


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Evaluation Report
on the
(MA) Holyoke, Team Police Experiment
of the
~~Holyoke Police Department~~
June 1973

Project supported by the Holyoke Model Cities Program, the United States Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice.

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SUMMARY

Holyoke's Team Police Project has three primary goals:

1. improve police-community relations, fostering a positive change in community attitude toward police.
2. improve both the effectiveness and the efficiency of police service delivery to team neighborhoods, and
3. foster greater police job satisfaction and raise police morale levels by creating a more challenging and rewarding police role.

The 1972 evaluation report has concerned itself primarily with the performances of Team One and Two. Other teams have been in operation for too short a period of time to allow proper assessment of their activities.

Both Teams One and Two have demonstrated success in achieving two project goals: improved police-community relations and increased effectiveness and efficiency of police service delivery.

1. Improved police-community relations.

Attitude surveys administered to a random sample of Area One and Two residents indicated strong support for the Team Police concept: residents interviewed stated that they felt more secure (56-59%), were receiving better service than under traditional policing, (77-80%), thought that Team Policing was a good idea (88-91%), and desired the project to continue (85-91%). The structural aspect of Team Policing which was most appreciated by Area One and Two residents was police proximity to neighborhood areas: police are now located in area storefronts and therefore are able to respond more quickly to complaint calls.

During the first six months of each team's operation, residents in both areas recorded similar positive opinions with reference to perceived police

attitudes toward citizens. In 1972, however, Area One residents expressed a greater percentage of neutral opinions with reference to team attitudes toward citizens, indicating that some deterioration in community attitudes had occurred in Area One during the course of the second action year. This occurrence was more than likely related to a slight decrease in Team One contact with citizens and in team spirit. This deterioration has occurred as a result of three separate factors:

1. Changes of personnel on Team One
2. Structural alterations in the team concept, and
3. Problems in obtaining wage raises, and hence, availability of extra time for community activities.

Although Team One as a whole still maintains a strong positive image among Ward One residents, it is evident that Team One must re-examine its role in the community and work to re-establish itself, particularly among the elderly citizens of that area.

A significant finding was that on most questions, Area Two residents expressed a greater percentage of positive attitudes toward police than did residents in Areas Three and Four which did not have team units at that time.

2. Improved effectiveness and efficiency.

Both Team Units One and Two have also made significant progress towards the improvement in effectiveness and efficiency of police service. At a time when the city as a whole experienced a slight increase (4.5%) in crime rate, Area One experienced a decrease of 31% in its crime rate (as measured by the number of Part I offenses occurring in Area One in 1972 as compared with 1971). Coupled with increases in the number of service calls and disturbance calls which Team One received in 1972, these data strongly suggest that the continued operation of Team Unit One has made significant positive impact on crime patterns and reporting patterns in that area.

Due to deficiencies in the departmental records-keeping system, comparisons could not be made between non-team performance levels. Hence, Team Two performance has been assessed according to performance standards established by Team One in its first action year. Comparison of these two teams during their first six months of operation demonstrated similar response times (approximately two minutes) from receipt of call to police presence at the scene of the call, similar numbers of calls handled per month by each team (approximately 250-350 calls per month per team), and similar clearance rates (number of cases which have been closed by arrest, extradition, or other police action). Teams One and Two clearance rates for Part I offenses were significantly better than those of the nation as a whole, (53% for Team Two, and 49% for Team One as compared to a national figure of approximately 20%). The demographic similarity of Areas One and Two, and the similarity of performance levels of Team One and Two during their first six months of operations, would tend to indicate that in the future Area Two crime rate figures will follow the same improved pattern as have Area One figures in 1972.

Progress towards the third goal of the Team Police project, improved police job satisfaction and morale levels, has been more difficult to assess. 1972 was a year of intense controversy within the department. Morale in general within the department was low, as indicated by a 200% rise in the number of sick days taken per man per month by both Team One and Two members and non-team personnel. While the Team Two sick rate was almost identical with the non-team rate, Team One members continued to have a sick rate of only one-half that of the remainder of the department. This data suggests that although morale decreased slightly in Team One in 1972, Team One members in general continued to demonstrate higher morale and job satisfaction levels than other department members.

Interviews with Team One members confirmed this opinion. Members indicated that they have continued to feel greater job satisfaction and increased

effectiveness as police officers due to the team structure, particularly those facets of the structure encouraging greater independence, individual flexibility, police community contact, and reduced rank consciousness. Following cases to conclusion, greater knowledge of an area and its people, and team spirit were particularly cited by members as having had a positive impact on job satisfaction and morale. Problems with monetary incentives and increasing departmental control over the team have contributed, however, to a decrease in satisfaction and morale on Team One in 1972.

Team Two members, on the contrary, expressed lower levels of satisfaction and morale, largely because personnel tended to share in the negative departmental feelings about Team Policing. Members of Team Two could also cite little difference between traditional policing and Team Policing as it existed in most areas of the city, and this inability to distinguish between the two concepts has added to Team Two member skepticism about the need for a Team Police project.

Because of the ambiguity of most data in this section, one cannot determine unequivocally whether or not the team structure leads to improved job satisfaction and morale. Department resentment over the Team Police project and general dissatisfaction with the police pay scale have seriously distorted all 1972 measures of job satisfaction and morale. It is significant, however, that alterations in the team model in 1972 have affected morale on Team One in a negative direction. This would tend to support the hypothesis that at least on Team One, the team structure was a significant determinant of high levels of satisfaction and morale as recorded in 1971.

Although Teams One and Two have made significant progress toward two project goals, specifically improvements in community attitudes toward police and in the efficiency and effectiveness of police service, the experiment continues to face two major problem areas in 1973.

1. Alterations which have occurred in the team structure in 1972 must be reviewed in 1973. To a great extent, a precinct model of policing, as opposed to a team model, exists in Holyoke at this point in time. Close supervision by sergeants has vitiated the goal of reducing rank consciousness; centralized decision-making authority, and failure to adequately define Commanding Officer responsibilities and team prerogatives have greatly reduced the independence and initiative given to teams. Re-assignment of personnel in and out of the four area teams has broken the concept of the "unit" and has seriously hindered the development of in-depth knowledge of one area and its people. Delays in formal training programs have reduced the scope of the generalist/specialist concept in Teams Two, Three, and Four which therefore rely heavily on Detective Bureau personnel to provide investigative backup.

At this point in time city and police administrators and planners must clearly decide what form the team model will take in Holyoke and particularly to what extent centralization will continue to be permitted.

If a more decentralized team model cannot realistically be achieved, particularly one which encourages team decision-making authority, the generalist/specialist concept and permanent personnel assignments to one area of the city, planners and officials should be aware that project goals may be difficult to achieve. Although Teams One and Two have to date made substantial progress toward project goals with reference to community attitudes and improved police service to Areas One and Two, future achievements will very likely be adversely affected by structural alterations. We have already seen the impact of these alterations on Team One morale and on community attitude measures in Area One. Team efficiency and effectiveness too, dependent as they are upon group and individual initiative, citizen cooperation and in-dept knowledge of one community area, will certainly be affected by current practices within the department.

2. A second major problem facing the Team Police Project in 1973 is the division which still exists within the department with reference to the Project. To a great extent, resentment with Team Policing has become focused into opposition to the Master Plan Staff. Rivalries between staff-line functions, residual resentment with innovative change, and the self-enforced isolation of the staff have contributed to a continually worsening relationship between staff personnel and Commanding Officers. As a result, departmental planning and decision-making is fragmented and time-consuming. Information flow between staff and line personnel is minimal and not likely to increase.

In summary, the Team Policing experiment in Holyoke has demonstrated under difficult circumstances its ability to approach several project goals. At this point in time however, the department remains severely divided over the issue of innovative change. Further, a highly centralized team-precinct operation is developing within the city. Both of these developments are affecting project goals, and the staff as it currently exists cannot be expected to significantly improve the situation due to its own poor relationship with both Commanding Officers and most non-ranking personnel. A decentralized planning mechanism is one alternative which could be instituted in the remaining project period. If during this time, substantial progress has not been made in 1. repairing the divisions within the department, 2. involving all levels of department personnel in the planning, problem identification-and-resolution process, 3. defining the extent of Commanding Officer and team prerogatives and 4. instituting a more decentralized "team" model within the city, continued federal or local funding of the program should be seriously questioned, for it is doubtful that progress toward project goals can be maintained. The cooperation of department personnel and the establishment of a more adequate, but realistically, modified team structure are both necessary if real and continued progress toward project goals is to be achieved.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In December 1970, an experiment in police service was initiated in Ward I of the City of Holyoke, Massachusetts. Since that time the project, entitled Team Policing, has been expanded, first to another ward, and then throughout the city. The project, still considered an experiment, has been a controversial one in the city; it will be reviewed again by the City Fathers in the Spring of 1974 to determine its effectiveness as a means of police service delivery to this city of 50,000 people.

This evaluation report will concern itself with the first two Team Police Units; the first has been in operation a little over two years, the second in operation since August 13, 1972. Although the third and fourth teams will be mentioned, they have been in operation for too short a period to allow other than cursory examination.

