


NCJRS

This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.



Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531

Date filmed.

6/26/75

shop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis

15411

R74-2

COMMUNITY CONTROL AND GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIVENESS:
THE CASE OF POLICE IN BLACK NEIGHBORHOODS

by

Elinor Ostrom and Gordon P. Whitaker

Community Control and Governmental Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black Neighborhoods

ELINOR OSTROM
GORDON P. WHITAKER

□ CREATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD-SIZED GOVERNMENTS within large American cities has been proposed as a way to increase the responsiveness of municipal officials to their local constituents. Police are among those officials often thought to be least responsive to citizens. Black citizens are among those constituents cited as least satisfied with the performance of local police and other public officials. Because of the controversy surrounding neighborhood police service to urban black Americans, this area is particularly appropriate for inquiry into the effects of community control.

This study compares one big-city- and two neighborhood-sized departments in terms of the police services they provide to residents of similar areas. Since community control experiments have not yet

been instituted, it is not possible to examine directly the consequences of reducing the scale of large police jurisdictions. Similar neighborhoods served by different-scale jurisdictions within a single metropolitan area do provide the opportunity to assess comparatively some of the probable effects of community control.

Neighborhood police service is only one of the municipal activities for which community control has been proposed. Additional research on the effects of size of jurisdiction on the quality of other urban public services is also needed. This study investigates two questions: (1) Is community control conducive to greater governmental responsiveness? (2) Does community control create obstacles to the effective provision of public services? The study examines some specific problems which have been suggested as arising due to community control. It evaluates the extent to which those problems have developed in the small communities studied. It also assesses the relative responsiveness of the small-scale and the large-scale governments. The evidence presented here deals with police services in five neighborhoods of a single metropolitan area, but the findings can, with caution, suggest parallels in other places and for other urban public services.

THE NEED FOR MORE RESPONSIVE POLICE AGENCIES

Protection of property and person is more desperately needed by the poor than by the rich. While the poor have less to lose, they feel the consequences of loss more acutely. The respect police accord those of high social status is likewise important to those who have

AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors are appreciative of the financial support provided by the Center for Studies of Metropolitan Problems of the National Institute of Mental Health in the form of Grant 5 R01 M1 19911-02, by the National Science Foundation, Grant GS-27383, and by the Afro-American Studies Program at Indiana University. We want to thank Shelley Venick and

Susan Thomas for their conscientious work as research assistants, and Dennis Smith for his considerable help and criticism. A portion of this paper was presented at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago, September 7-11, 1971. Data were obtained from the National Opinion Research Center, Study N-506. Each suburban sampling area in the NORC frame for this study was coded as either a separately incorporated suburban municipality or as an unincorporated suburban place using the 1967 Census of Governments definition of municipalities. Only respondents living in separately incorporated municipalities are included in the category of white-suburban reported above.

suffered the indignities of lower status in an affluent society. However, black Americans charge that they continue to receive inferior police protection and suffer more abuse from the police than do the majority of Americans. The stance of many black citizens toward the police has shifted from "resentment to confrontation" (Fogelson, 1968). The resentment has been based on many charges related to the unresponsiveness of the police—police brutality, police corruption, lack of police protection in the ghetto and the lack of effective mechanisms for protest and remedy (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968; Hahn, 1971; Campbell and Schuman, 1968).

In many instances, the resentment appears to be widespread. In a recent comparative study, for example, TenHouten and others found that two-thirds of the respondents living in ghettos agreed with the statement that "police rough up people unnecessarily when they are arresting them or afterwards" (Ten Houten et al., 1971: 236). Resentment against police also appears to be based on experience. In a study of fifteen cities, using data obtained from four different sources, Rossi and Berk found that ghetto residents' grievances concerning police reflect the reality with which they live. Police brutality as a salient local issue was related to the existence of more abusive police practices, less responsiveness on the part of a local police chief to black grievances, less knowledge by the police of local black residents, and more personal experience by blacks of police abuse (Rossi and Berk, 1970: 122-125; see also Lieberman and Silverman, 1965). Aberbach and Walker (1970b: 1212) found that among the blacks they interviewed in Detroit during 1967, personal experiences of police mistreatment were negatively associated with political trust and that individuals with low levels of political trust were more likely to be able to imagine a situation in which they would riot. In general, they found that attitudes of political trust were not mere reflections of an individual's basic personality or of background factors. Their most important explanatory variables were "those which arise from the workings of the social or political system" (Aberbach and Walker: 1970b: 1214).

Police responsiveness varies by neighborhood. In their study of the large Denver police force, Bayley and Mendelsohn (1969: 114) found:

Ethnicity is a primary determinant of the amount and kind of contact people have with the police. Within ethnic groups there is by

and large no association between age, sex, and class and whether an individual has been stopped and arrested or has called the police for help or talked over difficulties with them.

The differences in contact which Bayley and Mendelsohn find related to ethnicity are largely related to the neighborhood in which individuals live. Denver, like most large American cities, is residentially segregated. Bayley and Mendelsohn learned from their surveys of officers that "police do carry certain predispositions into their contacts with minority people, especially in minority neighborhoods, that can produce a double standard in enforcement behavior" (Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969: 166). A similar dynamic may also be at work in Milwaukee, Seattle, and Detroit where blacks also report more unfavorable contact than whites with police and where neighborhoods are generally racially homogeneous.

Jacob, in his study of black and white Milwaukee neighborhoods, found that "the general reputation of the police in black ghettos has become so bad that good experiences do not bring correspondingly good evaluations" (Jacob, 1970: 72). He identified this phenomenon as "neighborhood culture" and considered it "one of the intervening variables between experiences and perceptions." Similar findings in Seattle were explained as a "contextual effect" whereby "persons in sub-communities subject to relatively high probabilities of arrest, develop less positive attitudes toward police whether they themselves have been arrested or not" (Costner et al., 1970: 46). The phenomenon which these authors identify as "neighborhood culture" and "contextual effect" appears to be a reflection of the lower levels and poorer quality of service provided to citizens living in black neighborhoods. That is, the low evaluations black citizens make of their police reflect the unresponsiveness of the police serving their neighborhoods.

