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Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices

This publication was prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS/DSS/ITA).

Comments and queries are welcomed and may be directed to the Chief of DS/DSS/ITA on 202–663–0786.

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Andrew Corsun
Editor

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United States Department of State
Assistant Secretary of State
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February 1994

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DS/DSS/ITA) is inaugurating a new analytical publication, *Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices*. The purpose of the publication is to identify and assess significant security concerns including terrorist tactics, techniques, and innovations, as well as suggesting possible countermeasures useful to potential victims. *Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices* complements DS/DSS/ITA's annual chronology *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans* and will be published on an unscheduled basis as information worthy of dissemination becomes available.

This issue focuses on two of the most violent indigenous Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups in Western Europe—Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Turkish group Devrimci-Sol (Revolutionary Left). Other articles deal with the potential use of surface-to-air missiles by terrorists, increased Middle East terrorist activity in Eastern Europe, and lessons learned from evacuations of U.S. diplomatic missions in sub-Saharan Africa.

I believe the insights this report offers will provide better awareness and understanding of security and terrorist-related issues.

Anthony C. E. Quainton

Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Introduction

Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices is a compendium of security issues and events that have or could impact U.S. interests overseas. Some articles include lessons learned that may help avoid similar events.

The first article analyzes the assassination of Germany's "senior industrialist," Alfred Herrhausen, by Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF). Although Herrhausen traveled in an armored car with a lead and follow car, the author describes how the RAF, through meticulous planning, was able to defeat a $200,000 armored Mercedes using a simple—though ingenious—"Radio Shack" type photoelectric cell device.

Turkey's Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left) is currently the most active and violent European Fighting Communist Organization (FCO). After briefly looking at the historical roots of leftwing terrorism in Turkey, the article focuses on the assassination of two Americans and the attempted assassination of a third by Dev-Sol. Also featured is a 21–page security program developed as a countermeasure during the resurgence of anti-American terrorist activity in Turkey. The security guidelines are designed to assist the reader in preparing his or her own security package based on local requirements, threat levels, and resources.

As Middle Eastern terrorism has steadily decreased in Western Europe, there has been an increase—albeit small—in Middle East terrorist activity in Eastern Europe. The third article looks at the reasons for the increase and also synopsizes the December 1991 attack on Soviet Jews at Ferihegy Airport in Budapest, Hungary.

The scope of the fourth article deals with the proliferation of manportable, surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS) and the potential threat they pose to civil aircraft. Since MANPADS are relatively small, easily concealable, and mobile, insurgent groups, narcocriminals, and terrorists are increasingly attempting to acquire them.

An outgrowth of the post Cold War era is the increase in ethnic and nationalist strife. To ensure the safety of official Americans and private U.S. citizens who may get caught up in civil disorder, the U.S. Department of State has established guidelines and procedures for the evacuation of U.S. Government personnel and private American citizens. Using case studies of the civil unrest in Liberia, Zaire, and Somalia, the last article describes the circumstances and mechanisms for implementing the drawdown and evacuation of Americans.

RAF Assassination of Alfred Herrhausen

"On 30 November 1989, our 'Wolfgang Beer Commando' executed the head of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen. We blew up his armored Mercedes with the help of a shape-charged mine that we made ourselves."

—RAF Communique, dated December 2, 1989

Background

By Dennis Pluchinsky

The Red Army Faction (RAF) has been West Germany's most dangerous leftist terrorist group since its inception in the early 1970s. In recent years, the RAF has demonstrated the tendency to carry out a major assassination and then go underground for periods up to 14 months. For example, attacks by the RAF commando level have taken place in February 1985, August 1985, July 1986, October 1986, and September 1988. Prior to the assassination of Alfred Herrhausen, the RAF had been inactive for 14 months.

In the months preceding the RAF's attack on Herrhausen, there was no specific intelligence to indicate that he had been directly targeted by the RAF. Generally speaking, Herrhausen was one of many prominent West German personalities who were considered to be logical and attractive targets for the RAF. While there were no specific indicators that the RAF was entering an attack mode, there were several general developments that suggested a heightened state of alert. Firstly, imprisoned members of the RAF had engaged in a hunger strike from February to May. The RAF commando level would generally carry out some type of action during a hunger strike. This time, they did nothing. The hunger strike failed to achieve its objectives and was terminated. Secondly, in early November, one of the imprisoned RAF architects of the hunger strike sent a letter to the "outside" (read: commando level). In it, he relinquishes the "initiative" to the outside. Some people have interpreted this as the final blessing for an RAF attack.

The Target

It is a mistake to perceive Alfred Herrhausen as just a bank chairman. He was the Chairman of the Deutsche Bank, the largest

bank of the third largest economic power in the world, and larger than any U.S. bank. However, Herrhausen's influence extended beyond the Deutsche Bank. He has been called Germany's "senior industrialist" and the "most influential economic strategist in Germany." A personal friend and economic advisor to Helmut Kohl, the Chancellor of West Germany, Herrhausen played a central role in pushing the Deutsche Bank and West German business toward Eastern Europe. He also engineered the merger between Daimler-Benz and MBB into the biggest arms manufacturing complex in West Germany. From the RAF's perspective, he had become a key figure in the "military-industrial complex." His role in expanding Deutsche Bank into Eastern Europe and his involvement in the Daimler-Benz merger made him an ideal symbolic target for the RAF.

One U.S. chief executive officer has stated that the "impact of his assassination is no less than that of a European head of state." Herrhausen's murder was significant enough to make the cover of *Der Spiegel*, a West German news magazine similar in style and influence to *Newsweek* or *Time*. The West German government has offered a $2.2 million reward for information leading to the capture of his assassins. Herrhausen was 59 years old.

The Attack

Herrhausen lived in a quiet, exclusive residential area in Bad Homburg, a suburb of Frankfurt. On November 30, he left his home at around 8:30 a.m. in a three-car motorcade and was travelling down a narrow, tree-lined road that went through a park (see schematic 1). He usually left his home at about the same time each morning and took the same route to work. Due to a school crossing and bus stop on this road, cars have to reduce their speed (to about 30–35 mph) as they drive through the area.

As Herrhausen's lead security car approached the attack site, it may have noticed on the left side of the road a man in a jogging uniform wearing what appeared to be a Sony Walkman-like device over his ears. This is not unusual since there is a nearby jogging path. As the lead car passed by the attack site, it may have seen a child's bike leaning against one of the white roadside posts that run along both sides of the street. A small package was sitting on



Schematic 1

the bike's back rack, just above the wheel. This is unusual since the roadside posts were designed to keep vehicles and bicycles from parking on the sidewalk.

What they did not notice, however, was a small photoelectric device that was attached to one of the white roadside posts on the right side of the road, about 6 feet after the child's bicycle. Directly across from this device on the other side of the road was another post which had a square, red, plastic reflector—similar to what one would find on a bike—attached to it.

What they also did not see was another man dressed in a jogging suit with earphones crouching down in a bush, just around the corner from the attack site. This man had a small electronic device, just a little bigger than a transistor radio.

The lead security car would pass by the child's bicycle, continue up the street and make a right onto Kaiser-Frederich Promenade. Alfred Herrhausen's armored vehicle, with Herrhausen sitting in the back right seat, was approximately 200 meters behind. However, as his car passed the bike, at 8:34 a.m., the bike exploded and some 22 pounds of TNT propelled schrapnel through the right rear door, forcing a piece of the armored door into Herrhausen, pushing him across the back seat into the left door. The force of the explosion, which took place 3 feet away from the right rear door of Herrhausen's vehicle, threw the 2.8 ton armored vehicle across the street, approximately 82½ feet. The explosion was heard some 500 yards away, at a nearby grade school where, reportly, Herrhausen's daughter, Anna, was having a social science class.

The bomb critically injured Herrhausen and he subsequently bled to death, but his driver was only slightly injured. None of the security personnel in the lead and follow cars were injured.



Herrhausen's 2.8 ton armored vehicle. The attacks site is to the left and beyond the vehicle.

RAF Assassination of Alfred Herrhausen

Frankfurt, FRG • November 30, 1989



Schematic 2

When police arrived at the attack scene, they followed the detonating wire that led from the bomb along a footpath and around the corner to a clump of bushes. In the bushes they found a small makeshift electronic device that consisted of six 4.5 volt batteries attached to a voltmeter and an on/off rocker switch. Beneath this device, they found a single sheet of paper placed within a plastic cover. On the paper was a drawing of a five-point star with a machinegun superimposed over it—the logo of the German terrorist group, the Red Army Faction. Underneath this logo were the words: "Kommando Wolfgang Beer." Wolfgang Beer was an RAF terrorist killed in a car accident in July 1980.

According to a police reconstruction of the RAF attack on Herrhausen, the RAF used a photoelectonic cell to project an infrared beam across the street onto a reflector that reflected the beam back to the infrared device. This device was connected to the explosives which were placed on the back of the bicycle. Another wire ran from the bike and infrared device along the sidewalk and around the corner to where a terrorist hid and waited. He had the device that activated the infrared beam.

Another terrorist, who was dressed in a jogging outfit with ear-phones, acted as a lookout on the street the Herrhausen motorcade was passing along to alert the terrorist in the bushes when the motorcade was passing the bomb. A third, woman terrorist was situated on the corner of a small side street, just beyond the attack site.

Initially the infrared beam was not on (see schematic 2). When Herrhausen's motorcade approached the attack site, the lookout waited for the lead car to pass by the bike, then radioed to the terrorist in the bushes who quickly activated the beam. Herrhausen's vehicle broke the beam which triggered the electronic detonator in the bomb. The front of Herrhausen's car broke the beam at the precise moment the back right seat, where Herrhausen was sitting, was directly across from the bomb. The force of the explosion was aimed at where Herrhausen was sitting. The bomb was placed on a child's bike to match the height of the back right door of the armored vehicle. To develop this attack, the terrorists had to compute the speed of the car, the length of the car, and the height of the back right door.

View shows Seedammveg and side street where woman terrorist was standing. The attack site is at the end of street on the left.





View from where terrorist lookout was standing. The attack site is on right, across from the car shown on the street,

There also appears to have been a terrorist vehicle parked facing the wrong direction on a side street (Weinbergsweg) about 100 yards from where the bomb was planted. This was probably the escape vehicle for the terrorist lookout and the terrorist with the triggering device. A second terrorist vehicle was situated on the corner of Seedammweg and Kaiser-Frederick Promenade. After Herrhausen's lead security car had turned this corner, the second terrorist vehicle moved up and blocked the road leading to the attack site. This effectively isolated the attack site from any unwanted vehicular traffic.

About 6 weeks before the attack, in mid-October, several RAF members apparently posed as construction workers near the site of the attack. They chiselled a groove into the sidewalk and placed the detonating wire in it. They then covered the wire with asphalt similar in color to the sidewalk. The wire was then placed along some bushes and shrubs and covered over with some brush.

View from attack site, looking right towards Kaiser-Frederick Promenade.

RAF Claim

On December 5, German news agencies received a communique from the RAF claiming responsibility for the assassination of Herrhausen, "We blew up his armored Mercedes with the help of a shape-charged mine that we made ourselves." The communique states why the RAF selected Herrhausen: ". . . head of this power center of German industry; he was the most powerful economic chief in Europe," and the Deutsche Bank "It has thrown its net over all of Western Europe and heads the fascist capital structure against which everyone has to make his way." The RAF criticized the Deutsche Bank's expansion plans in Eastern Europe: "For years it has been preparing for breaking into the East European countries; now it and others are lying in wait to subject people there, too, to the dictates and the logic of capitalist exploitation." The RAF also makes some cryptic references to the disintegration of the Marxist regimes in Eastern Europe and the ideological problems this presents for revolutionary groups:

> ***"We all, the entire revolutionary movement in Western Europe are facing a new stage.***
>
> ***"The completely changed international situation and all the new developments here require the further development of the entire revolutionary process."***
>
> ***"A new stage, this means for us also, above all, the new composition of the revolutionary movement . . . ."***

Lessons Learned

The RAF is the only terrorist group in Western Europe that has carried out a majority of its attacks against "protected" personalities. The RAF has carried out 10 attacks against prominent personalities. Six of these targets had protection, either bodyguards, an armored vehicle, or security escort vehicles. Three of the targets were travelling in fully armored vehicles. Three of the targets also were being transported in a three-car security motorcade. It is highly unusual for a terrorist group to consistently target protected personalities. The first security lesson on the RAF is that protective security measures do not significantly deter the RAF from attacking their target. Herrhausen was travelling in

a fully armored Mercedes with lead and follow escort vehicles. Most groups, after having initially observed these security measures, would have shifted their attention to a secondary target. The RAF, however, continued their surveillance on Herrhausen until they detected a protective security flaw. In this particular case, it may have been the fact that Herrhausen's motorcade passed through a park-like area.

It is true that Herrhausen had the habit of leaving his home at about the same time every morning, that his motorcade had no real route alternatives, and that he habitually sat in the back right seat of his car. These are security mistakes that certainly facillitated the RAF's operational plans. However, it was the motorcade's route through the park-like area that convinced the RAF to attempt an operation on Herrhausen. The common thread in many of the RAF's operations against protected personalites is that the motorcade routes of the targets passed through an area that offered the RAF three advantages: concealment for the attackers, concealment or camouflage for the explosive device or weapon (in the case of the attack on General Kroesen), and a quick escape route to a major highway. I would speculate that the most significant factor the RAF looks for in determining whether or not to plan an operation against a potential target is the topography along the target's route, rather than the security habits of the target.

Consider the topography of the Herrhausen attack site:

— It contained two features that caused vehicles to slow-down: a school crossing sign and a pedestrian crosswalk.

— No parking was allowed on the street, so there were no other vehicles to obstruct the explosion.

— The street was narrow and this shortened the distance between the explosive device and Herrhausen's vehicle.

— There was a bus stop, swimming pool, parking garage, and jogging path at or near the attack site. This made surveillance less conspicuous.

— Trees and bushes along the street concealed the detonating wire.

— The attack site was close to Herrhausen's home. The closer the attack site is to the victim's home, the less route alternatives the motorcade has to select from.

— In this particular attack, it was crucial that the terrorists on the scene where able to communicate with each other. The two terrorists were reportedly wearing Sony Walkman-like headsets. Given the jogging paths nearby, this did not attract attention.

Just as the RAF considers topography a key element when deciding whether or not to attack a potential target, protective security details also should consider this as an important element when designing their security package. If Herrhausen's detail had performed route analysis, they would surely have tagged Seedammwegstrasse (where the RAF hit Herrhausen) as a potential attack site. An advance car could then have inspected this area before the motorcade left Herrhausen's house. Having noticed the child's bike leaning against one of the traffic posts with a package on the back rack, it is possible that the advance car would have stopped and inspected the area more closely. Depending on when (how long before the motorcade left Herrhausen's home) the RAF had set up the infrared device and made the wire connections to the bike, the advance car could have detected the explosive device.

Given the consistency of the RAF's tactics against protected personalities, one must question the viability of using a lead car in the motorcade, as opposed to deploying this vehicle as an advance car. The RAF's attacks against General Alexander Haig in Belgium in 1979, General Frederick Kroesen in Heidelberg in 1981, Dr. Karl-Heinz Beckurts in Munich in 1986, and Alfred Herrhausen in 1989, demonstrate that the group has developed a tactical skill to construct operational plans that negate the value of lead and follow cars. These cars do not deter the RAF from attacking a target, nor do they present operational obstacles to the RAF.

The attack on Herrhausen once again emphasizes the importance of route analysis and of deploying an advance car to proceed the principal's motorcade.

Dev-Sol Attacks on Americans

"The goal of our organization, the Revolutionary Left, is as before: to strike at imperialism and its collaborators and to intensify the struggle."

—Dursun Karatas, leader of Dev-Sol

By Andrew Corsun

The Evolution of Dev-Sol

Since 1970, there have been eight significant Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups (a.k.a. Fighting Communist Organizations (FCOs)) operating in Western Europe.[1] However, from 1985 to 1987, European security forces were able to neutralize FCOs in Italy, France, Belgium, and Portugal. Today, only four FCOs remain: Spain's First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), Greece's 17 November, Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF), and the Turkish group Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left or Dev-Sol), which is the most prominent of the Turkish FCOs. [Author's note: the Turkish acronym for group names will be used throughout this paper.]

With GRAPO reduced to an irritant for the Spanish Government, and the RAF in April 1992 indicating its willingness to give up the "armed struggle" under certain conditions, 17 November and Dev-Sol are left as the two most active FCOs operating in Western Europe.[2] As the more prominent and lethal of the two groups, Dev-Sol is the only FCO to maintain a significant support structure outside its primary targeted country.

This article is dedicated to those public officials who lost their lives in the battle against Dev-Sol.

[1]The eight FCOs are: the Communist Combattant Cells (CCC), Action Directe, Red Army Faction, 17 November, Dev-Sol, Red Brigades, Popular Forces 12 April (FP–25), and the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO).

An FCO is generally a small lethal urban terrorist organization that is guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology. The ultimate objective of European FCOs is to overthrow the democratic government in their country of origin and replace it with a vaguely defined "proletarian dictatorship." Although no FCO has to date accomplished this goal, a number of FCOs still pose major political and security problems for their respective governments as well as U.S. diplomatic, military, and commercial interests in those countries.

[2]In communiques dated April, July, and August 1992, the RAF "commando" level initiated a temporary cease-fire with the German government. In essence, the RAF has "surrendered." They admit that their armed struggle in

(Continued)

Special thanks to the U.S. Air Force, Office of Special Investigations, Investigative Operations Center, Major Crimes Investigations.



Turkish leftwing terrorist groups evolved from the radical student protest movement in Europe and the United States during the late 1960s. U.S. "imperialism" in Vietnam, nuclear weapons, the Palestinian issue, and support for a number of third world "revolutionary struggles" are just some of the issues that the disaffected left in Western Europe and the United States rallied around. This "disaffection" eventually resulted in a rise in leftwing terrorism that was to plague parts of Europe for the next 20 years.

During the 1970s, the most important of the indigenous leftwing terrorist groups in Turkey was a derivative of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C) called Devrimci Yol (Revolutionary Way) or Dev-Yol.

The Dev-Yol leadership, in an effort to gain grass roots support and attract new members while remaining clandestine, set up an extensive organizational structure similar to the Communist partizans in Italy and Yugoslavia during World War II. This organizational structure also was used very effectively by the Tupamaros of Uruguay and Italy's Red Brigades.

Germany has failed. It appears that the RAF is only the second FCO to have voluntarily given up on the armed struggle, FP–25 was the other.

On June 27, 1993, members of the German GSG–9 antiterrorism unit attempted to arrest RAF commando level members Birgit Hogefeld and Wolgang Grams at Bad Kleinen railroad station in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Hogefeld was arrested but Grams and one GSG–9 member were killed in the incident. It is believed that the RAF will retaliate (most likely against a representative of the German security services) for what occurred at Bad Kleinen. However, as of this report, it is not known whether the RAF will reconsider its willingness to give up the "armed struggle."

Dev-Sol Attacks on Americans



Essentially, Dev-Yol established a central committee leadership responsible for formulating and directing the group's ideology and strategy. Leaders were attached to the central committee and responsible for regional, provincial, and local activities that included penetrating and recruiting from schools, elementary to university level, and the professional sector (i.e., civil servants, labor unions, etc.). By 1977, Dev-Yol had become the best organized—especially in schools—and largest terrorist organization in Turkey.

As happens to many mass terrorist organizations, Dev-Yol soon fell victim to internecine personality and ideological conflicts. The debates pitted the regional committee leaders in Istanbul against the central committee in Ankara. The Istanbul faction criticized the central committee for its "pacifist policies" and claimed they failed to serve the interests of the "Turkish Marxist struggle."

The Istanbul faction also felt that the organization was losing its "revolutionary momentum" by concentrating its attacks on rightist groups, known in Turkey as "idealists." In order to tilt the balance of power to their side, there had to be more armed attacks against the representatives of oligarchy and imperialism, which included the United States. The Dev-Yol central committee dismissed this view outright and refused to carry out anti-U.S. attacks. In June of 1978, the Dev-Yol central committee in Ankara decided to get rid of the Istanbul faction of Dev-Yol. They hoped to accomplish this by renaming the organization Tum (whole) Devrimci Yol and setting up cells in Ankara, Trabzon, and other cities in Turkey.



In an effort to counter Tum Devrimci Sol, members of the Istanbul faction met in a tent set up in the garden of Istanbul University amidst a protest strike that lasted several days. The Istanbul leadership (among whom was Pasha Guven), inspired in part by Latin American terrorist groups, changed their name to Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left) or Dev-Sol and in August 1978, split from the organization.[3]

Dev-Sol's leadership consisted of Bulent Uluer as head of the central committee, Abdullah Aksakal as general secretary, and Edip Eranic as finance officer. The group's board members were Celalettin Can and Emin Ovat, and the general manager for operations in Turkey was Dursun Karatas—the future leader of Dev-Sol.

A majority of Dev-Yol members and supporters agreed with the Istanbul faction and defected en masse. Complete regional and city cells joined Dev-Sol so that they soon had an effective countrywide organization. This mass defection was summed up by an alleged repentant Dev-Sol militant, whose comments appeared in the June 11, 1991, edition of the English-language newspaper *Turkish Daily News:*

"Organizations like the Eylem Birligi (Action Group) or Acilciler (Swift Ones) lacked any serious political background and were involved even in petty theft. Only the Marxist-Leninist Armed

[3]On July 11, 1991, Pasha Guven, who was one of the three founding members of Dev-Sol, was assassinated in Paris. Guven, who left the organization in 1986, had been the target of an earlier assassination attempt on May 5, 1988, when two gunmen entered his apartment and shot and wounded him and his wife. It is believed that Guven was killed because he allegedly stole money that was due to Dev-Sol from drug smuggling and money-laundering operations. Guven was shot at point-blank range in the back of the head with a 7.65mm handgun—trademarks of a Dev-Sol assassination.

Dev-Sol Attacks on Americans



Propaganda Unit (MLSPB) in Istanbul was attractive for the youth but almost impossible to reach for it gave great importance to secrecy. Just at that time something happened which many believed would fill the gap. Dev-Yol's Istanbul faction split with a bang. Just like that . . . until then, there were indications of unease at the top levels of the organization as well as among the grassroots but no one really believed that a whole network of the organization could walk out with only one step."

A representational flow chart of the Dev-Sol organization circa 1989–92. It is unknown how the group will be structured following the outcome of the schism.



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Fevzi IŞIK
M. Murat SÖZERI

The listed signatories (Imzalar) are hardcore members of Dev-Sol which appeared in a two-volume Dev-Sol manfesto written circa 1989 entitled *Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz (We are Right — We will Win).* The highlighted names are Dev-Sol central committee members. Two central committee members not listed are Haydar Basbag and Celalettin Can. The 1,159-page underground manifesto provides insight into Dev-Sol ideology and the organization's views on the contemporary political, social, and economic conditions in Turkey. It also offers a defense of Dev-Sol's "armed propaganda" and includes a death list with 845 names. Dev-Sol leader Dursun Karatas is identified as the editor, but it is clear that several individuals contributed to the final product.

Dev-Sol Attacks on Americans

Between May 1978 and the military intervention on September 12, 1980, Dev-Sol was responsible for some 298 killings, 28 robberies, and 396 incidents of armed assault.

Growing civil strife and political violence, coupled with the government's inability to deal with the myriad of economic, social, and political problems besetting the country, reached such a point that on September 12, 1980, the military, for the third time in 20 years, assumed control of the country.

In the 2 years leading up to the September 1980 military intervention, political violence between the leftist and rightist extremist groups claimed some 5,000 lives and caused over 14,000 injuries. Leftist terrorist groups such as Dev-Sol accounted for 30 percent of the political violence during this period. While factional fighting between the left and right caused more deaths than indigenous terrorism during the late 1970s, it was leftwing terrorist groups such as Dev-Sol that were responsible for initiating attacks against "representatives" of the Turkish state—judges, politicians, and journalists—and Americans. During 1979 and 1980, nine Americans were killed by leftwing terrorist groups (see **Lethal Attacks Against Americans in Turkey by Indigenous Terrorist Groups**).

Unlike the military interventions of May 1960 and March 1971, the September 1980 takeover was expected, bloodless, and generally accepted by the Turkish public. Its aim was the eradication of terrorism, creation of a new constitution, and political reforms to prepare Turkey for a return to civilian rule.

The 1980–83 period of military intervention in Turkey might be referred to as the "time of troubles" for Dev-Sol and other leftwing terrorist organizations. Since Dev-Sol was the largest of the Turkish leftwing terrorist groups, it suffered the most under military intervention. Many leftwing terrorists were arrested, went underground, or fled abroad. According to the Turkish Government publication *12 September in Turkey: Before and After*, political murders dropped by 82 percent in the first 8 months of military intervention. From September 12, 1980, to February 3, 1983, some 43,140 terrorist suspects were arrested. Of those arrested, 21,864 were leftists, 5,953 were rightists, and 2,034 were separatists. The political affiliation of 13,289 others was unknown.

