150821

REGIONALIZATION: IS IT A VIABLE CONCEPT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT BY YEAR 2000?

NCJRS

NOV 2 1994

ACQUISITIONS

150821

JACK B. STORNE
COMMAND COLLEGE III
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
DECEMBER 1986

3-0048

This Command College Independent Study Project
is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue
in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict
the future, but rather to project a number of
possible scenarios for strategic planning consider-
ation.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past
because the future has not yet happened. In this
project, useful alternatives have been formulated
systematically so that the planner can respond to a
range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future--
creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures
study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in the Com-
mand College project are those of the author and
are not necessarily those of the Commission on
Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CHARTS AND GRAPHS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report on regionalization was completed for
the State of California Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training, Command College. The report is
an in-depth analysis into the concept of regionalization-
unification of law enforcement services. The purpose
of the project is to raise the level of consciousness
of the benefits, risks, and potentials of regionalizing
law enforcement services. There are three main sections
of information in this report.

The first section provides information on different
concepts of regionalization-unification from an historical
perspective. A thorough review of academic literature
is presented providing the arguments and assumptions
supporting the concepts of regionalization. The chal-
lenges to those assumptions and arguments against
regionalization and an overview of the major concerns
and considerations of regionalizing services. This
section also contains information on regionalization-
unification data for the United States and more speci-
fically for the State of California. The major findings
and conclusions of the academic research are presented
in the close of this section.

The second section contains an explanation of the process and the findings of futuristic analysis of the events and trends which may be major factors in re-gionalization-consolidation. The Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was used to forecast 25 trends that should be monitored concerning regionalization-consolidation. There were also 21 events identified which could affect regionalizing an area. These events and trends were examined, refined, and re-defined into five major trends and events that the selected group felt were most likely to play a major role in the unification concepts.

The trends were analyzed as to their level of influence five years ago, their level of influence today, and the level of influence they may have by the year 2000. The events were analyzed as to their pro-bability of occurrence and the expected level of impact on law enforcement. A cross impact analysis of how the occurrence of one event may affect the pro-bability of occurrence of other events is also presented.

The second session concludes with the development of three possible scenarios involving regionalization-consolidation. The scenarios were developed using in-formation obtained from the futuristic research. One of the three scenarios is identified as being the "most

likely" situation to occur and is used as the basis for developing strategic and management plans.

Section three contains a strategic plan for dealing with the most likely scenario and a transition management plan for effecting the desired change. The plans of this section are based on a hypothetical situation so as not to be too specific for a particular agency or setting.

The strategic plan analyzes the hypothetical situation as to the environment, the resources available, and the major players which are identified as "stakeholders" and "snaildarters". The mission of the plan is specified and alternate courses of action suggested. The administration of the plan is discussed along with suggestions for gaining necessary support to ensure the desired change can be accomplished. Points of negotiation, nonnegotiation, and dealing with issues of conflict are covered in the strategic plan.

The transition management plan provides a roadmap or strategy for actual implementation of the change. The transition plan discusses obtaining support and commitment from a group identified as the "critical mass" - that group whose support will be necessary to achieve success. Each member of the critical mass is

evaluated as to their readiness for the change and their ability to cause or block the change. Suggestions are given to obtain the necessary commitment from each group member. The necessity of establishing monitoring and feedback systems is briefly covered.

The project ends with a brief discussion of the findings and conclusions of the study.

ARGUMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATION

The arguments in favor of regionalization/con-
solidation are numerous. Most of these arguments center
around economy and efficiency increases. The pro-con-
solidation arguments usually will be oriented toward
cities or jurisdictions which are geographically close
to one another. This point is emphasized in an Inter-
national City Management Association (ICMA) newsletter.
The ICMA states that the geographical isolation of many
small cities helps make small departments a "tolerable"
situation. However, ICMA also goes on to point out
that continuing urban sprawl is creating towns in which
the larger jurisdictions are essential (ICMA, 1973).
The older tradition of the small local departments has
been to oppose the consolidation movement, rejecting the
movement toward a "police state". But, in spite of the
older traditions, Parsonson points out while many
jurisdictions insist on local police responsibility and
accountability, this insistance has "...greatly favored
the criminal". He continues by stating, "...There are
wide disparaties between the urban and rural areas in
all phases of criminal justice administration and only
voluntary cooperation between departments has prevented
the criminal situation from getting 'completely out of
hand'" (Parsonson, 1971).

The pro-regionalization supporters carry the urban-rural argument to include what some may consider larger cities. Wickum, in a 1986 project report, states that if all things are equal, the cities most likely to contract for law enforcement services are "small cities" and populations up to 100,000 (Wickum, 1986).

Another argument for pro-consolidation is that even though larger departments do not have as close a contact with the citizens, the satisfaction expressed by those receiving law enforcement services is not diminished. Pachon and Loverich state, "Evidence further suggests that 'if all things were equal', larger jurisdictions would produce more satisfying police services". They continue to say that the effect of size of jurisdiction (and consequently the size of a police force) is not a negative one. The differences between the metropolitan, centralized cities and the smaller departments where citizen orientation is concerned is a socioeconomic characteristic rather than a result of size differences (Pachon and Loverich, 1977).

In an article on consolidation presented to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Adams and Vito suggest specific reasons in support of centralizing police services. These authors state that con-

solidation may result in the following benefits:

1. More effective delivery of police services.

2. More efficient police services by elimination of duplication of services by several small departments.

3. Development of specialized units with unique expertise.

4. Better trained personnel.

5. Increased opportunities for officers resulting in a lower turnover rate.

6. Increased opportunity for innovation with resulting improved quality of police service.

(Adams and Vito, 1982)

Other authors support these reasons for consolidation. Pachon and Loverich (1977) claim consolidation, particularly in the public safety field, would lead to more effective and equitable provisions of services. Utilization of modern equipment and better trained and educated personnel are the reasons suggested by the ICMA (1973). Wickum, too, has similar arguments as presented below:

1. Standardization of services.

2. Increased effectiveness and efficiency.

3. Increased crime prevention.

4. Increased traffic enforcement.

5. Adequate financial support

6. Better utilization of manpower.

7. Cohesive planning to meet future needs.

Wickum also makes a strong argument in favor of consolidation where the recent "deep pocket" insurance crisis is concerned. He points out the high cost of insurance and insurance claims as a factor favoring regionalization (Wickum, 1986).

Do these arguments suggest that regionalization is, or should be, increasing? In his article on regional trends, Parsonson states:

> More and more, it is being demonstrated that the increasing number of routine police functions can be performed more efficiently and more economically on a regional basis. ... The soundness of this approach has been demonstrated in a number of areas all over the country.
>
> (Parsonson, 1971)

The concept of consolidation or regionalization is strongly supported by its advocates. However, they also point out it is not an inexpensive undertaking. In an article submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Carson and Brown claim that combining of departments can create one large and under financed department. They further state:

> So do not let anyone sell you on the idea of saving money through law enforcement consolidation. You can promise them a much more efficient operation, but adequate law enforcement is expensive.
>
> (Carson and Brown, 1970)

The point of saving little or no money is illustrated in a study where it was proposed that financing for the

regionalized law enforcement agency be obtained by each of the five California cities contributing "...100 percent of the amount appropriated in the last fiscal year..." (Adams and Vito, 1982).

To summarize the arguments in favor of consolidation or regionalization, Carson and Brown (1970) state, "Consolidation has given us the opportunity for experimentation and innovation". Wickum (1986) claims that contract law enforcement (consolidation and regionalization) is a viable alternative to law enforcement service delivery and that a large number of police departments have started a trend that will be hard to reverse - participation in regionalization. The recommendation of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice was that regionalization was one of the most certain ways to improve the delivery of police services. The commission's recommendation specifically was:

> Each metropolitan area and each county should take action directed toward the pooling or consolidation of services, through the particular technique that will provide the most satisfactory law enforcement service and protection at the lowest cost.

> (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1968)

ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONSOLIDATION

Although there are numerous arguments in favor of regionalization/consolidation and the proclaimed or expected benefits of centralizing services, that concept is not without challenges. The arguments in favor of regionalization center around economies of scale, more equitable delivery of services and alleged efficiency. These assumptions are strongly challenged by researchers and authors who do not favor regionalization. In a report to the National Science Foundation, Ostrom, et.al., state, "The erroneous, but common, picture of metropolitan police agencies is that they are too numerous and diverse to work together". The authors continue, "Some common assumptions about department size are also erroneous. Small departments are thought to dominate service delivery, to 'waste' resources by duplicating administrative personnel, and to fail to provide complete service to the communities they serve" (Ostrom, et.al., 1977).

In another publication, these same authors point out that the arguments in favor of regionalization/ consolidation are based on three assumptions and that these assumptions are "little examined". The assumptions challenged by the authors are as follows:

1. Specialization and professionalization are necessary for effective urban law enforcement.

2. That large size is necessary for specialization and professionalization.

3. Large scale departments are thought to be more efficient.

The conclusion drawn from these assumptions then are that small departments cannot provide the level of services needed and that smaller departments ith lower per capita expenditures are assumed to provide inferior services (Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker, 1973).

The arguments supporting regionalization because larger departments are able to specialize, professionalize and deliver a full range of services are not as strong as they appear. In the study Ostrom, et.al., made in preparing their report to the National Science Foundation, they determined that, of the 80 metropolitan departmens studied,:

> Reliance on other agencies for auxiliary services is not limited to small departments. In fact, there is only one department in the 80 metropolitan areas producing all of the services we studied. With few exceptions, all direct police service producers in the 80 metropolitan areas...have arrangements with other agencies to supply them with entry level training, chemical analysis of evidence, pre-trial detention of suspected offenders, and radio communications.

(Ostrom, et.al., 1977)

In the same report, these authors write that, "Duplication of police services delivery is not common. Few police agencies serving the same community act in isolation from each other". A major conclusion of their report is that regionalization/consolidation is not necessarily a "good" or desireable condition. They state, "whether or not departments should decentralize, consolidate, or remain the same will depend upon the service needs and the resources of each particular metropolitan area" (Ostrom, et.al., 1977).

A major issue that always arises when a consolidation is considered is the matter of local control. Most all communities, citizens and elected officials alike are reluctant to give up "local control" of their police forces. Ostrom, Parks and Whitaker (1973) write:

> Where mechanisms exist to insure that the policemen are responsive to citizen require-ments for service, then an increase in the availability of police should lead to better service. Alternatively, if police are in-sulated from the needs of the citizens served, their increased presence may be perceived as a force imposed from the outside.
>
> Community control of governmental officials can be exercised both formally and informally. We postulate that greater informal communication between citizens and police contributes to greater community control of local police in the independant communities.

In a separate article, Ostrom and Whitaker (1973) write:

> Our findings strongly suggest that in the area
> studied, small police forces under local
> community control are more effective than a
> large city-wide controlled police department
> in meeting citizen demands for police pro-
> tection.