Trends found in specific large cities have also been established nationwide. In a survey conducted for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1966, the National Opinion Research Center administered a nationwide survey including several questions asking respondents to rate their police services. Analysis of the data from that survey shows that black residents of large center cities consistently rated police services lower than white residents of either center cities or incorporated suburbs. As shown in Table 1, black center-city respondents were less likely than white respondents at all income levels to rate their police as

respectful, as paying attention to complaints, as giving protection to the people in their neighborhood, or as being prompt. Wealthier white respondents living in center cities tended uniformly to rate the police higher than did poorer white respondents. White respondents living in independently incorporated suburbs tended to rate the police higher at all but the lowest income level than did white center-city residents. The ratings of police services by black respondents were *not* positively associated with income levels as were the ratings by white respondents. In fact, black respondents of higher income levels tended to be less likely to give high ratings to police than black respondents of lower income levels. Thus, the criticisms

TABLE 1
Rating of Police Services by Black Center-City Respondents,
White Center-City Respondents, and White Incorporated
Suburb Respondents Controlling for Income^a

	Income Levels of Respondents				n
	Less than \$3,000	\$3,000 to \$5,999	\$6,000 to \$9,999	\$10,000 & Higher	
Percentage Giving Highest Rating to Police for:					
Being respectful to people like themselves					
Black—Center City	40	28	33	25	256
White—Center City	69	59	67	74	877
White—Incorporated Suburbs	62	65	78	77	430
Paying attention to complaints					
Black—Center City	36	18	18	8	242
White—Center City	47	49	54	64	823
White—Incorporated Suburbs	50	56	57	70	387
Giving protection to the people in the neighborhood					
Black—Center City	23	17	22	9	241
White—Center City	50	42	53	55	829
White—Incorporated Suburbs	50	58	60	72	412
Promptness					
Black—Center City	30	16	24	8	249
White—Center City	50	42	53	55	803
White—Incorporated Suburbs	47	56	63	73	379

a. Data obtained from the National Opinion Research Center, Study N-506. Our thanks to Patrick Bova for assisting us in working with these data. Only respondents living in separately incorporated municipalities are included in the category "White-Suburban" reported in the table.

[308] IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF URBAN MANAGEMENT

of police by black citizens are not restricted to the poor, but are shared by all segments of the black urban population.

Complaints related to police brutality and harassment coupled with complaints of insufficient police protection have seemed somewhat paradoxical to some observers. However, it would appear that the practice of "preventive patrolling" utilized by some police forces simultaneously increases the resentment of residents and diverts police manpower from other activities such as answering calls and investigating the many crimes which do occur in the ghetto (Hahn and Feagin, 1970). Across the country, victimization rates for blacks are higher than for whites at all levels of income for serious crimes against the person (Ennis, 1967: 30). Black residents living in cities of over 100,000 population were considerably more likely to cite a need for self-defense when asked: "Do you think that people like yourself have to be prepared to defend their homes against crime and violence, or can the police take care of that" (Feagin, 1970: 799)? Thus, the simultaneous criticism of too much and too little policing may be valid. Police seem to be failing to serve the residents of many black neighborhoods in U.S. cities.

Increasing attitudes of confrontation have become all too obvious. While some confrontations between black citizens and police have occurred within the institutional settings provided by elections, courts, and review boards, many have occurred in the streets. Street confrontations have occurred particularly in larger cities in which the proportion of black citizens has increased significantly. Riots, assaults on officers, and the stony hostility or taunting jibes which often greet policemen are all reflections of hostility between black citizens and their police. Confrontations on the street reflect the absence of opportunities for confrontation through the regular institutions of government. The failure of established governmental institutions to be responsive to black citizens' demands for effective and impartial police services represents a serious threat to domestic peace and order.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING RESPONSIVENESS

PROFESSIONALIZATION AS A REMEDY

Two remedies are frequently recommended for reducing the overt antagonism, mistrust, and hostility toward the police by many black citizens. These are similar to those often suggested as strategies for enhancing the responsiveness of government generally. One remedy involves increasing the "professionalization" of public servants. According to James Q. Wilson (1968a: 175), a "professional" police department is one "governed by values derived from general, impersonal rules which bind all members of the organization and whose relevance is independent of circumstances of time, place or personality." Professional departments are said to have attributes which include the following:

- recruitment on the basis of achievement,
- equal treatment of citizens,
- negative attitudes toward graft both within the force and in the community,
- commitment to training of generally applicable standards,
- bureaucratic distribution of authority.

In communities served by professionalized departments, law enforcement may be stricter, but it is thought to be more equally applied to all groups than in communities served by nonprofessional departments (Wilson, 1968a). Reliance upon brutality as a means of social control is thought to be less within such departments than in nonprofessional departments.

However, tensions between black citizens and the police have not lessened in the cities with police departments described as highly professionalized. Two of the departments most frequently characterized as "professional," Oakland and Los Angeles, have also been observed to take strong punitive actions against blacks (Skolnick, 1967; Jacobs, 1966). More "professional" recruitment, training, and authority structure does not necessarily entail equal treatment of citizens. Even advocates of professionalization recognize the "limitations of professionalization especially when it is used to rationalize

the employment of preventive patrolling and the other extraordinary tactics which transform the Negro ghettos into occupied territories" (Fogelson, 1968: 247). Police professionalization may have served more to insulate the police against external criticism than to reduce the level of discrimination by police against black citizens.¹ James Q. Wilson (1963: 201)—a firm advocate of police professionalism—has argued that "professionalism among policemen will differ from professionalism in other occupations in that the primary function of the professional code will be to protect the practitioner from the client rather than the client from the practitioner." Thus, "professionalization" may in fact decrease rather than increase a police department's responsiveness to citizen needs and preferences.

Paul Jacobs vividly describes resistance to any meaningful review procedures by the Los Angeles Police Department prior to the Watts riot. One of its basic strategies was to demean civil rights groups and others calling for outside review. In the department's 1964 *Annual Report*, for example, the charge was made that

the detractors of law enforcement stepped up their pervading accusations of police misconduct and pleas for an independent review of police practices in an attempt to create an atmosphere of apprehension, predicting that the streets of this city would also become an arena in which the issues of the civil rights movement would be settled [cited in Jacobs, 1966: 99].

During the same year, 121 complaints were lodged with the police department concerning the excessive use of force. Only 21 were sustained. However, in none of the 21 cases where charges were sustained did the officer charged receive the penalty associated with the use of excessive force. Officers were allowed either to resign without penalty or to receive a lesser penalty (Jacobs, 1966: 98-99).

At least one early champion of the "professionalization" remedy has recently reversed his position. Burton Levy, after a two-year period of intensive observation of police departments across the country for the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that recruitment, training, and community relations efforts did not seem to have a significant impact on police practice.

The problem is not one of a few "bad eggs" in a police department of 1,000 or 10,000 men, but rather of a police system that recruits a

significant number of bigots, reinforces the bigotry through the department's value system and socialization with older officers, and then takes the worst of the officers and puts them on duty in the ghetto, where the opportunity to act out their prejudice is always available [Levy, 1968: 348].

Professionalism as a remedy for the problems of resentment and hostility toward the police among black citizens would appear to have serious limitations. It provides no leverage for blacks to demand improved service and is thus an inadequate device for institutionalizing confrontation.

COMMUNITY CONTROL AS A REMEDY

A second general proposal to alleviate the growing tension between black citizens and government is community control (for the best in-depth overview of the issues involved, see Altshuler, 1970; see also Shalala, 1971). In the case of police services, proponents argue that reducing the size of local police jurisdictions and bringing the jurisdiction under the control of the citizens living in the community served will increase responsiveness of police to the preferences of citizens. Under a more responsive institutional structure, police would be expected to provide services needed by community residents, thus increasing citizens' satisfaction with police services.

