



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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
Bureau of Justice Assistance



Bureau of Justice Assistance

RESULTS OF FIRST FOCUS GROUP MEETING

DECEMBER 9 - 11, 1992
Nashville, Tennessee

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U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

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MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TASK FORCES PLANNING EFFORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document presents a summary of the findings of the Multijurisdictional Task Force Focus Group Meeting (FGM) conducted in Nashville, Tennessee, in December of 1992. This meeting was the first in a series of planned meetings conducted for the purpose of supporting a larger effort sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). The goal of this larger effort is to identify and implement approaches to assist State administrative agencies and task force managers in improving the performance of Multijurisdictional Task Forces (MJTF). A key objective is to develop nationwide standards and guidelines for the design and operation of MJTFs funded by BJA formula grants. These will include Standard Operating Procedures, sample Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and training standards for use by State offices implementing task force programs.

The results of the FGM are presented in this two-part report, which reflects the two major topics discussed at the FGM. The first part is concerned with identifying current and future threats facing that task forces. The second part is a methodical discussion and evaluation of operational and functional problems that are encountered in the management and operation of MJTFs.

The primary challenge faced by the task forces was identified, perhaps predictably, as narcotics trafficking; however, the ultimate findings are more complex and subtle than this statement implies. The threat arising from illegal narcotics was determined to have several varied parts that include gang-related crime and particularly gang-related violent crime, violent crime in general, weapons trafficking, and drug-related money laundering.

An exceptionally well-reasoned observation arose in the form of a letter presented to BJA shortly after the FGM. This letter suggested that MJTFs should concentrate on those criminal activities that are of the greatest concern to virtually every community in the United States, namely violent crime. The suggestion was supported by several observations; one of these noted that drug consumption and availability have not been significantly reduced in any community in the country as a result of law enforcement efforts. This letter concludes with the suggestion that MJTFs should concentrate on reducing violent crime partly because this is precisely what the community really wants and because it is an objective that can actually be achieved.

A number of other criminal activities were discussed and determined to be either of marginal interest or of a specialized nature. Other potential targets mentioned included white-collar crime and political corruption.

Several very reasoned arguments were presented in favor of the proposition that MJTFs could legitimately and effectively participate in drug demand reduction activities, particularly drug education.

The second major portion of the FGM, the portion directed at identifying the problems that task forces and their managers encounter, succeeded in identifying and defining over forty representative problems. An approach to ranking these problems referred to as the Program Development Model was applied with significant success. The effort resulted in a logical ranking of the identified problems based on such criteria as safety, enforcement results, cost and effort required to solve the problem, and effects on morale. Among the problems determined to warrant the earliest attention were lack of inter-task force cooperation, lack of communication between agencies, inequitable distribution of forfeiture and case credit, lack of national leadership and direction, and a lack of operational procedures and planning.

The results presented here should not be perceived as final; they are intended to constitute only the results of the first FGM. These, in turn, are the beginning of a further planning effort that will consist of refining the threat assessment, specifically, continuing the application of the Program Development Model for the purpose of identifying solutions to problems and developing a set of criteria for evaluating and predicting task force performance.

For the next step it is proposed that a small working group of approximately 10 members be assembled from the larger MJTF Focus Group. This working group will complete the next two stages of the Program Development Process: Problem Definition and Strategy Selection.

The major result of this stage will be a recommended strategy (plan) for the solution of each problem. Additional results of this stage also include an outline of future actions/work required and an outlined plan for implementation.

Upon the completion of the Strategy Selection Stage, the results of the work group will be reviewed by the MJTF Focus Group and a determination will be made as to which Strategy Selection Packages are appropriate for submission to a program design effort and/or further work. It is proposed that several program design teams be assembled from the MJTF Focus Group to undertake the expected work required.

The completion of the Problem Definition and Strategy Selection Process is the starting point for the task force design work, small scale testing and possible subsequent implementation of new national standards and guidelines for MJTFs.

One scheduled objective of the December FGM could not be achieved due to time constraints, namely the development of evaluation methods for assessing Task Force effectiveness. This objective will be addressed at the next FGM.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the period from December 9, 1992, to December 11, 1992, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) sponsored a task force Focus Group Meeting (FGM) in Nashville, Tennessee; the FGM was attended by representatives from approximately 35 Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies. The objective of the FGM was to provide a forum for the States to participate in a planning effort directed at improving and optimizing the effectiveness and capabilities of the Multijurisdictional Task Forces (MJTF) funded by the Edward Byrne Memorial Formula Grant Program administered by BJA.

1.1 PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER

The purpose of this paper is to provide a concise but accurate summary of the facts, opinions, and conclusions offered by FGM participants. The version you are presently reading is a "first draft" rather than a final report. It will not become a final report until all FGM participants have had generous opportunity to comment on it and propose revisions.

BJA places an extremely high value on the experience and participation of attendees at the FGM. Since this FGM (and additional FGMs that are planned) constitute the fundamental basis for the overall MJTF planning effort, the substantive content of this report must provide an accurate reflection of the statements and opinions expressed during the course of the FGM. To achieve this, BJA is publishing this report in draft form and circulating it to all participants for revision and comment.

Participants and State officials receiving this report are requested to provide comments either by marking up this document, by attaching a letter expressing comments, or a combination of the two.

Comments received will be used to revise the report. The best possible effort will be made to assure that this report reflects the FGM results as accurately as possible. BJA recognizes that a group of 35 experienced participants are unlikely to agree on all elements of task force planning and cannot be expected to reach a perfect consensus. It is anticipated that the subsequent analysis will identify and eventually resolve any contradictions and uncertainty; we hope this can be achieved in a manner that is acceptable to all participants.

