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COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AND DISORDERS

An Annotated Bibliography

A STUDY OF COLLECTIVE DISORDERS
INSTITUTE OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

December 1980

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INTRODUCTION

In the last fifteen to twenty years, the field of collective behavior and
social movements has grown by leaps and bounds. Researchers and theorists
in many disciplines, including sociology, social psychology, psychology,
anthropology, political science, economics, and history, have sharpened their
methodological tools and developed a variety of conceptual schemes based on
the dramatic confrontations of the 1960s and 1970s. In part the growth of
this area can be attributed to changes in patterns of government funding of
research, reflective of strong public concern and interest in such phenomena
as the civil rights movement, anti-war demonstrations and student power activ-
ities on college campuses, the urban ghetto riots, the unionization of farm
workers and strikes in the public sector, anti-busing activities, and movements
around other issues such as women's liberation or nuclear power. Attention to
the area may also be a function of the degree to which these activities have
impinged on the scientists themselves. Many of these events occurred in close
physical proximity to colleges and universities, shattering the relative peace
and calm of the ivory tower and forcing otherwise "objective" observers of
these events into a re-examination of their meaning and significance.

Between 1969 and 1977 at least twenty-four books dealing directly with
collective behavior were published while far less than half this number ap-
peared in the previous 25 years (Marx, 1977). In Morrison and Hornback's
bibliography on collective behavior published in 1976, a large part of the
many thousands of articles and books are of recent origin. In a computerized
search of recent literature in this area, we retrieved over 7,000 articles and
books considered relevant for a comprehensive and complete bibliography.

The voluminous amount of published material in the area of collective be-
havior and social movements is also due to unfocused and often disparate
definitions of the field. Collective actions and disorders have usually been
derided as events involving property damage or personal injury or other forms
of violence engaged in by varying numbers of people acting in concert; tra-
ditional phenomena such as "riots," "civil disorders," "crowd actions,"
"crazes," and "panics" have been the focus of attention. Some theorists argue
that disorders are not always violent and that the relevant criterion for such
a classification is the degree to which there is substantial disagreement among
contending parties over the rules and meanings of particular situations. Still
other theorists maintain that it consists of people acting together in pur-
suit of common interests and that almost all organized collective events are
included.

In this bibliography, a broad range of published material is included
from the areas of "collective behavior" and "social movements" as well as from
related fields which are relevant to the understanding of collective actions
and disorders, such as "social change," "social conflict," "political socio-
logy," "race relations," and "criminology." Obviously it would have been
impossible to annotate all relevant publications so several criteria were used
to select articles and books for this monograph. Journals and books published
between 1958 and 1979 were major sources and particular attention was paid
to empirical research on specific collective actions and disorders involving
or threatening violence. Although concerted efforts were made to locate

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materials whose findings could be readily applied to the amelioration or prevention of collective violence, much of the material is more relevant to the development of theoretical propositions and methodological advances. The parameters of this bibliography were loosely drawn around conflicts and confrontations between groups in which there was at least the possibility of violence. Certain types of confrontations were excluded, such as prison riots, violence in secondary schools, domestic violence, and acts of terrorism. Unpublished material, including papers presented at professional meetings and doctoral dissertations, also were deleted although many of them contain information that should be contained in any comprehensive review of the field.

The books and articles in this bibliography are organized into five main categories:

(1) Overview--general definitions of the field of collective behavior and social movements; typologies; literature reviews and critiques; theoretical perspectives; and methodological problems and solutions

(2) Historical and Cross-National--comparative and case studies of social movements and collective violence in American history and in other countries

(3) Riots and Civil Disorders--the antecedents, causes, participants, dynamics and processes, and outcomes of the urban ghetto disorders of the 1960s and early 1970s

(4) College and University Student Movements--student power movement and student activism on campuses during the 1960s and 1970s

(5) Other Social Movements and Collective Actions--this section is subdivided into the following subcategories:

   a) Black Activism--the civil rights movement, the black student movement on college and university campuses, and black involvement in voluntary associations

   b) Poor Peoples' Movements--the welfare rights movement, rent strikes, and urban renewal protests

   c) Peace Movements--anti-Vietnam demonstrations and anti-war organizing

   d) Feminism and Women's Liberation--feminism on college campuses, the origin and growth of women's liberation, and organizing around the ERA

   e) Labor Conflicts--strikes and work stoppages in the public and private sectors

   f) Environmental Movements--anti-pollution and environmental quality activities

   g) Conflicts around Racial Segregation--demonstrations and community conflicts regarding the integration and segregation of public accommodations, schools and housing

h) Militancy in Secondary Schools--boycotts, protests and school closings involving teachers, students and parents

i) Other Youth Movement Activities--Yippies, Hippies, and the New Left

j) Right Wing Crusades--The John Birch Society, anti-textbook controversy, and anti-pornography crusades

k) Miscellaneous--consumers' meat boycott and public attitudes toward protest and violence

Within each of these sections, the entries are alphabetized by author's surname. Each annotation is classified according to the general approach or approaches used in the article or book--theoretical, historical, descriptive, empirical, prescriptive, and so forth--and the empirical materials are further classified according by predominant methodology--controlled experiment, content analysis, case study, analysis of existing data, observations, survey research, participant observation, literature review, and so forth. Following a fairly detailed annotation of each piece, there are brief comments which are usually methodological critiques or assessments of the relevance of the material for different audiences. These comments are necessarily subjective and may often be controversial. We are resigned to the fact that they will be useful to some readers and not to others and that they may reflect the views of only a small proportion of researchers and practitioners in this area. However, because there is so much material available in this area, some initial sifting of the literature is probably necessary in order to point out contradictions, inaccuracies and methodological flaws for readers who may be interested.

An alphabetical (by author surname) list of articles and books annotated in this bibliography as well as others which were not annotated is contained in an Appendix in order to facilitate the efforts of those who wish a more comprehensive review of the available material.

OVERVIEW

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Controlled Experiment

The authors designed an experiment to test the Marxian hypothesis
that exploitation plus awareness of common position produces an
orientation toward achieving collective benefits rather than self-
advancement. Marx's original variable, exploitation, was deemed empir-
ically unworkable, since a given degree of exploitation tends to be
objectively attributed rather than subjectively felt. An operational
variable, relative deprivation, was substituted in its place. The
two independent variables, then, were relative deprivation and aware-
ness.

Forty-eight male undergraduates were randomly assigned to four
experimental groups, corresponding to a dichotomized 2 by 2 design
including all possible pairings of the two variables. The subjects,
identified with the proletariat, were paid on an incentive basis to
assemble jigsaw puzzles, but had to turn over half their earnings to
an experimental assistant, a member of the bourgeoisie. Conditions
of high and low deprivation were simulated by presenting the assistant-
ship as either an ascribed or an earned position. Response to post-
experimental query validated the simulation, showing that subjects who
perceived the assistant's status as ascribed (because he was a social
science major) indeed felt more deprived than those who perceived
it as earned (through hard work as a subject in the past). Conditions
of high and low awareness were simulated by either allowing or restrict-
ing discussion of financial arrangements; in this case also the effec-
tiveness of the simulation was confirmed by postexperimental query.

Two multiple-item scales were devised for the experiment. The
first scale, assessing collective revolt (the dependent variable), con-
sisted of five items dealing with feelings toward the system and desires
to change it. The second scale, assessing the degree to which subjects
were motivated by money (a conditional variable introduced during the
experiment to ascertain which subjects most closely matched the Marxian
hypothesis that money means survival and therefore has an unquestionable
bearing on motives), consisted of four items dealing with desired
earnings and perceived limitations on those earnings.

Before controlling for money-motivation, the conditional variable,
the expected correlation between a high-deprivation/high-awareness
condition and a high collective revolt response failed to occur. After
controlling for the conditional variable, however, the expected corre-
lation did occur: money-motivation was high. Since money-motivation
was high in the system on which Marx based his predictions, the authors
conclude that their experiment validated his hypothesis. Finally
they suggest that their model need not be restricted to classic Marxian
class struggles. The three variables -- ascribed rather than achieved

status of the superior, subordinate's awareness of a common position, and strong desires for financial gain -- could operate in any moderately complex organizational system.

Comments:

The stated objective of the experiment was to test the hypothesis that deprivation plus awareness produces an orientation toward collective, rather than self - betterment, but in the heat of simulation the authors apparently lost sight of that goal. The items in the "collective revolt scale" were both confusing and inappropriate for measuring "dissatisfaction with a system, a willingness to utilize any means to change the system and an orientation to collective rather than individual change." The measurement of subjective deprivation was not presented; we were only told that the conditions of high and low deprivation were invoked by varying the credentials of the assistant.

To demonstrate attitudes favorable to collective revolt as the authors claim to have done, is one thing; demonstrating an actual collective orientation would be quite another. Some opportunity for subjects to act as a collectivity at the expense of self should have been built into the experiment -- perhaps through some such action as paying union dues.

Berk, R.A., "The Controversy Surrounding Analyses of Collective Violence:
  Some Methodological Notes," Ch. 8 in Analysis of Collective Violence,
  James F. Short Jr. and Marvin Wolfgang (Eds.), Chicago: Aldine, 1972.

Approach: Theoretical

According to Berk, those who study crowd behavior are often strongly
motivated by personal and political concerns. Despite the varying acces-
sibility of data and in the face of little information on mob processes,
some investigators feel compelled to "analyze crowds" and "take a position,"
when caution would be more advisable. Berk concludes that the "shape of
the controversy surrounding crowd behavior is a function of the motivation
of the investigator and the kinds of data that are available...."

Patterns of mob action are extremely difficult to study. Events occur
quickly; many occur at once; actions span a wide geographic area; it is
difficult to anticipate the outbreak of any disturbances; the way mobs
develop leaves few traces; participants are unlikely to take time to answer
an investigator's queries; participants have salient interests in the
interpretations of the events they are taking part in; and the high risk
of personal injury induces many to conduct their investigations from a
distance. As a result, one can profitably examine the precursors and re-
sults of mob action but little in between. Nevertheless, some researchers
focus on crowd actions despite the lack of data.

Interpretations of crowd behavior based on such research suffer from a
number of drawbacks. First, crowd behavior is sometimes characterized as
demonic, implicitly irrational and otherworldly; and although not veri-
fied by empirical results, this characterization of crowd behavior has
become a part of the literature. Berk maintains that what happens to
people in crowds is an empirical question on which social researchers have
little information.

Second, extensive use is made of metaphor to cover the absence of facts.
Berk's major criticism on this point concerns the degree to which metaphors
are employed to introduce into the analysis ideas that are not explicitly
examined.

Third, the actions of mobs may be viewed from different levels and the
availability of data varies at each level. This is an example of the fallacy
of inferring generalizations from concepts developed for individuals or
small groups. The solution to this problem, Berk states, is for researchers
to be more careful in specifying the level of their analysis and in selecting
concepts that are appropriate for that level.

Fourth, it is unwise to assume that people in crowds are moved by the
same interests or are nearly identical in other ways.

Finally, conclusions may be distorted by speculations based on events
preceding and results following the collective behavior. Berk notes that
his intention is not to belittle the typical elaborative speculations about
crowd behavior, but rather to encourage the collection of relevant data.
The McCone Commission is cited as an example of extrapolation and a series

of resulting distortions. Banfield's The Unheavenly City is also used as
an example of distortion following extrapolation. Banfield "extrapolates
that the resulting mob processes initiating most civil disorders are due
to the 'animal spirits' of lower class male participants."

Berk concludes that far more data on what happens in crowds will have
to be collected if characterizations are to be accurate. Students of
crowd behavior should be aware of the sources of their material and should
use original data wherever possible.

Comments:

This is a very readable summary that beginning students of crowd be-
havior should use in conjunction with their own independent data collection.

Bittner, Egon, "Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements,"
   American Sociological Review, 28, December 1963, 928-40.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

   The following statement summarizes the author's intention:

> This is an essay attempting a theoretically pure
> description of radicalism. On the basis of the
> writings of Max Weber radicalism is defined as
> differing in one crucial aspect from the socially
> sanctioned outlook of common sense. Because of
> this difference, radical beliefs have a polemic
> disadvantage vis a vis the outlook of common sense
> which jeopardizes the integrity and continuity of
> radical movements. To cope with this pernicious
> flow is the principal organizational task of such
> movements. A number of features commonly asso-
> ciated with radical, extremist or totalitarian
> doctrines and actions are interpreted as solutions
> of this organizational problem. Previous social
> and psychological inquiries are related in the
> proposed argument.

   Bittner, often using arcane language, attempts to construct a
philosophy, and hence a pure theory, of radicalism. He begins with
this premise: radical movements cannot function without persons pre-
disposed to participate; but since this is true of any and all social
behavior one can eliminate the motives behind actions in the search for
causes. He believes motives fall into two categories. One expresses
the common-sense attitude to life which is the "ordinary, traditionally
sanctioned world view." The other, represented by science challenges
this accepted world by questioning many of its assumptions and its
logic.

   Bittner discusses Max Weber's ideas about prophets and prophecy,
seeing many similarities between science and religion. They both demand
some kind of world order; but religion requires a "unity of meaning,"
whereas science calls for a unity of logic which is itself morally
neutral. Bittner then extrapolates his theory of radicalism from both
of these demands and concludes that radical movements, to be successful,
must on the one hand abandon pure doctrine and on the other eliminate
any elements discrediting the doctrine. He lists three necessary con-
ditions or mechanisms for accomplishing this end: 1) psychological
satisfaction of participants; 2) internal harmony without great expen-
diture of energy; and 3) strong group boundaries. On the basis of these
formal criteria and descriptions of past "radical" movements, Bittner
then lists seven "substantive features of belief and conduct" (including
charisma, purity of belief, a notion that suffering is integral to
group progress, etc.). These "pure" features of a movement, he insists,

tell the other half of the story, the first half being the partici-
pants' actual motives which "get the movement going." "It is necessary,"
he notes, "to show that personal attitudes are socially sanctioned
and that these sanctions are social facts precisely in the sense
Durkheim gave the term. ...Movements are not the product of the pre-
sence of persons...(they are the products of structure)." Bittner
concludes, therefore, that successful radical movements feed on both
the emotional (irrational) aspects of behavior and the rational (goal-
oriented) ones. These structural features are hence essential to the
success of radical movements.

Comments:

    This is a philosophical article. Despite its avowedly theoretical
approach, it does not supply any data, variables or the like, to bear
out the conclusions. The article has many interesting points, however,
especially the comparison between science and religion, normally thought
to be at opposite poles. Bittner's concern with the motives of par-
ticipants in radical movements lends a strange perception to a pure
theory, but may be useful since many of his conclusions seem sound.

Brannon, Robert, Gary Cyphers, Sharlene Hesse, Sharon Hesselbart, Roberta
    Keane, Howard Schuman, Thomas Viccaro, and Diana Wright, "Attitude
    and Action: A Field Experiment Joined to a General Population Survey,"
    American Sociological Review, 38, 5, October 1973, 625-36.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research; Experiment

This unique research used the 1969 Detroit Area Study sampling pro-
cedures and findings to test the validity of survey measures and the link
between attitudes and behavior. Three months after survey researchers
had measured (640 randomly selected) Detroit residents' attitudes toward
open housing laws, "petitioners" (actually researchers) appeared at their
door to enlist action (petition signing of varying degrees of publicity)
for or against the position they had taken in the survey. Eighty-two per-
cent of whites opposed open housing according to the 1969 D.A.S. data;
of these, 81.5% behaved consistently in the "action" experiment. Of
those favoring open housing (16%) similar results were found, except that
a somewhat smaller percent were willing to act on this (obviously unpop-
ular) stand, but those acting were willing to act more strongly, by
allowing the publication of their names, when compared to open housing
opponents. The authors feel this unusually strong attitude-action link
resulted from: a) assessing well formed and stable attitudes, b) the
use of a specific and constant attitude object (housing laws in both
cases), and c) using household (as opposed to classroom, or other) inter-
views.

Comments:

An excellent sample with very good controls is used to measure a cri-
tical question. The link with D.A.S. data offers very useful methodologi-
cal opportunities. One of the very few randomly selected populations for
an action experiment representing an entire city subpopulation (whites).

Couch, Carl, "Collective Behavior: An Examination of Some Stereotypes,"
    Social Problems, 15, 3, 1968, 310-322.

Approach: Prescriptive
Methodology: Literature Review

    Contemporary theorists have taken issue with LeBon's notion that crowds
are literally subhuman; but according to Couch, most continue to think of
crowd behavior as "pathological or, at best, a more primitive form of conduct
than non-crowd behavior." As a result of LeBon's influence, he argues, the
favorite approach of collective behavior theorists has largely focused on the
causal roots of "collective deviance," rather than on the crowd as an inter-
active social system.

    One by one he refutes the traditional stereotypes. Crowds are destructive?
Not compared to established authorities, whose superior organization and means
of coercion have traditionally enabled them to inflict damage with relative
impunity. "In the entire history of mankind," he writes, "crowds have been
responsible for only a very small percentage of the lives taken by fellow
humans. In fact, it appears that systems with a highly authoritarian struc-
ture are more given to killing humans and are far more effective at it."
During the revolutions in France and Cuba, the author points out, newly estab-
lished authorities, not angry mobs, brought about the execution of thousands
of opponents. Crowds are irrational? Not as long as numbers decide the suc-
cess of efforts to alter the structure of authority; on the contrary, members
of crowds would appear "highly irrational if they attempted to achieve the
desired result as individuals." Crowds are spontaneous? No. Surprise is
crucial to success; hence organizers tend to maintain a low profile, though
they are always active, shaping the violent, or what is equally likely, the
nonviolent orientation of the crowd. The author contends that crowds differ
from institutionalized social systems only in that their organizers "are not
expected by tradition to plan the activities of collectivities." Crowds
represent the riff-raff? No. "Those of the very lowest prestige do not com-
mand sufficient respect to organize others; nor do they usually have the skill
and know-how to organize others."

    The author calls it misguided to accept the dominant sociological perspec-
tive on crowd behavior: that such behavior is abnormal, a pathology rooted
in the culture or environment of the participants. Instead sociologists
should have been looking at the ways in which "cultural elements are created,
modified, and adopted in interaction." From this point of view, the crowd
appears as "a social system human beings adopt to take action with reference
to other systems," chiefly distinguished by its ad hoc uninstitutionalized
character.

Comment:

    Although this article is well written and occasionally incisive, much of
its original impact has been lost since it was published in 1968, thanks to
the work of Gary Marx, Charles Tilly, and others who began where this article
ends, taking for granted that collective behavior is part of the standard
repertoire of human actions and basing their descriptions, classifications,
and analyses on that premise.

"Criminal Law -- The Controlled Use of Police Discretion to Avert Civil
    Disorder," Wisconsin Law Review, 1970, No. 3, 907-915.

Approach: Prescriptive
Methodology: Content Analysis; Analysis of Existing Data

This article explores the legal contradiction when the most appropriate
tactics for crowd control require that police permit some violations lest a
more serious confrontation occur. Although effective, such discretion may not
have legislative authorization and should be subject to external controls.
Its use in flagrant situations may anger the public and encourage disrespect
for the law. Corrective action requires training, administrative procedural
changes, and legislation.

In two civil incidents at Madison the decision to follow or not to fol-
low a strict interpretation of a statute is thought to have had an important
bearing on the degree of disorder and violence. Police intervention with
arrests, in response to a spontaneous block party, is believed to have pre-
cipitated the subsequent three days of violence and disorder. In another case,
decisions not to arrest individuals who were protesting proposed welfare cuts
without a permit are given credit for the peaceful resolution of the incident.

Although an effective tactic, police discretion does not appear to be
sanctioned by Wisconsin law and may be abused if not officially recognized
and made subject to controls. Legislation should encourage actions which sus-
tain peaceful behavior and protect individual rights; it should not demand
"full enforcement at all costs." Decisions regarding the use of discretion
should be transferred from the police to more accountable officials, such as
the mayor, and their decions should be subject to judicial review. Central-
ized police training units should develop guidelines which reflect the legisla-
tive intent and should make these known to both mayors and police departments.
Such actions should reduce violence and significantly improve police-community
relations.

Comments:

The article recognizes the value of police discretion and the problem of
its control but offers only slight support for the assumption that the decision
regarding arrest was solely responsible for the difference in the outcome of
the incidents in Madison. It is not evident that discretion in the hands of
the mayor would result in less abuse.

Currie, Elliott, and Jerome H. Skolnick, "A Critical Note on Conceptions of Collective Behavior," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 391, September 1970, 34-35.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Critical Book Review

In contrast to what they consider the antidemocratic bias of theories of traditional collective behavior, which view collective acts as destructive, irrational, and inappropriate, the authors have earlier argued for an approach to the study of collective violence which takes seriously the historical and political context and the point of view of the people involved, as well as the specific "natural history" of the episodes.   Using the work of Neil Smelser as an example of this antidemocratic bias, they argue that his efforts suffered from an excessive emphasis on definition and classification, did not differ much from earlier approaches, depend largely on undemonstrated assertions about the characteristics of collective behavior, and adopted the perspective of official control agencies in interpreting and dealing with these events.

In particular, they use selected statements from Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior to show that it provides a "potentially misleading implication that social movements are necessarily based on distorted beliefs...and that presumably those who do not hold distorted beliefs seek social change through established institutions." Moreover, they assert that Smelser tended to discredit the beliefs of participants on a priori grounds and to accept uncritically the testimony of "officials" or of clearly hostile observers.   He regarded collective behavior, they say, as something requiring control or containment, and he thus "underestimates the role of agencies of social control in the origins and the content of the 'outburst' itself, rather than merely affecting its outcome."

Comments: This is a thorough and provocative review of Smelser's work, although it is somewhat biased against his point of view.

Davies, James, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological
    Review, 27, 1, February 1962, 5-19.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study; Analysis of Existing Data

    Denying the traditionally held Marxist view that revolutions are born
from degradation and poverty, Davies argues that revolutions are most
likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social
development is followed by a short period of sharp revearsal. People
then subjectively fear that ground gained with great effort will be
quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary. The evidence from Dorr's
Rebellion in Rhode Island, the Russian Revolution, and the Egyptian
Revolution in 1952 supports this notion; tentatively, so do data on
other civil disturbances.

    This theory is often graphed, with time and "needs" showing a steady
upward bent until some catastrophic event causes the line to dip. Half-
way through this process a certain section of the line is marked as a
"tolerable gap." Just before the catastrophe, the gap has widened to an
"intolerable gap." This graphed line--often referred to as the J-Curve,
is purported to explain why in times of seeming progress in objective
social and economic status, violent and often what is seen as counter-
productive behavior ensues.

Comments:

    There are many problems with Davies' argument, his assumptions and
his choice of examples. Aside from these problems, Davies does not
adequately define his most critical measures. What constitutes a toler-
able versus an intolerable gap is never spelled out, and what is consi-
dered a "long" versus a "short" period of time varies with each individual
case examined. Similarly, the measure of "needs" is overwhelmingly
vague, with rising expectations equated with increased demands for goods
in the Dorr Rebellion, while in the case of the Russian Revolution it
is "measured" by magnanimous acts of the Czar. In this attempt to
combine psychology and history, Davies ends up using ill-defined concepts
as "needs and expectations" (measured differently in each case) to
discern "revolutionary mood."

Davies, J.D., "The J-Curve and Power Struggle Theories of Collective Violence: Comments," American Sociological Review, 39, 4, 1974, 607-10.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Critical Comment

This article is a response to a critical analysis of theories of collective violence conducted by Snyder and Tilly (Hardship and Collective Violence in France: 1830-1960, American Sociological Review, 37, 1972, 520-32. Snyder and Tilly find that theories which assert that political violence is a product of a widening gap between what people want and what they get do not explain incidents of violence in France between 1830-1960. Snyder and Tilly then propose a theory which asserts that violence is a byproduct of political struggle among groups over resources.

Davies responds that though the data used by Snyder and Tilly are nationwide data, no nationwide collective violence occurred in the period studied and that data on the localities in which the incidents studied occurred is required to analyze and test the J-curve theory. Davies identifies other sources of weakness in the Snyder and Tilly critique as a reliance on variables for which data are easily gathered and quantified and thus a substitution of statistical significance for empirical significance; the sampling of time periods within the years 1921-29 which may have obscured variations in the magnitude of incidents of collective violence; and their measures of the gap between expectations and gratifications which do not address changes in real income levels and thus cannot demonstrate a change in standard of living as Snyder and Tilly assert.

Davies sees the crucial research problem shared by all theorists in this area as one of measurement. How one measures those concepts of theories which are most critical--e.g., the cognitive and psychological gap between expectations and gratifications or given the existence of this gap, the point at which violence is likely to erupt--are at this time just as significant as the substance of the theories themselves.

Finally, Davies sees the Snyder and Tilly theory as tautological. Violence is a type of conflict just as political struggle is. They are two strategies of competition for resources. Why a group chooses to compete and why it chooses one strategy rather than another, Snyder and Tilly don't tell us.

Drew, Paul, "Domestic Political Violence: Some Problems of Measurement," Sociological Review, 22, 1, February 1974, 5-25.

Approach: Theoretical

The basic argument contained in this paper is that events should be classified according to the meaning they hold for participants rather than social scientists, and that labeling events a priori as collective violence or disorders results in comparing nonequivalent phenomena particularly in cross-national analyses. He states that "social scientists have generally been concerned to elucidate the concepts of 'instability' and 'disorder' and in so doing have imposed on categories of action such as 'demonstrations,' 'revolts,' 'riots,' etc. a spurious equivalence resulting from the social scientist's own understanding of these events, in ignorance of the meaning and significance they may have for the members of particular societies in particular contexts.

Most social scientists, for example, categorize events as "political violence" because they inevitably disturb members' expectations about the 'normal' operation of the political process. This tends to limit the search for causes to certain social structural conditions that promote instability and assumes that the 'normal' political process is nonviolent. Moreover, there may be multiple definitions of observably similar events even within a particular society. Some of these events would not be considered as political violence in our culture but may be so defined elsewhere--for example some actions of authorities which, though are officially defined as 'legitimate' may be defined by some members as politically and violently repressive.

In a priori definitions of collective disorders, collective violence, political violence, and so forth, the researcher "misses the significance of the processes by which members produce definitions in accounting for whether and to what extent, events are disordering...Questions as to whether and to what extent events disrupt political organizations must be treated as empirical problems."

Violent events are not necessarily disorders. In certain cultural contexts, particular types of violent activity may not have the same disruptive significance for the political system that they have in other countries. For Drew, an event can only be defined as a "disorder" if either the parties apply different rules or for some reason are unable to apply rules in common, so that they make different sense of the same situation; or if any of the parties are unable to apply any rule, for at least a temporary period, to an 'unusual' event. Whether or not an event is 'disruptive' and the extent to which it is, can only be decided within the context of what is considered by members to be 'perceivedly normal' in a particular situation.

Comments:

This is a useful corrective to the tendency of many researchers to ignore the varying meanings attached to events which are similar in form, magnitude, or duration by members of the same society and especially by members of different cultures. Drew argues that the cross-national compar-

isons typically ignore the cultural context and assume that the researchers'
measures of the severity of a violent event indicates the degree to which
it indicates or is a cause of instability in the political system. Yet
this is often spurious because even the same event may be defined as a
"riot" by some members of a society, a "social protest" by others, or as
simple "criminality" by others.

Erlanger, Howard S. and Fred Persily, "Estrangement, Machismo, and Gang Violence," Discussion papers of the Institute for Research on Poverty. Wisconsin University, Madison, Wisconsin, September 1976.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Interviews

In considering whether subcultural values are associated with violence, it is critical to determine both the precise content of such values and the way in which the subculture interacts with structural forces to affect the level of violence. This paper is a qualitative inquiry into the way these questions bear on adolescent gangs in the Chicano barrios of East Los Angeles, the largest group with Mexican heritage outside of Mexico. The research suggests that the literature has generally misunderstood the meaning and role of machismo in Chicano life, and that the frequency of gang violence depends strongly on political conditions in the community.

Studies of Chicano culture have emphasized the subcultural valuation of machismo as a primary cause of violence. Sociological conceptions of the subculture (or "contraculture") of violence suggests that violence--and, in East Los Angeles, especially gang violence-- is encouraged by admiration of physical aggression. The authors believe machismo to be a cultural trait that may contribute to physical aggression, but only indirectly and under certain structural conditions.

The Glaser and Strauss model for the development of empirically grounded theory was used to conduct open-ended interviews with 25 East Los Angeles Chicanos. These were nonrandomly selected because they were then active or had been active in gang activities which included violent confrontations. Interviews were also conducted with various police, school, and community representatives. The products of this inquiry are qualitative and suggest, rather than test, plausible hypotheses.

It is argued that "machismo means 'having courage,' 'not backing down,' or 'being ready to fight'." But it does not imply physical aggression. For example, Cesar Chavez's non-violent activism was considered very "macho" by virtually all respondents in this study. Machismo connotes to them a courageous toughness in exhibiting "manhood," but this concept included many positive social goals and neither specifically included nor required violence or physical aggression.

The cultural value of machismo might, however, contribute to violence under specified conditions, according to the authors, who then detail the conditions responsible for structurally induced anomie among Chicanos. They use a model of "internal colonialism" to summarize widespread racial and cultural discrimination, political

disenfranchisement, and limited educational and occupational oppor-
tunities. This social "estrangement" apparently focuses adolescent
attention and loyalties on the local groups, demarcated by neighbor-
hoods and barrios. Gang violence would logically be augmented by
the search for machismo whenever daily involvement with territorial
defense and intergang rivalry estranges the members from wider social
concerns.

Interview material (cited throughout) details several ways in
which the politicization of the Chicano movement from 1967 to 1972
served to reduce gang violence. Largely because a wider group identi-
fication and a sense of efficacy was engendered by a clearer path
toward possible goals, intergang rivalries appeared to be dramatically
reduced during this five-year period. Other kinds of group action
and excitement were available through a movement which directly
stressed brotherhood between Chicanos. This seemed to be an era of
increasing machismo and decreasing gang violence. In fact, a sub-
stantial -- though difficult to document -- decrease in gang violence
was recalled by many observers.

According to Erlanger and Persily it might seem that "an excessive
concern with values such as courage and dignity escalates trivial
affronts into major physical confrontations. We have shown that in
East Los Angeles the explanation is much more complicated than this,
and that this type of impetus to gang fighting operates only in an
estranged setting." Recent increases in gang violence may
therefore result from a decline of clearly visible community efforts
to affect social change. "When...political consciousness...(is) com-
bined with a sense of unity and power, fundamental changes in the
perception and handling of status threats could ensue."

Comments:

This study carefully assesses the interaction between individually
espoused cultural values and the sociopolitical context in which such
values are expressed in action. "Findings" are largely suggestions;
the authors offer useful ideas about topics for further investigation.

Fireman, Bruce and Gamson, William A., "Utilitarian Logic in the Resource
    Mobilization Perspective," In The Dynamics of Social Movements,
    Mayer Zald and John D. McCarthy (Eds.), Cambridge: Winthrop Pub-
    lishers, 1979, pp. 8-44.

Approach: Theoretical

   Building on a critique of Mancur Olson's utilitarian approach to
social movements, the authors generate an expanded theory of how individuals
and groups can be mobilized for collective action. Olson's theory empha-
sized the difficulties in getting people involved in such actions and ar-
gued that personal self-interest is the major determinant of mobilization
--people act collectively only if they are provided with "selective incen-
tives" (i.e., constraints or inducements that mean something to them as
individuals). Firestone and Gamson don't disagree that selective incen-
tives are important in mobilizing for collective action but they argue
that other factors are also important and often more critical in organizing
potential constituents.

   > "We argue that most social movements would never get off the
   > ground if their constituents' decisions to participate were
   > based exclusively, or even primarily, upon individual self-
   > interest. Social movements are often facilitated by the soli-
   > darity of a group of actors sharing common interests. Rapid
   > mobilization of social movements is often precipitated by
   > conspicuous threats to common interests and by conspicuous
   > opportunities for common interests to be defended by collec-
   > tive action. Self-interest is only one basis for mobiliza-
   > tion."

   From materials written by organizers and accounts of organizing at-
tempts, they suggest strategies that can be used or have been used to mobil-
ize people for collective action. One set of strategies relates to increas-
ing solidarity by developing clubs and voluntary associations and cultural
events. "Social events, even rituals, can be useful in strenghtening the
solidary relations that help to sustain collective actors during quiescent
times and then facilitate rapid mobilization when collective action is
urgent." Another set of strategies relates to how to align the program
of a social movement with the interests of a solidary constituency. This
can be accomplished easily when the social movement organizers are long-
standing leaders of the constituent group but if they are not, they must
either woo the solidary group (through the leaders or key actors) or side-
step the core leaders of the old solidary group and woo more sympathetic
subgroups. In all of these instances the organizer needs to earn the
trust of the constituents by either sharing some of their characteristics
(e.g., age, class, occupation) or having at least a cursory familiarity
with their experiencies.

   Individuals as well as groups have interests that can be mobilized
for collective action. The authors discuss briefly some strategies organizers
have used to raise personal interest and these include appealing to their
principles through political education, ideological discussion, conscious-
ness-raising sessions, newsletters and the like. "Sometimes events occur
that present mobilizing agents with consciousness-raising opportunities.

Sometimes they can stage their own events or actions. Yippie activities, such as throwing dollar bills on members of the New York Stock Exchange, or guerilla theater have such a purpose."

Finally, mobilization is more likely when the collective action is viewed as urgent--that is, it is seen as necessary for achieving the interests of the constituents and the opportunity for the action is there. Constituents' consciousness of the necessity of collective action is increased by events that threaten their interests, undermine their trust in authorities, and discredit rival possibilities of collective action. "Organizers may...try to precipitate these events, but they must act discreetly in order not to discredit themselves." The opportunity for collective action is increased by events that raise the credibility of the collective actor (the organizer), throw its antagonists into disarray, and make available coalition partners and third-party support. "The basic strategy is to demonstrate influence by picking a target that offers promise of a quick success, thus showing potential constituents that the social movement actor is one to be reckoned with and that opportunities exist for collective action."

Although the authors have presented other determinants of mobilization besides selective incentives, they note that there are instances when self-interest is paramount.

> "When social movement organizations have the armed force it takes to tax and draft soldiers, or when they controll access to crucial goods and services (e.g., jobs, patronage), they may have the capacity to maintain or extend their levels of mobilization primarily by means of selective incentives...Some social movement organizations mobilize enough resources from one constituency on the basis of solidarity and responsibility so that they can mobilize another constituency on the basis of self-interest."

However, since self-interest is such a limited basis for mobilizing a constituency, they suggest that research focus on how organizers raise consciousness of common interests, develop opportunities for collective action, and tap constituents' solidarity and principles.

Comments:

This corrective to the strictly utilitarian perspective on mobilization of a potential constituency by reference to their self-interests is useful because it helps to understand the emergence and growth of social movements in which the actors may gain no concrete benefits. Moreover, it suggests a new source of data for understanding what strategies and tactics may be effective or ineffective in particular situations--organizers' own accounts of their experiences.

Firestone, Joseph, "Continuities in the Theory of Violence," Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 18, 1, March 1974, 117-42.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Literature Review

This is an in-depth critique of the model of collective violence
found in T. Gurr's Why Men Rebel. The author begins with a discussion
of two important earlier theoretical works on collective violence.
He notes that both Smelser (1963) and Kornhauser (1959) move from the
abstract to behavior -- from "discontinuities" to violence -- without
specifying the kinds of discontinuities which exist and therefore
render their theories untestable. Both are too inclined to look for
a single cause, rather than ask why the discontinuities in authority,
society, or community arise initially. If causes are "transactional,"
however, he says, "then it is necessary to view the onset of conflict
from the standpoint of the interaction of elites and masses."

He notes that Gurr at least attempts to convert these illustra-
tions into cause-and-effect variables of conflict and violence (i.e., a
dynamic model) but Gurr too ends up with Smelser's and Kornhauser's
categories and concludes that no objective criteria can tell us which
"social conditions" will produce violence and therefore which ones
ought to command study. The reasons lie in Gurr's adherence to frus-
tration-aggression theories about violence and in his uncritical appli-
cation of its basic tenet that aggressive tendencies are in all men.
Gurr errs, says Firestone, when he assumes that if relative deprivation
can be documented, it must necessarily lead to aggression: Why not
to withdrawal or drugs? Why violence? And why only an irrational
reaction? Why not organized, rational protest? Gurr does not sufficiently
distinguish collective violence from political violence.

Yet, after all his criticism, he concludes that "Gurr's hypotheses
ought to have a prominent place in future models of social conflict"
as long as he attempts a transactional approach by which he could then
"postulate a continuous social process giving rise to violence." This
he regards as only a short step.

Comments:

This critique illustrates the primitive state of the theory on
collective behavior. It also implicitly reveals the lack of a good
quantitative data base. Data cited to support the author's positions
tend to be descriptive. The basic weakness of the theories lies in
the lack of operational specificity.

Flacks, Richard, "Protest or Conform: Some Social Psychological Perspectives
    on Legitimacy," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 5, 2, April-
    May-June, 1969.

Approach: Prescriptive
Methodology: Literature Review

According to Flacks, there is widespread speculation among scholars that
"instances of defiance, resistance, and disruption by young people, directed
against established authority, represent a trend leading to the erosion and
destruction of the legitimacy of military and other authority." This is per-
haps surprising, says Flacks, since the small amount of empirical research
(he cites the Milgram experiment as a pioneer study of the nature and legiti-
macy of authority) suggests that mass conformity, not mass protest, best
characterizes our society. Flacks remarks that "Milgram's subjects and draft
resisters stand for opposing aspects of the same culture and social system."
The attempt to use social analysis to predict which of these best represents
our future, he says, is like applying meteorology to say whether the planet
will be hotter or colder twenty years hence: change is expected, but in what
direction?

Flacks, a priori, sides with protest and against authority. To support
his position he reiterates his "new working class" argument: children reared
according to the egalitarian precepts of the rising class of intellectual
workers naturally challenge the legitimacy of authority. He then cites the
black movement as another source of skepticism toward authority. Children
raised under oppressive conditions also naturally challenge authority. The
implication in both cases is that the family, as the prime agent of political
socialization, undermines authority. Among more privileged parents, of course,
the formative influence has the opposite effect: the child of the favored
class "sees a vision of holiness when he chances to glance in the direction
of government." Nevertheless Flacks declares that the presence of the "two
countercultures, socializing their children quite differently," significantly
challenges the dominant mode of rearing children and by extension the legi-
timacy of the American system. In particular he feels that the increasing
exposure of the children of the new working class to liberal education is
disturbing the legitimacy of authority: the personal competence and indepen-
dence inculcated by such education mix badly with the bureaucracies into which
these young workers are increasingly drawn.

Comment:

There are some interesting observations here but no structure to hold
them together. The conceptual focus of the article -- the legitimacy of
authority -- is laid down at the outset and is followed by what looks like
a brainstorming session. But the idea is never quite clear. Flacks seems to
look for a way to work his "new working class" theory into an issue of general
sociological concern: the issue of legitimacy gives the antiauthoritarian
instincts of new working class youth a central significance. In today's
uncertain world, however, Flacks' remark that "there appears to be a funda-
mental incompatibility between the commitment of American national authority
to the maintenance of a world empire and the continued legitimacy of that
authority" seems questionable to say the least.

Freeman, Jo, "Resource Mobilization and Strategy: A Model for Analyzing Social
   Movement Organization Actions," In The Dynamics of Social Movements,
   Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (Eds.), Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers,
   1979, pp. 167-89.

Approach: Theoretical

     In looking at the determinants of the strategy of a social movement,
Freeman utilizes the resource mobilization perspective and draws on her earlier
work on the women's liberation movement as well as on data from other con-
temporary social movements. She developed a model which highlights the re-
sources available to a social movement organization at one point in time, the
limitations they face on the use of these resources, and aspects of the organ-
izational structure of the group and expectations about potential targets
that affect the ways these resources become deployed.

     Resources can be both tangible (e.g., money, space, publicity) and intan-
gible (e.g., people) and they can be specialized in the sense of being pos-
sessed by only a few participants (e.g., expertise, access to networks, access
to decision-makers, status) or unspecialized (e.g., time and commitment). In
contrast to established interest groups which tend to mobilize tangible re-
sources, social movements are low in these and tend to emphasize the deploy-
ment of people resources. There are three major sources of mobilizable re-
sources: the beneficiary constituency (i.e., those who both benefit from it
and provide resources); the conscience constituency (i.e., those who are
sympathetic but are not beneficiaries and do provide resources) and noncon-
stituency institutions (i.e., those who are independent of the movement but
can potentially be coopted by it, such as the government). One of the major
factors making mobilization of resources easier is the density of them--those
that are concentrated, such as students, can be mobilized fairly easily.
Another factor is the existence of a cooptable communications network.
Freeman notes:

     "The reason many different movements tend to appear during the
     same historical period is not that different groups just happen
     to discover their grievances at the same time, or even that the
     example of one group alerts others to opportunities to alleviate
     their own grievances. Rather, it is that the resources one move-
     ment generates can be used for cognate movements. Organizing or
     publicizing skills gained in one movement are readily transferable.
     One movement's conscience constituency can become the next move-
     ment's beneficiary constituency."

     However, all resources have constraints upon their use attached to them
and she identifies five of these: values, past experiences, reference groups,
expectations, and relations with target groups. The differences in the stra-
tegies and tactics used by the older and newer branches of the women's liber-
ation movement were analyzed in light of these constraints on the use of
resources. For example, the reference groups that were significant for the
newer "consciousness raising" branch were other radical groups and their goal
was revolution and preparation for a plan for women's roles in a revolutionary
society. Consciousness raising and study groups were two ways of doing this.
In contrast, the older branch was oriented to their past professional and
political associations so their goal was to be effective by making demands for

small changes and to concentrate resources on a few specific areas, particularly those that would give women legal parity with blacks.

Once these different organizational structures were created, they molded the strategic possibilities and though both branches have made some efforts to change these structures, they have remained essentially the same.

The search for effective strategies also involves a set of expectations about potential targets and the external environment, particularly, the structure of available opportunities for action; possible social control measures that might be taken; and the effect on bystander publics. The structure of available opportunities varies according to whether the group has leverage points within the political system, has some minimal knowledge or access to the political system, can substitute resources such as the time and commitment of their members for large voting blocs, or has no capacity (because of the alienation or ignorance of its constituency, incompatible structure or values, or demands which cannot be accommodated by the available channels) to act. Social control measures can have a variety of effects and Freeman argues that it is the perceived and not the real opposition that is important. Although some opposition is necessary to unify and solidify the group, an opposition of great strength (real or perceived) can destroy a movement. Finally, the reactions of bystander publics not only affect the decisions about strategies a movement will pursue, but can also affect the outcomes of those actions.

Comments:

Pointing to some flaws in her model, particularly the fact that it is a static one which ignores accidents of history that are often crucial to success or failure, Freeman still argues that the model could help social movement organization leaders to analyze their strategic options and help outside observers explain why certain actions were chosen. Her skillful analysis of several contemporary movements using this framework reaffirms this assertion.

Gamson, William, <u>Power and Discontent</u>, Homewood, Ill.: The Dewey
     Press, 1968.

Approach: Theoretical

     This book examines political relations between citizens and auth-
orities: who will try to influence authorities; what means of influ-
ence citizens will use; and how authorities will respond to these attempts.
It argues that understanding discontent requires examining it from the
standpoint of both potential partisans and authorities. Its author
clearly assumes that groups act so as to increase their benefits rela-
tive to their costs, suggesting that neither political activism nor
acquiescence is necessarily irrational. He proposes that groups' re-
sources and perceptions of their situation affect their political
behavior.

     Resources affect political mobilization as follows:

          The greater the total amount of resources controlled
          by a solitary group, the higher the probability of
          its attempting influence....The more liquid and un-
          committed are the resources controlled by a solitary
          group, the higher the probability of its attempting
          influence (pp. 146-47).

     Two kinds of political perceptions, efficacy and trust, affect
participation in both ordinary politics and social movements. Efficacy
is the probability perceived by a group that it can do something to
influence a political system (or part of it). Groups that have a low
degree of efficacy are unlikely to try to influence authorities because
such behavior would be irrational. Trust is the perceived probability
that a political system (or some part of it) will produce results pre-
ferred by the group, without its doing anything to get these results.
Hence, trust can be a cause of political inactivity (pp. 46-48).

     Gamson uses variations in trust to identify three groups of potential
partisans: "alienated groups" have a low degree of trust, "confident
groups" a high degree, and "neutral groups" an intermediate degree.
He argues that alienated and confident groups, if they have a sufficient
degree of efficacy, are likely to try to influence authorities (pp. 155-62).
Alienated groups are likely to use constraints, such as disorders or
threats of disorder, as a means of influence; confident groups will
generally prefer to use persuasion, and neutral groups to use induce-
ments (see pp. 164-71). Authorities will tend to respond to alienated
groups with "insulation," limiting their access to resources; with
confident groups they will choose persuasion; and with neutral groups,
inducements (pp. 180-83). These arguments reflect a fundamental
symmetry in relations between citizens and authorities.

     Gamson suggests that authorities might modify a potential partisan
group's trust as follows:

> A confident group can be moved toward neutrality
> or alienation by heavy reliance on sanctions and
> insulation. A neutral group can be made more
> confident by involving its members in relationships
> that increase identification with authorities and
> encourage potential partisans to internalize the
> authorities' goals. A neutral group can be made
> more alienated by heavy reliance on constraints and
> by insulating it from relationships that increase
> identification and internalization. An alienated
> group can be made more confident by involving it
> in a system of exchange with authorities and a series
> of relationships which encourage identification
> and internalization (p. 183).

This book indicates that when citizens in a neighborhood, city, or nation have a high degree of political efficacy and a low degree of political trust they are most likely to be mobilized to political actions with a high potential for collective disorder. When citizens have a low degree of political efficacy and trust, they are least likely to be mobilized to take part in ordinary politics or social movements.

Comments:

The author characterizes this book as "a discursive essay...on a topic of endless complexity" (p. vii). A nonacademic reader may find the detailed discussion of concepts tedious and the integration of arguments complex. The work focuses on solitary groups, "collections of individuals who think in terms of the effect of political decisions on the aggregate and feel that they are in some way personally affected by what happens to the aggregate" (p. 53) rather than on individuals. Hence the book does not directly take up the question of whether or how a particular person will try to influence authorities.

Granovetter, Mark, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," American
Journal of Sociology, 83, 6, 1978, 1421-43.

Approach: Theoretical

The norms, preferences, motives, and beliefs characterizing collective
behavior do not sufficiently explain its outcome. The following model of
collective behavior addresses this deficiency and applies to any situation
in which individuals make such yes-or-no decisions as: whether or not to
riot, strike, vote for a particular candidate, go to college, or to leave
a social gathering.

The threshold model of collective behavior assumes that an actor has
two mutually exclusive alternatives and that the costs and benefits depend
partly on how many others make the same or a contrary choice. Individuals
are assumed to choose rationally, given their goals, preferences, and per-
ceptions of their situation.

Each person's threshold represents the number or proportion of other
people who would have to join an activity before he would do so himself.
In other words, it is the point where the benefits to himself that he
perceives exceed the perceived costs, assuming that the more participants
the lower the costs. Different individuals have different thresholds.
In a riot, for example, different degrees of safety and different benefits
will be required before they will join in a riot. Individual riot thresholds
may range from zero (among "instigators" who do not require that others
join) to 100 percent (for persons who would not participate no matter how
many others did). Thresholds for individuals may change during a single
event, if the costs and benefits of participating change, as a result, for
example, of the arrival of armed police.

A domino effect occurs when a crowd with an instigator will recruit a
member with a threshold of one so that a person with a threshold of two
will join, and so on. With only one instigator and no one in the crowd
with a threshold of one, however, no one will join and no riot will de-
velop. One crowd may riot and another, quite similar, may create only a
minor disturbance because of differences in threshold distribution. In a
city with a constant distribution of thresholds, one crowd's actions may
be radically different from another's because of sampling varability:
each crowd can be conceived of as a random sample taken from the total city
population; therefore, different crowds in the same city will vary in
their threshold distribution. Because large cities have more disorders
than small cities, the threshold distribution of a crowd in a large city
will be more likely to produce a major riot. Clusters of individuals in
a large area during a given period will also show different patterns be-
cause of sampling variation; and results may be complicated by the movement
of individuals from group to group. The number of people who know each
other in a group may also affect the outcome.

Comments:

    To test the model, Granovetter suggests recording the threshold
distribution in an incident of collective behavior, analyzing the socioecon-
omic characteristics of the individuals, and predicting threshold distri-
butions for new groups on the basis of their socioeconomic characteristics
and attitudes. As the author notes, however, measurement errors, imper-
fect information, and the chance that personal events unrelated to the
situation may play a role in a person's threshold make such an attempt
hazardous. One might loosely reconstruct the threshold distribution of a
riot by asking participants when they joined, what proportion of the crowd
was active at that point, and why they joined at that exact time. This re-
construction would be too vague to predict accurate threshold distributions
for similar crowds, however, and therefore is more useful theoretically as
a "domino theory of riot participation" emphasizing interaction among
people rather than disclosing long-term underlying causes.

Grimshaw, Allen, "Interpreting Collective Violence: An Argument for
the Importance of Social Structure," The Annals of The American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 391, September 1970, 9-20.

Approach: Theoretical

This article focuses on a sociological explanation of "social violence"
which locates its source in differences in the access to power at dif-
ferent social levels. "Social violence" is defined as the physical
assault upon an individual or his property solely or primarily because of
his membership in a social category. By means of an analytic framework
constructed by George Simmel, instances of social conflict which vary
greatly in content can be understood in the abstract by identifying their
form. Four forms of interaction which inevitably result in violence are
"competition," "conflict," "accommodation," and "assimilation."

Accommodation is the characteristic interaction between potentially
conflicting parties in all societies where there is no open conflict.
But it is an unstable superordinate-subordinate relationship since sharp
differences in power usually encourage attempts to establish parity or
reverse the power structure.

Grimshaw makes two generalizations on social violence. First, it is
likely under three conditions: 1) if an accommodative relationship
breaks down (when a superordinate group loses its vitality or when a
subordinate group either gains power or realizes its existing latent
power); 2) if the legitimacy accorded the superordinate group declines
because it abuses its power or new ideas about legitimacy take hold;
and 3) if a real or perceived change in the available commodities or pat-
terns of allocation results in relative deprivation or rising expectations.
Second, Grimshaw suggests that social violence is more likely if control
agencies are perceived as weak or partisan.

Comments:

Simmel's analytic framework and Grimshaw's generalizations seem useful
in analyzing past instances of social violence. Their value in predicting
violence or understanding how it develops is less apparent. For example,
the conditions under which an accommodative relationship loses its via-
bility are difficult to fix precisely. At what point can we say -- except
in retrospect -- that a superordinate group has "losts its vitality" or
has "abused its power"?

Grimshaw's second generalization is theoretically flawed, If a
superordinate-subordinate relation exists in society, the control agencies
will probably be partisan with a mandate to maintain the status quo.
Furthermore, instead of being an independent factor, the relative strength
or weakness of the control agencies may be merely a function of the
"viability" or "legitimacy" of the accommodative structure.

Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
    Press, 1970; see also, Firestone, Joseph, "Continuities in the Theory
    of Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 18, 1, March 1974,
    117-42.

Approach: Theoretical

     This book focuses on the view that the intensity of relative
deprivation explains the potential for violent political disorders.
Relative deprivation arises from a perceived discrepancy between the
goods, services, and conditions people believe they are justly entitled
to and the goods, services, and conditions they believe they could
attain given the opportunities currently available to them. The hypo-
thetical linkage between deprivation and discontent has been implicit,
if not explicit, in theoretical notions that the causes of violence
can be traced to such factors as frustration, alienation, exigency,
and strain.

     Gurr argues that the causal sequence of political violence is first
the development of discontent, second the focusing of that discontent
on political objects or actors, and finally the realization of the
discontent in violent action against those targets. He outlines the
theoretical perspective as follows:

     "Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation
is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective
violence." Social factors that increase expectations without increasing
capabilities heighten the discontent. Among these factors are the gains
of other groups and the promise of new opportunities. Social factors
that decrease people's capabilities without lowering their expecta-
tions similarly create a stronger sense of deprivation, hence greater
discontent. Among these factors are deteriorating and increasingly
limited opportunities.

     Deprivation-induced discontent provides a general impulse to
action. Specific actions are then determined by people's beliefs about
the sources of deprivation, and about the normative and utilitarian
justification for violent acts against targets believed to be responsi-
ble for deprivation. Social factors that affect the focusing of discon-
tent include cultural restraints against overt aggression, the extent
and success of previous political violence, the legitimacy of the
government, and its responses to relative deprivation. The belief that
violence is useful in obtaining scarce resources can be an independent
source of political violence, but it is most likely to provide a secon-
dary, rationalizing motive.

     Although extreme discontent is a necessary condition for political
violence, its scope, intensity, and the forms it takes are affected,
in part, by officials' responses to disorders. There is evidence that
coercive measures to prevent or control disorder can heighten the
initial discontent and even trigger full-scale revolutionary movements.
Political violence is also affected by the relative power of officials
and dissidents: when both groups have approximately equal power,
especially when the officials have fewer supporters, the probability

and magnitude of violence are geatest.

Gurr further suggests:

> The three stages in the process of political violence
> -- those in which discontent is generated, politi-
> cized, and actualized in political violence -- are
> each dependent on the preceding one... . It is
> likely but not necessarily the case that there is a
> temporal relationship among the three stages, whereby
> a sharp increase in the intensity of discontent
> precedes the articulation of doctrines that justify
> politically violent action, with shifts in the bal-
> ances of coercive control and institutional adherence
> occurring subsequently (p. 15).

Comments:

The arguments developed in Gurr's book "are not intended to pro-
vide a ready-made explanation of any given act of political violence,"
(p. 356) but they do challenge certain notions:

> There is not much support here for the view that
> political violence is primarily a recourse of vicious,
> criminal, deviant, ignorant, or undersocialized
> people... . Nor is political violence "caused" by
> pernicious doctrines, or at least by doctrines alone... .
> The belief that some kinds of social arrangements or
> political institutions are intrinsically immune from
> violence or capable of satisfying all human desires
> is only a partial truth (pp. 357-358).

This perspective tries to finesse a critical point: "There is
some discontent among almost all members of all societies" (p. 84). If
grievances and discontent can be defined, created, or manipulated by
dissidents, then the notion of a linkage between relative deprivation
and discontent is suspect.

Gurr, Ted R., "The Calculus of Civil Conflict," Journal of Social Issues, 28, 1, 1972, 27-47.

Approach: Literature Review

This review of the literature on recent quantitative, comparative studies of violent conflict within nations examines some of their assumptions and results, and the prospects they offer. Studies by Eckstein (1963), Rummel (1963), and Russett (1964) and the impact of the urban riots and other revolutionary movements are said to provide a critical mass for what is now an "influential subfield of quantitative comparative conflict studies."

Gurr notes several assumptions in these studies:

1. Diverse events such as demonstrations, coups d'etat, and terrorism were generally considered subtypes of the same social phenomena and could be explained by similar theories. Most of the studies were concerned with conflict having some political object or impact, since the state is always thought to be implicated in overt conflict by acts of either commission or omission.

2. There are general as well as specific reasons why civil conflict in different countries is of a particular kind or intensity. Yet opinions differ greatly about the properties of strife -- such as the frequency of certain events, their pervasiveness, duration, or severity -- that cross-national studies should consider, and what their causes might be: discontent, material well-being, socioeconomic change, coerciveness of the regime, and foreign conflict, for example.

3. Comparisons should be between nations, despite gross differences among the nations studied. Very few of these studies looked at variations within nations or compared single nations at different times.

4. Methodological and statistical techniques are sufficiently advanced for the results to be accurate and useful. Gurr notes, however, that many of these studies are based on questionable data, and a credibility gap exists between concepts and indicators. Moreover, he says, "these studies have been characterized by extensive use of sophisticated statistical sledgehammers to crack half-ripe chestnuts."

In reviewing a few significant results that different studies have corroborated, Gurr looks at the forms of civil conflict, the relation between socioeconomic changes and civil conflict, the psychological origins of strife, the association between coercive regimes and conflict, and linkages between internal and external conflict.

Although civil conflicts comprise a dimension of national characteristics that are distinct from other characteristics, they can be divided

into at least two types: those representing an intense and organized bid for political power, such as revolution and subversion, and those which express a more diffuse popular turbulence, such as riots and demonstrations. If grievances, however serious, are largely felt by the masses and do not significantly affect elites, they are likely to induce riots and demonstrations. If the elite classes also experience the grievances, revolutionary behavior is more likely.

The incidence of violent conflict tends to be moderate in under-developed, traditional societies, greatest in developing nations, and least in modern nations. The transition to modernity does more to lessen revolutionary activity than to curb riots and demonstrations, but rapid social change apparently threatens political stability; whereas rapid economic growth tends to diminish conflict. The research supports the obvious conclusion that when the legitimacy of a political system is accepted, violent political conflict is less likely.

Studies agree that there is a curvilinear relationship between public coerciveness and violent civil conflict; civil conflict is greatest in regimes which use moderate coercion and less where coercion is either strong or very slight -- an indication that moderate coercion induces more public hostility than fear.

Domestic and foreign conflicts give little indication of being re-lated by cause, effect, or other links. Foreign intervention is likely to intensify domestic conflict rather than minimize or stop it.

Comments:

An interesting review of selected studies of internal collective disorders.

Hirschman, Albert, <u>Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States</u>, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Approach: Theoretical

This book examines two responses to discontent: voice (i.e., an attempt to change an objectionable situation) and exit (i.e., escape from an objectionable situation), and defines the conditions under which each option will prevail. Whenever exit is not feasible, the only way that dissatisfied customers, members, or citizens can register their discontent is by voice.

In many situations exit will be a response of last resort after voice has failed: removing oneself means losing the opportunity to use voice, but the reverse is not true. Voice can therefore substitute for exit or complement it. Whenever both options are feasible, there is an important bias in the favor of exit: voice often involves sequential choices but exit requires only a single decision. The presence of the exit alternative may therefore retard development in the art of voice.

This perspective has several implications for collective disorders. First, Hirschman suggests that severe limitations on and penalties for exit are likely to delay the recourse to voice but to intensify its use, once it has begun, more than would ordinarily be the case (p. 93-98). Second, he suggests an explanation for the radicalization of politics: an organization that responds more to voice than to exit is likely to be more responsive to the discontent of its remaining members than to those who leave.

> The day-to-day policies of these movements tend to
> be influenced -- especially when they are out of
> power -- by their present activist members rather
> than by the preoccupation with losing the favor
> of all members and voters. Hence a shift toward the
> center which antagonizes the...activist members is
> likely to be resisted more strenuously than a
> radical shift, even though the latter might lead to
> the exit of...members and voters. One could con-
> jecture that radicalization of political movements
> predicted by this model would assert itself more
> strongly the longer the interval between elections.
> ...But this whole matter is further complicated
> by the phenomenon of organizational loyalty. (p. 75)

Loyalty is a key concept "because, as a result of it, members may be locked into their organizations a little longer and thus use the voice option with greater determination and resourcefulness than would otherwise be the case. It is helpful also because it implies the possibility of disloyalty, that is, exit" (p. 82).

Hirschman argues that the use of voice becomes more likely as the degree of loyalty increases (p. 77). This argument implies that discontented patriots rather than the alienated are potential participants in social movements. Voice and loyalty are intertwined:

> A member with considerable attachment to a product or organization will often search for ways to make himself influential, especially when the organization moves in what he believes is the wrong direction; conversely, a member who wields (or thinks he wields) considerable power in an organization and is therefore convinced that he can get it "back on the track" is likely to develop a strong affection for the organization in which he is powerful (pp. 77-78).

Comments:

Political scientists have thought about discontent expressed in protests (voice), and economists have thought about dissatisfaction with products expressed in a withdrawal of demand (exit). Hirschman argues that both processes are at work and suggests the implications of their interactions. The concept of loyalty in this essay is diffuse, confusingly intertwined with voice. It seems plausible that a specific commitment rather than loyalty generally will determine the intensity of voice, but not make it more likely to be used.

Kelley, Jonathan and Herbert S. Klein, "Revolution and the Rebirth of
Inequality: A Theory of Stratification in Postrevolutionary Society,"
American Journal of Sociology, 83, 1, July 1977, 78-99.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Drawing on the outcomes of a number of "peasant revolutions" which
have occurred in modern times--Mexico, 1910; Russia, 1917; China, begin-
ning 1921; Bolivia, 1952; Cuba, 1958--the authors set forth theoretical
and mathematical formulations relating to the short-and long-term effects
of revolution on status inheritance and distribution of wealth.   (The
authors assume that revolutions seek to overcome deviation from a hypo-
thetical mean level of wealth and status.)   Defining the sequence of
events in which a traditionally exploited peasantry is liberated at the
expense of a traditionally exploitative elite as a "radical revolution,"
the authors propose the following: In the short run a radical revolution
leads to more equal distribution of physical capital and less status
inheritance; renders human capital (that is, agricultural, educational,
or linguistic skills) more valuable than physical capital as a source of
occupational status and income, causing a shift in the basis of stratifi-
cation; and "does not immediately benefit the poorest of its supporters
as much as it benefits those who possess human capital or have been able
to retain physical capital."   The authors argue that, although in the
short-term revolutions lead to a net reduction in social inequality, the
achieved redistribution of wealth--necessarily implemented by means of
newly created bureaucratic, commercial, and political jobs--gives rise
to a new stratification which favors that segment of the peasantry which
by virtue of its unequal reserve of human and/or physical capital can
most readily enter these newly created positions.

The foregoing argument hinges on the fact that even where revolution-
ary governments try to enact their ideological commitment to equalitarianism
through the abolition of private capital, this in itself is "not enough
to prevent the long-term growth of inequality, since much (indeed most)
inequality arises from differences in education, skills, language, and
other forms of human capital which are almost immune to redistribution."
In the long run, this advantaged sector tends to consolidate its ascen-
dancy by means of a steady increase in the prevailing degree of status
inheritance; inequality is thus restored.   The argument is qualified,
however, by a distinction between "modern revolutions," which promote
economic development and hence favor the formation of a new 'peasant
bourgeoisie,' and "classical peasant revolutions" (the example given is
Punjab in the late 19th century), which because they do not entail economic
development tend not, over time, to erase gains in social equality.

The authors proceed to quantify the foregoing in the form of a series
of mathematical equations expressing the relationships between and among
different wealth and status inheritance variables.   The major observation
drawn from the mathematical model is that, in a "modern revolution," if
the mean wealth of the society as a whole is low to begin with, the
new 'peasant bourgeoisie' will more readily exceed the mean and social
inequality will be the more likely result than if the initial mean is
somewhat higher.

The authors conclude by describing two styles of dealing with these postrevolutionary forces of stratification. In Bolivia and Chile, they argue, a laissez faire approach predominated and the new status quo was more or less simply accepted as inevitable. In China and in Cuba, on the other hand, there have been continuing efforts to "root out even the smallest vestiges of private property." Both approaches are problematic, and the article ends with the statement that "a revolution must either quietly turn conservative, allowing inequality and inherited privilege to grow steadily in the countryside, or turn radical and embark with uncertain prospects on an arduous struggle to remake the entire economy and culture."

Comments:

While the thesis set forth here is probably quite valid, the approach should have been oriented toward description rather than mathematical quantification. This is not to say that data cannot be presented descriptively; Charles Tilly, for example, in From Mobilization to Revolution, has given a virtuoso demonstration of the conceptual dimensions which raw data, appropriately graphed, can be made to yield. Kelley and Klein, on the other hand, generate equation after complex equation in a gratuitous fashion which serves merely to obstruct rather than to convey meaning. In addition, the underlying assumption that the mean level of wealth in a society is an adequate (or the sole) measure of revolutionary success or failure is qualified only by a brief and unsatisfactory discussion of the level of the mean itself and the extent of deviation from the mean--and what these factors say about the society. Finally, the article is poorly organized: despite the orderly presentation of numbered hypotheses, the argument does not follow a clear logical progression.

Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society, New York: The Free
     Press, 1959.

Approach: Theoretical

     Kornhauser combines two criticisms of mass society, the democratic
and the aristocratic, in order to formulate a general theory of mass society.
The aristocratic criticism, propounded by Ortega y Gasset and others, de-
fines mass society in terms of the vulnerability of elites to intervention
by the masses, warning that such intervention weakens the integrity of poli-
tical and cultural life. The democratic criticism, reversing the aristocratic
view, defines mass society in terms of the vulnerability of the masses to
domination by elites. Here the danger is that such domination verges on
totalitarianism. Two concepts of freedom are at stake. The aristocratic
notion that elites should have a free rein, within constituted limits, to
exercise authority wars against the democratic notion that the freedom to
participate in the exercise of authority should be shared by others. What
links the two points of view, according to Kornhauser, is a mode of direct
intervention--either of elites in the affairs of nonelites or of nonelites
in the affairs of elites. This naked opposition of the two poles of society,
says Kornhauser, jeopardizes both kinds of freedom, and is the defining
characteristic of mass society.

     Kornhauser plots the relative vulnerability of elites against the
relative vulnerability of nonelites:

VULNERABILITY OF NONELITES

		Low	High
VULNERABILITY	Low	communal society	totalitarian society
OF ELITES	High	pluralist society	mass society

Low vulnerability signifies a condition where elites and nonelites are to
some degree bound or permanently fixed within the social structure; high
vulnerability designates a relatively detached condition. In communal
society, for example, elites are not very vulnerable, since the force of
tradition upholds their ascendancy. Nonelites are invulnerable also, but
because strong ties of kinship and community bind them to their subordinacy.
Pluralist society is characterized by the high vulnerability of elites, the
result of competition among various independent elite groups for positions
of power, and by the low vulnerability of nonelites, stemming from their
vigorous participation in autonomous groups and associations. In both
communal and pluralist societies, nonelites are fairly invulnerable--that
is, firmly bound to the social structure--which means that such populations
resist mobilization by elites.

     Mass and totalitarian societies, on the other hand, are characterized
by relatively vulnerable nonelites who are easily mobilized because they
are not insulated from elites through participation in intervening groups
or associations. In a mass society, where elites are vulnerable, "large
numbers of people are pulled toward activist modes of intervention in vital
centers of society" in the sort of philistine uprising feared by Ortega y
Gasset. Kornhauser argues that a mass society may easily become totalitar-
ian if elites, having gained control of the means of coercion and persuasion,
use them to manipulate the alienated masses.

In summary, those at both poles of society, elite and nonelite, require a certain level of autonomy--that is, of insulation from each other--if freedom is to be preserved. A society which embodies a fully articulated set of social relations by means of which both elites and nonelites are integrated into the social order affords maximum freedom. Individuals within such a society are in one sense less free, in that they are firmly bound to the social order. Nevertheless, the social order as a whole can, thanks to its pluralistic structure, accommodate a wide range of interests and still remain fairly stable. In mass or totalitarian societies, on the other hand, intermediate social relations have collapsed, and whites and non-elites contend directly with one another. While individuals within such societies are not subject to intermediate constraints, their collective conduct is determined by broad shifts of public opinion in a mass society, or by dictatorial decree in a totalitarian society. In either case, freedom is precarious or altogether absent.

Mass movements are characterized by: remote and extreme objectives; activist modes of intervention; mobilization of uprooted and atomized sections of the population; and the lack of an internal structure of independent or decentralized groups. They differ from "traditional movements" which arise within communal society (e.g., revival movements); "reform movements" which arise within pluralist societies (e.g., labor movements); and the "totalitarian movement" in totalitarian societies. The development of mass movements is not necessarily related to the degree of democratization, urbanization, or industrialization of a society except to the extent that these processes occur so rapidly that social atomization results. Persons with the fewest social ties within all social strata are most responsive to these mass movements.

Comments:

In this classic exposition of the Durkheimian perspective relating collective behavior to the fragmentation of existing social ties and anomie, three basic hypotheses relating to collective disorders have been drawn:

1) Extremist movements will flourish in societies with few voluntary, occupational, religious, civic, and other types of associations;

2) The alienated uprooted nonparticipants in such associations will be the first and most active members of extremist movements;

3) In societies characterized by multiple memberships in associations there will be more integration of group members which will inhibit participation in extremist movements.

Much of the empirical evidence on extremist movements, such as McCarthyism, the Radical Right of the 1960s, and community movements such as anti-fluoridation in the United States as well as the Nazi movement in Germany, however, does not support these hypotheses (Oberschall, 1973).

Krammick, Isaac, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship," History and Theory, 11, 1, 1972, 26-63.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Critical Literature Review

Abstract:

This attempt to evaluate current scholarly writing about revolution is by an admitted outsider to the field. In reviewing the often "confused, complicated, and untidy set of observations" of revolutionary theorists, he describes the approaches in terms of taxonomy (the classification and categorization of revolutions), etiology (the examination of their causes), and periodization (generalizations about stages, patterns, processes, and dynamics of revolutionary momentum).

Before these approaches can be used, however, the term "revolution" must be defined or described, and he indicates that recent efforts have focused on three aspects of political change: its mode, impact, and purpose. Noting that many writers describe revolutions as simply the presence of violence in the political process, Krammick suggests that this view denies the possibility of nonviolent revolution and overlooks the existence of nonrevolutionary violence. He argues that to be considered a revolution an event must reach and affect the entire society and must also intend a new structuring of society -- a fundamental change in world view.

This latter point is analogous to Thomas Kuhn's description of scientific revolutions: an established paradigm collapses in the face of an unexplained anomaly, to be replaced by a fundamentally different set of conditions which resolves the problem. In political terms, the paradigm is the established practices, authority structures, and value and belief patterns used to cope with the problems faced by the system. When the system can no longer cope, as when a scientific theory cannot explain experimental results, it gives way to a new political paradigm, one which can cope. This theme recurs in the author's assessment of four causal theories of revolutions (political, economic, sociological, and psychological).

Political explanations see revolution as primarily a political event with political causes and characteristics. The work of Samuel Huntington is a good contemporary example. According to Huntington, the essence of revolution is the expansion of political participation by new, assertive groups and classes, which have been mobilized too fast for the old order to assimilate them. Only when the old institutions are too rigid to accommodate these demands for participation will revolutions occur.

Economic explanations focus on the material conditions and the relation of property to power, although there is little consensus pointing to revolutions as the product of either prosperity or poverty. Using the theory of J.C. Davies to characterize the economic

explanation, Krammick cites it as economic determinism -- the assumption that psychic states of frustration and aggression derive solely from economic factors such as unemployment, living costs, and increases in GNP/CAP. According to Davies, revolutions are precipitated when stable or rising expectations regarding economic improvement are suddenly and decisively dashed, creating an intolerable gap between what people want and what they get. Criticizing Davies, the author argues that one cannot assume a high correlation between moods of frustration and economic conditions without some empirical demonstration. Moreover, economic theorists tend to ignore noneconomic factors that might contribute to the event. These theorists also do not account for the fact that the frustration is vented on a particular target -- the governing regime; nor do they say what connection there is between the locus of frustration and the movement of people to revolution.

In characterizing the sociological level of explanation, Krammick argues that it turns attention away from individual motives, intentions, and responsibilities and directs it instead to interpersonal data such as group affiliations, societal roles, divisions of labor, hierarchy, and value structure. He considers the most ambitious sociological interpretation of revolution to be that of Chalmers Johnson, a political scientist. Johnson's argument is that revolutions are produced by dysfunctional social systems (those in which the existing equilibrium has been destroyed because challenges to the system have not been integrated or accommodated). When the systems become dysfunctional, either conservative or revolutionary change can occur, and such changes are distinguished by their use or avoidance of violence. No matter what produces the disequilibria, however, they are not sufficient to explain revolution; what ultimately precipitates revolution is the political elite's inability to meet needs creatively and effectively. Krammick criticizes Johnson's theory on the grounds that the significance of the political performance of the elite is a last-minute addition and that the gist of his argument is simply a translation of old theories into new and vague language.

The psychological explanation is concerned primarily with the states of mind and personality traits of revolutionary actors and their movements. The author sets up two subdivisions: one explains the actions of groups or crowds and the other examines the personality structure of individual revolutionaries. The first, which builds on the work of LeBon and Fromm, is exemplified by the recent approach of Ted Gurr who claims that group aggression is primarily a response to frustration occasioned by feelings of relative deprivation. In contrast to Davies, Gurr is less interested in why the gap between aspirations and opportunities occurs than in the ways in which it determines the likelihood and magnitude of violence. Krammick criticizes this approach because it fails to explain why frustration is directed toward the government and why it results in revolution rather than other forms of civil strife.

In the second major subdivision, particular personality types are isolated as being predisposed toward revolutionary action as

leaders and followers (e.g., Harold Laswell, Lewis Feuer). This view is exemplified in the more recent work of E.V. Wolfenstein. Wolfenstein used the lives of Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi to show that their political careers were a function of the displacement of psychic tensions. Krammick disagrees with this theory because it belittles the revolutionary and does not explain why people of many different personalities share the same ideological beliefs. The approach is also culture-bound and has little relevance to revolutionaries in contexts other than western and modern. Moreover it neglects the social structure in which these actions occur.

Comments:

This extremely useful review of some of the more significant approaches to the study of revolution summarizes clearly and concisely some of the familiar criticisms of them. Suggesting that any theory of the causes of revolution must take into account the political factor, as well as the others, Krammick patently believes that the political role seems to be decisive and that it is encompassed in the other approaches. The review is not comprehensive, since it deals only with a few of the theorists who have contributed to the literature in this area.

Kreps, Gary A. and Dennis G. Wenger, "Toward a Theory of Community
    Conflict: Factors Influencing the Initiation and Scope of
    Conflict," Sociological Quarterly, 14, 1973, 158-74.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Propositional Inventory

     This article represents an attempt to develop a formal systematic
theory of community conflict, with particular attention to: 1) the
setting and initiation of conflict; 2) its dynamics, with particular
reference to factors influencing its scope; and 3) intervening circum-
stances that extend the conflict. Conflict is defined as a "social
process in which overt opposition occurs between two or more interacting
units because of an event that is related to the vested interests of
these units." Community conflict is the occurrence of opposition be-
cause of a specific event related to one of five basic community func-
tions: 1) production-distribution-consumption; 2) socialization;
3) social control; 4) social participation; and 5) mutual support.
Because communities differ in the relative importance they attach to
these functions, conflicts will differ among communities. Conflict
is more likely to develop around an event related to the functions
considered most important. For example, if production-distribution-
consumption is not carried out locally, but socialization is frequent --
as it would be in residential suburbs -- the community is unlikely to
experience labor disputes but may have disputes over schools. Conflict
will not occur without an intervening event that impinges on one or
more of the community functions and affects social units within the
community in different ways. Community members must also have an
opportunity to respond to the event.

     The first to become involved will be groups with a vested interest
in the issue. For example, educational issues will draw the attention
of the school system, the PTA, and parents. Once conflict occurs,
participation by community members will be determined by these condi-
tions: 1) how far the political structure of the community is involved;
2) the way power is shared among members of the community; 3) the
amount of conflict the community has experienced in the past; 4) the
degree to which conflicts and the issues associated with them are pub-
licized by the news media and other agencies; and 5) how greatly
members of the community are structurally integrated, for example,
through overlapping memberships in organizations.

     As the scope of conflict increases 1) a greater number of issues
will be associated with the conflict; 2) general issues will become
more important; 3) the community will be more polarized; and 4) more
partisan organizations will develop.

     When conflict leads to change in the structure of the community
the author asserts that structural change always accompanies conflict
-- one can identify the structural changes by looking at the same var-
iables which influence the scope of the conflict. After conflict ends,

the community will be characterized by different positions toward each variable.

In summary, the author theorizes that structural strain in a community will result in conflict when some event makes community members aware of an inability to meet some basic social needs in the community. The scope of the conflict will be influenced by the manner in which the community participates, especially its political participation. Conflicts will change in the way community members structure their participation.

Comments:

This formal and rather abstract theory of community conflict contains 35 propositions derived from the work of Gamson (1966), Crain et al. (1969), Hillery (1971), and Coleman (1957), along with suggested ways of measuring the variables involved. To this extent, it is extremely useful in initial stages of designing research toward the analysis of conflict and disclosure of the conditions and settings in which it occurs and expands. The theory does not deal with the resolution of such conflict, however, except by implying that it may result from the structural change within the community that accompanies the dispute. Other literature on this topic -- Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, for example -- suggests that structural change is not an inevitable outcome of conflict, particularly when the conflict is not very intense. All of the propositions oversimplify complex relationships. For example, as a conflict increases in scope the author says that will be greater polarization in the community, because disagreement will cut across existing personal and organizational attachments and create barriers between people with contrary interests. But other possibilities -- such as that these very attachments may inhibit conflict -- must be considered. The propositions advanced here are nevertheless clear and capable of being tested; hence they could well be the object of further empirical analysis.

Lang, Gladys and Kurt Lang, "Some Pertinent Questions on Collective Violence and the News Media," Journal of Social Issues, 28, 1, 1972, 93-110.

Approach: Theoretical

The information available suggests that the media are rarely a major influence on the amount of violence in any specific situation and that they function as much to deter as to incite violence. Yet, if media reports of both actual and potential violence affect expectations, then this will influence the nature of public protest as well as the official response to it.

This article discusses the effects of media coverage (especially TV) of major public events on the violent or nonviolent outcome of these events. Collective violence is defined as an attribute of conflict situations involving illegal physical force resulting in physical injury or distruction of property.

The media both contribute to the appearance of increased frequency of protest and accelerate the cycle of protest by magnifying protest taking place and being inattentive to protest still in the embryonic stages. For example, availability of media coverage gives organizers incentive and attracts participants, but when media decide the movement is old hat, they begin to ignore it and this may affect the turnout and result in a loss of momentum (i.e., the Vietnam Moratorium Committee).

The presence of the media may act more as a deterrent of violence in potentially violent situations than as an instigator. Media offers protesters a nonviolent channel to express their grievances and illustrate their potential power for violence. The media may also offer a restraining influence to individuals, including law enforcement officers, who don't want their unlawful acts recorded or to have an adverse effect on public opinion. The impact of reporting of violence in progress depends on the availability of alternative channels of communication. News blackouts may be ineffective in keeping minor incidents from spreading since people near the site of violence are most likely to get involved, most often get their news by word of mouth, and are least dependent on the official news media.

Once the size of a demonstration reaches a point where control depends on spontaneous cooperation by the mass of demonstrators, the likely course of events depends on the intent of those who have turned out to resist or participate in violence. Who is attracted and who is deterred by media predictions of violence determines in large measure whether that prediction becomes self-fulfilling or self-defeating. Insofar as the media stress the likelihood of violence but also the preparations and intent of demonstrators and law enforcement agencies to keep order, they may contribute to the nonoccurrence of violence.

The likelihood of collective violence in any specific situation depends on who is assembled, where they are assembled, how they are physically distributed, and the provisions that have been made for minimizing the eruption of incidents and containing any outbreaks of violence.

Comments:

     This article is essentially a response to the Kerner Commission report and other official reports which have expressed concern over the role played by the news media in the conditions leading to violence, its eruption, its spread or abatement. Arguing that the news media must be seen as "essential ingredients of a complex network through which the spokesmen for various publics seek recognition and...that hard as newsmen may try...they can never be neutral transmitters," they offer a plea for empirical analyses rather than polemical statements about the role of the media in collective violence. In many ways their hypotheses are useful correctives to the untested assumptions about the effects of the media in promoting and escalating violence.

Libman-Rubenstein, Richard E., "Group Violence in America: Its Structures
    and Limitations," In Violence in America, Historical and Comparative
    Perspectives, Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (Eds.), Revised
    Edition, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979.

Approach: Theoretical

In this essay, Libman-Rubenstein argues that American society has "a
high propensity for historical amnesia" about its continuing episodes of
mass political violence, aided by the reliance on theories of consensus
and pluralism for explanations of the political process. He states that
violent politics have played a significant role in American political history
and cites examples beginning with American Indian revolts in the 17th century
and ending with the disorders during the New York City power failure of
1976. Further, he notes that the "norm" in American politics has not been
peaceful progress but reformism, both violent and nonviolent.

Despite the frequency of political violence in American history, most
of the episodes have been localized--an expression of specific group interests
and emotions rather than a more general interest (e.g., class) in system
change. "Most domestic revolts have been conceived, to begin with, as de-
fensive responses to outside aggression and have retained their localistic,
reformist, autonomy-oriented character even after serious escalation has
taken place." This is a result both of the nonrevolutionary goals of most
of the groups involved as well as the responses of control agents. Class
consciousness has not been fully developed because of the sociocultural
differences among members of the groups. The ambiguous responses of social
control agents to mass political violence, "alternating the carrot of moder-
ate reform with the stick of suppression," has also effectively ended many
domestic revolts.

Whereas the ghetto revolts and student disorders of the 1960s were seen
as "independence" rebellions, seeking for each group a local power base
which would permit participation by their leaders in American life, the author
argues that domestic rebellions will tend to assume other reforms in the
future. Although there will be continued culture group conflict based on
race (urban blacks) and ethnicity (Mexican and Spanish-speaking immigrants),
most episodes will be based on class conflict between workers in and owners
of monopoly enterprises. "The persistence of economic crisis in the United
States suggests that future episodes of domestic violence will have more in
common with the labor-management conflicts of the 1930s than with past
episodes of culture-group rebellion."

Comments:

In this Marxist analysis, Libman-Rubenstein argues that the limited de-
mands and limited responses characteristic of past mass political activity
in the United States is unlikely to continue. If boundaries continue to
blur between ethnic and occupational groups and if the economic crisis per-
sists, the large class-based groups are increasingly likely to challenge the
capitalist system nationally and the issues are likely to be revolutionary
not reformist. This speculative essay can serve as a set of predictions

about the future but the reader must note that in other Western European countries where class lines have been more sharply drawn, the consequences have not been more revolutionary in the Marxist sense and this may largely be due to the similar responses given to demands by authorities.

Lipsky, Michael, "Protest as a Political Resource," The American Political
Science Review, 62, December 1968, 1144-1158.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive
Methodology: Conceptual

The author develops a conceptual scheme for analyzing protest activity,
focusing particularly on the strains that protest leaders undergo in appealing
to four separate constituencies. They must: 1) "nurture and sustain an organ-
ization comprised of people with whom they may or may not share common values";
2) "articulate goals and choose strategies so as to maximize their public
exposure through communications media"; 3) "maximize the impact of third par-
ties in the political conflict"; and 4) "try to maximize chances of success
among those capable of granting goals." His concept hinges on the assumption
that a protest group by definition lacks conventional political resources.
In other words, it is powerless. Hence its only hope is to influence the
group in power, the government, indirectly through a third party or "reference
public." This latter can take in all voters or certain groups promoting
political reform or civic welfare, but it must be both sensitive to the plight
of the protest group (or capable of becoming so under pressure) and respected
by the group in power.

Not surprisingly, this circuitous route to power is hazardous. One major
problem, according to the author, is that if the group in power defers to a
third party, not the protest group, it will grant concessions to the third
party that do little to improve the plight of the protest group. As the author
puts it, the group in power may dispense symbolic rather than material rewards.
The problem for protest leaders is that if they deride such sham concessions
they risk alienating the third party altogether. Conflict also occurs because
protest leaders must often resort to militant rhetoric so that the media will
present their grievances to the reference public. But such militancy gives the
group in power an excuse to bar protest leaders from policy-making councils.
As the author points out, "People in power do not like to sit down with rogues."
Or, it can alienate the more moderate in the group and at the same time inad-
vertently encourage the radical fringe.

The author concludes that protest by relatively powerless groups is an
uncertain and probably futile way to achieve long-term, concrete gains. It is
too difficult to conjure political bargaining power out of a diverse and shift-
ing amalgam of interest groups. Following radical organizer Saul Alinsky, he
suggests that for such groups "long-run success will depend upon the acquisition
of stable political resources which do not rely for their use on third parties.

Comment:

This article is an interesting, well-written, and generally useful state-
ment of the "group dynamics" of protest. Piven and Cloward, of course, would
take exception to the conclusion that organization-building is the best way
to wrest concessions from authority.

Lopreato, Joseph, "Authority Relations and Class Conflict," Social
Forces, 47, 1, 1968, 70-79.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

In this assessment of Ralf Dahrendorf's theory that class conflict
is produced by differences in the relationship to authority, the
author uses a national survey of male heads of families conducted in
Italy in 1963 to test the following hypotheses: 1) members of the
"command class" (i.e., proprietors, managers, and officials) will be
more likely than the "obey class" (i.e., skilled, semi-skilled,
and unskilled workers) to accept as legitimate the existing authority
structure in their organizations and to acquiesce in its control
system; 2) to the extent that nonacquiescence and a perception of
illegitimacy are present within the "command class" they will not
reflect class differences within that class.

The original sample of 1,569 respondents yielded a reduced sample
of individuals who can be classified according to Dahrendorf's
criteria, consisting of 146 members of the command class and 520 members
of the obey class. Respondents' perception of whether the nature of
authority was legitimate legitimate or illegitimate was indicated by
statements such as that work superiors "did their duty" or "took
advantage of their position." Attitudes of acquiescence were measured
by whether respondents reported that they themselves "obeyed or had
patience" as opposed to "finding it hard to obey or getting mad."

The first hypothesis was partially confirmed in that the command
class was significantly more likely than the obey class to regard
existing authority relations are legitimate, but the command class was
considerably less acquiescent than the obey class. Differences were
noted within the command class, both in the perception of legitimacy
and attitudes of acquiescence. The upper echelon, consisting of pro-
prietors and managers, was more likely to regard the authority structure
as legitimate and more acquiescent than the officials making up the
lower echelon. In fact the lower echelon accounted for the lower
acquiescence of the command class, compared with the obey class.

In testing the second hypothesis, it was important to determine
whether the refusals to accept legitimacy and to acquiesce among
members of the command class were a function of differences in the
authority their positions gave them rather than arising simply from
"stresses and tensions." Finding that those in the lower echelon of
the command class were most likely to consider themselves members
of the obey class, whereas upper echelon respondents were most likely
to consider themselves in the command class, Lopreato concluded that
"the discord and rebelliousness that have so far emerged within the
dominant class represent real class cleavages within that class."

Dahrendorf's theory is thus held to be inadequate either for delineating the two classes involved in conflict or for explaining why internal conflict within the command class is often more pronounced than conflict between the two classes. In trying to account for this conflict within the command class, Lopreato argues that dissatisfaction with existing authority relationships is likely to be more intense when persons have a little authority than where they have none at all. Such persons, he explains, have to deal frequently and continuously with one another but have too low a standing in the authority structure to control the conflicts such a situation entails.

Comments:

Although this article is particularly useful for understanding conflict within an organization, it is relevant to the study of collective action and disorders on a wider scale because it argues that power conflicts will be more intense among those who already have some power and authority than among those without any at all. Although there are some serious problems in the operationalization of the concepts of "legitimacy" and "acquiescence" which limit their applicability, the analysis is interesting and provocative.

Manning, R.O., "A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Collective
Behavior Theory," Sociological Focus, 4, 4, 1971, 99-106.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Critical Review

The author of this critical analysis of Smelser's theory of collec-
tive behavior favors his attempt to create an economic collective be-
havior by using illustrations from financial panics and his efforts to
broaden the field, but considers Smelser's use of the value-added scheme
to be unfortunate. Manning argues that the extreme breadth and impre-
cision which characterize the five "necessary conditions" or "deter-
minants" make it impossible to disprove the theory, which must there-
fore be considered unscientific. In particular, "the lack of specificity
of the 'necessary conditions,' together with the disclaimer that they
need not necessarily occur in the suggested order, insure that nothing
has been contended and that nothing can be questioned. In any case, if
the 'determinants' are sufficiently nebulous, almost any sequence of
actual events can later be associated with them."

Comments:

Manning's review suggests why most of the empirical work based on
Smelser's theory uses the framework to impose some order on explanations
of past events rather than as a basis for prediction.

Marx, Gary, "Issueless Riots," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1970, 21-33.

Approach: Descriptive/Comparative
Methodology: Critical Analysis

By identifying not only sources of strain which can lead to riots but also "generalized beliefs" which give a riot shape and political significance, modern sociology has produced a healthy corrective to the work of pioneering theorists like LeBon, who emphasized the atavistic and irrational character of mob behavior. Yet this author argues that because of the current fashion investigators may automatically ascribe political significance to rioting where protest, ideology, and grievance are in fact relatively insignificant. In particular, Marx argues, the term "generalized belief" -- which Neil Smelser believes to be the crucial defining characteristic of collective behavior -- is not necessarily applicable to all instances of noninstitutionalized, hostile, collective action.

In order to distinguish different kinds of riots the author proposes a typology along two lines:

1. To what degree is a generalized belief present?

2. To what degree are riotous actions themselves instrumental in collectively solving a group's problems?"

The two are combined and illustrated in the following typology:

GENERALIZED BELIEF PRESENT

		Yes I	No III
	Yes	Bread riots Luddites Prison riots	Riots misinterpreted by authorities
COLLECTIVELY INSTRUMENTAL		II	IV
	No	Pogroms Communal Riots	Riots during police strikes Riots in victory

After briefly discussing the typology, the author offers short descriptions of several riots of the fourth type -- those during police strikes in Liverpool and Boston; and rioting in celebration of athletic victories, successful elections and the end of World War II -- which illustrate the absence of specific grievance, protest, or ideology. He concludes that acknowledgment of variation in types of rioting will advance the general understanding of collective behavior.

Comment:

   While the author satisfactorily describes type I, II, and IV riots, he nowhere indicates what he means by a type III riot. Apart from this lack, the article is a useful exercise in the good old Aristotelian tradition.

Marx, Gary T., "External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes and Complications," In The Dynamics of Social Movements, Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (Eds), Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1979, pp. 94-125.

Approach: Theoretical

In this review of government actions intended to facilitate or damage social movements in the United States during the last two decades, Marx found that (1) movements on the Left received the most attention, followed by those on the Right, with relatively little government action directed to organizations and groups in the center; (2) efforts to damage social movements were far more common than efforts to facilitate them; and (3) the tendency for government intervention in social movements has expanded over the last forty years.

The major governmental actions designed to damage movements included: creating an unfavorable public image (e.g., passing on negative information to the media, provoking the movement to illegal actions or carrying out such actions and attributing them to the movement, blocking the publication of favorable materials); information gathering (e.g., infiltration, wiretaps, physical surveillance, mail openings); inhibiting the supply of resources and facilities (e.g., revoking tax-exempt status, denial of government funding, getting activists fired from jobs); derecruitment (e.g., contact persons close to activists and encourage them to dissuade and threaten them, directly appealing to activists and giving them damaging information about others, deprograming); destroying leaders (e.g., legal sanctions, tax difficulties, cooptation, efforts to displace them); create internal conflict (e.g., encourage schisms based on disagreements, accuse key activists of being informants); encourage external conflict (e.g., prevent coalitions and cooperative actions, create alternative social movement organizations to compete); and sabotaging particular actions (e.g., use of tactics of misinformation to tell participants that events were cancelled, restrictive parade routes, permit denials, encourage counter-demonstrators).

Although the major governmental actions were designed to inhibit social movements, certain movements have been aided, including anti-Communists, the Klan, and the labor, civil rights and women's movements. The predominant forms of support were immunity and information. Sometimes the government helps a movement (or segments of it) not for purposes of helping it obtain its goals but as a way of exercising partial control over it (e.g., the moderate Klan organizations created by the FBI).

Five types of explanations for the general expansion of government intervention, particularly at the federal level, in social movement affairs were advanced. First, the reactive crisis-response model argues that social control efforts expanded because the threats or perception of threats from their activities have increased. Second, the pro-active anticipation-response model argues that the government actions are based on an anticipated crisis and the emphasis is put on offensive action. Third, the bureaucratic and individual aggrandizement model argues that social programs may take on a life of their own as vested interests develop around them and they may become vehicles for career advancement and organizational perpetuation and

growth. Fourth, the resource expansion-temptation model argues that with the development of more sophisticated technology for data gathering, storing, retrieving and analyzing as well as a larger pool of personnel skilled in covert operations, the temptation as well as the resources are available for major expansions in social control operations. Finally, the "society-needs-devils" model argues that government attention to dissident groups may be seen as a way of integrating a loosely organized society by serving as a reminder to others to stay in line. It may also take mass attention away from more basic sources of grievance.

Marx also argues that the efforts of government agencies may result in some unintended outcomes and that there are six factors that increase the likelihood of these unplanned outcomes: the secrecy involved; the frequent illegality of the actions; ineffective intervention techniques; the need for government agents (e.g., infiltrators) to establish credibility through seemingly loyal actions; and the reactive processes that occur when a movement comes under attack by social control agents (e.g., neutral groups may provide resources or attempt to disrupt the activities of government agents).

Underscoring the problem of determining the effect of efforts at social control or facilitation on a given outcome, the author looked at the decline of the student and anti-war movements and asked:

"Is the splintering of a sectarian group into two rival groups more a function of the efforts of authorities to create internal conflict, or of the seemingly endemic tendency of such groups to factionalism, even where no social control efforts are present? Is a high degree of turnover, sporadic participation, and ebbs and flows in mass participation more a function of authorities' ability to damage morale and create an unfavorable public image and the myth of surveillance and repression, or of the general problems involved in sustaining a mass movement, where many of the rewards for participation may be minimal and some may be available (if the movement succeeds) to nonparticipants as well?"

Comments:

Marx's article draws attention to the impact of government practices on the dynamics and processes of social movements--an area of inquiry that has involved much speculation but little empirical work.

McPhail, Clark and David Miller, "The Assembling Process: A Theoretical
and Empirical Examination," American Sociological Review, 38,
6, 1973, 721-35.

Approach: Theoretical; Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Abstract:

This paper sets out primarily neither to define nor to explain col-
lective action, but asks how people come together when they do, since
previous literature suggests that much collective behavior requires
large assemblies of people. Four dominant theoretical types of orienta-
tion (contagion, convergence, value-added, and emergent norm) were
reviewed. The authors conclude that all of them gave inordinate weight
to the individual predispositions of people and that communication
processes and ecological factors have been underplayed and underdeveloped.
They advance and test a different interpretation of the assembling pro-
cess, which focuses on the sources and processes by which people are
notified of and directed to their location.

McPhail and Miller use the following variables to examine the as-
sembling process by which people "move from disparate points in space
at time one to a common location at time two:"

1. Variations in sources of instructions. For example, short-
   range notice is available to people near the location; long-
   range notice, which takes from several hours to several days,
   is necessary for those farther away. Non-verbal notice occurs
   when people see others converging. The authors suggest that
   the assembling instructions people receive affect their subse-
   quent behavior.

2. Variation in location access. In the authors' view, the closer
   people are to an event the more likely they are to decide for
   themselves whether to move toward or away from it, whereas
   people who are distant are more dependent on others for instruc-
   tion. Moreover, assemblage is a simple function of the number
   and geographical range of people having physical access to
   events such as those occurring on college campuses and in
   ghettos.

3. Variation in prior and ongoing behaviors. When people have
   been labeled in certain ways -- as a black militant, let us
   say, or a sports fan -- because of their prior or current be-
   havior, and when the motive for assembling is relevant to these
   labels, the authors believe such people will be more likely
   to receive instructions from others and to instruct themselves
   to assemble at the scene of an event.

4. Variation in availability. Persons subject to fewer competing
   demands are considered to be more available for assembling at
   odd hours, such as evenings and weekends.

5. Space-time lag, sequence and frequency of instructions.
   The greater the distance and the longer the time between
   notice of a pending event and its actual occurrence, the more
   likely it is that people will be deflected. Thus, unless the
   assembling instructions are repeated, people will not go on
   to the scene of the event.

To study the assembling process, a questionnaire was administered
in March 1968 to 531 students at a state university. The questionnaire
asked whether students had attended an assembly that took place three
weeks earlier. This was a gathering at the local airport which was
planned as a welcome home for the victorious basketball team, but which
subsequently turned violent. Two and a half hours before the arrival
of the team, the radio station broadcasting the game had announced
the time and place of the celebration, and a crowd of 3,000 to 5,000
people had responded.

The following indices were used to measure the major variables in
this study:

1. Assembling instructions index: whether the respondents had
   been requested, invited or directed to go to the airport during
   five time periods, and the sources of the message.

2. Social density index: where respondents were and how many
   others were with them at two different times.

3. Transportation access: whether respondents had access to pri-
   vate transportation.

4. Prior behavior indices: respondents were asked about three
   types of behavior, whether they had attended earlier home
   basketball games, whether they had made plans to listen to the
   broadcast of the game in question, and whether they had actually
   listened to the game.

5. Index of relative availability: whether respondents had jobs,
   family obligations, or school work that competed with the
   assemblage that night and the following morning.

6. Space-time proximity to the assembly location: since most
   respondents were some distance from the airport and heard an-
   nouncements from the media of the event at least one hour before
   it took place, space-time proximity was treated as a constant.

7. Sex and year in school.

8. Admitted presence at the assemblage.

The multiple correlation between all variables and presence at the
assembly was .67 (R^2 = .45). "Assembling instruction (AI) was by far
the most important predictor of presence at the assembly (r=.59) and
remained high (r=.49) after controlling individually for the other

variables. Transportation access and attendance at prior games were next in importance, with zero order correlations of .44 and .42 respectively, both dropping to .23 after controlling for AI. The social density index had a .31 correlation with presence at the assembly, but dropped to .09 after controlling for AI. Relative availability was not highly correlated with presence at the assembly (r=.20), but it remained constant after controlling for AI. Sex was not considered a good predictor of assemblage (r=.26).

In showing a strong relation between the receipt of instructions which direct people to a specific location at a given time and their gathering at that location, the authors consider their alternative theory of the assembling process to be supported. They do note, however, that the theory may only be relevant to events which are not routine, which disclose a comparatively long interval between the announcement and the time of the gathering, and which demand access to transportation because of the distances involved. Further, they admit that this study ignored the interruptions and deflections in the assembling process, and the impact of the "directional content" of assembling instructions.

Comments:

This article is particularly interesting because it draws attention to the influence of such ecological factors as distance from events and density of population, and to the role of various channels of communication impelling people to participate in collective events. Yet we cannot really conclude from the study that theories based on individual predispositions are invalidated, since they were not tested at all in this research. One would hope that further research would effectively combine the range of attitudinal, ecological, and background factors that must be considered in a thorough examination of the assembling process.

Molotch, Harvey, "Media and Movements," In The Dynamics of Social Movements,
    Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (Eds), Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers,
    1979, pp. 71-93.

Approach: Theoretical

The basic premise for this chapter is that the media and social move-
ments need one another but function in a context with a high potential for
tension. Media coverage provides a means for organizational goal attain-
ment but also gives participants a sense of dignity and effectiveness--
regardless of the type of coverage received. Social movements can provide
"interesting" copy, can fill the daily news hole, and can help to see
attentive audiences to advertisers.

In order to have media coverage be useful to movements they must shape
their behavior so that the behavior is actually reported and at the same
time portrayed in such a way as to be effective in boosting morale and gain-
ing strength. Because of the fact that the mass media are "under the con-
trol of the ruling class" their coverage of the movement has opposite
goals--"the media wins if the status quo is enhanced as a result of the
media coverage." The media become preoccupied with "world view" of dissi-
dents in which they are seen as incompetent, irrational, or dangerous, and
where coverage is limited to the personal pathologies of movement partici-
pants, rather than the issues important to the activists themselves.

Movements can respond to this world view by 1) providing behaviors that
generate media curiousity such as confrontation politics, or 2) capitalize
on the presumed insanity of the movement by behaving absurdly (e.g., the
Yippies). Debates within movements about the net benefits of these stra-
tegies can often be extremely bitter but the outcome of these debates
affect the success of the movement, shape its leadership, and determine its
processes.

In a rambling discussion of the strategies of the media and conditions
under which they do cover dissident groups, the author makes some interesting
points. He suggests that favorable coverage will be given to movements
by publications who have a fusion of interests between advertisers and readers
committed to these movements or to particular segments of them. Moreover,
certain movements may be particularly useful to media interests and these
will also receive favorable stories. Often in order to maintain legiti-
macy, the media will have to cover events which had eye witnesses who
would think something was amiss if there was no coverage. Finally, he
argues that reporters may be able to cover stories that editors and pub-
lishers would prefer to ignore. "Not being as sensitive to the news needs
of the ruling class are the members of that class themselves, the may at
times make coverage decisions at variance with those that would be made by
higher-ups." However, when coverage of movements is viewed as a real threat
to the status quo, the media--as a conscious, deliberate policy--will pull
out, using as a rationalization, "journalistic responsibility."

Comments:

This Marxian perspective on the relationship between the media and social movements has, as the author notes, "pushed a certain perspective quite hard and has been, at times, quite speculative." His insights, however, gleaned from his own experiences as an activist and a researcher, are important and often valuable.

Morrison, Denton E., "Some Notes Toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements and Social Change," American Behavioral Scientist, 4, 5, 1971, 675-90.

Approach: Theoretical

In identifying shortcomings in the relative deprivation theory and offering further ideas about its application to social movements, Morrison builds on his previous research on the National Farmers' Organization. He stresses the ways that relative deprivation leads to certain beliefs about social structure, and the structural conditions that foster these beliefs.

"Relative deprivation" refers to discontent arising when comparisons with other groups intensify the difference between what people want and what they have. This feeling develops when people have legitimate expectations that they know will not be fulfilled. But it arises only from sudden perception of blocked opportunities since the expectations depend on some hope of fulfillment. Certain structural conditions are believed. to lead to relative deprivation because they produce rapid social changes that 1) increase upward social mobility so fast that hopes rise more quickly than opportunities occur ("aspirational deprivation"); 2) lessen the opportunity to realize longstanding expectations ("decremental deprivation"); or 3) cause aspirational deprivation followed closely by decremental deprivation ("progressive deprivation").

This gap between expectations and opportunities leads people to find their own solutions. The author lists four avenues such individuals may take: 1) to blame it on their own lack of talent, luck, resources, motivations, and so on, the solution being to change their expectations; 2) to believe that their expectations will be fulfilled with a little patience, in other words, to change their beliefs about blocked opportunities); 3) to change their situation so that opportunities will correspond with expectations; or 4) to see themselves as part of a group hampered by some larger social structure and to organize group action to change the structural obstacles.

This fourth mode of resolving feelings of relative deprivation is what leads to social movements. Morrison outlines the main conditions under which beliefs in structural blockage and structural solution are most likely to emerge and spread when perceptions of relative deprivation are strong: 1) a large population undergoing relative deprivation; 2) close interaction, communication, and proximity among this population; 3) corresponding roles, status, race, or sex among the group; 4) stratification with clear boundaries and visible differences in power at each level; and 5) much voluntary association between members of the society.

Finally, since the structural conditions and feelings of relative deprivation that first give rise to the movement may not be enough to maintain and strengthen it, one must also examine goal-displacement, oligarchy, and coercive tendencies, including violence, in social movements.

Comments:

Many of the measurements of relative deprivation in recent research have been far from adequate. Morrison's clear definition and detailed examination of relative deprivation may increase our understanding of this phenomenon and facilitate more accurate measurements.

In his contentions about the main structural conditions that link feelings of relative deprivation to participation in social movements, Morrison's arguments are the most speculative and they are probably incomplete. For example, he considers a stratification system where boundaries are clear and power differences visible to be one of the structural conditions that help to foster and spread beliefs in structural blockage and structural solutions among those suffering relative deprivation. Since he has restricted his analysis to power movements in fairly open, democratic societies that stress individual mobility, however, the meaning of this condition is not clear. Furthermore, others have argued that a stratification system with clear boundaries has deterred social movements in traditional societies because people then tended to accept the social order as legitimate.

Nieburg, H.L., "Violence, Law, and the Social Process," American Behavioral
      Scientist, March-April 1968, 17-19.

Approach: Theoretical

      "The function of the police power of the state," writes Nieburg, "is
to maintain a threshold of force to deter and/or contain the everpresent
margin of anti-social acts by individuals and groups." When so exercised,
that power is legitimate. However, contemporary urban riots in America
manifest a disturbing pattern: police action tends to exacerbate rather
than to suppress anti-social violence, touching off a vicious cycle of
escalation. The author discusses the resulting situation in terms very
similar to those employed by Charles Tilly in From Mobilization to Revolution.
Violence is associated with a challenger's effort to penetrate the polity,
become a member, and claim a share in the control of the government. The
government resists the claim because to accede would 1) involve realloca-
tion of resources under government control, and 2) change the rules of mem-
bership so as to allow further challengers entry to the polity. Repressive
agents of the state (police) therefore act to put down the challenger.
But the challenging group (urban blacks) has little or nothing to lose, so
it escalates the level of violence to a point at which the cost of repres-
sing the challenger becomes unacceptable to the government.

      Nieburg goes on to elaborate just what an "unacceptable cost" would
mean. He distinguished between the legality and the legitimacy of author-
ity. Legality refers to the formally constituted system of law and order,
which is useful in preserving the status quo but becomes a hindrance when
processs of change are afoot. Legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to
the vital popular consensus which supports authority; it can be denied for
a while but will ultimately reassert itself. When legality is upheld at
the cost of legitimacy, the position of the government is weakened:

      "A state system whose central and primary values become the
negative and costly ones of internal security and repression is soon riddled
by subversions, interventions, assasinations, and extremist fits and
seizures of all sorts."

      Nieburg concludes that all state systems (presumably the American
system in particular) must integrate into the power structure these groups
which successfully organize as challengers (presumably insurgent blacks
in particular).

Comments:

      This article is both sophisticated and eloquently written. Unfortu-
nately there is an air of unreality about it. It is all too easy to contra-
dict the author's assertion that "the notion of a totalitarian regime able
to ride roughshod over practically all its citizens, enforcing from above
dogmatic ideological norms and/or preventing political change from below,
is a myth." There are too many living examples of that myth.

Oberschall, Anthony, "Group Violence: Some Hypotheses and Empirical Uniformities," Law and Society Review, 5, 1, August 1970, 61-92.

Approach: Theoretical

In this essay specific testable hypotheses and empirical uniformities of group violence are presented in order to move toward answers to the question: Under what conditions will conflict tend to be violent rather than nonviolent, and what accounts for the magnitude of violence. Violence is one means used to pursue conflict and it simply means using physical coercion for personal and group ends.

While some theorists link both an increase in conflict and the likelihood of violence to rapid social change which produces dislocations, grievances and strain, others emphasize the importance of intervening variables in this relationship such as the amount and type of social control. According to these theorists if the authorities are unresponsive, block channels of communication, do not provide the opportunity for peaceful protest, refuse to make concessions, and so on, the likelihood of violent conflict increases. While conflict frequency might be accounted for by strain and grievances, the forms and magnitude the conflict takes is likely to be better explained by the interaction between authorities and protestors. Factors such as the degree of consistency, leniency, and repression exercised by authorities are linked to the magnitude of violence.

A series of hypotheses are then presented, based on a review of the literature and research in this area:

1. Protestors use violent means only after they have attempted other nonviolent means of seeking redress for their grievances.

   a. The protest group waits for some time for reforms and only after these reforms have proved ineffective do they resort to violent means of protest.
   b. Violent actions are initiated by protest groups when authorities break promises or agreements to reform and thus provide little or no opportunity for nonviolent means of effecting change.

