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WHAT WILL BE THE STATUS OF COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING IN LARGE CALIFORNIA POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY THE YEAR 2003?

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What Will be the Status of Community-Based Policing in Large California Police Departments by the Year 2003?

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Abstract

This study examines the future status of community-based policing in large California police departments by 2003. Background data suggests a dilemma between the demand for community based policing and necessary financial and organizational support. Through a brainstorming and Delphi panel process (made up of public and private sector management-level individuals), a survey of the literature, and input from selected academic and high-level law enforcement officials, significant trends and events were forecasted and evaluated as to their potential impacts upon the issue. A conceptual model with critical components for creating a community-based service oriented policing model over a five year period with future budget and workload realities was recommended. Charts, graphs and bibliographic information attached.

This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future--creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in the Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

INTRODUCTION

Los Angeles in 1993 is a place of increasing social and political turmoil. In many of its neighborhoods, crime, violence, unemployment, and hopelessness have become a way of life.¹ Unfortunately, the problems that plague Los Angeles can be found in major urban areas around the world.² In a post-industrial society, the rapid pace of social and economic change strongly suggests that the recent conflict and violence in our cities may only be the crest of the wave.³

Within this changing environment comes increasing demands from all directions to change the policing model in Los Angeles from the traditional, professional, or military design of the industrial age, to a community-based policing strategy.⁴ Prompted by the ill-fated Rodney King police beating episode in March of 1991, and supported by the massive civil disturbance in Los Angeles in April and May of 1992, community leaders, politicians, and police officials have repeatedly called for a transition to a community-based policing model for the delivery of public safety services. Community-based policing, according to its supporters, will enhance public confidence in the police, create a better working relationship between the community and the police, and enhance community crime and problem-solving efforts.⁵

In July, 1991, the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department issued its report following a major review of Los Angeles Police Department operations. One year later, in July, 1992, the Kolts Commission released its report after concluding a similar study of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. The reports were critical of both departments' relationships with their respective communities. Mistrust, misunderstanding, and outright fear of

the police on the part of residents were cited as some of the causes for the chasm between the police and the public they serve. In addition, both the Christopher Commission Report⁶ and the Kolts Commission Report⁷ strongly urged the adoption of the community-based policing model.

A DEFINITION

Community-based policing has been given a variety of definitions. By some, the concept has been called the next era of policing philosophy, the next stage beyond the political and reform eras of policing.⁸ Reaching beyond the reform model's emphasis upon rapid response and temporary peace keeping and order maintenance strategies, the community-based model involves long term "problem-solving techniques, strategic utilization of resources and increasingly sophisticated investigative techniques."⁹ Most importantly, the model emphasizes community-police partnerships, recognizing that the police, by themselves, cannot solve or resolve community crime problems.¹⁰

Essentially, community-based policing is an expansion of the traditional role of police officers which creates an environment where officers and residents can work together to solve community problems.¹¹ It involves transforming a police department from the traditional impersonal, reactive, response-driven model, into a system where the police view residents as their customers and their partners in reducing crime and quality of life problems in their service areas. A sense of partnership, of "listening to the customer," permeates the attitudes and the strategies of a community-based police department. The model is both a policing philosophy and an organizational strategy.¹²

Of the three models of policing in the U.S. most often found in the literature (traditional or strategic, problem-oriented, and community-based policing) a distinctive element of the community-based model is "one of duration."¹³ Where traditional policing usually involves at most temporary order maintenance and problem-oriented somewhat greater degrees of community intrusion, community-based policing involves the police in permanent neighborhood management. Under the problem-oriented model police tackle longer-term community problems but eventually move on to other problems. In the community-based model, "The police come to a neighborhood, and are there to stay as generalist government agents responsible for the quality of life in the microcommunity."¹⁴

EVALUATING THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING

To attempt to answer questions about the future of community-based policing, and to develop specific strategies to implement the model in large urban police departments, a one-year Independent Study Project was conducted as part of California's Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Command College program. Entitled, "What Will be the Status of Community-Based Policing in Large California Police Departments by the Year 2003?", the study identified over 20 significant trends and events which could affect the successful implementation of a community-based policing model over a ten-year period. Questions concerning the impact of social and cultural forces, economic considerations, and how a conceptual model of community-based policing could be structured were also answered in the study.

Through a modified conventional Delphi process, five and ten-year downline forecasts were determined for the following trends and events:

TRENDS

- * Level of Police Budgetary Support
- * Level of Community-Police Relationships
- * Level of Police Responsiveness to Community
- * Level of Demand for Police Accountability
- * Level of Public Fear of Crime
- * Level of Effect of Gangs/Narcotics Violence
- * Level of Officer Acceptance of Community-Based Policing

EVENTS

- * Major Civil Disturbance Occurs
- * Tough Law Enforcement Mayor Elected
- * Bond Measure to Hire More Officers Passes
- * State Budget Crisis Forces Department Cutbacks
- * Police/INS Team Against Immigrant Gangs
- * Civilian Review Board Established

Based upon the results of the Delphi panel's forecasts, a scenario depicting the future state of community-based policing in large California police departments was developed. Data collected in the study were used to construct a normative or "should be" scenario specifically for the future of community-based policing within the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). However,

because many of the social, cultural, and economic issues identified and forecasted in this study will be found in most urban areas in California and the United States, the research findings have implications for other urban law enforcement agencies, as well.

THE LIKELY FUTURE

The Delphi panel concluded that the LAPD will be caught between two significant social forces in the future. On one side is the present day reality of strained budgets, an understaffed and under-resourced police department, working with outdated information technology and information systems, and an infrastructure near collapse. The department, in turn, must deal with an ever-increasing workload and an unprecedented level of violence, particularly associated with gangs and narcotics activity.

On the other side are strong demands for a more sensitive, customer-driven police department, prompted largely by the Rodney King incident and the civil disturbances in Los Angeles in the Spring of 1992. Repeatedly, community-based policing is cited as the solution to these demands and the future of policing in Los Angeles. But, will it work? Can the Los Angeles Police Department, given its history, its culture, the current and future fiscal realities, and the increasing workload, successfully transition into a community-based policing model? Can any large metropolitan police department, in light of the current and future social, political, and economic realities, transition beyond the reactive, incident-driven and essentially failed policing model found in most departments today?

The future of policing in Los Angeles in general, and the future of community-based policing specifically, then, appears to rest with the development of policing strategies which successfully cope with these two significant conflicts. But one must also approach any large-scale organizational change strategy with caution. The history of community-based policing strategies is littered with well-intentioned, but mostly failed programs. Good ideas, good theories, good programs - all are likely to fail without proper consideration by managers as to the potential barriers which can negatively impact successful planning, development, and implementation of strategic change.¹⁵ And the barriers to a transition from the traditional to a community-based policing model, especially in large metropolitan police departments, are considerable.

OBSTACLES

There is certainly no doubt that innovation in American policing is occurring across the country.¹⁶ But is community-based policing the next era of policing methodology or, like team policing, a fad to be tried but which is doomed to failure when removed from the halls of academia to the harsh realities of our inner cities? There is certainly substantive evidence that the latter may be the case. In Houston, where the police department, under Chief Lee Brown gained considerable attention in the early 1980s by implementing neighborhood-oriented policing, efforts to transition to a community-based policing model have been largely unsuccessful. In a recent management audit of the Houston Police Department, a consultant wrote:

The Houston Police Department has, in recent years, struggled to expand its traditional enforcement role to embrace Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (NOP). The core tenet of

NOP - making officers more aware and responsive to neighborhood problems - is well-conceived. The Department's implementation of NOP has, however, faced a number of difficulties and has not produced any comprehensive improvement in performance. The results of the Department's NOP initiative appear quite limited in their tangible effects on citizens' security and quality of life.¹⁷

The literature definitely contains mixed results. Many people believe community-based policing to be the policing model of the future.¹⁸ But past experiences in Houston, Los Angeles, and Detroit indicate that the results may not live up to the promise. Budget shortages in the late 1970s doomed the LAPD's team policing efforts.¹⁹ Budget problems and concerns about rising crime rates negatively impacted community-policing efforts in Detroit in the mid-1980s.²⁰ And has been noted, the leader in community-based policing efforts, Houston, although maintaining some community-based policing strategies, has been forced by rising workloads and strained budgets to return to more traditional policing methods.

The literature also suggests some additional difficulties with community-based policing which police managers would be wise to consider. Criminal Justice Professor David Bayley expresses concern that community-based policing may send a message to police officers and the community that departments now want a "soft" approach to crime control.²¹ Other problems noted by Bayley are the improper influence of special interest groups, a dualistic appropriation of resources between affluent and poorer communities, reduction of supervision and operational oversight by

managers, and the replacement of professional standards with uneven community standards.²² In addition, he writes:

Community policing provides a new and less demanding rationale for the police at the very moment when the traditional justification is failing. Massive research on the efficacy of the police undertaken during the past 20 years has been singularly unsuccessful in demonstrating any connection between public safety and the numbers of police, budgetary expenditures, or dominant strategies such as random mobile patrolling, rapid emergency response, or specialized criminal investigation. The accumulatory evidence has reinforced the findings of criminologists that neither the police nor the larger criminal justice system has much leverage over criminal offending.²³

Beyond our failure to recognize some of the weaknesses of both the traditional and community-based policing models, which are somewhat external issues, there are also internal management issues which create formidable obstacles to a transition to community-based policing.

First is the assumption that through leadership and training, the incredibly strong traditional police culture can be changed. Except for perhaps the U.S. military, it is doubtful a stronger organizational culture can be found than within police departments.²⁴ It was that culture which negatively impacted Detroit's efforts to implement community-based policing strategies.²⁵ And as already mentioned, Houston has struggled with its implementation of community or neighborhood-oriented policing. It is noteworthy that the overwhelming majority of Houston's

police officers, who have probably received more training in the philosophy and practice of community-based policing than any other group of officers in the country, remain skeptical of the efficacy of the model.²⁶

Serious questions also exist about both the abilities of police personnel which may be thrust into the new demands of a community-based policing model, and about the ability of police managers at all levels to manage the change.²⁷ Under a community-based policing model, police managers must change their style of supervision and management to a more open, flexible, democratic approach and away from the mechanistic, centralized, control-oriented model found in most departments, especially large police departments.²⁸ The negative effects of the rigid control-oriented style of management upon organizational innovation are well-recognized.²⁹ That perceived need for strong managerial control by some police executives may be difficult to overcome.

A related concern is simply whether line officers will be able to meet the demands required of them under community-based policing. Criminologists Lisa Reichers and Roy Roberg note that the skills and abilities to handle the ever more complex policing task require an individual with "a high degree of intelligence, open-mindedness, and non-prejudicial attitudes."³⁰ Such skills and abilities, they conclude, are usually found in individuals with a college degree. But ironically, unlike the last time reformers tried to transition from the military to a more community-oriented model (late 1960s, early 1970s), today the importance of advanced education for police officers

has been noticeably absent from much of the community-based policing literature. The so called "reformers" in Los Angeles have certainly missed this critical component of the community-based policing model.

THE NEW MISSION

The study's data and a review of the literature indicate that radically changing the military model in large metropolitan police departments may not be possible. Discussions with police executives have revealed the problems created within the patrol work force when customer relations strategies are emphasized by top managers at the apparent expense of aggressive responses to street crime.³¹ Perhaps a more logical approach may be to simply ask, "What is the objective, the goal, the mission of a transition to a community-oriented policing model?" While the prevailing wisdom is that the entire organization must "share the vision" for community-based policing to really "take hold," thoughtful consideration, in light of considerable empirical data suggesting such a goal to be impossible, questions the validity of that assumption.

As with most organizational designs, there is likely to be one best way. Thus, rather than try to fit every officer into the same organizational mold, a better strategy may be to first consider the organization's future goals as they relate to community-based policing, and create an operational model that will work in the internal and external environments likely to be encountered by large California police departments five and ten years downline.

The purpose behind the demand for police departments to embrace the community-based model are numerous. Put simply, it is to make the only governmental institution which has a virtual monopoly on the legitimate right to use force (sometimes lethal), more sensitive to the needs and concerns of the public (to create a more "user-friendly" police department). Admittedly, past attempts to put a softer spin on a department's operations while ignoring the role of the street officer in good customer relations has been a mistake. It has rarely worked in creating a more sensitive, customer-driven police department. But attempts to transform every officer into a community-based policing officer has not worked very well either.

However, as the trend and event data developed in the study suggest, it is unlikely police departments will be allowed to simply continue in their current military, reactive style. Therefore, a policing model needs to be developed which takes the talents and initiative of those officers who can and want to expand their expertise and responsibilities beyond the narrow roles found in the military model, and blends those officers and their policing strategies into the mainstream of street police work.

A HYBRID MODEL?

In spite of the well-intentioned efforts by reform-minded citizens, elected officials, and the police, substantive changes to the response-driven, military model appear to have been sporadic and minimal. Changes in top management, changes in fiscal pictures, intractable police culture, and the demands for public protection over public service strategies have been just some of the significant barriers to a large-scale change in the American policing model.

Another barrier may also be the insistence by the so-called experts that in order to successfully implement community-based policing, the concept of service and community orientation must permeate the thinking and attitudes of everyone in the organization.³² It is implied, that failure to get everyone involved in, and supportive of, community-based policing is a formula for failure. But expecting such radical changes in thinking by line personnel may be unrealistic. Converting all or even most line personnel into enthusiastic community-oriented, problem solving police officers may be impossible. The nature of the work of patrol officers, along with the tendency for departments to attract action-oriented individuals, results in a strong sub-culture supportive of the traditional policing models. The chances of converting all or most line personnel into enthusiastic community-oriented problem-solving police officers is doubtful.

Creating a special cadre of community-based policing officers, as was done in early community-based policing efforts, has been widely dismissed as a poor strategy, and one to be avoided.³³ But perhaps it has been the insistence that everyone become community and service-oriented police officers that has been one of the more formidable obstacles of all. The stubborn belief that all line personnel would want, or even could, embrace the broad and somewhat nebulous requirements of the community-based policing model may have handicapped previous efforts at achieving a more modest, but a more permanent change to the organization, its culture, and its structure.

It is possible that this well-intentioned but perhaps impossible goal of radically changing the policing style of large urban police departments has been too much to realistically expect. Given

the obstacles and the realities of the urban policing environment, a somewhat scaled-down, hybrid model which blends the current reform model with a more community service/problem-solving approach may be more likely to be successful in the future. Similar models in the past have failed, perhaps not because of flawed methodology, but because police managers failed to remain committed to such efforts in the face of rising crime rates and reduced resources.

A STRATEGIC PLAN

The outcome of the study was the creation of a policing model which synthesizes the traditional, problem-oriented, and community-based policing models, taking into account the realities of policing major urban areas. A strategic plan was developed which identified 17 alternative strategies aimed at creating a more customer driven, service, and results-oriented policing style within the LAPD. Refining those strategies and consideration of current and future trends resulted in a model which addresses the needs of responsiveness to the community, problem-solving, community-police partnerships, and rapid patrol response. Given the realities and the obstacles of urban policing today, this synthesized or hybrid model may be one method of integrating a community-based policing style into the traditional model. This hybrid model has the following key components:

- * Police Advisory Councils
- * Senior Lead Officer
- * Internal/External Support Resources
- * Community Policing Center
- * Mobile Substation Unit

Senior Lead Officers

There is considerable anecdotal evidence that specialized units dealing with specific community problems and in concert with community residents can achieve results.³⁴ What is frequently missing, however, is the integration of these specialized units into the organization's structure in such a way as to make them part of the patrol operation itself. Separate chains-of-command sometimes foster an elitist attitude and create tangible separation and, thus, a bifurcation between community problem-solving strategies and necessary reactive patrol operations.

But it is suggested that a department's goal of becoming more responsive to community needs and problems can be achieved by creating a group of customer service, problem-solving police officers working in tandem with patrol division operations. In Los Angeles, modest success has been achieved over the years when individual patrol captains allowed their senior lead officers (officers with 24-hour responsibility for a patrol beat) to work full time as a community public safety problem-solver.³⁵ Unfortunately, as in some departments, when chiefs come and go, or captains rotate, priorities change. The first step in creating a community-based policing model in Los Angeles has to be the long-term commitment to assigning community problem-solving responsibilities to the senior lead officers, and to allow them to fill that role on a full-time basis.

The increasing complexity of the social environment in which police officers must work almost mandates specialization. Getting to know the community, its residents, its resources, and its problems, takes time. And while one goal of community-based policing is to assign officers to a particular community for a protracted period of time, countless factors make such a strategy

within the patrol environment difficult in Los Angeles. Therefore, the creation of a community problem-solving specialist is critical to the development of a hybrid model.