This point of view is supported by Norton and Cowart

(1978) who state that local communities exercised

greater control over the smaller police departments.

They state, "Their (small departments) small size fostered

greater intimacy, community identification, public inter-

action and civic education". In writing about the

political considerations of regionalization/consolidation,

they write, "Local communities are reluctant to share

control over what they consider to be their police;

they fear reorganization (regionalization/consolidation)

will be detrimental to service delivery...".

The issue of police responsiveness and sensitivity

to the local citizens is emphasized in the service levels

and "production strategies" between small and large de-

partments. The larger departments are seen as being

"task oriented utilizing specialized units and divisions

of labor characteristic of "professional" departments.

The small departments are seen as being patrol or

service oriented and having little job specialization

(Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker, 1973). As Norton and Cowart

(1978) point out:

> Larger departments assert that because of
> their greater professionalization and
> specialization, they have an edge in per-
> formance over small departments. Such claims
> have yet to be validated scientifically. In
> contrast, small police units obviously remain
> viable, and their performance frequently
> seems superior.

Supporting the "small is better" concept, Ostrom, Parks

and Whitaker (1973) conducted a survey of comparative

levels of police services. They used citizens' direct

experiences with their local police departments as well

as their evaluations of police services as indicators of

services provided to their neighborhoods. They looked

at follow-up investigations, answering calls for assis-

tance, speed of service delivery and relative satisfaction

as measures of performance. The authors' general con-

clusion was, "The citizens living in the independent

communities were victims of crime less and received more

and better service". They also found that, "...The

smaller departments were allocating somewhat more re-

sources than the larger department, while providing

higher levels of service".

In further examinations, Ostrom and Whitaker (1973)

say findings from over 200 urban areas appear to support

the same conclusion. They, too, conclude, "...We are

beginning to gain a little more confidence in our affir-

mative answer to the question: Does local community

control of the police make a difference?.

In examining the economic considerations of region-
alization/consolidation, Norton and Cowart (1978) point
out that freezing services and keeping costs down is not
popular with communities if the result is poorer service
or increased labor actions. They also point out that
"Per capita costs (of services) are much higher in larger
police departments than smaller" (Ostrom, 1976). Ostrom
adds that larger departments do achieve economies in
some areas such as crime lab analysis, training academies,
detention facilities, but not necessarily in the bulk of
police work. The implication here is that economies of
scale can be a factor for certain auxiliary services but
not necessarily a factor for blanket justification for
regionalization/consolidation.

In a paper prepared for the Urban Affairs annual
reviews, a strong challenge was made to those who support
consolidation. The paper makes reference to the many
task forces, commissions and "scholarly" claims that
urban police forces are too many and too small. The
authors claim that the consistency of that philosophy
would lead one to believe that claim is empirically well
documented when, in fact, it is not. They also point
out that:

> ...a search of these publications for citations
> to specific studies establishing a negative
> relationship between the size of municipality
> of suburban police departments with service
> levels reveals a paucity of references.

> The most frequent form of "evidence" is a
> "list" of the number of police departments
> serving some particular metropolitan area.

> (Ostrom and Parks, 1973)

These authors conclude that two of the major working

hypothesis used to justify regionalization/consolidation

are not supported by empirical evidence. These hypo-

thesis are:

1. An increase in the size of jurisdiction
   providing police services to citizens
   will be positively associated with higher
   levels of service.

2. For consistant levels of service, an
   increase in the size of the jurisdiction
   providing police services will be
   positively associated with lower per
   capita expenditures or police services.

> The major conclusion which can be derived
> from the analysis presented above is that
> proposals for the elimination of suburban
> police departments by consolidation are not
> based on firm empirical evidence.

> (Ostrom and Parks, 1973)

From their studies, Ostrom, Parks and Whitaker (1973)

state:

1. Small police departments can provide
   a higher level of service than larger
   departments.

2. High degrees of specialization are not
   required for effective police services.

Concerning regionalization/consolidation of police services,

Norton and Cowart (1978) caution, "...We advocate a serious

rethinking of the underlying assumptions". Ostrom, et.al.

(1977), support this caution stating:

> Conventional wisdom holds that coordination
> and cooperation of activities can occur only
> under the direction of a single, overarching
> hierarchy. This assumption is clearly con-
> traindicated by the experience of many of the
> police agencies in the 80 metropolitan areas
> we studied.

Those opponents of the regionalization/consolidation

concepts perhaps best summarize their position with the

following statement, "...Full consolidation involving

the total merger of two or more police departments into

one very large agency has not lived up to early ex-

pectations" (Marcus, et.al., 1976).

It is interesting to note that except the work by

Wickum, 1986, and the references both supporting and

challenging regionalization, date back to the late 60's

and 70's.

GENERAL INFORMATION

In looking at the overall picture of regionalization/
consolidation, there are many aspects to be considered
in weighing the pros and cons of "becoming centralized".
One must consider who stands to benefit or lose, who is
the consumer and what is the market place. "An or-
ganization exists and prospers based on its capability
to provide quality services that respond to the needs
of the user - the citizens" (Bolas, 1981). The basic
concept of regionalization/consolidation is to provide
a better service to citizens. Recognizing the sensitivity
of the local control issue, Morgan (1969) writes that
we must accept the idea that local control must be pre-
served along with increasing quantity and quality of
services. Morgan continues that any regionalization/
consolidation being considered must benefit all con-
cerned and there must be a commonality of interest.
Consolidation of services is not a panacea for overcoming
police problems, but it can provide a successful means
to attack the criminal element. Consolidation does
require "...a structure manned by a team of competent
professionals and a community prepared to support the
changes..." (Bolas, 1981).

A great deal of preparation must be considered before
a regionalization project can be begun. In a final re-
port on a coordination project involving four California
Bay Area cities, Higgins and Klump (1977) point out:

> All of these major programs have required
> many hours of research and planning. If the
> project staff had not been available, then
> each of the cities would have been forced to
> devote many hours to these programs. It is
> doubtful whether the Chiefs of Police or the
> City Managers would have permitted that volume
> of time.

These authors point out in their report several problems
encountered in the project. Celebration of holidays on
different days, differing personnel rules and regulations,
and establishing equitable funding formulas, to name a
few. To simplify matters, the authors suggest there
should be a lead city or department for control.

The stimulus for the regionalization project was
the individual departments' identification of problems
of mutual concern which led to a "natural cohesiveness".
Another very important factor, according to the study,
was each city's "contiguous geographical proximity".
Even though all the right conditions seemed to exist to
make the project a success, the project staff recommen-
dations were not adopted. The reasons given were a
change in the cities' demands and needs, the fact that
one city became involved in a law suit with Fair

Employment Practices Commission and one city was said to

have had never been "overly excited" by the project.

In, summary, the "project staff realized that they were

'change agents' and not always accepted by the bureau-

crats" (Higgins and Klump, 1977).

Regionalization/consolidation of local government

services is not uncommon. However, in a report by the

Public Administration Service (1961) the special case

of law enforcement is highlighted.

> However, the obstacles to coordination and
> consolidation of police services tend to be
> among the most formidable, primarily because
> police service is generally considered to be
> one of the most local of governmental services
> and also because even the smallest local
> governmental jurisdictions like to believe
> that they can provide at least minimal needed
> police services.

> Generally, the political and social pressures
> inherent in the desire for local self-govern-
> ment, rather than legal restrictions, militate
> against the coordination and consolidation of
> police services.

The fact that the regionalization/consolidation of

law enforcement services is a "sensitive" issue is also

pointed out in the regionalization of staff and auxiliary

services in Snohomish County, Washington. During the

study, one of the first problems encountered was a

semantical problem.

> ...The word consolidated was freely used.
> This caused concern among certain citizens,
> since they felt there was going to be a

regional take-over of law enforcement matters
in the county. As this problem emerged, the
use of the word <u>consolidated</u> was largely
abandoned, and it was stressed that the matters
under consideration involved a "cooperative
effort" and all law enforcement agencies would
retain their own identities.

(Eastman and Chapman, 1976)

The Public Administration Service said that law enforce-

ment regionalization/consolidation can be broken down

into two major categories. First, is the area involving

recruitment, selection, training, and planning which

will fit well into joint actions. The second area

which consists of public information, internal investi-

gation and staff investigation (control) is better

handled by each department.

Field services are a controversial area for
the implementation of coordinated and con-
solidated police service, primarily because
such activities involve the fulfillment of
basic police responsibilities that involve
direct contact with the public.

(Public Administration
Service, 1966)

The conclusion of the Public Administration Service was

that comprehensive reorganization offers the best of

possibilities but is most difficult to accomplish.

This point of view is supported by the Advisory Commission

on Intergovernmental Relations which states that law

enforcement is "not a very promising area" for regionali-

zation/consolidation. The Commission does point out that

in the law enforcement field, there are certain aspects

that are amenable to regionalization (Acir, 1963).

The numerous studies, reports, and attempts in-

volving regionalization have many different values for

different groups or individuals. What Eastman and

Chapman (1976) say about their work appears to be very

appropriate for any of the information available to the

subject matter. They state:

> For the student, this work may be just
> another assignment, or it may provide clues
> to better understanding of local problems
> and alternative solutions to them. For the
> law enforcement official, the ideas may be
> partially unacceptable, or, conversely,
> they may provide avenues to resolve vexing
> questions. For the local government official,
> the text may be a blueprint to achieving
> greater efficiency and more effective use of
> existing resources. For the interested
> citizen, the program may appear to be just
> another waste of taxpayers' money or a use
> of money in the right direction--action
> toward more logical use of resources.

In reviewing the overall picture concerning regionalization/

consolidation, Francis (1981) makes two clear points.

First, he says:

> Many cities and towns do not want to con-
> solidate their police departments with others
> to create one "super" agency. It is for
> this reason that sharing designated services,
> buildings, and equipment by more than one
> department can be a workable alternative to
> total consolidation by those communities not
> desiring to lose local control.

Francis' second point is:

> In light of this strong opposition [to
> total regionalization/consolidation and
> loss of control] coordination, cooperation,
> and sharing must be examined as alter-
> natives to total jurisdictional consolidation
> of police agencies.

These points made by Francis fairly well summarize the considerations that one must look at in dealing with regionalization/consolidation. Regionalization can be beneficial if it provides better delivery of service and/or improves efficiency and economy. However, regionalization/consolidation is not cheap and there are numerous political aspects that would have to be resolved if regionalization/consolidation is to be successful.

OVERVIEW

In an effort to get a current understanding of the
present status of regionalization/consolidation, several
references were reviewed. In 1976, the U.S. National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice con-
ducted a survey of the then recent law enforcement and
criminal justice unification, regionalization/consolida-
tion or coordination efforts. The Institute's survey
was exploratory in nature and included citations from
several sources. In law enforcement, regionalization/
consolidation efforts were reported by 26 states and
61 cases of unification were cited. Twenty of those
cases involved regionalization/consolidation of general
law enforcement services. Two of those twenty cases
were planned but were not implemented. The survey
gave a very brief abstract of each case but no history
as to the factors involved in the success or failure
of the particular cases cited (National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1976).