Lethal Attacks Against Americans* in Turkey by Indigenous Terrorist Groups

April 12, 1979—Izmir:
U.S. Air Force Master Sergeant Edward Claypool and Staff Sergeant Geoffrey Vail were shot and killed by two unidentified gunmen while walking home. The MLSPB claimed credit.

May 11, 1979—Istanbul:
Two MLSPB gunmen strafed the Atakoy Hotel, a hotel formerly used as a transient facility for U.S. military personnel. Private First Class Thomas D. Mosley was killed and another soldier was injured.

June 2, 1979—Adana:
The THKP-C claimed credit for killing Dwight Goodman, an American teacher managing a private English-language school.

December 14, 1979—Istanbul:
The MLSPB claimed credit for killing one U.S. military serviceman and three Department of Defense contractors. The men were shot after being ordered off a U.S. Army minibus that had stopped near their home.

April 16, 1980—Istanbul:
The MLPSB claimed credit for killing U.S. Navy Petty Officer Sam Novello and a Turkish friend, Sabri Baytar, a former Turkish Navy Chief Engineer. The men were killed by two gunmen as they were about to enter Novello's pickup truck.

November 15, 1980—Adana:
Gunmen opened fire on two U.S. Air Force servicemen as they were backing out of their driveway. The driver, Sergeant William Herrington, was killed and the passenger, Senior Airman Jay M. Perry, was able to escape. The MSLPB claimed credit for the attack.

February 7, 1991—Adana:
Dev-Sol claimed credit for assassinating VBR employee Bobbie Mozelle.

March 22, 1991—Istanbul:
Dev-Sol claimed credit for assassinating VBR employee John Gandy.

*** August 19, 1991—Istanbul:**
Andrew Blake, the British Manager of Commercial Union Insurance, was shot and killed by a gunman as he was entering the lobby elevator at his place of work. Dev-Sol claimed credit for the attack. To this day, there remains some doubt as to whether Dev-Sol knew that Andrew Blake was British or thought he was American.

In spite of these figures, only 68 percent of those incarcerated served at least 1 year in prison (95 percent served less than 10 years). Secondly, 56 percent of the terrorists arrested were between the ages of 15 and 16, and 29 percent were between the ages of 25 and 35. These factors contributed to the rise in urban terrorism that Turkey would experience a few years later.

In November 1983, the center/right Motherland party won a majority of parliamentary seats and Turgut Ozal became Prime Minister in the first civilian election since the military takeover of September 1980. Following the return to democracy and the easing of security controls—such as the lifting of martial law in 1984 in some cities and provinces (it ended officially on

July 19, 1987) and the State of Emergency in 1985—leftist terrorist groups such as Dev-Sol infiltrated major urban centers to reorganize and intensify their recruitment efforts. (The State of Emergency was reinstituted in southeast Turkey in July 1987 and is still in effect in 10 provinces.)



The Resurgence of Dev-Sol

During the first 6 years of civilian rule, Dev-Sol reconstituted itself following the reverses inflicted by military intervention. Dev-Sol's new lease on life was illustrated by the movement's sponsorship of violent and nonviolent student demonstrations and boycotts, passive resistance and propaganda (i.e., distributing illegal pamphlets and hanging banners), robberies, extortion, and four types of bombing attacks (including banner bombs that are unique to Turkish terrorist groups).[4]

"Dev-Sol has more than 10,000 followers and militants in both the cities and countryside and who are involved in trade union circles as well as in the armed struggle."

—Ahmet Erkan, Dev-Sol European spokesman

[4]Banner bombs are simple but effective explosive devices that were first used by the Vietcong guerrillas early in the war in Vietnam. Turkish terrorist groups have used them successfully in maiming and killing a number of Turkish police officers and others who have opposed them. The explosive charge in a banner bomb is either concealed within the pole or standard that is connected to the banner, or placed in a package attached to the banner. The charge is detonated by an antidisturbance device. (One type of antidisturbance device used by Dev-Sol supporters utilized a plastic syringe with a movable ball bearing to close the electrical circuit.) Other types of Dev-Sol bombings include: off-hour bombings primarily designed to cause property damage; bombings conducted by armed teams (believed to be the precursor to assassination teams) who enter a building, hold the occupants hostage, and place the bomb where it would severely damage an office; and, demolition attacks against police stations and prisons under construction, using hostages to move the explosive into place.



The group's resurgence was aided by its ability to rebuild and reactivate the countrywide infrastructure it took over from Dev-Yol, and by prison escapes of Dev-Sol leaders and working level militants. The more notable prison breaks included the escapes of Dev-Sol leader Dursun Karatas and central committee member Bedri Yagan from Sagmacilar Prison (October 1989), Dev-Sol central committee members Mursel Goleli and Mehmet Sinan Kukul from Bayrampasha Prison (January 1990), and most recently, the escape of 12 PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and 6 Dev-Sol prisoners from Nevsehir Prison (February 1993). It has been reported that 7,900 men have escaped from Turkish prisons over the last 15 years. Prison officials have complained that under the dormitory system (rather than the cell system in the United States and Europe) the prisoners "run the prisons."

Beginning in 1990, Dev-Sol embarked on a campaign of "armed propaganda" against the Turkish state.[5] From January 1990 to July 11, 1991, Dev-Sol "punished"—their term for killed—Turkish security personnel who they believed were involved in the "torture and murder of revolutionaries" leading up to the September 1980 military takeover. (On July 11, 1991, police raided eight Dev-Sol safehouses in Istanbul, resulting in the death of 12 Dev-Sol members. Following the July raids, attacks on police were primarily in response to raids on its safehouses.)

[5]Today, the vast majority of Turkish leftwing terrorist groups consist of a limited number of members and, due to lack of resources, are limited to carrying out periodic low-level bombings and robberies. A relatively small number of groups—primarily Dev-Sol and its supporters—have been responsible for most of the recent leftwing urban violence in Turkey.

Dev-Sol Attacks on Americans



Seventy-eight percent of all Turkish policemen killed by Dev-Sol in this first phase had worked in sections dealing with terrorism. Six of the retired and active military/jandarma officers were killed because of their "activities during the September 1980 military coup," or for "their treatment of the local population in southeast Turkey." The one exception was the assassination of retired Turkish General Memduh Uluturk on April 7, 1991. Uluturk was killed for his "actions during the 1971 military takeover" 20 years earlier!

It was not until the advent of a "trigger event" such as Operation Desert Storm (January 17–February 28, 1991), that Dev-Sol expanded its targeting by carrying out a wave of bombings that included U.S.-affilated interests.[6] It now appears that the group concentrates its attacks against U.S. or foreign interests in response to a major "trigger event" (i.e., Desert Storm, the visit of Secretary of State Baker and President Bush to Turkey, President Ozal's visit to the United States) and in response to raids on its safehouses.

Among the anti-U.S. attacks carried out by Dev-Sol in response to Operation Desert Storm and the visit of Turkish President Turgut

[6]From January 1990 to the advent of "Operation Desert Storm," Dev-Sol carried out 10 assassinations and 1 attempted assassination of official Turkish personnel. The targets included five active or retired police officers, one retired military and Jandarma officer, one former intelligence officer, one public prosecutor, a doctor who had worked in a prison in 1977 and allegedly covered up the death of a terrorist by torture, and a real estate speculator because "he had taken the land from the people and cooperated with the police." The attempted assassination was against a retired military officer.

Dev-Sol Lethal Attacks*
1990 – 1993



* The 51 lethal attacks against Turkish security, military, and government personnel resulted in 73 deaths.

** December 26, 1990—Istanbul: Real estate speculator Fezail Bulak was killed by Dev-Sol for taking land from the people and cooperating with the police.

Legend



Ozal to the United States was the assassination of two U.S. Department of Defense contractors employed by Vinnel, Brown, and Root (VBR), and the attempted assassination of a U.S. Air Force officer. Following are case studies of those attacks.[7]

"We are calling in the name of Dev-Sol Armed Revolutionary Units. We have punished a CIA agent in Adana, Turkey. The bases cannot be used for U.S. imperialism—Turkish and Kurdish people are not the servants of American imperialism. . . . We will not be the tools of the bloody games of the United States."

Assassination of VBR Employee Bobbie Mozelle

On February 7, 1991, Bobbie Eugene Mozelle, a Customs Specialist with Vinnel, Brown, and Root at Incirlik Air Base in Adana, became the first American killed by terrorists during operation "Desert Storm," and the first terrorist-related American death in Turkey in 12 years.

At approximately 7:15 a.m., Bobbie Mozelle exited his house carrying a coffee cup in one hand and an attache case and gas mask in the other. He walked to his car, a green 1963 Mercedes, that he always parked in front of his apartment building.

When he approached the passenger side of his vehicle, he placed the attache case and gas mask on the ground, and with the coffee cup still in his left hand, he proceeded to unlock the car door. At that point, a man in his mid-to-late 20s approached Mozelle from the rear of his vehicle and shot him five times with a 7.65mm handgun.

Crime scene evidence indicates that the gunman fired the first three shots from a distance of 5–7 feet, and moved in closer for the last two shots. Given Mozelle's size, (6 feet tall and well over 300 pounds), the last two shots fired at close range were most likely the coup de grace. At the same time, a second gunman commandeered a taxi that happened to be passing by the attack

[7]Vinnel, Brown, and Root (VBR) is an American support services contractor for U.S. and NATO facilities in Turkey.

The crime scene photo of the assassination of Bobbie Mozelle.

site. The terrorist pulled the taxi driver out of the taxi and attempted to put the car in reverse. When he failed to do so, both gunmen fled the area on foot.

Shortly before noon on the day of the attack, anonymous calls to various local newspapers claimed the attack in the name of Dev-Sol and the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLSPB). The caller for the MLSPB stated that "We punished a CIA agent . . . Turkish lands are not an American base . . . . We want them [United States forces] to leave immediately." According to the Dev-Sol caller, "We are calling in the name of Dev-Sol Armed Revolutionary Units. We have punished a CIA agent in Adana, Turkey. The bases cannot be used for U.S. imperialism. Turkish and Kurdish people are not the servants of American imperialism . . . . We will not be the tools of the bloody games of the United States."

Assassination of Bobbie Mozelle

Adana, Turkey • February 7, 1991



On June 17, 1991, Turkish police raided a Dev-Sol safehouse in Adana, and arrested four individuals. Among those arrested were Ali Sahin and Adnan Temiz.[8] Ali Sahin admitted to shooting Mozelle and Adana Regional Jandarma Commander Brigadier General Temel Cingoz on May 23, 1991. (Cingoz was fatally shot when his car was ambushed by three gunmen while en route to work. His driver and an aide/bodyguard were wounded in the attack. Cingoz, the former Brigadier Commander of Sirnak Province in southeast Turkey died of his wounds 4 days later.) Among the weapons found in the safehouse was the 7.65mm pistol which ballistic tests matched to the Mozelle and Cingoz murders.

Tactically, the early morning hours present the best opportunities for a terrorist group to attack. At that time of the day there is little pedestrian or vehicular traffic. Additionally, the potential target lacks alertness and situational awareness. At this time of the day, the assassins are reasonably certain of two key elements—the location of the target and his next move.

This principle was not lost on Dev-Sol. Of the 51 lethal attacks—which resulted in 73 deaths—carried out by Dev-Sol against retired and active Turkish police, military, and government officials from January 1990 to December 1993, 23 were carried out in the morning hours while the victim was at or near his residence or en route to work.[9]

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[8]On June 10, 1992, Adnan Temiz was found bound and stabbed to death in front of a toilet in the Malatya State Security Prison. Temiz, who was convicted for his involvement in the assassination of Mozelle and Cingoz, allegedly provided police with information that resulted in the uncovering of other Dev-Sol safehouses in Adana. A note found near Temiz's body read, "Death is the end for police informers. Dev-Sol."

On May 16, 1993, Ali Sahin and two other Dev-Sol terrorists arrested in the June 1991 safehouse raid (Serdar Demirel and Gulser Sarigul), were found guilty in a Malatya State Security Court for the April 7, 1991, murder of Bobbie Mozelle. Sahin and Demirel received life imprisonment for their direct involvement in the murder. Sarigul received 12½ years imprisonment for being an accomplice. Adnan Temiz was the second accomplice (see above).

[9]Of the 17 attempted assassinations of retired and active Turkish police, military, and government personnel during the cited period, 10 occurred while the victim was at or near his residence or en route to work.

Excluding those blind indiscriminate attacks (i.e., strafing police cars, shooting police in tea houses) by Dev-Sol against the police in response to significant raids on its safehouses that began in July 1991, the percentage of attacks carried out at or near the victim's residence or while en route to work dramatically increases to 72 percent.

Almost all the Dev-Sol assassinations were carried out on weekdays when the targets' movements were more predictable. The weekday morning pattern changed when a story in the Turkish press highlighting Dev-Sol's penchant for weekday attacks. Thereafter, Dev-Sol carried out its first lethal weekend attack when it assassinated retired Turkish Army General Memduh Unluturk on Sunday, April 7, 1991. Prior to the assassination of Unluturk, only one of Dev-Sol's previous 19 violent attacks had taken place on a weekend. On Sunday, August 26, 1990, Dev-Sol gunmen attempted to assassinate Adnan Ozbey, a retired army major who had served at Metris Military Prison during the September 1980 military takeover.

"We have punished one more senior imperialist officer . . . . We will carry on until imperialism gets its hands off the region."

—Dev-Sol

Attempted Assassination of Lt. Col. Alvin Macke

Three weeks after the assassination of Bobbie Mozelle, Dev-Sol struck again on February 28, 1991, when it attempted to assassinate U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Alvin Macke in Izmir. At approximately 5 p.m., while Lt. Col. Macke was waiting for the elevator in the lobby of his apartment building, he was joined by the building janitor or *kapıcı* (pronounced: cop-ah-ja), another American who lived in the building, and two unidentified Turkish men.[10] When the janitor asked the two Turks what they were

[10]A *kapıcı* is a combination concierge, watchman, and handyman found in many apartment buildings in Turkey's larger cities. They often run errands for the tenents and do limited shopping. They also serve as the eyes and ears of the building owner, to whom they owe their job and home.

doing in the building they indicated that they were conducting a survey and distributing questionnaires.

When the elevator arrived, Macke, the other American, and the two Turks entered the elevator. Upon reaching Macke's floor, Macke and the two Turks got off the elevator. (The other American stayed in the elevator and went up to his floor.) The two Turks walked past Macke as if they were going to visit someone on the floor. With his back to the two men, his attache case in his left hand, and his keys in his right, Macke began to unlock the door to his apartment.

Then, for some inexplicable reason, Macke turned his head to the right. Unbeknownst to Macke, one of the men had a gun pointed to the back of his head. By turning his head, Macke avoided being shot in the back of the head, and the bullet hit him just under the right ear and jawbone. Though wounded, Macke grabbed his attache case with both hands and threw it at the terrorists in self-defense.

Macke's actions startled the two terrorists, but before descending the stairwell, the gunman fired two more rounds at Macke. These hit the wall across from the elevator. As the two men fled down the stairs, Macke chased them to the foot of the stairs, but collapsed from loss of blood.

An anonymous caller telephoned the local press after the attack and claimed the operation in the name of Dev-Sol. The caller further stated, "We have punished one more senior imperialist officer . . . . We will carry on until imperialism gets its hands off the region."

A subsequent police investigation helped police identify Kahraman Altun and Bulent Sari as the two men involved in the attack against Macke.[11]

[11]At approximately 8 p.m. on March 16, 1991, in Izmir, Kahraman Altun was killed when a bomb he was placing prematurely detonated. The target of the attack appears to have been a Turkish auto parts company that sold General Motors and Detroit Diesel parts. The explosion caused minor damage. The bombing was being carried out by Dev-Sol to protest Secretary of State Baker's visit to Turkey and U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Attempted Assassination of USAF Lt. Col. Alvin Macke

Izmir, Turkey • Februlary 28, 1991





On April 6, 1991, Bulent Sari was arrested by the police while boarding a bus in the Balcova district of Izmir. Sari indicated that Kahraman Altun shot Macke, and that he (Sari) was just involved in the surveillance. Bulent Sari was eventually charged with participation in a number of terrorist incidents, as well as being an accomplice in the shooting of Macke. As of this writing, he is in prison while awaiting trial in the Izmir security courts.

"We are giving one of Bush's kids to Ozal to take with him to the U.S., in order that he does not go without anything . . . . Today, in Yesilyurt, we punished the American working for the NATO bases of the U.S. We claim the attack in the name of Dev-Sol Armed Revolutionary Unit."

Assassination of VBR Employee John Gandy

With the cessation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf on February 28, 1991, there were no more anti-American attacks in Turkey, except for the firebombing of a McDonald's restaurant in Istanbul on March 3, 1992. The next major "trigger event" for Dev-Sol occurred on March 16, 1991, with the visit of Secretary of State



The office where John Gandy was assassinated. On the near wall, the terrorists wrote "We are determined and we shall win.... Dev-Sol Armed Revolutionary Unit." The slogan on the far wall reads: The Middle East belongs to the Middle East people.... It cannot be divided. Dev-Sol."

Assassination of VBR Site Manager John Gandy
Istanbul, Turkey • March 22, 1991



Baker to Turkey. During the cited period, Dev-Sol carried out eight anti-U.S. bombings to protest the visit. However, it was not until Turkish President Ozal arrived in the United States on March 22, 1992, that Dev-Sol carried out its next lethal anti-American operation.

At approximately 12 noon on March 22, 1991, three men rang the doorbell at the VBR office in Istanbul. The secretary looked through a peephole and noticed that one of the men was wearing a police uniform and let them in. The uniformed officer asked to speak to the person in charge. The three "policemen" were



The pistol, manufactured by Manufacture d'Armes des Pyreness Francaises (MAPF) in Hendaye, France, is officially known as the *Pistolet Automatique Unique* or Bcf-66. Turkish Police in the weapons and terrorism sections refer to it as the "French Ten" because it holds nine rounds in the magazine and one in the chamber. It has long been a Dev-Sol weapon of choice for close-quarter assassinations because of its utility and availability. Note: For robberies, confrontational attacks, and killing targets in vehicles, the group uses more powerful 9mm weapons.

The 7.65mm (.32 auto) cartridge is a subsonic round that travels about 970 feet per second (fps). The barrel/receiver configuration—front sight mounted on the receiver leaving the extended barrel clear—is ideally suited for connecting a sound suppressor or silencer. Stability and accuracy is enhanced due to the 24.3 oz unloaded weight of the steel alloy weapon. Note: rifling is six grooves left twist.

The stamped letters T.C.O.M. is the Turkish acroynm for Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Ordu Mali (property of the armed forces of the Turkish Republic) which include the jandarma but not the police. Police issued weapons are stamped "POLIS." The Turkish jandarma reportedly purchased a number of these pitstols some years ago. The markings on this particular weapon indicate that it once belonged to the Turkish Government. A number of these pistols have been captured that do not bear the marking—they were bought into the country via other means.



directed into the Deputy Site Manager's office. They engaged him in conversation about the security situation in Istanbul and asked if any Americans worked in the office. The Deputy Site Manager indicated that the Site Manager (Gandy) and the secretary were Americans. At that point one of the terrorists dressed in civilian clothes asked to speak to the Site Manager.

When Gandy came into the Deputy Site Manager's office, one of the terrorists dressed in civilian clothes asked the American secretary and a Turkish coworker to join them in the office.

With all four of them in the office, one of the terrorists drew his handgun and told them to kneel on the floor. As the hostages were being tied up, the gunman indicated that they were members of an Armed Revolutionary Unit of Dev-Sol. Once the hostages were tied up, the terrorists took Gandy back to his office.

Inside Gandy's office, the terrorists wrote slogans on the walls, seated Gandy on a chair, and bound and gagged him before shooting him three times, twice in the head and once in the chest. Written on the wall closest to Gandy was the statement, "We are determined and we shall win. Dev-Sol Armed Revolutionary Unit." On the adjacent wall was written, "The Middle East belongs to the Middle East people . . . . It cannot be divided. Dev-Sol." A third slogan was written on the office's outer wall which

read, "We are sending an American to Bush with Ozal." [Author's Note: All of the slogans were written in Turkish.]

Following the attack, a woman called the local press in Istanbul and stated, "We are giving one of Bush's kids to Ozal to take with him to the U.S., in order that he does not go without anything . . . . Today, in Yesilyurt [the area of Istanbul where VBR is located] we punished the American working for the NATO base of the U.S. . . . We claim the attack in the name of Dev-Sol Armed Revolutionary Unit."

At the crime scene police found three 7.65mm shell casings near Gandy's body. Though the murder weapon was never found, it was determined that Gandy was shot with a gun equipped with a sound suppressor. For close-quarter assassinations, Dev-Sol prefers to use the Pistolet Automatique because of its utility and availability.

Since Gandy lived only two blocks from his office, it appears that Dev-Sol purposely shot him in his office to demonstrate its ability to penetrate a "hardened" area and instill fear throughout the foreign business community by killing a businessman in the one place he would feel safe—his office.

The terrorists also carefully noted and took operational advantage of the fact that it was the Islamic Holy month of Ramadan when many practicing Moslems fast. Fasting, which has a deleterious effect on levels of alertness, enhanced the terrorists' element of surprise. Additionally, the attack occurred at the time when the janitor at Gandy's building, as well as the janitors of the surrounding buildings, could be expected to be at the local mosque for prayer.

Conclusion

Since the July 11, 1991, raids on Dev-Sol safehouses in Istanbul, Turkish police have continued their success against the organization. From July 11, 1991, to December 31, 1993, Turkish police uncovered about 148 Dev-Sol safehouses, and some 92 Dev-Sol members were killed. Among those killed in safehouse raids were Dev-Sol central committee member Sinan Kukul and Sebahat Karatas, the wife of Dursun Karatas (April 16, 1992); Bedri Yagan, Dev-Sol central committee member and alleged number two of the organization (March 7, 1993); and Irbrahim Yalcin, Dev-Sol commander of the Aegean region, and Avni Turan, Dev-Sol commander of the Black Sea region (March 24, 1993).

In the fall of 1992, Dev-Sol underwent a schism that pitted Dev-Sol leader Dursun Karatas against Bedri Yagan. Ideological differences and Karatas' alleged undisputed control over the organization and its finances were reasons for the split. Factionalism within the group, the death of Bedri Yagan, and police successes have had a debilitating effect on Dev-Sol operations. From March 7, 1993, to December 31, 1993, the group murdered eight people.

It remains to be seen what long-term effects the split will have on the organization. The death of Yagan has helped Karatas in his efforts to regain control of the organization. If Karatas is successful, it should not effect the group's ideological goals—only its operational strategy. Dev-Sol will become more insular and clandestine in its effort to counter police infiltration, and, given the size of the organization and its ability to survive "tactical withdrawals," it will remain a security concern for Turkish law enforcement authorities.

List of Advisories and Checklists

[Author's Note: This information was provided to address specific security concerns of the local U.S. business community by Regional Security Officer John McKennan, who served at the American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey, from 1987 to 1991; he has also served at U.S. Embassies in Beirut, Lebanon, and Bonn, Germany. Over 130 U.S.-affiliated businesses and institutions operate in Istanbul—Turkey's largest city and economic capital. The population is over 10 million and continues to grow by 500,000 people a year. This extensive security advice program was developed and used by Mr. McKennan to assist and protect U.S. firms during a time that saw the strong resurgence of terrorist organizations, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the terrorist actions and assassinations described earlier in this article.]

- **Vehicle Inspection Techniques:** A thorough description of bomb search techniques for personal and corporate vehicles. These detailed instructions can be used as the basis for a company-specific plan designed to meet local requirements, threat levels, and resources. A simplified version of these instructions should be translated into the local language and provided to vehicle access control guards, drivers, and others as appropriate.

- **Residential Security Instructions:** Security guidelines for domestic employees. These instructions should be translated into the local language and attached to the English language text.

- **Physical Security Considerations for Businesses:** Physical security and defensive measures for the company office where the general manager is located.

- **Company Security Profile:** An abbreviated security survey as a reference for general managers and corporate security officers. The form was created for faxing in order to elicit and expedite the flow of immediate detailed information to the Regional Security Officer (RSO) during a period of high terrorist threats and incidents.

- **Business Operations Security (OPSEC):** Guidelines to be considered by management to increase company operational security awareness and procedures in an overseas environment.

- **Bomb Threat Call Checklist:** To be filled out by a receptionist or operator receiving a suspicious telephone call.

- **Suspicious Activity Reporting Checklist:** To be filled out by guards, receptionists, drivers, or other employees who observe suspicious activity near company facilities and residences. Should be translated into the local language on the same form.

- **Security Guard Selection Criteria:** A country-specific list of criteria to be considered when hiring local guards. This can be used as a guideline and modified to reflect local conditions.