The role of this senior lead officer specialist can be illustrated by an automotive analogy used by a local police chief. If you had a problem with your car's carburetor, you would take it to the local auto parts store. There, the parts specialist would listen to your problem and then consult parts manuals to find the resource(s) which would solve your problem.³⁶ It would be nice if every line officer was sufficiently trained to know where to look to solve some of the complex and labor-intensive community problems which exist today. Unfortunately, they are not.

But the senior lead officer needs support as well. For over 20 years, in Los Angeles, the senior lead officer has been required to turn to the eight other officers assigned to his or her basic car beat to attempt to work on a particular crime problem. Directed patrol strategies by officers assigned to a basic car remain a valuable asset for responding to community crime problems. However, the volume of radio calls, plus the fact that many problems require long-term approaches using resources external to the department have made the basic car generally ineffective in assisting senior lead officers solve community problems.

Police Advisory Councils

Rebuilding trust and community cooperation is important for the LAPD. The creation of Police Advisory Councils (PACs) in each of LAPD's geographic service areas is critical to that goal. PACs should consist of representatives of the numerous communities found within Los Angeles.

The benefits of the PACs are numerous. A closer working relationship between the police officers in an area and community members would develop over time. Police officers and their supervisors, most of whom live considerable distances from the communities they service, will learn about the problems and community needs from those in the best position to regularly provide that information. Sensitivity to the different policing needs of various communities would be greater among officers and their supervisors. As future demands for accountability increase, these advisory councils will provide a critical community involvement vehicle to educate the public and the police and diffuse community tension and conflict.

Internal/External Support Resources


In order to succeed as community ombudsmen or community service officers, senior lead officers need resources from both the department and the community. Significant support for a senior lead officer's problem-solving efforts can be achieved by assigning two police officers to each senior lead officer as problem-solving resources on a full-time basis. As mentioned, the literature has been critical of the bifurcation of community-based policing operations from patrol operations. Much of that criticism is justified. But the gap between the two operations can be partially bridged by the assignment of two officers from patrol to work with each senior lead officer. By rotating these officers in and out of patrol duties (perhaps in six-month assignments), over a period of a couple of years, a critical mass of patrol officers will have been trained in and worked in the community-based policing environment. Although some officers may never come to view residents as partners in their department's crime and problem-solving efforts, the many officers who rotate through an extended assignment working with the senior lead officers most

likely will. The strong Los Angeles Police Department military-style culture will only be affected through such a bottom-up approach. Training alone is insufficient.


But senior lead officers and the officers assigned to them as problem solving experts need both information about community concerns and knowledge and expertise about the various resources which can be used to reduce or resolve community problems. The complexity of that process and the role of the senior lead officers within it is illustrated by the following impact network.

SENIOR LEAD IMPACT NETWORK

Input Sources



Problem Solving Resources



The impact network depicts a comprehensive, though not exhaustive list of input sources which bring to a senior lead officer's attention the many quality-of-life issues they must deal with. Such

problems are usually beyond the capabilities in terms of time and expertise of the senior lead officers' basic car officers. Thus, the need for two assigned officers to work with senior lead officers.

In turn, senior lead officers need to know about the resources they can call upon to resolve community problems. This takes training and considerable time in developing relationships between department personnel and other city entities. The better the senior lead officer (and his or her team of problem solving officers) understands what resources are available, the more likely problems can be resolved.

Community Policing Center

As the data in the study show, the demand for customer sensitivity and involvement will continue to grow over the next ten years. To break down the formidable barriers between the police and their customers, the LAPD should open neighborhood police centers in each basic car area within each of its 18 geographic service areas. These centers should become the focal point of the senior lead officers' operations. Donated storefront space is readily available throughout the city, thus, cost to the department would be minimal.

As a base of operations, the senior lead officers and their support officers will be more accessible to members of the community. For the centers to be effective, senior lead officers must develop a volunteer cadre to staff the facilities for longer business hours. With sufficient training, volunteers (or even light-duty personnel) can take reports and provide information and guidance to local residents. For the cost of a telephone and perhaps utilities, the department can put customer service

representatives out in the communities where they belong, not back in a fortress-like police facility many miles away.

Mobile Substation Unit

In a city of 470 square miles, and which has a severe shortage of patrol officers, a visible, tangible police presence, especially in crime-ridden inner-city neighborhoods is essential. Visible police responsiveness to customer complaints can be achieved by the deployment of a mobile substation in each of the Los Angeles Police Department's 18 patrol areas. For about \$80,000 (approximately the cost of a police officer's salary and benefits for one year), these motorhome-sized mobile police stations can be deployed for extended periods in areas where police presence can provide not only a deterrent to criminal activity, but customer peace of mind as well. Working with a squad of gang officers or special problems officers in a neighborhood, mobile substations demonstrate a visible show of police presence where footbeats and bicycle patrols often fail. The rapid deployment of these units to specific customer complaints, or where statistics indicate persistent crime problems, are integral to the achievement of the goal of responsiveness to the public.

TO THE FUTURE

A great deal has been written about a new era for policing in America. What structure or style will result remains unclear. And it is safe to say that the model will vary among agencies. It is also safe to say that significant variables, such as reduced resources, rising workloads and crime rates, traditional police culture, and the abilities and motivation of the patrol workforce, to name a few, will significantly affect an agency's ability to implement a community-based policing model.

Unfortunately, past experience with radical transformations of large urban police departments do not give one a sense of optimism about the future of community-based policing. There is certainly a great deal of evidence to suggest that the model may be more rhetoric than a workable police services delivery system. Community-based policing certainly has its share of critics. As political scientist and UCLA Professor James Q. Wilson recently stated:

I believe that in ten years the LAPD will look much as it does now. Community-based policing is really just a way for politicians to appear to be doing something about crime while escaping their responsibility to give the department the three to four thousand police officers it needs to do its job.³⁷

Do the realities of delivering public safety services in large urban environments mean that a service-oriented model cannot be achieved? Only if any strategic attempt at such change is not carefully planned and considers the numerous and formidable obstacles. And only if realistic and achievable goals are set. Without question, rising gang and narcotics related violence, increasing patrol workloads, and the fear of crime will continue to make the traditional policing model difficult to replace or significantly modify.

However, the data developed in this study seem to point to three possible futures for community-based policing in large California police departments: Abandonment of community-based policing efforts to the traditional model (again); a proliferation of police executives who voice the rhetoric of community-based policing, but who actually understand little of the concept or truly practice community-based policing within their departments; or, substantial philosophical, structural, and operational changes within departments which result in the substantive practice of

community-based policing. If anecdotal evidence, the literature, and the data developed in the Command College study are indications, a synthesized or hybrid model may be the most likely future of the community-based policing model within large California police departments.

CONCLUSION

The 1990s will no doubt be turbulent times for America's most visible representative of government, its uniformed police. Policing models will no doubt be affected by a myriad of social, political and economic forces. But many important questions remain unanswered. Can large police departments make the transition from the traditional model to a community-based model in light of the formidable obstacles to such a transition? Will community-based policing become simply another circumlocution of policing? Will service-oriented models finally live up to their promise? Or, because of the questionable efficacy of traditional policing and the unproven promises of community-based policing, along with serious cost-benefit questions, will a new model unimaginable today be developed by the early 21st century? The privatization of policing marched inexorably onward.

There are also other serious questions to consider. In this increasingly complex, heterogeneous, multi-cultural urban environment, what type of patrol officer will be needed to ensure the successful operation of a community-based policing model? Will two types of cops emerge - one a group of urban crime-fighters, the other skilled in community relations and team building? What educational and training levels will be required? And what skills will police managers need to be successful within a community-based policing environment?

These are but a few of the significant questions facing police and political leaders as they attempt to transform large metropolitan police departments into a new era of policing. They certainly warrant consideration as areas for further research. That policing in Los Angeles, and elsewhere, will change over the next ten years is certain. The effects of such change and its value to the customer, however, remain problematic questions.

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- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 227.
- ²² *Ibid.*, 228-235.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 228.
- ²⁴ Lee Brown, "A Finger in the Dike," Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1993, sect. B, p. 7.
- ²⁵ Skolnick and Bayley, The New Blue Line, 77-80.
- ²⁶ Hoover, Police Management, 23.
- ²⁷ Lisa M. Reichers and Roy R. Roberg, "Community Policing: A Critical Review of Underlying Assumptions," Journal of Police Science and Administration 17 (February, 1990): 111-112.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 112.
- ²⁹ Thomas A. Stewart, "The Search for the Organization of Tomorrow," Fortune, May 18, 1992, 93.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 111.
- ³¹ Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Shaping and Serving the Community: The Role of the Police Chief Executive," in Police Leadership in America, ed. William A. Geller (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1985): 62.
- ³² Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, Community Policing, xiii.
- ³³ Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Shaping and Serving the Community: The Role of the Police Chief Executive," in Police Leadership in America, ed. William A. Geller (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1985): 62.
- ³⁴ Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing, 58.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 58.
- ³⁶ Deladuranty, Interview, Feb. 23, 1993.

³⁷ James Q. Wilson, UCLA Professor of Political Science, telephonic interview by author, Jan. 6, 1993, Cerritos, CA.

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WHAT WILL BE THE STATUS OF COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING IN LARGE CALIFORNIA POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY THE YEAR 2003?

**TECHNICAL REPORT
BY
GREGORY R. BERG
COMMAND COLLEGE XVI
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
1993**

This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future--creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in the Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

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INTRODUCTION

Study project background, reasons for studying the research question, and the importance of the issue

INTRODUCTION

The next ten years are likely to be turbulent times for California's densely populated cities. Increasing population and concomitant demands for social services, along with decreases in tax revenues and available public funds, will have significant impact upon the quality of life in many cities during the 1990s. Although most people can remember back a few years or decades to a more orderly, predictable and, to some, a more pleasant California, that era is gone forever. California of the early 21st century, at least in urban areas, will be vastly different.

Emphasizing the significance of this new social environment are futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Recently they wrote, "The fact is that almost all the major systems on which our society depends - from the transportation system and health system to the postal system and the educational system - are in simultaneous crises."¹ The literature is replete with warnings of future problems of urban overcrowding, a failing public infrastructure, and budgetary shortages for public services.² While the number of problems facing government is likely to continue to rise during the 1990s, sufficient increases in fiscal resources and the leadership required to meet those and many other challenges facing public officials and decision-makers will likely remain problematic.

The police, particularly the patrol officer on the street, finds himself or herself in the middle of this vast arena of social change at a time when the "social glue" so important for the maintenance of order within communities is eroding.³ Americans have turned to the police for protection for over 100 years. But over the next decade, the ability of police departments and their personnel to meet

those past and future expectations, and to accomplish the police mission, frequently described as preventing and deterring crime, will be doubtful, if not altogether impossible.⁴

Within this turbulent environment come increasing demands to change the policing model from the traditional, professional, or military design to a community-based policing strategy.⁵ Such efforts are not really new. The urban riots in the U.S. during the 1960s resulted in policing strategies in the 1970s which emphasized community relations and community police partnerships such as neighborhood watch. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, increasing support for more personal, community-oriented policing approaches developed. But it took a videotaped incident of excessive police malpractice in Los Angeles on March 3, 1991, to focus national attention upon the effectiveness of the policing model in the country's second largest city, and other major metropolitan police departments as well. The ill-fated Rodney King police beating has resulted in community leaders, elected officials, and police officers themselves, eschewing the traditional model of policing and demanding it be replaced with community-based policing strategies. Community-based policing, it has been claimed, is the best policing method to enhance public confidence in the police, create a better working relationship between the community and the police, and to combat and eliminate specific community crime problems.⁶

Community-based policing has been given a variety of definitions. By some, the concept has been called the next era of policing philosophy and the next stage beyond the political and reform eras of policing.⁷ Expanding the traditional model's primary emphasis upon rapid response and crime suppression strategies, the community-based model involves "problem-solving techniques, strategic

utilization of resources, and increasingly sophisticated investigative techniques."⁸ Most importantly, the model emphasizes community-police partnerships, recognizing that the police, by themselves, cannot solve or resolve community problems.⁹ Foot patrols to encourage closer police-resident interaction, storefronts and substations, and local police-community advisory groups are some of the strategies community-based policing employs to put the public in a closer working relationship with their police.

Unfortunately, significant reform of municipal policing in America, while both necessary and long overdue, is neither a small nor inexpensive task. Given that police departments constitute the major share of most city budgets, police managers, public officials, and politicians must carefully consider the costs, benefits, and the potential for success before attempting to transition from the traditional model to a community-based strategy. The responsibility for preventing and deterring crime, as well as solving community problems, are major social service responsibilities for local police. They may also be impossible mandates.¹⁰ Without a clear understanding of what community-based policing can and cannot do, programmatic changes, no matter how well intentioned, are likely doomed to failure.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISSUE AND SUB-ISSUES

The purpose of this research project is to examine the emerging trends and events which may influence the movement by large California police departments toward a community-based model of policing. The issue and sub-issues were developed through discussions with police managers from several police departments in Los Angeles County, a review of relevant literature, and

discussions with POST staff and consultants. There was a consensus that both external and internal forces will result in more open, community-oriented policing styles in police departments of all sizes in California over the next ten years. However, there was also a noteworthy lack of consensus as to how successful police departments will be in transitioning from the traditional style of policing to a community-based policing model.

The issue identified for study in this research project was:

WHAT WILL BE THE STATUS OF COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING IN LARGE CALIFORNIA POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY THE YEAR 2003?

To further refine the study, and to more clearly delineate its scope, a brainstorming group and an impact network (described in detail in Section One of the study) were used to develop the following sub-issues:

1. What social/cultural forces will determine the future of the community-based policing model?
2. What economic forces will affect the transition to a community-based policing model?
3. What conceptual model of police service may result?

STUDY FORMAT

This project is presented as a three part technical report which analyzes trend and event data relevant to the future management of any police department operating in large metropolitan areas

within California. Those data were then used to develop a strategic plan and a transition management plan specifically designed to implement a community-based policing model within the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

In Section One, Defining the Future, trends and events concerning budgetary issues, impacts of social forces such as immigration, gangs, and narcotics, and management and political concerns were identified and analyzed as to their potential impact upon the issue and sub-issues. In Section Two, Strategic Management, a strategic plan for the implementation of a community-based policing model was developed. In Section Three, Transition Management, policies and strategies were reviewed, and a plan for transition to a future state was outlined. Responsibilities for implementing a community-based policing model, and the components of that model are presented.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The development of policing in America as it transitioned from a period of political corruption into the current reform style of policing is a complex history which has been well-documented.¹¹

It is not the intent of this project to conduct an exhaustive review of relevant literature and present a comprehensive study of all of the variables that may affect the evolution of the community-based policing movement. Rather, the study examines some strategic issues which may affect large municipal police departments as they attempt to assess what the marketplace for policing services may look like five to ten years downline. By using the data collected and analyzed in this study, and applying those data to the largest police department in California, the

LAPD, relevant issues are identified and addressed. For the purpose of the study, large municipal police departments are defined as those with over 200 sworn officers. There are currently 43 such departments in California.¹²

BACKGROUND

Why is this issue important? Simply because, like so many social institutions, police departments in California are being buffeted by numerous social forces ranging from economic, to population and workload increases, to a demand for results and accountability. Will community-based policing provide the strategies which will allow police departments to effectively deal with their changing environments, or is it simply the latest police fad that is more form than substance?

In these turbulent times, these are important questions for police managers in departments of all sizes to ponder and attempt to answer. But those in the policing profession with a few hash marks on their sleeves must wonder if they have not been down the same path before. Shortly after the urban riots of the 1960s, Criminologist A.C. Germann wrote:

The future is bleak, indeed, if the American police department continues to meet today's problems with yesterday's attitudes and habits. The philosophy of social control must be reconsidered, with a resultant redefinition of criminal statutes and a more broad role for police so that they become less narrowly repressive and military and more obviously dedicated to protection and service. A well-educated, highly-motivated, friendly-appearing public safety officer, public welfare officer, human affairs officer, public safety officer - whatever name used - should replace the repressively oriented and frightening policeman.¹³

Such was the prevailing academic wisdom and theory of the time. Improved community relations, better educated police, and early efforts at community-based policing strategies (team policing was a leading one) resulted. And while policing innovations did flourish in some American cities,¹⁴ in spite of all of the planning, all the expense at re-engineering police departments, and all the rhetoric, have fundamental changes in American policing really occurred? And why should police managers and the public believe that after over 20 years of effort at police reform, with little change in policing methods, fundamental changes to policing strategies can be achieved in the 1990s? The answer is that there may simply be no other choice but to carefully evaluate and plan new policing strategies or risk total collapse of public support. The result could be widespread dismantling and consolidation of municipal police departments throughout California.