2. In violent confrontations the authorities' actions produce the bulk, or at least more than half of the casualties.

   a. Violence is more often initiated by the authorities and their agents than by the protestors, as when they break up peaceful demonstrations or attack marchers.
   b. In confrontations between two hostile groups, the casualties tend to be higher when the authorities either openly side with one group against another, or don't intervene at all and legitimize the actions of the aggressor.
   c. Casualties will be greater if social control agents know they will not be held accountable for them.

     d.   If the protestors belong to a stigmatized group who have not enjoyed full citizenship rights and have traditionally been violently repressed, casualties will tend to be high.

     e.   There will be less violence if a third impartial party intervenes as a buffer or mediator in the conflict.

3.   When a majority group attacks a numerical minority, casualties will be especially high if the minority group lives in small clusters dispersed among the hostile majority rather than in compact settlements.

4.   Casualties tend to be higher if there is a weapons disparity between the two sides.

     a.   If there is no weapons disparity, the possession of firearms by both sides is not itself productive of higher casualties.

     b.   Violent clashes in rural areas between two hostile groups will be more productive of casualties than clashes in cities, because a larger number of participants have access to weapons in rural areas.

5.   The number of grievances, the magnitude of strain, the magnitude of the frustrations experienced by the protestors, while making conflict more likely and increasing the intensity of the conflict, has no relationship to the probability of violence and the magnitude of the casualties.

6.   Conflict is likely to involve more people, last longer and have a higher intensity if the opposing groups are separated by a number of divisions (ethnic, religious, class, etc.) but these reinforcing social cleavages have no relationship to the likelihood and magnitude of violence.

7.   The ideological level of the demands bears no systematic relationship to the likelihood and magnitude of violence.

8.   The lower the level of organization of both conflict groups, the higher the likelihood and magnitude of violence.

     a.   If the protest group is split into rival camps and factions with competing leaders, the likelihood of violence is greater than if it is internally united.

9.   If the authorities recognize the right to protest and are willing to negotiate, the likelihood and magnitude of violence tends to be lower than if recognition is not granted or is being withdrawn.

     a.   Even after violence has already broken out, it is likely to dinimish when recognition is granted, but it is likely to continue if it is not granted.

10. If modern protest movements go unrecognized and are not crushed by the authorities, they will tend to become highly organized and more ideological and the likelihood of protracted violent conflict will be high.

Oberschall then goes on to test some of these hypotheses using strikes which occurred between 1870 and 1930 in the coal, railroad, iron and steel, mining, and textile industries. Using data from the index of Commons, strikes were rated on intensity of violence (none, property damage but no fatalities, or one or more fatalities) and degree of recognition (issues of wages etc., "union weakening" issues such as harassment or busting, or demands for collective bargaining or the right to organize). Hypothesis 9 was supported in this analysis. When the patterns of violence in strikes were examined separately for each industry, other interesting patterns were found. The low incidence of violence in the railroad industry was attributed to the recognition granted by management of the brotherhoods and the fact that they tended to accept outside mediation in railroad disputes by governmental bodies (Hypotheses 9 and 2e). In coal mining strikes were especially numerous and violent and this was explained by the lack of recognition given to the United Mine Workers as well as the fact that employers tended to import strikebreakers and armed guards and harass strikers. Also, local authorities tended to side with the authorities, had low accountability, and the strikes took place in remote mountain districts by powerless ethnic immigrant work forces (Hypotheses 9 2a,b,c,d).

Comments:

This is an extremely interesting and provocative article not only because of its relevance to modern collective violence but also because it clearly and simply synthesizes a large amount of descriptive historical material.

Oberschall, Anthony, "Protracted Conflict," In The Dynamics of Social
Movements, Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (Eds.), Cambridge:
Winthrop Publishers, 1979, pp. 45-70.

Approach: Theoretical

In this essay, the dynamic aspects of group conflict--its course, dura-
tion, intensity, and outcome--are viewed as the result of a sequence of
choices made by the contesting parties: choices about means of confronta-
tion, conciliation, escalation, repression, and withdrawal.

The means of confrontation are dichotomized into nonconventional means
(e.d., marches and demonstrations, picketing, strikes, boycotts, civil
disobedience, civil disorders, riots, terrorist acts, kidnappings, sabotage,
and guerrilla warfare) and conventional means (i.e., persuasion, influence,
bargaining in negotiations, and routine political transactions). Oberschall
argues that a "negatively privileged challenger" in facing a "positively
privileged target" will resort partly to nonconventional means because the
challenger has no resources to offer the target. These nonconventional
strategies necessitate a response from the authorities which then creates
new or derivative issues, such as did the police use of unnecessary force.
The response of the target, whether it is conciliation, repression, or escala-
tion of the conflict, will affect the actions and survival of the challenger
group.

Conciliation refers to the "recognition of and negotiation with represen-
tatives of the opposition in order to reach an agreement that will lead to
a cessation of nonconventional conflict." If challengers are not organized
with a leadership capable of enforcing discipline among followers, negotia-
tions will not be attractive to the target. Moreover, conditions favorable
to conciliation decrease as the duration of coercive conflict increases for
a variety of reasons outlined by the author. "Conciliation in destructive
conflict will in many cases be undertaken only as a result of third-party
intervention based on superior force.

The benefits and costs of various means of confrontation are then examined
for both antagonists in a conflict--the challenger and the target. Despite
the fact that the target usually has enormous resources compared to the chal-
lenger, they also face legal, political, and constitutional constraints in
the exercise of social control. Three types of social control are defined:
1) confrontation control which refers to means used by social control agents
during confrontations such as crowd control and riot control, 2) preventive
control which refers to such things as regulations governing meetings and
marches, laws dealing with possession and use of weapons, censorship, pre-
ventive detention, etc., 3) judicial control which refers to deterrent
effects on future conflicts such as prosecution of law violators and the
imposition of penalties. Oberschall maintains that the target will have an
incentive to be conciliatory if it is restrained from social control that
would make confrontation costly to the challenger, and if repression is
counterproductive because it creates sympathy and support for the challenger.

The challenger is constrained in his choice of the means of conflict
by his size, dependence on outside sources of support, and by the degree to
which he is an organized entity. Oberschall hypothesizes that there is a

curvilinear relationship between size and the probability of a conciliatory response to the challenge by the target. The larger the size of the challenging group, the more collective action it will undertake, and the greater the incentive of the target to conciliate because the social control costs will be high. However, if the challenging group is too large, it may result in a repressive response from the target because the costs of providing a collective good to the entire group will be higher and because the group will appear so threatening as to invite an attempt at ultimate suppression. In addition, he suggests that the incentive for conciliation on both sides is much diminished when outsiders share in the costs of confrontation. "Maintaining pressure by nonconventional confrontation on even a fairly conciliatory opponent in order to draw a more repressive response will be a rational tactic for a weak challenger counting on increased outside support." Finally, unorganized or loosely structured movements face a different set of problems than highly organized groups. Because the first individuals to attempt collective action run high personal risks, because there are free rider tendencies, and because the length of time involved before gains are realized is substantial, organized challenges by these movements are unlikely. If the collective action is of short duration, the costs for individual participants will be less. Moreover, if there are a large number of participants, the costs for individual participants will be less and the probability of success will be greater.

Using the 1960s Black riots as a case example, the author argued that the rioting occurred precisely where and when the conditions for strategic interaction (i.e., where individuals could assess the likelihood of others participating) were present and would lead to massive participation and low costs for the individuals involved: large size of black population; ease of informal communication in black neighborhoods in the warm months; and weekends when there was less chance of lost wages. The growth of a riot ideology helped explain the increase in frequency and severity over the years. He argues that the riot wave came to an abrupt end in 1969 because the costs of the rioting outweighed the expected benefits once the political leadership was no longer responsive to this form of confrontation. Unilateral concessions made by the authorities satisfied and demobilized a majority of the participants, leaving a small group of full-time activists who turned to more violent and anonymous means of conflict. And eventually this small group would abandon the challenge or would be tracked down by the authorities, or more likely, both.

Comments:

Using rational choice and resource mobilization theory, an interesting and often provocative set of hypotheses were developed as part of an emerging theory of conflict dynamics. The author concedes that much more theoretical work in this vein remains as well as empirical tests of deductions and generalizations, and he makes some suggestions for the most promising avenues.

Olson, Mancur, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods
and the Theory of Groups (revised edition), New York: Schlocken
Books, 1971.

Approach: Theoretical

This book argues that public goods, unlike private goods, pose a
problem in political behavior. A public good is defined as a good
that is not exclusive; that is, once a public good has been purchased
it is available to the purchaser as well as to others. Consumption
of a private good is at the purchaser's discretion. The privision of
public goods by means of voluntary contributions incurs problems for
a group sharing common interests because some can at least temporarily
enjoy a free ride, that is, benefit from a public good without contri-
buting to its purchase. Individuals who put their own interests first
are likely to elect a free ride rather than to act jointly with
others to further the group's common interests.

The problem of free riders is not particularly serious for small
groups.

> (In) some small groups each of the members, or at
> least one of them, will find that his personal gain
> from having the collective good exceeds the total
> cost of providing some amount of that collective
> good; there are members who would be better off
> if the collective good were provided, even if they
> had to pay the entire cost of providing it them-
> selves, than they would be if it were not pro-
> vided....Thus, in a very small group, where each
> member gets a substantial portion of the total
> gain because there are few others in the group, a
> collective good can often be provided by the vol-
> untary self-interested action of members of the
> group (pp. 33-34).

Olson contends that large, unorganized or "latent" groups ordinarily
will not act to promote common interests when such behavior conflicts
with action in the immediate interest of each individual. "(The
very large group) is distinguished by the fact that, if one member
does or does not help provide the collective good, no other member
will be significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to
react. Thus an individual in a 'latent' group, by definition, cannot
make a noticeable contribution to any group effort, and since no one
in the group will react if he makes no contribution, he has no incentive
to contribute" (p. 50). The "logic of collective action" leads to a
halt in the voluntary provision of public goods.

Olson argues that any large group with common interests must use
some strategy to solve the dilemma of its public goods. One is to
provide, in addition to public goods, one or more private goods.

Professional groups use this device, offering some selective individual benefits which are not available elsewhere. An individual's support for the lobbying efforts of these organizations then becomes a by-product of his receiving a particular benefit (see pp. 132-67). Another solution is a mechanism such as the "closed-union shop" that allows members of a group to coerce each other into paying for public goods (pp. 66-97).

This book asserts that "group theories" of political behavior which claim that "groups will act when necessary to further their common or group goals" (p. 1) are faulty because they neglect the problem of free riders. These theories assume not only that participation in voluntary associations is virtually universal but that small groups and large organizations tend to attract members for the same reasons (p. 20).

In the appended materials Olson suggests that demands for a government or organization to provide public goods can increase divisiveness and make disorder more likely. Although each person can consume private goods according to particular tasts or preferences, everyone receives about the same amount and type of public goods where they are provided (p. 172). Consequently one suspects that many of those provided with such public goods as roads, schools, or means of national defense will be either less than satisfied with their quantity or quality or feel that these are excessive.

Comments:

The author uses a "strong free-rider" hypothesis which predicts that under ideal-typical conditions, no group member should contribute voluntarily to the provision of a public good. Individuals are faced with a paradox similar to the "prisoner's dilemma," in which -- no matter how other members behave -- they are best off not contributing. Of course if everyone behaves this way individuals are worse off than if everyone contributed.

According to Samuelson's weaker version of this hypothesis, under ideal-typical conditions, provision of a public good will be less than optimal. Even if some of a good is supplied by those particularly interested in making it available, other members will have a free-ride. The group will thus get less of a good than if a single member made an economic decision on the optimal amount each would provide.

Olson, in fact, seems somewhat uncomfortable with a broad application of the "strong free-rider" hypothesis. His footnotes (pp. 6, 160) suggest that contributions to religious and philanthropic organizations differ from voluntary contributions to other instrumental organizations in that the motives go beyond self-interest.

Pepitone, Albert, "The Social Psychology of Violence," International
    Journal of Group Tensions, 2, 2, 1972, 19-32.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Abstract:

For a deep understanding of collective violence, one must identify
the social psychological processes that are involved and see how they
are related. The author considers the present theoretical orientation
of social psychology -- the theory of frustration-aggression -- to
be too simplistic, excluding many kinds of destructive acts and disre-
garding the multiple causal processes.

Social psychologists must understand how people perceive and define
violence, for this will affect their analysis of the phenomenon. The
concept of violence has been so politicized that its very definition
is affected by political values -- for example, some persons view gov-
ernment decisions as acts of violence. Political attitudes can lead
directly to violent behavior: violence is often used deliberately by
political groups to provoke counterviolence. The political conceptions
of violence held by social scientists studying these events will affect
both their selection and their analysis and interpretation of data.
The political interests of the investigators should therefore be stated.
With the politicization of violence, the concept itself has also become
vague and general, to include wars, homicides, evictions of poor
families, and barroom brawls. Though these events may have common
effects, they should not be grouped into a single category; in most
sciences the decisive criterion is whether events have a common cause.
Although the author does not define collective violence in the paper,
he refers to "urban disorders," juvenile gang wars, police riots,
campus battles, etc.

In applying the frustration-aggression theory, social psychologists
have focused almost entirely on individual aggression and have ignored
aggression that was not a response to injury. In particular, they
ignore instrumental aggression that is a deliberate political tactic
to provoke police brutality or justify violent intervention by the
police, explosions of anger and rage, or violence carried out as part
of role requirements and constraints. Moreover, frustration is not
the only condition causing collective violence.

Going beyond the frustration-aggression theory, Pepitone discusses
other processes making up the background of violence: discrepancies
between aspirations and achievement, especially under circumstances of
rising expectations, increasing deprivation of the group compared to
other groups or to conditions in the past, instances of perceived in-
justice and states of being without norms, power or identity. The
discontent of individuals becomes translated into mass violence
against people and things by a sequence of attribution processes, in-
volving face-to-face interaction and communication in which individuals

begin to share their discontent. An "enemy" becomes defined; the diffused discontent then becomes focused anger which triggers violent tendencies. Whether or not these tendencies actually erupt in violence depends on how the given situation develops.

The situations in which violence explodes have features in common, including these: (1) a collection of oppressed actors; (2) the presence of actual or symbolic enemies; (3) issues of conflict which are at a critical stage; and (4) some decisive event like an edict or a show of force. The outbreak of violence would then depend upon the anger that the situation -- especially the triggering event -- aroused, how greatly ordinary restraints against the expression of violence were broken down, and each party's estimates of its power and of the amount of resistance it will encounter. Studies on "disinhibition" are cited, suggesting that the anonymity furnished by masks, darkness, or the uniformity of participants reduces external restraints and the "deindividuation" occurring when people in small groups cease to pay attention to each other reduces internal restraints against collective violence. "Contrast theory" research has shown that when serious punishment is not allowed, the use of a less severe punishment is increased; and Pepitone argues that when police are allowed to carry lethal weapons but urged to use less harmful weapons they may be more likely to make excessive use of these lesser weapons. If so, it follows that to reduce the use of clubs, the police should not be allowed to cary lethal weapons at all. The article also discusses the impact of sympathetic arousal, that is, physiological arousal "transferred" to unrelated outlets, and uses this concept to explain instances where crowds become converted from celebrants at football games to wild, destructive mobs.

Comments:

This is a sound theoretical analysis in the mainstream of social psychological tradition. Empirical research in the field is integrated into generic theoretical and research prescriptions. Although more recent empirical finds could not be included, they would be welcome.

Perrow, Charles, "The Sixties Observed," In The Dynamics of Social Movements,
Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarty (Eds.), Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers,
1979, pp. 192-211.

Approach: Theoretical

In this essay abstracts of news stories that appeared in the New York
Times Annual Index were used to understand the dynamics of several movements
or issues from 1950 through 1972 in the United States. A variety of popular
and academically respectable theories of the origin and demise of social
movements are examined using examples from the civil rights and black power
movements, the student movements, welfare rights, farm workers and women's
liberation movements, among others, to illustrate the limitations of each
explanation.

The first set of theories (labeled demographic-generational) explained
the emergence of disorder by reference to the bulge in the youth population,
particularly in age-segregated institutions (colleges), which led to the de-
velopment of specific ideologies and values as well as the resources available
for collective action. This theory is criticized because there was no sudden
influx of youth when the student movement started or when other movements
began; because the proportion of youth as a fraction of the total population
was lower during those periods than during periods of relative quiet; the
increase in college enrollment during that period was not dramatic; because
students were not the backbone of most movements; because the demise of these
movements was not associated with a decrease in the youth population; and
because even the student movement itself was more oriented to opposition to
the war than to the draft. "If there had been no Vietnam war, and no
(gradual) rise in the youth and college population, I would argue that the
1960s still would have been stormy."

The second set of theories (resource mobilization arguments) are sub-
divided into two types. The first (espoused by Oberschall, Tilly and Gamson)
argues that protest grows out of the ongoing political process and that the
resources available for generation of disorder are critical. Perrow does
not really contest this view. The second type of resource mobilization
theory (espoused by Zald and McCarthy and Moynihan) argues that movements
arise because organizers from outside the aggrieved collectivity make a
profession of leading dissident groups, supported by surplus funds in the
federal budget because of a rise in discretionary income. This theory is
criticized using examples from both the civil rights and anti-war movements
in which the leadership emerged from within the aggrieved constituency.
Moreover, although prosperity led to the increased funding of liberal social
causes, the question of which came first, the social movements or the funding,
has not been established. In addition, the demise in these movements while
affluence remained relatively high casts doubt on the argument.

The third theory, which Perrow labeled "the greening of America," explains
these movements as occurring as part of a cultural revolution involving a
rapid and deep-seated liberalization. He admits having a strong bias in
favor of this explanation but notes that these theorists spend little time
trying to account for the emergence of this cultural revolution and that the
demise of the movements is not well understood, except by arguing that the
revolution succeeded and the movements moved into more respectable, institu-

tional and moderately successful phases.

The final theory, labeled "the greying of America," accounts for the emergence of these movements by the inability of world capitalism to handle its contradictions, resulting in the alienation of major sectors of the society. Although each social movement started out with a "safe program," once alienation was made manifest and disaffection unloosed, each movement escalated to radical and even hysterical demands, to the surprise of elites. Elites then repressed them, leaving only a few nonthreatening movements such as the environmental movement, which actually serve the interests of government. Perrow notes:

> "Distracted by the collection of soft drink cans, the public
> avoided any serious consideration of requiring that business
> and industry pay for their externalities out of dividends or out
> of funds reinvested for the great god Growth."

Although Perrow leans to a mixture of each of these perspectives for an explanation of particular movement dynamics in the 1960s, he cautions the reader that "society is sufficiently complex and social processes are sufficiently random, accidental, unpredictable, and disorderly to make us wary of citing even 'major' causes."

Comments:

In criticizing many of the theories, Perrow argues that they failed because the explanations given for the cause or emergence of a movement were not consistent with reasons given for the decline. In the end of the essay he modifies that criterion noting that this requirement may not be found in reality and that it might be enough to use certain explanations for the emergence and other explanations for the decline. In developing a theoretical framework for the dynamics of social movements, this may be the appropriate next step.

Pinard, Maurice, "Poverty and Political Movements," Social Problems, 15, 2,
      1967.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

      This article offers empirical evidence bearing on a common sociological
observation (by Trotsky, Crane Brinton, Turner and Killian, Searles and
Williams, Jackson and Johnson, and others): the poorest, most downtrodden
members of society are not the most likely to join and support a mass movement.
Their circumstances are so desperate, the argument goes, that day-to-day
survival consumes the energy which might otherwise fuel an uprising. Those
somewhat closer to the median income are more likely to participate in a mass
movement. They are less constrained by circumstances, and as employed workers
their expectations are alternately raised, and dashed by the instability of
industrial capitalism.

      To support his argument the author cites a survey of 998 Quebec residents,
conducted in 1962 when the Social Credit Party, never before powerful in
Quebec, suddenly won 26 percent of the vote. Respondents were classified by
income (low, middle, or high, according to standards set by the Conference on
Economic Progress) and political preference. A curvilinear relationship was
found in which support for the blossoming Social Credit Party was weakly
correlated with low income, more strongly correlated with middle income, and
weakly correlated with high income. The additional finding that support for
the Social Credit Party was also strongly correlated with unemployment suggests
to the author a corollary of the central hypothesis: unlike the poor, who
still have something to lose, the unemployed have nothing to fear from support-
ing a social movement. Moreover, the same curvilinear relationship between
income and social activism is evident, according to the author, in existing
studies of the Poujade movement in France and the Freedom Ride movement in
Baltimore.

      Finally, the author discusses another result of his Quebec survey: among
persons who did not report feeling significantly worried and hopeless, people
with low incomes were no more likely than those with middle income to become
active in social causes. Among persons who did report feeling worried and
hopeless, however, those with middle incomes were significantly more likely
than those with low incomes to join social movements, in accordance with the
curvilinear relationship specified in the article. The author suggests that
the effects of worry differ with income; people with low incomes become paral-
yzed while those with middle incomes are spurred to action.

Comment:

      There are several problems with this article. The most glaring is that
the hypothesis generally refers to mass social movements, yet the movements
dealt with in the article are all institutionalized political movements, and
the behavior interpreted as supporting these movements is strictly self-
reported voting behavior. These are serious limitations. Yet the meteoric
rise of the Social Credit Party does bear a resemblance to a social movement
in the broad sense, and the voting statistics did correlate (or rather, did

not conflict) with official voting and census figures. The premise of the
article, furthermore, is supported by data concerning other social movements.
While the article as a whole by no means proves the hypothesis, it does offer
at least the beginning of an empirical confirmation.

Rosenbaum, H. and Peter Sederberg, "Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establish-
    ment Violence," Comparative Politics, 6, 1974, 541-70.

Approach: Theoretical

    In contrast to violence aimed at changing the established order (i.e.,
revolution), vigilantism is defined as "acts or threats of coercion in
violation of the formal boundaries of an established sociopolitical order,
which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from
some sort of subversion." Another term for it is "establishment violence."
In this article, the authors try to determine conditions likely to produce
vigilante action, develop a typology of vigilantism, and discuss the
effects of these actions on the societies in which they occur.

    Vigilantism is most likely to occur under conditions of "decremental
deprivation"--when there is a sharp decline in the perceived value capa-
bilities of groups but their value expectations remain constant. This
perception of threatening challenges by groups interested in altering the
status quo is likely to lead to vigilantism when established groups feel
that a regime is ineffective in thwarting these challenges to the pre-
vailing sociopolitical order. Moreover, "the magnitude of vigilante
violence appears negatively related to the ability of the regime to defend
its formal boundaries against this type of breeching and positively re-
lated to the scope and coherence of social support for the vigilante move-
ment."

    A typology of vigilantism was developed based on the intended purpose
of the actions. Three types were distinguished: crime control, social
group control, and regime control and the participants in each of these
types could be either private or public persons. Crime control vigilan-
tism is directed against persons believed to be committing illegal acts
who have escaped justice because of government inefficiency, corruption,
or the system of due process. Although this is usually associated with
the acts of private persons, law enforcement personnel may also engage in
it especially when using excessive physical compulsion in apprehending
criminals. Social group control vigilantism refers to acts of violence
against groups that are competing for, or advocating a redistribution
of values within the system. The target groups can be either communal
(racial, religious, etc.), economic, or political, and vigilantes can be
either public or private persons. Regime control vigilantism is estab-
lishment violence intended to alter the regime, in order to make the
"superstructure" into a more effective guardian of the "base."

    Arguing that vigilantism is basically "negative" because its essen-
tial aim is to suppress any threat to the status quo and is "disorderly"
because it inhibits the development of "reasonably accurate and stable
behavioral expectations," the authors state that it tends to be dysfunc-
tional over the long run because it cannot replace formal political insti-
tutions and is probably antithetical to their growth. In the short run,
however, it may stabilize the political process.

Comments:

This is a rather superficial survey of existing material on vigilante groups in several different countries. Since the typology and definition of vigilantism is based on the intentions of the participants, other relevant distinguishing characteristics of these actions are not discussed including size, structure, duration, and power of the group.

Russell, Gordon W., "The Perception and Classification of Collective Behavior," Journal of Social Psychology, 87, 2, 1972, 219-27.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Controlled Experiment

Russell proposes a model for classifying collective behavior based on a perceptual dimension obtained through multidimensional scaling. This method allows a certain flexibility in viewing events.

The author discusses past efforts by social scientists to define and classify instances of collective behavior. A priori frameworks are generally proposed to classify events, but some invariably defy such simple categorization. Existing explanatory systems are said to provide ex post facto analyses, but fail to provide testable predictions, since it is not known how to label and weight relevant concepts.

Multi-dimensional scaling techniques are applied to a wide range of collective behaviors -- from fads and crazes through riots and revolutions -- to determine the attributes used by judges in cognitively distinguishing such events. From this, the relative order and distances among concepts can be represented in N-dimensionalspace. A college class on collective behavior, numbering 42 students, who had shared readings and used Lang's text, rated 19 names of collective events on a 9-point rating scale. A 4-dimensional solution was found: 1) degree of violence; 2) degree to which the collectivity was amorphous or focused; 3) anomie; and 4) ideology. The results suggest that the method may specify the causal perceptual space of collective events. Comparing these perceptions of individuals in various groups might be useful.

Comments:

The approach could contribute toward more sophisticated models for classifying and predicting and the author's methodology could be useful in further study.

Sawyer, Jack, "Relative Deprivation: A Politically Biased Concept,"
Psychiatry, 34, 1, 1971, 97-99.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Literature Review

This very brief article makes a single point: dominant institu-
tional values influence the choice of concepts used by social scientists.
These values must be explicitly acknowledged and alternative concepts
based on other values must be explored. The sense of discontent or
dissatisfaction inherent in the concept of relative deprivation, as
currently used, is a function of the discontented persons' achievement
judged by some standard they employ for comparison.

Discontent may be defined in a number of ways. Individualistic
discontent is fostered when one's present situation or future outlook
is poor compared to one's past or current state. Competitive discontent
is a product of comparisons with another person or group that disclose
a failure to develop one's own possibilities. Equality-oriented dis-
content, also arises from comparisons with other persons or groups; but
instead of resulting from failure to maximize one's own position it is
generated by perceived inequities between the groups. According to
the author, research has made the individualistic definition less
plausible than the competitive definition, which is dominant in the
literature. Laboratory findings show, however, that the equality-
oriented definition is useful in understanding feelings of discontent
among some people and groups.

Relative deprivation is a built-in concept, given the competitive
orientation of our dominant institutions. However, in laboratory
studies when subjects perceived the absence of the equality they de-
sired they tended to reallocate resources until they achieved a more
nearly equal status.

Comments:

The author reviews only laboratory studies that support his point
of view, but his object is merely to illustrate the point, not to
prove it. Further research might be directed toward ascertaining the
extent that the three concepts of discontent described above influence
participants in collective disorders, and how greatly such disorders
have narrowed or widened the differences in status and achievement
that are part of these concepts.

Schumaker, Paul D., "The Scope of Political Conflict and the Effectiveness of Constraints in Contemporary Urban Protest," Sociological Quarterly, 19, Spring 1978, 168-84.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data; Survey Research

In reviewing past research and theory on the effectiveness of militant tactics and constraints for protest movements, the author found conflicting and often weak relationships. While some researchers (e.g., Gamson, 1975; Astin et al., 1975; and Tilly et al.,1975) found that the use of violence was associated with successful outcomes, others (e.g., Welch, 1975; Snyder and Kelly, 1976; Crain, 1969) found that nonviolent tactics seemed to be more effective.

In this article Schumaker hypothesizes that the effectiveness of the use of direct action tactics and violence by protest groups depends on the conditions of the conflict, particularly the degree and direction of public involvement in the protest incident.

The effectiveness of the use of "constraints" or militant tactics is in part a function of the number of parties involved in the conflict, according to the major hypothesis:

"When a political conflict is confined to the protest group and their target (when the scope of the conflict is narrow), the use of constraints will usually enhance the chances of a successful outcome for the protest group. Conversely, when the public is involved in the resolution of a political conflict (when the scope of conflict is broad), the use of constraints will usually reduce the chances of a successful outcome for protest groups."

Several subsidiary hypotheses are also examined. The first one suggests that the scope of the conflict is a function of the types of demands made by the protesters: When protesters make demands that impinge on the resources of other citizens, the scope of the conflict will be broadened and the greater will be the public involvement in opposition to the protesters. The second one suggests that when protesters are relatively powerless and have little hope of appealing to the authorities and the public, constraints may be the only tactics available that can be effective: In a context where protest groups confront an activated and hostile public, constraint utilization may be positively related to protester success. The third one suggests that when the public is initially uncommitted, protesters may wish to involve them and broaden the scope of the conflict by the use of militant tactics: When protest groups employ strategies that involve the use of constraints, the scope of the conflict will usually be enlarged. However, in using constraints in societies which view disruption and violence as illegitimate tactics, protesters may activate the public against them: The more that a protest group utilizes constraints, the more opposition it will attain from the relevant public.

To test the hypotheses, Schumaker examines how the scope of conflict (the extent to which members of the public are involved), public hostility (the extent to which the public opposes or supports the protesters), and constraint utilization (the extent to which protesters use disruptive and violent tactics), interact to determine policy responsiveness (the extent to which the target adopts policies congruent with the protesters' demands). "Zero-sumness of demands" (the extent to which the protesters' demands are burdensome to others) is used as a control variable, because of the possibility that groups making zero sum demands would be both more likely to use constraints and less likely to achieve positive outcomes.

Two different samples, totalling 212 conflicts between protest groups and political authorities were used to test the hypotheses. One sample consisted of data from content analysis of existing case studies of protest incidents which occurred during the 1960s. The other sample consisted of data gathered in 1970-71 by mail questionnaire; officials of public agencies were asked questions about the most recent incident targeted at their agency. Incidents in the case studies tended to be larger and more sustained than the incidents in the questionnaire sample.

The results tend to support the hypotheses, albeit weakly. Overall, there is no significant relationship between the use of tactics of direct action and violence and the degree to which policy changes were achieved. These constraint tactics were more likely to lead to successful outcomes for the protesters when the public was uninvolved in the conflict, however. In situations where the public was highly involved (i.e., the scope of the conflict was broad), the use of constraints was more effective if the public was hostile rather than supportive of the protesters. The author interprets this finding to mean "that when protesters are operating in a supportive environment, the use of constraints is counterproductive because it alienates those who would otherwise be allies. But when protesters are operating in a hostile environment, they have few allies which can be alienated by the use of constraints."

The results also indicate that the more the protesters' demands impinged on the resources of others (i.e., zero-sum demands), the greater the level of hostile public involvement. Similarly, the use of constraint tactics also activates the public in opposition to the protesters.

Since the public is rarely uninvolved and unconcerned with the outcome of a protest incident but generally is not strongly opposed to the protest group at the start, the use of constraints is most likely to enhance public hostility toward the protesters and thus are not very effective strategies.

Comments:

This article is provocative in its attempt to refine the questions being asked about the effectiveness of the use of constraints by protest groups. However, methodological problems limit the usefulness of the study: Differences between the two samples and non-random sampling techniques make it difficult to interpret the results, particularly because of the discrepancies in the two samples; no response rate is given for the mail questionnaire sample and no assessment of the overall quality of the data in either sample is given; significance levels are not reported and all relationships are weak. As noted by the author, policy responsiveness

is only one way of measuring successful outcomes and additional indicators would be useful for future research.

Overall, this article should be viewed as suggestive rather than conclusive. A better data base and more adequate variables for measuring concepts such as success are necessary to test the hypotheses appropriately. Conditions of the conflict other than the degree and direction of public involvement also need to be specified in order to accurately assess when the use of constraints is most effective and least effective.

Skolnick, Jerome, <u>The Politics of Protest</u>. New York: Simon and Schuster,
    1969.

Approach: Theoretical/Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

    This volume reports the findings of the Task Force on Violent Aspects of
Protest and Confrontation of the National Commission on the Causes and Preven-
tion of Violence, whose research was conducted under Skolnick's supervision.
Field study occupied only five months, the bulk of the report being based on
the literature of collective violence rather than original data.

    The author defines violence as the intentional use of force to injure
or kill or to destroy property. In this country violence is defined through
the political process and always implies a disruption of order, but order too
is politically defined. According to the author, violence has not always been
condemned in this society and the decision by agents of social control to use
violence is a political one.

    The author labels as a myth the view that social mobility in this country
has been achieved through the peaceful pursuit of group goals. He cites numer-
ous violent conflicts between people at all income levels and from all ethnic
groups. In his view the need for protest originates in the orientation of
American institutions toward progress of the individual rather than of the
group, although group identification has continued to be significant to Americans.
He names the modes of resolving conflict that have been relied on in the past:
massive military suppression, as in the American Civil War; urbanization and
industrialization; and organizing the activities of protesters through institu-
tions such as labor unions.

    Skolnick discerns two sources of bias in current views of collective be-
havior. One is the failure of theorists to recognize how authorities are des-
tructive and irrational and how collective behavior is constructive and rational.
Bias is also inherent in the view of authorities that collective behavior is
without purpose and direction and that violence doesn't pay, when in fact it
has paid for some American groups at certain periods.

    The author concludes that society should rather try to change fundamentally
the conditions against which groups protest than to emphasize the control and
containment of protest.

Comment:

    This volume gives only a brief description of the research methods employed
by the Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation of the Nation-
al Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, and hence it is diffi-
cult to judge the soundness of the conclusions.

    Though Skolnick offers no new theory and shows existing theories to be
inadequate, he makes few constructive and substantive recommendations about what
a new theory of collective disorder should contain. Perhaps the differing needs
of the intended audience made it impossible to do very much toward developing
theory. He succeeds in identifying possible biases in existing theories of

collective behavior (e.g., in the concepts of strain and the irrationality of collective behavior), but he fails to offer any alternatives to explain the very real phenomena which these inadequate concepts attempt to describe. Skolnick's concept of collective disorders as instrumental political action is not linked with strain (though it is linked with institutional crises) or with the ways in which collective disorders differ from other modes of instrumental political action.

This work raises several important issues: 1) Under what circumstances are existing institutions likely to label protests violent and to react violently to protests; 2) Under what circumstances has peaceful progress toward specified ends been achieved by a collectivity? 3) How do collective disorders differ from other modes of instrumental political action? 4) In what ways can the concept of institutional crisis, which Skolnick mentions briefly, be linked to strain as it is defined in contemporary literature?

Smelser, N.J., Theory of Collective Behavior, New York: Free Press, 1963; see also, Currie, Elliott and Jerome H. Skolnick, "A Critical Note on Conceptions of Collective Behavior," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 391, September 1970, 34-35; and Manning, R.O., "A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Collective Behavior Theory," Sociological Focus, 4, 4, 1971, 99-106.

Approach: Theoretical

This book documents an attempt to develop a sociological theory of the processes associated with particular forms of collective behavior. Specified in this theory are the definition of collective behavior, events which meet the terms of this definition, the components of social action, the determinants of collective behavior, the concept of "value-added" by which the determinants of collective behavior and the components of social action are organized and analyzed, and the concepts of short-circuiting and generalized beliefs. Historical data supporting this theory are analyzed.

Collective behavior is "mobilization on the basis of a belief" which redefines social action." Beliefs are assessments of the extraordinary consequences which will follow if the collective behavior is successful. They may be considered magical beliefs. Collective behavior is not institutionalized behavior. The situations on which it focuses are undefined and unstructured.

Five types of events are considered in this volume: 1) the panic response; 2) the craze; 3) the hostile outburst; 4) the norm-oriented movement; and 5) the value-oriented movement. Four components of social action are named and arranged hierarchically. Changes in a given component will require changes in all the components below it. Listed from the top down, the components are:

1) Values -- general sources of legitimacy
2) Norms -- regulatory standards for interaction
3) Mobilization of individual motivations into organized roles
4) Situation factors -- facilities, information, skills, tools, and obstacles in the path toward concrete goals

The determinants of collective behavior include: 1) structural conduciveness; 2) structural strain; 3) growth and spread of generalized belief; 4) precipitating factors; 5) mobilization of participants for action; and 6) the operation of agents and mechanisms of social control both before the collective behavior and after it. Precipitating factors provide a concrete setting or event toward which collective behavior can be directed. The order in which the determinants are listed above is based on the prior conditions that must be met before a given determinant will take effect. Thus the sixth determinant implies the occurrence -- either sequentially or simultaneously -- of the preceding five; and the fifth determinant implies the occurrence of the preceding four, etc. This scheme for organizing the determinants is based on the concept of value added.

An especially problematic concept that is not well handled in most related theories is the structural strain underlying collective behavior. Strain is defined as "an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of action. Evidence of strain will show up first at the lowest levels of a component of social action. To eliminate strain occurring in a given component of social action, participants in collective behavior will turn to those operating at some higher level among the social action component.

Because collective behavior is uninstitutionalized, only a generalized belief holds the collectivity together in lieu of the normal social supports. A common culture is created which defines the context of the concerted action. The search upward through the components is a search for a solution to the strain which is the focus of the collective behavior. Once these higher levels are settled on, participants in collective action try to redefine the commonly accepted meaning attached to these higher levels in order to guarantee the resolution of the strain either negatively (as in hysteria) or positively (as in wish fulfillment).

Another feature of collective behavior that is critical in the search for solutions and in the implementation of the solutions settled upon is short-circuiting. Collective episodes tend to skip hierarchical levels as they proceed from redefinition back to the source of original structural strain.

Comments:

Smelser's theoretical definition of strain, despite his many empirical examples, does not permit easy application. What essential characteristics underlie all strain? A more workable formulation of strain might be that strain exists 1) when there is a discrepancy between the expected expression of values, norms, or patterns of behavior; 2) when this discrepancy is judged to be unacceptable; and 3) when the discrepancy cannot be reduced or eliminated by the existing institutional modes of social action. If one accepts this formulation of strain, Smelser's point that collective behavior relies on belief in extraordinary means and ends makes more sense. What the formulation neglects is the requirement that normal alternative solutions have been judged inadequate -- perhaps by existing institutions as well as participants in collective behavior.

Though available solutions have been judged inadequate in meeting the concerns of a collectivity, the short-circuited solution developed by the collectivity have not been tested for either their fairness or their effectiveness. Thus the belief in extraordinary means and ends has more to do with the necessity for trial and error than with the irresponsibility of participants in collective behavior.

Smelser fails to say how collective behavior is structurally functional for a society. If extraordinary means and ends are developed through collective behavior, the outcome may be innovative solutions which for some reason do not develop the existing institutional structure.

Smelser also neglects the interaction between existing institutions and instances of collective behavior in that he fails to explain how repeated episodes of collective behavior become institutionalized. The way agents and mechanisms of social control are used may obstruct or facilitate this process. It is not clear, for example, whether strikes by auto workers and teachers meet Smelser's definition of collective behavior. At present such strikes do not involve belief in extraordinary means and ends (i.e., they are successful in their aims), though their initial occurrence may have been so labeled by contemporary institutions. Because the process of labeling is omitted in Smelser's theory, it is impossible to predict what collective behavior will become institutionalized and why.

The most serious shortcoming of Smelser's theory is that he did not show in an increasingly specific manner how the theoretical concepts of strain and

extraordinary beliefs operate before he began to analyze the historical data. This failure undermines the credibility of his framework and makes the linkage between structural strain, extraordinary beliefs, and incidents of collective behavior appear farfetched.

Questions for further analysis and research include these: 1) Under what conditions is repeated collective behavior likely to be institutionalized? 2) Which types of collective behavior are most likely to be institutionalized? 3) Under what conditions are the innovations associated with some collective behavior (e.g., particular forms of collective bargaining preceding a strike) likely to become institutionalized?

Snyder, David and Kelly, William, "Strategies for Investigating Violence and
Social Change: Illustrations from Analyses of Racial Disorders and
Implications for Mobilization Research," In The Dynamics of Social
Movements, Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (Eds.), Cambridge:
Winthrop Publishers, 1979, pp. 212-37.

Approach: Theoretical

Citing the relative neglect of the relationship between violence (or
other forms of collective action) and social change (or other consequences or
outcomes), the authors argue that "the investigation of consequences is cri-
tically important for understanding the determinants of changes in the extent
and form of (sometimes violent) collective action, including how resources
are mobilized and applied." The consequences of violent action have been
neglected largely because the major theories of their determinants (i.e.,
rapid change/social disorganization and relative deprivation) tend to treat
violence as meaningless and irrational without any major structural conse-
quences. In contrast, resource mobilization theories are more applicable
because they view violence as a more rational tactic with outcomes dependent
on the relative power and strategies of the parties involved.

The causes of violence and the outcomes of violence are seen as inter-
connected in at least three ways. First, the outcome will affect the level
of resources than can then be mobilized by the group (e.g., if there is a
"successful outcome," additional workers are typically recruited). Second,
the outcome will affect the forms of collective action (i.e., strategies)
the groups will use in the future (e.g., if there is a successful outcome
and more workers are recruited, then more "expensive" strategies can be used
in the future). Third, the outcome will affect the relationship between re-
sources and strategies (e.g., the relationship between resources and the
use of violence as a strategy may be linear until a successful outcome is
achieved and then there may be no relationship). Thus in the analytic
model the authors propose, social movements and their organizations "do not
necessarily, or even typically, move through a (nearly) linear sequence in
which there is a single outcome (or at most a few). Instead, they are en-
tities that persist through time, during which they continually mobilize
resources, apply them in various forms of collective action or 'tactics,'
and experience the consequences of those strategies in a fully interrelated
process that also affects subsequent 'rounds' of mobilization, action, and
outcome."

The model is designed to be used for the analysis of collective action
conducted by movement organizations and for spontaneous forms of action in
ecological units such as cities, but certain modifications in the key var-
iables are made for the analysis of the two types of action. The framework
is seen as especially useful because it specifies the kinds of questions
that can be asked about collective action; rather than simply asking "Is
violence effective?" it suggests the question "Under what conditions are
various tactics of collective action relatively more or less effective in
generating the outcomes that aid or hinder groups in accomplishing their
collective goals?" It also directs attention to the processes that help
explain the termination of disorder.

Some conceptual and methodological issues were also discussed, including how to designate types of social change, how to determine relevant goals and outcomes, how to measure and define collective action, and how to specify empirical models for analysis.

In designing research on collective action and its outcome, using events as the unit of analysis is seen as less appropriate than looking at organizational and ecological units. They argue that in concentrating on events, only immediately group-specific consequences are examined and longer run and/or systemic outcomes are neglected. Further, this strategy does not allow one to study situations where change occurs but collective action does not. Instead, they suggest studying outcomes using movement organizations as the unit of analysis (e.g., a modification of Gamson's strategy, 1975) or using ecological units such as cities (e.g., a modification or extention of the work on racial disorders done by Spilerman, 1970).

Comments:

This article is extremely relevant for researchers in this area because it provides specific suggestions for developing research designs around the consequences of collective action as well as an analytic model for looking at the interaction between strategies and outcomes.

Spiegel, John O., "The Dynamics of Violent Confrontation," Internation-
al Journal of Psychiatry, 10, No. 3, September, 1972, 93-105.

Approach: Prescriptive
Methodology: Case Study

Adopting an interdisciplinary, transactional approach, the author
examines the dynamics of violent confrontation from three foci: (1)
intrapsychic processes, both conscious and unconscious, (2) group pro-
cesses, and (3) processes based on cultural value orientations. He
sets up a paradigm of social roles -- Hero-Villain-Fool -- which he
applies generally to conflict and specifically to the Attica tragedy.

The Hero is one who, displaying courage, honor, and intelligence,
risks life and limb to resolve conflict for a just cause. The Villain
uses guile and aggression to escalate the conflict on behalf of an un-
just cause. The Fool is a third party who attempts to resolve the
struggle by pursuing right ends for the wrong reasons or wrong ends
for the right reasons and gets caught in the middle. As a key to preven-
tion, the author offers the reduction of external dangers and ambiguities
through institutionalized third-party intervention on the labor-manage-
ment model.

For the Attica case, the author alters the model triad slightly,
it becomes the Protagonist, the Antagonist, the Mediator (or Negotiator);
the Oppressor, the Victim, the Rescuer; and the Confidant, the Betrayer,
the Betrayed. One is left free to determine whom are the Hero and the
Villain, but the Fool in this case was the Committee of Observers,
a third party of mediators. The crux was that neither the Hero nor the
Villain saw the Committee as neutrally arbitrating, but as betraying
their interests. Thus neither party allowed negotiating to go undis-
turbed until a solution could be arrived at. Nor was either party sure
of its motives or position. This confusion caused the tragedy.

The author argues that through the intervention of skilled media-
tors ambiguity will be reduced since both parties will know, within lim-
its, what to expect. Second, the danger of violence will be reduced
since the adversaries will be partitioned.

Comments:

The argument that negotiation and better communication between par-
ties involved in a conflict might alleviate much of the potential for
violence and escalation of antagonism could have been made rather more
simply and clearly. Beyond that, this article is of limited value.

Spiegel, John P., M.D., "Psychosocial Factors in Riots - Old and New,"
    The American Journal of Psychiatry, 125, 3, 1968, 37-41.

Approach: Theoretical

    With the assumption that "collective violence is responsive to
the same set of underlying factors, no matter what group manifests the
behavior," the author discusses the social and psychological factors
associated with the following collective outbreaks: (1) violence of
whites against blacks; (2) violence of blacks against whites; and
(3) violence of police against protesters. Collective violence is
defined as "behavior exhibited by a group of three or more people act-
ing in concert, characterized by extremely destructive physical aggres-
sion directed toward persons, objects, or organizations." An
"explosiveness" quality distinguishes collective violence from other
forms of organized aggression, meaning that it will be released suddenly
and fully, close to the limit or intensity of which the person or
group is capable. Organized aggression, such as war or revolution,
is more rationally and deliberately directed toward the attainment of
particular goals. Collective violence is occasioned by insult or injury
to a group member or to the group as a whole, a threat or loss of
social status, or a severe frustration of the group's desire for higher
social status.

    In detailing the origins of contemporary collective violence,
Spiegel identifies the main social strain in American history as the
"incompatibility between its democratic ideals and its authoritarian
practices." He focuses on one way in which authoritarianism in the
United States is maintained: by excluding certain social groups from
the democratic process. "Reconstructivists" -- those seeking to
broaden the principles of inclusion -- have recruited their followers
from that social group most likely to succeed in breaking through the
elitist barrier at a given time (e.g., Irish Catholics in the 1940s,
blacks and youth since World War II). Their violence is primarily
directed towards impersonal targets, such as buildings and machinery,
and the aim is to disrupt law and order, not to kill people. "Nativists"
seek to prevent change and draw their recruits from social groups most
immediately threatened by the current wave of "reconstructivists," whom
they see as an alien force corrupting the American way of life.
Violence by "nativists" is aimed at persons in order to intimidate
them and eliminate their pressure for change.

    In his "general theory of violence," Spiegel finds that the dis-
tinction between "nativists" and "reconstructivists" can account not
only for the violence of whites against blacks and of blacks against
whites, but also for police violence. Whites and police are seen
as "nativists," and blacks are considered "reconstructivists." He
also posits the theory that Americans are more willing to settle for
violence then to remedy the social ills which generate it, "just as
many persons are willing to settle for their neurotic reactions rather

than undergo the experience of resolving their emotional conflicts."

In order to resolve this conflict between democratic ideals and authoritarianism, Americans, especially the elite, must acknowledge its existence. Attempts to share power with previously excluded groups should reduce the incidence of collective violence.

Comments:

The article draws on a few interesting examples of recent incidents and material from historical analyses of American conflicts in speculating on the causes of all collective violence. The attempt is ambitious; and the conclusions unwarranted, because the author almost totally neglects immediate causes, precipitating events, or processes that may distinguish one type of collective violence from another.

Tilly, Charles, From Mobilization to Revolution, New York: Addison-
        Wesley, 1978.   .

Approach: Theoretical

        From Mobilization to Revolution is primarily a handbook for the
study of collective processes. Although Tilly advances a certain line of
argument relating the evolution of collective action to the rise of the
national state, industrialization, and proletarianization, he does so in
a self-conscious fashion, enumerating at every point the exact configura-
tion of variables with which he is working, acknowledging the assumptions
behind those variables, and pointing to other possible lines of argument
which would proceed from different assumptions and configurations of
variables. More than anything else it is a book about variables, an exer-
cise in (pardon the phrase) conceptual multi-dimensionality.

        The basic variables are these:

        Interest - gains and losses resulting from a group's interaction with
                other groups
        Organization - that aspect of a group's structure which most directly
                affects its capacity to act on its interests
        Mobilization - the process by which a group acquires collective
                control over the resources needed for action (labor power,
                goods, weapons, etc.)
        Opportunity - changes in the environment which make it favorable for
                a group to act on its interests
        Collective Action - people acting together in pursuit of common
                interests.

        Tilly's approach employs game-theory--the study of the struggle for
some collective good, given contenders with fixed interests and a range
of alternative decision rules governing the outcome of contention--in order
to create microeconomic simulations of collective processes. Implicit in
game-theory is a kind of ongoing cost-benefit analysis: every move by a
contender entails a certain cost, reckoned in terms of resources expended
(labor power, capital, etc.) and brings a certain return in collective
goods.

        By way of integrating the variable components of collective action
illustrated in Chapter 2, Tilly's third chapter sets forth a polity model,
consisting of a government, a number of contending groups which employ
their resources in efforts to influence the government (subdivided into
members of and challengers to the polity), one or more coalitions between
contenders and/or governments, and the polity itself, consisting of the
collective action of members and government. Within such a framework the
variable characteristics of contenders (interest, organization, etc.) are
now defined in relation to other contenders. As a result many of the
variables turn out to be double-edged; what represents an opportunity to
one contender may be a threat to another, mobilization can be offensive
(to capitalize on an opportunity) or defensive (to guard against a threat).
New interactive variables also emerge. Repression, for example, refers

to any action by another group (most likely a government) which raises a contender's cost of collective action, facilitation to any action by such a group which lowers that cost. Chapters 3 and 4 explore potential combinations of these variables. A simple graph which plots "collective goods obtained" as a function of "resources expended" provides a basic conceptual picture of collective action, and that picture turns into a series of increasingly complex and subtle "snapshots" as variables are built into the graph. Tilly pushes the series to a rather startling level of abstraction and then calls a halt. Having made the point that such a series of snapshots could in theory dissolve (like a motion picture) into a fluid account of reality, he calls attention to the methodological problem that approach entails: it demands meaningful quantification of all component variables, and measurement of that sort is beyond the current state of the art. Exhorting others to continue developing suitable methods of quantification, Tilly himself plunges "headlong into the world of time and qualitative variation" in an effort to apply his abstract models to major historical problems in the study of collective action.

Chapter 5 deals with the changing forms of collective action. Like art forms, Tilly points out, forms of collective action vary from period to period. Strikes, for example, occurred only rarely at the beginning of the 19th century (although other forms of collective action--food riots, tax rebellions--were common) but by the end of the century strikes were routine facts of working-class life. Why? Tilly argues that the shift from task compensation to time-effort compensation deprived workers of control over a valuable resource--their own labor--while the increasing concentration of workers in common workplaces lowered the cost of defensively mobilizing to regain control over that resource.

In Chapter 6 Tilly discusses collective action in terms of the polity model, representing collective violent actions as clusters of events associated with efforts by challengers to penetrate the polity. A challenger' claim to membership threatens 1) to reallocate resources under government control, and 2) to redefine the rules of membership, allowing further challengers to penetrate the polity.

After discussing revolution in Chapter 7, Tilly closes in Chapter 8 with some general observations concerning the historical study of collective action. First, he points out that the collective action of a period intersects the interests of the common people in their day-to-day lives--a valuable perspective indeed. If the theoretical method set forth by Tilly has any general validity it should enable investigators to "hold constant" situational variables in order to make the record reveal that everyday profile. But if, as Gaston Roupnel suggests, the texture of life in 17th century Burgundy (for example) requires an approach fundamentally different from any appropriate today, then, says Tilly, that in itself would be worth knowing. As it happens, Tilly disagrees with Roupnel. Although rural collective action in Burgundy before the Revolution was very different from rural collective action afterward, Tilly finds significant continuities linking the two periods. The rural Burgundians of whom Roupnel speaks felt the effects of expanding capitalism and the concentration of power in the hands of the state. Yet earlier forms of collective action (food riots etc.) did not simply vanish upon encountering capitalism and the all-engulfing state, to be abruptly replaced by later forms

(strikes demonstrations)--rather, the earlier forms evolved into the later ones. In that context the Revolution of 1830 serves not as a barrier dividing two incompatible forms of life but as a lens in which a whole continuum is brought into focus:

> "The Revolution brought an extraordinary level of collective action,
> a politicization of all interests and thus of almost all the
> means of action, a centralization of power and thus of struggles for
> power, a frenzy of association and thus of action on the basis
> of associations, a promotion of the conditions for the development
> of capitalism and bourgeouis hegemony and thus of a mounting
> threat to noncapitalist, nonbourgeouis interests. If that
> summary is correct, the Revolution acted as a fundamental stage
> in the course of a transformation far longer and larger than the
> Revolution itself."

Tilly, Charles, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," In <u>Violence in America, Historical and Comparative Perspectives</u>, H. Graham and T. Gurr (Eds.), Revised Edition, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979.

Approach: Historical/Theoretical

In this revision of his earlier essay on collective violence in Europe, Tilly adds some "afterthoughts from the seventies" to buttress his theoretical arguments and to clarify his "resource mobilization" perspective on the phenomena. Reviewing his empirical work on France, England, and other Western European countries from the Middle Ages to the present, he argues that collective violence is "normal" in the sense of being an enduring and persistent phenomena throughout history and that it is one of the best social indicators of the basic political processes occurring in a society.

In contrast to mass society perspectives on the emergence of various forms of protest, Tilly argues that violence grows most directly from the struggle for established places in the structure of power. That is, the processes most regularly producing collective violence are those by which groups acquire or lose membership in the political community. While mass society theorists stress the feelings of anomie and anxiety generated by the social disorganization of urbanization and industrialization as productive of violence, Tilly argues that the process is more direct:

> "The impact of large structural changes, such as organization, industrialization, and population growth, it seems to me, comes through their creation or destruction of groups contending for power and through their shaping of the available means of coercion...Collective violence clusters in those historical moments when the structure of power itself is changing decisively --because there are many new contenders for power, because several old groups of power-holders are losing their grips, or because the locus of power is shifting from community to nation, from nation to international bloc, or in some other drastic way. Violence flows from politics, and more precisely from political change."

He identifies three basic types of collective violence which differ in the form of the action (e.g., inter-village fights versus strikes), the sort of social groups involved (e.g., peasant communities versus political parties), and the relationship of the groups to the structure of power (e.g., acquiring rights versus losing rights). The three types are labeled "primitive," "reactionary," and "modern." Primitive varieties of collective violence are of small scale, local scope, with inexplicit and unpolitical objectives in which local communal groups oppose other communal groups (e.g., feuds, religious attacks). Reactionary disturbances are also of small scale but their target is representatives of those who hold power, as a reaction to some changes which they regard as depriving them of rights they had once enjoyed; they are backward-looking (e.g., food riots, tax rebellions). Modern forms of collective disturbance are often of larger scale and involve specialized associations with relatively well-defined objectives, organized for political or economic action. The

participants are forward-looking, that is, they regard themselves as striking for rights due them but not yet enjoyed (e.g., demonstrations and violent strikes).

In all countries, there was a transition from one type to another as nonviolent political life was also transformed by the victory of the national state over localized power and as complex special-purpose associations (such as parties, firms, unions, and clubs) grew and became prominent. "Just as industry shifted its weight from the small shop to the large factory and population rushed from little town to big city, collective violence moved from the normal congregations of the communal groups within which people used to live most of their lives toward the deliberate confrontations of special-purpose associations."

Tilly then goes on to identify two dimensions of a typology of collective violence from which his three types are a subset. The two dimensions are: the organizational base (communal groups versus associational groups) and the relationship of those groups to the existing structure of power (acquiring position, maintaining a position, and losing position). When the other boxes in the typology are filled in, it looks like this:

RELATION TO STRUCTURE OF POWER

ORGANIZATIONAL BASE	Acquiring Position	Maintaining Position	Losing Position
Communal	Other Worldly (Millenarian Movements)	Primitive	Reactionaly
Associational	Offense (Modern)	Interest-group	Defensive

He hypothesizes that groups maintaining their position will be less likely to pay attention to rights and justice than groups trying to change their positions and that the actions of these latter groups are likely to be more violent than those maintaining their position. He also suggests that the communal group actions will result in more violence because associational groups have more control over their own actions and thus are permitted a show of force without damage or bloodshed. Over the short run, the extent, location, and timing of collective violence depends heavily on the way authorities and their agents handle these challenges but over the long run it depends more on the way the entire political system apportions power and responds to grievances.

In rethinking this essay for the revised edition, Tilly admits to some major complications in using the typology of collective violence as more than a useful preliminary sorting device. First of all there is not a perfect correlation between the form of the action and its purposes (e.g., strikes have not often served defensive purposes). Secondly, the basic actions in the scheme are not usually violent and are actually interactions between challengers and opponents. This scheme thus "lacks an analysis of the actions of their opponents, and an account of interactions between

underdogs and their opponents. As an unintended result, the lopsided
argument ends up suggesting that collective violence is an expression of
underdog experience alone." Finally there is very little attention paid
to the role of interests in generating collective action.

Comments:

This is an extremely interesting and thoughtful essay on collective
violence in general and insights from the European experience are general-
ized into a more theoretical view of the phenomena as a whole. Moreover,
it is a very clear and consistent explication of the resource mobilization
perspective on collective action.

Tilly, Charles, "Major Forms of Collective Action in Western Europe, 1500-1975," Working Paper No. 123, Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan, October 1975. (adapted from chapter three of From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

Approach: Theoretical/Historical
Methodology: Descriptions/Case Studies

Tilly classes collective actions according to the claims that agents assert: (1) competitive; (2) reactive; (3) proactive. He argues that the evolution of these claims from 1500 to the present parallels the concurrent rise of capitalism and the modern state. As an example of the earliest class, the competitive, Tilly offers the rural charivari (known to readers of Hardy as a "skimmity ride"), a ritual mock serenade of a remarried widower and his bride by village youths objecting to the depletion of the precious resource that eligible females represent. Such collective action is characteristic of an essentially feudal order in which small-scale contenders vie for local resources; and according to Tilly it prevailed during the sixteenth century, before national states appeared and began to edge out communal groups like "craft brotherhoods, families, peasant communities."

As resources were absorbed by the all-engulfing new institutions, competitive claims became less meaningful. Under this encroachment, local contenders lashed out with reactive claims,"efforts to reassert established claims when someone else challenges or violates them." Tilly lists the reactive repertoire of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe: "food riots, machine-breaking, tax rebellions and local actions against military conscription: all moved directly against someone who had injustly deprived, or tried to deprive, a local population of a precious resource."

Once the resource base of Europe was almost entirely under central control, roughly in the nineteenth century, the reactive response in its turn became obsolete, and a new proactive set of collective actions was undertaken to "assert group claims which have not previously been exercised." This type, still with us includes a number of characteristically modern public actions: the strike for higher wages, the public meeting, the demonstration. Contenders also had by this stage evolved from a communal organization, in which natural constituencies mobilized to protect some local resource, to an associational mode in which artificial constituencies mobilize for attack, pooling their political strengths to influence governmental allocation of certain resources.

Comment:

In From Mobilization to Revolution Tilly proposes that changing forms of collective action reflect evolving patterns of resource distribution, a profound notion that invites further research. He explores it in a dialogue between abstract social, political, and economic theory on the one hand and historical facts on the other. To one who has read the book, the present paper (a version of Chapter 3) is perfectly understandable. By itself, however, unsupported by the mass of primary data graphed and tabulated elsewhere in the book, uninitiated readers may find it long on description and short on substantiation.

Traugott, Mark, "Reconceiving Social Movements," Social Problems, 26, 1, 1978, 38-49.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Definition of Field of Inquiry

The fact that theoretical principles have not been adequately developed in the study of social movements results from a tendency to lump these movements together with "collective behavior" and to disregard differences in the unit of analysis and institutional orientation of the two fields. This author argues that unlike "collective behavior," which has been dominated by a psychological and individualistic perspective as well as a focus on "noninstitutional" behavior (characterized by spontaneity and lack of internal structure), the field of "social movements" should use a sociological perspective that presents the group as the unit of analysis; it should also be concerned with "antiinstitutional" organizations, those with a high degree of internal order, formed with the purpose of challenging existing institutions.

The author examines the historical development of the two fields, collective behavior and social movements, and indicates where distinctions in unit of analysis and institutional orientation would clarify or change the sociological perspective of LeBon, Smelser, Blumer, and the "Chicago School."

Studies of social movements should examine groups which exhibit "bonds of positive solidarity that make it possible for them to generate common ideology, internal organization, continuity of leadership, and a sense for strategic necessity." These groups must also have an "antiinstitutional orientation...in that the movement engages in or envisions acts that when successful bring it into an inevitable confrontation with the existing order." The demarcation of the field by means of these two criteria would have two effects, according to Traugott: 1) it would resolve the present tendency to view the group's actions as irrational because inappropriate units of analysis are used; and 2) it would increase our understanding of movement dynamics in several specific ways. The two specialties, collective behavior and social movements, would then be "free to pursue their separate paths to mutual advantage...and the sociology of social movements would regain its proper focus: the analysis of large-scale social change outside institutional channels."

Comments:

This essay thoughtfully analyzes many of the problems in studying both social movements and collective behavior and it points out in a clear and readable fashion many of the deficiencies in the approaches by LeBon, Smelser and others. The attempt to demarcate the field is quite useful and clarifies many of the differences between the perspectives of the "resource mobilization" school (to which the author is particularly sympathetic) and the more psychological theories. Traugott's

effort to limit the field of social movements by their degree of "antiinstitutionalism" is less convincing, however, than the criterion of "positive solidarity."

Turner, Ralph, "The Public Perception of Protest," American Sociological
    Review, 34, 6, December 1969, 815-30.

Approach: Theoretical

In this paper five theoretical perspectives are used to predict when
a public will and will not view a major disturbance as an act of social
protest, rather than as crime or deviance or as rebellion or revolution.
Social protest is defined as protest that is serious in the telling of
grievance that moves it and in the intent to provoke ameliorative action.
In contrast crime and deviance are identified chiefly by their nonconforming,
illegal, or harmful character and the causes are seen as individual aber-
rations. Rebellion and revolution differ from social protest in that the
former constitute direct action rather than communication and their aim is
to destroy the authority of the existing system.

The first theoretical perspective uses the folk concept of social
protest to determine when events will be seen as credible protests. Exam-
ination of relevant materials such as letters to newspapers, essays, and
feature articles suggests that the folk concept of social protest includes
the following features: Participants must be a major part of a group
whose grievances are already well documented, who are believed to be power-
less to correct their grievances and who are "deserving." The disturbance
must follow an extended pariod in which the powerlessness and the grievances
have been repeatedly and strongly advertised and in which the group's past
or current behavior has been restrained and virtuous. It must be seen as
either a spontaneous, unplanned and naive outburst or as an openly organ-
ized protest of more limited nature that got tragically out of hand. It
cannot be seen as occurring for self-aggrandisement, the settlement of pri-
vate feuds, or for enjoyment of violence and destruction and must show some
indications of restraint. Depending on what reference group is used, vio-
lence and disruption may be seen as justified because of the injustice suf-
fered by the protesting group. Thus, groups who are clearly advantaged in
comparison with the "protestors" will find the claim of injustice more
credible than groups less advantaged and groups who see themselves as
even more disadvantaged than the protestors are least likely to grant their
claim. Groups who see their situation as about the same as that of the
protestors also do not find it easy to consider the activity a protest.
Finally, the assumptions that persons have about the society and the de-
gree of consensus that exists will influence their definitions of events
as protests, rebellions, or criminal activities. Rebellion will only be
perceived by those whose disaffection with the society makes them delight
in the threat of its disintegration. Crime and deviance will be perceived
by people who understand society as a sort of jungle accommodation and who
have more day to day experience of crime. In contrast, persons who believe
that there is a fundamental consensus over values in the society even though
there is disagreement over the means and opportunities of reaching these
values are readier to make protest interpretations of the same events.
Turner argues that these people are more likely to be members of the middle
class.

The second theoretical perspective argues that disruption will be
labeled as protests when there is an optimal balance between the appeals
and threats involved. The experience of threat cannot be excessive so

that the appeals are lost and it is seen as a rebellion, but there must be enough threat of personal involvement and proximity to the events and of the ability to see the limits and patterns of disorder realistically. Thus persons close enough to fear any spread of disorders but not close enough to correct exaggerated reports from personal experience may find it most difficult to see the activities as protest. The degree of identification with the group under attack will also influence the amount of threat experienced in these events. Since the optimal balance of appeal and threat is difficult to maintain over time, it may be difficult to keep the awareness of protest dominant for a long period. Repeated unescalated disturbances are likely to reduce the amount of threat experienced and lead to a replacement of the protest definition by a deviance definition.

A third perspective suggests that defining an event as a protest is often an act of conciliation in order to forestall, reduce, or conclude a conflict without victory or surrender. Faced with potential conflict, the dominant group can either ignore or deprecate it by defining it as deviance or call it rebellion and respond to it with retaliatory suppression or join with the dissidents and repudiate their own group identification or finally to extend an offer of conciliation. If conciliation is the strategy, then the prospect of conflict is accepted as real and there is public acknowledgement of injury done to the protestor as well as promises of repentence and corrective actions. Interpreting violent and disruptive action as protest is following exactly this pattern because it acknowledges that there is some basis in the behavior of one's own group for the antagonism displayed by the protestor. This definition will most often occur when there is some apparent danger to the target group; when there are strong norms, values, or sentiments against doing injury to others; when there is great interdependency between groups; when there is a great commitment to activities or resources that would be sacrificed by conflict; and when the costs of conciliation are seen as modest. However, this definition of disorder is inherently unstable and gives way to the interpretation of the events as rebellion if there is no discontinuance of insults and threats and no retraction of earlier attacks.

The fourth perspective argues that defining disorder as protest may be a way for third parties to extend an invitation to form a coalition or prepare to enter into one. When a coalition among the groups for mutual gain seems possible, then the third party is inclined toward understanding the disruption as social protest. These coalitions with disruptive groups are more likely to work for groups of higher standing whose own position is strengthened by adding the threat of disorder from the protesting group to their own established power and who then help to legitimate the grievance claims and apply pressure on the target group.

The fifth theoretical perspective views defining a disruption or protest as a first step in a bargaining relationship between officials and disruptive groups. It permits a restrained handling that does not create the expectation of immediate suppression of disturbances but allows for a shift toward a harder line if the situation changes. However, as bargaining becomes routinized and impersonal, public sanction for the protest interpretation will weaken because the disturbance is no longer seen as spontaneous and naive. Then the disturbance comes to be seen as a move in a competitive game, to be met by minimal and calculated concessions.

What all of this means is that 1) the definition of a disturbance as deviance, protest, or rebellion is a function of the relationships between the relevant groups and will change as these relationships change, 2) the definition will also depend on who is involved and what their roles are. The definitions of partisans, targets, and officials will differ, and 3) Interpreting public disorders as social protest is an unstable and precarious act for it requires an optimally balanced set of conditions and is difficult to maintain over time. Because of this, Turner argues that "...reformers should not overestimate what can be gained by disorderly protest in relation to the many other means for effecting change."

Comments:

This is an extremely insightful and provocative analysis of the ways in which disorders are defined by a variety of publics. Although a number of studies have labeled the riots and civil disorders as protests based on specified objective criteria, this perspective is useful in underscoring the subjective values involved in those definitions.

Wallis, R. "Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Cautionary
    Note, British Journal of Sociology, 25, 3, 1975, 360-63.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Critical Comment

    This comment on the application of the concept of "relative
deprivation" to the analysis of social movements raises a number of
theoretical and methodological objections. The usual examination of a
movement and its beliefs uncovers a gap between the actual and the de-
sirable and leads to the conclusion that this disparity was experienced
by members before they joined the movement, indeed that it was a major
factor in their joining.

    Wallis' first criticism is that this line of thought results in
overprediction: more people are presumed to be deprived than actually
join such movements. Thus we need to be told whether those who join
are actually more deprived or whether other reasons operated; otherwise
one has to argue that relative deprivation is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for participation. His second criticism is that
many types of deprivation have developed which have not been clearly
understood or described, making one suspect that "a plausible type can
be invented to fit each and every social movement." His third criticism
is that relative deprivation, though thought to be a subjective exper-
ience, is usually measured by objective indicators. Finally, Wallis
argues that applying the concept to social movements is tautological,
since social movements are in fact defined as alleviating some disparity
between the aspirations and expectations of members. One must begin an
analysis of social movements by listening to the accounts of participants
to determine their needs and motives rather than by guessing at them.
"The relative deprivationists in their aspiration to achieve a mono-
causal explanation, or a simple set of necessary or sufficient conditions
for social movement formation or affiliation, are doomed to permanent
(cognitive) deprivation.

Comments:

    Wallis offers a useful corrective to some persistent tendencies
among proponents of the relative deprivation theory, but many of the
criticisms are overstated.

Weiss, Robert, "Defection from Social Movements and Subsequent Recruitment to New Movements," Sociometry, Vol. XXVI, 1963; reprinted in Studies in Social Movements, B. McLaughlin (Ed.), New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Approach: Theoretical

Using four psychological processes from learning theory (stimulus generalization, extinction, displacement, and counterconditioning), a theory of recruitment to social movements following defection is developed. Characteristics of the original defection are hypothesized to determine the tendency to join a new movement and the choice of the particular movement. The reasons for the original defection include: a) the unavailability of the original movement (e.g., the member moves away or the movement collapses, b) the strength of belief or participation is decreased by nonreward, c) the strength of belief or participation is decreased by punishment, or d) the strength of belief or participation in an alternative movement is increased and is incompatible with that of the original social movement.

Predicting defection from one movement to another depends on which psychological process is involved, whether both belief and participation in the movement are equally affected, and the social conditions at the time of re-recruitment (especially the characteristics of the new movement). For example, when defection occurs because the original movement became unavailable to the member, stimulus generalization leads to recruitment in the available movement most nearly similar to the original movement. However, when punishment for belief and participation led to the defection, displacement leads to recruitment into a social movement of moderate similarity to the original movement, not to the most nearly similar movement available. Under this latter condition, there is a weaker tendency to join any new movement than when the defection occurred because the original movement was unavailable. When defection occurred because of nonreward of both belief and participation, the process of extinction will result in a somewhat greater resistance to recruitment to similar movements than among people who had not previously been movement members and if any recruitment took place it would most likely be to the old movement.

Weiss also discusses some measurement problems in determining the similarity of the old and new social movements and assessing the magnitude of the rewards and punishments inflicted on members. Since many diverse continua may be involved in comparing social movements, he suggested using multi-dimensional scaling to measure their similarity. However, the researcher must be aware that the defector's evaluation of the similarity of the movements may change from when he defected to after he became recruited. Although it is difficult to determine what rewards and punishments were given to members on the basis of historical records or contemporary studies of social movements, he suggested administering questionnaires to defectors as well as to other informants such as members and ex-members of the movement who knew the defector.

Comments:

      This theory is designed to analyze only members who voluntarily joined and made commitments to movements. It specifically excludes those who comply under duress, who have only opportunistic associations with the movement, and where defection is organized and occurs in factions. It does not concern itself with individual personality traits which may conceivably predispose some individuals to the indiscriminate joining of social movements. While historical illustrations were used as examples, any critical test of the theory would involve individual level analysis of the actions and attitudes of the defectors.

Weller, Jack M. and E.L. Quarantelli, "Neglected Characteristics of Collective Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, 79, 3, 1973, 665-85.

Approach: Theoretical

This article attempts to overcome the lack of theoretical ties be-tween general sociological perspectives and middle-range theories of collective behavior by suggesting a social-organizational conception of collective behavior. Current efforts to apply sociological analysis to collective behavior have concentrated on social conditions and their consequences, but they still describe collective behavior in terms of participants' psychological states or atypical actions among them. The authors suggest that "not only the search for social conditions and social consequences of collective behavior, but also all problems of its analysis (should) be defined at a social level." Concentration on indi-vidual participants in collective behavior has obscured the fact that the acts are those of collectivities whose characteristics resemble -- but are not the same as -- those whose behavior is institutionalized. The central problems are these: What are the social properties of the groups that engage in collective behavior? How do they compare conceptually with the properties of groups engaged in institutionalized behavior?

If one grants that social action by any group is based on social norms and relationships, institutionalized behavior is distinguished from col-lective behavior along those two lines. Institutionalized behavior is based on enduring systems of both social norms and social relationships. In contrast, collective behavior rests on emergent social norms or emer-gent social relationships, or both of these. Collective behavior also includes previously dissociated systems of norms, and relationships are integrated with each other.

Examples of four types of collective behavior are given. The first, where enduring social relations are combined with emergent norms as a basis of social action, is evident when organizations respond to disasters by different rules and policies. The second type, where enduring norma-tive patterns are combined with emerging social relations, include lynch-ings, looting during civil disorders, and the like. The third type, where both norms and relations were emergent, is the "purest type" of collective disorder, and includes much of what is called crowd behavior. The fourth type, involving the "confluence of previously dissociated norms and relationships," is exemplified in an organization which borrows the norms of another organization, as happens when a teachers' associa-tion adopts the norms of collective bargaining.

The authors feel this typology has important implications for the theory and study of collective behavior. First, it offers a definition of collective behavior: social action engaged in by one of four types of collectivities. Second, it avoids combining the features that delineate different kinds of collective behavior with factors that serve to explain the behavior or record its consequences. Third, it undermines the impor-tance of the crowd as a prototype of collective behavior.

Comments:

According to this notion, collective behavior includes all group
activity. Any collective action in which the rules, policies and norms,
as well as the roles of participants, are changing is considered collec-
tive behavior as opposed to institutionalized behavior. Although this
alerts us to the idea that actions generally considered "irrational"
or "individualistic" are essentially an emergent form of institutionalized
group activity, such a definition may well be so broad as to meaningless.

With respect to social relationships and social norms, this analysis
helps us realize that collective behavior involves more than emergent
norms and that new patterns of social relations can be just as dynamic
as the old. Whether the typology makes is easier to differentiate be-
tween social actions that may stem from different conditions and have
different consequences remains to be seen.

Williams, R.M., "Conflict and Social Order: A Research Strategy for Complex
    Propositions," Journal of Social Issues, 28, 1, 1972, 11-26.

Approach: Theoretical

Arguing that the legacy of past studies of conflict has provided a
valuable array of hypotheses, empirical generalizations, conceptual
schemes, and proto-theories, Williams suggests that approaches for further
research should include multivariate models which do not try to account
for all variance. Rather, researchers should be prepared to take serious-
ly variables which may only contribute to rather than fully explain conflict.

As an example of this strategy, the author tried to develop a simple
multivariate "law" of collective conflict. Given the existence of two
sets of interacting persons who are different from one another, who are
interdependent for the realization of vital needs, who interact frequently,
and who are unequal in terms of authority or other scarce values, there
will be a very high probability of overt disagreements leading to conflict
if there is a marked and continuing decrease in interaction between the
two groups. This will not occur, however, if: 1) There are strong affec-
tive ties between members of both groups, 2) The shared values of the two
groups are so strong that they negate the predicted consequences, and
3) Negative feedback occurs so that there are counter processes of social
control which reduce the probability of conflict.

Departing from this model, the author then goes on to try and account
for student unrest in the 1960's. The proximity of large numbers of persons
of the same age and social status (i.e., student) in the ecological context
of a university provides the context for high interaction. Yet students
are more heterogeneous than ever before and so collective unity is unlikely
on very many specific issues which are closely related to these differences
such as social class, religion, ethnicity, race, and educational aspira-
tions. Collective action is more likely to be based on abstract and in-
clusive symbols, a common threat, or a common opposition. Thus, students
are most likely to be mobilized on the basis of broad ideological appeals
or diffuse loyalties or against something. There will be a tendency to
move toward a strategy of threats and to be led by charismatic or dema-
gogic leaders.

Williams then lists some predictive hypotheses for further research
on the processes of collective conflict. First, escalation in the means
used for conflict will be more likely and more rapid when there are mul-
tiple contenders for leadership, rapid turnover of both leaders and
followers, and lack of definiteness in the powers, rights, duties, and
privileges of spokesmen, organizers, representatives. Second, the number
of issues involved in a conflict will be less among individuals or groups
having responsible involvements in social systems (i.e., jobs, families,'
religion, or politics). Third, the greater the number of interactions be-
tween individuals or groups that cross-cut specific cleavages, the greater
the number of issues that will be seen as relevant to a given conflict.
Thus, groups whose members lack responsible involvements in the major
activities of the community are likely to be extreme in their demands and
tactics in a dispute.

Comments:

This is a useful source of hypotheses for further research but as
the author notes, "the approach does not in itself cope with the extremely
difficult problems of specific research design, techniques and modes of
analysis."

Williams, Robin M., "Relative Deprivation Versus Power Struggle? 'Tension'
and 'Structural' Explanations of Collective Conflict," Journal of
Social Relations, 11, 1, 1976, 31-38.

Approach: Theoretical

This review of the literature focuses upon the relative adequacy of
concepts and variables commonly used in the analysis and interpretation of
collective conflict. The author's view is that the hundreds of nontrivial
hypotheses and generalizations about collective conflict which have sub-
stantial empirical support may be classified in the following manner:
1) as hypotheses emphasizing discontent, grievances, tensions, depriva-
tions, and the like as independent variables, and 2) as hypotheses empha-
sizing such structural or organizational factors as size of the collectivity,
distribution of power, etc., as independent variables. After roughly
sorting the literature of collective conflict into these two categories,
the author notes important reviews of the conceptual problems of defining
collective conflict, though he does not report the substance of these re-
views. The author makes two general recommendations for dealing with the
problems of selecting appropriate methods and concepts for the study of
collective conflict: 1) The concepts and methodology used in the study of
collective conflict must allow the answering of the following questions--
Why did the conflict occur where it did? Why did it happen when it did?
Why did it appear among some social positions or formations and not among
others? Why did some individuals and not others participate in certain
ways? 2) Indicators of collective conflict must be disaggregated in order
to make clear the interdependency of theory and methods; for example,
total value of strike activity can be separated into the three components
of strike proneness, extensity (number of workers per strike per 1000
workers) and intensity (number of work days idle per worker).

In reviewing research findings, Williams notes that many studies
have incorporated both grievance-level factors (e.g., discontent, relative
deprivation) with structural factors (e.g., legitimacy of political system,
coercive capacity of authorities, region of the country, nonwhite popula-
tion size) in their explanations. It is important to remember that it is
under conditions of "relative deprivation and hope" rather than "absolute
deprivation and dispair" that conflict flourishes but a high level of dis-
content by itself will not accurately predict collective conflict. Simi-
larly, certain conditions such as rapid social change or inequality may
contribute to political conflict but they are not sufficient conditions.

Moreover, there may be quite different explanations for those indi-
viduals or groups who initiate and lead as compared to those who later
follow or acquiesce in collective conflicts. The type of conflict also
makes a difference in the explanatory variables: Some kinds of popular
discontent are linked to spontaneous and unorganized conflicts but much
organized political violence seems to arise from purposive, rational,
organized attempts to take advantage of perceived opportunities or to
avert perceived threats. Conflict arising from rising aspirations which
are blocked but where hope still remains differs from conflict arising
from dispair but both types must be included in a comprehensive scheme.

Arguing that complex, multivariate models are most suitable, Williams generated a series of hypotheses based on results of past research. Structural factors, particularly the type of stratification, institutional imbalance, and organizational conditions, are likely to produce important social tensions leading to collective conflict, according to this strategy. And the most important collective conflicts are expected to arise only when there is the confluence of a quite complex sequence of conditions. This sequence begins with a group of people occupying similar social positions who are subjected to similar threats, deprivations or blockages. This produces mass discontent which is shared, leading to a collectivity. If the collectivity is either rising in power or is already powerful, it will mobilize and develop organization and leadership. This will also lead to countermobilization. This may escalate into large scale strife or it may be resolved depending on other conditions but once it has become severe and large-scale its dynamics will differ from the processes that led to the conflict in the first place.

Comments:

This is a well written and comprehensive review of the controversy between the relative deprivation and resource mobilization perspectives on conflict and disorder. It is particularly useful in differentiating the types of conflict and the stages of the conflict for which different explanatory models might be most effective. And it elevates the controversy from one of simplistic opposition between two perspectives to an attempt to integrate them both in an overarching theory.

Wilson, John, "Social Protest and Social Control," Social Problems,
    24, 4, 1977, 469-81.

Approach: Theoretical

Wilson has developed theoretical propositions about the relation
between social control agents and protest groups, using as a descriptive
base the civil rights and antiwar movements in the United States in the
1960s. The chief aim was to formulate hypotheses about specific effects
of social control on social movements, as well as to identify the agents
of control. Social control was defined as "criminalization", labeling
and treating dissenters as deviants; and the agents of control are offi-
cials, exercising an acknowledged authority, who identify and deal with
deviants.

The target group -- that is, those whom the movement is trying
to influence or win over because they have the decisive power to affect
the issue in question -- must not be confused with the agents of social
control. Although these two groups may act with a common purpose, at
times they may not, "and even a heavily 'politicized' view of social control
operations must grant them independent causal significance." The fol-
lowing features of social control agencies lead to a complex and fluid
relationship between them, the target groups, and the protest groups:

1) Different situations and events lead to different decisions
    about which agency of social control will be responsible
    and the strategies it will use. The observer should not
    assume a priori knowledge of who will act and what tactics
    will be employed.

2) Many strategies of social control are discretionary and
    heavily influenced by informal rules. These too can only be
    discovered by a close examination of each situation.

3) Avoiding the formal positions and responsibilities of social
    control agents may not give an adequate understanding of their
    behavior because they are an autonomous professional group
    with distinctive attitudes toward social issues; their rela-
    tions with both target and protest groups may actually provoke
    a clash of subcultures.

4) The structure of social control agencies -- their status in the
    bureaucracy, their technological resources, and interorganiza-
    tional competition -- will affect the strategies they use in
    handling protest groups.

From the literature dealing with the effects of social control on
attitudes, three propositions were developed about the manner in which
"criminalization" and violent police restraint influence demonstrators' and
bystanders' commitment to issues and tactics. Demonstrators' commitment
to the issues is likely to increase if police control is abrupt, unexpected,
and violent, if the protest group believes that the police and the target
group are indistinguishable, and if they perceive that the community
strongly supports the demonstration.

Wilson argues that the completeness, severity, and extensiveness with which control agencies regard protests as criminal acts will affect sympathizers' willingness to mobilize for action, whether marching or licking stamps. The more complete the "criminalization," the more severe the sanctions, and the more extensive the control, the less the likelihood of mobilization.

Under certain conditions, the tendency to treat protest as a crime is believed to make the social movements more radical. Radicalism is thought to occur under four conditions: 1) when the target group and social control agents are closely identified with "criminalization"; 2) when police actions force the most moderate faction out of the movement; 3) when support by buffer groups -- i.e., potentially helpful elites -- which keep target groups and social control agents separate; and 4) when moderate and extreme factions are united by "criminalization."

Social control will also affect the organization of social movements. Wilson suggests that it fosters internal solidarity if it is not extreme, and if the group's structure is resilient and includes means of coping with tension. A threat of "criminalization" intensifies the need for better coordination and compliance; hence the more stringent the social control, the more centralized and formal a movement will become.

Because political demonstrations and other forms of protest are both collective and ideological, the traditional theory of labeling must be modified before one applies it to the effects of social control on protest movements. For example, demonstrators may deliberately commit deviant acts in order to be labeled, and this may increase their commitment to a cause. Other protesters may resist being called deviant because they believe their acts were legal, but agents of social control might forestall demonstrators' attempts to resist being classed as criminals. Finally, Wilson suggests that the most significant effect of labeling is not on those labeled but on bystanders and sympathizers.

Comments:

This article is extremely useful in synthesizing a vast amount of material about the effects of social control on collective disorders and in developing testable hypotheses for future research.

Zald, Mayer N. and John D. McCarthy, "America and the Rise of Social Movements," New Society, 29, June 1972, 670-72.

Approach: Theoretical

The traditional view that social movements are spontaneously created by troubled people would predict that as affluence increases, social movements ought to decrease in rate and intensity. Zald and McCarthy contend, however, that the recent increase in social movements in America (defined as attempts by a group of people to change some aspect of the social structure, or their own relationship to it) is in part due to affluence, which has made possible massive changes in the financing of social movements, the development of transient, part-time and full-time social movement careers, and television.

As affluence has increased, the middle-and upper-middle classes have increasingly supported their values by contributions. Contributions from philanthropic foundations, churches and governments (War on Poverty, VISTA) have increased as well. Affluence is also associated with an increase in the number of people active in social movements. There has been an increase in the number of students, the size of faculties, and members of the upper white-collar class with flexible work schedules who are able to make short term commitments to social movements. With the nation's affluence, decently paid careers in social movements are also available. However, organizations may get tied to a fight for survival because of the needs of those with careers in the movement rather than the needs of its membership. Television acts as an advertisement for social movement causes, helping member recruitment and funding. Portrayal on television can confer legitimacy and can shape the priorities of political decision makers.

Funding, activist careers and the media have transformed the structure of operation of social movements in the U.S. The split of the funding and personnel base from the membership base (e.g., Common Cause) is not new; what is new is the extent to which the social structure supports a social movement industry. The authors predict that "in all open societies that allow social movements to flourish, affluence will contribute to the pressure to change our social and political institutions.

Comments:

Zald and McCarthy make a strong argument that the increase in social movement activity cannot be attributed solely to the level of deprivation in society; the ability to mobilize resources plays an important role as well. It is not clear, however, that poor people's movements are affected by affluence in the same manner. Social movements that advocate redistributing the nation's wealth, for example, are unlikely to get the financial support of the middle classes, government and philanthropic institutions whatever the current level of affluence may be.

Zygmunt, Joseph, "Movements and Motives: Some Unresolved Issues in the Psychology of Social Movements," Human Relations, 25, 5, November 1972, 449-67.

Approach: Theoretical

In this examination of the motivational analysis of social movements (i.e., the study of why people are attracted to, join, and remain in them), questions of its theoretical and methodological adequacy are raised "so that its proponents might sharpen and extend their inquiries to maximize their theoretical yield." Zygmunt distinguished the motivational approach which has tended to be concerned primarily with why people join social movements from the structural-functional and the interactional approaches. Structural-functional theorists have focused on conditions such as structural strain or societal disequilibrium which are conducive to the emergence of movements and which may be resolved by the existence of the movement. Interactional theorists concentrate more on the collective processs involved in the development, maintenance and change of the movements once they have emerged.

Recruitment of members has been the central concern of the motivational approach and the emphasis has been on states of psychic disequilibrium (e.g., "anomic," "neurotic," "frustrated," "discontented," "relative deprivation," "powerlessness") which make potential members susceptible. There are variations in the relative weight assigned to historical, social-situational, or deeply rooted characterological factors in generating this susceptibility and theorists also differ in whether they argue that susceptible persons will join almost any movement or whether there are specific predispositions for particular movements.

An adequate theory of the recruitment process must include attention to four basic processes: 1) alienation (i.e., how existing institutional and group ties are broken); 2) attraction (i.e., how individuals come within the influence of the movement and choose to remain within it); 3) conversion (i.e., how recruits are shaped to meet the movement's own organizational requirements); and 4) post-conversion management (i.e., how the movement fortifies and controls its members and what the career patterns are).

With regard to the process of alienation, the major weaknesses of the motivational approach has been that there has been a selective focus on the symptoms (e.g., discontent) or a simplistic explanation of the process (e.g., frustration of basic needs). Very little attention has been paid to the interaction of disaffected individuals (e.g., ethnic groups or social classes), to the social structural conditions such as periods of chaos, or to the role of the movements themselves in generating these alienative predispositions.

Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the motivational approach, according to the author, is in the explanation of the process of attraction to a social movement. In trying to understand the appeal of these movements, theorists have generally inferred them from ideological pronouncements or from observations about the kinds of groups who have joined.

Most of the motivational assumptions have been untested with little or no research on how the recruits themselves perceived or defined the appeal. In some cases there has been a kind of "psychological debunking" of the movements and their ideologies in the search for more sinister motives. Moreover, there has been a neglect of factors such as social networks and interactional relationships or external factors such as public perceptions of the movement in explaining affiliation.

Very little attention has been paid to the process of conversion although the motives which lead to attraction and affiliation may be quite different from those that insure continued participation. Similarly, with regard to post-conversion management, the motivational approach should be extended to embrace this process and to understand the movement's role in maintaining, strengthening, or changing the motivations of its members in the face of adversity, disappointment or boredom.

Comments:

This article provides a sophisticated theoretical analysis of literature on social movements prior to 1970. It provides incisive critiques and promising paths for further theory and research. The issues it raises and the need for critical assessment of this approach remain relevant.

HISTORICAL AND CROSS-NATIONAL

Birrell, Derek, "Relative Deprivation as a Factor in Conflict in Northern Ireland," Sociological Review, 20, 3, August 1972, 317-43.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

In this paper the concept of relative deprivation is examined for its explanatory value in understanding the violence in Northern Ireland. Impressionistic evidence of discontent expressed by Catholics regarding their socioeconomic deprivation in comparison to Protestants is discussed along with statistics indicating a factual basis for this perception. Scanty socioeconomic measures are used to show that economic conditions were improving in the sixties in the period leading up to the intense expression of grievances and the theory of rising expectations was advanced to explain the formation of radical social movements and political activity during this period. When these channels were obstructed and the demands not met, frustration increased and provided conditions leading to violence. Given the strong reactions to these processes as well as demands from the Protestant community and the police forces, the preconditions for collective disorders were established.

Comments:

This is little more than a descriptive and rather superficial account of the situation in Northern Ireland which is illustrated but not illuminated by the theory of relative deprivation.

Brown, Richard Maxwell, "The American Vigilante Tradition," In <u>Violence in America, Historical and Comparative Perspectives</u>, H. Graham and T. Gurr (Eds.) for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, New York, 1969.

Approach: Historical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

In what is basically an historical recitation of events preceding, forming and following the vigilante movement, Brown traces its development from a revolutionary beginning and its association with democracy, to its great flowering in the frontier (both in actual practice and in the literary traditions of the 19th century), its bastardized form in the 20th century where it was used to punish ethnic groups, political radicals, and union organizers. Brown seems sympathetic to the earliest forms of vigilantism --that somehow justice in the hands of community leaders was better than no justice at all--but comes down hard on "neovigilantes" who are prejudiced bigots--not upholders of social and moral justice. As an epilogue, Brown recites events, by year, beginning in 1964 and extending to 1968, which he considers vigilantism of the 60s. Almost all of these occurred in New York, and were responses of whites to threats of black violence in their communities. Brown seems to think this is a swing of the pendulum back to the earlier ideals associated with vigilantes: "...citizens join together for self-protection under conditions of disorder and lawlessness..." A 13-page appendix following the article lists, in alphabetic order by state, vigilante movements, their type (large, medium or small), their dates, the number killed, and the number of members in the movement.

Comments:

Brown's article, though a massive historical study, does not connect these movements with any other socioeconomic processes occurring in America and is too value-laden to be of much use for modern historians and sociologists wishing to form policy. Brown also lumps together many types of violence which many may not consider real "vigilantism"--and this too tends to weaken his arguments.

Brown, Richard Maxwell, Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American
Violence and Vigilantism, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Approach: Historical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

The author maintains that violence is endemic in American history and
has been imprinted upon the popular consciousness. Violence reinforces
itself by creating a propensity toward violent behavior patterns and the
belief that violence solves problems. The inertia of historical tradition
condemns Americans to more violent behavior.

American violence is typed as conservative because it has been used
to protect social stability. Participants have been drawn from all social
strata, but usually were led by community elites as in the case of vigi-
lantism. These elites in most cases represented business interests. Vigi-
lantism, which is the only category of conservative violence extensively
examined, received considerable support from many recognized and responsible
national leaders in the 19th and early 20th centuries. According to the
author, the unsettled nature of American life motivated Americans to invoke
the concept of "popular sovereignty" in order to justify group behavior
outside of the bounds of positive law. Violence has often been sanctioned
by the belief that the "people's will" can intercede when law enforcement
is incapable of solving disorders.

Comment:

Outside of the sound chapter on vigilantism, the author presents no
typology of conservative violence. He tries to demonstrate that American
violence is prevalent, contagious, and reinforcing of itself, but offers
no cross-national data. Further, this study relies heavily on a psycho-
historical explanation of collective violence, as in the extended chapter
which argues that President Johnson's bellicose position on Vietnam had
its roots in the violent background of his central Texas homeland. Lastly,
this study concentrates only on reactive or conservative forms of violence.
It ignores the numerous instances of "progressive" violence as well as
the dimension of the role of the state in violent confrontations between
social classes, ethnic groups and other associations.

Brown, Richard Maxwell, "Historical Patterns of Violence in America," In
Violence in America, Historical and Comparative Perspectives, H. Graham
and T. Gurr (Eds.), for the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence, Revised Edition, New York, 1979.

Approach: Historical/Descriptive

Using a descriptive analysis of historical literature on American
violence, Brown argues that "violence has accompanied virtually every stage
and aspect of our national existence...that time and time again it has been
the instrument not merely of the criminal and disorderly, but of the most
upright and honorable." He emphasizes the conservative nature of much of
American violence--that it has represented the attempt of established Amer-
icans to preserve their elite positions in the social, economic, and politi-
cal order. In making a distinction between "negative aspects of our
history" such as criminal activity, political assassinations, and racial
conflict, and "positive events" such as the American revolution, the Indian
Wars, the Civil War, vigilante violence, and police violence, Brown describes
the violence used in both types of actions, and emphasizes that "Americans
have never been loath to employ the most unremitting violence in the interest
of any cause deemed to be a good one."

Comments:

This is a fairly superficial descriptive survey of a battery of events
in American history in which violence (in the form of property destruction
or personal injury) occurred. The attempt to characterize some of these
events as positive and others as negative is questionable at best.

Davies, James C., "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Violence in America, Historical and Comparative Perspectives, H. Graham and T. Gurr (Eds.), for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, New York, 1969, 671-791.

Approach: Historical
Methodology: Case Study

In challenging the traditionally held views concerning "why men revolt," Davies combines historical data with "causes of revolution and rebellion, psychologically considered" to develop his ideas on the causes of unrest. In the very first paragraph he asserts his definition of the J-Curve: "Revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal, during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes intolerable." He then proceeds to test this notion using four case studies (the French Revolution, the Nazi Revolution, the American Civil War, and the uprisings of blacks in the 1960's - which he calls rebellion). A fifth case, that of student rebellions in the 1950s and 60s is only briefly discussed. These cases together are believed to support Davies' assertions, i.e., that "the J-curve is a necessary though not sufficient part of the explanation of at least several revolutions and some contained rebellions...a psychological, not a sociological explanation." Gratification of human needs is the root of all happiness, and the deterrent to all violence: "And it is that universal a phenomenon. Lawmakers as well as clerks, businessmen as well as laborers...would react the same if suddenly they were deprived of all the goods and dignity they had come to expect in the normal course of life. They would be less than human if they did not become angry."

Comments:

The basic thrust of Davies' argument, that psychological gratifications are the source of violence, is poorly defined and only incidentally supported by his choice of case studies. Not only are his terms "rebellion" and "revolution" (and war) poorly articulated, but the incomparability of these cases with those of blacks is a real drawback to his logic. Thus, for the Nazi case, he uses data on personal income, and numbers of unemployed, while for blacks he is content to use Supreme Court decisions regarding transportation, housing, and education, without any reference to actual conditions for blacks. This leads the reader to suspect that the data were used to selectively support the original contentions which amount to pseudo-scientific measures of "expectations" or "gratifications." These concepts need to be more rigorously defined, and better measures of them used, including subjective ones.

Feierabend, Ivo K., Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social
Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns, In H. Graham,
and T. Gurr (Eds.), Violence in America, Historical and Comparative
Perspectives, for the National Commission on the Causes and Preven-
tion of Violence, New York, 1969.

Approach: Theoretical/Empirical/Historical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data; Content Analysis

This study attempts to examine the relationship between social change,
political violence and political stability. The basic concepts pursued
in this article are that rapid socio-economic changes lead to violence, a
violence which is an expression of frustration resulting from severe and
persisting grievances which are not resolved. Their conclusions are de-
rived from looking at information on 84 countries after World War II.
These data are derived from two sources: Deadline Data on World Affairs
and The Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbooks. Each political event is coded
on 16 characteristics into 28 non-overlapping categories. These data
are then used to create political stability indices for these countries;
these are then compared separately with other indices of "modernity,"
"economic development," "political development," "coerciveness of regimes,"
and "political violence."

The authors conclude that there is a strong relationship between rapid
change and political violence and suggest thresholds for stability in-
volving minimum requirements for numbers of radios, newspapers, physi-
cians, calories, and telephones, coupled with levels of literacy, urban-
ization and base incomes. Their ultimate conclusion is that political
violence is more likely in countries which are either "modern" or "tra-
ditional"; those countries dubbed "transitional" (i.e., undergoing change)
are more likely to be violent.

Comments:

This attempt to link psychological motivations toward violence with
historical and political data on many diverse countries suffers from
1) data on a very short time span; 2) poorly defined concepts such as
"modern," "traditional," "stability," "change," etc.; and 3) an ethno-
centric perception and application of these concepts to these countries
without recourse to colonial histories, or cultural characteristics
which might be critical in understanding violence in non-Western societies.

Feldberg, Michael, "The Crowd in Philadelphia History: A Comparative
    Perspective," Labor History, Summer 1974, 323-36.

Approach: Historical/Theoretical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

In this article the author summarized the models of pre-industrial
collective violence proposed by social historians including George Rude',
Eric Hobsbawm, Edward Thompson and Charles Tilly. Studies of Britain
and France in the period 1750 to 1850 led scholars to alter the earlier
view that pre-industrial crowds were bloodthirsty and irrational. The
work of Rude' and others supported the view that as localized economies
were becoming industrialized and politically centralized, urban and rural
rioters struggled against modernization to preserve traditional social
values and economic systems. The pre-industrial crowd, which Tilly
labelled "reactive" or "backward looking" defended itself against modern
commercial capitalism and centralizing national governments. For the
most part, Rude' and others propose that only after industrialization and
centralization occurred did the lower orders of European society become
a working class which pursued "forward looking" goals of obtaining a
fair share and some influence in the new economic and political order.
With the new order came larger crowds whose unity was based on class
consciousness rather than residence or craft association; this working
class unity was also encouraged by capitalist violence.

Feldberg used this model of pre-industrial violence to explain inci-
dents of collective violence in Philadelphia between 1830 and 1850. In
this period the urban economy shifted from a pre-industrial to an indus-
trial stage. Factories and machines altered the textile, clothing, and
shoemaking industries and caused dislocation and unemployment among
skilled artisans. Industrial change, coupled with commercial dislocations
which occurred when the developing national network of trade brought the
city's commerce into competition with the rest of the country, brought
violent strikes in its wake. He believes that for incidents of collective
violence such as the weaver's strikes of 1842-43 and the railroad riots
of 1840-42, the model is supported. Skilled weavers struck against
suburban textile mills and against the railroad's disruption of neighbor-
hood life and its threat to local trade through transportation monopoly,
i.e., they resorted to violence to protect old ways of life.

On the other hand, the author suggests that the European model of
Rude' and Hobsbawm are too "technologically bound" to fully explain the
element of racial and ethnic violence found in America. To explain
incidents of nativist attacks on Irish immigrants and abolitionists or
Irish attacks on blacks, he used Tilly's thesis that in addition to per-
iods of economic change, violence will also occur when competitive social
groups gain or lose influence in the political power structure. Feldberg
points out that unlike European crowds, however, Philadelphia crowds did
not fight on one side and the representatives of the state on another.
In the U.S. government often stood aside or in between when private groups
clashed. In the early 19th century Philadelphia's municipal government
rarely protected unpopular minorities, except when violence against them

threatened respectable neighborhoods. It was not until the later 19th century that the state had the capacity to intervene and to perpetrate significant violence itself; when it did, it came in on the side of socially and politically dominant groups.

The author concluded that riot was easily employed as a method of direct action by which groups regulated their relations because Jacksonian Philadelphia lacked strong or purposeful authority to mediate between groups or keep them from each other's throats. Violence was part of the political process of social bargaining by groups for political power, influence and economic position.

Comments:

This analysis suggests that any examination of inter-group violence should include a study of existing channels of communication between groups before and during confrontations and that determination should be made of the group loyalties and influence on police officials in any violent conflict. Knowing what participants expect to gain is important in understanding collective violence, but knowing why participants feel their goals cannot be reached or grievances settled in ways other than violent ones is also important to that understanding.

Gamson, William, "Violence and Political Powers: The Meek Don't Make It," Psychology Today, 8, 2, July 1974, 35-41.

Approach: Historical; Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Abstract:

In examining the relation between the ability and willingness of participants in social movements to use violence to achieve their goals and the likelihood of their success, Gamson used a "random" sample of 53 social movements and formal organizations that challenged the political and economic system between 1800 and 1945. A "challenging group" was defined in the following way: (1) its membership is not already sufficiently organized to form, for instance, an established interest group, and (2) the group must demand from an antagonist some change that its own membership can't provide.

The measures of success were whether "other power holders came to accept the group as a valid representative of legitimate interests" and whether the group gained new advantages for its constituents and accomplished its goals. More than half of the sample of social movements was successful judging by one measure or the other, but only 33 percent were successful on both counts.

Very few (15) of these groups had participated in any kind of violent exchange, but these, having either initiated the violence or fought back, had a higher than average success rate than those who did not do either. Groups that used violent tactics were more likely to be successful if their goals were limited and if they sought to co-exist with, rather than displace, established groups. The least effective strategy appeared to be advocating violence without having the strength to use it. Disruptive tactics -- strikes, boycotts, and efforts to humiliate or embarrass those in power -- were often successful. Gamson observed from his data that violence seemed to grow from "an impatience born of confidence and a sense of rising power," rather than to result from frustration and desperation. Groups which had a bureaucratic structure and centralized power were most likely to accomplish their goals: those that tried to avoid an internal hierarchy were less likely to be successful.

Comments: This interesting look at the strategies and characteristics of activist groups to see why some succeeded and others failed, challenges some of the traditional ideas about American pluralism. The author sees violence as the "spice of protest"; the successful group in American politics is "not the polite petitioner who carefully observes all the rules, but rather the rambunctious fighter, one with limited goals, that can elbow its way into the arena." At the same time, a word of caution is due about the size of the sample and the conclusions drawn from it. Gamson indicates that he drew a random sample from the hundreds of challenging groups that surfaced in American between 1800 and 1945. After eliminating those that did not fit his definition, he was left with 64 valid groups and found that information was

available on 53. Of this number only 15 met with any violence in
their history and only 8 of these were willing to fight back. The
finding that the 8 which actually participated in violence were more
successful than the 7 nonviolent victims of attack, though suggestive,
must be tempered by the realization that other factors than the
willingness to use violence and the ability to organize for it may
have been influential. Characteristics of the challenge itself, the
antagonists, and environmental factors may be necessary considerations
as well and may do much to explain the assumed causal relation between
the use of violence and the success of movements.

Gurr, Ted, "Urban Disorder: Perspectives from the Comparative Study of
Civil Strife," American Behavioral Scientist, 11, March 1968, 50-55.

This article is divided into two sections. The first of these
summarizes some propositions about psychological factors that dispose peo-
ple to violence and suggests their implications for research on urban dis-
orders. The second section reports on a cross-national study designed to
determine the effects of various social conditions on the outcome of dis-
content; and suggests some implications for the civil disorders in the
United States in the late sixties.

The basic psychological source of turmoil, according to Gurr, is
relative deprivation which is a discrepancy between people's expectations
about what they deserve and their perceived chances of getting and keeping
these things. He suggests several factors that affect the intensity of
the response to relative deprivation: anger and aggression will increase
when the extent of the discrepancy increases, when there are few alterna-
tives to the blocked opportunity for reaching goals, when the expectations
are held with great intensity, and when the deprivations are viewed as
unjustified or illegitimate. Thus, "we need to know which groups feel
most deprived, for these are the people who are most likely to become
alienated to the point of violence. We need to assess the intensity of
their anger because this is a major determinant of the intensity of their
action. Most important for policy purposes, we need to know--not just to
assume that we know--the content of their deprivation, for effective solu-
tions can be devised only on the basis of accurate diagnosis." Although
he believes that relative deprivation is a necessary condition and a major
source of civil strife, he also recognizes that it is not a sufficient
condition and patterns of social control and facilitation also have a
great deal to do with the responses.

In his cross-national study of 114 countries with populations over
one million, he used news information to categorize their short-term and
persisting deprivation and the magnitude of civil strife (i.e., turmoil,
conspiracy, and internal war). Most of the analyses were made with regard
to turmoil, which is defined as "relatively spontaneous, unstructured,
mass strife, including demonstrations, political strikes, riots, political
clashes, and localized rebellions." Four intervening variables between
deprivation and strife were developed: 1) the legitimacy of the political
regime (measured by the length of time the political system remained stable
and the extent to which it was developed indigenously rather than im-
ported or imposed); 2) the coercive potential (measured by the relative
size of military and police forces proportional to population and by their
size and loyalty to the regime); 3) institutionalization of the expression
of discontent (measured by the relative strength of unions, the stability
of the political party system, and the fiscal resources of government);
and 4) social facilitation of aggression (measured by history of civil
strife violence and a composite measure of present size and activity of
Communist parties, amount of rugged terrain available for sanctuary of
rebels and the direct assistance to rebels given by foreign countries):

He found that all but one of these variables were significantly related to the measures of strife. Large military and police forces alone seemed to be unrelated to the amount of turmoil but in some cases turmoil tended to increase as the coercive forces increased in size. Multiple regression analyses showed that the amount of civil strife was well accounted for by the eight variables with an R of .806, but turmoil as one facet of strife was less well explained by the set of factors. He suggested that "a great many temporary and local conditions of kinds not represented in the summary measures of deprivation are probably responsible for much turmoil." Only three variables were direct and important causes of turmoil: long-term deprivation (i.e., economic and political discrimination, political separatism, religious cleavages, and lack of educational opportunity); a history of civil strife, and the illegitimacy of the political system. Thus, short-term deprivation is unlikely to lead to violence if the coercive forces are large and loyal, if few facilitative conditions are present, and if there is no tradition of civil violence.

In generalizing to the situation of American Blacks in the 1960s, Gurr suggests a sharp increase in short-term deprivation because the civil rights activism of the early 1960s led to repression which has effects similar to deprivation in that it infuriates its victims. Moreover, there is a chronic history of violence in the United States which is joined by a new pattern of racial violence which has potent facilitative effects on deprivation in the future. Along with these factors is the growth of extremist organizations which advocate covert and violent protest, and the persistent racial discrimination in this country. "The inference is that turmoil will be chronic in the near future."

