In addition, personal interviews and firsthand observations were conducted in 8 of 20 cities.

Some of the cities were reluctant to provide information, and a pledge of limited anonymity was required to ensure candor. In most cases the reluctance was based on a concern of potential damage to city image. Therefore, the cities surveyed are generally not referred to by name, except for being listed in Appendix A.

Information gained is woven throughout this report and provides a very solid and current source of information.

PAST RESPONSES AND ISSUES

In the past the seriousness of the gang activities was measured, not by prevalence, number of gangs or the number of members in gangs, but by the dimension of their anti-social behavior, and the number and severity of the crimes committed (Needle, 1983, 13). Law enforcement only recognized youth gangs as a serious problem when criminal behaviors became very serious. Law enforcement efforts were for the most part reactive, and responses were limited to arrest and incarceration. Little, if any, preventive measures were implemented. Unless criminal activity posed a serious and imminent threat

outside of the gang's territory, they were essentially ignored. Of course, in the 1940's, 1950's and early 1960's, civil rights had not yet become a significant issue in dealing with youth gangs, therefore, some outdated and now unethical methods were used.

PRESENT RESPONSES AND ISSUES

According to information gained through surveys, gang activity was virtually invisible during the 1970's. However, the 1980's saw a resurgence of the youth gang phenomenon, with some new twists. Compared to gangs of the past contemporary gang members have a great deal more mobility. This is due primarily to the availability of automobiles to even the lowest socio-economic groups and to the efficiency of our roadway system. Even court ordered school busing and desegregation has exacerbated gang conflict. Rival gangs, which are organized around neighborhood turf, now often attend the same high schools as the result of this well-intentioned civil rights effort.

Gangs of today are more indiscriminate in their use of violence. Their membership has blossomed and some of them have even developed into criminal drug trafficking enterprises (School Safety, Fall 1989, 4). As viewed through media accounts, youth from mid-size cities attempt to emulate the activities of their peers in the denser populated urban centers.

Although today's approaches are somewhat more systematic than those of the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's, they still only tend to involve the criminal justice system. It is not yet commonplace to see law enforcement agencies organizing and working cooperatively with community groups.

Many cities are reluctant to admit, and in some cases deny, that they are experiencing the youth gang problem. Image, business development, and other political and economic reasons are at the root of this denial. However, such denial only provides gangs the opportunity to become entrenched. While conducting interviews the author learned that neighboring cities had youth gang problems, but when contacted, some of these cities denied a problem. A visual inspection revealed the presence of youth gangs as evidenced by gang-type graffiti, gang members roaming the streets and obvious gang activity.

Although larger cities can more easily take advantage of grant funds and other discretionary funds, mid-size law enforcement agencies do not often have the flexibility nor the funding sources to easily deal with the youth gang issue.

The media attention is a sub-issue in itself. The media, getting caught up in reporting the news, often create an atmosphere of fear and panic in communities that by comparison do not have a significant gang problem. Some chiefs who were interviewed indicated that this mania created by the media can stampede politicians into action when a strategic approach by law enforcement in the community would better serve the solution.

FUTURE RESPONSES AND ISSUES

Communities, especially mid-size ones, will need to treat youth gangs as not just a police problem but a community issue. Unlike the 1970's and 1980's, the 1990's will see law enforcement become part of the solution rather than be the entire solution. Law enforcement, in its responses, will need to be sensitive to the community image. Overreaction and indiscriminate enforcement may cause a backlash of the minority community and tarnish the overall city image. On the

other hand, continued denial or under-reaction may eventually lead to vigilantism. Law enforcement must take a pro-active stance and, where possible, put responses in place that will mitigate the impact of youth gangs on the community and prevent them from becoming entrenched. At the same time, law enforcement must cooperate with other elements of the public and private sector. Simply aligning itself with the criminal justice system and ignoring other agencies, such as parks and recreation, social services, housing, etc., will not promote a long-term solution.

SUMMARY

The preceding pages were provided as a context and foundation for this report. The remainder of this report is divided into three main parts.

Part I is titled, "Defining the Future." It primarily represents work performed by a "nominal group" in forecasting and analyzing future trends and events through a cross-impact analysis of those trends and events. Three scenarios of the future were created.

Part II, titled, "Strategic Management Plan," provides a model strategic plan designed to make one of the Part I scenarios come true. That model plan is intended for use in mid-size cities which are not located in major population centers.

For the purpose of this study the Bard Police Department has been created as a pseudonym, representing a California city that is approximately 85,000 in population, is not located in a major population center of the state such as Los Angeles, and has an emerging youth gang problem in its community--a problem that

the city council, news media and community at large is becoming increasingly concerned about. In the transition management section of this report the Bard Police Department will be used as the basis for the plan. It is hoped that other cities of similar size with an emerging gang problem will find this study helpful in immediately responding to the gang menace in their communities.

PART I

DEFINING THE FUTURE

PART I -- DEFINING THE FUTURE

Following a review of the literature and personal interviews, a group of ten individuals were brought together to forecast the future. A process used is known as the "nominal group technique" described in a Model for Applied Futures Research (Boucher, 1987). The group, ten members in all, represented municipal law enforcement, state law enforcement, city management, chamber of commerce, school district, clergy and gang experts.

This process was designed to identify and forecast events and trends that would impact the issue area. One week prior to the group meeting, participants were mailed information describing the process and the issue. On the day of the meeting the group was asked to discard, for the purpose of this process, their existing paradigms. They were requested to operate on the following assumptions: (1) they were currently living in a city of mid-size that has no significant youth gang problems, (2) they were not to be biased by media coverage of youth gang violence, and (3) they were not to be influenced by measures, efforts and programs that were currently in operation in nearby communities or in their city of residence.

In all, 26 trends (Appendix B) and 21 events (Appendix C) were considered. Those lists were distilled to a set of five trends and five events. Each of the five events and trends most closely fit the criteria which included realism, impact on the issue area, comprehensiveness and balance. Also in selecting these five trends and events the author took a minimal amount of editorial license in the final decision. That license was based on the author's research, knowledge and experience in the area of youth gangs.

TRENDS

The five trends selected for forecasting were:

1. Extent to Which Government Agencies Cooperate. In identifying this trend the group concluded that government agencies, although on the surface polite to each other, often show little true cooperation on any given issue. To the extent that government agencies cooperate together on the issue of youth gangs and take a collective pursuit for a joint solution, they can and will impact the issue area. One agency or even a handful of agencies will not on their own be able to have significant desired impact. Government cooperation is essential, but the mere establishment of commissions, boards and committees without a specific call to action would be useless. As used in the context of this trend statement, government cooperation is being measured as it relates to the issue area of youth gangs.
2. Level of Graffiti Impact on the Community. In defining this trend statement the group assumed that graffiti typically has a negative impact on the community. In most mid-size California cities the 1970's and early 1980's saw little, if any, graffiti; however, that may change in the 1990's. The negative impact may be seen as a loss in the quality of life, in property values, and in a general sense of safety for the community. The impact of graffiti can damage a community's image, and in some extreme cases its desirability as a place to live and work.

3. Community Intolerance Level for Gang Activity. This trend was identified because the group felt that the community's tolerance of gang activity would have a proportionate impact on the issue. The community that will tolerate the existence of gangs creates an atmosphere where gangs can exist easily. However, if a community's social values are such that gangs are not tolerated as a part of the value structure, then gangs find little room and tolerance for existence. The group felt that most mid-size communities have an intolerant attitude toward youth gangs today and that some level of intolerance is likely to exist in the future. That intolerance might be shown in ways, such as in pressuring the police department to "clean up" gangs, in school policies prohibiting gang dress, and in extreme vigilantism.

4. Extent to Which "Crackdown" Causes Los Angeles Gang Members to Move to Mid-Size California Cities. There is increasing concern that the crackdown and intolerance of gang activity shown by Los Angeles area police agencies may very well cause L.A. gang members to move to outlying and other mid-size California cities. The group felt that this trend may impact the issue area over the course of the next five to ten years.

5. Level of Gang Membership. This trend was identified in order to capture a forecast that would indicate whether or not gang membership would increase or decrease in the future. Certainly the number of gang members statewide and, in particular, in mid-size California cities, has a direct bearing and impact on the issue area.

The group was asked to evaluate each of the trends on a "trend evaluation form." They were asked to forecast the impact of the trend five years ago with a "will be/should be" forecast for five and ten years from now. Once the group completed their initial forecast, a general discussion was held about each of the trends. After that discussion was completed, the group was given an opportunity to revise their final forecast.

The "will be" estimate is the forecast based on the member's knowledge of the area and subjective assumptions. The "should be" estimate is the forecast based on the same assumptions, but with an optimistic outlook, as if some intervention or course correction on the direction of the trend were possible.

The combined results of the group's forecast are depicted on the trend evaluation chart (Table No. 1). "Will be" and "should be" estimates based on the median are shown. In addition, both upper and lower quartile figures are given for each forecast.


Following Table No. 1, each trend is graphed and explained, using the median group composite.

TREND EVALUATION CHART

Table No. 1

TREND STATEMENT	LEVEL OF THE TREND			
	5 Years Ago	Today	5 Years From Now	10 Years From Now
EXTENT TO WHICH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES COOPERATE (T-1)	50 0	100	200 150 100 250 200	300 200 100 300 200
LEVEL OF GRAFFITI IMPACT ON COMMUNITY (T-2)	30 10	100	300 200 100 125 0	300 250 200 50 25 0
COMMUNITY INTOLERANCE LEVEL FOR GANG ACTIVITY (T-3) (Higher number's reflect more intolerance)	60 40	100	200 150 100 400 300	300 200 100 500 300 200
EXTENT TO WHICH "CRACKDOWN" CAUSES L.A. GANG (T-4) MEMBERS TO MOVE TO MID-SIZE CALIFORNIA CITIES	100 80	100	250 200 150 100 100	200 200 200 100 90 80
LEVEL OF GANG MEMBERSHIP (T-5)	30 20	100	200 200 100 50 20	250 200 150 50 35 10


Smaller numbers represent the upper & lower quartile (range of uncertainty)



= Forecasts


EXTENT TO WHICH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES COOPERATE

Table No. 2




Generally, the group agreed that as it pertains to the issue of youth gangs, there was very little cooperation among government agencies five years ago. Even today the group felt that cooperation around the issue of youth gangs is minimal. As they saw, it government agencies are often working in opposition to each other and duplicating efforts. Generally, the group felt that government agencies sometime feel they have "the" approach and are not willing to compromise or negotiate. Also, government agencies have their own priorities which interfere with their flexibility and ability to meet emerging demands. The group's view of the future was more optimistic. They felt that in ten years the cooperation among government agencies would double and, perhaps, even triple if some intervention or course correction were made.

**LEVEL OF GRAFFITI
IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY**




The discussion of the group centered on the importance of this trend. The group felt that the impact graffiti can have on a community could be very significant. They agreed that five years ago the impact felt in most mid-size cities was minimal, and that it would steadily increase during the course of the next ten years to a level two and a half times what it is today. In the context of the defined impact, the group felt that their ten-year projected level was unacceptable, and that it should be far less than it is today. The group was willing to accept the fact that even with the most valiant efforts graffiti may rise slightly during the next five years, but that at the ten-year mark it should have decreased substantially. The range of uncertainty was fairly broad with this trend.

COMMUNITY INTOLERANCE LEVEL FOR GANG ACTIVITY




With the advent of the gang issue and the media attention it draws, the group felt that community sensitivity will be heightened. They believe that social values will become more intolerant of gangs and their menace. As the graph depicts, five years ago the community tolerated more gang activity, in that the community was not as sensitized to the issue, and that the actual occurrence of gang activity in a given community was also less. As depicted in the graph, the group felt that by the year 2000 the community's intolerance toward gang activity will double from what it is today. It was interesting to note that the group expressed that its intolerance should be at a much higher level. When questioned, the group explained that the higher 1995 level is reflective of a "phobic" reaction that would weaken over time.