But to increase the likelihood that a department can truly implement a community-based policing model, it will take much more than a desire by political leaders, police managers, and the public. It will take a careful assessment of what community-based policing is and is not, and an evaluation of the significant barriers to its implementation. It will also take carefully developed strategic and transition management plans. This project assesses the future of community-based policing in large metropolitan police departments in the context of present and future trends and events which may shape the development of the model. The outcome is a strategic and transition management plan which is achievable in light of current and future environmental realities.

SECTION ONE:

DEFINING THE FUTURE

Identifying trends, events, and issues affecting the future of community-based policing in large California police departments.

ISSUE AND SUB-ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

As discussed in the Introduction, police executives are being confronted by a new and rapidly changing environment. Twentieth century social institutions are becoming increasingly obsolete.¹⁵ The homogeneity that once existed in many communities has given way to a heterogeneity which affects peoples' thinking, their families, and how people organize as an economy and a culture.¹⁶ America, and the entire globe, is transitioning into what Peter Drucker calls the "knowledge society."¹⁷

At the same time, communities are suffering from rising unemployment, fiscal problems, and increasing demands for services. California experienced 38 percent of all job losses in the United States from June, 1990, through December, 1992.¹⁸ Population in the six-county Los Angeles region is expected to increase from the current 15 million to 21 million residents by the year 2010.¹⁹ And crime continues seemingly unabated at a level unimaginable just a few short years ago.

In a recent Post Command College study examining future policing strategies in medium and smaller California police departments, Robert Harrison wrote:


The mission, goals, and strategies of police agencies will undergo significant changes in the next ten years. One need look no further than the daily and weekly periodicals to gain a sense of fundamental change in government service and structure. The demands for reform and a reinvention of how public agencies fund and deliver their services continue to swell. The transition into the government entity of the future will require quantum changes in the paradigm of what government is supposed to do.²⁰

Part of that reinvention of public agencies involves the increasing demand for police reform. An analysis of what and how changing social forces will affect that reform is needed. To that end, the following futures issue question was formulated as the basis of seeking an answer to some of the endemic problems facing police leaders in California today.

WHAT WILL BE THE STATUS OF COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING IN LARGE CALIFORNIA POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY THE YEAR 2003?

In order to develop a comprehensive answer to the futures research question, within the limitations of the study, three sub-issues were developed through the use of the following impact network:

IMPACT NETWORK



Based upon the impact network process, the following three sub-issues were included in the study:

- * What social/cultural forces will determine the future of the community-based policing model?
- * What economic forces will affect the transition to a community-based policing model?
- * What conceptual model of police service may result?

ENVIRONMENTAL SCANNING

Identifying additional relevant trends and events which might affect the issue over the next ten years was accomplished by a further review of the literature conducted from the summer of 1991 through the end of 1992. A futures file was created consisting of articles from journals covering topics ranging from policing to politics as well as books, business publications, and various magazines and newspapers.

LITERATURE REVIEW

That there are significant problems facing municipal police agencies in California is widely acknowledged by police managers, elected officials, and the general public. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler write:

"Our courts and prisons are so overcrowded that convicted felons walk free. And many of our proudest cities and states are virtually bankrupt. Our cities succumb to mounting crime and poverty, our states are handcuffed by staggering deficits."²¹

But while economic and political factors will greatly influence policing in California's large metropolitan areas in the future, it was the event of March 3, 1991, in Los Angeles which may have

provided the greatest impetus toward reform of not only the LAPD, but many other police departments as well.

Public outcry resulting from the videotaped police beating of motorist Rodney King swept not only Los Angeles, but California, the United States and even foreign countries. This graphic example of police malpractice, which even two years later continues to be televised into communities throughout the world, will keep the demand for police reform high on the social issues agenda for years to come. One outcome was critical reviews of both the LAPD in 1991, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department in 1992.

The Report of the Independent Commission of the Los Angeles Police Department begins by stating, "The Rodney King beating stands as a landmark in the recent history of law enforcement, comparable to the Scottsboro case in 1931 and the Serpico case in 1967."²² This comprehensive review of the LAPD devoted an entire chapter to an analysis of the LAPD's military model of policing and suggested that community-based policing "has developed and gained increased acceptance in the 1980s and is seen by many as the preferred policing style of the future."²³

A similar study of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department published one year following the Christopher Commission Report also addressed the subject of community-based policing. The "Kolts" report stated, "We view the immediate, Department-wide implementation of community policing as our single most important recommendation for the reduction of excessive force."²⁴

Change in policing styles and methodology will surely occur. However, the apparent unquestioned acceptance of the community model and the demand for immediate transition to it should be

thoughtfully considered as to the potential barriers and obstacles which may affect a department's attempt to implement community-based policing, especially large metropolitan police departments. Good ideas, good theories, good programs - all are likely to fail without proper consideration by managers as to potential barriers which can negatively impact planning, development, and implementation of strategic change.²⁵

There is no question innovation in American policing is occurring across the country.²⁶ But are these innovations the logical evolution of policing strategy or, like team policing, are they fads to be tried but which are doomed to failure when removed from the classroom to the harsh realities of our inner cities? There is certainly substantive evidence that this may be the case.

Under Chief Lee Brown, Houston broke new ground in the early 1980s by implementing Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (NOP). Houston has been widely recognized as the model city for community-based policing reform. Unfortunately, its police department was unable to live up to earlier reviews²⁷. In a recent audit of the Houston Police Department, a management consultant wrote:

The Houston Police Department has, in recent years, struggled to expand its traditional enforcement role to embrace Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (NOP). The core tenet of NOP - making officers more aware and responsive to neighborhood problems - is well conceived. The Department's implementation of NOP has, however, faced a number of difficulties and has not produced any comprehensive improvement in performance. The results of the Department's NOP initiative appear quite limited in their tangible effects on citizens' security and quality of life.²⁸

Literature on community-based policing implementation strategies definitely contains mixed results. To many observers, community-based police is the policing model of the future. But past experiences in

major cities such as Houston, Los Angeles, Tulsa, Dallas, and Detroit indicate that the results may not live up to the promise.

Will community-based policing work, or should it even be attempted in major metropolitan police departments such as the LAPD, in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Oakland, San Francisco, or Torrance? Municipal funding is too precious to simply accede to the demands or the whims of the politicians, the media, or the public without more careful study and evaluation. Such a large scale organizational change requires careful study and evaluation, or risks repeating the mistakes of the past.

BRAINSTORMING

In the Spring of 1992, an eight member brainstorming panel comprised of law enforcement and civilian public sector managers and one business executive met to study the issue and sub-issues, and to suggest trends and events they believed to be relevant for further study and analysis. Members of the pannel were:

- * Peter DiCarlo, Budget Analyst, City Administrators Office, City of Los Angeles
- * Linda Bunker, Information Systems Manager and Commanding Officer, Emergency Command Control, Communications System Division, Los Angeles Police Department
- * Ken Crouse, Officer-In-Charge, Civilian Employment Section, Los Angeles Police Department
- * Joe Bonino, Commanding Officer, Records and Identification Division, Los Angeles Police Department
- * Estella Lopez, Executive Director, Miracle on Broadway, Business Association
- * Captain Mike Post, Glendale Police Department
- * Commander Art Lopez, Los Angeles Police Department
- * Commander Dave Gascon, Los Angeles Police Department

Prior to the half-day meeting they were briefed on the purpose of the meeting and the study, and were also informed of the issue and sub-issues. During the brainstorming process, panel members were asked to suggest trends and events they believed might impact the issue and sub-issues. Discussion for the purposes of clarification followed some of the suggested trends and events, but all trends and events offered by panel members are included in the following lists:

Trends

1. Police-community partnerships
2. Public demand for police accountability
3. Community racial conflicts/division
4. Privatized criminal investigation
5. Service assessment districts for law enforcement
6. Hispanic community population increases
7. Undocumented alien impact on government resources
8. Cost of "doing business" to fund police operations
9. Local funding support for law enforcement
10. Contracting/outsourcing for some policing services
11. Cities contracting for all policing services
12. Demand for community policing strategies
13. Level of resident control of police departments
14. Effect of population changes upon police workload
15. Level of police department cohesion or coalescence
16. Patrol officer formal education level
17. Public demand for tough law enforcement
18. Public fear of crime
19. Gang/narcotics violence in communities
20. Patrol officer workload
21. Ability of police to impact community crime problems
22. Acceptance of C.B.P. by line personnel
23. Ability police to affect community quality of life
24. Private security services involvement in C.B.P.
25. Department's top management commitment to C.B.P.

Events

1. Unemployment reaches 12 percent in California
2. All new officers must have two years of college
3. Bachelor's degree required for police promotion
4. State no longer provides Proposition 13 "bail out" funds
5. City disbands police department - contracts with Sheriff
6. Private policing agencies are accredited
7. Law enabling special assessment districts for police
8. "Hard" narcotics decriminalized
9. Internal racial incident polarized police workforce
10. Major civil disturbance occurs
11. New mayor elected on tough law enforcement platform
12. New chief of police returns to military policing model
13. Six county L. A. region population reaches 15 million
14. Bond measure to hire new officers passes
15. Women make up 43 percent of department's work force
16. Military rank titles eliminated
17. Budget shortfall closes police geographic divisions
18. Baccalaureate degree required for new hires
19. Major corruption scandal occurs in substation
20. State financial cutbacks drastically curtail City's ability to fund police department
21. Police department jurisdictional boundaries reduced -City contract with Sheriff's department
22. Cities allowed to pass local bonds with 51% of vote.
23. Gang problem results in joint INS/police task forces.
24. Civilian Review Board created.

FUTURES FORECASTING

In January, 1993, a ten-member modified conventional Delphi (MCD) panel was created to further refine the list of trends and events, and to engage in a futures forecasting process of the final list of seven trends and seven events selected for further study.

Panel members included:

- * John Eck, Assistant Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum
- * Superintendent Chris Braiden, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, Police Department
- * Chief Paul Walters, Santa Ana Police Department
- * Sergeant Dominic Licavoli, Los Angeles Police Department
- * Deputy Chief Mark Kroeker, Los Angeles Police Department
- * Estella Lopez, Executive Director, Miracle on Broadway Business Association
- * Cheryl Wilson, Building Manager and Director, Spring Street Business Association
- * Dr. Kenneth Hickman, President, Law Enforcement Consulting Services
- * Chief Joseph Deladurantey, Torrance Police Department
- * Dr. Nels Klyver, Training Administrator, Los Angeles Police Department:

The MCD panel members were individuals with a range of public and private sector organizational experience and backgrounds affording them insight into the study issue and sub-issues. They were initially contacted telephonically and the purpose of the project and the MCD process was explained. Panel members were sent a follow-up letter containing a detailed explanation of the MCD process (adapted from a similar letter developed by Ken Petterson, Command College Class 12, Appendix One). Included in the letter was the list of trends and events developed through the brainstorming process. Members were also asked to include any additional trends or events they believed relevant by writing them on the forms as they participated in the MCD process. Three trends and one event were added during the MCD process and are part of the lists previously presented.

The MCD process consisted of three rounds (all conducted by fax). The first round asked panel members to rank the entire list of trends and events in order of their perceived importance or impact

upon the issue and sub-issues. The results of the first round were analyzed by this writer and seven trends and seven events were selected for further study based upon their high level of ranking by the MCD panel and their level of impact upon the issue and sub-issues as perceived by this writer. It was deemed important that the selected trends and events include a broad range of topics so that all three sub issues would be addressed. All of the selected trends and events were ranked in the top ten by the MCD panel members.

The second round of the MCD process involved sending trends and event forecasting charts to MCD panel members asking them to submit five and ten year forecasts for the seven trends and events. Once these data were collected and median forecasts determined for each trend and event, a final round involved sending median forecast data back to the panel members and asking them to review their previous responses, and modify their forecasts if they wished to do so. Slight changes to the trend forecasts were re-submitted by two panel members. One member made minor adjustments to his event forecasts.

TREND IDENTIFICATION

Trends selected for final study and analyses were:

- T1. **LEVEL OF POLICE BUDGET SUPPORT** - The willingness of a city to provide **funding** requested by a department to meet service and workload demands.
- T2. **LEVEL OF COMMUNITY-POLICE RELATIONSHIPS** - The amount of trust, faith and confidence the community has in its police department to treat all people fairly and equitably.
- T3. **LEVEL OF RESPONSIVENESS TO COMMUNITY NEEDS** - The willingness of police officers, supervisors, and managers to be sensitive to and respond to what residents and communities want their policing priorities to be.

- T4. **LEVEL OF DEMAND FOR POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY** - The demand to which police officers, supervisors, and managers will be held accountable for both proper and professional conduct, but also for program results.
- T5. **LEVEL OF PUBLIC FEAR OF CRIME** - The degree to which people are concerned to a significant degree about the level of overall crime in their community and their potential for criminal victimization.
- T6. **LEVEL OF EFFECT OF GANG/NARCOTICS VIOLENCE UPON NEIGHBORHOOD** - The degree to which visible narcotics trafficking and gang violence impacts peoples' perception of neighborhood safety and quality of life.
- T7. **LEVEL OF ACCEPTANCE OF COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING BY OFFICERS AND SUPERVISORS** - The willingness of line officers and their supervisors to accept and practice community-based policing strategies.

While some trends did not make the final list, many panel members noted the increase of private security patrols in many communities which, until recently, has been observed primarily in wealthier neighborhoods.²⁹ Several panel members also observed a trend in the creation of special assessment districts to fund such patrols and other crime prevention strategies in both residential and business communities.³⁰

EVENT IDENTIFICATION

Events selected for final study and analysis were:

- E1. A major civil disturbance occurs in the city.
- E2. A new mayor is elected on a tough law enforcement platform.
- E3. A local bond measure is approved to hire a significant number of new officers.
- E4. State initiative is approved allowing cities to pass local bonds with 51 percent of vote.
- E5. State financial cutbacks drastically curtail cities' ability to fund police department.
- E6. Increase of immigrant gangs forces joint action between police and the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)/Border Patrol.
- E7. Community demand for outside review process results in the creation of a civilian review board.

FORECASTING TRENDS AND EVENTS

Trend Forecasting

Table One shows the median response from panel members for the seven trends. In order for panel members to have the same point of reference, a value of 100 was given to the current level (1993) of the trend. While the lower limit of a trend can go to zero (when a trend no longer exists), there are no upper limits. The panel was asked to evaluate the status of the trend in 1988, and to forecast the trend in 1998 and 2003, both as an exploratory trend (what the trend will be), and as a normative trend (what it should be). The exploratory and normative figures for each trend are the median responses from the panel. The Trend Interpretation Section, (page 21 and following), shows the low, median, high, and median of the normative responses for each trend in graph form.

Table 1

TREND STATEMENT		LEVEL OF THE TREND** (TODAY = 100)			
Trend #		5 Years Ago	Today (1993)	*Five Years From Now	*Ten Years From Now
T1	Level of Police Budgetary Support	115	100	110 140	125 150
T2	Level of Community-Police Relationships	90	100	125 150	120 190
T3	Level of Police Responsiveness to Community Needs	80	100	110 150	125 180
T4	Level of Demand for Police Accountability	75	100	120 150	130 150
T5	Level of Public Fear of Crime	75	100	120 80	150 80
T6	Level of Effect of Gang/Narcotics Violence Upon Neighborhood	85	100	120 70	130 50
T7	Level of Acceptance of Community-Based Policing by Officers/ Supervisors	50	100	125 140	150 150

**Panel Medians
N=10

*Five Years From Now
will be/
should be

*Ten Years From Now
will be/
should be

Event Forecasting

The MCD panel was then asked to forecast the probability of the seven events occurring by 1998 and by the year 2003, and to express the probability of occurrence in a percentage of 0 to 100. Panel members were also asked to estimate the number of years which would elapse until the probability of occurrence first exceeded zero. Finally, members were asked to forecast the potential positive or negative impact, on a scale of zero to ten, that an event would have on the issue if it should occur. Table Two shows the median panel forecasts for the seven events. Low, median, and high forecasts are presented in graph form in the Event Interpretation Section, (page 28 and following).

Table Two

Event No.	EVENT STATEMENT	*YEARS UNTIL PROBABILITY FIRST EXCEEDS ZERO	*PROBABILITY		IMPACT ON THE ISSUE IF THE EVENT OCCURRED	
			Five Years From Now (0-100%)	Ten Years From Now (0-100%)	*POSITIVE (0-10) Scale	*NEGATIVE (0-10) Scale
E1	Major Civil Disturbance Occurs In City	0.5	75	85	+7	-8
E2	New Mayor Elected On Tough Law Enforcement Platform	0.5	70	80	+5	-5
E3	Bond Measures Approved To Hire Significant Number Of New Officers	3.0	45	60	+8	0
E4	State Initiative Approved Allowing Cities To Pass Local Bonds With 51% Of Vote	4.0	50	55	+5	0
E5	State Financial Cutbacks Curtail Cities' Ability To Fund Police Department	0.5	50	50	0	-8
E6	Increase Of Immigrant Gangs Forces Joint Action Between Police And INS/Border Patrol	2.0	50	70	+3	-5
E7	Community Demand For Outside Review Process Results In Creation Of Review Board	2.0	60	80	+2	-4

*Panel Medians, N=10

TREND INTERPRETATION

Exploratory Trends

The panel focused on a broad array of trends with the potential to affect the probability of large metropolitan California police departments successfully implementing a community-based policing model. As with many issues concerning the future of policing in California, financial resources (T-1) were forecasted to be constrained throughout the 1990s. While the panel did expect budgetary support to increase, those increases were estimated to be, at best, one-half of the needed budgetary support over the next ten years.