Comments:

This study generated an impressive array of significant correlations. Its weaknesses, however, are concentrated at its initial stages. First and foremost is the lack of congruence between the opening discussion of psychological sources of turmoil and the subsequent examination of the economic and political correlates of such turmoil. The reliance on data derived exclusively from news sources is also a considerable limitation; checks against data from other sources were needed. Finally, brief and incomplete descriptions of the measures used and the limited presentation of the results prevent this from being a comprehensive report of the research.

Gurr, Ted R., "Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quantitative Evidence," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 391, 1970, 128-44.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

This study was one in a series which utilized data on civil strife (during 1961-65) collected for 114 contemporary nations to understand the extent, types, and causes of protest and rebellion in 21 Western countries. Three hypotheses were tested: 1) the greater the intensity and scope of discontent in a population, the greater the magnitude of strife (defined as collective, overt, violent or nonviolent, nongovernmental attacks on people or property within a political system); 2) the greater the normative and utilitarian justifications for strife in a discontented group, the greater the magnitude of strife; and 3) the greater the institutional support and coercive capacities of the dissidents relative to regime capacities, the greater the magnitude of strife.

Magnitude of strife was indexed using proportional man-days of strife and deaths from strife. Four component strife scores were determined by distinguishing between violent and nonviolent strife, and between turmoil and rebellion. Turmoil was defined as spontaneous, unorganized strife with substantial popular participation. Rebellion included the organized strife with limited participation which characterizes conspiracy, and the organized strife with widespread participation found in internal wars. There were three summary measures of deprivation: short-term economic deprivation, short-term political deprivation, and long-term deprivation (persisting structural conditions causing enduring discontent, such as discrimination, lack of educational opportunities, and religious cleavages).

Analysis of the data indicated that levels of peaceful protest were not significantly affected by any of the deprivation measures. Both the measures of total turmoil (violent and nonviolent) and total strife (turmoil and rebellion) correlated moderately with short-term political deprivation and persisting deprivation. Rebellion, however was significantly correlated with each of the three forms of deprivation. Thus, intense and persisting discontents in Western societies would most likely lead to the more intense and violent strife associated with rebellion.

The justification of protest and rebellion was determined for each country by measures of governmental legitimacy, extent of past strife (1946-1959), and the historical success of strife. It was found that half of the differences in magnitude of strife among Western nations could be explained by the differences in justifications. Furthermore, each aspect of justification was significantly correlated with magnitude of strife, and the relationship was all the more pronounced when nonviolent strife alone was considered. The measures of justification thus proved to be more strongly associated with total strife and turmoil, and more weakly related to rebellion, than were the deprivation measures. Therefore, it seems that demonstrations and riots (turmoil) are less the result of intense grievances than of people's perceptions of their government and the desirability of protest. But the most serious forms of strife (such as terrorism and extremely violent riots) are related to intense and persisting frustrations.

The data on institutional support and coercive capacities showed that increases in dissident institutional support were likely to lead to greater nonviolent protest, whereas the prospects for rebellion were enhanced by increases in their coercive capacities. Regime institutional support, however, had a moderate effect of minimizing all forms of strife. Although the regime's coercive capacity had a minimizing effect on rebellion, it had little effect on the other forms of strife.

In conclusion, the institutional/coercive balance proved to be a significant and negative determinant of all forms of strife. Of equal importance but positive association were normative and utilitarian justifications. Finally, deprivation was found to have only significant associations with nonviolent protest (negative correlation) and rebellion (positive).

Comments:

As a part of a series of related studies, this study relies on the others for presentation of such basic information as the sample, sources of data, procedures used, and the development of the measures. Throughout this article the author continually equates causal and correlational analyses but the data do not support claims for causality.

Gurr, Ted Robert, "Political Protest and Rebellion in the 1960s: The United
States in World Perspective," In Violence in America: Historical and
Comparative Perspectives, H. Graham and T. Gurr (Eds.), for the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Revised
Edition, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, pp. 49-76.

Approach: Theoretical

In this chapter the characteristics of political protest and rebellion
in 87 of the world's largest countries during the 1960s are examined and
special attention is paid to the United States. All overt collective con-
frontations between groups contending over political issues, violent and
nonviolent, gathered from material reported in the New York Times and
specialized regional news services were identified and coded, providing
data on 2200 episodes of conflict. These episodes were categorized as
either protests (conflicts over limited issues such as strikes, demonstra-
tions, riots or clashes) or as rebellions (conflicts over more fundamental
issues such as coups, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist campaigns).

Protests were far more common than rebellions and were far less deadly.
In the United States the great majority of episodes were both legal and
peaceful but the U.S. had more widespread and intense civil conflict than
most other Western democracies though far less than many countries in
Latin America, Africa, and Asia during the 1960s.

In trying to discover what kinds of people were most likely to take
part in civil conflict, Gurr found that protest was not solely or primarily
a lower class phenomenon. In contrast, rebellion was engaged in largely
by military, police and public officials. The kinds of organizations which
were involved in these episodes varied according to the level of economic
development of the country. Associational groups (economic and open poli-
tical organizations) were the major sources of dissidence in economically
developed countries whereas conflict was relatively more likely to originate
with communal and clandestine groups in the least developed countries.
A country's type of political system (democratic or authoritarian) had
less effect on the sources of organized dissidence in the 1960s than its
level of economic development.

Nearly all dissidence in the United States had limited aims of reform
rather than revolution, but countries differed significantly in the relative
importance of different motives. In democratic countries, dissidents
very rarely had revolutionary objectives but the less developed a country,
the more likely was conflict waged over the revolutionary issues of who
should rule and how and the less likely it was to be limited to questions
of policies and personnel.

In the 1960s not only did the United States have more protest and
rebellion than most other Western societies, but these episodes differed
in two other ways: 1) right-wing groups resorted to violence in political
causes and 2) the authorities responded to some kinds of protest with
violence. Gurr noted that "The United States is unique among contemporary
Western democracies in nurturing an enduring tradition of private political
murder in resistance to change and...It was all too clear in the 1960s
that the nonviolent response to protest which characterizes other Western

democracies had not taken root in the United States."

Comments:

This is an interesting and comprehensive survey of collective confrontations in the United States during one decade with a comparison to incidents in other countries, but the limitations in data collected from newspaper stories must be considered in assessing the conclusions.

Gusfield, Joseph R., "Functional Areas of Leadership in Social Movements,"
    Sociological Quarterly, 7, 2, 1966, 137-56.

Approach: Historical/Theoretical
Methodology: Case Study

The author discusses the persistent demands made upon leaders to
simultaneously head a hierarchy of authority and decision-making within the
movement, and represent the movement to an environment of clients, enemies,
and potential recruits. An analysis of the leadership of the Women's
Christian Temperance Union during two different periods--at the turn of
the century and in the mid-1950s--provides the base from which the author
examines tensions between these two areas.

As the mobilizer of the movement, the leader is expected to express
the disjuncture between the values of society and those of the movement,
and promote the development of a separate identity for the movement and
cohesiveness among its members. The leader must also serve as an articula-
tor of the movement to the larger society and must both communicate and
negotiate the social movement's interests and doctrines. As a result of
the dual functions of mobilization and articulation, demands develop within
the movement for divergent modes of leadership behavior. Whereas these
frequently exist at the same time and are often inconsistent, they can also
result in an alternating sequence of leadership patterns.

Presidential transition in the WCTU in the mid-1950s highlights the
interplay of these demands. The outgoing president was known for her strict
adherence to the doctrines of total abstinence and Prohibition. Her zealous
commitment to doctrine, and intransigence toward other dry groups that took
a moderating stance, made the group increasingly subject to outside ridi-
cule and disapproval, though she was quite successful in recruiting and
mobilizing members. The demand for a balance between mobilization and
articulation led to the election of a president admired for her ambassadorial
qualities who was called upon to find the common ground which WCTU could
share with other organizations within and without the Temperance movement.

Whereas the "natural history" approach to leadership suggests a se-
quence in which mobilizing leadership is supplanted by articulating leader-
ship as a movement matures, the WCTU presents another picture. The second
president of the Union (Frances Willard, 1879-1898) was particularly adroit
at selling the movement to other groups, but a mobilizing movement within
the WCTU eventually forced her to moderate her drift toward anti-WCTU
alliances. Thus, rather than the natural history sequence of an evolving
emphasis on articulation, the WCTU was characterized by a cyclical change
between emphases on articulation and mobilization.

It is the author's view that "the disjuncture between ideology and the
adaptive problems of the movement constantly raises the issue of too much
or too little accommodation; or renunciation of the mission or overrighteous
indignation." But the resulting tensions in leadership role-sets can be
minimized by: minimal visibility, insider pose (seemingly disloyal be-
havior excused as a temporary expedient), separation of mobilization and
articulation functions through dual leadership, colorless leadership

(the mediocre, compromise candidate), and cycles or stages of leadership. The history of the Women's Christian Temperance Union indicates that this social movement has been characterized by a cyclical sequence of leadership types in which the functions of each role have been met by a succession of leaders.

Comments:

Although the choice of the two time periods makes for a disjointed case study, it appears likely that these periods provide clear instances of organizational shifts between the mobilization and articulation components of presidential leadership. The selection also effectively counters the natural history view while providing support for the author's belief that such components are persistent aspects of organized groups operating within more than one social system. The essential point, then, is the existence within social movements of a "general and persistent need for internal authority, supervision, and morale at the same time as a need for control of external forces which shape and limit the organization."

Hackney, Sheldon, "Southern Violence," in Violence in America, Historical
and Comparative Perspectives, H. Graham and T. Gurr (Eds.) for the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence,
New York, 1969; also American Historical Review, LXXIV, February
1969, 906-25.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

A tendency toward violence has always. been one of the traits most
frequently attributed to Southerners. The author reviews data supporting
this regional variation in the pattern of violence. He demonstrates
that violence in the South compared to that in the North has three
aspects: high rates of homicide and assault, a moderate incidence of
crime against property, and low suicide rates.

He examines several possible explanations of the pattern of southern
violence which he finds unsatisfactory, including anomie, frustration-
aggression, economic backwardness, the business cycle, child-rearing
practices, colonial status, and Cash's Southern cultural pattern position.

Hackney concludes that social science offers no clear valid evidence
for predicting a relation in different populations between homicide
and suicide rates. He then cites what he considers to be a promising
line of research, the relation between a tendency toward depression
(and suicide?) and a tendency toward paranoia (and homicide?) with
socialization patterns. Depressed patients come from families which try
to force children to behave as their parents wish through positive "ought"
channels. The children so trained come to see the environment as not
threatening, it is something to be manipulated. The person acts on the
environment. Paranoid patients, on the other hand, were forced to behave
acceptably by "ought not" demands. To such persons the environment
has potentially harmful properties that he cannot control and that he
must in some way avoid. The environment acts on the person.

The author cites crosscultural data which support a relation between
perceptions that the social and physical environment are potentially
harmful and a high homicide rate. No such data were then available with
respect to the South, but Hackney notes that the southerners have from
the first exhibited a siege mentality, created by the need to protect
a peculiar institution -- the South -- from threats originating outside
the region. He then traces events in the South since the Civil War
and concludes that "being Southern involves a feeling of persecution at
times and a sense of being a passive insignificant object of alien
impersonal forces."

Comments:

The homicide-suicide pattern the author is trying to account for is
based on 1940 findings which may be out of date. That is, the further
urbanization of the South and the heavy increase in northern urban violent
crime may show a different regional pattern today.

Hudson, M.C., "Political Protest and Power Transfers in Crisis Per-
iods: Regional, Structural and Environmental Comparisons,
Comparative Political Studies, October 1971, 259-94.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

This comparative analysis of 95 countries focuses on the relation
between patterns of protest and governmental change during periods of
crisis. Taking each country's most violent year (the year in which
most political deaths were reported) between 1949 and 1966, the author
examines the frequency of incidents of protest and of governmental
change compared with the year immediately preceding and immediately
following the crisis year. Similar comparisons between the countries
are based on three types of variables -- regional, structural, and
environmental.

The author classified protests reported in daily news publications
into three groups. 1) Protest demonstrations. These were nonviolent
(i.e., they did not cause major injury or destruction) gatherings of
people organized to protest the policies, ideology, or actions of a
regime, or a governmental or political leader. 2) Riots. These were
relatively unstructured gatherings of large numbers of people which
caused material damage or bloodshed. 3) Armed attacks. These were
highly organized gatherings where people joined to commit violent acts
against other organized groups in an effort to weaken or destroy the
power of the group under attack.

Events indicating governmental change fell into four groups.
1) renewals of executive tenure, for example, presidential elections
won by incumbents and votes of confidence won by parliamentary regimes;
2) regular executive transfers, that is, changes in the office of
the national executive accomplished through conventional legal or
customary procedures and unaccompanied by actual or directly threatened
physical violence; 3) irregular executive transfers or changes in the
office of the national executive outside the conventional legal or
customary procedures and accompanied by actual or threatened violence;
and 4) attempted irregular executive transfers, that is, reported
efforts to remove and replace the incumbent national executive outside
the conventional procedures for transferring formal power (this group
did not include plots discovered before they could materialize).

The regions that were compared included Asia, Latin America, the
Middle East, Western Europe-North America, Oceania, and the Communist
countries. The two structural variables examined were the age of the
state in its current form and party fragmentation, that is, the dis-
persion of political party representation in lower houses. Defini-
tions for environmental variables were not given, but these variables
included GNP growth rate and ethnolinguistic fragmentation.

The author found that on the average the most violent year exper-
ienced by countries after World War II was characterized by many

armed attacks but few demonstrations or riots, "suggesting that these milder forms of activity cannot be taken as hallmarks of systemic crisis." Moreover, his data suggested that violent crises and major governmental change tended to be independent of each other; nor was any close relation found between the intensity or frequency of violent events and the frequency or irregularity of governmental changes. During the three-year crisis period, the number of protests rose from the first year then dropped off in the year following the crisis year. This was especially true of armed attacks and of irregular governmental changes; but regular transfers of executive power rose throughout the period. Although there is little regional variation in these patterns, Europe-North America was first in protest demonstrations, the Middle East in riots, and Asia in armed attacks. In general, demonstrations tended to predominate the older states, riots in the middle-aged states, and armed attacks in the newest states. The number of protests is greatest among the new states and those with low rates of economic growth; and it is lowest in the middle-aged states and those with high growth rates. Countries with the most ethnolinguistic fragmentation in the population ranked highest in the number of all types of protest as well as in the number of irregular transfers and renewals.

Thus, Hudson concludes, "Countries with low economic growth rates and high ethnolinguistic fragmentation would appear to be the most prone to high levels of protest and irregular transfers in crisis periods. Young countries with low party fragmentation appear most prone to high levels of protest while old countries show high levels of irregular change and high party fragmentation countries show high levels of regular change."

Comments:

This is an ambitious though exploratory attempt to understand what kind of violence and power transfers occurred while a country was undergoing its greatest period of violence, and to examine the seuence of such events. The methodological limitations are detailed in the article, particularly in the reliance on existing reports of events and the selection of the crisis year on the basis of the number of reported political deaths.

It is useful to challenge certain common beliefs about the genesis and aftermath of political protest, as the author does here. A thorough examination of how political protest is linked to power transfers, however, requires some attention also to social and economic changes that could bear on the question. Without this, the effectiveness of protest as a mode of political action is not fully disclosed, since power transfers may not do much to change basic conditions.

Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri, Violence and Reform in American History, New York and London: New Viewpoints, 1978.

Approach: Historical

This study discusses the interaction between violence, the propensity to respond to violence with political reform, and the rhetoric of violence in 20th century America, with special attention given to the years between 1900 and 1917. The author argues that these crises of order were exaggerated by social reformers and in reality reflected a crisis of the "middle-class mind" rather than an incipient social cataclysm. For example, he found that industrial disorders were only slightly higher in the U.S. than in Western Europe, despite the conventional view that industrial violence in the U.S. has been significantly more pronounced.

The United States has an unwarranted reputation for collective industrial violence, according to the author, because social reformers, the military, the national guard, and private detective agencies exaggerated disorders for self-serving reasons. This contributed to an inevitable political reaction in the 1920s and late 1960s and 1970s which destroyed the achievements of reform and clouded rational examination of social disorders.

Comments:

The author may be right in asserting that there was a "crisis" of the bourgeois mind in the generation or so before World War I. The sense of an impending clash between social classes was common to all the advanced capitalist nations of the period. What the author does not explore and which therefore weakens his argument, is whether this crisis had its origins in clearcut material conditions. Incidentally, the author used only one index of violence—deaths in industrial disputes—to compare European and U.S. labor disputes. When other criteria have been used, violence in U.S. labor disputes seems to have been greater than in Europe.

Lyman, Stanford A., "Red Guard on Grant Avenue," Trans-Action,
     April 1976, 21-35.

Approach: Historical; Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

     This article describes conflicts in San Francisco's Chinatown.
At odds are the traditional authority of the clan associations and
secret societies, the emerging organizations made up of the American-
born bourgeouisie, and the gangs of disaffected youth. The author
discusses and analyzes the relations between these groups and their
internal problems.

     Using changes in American immigration policies, the increasing birth
rates among the indigenous population, changing educational character-
istics of the Chinese, and actual conditions in the ethnic enclave,
he traces the development of rebellion among American-born youth and
Hong King immigrants, comparing the traditional authority of the
secret societies to that of the newer organizations, and detailing
the potential conflicts between Chinatown and the larger metropolis.

     Hobsbawm's discussion of social bandits and primitive rebels leads
the author to pay particular attention to the emergence of politicized
rebellion among such populist groups as the Red Guards and the con-
servative factions of Hwa Ching. These groups of disaffected youths
are in conflict with each other and are separated by differences in
their place of birth, ideology, and organizational ties. The Red
Guards, composed primarily of American-born Chinese, have revolted
not only against the traditional power and authority exerted by the
secret societies and clan associations but against the white power
elite.

     The Hwa Ching, composed primarily of youths from Hong Kong, was
thwarted in its original attempts to provide a vocational training pro-
gram for young immigrants, and its bitterness and anger resulted in its
complete fragmentation. Rather than turning to populist revolt, its
members either resumed their criminal activities in the streets or
accepted a place in the old order's secret societies as paid guards.
According to the author, members of the Hwa Ching who aligned them-
selves with the old order rather than adopting the radical militancy
of the Red Guards did so to serve their immediate practical needs, to
make up for their poor command of English, and in answer to their fear
of political persecution and possible deportation.

     The recruitment of these newly arrived and disaffected immigrant
youths has done much to rejuvenate the clan associations and secret
societies, which had been declining in power and authority as a result
of the aging of their members and the acculturation of the American-
born Chinese. Yet these new members are expected to challenge the old
order from within.

In addition to the "illegitimate" rebellion of the Red Guards
in Chinatown, there is a "legitimate" resistance by adults to the
communitywide authority of the old order, particularly by the middle-
class American-born Chinese in several associations. With all these
pressures, "the crust of Chinatown's cake of customary control may
be beginning to crumble...The politics as well as the 'crimes' of
Chinatown are coming to resemble those of the larger society, with
alienation, race consciousness, and restive rebelliousness animating
a new generation's social and organizational energies."

Comments:

A detailed and fascinating account of the organizational challenges
to a traditional power structure in an ethnic enclave, this study
provides many insights into the dilemmas of emerging social movements
and the motives of different participants.

Maier, Pauline, "Popular Uprising and Civil Authority in 18th Century America," William and Mary Quarterly, 27, 1970, 3-35.

Approach: Historical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

The author maintains that popular non-institutionalized crowd action was an accepted social force in 18th century America and that colonial elites did not by and large view crowd action as an illegitimate form of protest. It was not unusual for contentious gatherings to draw participants from all social classes. Crowds acted as extra-legal arms in defending community interests. In many cases, they sought to serve the community where no law existed or when the authorities could not act due to unsettled frontier conditions, as vigilante groups.

A typology of crowd action and civil disturbances can be inferred from the author's several examples. Communal brawls were notably lacking in this period. But, disturbances between communities over land cessions precipitated mob action which was distinctly non-political in nature. Political disturbances were usually precipitated by British imperial policies which either upset traditional practices or assaulted general notions of social justice. For example, customs riots preceded the American Revolution as did anti-impressment commotions. Both types of disturbances saw the emergence of a politically forward-looking crowd activity. The character of Anglo-American law enforcement explains popular uprising and its persistence in the 18th century. Because no professional police forces or militias were established, authorities depended on informal systems of control. The uprisings of the North Carolina Regulators, Fries Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, and Shays Rebellion grew to large dimensions due to the state's lack of policing power.

Comments:

This is a largely derivative article. It does not tell us much more about the crowd than we have learned from Rude' and others. Absent is an explanation of how crowd action was politicized into a revolutionary movement beyond the immediate control of local elites. Nor does this essay contrast rural and urban violence in an effective fashion.

Miller, Floyd, "Black Protest and White Leadership: A Note on the Colored
  Farmer's Alliance," Phylon, 33, 2, Summer 1972, 169-174.

Approach: Historical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

      To refute the notion of many historians that class interests may over-
ride racial distinctions, Miller points to the experience of the Colored Farmer's
Alliance. This alliance, formed in the 1880s, consisted of a black majority
led by whites.

      Among the reasons why "a large black organization committed to protest-
ing both racial and economic injustices allowed whites to serve as its chief
spokesmen," the author contends that organization beyond the local level re-
quired resources that only white leaders could provide and that the organiza-
tion's ideology was compatible with white leadership. Although the early
leader of the alliance, Richard Manning Humphrey, was a paternalistic "economic
radical with liberal racial views" who often differed with the members regard-
ing federal supervision of elections and other issues, he was useful to the
organization because he supplied access to financial and other support from
whites. Moreover, blacks within the organization expressed a clear desire
to unite with whites to advance common interests, a position in harmony with
white leadership. Humphrey was also able to support blacks in their economic
demands.

      According to the author, racial issues were becoming so important to the
members of Humphrey's organization that he could not have retained his leader-
ship if the organization had survived the formation of the Populist Party in
1892. The Colored Farmer's Alliance did not fail because militant black
leaders were lacking, Miller asserts, but because of the temper of the South
at that time. He implies that the organization had depended wholly on the
white leaders and eventually died because "the decade of the 'nineties!..
was not the time for a black protest organization to succeed--even exist--in
the South."

Comment:

      According to Miller, the white leadership of this black protest organiza-
tion represented a means by which a politically and economically powerless
population could accumulate needed resources, acquire legitimacy, and form
alliances with whites on the basis of class interests. The observation that
the usefulness of such leadership was limited both by the stage of the organ-
ization's development and the degree that its leaders reflected the needs and
desires of members has important implications for other such groups, including
many of the later civil rights organizations.

Monti, Daniel, "Mob Action and Civic Responsibility: The New York
      Case," New York Affairs, 4, Summer/Fall 1977.

Approach: Theoretical/Prescriptive
Methodology: Analysis of Secondary Data

      Monti is concerned with demonstrating the positive utility of
collective violence in New York City's history. Contrary to some sug-
gestions in the report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism
(1976), he contends that altering traditional political processes to
control and prevent violence would exacerbate tensions and eliminate
avenues of protest. Public policy should direct and manage collective
action along moderate lines, not try to eliminate it.

      On the basis of a selective study of collective violence in New
York City, the author argues that this form of disorder has been an
established part of the city's life for three centuries. Violence ori-
ginated in the unsettled conditions of urban life and generally has
been "conservative" in that its goal has been to protect parochial inter-
ests rather than to foster insurrection. Most violence before 1850 was
committed by lower-class mobs who were manipulated by the city's elites
to serve the elites' interests. After 1850 the elites withdraw support
for mob actions and reorganized the police force in order to deal with
disorders. This did not mean that upper-class people or politicians
no longer cared about protecting their positions. They merely relied
on municipal police forces to carry out their wishes, rather than on
working and lower-class persons.

      Even the draft riots of 1863 were reactionary or conservative,
in the author's view, since the rioters did not seek or receive sweeping
economic and political reforms or relief from the hated draft laws im-
posed by the federal government. Monti also considers most labor vio-
lence conservative since it most often occurred when workers could not
represent themselves. Moreover these disorders were hardly the violent
confrontations that revolutions are made of, despite the industrialists'
fears. Monti believes that New York City's history and probably other
cities' as well furnishes few precedents for using mob action deliber-
ately to threaten existing institutions. Yet violence traditionally
aimed at comparatively moderate ends "would seem to argue against the
need to subvert the political processes of cities just so people fail
to riot."

      Predictions about collective violence included the notion that
urban riots will be more radical than those of the 1960s and that they
could involve gangs as well as such special interest groups as labor
unions and civil rights organizations. Distasteful as mass rioting
may be to most Americans, it is over fairly soon and would only be
replaced by terrorist activities if it were suppressed.

Comments:

      The argument that civil unrest is often effective when conventional
legislation fails is well stated in this article, and some interesting
examples are given of violence as a political device in New York City.

Richards, Leonard, Gentlemen of Property and Standing: Anti-Abolition
Mobs in Jacksonian America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Approach: Historical

This study has two main goals: first, to uncover the causes behind
elite participation in the violent and organized anti-abolition riots
of the 1830s; and secondly, to examine the ebb and flow of collective
violence against abolitionists, what types of riots there were, the
social characteristics of the participants, and the reasons for the rise
and decline of anti-abolition riots.

Anti-abolition crowds were not motivated by the oftentimes inflamma-
tory rhetoric of the anti-slavery movement. According to the author,
violence was precipitated by the establishment of organized and well-
funded abolitionist societies which threatened the older colonization
societies, favoring the repatriation of blacks to Africa, not racial
assimilation.

Drawing upon Niles' Register (a compilation of nationwide newspaper
reports), the author established that collective violence against aboli-
tionists affected all parts of the country, rural as well as urban areas.
The rhythm of anti-abolitionist violence was affected, again, not by
the rhetoric of the abolitionists but by their actions. The more aboli-
tionists agitated through the postal system, in the halls of Congress,
and in street demonstrations, the greater was the violent response of the
anti-abolitionists. Mob action against the abolitionists declined when
the abolition societies ran out of funds in the late 1830s and when the
question of slavery in the territories gained national prominence.

The typical anti-abolition mob was a well-planned and well-organized
group action, led by prominent local citizens. The author has drawn
an interesting profile of these elites by examining city registers, manu-
script censuses, newspaper reports, and some arrest records. These
rioters were likely to be native born professional men engaged in com-
mercial enterprise, "high church" Protestants (Episcopalian), and were
in most cases part of the local poltical establishment. It was not
unusual for sheriffs, district attorneys, businessmen, doctors and
other well-placed citizens to become part of an anti-abolitionist mob.
In contrast, abolitionists were drawn from the rising manufacturing class,
artisans, and journeymen workers, and were more often foreign born
and members of lesser Protestant churches. In the author's view, the
anti-abolition mobs were threatened by abolitionism not simply because
some northerns stood to gain by the continued existence of slavery,
but because radical abolitionism bypassed traditional patterns of power
and influence and provided a vision of society based on a non-hierarchical
egalitarianism. Anti-abolition mobs were an aggrieved elite class of
men who sought to protest their social dominance and the traditional
values of deference, hierarchy and elite leadership in the face of
sweeping economic and cultural change.

Comments:

The basic question which the author has not faced in this outstanding work is why elites resorted to violence. Presumably, if elites organized and directed mob action, they were also in a position to manipulate the political system in favor of their own position. The resort to violence was a desperate action by men in an apparently non-desperate situation.

Rosen, George, "Social Change and Psychopathology in the Emotional
    Climate of Millennial Movements," The American Behavioral
    Scientist, 16, 2, 1972, 153-67.

Approach: Historical/Theoretical
Methodology: Descriptive

        This is an overview of the psychological characteristics and
social conditions of "millennial movements" in Europe, Asia, Africa,
North or South America, and Oceania. The doctrine of millennium is
defined as the "idea of intervention by a define leader who would
deliver his people from oppression and usher in a promised age of
peace and plenty." Movements based on this belief occur as a response
of people who cannot improve their condition by ordinary means and
turn to "religious developments for salvation." The impulse occurs
under conditions where a group of people finds itself dominated by
another group or where people believe themselves collectively trapped
in a situation. In seeking to escape, they may try to destroy the
old order and create a new and better one, or they may withdraw into
a compensatory inner world.

        In these situations, "messiahs" may appear who promise to free
the group from their troubles either through material or spiritual
means. Members of these movements, sometimes called "revitalization
movements," frequently exhibit such bizarre behavior as frenetic
dancing in group, falling into trances, twitching, convulsions, which
observers attribute to mass psychopathology. The group may harbor
or even be led by mentally disturbed or emotionally disordered indi-
viduals. According to this author the movements occur in emotional,
explosive situations where a contradiction exists between cultural
goals and the means of attaining them. Such movements may help
disordered individuals function and may be vehicles by which frus-
trated individuals can express their need for action.

Comments:

        This paper, attempting in only a few pages to summarize centuries
of history and social movements, lacks focus and seems to ramble,
although the purpose -- interpreting millennial movements as social
as well as psychological events and viewing them in their historical
context -- could be usefully carried out in a longer, more rigorous
study. Such a work would define the dynamics of millennial movements
more thoroughly and help to interpret current examples, like the
Jonestown group.

Rude', George, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in
France and England, 1730-1848, New York: Wiley, 1964.

Approach: Historical

This study is divided into two basic parts. In the first part, the
author examines rural and urban crowd action in England and France as
well as a number of specific riots, insurrections, and other instances
of collective violence. The second part is an analysis of the "preindus-
trial crowd" as a distinct historical phenomenon.

The author maintains that this period warrants study because it served
as a transitional bridge between distinctly medieval forms of crowd action
and more modern types of collective behavior. The millenarian social
protest movements of the middle ages, especially among the rural popula-
tion, were largely unrealistic attempts to establish otherworldly goals
in an inhospitable social climate. In contrast, modern collective action
is characterized by mass political organizations with well-defined, for-
ward-looking goals that can realistically be achieved. The preindustrial
period (roughly 1700-1850) saw the beginning and ultimate triumph of the
modern type of collective action.

In examining this transitional period, the author drew upon tradi-
tional and non-traditional sources, including newspapers, police records,
and parish registers to understand who the participants were, why they
acted, and how their actions affected the responses of the authorities.

Many of the chapters on specific riots and rebellions offer a view of
how uneven, slow, and at times mixed the transition was to modern collec-
tive action. For example, the typical form of social protest in rural
areas was the food riot, precipitated by the desire of villagers to lower
the price of grain in times of distress. Except for the harassment of
merchants and millers, there were no political overtones in these affairs
until the French Revolution when the food riot was turned into an explicit-
ly political action. Rude' sees new ideas of social justice and the poli-
tical philosophy of the Enlightenment as important in modernizing the
older forms of collective action.

Urban riots were more varied and distinctly more political than rural
food riots. In the Wilkite riots of the 1760s and 1770s protest was
aimed directly at government policies, but not to capture state power.
In the development of mass urban crowd action, the period 1798 to 1850
was crucial because it saw the growth of popularly based social movements
aimed at bringing about wider political participation, as in the case
of English Chartism, and a direct assault on aristocratic power as in
the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848.

From these case studies, the author establishes several important
points about the crowd in this period. He argues that the riff-raff
theory of LeBon and other crowd psychologists does not fit the preindus-
trial world. Participants in collective violence were not vagrants,
criminals or other undesirable social elements. Rather, the vast majority

were sober householders and citizens with established, though usually modest, positions in the community. In rural areas participants were usually small peasant proprietors, rural craftsmen, or landless laborers. In urban centers they were typically small shopkeepers, artisans, servants, laborers, miners, or weavers. Again, contrary to LeBon, the author asserts that crime and social protest were not synonymous in these disturbances. At times criminals may have taken advantage of social conflict, but the slum elements of the great cities were not the shock troops of crowd action. Crowds were motivated by principals and beliefs that show a mix between pre-modern and modern collective action. In the first half of this period, motives and "ideology" were often based on the attempt to preserve traditional practices against the encroachments of new technologies and the demands of the state. The later half of the period saw the emergence of more forward-looking social protest in which demands were made not for the restoration of lost rights and practices, but for a new configuration of political participation and power. Clearly, the author concludes, the preindustrial crowd was not fickle, irrational, or pathological. It knew what it wanted and over the years learned how to achieve some of its goals.

Comments:

This important study suggests several possibilities for research in the American context and shows that crowd action and social protest are not static phenomenon, but involve processes that require much time in which to develop and mature.

Schwartz, David C., "On the Ecology of Political Violence: The Long
   Hot Summer as a Hypothesis," American Behavioral Scientist,
   11, 6, 1968, 24-28.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Abstract:

This attempt to see if any relation exists between climate and the
frequency of certain types of political violence tests two hypotheses:
(1) the "long hot summer" theory that violence is greatest in the
warmest months and the warmest regions; and (2) the "temperate weather
activity" theory that violence is most frequent in zones and periods of
moderate climate.

Using a sample of 51 nations (excluding North America) for which
data on violent incidents were available in the Feierabends' Cross-
National Data Bank from 1948 to 1964, Schwartz constructed frequency
measures of five forms of political violence: coups, assassinations,
terrorism, guerilla warfare, and revolts. He identified 340 events,
using the formal code index of these activities. Monthly data were
also gathered on average maximum temperature, median relative humidity,
and average rainfall for representative sites in each of the 51
nations.

Political violence in the countries was found to be disproportionately
associated with periods of moderate temperature, high humidity, and high
monthly rainfall. Climate was less important as a factor in assassina-
tions, incidents of terrorism, and other, less organized and more
spontaneous forms of political violence than in more organized forms.
In fact, revolts, which are one of the most organized forms of sustained
violence were most clearly associated with particular climatic condi-
tions, being especially frequent in countries with hot humid weather.
Countries with high humidity and those with more temperate climates
tended to have more violence than the less humid nations, but they
were also less likely to be economically developed. In short, these
data do not support the "long hot summer" thesis that extreme tempera-
tures lead to violence, but they do lend some validity to the "moderate
temperature activity" hypothesis.

Comments:

Unfortunately Schwartz was limited by a lack of precise data on
both climate and violence. The exact location and time of the outbreaks
of violence were unknown and so the data on violence were aggregated
at the national level and the weather locales were similarly constructed.
Moreover, the weather data were aggregated into quartile periods conse-
quently the high average rainfall associated with political violence,
for example, would not necessarily mean that these events occurred when
it was raining. Since the climatic conditions were designated on the
basis of temperature and humidity during an average three-month period,
it was impossible to compare the results with other findings, which

have shown that riots tend to break out immediately after spells of unusually hot weather.

Throughout the analysis, Schwartz notes an interaction between climate and the level of development of the nation: "nations which significantly overrepresent violence in the temperate quartiles are more developed, judged by per capita gross national product, than the other nations," and "nations which are higher in relative humidity do tend to be more violent than their less humid -- and significantly less developed -- counterparts." But he does not control for this fact in his analysis. In his conclusions he suggests that the level of development of the nation may influence the degree to which violent events are reported, and for this reason he acknowledges that to some extent his findings may be invalid. But he does not come to terms with the possibility that the significance of climate may be a spurious conclusion because of the correlation between climate and economic development.

Scott, Joan W., The Glassworkers of Carmaux, Cambridge: Harvard University
      Press, 1975.

Approach: Historical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

      In this study of glassworkers in the town of Carmaux, Department of
the Tarn, in southern France during a critical period of transition in
their status from highly skilled, respected, and mobile workers to unskilled
proletarians, Scott challenges several traditional explanations of how and
why workers react under the process of proletarianization. She maintains
that traditional arguments about a linear evolution of working-class con-
sciousness are not adequate. Workers whose skilled status had been diluted
by technological changes did not turn to protest and socialist ideology
because they had become proletarianized. Rather, protest was a consequence
of skilled worker mobilization to prevent proletarianization. In Carmaux
the glassworkers formed a union as a last ditch effort to block further
degradation of their status. Socialist ideology and leadership were not
determinative in mobilizing protest.

      Prior to 1880, French glassworkers enjoyed virtually total control
over conditions of employment. A strict hierarchy of skill governed who
was admitted to the trade (usually sons of glassworkers), when advancement
within the trade would take place, and what quality standards were accep-
table. Glassworkers were highly mobile, moving from town to town as market
factors dictated. Mobility also isolated glassworkers from the more
sedentary groups of workers in the towns where they worked. High wages and
job control were also important factors in explaining the political con-
servatism of glassworkers. Beginning about 1880, however, technological
advancements in glassmaking undermined the status, job control, and wages
of glassworkers. As the ancient secrets of the trade became mechanized
and less difficult to learn, industrialists increased their own control of
working conditions vis-a-vis the glassworkers. Throughout the 1880s and
1890s the hierarchy of decision-making among glassworkers was replaced by
management control. Fewer sons of glassworkers entered the trade, while
unskilled peasants from the surrounding areas easily gained entry into an
increasingly unskilled industry. The development of the glassworkers
union had its origins in the attempt to recapture control over job condi-
tions and production standards. The decision to unionize and to embrace
socialist politics was not made by fully proletarianized workers, but by
skilled workers in the process of proletarianization.

      Despite the fact that the union arose as an agency of skilled workers,
technological changes far outstripped labor's ability to protect its
position. By the time of the great strike of 1895 the union in reality
represented a body of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Scott has done
a good job of examining the records of the local police, church, and indus-
trialists to show how conservative elites combined to defeat the strike
and the socialists in the subsequent elections.

      New workers at Carmaux resisted unionization because wages and condi-
tions in the old plant were an improvement over their former peasant status.
The decline of the union at Carmaux accompanied the passing of the occupa-
tional crisis which marked the lives of the older skilled workers. New

workers accepted proletarianization, while the older workers attempted to establish an alternative structure of job control. Thus, the decline of militancy was occasioned by the emergence of a new kind of glassworker.

Comments:

Scott's historiographical methods are in the main traditional. She has culled the census returns to determine the characteristics of glass-workers and their families before and after the crisis of the 1880s. In addition, her work in the police archives demonstrates how police acted as agent provocateurs and informers. Control over the police was in the hands of the local notables, and this control was used to disrupt labor meetings and at times to imprison laborers under dubious pretenses.

Taft, Philip and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character and Outcome," in H. Graham and T. Gurr (Eds.), Violence in America, Historical and Comparative Perspectives, for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, New York, 1969.

Approach: Historical/Descriptive
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

In what is essentially an historical recitation of violent events connected to the rise of labor unions in America from 1870 to the present, the authors argue that "...the U.S. had the bloodiest and most violent labor history of any industrial nation in the world... Labor violence was unquestionably pervasive and intense, occurring in every region, in almost every type of industry and with great frequency in almost every decade from the 1870s to the 1930s. At one of its peaks, between 1902 and 1904, the loss of life reportedly exceeded that of recent ghetto riots in both absolute and relative terms."

They conclude that the most consistent reason for violence was the refusal of those in authority to allow the aggrieved the right to organize and protest; and that the attitudes taken by management in response to unresolved disputes led to increased violence. However, they also note that despite the elimination of this cause (i.e., the acceptance of unions), violence in labor has persisted. However, "present day violence is by and large the result of accidental and random events which occasionally erupt in a picket line confrontation."

Comments:

This is basically a very detailed historical article. Those interested in specific labor strikes will find great amounts of information here. However, the authors themselves wonder if labor violence is a unique type of violence or whether it is part of larger societal problems.

Tilly, Charles, Louis Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century,
    1830-1930, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Approach: Theoretical/Historical

    This study examines the way in which urbanization and industrialization
transformed the character of collective violence in France, Italy, and
Germany over a one-hundred year period. The authors challenge the so-
called "breakdown" theories of LeBon, Durkheim, Weber, and Smelser, and
posit a "solidarity-articulated interest" theory of their own to explain
collective action. This theory emerges from an analysis of the relation-
ship between collective violence and more traditional indices of social
disorders such as crime, suicide, strike activity, and political action.

    In the first section on France, Charles Tilly summarizes Durkheim's
theory of anomie and social discontinuity which posited that rioting,
criminal extremism in crowds, and personal disorientation are direct re-
sults of the collapse of traditional solidarity bonds. While conceding
that anomie occurs on the individual level, Tilly argues that it is not
translated into collective outbursts of violence, and modernization does not
in itself cause collective violence. He maintains that there are three
stages of collective violence. The first stage, primitive collective vio-
lence, characterized by family feuds and communal brawls, essentially died
out by the eighteenth century. The second stage, reactive violence, exempli-
fied the efforts of parochial interest groups such as peasants or workers
to resist the new demands made by the state or industrialization. In this
stage participants in violence sought to restore traditional rights and re-
source allocation. The final stage, called proactive, involved the modern-
ization of action and violence. Here violence was instigated not as a re-
storative measure but as a forward-looking effort, usually by industrial
workers to redesign the configuration of power and the division of resources
based on new economic and political conditions. The Rebellious Century
concentrates on the transition from the second to the third stage and the
maturation of collective action.

    In examining time series data on social disorders, the authors found
that criminal activity did not closely correspond to the fluctuation of
collective violence such as strikes or political rebellions, or with the
pace of urbanization and industrialization. By analyzing officially pub-
lished data on suicides and vagrancy supplemented with his own time series
on strikes, lockouts, and political violence, he argued that the rise in
arrests for vagrancy showed little relation to the shape of economic or poli-
tical violence. In short, the personal disorientation observed by LeBon   .
and Durkheim in nineteenth-century France did not accumulate into a mass
movement for change; collective violence was not a result of intolerable
strain.

    Unlike the breakdown theorists, Tilly maintains that four conditions
promoted the organizational solidarity in industry and elsewhere that led to
sustained collective action: 1) the absence of hereditary membership in
community and family (the shift from involuntary or communal associations
to voluntary associations); 2) a large population in daily contact; 3) the
accumulation of common lore, grievances, and political experience; 4) the

visible presence of an antagonist. The shift in the basis of collective action from communal to associative reflected the shift from a society organized in classes based on landed wealth to one stratified according to control of capital and labor. Inevitably, argues Tilly, the changing nature of collective action changed collective violence as well. In France, for instance, the shift towards proactive action and violence (c. 1830) corresponded to the decline of the food riot, which called for the imposition of a "just price," and the rise of the strike which had as its object an increase in wages. Clearly, the new industrial bases of association among workers changed the complexion of collective actions.

In Louise Tilly's chapter on Italy and in Richard Tilly's chapter on Germany, similar conclusions are drawn. Louise Tilly found little collective violence in Italy as a result of the deprivations created by industrialization, and in referring to David Snyder's study of Italian strikes between 1878 and 1924, argued that there is no real relation between the fluctuations of industrial activity and strike activity. Richard Tilly made the same claims for Germany.

In rejecting the Durkheimian theory of collective violence, the Tillys have embraced what they call a "solidarity-articulated interests" point of view. Rejecting the position that collective violence is a result of blind rage, manipulation, or large scale structural weaknesses caused by immiseration or anomie, violence is seen as one outcome of collective action--the result of a struggle for power when one group resists the claims of another. Although the distribution of collective violence is not random, neither does it correspond to the pace of urbanization or industrialization in a direct sense. The crests of collective violence occurred at times of national struggles for power (France-1830, 1848-51, 1879-71; Italy-1890s, 1921-22; Germany-1920-33) in which new claims of social justice emerge to challenge the dominant ideas about controlling the distribution of resources.

Comments:

The Tillys have done much to effectively refute the LeBon-Durkheim position on collective action, and have also offered a counter theory. Collective action and violence were not the result of modernization per se, but of newly articulated demands for social justice based on modern associative ties. It is unfortunate that in limiting the time period from 1830-1930, the discussions of Fascist violence in Italy and Nazi violence in Germany are not developed. This would be particularly desirable since all three authors claim that the levels of collective violence in each country are closely associated with struggles for power on the national level.

Tilly, Charles, "Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750-1830,"
In The Dynamics of Social Movements, Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy
(Eds.), Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1979, pp. 126-55.

Approach: Historical/Theoretical

The basic argument of this chapter is that "repertoires of collective
action" (i.e., the forms or strategies generally used) differ according to
the particular time, place and population. These repertoires are well de-
fined and quite limited in comparison to the range of actions that are
theoretically available to contesting parties, change slowly, and signifi-
cantly constrain the strategy and tactics of collective actors. A flexible
repertoire leaves some room for change and for the pursuit of relatively
unfamiliar tactics, but still constrains the actor by setting limits beyond
which he will not go. A rigid repertoire is highly constraining and con-
fines the actor to familiar tactics except perhaps in crises.

By sketching the repertoires of collective action in America and England
between 1750 and 1830, he found both similarities and differences. There
was a parallel movement away from the actions occurring at authorized public
ceremonies to preplanned meetings of people organized around a particular
interest. · Yet, there were differences between the two countries during the
same time periods. .The food riot which was a frequent occurrence in Britain
in the 18th century was rare in America.

In trying to develop a set of factors to account for change and varia-
tion in the repertoires, he concentrates on four major variables: the pat-
tern of repression; the accumulated experience of the actor with prior col-
lective action; the daily routines and organization of the population;
and the standards of rights and justice that prevail.

> "The line of analysis...does not deny the relevance of interests
> or dissatisfactions to a population's action. But it insists on
> the importance of mediating factors: the internal organization of
> groups, the current opportunities to act effectively, the available
> repertoires of contention. It suggests, furthermore, that changing
> interests and dissatisfactions account for little of the short-run
> variation in contention, whereas changing opportunities and internal
> organization account for a great deal of it."

Comments:

In this attempt to dissect the reasons for the choice of particular
strategies, tactics, and modes of contention used by various challenging
groups, Tilly finds that there is some support for the notion that most
collective action is undertaken by actors with flexible repertoires and
that some innovation of tactics does take place. However, he concedes that
the similarities in the forms of action used in America and Britain could
have resulted from the similarities in interests, organizations, and oppor-
tunities in those two countries rather than because they had similar reper-
toires that constrained their actions. Tilly may have also neglected to
look at the impact of diffusion processes (or lack of them) in accounting
for changes and variations in these repertoires.

Tilly, Charles and Abdul Lodhi, "Urbanization, Crime and Collective Violence in 19th Century France," American Journal of Sociology, 79, 2, 1973, 296-318.

Approach: Historical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

During the period 1831-1861, France experienced a surge of industrialization and urbanization. Drawing on three sources of data--national censuses conducted at five year intervals, newspapers and political yearbooks, and annual reports of criminal justice in France--the authors explore the relationships between and among urbanization, crime (both against persons and against property), and collective violence. In dealing with these data the authors seek to distinguish two general kinds of arguments: structural arguments, which stress the "impact of organization and setting on the form of individual and collective action," and tension arguments, which treat "disapproved behaviors as responses to strains and disorientations." That distinction is paralleled concretely by the (operationalized) concepts of urbanity, which refers to a structural condition--the proportion of a population "living in communes of 10,000 persons or more at a given point in time," and urbanization, which refers to the rate of change in that proportion, which may produce tension.

The authors cite data for three particular census years--1841, 1846, and 1851--because the data for those years is exceptionally complete. These 'shapshots' reveal that in each of these three years there was a strong positive relationship between property crimes and urbanity, and a somewhat weaker correlation between urbanity and crimes against persons. Yet throughout the overall study period, property crimes declined as a function of increasing urbanization. While the authors offer no explanation for this decline, they point out that it casts doubt on the popular notion that urbanization causes crime. That notion is grounded on the assumption that urbanization creates tension and that crime represents the release of that tension. Rather, the authors favor the notion that organizational conditions associated with a high level of urbanity are responsible for high levels of property crimes--that is, they favor a 'structural' argument over a 'tension' argument. Crimes against persons showed "a minor and irregular decline" during the study period, casting further doubt on the 'tension' model.

"Collective violence fluctuated independently of crimes against property and crimes against persons," according to the authors, "and much more sharply than either one of them." Collective violence showed no relation to urbanization, but varied as a function of struggles for power at the national level--again, a negative conclusion with regard to the 'tension' hypothesis.

The authors conclude that, at least for France during the period studied, the 'structural' argument, which treats crime and collective violence in terms of "the structure of power, and the capacity of deprived groups for collective action," is a more reasonable explanation of these phenomena than the 'tension' argument, which, reminiscent of Durkheim, operates on the assumption that increasing urbanization leads to "individual malaise" and the dissolution of social ties.

Comments:

Although the interpretation made by the authors rejected the 'tension'
theories of social disorganization causing collective violence and crime,
they admit that "one simple way to hold on to the idea of both phenomena
as responses to normlessness (or some related condition) is to claim
that normlessness is intrinsic to urban organization itself instead of
a consequence of change in that organization...Our evidence cannot rule
it out." Moreover, they remind the reader that the pattern of findings
might be a result of changes or variations in reporting procedures rather
than actual changes in criminal or collective behavior. Still, the article
is quite important in proposing that criminal activity and collective be-
havior be treated as quite different sorts of behavior, each requiring
substantially different explanations and methods of investigation.

Wallace, Michael, "The Uses of Violence in American History," The American
Scholar, 41, 1, Winter 1970-71, 81-102.

Approach: Historical

The article is a survey of the kinds of violence that have marked
American history. The author focuses on violence as an aspect of group
relations and examines incidents of racial, economic and ethnic conflict.
He proposes that the bulk of violence in America has been repressive
violence, i.e., violence used by powerful groups against subordinate groups
in society.

In support of this thesis he points to the racial suppression of blacks
by whites both before and after the Civil War, the economic oppression
of labor by capital, and the political and economic oppression of re-
cent immigrants by established ethnic groups.

With regard to racial conflict, he gives examples of white attacks
on black communities in the North before the Civil War, prompted by racism
and by fear of economic competition from liberated blacks. Wallace iden-
tifies the years of Reconstruction in the South as a major period of racial
violence in the U.S. The commonest violence in the 1860s and 1870s was
individual intimidation of blacks by whites who were led in many cases
by local officials and police on rampages of burning and lynching. When
the federal government ceased to use force to maintain radical reconstruc-
tion governments in the South, the black communities were left defense-
less against white violence. While the author did not fully explain the
decline of lynching as a form of racial violence in the 20th century, he
does mention black migration to the North and an increase in black
assertiveness as related to the emergence of a new form of racial vio-
lence--race riot. He pointed out that in the course of the 20th century,
the pattern of white aggression changed from spontaneous violence against
blacks to systematic police repression. At the same time, black resis-
tance to discrimination, unemployment, and police violence became more
militant and led to the urban disorders of the 1960s.

Wallace choses to limit his discussion of economic violence to con-
frontations between labor and capital. Wildcat strikes and outbursts
against managers and business property in the early 19th century were
caused by the legal proscription of labor unions. After the 1840s with
the increasing discipline of trade unions, labor violence declined but
violence on the part of owners and managers increased. Capitalists de-
veloped private resources of violence which were reinforced by local
militias and federal troups. His central point is that with the develop-
ment of union discipline in the later 19th century, labor seldom initiated
violence except for the occasional destruction of employers' property.
In the "60 years of industrial war" (1870-1930) labor violence was directed
against strike breakers more often than against capital. The 1930s was a
period in which the government managed to call a truce between labor
and capital and began to assume a role of arbitration rather than one
of support for the dominant economic interests. It was also a period
in which the strength of organized labor grew sufficiently to make vio-
lence counter-productive and too expensive for capitalists.

Wallace saw a similar pattern of repressive violence in ethnic conflict in the U.S. However, the successive waves of immigration kept a rigid ethnic hierarchy from developing so that no single ethnic group controlled the state in the way that whites and capitalists did. Ethnic groups confronted one another in competition for economic opportunity, housing, and in an effort to win elections. Violence against newly arrived ethnic groups most often was the result of nativist fears of economic and political competition.

Comments:

The examples which the author gives to support his view that the bulk of violence in America has been that of the strong against the weak generally supported his thesis; however, much more data could and should have been used. No effort was made to catalog and quantify all incidents of violence in the three categories he discusses. The examples illustrate his points, but do not offer final proof of the overarching hypothesis. The author does suggest that there are other types of purposive violence to probe and that the interaction between domestic and international violence should be explored (e.g., why most racial violence occurs during wartime and how racism shapes U.S. foreign policy).

Wood, Gordon, "A Note on Mobs in the American Revolution," William and
Mary Quarterly, 23, 4, October 1966, 635-42.

Approach: Theoretical/Historical

In this essay, the author draws upon the recent work of European
historians to challenge the traditional notion that 18th century American
crowd action was unique. Many American historians have suggested
that American mobs behaved differently from their European counterparts.
Where European mobs have been seen as extraordinarily violent, spontan-
eous, nondiscriminating about the objects of their attacks, and seized
by an irrational mental state, the American crowd was viewed as moder-
ate, rational and motivated by "real" grievances. The author rejects
this position. He maintains that European and American crowds were
in fact very similar to one another. Both behaved rationally, moder-
ately, and in response to genuine grievances. According to the author,
the work of George Rude' has established this point beyond question
and has destroyed the myth of American uniqueness. The basic distin-
guishing feature of European and American mobs was the almost total lack
of resistance to mob action by the authorities in America. The author
suggests that the American Revolution may have escaped the escalated
violence of the French Revolution and later revolutions because of the
dearth of resistance to popular crowd action.

Comments:

The author may be correct, that official non-resistance to crowd
action was probably the reason for the "moderate" tone of the American
Revolution, or any other social conflagration. Unfortunately, the
reasons behind the acquiescence of the American authorities were not
explored or developed.

RIOTS AND CIVIL DISORDERS

Abudu, Margaret J.G., Walter J. Raine, Stephen L. Burbeck and Keith L.
Davison, "Black Ghetto Violence: A Case Study Inquiry into the Spatial
Pattern of Four Los Angeles Riot Event-Types." Social Problems,
19, 3, 1972, 408-26.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

A riot is not "all hell breaking loose" but a complex sociopolitical
process -- a form of attempted communication which is as articulate as
more conventional forms of political expression, such as voting or writing
one's congressman. Under this assumption, the authors attempted to anal-
yze the structure and patterns of four types of rioting during the Watts
disorder of 1965. Many of the independent structural variables used in
the study of more conventional forms of political behavior were relied
on here.

The authors first review the studies of riots using attitudinal/be-
havior variables and structural/environmental factors; then they examine
four specific types of action during the Los Angeles riot (fires, false
alarms, lootings, and rock throwing) as these relate to selected environ-
mental indices. Data on the rioting were obtained from police and fire
department records, unedited television film, newspaper accounts, and the
McCone Commission Report. Measures to avoid duplication revealed that
1,793 separate "events" took place. Data on the sociostructure of the
135 census tracts in the curfew area included the total number of retail
establishments of certain types, as well as 62 additional census variables,
of which 14 final factors were selected for regression analyses.

These census tracts showed a tremendous spread in the incidence and
frequency of each of the four types of rioting. Very few tracts had
no rioting. Clearly the riot was not a local phenomenon but was wide-
spread, involving heterogeneous census tracts.

Stepwise regression analyses found that fires tended to occur in
"black" tracts, those having large nonwhite populations and mostly non-
white unemployment, and tracts having large numbers of department stores
and retail establishments, and a higher proportion of the nonwhite popu-
lation with schooling through the eighth grade. These factors accounted
for 44 percent of the variance among census tracts in the incidence of
fires. False alarms also tended to occur in tracts of this kind, but
only 29 percent of the variance was explainable by these characteristics.
About 22 percent of the variance among tracts in instances of rock throw-
ing was explained by seven factors: a high degree of "blackness," a
large number of department stores, less dilapidation in the black neigh-
borhood, a higher proportion of respondents who had completed the eighth
grade, less deterioration in black housing, lower unemployment among
black males, and larger numbers of single, young black males. The authors
infer that "rock throwing is more prevalent in areas with large numbers
of young black males who are to some extent socially isolated, though
tending not to be unemployed."

Looting revealed a very different pattern from the other events: 61
percent of the variance among tracts was accounted for by the number of

department stores and other retail establishments, high black male un-
employment, and higher proportions of nonwhites who had completed the
eighth grade. "Looting appears to have been much more of an 'economic
thing' though, to be sure, carrying obvious political overtones; the
stores and the merchandise were present in substantial quantities, as
were significant numbers of unemployed black males, and the riot presented
an unparalleled opportunity for a redefinition of property rights and a
corresponding redistribution of property."

According to the authors these findings confirm the work of Spilerman
in showing that three of the four types of rioting are explained to a
remarkable degree by the number of blacks in a given tract; but they re-
fute the work of Banfield who attempted to characterize rioting as a
lower-class rather than a racial phenomenon. "This suggests that the phe-
nomenon of a concentration of ghettoized blacks in certain tracts creates
a community consciousness and mass base from which, even in the absence
of the incentive for quick material gain, personally risky and outwardly
hostile commissions of violence can comfortably spring and calls upon us
to view the black ghetto as an emerging social movement." They argue
further that because different kinds of rioting have different structures
and spatial patterns the past simplistic classifications and explanations
of rioting are no longer valid.

Comments:

This article is both interesting and provocative in relating specific
types of rioting to neighborhoods or census tracts with certain character-
istics. It is weakened, however, by problems in the measurement of the
independent variables and by interpretations far removed from the
analysis itself. The factor analyses performed on the 62 census variables,
reducing them to 14, made many of the indices unclear and confused.
Several of the factors overlapped; for example, the variable of black
unemployment was contained in three different factors. Many of the clusters
contained variables that were not clearly related to each other theoretically
-- and certainly not to the label attached to the factor. Further, the
characteristics of census tracts are related only to riot events. These
relations cannot be used to describe participants in the actions, only
the location of the incidents. Rioters and counterrioters often cross
tract lines and might have been likely to attack more populated, commer-
cial areas because these were more accessible or less subject to law
enforcement.

Akins, Carl, "The Riot Commission Report and the Notion of 'Political
     Truth'," Social Science Quarterly, 40, 3, 1968, 469-74.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Critical Review

     This article examines the Report to the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders with respect to actual issues and "political truth."
This Riot Commission is contrasted with the McCone Commission which
investigated the Watts riots of 1965 to clarify the notion of political
truth.

     According to several evaluations of the McCone Commission, its re-
ported findings were not supported by the data it collected. Specifically,
this commission was charged with having ignored racism in spite of the
evidence that the Watts disorders were manifestations of race problems
rather than class conflict. In contrast, the Riot Commission was credited
with providing ample evidence for its findings and conclusions. Yet the
notion of political truth is often invoked to explain the work of a par-
ticular commission, and neither the McCone or Riot Commission is an
exception.

     The notion of political truth is simply that such "truth" is more a
product of political acceptability than objectivity. Thus, the McCone
Commission advanced the "riff-raff" explanation for the Watts riots in
spite of the conflicting evidence provided by social scientists. The
Riot Commission did not find this explanation valid, nor did it find
evidence of any conspiracy. The evidence suggests that the Riot Commission
did not seek or find political truth: Akins thinks otherwise. His view
is that the political truth was the commission's major findings of per-
vasive racism -- a finding which largely ignores all the poverty also
described by the commission. Both poverty and racism are fully docu-
mented, and the author contends the former is at least as pervasive as
the latter. The Commission's emphasis on racism is therefore construed
as a political truth.

     Akins considers racism to be a comforting explanation for the riots:
supporters approve of the commission's recommendations for they find
justification for existing programs on welfare and the "War on Poverty";
opponents approve because the problem then concerns the "hearts of men,"
which cannot be changed by law. "Racism is as nebulous as the notion
of collective guilt -- meaningful yet vaguely disturbing. Both upset a
little but not too much, and neither is specific enough to require meaning-
ful action." Thus the finding of racism is a politically acceptable
answer for the seeker of political truth.

     The explanation based on racism is also described by Akins as a
political truth in the sense that it has presented a new problem for the
attention of the public and media alike. In his view, an emphasis on the
"dull and unpleasant" problem of poverty could not be expected to have
the impact that charges of racism would. So, although the commission
found a different and unexpected political truth, it exemplifies the

conscious or unconscious ploy of using "a group of 'moderates' (after careful study) to advocate a set of 'radical' conclusions and policy recommendations."

The reception of the commission's report by most political leaders has been unfavorable, but Akins sees no clear reason for rejection. The two major criticisms leveled at the Report -- failure to give credit for what has been done and failure to consider costs -- do not challenge the veracity of the findings or the need for the recommendations. Akins contends that the public's reception of this and other commission reports and their subsequent use should be systematically studied. Moreover, he calls on political scientists to consider in such study the question of whether their efforts contribute to objective truth or political truth.

Comments:

Akins' commentary makes a valid point concerning the nature of political truth, but it seems to carry the notion to its limit in the case of the Riot Commission. The report of the commission clearly documents poverty and its recommendations deal less with racism than with poverty. While the media may have capitalized on the findings of racism, it was hardly a "new problem" that would stir the collective imagination. Akins does not make it clear whether the "political truth" of pervasive racism has its source in the commission or in the interpreters of its Report. Nevertheless the primary need is still to recognize the influence of both poverty and racism in civil disorder. The Report's conclusions and recommendations suggest just such an interplay of these factors.

Aldrich, Howard, Albert Reiss, "The Effect of Civil Disorders on Small
      Businesses in the Inner City," Journal of Social Issues, 26, 1,
      1970, 187-206.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Survey Research

      This paper deals with the impact of the 1967 and 1968 racial dis-
orders on small business firms.   Studied were the damages suffered and
changes in the problems and attitudes of managers or proprietors.   Data
were obtained from a 1966 panel study of small businesses in the inner
cities of Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. with a follow-up study
in 1968.

      Among all businesses in riot areas, 24 percent were materially
affected by the disorders, suffering either damage or looting.   Arson
and looting were directed against 31 percent of the retail businesses
and 18 percent of the service businesses.   Little racial turnover in
ownership was found.

      As for insurance, cancellation rates were found much higher in riot
areas than elsewhere.   Virtually no difference in rates of premium in-
creases was found, however, since companies are normally prohibited from
charging different rates in different parts of a city.   Difficulties in
obtaining insurance also affected ability to obtain credit, and these
problems, along with riot losses, combined to make white owners of
businesses in the riot area more eager to relocate their firms than white
owners in other areas.   Black owners were less desirous of moving, how-
ever, owing to ties to the community and the difficulty of establishing
businesses in white areas.

      White businessmen had become more pessimistic about crime: 83 per-
cent of those in riot areas thought crime was increasing in 1968, as
opposed to 61 percent in 1966.   Those in nonriot areas were also pessi-
mistic, but not to the same extent (62 percent and 48 percent respectively).
Attitudes about the effect of the civil rights movement on police work
showed little change, though most sentiments were negative.   In both
riot and nonriot areas, there was a shift toward believing the police
were too lenient with lawbreakers.

      Riot area businesses were found to have taken more protective mea-
sures: of those who had taken 0-3 measures in 1966, 31 percent increased
this to 4-7.   A greater percentage of these firms were taking the larger
number of measures than was true in nonriot areas.   More riot area busi-
nessmen had guns, but this had been so before the riots.   A higher per-
centage of black businessmen had guns.   Though it seemed paradoxical,
businessmen in riot areas were more likely to give or lend money to
residents.

Comments:

      Interpreting the findings about attitudes among residents of riot

areas, this paper presents the small businessman as having a siege mentality and being fearful of the residents. A direct comparison of the attitudes held by the two groups could be illuminating: what did residents feel about their local merchants and how did the merchants perceive the situation?

Allen, Vernon L., "Toward Understanding Riots: Some Perspectives,"
    Journal of Social Issues, 26, 1, 1970, 1-18.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Literature Review

This essay introducing a selection of articles "organized to reflect
the view that an adequate explanation of riots requires coordination of
conceptual systems, frames of reference, and empirical data taken from
several social science disciplines" integrates much of the current ma-
terial on collective disorders and urban riots. Allen contrasts six
views of riots: 1) they were senseless and devoid of message or meaning;
2) they were mere manifestations of large-scale criminal behavior incited
by outside elements; 3) they continued an old American tradition of race
riots; 4) they were part of the worldwide revolutionary movement to over-
throw white colonialism; 5) they chiefly result from a class conflict;
and 6) they represent protest against ghetto life. In his opinion only
the last explanation is valid.

Theories and research on riots must specify the conditions that pro-
voke riots and do so with such precision that a particular set of con-
ditions can be recognized as leading to riots, and others as inducing
different forms of collective behavior or individual reactions. They must
also explain why riots occur at certain times and places and explore var-
iations in the degree and type of participation. Other features to be
studied are the attitudes of rioters, their relations with each other,
and the influence exerted by the crowd. Also important is the way control
is exercised and its effectiveness. Finally, the consequences of riots
cannot be ignored.

Comments:

This is a clear and concise discussion of the literature on riots,
based largely on the material in the rest of the journal. It is a useful
means of reviewing the conclusions as well as the theoretical gaps of
research on this topic.

Anderson, William A., "The Reorganization of Protest: Civil Disturbances
and Social Change in the Black Community," American Behavioral
Scientist, 16, 3, 1973, 426-39.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Anderson discusses some of the changes that occurred in the black
community as a result of the civil disturbances of the 1960s, using data
collected from semistructured interviews with members of black groups
and organizations in several cities. The thesis is that the riots
created a disturbance for the black as well as the white community be-
cause they called into question the adequacy of the black community's
established approach to civil rights.

The urban disturbances of the 1960s were viewed as "protopolitical
movements" because they represented an early form of political behavior
which might result in more structured political activity. In this article
the restructuring of black community organizations during and after the
disturbances involved changes in roles of black leaders, the emergence
of new groups, and changes in established groups, as well as modifications
in intergroup relations.

Many of the new groups emphasized black nationalism and self-determi-
nation for the black community, economically, culturally, and politically.
Some of these groups were only on the periphery of the black protest move-
ment because of their dependence on white sources, such as the War on
Poverty, for funds.

Many established civil rights groups were embarrassed by the riots
which symbolized the black masses' repudiation of their leadership and
because white officials often criticized these groups for failing to
enforce nonviolent means of protest. Many of these older groups assumed
a more militant posture and emphasized greater grassroots involvement in
order to win more esteem from the black poor and to meet the challenge
to their leadership posed by the emerging militant groups. Other groups
which had not been political expanded their activities to include poli-
tical or quasi-political projects and programs so that they would be more
responsive to the problems of the black community.

Open breaks and power struggles developed between militant and moder-
ate factions in some cities, but solidarity in the black community was
growing. Eventually this resulted in a symbiotic relationship between
some of the new black militant groups and established core groups. "The
militants provided the dramatic confrontation and political rhetoric
often required before bargaining could take place over black grievances.
Moderate black leaders in turn pointed to the spectre of militant groups
and the politicized black masses, who were seemingly poised for action,
as a lever for securing concessions from the white community." At the
same time, the black and white communities and groups were increasingly
polarized; and black leaders became more cautious about working with white
groups as a result of rising black militancy and self-determination.

Comments:

    This article is an interesting essay about the ramifications of
the riots for black organizations, but it is rather superficial and lacks
the specific detail and systematic evidence needed to support most of
the assertions.

Anderson, William, Russell Dynes, E.L. Quarantelli, "Urban Counter-
    rioters," Society, 11, 3, Mar/Apr 1974, 50-55.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Case Study

The Kerner Report hypothesized, without supporting evidence, that
"counterrioters" (i.e., people attempting to reduce conflict by appeal-
ing to others to refrain from acts of violence) during the urban riots
by blacks in the 1960s were supporters of the status quo. The Disaster
Research Center conducted interviews with "key individuals and groups"
(including some counterrioters) in six midwestern cities (no date given).
Three of these cities had major disturbances, two had minor disorders,
and one experienced no violence.

Four distinct types of black counterrioters were described accord-
ing to their motives for trying to restore peace. Opportunistic counter-
rioters become involved mainly from private ambition or interest, for
example, members of street gangs who hope to achieve status and become
leaders. Moral counterrioters object to violence because of a strong
sense of duty and responsibility, although they often believe in the goals
of blacks. Many of these people are ministers and traditional civil
rights activists. Functionary counterrioters are those required to become
involved as a result of their official positions in government and com-
munity agencies. Political counterrioters are those who have often advo-
cated violence by blacks, but use the riot for political gain. They
agree to help restore order in return for political and economic conces-
sions to the black community. Counterrioters indicated in interviews
that they were far more interested in protecting blacks by removing any
excuse for counterviolence by police than they were in preserving the
established structure.

The relation between the police and counterrioters during racial
crisis may be one of conflict, accommodation or cooperation, depending
on the earlier patterns of action between the police and these individuals,
as well as the specific circumstances during the disturbance. The authors
argue that the type of interaction is often quite independent of the type
of counterrioter. When political counterrioters become part of the scene
their interaction with the police is frequently marked with conflict be-
cause they call for a shift in authority and control arrangements in the
ghetto, and the police view such a call as a challenge to their legitimate
role. This is particularly true when the counterrioters are black mili-
tants or nationalists, because their earlier experiences with the police
have been marked by mutual mistrust and hostility.

Moral counterrioters are often accommodated by the police, parti-
cularly when they are recognized moderate or traditional black leaders.
Their record of leadership gives them legitimacy which the police cannot
completely ignore despite a feeling by some that these leaders are in the
way. Both functionary and opportunistic counterrioters are more likely
to have received cooperation and mutual support from the police and may
actually be recruited by the police and other authorities to help quell
disturbances.

Comments:

Although this article is useful in suggesting that not all counter-
rioters have the same motives for trying to keep peace, we are not given
enough information to evaluate the argument. No empirical data are
provided on the socio-demographic characteristics of these four types
of counterrioters, the kinds of disturbances they were involved in, the
effectiveness of their efforts, their relations with the police depart-
ment or the black community, or their attitudes toward the riots. The
article is purely speculative, although it was apparently based on field
studies in six cities. Further, there may be other, more important ways
of differentiating counterrioters than by their motives, such as the
various means they used to counterriot or their base of support for such
activity.

Baron, Robert A. and Victoria M. Ransberger, "Ambient Temperature and the
    Occurrence of Collective Violence: The 'Long Hot Summer' Revisited,"
    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 4, 1978, 351-60.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

This study examined archival data to see whether the relation between
ambient temperature and the likelihood of collective violence was curvi-
linear and whether the temperature most likely to be accompanied by
violence is the mid-to upper 80s. The authors also discuss the possibility
that collective outbreaks are related to shifts or changes in temperature.

Between 1967 and 1971 there were 102 separate instances of collective
violence in the United States which were recorded in the Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) and Violence in the
United States (1974). Fires, looting, and rock-throwing that lasted at
least one day, drew sizable crowds, and occasioned intervention by law
enforcement authorities were the only forms of violence selected for study.
Sixteen of these were related to Martin Luther King's assassination and
were analyzed separately, as well as being included with the other incidents.
All geographical regions of the United States were represented, and no
apparent relation was recorded between the general climatic conditions
in those areas and the frequency of riots.

The frequency of these incidents increased with a rising ambient
temperature approximately through the mid-80s. But further increases
in temperature sharply lessened the frequency of incidents. Less than 9
percent of the disorders occurred when temperatures were over 90 degrees;
such events therefore seem much more likely to occur when it is moderately
rather than extremely hot.

During the disorders related to Martin Luther King's assassination
as well as the others, the ambient temperature, which had risen before the
riot, dropped during the following days. The temperature remained fairly
high and stable during the actual rioting. The authors also found that
riots were more likely to occur during the warm summer months than at
other times.

To see if public celebrations of athletic victories showed the same
relation to temperature, the authors used newspapers and magazines to
identify 58 such celebrations in the victors' hometowns during 1967 and
1971. Public celebrations of this type were not found to be more likely
at certain temperatures than at others; they were related more closely to
specific events than to weather conditions.

Although they consider other explanations briefly, the authors suggest
from these results and earlier laboratory studies that "up to some deter-
minable level, increments in subjective discomfort cause individuals to
become increasingly irritable or annoyed, thus enhancing the likelihood
that they will respond aggressively to provocation, the presence of
aggressive models, or other aggression-evoking conditions. Beyond this
point, however, they experience such high levels of discomfort that res-

ponses incompatible with aggression become prepotent, and the likelihood
of such behavior is reduced."

Comments:

Obvious limitations in this study, recognized and discussed by the
authors, resulted from restricting the study to serious civil disorders
in the United States and the reliance on archival data. As they acknow-
ledge, collective violence represents highly complex behavior, and it is
undoubtedly influenced by many variables which were not measured in this
study. Their explanation that riots are due to the discomfort and irri-
tability of individuals is too simple; it disregards other factors
associated with temperature: the number of people on the street, the
consumption of alcoholic beverages, and seasonal scarcities of jobs for
youths, for example. Moreover, it fails to explain why riots did not
occur in many other areas with similar climatic conditions and why the
violence occurred in particular neighborhoods.

Baskin, Jane A., Ralph G. Lewis, Joyce H. Mannis and Lester W. Mc-
Cullough Jr., Race Related Civil Disorders 1967-1969, Report No. 1
Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, 1971; The Long, Hot
Summer? An Analysis of Summer Disorders, 1967-1971, Report No. 2,
Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University,
Waltham, Massachusetts.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

The primary source of data in these reports is newspaper accounts
obtained through a commercial service of civil disorders defined by
the Civil Disorder Clearing House. The authors note certain disadvan-
tages in using newspaper accounts: information is not always reliable;
details showing the actual sequence of events during disorders or their
consequences consequences of disorders are almost unobtainable; and the
actual incidence of civil disorders throughout the country does not
show up in newspapers since minor incidents may fail to qualify as good
news stories.

Civil disorders are defined as events in which crowds cause injury
or damage to persons or property, defy civil authority, or commit aggres-
sive disruptions which violate civil law, such as seizing buildings.
Race-related civil disorders are events in which members of one racial
or ethnic group commit aggressive or violent acts against members of
another group or their property, either real or symbolic.

Report No. 1: 1967-69

For the three-year period 1,816 accounts of race-related disorders
were obtained. Serious events, those involving arson, firebombing,
looting, sniping, or some combination of these numbered 701. Disorders
tended to be concentrated in the most urbanized regions of the country
and in cities with the largest proportions of black residents. A fourth
of all disorders, however, took place in communities with total popula-
tions of less than 25,000, and almost a third in cities where less than
10 percent of the population was black. Violent acts were as likely
to occur in small communities as in large cities and where there were
relatively small as well as large black populations.

Disorders attributed to blacks or to racially mixed groups were
usually spontaneous outbursts of aggression, combined with hostile ac-
tions between crowds of civilians and civil authorities. That is, there
was no connection between the incident that attracted the crowd and
the eventual outbreak of disorder, and a large proportion of the vio-
lence was precipitated by interaction with civil authorities. The larger
share of the disorders attributed to whites took place in small towns,
in the least-educated communities, and in southern states.

The character of the disorders changed between 1967 and 1969. A
shift occurred in the racial distribution of participants: almost
80 percent were black in 1967, compared to 40 percent in 1969. The

primary site of the disorders shifted from city streets to school build-
ings. Disorders were spread throughout the year rather than concen-
trated in the summer months, and the incidents became less serious.

The authors recommend improved training for police, particularly
in crowd control and human relations. They note that the disorders
they discuss are symptoms of problems; the immediate causes of dis-
orders need to be understood and those social injustices which are the
underlying causes need to be eliminated.

Report No. 2: 1967-71, Summer Disorders

The number of summertime disorders has decreased annually from a
high of 176 in 1967 to a low of 46 in 1971. In 1967 most of the dis-
orders took place in the summer, but in 1968-71 they became progres-
sively more diffused throughout the year. Civil disorders also be-
came less serious. During this period the disorders have tended to
occur in large cities with large black populations; they are less often
attacks by blacks on property and more often open hostilities between
two or more groups.

Changes have also taken place in the responses by civil authorities
to race-related disorders. There are fewer arrests, fewer calls on
the National Guard, and more occasions when authorities are willing to
negotiate.

Comments:

As the authors note, journalistic accounts are unsatisfactory
sources of data because the thoroughness of the coverage and the relia-
bility of the content are uncertain. Although the authors give a
general definition of race-related civil disorders, they furnish no
details or examples to clarify the concept. Because the analysis was
primarily based on inspection of two variable tables, such factors as
interaction effects could not be detected.

Bellisfield, Gwen, "White Attitudes Toward Racial Integration and the Urban Riots of the 1960s," Public Opinion Quarterly, 36, 4, Winter 1972-73, 579-84.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

A popular notion that urban riots in the 1960s undermined support for racial integration is tested with data collected in National Opinion Research Surveys for the years 1963-68, except 1967. Percentile trends in white support for racial integration are compared for 1) the nation as a whole, 2) for metropolitan areas (NORC sampling points) enclosing cities which experienced serious riots, and 3) for metropolitan areas which experienced no riots, roughly matched to riot-torn areas in terms of population size and geographic region. Metropolitan riot areas were identified through comparative reliability checks of several published lists of cities experiencing serious riots.

During the years 1963 to 1968, the study finds an overall upward trend in white support for integration of schools and housing among respondents of both sexes, living in urban and rural areas throughout the country, and in all age and education groups. But in areas affected by riots, positive sentiment grew more slowly following a riot, relative to the trend in the same areas in non-riot years, and relative to trends in matched non-riot areas during riot years. In conclusion, the author finds no evidence of a "white backlash" as a result of urban riots in the 1960s.

Comments:

Matched non-riot areas tended to be smaller in population size than their riot equivalents since most major metropolitan areas experienced at least one riot during the study years. These smaller population areas may also have had smaller populations of blacks in terms of absolute numbers and in proportion to the overall population. Thus, low density of the black population might by itself lead to support of integration in non-riot control areas.

"White backlash" can also be interpreted to mean support for increased social control, i.e., increased support for police force to quell ghetto disturbances, in spite of expressed sentiments favoring racial integration. There was, in fact, widespread public support for the use of violent police tactics against ghetto rioters. Further, despite verbalization of support for racial integration, large segments of the white population in riot-affected areas such as Detroit deserted the city and moved to suburban areas. In sum, perhaps it may be more accurate to say that whites' responses to survey questions about integration were conditioned by what appeared socially acceptable during a period of widely publicized civil rights agitation, while their feet led them in another direction.

Berk, R.A., "The Emergence of Muted Violence in Crowd Behavior: A Case Study of an Almost Race Riot," in James F. Short Jr., and Marvin Wolfgang, Collective Violence, Chicago: Aldine, 1972.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

Berk presents an analysis of data on a new elaboration of the "Northern" race riot. His paper updates Grimshaw's division of racial violence into "Southern" and "Northern" style riots. Southern style riots are more or less organized, one-sided attacks by whites against blacks and the black community. The 1906 Atlanta riot and the 1908 Springfield, Illinois riot are examples.

Causes are secular in the Northern type of riots, which grow out of a long period of constantly increasing tensions and black-initiated or reactive violence. The Chicago riot of 1919 and the riots in the 1960s are examples of Northern race riots. Grimshaw believes that Northern style riots will be the form future urban riots will take.

Janowitz's "commodity riots" and militant black organizational ideologies have been intensively reported by the media in recent years. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that whites have greatly altered their views about blacks, including their capacity for violence. Berk demonstrates that the new white respect for the capacity of the black community to engage in mass (or organized) violence alters the form that the Northern style race riot can take.

The data are presented in an analytical context based on Roger Brown's social psychological approach to mass violence. Payoff matrices are employed to represent the processes occurring within each member of the crowd. Each matrix is a one-person or a two-person game in which the individual tries to achieve the greatest payoff consistent with the actions he can expect from others and his own actions. The decision of the group to engage in action is thought to result from each individual's attempt to get the highest payoff cell in the matrix. The data consist of Berk's personal observations in Baltimore shortly after the assassination of Martin Luther King. The documented events show how "broad changes in white perceptions of ghetto blacks may influence the behavior of crowds during race riots and how individuals involved in the mob processes act in a manner that appears consistent with the theoretical concept of costs and benefits, payoff matrices, group decisions, and emergent norms."

The scenario was this: blacks began four days of looting and arson on April 6, 1968. A crowd of whites gathered on a boundary separating the white and black communities and began to discuss the spreading black riot, the need to protect the white community from attack, making various racial innuendoes aimed at "keeping blacks in their place." Members of the crowd were classed as agitators or followers in Berk's analysis.

Agitators circulated through the crowd trying to convince small groups of followers that the crowd must act. They tried to prove that the benefits of a confrontation would greatly outweigh the cost of taking action. Symbolic gestures, emotional displays, and tentative actions were used to persuade the crowd. For agitators, the benefits of acting always greatly outweigh the costs.

Followers differ considerably from actors, primarily in the benefits they expect from confrontation. The costs for the followers are: the risk of personal injury at the hands of blacks or police, the danger of arrest, and some psychological inhibitions regarding the proposed tactics. The fact that benefits closely approximate costs for followers partly accounts for their ambivalence and tendency to vaccilate.

The events that Berk documents show the processes that moved agitators and followers during the Baltimore riot. Physical violence was very slight when confrontations did occur between the white crowd and rioting blacks. Berk noted that the violence was very restrained, marked by an absence of the weapons commonly used in weekend brawls among these groups. Instead, Berk said the atmosphere suggested a sporting event, with rock-throwing and cheering supporters on both sides. The race riot did not encourage additional violence, but apparently brought about a lessening of hostilities between the groups. In effect, it served as a "cease fire."

H.L. Nieburg characterized ritual action as action "expressed in a kind of muted symbolic display with a symbolic response which changes attitudes and values without major and unlimited conflict." Berk feels that the actions he witnessed in Baltimore can be reasonably explained as a kind of ritual action. Violence was muted, and there was a wide range of symbolic actions. The decision not to engage in a full-scale race war resulted from a number of processes in addition to the obvious verbal exchanges of information that took place within the crowd. A consensus may have emerged among crowd members concerning payoff matrices. Although they lacked the information and evaluative procedures used by Berk, many crowd members may have independently arrived at the same or very similar conclusions. Many kinds of information were also exchanged through nonverbal communication. The tone and style of the crowd cued members to perform trial actions that the crowd could evaluate.

Berk concludes that it might be useful to characterize mobs the same way other groups of people are characterized. Mobs may differ from other kinds of human groups only in the degree of their discipline and self-control. In a reformulation of Grimshaw's "northern style" race riot, Berk suggests that when racial confrontation involves high risks to both whites and blacks, both groups may seek less costly ways to accomplish their goals. Symbolic conflict then takes the place of or becomes salient in actual racial confrontation. When both groups believe each other capable of armed racial war, they may choose not to fight.

Comments:

Berk's account of the fluidity of mob behavior suggests the possi-

bility and feasibility of intervention by social control agents. Their
strategy would be to counter the agitators by attempting to change the
perceived payoff matrices with respect to either lower rewards or
greater risks, or both of these.

Berk, Richard A. and Howard E. Aldrich, "Patterns of Vandalism During
Civil Disorders as an Indicator of Selection of Targets," American
Sociological Review, 37, 5, October 1972, 533-47.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Using data from two independent surveys, this paper examines retail
merchants in segregated, run-down neighborhoods whose stores are likely
to be attacked during civil disorders. By linking the attributes,
behavior, and attitudes of merchants with vandalism during riots, the
authors set up and evaluate five hypotheses about the selection of targets.

The first sample consisted of 150 store owners and merchants in five
cities which had severe civil disorders in 1967. Quota sampling tech-
niques yielded a varied distribution of stores and a significant number
of black merchants and inner city locations. Merchants were interviewed
in spring 1968; this sample therefore included only businesses that had
survived or begun operations after the disorders.

The second sample contained longitudinal data on three cities with
riots in spring 1968. Although the original study was based on inter-
views with merchants in two parts of each city, this analysis included
only that section of each city where riots occurred in 1968. Again,
owners or managers of businesses were interviewed. About 100 merchants
in each area had been interviewed before the riots, in 1966, and a follow-
up study in the summer of 1968 yielded responses from two-thirds of
these original respondents.

The five hypotheses about types of vandalism and selection criteria
were measured somewhat differently in the two samples; but no major con-
tradictions appeared in the findings, and they tended to support each
other. The first hypothesis was that the more attractive the merchandise
was, the more likely the store was to be vandalized. Attractiveness
was measured by the price of merchandise in both samples, and by the
amount of customers traffic in the second sample only. Stores with more
expensive items and those used more regularly were more likely to be
vandalized, a finding that substantially supported this first hypothesis.

The second, "choice of targets by retaliation," suggested that if a
merchant behaved abrasively, his store would more probably be attacked.
Four measures were used to test this idea: 1) an index of negative
attitudes toward black customers (in the first sample) and negative atti-
tudes about civil rights (in the second sample); 2) whether stores sold
on credit (in the first sample); 3) evaluation of three business practices
that exploit customers (in the first sample); and 4) offers of customer
services, such as cashing payroll checks (in both samples).

Merchants who were not favorably disposed to black customers and did
not support civil rights were found more likely to be vandalized, but
so were stores that provided customer services. This unusual finding was
taken to mean that customer services might seem manipulative or patron-
izing to "ghetto" residents. This second hypothesis was thus only modestly

supported and the interpretations were very open to doubt.

The third hypothesis, "targets as symbols," suggested that white shopkeepers would have a high vandalism rate because they symbolize white society. Race was only important, however, when many other variables were controlled. Even then its effect was not large, and this gave only limited support to the hypothesis. Absentee ownership, the percentage of white employees, and whether or not the merchant was Jewish were unimportant.

According to the fourth hypothesis rioters would attack familiar stores because this would satisfy their need for some sense of control over the situation and because these stores would immediately come to mind. In the second sample this tendency was measured by the estimated percentage of black customers the store owner reported during the interview; stores with more black customers were shown to be more likely targets of vandalism. In the first sample, two measures were used: the amount of customer traffic and the merchants' awareness of the problems of blacks. The finding that stores with more customer traffic and more awareness of blacks' problems were more likely targets could support the familiarity hypothesis; but as the authors recognized, it could also support the idea of retaliation, and both explanations "rest on assumptions that we have been unable to measure effectively."

The final hypothesis was that stores closer to intense rioting would be more exposed to vandalism. In the second sample, exposure was measured by the stores' location in business rather than residential or mixed districts. More vandalism was found in business districts.

Regarding the probability of being vandalized, about 23 percent of the variance in the first sample and 21 percent in the second sample were accounted for by the six independent variables used in each analysis, and the "attractiveness of merchandise" hypothesis was the most convincingly demonstrated.

The authors argue that these findings strongly imply choices of targets for vandalism, but that motives of rioters vary from personal gain to collective protest and retaliation. Moreover the evidence, though limited, that selection is based on race and abrasive actions by merchants suggests that some rioters may have had a "prepolitical" not apolitical perspective.

Comments:

Because so much speculation about the victims of vandalism during ghetto riots is unsupported, this thoughtful article is particularly interesting. The authors admit they have only begun to understand the motives behind the selection of targets, and in particular that they have neglected not only variables relating to group processes during divil disorders but external forces which affect these activities, such as the presence of police, weather, time of day, and street patterns.

Unfortunately, the methodological problems that plague this analysis make it useful only as an exploratory effort. The measurement of critical

concepts is very poor, and many interpretations are less than plausible. Often we are not told whether information from the second sample came from interviews before or after the riots. How closely the information from the first sample and the follow-up study applies to all merchants in the community is questionable because a significant proportion of businesses folded after the riots and thus were not included.

Finally, other accounts of vandalism during the disorders suggest that certain stores, especially liquor stores, were especially hard hit, and that other characteristics, such as size or gross income, might be important. Yet this analysis covered only the attitudes of merchants and their reports about their own practices; and these might be a function of other structural characteristics of the stores themselves.

Berk, Richard, Peter Rossi and Betteye Eidson, The Roots of Urban Dis-
content, New York: Wiley and Sons, 1974.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

    The Roots of Urban Discontent was originally undertaken in order to
answer a question posed by the Kerner Commission: Why did urban disorders
affect some cities but not others? A comparative study was proposed in
which a number of cities, varying in their 1967 civil disorder experiences,
would be extensively surveyed, and the results analyzed in order to deter-
mine the relative effects of such factors as the responsiveness of municipal
institutions and the nature of black leadership on the probability of
civil disorder. As it turned out, although the study revealed significant
differences from city to city, these differences "were simply not related
to whether the city had experienced civil disorders in 1967, 1968, or in
any other year." In a sense, the project was over before it began. The
authors realized, however, that they had accumulated a valuable fund of
data--in all, fifteen cities were surveyed. They decided to analyze the
data in the light of a new question: What are the sources of intercity
differences? Whereas the Kerner Commission's question had been, in retro-
spect, a limited one, implicitly attributing civil disorder to local rather
than national conditions, the authors hoped that their new research orien-
tation would yield a general understanding of the structural causes of
urban discontent.

    The actual survey research was carried out by two groups--the Univer-
sity of Michigan's Survey Research Center and a Johns Hopkins University
research group. Together they performed a three-tiered study of the fif-
teen cities, targeting their efforts toward 1) municipal elites, 2) institu-
tional agents, and 3) rank-and-file city residents. The first category
included mayors, police chiefs, school superintendents, and sundry lesser
officials. The second category was defined in terms of six occupational
roles: police, welfare workers, retail merchants, major employers, educa-
tors, and political party workers. The third category consisted of a total
of 2,800 black, and 2,600 white city residents.

    Interviews with municipal elites revealed a variety of styles of urban
leadership. In Chicago (then) Mayor Daley overshadowed all other political
actors, and was unquestionably the dominant influence on the scene. In
Cincinnati, on the other hand, the mayor's influence (as perceived by
Cincinnati's municipal elites, that is) was rated the lowest of the fifteen
cities, yet the influence of Cincinnati's city council was rated higher
than that of any other council--a logical result, the authors point out,
given Cincinnati's "council-manager" form of government in which the
mayor's function is more or less ceremonial. In Washington neither the
mayor nor the city council was considered a dominant force, a peculiarity
which the authors attribute to Washington's unique situation: a "company
town" catering to the biggest corporation of them all, the U.S. government.
In general, two patterns of organization emerged--cities dominated by a
strong mayor, and cities dominated by business interests. Nevertheless,
each city retained its own unique profile, and these patterns could not,
in the opinion of the authors, properly be called typologies.

Interviews with "institutional agents" led the authors to conclude that "there are clear and consistent differences among occupational groups. Indeed, the groups tend to cluster into a liberal set--educators, social workers, and political party workers--and a more conservative set--retail merchants, police, and personnel officers." By and large, members of the conservative set were characterized by a contradictory posture the authors term "optimistic denial." For example, 86% of personnel officers interviewed acknowledged their social responsibility to hire and promote blacks and other minorities, yet 83% believed that few blacks are qualified to hold professional or white collar jobs. The liberal set, on the other hand, was genuinely sympathetic toward the plight of minorities--educators most of all. This dichotomy was graphically illustrated during the 1967 riots: retail stores, local representatives of the oppressive economic establishment, were commonly sacked, but schools, representing no such enemy, almost never were.

Interviews with city residents yielded mixed results. On the one hand, mayors who were rated "responsive to black grievances" by their city councils tended to be similarly rated by their black constituencies--a finding which suggests that the political leadership of a city is, through its institutional agents, intimately involved with that city's rank-and-file. On the other hand, there was no correlation at all between resident satisfaction with school systems and elite recognition of the political salience of school-related issues, which may be interpreted to mean that "grassroots sentiment is divorced from the issues that are of some concern on the level of decision-making in the community."

Comments:

The authors themselves declare that "much of the value of this book lies in its methodology." What should be a tool designed to accomplish a specific task is here assigned an intrinsic interest.

Berkowitz, Leonard, "Frustrations, Comparisons, and Other Sources of Emotion Arousal as Contributors to Social Unrest," Journal of Social Issues, 28, 1, 1972, 77-91.

Approach: Theoretical

Berkowitz objects to what he considers the onesided view that riot activity is solely a rational pursuit of social, economic and political goals. Aggressive behavior, especially that which occurs in the early phases of a riot, is more an impulsive reaction resulting from a high level of emotional arousal caused by frustration or other sources.

Frustration (the extent to which expected gratification is not realized) increases the probability of aggression, but other factors help determine whether violence will actually occur. Two such factors are the presence of aggressive stimuli in the environment (i.e., hot weather, police brutality) and the frustrated individual's belief that he has some control over the outcome of his actions. Recent research indicates that 1) if not anticipating advancement, people are less frustrated by failure to realize this gratification; 2) prolonged deprivation tends to be less frustrating; 3) a sense of personal efficacy may heighten frustration experienced by individuals but also leads to a greater willingness to fight the frustrating conditions; 4) attitudes of self-pride and efficacy distinguish militants from nonmilitants.

Berkowitz also questioned whether the relative deprivation of blacks is based on a comparison with white standards of living. He suggests that because blacks associate more frequently and intimately with other blacks and are more similar as well as more attracted to other blacks, unfavorable comparisons with other blacks, as opposed to with whites, are more likely to contribute to dissatisfactions.

He contended that impulsive aggression is less likely to be affected by feelings of personal efficacy and more likely to be affected by the interaction of strong emotional arousal and certain stimuli in the environment. Persons aroused (caused by pain, frustration, sexual stimuli, sports victories or defeats, or even loud noises) are more responsive to aggressive cues around them (such as police brutality).

Comments:

Many people who support the interpretation that riots are rational and purposive would not argue with Berkowitz that the behavior characteristic of the beginning of a riot is an impulsive reaction to a precipitating event. But that does not mean that the behavior is irrational. It could be that such behavior is instrumental but that it takes unusual conditions for people to overcome their initial aversion to violence and make use of it as a political statement.

Berkowitz, Leonard, "The Study of Urban Violence: Some Implications of
Laboratory Studies of Frustration and Aggression," In S.S. Guterman
(Ed.), Black Psyche: The Modal Personality of Black Americans,
Berkeley: Glendessary, 1972; also in American Behavioral Scientist,
11, 4, 1968, 14-17.

Approach: Theoretical

The eruption of violence in the urban riots of the 1960s is explained
from a frustration-aggression perspective. It is argued that frustrated
expectations of socioeconomic improvements set the stage for aggressive
behavior; aggressive potential is then actuated under precipitating con-
ditions of exposure to aggressive stimuli. This view differs markedly
from Lorenz's concept of an inherent aggressive drive which is automati-
cally released when inhibitions are relaxed.

Laboratory studies show that aggression originates in a physiological
capacity, rather than in an innate drive, which is actuated through
exposure to aggressive stimuli. Experimental studies with animals which
were conditioned to respond to stimuli through positive reward incentives
show that withdrawal of an anticipated reward leads to a burst of un-
focused "activity" which in turn becomes aggressive behavior only when
a suitable target is introduced (e.g., another animal). In the case of
ghetto rioters, thwarted expectations of socioeconomic improvements
create frustration and aggressive potential, but specific aggressive
stimuli are still required to lower inhibitions and incite aggressive
action. For instance, findings of laboratory studies show that observed
aggression may stimulate aggressive behavior, which suggests that people
viewing rioters in action may come to view their behavior as safe or
proper: "...if other people do this sort of thing, maybe it isn't so
bad." Other aggression-precipitating events may include attacks on
blacks by whites, reports of police brutality, the sight of aggressive
objects such as weapons, and even the police themselves insofar as they
may be seen as hostile enforcers in some communities.

Rioting can be inhibited through massive deployment of police: clear-
ing the streets allows emotions charged by the precipitating event to
cool off, and removes the aggressive stimulus of the sight of people
burning and looting. Berkowitz suggests that another way to inhibit
violence may be to use "Negroes from outside the regular police department"
to break-up crowds, since these "amateur law enforcers" would not be
associated with aggression and arbitrary frustration by the rioters, and
thus do not constitute aggression stimuli.

Comments:

The theory developed here is less than coherent. On the one hand,
the sight of police is itself an aggressive stimulus, according to Berko-
witz, yet in the next breadth he advocates deployment of massive numbers
of police to quell riots by removing aggressive stimuli--rioters--from
the view of other potential rioters, thereby inhibiting aggression.
This appears to rationalize the use of overwhelming police force in the
form of arrests, beatings and intimidation to suppress violent demands

for social change. Somewhere in his proposed techniques for inhibition of violent riots, Berkowitz lost sight of his prior argument that urban violence arises out of frustrations due to unmet expectations of socio-economic change.

Betz, Michael, "Riots and Welfare: Are they Related?" <u>Social Problems</u>, 21, 3, 1974, 345-55.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

This paper tests Piven and Cloward's assertion that cities experiencing the most acute turmoil in the 1960s would have the greatest expansion in their welfare rolls. The thesis is that political pressure by an oppressed group leads to growth of the relief system because this service could be expanded without threatening other interest groups. The author argues that the original analysis by Piven and Cloward was inadequate because it did not specify the effects on local welfare programs (except for AFDC) and because it did not identify the cities which had experienced the greatest pressures and turmoil.

Using the changes in total monies generated from all sources for local use in welfare programs between 1960 and 1969 in the 43 largest cities in the United States, Betz was able to compare major riot cities and minor or nonriot cities in terms of the expansion of welfare expenditures. During the 1960s, the major riot cities (n=23) experienced, on the average, a 6.2 percent yearly increase, whereas the other cities (n=20) had only a 3.3 percent yearly increase. Whether or not the riots in these cities occurred in 1965, 1966 or 1967, the highest percentage increase in welfare expenditures was found in the year following the riot, whereas the other cities had low increases during the entire period. For example, the average changes for the 1967 riot cities (n=16) were a 3.5 percent decrease in expenditures preceding the riots, a 5.6 percent increase the year following the riots, and a 5.1 percent decrease after the one-year effect of the riots. The data showed that neither increasing numbers of nonwhites nor city growth could explain why this relation between riots and the expansion of welfare.

The author recognizes that the explanation of this relationship requires further research. Other factors related to both riots and welfare expansion -- such as unemployment and poverty -- may be involved, but these were not examined. Nor do we know whether the expansion in welfare was needed because of the destruction from the riot itself or whether the riot encouraged eligible people to apply for and insist on aid. There was some evidence that there were postriot increases in applications and in the applications-approval ratio.

Another explanation could be based on the theory of internal colonialism which argues that the visibility of black rioters made it less easy for city officials to make concessions without jeopardizing their support from white constituencies. "Welfare, while expensive, would be (and probably was) easier to give than for the interests of other groups in the cities to be threatened. Also welfare could be expanded by local officials in the hope that it would quiet and control those who were discontented." A more sympathetic explanation was also provided: once they were aware of discontent, government officials responded with expanded welfare programs and perhaps other changes in

policy. Betz also suggests further avenues of research.

Comments:

      This article is extremely interesting and provocative in the light
of the work by Piven and Cloward... Although the aggregate statistics
here cannot shed much light on the "social logic and rationale connecting
welfare expansion and rioting," the tentative hypothesis is useful.
Unfortunately, however, the changes in welfare expenditures are averaged
across major riot cities as a group and minor nonriot cities as a group
so we cannot tell whether these changes occurred in each of the cities.
The patterns noted in the article may well apply only to a few cities
in each group and expenditures and riots in most cities be unrelated.
Furthermore, cities where riots occurred in 1965 and 1966 experienced
fairly large increases in welfare expenditures before the riots, whereas
the minor and nonriot cities had only slight increases in welfare monies
over this period. The causal direction of the relationship thus remains
in question.

Blauner, Robert, "Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt," Social Pro-
blems, 16, 4, 1969, 393-408.

Approach: Theoretical

This author discusses urban riots, cultural nationalism, and the
movement for "ghetto" control as the collective responses of black
Americans to the status of colonials. In making a distinction between
colonization as a process and colonialism as a social, economic, and
political system, Blauner asserts that black Americans share the ex-
perience of colonization with nonwhite people of the third world.
White racism is an insufficient explanation for the continued subor-
dinate position of blacks in American society because it ignores the
stake that white Americans have in racism and maintaining segregation.

Blauner lists four basic components of colonization.

1. Colonization begins with a forced entry.

2. The policy of the colonizing power constrains, transforms,
    or destroys indigenous values, orientations, and ways of life.

3. The colonized group is generally administered by representa-
    tives of the dominant power.

4. Colonized people are exploited, controlled and oppressed
    socially and psychically by the more powerful group, a form of
    racism.

Black Americans, according to Blauner, differ from other immigrant
ethnic minorities in the degree of external economic, political, and
administrative control their segregated communities are still subject
to.

Blauner contends that black protests during the 1960s can be seen
as a rebellion against colonial status. The guiding impulse of the
riots in the 1960s was not a desire for assimilation, as the Kerner
Report argued, but rather an attempt by blacks to control their community
and "clear out an alien presence," the targets being white-owned busi-
nesses and property and the police. The most profound impact of the
riots may have been the organizing momentum generated within black
communities. The recent cultural revitalization movements are essen-
tial to establish black identity and to provide a sense of solidarity.
Programs to increase economic, political and administrative power for
blacks are a necessary first step toward home rule of "ghettos."

Comments:

Blauner's article offers an interesting interpretation of riots.
If, as he says, they assert a territorial claim, this explains the
looting and assaults on police, but not the attacks on white communities.
The study does not help us to understand why the riots took place
during the 1960s, rather than earlier or later.

Bloombaum, Milton, "The Conditions Underlying Race Riots as Portrayed by
    Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis: A Reanalysis of Lieberson and
    Silverman's Data," American Sociological Review, 33, 1, 1968, 76-91.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

    A portion of Lieberson and Silverman's data on the conditions under-
lying race riots is reanalyzed here, using a recently developed technique
of nonmetric data analysis. Multidimensional scalogram analysis (MSA)
was applied to data on nine demographic conditions characterizing two
groups each compressing 24 matched cities: one in which rioting between
Negroes and whites occurred from 1925 and 1963, and one where riots did
not occur. This analysis enabled Bloombaum to see if the conditions con-
sidered together would be more predictive of race riots than each indi-
vidual one used in the original study. Comparison of riot and control
cities was based on: the proportion of Negroes in the local population
and the porportion occupying substandard housing; the porportion of
Negroes in traditional occupations and in the police force; the propor-
tion of Negro store owners, the percentage of Negroes and whites who
were unemployed; the growth in population during 1925-63; and the popula-
tion per city councilman. The analysis indicated that these conditions
studied jointly did distinguish riot cities from the control group. As
in the original study, however, no single item enabled one to discriminate
very well between the cities likely to have riots and those where rioting
was unlikely.

    Due to the interrelationship of the conditions listed above in dis-
criminating between cities, Bloombaum concludes that "Northern riots
occurring before the end of World War II, and their controls, are sub-
stantially different from Southern riots occurring after World War II,
and their controls." Moreover the analysis seemed to predict riots
occurring in the North before the end of World War II -- i.e., it separates
the riot cities from the control cities -- better than riots in the
South after World War II. For this reason, he concludes the theory of
institutional breakdown advanced by Lieberson and Silverman and measured
by the nine demographic conditions, "appears to be of diminishing utility
as we move from North to South and forward in time."

Comments:

    Since completeness of data was the main criterion in selecting the
24 riot cities (and their controls), the sample cannot be assumed to be
representative of the population as a whole.

Boesel, David, "The Liberal Society, Black Youths, and the Ghetto
    Riots," Psychiatry, 33, 2, May 1970, 265-81.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive
Methodology: Review of Existing Data/Case Study

    This author believes that, in contrast to the relatively insig-
nificant and infrequent racial incidents before World War I and the
defensive and retaliatory race riots immediately after the war, the
ghetto riots of the 1960s constitute "the most massive black revolt
in American history to date." He analyzes the social and economic
changes since the Civil War which established the conditions for this
revolt and uses a case study of the 1967 riot in Plainfield, New
Jersey to illustrate the processes involved in these recent protests.

    Boesel's principal thesis is that until the New Deal liberalism
and the economic and technological changes decreased the need for
racism as an economic prop, systematic and forceful repression of
blacks had given them small chance to carry out any effective and
enduring rebellion. The repressive conditions exemplified in a formal
caste system were present in the South under slavery and Jim Crow,
and some of them were also found in the North before the New Deal.
Between 1932 and 1945, however, massive social and economic changes
occurred, paving the way for a violent assertion of black power led
by the current generation of ghetto youth in the North.

    Existing data on blacks' participation in riots and their atti-
tudes toward protest are used to argue that young blacks born in the
North have higher self-esteem, more racial pride, and a greater incli-
nation to favor black control of institutions affecting blacks than
those born in the South. Although they are more highly educated,
they have not been able to close the long-standing gap in employment,
and hence they are alienated and discontented. These youths are
more inclined toward violence and feel more alienated from social
control agencies such as the police, than their elders, and their
individual conflicts with the police have begun to take on a collective
character.

    Boesel argues in favor of the "New Urban Black" theory, which
asserts that the riots are attempts by the more militant, race-con-
scious, and politically aware young blacks to seize control of the
ghetto from whites. In a detailed description of the Plainfield riot,
he points to the collective rationality in the participants' actions.
He sees "much more deliberateness in the riot action than is evident
at first glance. Past grievances are very much present and connected
to the action; often in the midst of the rioting, meetings between
young blacks and public authorities are held; demands are articulated
and sometimes acted on; efforts to work out a 'truce' proceed from
both sides." Although the riot is a beginning exercise in black
power, he suggests such violence may be giving way to more disciplined
means of asserting black claims.

Comments:

Although very little of the material presented in this article is original or innovative, it does summarize much of the Kerner Commission material in an interesting way. Moreover, it reaffirms the importance of looking at the processes inherent in the riot actions themselves and emphasizes the dynamic interactions between participants and social control agencies.

Boskin, Joseph, "The Revolt of the Urban Ghettos, 1964-1967," The Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science, 382, 1969, 1-14.

Approach: Theoretical

Boskin believes that in 1964-67 urban riots highlighted the failure of American society to recognize problems of blacks in cities. He traces this failure to racism and to the public's ambiguous attitudes towards their cities.

Cities have long been portrayed as corrupt places where individuals are lost and where, although material prospects may be better, one would not want to raise a family. Millions of affluent whites fled to the suburbs in the 1950s when expressways enabled them to commute to city jobs, leaving the inner city to the poor and nonwhites. Meanwhile, living under slum conditions drew blacks together, creating an "urban consciousness" out of which the riots developed. The riots were a great extent un- planned and unorganized, participated in or supported by a large proportion of the ghetto community. They expressed class antagonism as well as re- sentment against racial prejudice. Businesses owned by whites and members of the police   were the chief targets for attack, an indication that the black residents were retaliating against the white power structure.

The riots in the summer of 1967 marked a change from the spontaneous, violent outbursts of the preceding three years. During the Detroit riot of 1967, a number of whites joined in the looting, a fact suggesting the development of a unified economically deprived class. The second change, was that black militant organizations began playing an important role in organizing slum residents and redirecting their energies from dis- organized outbursts to actions serving more specific militant goals.

Comments:

Boskin's emphasis on the role the city itself played in the urban riots is interesting. A number of researchers have noted a correlation between the outbreak of riots and the number of blacks in a city. Spiler- man interpreted this to result from the grievances common to all blacks: the more blacks in a city, the higher the probability of a riot. Boskin's approach, however, suggests that the effect of large numbers of blacks in a city is more than the sum of individual grievances. Blacks in large ghettos develop a more clearly defined urban consciousness, resulting in stronger feelings of resentment and hostility against white society.

Bowen, Don R., Elinor Bowen, Sheldon R. Gawiser, and Louis H. Massotti,
"Deprivation, Mobility and Orientation Toward Protest of the
Urban Poor," The American Behavioral Scientist, March/April 1968,
20-23.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Noting that dissatisfaction has traditionally been linked to political
and social unrest and has been cited as the major explanation of protests
and riots, the authors join other theorists in arguing that objective
deprivation is less important than subjective or felt deprivation in
understanding these phenomena. Using an opinion survey conducted in
largely black areas of Cleveland which had been officially designated
as poverty areas, they sought to compare the efficacy of four hypotheses
derived from relative deprivation theories in accounting for attitudes
toward protests.