The group generally felt that today the impact of L.A. gangs being displaced by the crackdown is minimal in most mid-size California cities. It generally agreed that five years ago the impact was even less, and that ten years from now the impact will likely double. The group, in identifying and forecasting this trend, felt that any displacement of L.A. gang members to mid-size cities would have a negative impact on those communities. Its "should be" forecast for the year 2000 would put the impact at less than it is today. The group's concern about this trend is consistent with the sentiment of the general populous that L.A. gangs are to be avoided at nearly all costs. This particular trend generated a great deal of discussion as the group attempted to discern fact from fiction in relationship to the news media accounts of the L.A. gang disbursement. Its concern centered on reports in the media about the Crips and the Bloods infiltrating cities nationwide. In the final analysis the group agreed that for most mid-size cities the impact of Los Angeles' most infamous gangs, the Crips and the Bloods, is minimal today.

LEVEL OF GANG MEMBERSHIP



This trend generated the most lively of discussions within the group, but after its initial ratings and the discussion that followed, the group was able to revise its forecasts which shrank the range of uncertainty for the "will be" forecast. The group forecasted that the level of gang membership would likely double in five years and remain constant through the year 2000. Its "should be" forecast describes an optimistic future with less than half the gang membership in the year 2000 as compared to today. The panel felt that to the extent that future strategies were successful, proliferation of gang membership could be curtailed. The group indicated that the optimistic future not only was desirable, but absolutely necessary if the issue of youth gangs is to be resolved within the next ten years.

EVENTS

The group next focused its attention on forecasting the identified events continuing the use of the nominal group technique. The five events selected for forecasting were as follows:

1. Public Fear Generating Incident Occurs. This event title was created to consolidate a number of individual fear-generating incidents that the group identified. Initially listed on the event identification chart were such things as a drive by shooting or a major gang fight at a local high school or some other single incident that would likely receive heavy news media coverage. The group felt this type of event would cause a significant amount of fear in a community and, perhaps, even some overreaction by political figures and perhaps even government agencies.
2. Implementation of an Effective Graffiti-Abatement Program. In identifying this event the group defined an effective program as one that would clean graffiti from both public and private property within 48 hours of report. Although the group suggested that some organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce or local Realtors Association might fund such a program, the group did not settle on any one funding source for the purposes of forecasting. The group felt such a program could even be funded with public funds.
3. A Community Advisory Board is Formed. This event is defined as a community-based board of private individuals and organizations whose purpose is the issue of youth gangs. The group envisioned

that such a board could likely be made up of a variety of ethnic groups, clergy, neighborhood councils and perhaps even some service organizations such as the Salvation Army, Boys' and Girls' Club, YMCA, etc. The group envisioned its mission as that of outreach to gang-involved youths and those youth that are at risk of becoming involved. It could at times develop an adversary relationship with government agencies responsible for dealing with youth gang problems, and might serve in the capacity of critically reviewing law enforcement and other agency responses to the youth gang problem. The nominal group felt that when initially formed the community advisory board would not have a desire to become adversaries, but may over the course of time develop that response. On the other hand the nominal group felt that the advisory board might serve as a catalyst for change and perhaps even pave the way for additional resources to become available for use on the problem. The nominal group also felt such a board might be able to assume a leadership role in directing the long-range efforts of the community toward the youth gang issue.

4. Youth Gang Problems Cause a Major Economic Loss Incident. In defining this issue the panel was describing an event or series of events that would "dry up" a major revenue source to the community. As an example, gang violence at a local shopping center causes merchants there to close up shop. Such an occurrence in a mid-size city would create a number of significant economic impacts on the community. They would include a loss of jobs, bankruptcies, loss of tax revenue to the city and other economic impacts. Like event

number one, the group consolidated the number of single and specific examples of an economic loss event under this major title.

5. A Multi-Agency Task Force Is Formed. The group were of the opinion that the formation of a multi-agency task force would have significant impact on other issues and trends. By the term "multi-agency task force" the group included only law enforcement agencies; however, they did not preclude the inclusion of other agencies, such as schools, parks and recreation, etc. The mission of the identified task force would focus on the youth gang issue.

Following the identification and definition of each event the nominal group members were asked to forecast probabilities for each event. The following chart contains the medians of the group's responses:

Table No. 7

EVENT EVALUATION CHART

EVENT STATEMENT	Probability			Impact on Issue Area If event occurred	
	Year Probability first exceeds zero	Five years from now (0-100)	Ten years from now (0-100)	Positive (0-10)	Negative (0-10)
Fear Generating Incident	'90	65	90	6.5	6.5
Graffiti Abatement Program	'91	55	78	8.5	2
Community Advisory Board Formed	'92	10	23	7.5	1.5
Economic Loss	'90	15	25	Ø	8
Multi Agency Task Force	'92	65	70	8	1

Data is reflective of group medians

Like the process for the trend evaluation, the members made their own individual forecasts and then discussed them. At the conclusion of the discussion the nominal group was allowed to revise its probability estimates. In reviewing the group's responses, the author finds it notable that the group forecasted that the probability of all events first exceeds zero within the next two years. It is also important to note that two of the events will probably not occur. The group forecast the probability of both a community advisory board forming and gangs causing an economic loss as "improbable." Most of the events had both a positive and negative potential impact on the issue area indicating that there is a silver lining in every cloud. The fear-generating event (number one) had by far the highest probability of occurrence, being forecast at a 90 percent probability within the next ten years from now. The group felt that there was a 78 percent chance that an effective graffiti-removal program would be formed, and an almost equally high probability that a multi-agency task force would be formed within the ten-year period.

CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS

The group next completed a cross-impact analysis of each event on the other events and trends. The results of their evaluation were briefly shared publicly in the group setting and then group members were given the opportunity to revise their individual cross-impact ratings. The results of that group cross-impact evaluation are reported on Table No. 8.

CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION CHART

Table No. 8

Suppose that this event actually occurred

How would the probability of the events shown below be affected?

How would the level of these trends be affected?

	Fear Generating Event	Graffiti Abatement Program	Community Advisory Board	Economic Loss Incident	Multi-Agency Task Force	Govt. Agen. Coop.	Level of Graf. Impact	Comm. Intol. Level	L.A. Gangs Displ.	Level of Gang Membership
These #'s reflect forecast before cross-impact	90	78	23	25	70	200	250	200	200	200
Fear Generating Event	X	---	Increase to 65%	Increase to 35%	Increase to 80%	Incr. 30%	Incr. 30%	Incr. 50%	---	Increase 10%
Graffiti Abatement Program	Decrease to 80%	X	---	Decrease to 15%	---	---	Decr. 90%	---	---	---
Community Advisory Board	Decrease to 80%	---	X	---	---	Incr. 25%	---	Incr. 25%	---	Decrease 10%
Economic Loss Incident	---	Increase to 90%	Increase to 35%	X	Increase to 80%	Incr. 30%	---	Incr. 50%	---	---
Multi-Agency Task Force	Decrease to 80%	Increase to 90%	---	Decrease to 15%	X	Incr. 50%	---	---	Decr. 50%	Decrease 60%

CROSS-IMPACT DISCUSSION

The following is a brief discussion of each event and its impact on the other events and trends. The comments made will focus only on those impacts that appear to be significant.

1. A Public Fear-Generating Incident Occurs. This event is considered the leading actor event of the series. It impacted seven out of nine possible cells. It more than doubled the probability that a community advisory board would be formed, and it had some significant impact on both the probability that the community would experience an economical loss incident and that a multi-agency task force would be formed. The only trend that this event would not impact would be that of displacing L.A. gangs to the mid-size California cities.

In general, the group felt that of all the events the fear-generating event was the least controllable and would by far have the most significant impact on the issue area. It would propel to the forefront the youth gang issue in a mid-size city. It could impact the economy of a city, the level of graffiti impact, and the gang membership in a community. It could deteriorate a community's sense of safety and well-being and would certainly diminish the quality of life.

2. Implementation of an Effective Graffiti Removal Program. Of the five events this event had the least impact on the other

events and trends, however, it did decrease the likelihood of a fear-generating event and an economic loss event from occurring. It also decreased the level of impact of graffiti on a community by 90 percent.

The group felt, by and large, that such a program would have an overall beneficial effect on the issue area and that it should be pursued as a policy consideration.

3. A Community Advisory Board is Formed. This event affected four out of the nine cells of the cross impact evaluation. It was one of two events that would positively impact the level of gang membership and would decrease the likelihood of a fear-generating event from occurring in a community. It would increase the level of cooperation among government agencies in that it would likely force or at least serve as a catalyst to such cooperation. The group also felt that it would raise the level of the community's intolerance to youth gangs.

4. Youth Gang Problems Cause a Major Economic Loss Incident. This event impacted five of the nine cells of the cross-impact evaluation. It would increase the likelihood that a graffiti-removal program would be implemented. It would also increase the likelihood that a community advisory board and a multi-agency task force would be formed. Such an economic loss to a community would receive a great deal of media attention and might, like event number one, "Fear-Generating Event," cause a public outcry and a call to arms from the community.

The group believed that such an event would increase the level of government agency cooperation by 30 percent and further cement the community's intolerance to gang activity.

5. A Multi-Agency Task Force is Formed. The formation of such a multi-agency task force would likely decrease the probability of a fear-generating event from occurring. It would further serve as a catalyst to the potential for a graffiti-removal program to be implemented and would decrease the likelihood of an economic-loss event from occurring. It would also increase the level of government agency cooperation and decrease the likelihood that L.A. gangs would be displaced into a mid-size California city. It would also decrease the level of gang membership. This event, "A Multi-Agency Task Force is Formed," is also considered an actor event and impacted six of the nine cells.

REACTORS

Government agency cooperation was considered the highest reactor trend. Four of the events caused the level of government cooperation to increase. The group felt that it would take such events to serve as a catalyst to cause government agencies to cooperate over the issue of youth gangs. As stated earlier in this paper, government agencies usually have their own missions and priorities and are not flexible because of the bureaucracy that they are formed from. Other reactor events and trends included: fear-generating event and economic-loss event, the

extent to which communities tolerated gang activity, and the level of gang membership.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

In the words of Wayne Boucher, from his Miscellaneous Tips on Forecasting, "A futures study that does not include a policy analysis is probably a waste of time." To that end the nominal group was asked to reflect upon the forecast of the events and trends and their cross-impacts. It was asked to pay particular attention to the actor events and those events and trends that appear to be reactors. It was also instructed to closely examine those events and trends that would have major impact on the issue area. After a brief period of reflection the group was asked to brainstorm possible policy considerations with the notion that these considerations would prove useful in developing a strategic management plan.

The group provided over 35 possible policy considerations relating to areas such as: community, prevention, intervention and enforcement. These policy considerations were saved for possible use in the strategic plan section. The specific possible policy considerations are listed in Appendix D.

SCENARIOS

In order to further integrate and synthesize the data derived from the nominal group forecast, three scenarios have been developed. These scenarios provide ways of looking at different futures and serve as a starting point from which to develop a strategic management plan.

Exploratory Scenario

Jeff Chester pushes the five-page document across the mayor's desk. The document, still in rough draft form, was prepared by Chester who serves as the mayor's administrative assistant. Several weeks ago the mayor, who also chairs the city council's public safety committee, asked Jeff to provide the committee with an analysis of what programs, policies and actions had been implemented to deal with the youth gang issue since 1990. The request was spawned by a call to the mayor from the Chamber of Commerce. The report covers the intervening ten years.

Jeff explained to the mayor that the youth gang problem first became an issue in the community nearly ten years ago. The then city manager, Daniel Moraga, and Police Chief Mark Steinberg, did not view the gang issue as a serious community problem. Of course there had been the widespread media coverage of youth gang violence in the Los Angeles Basin and other large population centers in Southern California, and even Hollywood had joined the bandwagon by producing a movie called, Colors. The nation as a whole became somewhat concerned about the potential menace, but the citizens of Bard felt they were sufficiently insulated by distance from Los Angeles and San Francisco.