The trends toward more police responsiveness to community needs and problems, (T-3), and toward the establishment of better community relationships and partnerships (T-2), were both expected to improve slightly over current levels. Unfortunately, the panel expected such improvements to fall markedly short of where they should be by the year 2003. This gap is widest when considering the establishment of better community-police relationships. The panel believed that while such relationships may improve slightly over the next five years, by the end of the ten year evaluation period, such relationships may begin to again deteriorate. The possible increase in community-police relationships over a short period of time followed by a gradual decrease is similar to what happened in the late 1960s through the early 1970s when community relations programs accelerated and then faded as workloads increased and funding began to decrease.

The panel also believed police accountability (T-4), would continue to increase from where it is now by almost one-third over ten years. Member responses covered a wide range for this trend, with some panel members believing demand for accountability would actually decrease over the ten year period, and others contending it would increase as much as 80 percent.

The fear of crime (T-5) and the effects of gang and narcotics related violence upon communities (T-6) received the widest range of responses. Responses for both trends ranged from slight decreases to over 100 percent increases over the ten year forecasting period. However, the majority of panel members believed that both trends would either decrease, or at most increase at only modest levels.

There was also disagreement as to the level of police officer and supervisor acceptance of community-based policing (T-7). Some panel members believed acceptance levels would decline over time, while others believed it would actually double. A majority believed, however, that such acceptance and support would increase considerably.

In summary, the panel focused upon what they considered to be some primary factors affecting the future of community-based policing. The necessary fiscal support for overall police operations does not appear likely to increase commensurate with rising workload demands. Community-based policing can be labor intensive, thus fiscal constraints will have negative impacts. This trend is especially important in view of the likely increase in resources devoted to community crime fighting. Gangs, narcotics, and fear of crime will continue to escalate, requiring aggressive police response.

Forging stronger community relationships will present police managers with an interesting dichotomy: Devote precious personnel resources to labor-intensive but critical community problem-solving and customer responsiveness strategies, or aggressively and visibly fight increasing crime problems. Police managers no doubt will have to do both.

The acceptance of community-based policing by line personnel is also vital to a successful transition to the model. While the panel noted a substantial increase in support five to ten years downline, the policing landscape is littered with examples of how difficult such a "buy-in" can be.

Normative Trends

There was strong consensus among the panel that police budgetary support (T-1) should increase substantially. While the median response was that a 50 percent increase was needed, responses ranged as high as a 100 percent increase in future police funding. Similarly, panel members responded that community-police relationships (T-2) and police responsiveness to customer needs (T-3) should increase dramatically. Such perceptions are in stark contrast to the panel's exploratory forecasts for these trends, which indicated only modest improvement in both areas. Clearly, organizational strategies are in order here.

Response concerning the level of police accountability were noticeably consistent for both the exploratory and normative forecasts. Trends Two, Three, and Four all clearly point out the importance of the community relationship component of police operations in the future. The effect of crime upon communities and their police departments will continue into the next century. The panel, as a whole, believed that significant reductions in crime should be achieved over that period of time. This


perception is important in light of the potentially conflicting demand for more positive interaction strategies during a period of decreasing tax revenue to fund government services.

The overall evaluation of the normative trends suggests the importance of recognizing the environment in which a community-based policing strategy must be developed. Personnel resources, as well as fiscal support, will be difficult to obtain. Demand for police protection and responses to growing crime problems may conflict with demands for community-police partnerships. Management of these potential conflicts will present interesting challenges for police leaders in the future.

Trend Charts


Trend One - All but two of the panel members believed police budgetary support has declined over the

LEVEL OF AGENCY BUDGETARY SUPPORT



past five years. The level of budgetary support was forecasted to decline somewhat over the next five years, but should slightly increase over ten years. The panel's normative forecast indicated a need for significantly greater police funding over that same time period.


Trend Two - The panel believed an improvement in community-police relationships could be expected to continue throughout the forecasted period. However, a notable scattering of responses was



recorded. While there existed a consensus that improvement in community-police relationships would continue, some panel members believed such improvement would remain about as it is today, while several other members viewed this trend as


possibly increasing by as much as 50 percent. There was also a strong consensus that community-police relationships should be improved as much as 100 percent.

Trend Three - Police responsiveness to the needs of their customers was also believed to have



improved over the past five years. Such improvement was forecasted as likely to continue to increase five and ten years downline, although not as significantly as the last five years. As with Trend Two, there was some belief that this trend could increase by as much as 100 percent.


Trend Four - Police accountability has continued to increase considerably over the past five years, but



is expected to rise only moderately for the next five, at which time it should level off. Little change in this trend was forecasted, although it should be noted that police accountability is of considerable public concern today. This modest increase

is at odds with the rhetoric found in much of the literature which indicates considerable interest in this issue on the part of the public and political leaders. It is possible that the demand for police accountability is a useful issue for politicians and community activists, but not the public at large.


Trend Five - Public fear of crime has risen and is expected to continue to rise in a somewhat linear



fashion. The nominal trend indicated a modest increase over the next five years; however, almost one-half of the panel members believed the fear of crime would likely increase by 50 to 125

percent ten years downline. The normative forecasts suggest a moderate decrease in the level of the fear of crime from 1993 levels. Unfortunately, the Delphi process provides little insight into the more deeply held beliefs and opinions of panel members. This decrease could be attributed to endogenous social change such as aging of the population. There was a wide range of forecasts, however, at the end of both the five and ten year period. Responses at T+10 ranged from a low of 60 to a high of 220, suggesting a wide range of opinions about the future direction of public fear of crime.

Trend Six - Similar to Trend Five, the panel believed gang and narcotics violence has and will




continue its gradual upward trend.

Considerable disagreement existed, however, as to the size of such increases.

Responses ranging from slight decreases to 100 percent increases were

observed. The normative or "should be" forecasts at T+5 and T+10 were both significantly lower than the nominal or "will be" forecasts, suggesting strong consensus that the gang and narcotics problems are of considerable public concern and should likewise be of concern to police executives.

Trend Seven - The potential for police officers and their supervisors to accept the community-based policing model appears substantial. The panel believed there was very little



acceptance of the concept five years ago; however, panel members noted modest to significant increases in support over the next ten years.

EVENT INTERPRETATION

Continuing to note problems associated with fiscal constraints and increasing levels of serious crime, panel members focused upon future events with a strong likelihood to affect both. Because most panel members were from the Los Angeles area, they expressed concerns about the potential for another major civil disturbance (E-1). Panel members believed the likelihood of such an occurrence almost at any moment was very high. The panel noted the strain such an event would have on both the demand for greater community-police partnerships, but also the demand for greater police protection.

Interestingly, the panel considered the election of a strong law enforcement-oriented mayor (E-2) in the near term also quite likely. Such an event did in fact occur in Los Angeles on June 6, 1993.

The effect of that event remains to be seen, but historically getting tough with crime often lessens enthusiasm for building strong community-police partnerships and general community-based policing strategies.

Funding continues to be the Achilles heel in responding to community needs, whether those needs are for more protection or more interaction strategies. The panel identified three trends which could affect a city's ability to effectively operate. Passing bond measures (E-3) to hire new personnel or changing the percentage of "yes" votes needed to pass local general obligation bonds (E-4) do not appear likely in the near future. Only after several years pass and conditions in urban areas continue to deteriorate did the panel perceive voter willingness to increase their taxes to fund additional police resources (E-5)

Adding to local fiscal woes will be the significant reduction of state funds available to operate municipal police departments five and ten years downline.³¹ Although their city council declined to do so, financial considerations recently caused the City of Long Beach to consider disbanding its police department and contract with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. The City of San Clemente, California, did disband its police department in the Spring of 1993 and now contracts for services with the Orange County Sheriff's Department. Taking the strategy to its extreme, the City of Sussex, New Jersey, disbanded its small municipal police department a year ago and now contracts for services with a private security firm.³²


The consolidation of departments and the privatization of patrol services are trends worth noting and in need of further study. The panel also believed that the past political climate which discourages cooperation between local police and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) may change (E-6). Concern over undocumented aliens and their involvement in criminal gang activity is increasing, although little data exists establishing such a relationship. These fears, the panel believed, will significantly increase the probability that community pressure against police/INS cooperation will decrease. The panel also believed, though, that such an event would have more of a negative than positive effect upon community-based policing efforts.

Finally, the panel believed that a substantial probability of increasing demands for greater outside review of police operations (E-7) will exist in the future. Next to a major civil disturbance and a new mayor, creation of a civilian review board was believed to have the highest degree of probability of any event the panel considered, with an 80 percent probability of occurring by the year 2003. However, the panel also believed such an event would further strain relations between the community and the police, suggesting the need to identify alternative methods of community involvement in police operations.

Event Charts

In the event charts, the vertical scale represents the probability of the event occurring in a percentage from zero to 100. The horizontal scale is a time line in years, from the present to ten years downline.

Event One - The current tensions in many urban areas throughout California support the panel's conclusion




that a major civil disturbance at any time has a high degree of probability.

The panel forecasted a 75 percent chance by the year 1998 and an 85 percent probability by 2003.

Interestingly, panel members perceived such an event as having both a high positive and negative

impact upon the study issue. Extreme events causing strained community-police relations also demand improvement in such relations at the same time. Community-based policing strategies address those needs.


Event Two - Over time, attention to crime problems may gain more political support than attention to



community relationship concerns. Thus, the panel forecasted a high probability that "tough on crime" politicians may again become popular, with an 80 percent probability by 2003. However, depending upon attitudes toward community-

based policing, such an event may be equally negative or positive in impact upon the issue.

Event Three - The failure of several cities, including Los Angeles on two recent occasions, to obtain the necessary two-thirds voter approval to pass local general obligation bonds to fund additional police officers




is consistent with the panel's belief in a low probability that such an event would occur over the ten year period. The panel was unanimous in the belief that such an event would have significant impact upon the future

status of community-based policing in any


urban police agency. Two panel members believed it would be at least five years before the probability of Event Three exceeded zero, and one panel member believed it would be at least ten years before the probability exceeded zero.

Event Four - There was considerable dissensus among panel members over whether or not voters would amend state law to allow local property tax increases with only 51 percent of the vote. While the high and




median forecasts did give such an event at least a 50 percent probability of occurring within five years, the median rises to only 55 percent at the ten year point. Two panel members believed the event would likely never occur.

Event Five - The panel considered significant reductions in state funding to cities to be 50-50 probabilities both at the end of the five and ten year periods. The panel did believe, however, that




the probability of this event occurring would exceed zero within six months, or by the summer of 1993. This event would have the opposite impact of Event Three, in that significant funding levels reduces the available personnel for all but essential public safety assignments.

Event Six - The probability that municipal police and the INS will work more closely than at present increases gradually over the next ten years. The panel responses ranged from zero to seven years before the probability of occurrence exceeded zero, but the probability of the event



occurring increases to 80 percent at the ten year point. The panel felt that in heavily populated urban communities, such cooperation would have greater negative impacts and outweigh the crime reduction benefits this event might achieve.

Event Seven - While there was a wide range of panel responses, the vast majority of members perceived a strong probability of the creation of civilian review boards in the fairly near future. Only



two panel members saw the probability not exceeding zero until the five year point, but the majority believed that within two years or less, the probability of the event would exceed zero. Within five years, four panel members believed a 90 to 100 percent probability of occurrence existed, and eight of the ten panel members believed

that the probability was either 90 percent or greater at the ten year point. The panel also believed that this event would have a slightly more negative than positive impact upon the issue.

CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS

A four-member focus group consisting of individuals who were also members of the MCD panel (Chief Deladurantey, Dr. Klyver, Dr. Hickmam, and Sergeant Licavoli), assisted in a cross-impact analysis of the trends and events evaluated in the forecasting process. The purpose of the cross-impact analysis was to assess how each of the seven events would impact all other events and trends. The analysis forecasted the impact of each event on the other events and the trends by use of a cross-impact matrix (Table 3). The impact is shown as the percentage of change (plus or minus) the event would have in relation to the probability of other events occurring, and on the amount of increase or decrease of the trends. Median panel forecasts are shown in the table.

Table Three:

Cross-Impact Analysis Matrix

Maximum Impact (% Change \pm) Event-to-Event								Maximum Impact (% change)/ Years to Max. Event-to-Trend							IMPACT TOTALS
**	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6	T7	
E1	X	+85	+95	+60	X	+20	X	+50/3	-30/2	+40/4	X	+90/2	X	-20/3	E1 <u>9</u>
E2	-30	X	+40	X	X	+70	-30	+40/2	-10/3	+30/4	-20/4	-20/5	+50/5	-20/2	E2 <u>11</u>
E3	-20	X	X	+20	-10	X	X	+90/4	+40/5	+40/5	X	+30/4	-15/4	X	E3 <u>8</u>
E4	X	+20	100	X	-50	X	X	+70/5	X	+40/4	X	X	X	X	E4 <u>5</u>
E5	-30	+20	+60	+90	X	X	X	-50/1	X	-50/2	+20/2	+60/4	+30/3	X	E5 <u>9</u>
E6	X	+30	X	X	X	X	+40	X	-30/4	+20/3	+30/3	+20/5	+40/3	X	E6 <u>7</u>
E7	X	X	X	X	X	-30	X	X	-20/3	+30/4	+70/4	X	X	X	E7 <u>4</u>

IMPACTED TOTALS

E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6	T7
<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>

Legend

E1- Major Civil Disturbance
 E2- Law Enforcement Oriented Mayor Elected
 E3- Bond Measure for New Officers
 E4- State Initiative for Local Bond Approval
 E5- State Financial Cutbacks
 E6- Police/INS Cooperation
 E7- Civilian Review Board Established

T1- Level of Agency Budgetary Support
 T2- Level of Community-Police Relationships
 T3- Level of Police Responsiveness to Community
 T4- Level of Demand for Police Accountability
 T5- Level of Community's Fear of Crime
 T6- Effects of Gangs/Narcotics
 T7- Officer Acceptance of Community-Based Policing

An analysis of the matrix indicates that major civil unrest has the potential to have significant impact upon the election of a strong law enforcement-minded mayor, as well as the passage of a bond measure for more officers, increasing the probability of a change in Proposition 13, and improving the probability of more police/INS cooperation. While this event would likely strengthen support for police funding by raising community fear levels, community-police relationships would suffer. Interestingly, in Los Angeles a law enforcement oriented mayor was elected in June, but a bond measure for additional officers failed in April.

Positive economic events would increase the probability of increased responsiveness to the community through additional resources for staffing required to implement community-based policing strategies. Additional personnel resources would also have a positive effect upon overall fear of crime in the community and reduce the negative influences of gang and narcotics on neighborhoods.

Increased cooperation between the police and INS was perceived as having a negative effect upon community-police relationships depending on the particular city. In larger urban communities, however, such a policy decision will likely increase community tension and negatively affect relations between a large segment of the community and its police. Civilian review boards will result in increased police responsiveness and accountability, but at the same time could have a considerable negative impact upon overall community-police relationships.

In summary, possible events, like current trends, have the potential to push community-based policing either forward or backward, depending upon how politicians and police managers respond and manage the process. Whether financial issues will result in large California police departments providing only emergency response and investigative services, and unable to afford community-based policing strategies, is presently unknown. The goal for innovative leaders will be to implement community-based policing strategies in spite of California's government funding crisis.

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

The final part of this section on Defining the Future is devoted to the development of scenarios or possible futures for policy development. Scenarios are "word pictures" of what the future could be, based upon data and information developed through the futures forecasting stage of the project. The

scenarios provide a blueprint of the future for the purposes of developing policies and a strategic plan.

The three types of scenarios created for this project are defined as follows:

- * **Exploratory Scenario:** This is a "surprise-free," or "will be" scenario. It assumes the forecasted trends and events would play out as forecasted.
- * **Normative Scenario:** This is the "desired and attainable" future. This scenario focuses upon the "should be" data and combines it with community-based policing literature which suggests the positive aspects of the strategy. This scenario is based upon the "should be" forecasted trends and events.
- * **Hypothetical Scenario:** This is a "what if" scenario. It assumes that all of the events with at least a 30 percent probability of happening did occur. This scenario describes a chaotic future which may occur if police managers do not take steps to manage their futures in some manner.