However, community control has been strongly questioned as an effective reform strategy. Sherry Arnstein (1969: 224) has summarized some of the most frequently articulated arguments against community control in the following overview:

Among the arguments against community control are: it supports separatism; it creates balkanization; it enables minority group "hustlers" to be just as opportunistic and disdainful of the have-nots as their white predecessors; it is incompatible with merit systems and professionalism; and ironically enough, it can turn out to be a new Mickey Mouse game for the have-nots by allowing them to gain control but not allowing them sufficient dollar resources to succeed.

Let us briefly examine these arguments against community control and the responses in favor of such a system.

Separatism. The first argument is that community control supports racial separatism. Given existing patterns of residential segregation, the population of local communities would be more racially homogeneous than the population of citywide areas. Once boundaries were drawn, it is argued, the tendency toward homogeneity of communities would increase as citizens scurried to move out of areas where they were in a minority. The result might be that police forces in each type of community would be much more oriented to abusing members of the minority race in that community than now occurs in the big city.

Proponents of community control reply that segregation is a fact imposed on black citizens by the unwillingness of white citizens to allow integration in any meaningful form (Spear, 1967; Tauber, 1968). Community control would not appreciably increase the amount of segregation and racism currently in existence—it would give to those who had been denied open access to housing a greater opportunity to control what happens in their own neighborhood. There is no evidence that blacks controlling their own areas would be more racist in orientation. Aberbach and Walker (1970a) found that eighty-eight percent of the black residents of Detroit interviewed in 1967 preferred to have the "best trained police, no matter what their race" patrolling in Negro neighborhoods rather than "Negro police only." Interestingly enough, of the whites interviewed, twenty-two percent (as compared to twelve for blacks) thought that Negro police only should patrol in black areas.

Balkanization and economies of scale. The second argument is that community control creates balkanization of public services and is more costly and less efficient. This is an old argument repeatedly presented by advocates of metropolitanwide governments. Advocates of metropolitan government recommended the *elimination* of most of the currently established units of local government in metropolitan areas (Zimmerman, 1970).² Metropolitan reformers assume that large economies of scale exist for all public services and thus urge the creation of one or a few large-scale public jurisdictions to serve an entire metropolitan area. Those associated with this movement argue that decreasing the size of police agencies and increasing their number within a particular metropolitan area would increase the costs of service and lead to grave problems of coordination among diverse agencies. The sheer presence of a large number of local units is frequently cited as evidence in and of itself

that coordination of efforts among such a multiplicity of jurisdictions cannot be accomplished. Coordination within a single large jurisdiction is presumed to be more easily accomplished than cooperation among many jurisdictions.

Proponents of community control have argued that economies of scale do not exist for such services as police and education and that, consequently, community control may not lead to an increase in the cost of local services. Large-scale agencies could continue to provide such services (which do benefit from large scale) as transportation, water, sewage and to help provide some of the financing for smaller units within the larger unit (Meltzer, 1968; Mayer, 1971). Just as large units may be more effective and efficient in the provision of certain services, smaller units may also be more advantageous for other services. Police services such as neighborhood patrols and emergency aid appear to be of this type. Furthermore, in many situations in the United States, a number of disparate public jurisdictions are able to coordinate efforts through joint agreements, contracting, and distinct distribution of authority (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961; Bish, 1971; Warren, 1966; Bish and Warren, 1972). Community control would enable blacks in the center city to have the personalized, small-scale service provided today to whites in the suburbs (Ferry, 1968). Suburban residents have vigorously fought against being included within large, metropolitanwide governmental jurisdictions. Why should residents of the center city be the only ones who cannot have small-scale public agencies responsive to the particular needs of their communities (Rubenstein, 1970; Babcock and Bosselman, 1967; Press, 1963)?

Lack of participation. The third argument against community control is that local decision-making within small communities is more "undemocratic" than that within larger units (Kristol, 1968; Perlmutter, 1968). Critics point to the low turnout of voters and the ineffective bickering among "poverty representatives" in many of the early community action programs. Because of the relative homogeneity of an individual community, they also argue that there would be less challenge to local leaders who may be more demagogic than leaders of large, heterogeneous city governments. The intimacy of the local community, furthermore, may lead to corruption and lack of uniform enforcement practice (Wilson, 1968b; Prewitt and Eulau, 1969; for a different argument, see Rossi, 1963: 12).

If black citizens have genuine control concerning local affairs,

however, participation levels may be expected to increase (Gittell, 1968). While participation in many programs in the past has been low, it is unreasonable to expect high participation in newly organized arrangements whose potential benefits may be quite nebulous. Many programs have used "participation" as therapy rather than as a means to enable local people to exercise substantial control over events affecting them (McGulof, 1969; Arnstein, 1969). People do not learn to participate actively or constructively in a short time period. If meaningful control were placed in the community, individuals would begin to learn that it was worthwhile to participate and how to participate more constructively.³ Once community control was established, the effect of having local public officials sympathetic to the needs and aspirations of local citizens would decrease the general level of alienation among black citizens living within the ghetto of a typical large American city.⁴

Amateur public servants. The fourth argument is that small, community-controlled police departments would be less professional. It is assumed that a relatively large department is needed to be able to afford adequate salaries, good training facilities, and sufficient levels in the bureaucracy to achieve meaningful advancement for ambitious young personnel (Altshuler, 1970: 39). It is frequently argued that small departments cannot attract as qualified employees as can large departments. Such personnel, employed in specialized, hierarchically controlled departments are seen as necessary to improved police service.

Proponents of community control argue that many of the consequences of "professionalization" have been to keep blacks from obtaining jobs due to irrelevant educational requirements or middle-class, biased examinations (see also Baron, 1968).⁵ The establishment of less-bureaucratized forces with police officers living in the community they serve and sympathetic to the life style of the residents is seen as a benefit rather than a cost.⁶ Career opportunities can be pursued among small jurisdictions by lateral movement as occurs in many school districts rather than relying on vertical movement in a single bureaucracy. Neighborhood agencies can be expected to be less effective in providing specialized units for criminal investigation but more effective in providing police patrol services to the neighborhood (Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker, 1973). A centralized police force could continue to provide specialized police services for the entire city.

Lack of financial resources. Finally, it is argued that community control may be a futile strategy if significant reallocation of resources is not also accomplished at the same time. Impoverished areas would remain just that—impoverished areas. Once separated from the rest of the city, black citizens would find it difficult to obtain from white citizens living in separate jurisdictions the resources needed for effective programs. Community control might prove to be a cruel joke. Those in “control” would not have sufficient resources to be able to accomplish their goals (see Altshuler, 1970: 53-54). Consequently, the long-run consequences of community control might be further bitterness, disillusionment, and alienation among black citizens (Aberbach and Walker, 1970a: 1218).