The report recounts that on December 1, 1990 a drive-by shooting occurred at Bard High School. Three people were seriously injured, and the suspects were arrested some months later. Because of that incident the police chief, in cooperation with the county sheriff, formed a multi-agency task force, which included members from both agencies, as well as probation, parole and the district attorney's office. The task force, scheduled to meet monthly, ran out of steam within the first four months and has not met since. Jeff was quick to point out to the

mayor that although the task force quit meeting, it did develop a spirit of cooperation among the agencies that continued for some time as they dealt with the issue of youth gangs. A graffiti-removal program was also implemented in the spring of 1994, in response to chronic complaints from the Bard Realtors' Association and the Chamber of Commerce. The program, which had a goal of removing all graffiti within 48 hours of report, actually removed only 50 percent of the reported graffiti within two weeks of report. Funding for the program was scarce and relied heavily on the cooperation of private property owners. By 1996 the graffiti hot line number was disconnected from city hall.

The drive-by shooting at the high school and two other similar fear-generating events brought about, at least on the surface, an increased cooperation among other government agencies. Department and agency heads not wanting to be outdone, all pledged their cooperation and active support of any programs that would be helpful in mitigating or eliminating the gang menace. Other priorities soon got in the way, and after a few months of typical committee meetings, the interest waned and disappeared.

In preparation for his report to the mayor, Chester had taken a "look around town." Chester took a series of photographs of locations where graffiti was highly visible from public thoroughfares and roadways. Even the West End Shopping Center, which had been built some seven years before, showed a significant amount of graffiti. Other buildings around town had also been scrawled on by local gangs and, in part, was responsible for the recent complaints from the Realtors' Association and Chamber of Commerce.

Chester's best estimate of gang membership was that it had doubled since 1990. That increase was not alarming, but added substantially to the current threat and

menace of gangs. The hardest hit by the membership were a few of the local neighborhoods and, of course, the schools.

Although during this same time period the community's intolerance had virtually doubled, it was still barely one peg above denial. A few of the feared Los Angeles gangs had moved into the city of Bard, but they had not yet established a significant foothold, nor had they carved out any territory.

Chester concluded his briefing to the mayor by suggesting that the mayor renew the city's efforts and interest in the youth gang problem.

Normative Scenario

Officer Machele slowly nosed his black and white unit out of the alley onto Bard Lane. In the distance he heard a child's voice calling, "Officer! Officer!" He turned and looked and saw the young Hispanic lad with bright shining eyes and smiling face flagging him desperately. Machele stopped the black and white and awaited the young man's arrival. Machele, who had worked this beat for more than a decade, remembered the day that he would avoid traveling Bard Lane unless accompanied by at least one other officer. This used to be the center for gang activity on his beat. Bard had never had a gang problem of the nature and scope found in such places as Los Angeles, Fresno, Sacramento or the Bay Area, but it did have its local home-grown gang members that terrorized and intimidated the neighborhoods from which they came.

Ten years ago the police department recognized youth gangs as an emerging issue for the decade. They had developed a strategic plan in 1990 that had all but eliminated the gang menace. Although things looked bright in Bard now, the path

to the current state was not without its unpleasantness. A drive-by shooting had occurred at a local high school in the early 1990's. It was closely followed by the stabbing death of one of the "Bard Gangsters" by a rival gang member. Following those two fear-generating incidents the police department developed a strategic plan that was adopted by the city council. That plan was heralded as innovative and futuristic by the community at large and the city council in particular. The plan put together a number of strategy elements that were cost effective, politically sound and well received. It generated a great deal of cooperation among government agencies and promoted public-private partnerships to fund a graffiti-abatement program.

Before leaving the young boy, Machele handed him a coloring book with the title, I am Not a G.I.A.R.Y. The term "G.I.A.R.Y." stood for "Gang-Involved At-Risk Youth." The G.I.A.R.Y. program, which combined resources from the police department, parks and recreation and several other community organizations including the Boys' and Girls' Club and the YMCA, in conjunction with the school district, in an all out prevention and education effort aimed at reducing gang involvement and membership. Because of this program, the community's intolerance to gang activity and the zero tolerance approach implemented by the police department, gang membership had declined to less than half of what it was in 1990. There were so few gang members in the city of Bard that their presence was hardly noticeable. Graffiti was virtually wiped out and L.A. gangs, even though they had tried, could not establish a foothold in the city.

Officer Machele had played a strong and important role in the efforts advanced during the past decade. He wore his uniform and badge proudly, and he justly deserved the admiring look the young man gave him as he checked back into service.

Hypothetical Scenario

Chief Mark Steinberg stares across his desk at his calendar. The page is open to October 31, 1998. He has just returned from a four-week, all-expense-paid trip to the Soviet Union. Chief Steinberg is a recognized expert in police administration and is very active in national and international circles. His assistant chief is briefing him on the testimony received at a Bard City Council meeting on youth gang problems.

Some anxiety slowly crept forward as Chief Steinberg reflected on the newspaper accounts of gang incidents that occurred during his absence. In the past four weeks there were seven significant gang incidents, not the least of which was a drive-by shooting at Bard High School, where four innocent students were gunned down and seriously injured. The article that gave him the most concern and received front-page coverage was headlined, "West End Shopping Center Closes." Steinberg realized that the city of Bard's redevelopment district had sunk several million dollars into that shopping center just nine years ago. It had been an immediate success, but recent gang-related incidents at the shopping center and the attendant graffiti created a lack of business and eventually the shopping center's closure.

Steinberg was somewhat aggravated that the council had not taken a firmer stand sooner. In fact, former council members had virtually denied the existence of a gang problem in the city of Bard, and they encouraged Chief Steinberg's low key news media releases. It appeared the new council had a change of heart and had held a special hearing during his absence. Steinberg's assistant chief continued with a brief summary of the significant testimony.

City Manager Bob Moraga. Dresser reported to the council that the city would lose nearly one million dollars in tax revenue per annum because of the West End Shopping Center closure. During the past ten years the city had spent approximately \$200,000 on the youth gang problem, and he tried to assure them that was believed to be sufficient. Moraga was questioned in detail on the planning efforts by the city and his seeming lack of commitment to the issue. Moraga appeared defensive, and that posture came across in his testimony.

Ruben Bustillos. Bustillos, chairman of a local Hispanic activist group, reported to the council that it was his contention that the city had all but ignored its duties in response to the youth gang issue. He placed all blame on City Manager Moraga, Police Chief Steinberg and former city council members. He recounted to them his prior attempts to get some action on the issue. It seemed that Bustillos had more than one receptive ear on the council.

Dorothy Long. Long, President of the Bard Chamber of Commerce, reported the chamber's concern over the issue of youth gangs in the City of Bard. Long indicated that the chamber was appalled at the lack of action on the part of the city council and various city departments and that the chamber was now demanding action. Long presented a long list of statistics, all of which showed an overall economic decline during the past eight years when the rest of the county was on an upswing, and she attributed most of this decline to the city's failure to deal effectively with the youth gang menace. Long told the council that it had let this problem get out of hand to the point that the

Chamber has not been able to attract any new business starts in the city of Bard for the past six months.

Bruce Roberts. Roberts, Superintendent of Schools, reported a significant increase in youth gang violence on school campuses during the past five years. Roberts went on to advise the council that repeated pleas for help by school district officials to the Bard Police Department had been met with only the most haphazard response. It was clear by his testimony that the Bard Unified School District, too, was not pleased with the city's response.

Virgil Cribbs. Cribbs, representing "M.A.H." (Mad as Hell), braced the city council for the city's lack of action on the gang problem. Cribbs informed the council that M.A.H. would take care of the problem themselves, if swift and effective action was not taken immediately.

The assistant chief concluded his summaries of testimony, most of which took the position that the city of Bard and, in particular, the police department had not done a sufficient job in dealing with the gang issue. Some, in fact, accused the department of refusing to accept its role in solving the gang problem. The assistant chief advised Steinberg that although Steinberg did his best in the chief's absence he could neither head off the hearing nor satisfy the council with his own testimony. Several minutes went by and after receiving no response from Chief Steinberg the assistant chief left the office.

SUMMARY

The future has now been defined. Events and trends that will impact the issue of "How Should a Mid-Size Law Enforcement Agency Respond to Youth Gangs in the 1990's" have been identified and forecast. A cross-impact analysis of those events on the over events and trends has been completed, which aided in the development of policy considerations. Based on the analysis thus far, three scenarios were developed, one of which, the normative scenario, will serve as the basis for the strategic plan which will be developed in the next section.

PART II

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN

PART II -- STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN

The strategic management section of this report is intended to provide a blueprint or guideline that a mid-size law enforcement agency, faced with an emerging gang issue, could implement in its community. In the first section of this report a thorough futures study on the issue of, "How Should a Mid-Size Law Enforcement Agency Respond to Youth Gangs?" was completed. That futures study included a thorough identification of the issue, scanning of literature, identification of trends and events that would have impact on the issue area, interviews and a cross-impact analysis. In addition, three scenarios were developed. For the purpose of this study, the normative scenario has been selected to represent the desired future. The purpose of this plan is to make that scenario come true. Contained within that scenario are specific references to the trends and events that were identified in the futures study. That scenario also describes a point in the future of a mid-size California city named "Bard" that had at one time experienced a youth gang problem. Through a deliberate, measured and well-coordinated strategy the youth gang problem was virtually eliminated.

This strategic management plan contains a mission statement, a situational analysis, a stakeholder analysis, strategy analysis and recommendation, and concludes with an implementation plan.

In keeping with the desire to have this report serve as a plan that could be implemented in a mid-size California city experiencing the emergence of a gang problem, every attempt has been made to keep this report "down to earth." It is intended to be realistic, feasible, politically sound, cost effective and futures-oriented.

MISSION

Nearly every California law enforcement agency has a mission statement. Some display it boldly in the lobby of their facility, others have codified it as a section of their police manual, and still others print it in various publications the department produces. Most law enforcement agencies generally agree that their mission (MACRO) is to protect life, prevent crime, ensure public safety and serve their community. Some mission statements include philosophical mention of fair and impartial enforcement of the law, as well as preservation of individual liberties and freedoms. Mission statements, in order to be effective, must be known by those who are responsible to carry them out. They are essential to ensure shared purposes and common goals for those in the organization.

For the purpose of this study, a MICRO mission statement has been developed that focuses narrowly on the issue of how should a mid-size law enforcement agency respond to youth gangs in the 1990's. It is as follows:

To eliminate, or at least mitigate the impact of youth gangs on the community's quality of life, economic security, image, and sense of security and safety by its citizens. This must be accomplished while preserving the integrity of the department and the full support of elected officials and the community.

Although this mission is not a lofty pie in the sky vision, it will require the full commitment of a law enforcement agency that is experiencing the emergence of a youth gang issue in its community.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

As a necessary step in the formulation of a strategic plan, an analysis of the situation that a mid-size law enforcement agency has found itself in must be made. In the first portion of this report, the Futures Study, a careful analysis of the current situation in California, and for that matter the nation, was described. That description was based on interviews and literature scanning. Following that description, a nominal group panel helped further to define the situation by describing potential future events and trends that might impact on the issue area. As a third element in defining and describing the situation a "wots up analysis" was completed that focuses in on both the external and internal environment that a mid-size law enforcement agency currently dealing with a youth gang problem or youth gangs as an emerging issue in their community.

WOTS UP

The "Wots Up Analysis" was completed by a panel of individuals representing both law enforcement and the community. Every attempt was made by the panel to identify and analyze the internal and external environment in terms of what is typical of most mid-size California law enforcement agencies. A Wots Up analysis serves as a framework for a situation audit. It forces an organization to think about the impact of previously identified environment trends and events: the impacts in terms of being threats to the organization or opportunities the organization can seize and use advantageously. It requires the organization to do a thorough analysis of its strengths and weaknesses related to the strategic issue.