The following three scenarios are different in their focus based on the visualization of alternative futures. All scenarios are written as retrospectives, relative to the occurrence of possible trends and events from 1993 through 2003. The data were used to create scenarios specifically describing Los Angeles and the greater Los Angeles area. They could apply to any major metropolitan area of California.

Exploratory

Newly Elected Mayor Vows All Out War on Crime (U.S. News and World Report, July 6, 1993)

Business Continues to Abandon Urban Areas - Cite Fear of Crime (Newsweek, April 15, 1996)

Budget Shortfalls Reduce Community-Based Policing to Hollow Rhetoric (Los Angeles Times, November 10, 1998)

Warring Street Gangs Fight Over Narcotics Trade-Communities Demand Action (Los Angeles Times, August 1, 2002)

Serious gang crime, along with epidemic levels of narcotics trafficking in many densely-populated Los Angeles neighborhoods made many neighborhoods, unlivable for law-abiding residents. The city's tax base continued to decline as business after business moved to safer regions of the county and state. The 25 percent business exodus predicted by the Southern California Association of Government in the early 1990s increased to about 40 percent by the end of 1997.

As has occurred in other major U.S. cities in the recent past, Los Angeles had to make some difficult choices. As the population approached five million and growing by early 1995, significant cutbacks forced drastic reductions in funding for its police department. Community-based policing, so widely touted as a method for improving community-police relations and reducing tension, never materialized in the wake of rising levels of violent crime. Urban gang warfare continued unabated, and as attacks by gang members upon police also rose, relations between the police and the community deteriorated. The Attorney General's prediction in 1993 that street gang membership in California would rise to 250,000 by the year 2000 fell short, but only slightly.

Community-based policing reforms fell victim to increasing concerns about gangs, drugs, and incidents of civil unrest. While the police did make some modest changes in an attempt to be more sensitive to residents' policing concerns from 1993 through mid-decade, by the latter 1990s community-based policing lost out to the same budget shortages, the same realities of urban street crime, and similar changes in management priorities which doomed L.A.'s team policing efforts in the 1970s.

Concerns about the debilitating effect of civil unrest and crime in Los Angeles resulted in the Spring, 1993 election of a new mayor who vowed to pour all available resources into crime control. While this event reduced the fear of crime for a couple of years, the changing urban environment made it impossible for the police to keep up with rising workloads. Unemployment remained at or near 25 percent for inner-city residents throughout most of the decade and, by early 1996, users of government services began to outnumber taxpayers. Population growth in the six-county Los Angeles region continued unabated as well, with the region becoming home to a projected 18 million people by the year 2000.

While the Los Angeles Police Department continued to fight an all-out war on crime, it was a losing war. The lowering median age in Los Angeles, to around 16 years of age, created a significant surge in the number of people in their highest crime prone years. The result was an increasing arrest rate, but a decreasing incarceration rate as California's jails and prisons, in spite of the billions of dollars spent on new facilities in the 1980s and 1990s, were still over 200 percent beyond capacity. By the early 21st century, Los Angeles ranked last in terms of quality of life of any major city in the United States.

Normative

Despite Budget Woes, Los Angeles City Council and Mayor Committed to Police Department Funding (Los Angeles Daily News, May 1, 1994).

L.A. Police Chief Says Community-Based Policing Not Antithetical to Combating Crime (Police Chief, September 20, 1995).

New Police Stations and Customer-Oriented Policing Strategies Give Residents a Voice, Ease Tensions (Newsweek, December 6, 1997)

Focus on Drug Rehabilitation and Education Seen as Cause of Reduction of Gang and Narcotics Violence (Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2003)

Despite dwindling budget revenues, the Los Angeles City Council, in concert with the newly-elected mayor, made major commitments to fund essential city departments, especially its police department. After watching staffing levels decline from a high of 8,300 officers in 1990 to a low of 7,200 in 1993, and noting an escalating demand from residents to respond to rising incidents of crime, city political leaders realized that only by maintaining a strong police presence in the city could the fear of crime and the negative impact of such fears upon residents, the business community, and tourism be halted. To that end, Los Angeles officials embarked on the implementation of several community-based policing strategies designed to get more officers into the street and to put those officers in closer contact with the community.

In 1994, Los Angeles embarked on a five-year plan to build eight new community-police stations, four in San Fernando Valley and four in the densely populated central city area. Because budget constraints would not permit building from the "ground up," these new facilities were refurbished

existing buildings such as vacant banks and warehouses. The result was that by the end of 1997 densely populated areas such as the Pico-Union and Koreatown districts, and the sprawling West Valley area had facilities built which created more homogenous communities for community police to concentrate their efforts. Other problem-oriented strategies such as assigning community service officers (formally called senior lead officers) to community police centers to focus resources on neighborhood quality of life problems and the deployment of mobile substation units to focus on specific crime problems for a protracted period of time were initiated.

An additional step was the establishment of community Police Advisory Councils in all of the then existing 18 stations by mid-1995. Consisting of community members and the local station management team, these councils provided a vehicle to disseminate information about policing methods, problems, and policy. It also afforded residents a vehicle for input into how policing priorities were determined. The councils were instrumental in reducing tensions following a number of aggravated police incidents throughout the 1990s.

In order to head-off growing unhappiness about community-based policing among Los Angeles Police Department line officers, supervisors and middle managers, the Chief of Police initiated a comprehensive training program to teach line personnel about the concept and goals of community-based policing. The chief recognized that on a daily basis, front-line personnel were faced with the grim realities of street police work and the need for a firm response to crime. The seemingly over-emphasis on community-responsiveness and sensitivity at the expense of fighting crime had turned off many line officers and threatened to doom Los Angeles' policing reforms. As Houston officials had learned several years prior, concerns over crime can quickly push community-based policing reforms to the back burner. The Chief struck an appropriate balance between attention to the realities of street crime and the need for developing community-police partnerships.

The latter half of the 1990s marked a period of cooperation between top police managers and elected officials who worked together to develop and fund programs to stop the deteriorating quality of life in Los Angeles. Only by realizing that gangs, drugs, and the overall crime rate would only exacerbate

the exodus of businesses and tax paying middle class residents from Los Angeles, and seriously making tough budget decisions, did real reform take place.

It was also an era where police planners and decision-makers decided not to allow a repeat of the process observed in other large cities where rising crime and reduced budgets doomed policing reforms. While fear of crime remained high on the list of social problems, improved community-police relations prevented any further outbreaks of civil unrest, and federal drug rehabilitation programs began showing results as gang crime and associated narcotics violence began to show a downward trend by the end of the 1990s.

Hypothetical

New Mayor and Police Chief Vow Return to Tough Law Enforcement (L.A. Times, July 25, 1997)

City Budget Cutbacks Force Closure of Half of L.A.'s Police Stations (Newsweek, May 17, 1998)

Crime in L.A. Reaches Epidemic Proportions: Is the Sheriff or the National Guard Our Only Hope? (L.A. Times, June 12, 2000)

Has LAPD Priced Itself Out of Existence? (The Economist, August 15, 2001)

The rate and nature of violent crime in Los Angeles has had a profound effect upon the City's police department. Early efforts at community-based policing reforms fell by the wayside by the mid-1990s as gangs and narcotics and the associated violence preoccupied the thinking of residents, police, and government officials alike.

Budget shortfalls forced the elimination of community-police storefronts and the abandonment of most community-police interaction strategies. By 1996, the Los Angeles Police Department had closed its crime lab, its police academy, and its driver training facility and subcontracted for these and other services.

By 1998, the department was forced to close nine of its 18 police stations. While personnel from closed divisions were shifted to the remaining facilities, sufficient space for reassigned personnel was not a major problem as personnel reductions, accomplished through retirements rather than lay-offs, had reduced the department to 5,100, about a 40 percent decrease from 1990 to 1998.

By the year 2000, state voters had finally relented and voted to allow the passage of local obligation bonds for more police to pass with 51 percent of the vote. It was too late for the Los Angeles Police Department, however, as private armed security patrols, funded by individual groups of homeowners and by special assessment districts had taken over a major share of community patrol services. Polls showed that a majority of residents wanted elected officials to hire lesser expensive Sheriff's personnel. A growing sentiment for permanent assignment of National Guard troops in L.A.'s highest crime-ridden communities could also be heard by the latter part of the decade.

This breakdown in confidence occurred despite a vow of a return to strong law enforcement in 1997 by the new mayor and her newly appointed chief of police. Although the chief put as many officers on the street as possible, staffing reductions, changing demographics, rising workloads, and community-police tension, along with the crime rate, continued their upward trends.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Based upon data from the normative ("should be") forecasts, there are several issues which police managers should consider when developing policies as they relate to the implementation of a community-based policing model.

Driving policing strategies in large metropolitan police departments will be issues such as fear of crime, civil disturbances, and increasing levels of gang and narcotics violence. A new mayor who takes a pro-law enforcement position could have a major affect upon several of the trends and events evaluated in this study.

A new mayor may have a positive outcome on the ever-present funding issue confronting most police departments in California. Support for police related bond measures, more aggressive approaches to gang and narcotics crime, and the development of more effective cooperative strategies between local police and the INS may also occur. Strategies for putting more officers back in patrol will be mandatory. The use of current and emerging information technology to make both line officers and detectives more productive needs to be seriously considered by police managers. Processing information by hand rather than electronically is a waste of expensive human resources.

Conversely, a new mayor may also affect the current demand for more customer driven policing strategies and community partnerships. These trends could be negatively affected should a new mayor be overly concerned with fear of crime and business exodus, and be unable to locate adequate funding to deploy sufficient numbers of patrol officers to deal with rising police workloads. Tax revenue shortages at the state level may also present formidable obstacles. Community-based policing focuses upon problem and service oriented strategies, is labor-intensive, and results are not easily quantifiable. Severe budget shortages may force cities to reduce many important but critical services and focus primarily upon front line police work. California's future economic climate may accelerate the trend toward assessment districts to fund private and public peace keeping services. The integration of private sector security companies into line patrol operations are policy issues police managers would be wise to begin to consider.

Police executives must develop operational policies within the content of a severely constrained California economy which is likely to remain so into the 21st century. Downsizing, outsourcing, sub-contracting, and regionalization should all be strategies police managers consider as they develop their

future policing models. Community-based policing strategies, along with proactive crime fighting strategies, will need to be melded together. Customers of police services will continue to want visible emergency response, control of street crime and civil unrest, but will also demand community-police cooperation and interaction strategies. The importance of strategic thinking and planning by police executives cannot be understated. Careful strategic planning in the early 1990s may determine whether a police department will still be in business by the year 2003.

SECTION TWO:

A STRATEGIC PLAN

Creating and planning the future of community-based
policing in the Los Angeles Police Department.

PURPOSE

The purpose of a strategic plan is to develop a detailed guideline for achieving the goals of organizational policy.³³ While the following plan describes specific objectives for the LAPD, the obstacles to a successful transition toward community-based policing identified in the Defining the Future section of this study are likely to be found in most large California police departments. Thus, strategies for overcoming these obstacles may be relevant in many large departments. The plan was developed through the consultation and guidance of the focus group described in Section One of this study.

This strategic plan will focus upon achieving the normative or "desirable and attainable" scenario also described in Section One. It is believed that despite the formidable barriers, a strategic plan can be developed which will allow the LAPD, and any large urban police department, to successfully implement some of the primary community-based policing goals of getting closer to the customer, becoming more aware of community needs and priorities, and developing better relationships between people and their police department.

THE SETTING

The LAPD will undergo a radical transformation over the next several years. Prompted by external events (the Rodney King incident, the critical Christopher Commission Report, internal and external dissatisfaction with police leadership, and recent incidents of civil unrest), along with internal events (most notably a new police chief), the LAPD policing model will no doubt change.

The calls for changing the LAPD from its traditional aggressive, enforcement-oriented model to a community-oriented approach have been voiced by community and political leaders throughout the

city. A new police chief was hired on the promise to transform the LAPD into a community-oriented agency using the community-based policing model. However, the apparent unqualified acceptance of community-based policing appears to have occurred without thoughtful consideration being given to the potential barriers and obstacles which may affect such a large scale organizational change.

The barriers to a transition away from the traditional enforcement-oriented model in Los Angeles are formidable. Los Angeles is the second largest U.S. city in terms of population. But with almost four million residents and a shrinking police workforce, its 2.2 per 1,000 officers-to-residents ratio is the smallest of any major city in the country.³⁴ With 470 square miles to police, the LAPD must cover a tremendous amount of territory with a relatively small number of personnel.

Los Angeles is also one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse cities in the world.³⁵ Immigration from Mexico and Central America continues at a rapid pace. Its school children speak scores of different languages. By the year 2010, it is anticipated that Southern California "will have become a Latino subcontinent - demographically, culturally and economically distinct from the rest of America."³⁶ Los Angeles' peace keeping services will have to be redesigned with these myriad of internal and external realities in mind.

THE MISSION STATEMENT

In order to communicate the intent of the strategic plan and the direction top management should desire for the organization, the following mission statement was developed with input from the focus group:

The Los Angeles Police Department exists to provide visible and responsive police-oriented public safety and peace keeping services. Using a community-based,

problem-oriented, approach in the delivery of such services, Department members will work in partnership with members of our various residential and business communities to identify problems, garner and focus resources, and resolve problems wherever possible. Keeping the peace and enhancing the quality of life in our communities will be the cornerstone in the Department's overall goal of enhancing public safety. Above all, Los Angeles police officers will treat all members of the public, whether law abiding or not, as customers. And our customers must always perceive value in the service they receive.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

An understanding and careful analysis of the existing and future environment, both internal and external, is critical to the success of a strategic plan. In addition to input from the focus group, several members of the brainstorming panel (Estella Lopez, Krouse, Bunker, Gascon) met with this writer and provided input as to relevant social, economic, and organizational issues and realities which could affect any future large scale organizational change. Members of the modified conventional Delphi panel (Eck, Braiden) also provided input (telephonically).

Social Environment

Opportunities

The political and social climate in Los Angeles today provides strong impetus for change in the policing model. In the aftermath of the Rodney King incident, there is a consensus among the political leadership, special interest groups, community activists, and among a significant percentage of the general public that a service-oriented community-based policing model is needed. While the relationship between the community and the police is expected to improve over the next ten years, this trend is based upon the belief that the LAPD will adopt community-based policing in some form.

Threats

Crime, narcotics, and gang violence, along with recent civil disturbances and community unrest, will result in putting the police in a position of having demands placed upon them for more protection on one side, and the need to be more sensitive to communities and community residents on the other. The fear factor has been exacerbated both before and immediately following the second trial of the four officers involved in the Rodney King incident. A second riot-related trial will be conducted later this summer. Community unrest, bleak economic forecasts, job exodus from California, and the projection of massive population increases in California over the next 50 years,³⁷ all suggest an external environment conducive to a continual escalation of crime and violence in densely populated urban areas.

Economic Environment

Opportunities

To what extent Los Angeles' political leaders realize how fiscal cutbacks have eroded public safety is unknown, but there does appear to be support for some funding increases in an attempt to transition to a community-based policing model. In December, 1992, the Los Angeles City Council authorized the expenditure of \$225,000 to be combined with an approximately \$400,000 National Institute of Justice grant to be spent on community-based policing training and the development of a strategic plan for the Los Angeles Police Department. The grant will be managed by Dr. Jack Greene, a Temple University Criminal Justice professor and an expert on community-based policing. As both public and private sector organizations become more results and customer focused in the future, the interest in community-based policing should remain high. Support remains strong for improving the LAPD and its policing strategies, but only through strong political support in the form of funding increases will the economic picture brighten for the LAPD.

Threats

Foremost among all of the threats to community-based policing are economic. Over the years, governmental leaders in Los Angeles have failed to provide the LAPD with the necessary human and support resources which the department needed to keep pace with an ever-increasing workload. As a result, the second largest city in the United States, in terms of population and geographic size, has a smaller officer-to-resident ratio than any other major urban city.³⁸ In light of California's long term economic outlook due to the recession, funds to increase the size of the department and to provide adequate technical equipment and other logistical support will simply not be there for years to come.

In addition, it will take a significant effort simply to hire enough new officers to keep pace with increased attrition due to retirements during the 1990s. But, by most accounts not only is community-based policing more labor-intensive, it can lengthen police response times. Unfortunately, future forecasts concerning the levels of violent crime in Los Angeles may result in more demands for protection and less for public-police interaction strategies. Such has been the case in other major urban cities where community-based policing has been largely abandoned.

Political Environment

Opportunities

With the hiring of an outside chief of police, the Mayor, the Los Angeles City Council, and the Police Commission have signaled their desire to take the LAPD in a new and different direction. The political community has strongly supported community-oriented policing strategies. Such support no doubt had a significant influence in the selection of a new Police Chief. Chief Willie Williams has repeatedly voiced his support of the community-based policing concept. With strong support at the top of the

organization, and with a significant number of "old guard" managers retired, or soon to be, an environment for change will remain strong for the foreseeable future.