- **Protective Window Film:** A briefing on the use of shatter-resistant window coatings.
- **Letter and Parcel Bomb Recognition Clues:** A detailed list of clues helpful in recognizing mailed bombs.
- **Letter and Package Bomb Recognition:** A poster for display in mailrooms and other areas where incoming mail is received, sorted, or handled. The poster should be translated into the local language on the same form and displayed as a bilingual announcement.

Vehicle Inspection Techniques

The following guidelines provide a basis for checking vehicles for explosive devices, or what is known as an improvised explosive device (IED). These guidelines include some, but not all, of the techniques used by professional explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) personnel.

✔**Before touching the vehicle, conduct an external search as follows:**

- Check the area around the vehicle. Look for bits of tape, wire, string, or time fuse that may have been left during the installation of an IED.
- Look for marks on the ground, such as footprints, car jack or jack stand impressions. Depending on the slope of the parking surface, these marks may indicate unusual activity around the vehicle.
- Look for signs of forced entry around the doors, windows, trunk, and hood of the car. Fingerprints and smudges on the trunk, hood, door, or wheel covers may indicate a recent attempt to enter the vehicle.
- Look inside the vehicle, through the windows, for any obvious devices, packages or other items that do not belong. Look under the dashboard for protruding wires. Look on the floor for packages partially hidden under the front seat.

✔**The most likely place to find a bomb, if the vehicle has been locked, is under the vehicle. Check for the following:**

- Chunks of dirt on the ground that may have been dislodged from the undercarriage of the car during an attempt to place an explosive device.
- Loose wires or strands of wire that are clean (probably 22–24 gauge in thickness, similar to those used in a blasting cap).
- Check the top and both sides of all four tires.
- Look into the exhaust pipe for any inserted objects.

✔**All vehicles should be equipped with locking gas caps to prevent foreign objects from being dropped into the gas tank.**

✔**To check the inside of a vehicle that has been left unlocked:**

- Look through the windows (see above) and then open a door other than the driver's side.
- Check the interior of the car in a logical sequence, generally starting on the floor and working up.
- Check under the floormats for pressure-sensitive switches or any other items that should not be there.

- Look under the front seats and lift and inspect under the rear seats.
- Check the door panels for signs of tampering.

At a minimum, always look under an unattended vehicle before entering for signs of an IED that may have been left on the pavement or become detached from its mounting place. If, at any time during the inspection, a suspicious object is discovered, do not touch it. Immediately move away from the vehicle. Notify the police.

The search techniques mentioned above are rather comprehensive and presented to inform and assist those individuals and businesses that are interested in understanding how to conduct a thorough vehicle bomb search.

Residential Security Instructions

All domestic employees should be given a copy of the following security instructions translated into their native language. All of the instructions apply to maids, and most apply to janitors, gardeners, and other domestic help. These employees should be alert to suspicious individuals around your residence. The importance of reporting any unusual inquiries or activities promptly should be emphasized. Vehicle license numbers and accurate descriptions should be obtained whenever possible. The **Suspicious Activity Reporting Checklist** can be used for this purpose.

- ✔ Keep exterior doors closed and locked during the day.
- ✔ Close and lock all exterior doors at night.
- ✔ Close and lock windows and shutters, and roll down window coverings at night.
- ✔ Do not admit strangers, peddlers, inspectors, survey or census takers, or investigators you do not know, even if they are in uniform or display credentials. Tell them to call your employer or contact the company office. Do not open the door to these people.
- ✔ Do not admit repair people unless you have been told by your employer to expect them.
- ✔ Do not accept packages unless you have been told by your employer to expect such a delivery.
- ✔ Do not give information of any kind about this family on the telephone unless you are absolutely certain the caller is a friend. Do not identify the family's street address or telephone number to unknown callers.
- ✔ If you receive any anonymous calls or threats, or if you observe anything unusual or suspicious in the vicinity of this house, report it to your employer.
- ✔ Make a note of the license number of any suspicious vehicle parked near this house and give the information to your employer.
- ✔ If any strange objects or packages are discovered in the house or yard, leave them alone and inform your employer at once. If your employer is not available, call the police.

Physical Security Considerations for Businesses

1. Basic security survey of compound, building(s) and office space. Photograph overall area and all access points. Sketch facility or office space noting access points, elevators, entrance areas, stairwells, fire exits, and all points of pedestrian or vehicle entrance, egress, and control. Note the location of guards, the receptionist, and the general manager's office.

2. Perimeter fences, walls, and lighting. Lighting for rear areas and entrances.

3. Controlled gates, vehicle access, and parking areas.

4. Public Access Control (PAC). Entry doors controlled by a guard or receptionist with electric lock release.

5. The sally port concept: an airlock entry system where the visitor is held between two locked doors until a guard or receptionist releases one of the doors. Ideally, the guard or receptionist is behind bulletproof or shatter-resistant glass.

6. Install closed circuit television (CCTV) in entry area with VCR recorder capability to tape persons passing through the PAC area.

7. If possible, place a walk-through metal detector (WTMD) at the entrance.

8. Silent alarm system for the guard or receptionist to alert the general manager's office in case of an emergency. It could be hooked up to trigger a flashing light (i.e., silent alarm) in the manager's office.

9. The manager's office door should be constructed of reinforced material with a drop bar or strong bolt to "harden" the office and to enable the office to be used as a safehaven in case of an emergency. This can (and should) be done unobtrusively. Install a peephole in the door. Almost all terrorist attacks directed against individuals in an office environment have been against those perceived to be important. Office workers are generally not considered to be at special risk.

10. Consider shatter-resistant protective window film or "mylar" for increased protection against flying glass in the event of a bombing or violent demonstration. (See the advisory on **Protective Window Film**.)

11. Maintain the telephone numbers of the local or district police station. Call them to verify unexpected police visits.

12. Iron grillwork for ground floor windows.

13. In some cases, large ground floor windows should be made smaller and the walls reinforced to reduce potential bomb damage effects and risk to employees.

14. If the security survey indicates a number of weak points, or the office is located in a multiple occupancy building with few, if any, access controls, then serious consideration should be given to relocating the office. Controlling access is one of the most important elements of a good security program.

15. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the U.S. Embassy or Consulate General is always interested in comments and suggestions regarding ways to improve the security of the American business community. If you have any suggestions or "lessons learned," please contact the RSO. Additionally, the names of any reputable local firms that have done particularly good security related work (i.e., iron grilles, security doors, lighting, CCTV, and alarm installations) would be appreciated so that the information can be shared with other concerned managers.

16. An excellent source of professional security publications is a catalog available from:
    Butterworth-Heinemann
    80 Montvale Avenue, Stoneham, MA 02180
    Telephone: 800–366–2665 or 617–438–8464
    Fax: 617–438–1479.

Company Security Profile

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN COMPLETED

1. Company Name: _____

   _____

   Address: _____

   _____

   Telephone Number: _____ Fax Number: _____

   U.S. Affiliate Corporation: _____

Names of key managerial contacts in the company (i.e, General Manager, Assistant General Manager, Finance Director). Please note direct telephone numbers, fax numbers, and home phone numbers when possible.

Name	Work Number	Home Number	Fax Number

2. Brief description of firm's operation in city or country (i.e., location of the main office, factories, sales offices, etc.):

_____

_____

_____

_____

3. Overview of professional and support staff and their respective nationalities. (For larger firms just a numerical description.)

Name	Nationality

4. Exact location of offices and facilities:

_____

_____

_____

_____

5. Short description of office configuration (e.g., top two floors of a five-floor building, etc.):

_____

_____

_____

6. Company office hours:

7. Mark location of main office and factory on a map.

8. Company watchmen and/or guards? (Number and type of coverage):

9. Describe areas of public access briefly:

10. Previous security problems and incidents (i.e., bombings, bomb threats, robberies, threats, strikes, etc.):

11. Security procedures and equipment now in place (i.e., alarms, CCTV coverage, special lighting, bulletproof glass, shatter-resistant window film, public access controls, etc.):

12. Controlled parking/garage, vehicle access areas: Yes__No___ Provide a brief description:

13. Security concerns or questions:

14. Is your company registered with the U.S. Embassy or closest U.S. Consulate Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) office?

15. Have you received written security materials from the Regional Security Officer (RSO) or U.S. Government before?

16. Have you been given security advice by the RSO?

17. Have you ever attended a U.S. Embassy- or Consulate-sponsored security briefing or American business community meeting?

Note: If this Company Security Profile is faxed, please follow up with a hard copy by mail. Use additional pages if needed.

Business Operations Security

Operations Security (OPSEC) is a term generally associated with the military. It is also a functional concept that can be utilized to enhance the security of U.S.-affiliated corporations and institutions in an overseas environment. A definition of OPSEC that can apply to these business operations is:

> ***A process to deny potential adversaries information about corporate executives, procedures, capabilities, and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting corporate vulnerabilities that are susceptible to hostile exploitation.***

The first three program elements listed below are critical for the protection of personnel and facilities. Once these are in place, additional OPSEC procedures can be implemented to further enhance security.

Assure the Physical Security of the Office Facility

(See **Physical Security Considerations for Businesses** and **Protective Window Film**)

Establish a Fire Plan

This is particularly important in countries that may not have the same level of firefighting support as that required in the United States.

Implement a Bomb Threat Plan

Establish a written bomb threat plan and bomb search procedures with clear instructions. Delegate responsibility to appropriate employees. Consider the installation of a telephone recorder for bomb threat calls. This can and should be done in such a way as to restrict access to the recorder and any tapes made. Maintain a log of all bomb threats and other threatening phone calls. If a written threat is received, handle it as evidence, do not destroy possible latent fingerprints, and contact the police. (See **Bomb Threat Call Checklist**, **Letter and Package Bomb Recognition**, and **Letter and Parcel Bomb Recognition Clues.**)

Develop and Improve Employee Security Procedures

Make employees aware of how important it is to control information. Sensitize employees to handle inquiries, both in person and by telephone, with concern for the identity of the requester and the legitimacy of their "need-to-know."

Employees should be briefed on how to handle suspicious, probing calls and to whom to report such calls.

All employees should be alert to: unusual inquiries, non-bona fide inquiries, callers who refuse to give their number, unidentified callers, under-identified callers, and information-seeking calls with no apparent justification. Visitors or callers who show more interest in the nationality of the general manager than in conducting business are cause for concern. An attempt to determine the presence of an American executive or confirm their name by an individual who cannot be identified should be reported.

At the onset of the Gulf War, two young women visited an international shipping business in Istanbul. They looked curiously about the office and asked if there was a "foreign" manager. They did this in the course of trying to "ship" a package. The company, however, dealt in ocean-going ships, not parcels. The next day an armed terrorist bomb team arrived, forced the workers to a back room and set an explosive charge that detonated after their escape. The two teenage girls had been the site advance team.

Teach Employees Surveillance Detection and Reporting

Surveillance detection in its most basic form is simply watching for persons who are observing corporate personnel and facilities, presumably for hostile reasons. One of the primary reasons that terrorists do surveillance is to determine target suitability. Suspected surveillants should never be challenged, confronted, or acknowledged except by security personnel. When surveillance is observed or suspected, it must be reported immediately. The report should be made in strict confidence and in accordance with an established reporting procedure. The reporter should not discuss or speculate about his or her observations with other employees.

Employees should pay attention for observers loitering in the area especially when arriving at and departing from the office. Particular caution is also important when going to and from lunch at nearby restaurants known to be frequented by corporate employees.

What does a surveillant look like? In a number of cases, the Dev-Sol group has used young men and women in their late teens to early 20s—student age and appearance. In the case mentioned above, two young women were sent into the company. The group attempts to use individuals without police records or known affiliations to leftist organizations for some collection assignments. These individuals can stand light scrutiny if stopped and questioned by the police. They will usually have "cover for status"—a ready cover story to explain their presence. Often their assignments are compartmented and they may actually be unaware of the specific nature of the mission that they are supporting.

For example, in one case young surveillants were told to acquire the license plate numbers and departure times of all foreigners on a particular street. (At one time it was possible to identify any vehicle registered to a foreigner by the distinctive color of their special license plates.) They were never told which individuals were targets, or in fact, if any were targets. If interrogated by the police the collectors had almost no operational knowledge—certainly none that could lead back up the group's chain of command because cutouts had been used.

The profile of an armed "operator" who takes part in robberies and assassinations is somewhat different. They are most likely to be men in their mid-20s to early 30s. Many have police records and known connections to leftist groups. They are hard-core members of the group. Between assignments these individuals are likely to be in hiding and living under assumed identities. Typically, they will only surface when given an operational order to carry out an action and then return to the underground.

Employees (in addition to guards and receptionists) can be briefed to spot things that are not normal, thereby expanding the company's "early warning network." They can be trained to, in effect, perform a type of countersurveillance. The scope and level of this training should be tailored to an individual's willingness and capability to assist in this effort. The instruction should be presented in a matter-of-fact, nonthreatening manner.

Drivers of executives should be given more detailed instructions because of their direct responsibility for the safety of a principal. They should also be told the importance of paying attention for possible surveillants when their principal is with them and when the executive is not in their vehicle. They must be observant whenever approaching or departing the company area and the area of the general manager's residence—not just after the pickup is made. Any sightings of people taking notes or using hand signals, cameras, binoculars, telephoto lenses, camcoders, car telephones, or shortwave radios near the office or executive residence should be reported, particularly if any of these actions coincide with the movements of the general manager. Also take note of any "art students" making sketches of the office building or general manager's residence. (See **Suspicious Activity Reporting Checklist.**)

Suspicious vehicle repairs of extended duration, and utility crew work near the principal's residence or at various chokepoint locations en route, should be noted. Privacy fence screening should be considered for the executive parking area at the office in order to obscure the view of vehicles, passengers, and license plates. (See **Protective Window Film.**)

Observant employees, when noticed by surveillants, signal a firm with a strong security posture that is a potential hard-target. Early detection, or the perceived threat of detection, by surveillants can and has deterred attacks. The analysis of notes found in various safehouses confirms that terrorists make careful observations about the nature and level of security, both physical and procedural, at targeted companies.

Utilize Administrative and Procedural Security Techniques

There are a number of procedures that can be implemented in order to increase security immediately, such as: employee photo identification cards, card access to controlled areas, visitor controls and log books, computer security procedures, and delivery/tradesmen controls and logs for individuals and vehicles. Records should also be maintained for maintenance and cleaning crews, some of whom have afterhours access to offices and executive areas. Personally owned computers and computer media should be severely restricted, if not prohibited, at company offices. Strict control of

executive schedules, home addresses, telephone numbers, and personal vehicle identification data is imperative. Addresses in many countries can be determined from telephone numbers.

Limit the Possibility of Exploitation by Trash Cover

Trash cover is a means of obtaining information by examining and analyzing corporate or personal refuse for exploitable information—both at the office and the executive residence. This is an effective procedure that has been used successfully by competitors, intelligence services, police, computer hackers, stalkers, and terrorists. Use paper shredders to destroy all sensitive and potentially useful information regarding company activities.

Consider the use of a small one- or two-drawer security container (safe) and mini personal shredder at executive residences for protection from browsing by domestic help or others who may have gained building access. The use of a personal shredder and safe can greatly reduce the potential for this type of exploitation. (See **Residential Security Instructions**.)

Understand the Exploitation Potential of Advertising, Press Releases, and Corporate Posture

Consider and evaluate the potential risk posed by the overt collection of open source information about company executives and business activities. Analyze the risk versus the benefits to be gained by the dissemination of information which, if necessary, can be controlled, timed, and managed.

Delay promotional activities during times when it is best to be as low key as possible.

Consider the advantages and disadvantages of publicizing the business' affiliation to a U.S. firm. Be aware that society page photographs from special functions and social and sporting events are sometimes collected by terrorist groups to aid in target selection and identification. This applies to family members as well.

Monitor the Status of Local Terrorism Indicators

Be familiar with dates of significance to terrorist groups, such as anniversary "trigger" dates, and know how to recognize the impact of a potential "trigger" event such as the onset of the Gulf War or death of a special group leader, etc. (the type of incident that has caused a reaction in the past). Remember that actions in other countries can result in local attacks and reprisals by transnational or other sympathetic groups.

Know the Potential Effect of the Word "American"

Be aware that the mere presence of the word "American" in a corporate title can attract attention and affect targeting.

In Istanbul several local companies with the word American in their titles were bombed in short-notice, field-expedient targeting, at the start of the Gulf War. Several had no

U.S. connection whatsoever. This was literally "telephone book target selection." No research was done beyond determining the name and address of the business.

Establish an Active Terrorism Read File

Identify and list the principal terrorist groups of concern. Then obtain basic background information on these groups. Develop a list of key anniversary trigger dates for potential terrorist actions—times when some type of action may be reasonably predictable. Designate a staff member responsible for monitoring the local press for significant terrorist actions. Clip and save relevant news items.

Major demonstrations, safehouse raids, terrorist robberies, and police actions should be part of a watch list or target list of stories and reports for the collection effort. Take particular note of assassinations, kidnappings, and actions or threats directed against the business community. Robberies of payroll offices, banks, and other businesses can be an early indicator of pre-operational fund raising for future activities.

Generally, the type of news coverage in the local English language press for expatriate business people and tourists is not sufficient to accomplish this task. The local language press must be used. Usually a great deal of open source information is available. Articles should be clipped, dated, and filed. Translation is not necessary—stories can be synopsized and translated later as required. Note: some newspapers publish year-end summaries just after New Year's Day that list in chronological order all significant events from the past year—including terrorist actions. Articles such as these should be collected. Additionally, a local newspaper-sponsored almanac (if available) can be an excellent historical reference. All of this information can be extremely useful in following and documenting the local security situation, briefing visiting corporate security officials, and supporting requests for additional security measures.

Several general managers who have successfully implemented these suggestions have reported that visiting corporate security officials were "amazed" to see the extent (local papers contained many vivid photos of bombings and assassinations) of what was really going on in the city where their business was located. These general managers have found their terrorism read files to be extremely useful—and persuasive.

Bomb Threat Call Checklist

Record the exact language of the threat: _____

_____

Questions the person taking the call should ask:

When is it going to explode? _____

_____

Where is it? _____

_____

What kind of bomb is it? _____

_____

What does it look like? _____

_____

Why are you doing this? _____

_____

Who are you? _____

_____

Operator should attempt to ascertain the following:

Voice on the Phone:

Man/Woman/Child (Circle)
Age _____
Intoxicated _____
Regional Dialect _____

Excited _____
Loud _____
Calm _____
Language spoken: _____
Other comments: _____

_____

Background Noise

Children _____
Aircraft _____
Traffic _____
Typing _____
Machines _____

Music _____

_____

Other noises: _____
Distinctive telephone signal tones:* _____

_____

Experience with this type of call: Yes___ No___

Please describe:

_____

_____

_____

_____

***Note:** Sometimes it is possible to distinguish long distance and intercity calls, as well as calls from pay telephones, by their signal tones. This information should be noted when available.

Date: _____ Time of Call: _____

Incoming Line Number: _____ Length of call: _____

Call received by: _____

Suspicious Activity Reporting Checklist

Suspect

Height:_____ Weight:_____ Sex:_____ Hair (color and length):_____

Race/Nationality:_____

Clothing (hat, jacket, pants, shirt, footwear, etc.):_____

Distinguishing features (glasses, mustache, or beard):_____

Walks with limp:___ Scars:_____ Birthmarks:_____

Other:_____

Activity

Time of sighting:_____ Location:_____

What was the suspect doing?_____

Any use of a camera, binoculars, telephoto lens, camcorder, shortwave radio, tape recorder or other devices, note taking, drawing/sketching, or hand signals?

Vehicles

Make and Year:_____ Color:_____

License Plate Number:_____

Type (two-door, four-door, other):_____

Number of occupants:_____

If departed, direction of travel:_____

Other Information

Did anyone else see the above suspect, activity, or vehicle?
Yes ___No___ If yes, who:_____

Full name of person making this report (please print and sign name):_____

Security Guard Selection Criteria

In this country, guard protection must come from one of two sources: local police or private security guards hired as full-time company employees. Private security guard companies (contractors), either local, or foreign-based, are not authorized at this time.

Experience has shown that the initial selection process is extremely important. Every effort must be made to find good candidates who have the potential to perform effectively. The following recommended profile outlines some of the experience and qualities that a successful guard candidate should demonstrate.

It should be noted that military and jandarma (*gendarmerie* in French) service usually consists of about 2 years of conscripted service or a long enlistment generally extended to a full career. Therefore, most younger candidates will have served about 2 years or less, unlike in the United States where veterans may have more experience. The best candidates will be 22–29 years old and have the following military-related experience:

- **Former jandarma commandos with counterterrorism experience**
- **Former army commandos with counterterrorism training**
- **Former police special paramilitary SWAT team veterans**
- **Former jandarma members (note: in rural areas the jandarma have many law enforcement responsibilities)**

The best candidates will ideally have an interest in a martial art such as Karate, Judo, or Tai Kwan Do. The discipline, fitness, and mind-set associated with these types of activity enhance performance. At a minimum, the candidate should be involved in some sport such as soccer. Owners, managers, and instructors at martial arts schools are a potential source of applicant referrals.

In job announcements, stress the importance of physical fitness and that preference will be given to applicants with jandarma and army commando experience. This experience is highly desirable because these individuals have already demonstrated their ability to follow orders, work hard, and achieve high standards.

A word of caution: there is a tendency to hire retired police officers or military personnel based on their possession of a permit to carry a weapon. The motivational level of these applicants should be evaluated carefully.

In determining salary, check the local market and see what a police officer earns. Design an incentive for performance and include a strict probationary period. If guards do not perform well during probation, it is best to let them go.

Protective Window Film

Shards of flying glass can be lethal. Because of the potential danger of thrown objects or explosive blasts, all exterior, nonballistic-resistant windows in office buildings should be treated with protective window film. While heavy wooden or metal shutters are an effective means of protecting windows and containing flying glass, the protection depends on the occupant keeping the shutters closed. That is not likely except in times of explicit danger. The best overall protection against the danger of flying glass is the application of protective window film to the inside of the glass. It will not prevent the glass from breaking, but will hold it in place if it is broken. More importantly, protective window film is in place and "working" at all times.

Bomb curtains have been touted as effective against flying glass. As a general statement, however, they are heavy, expensive, and not particularly effective. They present the same weakness as shutters, in that an occupant may not keep them closed because they restrict light and ventilation. As a result, they are not recommended.

The U.S. Government generally recommends protective film that is a minimum of 4 mils thick (.004 inch, 1 mil is .001 inch). Reflective film is not recommended for this purpose, although some firms are experimenting with a new shatter-resistant, partially reflective coating.

Mylar is a well known trade name for one of the first protective window films made, but there are now a number of products available—Armorcoat, Profilon, Protekt, Trugard, Scotchshield, and others. Be sure to specify scratch-resistant film. Coatings thicker than 4 mils are available and are sometimes used in special applications such as jewelry store showcases, etc. Ten mil film has proven effective in stopping smash-and-grab robberies and offers a higher degree of protection against thrown objects such as molotov cocktails. For best results, your company should try to find an experienced contractor to do the installation.

For special, high-security situations, consider the use of ballistic-resistant transparencies or "glass" that can be obtained in various thicknesses depending upon the level of protection required. Ballistic-resistant glass is considerably more expensive than shatter-resistant window film.

Note: Many of the companies that make protective coatings also produce specialty window films that are not shatter-resistant for energy control and increased privacy. These coatings can be used in vehicles as well as residences. Lightly tinted vehicle windows can make it difficult for passers-by or would-be surveillants to identify passengers. Because these coatings are extremely thin, they must be professionally installed.

Letter and Parcel Bomb Recognition Clues

Some mail devices may be recognized by visual inspection. Mail handling personnel should be alert to a number of recognition clues, the most common of which are detailed below.



Place of Origin: Note the postmark. This may be from a country directing a terrorist campaign or from an area associated with postal bombs. If the arrival of such mail is uncommon, it should be treated as suspect.

Sender's Writing: Mail should be treated with caution if it features a foreign style of writing, not normally received, on the address. This should be considered in relation to No. 1 above.

Excessive Postage: Mail with excessive postage and no return address should be viewed with caution.

Balance: A letter or package should be treated as suspect if it is unbalanced, has loose contents, or is heavier on one side than the other.

Weight: If a package or letter seems excessively heavy for its volume, it should be treated as suspect.

Feel: If an envelope has any feeling of springiness at the top, bottom, or sides, but does not bend or flex, be careful, this is a key sign of an explosive device. **Warning—examine mail gently!**

Protruding Wires: Mail devices are often loosened or damaged by rough handling. It is possible that a fuse, electrical wire, or connection may become loose and penetrate the wrapping or envelope. Any such device is unstable and highly dangerous. It must not be touched.

Holes in the Envelope or Wrapping: An explosive mail device that has been handled roughly may show wire or spring holes in its outer wrapping. This, by itself or in combination with the other clues described, should alert mail handlers to a suspect device.

Grease Marks: Certain types of explosives leave greasy black marks on paper, a good indication of a suspect device. It can also mean that the explosive device has become old and unstable, making it extremely dangerous.