The Wots Up panel was provided with the list of trends and events identified in the futures study portion of this report. It was also provided with the normative scenario and a list of other factors it should consider in performing its analysis. The panel focused first on threats and opportunities in the external environment and, secondly, on the strengths and weaknesses of the internal environment (the organization).

External Environment

The panel viewed its external environment in the context of a mid-size California law enforcement city. Like the city of Bard (pseudonym described in the first portion of this report) the panel operated from the assumption that the community had identified the emergence of youth gangs as an issue and point of concern within the community. It further assumed that some action on the part of the law enforcement agency was required because of the fear in the community and concern expressed by elected officials, etc. After reviewing the trends and events identified in the futures study portion of this report, the normative scenario and other factors, the panel offered the following list of opportunities.

Opportunities...

1. Unite Criminal Justice System Around Common Issue. The panel felt that the youth gang issue could serve as an opportunity to unite the criminal justice system around a common issue. The criminal justice system approach to its mission is often fragmented and its parts often do not have clearly identified shared goals and purposes. To some extent each part operates autonomously and, in some cases, at cross purposes. The

panel felt that the threat offered by youth gangs might serve as a catalyst to unite this fragmented system.

2. Gain Support From Community through Fight with the Common Enemy. Mid-size communities often, like the criminal justice system that serves them, are fragmented and have no shared purpose. However, as part of "the American way" communities will often unite to fight a common enemy. The panel felt this issue might serve that purpose.

3. Opportunity for Police Department to Become A Leader. Although this report postures the notion that youth gangs are not a police problem, but a "community issue" the panel felt that the law enforcement agency of a mid-size community would necessarily have to take the lead or spearhead the efforts of the community. In that role, the police department would gain the reputation as a community leader.

4. Opportunity for Police Department to Effect Other Issues. As a result of its spearheading and leading the community's effort around the issue of youth gangs, the police department may get into a position of being able to effect other community issues downstream. Once a department is viewed as a community leader, it often has the leverage to effect other issues in its concern.

Threats...

1. Negative Public Relations by Police Department Overreaction.

The panel felt that any effective plan designed to combat youth gangs might place a law enforcement agency in a position of operating on a very fine line between proper and over reaction. If the department's activity was viewed by the community as coming down on the overreaction side, the department's public relations would suffer.

2. Negative Economic Impact on the Community. A youth gang

problem in any community has the potential of exacting a toll on the economic health of the community. The panel felt that a significant economic loss could pose a serious threat to any community.

3. Backlash of Minority Community. If the actions taken by the

police department and community at large was viewed as oppressive, the minority community effected might protest. Should such a backlash occur the success of the plan in the community in general may suffer.

4. Police Could Fail. The panel felt that although the issue of

youth gangs is not just a police problem, the community often views the police department as the "cure all" when social issues become concerns. The community often holds the police, not only responsible for the resolution of the issue, but accountable. A police department using an unrealistic

and ineffective plan could fail. The consequences of failure could be significant for the agency, department head, and community at large.

Internal Environment

The second phase of the Wots Up analysis entailed an examination of the organization's internal strengths and weaknesses. The panel's focus was a mid-size law enforcement agency typical of those found in California matching the description of the city of Bard (pseudonym). Although the panel identified many strengths and weaknesses it distilled them to those provided below.

Strengths...

1. Good Quality Employees. The panel felt that, particularly in California, mid-size law enforcement agencies are able to attract top quality employees. By virtue of the selection requirements imposed by state mandate and training available, law enforcement employees are the very best.
2. Police Departments Have Established Networks with other Agencies and Community Groups. The panel felt in order to be effective with any plan, a strong network with other agencies and community groups would be necessary. Police departments by their nature, typically have formed networks within the criminal justice system and with community groups at large. Those networks will prove valuable in the implementation of the plan.

3. The Police Departments Have Intelligence and Information Networks. Mid-size law enforcement agencies typically have well developed, intelligence and information networks. They meet with, confer with and exchange information with other law enforcement agencies throughout the state and typically have good internal filing and information sharing processes.

4. Police Departments Can Be Creative in Approaches. Because of their top quality personnel and quality training made possible by the Commission on Peace officer Standards and Training, police departments often are capable of developing extremely creative approaches to problems. Although they do not always use this ability and sometimes get mired in tradition it is present.

5. Communities Trust Police Departments for Solutions. Mid-size law enforcement agencies are generally trusted by their communities. The communities often look towards the police to solve social issues. By virtue of this unique position, police departments have the built in support from the community at large to take necessary and effective action in dealing with the youth gang issue.

Weaknesses...

1. Bureaucracy Makes Fast, Flexible Responses Difficult. Although police departments typically employ intelligent,

well-trained personnel, they are often steeped in tradition and bureaucracy. That tradition and bureaucracy makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to respond to emerging issues pro-actively. It is difficult for them to be fast, flexible and focused.

2. Susceptible to Political Interference Around This Issue. The panel felt that the issue of youth gangs is a very sensitive issue to the community. Because of that sensitivity, political figures such as, city councils, would have a unique and strong interest. That interest could easily turn to interference. And stimulate overreaction or perhaps even under-reaction by the police department.

3. Difficulty in Acquiring Total Department Commitment to Priority. Law enforcement agencies generally are overworked and understaffed. Divisions and units have a high degree of autonomy and frequently resist a change in priorities. The panel recognized that in order to be effective in implementing any plan designed to mitigate or eliminate youth gangs in a community, the total department must be committed. The panel further recognized that full commitment would be difficult to achieve.

4. Poor Strategic Planning. Mid-size California law enforcement agencies pride themselves on their tactical planning. They typically are excellent in this arena. Only in recent years has planning strategically been emphasized. Strategic

planning is time consuming on the front end and often thought of as a last resort instead of the first.

5. May Deny Problem to Avoid Upsetting Existing Priorities or to Preserve the City Image. Following the theme of being overworked and underpaid, most mid-size law enforcement agencies have more than enough to do without dealing with a youth gang problem. Law enforcement agencies might find it more convenient and expedient to deny the existence of a real problem. Therefore, they could continue to work on existing priorities without interruption or redirection. Pressure through city council and city management to deny or "down play" the youth gang issue may be felt and be motivated by a desire to preserve the city image.

In general, the Wots Up panel felt that the external and internal environment would be conducive to a mid-size law enforcement agency implementing an effective strategic plan to deal with the issue of youth gangs. It generally felt that society would support any approach short of "Gestapo" tactics that would improve upon the quality of life and prevent economic loss to the community. The panel also felt that although mid-size law enforcement agencies may find it difficult to plan strategically, they certainly have the capabilities to develop and implement plans.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

In order to develop an adequate and responsive strategic plan, a stakeholder analysis must be completed. Stakeholders are individuals, groups or organizations who are either impacted by what the organization does, or are able to impact the organization, or are concerned about the issue and/or the organization. Law enforcement agencies must accept the fact that they do not operate in a vacuum. Its policies have implications outside the organization and "outsiders" can impact policy choices and implementation.

To facilitate the stakeholder analysis, the Strategic Assumption and Surfacing Technique (SAST) was used. A panel representing both law enforcement and the community was convened to identify the most significant stakeholders around the issue of youth gangs and then to identify assumptions each of the stakeholders would hold. It was then asked to evaluate the importance of the assumption stakeholder to the organization and the issue, and the certainty that the assigned assumption was, in fact, correct. The panel initially identified eighteen stakeholders and then distilled this list to the ten they felt most significant. Those ten appear below, along with the assumptions identified by the SAST panel.

Stakeholders...

1. Parents

- A. Want safe environment for their children
- B. Desire input into plans that affect their children

2. Schools

- A. Safe environment for learning
- B. Want law enforcement's help on their terms

3. Activist Groups (Such as NAACP or ACLU)

- A. Protect civil rights of their constituents
- B. Want publicity for their issue

4. City Council

- A. Political survival (re-election)
- B. Safety for the community at large and its constituents
- C. Good image for the community

5. Neighborhood Groups

- A. Safe environment and services to ensure it
- B. Input into plans that affect them

6. Local Politicians

(Excluding city council, i.e., state and federal legislators, etc.)

- A. Political survival
- B. Please their constituents

7. Chamber of Commerce

- A. Maintain environment for economic growth
- B. Desires good image for the community

8. Local Criminal Justice System Elements

- A. Will be concerned about impact on their priorities and workload
- B. Will want to look "tough on gangs"
- C. May take advantage of issue to get more resources

9. Media

- A. Want sensational information to sell its product


10. Clergy

- A. Desire fair, just and moral approach to issue and would be willing to help

Once the SAST panel identified the stakeholders and assumptions they might hold, it was asked to rate the importance of the assumption's stakeholder and the certainty of the assumption. Those ratings are reflected in the Stakeholder Assumption Map (Table No. 9).

STAKEHOLDER ASSUMPTION MAP

Table No. 9



1 Parents

2 Schools

3 Activist Groups

4 City Council

5 Neighborhood Groups

6 Local Politicians

7 Chamber of Commerce

8 Local Criminal Justice System

9 Media

10 Clergy

In its analysis and identification of stakeholders the SAST panel also concluded that a snaildarter could emerge once a strategy was developed and implemented. A snaildarter is an individual or group that seemingly would have little interest or impact on the issue area, but once a plan has been developed and implemented could come forward and interfere or perhaps even scuttle efforts. After due consideration the SAST panel identified two potential snaildarters which are listed below with their potential assumptions:

Snaildarters...

1. Nearby Law Enforcement Agencies

- A. May fear displacement of youth gang members into their communities
- B. May be concerned about being forced into action and thus disrupting their current priorities

2. Other City Departments

- A. May fear some mandatory involvement on their part in resolving the gang issue
- B. May see the law enforcement agency's effort as attempt to unfairly gain a budget advantage

These stakeholders and snaildarters must be considered in developing an effective strategic plan to deal with the issue of youth gangs. Some negotiation and certainly coordination and involvement will likely be necessary.

STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

The next step in the strategic management portion of this report is to develop alternative strategies and, finally, select what appears to be the most desirable and feasible. To accomplish this task a "modified policy delphi" was completed. A panel of individuals representing both law enforcement and the community was convened. The objective of the panel was to ensure that a variety of alternative strategies designed to address the strategic issue of, "How Should a Mid-Size Law Enforcement Agency Respond to the Issue of Youth Gangs in the 1990's?" were identified and explored. The panel identified nine strategic alternatives. It was then asked to analyze and evaluate the feasibility and desirability of each alternative. From that analysis the top two alternatives and the most polarized alternatives were selected for complete strategic analysis.

STRATEGIES IDENTIFIED BY MODIFIED POLICY DELPHI PANEL

The following is a list of the nine strategies identified by the group. Although each of the strategies were discussed in length, their definition is abbreviated here.

1. Criminal Justice Task Force. Coordinated criminal justice approach emphasizing the use of a multi-agency task force, zero tolerance enforcement and prosecution, arrest, incarceration and intervention.
2. Media Campaign. Intense multi-media campaign emphasizing public education, gaining support for youth gang efforts,

securing community's assistance with suggestions on how the community can help itself.

3. Graffiti Abatement Program. Graffiti abatement program emphasizing timely removal of graffiti from both public and private property. Designed to deny territorial markers and improve image of the community. The program envisions the use of both public and private funds.

4. Problem Specific Enforcement. Problem specific approach emphasizing the focus on a single gang or single neighborhood in an all out effort to eliminate or mitigate the impact of a specific youth gang or the impact of gangs on a specific neighborhood. This approach emphasizes primarily enforcement and graffiti cleanup.

5. G.I.A.R.Y. Program. Youth outreach program emphasizing a comprehensive approach by both parks and recreation, schools and other social services addressing gang-involved or at risk youth (G.I.A.R.Y.). This approach would include outreach, alternative activities, self-esteem enhancement, reduction of peer pressure, etc.

