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WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLICE OPERATIONS BY THE YEAR 2003?

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**TECHNICAL REPORT
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This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future--creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in the Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION.....	1
FUTURES STUDY.....	6
Issues and Sub-Issues.....	6
Selection of Events and Trends-Methodology.....	6
Nominal Group Technique Participants.....	7
Identified Events.....	8
Event Distillation.....	10
Event Forecasting.....	12
Identified Trends.....	24
Trend Distillation.....	24
Trend Forecasting.....	28
Cross-Impact Analysis.....	40
Event-to-Event.....	41
Event-to-Trend.....	43
Most Likely Scenario.....	44
Alternate Scenario - No. 1.....	52
Alternate Scenario - No. 2.....	55
Summary of Futures Research.....	60
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ACQUISITION OF MILITARY SUPPORT.....	62
Introduction.....	62
San Angelo Police Department.....	63

Mission Statements of the San Angelo	
Police Department.....	67
Situational Analysis.....	68
The Environment.....	68
Opportunities.....	70
Threats.....	73
Organizational Capabilities.....	75
Ability to Deal with Opportunities.....	76
Ability to Deal with Threats.....	78
Stakeholder Analysis.....	84
Strategic Alternatives.....	94
Three Top Strategies.....	97
Preferred Strategy.....	103
Implementation Plan.....	103
Actions and Sequence.....	104
Summary.....	106
TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN.....	107
"Critical Mass".....	109
Discussion of the "Critical Mass" Actors.....	111
Readiness Capability Analysis.....	117
Readiness Assessment of Key Leaders.....	117
Summary of Capability Analysis.....	121
Transition Management Structure.....	122
Technologies and Methods to Support	
Implementation.....	124
Transition Management and Implementation Plan.....	127

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY.....	131
ENDNOTES.....	134
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	135
APPENDIX (Unstructured Interviews).....	137

ILLUSTRATIONS

<u>List of Charts</u>	<u>Page</u>
Event Evaluation Chart.....	13
Event Charts	
1. National Civil Unrest/Riots.....	14
2. 8.0 Earthquake.....	15
3. Violent Crime Out of Control.....	16
4. Military Involved in International Conflict...	17
5. Major Nuclear/Toxic Spill.....	18
6. Police No-Show at Critical Incident.....	19
7. Police Military Exchange.....	20
8. National Depression.....	21
9. U.S.-Mexico Border Closed.....	22
10. Terrorist Detonation.....	23
Trend Evaluation Chart.....	28
Trend Charts	
1. National Level of Crime.....	29
2. Citizen Confidence in Law Enforcement.....	30
3. Public Confidence in Government.....	31
4. Fiscal State of State/Federal Governments.....	32
5. Changing Role of the Military.....	33
6. Have/Have Not Disparity.....	34
7. Multiple Disasters.....	35
8. Vigilantism.....	36
9. Level of Media Influence.....	37
10. Weapons Availability.....	38

Event-to-Event Cross-Impact Matrix.....	39
Event-to-Trend Cross-Impact matrix.....	39
Trend Values for Iteration No. 37.....	57
Trend Values for Iteration No. 56.....	57
Stakeholder Assumption Map.....	93
"Critical Mass" Chart.....	110
Key Leaders' Readiness for Major Change Chart.....	119
Readiness Capability Chart.....	120
Responsibility Chart.....	129

INTRODUCTION

The challenges ~~that~~ have been created by the types of situations which will be described, coupled with the likelihood of additional similar challenges in the future, constitute the issue question: What will be the impact of military involvement in police operations by the year 2003? This question gives rise to two key sub-issues: 1) What command relationship will have to be established between military and law enforcement personnel?; and, 2) what organizational changes and liaison functions will have to be developed in using military forces in civil arenas?

The 1990's, although early into the decade, throughout various portions of the United States, have been very challenging in terms of significant man-made and natural disasters which have been catastrophic in terms of damage and suffering, and equally as catastrophic economically. The one common trend that is found in most of the situations associated with chaos thus far in this decade is the utilization, to various degrees, or the potential for the utilization, of military forces. At the onset of this research, the decade had yielded catastrophic riots in the City of Los Angeles,¹ Hurricane Andrew in the Southeast portion of the United States,² a devastating hurricane which struck the Island of Kauai in the Hawaiian Islands chains,³ and several earthquakes in Southern California which resulted in millions of

dollars in losses.⁴ In these events, the resources of local authorities were stretched to and beyond available resources. Military resources were called up to support local emergency response efforts.

Interestingly, three additional catastrophes of the nature that this report will address occurred subsequent to this research phase of this report: devastating floods in the Midwest stemming from the overflow of the Mississippi River;⁵ a terrorist bombing of the New York Trade Center by radical Muslim fundamentalists;⁶ and, a series of extremely destructive brush and forest fires in Southern California.⁷ In each of these situations, the problems encountered, in terms of both equipment and personnel, required resources far in excess of what is normally available by state and local authorities, and created the opportunity for various degrees of military assistance to support civil authorities.

The potential for serious problems in the remaining years of this decade is very strong. As this paper will discuss, it appears very likely that serious crime will continue to rise, the number of incidents of significant civil unrest will increase, and that strong earthquakes - possibly even the "Big One" - will occur in California. Additionally, there is every reason to speculate that additional types of natural disasters, primarily wild fires, hurricanes, and tornados, will occur in the future with roughly the same frequency as they have in the past. There is every

reason to expect that the resources of the military will be called upon, time again in the future, to support state and local efforts of these-natures. It should be noted that such utilization is not in conflict with the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is responsible for coordinating the assistance of the myriad of federal resources which are brought to bear, depending upon the situation; although there is no chain of command relationship between the military and FEMA, coordination between the other federal entities and military forces is critical and FEMA would certainly play a role in that coordination.

The predictable and possible disasters that may well occur during the remaining years of this decade could hardly come at a worst time for two reasons. The first is that the elements of likely civil disobedience and out of control violent crime literally double the amount of disasters which the nation may encounter. For the most part, disasters in the past, with a few notable exceptions, have been fewer in number and primarily restricted to those of a natural nature. Secondly, the present economic state of the national government and most of its states is such that far fewer resources are likely to be available to handle what is likely to be far more major significant difficulties, some of which may be concurrent or closely simultaneous with one another, than has been experienced in the past.⁸

The role of the military is changing in such a way as to increase the likelihood of military support to civil authorities in a variety of situations. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the decline in federal revenues, there has also been a significant reduction in military forces which continues at the time of this report. All branches of the military are heavily involved in defending their missions and actually searching for new missions in an effort to reduce the degree of financial and personnel cutbacks they are both experiencing and facing. While there was little enthusiasm, in general, among the services (except for the Coast Guard) for domestic responsibilities several years ago, such responsibilities and missions are now being aggressively sought and embraced because such can be a factor in retarding the aforementioned cutbacks. In addition to short-term roles in disaster situations, this willingness to accept domestic missions is also potentially taking longer-term implications in activities such as specialized border interdiction of drugs and illegal alien smuggling.

This writer's interest in this topic stems not only from curiosity, but equally from past experience and likely future involvement, from either a police standpoint, a military standpoint, or possibly both (hopefully at different times!). As a Commander with the Los Angeles Police Department, this writer observes and experiences on a daily basis those factors which have contributed to the rampant crime and chaos facing many of

this nation's major cities and, most specifically, those factors that weighed most heavily in the Los Angeles Riots in 1992. Additionally, as-a Colonel in the United States Marine Corps Reserve, this writer is sensitive to and familiar with the concept of military support to civil authorities in dealing with both man-caused and natural disasters.

In late April of 1992, during the Los Angeles Riots, this writer was designated by then Chief of Police Daryl F. Gates as his military advisor and as the liaison to the military forces deployed in Los Angeles in support of civil authorities. While there has been much talk of the things that could, and probably should, have been done differently, it is also important to recognize the tremendous value of the military support and that most of the support provided was of the highest order.

Nonetheless, it is critical to institutionalize the lessons that were learned from this tragic and historic event. Unfortunately, it is possible, because of many factors which will be discussed in this paper, that similar tragedies will strike in other cities, and possibly again in Los Angeles, and that those tragedies will require the assistance of military forces.

FUTURES STUDY

Issues and Sub-Issues

Issue question:

What will be the impact of military involvement in police operations by the year 2003?

Sub-issue #1:

What command relationships will have to be established between military and law enforcement personnel?

Sub-issue #2:

What organizational changes and liaison functions will have to be developed in using military forces in civil arenas?

Selection of Events and Trends - Methodology

The trends and events found in this report resulted from a Nominal Group Technique (NGT) which involved the participation of a group of carefully selected individuals. These individuals, chosen on the basis of their exceptional knowledge and/or experience in their fields of endeavor, included representatives from the military, the political establishment, and law enforcement. Additionally, this panel also included two community representatives chosen on the basis of their strong personal traits and civic involvement. This technique yielded 37

event nominations and 26 trend nominations. These nominations were then thoroughly discussed, after which additional rounds of voting took place in order to deconflict similarities and to identify the ten ^{most} important events and the 10 most important trends.

Nominal Group Technique Participants

1. Mr. Philip Depoian, Executive Assistant to former Los Angeles Mayor Thomas Bradley, and principal advisor to the Mayor on military, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and mutual aid during the 1992 Los Angeles Riots.
2. Officer Michael Howard, Los Angeles Police Department, former U.S. Marine Corps Captain and a recognized authority on military strategy and tactics.
3. LtCol Wesley May, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Commanding Officer of the 3D Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, Long Beach, California, and an individual likely to play a leadership role in the event that military support is again provided to civil authorities in Los Angeles.
4. Commander Rick Dinse, Los Angeles Police Department, and an individual who played a significant field command role, and was a key advisor to then Chief of Police Daryl F. Gates, during the 1992 Los Angeles Riots.

5. Commander Dan Watson, Los Angeles Police Department, and an individual who played a significant Emergency Operations Center leadership role during the 1992 Los Angeles Riots.
6. Mr. Art Mattox, Xerox Corporation, and a Los Angeles resident who has been involved in a number of civic endeavors. Subsequent to his participant in this NGT, Mr. Mattox was selected by Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan and now serves as a Los Angeles Police Commissioner.
7. Mr. Edward Mitchell, small business owner, and a Los Angeles resident who has been involved in a number of civic endeavors.
8. Captain Robert Riley, Los Angeles Police Department, and the Commanding Officer of Training Division, which played a major liaison role with military forces, during the 1992 Los Angeles Riots.
9. Lieutenant Thomas Gabor, Culver City Police Department, and an individual who has had significant domestic law enforcement mutual aid experience.

Identified Events

1. Local Political Upheaval
2. National Civil Riot/Incident

3. 8.0 Quake with National Economic Impact
4. Terrorist Detonations Nuclear/Bio Device
5. Major Police Strike
6. Re-establishment of Communist Bloc
7. Political Restriction of Domestic Use of Military
8. National Depression
9. Nuclear Accident
10. Famine
11. Illegal Alien Population Declared Officially Out of Control
12. U.S.-Mexico Agree Close Border
13. Religious Insurrection
14. Major Nuclear/Toxic Waste Spill
15. Palestinian/Jewish Accord
16. Military Involved in International Conflict
17. Medical Catastrophe
18. Special Interest Insurrection
19. Legislation to Militarize Certain Tasks (SWAT/EOD)
20. Ross Perot 1996
21. Decriminalize Narcotics Use
22. Massive Theft of Critical Military Weapons
23. Violent Crime Declared "Out of Control"
24. Legislated Consolidation of Police Agencies
25. Major Political Assassination
26. Military Unionization
27. Mandated Military/Civil Sharing of Resources
28. Military Given Peace Officer Status

29. National Homeless Encampment Declared
30. Politization of Military
31. Police/Military Exchange Program
32. Open Border ~~to~~ Mexican
33. Sabotage Major Utility
34. Military No-Show
35. Police No-Show
36. Political Call for Increases Military Involvement
37. Mexico 51st State

Event Distillation

After the Nominal Group Technique process yielded the 37 events, there was considerable discussion in order to reach a common understanding as to what each event was describing, and resolve conflicts in areas where similarities had the potential to create misunderstandings. Two rounds of voting were then required to identify the ten most important events in relation to the issue, with one final round used in order to place them in the following rank order:

- Event #1: National Civil Unrest and Riots: That additional events of this nature will occur in one or more major cities in the United States, and which will require military as well as civil mutual aid in which quell.
- Event #2: 8.0 Magnitude Earthquake: That will result in massive destruction and/or deaths and injuries of a nature that will be well beyond the ability of local authorities to handle all aspects.
- Event #3: Violent Crime Out of Control: Of a nature, admittedly subjective, that will result in a public and/or political demand for personnel and/or equipment from

outside civil or military sources. This situation becomes an event when a majority of the significant political leadership at the city, state, and federal levels agree that military support, to some degree, is a necessity.

Event #4: Military Involved in International Conflict: Of a nature that will require a significant percentage of the United States Armed Forces to be deployed outside the continental limits of the United States.

Event #5: Major Nuclear/Toxic Spill: Of a nature that will require personnel and/or equipment and/or expertise that is well beyond the abilities of local government to provide.

Event #6: Police Non-Response to Emergency Situation: Of a nature where the non-response is the result of a conscious decision as opposed to an inability, possibly resulting from police officer disagreement with a controversial public policy, or possibly a labor dispute.

Event #7: Police-Military Exchange: Of a nature where a mutual physical exchange of personnel would occur, for training and/or liaison purposes, for a fixed period of time.

Event #8: National Depression: Of a nature that would result in the failure of 20% of businesses and 20% unemployment, stemming from 10% of the above two figures occurring in a one-year period, throughout the United States.

Event #9: Closure of U.S. - Mexico Border: Of a nature where only legally authorized individuals would be permitted

to cross the border. This would involve radical measures to protect the sovereignty of all United States international borders.

Event 10: Terrorist Detonation: Of a nature where a major destructive device would be detonated at a major location resulting in major damage and/or massive deaths and/or injuries.

NOTE: Interestingly, between the forecasting phase and submission of this technical report, a terrorist bombing, attributed to Muslim Fundamentalists, took place at the World Trade Center in New York City on February 26, 1993.

Event Forecasting

The panel also forecasted the ten events. This forecast involved individual estimates, ultimately converted into high, median and low probability estimates, as to the years until the probability of the individual events first exceeded zero, the probability of the events occurring in five and ten years, and whether the impact of the event was perceived as either positive or negative.

The probability scale went from 0 to 100, indicating no probability within the prescribed time period, to absolute certainty. The Event Evaluation Chart graphically depicts this process, using the median, upper mean deviation from the median (high) and lower mean deviation from the median (low). Event Graphs 1 through 10 provide event descriptions, discussion, and graph analysis.


Event Evaluation Chart

EVENT STATEMENT	YEARS UNTIL PROBABIL- ITY FIRST EXCEEDS ZERO	PROBABILITY		IMPACT ON THE ISSUE AREA IF THE EVENT OCCURRED	
		Five Years From Now (0-100)	Ten Years From Now (0-100)	Positive (0-10)	Negative (0-10)
EVENT #1 NATIONAL CIVIL UNREST/RIOTS	HIGH .5 MED 1 LOW 3.25	71.25% 60.00% 52.50%	90.00% 70.00% 55.00%	8.5 8 6.25	2.25 0 0
EVENT #2 8.0 EARTHQUAKE	HIGH .25 MED 1 LOW 4.75	66.25% 50.00% 27.50%	89.75% 80.00% 61.25%	8.25 7 4.25	4.25 0 0
EVENT #3 VIOLENT CRIME OUT OF CONTROL	HIGH 1.75 MED 1 LOW 5	66.25% 50.00% 26.25%	78.75% 50.00% 36.25%	8.75 7 3	7 2 0
EVENT #4 MILITARY INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT	HIGH 1.25 MED 5 LOW 8	63.75% 25.00% 0.00%	92.25% 75.00% 47.50%	5.5 0 0	7.75 6 0
EVENT #5 MAJOR NUCLEAR/TOXIC SPILL	HIGH .25 MED 3 LOW 7.25	63.75% 20.00% 0.00%	87.50% 60.00% 30.00%	8 7 4.25	1 0 0
EVENT #6 POLICE NO-SHOW	HIGH .5 MED 5 LOW 8	42.50% 20.00% 0.0%	65.00% 30.00% 13.75%	7 0 0	7.5 5 1.5
EVENT #7 POLICE MILITARY EXCHANGE	HIGH 1.75 MED 3 LOW 7.25	72.5% 50.00% 0.00%	79.75% 40.00% 25.00%	9.25 7 6	2.25 0 0
EVENT #8 NATIONAL DEPRESSION	HIGH 5 MED 10 LOW 10	8.75% 0.00% 0.00%	36.25% 20.00% 11.25%	7.5 0 .5	9.25 4 .75
EVENT #9 U.S./MEXICO BORDER CLOSED	HIGH 2.75 MED 5 LOW 10	33.75% 10.00% 0.00%	67.50% 50.00% 20.00%	8.5 6 3.25	4.5 0 0
EVENT #10 TERRORIST DETONATION	HIGH 0 MED 2 LOW 7.75	32.50% 5.00% 0.00%	48.75% 20.00% 16.25%	9 8 3.75	3 0 0

Event No. 1 Analysis

This event forecasts a strong belief on the part of the group that the likelihood of national civil unrest and/or riots will increase in probability into the next decade. Based on the variety of factors discussed throughout this report, such occurrences are likely to require significant military support to civil authorities, because of the need for additional personnel, equipment, and/or expertise exceeds that which is available from civil authority sources.


The graph shows three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) of National Civil Unrest/Riots. The High indicates increasing probability of occurrence starting in late 1993, reaching 71.25% by 1998 and 90% by 2003. The Median indicates increasing probability of occurrence starting in 1994, reaching 60% by 1998 and 70% by 2003. The Low indicates a sharply increasing probability of occurrence starting in early 1996, reaching 52.5% in 1998 and slowly increasing to 55% by 2003.



Event No. 2 Analysis

This event forecasts a very strong belief that an 8.0 magnitude earthquake has a very high probability of occurrence prior to 2003. Frankly, within the Nominal Group Technique, the input was driven primarily by California beliefs and common knowledge. Most Californians, based on scientific estimates and extensive media discussion, accept this likelihood almost as a fact.


The graph shows three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) of an 8.0 Earthquake. The High indicates increasing probability of occurrence beginning early 1993, reaching 66.25% by 1998 and 89.75% by 2003. The Median indicates increasing probability beginning in 1994, reaching 50% by 1998 and 61.25% by 2003. The Low indicates this event will not occur for almost five years. The probability in the fifth year (1998) is 27.5% increasing to 61.25% by 2003.



Event No. 3 Analysis

This event forecasts a belief that violent crime is likely to be perceived as out of control, in one or more major city, with a demand of outside resources, at some point, prior to the Year 2003. Criminal violation of the greatest concern would include homicide, attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, random shootings, and other types of acts of physical violence. This situation becomes an event when a majority of the significant political leadership at the city, state, and federal levels agree that military support, to some degree, is a necessity.