Smell: A smell suggestive of almonds or marzipan, or any other strange smell, is a indication of a suspect device.

Unrequested Deliveries: Unrequested deliveries, especially packages, should be screened and treated with caution. A book or thick brochure discovered upon opening a

delivery should be reported to the security department or examined for any of the above clues. Any mail which raises the slightest suspicion should not be handled. Remember the catch phrase: TOUCHING TRIGGERS TRAGEDY. (It is of benefit to both parties if senders place their name, organization address, and telephone number on packets. Then, in cases of suspicion, they may be contacted for an explanation of the contents.)

Suspicious Packaging: If an envelope is taped down all around, instead of having a normal opening flap, it may contain a booby trap spring. Such letters should be handled very carefully and treated as suspect.

Letter Stiffness: Gentle handling can reveal whether an envelope contains folded paper or a device. The presence of stiff cardboard, metal or plastic should alert the handler to a possible suspect device.

Inner Enclosures: If, after opening a letter or package, the mail handler encounters an inner sealed enclosure—whether or not it fits any of the above descriptions—the item should be treated as suspect.

WARNING

Letter and Package Bomb Recognition

Watch For:

- Foreign mail, airmail, and special delivery
- Restrictive markings such as confidential, personal, etc.
- Excessive postage
- Handwritten or poorly typed addresses
- Incorrect titles
- Titles but no names
- Misspelling of common words
- Soil, stains, or strange odors
- No return address
- Excessive weight
- Rigid envelope
- Lopsided or uneven envelope
- Protruding wires or tinfoil
- Excessive securing material such as masking tape, string, etc.

Middle Eastern Terrorism in Eastern Europe

"Prior to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, attacks by Middle East terrorist groups in the region were rare, although not unknown."

Special thanks to Richard Gaiani, the former Regional Security Officer in Budapest, Hungary.

By Maria Barton

Introduction

Prior to the political upheavals in Eastern Europe attacks by Middle Eastern terrorist groups in the region were rare, although not unknown. Those incidents that did occur were the result of internecine feuds, and any injuries to the locals appeared inadvertent. The former Communist regimes had offered substantial assistance to many Middle Eastern groups fighting for what was termed "national liberation" against their common enemy, "Western imperialism." This included funding, training, logistical support, and safehavens. Such assistance generated an informal agreement between the governments and those groups they supported that no terrorist activities would take place on the patron's own soil and of course there would be nothing to gain by targeting any of the patron's own nationals. In addition to an unwillingness to offend their benefactors, they faced the difficulties inherent in operating clandestinely in a police state. Even for those groups who were not direct beneficiaries of such largess, the ability of the Communist regimes to control media attention in the event of a terrorist incident negated much of the impetus to staging any spectacular attacks in Eastern Europe.

The regional collapse of communism in the fall of 1989 fundamentally changed this equation. As the new Eastern European governments sought to distance themselves from their past support they lost what immunity that support had provided. The new ground rules attendant on the introduction of democracy and the economic difficulties resultant from the switch to a market-based system also have hindered the ability of security forces to maintain their previous level of accountability for those within their borders. Added to these constraints is the loss of many experienced security officers, dismissed for their past association with the Communists. Several of the new governments have chosen to seal the records of the former regimes' secret police rather than undergo the internal dissensions that some countries witnessed following such revelations. These decisions, while possibly aiding domestic stability,

Chronology of Middle Eastern Terrorist Attacks in Eastern Europe

April 22, 1980—Belgrade, Yugoslavia: An unidentified Arab-looking man threw a bomb at the Belgrade PLO representative. The bomb damaged the rear of the representative's car, broke the windows, and injured one of the three occupants.

August 1, 1980—Warsaw, Poland: An unidentified woman shot and seriously wounded Abu Daoud, a Palestinian, as he sat in a hotel coffee shop. Abu Daoud was believed to be the mastermind behind the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre of 11 Israeli athletes. Two Polish women also were injured in the attack.

June 10, 1981—Belgrade, Yugoslavia: A bomb exploded under the car of an Iraqi military representative while it was parked in front of the building housing the offices of the Iraqi Military Attache. No one was hurt in the incident.

December 4, 1984—Bucharest, Romania: A senior Jordanian diplomat was shot and killed in front of his son as he left his hotel to take the boy to school. The assassin was apprehended almost immediately and later sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. He served 1 year and was released after paying some $50,000 to cover the remainder of his sentence. The Black September Organization (a.k.a. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)) claimed credit for the attack.

May 26, 1985—Bucharest, Romania: Two militia officers were killed as they attempted to defuse a bomb planted under a car belonging to the president of the Syrian Students Union. Another bomb was found under the car belonging to the secretary of the Union. This device had not been fully connected and militia officers were able to disengage it successfully. Two other Arab students were apprehended. Colonel Hawari's group was suspected.

March 14, 1990—Sofia, Bulgaria: An Iranian dissident was assassinated, probably by Iranian government efforts.

December 23, 1991—Budapest, Hungary: A bus carrying Jews from the former Soviet Union was the target of a car bomb at Ferihegy Airport. The Jews, en route to Israel, were not harmed but two Hungarian policemen escorting the bus were severely injured. A previously unknown group calling itself Movement for the Protection of Jersualem claimed credit.

April 30, 1992—Bucharest, Romania: A fully functional bomb, consisting of 6 kilos of explosives and some 2,000 steel balls for shrapnel, was discovered in a car located in Herastrau Park. It was defused by the police. The car had apparently been parked for several days after having been rented by a person using a false Iraqi passport. The park had been used by the Iraqi community to celebrate Saddam Hussein's birthday on April 28. The Israeli authorities opined their embassy was to have been targeted during the Independence Day festivities on April 30. The Israelis suspect Hizballah was behind the attempted attack.

September 24, 1992—Prague, Czechoslovakia: An attache of the Kuwaiti Embassy was shot and seriously wounded by an unidentified assailant near his home. The attache was approaching his residence when he apparently noticed someone nearby. The attache and the unknown person were engaged in a quarrel, when the assailant pulled out a handgun equipped with a silencer and shot the attache three times.

have left the nascent intelligence services knowing less about what transpired within their country than many of their Western counterparts. Although a large number of Middle Eastern residents have returned home, either of their own volition or by action of the government, enough remain in most of the republics to provide a support infrastructure if needed. In addition, with its newfound freedom, the media can now offer the terrorists access to their life-giving publicity.

Secondly, as the countries of Western Europe tighten their security postures, the former Soviet Bloc may see an increase in terrorist activity by radical Middle Eastern groups. (Statistically, of the nine Middle Eastern terrorists attacks carried out in Eastern Europe since 1977, four have occurred in the last 3 years.) Many groups retain their familiarity with the territory while no longer feeling restricted by the need for retaining the government's support. The December 23, 1991, attack against a bus transporting Soviet Jews

at Ferihegy Airport in Budapest, Hungary, is offered as an example of the type of terrorist activity that could occur with more frequency in the region.

Car Bomb Attack at Ferihegy Airport

The Background

Hungary has long served as a transit country for Jews immigrating from former Soviet Union to Israel. More than 125,000 people have made the trip. Since several radical Palestinian and Islamic terrorist organizations had made threats against these Jews, Hungarian officials introduced extra security measures to protect those transiting through their country.

Immigrating Jews usually enter Hungary from Kiev, Ukraine, arriving at the Budapest Eastern Railway Station. Here they are met by Hungarian police and Israeli security agents and are then loaded onto buses for transfer to Ferihegy Airport. For security reasons, the buses use one of five different routes to the airport.

Israeli agents were authorized by the Hungarians to participate in providing security for the transiting Jews due to their greater experience in dealing with the threat posed by such terrorist groups.

Pictured is the police lead vehicle (no. 9) and the bus (no. 10) after the car bomb explosion at Ferihegy Airport.

Car Bomb Attack Against Soviet Jews

Budapest, Hungary • December 23, 1991



The Bombing

On December 23, 1991, the terrorists finally struck. Twenty-eight Jews were en route to the airport in a bus. In front was a Hungarian police car carrying two officers. Immediately behind the bus was a car containing several Israeli security agents. A tail car with two more police officers completed the motorcade. All vehicles had Hungarian license plates.

Shortly after 9:30 a.m., as the convoy approached the entrance of the parking lot of Ferihegy Air Terminal One, a car parked perpendicular to the roadway exploded. The lead police car was heavily damaged and caught fire. Both police officers were severely injured, one eventually losing an arm and an eye. The driver of the bus was not hurt and a few passengers received superficial wounds, mostly from flying glass. The Israeli security agents and the policemen in the tail car were unharmed.

On December 25 a previously unknown group, calling itself the "Movement for the Protection of Jerusalem" issued a statement claiming the attack. No further information has been discovered regarding this group and it is probable it was used as a cover name for an as yet unidentified Palestinian organization.

The billboard after the explosion. The car bomb was parked at the base.



Aftermath of the car bomb.

The Investigation

Forensic experts concluded that the bomb consisted of approximately 20 kilograms of plastic explosives that had been placed in the trunk of a Fiat Tipo parked with its rear towards the expressway. Debris from the explosion was scattered over a wide area, some found as far away as 150 meters from the epicenter. Investigation determined that the bomb had been remotely detonated from a distance of 170–180 meters by a radio working in the 400–500 MHz range. The bomb contained metal pellets similar to machined roller bearings (a technique widely used in South Lebanon) indicating it primary aim was to inflict personal injuries rather than material damage. For whatever reason, much of the force of the blast was diverted away from the road. Had the device been more accurately positioned, it is probable it would have caused significantly more destruction than it did.

Parallel with the Ferihegy expressway on which the convoy travelled are rail tracks of the Hungarian State Railways. Approximately 80–100 meters away, also running parallel to the tracks, is Istvan Pataky Street. Police found two witnesses who both mentioned that during the week previous to the explosion they had seen a dark Volkswagen Golf car present several times on the street, without any apparent purpose.

The first witness stated the car had appeared at the same time of day on each occasion, about 9:30 in the morning. The witness said he once approached the driver of the car to find out what he wanted, but the driver refused to reply. The witness described the driver as an Arab-looking man, about 20 to 30 years old, having a thin, hook-nosed face. He was wearing a gray ski hat, pulled low on his forehead.

The first witness stated that on the day of the explosion he again saw the car. It turned into Istvan Pataky Street and stopped in front of No. 15. As the witness approached the car, he noticed an open glove compartment that was deeper than the dashboard. In the glove compartment was a rectangular object, approximately 15 by 6 centimeters. Its front part was silver colored and there were three small lights and three push buttons. There was also an antenna with a ball end, approximately 25–30 centimeters long, on the right side of the object. Following the explosion, the witness

saw the car leave Istvan Pataky Street. He was sure there was only one person in the car at that time.

The second witness also had seen the car again after the explosion. The car was turning out of Istvan Pataky Street at the time and there were two persons sitting in the car. The witness opined the passenger had probably only gotten in the car a short time before, as he was still fastening his seat belt. He described the two individuals as about 35 years old, both wearing gray ski caps.

It was established that the car that contained the explosives had been rented on December 14, 1991, by a supposed German national. The vehicle was to have been returned on December 20. Another automobile also had been rented by the same person. The second car was later found in Budapest on December 29. Forensic examination showed this car had recently contained explosives similar to the type used at the airport. Further investigation revealed the subject had previously rented two other cars in Hungary, both of which were returned on time and in good order.

Investigation determined the renter of the car was not known at the apartment he had given to the car company as his Budapest address or at the one provided as his home in Stuttgart. However, another apartment was located in Budapest that was believed to have been used by the subject. Forensic examination of this residence showed evidence of the same explosives that were found in both cars.

Hungarian security officials have reconstructed the probable events of that morning. It appears likely that one perpetrator drove the Fiat Tipo, packed with explosives, to the site on the Ferihegy expressway. The other subject, having observed the departure from the Eastern Railway Station, drove by a different route to the previously designated observation point at 15 Istvan Pataky Street. The driver of the Tipo parked the car in the spot chosen earlier, then crossed the railway tracks and joined his partner on Istvan Pataky Street. It is possible that the same routine had been followed on previous occasions, waiting for the time when the convoy would chose this particular route. In this instance the bomb was detonated a few seconds prematurely, expending most of its force on the lead police car, inflicting limited damage to the bus and only minor injuries to the passengers.

MANPADs: The Potential for Use as a Terrorist Tactic

The Reality of the Threat

Case Study: Flight 970

On March 31, 1993, American Airlines Flight 970 (AAL 970) was scheduled to depart Managua, Nicaragua's Augusto Cesar Sandino International Airport for a routine 2-hour flight to Miami's International Airport. Nicaraguan Presidential Minister Antonio Lacayo and his wife were two of the passengers aboard the Boeing 727; other members of the Nicaraguan diplomatic corps were among the passengers aboard the flight. Miami was to be an intermediate stop for Minister Lacayo and the other diplomatic officials whose ultimate destination was Paris. Once in Paris, Minister Lacayo would be Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro's representative at a consultative group meeting of Latin American governments to further the ongoing democratic process in Nicaragua. Shortly before AAL 970 was to depart, an anonymous call was received by airport authorities threatening to shoot down the Miami-bound flight with a "'Redeye' surface-to-air missile" as the aircraft departed Sandisto International.

By Jack Salata, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence.

Special thanks to FAA and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Huntsville, Alabama.

The 'Redeye'

The 'Redeye' is a 1960s' vintage, American-made, manportable, surface-to-air missile (SAM or MANPAD[1]) with infrared homing; that is, a heat seeking, anti-aircraft system designed to attack low flying, high performance combat aircraft. It is optically sighted and shoulder launched by a single gunner, which justifies its manportable designation. This SAM is further designated as a "fire-and-forget" system; once the gunner acquires the target and pulls the trigger, his or her work is done. The missile's infrared guidance system "locks on" to the heat signature of its target's engine. Because of this characteristic guidance system, the 'Redeye' is known as a "rear aspect" or "chase" missile. Once fired from its launch tube, the 'Redeye' and its "contact-fuzed,



The 'Redeye'

The 'Redeye' is a 1960s' vintage, American-made, manportable, surface-to-air missile...with infrared homing; that is, a heat seeking, anti-aircraft system designed to attack low flying, high performance combat aircraft.

[1]Manportable SAMs are also known as MANPADs. For purposes of this discussion, the term MANPAD or SAM will be used interchangeably as they are both routinely found in the vernacular of the terrorism analyst. The original extrapolation of the designator M-A-N-P-A-D was "Man Portable Air Defense System" which has been subsequently shortened to "manportable" or MANPAD.

For the crew of AAL 970 and the airport security authorities, the reality was that a specific, proactive plan was needed to counter the threat.

fragmentation high explosive warhead race toward its target at a speed of Mach 1.6 (1,232 miles per hour). Although the 'Redeye' SAM is now somewhat dated in terms of its overall capabilities against modern combat aircraft equipped with SAM electronic countermeasure defenses, its infrared-guided, heat-seeking capabilities could certainly create havoc for a commercial airliner. This is especially true during takeoff when the commercial airliner's engines are at maximum thrust and present an undeniable heat signature. The 'Redeye' can reach a range of 3 miles from its original launch point and climb to a maximum altitude of 9,000 feet to engage a target.

AAL 970's Response

For the crew of AAL 970 and the airport security authorities, the reality was that a specific, proactive plan was needed to counter the threat.

Although Minister Lacayo's intended travel to Paris was widely publicized in the media, the particulars of his itinerary were not in the public domain. In this instance, the anonymous caller knew the flight number and, therefore, the scheduled departure time. Because the caller specifically stated that a 'Redeye' SAM was the intended weapon, the airport security authorities, in coordination with American Airlines, reacted with positive steps to counter the threat.

Nicaraguan airport security officials immediately launched two military helicopters to comb the surrounding environs of the airport's perimeter. The helicopters paid particular attention to the areas parallel to and leading from the departure end of the runway. Nicaraguan soldiers and airport security officers initiated patrols on the interior of the airport. Only after a thorough heliborne sweep of the airport's perimeter and immediate surroundings—paying particular attention to the departure end of the runway—was the decision made to allow the Boeing 727 to depart. While the two military helicopters remained airborne, a final countermeasure was devised to address the possible SAM threat. The cockpit crew, in coordination with the air traffic control authorities, deviated from normal procedures and took off in a downwind direction. They also altered AAL 970's flight path during their climb out

from the airport. Although delayed by about 1 hour, AAL 970 departed Managua without incident and landed safely in Miami. Minister Lacayo and the other diplomats continued onto Paris without further incident.

The anonymous caller was never identified; however, Nicaraguan authorities believe the call originated from one of the opposition political elements. The probable motive of the threat was to interrupt or derail the Paris meeting that was intended to further the ongoing democratic political process in Nicaragua.

Threat Assessment Considerations

Were the security measures taken in this situation an overreaction or a prudent response to a credible threat? As a point of analysis, the Federal Aviation Administration and the major airlines receive hundreds of anonymous bomb threats each year. However, the number of threats that suggest a manportable surface-to-air missile system as the possible tactic of destruction are but a fraction of a percent of all threats received. In an after-the-fact assessment of the probability of this being a viable threat, the following factors are worthy of further examination. First, what was the likelihood that a 'Redeye' system was present and available to those making the threat? The 'Redeye' was a widely proliferated system during the 1970s, and there have been claims by various groups in Nicaragua that they have the missiles. Airport authorities were probably aware that both Soviet-made SA–7 and 'Redeye' SAM systems were identified in Nicaragua in the aircraft wreckage of an intended covert arms shipment in 1989.

Second, if in fact the 'Redeye' was present, what was the likelihood the system was operational? MANPADs such as the 'Redeye,' because they are designed to be infantry weapons, are built to withstand the harsh conditions of the battlefield. The 'Redeye' is known for its durability. U.S. Department of Defense SAM experts indicate that the battery pack, because of its thermal energy source properties and design, can remain viable for 10–20 years or more. U.S. SAM experts have demonstrated that 'Redeyes' have fired normally even after being held is storage for years with little or no maintenance.

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Third, is the question of gunner training and proficiency. As with any specialty weapon system, the gunner or operator must have had adequate training to operate the system and successfully acquire a target. Without recurring training, the chance of a successful target lock on, launch, and destruction is greatly diminished—but not impossible.

Of the three factors cited above—system presence, operational SAM system, and trained gunner–the Managuan airport security officials could reasonably conclude that a 'Redeye' system presence in Managua was a plausible conclusion. Given the durable nature of the system, they also could conclude that if the missile was present, the probability of the system being operational was good. Given these plausible conclusions, any actions short of a definitive proactive countermeasures plan would be unconscionable had the 'Redeye' threat come to fruition.

Manportable SAMs in the Hands of Rebels?

There is a record of confirmed SAM sightings in Central America. This is especially true in El Salvador and Nicaragua, both of sightings included the identification of 'Redeye' systems. Both Nicaragua and El Salvador experienced long and bloody antigovernment rebel activity during the 1980s. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Communist-sponsored, Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and the antigovernment factions of the Faribundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, received SAMs from the Soviet Union's main satellite in Latin America—Cuba. As an example, SAMs which were intended to exchange hands between rebel factions in Nicaragua and El Salvador occurred on November 25, 1989. On that date, an unmarked Cessna airplane crashed in the remote regions of eastern El Salvador while en route from Nicaragua. Found in the wreckage were 24 Soviet-origin SA–7 'Grail' and 1 'Redeye' SAM system. El Salvadoran authorities indicated the flight originated from one of the antigovernment rebel camps located in remote Nicaragua. The SAMs, part of a larger weapons cache, were to be delivered to one of the rebel factions of the FMLN in El Salvador.

AP/Wide World Photos

November 25, 1989: Salvadoran soldiers stand among the wreckage of a light plane carrying 25 SAMs and other sophisticated munitions. Officials said the flight originated in Nicaragua and was proof of Sandinista support for El Salvador's guerrillas.

Epilogue to the AAL 970 Threat

On May 23, 1993—not 2 months after the March 31 'Redeye' threat at Managua's International Airport—a massive explosion ripped through the densely populated Santa Rosa barrio of central Managua. The blast, centered in a car repair shop, left a smoldering crater and instantly killed two innocent civilians. Moreover, the explosion exposed its source—a clandestine arms cache. The investigation revealed that the car repair garage was, in fact, the location of an arms cache belonging to the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), a rebel faction of the El Salvadoran FMLN. As the investigation proceeded, three individuals linked to the ownership of the repair shop were identified as immigrants from the Basque region of Spain. They were subsequently extradited to Spain on May 30, 1993, after the Spanish government produced evidence that the trio were members of the ultranationalist Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorist group.

Among the armaments recovered from the blast site were 19 Soviet-origin SA–7 'Grail' SAMs. After much pressure from the Nicaraguan government, the FMLN admitted to another 15 safehouse locations spread throughout Nicaragua. They admitted that of the 15 safehouse locations, 5 are arms cache sites.

MANPADS: An Emerging Terrorist Threat in the '90s?

Analyzing the emerging trends in terrorist tactics of the '90s, as related to the potential threat to civil aviation, is a dynamic, yet inexact, science. Terrorism experts of the government intelligence agencies responsible for the security of the traveling public recognize that the threat to civil aviation interests is a constantly evolving problem. The threat from improvised explosive device (IED) bombs and hijacking remain high priority concerns. However, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest the threat to civil aircraft emanating from terrorist groups, rebel militias, and even criminal enterprises possessing MANPADS is an increasing possibility.

However, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest the threat to civil aircraft emanating from terrorist groups, rebel militias, and even criminal enterprises possessing MANPADS is an increasing possibility.

MANPADs were widely proliferated during the 1970s and 1980s. Now after 20 years of reported instances of SAMs in the hands of rebel militias, narcocriminals, and terrorist groups, the potential for increased SAM threats to civil aircraft has become a serious reality. Recent terrorism events such as the World Trade Center bombing, and those that were prevented, underscore the fact that fanatical elements are not deterred by the potential implications of mass casualties that could occur if a manportable SAM were used against a commercial airliner.

Another worldwide trend having implications for the safe passage of civil airliners is the growing instance of ethnic, religious, and civil unrest. Although the risk of a world war has past, the ethnic and regional conflicts found in the four corners of the world indicate that perhaps our situation is more unstable than at any time in recent history. With this instability has come the risk of terrorism in new and more dangerous forms. Hundreds of MANPADs have fallen into the hands of ethnic militias that are battling against established governments.

The five most recent confirmed instances of MANPAD attacks against civil aviation have been the handiwork of rebel militias. In June, July, and September of 1993, four Georgian airliners were struck by MANPADs fired by Abkhazian militiamen in the breakaway region of Abkhazia in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. In March of 1992, an Armenian Yak 40 commercial

flight skirted disaster when it was hit by a MANPAD fired from an Azeri rebel position while overflying Azeribaijan territory near the disputed region of Nagorno Karabakh. Similarly, MANPAD attacks reported and confirmed prior to 1992 are largely focused in areas of ethnic or regional strife. This study, therefore, will attempt to put into perspective the proliferation of MANPADs and examine the potential for terrorism targeting civil aviation with MANPADs.

Scope of the Study

The intent of this study is to analyze the potential threat to civil aircraft from terrorist groups using MANPADs. It will not include incidents involving the broader categories of ground-to-air attacks caused by small arms or anti-aircraft artillery. Also not included are stand-off attacks, such as a light antitank weapons or attacks from rocket-propelled grenades.

This analysis will follow from three particular factors exclusive to the nature of MANPADs. First a historical chronology will be presented of the 25 confirmed instances in which civil aviation aircraft have been damaged or destroyed by MANPADs during the period 1978–93. The second major consideration of this study is the issue of MANPAD proliferation. That is, because of the very nature and characteristics of MANPADs, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding their proliferation to and among terrorist groups, guerrilla movements, and criminal elements. The real issue with regard to the potential use by a terrorist group is which groups have acquired MANPADs. The overriding concern in this regard is that the exact number and location of these systems cannot be accurately assessed due to the inherent characteristics of MANPADs—size, mobility, and concealability.

Some representative examples of where manportable SAMs have been identified with terrorist, criminal, or antigovernment rebels are presented to illustrate the problem of proliferation and the difficulty of trying to accurately predict the potential threat. The third and final aspect will be a descriptive account of the best available information on the most widely available types of SAMs and the associated technical data regarding their characteristics and capabilities.

Limitations and Criteria for Analysis

As in all analyses, there are certain limitations and criteria established in order to classify the resulting data. In all cases the missile involved must have been confirmed or highly suspected to have been a MANPAD. This study focused only on civil aircraft or military transport/cargo-type aircraft involved in nonmilitary or humanitarian relief missions. Three other criteria were grounds for exclusion: incidents involving strictly military operations, incidents involving helicopters, and events that were identified as originating from larger tactical or vehicle-borne SAMs; that is, surface-to-air missiles other than the manportable variety.

The overriding concern in this regard is that the exact number and location of these systems cannot be accurately assessed due to the inherent characteristics of MANPADs—size, mobility, and concealability.