The International City Management Association
reported in its 1983 Municipal Year Book on Alternative
Service Delivery Approaches, there was an extensive
investigation into alternative approaches including
contractors, franchises, grants, vouchers, volunteers,

and self-help. There were 3,130 cities and 1,570 counties
surveyed with 1,433 (46%) and 347 (24%) responses res-
pectively. In the general law enforcement category,
There were no reported cases of alternative services
delivered through franchises, grants, or vouchers.
Volunteerism was reported used by 9% of the agencies
reporting, self-help by 5% and none reported using
contracting. However, a note was made that contracting
here referred to contracts with the private sector and
that police powers are a power granted to governments
(Harty and Valente, 1983). The implication here for
regionalization/consolidation is that there is not any
apparent trend toward regionalization outside inter-
governmental agencies or joint powers agreements.

The author of this report has also researched the
most recent data available about current trends in
regionalization/consolidation as these concepts pertain
to California law enforcement. Using a roster of Chiefs
of Police provided by California's Commission on Peace
Officer Standards and Training, it was determined that
there are presently 85 cities that have contracted for
or consolidated their general law enforcement services.
Each of these 85 jurisdictions was contacted to obtain
information concerning the date that its particular

jurisdiction entered into a contractural, regionalized, or consolidated agreement. The earliest record found was dated back to 1954 when the City of Lakewood, California, contracted with Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office. The most recent "consolidations" were in 1985 involving the cities of Plymouth, Loomis, and Solvang. A list of these 85 cities and the date they "contracted" is presented in Appendix I. A line graph showing how many jurisdictions unified each year from 1950 and prior through 1985 is presented in Appendix II.

A closer examination of those jurisdictions which have unified between 1980 and 1985 was made. During that five year period of time, there were 19 jurisdictions unified in some manner. Most were "contract" agreements between the city and its associated county. Of those 19 jurisdictions, seven were older cities that disbanded their police departments or went to regional service delivery. The remaining 12 jurisdictions contracted with their respective counties at the time of incorporation. A bar graph representing this information is represented in Appendix III.

In reviewing the data for California, the author did not find either a long term trend or recent trend that would suggest a growth in regionalization/consolida-

tion. With the exception of 1957, 1964 and 1978, which had 9, 7, and 8 unifications respectively, the pattern seems fairly steady over the past 35 years.

The data for ther period of time from 1980 to 1985 show there were 3 or 4 unifications each year, but on close examination, over half (63%) of those unifications occurred simultaneously with incorporation. Unification of jurisdictions between a city and county would be expected at the time of incorporation. A new city would need time to establish its predictable revenues to fund a full service police department and time to recruit, train and develop its law enforcement personnel.

Each year the California Commission on P.O.S.T. publishes information on employment data for California law enforcement. In 1985, for 356 police departments, there were 95 departments which employed between 1 and 24 personnel. Those 95 departments comprise 27% of those departments listed. These same data for 1975 indicate that of the 350 of cities listed, 156 were shown as having 1-24 personnel or 45% of the total. Appendix IV presents a table of these data.

While a decline from 45% to 27% might have indicated a decline in small community police departments, further study showed that the decline was not due to the disbanding of small departments, but was due to

growth. Of the 156 departments which had 1-24 personnel in 1975, 59 were not listed in the same size group for 1985. Fifty-one of those 59 were listed in categories of departments with over 24 personnel, 7 were found to be under contract with counties, and 2 had regionalized. It was also noted that there were 6 new departments listed in the 1-24 personnel size in 1985 that were non-existent in 1975. The net loss of departments in the 1-24 personnel size was three if one does not count those departments that grew in size. These statistics do not indicate any major trend toward regionalization/con-solidation or the disbanding of small departments.

One other factor that should be considered when looking into regionalization/consolidation in California is how those cities not providing their own law en-forcement services are spread out over the state. It is usual when discussing California to differentiate northern California and southern California using an imaginary dividing line approximately located along the Tehachapi mountain range in Kern County. Using this imaginary and arbitrary line, it was determined that 61 (72%) of the 85 California cities presently regiona-lized or under contract, were located in southern California in seven counties. The remaining 24 cities

(28%) were located in northern California in 18 counties.
Southern California has by far the smallest portion of
land and the most cities and highly concentrated popula-
tion. Los Angeles, San Diego, and Riverside Counties
alone have 47 (55%) of the 85 cities under contract.
One possible reason for the high concentration in
southern California is that unification of police
services is very dependant on close proximity and con-
tiguous boundaries of the unifying jurisdictions.

The overall conclusions from the research done for
this project concerning the past history of regionaliza-
tion/consolidation can be stated as follows:

1. The major advantages of regionalization/
   consolidation are claimed to be an increase
   in effectiveness and efficiency, savings
   by utilizing economies of scale, and better
   overall delivery of police services.

2. The obstacles that hamper regionalization/
   consolidation/ are primarily political and
   social issues involving maintaining local
   control of law enforcement services.

3. Sound empirical data supporting the
   arguments for the benefits of region-
   alization/consolidation seem to weak,
   especially financial ones.

4. The largest push for regionalization/
   consolidation and the major arguments
   against such unification of law en-
   forcement services seem to have taken
   place a decade or more in the past.

5. There does not appear to be a major trend
   toward regionalization/consolidation at
   the present time. In California, the
   unification of services has remained
   stable over the past 10 years.

FUTURES RESEARCH

Upon completing the research of past and present
literature, this project then undertook a study to try
to predict those factors which could influence region-
alization/consolidation in the future. A time span
expanded to the year 2000 was used as a guideline in
working with the predictions. To try to gain understanding
of the dynamic factors that have a role in the region-
alization/consolidation issues, a group consisting of
both law enforcement and non-law enforcement members
was assembled by the author. The group members were
selected using the following criteria:

1. Familiarity with law enforcement and
   current law enforcement issues.

2. Familiarity with local government and
   current issues affecting local govern-
   ment operations.

3. Experience in the administrative or
   semi-professional field of work.

4. Familiarity with regionalization
   concepts or unification of police services.

There were eight persons selected to participate in the
idea generating group. The use of eight persons was
chosen following the guidelines set by Boucher (1986)
in which he suggests the optimal group consists of
between 6 and 10 persons.

The group consisted of the following individuals:

1. A retired Deputy Director of County Planning.

2. The administrative head of a regionalized public transit system.

3. An administrative head of a building inspection department.

4. A director of county finance.

5. A Police Lieutenant in charge of operations.

6. A Deputy Chief of Police.

7. An administrative supervisor of a county District Attorney's office.

8. A supervising county probation officer in charge of a multi-jurisdictional juvenile offender supervising office.

The group was given information obtained from the literary research and instructed to provide answers or generate ideas concerning the regionalization or unification of services.

Information was obtained using a nominal group technique (NGT). This technique involves idea generation of group members on an individual basis, recording of the ideas in a "Round Robin" fashion, then through priority selection by the group of a few main ideas. The goal of this process is to examine ideas, not to determine actuality or "truth".

Forecasting Trends

Using the NGT, the group identified 25 current trends they felt would or could influence regionalization/ consolidation. The 25 predicted trends identified were as follows:

1. Computer aided dispatch systems and the availability of high technology equipment will increase.

2. Available manpower (qualified personnel) will not keep pace with increased demands for service and work loads.

3. Urban sprawl will increase.

4. Demands for services will increase.

5. Population will increase without a corresponding increase in manpower resulting in a reduction in levels of service.

6. Funding will be reduced or fail to keep pace with needs for local government services.

7. The need for support services for small agencies will increase.

8. Private sector sources will provide services now provided by local government agencies.

9. Officers' training and skill development will not keep pace with increased demands for more highly skilled service providers.

10. Demand for specialization in skill areas will increase.

11. Federal funding will be reduced.

12. There will be loss of local identity and an increased demand for consolidated services.

13. The ethnic mix in the population will change.

14. The focus of prosecution will be toward major crimes.

15. Movement toward uniformity of testing and pre-employment requirements will increase.

16. There will be loss of "personalization" in policing. Police will not relate to citizens as much on a one to one basis.

17. Local government will increase debt financing.

18. Services will deteriorate due to fiscal reasons.

19. Centralization of criminal justice information will increase.

20. Civilianization of police services will increase.

21. Public transportation systems will decline.

22. The use of federal prosecution will increase.

23. In-house employee assistance programs, i.e., peer counseling type programs will increase.

24. The demand for officers who are skilled understanding different ethnic cultures will increase.

25. The early release of prisoners due to prison overcrowding will increase.

Through the continued process of using NGT, these

25 trends were refined. The group has identified five

major trends which they felt were most likely to be

factors involved in having an effect on regionalization/
consolidation. The five identified trends were:

1. There could be a general reduction of
   monies available to local agencies.

2. An increased demand for the delivery of
   services and a consequent deteriorization
   of available services due to population
   increases is likely to occur.

3. Significant advances in hi-technology
   equipment will occur.

4. There will be an increase in the use of
   civilians to perform those tasks not
   requiring sworn personnel.

5. Education and training of law enforcement
   personnel will not keep current with the
   progressive needs of the profession.

Using the collective projections of the individual
members of the group, the author evaluated by the group
the expected effect of the five trends to the year and
the maximum possible effect of each trend to 2000. The
relative level of each trend is given below. Each trend
has also been plotted graphically.

> Trend Evaluation Forms

> 5 Plot Graphs

Forecasting of Events

Following the forecasting of the trend and the
trend analysis, the group then forecasted possible events
which may affect the expected trends and which may have

TREND EVALUATION FORM

Subgroup: ___N=8___

TREND STATEMENT	LEVEL OF THE TREND (Ratio: Today = 100)			
	5 Years Ago	Today	"Will be" in 2000	"Could be" in 2000
Continuing trend that results in reduced funding for local agencies.	x̄=77	100	Range 125-200 x̄=154	Range 150-400 x̄=235
Increasing demand for the delivery of services and a consequent deteriorization of available services due to population increases.	x̄=66	100	Range 125-200 x̄=172	Range 175-400 x̄=263
Significant advances in high technology equipment.	x̄=52	100	Range 125- 10,000 x̄=1465	Range 150- 10,000 x̄=1606
Increase in the use of civilians to perform those tasks not requiring sworn peace officers	x̄=48	100	Range 120-300 x̄=152	Range 140-500 x̄=218
Education and training of law enforcement personnel not keeping current with the progressive needs of the profession.	x̄=56	100	Range 125-200 x̄=154	Range 100-400 x̄=209

35

CONTINUED TREND THAT RESULTS IN REDUCED
FUNDING FOR LOCAL AGENCIES

INCREASING DEMAND FOR THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES AND A
CONSEQUENT DETERIORIZATION OF AVAILABLE SERVICES
DUE TO POPULATION INCREASES

SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT

INCREASE IN THE USE OF CIVILIANS TO PERFORM
THOSE TASKS NOT REQUIRING SWORN PEACE OFFICERS

EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
NOT KEEPING CURRENT WITH THE PROGRESSIVE NEEDS OF THE PROFESSION

an effect on regionalization/consolidation rates. The

group again used the NGT to identify which events may

play a major role in regionalization/consolidation.