There is, however, considerable doubt that extensive redistribution in favor of the poor does occur in larger political units. In a study of American cities which had adopted one of the reform measures leading toward greater consolidation, Erie et al. (1972) found no tendency toward redistribution of wealth among elements of the populations within reformed metropolitan institutions. Moreover, many of the needs of poor areas are not solved by the mere infusion of more economic resources. Even if more funds are available, the services provided by the larger government may not suit the affected community. More effective service depends upon fitting public services to the particular needs of a community. Milton Kotler describes the deliberation of a community corporation in a poor neighborhood of Columbus, Ohio, concerning medical services. Doctors were proposing “fancy new clinics with interns rotating the work day by day.” However, the people in the neighborhood corporation “said no, they didn’t need anything as elaborate as a big clinic. What they needed was a night doctor. . . . Neighborhoods like this need doctors who work on a different schedule” (Kotler et al., 1968: 16). If the views of the professionals had prevailed, more money would have been spent, but the people living in the neighborhood would not have been as satisfied with the type of medical service provided. Many (but, of course, not all) of the problems of the ghetto relate to the need for services tailored to residents’ own needs (Itzkoff, 1969).

Finally, the financing of services in a public jurisdiction does not always have to come entirely from the area itself (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961). Redistribution formulas by which larger units provide some of the funds for smaller units are used by both state

and federal governments. Effective organization of the local community may enable sufficient pressure to be brought at metropolitan, state, or federal levels to achieve further redistribution of resources. Such resources could then be utilized in a way responsive to the preferences of local residents in various types of areas rather than as a result of decisions made by a single set of officials for all areas.

AN EVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENTS RELATED TO COMMUNITY CONTROL

Several studies have been undertaken to evaluate the warrantability of the arguments for and against community control. Most of these studies have focused on white, middle-class neighborhoods. When the performance of relatively small police jurisdictions (serving under 20,000 people) is compared to the performance of relatively large forces (serving 200,000 to 450,000 people) serving similar white, middle-class neighborhoods, the smaller jurisdictions were found to produce higher levels of output at similar or lesser costs (see Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973; Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker, 1973; Ostrom, Baugh, Guarasci, Parks, and Whitaker, 1973; IsHak, 1972). An additional study examined a range of police departments located throughout the United States. The 102 departments included in this study served jurisdictions ranging in size from 10,000 to 8 million. When the levels of output of these police departments are compared, smaller departments are found to produce equal or higher levels of service for similar or lower expenditure levels (Ostrom and Parks, 1973). Thus, contrary to the arguments against community control, larger departments do not appear to provide higher levels of service. Therefore, the small scale implied by community control does not necessarily entail loss of effectiveness or efficiency.

Local control of the police has not been a salient issue for most middle-class, white citizens. Several reasons can be stated for this lack of saliency:

- (1) Wealthier white citizens are often well served by large-scale police jurisdictions and thus tend to be more satisfied with large-scale jurisdiction than black citizens or poorer white citizens living in the same city (see Table 1).

- (2) White citizens—living in large cities—who are dissatisfied with the services provided by their police, or for that matter with any other aspect of local government, can move to a different jurisdiction relatively easily (Tiebout, 1956).
- (3) White citizens at all income levels except those under \$3,000 income, living in separately incorporated suburban jurisdictions, appear to be receiving higher levels of service than either white or black citizens living in center cities (see Table 1).

White citizens appear to have the opportunity to receive the kinds of urban public services they desire either by moving to a jurisdiction which will provide them or by exercising a greater voice in the articulation of their demands for service (Orbell and Uno, 1972).

However, most black citizens and members of other minority groups are excluded from these options. They are prevented from moving to smaller, suburban jurisdictions where public services are subject to more direct control by residents. Black citizens can find housing primarily in the most crowded sections of central cities and rarely in suburban jurisdictions. They rarely have effective channels for articulating their service demands to big-city governments (Parenti, 1970). Neither are black citizens able to compete effectively for control of police policy in large cities. Consequently, many black demands have been focused on "decentralization" of large-scale police forces already serving central cities.

Given the concentration of black citizens in most large cities and the low percentage of blacks in most suburban cities, it is extremely difficult to locate adequate research sites to examine the consequences of increased levels of local control for black citizens. There are, however, several independently incorporated black communities located in the Chicago metropolitan area. A small study was recently undertaken to evaluate the consequences of community control for the residents living in two separately incorporated black communities by comparing the police service they receive with that provided to residents of matched neighborhoods within the city of Chicago.

THE AREAS STUDIED

The villages of Phoenix and East Chicago Heights, Illinois, are both small and poor. The population of Phoenix in 1970, according to official census figures, was 3,596, while village officials feel that the

population was closer to 5,000. The official census figure for East Chicago Heights was 5,000. Village officials feel that at least 2,000 East Chicago Heights residents were missed in the official census. In 1970, the median family income in Phoenix was \$7,600 while that of East Chicago Heights was \$6,750. The median value of homes in Phoenix in 1970 was \$15,900 and in East Chicago Heights was \$16,000 (Illinois Regional Medical Program, 1971). Whenever socioeconomic rankings of the municipalities surrounding Chicago have been published, these two villages have always been among the lowest five municipalities (see De Vise, 1967; Illinois Regional Medical Program, 1971; *Chicago Sun Times*, 1972).

Each village is governed by a six-person Board of Trustees and an independently elected mayor and village clerk. All village officials are black. The ratio of village residents to members of the Board of Trustees is less than 1,000 to 1. Other than the full-time village clerk, all other elected officials serve in a part-time capacity. The mayor and village trustees all hold other jobs and attend to village affairs during the evenings and weekends. However, village officials spend almost all their "free" hours working for the village. The level of volunteerism is high in the villages. Tasks such as clearing snow and salting roads are performed by the trustees along with village citizens who have volunteered to help. Community projects such as painting or repairing a public building are frequently organized on a voluntary basis with a community cookout scheduled for relaxation after the work is completed. Both communities are served by volunteer fire departments.

The police forces in the villages are quite small. The size of each force fluctuates considerably. At the time of the study, however, Phoenix employed four full-time and fifteen part-time officers. East Chicago Heights had six full-time and five part-time officers. Part-time police officers were paid at the rate of \$1.60 per hour. Full-time officers received approximately \$400 per month. Policemen in the villages received little formal training. Both chiefs and some officers have received training at police institutes run by the state of Illinois. Training within each department is provided by the more experienced officers.

The villages face a perplexing problem with regard to training. When they have provided funds to send a regular patrolman to a police training program, they have frequently lost the patrolmen within a short time to one of the surrounding municipalities which pays higher salaries to police officers. Both villages find that their

best police officers are frequently lured away after they gain experience on the village force. Consequently, there is a high level of turnover on both police forces. Inexperienced individuals who gain experience in a small police force and demonstrate proficiency in police work are able to follow better career opportunities by seeking employment in other jurisdictions.