One of the foremost limiting factors is the lack of comprehensive and available information about the instances where MANPADs were used against civil aircraft. In the instances where MANPADs were employed against an aircraft, the details are very difficult—if not impossible—to chronicle. Most of the recorded incidents have occurred in third world countries embroiled in civil strife or ongoing civil wars. Newswire services and their correspondents, which may be the first and only source of information, tend to report an incident in generic or incorrect terms to describe the circumstances and details of the attack. Although not usually intentional, these reports can confuse or misrepresent the facts. One very specific and important example has become the use of the generic term "Stinger" to describe any and all types of manportable SAMs. Attacks involving the use of rocket-propelled grenades and light antitank weapons also have been consistently misinterpreted as attacks by MANPADs and are excluded from this study.

MANPAD Attacks Against Civil Aviation
By Country



A Chronology of MANPAD Attacks: 1978–1993

According to information available from various open sources and collected during the period 1978–1993, there are believed to have been 25 incidents involving MANPAD attacks on civil aircraft.



There were 536 fatalities[2]—passengers and crew—as a result of these 25 attacks. An analysis of the attacks reflects that shoulder-fired MANPAD attacks are a third world phenomena. These attacks occurred in: Angola (5), Georgia (formerly the Soviet Union) (4), Afghanistan (4), Sudan (3), Mauritania-Morocco border (2), Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) (2), Mozambique (1), Somalia (1), Azerbaijan (1), Costa Rica (1), and Chad (1).

According to information available from various open sources and collected during the period 1978–1993, there are believed to have been 25 incidents involving MANPAD attacks on civil aircraft.

All of the 25 attacks occurred in areas of regional conflict, that is, countries or regions in which there was an active rebel guerrilla movement, border dispute, secessionist movement, or other civil unrest. By region, all attacks occurred in either Africa (15), one of the emerging republics of the former Soviet Union (5), the Near East Asia region (4), or Central America (1). Angola's UNITA antigovernment guerrillas were responsible for 5 incidents, the Afghan Mujahedin militia claim 4 attacks, and Abkazian separatist militiamen in Georgia are responsible for four of the 25 attacks.



The following is a synopsis of the best available information for each recorded incident.

January 29, 1978—Chad: Exact details of this event are lacking. However, press reports, international aviation records of the time, and records held by McDonnell Douglas aircraft indicate that a DC–4 is believed to have crashed near Faya Largeau in northern Chad. Reports are that the aircraft and its crew were never located.

[2]The figure of 536 fatalities may vary slightly as this figure represents reporting from open press accounts. A few of the listed incidents have slightly different numbers of reported fatalities.

Reportedly the crash was caused by a heat-seeking missile. The DC–4 ordinarily contains a crew of three; all are believed to have died in the crash.

September 3, 1978—Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe): In one of the earliest recorded MANPAD attacks against civil aviation by terrorists or rebel guerrilla forces, an Air Rhodesia Viscount-type aircraft was hit by a SA–7 near the city of Kariba, Rhodesia. Fifty-two passengers and crew reportedly were killed in the crash that occurred shortly after takeoff from the Kariba Airport in the north of Rhodesia. Antigovernment rebels belonging to the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) were responsible for the attack.

This 1978 incident is one of the earliest reported instances of a MANPAD attack resulting directly from the proliferation of Soviet SA–7 'Grails'. SA–7 style 'Grails' were purchased from the Soviet Union by Libyan dictator and arms buyer, Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi. Qaddafi reportedly supplied Uganda's Idi Amin with SA–7 style MANPADs from his stocks; ZAPU is reported to have received its SA–7s from Uganda's dictator Amin.



DC 10

February 12, 1979—Rhodesia: Only 5 months later, ZAPU again used one of its SA–7s to down another Air Rhodesia Viscount aircraft. As before, the aircraft was on departure from Kariba Airport, northern Rhodesia, when it was struck by a MANPAD and crashed. Fifty-nine passengers and crew members were killed in this attack.

September 21, 1984—Afghanistan: A DC–10 Ariana Airlines flight carrying 308 passengers and crew was attacked by a MANPAD while en route from the Afghan capital of Kabul to Kandahar. The explosion tore through the aircraft's left engine and damaged its hydraulic system and wing in an area containing a fuel tank. The captain was able to land the aircraft at Kabul International Airport without any loss of life. Afghan guerrilla fighters armed with a 'Redeye' were reported to be the attackers.

October 5, 1986—Costa Rica: A U.S.-registered Corporate Air Services C–123 commercial cargo aircraft was hit by a SA–7 'Grail' shoulder-fired MANPAD while flying over Costa Rica. The aircraft sustained considerable damage and crashed. Three of the four crew members were killed.

August 16, 1986—Sudan: A Sudan Airways twin-engine Fokker F–27 aircraft carrying 57 passengers and a crew of 3 was shot down within minutes of takeoff while on a flight from Malakal to Khartoum. All 60 people on board perished in the crash. The Sudan News Agency reported that a Soviet-style SA–7 SAM was used by rebels of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the attack. The SPLA contend that civilian flights are being used to resupply government troops and are, therefore, legitimate targets.

February 9, 1987—Afghanistan[3]: An Afghan government Antonov AN–26 flight from Khost to Kabul with 37 passengers and 6 crew members was shot down just after takeoff from Khost. All on board were killed. The attack is reported to be by a 'Stinger' SAM fired from a rebel guerrilla emplacement in the hills near Khost. The guerrillas claim the flight carried military personnel while the Kabul government countered that the deceased were all civilians.

May 5, 1987—Sudan: A Cessna 404-type aircraft operated by Sudanese Aeronautical Services, Ltd. (SASCO) was shot down by a probable SA–7 as it left Malakal Airport en route to Khartoum, Sudan. Eleven passengers and two crew members were killed in the crash. An antigovernment rebel group from the southern regions of Sudan, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), claimed responsibility but contended that it was a military flight.

Courtesy of Jane's Information Group



AN–26

[3]Fighting between the Mujahedin and the Kabul government was at its highest during 1987, and attacks against both civilian and military aircraft were at a near fevered pitch. Some press reports of the time suggest there were over 200 civilian fatalities.

There is conflicting information regarding MANPAD attacks against aircraft for the period, as the recorded shoot downs involve government-Mujahedin counterclaims regarding the status of the flights, that is, civilian aviation flights versus military mission. In the two attacks listed, February 9 and June 11, the common denominator was a Mujahedin claim for the attack countered by a Kabul government contention that all fatalities were civilians.

June 11, 1987—Afghanistan[3]: A Bakhtar Afghan Airlines Antonov AN–26 on a flight from Qalat to Kabul with 50 passengers and 3 crew is shot down by a reported 'Stinger' fired from a Mujahedin rebel position. All 53 people on board are fatally injured. A Mujahedin spokesperson, while claiming credit for the attack, contended the flight was a munitions supply sortie.

November 6, 1987—Mozambique: An Air Malawi Skyvan–3 was shot down by Mozambique armed forces as it passed over Ulongue while en route from Blantyre to Lilongwe, Malawi. Mozambique military officials contend that the aircraft was violating Mozambican air space. A total of 10 people, 8 passengers and 2 crew, were killed in the crash.

December 8, 1988—Mauritania/Morocco: Two DC–7 aircraft of the T&G Aviation company and chartered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) were attacked while on a locust spraying mission. The aircraft were over the western Sahara Desert near the Moroccan-Mauritanian border when they were struck by manportable SAMs. Mauritanian guerrilla fighters from the Polisario Front claimed that the aircraft were mistaken for Moroccan military aircraft. One of the two aircraft was completely destroyed and all five crew members were killed. The second DC–7, though badly damaged, was able to land safely.

April 10, 1988—Afghanistan: A Bakhtar Afghan Airlines Antonov AN–26, while on a domestic flight between the cities of Maimaneh and Mazar Sharif, was struck by a 'Stinger.' Antigovernment Muslim militiamen, the Mujaheddin, fighting to oust the Soviet-backed Kabul government, contend the flight had a military purpose. All 29 passengers and crew died in the crash.

July 23, 1989—Angola: An Angolan government Antonov AN–26 type aircraft carrying 43 passengers and 5 crew on a flight over western Angola was shot down by an undetermined type of MANPAD near Kazombo. Forty-two people on board the aircraft were killed in the crash. The Angolan government charged that the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was responsible; the pattern of the attack and the location supports this conclusion.

December 21, 1989—Sudan: A *Medecins Sans Frontiers* (Doctors Without Borders) French relief aid aircraft with four passengers and crew was shot down by a MANPAD after departing Aweil en route to Khartoum. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), a rebel faction fighting the Sudanese government, is believed to be responsible for the crash and deaths of all on board.

February 22, 1991—Angola: An Angolan government Antonov AN–26 transport was shot down by a missile identified by press reports as a 'Stinger' near Cazombo in Moxico Province. The pro-government People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALPA) alleged that UNITA rebels were responsible for the downing. All 47 on board—37 civilian and 6 military passengers and 4 crew—died in the crash.

March 16, 1991—Angola: A Transafrik C–130 cargo aircraft was shot down while on an Angolan government-sponsored supply flight between Luanda and Lunda Provinces. All nine passengers and crew were killed. The remains of a 'Stinger' missile were found near the crash site. Two Americans were among the crew. UNITA rebels were the likely perpetrators.

April 1, 1991—Angola: An International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Twin Otter DH6 aircraft on a domestic flight was hit by a SAM in the Cuanza Region, Bie Province. The missile attack damaged the engine and fuselage. There were no casulaties and the aircraft landed safely. ICRC claimed that UNITA militia rebels fired a MANPAD that caused the damage.

June 10, 1991—Angola: A C–130 Hercules cargo transport was struck by a MANPAD reported to be a 'Stinger' fired by UNITA rebels. The aircraft was on a Angolan government contract flight and had just taken off from Luanda's airport. All seven crew and passengers were killed in the crash. UNITA rebels have been fighting the government which, during the time of the attack, had been backed by the Soviet Union.

September 17, 1991—Somalia: An ICRC Dornier aircraft, carrying medical supplies en route from Mogadishu to Berbera, was hit by a manportable SAM -most probably a SA–7—while flying over Galcayo. The aircraft, flying at 9,600 feet, was hit in

Courtesy of Jane's Information Group



C–130 Hercules

Courtesy of Jane's Information Group



C–130 Hercules

the tail section by a missile. There were no casualties. The aircraft landed safely in Djibouti. At the time of the incident, Somalia was torn by tribal faction violence in which various clan leaders were vying for territory and influence.

March 27, 1992—Azerbaijan: An Armenian Airlines Yak 40-type aircraft was hit by an unknown MANPAD in the tail engine while flying over Azerbaijan. There were no casualties, and the aircraft landed safely at Yerevan, Armenia. This incident occurred as a result of the ongoing military-style actions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over territorial claims for the region of Nagorno Karabakh.

June 25, 1993—Georgia: An Aeroflot Airlines TU–154 with 200 passengers on a flight from the Georgian capital city of Tbilisi en route to Sukhumi (the capital city of the disputed region of Abkhazia) was hit in an engine by a SAM while on approach to land. The probable SA–7 was fired from a Abkhazian rebel position. The aircraft was able to land safely and there were no casualties. Nationalist Abkhazian rebels are fighting the government of Georgia in order to secede from Georgia and form an autonomous state.

Courtesy of Jane's Information Group



TU–154



This photo graphically illustrates the damage to this Georgian TU–154 airliner hit by a Soviet-style MANPAD, most likely a SA–7. The 'Grail' was fired by Abkazian separatists on June 25, 1993, while the aircraft was on approach into Sukhumi, Georgia.

July 21, 1993—Georgia: The TASS news agency and Moscow Radio reported that a Tupolev TU–154 airliner on a flight from the Georgian capital city of Tbilisi to Sukhumi was struck by what the press described as "a heat-seeking missile" while on landing approach at the Sukhumi airport. The aircraft was struck in one of its engines, but was able to land safely; there were no casualties. The flight was described as carrying passengers and humanitarian aid into the disputed ethnic region of Abkhazia. This was the second such incident in less than 1 month.

September 21, 1993—Georgia: According to the ITAR/TASS news association, and confirmed by the Georgian Defense Ministry, a Georgian airlines TU–134 carrying about 20 passengers—all members of the news media—and a crew of 6 crashed into the Black Sea near the city of Sukhumi. The aircraft was approaching Sukhumi from the southern Russian city of Sochi and was reportedly hit by a heat-seeking, manportable missile. The MANPAD was believed to be a SA–7 fired from an Abkhazian rebel gunboat operating off the coast of the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi.

This incident occurred in the final days of the battle for Sukhumi and before secessionist Abkhazian rebels captured the provincial capital from the defending Georgina military forces. There were no survivors among the 26 passeners and crew.

September 22, 1993—Georgia: A second Georgian airliner, a TU–154, was hit while in mid air by a heat-seeking MANPAD as it approached Sukhumi from Tbilisi. Upon being struck, the pilot was able to crashland at Sukhumi; however, the aircraft exploded while on the runway. Of the 100 passengers and crew aboard the flight, 26 were able to flee before the explosion. The Georgian Defense Ministry reported that 75 Georgian soldiers were killed in the explosion. One of the passengers was an American newspaper reporter for the *Wall Street Journal.*

Courtesy of Jane's Information Group



TU–134

The Proliferation of MANPADs

Historical Overview: The Genesis of the Manportable SAM

As with most weapons systems that are now found in the four corners of the world, the origin of the proliferation of manportable, shoulder-fired SAMs is the Cold War. The first generation of manportable SAMs resulted from the United States' development of the 'Redeye' as early as 1959. The combat role of this revolutionary system was to be a "shoulder-fired, infrared-guided (heat-seeking), fire and forget" infantry weapon designed to destroy low flying, high speed enemy aircraft before they interdicted friendly forces.

The combat role of this revolutionary system was to be a "shoulder-fired, infrared-guided (heat-seeking), fire-and-forget" infantry weapon designed to destroy low flying, high speed enemy aircraft before they interdicted friendly forces.

'Redeye' first entered operational capability and large scale deployment with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, as well as select NATO allies, in 1967. Not deterred by this technological leap in frontline infantry defense, the Soviets were concurrently developing their own first generation MANPAD—the SA–7a. NATO gave it the nickname 'Grail' to help its soldiers and airmen classify the type weapon system by the alpha-designator "G." All subsequently developed Soviet MANPAD systems follow the NATO established paradigm of assigning a "G" designated code name. Also fueling the flames of MANPAD propagation, the British, eager to illustrate their weapons system development prowess, introduced their first generation manportable SAM and named it 'Blowpipe.'

By most accounts of the era, the 'Redeye' was technically more lethal than its SA–7 competitor. The 'Redeye' was a bit more accurate and it produced a more significant explosive effect upon achieving its target as compared to its opposite number—the first generation SA–7 'Grail.' The Soviets, undaunted by their system's minor technological shortcomings, improved the 'Grail' to release the SA–7b in 1972. As the technology race continued to build new and improved MANPADs, the Superpowers began a different kind of competition—a race to arm their ally states and those forces who would align themselves against their respective adversaries.

According to manufacturer estimates, about 100,000 'Redeye' systems were built. Conservative estimates hold that 10,000

systems were sold to Australia, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Israel, Jordan, and West Germany under sanctioned and controlled arms transfers. The Soviet SA–7a and 7b was the father of what has become a family tree of SA–7 variants. The Soviet 'Grail' has been copied by no less than five nations, each producing its own SA–7 variant: China (HN–5a/b, sometimes designated as the CSA 3a/3b), Pakistan (Anza–1), Egypt (Sakr Eye), the former Yugoslavia ('Strela'–2/2M), and North Korea (NK–7).

The Soviet 'Grail' has been copied by no less than five nations, each producing its own SA–7 variant . . . .

Estimates of the number of SA–7 style manportable SAMs are unavailable, but it is probable that the SA–7 was the most widely built and proliferated system in the world throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The SA–7 and its variants are perfect examples of the issue which is at the crux of MANPAD threat question. That is, the exact number and location of MANPAD systems cannot be accurately assessed due to the inherent characteristics of MANPADs: size, mobility, and concealability.

The Chinese variant CSA 3a is pictured above.

The Next Generation: The Sons of 'Grail and 'Redeye'

In the late 1970s, the 'Redeye'and 'Grail' lifespans began to give way to the technological advancements of their respective progeny. The United States had begun research and development on the 'Redeye' replacement in the name of the 'Stinger.' The first iteration of the 'Stinger,' the 'Stinger Basic,' was fielded in 1981. The 'Stinger Basic' improved over the 'Redeye' in that it was able to attack much faster targets and, more importantly, it could engage targets from "all aspects;" that is, it could acquire and hit a target from the front, side, or rear. It could fly faster and higher to its target, and it carried a much improved high explosive warhead. The 'Redeye' was exclusively a "rear aspect" or "chase" missile system.

The Soviets began their own research and developement on the "Son of SA–7" in the 1970s and began to field the first successor to the 'Grail' in the form of the SA–14 'Gremlin' in the late 1970s. Subsequent improvements of the Soviet-style SAMs included the SA–16 'Gimlet,' sometimes designated the 'Igla–1' (Needle). The latest and most formidable of the former Soviet Union systems is the SA–18 'Grouse' ('Igla'). The SA–16 is roughly the technological counterpart of the 'Stinger-Basic.'

Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi

Libya's dictator Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi was one of the earliest buyers of Soviet SA–7s. He was also one of the first benefactors of MANPADs to terrorist groups, nationalistic separatist movements, and guerrilla forces in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and Africa.

MANPADs Spread Throughout the World

MANPADs were widely distributed throughout the waning decades of the Cold War. This was especially true as the United States and the U.S.S.R exported thousands of manportable SAM systems to their ally nations, third world militias, and various subnational groups. In the early 1980s, U.S.-manufactured 'Redeyes' found their way into the caches of the Afghan Mujahedin guerrillas. By the fall of 1986, the Mujahedin received their first consignments of 'Stingers.' The UNITA guerrilla fighters of Angola, another anti-Communist regime militia, also found themselves in possession of 'Stingers' during the late 1980s.

In both instances, the 'Stingers' were intended to enhance their ability to counter the militaries of the pro-Communist governments. However, in reality, these state-of-the-art MANPAD systems soon became an instrument by which civilian aircraft flights—contested as government military flights—were attacked by the rebel militias. The chronology of attacks in Angola and Afghanistan against civil aviation targets, presented earlier, reflects the results of such technologically advanced systems in the hands of undisciplined guerrilla militias.

Throughout the period, the Soviets supplied SA–7 'Grail,' SA–14 'Gremlin,' and SA–16 'Gimlet' SAMs to their satellite nations and the Warsaw Pact countries. Those countries producing SA–7 variants, China in particular, also began sales of their systems in order to raise hard currency. Other nations such as France and Sweden developed and fielded manportable SAMs, but have largely managed to limit the numbers and countries of proliferation.

MANPADs and State Sponsors of Terrorism: A Dangerous Combination

During the early 1970s, the Soviets were selling or otherwise transferring significant quantities of SA–7 'Grails' to regimes that were—and still are—considered state sponsors of terrorism. Two such nations that have received Soviet-style MANPADs, and have then subsequently further distributed the technology, were Libya and Cuba. Libya's dictator Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi was one of the earliest buyers of Soviet SA–7s. He was also one of the

first benefactors of MANPADs to terrorist groups, nationalistic separatist movements, and guerrilla forces in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and Africa. Cuba, the Soviet empire's favorite Western Hemisphere satellite state, became the main conduit for Communist-supplied arms to the antidemocratic government guerrillas of Central and South America.

In particular, Nicaragua and El Salvador, each embroiled in bloody civil conflicts, received their first consignments of 'Redeye,' SA–7, and SA–14 SAMs from Cuba in the late 1980s. The Communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and the antigovernment, pro-Communist FMLN guerrilla movement in El Salvador received 'Redeye,' SA–7, and SA–14 SAMs funneled through Nicaragua from Cuba. The U.S. 'Redeye'systems introduced into Central America during this time were from U.S. military stocks captured at the end of the Viet Nam conflict, taken into Soviet control, and subsequently shipped to Cuba.

MANPADs in the Sub-Saharan

State sponsors of terrorism, such as Libya, did not hesitate to supply their terrorist surrogates with MANPAD systems. Lacking any type of secondary, formal control, all MANPADs became highly valued and sought-after commodities in the underground black arms markets and weapons bazaars around the world. Libya's dictator, Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi, was one of the 1970s chief benefactors of military-style arms—including SA–7 MANPADs—to terrorist groups, separatist movements, and guerrilla forces.

One of the earliest recorded instances of an "intended" use of a Libyan-supplied SA–7 'Grail' by a terrorist group occurred in Italy during September 1973. At that time, Qaddafi supplied one of his surrogates, a team of five Arab terrorists, with SA–7 SAMs. Their mission was to shoot down an Israeli El Al Airliner in retaliation for an Israeli military dogfight victory over a Libyan combat jet during an air-to-air confrontation. Acting on Mossad information, the Italian police arrested five Palestinian terrorists in an apartment near Rome's Fiumicino Airport. The apartment contained two Soviet-origin SA–7 'Grail' MANPADs. Reportedly, the SA–7s were on a balcony and ready to shoot down an El Al plane after takeoff.

Although this 1973 attempt failed, Qaddafi again commissioned Palestinian surrogates in 1977 to bring down an El Al jetliner. This time the venue was to be Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta Airport in Kenya. The terrorist team's mission—to bring down the El Al jet shortly after takeoff—was interrupted by a routine security patrol in the vicinity of the airport. After their apprehension, the terrorists were never heard from again; Kenya's counterinsurgency unit headquarters was their last known location. Unfortunately, more SA–7s bearing Qaddafi's fingerprints would continue to turn up throughout the African subcontinent.

There are reports that place Uganda's Idi Amin on a short list of those who sought, and received, SA–7s from Libya during the mid-to-late 1970s. Other open source reports offer that Libyan-supplied SAMs were funneled into the arsenals of the South African liberation movement known as the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). During this time frame, SWAPO was attempting to establish its own nation in the western portion of South Africa; the area now known as Namibia. Subsequently, the UNITA guerrilla movement of Jonas Savimbi, attempting to counter the pro-Communist Government of Angola, was identified to cache SA–7s. Not surprisingly, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)—UNITA's mortal enemy—had also received SA–7s from their Soviet, Communist backers.

Tragically, SA–7 MANPAD use as a weapon of terror first occurred in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1978 and 1979. ZAPU, using their SAM –7s, attacked two Rhodesian Airlines flights resulting in the deaths of at least 111 passengers and crew.

The Zimbabwe African Peoples Army (ZAPU) had already been the recipients of SA–7 SAMs received from Idi Amin in Uganda. Amin had received his supply directly from Libya; Qaddafi acquired his arsenals of MANPADs directly from the Soviets. Tragically, SA–7 MANPAD use as a weapon of terror first occurred in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1978 and 1979. ZAPU, using their SAM –7s, attacked two Rhodesian Airlines flights resulting in the deaths of at least 111 passengers and crew.

Nicaragua and El Salvador: Maestro Fidel Orchestrates the Arms

Another area of the world where MANPADs have surfaced in the hands of rebel guerrilla movements is Nicaragua and El Salvador. In Nicaragua during the1980s, the pro-Communist Sandinista

government of Daniel Ortega received its military sustenance, including SAMs, from Mother Russia through Cuba. In El Salvador, the five factions of the pro-Marxist/Leninist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) received their Soviet munitions from Cuba. The proliferation of MANPADs in that particularly troubled part of the Southern Hemisphere is due, in large part, to the beneficence of Fidel Castro.

Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, Castro's Soviet-supplied weapons coffers teemed with Soviet small arms of all shapes and calibers. The caches also contained ample varieties of Soviet manufactured MANPADs: 'Grails,' 'Gremlins,' and 'Gimlets.' Thrown in for good measure was the occasional 'Redeye,' which made its way into Castro's hands through the Soviet Union. Given this reality, Castro's ability to vicariously incite rebel guerrilla mischief was considerable.

Nicaragua

With regard to MANPADs in Nicaragua, recall the introductory case study that detailed the 1993 explosion in Managua, Nicaragua. This disaster was caused by an FMLN arms cache explosion that unearthed 19 SA–7 SAMs. As early as 1989, MANPAD systems were definitively identified in Nicaraguan rebel hands when an unmarked aircraft transporting a shipment of arms crashed in southeastern El Salvador. The air shipment, reported to have originated in Nicaragua, included 1 'Redeye' and 24 SA–7s.

In September 1991, the American Embassy in Managua, citing local media, reported a failed attempt by ex-EPS (Nicaraguan Army) members to sell arms valued at $1 million to an unidentified Colombian "network." The arms to be sold included 20 SAMs—reportly an assortment of SA–7 'Grails' and SA–14 'Gremlins.' The SAMs were stolen from a Nicaraguan EPS armament supply. A senior Nicaraguan security official identified the Colombian "network" to be the Colombian M–19 guerrilla movement. Perhaps just as potentially nefarious, a second report in the Barricada newspaper indicated that the intended arms sale was to be consummated with "unnamed Salvadoran guerrilla movements and, subsequently, with Guatemalan insurgents."