The report is primarily concerned with: 1. determining the extent to which the first two teams have achieved the goals of the experiment as elaborated by police planners, what modifications have occurred, and what affect they are having upon the teams; and 2. describing to the reader the general atmosphere with which the experiment has had to contend and which in many ways has adversely affected the project. This atmosphere has clouded the experiment to the extent that it has become impossible to ignore its affects as one examines the Team Police Concept as it exists in Holyoke.

II. HISTORY OF THE PROJECT

A. WHY EXPERIMENT WITH POLICING?

Improving police service has been a subject uppermost in the minds of public officials in recent years. Rising crime rates and outspoken national leaders have focused attention upon the issue and forced many in this country to take a long, hard look at policing.

A further impetus for examining policing as it currently exists came in the 1960's, when a new kind of policing problem developed: how to deal with college-aged, middle class youths demonstrating across the nation and how to deal with the "hot" summers in the nation's ghetto areas. Observers saw that police, in trying to manage oftentimes violent dissent, provoked greater violence by their very presence. Time and again violence erupted as communication links broke between police and demonstrators.

Public officials began to question the wisdom of traditional policing philosophy, as they saw its limited effectiveness not only in controlling crime but in dealing with dissent and disorder on the campus and in the ghetto.

As police planners examined these particular situations, they began to see a pattern of communication breakdown which extended far beyond police and dissidents. The "police" as a group had somehow become separated from the community, from average citizens. This was particularly obvious in minority group areas, where customs and language barriers made understanding difficult for both police and residents. But, it was also true of other areas whose contact with police was minimal. No one seemed to understand what a police officer was and what he could do and could not do; by the same token there seemed to be little understanding on the part of the police themselves of community feelings, needs, or desires. Criticism, just and unjust, began to fall on police forces across the country, culminating in Supreme Court

decisions on policing procedures and individual rights, and in investigations such as the Knapp and Kent State hearings.

Why had this separation between police and their communities occurred in what seemed so short a period? Was it that the police had suddenly become brutal or psychotic or did the fault lie elsewhere?

As officials examined the problem, it became more and more obvious that perhaps the greatest cause of disintegrating police-community relations was the attitude of police officers in dealing with community disorder. This attitude stemmed directly from the role perception of police officers. Most police officers viewed themselves, and were expected to view themselves, as enforcers of law charged with bringing the lawbreaker, the criminal, to justice. In reality, however, the police officer had to become much more than a law enforcer in the 1960's: he had to maintain order in the community, dealing with lawbreakers who were not necessarily criminals in the classic sense.

Sometimes laws were broken because of genuine disagreement over national attitudes. Sometimes laws were broken because of differences in national customs. When a Puerto Rican "loiters" and refuses to move, he feels justified in doing so because "hanging around" the corner is something one does in his community to participate in the life of that community.

If the police officer reacts to such situations in terms of law enforcement alone, he immediately becomes an adversary. Separated from the community as he already is by the very structure of his job*, he becomes progressively more alienated from those with whom he must deal by the very fact that he views community problems in terms of law enforcement alone. Order within the community in such situations comes to rest on the power to arrest. And when only the fear of arrest separates a community from violence, violence is sure to erupt.

* He dresses differently, he rides through the community in a cruiser, he usually meets people under tr an. circumstances.

Even in non-violent situations, the law enforcement attitude of a police officer may be harmful to police-community relations; it may cause him to react in the same manner to a law-abiding citizen who has failed to stop for a red light as he might react to someone who had committed a much greater criminal act (they have both, after all, broken a law). Such treatment, however, only serves to antagonize the citizen who feels needlessly belittled or insulted, and further separates the officer from the people with whom he deals.

As officials and citizens began to examine these issues, they came to realize that if the police role was thought of primarily as one of conflict management or maintenance of community order, with only a small percentage of its time actually devoted to law enforcement (as is actually the case) it no longer had to confront situations, such as those described above, in an adversary manner. And, the thinking went, as soon as the police began this reorientation, the community could be expected to make a comparable shift in its feelings towards the police. Such a shift would benefit both the community and the police.

This kind of thinking, the whole idea of role re-orientation, implied that more training in conflict management, in understanding different cultures and customs, in overcoming language barriers, in handling oneself and others, and in handling non-criminal situations, was necessary in order for police officers to become effective in attaining their goal of order maintenance within the community.

As police officials continued to examine the breakdown of police-community relations, another cause came to light. Not only was the role description of police officers and the training for their role outdated and ineffective in dealing with communities; the very structure of most police departments often discouraged the development of a relationship of cooperation between

police and communities. . . Bureaucratic, militaristic, hidden away in archaic and often prison-like buildings, most police departments were not geared to drawing the average citizen off the street and into the police world in order that he might grow to better understand that world. Police buildings, police uniforms, police cruisers are intimidating sights for the average person and are usually not sought out unless one is in trouble. Hence it is not unusual that most citizen contact with police comes in tragic or bothersome situations. That is, there is no police structure which allows close police-community contact in other than stressful circumstances.

Mechanization and modern police techniques have also contributed their share to the growing separation of the police officer and the people. The walking beat had allowed friendly contact to develop, but with the advent of the automobile, the advantages in both deployment and speed of motorized patrols became obvious, and walking beats were drastically curtailed.

Thus, the police have become progressively more separated from the community. Although in a sense no group of officials is closer to the people than those who are "there" in time of trouble, in another sense, no group is more isolated from the people than those not given the opportunity to meet and work with people in other than confrontation situations.

This concern over the separation between police and community, whether that community be White, Puerto Rican, or Black, is a very real one today. For police officials readily admit that good policing is only possible with close community cooperation. It is a rare occurrence when a crime is committed in the presence of a police officer. In most instances, the officer must depend on the cooperative citizen to inform him of trouble, give accurate information and serve as a witness in court. Just as importantly, when one approaches policing from the perspective of order maintenance, one sees that

citizens must learn to work closely with one another and with police in identifying potential trouble spots, setting up programs to deter crime, calming down potentially violent community disturbances, and in general assisting police in keeping the community safe. The best deterrent to crime is the knowledge that every resident of an area is a potential assistant to the police.

In summary, as William A. Westley has written, police planners came to see in recent years that, "...the principal objective of modern urban policing should be the maintenance of public order. To achieve this objective the police must have the cooperation of citizens, be trained in skills eliciting such cooperation, and be given a relationship to the community which breeds trust and confidence."

It was just these feelings of mutual trust and confidence between police and the community which seemed to be collapsing in the 1960's.

There is another side to today's concern with the practice of policing. We have spoken of changing public attitudes with reference to the role a police officer must play and the importance of providing a structure of community cooperation within which this role of order maintenance can be performed. Police administrators have also realized that the quality of police service received by a community depends to a great extent on the calibre of the individual police officer dispensing that service. Hence, we have begun to see a drive to attract more qualified personnel into the police profession. As the nature of a policeman's job becomes more and more complex, as it must in today's world of diverse cultures and situations, it becomes increasingly important for the policeman to become a professional: skilled, trained, competent, with examinations that assure a certain level of quality.

But if one wishes to attract highly qualified personnel, one must assure these personnel that the job will provide challenges, satisfactions, and benefits that compare attractively with other professions. The manner in which policing has developed in recent years, however, has hindered its ability to compete successfully with other jobs.

Specialization has entered police departments just as it has entered other realms. A Dayton, Ohio, police syllabus describes the situation as follows:

"Today, police are terribly specialized: they have special units for investigations, traffic control, accident investigation, juvenile aid, community relations, and a wealth of other special activities. Police officers assigned to these specialities rarely receive adequate training to become 'book experts' in a technical sense, but over the years, by working at the one identified task, they gain a fairly high degree of competency in a narrow task area.

Such specialization can be destructive to the development of the initiative of field patrol officers. For example, if a beat officer responds to a traffic accident where a person is injured, in most cities his only responsibility is to aid the sick and injured; the investigation must be left to the accident investigation specialist. The same is true of a great number of situations; for example, if a minor crime is encountered, the detective is called in to investigate and the beat officer goes back on patrol.

With police agencies constantly trying to recruit and utilize college trained men, this type of organizational structure does not allow a mature and responsible individual to exercise initiative. Few college graduates would find it attractive, as a job opportunity, to ride around in a marked automobile all day being seen, but not being allowed to follow through on any particular case. And when this occurs, the beat patrol officer cannot be held responsible for what happens on his beat for all he does is take reports, he doesn't investigate or participate in like matters."

The frustrations on the part of the beat patrolman in such instances are understandably great. To attract high calibre personnel, and to keep these personnel performing at high levels of quality, the policeman's job had to be altered.

And so, police officials and planners began a search for solutions to the problem discussed above: the separation of police and citizens in general and more particularly, the breakdown in communication between the police and various segments of society, and the unattractive, unsatisfying job structure into which most patrolmen are placed. The solution it was felt: 1. must embody an attitude and role change which would allow police to "return to the community", without jeopardizing the objectivity of the officer in making a necessary arrest (an argument traditionally used for justifying minimal police-community contact), 2. would have to provide a police structure within which citizens would be more likely to seek out police officers in other than crisis situations, and 3. would have to provide a job structure which would attract young, qualified people into the police profession and which would increase the individual responsibility of each officer.

These, then, are some of the basic goals of projects in policing which have developed in recent years.

B. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM

One such project was begun in Holyoke, Massachusetts, in December 1970. Holyoke, the "Paper City", is typical of many New England cities. Reaching its zenith at the turn of the century when its mills were providing paper and cloth for the nation, Holyoke is now fighting to hold on to the remainder of its industrial base and to cope with the multi-faceted problems of older cities: tenement housing, suburban sprawl and a concomitant decay of the Central Business District, a declining total population (from 54,540 in 1960 to 50,112 in 1970, according to U. S. Census figures), and a populace changing from middle and upper low income white to lower income non-white. The overall ratio of minorities, however, is relatively low when compared to most urban areas (in 1970, Black and Puerto Rican minorities accounted for only 8% of the city's total population).

As is usually the case, however, most minority residents are located in one area of the city, Wards 1 and 2, (See table 2-I, Team Areas One and Two) which contains 20% of the city's total population, but almost 60% of its Black and Puerto Rican minorities. Living conditions are poor in this area; almost one quarter of the families in these wards have incomes below the poverty level. Recently, minority residents have begun to locate themselves in a deteriorating area to the west of Ward 2 and south of the CBD (part of Team Area Four on Table 2-I). Police-community relations in each of these areas are potentially the worst in the city.

Holyoke has taken positive steps to deal with these problems. The first step was Holyoke's receipt of Model Cities funds in 1969 to develop a Model Neighborhood in Ward 1. Approximately 1/10 of the city's population of 50,000 people occupy this area. The ward population is approximately 20% Puerto Rican, 10% Black, and the remainder French, Polish, and Irish families who had originally settled the area and who, within recent years, had begun

Table 2-I, SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CITY OF HOLYOKE & TEAM AREAS

BASED ON 1970 CENSUS INFORMATION *

Characteristics	Area 1		Area 2		Area 3		Area 4		City	
Total Population	4,666		4,184		31,044		10,218		50,112	
	#	%**	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Black	420	9	223	5	210	.7	274	3	1127	2
Puerto Rican	893	19	287	7	41	.1	49	.5	1496	3
White	3338	72	3664	88	30730	99	9856	96	47362	95
Income Below Poverty Level (Families)	235	22	246	25	406	5	432	17	1319	11
Average Family Income	\$8,189		\$6,421		\$12,353		\$7,606		\$9,963	

* All data is based on Census Tract Divisions and hence is slightly inaccurate but serves for purposes of description and comparison. Area 1 corresponds exactly with Tract 8114. Area 2 has been equated with Tract 8115, but is in reality larger (including the Springdale-Ingleside Area of the City). Area 3 has been equated with Tracts 8118, 8119, 8120, and 8121, but is smaller by approximately 2300 people, most of whom live in the Springdale-Ingleside section of Area 2; the remainder are added to Area 4. Hence, Area 4 (Tract 8116 and 8117) is larger than it appears.

** Rounded off to the nearest percents.

Their uneasiness was reflected in a list of neighborhood needs which was drawn up by the citizen body governing the Model Cities Program. A specific request was made that Model Cities planners develop a project which would bring back a "sense of security to the neighborhood."

This was in 1969. The summer of 1970 brought special impetus to police planners in the city to provide an answer for this request. That summer, one police officer was stabbed, another narrowly missed a skull fracture from a tossed flowerpot, a third was shot in the stomach. Although no major riots occurred, near riots were a constant threat to order and stability.

The city government's reaction to this situation was to authorize planning for a Model Cities-police project to ease the tension in the city. The plan decided upon was an elaboration of the "Team Policing" concept which had begun in Aberdeen, Scotland, shortly after World War II and had spread to a handful of cities in this country. The project was to be funded with Model Cities-HUD monies, with Ward I serving as the experimental area and Ward 2, its demographic twin, serving as a control. Ward 2 would receive police service delivery in a traditional manner; Ward 1 would have its own Team Police Unit. Planners envisioned that if Team Unit One could prove a success in the tense situation into which it was thrown, the team concept could be expanded to another area and eventually throughout the city as the means of police service delivery.

C. THE TEAM APPROACH

1. Goals

Holyoke's plan is perhaps the most far-reaching of any team police experiment in the country, for it encompasses most goals which other departments have attempted to cope with in a piecemeal fashion. The goals of the Holyoke Team Police Project are as follows:

I. Improve police-community relations, repairing the breakdown in communications which has occurred between police and citizens.

- a. develop a means of policing better equipped to deal with the cultural and language barriers which separate police from minority groups or foreign language citizens.
- b. foster a positive change in community attitude toward police individually and toward the police institution.
- c. increase cooperation between the community and police.

II. Develop a more satisfactory role conception and job description to govern the performance of police officers, one which allows for both responsiveness to and greater responsibility for community problems.

- a. change in a positive manner the role conception of police in order that they may come to view their roles as more self-motivated and self-directed, affording more responsibility and authority in decision making.
- b. change the job description of police officers by developing a generalist/specialist approach to police service delivery.
- c. foster greater job satisfaction by creating a more challenging and rewarding police role.

III. Improve both the effectiveness and efficiency of police service

delivery to a neighborhood.

- a. reduce the cost of service delivery
- b. increase the sense of security in the community

2. The Team Police Model

Holyoke Police planners developed broad guidelines to accomplish these goals, guidelines which were to be elaborated upon and refined by team members themselves. This general structure has been most adequately described in a previous evaluation report prepared by John Angell, Ray Galvin, and Michael O'Neill.:

"The police operation that was implemented in Ward I was to be relatively independent of control from the normal command hierarchy of the Holyoke Police Department. A team of officers was assigned to the area and given the responsibility of providing police service in the area. The precise goals they were to pursue and the methods that would be utilized were left to the team. In arriving at the definition of the goals and the procedures that the police would be using, the officers were required to work closely with members of the community and their organizations. The team structure and operations were to be very flexible, insofar as possible providing the kind of police service that the people of Ward I wanted. The team model was to have the following characteristics:

- 1. Police operations in Ward I were to be decentralized with the police officers working out of a local storefront rather than the central station.
- 2. The team was to be given the authority to make decisions concerning their goals, procedures, duty assignments, training needs, etc. Such authority was not given to regular patrol officers.
- 3. Traditional formal supervisory assignments were to be suspended in favor of situational, informal arrangements.

4. The concept of autocratic supervision was to be dropped and democratic methods of decision-making within the Team Area were implemented. Rank consciousness was to be eliminated and each man given an equal vote regardless of former police rank, not only on administrative procedures, but on policy matters and disciplinary matters as well.

5. The community was to be involved in policy-making, conflict resolution, selection and training of personnel, and in decision-making, through periodic meetings between the Team and two citizen bodies, the Community Relations Council and the Crime and Delinquency Task Force.

6. Centrally located staff services and investigative support units could be called upon by the Team and its members.

7. Team members would be taken out of traditional uniform and put in readily identifiable outfits of their own choosing that would not carry militaristic or repressive connotations.

8. Salaried civilian aides would be recruited from the neighborhood to act as liaisons and interpreters for police and foreign language residents. Their knowledge and understanding of the area would provide an important link between police and area residents.

9. A task-oriented work team would replace traditional preventive patrols and the responsibility for the performance of tasks would be shared by all members of the team.

10. All officers would function as generalists, assuming responsibility for the investigation of all criminal matters coming to their attention. Department specialists would be eliminated from the area except as requested by the team.

11. To increase the overall effectiveness of the team, each officer would be trained as a specialist in a field such as fingerprinting or photography.

12. Provisions would be made to provide each officer with increased skills in addressing the widest possible range of police problems, particularly in the sensitive area of conflict management.

3. Assumptions

In implementing this type of program several assumptions were made by Holyoke's Police Planners.

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

In the area of improving police-community relations in general, and police-minority relations in particular, it was assumed that in order for residents to meaningfully relate to police, police had to develop a community structure and a role toward which residents could relate. The assumption was made that the isolation of police from the general populace was in large part due to the role they had traditionally played (law enforcer), the oftentimes authoritarian bearing and attitude of police officers, the imposing atmosphere of most police stations and the simple fact that the average citizen has little or no contact with police officers in other than stressful situations.

Furthermore, planners recognized that within the city there were several smaller communities, each with its own policing problems and needs. Increasing police familiarity with a specific neighborhood area and its problems, would produce improved police-community relations in the area. By establishing a neighborhood police team, permanently assigned to an area and working out of an informal setting (the storefront), natural and easy lines of communication and understanding could be opened between police and neighborhood residents. Using neighborhood aides for translation and liaison purposes would facilitate the breaking down of barriers between minority groups and police and would assist minority residents in entering the police force.

It was above all assumed that the community's input into policing should be a vital and intimate one, not only in terms of providing witnesses and information, but also in terms of defining those areas towards which limited police resources should be directed. Further, it was hypothesized that by

shifting part of the responsibility for order maintenance to community residents themselves, community support could be enlisted in developing alternative courses of action in potentially violent situations. Hence, the program envisioned community bodies, made up of a cross section of area residents, which would assist the team in developing and clarifying the broad guidelines and policies which planners presented to the team. Through such bodies, area residents would also learn to understand the policeman's duties and perspective.

It was assumed that in order to accomplish these ends, the police officer would have to view himself differently; he must understand that his primary task is the management of community conflict and not simply law enforcement and he must be provided with skills and techniques for intervening in or preventing the development of community crises. A deeper awareness of community styles and customs had to be developed by each officer in order to prevent senseless confrontations.