Each village has two or three radio-dispatched cars. However, police cars are out of operation for relatively long periods of time due to the high costs of repair. The lieutenant in one of the villages usually drives his personal car (which he has equipped with a radio at his own expense) in order to reduce the operating expenses of the village department.

Both villages cooperate with neighboring villages when extra help is needed in any of the south suburban municipalities. They rely upon the Cook County Sheriff for investigative services and laboratory work when needed.⁷

Financially, both departments have extremely limited resources. The police department budget for each community is approximately \$40,000 per year. One of the villages has had a long-standing reputation as a speed trap and, until recently, traffic fines provided most of the financing for its police department.

The sample areas within the city of Chicago were selected to match as closely as possible the socioeconomic characteristics of the independent villages. Some factors which affect police service were thus controlled through the use of a most-similar-systems research design (see Prezeworski and Teune, 1970). A comparison of respondents in the Chicago neighborhoods to those in the independent communities is shown on Table 2. A major socioeconomic difference between the two types of sample areas relates to housing patterns. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents living in the independent villages reside in public housing. All these respondents live in East Chicago Heights in two-story, low-density public housing units. It was not possible to find within Chicago, with similar public housing units, a neighborhood which was not greatly dissimilar to the independent communities on most of the other socioeconomic factors. One Chicago neighborhood chosen did have a large low-rent apartment complex within it. Residents of public housing may generally rate public services less favorably than nonpublic housing residents. Consequently, the presence in our sample for the independent communities of a large number of public housing residents biases that portion of our sample downward with regard to citizens' evaluations of services received.

TABLE 2
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS IN THE
TWO TYPES OF NEIGHBORHOODS (in percentages)

	Two Independent Communities	Three Chicago Neighborhoods
Age of Respondent		
16-20	10	16
21-30	16	18
31-40	32	30
41-50	20	15
51-65	10	12
Over 65	11	10
(n)	(213)	(294)
Sex of Respondent		
Female	62	64
Male	38	36
(n)	(213)	(294)
Husband's Occupation		
Professional-Managerial	13	12
Clerical-Sales	9	14
Craftsmen-Foremen	14	18
Semi-skilled	26	25
Unskilled	14	14
Retired	14	12
Unemployed	10	5
(n)	(118)	(156)
Ownership of Housing		
Buying home	48	73
Renting	15	27
Public housing	37	0
(n)	(201)	(280)
Length of Residence		
Less than 2 years	16	20
2-5 years	13	27
6-10 years	17	23
More than 10 years	54	37
(n)	(209)	(290)
Education		
8 years or less	33	18
Some high school	26	27
High school graduate	29	32
Some college	9	15
College graduate	2	6
(n)	(198)	(274)
Number of Dependent Children		
No dependent children	16	25
1 or 2 dependent children	26	32
3 or 4 dependent children	26	22
5 or 6 dependent children	18	13
More than 6 dependent children	14	8
(n)	(198)	(274)

Chicago is governed by a strong, independently elected mayor and a city council of 50 members. The mayor of Chicago dominates the city council as well as the executive departments, including the police. The ratio of Chicago residents to members of the Chicago City Council is more than 65,000 to 1.

The Chicago Police Department is one of the most modern, best trained, and best financed departments in the country. The force had over 12,500 men at the time of this study. Patrolmen received from \$9,600 to \$12,000 per year, depending on years of service. The department conducted extensive training programs, including in-service instruction and a thirty-one-week cadet program for recruits. The proportion of blacks serving on the Chicago police force was substantially less than the proportion of black residents in the population of Chicago. While blacks made up approximately forty percent of the Chicago population, approximately twenty percent of the patrolmen were black; eight percent of the detectives were black; and four percent of the lieutenants were black (Jackson, 1970; see also Baron, 1968).

Chicago is divided into twenty-one police districts, each with its own station. The Englewood station is located within one of the neighborhood areas included in this study. Thus, residents of that neighborhood have somewhat more immediate access to police than those of the other two study areas inside Chicago. However, all radio cars in Chicago are controlled by a central dispatch office. In terms of telephone access to police, all three Chicago neighborhoods are quite similar due to this central dispatching. The Chicago Police Department has highly specialized units to handle a variety of investigative and support activities. The total budget for the Chicago Police Department during 1970 was \$190,922,514. Expenditures for police services in the three Chicago neighborhoods have been estimated at \$1,720,000 (Whitaker, 1971). Thus, over fourteen times as much was spent on policing each of the three Chicago neighborhoods as was spent by the villages for local police services there.

Given the relative similarity of the sample areas but large difference in financial resources allocated to police and the differences in the training of the personnel employed by the different types of police departments, one would expect the Chicago Police Department to provide a much higher level of service to residents than would the village police departments.

LEVELS OF POLICE SERVICE PROVIDED

In general, citizens living in the independent communities received equal or higher levels of service than residents of similar neighborhoods in Chicago. As we have discussed elsewhere, there are no generally agreed upon methods for measuring police output (Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973; E. Ostrom, 1971). Because of our interest in services provided to citizens, we have utilized survey methods to obtain two types of indicators of police output. The first type of indicator is the police-related experiences which respondents have had. Levels of criminal victimization and the quality of a variety of police actions are assessed in this way. The second type of indicator consists of citizens' evaluations of service levels. In eight items, citizens were requested to evaluate various aspects of police service. Five additional items were included to obtain respondent's evaluations of local government in general.

Citizens' reports of the police services they have received are summarized on Table 3. For four of the indicators, service levels are reported to be quite similar (tau less than .10). For the other three indicators, village respondents are more likely to indicate higher levels of service (tau greater than .10). A similar pattern is seen for citizens' evaluations of the equality of police services provided by their local forces. As shown on Table 4, police services are judged similarly by respondents on four of the indicators. On the other four indicators, village respondents are more likely to give high ratings than are Chicago respondents. The service levels reported in this study are much lower than those reported in white neighborhoods of Indianapolis and Grand Rapids. The pattern is the same, however; residents of independent communities report services of similar or higher levels across a large number of indicators when compared to residents of similar central-city neighborhoods. In no case do residents served by large police departments report higher levels of service on any indicator. This finding is particularly surprising in the Chicago area because of the substantially smaller amount of funds devoted to the village police forces. The experiences of these five neighborhoods cannot be generalized to all black neighborhoods, but the study does provide evidence which bears upon arguments for and against community control.