1.2 HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Under the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (hereafter referred to as "the Act"), Part E, Bureau of Justice Assistance Grant Programs, as amended by the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the State and Local Assistance Division of BJA is responsible

for the funding of and assistance to over 800 MJTFs throughout the United States. Subpart 1 of the Act, the Drug Control and System Improvement Grant Program, specifically requires that BJA provide guidance and technical assistance to multi jurisdictional task forces. The objective of this assistance includes providing enhanced interagency coordination, intelligence, and the facilitation of multijurisdictional investigations.

As part of this assistance program, BJA has established a Technical Assistance Group (TAG) consisting of representatives from the principal Federal law enforcement agencies.

The MJTF planning effort is partly a result of a series of visits to State and local task forces conducted by the TAG and sponsored by BJA. These visits revealed that task forces were an exceptionally effective law enforcement tool. It has therefore become an objective of BJA to optimize these task forces and make certain that they continue to adapt to the changing times. The suggestion that BJA should play a lead role in the establishment of nationwide standards and guidelines for MJTFs has also been made by numerous representatives of State and local law enforcement agencies.

The first step in the MJTF improvement effort was the establishment of the MJTF Focus Group. This Focus Group was assembled with the objective of providing the widest possible level of experience and involvement with both the operation and the policy-level management of MJTFs. The Focus Group participants included twelve representatives of state administrative agencies, eight State and local law enforcement agencies, eight task force managers and commanders, and three State prosecutors. The Focus Group also included four members of Federal law enforcement agencies and a Federal Law Enforcement Training Center representative with extensive task force experience. See Appendix A7 for a complete list of participants.

The effort has been underway since late July 1992 and is expected to result in a final plan in mid-1993. The results will, of course, be made available to all participants and to State administrative agencies for the Edward Byrne Memorial Programs as well as to other State and Federal law enforcement agencies.

1.3 PURPOSE OF THIS EFFORT

The objective of the larger planning effort supported by the December FGM and its participants is to develop a comprehensive design for a "second generation" MJTF. This is sometimes referred to as a "blueprint" or "design" for a task force. A specific objective is the development of nationwide standards and guidelines for the design and operation of MJTFs funded by BJA formula grants. These will include standard operating procedures, sample MOUs and training standards for use by State offices implementing task force programs.

The objectives of the MJTF planning effort are enumerated below:

- (1) *To develop a standard for the design and operation of an optimized Multijurisdictional Task Force;*
- (2) *To provide a plan for the implementation and testing of this "optimized" task force design; and,*
- (3) *To provide a long-term plan for the implementation and support of these task forces.*

While BJA recognizes the achievements of MJTFs and believes that it has been an active contributor to the success of these task forces, there is little doubt that many lessons have been learned since the inception of the Edward Byrne Memorial Grant Program, which is used to fund task forces. It is anticipated that these lessons along with a clear analysis of them on a national basis can lead to a significantly improved approach to the design, management, and operation of task forces and can thus make a serious and visible contribution to both the overall effectiveness of task forces and to the communities they serve.

It is extremely important to note that the plan for improving MJTFs that will eventually result from this effort is considered a plan sponsored by BJA but actually proposed and developed by the participating State and local agencies. It is intended to reflect the real and practical needs of the participants - it is not a plan developed by the Federal government for imposition on those who are on the front lines of the effort against drugs and violent crime.

The problem identification portion of the FGM, which required the largest effort, was conducted using a process referred to as the Program Development Model. This process, which is described at length in Section 3 of this report, is not unique. It was chosen because it has been applied and proven in a law enforcement environment on other occasions.

It is important that participants recognize that the December FGM represents only a beginning for this planning effort; much work remains to be done. Additional FGMs are planned; these will be followed by some very significant analysis before conclusive and authoritative planning can begin.

1.4 OVERVIEW

This paper is organized into the following sections:

SECTION 1: Introduction. The introduction explains briefly the nature of the FGM; the purpose of this paper and the effort it will ultimately support; the history of the planning effort, and the response being solicited from readers and participants.

SECTION 2: Threat Assessment. This section explains the general approach used during the FGM to determine the future threat that task forces must be prepared for, the actual results obtained during the FGM, and provides an analysis of the results.

SECTION 3: Problem Identification. This section, which parallels Section 2 above, explains the general approach taken to identify and evaluate the problems encountered in operating a multi-jurisdictional task force, the actual results of the problem identification process, and provides an analysis of the results.

SECTION 4: Future Plans. This final section of the report offers a brief description of the future work currently proposed for the planning effort.

APPENDIX A1 Unranked list of 48 problems. This appendix provides a list of 48 problems determined to affect the operation of task forces.

APPENDIX A2 Compressed list. This appendix lists the problems from Appendix A1 after they were "compressed" to a smaller list through the identification of redundant or closely related problem statements.

APPENDIX A3 Ranked list, or Decision Matrix list. This appendix lists the problems from Appendix 2 in a ranked order based on the evaluation technique described in Section 3.

APPENDIX A4 Decision Matrix. This appendix provides a copy of the form used to rank problems.

APPENDIX A5 Selected Problem List. This appendix lists the problems that have been selected as having the highest priority for solution.

APPENDIX A6 Problem Definition and Strategy Selection details. This appendix describes in detail the technique used to select and define problems.

APPENDIX A7 List of Attendees. This appendix provides names, addresses and titles of the participants in the Focus Group Meetings.

2. THREAT ASSESSMENT

2.1 GENERAL APPROACH

The objective of the threat assessment portion of the FGM was to identify as clearly as possible the kinds of criminal activity that task forces should be directed against in both the near term and the foreseeable future. The approach taken to this objective is described as follows:

1. An agenda for the discussion of criminal activity was established. This agenda was brief, consisting of the following three parts:

- Identification of threat candidates
- Anticipated threat behavior
- The threat response to enforcement efforts

The general approach taken was a moderated free-form discussion of the criminal threat. All participants were offered the opportunity to provide relevant observations and to respond to the observations and comments of other participants.