The four hypotheses were: 1) feeling deprived because one's present
and future position compares unfavorably with "the best possible life
(one) could achieve" leads to support of protest; 2) individuals who
perceive themselves to be upwardly mobile would most clearly and strongly
support protests; 3) those who consider themselves downwardly mobile
would most often support protests; and 4) any degree of change in mobil-
ity (either upward or downward) would lead to greater support of protest
than no change at all.

Interviews with 500 residents of Cleveland's nine officially desig-
nated poverty areas were conducted nine months after the Hough riot.
The respondents, a 1.4 percent sample, were selected on the basis of a
block quota design. The authors derived an index called an "orientation
toward protest" from a factor analysis of fifteen questions regarding
attitudes toward and participation in various kinds of conventional and
unconventional political activities. The four-item index clusters
support approval of protests that are expressed through picketing,
marching, demonstrating, and rioting, but excludes actual participation
in such acts.

The first hypothesis was partially confirmed: a current feeling of
deprivation was significantly associated with an orientation toward pro-
test, but the expectation of future deprivation was not. Neither the
second nor the third hypothesis was confirmed, but the four yielded
statistical significance. Those individuals who expected change in
their status between the present and five years in the future supported
protest activites to a greater degree than those who expected no change.
Among those not expecting change, those with a stronger feeling of
deprivation at the time were very likely to support protest, while those
who did not feel deprived were unlikely to do so. Thus, the authors
argue "feelings of deprivation are associated most strongly with approval
of protest activities for those people who have no expectation of
upward or downward mobility."

Comments:

The findings from this study suggest that links between felt deprivation and perceived mobility may help to account for differences -- the degree that the urban poor support political activities. Unfortunately the measurement of support for protests is uncorrelated with actual participation. The authors explain this by the fact that only 32 respondents admitted engaging in any of these activities; and, of these, 26 did so as members of striking unions. Nether feelings of deprivation nor mobility seemed therefore to be linked to actual participation in protests. The operationalization of relative deprivation was limited to a comparison of one's present or future state with individual aspirations and did not include comparisons with other groups, as has often been done in testing relative deprivation theories.

Campbell, James S., "The Usefulness of Commission Studies of Collective
Violence," Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political
Science, 1970, 168-70.

Approach: Theoretical

The cliché has it that national commissions to study collective vio-
lence are useless because their recommendations are not followed. But
according to Campbell the real utility of these commissions lies in
their ability to present significant facts to those who possess political
power and make political decisions. Judging by this standard, he feels
that many national commissions have been highly successful. In this paper
he suggests some ways to improve commission fact-finding about collective
violence.

Because commission reports are far more informative than news stories
and more immediate and visible than thorough scientific or historical
studies, they can inform the public quite promptly and effectively about
the causes and consequences of collective violence. It is hence impor-
tant that the social sciences provide them with sharper analytical tools.

Campbell illustrates this point by discussing two of the Kerner Com-
mission's findings: 1) the recent urban riots were political acts; and
2) they were caused by white racism. With regard to the first issue,
Campbell argues that social science should help commissions to be rather
clearer than they are now about their standards for determining whether
and to what extent collective violence is "political." One might ask,
for example, whether the rioters have developed an ideology capable of
attracting adherents and paralyzing opponents in order to change patterns
of power and authority. In regard to the second issue, the "cause" of
the riots, he felt that the commission should have attempted a more ex-
plicit and systematic distinction between the immediate and the underlying
causes. There might be other underlying causes than white racism or
even deeper ones demanding a historical and sociological analysis of the
sources of prejudice against blacks in this country, and the actual condi-
tions of their lives. Thus, "a careful application of the hoary distinc-
tion between necessary and sufficient causes might have prodded the Kerner
Commission into a more detailed discussion of why the riots occurred in
the latter half of the decade of the 1960s."

Comments:

The criticisms of the Kerner Commission Report should help sharpen
the conceptual and methodological tools used by those studying this area.
The usefulness of national advisory commissions in helping to shape public
policy is still in question, however. Even if they fulfill their function
of fact-finding, we still do not know how much they actually influence
the general public and policymakers.

Caplan, Nathan, "The New Ghetto Man: A Review of Recent Empirical
    Studies," Journal of Social Issues, 26, 1, 1970,

Approach: Theoretical/Methodological
Methodology: Literature Review

    Using findings from some of the major studies of riot participation
in the 1960s, the author describes the black militant as the "New Ghetto
Man." This view contrasts with the "riff raff theory," which sees black
militants as social or personal deviants who are peripheral to organized
society and have no broad social or political concerns.

    To Caplan the new ghetto man is a militant in search of practical
responses to "arbitrary institutional constraint." He attributes the
riots to a growing sense of black consciousness and pride without com-
mensurate improvement in opportunities. Data from selected surveys of
attitudes and behavior among ghetto residents show that about one-third
to one-half expressed support for riots and militant civil rights posi-
tions, although only a small number reported active participation in
militant actions.

    Rioters were not from the lowest income groups, were less likely
than nonrioters to feel a sense of relative deprivation because of
disparities between their income and that of whites, and were better edu-
cated than those not participating. They are not the hard core unemployed
but did evidence a tendency to move in and out of the labor market.
They were better integrated into the black community than nonrioters
and tended to have committed fewer serious crimes. They were more often
natives of the northern urban areas in which the disorders occurred.
Although many had strong feelings of racial pride and even superiority,
this group did not show generalized feelings of hostility toward whites.
Instead, they wanted to have the same freedom and opportunities as whites
and to attain these through the existing political system. Although
their sense of personal competence and efficacy has grown, they feel that
they still have less political, social, and economic control over their
lives than whites.

Comments:

    Although this review offers a useful new perspective for judging the
"riff raff theory" of militancy, it looks very selectively at the research
on this topic and shows a less than critical focus. Miller, Bolce, and
Halligan, assessing the theory of the new urban black, pointed to a funda-
mental flaw in Caplan's essay -- the failure to distinguish protesters
from rioters. "Because Caplan treated militants alike, irrespective of
whether they were protestors or rioters, he summarized without distinc-
tion studies that focused on protestors and those that focused on rioters."
In some cases this failure led to certain contradictory findings that
Caplan ignored in his conclusions. For example, he cited both Tomlinson
(1970) finding that militants in Watts were less distrustful of elected
officials than nonmilitants and the Caplan and Paige study (1968), which
found that rioters were more distrustful of politicians than nonrioters.
These discrepancies are never resolved or discussed further.

Caplan, Nathan and Jeffrey Paige, "A Study of Ghetto Rioters," Scientific
American, 219, 2, August 1968, 15-20.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

To explain the outbreak of riots in black urban ghettos during the
1960s, the authors consider three major hypotheses. (1) The riff-raff
theory. Rioters are social deviants: hard-core unemployed; psychologically
unbalanced, criminal types; or recent migrants who have been unable to
adjust to urban life. (2) The relative deprivation theory. Expectations
of blacks have been rising faster than their actual economic and social
conditions warrant; or the gap between economic and social conditions
of whites and blacks is perceived to be increasing. (3) The blocked
opportunity theory. Blacks are reacting to discrimination that prevents
them from bettering their economic and social situation.

The first two theories imply that the blame for the riots rests on the
rioters themselves, while the third blames white institutions.

In early 1968 a representative sample was taken from census tracts in
Detroit and Newark, where violence and damage had occurred during riots.
In Detroit 437 black male and female respondents over the age of 15 were
selected, and in Newark 236 black males between the ages of 15 and 35 were
selected. The interviews sought to measure characteristics and attitudes
of the respondents. Participation in the riots was determined by asking
the respondents whether they had been active during the riot and what
specific activity they had engaged in.

The authors rejected the riff-raff theory on the grounds that the
rioters did not differ from nonrioters in income and were only somewhat
more likely to be unemployed or to hold unskilled rather than semiskilled
or better jobs. In fact, in some respects, such as education and social
activity, they fared better than the nonrioters. The rioters were also
more likely than nonrioters to be long-term residents of the city.

Regarding the relative deprivation theory, no difference was found in
the percentage of rioters and nonrioters who thought conditions had become
better (or worse) for their family in the past few years, or who thought
the gap between whites' and blacks' income had increased (or decreased).
Rioters were more likely, however, to think that the income gap between
blacks within the community was increasing.

The hypothesis of blocked opportunity was supported by the following
findings. The rioters were more likely than nonrioters to feel that they
had been discriminated against in school and in the job market; they tended
to have stronger feelings of racial pride and superiority; and they were
more angry at both whites and affluent blacks

According to the authors, the facts support the blocked opportunity hypothesis that discrimination against blacks in economic and social life is the fundamental cause of riots. Recently the self-confidence of blacks has improved, but because their chances for a better life have not, they feel anger and are moved to violence.

Comments:

This is a well-written and well-organized presentation of three basic hypotheses about the causes of rioting, using relatively standard measures for testing them. However, the rejection of the "relative deprivation" hypothesis in favor of the "blocked opportunity" argument is premature. Relative deprivation measurements were applied only to respondents in Newark, whereas the two other hypotheses were tested in both Newark and Detroit; and the measures were inadequate. Over a third of both rioters and nonrioters reported that the gap between blacks' and whites' income was increasing; and rioters more often than nonrioters felt that the gap in income among blacks was increasing. This seems to suggest that comparisons with other blacks as well as with whites might lead to a sense of relative deprivation which could induce rioting. Further, while the finding that rioters disproportionately felt subjected to racial discrimination was used to support the "blocked opportunity" hypothesis, it certainly supports "relative deprivation" arguments, since discrimination involves a comparison with whites with the same education and training. Even more basically, the study suffers from the usual problem of postriot studies, in that rioters' attitudes could have resulted from rather than caused their participation.

Comer, James P., "The Dynamics of Black and White Violence," in
    Violence in America, Historical and Comparative Perspectives,
    H. Graham and T. Gurr (Eds.), for the National Commission on the
    Causes and Prevention of Violence, New York, 1969.

Approach: Historical/Descriptive

        Comer is interested in accounting for the apparent paradox of
Negroes rioting after many years of submissive behavior and during a
period of substantial improvement in occupational opportunities and
income.

        He examines and discounts three explanations generally offered.
First, low socioeconomic position: this is an inadequate explanation
because the Negro's position has been improving. Second, racism:
this is not a sufficient cause because racism has existed for many years.
Third, weak control over impulses as a result of disintegrating fami-
lies: this too cannot be related to the events of the sixties. He
concludes that racism, poverty, and a lack of control, though they may
be involved, do not satisfactorily explain the conflict's complexities
and incongruities.

        Comer then traces the effect of a legacy of slavery on the develop-
ment of the Negro psyche. The slaves were shorn of their normal social
means of developing an identity and were placed in a submissive and de-
pendent role. Identification with the aggressor -- the master -- became
the common mode of adaptation involving attitudes of self-hatred, anger
toward self, and presumption of black incompetence. After the Civil
War, these feelings were reinforced by segregation and exclusion.
The Civil War had ended control and exploitation by masters, but legis-
lation, judicial, and extra legal control through intimidation, vio-
lence, and economic reprisals were established. Control and authority
had now been extended to all whites -- many of them economically vulner-
able and needing scapegoats. The psychological tie of powerless blacks
to powerful whites was as important in deterring black retaliation
as the probable physical consequences. To express hostility toward
whites, on whom they still depended, was to risk the loss of a major
source of security. This state existed largely intact into the twentieth
century.

        But there was a change. In time, the segregated community devel-
oped leaders: physicians, teachers, preachers, and small businessmen.
These were successful people whom they could identify with, and who gave
young Negroes the opportunity to develop a positive self-image.

        Perhaps more important, after the migration to urban centers, Ne-
groes, were no longer largely employed in southern agriculture, and con-
sequently less vulnerable to economic reprisal. Actually, as their lot
improved they came to represent a large enough consumer group that col-
lectively they were themselves capable of economic reprisal.

        Greater independence permitted the anger and rage against injustice
to be expressed and gave Negroes an identity that was free of the white

power structure. Breaking the bond brought on acceptance of blackness and a sense of outrage which was energizing and potentially explosive. By now many Negroes have experienced good relations with individual white people, so it is the symbolic enemy with which they do battle: they battle and plunder the symbols of continued oppression.

Comments:

The author, a psychiatrist, does an excellent job of tracing the development and change in the American Negro psyche within a historical and social context.

Crawford, Thomas, Murray Naditch, "Relative Deprivation, Powerlessness,
and Militance: The Psychology of Social Protest," Psychiatry
33, 2, 1970, 208-23.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

The most widely accepted social psychological explanation of re-
cent increases in Negro American discontent and violent protest cites
frustration stemming from feelings of relative deprivation. The main
purpose of the present paper is to extend the relative deprivation
theory systematically to take into account not only the perceived
discrepancy from important goals, but also the perceived means, if any,
for reducing the discrepancy between people's success in attaining
goals.

To see whether feelings of relative deprivation on the part of
northern urban Negro-Americans are associated with a propensity for
racial militancy and violent protest, a representative sample of 107
male black residents of the Detroit riot area (18-45 years old) were
interviewed several weeks after the 1967 riot. Respondents who felt
that their present status was relatively close to their ideal life
were more likely to believe that the riots hurt the Negro cause, that
most Negro Americans disapprove of riots, and that persuasion is more
effective than force in changing white attitudes. They were also more
likely to disapprove of Black Power and to feel less sympathetic to
Black Muslims and closer to the NAACP than respondents who experienced
high relative deprivation.

The authors then suggest that "while knowing the individual's
level of relative deprivation will be of some use in predicting his
feelings of discontent and political disaffection, precise behavioral
predictions can only be made when the individual's level of relative
deprivation is considered in conjunction with the behavior means for
reducing relative deprivation which he perceives as available to him."
In cross-classifying relative deprivation with variables measuring locus
of reinforcement or control (feelings of efficacy and powerlessness)
the authors derived four types: 1) "content fatalists" (low relative
deprivation and low efficacy); 2) "discontent fatalists" (high relative
deprivation but low efficacy); 3) "discontent activists" (high relative
deprivation and high efficacy); and 4) "content activists" (low depri-
vation and high efficacy).

Discontent fatalists were believed to be the most dangerous and
disruptive for the social system because their behavior is expected to
be expressive and explosive. In contrast, discontent activists will
use legitimate means to attain goals if such means seem available;
hence social transitions can occur without disruptions. "However
indistinguishable violent threats to the existing order may appear to
those who wish to maintain it, the revolutions of the discontent
activists differ sharply from the riots of the discontent fatalists in
that the former are planned, purposeful implementations of means to

achieve desired goals."

Data from Ransford's study of the 1965 Watts riot and the 1966 National Opinion Research Center's (NORC) survey for the U.S. Civil Rights Commission were used in analyzing the behavioral consequences of these four types. The Watts study suggested that "discontent fatalists" were the most willing to use violence, and "content activists" were the least willing. In the NORC study, both types of activists were the most likely to attend a civil rights rally; "discontent activists" were the most likely to participate in demonstrations, and "content activists" were most often members of the NAACP. Very few of the "discontent fatalists" engaged in these three activities. Thus, "the psychology of social change must consider perceived means as well as subjective goals, efficacy as well as relative deprivation."

Comments:

This is a useful treatment of the way behavior and attitudes correlate with feelings of relative deprivation and powerlessness, but neither relative deprivation nor powerlessness is adequately specified and measured. Relative deprivation refers in this study only to the discrepancy between a present state and some ideal condition, not to a comparison with other groups in the society. Powerlessness refers in some of the data to personal feelings of efficacy, while in others it is measured by perceptions of power vis a vis the social system. The confusion here in definitions and measures of powerlessness, as well as the very narrow use of the concept of relative deprivation, suggest the need for further work along the lines of Paige (1971) and Ransford (1972).

Crosby, Faye, "Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bolce, and Halligan," American Political Science Review, 73, March 1979, 103-111.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Critical Review

This rejoinder to the article by Miller, Bolce, and Halligan, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots," is an attempt to demonstrate the theoretical inaccuracies and methodological problems that lead to their premature rejection of relative deprivation as an explanation of black unrest. The author contends that their analyses misrepresented the literature on relative deprivation and used faulty measures of felt deprivation. Although Miller et al. considered the J-curve theory of relative deprivation of Gurr, they omitted the other three standard models of relative deprivation by Davis, Runciman and Crosby. They denied that relative deprivation explained their data, partly because they found no correspondence between present and future perceptions and because they believed that such a connection was necessary. This author, however, asserts that relative deprivation theory does not assume a correspondence between present conditions and future expectations; in fact the proposition that expectations are not simply a function of present status is central to these theories.

She argues that the empirical analysis of data in the article by Miller, Bolce, and Halligan is characterized by the usual lack of correspondence between operational definitions and theoretical concepts found in the literature on relative deprivation. In particular, their measure of "perceived relative deprivation" is not what any of the four theorists meant by relative deprivation. A sense of relative deprivation commonly includes an emotion, not simply a perception of one's financial situation. She also criticized the lack of information about the sampling, the grouping of the data by region rather than by the occurrence or absence of riots, and the possibility that the differing temporal patterns among the four samples were merely a function of differences in sample sizes. She made suggestions for different measures that would test the four models of relative deprivation and argued that "fast and loose 'tests' of relative deprivation have probably outlived their utility; the time for methodological rigor has arrived."

Comments:

This is an extremely well written and rigorous attempt to specify the components of relative deprivation theories and to devise some crude measures for testing them.

Danzger, Herbert M., "Validating Conflict Data," American Sociological
Review, 40, October 1975, 570-84.

Approach: Theoretical/Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

The strikingly similar findings in studies of the factors conducive
to racial conflicts by Danzger and Spilerman, despite the fact that they
used different operational definitions of conflict and different time
periods, led Danzger to suspect that both sets of results may have been
based on similarly tainted data. In an examination of the data sources
used, he found that both researchers as well as many other sociologists
relied heavily for their reports of conflicts on wire service stories.
"If the reporting process distorted the data so that conflicts were more
often reported in some cities than others, not because conflict occurred
more often in fact, but because it was better reported, then this would
explain the remarkable similarity...and more conflicts would be reported
to have occurred in those cities with fuller reporting services than in
others."

Reanalyzing his original data by adding a new variable, whether or
not a city had a wire service bureau office in it, he found that cities
with wire service offices reported a greater number of conflict events
than other cities. He then presented an overview of the literature criti-
cal of newspaper reports as a source of data. Three types of criticisms
were examined: 1) that newspapers present inaccurate and distorted facts,
2) that they are biased in the sense of slanting the news or favoring
one side in their coverage and placement, and 3) that they suppress stories
than run counter to the views of the reporter or the policies of the
newspaper.

He rejected the first criticism by arguing that the inaccuracies that
might occur in a given report are likely to become corrected quickly
once the wire services become involved because they act as an alarm signal-
ling the existence of a story and attracting a number of reporters who
exchange information with each other and correct each others' mistakes.
"Thus, utilizing a sequence of reports, one is likely to have accurate
facts." He added an additional caution and that is that events such as
riots which involve no prior notice, have intense violence, and reporters
have severely restricted movement and are dependent on the accounts of
others. They are thus more difficult to report and thus are more inaccur-
ately documented than demonstrations.

In regard to the second criticism of bias, he agreed that evidence
substantiates that it exists, but "hard" facts are not affected by it.
"In a case of conflict whether an action was a march or a boycott, in-
volved ten or one hundred, the police or the clergy, are all hard facts.
The attitudes of rioters--i.e., are their actions part of a 'Christmas
in August' looters' syndrom or are they trying to get a message through
to the power structure; is an attempt to break up a mob intentional har-
assment or a reasonable action--all these are open to question."

In order to explore the third criticism, that is that news is suppressed at a local level, Danzger compared cities which had either AP or UPI offices with all other cities, hypothesizing that more stories would be reported in cities with AP or UPI bureaus than in other cities. His sample consisted of all civil rights conflict reports cited in The New York Times between 1955 and 1965 (including demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, and the posting of guards around schools to facilitate or prevent integration, etc.), in cities with populations larger than 25,000. The correlation between presence of AP/UPI bureaus and conflict reports was quite high, indicating that reports are an artifact of the location of AP/UPI offices and the absence of a report may not be an indication that an event did not occur. Conclusions concerning the factors that produce conflict based on newspaper reports are therefore likely to be misleading.

He concluded that the facts reported in newspapers are generally reliable because of the network of news gathering, and especially if they are gathered for a time sequence rather than for a single event. But statistical comparisons of events, especially those which attempt to account for why events occurred in one place but not another, are unreliable because the lack of reports for specific places may not be indications that events did not occur. If the analyst needs to compare newspaper reports of the occurrence of events, it is necessary to make sure that the new reporting networks are similar in the cities compared and so one possibility is to compare only cities with wire service offices or to add to this base other cities in which several conflicts have been reported because then the news networks will be more accurate.

Finally, in assessing his previous work and that of Spilerman, Danzger asserted that the number nonwhite in a population still remains the critical factor in the occurrence of conflict.

Comments:

In this methodological inquiry regarding the validity of newspaper data, the author provides a useful set of techniques for evaluating the adequacy of this data for sociological studies of the incidence and dynamics of collective disorders. While he seemed generally aware of the problems of bias and suppression, he seemed to gloss over some of the very real problems of inaccuracy and distortion of facts by suggesting that these errors are corrected by the interactive network of communication in news agencies. Further empirical work to substantiate that argument needs to be done.

Davis, E.E., and Marget Fine, "The Effects of the Findings of the U.S.
    National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders: An Experimental
    Study of Attitude Change," Human Relations, 28, 3, 19 , 209-27.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Controlled Experiment

The major purpose of this study was to measure the effects of the
Kerner Commission Report on the social attitudes of white students and
to examine the interrelations and correlates of these attitudes. Students
from four junior colleges on the east coast took part in this pre-test,
post-test experiment: 37 in the experimental group and 29 as controls.
These 66 students, along with 53 others in a classroom filled out a
pre-test questionnaire covering a number of variables, including their
attitudes toward blacks and toward various social issues, their percep-
tions about the status of blacks, their factual knowledge about civil
rights issues, and their social distance from persons of different races
and different beliefs about civil rights movements. The experimental
group was given an abridged version of the Kerner Commission Report
while the control group received "dummy" reading material dealing with
science fiction. After a three-week interval, the post-test question-
naire was administered to both groups.

Among the 119 students who responded to the pretest questionnaire,
the respondents whose attitudes corresponded with classical anti-Negro
stereotypes were most likely to favor calling in the National Guard for
racial riots, to oppose the busing of children for school integration,
to oppose federal enforcement of open housing, to estimate that a high
percentage of Negroes favored intermarriage, and to have low scores on
information about civil rights issues. Respondents taking a liberal
position on the issues expressed low social distance toward whites re-
gardless of their position on civil rights and toward blacks who opposed
civil rights action. However, liberal respondents expressed high social
distance toward blacks who strongly favored civil rights action. The
authors suggest that Negroes who strongly favor civil rights action may
be threatening to the respondents, even the liberal ones. "It may pro-
vide a clue to the depth and pervasiveness of racism in the United
States and may also be explainable on the basis of the fear -- even
among white liberals -- which was prevalent at that time."

In general, the experimental material containing the salient points
made in the Kerner Commission Report had a "liberalizing" influence on
the students, even though the post test was administered after an inter-
val of three weeks, rather than immediately after presenting the material.
More liberal attitudes toward such policies as federal enforcement of
open housing, busing, calling in the National Guard, and toward persons
who favored civil rights action, more awareness of discrimination, and
a better factual knowledge of civil rights issues were found among this
experimental group during the three-week period. Conversely the control
group tended to move in a more negative direction during the same period.

Comments:

Since this experiment involved only white students in a class the results might not apply to a larger population. Simple exposure to written material, even from a respected source, may not be enough to induce major shifts in deeply rooted attitudes.

De Fronzo, James, "Comment on 'The Causes of Racial Disturbances':
    A Comparison of Alternative Explanations," American Sociological
    Review, 36, 3, 1971, 515-16, reply.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Critical Review

    De Fronzo presents four major criticisms of Spilerman's contention
that the size of the black population and the percentage of blacks
in a city are major causal factors in disorders. First, De Fronzo
claims that Spilerman rejects factors in disorders that exist in zero-
order correlations (e.g., blacks in disorder-prone cities tend to have
higher incomes, more desirable occupations, and more education than
blacks of other cities). Second, De Fronzo notes that a larger black
population might result in improved conditions for blacks, increasing
their expectations and hence indirectly leading to disorder. Third,
the types of disorders under consideration weren't differentiated.
Fourth, De Fronzo cites two studies that contradict Spilerman's view
that social disorganization factors have no significance. He believes
that Spilerman's conclusions are too general and that they are based
on faulty interpretation of correlational data. He also notes the
need for a more thorough consideration of the part played by a combina-
tion of variables (demographic, social psychological, and social
structural) in disorders.

    To these criticisms Spilerman replies by correcting two errors in
De Fronzo's representation of the original study. He says he did
not emphasize the percentage of nonwhites in the city, and he did
identify "spontaneous" aggressive outbursts as the type of disorder
under discussion. Spilerman justifies rejecting rising expectations
as a variable because significant zero-order correlations are not
enough to establish causal relationships. He notes also that since
multicolinearity (between black population size and indicators of
absolute and relative deprivation) was not high, it was possible to
separate the relative contributions to the variance from these sources.
Countering De Fronzo's contention that rioters differ from nonrioters
and that the article ignores this, Spilerman replies that his unit
of analysis is the city, not the individual, and that studies about
characteristics of riot-prone individuals have produced contrary findings.

    Spilerman does not understand De Fronzo's claim that "this conclu-
sion is questionable since it rules out the specific situation," agree-
ing that there are idiosyncratic causes of disorders, but noting that
the original intent was rather to consider systematic causes.

Comments:

    Although De Fronzo may have inaccurately represented two aspects
of Spilerman's original thesis, the particular misrepresentations are
given relatively little significance in De Fronzo's discussion, being
merely mentioned and not pursued.

Spilerman's treatment of correlational analyses is appropriate, since he is looking for relationships between characteristics of cities and the number of disorders they experience, using regression analysis. The original zero-order relation between the other variables and the number of disorders is reduced to insignificance when black population size is controlled.

Spilerman seems prematurely to reject the idea that "idiosyncratic" causes of disorders are of interest and to search instead for more systematic causes. We still know little about the causes of disorders, and investigation of these "idiosyncratic" causes might well contribute to a more thorough understanding of why they occur.

Donnerstein, Edward, Marcia Donnerstein, Seymour Simon, and Raymond Ditrichs, "Variables in Interracial Aggression: Anonymity, Expected Retaliation and a Riot," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22, 2, May 1972, 236-45.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Controlled Experiment

This study examined the effects that anonymity, expected retaliation, race of target, and a racial disturbance at a campus exerted on delivered and anticipated aggression (electric shock) in two experiments. A sample of 108 white males displayed fewer direct and more indirect forms of aggression against blacks than against white targets when there was an opportunity for the target to retaliate. When retaliation was unlikely, more direct aggression was aimed at black than white targets. After the racial disturbance (Experiment II), direct aggression toward black targets increased and was less dependent on opportunity for retaliation. In both experiments more direct retaliation was anticipated from black than from white targets. According to these findings, white persons have learned to fear black retaliation, but this fear inhibits only direct aggression in certain situations.

Comments:

The authors' first experiment indicates a general fear of black retaliation, at least among middle-class white students at Northern Illinois University.

The second experiment, following a racial disturbance on campus, suggested a white backlash, evidenced by increases in direct aggression toward blacks.

The laboratory experiments were conducted properly and represent a timely exploitation of a campus event. The usual problem is present, however, of how far the laboratory findings can be applied to other populations and in a larger social context.

Downes, Bryon T., "A Critical Reexamination of the Social and Political
     Characteristics of Riot Cities," Social Science Quarterly, 51, 2,
     1970, 349-60.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

     This article reexamines an earlier one (1968) concerning the effect
of objective deprivation on the occurrence and severity of urban riots.
Here Downes has extended his original data base, changed some of his
analytical techniques, and compared his findings with those of Ford and
Moore (1970) and Wanderer (1969). He argues that although these authors
raised questions about some findings in his original study, their studies
suffered from severe methodological problems. These, along with dissi-
milar data, make it extremely difficult to compare their findings with
his work.

     The data base, extended from the original study, now includes the
72 months between 1963 and 1968, a period in which 283 incidents occurred
in cities with populations of over 25,000. Of the 676 cities in the study,
149 had one or more riots according to the New York Times, the primary
source of information.   Data on the independent variables were collected
from the 1960 Census and the 1963 Municipal Yearbook. As in the earlier
article, Downes found that cities experiencing riots generally had very
distinctive social and to a lesser extent political structures. Riot
cities tended to "be our largest, least rapidly growing, most densely
populated central cities, whose citizens have less education, lower incomes,
and higher unemployment rates than those in municipalities in which no
incidents of racial violence have taken place. They also tend to have
higher proportions of nonwhites and nonwhite populations that have in-
creased, sometimes quite substantially since 1950."

     In measuring the intensity of riots, the author used a four-point
ordinal index which included only cities where riots took place. This
was a departure from his original study and those of Ford and Moore and
Wanderer, which included all cities. Downes found, however, that when the
nonriot cities were dropped from the analysis, the size of both the
gamma and product-moment correlations decreased and signs often changed.
Anchoring the scale with cities in which no violence took place thus
affects the results. Analysis showed no particularly strong correlations,
except between the total population in 1960 and riot intensity.

     Downes makes several points about the difficulty of comparing these
results with those of Ford and Moore and Wanderer. One serious problem
is the general lack of agreement on the meaning -- and hence measurement
-- of objective deprivation. Another is the scant attention the other
authors pay to clarifying or specifying the theory underlying their re-
search; thus they cannot answer questions about why these objective char-
acteristics are associated with riots. Downes suggests that adverse con-
ditions do not "cause" hostile outbursts but must be associated with atti-
tudes and beliefs of blacks which are ready to be mobilized. Whether or
not they are actually mobilized will depend on a number of factors: How
well can the authorities control an outbreak? How widespread and intense

are the hostile attitudes among blacks? What is the nature of the pre-
cipitating event? Downes also argues that we cannot be content with
apolitical explanations of racial violence, which reduce its causes to
psychological and personal factors or objective conditions. Instead the
institutional arrangements that sustain the ghetto, institutional racism,
must also be examined.

Comments:

This is an important article, first because it carefully reanalyzes
data on the socioeconomic and political characteristics of cities which
are associated with racial violence, and second, because it documents
the extent to which objective deprivation may explain these incidents.
In reaffirming some of the methodological differences between his work
and the studies of Ford and Moore and Wanderer, Downes provides clues
for the disparities in findings and pinpoints the need for more coherent
statements of the theoretical questions involved. It is of course, un-
fortunate, as Ford and Moore point out, that the independent variables
were not direct measures of the conditions among the nonwhite populations
of these cities, since the conclusions imply that they are.

Dynes, Russell, and E.L. Quarantelli, "Organization and Victim in Mass
    Civil Disturbances," Issues in Criminology, 5, 2, 1970, 181-93.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive

        In most of the major civil disturbances between 1964 and 1969,
vandalism, looting, arson and sniping occurred. These acts were not
committed against individuals, however, but against organizations. The
two authors examine some of the patterns and the conditions associated
with the organization as victim in mass civil disturbances. They use
the term "mass civil disturbance" to distinguish the riots in the urban
ghettos in the middle and late 1960s from earlier confrontations between
groups of whites and blacks. In contrast to the earlier incidents,
these urban disturbances arose from large numbers of people attacking
the symbols or representatives of the larger society. Discrimination
was used in selecting objects for attack, and the behavior during these
incidents was collective rather than individual, partly socially supported
rather than totally condemmed, and public rather than private.

        The objects of attack were primarily small retail business establish-
ments and the police. Direct interaction as an explanation for the choice
of victims was rejected because many looters and arsonists had had no
contact with the targeted stores and there were no immediate confronta-
tions. Retaliation for economic exploitation was also felt to be an
inadequate motive: although some evidence was found that specific
targets of attach were chosen because of the retail practices or white
ownership or management, contradictory evidence also appeared.

        The authors conclude that "other factors appear to be more influen-
tial in the selective process than whether the objects of attack do or
do not actually have certain objectionable features. More important is
how organizations, especially classes of them, come to be perceived.
In essence, what appears to be involved is best described as a collective
definitional process." This process is always going on among dissatisfied
groups and can involve the rejection of traditional definitions of
property and the creation of symbols of economic and political exploita-
tion, such as retail stores and the police. Retail stores are most likely
to be considered collectively to be economically exploitative because
they bring home to people the realities of a limited income and show con-
cretely which goods they could obtain if property rights were different.
Similarly the police evoke images of political exploitation, and symbolize
political and repressive power.

        The authors argue that these collective definitions may change
quickly, particularly when other more important values enter into the
situation, as they may do in crises.

Comments:

        The essence of this article is that the illegal acts committed
during the civil disorders of the 1960s cannot be interpreted as simple
criminal behavior but rather as symbolic retaliation by ghetto residents.
Unfortunately, the evidence presented is suggestive but not definitive,
and the "collective definitive process" by which targets are selected is
not presented clearly or adequately.

Dynes, Russell and E.L. Quarantelli, "What Looting in Civil Disturbances Really Means," Trans-Action, 5, May 1968, 9-14; Dynes, Russell and E.L. Quarantelli, "Looting in Civil Disorders: An Index of Social Change," American Behavioral Scientist, 7, March/April 1968, 7-10.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data/Observation

In both of these articles, looting is viewed as an index of social change, signaling the end of a period "when existing 'rights' in a community will be automatically accepted by a significant proportion of Negroes therein as being given." Using data from personal interviews with organizational officials, supplemented by systematic observations and analyses of unpublished agency reports, the authors argue that the civil disturbances of the 1960s represent temporary and local redefinitions of property rights and that the presence of selective and socially sanctioned looting is the indicator of this trend.

Three stages in looting are described. In the first, which is primarily symbolic, little looting occurs but intense and destructive attacks are targeted at symbolic sources of conflict like the police and white merchants. This stage often seems to be initiated by alienated adolescents or ideologically motivated agitators in the area. Many of the outbreaks never progress beyond this first stage. In the second stage, there is conscious and deliberate looting, an organized and systematic plunder of goods for pragmatic economic reasons, frequently seeming to be influenced by delinquent gangs and groups of thieves. In the third stage, widespread and nonsystematic looting takes place, which is socially supported. This looting is quite open and often collective, and there is an almost total absence of competition or conflict by looters over plundered goods. Moreover looters are from all segments of the local community.

Rather than being "meaningless" or "criminal," the authors interpret looting as a major structural device for change in the American social system. "However, it would seem that American society, if it wishes to insure domestic tranquility, should move to institutionalize nonviolent means for redistributing certain property rights. Looting can only be a temporary and localized redefinition of property rights."

Comments:

This is a very superficial and selective analysis of the data available on looting in civil disorders. The interested reader is directed to the more important work of Aldrich and Reiss.

Feagin, J.R., "Social Sources of Support for Violence and Nonviolence in
a Negro Ghetto," Social Problems, 15, 4, 1968, 432-41.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Using data collected by the National Opinion Research Center shortly
after the 1964 riot in New York's Bedford-Stuyvesant ghetto, the degree
of support for the violence among the 200 residents interviewed was linked
to their social demographic and associational characteristics. Only 17
percent of the sample were classified as violence-oriented by their answer
to the following question: Do you think that Negroes will be able to get
equal rights, better jobs, and such, by using nonviolent means like sit-
ins, or will they have to use violence like riots and fighting to get them?

These violence-oriented respondents were found to be younger, more
often male, very recent residents of the area, more often Northern born,
in the two lowest income groups, of lower educational levels, less active
in the church but more active in organizations such as unions and civil
rights groups, and more regular readers of newspapers than the residents
who were not oriented to violence. However, there were some discrepancies
from this pattern. The very lowest income bracket (the "very poor") were
less likely to be violence-oriented than the poor just above them and over
half of the violence-oriented had incomes above the poverty level. College-
educated respondents had the highest percentage of violence-oriented and
ambivalent responses of any of the educational groups. And about half of
the violence-oriented respondents attended church at least twice a month
or more often.

Comments:

While the author tries to argue that members of certain socioeconomic
groups were more likely to be violence-oriented than others, his analysis
is based on only 34 respondents who were classified as violence-oriented
because of their answer to one abstract question. Even though the riot
had occurred two weeks before the interview, there was apparently no attempt
to assess whether those who were violence prone had actually participated
in it. The size of the sample also precluded an attempt at multivariate
analysis to determine whether or not all of the variables were equally
important in predicting violence orientation.

Feagin, Joe R. and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Ghetto Resident Appraisals
     of a Riot," Public Opinion Quarterly, 32, 3, 1968, 352-62.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Abstract:

    This paper takes an original line by presenting the view of a
sample of rank-and-file Negro ghetto residents on the issues of who
starts riots, the "real" causes of riots, and the purposes and char-
acteristics of rioters, since opinions about these matters are usu-
ally obtained from either white or Negro leaders.

    The riot in question occurred in July 1964 following the shooting
of a Negro boy by a white policeman. It began in Harlem and spread
to Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant section. The rioting lasted six
days, involved approximately 8,000 persons, and resulted in 188 in-
juries and 465 arrests.

    The method of research was to interview a "block quota" probabil-
ity sample of the residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant shortly after the
riot. The eligible sample consisted of 200 respondents (all black)
in the 50-block area, with a proper representation of men and women
and a reasonable proportion of employed females and younger males.
All interviewers were black.

    In trying to judge why the riot occurred, residents were asked
about both the precipitating event and what they considered the real
cause of the riot. Most respondents saw the riot as a response to the
shooting of the Negro boy by the policeman. Most journalistic ac-
counts also followed this line, but when residents were asked about
the real causes of the riot and the purposes of the rioters, an inter-
esting shift occurred. A substantially larger proportion emphasized
the importance of underlying conditions such as social and economic
discrimination, deprivation, and police brutality. Very few (about
9 percent) felt that the riot had been stirred up by agitators or ex-
tremists. This view contrasts sharply with those of whites, according
to public opinion polls. Feagin and Sheatsley attribute the difference
to the fact that many whites believe conditions for blacks have greatly
improved, and thus they blamed outside agitators for the violence.
Moreover, since the rioting made no apparent sense to the whites, they
imposed meaning to the actions by viewing it as a conspiracy. This is
believed to be an explanation which fits well with the individualistic
American value orientation and might soothe a sense of guilt of which
the whites were only half aware.

    When residents were asked about the actions of various groups
during the riot they disapproved most sharply with the actions of
the white establishment (the police and the mayor), with Black National-
ists and Black Muslims, and with the neighborhood teenagers. The great
majority approved of the actions taken by the Congress on Rational
Equality and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, the churches, and most adults in the neighborhood. Most of

the residents saw some room for improvement in media coverage of
the events.

When asked about riot participants, only two of the two hundred
respondents admitted that they themselves took part, but 22 percent
reported actually having seen some of the rioting. There was very
little consensus about who the rioters were. When asked whether the
event helped or hindered the cause of civil rights, about 61 percent
of the residents felt that the effect had been negative, but a sub-
stantial minority felt that it had been good. Residents were asked
about the future of racial strife and whether it could be avoided:
60 percent felt that more rioting was likely in other northern cities
in the next two years, and 40 percent thought it might happen in
their neighborhood in the next month or two. Yet two-thirds of the
respondents said that they would not have predicted the recent riot.

Most of the respondents felt that something could have been done
to avert the riot, citing actions such as proper investigation of pre-
cipitating events, community discussion of incidents in a biracial
fashion, and eradication of the underlying causes--discrimination and
deprivation.

Comments:

This is an extremely interesting public opinion survey regarding
the attitudes of local residents of a riot-torn area, and the sampling
and interviewing procedures are quite adequate. It might have been
enlightening to ascertain other characteristics of the participants
themselves and relate them to differences in perceptions of the exper-
ience by participants, according to age, sex, and residential area.
Unfortunately, the views of the respondents who actually saw some of
the rioting were not contrasted with opinions formed only from media
representation of the events.

Firestone, Joseph M., "Theory of the Riot Process," American Behavioral
   Scientist, 15, 6, 1972, 859-82.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

     This author objects to the unintegrated and competitive charac-
ter of riot theories so far, as well as to their tendency to locate
causes primarily in the actions of dissidents. He presents a new
theoretical framework, based on Siegel's stage theory of the riot
process, that he hopes will integrate some of the previous theories
and incorporate the actions of both dissident and dominant groups.
His approach is "transactional," emphasizing the mixture of rational
and irrational elements in urban riots in which an "extremely sensi-
tive, goal-directed system subject to environmental constraints and
human influence is driven at one moment toward peaks of violence, and
at the next toward a return to normalcy, in response to changes in
the environmental constraints or in human purposes."

     Seven propositions, derived from Spiegel's state theory, delinea-
ting some patterns of change in the riot process as a result of inter-
action between the motives of the dissident group and the actions of
the dominant group:

   1. Some precipitating event will crystallize grievances which
       impel the aggrieved toward violence. Their motives can be
       rational (violence is an end in itself, a way of releasing
       anger and aggression). In this part of the process, the
       effectiveness of calming agents compared to promoters of
       the riot is important.

   2. Offers to negotiate may dampen the urge toward violence, but
       they will lose their effectiveness once the irrational motives
       take over until some of the frustration has been released
       through aggression.

   3. The effectiveness of early negotiation in cooling down the
       incidents will thus depend on the combination of rational
       and irrational impulses toward violence.

   4. Although efforts to suppress violence tend to dampen rational
       motives toward violence, they increase resentment and encour-
       age irrational action. Severe suppression can weaken irra-
       tional drives but the resentment will continue and could lead
       to a later resurgence of riots.

   5. Riots have turning points in which the impulses (both rational
       and irrational) toward violence are weak and will falter
       unless a crystallizing of grievances occurs as a result of
       conciliatory or suppressive tactics.

6. If the riot passes through the turning point and is renewed it can develop to a stage where irrational drives, fed by fear and mistrust, preclude direct communication.

7. If the irrational motivation then leads to the release of aggression, exhaustion may become the dominant condition and negotiation can again take place.

According to Firestone, the internal processes by which the dominant group mobilizes the police, National Guard, or the like to curb violence resemble to a strong degree the dissident groups' internal processes, and so the same basic propositions can be used to describe them. He then translates this conceptual framework into a mathematical model to show that "verbal theoretical frameworks can provide a useful heuristic basis for mathematical model construction."

Comments:

The author recognizes many of the limitations in this article and views it as work in progress. His aim is to produce a comprehensive conceptual framework for relating the diverse findings from case studies, time-series analyses, and cross-sectional research to riots.

Fogelson, Robert M., "Violence and Grievances: Reflections on the
1960s Riots," Journal of Social Issues, 26, 1, 1970, 141-63.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive
Methodology: Observations/Review of Existing Data

This article's main thesis is that the violence of the 1960
riots can only be explained and understood as a manifestation of
grievances by those in the black ghettos. The author dismisses
other explanations, including such common precipitating factors as
police brutality, the breakdown of public order, long hot summer days,
the social class of participants, and the irrationality of crowd
behavior, because they cannot account for the critical features of
these riots.

Using a selective set of observations and analyses of data,
Fogelson looks at four specific types of violent behavior -- rioting,
looting, arson, and assault -- and argues that the nature of these
actions, their targets, and the degree of restraint exercised will
reveal the nature of the grievances and the meaning of the riots in
general. Rioting was defined as "milling in the streets, defying
patrolmen, denouncing authorities, threatening reporters, and violating
curfews." It was the most common activity and particularly attracted
young adult males born in the area. Rioting was most prominent just
after the triggering incidents; but it went on during all the vio-
lence, eliciting a series of emotions that included a sense of
camaraderie, exhilaration, and accomplishment. Looting, like rioting,
was very common and not very serious. It was theft from property,
not persons, and attracted a large and broad segment of the ghetto
population, who stole openly without remorse, "driven by acute and
chronic economic deprivation." Although arson was more destructive
than either rioting or looting, it was less widespread and was largely
the act of teenage and young adult males. It was also selective,
bypassing stores owned by blacks and hitting only stores which
charged excessive prices and sold inferior merchandise." Assault was
defined as the whole range of violence directed at people, including
attacks on white passers-by, overturning automobiles, tossing bricks
and stones, hurling Molotov cocktails, and firing rifles at police
and National Guardsmen. Fogelson argues that assault was not common,
but it evidenced black racism, being directed primarily toward
whites. It also signaled a growing sense of territorial rights
among blacks, since assaults were intended to drive whites out of the
ghettos. The assaults were very restrained, however; very few
whites were attacked and even fewer were deliberately killed.

Fogelson argues that the most remarkable feature of the riots
was the restraint and selectivity shown by participants, which to
him implies that "the blacks' disaffection (though not their dissatis-
faction) is probably somewhat less acute than is commonly thought."
Yet he also maintains that disaffection among blacks was rapidly
increasing, partly because of their rising expectations and the

growing dependence on white merchants and the perceived need for
self-determination.

Fogelson concludes by prescribing a course of action for both
blacks and whites: blacks must "abide by the unwritten, yet effec-
tive, rule whereby American society tolerates the rioting precisely
because it is restrained and selective"; whites must "eliminate
racial discrimination, economic deprivation, consumer exploitation,
and involuntary residential segregation as quickly and completely
as possible."

Comments:

This article compiles a very selective set of data from the
Kerner Commission reports and informal observations to try and account
for the restraint and selectivity shown by riot participants in the
1960s. Many of the data and the conclusions drawn from them are
questionable because the original studies relied on inadequate methods,
yet Fogelson does not acknowledge their deficiencies. A number of
unquestioned assumptions are made throughout the article, and there
is a general reliance on the "New Urban Black Man" theory of riots.

Ford, William F. and John H. Moore, "Additional Evidence on the Social
    Characteristics of Riot Cities," Social Science Quarterly, 51, 2,
    September 1970, 339-48.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

    This article is a response to an earlier one by Bryan Downes (1968)
in which he tested the "deprivation thesis" of rioting. According to
that thesis, the readiness of ghetto dwellers to riot is related to their
bleak socioeconomic and political prospects. Downes found that cities
experiencing "hostile outbursts" since 1964 had a much higher propor-
tion of nonwhites, lower levels of education among residents, lower
median incomes, and poor housing conditions, particularly among blacks.
Using essentially the same data base but different methods of analysis
and somewhat different measures, Ford and Moore found that those conclu-
sions required modification.

    Their data on the incidence and severity of disorders came from a
summary of major riots and civil disorders between 1965 and September
1967, prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Government Operations of
the U.S. Senate (the McClellan Committee). To account for differences
in the incidence and severity of disturbances, Downes had used data from
the whole city population and only indirectly measured the conditions
of the nonwhites. In contrast, Ford and Moore used direct measures of
characteristics of the nonwhite population, but extended them to cover
the larger metropolitan area. They also used more sophisticated analyti-
cal techniques -- multiple regression -- and somewhat more precise mea-
sures of population characteristics than Downes had done.

    The analyses included 135 cities, 60 of which had riots. The authors
tested two separate hypotheses: 1) Differences in socioeconomic charac-
teristics of the nonwhite populations "explain" observed differences
among the cities in the incidence and intensity of civil disorders
(objective deprivation). 2) Differences in the socioeconomic character-
istics of the white and nonwhite population may "explain" the incidence
and intensity of these disorders in cities (relative deprivation).

    Over 40 percent of the variance in the number and intensity of dis-
orders was accounted for by the five variables measuring socioeconomic
characteristics of the nonwhite population of the cities: education,
income, home ownership, crowding, and the proportion of Negroes. Thirty-
six percent of the variance in the rate of occurrence and 26 percent
of the variance in the intensity of disorders were accounted for by
the five variables measuring socioeconomic differences between blacks
and whites. The higher proportion of variance explained by the first set
of variables is seen as "possibly indicating that the lot of the non-
white population relative to that of the white population is less impor-
tant than the status of the nonwhite population considered alone."

    With regard to the specific variables contained in the regression
equations, the findings of Ford and Moore either contradicted or failed

to confirm the earlier work of Downes. These authors found that nonwhite income levels were positively correlated with the incidence of disorders, rather than negatively as Downes had reported. They also found that the role of educational achievement was not clear cut and that neither the occurrence nor the severity of disturbances was directly related to the proportion of Negroes in the area. Disorder in cities was less intense where home ownership was higher among the nonwhite population. Cities where home ownership among blacks was much lower than among whites had a greater incidence of riots and they were more intense. The hypothesis that crowded living conditions were related to civil disturbances was not supported. When separate regressions were run on data excluding the southern states, the amount of variance accounted for by the variables was reduced, but there was a high degree of consistency.

The general conclusion is that "simple economic models of the disturbances are not very illuminating. In itself, this is hardly surprising and would not merit emphasis were it not that many recent policy proposals have been directed at improving the economic lot of minority groups, as if this alone will alleviate the causes of the disorders."

Comments:

Because they used multiple regression, rather than simpler measures of association such as gammas, the authors argue that their work "involves more sophisticated analysis of data related to some of the variables that Downes studied." And they used this analysis to rebut several of the empirical patterns that Downes had observed in data on the riot cities. Unfortunately, their analysis does not present important data adequately and their interpretation and conclusions are faulty.

They used only summary statistics from the multiple regression equations in drawing conclusions, without examining or presenting the zero order correlations that existed between the independent and dependent variables. In several instances this may have led to major errors in the findings. For example, their argument that riots were not directly related to the relative size of a city's nonwhite population was based only on the fact that in three of the four equations, the percentage of Negroes did not emerge as a significant independent predictor. We are not given any information about the zero order correlation between this variable and the incidence or severity of disturbances, and hence we cannot know whether any relationship exists. Quite possibly such a relationship could exist, but not show in the multiple regression because of the multicollinearity of the independent variables.

Moreover, although over 40 percent of the variance in both the incidence and severity of disturbances was accounted for by the socio-economic characteristics of the city's nonwhite population, these authors state that "it is clear from the R^2 values that the variables included in the regressions explain relatively little of the variation in the dependent variables." They then conclude that economic models are not very helpful. It seems to us that a fairly large proportion of variance has been accounted for by the five variables in this model.

In a later article (1970), Downes indicates a number of other critical problems in the article by Ford and Moore. Their source for the information on racial violence was the McClellan Committee, which tended to underreport smaller less violent incidents even more than the source used by Downes. Since Ford and Moore studied only a 31-month period, compared to Downes' 54-month period, neither the periods nor the riots studied are fully comparable. Ford and Moore used the metropolitan area (SMSA) as their unit of analysis, rather than the city as Downes did, and hence the two studies were probably asking different questions. Finally, Ford and Moore anchored their measure of the severity of violence to metropolitan areas in which no racial violence took place. More than half of the cities had no racial violence yet they were all included. As a consequence, there was considerable skewing and probably other affects as well.

Generally, one should use considerable caution in drawing conclusions from this study, although the precision in measuring the socioeconomic characteristics of the nonwhite population of the metropolitan areas is an improvement over earlier work.

Forrest, Thomas R., "Needs and Group Emergence - Developing a Welfare
    Response," American Behavioral Scientist, 16, 3, 1973, 413-25.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

    This article, using analytical dimensions from Turner's "emergent
norm theory of collective behavior" describes the formation and transfor-
mation of the Interfaith Emergency Center (IEC) during the Detroit
Riot of 1967. As the crisis developed, the established welfare organ-
izations could not cope because they were not structurally equipped
to deal with such an urgent and immediate situation. Because Detroit's
clergymen had established previous patterns of interaction and a firm
foundation of friendship and trust, they were able to meet quickly and
exchange information and ideas. Through observation and questioning
about what occurred and why, they began to analyze the crisis and plan
a course of action.

    One highly respected church executive suggested that instead of
merely calling for law and order they try to establish an information
center. The group agreed, and the IEC was formed to distribute food,
communicate information, reunite families separated by arrests, and
help homeless families find permanent housing. Coordinated action was
made easier by a core leadership group, who began to carry out and
organize the activities of the center. Forrest was primarily concerned
with analyzing the first phase of the IEC, which lasted twelve days,
although the actual organization functioned for almost four months,
during which time it adapted to changing needs of its clients.

Comment:

    This is an interesting account of how a crisis center emerged in
the midst of a large-scale urban disorder and the conditions under
which such an effort succeeds. The focus on already formed networks
to provide leadership, and on their ability to mobilize support from
diverse segments of the community, is particularly useful.

Geschwender, James A., "Social Structure and the Negro Revolt: An
Examination of Some Hypotheses," Social Forces, 43, 2, December
1964, 248-56.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Census data comparing the education, occupation, and incomes of
whites and nonwhites provide the author with a structural explanation
for the "Negro revolts of 1963." He derives five propositions from
sociological literature and evaluates them for their consistency with
the census. According to these hypotheses, dissatisfaction and rebel-
lion would result from the following circumstances: 1. Worsening
objective economic conditions (the "vulgar Marxist" hypothesis);
2. Improvement in objective economic conditions that creates higher
aspirations than can be achieved (the "rising expectations" hypothesis);
3. Less rapid improvement of economic conditions than that enjoyed
by another group (the "relative deprivation" hypothesis); 4. A tempor-
ary improvement in conditions followed by a reversal (the "rise and
drop" hypothesis); 5. Gaps between the occupation, income, and edu-
cation of one group compared to another (the "status inconsistency"
hypothesis).

Geschwender rejects the "vulgar Marxist" and "rise and drop" hypo-
theses because there appeared to be a steady improvement in education,
occupation, and incomes of nonwhites between 1940 and 1960. This im-
provement made the "rising expectations" hypothesis consistent with
the data. The "relative deprivation" hypothesis also found support in
the fact that the gap between white and nonwhite incomes was increasing
in terms of both current and constant dollars. Finally, the "status
inconsistency" hypothesis was also consistent with the data, since
nonwhites seemed to be improving their education but were "being denied
the occupational mobility or income level which would 'normally' be
associated with such progress."

The reason why the hypotheses ("rising expectations," "relative
deprivation," and "status inconsistency") were consistent with the
census data was that all three have a common basis in the concept of
relative deprivation. The author argues against taking his results as
a claim that feelings of relative deprivation will, regardless of objec-
tive conditions, produce rebellion. He does suggest that certain
objective conditions will produce feelings of relative deprivation which
will, in turn, produce rebellion.

Comments:

This article clearly distinguishes between several of the major
theories of discontent and rebellion, shows some of their similarities,
and points to complementary features in an attempt to reconcile them.
Obviously the use of census data to support theories of relative depri-
vation entails problems, but these data were used merely to suggest
that the objective conditions would lead to feelings of relative
deprivation.

Geschwender, James A., "Civil Rights Protest and Riots: A Disappearing
Distinction," Social Science Quarterly, 49, 3, 1968, 474-84.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

This article challenges the assumption that civil rights activities
and urban riots are different and contradictory phenomena. To that
end, the author discusses several sociological conceptions of social
movements and riots and the characteristics of recent urban disorders.

On the basis of Smelser's conceptual framework, the crucial distinc-
tion between hostile outbursts (riots) and norm-oriented movements
(social movements) lies in the growth and spread of generalized beliefs.
Both collective actions begin with ambiguity, anxiety, the attachment
of anxiety to some agent, and the exaggeration of the threat from that
agent. Their development diverges, however, when their belief systems
are enacted. "If the episode of collective behavior is seen as a direct
attempt to attack or punish the agents of evil (in this case, police
and white businessmen), then it is classed as a hostile outburst.
However, if the episode of collective behavior is seen as a means of
bringing about normative change to prevent the agents from working their
evil, then it is termed a social movement." This classification recog-
nizes that violence and assigning scapegoats can be part of either
behavior.

Disorders are usually labeled riots if they meet three criteria:
1) looting was the main activity of most participants; 2) the disorder
was spontaneous, relatively unorganized, and leaderless; and 3) the
participants did not attempt to seize permanent control of an area or
specify political demands. The Watts and Detroit riots indicate that
the targets of looting and arson were whites and blacks with the same
reputation for exploitation. These riots gave looters a chance not
only to acquire goods but also to attack the system of distributing
property. Looting as an attack against exploitation, rather than
exploiters, is thus an act which is more characteristic of social move-
ments than of hostile outbursts.

As for the second criterion, the Kerner Commission asserted that
urban disorders were spontaneous and gave no evidence of being organized.
But this alone is not a basis for concluding that such disorders are
not part of a social movement. According to the Langs view, a social
movement has "organized associations at its core that provide general
direction and focus; but it also includes large, unorganized segments
pushing in the same direction but not integrated with the core associa-
tions." Thus, unorganized participants in demonstrations and urban
disorders can be part of a social movement as long as they share the
same general goals. To know whether the latter condition is fulfilled
one must examine the motives of the participants.

The third criterion involves the issue of tactics. In Geschwender's
view, the reluctance to consider urban disorders as part of the civil
rights movement stems from the propensity to define the movement in terms
of its organized core associations and its use of such respectable

tactics as court suits, nonviolent action, and drives to register voters.
Further, he thinks it plausible that dissatisfaction with the slow rate
of change accomplished by these tactics has led to more extreme methods
of quickening and broadening social change. The evolution of tactics is
thus extended from "creative disorder" accomplished by nonviolent resis-
tance to "creative rioting" that, while also disruptive of social pro-
cesses, goes a step farther by including deliberate violence against
property and persons. As for the absence of political demands, the
Kerner Commission reported that during 21 of 24 disturbances they sur-
veyed, some discussion or negotiation of grievances and issues occurred.

The characteristics of riot participants in Detroit and Newark provide
additional insight into the nature of the disorders. These participants
evidenced the blocked-mobility syndrome considered to be typical of po-
tential revolutionaries. Inconsistency in their status was also considered
typical of activists: the Detroit and Newark rioters tended to be better
educated than those not involved and were "considerably less likely to
be able to bring their occupational status, income, or employment status
up to a level comparable to their level of education."

Although evidence of thwarted aspirations and gaps between education
and standing does not in itself demonstrate that riots are a part of
social movements, an additional factor lends credence to this interpre-
tation. The Ransford study of Watts Negroes supported the suggestion by
Marx that isolating aggrieved persons into an interacting collectivity
is likely to produce   conflict from a group with a high degree of group
consciousness and awareness of a common enemy. Furthermore, this group
will probably be willing to use violence in seeking redress for their
grievances. The Newark and Detroit data "strongly suggest that rioters
are individuals largely isolated from whites, that they interact with
blacks who share common grievances, that they develop a high level of
hostility towards whites, combined with a high level of black conscious-
ness, and that they subsequently participate in riots as a means of
attacking the system. In short, they are participating in a social move-
ment that may or may not reach revolutionary proportions."

Comments:

The argument that the urban disorders of the late 1960s should be
labeled creative rioting because they involved the conscious and deliberate
use of violent attacks against property and persons deemed part of a
system of exploitation is based on evidence from the riots in Watts,
Newark and Detroit. Many of these studies used inadequate methods of
data gathering, and other studies contradict their findings. In particular,
the work of Aldrich and Reiss on the selection of targets casts doubt
on many of Geschwender's conclusions about looting. Although the civil
rights movement may very well have incorporated the urban disorders into
its ideology and tactical design, this does not mean that when these
disturbances occurred these "creative riots" were clearly a part of the
movement's evolutionary pattern.

Geschwender, James A. and Benjamin D. Singer, "Deprivation and the
    Detroit Riot," Social Problems, 17, 4, 1970, 457-63.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

The portrait of the black rioter as a relatively well-educated
male has been drawn from studies that did not control for age. The
authors of this study therefore proposed to test the relative depriva-
tion of rioters and nonrioters by using appropriate age controls in
examining the 1967 Detroit riots.

Interviews were conducted in the jails, internment locations, and
prisons where those arrested in the riot were being held. The first
sample consisted of 499 black males (of approximately 6,500 adults
arrested during the period) who agreed to be interviewed about the
event. A test for bias from the self-selection of study participants
indicated that criminal charges were similarly distributed among the
sample and the population of those arrested. A second sample of 499
respondents was matched with all those arrested on the basis of sex,
race, and residence. This second group represented a quota sample
based on how near they lived to an arrested person.

Although the arrested sample had a slightly higher median for
years of schooling, an age-controlled analysis determined that at every
age a higher proportion of the community sample had completed high
school.

Those in the arrested sample were found to be much less likely
to be in white-collar jobs, more likely doing skilled and semiskilled
work, and about as well represented in the unskilled and service occu-
pations as those in the other group. This somewhat lower occupational
status was not due to the younger age of the jail sample, for age
standardization increased their relative deficit.

Age standardization also increased the relative deficit in the
weekly incomes of those arrested. They had significantly lower incomes,
with a higher proportion in each of the income categories of less than
$100 per week; in contrast, the community sample had a higher proportion
in each category over $100.

Finally, a smaller proportion of those arrested were unemployed
at the time they were interviewed, and their history of employment was
different. A much higher proportion of the arrested sample had been
unemployed at some time during the year preceding the interview and had
been unemployed for two months or longer.

Participants in ghetto riots are thus considered likely to be
from the more deprived segment of that community. Age controls not only
established the higher educational achievement of riots as an artifact
of their youth, but also that those arrested during the riot were more
deprived than others in their neighborhood. The authors, therefore, con-

sidered it premature to reject the deprivation hypothesis to explain riots.

Comments:

This study compared those arrested for rioting to members of the same community who were not arrested. Although the former were charged with participation in the riots, whether or to what degree their comparison group participated was not determined. The results of this study are hence not directly comparable with those of studies which specifically compared riot participants to nonparticipants. These other studies, however, would have benefited from the use of age controls. No evidence was presented showing how well the arrested sample represented all rioters.

Goldberg, Louis C., "Ghetto Riots and Others: The Faces of Civil
Disorder in 1967," Journal of Peace Research, 2, 1966, 116-32.

Approach: Theoretical

The "Negro riots" in 1967 varied in many critical respects. The
author examines 23 such disturbances and groups them on the basis of
their most prominent features. Two, those in Detroit and Newark, can
be described as "general upheavals" that were beyond the control of
control agents or community leaders. Both riots followed two phases.
In the first, collective violence was initiated by blacks; from preci-
pitating encounters with the police it escalated spontaneously into
a general rebellion against white authority. Social control agents were
overwhelmed; they lacked the resources and the decisiveness needed to
maintain order. Old people, women and children then joined the pre-
dominantly young male rioters. In the second phase, the agents of
social control reestablished their dominance. Reinforcements from the
state police and the National Guard arrived, police became less disci-
plined, and expressed racist attitudes through lawless acts against
blacks. Violence ended with the presence of massive social control
forces, their withdrawal from the area, or the exhaustion of both social
control agents and rioters.

Some riots can best be described as political confrontations.
These disturbances, although violent, were never entirely beyond the con-
trol of community leaders. Where blacks were sufficiently organized to
select the leaders for negotiation; or community leaders were accepted
as spokesmen, then militant negotiation could substitute for militancy
on the streets.

Few disorders can be described simply as expressive rampages, in
which the rioters' behavior gained little focus or direction in the
course of time. When such riots did occur, however, negotiations with
community leaders were ineffective because the rioters were "organized
around drinking and chaotic emotional expression" rather than political
grievances.

Some riots developed as the fulfillment of anticipations, in which
the first acts of collective aggression came not from blacks, but from
the expectation by social control forces that a riot would develop.
Subsequent black responses tended to be defensive, protective, or re-
taliatory.

The spread of news about disorders through media channels and
friends and relatives was considerably more important a factor in trigger-
ing attempts to instigate violence. The kind of grievance may be more
important than the intensity of feelings in determining whether a riot
will develop -- for instance, responses to police brutality are more
volatile than those aroused by bad schools. The process of seeking
redress for grievances can be a source of grievance, since it illus-
trates how much white authorities care about black constituents. Finally,
competition may be involved in the development of disorders; sometimes
negotiations fail because blacks and police want violence.

Comments:

     This article is interesting in that it describes different types of 1967 urban riots, especially because it points out that a number of riots were instigated by the police with the expectation that blacks were going to riot anyway. Such incidents in a sample would represent a problem in a study examining underlying conditions and grievances felt in riot cities.

Gordon, Leonard, "A Comment on 'Political Orientation and Riot Partici-
pation'," American Sociological Review, 37, 3, 1972, 379.

Approach: Commentary

This brief commentary recommends the modification of J.M. Paige's
thesis that "radical political action depends on a combination of a
strong sense of personal political competence (i.e., "efficacy") com-
bined with a deep distrust of the political system" (ASR, October, 1969:
810), since Gordon considers it important to distinguish between trust
in government and trust in government officials.

To support this view he cites the Kerner Commission and other
studies of black counterrioters, where the combination of political
efficacy and distrust produced the opposite result, that is, opposition
to radical political action. Since "protest among the non-rioting pro-
portion of Paige's four efficacy-trust types often assumes non-rioting
forms," the author considers this indicative of confidence in govern-
ment institutions but not in the officials operating within them.

Comments:

Paige's point is that rioters demonstrated a deep distrust of the
political system, and thereby a lack of confidence in the institutions
and officials that make up that system. It appears unlikely that the
distinction between trust in government and in its officials, which
holds for counterrioters, has relevance for rioters.

Grimshaw, Allen D., "Three Views of Urban Violence: Civil Disturbance,
    Racial Revolt, Class Assault," The American Behavioral Scientist,
    11, 4, March/April, 1968, 2-7.

Approach: Theoretical

Grimshaw discusses labels and interpretations of the urban riots
of the 1960s and attempts to relate rioting to the places within the
social structure occupied by chief participants. The label one
chooses is a function of one's perspective, that is, race, ideology,
and distance from the disturbance. It also depends on motives and
tactical outlooks -- whether one is a police officer or a black
militant -- as well as on the usual variables such as age, sex, educa-
tion, and income. Grimshaw emphasizes that blacks should not be viewed
as a homogeneous group. Their perspectives on goals and tactics also
depend on their particular circumstances.

When communities become polarized, pressures from peers and refer-
ence groups may also influence one's labeling, often forcing people
to accept or reject ideological and tactical positions. Labels may
shift as a consequence of changes in policy and in the information
received about the scope and magnitude of disorders. The labels
chosen by policy makers strongly influenced not only the immediate
changes of improving ghetto conditions, but the prospects of avoiding
major urban violence in the future.

Grimshaw discusses three labels applied to the riots and describes
the individuals or groups adopting each label. The terms civil distur-
bance and insurrection have no racial overtones. Radical rightists use
these terms to suggest that the disturbances result from community
agitation or from a general breakdown of the normative order. They
hope to discourage sympathy for blacks which could lead to appeasement
and thus encourage more violence. Others who tend to use a label with
no racial overtones are elected moderates hoping to avoid a black or
white backlash, people concerned with the implications of rioting in
relation to foreign policy, and officials in law enforcement or the
military who are interested only in tactics.

Racial revolt has been the label used by militant blacks to define
explicitly the boundaries of a conflict group and thus rally support
within the black community that could force moderate black leaders to
take a more militant stance. Moderate black leaders took advantage
of such labeling to convince white decision makers that meeting their
demands was preferable to dealing with the militants.

Class assault was the term chosen by people -- leftists, poverty
workers, and some social scientists and journalists -- who wished to
emphasize the economic factors causing the violence. Grimshaw sug-
gests that there was, in fact, a division between lower-class and
middle-class blacks and the beginning of class solidarity among lower-
class blacks and whites. The latter was nipped in the bud by the

"questionable practices" of the police and National Guard, reminding
blacks of their common identity.

Comments:

Labeling is important, as Grimshaw points out, because the choice
of labels reveals people's perspectives, motives, tactical outlooks,
and socioeconomic position. One must keep this fact in mind when
evaluating an individual's interpretation of an incident.

Groves, W. Eugene and Peter Rossi, "Police Perceptions of a Hostile
 Ghetto," American Behavioral Science, 13, 5, 6, 727-744,
 May-August, 1970.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

 This study is an examination of the perceptions of hostility by
policemen assigned to duty in ghetto areas. The researchers propose
two models to explain police/community relations: 1) that the hostility
perceived by police is based on the level of friendliness or hostility
that actually exists; 2) that police perceptions of hostility may arise
from prior attitudes, influences of other policemen, or actual situa-
tions generated by the policeman himself through his own actions. The
authors' data tends to support this later model.

 Data for the study were drawn from interviews conducted in 1967 as
part of the Kerner Commission Report. The sample consisted of 515
policemen assigned to ghettos in thirteen cities. If police perceptions
of hostility were based on objective experiences the researchers would
have expected to find significant differences between cities regarding
the amount of hostility the police perceived to be present. Overall,
the findings indicated that a large proportion of the police (60%) in-
terviewed perceived the ghetto residents as either hostile or indiffer-
ent. In fact, only 8.7 percent of the variation in perceived hostility
could be explained by differences between the cities, and this was be-
cause the cities studied had experienced varying amounts of violence
during the period studied. It was shown that individual characteris-
tics of the policemen had a great deal more impact on their perceptions
of hostility than community characteristics.

Comments:
 There are problems in the measurement of both active and psycholo-
gical riot participation: active participation is merely self-reported
overall activity (i.e., very active, somewhat active, etc.) without
reference to specific behaviors and without differentiating an activity
such as looting from counterriot activity. Psychological riot activity
suffers from even more severe measurement problems since it only indi-
cates that the respondent witnessed activity or believed others in the
neighborhood to be involved.

 Five variables were significantly related to perceived hostility:
these were race, rank, age, prejudice, and acquaintance with residents.
Race was highly correlated with prejudice. The results indicated that
for whites, prejudice was highly related to perceived hostility, but the
data indicated that a larger proportion of the variation in perceived
hostility of black policemen could be explained by city differences.
Similarly, age was highly with rank: the results indicated that younger
policemen perceived more hostility than older policemen. This may be

because younger police are given more dangerous tasks in patrolling the ghetto or that young white policemen are more the target of black hostility than the older policemen, but this is not explored further. Finally, police who had more acquaintance with community members perceived less hostility.

The police interviewed for the Kerner Commission Report were selected by the police departments and thus the sample may be biased. If the sample were randomly selected, they might have found an even higher percentage of perceived hostility, more differences among cities, and reversals of the age/perceived hostility relationship.

These interviews were completed before the assassination of Martin Luther King, which sparked a number of civil disorders, and the amount of variation explained by city differences might have been higher if the interviews had been conducted several months after the outbreaks. In fact, one of the major defects in the study may be the assumption of differences among cities in the actual level of hostility ghetto residents had for the police; that is the finding of few significant differences among cities may be a reflection of the reality, not of characteristics of police.

Hahn, Harlan, "Cops and Rioters: Ghetto Perceptions of Social Conflict
     and Control," American Behavioral Scientist, 13, 5-6, August 1970,
     761-79.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

     Part of an entire issue of this journal devoted to "Police and
Society," Hahn's article deals with attitudes among black residents of
Detroit about riot control and police conduct before, during, and after
the 1967 riot. Hahn concludes that attitudes toward police were not
the major factor in the riot, but that unemployment and housing were the
chief grievances. He says, however, that police should work harder to
gain public support for their methods of riot control.

     Hahn states that "the most demanding problem confronting law enforce-
ment officers today is the outbreak of civil disorder....Local police
must assume the major responsibility for curbing urban violence."
His paper represents an attempt to see what part police behavior plays
in setting the stage for a major riot. It is a combination of several
studies. One was made in 1965-66 by the University of Michigan School
of Public Health. In the other, carried out shortly after the riot,
Metro Opinion Research Corporation of Detroit interviewed 270 black
adults from the 12th Street area, the center of the Detroit riots, who had
been interviewed before the riot.

     The major findings were these:

     1. Most respondents reported that jobs and housing, not police
         brutality, were the chief causes of the riot.

     2. Approval ratings of police behavior by both whites and blacks
         dropped eight points shortly after the riot.

     3. A majority of blacks approved of police behavior, even after
         the riot.

     4. Among those who thought the "low profile" of the police during
         the initial stages of the riot was due to a policy of restraint,
         most endorsed the later use of force to halt the rioting.

     5. Among those who thought the police were slow to act because
         they were outnumbered, most believed the later show of force
         was excessive.

     6. Most respondents considered that police conduct after the riot
         would improve. This was especially true of those who explained
         the initial inaction of the police as the result of policy.

     The author concludes that police restraint may have been an impor-
tant requirement, not only for securing public acceptance of riot control
measures but also for restoring social controls in the area after the
rioting ended.

Comments:

Details about the 12th Street respondents were limited to the area of residence and the fact that a modified quota sampling procedure was used. The sampling procedure and a listing of other details about respondents though probably available elsewhere, are missing from this article.

The author's conclusion concerning the ways that initial police restraint affected attitudes goes beyond the data. The problem is intrinsic to having an $\underline{N}$ of 1, the city of Detroit.

Hahn, H. and J.K. Feagin, "Rank and File Versus Congressional Perceptions
of Ghetto Riots," Social Science Quarterly, 51, 2, September 1970,
361-73.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data; Survey Research

To explain the political effects of the riots between 1964 and 1967,
the congressional responses were contrasted with those of members of the
general public, both black and white. Perceptions about the causes and
cures of the riots were gathered by surveying black residents of Detroit's
Twelfth Street area shortly after the 1967 riot and through similar postriot
surveys in other black ghettos. Congressional data were obtained from a
mail questionnaire to which about half of all senators and representatives
responded.

Most black respondents singled out discrimination, deprivation, and
police brutality as the main reasons for riots. Most whites cited outside
agitation or criminal elements in the ghetto. Even in the ghetto itself
many in the predominantly white occupational groups--policemen, merchants
and employers--seemed inclined primarily to blame agitators, militants,
or criminals. In contrast, those in the predominantly black occupational
groups --teachers, social workers, and political workers--were more inclined
to attribute the riots to unheeded Negro complaints.

Given this black-white polarization of opinion among the rank and
file, the authors sought to discover whether the orientation of a predomi-
nantly white Congress would follow that of the white public or whether
the disorders would make its members more sympathetic to the problems of
blacks. Congressmen most frequently cited "joblessness and idleness, es-
pecially among young Negroes" as the cause of the riots, and nearly half
of them felt that "outside Negro agitators" were greatly to blame. These
congressmen also tended strongly to blame political institutions other than
the federal government, especially state and local governments. Of course,
these opinions varied according to the member's party and the region
represented.

Most ghetto residents in Detroit felt that the riot was bound to happen
sooner or later, but touched on possible ways to prevent future disorders:
"giving black people equal rights" and improving slum conditions. Fewer
than one-fifth of the residents suggested the need for tougher control, a
finding reported in other postriot surveys. Rank-and-file whites, however,
do not emphasize the need for crash programs to deal with discrimination
and ghetto conditions. Like the rank-and-file white citizens, most con-
gressmen felt that greater penalties for rioters and larger, better-paid
police forces would do much to prevent riots. "As reflected in this survey,
the general mood of Congress seemed to represent a desire to avoid major
social reform or--at best--to escape the responsibility for preventing
future riots by delegating it to other public and private agencies."

Comments:

Although there are weaknesses in the congressional survey and in many
of the postriot surveys cited in this article, the contrast in perspectives
between black and white Americans is both revealing and dramatic. The
impact of the riots on the attitudes of white Americans is particularly
interesting in the light of the Kerner Report.

Himes, Joseph, "A Theory of Racial Conflict," Social Forces, 51,
    1, September 1971, 53-60.

Approach: Theoretical

Abstract:

    According to this author, racial conflict could develop against
the background of the traditional racial structure and become socio-
logically inevitable when four conditions were fulfilled: fist,
blacks would have to become motivated toward conflict; next, they
would have to create resources for social power; third, organizational
devices for mobilizing would have to be developed; and fourth, tactical
devices would have to be produced.

    Why did racial conflict erupt across the nation in the 1960s,
instead of in 1950 or 1970? Himes claims that racial conflict is
inevitable in a given situation -- in this case the traditional
racial structure in which blacks and whites are segregated and
interdependent -- when certain factors are added in a particular
sequence with cumulative effect.

    Adequate motivation by blacks entails heightened frustration, a
belief that change is possible, a perception by black people of their
collective power, and ideological support for conflict, such as Martin
Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech. Sources of power are deliber-
ately sought by leaders of violent movements. In this case, they
found power in the black masses themselves, by tapping the moral
guilt of whites, and by using the mass media. Organization was needed
in order to inspire and galvanize blacks to fit them into divisions
of labor, to impose control over relevant behavior, to sustain morale
and enthusiasm, and to develop what Himes called the "mass-partici-
pating conflict activity pattern." Invented or borrowed tactics for
manipulating and deliverying power included direct action, confron-
tation, intimidation, and controlled violence.

    According to the author, "the times" produced this combination
of factors, one "that triggered conflict as the expected outcome of
change" and "eliminated any other possible outcome."

Comments:

    Himes does little more than list the events leading up to the
racial conflicts of the 1960s as a basis for an alleged theory that
these events led to conflict. It would be more convincing if he
showed that those factors were present in many other countries at
different times and in different settings. Do they appear in situa-
tions that did not lead to conflict?

    The author claims that an "adequate" theory should account for all
types of conflict behavior. Are the factors causing other kinds of
conflict the same as those causing specifically racial conflict?

Racial conflict is not defined, and Himes's inclusion of King's "I Have a Dream" speech as exemplifying support for conflict implies quite a broad definition. Under those terms there has been racial conflict throughout American history.

Hippler, Arthur, "The Game of Black and White at Hunter's Point,"
    Trans-Action, 7, 6, April 1970, 56-63.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Participant Observation

        This case study of the 1966 riot at Hunter's Point in the south-
eastern section of San Francisco, describes the underlying conditions,
the precipitating event, the dynamics and development of the disorder,
and its aftermath. Hippler was himself engaged in field work in the
area both before and after the five-day riot.

        Hunter's Point is described as a "true ghetto, despised and neglec-
ted as far as possible by the rest of the city." Its population is
largely black, with high unemployment, substandard housing, inadequate
community control, and unpredictable and unsatisfactory relations
between residents and the police.

        The 128-hour riot began when a black teenager was killed by a
white policeman; it seemed a tragedy in which community leaders and the
police were completely ineffectual. The Negro leaders of the middle-
class community could exert no influence on the young male rioters;
the organization of former gang leaders who maintained a liaison between
the police and the participants had no strength, and the mayor was
considered incapable of understanding the roots of the discontent.
"Vague promises could not compensate for abandoning the sense of power
which the riot gave its participants."

        The police made a major tactical error by opening fire on the
settlement house and engaging in some willful property damage. The
community then believed that the police wanted to kill them and would do
so. "The police undoubtedly considered the residents as riotous and
dangerous long before they had become so, and this perception determined
the actions of the police and finally the actions of the rioters."
Yet very few violent acts by Negroes against whites were said to occur
in the course of the rioting, and the reason given by Hippler is the
Negroes' fear of whites coupled with a holiday mood.

        The riot caused even greater disintegration of the community.
Blacks and whites are farther apart than ever, very few community organ-
izations still function, few of the jobs promised for black youth have
materialized, and separatism between the races is increasingly supported.

Comments:

        This is a very readable case study of a tragic episode.

Hofstetter, C. Richard, "Political Disengagement and the Death of Martin
      Luther King," Public Opinion Quarterly, 33, 2, 1969, 174-79.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

        Ethnic groups are believed to become integrated into political
systems at the beginning by ethnic leaders who serve as brokers or links
for the group. Hofstetter suggests here that the murder of Dr. Martin
Luther King would sever this connection for many blacks, disengage
them from the political system, and intensify their mistrust of whites,
and of major political institutions and leaders. Data were from an on-
going study of political attitudes, with comparisons of attitudes before
and after the murder among a stratified random sample of the Columbus,
Ohio, metropolitan area. The results showed a somewhat more selective
pattern of change than had been predicted: 1) the only effect on whites
was a slight polarization toward and against national politicians;
2) the effect on the ties blacks felt to political objects was much
greater; 3) negative attitudes toward police increased sharply; 4) negative
feelings toward whites doubled in frequency; 5) black's resentments
about national politicians, and Richard Nixon in particular, grew more
negative; 5) positive feelings increased for the N.A.A.C.P. and other blacks.

Comments: The greatest weakness is that only 29 blacks took part before
the murder and only 27 after it.

Janowitz, Morris, "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence," In <u>Violence in America, Historical and Comparative Perspectives</u>. H. Graham and T. Gurr (Eds.), for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, New York, 1969, 393-422.

Approach: Historical/Theoretical

Janowitz states his purpose at the very beginning as being an attempt to "...trace the transformation of patterns of collective racial violence in urban areas over the last fifty years in three phases: the World War I race riots (1919); the World War I ghetto riots; and the political riots of the 1960s." Janowitz assumes that the "extent and form of collective racial violence" is an expression of the "social structure and agencies of social change and social control" and specifically targets the mass media (newspapers in the 20s; TV in the 60s) and the police as causal agents. He builds a typology of race riots, linked with each historic period. The first type, Communal ("contested area") riots, were interracial clashes typical of the post World War I period. They occurred on the periphery of expanding black neighborhoods and represented the white community's desire to put blacks back "in their place." Beginning with the Harlem riot of 1943 and climaxing during the 1960s, communal riots gave way to large scale violent disorders within the black urban ghettos. This second type is termed "commodity" riots because violence by blacks was directed towards property and retail establishments rather than against persons. The third kind of riot, 'political terror waged by small groups of people with crude ideologies' is what happened in the 1960s.

Janowitz contends that styles and strategies of intervention and control of black-white tensions and actual riots by police have a tremendous effect on the actual dynamics of protest. He specifically cited police overreaction and excessive use of firepower as a cause in the escalation of violence in riots.

The role of the mass media has been significant. During communal riots newspapers contributed to the violence by publishing inflammatory reports. During the 1960s, violence spread contagion style throughout urban areas and the nation via television. The media disseminated the rationalizations of rioters and presented information about tactics of participation and the gratifications that were derived from violence.

The decline in the scope and intensity of 1968 racial riots is due in part to the development of new tactics and organizations that facilitate the expression of black interests and solidarity as well as to changes in the role of the police: improved police community relations, higher levels of police professionalism, and improved police training. Janowitz predicts the next phase of collective racial violence will involve a shift from "expressive" outbursts to a more instrumental and goal oriented use of violence by blacks. The failure of society to meet needs of the black community will contribute to an environment in which conspiratorial violence will flourish. The role of the police will involve covert surveillance of militant organizations, thus escalating violence as happened during the communal and commodity phases.

Comments:

In the three types of collective racial violence outlined by Janowitz, a variety of dimensions are used to distinguish them but their essential similarities to other nonracial violent events are not noted. It would seem to be useful and indeed necessary to show that each of the types-- communal, commodity, and political riots--represent types of violence which have occurred over issues other than racial issues throughout our history. For example, communal riots are essentially defined by the fact that a dominant or establishment group attacked a minority group when there is a perceived threat of loss of status. These types of riots are similar to vigilante actions in the same or earlier periods of American history. Commodity riots and political violence on the other hand, repre- sent efforts by a minority or oppressed group to secure concessions from dominant groups and differ more in the choice of strategy and tactic than in target. Both of these types of violence have also had their counterparts in nonracial collective actions such as labor violence.

Jeffries, Vincent, and H. Edward Ransford, "Interracial Social
Contact and Middle-Class White Reactions to the Watts Riot,"
Social Problems, 16, 3, 1969, 312-24.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Abstract:

Shortly after the Watts riot, the reactions of a sample of white,
middle-class residents were studied to see whether friendly, equali-
tarian social contacts with blacks predicted to any extent the way
they reacted to blacks immediately after the riot, and to assess their
perception of the riot itself. The authors assume that uncompetitive
interracial contact develops tolerance and a better knowledge among
whites of the problems and grievances of blacks.

They hypothesized that, compared to whites with social contact,
those lacking such contact would (1) estimate a higher proportion of
blacks participating in the riot; (2) be more aware of the presence of
blacks in day-to-day activities following the riot; (3) be more likely
to blame outside agitators for the riot; (4) display more fearful reac-
tions to blacks; (5) feel more alienated from blacks because of the
riot; and (6) be more in favor of punitive measures to prevent riots.

Social contact was measured two to four weeks after the riot by asking
103 white respondents if they had been associated with blacks in a
series of situations, and whether they had engaged in such social
activities with these blacks as visiting back and forth, going out
together, and so on. Of these respondents, 52 lived in an integrated
neighborhood on the periphery of the riot zone, while the other 51
lived in all-white areas 15-20 miles farther away. In both areas homes
were valued between $25,000 and $40,000. No social contact was re-
ported by 74 respondents; 29 reported some social contact. The housing
units and respondents were not specified. The interviewer was given
a random corner and direction to take.

The data supported the hypotheses, but sometimes with significance
as low as $p < .20$. To control for prejudice, the authors eliminated
27 extremely prejudiced respondents who agreed with the statement that
"Negroes are lazy and ignorant." Even in this smaller, more tolerant
sample, social contact with blacks remained an important predictor of
most reactions to the riot. After controlling for proximity to the
riot, all the original relationships between social contact and riot
reactions remained; in fact, whites with no social contact living
15-20 miles from the riot zone were more likely to fear attacks by
blacks than was true of whites with social contact who lived close to
the riot zone.

Comments:

Unfortunately the sample was not large enough to allow much intricate
analysis. Only 29 respondents reported having had social contact with
blacks. The authors view the study as exploratory because of the small

sample and the fact that every household in Los Angeles did not have
an equal probability of representation. In addition, there may have
been some systematic biases in the interviewers' selection of respon-
dents, in that the housing units in the white areas were not specified.

There is no evidence that social contact determines attitudes toward
blacks and toward the riot itself. It appears equally probable that
attitudes have determined whether social contact takes place. It is
also conceivable that a third variable, such as personality, determines
both social contact and attitudes toward blacks. Finally, since it
is not clear how the indices of social contact were constructed, it is
difficult to evaluate their validity.

Jeffries, Vincent, Ralph H. Turner and Richard T. Morris, "The Public
    Perception of the Watts Riot as Social Protest," American
    Sociological Review, 36, 3, 1971, 433-51.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Abstract:

    Using data gathered soon after the Watts riot, the authors test
several hypotheses regarding the conditions under which people will
identify a collective disturbance as a social protest. Social protest
is defined as an action that "expresses a grievance, a conviction of
wrong or injustice; the protestors are unable to correct the condition
directly by their own efforts; the action is intended to draw attention
to the grievances; the action is further meant to provoke ameliorative
steps by some target group; and the protestors depend upon some combi-
nation of sympathy and fear to move the target group in their behalf.

    Three determinants of the perception of an event as social protest
were examined in this study: the "credibility of the protest image
to the individual," the "communication balance between appeal and
threat," and "conduciveness to gestures of conciliation." Data consisted
of 583 interviews with whites living in six Los Angeles communities:
an all-white and a racially mixed community for each of three levels
of socioeconomic status - high, middle and low. The authors constructed
an Index of Protest Definition (IPD) by combining responses to three
questions: Was the Watts riot a protest? What were its causes?
What steps might prevent further riots? They found that 48 percent of the
sample viewed the Watts riot as a social protest in answering at least
two of the three questions.

    The "credibility of the protest image to the individual" was be-
lieved to be based on three factors: (1) some prior sensitizing exper-
ience, knowledge or attitudes, such as a belief that discrimination was
practiced against Negroes; (2) some similarity between respondents'
generalized conception of protest and this particular event; for example,
a belief that protests involve substantial support from the group they
represent and that this is true of the particular event; and (3) an
evaluation of another group's complaints by comparison with their own
situation; that is, groups that are better off than the complaining group
can find the claim of injustice more credible than groups that are
worse off.

    To measure the first factor the authors looked at respondents' atti-
tudes toward discrimination and toward the civil rights movement, as
well as their participation in activities supporting civil rights, mea-
sured after the riot, and found that they were substantially related to
definitions of protest. Respondents who agreed that Los Angeles blacks
suffer from discrimination, those who approved of the civil rights move-
ment, those who had participated in civil rights protests, and those
who believed the requests of blacks were just, tended to view the Watts
riot as protest, according to the summarized data, after controlling
for respondents' attitudes towards blacks.

The authors assumed that most individuals believe protests involve substantial support and little opposition from a given constituency, and so they asked people how much support, participation, and opposition to the disturbance they observed in their neighborhoods. They found only a weak relation between these perceptions and protest definitions.

Data on reported income, occupation, educational attainment, and the degree of discrimination the respondents perceived toward low income whites as well as toward themselves showed only a slight or insignificant relation between the demographic variables and protest definition; the relation between definitions of protest and discrimination against low income whites and the respondents themselves was weak.

Finding that a perception of discrimination against low income whites or oneself strongly affects only the number of persons with high socioeconomic status who define the Watts riot as a social protest, the authors suggest that "subjective common cause affects protest definition only among those who are in a clearly more advantaged position than the protestors."

The "communication balance between appeal and threat" was believed to make it more likely that a disturbance would be interpreted as a social protest. The identification of grievances and the appeal for help had to be loud enough to be heard, but the intimidation or threat could not be too loud to drown out the appeal.

Respondents were asked about the positive or negative responses other people made to the riot. Were whites now more aware of or more sympathetic to "the Negro problem" than before? Respondents who believed that whites were now more aware and more sympathetic, those who felt the gap between the races had not increased, and those who felt the riot had helped "the Negro's cause" were more likely to define the riot as protest. Most of these relationships held up after controlling for attitudes towards blacks, and this fact was interpreted as supporting the hypothesis. Those respondents who felt threatened by the riot were expected to be less likely to perceive the riot as protest. Respondents were asked whether they feared for themselves or the safety of their families during the riot, whether they considered using firearms for protection, and whether they approved of whites buying guns to protect themselves during a riot. Two of these measures of threat were negatively associated with the perception of the riot as social protest.

The final determinant the authors examined was "conciliation." If defining an event as a protest is taken to be an act of conciliation toward blacks, then whites are likely to redefine the riot as something other than protest, if blacks continue to attack them. The authors tested this hypothesis by asking the respondent if he thought blacks were ungrateful, whether blacks were in general violent people, and whether most Los Angeles blacks respect law and order. The hypothesis received no significant support after controlling for attitudes towards blacks.

The strongest finding in this study is the establishment of a relation between a sensitizing experience or predisposing ideology and the definition of social protest, over and above general attitudes toward blacks. The authors suggest that strategies to increase public awareness of discrimination will be helpful in reducing racial inequality in the United States.

Comments:

The measurements used in this study are not good tests of either the hypotheses or the concepts. For example, the respondent's perception of whether other whites felt that the riot had widened the gap between the races, or whether other whites were now more sympathetic to black people's problems, is taken to indicate the respondent's perception of the riot as an identification of grievances and a call for help. Neither the respondent's own attitude nor the authors' concept of appeal is measured. The authors themselves state that some of the relations may have been clear "if the items had been designed as indicators of the basic theoretical propositions," an understatement of the measurement problem.

A more detailed definition of a "sensitizing experience or attitude" is required to justify the use of "attitudes towards blacks" as a control. The authors' definition "some prior experience or knowledge or attitude that prepares the individual for what he encounters," appears to include a respondent's attitude towards blacks.

Among respondents of higher socioeconomic status, there was a relationship between the belief in discrimination against themselves and lower-class whites and their definition of the riot as a social protest. This was seen as support of the common cause theory. On the other hand, a relation between such a definition and a belief that lower-class whites are discriminated against would support the comparison theory, unless the respondents which were better off believed as they did because of "sympathy from shared misfortune." Without knowing which part of the question the respondent agreed with, or the part played by sympathy, we cannot conclude that either theory is supported.

The authors point out the "pervasive" problem of causality. "Tentatively, it is reasonable to regard attitudes towards the Civil Rights Movement and beliefs about discrimination against blacks in Los Angeles as both prior to and somewhat more generalized than interpretations of the particular event of Watts." It is also possible that the "observed" relationships may be spurious; a conceptually prior variable may have determined the definition of the riot as well as beliefs about discrimination.

Jiobu, Robert M., "City Characteristics, Differential Stratification, and the Occurrence of Interracial Violence," <u>Social Science Quarterly</u>, 52, 1971, 508-20.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

According to the author, many of the theories relating urban structure to interracial violence are piecemeal·and ad hoc. This article uses path analysis to test a model linking a city's characteristics to differences between blacks and whites in education, occupation, and income that have led to segregated housing and finally racial violence.

Three urban characteristics were considered: population size, percentage of blacks, and regional location. Larger cities were. expected to have more racial violence because violence was more likely to have some legitimacy and because a sense of anonymity and impersonality among people was a more common problem. Cities with larger black populations were believed to have more violence because discrimination and blocked opportunities are more frequent. Southern cities were expected to have less racial violence because of their castelike system of racial accommodation and the higher degree of social control by whites. Cities with greater gaps between whites and blacks in education, occupation, and income were expected to have more violence in protest against the prevalent accommodative structure. Moreover, segregation was thought not only to lead to violent acts as an expression of black solidarity but also to promote cohesiveness among blacks which could be mobilized in support of the violence.

With regard to relationships among these variables, Jiobu argues that city size will be negatively related to the comparative differences between education, occupation, and income of blacks and whites because attitudes about racial equality would follow the national pattern, and race would be less likely to create differences in education, occupation and income of residents. Large cities were expected to have more residential segregation, however, and differences in the education, occupation and income of blacks and whites were expected to be associated with segregated housing.

Seventy-four cities were included in the analysis. Each had a population of over 100,000, including at least 2,500 blacks. Since at least 85 percent of the nonwhites in these cities were black, the nonwhite statistics could be said to refer to blacks. Reports of 73 undefined incidents of "interracial violence" occurring between 1964 and 1967 were obtained from the <u>Christian Science Monitor</u>, the <u>New York Times</u>, <u>U.S. News and World Report</u>, and the Kerner Report. More than half (54 percent) of the cities experienced at least one outbreak of such violence.

As predicted, city size was directly related to racial violence. This effect was virtually independent of other variables included in the model, "a finding consistent with the argument that size reflects city city centrality in society and urbanism, both of which can lead to interracial violence." In contrast to size, the percentage of blacks had

hardly any direct effect on racial violence, on differences in occupation and income, or on residential segregation. As the authors expected, the direct effect of regional location was great: southern cities were relatively immune from violent incidents with respect to this one variable. Differences between education, income and occupation of blacks and whites were in general not related to racial violence, although where blacks held lower jobs there was a likelihood that less racial violence would occur. Residential segregation also had little effect on the incidence of violence, contrary to the hypothesis.

Differences in the socioeconomic status of blacks and whites thus exerted a generally negligible influence. Size, followed by region, clearly represented the most important of the variables explaining violence. The author argues that "while interracial violence may change accommodative structures, there is little support for the proposition that present accommodative structures lead to violence."

Comments:

The use of causal models, careful construction of indices in which blacks -- not nonwhites -- are the units of measurement, and clearly formulated hypotheses make this article important in the continuing examination of the relation between urban characteristics and racial violence. Unfortunately because the author does not define the incidents covered by the term "interracial violence," it is difficult to compare the results with those of Spilerman or Morgan and Clark.

Keniston, Kenneth, "How Community Mental Health Stamped Out the Riots (1968-1978)," Trans-Action, 5, 8, July/August 1968, 21-29.

Approach: Satirical Essay

Keniston presents here a view of the future in which the combined efforts of law enforcement, the military, and community mental health organizations have effectively suppressed dissent and urban violence. The vehicle is an imagined speech that might be given to the "Community Mental Health Organization" ten years after this article was written. Satirized are the euphemisms and labels attached to strategies of control and containment. The author reaffirms the danger of treating dissent and protest as manifestations of individual and social pathology. He also suggests that mental health workers might be asked to police the behavior of dissidents and violent protesters, envisioning a transfer by which the traditional tactics used to promote community mental health are devoted to the control and repression of urban inner-city dwellers.

Comments:

An amusing and thought provoking essay revealing the policy implications of meshing the efforts of control and treatment organizations to prevent disorder and dissent.

Kerner, Otto, et al., Report of the National Advisory Commission on
    Civil Disorders, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968.

Approach: Descriptive/Prescriptive
Methodology: Case Study

The report is divided into three parts. Part I contains profiles
of disorders which occurred in 10 cities during the 1967 wave of urban
unrest, selected from a total of 23 cities which were investigated.
Part II analyzes the causes of the 1967 disorders: discrimination in
employment, education, and housing; increasing demographic concentration
of blacks in the .cities and whites in suburbs; frustration bred by the
powerful contrast between the utopia portrayed by TV and the press and
the reality of impoverished life in deteriorating neighborhoods. In Part
III the Commission tries to answer the question, "What can be done?"
This review examines a number of the recommendations in response to
that question.

Several aim at reducing the social and political isolation which
characterizes ghetto life. The commission found that the trigger inci-
dents in many of the 1967 disturbances were themselves relatively small,
yet because of an accumulation of unresolved grievances they led to
enormous disruption. .The commission therefore recommends "Neighborhood
Action Task Forces," coalitions between ghetto leaders and city govern-
ment to cut some of the bureaucratic entanglements which prevent ghetto
leaders from obtaining an orderly redress of grievances. Since such
redress of grievances requires knowledge of and participation in the
legal system, the commission also recommends low-cost legal assistance for
the urban poor generally. The commission also recommends a campaign
by city governments to hire, train, and promote ghetto residents. Other
recommendations deal with the relation between police and ghetto commun-
ities. As the commission points .out, the police are the most visible
representatives of city government, and if they are abusive or insensi-
tive (as a certain percentage undeniably are) the already touchy rela-
tions between ghetto residents and local authority can explode into
full-scale disorder. The commission therefore recommends that officers
with bad reputations in ghettos should be transferred to other districts
and replaced by outstanding officers attracted to work in such areas
by special incentives. More generally the commission suggests that the
role of police departments should extend beyond law enforcement -- which
in itself engenders paranoia and suspicion -- to include a·range of
community services. Police departments, like other branches of city
government,.should also actively recruit members of the ghetto community.
All of these recommendations aim at overcoming the barriers which separate
urban authorities from their ghetto constituencies.

A different sort of recommendation set forth by the commission deals
with the news media. The commission investigated the charge that media
coverage of the disorders was inflammatory and concluded that for the
most part it was not. The commission realized during the investigation,
however, that the issue of media and the ghetto goes beyond the behavior
of reporters during riots and includes the general idea about the ghetto
conveyed by the media. The failure of the news sources to report the

urban ghetto and its problems realistically is reprehensible for two
reasons: 1) when news sources do not report ghetto problems regularly,
the outburst of stories during urban disorders will inevitably shock
an unprepared public; and 2) given the central role of the media in
socialization, failure to present the ghetto as a part of a larger
society perpetuates the alienation felt by ghetto dwellers. The com-
mission therefore recommends the establishment of permanent media
coverage of the urban ghetto. Also, citing the failure of the profes-
sional journalists and news sources to hire, train, and promote blacks,
the commission urges the profession to recruit blacks more actively
by instituting training programs in colleges and even high schools.

Regarding the future of U.S.Cities and of race relations in general
the commission declares that the current trend of black migration into
cities and whites to the suburbs shows no signs of diminishing and will
increasingly polarize U.S. society unless actively opposed. Effective
opposition would have to include a national fair housing law to support
black migration away from urban centers, a move that would in turn
enable blacks to follow industry in its exodus from the cities. (Another
strategy -- government subsidy of renewed urban industrialization -- is
less attractive.) Such opposition would also involve a serious effort
to rectify the present gross discrepancies between educational oppor-
tunities for blacks and for whites.

Comments:

In terms of commission reports, this one is outstanding, both in
terms of the sheer magnitude of the effort and the involvement of experts
both from the policy and research spheres of the society. Data collected
for the report have been useful in a variety of later efforts to dissect
the causes and characteristics of the urban riots.

Killian, Lewis M., "The Significance of Extremism in the Black Revolu-
tion," Social Problems, 20, 1, 1972, 41-49.

Approach: Theoretical

Killian examines the various connotations of the term extremism
as used with reference to the black movement. "Extremism" is a vague
term of opprobrium used by black leaders who wish to seem moderate
and is frequent in news reports. His definition of black extremism is
derived from Gary Marx's review of fifteen opinion and attitude surveys
of blacks in 1967 and 1968. Black extremism is characterized by the
following: 1) approval of violence as a tactic; 2) pessimism concerning
past changes or expected ones; 3) support for separatist goals; 4) hostil-
ity toward and mistrust of whites; 5) positive evaluation of black
power (black control of the black community); and 6) support for
Stokeley Carmichael and the Nation of Islam versus the NAACP and Ralph
Abernathy. Marx also suggests that the extremist is deeply committed
to his cause.

Before addressing the significance of extremism in the current
black movement, Killian examines it in earlier periods in black history.
He concludes that what is considered extreme in one period may be con-
sidered moderate or reactionary later. A. Philip Randolph is cited as an
example of the shifting ideological preferences in the black movement.

Six propositions concerning the possible significance of extremism
in the current black movement are presented. Extremists can accom-
plish these gains: 1) increase the bargaining power of moderate leaders
by making them appear more reasonable; 2) provide a constant corrective
to what may be illusions of progress; 3) identify unresolved issues
and define new ones; 4) radicalize a growing part of the movement's
membership and increase the polarization between the movement and its
opposition; 5) focus the attention of the opposition and public on new
issues; and 6) evoke extreme repressive measures from the opposition.

Killian notes that the extremist plays a dangerous game in making
things worse so that they can get better. This is often a self-defeating
strategy. It can evoke drastic repression of the whole movement. The
stakes he plays with are not just his but those of the moderates as well.

Comments:

This was an interesting analysis. The author describes the reaction
of moderates, leaders of the opposition, and the news media to extremists
and notes the pay-off, especially for the moderates, in successfully
labeling a person as extremist.

Knopf, Terry Ann, "Race, Riots and Reporters," Commonweal, July 1970, 336-40; see also, Knopf, T.A., "Race, Riots and Reporting," Journal of Black Studies, 4, 3, March 1974, 303-27; and Knopf, T.A., "Media Myths on Violence," Civil Rights Digest, 4, 1, Winter 1971, 2-9.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Content Analysis

This article argues that serious problems characterize press coverage of urban disorders, despite technical improvements. "Glaring instances of inaccuracy, exaggeration, distortion, misinterpretation, and bias have continued at every level--in newspapers and news magazines large and small, Northern and Southern, liberal and conservative."

Knopf attributes the problems to the system of reporting in which the wire services, nationally known newspapers, and the news magazines constantly exchange information and tend to reproduce rather than examine each other's views. In the main, she says, these views reflect the bias of the "vast American middle class." "Both the general public and the press share the same dislike of the protestors; both are unable to understand the violence as expressions of protest against oppressive conditions. Both prefer the myth of orderly, peaceful change, extolling the virtues of private property and public decorum."

Surveys of white attitudes conducted by the Lemberg Center, compared with research on the riots themselves, she says, show that the findings in the riot studies have had little impact on the American public. Most Americans continue to believe that outside agitators were a major or contributing cause of the disorders, and the reason in part is the failure of the press.

Comments:

Although the article presents convincing evidence about the biases of the American press, the coverage of the media reports is selective and unsystematic. Further, this is a relatively superficial analysis of the factors tending to reinforce and maintain inadequate press coverage of disorders.

Kreps, Gary A., "Change in Crisis-Relevant Organizations: Police Departments and Civil Disturbances," American Behavioral Scientist, 16, 3, 1973, 356-67.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

How the civil disturbances of the late 1960s affected "crisis-relevant" organizations like police departments is the focus of this article. Police departments in fifteen unnamed cities with varying civil disturbances between 1965 and 1969 were selected for testing fifteen hypotheses about the impetus for organizational change, the development of change, and important factors associated with it. Change referred to relatively permanent modifications of the internal workings of the environment as a consequence of threats of civil disorders.

The first set of hypotheses stated, 1) that the greater the civil disturbances the greater the organizational changes; 2) as information gathering increased, more contact was made with other police departments, the range of problem-solving broadened, and the organizations became more complex. Police departments of larger sizes which were more complex and had more funds, and where they were more professionally trained were believed to experience more change.

The data came chiefly from 68 interviews with police officials who described the changes that had occurred in response to the threat of civil disturbance; but documentary information about each organization was also used as well as information from official records about the structural characteristics of the departments.

Spearman rank-order correlations supported most of the hypotheses, but organizational changes were more closely associated with perceived threats of civil disturbances than with actual disorders. Professional training of department personnel showed consistently higher correlations with the organizational changes than other structural characteristics of the organizations such as size, wealth, and complexity. Two case studies were presented to trace the organizational change in more detail.

Kreps concluded that "in these police departments, increasing amounts of information, activated by some definitions of civil disturbance threat, were associated with increasing amounts of change. Furthermore the existence or activation of interpolice contacts, as a source of information, were also an impetus to change."

Comments:

This is a very superficial analysis of how organizational change takes place in the police departments, and the documentation of methods is deficient. We are given no information about the characteristics of the fifteen selected cities, the kinds of disorders they experienced, their responses to the disorders, or many other factors which might be important.

Lang, Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang, "Racial Disturbances as Collective
Protest," American Behavioral Scientist, 11, 4, 1968, 11-13.

Approach: Theoretical

. This article reviews the dynamics of racial disturbances, defined
as "a spontaneously shared collective defense, i.e., a collectively
sanctioned defense against demoralization through the spontaneous coa-
lescence of individual reactions in a distressing situation." In such
situations, aggrieved persons are considered to act directly, coer-
cively, and often violently to assert certain norms against established
authority.

In the authors' opinion, any group is capable of violent reactions.
The potential for violence increases when the means of institutional
redress are limited or lacking, and when a perceived threat touches
on common moral sentiments. Police arrest is especially likely to
elicit violence because "there is a disposition common to all segments
of the population to view the use of force by police as provocative
and offensive." This is all the more true of people isolated from the
mainstream of society, those whose self-esteem has been undermined by
authorities, and those who recognize the limitations of civil disobedience.
Residents of Negro ghettos are therefore especially at risk.

Once a given incident, usually involving a victim of an apparent
outrage by police, mobilizes the sentiments of bystanders, a spontan-
eous collective defense is likely to ensue. This tendency to side with
the victim and against police depends upon the presence of a "critical
mass" of individuals who are ready to act against authority when pro-
voked. The disorder which follows usually involves only a small number
of residents; they are most likely to be young black males. Expansion
into a full-scale riot, however, is the work of two groups: "sectarian
agitators ready to foment trouble and/or to exploit any incidents for
their own purpose, and those who normally participate in all sorts of
illegal activities and are therefore prepared to take advantage of any
disorder as a cover for their usual pursuits."

The next issue considered by the Langs is whether or not rioters
employ violence as a political instrument. The fact that many riots
were similar and occurred within a limited period suggests a social
movement, however spontaneous the precipitating events appeared to be.
Yet two observations seem to contradict the political explanation:
the disturbances usually coincided with hot weather -- not politically
significant events; and even the militant rank and file of the civil
rights movement dissociated themselves from the disorders. The authors
consider that the diffuse nature of the acts indicates that the dis-
turbance was an occasion for "collective license" and personal gain.
The deliberate selection of riot targets is thought to suggest that
revenge was a motive.