6. Community Advisory Group. Develop a community advisory group to deal comprehensively with the issue. This approach would emphasize that a group comprised of community members be established to serve as the governing body or spearhead for any efforts in the gang area. Although the law enforcement

agency may be represented as a member of the group, it would primarily serve as one of the resources available.

7. Youth Gang Commission. Form an officially commissioned agency with a budget to oversee a multi-agency approach to the youth gang issue much like a community development agency. This newly formed agency would have limited regulatory and political oversight.

8. Legislative Committee. Form an ad hoc committee to identify and pass legislation that would impact on the gang issue. This approach would emphasize gaining support of local, county and state legislators in the authoring and sponsoring of bills that would impact on the youth gang issue.

9. Multi-Level Comprehensive Program. Implement a multi-level comprehensive approach applied in an incremental, measured fashion. This approach would emphasize pro-actively dealing with an emerging youth gang issue in a given community. As the problem escalates, so would the level, type and intensity of the strategies. The approach would include elements of prevention, enforcement, intervention, intelligence, community involvement and alternative activities. This strategy recognizes that no single strategy would be sufficient and, therefore, requires a comprehensive approach which can be adjusted based on intensity of the problems experienced.

Following the identification and definition of each of these strategies the panel was asked to evaluate them based on criteria including desirability short-term, feasibility, cost, desirability long-term, stakeholder support, and political feasibility. The top two alternatives, along with the most polarized, were then examined closer. They are as follows:

1. Graffiti Abatement Program. This alternative strategy was one of the top two rated strategies by the panel. Advantage of this program would include an enhanced image, a stronger sense of security and safety to the community and the elimination of gang territorial markers. It would also minimize the potential for economic loss and could be financed through private contributions.

On the other hand, this program could be costly if it was financed with city funds, and could create apathy on the part of private property owners who may, as a result, maintain their property even less. There is also a minimal chance that graffiti abatement could generate retaliation by the gangs. This approach is certainly not comprehensive and if applied alone may serve as only a "band-aid" treatment for a fatal disease.

The panel generally felt that the identified stakeholders would generally support this program. The city council, schools, neighborhood groups, local politicians and community activist groups would all benefit to some degree by such a program. The chamber of commerce and its constituents would

view this as an improvement to the city's image and thus enhance business opportunities. Although this alternative strategy could be costly if financed completely with public funds, the cost of this program could be off set by private contributions from such groups as, realtor associations, chamber of commerce, etc. The panel, however, felt that although this approach would be generally supported by the stakeholders, it would also be seen as less than comprehensive and would treat only the symptoms of a youth gang issue in a community.

2. Problem Specific Enforcement. This strategy alternative received the most polarized ratings by the panel. Half the panel highly favored this strategy and the other disfavored it. Problem specific enforcement may be one of the easiest approaches to manage; it is single focused and less expensive than other alternatives. At the same time it ignores other elements such as, prevention and intervention. It ignores other problem areas in the community, and may generate claims of singling out one minority or group. This approach to many may be seen as a "band-aid" and could be politically difficult.

Although the panel generally agreed this approach may be attractive to some stakeholders, most stakeholders would find it difficult to support this strategy in that it singles out one area of a community or one gang which might be of minority makeup. Therefore, certain activist or neighborhood

groups might bring significant political pressure to bear. City councils and chamber of commerce would find it difficult to support this strategy. Some parents and schools might support this strategy, but others would feel ignored. Although this strategy has some merit others appeared more attractive.

3. Multi-Level Comprehensive Program. This strategy was rated by the panel as one of the top two. It provides a good mix of long- and short-range strategic elements. This approach allows the department to ease into operation incrementally and eliminates the potential for overkill and wasting of resources. It is certainly easier to sell to the community and provides a good mix of intervention, enforcement and prevention elements. This strategy is comprehensive, cost effective and politically sound.

On the other hand, this strategy requires a high level of planning and frequent evaluation to ensure appropriate incremental advances. Although it is cost effective, it can be high cost, especially at the higher levels.

The stakeholders would generally view this strategy as the most effective. Politicians, schools, parents and community groups would see some immediate, short-term action, but could rest assured that long-term, more permanent strategies would be forthcoming as needed. The stakeholders would view this as generally economical in that resources would be applied as

needed. Activist groups could have the opportunity for input which would satisfy some of their concerns and would see a good mix of prevention and intervention, along with enforcement.

SELECTED STRATEGY - MULTI-LEVEL COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM

The selection of this strategy is based on, not only the input from the modified policy delphi panel, but also the information obtained in the futures study portion of this report. Youth gangs in mid-size California cities require a comprehensive strategic approach. Any single method is doomed to failure. Enforcement alone may have some limited short-term impacts, but in the long run will likely prove ineffective at eliminating or significantly mitigating the issue. Intervention strategies such as graffiti removal treat only one of the symptoms of a serious disease. It can quickly be seen that comprehensive approach is far more desirable. The multi-level incremental aspect of this strategy allows a mid-size law enforcement agency to immediately implement certain elements of the overall strategy and save more costly and higher level strategies for application when and if they become necessary.

This strategy has been divided into three levels. Level one should be implemented when a youth gang issue is first emerging in a community. Level two could be implemented if the elements used in level one are not effective in eliminating or significantly mitigating the impacts of an emerging youth gang issue. Level three, which is by far the most sophisticated, long-range, difficult and costly, could be implemented should level two not be sufficient. It is expected that level three need be implemented only in the most severe of cases. It is also important to understand that although specific elements are

detailed in each level, a law enforcement agency applying this strategy could mix and match as needed. The multi-level comprehensive strategy is illustrated in the following table (Table No. 10).

**MULTI-LEVEL
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY MATRIX**

Table No. 10

ELEMENT	LEVEL I	LEVEL II	LEVEL III
Graffiti Abatement	X ¹	X ²	
Gang Unit	X ³	X ⁴	X ⁵
City Council Commitment/Involvement	X		
Educate School Officials	X		
Zero Tolerance L.E. Approach	X		
Gang Activity Reporting	X		
Parent Contact		X	
Criminal Justice System Coordination		X	
Department Top Priority (Gangs)		X	
News Media Involvement		X	
Community Advisory Board			X
G.I.A.R.Y. Program			X
Multi-Agency Task Force			X

Note: Once an element is implemented it continues thru successive levels.

- 1 = Privately Funded
- 2 = Publicly Funded
- 3 = One officer per 100 gang members
- 4 = Two officers per 100 gang members
- 5 = Six officers per 100 gang members

Level One

A variety of elements are identified as part of the overall multi-level comprehensive strategy. Level one elements are intended to be implemented when the youth gang issue either first emerges in a community or has become a significant enough concern that a law enforcement agency is compelled to deal with it. Level one elements are by their nature fairly easy to implement and designed to have an immediate impact on the problem and should provide a certain sense of security for the community. The stakeholders, particularly city council members, will be satisfied with the immediate action.

Element One -- Graffiti Abatement. As a level-one strategy element, graffiti removal should be accomplished within 48 hours of report. A graffiti hot line could be established either in the law enforcement agency or at city central information. Once reported, graffiti should be removed quickly from public property. Removal from private property could be accomplished voluntarily by contact of the property owner and, if necessary, abated as a nuisance.

Element Two -- Gang Unit. A gang unit should be implemented immediately on the ratio of one officer per 100 gang members. The gang unit at this level would serve primarily as an intelligence gathering device providing constant monitoring and knowledge of gang participants.

Element Three -- City Council Commitment and Involvement. City council commitment is not only an essential but a critical element to the success of any strategy dealing with youth gangs. If committed

to this or any strategy, the efforts of the law enforcement agency will be much easier and well supported. Without such commitment, involvement and support by the city council, and other stakeholders such as, activist groups (ACLU, NAACP), neighborhood groups, etc., could significantly interfere with the efforts of the law enforcement agency.

Element Four -- Education Program for School Administrators and Faculty. School officials, although aware of the youth gang problem are one of the least equipped groups. Law enforcement agencies are in a unique position to educate school officials about youth gangs. Once educated, school officials can become a ready source of intelligence and further enforcement goals. Properly educated, they can also implement prevention strategies. Such education also creates instant rapport and liaison between the law enforcement community and the schools themselves.

Element Five -- Zero Tolerance Law Enforcement. As an essential element of the level-one strategy, zero-tolerance law enforcement sends a signal to the community and specifically to gang members that violent acts and other criminal behavior will not be tolerated. Breaks and second chances usually associated with juvenile behavior are non-existent. Any criminal offense should result in arrest and incarceration. Other asocial but non-criminal behaviors should result in a detention and report (field interrogation card, incident report, etc.). As a note of caution, some stakeholders may view this zero-tolerance approach as discriminatory.

Element Six -- Gang Activity Reporting. If not already established, the law enforcement agency should immediately begin documenting all gang activity. Crime reports, incident reports, arrest reports, citations, etc., that relate to gang activity should be specially indexed so that an accurate, long-term measurement of gang activity can be made. This element will prove very useful in the long-term and will help as an evaluation mechanism. It is recommended that even a department that does not perceive the presence of a youth gang problem should develop this mechanism now. The collection of such data could serve as an early warning system.

Level Two

Level-two elements are designed to be implemented when a community has made the assessment that level-one strategy elements are not sufficiently effective. Level-one strategies that are repeated here have some degree of enhancement added.

Element One -- Graffiti Abatement. The necessity of removing graffiti being established and described in level one, the community may find it necessary to enhance this element. If removal from private property is not being accomplished on a voluntary basis as indicated in level one, city funds should be provided for such removal. Either city maintenance crews or private painting and sandblasting contractors can be retained for such services. Permission waivers can be obtained from private property occupants and graffiti removed at city cost. In the long-term the cost of such removal could potentially be off-set by contributions gleaned from

organizations such as the chamber of commerce or local realtor associations.

Element Two -- Gang Unit. The number of officers assigned to the gang unit is increased to two per hundred at this level. These two officers, working full-time in the field in an enforcement role, will significantly dissuade gang activity and membership. Youths involved in gangs or who are at risk of becoming involved in gangs will quickly learn that these officers are monitoring their every movement. The officers themselves will quickly become thoroughly familiar with gang members, will know their names, place of residence, their associations, etc. The mere appearance of these two officers in a neighborhood will drive gang activity underground and disrupt their normal movements.

Element Three -- Parent Contact. The involvement of gang-member parents and parents of an at-risk youth is essential. In order to gain parental involvement and cooperation parents must know that their children are involved in gang activities. Research indicates that most parents are not aware of their children's involvement in gangs. The law enforcement agency must establish programs by which the parents of all gang-involved and at-risk youth are contacted and notified of their children's involvement. Their cooperation should be solicited. Often parental knowledge is sufficient to dissuade a youth from further gang involvement.

Element Four -- Criminal Justice System Coordination. Typically the elements of the criminal justice system, although inter-connected,

operate autonomously. To maximize the system's impact on the youth gang issue a coordinated effort is necessary. The law enforcement agency must take the leading role in establishing coordination between the elements and a commitment on their part to work together. Each element, if treating the youth gang issue as a serious priority, can present a common front and an ominous deterrent to youth gang activity.

Element Five -- Department Top Priority. Full department support and commitment is essential to the success of this strategy. Two officers assigned to a gang detail, parental contacts, coordination with criminal justice system, etc., will not adequately address the issue of youth gangs. All personnel, patrol, detectives, etc., must be committed and see this as a top priority.

Element Six -- News Media Involvement. The news media is an essential element to the success of this strategy. Ensuring responsible reporting is a key ingredient of news media involvement. The media should also avoid giving a gang free advertisement and notoriety by publishing its name.

Level Three

The third and final level of the strategy is designed for implementation when and if level two is deemed insufficient. Level-three is seen as just about an all-out realistic effort to deal with the gang issue. These elements should only be implemented when necessary.