There were 21 possible events originally identified

by the group. These events were as follows:

1. Federally mandated accreditation of
    law enforcement officers.

2. Collapse of the U.S. monetary system.

3. Counties consolidation of circuit courts
    into one central system.

4. Major economic recession - depression.

5. Major physical disaster - earthquake.

6. Development of major industrial areas
    or sports complexes.

7. Major reform in taxation.

8. Major legislation limiting compensation
    and benefit packages.

9. County reduction of services to local
    agencies.

10. Increase in state sales tax.

11. Major political problem in Mexico.

12. Change in California's bond rating.

13. Legislation making regionalization/
     consolidation a more viable option.

14. Change in federal political power.

15. Federal or military involvement in law
     enforcement activities.

16. Drastic cut in costs of high-tech-
     nological equipment.

17. Loss of funding or change of benefit
    philosophy by welfare programs.

18. Resurgence of organized crime.

19. Major influx of aliens.

20. Increase in terrorist activity.

21. Drastic change in weather patterns.

Using the NGT process, again the group refined, redefined these 21 events, and five major events were identified as being the most likely events to affect regionalization/consolidation. The five major events are:

1. A major recession or depression in the
   nation's economy. This event is
   estimated to have a 42% probability of
   occurring by 2000.

2. A major disaster, natural such as earth-
   quake or man made such as nuclear disaster.
   The estimated probability of this event
   is 76% by the year 2000.

3. A major change in political power with
   a corresponding change in philosophy of
   dealing with criminal justice matters.
   Estimated probability of occurrance by
   2000 is 77%.

4. Collapse of the United States' monetary
   system. Estimated probability is 27%.

5. Development of major sports complexes
   or industrial development such as the
   Superconducting Supercollider. Estimated
   probability by the year 2000 is 58%.

These five events, their probability and net impact are presented in summary form in the event evaluation chart below.

Event Evaluation Chart

A cross impact evaluation was done on these events and
an effort made by the group to assess the effect that
the occurrance of an event may have on the probability
of other events. The cross impact evaluations are pre-
sented in the following chart:

Cross Impact Evaluation Chart

The author of this project believes that a few
comments should be made concerning the trend and event
forecasting process and results. The NGT process calls
for the soliciting of trends and events from group par-
ticipants without critical comment. Some of the trends
and events as presented in first round of recording
seem not to be related to the regionalization/consolida-
tion issue in any significant manner. The "round robin"
recording was specifically done to solicit ideas which
come from the group and which may have been of value in
examining the regionalization/consolidation issue.
After the trends and events were reviewed and narrowed
to five each, there was still some question in the
author's opinion as to the relevance of some of the
items as they pertain to regionalization/consolidation.
However, the identified trends and events are the pro-
duct of the group, obtained as specified using the NGT
and will be the basis for scenario development.

EVENT EVALUATION FORM

EVENT STATEMENT	PROBABILITY		NET IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCE-MENT
	By 1990 (0—100)	By 2000 (0—100)	(—10 to +10)
Major recession or depression in nation's economy	21%	42%	5.4
Major disaster, natural such as earthquake or man made such as nuclear disaster	52%	76%	3.3
Change in political power and corresponding change in philosophy in dealing with criminal justice matters	45%	77%	1.8
Collapse of United States' monetary system	7%	27%	4.6
Development of major sports complexes or industrial development such as the superconducting supercollider	36%	58%	5.5

CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION FORM

Suppose that this
event ——— with this probability ﹁
actually   occurred . . . . How would the probability of the events
shown below be affected?

		1	2	3	4	5
1	42%		0	86.4	79.3	97.9
2	76%	19.3		27.9	22.1	63.6
3	77%	51.4	5.7		42.1	51.4
4	27%	98.6	2.9	95		98.4
5	58%	30.7	7.1	30	27.1	

SCENARIO

In order to provide an adequate insight into the
future of regionalization/consolidation, three scenarios
are presented below. These scenarios are descriptions
of what future events may be and are not intended as
predictions of what actually will be. The scenarios
were developed using a combination of information ob-
tained in the literary research and futures research
using the idea generation group and NGT process.

Scenario "A"

The year is 1995. Recent trends have indicated
that there is a continuing increase in the use of
civilians to perform non-critical law enforcement jobs.
The delivery of services by the civilians has proven
to be at an acceptable level.

In recent elections, two small communities have
experienced a change in a majority of their five member
City Councils. The cities are located in the southern
region of the Imperial Valley. One city has a population
of 10,000, the other city has 8,500 residents. The
cities are in the same county and separated by 15 miles.

With the new Councils in power, there has been a
change in philosophy from an older more conservative
position to an innovative more liberal position. The

cities are looking into the possibility of developing a southern Imperial sports complex and are hoping to attract a major league basketball team to the area.

If the complex is successful, there will be continued rapid growth causing increased demands for services from the local law enforcement agencies. The two cities have decided they will unite their two police departments and also would like to form a special "police district" to service the two cities as well as the unincorporated area between the cities. The unincorporated area is where the complex is planned.

Scenario"B"

The year is 2000. In the past decade, there has been a major shift in priorities of the use of federal, state and local funding. The influx of aliens, unemployment and general nature of social welfare programs has resulted in cutbacks of funding for law enforcement, public works and capital improvement services. Local law enforcement agencies have not received increases in funding to permit keeping up with expenses. The education and training funds once available for full service training, are gone. State P.O.S.T. programs have limited reimbursement for funding of basic academies and occasional update training classes. The education,

training level and professional standards expected of police officers in the past have not kept pace with the needs for today's delivery of services.

In the central valley of the State of California, there has been an increase in the number of small cities (population under 7,000). The fiscal base of these cities, which was once agriculture, is now a combination of agriculture, light-to-moderate industry and commerce. In the central San Joaquin valley, there are six cities of similar size (5,000-7,500 population) located in a 25 mile radius. These six cities are also located in three counties.

Late last fall there was a major earthquake along the central valley's San Andreas Fault which caused heavy damage to one of the cities similar to the damage of the Coalinga, California, earthquake. Last winter another city experienced moderate damage along its northwestern border due to severe winter storms and consequent flooding. These naturally occuring, damaging events have severely affected the financial solvency of these cities. In one instance, the entire infrastructure must be replaced or repaired, in the other, the loss of a large commercial area has severely affected tax revenue.

The demands for law enforcement services have been tremendous for these two cities and they have needed to

call on the state and county for mutual aid several
times. The other four cities have been strained, too,
due to the increased demand for services associated
with growth problems.

There had been talk a year ago about moving toward
unifying law enforcement services among these cities,
and the concept was still being considered when the
disasters hit. There was strong opposition to making
"one big police department" due to local control issues,
yet financing each department is becoming more and more
difficult.

Scenario "C"

The year is 1990. There has been a steady decline
in funding to local governments from state and federal
subventions. The national economy is experiencing a
fairly substantial recession, the United States dollar
has begun to decline on the international market.

The stress of the changing economy is adversely
affecting small cities and the rural counties. Hardest
hit are the non-enterprise public services such as
recreation programs, fire protection services and law
enforcement services.

In the extreme northern counties of California,
the small cities and rural counties are very dependant
on agriculture and the lumber industries for fiscal

security. The recession has drastically reduced building and agricultural expansion. The import markets, too, have hurt both industries.

The two west coast northern counties and the adjoining counties to the east have met and decided to undertake a feasibility study to regionalize auxiliary services. There is talk of including joint recruitment and training to establish a manpower pool, joint purchasing for economies of scale, and creating a central records center available by access through hi-tech equipment. Communications and detention facilities are not being considered due to the distances involved.

Of these three scenarios, the author believes the most likely scenario or some version similar to Scenario "B" could occur. For the purposes of this project, Scenario "B" will be used to develop a strategic plan and transition management plan.

STRATEGIC PLAN

Situation

1. Current Environmental Analysis

In the central valley of the State of California, there are presently six cities considering some type of unification of their law enforcement services. The cities do not share contiguous boundaries but are located within a 25 mile radius. The six cities are located in three independant counties with contiguous boundaries.

The six cities share similar types of financial base. At one time, they were all supported by their nearby agricultural farms. The picture today has changed in that there has been a large influx of persons coming to the area to find relief from urban-metropolitan living. Along with the population increase, commercial development has increased and light to medium manu-facturing has increased. No longer are these six communities isolated rural agriculture dependant cities. They now have a financial base comprised of commercial, agricultural and industrial support.

As is typical of small communities, the cities are all general law cities governed by Mayor/Council legis-lative bodies and managed by city managers/city adminis-

trators. Also, typical, in these cities there is a strong identification of the "city fathers" and citizens in the communities with each of their respective cities and the individual uniqueness of each city.

One of the usual services that each city would be expected to defend as "their own" is their law enforcement service. The crime rates for these cities are relatively low compared to metropolitan standards and the small cities are perceived by a majority of their residents as "safe". Whether or not it is an accurate assumption, the credit for the communities being safe is given to the individual police departments and their respective Chiefs of Police.

There is also strong identification and association between the local citizens of each community and the members of the police departments. Both the local legislative bodies and the individual citizens believe there is a strong sense of "local control" over their police departments. The Chiefs are readily available to the citizens to discuss problems and/or receive complaints. The officers, for the most part, are residents in their own cities and spend the "off duty" time, leisure time, etc., in local activities. There is a feeling of cohesion between the police and the community.

The general picture of "all is well" where law
enforcement services are concerned is well deserved
in these small communities; however, the static <u>status</u>
<u>quo</u> of peacefulness has been challenged during the
past decade. There have been several threats to the
peaceful picture. The local funding for the law en-
forcement services has been threatened due to the trend
of federal and state monies being allocated more and
more toward social welfare programs, primary and secondary
education, and to programs oriented toward benefiting
protected classes of people, i.e., aliens, minorities,
etc. The funding once realized by law enforcement ser-
vices has not received increases comparable to inflation
rates or the needs of law enforcement as perceived by
law enforcement administrators.

As a consequence, education, training, and financial
support for law enforcement has not kept pace with the
needs as perceived by municipal governments. The need
for highly skilled officers trained in legal matters,
multi-cultural understanding and the ability to keep up
with technological changes has become acute. The ability
of small departments to meet that need has been and is
being challenged, and their ability to deliver services
effectively is threatened.

Added to these challenges and threats have been the
occurrences of recent events which adversely affected
some of the cities involved. A major earthquake and
flooding from an unusually wet winter have caused major
damage to infrastructures and abilities to provide non-
law enforcement services. Funds have had to be taken
from wherever possible to repair and rebuild. Law
enforcement funding has been further reduced at the
local level during the crisis.