2. A general discussion of threat types was conducted; the discussion was unstructured and no attempt was made to rank the threats; i.e., to determine which threat warranted the greatest attention or allocation of enforcement resources from task forces. At the conclusion of this portion of the discussion a brief poll of all participants was conducted to ascertain the general spectrum of threat candidates.

3. Additional comments relating to the threat and the general role of MJTFs were solicited and recorded.

4. A poll was conducted to determine which specific kinds of narcotics were considered the most serious threats. This poll was not expected to reveal a consistent result but was instead intended to aid in determining regional variations in the kinds of narcotics that are currently popular or that are expected to become popular.

5. The kinds of threats mentioned were periodically summarized, and comments were solicited.

6. Once the FGM was concluded, BJA conducted an analysis of the recorded comments and observations; a preliminary draft of this analysis is published in this report.

2.2 DISCUSSION OF FGM RESULTS

As a result of the discussion of current and future criminal threats the following were identified as potentially suitable targets for task force activity in the future:

- Drugs
- Violent crime
- Gangs
- Organized crime
- Non-traditional organized crime
- Money laundering
- Bank fraud
- Burglary
- Drug-related (or induced) crimes
- Illegal weapons
- Serial killers
- Political corruption
- White collar crime

When all participants were polled on the question of future threats that task forces should focus on, the following replies were recorded: (Identical replies are listed only once)

- Drug-related crime
- Violent crime
- All multijurisdictional criminal activity
- Community problems
- Gangs
- Street drugs
- Organized crime activities
- "Anything"
- Repeat offenders
- Corruption, corruption linked to drug trade
- Alcohol-related violent crime
- Auto theft
- Gambling
- Illegal weapons trafficking
- Career criminals
- Armed violent crime

Participants were polled about those drugs that seem to be most prevalent. The following replies were recorded: (Not prioritized, identical replies are listed only once)

- Synthetics
- Marijuana
- Crack
- Cocaine
- LSD
- PCP
- TAR heroin

During this portion of the discussion a number of related observations were offered by participants. Several states pointed out that marijuana is a very significant cash crop; thus making enforcement efforts difficult and extremely unpopular. It was also noted that heroin is experiencing a decided rise in popularity, particularly in urban areas. In addition, synthetic narcotics are becoming increasingly popular. Crack cocaine is being encountered with increasing frequency in rural areas.

It was also noted that the substantial profits from drug trafficking are often used to acquire legitimate businesses and operate them.

Another point of view suggested that drugs were in fact not the most significant threat for task forces to focus on. Instead it was proposed that law enforcement cannot win the war against drugs and cannot be expected to do so. In this alternative analysis it was suggested that any kind of trafficking in contraband, whether it is drugs, untaxed tobacco, or weapons, is likely to spawn illegal markets and consequent violent crime. It was then further argued that law enforcement authorities, according to arrest and seizure statistics, have been very effective in doing what has been asked of them. Despite this, there is no example of a jurisdiction where law enforcement has been able to eliminate the availability or use of drugs. This point of view concludes with the suggestion that law enforcement should, in fact, return to a mission that has a high probability of success and that lies uppermost in the community perception: public safety through the suppression of violent crime. Such a mission is attractive and it is proposed, for several reasons. First, it conforms to the major concern of the public; second it offers law enforcement an objective that can be achieved. This suggestion is supported by the fact that the population of violent criminals is vastly smaller than the population of drug abusers.

One focus of this discussion related to the potential role of task forces in demand reduction rather than an exclusive focus on supply reduction. Several participants discussed the active role of their task forces in providing community support particularly in the area of drug education. While there may be a body of opinion that this is, at best, a peripheral role for law enforce-

ment resources, there can be little doubt that demand reduction activities by task forces - or any other element of law enforcement - can make a substantial and positive contribution to reducing the level of drug-related crime. The effective educational role played by police forces throughout the United States, particularly in primary schools, suggests that MJTFs can be equally active participants in demand reduction efforts.

2.3 ANALYSIS

Based on the discussion the group quickly expressed a consensus indicating that the principal focus was drugs and drug related criminal activity, this refers principally to violent crime and gang-related crime and violence. This does not imply that drugs (and related crimes) are the only suitable target for MJTFs; a number of other candidate activities were identified that require serious discussion and that ultimately must be incorporated into the final planning effort.

A tentative ranked ("prioritized") list of threats has been developed by BJA as follows:

1. *Drug trafficking.* This includes street-level sale of narcotics, large-scale transportation and distribution, and all activity related to the processing of narcotics as well as the production of synthetic narcotics.
2. *Violent crime; trafficking in illegal weapons.* These are treated as identical for the purposes of this report. Trafficking in weapons is a social and criminal problem to the extent that the weapons are ultimately used for violent criminal purposes.
3. *Gang-related crime and violence.* The term "gang" is used here to describe urban gangs composed primarily of young offenders (typical ages from teens to mid-twenties). These gangs are likely to use drug sale as a source of revenue and are therefore perceived as closely related to item (1) above; nevertheless, they are treated separately because of their strong tendency to become involved in both violent and property crime.
4. *Money laundering.* Money laundering is closely related to drug trade, but is treated separately since the law enforcement techniques involved are very different from those used to combat drug trafficking in general.
5. *Organized crime.* Two kinds of organized crime were discussed in the course of the FGM; these were traditional and non-traditional organized crime. Non-traditional organized crime consists of organizations that include Southeast Asian, Haitian, eastern bloc (principally Russian), and African organizations.
6. *Drug-related crime.* These consist principally of property crimes that are related to narcotics consumption.

7. *White collar crime.* This term comprises non-violent property crime and therefore includes such activity as fraud directed against financial institutions and political corruption.