The graph shows three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) of Violent Crime Out of Control. The High indicates increasing probability of occurrence beginning late 1994, reaching 66.25% by 1998 and 78.75% by 2003. The Median indicates this event will not occur before 1996. In 1996, the probability increases sharply reaching 50% in 1998, where it remains. The Low indicates this event has no chance of occurring until 1998 when the probability is 26.25%, increasing to 36.25% by 2003.



Event No. 4 Analysis

This event forecasts that the United States will be involved in an international conflict at some point in the future. For the purpose of this discussion, a conflict of the magnitude of the Persian Gulf War was used as an example. Relatively minor military deployments, such as the U.S. participation in the efforts of the United Nation in Somalia, do not fall into this category.


The graph shows three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) of Military Involvement in an International Conflict. The High indicates increasing probability of occurrence starting early 1994, reaching 63.75% by 1998 and 92.25% by 2003. The Median indicates no chance of occurrence until 1998 when the probability is 25%, increasing to 75% by 2003. The Low indicates no chance of occurrence until 2001, when the probability increases sharply to 47.5 % by 2003.



Event No. 5 Analysis

This event forecasts that there is likely to be a major nuclear incident and/or toxic spill at some future time. For the purposes of this report, the magnitude of the incident would be somewhat similar, also probably less severe, than the Chernobyl tragedy which occurred several years ago in the Soviet Union. An incident of this nature would in all likelihood be seen as a worldwide disaster and would far outstrip, for a significant period of time, the resources of local and state agencies.


The graph shows three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) of a Major Nuclear/Toxic Spill. The High indicates increasing probability of occurrence beginning early 1993, reaching 63.75% in 1998 and 87.5% by 2003. The Median indicates the probability of occurrence increases at a linear rate starting in 1996, reaching 20% by 1998 and 60% by 2003. The Low indicates a constantly increasing probability starting early 2000 and reaching 30% by 2003.



Event No. 6 Analysis

This event forecasts a slight belief that there may be a situation in the future where police do not respond to a significant crisis situation. For the purpose of this report, such a situation might have stemmed from law enforcement disgust at public policy which resulted in a crisis and was not, in the judgement of law enforcement, being dealt with properly. Of less likelihood, also discussed was a labor dispute. At the core of this event, was the lack of confidence in government that many of those in government themselves, such as law enforcement, appear to be feeling.


The graph shows three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) for a Police No-Show at a Critical Incident. The High indicates increasing probability of occurrence beginning mid 1993, reaching 42.5% by 1998 and 65% by 2003. The Median indicates no chance of occurrence until 1998 when the probability is 20% increasing to 30% by 2003. The Low indicates a steadily increasing probability starting in 2001 and 13.75% by 2003.



Event No. 7 Analysis

This event forecasts the likelihood of a police-military exchange program. The purposes of this report, such a program will involve cross-training and cross attachment of police and military personnel for the purpose of enhancing the military's ability to support civil authorities in large magnitude crisis situations.


The graph shows three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) for a Police Military Exchange. The High indicates a sharply increasing probability of occurrence beginning late 1994, reaching 72.5% by 1998 and 79.75% by 2003. The Median indicates a sharply increasing probability beginning in 1996, reaching 50% in 1998, then slowly decreasing to 40% by 2003. The Low indicates a steadily increasing probability beginning early 2000 and reaching 25% by 2003.



Event No. 8 Analysis

This event forecasts the possibility of a national depression. Given the present condition of state and national economies, coupled with the serious deficit facing the United States and the likelihood of future man-made and natural disasters, such a possibility exists.


The graph shows three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) of a National Depression. The High indicates no chance of occurrence before 1988 when the probability is 8.75%, increasing to 36.25% by 2003. The Median indicates no chance of occurrence until 2003 when the probability is 20%. The Low indicates no chance of occurrence until 2003 when the probability is 11.25%.



Event No. 9 Analysis

This event forecasts the probability that the U.S. will close the Mexican border at some point in the future. For the purposes of this report, such a closure would best be described as taking seriously and truly enforcing what is supposed to be the case at present; a border which is secure to the point that only legal immigration, for the most part, would occur.


The graph depicts three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) for a U.S./Mexico Border Closure. The High indicates increasing probability of occurrence beginning late 1995, reaching 33.75% by 1998 and 67.5% by 2003. The Median indicates no chance of occurrence until 1998 when the probability is 10%, increasing to 50% by 2003. The Low indicates no chance of occurrence until 2003 when the probability is 20%.



Event No. 10 Analysis

This event forecasts the possibility of a terrorist detonation in the future. For the purpose of this report, such a detonation would stem from either an environmental (i.e., Green Peace, etc.) or international terrorist, and not from a domestic civil unrest situation.

The graph shows three ranges of probability (High, Median, Low) for a Terrorist Detonation. The High indicates this event may occur at any time. The probability increases over time reaching 32.5% by 1998 and 48.75% by 2003. The Median indicates an increasing probability starting in 1995, reaching 5% by 1998 and 20% by 2003. The Low indicates no chance of occurrence until late 2000 reaching 16.25% by 2003.



Identified Trends

1. Civil Rights Demands
2. Citizens Confidence in Law Enforcement
3. Size of Military
4. Reserves Outnumber Regulars
5. Fiscal State of State/Local Government
6. National Level of Crime
7. Personnel (Police) Resources
8. Level of Media Influence
9. Police Morale/Self-Esteem
10. Have/Have Not Disparity
11. Earthquake Prediction Capability
12. Free Trade with Mexico
13. Level of Major Disasters (including national and man-made)
14. Regionalization of Law Enforcement Agencies
15. Political Leadership Diversity
16. Public Confidence in Judicial System
17. Weapons Availability
18. Prison/Jail Space
19. Military Unification
20. Vigilantism
21. Public Confidence in Government
22. National Debt - Level
23. Changing Role of the Military
24. Level of Ethnic Harmony
25. Reliance Nuclear Power
26. Level Military/Civilian Interaction

Trend Distillation

The top ten trends were ultimately arrived at through a Nominal Group Technique which yielded 26 trends; once again there was considerable discussion in order to reach a common understanding as to what each trend was describing, and to deconflict those areas where there was potential for misunderstanding. As in the

event distillation process, two rounds of voting were required in order to identify the ten most important trends, with one final round used in order to place them in the following ranked order.

Trend #1: Level of Crime in the United States: The level of crime to be determined based on existing measurements with respect to increases and decreases, and measuring crime of both a property and personal nature. Essentially, an increase or decrease using the present level as a bench mark.

Trend #2: Level of Citizen Confidence in Police: A subjective evaluation which is not easily measured, but which is determined not only by perceptions, but by the public's willingness and inclination, in general, to support and cooperate with police agencies and individual officers. Indications of the level would include actions such as support for bond measures, support for agencies in the face of media adversity, and prompt reporting of crimes.

Trend #3: Level of Public Confidence in Government: A subjective evaluation which is not easily measured, but which is determined not only by perceptions, but by the public's willingness and inclination to be sensitive to the governmental and political process, and to be influenced by the guidance and leadership of elected and appointed officials. Indications of the level would include various types of interactions with individuals and governmental agencies, the percentage of the voters' participation, and related activities.

Trend #4: Fiscal Condition of State/Federal Governments: Pertains to the amounts of revenue available by State

and Federal Governments to provide varying degrees of needed or desired services. Measured by the degree of financing for the myriad of services now provided by all levels of government, from public safety to recreation to cultural and educational.

Trend #5: Changing Role of the Military: Pertains to the degree that military personnel, equipment, and/or expertise is devoted to tasks which are not primarily focused upon national defense. Indications of this role would include dedicated domestic missions, training for potential domestic situations, equipment acquisitions with dual or exclusive domestic applications, and related activities.

Trend #6: Degree of Disparity Between Haves/Have Nots: Measured by economists and demographers by determining the percentages of the populace that are in different major economic groupings based upon annual average individual and family incomes. This maybe further broken down as to geographic regions, regional trends, and related factors.

Trend #7: Number of Multiple Disasters: Activities falling within this trend would include two or more situations, each having a national impact and requiring national resources, occurring simultaneously or within close enough proximity as to be in competition with one another for various types of resources.

Trend #8: Level of Vigilantism: A subjective evaluation that would involve a change in the level of individuals, from the present, who are inclined to take personal types of enforcement and/or retaliatory actions based

on real or perceived violations of the law.

Admittedly, this is a difficult trend to measure and can be influenced, and in some cases, greatly exaggerated or downplayed, by the media.

Trend #9: Level of Media Influence: A subjective evaluation that involves the level to which public opinion and public policy is influenced by either the visual, voice, and/or print media. Indications of the level of influence would include subjective evaluations as to the impact of the media on actions related to frequent reporting and/or editorial positions, and strongly influenced by perceptions as to accurate and balanced reporting.

Trend 10: Level of Firearms Availability: Pertains to the ease or difficulty with which firearms could be obtained both by illegal and illicit means. Although a somewhat subjective determination with strong political overtones, reasonable bench mark would include an assessment of laws and rules, percentages of crimes wherein firearms are used, confiscation statistics, and related activities.

Trend Forecasting

The panel also provided forecasts for each of the selected trends. A ratio scale was used to conduct forecasting, based on today's value being equal to 100. The forecast went five years back and ten years into the future. Trend Graphs 1 through 10 graphically depict the median, upper mean deviation from the median (high) and lower mean deviation from the median (low), for each of these trends.


Trend Evaluation Chart

TREND STATEMENT		LEVEL OF THE TREND (today = 100)			
		5 Years Ago	Today	5 Years From Now	10 Years From Now
TREND #1	HIGH	87.5	100	133.75	162.5
NATIONAL LEVEL OF CRIME	MED	80		120	110
	LOW	72.5		101.25	87.5
TREND #2	HIGH	160	100	117.5	135
CITIZEN CONFIDENCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT	MED	140		100	120
	LOW	116.25		71.25	87.5
TREND #3	HIGH	145	100	112.5	132.5
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT	MED	130		100	100
	LOW	83.75		77.5	87.5
TREND #4	HIGH	137.5	100	93.75	116.25
FISCAL STATE OF STATE/FEDERAL GOVERNMENT	MED	125		80	100
	LOW	106.25		77.5	83.75
TREND #5	HIGH	105	100	121.25	133.75
CHANGING ROLE OF MILITARY	MED	80		110	120
	LOW	58.75		97.5	97.5
TREND #6	HIGH	90	100	140	160
HAVE/HAVE NOT DISPARITY	MED	75		120	130
	LOW	67.5		112.5	115
TREND #7	HIGH	93.75	100	135	142.5
MULTIPLE DISASTERS	MED	80		102	100
	LOW	68.75		100	100
TREND #8	HIGH	91.25	100	135	142.5
VIGILANTISM	MED	75		110	110
	LOW	42.5		101.25	95
TREND #9	HIGH	95	100	120	130
LEVEL OF MEDIA INFLUENCE	MED	90		110	120
	LOW	73.75		106.25	108.75
TREND #10	HIGH	63.75	100	125	123.75
WEAPONS AVAILABILITY	MED	80		110	110
	LOW	63.75		92.5	76.25

Trend No. 1 Analysis

This trend forecast indicates that crime will continue to increase in the future. This is an important forecast in that, coupled with the forecasted decrease in all types of governmental revenues, it lends strong support to the premise that military resources will be used in support of civilian authorities in the future.


The graph shows three possible levels (High, Median, Low) of Trend #1, National Level of Crime. The High depicts a Trend 12.5% lower in 1988, 33.75% higher in 1998 and 62.5% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Mean depicts a Trend 20% lower in 1988, 20% higher in 1998 and 10% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 27.5% lower in 1988, 1.25% higher in 1998 and 12.5% lower in 2003, relative to today's level.



Trend No. 2 Analysis

This trend forecasts the level of confidence, in general, that citizens have in the police. It examines what has occurred in the past and what is likely to occur into the future. Coupled with the other factors (i.e., levels of crime, dwindling resources, changing role of the military, etc.) this issue is likely to be an influencing factor in any future military support of civil law enforcement.


The graph shows three possible levels (High, Median, Low) of Trend #2, Citizen Confidence in Law Enforcement. The High depicts a Trend 60% higher in 1988, 17.5% higher in 1998 and 35% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Median depicts a Trend 40% higher in 1988, unchanged in 1998 and 20% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 16.25% higher in 1988, 28.75% lower in 1998 and 12.5% lower in 2003, relative to today's level.



Trend No. 3 Analysis

This trend forecasts what is believed to be the overall citizen perception of confidence in government for the next ten years, as well as looking back to see where this confidence was five years ago. As with the previous trend to which this trend is closely related, public confidence in all levels of government is likely to play a significant role in any future decisions to use military forces in a civil setting.


The graph shows three possible levels (High, Median, Low) of Trend #3, Public Confidence in Government. The High shows a Trend 45% higher in 1988, 12.5% higher in 1998 and 32.5% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Median shows a Trend 30% higher in 1988, unchanged in 1998 and 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 16.25% lower in 1988, 22.5% lower in 1998 and 12.5% lower in 2003, relative to today's level.



Trend No. 4 Analysis

This trend forecasts a continuing decline in all levels of governmental revenues. As with other trends and events, this is likely to be among the most significant factors in future decisions to use military forces in support of civilian authorities. As can be seen from the graph, there was relatively little deviation between the highs and the lows.


The graph shows three possible levels (High, Median, Low) of Trend #4, Fiscal State of State/Federal Government. The High depicts a Trend 37.5% higher in 1988, 6.25% lower in 1998 and 16.25% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Median depicts a Trend 25% higher in 1988, 20% lower in 1998, and unchanged in 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 6.25% higher in 1988, 22.5% lower in 1998 and 16.25% lower in 2003, relative to today's level.



Trend No. 5 Analysis

This trend forecasts a changing role of the military. It is believed likely that it will move from a primarily national defense posture, to one that also has a national internal mission to support civil authorities in different types of challenging situations, be they man-made or natural, where large numbers of well trained and disciplined personnel can be of assistance.


The graph shows three possible levels (High, Median, Low) of Trend #5, Changing Role of Military. The High depicts a Trend 5% higher in 1988, 21.25% higher in 1998 and 33.75% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Mean depicts a Trend 20% lower in 1988, 10% higher in 1998, and 20% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 41.25% lower in 1988, 2.5% lower in 1998 and 2003, relative to today's level.



Trend No. 6 Analysis

This trend forecasts what has occurred in the past and what will occur in the future in terms of disparity between the more affluent and less affluent groups in our society. This graph is closely related to the potential for national civil unrest, which in turn is likely to have a significant impact on potential future use of the military in support of civil authorities during domestic unrest.


The graph shows three possible levels (High, Median, Low) of Trend #6, Have/Have Not Disparity. The High depicts a Trend 10% lower in 1988, 40% higher in 1998 and 60% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Median depicts a Trend 25% lower in 1988, 20% higher in 1998 and 30% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 32.5% lower in 1988, 12.5% higher in 1998 and 15% higher in 2003, relative to today's level.



Trend No. 7 Analysis

This trend forecasts what is believed likely with respect to future multiple disasters. For the purposes of this report, multiple disasters will include catastrophic events which will have a national financial impact which might occur either simultaneously, or in close proximity to one another. A good example of such a situation would include the riots in Los Angeles and the devastating hurricane in the southeast; both required significant federal assistance and personnel.


The graph shows three possible levels (High, Median, Low) of Trend #7, Multiple Disasters. The High depicts a Trend 6.25% lower in 1988, 18.75% higher in 1998 and 43.75% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Median depicts a Trend 20% lower in 1988, 2% higher in 1998 and unchanged in 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 31.25% lower in 1988, unchanged in 1998 and 2003, relative to today's level.



Trend No. 8 Analysis

This trend forecasts what has occurred in the past and what is believed likely to occur in the future with respect to citizens taking the law into their own hands. This graph is very closely related to the other graphs, both trends and events, that deal with lawlessness, levels of crime, and confidence in various levels of government. Clearly, the potential for vigilantism, or actual acts of vigilantism, are a significant factor in measuring the ability of civil authorities to deal with domestic situations. This is likely to be a major factor in future decisions to use military in support of civil authorities during civil unrest.


The graph shows three possible levels (High, Median, Low) for Trend #8, Vigilantism. The High depicts a Trend 8.75% lower in 1988, 35% higher in 1998 and 37.5% higher in 2003, relative to today's levels. The Median depicts a Trend 25% lower in 1988, 10% higher in 1998 and 25% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 57.5% lower in 1988, 1.25% higher in 1998 and 5% lower in 2003, relative to today's level.



Trend No. 9 Analysis

This trend forecasts the past and future level of influence exerted by the media. The importance of this factor cannot be over-emphasized because media's ability and inclination, in many instances, to tamper with public opinion and public policy. Plainly stated, the direction of the media, coupled with the perception of the population, can caused popular issues to become self-fulfilling prophecies; if the media says something is either good or bad for a long enough period of time, it becomes fact.


The graph shows three levels (High, Median, Low) of Trend #9, Level of Media Influence. The High depicts a Trend 5% lower in 1988, 20% higher in 1998 and 30% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Median depicts a Trend 10% lower in 1988, 10% higher in 1998 and 20% higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 26.25% lower in 1988, and 6.25% higher in 1998 and 8.75% higher in 2003, relative to today's level.



Trend No. 10 Analysis

This trend forecasts the degree of weapons availability to the general populace, with a review of availability five years in the past and ten years into the future. Once again, this graph reflects an issue that is certain to play a role in the potential future use of the military in support of law enforcement.

The graph shows three possible levels (High, Median, Low) of Trend #10, Weapons Availability. The High depicts a Trend 6.25% lower in 1988, 25% higher in 1998 and 23.75 higher in 2003, relative to today's level. The Median depicts a Trend 20% lower in 1988, 10% higher in 1998 and 2003, relative to today's level. The Low depicts a Trend 36.25% lower in 1988, 7.5% lower in 1998 and 23.75% lower in 2003, relative to today's level.