These goals were to be accomplished not only by intensive training programs, but by allowing the team to alter its appearance in such a way as to facilitate closer police-resident contact. It was believed that the traditional uniform, with its militaristic appearance, contributed to both citizen unwillingness to socialize with police, and the authoritarian attitude of most police officers when dealing with citizens. A less traditional blazer uniform would, it was believed, contribute to the rapprochement of the officer and the community.

ROLE CONCEPTION AND JOB DESCRIPTION OF POLICE

Traditionally, the Chief of Police is the only person held accountable for the condition of community relations, police services, and crime control in the city. The specialized and divided functions of police personnel prevent the fixing of accountability at lower levels of performance, for in one criminal case or in one area, any number of specialized bureaus might contribute to the resolution of a problem. Holyoke's planners assumed that specialization as it currently exists not only hinders individual accountability (and hence stifles an important source of motivation); it also negates any opportunity for officers to become intimately knowledgeable about an area of the city and is a prime source of frustration for the beat patrolman.

Further, it was assumed that a police officer, deprived of a meaningful role in the life of the community, lacking a positive self-image, hemmed in by hierarchical structures of responsibility and limited opportunity for personal initiative, would be dissatisfied with his job and could not be expected to function responsibly or provide the kind of police service the times demand.

Planners assumed that if patrolmen were given the opportunity to become generalists, investigating to conclusion all calls to which they responded, officers would, over a period of time, begin to view their professional police roles as more self-motivated and would assume more authority in the decision-making process. Reducing rank consciousness and increasing democratic decision-making would facilitate this process. Greater individual and group responsibility would serve to develop a more challenging police role which would prove more satisfying to participating officers. Morale level would also increase as job satisfaction and team spirit grew.

This change in job description would attract more qualified personnel in the future and would improve the productivity of men currently on the force by providing not only a more challenging job structure but by offering greater rewards to officers: salaries could be increased as the cost of service delivery was reduced.

It was also assumed that by allowing interested patrolmen to become specialists in certain fields, team capabilities and individual job satisfaction would be increased.

EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF POLICE SERVICE DELIVERY

It was assumed by planners that the above goals, if achieved, would contribute to the ultimate goal of more effective police service to the community. A higher level of police morale and job satisfaction would manifest itself in the increased productivity of individual officers.

The team, in bringing together the talents of a number of generalist/specialists and receiving meaningful assistance from the community, would handle cases in a more complete, expeditious and successful manner. A greater number of cases would be handled than in the past, thus reducing the cost of rendering these services. And as the cost of delivering services went down and the quality up, savings to the city would bring increased dollar returns to the department and the taxpayer.

By reducing the priority of preventive patrol and allowing the team to concentrate on performing specific tasks, the team and community would have greater flexibility in dealing with problem areas, and police operations would become more effective. That is, arbitrary priorities would be eliminated in order that the team and community could establish meaningful priorities for their particular neighborhood.

It was further assumed that because of the increased level of police service and because of the proximity of police to their neighborhood, residents would feel more at ease in their homes. More concentrated police personnel plus added community input and cooperation would result in higher clearance rates, shorter response times, and improved crime control.

D. SYNOPSES OF FIRST ACTION YEAR (DECEMBER 1970 - FEBRUARY 1972).

1. Organization of the Team.

The Holyoke Police Department conducted an intensive education program before requesting volunteers for its first team policing unit. Thirty percent of the force was ordered to attend several weekend training sessions on the Team Police concept and from this group twenty five men volunteered to become part of the team. Of these, fourteen were selected largely on the basis of seniority and experience.

Training of team volunteers consisted of two approaches: 1. formal sessions and 2. site visitations. The formal training sessions consisted of courses taught at Holyoke Community College and covered three major areas: Elements of Crime in Relation to Massachusetts Statutes; Investigation and Interrogation; Interviewing and Report Writing and special courses in Fingerprinting, Photography and Laboratory Sciences. Between October 1970 and June 1971 consultants and team members also conducted seminars relating to team policing theory and organization, decision-making in a democratic setting, management problems, records keeping, developing communications systems, and various other topics. Short seminars on conflict management, inter-personal situations and common behavioral patterns were also given. Various action alternatives available to police were reviewed in order to help officers develop a better way in which to handle domestic and street problems.

Site visitations were arranged to allow team members to visit other cities with innovative police programs that faced problems similar to Holyoke.

As the first year's evaluation report states, "Overall the primary emphasis of the (training) program was in the participatory process rather than the specifics. The officers had to learn to assume authority and participate in decision-making about their own jobs and the management of their own affairs."

For a two month period sessions were conducted on an overtime basis on weekends to allow the team to prepare for implementation. Galvin, Angell and O'Neill describe these sessions:

"The officers were told they would be responsible for the success or the failure of the project. They were encouraged to learn and use the informal system. They then proceeded to identify problems, establish priorities among the problems, and appoint three and four member committees to study the problems and make recommendations back to the entire team. One committee worked on communications, another on equipment, a third on relationships with the rest of the police department and a fourth on community relations....

The Team agreed to reduce rank consciousness among members to as low a level as possible. While it was the consensus of the team that the Project Director, who was a captain, could overrule a decision at anytime, everyone was to be involved in decision-making related to the management of the program, and a consensus was to rule unless the captain felt that the implementation of a group decision would severely damage the team, department, or a citizen."

Team meetings were to be held twice monthly in order to facilitate group decision-making. The chairman could be challenged every six months and new elections held. Personnel work schedules, disciplinary problems, policy making decisions, and rules and procedures were discussed at these meetings. Community residents were allowed to attend to offer suggestions and advice. A seventeen member Crime and Delinquency Task Force and a nine member Community Relations Council (six community residents and three police representatives) also linked neighborhood residents with the team.

On December 13, 1970, Team Unit One began operations in a storefront which members had renovated themselves. In addition to the fourteen patrolmen and one captain on the team, four Community Service Officers, selected from neighborhood minority groups, were employed to work with the team.

2. Evaluation

The first year's evaluation report termed Team Policing in Holyoke a "qualified success." Within the area of community attitude, there was a change in a positive direction as measured by: 1. a community attitude survey administered on a pre- and post-test basis in both the experimental and control areas, and directed toward eliciting citizen opinions on perceived attitudes of police, citizen willingness to help police, and the quality of policing in the area; 2. a clientele attitude survey administered to a random selection of people who had called for police services in both Wards 1 and 2 during the course of the action year, and directed toward eliciting client opinions on police response time and desire to do a good job; and 3. group interviews with key people in the community directed toward eliciting opinions on Team Policing and police service delivery in general.

Although these measures indicated a positive attitude change toward police on the part of citizens in Ward 1, the evaluators did caution that publicity about the team, which ran for the course of the experimental and testing situation, might very likely have influenced public opinion about the team. Ward 2 residents expressed a significant negative attitude change toward police service in their ward, when one would have expected no change in attitude (since police service had not changed). This fact would tend to support the hypothesis that publicity had played some role in the attitude changes, positive and negative.

Within the area of job satisfaction and morale, interviews with team members elicited strong positive responses toward community involvement and cooperation and toward the team's organizational structure, although responses to the latter were not so unequivocal. Men preferred being allowed to work at

their own pace without constant supervision by a sergeant. Almost all enjoyed the freedom to follow cases through to conclusion. Men did decide however, (in a team meeting) that one man on each shift would be given authority to "resolve disputes and to redirect team energies when needed." Men organized projects within Ward I such as dances and sports events, enjoyed the recognition they received in the press and from individual citizens, and felt that their work was more pleasant and easier than traditional policing. The team's sick leave record was lower than that of the remainder of the department, another indicator of high morale and job satisfaction.

Although team morale was, in general, excellent one problem area which evaluators saw was the need to provide additional compensation to team members who no longer had enough time to take part-time jobs. This issue, as we shall see, has not been solved.

In the area of effective and efficient police service delivery, evaluators reported the following results: a six man panel composed of police administrators from across the country found that "the team concept obviously contributed to the improvement of police service in Holyoke and even though the teams's public relations were important to them, there was nothing to suggest a deterioration of their performance in the area of crime control because of this stance. Indeed, the contrary seemed more likely."

Because of the inadequacy of the records keeping system within the department, no before-and-after comparisons could be made in evaluating team workload, response time or clearance rates. Instead, evaluators chose three days at random from each month of the project period and examined all team and Ward 2 case reports for those days. Analysis showed that the average monthly caseload per team member was approximately twice that of the remaining 101 members of the department, including Bureau personnel. No other analysis of police records could be made.

Based on this information, evaluators felt that team policing in Holyoke could be declared a qualified success in the areas of improved police-community relations, police morale and job satisfaction.

Data collected in another area, that of police attitude change, was more ambiguous. It was assumed that the team structure, training and increased community contact would result in a change in the working personality of team members. Therefore, a battery of psychological instruments was administered to the team and to a control group selected at random from the remaining non-team patrolmen, both in the pre- and post-test periods of the action year.

Evaluators indicated that results for both police role orientation and authoritarian tests were questionable because of the lack of insularity in experimental design; that is, neither the team nor the control group could be shielded from the publicity or increased status of team members, nor from knowledge of the aims of the experiment. All of these factors, no doubt, affected police officers' perceptions of the "proper" role and attitudes which officers should demonstrate.