A number of other candidates were mentioned during the FGM. It was noted that task forces have been established solely for the purpose of apprehending serial killers. While this is indeed a legitimate focus for a MJTF, such task forces arise on a case-by-case basis and are narrowly focussed in both a temporal and regional sense. Since the need for such task forces cannot be reasonably predicted, they are not addressed as part of this plan.

It is also clear that there are significant regional variations in the nature of the threat. In some parts of the country marijuana has a higher significance. There is also a significant variation in the threat between rural, suburban, and urban environments. These attributes must be addressed in the final plan for MJTFs.

3. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

3.1 GENERAL APPROACH

A problem identification and ranking exercise was conducted with participating members of the MJTF Focus Group Meeting at the Nashville conference. The result of this exercise was a listing of problems that affect the operation of MJTF's and a rough ranking of those problems in order of importance. This exercise was the first stage in a Program Development Model designed to improve the operations and effectiveness of the MJTF.

The selection of the Program Development Model as the prime management approach is based on the idea that the personnel most involved with the MJTF's represent the most effective sources for development of new initiatives and improvements.

The Program Development Model provides a framework for direct involvement of operational and managerial personnel in a structured program change process. It requires that all levels involved with the MJTF be active in identifying, defining, categorizing and prioritizing major issues and problems. It provides top managers with opportunities to make rational and informed decisions on major/new program initiatives designed to solve problems and take advantage of identified opportunities. The Program Development Model drives managers through a rigorous, analytical process in order to develop, propose and test effective and acceptable response strategies to major problems. In addition, the process provides all levels of personnel involved with the functioning of the MJTF Program an opportunity to participate in the long- and short-range planning process. Finally, the model provides the information necessary to justify the implementation of a new or changed MJTF Program along with appropriate funding requirements.

The process involved in the Program Development Model includes six distinct stages as follows:

1. Problem/Opportunity Selection List. This stage results in a prioritized list for inclusion in the remainder of the program development process. This stage should be considered the most important stage in the entire process in that a problem, if incorrectly perceived, will almost always result in the wrong response in addition to the wasted time and resources involved in solving problems that do not materially improve the operating situation. The development of the prioritized problem list is normally undertaken in a conference with affected managers and operational experts.

2. Problem Definition Statement. This stage looks at describing the highest ranked problems and ascertaining their root cause(s). The purpose of the analysis in this stage is to discover the cause of the problem that truly explains what is happening and why. This analysis includes determining the dimensions of the problem, any unique factors driving the problem as well as listing and

examining the possible causes. This kind of analysis is designed to restrain participants from jumping to instant solutions and premature decisions. Each problem analyzed will be fully defined and have its probable cause(s) listed. A review will be conducted to select those problems significant enough or sufficiently solvable to warrant the investment of further development.

3. *Strategy Selection Package.* This effort consists of identifying and evaluating alternative strategies/solutions to correct the identified causes of selected problems. This stage includes developing and setting objectives for corrective action and recommending the optimum strategy as well as providing an outline for further actions and strategy implementation.

4. *Program Design.* This stage includes the development of a program description, evaluation criteria, resource requirements and an implementation plan. The purpose of the program design stage is to structure clearly and in detail the strategies selected and approved by top management. This effort is carried out in three steps: the development of the detailed program design, coordination and integration of the design with other programs, and final approval of the design.

5. *Test Plan.* This effort provides a plan for the field test of the strategy and program. Included in this stage are the test objectives, action steps and dates as well as an evaluation plan. This stage ends with an analysis and evaluation of test results and recommendations for modification and/or implementation of the program design. Testing will be accomplished on a small scale in areas which are likely to insure representative results. The purpose of this stage is to avoid expensive mistakes in the implementation process.

6. *Implementation Plan.* This final stage provides for nationwide implementation of a successfully tested program strategy. It includes the necessary action steps and dates as well as the resources, training, and policy issuances required for full-scale implementation. Also included in this final stage are presentations to field managers and external interest groups and a full evaluation plan based on finalized performance standards and evaluation criteria for the program.

3.2 DISCUSSION OF FGM RESULTS

The MJTF FGM devoted almost two full days to producing a problem list and a ranking of that list.

The first problem identification exercise conducted during the conference produced an unranked list of 48 problems. This list is provided in this document as appendix A1. The problems contained in this list were provided by the participants during a structured discussion of deficiencies which hampered task force operations.

The initial list was then discussed again in order to obtain better definition and improved focus. This second effort produced better problem statements but also resulted in some combining of problems under generalized headings. This list, known as the "compressed list," provided an array of 40 unranked problems and is found in appendix A2.

The next effort undertaken by the FGM participants was to rank the problems in order of their importance. The primary approach for this exercise was the use of a decision matrix which provided for the numerical rating of each problem against five criterion thought to be important to task force members.

Differences in the number ranges weighted the criterion. This weighing gave the most emphasis to the criterion of Safety and Enforcement Results, with Cost the next most emphasized of the criteria. The factors of Effort to Solve and Morale were given lesser importance among the decision factors. A copy of the Decision Matrix employed at the conference can be found in appendix A4.

Each problem was graded on each of the five criterion by an oral consensus established among the participants. The total points for each problem were then added. The problems were subsequently ranked in numerical order, with the highest scoring problems toward the top of the list. This ranked list of problems can be seen in appendix A3. The ranked list was then divided into two parts with the top 20 percent being considered as high priority Critical Problems requiring immediate action. The remaining 80 percent of the problems were to be considered as less critical.

The five criterion used are described below:

1. *Safety.* This criterion pertained to "on-the-job" officer safety. Participants were asked to judge the impact on officer safety if the stated problem were solved. The participants could then grade this criteria with any number within a range from 1 to 6. The highest grade of 6 points would indicate that the solution of the problem would provide the maximum benefit for officer safety. On the other hand, awarding the lowest grade of 1 point would indicate that solving the problem actually degraded officer safety.