The Langs observed that authorities often focus on troublemakers
themselves rather than negotiation of issues. This tendency is magnified

by the attention reporters pay to violent incidents and to the would-be leaders who advocate violence. Although the maladjusted initiate protest, "as efforts at reasonable negotiations are frustrated, and alternative collective solutions to problems appear, even psychologically adjusted persons will be prone to tactics that include or invite violence." These authors therefore conclude that "the resort to violence is indicative of social, and not an individual, pathology."

Comments:

An underlying ambivalence is apparent throughout this article. On the one hand, the authors consider that violence is possible among groups having limited prospects of redress and feeling threatened by authority. When common sentiments are mobilized, hostile action takes the form of a spontaneously shared collective defense. Yet the Langs also assert that an incident is expanded into rioting by groups of troublemakers and criminals. They further contend that "among the main carriers of movements of radical protest in their early phases are persons who, because of their poor adjustment, exhibit many facets of pathology." Thus they belie their main argument that racial disturbances represent a collective protest by their own emphasis on the role of troublemakers, individual pathology, and "collective license."

Levy, Burton, "Cops in the Ghetto: A Problem of the Police System,"
The American Behavioral Scientist, March-April 1968, 31-34.

Approach: Prescriptive
Methodology: Observational/Literature Review

The riots in Newark and Detroit and the actual and threatened
civil disorders in other urban areas in the summer of 1967 led this
author to question the efficacy of traditional programs aimed at
bridging the gulf between the black community and the police.   Using
years of "intensive experience with police in all parts of the nation,
combined with results of other studies and statements by police offi-
cers themselves," Levy argues that the money spent on police recruit-
ment, in-service training, community relations programs, and profes-
sionalization of police will not measurably improve the relations be-
tween police and Negroes in the urban centers.

He first cites evidence that the hostility to the police expressed
by blacks is of long standing and is not confined to the poor or
criminal.   Moreover, every actual or potential civil disorder in the
urban ghetto began with an encounter between a police officer and a
black citizen.   Systematic evidence of police brutality is difficult to
obtain; but after an independent review apparatus was set up there were
significantly more convictions against police departments than earlier
departmental grievance procedures had produced.

Efforts to upgrade the education, training, and salaries of police
have provided no evidence of change in their actual attitudes and be-
havior.   Programs to ease relations between the black community and the
police have not been evaluated for effectiveness, but the author be-
lieves they are probably not effective in changing the behavior of
police, or the attitudes of blacks.   Attempts to bring more blacks into
the police force have generally failed because "with one or two minor
exceptions, Negroes simply are not employed in any number in any depart-
ment."

His own observations as well as a study by Arthur Niederhoffer,
Behind the Shield, lead Levy to argue that the problem is not a few
"bad eggs" but rather a police system that recruits a significant number
of bigots, reinforces the bigotry through the department's value system
and association with older officers, and then takes the worst of the
officers and assigns them to duty in the ghetto.   Although other forms
of institutional racism have been addressed by civil rights organizations,
and the black community, and at least some of the white community,
the police issue has been neglected because information is lacking and
because of the defensiveness and secrecy exhibited by both the more
professional police and the "old-line cops."   Levy believes that to
confront the issue mayors and police chiefs must be strong and committed
to control of the police system.   This will require a political base,
a sensitive power structure, and changes in the attitudes held by a
large number of white citizens.

Comments:

In contrast to earlier work by this author recommending that mean-
ingful change in the relations between blacks and police could be
brought about by the police department itself, Levy here proposes that
the political centers of power must take the initiative to restructure
the entire system. The argument would be considerably strengthened
by a more detailed documentation to support the charge that current
programs are ineffective. It is misleading to assert that certain
programs will not work, when they have not even been tried.

Levy, Sheldon G.,"Communications During the Detroit Riot," Journalism
Quarterly, 1971, 48 (2), Sum., 339-342.

Approach: Descriptive, Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

This paper examines the flow of information during the 1967
Detroit riot in a random sample of 504 adults (16 years and older)
in the city of Detroit and a few suburban areas. Interviews were con-
ducted with 310 whites and 194 blacks between September and December,
1967.

Although the riot broke out on Sunday, July 23, 1967, at about
4 a.m., the major news media suppressed information about it until about
6 p.m. on Sunday. Nevertheless many of the respondents (51 percent of
whites and 66 percent of blacks) had heard about the riot by that time.
Information had spread eralier and through more informal channels for
blacks than for whites. "It is apparent that, in spite of efforts to
restrict the flow of information, informal networks disseminated the
information rapidly, especially within the Negro community."

Most of the respondents heard about the disturbance while they were
at home, and hearing it by word of mouth was more common among those
persons who were at home. Most of the respondents followed the news
about the riot and the greatest number of blacks and whites relied on
television. Only 6 percent of the whites and 4 percent of the blacks
said that newspapers were the most important source of information.
Less than 5 percent of either group cited informal sources. Negroes
spent more time following accounts of the riot than whites did.

Comments:
Readers should remember that the data on information source and
first knowledge of the incident come from respondents' own reports as
much as five months after the riot and that memories become vague,
particularly about details after so long an interval.

It is interesting to compare these results with those of Warren
(1972), who analyzed the influence of the media in Detroit during a
later racial crisis. Warren also found that blacks relied more on
friends and relatives for information than whites did, but that for
whites newspapers were more important sources than for blacks. Warren
went far beyond Levy in trying to analyze the way the sources of infor-
mation affected respondents' perceptions of the incident.

Lieberson, Stanley, Arnold Silverman, "The Precipitants and Under-
    lying Conditions of Race Riots," American Sociological Review,
    30, 6, 1965, 887-898.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Content Analysis

The authors suggest that race riots tend to be triggered by con-
frontations in which one racial group feels deeply wronged by the
other. Cities where economic competition between the races is very
keen and city councils do not adequately represent their constituents
are more likely to have a riot.

A riot differs from other forms of collective violence in that
persons and property are attacked simply because they represent a
given subgroup of the community. The first hypothesis here is that
the immediate cause of race riots tends to be the "actual or rumored
violation of one group by a member of the other." The second hypothesis
is that certain conditions in the community make it more likely that an
incident will lead to a riot.

A search through back issues of the New York Times revealed that
76 race riots occurred during 1913-63. To test the first hypothesis
the events assumed to have precipitated the riots were classified. It
was found that precipitating incidents often involved highly charged
offenses (real or rumored) committed by members of one group against
the others. Riots may be precipitated by violations of symbols
rather than persons or taboos (e.g., the burning of an American flag
by Negroes).

For the second hypothesis, a paried-comparison analysis was used:
each city experiencing a riot was compared to a city similar in size
and region that had not had a riot. By means of a nonparametric
sign test, pairs of cities were compared in terms of growth rate of
white and black population, proportion of black men employed in tradi-
tionally black occupations, difference between proportions of white
and black men in traditionally black occupations, frequency of black
store ownership in ghetto areas, white and black unemployment rates,
difference between white and black unemployment rates, median white
and black incomes, the difference between white and black median in-
comes, the percentage of blacks in substandard housing, the number of
black policemen for every thousand blacks in the population, the man-
ner in which city council members are elected (at large or by district),
and relative size of city council.

Riots are not randomly distributed; there is a systematic reason
why riots occur when and where they do. Although not all the relations
were statistically significant, the difference between the occupations
of whites and blacks was less marked in the riot cities and white in-
come was lower, indicating more intense economic competition between

the races. The percentage of black store owners was smaller and black policemen were fewer relative to the total black population. These cities also tended to have at-large elections and larger population per city council member, implying that these city governments were less capable of reflecting and responding to constituents' needs.

Going beyond the data, Lieberson and Silverman suggest that riots are likely to take place when social institutions are not functioning adequately and thus fail to resolve grievances quickly and fairly.

Comments:
The support of the first hypothesis is weak, since it depends on brief subjective newspaper accounts. Data for the second hypothesis come from the most recent census, which could be as much as ten years old, a particular problem when measuring unemployment. The authors were unable to differentiate between white and black riots and they do not control for the severity of the riots. The analysis does not go beyond ecological correlations and is therefore suggestive but not conclusive.

Lipsky, Michael, "Social Scientists and the Riot Commission,"
        The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
        Science, March 1971, 72-83.

Approach: Descriptive

        A wide gap exists between the ideal in recruiting social scien-
tists to serve on presidential commissions and the actual contribution
toward the commission's goals. Social scientists are appointed to
add "to the status and reputation of the commission's work in general
and to its research and recommendations in particular." However, be-
cause of "temporal, political, conceptual and methodological constraints,"
they are able to provide little more than window dressing to the re-
search effort as a whole.

        Lipsky illustrates his point through the research engaged in by
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, the Kerner
Commission. "A Harvest of American Racism," an interim report by social
scientists was rejected because "it was not authoritative enough to win
the support of the Commissioners." However, the fact that it contained
politically unpalatable conclusions was one of the bases for its re-
jection. Viewpoints politically acceptable required little documenta-
tion; those more controversial faced much stiffer standards of evidence.
Other outside research did not meet time requirements because the social
scientists under contract "proved unable or unwilling to conduct soph-
isticated research on short notice and with abbreviated procedures."
Consequently the commissioners had to continue their deliberations with-
out the benefits of these studies.

        Lipsky notes that the final report of the Kerner Commission does
not suggest the "unsystematic nature of the interviewing, the hazards
of recreating a day's interviewing in an evening of dictation, or a
theoretical context in which data were collected and informally classi-
fied."

Comments:

        A provocative point of view is expressed here, summed in Lipsky's
statement that commissions are formed partly because they "symbolically
reassure mass publics that events are under control...when, in fact,
successful intervention remains elusive."

MacDonald, A.P. Jr., "Black Power," Journal of Negro Education, 44, 4,
    Fall 1975, 547-54.

Approach: Theoretical

    MacDonald suggests that the first urban riots of the 1960s were dominated
by blacks who believed external forces were the cause of their problems. When
blacks tending to believe in internal control saw that the riots were achieving
positive results, they began to think of rioting as a strategy. The author
believes future research will show that "internal" blacks were overrepresented
in riots of the later 1960s.

    MacDonald interprets the concept of Black Power to refer to the black man's
power to exercise control over himself. The belief that one can control his
lot -- that is, that there is a relationship between what a person does and
what happens to him -- is based on what is called an "internal locus of con-
trol." The belief that people's lives are controlled by such outside forces
as fate or chance derives from a belief in "external locus of control."   A
considerable body of literature indicates that blacks and other minority groups
have a greater tendency to believe in an external locus than is found in the
white middle class owing to their harsher experience in the socioeconomic
system. The author believes that recent events affecting blacks, including
the Black Power movement, are bringing about a radical change in blacks and
making them more likely to assign importance to internal causes.

    MacDonald proposes a typology relating the discontent of "externals" and
"internals" to their behavior. Where discontent is either high or low, the
typical behavior of "internals" will be instrumental (i.e., goal oriented);
in contrast, the "externals'" behavior will be "expressive-passive" where dis-
content is low and "expressive-explosive" where it is high.

    MacDonald suggests that black rioters in the early 1960s largely believed
in an external locus and that those focusing on internal causes tended not to
participate because they did not believe rioting would be effective. Accord-
ing to his argument, the earlier riots changed the interpretation of rioting.
Though traditionally thought of as expressive behavior, it was then viewed
as instrumental by "internals," and they therefore became active in the
later riots.

    MacDonald presents no data of his own, but he cites two contradictory
studies. The Ransford study, conducted in 1965 shortly after the Watts riot
and published in 1968, found that discontented blacks who felt powerless were
most willing to resort to violent protest. Forward and Williams (1970) col-
lected data on the 1967 Detroit riot. They found that blacks who had a high
sense of personal efficacy had the strongest belief in the efficacy of rioting
for Black rights. MacDonald concludes that both results, given the times they
were obtained, may be correct within his framework.

Comments:

    MacDonald's hypothesis is interesting, although the studies he cites offer
only weak support for his position and he ignores other possible explanations
for the differences, such as different methods of sampling and measurement.

His point is nevertheless thought-provoking. Its chief implication is that differences in findings over time may reflect a dual psychic change in blacks, or perhaps a changed interpretation of the instrumental nature of various kinds of behavior.

Marx, Gary, "Civil Disorder and the Agents of Social Control,"
     Journal of Social Issues, 26, 1, 1970,

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

     A review of police behavior in the summer race riots of 1967
indicated to the author that the agents of social control seemed to
create disorder as much as they controlled it. As he is quick to point
out, the police as a group have been greatly maligned: and he dis-
claims any intention of blaming them for racial disorder. Nevertheless
he proposes to examine how police behavior can inadvertantly contribute
to disorder.

     To provide historical perspective, Marx reviews the literature on
police behavior in earlier twentieth century racial disorders: the
1900 New York riot, the 1906 Atlanta riot, and 1917 East St. Louis
riot, the 1919 riots in Washington and Chicago, the 1943 Detroit riot,
and others. Three criticisms of police behavior emerge: "a) the police
were sympathetic to (white) rioters and sometimes joined the riot them-
selves, b) police often failed actively to enforce the law, and c) when
police did try to maintain law and order this often was not done in a
neutral and impartial manner."

     Marx finds some improvement in police behavior during the 1960s.
One reason, he argues, is the increasing professionalism of police de-
partments: better organization, improved methods of communication, and
more resources all added up to better social control. Another reason,
however, reflects less credit on the police. With the increasing poli-
ticization of blacks in the 1960s a qualitative difference in racial
disorders appeared: "Rather than whites attacking Negroes under the
guise of an ideology of white supremacy (also) held by police, we
find Negroes attacking stores and police under the guise of an ideology
clearly not held by the latter. The task of restoring law and order
today coincides with the repression of Negroes, rather than of whites
as earlier." While police in the 1960s may no longer have been guilty
of passivity or contributing to rioting, evolving circumstances pre-
vent one from calling their changed behavior an outright improvement.

     Police behavior in recent disturbances -- up to 1967 -- are then
analyzed in the light of the initial thesis: that the agents of social
control often inadvertantly foster disorder. He defines three weaknesses
in police tactics: inappropriate methods of control, lack of coordina-
tion among control units, and breakdowns in police organization.

     Inappropriate methods of control usually stem from a state-of-
siege mentality among police which leads them to use force. Such
methods are not only damaging in themselves, but they rule out more
appropriate tactics such as negotiation or building on counterriot senti-
ment within the community. (The author notes a curious contradiction in
such "get-tough" thinking: on the one hand it assumes that the symbolic
value of an overwhelming display of force will induce rioters to weigh

their actions and subside; on the other hand, in a way reminiscent of LeBon, it suggests that rioters are wildly irrational creatures who must be smashed into submission.)

Lack of coordination and organizational breakdown are more creditable reasons for ineffectiveness than inappropriate control methods. Coordination, for example, often suffered when state or federal forces supplemented the local force, yet this disadvantage was offset by the freshness and greater impartiality of the outside forces. Police organization often broke down late in the riots when members of the force were battle-worn and understandably susceptible to confusion, panic, and frustration.

Marx concludes that as long as racism and poverty exist American society needs protest, but it also needs police. Acknowledging that police are the ones who must deal directly with the consequences of social inertia, he hopes they will behave as humanely as possible until change is forthcoming.

Comments:

This is a useful and extensively documented survey, providing both concrete examples of riots and anecdotal material. The descriptive classification in this article breaks no new ground in the theory of collective behavior but is certainly a necessary foundation for building on this theory.

McCord, William and John Howard, "Negro Opinions in Three Riot Cities,"
    The American Behavioral Scientist, 11, 4, 1969, 24-27.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Review of Existing Survey Research

    In this review of data collected in three cities in which riots
occurred during the late 1960s, the authors compared what blacks con-
sidered to be their main problems, what these blacks thought the impact
of the riots had been, and how effective they believed violence to be.
Formal interviews with randomly selected blacks were conducted in both
Houston and Oakland: in Houston 572 respondents were interviewed a
year before the riot; in Oakland 187 respondents were surveyed during
the disturbances. Informal "natural dialogue" interviews were conducted
in Watts with 426 randomly selected blacks two years after that riot.
All the interviewers were blacks of approximately the same social class
and from the same area as the respondents.

    When asked about their main problems, the majority of respondents
in Houston and Oakland mentioned jobs. In Watts, no particular problems
dominated, but a larger percentage of respondents mentioned problems
with the police and the power structure than was true in the other cities.
When asked specifically about their opinions of the schools, housing,
and police, the respondents in the three cities differed considerably.
Respondents in Oakland showed a higher degree of resentment about their
schools and police than those in the other cities, and residents of
Houston appeared to be most satisfied. Very few of those surveyed in
any of the cities reported "having taken part in the civil rights move-
ment -- by protesting, picketing, boycotting stores, etc." Only a minor-
ity of the respondents could correctly identify the mayor of their city.
Both in Watts and Oakland the respondents appeared to be more militant
than those in Houston, but even in Houston only a small proportion of
those interviewed said they were always opposed to violence. When asked
whether the Watts riot and disorders in other cities had helped or hurt
matters, the number of respondents who believed that the riots had been
helpful was larger in Houston and Oakland (cities which had not undergone
a full-scale disorder) than in Watts.

    The authors also explored the possibility that occupation, education,
age, sex, and religious convictions of the groups in Houston and Watts
could be related to their views about violence. Holding age constant,
they found that residents of Watts were more discontented in every way
than those in Houston, but that the young were not more dissatisfied
or more militant than older people. Militant attitudes were more preva-
lent among the least religious. The only differences between men and
women in this regard concerned the utility of violence: a higher pro-
portion of women condemned the use of violence under any circumstances,
but a large number of both sexes felt that violence was sometimes useful.
There were no major differences between occupational groups in Watts;
but in Houston the unemployed were -- predictably -- more dissatisfied
and militant than those with jobs, particularly those in more highly
paid jobs. Similarly, respondents in Watts showed more uniformity in

attitudes regardless of education than the Houston group, leading the
authors to suggest that "unification may be one effect of a major
riot upon urban Negroes." They further argue from all these facts "that
the rash of civil disorders which has spread in American cities during
the last few years will not soon abate -- without fundamental changes
in the urban American social structure."

Comments:

This article is an interesting descriptive account of the opinions
of urban blacks, but it is flawed by an attempt to be comparative and
prescriptive. Because the sample sizes of the three cities, as well as
the interviewing methods and questions, differed, rigorous comparisons
were impossible. Although the authors cite differences between the
three cities in expressed militancy and dissatisfaction, they could
only provide impressionistic explanations and so resorted to a finding
of "unexpected unanimity in the opinions expressed by urban Negroes."
This weakness in the study is particularly unfortunate because oppor-
tunities to compare cities before, during, and after the outbreak of
riots are rare.

McElroy, J.L., L.D. Singell, "Riot and Nonriot Cities: An Examination
    of Structural Contours," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 8, 3, 1973, 281-302.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

    In trying to explain the location of the 1960s riots, the authors
hypothesize that 1) cities where riots have occurred differ significantly
from other cities in their social, economic, and political structure;
2) these differences are consistent with both the "relative" and
"absolute" deprivation theories. A sample of 129 large standard metro-
politan statistical areas (SMSAs), including 64 which experienced racial
violence between 1965 and 1968, provided data for discriminant analysis
to distinguish riot cities from others according to social, economic,
and political variables, and to explain the degree of property damage
and economic loss they suffered.

    Independent variables consisted of 64 surrogate measures of socio-
economic conditions constructed from the 1960 Census of Manufacturing,
and 1960 Census of Population, and previous research on riots.
Comparisons were made of riot and nonriot SMSAs on the basis of socio-
economic variables, and a regression analysis was used to see what rela-
tions could be found between socioeconomic variables and the intensity
of racial violence.

    Analysis of the variables reflecting socioeconomic structure shows
clear differences between riot and nonriot SMSAs, a finding that reverses
some findings of earlier studies. In comparison with nonriot SMSAs,
riot SMSAs have more rapid population growth, greater growth of family
income, higher educational levels, a smaller percentage of people with
less than six years of education, a smaller percentage of nonwhite
policemen in juvenile divisions, a higher rate of increase in the number
of private household workers, a lower rate of increase in clerical
and other white-collar workers, and greater ratios of population to
each council member. The degree of racial segregation found in the
two types of SMSAs did not differ significantly.

    Between 1950 and 1960, however, the SMSAs where riots occurred showed
a decline in residential segregation, and the nonriot SMSAs an increase.
Two explanations of these findings on segregation have been advanced.
One is that tension in the riot SMSAs was caused when residential integra-
tion and social and economic improvements preceded at a different rate.
The other explanation is that decline in segregation in the riot SMSAs
resulted in greater interaction between blacks and whites and thus a
greater perception of relative deprivation. The authors' central expla-
nation of the locus of riots is that "it is the high levels of economic
performance and social development in the large SMSA juxtaposed with
the inferior levels in the central city and the ghetto which basically
distinguish riot and nonriot cities."

    To account for the intensity of the riots, the extent of property
damage and economic loss in the 64 SMSAs which had experienced disorders

was used to classify them as cities of low, medium, or high intensity and discriminant analysis and multiple regression were used to see if the measure of intensity could be associated with measures of their social and economic structures. In general the authors had difficulty in obtaining a set of structural conditions which explained riot intensity, but they did find that many of the significant variables were related to urban size. Thus they argue that "the interaction of riot-conducive characteristics produces 'threshold levels' associated with explosions. The conditions most generally surrounding intense riots are, in addition to large urban size and correspondingly large ghettos, factors which reflect inequality between the central city and the larger metropolitan area." And they conclude that improvements in social and economic conditions without reducing the inequalities between the races may also lead to more violence.

Comments:

This abbreviated version of what must have been a much more comprehensive and detailed analysis raises a number of questions that cannot be answered because the authors failed to define many of their terms, such as relative deprivation. Instead of providing concrete specifications of their indicators (e.g., riot cities, versus nonriot), they often rely on questionable "surrogate" indicators of abstract structural conditions. For example, they used per capita expenditures on welfare as an index of "socioeconomic dysfunction." The tendency to use more than sixty variables when less than ten show statistical significance, and to neglect the possibility that apparent relations were the result of chance, makes many of their conclusions questionable. Important also is that the article examines differences in structural conditions underlying only one type of protest, riots; and thus it may have obscured associations between many of the independent variables and other forms of collective action, such as demonstrations that were not violent.

McPhail, Clark, "Civil Disorder Participation: A Critical Examination of
Recent Research," American Sociological Review, 36, 6, 1971, 1058-73.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data; Literature Review

Most research on the civil disorders in the 1960's examines the relation
between individual attributes and participation in disorders. This paper summar-
izes the results of these studies, assesses the adequacy of the "deprivation-
frustration-aggression" (DFA) explanation of individual participation, and
evaluates the focus of these studies. According to the DFA explanation, urban
blacks feel deprived when they compare their situation to that of whites.
Their resulting frustration leads to aggression against white society expressed
in the form of civil disorder.

The author examines individual participation in five riots: Watts, 1965;
Omaha, 1966; and Detroit, Milwaukee and Newark, 1967. Five operational measures
of riot participation were used in these studies: status of those arrested;
respondents' reported status; respondents' testimony about others' behavior;
respondents' reported status and testimony about others' behavior; and respon-
dents' reported status and their own behavior. McPhail used 24 independent
variables which he divided into six categories: 1) statements of attitudes
toward jobs, housing and the political system; 2) social relationships and
patterns of interaction such as extent of respondents' interracial contact,
marital status, number and types of groups in which they reported membership;
3) socioeconomic attributes. e.g., education, income, employment, SES, etc.;
4) experiences of and opinions about discrimination toward blacks; 5) demo-
graphic attributes, e.g., age, sex, place of origin; and 6) participation in
politics, voting, civil rights activity.

Among the 287 associations between independent variables and measures of
participation, 91 were not statistically significant at the .05 level, 177 had
low magnitude (less than .29), 17 were moderate (.30 to .59), and 2 were .6
or higher.

The deprivation-frustration-aggression explanation received little empirical
support when variables bearing on this argument were examined in relation to
individuals' riot participation. Of 173 instances where deprivation (such as
low socioeconomic status and experience with police brutality) and frustration
(expressed in attitudes about the police, the political system, and whites)
were associated with participation in riots, only 12 had moderate magnitudes
and 1 had a high magnitude. Five of the moderately associated variables
related opinions about police brutality to riot participation. But in all such
cases the respondents' statements about abusive police action were made after
their arrest and may therefore be a result of their arrest, not the reason
for rioting.

Inferences from associations between attitude statements and riot partici-
pation demand caution: 1) Frequently a respondent's attitude after the dis-
order is taken to be the same as it was before the event and to be the cause
of this joining in the disorder, whereas his participation might have produced
the reported attitude. 2) Studies did not yield consistent evidence that
attitudes at one time produced particular behavior at a later time. 3) It is
doubtful that one can account for participation in terms of attributes. Mea-
sures of participation fail to sample variations in respondents' behavior through-

out the disorder and many rioters may intermittently refrain from rioting, or even engage in counterrioting. Interaction with other people during the riot may have had a stronger influence on an individual's readiness to riot than his personal attributes or his previous attitudes.

Research on riots has focused on individual attributes and attitudes and given less attention to the immediate actions of people in relation to each other. To find the necessary conditions for civil disorder, one must answer the following questions:

1. In what settings and at what times are large numbers of persons in the same general area? For example, according to the Kerner Report most of the disorders it examined began on weekends or evenings at major intersections in densely populated areas.

2. What are the steps by which people learn about and are drawn to the scene of the event?

3. What individual and joint actions do people engage in during the disorder?

4. What produces, maintains, and alters these different actions?

Comments:

McPhail's review of a large number of associations between individual variables and riot participation does an important service in organizing the massive amount of empirical material generated in the 1960s and in providing a perspective on its quality and statistical significance. Yet the article does not spell the end of the deprivation-frustration-aggression theory as an important explanation of riot participation; it only reaffirms the methodological flaws and conceptual inadequacies that have consistently plagued these studies. Quite clearly, multivariate analyses are necessary; but of the 287 associations reported in this article, 172 were bivariate with no controls, and we were not informed about the control variables for the remaining 115 associations.

McPhail has suggested that researchers abandon the deprivation-frustration-aggression thesis and study instead the process and dynamics of rioting, focusing on the interactions of individuals before and during the incidents. Although this approach is important in understanding the immediate context of rioting and the way the incident develops, it is not a substitute for theories which explore the deeper underlying conditions, including deprivation or class conflicts.

Meier, August and Elliott Rudwick, "Negro Protest and Urban Unrest,"
    Social Science Quarterly, 49, 3, 1968, 438-43.

Approach: Theoretical

    This paper examines the causes assigned to the riots of the 1960s
and the historical sketch of the Negro protest movement in the Kerner
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

    Meier and Rudwick claim that the cause of the riots was not white
racism as claimed by the report, pointing out that if white racism had
been the precipitating factor, the riots would have occurred where
racist repression was most severe and where most Negroes were to be
found -- in the South. Data on the 1967 riot show that this was not
the case. Rather, the authors conclude, the riots of the 1960s occurred
because of heightened expectations of equality and racial justice, and
these had grown greatly because white racism had declined.

    Although the report noted that the civil rights movement was
crucial in bringing about changes that resulted in heightened expecta-
tions, it did not consider that certain policies of the Johnson adminis-
tration made the Negro protest movement in the mid 60s even more frag-
mented and ineffective, a condition which did much to alienate black
militants.

    The 1964 Democratic Party's compromise offer of two delegates-at-
large divided Negroes: some, like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) rejected
the compromise as an insincere gesture; others like the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) urged its
acceptance.

    The Vietnam war also divided those engaged in the Negro protest
movement: members disagreed on such issues as whether the war diverted
attention from domestic problems, kept Negroes in a subordinate status,
or was irrelevant to the movement. Later the movement suffered financially.
After the riots of 1964 and the following summer, the refusal of direct
action organizations like CORE to accept the delegation's compromise,
and by 1965 these organizations' opposition to the Vietnam war diminished
the willingness of whites to help support the organizations financially.

    The antipoverty program also hurt the protest movement. Emphasis
by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) on the development of local
community organizations to handle problems of Negroes impaired the tra-
ditional civil rights activities of certain national organizations and
fragmented the Negro protest movement by, for example, depriving it of
its most capable leaders. The resulting prominence of militant types
from CORE and SNCC in antipoverty programs brought further fragmentation,
as the struggle between the more moderate middle-class leaders like those
in the NAACP, and the radical, militant types became more intense. In
addition, OEO had inadvertantly added to the frustration of poor blacks
by raising their expectations but failing to deliver. This heightened

the militance among the poor, who pressed for government resources and programs to be initiated and administered by ghetto dwellers.

The authors conclude that the report oversimplifies the cause of the riots and the historical development of the Negro protest movement, although it deals well with the description of "typical rioter" and some other matters.

Comments:

Meier and Rudwick briefly analyze riot data and other examples of disorders to support their contentions; but their conclusions are quite speculative and should be viewed cautiously. Though the authors rightly note the complexity of the issues and circumstances in the riots of the 1960s and the civil rights protest movement, many other factors they ignore, such as social events and political climate, may also have been influential.

Meier, August and Elliott Rudwick, "Black Violence in the 20th Century:
A Study in Rhetoric and Retaliation," In Violence in American,
Historical and Comparative Perspectives, H. Graham and T. Gurr (Eds.),
for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence,
New York, 1969.

Approach: Historical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Although black retaliatory violence has been characteristic of recent
racial rioting, neither the rhetoric nor the practice of black retaliation
is new. The tendency toward black retaliatory violence is correlated to
a considerable extent with periods of generally heightened militance among
blacks, and is a product of frustrations resulting from growing disparity
among blacks' status in American society and their rising expectations.
Using historical accounts of race riots and the rhetoric of black organiza-
tions, they found an increase in militant rhetoric as well as actual rela-
iatory violence against whites occurring immediately after World War I
and during the 1960s. The violence itself differed during these two per-
iods; in the years after World War I black retaliatory violence was char-
acterized by armed defense against attacking white mobs, while during the
1960s the violence was characterized by "the symbolic distruction of
'white' through his property." This difference was attributed to an in-
creased sensitivity among whites to the plight of blacks as well as the
growth of black urban ghettos, making repression by police difficult. Rela-
tive deprivation was the major explanation for blacks advocating and adopt-
ing retaliatory violence. Thus, while black militant rhetoric increased
after World War I, black retaliatory violence did not, because during these
years the position of blacks in American society was improving fast enough
to keep pace with their rising expectations, resulting in low levels of
frustration and relative deprivation.

Comments:

While the authors assume high levels of relative deprivation among
blacks during the period immediately after World War I and during the 1960s,
and low levels at other times in our history, they cite no supporting evi-
dence. In fact, they acknowledge that there is little systematic work
on "negro advocacy of violence prior to World War II, and that a careful
analysis of race riots of the 19th century" has not been made. An alter-
nate hypothesis is that black retaliatory violence and rhetoric are linked
to the current level of repression as well as the relative power of blacks
in terms of their numbers and level of organization. For example, the
lack of retaliatory violence and Booker T. Washington's rhetoric of accommo-
dation to white supremacy may be a result of the extremely high levels of
repression used against blacks at the turn of the century. Again, the
retaliatory violence during the 1960s may be more a function of the in-
creased power of blacks due to their numbers and level of organization than
of relative deprivation. One could test this theory by determining if
levels of repression correlate with black retaliatory violence. In all
examples, retaliatory violence occurred in cities, where blacks had power
in numbers with the exception of Elaine, Arkansas. However, even in this
case, blacks had been attempting to unionize. Their increased level of
organization undoubtedly increased their position of power, resulting in
retaliatory violence rather than submission when they were attached by
white mobs.

Meier, Richard, "Violence: The Last Urban Epidemic," The American
      Behavioral Scientist, 2, March-April 1968, 35-37.

Approach: Theoretical

The major threats to life in the cities have been eliminated. The
only serious one that remains is epidemic violence. Meier approaches
this problem from the perspective of public health, offering speculations
on how to deal with violence.

He first explores urban planning. Since violence is associated
with newcomers unused to the prevailing culture, one option would be to
attempt to exclude them altogether. Since this does not appear possible,
the newcomers are concentrated in ghettos. Spreading of disorders then
depends on transportation: mass transit systems tend to confine them,
while automobiles allow enough mobility to make the entire metropolitan
area vulnerable. In developing countries, newcomers to the cities may
be confined to the periphery where space prevents encroachment by rival
groups or crowding.

Urban violence can also be studied from the perspective of the
individual. Since tranquilizing the population is obviously not practi-
cal, such violence as arises from frustration and suggestions that
aggression is expected would be best dealt with by measures to remove
the frustration -- providing jobs, for example. Crowding, shown to be
a severe cause of stress, could be lessened by designing living arrange-
ments with privacy in mind.

Comments:

This paper is by no means an extensive treatment of the subject of
urban violence, but it does offer novel insights.

Midlarsky, Manus I., "Analyzing Diffusion and Contagion Effects: The
    Urban Disorders of the 1960s," American Political Science Review,
    72, 3, 1978, 996-1008.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

    Earlier studies of the riots of the 1960s (Spilerman; Morgan and
Clark), gave the size of the black population as the primary factor
in explaining the frequency of such disorders. Their conclusion that
a diffusion effect was absent is unsatisfactory to Midlarsky because
they fail to explain why the number of these disorders increased
steadily between 1965 and 1968, and because they failed to use longi-
tudinal analyses or a theoretical model of the diffusion process that
can be tested.

    In analyzing the frequency of disorders in cities where one or
more occurred during 1966 and 1967, the lognormal distribution is
used as a means of understanding overdispersion phenomena that have
resulted from diffusion processes. This disclosed two types of dif-
fusion. The first is a classic diffusion effect in which disorders
are precipitated by events which are independent of each other (such as
interactions between police and black city residents) but lead to
similar outcomes (such as a proportional number of arrests) which
are proportional to previous disorders. Here the lognormal distribu-
tion is clearly applicable and was found to apply to several intervals
in the time period: 1966, and the first and last portions of 1967. The
second process is contagious. Disturbances occur because smaller
cities, those with a black population of less than 40,000, imitate
the larger ones, such as Newark and Detroit where riots have occurred.
This process was observed between July 14 and August 3, 1967.

    In general the author theorizes that "initially the disorders would
likely follow   diffusion processes caused by some interaction between
a minority population and elements of its environment. The transi-
tion to a contagious process would be slow...and in fact takes several
weeks. In addition, a salient event such as a lengthy disorder in a
large visible city like Newark or Detroit would be required. Thus
the infrequent summer disorders which have occurred periodically in
cities during the 1970s are not likely in themselves to result in a
major contagious process. However, if there were to be an extended
disturbance in a large visible city then it could result in the fairly
widespread contagion of disorders throughout the country."

    Midlarsky suggests that in large cities the frequency of disorders
is closely associated with the size of the police force, because greater
interaction between black residents and police occurs when more
police are present. On the other hand if residents of smaller cities
learn from the media that a major disorder is taking place in a large
city, they would not wait for a separate precipitating event. Con-
tagion could thus cause disorder in smaller cities without any actual
local incident.

Comments:

This perspective on diffusion and contagion helps to show why particular types of collective violence and collective action may occur almost simultaneously in many different places. Although the conclusions seem to make sense, the fact that only smaller cities were affected by such contagion is not explained. Residents of larger cities should be equally aware of the large riots through media reports, and hence equally susceptible to suggestion.

Miller, Abraham, Bolce, Louis, and Halligan, Mark, "The New Urban Blacks,"
Ethnicity, 3, 4, December 1976, 338-67; see also, Crosby, Faye,
"Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bolce, and
Halligan," American Political Science Review, 73, March 1979, 103-11.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

The authors contend that the black urban riots have given rise to
two separate myths. The first is the so-called riff-raff theory, which
identified rioters as coming from the lowest black society, primarily
the uneducated, unemployed, and socially unintegrated, who were likely to
be migrants from the South. The second is the new urban black theory,
which holds that rioters were the cream of urban Northern-born black
youth, impatient to correct racial injustice and committed to social
change. In their reanalysis of data from the Kerner Commission Report
and from Sears' and McConahay's study of Watts, they argue that the
widely cited theory of the new urban black is not sustained.

The limitations of the Sears and McConahay study include a sample
which is not random and therefore not amenable to statistical testing, a
poor measure of riot participation, and small and undisclosed cell fre-
quencies in many of the tables. The Kerner Commission data are criticized
because of methodological deficiencies in the tables, the use of biased
data on arrestees, and arbitrary segmentation of the data on education.
In recalculating the Kerner Commission data on education on the basis of
the study by Caplan and Paige in Detroit, Miller and his co-authors found
that "contrary to the Commission's original statement, the higher one's
education, the more likely an individual was to attempt to stop violence,
not participate in it...There is no indication that the better educated
were more likely to riot." In reanalyzing Sears'and McConahay's data and
controlling for age, these authors found that in the 30-44 age group
southern migrants were more than twice as likely to participate in riots
as Los Angeles natives were. In the 45-and-older group, there was no dif-
ference in the behavior of northern and southern migrants.

Arguing that many of these studies demonstrate faulty methods and
considerable sloppiness as well as a failure to distinguish protesters
from rioters, the authors buttress their argument by turning to the study
done by Campbell and Schuman for the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders. This sample of 3,181 black respondents interviewed in 1968
showed that the rioters were most likely to be 16-29 years of age, to
have only a grammar school education, and to be in poorly paid occupations.
In contrast, nonviolent protesters tended to come from the older groups
having higher incomes and better occupations and education. Northern
upbringing had absolutely no influence on riot proneness or action as
nonviolent protesters. Men were more prone to riot than women. Among
men, those raised in broken homes and those who were unmarried were more
likely to riot. Thus, "it is clear that the rioters were not the most
socially integrated nor the best element of the community...If there is
a new urban black, he is a militant nonviolent protester who has emerged
from among the upper ranks and middle-aged segments of the black community.
He possesses the demographic characteristics that bespeak of social
integration and not social alienation."

Although these authors admit that their results partly support the riff-raff or underclass theories, they note that they have no evidence on motives for rioting and that their results do not preclude a political interpretation of the events.

Comments:

This is a very useful corrective to many of the haphazard interpretations of postriot surveys in which faulty information is continually reinforced and reproduced. Unfortunately, however, the authors fell into the same trap as many of the predecessors with regard to the measurement of riot participation. The "riot prone" category includes 77 respondents who reported direct involvement as well as a "series of surrogate measures... tapping orientations toward violence." Further, counterrioters as a class are ignored in the reanalysis of the Campbell and Schuman data, and we are not told whether they were included among the riot prone, the protesters, or in another category.

Moinat, Sheryl E., Walter J. Baine, Stephen L. Burbeck, and Keith K.
    Davison, "Black Ghetto Residents and Rioters," Journal of Social
    Issues, 28, No. 4, 1977, 45-62.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

This study compares riot participants with nonparticipants in the
1965 Los Angeles riot to see if participation could be predicted. The
hypotheses tested were: 1) active riot participation (defined by an
"active" response on the self-reported activity question) can be predict-
ed; 2) psychological riot participation can be predicted (measured by
questions such as "how active were the people in your neighborhood" or
asking what kinds of riot activity the respondent witnessed.

The data were interviews conducted in 1965-66 from "a representative
sample of blacks" (n=586) in what had been the curfew zone during the
LA riot - the black ghetto and surrounding racially mixed neighborhoods.

A stepwise linear regression and Woods' algorithm were used with
80 variables (socioeconomic, demographic, attitudinal, etc.) accounting
for 36% and 38% of the variance in active and psychological participation
respectively. Each variable by itself explained very little variance
and the authors concluded that neither hypothesis was supported.

Prediction improved when the active participant sample was divided
into four groups by age and sex. Ten variables concerning attitudes
toward police brutality; discrimination; evaluation of the riot; contact
with whites; social distance from whites and evaluation of organizations
accounted for 78% of the variance for young males, 48% of the variance
for young females, 50% for older males and 42% for older females. How-
ever, the authors warn that the stepwise linear regression technique
tends to maximize fortuitous prediction and think that the explained
variance for the four groups is exaggerated.

The authors are critical of studies that try to sketch the charac-
teristics of the typical rioter. Because independent variables are not
independent of each other, a multivariate study is required to give us
a profile of the urban rioter, rather than strings of individual percen-
tages, as in the Kerner report. It is highly likely that certian condi-
tions prevalent in the ghetto predispose nearly everyone living under
them to riot. The authors conclude that one cannot predict who will
riot, but one can say that given the conditions prevalent in the ghetto,
there will be riots, i.e., rioting is a community phenomenon.

Comments:

     There are severe problems in the measurement of both active and psychological riot participation. Active riot participation is merely self-reported overall activity without reference to specific behaviors and without differentiating such activities as looting from counterrioting activity. Psychological riot participation suffers from even more severe measurement problems since it only indicates that the respondent witnessed activity or believed others in the neighborhood to be involved.

Morgan, William R. and Terry Nichols Clark, "The Causes of Racial
    Disorders: A Grievance-Level Explanation," American Sociological
    Review, 38, 5, 1973, 611-24.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

        In this spin-off of Spilerman's attempt in 1970 to account for
the location of the urban disorders of the 1960s, the authors argue
that other things than the size of the nonwhite population affect the
frequency of such disorders, that the severity and the frequency of
these incidents are accounted for on different grounds, and that the
severity of disorders is strongly associated with the grievances of the
black population.

        They used the NORC Permanent Community Sample to select 42 cities,
ranging in population from 50,000 to 750,000 (1960 census). Data on
racial disorders were obtained from the Lemberg Center for the Study of
Violence. Disorders occurred in 23 of the 42 cities in the sample.
Racial disorders are defined by 1) crowd behavior (although the defini-
tion calls for four or more people acting in concert, all disorders in-
cluded in this study had at least fifty participants); and 2) aggressive
behavior by either blacks against whites or vice versa, involving
damage to either persons or property or defiance of civil authority.
All the disorders occurred in 1967, and the authors expect that blacks
valued racial disorders highly as a means of social protest at this
time.

        Variables included severity of the disorder (total arrests, dura-
tion, injuries, property damage, militancy, number of rioters and
police at the scene), a precipitation index (degree of instigation by
blacks rather than by whites or civil authorities) and a measure of
disorder frequency.

        Using a stepwise discriminant function analysis, the authors
found that the size of the total population, not of the nonwhite popula-
tion, was the single best predictor of disorder frequency. Cities with
disorders had an average population of 382,738, compared with 171,244 for
cities without disorders, a fact explained by the added probability
of confrontations between black youths and the police in larger cities.
Part of the variance in disorder frequency (34 percent) was accounted
for by the size of the nonwhite population and the police force.

        These variables accounted for only 11 percent of the variance in
disorder severity, however, and thus offered further evidence that "the
community conditions critical to the dynamics of initial confrontation
were not those critical for the dynamics of escalation." A grievance-
level approach was used as the principal theoretical link between the
objective social conditions of cities and the subjective decision of
individuals to participate in disorders. The present test of the
grievance-level model emphasized determinants of dissatisfaction with
conditions in which they lived and included measures of 1) racial inequal-

ity in housing and jobs; 2) the "central city syndrome" (high total population, residential segregation, population density, increase in nonwhite population, and so forth); and 3) government service (per capita expenditures on urban renewal, the city budget, and police salaries). Fifty-eight percent of the variance in disorder severity was explained by inequality in housing and jobs and in city size. Although inequality in housing increased the severity of disorders, inequality in jobs had the opposite effect. This was explained in two ways. First inequality in jobs would reduce the opportunity for contacts with whites with equal status and thus lessen comparisons that lead to feelings of relative deprivation. Second, long-term inequality in jobs would reduce blacks' expectations and keep them satisfied with their current jobs. "Or it may simply be that the conception of an adequate life style for blacks is more tied to housing inequality than to job equality." Citing four Gallup polls, the authors found that blacks in the 1960s tended to be more satisfied with their jobs than whites but less satisfied with their housing. In contrast to the strong link between inequality in housing and jobs and the severity of disorders, only 1 percent of the variation in frequency was accounted for by these variables.

Mobilization for a disorder thus seems likely in cities with large black populations, although it also requires a large number of social control agents such as the police. Community conditions are not causally related to the frequency of disorders, but factors which induce grievances among blacks had a strong effect on the severity of disorders regardless of the size of the population. The authors suggest that "to decrease these tensions, housing conditions for blacks should be improved...for clear discrepancies in job and housing patterns exist across cities, and these significantly affect the grievance level."

Comments:

Particularly useful is the authors' suggestion that the variables accounting for the outbreak itself may be quite different from those explaining its severity. In 1967 the outbreak of a disorder, according to this analysis, followed a far less uniform pattern than was seen in the subsequent escalation, which coincided with widespread feelings of grievance among blacks.

The reader must note, however, that there is no measure of the grievance felt among blacks, only a set of variables tapping the "determinants" of these attitudes. The finding that inequality in jobs and housing emerged as the most significant predictor of severity could well have resulted from the regression procedures. The degree of multicollinearity among the independent variables was not discussed, and although a simple additive model (looking at community conditions for blacks and whites separately) explained as much of the variance as the interaction model, the authors chose to use the interaction model (looking at the inequality between blacks and whites) because they believed it theoretically superior. Further, limiting the study to cities with populations between 50,000 and 750,000 omitted many of the larger cities where massive disorders took place in 1967, including Newark, Detroit and Chicago.

Morris, Richard T. and Vincent Jeffries, "Violence Next Door," Social
Forces, 46, 3, 1968, 352-58.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

This study investigated white reactions to the Watts riot of August
1965. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 583 respondnets, sel-
ected through block quota sampling techniques. They represented six
all-white or integrated communities in Los Angeles, and three socio-
economic levels.

The authors considered it important to understand why there was little
violence by the fearful but aroused white population during the riot.
Findings showed that a large number of whites were sympathetic to the
rebellion, but the majority felt it would have a bad effect upon the Negro
cause and on Negro-white relations. These perceptions of the rebellion
were strongly influenced by general feelings of either antagonism or
sympathy toward Negroes in everyday social situations.

Antagonism was defined as a "set of attitudes toward a particular
group involving sentiments such as avoidance, incompatibility, opposition,
mistrust, dislike, or hatred," including belief in stereotypes and
prejudice. Such antagonism was measured by respondents' answers to five
questions about social distance from blacks; for example, "Do you think
you would ever find it distasteful to eat at the same table with a Negro
person?" and "Do you think (the rebellion) helped or hurt the Negro's
cause?" Twelve percent of the antagonistic whites and 26 percent of the
sympathetic ones thought the rebellion helped.

To understand the roots of antagonism, the authors looked at respon-
dents' values and their contact with Negroes. They began by assuming
that people whose values tend to pit one party against another will show
more antagonism than those valuing a "spirit of love, mutual aid and
cooperation." Altruism or egoism was thus related to antagonism, and the
assumption was confirmed: the egoistic respondents showed more antagonism
than the altruists; without regard to their occupation, education, age,
sex, and political party.

The frequency of contacts with Negroes in six situations had no ap-
parent effect on antagonism. But the degree of intimacy, measured by
asking whether the contacts were social, was strongly related to antagonism
regardless of other variables: 59 percent of the respondents who reported
no intimate social contact with Negroes were antagonistic; only 29 percent
of those who had such contact showed antagonism. The authors conclude
that to prevent violence by whites in future racial clashes, we must
"provide opportunities for voluntary intimate social contact with Negroes,
and in some way, certainly not clear at this time, to inculcate different
values."

Comments:

As Morris and Jeffries admit, "The implications that may be drawn from
the results of the study are open to all the doubts, arguments, and differ-
ences in interpretation which are common properties of survey research

carried out at one point in time and asking for retrospective materials."
Beyond the difficulties in assigned causes, and more specifically, we
are given no information about the response rate. Other factors which
might account for both antagonism and reaction to the riot, such as dis-
tance from Watts, personal involvement in or loss and injury from the riot,
and first-hand knowledge of the events, were unfortunately not studied.

Mueller, Carol, "Riot Violence and Protest Outcomes," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 6, 1, 1978, 49-63.

Approach: Descriptive/Empirical
Methodology: Content Analysis

The black ghetto riots of the 1960s have been discussed chiefly in terms of their causes. But if riots are interpreted as protests to gain influence, one must consider their political consequences. Mueller evaluates two consequences of riots in 77 cities during 1967 and 1968: 1) symbolic reassurances, cooling-off measures that officially recognize grievances but do not transfer resources; and 2) long-term commitments to the black community. Data for this study were obtained from analysis of local newspapers.

Measuring the success of protest is an inexact process, varying with the frame of reference and complicated by a lack of formal definitions of grievances. Several variables were identified, including recognition, advantages, meetings, tokenism, diplomacy, investigation, and appointments. Factor analysis of measures of these variables yielded two factors. The symbolic reassurances factor accounted for two-thirds of the explained variance and was dominated by recognition and the number of meetings. The second factor, long-term commitments, was dominated by advantages, appointments, and personal diplomacy.

In measuring violence, a set of six factors was found to account for 67 percent of the variance. These were size, assault on whites, duration, assault on police, arson, and "warfare." The first factor, size, explained the greatest amount of variance and was heavily loaded by the numbers of arrests, police, and participants. These variables alone have been frequently employed as the sole measure of riot violence, but this study includes other measures to provide a more complete treatment.

Besides measures of violence, three other variables were assessed to ascertain their effect on the two measures of outcomes: 1) the size of the nonwhite population; 2) whether the city was in the South; and 3) the time of the riot, since riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King were included. None of these factors were found to affect long-term commitments, though the timing affected symbolic reassurances, which dropped off after Dr. King's assassination.

Finally, violence and outcomes were related. Violence to persons was the key component contributing to symbolic reassurances. Injuries to blacks were seen to spur long-term commitments. The period before the assassination month (April 1968) differed in the number of symbolic reassurances; more long-term commitments were followed by a return to symbolic reassurances.

The relation between violence against persons and symbolic reassurances was explained as a threshold effect: violence triggered official recognition. Injuries to blacks were believed to increase

black solidarity, making demands for long-term commitments more effective. The variation in outcomes before and after the assassination of Dr. King was explained by a unique combination of responses following the murder: remorse and outrage for blacks, and guilt and fear for whites.

Comments:

This was an excellent study with sophisticated measures of riot characteristics and outcomes.

Oberschall, Anthony, "The Los Angeles Riot of August, 1965," Social
    Problems, 15, 3, 1968, 322-42.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

This sociological analysis of the Los Angeles (Watts) riot of 1968
uses Neil Smelser's analytic framework, which emphasizes a number of
conditions that must be present before a riot will occur. Along with
high unemployment, low income, well-defined racial cleavages, alienation
from authorities and other socioeconomic conditions, this approach
stresses that the population must share a belief which explains the
situation and pins the blame on specific agents or groups, who then become
the targets of hostility. Oberschall's scheme is also useful in calling
attention to the part played by control operations in influencing the
size and course of the collective outburst.

Data from the McCone Commission Report and other studies of the riot,
show that both the conspiracy and criminal riff-raff theories are un-
supported, since participants came from all social strata in the pre-
dominantly lower-class black area, and no evidence of a conspiracy was
found. He then states that the key to a sociological explanation is
the police-Negro relationship before the riot: "it was a major source
of Negro frustrations and accounts for the presence of a generalized -
belief which is a necessary ingredient in producing collective action."

The police as a symbol of a white-dominated world bore the full brunt
of the accumulated frustrations and hostility of the community. Moreover
the cleavage between blacks and the police had been longstanding -- a
product of arbitrary and abusive police practices toward minority groups,
made worse because no independent police review board existed to hear
complaints and exert discipline. Police had recently given up their
beats in favor of police cars, thereby losing the "special knowledge and
contacts with neighborhood which alone makes law enforcement bearable
especially in lower class neighborhoods."

The riot was precipitated by the arrest of a young black male for a
traffic violation. Oberschall explains its escalation into a full-fledged
riot by the characteristics of the precipitating event, communications
among the riot-prone population, the "ecology" of the area, and the way
the police tried to control the disturbance. The arrest occurred on a
very hot night when people were hanging around outside. At the same time
it was rumored that police had beaten a pregnant woman. All this fit in
with a general belief in police brutality and led to a violent reaction
from the gathering crowd. Because the initial incident was widely re-
ported in the news, the original site of the disturbance acted as a
magnet for angry crowds on the next day, and the riot eventually spread
through south Los Angeles. A curfew was declared, but the area was very
large and could not be enclosed to seal off the destruction. Hence the
looting and other disorder spread from one site to another, making it
impossible for the police to interfere. Moreover, officials at all
levels underestimated the riot at the start; the police were outnumbered
and undermanned and their efforts to disperse crowds were ineffective.

Oberschall argues that "the partial show of force happened to be a dem-
onstration of vulnerability and weakness and acted more as an incitement
than a deterrent to the riot."

Unlike theorists who argue that riotous acts are essentially irrational,
Oberschall saw considerable evidence that the rioters kept within cer-
tain bounds. They did not kill people. They directed their aggression
at specific targets, the main target being the Los Angeles police and
white store owners. They selected appropriate means for achieving their
ends: they observed traffic laws even when they were carrying away
stolen goods. Rioting was a group activity in which participants and
bystanders "experienced a sense of solidarity, pride, and exhilaration
...a collective celebration in the manner of a carnival." He argues that
the Watts outbreak was indeed a riot, because its main purpose was to
damage certain groups or individual members, such as police, merchants,
or whites in general. If the aim had been to overthrow the government
or authorities, it would be labeled a revolt, rebellion, or uprising.

Comments:

This is a very thorough and detailed case study of the causes and
processes of one of the most significant riots in the 1960s. It suggests
useful approaches to the study of collective disorders in other cities
during that period and the present. The sources of many of the data are
of course questionable, particularly the McCone Commission Report, and
some of the explanations rely on causal relations that require more
specific treatment. For example, in the author's opinion, removing police
from foot patrol to police cars "caused" much of the alienation that led
to the riots, but this policy change may just as well have been a response
to hostility that was already present.

Paige, Jeffrey, "Political Orientation and Riot Participation," American
Sociological Review, 36, October 1971, 810-20; see also, Gordon,
Leonard, "A Comment on 'Political Orientation and Riot Participation',"
American Sociological Review, 37, 3, 1972, 379.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Abstract:

    This paper analyzes the relation between political trust, political
efficacy, and riot participation. It is based on interviews with 237
young black males living in the riot zone in Newark, New Jersey, six
months after the 1967 disorders.

    Two independent but interacting factors are assumed to affect riot
participation: political efficacy, or personal political competence,
and political trust, or the belief that government is generally acting
in one's interests.

    In contrast to the more traditional writers about extremist politics,
who have attributed radical or revolutionary behavior to alienated or
apathetic individuals who lack feelings of political efficacy, Paige
draws on the work of Almond and Verba as well as Gamson to suggest that
radical political action depends on a combination of high political
efficacy and deep distrust of the political system. In situations
where both efficacy and trust are great, the predominant political
orientation will be allegiance to a responsive regime. Where both
efficacy and trust are weak, the tendency will be toward alienation and
withdrawal rather than radical action. With weak efficacy and strong
trust, citizens will make a passive adjustment, believing that government
is largely run in their best interests. Assuming that riot participa-
tion is a form of revolutionary activity, the author views it as a res-
ponse to an unresponsive and untrustworthy regime by politically
sophisticated activists.

    Riot participation was determined by respondents' admission of
involvement, and rioters were defined as those who said they were
"active" and confessed to some specific activity like throwing rocks
or arson. Noting that it is difficult to construct a measure of effi-
cacy which is not contaminated by trust, a measure of political infor-
mation was used to approximate the concept of efficacy. Specifically,
respondents were asked to identify the race of nine political figures.
Trust was measured simply by asking respondents how much they could
trust the government of Newark.

    Statistical analysis of the survey responses clearly supports the
author's hypotheses. The group displaying high efficacy (as measured
by political information) and low trust showed the highest incidence
of participation in riots. The low efficacy-low trust group had the
lowest incidence, but participation among the other groups -- high
efficacy-high trust (allegiant) and low efficacy-high trust (subordinate)--
was almost as low.

It was further suggested that among individuals with high efficacy (information) the exact form of political participation depends on the degree to which they trust the government. Those with extreme trust would be most likely to use persuasive tactics, neutral people would be more likely to use inducements, and those who believe that authorities are unlikely to act in their behalf would have little to lose and would rely on constraints. Riot participation was used as a measure of the reliance on constraints, and civil rights activity as a measure of milder constraints. Being registered to vote was used as an indicator of the use of inducements.

Voting registration was highest among those relatively high in trust, falling off linearly with decreasing trust. Rioting was most common among those lowest in trust and decreased with increasing trust. Civil rights activity peaked among those with an intermediate degree of trust, falling off at either extreme.

The author's conclusion was that "rioting can be profitably considered a form of disorganized political protest engaged in by those who have become highly distrustful of existing political institutions."

Comments:

This is a significant addition to the literature on the characteristics of riot participants because it clarifies the components of the traditional measure of political efficacy and reaffirms the strong relation between participation and political awareness and sophistication. The measurement of variables and the sample have limitations, however, that must be taken into consideration in assessing the results. The sample consists only of black males between the ages of 15 and 35, and hence generalizations must be limited to this age group. In addition we are not told how these respondents were selected or the extent to which they represent the black youth of the area. Participation was measured by self-reports and it is difficult to show external validity, although the responses would seem more accurate than official arrest statistics. Efficacy was measured by one item of political knowledge, the race of certain political figures, and this is not an adequate index of people's feeling of personal political competence. It would have been better to ask respondents directly about their capacity to assess the actions of government, their understanding of its operations, and the degree to which they think they are capable of influencing it. Because this was not a longitudinal study and no measure exists of attitudes of efficacy and trust before the riots, it is difficult to conclude that the causal sequence posited by Paige is in fact correct. One could equally well argue that riot participation resulted in feelings of high political efficacy and low trust.

Paige, Jeffrey, "Changing Patterns of Anti-White Attitudes among Blacks,"
    Journal of Social Issues, 26, 4, 1970, 69-86.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

    This article examining changes in black attitudes toward whites from 1945
to the late 1960s argues that the correlates of antiwhite attitudes changed in
response to the exigencies of political conflict. As minorities develop
strategies to combat discrimination by majority groups, the attitudes giving
rise to these strategies will also become more widespread. Those who have
adopted the successful strategy will have a strong tendency to resolve the
dissonance between their behavior and their attitudes by changing the atti-
tudes.

    Three strategies in interaction with whites have been characterized by
Pettigrew (1964) and are described here. "Moving away" (the earliest mode of
response) involved either passive withdrawal or active separatism and was
associated with apathy, self-hatred, avoidance and hostility toward whites.
This tendency gave way to "moving toward," attempting to achieve integration
and become assimilated into white culture; it was associated with trust and
affiliation with whites. By the late 1960s a third strategy developed:
"moving against," in which there were direct confrontations with whites and
open hostility toward them.

    Using survey data from a postriot study of Newark in 1968, and comparing
this study with one at Cornell in 1949, Paige attempts to show that "if moving
against is a new and increasingly important strategy in ghetto areas, then the
subgroups most receptive to change would be the most likely to adopt the new
strategy and its corresponding anti-white attitudes...Thus the old, the female,
the married, and the Southern born should not be less anti-white than the
young, the male, the unmarried, and the Northern born."

    The Newark sample showed more antiwhite feeling than the Cornell sample,
but their was little difference in social distance. This finding supports
Paige's contention that black males were more hostile towards whites in 1968
than during the "moving towards" period (1949). The younger group (15-35)
was more antiwhite than the older group (25-35) with respect to both hatred
of whites and social distance in the Newark sample. Those who had grown
up in the North were also more hostile to whites than those reared in the
South. Authoritarian attitudes (measured by the California F scale) were
associated with antiblack feelings, as expected, but there was no significant
relationship with attitudes toward whites. Militancy, measured by self-
reported riot participation, was correlated with antiwhite and problack
feelings.

    The finding that attitudes toward whites are closely tied to the politi-
cal strategy that is most useful in furthering black interests at a given
point in history has the following implications. First, psychological expla-
nations that link antiwhite attitudes with a low self-image and "scapegoating"
are not enough to explain the change in black's attitudes towards whites.
Secondly, because certain black subgroups are more or less open to change,
attitudes toward whites will vary throughout black communities, especially

during times of social change. Finally, if and when a new political strategy becomes useful to black interests, we can expect a corresponding change in blacks' attitudes towards whites.

Comment:

This study is very appealing in its contention that attitudes result from political conflict and social reality, rather than primarily from personality traits or early influences. Given the changes in blacks' attitudes towards whites since the turn of the century, the more reasonable explanation seems to be the concurrent changes in political and social conditions, rather than differences in childrearing or the distribution of personality types within the black population.

There are problems with the study, however. It is not clear, for example, that attitudes of blacks in 1949 were not just as antiwhite as in 1968. If respondents believed that a strategy of integration was in their best interests, they may have been more likely to conceal the extent of their antiwhite attitudes. Blacks may also have been more likely in 1949 to think that expressing antiwhite feelings would place them in personal danger. To a certain extent, therefore, the study has measured expressed rather than actual attitudes, and it is not clear whether the relationship between them was the same in 1949 as in 1968.

The hypothesis that young black males are more receptive to change -- and therefore likely to show most clearly the corresponding shift in attitudes towards whites -- did not receive much support from the data, except that age appears to be an important factor. Women were not included in the sample, and another cited study did not reveal significant differences in the attitudes of black men and women towards whites. Although attitudes of northern and southern blacks were significantly different, it is not clear whether this would be true after controlling for age, since other research has shown that older urban blacks are more likely than young blacks to have been raised in the South.

Paletz, David and Robert Dunn, "Press Coverage of Civil Disorders: A
    Case Study of Winston-Salem, 1967," Public Opinion Quarterly,
    33, 3, 1969,

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

The authors examine the Winston-Salem Journal's treatment of that
city's riot in November 1967 to assess the charge, raised by studies
of the Los Angeles riot in 1965, that the press and TV use sensational
reporting to gain bigger audiences and thereby exacerbate civil dis-
orders. First they present an account of the disorders in Winston-
Salem, based on a variety of newspapers and interviews with editors,
journalists, participants, and eyewitnesses.

On October 15, 1967, James Eller, a thirty-two year old black was
clubbed by a white policeman while resisting arrest for drunkenness.
He died of a fractured skull on October 28, and Mrs. Eller charged the
policeman, W.E. Owens, with murder. On October 30, Municipal Judge
Leroy Sams dismissed the case. At Eller's funeral on November 2 it
was announced that a grand jury might reopen the case; but sporadic
violence began and it escalated when police tried to control the dis-
orders. All told, in the four-day period, November 2-5, almost 200
people were arrested and an estimated $750,000 worth of property damage
occurred.

The authors found that, far from treating the Winston-Salem riot
sensationally, the Journal not only played down the racial aspects but
promoted the efforts by authorities to check the violence and restore
order. The paper mentioned that whites were among the looters, and
there were blacks in the police force; it stressed the calm, business-
as-usual atmosphere prevailing in most parts of the city. The Journal's
reference to the Eller case as muted: the disturbances were said to be
"in connection with unrest created by the recent death of James Eller,
Negro, who died after injuries believed sustained when he resisted
arrest and was hit by Patrolman W.E. Owens."

The authors attribute the Journal's slant to its way of operating:
some reporters were stationed at the riot-control center at City Hall
and some traveled with police; editors obtained information from the
police broadcasts. Working so closely with local officials, the
Journal inevitably reflected the concern of authorities to suppress the
rioting; and just as inevitably they failed to sympathize with the
grievances of the rioters. Newsmen from outside, who were independent
of local authority, were more truthful. An AP story was headlined
"Racial Outbreak in Winston-Salem," and a UPI story declared bluntly
that Eller died "after he was blackjacked by a white policeman."

The authors conclude that while sensational reporting may have
played a part in the 1965 Los Angeles riot, its outcome and the later
wave of civil eruptions led the media to shift toward authoritarianism.
While exacerbating the protest is damaging, they contend, denying its
significance is in a different way, just as damaging.

Comments:

This article is both provocative and unsettling. The interplay between media and authority is worth examining. Also very interesting is the implication that the nearer the news source to the disruptive event, the more it may be distorted in the printed reports. The authors should not have proclaimed what amounts to a national trend, however, on the basis of a single case study.

Ponting, J. Rick, "Rumor Control Centers: Their Emergence and Operations," American Behavioral Scientist, 16, 3, 1973, 391-401.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

This is a descriptive study of rumor control centers -- their origin, internal structure, functions, clientele, interorganizational relations, operational problems, and future.

Rumor control centers (RCCs) investigate rumors and gather and disseminate accurate information that will curb or correct rumors. Most are affiliated with city governments. The prototype for RCCs in this country was established in Chicago in 1967. More were founded in 1968 following the local riots and other civil disturbances, the tensions, and the rumors that increased after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

This survey of 16 rumor control centers was begun after identifying a universe of RCCs that were active in 1969. Of those surveyed, 12 were affiliated with municipal commisions on community relations. Data were collected through oral questionnaires administered to center supervisors.

Most RCCs were found to have been established in 1968. The Chicago center was credited by the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders with preventing an outbreak of civil disorder in the city. Structurally, RCCs are "intermittent" organizations that remain dormant until needed, at which time the parent organization lends staff. It is assumed that they will alleviate social unrest caused by rumors. Their functions are: to exert social control, to mediate disputes, to facilitate the work of emergency organizations, to disseminate information, to offer psychological relief, and to serve as a buffer between racial groups. Clientele are predominantly white; only two centers served minorities more than whites. The data suggest that, instead of functioning to prevent rioting in which property is destroyed -- the pattern of the 1960s -- they have been used to inhibit the classic interracial riots that were common in the 1940s. They alleviate the fears and anger of whites and occasionally of blacks. Blacks, however, tend to consider them part of the establishment. Government based RCCs encountered conflict when faced with having accurate but inflammatory information. The future of RCCs is in doubt, for the decrease in civil disturbances has made them less necessary. Some now act as ombudsmen or general information centers. The author thinks they may be extended to serve blacks, or may simply fade away or be attached to more local establishments like schools or factories.

Comments:

Rumor control centers have not generally succeeded in their initial purpose -- rumor control in the ghettos.

Quarantelli, E.L., Russell Dynes, "Property Norms and Looting: Their
   Patterns in Community Crises," Phylon, 31, Summer 1970, 168-82.

Approach: Theoretical

   This paper views looting during civil disturbances as a "subcultural
pattern that becomes manifest under appropriate stress circumstances and
is not different in this respect from other normative behavior." Unlike
most explanations that trace looting to deviant behavior of individuals
suffering from shallow, incomplete, or faulty socialization, this theory
regards looting as a temporary manifestation of a new group norm based
on a redefinition of property rights within a community.

   Although the authors do not give specific sources of data to buttress
these arguments, they draw on a variety of unpublished estimates, includ-
ing insurance records, material from several congressional committees, and
information from the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence and Ohio
State University's Disaster Research Center.

   They dismiss frustration-aggression formulations with regard to looting
because arrest records showed that most looters were employed, married,
and long-time residents of their cities. Unlike looting accompanying
natural disasters, plundering during civil disorders is widespread, collec-
tive, and public, and is undertaken by local people who show selectivity
and are supported in their actions by the community. The authors note
that looting is more common when the disorder focuses explicitly on pro-
test. It has also become a somewhat institutionalized response when dis-
orders grow beyond a minimal point.

Comments:

   The arguments here must be considered suppositions rather than conclu-
sions because many of the data are questionable, primarily based on arrest
records. Further, the authors do not question why looting was more frequent
in certain locations and at certain times. If looting stems from a rede-
finition of property rights, then we must be able to explain why this
occurs in some cities or neighborhoods more than in others and why it tends
to happen at different stages of an outbreak. We must also understand why
only certain businesses are subject to these redefinitions.

Quarantelli, E.L., "Changes in Ohio Radio Station Policies and Operations in Reporting Local Civil Disturbances," Journal of Broadcasting, XV, 3, 1971, 287-92.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Abstract:

Since the Watts riots of 1965 there has been extensive criticism of the broadcasting industry for its reporting of civil disturbances, but few reports on what the radio stations are actually doing. This article attempts three lines of inquiry: 1) Have any changes occurred in the formal policies of stations regarding the handling of news about similar events? 2) What internal or external factors brought about these changes in policy? 3) Have any changes occurred in the reporting of such news? The sample consisted of personal interviews with news directors or station managers in 42 stations in the 8 largest cities in Ohio. All of the communities had had civil disturbances of some intensity since 1966.

The author found that policy changes between 1965 and 1969 were neither widespread nor radical, and most of the stations had not developed any written policy about reporting such disturbances. There were no discernible differences between communities; but the larger stations were apparently more likely to evolve some formal policy, perhaps because they were more often affiliated with networks and had more experience in such reporting. Stations seemed reluctant to develop such policies, fearing to create inflexibility in their responses to events and anxious to protest the professional status of their personnel.

News directors and station managers believed that stories about local racial controversies were scheduled in the same way as other news; the reports were broadcast without delay or checking with the authorities. The actual broadcasts, however, were handled with more caution and sensitivity. Often the sounds accompanying the disturbances were not aired, and the reporting was frequently "softened" by making it brief or giving minimal attention to the more extreme forms of behavior. There was also a tendency to report the event from the official point of view, i.e., to use community control agencies as sources rather than participants.

Comments:

Although this article provides a few insights into the official point of view regarding the reporting of civil disturbances by radio stations, the treatment is fairly superficial. After finding that stations had no written policies regarding the reporting of civil disturbances (an undefined term), they concluded that there were no clearcut guidelines. However, it is important to recognize that policies need not be written to be effective, and as the author states, "There may have been an informal consensus among station personnel on how

news of local disturbances should be handled." He did not describe or discover any of these informal practices, and all of his information was gathered by talking to administrators, not broadcasters. The observations on the actual reporting of such events were based on what news directors said their stations broadcast rather than on a content analysis of the actual coverage of such events or interviews with other station personnel involved.

Quarantelli, E.L., Rick Ponting and John Fitzpatrick, "Police Depart-
ment Perceptions of the Occurrence of Civil Disturbances,"
Sociology and Social Research, 59, 1, October 1974, 30-38.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Case Study

A study of police department perceptions of four
different civil disturbances in American cities,
through interviews with key organizational
personnel, yields five general propositions about
organizational perceptions of riot participants
and dynamics. In general, social control agencies
saw specific events and particular types of people
rather than sequential happenings and social condi-
tions as being responsible for the occurrence of
the disturbances, although they did not perceive
the disorders as being organized or planned.

Objecting to many explanations of riots which purport to give a
"true" picture, the authors concentrate on the perceptions of law
enforcement groups which responded to riots. Their article offers an
organizational rather than a social-psychological perspective of the
parties involved in riots.

It is derived from a larger work which used data collected by the
Disaster Research Council (DRC) during 1968 in four cities where rioting
took place. These data included 100 interviews collected from public
agencies in each city six to nine months before the riots, as well as
50 taped interviews obtained by DRC teams from police, fire and National
Guard officials a few days to several weeks after the riot. Additional
documents from various agencies included arrest records, memos, and the
like.

Responses to the riot, as reported by the police and others, could
be summed up as follows:

1. Riots were perceived as the result of a particular event.

2. Individuals, not social conditions, were blamed, despite the
    fact that "social control personnel acknowledged the existence
    of unemployment, poverty, substandard housing, poor education,
    etc." (This view is sometimes called the riff-raff theory of
    riot participation.)

3. Although they believed the riots were unplanned and unorganized,
    police often blamed outside agitators and specific trouble-
    makers. This belief diminished as one looked higher in the
    police hierarchy: officers and especially police intelligence
    units were the least likely to blame agitators.

4. Participants in riots were classed by police as belonging to certain psychological categories: agitators, enacters, sustainers, supporters, nonparticipants, and counterrioters.

5. The police never thought they were themselves responsible for the riot.

Comments:

This study has value in showing the extent of the misunderstanding of riots by those supposedly controlling them. Although the authors do not say so specifically, it becomes evident that more knowledge about who the rioters are and why they engage in riots might lead to better handling of such events by social control agencies. The discovery that police do not think their behavior contributed to the riots is important.

Ransford, H. Edward, "Isolation, Powerlessness, and Violence: A Study of Attitudes and Participation in the Watts Riot," American Journal of Sociology, 73, 5, March 1968, 581-591.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

This study attempts to test the "mass society" explanation for participation in radical protest and mass movements. It is based on data from a sample of 312 Los Angeles black males who were interviewed shortly after the Watts riot to ascertain their willingness to use violence. The mass society thesis uses two related approaches to explain extreme political behavior. According to the first, the degree to which the individual is isolated by circumstances from community institutions affects his vulnerability to an authoritarian outlook and his availability for volatile mass movements. According to the second approach, the individual's awareness and evaluation of his isolated condition may heighten his readiness to engage in extreme behavior. The following hypotheses were tested:

1) Blacks who have little intimate contact with whites will have fewer channels for communicating their grievances and will feel little commitment to the leaders and institutions of the community. Thus they will be more willing to use violent protest than those with greater involvement in white society.

2) Blacks who feel powerless to change their situation or control crucial decisions that affect them will be more willing to use violent means to get their rights than those who believe they exert some control within the social system.

3) Blacks who feel that they are treated badly because of their race will be more willing to use violence than those who are satisfied with their treatment.

4) Racial isolation will be most likely to induce participation in violence when individuals feel powerless or when they are highly dissatisfied with the treatment of their race.

Empirical evidence supported the contention that blacks who were more disengaged from the society because they were isolated and because they felt powerless and dissatisfied were more likely to think violence necessary to the attainment of racial justice than those more firmly tied to the society. Although only 5 percent of the sample admitted to violent action for Negro rights, the same feelings of powerlessness, dissatisfaction, and isolation were reported among those who were merely willing to use violence. The fourth hypothesis was also confirmed: that isolation was a strong predicter of violence only among people who already felt powerless and dissatisfied. The relatively satisfied and those with a sense of control did not respond significantly to the fact of being isolated by resorting to violence. But, among blacks who were isolated, and who also felt powerless and voiced strong disaffection because of discrimination, 65 percent were willing to use violence, compared to 12 percent among those who were integrated, satisfied, and felt they had some control over their lives.

Feelings of powerlessness and dissatisfaction did not lead the college-educated to favor violence. Ransford suggested that college-educated blacks may be unwilling to risk their position, despite their feeling powerless and dissatisfied, or this group may prefer nonviolent strategies. In contrast, he says, the less educated and alienated blacks may use "violence as a means of communicating with white society: anger can be expressed, control exerted -- if only for a brief period."

Comment:

This study of the attitudes of black males regarding the use of violence does not test the mass society argument or study participation in the Watts riot, as the title suggests. It is not a test of the mass society thesis because it does not measure "structural isolation" but only the amount of contact respondents had with white people in a number of different situations. And it is not a study of participation in the Watts riot since respondents were not asked about their activities in that disturbance; rather they were asked whether they would be willing to use violence and whether they had ever used violence to get Negro rights.

Moreover, like all postriot explanations of attitudes, this one suffers from the problem that the causal direction of the variables cannot be ascertained. One interesting point is that the area where the respondents lived had an effect on their propensity to violence, though this was not explored in the article. As the data show quite clearly, respondents in the localities surrounding the riot (South Central Los Angeles and Watts) were more willing to use violence than those living further away, around Crenshaw, though both groups reported the same degree of contact with whites, and were alike in their feelings of powerlessness and dissatisfaction.

Rossi, Peter H. and Richard E. Berk, "Local Political Leadership and
Popular Discontent in the Ghetto," The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 391, 1970, 111-27.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

To understand how public opinion is formed and how leaders affect
the perception of grievances, the authors study the sources of varia-
tion in the grievances felt by the black populations in fifteen cities.
They concentrate on grievances stemming from business practices of
ghetto merchants and behavior by poice. Data had been collected inde-
pendently from four sources:

1. Censuses, labor force statistics, and "documentary sources"

2. Qualitative interviews with forty community leaders in each city

3. Structured interviews with forty ghetto merchants and fifty
    police in each city

4. Probability samples of two hundred respondents: half of those
    interviewed were black, half were white

If a belief that services to ghetto residents by local merchants
were inferior to those offered in white neighborhoods and could give rise
to grievances against local merchants, under what conditions would
these differences in services be translated into grievances and public
issues? An elite model seems to fit the data best, based on correlations.
Elites must identify merchants' sharp practices and make them a public
issue before mass dissatisfaction with such practices will develop.
This interpretation is consistent with Berk's previous finding that sharp
practices are not the best indicators of which stores will be vandalized
during a riot or in ordinary times. Furthermore, customers often do
not know how ghetto merchants' practices compare with those outside the
ghetto unless they are told.

In all fifteen cities, complaints were voiced about discriminatory
behavior of police in the ghetto. On the basis of correlations, the
authors propose a causal model in which the proportion of blacks in a
community affects the responsiveness of the police chief, which in turn
is associated with the abusive practices of the police. According to
interviews with blacks, abusive practices by police and their knowledge
of black residents, both based on interviews with police, and the
responsiveness of the police chief as determined by interviews with local
black elites, affect ghetto residents' personal experience of police
abuse. The police chief's responsiveness to black grievances and abuse
of blacks by police make police brutality a salient local issue. Both
the populist and the elitist models fit the data; police brutality as
a local issue is a function of the reputation of the chief of police
as well as the level of black residents' grievances.

Comments:

The correlations are based on a sample of fifteen cities, a small
sample that permits much chance for error. However, the authors note
that the fifteen cities represent the largest cities of the Midwest
and Northeast. The models developed, while suggestive, suffer from the
shortcoming that the only variables which could be investigated were
those for which data existed from other studies.

Schmidt, Charles, "Multidimensional Scaling Analysis of the Printed
    Media's Explanations of the Riots of the Summer of 1967,"
    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 1, October
    1972, 59-67.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Experiment

A multidimensional scaling analysis of explanations in the press
of the 1967 summer riots was used to understand the relation between
the evaluation, or perceived legitimacy, of the disturbances and the
type of explanation proposed. A partially representative sample of
U.S. newspaper and magazine editorials and feature articles dealing
with the riots was drawn from 22 publications, ranging from the political
right to left. Forty male students were asked to sort through 76
statements compiled from these publications and to class them according
to their explanation for the riots.

A two-dimensional representation of the explanations provided a
very satisfactory fit with these classes. The explanations varied accord-
ing to the internal-external causes -- the participants themselves or
forces outside -- and according to social institutions or the physical
environment -- because of the failure of government and other institutions
or because of physical conditions surrounding the participants.

An additional group of five people was asked to judge the 76 state-
ments according to the two causes mentioned above as well as their legiti-
macy or illegitimacy -- the extent to which the statement implied that
the rioting was legitimate or illegitimate. As expected, statements
that seemed to imply an internal cause also seemed to imply that the
rioting was illegitimate. Conversely, statements that focused on an
external cause seemed to confer more legitimacy on the rioting.

Publications classed as left of the center tended to assign external
causes to the rioting, those of the right and the far left asserted in-
ternal motives -- whether they saw participants as heroes or villains.
Some evidence also showed an effect from the passage of time: in the
first wave of articles individual actors were presumed to be blameworthy
causes of rioting (internal attribution); later articles were more likely
to cite external conditions such as poverty, slums, racism, and so on,
predisposing such individual actions or "reactions."

Comments:

The theoretical explanations for collective disorders can also be
classified according to the three criteria cited in this article. The
findings suggest that these explanations probably reflect the theorists'
own evaluation of the disturbances and that most of our theories are a
function of our political ideas.

Sears, David O., and John B. McConahay, "Participation in the Los
Angeles Riot," Social Problems, 17, 1, 1969, 3-20.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

The authors first surveyed a black community in Los Angeles to esti-
mate the size and scope of the 1965 Los Angeles riot. The size of the
riot was then related to the black community's ideology about it and
the relevance of the "riff-raff" theory of riot participation. They
took a random sample of 586 "curfew zone" residents, with oversampling
of census tracts at the poverty level to compensate for residential
transience. Interviews were conducted by black interviewers in late
1965 and early 1966, and they also examined an "accidental" sample of
124 blacks arrested during the riot. Although this sample was not
representative, the authors found it a useful reference point.

Respondents' reports of their activity and their estimates of how
many area residents took part in the riot indicate that approximately
20 percent of Watts residents participated. Of the entire sample 15
percent were classified as rioters; they reported not only having seen
looting, burning, and large crowds of people, but taking part in the
riot. Another 31 percent were labeled "close spectators": they saw
looting, burning and large crowds but said they were not themselves
active. "Distant spectators," comprising 27 percent, saw only some
kinds of rioting, and "stay-at-homes," numbering 27 percent, did not
see looting, burning, or large crowds of people. On the basis of census
data this translates into 31,000-35,000 rioters and 64,000-72,000 close
spectators.

Those classed as rioters were most favorable towards the event and
most optimistic about its aftermath. Although the close spectators
had negative views about the action itself they expressed sympathy for
the rioters. Few attempts to curb the riot were reported. Over half
the sample reported that they saw looting, burning of stores, and large
crowds of people, an indication that the riot represented a "large and
proximate experience" in most residents' lives.

A "protest ideology" scale was constructed from responses to four
questions: "Was it a Negro protest?" "Did it have a purpose?" What
was its cause?" "Were the main targets attacked by chance?" Most res-
pondents perceived the riot as a purposeful, deliberate, Negro protest.
Protest ideology was not related to personal contact with the riot,
however, or to perceptions of the extent that the community was involved.
That personal contact with the riot or perceptions of its size had little
to do with interpreting the riot as a protest is supported by data from
a concurrent sample of white Los Angeles residents. Although white
respondents believed community participation was quite strong and they
were fairly distant from the scene, few viewed the riot as a "Negro
protest."

According to the "riff-raff" theory, the Watts riot was the work of
a small number of disreputable "ghetto" residents, chiefly the uneducated

and unemployed, recent migrants, and criminals. The data do not support this theory. Many of the residents were active participants in the riot: at least half of the community were "close spectators," and a number were sympathetic with the rioters and critical of the police. Although somewhat more likely to be unemployed, those reporting participation in the riot were representative in terms of their own and their parents' education, occupation, subjective social class, and the status of their neighborhood. The only distinguishing characteristics of the rioters were sex, age, and place of birth: they tended to be young, male, and native born.

Comments: .

Although the authors felt their estimates to be more accurate than the McCone Commissions' which were founded on press and police estimates, they recognized possible problems because the questions probing riot participation were purposely indirect. Moreover, the respondents may very well have exaggerated or played down their participation in the riot.

Abraham H. Miller, Louis H. Bolce and Mark R. Halligan, in their article "The New Urban Blacks," (Ethnicity, 3, 1976, 338-67), further suggest that the association between place of birth and riot activity could be a matter of age since "as a result of the changing demography of the black population, it is the young who are most likely to be born and reared in the North. Consequently, any relationship between Northern residence and riot activity might simply result from the concomitant variation of age with both variables." In later studies of the Watts riot, Sears and McConahay attempted to control for age when looking at background of respondents.

Sears, David O. and John B. McConahay, "Racial Socialization, Compari-
    son Levels, and the Watts Riot," Journal of Social Issues, 26,
    1, 1970, 121-39.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

    This article attempts to explain the urban race riots of the 1960s,
seeing them as "mass eruptions" for which "there has been virtually
no precedent," and citing the alleged passivity of blacks in this
country in the face of "uninterrupted frustration and privation." The
social psychological factors underlying the Watts riot of 1965 receive
particular attention.

    The authors offer the basic hypothesis "that the outbreak of mass
violence was an almost inevitable consequence of the major population
changes that American Negroes have been undergoing in recent years,"
and that these "fundamental and irreversible social changes in the loca-
tion and characteristics of the black population have produced important
psychological changes within individual blacks." These changes have
increased enormously, they say, the "probability that blacks will
respond to white racism with intransigence, vigorous protest, and even
violence." These points about the black population are stressed:

> (It) has become much more urbanized, Northernized, and
> considerably better-educated. It is a young and physi-
> cally vigorous population. Yet it remains highly segre-
> gated, crammed into relatively small and deteriorated
> urban areas, underemployed, and underpaid. It is also
> a population generally regarded as inferior by the
> white majority.

    To test whether such demographic changes are responsible for the
rioting the authors attempt to determine whether the young, northern
urban, and better-educated blacks took a greater part in the rioting
than those representing the earlier pattern of black life. Their data
come from a sample survey conducted in the south central black ghetto
in Los Angeles during late 1965 and early 1966, soon after the Watts
riot of August 1965. Two samples were used: 1) a representative
sample of 586 adults (aged 15 and older), living in the area cordoned
off during the riot -- the "Curfew Zone"; 2) an accidental sample of
124 blacks arrested during the riot. Persons who were most involved in
the riot were identified in three ways: arrested persons; those in
the Curfew Zone sample who admitted being "active"; and those who
reported that they had seen at least four of the following: shooting,
stone-throwing, burning of stores, looting of stores, and crowds in
the street. The findings were that the bulk of those arrested were
young; in the Curfew Zone sample a considerably larger portion of
young persons than old reported that they were either active or had
witnessed the events listed above. Natives of Los Angeles were con-
siderably more likely to have been active than migrants from the South

or from nothern cities. Educational level or other indices of socio-
economic status meant little in attempting to predict participation
in riots.

In trying to understand how the demographic changes exemplified
by the "new urban black man" led to rioting and other violent behavior,
the authors used two social psychological theories: the effects of
early socialization and relative deprivation. They hypothesized that:
1) socialization among the black youths, particularly in the North,
has become substantially more militant, partly because the civil rights
battles of the late 1952s and early 1960s served as a model for open
confrontations with white authorites; and 2) migration from the South
to join the more affluent and better-educated population of the North
raised black expectations which in turn made dissapointment -- a sense
of relative deprivation in comparison with other groups -- more
probable.

Using the data from the Watts riot, the authors tested the mediating
effect of early racial socialization. Were young, Northern-reared
black males more disaffected in their attitudes toward conventional in-
stitutions and the whites in office than was true of older, migrant
Negroes? Were rioters more likely than others to feel that conventional
mechanisms of redressing grievances were useless in serving the needs
of ghetto residents? In answer, considerable evidence showed greater
disaffection toward government among the young, Northern urban blacks,
particularly those raised in Los Angeles. Yet this same group was
more enthusiastic about black militant groups such as the Muslims.
Compared to those who did not participate, riot participants were more
disaffected with regard to local government, more cynical about mechan-
isms of redressing grievances, more likely to think of the protest as
aimed as specific persons and institutions, and more optimistic about
the outcome. Both groups, however, held grievances against the police
and felt that the riot was a Negro protest, a finding cited to show
that these attitudes were not merely post facto rationalization by
rioters of their participation in the disorders.

Young black men who were native to Los Angeles, especially those
taking part in the riots, had higher aspirations and stronger feelings
of relative deprivation than older migrants. In fact most respondents
felt that things were better in Los Angeles than in the South; and
Los Angeles natives thought their chances of getting an education were
better, although their feelings of relative occupational deprivation
were higher than those of southern migrants. Riot participants were
more optimistic about attaining additional education, but they had
stronger feelings of relative deprivation than those who did not riot.

The authors conclude by offering this opinion:

> The apparently centrifugal movement represented by
> the Deacons, the Black Panthers...(is) not merely
> representative of a small minority's peculiar and
> disreputable ideas. They symbolize, although in more

extreme form, the direction being taken by young
ghetto natives throughout the country. Our data
suggest that the direction and thrust of this
movement are irreversible without extreme measures
that white Americans would presumably not condone.

Comments:

This article and others by these authors significantly helped to
discount the traditional "riff raff" theories of riot participation
in favor of the "new urban black" views of activism and militancy.
Nevertheless their conclusions have been criticized for being based
on "inappropriate analysis and questionable data, unexamined citations
of the work of other researchers, and exaggerated reinterpretations.
These objections are detailed in the article "The New Urban Blacks"
by Miller, Bolce, and Halligan.

Sears, David, Tomlinson, T.M., "Riot Ideology in Los Angeles: A Study of
Negro Attitudes," Social Science Quarterly, 49, 3, December 1968, 485-503.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Survey Research

The reaction among white people to the urban riots of the 1960s was char-
acterized by three widely held myths about the black communities' responses
to the riots. One was that only a tiny segment of the black communities par-
ticipated in and supported the riots. The riots were also said to be purpose-
less outbursts of criminality. The third myth was that blacks did not expect
any benefit from them. This paper presents evidence that disputed these three
beliefs about blacks' responses to the 1960s riots, specifically the Watts
riot in 1965, on the basis of data from a sampling of black residents of the
riot area, persons arrested during the riot, and whites surveyed soon after
the riot.

According to the survey, about 15 percent of the blacks living in the
riot area participated in the riot, and about one-third supported it. Thus
the first myth, that support and participation were confined to a tiny por-
tion of the population, was unfounded. Nor was there any evidence for the
second, that the riot was an expression of purposeless disregard for law and
order: over a third of those interviewed described the riot in revolutionary
terms. Substantial majorities felt that the riot represented a black pro-
test and that the targets deserved what they got. Similarly, the belief that
blacks foresaw no benefits from the riot had no foundation in fact. A full
58 percent expected beneficial effects. These views were generally shared
by both participants and others and contrasted with whites' attitudes, which
were considerably less favorable and more in accord with the myths.

Reactions to the riot can be evaluated according to the degree that it
is considered an instrument of protest. The black community was found to be
generally sympathetic toward the events and participants. That is, the ac-
tual events were widely condemned, but the majority expressed remorse and re-
gret rather than outright repudiation. More described riot supporters in
sympathetic terms rather than as "hoodlums" or Communists." The authorities'
handling of the riot was judged poor by nearly two-thirds of the respondents.
They believed the riot was caused by legitimate grievances. In sharp con-
trast, whites approved the behavior of authorities and were more willing to
attribute the riots to agitators or to chance.

Most black respondents felt the purpose of the riot was to call attention
to black problems. They believed the main targets to be merchants, white
people in general, and the police, all sources of grievance.

Blacks expected that the riot would persuade whites to begin redressing
their grievances. They looked forward to help from whites, as well as greater
awareness of black problems, anticipating neither white backlash nor greater
black solidarity. In contrast, the white respondents, though reporting
greater awareness of black problems, did not expect greater sympathy for
blacks to result from the events, but rather an increased gap between the
races.

Despite their sympathetic view of the riot, blacks predominantly believed that the tactics necessary for dealing with their grievances were conventional, moderate ones. Violence was not frequently advocated, though the possibility of further riots was not dismissed.

Comment:

This paper portrays the Watts riot as an expression of protest. The black community viewed events and their participants sympathetically and believed the riot to have a purpose. Thus, from the black community's point of view, the riot was a popular rebellion.

The contrast between the reported attitudes of blacks and whites was clear. If they became bases for action, the response from white authorites could be stern and in the eyes of the black community unjustifiable, thus leading to further polarization.

Many of the reported findings were based on open-ended questions. The detailed discussion of the content analysis and such issues as reliability are reported in other articles.

Shellow, Robert and Derek V. Roemer, "The Riot that Didn't Happen,"
    Social Problems, 14, 2, Fall 1966, 221-33.

Approach: Descriptive; Prescriptive
Methodology: Participant Observation

Shellow and Roemer examine the role of social science in communities
facing civil disorder. Specifically they treat the possibility that
social scientists could study developing riots while working to prevent
them. The authors present a narrative, anecdotal account of their
participation in a six-week preparation for potential violence during
a national motorcycle race on Labor Day weekend, 1965, at Upper Marlboro,
Maryland (population 500,000).

On the basis of newspaper reports, the authors theorized that riots
related to recreational sports events are characterized by a large
influx of "outsiders," who exhibit distinguishing common features, such
as being of the same age, and differ from locals in dress and other
outward signs. Rioting seemed to occur when: (1) city facilities were
"flooded" by overwhelming numbers of visitors; (2) authorities resorted
to ineffectual, provocative measures in their efforts at control;
and (3) group solidarity developed among crowd members.

Circumstances favoring violence existed prior to the "riot that
didn't happen": rumors that Hell's Angels from California planned to
appear; minimal advance coordination between the local cycle club and
police; inadequate facilities for the event; and little advance coordi-
nation between local police departments. The authors also describe
several strategies that were used to prevent violence: the police ·
were highly visible and dispersed throughout the community, and good
communication networks were established.

After the event, command officers and the county commissioner con-
sidered the control efforts successful, though local "short-hair"
groups thought the police had shown too much restraint. Reactions from
outside cycling groups were not available.

Shellow and Roemer concluded that the planning and preparation were
justified, since hoodlums would otherwise have succeeded in creating
mob friction. Four factors were considered crucial in preventing
violence: police strength, fairness and neutrality; authorities' res-
traint from interfering with camping and drag racing on private proper-
ty until extreme violence seemed imminent; a flow of intelligence
before and during the event; and "good luck." It was suggested that
the local cycle club's involvement in the control effort would have
decreased the severity of the fighting. Other suggestions for better
handling of such events included the provision of activities and camp-
sites for visitors, more coordination and consultation with other
police departments, and a registry of visitors to eliminate their
anonymity.

Comments:

Although this case study of a "riot that didn't happen" charac-
terizes in interesting detail a recreational disturbance and the
police methods used in dealing with it, some biases in the data-gather-
ing strategies and the underlying assumptions mar the work: the
authors were unable to interview significant participants in the event,
specifically the cyclists from outside, and much of their information
about the outside group came from talking to one local cycle dealer
and from rumors. This hindrance may have been due in part to the
authors' clear identification and affiliation with the local law en-
forcement authorities. At any rate one must doubt some of their
assumptions, specifically that these outside cycling groups have an
"inherent need for collective action, excitement and violence."
Moreover, there appears to have been no systematic attempt to evaluate
evidence or substantiate contentions. For example, the claim that the
riot didn't happen because police were fair, strong, and neutral was
based on official reports of three near-disturbances. Further, the
authors contend that sober planning by the police was critical in
avoiding disaster but they admitted that very little planning and
coordination actually occurred.

Spilerman, Seymour, "The Causes of Racial Disturbances: A Comparison of
Alternative Explanations," American Sociological Review, 35, 4, 1970,
627-49; see also, De Fronzo, James, "Comment on 'The Causes of Racial
Disturbances': A Comparison of Alternative Explanations," American
Sociological Review, 36, 3, 1971, 515-16.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Content Analysis

Spilerman examines the relation between frequency of urban riots
during the 1960s and variations in ghetto conditions. Data were collected
for 341 instances of racial violence during the period 1961-68. The
sample was restricted to "spontaneous" racial disorders where aggressive
acts were committee by 30 or more black participants. Information came
from various sources, including the Lemberg Center's Riot Data Review,
and the New York Times Index.

Spilerman compared the actual distribution of racial disorders among
the cities with predictions made from mathematical models that incorpor-
ated the following assumptions: 1) the probability of a riot is the same
in all cities through time; 2) structural characteristics of cities are
related to the frequency of racial outbreaks; 3) a disorder may alter
the probability of a repetition of violence in the same city; and
4) disorders tend to cluster in time and location. Only structural
characteristics account for the distribution of disorders, he found,
although some of the other factors may have had a minor influence on
the distribution.

Several hypotheses were tested to analyze the relation between var-
iation in community conditions and racial disorders. The "social disor-
ganization" thesis -- that disorder results from the absence of social
links which normally permit the exercise of informal control -- was
examined by looking at the percentage change in population from 1950-60,
the percentage change in nonwhite population during this period, and
the percentage of dilapidated housing.

The "underclass theory" -- that rioting is most likely among the
most disadvantaged -- is measured through the percentage of the nonwhite
male labor force employed in low status occupations, the nonwhite male
unemployment rate, and the median family income and median education
of nonwhites.

"Relative deprivation" assumes that blacks compare their living
conditions and status to those of a white reference group and as a result
feel so deprived and frustrated that they riot. If we assume that the
white reference group comprises white residents of the same community,
the variables are those indicators for the underclass theory divided by
the corresponding values for whites (i.e., family income for whites
and nonwhites).

In testing whether frequent disorders are more likely in cities
which have unresponsive political structures, Spilerman included variables
for nonpartisan election, mayor-council government, population per
councilman, and proportion of city council elected at-large.

Significant zero-order correlations were found between some variables and the number of disorders; there were at least two significant associations in each of the above sets of variables. Variables positively correlated to frequency of disorder were nonwhite population, percentage of nonwhite population, nonwhite median income -- both absolute and relative to income of whites -- nonwhite median education relative to whites, population per councilman, and the presence of a mayor-council government. Variables negatively correlated with frequency of disorder were the percentage change in total population; percentage of dilapidated housing; percentage of nonwhite males employed in low status occupations, absolute and relative to whites; and a dummy variable for the South. In short, communities in which conditions for nonwhites were better, on the average, were more prone to disorders. However, when the South and the nonwhite population were controlled for, most of these correlations became insignificant. Spilerman's interpretation of this finding is that the significant correlations were with "incidental characteristics of cities with large Negro populations," rather than causal conditions. The total explained variance for all the independent variables, when entered into a multiple regression after nonwhite population and the South, was only 4.5 percent, while nonwhite population and the South explained 48.8 percent of the variance.

Spilerman concludes that cities outside the South which have a large number of nonwhites were more likely to experience numerous racial disorders during the 1960s, that the susceptibility of an individual to participating in a disorder does not depend on the structural characteristics of his community. He conceptualizes the community's propensity to be an aggregate of the individual propensities; the larger the black population, the greater the likelihood of disorders. He speculates that vacillating federal leadership in civil rights, television, and the development of black solidarity and consciousness has had such a strong influence on blacks that variations in community characteristics appear negligible.

Comments:

See Spilerman, 1975, for comments.

Spilerman, Seymour, "The Causes of Racial Disturbances: Tests of an
     Explanation," American Sociological Review, 36, 3, 1971, 427-42.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Content Analysis/Analysis of Existing Data

     In this article Spilerman evaluates his previously proposed expla-
nation for the location and frequency of racial disorders, in which the
region and the size of the nonwhite population account for most of the
variance.

     Data on racial disorders during 1961-68 were gathered from the
Lemberg Center's Riot Data Review, the Congressional Quarterly's Civil
Disorder Chronology, and the New York Times Index. The only instances
considered were spontaneous outbreaks of thirty persons or more, char-
acterized by black aggression.

     Spilerman finds an S-shaped relation between black population size
and proneness to disorder for both southern and other cities. In other
words, a community requires a black population of a certain size before
racial disorders as defined above can occur. Beyond this minimum,
disorders per black individual increase with black population size,
hit a ceiling and then decrease. This nonlinear relationship explains
73 percent of the variance elsewhere than in the South, and 34 percent
in the South.

     Spilerman then examines the unexplained variance. He simulates a
situation in which proneness to disorder can be accounted for by the
size of the nonwhite population, but the incidents which trigger the
disorders are considered random events. In such a situation only 75
percent of the variance outside the South and 48 percent for the South
can be explained by the size of the nonwhite population, even though
all the information about the generative process is contained in that
variable. By this reasoning the explained variance for the actual
disorder looks better: 98 percent and 72 percent respectively.

     Spilerman examines the explanatory power of 16 community character-
istics and finds that indicators of political responsiveness account for
an additional 6 percent of explained variance in the South. The number
of disorders is positively correlated with the presence of nonpartisan
elections and a mayor-council structure. One explanation for this find-
ing is that politicians in nonpartisan towns are extremely vulnerable
to public opinion, and therefore they are less likely to take contro-
versial action that benefits blacks.

     Finally, Spilerman attempts to predict the disorders during 1968
from the pattern of disorder proneness during 1961-67 using only black
population size and region as variables. Prediction was good for cities
outside the South, but disorders in the South were more accurately
predicted by the S-curve for other areas, indicating that southern blacks'
responses to frustrations are becoming more like those of blacks else-
where during the 1960s. Perhaps southern blacks were shocked out of

their passivity by the assassination of Martin Luther King.

These findings do not explain the variation in the number of disorders over the years, which is a result of national phenomena; and therefore we should hesitate to use these findings generally to predict future disorders or to explain disorders before 1961. For example, the election of black mayors and the conservative turn in federal policy since the election of Nixon might well alter the trend in racial disorders.

Comments:

See abstracts on Spilerman 1970 and 1975.

Spilerman, Seymour, "Comment: Strategic Considerations in Analyzing
the Distribution of Racial Disturbances," American Sociological
Review, 37, 1972, 493-99.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Allan Mazur critized Spilerman's study of the locations of racial
disorders on four grounds. First, he argued that a postulate of iden-
tical riot-proneness values for all cities cannot be rejected. Second,
he found support for a reinforcement assumption, indicating that an
outbreak in a city raises that probability of subsequent disorder.
Third, that riots can spread geographically by contagion appears possible.
Finally, the apparent insignificance of community characteristics may
result from crude indicators. This article refutes these criticisms.

Mazur argued that identical riot-proneness can be tested with a
yearly Poisson distribution, rather than aggregating data for the
entire 1961-68 period. Even if one accepts this assertion, Spilerman
says, there is no confirmation of identical riot-proneness. He also
considers a yearly disaggregation unwise, because, if Mazur is correct,
an aggregate distribution should still be Poisson; such disaggregation
weakens statistical testing and no substantive issues are raised
that would call for it. Indications of randomness prove nothing,
since differing riot-proneness would still involve randomness, and infer-
ences Mazur drew from this are inappropriate to a distributional model.

Mazur's argument in favor of reinforcement, according to Spilerman,
was obtained by statistically incorrect means. Using a sequence of
estimates of the expected number of disorders, he obtained values
supporting Mazur's position but also consistent with heterogeneous
riot-proneness. The latter explanation is further supported by the
effect of Negro population size on riot-proneness and a regression anal-
ysis which found the effect of riots in a previous year or prior distur-
bances in the same year to be insignificant. The reinforcement thesis
was not only unnecessary, he believes, but contradicts Mazur's idea of
identical riot-proneness.

The theory of geographic contagion was tested by using regression
equations that took into account the Negro population of neighboring
states, the number of disorders elsewhere in a state, and the number of
disorder-susceptible communities in a state. Since in no case were
these factors significant, their finding contradicts the idea of contagion.

Mazur's criticism concerning crude indicators was answered by
pointing out that several factors were used for each construct, that more
refined measures would be highly correlated with the indicators used,
that unexplained variations can be explained without further variables
relating to community situation, and that other research has reduced
the importance of community variables.

Comments:

The author's response to the fourth criticism was the weakest - a half-dozen (inter-correlated) weak measures of a construct are not as good as one highly reliable and valid measure. When he controls for black population size, the association of his other measures largely becomes insignificant; there is no basis for arguing that this would necessarily occur with better measures of community characteristics.

Spilerman, Seymour, "Structural Characteristics of Cities and the Sever-
ity of Racial Disorders," American Sociological Review, 41, 5,
1976, 771-93.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Content Analysis

This study attempts to ascertain whether particular structural
arrangements and demographic features of a community were responsible
for especially severe disturbances during the 1960s. Spilerman found
that 1) severity of disorders declined as a function of the number of
prior outbreaks in a city, and 2) there is evidence for a temporal
effect: the disturbances after Martin Luther King's assassination
were unusually destructive. Only nonwhite population size and a dummy
term for the South were related to severity. Leaving aside these
variables, various indicators of black disadvantages in a community
failed to reveal significant associations with severity.

Spilerman investigated the relation between the severity of ghetto
riots during 1967-68 and differences in living conditions. He tested
the hypothesis that the more the community was deprived, the more severe
the riot would be. Severity was measured by the size of the crowd,
number of arrests, number of injuries, and whether rocks were thrown,
fighting occurred, property was damaged, or looting and arson took
place. The data were collected from the New York Times and the Lemberg
Center's Riot Data Review (1968b). A total of 322 incidents from 300
cities met the definition of violence: instances of black aggression
having a "spontaneous" origin and thirty or more participants. Multiple
regression was used to analyze the data.

Variables for "South" and "nonwhite population size" were used as
controls because the data indicated that disorders in the South were
less severe than elsewhere, and that the larger the nonwhite population
the more severe the riots.

When the time of the disorder was examined with respect to severity
it was found that after each racial disorder, the severity of disorder
in the same city declined. According to Spilerman, this might result
from fading interest or exhaustion among the participants. Disorders
during April 1968, immediately after Martin Luther King was assassinated,
were found to be substantially more severe than during other periods.

Spilerman then tested his main hypothesis that the variation in
severity across cities corresponds with variations in ghetto conditions.
He examined two versions of the "social disorganization" thesis:
1) disorder results from an absence of social links which normally permit
informal control to be exercised; 2) it arises from negative attitudes
of ghetto dwellers toward their community because of the crime, filth,
dilapidated housing, etc., that they are exposed to. To test these
two versions, Spilerman looked at the percentage change in population,
percentage of nonwhites living in housing with substandard plumbing,
and percentage of nonwhites living in housing built before 1950.

Spilerman examined the hypothesis that ghetto violence results from a city government's lack of responsiveness to minority problems and demands. He included in his model variables for nonpartisan elections, mayor-council government, population per councilman, and proportion of city council elected at large.

The effects of absolute and relative deprivation were also examined. Indicators of absolute deprivation were the percentage of nonwhite males employed in low status occupations, nonwhite unemployment rates for 1960 and 1970, and nonwhite family income and median education. The relative deprivation theory was tested by using the same indicators divided by the corresponding value for whites (e.g., nonwhite family income/white family income).

While some zero order correlations were significant between the above community characteristics and disorder severity, control for region, Negro population size, and temporal effects reduced all associations to insignificance. Spilerman examined the joint contribution from each cluster (e.g., all of the indicators of absolute relative deprivation), but none added significantly to explained variation over the control variables. He concluded that the severity of the racial disorders under study was not a function of variations in Negro living conditions or variations in social and economic status in a community. He suggests that the riots in the mid-1960s were a national phenomenon and reflected nationwide frustrations. The extensive news coverage of the Newark riots provided a model for angry blacks, and TV and press reports on civil rights demonstrations contributed to black solidarity.

Comments:

Although this study employs sophisticated statistical and analytical methods, what such an analysis yields depends on what was put in. The weaknesses here are in the measurement of variables, and this the author acknowledges. Newspaper accounts were used to decide whether an incident met the criteria for a riot and what degree of severity it represented. Census data are relied on for indicators supporting various theories about social unrest. The author warns against individual level relations from ecological data: differences in important determinants of well-being are not sufficient for expecting a corresponding variation in the frustration felt by inhabitants of different ghettos.

Spilerman, Seymour and Jules J. Wanderer, "Comments on Wanderer's
Article on Riot Severity and Its Correlates" and "The Author
Replies," American Journal of Sociology, 75, 4, 1970, 556-61.

Approach: Critique

Abstract:

Spilerman seriously criticizes Wanderer's attempt to relate commun-
ity characteristics to riot severity, objecting to both the conceptual-
ization and the methodology. First, he says Wanderer failed to present
a rationale for his selection of variables affecting the severity of
disorders, relying rather on the work of Lieberson and Silverman who
were concerned with another question -- the location of a riot.
Second, the few significant correlations Wanderer reported could have
been due to sampling errors, particularly since nothing was said about
why some variables showed associations and most of the others did not.
Third, the findings of Wanderer cannot be compared with those of Lieber-
son and Silverman, since the two studies covered different periods and
vastly different phenomenon. (The work of Lieberson and Silverman
covered a 50-year period before 1963 and focused on interracial violence,
while Wanderer's data were based on disorders in the summer of 1967 which
were instances of "Negro rebellion".) Moreover, several of the measures
that Wanderer considered the same as those used by the earlier researchers
were in fact different. Fourth, Wanderer's methodology was flawed; it
ignored the possibly large within-scale-type variation because he
averaged the city values on each dependent variable within each scale
type. Fifth, he was not able to test for spurious effects between riot
severity and a community's characteristics because he used the Spearman
coefficient, which has no partial. In particular, he was not able to
control for Negro population size when he asserted a relation between
the percentage increase of nonwhites and severity. In recalculating
Wanderer's data, Spilerman found that one of the two community charac-
teristics which had been significant (the proportion living in dwellings
less than ten years old) was uncorrelated with riot severity, while the
second characteristic (the increase in the nonwhite population) became
insignificant when the numerical size of the Negro population, a con-
ceptually prior variable, was controlled.