Under consideration has been the unification of
law enforcement services. This change, too, has been a
threat. The local citizens realize that the effective
services they have enjoyed and the local control they
have had are threatened. They also realize that in order
to continue to receive effective law enforcement service
there must be some change in their ability to provide
for the services.

Not only are there threats, but opportunities as
well. Through unification there is an opportunity for
innovation, better financial support (possibly) and an
opportunity to strengthen the law enforcement services
delivered to the communities. Opportunities and threats
are both realities in the present environment. Much of
what happens will depend on how unification is approached,

what form it takes and if the idea can be presented to
the communities in such a way as to be acceptable. The
challenges presented by the environment are declining
financial support, increasing demands for professionalism,
local control issues, and the need to continue providing
safe communities.

2. Analysis of Current Resources

An analysis of current resources must be made to
clearly identify the strengths and weaknesses of the
agencies, persons (both law enforcement and non-law
enforcement) and finances involved in considering unifi-
cation of services.

In identifying the current resources for the cities
and police departments, one must consider the persons
involved, their ideas, their concerns and desires.
Within the police departments, there are no formal or-
ganizations or unions. As such, the major resources
there are the individual officers themselves. This
includes management and line personnel. Where the police
departments are concerned, the officers, while the only
source of internal information, provide the best source
of information as they are the ones involved in the
daily performance of the job.

Outside the police department, the main source of
information comes from other departments' personnel,

allowing a "big picture" perspective. These others,
especially the finance/purchasing and administrative
departments, see the police department not as the epi-
center of the cities, but as functioning arms of the
government. As well as seeing the police department in
its proper perspective, these branches of the city
government are a most valuable source of information
when it comes to future forecasting of the financial,
planning, or operational needs.

Finally, the members of the community, i.e.,
business, political, social, or service groups, etc.,
must be sought out for their input to insure that the
direction of the departments is consistent with the
desires of the communities they protect.

In order to analyze the current status of the
agencies involved, a capability analysis: Rating 1, was
prepared. This rating indicates the overall rated
capability for all agencies involved. Individual agen-
cies may vary from the joint rating on a given item but
the rating was prepared with the intent of gaining a
general picture of the agencies in the present environ-
ment. The Rating I analysis is presented in Appendix V.

In order to assess the departments' abilities to
change, a separate capability analysis: Rating 2, was

completed. The rating, as in Rating 1, is on all depart-
ments as a whole. If change is possible, there must be
flexibility and willingness to change. Rating 2 analysis
is presented in Appendix VI.

The ratings indicate that presently the departments
involved share a good image, have better than average
personnel (both management and line), have a good atti-
tude but low morale due to present problems, and have
average skills and flexibility. The departments suffer
from lack of technologies, specialization, poor pay and
benefits, and may be faced with a feeling of crisis
where growth, financing and training are concerned.
The departments' ability to change to meet specified
strategic needs is seen as good in the areas of increasing
professionalism and service delivery but poor in changing
local control. There is a perceived strong resistance
to the loss of or change in local control where the
community and citizens are concerned.

3. Stakeholders/Snaildarters

In evaluating this plan and doing the analysis of
the situation, one must carefully examine persons and
groups which can be considered as having an influence
and exerting some power on the issue. These persons
would be identified as those who have a "stake" in the

direction the issue goes and in the outcome of final
decision. Therefore, the name "stakeholders" is given
to these persons or groups. Another set of persons or
groups to be dealt with which is less influential and
less powerful but who could have either a positive or
negative effect on the issue has been named "snail-
darters". When identifying the stakeholders and snail-
darters, there are assumptions made as to what extent
each may support or oppose unification. The stakeholders
and the assumptions about their support/opposition to
regionalization/consolidation are as follows:

Stakeholders	Assumptions
Law Enforcement	
1. Police Chiefs	Mixed reactions
2. Police Supervisor	Cautious support
3. Police Officers	Mixed reaction
4. Police Associations	Opposition
Local Government	
1. Mayors and Elected Officials	Mixed reactions
2. City Managers	Cautious support
3. Fiscal Officers	Support
4. Other departments	Mixed reactions
5. County Board of Supervisors	Support
Courts	
1. Local	Support
2. State and Federal	Mixed reactions
Educational Institutions	
1. P.O.S.T.	Support
2. Private Providers (in-service)	Cautious Support
3. Public Providers (academies)	Mixed reactions
4. Local Public Schools/Districts	Oppose

Community Groups

1.	Home Owner's Associations	Oppose
2.	Service Clubs	Mixed reactions
3.	Political Activist Groups	Mixed reactions
4.	Residents	Mixed reactions to opposition

Within each groups of stakeholders identified, one could point out several other stakeholders of a minor nature. The identified stakeholders are grouped above for brevity. The following discussion is intended to provide some insight to the expectations of each group of stakeholders.

1. Law Enforcement

The Chief of Police is the primary stakeholder in this group. The Chiefs are usually long time members of the community and are considered powerful people. The Chief could lose a lot of political power if unification meant disbanding of his/her department. The Chief is assumed to want to protect his/her position and work to insure that police employees would be well cared for regardless of what type of unification occurred.

Police supervisors would maintain a somewhat more secure position and would more likely support unification than strongly oppose. They could expand their span of control and realize more opportunities.

.Police officers would vary in their support of unification. More opportunity would be accompanied by

more challenge and responsibility. Police associations
are assumed to oppose any change in that some unifica-
tions could lead to the dissolution of associations.

The law enforcement group would be a very important
group to content with if a change were to take place.

2. Local Government

Mayors and elected officials are assumed to vary
in support depending on their perceptions on maintaining
or losing local control.

City Managers and fiscal officers would be expected
to support a unification, expecting to realize some
fairly substantial fiscal relief from economies of scale.
The City Managers could also be faced with loss of local
control, however, and would have to deal with the issue
politically.

County boards of supervisors are assumed to support
a unification as it would not reduce their control and
could provide services for some county residents or
county law enforcement activities. The centralization
of courts and district attorneys services could reduce
expenses.

3. Courts

Courts are assumed to support unification because
it would probably centralize court services.

4. Educational Institutions

P.O.S.T. is assumed to support unification due to centralization of needs and services. Local school districts would be expected to oppose unification due to loss of local intimate contact with police services. In-service agencies and academies are assumed to support if they do not perceive a loss of opportunities to continue to be providers.

5. Community Group

These groups would be expected to have the second largest impact on the issue as stakeholders. Homeowners' associations and residents could strongly oppose unification if they felt there would be a loss of personal contact with their police. If unification meant "one big department" with most officers being unknown to the residents, it is assumed to be seen as a threat.

Service clubs are assumed to be mixed in support of unification. If there were close contact with police, they probably would oppose it. If there were not close contact, there could be some support as long as the clubs did not perceive unification as meaning loss of local control or anonomity.

Political activist groups are assumed also to be mixed in their support of unification. Conservative and traditional groups would probably oppose loss of

"their" police department. The more liberal groups may expect innovation and opportunity from change and thus support unification.

The snaildarters identified with the unification issue and assumptions about their positions are as follows:

Snaildarters	Assumptions
Law Enforcement	
1. Reserves/Volunteers	Oppose
2. Civilian Employees	Mixed reactions
Local Government	
1. Planning Boards/ Commissions	Weak support
2. County Administration	Support
3. Special Districts	Mixed reactions
4. Recreation Groups	Oppose
Community Groups	
1. Neighborhood Watch Groups	Oppose
2. Local Advisory Boards	Mixed
3. Taxpayer's Associations	Cautious support
4. Churches	Mixed
Media	
1. Local	Mixed
2. Regional	Cautious support

A plotting of stakeholders and snaildarters and the assumptions about their support are given in Appendix VII and VIII respectively. The plotting shows the relative importance of each identified stakeholder or snaildarter and the relative certainty of predicting their assumption.

The above situation fairly accurately describes
the environment in which this plan must be implemented.

Mission

The first goal of this plan is to examine the
mission of unification appropriate to law enforcement
agencies at the macrolevel, that is, the entire six-city
region. Second, the mission must be examined at the
microlevel, or, in light of what must be considered for
each city locally.

It is the mission of law enforcement to provide for
the protection of lives, and property of the citizens
and to provide a safe and healthy community in which to
live, work, attend school, and share recreational and
leisure activities. This protection is accomplished
through enforcement of local ordinances and state laws,
and by apprehending violators and assisting in their
prosecution in court. In addition to the above general
mission of law enforcement, the local departments are
afforded special opportunities for community activities
due to the size of the cities, the good working rela-
tionship with the city's people, and the relatively low
crime rates. The departments have become heavily in-
volved in providing public relations programs including
child safety programs, community safety programs, fire-
arms and hunter safety courses, etc. These programs

have become built into the departments' mission.

In addition to providing sound, economical and efficient law enforcement services, the departments must orient themselves to a dynamic, changing field of public safety. The reason this orientation becomes important is to prepare the police departments to cope with and adjust to the increasing pressure of a dynamic society. The departments must develop pro-active pro-grams for adequately facing possible future trends and changes. The departments should not allow themselves to be put into a position of reacting to pressure but take a public safety leadership role in dealing with the changes. Such a mission should be viewed as a necessary and positive role.

Where the possibility of unification exists, the mission of the departments will be to review the current resources, roles, programs and determine what exists now and what is needed. Obstacles that need to be overcome must be identified, priorities set, key ideas and deter-mined, possible solutions discussed, goals set, res-ponsibilities identified and assigned, and in general, a tentative "game plan" devised. Once this part of the mission is accomplished, the continued mission will be to monitor the "game plan" for changes and to continue to forecast future changes. The departments must con-

tinue to prepare themselves to deal effectively with the changing times and pressures.

In any unification plan, the special opportunities of these small cities, i.e., public safety programs, maintaining a low crime rate and close contact with local citizens must be a primary concern if the change is to be effectively executed.

Execution

1. Alternate Courses of Action

   A. The six cities and three counties that are geographically involved in the area under study could decide to create a special police district or region that would encompass the cities and unincorporated parts of the county lying within the given 25 mile radius. This alternative would be the creation of the "one big department". It would be necessary to create a governing body and realign the administration of law enforcement portions of the county within the district.

   B. The cities involved could disband their individual police departments and contract for full law enforcement ser-

vices from their respective counties.
Contracting would be a more traditional
approach to consolidation of services
and would have a large volume of research
and reference material available.

C. The six cities could decide to region-
    alize some of the services, usually
    referred to as auxiliary services and
    maintain their own individual departments
    to deliver "front line" or field services.
    Auxiliary services to be considered for
    regionalization could include recruitment,
    training, purchasing, record keeping and
    communications.