2. *Enforcement Results.* This criterion pertained to the most likely law enforcement effect of solving the problem. Participants had a grade range from 1 to 6 from which to select. Selection of the highest number would indicate that problem solution would result in a maximum improvement for this factor. At the other end of the scale, an award of 1 point would indicate that solving the problem would result in reduced enforcement results.

3. *Cost.* This criterion pertained to the effect on operating costs of the MJTF's after the stated problem was solved. If participants thought that solving the problem would result in lower operating costs they could award the top point grade of 4. If they thought solving the problem would

greatly increase costs they could award the lowest score of 1. The grade guide in the decision matrix also contained a number within the range of numbers to indicate that solving the problem may have no effect upon the factor being judged.

4. *Effort to Solve.* This criterion, unlike the other criteria, asked participants to judge how easy or difficult the stated problem would be to solve. The grading numbers ranged from 1 to 3. The lowest number indicated that the problem would be hard to solve, while the highest score was reserved for those problems judged easy to solve.

5. *Morale.* This criterion pertained to the effect on morale (of MJTF personnel) if the stated problem were solved. The grading numbers ranged from 1 to 3. If a participant decided that the solved problem improved morale he/she had to select a grade of 3, while no effect on morale or a degradation of morale, called for a grade of 2 and 1 respectively.

Although it is believed that the Decision Matrix ranking exercise provided a basis for objective results, there was a concern from some participants that the problem priority order did not conform to their feelings about the relative importance of the problems. A second ranking exercise was subsequently conducted. This ranking effort asked participants to individually rank each problem in the compressed problem list as it impacted their enforcement results and as it impacted their organization.

Tallied responses from this exercise resulted in the identification of the top five problems as ranked by the individual respondent. The top five problems are shown in abbreviated form and rank order as follows;

1. Personnel issues
2. Operational constraints due to lack of money
3. Turf problems
4. Training requirements and standards
5. National coordination and planning

Problems 3 and 4 above fell into the top 20 percent of all problems ranked by the Decision Matrix. Problems 1 and 2 fell into the mid-range of the Decision Matrix ranking, while number 5 was a relatively low ranked problem.

3.3 ANALYSIS

Upon review of the Decision Matrix ranking as shown in appendix A3, a cutoff of the top rated problems was established using an initial cut of 20 percent. This action identified the top 8 problems out of 40 as the ones to be immediately addressed. However, problem 8 was in an array

of problems with a score of 19 points. The cutoff of problems was therefore extended to the top 11 problems to encompass all problems that had scored 19 or better point totals. As seen in appendix A3, these problems extend from "A" to "K" in the list.

In addition, the three problems from the second rating exercise, which fell outside the Decision Matrix cutoff point, were added to this top list of problems. This action provides 14 problems out of the total identified for immediate work.

Under close examination of the problems to be addressed, it became evident that some problems as stated were inappropriate for processing in the next stages of the Program Development Model. It was also apparent that the compression of some problems under generalized headings made the solutions for these "sub-problems" different from each other. Therefore, for each sub-problem to be addressed adequately, it needed either to be broken out as a separate problem or to be combined with a similar (same solution) problem.

The problem listing below represents the final product of this review and analysis:

1. Lack of inter-task force cooperation;
2. Lack of communication and coordination between agencies relative to enforcement activity;
3. Inequitable distribution of forfeitures and case credit;
4. Lack of national leadership and direction as it impacts local law enforcement authorities;
5. Lack of operational procedures and standards in writing;
6. Lack of full cooperation and commitment among affected agencies and agencies not directly participating;
7. Lack of intra-task force communications capability;
8. Absence of defined training requirements and lack of standardized training for MJTFs;
9. Lack of strength within MJTF Memoranda of Understanding;
10. The existence of corruption within government and law enforcement organizations;

11. Lack of intelligence sharing;
12. Unqualified personnel being assigned to the MJTF;
13. Lack of personnel tenure and rapid recycling of personnel assigned to the MJTF;
14. Pay inequity between law enforcement members of the MJTF;
15. Union and labor contractual restrictions and impediments to MJTF operations;
16. Permanent withdrawal and reduction of MJTF staffing;
17. Operational constraints due to lack of money; and
18. Lack of national coordination and effective planning.

Unless there is serious disagreement with the above-listed problems they will be processed through at least the next two stages of the Program Development Model (stages 2 and 3). The first stage of work will involve describing each problem in enough detail to determine a list of probable causes for the problem and identification of the true cause(s). The second stage of this work will set objectives for corrective action, identify and evaluate alternative strategies for solution, and recommending the strategy to be employed as well as providing an outline for implementation of the action(s) proposed.

4. FUTURE PLANS

It is proposed that a small working group (approximately 10) of MJTF members be assembled from the larger MJTF Focus Group. This working group, along with the appropriate facilitators would submit the Selected Problem List of 18 problems on page 13 (also in Appendix A5) to the next two stages of the Program Development Process: Problem Definition and Strategy Selection.

The input to the Problem Definition Stage is the Selected Problem List. The purpose of this stage is to discover the true cause of each problem. Each problem would be thoroughly analyzed to discover its dimensions; unique factors, if any; and a listing of possible causes. Each listed cause is subsequently tested to determine which is the true cause. The end products of this effort will be an individual Problem Definition Package for each Problem. The Problem Definition package will be composed of the individual problem restated or a new, stated problem, a short narrative defining the dimensions of the problem, a discussion of its possible causes; and its ascertained true cause.

With the Problem Definition Packages completed, the working group would begin processing them through the Strategy Selection Stage. The major result of this stage is a recommended strategy (plan) for the solution of each problem. Additional outputs of this stage also include an outline of future actions/work required and an outlined plan for implementation.