EVENT-TO-EVENT CROSS-IMPACT MATRIX

IMPACTING EVENT	MAXIMUM IMPACT										HITS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
E1. NAT'L CIVIL UNREST/RIOTS	X	1.00	1.50	1.05	1.15	1.35	1.00	1.60	1.15	1.05	7
E2. 8.0 EARTHQUAKE	1.00	X	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0
E3. VIOLENT CRIME OUT OF CTRL	1.75	1.15	X	1.00	1.20	1.75	1.00	1.60	0.25	1.15	7
MILITARY INVOLVED IN E4. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT	1.00	1.00	1.00	X	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	1.05	1.15	3
E5. MAJOR NUCLEAR/TOXIC SPILL	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.00	X	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.00	1.50	4
POLICE NO-SHOW AT E6. CRITICAL INCIDENT	1.50	1.00	1.50	0.75	0.75	X	0.75	0.90	0.90	0.75	8
E7. POLICE MILITARY EXCHANGE	1.95	1.60	1.75	1.00	1.50	1.25	X	1.50	1.45	1.75	8
E8. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY	1.60	1.15	1.25	1.40	1.25	1.10	1.00	X	0.20	1.05	8
E9. US/MEXICO BORDER CLOSED	1.60	1.15	1.60	1.05	1.00	1.25	1.00	1.75	X	1.05	7
E10. TERRORIST DETONATION	1.20	1.00	1.20	1.75	1.30	1.15	1.05	1.10	1.20	X	8

EVENT-TO-TREND CROSS-IMPACT MATRIX

IMPACTING EVENT	MAXIMUM IMPACT										HITS
	T1. NATIONAL LEVEL OF CRIME	T2. CITIZEN CONF IN GOV'T	T3. PUBLIC CONF IN GOV'T	T4. FISCAL STATE OF GOV'T	T5. CHANGING ROLE OF MILITARY	T6. HAVE/HAVE NOT DISPARITY	T7. MULTIPLE DISASTER	T8. VIGIL-ANTISM	T9. LEVEL MEDIA INFLUENC	T10. FIREARMS AVAILABILITY	
E-1 NATIONAL CIVIL UNREST/RIOTS	2.5	2.2	2.2	3.7	0.0	3.7	1.5	2.2	2.2	2.2	9
E-2 8.0 EARTHQUAKE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
E-3 VIOLENT CRIME OUT OF CONTROL	22.8	15.2	7.6	12.2	10.6	7.6	3.0	4.5	3.0	6.1	10
E-4 MILITARY INVOLVED INT'L CONFLICT	0.175	0.0	0.0	0.52	0.52	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3
E-5 MAJOR NUCLEAR/TOXIC SPILL	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.375	0.0	0.0	0.25	0.0	0.0	0.0	2
E-6 POLICE NO-SHOW AT CRITICAL INCIDENT	0.05	0.115	0.115	0.115	0.05	0.0	0.46	0.05	0.28	0.05	9
E-7 POLICE MILITARY EXCHANGE	4.25	2.55	0.85	3.4	4.25	1.7	6.8	3.4	0.0	1.7	9
E-8 NAT'L BANKRUPTCY	5.6	3.3	5.6	11.2	-5.6	2.2	3.3	3.7	7.8	2.2	10
E-9 US/MEXICO BORDER CLOSED	-0.35	0.0	0.7	-1.0	1.0	-0.35	0.0	0.0	-1.4	0.0	6
E-10 TERRORIST DETONATION	0.35	0.175	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3

Cross Impact Analysis

A computer program, XIMPACT version 1.X (November 1992), was used to develop alternative futures based upon the originally generated trends and events (10 each) from the Nominal Group Technique (NGT). The following data was entered to provide the tables from which to develop alternative futures:

- * Event-to-event cross-impact matrix results
- * Event-to-trend cross-impact matrix results
- * Cumulative event probability for 10 events
- * Median forecasts of 10 trends

The program compiled and correlated the sets of input data and generated 100 iterations or alternative futures. Two iterations were then selected from the 100 to be developed into scenarios to compliment the "most likely" scenario developed in the NGT. The two scenarios were selected as alternates for their unique and interesting futures.

The estimates as to the degree of influence that each event had on the other events and upon the trends was done in the most reasonably objective way, during this subjective process, that could be determined. Subsequent to the Nominal Group Technique, a Modified Delphi technique was used to further develop thoughts on the cross impacts. Finally, the ultimate weight was assigned by this writer in a joint process with another Command College student, Commander Rick Dinse. While there was relative agreement in most instances, the ties were broken by this writer in the few instances where there were differences in opinion. Upon completion of the estimates, the data were then inputted into the "Cross Impact Computer Model," which provided the 100 possible alternative futures. While the most likely scenario is nominal and based upon the Nominal Group Technique, the two alternate scenarios are based upon the cross-impact analysis.

In reviewing the following charts, a brief explanation as to interpretation of the data may be helpful. On the Event-to-Event Cross-Impact Matrix, 1.00 equals no impact, with a figure above or below 1.00 indicating an increased or decreased impact on the event, respectively. On the Event-to-Trend Cross-Impact Matrix, 0.0 equals no impact, with a figure above or below 0.0 indicating an increased or decreased impact on the trend, respectively.

Cross Impact Matrix Analysis - Event to Event

In examining the event-to-event cross impact matrix, several of the events are particularly worthy of discussion because of their impact upon one another. These events, which have proven most helpful in scenario considerations, shall be discussed briefly.

One can see from a review of Event No. 1, National Civil Unrest/Riots, that Events 3 and 8, Violent Crime Out of Control and National Depression, have a significant impact. This supports the conventional wisdom that increases in crime and decrease in revenues at various levels of government, are factors which are likely to increase the probability of national civil unrest. An additional by-product is the likelihood that there will be fewer resources, because of limited funding, to deal with such a catastrophic occurrence.

The reader can see from a review of Event No. 3, Violent Crime Out of Control, a significant impact of Events No. 6 and 8, Police Non-Response and National Depression. While this writer had reservations about the likelihood of Event No. 6, Police Non-Response, it was included because of the strongly held beliefs of other members of the group. To have not included this Police Non-Response event would have been to "turn away from the data." Finally, once again, the strong impact that National Depression that such a problem is illustrated.

The reader can see from a review of Event No. 6, police no-show at critical incidents, a significant impact on Events No. 1 and 3, National Civil Unrest/Riots and Violent Crime Out of Control. Once again, while this writer has reservations about the likelihood of the police failing to respond to a critical incident, such an occurrence would have a very strong impact upon the likelihood of specific instances of civil unrest and/or the overall situation of violent crime.

Event No. 7, an exchange program between military and police personnel, is an event believed to be strongly influenced by Events No. 1, 2, and 3, National Civil Unrest, an 8.0 Earthquake, and Violent Crime Out of Control, the latter of which is seen as a factor in encouraging this type of cooperation. Additionally, such an exchange, at significant levels, is likely also to be influenced, to lesser extent, by Events No. 5, 8, 9, and 10, Major Toxic/Nuclear Incident, Depression, U.S.-Mexico Border, and a possible terrorist detonation.

Event No. 8, National Depression, is an issue that most certainly would impact, to varying degrees, virtually every event and trend identified thus far in my research. The thought of such a financial catastrophe is mind-boggling and most likely would have dire social and political consequences. Such consequences would likely involve an increase in all levels of crime, stemming both from conventional causation and increases in frustration; an increased inclination to use creative resources, which would include the military; and an increase demand to close our borders to additional immigrants, whether legal or illegal. Additionally, such an event would make it increasingly difficult to deal with other events, such as major earthquakes, major nuclear/toxic spills, or a terrorist detonation, because of the likelihood that these types of events would require financial resources which would be quite scarce in the event of national

depression.

Event No. 9, closure of the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as a failure to close the border, has enormous implications. On one hand, an unabated flow of aliens, from other cultures and with other values, has the potential to contribute significantly to both civil unrest and out of control violent crime. On the other hand, a closure of the border carries with it the potential of civil unrest based on arguments which stem from racism to abandonment of our southern neighbor, and everything in between. Because of the enormous social and financial implications of this border issue, Event No. 9 also has a great impact on many of the other events and trends.

Cross Impact Matrix Analysis - Event-to-Trend

Once again, the reader is able to see a strong merging relationship in predictable areas which have been validated by the aforementioned analysis process. Predictably, Event No. 1, National Civil Unrest/Riots, is closely related with Dwindling Fiscal Resources (T-4), and the Disparity between the Haves/Haves Nots (T-6). Event No. 3, Violent Crime Out of Control, also bears close relationship to the National Level of Crime (T-1), Citizen Confidence in Police and the Government (T-2 & T-3), Governmental Revenues (T-4), and the Changing Role of the Military (T-5).

A number of these trends bear a significant relationship to Event No. 7, a Police Military Exchange. These trends include the National Level of Crime (T-1), Governmental Revenues (T-4), Changing Role of the Military (T-5), and very significantly, the possibility of Multiple Disasters (T-7).

These trends and events constitute the primary input for the scenarios that will follow. This information has allowed this

writer to go beyond mere personal speculation, but to use processes which consolidates and focuses the wisdom of a group of specially chosen individuals, in examining how the future may appear, and the influence of the various likely trends and events upon one another. The most likely scenario is nominal in nature and based primarily on the nominal group technique process; the two alternate scenarios were chosen, based upon their interesting nature, from the cross impact analysis process.

Most Likely Scenario

Colonel Douglas G. Moran, having completed a long day at a Southern California military base where he was fulfilling his monthly weekend drill requirement as a Marine Reservist, had retired to his quarters for an evening of reading and relaxation. On the coffee table was the most recent edition of "Weekly World Review" Opinion section from the Greater Los Angeles Times dated July 1, 2003. Colonel Moran then read the following article on significant activities which have occurred throughout the previous decade within the United States.

"At the half way point through the year 2003, violent crime, particularly homicide, attempted murders, assaults with deadly weapons, random shootings, and other types of physical violence, is perceived to be out of control in our major cities (E-2), particularly those which are in close proximity to foreign borders and off shore islands. Both state and local governments are confronted with crime that is well beyond the ability of public agencies to control. Interestingly, there continue to be individuals, including some politicians, who deny that violent crimes are out of control; these few individuals refer to what is occurring "as merely growing pains in our major cities." While there may be much disagreement as to what the bench mark was when violent crime passed the "out of control" threshold -- as many will argue that our country has been in this mode for many years

-- those responsible individuals in position of leadership are in unanimous agreement that we have passed over that threshold. The various factors, to be discussed in subsequent paragraphs, contributed to this lawlessness include the following: Significant civil unrest and riots (E-1); an 8.0 magnitude earthquake in Southern California (E-2), one nuclear and several toxic spill accidents (E-5); the occasional failure of police to respond to civil unrest (E-6), serious governmental revenue problems (T-4); a serious delay in the ultimate decision to close the U.S.-Mexico border to illegal immigration (E-9); declining confidence in all levels of government (T-3); increasing disparity between haves and have nots (T-6); vigilantism (T-8); media influence (T-9); and, weapons' availability (T-10).

There have been a series of riots and significant acts of civil unrest in major cities across the United States (E-1). The incidents of these events rose fairly steadily between 1993 and 1998, and now seem to be increasing at a lesser rate. Unfortunately, it appears that last year's earthquake in California (E-2) may cause this increase to become steeper. Throughout this decade, major riots occurred in Miami, New York City, Detroit, Philadelphia and once again in Los Angeles. Although to a lesser extent, significant riots also occurred in Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Pittsburgh. The percentage of categories of individuals involved in the Los Angeles Riots in 1992 was repeated time and again in other cities across the nation. In reviewing those persons arrested in the civil disturbances, approximately 40% were ex-criminals, most of whom were on either probation or parole. An additional 30% have been illegal aliens, with the bulk from South and Central America, but with an additional significant percentage of violators from Haiti and Somalia. Finally, the remaining approximate 30% are people characterized as either the "have nots" or secondary opportunists; inner-city residents whose value systems were not

of adequate strength to dissuade them from the opportunities that arise (i.e., looting, vandalism, etc.) during civil unrest.

The 8.0 earthquake (E-2) which occurred late last year in Southern California was a pivotal point in national unrest. This earthquake, which affected the area between San Diego and Santa Barbara and between the Pacific Ocean and the Mojave Desert, caused billions of dollars in damage, resulted in the deaths of 5,500 persons, and injuries to an additional 100,000 persons. This event so badly outstripped the ability of local, state, and federal governments, that lawlessness prevailed for approximately seven weeks. During this period, stealing and crimes of violence took place almost without interruption by civil authorities. Although both the California National Guard and Federal troops, consisting of active duty military and the national guards from other states, were quickly injected into the stricken area, their impact was initially minimal and it was not until approximately week three that they were able to disengage from search and rescue and devote all their energies to restoring order. Some semblance of order was restored at approximately week five. This event firmly established the need and inclination to use military forces in catastrophic situations (T-5). Additionally, this event had a devastating impact on local, state and federal revenues, and was cited as the key factor in the federal government's continuing inability to adequately address the deficit, which at the present time is consuming 21% of all federal revenues in order to pay the interest only (T-4).

The dire fiscal problems of the U.S. government (E-8) are seen as a key factor in the limited nature of the United States government's limited military involvement in a series of global conflicts. Simply stated, while the United States continues to be visible and play a role in significant international conflicts, this role has been scaled back from the large force commitments

of the early 90's to the present, which is primarily peace keeping and humanitarian nature. Military operations of this nature have occurred in Somalia in 1993, Bosnia in 1995, Haiti in 1997, Philippines in 1999, Cuba in 2003, and support in an attempt to develop the social, agricultural, and manufacturing systems in Mexico continued during the entire decade (E-4). The past decade has seen a gradual increase in the nation's financial difficulties, which have become particularly steep in this past year, a situation which continues to be badly aggravated by the seemingly historic inability to realistically deal with the national debt (T-4). Additionally, there is seemingly no end to the aforementioned types of global challenges, despite this nation's worsening financial woes; nor to this nation's continued insistence, however limited, to be a visible force throughout the globe (E-4). The limited size of today's active military forces, coupled with the continued and predictable peace keeping and humanitarian missions, have placed a great reliance on reserve forces in the event of a major global conflict.

There has been one major nuclear accident and two serious toxic spills which have had international implications in this decade (E-5). The nuclear reactor in Boise, Idaho, had a melt down in 1998 which resulted in an evacuation of the entire state between Boise and Lewiston, west to the Oregon border, and east to Idaho Falls. Although most residents were permitted to return after seven months, there continues to be approximately 300,000 acres of farm and ranch land that must remain uninhabited for the foreseeable future. The two serious toxic situations, the Spring Fellow Dump in San Bernardino (California) and the Brooklyn Dump in New York City (New York) so badly polluted the water supplies for literally millions of persons that future supplies, once again for the foreseeable future, had to come from elsewhere. The financial impact of these events, including the necessity to construct the Peripheral Canal in California, took a devastating

financial toll at all levels of government (T-4).

Although few in nature, the several situations where the police did not adequately respond to civil unrest in the cities of Detroit, New York City, and Miami, resulted in a lack of confidence in the police that had a greater impact on the public than the situations merited (T-2). Predictably, these were recorded as major issues by the media and the damage the reporting did to law enforcement, nationwide, was way out of proportion to what actually occurred (T-9). Unfortunately, like the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles in 1991, the damage was done and it was national in scope, and it has not been until this past year that the nation, in general, has once again developed the same degree of confidence in law enforcement as it had in 1988!

The steadily increasing tide of public opinion, which was showing no signs of abating, resulted in the closure of the U.S.-Mexico border in 1998 (E-9). This closure, which radically stemmed the tide of illegal entry, was part of a national strategy to bring pressure to bare on the Mexican government to solve its own problems, as opposed to the long history of exporting them to the United States. Unfortunately the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) failed to significantly stem the flow of illegal immigration into the United States from both Central and South America. Interestingly, the problem had pre and post closure dimensions. Many of the participants in the aforementioned disturbances were individuals who had illegally entered the United States. Various rights groups and immigration activists played a major role in the disturbances, primarily in Los Angeles and Miami, which occurred after the closure. In Miami, Haitian right groups had been responsible for several major disturbances in the past several years as a result of President Colin Powell's decision, in 1997, to take a hard line

on illegal immigration from that island nation. Fortunately, the death of Fidel Castro in 1996, coupled with a genuine emergence of a democracy in Cuba, and despite the economic challenge they are currently facing, has not resulted in the attempted flow of immigrants that were expected from that country.

Public confidence in government has remained at the relatively low level that it has been at since the early part of the 1990's (T-3). Government's inability, at all levels, to deal adequately with crime, deterioration of our major cities, and other related issues continues to cause a great deal of frustrations and skepticism. Unfortunately, the term limits panacea which swept the nation in the 1990's did not solve the problems of favoritism and special interest; as many predicted, the staffs of elected officials became all too powerful and, in far too many instances, became the successful targets of lobbyists and special interests. For the most part, our legislators continue to tamper with trendy social issues and quick fixes, while avoiding the hard issues and real problems.

The changing role of the military has dovetailed well with this national crisis (T-5). When it became obvious in the early 1990's, with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, that there was not likely to be any major global conflicts, the military started scaling down significantly in manpower. At the same time, the military, partly out of efforts focused on self-preservation, started looking for new roles it could perform. These new additional roles came at a time when civil unrest in our cities was rising and there was a need for additional personnel resources at various times in various cities across our nation (E-1). The real key occurred with the California earthquake in 2002 (E-2). This past decade has seen, time and again, a need and inclination to use the military in support of civil authorities (E-5).

The disparity between the haves and the have nots has continued to increase (T-6). The dwindling governmental revenues, during the entire decade, have resulted in government's inability to fund the many social programs that occurred in the 1970's and 1980's (T-4). Predictably, in our major cities, this has caused a great deal of disenfranchisement, especially with the burgeoning homeless population and the attention, out of proportion as usual, given to this issue by the media (T-9).

While not an epidemic, in many instances citizens have taken the law into their own hands (T-8). This stems from a realization, especially in our major cities, that police cannot provide adequate protection in many instances, especially during civil disturbances and unrest. While some elements of our population call this lawlessness and vigilantism, others insist that it is merely consistent with public-spirited citizens acting in cooperation with legitimate authorities. Ever since the riots in Los Angeles in 1992 where the difference between many of the businesses that survived or burned was the presence of an employee on the roof with a gun, such a practice have become common during these types of situations.

Despite many various types of efforts to bring about truly restrictive gun control in the United States, such has not occurred. There have been continued restrictions on foreign importations of all weapons, and a national restriction against any assault-type rifles. Despite the lawlessness, the realization that citizens must often fend for themselves has had a greater impact on restricting further gun control than all of the previous anti-gun lobbyist combined (T-10).

The media continues to contribute to the national problems by reporting which is out of balance (T-9). Although there are few instances where issues are not covered accurately, the historic

problems of emphasizing the spectacular, and minimal reporting on other issues which are less trendy but of potentially much greater long-term significance, continues nationwide. This phenomena continues to result in politicians giving quick solutions to trendy issues while at the same time ignoring -- in many instances -- the real problems.

There is some room for optimism. The old adage that "no problem will be solved by government until it become so serious that it can no longer be ignored" certainly applies to our government. Although about to enter the final year of his second term, President Powell continues to enjoy a high degree of popularity and is becoming successful in using his office as a bully pulpit for change. While our problems are great, they have been increasing at a decreasing rate for the last five years. His theme that people, places, movements, and countries must be held accountable for their behavior appears to be taking hold. His efforts to use the influence of this office, in a unique partnership with the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress, by the use of Executive directives to resolve long-term political log jams (federal workers' compensation, immigration policies, medical reform, criminal sentencing practices, financial regulatory measures, etc.) are proving to be increasingly popular with the American public to the point where a constitutional amendment to provide him with the opportunity for a third term appears possible.

Let us hope that he is successful and that our country learns a lesson that will endure into our future: that the ignoring of problems and the failure of elected officials to deal with the real problems, as opposed to the symptoms, brought our country close to the brink of social and economic disaster."

Colonel Moran finished the article, and, reflecting upon his

thoughts and experiences, felt that Mr. Anderson had indeed written an article that adequately summarized those significant situations which had occurred during the past decade.

Alternate Scenario - No. 1

The following scenario is based upon Iteration No. 37 from the XIMPACT Program, which is shown at the end of this section. This particular scenario was selected because it is one of only four scenarios that has an event that occurs in six different years, and the only scenario that has an event occur each year for four years in a row during the first five years.