Refuting this criticism, Wanderer said that he was not trying to
replicate or compare the work of Lieberson and Silverman with his own.
He also said that he did not raise the issue of causality and did not
imply that he was giving a comprehensive analysis of the causes of
severity. He admitted that many of Spilerman's criticisms were correct
but objected to the use of analysis of variance in reanalyzing the data.

Comments:

Spilerman's criticisms are harsh but seem for the most part deserved.
In fact, others could be included: for example, problems with the Index
of Riot Severity. Wanderer's reply appears merely defensive in that
he argues fervently against points Spilerman never made.

Stark, Rodney, "Police Riots: An Anatomical Report," <u>Urban Life & Culture,</u>
    1, 1, April 1972, 7-38.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Observational; Case Study

    This article describes police riots (i.e., collective disturbances in
which the police are the principal rioters) and their stages of escalation.
Through a case study of such a riot in Berkeley, California, in June 1968 the
author explores the unique characteristics of these disorders and the reasons
why they occur.

    A police riot occurs "when roving bands of policemen set upon nonprovoca-
tive persons or property in an excessively violent manner...involving more
than one attack in a single location." One necessary condition is a certain
intent to employ force in violation of reasonable standards governing its law-
ful use. Two major indicators of police attacks or riots are these: 1) Police
assault and abandon persons without arresting them in situations where arrest
is possible. 2) Police destroy or damage property without filing a report
attributing this action to the necessities of duty.

    Police riots go through six stages. In the first, convergence, a rela-
tively large number of civilians and policemen are present at the same time
in a fairly restricted area. In stage two, confrontation, police and civilians
exhibit a conflict of interest, mutual hostility, or different ideas about
appropriate behavior. In the third stage, dispersal, police rely on their
own discretion in attempting to close the incident by dispersing the civil-
ians. The fourth stage, utilization of force, occurs when the crowds either
refuse to disperse or cannot do so. At this stage the use of force by the
police tends rapidly to become excessive, particularly if the crowd offers
any significant resistance or is made up of persons disliked by the police.
At the fifth, or limited, stage police cease their attacks when the crowd
has dispersed completely or very shortly afterward. The final stage, the
extended police riot, is reached if police attacks continue well beyond the
crowd's dispersal. This stage is more likely if the confrontation develops
in the citizens' neighborhood, or where they habitually congregate and where
dispersal is therefore not complete.

    In this study of a police riot in Berkeley in June 1968, data were col-
lected by a crisis research team consisting of the author and six other ob-
servers who were on the streets during the crisis and who interviewed more
than five hundred persons variously associated with it. They were also able to
examine affidavits, filed with the ACLU, and other accounts given by victims
and witnesses.

    The riot began with a peaceful rally sponsored by the Young Socialist
Alliance in support of the French students' strike. The gathering was declared
an illegal assembly by the Berkeley police chief and the police attempted to
disperse the crowd but left no routes open. Police then resorted to tear gas
and apparently began at random to club people who had not been involved.
Authorities sent massive police forces into the area, including all off-duty
officers, and notified the county sheriff's department, the California high-
way patrol, the Oakland police department, and the National Guard. By the

next night the crowd was larger and included more young people, but it had begun to diminish when, without warning, the police struck violently and in great numbers. They blocked all exits and beat many citizens. The rumor that militants had attacked highway patrolman occasioned the most furious outburst of violence by police during the entire crisis, which altogether lasted four days.

The typical victims were white males over 25 years old and "straight" in appearance. Many persons refused to be interviewed, however, and hence the data may be systematically biased to suggest a lower estimate than the actual number of police beatings.

In trying to explain these actions in a city with a model police department, the author cites the growing hostility toward youth in Berkeley as well as the belief by police that the rally was organized by anarchists who planned to flout law and order. Apparently FBI agents had been warning the Berkeley police about the impending arrival of radicals into the state. From that point police preparations and behavior followed a self-fulfilling course.

Comment:

In this sketch of a "police riot," Stark tries to show that collective disorders where police use excessive and unrestrained violence have distinct features which he describes by citing the typical stages and interactions. All collective disorders can become police riots in this sense, however, and the important thing is to differentiate between the conditions that make violence inevitable and those which might defuse it. This is not done in this article. The description of the Berkeley riot pays very little attention to actions by regulatory agencies in the community, the news media, the university, or other organizations which could conceivably have restrained the police. Moreover the actions of the demonstrators were not detailed sufficiently to show what provocations the police may have experienced. Stark argues that the hostile actions of the citizens, whatever they may have been, are beside the point because "regardless of how many people steal, it is the job of the police to catch them, not to become thieves themselves." In order to understand actions by the police, however, one must also consider the actions of the citizens.

Stallings, Robert A., "On Theory in Collective Behavior and Empirical
    Patterns in a Riot Process," American Sociological Review,
    41, 4, 1976, 749-51.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Critical Review

Although Stallings commends Stark, Raine, Burbeck, and Davison
(1974) for unraveling the complex spatial/temporal differences in the
frequency and intensity of riots, he argues that their data do not
actually test propositions about crowd behavior. First, they imply
that assertions about the processes of riot behavior apply equally to
the behavior of crowds, whereas the two demand separate lines of
inquiry. The authors should therefore have referred only to instances
of "riot activity" rather than to "crowd action." Further, in testing
and rejecting the proposition that riot participants are likeminded,
they used inadequate data because they located only the incidents, not
the actors or their motives. Stallings also criticizes the failure
to define a crowd, which is equated with riot, and to disclose that
their "crowd actions" were in fact instances of group activity.
Finally, he says that Stark et al. do not really describe the detailed
circumstances of crowd actions, such as the scope, structural complexity,
or dynamics of the episodes but rather focus on the results of the
action, i.e., looting or arson.

Comments:

Stallings makes a clear and accurate assessment of the weaknesses
in the article and its attempt to relate limited empirical findings to
a general theory of collective behavior. Yet he also recognizes its
merit, particularly in clarifying some controversial issues in the
analysis of riot processes.

Stark, Margaret J. Abudu, Walter, J. Raine, Stephen L. Burbeck, and Keith
K. Davison, "Some Empirical Patterns in a Riot Process," American
Sociological Review, 39, 6, 1974, 865-76; see also, Stallings, Robert
A., "On Theory in Collective Behavior and Empirical Patterns in a
Riot Process," American Sociological Review, 41, 4, 1976, 749-51.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data; Case Study

In this article the riot process itself, rather than participants
or riot-prone communities is examined. More than 1850 instances of
action recorded in the Watts riot of 1965 were used to focus on
spatial and temporal patterns of "crowd actions," a term used to cover
assemblies, fires, false alarms, looting, and the throwing of rocks
and other objects. The authors reconstructed the date, time, and
exact location of such incidents from records of the fire, police and
sheriff's departments, the McCone Commission Report, newspaper reports,
and unedited films of the riot. After details of each event were
coded, data were examined by computer and by hand to eliminate any dupli-
cation of incidents.

The authors found that census tracts where one type of crowd action
was frequent did not necessarily show a high frequency of other types;
and a great deal of variation among the tracts was noted for each
action. All five types of crowd action were recorded in the entire
curfew area. Relatively few tracts had no "crowd actions"; most had
a wide range. "Clearly the riot was not localized; nor did it encompass
only homogeneous tracts." In fact it appeared to develop in an almost
random spatial pattern.

Most of the rioting occurred at night: 62 percent between 8:00 p.m.
and 4:00 a.m. The rate of "crowd actions" increased during the first
half of the riot period and declined during the second. When arson and
looting were examined separately, these two types of action showed very
different time-space spreads: they occurred at the same time and
place far less often than one might expect.

In examining the instances where "crowd actions" spread to a new
geographical area the authors found that only 21 percent spread to a
contiguous tract; most of the activity spread to a tract widely separated
from the point of origin. Tracts where rioting broke out on the first
day tended to adjoin other tracts having riots. This was not true later
on, however. Tracts which had riots on the first day tended to become
quiet after the fourth day. In those whose rioting began on the second
day, the intensity of the action was generally low but likely to
grow until the fifth day when it again became slight. In those areas
where the riot began on the third day, a much higher intensity was
evidenced but activity decreased the next day. When the rioting did
not start until the fourth and fifth day, the intensity remained low
and the rioting usually lasted only one day.

Stark, et al. suggest that a widespread riot may contain several
smaller ones occurring at the same time and that coherent patterns
may be discernible within more limited temporal and spatial frames.

They argue for an approach which addresses rioting as a "complex, diverse, dynamic and interactive process."

Comments: This article adds significantly to the literature on riots in the 1960s because it focuses on what actually happens during a riot. Most studies of the subject examine riots as the outcome of circumstances affecting individuals or the characteristics of communities but fail to see them as processes with inner dynamics of their own. This study alerts the reader to the fact that riots are not monolithic phenomena, and shows the value of classifying the different actions they encompass. Yet the authors themselves recognize certain problems in the methodology (e.g., the limitations of documenting riot behavior on the basis of official records).

Because the findings are not related to a theoretical perspective, this is an exploratory effort. Several of the conclusions are very shaky. For example, after finding that looting and arson had different temporal and spatial profiles, the authors concluded that these acts were committed by different groups with different motives. They cite no evidence that this was so except that the events occurred at different times and places. Similarly the authors consider the activities they studied to be "crowd actions," but there is no certainty from their coding that these events were indeed group activities; in fact many, including arson and looting, may have been the acts of individuals. Robert Stallings' comments on this article, detail many of these criticisms.

Tomlinson, T.M., "The Development of a Riot Ideology Among Urban
    Negroes," The American Behavioral Scientist, March/April 1968, 27-31.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Following the Watts riot of 1965, a random probability sample of
585 Negroes residing in the curfew area were interviewed. From the
data thus obtained the author argues that riots today resemble a popular
movement and that this development has implications for society as a
whole. In particular, he says, "it is the thesis of this paper that
urban riots in the North will continue until the well of available
cities runs dry. They will continue because the mood of many Negroes
in the urban North demands them, because there is a quasi-political
ideology which justifies them, and because there is no presently effec-
tive deterrent or antidote."

The legitimacy of the riots in the eyes of the Negro community is
attested, he says, by the fact that 62 percent of the respondents saw
it as a Negro protest, 58 percent expected it to produce favorable
results, at least 34 percent sympathized with the supporters, and
15 percent claimed to have participated. Those who sympathized with
the riots (about 30 percent of the sample) were more likely to be
young males with urban backgrounds who were long-term residents, better
educated, more religious and had a more positive self-image than those
who decried the violence. Their militancy stemmed from disenchantment
with whites, anger towards the police and the news media, and a feeling
that change should come from the whites. Compared to the bulk of the
Negroes surveyed, they showed a greater hope for better race relations,
but were more approving of violent measures. In this author's opinion
riots are not produced by differences in the economic or political
structures of cities but are rather traceable to "the shared agreement
by most Negro Americans that their lot in life is unacceptable, coupled
with the view by a significant minority that riots are a legitimate
and productive mode of protest."

Tomlinson dismisses many current approaches to riot control such
as costly but nonrepressive programs of amelioration, commission reports,
self-restraint by the Negro community, counterviolence by social control
agencies, because they are either ineffective or unlikely to be imple-
mented. After the riots have run their course and if nothing is done
to relieve the underlying conditions, he believes, politically motivated
black organizations may very well actively foment civil disturbance
tending toward revolution. He prescribes: 1) the infusion of massive
amounts of money and industrial resources into the ghetto; 2) union
of street militants and middle-class Negroes to carry out economic
and political projects; and 3) demonstrations of faith in Negro equality
by white society and open access to housing, trade unions, courts,
and other institutions.

Comments:

This article, another version of the "new urban black man" theory
of riot participation, relates it to a general view of American race
relations. The author offers little systematic evidence to support
many of the conclusions, particularly those regarding deterrents and
antidotes. Moreover, his assertions that the ideology leading to
riots represents a "popular movement" are questionable: his own data
suggest that at least half the respondents did not express a sympa-
thetic understanding of the riots, and at least three-fourths were
troubled by the destruction.

Tomlinson, T.M., "Ideological Foundations for Negro Action: A Comparative
   Analysis of Militant and Non-militant Views of the Los Angeles Riot,"
   Journal of Social Issues, 26, 1, 1970, 93-119.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

   Tomlinson compares three groups of blacks with respect to their
demographic characteristics, the intensity of their grievances, their
attitudes toward the news media, their relations with whites, political
attitudes, and their evaluation of and participation in the Los Angeles
(Watts) riot of 1965. This article is largely an extension of his earlier
study, "The Development of a Riot Ideology Among Negroes" (1968). The
data were obtained from a random probability sample of 586 black respon-
dents from the "curfew area" who were interviewed in late 1965.

   In response to the question, "How well do you think the Black Muslims
are doing?" those expressing a positive evaluation were labeled "militants"
(30 percent of the sample), and those with negative views "conservatives"
(35 percent); the neutral or undecided were considered "uncommitted"
(35 percent).

   In comparison to the other two groups, "militants" were more often
male youths, brought up in an urban setting, somewhat better educated,
long-term residents, equally or more attached to some religion and
possessed of a more positive self-image. Slightly more of them claimed
lower-class status, though they were as likely as the nonmilitants to
have jobs. They were the most deeply aggrieved and claimed to have more
experience of police brutality. They also tended to be more politically
sophisticated and more of them thought the communications media portray
Negro problems unfairly. Although they were not markedly antiwhite, they
were considerably more disenchanged with whites than nonmilitants were.
They were the most active politically, and they supported any method
necessary to advance the cause of blacks, including violence. They more
often considered the riot to be a revolutionary act and tended to view
it more favorably than the other two groups; they also reported higher
rates of participation. They were more hopeful of positive changes in
race relations as an aftermath of the riots, but placed the responsibility
for these changes clearly on whites.

   Although differences between these three groups of blacks were stressed,
the author also documented the fact that most of those in the sample were
angry, aggrieved and disaffected. At least 70 percent of all respondents
believed that discrimination existed in housing, jobs, and schools, and
in the practices of landlords; a majority did not trust the police.
Respondents as a whole thought the white daily newspapers treated black
concerns less fairly than was true of black newspapers or the television
and radio stations. Moreover over half the sample had no social contact
with whites, and within this large segment of the black population are
"imbedded a group of sophisticated, activist young people who have pro-
vided the riot with political interpretations of purpose."

   According to Tomlinson the riot occurred because the community was

moved by a collective and contagious idea that violent measures to effect
social change were justified. The Watts riot simply lowered the kindling
point for later urban disorders, so that conditions of Negro life that
had always existed were at last felt to be intolerable. Riots are thus
produced by shared beliefs that these conditions are unacceptable, espec-
ially when a significant minority feels that riots are a legitimate
and productive mode of protest. Because these conditions are fairly
uniform from city to city, riots are not related to gross political and
economic differences between cities. Thus, "little could have been done
to stem the tide of urban disorders until they ran their course. There
were no immediate responses within the repertoire of any agency of person
which were (and are) sufficient to expunge the outrage that gave and
continues to give birth to collective black rebellion."

Comments:

The author gives two reasons for using attitudes toward the Black
Muslims as an indicator of militancy; at the time of the riot in Los
Angeles the Black Muslims were the only exponents of black radicalism in
the eyes of most black and white citizens; and this was the only such
organization receiving national attention from the news media. Whether
or not these assertions are true, there may have been better ways to
conceptualize and measure black radicalism without risking the tautology
inherent in this article.

Wanderer, Jules J., "1967 Riots: A Test of the Congruity of Events,"
    Social Problems, 16, 2, 1968, 191-98.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

        In an attempt to refute the traditional view of crowd behavior as
"bizarre, pathological, sociologically primitive and without order," the
reports of 75 civil-criminal disorders which took place in the summer of
1967 were analyzed using Guttman scaling. These disorders, which were
reported by mayors' offices in 67 different cities to a Senate sub-commit-
tee investigating the riots between 1965 and 1967, were coded according
to whether or not they contained the following ordered factors: vandalism,
interference with firemen, looting, sniping, calling of state police,
calling of national guard, and the killing of law enforcement officers or
civilians.

        These variables fit a Guttman scale, based on the severity of the
disorder, with a coefficient of reproducibility of 92 percent. Since one
of the properties of a Guttman scale is cumulativeness, this indicates
that in general, cities which experienced the most severe factors in their
disorders (e.g., the killing of a law enforcement officer or civilian) also
reported the presence of all of the less severe factors.

        Wanderer concludes that 1) the factors clearly constitute a contin-
uum of the severity of the disorder and cities can be classified according
to the seriousness of their riots, based on how many of the factors were
present; 2) the factors may be seen as supporting a developmental model of
disorders where vandalism precedes interference with firemen, then looting
occurs, and so on; and 3) riots are not incongruous for the "events charac-
terizing the riots reported here conform to a relatively rigorous criterion
of contruity, i.e., they scale."

Comments:

        Although the attempt to show that riots and civil disorders are pat-
terned is interesting, there are substantial problems with this analysis
and the interpretations of the results. The inclusion of law enforcement
procedures (i.e., the calling of state police and the national guard) with
dimensions of violence (e.g., vandalism, looting, etc.) serves to weaken
the scale and confuse the typology. Quite clearly factors independent of
the severity of the disorder could affect whether or not the state police
and national guard were called, including the size of the city and its re-
sources and the political climate. A number of variables that might also
have been related to the severity of the disorder (and which were collected
as data) such as whether or not arson occurred, whether or not law enforce-
ment officers or civilians were injured, and the estimated financial losses
were not included in the scale and no reason for their absence was given.
Moreover, there was no independent verification of the data obtained from
mayors' offices and no information was provided regarding whether the
cities that provided data were representative of all of the cities that
experienced riots that summer.

The interpretations are also suspect. Wanderer suggests that because the Guttman scale could be viewed as a developmental model, "the problem-oriented individual might surmise that timely intervention could stop the development of a riot, e.g., the way to prevent killing is not to call the national guard." Yet his own data suggest the opposite. In eight of the riots national guard were called and there was killing but in 13 riots national guard were called and there was no killing.

Unfortunately no definition of riot or criminal civil disorder is provided so we cannot evaluate the adequacy of a sample in which nearly a quarter of the cities had "riots" which included only vandalism or none of the scale items.

Wanderer, Jules J., "An Index of Riot Severity and Some Correlates,"
American Journal of Sociology, 74, 1, 1969, 400-05; see also, Spiler-
man, Seymour and Jules J. Wanderer, "Comments on Wanderer's Article
on Riot Severity and Its Correlates," and "The Author Replies,"
American Journal of Sociology, 75, 4, 1970, 556-61.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

Abstract:

This article focuses on the severity of riots in different cities.
Assuming that some variables have more influence on the severity of a
riot, once it has begun, and less to do with causing the riot, the
author sets up a Guttman scale of riot severity and relates it to
community characteristics.

Riot data for 75 urban riots and civil-criminal disorders (unde-
fined) during the summer of 1967 were obtained from mayors' offices
and reports to a U.S. Senate subcommittee. The Riot Severity Index
thus constructed included the following actions by rioters and author-
ities, ordered by severity: killing, calling of the national guard,
calling of the state police, sniping, looting, interference with fire-
men, and vandalism.

Lieberson and Silverman's 1965 study guided the selection of 21
community characteristics that the author correlated with riot severity.
The increase of nonwhites as a percentage of the total population between
1950 and 1960 was significantly related to riot severity, but racial
composition (measured by the average percentage of blacks in each
scale type) was not. Of eight variables concerning housing -- the age,
condition, and value of the structure, the amount of crowding, the rent
level and the percentage of nonwhite homeowners -- only one was signi-
ficantly correlated with riot severity. The smaller the proportion of
nonwhites living in housing less than 10 years, the greater the sever-
ity of the riot.

Population density was not significantly related to severity, nor
were two measures of a "criminal tradition," based on aggravated assault
and larceny rates. Examination of eight items measuring police prepara-
tion -- inservice training, riot training, existence of and riot training
for an auxiliary police force, mutual aid arrangements with neighboring
law enforcement agencies, special riot units and plans, and the use of
dogs to control crowds -- reveals that only the presence of a special
riot plan was positively correlated with riot severity. This particular
finding can be interpreted in at least two ways: either the decision
to draw up a riot plan was based on an accurate prediction of the
severity of the coming riot, or police expectations of a severe riot
were self-fulfilling. Similarly, the lack of correlation among the
other measures of police preparation has ambiguous implications. Police
were either overprepared for the actual severity, or they were adequately
prepared and were therefore able to minimize what was potentially a
severe riot.

As Wanderer concludes, although Lieberson and Silverman found that certain variables were not correlated with the presence or absence of a riot, they do influence the severity of a riot. The fitting of a Guttman scale indicates a pattern in the severity of riots and civil-criminal disorders that helps predict the riot's severity following a given sequence of events.

Comments:

Among the problems with the author's index of riot severity is the fact that calling the national guard and state police is not necessarily an indication of riot severity. Immediately after the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1967 a number of cities called in the national guard in anticipation of a severe riot. Furthermore, large cities are much less likely than small cities to seek aid from the state police because they have large police forces of their own.

Second, the size of crowds, the extent of looting and vandalism, the number of casualties, and the number of police at the scene as well as the time they remained are not included in the unidimensional index.

A test of validity for Wanderer's index calls into question the rationale of the entire study. Did the five cities with more than one riot register equal severity each time? It seems unreasonable to expect that they would, but if a significant relation between riot severity and community characteristics is assumed, we should expect the riots in a given city to be close to each other in severity.

Citywide aggregate data as a basis for measuring community characteristics are too general for large cities, where the riot involves only a small proportion of all the black neighborhoods in the city. The use of such data may hide significant relationships or may indicate relationships that in fact have no bearing on the severity of the riot.

Warheit, George and Jerry Waxman, "Operational and Organizational Adaptations of Fire Departments to Civil Disturbances," American Behavioral Scientist, 16, 3, January 1973, 343-55.

Approach: Descriptive

One feature of the urban riots of the 1960s was the massive and widespread arson, necessitating the total involvement of city fire departments. This paper examines operational and organizational adaptations by fire departments of six cities, including Los Angeles, in the face of major disturbances.

These departments changed their operations as follows: 1) a task force concept was developed to protect men and equipment from hostile action by rioters; 2) box alarms were disregarded because of the large number of false alarms, and primary reliance shifted to telephone reports and direct inspection by police; 3) a priority for responses was established -- hazards to life were at the top and trash and automobile fires at the bottom; 4) efforts to suppress fires were limited to the minimum time needed to put out the blaze; 5) mutual aid pacts were established, freeing firemen to work in the disturbed area, with neighboring departments covering more distant localities; 6) decision-making was decentralized, giving commanders at the scene more control; and 7) the organization's focus was shifted from fire prevention to fire suppression.

Four functional divisions -- administrative, fire prevention, fire suppression, and communications -- became the basis of analyzing organizational adaptations in the six departments. Three had experienced "fluctuating stress"; that is, the disturbances would peak at night and abate during the day. The other three reported "peak stress"; that is, the disturbances started at night but continued to build the next day until activity reached a peak, after which it began to subside.

The administrative division found that stress was greatest at the beginning of the disturbance, when the primary decisions had to be made about whether the incident should be treated as a civil disturbance and how this should be done. Once these decisions were made, however, field officers in charge of task forces took over the major operational decisions, and the administrative section acted largely in a coordinating role. Regardless of the nature of the stress, the administrative section easily handled the demands upon it.

Since fire suppression was for a time the main goal, the resources and manpower of the fire prevention sections were dispersed to other sections. Structurally the sections ceased to exist, and their functions were abandoned for the duration. The fate of these sections varied with the situation. In cities with fluctuating stress, the respite during the day allowed time for problems to be handled. In contrast, a pattern of peak stress, which allowed no time for a section to organize and adapt to the situation, overwhelmed the fire suppression section and required massive intervention of social control agencies, especially

the Army and National Guard. Under both types of stress, the sections underwent organizational changes. Task forces and decision-making were established in the field, but the functions of the sections remained the same.

The communication sections retained their basic structure under both types of stress and operated well under established procedures for handling civil disturbances. Establishing links with the police was the major difficulty faced by communications sections.

Four types of internal adaptation to the stress situation were identified: 1) No changes were made in either the structure or function of the unit; this was exemplified by such peripheral sections of the fire department as budget or finance. 2) The unit's function remained unchanged but the structure was modified to make them more decentralized task forces. Fire suppression units seemed to fit this type of adaptation. 3) The structure remained the same but the functions of the unit changed. This was true of the communications and administration sections. Communications sections helped units to respond to calls and served as an interorganizational link with the police department. Administrative units coordinated efforts to suppress fires rather than initiating organizational decisions. 4) Both the structure and the function of the fire prevention units changed, these units disappeared as a distinct section during the crisis and personnel were transferred to other sections.

Comments:

This article is useful in portraying the various ways that collective disorders affect the internal structures of fire departments in several cities, and in showing how the dynamics of the disorders determine the stress that social control agencies undergo. Unfortunately, we are given no specific information about any of the characteristics of these departments, the names of the cities, or the effectiveness of their efforts. It is thus difficult to evaluate the conclusions. The article implies that all six fire departments reacted in the same ways to these events and that the differences in their success were due solely to the dynamics of the riots.

Warren, Donald I., "Neighborhood Structure and Riot Behavior in Detroit:
Some Exploratory Findings," Social Problems, 16, 4, 1969, 464-84.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research; Analysis of Existing Data

In trying to discover the relationships between types of neighborhood
and several types of riot behavior in Detroit in 1967 the author relies
on a typology of neighborhoods according to their orientation toward a
local or a larger community and the extent to which the neighborhood is
viewed as a positive reference group. The neighborhood types are then
related to three types of involvement in riots: rioting, counterrioting
behavior, and neutral or withdrawal behavior.

Six types of neighborhoods, differentiated by their degree of informal
and formal local organization, their orientation to the larger community,
and how much the neighborhood is viewed as a positive reference group,
are characterized:

1. Integrated--the neighborhood is high in formal and informal organ-
ization, strongly oriented toward the larger community, and is a positive
reference group.

2. Parochial--the neighborhood is high in formal and informal local
organization, but weakly oriented toward the larger community; it is a
positive reference group.

3. Diffuse--although the neighborhood is a positive reference group,
it has little informal or formal local organization and only a weak orienta-
tion to the larger communtiy.

4. Stepping-stone--the neighborhood is not a positive reference group,
but there is a strong informal or formal organization and a strong orienta-
tion to the larger community.

5. Transitory--the neighborhood is not a positive reference group;
there is little informal or formal local organization but a strong orienta-
tion to the larger community.

6. Anomic--the neighborhood is not a positive reference group; it
has little formal or informal local organization and only weak ties to
the larger community.

Suggesting that the role of the local neighborhood is more significant
in a black ghetto than in white communities, Warren further believes that
parochial, stepping-stone, and transitory neighborhoods will be more preva-
lent in ghettos. A major hypothesis is that rioting would be more likely
to occur in the diffuse, transitory, or anomic neighborhoods than in the
others and that this would also be true of withdrawal from action. Counter-
riot efforts were expected to take place in integrated, parochial or step-
ping stone neighborhoods.

The chief portion of this analysis is based on a study conducted in the
two main zones of a riot a month after the event. A block sample yielded
personal interviews with 417 black respondents. In addition, preriot data
were generated from two surveys: a 1963 study surveyed 593 Negro mothers

in eight school districts, and a 1964 study, 260 respondents in the same eight school districts. Only six of the 19 neighborhoods in the postriot survey were also included in the preriot studies.

Three indices of involvement in riots were constructed from self-reports by respondents. Participation included five specific activities: entering broken stores, taking home goods, breaking windows, making fire bombs, and throwing them. Counterriot activity included six kinds of action; such as trying to stop the riot, and helping to put out fires. Withdrawal signified leaving the neighborhood or staying at home and not going out during the disturbance. Using ecological correlations, Warren found that neighborhoods which ranked high in admissions of participation in the rioting also ranked high in counterriot activity and in withdrawal. Neighborhoods with high reported counterriot activity, however, had low rates of withdrawal.

The type of behavior was also related to the length of time respondents had lived in the neighborhood. Neighborhoods which had higher proportions of new arrivals tended to have more rioting and more "withdrawal" but less counterriot activity. Neighborhoods with higher percentages of long-term residents (within the neighborhood and from the Detroit area) were likely to have more respondents counterrioting.

Behavior during riots was also related to informal social contact in the neighborhood. Neighborhoods with higher numbers reporting counterriot behavior also had more frequent contacts between neighbors, whereas the neighborhoods characterized by withdrawal had the least amount of such contact. The preriot data also indicated that visiting among neighbors was infrequent among the residents of the four neighborhoods where the riots occurred.

Using attitudinal measures to show the reference group's orientation toward the neighborhood (including their perception of common interests with neighbors, the degree to which they would inform on former neighbors, and their preference for living in an all black neighborhood) Warren found no consistent pattern for predicting withdrawal from or attempts to counter riots, but he did find that riot participation tended to be higher in neighborhoods in which respondents had negative reference group orientation.

To measure attitudinal ties to the larger community, questions focused on respondents feelings of patriotism toward the country, their belief that blacks can solve their problems without help from whites, and the extent to which they thought that riots were caused by a failure of black leadership or inadequate social training by black parents. In the postriot data, neighborhoods with high rates of both rioting and withdrawal were also those in which higher percentages of respondents felt the country was not worth fighting for, that blacks could solve their problems without the help of whites, and that the causes of riots were weak black leadership or the failure of parents. In contrast, neighborhoods with a higher incidence of counterriot activity were those where respondents felt strong links to the country as a whole and the need for help from whites and who more often attributed the riots to weak black leadership and a lack of social control by black parents.

Relating these patterns to his classification of neighborhoods, Warren concludes that: 1) integrated neighborhoods were characterized by counterriot behavior; 2) parochial neighborhoods were not riot areas; 3) diffuse neighborhoods typically showed withdrawal behavior; 4) stepping-stone neighborhoods were somewhat likely to be counterriot areas; 5) transitory neighborhoods were characteristically scenes of rioting; and 6) anomic neighborhoods had high rates of both withdrawal and rioting. He also found that in most cases riot and counterriot neighborhoods were more like each other than like withdrawal areas. Both riot and counterriot neighborhoods had extensive ties with the larger community, and counterriot localities also had extensive neighborhood interaction. In contrast, neighborhoods where withdrawal was common lacked informal social ties to the larger white and black communities.

Comments:

Warren's neighborhood approach to the study of urban riots is quite interesting; further research conducted in this area should prove fruitful. However, the details of his methodology are extremely unclear (e.g., construction of riot activity indices, categorization of neighborhoods according to riot participation, etc.). Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate his findings. Despite this confusion, some definite flaws in the study are apparent. For example, a number of indicators of neighbhood structure are not only inadequate, but their validity is extremely questionable.

Warren, Donald, "Mass Media and Racial Crisis: A Study of the New Bethel
Church Incident in Detroit," Journal of Social Issues, 28, 1,
1972, 111-31.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

Twenty months after the 1967 Detroit riot, a racial crisis involv-
ing a shoot-out occurred between police and members of an African Separa-
tist group meeting at Detroit's New Bethel Church. The coverage of this
incident by the television and newspapers and the racial tension generated
by it are detailed by this case study analyzing media reports as well as
interviews with 1,130 Detroit residents.

Coverage by three newspapers, the Detroit News, the Detroit Free
Press, and the Michigan Chronicle (a black weekly), and by the two
television stations which the FCC permitted to air editorial comments
were studied and their portrayal of the incident contrasted. The news-
paper accounts emphasized the "ambush theme." In this view the shooting
started when armed militants ambushed the police. They also criticized
the black judge who released most of those arrested. Television coverage
was also at variance with facts established by the court proceedings,
although both newspapers and television stations later tried to reverse
some of the earlier impressions they had fostered and to relieve some
of the tension the incident aroused.

In an ongoing study based on an area probability design, special
questions about the incident were inserted in interviews with 507 blacks
and 623 whites immediately after the riot. Perceptions of the incident
were based on three questions: 1) What do you think happened at the
church? 2) What do you think happened at the court hearing? 3) How do
you feel about the police going into the church in this kind of situation?

Extremely large racial differences in these perceptions were found.
Over half the whites but only 15 percent of the blacks believed that
the shooting started because the armed militants ambushed the police.
Nearly half the whites but only 8 percent of the blacks believed that the
judge released most of the arrested persons because of his personal feel-
ings. The view that the police were right in going into the church was
held by 84 percent of the whites but 57 percent of the blacks thought
the police were wrong.

Respondents were also asked to rank the importance of the various
sources of information about the incident. Whites, regardless of education,
were much more likely to rely on newspapers than blacks were. Blacks
were more likely to rely on friends, relatives, and neighbors for infor-
mation than whites.

The differences in the percentage of whites and blacks subscribing
to three views of the incident were the basis of an "Index of Polariza-
tion." Among respondents who relied most on friends and relatives for
information, blacks varied extremely from whites in their views of what
happened at the church and at court. Among those who relied most on

newspapers and television (the majority of respondents), differences in
their perceptions about the behavior of the police were extreme. The
relatively few respondents who relied primarily on neighbors for infor-
mation evidenced the least black-white polarization on the issues.

Varying combinations of information sources were also analyzed and
related to education as well as the time elapsed since the incident.
Those relying on newspapers more than any other source lost the original
perspective derived from the mass media. Whites to whom television was
the most important source of information persisted in the original
view, which differed even more from that of blacks.

In a situation of tension and conflict like that in Detroit during
the late 1960s, Warren argues that the polarization between blacks and
whites is not reduced by the media. He argues that "racial tension is
an area where the mass media play a particularly significant role in
shaping the perceptions of individuals...because of the low degree of
primary-group ties existing between members of the black and white com-
munity."

Comments:

In this rather serendipitous addition to ongoing research, Warren
demonstrates that blacks and whites diverged sharply in their perception
of a particularly dramatic incident and that the source of information
was seemingly related to these perceptions. Yet the arguments -- and
the measures used to buffer them -- are often so convoluted and diffi-
cult to follow that the reader is left unsatisifed. For example, the
degree of attention commanded by particular sources of information is
not broken down, and whether the coverage by the Detroit News, for
example, compared to that of the Michigan Chronicle had any effect on
these views is left unanswered.

Warren, Donald, "Some Observations from post-Riot Detroit: The Role
    of the Social Researcher in Contemporary Racial Conflict,"
    Phylon, 34, 2, June 1973, 171-86.

Approach: Prescriptive
Methodology: Observational

Two case studies of research failures in post-riot Detroit in the
1960s dramatize the problems in investigating race relations in rela-
tion to policy. Three "working hypotheses" guide this essay. The
first is that tension occurring when scientific detachment and relevant
research are conflicting goals hamper the testing of both accepted and
unconventional explanations of society. Researchers who step outside
of the institutional value system must defend their role and then selec-
tion of problems as well as consider conditions under which their re-
search must be abandoned and "hostile" findings suppressed.

The second hypothesis is that researchers who derive their creden-
tials solely from the academic world are increasingly distrusted in
black communities, and for them access to information can be a major
problem. The third hypothesis is that research can become the scape-
goat for white and black groups preoccupied with direct action and poli-
tical ascendency, since many studies heighten expectations of material
gains.

A number of points gleaned from these cases are particularly impor-
tant toward improving the quality of future research. Warren argues
that a major reason why several efforts failed was that surveys were
carried out by persons without previous experience who did not seek
guidance from indigenous leaders of the communities or specialists in
interracial confrontation, and that interviewing did not even follow
the matched-race principle. Many fail to face the assumptions about pol-
itical and social value implied in the design. "Nineteen of the twenty-
three proposals underscore the idea of the white community that something
is wrong with blacks as individuals or with their community. In sharp
contrast only six studies made such imputations about the white com-
munity." Moreover, the subjects of research are rarely considered to
have any stake in the research findings and are not consulted in designing
the studies. Moreover, there is an attempt to avoid controversy.
According to Warren, this leads to "a kind of academic Gresham's Law.
The social scientists who wish to scientifically test hypotheses are
driven away. Left are the purveyors of outdated findings, appliers of
easy simplifications ('the culturally deprived'), or technicians de-
signed for existing institutional assumptions -- whether social action,
social welfare-bureaucratic, or purely academic."

Comments:

Although parts of the article are difficult to follow, and the
arguments are often rather convoluted, it raises a number of issues
central to policy-oriented research on such controversial subjects as
race relations and collective violence.

Weller, Jack M., "The Involuntary Partisans: Fire Departments and the
    Threat of Violence," American Behavioral Scientist, 16, 3, 1973,
    368-77.

Approach: Descriptive

During the 1960s, urban fire departments in the United States, in
fighting fire during civil disturbances, had to adapt to a frequently
hostile milieu. This study explores the problems that six urban fire
departments now anticipate during civil disturbances, the contemplated
organizational changes, and the major factors shaping these changes.

Fire departments anticipated two classes of problems during civil
disturbances: 1) extended and excessive demands on their equipment and
manpower, and 2) danger of injury to men and damage to equipment. The
solutions most often included were these: adopting emergency call-up
procedures to mobilize off-duty firefighters; 2) adding some reserve and
protective equipment; 3) developing mutual aid pacts with county and
municipal departments; 4) writing operations plans for task force and
other operations, cutting down salvage and overhaul operations, checking
for false alarms, and changing communications equipment; and 5) adopting
policies explicitly limiting the conditions under which they would res-
pond in civil disturbances.

To cope with such disturbances, departments began to cooperate more
frequently with each other. The result among local organizations was a
generally informal "understanding" about what they could expect of each
other. Agreements with the police and National Guard were the most
important because they would supply the protection for secure fire opera-
tions.

Although the federal government financed an extensive network of
organizations to help police departments make the changes necessitated
by these new responsibilities, fire departments were not given the funds
for meeting their problems and could do less to develop and change than
the police could. "In every one of fourteen cities where information on
both police and fire departments was available, police changed more.
Doubtless there are other factors involved in this consistent difference,
but as our interviews make clear, the contrast would not be so great if
the interorganizational network assisting fire department changes had
disbursed money as well as encouragement and advice." Because of these
limitations, many of the permanent changes in fire departments derived
from "on the spot" adaptations made during civil disturbance responses.

Many of the changes were attempts to heal relations with minorities
that had been tarnished because the firefighters had to extinguish fires
caused by civil disturbances. Although most departments did not adopt
such community relations programs, they cited expense as the reason,
rather than a lack of interest. They resisted several innovations extend-
ing their responsibilities for social control because they hoped to
recapture their image of a nonpartisan organization serving all citizens
and accepted by all.

Comments:

The way civil disturbances affected the organization and capabilities of fire departments is described in this article, but the information about the data collection, the characteristics of the sample, or even the hard data available is wholly inadequate.

Wenger, Dennis, "The Reluctant Army: The Functioning of Police Depart-
      ments During Civil ·Disturbances," American Behavioral Scientist,
      16, 3, January/February 1973, 326-42.

Approach: Descriptive

      The outbreak of a civil disturbance causes transient but signifi-
cant changes in the command and control arrangements of the typical
police department. Much of the ineffectiveness of the police during
civil disturbances might stem from their attempts to resolve "the
stresses, strains, and conflicts produced by these alterations."

      Wenger asserts that the power of command in a police department is
officially borne by hierarchical arrangements closely resembling a
"military model" of organization. In the "military model," authority
and subordination are delineated by "military rank, titles, and insig-
nia"; decision-making powers are vested in the highest echelons;
"decisions are transmitted through a one-way communication channel to
the operational level"; and close supervision of personnel is maintained
at all times.

      During normal operations, however, the resemblance between a police
department's organization and the "military model" is slight. Deploy-
ment in response to citizens' requests for service, or situations where
the police have statutory responsibility, is in reality decided by the
dispatcher in the department's communications center. Officers in the
field are accustomed by training, experience, and tradition to fairly
independent action in dealing with small groups of law-abiding citizens,
for example, or resistance from individual criminals, as well as with
"mass behavior," as in controlling traffic and normal crowds. In this
sense, "mass behavior" is defined as "isolated individual acts concen-
trated in time and space."

      In contrast, a civil disturbance is "collective behavior" by a
group which favors coherent actions that contravene legally constituted
authority. Such collective behavior imposes strains on police organ-
ization because its manpower and equipment must be deployed in a military
fashion. The police tradition enjoining minimum use of force in iso-
lated contexts is set aside, and preparations are made to resort to
extensive and substantial force. Field personnel are called on to
shed their customary autonomy in favor of tactical disposition in
platoon-like formations led by officers directly responsible to the
department's top commanders. Instances of police officers breaking
ranks to attack individuals taking part in a disturbance can be inter-
preted as spontaneous protest against the sudden loss of autonomy en-
tailed by tactical operations. The excessive force police frequently
resort to in handling collective behavior is also attributed to the
extended chain of command created by the emergency: no one knows who
can properly authorize the use of more than routine force, and this
uncertainty leads to many misguided and unproductive acts.

      According to Wenger, the effectiveness of police decisions during
civil disturbances may also be impaired by a tendency to treat unlawful

collective behavior as mass behavior: police fail to note the division
of labor and other organizational aspects of the disturbance and to
differentiate between types of participants. To substantiate this
point Wenger reports that curfews imposed by police -- and the whole-
sale clearing of the streets that a curfew implies -- frequently prove
successful because collective behavior can thus be treated like the
more familiar mass behavior.

Wenger also argues that police decision-making and operational
control in civil disturbances are hindered by the sudden need to inte-
grate police activities with those of the fire department and the
National Guard. Although fire department and National Guard commanders
often join police officials at emergency headquarters and field command
posts, joint action is often inhibited by the persistence of autono-
mous chains of command, differences in terminology, organization and
traditions, and incompatible telephone and radio equipment. He notes
that problems of coordination are sometimes partly overcome by having
a "third party," such as a state police commander, assume overall con-
trol of operations to halt unlawful collective behavior.

Comments:

Wenger assumes that a police department's organization is derived
from a military tradition, and that a department adheres more closely
to it in civil disturbances than in routine operations. But he presents
no evidence to support his belief. The idea that a police department
is a latent military organization seems neither accurate nor especially
useful. The organization required in military operations is probably
no more like that needed in police work than war between nations is
like civil disorder.

COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY STUDENT MOVEMENTS

Adamek, Raymond J. and Jerry M. Lewis, "Social Control Violence and
     Radicalization: Behavioral Data," Social Problems, 22, 5,
     1975, 663-74.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

     This study of the sociopolitical behavior of Kent State students
before and after May 4, 1970 was directed toward the effects of the
violent measures used to control the student demonstrators.   Two
plausible hypotheses were examined: 1) the radicalization hypothesis
suggests that social control measures such as those used by the
National Guards at Kent State lead to greater activity by protesters;
2) the pacification hypothesis suggests that such measures would check
the protest and make protesters more passive, or induce more conven-
tional sociopolitical activity.

     The subjects for this study were students on campus in 1972 (when
the data were collected), who had also been at Kent State on May 4,
1970 when the fatal shootings occurred.   The 208 respondents comprised
124 persons who had gone to the May 4 rally to demonstrate or observe,
and 84 who did not go.   The present data were collected as part of
another research project in which those arrested in a 1972 sit-in
were compared with students who were not arrested.   Thus the respon-
dents constitute a subsample of a larger data base obtained through
two strategies of data collection: data from 31 of the subjects,
those arrested in 1972, came from interviews; the information from the
rest of the subjects, those not arrested, came from mailed question-
naires sent to a random sample of juniors and seniors.

     Participants and nonparticipants in the May 4 rally, compared in
relation to 23 variables, including race, age, academic major, religion,
social class, were found to be quite similar.   They did differ signi-
ficantly, however, in that those who attended the rally were more
likely to be males, to attend church less frequently, and to describe
their own and their mothers' political views as liberal or radical.

     Respondents were also asked how many times they had engaged in
various protest and other sociopolitical activity before and after
May 4, 1970.   Students present at the May 4 rally engaged in more
such activities both before and after the rally than the students who
had not attended.   Moreover, those present at the rally participated
in protests from three to six times more after May 4 then they had
before.   "Participation" included attending rallies, picketing or
marching, engaging in civil disobedience, and nonviolent or violent
confrontations with authorities.   Those present at the May 4 rally, also
maintained or increased their previous amount of other sociopolitical
endeavors, such as canvassing, petitioning, and working for social
action or social causes.   The results therefore indicated that the use
of violent measures resorted to by the National Guard radicalized
rather than pacified the students most directly affected by them.

Comments:

This study attempted to examine the changes in behavior -- as opposed to attitudes -- resulting from exposure to violent methods of social control. Although based on participants' own reports, which relied on their recollections after two or three years, the data consistently suggested that the effect of such exposure was to increase radicalization. The data of those studied were presented as mean frequencies and percentages, however, without the benefit of tests of significance. The authors discuss these findings in another article, "Social Control Violence and Radicalization: The Kent State Case," in Social Forces, March 1973.

Bay, Christian, "Political and Apolitical Students: Facts in Search
of Theory," Journal of Social Issues, 23, 3, 1967, 76-91.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Literature Review

This article tries to explain why activist students tend to be
more academically able, intelligent, and intellectually oriented than
more apolitical students. This fact has been acknowledged since the
1920s, but the theoretical basis for understanding the relationship
is lacking. The author attempts to fill this void.

To show the academic and intellectual superiority of liberal and
radical students, the author reviews data from three research cate-
gories: traditional attitude measurement studies (e.g., Newcomb and
Stouffer); studies of authoritarianism, dogmatism, and other neurotic
tendencies (e.g., Adorno, McClosky); and contemporary studies of
student activists (e.g., Selvin and Hagstrom, Sommers, Heist, and Watts
and Whittaker). In his theory of the psychological basis for radical
versus conservative political attitudes, he emphasizes the functions
that political attitudes and behaviors serve in meeting personality
and social needs.

For example, the association of right-wing views with indices of
neurosis might be a function of ego-defensive motives stemming from
"unresolved childhood anxieties." Other conservative attitudes may
be a function of social acceptance motives (i.e. a wish to impress
reference groups and persons favorably). Since in large part the
reference groups are conservative or at most mildly liberal, "more
conservative views, among students or adults generally, are likely to
be less rationally, less independently motivated, compared to more
radical-liberal views." Bay further argues that neurotic motivation
for political attitudes is probably more frequent the farther away the
politically active person is from the left side of the political spec-
trum. In other words, the holder of liberal or radical attitudes
could effectively resist the pressures of early childhood and the
practices of social organizations which would have led him to more con-
servative attitudes. His intelligence was freed because of a secure
and sheltered childhood and the freedom and autonomy granted him
through educational and social processes.

Comment:

A prime example of a "cream of the crop" theory of political and
social activism, this article suffers from a very selective perusal of
the relevant literature, inattention to other dimensions of the problem
such as the environment in which the individual is moored, and failure
to address some basic inconsistencies in the cited data.

DeMartini, Joseph, "Student Activists of the 1930's: A Comparison
of the Social Base of Two Student Movements," Youth and Society,
6, 4, 1975, 395-422.

Approach: Historical/Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data/Case Study

In this case study of political protest by students at the
University of Illinois, Urbana, the background and social profiles of
selected student activists in the 1930s and 1940s were compared to
those of the student body as a whole and those of activists of the
1960s. Using data from student newspapers and other archival material,
the author identified 134 members of Socialist and Communist student
organizations active on the campus between the academic years 1932-33
and 1941-42.

Four variables were used to describe student activists and compare
them to the student body as a whole: urban-rural background (size
of home town), social class (father's occupation), social integration
(academic major and participation in extracurricular activities),
and religion. Left-wing student organizations attracted only about
1 percent of the university's average enrollment between 1934 and 1941;
the average membership of each radical student organization during
those years was 34. The student activists were described as more
urban; their fathers were more likely to be engaged in professional
occupations than in skilled or unskilled jobs; these students were
more likely to be Jewish and to be less integrated into the traditional
student culture, with lower membership rates in fraternities and
sororities than nonactivists. Their academic majors were more often
in the arts and sciences than in business, agriculture, and engineering,
an indication that they were less oriented toward taking traditional
jobs immediately after graduation. In comparing these findings with
studies of student activists in the 1960s, DeMartini finds marked
similarities in the social bases of student protest in these periods,
and "this suggests the possibility of developing theoretical explana-
tions for both the rise of and participation in such movements which
encompass different socioeconomic historical conditions."

Comments: This study has serious limitations in the data supplied
and the implications drawn from them. Clearly the sample was neither
random nor representative of all student activists in the 1930s or
1940s, and the activists who were identified may have represented a
systematically biased sample of even left-wing protesters. The infor-
mation on the entire student body was available for only one of the
years studied, so DeMartini compared the characteristics of activists
of three time periods to the student body of 1939-40. Since the tables
he presented clearly indicated different characteristics of activists
in the three periods, it seems inappropriate to compare them to the
characteristics of the entire student body for only one year. Another
problem is the lack of data on some identified activists. For nearly
two-thirds of the activists, data regarding fathers' occupations

were missing, yet the study concluded that the social class of activists differed from that of the rest of the student body. The only information on religion was an estimate by the dean of men of the religious backgrounds of the members of one organization, yet DeMartini concluded that Jews were overrepresented among the activist population. Similar problems in measurement of social integration plagued this study. Assumptions underlying some of the conclusions were equally shaky. For example, because activists were more likely than nonactivists to be enrolled in the college of liberal arts and sciences and less likely to be in the colleges of business, engineering and agriculture, he concludes that activist students were "less likely to plan, through academic specialization, for an integration into adult occupational roles supportive of the dominant culture."

Dunlap, Riley, "A Comment on 'Mulitiversity, University Size, University
    Quality, and Student Protest: An Empirical Study," by Scott and
    El-Assal; Roos, Philip, "A Comment on 'Student Protest,";
    Scott, Joseph W., "A Rejoinder to Dunlap and Roos," American
    Sociological Review, 35, 3, 1970, 525-30.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Commentary/Critical Review

        This article comments on the Scott and El-Assal study of the rela-
tion between multiversities and student demonstrations. Dunlap dis-
agrees with the interpretation that attributes the disproportional
amount of protest at these universities to the bureaucracy and imper-
sonality which characterize them. Instead, Dunlap believes protests
originate in a concern with the problems of racism, militarism, and
poverty and in the failure of academic institutions to combat these
problems, rather than dissatisfaction with the educational experience
at the multiversity.

        At issue is the Scott and El-Assal assertion that "the more the
students are personally separated from administrators, faculty members,
and other students by structural complexity and social heterogeneity,
the more likely it is that the students will feel separated, neglected,
manipulated, and dehumanized to the extent that they will engage in
protest activities," implying that protesters are unhappy about campus
conditions and hence that these conditions are responsible for campus
demonstrations. Although this view is popular, in other studies cited
by Dunlap, the relevant data do not support it.

        Case studies of two periods of student protest provide the base
from which Dunlap develops his dissent: studies of Berkeley and a
nationwide survey cover the period studied by Scott and El-Assal,
1964-65; case studies of Berkeley and Columbia, along with national
surveys, cover the period from 1967 to 1969. Data from the earlier
period indicate that students felt little dissatisfaction with their
educational experience. Peterson's national survey included all of
the country's 996 four-year educational institutions, compared with
Scott and El-Assal's purposive sample of 104. Although Peterson's work
revealed that large public universities did experience more protest
than other institutions, student protest was also found to involve
off-campus social and political issues rather than campus conditions.

        Another survey conducted by Peterson during the second period,
however, indicated slightly more concern with instructional matters
but substantially more interest in increasing students' participation
in policy-making within their schools. Studies by Somers, Bell and
Trimberger clarify this latter finding: they suggest that demands for
student power are not made to improve the lot of the student but to
force "the university to divorce itself from existing centers of power,
and to contribute to the solutions of major social and human problems."

Advocates of student power were more concerned with the multiversity's ties to an oppressive establishment than with its impersonality and bureaucracy. While Dunlap does not deny that students' dissatisfaction with an impersonal, bureaucratic administration has played a part in producing protest, he maintains that this factor has been minor compared to the concern of students with such basic issues as civil rights and the Vietnam war.

Scott's rejoinder to Dunlap is that he and El-Assal did not try to account for the variety of issues involved in the demonstrations: they attempted only to account for the rate of demonstrations per school. Their research had this basis: whatever the issue of student protests, they are differently distributed over the campuses of academe, and they correlate with different degrees of administrative complexity and different degrees of social heterogeneity of the school bodies."

Scott also considers that Dunlap errs in emphasizing a clear dichotomy between social problems and campus conditions. In Scott's view, one is reflected in the other, the evidence being that protests against militarism take the form of anti-R.O.T.C. demonstrations, and protests against racism are directed against racial discrimination in student housing. Furthermore, Scott considers that "most, if not all, of the societal issues identified to date are also 'campus conditions' by virtue of the multiversity's complicity with the political, economic, and military establishments of this country."

Comments:

The source of the disagreement is the assumption by Scott and El-Assal that students are likely to feel separated and manipulated as a result of the structural complexity and social heterogeneity of their educational institutions. Their data, however do not show whether students actually felt alienated, although one can conclude from their findings that their measures of institutional complexity and heterogeneity are associated with the rate of protest demonstrations by students. In fact, neither the Scott and El-Assal data nor studies reviewed by Dunlap provide insight into why demonstrations are more likely at large and complex universities, and more likely to be frequent.

Dynes, Russell, E.L. Quarantelli, and James L. Ross,"Police Perspectives
  and Behavior in a Campus Disturbance," Journal of Police Science and
  Administration, 2, 3, September 1974, 344-51.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Case Study

   This article describes a study done of police attitudes and behavior
during a particularly violent campus disturbance in Columbus, Ohio (1970)
in which large numbers of people were arrested and a substantial amount
of injuries incurred. Questionnaires were submitted to all sworn police
officers and about 50% responded. The theoretical approach taken was that
attitudes and actions of police are in part determined by their occupa-
tional position and from organizational definitions of the police func-
tion rather than their personal characteristics. The picture that emerged
was one of a police force that viewed itself as in danger from a hostile
crowd--which justified the strong actions taken to suppress crowd be-
havior. The authors found that most officers viewed their job as "law
enforcement" not "peace keeping." Since they found almost no differences
in the attitudes of police, regardless of age, rank, education, and assign-
ment, they concluded that the nature of the occupation was of overriding
concern in establishing attitudes and actions.

   However, police who had more experience with earlier disturbances
tended to have higher arrest records in this incident; similarly, exper-
ience in previous riots also tended to provide higher estimates of the
number of students involved in the university disturbance. Previous ex-
perience was also more likely to lead to heightened criticism of police
planning for the disturbance and to recommend more forceful techniques of
control in the future. In addition, those who reported injuries to
themselves and to other officers during the campus disorders were also
more likely to estimate larger numbers of crowd participants.

   Although the study did not measure perceptions of other participants
in the demonstrations, content analyses of newspapers were done in an
attempt to compare police reports with media coverage of the incidents.
Great discrepancies were found between newspaper and police reports--
except in terms of what they saw as the "causes" of the incidents. Mass
media accounts reported police actions (particularly those which involved
the use of force or weapons) which the police did not report, saw crowds
as less hostile than police viewed them, did not report subjective reac-
tions of officers, and did reporting in such a manner as to make judgments
of bias difficult to consider. The police officers said they were more
afraid, reported more personal attacks, and saw more fellow officers
injured than was reported in the news.

Comments:

   The authors themselves cite three limitations to this study. First,
the data were taken from one particular event which was atypical because
of its large size, Thus the generalizability of findings is in question.
Secondly, there were large gaps in data since only police were interviewed.
Also, the police responded quite differently to a second phase of the

disturbance (with more provocation) so the reasons for the strong show of force in the one incident is not clear. Finally, it is not clear whether the actions taken were based on attitudes of police about their professional role, or on centralized organizational decisions.

Friedman, Samuel R., "Perspectives on the American Student Movement,"
  Social Problems, 20, 3 Winter, 1973, 283-299.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

     Sources of student discontent are the focus of this paper. The
review of research and discussion address two factors related to student
movements: the conditions of the initial organization of the movement,
and the matter of why students are available for radical political ac-
tivity. These factors are examined in order to understand some of the
basic causes of student unrest and activism among white college and
university students.

     It is argued that a major basis for student discontent is the alien-
ation (in the Marxist sense) of intellectual labor. Traditional argu-
ments regarding the growth of the multiversity and the "liberated gen-
eration" are subsumed in this approach; that is, arguments that point
to general political and social issues as the main causes of student
unrest are held to be inadequate since they fail to answer the question
of why students are so much more active than other constituencies.

     Regarding the factor of the conditions of the initial organization
of the student movement, the implications for analysis are set forth in
the terms of Dahrendorf's model of the preconditions for organization,
namely: 1) collection of initial leaders (civil rights and peace move-
ment leaders); 2) enough political freedom so potential members can get
together (they must come from liberal schools and be immune from punish-
ment; 3) communication among potential membership base (student newspaper,
intercampus visiting, intercampus transferring of students); 4) struc-
turally ordered selection into social groups that comprise a potential
group (self selection creates the sense of commonality and consciousness).

     With respect to the factor of why students are available for radi-
cal political activity, the implications for analysis are: 1) for
those who don't drop out, it (radical student activity) produces a will-
ingness to take part in activist movements, especially those which sym-
bolize the powerlessness of students; 2) traditional sanctions against
radical political behavior have lost impact because alienated students
are less willing to put up with unpleasant conditions or arbitrary
authority to which they are increasingly exposed because of the multi-
versities; 3) the grading system and impersonal nature of education
carry a message about the nature of intellectual jobs after graduation.

     The author notes that while the argument that intellectual labor
has become increasingly alienated has been documented, awareness of this
by undergraduate students has not been discussed in relation to faculty
activism, or lack thereof -- given the understanding that "the arrived"
would presumably be more aware of not having control over the nature
and uses of their work than would "the aspirants."

Comments:

Whereas the argument that intellectual labor has become increasingly alienated is applied to undergraduate students, it was not applied to faculty who presumably would have an even greater basis for discontent -- for the "arrived" would presumably be more aware of not having control over the nature and uses of their work than would the "aspirants." If the argument is really correct, we would expect to find that faculty members would be at the forefront of the movement, particularly those without tenure and in situations of little power.

Gamson, Zelda F., Jeffrey Goodman, and Gerald Gurin, "Radicals, Moderates and Bystanders During a University Protest," Paper read at the meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August 1967.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Few if any systematic attempts have been made to understand why some people join in protest movements while others do not -- even when their attitudes are similar. These authors studied a sample of students with like attitudes on an issue and a strong interest in it. Their object was to see what conditions produce activists and what prevents some people from social action.

The research, done at the University of Michigan in January 1967, followed a minor student rebellion in the fall of 1966. The "movement" focused on student rights within the university. Under attack were the administration's agreement to give the House Committee on Un-American Activities membership lists of several radical student groups, its policy of submitting class ranks to Selective Service boards, its refusal to accept the results of a referendum in which nearly 10,000 students voted against this policy, and the ban on student sit-ins in university buildings.

As part of an ongoing longitudinal study (the Michigan Student Study) a subsample of 151 strongly anti-administration seniors interested in student power were studied. They were classified according to three degrees of activity: "bystanders" did nothing to support the protest except possibly to vote in the referendum; "moderates" engaged in minor activites such as attending a teach-in or campus rally; "activists" engaged in direct action like the sit-in in the Administration Building. For each group, the stability of their interest was considered and they were further classified according to this criterion into six groups: bystanders with increased interest (25), bystanders with a stable interest (16), moderates with increased interest (40), moderates with a stable interest (17), activists with increased interest (26), and activists with stable interest (27).

The largest number in each of these groups, except bystanders and activists with increased interest, were male. Stable activists were much more likely to come from large metropolitan areas (85 percent) than stable bystanders or moderates. Compared to other groups, stable moderates were much more likely to come from Protestant and Republican backgrounds and to differ with their parents on issues of race and religion. Activists were more likely to have parents who were Jewish and Democratic. The authors argue that conflict between students and their parents "is a consequence rather than a cause of the students' activities and beliefs." They feel that the pressure is particularly intense for the moderates because these students had broken away from their backgrounds to a greater extent and thus showed more restraint in acting on their beliefs.

Bystanders were most likely to be majoring in natural science or mathematics, moderates were more often humanities majors, and activists tended to be in the social sciences. Activists excelled in measurements of intellectualism and academic achievement. Stable bystanders emerged as rather isolated individuals who did not join groups or discuss issues of national and international importance.

The semantic differential was used to assess personality characteristics of these groups. Stable bystanders were described as the prototype of the inner-directed person, concerned with issues on an intellectual level but detached and not participating. They seemed "beset by several obstacles which inhibit their acting on their beliefs," including background, social support at the university, and their personalities." Activists with an increased interest seemed, among all the groups, the most unsure and dependent, with more personal crises and problems. They also seemed involved in more temporary activity and subject to other influences. Stable activists were much more comfortable and self-confident and less inclined to focus on their personal problems. They were "characterized by an absence of obstacles which prevent them from fully acting on their beliefs." Both groups of moderates "pursue their beliefs without openly rejecting their past...a choice which involves some personal conflict."

If the best students are found in the stable activist group, the authors suggest that the answer must be found in a structural explanation of why a social system's successes lead to protests against it.

Comments:

This is an interesting study of student activism because it seeks to understand why similar attitudes held with similar degrees of intensity are not expressed in similar actions. Rather than arguing, as others have, that conflict with parents leads to radical activity as a means of rebellion, the authors contend that the probability of such conflict makes students less ready to act on their beliefs.

Certain limitations of the study must be noted. The sample includes only seniors, and thus, as the authors note, excludes other students who may have been most active in the rebellion. Since the respondents were interviewed two months after the protests, some of the responses may be subject to either faulty memory or exaggeration. The sociopolitical attitudes they expressed at the later date could also have been influenced by the event itself.

Kahn, Roger M., and William J. Bowers, "The Social Context of the Rank-
and File Student Activist: A Test of Four Hypotheses," Sociology
of Education, 43, 1970, 38-55.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Colleges of varying quality provided the locale for this study of
the activism of students. The object was to investigate characteris-
tics, such as socioeconomic background, academic commitment, major
academic field, and intellectual orientation, that in previous studies
were found associated with political activism.

The sample drawn from 97 institutions, included 946 students,
mostly seniors, who responded to mailed questionnaires in a 1966
follow-up survey of a national study of academic dishonesty done in
1963.

Activists were classified as those who answered affirmatively to
either one of these questions: "Have you ever participated in a social
protest demonstration or march?" "Have you ever violated the law in a
deliberate act of civil disobedience on behalf of a social cause?"
About one-fifth (18.7 percent of the sample) had participated in one or
both of these actions. The distribution by sex for activists and
others was not reported.

The measure of school quality was based on the proportion of ap-
plicants accepted for admission. Four categories were used: "not very
selective" (accepted 80 percent or more), "modestly selective" (accepted
50-79 percent), "highly selective" (accepted less than 50 percent),
and "top ranking" (accepted less than 50 percent and included the very
top schools in the sample). Those in the top category were identified
by a measure of their prestige as the very best schools in the nation.

Activists compared to others in the sample had more highly educated
mothers and fathers, fathers with higher occupational status, higher
family incomes, and higher scores on an index of status based on the
parents' education, the father's occupation and family income; they had
a greater academic commitment and better performance, as indicated by
longer hours of study and higher grade averages, and were more likely
to major in social science and humanities than in physical science and
preprofessional fields. They also placed more importance on intellectual
ideas and problems, the arts, and intellectual skill and knowledge, and
they scored higher on an index of intellectual orientation.

When school quality was controlled, the authors found no associa-
tion between activism and socioeconomic status. A positive association
between activism and academic commitment showed up only at the two
most highly ranked schools, where a relation was also seen between ac-
tivism and choice of the humanities and social sciences as a major.
A positive association between activism and the intellectual orientation
index was found in all the institutions. Controlling for school size
had no effect; top-ranking schools, in particular, had higher rates of

activism than the others, regardless of size.

The authors conclude: 1) activism is more frequent among students from high status families primarily because they are concentrated in the highly ranked schools and this fosters a student activist sub-culture; 2) academic performance is associated with activism only at the better institutions largely because the better students there are stimulated to think critically and are likely to come in contact with activist faculty members; 3) activist students are more common among social science and humanities majors, particularly in the better institutions because the quality of the school makes them more likely to express their critical views in social and political action; 4) students who are more intellectual feel, regardless of the quality of the institution, that they should participate actively in social and political affairs; and 5) the top-ranking schools encourage activism among their most able and intellectual students by providing a supportive climate and a symbolic and strategic target for student activists. Because these institutions play an important role in community and national affairs, they are especially vulnerable to the judgments of social critics.

Comments:

This study is useful in directing attention to the mediating role of institutions in the relation between student characteristics and activism; but the findings should be considered only suggestive. Statistical tests of the data showed that activism was not significantly related to the father's education or occupation, to academic commitment (either hours spent in study or total grade average) or to the importance students attributed to intellectual skills and knowledgeability in general. Nor was it related to the socioeconomic status of students at the highly selective schools.

It is difficult to devise a measure of school quality that appeals to everyone. But there seems little justification for using only an index of selectivity of applicants and reputation and then inferring that schools ranking highest have "the most activist faculty members," "Provide a broad and general education," and are "associated most closely with the most powerful institutions in the society." Because virtually nothing is said about other characteristics of these institutions -- auspices, geographical region, student/faculty ratios, average tuition, or total size (not just the number of undergraduates) -- it is unsafe to assert that school quality is the most important determinant.

The measurement of activism is also inadequate, since it fails to indicate whether the participation in protests reported by students occurred at the university or before, and the study does not differentiate between types of activism, issues, or the frequency of protests. It is also unfortunate that the variables were not related to race and sex.

Keniston, Kenneth and Michael Lerner, "Campus Characteristics and
Campus Unrest," The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, 395, May 1971, 39-53.

Approach: Literature Review

The authors evaluated five widespread beliefs about student activ-
ism and campus unrest, using published research on student and campus
protests: 1) campus protests are typically violent; 2) campus disci-
pline is too permissive (or repressive); 3) higher education indoctri-
nates its students; 4) American campuses have been politicized; and
5) student discontent with higher education causes unrest."

The authors found no support for the alleged frequency of violent
protests: violent campus protests were extremely rare in the period
1968-70, involving only 7 to 9 percent of college campuses, but there
has been a sharp increase recently in non-violent campus protests fo-
cused on social, political, and off-campus issues. Studies of campus
discipline show that universities frequently disciplined protesters,
but that police were usually not involved in systematic repression of
students. There is little evidence to support higher education's indoc-
trination of students: faculty leadership of violent protests was
rare and faculty members only supported the protests which were non-
violent. Most faculty members believed, however, that "campus disrup-
tions by militant students are a threat to academic freedom," and
"students who disrupt the functioning of the college should be expelled
or suspended." Allegations that universities "indoctrinate students
with a military-industrial, racist-imperialist mentality" are undermined
by research showing that students have become more open-minded, less
dogmatic in college and are hence unlikely to be indoctrinated. The
finding of faculty commitment to academic freedom and institutional
neutrality and the very small dependence by universities on military
research deny the charge of politicization of campuses. That dissatis-
faction with higher education is a cause of campus unrest is contra-
dicted most strongly by the fact that no relation between student activism
and educational dissatisfaction has been found. This conclusion is
borne out by another study, showing that after controlling for entering
freshmen's characteristics only one of 58 campus characteristics was
related to the percentage of students in antiwar protests.

Since student characteristics have been shown to be most predictive
of involvement in protest, the authors conclude that better clues to
the source of campus dissent may be found in "protest-prone" students.
In particular, they urge that students' "moral values and their percep-
tions of the world around them" are important indicators of students'
inclincation to protest.

Comments:

This article is a useful article, albeit selective, of some of the
major studies of student protests in the 1960s and 1970s. In organizing
the review of the literature around five major propositions which have

traditionally had the support of both the right and the left, the authors clarify many of the assumptions underlying these positions. Yet they fail to evaluate critically much of the research they cite, and they ignore some other factors which might account for the protests during that period.

For example, in refuting the argument that campus discipline is too repressive, they use one incident as evidence that the overwhelming majority of students involved in demonstrations met a restrained response from civil authorities. In their enthusiasm for studies of "protest-prone" students, they argue that the "best way to predict the presence or size of protests on any given campus is to study the characteristics of incoming freshmen." Yet they also admit that it is fairly easy to predict the institutions that will have war or race-related protests, but very difficult to say which individual students will be actively involved in them. In that case, we should suspect that other causes contributing to protests have been ignored, including characteristics of the universities and the larger environment.

Laufer, Robert, "Sources of Generational Consciousness and Conflict,"
    The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,
    395, May 1971, 80-97.

Approach: Descriptive

The author begins with the observation that generational conflict
is largely a middle-class phenomenon. He attributes this development
to the middle-class orientation of the new technological or "post-
industrial" society, where the middle class furnishes its academically
trained manpower and is showered with an unprecedented cornucopia of
consumer products.

Student protest against the postindustrial society is the exemplar
of contemporary generational conflict for the author, writing during
Nixon's first term. It is thus defined as intraclass conflict, since
university students, by and large, hail from the upper-middle and middle
classes. One structural precondition for such conflict is the extended
training required of the young by the new technological society; while
universities provide such training they also provide an intellectual
milieu for challenging the postindustrial ideology.

A second precondition involves a new pattern of childhood social-
ization. Current parents were indoctrinated with the mystique of upward
mobility, Laufer argues, and learned to weigh carefully the demands
of public life (institutionalized sacrifice) and private life (human
enjoyment) if they hoped to succeed. The consequent sublimation of
human impulses bred in their generation a desire for a vicarious
integrated existence through their offspring -- today's youth. But
when these youths began actually to fashion such an integrated exis-
tence for themselves, declaring that institutions conflicted with their
inner needs, their parents' generation became upset: institutions
meant security and one must put up with them.

A third precondition, according to Laufer, is the repressive reac-
tion by the parents' generation to the countercultural life flaunted
by youth, a reaction which consolidates the counterculture by forcing
it into a defensive posture. Likewise youth encounters hostility when
it tries to extend its integrated life-style into the political realm
and create change there.. The author regards the episodes at Kent
State and the Democratic National Convention in Chicago as having sig-
nificantly radicalized the young.

He concludes that student protest, changing patterns of social de-
velopment, and punitive authoritarian responses combine to create a
generational conflict of the first magnitude. Insofar as the issues
at stake remain unsolved, he fears continued conflict of an increas-
ingly bitter and violent nature.

Comments:

This article bears on no central issue. Apparently in the early
seventies everything was suffused with a special angst which itself
served as a focus, although hindsight shows the issues were there
in plenty. Most disturbing is the way in which such short-lived phe-
nomena as styles of dress and isolated political events weigh as
heavily in the analysis as presumably longer-lived phenomena like the
social ramifications of postindustrialism. The author's thesis on
changing patterns of social development would be worth looking into
if it could be rescued from the general confusion.

Levenson, Hanna and James Miller, "Multidimensional Locus of Control in
    Sociopolitical Activists of Conservative and Liberal Ideologies,"
    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 2, 1976, 199-208.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

    Three studies were conducted to examine the relationship between locus
of control (the extent to which events are seen as contingent on their
own behavior, fate, or powerful others) and sociopolitical activism while
controlling for the effects of political ideology. The locus of control
measure used was a multidimensional one designed especially to distinguish
between internal control and two types of external control: those persons
who feel that events are beyond their control and are determined by fate
or chance; and those who feel their lack of control results from the con-
trol powerful others have over them. The scales of Chance and Powerful
Others, in addition to the one for Internal Control, were expected to
clarify the relationship between activism and locus of control. Thus, it
was hypothesized that the activists in the early 1960s believed in their
own power to change society (Internal Control) whereas the activists of
the late 60s believed that the "system" had the power to control outcomes
(External Control of Powerful Others). Activists would not believe that
events were controlled by fate or chance.

    In the first study, a purposive sample of 98 male college students
(48 of whom had been identified as highly active in conservative or
liberal causes) completed an Actual Activism Scale, a measure of conserva-
tism-liberalism, and the locus of control measure. To avoid the usual
confounding of political involvement and political ideology, liberal and
conservative students were compared on the basis of their level of political
activism. It was specifically hypothesized that activist liberals would
score significantly higher on the Powerful Others scale than would activist
conservatives, because internal items on the scale are more appealing to
conservatives and those supporting a protestant ethic philosophy. As
hypothesized, highly activist liberals believed significantly more in con-
trol by powerful others than highly activist conservatives. In general,
increases in expectancies of control by powerful others were positively
associated with increases in activism for liberals; for conservatives,
activism decreased as expectancies of such control increased. It was inter-
preted that liberals perceive this power as inhibiting their rights and
potential, while conservatives tend to see power as legitimate.

    The second and third studies examined the locus of control scores for
female college students who differed in the extent of their participation
in leftist political activities. The second study compared female activists
attending an S.D.S. conference (N=9) with female political science majors
who were similar to the activists in political ideology but were inactive
(N=17). In the final study, activists in a small lesbian group (N=12)
which was actively working to change sexist laws and attitudes was compared
with a group of feminists (N=28) from a relatively inactive chapter of a
national women's liberation organization.

The findings from these later studies indicated no significant differences between activists and nonactivists on the scale, indicating that events were controlled by chance. Although the groups from Study 2 did not differ on their Internal Control scores, the activist lesbians of the third study indicated significantly less personal internal control over their lives than did the feminists. The latter finding was considered to reflect either the limited success obtained by the activist lesbians through their own efforts, or their internalization of society's negative view of homosexuals.

As for the major hypothesis, both of these studies also found significant differences in scores on the Powerful Others scale; activists expected more control by powerful others than did nonactivists.

The authors assert that the belief in control by powerful others can lead to activism because "in such situations, the potential for change with increased effort exists because the situation is relatively stable and predictable." In contrast, the belief in external control because of chance or fate would make activism frustrating and noninstrumental.

Comments:

These studies offered several research controls not employed in previous studies. Controlling for the effects of political ideology is a definite improvement over earlier studies which compared liberal activists with liberal and conservative nonactivists, or very active liberals with slightly active conservatives. The behavioral indices of activism used in the two later studies provide potentially more accurate data than that derived from the self-reported activism found in related studies. That accuracy, however, is countered by the very small sample sizes and the selection procedures used. The subjects for the second and third studies were tested as they appeared for their respective group meetings. And although they completed only the locus of control measure, with no mention made of activism or political ideology, it is possible their responses reflect the knowledge that they were being tested as members of "radical" groups.

The use of the differentiated locus of control measure is also an advantage in these studies. It is evident that the "fine tuning" of the measure increases its explanatory power, but there remains the tendency to treat locus of control as a stable trait or orientation rather than as a variable dimension of behavior. What is lacking in these and other studies is adequate attention to the situational cues that activate the various control orientations.

Lewis, Steven H. and Robert F. Kraut, "Correlates of Student Political
     Activism and Ideology," Journal of Social Issues, 28, 4, Fall,
     1970, 131-150.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

     In the fall of 1960, a group of randomly selected Yale freshmen
were mailed questionnaires as part of the first stage of a longitudinal
panel study designed to explore political development in college. The
sample of 400 students (from a class of 1,250) was reduced to 164 by a
response rate of 55% and the exclusion of data from women and nonwhites.
Most of the 400-item questionnaire (one hour to complete) was devoted
to statements of personal political belief. Also included were socio-
demographic items, the New Left Scale, an alienation measure, versions
of the Machiavellianism (Mach IV) and Social Desirability (SD) scales,
and adjective checklists describing self and ideal-self. To assess stu-
dent political belief, the Left-Right Ideology Scale was developed from
high factor loadings on the political items; students were then divided
into quartiles (conservative, moderate, liberal, and radical) on the
basis of mean scores on this nine-item scale. The measure of political
activism (active/nonactive) was the student's (single-item) global esti-
mate of the extent of his high school political activism. No demograph-
ic variables distinguished between groups of students differing on
ideology or activism. A strong relationship was found between student
political ideology and parental political beliefs. Leftists, activistic
or not, reported significantly more personal and political conflict with
their parents than did rightists. Democratic and permissive upbringing
was not found to be related to political activism or radical ideology.
Other findings were: leftists emphasize humanism and idealism while
rightists emphasize stability and responsibility; leftists describe
themselves as being and wanting to be different from others; radicals
and liberals are more likely to have no religion or to be indifferent
to it. Student activism was found to be associated with the importance
to the parents of political concerns to and with frequency of family
political discussions. Finally, activists scored lower on the Machiavel-
lianism scale, and had lower self-ideal-self discrepancies than did non-
activists.

Comments
     Yale is an elite university which may have a highly homogeneous
population; the questionanire moreover was excessively lengthy and appar-
ently complex which may have been the reason for the low response rate.
The measure of political activism was inadequate because it reflected
only high school activism.

Lewis, Jerry, "Review Essay: The Telling of Kent State," Social Problems,
19, 2, Fall 1971, 267-79.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

This article reviews ten books written shortly after the May
1970 riots at Kent State which resulted in the death of several student
demonstrators. The author then analyzes the events according to the
perspectives outlined in the accounts.

Coverage of the incident included the report of the President's
Commission, presenting the results of investigations by one hundred
FBI agents, a report by I.F. Stone, a series of articles by James
Michener for the Reader's Digest, articles in the Knight newspapers,
and a book by Davies. Only one of the writers was a behavioral scien-
tist. All of them focused on the students, the administration, the
National Guard, and -- to a lesser extent -- the general public.
James Michener, who lived in Kent from August to November 1970, also
wrote a long book about the tragedy, which Lewis includes in his
review.

Lewis notes that all the writers asked the same questions. How
many students were involved and did they have a right to be there?
No author asked whether the Guard, which had taken over the campus on
orders from the mayor, had a right to be there. What was the influence
of radical students? Little. Few were even there; yet most of
the general public blamed the radical students rather than the Guard.
Did the Guard use proper crowd control procedures? No. What was the
effect of the continuing student-Guard interaction? The Guard was
sent by the governor at the mayor's request; university officials had
not approved this action. Most authors concluded that the "ineptness
of the Guard was beyond belief." Did the university president respond
adequately? More or less. How was the faculty involved? Letters
to the editor in the school paper showed that radical faculty members
stimulated students but were not "agitators." How did the public
react to the shootings? According to letters to local papers, there
was tremendous public hostility toward the students.

Lewis also looks at the motives of the different authors. He
notes that I.F. Stone criticized the Scranton Commission Report; and
he himself criticizes others among the selected works as "too journal-
istic." Yet he also complains that too many of the authors interpreted
the "facts" for the reader and that none of the books succeeded in
conveying an understanding of this event and "its enormous social and
political implications. This is a challenge to sociology."

Comments:

Although this is a purely descriptive, nonempirical study, it
nevertheless represents an important approach to the events at Kent

State, going beyond the motives of the participants or their demographic characteristics and looking at reactions to the disorder. Lewis doesn't stress this point, but these books clearly fail to analyze how the political forces of the mayor, the governor and the university officials interacted to bring the Guard on campus. By not asking the relevant questions, the authors in effect deny the importance of this issue. A line of research which deserves more attention is how the media portray an event and to what extent they create conditions favoring a repetition of such incidents.

Lewis, Jerry, "A Study of the Kent State Incident Using Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior," Sociological Inquiry, 42, 2, 1972, 87-96.

Approach: Theoretical

The author, who personally witnessed the Kent State shootings, describes them in the light of Smelser's series of five increasingly all-encompassing ("value additive") principles: structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth of a generalized hostile belief, mobilization of participants for action, and finally, the control of hostile outbursts. The presence of the National Guard was structurally conducive to a hostile outburst on the part of the students; their continuing presence created strain which increased the likelihood of an outburst; these factors contributed to the formation of a generalized hostile belief toward the Guard; the generalized belief in turn encouraged a group of students to aggressively mobilize and actually pursue Guard members; all of the preceding constituted the context in which a control response could (and did) occur. The author concludes that he found Smelser's theory "extremely useful in organizing the large body of information that has been generated by the Kent State episode."

Comments:

This article is a sorry piece of work. Its conclusion reveals the mind-set of the author, who is more concerned with filing events in their proper Smelserian drawers than with conducting any analysis by means of, or evaluation of, Smelser's theory. The hopelessly stilted formality of the writing throughout signals the author's failure to work things through for himself, to accomplish anything other than a drowsy recitation of Smelser's ideas.

Lewis, Jerry M. and Raymond J. Adamek, "Anti-R.O.T.C. Sit-in: A
    Sociological Analysis," Sociological Quarterly, 15, 1974, 542-47.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

    This study compared the social characteristics, political activ-
ities and past involvement in protests of participants and nonpartici-
pants in a nonviolent, anti-R.O.T.C. sit-in at Kent State University.
It also examines the effect of social control measures used to end
the protest. Survey data were collected from 116 undergraduate stu-
dents who were arrested at the sit-in, and from a random sample of
273 juniors and seniors, whose class standing made it likely that
they had experienced the violence two years earlier, in May 1970.
Interviews with participants in the sit-in were based on the same
questionnaire that was mailed to nonparticipants.

    The sociodemographic data indicated that those who participated
were more likely than the others to be male, social science or humanities
majors, to be Jewish or with no religious affiliation, to call them-
selves politically radical, and to have mothers enjoying a higher status
in their occupations. The two groups were similar in their financial
dependence on parents, the total income of their parents, and the
education attained by their parents.

    If students participated in a sit-in where arrest was a possibility,
the authors assumed that they would be more likely to have engaged in a
wide variety of political activities and protests than students who
had never taken part in such a sit-in. Political activity was defined
as work on a project to help the poor or disadvantaged, service as an
officer of a social action organization, work in a political campaign,
or support for a cause by canvassing or petitioning. Actions classed
as protests were attending a rally or meeting to protest public policy,
picketing or marching on behalf of a cause, engaging in civil dis-
obedience with or without risking arrest, and violent or nonviolent
confrontation with authorities.

    Sit-in participants indicated more political and protest activity
than nonparticipants both before and after the Kent State shootings
of May 4, 1970. Moreover, participants reported a significant increase
in both protests and political activities after that date. While no
significant changes were found in the political activity of nonparti-
cipants before and after the shootings, their participation in such
protests as attending rallies, picketing, engaging in acts of civil
disobedience (without arrest), marching, and in nonviolent confron-
tations became more frequent after the shootings.

    The second major hypothesis was that students who were directly
exposed to violent control by the police, National Guard, or other
authority, would be more likely to join in a sit-in at the risk of
arrest than students not so exposed. A higher proportion of participants

reported such exposure than nonparticipants, and more participants in
the sit-in reported demonstrating at the May 4, 1970 shootings than
was true of nonparticipants. From this the authors concluded that
"exposure to social control violence served to stiffen the demonstrators'
commitment against the war, and in this instance, to accept the dis-
cipline of nonviolence."

Comments:

Critical problems in the sampling design of this study limit its
credibility. The sample of "nonparticipants" consists of juniors and
seniors who responded to a mailed questionnaire and who presumably
were not arrested during the sit-in. The "participants" were mostly
freshmen and sophomores who were interviewed after being arrested.
The response rates in the two samples differed considerably, as did
other relevant characteristics such as age and grade point average.
Moreover, the authors give little information about the actions of
"nonparticipants" at the time, except that they were not arrested.
Conceivably, like most of those involved in the sit-in, they could have
taken part and then left in time to avoid arrest.

Using respondents' reports of their own activity at the Kent
State shootings two years before the sit-in as one of the major indica-
tors of exposure to violent control measures was also extremely mis-
leading since few respondents were present at the earlier event.

McPhail, Clark, "Student Walkout: A Fortuitous Examination of Elementary
   Collective Behavior," Social Problems, 16, 4, 1969, 441-55.

Approach: Theoretical/Empirical
Methodology: Case Study

   This paper attempts a short-cut approach to social behavior across
substantively different areas. Blumer and others distinguish routine
social behavior from crowd behavior. The former occurs "because people
have common understandings and expectations." The latter arises "spon-
taneously and is not due to preestablished understandings or traditions."
It lacks "any intricate organization."

   McPhail questions whether "different principles of explanation are
required for the substantively different patterns which may be observed
in collective versus routine social behavior settings." Ten minutes
before the end of his sociology class all but two of his 25 students
walked out. Later he collected statements from most of the students,
and he uses these to illustrate nonroutine collective behavior: 1) par-
ticipants fit together a routine sequence of behavior; 2) they then de-
flect that sequence; 3) finally they try to resolve the problematic
sequence of behavior.

   McPhail develops the following fundamental principles which apply
to the way social behavior is produced, maintained, and altered in
routine and collective settings.

   1. New lines of coordinated behavior are begun in response to the
       deflection of previous lines of behavior and to proposals and
       organizational efforts by at least some participants. New
       coordinated behavior always involves a new or different sequence
       of behavior, skill, and knowledge. In this example, McPhail
       himself had mentioned an experiment in which a lecturer had left
       the classroom in mid-sentence. Later several students discussed
       among themselves the possibility of staging a walkout.

   2. The development and implementation of a new coordinated behavior
       requires a new relationship among participants, and this is
       established by the participants themselves. In this case, a
       senior sociology student was designated the leader, and the
       professor was to be the object of the new behavior.

   3. The success of a new line of coordinated conduct is directly
       related to the participants' commitment to it. When some are not
       deflected from the chosen course, the likelihood of compliance
       by the others increases. As more students expressed a commitment
       to walk out, and each deflection from challenge or dissent oc-
       curred, the action was increasingly viewed as legitimate.

   4. When people commit themselves to a coordinated action but do
       not specify procedures for synchronizing their actions, no
       coordinated action can develop. In this example, the class
       had agreed to a walkout, but had not agreed on a time.

5. A new line of conduct toward someone not involved in its proposal and organization is helped if the person continues to perform an old action or makes a disorganized response to the new behavior. The professor's confusion at the start of the walkout served to synchronize the students' new behavior.

Comments:

This is an extremely interesting article and may illustrate the "emergent relationships/established norms" in Weller and Quarantelli's model of collective behavior ("Neglected Characteristics of Collective Behavior," AJS, 39, 3, 1973).

Meier, Harold C. and G. William, "Student Legitimation of Campus
      Activism: Some Survey Findings," Social Problems, 19, 1970, 181-92.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

      The authors' aim in investigating the activism among students at
the University of New Mexico was to isolate some of the factors that
might account for students' approval or disapproval of activism. The
variables that previous studies had found to be associated with student
protesters were assumed to be also associated with the legitimation
of protests.

      Four systematic samples of undergraduates (n=672) were surveyed
during 1969-70. Questionnaires made up of twelve items furnished
the basis for a scale of student activism legitimacy (SAL). Respondents
scoring in the two highest categories of five scale types were designated
as "legitimators," as opposed to "nonlegitimators," whose scores were
in the low and middle ranges of the scale. The SAL score measured
attitudes about such questions as the role of student protest, charac-
teristics of protesters, university authority, and responses by the
university to protest. "Legitimators" were students who indicated
approval of student activists and what they did, or disapproval of the
role of the university or its authority.

      In contrast to findings pertaining to activists, data on legiti-
mators showed no significant relations to social class, sex, or parents'
education, but other variables provided a pattern like that found for
activists. Thus, legitimation of activism was found to be associated
with: 1) peers as reference groups rather than parents; 2) educational
goals not oriented to income or status; 3) a choice of academic rather
than vocational curricula; and 4) highly secular rather than religious
leanings.

      The influence of peers in relation to activism was assessed by
asking whether it would be harder to bear parents' or friends' dis-
approval if the student considered joining an organization approved by
one but not the other. Those scoring high on the SAL were more oriented
toward their peers than their parents. Educational goals were classi-
fied according to whether they emphasized income and status mobility,
vocational self-fulfillment rewards, or humanistic and intellectual
rewards. Students who approved of activism were likely to have human-
istic and liberal goals. Academic fields such as the humanities,
and the natural and behavioral sciences were clearly favored by those
approving of activism. "Legitimators" were likely to have no religious
or Christian beliefs, but Roman Catholics who attended church infre-
quently were as likely to be in the legitimator group as students
professing no religious faith.

      Findings related to sex showed that male "legitimators" were
likely to have an A or B grade-point average and also to have Spanish
surnames, probably because of the university's location in New Mexico

and the emergence of local Mexican-American action groups. Among females, legitimation of student activism was highest among those attending college away from home, living in unsupervised residences, having nontraditional educational goals and choices of subjects, avoiding conventional campus organizations and extracurricular activities, and revealing alienation from organized religion.

The authors summarize their results by suggesting that "for students of both sexes, activism orientation (legitimation) is strongly related to alienation from institutional authority, freedom from or evasion of traditional controls, strong peer reinforcement, and in intellectual or humanistic orientation to education -- and by implication to life in general."

Comments:

Data are reported for "legitimators" only (n=139); the other three types are not described or discussed. The findings here parallel those obtained in several other studies; the essential difference is that the contrast between approval and disapproval was substituted for that between participants in protests and nonparticipants. This substitution brings out a finding for women: although they are less likely to be student activists than their male peers, they appear to be just as approving of activism. The authors do not try to explain why no relation is found between approval of activism and the parents' social status and education. Since the student activism legitimacy scale is merely a variation on the measures developed by other studies of student activism, the importance of parents' social status and education would be expected to be considered here. Multivariate partition analysis was used effectively in exploring the interactions of the major variables.

Ong, Walter, "Agonistic Structures in Academia: Past to Present," Daedalus,
    Vol. 1, Fall 1974, 229-38.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Observation

        Walter Ong is a cultural historian. He is especially interested in the
psychological and sociological changes occurring as techniques of managing
knowledge have evolved from the orgal mode to the written, and now to the elec-
tronic. In all his published writings he shows how modes of storage and re-
trieval not only support civilization, but also serve individual consciousness.

        This article brings his unique perspective to bear on the campus upheavals
of the 1960s. Surprisingly, he believes that the struggle within the academic
world did not begin in the 1960s, but rather that it disappeared; the primary,
of seldom articulated, object of protests in this period was the final dismant-
ling of the traditional combative or agonistic mode of education.

        According to Ong, agonistic education grew out of the need of early cul-
tures to repeat the cliches and formulas which comprised all that was known.
The oral mode, says Ong, demanded virtuoso feats of memory and oration, which
in turn dictated a system of competitive performances -- a dialectical version
of the athletic contest. It also fostered an extreme conservatism with regard
to the known, since "knowledge in an oral culture is managed and manageable
only if formulas are kept relatively rigid and unchanged: otherwise it is dis-
torted and vanishes." Oral cultures therefore encourage agonistic perfor-
mance "with a single-minded intensity sure to affect formal schooling when
it finally begins."

        Having shown that formal education at its inception was vitally linked
to the oral agonistic tradition, Ong goes on to show how that was inherently
masculine, and how as a result education was initially tailored to male speci-
fications. Physically, Ong points out, "the typical male voice can articulate
words in far greater volume than the typical female voice." Before electronic
amplification, women were incapable of delivering the bellowing orations that
enabled males to dominate audiences of hundreds or even thousands and thus
to succeed in the civic roles their education prepared them to play. "A
second connection between masculinity and oral polemic," says Ong, "is psy-
chological or psycho-physiological. This is the connection via ceremonial
combat...(which) not only among human beings but pretty well through the whole
animal kingdom, is significantly, and often spectacularly, more the business
of males than of females." In the various male arenas -- military, athletic,
academic -- the insecurity of males, resulting not only from their biological
expendability but also from their psychological need to reject the female,
nurturing environment, worked itself out in the ceremonial struggle of males
with males. The ceremonial nature of these different conflicts becomes
clear, says Ong, when one considers a critical aspect of gaming common to all:
the recognition of the sanctity of surrender, of stepping out of bounds.

        Yet in the 1960s, he says, faculty members found that they could no
longer simply withdraw from their involvement with students by retreating into
their private lives: "Combat had moved from the ceremonial arena and had be-
come an ad hominem attack, in which the attacker pursued his opponent anywhere

and everywhere." Students were largely unaware that their contentiousness in itself was not so revolutionary as their refusal to respect the traditional rules of the game. Ong concludes with the suggestion that "connections between the campus crisis and women's liberation movements were more direct, and at the same time more profound and veiled, than many have made them out to be."

Comment:

Even though this approach involves social structures which are deeply buried in the past and in the collective unconscious, the link that Ong sees between student and feminist movements seems an extremely promising way of bridging what has been a conspicuous gap in the study of social movements.

Rogers, Evan, "Intelligence and Student Political Activism," Social Science
    Quarterly, 53, 3, December 1972, 557-62.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

    "A positive correlation between intellectual ability and leftist
ideology is an empirically well established generalization." Following
Seymour Lipset's critique of this generalization on the grounds that only
Left-oriented activists are compared to the general student population,
Rogers explores the possibility that activism itself is positively related
to intelligence by defining four categories of student activism--Right,
Right Center, Left Center, and Left--and comparing the intelligence of
students in each of these categories to that of the general student popula-
tion. Activists were identified as all elected office-holders in 39 stu-
dent political organizations at the University of Minnesota over a 10-year
period from 1955-1964. Intelligence was defined in terms of performance
on standard college entrance examinations like the SAT and ACT; altogether
nine ability variables were measured. The potential problem of unequal
representation of ideological positions (only 2 groups were considered
rightist, whereas 13 were termed leftist) was handled by independent var-
iance analysis for each of the four ideological categories on each of the
nine variables; variance was found to be negligible, and the author reports
that there were no significant differences in intellectual ability among
groups of different ideological persuasion. Finally, the author concludes
that activism in general is positively related to intelligence--"political
activists as a whole have higher average scores than approximately 70-75%
of all entering freshmen"--thus affirming Lipset's critique.

Comments:

    Although the effort to substantiate Lipset's critique seems worthwhile,
the presence of only two rightest groups (as opposed to 13 leftist groups)
among the total 39 organizations is curious in a study critical of the
predominantly leftist orientation of prior studies. Granting the scarcity
of rightist organizations, the study should have been extended beyond the
University of Minnesota so as to include more of them; variance analysis
alone is an unconvincing way to bolster such a small sample.

    More generally, the criterion of political activism (formal office-
holding) may exclude some of the most committed activists--as well as
persons who hold offices in nonstudent organizations.

Salter, Brian, "Explanations of Student Unrest: An Exercise in Deval-
uation," British Journal of Sociology, 24, 3, 1973, 329-40.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Criticism

This author argues that social scientists have by and large sought
to "explain away" student unrest in the 1960s, analyzing the social and
psychological circumstances to avoid dealing with the ideological impe-
tus behind the movement. The author presents and then criticizes five
common arguments used to explain student unrest:

1) The multiversity argument: The increasingly bureaucratic
character of modern universities has alienated students and thrown them
into confusion. The solution is to compensate by giving students greater
access to the university's resources -- faculty, libraries, laboratories.
The author criticizes this argument on the grounds that it focuses solely
on the machinery of the university and excludes the possibility that
students were also reacting to society as a whole. He also cites evi-
dence that support for demonstrations was not related to feelings of
dissatisfaction with the university.

2) The adolescence argument: According to this argument student
protests and panty raids are on the same level and have the same cause
-- adolescent exuberance. A variant, which emphasizes the need for
public exhibition, is likewise a reductive approach, denying larger sig-
nificance to the unrest.

3) The "permissive family socialization" argument: Salter con-
siders R. Flack's conclusion in Psychology Today (October 1967) that an
"egalitarian, permissive, democratic, and individuating" family environ-
ment produced many student activists too vague. He notes that other
writers (Miller and Swanson in The Changing American Parent) thought
permissiveness and egalitarianism would produce a generation of docile,
well-adjusted workers in the 1960s.

4) The issues argument: According to this view, student activism
is a transitory response to specific stimuli (the civil rights issue,
Vietnam) and cannot outlive those stimuli. Salter concedes that the
argument is largely true, but says it nonetheless misrepresents the case
because the issues may serve to focus a broad and more permanent dis-
content.

5) The conspiracy argument: Seymour Martin Lipset suggests that
creative intellectuals in the liberal arts, particularly graduate stu-
dents, are made insecure by their marginal social position and uncer-
tainties about their careers. They consequently tend to blame the
world for their problems and this attitude is nurtured by extremists on
campus. Salter also calls this approach reductive: it denies that
activists exercise free will and that the protest movement has any
ideological content of its own.

Each of these arguments, according to the author, is based on objective or external aspects of the protests; in one way or another each sets forth conditions preceding the beliefs in question. But any complete sociological explanation of human behavior must take into some account the beliefs which are enacted in behavior; and that requires some sort of internal approach -- some willingness to dwell in the belief, to see through the eyes of the believer. Salter offers Max Weber's concept of "understanding," closely akin to Michael Polanyi's notion of "indwelling" as the missing ingredient that will correct the weakness.

Comments:

More could have been done to document the arguments Salter criticized, but his article as a whole is incisive and its conclusion well taken.

Scott, Joseph W. and Mohamed El-Assal, "Multiversity, University Size, University Quality and Student Protest: An Empirical Study," American Sociological Review, 34, October 1969, 709-09; see also, Dunlap, Riley, "A Comment on 'Multiversity, University Size, University Quality and Student Protest: An Empirical Study," by Scott and El-Assal; Roos, Philip, "A Comment on 'Student Protest'"; and Scott, Joseph, "A Rejoinder to Dunlap and Roos," American Sociological Review. 35, 3, 1970, 525-30.

Approach:
Methodology:

Abstract:

The study attempts to test the hypothesis that the more nearly a university constitutes a "multiversity," the higher the rate of protest demonstrations. Multiversities are characterized by complex formal structures and a socially heterogeneous student body, both of these leading to structural separations among the various segments of the community. Under these conditions, the authors believe, students will be more likely to "feel separated, neglected, manipulated, and dehumanized to the extent that they will engage in protest activities."

A purposive sample of 104 state-supported colleges and universities was selected, reflecting a diversity of size of institutions, resident communities, and geographical region. On the basis of secondary sources, sociodemographic profiles were compiled for each school, as well as a list of the number and types of demonstrations each experienced in 1964 and 1965. Questionnaires were sent to the dean of students and the editor of the school newspaper at each school to ascertain characteristics of the demonstrations; these had a response rate of 66 percent.

The independent variable, "multiversity," was measured through a composite index combining structural complexity and social heterogeneity. In general a school that was considered complex (a multiversity) was above the median in these categories: the number of departments granting doctoral, master's, bachelor's, and professional degrees; the number of students living off campus; the number of outstate, foreign, and graduate students; and the ratio of professors to students. The dependent variable was the number of demonstrations (an undefined term). Intervening variables included: the size of the school measured by the number of full-time students; the quality of the students, based on the ratio of library books to students, the percentage of faculty members with doctoral degrees, and the percentage of graduates receiving scholarships and honors; and the size of the community.

Complex schools that had 10,000 students or more and were located in large or medium sized communities had disproportionately more demonstrations than those ranking lowest. Regardless of complexity, all the large schools except one reported having had some demonstrations, but most small complex schools also had demonstrations. Complexity was important in both large and small communities, regardless of the school's quality. Using both nonparametric and stepwise regression analysis, the authors found that school size was the most important predictor of the number of demonstrations, because "it seems to give rise to those structural and social features which lead us to term an institution...a multiversity."

Comments:

This is a significant effort to account for the institutional char-
acteristics that are associated with protest and militant behavior
by the use of both structural and contextual analyses. The measure-
ment of key variables like "quality of the university," "multiversity,"
and protest demonstrations, however, presents serious problems. For
example, why should colleges with a greater ratio of professors to
students be considered more like a multiversity than those with a
lower ratio? Moreover, only the number of protest demonstrations -- not
the duration, seriousness, or type -- was used as the dependent var-
iable, despite the fact that extensive data were presumably collected
on all of these indicators. No indication is given that validity
checks were made on the multiple reports by respondents to question-
naires and secondary sources. Although the basic argument is that the
conditions of the multiversity lead students to feel alienated and
hence to protest, no evidence is furnished to relate these demonstrations
to campus conditions or to show that the protesting students actually
felt alienated.

Thistlewhaite, Donald L., "Impact of Disruptive External Events on Students' Attitudes," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 2, August 1974, 228-42.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

The Cambodian incursion, the deaths at Kent State University, and the Jackson State College shootings were reference points in this attempt to see how such events affect the frequency of protest demonstrations and the attitudes of college students. Questionnaires, which had been mailed to students in 1969, one year before these events, were used as Wave 1. Two more sets were mailed: one immediately after the events, Wave 2, 1970; and one a year after, Wave 3, 1971. The sample comprised randomly chosen male freshmen and juniors from 25 public and private universities in various parts of the country.

Trend analyses revealed a peak in campus protest or demonstrations in Wave 2. The goals of these protests, when classified, showed that incidents related to minority and student-administration issues peaked with Wave 1; those related to war and the military peaked with Wave 2. Participation by respondents themselves in campus demonstrations and activity on behalf of social issues also peaked with Wave 2. Three-fourths of the freshmen and two-thirds of the juniors reported some participation in such activities during the 1969-70 academic year; but only about 9 percent had actually "helped to plan and organize the actions."

College Press and Attitudes Scales, where subjects characterized the attitudes of teachers (Faculty Press) and peers (Student Press), as well as their own (Attitudes Scale), were used on a 5-point (Likert) rating scale. Factor analyses were performed on scale intercorrelations to identify factor clusters.

Marked increases in pacifist attitudes occurred, particularly among freshmen, from Wave 1 to Wave 2. The authors note the possible influence of the Vietnam war as well as the rise in conservatism. Peaks in civil rights scales and in campus demonstrations related to minority groups occurred in Wave 2. Political participation also peaked in Wave 2. The authors suggest that if this peaking was due to the November 1970 elections, the same thing would have occurred in Wave 3.

According to the scales, students' orientation toward science and practical matters, affluent jobs and interest in preparation for jobs, decreased from Wave 1 to Wave 2, but feelings of alienation and interest in social issues peaked. Since the faculty were considered especially sympathetic during Wave 2, the authors suggest that many faculty members increased their rapport with students as a result of these disruptive events. By Wave 3, there seemed to be a return to "business as usual": attitude and press scores leveled and campus demonstrations dwindled.

According to a test-retest product moment correlation coefficient for each class during the 1-year and 2-year intervals, scores were relatively predictable on the basis of Wave 1 scores, with juniors exhibiting more stability in attitudes and reported press than freshmen.

The authors conclude that since most of the scales showing score variation were highly significant, the events did affect the attitudes and press of students. They also believe these effects were relatively transient, given the V and inverted-V trends noted (e.g., political participation), and that the test-retest product moment correlation coefficient results showed individual differences to be stable enough to be considered fairly permanent.

Comments:

Because the universities in the sample had at least 5,000 students, generalizations apply only to institutions of this size; smaller universities or colleges might differ both in the characteristics of their students and the influence exerted by distant events. Sampling procedures also introduce some biases. The sample is limited to males who were freshmen or juniors in 1968-69. Moreover, only about 36 percent of the questionnaires mailed as Wave 1 were returned, creating a base sample of 1,036 respondents. The researchers were unable to determine the nature or extent of the resulting bias, but comparisons of the responses suggested that subjects who completed all three waves were probably more conservative than those who did not.

The authors made consistently detailed attempts to measure the reliability of the measures and paid attention to the use and development of scales showing evidence of validity in past studies. Unfortunately they did not measure the degree to which respondents were actually aware of or impressed by these three events or others such as recent elections or the Vietnam War, which may also have affected them. One must therefore be cautious in attributing the changes in attitudes to these particular incidents. Finally, the authors tell us nothing about how these changes may have occurred -- through the influence of peers, in response to sentiments on other campuses, as a consequence of news stories, etc.

Trent, James W. and Judith L. Craise, "Commitment and Conformity
in the American College," Journal of Social Issues, 23, 3,
1967, 34-51.

Approach: Empirical/Prescriptive
Methodology: Review of Literature

The major thesis of this paper is that the intense political
activism recently observed on some campuses is not pervasive and repre-
sents only a small proportion of college students in the United States.
Further, they say that most students today manifest in large measure
the apathy and conformity that have characterized students of the
past, rather than the kind of commitment and autonomy that leads to
political activism or serious social and political activism. The
authors believe intellectual involvement to be a healthy departure
from commonly accepted goals and norms.

This article is based in part on research on college students
generally, including work by others as well as the authors' own study
of nearly 10,000 who were interviewed first in 1959, as high school
graduates, and again in 1963. Findings showed the typical college
students to be nonactivists, to have very little political interest
or sophistication, and to be largely satisfied with their college exper-
ience and not concerned about social or religious issues. Research
more closely directed toward activists involved a sample of Free
Speech members who risked arrest and a representative group of Berkeley
students who were seniors at that time. Using the Omnibus Personality
Inventory to compare their national sample of students with the
Berkeley seniors and the Free Speech members, the authors found that
the activist members of the Free Speech Movement had unusually high
scores on intellectualism and autonomy, although they also showed
high degrees of anxiety.

Other studies of activist students have found them to be not only
highly autonomous and intellectually disposed but also to be more often
in the humanities and social sciences rather than technical fields and
education. The activists, regardless of major, were most likely to be
students at a few select liberal arts colleges and universities.

The authors' national sample also disclosed that students who had
been in college for the entire four years between 1959 and 1963 showed
significantly greater intellectual disposition and autonomy (even if
this growth was not exceptional). Those who took jobs after high
school tended to have regressed on both of those counts during the four
year period. "Therefore...college does have some bearing on personal-
ity development, particularly on those traits which, to a more intense
degree, characterize student activists."

Comments:

In their view that student activism is characteristic of only a
small minority, but that these are the "cream of the crop," the authors

are primarily concerned with personality traits as evidence and fail
to discuss more concrete manifestations of intellectual disposition
and autonomy, such as grades, productive accomplishment, or social
development. Moreover they do not explore in any depth the character-
istics of the colleges themselves or the fields of study that might
be associated with activism. Nor do they discuss the extent to which
activism is a result of self-selection or socialization.

Waters, Carrie Wherry, "Comparison of Protesting and Non-protesting
    Students," Psychological Reports, 33, 1973, 543-47.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

    This study, comparing characteristics of student protesters and non-
protesters to determine whether the two groups resembled those found in
earlier research on student activism in the 1960s began after the re-
search site (a midwestern state-supported school with 18,000 students)
was temporarily closed as a result of several incidents of "protesting
or rioting on the part of a small segment of the student body." Protests
expressed resistance to "fee increases, complaints about ROTC, dissatis-
faction with war, (and) felt comradeship with student 'causes' at other
universities." Some of those involved in the protests were arrested or
disciplined by the university.