Upon completion of the Strategy Selection Stage, the results of the working group will be reviewed by the MJTF Focus Group, and a determination will be made as to which Strategy Selection Packages are appropriate for the Program Design effort and/or further work. It is proposed that several program design teams be assembled from the MJTF Focus Group to undertake the expected work required.

The completion of the Problem Definition and Strategy Selection Process is the starting point for the program design work for small-scale testing and possible subsequent implementation of a new nationwide operating program for the MJTF.

A more detailed description of the Problem Definition and Strategy Selection process is found in appendix A6.

One scheduled objective of the December FGM could not be achieved due to time constraints: namely, the development of evaluation methods for assessing Task Force effectiveness. This objective will be addressed at the next FGM.

APPENDIX A1

Unranked list of 48 problems

APPENDIX A1

UNRANKED LIST OF 48 PROBLEMS

1. TOO MANY DATABASES; NO SINGLE POINT OF QUERY
2. MAINTAIN FOCUS
3. COMMUNICATIONS - STANDARDS
4. ANALYSIS
5. JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRITY
6. NON-STANDARD EQUIPMENT
7. NATIONAL FOCUS AND COORDINATION
8. INFORMATION OVERLOAD
9. POLICE AUTHORITY
10. TRAINING RESOURCES
11. CIVIL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE
12. "TURF" PROBLEMS
13. INVERSION OF RESOURCES VS. NEEDS
14. PERSONNEL ISSUES
15. LEADERSHIP ISSUES
16. STRENGTH OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
17. FUNDING DURATION (NATIONAL POLICY)
18. MEETING THE "MATCH"
19. STANDARDIZED FINANCIAL RECORDS AND JAIL/SPACE BACKLOG
20. LAB RESOURCES
21. PERSONNEL WITHDRAWAL/RETENTION

22. QUALIFICATIONS
23. COMMUNITY CONFIDENCE
24. LOCAL CORRUPTION
25. TRAINING STANDARDS
26. ACCESS TO DEA TRAINING
27. LACK OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES (IN WRITING)
28. UNEQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK (MORALE PROBLEM)
29. UNION AND CONTRACT INHIBITIONS, CONSTRAINTS
30. EXCESS PAPERWORK
31. SUPPORT STAFF
32. LACK OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING
33. ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES:
 - NATIONAL GUARD
 - OTHER DOD
34. TRAINING FOR PROSECUTORS
 - LOCAL
 - FEDERAL
35. MORE LEAD TIME ON BJA GRANTS, MORE PREDICTABILITY
36. "EARMARKING", LACK OF CONTROL
37. NEED FULL COOPERATION AND COMMITMENT OF AFFECTED AGENCIES
38. INTER-TASK FORCE COOPERATION
39. COMMUNICATING
40. MONEY
41. UNIFORM REPORTING OF STATISTICS

- 42. EXCESSIVE PUBLIC ACCESS TO SENSITIVE DATA (e.g., confidential informants)
- 43. MINUTES OF BOARD MEETINGS
- 44. LANGUAGE PROBLEMS, NEED FOR MULTI-LINGUAL OFFICERS
- 45. FORFEITURE PROGRAMMING
- 46. FORFEITURE LAWS
- 47. RESOURCES FOR FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS
- 48. ASSET SHARING

APPENDIX A2

Compressed list of problems

APPENDIX A2

COMPRESSED LIST OF PROBLEMS

1. MANY INTELLIGENCE DATABASES, NO SINGLE POINT OF QUERY
2. FAILURE TO MAINTAIN FOCUS ON MISSION, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES BY THE TASK FORCE
3. LACK OF INTRA-TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS COMPATIBILITY, LACK OF ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATIONS
4. LACK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CAPABILITY
5. LACK OF JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRITY, LACK OF ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION
6. LACK OF STANDARDIZATION
 - A. COMPUTERS
 - B. SOFTWARE
 - C. WEAPONS
 - D. RAID EQUIPMENT
 - E. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
 - F. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT
7. LACK OF NATIONAL COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVE PLANNING
8. LACK OF CLEAR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FROM MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR OTHER FORMAL UNDERSTANDING; "LACK OF EMPOWERMENT"
9. ABSENCE OF GENERAL DEFINITION OR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND LACK OF STANDARDIZED TRAINING FOR MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TASK FORCES IN:
 - A. MANAGEMENT
 - B. DRUG IDENTIFICATION
 - C. SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES
 - D. OPERATIONAL
 - E. TEAM TRAINING
10. LACK OF CIVIL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE

11. "TURF" PROBLEMS
 - A. FORFEITURES
 - B. CREDIT/MEDIA RECOGNITION
 - C. CASE INTERFERENCE
12. INVERSION OF RESOURCES VS. NEEDS
13. PERSONNEL ISSUES
 - A. UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE TASK FORCES ("DUMPING")
 - B. LACK OF PERSONNEL TENURE/RAPID CYCLING OF ASSIGNED PERSONNEL
 - C. LACK OF QUALIFIED, TRAINED PERSONNEL
 - D. PAY INEQUITY
 - E. UNION AND LABOR CONTRACTUAL INHIBITIONS AND DERIVATIVE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
 - F. PERMANENT WITHDRAWAL, REDUCTION OF TASK FORCE STAFFING
14. LEADERSHIP ISSUES
15. LACK OF STRENGTH IN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
16. FUNDING DURATION (STATE POLICY GRANT ADMINISTRATION VARIANCE IN DISTRIBUTION) TOO SHORT
17. MEETING THE MATCH
18. LACK OF ADEQUATE JAIL SPACE/CASE BACKLOG
19. LACK OF ADEQUATE LAB RESOURCES (48 MONTH TURNAROUND RULE)
20. LACK OF COMMUNITY CONFIDENCE
21. CORRUPTION
22. LACK OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS IN WRITING
23. EXCESS PAPERWORK
24. LACK OF ADEQUATE SUPPORT STAFF (E.G., CLERICAL, ANALYSIS, COMPUTER)
25. LACK OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING

26. LACK OF AWARENESS OF AND ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES
 - NATIONAL GUARD
 - OTHER
27. LACK OF PROSECUTORIAL RESOURCES
 - A. EXPERIENCE
 - B. SUPPORT
 - C. NUMBERS
28. CONGRESSIONAL "EARMARKING," DEPENDENCIES ON OTHER AGENCIES, SPECIAL INTERESTS
29. LACK OF COOPERATION AND COMMITMENT FROM AFFECTED AGENCIES, INCLUDING THOSE NOT PARTICIPATING
30. LACK OF INTER-TASK FORCE COOPERATION
31. LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN AGENCIES
32. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS DUE TO A LACK OF MONEY
33. LACK OF UNIFORM REPORTING OF STATISTICS BY TASK FORCES
34. FAILURE TO RECORD AND COMMUNICATE BOARD POLICY DECISIONS TO TASK FORCES
35. LANGUAGE PROBLEMS, SHORTAGE OF MULTILINGUAL OFFICERS
36. FUNDS BEING DIVERTED AWAY FROM TASK FORCES
37. UNWORKABLE FORFEITURE LAWS
38. LACK OF RESOURCES FOR FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS
39. LACK OF AWARENESS OF ASSET SHARING (COULD BE PART OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING)
40. LACK OF LONG TERM PLANNING BY STATE AND TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS

APPENDIX A3

Ranked list
or
Decision Matrix List

APPENDIX A3

RANKED LIST or DECISION MATRIX LIST

The number given in parentheses (score =) is the evaluation of the problem using the form from Appendix A4. The maximum possible score is 22. This is a cumulative list of all problems sorted by their numerical score.

- (A) (Score = 21) LACK OF INTER-TASK FORCE COOPERATION
- (B) (Score = 21) LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN AGENCIES
- (C) (Score = 20) "TURF" PROBLEMS
- (D) (Score = 20) LEADERSHIP ISSUES
- (E) (Score = 20) LACK OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS IN WRITING
- (F) (Score = 20) NEED FOR FULL COOPERATION AND COMMITMENT OF AFFECTED AGENCIES, INCLUDING THOSE NOT PARTICIPATING
- (G) (Score = 19) LACK OF INTRA-TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS COMPATIBILITY, LACK OF ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATIONS
- (H) (Score = 19) ABSENCE OF GENERAL DEFINITION OR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND LACK OF STANDARDIZED TRAINING FOR MULTIJURISDICTIONAL TASK FORCES IN:
 - A. MANAGEMENT
 - B. DRUG IDENTIFICATION
 - C. SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES
 - D. OPERATIONAL
 - E. TEAM TRAINING
- (I) (Score = 19) LACK OF STRENGTH IN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (CAUSES OTHER PROBLEMS)
- (J) (Score = 19) CORRUPTION
- (K) (Score = 19) LACK OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING

(L) (Score = 18) LACK OF STANDARDIZATION

- A. COMPUTERS
- B. SOFTWARE
- C. WEAPONS
- D. RAID EQUIPMENT
- E. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
- F. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

(M) (Score = 18) FAILURE TO MAINTAIN FOCUS ON MISSION, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES BY THE TASK FORCE

(N) (Score = 18) PERSONNEL ISSUES

- A. UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE TASK FORCES ("DUMPING")
- B. LACK OF PERSONNEL TENURE/RAPID CYCLING OF ASSIGNED PERSONNEL
- C. LACK OF QUALIFIED, TRAINED PERSONNEL
- D. PAY INEQUITY
- E. UNION AND LABOR CONTRACTUAL INHIBITIONS AND DERIVATIVE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
- F. PERMANENT WITHDRAWAL, REDUCTION OF TASK FORCE STAFFING

(O) (Score = 18) LACK OF AWARENESS OF AND ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES

- NATIONAL GUARD
- OTHER

(P) (Score = 18) LACK OF LONG-TERM PLANNING BY STATE AND BY TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS

(Q) (Score = 17) LACK OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CAPABILITY

(R) (Score = 17) JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRITY, LACK OF ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION

(S) (Score = 17) LACK OF CLEAR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FROM MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR OTHER FORMAL AGREEMENTS; "LACK OF EMPOWERMENT"

(T) (Score = 17) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS DUE TO A LACK OF MONEY

(U) (Score = 17) FUNDS BEING DIVERTED AWAY FROM TASK FORCES

- (V) (Score = 16.5) LACK OF COMMUNITY CONFIDENCE
- (W) (Score = 16) EXCESS PAPERWORK
- (X) (Score = 16) LANGUAGE PROBLEMS, SHORTAGE OF MULTILINGUAL OFFICERS
- (Y) (Score = 16) UNWORKABLE FORFEITURE LAWS
- (Z) (Score = 16) LACK OF RESOURCES FOR FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS
- (AA) (Score = 15.5) SUPPORT STAFF (E.G., CLERICAL, ANALYSIS, COMPUTER)
- (BB) (Score = 15.5) LACK OF AWARENESS OF ASSET SHARING (COULD BE PART OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING)
- (CC) (Score = 15) LACK OF LAB RESOURCES (48 MONTH TURNAROUND RULE)
- (DD) (Score = 15) MANY INTELLIGENCE DATABASES, NO SINGLE POINT OF QUERY
- (EE) (Score = 15) LACK OF PROSECUTORIAL RESOURCES
 - A. EXPERIENCE
 - B. SUPPORT
 - C. NUMBERS
- (FF) (Score = 15) FAILURE TO RECORD AND COMMUNICATE BOARD POLICY DECISIONS TO TASK FORCES
- (GG) (Score = 14.5) LACK OF JAIL SPACE/CASE BACKLOG
- (HH) (Score = 14) LACK OF LAB RESOURCES
- (II) (Score = 13) FUNDING DURATION (STATE POLICY GRANT ADMINISTRATION VARIANCE IN DISTRIBUTION) TOO SHORT
- (JJ) (Score = 13) LACK OF NATIONAL COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVE PLANNING
- (KK) (Score = 13) CONGRESSIONAL "EARMARKING," DEPENDENCIES ON OTHER AGENCIES, SPECIAL INTERESTS
- (LL) (Score = 12.5) LACK OF UNIFORM REPORTING OF STATISTICS BY TASK FORCES