Regardless of which of the scenarios is accurate, either one represents potentially dangerous consequences had the sale not been interrupted by security forces. Moreover, it is one more example of the underworld nature of manportable SAM proliferation.

The question of MANPADs in Nicaragua is an ongoing problem. Nicaragua's emergence as a fledging democracy is an ongoing competition between pro-Communist Sandinistas, former Contra rebel forces, and the current democratically elected government. There is a constant battle between the duly elected officials attempting to establish a coalition and the forces that held power during the 1970s and 1980s.

One manifestation of the competition between the central government and competing factions occurred on August 19, 1993, when Nicaraguan government officials were taken hostage by rebel forces known as the "Recontra 380 Northern Front." The term "Recontra" refers to a group of former Contras now known as the "Rearmed Contra" rebels; the "380 Front" is a faction in the northern regions of Nicaragua near the Honduran border.

AP/Wide World Photos

Rearmed Contra rebels display a ground-to-air missile from their arsenal in Caulatu, northern Nicaragua. A large convoy of government troops and artillery rumbled toward northern Nicaragua after the rearmed Contras kidnapped dozens of ranking officials who had gone to offer them amnesty.

Nicaraguan officials traveled to their region in an effort to offer them amnesty from the central government. In an effort to demonstrate their resolve regarding the hostage taking and illustrate their weapons capability, the Recontras posed two of their men brandishing a 'Redeye' launcher. Though clearly a symbolic gesture rather than a serious threat, it underscores the psychological nature of threatening a government with a MANPAD. Moreover, it underscores the existence of 'Redeyes' in Nicaragua.

El Salvador

Beginning in 1980, the umbrella organization Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, the FMLN, fought to replace the U.S.-backed democratic government of El Salvador with a pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet, Communist-style government. After 12 years of bloodshed, the five factions that comprise the FMLN agreed to a United Nations-brokered Peace Accord that effectively ended the open warfare on December 31, 1991. Throughout 12 years of guerrilla warfare, the FMLN indirectly received its weapons from the Soviet Union; Cuba was the Soviet warehouse and Nicaragua was the land mass in which the arms were either stored or transferred to FMLN factions. The November 1989 crash chronicled earlier demonstrates an intended transfer of SAMs into FMLN arms caches. FMLN-controlled MANPADs were intended to engage both the fixed-wing and rotor-wing assets of the El Salvadoran Air Force (ESAF).

The respected publication *Jane's Defence Weekly* (August 31, 1991) reported that there were in fact two ESAF aircraft and one helicopter shot down by FMLN rebels during the civil war. The ESAF aircraft were reportedly brought down with SA–14 'Gremlin' SAMs (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 12, 1991). In its August 31, 1991 edition, *Jane's* reported a weapons cache discovery in the capital city of San Salvador by the El Salvadoran Army. The inventory of weapons included four Soviet SA–14 'Gremlins' and one U.S.-manufactured 'Redeye.'

Under the 1992 United Nations peace accord, the FMLN agreed to declare the number and location of its MANPAD systems. The FMLN admitted that its factions maintained SAMs in various rebel encampment arms stores spread throughout El Salvador. Throughout 1992, dozens of MANPADs were relinquished to the U.N.

The 'Stinger' was first introduced in relatively small numbers into the Mujahedin arsenals during the summer of 1986. The 'Stinger's main target was to be Soviet attack helicopters and low flying, high performance military aircraft.

peacekeepers, who destroyed the weapons. In December 1992, the U.N. ONUSAL (the U.N. commission overseeing the implementation of the Salvadoran Peace Agreement) forces certified that the last of the FMLN's declared SAM systems had been accounted for and destroyed. Even though the FMLN supposedly declared to the United Nations the numbers and locations of all their arms caches, the May 23, 1993, explosion in Santa Rosa, Managua, exposed the FMLN's true intent to hold back sizeable quantities of small arms and MANPADs.

Afghanistan and 'Stingers'

Beginning in 1978, Afghanistan had been torn apart in a bloody internal struggle for control of the country between the pro-Soviet, Moscow-backed government forces and an active insurgency spearheaded by tribal Muslim factions known as the Mujahedin. In December of 1979, recognizing that the pro-Soviet ruling regime of one of its client states was in danger of being toppled by an organized militia, Moscow decided to invade Afghanistan. The goals of the Kremlin were to support the pro-Soviet Kabul government and suppress the insurgent Mujahedin fighters. As the invasion occurred within the context of the Cold War, the United States and other nations countered the Soviet invasion with an assault of their own. The U.S. action was in the form of arms and supplies for the Mujahedin fighters in order to counter the Soviet Army's clearly superior arms technology. Of those arms transferred to the Mujahedin, the weapon system that epitomized U.S. aid was the 'Stinger,' a manportable, surface-to-air missile system.

The 'Stinger' was first introduced in relatively small numbers into the Mujahedin arsenals during the summer of 1986. The 'Stinger's main target was to be Soviet attack helicopters and low flying, high performance military aircraft. By 1987, a significant number of 'Stinger' systems had been supplied to the seven major Mujahedin tribal factions. As the resistance fighters became trained and proficient on the 'Stinger' system, the Soviets forces began experiencing losses and were forced to alter their targets and operations area and, especially, their air attack doctrine (*Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1, 1992).

In actual warfare, the 'Stinger' proved itself capable of intercepting and destroying military aircraft. Initially this was especially true with regard to Soviet ground-attack helicopters. However, as the actual numbers of 'Stingers'—and those trained to use them—increased the Mujahedin expanded their target list. Beyond the obvious use against clearly identified military aircraft, the disparate Mujahedin factions expanded their own rules of engagement. Individual factions began attacking civilian aircraft they believed to be ferrying troops or supplies for the Kabul government (see **A Chronology of SAM Attacks: 1978–1993** for incident summaries).

During February 1988, more than 8 years since the first troop formation moved into Afghanistan, the Soviets decided to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. By the time the last of the Soviet forces withdrew in 1989, literally hundreds of 'Stinger' systems had been acquired by the seven factions of the Mujahedin. There is no way of knowing exactly how many 'Stingers' remained with the seven Afghan factions at the end of the war, nor was there any accounting for the number introduced and ultimately expended during combat operations. Likewise, it is impossible to estimate how many 'Stingers' may have been distributed beyond Mujahedin control (*Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 1993, and *New York Times*, July 24, 1993).

Conservative estimates suggest that there are hundreds of 'Stingers' yet unaccounted for and still in the hands of the Muslim Mujahedin clans.

Conservative estimates suggest that there are hundreds of 'Stingers' yet unaccounted for and still in the hands of the Muslim Mujahedin clans. Hoping to curb any additional 'Stinger' proliferation, in early 1993, the U.S. Government established a program to buy back some of the 'Stingers' currently under the control of the various tribal factions. Under the buy-back program, the United States is paying $100,000 or more per system to recover the SAMs. Even at this inflated price, a 'Stinger' reportedly will fetch more than $100,000 in the open arms market. Intelligence officials caution, however, that even with the buy-back program, hundreds of 'Stingers' will remain under the control of the Afghan factions (*Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 1993).

Further complicating the picture, it is significant that over the course of the 9-year insurgency, the Mujahedin received logistics, arms, and financial support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and

An Afghan Mujahedin rebel armed with a 'Stinger' MANPAD.

China. Additionally, during the last 5 years of the war, Muslim zealot volunteers came from the four corners of the Islamic world, namely, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Sudan, and others, in solidarity to fight with their Afghan Mujahedin brethren. Not only did they offer their services in the name of establishing an Islamic state in Afghanistan, they too, were exposed to and trained on the 'Stinger' in relatively large numbers. Therefore, the issue of proliferation must extend beyond the 'Stinger' system hardware. Just as important, the system "know how" has been transferred to other Mujahedin fighters who, today, might be among those at odds with the West.

'Stingers' on the Loose

News reports of 'Stingers' surfacing in Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, like Pakistan, occur relatively infrequently. What is certain is that the seven Afghan factions and their leaders do maintain 'Stingers' in some quantities. Some are held as a potential source of black market cash, while others, are "trophies" of the war with the Soviets. In what can only be described as the most perverse example of 'Stinger' systems on the loose, on July 10,

1993, Afghan Muslim Mullah Abdul Salem demanded the return of three 'Stingers' confiscated from his home by Pakistani authorities in March of 1993. The 'Stingers' were demanded as a partial ransom for the return of two Chinese citizen hydrologists who had been abducted by his clan in June of 1993. The two Chinese, who were working in a territorial area controlled by Mullah Salem's tribe, were merely in search of water sources at the time of their abduction (Reuters, July 10, 1993, and AFP-Hong Kong, July 6, 1993). This incident lends strong support to the widely held belief that 'Stingers' are still on the loose.

The Afghan Connection: 'Stingers' to Iran

Aviation security and intelligence officials of the U.S. Government are clearly concerned with the implications should 'Stingers' end up in the hands of organized terrorist groups or state sponsors of terrorism. This fear may be well grounded in that there is already a historical example of 'Stingers' falling into the hands of the Iranians. During the summer of 1987, the United States led a coalition of countries—in efforts to protect oil tankers' shipments—through the strategic Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf.

In particular, the United States symbolically "reflagged" a number of Kuwaiti oil tankers to deter attacks against the oil shipments. U.S. Naval and other Special Forces also were deployed into the Gulf to escort the tankers through the disputed waters. On the night of October 8 an American helicopter was on an defensive airborne patrol over the convoy of tankers and naval escorts. They were particularly on the look out for Iranian speedboats that had previously attacked the tankers using hit-and-run attacks. While investigating a suspected surface contact, the U.S.-McDonnell Douglas MH–6 helicopter encountered tracer rounds probing the night skies. The helicopter had found a small formation of Iranian speedboats. Two other U.S. Special Operations-type helicopters responded to the incident, and within minutes, the skirmish was over (*The Washington Post*, October 13, 1987).

Four Iranian speedboats had in fact been sighted. In the darkness the speedboats were ill-equipped to fend off the night-vision

capable helicopters. One of the speedboats, a 43-foot Swedish-made Boghammer patrol boat, was immediately sunk. A second speedboat, a 'Corvette' escaped into the darkness. The remaining two vessels were not as lucky. Identified as 'Boston Whalers,' they were severely damaged and quickly put out of commission. Both boats were later recovered to the deck of one of the U.S. Navy ships. According to Pentagan sources cited in *The Washington Post* (October 10, 1987), "pieces of a 'Stinger,' including batteries and packing, were found aboard two bullet-riddled gunboats." Ironically, 3 weeks earlier, *The London Sunday Times* (September 20, 1987) reported that "the Younis Khalis' Islamic Party, perhaps one of the most fundamentalist of the seven Afghan rebel factions with close ties to the Iranian regime, had sold 'Stingers' to the Iranians." According to *The London Times* story, two local Islamic Party commanders in western Afghanistan sold at least 16 'Stingers' from their stock of 32 to the Iranians for $1 million. Again citing *The Washington Post* (October 10, 1987), "*The Middle East Economic Digest* reported in its October 3 edition that the Iranian military had put some of the 'Stingers' on display during 'War Week' parades" in late September. According to an interview with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger conducted by *The Wall Street Journal* (October 14, 1987), the Pentagon believed the Iranians acquired the 'Stingers' by hijacking a convoy of supplies and arms destined for one of the Afghan Mujahedin factions operating near the Afghan-Iran border. Regardless of the avenue by which the Iranians were able to acquire the 'Stingers,' the end result is that they did have limited numbers in 1987, as evidenced in the speedboat incident of October 8.

At daybreak on October 9 the official Iranian radio news agency, INRA, reported its version of the speedboat-helicopter confrontation. INRA reported that a U.S. warship had been damaged by a surface missile and, that one U.S. helicopter had been shot down in the encounter—by a U.S.-made, 'Stinger' anti-aircraft missile. Although this claim was a fabrication, the Western news services did not learn of the 'Stinger' parts discovery until October 10.

Comparative Analysis of the Most Widely Proliferated MANPADs[4]

Throughout this study, many of the technical details associated with the most widely proliferated U.S. and former Soviet Union SAM systems have been incorporated within the text of the articles. The information below will attempt to provide concise descriptions, comparative details, and technical data associated with the U.S. 'Redeye' and 'Stinger' and the SA–7 'Grail,' SA–14 'Gremlin,' SA–16 'Gimlet' (Igla–1), and SA–18 'Grouse' (Igla).

U.S.-Manufactured Systems

FIM–43A: The 'Redeye.' The 'Redeye' is officially designated the FIM–43A. The system is comprised of three components: the M46A2 molded material launcher assembly, the M41 missile, and the launcher battery/coolant unit. The launcher includes an integral gripstock, an open-sight aperture and cover, and the missile launcher and container tube.



The 'Redeye'

It is an optically aimed, infrared homing, and shoulder-fired MANPAD based on a 2 3/4 inch rocket frame. It was first developed by the General Dynamics Corporation in 1959 and was fielded for operational use in 1967. It weighs approximately 29 pounds, has a range of nearly 3 miles, and can climb to a ceiling of 9,000 feet. It is powered by a two-stage propellant motor to a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 (1,232 mph). 'Redeye' has a contact-fuzed, high explosive warhead weighing approximately 2.2 pounds. Its guidance system is "passive infrared homing," which means it is a heat seeker; it is sometimes referred to as a "tail chaser" or simply a "chase" missile. Furthermore, it is known as a "fire-and-forget" system, meaning the gunner's job is complete after he or she pulls the trigger. As the target is acquired by the gunner, a gripstock buzzer indicates the missile is ready to fire. Upon pulling the trigger, the missile is launched and a booster motor carries it 20 feet in the air, protecting the gunner from the rocket motor blast. At that point, the sustainer motor ignites and propels the missile to its target.

[4]For larger diagrams and concise descriptions of these missile systems, please consult the supplement at the end of this article.



The 'Stinger'

The 'Stinger' is considerably improved over the 'Redeye' as the missile (weighing 22.3 pounds) is capable of a peak speed of Mach 2.0 (1,540 mph) which enables the missile to engage high-speed, maneuvering targets at any angle.

FIM–92A: The 'Stinger.' Like its predecessor, the 'Stinger' is shoulder-fired from its own sealed, disposable transport container and launch tube. The components include the launcher assembly with a missile, gripstock, an indentification friend or foe (IFF) interrogator, and an argon gas battery coolant unit.

Weighing 34½ pounds, the system incorporates a similar dual-stage solid propellant motor in which the booster launches the rocket a safe distance from the gunner before the ignition of the main sustainer motor. The 'Stinger' is considerably improved over the 'Redeye' as the missile (weighing 22.3 pounds) is capable of a peak speed of Mach 2.0 (1,540 mph) which enables the missile to engage high-speed, maneuvering targets at any angle. Its maximum ceiling is estimated to be between 3,800–4,000 meters (about 12,000–13,000 feet) and has a maximum range of 4,500 meters (2.8 miles).

The first generation (circa 1981) 'Singer-Basic' missile has a passive, infrared homing guidance, that is, it homes on infrared energy emitted by fixed-wing or rotor-wing aircraft and flies a proportional navagational course to intercept its target. An improved 1987 version, the 'Stinger-Post' (Passive Optical Seeker Technique) incorporates a dual-mode infrared/ultraviolet homing system.

The gunner visually acquires the target and then interrogates it as "friend or foe," known as IFF or identify friend or foe. It, too, is a "fire-and-forget" system. The missile notifies the gunner of lock-on, at which time the missile is launched. The 'Stinger' can be fired from all aspects, meaning the gunner is allowed the flexibility of a front, side, or rear shot. The 'Stinger' is an extremely durable system; the actual missile is stored in a sealed storage and launch tube, and requires no field maintenance.

Former Soviet Union-Manufactured Systems



The 'Grail' SA–7a and 7–b

SA–7a and 7b: The 'Grail.' The development of the former Soviet Union SA–7a was completed in 1965 and entered service in Soviet combat units in 1966. The SA–7b SAM entered service in 1972 and consisted of incremental improvements to the SA–7a. The SA–7 SAM consists of: the missile and its launch container canister, a reusable gripstock, and an external thermal battery. It has solid fuel booster and sustainer rocket motors that leave a distinctive

smoke signature at the initial stage of launch. The warhead consists of .37 kilograms of high explosive connected with both contact and graze fuzing. Its guidance is infrared, passive homing, that is, a "fire-and-forget" system.

The basic SA–7 'Grail' is probably the most widely copied of any manportable system.

The basic SA–7 'Grail' is probably the most widely copied of any manportable system. Its design and basic technical parameters spawned a family of variants that have been produced in Yugoslavia as the 'Strela'–2M and –2M/A, the Chinese HN–5A/B, the Egyptian 'Sakr Eye,' the Pakistani 'Anza,' and the North Korean 'NK–7' SAM system.

SA–14: The 'Gremlin.' The SA–14 was designed in the late 1970s as the advanced successor system to the SA–7a and 7b; it was first introduced into Soviet infantry units in 1977. Compared to its predecessor, the SA–14 consists of an upgraded rocket motor, a more powerful 2 kilogram (4.4 pound) warhead, cryogenically cooled, passive infrared homing seeker with proportional guidance. It is easily distinguishable from the 'Grail' family in that it has a ball-shaped battery/coolant reserve at the front of the gripstock as compared to a can-shaped thermal battery on the SA–7. It is roughly the same size as the SA–7, but is heavier in weight.



The 'Gremlin'

Available technical specifications indicate that its maximum engagement range is 6 kilometers and has a maximum altitude of 5,500 meters. It can attain a speed of Mach 2, roughly 1,540 mph. Its 2 kilogram, high explosive fragmentation warhead has contact and graze fuzing.

SA–16: The 'Gimlet' ('Igla'–1). The SA–16 SAM is an advanced evolution of the earlier SA–7 'Grail' and SA–14 'Gremlin' family. Designated 'Igla' (Needle) by the Soviets, it offers better range and greater seeker sensitivity than the SA–14. The technical enhancements and advanced design characteristics of the SA–16 make it the approximate equivalent of the U.S. 'Stinger-Basic' SAM. According to intelligence sources, the main improvements are the internal electronics. The SA–16's completely overhauled design incorporates a longer and greater diameter missile than its predecessors. Like the SA–14, it has a ball-shaped battery reserve



The 'Gimlet'

at the front of the gripstock; however, the battery is canted at a downward angle of 10 degrees relative to the launch tube. The guidance is described as "cooled infrared homing"; that is, it is a passive, "fire-and-forget" system.

The most significant change is in the shape of the missile's nose. Unlike the traditional hemispherical-shaped head with optical element, the SA–16 head has a pyramidal shape, that is, the nose is pointed like the French Mistral MANPAD system. It has a 2 kilogram, high explosive fragmentation warhead fitted with impact and graze fuzes. Reportedly, it has a maximum engagement range of 5 kilometers (about 3 miles) and a maximum altitude of 3,500 meters. It can attain a speed to target approximating 570 meters per second or 1,460 mph.

The SA–18 design enhancements allow it to engage low-flying aerial targets in both a "heads-on" and "tail-chasing" mode.

Jane's Defence Review (July 20, 1991) reported that the Soviets have exported the SA–16 system to Iraq, Nicaragua, and Angola. In the same article, the author offers that a SA–16 downed a U.S. Marine AV–8B Harrier II during the Gulf War.

SA–18: The 'Grouse' ('Igla'). Because it is the former Soviet Union's latest design, less is known about the SA–18 than any of the other SA family of SAMs. It is relatively and widely accepted that the SA–16 has been either sold, traded, or otherwise proliferated to other nations outside of the former Soviet Bloc since the mid-to-late 1980s. Therefore, the SA–18 is included in this section because it is assumed that it is only a matter of time before the SA–18 appears on the "for sale" displays in the arms bazaars of the world.



The 'Grouse'

The SA–18 design enhancements allow it to engage low-flying aerial targets in both a "heads-on" and "tail-chasing" mode. It also possesses electronic counter-countermeasure defensive capabilities. Its major component parts include: a missile in a launch tube (which doubles as its container), external power supply, launching mechanism, training device, and a mobile maintenance test set. The gunner has the flexibility to fire the system from a shoulder-standing or shoulder-kneeling firing position with an open field-of-view. The technical specifications indicate a maximum engagement range of 5.2 kilometers (about 3.1 miles); its maximum engagement altitude is 3,500 meters.

Attempts to Acquire MANPADs in the United States

Since 1986, there have been at least four instances of attempted purchases of U.S.-manufactured 'Redeye'or 'Stinger' manportable SAM systems.

In 1986, terrorist operatives of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) attempted to purchase a single 'Redeye' SAM along with other military weaponry; the intended use of the 'Redeye' SAM was to target a British military helicopter in Northern Ireland. Although their 1986 attempt to acquire a 'Redeye' was unsuccessful, the Provos again attempted in January of 1990 to purchase 'Stinger' SAMs in Florida. Also in 1990, narcotraffickers affiliated with Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar, attempted to purchase 120 'Stingers' for use against Colombian counternarcotics helicopter flights. In 1991, expatriot Croatian American citizens, acting on behalf of the Croatian National Resistance (CNR) militia of the former Yugoslavia, initiated negotiations in the Chicago area to purchase significant quantities of military supplies that included 100 'Stinger' MANPADs.

In all four of these attempted illegal acquisitions, the ultimate "end use" would have been outside of the continental United States and against noncivil aviation targets. In each of the stated instances, effective law enforcement operations are credited with the successful interruption of the intended diversions. In particular, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Customs Service (USCS), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) are the Federal agencies responsible for the enforcement of the arms export laws.

Boston 1986: A 'Redeye' and the PIRA

In the 24-year bloody campaign waged by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) nationalists against the British Crown, PIRA terrorists have stopped at nothing to acquire the most sophisticated and deadly weapons available on the world's underground arms markets. Such was the case in late 1985, when an Irish citizen living in Boston, Massachusetts, was identified by the FBI

as intending to purchase U.S. military weaponry for shipment to the PIRA in Northern Ireland. Among the items on the PIRA shopping list was a 'Redeye' manportable SAM.

The FBI, using an undercover special agent, began negotiations for the sale of 100 M–16 automatic infantry rifles, 5,000 rounds of ammunition for the rifles, and the 'Redeye' MANPAD. The price to be paid for the 'Redeye' was $10,000. On May 15, 1986, the FBI agent met with the prospective Irish purchaser and an accomplice who would be responsible for the transportation of the arms cache to Ireland.

During a subsequent undercover meeting, the purchase details were formalized, however, the Colombian subjects further revealed that the purchase was being made for the Pablo Escobar narcotics cartel.

On May 20, the undercover agent again met the duo in anticipation of consummating the transaction later that day. As the "dangle and sting" operation unfolded, the agent arranged to present his "bona fides," that is, the actual M–16s and the 'Redeye' SAM, to the purchasers on the confines of Hanscom Air Force Base near Boston. As the deal was about to unfold on Hanscom, the FBI arrested the two PIRA arms merchants as well as five other PIRA confederates who had been party to the final stages of the negotiations.

Stingers' for Pablo Escobar: The Ultimate Narcoweapon

In March of 1990, an undercover narcotics investigation initiated by the Sheriff's Department in Polk County, Florida, identified two Colombian nationals who disclosed that they wanted to deliver more than cocaine into the local illicit drug market. During the course of the undercover operations, they expressed a desire to purchase automatic military weapons and 'Stinger' SAMs. Furthermore, the Colombians stated that the intended use of the automatic weapons was for assassinating Colombian government officials and U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) special agents. The 'Stingers' would be used for shooting down Colombian military helicopters involved in counternarcotics operations.

As the investigation involved violations of Federal statutes, the FBI became involved in the operation and introduced an undercover special agent as the "arms dealer." During a subsequent undercover meeting, the purchase details were formalized, however, the Colombian subjects further revealed that the purchase

was being made for the Pablo Escobar narcotics cartel. On May 3, 1990, the subjects contacted their would-be arms merchants, advising the undercover agents that they had received authority from Pablo Escobar to consummate the deal. The duo was arrested 2 days later at the home of a known Miami, Florida, narcotics dealer as they intended to take delivery of the weapons. They were charged and subsequently convicted for conspiracy to violate three Federal statutes: Receiving Stolen Government Property, Exporting Arms Without a License, and a Federal narcotics statute.

Not deterred by their 1986 failure at acquiring a 'Redeye' SAM, the PIRA again sent its operatives to the United States with orders to purchase 'Stinger' SAMs.

January 1990: PIRA Ups the Ante and Goes for a 'Stinger'

Not deterred by their 1986 failure at acquiring a 'Redeye' SAM, the PIRA again sent its operatives to the United States with orders to purchase 'Stinger' SAMs. This time the PIRA looked south and established Florida as the place to acquire various military armaments. However, this time the PIRA quartermasters in Northern Ireland upped the ante to include a 'Stinger' SAM. As before, a joint undercover operation conducted by agents of the USCS, the BATF, and the FBI, posing as arms merchants, lured four admitted PIRA members into a sting operation.