The past decade has truly been one in which there has been no shortage of challenges for the law enforcement profession. These challenges has been such as to afford both the opportunity and necessity for military involvement in order to deal with the need for personnel, equipment, and expertise that has exceeded that which is typically possessed by conventional local and state agencies. Inherent in the provision of military support to civil authorities is the need to develop solid command relationships between those military organizations and civil governmental entities where a joint effort is likely to become necessary, and to initiate and maintain the types of measures most likely to ensure levels of cross training, liaison, and communications are appropriate to the potential missions.

The outbreak of civil unrest and riots which occurred in Newark, Boston, and Miami in 1995, resulted in a desperate need for personnel and equipment that far exceeded the resources of those cities, including that which was available through conventional mutual aid (E-1). In each instance, military assistance, both state and federal, was committed and played a crucial role in quelling the unrest.

The peaking of violent crime in 1997 was once again a situation that resulted in military forces deployed into selected major cities to address this challenge (T-1). This situation is best characterized by what occurred in Los Angeles, Miami, and Chicago when the public hue and cry over the number of homicides, attempt murders, assaults with a deadly weapon, random shootings, and other types of serious physical assaults resulted in a political outcry, ultimately successful, for National Guard troops to supplement local authorities, in performing conventional police tasks (E-3). Although the primary police functions continued to be performed by sworn police officers, National Guard personnel were used to great effect in prisoner detention, crime scene protection, support at intoxication check points, third person in a patrol car in particularly dangerous areas, fixed-post security, limited accident investigation, report completion, and related tasks.

The meltdown of the nuclear reactor in Boise, Idaho, in 1998, had enormous implication for a major portion of an entire state (E-5). This meltdown required evacuation of the entire area between the cities of Boise and Lewiston, to the south and north, and from the eastern city of Idaho Falls west to the Oregon border! The magnitude of this evacuation was such as to require enormous resources, not only to move people, animals, things, and governmental operations out of the affected area, but also for temporary reestablishment elsewhere. Although the personnel, equipment, and records of the state of Idaho remained intact, the disruption and movement of the entire government and its personnel to the adjacent southern state of Nevada was such that Idaho, as an effective governmental entity, realistically ceased to function for approximately three of the seven months before limited reentry into the affected area was possible. While there was no shortage of various types of resources and commitments to deal with this enormous tragedy, there was no disagreement with

the fact that the single most important factor in dealing with this disaster was the involvement of military forces (T-5). From large numbers of troops, to transportation assets, to the temporary lodging of evacuees to military installations across the nation, this near impossible situation would have been impossible had it not been for the military involvement which occurred.

The 8.0 earthquake (E-2) and closure of the U.S.-Mexico border in the year 2000 (E-9) caused a great deal of trauma in California. Although Californians had allegedly been expecting and preparing for "the big one" for a number of years, the state and its people were not prepared for what occurred. With the seriously impacted area affecting large portions of Riverside, San Bernardino, Orange, and Los Angeles Counties, state and local agencies were far outstripped by the 1700 fatalities, 14,000 serious injuries, and an estimated 17 billion dollars in property damage. Once again, as in the 1998 Idaho nuclear incident, the pivotal factors in initial response (48 hours), medical support, evacuation and excavation, transportation, utility restoration, and temporary shelter was military support, both of a state and federal nature (T-5). The closing of the border in March, despite initial strong political upheaval by various groups on both sides of the border, was eclipsed by the earthquake in early June. Predictably, the temporary economic chaos that resulted from the earthquake, including the temporary loss of many jobs because of damaged and/or ruined commercial facilities, resulted in the fact that fewer persons from South and Central America, at least temporarily, were attracted to the Southland.

The formalized exchange between military and civic officials which was commenced in the year 2002 was really a culmination of the type of cooperation which had long been occurring between military organizations and the state and local jurisdictions

likely to be the recipient of military support in the event of special needs (E-7). The incidence of this past decade have clearly demonstrated that the military can be used to great advantage in supporting state and local governments in various types of situations where the challenges are greater than the resources (T-5). This realization, over the past decade, has resulted in closer cooperation, stronger liaison, and joint planning between civil and military authorities. The 2002 police military exchange was a continuation of that process (E-7).

Alternate Scenario - No. 2

The following scenario is based upon Iteration No. 56 from the XIMPACT Program, which is shown on page 56A. This particular scenario was selected because it has not only the largest number of events occurring in a single year, but is the only one of all the iterations that have such a large number of simultaneous events without anything occurring in prior years.

There was relative complacency within the United States between 1993 and 1997. Although there were certainly no shortage of challenges, as economic difficulties and crime continued to be major topics, there were no real "peaks" in terms of major difficulties. Then came 1998!

The peaking of violent crime in the cities of Los Angeles, Miami, and Chicago, was the initial challenge (T-5). The public outcry over the number of homicides, attempt murders, assaults with a deadly weapon, random shootings, and other types of physical assaults resulted in a successful effort in March to deploy National Guard assets into those cities to assist local authorities with those types of police tasks which did not require extensive police training (T-5). These guardsmen, who performed a variety of conventional police tasks which enabled sworn officers to focus more on violent crime, were seen as

essential ingredients in the gains and crime reduction which occurred.

The terrorist detonation which occurred in New Orleans in June had the effect of politically rocking the nation (E-10). Although there had been other types of terrorist bombings and actions, primarily nationalistic in nature, which had occurred during the previous decade, the total destruction of New Orleans' City Hall by French Creole Separatist was the most serious act of this nature since the New York World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Once again, military support was an intrigal component in dealing with this tragedy (T-5). Although state and local authorities, however taxed, were able to provide for most of the response and aftermath, military aircraft from the adjacent military air station hilo-lifted literally hundreds of injured persons to distant medical facilities, military medical personnel from nearby military installations played a major role in excavation and triage, and military explosive ordinance disposal personnel provided support to local authorities and to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearm during the resulting extensive investigation.

The decision of President Powell to deploy large numbers of military forces into Cuba in September (E-4), in response to an international hue and cry to restore order and to provide for humanitarian relief, further taxed the resources of the United States government (T-4). As the number of conventional active duty forces has remained at a relatively low level since the cuts imposed by President Clinton during his term in office, it was necessary to mobilize significant numbers of State National Guard and Federal Reserve personnel in order to deal with the Cuban situation and to maintain a global presence elsewhere in the world. Predictably, the commitment of state forces to the aforementioned major cities where National Guard personnel were

'Trend values for Iteration No. 37'

100	104.8	112	114.3	136.9	132.2	129.3	126.3	123.6	125.2	122.8
100	99.8	101.8	100.5	112.8	108.5	119.9	121.4	123	127.1	128.9
100	99.8	101.8	100.9	107	104.4	104	104.3	104	104.5	104.4
100	96.6	96	89.9	94.4	86.6	89.9	92.4	95.9	102.7	106.4
100	102	104	105	115.5	114.4	116	118.6	120.3	126.3	128.2
100	103.6	111	113.7	123.6	125	126.6	128	129.7	133.1	135
100	99.8	102.2	102	103.6	100.8	104.3	108.1	111.8	121.3	124.1
100	101.8	105.8	106.8	112	111.5	111.2	110.9	110.7	113.8	113.7
100	101.8	105.8	107.2	111.5	112	113.8	114.3	116.2	118	119.8
100	101.8	105.8	106.8	113.6	113.5	113.1	112.9	112.7	114.1	114

'Occurrences in Iteration No. 37'

0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1	1	1	1	1	2	1				7

'Trend values for iteration No. 56 '

100	104.8	109.5	111.4	111.2	134.1	131.2	128.6	125.9	123.2	120.9
100	99.8	99.6	98.1	95.3	108.9	120.2	121.8	123.4	124.9	126.7
100	99.8	99.6	98.7	97.2	103	102.6	102.3	102	101.6	101.5
100	96.6	92.3	85.5	77.8	86.5	89.8	93.3	96.8	100.1	104.2
100	102	104	105	104.9	119.2	120.7	122.4	124.1	125.8	127.7
100	103.6	107.3	110	112.3	123	124.6	126.3	128.1	129.8	131.6
100	99.8	100.7	100.5	99.1	105.8	109.4	113.1	116.8	119.5	122.6
100	101.8	103.6	104.6	105.3	112.7	112.4	112.1	111.9	111.6	111.5
100	101.8	103.6	105	106.3	109.8	111.6	113.5	115.4	117.2	119
100	101.8	103.6	104.6	105.3	113	112.6	112.4	112.2	111.9	111.8

"Occurrences in Iteration No. 56"

0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
<hr/>											
				4					1	1	6

supplementing local law enforcement, had a noticeable impact on which reserve units were activated in support of this national necessity.

The police military exchange program also came to fruition in 1998 (E-7). The extensive interaction of civil and military authorities which had occurred earlier in the year resulted in federal legislation which both mandated and funded a joint exchange between state and local agencies and the various types of military forces likely to support those civil jurisdictions in the event of special requirements.

The year 2002, after three years of regional tranquility, was the year that the "big one" hit California (E-2). This 8.0 earthquake affected major portions of Riverside, San Bernardino, Orange, and Los Angeles Counties. This tragedy resulted in 1700 deaths, 14,000 serious injuries, and 17 billion dollars in property damage. Far outstripping state and local resources, the military played a major role in contributing to medical response, excavation, transportation, restoration of utilities, and temporary lodging (T-5). The police military exchange program, established in 1998, was widely acknowledged as having been a major factor in the prompt response of the military and the favorable levels of cooperation which existed between military and civil authorities (E-7).

The nuclear meltdown in Boise, Idaho, in 1998, turned out to be everyone's worst nightmare (E-5). Although injuries were few, this incident required evacuation of the entire state between the northern city of Lewiston, southern city of Boise, eastern city of Idaho Falls, and south to the Oregon Border. Local and Southern Idaho state governments were virtually paralyzed by the disruption and relocation. Once again, there was no disagreement that the single most important element in dealing with this

tragedy was the prompt response of National Guard units from neighboring states and federal military forces (T-5). The military support included evacuation, transportation, utility stabilization, storage, and temporary shelter at military facilities across the nation.

SUMMARY OF FUTURES RESEARCH

The types and degrees of the future forecasting which occurred during this portion of the technical report cannot be overemphasized. The process of carefully selecting qualified participants, conducting a solid nominal group technique process, developing solid data, and then analyzing that data as to its impact upon the issue question and the sub-issues, has yielded a wealth of information as to what the future might hold. Although there is certainly no guarantee that the events and trends which have been forecasted will in fact become a reality, they have been developed as the result of a solid process involving solid people, and therefore yielded a wealth of information that cannot and should not be ignored.

In this portion of the technical report, the primary issue has been emphasized in many different ways in many different situations. There is little doubt that state and local resources are becoming more scarce, that the military is modifying its traditional role and seeking new missions, and that serious situations involving a need for extensive resources are likely to occur throughout the United States in the future, just as they have in the past. It should be clear to the reader that the future holds a strong likelihood that there will be both the opportunity and the necessity for military support to police operations in the decade ahead.

The sub-issues become very important to the main issue. The agreement and understanding that military support will be provided under certain circumstances to civil authorities is just the beginning of the challenge. The methods in which this support will be provided, the command relationships, the types of liaisons necessary for effectiveness, and the manners in which these different entities will communicate with one another, must

all be addressed. Agreeing to do something may well be the easy part, the mechanics of accomplishment may well constitute the greatest challenges.

The strategic plan section which follows will focus on the many aspects of providing military support and how such can be achieved.

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ACQUISITION OF MILITARY SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION

The futures research portion of this technical report reflects strong beliefs and predictions that the future is likely to yield additional man-caused and natural disasters which will create both the opportunity and necessity for military support to civil authorities. This strategic portion of the technical report will take the reader from a discussion of what the future may hold to an exploration of a strategy to deal with that future.

The common threads, more so than the other many variables, that run through this discussion are two-fold: A need for resources beyond those possessed by civil authorities, and a fiscal trend which is forcing all levels of government to look for alternative resources. This strategic plan section of the technical report will explore the most effective ways of strategically developing the desired future state with respect to a given scenario in a major law enforcement agency. Additionally, this portion of the report will include a situational analysis, a stakeholder analysis, a review of alternatives, and an implementation plan.

The overall situation described in proceeding portions of this technical report as the Most Likely Scenario constitutes the challenges which lie ahead for the San Angelo Police Department

(hypothetical). Simply stated, this writer believes that it is likely that a wide range and array of man-caused and natural disasters, some of a nature that will require military support, will occur into the next decade, and that the law enforcement agencies must plan for and be prepared to deal effectively with those situations which might occur.

It is the intent of this strategic plan to develop a hypothetical police agency, based very much upon actual agencies and actual locales, and to explore the various factors and issues that should and/or must be addressed if an effective means of acquiring military support is to be achieved. These factors and issues include: Development of macro and micro mission statements; analysis of the internal and external situations; identification and analysis of the stakeholders; discussion of various strategies and selection of the one which appears to be most appropriate; and, development of a plan for implementation of the preferred strategy.

SAN ANGELO POLICE DEPARTMENT

The City of San Angelo, with a population of slightly more than two million residents, is located in Southern California along the coast midway between San Diego and San Francisco. Incorporated in 1892, it now consists of a blend of old and new

residential, old and new businesses, light and heavy industrial, and several hundred thousand acres of undeveloped land. Having previously acquired several smaller jurisdictions since it's founding, the City of San Angelo now encompasses approximately 300 square miles.

The San Angelo Police Department has approximately 4,000 sworn and 600 civilian support personnel. Under the direction of the Chief of Police, the personnel are assigned proportionally to the major functional areas of field operations, investigations, and administrative services. The San Angelo Police Department is considered to be a professional and progressive organization whose personnel, equipment, and procedures are at least equal, if not slightly above, that of most other California law enforcement agencies.

The dismal fiscal situation of the City of San Angelo is very conducive to the pursuit to alternative approaches to obtain resources. The sagging economy has resulted in less retail sales, business activity, hotel business, and the other types of revenue sources upon which a city primarily depends. The City is presently facing a potential 125 million dollar shortfall and feels, as do the majority of the citizens, that it is not able to provide adequate day-to-day services. The new mayor has placed all of the City's general managers on notice that he expects true leadership to be exercised in the areas of creativity, flexi-

bility, and originality in not only seeking new sources of revenue, but also in the expenditures of those revenues which are available.

The San Angelo Police Department enjoys a very favorable and close working relationship with several nearby military installations. These superb relationships, which go back as far as three decades, have traditionally involved primarily training such as special weapons and tactics, SCUBA and underwater recovery, explosive ordnance disposal, special weapons familization, and related functions. Interestingly, this training has been a two-way street. The highly advanced nature of the San Angelo Police Department is such that there is typically an exchange of specialized expertise. Of special note is the fact that, of recent, the San Angelo Police Department has been a contributing factor in the development of military Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) training by the major combat command at a nearby Marine Corps base. It should be noted that virtually all of the cross training and support has been among small and specialized military and police units; there has been no joint training among large numbers of police and military personnel.

San Angelo is a old and established city that is rapidly taking on new deminsions in terms of cultural diversity. While once an all white enclave with small and well defined pockets of minority groups, the City is now a virtual melting pot of different

cultures and peoples. Hispanics, including a substantial percentage of undocumented aliens, now constitute the greatest percentage of San Angelo's citizens, with caucasians being the second largest group. African-Americans and Asians, although constituting much smaller percentages, also represent strong political and social forces. Although a city that has long prided itself on good relations among all peoples, there have been two major riots, the first in 1965 and the second in 1992, where economic and ethnic considerations were attributed as the primary factors. As the result of sharp difference of opinion as to the outcome of two well publicized criminal trials, one involving a black motorist beaten by a white police officer, and because of continued mistrust and hostility between certain African-American, Hispanic, and Korean groups, there continues to be a potential for mass civil disobedience in San Angelo. Unfortunately, this constitutes a strong opportunity for potential military support.

The great majority of the law abiding citizens in San Angelo are solidly behind the use of military forces to quell mass civil disobedience should it occur. The 1992 San Angelo riot's resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars of property damage and over 50 deaths. There is general agreement that much of the devastation that occurred, especially the looting and arson of various businesses, might have been less severe had the military arrived sooner. Although there was some criticism that the

military was unjustly delayed, it was outweighed by an appreciation that they were deployed to San Angelo and the fact that the damage most likely would have been even more extensive had the military not been utilized. While the citizens hope and pray that there will not be further mass civil disobedience in San Angelo, the welcome mat is out for the military if such should occur.

Mission Statements of the San Angelo Police Department

The San Angelo Police Department has recently completed a cooperative process wherein representative members of the Department developed both a macro-mission statement guiding the entire organization in it's overall mission, and a series of micro-mission statement's directed at specific activities and challenges. The following two paragraphs contain the macro-mission statement, and the micro-mission statement which deals with military support.

"The men and women of the San Angelo Police Department are comitted to protecting and serving the people of San Angelo through a police-community parternship. To identify community concerns, solve problems, and enhance the safety and order of our neighborhoods, the department must ensure a continuous flow of information between the police and the people we serve. To achieve these goals, the Department will mobilize individuals and organizations and enpower Department personnel. The members of the department will maintain the highest standards of justice and dignity in all of their activities. It is the goal of the San Angelo Police Department to ensure that the entire organization is

committed to this mission."

"The San Angelo Police Department is committed, through internal training and external liaisons, to the development and maintenance of an operational environment whereby military personnel can be rapidly deployed into the city, immediately assigned with and/or in support of police personnel, and utilized as a key resource in accomplishing the overall mission."

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

The Environment

This writer has closely examined the environment in which there is both a need and an opportunity for military support to civil authorities. This examination has included not only a review of existing literature, but, more importantly, indepth conversation with a great many individuals, most of whom are identified in various portions of this report. Finally, this writer has also drawn significantly on personal experiences as military advisor to the Chief of Police during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, and upon continued service as a Colonel in the United States Marine Corps Reserves.

The opportunities for providing various levels of military support to civil authorities are abundant. Although historically there have always been situations where outside resources, including the military, were called upon to assist local and state authorities, these types of challenges appear to have become more frequent in the decades of the 1980's and 1990's.

This discussion on the environment will explore the various opportunities and threats associated with the provision of military support to civil authorities.

There always has been and there always will be different types of catastrophies which can strike the various portions of the Nation. The traditional types of catastrophies include: earthquakes, wild fires, explosions, hurricanes, tornados, flooding, and related activities. As society has become more complicated and taken on global implications, there is also an increase in the types of catastrophies which, to some extent, are likely to occur. These additional types of catastrophies include: nuclear accidents, toxic incidents, terrorists activities, and large scale transportation disasters. Additionally, the fact that there is an increasing number of people is also a contributing factor to the likelihood of greater challenges; whereas 30 years ago a major aircraft accident might have been an airliner with less than 50 passengers crashing in a rural area; today such an incident may well be an airliner with several hundred persons crashing into a populated residential community. Simply stated, the likelihood of more frequent and more devastating challenges where military support can be of assistance are definitely increasing.

There are a number of trends and events which are related to this overall issue. While some of these trends and events are

opportunities which will facilitate the achievement of the mission, there are others that are perceived as threats in that they will jeopardize mission accomplishment. What follows is a discussion of these concerns.