Element One -- Gang Unit. Four to six officers per one hundred gang members should be employed as a field force for special enforcement. These officers' full-time single priority should be the enforcement of laws against those gang members who choose to violate. The unit's hours of operation need to be flexible and focused at the time when most gang activity occurs. If appropriate the addition of two officers (a total of eight) could be considered for initial efforts. Officers should work as two-man teams, in uniform and plainclothes, providing a continuous presence in gang territories.

Element Two -- Community Advisory Board. To encourage the involvement of the community at large and to emphasize that the gang issue is not just a police problem but a community issue, the formation of a community advisory board is recommended. This element will also provide two stakeholders, otherwise excluded, an opportunity for input and involvement. Neighborhood groups, activist groups, and concerned parents, could either be represented on the board or attend board meetings. This board would also provide a broad basis support for the city's action and strategy. The law enforcement agency could spearhead the formation of this advisory board.

Element Three -- G.I.A.R.Y. Program. At this level a gang-involved at-risk youth program should be implemented. The program, combining agency resources for youth outreach, should include such features as alternative activities, self-esteem training, reduction of peer pressure, gang resistance education, etc. School resource program, DARE programs, Quest programs, parks and recreation programs, and

boys' and girls' club programs provide ready-made forums for such efforts. This element is envisioned as a high-level intervention and prevention activity. If a law enforcement agency is not equipped to implement this strategy, the parks and recreation department of the city may be able to implement this response.

Element Four -- Multi-Agency Task Force. If level three is necessary, an assumption is made that the gang problem in a mid-size community is significant. It likely impacts other areas outside the community and may perhaps even be a county-wide problem. If so, a multi-agency task force could benefit and produce significant impacts on the problem. A task force made up of various law enforcement agencies affected by the gang problem, such as police, county sheriffs, parole and the district attorney's office could form a special unit to actively seek out, arrest, incarcerate and prosecute the most active and violent gang members. Membership on the task force might also include representation from the school district, corrections, courts, etc.

As it becomes necessary to incrementally move from one level to the next, the elements of the previous level should be continued. The strategy, as described in the various elements and levels, is intended to represent a comprehensive strategy. It is recognized, however, that local conditions might dictate somewhat different approaches. Perhaps even the movement of an element from one level to the next or the addition of an element may be necessary. However, the foundation of this strategy remains; it's incremental, measured and deliberate implementation by level. The design itself promotes a sense of confidence in the law enforcement agency that would implement such a plan. It is not, however,

intended as the only answer to a community's gang problem. On the contrary, it is intended to lend a sense of direction at a time when a department may have little time to develop this comprehensive of an approach. A law enforcement agency could present this plan to its community leadership, such as city councils or city managers and then modify it as time permits.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Having completed the strategic plan, it is now necessary to design an implementation process. It provides a foundation for the transition management plan, which is the final portion of this report. An implementation plan addresses three areas: (1) Time lines, (2) Resource Requirements, and (3) Action Steps. Those areas are detailed in the following pages, by strategy level and element.

Level One

It is recommended that level one be given a full year before a decision is reached to move to level two.

Graffiti Abatement. The graffiti-abatement program envisioned at level one anticipates the removal of graffiti from public property within 48 hours of report. The abatement of graffiti from public property would occur at city expense and could be performed by city maintenance crews or private contractor. The expenses could range from \$5,000-\$15,000 per year. Additionally, a graffiti hot line would also be established, assuming existing personnel would serve the answering point and existing phones would be used. Graffiti

abatement from private property would be done at owner's expense on a voluntary basis.

It is recommended that the graffiti program be handled by a city department other than the police department. The steps necessary to implement an effective program include: policy development that requires immediate reporting of graffiti sighted by city employees, establishment and publication of a graffiti hot line number through which the public can report graffiti, and notification of property owners to abate graffiti.

Gang Unit. At this level, one officer would be need per one hundred gang members. In most cases, the officer would be pulled from some other assignment and would staff the gang-intelligence function. If the department was equipped with a crime analysis unit or other like unit, the responsibility for this function could be assigned there.

Once the responsibility for collection of gang intelligence is assigned, the intelligence information must be disseminated to both patrol and detective units. Policies must be established to ensure that gang-intelligence information is pursued vigorously by these two units.

City Council Commitment and Involvement. Although there is no direct cost required to implement this level-one element, the police chief, in concurrence with the city manager, must meet and inform the council of the plan. Some work may need to be done to frame the problem and issue and provide them with some comparative data. A

department should not be surprised if the council resists dealing with the issue, since youth gangs can impact the city's image and, therefore, politicians may wish to deny its existence.

Education Program for School Administrators and Faculty. This element could be performed by the officer assigned to the gang detail, or if an agency already has a school resource or youth services division, personnel from those units could perform this function at no additional cost. School administrators and certain key faculty members need to be trained on gangs in general. Clear identification of roles and expectations must be defined.

Zero-Tolerance Law Enforcement Approach. Although this is an essential element of the level-one strategy, it requires no additional resources. It does, however, require the establishment of a zero-tolerance policy with both patrol and the detective divisions. Expectations must be made clear.

Gang Activity Reporting. This element is another no-cost item. However, a mechanism to capture all relevant gang activity occurring in the city must be developed. All gang-related crimes, arrests and other non-criminal gang activity should be documented and stored for access later.

Level Two

The level-two strategy elements should be employed for approximately eighteen months before a decision is made to move to level three. This time frame is

necessary to allow full development of the strategy elements and to give them an opportunity for success.

Graffiti Abatement. Assuming that voluntary compliance by private property owners was not satisfactory, level two graffiti abatement would be accomplished with public funds. Although public funding can be offset by some private contributions, the first year costs may range between \$20,000-\$70,000.

At this level, graffiti abatement should certainly fall under the jurisdiction of either the public works or parks division. Every attempt should be made to remove graffiti within 48 hours of report, since the quicker the removal is made the more impact the program will have. Although city employees could be used to remove graffiti, private contracting may be more cost effective.

Gang Unit. At level-two two officers per one hundred gang members would be assigned to this unit. Some additional funding may be necessary if these officers could not be pulled from some other assignment. These officers should be assigned full time to the gang detail and must be trained appropriately.

Parent Contact. This element is designed to be accomplished by the gang unit members and would require no additional resources. However, the officers assigned to the gang unit must be informed that parental contact is a clear expectation.

Criminal Justice System Coordination. This element can be accomplished through existing resources. However, this element must not be left to chance. A clear, concise timetable and process must be established and followed.

Department Top Priority. This perhaps is one of the most important elements of the level-two strategy. Although there is little, if any, cost associated with this element, gangs must be viewed by the entire organization as one of its top priorities. Expectations around this element must be clear from the agency head down.

News Media Involvement. This strategy element also requires no funding, but like in some of the previous elements, a plan of action for approaching the media with clear expectations must be devised and responsibilities assigned. A ranking staff officer, perhaps the department public information officer, could coordinate a series of meetings with news media representatives to outline the issue, the strategic plan, and the need for responsible, accurate reporting. The media cooperation and publication of public service announcements should be garnered. Additionally, the media should be encouraged not to publicize gang names.

Level Three

Although no time line for the level-three strategy elements is defined, once implemented, level three should continue until the youth gang problem is sufficiently abated.

Gang Unit. At this level it is anticipated that six officers per one hundred gang members would be required. It is likely that additional funds would be necessary to field such a unit. The officers assigned need to be appropriately trained, properly equipped and well directed.

Community Advisory Board. This board comprises perhaps the most sensitive of all the strategies. Although it is a low- or no-cost element, the city manager and council may have significant concerns over the formation of such a group. The potential political ramifications are significant. It is recommended that the police chief or perhaps even the city manager be actively involved in the selection and formation of this board. City council members may also wish to be active in the selection and formation.

G.I.A.R.Y. Program. It is anticipated, for a city of approximately 100,000 population that at least one officer or other full-time employee will be necessary to coordinate and facilitate this program. Although this program may not be administered by the law enforcement agency, it is highly likely that some city department would be responsible. Cost could range between \$30,000 to \$50,000 per year.

The assigned individual must be properly trained in the area of youth gangs and the kinds of youth outreach programs that are effective. Once the training is completed, a specific operational plan can be designed and implemented.

Multi-Agency Task Force. The cost of this element is difficult to assess. To the law enforcement agency that is spearheading this effort, it would likely cost the services of at least one officer or supervisor. That person could be drawn from the gang unit or elsewhere.

It may be difficult to garner support for such a unit. It would likely take the full efforts of the police chief. Once the task force is agreed to by the other law enforcement agencies involved, a command staff officer could coordinate it from that point. Initial meetings would need to focus on the scope of the problem and the development of an operational plan.

SUMMARY

A strategy designed to fulfill the micro-mission of eliminating or at least mitigating the impact of youth gangs has been developed. That strategy embodies in a multi-level comprehensive approach consists of 13 strategy elements, which include aspects of abatement, enforcement, intelligence, prevention, community involvement, education and agency cooperation. The plan is designed to be implemented incrementally, by level, as the severity and intensity of the gang problem dictates. The plan recognizes the need for involvement of the total community (stakeholders) and operates on the premise that the issue of youth

gangs is not just a "police problem," but a community issue. It is designed to be flexible and allows for modification by an agency in need of a fast and focused approach to an existing or emerging youth gang issue.

PART III

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN -- PART III

The transition management plan is the third and final portion of this report. It is through this plan that movement from the present state to the desired future state will be accomplished. Having completed the futures study and a strategic plan on the issue of, "How Should a Mid-Size Law Enforcement Agency Respond to Youth Gangs in the 1990's?" it is now time to turn attention and focus to critical mass identification, commitment planning, responsibility charting, management structure, and supporting technologies, all of which will be necessary to develop an effective law enforcement response to youth gangs. However, it should be understood that as an agency finds the need to progress from one level to the next, the critical mass, responsibilities, etc., may change somewhat.

In order to demonstrate that the strategic plan is feasible and possible to achieve, the Bard Police Department will be used as a framework upon which the transition management plan is developed. The Bard Police Department is a typical mid-size California law enforcement agency located anywhere outside of the major population centers.

BARD POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Bard Police Department consists of 110 sworn personnel and 55 civilian personnel. The department polices 15 square miles and the latest population estimates exceed 85,000. The city is composed of 2 percent Black, 13 percent Hispanic, with no other significant minorities represented. It is a community located 60 miles from the nearest major population center and is in a county with an estimated population of 450,000. The city of Bard is bordered by a city of approximately 120,000 residents, with a significantly higher minority population

and crime rate. At one time, the city of Bard was almost exclusively dependent upon oil and agricultural business; however, it has now diversified to a point that it is no longer dependent on these two industries. Generally speaking, the city has sufficient revenues to conduct its business in a quality fashion. The city of Bard is a charter city and uses the city council/manager form of government. In many respects it typifies most mid-size California cities.

Until a year ago, youth gang problems in the city of Bard were non-existent; however, during the past year the youth gang issue has been emerging. Graffiti, in and around the city of Bard, has developed into an eyesore that growing numbers of residents are complaining about. Media coverage of gang problems and nearby urban centers has heightened the sensitivity of Bard residents. Bard youth have begun forming gangs; in fact, five separate gangs consisting of about 20 members each have formed in the city. Two are Hispanic and the three remaining are predominantly White, middle- and upper-class males. In the neighboring city of Santa Lucia gangs have been a standing problem for years. Occasional conflicts between Bard youth gangs and those located in Santa Lucia and other nearby cities have been on the increase.

In response to growing community concerns the Bard Police Chief Mark Steinberg, in cooperation with his command staff and city administrators, developed a three-level strategic plan to deal with the youth gang issue.

STRATEGY

The plan developed by Chief Steinberg is a multi-level comprehensive approach applied in an incrementally measured fashion. This approach emphasizes pro-actively dealing with the emerging youth gang issue in a measured fashion.