Threats

Political leaders will come under increasing pressure from their constituents to emphasize a "tough on crime" approach. The LAPD, through its traditional policing model, currently attempts to deliver visible, aggressive police services. Community-based policing emphasizes concentration of resources on long-term problem-solving and greater interaction between residents and their police.

While a laudable goal, the large number of crime ridden problem areas in Los Angeles, the already understaffed patrol force, and the rising number of calls for service may force the Mayor and the City Council to choose between traditional policing's emphasis upon rapid response and aggressive crime fighting, and community-based policing's emphasis on community partnerships and long term problem solving.

Organizational Environment

Opportunities

Organizational readiness is a key to successful large-scale organizational change. In some respect, the LAPD fares well. The LAPD and many of its officers, especially middle and upper-level managers, are familiar with community-based policing. In the early 1970s, former Chief Ed Davis implemented the team policing concept. Although many of the team policing strategies were abandoned in the late 1970s due to budget constraints (which are even greater in 1993), many of the components of team policing such as neighborhood watch, the Basic Car Plan, and the senior lead officer position responsible for specific communities are still part of the LAPD organizational structure. Because these community

involvement strategies already exist within the department, and because they fit well into the community-based policing model, a transition to community-based policing may not be perceived as radical by some line personnel.

Threats

In addition to increasing workloads and decreasing personnel levels, there is still a question as to the degree of acceptance of community-based policing LAPD managers can expect from line personnel. Community-based policing will require patrol officers in particular to view their roles and responsibilities much differently than in the traditional military model. It will require officers to interact with a much broader segment of the community than under traditional policing. That interaction will require patrol officers to be aware of, and sensitive to community problems they may have neither the resources nor the academic or training backgrounds to resolve. Additionally, the reality of street violence may facilitate "tough on crime" attitudes, resulting in even more cynicism on the part of police officers. Cracking the formidable patrol subculture may be the greatest obstacle to any department's transition to community-based policing.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY

To determine the LAPD's readiness for change, this writer conducted an evaluation of the Department's transition capability which is described in the Organizational Capability Analysis, (Table Four). The focus group assisted in an analysis of critical stakeholder assumptions in light of the new mission statement (Table Five), along with a strategic assumption map assessing the level of importance and certainty or uncertainty of assumptions held by stakeholders (Table Six).

Table Four**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY ANALYSIS**Strategic Needs Capability

CATEGORY		RATING				
		Superior	Above Average	Average	Improve	Crisis
Manpower						X
Technology					X	
Equipment					X	
Facilities						X
Budget						X
Workload						X
Supplies					X	
Management skills				X		
Officer Skills					X	
Supervisor Skills					X	
Training				X		
Po. Ofcr. Attitudes					X	
Spvrs. Attitudes					X	
Management Attitudes					X	
Council Support		X				
Mayoral Support			X			
Public Support			X			
Police Commission			X			
Pay Scale				X		
Benefits				X		
Turnover				X		
Morale					X	

LEGEND

Superior: Better than most other departments. Beyond present needs.
 Above Average: Better than many other departments. Suitable. No problems.
 Average: Acceptable. Similar to other departments.
 Improve: Not as good as it should be. Must be improved.
 Crisis: Real cause for concern. Action must be taken now.

Strengths

Transition to a community-based policing model will likely be driven primarily by external social forces. Strong consensus exists that political support, if rhetoric is any gauge, will remain quite high. Although the average resident may not understand the concept of community-based policing, the demand for increased community-based policing interaction strategies is likely to remain topical in the media, thus giving the issue currency for at least two to three more years. The new Mayor and Police Commission's level of support for community-based policing is uncertain at this time. However, it can be assumed to be at least above average based upon general community support.

Weaknesses

Internally, considerable obstacles exist. Years of budget stagnation have left the Los Angeles Police Department with a critical shortage of work space. Where to house new officers should hiring levels increase presents a dilemma. Personnel and equipment shortages, obsolete technology, and a shrinking budget have created a climate where maintaining the status quo prevails. Wages, benefits and turnover are ready to fall into the Improvement category. Since the Rodney King incident, morale at all levels remains low. The use of electronic information systems to increase officer productivity has been minimal.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS


The transition to a community-based policing model will take time and careful planning. Critical to that planning are key stakeholders who will impact or are impacted by the issues. Each has assumptions, perceptions, and values which may affect the LAPD's implementation of a community-based policing model. Table Five lists 12 stakeholders and their possible assumptions about the study issue and sub-issues. Table Six describes the importance of each stakeholder's assumptions about the issue and the degree of certainty/uncertainty about their assumptions.

Table Five:

STAKEHOLDERS ASSUMPTIONS

<u>STAKEHOLDER</u>	<u>ASSUMPTIONS RE: THE ISSUE</u>
1. Chief of Police	A. Change is needed B. Community wants C.B.P.
2. Los Angeles Police Department Line Officers (SD)	A. Crime fighting higher priority than C.B.P. B. Another management fad
3. First-line Supervisors (Sergeants & Lieutenants)	A. C.B.P. will drain critical patrol resources B. Cannot handle emergency call load now
4. LAPD Middle Managers (Captains)	A. Focus on crime and call load must be maintained B. Greater community-police interaction and police responsiveness important
5. LAPD Staff & Chief Officers (Cmdr/Dep. Chief/Ass't Chief)	A. Environment right for change B. Community wants C.B.P.
6. Police Commission	A. Community wants C.B.P. B. Chief able to implement C.B.P.
7. Mayor of Los Angeles	A. Service-oriented police department needed B. Good community-police relations important
8. Los Angeles City Council	A. Wants a "user friendly" police department B. Involvement of the community in their police department desired
9. Community Groups (Critical)	A. Brutality and racism rampant in the Los Angeles Police Department. C.B.P. will help B. Want greater external control of police department
10. Community Groups (Pro-Police)	A. Desire greater community-police interaction. B. Get tougher on crime.
11. Business Leaders	A. Get tougher on crime B. C.B.P. may pull officers out of the field
12. Crime Control Advocates	A. C.B.P. soft on crime B. Tough on crime only solution
13. Police Protective League	A. C.B.P. a management fad B. Too much community involvement.

Table Six



LEGEND

"X" axis-- Importance of the stakeholder's assumption to the Department's management of the issue

"Y" axis-- Certainty/Uncertainty of the stakeholder's assumption

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1A- Change Needed (Chief) | 1B- Community Wants C.B.P. (Chief) |
| 2A- Priority on crime-fighting (line officers) | 2B- Management Fad (line officers) |
| 3A- Drain on Resources (supervisors) | 3B- Overworked Now (supervisors) |
| 4A- Crime/Community Relations Balance (managers) | 4B- Community Relations Important (manager) |
| 5A- Environment for Change (Staff/Chief Ofcrs) | 5B- Community wants C.B.P. (Staff/Chief Ofcrs) |
| 6A- Community wants community-based policing (P.C.) | 6B- Chief will implement (Police Commission) |
| 7A- Service Orientation Needed (Mayor) | 7B- Community Relations Important (Mayor) |
| 8A- User-Friendly Police Department (City Council) | 8B- Want Community Involvement (City Council) |
| 9A- Brutality/Racism a Problem (community groups) | 9B- External Control (community groups) |
| 10A- Greater Community Involvement (community groups) | 10B- Tough on Crime (community groups) |
| 11A- Tough Crime Laws (business leaders) | 11B- Officer Shortages (business leaders) |
| 12A- Soft on Crime (crime control advocates) | 12B- Get tough (crime control advocates) |
| 13A- C.B.P. a Management Fad (Protective League) | 13B- Too Much Community Involvement (PL) |

SNAILDARTERS

"Snaildarters" are those groups, organizations, entities, or individuals which may affect the project or plan, usually in a negative fashion. Snaildarters are generally not stakeholders and are often not perceived during the initial stakeholder analysis. Snaildarters which could pose potentially negative barriers to the strategic plan are the California legislature (budget restrictions, program mandates), taxpayer associations (thwarting any attempt to obtain additional revenue sources), and employee associations in addition to the Police Protective League such as La Ley (Hispanic Officer Association) and OJB (African-American Officers Association) which may object to education requirements for promotion and mandatory job rotation policies. Immigrants rights groups are also among the list of potential snaildarters.

DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

Individual input from focus group members was used to develop the following list of alternatives strategies which would assist the LAPD in accomplishing the goals of community-based policing and problem solving as described in the mission statement:

1. Establish Police-Community Advisory Councils within geographic service areas.
2. Enhance the role of senior lead officers to emphasize their community service officer responsibilities.
3. Establish a community policing center in each basic car area.
4. Measure and reward professional and courteous service by line officers.
5. Create the position of community relations officer (lieutenant) in each geographic service area.
6. Increase the number of basic car areas in patrol divisions and the number of senior lead officers.

7. Realign patrol division boundaries to more closely conform to identifiable communities.
8. Establish more (thus smaller) patrol divisions, thereby reducing the span of control and responsibility for managers and supervisors.
9. Establish community-police centers in all basic car areas.
10. Mandatory use of bicycle and foot patrols in each geographic area.
11. Give area captains more authority and discretion over their budgets and hold accountable for CBP results.
12. Conduct methodologically sound customer satisfaction surveys.
13. Deploy a mobile substation unit in each geographic patrol division.
14. Establish a staff level position devoted to oversight of community-based policing strategies within the LAPD.
15. Increase civilianization of administrative positions and create civilian community service officers to conduct preliminary on-scene crime and traffic investigations.
16. Provide comprehensive, ongoing training on all facets of community-based policing strategies.
17. Provide financial incentives for increased education and educational requirements for promotion.

It is envisioned that the future policing model of the LAPD, consistent with the goals as described in the mission statement, would focus upon three key areas: Expand the role of police officers from the current traditional response-driven model to a community-based, problem-solving orientation; be customer-oriented through the development of police-community partnerships; and, use a variety of internal and external resources to deal with community crime and quality of life issues. To that end, three strategies (one short, one medium, and one longer term) which

should have significant impact in accomplishing many of the goals of community-based policing are described in greater detail.

Strategy One: Implement Police Advisory Councils in each of the Los Angeles Police Department's geographic service areas.

Advantages

The Police Advisory Council (PAC) concept is not new. But what is new is the degree of involvement such councils would have under the community-based policing concept. PACs should be established in each of the LAPD's 18 geographic service areas. And rather than being an advisory group of selected community members, these councils would be more intimately involved in their respective division's daily decision-making and service delivery. PAC members would be visible in the station, possibly work brief assignments at the front desk, participate in ride-alongs, and regularly attend supervisors' meetings and roll calls. PAC members could also assist in divisional personnel selections.

The benefits of the PACs are numerous. A closer working relationship between the police officers in a division and the community members they serve would develop over time. Police officers and their supervisors, most of whom live considerable distances from their division of assignment, would learn about the problems and community needs from those in the best position to regularly provide that information. Sensitivity to the different policing needs of various communities would be greater among officers and their supervisors. As future demands for

accountability increase, these advisory councils would provide a critical community involvement vehicle and would also serve to diffuse community tension and conflict.

Disadvantages

This strategy does face some obstacles. The key to its success are the levels of acceptance of various stakeholders within each service area. Captains have to be willing to establish a PAC consisting of community representatives with a variety of backgrounds, expertise, and opinions. A PAC's effectiveness will be reduced significantly if it is made up of police supporters with fairly homogenous backgrounds and viewpoints.

While this strategy poses significant opportunities for the LAPD to demonstrate a willingness to enter into community partnerships, there can be hazards in the process. Improper requests for the use of resources or the targeting of unpopular groups or individuals is a potential problem facing divisional captains as they coordinate a PAC's activities. Too much authority can potentially lead to problems, but too little and the PACs become of marginal value in achieving organizational goals. It is important, however, that the LAPD convince the public of its desire to have community input.

The hardest sell, however, will be the line patrol officers and their supervisors. Crime is likely to continue to rise through the end of the decade. This trend may result in incidents which further aggravate community tensions. Continued community-police conflict and demands for tough approaches to crime problems may make it difficult to convince line personnel that their primary

mission is no longer to only "crush crime," but to establish a close working relationship with the communities they serve and to work together on community problems.

Strategy Two: Redesign and enhance the role of the senior lead officer

Advantages

Focusing upon neighborhood crime and safety issues can be a labor intensive endeavor. It not only takes time, it takes expertise and knowledge of community and governmental resources which can be identified and focused upon local problems. While the senior lead officer (SLO) position has existed in the LAPD for over 20 years, the role has become vague and misdirected. By assigning SLOs full-time as a community "ombudsman," providing the requisite training, and providing the time and resources needed to focus attention upon community problems, responsibility and authority to become expert problem solvers will be given to people closest to the customer and who have a real chance to succeed in such an assignment.

Disadvantages

Creating community based policing specialists does risk making community-based policing a program and not a policing philosophy. However, the LAPD is an overworked public bureaucracy where it is often difficult to hold people truly accountable. Specialization can overcome this problem to a large extent. Assigning SLOs full time in such a capacity may also result in their loss of contact with the radio car officers assigned to the basic car area and creating a belief that problem solving abilities and customer oriented services and attitudes are only necessary for SLOs. But by assigning SLOs to work their basic cars handling the regular call

load, perhaps twice per month, and by temporarily assigning other watch officers to work on temporary problem solving tasks at the direction of the SLOs, the gap between the SLO operation and patrol can be closed.

Strategy Three: Strong external support exists for the creation of a more service-oriented, "user-friendly" Los Angeles Police Department. The department should open community policing centers (storefronts) in each basic car area. These centers will put SLOs and officers out in communities and much more accessible to their customers.

Advantages

Higher police visibility coupled with greater community-police interaction strategies are important components of community-based policing. To reduce the faceless bureaucratic barriers which currently exist between the LAPD and its customers, it is important to spread "customer service representatives" throughout the city. This strategy can be accomplished at minimal cost by deploying SLOs and other volunteer personnel on a part-time basis in a storefront facility (community policing center is a preferred term) within their basic car areas.

Working at various times and days, SLOs can begin establishing closer working relationships with the surrounding community and establish a location where residents can meet with their local "ombudsmen" to work on both short and long-term community crime and quality of life problems. Developing a cadre of volunteers from the surrounding community to staff the centers will enhance community-police relationships. Operating to their fullest potential, community policing centers can also reduce 9-1-1 calls which so often are not emergencies, but simply community disorder problems.

Disadvantages

Community expectations as to the effectiveness of a community policing center in reducing crime can become a problem. Residents may expect the center to be a large, well-staffed police substation. Unfortunately, the LAPD will have neither the budget nor the personnel resources for at least five years downline to accomplish more with this strategy than minimal part-time staffing in donated space. Centers should not be opened until a sufficient cadre of volunteers can be recruited and trained to keep a center open on a semi-regular basis.

SELECTED STRATEGY

All of the previously listed 17 alternative strategies can play an important role in developing a community-based policing model within the LAPD. Except for the strategy of reducing the size of patrol divisions by constructing several new police facilities, the strategies have approximately one to five year time lines for implementation. Considering the turbulent environment which will likely exist in California through the end of the decade (budgetary, demographic, and social), it may be impossible for large urban police departments to plan for more than five years downline.

Data collected and analyzed in Section One of this study do not indicate major changes in trends or significant events between the five and ten year downline period which require a strategic plan projecting beyond the next five years. If LAPD top management decides to adopt a strategic plan which makes substantive changes in the department's policing model, it should take fully five years to implement most of the strategies necessary to accomplish that goal, to evaluate strategic plan accomplishments, and to be able to discern positive results. The five year mark should be the

point where the LAPD conducts a comprehensive evaluation of the strategic plan (beyond annual reviews) to determine what new trends and potential events loom over the next five to ten year period and then adjust the strategic plan accordingly.

As described in the mission statement, it is the goal of the LAPD to enhance community safety through the delivery of visible and customer-oriented peace keeping services. In order to provide such services to the people of Los Angeles, no single strategy will suffice. Therefore, the selected strategy recommended for implementation is a combination of the three strategies previously described.

The creation of PACs in each geographic patrol area is an excellent beginning to accomplish the goal of opening up the department to community involvement and review. Involved community members who regularly interact with their police will begin to break down the barriers between the police and the public. As levels of crime and violence rise over the next five to ten years, PACs can play an integral role in developing essential community mobilization strategies to respond to neighborhood problems.