(MM) (Score = 12) CIVIL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE

- A. FORFEITURES
- B. CREDIT/MEDIA RECOGNITION
- C. CASE INTERFERENCE

(NN) (Score = 12) MEETING THE "MATCH"

(OO) (Score = N/A) INVERSION OF RESOURCES VS. NEEDS

APPENDIX A4

Decision Matrix

PRIORITIZATION OF PROBLEMS/OPPORTUNITIES

PROBLEM: _____

CRITERION	GRADE	RANGE	GRADE GUIDE
SAFETY		6 - 1	6: MAX. IMPROVEMENT 2: NO EFFECT 1: DEGRADES
ENFORCEMENT RESULTS		6 - 1	6: MAX. IMPROVEMENT 2: NO EFFECT 1: DEGRADES
COST		4 - 1	4: REDUCES 3: NO EFFECT 1: INCREASE
EFFORT TO SOLVE		3 - 1	3: EASY 2: MODERATE 1: HARD
MORALE		3 - 1	3: IMPROVES 2: NO EFFECT 1: DEGRADES
TOTAL			

APPENDIX A5

Selected Problem List

APPENDIX A5

SELECTED PROBLEM LIST

- (1) LACK OF INTER-TASK FORCE COOPERATION
- (2) LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN AGENCIES RELATIVE TO ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
- (3) LNEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF FORFEITURES AND CASE CREDIT
- (4) LACK OF NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND DIRECTION AS IT IMPACTS LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
- (5) LACK OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS IN WRITING
- (6) LACK OF FULL COOPERATION AND COMMITMENT OF AFFECTED AGENCIES AND AGENCIES NOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING
- (7) LACK OF INTRA-TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY
- (8) ABSENCE OF DEFINED TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND LACK OF STANDARDIZED TRAINING FOR MJTF'S
- (9) LACK OF STRENGTH WITHIN MJTF MEMORANDUM,S OF UNDERSTANDING
- (10) THE EXISTENCE OF CORRUPTION WITHIN GOVERNMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
- (11) A LACK OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING
- (12) UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL BEING ASSIGNED TO THE MJTF
- (13) LACK OF PERSONNEL TENURE AND RAPID RECYCLING OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE MJTF
- (14) PAY INEQUITY BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMBERS OF THE MJTF
- (15) UNION AND LABOR CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTIONS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO MJTF OPERATIONS

(16) PERMANENT WITHDRAWAL AND REDUCTION OF MJTF STAFFING

(17) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS DUE TO LACK OF MONEY

(18) LACK OF NATIONAL COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVE PLANNING

APPENDIX A6

Problem Definition and Strategy Details

APPENDIX A6

PROBLEM DEFINITION DETAILS

In this stage it is necessary to distinguish between symptoms and real problems. It is necessary to break down any complex situations/problems into their individual elements and significant factors. The purpose of this analysis is to discover the true causes that explain exactly "what is happening" and "why". Each problem is submitted to the following analytic questions:

1. What is happening?
2. Where is it happening?
3. When is it happening?
4. How widespread is the problem?
5. Any unique factors that cause problem to be in one place but not in other places?
6. What are the possible causes of this problem?

The developed list of probable causes must be examined to determine which cause or causes adequately explain what is happening and why (within the framework of the data collected from questions 1 to 5).

The next step in this stage is to select/identify the true cause(s) of the problem.

Each completed problem definition package will consist of at least the following three elements:

1. Problem statement, restatement or new stated problem.
2. Problem definition
3. True cause.

When all problems being worked have been assigned their true causes, the work group will review all the problem definition packages with a view toward evaluating each package's impact on the mission, goals and objectives of the MJTF. The group will then prioritize and select the appropriate problem definition packages for further development.

The completion of this stage would also require making recommendations for future actions relative to designing and implementing the proposed solutions.

STRATEGY SELECTION DETAILS

Each selected problem definition package will be submitted to the strategy selection process. The work required in the Strategy Selection Stage consists of describing and evaluating alternative approaches, addressing specific objectives for handling the problem, specifying major assumptions, and estimating the effect of policy constraints on each alternative approach (strategy).

The development of alternative strategies will proceed along the following sequence of actions:

1. Setting objective(s) to be achieved. This step must consider the estimated policy constraints. The objectives outlined in this step will be used to evaluate all alternative response strategies.
2. Determine priority order of objectives. The priority order will also guide the search for the best alternatives.
3. List all assumptions that will be made in deriving the alternatives (budgets, attitudes, trends, etc).
4. Develop alternative strategies consistent with steps 1 to 3.
5. Evaluate each alternative against the stated objectives in terms of how well they meet each requirement. Each alternative must also be examined for possible adverse side effects as well as costs.
6. Recommend the optimum strategy for implementation.

The completion of this stage would also require making recommendations for future actions relative to designing and implementing the proposed solutions.

The completion of the Problem Definition and Strategy Selection Process is the beginning point for possible program design work, small scale testing and possible subsequent implementation of a new nationwide operating program for the MJTF.

APPENDIX A7

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