As the problem escalates, so does the level and intensity of the strategy elements. The approach includes elements of prevention, enforcement, intervention, intelligence, community involvement, and alternative activities (the plan is described in detail in the strategic management portion of this report). In completing the required research to develop this plan, Chief Steinberg has become extremely familiar with various approaches used in other cities across the nation. Most of the approaches, however, are tailored to major population centers, where large numbers of youth gangs exist and have existed for perhaps decades. The three-level approach described in the strategic planning portion of this report seemed to contain the best of the elements that could be applied in an incrementally measured fashion to a mid-size city, such as the city of Bard.

SITUATION UPDATE

Today, Chief Steinberg met with City Manager Daniel Moraga. The purpose of the meeting was to update the City Manager on recent gang activity in the city of Bard. Chief Steinberg described a cross-burning incident perpetrated by members of the Bard City Skinheads, and an aggravated assault wherein members of the West Side Boys severely beat four young adults who were walking through a Bard city park. These two and several other less notorious incidents have caused a ground swell of fear throughout the community. Chief Steinberg, having recently completed the strategic plan, used the opportunity with the city manager to help identify the key players, the critical mass individuals whose active commitment is necessary for the plan to succeed.

CRITICAL MASS

The following individuals have been identified as critical mass whose commitment is necessary for the strategic plan to succeed. The individuals are listed on the commitment planning chart which appears below (Table No. 11). The chart describes their current and desired commitment level.

COMMITMENT PLANNING CHART

Table No. 11

Actor in critical mass	Block change or no commitment	Let change happen	Help change happen	Make change happen
1. City Council		●—————▶X		
2. School District Executive		●X		
3. Newspaper Editor (Bard Tribune)		●▶X		
4. City Manager			X←————●	
5. Patrol Commander		●—————▶X		
6. Chief of Police				●X

● = Current Commitment Level

X = Desired Commitment Level

As can be seen in the above chart, each of the critical-mass players have a different desired commitment planning position, and they are described in the following pages. A narrative analysis follows each, which justifies the assumptions assigned and the proposed need for movement. Also, each of the critical mass players are identified by their pseudonyms in the city of Bard. They could just as easily apply to most, if not all, mid-size California cities.

Bard City Council. The city council in the city of Bard takes a keen interest in public safety issues. The youth gang issue in the city of Bard has generated a number of calls from constituents. The constituents including residents, representatives from services clubs and the chamber of commerce all report a growing concern over the issue and a fear for their safety, a loss of city image and the potential for economic impact. The Bard City Council could react to these concerns in a number of ways. They could choose to "deny" the youth gang problem in an effort to protect the city's image. Such denial would hamper efforts of the Bard city government in dealing with the youth gang issue in a quick and short fashion. They also could overreact to the issue and hence require unnecessary effort and resource commitment to the youth gang problem. Such overreaction could easily stimulate a backlash from the community. The Bard City Manager Daniel Moraga and Chief Bill Steinberg both fear that without quick and accurate information, the city council could assume a "block change" position either by "denial" or by overreaction. The council must be moved to a "help change happen" position in order to generate the overall support of the community. By gaining the overall support of the community, special interest groups could be more easily dealt with should they disagree with the plan.

School District Executive. The youth gang issue affects the school district as much as it affects the community at large. This is particularly true in the city of Bard, where a number of youth gang incidents have occurred on school campuses. The chief and city manager both feel that the school district executive would support the plan and allow the elements that directly and indirectly impact

the school district succeed. They also agreed that they must make certain that the school district executive continues in his "let change happen" position. Without his continuing support it would be very difficult to implement those strategy elements that directly involve the schools in education and other types of activities.

Newspaper Editor -- The Bard Tribune. Like in most communities, especially in California, the news media plays a significant role in public policy and community sentiment. The city of Bard is no different. Although the editor of the Bard Tribune has generally been supportive of the police department over the past several years, his support for the strategic plan is not guaranteed. In order to ensure that the editor will remain in a "let change happen" position, the chief and the manager will personally meet with him and share the strategic plan before the council publicly adopts it in the coming weeks. They remain confident that once the editor has been educated (educational intervention) on the strategy, he will remain committed. The editor, by his commitment to the strategy, will also need to be convinced of the importance of responsible reporting. Every effort to avoid panicking the community by sensationalized reporting should be made.

City Manager. The city manager is another essential critical mass player. Once the manager has been briefed on the plan and has had an opportunity to make suggestions for modification, he is likely to want to assume a "make change happen" position. However, the chief must carefully persuade City Manager Moraga to a "help change happen" position. Although the youth gang problem is a community issue, the

city manager must allow the police chief and his staff to maintain the leadership role. Most of the elements of the strategic plan remain the responsibility of the police department.

Patrol Commander. The patrol commander for the city of Bard has assumed a "let change happen" position. To date, he has been instrumental in the plan development, but does not see himself as performing a leadership role. The chief, after assessing the strengths and weaknesses of his staff and their individual position power, has made a conscious decision that the patrol commander must perform a leadership role as a "make change happen" player. The chief does not anticipate a great deal of resistance from the patrol commander; however, the police chief expects to garner the commander's full support through role modeling. The chief is confident that by putting his full support behind the program, the patrol commander will readily accept his new role as project manager.

Chief of Police. Although the chief was actively involved in the development of the strategic plan and is certainly supportive of it, he must maintain his "make change happen" position. If his commitment and support to the plan dwindles, the success of the plan will likely diminish proportionately.

Now that the critical mass and their assumptions have been identified, as well as the commitment needed from each, attention can now be turned to responsibility charting.

RESPONSIBILITY CHARTING

Responsibility charting is a mechanism that is used to clarify role relationships in an effort to reduce ambiguity, wasted energy, duplication of effort and adverse emotional reactions. A list of actions, decisions or activities is developed and recorded on the forms vertical axis. The horizontal axis is then used to identify and list "actors" who have some behavioral role concerning each action or decision. The required behavior of an actor towards a particular activity is then charted using the following classifications: R = responsibility to see that decisions or actions occur, A = approval of action or decisions with right to veto, S = support of actions or decisions by provision of resources, but with no right to veto, and I = informed of action or decisions, but with no right to veto.

The usefulness of the responsibility chart lies not only in the end product of the chart, but also in the new understanding and appreciation of peoples roles and attitudes to them developed during the process. This same process of responsibility charting could be applied in any mid-size California law enforcement agency.

RESPONSIBILITY CHART

Table No. 12

DECISION	City Council	Chief of Police	City Manager	Patrol Committee	Patrol Task Force Sgt.	Parks & Rec. Director	Command Staff	Gang Unit	Record Division
Budget	S	A	A	I	--	I	I	--	--
Graffiti Program Level I	I	A	S	R	--	I	--	--	--
Graffiti Program Level II	S	A	S	R	--	I	--	--	--
Educational Program - School District	--	S	I	R	R	--	--	R	--
Gang Activity Reporting	--	--	--	I	S	--	S	R	R
Coordinate meeting with Criminal Justice System	--	R	--	R	S	--	S	S	--
Community Advisory Board	A	A	A	I	S	R	--	S	--
Police Department Top Priority Policy	I	R	--	S	S	--	S	S	S
News media cooperation	--	R	R	I	--	--	--	--	--
G.I.A.R.Y. Program	S	S	S	R	--	R	S	--	--
Multi-agent Task Force	--	S	I	R	S	--	--	S	--
Training Gang Unit	--	I	--	--	S	--	--	I	--
Develop Intelligence files	--	I	--	S	R	--	--	S	S
Parent Contact	--	--	--	S	R	--	--	R	--

KEY

R = Response A = Approval S = Support I = Informed

As can be seen in the above responsibility chart, not all of the critical mass players are identified on the chart. Although they may be expected to play a role in the strategic plan elements, they did not have direct decision making and support functions. In addition to the critical mass, two other responsibility chart actors were identified--the gang unit and the records division, because they have direct input and actions in regards to the transition plan.

The key actors identified in the responsibility chart have the clear and present capability. Most of the actors are critical mass players and their readiness to support the plan was assessed in the critical mass section of this report. In the case at point, the city of Bard, both the police chief and the city manager are satisfied that the key actors are now prepared to move forward with their responsibilities and are in the proper position of support. In order to carry out these functions, a management structure must be defined.

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

For the purposes of this strategic plan the "project manager" approach, as described in Richard Berkhart and Reuben T. Harris' book, Organizational Transitions, has been selected:

The executive manager may temporarily give either a staff person or line person the executive power to manage the change. Here, the project manager functions, not from his own base, but from the executive manager's office. This alternative is very similar to that of the product manager in a technical organization. The product manager is a program integrator charged with the responsibility of getting the job done, but having to do so with resources whose "home rooms" are (or may be) in other parts of the organization.

In the application, as described in the city of Bard, the patrol commander will serve as his project manager and is given this responsibility as a separate and additional responsibility to his regular operation. The patrol commander who has a great deal of clout and position power within the organization and one who controls a substantial amount of the agency resources, is in a perfect position to be project manager. Additionally, his day-to-day contact with the patrol task force and other patrol operation personnel places him in a position of ready access to information. The patrol commander in the city of Bard scenario is a well-respected captain who also holds a great deal of personal power within the

organization. His assignment as project manager is a natural adjunct to his ordinary role.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES

Little training is necessary for the implementation of the elements of strategy level one. However, once level-two and level-three elements are implemented, certain technologies and methodologies must be employed to ensure adequate training and evaluation of progress.

Training. In order to properly implement the strategy, the key players responsible for implementing the elements must be properly trained in order to complete the task for which they are responsible. Such training might include POST-sponsored training courses that focus on gang activity and gang enforcement. Other training may be available through California Police Officers' Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Additionally, police personnel who deal with the gang issue could glean valuable insight by participating in panel discussions on the issue of youth gangs and by visiting departments such as Los Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, who have developed extensive gang prevention and intervention activities. Although in the case of the Los Angeles area agencies the types of youth gangs are different from those found in most mid-size cities, the skills and knowledge is transferable. Most police personnel are not well trained in youth prevention and intervention strategies, and such training courses are available to them through schools and parks and recreation programs.

Private consultants could be used to provide certain training, particularly in the area of generating community involvement and in the formation of community advisory boards.

Monitoring/Evaluation. It is important with any program to monitor and evaluate progress to date. One of the elements in the level one strategy calls for gang activity reporting. This can be accomplished by simply adding a "gang involved incident" box to existing crime, arrest, and incident report forms. Officers and other report writers, upon determining a reportable incident as "gang involved" can check the box. The police records unit can then keep a log and accurate count of gang involved incidents. A consistent definition must be applied and should be developed as an integral part of the reporting procedure.

It is incumbent on a police agency embarking on this strategy to immediately begin collecting data on the occurrence of gang activity in its community. Only through accurate gathering of data can an ongoing assessment be made. In keeping with the belief that the issue of youth gangs will be with us for many years into the future, those statistics will be necessary for years, if not decades, to come. Such data can be used effectively in evaluating the department's responses, but also in assessing the overall significance of the gang issue in a given community. Some departments may find themselves in a position of having a "gang problem" identified for them by a city council or some special interest group. Only with accurate data can a true assessment be made.

It is also important to arrive at a fairly accurate count of the number of youth gangs in a community and the number of members in each. Some distinction must be made between hard core members, associates, and those on the fringe or periphery.

SITUATION UPDATE

Nearly a year and a half has lapsed since Chief Steinberg and City Manager Moraga first met and discussed the strategic plan developed by Chief Steinberg and his staff. Within weeks of that meeting the Level One strategy had been implemented. The City Council was in full support of the plan and remains committed. The other critical mass players were all brought aboard through the use of the techniques described in the critical mass section of this report. The responsibilities that were appropriate for the level-one strategy elements have been carried out by the indicated actors. Even so, the issue of youth gangs has not disappeared. In fact, in recent weeks two fear-generating events, a drive-by shooting near Bard High School and a fatal stabbing at a neighborhood party, both the result of youth gang violence, have stimulated renewed community concern. Both events were highly publicized, and although the Bard City Tribune attempted to avoid sensationalizing the incidents, the City Council requested a meeting with the Chief and the City Manager. Chief Steinberg is at this very moment approaching City Hall with level two of the strategic plan in hand. He has prepared his staff to implement immediately the elements of the level-two strategy. A late-night consultation with City Manager Moraga ended in an agreement that the City Council was definitely ready for level two. Although additional costs would be associated with these elements, the Chief and the City Manager agree it is time to move...it has been nearly three years since level two was implemented in the city of Bard. Gang violence and activity has diminished

significantly. In fact, there is only one remaining gang left in the city. The strong approaches outlined in level two proved very effective.