2. Recommended Course of Action

The first consideration to be given toward
unification of services in the case of the
six cities cited above would be whether or
not there is a practical value in savings,
delivery of services and political acceptance.
One need to consider carefully is that the
six cities do not share a contiguous boundary
as is usually the case in areas where unifica-
tion and consolidation are common. If a
unified effort is perceived as practical,

considering the geographic location of the
cities, the distance separating the cities
and the political implications of unifica-
tion, the recommended courses of action
would be alternate number three. This
recommended course of action is chosen because
it offers the best consistency between the
elements identified in the discussion of
the environment, the resources available
and in keeping with the overall mission of
providing local public safety. Alternate A,
the "one big department" concept, would
threaten police administration and reduce
local control. Alternate B would, in fact,
disband the small departments and drastically
reduce, if not eliminate, local control.
Local control is promised and worked toward
in contracting; however, any services de-
livered by the county would have to be pro-
vided within the scope and control of county
rules and regulations. These first alter-
natives are seen as possible but not practical
for the given circumstances.

To implement alternate number three, the following
steps must be taken:

1. Establishment of a governing body that will
   eventually have policy and direction/control
   of the regionalized services. This body
   must believe in and support the concept
   of regionalization. The governing body
   should include at least one member from each
   affected city.

2. Election of a spokesperson or leader of the
   body from within the members of the group.
   This individual should have the trust and
   confidence of other members of the group.

3. Appointment of an administrative or executive
   leader for the management and day to day
   operation of the regional agency. This
   individual would be responsible for staffing
   the necessary jobs within that agency.

4. Bringing both governing body and staff
   together, carefully outlining expectations
   of both, and defining the relationship of
   each to the other, including specifying
   powers granted to and limitations placed on
   each group. The method of functioning, of
   providing effective communication links and
   of establishing social-political relation-
   ships for both groups would be a very

important step in this process.

5. Establishment of advisory committees for each of the special auxiliary services to be provided by the regional agency. These committees would not have power or authority to dictate policy or control but would serve to provide recommended guidance and direction to staff and the governing board. These groups would be technical in nature and would have to have a working under-standing of their areas of advisory res-ponsibility.

6. The governing body and administrative staff would then review present status of the services to be regionalized, identifying what each department was presently doing in the respective areas. The future direction and needs of the regional agency would be established.

7. With a clear picture of needs of the region, the establishing of roles and power or spans of control and a solid analysis of resources available, a Joint Powers Agreement would be drawn up and entered into by all affected parties. The Joint Powers Agreement would

specify the rights and responsibilities

of control, function, fiscal support, etc.,

for each involved city.

8. Selection and training of operational staff

for the regional agency.

9. Selection and installation of capital supplies

necessary to carry out the regionalized

functions.

10. Training and briefing of the "consumers"

of the functions who will be using the

provided services.

11. Establishment of an implementation calendar

for the agency to become operational.

12. Provision of feedback system for all in-

volved cities to insure that complaints,

problems, and needed changes are dealt with

quickly and efficiently.

13. Throughout this entire process, a public

relations program through the media and

through various citizen contacts to work

at "selling" the regionalization of ser-

vices to the communities as a whole and to

the consumers.

Administrations and logistics

Support for implementating the recommended course

of action would primarily be needed from administrative

sources. The governing body and staff would have to

believe in and work toward "selling" the regionalized

concept to the intended users. To enlist their support,

Chiefs of Police and other police administrators would

have to be included in the planning and research phases

of the project in order for them to share "ownership"

of the regional agency.

Proper and effective administrative support is seen

as the key to success or failure of the project. The

support of the stakeholders who are not directly or

administratively involved in regionalizing of the ser-

vices would have to be won. The winning of their support

would be primarily an administrative responsibility.

The logistic support needed to carry out the re-

commended course of action appears to be fairly routine.

Each affected participating city would have to pay its

fair share based on use and need. The logistical support

where revenues are concerned can be assumed when a given

city enters into the Joint Powers Agreement. The Joint

Powers Agreement would specity what support is expected

from each participant.

One problem concerning logistics that would have to

be addressed is insuring economy. Economy is seen as

being a major factor for unifying auxiliary services.

The research cited above indicates that increased
economy from unification is often questionable. Support
for sound fiscal management is a must if unification is
to be a success.

Planning System

The author, in an attempt to determine which planning
system to utilize in dealing with the implementation of
alternative number three, analyzed the present environ-
ment for turbulance and visibility. A planning mode
chart was utilized to plot measures of these two variables,
and a planning system of "issue planning" was determined
the most appropriate system. Appendix IX shows the
planning mode chart. The issues to be addressed by
planning should be forecast to the best of the staff's
ability. The important feature of this type of planning
system would be the timely and accurate forecasting of
emerging issues. Special issues would be dealt with on
a demand-need basis, similar to a surprise/signal plan-
ning system.

Implementation

In order to implement the strategic plan, there
would have to be some decisions made as to the specific
value of the points which are negotiable and the points
which are not. Since the plan was developed by a governing
body, control of the plan should be kept by this body

and not given over to some outside participants.

The major points for implementation of this plan is to initiate the recommended course of action, which is alternative number three, to select an administrative head, and to form advisory groups to monitor futuristic trends, make predictions, and "assist" in planning. The selection of alternative number three should be followed; however, some negotiation could be had with advisory groups as to the scope of their involvement.

There are some points which should not be open to negotiation and a discussion of these points would emphasize their logic. The first point not negotiable is that of major control remaining with the governing body that developed the plan. The plan would have continuity and could best accomplish its intended purpose if controlled by the persons who developed the plan. If control were given to another authority, the direction and effectiveness of the plan might be jeopardized.

A second non-negotiable point would be tied very close to the first: the formal recognition of an appointed administrator. This individual should be associated with law enforcement administration to keep a practical, realistic orientation to regionalization

policies. It must also be an individual who can affect change where needed. No value would be had by having a director who could not affect needed change.

Other non-negotiable points (though not necessarily as important) would be as follows:

1. Certain members of the advisory groups would have to be persons familiar with the service provided for which they are advising. It should also be clearly specified that they were, in fact, members of an advisory group and not policy makers or directors.

2. Very specific training guidance and direction should be provided to the advisory groups. Accurate forecasting, planning and goal definition do not occur naturally but through a concentrated effort and through well directed training.

3. Finally, it should be a non-negotiable aspect that any feature of the plan be viewed as a guideline and not a rule. A plan should be flexible and should be amendable to fit a dynamic environment.

There are also some points on implementing the plan that would be negotiable. The definition of issues the

groups would deal with and the method of their function-

ing would be negotiable. The expertise of individual

members may also be considered in negotiations. Lay

people in law enforcement or persons with little pre-

vious exposure to law enforcement issues or political

processes may be seen as valuable group members.

One of the large stakeholders that would have to

be considered would be members of the police associations.

Initially, opposition would be expected from this group.

The Peace Officers Associations would be expected to see

the plan as a deviation from traditional policing. The

plan would be, in fact, a non-traditional approach. In

negotiating with this stakeholder, it is anticipated

that their agendas would deal primarily with new methods

or enforcement philosophies. These agendas could in-

clude a feeling that the administration may be giving

up control of the departments. The Peace Officers

Associations would be looking at their Memorandums of

Understanding, increased compensation for what they may

feel would be more work, more record keeping or docu-

mentation and a lessening of their traditional power.

It is expected that the police associations would not

negotiate on matters of span of control of the depart-

ments or administrators, and would not negotiate on

enforcement philosophies which vary from the traditional "way we used to do it".

The police associations can be expected to negotiate for a better deal with their Memorandums of Understanding or compensation plans, their influence, who may be suitable members of the advisory boards and for updated training programs.

Another important and powerful stakeholder to deal with would be the citizens of the community. This group is a vocal group that would probably be a front line group working with the governing body. In negotiating with this group, one could expect them to be sensitive to time lines, a "do it now" approach, a "we needed this a long time ago" approach, or a "we need more" attitude. They might be expected to try to negotiate for influence with the governing body, but they should not negotiate on whether or not they have representation on the advisory groups.

There is expected to be flexibility in this group where selection of a director is concerned, as to which parties might serve on the advisory groups and as to methods and amount of feedback which is received from other stakeholders. Their primary interest here would be insuring their own feedback mechanisms.

To negotiate the acceptance of this plan, a strategy would have to be developed for implementation which would hopefully foster the acceptance of the plan with as little changing as possible. To this end, it would be suggested that negotiations be started from a positive position of strength. The benefit to all involved would have to be clearly emphasized. The governing body would have to show the benefits and make sure to minimize any threat. The administration would have to enter negotiations knowing most of all the potential sources of conflict and prepared to resolve the differences.

Issues of conflict, as they arise, would have to be clarified to insure everyone is considering the same points. The costs of agreement to each party must be fully recognized and minimized or justified. By being fully aware of each of the parties' (stakeholders') agendas and through a process of active listening and accurate reflection, a win-win approach should be sought by all involved. Once there is a basic agreement as to the issues involved, differences resolved or at least negotiated to compromise, and a unity of purpose and direction established, the plan would be ready for implementation and the process begun.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PLAN

If a unification of auxiliary services were to take
place and the strategic plan implemented, the changes
involved would be both physical and emotional. There
would be a centralization of physical facilities for
records and communication, and centralization of per-
sonnel recruitment and training facilities. Emotionally,
many employees of the cities could be working for a new
employer - "the regional agency", or could be laid off
in a worst case situation. The transition from the
present state to the future state should be managed with
purposeful direction and planning. In order to accom-
plish the transition as easily as possible, the following
transition management plan would be suggested.

Planning - Strategy Development

Planning is the development of a process or a
"roadmap" to enhance the change from the present to
the future. In the case of the six cities which would
be undertaking the regionalization of their auxiliary
services, there would be certain critical events or
incidents that must occur to effect the change. Several
of these critical events are discussed in the strategic
plan under the recommended course of action. In addition
to those listed in the strategic plan, there would be

several events that must occur if the transition were
to be successfully smooth.   These additional events
would include the following:

    1.   Obtaining support from those most
        closely affected by the change.

    2.   Obtaining commitment from those involved
        in operations of the regional agency to
        make the change work.   Participants/workers
        must be shown how work loads would be
        equalized, possibly reduced by region-
        alization and how efficiency in time and
        money might be realized.

    3.   Changing the commitment of those who
        would resist or block the change to a
        commitment at least to let the change
        happen or even to help the change occur.
        These resistive parties would have to be
        assured that those aspects of the change
        perceived as threats could at least be
        low cost and at best be opportunities
        for gain.   This assurance would have to be
        well documented through careful study and
        presented as win-win compromises.

    4.   Gaining commitment of the consumers of
        the service.   Police administrators would

have to be shown the value of pooled

resources for recruitment and training.

Field officers would have to be assured

that the time for records and/or warrant

checks would be decreased and, more, that

a regionalized service would provide more

comprehensive checks than the present

state.

5.   Obtaining citizen commitment to the plan.

A positive media campaign, several com-

munity contacts through service clubs,

schools and councils/boards should be

arranged.

In addition to these critical conditions, an

explicit, but realistic time sequence for reaching

various milestones should be set. Progress should be

predictable and demonstrated. The planning strategy

should also be adaptable. Contingency plans should

be developed to deal with the unexpected obstacles or

enhancements that would always occur during a major

transition.