Separatism. The first objection raised to community control is that it would encourage racial separatism in American cities. If

TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF SERVICE LEVELS RECEIVED

Indicators of Police Services Received	Independent Communities	Chicago Neighborhoods	Tau for Complete Table
Percentage of Respondents:			
Reporting that they were not victimized during preceding 12 months (n)	75 (195)	74 (276)	.01
Reporting they do not stay at home because of fear of crime (n)	58 (205)	45 (276)	.13 ^a
Receiving high levels of police followup to reported crime ^c (n)	59 (32)	46 (48)	.13 ^b
Calling on the police for assistance not related to victimization (n)	19 (193)	24 (269)	-.05 ^b
Reporting police arrival in less than 5 minutes (n)	60 (30)	48 (44)	.11
Reporting effective police assistance ^c (n)	95 (36)	94 (62)	.01
Reporting fair treatment when stopped by own police force ^d (n)	77 (35)	70 (97)	.06

a. $p < .001$ b. $p < .05$

c. Coded "effective" when respondent indicated that police handled the matter, police gave emergency aid or police solved problem.

d. Includes respondents indicating that they were treated nicely or in a fair manner.

community control were to encourage racial separation, one would expect residents of the two independent black villages to have a *stronger* preference for black officials than respondents of the three Chicago neighborhoods. However, residents of the independent black villages were neither more nor less likely to prefer black officials. Twenty percent of the black respondents preferred black officials whether or not they lived in a separately incorporated community served by black officials.

Nor did a higher proportion of respondents in the independent communities express strong racial identity (Mitchell, 1973). Strong racial identifiers living in the Chicago neighborhoods were, however, extremely negative in their views toward the legitimacy of local

TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF CITIZEN EVALUATIONS OF
POLICE SERVICES (in percentages)

Evaluation Indicators	Independent Communities	Chicago Neighborhoods	Tau for Complete Table
Percentage of Respondents:			
Evaluating local police-community relations good (n)	46 (181)	44 (254)	.01
Evaluating local police response time very rapid (n)	26 (144)	25 (197)	.01
Believing local police do not accept bribes (n)	37 (110)	21 (157)	.18 ^a
Agreeing they have some say about what police do (n)	49 (196)	47 (264)	.01
Agreeing that local police have the right to take any action necessary (n)	61 (192)	38 (270)	.24 ^a
Agreeing that redress is possible for police mistreatment (n)	67 (176)	66 (270)	.01
Agreeing that local police treat all equally according to the law (n)	46 (105)	18 (181)	.31 ^a
Agreeing that local police look out for the needs of the average citizen (n)	56 (180)	36 (264)	.21 ^a

a. $p < .001$

institutions. On the other hand, strong racial identifiers living in the independent communities were more positive in their support of local institutions than were medium or weak racial identifiers (Mitchell, 1973). Given an opportunity to live in a separately incorporated black community, those with strong racial identification appear to become supporters of regular political institutions rather than antagonists.

Balkanization and economies of scale. Opponents of community control frequently assert that small units of government are most costly due to their failure to realize supposed economies of scale in the provision of public services. In the Chicago study, however, the

independent communities did not spend more for police protection than was spent by the city of Chicago in policing the neighborhoods studied. In fact, expenditures in the independent communities were much lower. Each independent community spent approximately \$40,000 in support of its local police department in 1969. During the same year, the Chicago Police Department, according to our estimates, incurred expenditures averaging over \$500,000 for each of the neighborhoods investigated. Similar or better services appear to have been provided by the smaller communities for about seven percent of the cost of the service provided by the larger police department.

Further, with regard to cooperation and coordination, there is considerable evidence of cooperative efforts between the smaller police departments and other local police agencies. Emergency mutual aid arrangements exist between the small black communities and some of the neighboring white communities. The Cook County Sheriff's Department, a large-scale agency with overlapping jurisdiction, provides a number of back-up and technical facilities for the two villages and many of the other small Cook County municipalities.

Lack of participation. The third objection to community control relates to a fear that small communities will be more undemocratic and their officials less responsive to the preferences of citizens than leaders in larger communities. Our findings indicate the opposite in the area studied. As shown on Table 5, village residents were more likely than Chicago residents to agree that citizens can get satisfaction from local officials. Village residents also were more likely to believe that local officials were interested in their neighborhoods. These findings are consistent with our findings that more village residents rated their police as responsive than did residents of the city of Chicago. Residents of villages are somewhat less likely to believe that local elections make a difference. Some might argue that this finding indicates a lack of willingness to participate in local elections and thus demonstrates that small-scale governments are less democratic. On the other hand, this finding may reflect the higher level of homogeneity in the villages and a belief that village government will be responsive regardless of electoral outcome.

Amateur public servants. With regard to the argument concerning professionalism, we did find that, by most standards, the village

TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF CITIZEN EVALUATIONS OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (in percentages)

	Independent Communities	Chicago Neighborhoods	Tau for Complete Table
Percentage of respondents agreeing that:			
Citizens can get satisfaction from talking with local public officials (n)	53 (170)	33 (256)	.21 ^a
Who gets elected to local office makes a difference (n)	66 (195)	76 (279)	-.15 ^b
Citizens can do something to prevent local corruption (n)	37 (186)	39 (264)	-.03
Citizens can influence the way the town is run (n)	60 (178)	54 (261)	.04
Local government is interested in their neighborhood (n)	46 (182)	31 (265)	.13 ^c

a. $p < .001$

b. $p < .005$

c. $p < .05$

police would not be called professional. Because of their limited resources, the villages paid policemen very poorly. The average salary of patrolmen was under \$2.00 an hour. Many of the police officers were part-time policemen and held full-time jobs elsewhere. The chief of police in each village was paid approximately two-thirds the salary of an *entering* patrolman in the Chicago Police Department. Officers were poorly trained and equipped. However, despite the obvious handicaps under which the village police pursued their duties, the citizens which they served rated police services as good as or better than similar citizens being served by the highly professional Chicago Police Department. Rates of criminal victimization and quality of police activity followed the same pattern. One would hardly argue that police service in the two villages could not be improved by increased training and higher salaries paid to officers. However, "professional" police without some means of relating to the people they serve do not seem to be more effective than even very "nonprofessional" police who are subject to community control.

Lack of financial resources. The final argument raised by opponents of community control relates to redistribution of resources. The two villages studied are very poor and are forced to rely very heavily on their own limited tax base. One of them has found it necessary to enforce traffic laws aggressively on a national highway within its jurisdiction to augment the funds available to the police department. Limited redistribution does occur as a result of the services provided by the Cook County sheriff, but it does not appear to be very great.

A potentially more important source of redistribution are the revenues which the villages receive under a recently enacted Illinois statute which returns a small percentage of the state income tax to incorporated communities. In personal interviews, both village mayors stressed the importance of the small additional source of revenue from this state source to the operation of the village government. If greater financial support were available from county, state, or federal funds, the villages could improve police pay levels, training of patrolmen and equipment.