Giving SLOs the full time responsibility for coordinating community resources toward the resolution of specific problems assigns this critical aspect of community-based problem solving upon individuals who know the community and who can establish strong relationships with customers and resource providers. One of the important tasks of the SLOs will be to coordinate the activities of his or her basic car officers, and to train their basic car officers in the

techniques of community problem solving. Under the strategy, the SLOs become responsible for guiding community efforts to resolve specific neighborhood crime problems, including focusing resources upon gang and narcotics problems. As the community's "point person" in the fight against neighborhood crime problems, SLOs will play an integral role in reducing fear of crime and the actual problems which cause such fear.

In a city of 470 square miles and only 18 police stations, the neighborhood cop, even the familiar SLO, can be a long way from his or her customers. Therefore, it will also be important to put the SLOs and the assigned basic car officers closer to the communities they serve. Community policing centers should be established in donated space (preferably visible storefront locations) in each of the department's basic car areas (although this strategic plan recommends initially establishing only one center in each service area as a pilot program). Such facilities can provide a location where community members can schedule appointments with their SLO or basic car officers, seek advice about specific problems, or even conduct neighborhood watch meetings. Staffing can be done through the use of volunteers or reserve officers, although grant funds from either state or federal sources may be available to provide minimal paid staff.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

A five phase implementation plan has been developed through which the combined selected strategy(ies) can be implemented over a two year period. Annual review should be conducted for an additional three years at which time comprehensive review of the entire strategic plan should be conducted.

Research Phase (7/93 - 12/93)

A team of researchers should be assigned to review relevant literature, assess current community-based policing methods around the country, interview critical stakeholders, develop precepts for the PACs, SLO operations, and the community policing center strategies. This team could be led by a staff level officer (police commander) if the Chief of Police opts to create a position in the department to manage overall community-based policing efforts. Researchers should also look at the other alternative strategies described in this strategic plan. Although the Transition Management Section of this project will involve only the selected strategy, it may be possible to include other alternative strategies in the research team's recommendations.

Review Recommendation (1/94 - 4/94)

The Chief of Police and his chief and staff level officers should review the research team's recommendations, including any in addition to the selected strategy. Modification or further review can be requested at this point. Area commanding officers (both the Captain IIIs and Is) should also be consulted during this phase and their comments or input solicited. Area captains are critical stakeholders in the transition management process.

Action Phase I (4/94 - 9/94)

Several processes should occur during this phase. Area captains will develop PACs with membership based upon the precept as approved by the Chief of Police. LAPD's Human Resources Bureau staff will conduct comprehensive training of SLOs in areas of cultural diversity,

problem solving techniques, and general community-based policing strategies and theories. SLOs will be assigned to their community service officer role on a full time basis during this period.

Action Phase II (9/94 - 7/95)

During this phase the effectiveness of the SLOs as community service officers will be continually evaluated. The importance of such regular evaluation makes the decision about assigning a staff officer the responsibility of ongoing strategic plan management and oversight, an important decision the Chief of Police must consider during the review of recommendations phase.

Evaluations can be conducted externally by the use of community surveys. The PACs may also provide useful feedback. Internally, interviews and anonymous written surveys can be used to obtain information on SLO, PAC, and general management performance as it relates to the implementation and management of the strategic plan.

It is also recommended that a single community policing center be established in each of the 18 geographic patrol areas during this phase. Opening a single center in each area will allow for the necessary focus of resources and management attention which may not be available if every SLO attempts to establish facilities simultaneously. Lessons learned from a pilot approach will avoid wasting time, effort, and money when expansion of the center concept is initiated citywide.

It is during this phase that line supervisors and officers must be given comprehensive training in the practice and theory of both problem-oriented and community-based policing. In addition to regular roll call training, such training should be conducted by Human Resources Bureau staff at

training days and at inservice training sessions. The use of outside consultants to provide some of this training should be considered.

Review And Evaluation (7/95 - 7/98)

This phase will be ongoing through the five year period considered necessary to fully implement and evaluate the strategic plan. At the beginning of this phase the Chief of Police will direct that a comprehensive review of the selected strategy be conducted (by the community-based policing manager if such a position exists, if not by assigning another research team). A comprehensive anonymous questionnaire should be used to survey members of the department at all levels to assess how fully the strategy has been implemented and permeates the department's culture. An evaluation of the PAC and community policing center operations will also be conducted.

STAKEHOLDER POSITIONS

Eight critical stakeholders or stakeholder groups were also identified by the focus group. An understanding of their positions on the various components of the strategic plan and the roles they play in its successful implementation are critical to the overall accomplishment of the department's mission. Although not listed, should the department create a position of community-based policing manager, that individual would also be a critical stakeholder.

Chief of Police: The Chief of Police must be the driving force in the LAPD's transition to a community-based policing model. His level of commitment to community-based policing is strong. But although the Chief has many responsibilities and concerns, he must remain focused,

and keep his top managers focused, on the strategies selected to move the Department into community-based policing.

LAPD Assistant Chiefs/Deputy Chiefs/Commanders: The Chief's top executives must also be highly supportive of the strategic plan. This is especially true for those top managers directing line command operations. Attitudes may be mixed as these individuals are quite experienced in the traditional policing model. However, if the Chief of Police remains focused on the plan and ensures that adequate review and evaluation is regularly conducted, these managers will help make the change happen.

Area Captains: Because so much of the selected strategy is based upon an understanding of, and attitude toward, community-based policing theory and practice, area and patrol division captains may be the most critical of all stakeholders. They are responsible for developing PACs, providing oversight of SLO operations, and ensuring customer service attitudes in their personnel to the greatest extent possible. One potential threat to the ability of these individuals to focus attention on the strategy is the significant workload line captains must handle. The myriad of tasks which may divert their attention from ongoing oversight of the plan's operation needs to be recognized. This is one reason the creation of a community-based policing manager position should be carefully considered.

Line Supervisors (Lieutenants and Sergeants): Whether problem solving and community-based policing strategies truly permeate the thinking, attitudes, and daily operations of

LAPD line personnel (officers and detectives) rests largely with the degree to which line supervisors understand and support the concept. Training conducted during the implementation plan period is critical to this important goal. However, the concept of customer service and community-based policing must be a topic of regular training for line supervisors and become ingrained in the organization's culture. In the busy patrol and detective environments which strongly adhere to the aggressive, military style of policing, such a change in thinking will be a formidable hurdle.

Line Officers (Patrol & Detectives): LAPD culture currently places great value on the good arrest, the number of arrests, and clearance rates. Getting patrol officers and detectives to look beneath the surface of problems and think about longer term solutions will not be easy. The risk in putting so much of the problem solving responsibility upon SLOs will be that officers and detectives may consider these important tasks only the job of SLOs. Given the opportunity to work on problems and given training in problem solving techniques can overcome this problem to a large degree. Admittedly, not all line officers will embrace the concepts and think of themselves beyond their roles under the traditional policing model. But through training, through structural changes which will be described in the Transition Management section, and with constant attention by middle and upper management, a critical mass of line personnel should be willing to expand their policing role.

Senior Lead Officers: Along with captains, SLOs, are certainly critical stakeholders in the change process. But this is not a new rank within the LAPD. Many of the duties required of

SLOs under the plan are already part of SLO responsibilities. It is recommended, however, that consideration be given to making this a limited tour assignment (perhaps three years).

Mayor: Problems in sustaining community-based policing strategies have occurred in other major cities (Houston and Detroit are two notable examples) when budgets constrict, crime increases, and politicians vow to get tough on crime. Such an environment exists in Los Angeles today. The new mayor intends to put more officers on the street and make Los Angeles safer. Although laudable goals, these efforts cannot be allowed to distract from the Chief's goal of adopting a community-based policing model. While talking tough on crime, the mayor must also talk community involvement on the part of residents and must voice equally strong support for community mobilization and problem solving efforts.

City Council: City Council members can play a key role in assisting the 18 geographic patrol areas' management teams in locating donated space for community policing centers, obtaining donated equipment, and recruiting volunteers to staff the facilities. Council members could also assist by assigning a member of their staffs to work the centers on a part-time basis. Essentially, if City Council members want such service facilities in their districts, and they should, they have considerable power to assist the department in turning this component of the strategic plan into a reality.

RESOURCES

The LAPD currently has most of the resource capability to implement the components of the strategic plan. Funds for supplies and equipment for the community policing centers should be

available through the current budget. However, comprehensive training by outside consultants on an ongoing basis is critical to the success of the strategic plan. The key word is "ongoing."

Reinforcement of community-based policing strategies and concepts must be continually taught to all line personnel throughout the five year strategic plan period. It is in this phase that the Mayor and City Council are in a critical position to aid in the implementation of the strategic plan.

CONCLUSION

There are numerous components of the strategic plan necessary to transition the LAPD from its current traditional or professional policing model into a model of problem solving, service-orientation, and community-based policing. While significant threats exist in the internal and external environment, and the department is faced with an increasing workload and decreasing resources, various alternative strategies have been identified which are "do-able," even in today's bleak economic times.

Seventeen alternative strategies have been identified to date. There are no doubt more. These strategies take into account some of the trends previously mentioned and identified through the brainstorming and futures forecasting processes. While the strategic plan covers a 2-5 year implementation and review period, by the year 2003 other alternative strategies such as the construction of new police stations and educational degree requirements for promotion could also be implemented.

Deployment of additional personnel to provide better customer service acknowledges the trend toward a greater workload. But increased civilianization, especially through the deployment of front-line civilian community service officers as has been done in a number of other police departments (Santa Ana is an example), also takes into account the need to provide services at lower costs. Greater sensitivity to Los Angeles' changing demographics is addressed through strategies such as rewarding officers for increased education, continual training and retraining, deployment of a community relations lieutenant in each patrol area, and rewarding officer service efforts as well as enforcement activities.

The value of this overall strategic plan is that it identifies numerous approaches to the accomplishment of the new, expanded LAPD mission of not only combating crime, but also creating community-police partnerships to resolve neighborhood quality of life problems. Fortunately, many are within the resource and ideological capabilities of the organization. The combination of strategies selected for more extensive review, the creation of PACs, enhancement of the role of SLOs, and the establishment of community policing centers, is certainly a strategy which the department can implement through a careful planning effort. Obstacles exist, but they are not insurmountable. The only question left is the level of commitment on the part of the Chief of Police and the various internal and external stakeholders.

SECTION THREE:

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

"Getting from here to there"- the desired future state.

RECOMMENDED STRATEGY

While demands for police reform are not new, Los Angeles' Rodney King incident on March 3, 1991, and the April 1992 riots have kept the topic of police reform high on the local social issues agenda. Problems such as officer insensitivity, racism, and brutality have moved to the forefront of public concerns. Erosion of public trust and confidence has heightened demands for change and reform.

The police reform movement has resulted in noted academicians and police leaders such as former New York Police Department Commissioner Lee Brown, suggesting that police departments must develop strategies to forge community partnerships.³⁹ Pundits, politicians, and people throughout Los Angeles believe the LAPD's only recourse to rebuilding its reputation and regaining public confidence is to change to a community-based policing style.⁴⁰ The key question is will, or perhaps more pressing, can a community-based policing model replace the traditional policing model in Los Angeles, or any large California city, by the year 2003? The answer to that question will only be "yes" if thoughtfully conceived strategies are developed.

To that end, Section Two of this study described a strategic plan for implementing community-based policing in the LAPD. Seventeen strategies or objectives that LAPD managers should consider in order to implement a community-based policing model were listed, most of which can be accomplished within a five year period. However, a critical first step is to build a bond or spirit of cooperation between the LAPD and community residents as soon as possible. The recommended strategy, and one with minimal budget impact, is the creation of Police

Advisory Councils (PACs) in the LAPD's 18 geographic patrol areas, the expansion and enhancement of the role of the senior lead officer (SLO), and the establishment of community policing centers throughout the city.

Much of the literature on community-based policing, in addition to the Christopher and Kolts reports, suggests that a system which allows residents in the local patrol area to be viewed as partners with the police and become involved in their police department's daily operational activities are critical components of community-based policing strategies.⁴¹ The experts believe that by allowing community access and input, police officer accountability and responsiveness will increase.⁴²

THE COMMITMENT PLAN

The focus group identified six key "actors" who must commit to making the change happen. Essentially, these "critical mass" stakeholders must support the recommended strategy if it is to succeed. These stakeholders are:

- * The Chief of Police
- * The Director of the Office of Operations (assistant chief)
- * Area Commanding Officers (captain IIIs and Is)
- * Line supervisors (lieutenants/sergeants)
- * Senior Lead Officers
- * Mayor/City Council

The levels of current commitment of the critical mass stakeholders to the plan and the commitment necessary to make the change occur are shown the following table:

Table Seven

COMMITMENT CHART

Actor	Block the Change	Let Change Happen	Help Change Happen	Make Change Happen
LAPD Chief of Police				X → ○
LAPD Director of Operations		X →		→ ○
Area & Patrol Commanding Officers	X →			→ ○
Line Supervisors	X →		→ ○	
Senior Lead Officers	X →			→ ○
Mayor/ City Council		X →	→ ○	

X - Present Commitment ○ - Minimum Commitment Needed

Individual Strategies

Transition management is a process designed to move critical mass individuals from their current level of commitment (if necessary), into a position to either help or make the change occur.

Based upon the work of the focus group and informal discussions with key stakeholders, the following is a description of the minimum level of commitment required to ensure successful

implementation of the strategy and the approach to be used to move critical mass stakeholders to the required level of commitment.

Chief of Police: Chief Willie Williams is a strong proponent of the PAC concept. He was hired in part based upon his support of community-based policing strategies. It is important for the Chief to vocally support the transition management process and provide visible leadership to ensure PACs become part of LAPD's operational structure and culture, and that the other less visible components of the strategy are also implemented.

Director of the Office of Operations: Because the Assistant Chief assigned as the Director of the Office of Operations is responsible for the management of the department's overall patrol and detective operations, he is in a key role to regularly monitor and evaluate the progress of the transition management process. During the review and evaluation phase of the Implementation Plan, experts on community-based policing should attend a joint meeting with the Chief and the Director of the Office of Operations to discuss current literature and research as it pertains to the strategy. Through the Chief's leadership, the Director of the Office of Operations can be quickly moved into a "make happen" position.

Area Commanding Officers: Captains in charge of line operations must fully support the PAC strategy, as well as the enhancement of the SLO role and the establishment of the community policing centers in their areas. The Captain III Area Commanding Officer will play a pivotal role in managing the implementation of the strategy. Commanding officers who do not fully support

the implementation plan essentially take a "block change" position. Based upon informal discussions with some of these commanding officers, their level of commitment is mixed. A major educative approach must be undertaken to develop the commitment of these key individuals. Because patrol captains have direct line command over patrol resources, their commitment must be almost as strong as the area captain. These captains can block the change if they are not equally supportive of community-based policing and problem solving strategies along with aggressive crime suppression efforts.

Line Supervisors (lieutenants and sergeants): How far community-based policing concepts are inculcated into the attitudes and thinking of the vast majority of line personnel will rest to a great extent upon the commitment levels of these first line managers. The pressure of workload and the traditional LAPD reward system emphasizing the volume of arrests requires an in-depth training program involving regular retraining components in order to move a critical mass of this group into the "help change happen" category.

Senior Lead Officers: It can be argued that these critical stakeholders may be in the strongest position to block the transition management process. Developing community partnerships and networks, and focusing resources upon community problems are not new responsibilities for SLOs. However, the enhanced SLO role makes them central figures in responding to the community (including input from the PACs), responding to ongoing problems, coordinating basic car officer efforts, and developing community police centers and the requisite cadre of volunteers.

Area captains will be required to work closely and interact regularly with this critical group of people to ensure their level of commitment remains high.

Mayor/City Council: These political stakeholders need to be moved into a "help happen" position. Some funding will be necessary and should not come out of the department's existing budget. Funding for quality training programs conducted by external consultants is essential to the transition management process. The Chief should regularly meet with the Mayor and members of the City Council in order to update them as to the progress of the implementation plan and seek funding for ongoing training programs throughout the five year strategic plan period. Funds for equipping and for part-time staffing of the community policing centers should also be sought from this group of stakeholders

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Managing and coordinating the implementation of the recommended strategy will be a sizable task. How it is accomplished depends in large part upon whether the Chief of Police approves the alternative strategy which suggested a high level management position be created (as was done in San Diego) to manage the change process. Management of the process also depends to some extent on whether a community relations lieutenant position is established in each division (which the focus group members believed to be unlikely).

In the absence of a community-based policing manager staff position, it is recommended that the Chief assign a command officer (captain) or staff officer (commander) on an ad-hoc basis to

oversee the transition project from the time the components of the strategic plan are approved until the Action Phase I evaluation period concludes (9-94). At that time a determination can be made as to the value and necessity of maintaining the ad-hoc transition management coordinator.