Results of the pre-tests show that team members initially saw themselves as "social agents", holding the department's service functions in as much esteem as its law enforcement activities as compared to the control group which viewed themselves as "crime fighters", minimizing the importance of non-criminal police functions. Team members also showed themselves less apt to be authoritarian, less concerned with power and "toughness", more liberal, more able to tolerate vagueness and make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, and less prejudiced toward outgroups than the control group.

The results of the second administration of the attitude surveys, however, did not present such a clear cut picture. First, as the 1971 evaluators pointed out, the control sample appeared to have been contaminated during the course of the project, thus eliminating the possibility of valid comparisons.

Second, the recorded changes in the Team Police Unit officers' scores did not all point to an unequivocal conclusion. All indices of change were very weak, barely reaching significance levels on only four of the seven instruments used.* Ethnocentrism of team members decreased slightly and activism (willingness to intervene in other than arrest situations) increased. Formalism also increased as did tolerance of ambiguity, indicating possible dissatisfaction with the democratic model within the team. Control responses, however, also shifted in similar directions and hence, no conclusions could be drawn from this data.

The evaluators conclude their 1971 report with the following paragraphs. These paragraphs will be quoted in full, for they have a direct bearing on the evaluation of the second action year:

"The bulk of the evidence certainly supports the concept as a viable approach to urban policing. Measures of community opinion indicate that the public served by the team are generally pleased with its performance. The officers assigned to the unit seem to be better motivated toward their jobs, and while it is still uncertain whether the internal mechanisms governing the operation of the team are functioning in the desired manner, the team seems to have survived the uncertainties and is maintaining an accepted level of administrative efficiency. A panel of police professionals found promise in the generalist approach to line operations espoused by this organizational form. There can be very little doubt that police service has markedly improved in Ward I since the inception of Team Policing.

On the other hand, there are one or two nagging problems that dissuade the consultants from offering a completely favorable report. Primary among these is our inability to compare the activity of the team versus the police activity carried out in the area prior to the introduction of the team and further, our inability to compare the workload statistics of team members and other police officers. As has been noted earlier in this report, this shortcoming is entirely due to a lack of useful departmental activity data.

* Activity scale and formalism scale, (police role orientation survey developed by the evaluators), general authoritarianism (California F Scale, Form 45), conservatism (California PEC Scale, Form 45), ethnocentrism (California E Scale suggested final form), tolerance of ambiguity (Budner Total of

The second major difficulty which definitely conditions the team's obvious successes is that of inter-organizational conflict. If the Team Police Unit, for the moment, can be viewed as an independent entity, its relations...particularly with the rest of the police department, have at times been severely strained. This by no means is solely due to the unit's actions. Each group contributed to the problem, and there is some conflict inherent in social change. However, the inter-organizational chaos related to this project was so monumental that it needs further study. The consultants do not feel that the problem stems from the concept, but once again, proving it is another matter."

The two problem areas mentioned by Galvin, Angell and O'Neill, the inadequacy of department record-keeping and intra-departmental conflict, have continued into 1972. Their effects on the evaluation of the Team Police project in Holyoke will be discussed in following sections of this report.

3. Demography of Team Areas

Four area teams have been established in the City of Holyoke in 1970-1973 and operate out of community storefronts. A fifth team is located at the main station and is charged with providing supportive services to the area teams, maintaining detention and laboratory facilities and manning the specialty bureaus of the department: the Traffic Bureau, Detective Bureau, Crime Prevention Bureau, and Safety Officer. Commanding officers also work out of headquarters.

"Areas" or community boundaries were established on the basis of homogeneity of crime problems and demographic characteristics. Area Four is the Central Business District and the immediately surrounding residential areas. The area is predominantly white, lower middle class with an average family income of \$7,600. Area Three by contrast is also primarily white, but almost totally residential and middle to upper middle class. One would assume that areas such as these would have rather different policing problems (breaking and entries, and larcenies in particular) than Areas One and Two where minority group tensions would be of primary concern to police personnel.

The four areas vary greatly in geographic size and population size and density (see Table 2-I). Area One with 4,666 persons is a densely populated inner city area; approximately one-half square mile in size. Area Three, however, is populated with approximately 28,000 people spread over a fourteen square mile area.

Because of differences in area size and problems, team sizes also vary. Team One is composed of fifteen patrolmen, Team Two of eighteen patrolmen, Team Three of twenty-one patrolmen, and Team Four of nineteen. Team Five, headquarters has eleven patrolmen plus commanding officers and bureau personnel.

As teams continue their operations, one would expect that policing styles, priorities, and problem solutions would vary from area to area as police teams

adjust their operations to specific community needs. Continued monitoring of team policies and procedures and comparisons between teams should therefore be of interest in the near future. The question to be asked is whether or not closer community contact has resulted in more in-depth knowledge of an area, and in policing policies and priorities tailored to meet specific area problems.

III. EVALUATION - 1972

A. METHODOLOGY

1. Evaluation of Innovative Projects.

The goal of any evaluation report is to provide a clear answer to the question, "Is this project successful according to our criteria of success?"

In the case of Holyoke's Team Policing project, evaluation must measure to what extent the team structure has:

1. Improved community attitudes toward police.
2. altered the role perception of police officers to a more self-motivated, responsible one and improved the job satisfaction and morale of police officers in so doing.
3. Improved the effectiveness and efficiency of police services to the team areas.

During the course of the first action year, an experimental situation was established in Holyoke; a control district was selected which was geographically similar to the experimental area, Ward I. A battery of community surveys and interviews were administered on a pre and post-test basis (for the most part) to both the experimental and control areas. Police role orientation and attitude tests were also administered to Team One personnel and a random sample of non-team police personnel. One would expect in such a situation that measurable changes would occur in the experimental area while no changes would occur in the area not receiving experimental treatment. Such a design comes closest to allowing evaluators to control for extraneous variables which could effect the results of the experiment. Therefore, changes which have occurred in the experimental area can be identified as stemming from altered circumstances in that area (team policing, in this case).

But even the best experimental design can be affected by variables which

evaluators could not be expected to anticipate. This is especially true in projects of a sociological nature taking place on a societal level. The 1971 evaluation report, although favorable to the experiment in Ward 1, could not unequivocally state that Team Policing had produced alterations in various measures. Was it the team structure or special personality traits demonstrated by Team 1 personnel which produced high levels of morale and job satisfaction on the Team? Was it a community-based police team which increased the sense of security of Area One residents and altered their attitudes toward police in a positive direction? Or was it the mere fact of having 15 police personnel and four Community Service Officers assigned to the area where only 12 persons had been assigned previously which led to increased satisfaction with policing in the area?

Another problem encountered by evaluators in 1971 was the fact that no accurate baseline measures of police performance (eg. number and types of calls handled, response times, clearance rates) could be established because of serious deficiencies in department records. No comparisons could be made, therefore, between non-team and team performance levels. Thus, although police experts from other cities found Team One to be an efficiently run unit, no quantifiable data could be produced which demonstrated that the team structure per se had encouraged more effective police service delivery as compared to traditional policing.

Although Team One was deemed a success on the basis of greatly improved citizen attitudes, the generally quieter atmosphere in the Ward 1 area and the high levels of morale and job satisfaction within the team, many questions relating specifically to the impact of the structural aspects of team policing remained unanswered. The goal of the second action year evaluation report is therefore to answer some of these questions.

2. Design

The 1972 evaluation design, although utilizing evaluation measures developed in the first action year, approaches Holyoke's team policing experiment in a manner different from that of the 1971 evaluation. Assessment of the effects of innovative change on 1. the department and 2. the team police structure assumed increased importance as a controlled experimental design was vitiated by city-wide expansion. Of particular interest are the factors which have contributed to departmental resentment toward this innovative project and how such intense feelings might have been avoided or alleviated by administrative or staff actions.

Alterations in team structure which have occurred as additional teams have been formed are of importance to other team police planners faced with eventual city-wide team police expansion. A question addressed in this report is, therefore, to what extent alterations were necessary in order for team policing to expand successfully throughout the city, and to what degree alterations can continue to be made in the concept before a precinct model becomes substituted for the team model. Necessary and realistic adaption vs. a vitiated team police model is an issue which is facing Holyoke police planners and will no doubt face other team police planners.

As a part of this phase of the evaluation, the activities of the Master Plan Staff (police planners) are assessed in light of their contributions with reference to team policing in Holyoke and with reference to the professionalization of the department as a whole.

The impact of innovative change is assessed, but of equal importance is the continued monitoring of team performance levels, job satisfaction and morale levels, and community attitudes with reference to team policing. Because departmental (non-team) baseline measures are inaccurate, Team One 1971 performance measures are used as a baseline with which to compare 1972

levels in Team One and Team Two. National, regional, state and comparably sized cities data are also cited to provide comparisons of team performance levels with other areas not experimenting with team policing. Although variables no doubt intervene to cloud comparisons among cities or areas, it is felt that "non-Holyoke" figures partially help clarify the impact of Team Policing in this city.

Other measures have been specifically altered to discern which facets of the team structure seemed to relate most directly to project goals. That is, interviews with Team One members are used to attempt to elicit information on which facets of the team structure are working, have been altered since 1971, and what changes in morale and job satisfaction have resulted from such structural alterations. Team Two interviews also attempt to uncover which facets of team policing (if any) have appealed to Team Two personnel.