As part of managing transition, a clearly defined

governance plan would need to be specified. This need,

too, was discussed in the strategic plan. The transi-

tion state would be a unique state unlike the past or future ones requiring close attention and unique management. During the transition state, management of the regional day-to-day operations would have to occur and management of the transition itself would offer challenges. There could be no perceived weakness of the managers during this important time.

The governance plan, as suggested in alternate number three, specifies a policy-making board to establish policies, directions and allocations of resources. A manager, director, or chief executive officer would be responsible for day-to-day operations, staffing and control of resources. Advisory bodies made up of persons with technical and political strengths would help direct the regional agency as far as the individual auxiliary services are concerned. There would have to be a specified hierarchy which clearly defines roles and expectations of those involved. Power struggles during the transition phase would be seen as weakness and could very well damage the chances for the success of the regional agency.

Provisions for obtaining commitment and loyalty of "natural" leaders would be a must. The influence of this informal group would be very powerful. Natural

leaders should be identified as early as possible and
where possible given tasks, duties or responsibilities
that can influence the positive directions of the
regional agency. Natural leaders should be closely
monitored for the commitment and loyalty to the region-
alization success. If they become disenchanted or frus-
trated, their natural leadership can be a large obstacle
to success. Contingency plans for dealing with the
disenchanted natural leader should be developed.

Provisions would also have to be made for dealing
with the trusted colleagues and confidents of the
regional agency's manager. These individuals, too,
would have high organizational influence and this in-
fluence could be used to help the agency through its
transition phase, or - conversely - could hurt it.

Another very important part of the planning or
strategy development phase of the transition management
plan would be the development of a commitment plan. It
has been mentioned above that commitment of specific
individuals or groups would be necessary for success.
The commitment plan is a strategy devised to obtain
support of key individuals or groups that have been
identified as critical to the success of the region.
These individuals are referred to as the critical mass.

The critical mass for the success of regionalization of auxiliary services for the six cities would be identified as follows:

1. Police Chiefs

2. Mayors - Council members

3. City Managers

4. Police officers

5. Homeowners' groups

6. County administrators

7. Media - local editors

8. Employee groups

An evaluation of the readiness and capability of each of these individuals or groups to support the change to regionalization of auxiliary services is presented in the readiness/capability chart, Appendix X. Once the readiness/capability of each is determined, their present commitment to the change and the desired commitment of each would have to be evaluated. A commitment planning chart of the present to desired commitment for each is given in Appendix XI.

To achieve the change from the present level of commitment to the desired level of commitment, there are certain action approaches that can be used. The following approaches would be recommended to change the commitment level of each member of the critical mass.

1. Police Chiefs. To raise their level of commitment from "help change" to "make change happen", a combination approach would use educational activities (awareness raising) and would explain their very important function as role models.

2. Mayors/Council Members. No change is needed. However, an action approach would consist of a monitoring - feedback system to pick up any warning signs of loss of commitment.

3. City Managers. Change level of commitment from "help happen" to "make happen" by changing rewards. Point out potential savings, expected success and possibility of additional available resources if the regional agency is success. City Managers should be sold on "ownership" of regionalization - especially the successes of the program.

4. Police Officers. It would be important to change their commitment from "blocking change" to "help change happen". An action plan of educational activities and problem-finding activities (awareness

raising activities) could well be used
to move the police officers away from
their traditional methods toward the
regionalized concept.

5. Homeowners' Groups. Change level of
commitment to "help happen" from "let
happen" by an approach using educational
activities.

6. County Administrators. Change the level
of these three individuals' commitment
from "let happen" to "help happen" by
emphasizing their functions as role models.

7. Media. These individuals would best be
moved from a level of commitment of "let
change happen" to "help change happen" by
an action plan of educational activities,
problem-finding activities, and a specific
action plan of inclusion. The media
should experience no surprises and no
secrets.

8. Employee Groups. These groups could be
the hardest to deal with. These groups
have traditionally stood for employees'
rights and maintaining the status quo
unless there are liberal benefits to

accompany change. An approach to dealing
with these groups might be forced colla-
boration. Hopefully, the action approach
could be moved toward problem-finding and
educational activities. These groups
should be led from a "block change"
commitment toward a "let change happen"
commitment.

Implementation

Once the planning and strategy of the above plans
were understood, the "getting started" could begin.
The work with the critical mass, the obtaining of the
necessary commitments, educational activities, and
treating of hurting systems should be started as soon
as practical. The support of the critical mass would
be paramount for success. Trust would become a primary
issue. The management of commitment, participation
and involvement and the exchange of information and
open communications would be critical from the beginning
of the program.

Continuous monitoring would be vital to success,
also. Periodic monitoring of levels of commitment,
assumptions about the regionalization of auxiliary
services, perceptions about progress and/or perceived
problems and a monitoring of unexpected events or

changes should be a primary concern. Any monitoring, evaluating or feedback plan should be fed with reliable data that would be dependable and trusted.

As with any plan, one should be prepared to adapt to reality. This transition plan does not exist in isolation to an ongoing "real world". Success of the regionalization of auxiliary services would be more assured by following no plan than by following a plan rigidly without flexibility.

CONCLUSION

From the information obtained in the literary re-
search, one can readily see that both the arguments in
in favor of regionalization/consolidation and the ar-
guments against regionalization/consolidation have con-
vincing points of merit. The prospects of unification
of law enforcement services is an issue that is certainly
politically charged and an issue that involves emotion.

The benefits of unification which are claimed to be
increased efficiency and economy in the delivery of law
enforcement services were not substantially documented
in the literature reviewed. The problem areas that must
be dealt with are primarily political and social issues.
Fear of loss of local control and the strong feelings of
"ownership" by citizens of their police forces is chal-
lenged by unifying with other jurisdictions.

Research has shown that in California during the
past decade, there has been no significant trend toward
regionalization/consolidation/unification.

If there is a threat toward regionalization/consoli-
dation, the unification of auxiliary services such as
recruitment, training, communications, custody, pur-
chasing, etc., seems most likely. This author would not
predict any significant or major regionalization of
general law enforcement services by the year 2000.

REFERENCES

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
     (1963). Performing of Urban Functions: Local
     and Areawide. pp. 9-23.

Bolas, S. M. (1981, November). "Consolidation: To
     What Extent?" Police Chief. pp. 64-66.

Carson, D. G., Brown, D. K. (1970, October). "Law
     Enforcement Consolidation for Greater Efficiency."
     FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. pp. 11-15.

Eastman, G. D., Chapman, S. G. (1976). Short of Merger:
     Countywide Police Resource Pooling. Lexington,
     Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

Francis, W. J. (1981, May). "Consolidation Alternatives:
     Coordination, Cooperation and Sharing." FBI Law
     Enforcement Bulletin. pp. 9-11.

Green, P. D., Beatie, P. M. (1981). Regionalized
     Consolidation of Law Enforcment Services.
     Unpublished Manuscript.

Harty, H. P., Valente, C. F. (1983). Alternative
     Delivery Approaches Involving Increased Use of
     the Private Sector. Municipal Year Book (pp. 199-
     217). Washington, D.C.: International City
     Management Association.

Higgins, J. P., Klump, L. A. (1977). Select Police
     Service Coordination Project. Unpublished
     Manuscript.

Horgan, W. P. (1980). "A Look at Local Control and
     Efforts Toward Consolidation of Police Services."
     Journal of Police Science and Administration, 8,
     1-4.

International City Management Association (1973). One
     Police Department for Five Cities. Newsletter of
     Successful Projects Funded by L.E.A.A., 2.

Kennedy, J. P., Adams, G. B., Vito, G. F. (1982).
     "Consolidation of Police Services: An Opportunity
     for Innovation." Journal of Police Science and
     administration, 10, 466-472.

Marcus, M., Edgan, J. E., Wheaton, R. J., Hicox, R. C.
     (1976). Police Consolidation - A Selected
     Bibliography. Washington, D.C.: National
     Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
     p. 5.

Morgan, J. D. (1969). Feasibility Study of Consolidated
     Police Services for the Cities of Campbell and
     Saratoga. Unpublished Manuscript.

National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
     Justice (1976) Recent Criminal Justice Unification,
     Consolidation, and Coordination Efforts. (Visiting
     Fellowship Aware No. 75-NI-99-1016). Washington,
     D.C.: Department of Justice.

Norten, J. J., Cowart, G. G. (1978, February). "Municipal
     Police Consolidation: Boon or Boondoggie?: Police
     Chief. pp. 24-26.

Ostrom, E. (1976). Police Consolidation and Economies
     of Scale: Do They Go Together? (Workshop in
     Political Theory and Policy Analysis), Indiana
     University. p. 5.

Ostrom, E., Parks, R. B. (1973). The Urbanization of
     the Suburbs. Urban Affairs Annual Review, 7,
     367-399.

Ostrom, E., Parks, R. B., Whitaker, G. P. (1973,
     September/October). "Do We Really Want to Consolidate
     Urban Police Forces? A Reappraisal of Some Old
     Assertions." Public Administration Review.
     pp. 423-432.

Ostrom, E., Parks, R. B., Whitaker, G. P. (1977).
     Policing Metropolitan America. Washington, D.C.:
     National Science Foundation.

Ostrom, E., Whitaker, G. (1973). "Does Local Control
     of Police Make a Difference? Some Preliminary
     Findings." American Journal of Political Science,
     17, 48-76.

Pachon, H. P., Loverich, N. P. (1977). "Consolidation
     of Urban Public Services: A Focus on the Police."
     Public Administration Review. pp. 38-47.

Parsonson, R. T. (1973, August). "The Regional Trend in
     Law Enforcement." Police Chief. pp. 26-28.

Peace Officer Standards and Training (1976). Juris-
    dictional Consolidation of Police Services: Legal
    Aspects. State of California. pp. 3-5.

Peace Officer Standards and Training (1982). Symposium
    on Professional Issues in Law Enforcement. State
    of California.

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
    tion of Justice (1967). Task Force Report: The
    Police. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
    Office.

Public Administration Service (1966). Coordination and
    Consolidation of Police Services: Problems and
    Potentials. Chicago. pp. 9-17.

Shyrock, J. R. (1971, August). "Regionalization of
    Police Services." Police Chief. pp. 8.

Wickum, T. G. (1986). California City Police Departments -
    A Dying Tradition. Unpublished Manuscript.

APPENDIX I

California cities contracting for law enforcement services,
regionalized or consolidated.