At the time of this study, the village governments found themselves in the strange position of not qualifying for most state and federal aid. They are both too small and too poor. Most grants offered by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, for example, are directed to police departments of medium and large cities whose budget exceeds a certain minimum level. The *only* federally controlled grant available through LEAA funds to the villages of Phoenix and East Chicago Heights in 1970 would support studies leading toward consolidation of their police forces with neighboring communities. While these police forces have been able to work out cooperative mutual aid arrangements with their white neighbors, consolidation with a neighboring police force is not a politically viable solution. The two villages are physically separate, and joint grant proposals have been refused due to lack of contiguity. Considerable redistribution could be accomplished with only minor changes in state and federal policies to open up opportunities for grants and other funds to small, very poor communities.

However, redistribution of resources, itself, is not sufficient to bring about responsive police services. It appears that considerable resource redistribution is currently occurring within the city of Chicago. More resources are probably being devoted to policing in the black neighborhoods studied than are derived in revenue for such purposes from these areas. Residents of these neighborhoods,

however, find police services no better and police somewhat less responsive than do village residents *despite* the much greater difference in resources devoted to policing.

A POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Police effectiveness depends, in part, on police understanding the nature of the community being served and police openness to suggestions, criticism, and complaints. This is particularly true of the kind of police services citizens receive in their own neighborhoods. Community control appears to be one way of enhancing the possibilities of citizen-police communication, thereby increasing both citizen support of police and police responsiveness to citizen preferences.

This policy alternative has already been adopted by those living in independently incorporated, small communities. Perhaps some of the problems of our largest cities might be more effectively dealt with by employing a similar remedy within their jurisdictions. There is no need for the elimination of the large city or its police department. Many police problems are city-, state-, or nationwide. Such police problems require a diversity of relatively large-scale jurisdictions. Moreover, some specialized police services can be provided better by larger-scale units. Communications and records, laboratory facilities and specialized investigatory details may be more economically provided by larger, citywide units.

Locally controlled police agencies could be established within the boundaries of a larger police jurisdiction to serve the particular needs of the large city's diverse neighborhoods. While many observers have assumed that overlap of jurisdictions was in and of itself wasteful and to be avoided, overlap of jurisdictions may be necessary to deal simultaneously with problems of varying scale (V. Ostrom, 1971). The United States has a number of federal agencies existing concurrently with a number of state and local agencies. Just as some police problems are only city- or statewide in scope, others extend only to a single neighborhood. Furthermore, the FBI and other police agencies with broad jurisdictions must rely on local agencies for specific and detailed knowledge of particular areas if their efforts in specific places are to be effective. Those at the top of many

now serve has a particular meaning for only a very few. Many live outside it in the suburbs and know the city's neighborhoods almost solely from their police work. Since there are no precinct stations but only radio car routes, and since these are frequently changed, there is little opportunity to build up an intimate familiarity, much less an identification with any neighborhood. The Western City police are, in a real sense, an army of occupation organized along paramilitary lines."

7. After this study was completed, the informal cooperation between villages was formalized through the establishment of the Suburban Mayors' Planning Group, involving the seven communities of Harvey, Markham, East Chicago Heights, Dixmoor, Chicago Heights, Phoenix, and Robbins. The first project undertaken by this group was a joint proposal by the seven communities to the Illinois Law Enforcement Association to establish a cooperative crime prevention program. (The proposal was, incidentally, turned down after extended negotiations because none of the communities involved had sufficient financial resources to meet the matching requirements of the program.)

REFERENCES

- ABERBACH, J. D. and J. L. WALKER (1970a) "The attitudes of blacks and whites toward city services: implications for public policy," in J. P. Crecine (ed.) *Financing the Metropolis: Public Policy in Urban Economies*. Beverly Hills: Sage Pubns.
- (1970b) "Political trust and racial ideology." *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 64: 1199-1219.
- ALTSHULER, A. A. (1970) *Community Control: The Black Demand for Participation in Large American Cities*. New York: Pegasus.
- ARNSTEIN, S. R. (1969) "A ladder of citizen participation." *J. of Amer. Institute of Planners* 35: 216-232.
- BABCOCK, R. F. and F. BOSSELMAN (1967) "Citizen participation: a suburban suggestion for the central city." *J. of Law and Contemporary Problems* 32: 220-231.
- BARON, H. M. (1968) "Black powerlessness in Chicago." *Transaction* 6: 27-33.
- BAYLEY, D. H. and H. MENDELSON (1969) *Minorities and the Police*. New York: Free Press.
- BERGER, C. J. (1968) "Law, justice and the poor," in R. H. Connery (ed.) *Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change*. New York: Random House.
- BISH, R. L. (1971) *The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas*. Chicago: Markham.
- and R. WARREN (1972) "Scale and monopoly problems in urban government services." *Urban Affairs Q.* 8: 97-122.
- CAMPBELL, A. and H. SCHUMAN (1968) "Racial attitudes in fifteen American cities," in *Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- Center for Governmental Studies (1970) *Public Administration and Neighborhood Control*. Washington, D.C.
- Chicago Sun Times (1972) "The ranking of 200 suburbs in status list." (August 15): 12.
- CLARK, T. M. (1970) "On decentralization." *Polity* 2: 508-514.
- COSTNER, H. L., R. O. HAWKINS, P. E. SMITH, and G. F. WHITE, III (1970) "Crime, the public and the police." University of Washington. (mimeo)
- DE VISE, P. (1967) *Chicago's Widening Color Gap*. Chicago: Interuniversity Social Research Committee.
- ENNIS, P. H. (1967) *Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Report of a National Survey*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