Community attitude surveys containing specific questions on what structural aspects of team policing appeal to residents the most and what complaints residents have with reference to their team were used with the hope that a clear picture could be obtained of which aspects of team structure have contributed to alterations in community feelings toward police.

The 1972 evaluation design also re-examines the goals of the team police project in light of those goals which can realistically be measured on a short-term basis, and those which can be approached only over a longer period of time. Although it was felt that measurable progress toward most goals was a realistic possibility in the project's first years, one goal was re-classified as long-term: role orientation and personality alteration. It may be true that the team structure allows greater flexibility and independence to personnel, encourages a more activist police role orientation, and that this structure could over many years have an affect on the personalities of team members. But results of personality and role orientation tests in both 1971 and 1972 are ambiguous enough to suggest that detailed analysis

of such data would be meaningless on a short-term basis. Hence, analysis of such data will not be presented in this report.

3. Schema

This then is the basic thrust of the 1972 evaluation report: an assessment of innovative change in a traditional institution, and continued monitoring of team performance levels and community attitudes, with particular reference to the impact of team structure on progress toward project goals.

As with the 1971 evaluation plan, subgoals have been established to determine the effects of the experiment:

1. assess the impact of innovative change and the adjustments necessary to accomplish that change, with reference to both the police department and the team concept
2. compare team policing and traditional policing on the basis of effectiveness of police service to the community
3. assess the effects of team policing on community attitudes toward police
4. assess the effect of team policing on role orientation and attitudes of police officers
5. assess the contributions of the Master Plan Staff toward the success of the Team Police project and toward the professionalization of the police department as a whole.

For the purposes of this evaluation report, the city is divided into four areas corresponding with the team areas now in operation and data was collected on this basis. Data collected from Areas three and four will be used as baseline data for measures taken at a future date, thus providing pre-team and post-team indices for these relatively new teams.

Data collected from Areas One and Two (the original experimental and control areas) on a pre-test, post-test basis, allows in-depth comparisons in this report between these demographically similar areas and their teams.

This schema governs the overall execution of the evaluation, but methods of data collection have varied with specific analyses. A discussion of each individual measure within the evaluation report is included in Appendix A of this report.

B. INNOVATIVE CHANGE: CITY-WIDE IMPLEMENTATION

1. Why city-wide expansion.

In their evaluation report, Galvin, Angell, and O'Neill cited a problem area which had begun to develop in the Team Policing experiment during the course of the first action year: intra-departmental conflict (Team One members vs. non-members). Initially, rivalry between these two groups served a positive purpose with reference to the team, uniting them as a body apart from others and, hence, contributing to the spirit of the team. Other team policing projects have cited similar results from the creating of one or more teams within a city, but all project leaders caution that "friendly" competition must be kept within manageable boundaries.

In Holyoke, those boundaries were overstepped, and the result has been a period of bitterness and strife within the police department, centering around the Team Police concept and the Master Plan Staff. The conflict between pro and anti-team forces came to a head in August - December 1972, as planners sought aldermanic permission to expand the Team Police experiment throughout the city. The controversy has abated since the formation of the third and fourth teams and the project has been given a period of grace to prove itself. Bitterness is still obvious, however, and has no doubt affected morale, job satisfaction, and attitudes in general within the department and teams.

The controversy's bearing on morale and job satisfaction will be discussed in a later section of this report. The following segment will discuss the impact of innovative change in the Holyoke Police Department: how and why the situation deteriorated to the extent it did. It will perhaps serve as a guideline to other innovative projects for avoiding similar pitfalls and will also serve to present the reasons behind the sudden speed-up in city-wide

Team Police implementation, which police planners felt was necessary for the success of the project.

The Holyoke Police Department is in many ways a very political department, and has been for many years. For the past 30 years, the issue of being pro or anti-police has played a part, sometimes major, sometimes minor, in the city's mayoral elections. Charges of favoritism, lack of discipline, irresponsibility and shirking of duties have been leveled at the police department by anti-police candidates. Pro-police candidates, often from the ranks of the department itself, have answered such charges.

Politics on this level does not, on the surface, seem particularly detrimental to the functioning of the department. Because of the structure of the city charter, however, politics enters even more deeply into the workings of the department. The City Charter and Ordinances designate that:

1. the department shall be governed by two, sometimes opposing, political forces: the Board of Aldermen and the Mayor (through designation by the Board) and
2. the Mayor has the power to promote officers within the department and to appoint and dismiss the Chief of Police.

The first designation means that decisions about various aspects of the Police Department can at times become a battle ground between the Mayor and members of the Board who oppose him politically. In many ways, the wording of ordinances relating to the powers of the Mayor with respect to the department is unclear, and both the Board and Mayor's office have sought to interpret them so as to gain final decision-making authority over the department.

Because of this dual government, police officers who do not agree with Mayoral or even in-house departmental rulings, feel free to "lobby" various members of the Board for their support, thus making most departmental decisions objects of intense debate and political maneuverings. No department can function smoothly in this kind of situation.

Just such an incident occurred in 1972 during the controversy over Team Police expansion to a city-wide basis. Police and some Board members fought police and the Mayor for five months, and not simply over the issue of the merits and faults of Team Policing, but also over the very powers and responsibilities of the Mayor and Board with respect to the department. This latter issue has not yet been resolved and will not be until the Charter itself is changed to state more clearly who will have ultimate decision-making authority with respect to the department: the Mayor, the Board of Aldermen, a board of police commissioners, etc.

The second source of political intrigue in the police department relates to the promotional policies of the city. Because the Mayor, by designation of the Board of Aldermen, has the power of promotions and appointments within the police department, the person who sits in the Mayor's chair becomes a subject of deep concern to many departmental personnel. This is true of all departments, on all levels of government to some extent. In a structure where politicking for promotions, favors, and political support assumes primary importance, however, the proper functioning of the department becomes difficult if not impossible. The Holyoke Police Department is an example of such a structure.

During the times when promotions are being made, politicking reaches new heights -- relatives, friends, all resources are called upon by even the best (although not necessarily all) policemen in order to present their case to the Mayor. It is the promotional policy of the city itself which allows for and encourages such a situation. Although civil service marks serve as guidelines for promotions, other measures of competence are not necessarily given proper weight (e.g., Commanding Officer's evaluations, quality of field work, etc.). There is no formula, that is, which ensures objective promotions; hence, the free-for-all atmosphere surrounding the process. The fact that the Mayor also has the power to appoint and dismiss the Chief of Police also

The non-professional atmosphere within the department has been enhanced by a lax disciplinary structure and a weak chain of command. The fact that the department had no Rules and Regulations Manual until June 1973, has contributed to difficulties in affixing responsibility and duties. Mid-management personnel and patrolmen have formed cliques within the department and, as police personnel have intimated in a Satisfaction and Morale Survey,* if one is part of the clique, or "in", one receives "favorable treatment" (e.g., little discipline, easy assignments, etc.). Personal preferences and rivalries, rather than fact or sound policing theory, sometimes influence decision-making on various levels within the department.

Into this department then, in 1970, came an "innovative" project that was aimed at improving police services to the city, and improving the policeman's job itself. It came at a time when city officials and residents were concerned with inner city tensions and with a desire to get more out of their tax dollars -- and so, Team One was formed.

It is natural for people to doubt new ideas, and the Team Police concept did call for not only a new police organization, but a new police role. It is understandable that not all policemen would or could well adapt themselves to these new expectations. Hence planners went slowly at first, conducting orientation sessions for the entire department to explain the reasons for and facets of the project. Volunteers were then solicited and Team One went into operation under the auspices of the Model Cities Program.

* Administered to the department in October - November 1972.

As the year (1971) progressed, however, so did the development of department resentment towards the project. "Good" publicity accrued to the team; none or indifferent publicity (compared to Team news items) was given the department. The team became progressively identified as the "Mayor's" idea, and hence forces inside and outside the department who opposed the Mayor, opposed the team.

A particularly bitter issue was that of incentive pay promised to Team One members for their volunteering to be assigned to a particularly dangerous area of the city. In a department where salaries are low compared to other cities and towns in the state, a pay differential was a legitimate choice of incentive for Team members; for non-team members it was another reason to resent both the concept and the men who were a part of it (planners and volunteers). A protest was organized within the department, and soon thereafter the original \$10 a week wage differential was restructured into a choice for Team One members between \$10 a week or regular overtime schedules. Thus, the monetary "incentive" was in effect eliminated from the team. The fact that no police pay raise was granted in 1971 (due to contract disputes), reinforced police bitterness towards a city administration that "demanded more work but gave no additional pay", according to the police.

Also, in 1971 a Management Survey of the Police Department was conducted by Galvin and Angell*. This treatise cited in clear and cogent terms the

*It should be noted that, given the general atmosphere in the department at this time (skeptical if not actually resentful of the Team Police Project) it was probably not a wise move to employ the three consultants who helped establish and train Team One, to also evaluate that project and conduct a management survey of the police department. Although their integrity is in no way questioned by

(Continued on next page - bottom)

problem areas within the Holyoke Police Department, some of which have been mentioned in this section. Major overhauling of department policy, coupled with the threat of expansion of team policing if it proved successful, severely rocked the foundations of tradition upon which the department had existed for years. Change was coming fast and furious, too fast for many who suspected personal gain or political intrigue as prime movers in this "rebuilding" of the Holyoke Police Department.