Opportunities

- * Need for increased creativity in acquiring resources - The decreasing levels of revenues available at most levels of government, while certainly a problem, are also creating a greater opportunity for creativity in the acquisition of goods and services. Certainly, a pre-planned and well thought out inclination to use military forces in specific instances would fall into this category.

- * Changing Role of the Military - Military forces of the 1990's, as a result primarily of the dissingration of the former Soviet Union, influenced heavily by decreasing federal revenues and increasing social agenda, are becoming smaller. These factors, coupled with the increasing domestic challenges mentioned elsewhere in this report where the military can be helpful, has resulted in a situation where today's military is not only not reluctant, but in many instances anxious - if for no other reason than to justify no further cutbacks - to take on domestic missions.

- * Fiscal difficulties facing many levels of government - The fiscal difficulties facing most levels of government into the 1990's-are such that many governmental entities have inadequate levels personnel and equipment to deal effectively with day-to-day activities, let alone a massive crisis. This factor increases the opportunity for responsible military support.

- * Increase tendency for civil disobedience - Especially so in major urban areas where there is significant cultural diversity and serious economic challenges. The decades of the 1980's and 1990's have seen such massive civil disobedience in several major cities across the United States, including Boston, Miami, and Los Angeles. Unfortunately, this factor creates the opportunity for military involvement.

- * Past successful utilization of military forces - The various utilization of military forces, both state and federal, in general, have resulted in a favorable reputation for effectiveness, especially during the early 1990's. Military support has been used with great effectiveness in a number of situations (hurricanes, floods, riots, and tornados) during this period.

- * Less public resistance to military deployment - The favorable reputation that various military forces have developed as the result of domestic utilizations have contributed to a situation where, in general, the public is not opposed to seeing men and women in military uniforms standing along side their civilian counterparts when an extraordinary need exists.

- * Increased military proficiency in domestic activities - A great many military organizations now provide training to their personnel in potential domestic tasks, including riot control. Additionally, the changing nature of global challenges are such that military training in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), which has great applicability to urban riots, is common place. Finally, due to situations such as the Los Angeles riots, there are now increasing numbers of military personnel who have gained this type of experience.

- * Increased communications capability - Many of the newer radios being acquired by military and civilian authorities are of a programmable nature that, with pre-planning and solid leadership, may be configured in such a way as to achieve military-civil authority communications interoperability.

Threats

- * Military cutbacks - Unfortunately, the demise of the former Soviet Union has not resulted in a reduction in the need for a strong global presence of U.S. military personnel. Since the Soviet Union collapsed, large numbers of U.S. military personnel have been deployed to the Persian Gulf and Somalia, and the likelihood of additional types of deployments is deemed possible. A reduction in the number of military personnel, to include state and federal forces, could yield fewer military resources available to deal with serious domestic challenges.

- * Military base closures - This is also a factor which could adversely affect military availability. Obviously, the distance of the military base from a domestic need will influence the promptness of response.

- * Potential political restrictions - While most political leaders appear to be somewhat pro-military, this support is not unanimous. There is an ever present possibility of political interference, where a potential military response to a serious need might be denied or rendered less effective because of philosophical and/or political considerations.

- * Military equipment funding cutbacks - As funds for the military are reduced, so is the ability of the military to acquire various types of equipment items (i.e., radios, transportation assets, heavy equipment, riot control equipment, etc.) which might be helpful in dealing with various types of domestic needs.

- * Military acquisition jurisdictional disputes - A very real consideration. In situations such as the 1992 Los Angeles riots, where the need for military assistance, at least initially, was far greater than could be satisfied, there can be and are conflicts between various jurisdictions and the operational area mutual aid coordinator as to how the limited military forces are to be distributed.

- * Political tendency to unnecessarily mobilize federal forces - A very realistic consideration which many, including this writer, believed occurred during the 1992 Los Angeles riots when, despite a belief by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County and the Police Chief of Los Angeles that the National Guard's response was adequate and that federal troops were not required, federal troops were requested and mobilized as a result of a decision by the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, the Governor of California, and the President of The United States.⁹

* Politicization of the military - While not seen as a significant threat, the fact that various social changes are taking place within the military, manifested in a number of ways including an increased inclination of service members to refuse to participate in activities in which they may have personal philosophical disagreements, could conceivably have the effect of some service members who might refuse to serve in a domestic unrest situation.

There are a great many other factors which effect the external environment in addition the previously identified trends and events. While it would be neither necessary or appropriate to list them all, some of the significant additional factors include: Deterioration and the resulting urban trauma prior to revitalization in the downtown area, continuous illegal immigration influx, increased popularity of the military, overcrowded jails resulting in significant numbers of probationers and parolees, increased gang activity, and aggressive emergence of ethnic and gender-related special interest groups.

Organizational Capabilities

The San Angelo Police Department has demonstated a strong organizational capability to deal with a variety of issues related to the utilization of military forces in support of the

City's potential needs. While many of these threats and opportunities clearly go beyond the ability and scope of the City to deal with, there are others with which the City and the Police Department are directly involved and have the ability to impact. What follows is a discussion of the City and the Police Department's role in the various environmental opportunities and threats that are specifically related to this issue. Although a hypothetical city was created for the purposes of this technical report, the capabilities were developed by this writer with the assistance of several of the individuals identified elsewhere in this report, based in part upon existing capabilities of similar types of law enforcement organizations.

Ability to Deal With Opportunities

The San Angelo Police Department is poised and anxious to deal with the opportunities which exist in relation to the utilization of military support in specific situations. Although it would be inaccurate to say that the rest of city government, especially all members of city council, are equally as anxious, it is fair to say that the mayor and the council, as a combined body, do recognize the need and opportunities for military support in specific situations, and are generally open to creative approaches and well thought-out suggestions.

The greatest strength of the San Angelo Police Department is its personnel. Long considered among the most professional law

enforcement agencies, the San Angelo Police Department, despite some controversial court mandated selection and promotion modifications intended to enhance Affirmative Action, continues to attract, hire, and promote highly qualified individuals. The training provided at all levels, whether general or specialized in nature, exceeds all state requirements by a considerable margin. Of equal importance is the overall degrees of dedication and honesty; while individual exceptions have occurred and been dealt with appropriately, the overall personal character of the Department's personnel is superb. Although attrition is starting to take its toll in specialized areas, the Department continues to be a leader in functions such as scientific criminal investigation, bomb investigations, narcotics investigations, special surveillance capabilities, anti-terrorist and organized crime intelligence, and specialized investigations. Finally, the Department is moving rapidly into an overall community based policing philosophy and is encountering more support than resistance from the rank and file officers.

The San Angelo Police Department has embarked upon a key technical endeavor that has the potential, if managed properly, to create police-military communications interoperability to an extent never experienced elsewhere. As the result of a bond measure passed by the citizens of San Angelo, a completely new communication system, which will ultimately cost nearly \$200 million, is presently under development. Part of this system

involves the acquisition of a new generation of portable radios which, unlike eariler models which were restricted in the bandwidth and the number of channels, are capable of being programmed to operate on over 200 channels over a fairly wide frequency spread. The commanding officer of the communication division has recently been given a project to determine if a large number of UHF radios might be available to military forces in emergency situations, and if so to determine the frequency of those radios and to program those frequencies, based on a solid plan, into the new radios being acquired by the San Angelo Police Department. This measure certainly creates the opportunity for increased effectiveness in the event that military forces are deployed into San Angelo.

Ability to Deal With Threats

The San Angelo Police Department is not so naive as to think that it can resolve all of the threats; those factors which might reduce the ability to acquire military forces, or to the effectiveness of such utilization. However, the top staff of the Police Department has taken considerable measures to identify the various threats, and where possible, has developed an approach to dealing with them. What follows is a discussion of these various threats and the Police Department's approach for addressing them.

The weaknesses of the San Angelo Police Department fall into the major categories of personnel, facilities, and equipment.

Although the Police Department has suffered less than other San Angelo city departments, the sagging economy has taken a very serious toll on police operations. From the standpoint of personnel, there are approximately 400 sworn and 75 civilian vacancies which remain unfilled because of budgetary limitations, and most overtime must be compensated in compensatory time off rather than cash, resulting in an inordinate number of officers who must be off on a daily basis. From the standpoint of equipment, with the exception of the new communications system which is under development as a result of a bond initiative, there are major equipment shortages in addition to difficulties in maintaining many aging items. These shortages and maintenance difficulties are especially acute with respect to police vehicles, where the aging fleet is barely able to accomodate the present number of personnel. Finally, several of the 12 area police stations are either very old and/or not large enough to accomodate the number of personnel assigned; the Department is making the best of the situation, but many of the facilities are definitely sub-standard in nature.

The political restrictions on preparedness, while once a serious problem, seem to have all but evaporated. As foolish as it may sound, strong political pressures played a major role in the fact that the San Angelo Police Department was not as well prepared

for the 1992 riots as it should have been. There was strong political pressure to not engage in riot control training for fear that such actions would appear to be provocative! The potential for this type of political interference remains alive and well in San Angelo where the City Council frequently involves itself in activities in which the social and political agenda, sometimes even global in nature (i.e., trade with South Africa, positions on Middle Eastern accords, etc.) are of questionable applicability to the City. To deal with this continuing threat, the San Angelo Police Department continually emphasizes the advantages of preparedness, and the consequences of being previously being unprepared, to elected officials and civic leaders.

The potential for jurisdictional disputes is always a factor because of the governmental structure for mutual aid in California. As a municipal entity, San Angelo is located within the County of San Clemente, whose Sheriff is the Operational Area Mutual Aid Coordinator for a portion of the State. As such, it is the responsibility of the Sheriff, in the event of a large scale serious incident where military forces are deployed, to determine which cities will receive those forces, and to what degrees. Although San Angelo is by far the largest city in San Clemente County, there are also a number of other jurisdictions, many in close proximity to San Angelo, which are also likely to have a legitimate need for military forces in the event of a

large scale incident. As did occur during the 1992 San Angelo riots, the potential for conflicts to develop over the distribution of military forces is a continuing challenge. For this reason, the San Angelo Police Department has strengthened its ties with the San Clemente County Sheriff's Department - with whom it has traditionally enjoyed a very fine relationship - for the purpose of unusual occurrence planning and to identify and resolve, to the extent possible, these types of conflicts before they arise.

The San Angelo Police Department recognizes the difficulties which are likely to arise with respect to command relationships should military forces be deployed in support of the City. For this reason, the Police Department aggressively encourages mutual visitations and discussions between those military and police personnel who may be deployed jointly during a serious situation. This factor, jointly recognized by the Department and nearby military officials who might be called upon to commit resources to the City, recently resulted in an aggressive program by the military to develop and maintain strong situational awareness of all that was occurring in the city during a time of potential unrest. This effort also included the identification of key individuals and commands, with consideration being given as to how military support might best be provided, while taking into consideration the unique organizational configurations of the military and the police. It should be noted that the afore-

mentioned activities occurred with the full realization that the County Sheriff, as the Area Regional Aid Coordinator, will have the final say in where troops are deployed and that it is possible that the City of San Angelo might not be supported by the same military representatives who were being dealt with. As awkward as this possibility may sound, the reader must remember that the primary driving force in how military forces are apportioned and used will be determined and driven by the situation that arises.

There is continuing concern over unnecessary federalization of military forces in the event of future civil unrest. As previously mentioned, there is widespread belief that this measure was absolutely not necessary during the 1992 San Angelo riots, as the participation of the California National Guard was sufficient and that federalization was driven by political considerations as opposed to operational necessity. In addition to being unnecessary, the 1992 measures actually were harmful as the latitude statutorially afforded to state national guard forces was lost with federalization because of the decrease in the tasks federalized troops are legally permitted to perform. Although there is no certainty that unnecessary politically driven federalization might not occur in the future, the command staff of the Police Department, in all related documents and presentations, continually remind elected officials that such measures were both unnecessary and harmful in the past. We can

only hope that they have gotten this message and that they will remember it!

The San Angelo Police Department has little or no ability to influence the factors which are exclusive to the military. Although the anticipated base closure include a nearby military installation that was used to stage military personnel during the 1992 riots, and that state and federal military organizations which may be called upon to support the city in time of future need are being cut back to some extent in terms of personnel and equipment, these are largely state and federal political and fiscal decisions. The City of San Angelo has, however, continually demonstrated its willingness to speak on behalf of military cutbacks in personnel and equipment, as well as to base closures issues, in support of those military organizations which may at some future point be called upon to provide assistance to the City.

The Chief of Police is understandably concerned about any possible police union opposition to military support to the City in time of need. For this reason, the Police Department's Employee Relations Administrator has actively discussed this issue with representatives of the San Angelo Police Association, and have come to a quickly reached mutual understanding that there would be no union opposition to the deployment of military forces, for any reason, into San Angelo should a situation of the

magnitude requiring such action occur. While the Chief did not believe there would be any opposition, he felt it best to bring the issue to the surface and address it, rather than to potentially have it arise in the midst of chaos.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

A detailed discussion was held between this writer and other participants identified elsewhere in this report, to identify the stakeholders with respect to this issue. This discussion resulted in a fairly large listing of different individuals and interests who/which, to varying degrees, could be considered as stakeholders. This discussion, however, yielded 13 stakeholders of special significance. What follows is an identification of those key stakeholders and an analysis as to their importance, the rationale for their inclusion, positions they are likely to hold, and their impact upon the future state, issue question, and where applicable, sub-issues.

1. California State Governor

This individual is the key to military support in the State of California. Whether mobilizing the National Guard or requesting federal forces, the Governor is the person who initiates that request to the President of the United States. Additionally, his appointments include the Commanding General of the California

National Guard, the Director of the State Office of Emergency Services, and other key state officials who play major-roles in the policy making, training, readiness, and deployment of state and federal military forces. His likely assumptions are: (a) that the use of military support is a perfectly acceptable tool for different types of serious problems, whether natural or man-made, that might outstrip local and state resources; and (b) that the high financial cost of National Guard mobilization is such, given the present state budget deficit, that military mobilization will be approved only upon a clear showing that all other methods of dealing with a crisis have been exhausted.

2. Mayor of the City of San Angelo

This individual is particularly important as he holds the key elected leadership position in the city. Because he is ultimately responsible for what occurs in this "strong-Mayor" city, he tends to be more pragmatic in his approach than other city officials. In addition to being the individual who must request military support, his support is also essential to accomplish any long-term types of planning and liaison which might be required. His likely assumptions are: (a) that the use of military support may be a necessity for municipal survival, and (b) that the use of the

military is politically acceptable when required.

3. Members of the San Angelo City Council

The members of the San Angelo City Council tend to give very close attention to any issue that has political overtones or which is either emotional or controversial, and certainly the deployment of military troops into a city falls into all of those categories. While it is the exclusive responsibility of the Mayor to request military support, he is certainly likely to be influenced by the position of the Council as a whole. Additionally, budgetary issues, which may become very important in acquiring personnel and/or equipment for pre-planning and liaison purposes, are almost the exclusive domain of the City Council. The likely assumptions of the Council are: (a) a recognition, however grudgingly by some members, that military support may be necessary in certain instances, and (b) a recognition, once again grudgingly by some members, that military support is politically acceptable.

4. Law Enforcement Officials

This group includes local, state, and federal officials. Representing entities that play a major role in safety and law enforcement, and because of the

certainty of necessary close liaison with any military organizations which might support the city, their support is essential. As a group, it is likely that they would hold the following assumptions: (a) that the use of the military may well be essential to maintain peace and restore order, and (b) that they would enthusiastically embrace such military support.

5. State National Guard Officials

As the leaders of the military support which would, at least initially, be provided to gaining municipalities, the support of these individuals is paramount. It is believed that such officials would hold the following assumptions: (a) that the use of the military is consistent with the state militia's philosophy and therefore politically acceptable, and (b) that the use of the military for domestic purposes tends to support the need to retain, rather than further reduce, military forces.

6. Federal Military Force Officials

This group would include those individuals from any branch of the regular armed forces, most likely the Army or Marine Corps, who might be called upon to provide leadership in a domestic environment should federalization occur. It is likely that such officials

would hold the following assumptions: (a) that the use of the military for domestic purposes interferes with conventional military training and competes for diminishing revenues, and (b) that the use of the military for domestic purposes tends to support retention, rather than further reductions in, military forces. The reader will note that these assumptions translate to military forces doing something they do not want to do, but realizing that such is in their best long-term interests.

7. Operational Area Mutual Aid Coordinator

This individual, who is also the Sheriff of San Clemente County, can be both the greatest supporter to the main issue and the worst snail-darter to the sub-issues. As the individual who decides where and to what extent military forces are apportioned throughout the county, his support is essential. He is likely to hold the following assumptions: (a) aggressively support early deployment of military forces in the event of a need, and (b) exercise caution, to the point of resistance, to advanced relationships between potential supporting military forces and individual cities within the county, for fear that it might complicate his ability to apportion military forces in the manner he believes most appropriate to meet

whatever challenges may arise.

8. Residents of the City of San Angelo

This group of people constitute the primary reason why San Angelo has a government. Certainly, as those who elect public officials, who in turn set public policy, their support is essential. The following assumptions are believed likely by this group: (a) a grudging acceptance, based upon fear, that military deployment to the city may be required, and (b) a grudging acceptance, based on their observations and experiences during the 1992 riots, that such military deployment is socially acceptable.

9. Merchants and Business Owners

This group includes the wide range of commercial interests, from small businesses to large companies, to manufacturing concerns. The success or failure of these commercial interests are the primary factors which result in either a weak or vibrant business vitality, which translates to city funds for personnel and services. Their support for the actions taken by the city, and their willingness to not aggressively seek to relocate elsewhere, is essential for the city's well-being. The following assumptions from this group are believed likely: (a) aggressively support the

early deployment of military forces to protect commercial interests, and (b) a strong belief that such military deployment is socially acceptable.

10. Special Equipment Vendors

This group of individuals is made up primarily of those who manufacture and sell specialized types of military and tactical equipment, such as radios, protective vests, chemical agents, and related items. Although not essential to either the main or sub-issues, the cooperation and willingness of this group to be sensitive to future needs in developing and providing equipment to support liaison and actual deployment can be helpful. It is likely that individuals in this group would hold the following assumptions: (a) aggressively support any and all situations where the military would perform tasks in addition to the primary defense mission, and (b) aggressively support preplanning and a continuous liaison between military and civilian agencies.

11. Other Major Cities

Other major cities are a factor in that there is close liaison between their elected officials, because the actions of one city can have an impact on the inclination of the other major cities to either repeat

or avoid similar actions. Simply stated, it is likely that the Mayor and Council of San Angelo will be concerned about how their actions will be perceived by their counterparts elsewhere across the nation. The likely assumptions with respect to the other major cities are: (a) support the precedent which is reinforced with each military utilization, as it tends to reduce the politically opposition they might face should they also call in military support, and (b) be somewhat undecided on the issue of aggressive pre-military utilization liaison because of an uncertainty as to whether or not, depending upon the cost, they would care to replicate such activities in their own cities.

12. The Media

The media, whether it be television, radio, or print, has the potential to be a real snaildarter. Due to the ability of the media to influence public opinion, both through objective and biased reporting, the activities of the media are of enormous importance. While these positions are the most uncertain, the following assumptions are believed to be most likely: (a) prior to a crisis, uncertainty almost to the point of opposition to the use of the military, and (b) after a crisis where the military is utilized, grudging support

if the utilization was effective.