    The protest sample included 127 students identified in some cases
from photographs; of these 96 were arrested and 31 disciplined by the
university. Using official data on 23 variables assessing personal
adjustment, ability and achievement, and family, biographical, and
college-related factors, the author found that the protest sample, com-
pared with the control sample, did not show significant differences in
ability but did show lower in high school and college achievement;
and a higher socioeconomic level. The protest group had a higher propor-
tion of out-of-state and Jewish students and more students from fine arts
and government or history than from business, education, engineering
and science. More students in the protest group had a history of past
university disciplinary offenses, and a greater number had obtained per-
sonal counseling. Concluding that these protesters, unlike those fre-
quently described in the literature, were not brighter and more achieve-
ment-oriented than their peers, the author suggests that they should be
termed "alienated" rather than "activist," using Keniston's definitions,
because they were likely to be disturbed psychologically and were less
committed to academic values and intellectual achievement than the non-
protesters."

Comments:

    The findings of this study must be considered tentative, at best,
because of some critical methodological problems and inadequate reporting
of procedures. How the protest sample was drawn or how well it represented
the actual participants in these different events is not shown. Since
there was no attempt to validate the official classifications by self-
report data on participation, many of these "protesters" may have been
merely bystanders or not present at all (especially when identification
was from photographs). The types of protest in which they "participated"
were not differentiated or identified. Members of the control sample
may have also engaged in these protests without being arrested, disci-
plined, or photographed. The overrepresentation in the protest sample
(and thus also in the control sample) of male underclassmen is atypical
of what has been found in previous studies and may also limit the general
validity of the findings.

Waters considers the protesters "alienated" primarily because they were more often subject to university discipline and because they more frequently sought personal counseling. They were selected as protesters in part because they were disciplined by the university, however, and the article does not describe the nature of the offense. Clearly, therefore, these variables do not necessarily indicate maladjustment or alienation. University discipline might have resulted from the protests themselves. Furthermore, the article does not reconcile with the absence of a significant relationship between protest behavior and high school counselor's recommendations regarding emotional stability or the need for vocational counseling. Perhaps because her bibliography and review of the literature are inadequate, the author overemphasizes the differences between her findings and those of previous researchers in this area. Actually only about half of her findings are inconsistent with previous research on activism and these may be a function of methodological problems rather than actual differences in student protesters.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Black Activism

Abeles, Ronald, "Relative Deprivation, Rising Expectations, and Black
Militancy," Journal of Social Issues, 32, 2, 1976, 119-37.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Using secondary analysis of data collected in the late 1960s in
Cleveland, Ohio, and Miami, Florida, Abeles investigated the relationship
of relative deprivation and rising expectations to two types of black
militancy. Black militancy is defined as "a cluster of attitudes cen-
tering around the rejection of the traditional, passive and subordinate
Negro role and around demands for more black control over the destiny of
black people." Two fundamentally different types of militancy are
distinguished: "moving towards the oppressor" (seeking equal treatment,
integration, and civil rights nonviolently); and "moving against the
oppressor" (seeking equal treatment but ambivalence toward integration
and use of both violent and nonviolent tactics).

A random sample of 400 black males and females residing in Cleveland's
poverty zones were interviewed in the spring of 1969, and 530 residents
of three predominantly black districts in and adjacent to Miami were
surveyed in the spring of 1968. In Cleveland the measure of militancy
consisted of attitudes of "moving against the oppressor," while militancy
in Miami was measured more in the sense of "moving toward the oppressor."
There were also differences in the ways in which the concepts of rela-
tive deprivation (both personal and fraternal) and rising expectations
were measured.

In Cleveland, militancy was most strongly correlated with a per-
ceived discrepancy between "well-educated blacks" and other groups, par-
ticularly between well-educated blacks and "white collar workers" and
"professionals." In the author's view this means that fraternal relative
deprivation was more critical than personal relative deprivation in
causing militancy. If a respondent believed that another group's economic
gains were merited, he was likely to be militant; those who felt that
they had made few gains in the past were also likely to feel such mili-
tancy. Younger and male respondents were more militant than their female
counterparts. All of the independent variables placed in a path anal-
ysis accounted for about 18 percent of the variance in militancy in
this sample.

In Miami, fraternal relative deprivation was not measured, but per-
sonal relative deprivation was not related to militancy. Respondents
who felt that whites and Cubans were doing better than they were, however,
were more militant than those who felt that blacks or unspecified groups
were better off. If they disapproved of the "better off group," they
were also more militant. Respondents who had made moderate gains or who
expected to make such gains were more likely to be militant than those
who had made or expected to make small or large gains. A variety of
other variables such as age, sex, education, income, and employment
status were significantly related to militancy, and the path analysis
accounted for about 22 percent of the variance.

Because the mediating role of relative deprivation and rising expectations was not as powerful as anticipated, the author suggests their role as causes of militancy changes as a function of the success and popularity of a social movement. Perhaps they are important during the early stages, spurring on the movement's initiators. But as the movement grows and gains acceptance, its ideology is transferred to new members and to the general public through socialization and diffusion of norms. Relative deprivation and rising expectations might continue to predispose some individuals toward militancy, but these other factors would become increasingly more dominant as the movement becomes more and more successful. Relative deprivation and rising expectations may thus explain the participation of leaders but not followers who learn attitudes through socialization from the elite opinion leaders.

Comments:

As the author admits, methodological problems with the data may partly explain the low correlation between militancy and relative deprivation and rising expectations. The measure of rising expectations is particularly lacking because it does not tap the discrepancy between aspirations and achievements; and the measures of militancy (though not specified) appear to be entangled with measures of relative deprivation.

Coles, Robert, "Social Struggle and Weariness," Psychiatry, Vol. XXVII,
    1964; reprinted in B. McLaughlin, Studies in Social Movements,
    New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Approach: Clinical
Methodology: Case Study

    The author describes here his experiences as a psychiatrist treat-
ing members of the civil rights movement who were suffering from depres-
sion and fatigue. Coles lived in the South and worked with civil rights
demonstrators during the 1960s. His primary interest is in how members
of the civil rights movement managed the stresses of being part of a
full-scale social struggle. His approach was to look at those who did
not manage, who suffered from depression and mental fatigue and who
dropped out of the movement.

    Most members of the civil rights movement in the South during the
early 1960s, according to Coles, were college students or recent grad-
uates, both men and women. They not only had to face local officials
who considered their activities illegal, but also the larger black com-
munity, which was often illiterate, apathetic, and fearful of what they
were doing.

    Some of the students developed the clinical symptoms of battle
fatigue: depression, exhaustion, frustration, and rage at their inabil-
ity to change the social order. In many cases, the author suggests,
leaders of such movements should be able to spot early symptoms of this
syndrome -- drinking, unwillingness to cooperate, gloom -- and help
these young people see their problems.

Comments:

    This article takes an interesting view of social movements, parti-
cularly the civil rights movement. The situation of those engaged in
it is equated with war: and their illness a form of battle fatigue.
They are combat casualties. Such a syndrome may exist in other types of
sustained social movements and one might ask, for example, whether some
of the hippies who dropped out or joined the drug culture were "casualties"
of the student protests of the 1960s.

Evans, Dorothy A. and Sheldon Alexander, "Some Psychological Correlates
of Civil Rights Activity," Psychological Reports, 26, 1970, 899-906.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

This study investigated the relation between the civil rights
activity of Northern students, both Negro and white, and several per-
sonality and demographic variables. The sample comprised males and
females with varying degrees of civil rights involvement in 1965.
Students from two Illinois universities, who participated in 50 percent
or more of the activities of the Students' Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) or NAACP for six months at least were categorized as
"active" (16 Negroes, 13 whites). The remaining 23 black members con-
stituted the "joiners." The study also included 58 nonmembers from
Negro fraternities and sororities at the two universities.

Subjects responded to Byrne's repression-sensitization measure,
Barron's ego-strength scale, the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability
scale, Rotter's I-E scale, and questions designed to determine socio-
economic aspiration, parents' occupation, and the students' membership
in groups other than those being tested.

Two-factor analyses of variance yielded several significant re-
sults. Negro "actives" showed more repression than white "actives,"
Negro "joiners" and non-members. These findings suggested that only
Negroes with strong repression could function actively and non-violently,
whereas white activists, not personally threatened by failure of a
civil rights movement, would not rely on repression as a defense.

The finding that white "actives" showed less regard for social
approval than Negro "actives" or nonmembers may reflect their disagree-
ment with the normative values of young, middle-class whites, or their
feelings of alienation from society in general.

In contrast to findings about the civil rights activity of southern
Negroes, these Negro "actives" came from a less affluent socioeconomic
background than Negro nonmembers and the degree of civil rights activity
was not related to internal or external control of reinforcement or to
membership in other groups. The differences found between northern
and southern Negroes may be due to the fewer opportunities for socioecon-
omic advancement in the South, methodological differences in the studies,
and more on-campus extracurricular opportunities for blacks in the
North than in the South.

Men showed higher socioeconomic aspirations than women: and
in all groups except the white "actives," men were more likely to attri-
bute reinforcement to their own actions than females.

The authors argue that although the study shows that psychological
variables are related to civil rights activity, since civil rights activ-
ities have become more militant, a fresh examination of the relation

between civil rights activism and personality measures is warranted.

Comments:

A number of problems in this study including the measure of civil rights activity, the small sample, and the total neglect of other explanatory variables such as region of birth and parents' residence, make the findings and interpretations questionable. The design prevents the causal direction of these relationships from being ascertained and hence the observed associations could be a function of membership in an organization rather than a cause of it, as the authurs suggest.

Henderson, Vivian, "Blacks and Change in Higher Education," Daedalus,
103, 4, Fall 1974, 72-79.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Observation/Description

The author, a faculty member at Clark University, offers a sympathetic
critique of the black student movement. From the perspective of a black
university, she says, the instant popularity of black studies at white univer-
sities was grimly amusing: black universities had been offering courses in
black studies for many years, while white campuses had "treated anything
pertaining to blacks solely as subjects for doctoral theses." When black
studies finally appeared on predominantly white campuses, however, they were
taught almost exclusively by and for blacks -- a grievous limitation, accord-
ing to the author, because whites need at least as much education about
blacks experience as blacks themselves do.

The author compares the effects of black activism on both black and white
campuses. Whereas black activists on white campuses sought to counter insti-
tutional racism by establishing enclaves of black culture -- separate classes,
living quarters, and social centers -- activists on black campuses took
institutional racism for granted and envisioned the black university as a
"training ground for building a separatist society."

In response to black activism at white universities, the author suggests,
white administrations acted rashly and frantically, with "crisis management"
rather than measured policy. "Black students had the gall to formulate the
programs," she writes, "and administrators had the even greater gall not only
to let them do it, but also to let them select and appoint personnel to teach
the courses."

In contrast to this chaotic abdication of authority, she reports, students
at Clark University were "placed on the board of trustees and on policy-making
committees of the college with the clear understanding that these were not
short-term responses to the national campus crisis, but ideas whose time had
come." Despite these orderly concessions, however, Clark refused steadfastly
to accede to the separatist demands of radical activists, since such demands
were incompatible with the constituted goals of the college (a position which
the author attributes to black colleges in general).

She concludes that "black students and black colleges have special roles
to play in nonviolent social change." While she realizes that "it is good
that higher education has recovered some of the respect and confidence it must
have," she fears a return to the status quo and hopes that black colleges will
continue in their "historic role of providing a base for challenging the
status quo in race relations and social behavior."

Comment:

Although the author makes no effort to document her assertions, this article
is valuable because so little has been written on black student activism. It
would be interesting to check her assertion about the orderly transfer of power.
Does Clark University still place students on the board of trustees and on
policy-making committees? It would also be useful to have more evidence about
the refusal of black colleges to accede to separatist demands.

Kalikow, Deborah W., and Lester Carr, "Determinants of Civil Rights
Activists," Journal of Social Psychology, 74, 1, 1968, 111-16.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Content Analysis

Kalikow and Carr observe that armchair speculations regarding the
"personality dynamics" of social activists have not been sustained in
any of a series of recent experiments. A large sample study by Carr,
for example, showed that none of 134 variables accounted for more
than 9 percent of the variance in the degree of involvement in social
action.

During 1963 and 1964, 168 southern college students -- classified
by race, sex, and actual participation in sit-ins -- wrote statements
about their goals and the progress they had made in achieving them.
Independent scorers rated the groups under these seven headings:
vocational goals; societal or helping goals; progress in achieving
goals; materialism; specificity; self-centeredness; and conformity to
white, middleclass standards. Nine separate analyses of variance re-
vealed no reliable associations between any of these variables and
race, sex, activist involvement, or any of their interactions.

Comments:

The principal shortcoming of this study was the reliance on content
analysis of written paragraphs to measure goals. Such writing assign-
ments have several weaknesses. They are open to a wide variety of
interpretations of the nature of the task. The results are affected
by different styles of writing and varying degrees of skills in handling
language. Such an assignment also assumes that the respondent has a
clear idea of his goals and is not merely saying what he thinks his
goals ought to be.

Korman, Abraham, K., " A Disguised Measure of Civil Rights Attitudes,"
    Journal of Applied Psychology, 1974, 59 (2), 239-240.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey

The purpose of this study was to construct and validate two know-
ledge tests at different skill levels as disguised measures of civil
rights attitudes. The assumption underlying the approach is that per-
sons become more knowledgeable about matters they are more interested
in. Korman tested the hypothesis that scores on civil rights knowledge
are related to independent measures of attitudes and behaviors with regard
to civil rights.

Two separate tests were developed to gauge knowledge of events con-
cerning civil rights: a difficult 69-item form completed by 329 sub-
jects and an easier 29-item form completed by 193 subjects. All sub-
jects were asked about membership in civil rights groups, and rated them-
selves on a five point scale measuring their attitude toward civil rights
(1 = anti...5 = pro). Subjects who had jobs responded by mail, students
in class sessions.

The correlation coefficients indicate a significant positive rela-
tion between knowledge of civil rights events, attitudes towards civil
rights, and membership in groups concerned with civil rights. Scatter
plot analyses showed that findings were not limited by nonlinearity of
regressions, and further analyses ruled out intelligence as a factor.

Further research is needed to determine why the consistent relation-
ship that showed up are "sometimes modest in magnitude"; one explanation
might be the unreliability of the author's single-item measure for both
civil rights attitude and behavior.

Noting the substantiated relation between educational level, liberal
racial attitudes and general knowledge, Korman suggests that the prac-
tical value of a test like this is limited to samples with much the same
education. Yet, if educational level is held constant, other variables
-- like positive interest -- may influence the relation between know-
ledge and attitudes among persons at each educational level. These
possible relations need to be validated with behavioral criteria.

Comments:

Korman acknowledges some of the limitations in this study: the
possibly modest reliability of the single items representing civil
rights attitude and behavior, and the fact that his sample was not ran-
dom. Other problems are the lack of a standard method of administering
the questionnaires (some were mailed, others distributed in classes),
and the fact that the students were required to respond, while workers
were volunteers. Other variables, such as age, sex, and race, might
be controlled to produce clearer results.

It remains to validate the two knowledge tests using more objective, behavioral indices of civil rights attitudes and behaviors, such as membership in civil rights groups ascertained from membership lists.

London, Bruce and John Hearn, "The Ethnic Community Theory of Black
    Social and Political Participation--Additional Support,"
    Social Science Quarterly, 57, 4, 1977, 885-91.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Abstract:

The article attempts to assess the relative efficacy of the ethnic
community and compensatory explanations of black participation (the
fact that participation in voluntary associations and the degree of
political activism is disproportionately higher among blacks than
among whites of similar status) by first creating indicators of both
"ethnic community identification" and "compensatory behavior" and
subsequently specifying their relative impact as predictors of volun-
tary association involvement and political participation.

The "ethnic community" hypothesis suggests that the activism of
blacks can be explained by the increasing race and class consciousness
within black communities; blacks who identify themselves with an
ethnic minority will be more active than those who don't. In contrast,
the compensatory explanation suggests that participation in such
organizations is a way of "compensating" for a subordinate status; thus,
individuals who feel themselves to be alienated are most likely to
be politically active.

Data were collected as part of a 1966 survey of three central cities
in Connecticut in which respondents were selected on a probability
basis; 297 blacks constituted the sample. Two types of collective
action by these respondents were studied: their voluntary involvement
in both issue-oriented and social organizations and their political
participation. Ethnic identification and community identification
indices were constructed, using a factor analysis of attitudes on
20 questions, and the index of compensatory behavior was based on
respondents' feelings of alienation or estrangement.

A stepwise multiple regression analysis showed that ethnic identi-
fication, community identification, and compensatory behavior accounted
for about 7 percent of the variance in issue-oriented organizational
involvement and 10 percent of the variance in social organization
involvement. Ethnic identification was the strongest predictor of
involvement based on issues, whereas community identification was most
important in involvement in social organizations. Compensatory behavior
was only slighly significant in predicting social involvement and
insignificant in issue-oriented organizations. In the prediction of
political participation, the authors included involvement in voluntary
associations as an independent variable and found that they could thus
explain over 20 percent of the variance. Ethnic identification explained
more of the variance than all of the other variables combined, but
compensatory behavior also accounted for a significant portion.

London and Hearn see in these findings strong support for the
ethnic community theory, but attenuated support for the compensatory
theory since ethnic identifiers tended to join issue-oriented organ-
izations and those in the compensatory group joined social organiza-
tions. Moreover, ethnic identification explained more of the activism
in issue-oriented organizations than compensatory behavior did.
These authors also affirm the importance of separating categories of
organizations, because entirely different dynamics motivate the
joining of the two kinds of organizations. Similarly they stress the
need to recognize the heterogeneity of the black population. They
suggest that while compensatory behavior may have been the best expla-
nation of high black participation in the past, ethnic community
theory has become more useful in the context of the 1960s and 1970s.

Comments:

Although this study helps greatly to differentiate the organiza-
tions blacks join and the dynamics involved in the process, the
authors neglect factors other than individual attitudes that may
account for such participation. They fail to mention the relative
availability of such organizations to different groups within the
black community (e.g., sex and age groups), the impact of competing
or alternative activities (e.g., child rearing, jobs), or social
conditions that might also account for the development of interest in
issues and organizations that support them. Moreover there is a
cause-and-effect problem here: ethnic identification or a sense of
alienation could very well result from participation rather than
occasion it.

Serious gaps exist between the measurement of ethnic identifica-
tion and compensatory behavior, and the concepts themselves. Ethnic
identification was measured by two sets of questions specifying the
recognition of "ethnic newsmakers" (their assessment of Martin Luther
King and Earl Warren) and by "race-oriented problem identification"
(e.g., were race relations mentioned as the most important city problem?).
Neither of these sets of questions attempted to find out how important
the respondents actually considered their black identity to be or the
strength of their sense of identification with other blacks. Simi-
larly, compensatory behavior was measured by feelings of "self-aliena-
tion," using such questions as whether they expected to stay on a job,
how strongly they believed that city issues were not resolved publicly,
or whether they thought unemployment was an important cause of poverty.
Such clearly inadequate measures cast serious doubt on the authors'
conclusions. Moreover, since they did not look at the characteristics
of the organizations in which respondents were involved, we do not
know whether most were black or civil rights organizations, or the
extent to which the membership was heterogeneous.

Nam, Tai Y., "A Manifesto of the Black Student Activists in a Southern Black College Under the Integration Order," Journal of Negro Education, 46, No. 2, Spring, 1977.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

This article describes a period of turbulence in a predominantly black college which became affiliated with a white state university system. Black students' demands for the resignation of several university officials were seen as reflecting their fears of being submerged in a primarily white system and the need for a more militant black leadership.

The brief period of conflict took place at a small (2200 students) Arkansas university during the autumn of 1972. The author, a political science professor at the university, conducted his research 1) through daily observation of student activities, 2) through interviews with student leaders, and 3) through analysis of literature circulated during the conflict. The unrest at the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff is viewed as stemming largely from the school's recent affiliation with the predominantly white Arkansas state college system. Until July, 1972, the school existed under the name Agricultural, Mechanical and Normal College. The affiliation was seen as triggering a wave of militancy among U.A.K.E. students struggling to reaffirm their identity as blacks under threat of white dominance. Rejection of the older black university officials, particularly the chancellor, who acquiesced with the merge (merge was supported by the NAACP) was the result of the student expression for new black demands. The major grievance cited was the decline in student population which was blamed on the merge. Both boycott of classes and a vote taken on the chancellor's resignation indicated considerable student support for the resignation. Class "walk-ins" and bomb threats were reported during this time. The chancellor's response threatening harsh punitive gestures towards boycotting students put an almost immediate end to the disruptive activities. By the spring, conciliatory gestures were exchanged between the chancellor and the major student protest leader, with the administration agreeing to expand student participation in decision making. The author concludes that the students' major concern--establishing some sort of new black power base on campus--was ultimately frustrated, although they did achieve a few desired reforms.

Comments:

The article is poorly written and organized, with its major premise -- that campus tensions were a result of the school's fusion into a primarily white university system -- difficult to evaluate because of the lack of relevant information. Insufficient data about the perceived ramifications of the affiliation as well as about the characteristics of the black students involved in the conflict were provided. But the article is interesting and moving and the situation is vividly (if clumsily) described so that the reader is given a vivid portrayal of the depth of emotion of the contending parties.

Approach: Theoretical/Historical

Peterson considers and finally rejects two theories of ideological change--the "group interest thesis" and the "lower class culture thesis" --as explanations of the transition from the ideology of the civil rights movement, integrationist and assimilative, to the Black Power ideology, segregationist and nationalistic. According to the "group interest thesis" it was the despair of blacks at ever attaining real integration which forced them to adopt the Black Power ideology. Yet, Peterson points out, "If white Americans have never acquiesced in genuine integration, their resistance clearly weakened in the sixties." Demonstrable advancement in the late sixties--Congressional approval of civil rights bills, the appointment of blacks to cabinet positions, the dramatic increase of black voting in southern states--casts suspicion on the theory that blacks, disgruntled en masse, spontaneously produced a new more radical ideology out of sheer desperation. According to the "lower-class culture thesis" Black Power ideology represented "the values, culture, and aspirations of a new lower-class elite." In other words, the politicization of blacks (what Ortega y Gasset would call the rise in their historical level) enhances the otherwise minimal political visibility of the "riff-raff" of black society (welfare mothers, dropouts, semi-skilled workers) who then, according to Martin Kilson, a proponent of the theory, "stamp the politics of black ethnicity with a lower-class style." But some evidence undermines this theory as well. Peterson cites one study claiming that "the upper income segment of the black community was clearly the most favorable to black power," and another showing that "militant black elites...were seldom from the lower-class segments of the population."

Peterson then proposes his own model of ideological change--an analysis of the structural interplay between political organization and ideological formulation. For Peterson it was not the failure but rather the undeniable success of the civil rights movement which created the need for a new ideology. As growing black political awareness demanded more and more from the civil rights organization, the problems inherent in the integrationist ideal of the organization were magnified: in particular, black resentment of white occupation of positions of power, and white dissatisfaction with less visible positions, contributed to organizational strain and led to the creation of independent black organizations. A black political elite propounded a new ideology which both stemmed from and justified these organizational changes, focusing on black separateness and individuality rather than ignoring the issue of race.

According to Peterson, the much-publicized violent rhetoric of some Black Power advocates tended to obscure the real political function of the new ideology; in fact, the Black Power ideology represented the logical and necessary continuation of the civil rights movement given the organizational imperatives generated by an aroused black constituency. On another level, it functioned as mediator between the impetus toward equality and the inertia of the American political system: whereas early civil rights demands seemed to threaten the homes, neighborhoods, and schools of white

Americans, Black Power demands for community control, affirmative action, and independent assertion of political influence produced less immediate anxiety among whites. More significantly, Black Power demands were negotiable as opposed to those of earlier integrationists, which involved redistributive issues that could not be resolved without explicitly choosing between black and white interests.

Peterson then tests this functional model of ideological change by applying it to the ideological transformation of the trade union movement in Britain at the close of World War I. Briefly, the Labor Party, junior partner in an uneasy alliance between the Labor and Liberal parties, shifted toward a more radical socialist ideology in the course of asserting its organizational independence. (Class conflict in this case closely parallels racial conflict in the case of the U.S.) The "group interest thesis" and the "lower-class culture thesis" are advanced and rejected as explanations of the ideological shift, and then superseded by a variant of Peterson's structural model of the interplay among political elites, organizational necessities, and ideological formulation.

Finally, Peterson draws on the outcome of the Labor-Liberal struggle (once sharing of power was achieved the Labor commitment to socialism significantly declined) to tentatively predict the future of the Black Power ideology: "one can now expect revisions in Black Power beliefs so that it no longer is so clearly differentiated from the earlier civil rights ideology."

Comments:

Peterson deserves credit for an elegant and rigorously well-organized handling of a complex range of phenomena. One might feel that the extreme tidiness of his historical analogy is too good to be true, but again to his credit he ventures an intriguing hypothesis with which to test the soundness of that analogy. All in all, a fascinating and worthwhile piece of analysis.

Pinard, Maurice, Jerome Kirk, and Donald Von Eschen, "Processes of Recruitment in the Sit-In Movement," Public Opinion Quarterly, 33, 3, 1969, 355-69.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Using data from participants in a sit-in demonstration in 1961, the authors examine the role of strain in recruitment for (or attraction to) a social movement and in the intensity of activity. In their view the greater the strain -- that is, deprivation -- the more intense will be the people's activity in a social movement once they join it. More stable and enduring strains, however, hinder the "generalized beliefs" that are essential for translating grievances into political action. The most deprived are, therefore, not early joiners of social movements generally; they are rather recruited when the movement has attained some success and can persuade them of its beliefs.

The authors, who participated in the Route 40 "freedom ride" staged by members of CORE and other civil rights organizations, distributed questionnaires to other participants. They felt that the data obtained from 386 freedom riders would given an undistorted picture of the group.

Using participant's own self reports on their actions in demonstrations as the indicator of activity in the movement, they found that those with lower socioeconomic status, measured by their present job or the job they were in training for in school, were most active. Those who were not students and whose occupation was lower than their father's were more active than the others, and those whose status was inconsistent with their father's also tended to be more active. Thus, for both whites and Negroes, there was a direct linear relationship between strains and intensity of activity in the sit-in demonstrations, although the movement was still predominantly white and upper middle class.

Within the movement, those at a relatively lower socioeconomic level tended to be relatively late joiners, even though they became the most active. Early joiners were generally only moderately deprived; neither the least deprived nor the most deprived tended to be early recruits. The movement in its early stages had to rely on the relatively small Negro middle class and on a largely marginal part of the white middle class.

To explain why those affected by permanent deprivation did not join the movement until later, the authors suggest these people could not develop sophisticated ideologies and that they suffered from "retreatist alienation." Ideologues (those whose political preferences were to the left of their mother's or who were Socialists) were the most active, and even when their status was low they tended to be the earliest joiners. Others seemed to be prevented by alienation (as measured by those who agreed that "most politicians are corrupt") from becoming early joiners; whereas alienation among ideologues increased the probability of their being recruited at an early stage.

Because the most deprived are likely to defer joining a movement

until they can translate their grievances into political terms and develop a sense of efficacy, the authors argue that early recruitment must often be aimed at middle-class people and reachable targets. "Thus it may be functional at times for movements to select as initial targets goals that are only dimly related to the core problems faced by the deproved population, if in this way they develop faith in the movement's power to change things and thus maximize long-run recruitment."

Comments:

As this article emphasizes, we need to look at differences between participants in social movements, particularly those between early and late joiners. We must also recognize that certain theories (such as relative deprivation) may help to explain the intensity of participation, while others (such as theories of resource mobilization and efficacy) may be more important in explaining the process of recruitment. The methodological weaknesses of the article, however, as well as the incomplete specification of research design make the conclusions speculative at best. The distinction between early and late joiners is premature since the study was made in 1961 and many more people joined must later. In fact, all the freedom riders could conceivably be called early joiners of the civil rights movement. The measurement of certain key variables such as activity, alienation, and ideology is less than adequate. An interesting point is that the measure of socioeconomic status is based on the respondent's own occupation or expected occupation rather than on family background or parents' occupation as is usual in studies of this type.

Sank, Zachary B. and Bonnie Strickland, "Some Attitudinal and Behavioral
     Correlates of a Belief in Militant or Moderate Social Action,"
     Journal of Social Psychology, 90, 2, August 1973, 337-38.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

     The authors wished to distinguish between moderate and militant
black social activists. Since previous personality studies had viewed
all black activists as a "monolithic group," militant students, accord-
ing to their assumption, would be more likely to feel that fate or
external forces controlled their lives, be more dogmatic, and show more
variable responses to success and failure than the "moderate" group.

     Seventy-four black male students at Emory University in Atlanta,
Georgia, were studied in the spring of 1969; sample selection criteria
and methods are unspecified. A pretested questionnaire distinguished
"militants," those who endorsed "revolutionary" change including the
use of "force, riot or destruction" from the "moderates," those en-
dorsing work within the "current social structure toward evolutionary
change."

     Militant students were slightly more likely to be "external" on
Rotter's I-E scale (r=.20; variance accounted for =4 percent).
Rokeach's dogmatism scale proved to be unrelated to a student's militance
or moderacy. Militants did perform differently on a laboratory-type
measure of level of aspiration (L.O.A.) and were claimed to be signi-
ficantly more "maladaptive" (relative to some unspecified adaptation
model for the particular task given). Militants were also less likely
to follow the standardized "lower aspiration after failure -- higher
aspiration after success" motivational pattern. That is, militants'
aspirations, or expectations of success were less constrained by recent
and local experience and, hence, were more "variable" than the aspira-
tions of moderates.

     In this study -- whose representativeness is open to question --
militant black males were likely to be slightly more external, no more
dogmatic, and significantly more "variable" than moderates. In other
words, militants appeared not to rely on "immediate past performance
in estimating future success." Meriting further research is the question
raised but not resolved, are militants - those who have found their
environments less responsive to their efforts than is true of moderates,
and have they somehow substituted long-range goals rather than their
recent experiences as the criterion for predicting future success?
These questions are variants of the "rising expectations" hypothesis,
which suggests that high expectations occur with -- and in spite of --
a record of little success in the past.

Comments:

     The variance in the social action category accounted for by the
Internal-External measures and level of aspiration was slight (about 4
and 10 percent respectively). Since the selection of subjects was not
explained, the general validity of the results would be difficult
to establish.

Searles, Ruth and J. Allen Williams, "Negro College Students' Parti-
cipation in Sit-Ins," Social Forces, 40, 3, March 1962, 215-20.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

In contrast to literature suggesting that protests occur primarily
among people who are profoundly alienated and in despair, this article
proposes that "sit-ins and other forms of Negro protest led by middle-
and upper-class Negroes are best interpreted by reference group theory
and the concept of relative deprivation." The shift from accommodation
to militancy among Negroes is seen as a consequence of their no longer
evaluating their social position in relation to other blacks, but com-
paring it instead to that of white persons with similar position and
training. This shift has occurred, with improvements in the socio-
economic position of blacks, because of the continuing disparity be-
tween the goals and attainments of the Negro middle class, accompanied
by greater social mobility which makes comparisons of status more
likely.

In particular, black college students are believed likely to have
a strong sense of relative deprivation which would predispose them to
protest segregation and discrimination. In the survey, 827 students
at three Negro colleges in North Carolina were given closed-ended ques-
tionnaires at class meetings. Nearly half the students were from
upper middle-class families, and these indicated strong agreement with
the position on segregation and discrimination taken by their college
peers and by college-educated adults in the black community. In addi-
tion nearly three-fourths of those surveyed agreed with the positions
taken by northern white college students. A very large majority endorsed
sit-ins, picketing, and negotiation, but fewer than 1 percent accepted
the use of violence. Over 90 percent of the respondents indicated
that they had participated in some way in the protest movement.

Frequent participators (24 percent of the total) were more often
from higher social status backgrounds than less frequent participants
and were more optimistic about the amount of black support for the
protests. Frequent participators were less likely to hold white people
responsible for the failure of protests and were more active in extra-
curricular activities than the infrequent participators.

Comments:

Despite the authors' contention that a shift in reference groups
accounts for the movement from accommodation to militant behavior, there
are no longitudinal data to support such a statement. Moreover no mea-
sures of relative deprivation (perceived or actual) are used to explain
participation in sit-ins. As the authors admit, other forms of Negro
protest arise from alienation and disaffection, but sit-ins as a form
of nonviolent protest may appeal particularly to black college students
with strong orientations toward the white middle class.

Shorter, D.L. (Kumea), "Towards Developing Black Activists: The Relation-
ship of Beliefs in Individual and Collective Internal-External
Control," Journal of Black Psychology, 3, 1, August 1976, 59-70.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Shorter attempts here to discover how blacks who become politically
active differ from those who do not. Political activism is defined as
"any action directed at the politico-economic system which is designed
either to support or change the distribution of power and/or resources
within the politico-economic system or the politico-economic system
itself. The author suggests:

1. Politically active blacks tend to believe that blacks as a group
control their lives and destiny. A sense of personal control (as
measured by Levenson's Internal Scale) is not a distinguishing character-
istic between the more and less politically active.

2. Politically active blacks tend to believe that fate or chance
has little effect on the lives and destiny of blacks as a group. A sense
that chance or fate controls one's own life (as measured by Levenson's
Chance Scale) does not distinguish the less politically active persons
from the more active.

A questionnaire was answered by 81 black undergraduates, divided
into three groups on the basis of their responses to the Kerpelman and
Weiner Activity Scale. For purposes of analysis, four internal-external
control scales were used; one of these, the Kujichagulia scale developed
by the author, measures an individual's beliefs about the control blacks
have as a group.

The first of the two hypotheses listed above was rejected, the
second supported. Highly active black students believe that blacks as
a group are not controlled by chance or fate.

The author concludes that a contradiction between a sense of per-
sonal control and perceptions of blacks as a group controlled by outside
forces stimulates action. To develop black activists, blacks therefore
need to feel they have power over their own lives. They also need to
develop an awareness that blacks are controlled by other powerful forces
and that chance or fate do not control their lives.

Comments:

It is difficult to evaluate the reported findings because of a major
design flaw. The author either did not control for sex or failed to
report it if he did. Sex differences could be expected for all of the
scales used, and if there were sex differences on the political activity
scale (as is likely) the findings could have showed sex differences
rather than differences in activism. The differences reported, though
apparently significant, were slight and preclude sweeping generalizations.
Finally, the Kujichagulia scales were developed for this study. No data
on their reliability or validity are presented.

Turner, Castellano B., and Wilson, William J., "Dimensions of Racial Ideology:
   A Study of Urban Black Attitudes," Journal of Social Issues, 32, 2,
   1976, 139-152.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Throughout American history there have been shifts in black people's
attitudes toward racial interaction. Most recently, support for interracial
cooperation in the early 1960s was followed by pessimism and alienation in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The intent of this study was to determine
current black perspectives by empirically defining aspects of racial ideology
and relating these to social and demographic characteristics.

A sample of 1,934 blacks was taken at random from one northern and one
southern city, and their social, political, and economic attitudes were probed
by black interviewers. Through factor analysis, six salient aspects of
racial ideology were determined: separatism, black alienation, fears of
genocide, racial consciousness, interracial cooperation, and violence. These
were then related to social and demographic characteristics: age, sex, geo-
graphical area, and socioeconomic status (education, income, occupation, hous-
ing, and neighborhood).

Blacks who favor black separatism tend to be alienated, fearful of race
genocide, and conscious of race. Neither interracial cooperation nor attitudes
about violence was correlated with the other factors, except negatively with
each other. Young black adults living in a northern city who had less than
twelve years of education, earned lower incomes, rented their living quarters,
and lived in a lower-income neighborhood tended to be separatist, alienated,
and fearful of genocide, but they also scored high on interracial cooperation.
Blacks under thirty who had lower incomes and rented their dwellings tended to
be most favorable toward racial violence. After controlling for age, the
only variable significantly related to racial violence was sex: males of all
ages showed more approval of racial violence than females reported.

The authors conclude that the less secure a black individual feels about
his socioeconomic position, the more receptive he is to belligerence and hos-
tility towards whites. Age is most consistently related to negative feelings
towards whites, reflecting the relation between security and age; that is,
as people grow older they tend to have more stable jobs and homes. This
study reinforces previous findings that more competitive race relations in the
North result in greater disillusionment and hostility when blacks encounter
racial barriers. This may mark an emerging emphasis in the black community
on developing their own economic, political and social resources rather
than attacking white institutions.

Comment:

Readers need an explanation showing why support of interracial cooperation
coincides with attitudes of alienation, separatism, and fears of genocide
among certain groups. Data are from only two cities and therefore do not
furnish sufficient evidence of regional differences. It is also questionable
whether the racial attitudes are mutually exclusive or have been accurately

tapped by the interviews.

No date is given for the collection of data. This is an ironic oversight, given the authors' position that black perspectives "ebb and flow" as a result of improvements or setbacks in race relations.

The identification of six aspects of racial ideology was noteworthy and should be used in future research. More sophisticated multivariate techniques would have helped in the analysis of social and demographic variables.

The fact that these data were collected in only one northern and one southern city, each having a population about one-third black, limits one's confidence in the application of the findings to all urban blacks.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Poor Peoples' Movements

Fellman, Gordon, Barbara Brandt, and Roger Rosenbault, "Dagger in the
    Heart of Town: Mass Planners and Cambridge Workers," Trans-Action,
    September 1970, 39-47.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

        This article reports on a road construction controversy in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Data presented in this article were collected by a team
of sociological observers who surveyed and participated in the every day
lives of some 5,000 residents of the Brookline-Elm Street neighborhood,
an area slated to be destroyed by the construction of a freeway. People
living in the area were characterized as being of predominantly lower and
lower middle income brackets (working class people of immigrant origins).

        In 1965, Save Our Cities (SOC), the citizen's anti-highway group for
the Brookline-Elm Street area was formed by the joint efforts of local
leaders from the community and a large group of external supporters, most
of them academics and professionals in city planning. Their main goal
was to halt the construction of the belt and suggest alternative possi-
bilities for its new location. However, because this article was written
before any definitive action was taken on their case we are only given
information to their success in temporarily holding off its construction.

        We are told that two major problems which hindered SOC's protest
efforts were:

    1) the organizations' inability to rally enough support among the
        residents most affected because they felt powerless

    2) the highway authority's lack of sensitivity in understanding the
        needs of those being affected by their plan.

        From this experience, the authors suggest that there is a need for a
person who can act as a representative for the less fortunate in the plan-
ning process, and at the same time transmit the assumptions and procedures
being proposed by planners to those who may later become affected by their
decisions.

Comments:

    This article is interesting reading for those desiring to understand:

    1) how legal coercive measures may themselves catalize or encourage
        the development of protest activities in an urban situation, and

    2) what occurs when the leadership organization of a protest move-
        ment is not fully integrated with the social environment of its
        constituency--in this case most of the supporters for SOC were
        not residents of the area affected and did not share any of the
        background characteristics of the affected group. SOC subse-
        quently failed in being able to relate to any of their consti-
        tuency's immediate needs and could not encourage them to become
        supportive of SOC protest activities.

Gelb, Joyce and Alice Sardell, "Strategies for the Powerless: The Welfare Rights Movement in New York City," American Behavioral Scientist, 17, 4, March/April 1974, 507-30.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

The welfare rights movement in New York City in the late 1960s is used to examine alternative strategies for giving the poor a greater voice in decisions affecting their interests. Using open-ended interviews with key participants in the welfare rights organization, as well as material from dissertations and press reports, the authors looked at successes and failures in these directions: 1) attracting members · and sustaining the organization; 2) gaining support from key "reference publics" and allies; and 3) influencing "target groups," that is political decision-makers.

The "minimum standards campaign," in which recipients were encouraged to apply, in large numbers and at the same time, for all the special grants to which they were entitled, and to demonstrate in favor of the immediate processing of these grants, enjoyed a short-lived success. It was eventually defeated, however, by the response of the Welfare Administration, lack of support from sympathetic third parties, and a political environment hostile to public welfare spending.

The authors concluded that "ultimately neither community organization nor protest (is) likely to provide the poor with a sufficient degree of access to the policy-making process." They agree with Saul Alinsky that such movements cannot be sustained without the material incentives supplied by organization, but they deny Alinsky's assumption that mere existence of an organization guarantees success. Protest cannot influence public policy unless key actors in the political system are sympathetic, and such support is particularly hard to attract when the issue directly challenges certain societal values. Although the welfare rights movement had some national effect in helping to defeat the family assistance program, the reason was that this instance did not involve any commitment to an unpopular outlay of funds for welfare. Moreover, the success of the movement at the national level could not reverse the decline of the local welfare rights organizations because it could not provide direct material benefits to members.

Comments:

In this study of the relative efficacy of protest and community organization in making the political system more accessible to poor people, the authors compared a variety of theories and suggested some critical deficiencies in their application. They contrast the "pro- · test strategies" suggested by James Q. Wilson and Cloward and Piven with the "community organization strategies" of Saul Alinsky and of · Lipsky and Levi. Their conclusion is that no strategy will be really effective in the long run unless the political environment is ripe for change.

Hertz, Susan, "The Politics of the Welfare Mothers Movement: A Case Study,"
Signs, 2, 3, 1977.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

The author uses participant observation and intensive interviews to
describe and explain the growth of welfare rights organizations in Minne-
sota in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Particular attention is given to
the AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) League and the MWRO
(Minnesota Welfare Rights Organization). Information was obtained pri-
marily through interviews with 34 long-term members of both organizations.

The AFDC League was first organized in 1964 and its strategy was to
participate directly in legislative politics and in self-help activities.
Its primary goal was to change the public image of welfare recipients and
to improve the welfare system by direct participation in the political
process. The organization disappeared for two major reasons: 1) the
organizers really beliefed in self-help and many of them went back to
school, got jobs, and took themselves out of the welfare system, 2) the
emergence of the MWRO, a more militant organization, which took over
the activities of the League.

The MWRO was a local chapter of the national organization and its
growth was characterized by two phases. In the first phase the group
concentrated on mobilizing recipients into the organization and its tactics
were much more militant than the AFDC League (although nonviolent and
usually legal). Organization leaders discouraged self-help, arguing that
it was the system that must change. Welfare administrators in Minnesota
were unprepared to deal with the militant tactics of the MWRO and conse-
quently the welfare mothers rarely received satisfactory responses to
their demands.

The second phase of the MWRO strategy was to move into more conven-
tional areas of politics. Leaders felt they had gained legitimacy as
representatives of the poor and could successfully move into the political
arena. In Minnesota, there was a reluctance to abandon militant tactics.
Several unsuccessful campaigns plus the fact that the state MWRO organizer
left the organization to go into other areas marked the collapse of the
organization.

The author concludes that although welfare mothers groups disappeared,
the movement had a positive effect on their self-image and involved them
in the political process. Many reported an increased feeling of power.
In this sense the movement brought about personal and political change
among women who had not been reached by other movements or organizations.

Comments:

While the article provides an interesting description of the natural history of welfare mothers organizations in Minnesota, it offers very little information about the participants themselves. It would be important to know more about the characteristics of the leaders of the groups and how they differed from other members. It would also be useful to know how much membership overlap existed between the two organizations. In order to test the author's conclusions, we would need to know about previous organizational involvement the members may have had and also whether or not their experiences in the movement led them to engage in other types of political activity. The author focuses primarily on the leadership of the organizations in drawing her conclusions and offers very little information about the movement's effect on the rank and file members.

Hobsbawm, E.J., "Should the Poor Organize?" New York Review of Books, March 23, 1978.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Criticism

In their book Poor People's Movements, Francis Piven and Richard Cloward argue that 1) "the capacity of subordinate groups to defy institutional norms and to disrupt institutional life is their only important political resource," and 2) "the building of mass-based bureaucratic organizations generates oligarchical tendencies, facilitates the cooptation of movement leadership by dominant groups, and, most important, diminishes the use of disruptive tactics...in favor of an electoral strategy that wins little."

Hobsbawm, reviewing Poor People's Movements, supports the first statement. He applauds Piven and Cloward for their elucidation of a principle unknown, according to Hobsbawm, to many sociologists: people cannot defy institutions to which they do not contribute -- one such institution, Hobsbawm points out, being Congress. He approves of Piven and Cloward's structuralist interpretation of protest, their notion of how the very forms of protest are institutionally determined: the choice between strike and riot depends on whether the factory hires or not. And he reports with genuine enthusiasm these authors' conclusion that, given institutional constraints, the poor are most likely to improve their position by withdrawing their cooperation, on which those institutions -- governments, corporations, whatever -- ultimately depend for their existence.

Yet while he accepts the first statement, Piven and Cloward's definition of the political power of subordinate groups, he is suspicious of the second, their critique of bureaucratic organization as a means of bettering the status of subordinate groups. True, Hobsbawm admits, the student movement of the 1960s was effective, not despite its loose unstructured format, but precisely because this enabled it to "catch and propagate a mood at a crucial moment." Nevertheless, Hobsbawm cautions that in practical terms a policy of spontaneous and inarticulate institutional disruption licenses governments to repress subordinate groups right out of existence. "It is not enough," Hobsbawm writes, "to push and see what will happen." At the very least, Hobsbawm insists that some collective body which formulates the goals of subordinate groups is necessary to prevent institutions from taking over the formulation of goals. Hobsbawm also thinks that Piven and Cloward's pessimism about poor people's organizations should be balanced by pessimism about capitalist institutions -- themselves disoriented by global economic crises, a crumbling work ethic, and upheavals in the social order. "In short," Hobsbawm writes, "if the masses are incapable of controlling, or even predicting, their destiny, neither at present are the elites."

Comments:

Hobsbawm's review of Piven and Cloward's work is thorough and generally supportive. When he parts company with Piven and Cloward, he does so in order to place their conclusions, which are specifically directed at egalitarian activists struggling against unyielding institutional elites, in a larger contest, in which the elites themselves are variable factors.

Jackson, Larry and William Johnson, <u>Protest by the Poor: The Welfare Rights</u>
    <u>Movement in New York City</u>. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974.

Approach: Historical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

    <u>Protest by the Poor</u> is an account of the growth and decline of New York
City's welfare rights movement. Noting that New York City, by the latter
part of the 1960s, led a welfare dependency trend of national proportions,
the authors address themselves to the questions: to what extent, and in
what ways, was this trend related to welfare rights activism? There is
never any doubt that the movement and the trend were positively correlated,
as two facts make abundantly clear: 1) by 1968 the city boasted over 70
NWRO-affiliated organizations, and 2) between 1965 and 1968 the city's
AFDC caseload nearly doubled.

    To provide an historical context in which to pose their central ques-
tions, the authors chronicle the rise of welfare rights activism in the
city. They contend that the movement was born of hope rather than frus-
tration. Although by the mid-1960s the waning civil rights movement had
created expectations among poor blacks which it could not bring to ful-
fillment, resulting in the urban riots of that era, a procedure for dealing
with collective grievances had been developed and, with varying success,
applied. Because the civil rights issue had once served as a political
focal point around which a movement and an organization coalesced, it was
reasonable to hope that the issue of welfare rights might become a new
focus, might lead to new advancement. Moreover, the authors stress the
fact that the welfare rights movement was <u>recipient-oriented</u>--it dealt
with those who were already wards of the state and, as a result, expecting
a certain level of well-being, rather than the unattached down-and-outers
with no hope of relief.

    During the winter of 1965 (in New York) the CWF (Committee of Welfare
Families), under the aegis of MFY (Mobilization for Youth), launched a
winter clothing campaign. In theory special grants were available through
the welfare system which would enable eligible families to purchase badly
needed winter clothing: in practice, these grants were scarce. By edu-
cating welfare recipients as to their rights in this matter, encouraging
them to demand that these rights be honored, and locating leaders from
among the recipient population and specially training them to organize
the appeal, CWF sought to close the gap between what was promised and
what was given. According to the authors, "the campaign was successful
in obtaining winter clothing grants for 80 of the 110 clients who applied
for them." Thus, while the campaign was relatively small in scope, it was
successful in that it exposed the recipient population to a protest tactic
which resulted in tangible personal gain. On the other hand, the ultimate
goal--automatic dispensation of winter clothing grants "in the same manner
that New York dispensed school clothing grants"--was denied.

    Much of the early welfare rights activity which followed took the form
of the winter clothing campaign: showing welfare clients what was avail-
able under the law, concentrating on a specific tangible benefit. By
1967 there was an explosion of requests for fair hearings concerning wel-
fare benefits, which recipients now began to realize were legally, if not

yet actually theirs. Side by side with this legal strategy, a new militant strategy calling for the visible disruption of welfare centers began to evolve. In 1967 and 1968 the welfare rights movement in New York City was in full flower, characterized by three main elements--its focus on tangible benefits (largely in the form of special grants), its argument that clients were entitled to a certain minimum level of well-being, its militant stance. The movement was successful--so successful in fact that by April 1968 the New York State legislature began to think about terminating the special grant. The movement responded by escalating the level of protest for the period May-August 1968--staging daily demonstrations in all parts of the city--at the end of which time the grant nevertheless came to an end, and the movement itself soon followed.

Now, between 1965 and 1968, as mentioned above, the city's AFDC caseload nearly doubled. (In addition, throughout the 1960s, but particularly between 1966 and 1968, there was a substantial increase in the average grant level paid to the city's AFDC families.) The authors attempt to determine the exact nature of the welfare rights movement's influence upon the city's caseload. To do so, they isolate three "decision variables"-- the application rates, the acceptance rate, and the closings rate. Multiple regression analysis identifies the individual effects attributable to each of the component variables. Liberalized acceptance was found to be least significant, undermining the claim that lax administration was the cause of the increased caseload. Applications, on the other hand, was most significant, and the authors think it reasonable to see the rising applications rate as a direct result of the welfare rights movement's campaign for minimum standards. The authors point out that even though the movement was recipient-oriented, and its primary effect was to motivate welfare clients to apply for special grants, the cornucopia of tangible rewards it produced had the secondary effect of inducing non-clients to apply for basic benefits.

The authors conclude that the welfare rights movement was highly effective while it lasted--that is, while the special grant lasted. In order to survive, welfare rights organizations must be able to deliver the goods (tangible benefits) to their constituencies; their failure to thrive has been largely the record of their failure to find or develop the equivalent of the special grant.

Comments:

This is an interesting and provocative analysis of the welfare rights movement in New York City.

Lipsky, Michael, "Rent Strikes: Poor Man's Weapon," Trans-Action, 6, 4,
1969, 10-15.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

Because protest leaders must balance the ways in which they appeal to
four separate constituencies (members of their own organization, mass media,
third parties, and the targets of the protest), protest in general is not a
reliable political weapon and is unlikely to prove successful in the long
run. In order to illustrate this thesis, Lipsky describes the Harlem rent
strikes of 1963 and 1964. By protest, he means any "political activity de-
signed to dramatize an objection to some policies or conditions, using un-
conventional showmanship or display and aimed at obtaining rewards from the
political system while working within that system." It has become "one tac-
tic the poor can use to exert power and gain greater control over their
lives."

Members of a leader's own organization can curtail the flexibility of
his actions. In order to preserve the basis of their support, leaders must
sustain involvement by intangible rewards and promises of material rewards,
but must also limit protest in line with what they can reasonably expect of
their followers. Thus they cannot plan strategies that involve a great deal
of money or create much anxiety and danger. The limitations on the skill
and resources of the protest organization's members may necessitate getting
volunteer assistance from lawyers, students, and skilled nonprofessionals
but usually these are scarce.

In order to get coverage from the mass media, protest leaders may take
strong and extreme positions that will then alienate them from the target
of the protest. The need to get support from third parties such as the
general public, sympathetic liberals and others who can put pressure on the
target of the protest may also conflict with what the protest leader must
do to retain the interest and support of his followers. This is exemplified
in situations where leaders bargain with public officials and then find that
their supporters become outraged and discouraged. In order to deal with some
of these tensions between different constituencies, the author suggests
having a divided leadership structure so that "one leader may bargain with
city officials while another continues rhetorical guerilla warfare" and one
leader takes responsibility for administration while another takes responsi-
bility for mobilization. He also suggests that successful "public relations"
would reduce the strain between the militancy required to gain and maintain
support and the reasonableness necessary to obtain concessions from target
groups.

Protest success depends on a number of factors: enlarging the number
of groups and individuals who are concerned about the issues, influencing
the shape of the decision, not merely whether or not there will be a decision,
attracting people of high status to work for their proposals, and presenting
data that public officials find "objective" and "reasonable." But since
public agencies are most responsive to their regular critics and immediate
organizational allies, they will try to deflect pressure from these reference

groups without meeting any of the protest demands. Lipsky outlines six tactics available to the targets of the protest: 1) providing symbolic satisfactions such as ribbon cutting ceremonies, temporary procedures to alleviate the pressure, and other tactics which "take the heat off," 2) provide token satisfactions such as dramatic responses to a few cases, 3) changing internal procedures and organization so that the most desperate situations can be alleviated and thus deflect pressure for more general solutions, 4) arguing that their resources are limited or their options are few, 5) discrediting protest leaders and organizations, and 6) postponing action until public sympathy for the protest cools and the issues are forgotten, e.g., "studying the situation."

Thus, protest can be a tactic to build an organization, to increase or change the political consciousness of people, or to gain short run goals in a potentially sympathetic political environment. "But ultimately relatively powerless groups cannot rely on the protest process alone to help them obtain long-run goals, or general improvements in conditions. What they need for long-run success are stable political resources--in a word, power."

Comments:

While this article used a case study to make a rather convincing theoretical argument, further research should employ a comparative strategy to test it on protests engaged in by persons with varying degrees of access to the polity, with varying levels of sophistication and resources, and different styles of leadership.

Roach, Jack and Janet Roach, "Mobilizing the Poor: Road to a Dead End,"
    Social Problems, 26, 2, December 1978; Piven, Frances Fox and
    Richard Cloward, "Social Movements and Societal Conditions:
    Response to Roach and Roach," Social Problems, 26, 2, December 1978;
    Roach, Jack and Janet Roach, "Disunity and Unity of the Working
    Class: Reply to Piven and Cloward," Social Problems, 26, 2, December
    1978

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Criticism

In the first of this series of articles Roach and Roach take issue
with what they consider the central theme in writings by Piven and
Cloward: "...the poor, on their own, can effect a substantial improve-
ment in their position in society, if they are militant enough." Piven
and Cloward's position is appraised largely by criticizing their
analysis of the failure of the National Welfare Rights Organization
(NWRO), which Roach and Roach claim to be the "major test case for
substantiating their views."

Roach and Roach agree with Piven and Cloward that the NWRO was
unable to sustain a mass base or to gain significant concessions for its
constituency. But they disagree with the lesson they say the authors
drew from that failure: that independent collective action (disruptive
protest) would have served the interests of the poor better than cooper-
ative collective action (an organized assault on the electoral-represen-
tative system). This conclusion is contested on the grounds that
1) independent collective action by the poor entails the risk of re-
pressive backlash, to which the poor are by definition highly vulnerable;
2) such independent action, tantamount to separatist organizing,
alienates the poor from their most promising ally -- organized labor.
Piven and Cloward's prescription for the poor is simply, these critics
say, irrelevant because the poor have no real social power, and hence
a militant strategy would fail. Organized labor, on the other hand,
exists at "the point of production"; its power is commensurate with
its crucial role in production. Roach and Roach therefore suggest that
activists seeking to advance the interests of the poor ought to concen-
trate on "promoting socialist consciousness among the rank and file
in the trade unions" -- a strategy they recognize to be indirect, but
believe can be inherently more effective than Piven and Cloward's.

In their response Piven and Cloward argue that Roach and Roach's
prescription for the poor derives from nineteenth century Marxist doc-
trine, and that such a perspective fails to account for the institutional
realities of twentieth century capitalism. Whereas, for example, Marx
expected an increase in the political power of the proletarian propor-
tionate to the increasing concentration of workers in industrial work
places, Piven and Cloward point out that institutional developments not
anticipated by Marx (such as "the balkanization of the proletariat,"
whereby the proliferation of job titles within a complex bureaucracy
fosters disunity and competition)limit that political power in form and
extent.

Piven and Cloward's position is that all popular movements take place within a social and institutional context and are subject to similar constraints. They criticize Roach and Roach for arguing from historically specific circumstances (the rise and fall of the NWRO) to a doctrinal injunction (the NWRO should have aligned itself with organized labor); they reject the notion that general lessons can be abstracted in this way from a set of historical circumstances.

Their own position is that no such "rhetorical" injunctions can meaningfully be superimposed upon popular movements: "...popular insurgency does not proceed by someone else's rules or hopes; it has its own logic and direction. It flows from historically specific circumstances, and it is limited by those circumstances." In the case of the NWRO, the mechanization of agriculture and the subsequent migration of southern blacks to northern cities made their increased demand for relief inevitable. Moreover, racism -- the residue of a historical institution -- foreordained the hostility of the white working class toward blacks' demands and thus precluded any alignment with organized labor.

Piven and Cloward dispute the allegation by Roach and Roach that in supporting action by poor blacks against the relief system they are advocating separatist movements. Rather, they contend, in a society that denied them any means of support, poor blacks had no alternative. In reply to the criticism that protest entails a repressive backlash, Piven and Cloward concede that blacklash is inherent in all class struggles, but is the price of progress. Moreover, they point out, even if gains by insurgent blacks are transient, they may may erode the legal foundations of institutionalized racism, and to that extent pave the way for more broadly based struggles by the working class.

Finally Piven and Cloward summarize the major themes of their published works: 1) "The capacity of subordinate groups to defy institutional norms and to disrupt institutional life is their only important political resource" and 2) The building of mass-based organizations like the NWRO "generates oligarchical tendencies, facilitates cooptation of movement leadership by dominant groups, and, most important, diminishes the use of disruptive tactics...in favor of an electoral strategy that wins little."

The third article of the series presents the reply of Roach and Roach to Piven and Cloward. Two groups predominate in society, it is argued: the capitalist class and the working class. Subordinate groups seeking social gains appeal ultimately to one or the other. By adopting the strategy recommended by Piven and Cloward, taking independent collective action instead of aligning themselves with the working class, such groups inevitably turn to the capitalist class for concessions. These concessions are limited in scope and granted largely at the expense of the working class, hence they not only fail to advance the interests of the subordinate group, but they hinder the class struggle as a whole. On the other hand, Roach and Roach's strategy of aligning

with the working class permits such limited power as the subordinate group possesses to be applied where it is most likely to further the class struggle and hence to promote progressive social change.

Comments:

The actual content of Poor People's Movements justifies its authors' allegation that Roach and Roach approached the work with doctrinal prejudices. One significant distortion they commit is in claiming that the NWRO is the "major test case" that Piven and Cloward rely on to substantiate their views. In fact, "The Structuring of Protest," the first chapter of Poor People's Movements, contains a theoretical exposition which the authors rightly claim as their major contribution, and it is substantiated in the next four chapters with four separate case studies. Two are from the 1930s, "The Unemployed Workers' Movement" and "The Industrial Workers' Movement"; the other are from the 1960s, "The Civil Rights Movement" and "The Welfare Rights Movement." Since two of these chapters deal with the upsurge of the (predominantly white) working class during the Great Depression, the labor movement itself might well constitute Piven and Cloward's "major test case." Curiously, Roach and Roach, so concerned about the cause of organized labor, ignore the very chapters where Piven and Cloward explicitly discuss labor -- a puzzling lapse.

Another omission by Roach and Roach distorts Piven and Cloward's stand, which they claim to be that "the poor, on their own (Roach and Roach's emphasis), can effect a substantial improvement in their position in society if they are militant enough." This charge ignores the first chapter of Poor People's Movements, where Piven and Cloward set forth the context in which social movements are possible. In that light their actual position might be paraphrased as follows:

> When calamitous change unsettles the institutional
> framework of the dominant regime, the ability of
> that institutional framework to insure the quiescence
> of subordinate groups is weakened, and the potential
> for rebellion--always latent within subordinate
> groups but ordinarily suppressed by the regulatory
> power of the regime--may be actualized. Defiance
> during such periods may result in gains for subor-
> dinate groups, but the nature, extent, and permanence
> of those gains is wholly contingent upon the new
> configuration of order into which the regime settles;
> gains wrested from a weakened regime are likely to be
> revoked once the regime again consolidates itself;
> unless those gains are somehow compatible with the
> new institutional framework. Thus for example
> unionization of labor, achieved during an economic
> crisis, proved to be a useful means of regulating
> labor and so became a permanent feature of the capi-
> talist regime. Had labor demanded, say, collective
> ownership, it would still have attained unionization,

if anything, because that was what the regime was
prepared to concede.

In Piven and Cloward's terms then, the poor, no matter how militant,
can achieve only what the regime which determines their poverty is pre-
pared to concede: moreover, their militancy itself depends upon the
relative stability of the regime. That is a far cry from exhorting
the poor to act on their own.

What Piven and Cloward do say is that activists seeking to advance
the interests of the poor ought to nourish rebellion when it appears,
taking the attitude that the regime is favorably unstable, and thus
getting the greatest possible concessions. While Roach and Roach find
such a strategy farfetched, it is certainly less indirect than their
own plan of calling on activists to "promote socialist consciousness
among the rank and file in the trade unions" in hopes that the gains
of labor will trickle down to the unorganized poor.

They could not have issued such a prescription if they acknowledged
the maxim Piven and Cloward set forth in their chapter "The Structuring
of Protest": "People cannot defy institutions to which they have no
access, and to which they make no contribution." The unorganized and
unemployed poor can hardly be expected to align themselves with organ-
ized labor in the struggle against capital, the reason being precisely
that they do not live at "the point of production." Piven and Cloward
take great pains to show how the institutional contexts in which
people live not only regulate their lives, when the institutions func-
tion, but regulate their defiance, when the institutions fail. Protest
essentially is the refusal to cooperate with an institutional system,
and the way in which cooperation is withheld depends entirely on the
particular norm of cooperation imposed by the system. Factory workers
normally cooperate with the assembly line; when they rebel, they walk
off the job. That is appropriate. But what of the unorganized poor?
To align themselves with labor in the struggle against capital, as
Roach and Roach prescribe, would be wildly inappropriate. Instead,
Piven and Cloward ask,"How do the poor normally cooperate with the
system which denies them means of survival?" And they come up with the
answer, "Normally, the poor acquiesce." Institutional conditions make
only one form of protest available to the poor: to withdraw their
silent cooperation and riot in the streets. Admittedly that is a harsh
and troubling conclusion. But by failing to address the theoretical
considerations out of which Piven and Cloward draw that conclusion,
Roach and Roach forfeit the debate.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Peace Movements

Abrams, Lloyd, "Commitment Via Public Protest as a Determinant of Atti-
tudes Concerning U.S. Defense Policy and Political Dissent,"
Psychological Reports, 32, 1973, 251-54.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Controlled Experiment

Questionnaires assessing attitudes about U.S. defense policy and poli-
tical protest were administered to 72 undergraduate volunteers at New
York University four days before, and then two weeks after, the 1969 march
on Washington. Students were tested both individually and in group (class-
room) situations to determine whether their anti-war attitudes were
strengthened as a result of participation in the march.

Participants in the march, as a whole, showed an increase in anti-war
attitudes while nonparticipants showed a decrease. There was a strong
effect for males but no effect for females of participation in the march
which "could be explained by the fact that the males faced the draft and
the females did not."

Comments:

The author makes no effort to explain the fact that the nonparticipants
in the march exhibited a net decrease in anti-war attitudes, nearly equi-
valent in absolute value to the net increase shown by participants. More-
over, nonparticipating males showed an even stronger decrease in these
attitudes than nonparticipating females, a result which cannot be explained
in terms of their susceptibility to the draft.

Berkowitz, William R., "The Impact of Anti-Vietnam Demonstrations Upon National Public Opinion and Military Indicators," <u>Social Science Research</u>, 2, 1, 1973, 1-14.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

The national impact of anti-Vietnam protests was studied by analyzing five major demonstrations in the United States during 1965-71 for their effect on public opinion, American troop strength, and American expenditures on munitions. The demonstrations were selected on the basis of crowd size (from 10,000 to 250,000 participants in a single location), how closely they followed other demonstrations, and pages of coverage in <u>Life</u>, <u>Time</u> and <u>Newsweek</u>.

The effect on public opinion was ascertained from three Gallup Poll questions which periodically asked respondents if 1) they thought the United States made a mistake in sending fighting troops to Vietnam; 2) approved or disapproved of the way the president was handling the Vietnam situation; 3) approved or disapproved of his handling the job of president. Indicators of the impact on Vietnam policy consisted of 1) the number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam, and 2) the munitions expended in Indochina by months. Time intervals of 1, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months were chosen to permit analysis of both immediate and long-term effects.

Recognizing the problems in measuring the effectiveness of any attempts at social change, including protests -- e.g., the smallness of samples, a lack of comparable cases, and risks in attributing long-term effects to independent variables -- Berkowitz searched for a pattern of results by way of multiple investigations in which deviations from the trend line formed by indicator data were examined, and t-test comparisons were made between the mean amount of change over each interval for those sets of data in which a demonstration had either occurred or not occurred during the first month of the interval. Out of 25 separate t-test comparisons, 3 significant results were obtained indicating that approval for the president's handling of the Vietnam situation increased significantly after a major demonstration compared to equal periods without demonstrations, when one month and three months intervened between demonstration and measurement. There was also a greater increase in approval of the president's handling of his job after major demonstrations, compared to equal periods without demonstrations. Since much of the demonstrating expressed dissatisfaction with presidential actions, these increases in approval indirectly suggest that the demonstration had an unwanted effect. Such an interpretation is open to doubt, however, since the same effect did not show up in opinions about sending troops. Moreover the large number of comparisons makes chance findings possible, and all effects diminished over time. Finally, no significant effects were turned up by military indicators.

Besides noting that the data may well indicate that demonstrations did not affect public opinion, Berkowitz suggests that these results may be related to the methodology used in the study. The demonstrations may not have been large enough or attracted enough attention to influence

public opinion, or the dependent variables might have been inadequate indicators. Analysis is also limited by problems in assessing the effects of a number of demonstrations over long intervals and the possible failure of the t-test to reveal complexities in the data. Berkowitz suggests ways to discover effects despite these limitations, and others, although he admits that with such complex events a given determinant will account for little of the variance.

For these reasons, although the demonstrations appeared to produce some relatively weak and transient negative effects, as shown by two questions from two public opinion polls, the author concluded that the "data in general do not reveal any consistent, dramatic, or lasting effects of the demonstrations one way or the other." In suggesting why the findings were inconclusive, Berkowitz noted that perhaps only the very largest demonstrations had significant effects, or the effect of a single demonstration might be less important than continuation of the movement as a whole. Perhaps other indicators should have been used -- he mentions several possibilities -- and other designs and analytic techniques. It is always possible, according to Berkowitz, that social protests in general may have little or no impact: "Americans may have become fed up with the Vietnam War not because of demonstrations, and certainly not because their perceptions concerning patriotism, morality or America's role in the world have changed at all, but rather because they have independently seen its persistence and inconclusiveness."

Comments:

The failure to establish any effect for the 15 selected demonstrations is suggestive but not conclusive, since more than 750 demonstrations took place between 1964 and 1971, all varying in size and prominence but deserving study for their possible impact. The measures of effectiveness were likewise too selective, and they suffered from recognized problems with questions on public opinion as well as inadequate data on military involvement. Other useful information relating to the effects of demonstrations might have been gained by examining the location of demonstrations, the time of their occurrence, the duration of each incident, and the response by police and other control agencies. None of these were analyzed.

Bolton, Charles, "Alienation and Action: A Study of Peace Group Members,"
    American Journal of Sociology, 73, 3, November 1972, 537-61.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

The membership of three peace organizations and a random sample of
nonmembers in a suburban university community of about 11,000 were given
questionnaires in 1972 designed to understand the relationship of social-
psychological orientations and political attitudes to affiliation and
activity in these groups. The three peace groups varied in degree of
radicalness of ideology and action and a complete sample of their mem-
berships was used (n=95). A random sample of households produced 234
respondents for the nonmember component of the study. In addition a small
sample (30) of radical pacifists from outside the community composed of
persons known to have engaged in tactics such as civil disobedience,
lengthy peace marches and vigils who devoted a much higher proportion of
their time to peace work than members of the other three peace groups was
drawn.

Two ideological scales (political attitudes and foreign policy atti-
tudes) as well as four alienation scales (powerlessness, meaninglessness,
isolation and normlessness) were constructed and comparisons between all
the groups studied were made.

Although the peace group sample as a whole was markedly more liberal
in political attitudes and more oriented to international and pro-disarma-
ment attitudes than the nonmember sample, there was considerable overlap
between the two samples. "Thus, it appears that political and foreign
policy attitudes alone are not sufficient to account for peace group
membership, although their influence, particularly when taken in combina-
tion, is very considerable." In all four types of alienation, the peace
group and nonmember samples differ significantly. Relative to the non-
member samples, peace group members are high in normlessness and isolation
but low in meaninglessness and very low in feelings of powerlessness.
"Most striking is the fact that peace group members are high in normless-
ness--that is, alienation from the economic-political structure--but very
low in feelings of powerlessness to influence that structure." This was
verified by data showing that peace group members were far more active
in a wide range of political action than any nonmember sample or subsample.
From data on the nonmember sample, the author found that there was a
considerable number of people of comparable social status in essential
agreement with peace group members on political and international questions,
but who felt powerless to influence political affairs and did not become
involved in organizations such as peace groups or political parties.

Using a scale measuring an underlying orientation to social pheno-
mena (social explanation), feelings of powerlessness were found to be
associated with social explanation. "It appears that political and
foreign policy liberals who tend toward a biopsychological mode of social
explanation have a sense of powerlessness and manifest a low level of
political activity. Political and foreign policy liberals who tend toward
a sociological mode of social explanation have a sense of social power and

are likely to be politically active, including activity in such organiza-
tions as peace groups."

Among the four peace-activist samples (the three peace groups and the
sample of radical pacifists), normlessness, isolation, and meaninglessness
all increased with degree of radical activity while powerlessness decreased
as radicalism increased. The social explanation scale was also highly
predictive of radicalism. "Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that a
high degree of meaninglessness, normlessness, and isolation, in combina-
tion with a high sense of being able to influence a social environment
perceived in terms of a sociological mode of causation, predisposes peo-
ple toward radical social action." Membership in groups can be explained
primarily by reference to political and foreign policy attitudes but the
radicalness or level of the activity of members is best explained by a
combination of the social psychological orientations of meaninglessness,
normlessness, isolation and powerlessness.

Comments:

This is an extremely interesting study of the effects of feelings of
political efficacy and alienation in a specific type of collective group
action. Bolton identifies certain problems with the analysis that must be
considered in interpretation of findings. First, there are indefinite
numbers of other orientations besides those considered which could be
related to kinds and level of peace group activity. Second, the problems
in attributing causality are unresolved since there was no before and after
data to judge whether the social psychological orientations cause or result
from group involvements. In that context, however, he tacked on 25 inter-
views with active members and leaders of peace groups which showed that
1) members of these groups were less often self-selected than recruited
through their social networks (e.g., friends who already belonged, through
groups such as a cooperative parents nursery, or from distinguishable
status groups in the community), and 2) that the predisposing orientations
developed in youth and early adulthood, prior to actual membership in a
peace group.

Burton, Michael, "Elite Disunity and Collective Protest: The Vietnam Case,"
   Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 5, 1977, 169-83.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Content Analysis

   Using an "elitist" interpretation of the development of collective
protests, this paper argues that an erosion of elite support for Vietnam
policies occurred before popular disenchantment and protest and that this
created the conditions necessary for the development of an anti-war protest
of national significance. Elites include nationally prominent politicians,
leading businessmen, top military officers, high-level civil servants,
trade union leaders, and prominent intellectuals such as academicians,
journalists, and social critics.

   Although no major segment of the elite was fundamentally opposed to
existing political institutions (which is a major precondition of revolu-
tion), they clearly became disunified on Vietnam policies and this is a
major precondition of nationally significant collective protest.

   Using a variety of admitted impressionistic evidence including criti-
cisms appearing in the "Week in Review" section of the New York Times
from 1962-1968, the author argues that 1) there was a publicly visible
erosion of elite support for Vietnam policies well before the first major
anti-war demonstration in 1965 and by this time elites had articulated all
major rationales for opposing the war; 2) there were many widely publicized
additional erosions of elite support for Vietnam policies preceding the other
major protest in 1967; 3) a number of public elite figures were directly
involved in encouraging, organizing, sponsoring and leading anti-war demon-
strations, such as the Teach-In movement; 4) there was no similar anti-war
protest against the Korean War largely because elites were highly unified
in support of Korean War policies.

   Elite disunity over national policies makes resources available for
protest mobilization including leadership, general protection of constitu-
tional rights, permission to use public facilities, access to communication
networks, and moral, financial, and organizational support. In fact,
"although many Americans thought protest of the Vietnam War was treasonous,
relatively few sanctions were applied to anti-war protesters because so
many prominent and powerful Americans also opposed the war."

   These observations are used to raise serious doubts about past research
suggesting that anti-war protest is evidence of a genuine youth rebellion;
rather they suggest that the interpretation of conditions of strain and
objective deprivation by elite persons determines whether nonelites will
identify their grievances and be willing to protest them. This elitist
approach is seen to complement recent resource mobilization theories be-
cause it is elite disunity that makes mobilization resources available.
It also complements Smelser's notion of structural strain because it argues
that strain is operant in a society to the extent that powerful persons
perceive strain and are willing to articulate it.

Comments:

While this argument is persuasive for the development and emergence of a movement in which sophisticated and ideologically liberal people were involved, there is a need to underscore conditions in which this elite approach may not be particularly useful. It may be less helpful in understanding extremist movements involving less sophisticated and right wing participants and may also be less useful in predicting processes and developments once the movement has emerged. It would seem necessary in really testing this theory to trace the linkages between protest participants and elites and to determine the extent to which protest participants were really aware of the actions and attitudes of these elites.

Granberg, Donald and William May, "I-E and Orientations Toward the Vietnam War," Journal of Social Psychology, 88, 1, October 1972, 157-58.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Previous research has shown that nonviolent civil rights activists were disproportionately internal--and those willing to use violence, disproportionately external--in Locus of Control (i.e., whether or not external causal events are perceived to be contingent upon internally motivated actions). In April 1971, 325 sociology undergraduates (University of Missouri) completed questionnaires including a semantic differential for the war, a locus of control test, and a list of twenty-three types of protest actions in which they might have engaged. Correlational analysis and multiple regression analysis showed that, in this sample: 1) most students opposed the war in Vietnam, checking an average of 3.2 protest action items; 2) locus of control was not associated with dovish vs. hawkish actions or attitudes; 3) subjective social class, sex, and dogmatism were also unrelated to S's position toward the war; 4) taking protest action was somewhat related to each of the following: attitudes toward the war (.39), year in school (.21), authoritarianism (-.20), and religiosity (-.16)--these four factors accounted for 43% of the sample variance. The authors hypothesize that earlier in the war matters may have been different, and they continue to suspect that "internals will be disproportionately present in the early stages of a conventional, reform oriented social movement which has an assumption of the responsiveness of the social system."

Comments:

This is a sparse description, but a useful nonfinding with a good sized sample.

Hayes, James R., "The Dialectics of Resistance: An Analysis of the
GI Movement," Journal of Social Issues, 31, 4, 1975, 125-39.

Approach: Descriptive/Theoretical

Social scientists have given little attention to the attempt by
a small number of military personnel to create an antiwar, anti-military
protest movement in the armed forces of the Vietnam eta. Hayes'
article briefly describes and analyzes this movement, focusing parti-
cularly on: a) some of the instrumental factors in starting and de-
veloping the GI movement, and b) the military's response to internal
resistance.

In contrast to the continuing presence on a small scale of internal
dissent within the United States military, the GI movement was a full-
scale protest movement, unique to the Vietnam era. It emerged between
1965 and 1967 in a rather piecemeal and disorderly fashion, marked by
individual acts of resistance. Many of these initial acts of resis-
tance to the war were by officers, protesting independently with no
real communication with others in the movement. These early resisters
paid for their isolated acts of protest with prison sentences and
dishonorable discharges.

Collective dissent regarding both anti-war and anti-military
issues began to replace individual acts in 1968. At first it was
expressed through uncoordinated groups of resisters, but joint inter-
action by these groups eventually came through the development of
the GI underground press and through specific organizations to support
the movement. The issue of the constitutional rights of military
personnel came to the forefront in 1969, and GI participation in anti-
war demonstrations continued to increase.

Throughout the rise of antiwar sentiment and antiwar confror-
tations, the military authorities responded with harsh suppression
and punitive actions, a policy that not only heightened the sense of
struggle among activist GIs but also occasioned much publicity and
public support for their cause. Civilian antiwar and civil liberties
groups began to view the dissident GIs as allies and provided legal
and financial support. Eventually the military used administrative
discharges in lieu of more repressive measures: and after this change,
which coincided with the end of the war and the draft, the movement
effectively quieted.

Comments:

This is a fascinating account of the emergence of a social move-
ment within an organization devoted to order and discipline. It pro-
vides an analysis of the formation and transformation of the movement
based on characteristics of participants, environmental and organiza-
tional factors, and the response of control agencies.

Kritzer, Herbert M., "Political Protest and Political Violence: A
    Nonrecursive Causal Model," Social Forces, 55, 3, March 1977, 630-40.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

What accounts for violence by both protesters and the police in
the course of political protests,   defined as "public group activity
utilizing confrontation politics to apply stress to specific targets
for the purpose of affecting public policy?" To answer this question,
a nonrecursive causal model was developed and tested using data from
126 largely antiwar demonstrations, one-fourth of which involved violence.

The model suggests that the outbreak of violence at protests is a
dynamic process, resulting from events specific to the settings them-
selves. Three underlying causes of violence by protesters were sug-
gested: 1) beliefs about the morality and function of violence in
general (normative choices); 2) a perception that violence is an effec-
tive tool both in general and in the specific situation; and 3) provo-
cation by violent police action in the specific situation. Violence
by police was said to result from 1) an anticipation of trouble from
protesters and in some cases a conscious intention or at least a readi-
ness to commit violence; 2) provocation, verbal or symbolic, by pro-
testers, and 3) violence by protesters.

All data were derived from the key event questionnaire designed by
MacCannell which produces specific information on 145 aspects of each
event. A mail survey yielded 118 descriptions of events from persons
who had participated in nonviolent action training programs; data on
the remaining eight events, which took place during the spring 1971
antiwar demonstrations in Washington, D.C., were from observers employed
on a research project to study nonviolent direct action. It was not
possible to test the model directly since no information was available
on several of the variables, but the actual departures from the original
model were minor. Six Guttman scales were constructed to reduce the
original items: 1) "arrests" (the nature of arrests made), 2) "equip-
ment" (the presence of heavy police equipment), 3) "cops" (the type of
police present), 4"CD" (the nature of the civil disobedience by pro-
testers), 5" "Police" (the use of violence by police), and 6) "pro-
testers" (the use of violence by protesters, including verbal violence).
Three other individual items were used: 1) whether demonstrators used
a finger as a sign of contempt, 2) whether they shouted obscenities;
and 3) whether they were trying to avoid being violent.

The model appeared to predict quite well the use of violence by
protesters, the police and the nature of arrests. The most important
factor accounting for violence during any single event was action by
police and protesters. Protesters' violence was primarily the result
of violence by police, and police violence was most commonly only the
result of violence by the other side.

Comments:

This article is both provocative and interesting because it asserts that the violence is less a function of long-standing beliefs, decisions, or strategies of police and dissidents than a result of their immediate interaction. Kritzer does not confront the question of what sets off the violence and argues that this present analysis makes it an issue for further research. Since the sequence of events was not specified, we do not know whether protesters or police tend to initiate the violence.

The findings must be viewed cautiously because of limitations in the sample and in the response rate to the questionnaires. Most of the descriptions of events were by persons who had participated in training programs in nonviolent action, and most of the events were demonstrations against war. Although we are not given any information about the time covered, or the types of participants, the events can apparently be generalized only to a subset of political protests which are largely nonviolent, strongly ideological, and relative short. The actual response rate to the mailed questionnaire is not given, but a yield of only 118 usable questionnaires from a 20 percent mailing to several thousand respondents would be about 20 percent (which is extremely low). Yet as an exploratory attempt to understand the conditions under which violence will occur and as an interesting methodological model, this article should interest most readers.

Mann, Leon, "Counting the Crowd: Effects of Editorial Policy on Estimates,"
   Journalism Quarterly, 51, 2, 1974, 278-85.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Content Analysis

Estimates of crowds attending large, well-publicized demonstrations
have aroused much controversy because they are believed to indicate the
strength of dissent. This study suggests that press reports of atten-
dance at anti-war rallies tend to reflect the newspaper's position on
the Vietnam issues.

Two major anti-war rallies in Washington on November 27, 1965 and
October 21-22, 1967, were selected to test whether the crowds estimated
by hawkish newspapers differed in general from those reported by the
dove press. The crowd at the first rally was estimated by the sponsors
at 40,000-50,000; the National Park Police estimated 20,000-25,000.
Estimates for the second rally diverged even more; organizers of the
march estimated 150,000-200,000 participants; the National Park Police
guessed 37,000. Accounts of each rally in more than twenty newspapers
were analyzed regarding their reports on crowd size and their editorial
policy. The newspapers were then classified as "hawk," "probable hawk,"
"probable dove," and "dove;" the crowd estimate was taken to be the figure
or an average of the figures each newspaper reported for attendance at
the demonstration.

For both rallies, "dove" dailies, giving equal weight to the esti-
mates by police and by the sponsor, had the highest crowd estimate.
"Hawks," which relied exclusively on the police estimate or offered an
estimate of their own, were lowest. The hawkish newspapers thus tended
to rely on the lower estimates of the Park Police, while the newspapers
on the side of the doves followed the higher Metropolitan Police estimate.

The author suggests that "the political position of a newspaper
had some bearing on the sources it chose to quote, which in turn affected
its report of attendance at the demonstration. Since hawks and doves
drew their stories from wire services and from their own staffs, it would
appear that for this event, editorial policy, rather than lack of infor-
mation was responsible for the selective reporting of crowd estimates."
He also argues, however, that large discrepancies between the crowd counts
of newspapers would not be likely if the estimate offered by an authori-
tative source indicated that the gathering was so impressive that an
attempt to arrive at an exact figure would be meaningless.

Comments:

The fact that the political position of news sources influences
their "factual reporting" of collective disorders is demonstrated in this
article which suggests that their reports can provide important evidence
for or against media bias.

Morse, Stanley and Stanton Peele, "A Study of Participants in an Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration," Journal of Social Issues, 127, 4, 1971, 113-35.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Data gathered from 410 protesters traveling on buses and trains from Chicago to an anti-Vietnam war rally in Washington, D.C. in 1967 were used to understand the way in which political attitudes, feelings of nationalism, and socioeconomic characteristics affect political actions such as participation in demonstrations. The basic framework of the research was that these demonstrators would stress political action aspects of the national role of citizens and would react more positively toward America's ideological base than toward its traditional symbols.

The backgrounds of these political activists were similar to those of students involved in on-campus political actions as measured by previous research efforts. Nearly all were white and from urban backgrounds and most were planning an education beyond college. They came from relatively high socioeconomic backgrounds and had parents with relatively high academic achievement. Both the student and nonstudent demonstrators had high educational levels but the 91 nonstudent protesters in the sample were most often female and had more heterogeneous income levels than the students. Most of the demonstrators came from Jewish backgrounds.

The demonstrators shared a belief that a good citizen should play an active role in the political process and they responded more positively toward ideological (e.g., the Bill of Rights) than traditional (e.g., Congress) U.S. symbols. They were more oriented toward the international rather than national political system and were concerned more with humanity in general than with any particular political system.

There were important differences in the beliefs of the student and nonstudent protesters. Over three-fourths of the nonstudents favored one of the socialist parties, while only 39% of the students favored them. Nonstudents were significantly more alienated from the political system and less optimistic about their political efficacy than students. The authors argue that there was a good deal of indirect evidence that one segment of the nonstudents (the older ones) seemed to be continuing a Socialist tradition of protest that had its heyday in the 1930s.

In an attempt to compare the protesters with a sample of "typical Americans" (i.e., a random sample of respondents in Ann Arbor, Michigan in 1967), they found that the protesters were less oriented toward traditional U.S. symbols, were more concerned with ideology and its symbolic representations, and more often felt that the United States had markedly diverged from the ideals on which it was founded.

Arguing that further research on the role conceptions of other Americans, including right-wing protesters, politically inactive but radical Americans, and just plain citizens, is necessary they suggest that the "protesters' tendency to empathize with humanity is probably a complex phenomenon resulting from the interaction of sociological factors and certain social

psychological forces in their histories."

Comments: Unfortunately, this study is largely descriptive and lacks any real attempt to systematically measure differences in ideology between different types of protesters or between protesters and nonprotesters. Moreover, there is only a meager effort to explain the few significant findings that emerged.

Peele, Stanton and Stanley Morse, "On Studying a Social Movement,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, 33, 3, 1969, 409-11.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

In this methodological note on the authors' experiences in adminis-
tering a questionnaire to people participating in an anti-Vietnam war
demonstration in Washington, D.C. in 1967, some pointers for others en-
gaged in this type of research are given.

Rather than trying to draw a sample of participants in Washington,
they decided to select the sample from those persons coming from a par-
ticular city because this would ease the problem of access and avail-
ability of respondents. They chose Chicago as the site for sampling
because it was far enough from Washington so that most individuals would
be traveling in groups and also because it was near their own home base.
Although the movement was haphazardly organized, they did find that one
group, the Chicago Peace Council (CPC) was coordinating the transporta-
tion of the demonstrators and was happy to cooperate with the researchers.
Access to respondents was facilitated by shared anti-war sentiments on
the part of the researchers and similarity in dress (long hair and beards)
as well as their willingness to participate in some of the routine
clerical duties of CPC. They also hired "bus captains" to administer
the questionnaire on the buses and trains en route to Washington, which
gave them information on the attitudes and perspectives of protestors prior
to their actual participation in the demonstration. The questionnaire
avoided highly controversial questions, required little writing and be-
gan with a relatively complete letter of introduction and set of instruc-
tions. In this letter, the researchers stressed the desire to gain ac-
curate information, in contrast to the often biased characterizations of
demonstrators which appeared in the press. The approach "worked remark-
ably well, yielding a more than 90 percent response rate."

Comments:

This short methodological note is extremely useful in designing re-
search in which sensitive populations are involved. The response rate
to the questionnaire may, however, be an artifact of the relatively
captive population, more than the other aspects of the research procedures
outlined.

Rinaldi, Matthew, "The Olive-Drab Rebels: Military Organizing During the Vietnam Era," Radical America, 8, 3, May-June 1973, 17-52.

Approach: Descriptive/Historical
Methodology: Observation

The author chronicles the rise and fall of dissent in the armed forces during the Vietnam war. He found that dissent did not by and large originate within the armed forces but rather was imported, after a certain time lag, from the organized civilian left. However, the radicalization of the armed forces was not, as might have been expected, primarily due to the drafting of civilian dissenters. As a Pentagon study showed, 64% of chronic AWOL's during the war years were enlistees, a fact which the author explains by means of a relative deprivation hypothesis: draftees went in for two years, expecting the worst, keeping their heads down and waiting it out, whereas enlistees, who signed up for three or four years looking for the glamorous career the recruiters had promised them, were unprepared for the ugly reality of the war and became violently disaffected.

Two major foci of political organizing during the war years were underground newspapers and off-base coffeehouses. The newspapers were prepared and circulated by members of the organized left who found themselves in an ideologue's paradise: class discrimination, which had never been more than a vague abstraction to working-class youth, became a life-and-death matter in the army. The disproportionate number of working-class GI's (who had neither the education nor the wealth to take advantage of college or other means of avoiding induction) created a volatile situation, the worsening of the war provided the catalyst: GI's embraced the radical viewpoint articulated in the underground newspapers. The coffeehouses provided environments in which GI's could share and consolidate their new-found radicalism. The coffeehouses were staffed by civilians, and although the military brass could have taken action against them (subverting soldiers being, after all, a crime) the fact that they did not indicated their respect for the growing anti-war movement among the civilian population at large.

Anti-war organizing within the military faded away, of course, as the war ground to a halt. The author concludes with a few remarks about the overall effect of the phenomenon. To what extent did the attempt by the left to organize the U.S. working class while in uniform and subjected to the atrocious circumstances of a floundering war carry over once the war had ended? In the author's opinion, although the working class is not now visibly more radical, "at the very least, the military tradition in the U.S. working class suffered a major setback."

Comments:

A very interesting article. The description of the vulnerability of the U.S. army to leftist organizing is particularly intriguing in light of the failure of the left to organize the larger society.

Solomon, Frederic and Jacob Fishman, "Youth and Peace: A Psychosocial
Study of Student Peace Demonstrators in Washington, D.C.," The
Journal of Social Issues, 20, 4, October 1964, 54-73.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Survey Research; Observation

This is a report of the findings of an "on the spot" research project
carried out during a two-day demonstration by student peace demonstrators
in Washington in 1962. Short answer questionnaires were filled out by
218 participants selected "randomly" by a group of medical student research
assistants and in-depth interviews were conducted with 29 other subjects
by four psychiatrists and one psychologist. This sample represented
approximately 6 percent of the total number of registered demonstrators
(4,000). Informal observations were also made and group interviews were
conducted with peace demonstrators as well as with some of the opposing
counter-pickets from conservative student groups. Eighteen months later
a follow-up questionnaire was sent to some of the peace demonstrator
sample.

Some of the results of the study of demonstrators included:

1) The demonstrators were quite young, with a mean age of 18 ½ years.

2) They tended to have no well formed, comprehensive political ideo-
logy and many spoke directly of the civil rights movement as the
model for political action.

3) The majority of the demonstrators were male, with homes in urban
areas, from small middle-class families, majoring in the humanities
or social sciences, with no religious preference.

4) Their perceived goals of the demonstration were mainly to streng-
then and expand the student peace movement itself and the majority
did not really expect any change in policy or in the attitudes
of government officials. Almost everyone hoped that the publicity
given the demonstration would somehow result in increased public
arousal and awareness of the issues.

5) Personal motivations to participate included the reduction of
feelings of isolation, to combat feelings of helplessness, anxiety
and uncertainty about the future, a desire for political action,
a sense of guilt about inactivity, and "striving for purity."

6) The majority of students came from politically liberal families,
but they were "rebelling" in going far beyond parental experience
in the realm of public action. Half of the participants who filled
out questionnaires felt that there was a definite risk because
government agents were observing them and that government jobs
might be later denied to participants. However, very few students
felt that there was any real risk academically because of lost
time or school disapproval or from family disapproval or physical
harm.

7) Three-fourths of the demonstrators were members of some organiza-
tion sponsoring the rally. Only 3 percent of the sample were
totally alone in that they knew no one else in the demonstration.
Indeed, the vast majority of students reported having six or
more friends who also had come to demonstrate in Washington.

8) The data strongly suggests that the development of the student
civil rights movement had a profound influence in mobilizing the
potential for student social action, in demonstrating the possi-
bility of such action being effective, and in focusing attention
on the techniques of nonviolent public action and civil disobe-
dience.

9) The age period in which first feelings for social or political
causes were most likely to develop was 12 to 15 years, and these
first experiences and activities usually came about outside of
and fairly independent of family experience and conscious influ-
ence.

Interviews conducted with ten counter-pickets from various conserva-
tive student groups were used to compare data on general characteristics
and attitudes with those of the peace demonstrators. All of the counter-
pickets were white and predominantly Catholic, and were generally pre-
paring for careers in businesses, law, or foreign service. The difference
in attitudes between these students and the peace group seem only partially
related to rationally formulated positions and partly to basic psycho-
social attitudes such as trust-distrust, cowardice-bravery, etc.

Twenty-one percent of the original questionnaire group responded to
a follow-up questionnaire mailed eighteen months later. Of these a clear
majority were still actively engaged in some sort of political and social
action but less with issues of peace and disarmament than with civil rights.

Comments:

"On the spot" research is always plagued with methodological problems
and this study is no exception. The sample size is small and though the
attempt to "randomize" it was well intentioned, it was probably not suc-
cessful since the research assistants were allowed to pick anyone and
were paid for each completed questionnaire. The orientation of the re-
searchers, particularly the interviewers, who were psychiatrists and psy-
chologists, led to a focus on psychosocial factors underlying participation
and ignored some of the situational and ideological determinants. For
example, no attention was given to how these students happened to become
involved in the organizations which sponsored the demonstration and why
they chose this particular form of protest as a vehicle for their psycho-
social motivations.

Teevan, Richard C. and Louis W. Stamps, "A Motivational Correlate of
    Viet Nam Protest Group Members," Psychological Reports, 33,
    3, 1973, 777-78.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Controlled Experiment

An earlier series of studies by Teevan and his colleagues demon-
strated that persons who scored high on the Hostile Press Thematic
Apperception Test projective test exhibited the following: a) fear
of failure, b) defensiveness toward authority, c) sensitivity to hos-
tility in the environment, d) responsiveness to group approval,
e) "paranoid-like" anxiety, f) an anxious regard for the future, and
g) a generalized aggressive response to externally imposed restric-
tions. Teevan and Stamps then hypothesized that this projective mea-
sure might distinguish antiwar protestors from nonprotestors.

Undergraduates at a large state university wrote projective pro-
tocols in response to four T.A.T. slides. Sixty subjects had not
been involved in protests; 39 were then members of active antiwar
protest groups. Marginally significant results showed higher scores
for protest group members. The variance explained by this difference
is not specified, but it is likely to be quite small. Nonetheless,
the authors conclude that "it is possible to say that protest group
members are reacting to the externally imposed restrictions placed
upon them by the United States government -- the Viet Nam policy --
with a form of generalized aggression -- the demonstrations. Because
the people high in hostile press are filled with manifest
anxiety and paranoid-type anxiety and feel an anxious regard for the
future while perceiving much hostility in their environment, they
might find it difficult to handle this anxiety about the future
without some form of anxiety-releasing (tension-releasing) mechanisms."

Comments:

How these projective reactions exceed the expectable "reactance"
is not clear. Stamps and Teevan are also remiss in failing to specify
the magnitude of the differences they found. Perhaps more seriously,
the confuse the requisites of causal evidence in their effort to
validate this Hostile Press personality characteristic. A student's
engagement in antiwar activities might very well itself affect the
projective measures. Such measures cannot then demonstrate that a
"hostile personality" caused the person to protest. One could just
as reasonably conclude that the anger a man feels after being mugged
represents a trait that explains the mugging.

Useem, Michael, "Ideological and Interpersonal Change in the Radical Protest
Movement," Social Problems, 19, 4, Spring 1972, 451-69.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Protest movements, in seeking to expand by recruiting new members rela-
tively rapidly, face severe problems in maintaining their original goals,
ideologies and identities. The author theorizes that:

"If the influx of new initiates is relatively rapid and large,
if the membership criteria are not restrictive, and if there
is little formal organization in the movement, two developments
are possible. The new people, lacking interpersonal loyalties
and political commitments to the movement, may swing the organ-
ization toward a less cohesive and less radical direction as
their numbers, thinking, and external commitments come to domi-
nate the movement. On the other hand, the radical character of
the movement may survive if socializing processes lead to effec-
tive integration of the newcomers. In the first instance new-
comer identity is preserved while the character of the movement
is altered. In the second case the movement retains its iden-
tity while the newcomers experience a transformation in their
social and political identity."

In his case study of the American draft resistance movement of 1967-68,
he focuses on the second outcome--the ideological and interpersonal changes
experienced by newcomers to the resistance movement. Although most of the
early organizers of the movement had been active in New Left groups, for a
significant fraction of the newcomers the resistance was their first acquain-
tance with radical protest politics. Membership criteria were not restric-
tive. All that was required was opposition to the draft and the Vietnam
war. There was little formal organization at a national level and local
resistance groups developed little structure. Yet the movement retained
its radical orientation throughout its existence, which meant that many of
those who joined it underwent significant transformations in their social
and political identities rather than that the movement was transformed by
the influx of newcomers.

The resisters who were relatively radical prior to participation in
the movement were more likely to have entered the resistance as a means of
strengthening a movement for change (e.g., to increase the political effec-
tiveness of the movement) whereas those without such a background placed
greater emphasis on the individual and moral implications of their involve-
ment (e.g., as an expression of personal convictions). Despite the initial
distance between organizers and those new to the left, the newcomers not
only came to accept the radical tenets of the movement but in many cases
advanced considerably beyond the perspective of those who originally knit
the movement together.

Several characteristics of the resistance movement were seen as critical
in facilitating this conversion. The act of burning one's draft card was
very risky and tended to require not only a strong resolution prior to doing

it but also further action afterwards to justify it and to demonstrate seriousness of the action. Thus there was a strong tendency for draft card burners to become highly involved in movement activities right away. This was also partially because the movement offered support and solace in the face of presumed imminent arrest and prosecution. Moreover since many newcomers entered at the same time, they "kept the oldtimers and their philosophy from being too overpowering or intimidating." But the fact that there were seasoned activists around provided a structured opportunity for direct personal contact with them.

For many resisters, especially those without left backgrounds, it was a period of alienation from close associates and parents and friends and diminished contact with non-movement persons. Although a significant fraction of the pre-resistance friends were retained, they were also undergoing considerable radicalization.

Comments:

This is an interesting portrait of the process of socialization following mass recruitment into a social movement and is considerably enhanced by the raw material from the interviews contained within the article. Unfortunately, there are some questions about the sampling method not answered in the article which affect the validity of the conclusions. Although the author mentions that a total of 274 names were generated through the snowballing technique, the sample consisted of only 97 persons. While he explained that 50 names were deleted due to refusal to participate, inability to locate respondents, or the fact that they turned out not to have been draft resisters, he did not tell us why the remaining 224 names led to only 97 interviews. He also indicated that the snowball technique seemed to involve a bias toward respondents who were more amenable to interviews, more active in resistance programs, and of greater prominence in the movement. This would seem to cast some doubt on the adequacy of data from these respondents in accounting for the effectiveness of the movement in socializing and incorporating the bulk of newcomers.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Feminism and Women's Liberation

Arnott, Catherine, "Feminists and Anti-Feminists as 'True Believers',"
Sociology and Social Research, 57, 3, April 1973, 300-06.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

"In 1951 Eric Hoffer maintained (in The True Believer) that proponents
of opposing ideologies (radical and reactionaries) are drawn from the same
'personality pool'--'frustrated failures'." Data drawn from a questionnaire
comparison of married women in feminist--NOW--(n=20) and anti-feminist--
Fascinating Womanhood--(n=41) groups provide an opportunity to examine
Hoffer's thesis from a sociological viewpoint. The findings show that
feminists were slightly younger, better education, more often married to
professionals, less religious and had fewer children than anti-feminists.
Both groups of women had strong and close relationships with their hus-
bands who supported their extra-marital activities; and more feminists
had careers other than "wifing." What the author concludes from this is
that both groups are "true believers" but "neither gave evidence of
being "frustrated failures"...

Comments:

The data brought to bear on Hoffer's hypothesis is so inadequate as
to make the findings almost meaningless. The samples are incredibly small
and the author herself admits "...the special characteristics of the sam-
ple must be kept in mind when making any generalizations from...this
study..."

Arrington, Theodore S. and Patricia A. Kyle, "Equal Rights Amendment Activists
      in North Carolina," Signs, 3, 3, 1978, 666-80.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

     This article examines the nature and characteristics of Equal Rights
activists in North Carolina in 1975, using the hypothesis that ERA activists
are similar to other political party activists in political activity,
political attitudes, personality characteristics, socioeconomic status,
religion, social cross-pressures, geography, and parental influences.

     Data on these ERA activists was collected by mail questionnaires sent to
200 persons randomly selected from signed letters to the editor of widely
circulated newspapers, newspaper stories about ERA, speeches before the state
legislature, organizational leaders of active women's groups, and member-
ship lists of involved groups. Four separate samples of 50 persons each
were drawn: Women for ERA, women against ERA, men for ERA, and men against
ERA.

     All of the respondents took an active role in the ERA dispute in North
Carolina, but women for ERA spent many more hours on ERA work than the other
three groups and women against ERA were most likely to report that they had
never been involved in a public issue before. Among the pro-ERA activists,
women were reported performing the more visible functions, but in the anti-
ERA camp, men were most visibly active. There was a good deal of political
partisanship among respondents with the pro-ERA activists espousing other
liberal causes such as increasing the domestic social program budget and
ending the death penalty while anti-ERA activists were opposed to busing to
achieve racial balance, believed in buttressing law enforcement agencies in
order to control crime, and so on. Many of the pro-ERA activists were
liberal activist Democrats and the majority of anti-ERA men were Republican
activists but most of the anti-ERA women identified themselves as Independents.

     With regard to ERA issues, all of the pro-ERA activists felt that
there was discrimination against women and that the government should take
action to achieve equal pay for equal work for the two sexes. Most women
against ERA denied significant discrimination but the men against ERA were
equally divided on this question. The major division between the pro and
anti forces was between those that wanted additional action by the government
and those who did not. The anti group was largely opposed to abortion on
demand while most of the pro people favored it.

     Using four personality scales (political alienation, dogmatism, trust
in people, and personal competence) they found no statistically significant
differences among the groups. They all felt capable and politically effective,
were open minded, were highly trusting and felt personally competent.

     When compared with the population of North Carolina, ERA activists were
better educated, with higher incomes, and younger. However, there were some
significant differences between the four groups. The men were better educated
than the women, with women against ERA being the least well educated.
While almost all the pro-ERA women worked outside the home and more than half

were in professional occupations, women against ERA were primarily house-
wives. While most of the men against ERA had wives who stayed at home, most
of the pro-ERA men had working wives who were professionals. Almost all of
the respondents were married and white. The overwhelming majority of anti-
ERA women belonged to the major fundamentalist religions while the other
three groups were mainly members of nonfundamentalist religious or not mem-
bers of any religious group. Most of the ERA activists were raised in
small town urban areas.

The authors find the anti-ERA women to be the most interesting because
they are the 'single issue activists' "about whom so little has been written,
who were mobilized primarily by fundamentalist ministers to oppose passage
of the ERA and...because the personal and political characteristics of its
members do not fit most of the hypothesized characteristics ascribed to
opponents of women's liberation."

Comments:

Although this article attempted to comprehensively characterize ERA
activists in North Carolina, the low response rate of 45 percent overall
(only 27 percent for anti-ERA activists) and the small initial sample severely
limit the credibility of the study.

It is not clear that the "typical, traditional" U.S. political activ-
ist with which the authors compared ERA activists really exists as the
authors used extremely selective sources in forming their existence and iden-
tifying their characteristics. Moreover, why would one would expect all
ERA activists to be similar to this "typical" activist. The authors them-
selves noted that previous studies found unfavorable attitudes towards
women's liberation to be associated with dogmatism, authoritarianism, and
lack of trust of others--personality characteristics dissimilar to those of
the 'typical' activist.

A third problem of this study is that the authors do not interpret the
data accurately or completely. In some cases their interpretations go beyond
the data reported. For instance, although the anti-ERA women did tend to
be first-time political participants and members of fundamentalist churches,
these findings do not support the interpretation that these women were
"mobilized primarily by fundamentalist ministers to oppose the passage of
the ERA." In other instances the authors fail to interpret the data they
presented. For example, without accounting for the real differences in
work experience between the pro- and anti-ERA women or the differences in
family background between anti-ERA women and the pro- groups, etc., the
authors contended that demographic factors were not sufficient to explain
the different behavior of the pro- and anti-ERA forces.

Overall, this study should be viewed as an initial attempt to identify
the characteristics of ERA activists. Additional research with a refined
research design is needed. Initial hypotheses should specify both similar-
ities and differences which can be expected among the various pro- and anti-
ERA groups. More systematic comparisons, e.g., between anti- and pro-ERA
women, between women and men against ERA, between early and late joiners
to the cause, and between ERA activists in various roles would be useful.

Fowler, Marguerite G., Robert L. Fowler, and Hani Van De Riet, "Feminism
    and Political Radicalism," Journal of Psychology, 83, 1973, 237-42.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Survey Research

    This study examined the political attitudes of feminist women in rela-
tion to those of their contemporary female peers. The subjects were 100
women aged 17-54: the feminist group (n=50) was composed of women selected
from those attending the 1972 Women's Symposium at the University of
Florida; the group of peers (n=50) was drawn from classes of upper-division
university women. Both groups completed the Attitudes Toward Feminist
Belief-Pattern Scale, the Conservatism-Radicalism Opinionnaire, and a
questionnaire providing biographical information and opinions regarding
feminine and political topics.

    The feminist and peer groups did not differ significantly in age,
educational level, marital status, and political party preference (although
there were more Democrats among the feminists; more Republicans among the
peers). They did, however, vary significantly on their feminism and
conservatism-radicalism scores. Subjects in the feminist group scored high-
er on feminism and lower on political conservatism than did their peer
counterparts. Furthermore, a high feminism score was found to be very
reliably related to a high radicalism score (radicalism is here defined
as an expectation of and striving for social change and new values).

    Questionnaire items on various political topics did not significantly
differentiate between the groups. Exceptions were the importance attri-
buted by peers to the issue of inflation, and the admiration expressed
for a woman in public life: feminists selected Shirley Chisholm, whereas
their peers most frequently endorsed Patricia Nixon. No difference was
evident from questions on whether the women's vote in 1972 would expand
women's rights and opportunities, and whether or not the subject would
"cast the same vote in the 1972 presidential election as that of the pri-
mary man in her life." It was suggested that this lack of significant
differences between feminist women and their female peers on several poli-
tical and feminist issues, in spite of their measured differences in poli-
tical and feminist orientations, may be accounted for by differing levels
of activism.

Comments:

    The data were incompletely presented and thus it is not known what
issues (other than Vietnam and inflation) were included in the measure con-
cerning attitudes toward political issues. It also is not known if the
feminist issues were limited to the three mentioned above--nor were data
provided for the three. Thus, in addition to not being an ambitious
study, it is inadequately described, the results are not fully presented,
the reliability and validity of the attitude scales are not addressed, and
the results are weakened by a 50% response rate for feminists and an unre-
ported rate of response by members of the peer group. Although the authors
assert a more radical, more activist orientation among feminists, all of
the women in this study scored relatively--and "equally"--high on radical-
ism. Little can be asserted about feminists--as distinct from nonfeminists
--when the critical measures fail to distinguish them from the "control"

group. While it seems clear that the "feminists" in this study were feminists, it is not clear what population was represented by the "nonfeminist radicals" in the college sample.

Freeman, Jo, "The Origins of the Women's Liberation Movement," American
Journal of Sociology, 78, 4, 1973, 792-811.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Case Study; Participant Observation

    Research on the emergence of a movement must embrace questions such
as: From where do the people come who make up the initial organizing
cadre? How do they come together, and how do they come to share a similar
view of the world in circumstances that compel them to political action?
In what ways does the way in which a movement emerges affect its future
development? Arguing that although theorists have analyzed causes of move-
ments and motivations of participants, almost none of them have looked at
origins, Freeman looks at the structure and origins of the women's liberation
movement.

    From her vantage point as a founder and participant in the younger
branch of the Chicago women's liberation movement from 1967 to 1969, editor
of the first national newspaper, and member of Chicago NOW, she did a
dissertation on the movement based on correspondence, interviews and exam-
ination of early papers. Three propositions are developed and supported
in this analysis.   .