The transition management coordinator would be responsible for monitoring each area's PAC development, working with Human Resource Bureau staff in developing training programs, and meeting regularly with critical stakeholders as the transition progresses. Ongoing progress appraisals, mail and interview surveys, and regular reports to the Chief of Police would be some of the responsibilities of the transition management coordinator. Staff support for the transition management coordinator should be minimal. A management assistant and limited clerical support would be sufficient. The key role in the transition management structure is to provide a process for continual review of the change process and regular feedback to critical stakeholders.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES

Careful planning during the initial research phase and during program implementation is critical. Developing comprehensive general PAC guidelines, increasing the commitment level of critical mass stakeholders, and successfully integrating PACs into the organization's structure are all formidable tasks. Monitoring longer term efforts of expanding the role of SLOs, establishing community policing centers, and other strategies approved for implementation are also important. To increase the likelihood that these important strategic plan components are accomplished, the following three transition management technologies are suggested:

* **Communication of the vision:** In order to gain the necessary level of commitment for not only the recommended strategy, but for the numerous other community-based policing strategies that the LAPD should implement by the year 2003, the Chief of Police must continually communicate his vision. Such communication can be accomplished through training, but also through a planned strategy of getting the support of key stakeholders, especially area captains. Regular update meetings and annual retreats will assist in this effort. By initially providing training, guidance, and inspiration, the Chief will establish a tone or attitude about the importance of community-based policing and the desired strategies for accomplishing a transition to that model among his command staff. Although his top managers will develop the general plan, empowering captains to manage the implementation process and tailor strategies to fit their own community's particular needs should increase their commitment level. Externally, the Chief can direct the use of surveys and the media to communicate his vision to the community. The focus group suggested the creation of a community "town hall" process in various parts of the city where the Chief and the Police Commission can meet with members of the community to discuss issues on a quarterly basis. Such a forum would be another method for the Chief to communicate his vision over the next several years.

* **Training:** Training will be a critical element of the Transition Management Plan. Training will consist of several components. The Chief must communicate his

overall vision through initial meetings with the Director of the Office of Operations and the transition management coordinator, should one be assigned. In addition, training and workshops must be conducted for SLOs, line personnel and supervisors. The Chief and the area commanding officers must "sell" the various plan elements at training days conducted early in Action Phase I. Outside management consultants should also be brought in on a regular basis. The Chief should continue communicating the transition management plan through monthly roll call video tapes and his quarterly command officer briefing sessions.

Responsibility Charting: To graphically depict critical actors, actions, and levels of responsibility, the following responsibility chart was developed based upon input from the focus group. Key actors initially would be the area commanding officers and the transition management coordinator (or ad-hoc coordinator). The focus group believed, however, that once the plan is implemented and should the ad-hoc coordinator position be disbanded, the Director of the Office of Operations would be in the best position to assign his staff to monitor the transition process.

Feedback must also be regularly channeled back to divisional personnel. Two methods to accomplish this goal would be to have PAC members and SLOs attend monthly supervisors' meetings, and to conduct regular community mail surveys soliciting community feedback about police service quality issues.

Table Eight**RESPONSIBILITY (RASI) CHART**

Actors Decisions or Actions	Chief of Police	Director of Office of Operations	Transition Management Coordinator	Area Commanding Officers	Senior Lead Officers
Establish Research Team	R	S			
Review/Approve Recommendations	A	S			
Select Transition Management Coordinator	R				
Coordinate Training	A	A	R	R	I
Establish PAC's	A	A	A	R	
Establish Centers	A	A	I	A	R
Define SLO Role	A	A	R	R	S
Periodic Reports to Chief		R	R		
Conduct Surveys (Internal/External)			R	R	
Monitor Transition (Action Phase I)		R	R	R	
Monitor Transition (Action Phase II)		R	R	R	

***Legend**

R=RESPONSIBILITY for action (but not necessarily authority)

A= APPROVAL (must approve, has power to veto the action)

S= SUPPORT (has to provide resources, but does not have to agree to the action)

I= INFORM (must be informed before the action, but cannot veto)

Gray Box= Irrelevant to that particular action.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

Carefully establishing key responsibilities for carrying out the recommended strategy, the communication of goals, objectives, and vision, both initially and in the future, and extensive training of critical mass stakeholders are three technologies which should be used to increase the effectiveness of the Transition Management Plan. Again, the recommended strategy was one

which combined three alternative strategies identified by the focus group as key elements necessary to successfully implement community-based policing in large California police departments over the next ten years. It was considered a strategy that has little direct budget impact, could be implemented over a three to five year period, and is likely to significantly heal the severely strained relationship that currently exists between the LAPD and the public it must protect and serve.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This study focused primarily on a ten year downline forecast of the future of community-based policing in large California police departments (although the suggested strategic plan involves primarily a 3-5 year implementation process). Its purpose has not been to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the myriad of issues facing the American institution of policing. Rather, the study has been conducted on the premise that considerable support exists to reform the current traditional model of policing found in the LAPD and many other police departments, and that many people believe community-based policing to be the primary strategy for that reform. If such widespread support for community-based policing does exist, it follows that a careful analysis of how such a policing strategy may be affected by possible future trends and events is critical for effective implementation of the model. It is also important to identify key components of that model.

The first question this study considered was the effect of various social and cultural forces upon the future of community-based policing. At least in California's major urban centers, changing

demographics, increased population, street violence, and narcotics related crime, to name just a few trends, will affect the ability of police departments to keep up with rising workloads.

Admittedly, most trends are not linear. However, Los Angeles' future remains somewhat bleak. Urban violence will continue to frighten away many employers, as well as the more affluent members of all ethnic groups. As the city experiences increasing levels of homicide, gang violence, and narcotics related crime, the LAPD will, by necessity, continue to be involved in reactive efforts to combat crime.

Unfortunately, not only do such efforts risk the occurrence of potentially aggravated and explosive incidents of police malpractice, the demand to respond to greater crime problems may pull away precious personnel resources from community-based policing efforts. Whether community-based policing strategies can be implemented along with the demands for tougher and more aggressive responses to expected increases in criminal activity remains an unanswered, but critical question.

Forecasts of California's economic future partially answer the question. The continued erosion of the state's beleaguered economy is expected for at least five more years. High-tech job loss, declining aerospace and defense industries, reduced funding for California's higher education systems, all will contribute to a decline in tax revenue for municipalities.

California's cities, while innovative in their strategies for generating revenue, have about exhausted their sources of additional funds. California's large police departments, and for that matter, all California police departments, must face up to the fact that funding increases to provide services much beyond basic patrol and detective operations will be unlikely throughout the decade of the 1990s. Therefore, community-based policing strategies, from training to operational programs, will all be affected by a lack of available resources.

However, these realities do not doom the future of community-based policing in large police departments or mean police managers must abandon their community-based policing efforts. Instead, police managers must look to the purpose and the intent of community-based policing (to create more sensitive, responsive, user-friendly departments), and develop strategies to accomplish those goals within the social and fiscal realities in California cities which are likely to remain into the early 21st century.

As described in the Strategic Plan section, there are numerous alternative strategies which should be evaluated as to their feasibility and their value within individual police departments. Those listed in this study were developed within the context of the LAPD. Responsiveness to community concerns and issues, problem-solving, community-police cooperation, and rapid patrol response can all become part of a large urban police department's community-based policing strategy. The key to success is to create a model of policing which includes components to accomplish these sometimes conflicting goals.

The third question or sub-issue asked at the beginning of this project was, "What conceptual model of police service may result?" Using ideas generated through the course of this project, along with some of the alternative strategies developed during the strategic planning process, a five point conceptual model for creating a customer driven, community-based police department has been developed. The model incorporates the strategic plan strategy, but adds additional concepts which, when blended together, addresses the need to become community-based and customer driven, while also responding to Los Angeles' serious crime problems. Key components of the model are:

- * Police Advisory Councils (PAC)
- * Senior Lead Officer (SLO)
- * Internal and External Support Resources
- * Community Police Center
- * Mobile Substation Unit

The PAC concept has been described in detail in the strategic plan section of this study. It is a strategy considered essential in regaining public trust and confidence and developing a stronger relationship between the area stations and their communities.

Within this conceptual model of community-based policing, the SLO becomes the community ombudsman who is trained and given the responsibility for developing relationships with the community, and for bringing various available resources to bear upon community problems.

Whether it is simply a targeted response by the assigned beat or basic car officers, a narcotics task force, or mobilizing a group of volunteers for a surveillance operation, the SLO has the task of coordinating the long term focus of internal and external resources upon crime and other neighborhood quality of life problems.

The identification and strategic use of specific internal and external support resources are also components of the model which are critical to accomplishing community problem solving. The use of basic car officers, assigning additional teams of officers to work with the SLO on longer range problems, or bringing in the mounted unit or a squad of motors, are a few examples of the internal resources a SLO can use to focus on specific problems.

External resources are those individuals or groups in the community, the public sector, or the nonprofit sector which may offer services that the SLO may be able to use to reduce or eliminate a problem. Street maintenance, drug and alcohol rehabilitation centers, homeless shelters, and even neighborhood watch groups and volunteers are just some of the groups or entities available for use in designing problem-solving strategies. It is critical that SLOs develop expertise in identifying these resource groups and establishing cooperative working relationships with these various service providers.

The creation of a community police center, established in existing public facilities or in donated space and staffed by volunteers from the surrounding neighborhood, is a component of the model which can be implemented at minimal expense. These centers serve as a response to the demand

for more police accessibility and accountability. The centers put officers out in the neighborhoods where working relationships and partnerships with various community and service entities can be established. Working in the centers alongside community volunteers, SLOs and beat officers can spend much more time with their customers than when working out of their stations, often many miles away.

Finally, an alternative strategy not part of the strategic plan's recommended strategy, but considered essential to the delivery of customer driven police services, is the Mobile Substation Unit. This unit provides the capability for establishing a visible police response to community problems. A key element of community-based policing is the demonstration of concern for neighborhoods and their problems. Deployment of a visibly marked trailer or motorhome, especially in those areas with concentrated drug and gang problems, is not only a useful deterrent, it demonstrates police commitment to customer problems. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department deploys a mobile substation (a trailer) in high crime areas and has experienced notable success with this strategy.

The conceptual model suggested as a result of this study is really a hybrid model which blends strategies to respond to the expected increase in demand for protective services and community safety with customer sensitivity and responsiveness strategies necessary in a community-based policing model. It merges many of the community-based/problem-oriented theories and strategies found in the literature, and assigns primary responsibility for coordinating community responsiveness and interaction strategies upon a specific individual (SLO). The model also

involves many of an area's patrol officers along with bringing a variety of internal and external resources into the community to solve specific problems.

CONCLUSION

The 1990s will no doubt be turbulent times for America's most visible representative of government, its uniformed police. The uncertainty of policing's future raises many important questions at a time when demands to reform the police model are strong. Will community-based policing become the new policing model in major California police departments? Will service-oriented models finally live up to their promise? Or because of the questionable efficacy of current policing and the unproven promise of community-based policing, will a new policing model unimaginable today become the 21st century model? These are questions which police managers should carefully consider before embarking on a major organizational change to a community-based policing model.

The status or future of community-based policing in Los Angeles and other large California police departments by the year 2003 will most likely be one of three futures: Doomed to failure when fear of crime and reduced budgets prevent departments from providing anything but traditional response-driven police services; hollow rhetoric by police executives suggesting that community-based policing is alive and well in their organization; or, the creation of a hybrid policing model which combines effective strategies found in the traditional, the problem-oriented, and community-based policing models. Positive changes toward the third future are possible, but only with careful, thoughtful planning and management. The traditional policing model will not

be replaced because police chiefs say so. It will be replaced only when police executives construct a better model, one that produces tangible results and better service to a department's customers.

APPENDIX ONE

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



WILLIE L. WILLIAMS
Chief of Police

TOM BRADLEY
Mayor

PO Box 30158
Los Angeles, Calif 90030
Telephone
(213) 485-4060
Ref #4.5

January 25, 1993

Dear Panel Member:

Thank you again for agreeing to participate in the futures forecasting section of my Command College paper addressing what will be "THE STATUS OF COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING IN LARGE METROPOLITAN CALIFORNIA POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY THE YEAR 2003?" with sub-issues of:

1. What social/cultural forces will determine the future of the community-based policing model?
2. What economic forces will affect the transition to a community-based policing model?
3. What conceptual model of police service may result?

Note: This study is limited to agencies with a total staffing of more than 250 sworn officers.

I have compiled a list of trends and events that may influence or impact the issue or sub-issues. This list is a result of interviews with experts like yourself, along with a review of relevant literature. I selected a group of trends and events that will directly impact a police department's capability to implement community-based policing, and which can be addressed when formulating a strategic plan. If you need additional information concerning the trends or events, please call me at (213) 485-4060.

The Modified Conventional Delphi process has been chosen for my futures forecasting methodology. The enclosed documents are the first of two Delphi rounds. Each should only take a few minutes to forecast. Please complete the forms and FAX them to me at (213) 485-8572. I would appreciate them within a few days, if possible, as I have a fairly short deadline. I will tabulate the data and send you the results, which will constitute the second round of the Delphi. You will be asked to examine the data and determine if you wish to modify your original response.

In the initial round, please evaluate the lists of trends and events using your knowledge, background, and opinions. Keep in mind that the analysis should be in relation to my project issue and sub-issues.

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TREND EVALUATION: (Instructions for process)

In futures research, a trend is a series of events. It is on-going, and the way the statement is presented is non-directional (i.e., does not imply increases, decreases, or a set opinion). The attached trend evaluation form contains eleven trends. The trend evaluation form calls for you to make estimates on each trend, using the base of 100 for today. The estimates asked for are five years ago, five years from now, and ten years from now. Additionally, on the five and ten years from now forecasts, two horizontal lines divide the box. The upper part of the box is for your forecast on what the trend will be. The bottom half is for your forecast on what you think it should be, or, stated another way, what you would like it to be. An example of trend forecasting is:

TREND		FIVE YEARS AGO	TODAY	FIVE YEARS FROM NOW	TEN YEARS FROM NOW
1	Cost of Housing	80	100	130	190
				120	150

In the case of this trend, the forecast was that, five years ago, costs were at level 80 compared to the 100 of today's cost. It could also be expressed as 80 percent of today's cost. Five years from now, the forecaster believes that the cost of housing will be 130 percent of today's cost, or an increase of 30 percent over today's cost, and that it should be 120 percent, or an increase of 20 percent over today's cost. The forecaster feels that ten years from now, the cost will be 90 percent higher than now, but that it should be 50 percent higher.

Note: The trend can go up and down. In the above example, it could go from 130 to 100, between the five and ten-year forecast.

EVENT EVALUATION:

The second evaluation asked of you is an evaluation of events. Unlike trends, which are a series of on-going events, events are things that can or have happened. They are incidents which can be said to have occurred at a certain place or time.

For example, the number of murders occurring in Los Angeles per year is a trend. The April, 1992, civil disturbance in Los Angeles is an event.

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EVENT EVALUATION: (Continued)

The attached Event Evaluation form contains a list of nine events related to my study issue. For each event, you are asked to forecast three things:

* Years until the probability first exceeds zero

This is your opinion as to when, in years from now, the probability the event could occur first exceeds zero. Fractions of years are acceptable.

* Probability - Five years from now and ten years from now

This is your forecast as to the probability the event will occur within five years from now and ten years from now. The probability is based on a percentage. Thus, 50 percent means it is as likely to occur as not occur, and 90 means it has a very good possibility of occurring, etc.

CAUTION: The probability can only increase from five to ten years, it cannot decrease. It is cumulative. If it is 50 within five years, it cannot be 20 within ten years.

* Impact on the issue area if the event occurred

This is your opinion as to the impact on the issue studied, if the event occurred. Positive and negative impacts may or may not be linked. Please consider them separately and rank them on a zero to ten scale, with ten being the greatest impact possible.

An example of event forecasting is:

Event No.	EVENT STATEMENT	YEARS UNTIL PROBABILITY FIRST EXCEEDS ZERO	PROBABILITY		IMPACT ON ISSUE AREA IF EVENT OCCURRED	
			FIVE YEARS FROM NOW (0 TO 100%)	TEN YEARS FROM NOW (0 TO 100%)	POSITIVE (0-10 SCALE)	NEGATIVE (0-10 SCALE)
1	Recycled paper house marketed	2.5	25	50	0	- 5

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EVENT EVALUATION: (Continued)

In this case, the forecaster felt that the probability a recycled paper house would be marketed would not exceed zero, i.e., it would not happen at all, until 2.5 years from now. There is a 25 percent probability it would occur within five years, and a 50 percent probability it would happen within ten years. If the event does occur, it would have a moderate negative impact on the issue.

Trend and event evaluation forms area attached. A list of definitions has also been provided. Also, if you have a particular trend or event you believe should be added to the list, please write it in at the bottom of the form. Again, if you have any questions concerning the process, please give me a call, at (213) 485-4060.

Thank you for your time and your help,


GREG BERG

Attachments

rlh/doc3-wp/a:berg-ltr

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