13. International Community

An interesting potential snaildarter. While there is no direct linkage between what occurs globally and that which occurs within our major cities, there is a potential for a conflict in that the same military forces which might be earmarked for domestic deployment could also be deployed to an international crisis. As an example, large numbers of the Marines who were deployed into San Angelo during the 1992 riots were, shortly thereafter, deployed into Somalia for the crisis in that country. Once again, while they may be of questionable speculative value, the following assumptions are provided: (a) that potentially hostile nations would support domestic utilization of U.S. forces because such utilization may make it more difficult for a U.S. leader to disengage and commit these forces elsewhere globally, and (b) that friendly or neutral nations, because military utilization in domestic situations is common place throughout most of the world, would support such deployments.

The following page details the stakeholders and the preceived impact of their respective assumptions on an Assumption Map.

STAKEHOLDER ASSUMPTION MAP

HIGH CERTAINTY



LOW CERTAINTY

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. California State Governor | 8. San Angelo Residents |
| 2. Mayor of San Angelo | 9. Merchants & Business Owners |
| 3. San Angelo City Council | 10. Special Equipment Vendors |
| 4. Law Enforcement Officials | 11. Other Major Cities |
| 5. State National Guard Officials | 12. Media |
| 6. Federal Military Officials | 13. International Community |
| 7. Area Mutual Aid Coordinator | |

STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

A cross section of personnel from the Los Angeles Police Department were selected to participate in a modified policy delphi process that was used to generate, examine, and select strategic alternatives designed to address this issue. During this discussion, criteria for consideration were developed by the group. These alternatives strategies were evaluated for further consideration based primarily upon funding, political palatability, minimizing and/or eliminating potential conflicts of interest and/or divided loyalties, and sound management and leadership applicability. The various members of the group were encouraged to offer pro and con arguments regarding the different policy alternatives. During a second round of voting, the process was narrowed from eight possible strategies to three primary strategies for detailed analysis.

The following reflect the eight possible strategies that were initially developed, and a brief discussion of the primary components of each:

1. Cross Assignment and Police Personnel

The cross assignment of police and military personnel, on a full-time basis, to regular police and military commands, to provide for personnel and equipment needs, and operational compatibility.

2. Significant Cross-Training and Cross-Coordination as Additional Duties

The assignment of cross-coordinators, as additional duties, of military and law enforcement personnel, with significant training and interaction, to provide for personnel and equipment needs, and operational compatibility.

3. The Creation of a Single Dedicated Military Support Command

The creation of a single dedicated military support command with nation-wide responsibilities, with the role to support civil authorities whenever the need may arise.

4. Dependence on Standing Plans

Primary dependence upon well thought out written Standard Operating Plans (SOP) to guide law enforcement/military coordination, if required.

5. Dependence Upon the Maintenance of High Level Coordination

Dependence upon continuous high level liaison at the civilian policy making levels (i.e., Department of Defense, and mayor/governor offices), to provide for the acquisition and utilization of military forces.

6. Complete Dependence Upon Strong Management and Sound Decision Making

Given the dynamics, uncertainties, and the likely need to fashion creative solutions to problems which may be difficult to anticipate, emphasis should be placed on general management and supervisory development and sound decision making. This concept would call for no special liaison or coordination measures.

ii

7. Use of Potential Military Support to Civil Authorities as a Bargaining Device

This concept would hold the potential support of military personnel to civilian authorities as fiscal hostage in an attempt to acquire additional dedicated military personnel and equipment. The inability to make meaningful progress until adequate funds are allocated would be cited.

8. Utilization of Police Personnel in the Military Reserves

Placing primary responsibility for mission accomplishment upon police personnel who are also in the military reserves, through re-assignments and additional training.

THREE TOP STRATEGIES

What follows is a discussion of the top three strategies. All three of these strategies have the same objectives with regard to the desired future state, the agency, the issue, and the sub-issues. The purpose is to develop and maintain, between the San Angelo Police Department and potential military support organizations, the types of command relationships, liaisons, agreements, and procedures which are likely to increase the probability of prompt response, smooth interaction, and maximum effectiveness in the event the military is called upon to serve in support of the San Angelo Police Department.

1. Full-time Cross Assignment of Military and Police Personnel

This is defined as the actual cross-assignment of military personnel to a police agency, and of police personnel to a military organization. Such a configuration would make these full-time assignments, as opposed to collateral duties. The assignees would be physically located with the organization to which attached.

The advantages include: Full-time attention to the assignment; a demonstrated strong commitment by the agencies involved; likelihood of adequate attention

given to personnel, equipment, and operational issues; clear chain of responsibilities; and of the fact that key personnel would always be in place.

The disadvantages included: Very costly from a personnel standpoint; could end up as a bonus/boondoggle assignment; potential loss of control and influence over police personnel working with military forces; detachment of people out of the mainstream of their profession; and the chance that personnel would also be used for tasks which were not intended.

Likely stakeholder perceptions: Elected officials could be sold on the merits, however, would be concerned with the cost; police officials would most likely oppose because of the disadvantages previously described; military personnel would see it as an additional unique billet and assignment opportunity; residents and merchants would not likely have strong feelings; special equipment vendors would be pleased in that they would be able to focus their marketing efforts on dedicated personnel; other major cities would be concerned about a potential precedent that might create pressure for a similar exchange program; the media's perception may well be shaped by editorial

beliefs or by the staff writer who does the story; and the international community would be unlikely to have an appreciable perception.

2. Significant Cross-Training and Cross-Coordination as Additional Duties

This is defined as making joint military-police planning and liaison responsibilities a collateral duty for military and police personnel, with each having other primary responsibilities within their respective commands. Within the police department, the most logical placement for these personnel and responsibilities is within the unit responsible for tactical planning. This configuration does minimize the importance of the task, but acknowledges that it is not likely a full-time assignment. This configuration does not preclude having one person from the police planning unit assigned to give full-time attention to military tasks.

The advantages include: Minimal disruption to primary duties; a dynamic process; personnel change easily facilitated; no loss of control and/or influence; does not require additional personnel; fiscally palatable; and provides for constant command level oversight of subordinate personnel.

The disadvantages are few. It is likely that the only opposition would come from those who would favor a full-time exchange program, who would likely cite the following as disadvantages: Lack of dedicated personnel; potential lack of single contacts; and the inability to develop the requisite expertise as a collateral responsibility.

Likely stakeholder perceptions: Elected officials at the city, county, and state level would see it as practical, and not expensive, and therefore would support; police officials would see it as practical and the most appropriate and reasonable use of manpower and would support; although the National Guard and regular military forces would most likely prefer a full-time exchange program, they, too, would see it as the most practical and would support; the residents and merchants would be unlikely to have an opinion one way or another unless the issue was explained in considerable detail and then, as taxpayers, they would support; special equipment vendors would still have identifiable marketable targets and would therefore approve of this concept; other major cities would likely believe this to be the most appropriate approach; the media, unless a feature article were to be done on the liaison process that would analyze the

merits of exchange versus cross liaison, most likely would not have a strong point of view either way; the international community would not likely have an opinion.

3. Utilization of Police Personnel who are Members of the Military Reserves

This is defined as identifying police personnel who are members of the military reserve and assigning these individuals the tasks of military planning and liaison. This configuration places a very strong emphasis on military background as a prerequisite for this assignment, the rationale being that such experience is a primary factor to communications, understanding, and effectiveness.

The advantages include: likely strong understanding of military issues and doctrine; in many instances, police personnel already in place in military units; and simplified personnel selections.

The disadvantages include: too much emphasis on military experience as opposed to a proper blend of managerial, staff, and coordination skills; despite military background, participants may not be the best individuals for the job; susceptible to being co-opted

by military superiors due to desire for continued military advancement and future desirable assignments; potential for divided loyalties; and may lack the balance required in assessment of all issues.

Likely stakeholder perceptions are: elected officials, despite the fact that such a concept might initially appear to make sense, would likely oppose when the disadvantages were explained; police officials would most likely oppose because it would limit their personnel flexibility; military officials would probably also oppose in concept, however, may lobby otherwise if they had a particular reservist in mind; residents and merchants would not be likely to have a grasp of the management issues involved and therefore would not be likely to have a strong opinion; special equipment vendors continue to be concerned only about marketing targets; other major cities would ultimately oppose after an examination of the management issues; the media, once again, unless there were indepth analysis of the management issues, would not likely take a position; and there would be no concern on the part of the international community.

PREFERRED STRATEGY

The Strategy of Cross-Training and Cross-Coordination of Military and Civil Law Enforcement Personnel, as additional duties, is clearly the preferable course of action. This approach is dynamic; ensures continuous oversight of assigned personnel by their respective commanders; maintains control at the appropriate levels of command; provides for continuous situational awareness among key personnel; provides for maximum flexibility in the assignment of personnel; provides for prompt access to key personnel and information; provides for the most efficient use of key personnel; and is likely to have applicability for the foreseeable future - certainly for a decade - in achieving the desired future state of continued strong liaison likely to result in effective deployment of military support to civil authorities should the need arise.

Implementation Plan

The various actions listed below, in the sequence provided, would most likely significantly maximize the likelihood of success in the implementation of the cross-training and cross-coordination strategy. This plan can be implemented within existing resources and does not absolutely require additional financial expenditures. While the acquisition of additional equipment, over and above that which typically exists in police and military

organizations - such as enhanced radios, the latest voice mail terminals, enhanced management information systems, specialized command post equipment, and related items - could be helpful to the process and enhance the effectiveness that is ultimately achieved, such additional expenditures are not essential. It is believed likely that some items and/or services which do require additional expenditures may be obtained as experience with the process is gained and strong justifications can be made.

Actions and Sequence

- * Initial coordination meeting to determine future agenda and items to be addressed, to include: nature of subsequent agreement (Memorandum of Agreement?); levels of effort; levels and types of personnel to be involved; identification of stakeholders and participants; clerical support; levels of approval and oversight; strategies to deal with various issues (acquisitions, media, funding, and public officials, etc.); planning functions, and liaison responsibilities.
- * Formation of a planning and implementation team.
- * Establishment of a time table for all steps in the implementation process.

- * Commencement of detail planning effort.
- * Ensure that key appointed and elected officials, as well as community leaders, have been thoroughly briefed and understand this process. If required, elected officials' ratification at this point.
- * Approval of plan and identification of the various agreements which may be required.
- * Institutionalization of plan in the plans, procedures, operational manuals, and organizational charts of the effected entities.
- * Appointment of police liaison officers by name, who, as a supplemental duty, would perform cross-operational and liaison functions in the event that military support is provided.
- * Establishment of and adherence to regular meeting and review sessions to identify the additional tasks and measures which will be either necessary and/or desirable to the development of a transition management plan.

SUMMARY

Clearly, the nation is in an era where the utilization of military resources in support of civil authorities is both necessary and politically acceptable. The difficult fiscal conditions of most major municipalities, coupled with continued human-cause and natural disasters and the fact that the military is desperately seeking an expanded role to retard personnel cutbacks, has resulted in a political and social environment where military forces are often a viable resource to assist beleaguered municipalities during various types of crisis.

Hopefully, this section of the report has assisted the reader to better understand the nature of past and potential future needs where the use of the military may be helpful, the social and political implications of such utilization, the various types of stakeholders involved with this issue and the likely points of view which they hold, and, finally, a series of thoughts on initial implementation strategies and measures.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN

The likelihood of additional man-caused and natural disasters, of both local and national scopes, which will require resources beyond those normally available, is a virtual certainty. Within the last two years, there has been a devastating hurricane in the Gulf states, series of earthquakes in California, and a devastating riot in Los Angeles. In each of these situations, local authorities lacked the personnel and/or resources required to respond to all the needs which arose.

The problem with inadequate resources is further exasperated by the fact that the United States, including most states, counties, and cities, is presently in the throes of an economic recession which has a devastating impact on the abilities of most levels of government to provide adequate levels of conventional services. For example, most cities are finding it necessary to scale back their levels of service in areas such as street maintenance, sanitation, recreation & parks, libraries, and other non-public safety related areas. Additionally, public safety requirements, primarily police and fire, are increasingly not being met and it is a rare municipality that is finding it possible to add additional personnel and to keep pace with the needs of growing populations. Considering the difficulties for providing for day-to-day operations, it becomes very apparent that adequate

resources to handle disasters of any type must be obtained from external resources.

The use of military forces, both National Guard and federal, is a viable and increasingly necessary approach in providing additional personnel and/or equipment to local governments in time of man-caused or natural disasters. Increasingly, such utilization comes at a potentially fortuitous time for the military; with cut-backs in state and federal funding for National Guard and federal forces, there is an increasing inclination on the part of the military to take on domestic missions as part of an effort to minimize the downsizing of these forces. Thereafter, having examined a variety of strategies, it was determined that significant cross-training and cross-coordination of military and police officials, as duties collateral to their primary assignments, is the most effective way to insure the prompt acquisition and utilization of military resources in time of local emergency. In arriving at this recommended approach, examined and rejected were the full-time cross-assignment of military and police personnel and also the utilization of police personnel who are members of the military reserves, as well as several other approaches that seemed to have less merit.

The significant cross-training and cross-coordination of military and police personnel, as additional duties, appears to be the

most dynamic process, provides minimal disruption to primary duties, personnel changes are easily facilitated, results of no loss of control and/or influence of assigned personnel, and provides constant command level oversight of the personnel, processes, and procedures. This section discusses the transitional management of the present to the desired future state.

THE "CRITICAL MASS"

A "Critical Mass" of individuals was identified during the modified policy delphi process. After having identified the stakeholders, the group further identified several individuals whose committment is essential to implementation of the recommended strategy. This group is referred to as the "Critical Mass." What follows is a chart of this "Critical Mass" and a discussion as to each of the identified individuals, their importance to the process, their perceived current positions, and the desired positions in order to achieve maximum effectiveness.

CRITICAL MASS CHART

Actors in Critical Mass	TYPE OF COMMITMENT			
	Block Change	Let Change Happen	Help Change Happen	Make Change Happen
EXECUTIVE ASS'T TO MAYOR		X → O		
CHIEF OF POLICE				XO
O.I.C. PLANNING UNIT				XO
REGIONAL MUTUAL AID COORD	X → O			
MILITARY SUPPORT COORD		X → O		
MILITARY COMMANDER		X → O		

Discussion of the "Critical Mass" Actors

* Public Safety Executive Assistant to the Mayor

As a key aide and trusted advisor to the Mayor, and the person who will facilitate funding issues and the political aspects of military support, this is a very key individual. His current position is seen as supportive, but cautious; while recognizing the advantages of military support in certain situations, he is likely to be very cautious in preparation as well as military activation because of concerns over political perceptions. Given the situation and information he possesses, with special emphasis on the fact that he is part of a new city administration, his position is reasonable and understandable. His present position is fairly close to his desired position, which is to have an increased confidence level in the tactical planning staff of the police department and the domestic capabilities of the military. The strategy to move this person to the desired position is one primarily of increased knowledge of the process and familiarity with the organizations and the key individuals. This person has good intentions, recognizes the value of military support, and merely needs an increased "comfort level" to arrive at the desired position.

* Chief of Police

This individual is both a stakeholder and an actor in the "Critical Mass." The Chief of Police in this department truly sets not only the direction, but the tone of what occurs. His continuous and aggressive interest, his direction, and the assignments that he makes will make the difference between acceptable and an outstanding program. His current position and his desired position as one in the same. He clearly recognizes the tremendous value of, and need for, military support in challenging situations. He will play a major role in the strategy to move other actors in the "Critical Mass" to their desired positions.

* Officer-in-Charge of Police Planning Unit

This individual is the point person for the Chief of Police in developing and maintaining the type of liaison activities with the military that will insure continued readiness and prompt provision of military support should it be required. As someone who is specially selected by the Chief of Police for this task, he is also already at his desired position in the "Critical Mass." Like the Chief of Police, he will play a role in the strategy to move other actors in the "Critical Mass" to their desired positions.

*

Regional Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Coordinator

This individual is the key in the conduit by which military support flows into the City of San Angelo. As the Sheriff of San Clemente County, he also serves as the Regional Aid Coordinator for the portion of the state which includes the City of San Angelo, and therefore is a very key individual to the military support process. While there have recently been some signs that he is taking a more conciliatory approach, he is still basically somewhere between skeptical and opposed to an aggressive effort on the part of the City of San Angelo to develop a direct liaison with military entities. His position is based on a concern that such liaisons may inadvertently result in his department being "left out of the loop" and that his role in apportioning military support throughout the mutual aid region that he serves will be eroded, and his flexibility curtailed, by pre-existing agreements. Given the fact that his relationship with the previous Chief of Police was not as good as it could have been, and that there were strong disagreements between the San Angelo Police Department and the San Clemente Sheriff's Department over apportionment of military personnel during the 1992 riots, his position, while possibly not reasonable, is understandable. The desired position for this person to hold is one of non-

interference to the planning and liaison between the San Angelo Police Department and the military forces that are likely to support San Angelo in time of special need. The strategy to accomplish this is for the Chief of the San Angelo Police Department to develop a stronger professional relationship, characterized by trust and an mutual understanding of mutual concerns, with the Sheriff of San Clemente County, and for there to exist a clear understanding that there is no guarantee that those same military personnel will flow into San Angelo if the situation dictates otherwise, and that the Sheriff, as Regional Mutual Aid Coordinator, is the sole authority on this issue.

* State Military Support Coordinator

This individual is the key representative of the Governor of the State of California and the person through which military forces organizationally flow to the mutual aid regions throughout the state. Like the Regional Mutual Aid Coordinator, except at a higher level, military forces flow through this state military support apparatus. Additionally, this individual plays a major role in developing doctrine, procedures, and requirements for the provision of state military forces to local jurisdictions, to include a major role in

budgetary issues. His present position is seen as supportive for the provision of military support, but somewhat skeptical and resistant as to aggressive liaison, cross-training, and other types of joint preparation. This resistance and skepticism is based on a concern that such activities will require budgetary expenditures beyond available funds and that such activities might detract from other missions and training. The desired position for this individual is to become an agent in helping the change to occur, to include aggressively supporting the aforementioned activities. The strategy to move this person to the desired helpful position is to include him in the efforts to also gain the support of the Regional Mutual Aid Coordinator through increased professional relationships; mutual understandings; a clear identification of the needs and potentials; and an assurance that, while possibly desirable, liaison and preparation does always require additional financial expenditures.

*

Military Commander

This individual is the highest military ranking commander most likely responsible for providing military support to San Angelo in time of an emergency situation. As the individual responsible for the

military personnel, the person who would approve liaison and planning, and - most importantly - the person who would set the tone for support, this is a very key individual. His perceived current position is one of strong preparation on the part of his own personnel and a positive willingness to assume a domestic assignment should such be directed. Given the historic nature and role of the military, coupled with other operational commitments, this position is understandable. The desired position is one of acceptance of the virtual fact that, sooner or later, military forces will be required to deal with a domestic situation that exceeds the resources of local authorities, that the effectiveness of such utilization can be tremendously maximized by advanced planning and liaison activities, and that this individual's aggressive support of such activities is essential to the success of planning and deployment activities. The strategy to move this individual to the desired position is one of increased communications, education, inclusion in meetings and other activities where potential crises are discussed, and the development and maintenance of strong professional relationships with law enforcement counterparts.