    1) The need for a preexisting communications network of infrastructure
within the social base of the movement is a primary prerequisite for a gen-
eralized movement.

    2) The communications network must be composed of like-minded people
whose background experiences, or location in the social structure make them
receptive or "co-optable" to the ideas of a specific new movement.

    3) Given the existence of a communications network, a crisis is all
that is necessary to galvanize it into spontaneous action in a new direction.
If the communications network is rudimentary, an organizing cadre of one
or more persons is necessary who are skilled and have a fertile field in
which to work.

    Freeman distinguished two branches of the women's liberation movement.
The older branch had at its core the National Organization for Women (NOW)
and concentrated its activities on legal and economic problems of working
women. The style of organization was traditionally formal, with top-down
national organizations, lacking a mass base. Conversely, the younger
branch consists of many small groups, decentralized, "eschewing structure
and damning the idea of leadership, it has carried the concept of 'everyone
doing her own thing' to the point where communication is haphazard and
coordination is almost nonexistent." Although both branches tend to be
predominantly white, middle class and college educated, the younger branch
was more homogeneous because the small groups tended to form among friend-
ship networks.

    Both groups emerged in similar ways. The older branch was formed by
women who had been politically active in federal and state commissions and
who had shared a growing awareness and concern over women's issues that
was intensified by the refusal of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to give equal enforcement to the sex provision of Title VII as was
given to the race provision. They formed NOW in 1966. The younger branch

was begun by "radical women" who had been involved in the New Left move-
ment conferences and demonstrations and who used the opportunity to talk
with other women around the country about the women's movement. "In spite
of public derision by radical men, or perhaps because of it, young women
steadily formed new groups around the country."

Thus, both the Commissions on the Status of Women and the "radical
community" created a communications network through which these women
initially interested in creating an organization could easily reach others.
Both of these networks were co-optable because the members had common
experiences (e.g., sex discrimination experiences) which predisposed them
to be receptive to the ideas of the new movement and were not faced with
structural or ideological barriers to action. For both branches these
perceptions were strengthened by crises or precipitating events such as
the refusal of the EEOC to enforce the sex provision and the minor crises
faced by radical women working with men unconcerned with their problems.

The ways in which the two branches originated also has influenced their
further development. The older branch was created as a national structure
with short range goals and traditional political activities. The younger
branch was based on local level small groups with an emphasis on personal
change and consciousness-raising. Both have retained their original
structures and are limited by these structures in adapting to new tasks
and recruiting new members.

Comments:

This is an extremely important and insightful analysis of the women's
liberation movement, using a resource mobilization perspective.

Goldschmidt, Jean, Mary Gergen, Karen Quigley, Kenneth Gergen, "The
      Women's Liberation Movement: Attitudes and Action," Journal of
      Personality, 1974, December, 42, No. 4, A. 9.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

      This is a study of experiences, social characteristics and atti-
tudes of university women as they are related to their belief and
participation in the women's liberation movement.

      Four groups of factors were hypothesized to have an effect on
their commitment to the causes and activities of the women's movement:
1) family background; 2) educational and social experiences in college;
3) personal beliefs and values; and 4) the individual's expectations
and career aspirations.

      The sample was composed of 448 undergraduate women from four dif-
ferent types of settings. Multiple Classification Analysis, a form of
multiple regression, was used to test the capacity of each variable to
predict activism and belief in the women's movement. Women coming
from non-religious families were most likely to be active in the move-
ment and Catholic and Jewish women least likely. The data suggested
a modelling effect in terms of the mother's politics.

      Students with high grades tended to be more active, and students
majoring in the social sciences were more likely to share the ideology
and participate. Quantity and quality of heterosexual relationships
related to both actions and attitudes. Women with the least number of
relationships and women more moderately active were likely to share the
ideology of the movement. Women who had plans for marriage, who did not
expect to have a career, and who did not aspire to graduate degrees
were least likely to become active in the movement. The overriding fac-
tor beyond people's own experiences and extraneous factors like religion,
grades, etc., was belief in the ideology of the movement.

      The findings of this study may have dispelled some of the stereo-
types about the women's liberation movement that were current at the
time of the study. Activists did not come from broken homes, were not
rebelling against values and attitudes espoused by their parents, did
not necessarily come from a higher socioeconomic status family and were
no more likely to have low interest in heterosexual relationships.
They were strongly activated toward professional careers, were more poli-
tically liberal and tended to be more aggressive. Initially, the
authors had proposed that they might find similarities between the char-
acteristics of liberationists and participants in radical antiwar
activity. They concluded that in at least half of the predictors the
relationships did not follow the same pattern for membership in the
liberation movement and radical antiwar protest and that the liberation
movement is thus unique in some important respects.

Comments

It might be important to assess changes in the later stages of the movement in terms of the characteristics of the women and their ideology.

Morris, Monica, "The Public Definition of a Social Movement: Women's Liberation," <u>Sociology and Social Research</u>, July 1973, 526-43; see also, Morris, Monica, "Newspapers and the New Feminists: Black Out as Social Control?" <u>Journalism Quarterly</u>, 50, 1, Spring 1973, 37-42.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Observation; Content Analysis

In order to discover the effect of the public definition of a movement conveyed by the mass circulation newspapers upon the ability of an organization to recruit members, to grow, and to act, the women's liberation movement and its coverage by two local newspapers was studied in Los Angeles County, California between 1969 and 1971. Content analysis of the newspapers by the size of the coverage of women's issues and the slant of the coverage was carried out for a two-year period (July 1968 through June 1969 and March 1970 through February 1971). Observations of more than 20 women's liberation meetings were recorded, telephone and personal interviews with participants were conducted and membership records of the groups were also assessed.

For the first time period (July 1968 through June 1969) there was very little media coverage of the movement and most of it was neutral. But despite this virtual black-out of information about it by the press, the movement had experienced a sizeable growth in its membership and had acted in a variety of ways. Between the first and second time periods, the movement had grown some four to five times in size, was producing its own newsletters, and had established a coordinating council. And the two major local newspapers had increased their coverage of women's liberation activities by more than 50 times. Yet the newspaper coverage of the movement and the public definition it created did not reflect what was actually happening at the group meetings. There was considerable factionalism within and between groups at both points in time and there was a strong left-wing orientation and revolutionary flavor to the movement which were not contained in the public definition given by the media. Morris seems to argue that the media presentation of the movement as a reform rather than a revolutionary effort is in effect cooptation and will "result in slight, slow changes in the status of women." Thus, whether to spurn or court the media can be a critical issue to movement organizations who may be able to grow and recruit without the publicity.

Comments:

The author seems for the most part to be simply toying with Turner and Killian's ideas with no very clear notion of how she intends to incorporate them into a thesis of her own. For example, her contention that the Turner/Killian paradigm should be modified to account for the growth of the movement in the absence of media reportage is puzzling. Turner and Killian, in the paragraph quoted by the author, do not exclude recruitment in the absence of public definition but rather state that once public definition is attained (and the movement recognized <u>as a movement</u>) it becomes a crucial determinant of tactics of opposition, circumstances of recruiting, and legitimacy. The sampling method is questionable too since the author winds up guessing at the whole picture from only a few pieces of the puzzle. Why not survey a solid five year stretch on a weekly or bi-weekly rather than a daily basis?

Riger, Stephanie, "Locus of Control Beliefs and Female Activism," _Psychological Reports_, 41, 3, December 1977, 1043-46.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

According to earlier findings on activists, the belief that rewards are controlled by external forces, independent of a person's own actions, is correlated with political militancy. In this study, veteran members of women's consciousness-raising groups in 1972 are compared with new members and with women never involved in these groups. The object was twofold: First, to learn whether members or nonmembers had a stronger belief in external control over their lives, and second, to learn if this belief among members precedes or resulted from their participation in feminist groups.

A sample of white women from the Ann Arbor, Michigan area were given a 23-item locus of control scale measuring their beliefs about their own lives and those of women in general, and three factors were isolated in the scale: 1) beliefs about the desirability of collective strategies compared to individual efforts to counter discrimination against women (feminist ideology); 2) the importance of discrimination and limited opportunities compared to hard work and effort in women's success or failure ("system blame"); and 3) the extent that these beliefs applied to the respondent's own life ("personal control"). Forty-three women in the sample were "veterans" -- members of consciousness-raising groups for at least six months, 38 were "neophytes," or new recruits; and 41 were not involved in any such groups, having been randomly selected through University of Michigan student and staff directories ("comparisons"). There were no significant differences between the three groups in age, or marital, socioeconomic and occupational status.

Rigor found that female activists were much more likely to believe in external control on all three scales than women who were not involved in consciousness-raising groups, and the beliefs of "neophytes and veterans" were the same. Rigor thinks this indicates "that the female activists' ideology exists upon joining a women's group and is not altered by group participation. Participation does not change one's locus of control profile, but it may offer an opportunity to translate that set of beliefs into congruent patterns of behavior and self-definition."

Comments:

This study emphasizes personal choice rather than group influence as a determinant of militancy. The high overall response rate of 95 percent is very good. It would be interesting to know whether the degree of involvement in consciousness-raising groups varied directly with a belief in external control, and whether such a belief was related to other forms of political militancy. Gamson and Paige found that a belief in external control of one's personal life was inversely related to political participation, which contradicts these findings. They suggest a sense of personal efficacy is needed for participation, whereas Riger found this belief was strongest in women not belonging to consciousness-raising groups.

Sanger, Susan Phipps and Henry Alker, "Dimensions of Internal-External Locus of Control and the Women's Liberation Movement," Journal of Social Issues, 28, 4, 1972, 115-30.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Survey Research

In this study possible similarities between the fate control profile of the black militant and feminist are explored using Rotter's Internal-External scale on fifty women active in feminist organizations at a large eastern university and a control group of forty-six female students and four recent female graduates of the same school. They hypothesized that fate control was not a unitary personality dimension for women, but rather that as with blacks, there are several dimensions that must be differentiated, particularly personal control and control ideology. They posited that relative to the controls a group of feminists would be more internal in their own lives (i.e., believe that they control their own lives) yet more external in their control ideologies (i.e., believe that in the culture at large forces outside oneself control rewards), and more critical of the system as responsible for women's inferior status in our society.

Each subject completed a ten-page questionnaire which included background questions, Rotter's I-E Scale, feminist ideology items composed by the authors, twenty-four of thirty-five items on the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale, and questions about women's liberation. Analysis of this data indicated no differences between the two groups on background characteristics. Factor analysis isolated three dimensions which were very similar to those found by Gurin. While the personal control (PC) items by themselves did not discriminate between the two groups, the protestant ethic ideology (PEI) items did. It is the latter set of items which correspond with Gurin's control ideology factor. The third dimension, feminist ideology, served simply as a confirmation of the original distinction between the women's liberation and control groups. As hypothesized, the women's liberation group was relatively more internal along the personal control dimension (but not significantly so), and was significantly more external on the PEI than were the controls. It was also found that feminists had more positive attitudes toward bisexuality than did controls. The results were viewed as supportive of the blocked opportunity theory of militancy.

Comments:

The women's liberation subjects modified or skipped significantly more of the I-E items and this is discussed in relation to conflict over forced choice. Such test-taking behavior throws any interpretation into question. The samples were small and non-random. The protestant ethic ideology in college women as discussed by the authors present an interesting perspective on the impact of socialization. Finally, one major limitation of Rotter's I-E scale is item transparency and the resulting social desirability response sets. Although a measure of social desirability was included in the questionnaire, its main effect with PEI externality is mentioned but not discussed.

Slaby, Andrew and Joan Sealy, "Black Liberation, Women's Liberation,"
    American Journal of Psychiatry, 130, 2, 1973.

Approach: Clinical
Methodology: Interviews

    To understand why "most black women reject a major concern for
liberation of women at present and instead devote their energies to
the more general liberation of the black people," the authors began
interviewing 74 "randomly chosen" Yale freshman in 1970 and again
in 1971 during their sophomore year.

    Finding that the major concern of the black students was black
identity and not religious or philosophical problems, Slaby and Sealy
attribute the contrasts they found between black and white female
students to the fact that the mothers of the black students were more
frequently engaged in highly regarded occupations than the fathers,
and that the oppression these students felt derived from their blackness
not their gender. White students, on the other hand, often reported a
clearly lower occupational status for their mothers, despite the fact
that they considered both parents intelligent, sensitive, and well edu-
cated. White female students were believed to be pursuing roles at
odds with their childhood experiences and their predominant models,
their mothers. Presumably this conflict led to a concern about women's
liberation. Since the black female students felt less disparity between
their roles and those of their mothers, they had become more aware of
the lack of opportunities for blacks in general, and more interested in
blackness than gender as an issue.

Comments.

    This potentially interesting inquiry into the low profile of black
women in the women's liberation movement is all but invalidated by the
inadequacy of the authors' sampling method. The extent to which 74
Yale freshmen represent the majority of college students, especially
black female college students must be doubted. Of these 74 students,
42 were white. In reality, then, only 32 black students were inter-
viewed, with no indication of their sex. (We are told that "there are
32 blacks and 29 women in the group of 74" -- a statement which conceals
the number of black females.)

    The conclusion itself -- that black females experience less discri-
mination as females because they enjoy educational and occupational
dominance within the black community -- is probably just and certainly
merits further research. But we are given no idea of how much the stu-
dents in the study actually participate in and support Women's Liberation.
Instead of raising questions relating to black matriarchy within American
society and its ramifications for collective action, such as whether
it will lead to a black male liberation movement, the authors conclude
with a paragraph, which in this context adds little light on the subject:

"...should such an all-black society be of a patriarchal nature with greater educational and occupational opportunities for men than for women and with a discrepancy between men and women in occupational status, as in the white American culture, one could postulate that someday in its history, too, cries of sexism would arise and a movement would form to liberate the women of that society."

Stoloff, Carolyn, "Who Joins Women's Liberation?" Psychiatry, 36, 3,
     August 1973, 325-40.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

        In response to the profusion of publications and activities dealing
with the Women's Movement, a first effort is made to specify some of the
member characteristics.

        Predisposing factors for involvement in Women's Liberation groups were
sought through the analysis of questionnaire responses from carefully
matched groups of randomly selected women graduate students at the U of
M (n=44). A variety of tentative findings are cited. Feminists (relative
to controls) were more likely to have come from middle and upper-middle
class families, much more likely to have grown up in large cities (vs.
small towns), and had parents who were higher on the expression of political
concern, but lower on ratings of religiosity. Family size and position
relative to the age and sex of siblings were not found to differ in the
two groups. Mothers of feminists were rated as being more independent,
competitive, articulate, and politically active. Rather than "rebelling"
against family values, feminists identified themselves as being more similar
to (as well as more radical than) their mothers when compared to non-femi-
nists. Countering the "sexually frustrated women" hypotheses, which then
still had some plausibility, feminists were, in fact, more experienced in
sexual matters, being less likely to have had no, or only one, sexual
partner in the past (age matched). Both groups agreed with the general
goals of the movement (due to education and achievement?) and having per-
ceived oneself as a "tomboy" described about half of both groups of women.
Feminists were, however, more politically aware, involved, and committed.

Comments:

        Although the sample size limits the generalizability of the study,
good control group and high response rates as well as useful suggestive
findings make this research interesting.

Tavris, Carol, "Who Likes Women's Liberation - and Why: The Case of the
    Unliberated Liberals," Psychology Today; reprinted in Journal of
    Social Issues, 29, 4, 1973, 175-98.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

        A questionnaire was designed to survey respondents' attitudes about
women's roles and then printed in a 1973 issue of Psychology Today. Out of
20,000 returned questionnaires, a sample of 890 men, 616 women not involved
in any women's group and 778 women who were members of various women's
groups was selected for analysis. The purpose was to see what background
experiences and beliefs contributed to a person's support or opposition of
the women's liberation movement. As expected, respondents agreed quite
strongly with certain liberal issues. They supported the movement's de-
mand for equality in work, housekeeping and childcare, etc. However,
only 25% were strongly in support of the movement itself and fewer than
half felt that WLM members were psychologically healthy.

        Using a Multiple Classification Analysis, the study looked at a number
of predictor variables as they related to attitudes toward women's libera-
tion. Among these variables were political and religious identification,
experiences with professional and sexual discrimination, attribution of
stereotypic characteristics to men and women, effects of marriage and the
family. Both political and religious liberalism are related to support for
the women's movement. As expected, experience with professional discrimi-
nation correlated with support of the movement, but sexual issues were more
complex. Feelings of being used as a sex object were not strongly related
to support for the WLM. The author hypothesizes that some women may feel
that being a sex object is desirable and not a negative component of the
women's role. Eighty percent of the sample believed that men and women
do differ on a number of individual characteristics but there were wide
differences in whether these characteristics were due to cultural or bio-
logical influence. Respondents who felt these differences were culturally
determined were more likely to support the WLM. Beliefs about marriage
and the family followed expected patterns. Both men and women who supported
traditional family roles were less likely to support the WLM. Women who
work and are fully responsible for household duties are the most likely
to be supportive of WLM.

Comments:

        The author notes that the sample was neither random nor representative.
Readers of Psychology Today are likely to have higher incomes, be more
educated, and hold more liberal views than the general public.

        While the study is concerned with attitudinal supporters and nonsup-
porters of the women's movement, it unfortunately did not ask about tangi-
ble support in terms of membership in or financial support to organizations
such as NOW.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Labor Conflicts

Bisanz, Charles, "The Anatomy of a Mass Public Protest Action: A Shutdown
by Independent Truck Drivers," Human Organization, 36, 1, 1977, 62-66.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Case Study

Using data from a field study of independent truckers (drivers who own
and operate their own trucks), Bisanz attempts to explain their mass public
protest actions, between December 1973 and February 1974. He is particu-
larly interested in explaining why persons with a nonradical orientation
(i..e., beliefs in law and order and the importance of working through es-
tablished institutional channels in seeking redress of grievances) might
use militant tactics and violence.

Interviews with and observations of independent truckers who either
participated in blockades and two national shutdowns of the trucking indus-
try or were active in either of two large trucker organizations were con-
ducted.

The trucker culture was described as including a view of truck driving
as a way of life rather than a job; the importance of being self-reliant
and independent, working hard and making it on one's own; a communication
network, facilitated by the citizen band radio network and various social
networks among the truckers (because of common residential patterns,
hangouts, and long established trucker organizations). Furthermore, there
was some previous experience with mass militant tactics within the trucker
culture; many truckers had participated in earlier trade union strikes.

Prior to the initial blockade, the independent truckers had numerous
experiences with federal regulatory agencies, the Teamsters (who were sup-
posed to represent the interests of both company drivers and independent
drivers), and trucking companies when seeking help for economic problems.
The truckers had come to believe that these institutional channels for
obtaining redress of grievances were closed to them. In addition, most
truckers perceived there to be few, if any, viable alternatives to inde-
pendent truck driving; they generally believed that they would have to take
unskilled factory jobs if forced out of business. Immediately preceding
the mass actions, many truckers were operating at a loss even when they
worked an illegal number of hours and/or hauled overweight loads. Operating
costs, especially the cost of fuel, had increased rapidly and severely
while hauling rates remained fixed.

The scenario of the truckers' militant actions and the government's
response was described as follows: In December of 1973, the Ohio Turnpike
and highways in various other states were blockaded by independent truck
drivers. A major confrontation between the truckers and the national
guard and highway patrol in Ohio occurred. Following these initial events,
there was extensive media coverage of the truckers' problems and discussion
among truckers by citizen band radio, at truck stops, etc. Independent
drivers drivers throughout the nation came to realize they were experiencing
similar problems. Numerous new trucker organizations emerged within a
month and a national shutdown of the trucking industry was agreed upon.
The first shutdown, which included blockades, the running of trucks off the

road and shootings, produced no government response. However, during the second shutdown, the independent truckers were granted a rate hike and recognized as a separate part of the trucking industry.

Bisanz draws three major implications from the data: The first hypothesis he generates from the data suggests that whether or not an individual (or group) uses militant tactics depends, in part, on what is at stake--how serious the grievance is, and the individual's perception of the feasibility of using more conventional strategies or changing his own life so that the grievance is no longer important:

> When an individual (or group) is confronted with a threat to his way of life, the more cut-off he perceives himself to be from established channels of institutional response and the fewer desirable alternative ways of life he perceives to be attainable, the more likely he will be to engage in militant actions to effect social change.

The second hypothesis is that the use of mass militant tactics partially depends upon the affected group of individuals' potential to organize. More specifically, Bisanz suggests that existing communication and/or social networks among a group of unorganized individuals provide the individuals with the potential to organize for mass action.

Lastly, Bisanz suggests that the use of militant tactics partially depends upon a person's (group's) previous experience with such actions:

> Each time an individual (or group) engages in militant actions, his appreciation for an intensity of involvement in such actions increases.

Comments:

This article provides an interesting and well organized descriptive account of the mass protest actions by independent truck drivers in 1973-74 and the factors which both prompted and made possible those actions. Although the author states that the purpose of the study is to generate new theory rather than verify existing theory, the data appear to be extremely useful for corroborating aspects of existing theory.

However, there are two major limitations to the usefulness of this article: First, the mandated short length of the article does not allow the author to develop the theoretical section adequately. The few insights presented are not elaborated upon and numerous insights suggested by the data, e.g., the influence of law enforcement actions on the organizing effort, are disregarded. Secondly, it is not clear that Bisanz has generated new theory. For instance, the importance of existing communication networks in organizing mass actions has been studied by Freeman (1975) while the relationship between previous experience with mass actions and subsequent action has been examined by numerous researchers, e.g., Tilly, Snyder and Kelly, and appears to be more complex than Bisanz suggests.

Overall, this article provides an insightful descriptive account of a major protest occurrence and the study provides a rich data base with the potential for refining theory pertaining to mass protest actions.

Eisele, C. Frederick, "Organization Size, Technology, and Frequency of
    Strikes," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 27, 4, July 1974,
    560-71.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

    This paper represents an investigation of the relationship between
organization size and frequency of strikes among manufacturing organizations
classified according to their technology. Organization size is defined
by the number of blue collar employees covered by labor-management agree-
ments. Strikes refer to all union authorized work stoppages and lockouts
except irregular concerted activities such as wildcat strikes. Technology
is grouped into three categories: "unit and small batch", "large batch
and mass", and "process."

    A considerable body of literature suggests that the effect of increas-
ing size on human relations and human behavior variables is negative or
undesirable. In light of this, the author hypothesizes that, all other
things being equal, as organization size increases, so does the frequency
of strikes. Some empirical evidence supporting this is described.

    The author is also concerned with the effects of manufacturing tech-
nology. Adopting Woodward's categories, in order of increasing complexity,
of "unit and small batch", "large batch and mass", and "process" (i.e.,
chemical refining), he terms them, respectively, Types I, II and III.
Type II, in particular, features a high degree of product standardization
and extensive use of assembly lines and machine tending. The second hypo-
theses was that for a given size, Type II plants will experience a higher
strike frequency than Type I or Type III plants.

    Questionnaires were sent out to 2400 plants employing more than 50
persons in 14 states representing a wide range of sizes and varieties of
manufacturing technologies. Information as to the number of strikes,
both authorized and wildcat, within a twenty year period or however long
the plant had been unionized was obtained, as well as other data relating
to internal organization. Only 282 usable returns were analyzed.

    Analysis of the data received provided only qualified support for the
hypothesized positive correlation between size and strike frequency.
For Type I plants this hypothesis was strongly confirmed for smaller
facilities but strongly rejected for larger ones. For Types II and III, a
mild overall confirmation was seen, but the relation was found to be much
more complex. Additionally, strike frequencies for Type I and II plants
were found to peak in the middle ranges. As for the second hypothesis,
that Type II plants should experience higher strike frequencies for any
given size plant, the data pointed toward rejection for all sizes, with
the possible exception of the very largest.

    In reflecting on the analysis of the data, two explanations for the
peaks in strike frequencies in the middle ranges of Type I and II plants
were given. First, it was found that the average number of persons report-
ing to the chief plant executive (span of control), the average number of
employees per supervisor, the span of control of first line supervisors,

and the percentage of skilled workers, all had the largest standard deviations in the middle range of plant size, with no such effect for Type II plants. This was taken to indicate unsettled plant organization, perhaps due to growth, which could, because the plant is "out of balance," lead to strikes. Another possible explanation for the middle range peak in strike frequencies given was that smaller plants might tend to capitulate to union demands, while larger plants would tend to have more sophisticated bargaining processes, leaving the middle range plants to fight it out with unions.

The lack of a middle range peak for Type II plants was explained by the small variations in organizational factors. It was suggested that assembly line technology locks in a management structure, leading to stability.

Wildcat strikes were also examined, although not extensively. Preliminary analysis suggested that neither size nor technology are important variables in predicting them. Neither was any significant correlation between authorized and wildcat strikes found. This was attributed to their spontaneous nature.

Comments:

This paper is interesting in its treatment of strikes as conflicts arising out of organizational factors, rather than economic ones. Both plant size and manufacturing technology were seen as having organizational consequences which in turn would have their impacts on labor relations. That the expected correlations were not found could either imply that the organizational consequences of size and technology were not as assumed, or that they do not have a significant effect, or that other factors, not taken into account, are at work.

Lane, Roger, "The Squeaky Wheel Gets the Oil: Independent Truckers and the OPEC Embargo of 1973-74." In Roger Lane and John Turner, <u>Riot, Rout and Tumult:</u> <u>Readings in American Social and Political Violence</u>, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

This article describes the response of independent truckers to the Nixon administration's handling of the 1973-74 oil crisis. Although these truckers lacked a formal organization for staging protests against measures clearly harmful to their economic well-being, they managed a successful work stoppage.

Triggered by the administration's reduction of the speed limit, informal, local work stoppages soon became nation-wide as independent truckers exercised their political and economic power across the country. In this nation-wide embargo, truckers demanded several concessions and enforced their demands mainly through violence and terror.

The first set of demands was rejected by the somewhat uninterested and preoccupied Nixon administration. A few weeks later, the independent truckers returned with a second set of demands which replaced the speed-limit question in favor of issues with more mass appeal. These demands were accepted without delay.

The author concludes that the right amount of violence in the right situation seems very useful to groups striving for recognition and the settlement of grievances. He also points out that those engaging in such outbreaks of lawlessness are relatively safe: none of the truckers who kept the stoppage going were ever brought to trial for their actions.

Comment:

While the article is both entertaining and interesting, it lacks theoretical content. In particular, the author fails to exploit the opportunity to analyze the way informal organizations become linked when their common interests are threatened. He does mention that a greater sense of organization developed in the second confrontation with the administration, but neglects to say how the increased planning among the informal groups took place after the truckers abandoned their main issue, the lower speed limit.

Smith, Michael, "Institutional Setting and Industrial Conflict in Quebec,"
    American Journal of Sociology, 85, 1, 1979, 109-133.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

        Snyder has produced an interpretation of temporal variations in indus-
trial conflict hinging upon the extent of the institutionalization of col-
lective bargaining and the political position of labor. Prior to the
acceptance of collective bargaining and unions, industrial conflict is
determined by political and organizational factors. · When bargaining is
institutionalized and government is responsive to labor, then economic
factors determine industrial conflict. This paper criticizes and refines
Snyder's theory, based upon data from postwar Quebec.

        Several problems with Snyder's interpretations were cited. His
differentiation between pre and post-World War II periods is problematic.
And the assumption that economic factors were only significant when bargain-
ing is institutionalized and government was sympathetic to labor is open
to question, based on the historical record. Finally, the use of the
nation as the unit of analysis may disregard significant regional varia-
tions, such as in the province of Quebec.

        An alternative interpretation of industrial conflict assumes that
while economic inducements to strike are always operative, the major element
in interpreting industrial conflict should be the ability of unions to
mount well organized and well timed strikes. This requires that unions be
willing to strike, that they have centralized control for prudent strike
decisions, and the ability to learn effective tactics through experience.
In Quebec after 1960, there was a shift in the major union's attitudes
towards the greater use of the strike weapon and an increase in its strike
funds and central control. Competition between central unions put a premium
on performance and made them more aggressive. This increased tendency to
strike produced a stronger relationship between strikes and economic con-
ditions after 1960. There also was a trend to greater numbers of strikes
in the post 1960 period, not accountable by increased union membership,
which was attributed to having had earlier favorable strike outcomes.

        In conclusion, the author sees the institutional bases of calculative
behavior on the part of unions to be the most significant factor affecting
industrial conflict, rather than employer willingness to bargain or the
political position of labor. That is, however, in keeping with Snyder's
stress on the importance of unionization.

Comments:

        Like Snyder's theories, this paper presents a valuable hypotheses that
could be applied generally to participant groups in collective actions.
Here Snyder is modified to stress the importance of organizational effective-
ness and ability as a determinant of collective actions.

Stern, Robert N. and Omar R. Galle, "Industrial Conflict and the
Intermetropolitan Structure of Production," Social Science
Quarterly, 59, 2, September 1978, 257-273.

Approach: Theoretical/Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

The authors contend that there is a relationship between levels
of industrial conflict and the economic specialization of cities.
Data on strike activity for all SMSAs from 1968-70 showed that 1) 50%
of the variation in strikes could be accounted for by the characteris-
tics of a metro area's functional specialization; and 2) that levels
of conflict within metro areas are not simply an additive function of
the industrial labor force composition of the area, but are intimately
tied to functional linkages between metro areas within the system of
cities in the national economy.

The authors recount past research on the subject of industrial
conflict which they feel has ignored the political motivations of be-
havior. To test their theory, the authors distinguish three measures
of strike activity: frequency; breadth (number of workers involved);
and duration, and related them to the following dimensions of the
functional differentiation of cities: size; specific function; general
function; and locus of control.

It would be useful to see if this analysis would be confirmed
if it were applied to areas of small population, and if some measures
of political differences among cities were used in the analysis.

Thus four hypotheses were tested using the strike data for SMSAs
of metro size between 1968-70: 1) the researchers found the larger
the SMSA the less frequently strikes occured, but the broader was parti-
cipation in the strike. Duration of the conflict bore no relationship
to size; 2) no significant relationship was found between the type of
specific function and the breadth, duration and frequency -- except
in specified industries; 3) cities dependent on manufacturing have more
independent conflict on all three dimensions - breadth, duration and
frequency; 4) the prediction that locus of control reduces frequency
and duration of strikes was also confirmed: nationally controlled
bargaining structures were associated with both more and longer strikes.
The authors concluded that "regression analysis provides evidence of
the ability of four aspects of metro function to predict different
levels of industrial conflict."

Comments:

The attempt to separately test the determinants of three measures of
strike activity -- frequency, breadth, and duration -- is particularly
noteworthy and is a useful corrective to many of the studies which have
concentrated only on the frequency of industrial disputes. The empirical
manipulations are rather impressive but unfortunately the theoretical
explanations for the observed phenomena are less well developed.

Waganaar, Theodore C., "Activist Professionals: The Case of Teachers,"
    Social Science Quarterly, 55, 2, 1974, 372-79.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

        This study focuses on participation in teachers' organizations
as one kind of activism and a precursor of more extensive forms of
militancy. It examines the connection between personal characteristics
and contextual and organizational variables on the one hand and activism
by teachers on the other. The various effects of such activism on
education are also studied.

        Data were gathered from 567 questionnaires given to supervising
teachers of Teacher Corps interns as well as to control teachers in
ten states during 1968-70. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents
belonged to the National Education Association (NEA) or its affiliates,
and 23 percent to the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) or its
affiliates. With the exception of race -- there were about 20 percent
more blacks -- the characteristics of the sample, such as sex, marital
status, education, socio-economic status, and experience, were very
similar to those of all teachers.

        Most of the measures are based on teachers' reports; a few were
from school principals. Activity in NEA or AFT was measured by an
ordinal scale: 1 represented "not a member, listed member only, or
dues-paying member, and the highest, 6, signified office-holders.

        The active member of NEA or its affiliates was generally an older
more experienced male who had been in the school for some time and on
the basis of his degree and certification was better qualified than
colleagues less active in the organization. Members of AFT or its
affiliates were generally married -- particularly the males -- older,
and in the school for some time. They were more likely to be teaching
in a very rigid school system than colleagues less active in the group.
The greater activism of male teachers was seen as a function of different
socialization patterns and relative deprivation, while the data on age,
experience, and tenure suggested that being well integrated in the
local school and system gave teachers the firm footing necessary to
engage in activism. Only one of the several contextual, situational
and organizational variables was related to activism; a perceived lack
of flexibility and freedom in their teaching was only related to
activism among AFT members.

        Several aspects of "outcomes" were thought to vary according to
degrees of activism. These included commitment to teaching in cultur-
ally deprived schools; the number and effectiveness of contacts with
students; identification with the local community, attitudes toward it,
and interaction with it, professional contacts with the principal and
with other teachers; career-orientation and "dedication." On none of
these counts were active NEA members distinguishable from inactive mem-
bers. The results indicated, however, that "teachers most active in
the AFT have the least effective communication with their students,

principals, peers, and communities...and are less client-oriented.
...This reinforces the stereotype the AFT has attained, a concern for
personal gains with little concern for how these gains may relate to
educational outcomes." Noting that activity -- whether in the NEA or
the AFT -- is not related to desirable educational outcomes, the author
argues that teachers' organizations allow them to insulate themselves
from the influence of students and parents and pursue their own self-
interests.

On the other hand, Waganaar recognizes that membership in teacher
organizations may not always indicate activism: membership may not be
voluntary, or some of the most active teachers may not choose to join.

Comments:

Problems in many measurements and the unrepresentative sample make
considerable caution advisable in using the results of this study. In
measuring teachers' activism the author gave respondents who were not
members of a teachers' organization the same score as those who were
members and paid dues, and his ordinal scale took no account of many
activities members of these organizations might pursue or how often they
engaged in them. Nor are we told how the situational and organizational
factors were measured. The little information given about how "out-
comes" were measured makes the validity of the indices quite dubious.

The sample consisted only of teachers who were members of one of
the two teachers' organizations; the results could certainly not be
taken as generally applicable to all teachers. Since we are given no
information on the control group and no analysis of differences between
the teachers of the Teacher Corps and the controls, the results cannot
even be linked to teachers in low-income schools who are members of such
organizations. Moreover, Waganaar says nothing about differences be-
tween those not responding to the questionnaire and the final sample;
hence the bias that might well exist is impossible to judge.

Walsh, Edward J., "Mobilization Theory Vis-a-Vis a Mobilization Process: The Case of the United Farm Workers Movement," in Research in Social Movements and Change, Volume I, Louis Kriesberg (Ed.), Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, Inc., 1978, pp. 155-77.

Approach: Theoretical/Empirical
Methodology: Participant Observation; Case Study

In this case study of farm worker mobilization efforts in California over a twenty to thirty year period, Walsh contrasts the "breakdown perspectives" of Kornhauser and Smelser with the "solidarity" theories of Tilly, Gamson, and Oberschall in their ability to account for the dynamic processes underlying the effort. Using published analyses and descriptions of the conflict and unpublished manuscripts and papers, as well as his own interviews and field notes from participant observation in the daily operations of the movement during 1974 and 1975, Walsh reconstructed five distinct periods in the conflict: the pre-1958 century; the period from 1958 to 1965; the period from 1965 to 1970; 1970 to 1974; and from 1975 to the present.

Prior to 1958, discontent among the farm workers had existed for almost a century but attempts by other unions to mobilize them had failed for a variety of reasons including the distraction of World War I and II; the strength of agribusiness in excluding farm workers from the Wagner Act and in recruiting Mexican laborers; ethnic cleavages among the workers; lack of support from organizations and the general public; the geographical dispersion, lack of collective consciousness and transiency of farm labor; and the involvement of the Communist Party in organizing attempts. Smelser's theory is criticized as inadequate because it does not focus on the chronic strain or the internal structures within the protesting collectivity, and because what sporadic outbursts did occur were a result of concrete and quite reasonable demands rather than irrational generalized beliefs. In contrast, Oberschall's hypotheses about the importance of pre-existent communal ties and associational memberships for successful mobilization are confirmed.

Between 1958 and 1965 there was a general loosening of social control and the beginning of liberal reforms which made the time ripe for mobilization of farm workers. Cesar Chavez began preparing internal structures to sustain the inevitable strikes and attempted to build these on a communally homogeneous ethnic base rather than with isolated individuals.

Between 1965 and 1970, the UFW grew and became well known because of strikes in the fields, Chavez's fast for nonviolence, and the grape boycott, but there were internal cleavages in the farm workers' organization as well as continuing and defiant refusal of growers to bargain with the UFW. The intra-Union pluralism around whether or not to use religious symbolism, whether or not to support the anti-Vietnam war movement, and whether to use violent or nonviolent tactics are cited to indicate problems with Smelser's notion of a "common culture" as necessary for collective action.

From 1970 to 1974 there is evidence that the growers, the Nixon administration and the Teamsters Union conspired to eradicate the UFW but their efforts were thwarted by a very charismatic (i.e., Chavez), a system of ranch committees, an ideology of sacrifice, loyal allies, and a lack of structural alternatives for the majority of UFW members. Walsh argues that it was not

Smelser's factor of the "failure of social control" that kept the UFW alife in the face of massive opposition but rather the presence of both powerful allies in the environment and particularly durable internal structures.

Up to the present the UFW has been successful in forcing growers to permit union representation elections and the balance of power has been significantly altered in favor of the farm workers. In general Walsh found Smelser's value-added theory to be inadequate because of the central importance of generalized beliefs and the essentially conservative assumptions underlying this model. On the other hand, he found Oberschall's hypotheses to be generally supported. However, he felt that Oberschall underestimated the importance of emergent and preexistent ideologies which can be used by skillful leaders either to legitimate repression or insurgency. He also expressed disagreement with Gamson's argument that both the use of violence and support from other organizations are associated with successful mobilization. Instead, the UFW's adoption of nonviolence was critical in obtaining support from churches, labor unions, and the boycotting public. Walsh strongly emphasizes the importance of an effective leader in successful mobilization efforts.

> "The history of this particular movement...appears to challenge all overly deterministic mobilization theories—whether of the Smelserian or Oberschallian variety—and prompts one to echo Lenski's suggestion that sociologists take a new look at the 'great man' theory of leadership lest their fascination with social determinism blind them to the operation of actual social processes."

Comments:

This is an extremely interesting analysis of the farm workers movement, particularly when compared with the work of Jenkins and Perrow (1977) who emphasized the disunity of the military-political-industrial elite as the key factor in the success of the movement. Unfortunately the other theorists representing the breakdown and solidarity perspectives such as Gurr, Tilly, Zald and McCarthy were not included in this contrast between the two frameworks but the analyses of the theories of Smelser and Oberschall are sound—and the criticisms are relevant to improving future hypotheses.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Environmental Movements

Buttel, Frederick and William Flinn, "Environmental Politics: The Structuring of Partisan and Ideological Cleavages in Mass Environmental Attitudes," The Sociological Quarterly, 17, Autumn 1976, 477-90.

Approach: Empirical/Theoretical
Methodology: Survey Research

This article explores the relationships between and among two political variables (party identification and political ideology) and two dimensions of mass environmental beliefs--awareness of the environmental problem and support for environmental reform. The authors advance three hypotheses:

1) There are no significant correlations between party identification and environmental attitudes. The argument here is based on studies which claim that although at the elite level the Democratic Party shows a strong alignment with environmental support relative to the Republican Party, no such correlation holds true for rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans. This suggests to the authors that American political parties are "poor vehicles of ideological crystallization among the mass electorate."

2) Anti-laissez-faire liberalism (the authors' term for liberal reform policies favoring governmental control of big business) should correlate with support for environmental reform more strongly among the middle class than among the working class. The authors base this prediction on the presumed concern among the working class that environmental reform represents a threat to economic security, relative to the presumed freedom of the more privileged middle class from such a concern.

3) There will be more substantial political-ideological differences in support for environmental reform than in awareness of environmental problems (especially among the middle class) because the necessity of securing reforms probably led to the cultivation of alliances with other reform liberal causes. At the same time the awareness of environmental problems at least in the early stages of the movement was generally independent of partisan or ideological overtones.

Data from a 1974 statewide Wisconsin survey of 548 respondents were used to test these hypotheses. Scales of awareness of environmental problems (e.g., Would you feel that air pollution in this area is a very serious, somewhat serious, small or no problem?) and support for environmental reform (e.g., Pollution laws have gotten too strict in recent years) were found to be separate dimensions of environmental concern. Anti-laissez faire liberalism was measured by a scale including items such as "are you for less government regulation of business?"

Results indicated a confirmation of hypothesis 1--Democratic Party affiliation showed only a weak positive correlation (r=.082) with support for environmental reform, and the corresponding Republican correlation was only weakly negative (r=-.132). Hypothesis 2 was also confirmed-- anti-laissez-faire liberalism was stronly correlated with support for environmental reform among the middle class (r=.442), weakly correlated among the working class (r=.060). Finally, hypothesis 3 was supported by the finding that laissez-faire political ideology was more closely related to support for environmental reform (r=.233) than to awareness of environmental problems (r=.096).

In addition to tentatively confirming their hypotheses, the authors suggest generally that "ideological sources of support for environmental reform exist despite political parties, and the political party structure might well be viewed as a major mechanism of muting the conflicts necessary to stimulate effective environmental policies."

Clearly, awareness of environmental problems was not strongly determined by either political partisanship or laissez-faire ideology. They suggest that "the translation of public awareness of environmental problems into support for liberal environmental reforms has been quite limited... and we believe this shortcoming is largely due to the channeling of environmental agendas into mainstream reform liberal politics...the political party structure might well be viewed as a major mechanism of muting the conflicts necessary to stimulate effective environmental policies."

Comments:

The concluding argument about the failure of the political party structure to mobilize environmental action dovetails neatly with the argument based on the discrepancy between awareness of environmental problems and support for environmental reform, which predicts politicization of the movement in the direction of ("non-partisan") liberal reform ideology. Although complex and difficult to read, this article merits attention both for its dextrous manipulation of interdependent variables and its convincing theoretical discussion of those variables.

Kronus, Carol, "Mobilizing Voluntary Associations into a Social Move-
    ment: The Case of Environmental Quality," The Sociological Quarterly,
    18, 2, 1977, 276-83.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

In this study of how voluntary associations, rather than individuals,
are mobilized into a social movement, data was collected from telephone
interviews with officers of 209 voluntary associations in a town in central
Illinois with a population of 100,000. Two basic theoretical perspectives
(resource mobilization and motivational) are used to develop the hypotheses.

The resource mobilization perspective argues that "wealthy" organiza-
tions are more likely to be mobilized than "poor" groups who will tend to
conserve their limited resources for present organizational goals. The
motivational perspective argues that organizations with goals that overlap
with the social movement will be more likely to be mobilized and that
organizations that accept responsibility for assuming the aims of the social
movement will be more easily recruited.

The social movement studied was the environmental quality movement
in 1972. Three measures of the organizational resources of voluntary asso-
ciations were developed: 1) Whether or not it had a national affiliation;
2) the size of the local active membership; and 3) the age of the member-
ship. Motivational variables included: the main purpose or goal of the
voluntary association (education, social/hobby, sports, church-related,
fraternal/service, and job-related); the leader of the group's personal
score on the Household Pollution Behavior Index; the leader's assessment
of the responsibility the group should assume for improving local environ-
mental conditions; and the leader's opinion about the amount of responsi-
bility other organizations in the community should take. The degree to
which voluntary associations were mobilized into the environmental quality
movement was measured by the degree to which the leader expressed an inter-
est in environmental quality issues and the number of environmental qual-
ity activities in which the organization participated during the year
previous to the interview.

Results indicated that 48 percent of the club leaders professed an
interest in EQ issues and 35 percent of the interested groups carried out
one EQ activity during the past year. Negative mobilization against the
goals and activities of the EQ movement was a rare phenomenon. As pre-
dicted, interest in the EQ movement was greatest in the educational groups
and lowest in social/hobby and church-related organizations. The over-
whelming reason why some organizations were not mobilized was that their
leaders felt that EQ goals and issues were irrelevant to their organiza-
tions.

Of the resource mobilization variables only the size of the active
local membership was a significant predictor of mobilization. The larger
the organization's manpower base the more likely that it became involved
in EQ issues, and undertook a larger number of EQ activities. The organ-
ization's affiliative locus and age structure had weak and inconsistent
effects on mobilization behavior. Organizations with national ties and
youthful members were more likely to be attracted to EQ issues but among

those organizations which were mobilized, those with local or regional bases and older members were more active in carrying out EQ activities.

Organizations that delegated a major share of responsibility for local improvement to other groups were the least active while those leaders who accepted organizational obligation and did not delegate the responsibility to other community organizations were the most highly mobilized.

In general, the author concluded that the congruence of interests had only an indirect influence in mobilizing community associations; although education groups were more interested in the EQ movement it was mainly because they were bigger and had a stronger sense of community obligation. Group resources played a secondary and independent role in affecting mobilization. In voluntary associations a large number of members permits greater, not less, flexibility in adopting the aims of the outside social movement and expanding their repertoire of organizational activities to act upon these additional goals. Mobilization was strongly and directly related to the organizational decision to accept self-responsibility and not to wait for other organizations in the community to act. "The critical influence on the decision to ignore or respond to the mobilization appeals of the EQ movement emanated from the organizational perception of its social or moral role in relation to other organizations in its environment... and this leads me to hypothesize that the greater the number of organizations in a community, the lower the individual sense of responsibility felt by organizations to work for some collective benefit. Thus, in large communities with a dense network of voluntary associations, I would predict less organizational activity aimed at benefitting the whole community."

Comments:

This is an important study largely because it focuses on the process of bloc mobilization, the mobilization of groups rather than individuals directly into social movements and because it combines at least two theoretical perspectives to draw testable hypotheses. However, it suffers from some methodological problems that make the results questionable. Since most of the measures of dependent and independent variables were obtained from the leaders of the organizations and were quite often expressions of their own opinions, some of the relationships may be tautological. Further, it is questionable whether these measures actually tap the mobilization of an organization rather than the mobilization of the group leader.

Levenson, Hanna, "Perception of Environmental Modifiability and Involvement
in Antipollution Activities," The Journal of Psychology, 84, 1973,
237-39.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Although this survey hypothesized that people involved in antipollu-
tion activities would be more likely to expect that something positive
could be done to improve environmental conditions than those not involved,
this was not found.

Subjects were 32 males and females who were randomly selected from a
membership list of an antipollution group; 32 persons who had been sent a
letter about the group but who did not join; and 32 who had not been in-
formed about the group (nonmembers). The 96 subjects were matched for
sex and socioeconomic status.

A 6-item Likert type Environmental Modifiability Test (EMT) was con-
structed for this study and administered to subjects during individual
interviews. The EMT was not significantly correlated with the Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale and demonstrated high internal consistency
in pretesting.

Members scored significantly lower on the EMT than did nonmembers,
indicating that members were more pessimistic about improving the environ-
ment. These results might be explained by an examination of the EMT item
content, which indicates that members were less favorable about using
technological methods to decrease pollution and thought that improvement
of the environment would require difficult, extensive changes in life styles
and economic and moral values.

The author notes the limitation in the use of correlational measure-
ment, and suggests that research relating perception of the environment
to antipollution involvement is needed.

Comments:

Limitations in this study involve the use of correlational analyses as
well as inadequate indices of environmental attitudes and perceptions of
efficacy.

Stallings, Robert A., "Patterns of Belief in Social Movements: Clarifica-
tions from an Analysis of Environmental Groups," Sociological Quar-
terly, 14, 4, Fall 1973, 465-80.

Approach: Theoretical/Empirical
Methodology: Case Study; Survey Research

While many of the leading explanations of the emergence of social
movements rest on the assumption that participants share a set of beliefs
differentiating them from nonparticipants (e.g., relative deprivation or
other generalized beliefs), previous studies of the environmental move-
ment have suggested a heterogeneity in attitudes and beliefs among mem-
bers. Stallings reviews several factors which may have led to the assump-
tion of homogeneity of beliefs, including the tendency to search for modal
or average responses, to focus on the leaders and spokesmen of organiza-
tions, to confuse movement ideology with individual belief structures, and
the denial of differences between leaders and members in the presence of
researchers. Further, the assumption of homogeneity of beliefs may be due
in part to restricting members to those who actually participate in move-
ment activities.

In this study of a "core group" within the environmental movement a com-
parison of the beliefs of the most active and least active group members
as well as those in between was made to determine how homogeneous the be-
lief system actually was. A questionnaire was mailed to the entire group
census of 100 people, including formal members, people who had attended
public strategy sessions, and/or who had made financial contributions.
A 64 percent response rate was attained. A group centrality index based
on whether the respondent was a formal member of the group, had ever served
on one of the group's committees, and/or had ever been an officer of the
group was used to develop four types of participants: leaders, active
members, inactive members, and nonmembers. Nonmembers were included be-
cause they had either supported the activities of the group by attending
public meetings or rallies during a local conflict or contributed their
financial support to the group.

Results showed a great deal of heterogeneity in the belief structure
of various types of participants. The more central members (leaders and
active members) attached higher priorities to environmental quality than
local economic conditions, had more radical solutions to solving environ-
mental problems, perceived the group's efforts as more effective in af-
fecting local environmental outcomes, and thought that the group was
viewed more favorably by outsiders than less central members. In general,
group members and active supporters exhibited greater consensus over gen-
eral priorities and goals but showed more dissensus over means for solving
environmental problems. In most cases members at the very center of group
activity possessed more "orthodox" beliefs than those participating in
increasingly more peripheral fashion.

Despite this heterogeneity in beliefs, during the two-year history
of this Core Group there had been no noticeable internal conflict, leader-
ship struggles, or factional politics, from field observations of meetings
or in-depth interviews with participants. Stallings explains this seeming

contradiction by arguing that: 1) conflicting ideas need not necessarily lead to conflict behavior because there is a gap between attitudes and behavior, 2) general support of the group and its aims may have overcome individual differences on specific points, 3) individual members might disagree with other participants on one issue but agree on another issue which mitigates against internal cleavages and factional conflict, 4) self-selection may operate so that members who disagree completely would gravitate to other groups, and 5) there was a great deal of consensus among leaders so conflicts seem less probable than if there were sharp differences within the leadership category.

Thus, he concludes that contrary to Smelser's theory of generalized beliefs as necessary conditions for the emergence of norm-oriented social movements, "homogeneity of ideas, beliefs, attitudes, or whatever is neither a defining characteristic nor a necessary condition for the appearance of a social movement."

Comments:

The delineation of various forms of participation in a social movement and the exploration of heterogeneity in the beliefs of members is valuable in a field which has tended to focus on consensus and uniformity among adherents to these movements. The extent to which nonmembers should be included as participants in a social movement is a matter of some controversy, however, and may differ according to the type of movement, stage of development, and degree of activity involved.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Conflicts Around Racial Segregation

Blumberg, Herbert H., "Accounting for a Nonviolent Mass Demonstration,"
    Sociological Inquiry, 38, 1, 1968, 43-50.

Approach: Theoretical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

    This study describes and analyzes a mass demonstration against
racial segregation that took place in 1963 in Durham, North Carolina.
No violence accompanied the incident. Blumberg attempts to account for
participants, the form, and the site of the event through the use of a
utility model. Face-to-face interviews with local student leaders, ad-
visors, and business and political figures yielded data showing how the
demonstration spread and was reinforced as it evolved.

    According to the data, the form and timing of such major protests
as sit-ins and mass demonstrations could be determined by earlier protests
in other cities such as Birmingham. The object of protests, however,
which in this case was segregated business establishments, depended on
specific local grievances. The assumption underlying the utility model
used by Blumberg is that each person involved in a protest will do what-
ever he thinks will bring as much reward and as little punishment as
possible. The processes of evolution, contagion, and reinforcement which
conform to this model are used to help answer the following questions:
1) Of all the actions that protesters might take, why did they choose this
particular combination? 2) What determines which people in a given city
will become nonviolent participants? 3) Of all possible targets, which
will be selected for persistent protests?

    The form of the protest is thought to depend on a process of evo-
lution; that is, the most rewarding or most fitting forms will evolve
with time. Particular strategies are selected partly on the basis of
known events in other localities and partly by people's own experience; the
choice of a particular form depends on the circumstances, the alternatives,
and the motives of the individual. Behavior which does the most toward
gaining objectives or is satisfying in itself is likely to be repeated.
Members of a protest movement who communicate with each other directly
or through the mass media should accumulate strategies for a variety of
occasions.

    Participation patterns are considered a function of the processes
of "contagion" and diffusion through the available communications network.
If a core of protesters in a given community persuade their friends to
join in the protest, the demonstration will grow if many members can
reach nonmembers and the likelihood is high that these nonmembers will
become members. This does seem to occur in high schools and other situa-
tions favoring "contagion." Action taken in one community can also suggest
similar action in another if communication between communities is good
and if their circumstances are similar. Both cases apply to the spread
of particular strategies such as sit-ins, as well as to the tone and in-
tensity of the protest.

    The site and target of activity depend at least partly on the process
of reinforcement -- the rewards to the group from protests at this and

other sites. Once the grievance is voiced, of course, the question is whether the establishment will change its policy. Some potential targets did not materialize because the group's demands were met quietly and immediately; in other instances the protest was extinguished by a policy of sitting tight and doing nothing.

The outcome of such protests is not predictable on the basis of a utility model: first, unforeseen events may have profound effects; and second, one cannot predict how a protest will evolve or attract support.

Comments:

A utility model intended to explain the form, target, and participation pattern of collective action is a healthy corrective to models which make the behavior of individuals seem irrational or stupid. This analysis suffers, however, from a tendency to oversimplify the dynamics and a failure to provide adequate evidence for the processes it treats. Information is lacking on: the organization of the demonstration, the demographic characteristics of participants, the sequence of events during the three days, the responses of police, and news coverage. Further, the validity of the information here is in doubt, because we are not told how many persons were interviewed, how they were selected, or their characteristics.

The process of evolution, "contagion," and reinforcement were not only oversimplified but dealt with in isolation, ignoring the fact that they might bear on the incident in other ways than those discussed here. For example, "reinforcement" could clearly be used to explain the form and participation patterns as well as the choice of target; and "contagion" could help account for the choice of form and target of the protest as well as the popular support it gained.

The analysis and description of certain features of the demonstration were particularly weak. For example, in discussing the way the choice of certain restaurants as targets was linked to reinforcement and "extinction," the author disregarded many circumstances which might have been crucial: their size, location, and clientele, for example. A more thorough examination of the two or three actual targets and a comparison with establishments not the object of protest would have been preferable.

Danzger, H., "A Quantified Description of Community Conflict," The American
Behavioral Scientist, 12, 2, 1968, 9-14.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

In this article findings from a larger study by the author of community
conflict and power structure are described. Using data on almost 1000
civil rights conflict events occurring in 19 communities between 1955 and
1965 which were covered by the New York Times, Danzger coded them according
to dimensions of the conflict, characteristics of participants, and issues
involved. The work of James Coleman, Norton Long, and Roland Warren on
community structure and power served as sources for hypotheses.

Six dimensions of the conflict were considered: 1) duration (the number
of days it was reported in the newspaper), 2) legitimacy-normalcy of tactics
used (from voting and legal action to physical violence), 3) degree of
violence (no confrontation to riots), 4) who initiated the conflict
(segregationists or integrationists), 5) site of the conflict (community,
state, etc.), and 6) outcomes (extent to which the issue was resolved).
Participants were classified according to: 1) numbers, 2) breadth (geo-
graphic spread of participants), 3) group structure (formal organizations,
associations, unpaid workers, elites, or collectivities), and 4) group
subtype (specific description of the group).

In comparing the coverage of these events by the New York Times with
other newspapers and the house organs of CORE and the NAACP and interviews
with experts, "the overwhelming weight of evidence indicated that the Times
stories were in fact highly accurate with regard to the items in the coding
scheme."

The importance of extra-community agents in triggering these incidents
was quite marked. Integrationists triggered about four-fifths of all the
conflict events and actors outside the community raised issues three times
as often for the integrationists as for the segregationists. Integration-
ists relied much more on nationwide support.

Formal organizations were used much more by segregationists and these
were largely local government agencies, especially between 1958 and 1962.
Between 1963 and 1965 they came to rely more on associations. Integra-
tionists primarily operated through associations in these conflicts. Rela-
tively few conflicts were the work of unaffiliated individuals (2-3%) or
elites (2-7%).

Throughout the entire period the bulk of conflict activity centered
around public accomodation. For integrationists the issues of public acco-
modations and school desegregation and police problems involved partici-
pants primarily within the community while conflicts around jobs and
housing, political rights and civil rights involved high proportions of
outsiders. Thus, when issues change, groups of different breadth become
involved. He also argues that groups defending the status quo (i.e.,
segregationists) probably rely on organizations while those attacking the
status quo rely primarily on associations.

Thirteen of the communities had been studied in terms of their power-structure and those which had a pyramidal structure differed from non-pyramidal communities in terms of dimensions of conflict. Conflict in pyramidal communities was not as extreme or as violent but tended to be sustained and even over time, with the conflict starting earlier and showing fewer seasonal changes than nonflict in nonpyramidal communities. Pyramidal power structures had conflicts that involved smaller integrationist groups but more integrationist organizations while associations tended to be used in nonpyramidal communities.

Finally, conflicts in pyramidal communities seemed to be focused on clearcut issues such as school desegregation while the issues in non-pyramidal communities seemed to be more diffuse (e.g., violence, civil rights, political rights). "This suggests that the existence of a clearcut power structure may be a factor in formulating clearcut goals, or in getting groups with clearcut goals involved in the conflict. Or, conversely, it may indicate that the lack of a clearcut power structure may frustrate groups seeking clearcut goals, causing their goals to be diffuse and unclear."

Comments:

Although this article is brief and the conclusions are quite tentative, it paves the way for the use of the research instrument in further studies of community conflict.

Van der Zanden, James, "Resistance and Social Movements," Social Forces,
37, 4, May 1959, 312-18.

Approach: Theoretical/Historical
Methodology: Analysis of Existing Data

This article argues that the white racist movement in the South,
organized in response to the Supreme Court's 1954 decision calling for
desegregation of schools, fits Heberle's criteria of a "social movement"
with one exception. Van der Zanden suggests a new definition of
social movement that will also apply to this movement.

Van der Zanden begins his argument that white racism constitutes
a bona fide resistance movement by discussing cultural persistence and
social change among many groups of people. Quoting much anthropological
literature on the subject, he notes that "social relations tend to be
carried on unchanged" once they are established. He also claims that
previous research on social movements has concentrated too much on
changes and revolution and has ignored groups that resist change, al-
though in fact, "counter movements frequently influence the speed,
degree and nature of social change."

The rise of organized white resistance to the Supreme Court's de-
cision illustrates such a counter-movement. Actions by the resisting
group fulfill five out of Heberle's six criteria for a resistance
movement. The exception is Heberle's first criterion that such groups
initiate social change -- but it can be altered in such a way that
white racists can be included.

Comments:

The point of this article is essentially academic. Van der Zanden
is correct when he observes that resistance to change has been over-
looked by researchers, but he gives us no sense of how such resistance
movements affect the process of change.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Militancy in Secondary Schools

Pitts, James, "Boycott Participation and School Organization Memberships,"
    Education and Urban Society, 3, 4, 1971, 383-97.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Self-reported participation in a boycott each Monday of classes in
a black high school in Chicago in 1968 was studied to understand how
membership in different student organizations affected black nationalist
activities and ideologies. The boycott, which began in a few schools
with school-racial issues, such as the teaching of Afro-American history
by black instructors, soon spread throughout the black community. Data
were gathered from interviews with 159 black students in a school where
most pupils were black and most teachers white. The interviews were
conducted by black college students more than five months after the boy-
cott. The respondents were all members of ten school organizations,
including two race-related associations -- the Afro-American History Club
and a more militant group.

Respondents who were members of the race-related organizations re-
ported more frequent participation in the boycotts than those in the rest
of the ten organizations. In the race-related organizations there was
little indication that participation was influenced by respondents' sex
or church attendance, but in the other organizations the girls and those
who reported attending church at least once a month were less likely to
have joined in the boycott than their counterparts. The author suggests
that the unimportance of sex or church attendance in the race-related
organizations suggests that the interest in black nationalism strongly
influenced students' participation in the boycott.

Because most of the students were dissatisfied with the education
offered black youth, discontent was not the major explanation for those
who joined in the boycott. Instead, the ability to recall the issues
involved, the inclination to mention the black nationalist focus of those
issues, and the perception of peer group support for the boycott seem to
distinguish the members of race-related organizations.

Comments:

Although it is reasonable to believe, as the author does, that
"membership in black nationalist high school organizations has a strong
effect on expressed attitudes toward racial solidarity and active com-
mitment to movements aimed at achieving objectives commensurate with that
goal" the data from this study do not prove the point. Problems in the
design of the research, the measurement of the variables, and the sampling
make the study less than adequate. To understand the effect of membership
in organizations one would have to compare members with students who were
not in any organizations, and of course the membership would have to
precede the boycott. Some attempt should also be made to understand
factors that might explain both organizational memberships and boycott
participation: differences in socioeconomic status, career and post-high
school plans, class, parents' memberships in organizations, age, rank
or grades.

Puckett, Myron, "Successful Protest Movements in School Districts: Limiting Factors," Urban Education, 11, 1, April 1976, 31-48.

Approach: Empirical/Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

Using the analytical framework for analyzing the problems of protest movements developed by Lipsky (1967), the author describes a protest of Mexican-American students, parents, community groups, political organizations and labor groups against the Los Angeles Board of Education in 1968. This protest which involved thirty-six demands for the improvement of educational procedures for Mexican-American youth resulted in little change in goals or policies.

The author, who was a member of a study team investigating decision-making procedures in the Los Angeles City Board of Education, conducted in-depth interviews with board members, third party influentials, and protest members, as well as direct observation of the protest sites and meetings of the Board of Education.

Several of the tactics described by Lipsky were used by the Board of Education to try and defuse the protest without granting significant concessions and these included dispensing symbolic reassurances (e.g., a special televised meeting of the board in which a student read the demands and the officials read responses to them); dispensing token material satisfactions (e.g., appointing a minority person as principal of a high school with much fanfare); appearing constrained in their ability to grant protest goals (e.g., claiming poverty); discrediting protest leaders and organizations (e.g., "non-pupil agitators" were blamed); and postponing action (e.g., several of the demands were referred for further study).

Gaining the favorable attention of the media was also quite difficult. Reporters all agreed not to show up for one demonstration and later restricted the amount and kind of coverage given to the movement. Some media persons castigated the protest leadership for not having the backing of the people when one demonstration failed. Although third parties were drawn into the conflict, there were also problems because they became fickle and also then attracted counter groups who spoke in opposition to the protest group. Third party representatives were not around for the final meetings "because they are prevented from full-time participation due to job and family constraints...and for another, they are easily satisfied by symbolic gestures made by a board." Moreover, bargaining was limited to "insiders" in the school system and decisions were made behind closed doors.

It was also difficult to maintain the commitment of members of the protest movement itself. Issues rich in symbolic content such as police brutality facilitated cohesion but leaders found it difficult to rally people to demand the transfer of a teacher. Open divisions in the ranks of the protestors subverted the group and volunteer workers left due to the press of their own occupational and educational needs. Some of the more bizarre actions of the protestors such as an occupation of the school board offices had severe repercussions for the group in the long run.

Comments:

This is a nice illustration of the Lipsky perspective but there are a lot of questions it leaves unanswered because it is such a brief article.

Ritterband, Paul, "Ethnic Power and the Public Schools: The New York
    City School Strike of 1968," Sociology of Education, 47, 1974,
    251-67.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Militancy among teachers in this country has been growing concur-
rently with the rise in militancy among blacks. The two movements
collided in the strike of the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) in
New York City in the fall of 1968. While the immediate issues were
community control of the schools versus the integrity of the contract
and civil service procedures, ethnicity became the key in determining
whether schools would be open or closed. This paper explores the way
ethnicity worked to decide the fate of the schools in the conflict.

Data were obtained from questionnaires completed by union chapter
chairman before and after the strike and from Board of Education records.
The amount of time that each school was closed during the strike as well
as reports of ethnic composition came from estimates by the chapter
chairmen.

Although the ethnicity of the pupils in the schools accounted for
41 percent of the variance in school closings, Ritterband assumed that
ethnicity worked through forces in the school or community. A path
analytic model was created in which four sets of variables were inter-
related; the rates of ethnic enrollment were assumed to affect the
ethnicity of teachers as well as pupils' achievement. These in turn
were linked to instruments of power, including rates of UFT membership,
teachers' seniority, and communal response, variables which were then
directly and indirectly related to whether or not a school was closed.

The initial finding that schools with a large proportion of black
pupils were likely to remain open, while those with a largely Jewish
student population tended to be closed was interpreted through inter-
mediate variables. One set of intermediate variables, labeled "proxi-
mate instruments of power," included differential rates of UFT member-
ship, teachers' seniority, and community responses in the schools.
The author found that rates of membership in the union were signifi-
cantly related to school closings and that the rates of membership
were higher in schools with large Jewish enrollments, where many of
the teachers were themselves Jewish. He also found that the older the
teachers in the school were, the more likely it was to be closed.
Moreover, the older teachers were found in the white schools, largely
because teachers with seniority have more choice in their assignments
and tended to go to schools where pupils ranked high in achievement.
In addition, overt acts showing community members' disapproval of the
strike were highly correlated with a school's remaining open, and these
acts were largely a function of the black enrollment in the school.

The ethnicity of teachers and the pupils' achievement were intro-
duced to provide an explanatory link between pupil's ethnicity and

these "proximate instruments of power" in the schools discussed above. Their residual effects were also examined. The percentage of black teachers was correlated with school closings, even when other variables were controlled; but pupils' achievement had no significant impact on school closings apart from its indirect effect through pupils' ethnicity and teachers' seniority.

Using the reduction in the partial path from pupils' ethnicity to school closing as an indicator of the effectiveness of union membership, teachers' seniority and community reaction for each ethnic group, Ritterband found that union membership and teachers' seniority accounted almost entirely for the direct effect of Jewish pupil's ethnicity, but not for that of black and Puerto Rican schools. He suggested that whites used their leverage as senior teachers and union members in the school system, while nonwhites worked outside the system, using direct confrontation.

Comments:

This is an impressive analysis of the direct and indirect effects of ethnicity on a complex network of power alliances within a large school system. Unfortunately, the available data were almost entirely from the chairmen of the union, and so the data on school-related variables were much better than data on neighborhood and community factors.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Other Youth Movement Activities

Lewis, George, "The Structure of Support in Social Movements: An Analysis
    of Organization and Resource Mobilization in the Youth Contra-Culture,"
    British Journal of Sociology, 27, 2, June 1976, 134-96.

Approach: Descriptive/Historical
Methodology: Observational

    The author discusses the evolution of the head-shop industry in terms
of the problematic relationship between a social movement and its resource
base, using the resource mobilization perspective of McCarthy and Zald.
An examination of 1960s culture from the standpoint of consumerism among
youth is appropriate, in the author's view, because although "teenagers"
as such were unknown prior to World War II they have been major actors
in the drama of consumerism which has been going on ever since.

    The author points out that head-shops began as "free stores" which
embodied a redistributive rather than a profit-making ethic, functioning
as centers where goods and services were exchanged. In addition, they
functioned as centers where information was exchanged--they were loci of
ideological dissemination. Two factors undermined "free stores": 1) the
general coming-into-fashion of "contraculture" artifacts and paraphernalia,
which represented to the stores a vast untapped resource base, and 2) the
impossibility of financing the kinds of activities which the stores were
(as a matter of ideological principle) supposed to support without tapping
that resource base. Despite the development of a "Robin Hood" ideology,
however, it became increasingly difficult to rationalize what was in
reality sheer cooptation of the movement. The author concludes that al-
though affluent youth comprise a social class economically potent enough
to spawn "enduring transgenerational social movements," that very potency
attracts outside resources which tend to obscure political purposes.

Comments:

    The analysis of the rise and fall of head-shops is in itself straight-
forward, but the relationship between the analysis and its context (the
phenomenon of affluent youth) is problematic. Does the author view the
head-shops as active disseminators of an alternative ideology which were
corrupted by capitalism, or as by-products of a period of affluence, cor-
rupt in themselves, which pretended to be disseminating an alternative
ideology for purely capitalistic reasons? It is unclear; the link between
affluence and social movements is never satisfactorily articulated.

Miller, Paul, "Social Activists and Social Change: The Chicago Demonstrators,"
American Journal of Psychiatry, 126, 12, June 1970, 1752-59.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

This paper is a study of social activists who participated in the demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968. The sample consisted of 107 arrested demonstrators, contacted through the Legal Defense Committee of Chicago, who filled out self-administered questionnaires anonymously.

The demonstrators were white, mostly male, youthful (75% between 18 and 25), and most had never been arrested before, except for traffic violations and protest demonstrations. They were well educated and nearly all were from middle-class backgrounds. Most aspired to practicing a profession or a career in the creative arts, and their parents tended to be well educated and liberal.

These demonstrators were politically left, giving strong support to the peace movement and the New Left. Though conceding the presence in the demonstrations of anarchists and communists, they strongly disagreed with Chicago officials' charges that such elements had taken over the demonstrations.

Nearly three-quarters believed in non-violence, either as a universal principle or for themselves individually. Despite the nearly universal claim that they had not resisted arrest, 54% claimed they had been attacked by police. Most demonstrators had been charged with non-violent offenses.

Most intended to remain activists by demonstrating, participation in the electoral process, formation of activist groups, and education of nonactivists.

The author sees this youth culture as existing distinct from adolescent and adult culture--the result of American affluence not requiring every able bodied person to work, allowing many to wait until their late twenties before beginning work, and as a result of a unifying communication network. It is the author's contention that social activists should be viewed as the political vanguard of this youth culture.

Comments:

Apart from the fact that the sample "represents perhaps one percent of all demonstrators" and "there is no way to test whether it is representative," the article is a fairly conventional report of the profile of activist youth.

Miller, Paul R., "Revolutionists Among the Chicago Demonstrators,"
American Journal of Psychiatry, 127, 6, 1970, 752-58.

Approach: Clinical/Descriptive
Methodology: Survey Research

A sample of 107 activists who demonstrated and were arrested at
1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago provided data for com-
paring the characteristics of "revolutionaries" and demonstrators
classed as "nonrevolutionaries." On the basis of questionnaires and
interviews, 19 self-designated revolutionaries -- that is, activists
who believe that overthrowing the government is acceptable if other
techniques fail to change national policies -- were compared to the
88 nonrevolutionary demonstrators. All of the activists were white,
most were male, young (75 percent were between 18 and 25), students
or full-time employees, well-educated, and from middle-and-upper-
class families. For most of them this was their first arrest and
in most cases they were charged with nonviolent acts.

Direct comparisons of the two groups indicated that the revolu-
tionaries were much more likely to reside outside of Illinois, to
consider social activism as a career, to have parental support for
their activism, to acknowledge the presence of anarchists and Commun-
ists in the demonstrations, to believe that capitalism is a major
social problem in the United States, and to support anarchism, commun-
ism, and the S.D.S. Revolutionaries also differed significantly from
other arrested demonstrators in that they did not support the
McCarthy and Kennedy wings of the Democratic Party; nor did they advo-
cate electoral activity, educational projects, and community action
groups as means of accomplishing social and political change. Unlike
their nonrevolutionary counterparts, they were not committed to non-
violence.

The author discusses conversion from activist to revolutionary
as a consequence of an increased awareness that conventional activist
techniques have limitations, the radicalizing effects of violent
coercion, new perspectives about the use of power to combat govern-
mental inaction on racism, poverty, war, and militarism, and a sense
of inadequate representation. The author's view was that these revo-
lutionaries were not advocating political revolution so much as "con-
ducting a cultural revolution by introducing radical changes in non-
political areas of life," that is, by rebelling against prevailing
American values and modes of life.

Comments:

Nineteen revolutionaries represent an exceedingly small sample, a
fact which limits the ability to generalize from the findings. The
survey instruments and procedures are not described, and the data were
incompletely presented. For example, revolutionaries are said to have
committed more previous acts of civil disobedience, but neither the
source of the data nor tests of significance are supplied.

Myerhoff, Barbara, "The Revolution as a Trip: Symbol and Paradox," The
   Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
   391. September 1970.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Participant Observation; Interviews; Historical Reconstruction

   According to Levi-Strauss and other writers, symbol and ritual func-
tion to unify opposing and paradoxical elements within a given belief-system.
In the context of this anthropological generalization, the author examines
the particular belief-system exemplified by a small group of student poli-
tical leaders involved in a university strike during May 1970. The situa-
tion was this: a "large, privately funded, generally conservative" American
university declared a moratorium on classes for several days in the wake
of the Kent State and Jackson State incidents, ostensibly to encourage the
development of positive programs of action addressed to critical national
issues, but covertly to defuse an imminent student strike. The students
struck anyway--that is, they vied with the administration for control of
the event, seeking both to make a political statement and to impress upon
it the indelible stamp of the counter-culture.

   The article focuses on the activities of the group which coordinated
that effort, described by the author as "student leaders" only for lack of
a better term, since the "leaders" themselves shunned any such hierarchi-
cal designation. That as much as anything exemplified their paradoxical
ideology. Following Yippie ideologues Hoffman and Rubin they styled
themselves as "poet-warriors" rather than politicians--demonstrators of an
integrated way of life combining work and play, organization and spontan-
eity, concrete political goals and joyous cultural celebration. Yet despite
their denial of the term they did unmistakably function as leaders. What
the author suggests is that via (their own use of) the symbol "poet-
warrior" they were able to resolve the leader/non-leader paradox inherent
in their chosen system of belief; more generally, the opposing but equally
valued elements "culture" and "politics" merged in this symbol.

   Counter-culture rituals--drugs, music, costume--served to ease diso-
nance created by the awareness that the strike was not, after all, their
own doing but a treacherous administrative ploy. If the university had
undermined the political side of their program (which it effectively had,
anticipating boycotting of classes and beating the students to it) then
the students would not emphasize politics, for that would mean ceding
control of the event to the university. Instead they would make the
campus resonate to their music, fill the air with their incense and reefer,
construct their kind of architecture--gaudy psychedelic bubbles. (Not
incidentally, the "leaders," being aware that their media image was more
interesting than that of the university, strove at every point for out-
rageous visual effects.) By exuberantly living out counter-culture
rituals, then, they were able to shape a paradoxical situation into their
own inmistakable creation. And if their political program was a failure,
their cultural program was, in the author's opinion, a significant triumph
--creating a mood of religious celebration (thanks to the successful
operation of symbol and ritual) and subverting the university's image in
the eyes of the public.

Comments:

This is an extremely attractive essay. The author deserves credit
for applying anthropological theory and techniques to a contemporary situa-
tion without losing either her objectivity or her sympathy--a delicate
balancing act indeed. Her thesis is a fascinating one; her argument
elegant and convincing.

Nieburg, H.L., "Agonistics--Rituals of Conflict," The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 391, September 1970, 56-73.

Approach: Descriptive

"Agonistics," writes Nieburg in his abstract, "is a term used by
ethologists to denote animal conflict behavior that is playful, symbolic,
or ritualistic. The ethological literature shows a remarkable consensus
about the social function of agonistic animal behavior: it is political."
The political function of ritualistic conflict behavior is twofold--it
initiates members of a group into a prevailing ordered set of relation-
ships, and it serves as a means by which these relationships can be modi-
fied at relatively low cost to the group. The author discusses the youth
movement, among other things, in these terms.

Comments:

The foregoing is necessarily brief because the article is in fact
a fraud. The thesis he presents in his abstract is promising indeed, but
the article bears little or no resemblance to it. Under the aegis of
serious ethology Nieburg heaps scorn upon the political and cultural claims
made for the Woodstock gathering and upon ceremonial social gatherings in
general. The total absence of the positive connotations attributed to
ritual in the author's abstract is a mystery; in the article itself the
term "ritual"--applied indiscriminately to anything and everything--connotes
vague ridicule. The author seems to have reduced a credible ethological
theory to a "proof" that ritualistic group behavior such as was manifest
at Woodstock is "merely childish."

O'Brien, James, "The Development of the New Left," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1971, 15-25.

Approach: Historical

In this article O'Brien chooses the time February 1969, when black
student sit-ins in the South touched off sympathy picketing in the North,
to mark the inception of the New Left.

During the first such period--1960-63--three major issues fueled the
movement: southern racial discrimination, atmospheric nuclear testing,
and the activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Although
the number of participating activists remained small, a number of political
groups formed, including the National Student Association, the Student
Peace Union, the Young People's Socialist League, the Young Socialist
Alliance, and Students for a Democratic Society.

The Birmingham demonstrations in 1963 marked the beginning of the
next period which, according to the author, culminated in the 1965 Watts
riot. This period was dominated by the civil rights issue, and was char-
acterized by a deepening involvement of the activist minority exemplified
by the hundreds of students who went into the Deep South to work for the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and other civil rights
groups.

In February 1965, the escalation of bombing in North Vietnam made the
Vietnam War into a major issue and the movement into an anti-war movement.
This was the beginning of the third period, 1965-67, characterized by public
demonstrations and teach-ins.

The fourth period, from 1967 up to the time the article was written
(1971), was characterized by the development of serious draft resistance,
obstructive campus protests against symbols of the military, the emergence
of cultural radicalism, support (during the 1968/69 school year) for black
students' demands--in short, a variety of manifestations of frustration-
fed revolt all centered on the continuing U.S. presence in Vietnam.

The author concludes that despite the traditional Marxist assertion
that socialist revolution must emerge from the working class, the develop-
ment of the new student Left--and in particular certain aspects of its
ideology such as rejection of the consumer ethic and dedication of cooper-
ative social arrangements--may augur a socialist revolution from that
quarter.

Comments:

As this decade has made plain, the author's prediction was way out in
left field. Apart from that, the segmentation of events into distinct
historical periods hardly justifies this uninspiring rehash of the sixties.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Right Wing Crusades

Broyles, J. Allen, "The John Birch Society: A Movement of Social Protest
    of the Radical Right," Journal of Social Issues, 19, 2, 1963, 51-62.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

    This article summarizes the conclusions drawn from a study of the John
Birch Society in 1962. The organization, ideology, and activities of this
organization are analyzed from a social-psychological perspective, with
particular attention paid to the type of social conflict in which Birch
Society supporters engaged.

    According to Broyles, the Birch Society functions as a "fundamentalist
reaction" to its social setting with a major appeal for members and leaders
being its ideology and activity designed "to expose, protest, and if possi-
ble destroy Communism wherever the leaders or members of the Society per-
ceive it."

    John Birch Society publications were examined and field research was
conducted through mail questionnaires to determine the sites for on-site
research. Observers and active participants on both sides of local contro-
versies were then interviewed in nine cities which had been identified as
centers of activity of local Birch Society chapters.

    A variety of conclusions were drawn from this field study. The top
leadership tended to be charismatic (focused on the founder Robert Welch)
but it also embodied an unstable mixture of both charismatic and rational
bureaucratic elements, with a paid staff. This led to certain strengths,
primarily because of the capacity to multiply the efforts of the leader
with a fairly high rate of efficiency but also had certain weaknesses in
that the efficiency might undermine the emotionalism and loyalty aroused
by the charismatic leader. The author predicted that if the society grew,
the rational-bureaucratic structure would increase and be strengthened but
if the society continued to shrink, the charismatic leadership would assume
a dominant position.

    A second set of findings pertain to the ideology of the Society which
reflected a conspiritorial view of society in which most leaders of major
societal institutions in the United States were knowing or unwitting Com-
munist agents. Members of the Society tended to accept the "total package"
of beliefs; they tended to accept the basic concepts as given "facts,"
and, consequently, refrained from examining their validity. He suggests
that these characteristics of rigidity and invulnerability were partially
a function of the close-minded nature characteristic of Society members.

    The ideology served the following functions: it provided certainty,
understanding and direction; it provided a sense of being "right" and super-
ior to opponents; it provided justification for and a target for direct
aggression. According to this interpretation, uprooted elites and others
who were frustrated by the transformation of societal institutions were
drawn by the charismatic leader of the Birch Society and its ideology which
allowed them to focus and act upon their frustration.

Broyles found that the conflicts in which the society engaged tended to be characterized as follows: 1) the tone of the conflict, both initially and as the conflict progressed, was highly acrimonious, 2) the intent of the conflict was to attract allies from the uncommitted public rather than to resolve differences between the conflicting parties, 3) the conflict broadened as it progressed, and 4) the conflict was resolved by being abandoned rather than by any negotiation of differences. He suggests that these characteristics were a function of the initial perception that the conflicting parties have of each other: They perceive each other as pursuing illegitimate ends and using illegitimate means. There is no common ground to make negotiation or compromise possible. Instead, the conflict is one of the "good" against the "evil," consists of charges and countercharges, and ends when the parties become emotionally exhausted.

Broyles concludes by suggesting that if opponents of the Society refrain from engaging in this acrimonious propagandistic conflict--"noncommunal conflict"--and force Society members to rationally debate the issues, then the John Birch Society might become a functional and constructive element of society.

Comments:

Although dated, this article provides an interesting descriptive account of a radical right organization and the type of conflict it engaged in. Particularly provocative is the suggestion that ideology may be more important in explaining persons' participation in social movement organizations and the types of activities the organization engages in than researchers generally acknowledge.

Nevertheless, there are methodological problems which make this article clearly suggestive rather than conclusive. No indication is given as to how many persons participated in the study or who refused and why. In general, the author tends to offer conclusions without providing a discussion of the data, making it difficult to evaluate them.

Kirkpatrick, R. George, "Collective Consciousness and Mass Hysteria:
   Collective Behavior in Durkheimian Perspectives," Human Relations,
   28, 1, 1975, 63-84.

Approach: Theoretical
Methodology: Case Study

   This article develops from two Durkheimian postulates:

1. Societies are based on a normative consensus or shared trust.
    A deviant act that threatens the commonality and thus the
    very basis of social order may call down punishment whose
    severity is much greater than the effects of the act warrant.

2. With increasing size, division of labor, and specialization of
    functions in a community or society, the strength of the
    collective consensus decreases; and acts contrary to public
    morality will incur less repression and hysteria.

   Antipornography movements in two American cities, Midville (pop.
100,000) and Southtown (pop. 250,000) were studied. Observations by
nonparticipants, documents, and structured and unstructured interviews
were used to flesh out a Durkheimian model of collective consciousness
and mass hysteria. Southtown's population was both larger and more
diverse than Midville's. According to Durkheim's model, Southtown would
therefore respond less hysterically than Midville to threatened porno-
graphy.

   Before formally advancing the Durkheimian model, however, Kirkpat-
rick tested a Freudian model for its predictive value. In Freud's
view, crusades for decency are not primarily a collective phenomenon
but rather an extreme manifestation of individual repressions. Accord-
ingly, attitude scales measuring sexual repression were administered to
samples of both populations. Since residents of Southtown showed sig-
nificantly more repression than Midville residents, Freud's model
then, would predict the reverse,   that Southtown would respond more
hysterically than Midville to the threat of pornography. Surveys of
antipornography movements in both cities showed that collective hys-
teria was actually greater in Midville than in Southtown, a finding
which undermined the Freudian and supported the Durkheimian model.

   On the basis of the two surveys, the author suggests a number of
intervening variables and corresponding generalizations by way of ela-
borating the Durkheim model. One of the intervening variables was
"public designation of deviance by prestige figures," In Midville a
'national expert' lectured against pornography; no such figure appeared
in Southtown.   Another was "central threat to value system." In Mid-
ville the only dealer in pornography had his store in the heart of the
downtown business district, a direct threat to its respectibility.
In Southtown the threat was more diffuse. Generally, the author says,
"The more public the threat to the collective consciousness, the more
hysteria..." Finally, he draws attention to the Dirkheimian notion of
"the symbolic nature of crime, and the relationship between the degree
of insult to the collective consciousness and the reaction to deviance,

irrespective of the seriousness of the act itself."

Comments:

     The thesis of this article touches on the very roots of collective behavior, and the two case studies are fairly convincing. Unfortunately the article itself is so poorly organized as to be almost impenetrable. The author tries to perform too many operations upon the case studies: first, he simplifies them to outline the thesis; then, having "confirmed" the thesis, he adds one variable after another, purportedly to bridge the gap between model and reality, but actually blurring the initial premise. For example, the "style" of the deviant -- the degree of ostentation or conformity he presents to the collective consciousness -- is introduced as a crucial variable interacting with the collective consciousness to produce hysteria. But the author makes no attempt to relate this variable to the basic model, and its introduction raises more questions than it answers: Is the deviant a product of his community or an independent agent? How might the deviant's style be a function of community size and relative homogeneity? By overextending himself in this way the author detracts from the force of his thesis.

Page, Ann and Donald Clelland, "The Kanawha County Textbook Controversy:
  A Study of the Politics of Life Style Concern," Social Forces, 57,
  1, September 1978, 265-81.

Approach: Descriptive
Methodology: Case Study

     Kanawha County, West Virginia is the scene of a continuing protest
over the content of textbooks used in the public schools. This protest is
analyzed within a reformulated theoretical framework of status politics
derived from Weber and Gusfield. The textbook controversy is viewed as a
group phenomenon in which an attempt is made to defend a way of life by
controlling "the means of symbolic production through which reality is
constructed." Kanawha County is described on the basis of Census data,
and the controversy is summarized and discussed from the resulting socio-
cultural profile.

     The anti-textbook protestors held marches and rallies, circulated
petitions, appealed to elected officials, and boycotted the school system
by keeping their children home or sending them to private Christian schools.
The controversy also involved violence in the form of sniping, vandalism,
and fire-bombing. The leadership of the anti-textbook groups reflected
the movement's strong traditional religious base and the lower educational
levels of the group members. Demographic data suggested a rural-urban
schism was also related to the controversy.

     The investigators analyzed the published statements and pamphlets of
protest leaders and letters to the editor and isolated four categories of
complaint: disrespect for traditional orthodox conceptions of God and the
Bible; use of profanity and vulgar language; disrespect for authority;
and advocacy of moral relativism. Examples of these complaints are pro-
vided, and the "cultural fundamentalism" that they reflect is compared with
the opposing cosmopolitan influence exerted in Kanawha school policy.
The question as to why this movement arose is discussed in relation to
structural conduciveness, sociocultural factors, the presence of a charis-
matic leader, other movements extant in the region, and relative power
bases.

Comments:

     The authors seem adept at drawing data from a variety of sources and
effectively utilizing them to substantiate their theoretical points. Their
presentation makes for a fascinating sociopolitical case study.

Zurcher, Louis A. and Russell L. Curtis, "A Comparative Analysis of
    Propositions Describing Social Movement Organizations,"
    The Sociological Quarterly, 14, Spring 1973, 178-88.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Case Study

    Research on two antipornography crusades and the organizations that
coordinated and directed them is used to assess the plausibility of
propositions developed by Zald and Ash regarding the characteristics
and dynamics of social movement organizations. Organization records,
observations at meetings, and unstructured interviews with participants
and others were used to compile "natural histories" of two crusades --
in Midville and Southtown -- which differed in geographical location,
size and affiliation of the organizations, strategies and tactics,
duration of the groups and other relevant facts.

    The Midville crusade took place in a heavily industrialized north-
central city of 100,000 residents. It was begun by a small group of
citizens from various organizations whose principal tactic was direct
action against an adult book store. When the book store retaliated
by filing a lawsuit, which was settled without judgment, the organiza-
tion continued to operate on a smaller scale against other targets.

    The Southtown crusade occurred in a southwestern state capital with
a population of 250,000. The goal of the religious fraternal organiza-
tion which began it was to modify the state's antipornography statutes,
but the group never engaged in direct action against businesses.
After the legislature passed two statutes that they had lobbied for, the
organization disbanded. It had been in existence for five months.

    The authors examine four sets of propositions, elaborated by Zald
and Ash: 1) Organizations with exclusive membership requirements are
likely to have more stable goals, to be less susceptible to pressures
for maintaining the organization, to have fewer coalitions or mergers
but more schisms, to have leaders who mobilize the members for tasks,
and to have a longer life span. 2) The success of the organization
depends greatly on the quality and commitment of the leaders and their
tactics. The charisma of leaders will be used to foster
conservative tendencies in the dominant core of the organization as
well as to encourage radical splinter groups. 3) Movement organizations
created by other organizations tend to disband when the goal is
achieved. Such an organization will be more likely to establish new
goals if it has its own recruiting and fund-raising base. 4) Organiza-
tions whose goals are oriented toward changing people are said to be
less susceptible to pressures to maintain the organization, to have
more stable goals, and to last longer than those aimed at changing
society. Organizations which have specific goals are likely to cease
operations when goals have been accomplished.

    Most of the hypotheses were supported. Exclusiveness, as in
Southtown, was not associated with longer life, however; and the

organization attempting to change people in Midville did not have
less pressure for organizational maintenance or more stable goals.
In accounting for the lack of support for these hypotheses, the authors
argue that "in the small or emerging social movement organization,
the variables leadership orientation, goal specificity, and incentive
structure are significant and perhaps overriding independent variables,
accounting for much of the variance in other organizational charac-
teristics."

Comments:.

    On the whole this article is interesting because it contrasts two
organizations which focus on the same issue but differ sharply in the
internal dynamics of their organizations. Those already familiar
with Zald and Ash's work on the structure and process of social
movement organizations will find the application interesting and provo-
cative, even though, as the authors admit, the sample is too small to
be a serious test of their propositions. Unfortunately, they do not
provide enough information to allow us to place these two organizations
in relation to many of the independent variables. For example, they
argue that Southtown's membership requirements were more exclusive
than Midville's but provide little support for this contention.
Moreover, in accounting for differences between the two movements, they
neglect other variables besides those concerning the internal organiza-
tion that Zald and Ash specified, including the support derived from
external sources.

Zurcher, Louis Jr., and Robert Kirkpatrick, Citizens for Democracy: Anti-pornography Crusades as Status Defense, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1976; also Zurcher, L. R. Kirkpatrick and C. Bowman, "Ad Hoc Antipornography Organizations and Their Active Members: A Research Summary, Journal of Social Issues, 29, 3, 1973, 69-94; also, Wilson, K. and L. Zurcher, "Status Inconsistency and Participation in Social Movements: An Application of Goodman's Hierarchical Modeling," Sociological Quarterly, 17, 4, Autumn 1976, 520-33; also, Zurcher, L. R. Kirkpatrick, C. Bowman, "The Antipornography Campaign: A Symbolic Crusade," Social Problems, 12, 2, Fall 1971; and, Curtis, Russell and Louis Zurcher, "Stable Resources of Protest Movements: The Multi-Organizational Field," Social Forces, 52, September 1973, 53-60.

Approach: Descriptive/Empirical
Methodology: Case Study

This book describes the emergence of two antipornography crusades to curtail the sale of sexually explicit materials within their communities and examines some of the attitudes and attributes of crusade participants ("Conporns") and their opponents ("proporns"). One crusade occurred in "Southtown" the hometown of the researchers; the other occurred in "Midville," a city in the northern midwest.

Drawing on Gusfield's work, the major hypothesis is that antipornography efforts "reflect status politics, escalated to the level of symbolic crusades by the concerted activities of status discontents, individuals who perceive as threatened the prestige (and power) of the life style to which they are committed" (p. 9). This hypothesis suggests three specific propositions: First, the goals, strategies, and tactics of antipornography crusades and the speeches, actions, attributions, responses and concerns of crusaders should reveal status discontent and efforts to resolve it. Second, crusaders will tend to fit a pattern of over-rewarded status inconsistency (high income with lower education and/or lower occupation). Third, opponents will tend to fit a pattern of under-rewarded status inconsistency (low income with higher education and/or higher occupation).

In addition to Gusfield's theory of status politics in symbolic crusades, the authors need several other perspectives on social movement phenomena, namely: Smelser's value-added theory of collective behavior; Gamson's propositions concerning political efficacy and trust; Zald and Asch's propositions concerning the growth and transformation of social movement organizations; and Turner's propositions specifying the determinants of movement strategy.

Researchers collected both quantitative and qualitative data. Structured interviews with "conporns," "proporns," and "controls" provided quantitative data. The samples of "conporn" and "proporn" respondents were drawn using a "snowball" technique (that is, by each respondent naming others who should be interviewed). "Control" respondents were drawn from the neighborhoods in which the "conporns" lived. Observation, documents, and unstructured interviews provided qualitative data. In "Southtown" researchers conducted over 150 unstructured interviews and 113 structured interviews (49 "conporns," 26 "proporns," 38 "controls') from

January to June 1969. In "Midville" they completed over 50 unstructured interviews and 73 structured interviews (36 "conporns," 25 "proporns," and 12 "controls") during 17 days in June and July 1969.

Community leaders, the press, and the police did not oppose the goals and actions of these crusades. Nevertheless, crusaders were concerned about unwanted side effects from their activities and the potential for their opponents to become organized. "Conporns" tactics were more orderly than disorderly, but their accomplishments were more dramatic than effectual: after these crusades the availability in these communities of sexually explicit materials had not been decreased.

Portions of this research had been published previously in journals and as research reports to the funding agent, the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (see pp. xiv-xv for citations). The introductory chapter provides a review of the various theoretical perspectives on social movement phenomena which guided the research. The next six chapters provide not only detailed descriptions of the two crusades but also brief theoretical interpretations. The eighth and ninth chapters focus respectively on individual and organizational characteristics. The tenth chapter synthesizes conclusions.

Zurcher and Kirkpatrick summarize their conclusions as follows:

"Throughout the preceding chapters we have interpreted the natural history, individual and organizational data to support our hypothesis. The Conporns were indeed status discontents, engaged in a symbolic crusade to defend the integrity of their life-style" (p. 307).

They also note that the data were insufficient to test (in a strict sense of the term) the assorted propositions they had presented. In fact, contrary to their propositions,

"Notable percentages of Conporns were low status consistents; notable percentages of Proporns were high status consistents. Nearly one-third of the Conporns were under-rewarded status inconsistents (the same percentage as those who were over-rewarded)" (p. 269).

The authors, nevertheless, synthesize their conclusions in a broad explanatory framework, presenting it in predictive form, listing a series of statements concerning the emergence of antipornography crusades specifically and symbolic crusades generally. They suggest that symbolic crusades can be "liberal" (e.g., pro-marijuana) as well as "conservative."

Comments:

This book appears conceptually elegant but analytically crude. The data on individual characteristics seem extremely weak. For example,

"Thirty-one percent of the Midville Conporns indicated that they were not official members of the antipornography organization... 42 percent of (its) members could not accurately name their cru-

sade; 20 percent of (the Southtown) membrs could not accurately name theirs" (p. 300).

The authors' warning about conclusions concerning the support (or lack of it) for the hypothesis and propositions must not be ignored.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Miscellaneous

Hopple, Gerald W., "Protest Attitudes and Social Class: Working Class
    Authoritarianism Revisited," Sociology and Social Research, 60, 3,
    1976, 229-46.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Past research has employed the F-scale and other agree-disagree atti-
tude measures to establish the existence of a relationship between authori-
tarian attitudes and lower social class suggesting that less educated
and lower status subgroups would oppose protest activity more than better
educated and higher status persons. The author, however, argued that
aspects of a particular protest situation determine responses within all
social strata. This situational hypothesis predicted that attitudes toward
a given protest activity would vary as a function of the context, issue,
and participants.

The Protest Situational Attitude Scale (PSAS) was designed to measure
attitudes toward ten protest situations and three nonprotest situations.
The PSAS was administered to eighty-four high school teachers and mailed to
500 labor union members. (A return rate of 24% of the mail questionnaires
resulted in data for 119 blue collar respondents.)

Results suggested that the teachers clearly differentiated between
coercive or disruptive protests and nonviolent legal types. Union member
results indicated that they were far from intolerant of all protest be-
havior: the range of positive and negative responses showed that their
attitudes varied with the given issue. In fact, their responses were pre-
dominantly favorable toward protest in opposition to busing and the use
of anti-religious books in school, and protest activity by neighborhood
and veterans groups.

Although the working class respondents were less supportive of due
process, and of protest behavior by liberal students, blacks, or other
minority persons, the two occupational groups were quite similar in their
disapproval of coercive or unruly protest situations.

Comments:

These findings should be accepted with caution because the samples
are small and unrepresentative (especially by age and sex) and the response
rate by the blue collar workers was quite low. But the findings do sup-
port the research hypothesis and, furthermore, they suggest that the PSAS
is useful in assessing the range of tolerance for protest behavior within
and between diverse subgroups.

Kahn, Robert L., "The Justification of Violence: Social Problems and
Social Solutions," Journal of Social Issues, 28, 1, 1972, 155-75.

Approach: Theoretical/Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

In this brief discussion of his research on the level of violence peo-
ple are prepared to justify, Kahn argues that the level of violence con-
sidered necessary for social control and the level of violence considered
necessary for social change are important social indicators of the quality
of life in a society. Using interviews with about 1400 American men,
chosen on a stratified random basis, they found that these men were pre-
pared to justify very substantial amounts of force and injury by the police
for the sake of social control but were much less likely to feel that vio-
lence for the sake of social change was necessary.

When asked to define problems of violence, the respondents mentioned
racial problems, civil disturbances, student protest, and crime, but very
few mentioned war or police violence. The causes of violence were largely
seen as social problems rather than individual pathology or criminality
but when asked to suggest cures, there was much more emphasis on threat and
punishment, along with economic and social change.

A statistical model is developed to describe violence justifiers. Those
who supported high levels of violence for social control (given multiple
choice options for potential events) were more likely to live in the South,
to identify with police, believe in retributive justice, define many forms
of protest as violence (draft card burning, for example), believe looting
is violent but that shooting looters is not, and so on. The profile of
those who believe property damage and injury are necessary for social
change--i.e., those who justify violence for social change--are more likely
to identify with minorities and protesters rather than police, disapprove
of police shooting looters and beating students, see the source of violence
in social problems, and so on.

Recommendations are made for national improvements in education and the
(distribution of) income, both inversely associated with the justification
of violence, and for continued data gathering on attitudes which justify
violence..a proposed social indicator. Kahn concludes with messages to
the supporters of violence. To justifiers of violence for social control
(the majority): Since over 90% of American men agree upon the need for
social change, and only a small minority of all men (and a larger minority
of Black men) are skeptical and angry enough to conclude that changes will
not occur without violence, it is the responsibility of the majority to
convince the minority through visible progress and support for change, that
violence is not necessary. To the justifiers of violence for social change,
Kahn points out that most citizens are not pessimistic about change and do
not feel it must be brought about by violence, and in fact endorse the use
of violence by police to crush protests involving damage to property or
injury to individuals. Thus he encourages nonviolent efforts to stimulate
the present--if dormant-- conscience of the majority since..."any minority
that uses violence in an attempt to produce social change may well face
a majority-supported response of counter-violence, and at any escalated
level of destructiveness...the resort to violence is likely to wreak

disproportionate havoc among those who seek change."

Comments:

Excellent theoretical analysis, a wealth of survey data from an impressive sample, well chosen and well analyzed. It is unfortunate that no attitudes of women are measured or even discussed. Also missing is a profile of the American men who approved of minimal violence by either police or protesters, i.e., citizens who do not justify violence. He makes another quite critical point for all researchers in this area--"Violence, to a considerable extent, is in the eye of the beholder; its meaning is not comprehended by the dictionary definition of force and injury."

Leahy, Peter and Mazur, Allan, "A Comparison of Movements Opposed to Nuclear Power, Fluoridation and Abortion," In Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume I, Louis Kriesberg (Ed.), Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, Inc., 1978, pp. 143-54.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research; Analysis of Existing Data

This article is a report of a comparative study of citizen movements against fluoridation, nuclear power plants, and legalized abortion, in which striking similarities among them are reviewed and discussed. All three are viewed as reactions to technological innovations in which there are clear disputes among experts over the consequences of the technology. The disagreements among experts in each of these areas revolve around the fact that they often address different questions, exploit ambiguities in the scientific data available, exaggerate the strength or significance of their findings, and interpret the same facts in different ways.

Interviews with representative samples of leaders of the movements opposed to nuclear power plants and legalized abortion were compared to existing data on anti-fluoridation activists and the authors found the leadership of the movements to be similar in many respects, not only to each other, but also to leading spokespeople for many other political issues. They argue that the leaders are older, middle class or higher, knowledgeable, appear to be well-integrated into the society, have a history of political activism, and have the time to be active. They are recruited into these movements through prior occupational or avocational interests and organizations, and through the personal influence of friends and acquaintances. Although their ideologies do differ, they all perceive that the innovation which they oppose is dangerous and they usually express their opposition both in an ideological context as well as in technological criticisms.

The authors argue that none of the innovations are intrinsically liberal or conservative and the politically partisan nature of the leadership is accidental.

> "We suggest that the leaders of a given movement are oriented to
> the left or right by 'historic accident.' The political complexion
> of each movement was set early in the controversy and remained
> stable throughout its course...The social process of recruitment
> acts to preserve this initial political orientation."

Comments:

Although the attempt to compare three quite different "reactionary" movements is both interesting and provocative, this article is too brief a summary of previous research findings to allow the careful reader to evaluate the degree of similarity among them. Caution must also be attached to the way in which the samples were drawn and the fact that the number of respondents is relatively small. The leadership of nuclear power plant opponents is based on 30 interviews conducted with members of a prominent national coalition of groups in 1973 and the anti-abortion leadership is represented by 31 interviews with board members of National Right to Life Inc. in 1975. Anti-fluoridation activists are described on the basis of 570 respondents to a poll conducted by an anti-fluoridation newspaper in 1971 and from interviews with newspaper editors in communities which experienced opposition to fluoridation.

Ransford, Edward H., "Blue Collar Anger: Reactions to Student and Black
    Protest," American Sociological Review, 37, 3, 1972, 333-46.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

Ransford tests the hypothesis that the working class is especially
antagonistic toward movements sponsored by blacks and students, using
a stratified probability sample of 477 white Los Angeles residents.
Personal interviews were conducted with males and females in predominantly
skilled and semiskilled positions, who were employed during late 1969
and early 1970. The author was interested in whether blue-collar workers
and those with less than a high school education would be more likely to
1) express punitive attitudes toward student demonstrators; 2) oppose
granting students more power; and 3) feel blacks are pushing too hard
for things they do not deserve, compared to respondents with more educa-
tion and better jobs.

The author gives three somewhat overlapping reasons why working
people may be more antagonistic toward demands by students and blacks
than people higher in the class structure. First, the blue-collar environ-
ment stresses respect for authority, hence protests which seem to flout
authority and downgrade traditional institutions will anger workers.
Second, the working class has traditionally believed in hard work and the
openness of the American system; they are hostile to black demands for
preferential treatment and resent students' assertions that the system is
racist, elitist, and exploitive. Third, because working-class people feel
powerless to check "radical" changes and influence political decisions
directly affecting their lives, they are especially antagonistic to groups
that seem directly threatening.

The analysis gave moderate support to the idea that white working-
class people are highly antagonistic toward students and blacks who demand
massive changes. Although blue-collar workers (especially males and those
scoring a strong sense of political powerlessness) were more antagonistic
than white-collar workers, fairly sizable segments of all educational and
occupational levels reacted in anger to the protests of the 1960s. Blue-
collar workers, regardless of their educational level, were most opposed
to protests by students and blacks. White-collar workers varied more in
their outlook depending on their educational achievement. All three
explanations for the greater antagonism of the blue-collar worker were
confirmed, but the antagonism toward blacks was not fully explained by
these theories. The greatest polarization was found among young adults:
young blue-collar workers and young well-educated professionals were worlds
apart in their attitudes toward student power and black demands.

According to the author, "much of the workingman's anger is a ra-
tional response to tangible strains, independent of personal bigotry.
...Apparently the potential exists for black as well as white militant
action when individuals perceive a distributive injustice and, in addi-
tion, feel blocked in gaining redress through institutional channels."

Comments:

Certain aspects of the sampling procedure used in this study make it
difficult to apply the findings to larger working-class populations. All
respondents were employed in predominantly skilled (probably union) jobs,
lived chiefly among whites, and were the only wage-earners in the household.
Only white persons who voted in the 1969 mayoral election were included,
and they were interviewed at a time of local unrest on the campus and
intense racial friction. All of these factors may have heightened
the antagonism toward students and blacks expressed by a selected group
at a particular time.

Ransford's hypothesis needs to be tested by adopting a more rigorous
definition and application of socioeconomic class distinctions. The
study design would be improved by sampling at different times and using
a more representative sample of socioeconomic groups stratified by region
and degree of ethnic homogeneity within communities. Interpretations of
the data must not only account for variations in attitude by industry
and occupation, but also look at the effect of union membership.

Zikmund, William and Stephen Miller, "Internal/External Control of Rein-
    forcement and Women's Participation in Direct Social Action," Psycho-
    logical Reports, 34, 3, June 1974, 1163-66.

Approach: Empirical
Methodology: Survey Research

    An individual's belief in internal or external control of reinforce-
ment has been linked to social action, with internal control positively
related to such behavior. Evidence as to the effect of this variable on
women, however, has been mixed. This paper presents a study of the power
of internal/external control of reinforcement in predicting female activ-
ism in a socioeconomic event "clearly within the female domain," the
national meat boycott of April 1973. The hypothesis was that those who
felt they had internal control over their own fate would be more active
in the boycott. In a mailed survey of 600 Oklahoma women, 166 usable
responses were obtained.

    Contrary to expectations, survey results failed to show any greater
support for the boycott among internally oriented women than externals.
And externals were actually more involved in boycotting than were internals.
The authors conclude that their results confirm the earlier studies in
suggesting that the "prediction of women's social action is more difficult
than men's using Rotter's I/E scale."

    The argument that this result could be attributable to economic class
factors was belied by the lack of differences in boycott participation
across income, education, and occupation lines. In a post hoc analysis of
the results, the authors suggest that the greater involvement of women
with external loci of control in the boycott might be a function of the
fact that persons with internal loci of control have a greater capacity
to discriminate between controllable and uncontrollable situations. If
they did not see the meat prices as "controllable," they may have opted
to react to the situation by selective shopping or changing their diets
rather than boycott participation.

Comments:

    The general design and timing of the study provide a valuable real-
world context for the study of this issue. Unfortunately, several factors
impair the evidential value of the findings: Technically, of course,
these data treat only the unpredictability of women's activism using the
I/E scale as no men were studied. The study would have been improved
if I/E scores had been shown to predict some corresponding male activity
using this same methodology. The fact that food-purchasing is done for
the family may well have reduced women's degrees of freedom to follow per-
sonal inclinations, especially for those unaware of adequate nutritional
substitutes.

    The lack of independence in the food-purchasing role is troublesome.
The low questionnaire return rate raises questions of sample self-selection,
and it is not likely that a median-split of the (self-administered and
slightly modified) I/E scale meaningfully distinguishes the traits of this
population. The test-retest unreliability of I/E scales virtually assures

categorization errors (of the most serious sort in this study) from so fine a distinction. One final, egregious omission is the failure to provide any "repeated measure" (or even self-report) comparison of behaviors during the boycott with behaviors during some non-boycott period. Checking the response "We did not eat any meat" does not necessarily indicate boycotting behavior (especially for vegetarians and the poor), while respondents checking the option "We frequently ate meat" might have done so less frequently than normal or in smaller "amounts per meal" as a form of participation in the boycott. This complex of methodological oversights renders the findings of this study substantially uninterpretable.

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