- ERIE, S. P., J. J. KIRLIN, and F. E. RABINOVITZ (1972) "Can something be done? Propositions on the performance of metropolitan institutions," in L. Wingo (ed.) *Reform of Metropolitan Governments*. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.
- FEAGIN, J. R. (1970) "Home defense and the police: black and white perspectives." *Amer. Behavioral Scientist* 13: 797-814.
- FERRY, W. H. (1968) "The case for a new federalism." *Saturday Rev.* 30 (June 15): 15.
- FOGELSON, R. M. (1968) "From resentment to confrontation: the police, the Negroes and the outbreak of the nineteen-sixties riots." *Pol. Sci. Q.* 83: 217-247.
- GITTELL, M. (1968) "Community control of education," pp. 63-75 in R. A. Connery (ed.) *Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change*. New York: Random House.
- GROVES, W. E. and P. H. ROSSI (1970) "Police perceptions of a hostile ghetto: realism or projections." *Amer. Behavioral Scientist* 13 (May/June): 727-744.
- HAHN, H. (1971) "Local variations in urban law enforcement," in P. Orleans and W. R. Ellis (ed.) *Race, Change and Urban Society*. Beverly Hills: Sage Pubns.
- and J. R. FEAGIN (1970) "Riot precipitating police practices: attitudes in urban ghettos." *Phylon* 31: 183-193.
- HALLMAN, H. W. (1971) *Administrative Decentralization and Citizen Control*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Governmental Studies.
- Illinois Regional Medical Program (1971) *Chicago Regional Hospital Study*. Chicago: Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry.
- ISHAK, S. T. (1972) "Consumers' perceptions of police performance: consolidation vs. deconcentration; the case of Grand Rapids, Michigan, metropolitan area." Ph.D. dissertation. Indiana University (Bloomington).
- ITZKOFF, S. W. (1969) "Decentralization: dialectic and dilemma." *Educ. Forum* 34: 63-69.
- JACKSON, J. (1970) "On the case." *Chicago Daily Defender* 4 (Weekend Edition for August): 22-28.
- JACOB, H. (1970) "Black and white perceptions of justice in the city." *Law and Society Rev.* 6: 69-90.
- JACOBS, P. (1966) "The Los Angeles police." *Atlantic Monthly* 218 (December): 95-101.
- KOTLER, M. et al. (1968) "Table talk/finding the city." *Center Magazine* 1 (May): 14-17.
- KRISTOL, I. (1968) "Decentralization for what?" *Public Interest* 11 (Spring): 17-25.
- LEVY, B. (1968) "Cops in the ghetto: a problem of the police system," pp. 347-358 in L. H. Masotti and D. R. Bowen (eds.) *Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community*. Beverly Hills: Sage Pubns.
- LIEBERSON, A. and A. R. SILVERMAN (1965) "The precipitants and underlying conditions of race riots." *Amer. Soc. Rev.* 31 (December): 887-898.
- MARSHALL, D. R. (1971) "Public participation and the politics of poverty," pp. 451-483 in P. Orleans and W. R. Ellis (eds.) *Race, Change and Urban Society*. Beverly Hills: Sage Pubns.
- MAYER, A. (1971) "A new level of local government is struggling to be born." *City* (March/April): 60-64.
- MELTZER, J. (1968) "A new look at the urban revolt." *J. of Amer. Institute of Planners* 34 (December): 255-259.
- MITCHELL, M. (1973) "Racial identification and public order in black communities." Indiana University Department of Political Science Studies in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.
- MOGULO, M. (1969) "Coalition to adversary: citizen participation in three federal programs." *J. of Amer. Institute of Planners* 35: 225-232.
- National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) *Report*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- NIE, N. H., G. B. POWELL, Jr., and K. PREWITT (1969) "Social structure and political participation: developmental relationships." *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 62: 361-378.

- OLSON, M. E. (1970) "Social and political participation of blacks," *Amer. Soc. Rev.* 35: 682-697.
- ORBELL, J. M. and T. UNO (1972) "A theory of neighborhood problem solving: political actions vs. residential mobility," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 66: 471-489.
- ORUM, A. M. (1966) "A reappraisal of the social and political participation of Negroes," *Amer. J. of Sociology* 72: 32-46.
- OSTROM, E. (1972) "Metropolitan reform: propositions derived from two traditions," *Social Sci. Q.* 53 (December): 474-493.
- (1971) "Institutional arrangements and the measurement of policy consequences in urban areas," *Urban Affairs Q.* 6: 447-475.
- and R. B. PARKS (1973) "Suburban police departments: too many and too small?" pp. 367-402 in L. H. Masotti and J. K. Hadden (eds.) *The Urbanization of the Suburbs*, UAAR VII. Beverly Hills: Sage Pubns.
- OSTROM, E. and G. WHITAKER (1973) "Does local community control of police make a difference? Some preliminary findings," *Amer. J. of Pol. Sci.* 17 (February): 48-76.
- OSTROM, E., R. PARKS, and G. WHITAKER (1973) "Do we really want to consolidate urban police forces? A reexamination of some old assertions," *Public Administration Rev.* 33 (September/October): 423-432.
- OSTROM, E., W. BAUGH, R. GUARASCI, R. PARKS, and G. WHITAKER (1973) "Community organization and the provision of police services," *Sage Prof. Paper in Administrative and Policy Studies* 03-001.
- OSTROM, V. (1973) *The Intellectual Crises in American Public Administration*. University: Univ. of Alabama Press.
- (1971) *The Political Theory of a Compound Republic*. Blacksburg, Va.: Center for the Study of Public Choice at Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
- C. M. TIEBOUT, and R. WARREN (1961) "The organization of government in metropolitan areas: a theoretical inquiry," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 55: 831-842.
- PARENTI, M. (1970) "Power and pluralism: a view from the bottom," *J. of Politics* 32: 501-530.
- PERLMUTTER, N. (1968) "We don't help blacks by hurting whites," *New York Times Magazine* (October 6): 31.
- PIVEN, F. F. and R. A. CLOWARD (1967) "Black control of the cities: heading it off by metropolitan government," *New Republic* (September 30): 19-21; (October 7): 15-19.
- PRESS, C. (1963) "The cities within a great city: a decentralist approach to centralization," *Centennial Rev.* 7: 113-130.
- PREWITT, K. and H. EULAU (1969) "Political matrix and political representation: prolegomenon to a new departure from an old problem," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 62: 427-441.
- PREZEWORSKI, A. and H. TEUNE (1970) *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: John Wiley.
- ROSSI, P. H. (1963) "The middle-sized American city at mid-century," *Library Q.* 33: 3-13.
- and R. A. BERK (1970) "Local political leadership and popular discontent in the ghetto," *Annals of Amer. Academy of Pol. and Social Sci.* 391: 111-127.
- RUBENSTEIN, R. E. (1970) *Rebels in Eden*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- SHALALA, D. E. (1971) "Neighborhood governments: rationale, functions, size and governmental framework." Prepared for the National Consultation on Neighborhood Government, Institute of Human Relations, New York.
- SKOLNICK, J. (1967) *Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society*. New York: John Wiley.
- SPEAR, A. H. (1967) *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
- TAUBER, K. E. (1968) "The problem of residential segregation," in R. H. Connery (ed.) *Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change*. New York: Random House.
- TenHOUTEN, W., J. STERN, and D. TenHOUTEN (1971) "Political leadership in poor

- communities: applications of two sampling methodologies," pp. 215-254 in P. Orleans and W. R. Ellis (eds.) *Race, Change and Urban Society*. Beverly Hills: Sage Pubns.
- TIEBOUT, C. M. (1956) "The pure theory of local expenditure," *J. of Pol. Economy* 64: 416-424.
- WARREN, R. (1966) *Government in Metropolitan Regions*. Davis: University of California, Davis, Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- WHITAKER, G. P. (1971) "Urban police forces: size and scale in relation to service," Ph.D. dissertation. Indiana University.
- WILSON, J. Q. (1968a) "The police and the delinquent in two cities," pp. 173-196 in J. Q. Wilson (ed.) *City Politics and Public Policy*. New York: John Wiley.
- (1968b) *Varieties of Police Behavior*. Boston: Harvard Univ. Press.
- (1963) "The police and their problems: a theory," *Public Policy* 12: 189-216.
- ZIMMERMAN, J. F. (1970) "Metropolitan reform in the U.S.: an overview," *Public Admin. Rev.* 30: 531-543.

END