READINESS CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

This writer has completed a Readiness Capability Analysis on both the key leadership of the San Angelo Police Department and of the individuals who constitute the "Critical Mass" with respect to the recommended strategy. Both of these analyses were completed by this writer based upon an interpretation of the data collected, knowledge of like organizations and situations, and upon discussions with those individuals who participated in the modified policy delphi process.

Recognizing that the entire issue of military support to civil authorities is somewhat foreign to most law enforcement agencies, it is only reasonable to assume that the implementation of the recommended strategy is likely to involve some difficulties and confusion, and that both the organization itself and key individuals must be capable and inclined to embark upon these new types of activities.

Readiness Assessment of Key Leaders

By utilizing a Readiness Assessment Survey Chart found on the following page, key leaders of the organization and their readiness for change can be measured by using three dimensions. The first dimension assesses the department's leaders in the area of awareness; this dimension looks at the environment and dynamics of the people in the organization and their reaction to

this change. The second dimension explores motivation; this dimension observes the leader's motivation and his willingness to accept change. It also takes into consideration the leader's plan and responsibility for the change. The third, and final, dimension measures the skills and resources of the key leaders; included in this dimension are items concerning the leadership's vision for the future, ability to activate contingency plans, assessment of interpersonal skills, and assesment of resources necessary to bring about the change.

The information gleaned from an analysis of this chart makes it clear that the key leadership of the San Angelo Police Department is poised to and capable of implementing the recommended strategy. While there continues to be room for improvement with respect to readiness, there is no doubt that the organization and its leaders are ready to develop and implement the type of ongoing programs that are likely to increase the likelihood of successful military support should the necessity arise. In all three of the aforementioned dimensions, this write believes that readiness levels will increase to even greater degrees as the process gets underway and the program develops.

KEY LEADERS' READINESS FOR MAJOR CHANGE

(MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES)

	VERY LITTLE DEGREE	LITTLE DEGREE	SOME DEGREE	GREAT DEGREE	VERY GREAT DEGREE	DO NOT KNOW
	1	2	3	4	5	0
AWARENESS DIMENSIONS						
1. Awareness of the nature of the organization's current environment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Understanding of the nature of inter-relationships among organizational dimensions (e.g. people, culture, structure, technology, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Appreciation that the change situation has some unique and anxiety-producing characteristics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Appreciation of the complexity of the nature of inter-relationships among organizational dimensions (e.g. people, culture, structure, technology, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MOTIVATIONAL DIMENSIONS						
5. Willingness to specify a detailed "vision" of the future for the organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Willingness to act under uncertainty	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Willingness to develop contingency plans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Willingness to activate (follow) contingency plans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Willingness to make achievement of the "vision" a top priority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Willingness to assess own theory of organizational behavior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Willingness to increase organizational dissatisfaction with current situation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Willingness to use non-authority bases of power and influence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
13. Willingness to share responsibility for managing change with other key leaders in organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SKILL AND RESOURCE DIMENSIONS						
14. Possesses the conceptual skills to specify a detailed "vision" of the future for the organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Possesses assessment skills to know when to activate contingency plan(s)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. Possesses interpersonal skills to effectively employ non-authority based power and influence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17. Possesses personal relationships with other key leaders in the organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Possesses ready access to resources (time, budget, information, people, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

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Readiness and Capability of the "Critical Mass"

By utilizing a Readiness/Capability Chart, those individuals who comprise the "Critical Mass" were assessed as to their readiness and capability with respect to the recommended strategy. As the following chart reflects, there is generally a readiness profile of medium to high and a capability profile is near completely high. Without minimizing the need, as discussed in previous portions of this technical report, to move some people to desired positions, this group of individuals is basically ready and capable to play the major necessary roles in developing and maintaining a program that will provide for military support to civil authorities in time of need.

READINESS/CAPABILITY CHART

INDIVIDUALS/GROUPS CRITICAL TO CHANGE	READINESS			CAPABILITY		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
EXEC ASS'T TO MAYOR		X		X		
CHIEF OF POLICE	X			X		
O.I.C. PLANNING UNIT	X			X		
REGIONAL MUTUAL AID COORD			X		X	
ST MILITARY SUPPORT COORD		X		X		
MILITARY COMMANDER		X		X		

Summary of Capability Analysis

Clearly, there are challenges to be overcome in terms of moving individuals, both within the organization, but primarily outside of the organization within the "Critical Mass," to desired positions. Nonetheless, the recognition of the need and the spirit to aggressively pursue a quality liaison program between the San Angelo Police Department and the military force likely to support the City of San Angelo is clearly there. The Capability Analysis' of the key leaders of the San Angelo Police Department, and of those individuals who comprised the "Critical Mass" has proven helpful in determining that the environment will support implementation of the recommended strategy.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The most appropriate management structure to implement this strategy is through the establishment of a project manager who will then assemble a staff who will be primarily responsible within the police department for: planning the effort; maintaining ongoing training, liaison, and continuity; and who will be responsible for coordinating the acquisition of military forces should they be needed. The person designated as the project manager is appointed by and represents the Chief of Police and will typically perform these duties as a collateral key task within his or her sphere of responsibility within the agency. It is essential that this person enjoy the special confidence of the agency of the Chief of Police, is able to speak on his or her behalf, and possesses skills necessary to not only manage this effort, but also possesses the credibility necessary to influence the beliefs and actions of the Chief.

Under the direction of the project manager, who most likely will have a more conventional law enforcement title such as Officer-in-Charge or Commanding Officer of the unit he or she is responsible for, a staff will have to be assembled who have the responsibility for all aspects of planning, coordinating, training and, should it become necessary, acquiring military support. Within this staff, it is important that certain types of expertise be resident, including: Legal skills, logistics

skills, planning skills, training skills, understanding of the military, including its role and structures, and strong interpersonal skills for the critical coordination and liaisons which must be developed and maintained.

The project manager form of organizations structure is the most logical approach. This strategy is not only the most appropriate in terms of effectiveness, but also represents the most reasonable utilization of personnel. As previously mentioned, several other strategies were considered and rejected, including the cross-attachment of liaison officers as a permanent and primary assignment and the exclusive assignment of police personnel who are also military reservists to such an effort. The project manager strategy places the overall responsibility for military and liaison within an existing agency entity which is commanded by a representative of the Chief of Police. This approach, assuming that the personnel have reasonable skills and that the effort is updated continually, keeps the effort in close proximity to the agency head and easily facilitates constant planning, periodic updates, ongoing liaison, close proximity of the planning effort to the Chief, and prompt consideration of legal and contractual issues.

From the standpoint of staff and administration, it is important that there be a physical location within the entity responsible for military planning that is dedicated exclusively to this

purpose. Even though most of those assigned are likely to have other responsibilities as well, it is crucial that the physical data and various documents not be commingled in filing cabinets or other storage facilities. While this may not sound like a significant consideration, it truly is important to ensure that all military-related data and information is located in a single area which facilitates rapid access to the information in a non-cluttered and professional way. While not an absolute requirement, it is highly beneficial if one particularly competent member of the project team, directly beneath the project manager, be assigned exclusively to military planning and liaison; this approach dramatically increases the continuity of the effort and ensures constant attention to the various tasks which may arise.

Technologies and Methods to Support Implementation

There are a variety of things which need to occur in order to develop the type of police-military partnership which will ultimately result in maximum effectiveness should the military be called upon to support civil authorities. These include: Gaining political support; support within the organization; modifying organizational structures; selecting key personnel; developing plans and policies; conducting training; acquiring equipment; conducting periodic liaison sessions; and auditing the effectiveness of the program/strategy.

Developing support for such a program is a key ingredient for success. Within the city, it is critical that key elected officials, primarily the Mayor, be solidly behind the concept of military support. Within the police department itself, there is likely resistance which may have to be overcome by individuals who either oppose the concepts, question the likelihood of additional necessity, or who resent the effort necessary to have a successful strategy. At both the county and state level, there are coordinators who are likely to have at least some reservations about the structure and certain prior agreements. Finally, within the military, there are those who are opposed because of the effort involved and the fact such a strategy can be seen as interfering with the primary military mission. These issues must be addressed as part of the implementation strategies.

Developing the organizational structure is another key ingredient to the success of the strategy. It is critical that strong and quality attention be given to the selection of the project manager, and that he or she has a very clear and well defined role within the organization; adequate staff; adequate resources; and enjoys the confidence of the Chief of Police. Once assembled, the personnel in this unit will be responsible for developing and maintaining a series of programs and efforts, including: Program administration; research; conduct of joint meeting and training sessions; development of plans and agreements; resolving the conflicts that are likely to arise;

review of technology; acquisition of equipment; media and community relations; and program evaluation.

The application of informational and communications technology is also an integral part of this strategy. There is an immediate need, upon activation of the liaison function, to develop an on-line computer system with a sizeable data base that is both tied into and will facilitate constant data communications between the police department and, if one can be identified, the military unit most likely to support the department in time of need. Such an on-line computer system would be invaluable for the transfer of information, exchange of ideas, modification of drafts, and other related tasks.

From the standpoint of voice communications, the implementation activities would include an aggressive effort to create radio interoperability between the police department and the military organization most likely to provide support. Specific efforts would include maximizing the expanded frequency spectrum and channels of the new police department radios, searching for surplus or radios which can be loaned to the military - possibly through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or another like organization - that are compatible with the new police department radios, and developing a communications plan and protocols to guide personnel in joint communications.

Finally, it is critical that the project manager continually evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy. It is an absolute certainty that some measures, directives, and/or assumptions will prove to be unsuitable and/or in need of modification, and will require refinement or new approaches. The project manager must assemble and maintain both a process and individuals who recognize the need for change when it exists and who have the qualities necessary to achieve it in an orderly, timely, and effective manner.

Transition Management and Implementation Plan

The following, in sequential order, represent the measures necessary to initiate and maintain a comprehensive effort that will, if such is required, facilitate the prompt and effective support of military forces to civilian law enforcement.

- * Develop political support.
- * Develop police organizational structure for military liaison.
- * Appoint project manager.
- * Assemble police members of the liaison effort, and to develop a solid team with a clear focus and common vision.
- * Conduct an Initial Planning Conference (IPC), to include the Chief of Police, regional and state coordinators, and military leadership to conceptually

discuss and hopefully agree upon broad key issues of military support.

- * Conduct internal police training to develop an understanding and, hopefully, an understanding and appreciation among police personnel for the strategy.
- * Administer the program on a day-to-day basis.
- * Conduct research as required.
- * Conduct periodic police-military joint meetings and training sessions.
- * Develop joint plans and agreements.
- * Develop a clear understanding of military Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the use of various types of force.
- * Provide for conflict resolution.
- * Continuous review of potentially helpful technology.
- * Equipment acquisition.
- * Media and community relations.
- * Program evaluation.

The following Responsibility Chart identifies key actors in the "Critical Mass" and the role that each performs in the transition management process. This process is particularly useful in that it identifies key responsibilities and provides for a clear understanding as to the role that each individual plays towards achievement of the overall strategy.

RESPONSIBILITY CHART

DECISION/TASK	MUTUAL STATE					
	MAYOR ASS'T	CHIEF OF CO/OIC POLICE	PLNG UNIT	AID COORD	MILITARY COORD	MILITARY C.O.
DEVELOP MILITARY SUPPORT	R	S	S	S	S	S
DEVELOP ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE	A	R	S	I	I	I
APPOINT O.I.C. PROJECT MANAGER PLANNING UNIT	I	R	-	-	-	-
ASSEMBLE LIAISON TEAM/SECTION	I	A	R	I	-	-
INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE (IPC)	I	S	R	S	S	A
CONDUCT INTERNAL POLICE TRAINING	-	A	R	-	-	-
ADMINISTER PROGRAM/STRATEGY	S	A	R	S	S	S
INITIAL RESEARCH	I	A	R	I	I	I
CONDUCT PERIODIC JOINT MEETINGS	I	I	R	S	I	A
DEVELOP JOINT PLANS & AGREEMENTS	I	I	R	S	S	A
DEVELOP MILITARY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)	S	S	A	S	S	R
CONFLICT RESOLUTION	S	S	R	S	S	A
CONDUCT PERIODIC JOINT TRAINING	I	I	R	I	I	A
TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND ACQUISITION	S	A	R	I	I	S
MEDIA & COMMUNITY RELATIONS	S	S	R	I	I	A
PROGRAM EVALUATION	S	A	R	I	I	S

ISSUE: Developing and maintaining strong coordination and liaison measures to ensure prompt military support to civil authorities should the need arise.

R= RESPONSIBILITY
A= APPROVAL
S= SUPPORT
I= INFORMED
--= NOT APPLICABLE

While the nature of this effort is such that a specific timetable is not applicable at this time, the above listed activities have been listed in their relative sequential order of importance. The first and most important things that must be accomplished are the identification of key individuals, the bringing together of key players and the conceptual agreement of those key players as to the overall mission and how it to be accomplished. Of special importance is providing the type of training within both the police department and the military so as to develop an understanding and, hopefully an appreciation as well, throughout both organizations, for the concept of military support to civil authorities. Once the above have been accomplished, the planning and liaison can begin with earnest and, given the complexities of the subject, it is unot unreasonable, in the absence of an absolute emergency, that the initial planning effort may require as much as six months to complete. At the end of this period, it is anticipated that plans and procedures would have been developed, approved, and implemented. At this point, the procedures should be in place that will insure the prompt and effective response of military forces to civil authorities in time of need, and that ongoing reviews, audits, and liaisons will provide for this continued ability.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

In summary, the results of this report make it quite clear that the future holds a very strong probability that additional challenges, both and natural and man-caused, are likely to occur during the next decade that are of a magnitude such as to require resources far beyond those available at the local level, and that military support is likely to be both required and available. This military support, which may be either state and/or federal in nature, if properly planned for and promptly acquired, can be highly beneficial in providing for an orderly provision of personnel and/or services that would otherwise be unavailable.

The sub-issue of command relationships is of critical importance. While a superficial similarity exists between police and military organizations, there are tremendous differences. It is essential that these differences be recognized and that special command relationships be agreed upon and developed, with clear lines of authority and responsibilities, in virtually all liaisons between the police and the military. The resolution of these relationships is important not only during the acquisition of military support, but in the planning and liaison stages as well.

The sub-issue of developing a liaison capability within the police department is of equal critical importance. This report makes it clear that the effective provision of military support

to civil authorities requires far more than a conceptual agreement to respond and assist if required. The strong need to identify key personnel, provide constant training, develop plans and procedures, develop rules of engagement, agree upon tasks, fixed responsibilities, explore technologies, resolve conflicts, and provide for a constant self-evaluation for effectiveness, have been shown to be absolutely necessary.

While this technical report has hopefully achieved its purpose of exploring the future with respect to potential military support to civil authorities, and reviewing key implementation and transition issues, it should be realized that additional research may well be helpful to a more thorough examination of the overall issue. Areas where additional detailed inquiry may well be merited include, but are not limited to, the following: The most appropriate command and control structure for the integration of civilian and military personnel; the configuration and operations of a joint command post; acquisition of radios which would provide for interoperability, and the procedures to provide for such; review of applicable laws and ordinances, at all levels of government, which may merit modification; review of military intelligence guidelines and restrictions as they may conflict with operational necessities in a domestic environment; potential funding and its sources; and the governmental and procedural

protocols for the initiation of military support in a domestic situation. As can be seen, there are a great many additional sub-issues which could merit additional substantial examination.

The planning for the provision of military support to civil authorities is not unlike other activities. If not well thought out and prepared for, it is likely to be of marginal effectiveness. However, if properly planned for, it can be rapidly attained and properly used in a manner that results in a high degree of value and effectiveness.

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9. Personal conversations by the author with Sheriff Sherman Block and then Chief of Police Daryl Gates during the 1992 Los Angeles Riots.

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APPENDIX

Unstructured Interviews

1. During the operational phase of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, a series of unstructured discussions with Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block and then Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates, on a variety of issues pertaining to state and federal military support to civil authorities.
2. During the operational phase of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, and on several subsequent occasions, a series of unstructured discussions with Major General James D. Delk, AUS (Ret), National Guard Military Field Commander, on a variety of issues pertaining to state and federal military support to civil authorities.
3. During a series of meetings in 1993, unstructured interviews with Commander George Morrison, Los Angeles Police Department, an individual with considerable military liaison knowledge and experience, on the issue of military liaisons, agreements, protocols, and acquisition.

What will be the impact of military involvement in police operations by the year 2003?

K. Bushey. Sponsoring Agency: California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. 1944. 160pp. Availability: Commission on POST, Center for Leadership Development, 1601 Alhambra Boulevard, Sacramento, CA 95816-7053. Single copies free: Order number 17-0336. National Institute of Justice/NCJRS Microfilm Program, Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850. Microfilm fee. Microfilm number NCJ _____.

Abstract

The study : examines the impact of military involvement in future police operations. Eight trends, which are likely to increase the necessity and/or opportunity for military involvement are identified using a futures methodology. High probability events that would impact such involvement are also identified. Policy recommendations include appointment of a project manager to develop and oversee a liaison-type unit within the police planning apparatus, liaison duties that are collateral to other tasks, identification of initial tasks which must be accomplished to achieve military-police liaison effectiveness, and close accountability to the Chief of Police. The transition management plan presents a sequential listing of critical tasks which should be performed by recommended individual(s), if a true and effective partnership is to be achieved. Survey data, forecasting results, and other various charts in text; unstructured interviews in appendix; references and bibliography.

WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLICE OPERATIONS BY THE YEAR 2003?

**JOURNAL REPORT
BY
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COMMAND COLLEGE XVII
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 1994**

This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future--creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in the Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

INTRODUCTION

The distinction between the roles performed by civil authorities and those roles performed by the military have historically been very different. Although there have been times in decades past where military support has been provided to civil authorities, the instances have been rare and the degrees of support have been of varying effectiveness. When such support has been provided in past decades, it has almost always been impromptu based upon an immediate emergency, and there had been little advanced planning or liaison.

This situation has begun to change radically into the 1990's. As revenues at most levels of government have declined, and as natural and man-caused catastrophes have increased, the void in available personnel and services has, in some instances and to some extent, been partially filled by military support. There is every reason to believe that military support to civil authorities is likely to become increasingly necessary, and that such will occur more often in the future.

This article summarizes a technical report which explores the future military support to civil authorities, implementation measures to achieve military support within a law enforcement organization, and the transitional management issues which are central and critical to developing and maintaining the type of

relationships - between military organizations and civil authorities - which are likely to result in effective military support should it be required. The central question addressed in this report is: What will be the impact of military involvement in police operations by the year 2003? Two critical sub-issues are explored: (1) What command relationships will have to be established between military and law enforcement personnel? and, (2) What organizational changes in liaison functions will have to be developed in using military forces in civil arenas?