To date, there has not been a need to implement the level-three strategies, but Chief Steinberg rests easily with the knowledge that he has the more aggressive level three elements ready to go. In fact, just last week the Bard Police Department was recognized by the Chamber of Commerce for their work on the youth gang problem.

SUMMARY

The transition management plan identifies and analyzes the critical mass actors, a responsibility chart, and a management structure. The supporting technologies include training, monitoring, and evaluation. The pseudonym Bard Police Department was created to provide a context in which the transition plan was developed. However, every attempt was made to develop this transition management plan to fit most mid-size California cities.

The transition management plan operates at a low level of specificity, it should serve as a guide to a department who has developed a need to implement a strategy for dealing with youth gangs. The critical mass analysis and responsibility charting developed in this transition plan can readily be transferred to most cities experiencing a youth gang problem. Their assumptions, tasks and issues would be very similar.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The three main sections of this report have now been completed. A futures study was completed, a strategic plan was developed and a transition management plan was outlined. These three very powerful processes applied to the issue, "How Should a Mid-Size Law Enforcement Agency Respond to Youth Gangs in the 1990's?" has resulted in a very practical, measured and incremental response to youth gangs for mid size law enforcement agencies.

As a result of the research conducted, it is apparent that the youth gang issue will likely be with us for a decade or more. Like most social phenomena it may take a decade or more to go full cycle. The plan developed in this report is intended to be used by mid-size law enforcement agencies that are not located in major population centers. Many cities throughout the State of California fit this picture. It is hoped that if and when a youth gang issue emerges in a mid-size city that the chief of the law enforcement agency can review this plan and with few local modifications proceed to implement it. Every attempt has been made to make it practical and realistic. The multi-level strategy is designed to maximize resources and minimize costs. It allows for immediate and quick response with low-level strategy elements that are expedient and highly visible. Those low-level strategy elements garner public support and city council satisfaction. In some communities the level-one strategy elements will be sufficient to eliminate or at least significantly mitigate an emerging youth gang problem. In some instances the level-two strategy elements or perhaps even level-three strategy elements will be necessarily implemented. If and when they are called for, the chief of the law enforcement agency can rest assured that the strategy elements will be supported by the council and the community at large.

Although this plan was designed so that it could be implemented intact by a mid-size agency, some local modification may be required. It is suggested that if a law enforcement agency be faced with an emerging youth gang issue in its community, that this plan should be studied in detail and the modifications made before it is presented to the city manager and/or city council. The chief may find modifications necessary because of political climate or the power and presence of special interest groups.

In the 1990's, communities, especially mid-size will need to treat youth gangs as not just a police problem but a community issue. Unlike in the 1970's and 1980's, law enforcement must become part of the solution and not be considered the entire solution. Law enforcement must be sensitive to the community and realize that overreaction and indiscriminate enforcement may cause a backlash of the minority community and tarnish the overall city image. Communities must also realize that denial of a youth gang problem or under reaction may eventually lead to youth gangs becoming entrenched and eventually to vigilantism. Law enforcement must take a pro-active stance and where possible develop a response that will mitigate the impact of youth gangs on the community and prevent them from becoming entrenched. Law enforcement must cooperate with other elements of the public and private sector, but simply aligning itself with the criminal justice system and ignoring the other agencies such as parks and recreation, social services, housing, and other community groups will not promote a long-term solution.

Some potential sub-issues that could emerge in the designated future of this study, but that were not specifically dealt with in this report include:

- What will the long-term impact of displacement of L.A. gangs have on mid-size California cities?
- What will the impact of vigilantism be on the community and youth gangs?
- How might a backlash of the minority community impact the issue of youth gangs?
- What will be the stand of organizations such as the A.C.L.U. and the N.A.A.C.P. on law enforcement response to gangs in the 1990's?
- Can a school curriculum dealing with school gangs be effectively developed and implemented?
- How can standing crime prevention programs, such as Neighborhood Watch, be effectively used to combat youth gangs?

These issues could be used as the subject of further futures studies.

As a final comment, a mid-size law enforcement agency that finds itself faced with an emerging youth gang issue has the opportunity to pro-actively serve its public through an enlightened futures-oriented approach. Remember, an issue such as youth gangs only becomes a problem when you've given up.

(Appendix A)

C I T I E S S U R V E Y E D
(CALIFORNIA)

1. CAMARILLO
2. CHICO
3. *FIVE CITIES
4. LODI
5. MERCED
6. MODESTO
7. *MONTEREY
8. *OXNARD
9. POMONA
10. ROSEVILLE
11. *SALINAS
12. *SANTA BARBARA
13. *SANTA MARIA
14. *SANTA PAULA
15. *SEASIDE
16. SIMI VALLEY
17. TULARE
18. VALLEJO
19. VISALIA
20. WOODLAND

*Indicates city where personal interview and/or observations were conducted

(Appendix B)

C A N D I D A T E T R E N D S

1. EXTENT TO WHICH DEMOGRAPHICS CHANGE
2. EXTENT TO WHICH THE COMMUNITY BECOMES INVOLVED
3. *EXTENT TO WHICH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES COOPERATE
4. LEVEL OF POPULARITY OF DRUG USE
5. CHANGE IN SOCIAL/COMMUNITY VALUES
6. LEVEL OF FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT INVOLVEMENT
7. *LEVEL OF GRAFFITI IMPACT ON COMMUNITY
8. EXTENT TO WHICH SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS BECOME INVOLVED
9. *EXTENT TO WHICH A COMMUNITY TOLERATES GANG ACTIVITY
10. LEVEL OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL BODIES
11. CHANGE IN AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES (\$)
12. EXTENT TO WHICH TECHNOLOGY CHANGES
13. EXTENT TO WHICH ENVIRONMENT CHANGES (COPING MECHANISMS/SKILLS)
14. EXTENT TO WHICH TOURIST-ORIENTED EVENTS ATTRACT GANGS
15. *EXTENT TO WHICH "CRACKDOWN" CAUSES LOS ANGELES GANG MEMBERS TO MOVE TO MID-SIZE CALIFORNIA CITIES
16. EXTENT TO WHICH VIOLENCE INCREASES, ESPECIALLY AGAINST THE POLICE
17. EXTENT TO WHICH MEDIA COVERS GANGS
18. LEVEL OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN GANGS
19. ALLIANCES BETWEEN ALL COMMUNITY GROUPS/AGENCIES
20. EXTENT TO WHICH ROLE MODELS CHANGE
21. LEVEL GANGS SOPHISTICATE (TO ORGANIZED CRIME)
22. DEGREE OF SEVERITY OF COURT SENTENCING PRACTICES
23. *LEVEL OF GANG MEMBERSHIP
24. EXTENT TO WHICH GANGS CREATE ATMOSPHERE OF TETALIATION/INTIMIDATION AT SCHOOLS
25. LEVEL OF CRIME RATE
26. LEVEL OF MINORITY BACKLASH

*Selected for forecasting

(Appendix C)

C A N D I D A T E E V E N T S

2. *PUBLIC FEAR-GENERATING INCIDENT OCCURS
3. GRAFFITI INCIDENT AT PUBLIC SCHOOL
4. SHERIFF'S OFFICE DEVELOPS COMPUTER GANG FILE
5. ORGANIZATIONAL PRIORITIES CHANGE
6. *IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFECTIVE GRAFFITI ABATEMENT PROGRAM
7. CITY COUNCIL PRIORITIES CHANGE
8. NEW COLLEGE IS BUILT
9. COMMUNITY ADVISORY BOARD FORMED
10. MAJOR COURT/LEGISLATION DECISION IMPACTS LEGALITY OF GANGS
11. LARGE ASSET SEIZURE
12. RIVAL SCHOOL EVENT GENERATES GANG CONFLICT
13. *YOUTH GANG PROBLEMS CAUSE MAJOR ECONOMIC LOSS INCIDENT
14. *COMMUNITY ADVISORY BOARD FORMED
15. ANOTHER MOVIE (LIKE COLORS)
16. CHAMPION FOR CAUSE OR PRESSURE GROUP APPEARS
17. REDEVELOPMENT OF GANG-INFESTED AREA
18. ESTABLISHMENT OF PARENT INVOLVEMENT OR SUPPORT GROUP
19. PUBLICATION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S WHITE PAPER
20. GANG CONVENTION IN TOWN
21. *MULTI-AGENCY TASK FORCE FORMED

*Selected for forecasting

(Appendix D)

P O L I C Y C O N S I D E R A T I O N S

COMMUNITY

- . VIEW AS COMMUNITY ISSUE, NOT JUST POLICE PROBLEM
- . COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT THROUGH COMMUNITY ADVISORY BOARD
- . POLICE DEPARTMENT MUST SPEARHEAD EFFORT WITH COMMUNITY
- . INCLUDE NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS
- . EDUCATE COMMUNITY THROUGH USE OF MEDIA AND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
- . INFORM PUBLIC WHERE TO GET HELP THROUGH RESOURCE GUIDE
- . DO NOT DENY EXISTENCE OF GANG PROBLEM
- . RAISE COMMUNITY LEVEL OF INTOLERANCE
- . DEMONSTRATE "PAYOFF" TO ENSURE INVOLVEMENT AND COOPERATION

PREVENTION

- . INCLUDE GANG ELEMENT IN NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAMS
- . INCLUDE GANG ELEMENT IN DARE-TYPE PROGRAMS
- . DEVELOP JUNIOR AND SENIOR HIGH PREVENTION PROGRAMS
- . WORK WITH PARENTS OF GANG-INVOLVED OR AT RISK YOUTH
- . EDUCATE PARENTS
- . RAISE PARENT LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY

INTERVENTION

- . INVOLVE SOCIAL SERVICES
- . DEVELOP ALTERNATIVES TO GANG INVOLVEMENT--SPORTS PROGRAMS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
- . REMOVE GRAFFITI PROMPTLY
- . ENHANCE PARKS AND RECREATION PROGRAMS
- . INVOLVE HOUSING AUTHORITY
- . LEGISLATE LAWS REGULATING SALES OF SPRAY PAINT

ENFORCEMENT/CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

- . FORM CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TASK FORCE
- . LAW ENFORCEMENT SHIRT FROM REACTIVE TO PRO-ACTIVE
- . RECOGNIZE ISSUE AND WORK ON SOLUTIONS (DO NOT DENY)
- . MOVE QUICKLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY
- . BE WILLING TO SPEARHEAD OTHERS (AS OTHERS NOT LIKELY TO TAKE LEAD)
- . DEVELOP LOCAL REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS
- . BE FLEXIBLE IN APPROACH AND EVALUATE WHAT WORKS
- . TAKE ZERO TOLERANCE ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION APPROACH
- . USE SERIOUS HABITUAL OFFENDER (SHO) PROGRAM FOR GANG MEMBERS

OTHER

- . INVOLVE CITY COUNCIL IN PLANS IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE AND KEEP THEIR SUPPORT
- . PREPARE CITY COUNCIL AND COMMUNITY FEAR-GENERATING INCIDENT
- . SOLICIT COOPERATION OF NEWS MEDIA
- . EMPHASIZE RESPONSIBLE REPORTING WITH MEDIA (BACK PAGE GANG INCIDENTS--FRONT PAGE GANG ARRESTS)

(Appendix E)

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