What happened in Holyoke in 1970-71 was that change, once having gotten its foot in the door, soon was asserting itself on all levels of department functioning. The city was not simply experimenting with Team Policing anymore; it was attempting to professionalize its police department. To do so would require training, re-orientation, fixed and objective promotional and management policies, elimination of politics (with all its ramifications), etc.

And this rehabilitation, it was hoped by planners, could be structured to take place within a team policing mode of service delivery. In early 1972, additional monies were received by the city to fund an Administrative Staff of the Chief of Police which would prepare a Master Plan for city-wide team policing and departmental improvement.

It was at this point that the Chief of Police, who had theretofore supported the team concept, balked at the face pace and enlarged scope of the project. Within a short time, a new Chief was appointed constituting another shake-up in an already shaken department. Add to this the natural conflict that often occurs between staff and line functions and personnel and the fact that staff personnel were receiving additional training, money, and more prestige than department personnel and the stage was set for the controversy which erupted in the summer and fall of 1972.

* this evaluator, their close association with the innovative project did raise doubts as to their objectivity; both among department personnel and aldermanic officials. Such doubts would most likely have arisen regardless of who actually

Whether or not the problems of innovative change could have been handled differently and more easily in the Holyoke Police Department is a difficult question to answer. It seems obvious that both planners desiring change and police personnel fighting change were in part responsible for the bitterness which evolved in the department. Clique structures were used by opponents of the concept to spread rumors and doubts about the goals of the project. But staff personnel also contributed to the problem, cutting themselves off as they did from the remainder of the department. Orientation sessions which staff personnel had begun in order to disseminate information to police personnel were allowed to fade out. The staff became permeated with the idea that such sessions would do no good when men had already refused to listen. Planning sessions would be a waste of time because commanding officers had shown themselves to be against the concept. Some commanding officers and police personnel, shut off from all but rumors, questioned and then actively fought the concept. One cannot doubt, regardless of how much time would have been or would not have been wasted, that had meetings, briefings, information dissemination and joint staff-line planning been attempted and continued on a regular basis, mistrust would not have developed to the level it did in 1972.

In this effort, clear and firm guidance from an experienced police administrator would have been invaluable. It was just at this point, however, that the chief's office was in a state of flux - filled first by someone who could no longer support the Team Police concept, and then by a new administrator who had to learn the ropes, so to speak. This new appointment as we have

conducted the evaluation or survey, given the level of resentment within the department. But it is more than likely that the selection of these men so closely tied with team policing, contributed to the doubts rising within the department.

mentioned put a strain on loyalties in the department at a time when bitterness was already high.

The elitest treatment of the team in news media, mistrust of staff personnel, a politically charged department, fear of change - many factors contributed to the department's reaction to Team Policing. Perhaps the most important factor was that although the original impetus for an innovative program came from within the department itself, much of the planning for it took place outside of the department, and the forces supporting change were primarily non-department personnel. As mentioned above, department personnel felt that an experiment had been imposed upon them by outsiders, by civilians, and this was resented. Although the Master Plan Staff is composed of a majority of police personnel, such resentments of "those outsiders" continues.

In August, a decision was made to seek approval for city-wide expansion of the Team Police concept. The reasoning went that if police personnel had the experience of being on a team, their anti-team stance would disappear. The department, as it existed before August, 1972, was split; planning occurred on two levels (department and team) and coordination was difficult. Continuing the period of strife and indecision for another six months to a year (the projected date for Master Plan approval and city-wide implementation) would have been disastrous to the department.

The public debate over Team Policing began in August and continued through December 5, 1972, at which time expansion was approved in a 9 to 5 vote by the Board of Aldermen. During the course of this period, formal and informal protests occurred within the department. Aldermanic hearings brought to the public's attention the fact that few aldermen seemed to support the concept (or the Mayor), and news stories on the "failures" of Team Policing became daily occurrences.

There is no doubt that both Teams One and Two and department morale have

been affected by the bitterness of the controversy over Team Policing. (This will be discussed more thoroughly in the section entitled "Morale and Job Satisfaction." The tension within the department seems to have abated, however, with the formation of Teams Three and Four; resignation or cautious observation are the by-words within the department. But feelings in 1972 ran high, and might erupt again in the fall as a mayoral election approaches.

One finds that in Holyoke, a combination of circumstances led to a bitterly contested fight over Team Policing and innovative change:

1. The political or "unprofessional" structure of department policies as regulated by the city charter, which encourages maneuverings, favoritism, and intrigue. Given this structure, even the best policemen may have no choice but to "politick" for their futures. And dependence on politics and tradition has been translated into opposition to change.
2. The anti-mayoral feelings within the department, particularly since the onset of the wage dispute, and a Team Police project and staff which has become closely identified with the Mayor.
3. The removal of one Chief who did not support the project and his replacement with another during the course of the year (1972), at a time when firm guidance was crucial for the well-being of the department.
4. The threat of rapid and vaguely specified change within the department once Team Policing got its foot in the door. Oft-times, planning for the department and team seemed disjointed - no one knew what the future of Team Policing would be or the extent of "change" as it was being planned.
5. The fact that much planning for the project and for change was seen as coming from "outside" sources (i.e., outside the department, outside the city.), although the impetus for the project came originally from within the department itself.
6. The break-down of communications between planners and mid-management personnel after initial orientation sessions.
7. Rivalries or jealousies between staff and line functions.

It is probable that controversy over the Team Police Project would have occurred in Holyoke regardless of how change was handled. A strong Mayor who supports innovative change, and a politically oriented department which has

identified the present Mayor as "anti-police", created a situation in Holyoke which erupted when Team Policing was brought to the fore. It is likely that any innovative project of this magnitude would have resulted in similar problems.

It is probable, however, that steps could and should have been taken to attempt a smoother transition within the department from traditional to team policing: a strong Chief who could firmly control the department*, continued department orientation and planning sessions, less emphasis upon the elitest aspect of the team and the negative aspects of the remainder of the department, closer coordination of staff and line functions (through more joint meetings), emphasis upon in-house contributions and opinions and less upon the "outside" nature of the concept.

As had probably become obvious, Holyoke was not the ideal location for experimenting with a team policing project. A well-disciplined, strongly hierarchical and professionalized department would have provided better testing grounds for such a concept. In Holyoke, in order to implement a successful team police project, a host of other reforms were and are necessary, all of which contributed to the feeling of too rapid change which struck the department in 1971 and 1972.

Although, as has been stated previously, certain steps could have been taken by planners and the city administration to insure a smoother transition within the department, it is also true that rapid change was necessary in order that the department prepare itself for team policing or any innovative modern concepts.

* It should be noted that such an appointment was attempted by the Mayor but thwarted by the city charter, which stipulates that the Chief of Police must have been a resident of the City of Holyoke for two years previous to his appointment.

Faced with the magnitude of their tasks and the strife within the department, Holyoke's police planners and city administration took the only possible step: expansion of the project and immediate implementation of the Master Plan for police department development.

The immediate goal of the move seems to have been accomplished. The atmosphere within the department has cleared substantially, at least on the surface. All four area team units are now in operation as is the fifth, or support unit. Rapid expansion has, so far, allowed the team project the time it may need to prove itself or fall.

C. PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF POLICE PERSONNEL

1. Records of Performance

An avowed goal of the Team Police Project is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of police service delivery to the areas within which teams are operating. Although the community's perception of the quality of police service is a valuable measure of success in achieving this goal, the much more tangible evidence of team and non-team actual performance records is the preferred measure of improved police efficiency. Data of this kind (response time, clearance rates, types and numbers of calls handled) have been collected from Teams One and Two in 1972 and from department records (mostly contained within the Detective Bureau's files) for areas without teams, in order to compare team and department performance. Unfortunately, both the reliability and meaningfulness of such comparisons are severely limited by the deficiencies in the police department's record keeping activities, a situation which is not uncommon in police departments across the country.

A decentralized police records system existed before Team Policing began in Holyoke, but it is obvious that the problems of decentralization have been exacerbated by the addition of four new operating units. A significant proportion of the Master Plan Staff's time has therefore been programmed into developing a centralized system which would meet the requirements of a decentralized mode of police operations. Until such a system is implemented, however, tabulation of records is at best a tedious manual chore and hence is done only for the FBI Uniform Crime Report. Information cannot be put to other uses because retrieval is time consuming, costly, and inaccurate (as will be discussed shortly). For the purposes of this report, therefore, data were collected manually from all sources of records and cross-checked to the extent possible to ensure a minimum level of duplicated reporting and a maximum level of comprehensiveness. Police personnel were employed for the purpose of collecting this data from department

and team records in order to ensure: 1. accuracy in reading reports (since cases often had to be followed across the department filing systems) and 2. confidentiality (police files are not open to civilians).

It was possible to overcome the problems of decentralization by manual review and codification; but a second problem bears more directly on the meaningfulness of the data presented in this section. Whereas team members report all events (crimes, incidents, services, etc.) on a complaint card and an investigation report, other patrol officers report selectively, generally only when a "significant" police service is rendered or wherein a report is usually required. That is, although one can get a fairly accurate picture of workload, crime statistics, and performance measures for team members, such a picture is not available for other police personnel. Hence, no meaningful comparison can be made between department and team performances.