The undercover operations lasted just 2 months and, in the end, netted four PIRA activists who had established their intent to purchase, among other armaments, a 'Stinger' SAM for the price of $50,000. In addition to openly discussing their membership in PIRA, they admitted the intended tactical use of the 'Stinger.' They readily professed that the 'Stinger' would be used in a spectacular operation intended to shoot down a British military helicopter operating in Northern Ireland. The suspects, three Irish nationals and one Canadian PIRA activist, were charged with conspiracy to Possess Destructive Arms, Possession of a Destructive Device, and violations of the Arms Export Control Act. All four were subsequently convicted and are currently serving their sentences in Federal institutions.

The OTPOR Operation: 'Stingers' for the CNR

During the summer of 1991, agents of the U.S. Customs Service were alerted to a group of Chicago-based expatriot Croatians affiliated with a group known as OTPOR. Their intent was to

purchase military hardware that would then be shipped to the Croatian National Resistance (CNR) militia in the former Yugoslavia. An USCS undercover investigation was initiated and targeted four OTPOR prospective arms entrepreneurs, who were attempting to arrange a shipment of arms reportedly worth $12 million; high on the priority for acquisition were 100 'Stinger' MANPADs.

The purchase requirement of 100 'Stingers' would have replaced or supplemented a reportedly earlier black market acquisition of the Chinese produced HN–5A version of the Soviet SA–7. In addition to the Chinese HN–5As under their control, the CNR supplies are reported to include significant numbers of the Yugoslavian produced 'Strela' 2M/A SAM; the 'Strela' is a more advanced and capable version of the Soviet SA–7B 'Grail.' For unknown reasons—perhaps because the buyers feared a "sting" in progress—the OTPOR group failed to resurface, and the investigation ended without the intended $12 million purchase of arms for the CNR.

It is unquestionably the MANPAD system most sought after by terrorist groups, criminal enterprises, even the many militia groups around the world. It is, also, arguably the best, most capable, and potentially lethal MANPAD system in the world.

'Stinger': The Cadillac of the MANPADs

This attempted purchase by an organized militia illustrates the serious nature of the proliferation of state-of-the-art manportable SAMs. Unlike the terrorist group which is intending to purchase MANPAD systems in small lots, the agents of the third world countries are looking to hundreds of systems per purchase. This 1991 'Stinger' diversion attempt was, arguably, intended for an "organized militia" in an area of open warfare. It is likely, that had the buy been accomplished, the highest probability of use for this system would be in a military-style defensive posture. However, it does underscore the preeminent status the 'Stinger' has achieved in the 1990s. It is unquestionably the MANPAD system most sought after by terrorist groups, criminal enterprises, even the many militia groups around the world. It is, also, arguably the best, most capable, and potentially lethal MANPAD system in the world.

Conclusions

Terrorism experts and U.S. Government officials responsible for the security of the traveling public are increasingly concerned about the threat to civil aviation from manportable, surface-to-air missile systems. This is due in large measure to the proliferation of U.S.- and Soviet-manufactured MANPADs during the last 20 years of the Cold War. There is a significant focus regarding the potential for MANPAD usage by organized terrorist groups because of the inherent nature of the MANPADs, that is, they are relatively small, easily concealable, and highly mobile. The exact number and locations of SAMs cannot be accurately assessed for these reasons.

There is a significant focus regarding the potential for MANPAD usage by organized terrorist groups because of the inherent nature of the MANPADs . . . .

During the Cold War, MANPADs were transferred or otherwise obtained by antigovernment militias, insurgent groups, and even known terrorist organizations. Countries identified as state sponsors of terrorist groups, such as Libya and Cuba, obtained large numbers and various types of MANPADs; they did not hesitate to further proliferate these MANPAD systems to their surrogates.

Libya's Colonel Qaddafi became a well known source of Soviet-style SAMs throughout the African subcontinent and to other groups with extreme nationalistic inclinations. During the 1970s, he twice enlisted radical Palestinian terrorists to attempt to shoot down an Israeli El Al passenger jet. Fidel Castro was the main conduit causing the secondary proliferation of SAMs to guerrillas in El Salvador and the Communist-backed Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.

During the period 1978–1993, there have 25 identified attacks against civilian airliners or other commercial or military aircraft that were on humanitarian relief flights. There were 536 passengers and crew fatalities as a result of these attacks. Of these 25 attacks, 22 occurred in areas of the world torn by ethnic or regional strife, an active guerrilla movement, or border dispute.

The FAA and the airlines receive hundreds of anonymous bomb threats each year; only a very few prove to be worthy of serious and active investigation and countermeasure intervention. By

contrast, the number of documented SAM-specific threats against U.S. civil aviation is but a fraction of a percent of all threats brought to the attention of the U.S. Government each year. However, in the instance of a specific SAM threat, accurate technical information coupled with a definitive, proactive plan of countermeasures is the best method for defeating the threat.



FIM–43A System

The U.S. FIM–43A system, or 'Redeye,' was developed as a shoulder-launched, infrared guided, fire-and-forget surface-to-air missile in 1956 by General Dynamics. The system is comprised of three components: the M46A2 molded material launcher assembly, the M41 missile, and the launcher battery/coolant unit. The launcher includes an integral gripstock, an open-sight aperture and cover, and the missile launcher-container tube. The FIM–43A initial operational capability was 1967.

Parameter	Description/Value
Guidance	Passive infrared homing
Propulsion	Solid fuel dual thrust ejection and sustainer rocket motor
Warhead	2 kg HE-fragmentation with contact fuze
Maximum speed	1.6 Mach
Engagement Range Maximum Minimum	 4.0 kilometers 0.6 kilometers
Engagement Altitude Maximum Minimum	 < 3,800 meters < 25 meters
Reaction time	10 secs
System deployment time	5 secs
Missile preparation time (after activation of battery (ies))	5 secs
Launcher	Manportable single-round disposable with gripstock



FIM–92 A System

The U.S. FIM–92A system, or 'Stinger,' is a manportable surface-to-air missile system which began production in 1979 by General Dynamics. It is comprised of the launcher assembly with a missile, a gripstock, an IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) interrogator, an argon gas Battery Coolant Unit (BCU), and an impulse generator (battery energizer) unit. The FIM–92A initial operational capability was 1981.

Parameter	Description/Value
Guidance	Passive infrared homing
Propulsion	Solid fuel ejection motor, dual thrust booster and sustainer motor
Warhead	3 kg HE-fragmentation with contact fuze
Maximum speed	1.7 Mach
Engagement Range Maximum Minimum	 < 6.0 kilometers 0.3 kilometers
Engagement Altitude Maximum Minimum	 <4,000 meters 10 meters
Reaction time	10 secs
System deployment time	5 secs
Missile preparation time (after activation of battery) (ies)	5 secs
Launcher	Manportable fitted IFF system

Summary of Short Range U.S. MANPADS Systems

Parameter	Redeye	Stinger Basic	Stinger Post [1]	Stinger RMP [2]
Initial operational capability	1967	1981	1987	1988
Engagement Range				
Maximium effective (km)	4.0	5.5	5.5	6.0
Minimum effective (km)	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3
Engagement Altitude				
Maximum effective (m)	<3,000	<4,000	<4,000	< 5,000
Minimum effective (m)	20	10	10	10
Warhead mass (kg)	1.07	1.03	1.03	1.03
Guidance Type	Passive IR homing	Passive IR homing	Dual Mode IR/UV (Infrared/ Ultraviolet)	Dual Mode IR/UV
IRCCM [3]	None	Flare reject		

[1] Stinger POST (Passive Optical Seeker Technique)
[2] Stinger RMP (Reprogrammable Microprocessor)
[3] Infrared Counter-Countermeasures



SA–7a System

The development of the FSU SA–7a, or 'Grail,' was completed in 1965 and entered Soviet Army service in 1966. The SA–7a surface-to-air missile system consists of the missile and its launch container canister, a reloadable gripstock, and a canlike thermal battery. Variants include the North Korea PGLM System and the Yugoslavian Strela–2M/A. The SA–7a initial operational capability was 1968.

Parameter	Description/Value
Guidance	Infrared passive homing
Propulsion	Solid fuel booster and solid fuel sustainer rocket motor
Warhead	1.1 kg HE-smooth fragmentation with contact and graze fuzing
Maximum target speed	450 meters per sec
Engagement Range Maximum Minimum	 4.2 kilometers 0.5 kilometers
Engagement Altitude Maximum Minimum	 4,000 meters 25 meters
Reaction time	10 secs
System deployment time	10 secs
Missile preparation time (after activation of battery)	5 secs
Launcher	Manportable single-round disposable with gripstock



SA-7b System

The development of the FSU SA-7b, or 'Grail,' (Strela-2M/9K32m) manportable missile system was specifically designed to destroy visually acquired aerial targets such as helicopters and aircraft. The system also can engage and destroy hovering targets provided they are within the launch envelope and emitting sufficient heat energy for the seeker to lock on to. The SA-7b missile system consists of the missile, reusable launch tube, gripstock launch mechanism, and disposable thermal battery power supply unit. The SA-7b initial operation capability was 1972.

Parameter	Description/Value
Guidance	Single channel passive infrared homing
Propulsion	Solid fuel ejection, booster, and sustainer rocket motor
Warhead	1.1 kg HE-fragmentation with contact and graze fuzing
Maximum speed	500 meters per sec
Engagement Range Maximum Minimum	 4.2 kilometers 0.5 kilometers
Engagement Altitude Maximum Minimum	 4,500 meters 10 meters
Reaction time	14-17 secs
System deployment time	10 secs
Missile preparation time (after activation of battery)	5 secs
Launcher	Manportable single-round disposable with gripstock



SA–14 System

The FSU SA–14, or 'Gremlin,' is a manportable missile system, as compared to the SA–7 series, consists of an ungraded rocket motor, more powerful warhead, cryogenically cooled passive infrared homing seeker with proportional guidance. It is distinguished from its predecessor in that it has a ball-shaped battery/coolant reserve in the front of the gripstock. The SA–14 initial operational capability was 1977.

Parameter	Description/Value
Guidance	Cooled infrared homing
Propulsion	Solid fuel booster and solid fuel sustainer rocket motor
Warhead	2 kg HE-fragmentation with contact and graze fuzing
Maximum speed	600 meters per sec
Engagement Range Maximum Minimum	 6.0 kilometers 0.6 kilometers
Engagement Altitude Maximum Minimum	 5,500 meters 10 meters
Reaction time	10–13 secs
System deployment time	10 secs
Missile preparation time (after activation of battery)	5 secs
Launcher	Manportable single-round disposable with gripstock



SA-16 System

The FSU SA–16, or 'Gimlet,' manportable missile system was considered to be a highly accurate weapon system to replace the SA–7 system. The SA–16 system is comprised of a missile in a 9M313–1 launch tube with a 9P515–2 gripstock launch mechanism and a portable battery power unit. The SA–16 initial operational capability was 1981. Like the SA–14, the SA–16 has a ball-shaped battery/coolant reserve (A) at the front of the gripstock as compared to a simpler can-shaped thermal battery on SA–7 'Grail' family. However, the SA–16 battery is canted at a downward angle of about 10° relative to the launch tube. The most distinctive difference between the SA–14 and SA–16 missiles is the nose shape (B). The SA–14 uses a traditional hemispherical optical head, while the SA–16 head is a conical, pyrimidal shape.

Parameter	Description/Value
Guidance	Cooled infrared homing
Propulsion	Three-stage solid propellant ejection, booster, and sustainer
Warhead	2 kg HE-fragmentation with contact and graze fuzing
Maximum target speed	680 meters per sec
Engagement Range Maximum Minimum	 5.0 kilometers 0.6 kilometers
Engagement Altitude Maximum Minimum	 3,500 meters 10 meters
Reaction time	10-13 secs
System deployment time	10 secs
Missile preparation time (after activation of battery)	5 secs
Launcher	Manportable single-round disposable with gripstock



SA–18 System

The FSU SA–18, or 'Grouse,' system is designed to defeat low-flying aerial targets head-on and in the tail-chasing modes. The SA–18 possesses electronic counter-countermeasure capabilities. The missile system consists of a missile in a launch tube (also used as a container), external power supply, launching mechanism, training device, and a mobile maintenance test set. The missile can be launched by an anti-aircraft gunner from a shoulder-standing firing position, or from the shoulder-kneeling firing position with an open field of view. The SA–18 initial operational capability was 1984.

Parameter	Description/Value
Guidance	IR homing
Propulsion	Solid propellant ejection, booster, and sustainer
Warhead	Blast fragmentation
Maximum target speed	680 meters per sec
Engagement Range Maximum Minimum	 5.2 kilometers 0.5 kilometers
Engagement Altitude Maximum Minimum	 3,500 meters 10 meters
Reaction time	13 secs
Missile mass at launch	10.6 kg

Summary of Short Range MANPAD Systems of the Former Soviet Union (FSU)

Parameter	SA–7a 'Grail'	SA–7b 'Grail'	SA–14 'Gremlin'	SA–16 'Gimlet'	SA–18 'Grouse'
Country of origin	FSU	FSU	FSU	FSU	FSU
Initial operational capability	1968	1972	1977	1981	1984
Missile:					
Engagement Range					
Maximum effective (km)	4.2	4.2	6.0	5.0	5.2
Minimum effective (km)	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5
Engagement Altitude					
Maximum effective (m)	4,000	4,500	5,500	3,500	3,500
Minimum effective (m)	25	10	10	10	10
Warhead mass (kg)	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Guidance:					
Type:	IR homing	IR homing	IR homing	IR homing	IR homing
IRCCM*	None	None	None	None	Flare reject-spectral comparison

*Infrared Counter-Countermeasures

Embassy Drawdowns and Evacuations

"As the author indicates, diplomatic immunity has become a frequent casualty in the civil wars which are accompanying the decay of states in the post cold war era. As Ambassador to Liberia and Somalia, and Director of the State Department's Task Force on Liberia in the months between Monrovia and Mogadishu, I was deeply involved in the events Jim Dunne describes. The lessons he has drawn from those episodes and the similar crisis in Kinshasha are in my experience quite valid. I would put greatest emphasis on the benefits of realistic drills. They not only detect the human and mechanical flaws which could complicate an evacuation but also help generate the self-confidence necessary to deal with that anxiety which is an inevitable consequence of physical danger."

—U.S. Ambassador James K. Bishop
June 22, 1993

By Jim Dunne

Introduction

Many areas of the world are experiencing levels of instability unknown since World War II. In many countries, the forces of democratization and uncertain economic circumstances have given rise to antigovernment movements and ethnic/nationalistic strife on a large scale. Developments in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union are examples of the kind of disorder that has been observed in a region that was kept tightly controlled by Communist governments. Profound social, economic, and political change has affected the stability of a number of industrialized countries but has had extensive ramifications in developing nations.

Nowhere in the developing world are occurrences of civil disorder more frequent or larger in scope than in Sub-Saharan Africa.[1] Gaining its independence in the late 1950s and 1960s, most African nations were ruled by autocratic governments that allowed little or no popular dissent. Freedom of expression through political action or other means was nonexistent or rare. Economic conditions on the continent remained, with few exceptions, depressed, leaving an ever-increasing number of Africans impoverished. Military and, less frequently, civilian coups brought about

Special thanks to the Citizens Emergency Center, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

[1]For the sake of brevity, sub-Saharan Africa will henceforth be referred to as Africa.

changes in leaders and governments, but usually with insignificant changes in the lives of its citizens. According to Max Rosenfels, a Zimbabwe parliamentarian whose comments appeared in a February 2, 1992, article in the Manchester *Guardian Weekly*, "Since 1960, there have been more than 70 military coups in Africa, and during the same period some $80 billion has been taken out of the continent by corrupt leaders." The era also was marked by several long-running insurgencies that took many casualties and drained economic resources.

...the threat of criminal activity and random violence, more than anti-Americanism or anti-Westernism, poses the greater threat to Americans in the more unstable nations of Africa.

Africa's traditional troubles have been supplemented by a broader element of popular dissent. Many African governments now face vocal and often violent resistance by citizens demanding more open and democratic systems and freedom from poverty. On August 10, 1992, the Freedom House, a nonprofit monitoring organization in New York stated that, "Nine sub-Saharan states can now be considered full democracies. That contrasts with just three in 1989. But 21 states still only have limited political freedom and 17 have almost none. With the region's population expected to grow from 526 million to 1.4 billion people in the year 2025, with poverty, AIDS, and illiteracy endemic and with sub-Saharan Africa's external debt exceeding its GNP, the prospects for a smooth transition seem dim."

Civil unrest is rarely anti-American in nature or an expression of political or ideological hostility toward Westerners in general. Americans can become the focus of protest because of perceived support by the U.S. Government for the host government or for the opposition. More often, the violence is criminal in nature and is aimed primarily at the wealthy expatriate community.

In addition, a breakdown of civil order usually leads to random violence that could inadvertently threaten the safety of diplomatic personnel and expatriates in these countries. In essence, the threat of criminal activity and random violence, more than anti-Americanism or anti-Westernism, poses the greater threat to Americans in the more unstable nations of Africa.

The Department of State acts to ensure the security of U.S. diplomatic personnel and private Americans who may be endangered by conditions of civil disorder. An important resource available to

GLOSSARY

Authorized Departure: A procedure, short of ordered departure, by which mission employees or dependents or both, are permitted to leave post voluntarily in advance of normal rotation or when imminent threat to life requires it.

Community Liaison Officer (CLO): The commitment of the Department of State to the well-being of its personnel and their families is manifested in its support of Community Liaison Officers (CLO) at overseas posts. The CLO works with U.S. Government community members to maintain high morale primarily through orientation activities, cultural and recreational programs, information dispersal, counseling and referral, and assistance with security, education, and employment for family members. The CLO frequently develops outreach programs that work with the large private American and host country community, but the CLO's primary focus is the successful intergration of the U.S. Government employee and his or her family into the life of the post.

Consular Information Sheets: Are available for every country in the world. They include such information as location of the U.S. Embassy or Consulate in the subject country, unusual immigration practices, health conditions, political disturbances, unusual currency and entry regulations, crime and security information, and drug penalties. If an unstable condition exists in a country that is not severe enough to warrant a Travel Warning, a description of the condition(s) may be included under an optional section entitled "Areas of Instability." On limited occasions, the State Department restates in this section any U.S. Embassy advice given to official employees. Consular Information Sheets generally do not include advice, but present information in a factual manner so the traveler can make his or her own decision concerning travel to a particular country.

Crisis Management Exercise: Exercise scenario that simulates rapidly deteriorating local regional and world conditions. As the exercise evolves, the post's Emergency Action Committee is tested on its ability to manage the emergency and on the validity of its Emergency Action Plan.

Drawdowns: A reduction in the number of official personnel and/or dependents at a U.S. mission carried out in reaction to or in anticipation of local events.

Emergency Action Committee (EAC): An organization established at a Foreign Service post by the Chief of Mission or principal officer for the purpose of directing and coordinating post's response to contingencies.

Emergency Action Plan (EAP): A mandatory plan prepared by all U.S. diplomatic missions overseas to assist personnel at post in dealing with emergency situations whether natural or manmade.

Noncombatant Evacuation Orders (NEO): A Department of Defense (DOD) term describing the procedures providing for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens and certain designated aliens in a dangerous area.

Ordered Departure: A procedure by which the number of U.S. Government employees or dependents or both at a Foreign Service post is reduced. Departure is mandatory and may be initiated by the Chief of Mission or the Secretary of State.

Public Announcement: A statement by Department of State Spokesman or Bureau of Public Affairs as a means to disseminate information quickly about terrorist threats and other relatively short-term and/or transnational conditions posing significant risks to the security of the American traveler.

Travel Warnings: Are issued when the Department of State decides, based on all relevant information, to recommend that Americans avoid travel to a certain country. Countries where avoidance of travel is recommended will have Travel Warnings as well as Consular Information Sheets.

overseas travelers is the Consular Information Sheets issued for every country by the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs. The Consular Information Sheet replaced the Travel Advisory with its combination of warnings, cautions, and notices. Consular Information Sheets include enough information regarding entry requirements and possible problems in a country to enable prospective travelers to make their own decisions as to the advisability of a trip. The Sheets include a listing of areas considered to be dangerous by embassy or consulate security officers, a brief statement on the availability and quality of tourist facilities, relevant curfew information, fax numbers for all U.S. posts in country, unusual public hours of U.S. facilities, and overseas dialing prefixes.

For a small number of countries posing special risks, the Department also issues Warnings. These are issued only when avoiding travel to a country is recommended because the situation is so dangerous or unstable that a U.S. citizen traveling there is likely to be adversely affected or the U.S. Government's ability to assist that citizen is severely constrained. For especially sudden or urgent developments, occasional public announcements are used to provide information to the traveling public.

From time to time, however, eruptions of civil disorder require the urgent removal of Americans, both official and private, from areas of possible harm. In such situations, the State Department, sometimes together with appropriate military elements, arranges for the evacuation of official Americans. Military elements often identify such evacuations as Noncombattant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).

All Americans generally are urged to depart by commercial transportation while they can, but are included in official charter or military evacuation efforts if they cannot. U.S.-arranged evacuations also may include third country nationals as designated by the mission with the approval of the Department of State. Ideally, evacuations are arranged to take place in a permissive environment, that is, under circumstances that permit departure before U.S. interests face immediate harm.

Embassy Drawdowns and Evacuations

Since 1990, partial or complete evacuations of U.S. personnel due to civil unrest occurred in several African countries, either due to domestic concerns or threats arising from international circumstances, such as Operation Desert Storm.

This article, will focus on evacuations in Liberia, Zaire, and Somalia. In the first section, we will review the conditions in Liberia and Zaire that required the partial withdrawal of personnel from U.S. posts. (Partial evacuations are usually called drawdowns.) Next we will examine, in more detail, the conditions that necessitated the complete evacuation of personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia. Finally, we will list and briefly discuss several important lessons that have been learned from the evacuation experiences.

Most evacuations are authorized or ordered as a result of civil unrest and the threat of terrorist activity. However, the evacuation of U.S. Embassy Columbo in June 1992 was due to massive flooding. Its evacuation status ended in July 1992.

As of January 1994 the evacuation status has ended for all diplomatic posts except U.S. Embassies Khartoum and Algiers. Their evacuation status is periodically reviewed.

U.S. Diplomatic Posts in Evacuation Status 1990–1993



Liberia and Zaire: Embassy Drawdowns

Liberia

The Liberian crisis began on Christmas Eve 1989, when rebel leader Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) began their drive from the northwestern part of the country toward the capital, Monrovia. The insurgent push lasted several months and allowed the U.S. Embassy adequate time to prepare for the chaos that would engulf the country. Throughout most of the crisis, however, the pace of the advancing insurgency and the potential level of the growing anarchy remained uncertain.

In the first half of 1990, thousands of private American citizens departed Liberia, together with dependents of official American Embassy personnel and other U.S. Embassy staff members deemed to be "nonessential." The U.S. presence in Liberia, one of the largest in Africa, was reduced to a few dozen employees. The initial departees flew via commercial charter aircraft from Monrovia's Spriggs Payne Airport to Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, and



Liberian civilians seeking refuge from the fighting outside the Embassy compound.

then onward to the United States aboard civilian charters and U.S. Air Force planes. Later evacuees were transported by military helicopter from the U.S. Embassy compound to Freetown, Sierra Leone.

By June, the NPFL surrounded the capital and attacked rival forces located close to the American community in Monrovia. During this period, the U.S. Embassy became physically isolated and received several stray rounds from the conflict that raged around it. It also was subject to possible mob action by Liberians seeking shelter or booty. Meanwhile, a six-vessel U.S. naval task force, part of an initiative designated Operation Sharp Edge, had been dispatched to a point a few miles from the Liberian coast as a precautionary measure. One of the first tasks of the force was to reach an agreement with U.S. civilian authorities concerning the ultimate parameters of the operation. Specifically, the issue under discussion was the advisability and extent of forceful intervention in the Liberian conflict by U.S. military elements.

A threat by Prince Johnson, leader of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), a rival group that had broken with Charles Taylor, to take foreign hostages, triggered the deployment of several hundred Marines from the task force. The Marines arrived by helicopter on the Embassy's former basketball court and began to secure the Embassy compound, installing mortar batteries at strategic locations. Furniture and metal safes and, in some instances, cases of MREs, or meals ready to eat, were stacked against windows to stop incoming rounds. The Marines were tasked with recovering small numbers of American personnel located at two regional communications facilities outside

The Marines unloading the fast attack vehicles on an Embassy compound basketball court coverted to a helopad.



U.S. Ambassador Peter Jon de Vos says goodbye to INPFL rebel leader Prince Johnson at Embassy steps.