The data that was gathered and which contributed to this report stemmed from several sources. First, the author, who is both a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Colonel and a Los Angeles Police Department Commander, who, during the 1992 L.A. Riots, served as a key aid and military advisor to then Police Chief Daryl F. Gates, drew heavily upon his own observations, conversations, and experiences. Secondly, the author interviewed several key individuals who have held positions of significant police and military liaison responsibilities. Third, a scanning of available literature yielded valuable information from a variety of civilian and military publications. Finally, the author assembled two separate groups of carefully selected individuals for participation in a Nominal Group Technique (NGT) and a Modified Policy Delphi Process, respectfully, which were extremely useful in identifying, distilling, and forecasting events and trends; creating scenario situations; creating a

hypothetical police department; identifying individuals critical to implementation and transition strategies; and in exploring those tasks and approaches to developing and maintaining an effective partnership between military and law enforcement organizations.

Once identified and prioritized, these events and trends were closely analyzed for the impact they might have upon one another. This was accomplished through the use of a computer program, XIMPACT, which provided a computer generated cross-impact analysis of the Event-to-Events and Event-to-Trends. This process was helpful in examining the potential impact that various situations might have on other situations, and provided the primary emphasis for the creation of alternate scenarios. While not a prime consideration, this cross-impact analysis was among the factors which contributed to the creation of the most likely scenario which is contained in this article.

THE FUTURE OF THE ISSUE

This report, by the nature of the subject, focuses on potential dismal situations which the future might hold. It is not the intention of the report to predict complete gloom and doom into the next decade, but rather to acknowledge that some serious challenges do appear to be on the horizon, and that the military has a valuable role to play in dealing with those situations. As

society becomes more complex as demands upon all levels of government continue to rise, and as people's expectations for government services continue to increase, there is little doubt that a turbulent future lies ahead in some portions of the United States.

A considerable amount of effort was devoted to determine just what the future might look like with respect to events and trends which are likely to impact the necessity and/or opportunity for military support to civil authorities. The NGT, with participants representing civil law enforcement, military, governmental, and community interests, initially identified 37 events and 26 trends likely to impact the issue. A distillation process reduced these numbers to ten trends and ten events, and further prioritized them in terms of perceived importance to the future of the issue question.

Identified Events

1. National Civil Unrest/Riots - A belief that such unrest will continue to occur periodically in major cities across the nation.
2. 8.0 earthquake in California - A belief of the likelihood of such an event continues to increase.
3. Violent crime out of control - A belief that violent crime will continue to increase.

4. Military Involved in International Conflict - A belief that U.S. military forces are likely to have increased global commitments.
5. Major Nuclear/Toxic Spill - A belief that such an incident or incidence will occur in the future.
6. Police No-Show at Critical Incident - A belief that there may be a critical situation where for several possible reasons (labor dispute, political disagreement, etc.) the police fail to respond.
7. Police Military Exchange - A belief that there will be such an exchange in the future.
8. National Depression - A belief that, nation-wide, the financial picture for all levels of government will continue to be challenging.
9. U.S./Mexican Border Closed - A belief that such will occur in the future.
10. Terrorist Detonation - A belief that a significant terrorist detonation(s) will occur in the future (interestingly, this prediction came true during the course of the research with the bombing on February 26, 1993 of the World Trade Center in New York City).

Identified Trends

1. National Level of Crime - A belief that crime will continue to increase.

2. Citizen Confidence in Law Enforcement - A belief that such will increase, but not radically.
3. Public Confidence in Government - A belief that such will increase, but not radically.
4. Fiscal State of State/Federal Government - A belief that revenues are not likely to increase.
5. Changing Role of the military - A belief that the role will change to some extent to include increased domestic responsibilities.
6. Have/Have Not Disparity - A belief that there will a further widening of the economic gap between those who are prosperous and those who are not prosperous.
7. Multiple Disasters - A belief that there will be an increase in multiple disasters (earthquakes, floods, fires, plane crashes, etc.).
8. Vigilantism - A belief that there will be an increase in the number of citizens who choose to take the law into their own hands.
9. Level of Media Influence - A belief that the media will become even more persuasive in influencing public opinion.
10. Weapons Availability - A belief that weapons will continue to be available at the present level.

THE SCENARIO

The Scenario Development Process

An analysis of the data that was developed during the NGT and Modified Policy Delphi Processes, and during the various stages in the process of evaluating events and trends, resulted in the creation by the author of "the Most Likely Scenario." This scenario reflects what the future might look like with respect to the necessities and/or opportunities to use military support to assist civil authorities into the next decade. The creation and examination of such a scenario is extremely helpful in determining what types of military support might be helpful, how it is to be acquired, ways of increasing the likelihood of its political and community palatability, organizational changes required within the police and military entities, and other implementation and transitional activities which may be required and/or helpful.

The Most Likely Scenario (Based upon the free play out of the NGT panel forecasts of the top ten events and trends.)

The following is a synopsis of an article found in the Opinion Section of the Greater Los Angeles Times on July 1, 2003. This article discusses the significant activities which have occurred throughout the previous decade within the United States:

"Violent crime continues to be acknowledged as being out of control and well beyond the ability of public agencies to effectively deal within the major

metropolitan areas, particularly those within close proximity to foreign borders and off shore islands. Contributing to this situation have been significant unrest and riots, from time to time, in major cities; an 8.0 earthquake in California; one nuclear and several toxic spills; occasional failure of police to adequately respond to civil unrest; governmental revenue difficulties; delay in the ultimate decision to close the U.S.-Mexico border to immigration; declining confidence in all levels of government; increasing disparity between the have/have nots; vigilantism; media influence; and weapons availability.

The series of riots and significant acts of civil unrest in major cities rose fairly steadily between 1993 and 1998, and now seem to be increasing at a lesser rate. In analyzing the participants in these disturbances, the same patterns seem to hold true: most of the participants are persons with criminal records, a significant but lesser percentage are either illegal or recent immigrants (primarily South and Central American, with large numbers specifically from Haiti and Cuba), and a lesser percentage of people who fit neither of the above categories, but who are in the lower economic spectrum.

The 8.0 earthquake which occurred in California last year was truly devastating. It resulted in 5500 deaths, injuries to approximately 100,000 persons, wide spread civil disobedience and looting for several weeks, and economic devastation to many cities and to the State of California. This event firmly established the need and inclination to use military forces in catastrophic situations, because of the superb response and performance of state and federal military forces in providing personnel and services that were not available through civil authorities.

The United States has not regained the economic prosperity of the 1970's and 1980's. Revenue sources at almost all levels government have not been adequate to fund the increased need that has accompanied population increases and other situations which challenge public budgets. Although the military has decreased somewhat in size, there has also been a change in the role of the military to include the responsibility to assist civil authorities, wherever possible, to provide for badly needed personnel and/or equipment in catastrophic domestic situations which require resources beyond those available by civil

governments. This changing role of the military has also lead to a partnership which has developed among some cities and states, and the military units likely to provide support, including several pilot programs where there has actual been a physical exchange of personnel where police officials are assigned to military units, and vice versa.

The worst fear of a major nuclear accident occurred with the meltdown of the nuclear reactor in Boise, Idaho, in 1998. This incident virtually brought a sizeable portion of Idaho to a stand-still, with residents being evacuated to neighboring states, for several months as the cleanup took place. Also, the catastrophic toxic situations at the Springfellow Dump in California and the Brooklyn Dump in New York long-term water sources completely unusable. Once again, military services were of immeasurable value in dealing with these situations.

The impact of foreign nationals, both legal and illegal, has been a major national influence for the past decade. The large numbers of immigrants from South and Central America has not been abated and, since the death of Fidel Castro in 1996, the influx from that country has been stifling, as has the influx from Haiti in 1997. Unfortunately, the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) did not reduce the levels of illegal immigration. While most of the immigrants are law abiding and anxious to become productive citizens, the percentage of those who continually engage in criminal and anti-social behavior has been a factor in the national crime problem. The immigration factor is very significant with respect to the continued widening financial gap between the more and less prosperous persons in the nation.

There continues to be, generally speaking, a lack of confidence by citizens in their governments, at just about all levels. While confidence in the police has risen somewhat in the past decade, attributed primarily to community based policing concepts, such confidence is neither overwhelming or unanimous. Unfortunately, there is a perception among most elected and other public officials that the media, in general, continues to pursue subtle political agendas as opposed to objective reporting. This lack of confidence in government, especially the widespread belief that, for the most part, people have to protect themselves, has lead to somewhat of an increase in vigilantism, and has been a major force in retarding efforts towards most

restrictive gun control. Interestingly, the military has become increasingly popular because of its expanded role in the support of civil operations during domestic emergencies (floods, forest fires, earthquakes, civil disobedience, etc.)

There is room for optimism, however. The old adage "No problem will be solved by government that until it becomes so serious that it can no longer be ignored" certainly applies to the U.S. government. Although about to enter the final year of his second term, President Colin Powell continues to enjoys a high degree of popularity and is becoming successful in using his office as a bully pulpit for change. While the problems are great, they have been increasing at a decreasing rate for the last five years. His theme that people, places, movements, and countries must be held accountable for their behavior appears to be taking hold. His efforts to use the influence of his office, in a unique partnership with Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court, by the use of Executive directives to resolve long-term political log jams (federal workers' compensation, immigration policies, medical reform, criminal sentencing practices, financial regulatory measures, etc.) are proving to be increasingly popular with the American public to the point where a constitutional amendment to provide him with the opportunity for a third term appears possible."

Let us hope that President Powell is successful and that our country learns a lesson that will endure into our future: That the ignoring of problems and the failure of elected officials to deal with the real problems, as opposed to the symptoms, brought our country close to the brink of social and economic disaster.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

There is little doubt that non-military agencies are likely to have challenges in which the military can be of tremendous

assistance. The need is there and the resources are there; the key is bringing the two together in an organized and strategic way which is likely to be effective. To that end, a hypothetical police agency, the San Angelo Police Department, has been developed for the purpose of exploring the various factors related to military support, implementing such a program in the law enforcement agency, and then bringing about the transition to make military support to civil authorities a reality.

San Angelo Police Department

The San Angelo Police Department serves a city of slightly more than two million residents and is located along the coast, midway between San Diego and San Francisco. The city possesses a healthy mix of old and new businesses and residents, and is a virtual melting pot in terms of cultural diversity. It has 4,000 sworn and 600 civilian support personnel. The San Angelo Police Department has the following macro and micro mission statements, reflecting the agency's overall philosophy and approach to military support, respectively:

"The men and women of the San Angelo Police Department are committed to protection and serving the people of San Angelo through a police-community partnership. To identify community concerns, solve problems, and enhance the safety and order of our neighborhoods, the department must ensure a continuous flow of information between the police and the people we serve. To achieve these goals, the department will mobilize individuals and organizations and empower department personnel. The members of the department will maintain the highest

standards of justice and dignity in all of their activities. It is the goal of the San Angelo Police Department to ensure that the entire organization is committed to this mission."

"The San Angelo Police Department is committed, through internal training and external liaisons, to the development and maintenance of an operational environment whereby military personnel can be rapidly deployed into the city, immediately assigned with and/or in support of police personnel, and utilized as a key resource in accomplishing the overall mission."

There are factors in the external environment, commonly referred to "threats," which are impediments, to various degrees, to the implementation of military support programs, including: military cutbacks; the closure of some nearby military bases; potential restrictions based on philosophical and political considerations; cutbacks in military equipment funding; potential jurisdictional conflicts on the acquisition of military personnel; a possible political tendency of politicians to unnecessarily mobilize federal forces; and increased politicalization of the military. Conversely, there are also factors in the external environment, commonly referred to as "opportunities," which may well facilitate the acquisition of military support, including: an increased premium on creativity in the acquisition of resources; the changing role of the military to include domestic missions; declining governmental revenues and a search for alternative funding sources; increased tendency for civil disobedience which goes beyond the ability of local government to control; past successful utilization of military resources; less public resistance to military deployment; increased military proficiency

in domestic missions; and technological advances which will facilitate communications interoperability between police agencies and military entities.

The San Angelo Police Department has many internal strengths that will facilitate the development and maintenance of a quality police-military partnership, including: high quality personnel; superb training; strong internal ethics; strong basic and specialized functions; and personnel who are, generally, responsive to new philosophies and programs, most recently community based policing. It is also important to recognize that there are some weaknesses within the organization which must be addressed if a quality police-military partnership is to be realized. These weaknesses include: deteriorating vehicles, facilities, and equipment; significant sworn and civilian personnel shortages; and a loss of additional personnel through mandatory compensatory overtime because of a shortage of money for overtime.

The most important key individuals (stakeholders) whose support and/or participation is absolutely essential to the success of a police-military partnership include: Governor of the State of California, who is likely to support the concept; Mayor of the City of San Angelo, who is likely to be conditionally supportive, but politically sensitive; Police Chief of the City of San Angelo, who is likely to be supportive and whose force and

leadership is essential to make it happen; Operational Area Mutual Aid Coordinator, who is also the County Sheriff, who is like to be somewhat resistance for fear that a direct partnership between San Angelo and a military entity may limit flexibility in determining how military forces are to be apportioned within the county; and Military/National Guard Officials, who are likely to be supportive in part because they recognize a domestic mission contributes the organizational survivability, but somewhat resistant in some instances for fear of distraction from the primary military mission.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

A variety of strategies to bring about implementation within the San Angelo Police Department were considered. After much review, it was determined that the most efficient and effective approach to achieve the desired partnership is the cross-training and cross-coordination of police and military personnel as additional duties. Other implementation strategies which were considered and rejected included: full-time cross-assignment of police and military personnel; utilization of police personnel who are military reservists; creation of a dedicated military support command; dependence upon standing plans alone; dependence upon high level coordination alone; and, no special plans, but rather to depend completely upon overall common sense, strong management, and sound decision making.

The selected implementation strategy, the cross-training and cross-coordination of military and law enforcement personnel as additional duties, is clearly the preferable course of action. This approach is dynamic; ensures continuous oversight of assigned personnel by their respective commanders; maintains control at the appropriate levels of command; provides for continuous situational awareness among key personnel; provides for maximum flexibility in the assignment of personnel; provides for prompt access to key personnel and information; provides for the most efficient use of key personnel; and is likely to have applicability for the foreseeable future - certainly for a decade - in achieving the desired future state of continued strong liaison likely to result in effective deployment of military support to civil authorities should the need arise.

Implementation Measures

Within the framework of the preferred strategy of cross-training and cross-coordination of police and military personnel, the following actions, in the sequence provided, would most likely significantly maximize the likelihood of an effective partnership. While there is no doubt that additional revenues could yield additional personnel, equipment, and effectiveness, the following measures are capable of implementation within existing financial resources: initial coordination meeting to agree upon the myriad personnel, procedural, legal, and logistics

issues; formation of a planning and implementation team; the development of timetables for all key steps in the implementation process; briefing and gaining the support of key and elected officials; institutionalization of the plan in departmental publications; appointment of liaison officers; and establishment of a schedule for regular meetings, training sessions, and procedural review.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Following the initial measures taken within the police department to bring about internal organizational implementation, it is critical to develop a transitional management plan that will essentially create an organizational, personnel, and logistical bridge between the police agency and the military entity most likely to provide support should the need arise. These measure include identifying those individuals, known as the "Critical Mass," whose participation is essential to the transition, developing the transition management structure, and developing specific techniques and methods that will bring about the desired end state.

The "Critical Mass"

The individuals are not necessarily previously identified as "stakeholders," but rather individuals whose aggressive support

and personal involvement is essential. These persons include: Executive Assistant to the Mayor, who serves as the key political advisor for the acquisition of military support and whose support is crucial; the Chief of Police, who must provide the force and leadership to make it happen; the Project Manager of the liaison team, whose skill and tenacity must be applied; the Regional Mutual Aid Coordinator, who must be convinced that latitude to apportion military forces throughout the county will not be diminished; the Military Support Coordinator in the State Office of Emergency Services, whose good will and assistance must be provided; and the Military Commander of the entity likely to provide support, whose aggressive support is essential to success.

Transition Management Structure

The most appropriate management structure to implement this strategy is through the establishment of a project manager who will then assemble a staff who will be primarily responsible within the police department for: planning the effort; maintaining ongoing training, liaison, and continuity; and who will be responsible for coordinating the acquisition of military forces should they be needed. The person designated as the project manager is appointed by and represents the Chief of Police and will typically perform these duties as a collateral key task within his or her sphere of responsibility within the

agency. It is essential that this person enjoy the special confidence of the Chief of Police, is able to speak on his or her behalf, and possesses skills necessary to not only manage this effort, but also possesses the credibility necessary to influence the beliefs and actions of the Chief.

Under the direction of a project manager, a staff will have to be assembled who have the responsibility for all aspects of planning, coordinating, training and, should it become necessary, acquiring military support. It is important that a variety of expertise exists within this staff, including: legal skills, logistics skills, planning skills, training skills, understanding of the military, including its role and structures, and strong interpersonal skills for the critical coordination and liaisons which must be developed and maintained.

Implementation Techniques and Measures

The following, in sequential order, represent the measures necessary to initiate and maintain a comprehensive effort that will, if such is ever required, facilitate the prompt and effective support of military forces to civilian law enforcement:

- * Develop political support.
- * Develop police organizational structure for military liaison.
- * Appoint project manager.

- * Assemble police members of the liaison effort, and to develop a solid team with a clear focus and common vision.
- * Conduct an Initial Planning Conference (IPC), to include the Chief of Police, regional and state coordinators, and military leadership to conceptually discuss and hopefully agree upon broad key issues of military support.
- * Conduct internal police training to develop an understanding and, hopefully, an appreciation among police personnel for the strategy.
- * Administer the program on a day-to-day basis.
- * Conduct research as required.
- * Conduct periodic police-military joint meetings and training sessions.
- * Develop joint plans and agreements.
- * Develop a clear understanding of military Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the use of various types of force.
- * Provide for conflict resolution.
- * Continuous review of potentially helpful technology.
- * Equipment acquisition.
- * Media and community relations.
- * Program evaluation.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

In summary, the results of the study make it quite clear that the future holds a very strong probability that additional challenges, both natural and man-caused, are likely to occur during the next decade that are of a magnitude such as to require resources far beyond those available at the local level, and that military support is likely to be both required and available. This military support, which may be either state and/or federal in nature, if properly planned for and promptly acquired, can be highly beneficial in providing for an orderly provision of personnel and/or services that would otherwise be unavailable.

The sub-issue of command relationships is of critical importance. While a superficial similarity exists between police and military organizations, there are tremendous differences. It is essential that these differences be recognized and that special command relationships be agreed upon and developed, with clear lines of authority and responsibilities, in virtually all liaisons between the police and the military. The resolution of these relationships is important not only during the acquisition of military support, but in the planning and liaison stages as well.

The sub-issue of developing a liaison capability within the police department is of equal critical importance. This report

makes it clear that the effective provision of military support to civil authorities requires far more than a conceptual agreement to respond and assist if required. The strong need to identify key personnel, provide constant training, develop plans and procedures, develop rules of engagement, agree upon tasks, fix responsibilities, explore technologies, resolve conflicts, and provide for a constant self-evaluation for effectiveness, have been shown to be absolutely necessary.

It is hoped that this journal article, which summarizes the much more complete technical report, has achieved its purpose of familiarizing the reader with a brief exploration of the future with respect to potential military support to civil authorities, a discussion of strategic alternatives, and a review of key implementation and transition issues. For a more detailed analysis of the material, it is recommended that the full technical report be obtained, as it contains a full discussion of the various issues and recommendations for potential areas of additional research.