CITY	DATE OF CONSOLIDATION OR CONTRACT
Alameda County Sheriff's Office	
Dublin	July 1, 1982
Amador County Sheriff's Office	
Plymouth	December 1, 1985
Butte County Sheriff's Office	
Biggs	January 1, 1982
Contra Costa Sheriff's Office	
Danville	July 1, 1983
San Ramon	July 1, 1984
Fresno County Sheriff's Office	
Parlier	July 1, 1984
San Joaquin	July, 1978
Humboldt County Sheriff's Office	
Blue Lake	July 1, 1975
Imperial County Sheriff's Office	
Calipatria	April 15, 1983
Kern County Sheriff's Office	
Wasco	July 1, 1981
Kings County Sheriff's Office	
Avenal	December 1, 1979
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office	
Agoura Hills	December, 1982
Artesia	May, 1959
Avalon	September, 1962
Avenal	November 1, 1979
Bell	October 1, 1974
Bellflower	September, 1957
Bradbury Estates	July, 1957
Carson	February, 1968
Cerritos	April, 1956
Commerce	January, 1960

CITY	DATE OF CONSOLIDATION OR CONTRACT
Duarte	August, 1957
Hawaiian Gardens	April, 1964
Hidden Hills	October, 1961
Industry	June, 1957
LaCanada-Flintridge	December, 1976
La Habra Heights	December, 1978
Lakewood	April, 1954
La Mirada	March, 1960
Lancaster	November, 1977
La Puente	August, 1956
Lawndale	December, 1959
Lomita	June, 1964
Lynwood	May, 1977
Norwalk	August, 1957
Palmdale	August, 1962
Paramount	January, 1957
Pico Rivera	January, 1958
Rancho Palos Verdes	September, 1973
Rolling Hills	January, 1957
Rolling Hills Estates	September, 1957
Rosemead	August, 1959
San Dimas	August, 1960
Santa Fe Springs	May, 1957
South El Monte	July, 1958
Temple City	May, 1960
Walnut	January, 1959
West Hollywood	November, 1984
Westlake Village	December, 1981

Napa County Sheriff's Office
  Yountville   June 24, 1975

Orange County Sheriff's Office
  Brea   October 1, 1970
  San Juan Capistrano   1961
  Villa Park   1962

Placer County Sheriff's Office
  Loomis   July 1, 1985

Plumas County Sheriff's Office
  Portola   July 1, 1970

| | DATE OF CONSOLIDATION |
CITY	OR CONTRACT
Riverside County Sheriff's Office	
Indian Wells	July 1, 1968
Lake Elsinore	July 1, 1968
La Quinta	July 1, 1983.
Norco	July 1, 1965
Palm Desert	July 1, 1974
Rancho Mirage	July 1, 1974
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Office	
Big Bear City	July, 1978
Grand Terrace City	July, 1978
Rancho Cucamonga	July, 1978
San Diego County Sheriff's Office	
Del Mar	July, 1959
Lemon Grove	July 1, 1978
Powar	December, 1981
San Marcos	1966
Santee	December, 1980
Vista	July 1, 1963
San Mateo County Sheriff's Office	
Portola Valley	July, 1964
Woodside	November, 1956
Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Office	
Solvang	July, 1985
Santa Clara County Sheiff's Office	
Cupertino	1966
Los Altos Hills	20 years +
Monte Sereno	20 years +
Saratoga	20 years +
Sierra County Sheriff's Office	
Loyalton	June 7, 1972
Siskiyou County Sheriff's Office	
Montague	July 1, 1983
Sutter County Sheriff's Office	
Live Oak	January 1, 1980
Tehama County Sheriff's Office	
Tehama	October, 1978

	DATE OF CONSOLIDATION OR CONTRACT
CITY	

Ventura County·Sheriff's Office

| Carmarillo	July, 1964
Moorpark	July, 1984
Ojai	January 2, 1980
Thousand Oaks	July, 1965

APPENDIX II

CALIFORNIA CITIES CONTRACTING OR CONSOLIDATING LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES

YEAR OF CONTRACT

YEAR OF CONTRACT

CALIFORNIA CITIES UNIFYING OR CONTRACTING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES SINCE 1980

CALIFORNIA POLICE DEPARTMENTS
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL BY CATEGORY
1975 and 1985

1975 — Size of Department

	1000+	500-999	400-499	300-399	200-299	100-199	75-99	50-74	25-49	1-24
No. of Dept.	3	4	0	2	14	37	20	46	67	157
% of Total	(<)1%	1%	0%	(<)1%	4%	11%	6%	13%	19%	45%

1985 — Size of Department

	1000+	500-999	400-499	300-399	200-299	100-199	75-99	50-74	25-49	1-24
No. of Dept.	5	5	1	8	21	48	41	47	85	95
% of Total	1%	1%	(<)1%	2%	6%	13%	12%	13%	24%	27%

N=356

%=100

Source: Employment Data for
California Law
Enforcement
California Commission
on P.O.S.T.
1975 and 1985

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING $\mathcal{I}$

Instructions

Evaluate for each item, as appropriate, on the basis of the following criteria:

I   Superior. Better than anyone else. Beyond present need.
II   Better than average. Suitable performance. No problems.
III   Average. Acceptable. Equal to competition. Not good, not bad.
IV   Problems here. Not as good as it should be. Deteriorating. Must be improved.
V   Real cause for concern. Situation bad. Crisis. Must take action to improve.

Category	I	II	III	IV	V
manpower		X			
technology				X	
equipment			X		
facility			X		
money					X
calls for service		X			
supplies			X		
management skills		X			
P.O. skills			X		
supervisory skills		X			
training					X
attitudes		X			
image	X				
Council support		X			
C.M. support		X			
growth potential					X
specialties				X	
mgmt. flexibility			X		
sworn/non-sworn ratio	X				
pay scale				X	
benefits			X		
turnover				X	
community support		X			
complaints rec'd	X				
enforcement index		X			
traffic index		X			
sick leave rates			X		
morale				X	

Financial Support

STRATEGIC NEED AREA   Innovative Financing

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING 2

Instructions

Evaluate Each Item   as to what type of activity it
encourages:

I	Custodial	- Rejects Change
II	Production	- Adapts to Minor Changes
III	Marketing	- Seeks Familiar Change
IV	Strategic	- Seeks Related Change
V	Flexible	- Seeks Novel Change

Category

TOP MANAGERS:	I	II	III	IV	V
Mentality Personality			X		
Skills/Talents				X	
Knowledge/Education				X	
ORGANIZATION CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms		X			
Rewards/Incentives			X		
Power Structure	X				
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure		X			
Resources				X	
Middle Management			X		
Line Personnel	X				

STRATEGIC NEED AREA
Provide Safe Communities
Service Delivery

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING 2

Instructions

Evaluate Each Item   as to what type of activity it
encourages:

I   Custodial   - Rejects Change
II   Production - Adapts to Minor Changes
III Marketing   - Seeks Familiar Change
IV   Strategic   - Seeks Related Change
V   Flexible   - Seeks Novel Change

Category

TOP MANAGERS:	I	II	III	IV	V
Mentality Personality					X
Skills/Talents				X	
Knowledge/Education					X
ORGANIZATION CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms				X	
Rewards/Incentives				X	
Power Structure		X			
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure			X		
Resources		X			
Middle Management				X	
Line Personnel					X

STRATEGIC NEED AREA Change in Local Control

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING 2

Instructions

Evaluate Each Item   as to what type of activity it
encourages:

I	Custodial	– Rejects Change
II	Production	– Adapts to Minor Changes
III	Marketing	– Seeks Familiar Change
IV	Strategic	– Seeks Related Change
V	Flexible	– Seeks Novel Change

Category

	I	II	III	IV	V
TOP MANAGERS:					
Mentality Personality	X				
Skills/Talents		X			
Knowledge/Education				X	
ORGANIZATION CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms	X				
Rewards/Incentives			X		
Power Structure	X				
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure		X			
Resources			X		
Middle Management	X				
Line Personnel	X				
COMMUNITY/CITIZENS:					
Attitudes/Beliefs			X		
Financial Climate		X			
Power Structure	X				
Perceived Benefits		X			

STRATEGIC NEED AREA <u>Increased Professionalism</u>

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS: RATING 2

Instructions

Evaluate Each Item   as to what type of activity it encourages:

I   Custodial - Rejects Change
II   Production - Adapts to Minor Changes
III   Marketing - Seeks Familiar Change
IV   Strategic - Seeks Related Change
V   Flexible   - Seeks Novel Change

Category

TOP MANAGERS:	I	II	III	IV	V
Mentality Personality					X
Skills/Talents				X	
Knowledge/Education				X	
ORGANIZATION CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms			X		
Rewards/Incentives				X	
Power Structure			X		
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure			X		
Resources		X			
Middle Management				X	
Line Personnel			X		

APPENDIX VII

STAKEHOLDERS

Certainty

*Police Chief

                                    *Police Assoc.

                                      *Local Court

                              *Local Public Schools

                                      *P.O.S.T.

                                  *Police Officers

                    *Police Supervisors

            *Fiscal Officer

               *Home Owners Assoc.

                                Other Departments*

           *City Managers   *County Board of Superviss

Most   Least

Important   Important

                *Mayors/Elected Officials

     *State and Federal Court

                                    *Private Providers

     *Residents   *Service Clubs

                              *Political Activist Groups

Uncertainty

APPENDIX VIII

SNAILDARTERS

Certainty

*Civilian Employees   *Reserve/Volunteers
                              *Neighborhood Watch

*County Administrator

                              *Planning Boards

Most   Least
Important   Important

    *Taxpayers' Associations

                                    *Special District

                                      *Recreation Groups

*Local Media   *Local Advisor Boards

                                        *Regional Media

                                    *Churches

Uncertainty

APPENDIX IX

PLANNING MODE CHART

```
V
I
S     1-   | Operation
I          | Management
B          |
I          |                          Periodic
L          |                          Planning
I     2-   |
T          |
Y          |_____
           |
      3-   |              *
           |
           | Issue
           | Planning
           |                 _____
      4-   |                 Signal/Surprise
           |                 Planning
           |
           |
           |
      5-   |_____
               |        |        |        |        |
               1        2        3        4        5

                         TURBULANCE
```

Turbulance	Visibility of Future
1. No changes	1. Recurring
2. Few Changes	2. Forecastable
3. Change on Regular Basis	3. Predictable
4. Many Changes	4. Partially Predictable
5. Constant Change	5. Unpredictable

Operation Management: Planning for routine ongoing operations

Issue Planning: Planning for specific issues important
for services of the strategic plan

Periodic Planning: Planning for operations or issues should
take place on an intermittant basis

Signal/Surprise Planning: Planning is reactive - in response to
"surprise" issues - may be considered
sometimes as crisis planning.

COMMITMENT PLANNING

X WHERE DOES "CRITICAL MASS" (INDIVIDUALLY) STAND
   NOW REGARDING THE CHANGE?

*DESIRED COMMITMENT FROM INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF
   CRITICAL MASS

TYPE OF COMMITMENT

Actors in Critical Mass	Block Change	Let Change Happen	Help Change Happen	Make Change Happen
Police Chiefs			X	*
Mayors/Council Members				x*
City Managers			X	*
Police Officers	X		*	
Home Owners Groups		X	*	
County Administrators		X	*	
Media-Local Editors		X	*	
Employee Groups	X	*		