Monrovia. In addition, the Marines facilitated the Embassy-arranged evacuation of more than 2,500 persons, mostly foreign nationals, by U.S. helicopters to safety in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

While the U.S. presence was reducing in size and increasing security measures in the face of growing mayhem around it, in August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a military force (known as ECOMOG) to intervene in Liberia. ECOMOG troops eventually succeeded in pushing the rival rebel groups out of Monrovia.

In their wake, a Liberian governmental entity referred to as the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was formed in mid-1990 under ECOWAS auspices and established itself as the principal governing entity in the capital area. Most of the country remained under control of the NPFL, which refused to recognize IGNU's authority. In time, fighting subsided and the task force, along with the Marines, were allowed to depart. Since then, ECOMOG has provided security in Monrovia and the U.S. Embassy, staffed by approximately 35 officers, has never closed.



The U.S. Marine Observation Post at the entrance to the American Embassy Compound.

Zaire

Civil disorder in Kinshasa, Zaire, by contrast, arrived with little warning. In the months prior to the unrest that required the Embassy to draw down, there had been growing dissatisfaction among the populace, including the poorly paid military, from escalating economic woes and frustration over the lack of progress in political reform. A mutiny and military-initiated riots and looting had occurred on September 2 and 4, 1991, which raised alarms about a possible breakdown of order, but relative tranquility prevailed during the subsequent 3 weeks. No one knew, however, when tensions would again erupt into anarchy.

It happened on September 23, 1991. The first indication of trouble arose when an Embassy employee arrived at work after escaping an attempt by soldiers to pull her from her car. The incident occurred in the midst of a riot encountered as the employee drove children to school. Shortly thereafter, reports of violence became more numerous and more serious, and looters could be observed from the Embassy. As the unrest grew, Americans were rapidly accounted for and deemed safe. Looting and other acts of violence appeared to be directed not at expatriates but at high-ranking

Non-American citizens awaiting evacuation.

Zairian officials and commercial establishments. An immediate problem in protecting U.S. mission personnel, however, became clear: residences of official Americans were not consolidated but scattered over various parts of Kinshasa, many in neighborhoods where Zairian officials also resided. As a result, many Embassy personnel had to abandon their homes and live with colleagues in safer parts of the city.

On September 24, more than a thousand French and Belgian troops arrived to restore order and protect their nationals in Kinshasa and other parts of the country. A curfew was put in place but civil disorder would continue for at least a month before a semblance of stability became apparent.

Americans were evacuated in stages, nearly all convening at the Kinshasa port and transported across the Zaire River to Brazzaville, Congo's capital. At Brazzaville's airport, Americans boarded charter aircraft for the journey home. Nonofficial Americans, including missionaries, teachers, and business people, signed promissory notes to reimburse the U.S. Government at a later date for costs of transporting them out of the region. More than 1,000 Americans departed on September 26. Teachers at the American school and some 200 Peace Corps volunteers left the next day. The final group of about 300 American evacuees was safely removed on Saturday, September 28.

In the midst of chaotic surroundings and despite numerous logistical difficulties, about 1,500 Americans were evacuated without death or injury. Potentially dangerous, chaotic conditions and other considerations caused the already reduced U.S. Consulate in Lubumbashi, Zaire, to evacuate its staff by charter air after Belgian troops securing Lubumbashi airport announced their intentions to depart.

Since the fall of 1991, disturbances and limited unrest in Zaire have flared briefly on several occasions but tension has been constant because of continuing political instability and economic deterioration. The U.S. Consulate in Lubumbashi has not reopened. Throughout the post-evacuation period, the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa has been staffed with 38 officers and, like U.S. Embassy Monrovia, has never closed.

Somalia: Embassy Evacuation

The unrest that engulfed Mogadishu, Somalia, in the first days of January 1991 provided a rare case in that U.S. Embassy personnel had to be extracted from an overseas post in a nonpermissive environment. Unlike the circumstances in Liberia and Zaire, where Americans evacuated because of the possibility of an attack, conditions in Somalia forced Americans to leave as they were under direct attack by marauding military and criminal elements. By all accounts, American personnel in Mogadishu narrowly escaped with their lives.

Drawdown and Consolidation

In the months prior to the evacuation, advances by three major rebel armies essentially limited the government's area of control to the national capital and regional administrative centers. Although large-scale hostilities had not broken out in Mogadishu, growing criminal violence and abuses by military personnel testified to the rapid deterioration of the security environment. One member of the U.S. Embassy's Marine Security Guard Detachment was seriously wounded in a downtown robbery, and similar encounters took the lives of several other Western expatriates. Several U.S. Embassy employees and dependents were shot or shot at by armed thieves, many in government military uniform. Increasingly adverse conditions forced official Americans to restrict their movements to within 2 kilometers of the new 160-acre U.S. Embassy compound and to observe a curfew.

Unlike the circumstances in Liberia and Zaire, where Americans evacuated because of the possiblity of an attack, conditions in Somalia forced Americans to leave as they were under direct attack by marauding military and criminal elements.

On December 5, 1990, the U.S. Ambassador recommended an authorized departure (voluntary) of U.S. Government dependents and nonessential personnel. This is the first step in reducing an embassy's size. The Embassy also began determining the prospective events, or "tripwires," that would lead to an ordered departure of personnel. In Washington, the deteriorating security situation in Mogadishu was reflected in a revised Travel Advisory. Soon afterward, the United Nations ordered the departure of its own presence in Somalia. On December 10, the U.S. Embassy moved to an ordered departure status.

When to Alert Private American Citizens

As a situation becomes increasingly dangerous, a Travel Warning is issued to alert Americans visiting or residing in the country. Whenever a decision is made to draw down or evacuate embassy personnel because of danger, this decision is made public immediately and included in the country's Travel Warning. The language of the Travel Warning will vary from situation to situation, but clearly explains why the decision has been reached to drawdown or evacuate and offer guidance to private Americans. Travel Warnings are published with the concurrence of the Department and used to alert travelers worldwide.

By December 19, the drawdown of U.S. Embassy personnel appeared complete. The size of the official American community was reduced from 147 to 37 people. Some 45 private Americans remained in the country. Efforts at further reduction were interrupted on December 30, when the Somali government provoked a spontaneous, popular uprising by attempting to disarm residents of eastern Mogadishu. This action sharply escalated the level of violence in Mogadishu.

First Calls for Evacuation

On December 30 and 31, almost all official Americans were moved into the Ambassador's residence, the Marine House, or official apartments, known as K–7, located across the street from the U.S. Embassy. International efforts to mediate the conflict failed, and fighting around the Embassy became more intense, effectively cutting off the U.S. compound from those situated outside of it. On the roof of the K–7 apartments, the Embassy stationed a lookout, who advised by radio when it was safe to open the Embassy gate for outgoing or incoming vehicular traffic.

By January 2, 1991, the situation further deteriorated with Somali government forces using heavy artillery and rebel strength increasing. The Ambassador cabled Washington, requesting military assistance to evacuate U.S. personnel from Mogadishu. Military assets participating in Operation Desert Shield, were made available for a NEO. Military (C–130) aircraft were ordered to fly to Mombasa, Kenya. There they would prepare to fly to Mogadishu when Embassy personnel obtained flight clearances and had made arrangements to proceed to the airport. In addition, the *U.S.S. Guam* and the *U.S.S. Trenton* set course for Mogadishu from their position in the Gulf of Oman. By January 7, U.S. military elements would be prepared to rescue U.S. Embassy personnel from the airport or by helicopter from the Embassy compound, if necessary.

Efforts to obtain landing clearance revealed that government and rebel leaders had lost control of their troops. It became increasingly clear to the Embassy that the rebels had no command and control structure and that command and control within Somali government forces was eroding quickly. On January 3, the U.S. Ambassador

advised Washington that the proposed January 7 rescue mission was inadequate, and the NEO would have to be conducted in a nonpermissive environment by helicopter, as soon as the approaching vessels could launch their aircraft.

Embassy Under Attack

On January 4, armed elements penetrated two sites providing safehaven for personnel. Looters armed with AK–47 assault rifles entered a primitive golf course that constituted half of the 160-acre Embassy compound and were harassing Foreign Service nationals (non-American Embassy employees) residing there. Although a wall separated the golf course from the chancery area, where Americans were consolidated, gaps in the wall provided the looters with an opportunity to shoot at American personnel. The situation required the Regional Security Officer, the Local Guard Force Supervisor, and local guards to remove the intruders. The looters were successfully driven away, but an encounter between the Embassy personnel and the looters led to an exchange of gunfire in which at least one looter was hit. The Americans were uninjured.



Weapons and ammunition stored by rebel forces in the abandoned apartment of a U.S. diplomat.

The same day, soldiers broke into the K–7 apartment and seized the Buildings Maintenance Manager. They released him when he gave them the keys to one of the Embassy's vehicles. He and another American briefly retreated to a safehaven area before returning to the Embassy compound once the intruders had departed. Clearly, the window of opportunity for a safe evacuation was rapidly closing.

Marines and Seals Arrive

Accelerating departure plans in response to events, the Ambassador asked Washington to supply two platoons of troops (already serving in Saudi Arabia with Operation Desert Shield) to protect the Embassy compound until the rescue vessels could launch their helicopters. Two Marine helicopters arrived at the compound in the dawn hours of January 5 in a high-risk operation requiring two mid-air refuelings during 3½ hours of flight in the dark. The Pentagon identified the NEO as Operation Eastern Exit. On approach, the Marines observed several Somali nationals preparing to scale the compound walls with ladders and frightened them away.

The 60 Marines and Navy Seals then protected the two compound safehavens (the Chancery and Joint Administrative Office) from incoming rounds of fire while a protective C–130 gunship flew overhead. The Ambassador advised all armed individuals that responsibility for the use of lethal fire remained his and his alone. The Marines rapidly boarded 60 evacuees, including all of the private Americans and chiefs of other diplomatic missions who had made their way to the U.S. compound. Also aboard was the Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission, who was to coordinate the rescue operation with Naval and Marine commanders on the *U.S.S. Guam.*

Helping Others

Throughout the worsening ordeal, remaining U.S. mission members accommodated members of other diplomatic missions who were unable to depart the growing chaos on their own. Some of the foreign diplomatic nationals were escorted from their own locations to the U.S. Embassy by Somalis who accepted fees. All were included in the American evacuation. Among others, the guests included 38 Soviets. Unfortunately, the Embassy's loyal crew of

U.S. Ambassador Bishop and some heads of diplomatic missions aboard the *U.S.S. Trenton* after being evacuated. Seated from left: Amb. Hikmet (Turkey), Amb. Mattar (Kuwait), Amb. Saif (Oman), and Amb. McCluney (U.K.). Standing: Amb. Al Khagah (U.A.E.), Amb. Bishop (U.S.), Amb. Korneev (Russia), Amb. Dahiru (Nigeria), Amb. Siparo (Kenya), Amb. Mustafa (Sudan), and Amb. Keilholz (Germany).

SHIP OR STATION **UNITED STATES SHIP TRENTON (LPD 14)**

On behalf of myself and the undersigned heads of diplomatic missions to Somalia, I wish to express our profound and heartfelt gratitude to the sailors and marines of USS TRENTON and her embarked units for their daring, swift, gallant and humanitarian rescue of the two hundred eighty-one souls in the American Embassy Mogadishu compound, in our most desperate hours, January five and six, nineteen hundred and ninety one.

JAMES K. BISHOP
AMBASSADOR,
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VLADIMIR KORNEEV
AMBASSADOR,
EMBASSY OF THE SOVIET UNION

JOHN P. SIPARO
AMBASSADOR,
EMBASSY OF KENYA

IAN MCCLUNEY
AMBASSADOR,
EMBASSY OF GREAT BRITAIN

AL KHAGAH A'HADI
AMBASSADOR,
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

MUSTAFA HASSAN AHMED
AMBASSADOR,
EMBASSY OF SUDAN

DAHIRU ABUBAKAR
AMBASSADOR,
EMBASSY OF NIGERIA

HIKMET SEZGENC
AMBASSADOR,
EMBASSY OF TURKEY

SAIF ALI SULTAN ALKALBANI
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES,
EMBASSY OF OMAN

MATTAR T. AL SALMAN
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES,
EMBASSY OF KUWAIT

SAED ABDULLA AL-MANSOURI
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES,
EMBASSY OF QATAR

HANS-JUERGEN KEILHOLZ
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES,
EMBASSY OF GERMANY

The Phases of an Evacuation and the Role of DS

The organized evacuation of Americans in a crisis has naturally been approached by participants as an operational matter. It has rarely, if ever, been viewed in an analytical light. However, for the purpose of this article, which attempts to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. Government's approach to evacuating U.S. citizens, it may be useful to distinguish three phases of evacuation planning that accompany a real or hypothetical crisis. These phases may be identified as the pre-crisis phase, the crisis phase, and the evacuation itself.

In the first phase, a crisis is not yet anticipated, but responsible U.S. missions must prepare for that contingency nonetheless. In the second phase, a crisis is anticipated in the near or far term and operations must be initiated to properly respond to the crisis when it arrives. In the third phase, the time for evacuating has clearly arrived, and operations must proceed without delay.

Foreign Service nationals (FSNs) did not receive full wages and could not be evacuated, but they were offered available cash and the keys to the Embassy commissary. During the next 2 years, Embassy Mogadishu officers subsequently stationed in Nairobi, Kenya, made several trips to Mogadishu to pay the Embassy FSNs.

Final Evacuation

The final evacuation of the Americans and others commenced on January 6 with the arrival of the helicopters (CH–46) from the *U.S.S. Guam*. Like several other endeavors undertaken in the days prior to the U.S. departure, the loading of the last evacuees aboard the military aircraft took place under conditions of imminent threat. The Ambassador was advised by his Local Guard Force Supervisor that a major from the Somali police was threatening to immediately radio his troops and order them to fire artillery rounds at the departing helicopters. The Ambassador reasoned that the major, who had recently earned large fees transporting stranded diplomats to the American Embassy, probably wanted more money but did pose a serious threat to departing personnel. After convincing the major to put down his radio, the Ambassador distracted him with small talk and finally, when the last helicopter relay awaited only the Ambassador's presence, handed the major a set of keys to one of the Embassy's abandoned vehicles.

Within minutes, the evacuation was complete. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces had evacuated 281 people (including 12 ambassadors) from 31 countries. Post-evacuation assessments revealed that Somali fighters, using rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), quickly gained access to the compound and looted virtually everything available. An inner vault that had been designated as a possible safehaven was reduced to rubble. The Embassy, now destroyed, was considered closed. In December 1992, U.S. diplomats, followed by U.S. Marines, returned to erect a new U.S. facility at another site and provide a measure of order to failing international relief efforts.

Lessons Learned

The three evacuations described above were accomplished with no serious injuries or loss of life. In that respect, all three may be considered successful. In retrospect, however, all three endeavors entailed many actions that worked and some that were less successful or failed outright. Also, it can never be completely clear to what extent the missions' success was due to planning and skill, and how much was due to good luck.

Exhaustive military and civilian studies have been written by responsible agencies to examine in detail the various strengths and weaknesses of procedures involved in the evacuations. This article is not intended to compete with those. Below, however, are some significant lessons learned from the experiences. Attention to the following points by appropriate governmental entities could determine whether future evacuations of Americans in crisis situations result in lives preserved or lives lost.

— Cooperation and coordination between civilian and military elements is essential. Embassy officials and military officers must have a clear understanding of each participant's roles and responsibilities. Disagreements or misunderstandings must be solved as quickly as possible once an evacuation is underway. Many problems can be avoided well in advance of a crisis through close attention to details in preparing an embassy's Emergency Action Plan (EAP) and by NEO exercises involving both Department of State and Department of Defense personnel. Close attention to the State and Defense Departments' Memorandum of Understanding on Evacuations also is recommended.

— Alternate escape routes are advantageous. A continuing concern for Embassy Kinshasa was the possibility of having to evacuate across the Zaire River to Brazzaville, the only practical escape route, while that city also was experiencing significant levels of civil unrest.

— Embassy safehavens reserved to protect personnel in a crisis situation should be located where they may best resist the damage inflicted by such weapons as RPGs. While

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) can contribute to the success of evacuation planning in any of the three phases, as illustrated by the actions of the Regional Security Officer at the height of the crisis in Mogadishu. Experience has shown, however, that the services of DS appear to be most crucial in the first phase, the pre-crisis period, and in the second phase of long-term preparation for a possible crisis.

In the case of Liberia, a series of DS-led teams was dispatched to the post up to 6 months before the deployment of the Marines. Such teams typically helped improve a mission's Emergency Action Plan, enhance physical security, provide training to local police units and guard forces, and provide other valuable services. In the case of Zaire, DS personnel were dispatched to Europe to coordinate the U.S. operational response with the French and Belgian response to the crisis. In short, the final evacuations carried out by military NEOs would be much more problematical, if not impossible, without the first steps of evacuation planning, which are invariably initiated by DS.

safehavens are normally designed to protect occupants from rifle ammunition only, locating them in building interiors or basements renders them less vulnerable to RPGs or similar explosives. As the fate of one of Embassy Mogadishu's safehaven illustrates, however, no protective facility is impervious.

— All NEO elements must have access to current information and other resources that bear directly upon an evacuation. In one case, the military's lack of an updated map delayed the arrival of rescue units at an Embassy by several precious minutes.

— Military and civilian security personnel must ensure that adequate facilities and resources are identified and available for a possible rescue mission. Regional Security Officers may provide the most current and accurate EAP data and associated materials, such as maps and photographs. In one operation, resources found lacking included secure communications facilities between the Embassy and military personnel, a clearly delineated landing zone for a rescue helicopter, and a sufficient number of medical personnel.

— Selected embassy personnel not formally associated with the embassy's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) must receive special training due to the enhanced importance of their roles in an evacuation. For example, the performance of Embassy Mogadishu's Local Guard Force Supervisor, who the Ambassador indicated was "always at the point of maximum danger," was crucial to the rescue mission. Other employees considered central in a crisis situation are the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) and consular officers, who are usually responsible for disseminating current information, determining the welfare and whereabouts of private Americans, and assisting in rumor control.

— The internal defense capabilities of a U.S. post should be enhanced if intrusion by armed groups is a possible threat. This may mean that appropriately trained embassy personnel, beyond the Regional Security Officer, should be issued firearms, in the event that an intrusion of armed groups

requires a response by several embassy employees. In all cases, however, the possession and use of firearms must be closely controlled by the Ambassador, in consultation with the RSO.

— Extremely important in preparing personnel for a crisis situation is the frequent performance of drills and exercises. Until recently, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security regularly conducted Crisis Management Exercises (CME) at overseas posts. While exercises are likely to improve the reaction to any crisis, they proved especially valuable in the Liberian case, the prolonged nature of which allowed more time for Embassy personnel to prepare. Participating in realistic drills uncovers flaws in procedures, unreliable equipment, and critical shortages. They also help prepare personnel to cope with the storm of actual emergencies usually encountered in evacuation situations.

Beyond the protection of personnel, of course, the protection of sensitive and classified information remains a concern in any embassy crisis involving evacuation or other security matter. To this end, officers also practiced destruction drills, in which a maximum amount of classified material is destroyed in a short period of time preceding a possible evacuation or invasion.

Direct participation in such drills by the Ambassador and EAC Chairman is recommended, not only to ensure the correct performance of the drills but also to help identify individuals who perform well in a crisis environment as well as those who might hinder EAC operations. The old addage, "Practice makes perfect," is never more important than in the case of preparing for a possible departure from an embassy or consulate under dangerous circumstances!

Conclusions

As illustrated above, the State Department and other U.S. Government entities provide useful information and other valuable tools that can facilitate a successful evacuation, should one become necessary. All of the lessons learned above underscore the importance of continuing efforts to make such tools, not only information but also opportunities for drills and other contingency planning, available to Americans abroad. The current trend in international affairs toward pervasive instability makes the need to broaden evacuation planning even more imperative.

Implicit, if not explicit, in available literature on evacuation planning is the idea that the ultimate responsibility for a successful evacuation lies with the individual being evacuated. Even with all the assistance provided by the U.S. Government, ultimately it is up to the individual to ensure that he or she is adequately prepared to remove him- or herself from harm's way. In the end, each crisis resulting in an evacuation is unique and the individual overseas must match the particular requirements of the situation at hand with the tools provided by the U.S. Government.

This information is provided by the U.S. Department of State *Bureau of Consular Affairs*

Consular Information Program

The Department of State has implemented a new Consular Information Program to replace the Travel Advisory Program. This program is designed to expand the type of information distributed to U.S. citizens traveling and residing abroad and to make it more understandable.

There are two categories of information: Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets. Warnings are issued when the State Department decides, based on all relevant information, to recommend that Americans avoid travel to a certain country. Countries where avoidance of travel is recommended will have Travel Warnings as well as Consular Information Sheets.

Consular Information Sheets are available for every country of the world. They include such information as location of the U.S. Embassy or Consulate in the subject country, unusual immigration practices, health conditions, minor political disturbances, unusual currency and entry regulations, crime and security information, and drug penalties. If an unstable condition exits in a country that is not severe enough to warrant a Warning, a description of the condition(s) may be included under an optional section entitled "Areas of Instability." On limited occasions, we also restate in this section any embassy advice given to official employees. Consular Information Sheets generally do not include advice, but present information in a factual manner so the traveler can make his or her own decisions concerning travel to a particular country.

How To Access Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings

Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings may be heard anytime by dialing the Citizens Emergency Center at (202) 647–5225 from a touchtone phone. The recording is updated as new information becomes available. They are also available at any of the 13 regional passport agencies, field offices of the U.S. Department of Commerce, and U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad, or, by writing and sending a self-addressed, stamped envelope to the Citizens Emergency Center, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Room 4811, N.S., U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520.

By Fax

From your fax machine, dial 202–647–3000, using the handset as you would a regular telephone. The system will instruct you on how to proceed.

Consular Affairs Bulletin Board (CABB)

If you have a personal computer, modem, and communications software, you can access the Consular Affairs Bulletin Board. This service is free of charge.

Modem Number: 202–647–9225
Modem Speed: Will accommodate 300, 1200, 2300, 9600, or 14400 bps
Terminal Communications Program: Set to N-8-1 (No parity, 8 bits, 1 stop bit)

By Computer Network

If you have a personal computer and a modem, you also can access Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings through the Official Airlines Guide (OAG). The OAG provides the full text of Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings on many online computer services. To obtain information on accessing Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings through OAG on any of the following computer services, call the OAG Electronic Edition at 1–800–323–4000.

CompuServe*	General Videotex-Delphi	NewsNet
Dialcom	GEnie	IP Sharp
Dialog	iNet-America	Telenet
Dow Jones News/Retrieval	iNet-Bell of Canada	Western Union-Easylink

*CompuServe subscribers may type GO State at any "!" prompt.

Infosys America Inc. also provides the full text of Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings through Travel Online BBS on the SmartNet International Computer Network in the United States, Canada, and overseas. The (modem) telephone number for Infosys America is 314–625–4054.

Interactive Office Services, Inc. offers online travel information in Travel+Plus through the networks listed below. For information on access, call Travel+Plus at 617–876–5551 or 1–800–544–4005.

Delphi, MCI (RCA Hotline)	Bell South TUG	GraphNet
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The Overseas Security Electronic Bulletin Board provides State Department Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings as a free service (purchase of necessary software required) for American firms doing business overseas. Apply to the Executive Director, Overseas Security Advisory Council (DS/OSAC), U.S.Department of State, Washington, DC 20522–1003.

Access By Colleges and Universities: NAFSANET & INTER-L

NAFSANET is the term used to refer to all the members of NAFSA, an association of international educators who have access to electronic mail and are using it to communicate among themselves and with colleagues in other countries. INTER-L is a program that manages the distribution of e-mail to various lists of subscribers. To subscribe to INTER-L, you need an e-mail account on either Bitnet or Internet. Then, send a message to LISTSERV@VTVM2.BITNET. You may leave the subject line blank. The text of the message should read SUBSCRIBE INTER-L YOUR Name. (Note: Some systems require that you prefix listserv commands with TELL LISTSERV. In that case, the message should read **TELL LISTSERV SUBSCRIBE INTER-L Your Name**). You may wish to consult your computer center on the correct format to use at your institution. Once subscribed to INTER-L, to receive Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings, send a request to **travel-advisories-REQUEST@stolaf.edu.**

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By Computer Reservation System (CRS)

The following computer reservation systems (CRS) maintain State Department Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings. This information can be accessed by entering the CRS codes listed below.

APOLLO: For the index, enter: S*BRF/TVLADV
For the full text of Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings, enter: TD*DS/ADV

DATAS II: For full text of Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings, enter: G* (**country**)

PARS: For the index, enter: G/AAI/TVL

Travel Document Systems, Inc. provides the full text of Consular Information Sheets and Travel Warnings to the following reservation systems:

SABRE: Enter: N*/ADVISORY INDEX
SYSTEM ONE: Enter: GG SUP TD ADV

In Western Europe, SYSTEM ONE is accessed through the AMADEUS system and APOLLO through the GALILEO system.