The tables dealing with non-team records, therefore, do not represent performance measures for the department so much as they represent the state of records keeping within the department. Hence, it will never be possible to attain a before-team and after-team measure of performance in Holyoke: the record base is too poor. We can, however, attempt to put available non-team data into easily recognizable form, and discuss performance levels of Teams One and Two, where improved record keeping has been instituted. These latter data can then be used in two ways: 1. as a baseline with which to compare the performance of later teams (three and four) and 2. as a means of comparing Holyoke Team Police performances with national figures.

The following analysis of response times, clearance rates, and numbers and types of calls to teams describes what changes have occurred between 1971 and 1972 in city rates in Team One, and changes occurring between the first months of operation in Teams One and Two and the second year of operation in Team One.*

* Keeping in mind that variables such as team morale and department attitudes toward team policing cloud the reliability of comparisons between different

Other data collected from department records on calls and responses to non-team areas (Team Area Two in 1971 and the first half of 1972, Team Areas Three and Four in 1972) are included in this report as Appendix B, and are presented as examples of the problems in reporting which the department has faced and which hampers the evaluation of team performance levels by vitating baseline performance statistics.

HYPOTHESES

In reviewing available data, one would anticipate that continued operation of a team in Area One would serve to alter the picture of crime in that area in a positive manner as measured by frequency of types of calls coming to Team One headquarters. One would also expect to find improved clearance rates and response times in Team One in 1972 as compared to the beginning months of Team One and Team Two.

That is, Team One in 1972 should demonstrate not only better performance levels than Team One (1971) and Team Two (1972), but also more encouraging crime rate levels. Data are presented below.

- a. Crime Indices. (see Appendix C for Annual Uniform Crime Reports, 1968 - 1972, for the city of Holyoke)

The following is a description of the Crime Index and Uniform Crime Reporting Program as stated by the FBI in their Annual Crime Report.

" The Uniform Crime Reporting Program utilizes seven crime classifications to establish an index to measure the trend and distribution of crime in the United States. These crimes -- murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny \$50 and over in value, and auto theft -- are counted by law enforcement agencies as the crimes become known to them. These crimes were selected for use in the Crime Index because, as a group, they represent the most common local crime problem. They are all serious crimes, either by their very nature or due to the volume in which they occur. Offenses of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault are categorized as violent crimes. Offenses of burglary, larceny \$50 and over in value, and auto theft are classed as crimes against property."

Table 3-I., a record of crime indices for the City of Holyoke for the past five years, describes the overall violent and property crime picture in Holyoke as it is reported to the FBI. The crime index trend (percentage increase or decrease in the total number of Part I offenses) is calculated by comparing the total number of Part I crimes with that of the previous year. Thus, one sees

Table 3-I. Crime Indices for Holyoke (1968-1972)

Based on Uniform Crime Reports of Part I Offenses * **

Year	Crime Index (# actual offenses minus 1b,4c,6b)	Increases (+) or Decrease (-) In Offenses Over Previous Year	% Increase (+) or Decrease In Offenses Over Previous Y
1968	1,666		
1969/1968	1,930	264 (+)	16% (+)
1970/1969	2,403	473 (+)	25% (+)
1971/1970	2,298	105 (-)	4.4% (-)
1972/1971	2,407	109 (+)	4.5% (+)

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* Tabulated by Holyoke Detective Bureau

** Part I offenses are: criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assaults, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. For purposes of computing the yearly crime index, the following categories are not included under number of actual offenses:

- (1b) manslaughter by negligence, (4e) assaults not aggravated, and
- (6b) larceny under \$50 in value.

that Holyoke experienced a rise of 16% in Part I offenses in 1969 as compared with 1968, a 25% rise in 1970, a 4.4% decrease in 1971, and a 4.5% increase in 1972.

Tables 3-II through 3-VI indicate crime index trends during similar time spans for the United States, the Northeast, Massachusetts, New England and cities of 50,000 - 100,000 people (within which is included Holyoke). Thus, we see that between 1971/1970 crime, as measured by Part I offenses, increased 6% in the United States, 9.2% in the Northeast, 14% in New England, 17% in Massachusetts, and 9.5% in cities of 50,000 - 100,000. In Holyoke, however, a decrease of approximately 4% was shown between these years. The previous yearly span (1970/1969) shows Holyoke to have a crime index trend which is almost twice that of other areas included on Tables 3-II and 3-VI.

That is, Holyoke crime rate figures do not seem to follow national or area patterns in 1970 or 1971.

A plausible explanation for Holyoke's divergence from national figures in these years is the city's "unusual" problem in Ward I in 1970. 1970 was a "hot summer" year in Holyoke, with violent outbreaks occurring in the Ward I area. The sharp increase in reported crimes for that year is due in large measure to actual increases in the numbers of Part I Crimes which occurred within the city just prior to Team One formation. In this respect, Holyoke, which has experienced a sudden growth in its minority population, may have been subjected in 1970 to the kind of situation which occurred in major cities in the mid-1960's.

The very formation of Team One no doubt also contributed to the rise in the crime rate in 1970. During its first few weeks of operation, Team One reporting accuracy most likely increased the numbers of Part I offenses which were recorded in the Ward I area, thus adding to the city's already high Part I figure. Whether or not Team One contributed to the 4% decrease in crime rate in 1971 cannot, unfortunately, be ascertained from these data.

CRIME INDEX TRENDS

TABLE 3-II. National Crime Index Trends

Year	Increase in total Part I Offenses over Previous Year
1969/1968	+11%
1970/1969	+11%
1971/1970	+ 6%
1972/1971	- 3%

TABLE 3-III. Northeast Region Crime Index Trends

1970/1969	+10.6%
1971/1970	+ 9.2%
1972/1971	- 8 %

TABLE 3-IV. New England Crime Index Trends

1970/1969	+13.3%
1971/1970	+14 %

TABLE 3-V. Massachusetts Crime Index Trends

1970/1969	+14%
1971/1970	+17%

TABLE 3-VI. Cities of 50-100,000 Crime Index Trends

1970/1969	+13.1%
1971/1970	+ 9.5%
1972/1971	+ 1 %

In 1971 and 1972 the national crime rate fell for the first time by 3%, and the Northeast regional rate by 8%. Holyoke's crime rate, however, during this time rose by almost 5% over the previous year. Holyoke's figure, therefore, does not echo that of either the nation or the region. A further analysis of crime index trends across cities and regions, however, indicates that the 1972 national crime decrease has been greatly influenced by the 12% decrease in reported crime in cities of over 1,000,000 people and the 8% decrease in crime in Northeastern states (which are largely comprised of just such dense population centers). In cities across the country which are comparable in size to Holyoke (50,000 - 100,000 and 25,000 - 50,000) crime increased by 1% in 1972, which is in line with the Holyoke rate. It should also be noted that Team Two began its operations in August, 1972, and improved records from this area may have contributed to the rise in the city's crime rate in 1972, just as Team One's inception no doubt contributed to an increased reported crime rate in 1970.

In very broad terms, Holyoke's crime index trends do conform to those of the nation as a whole for the four year period between 1968 and 1972 -- high rates of increase in crimes in 1969 and 1970 and a sudden tapering off of the rate of increase in 1971 and 1972. Figures for Holyoke have tended to fluctuate broadly, however, and as yet no trend in Holyoke's crime rate over this period can be discerned. One would hope that as reporting accuracy is improved throughout the city, data on crime rate will take some demonstrable direction.

Although one would expect Part I offenses to be fairly accurately recorded as compared to other crimes of a less serious nature, there is very little guarantee that the crime index even approaches accuracy. The FBI itself cautions that crime reporting methods and accuracy vary greatly from city to city. Hence, some arguments exist as to the relative worth of crime index values as measures of crime rate from one city to another.

Given this situation, it would seem more fruitful to analyze crime index data from the Ward 1 area of Holyoke over the two year span of Team One operations, a time during which reporting of Area One crimes has improved greatly in accuracy. Records (see Tables 3-VII and 3-IX) show that the number of Part I offenses in Team Area One decreased from 636 between March - December 1971 to 439 between March - December 1972. That is, in Area One, where one might expect continued high levels of violent crimes and property crimes, these kinds of crimes decreased by approximately 31% in 1972.

This sharp decrease in the number of violent crimes and crimes against property in Area One in 1972, coupled with the 4.5% increase in crime rate in the city, would seem to suggest that some of the decrease in Part I offenses in Area One resulted from displacement; i.e., perpetrators of violent crimes chose areas other than Ward 1 to commit their crimes. This is a common occurrence in policing projects -- when the heat is on, one goes where it is not so hot.

Because verifiable and accurate data is not available on Part I offenses in other areas of the city in 1972 (non-team areas) or in Area One prior to Team One formation, we cannot state conclusively that the advent of Team Policing was directly responsible for the 31% drop in violent crimes in Area One, although data certainly point to this conclusion. Continued monitoring of other teams, however, as the concept expands throughout the city in 1973 should clarify to what extent team units can make a demonstrable dent in the rate of Part I offenses in the city and to what extent displacement effect can be turned into a city-wide reduced crime rate. It is stressed that in order to accurately assess these crime rates, continued accurate reporting is necessary from all team areas.

SUMMARY: CRIME INDEX DATA

In very broad terms, Holyoke's crime indices conform to trends visible in the nation as a whole for the four year period between 1968 and 1972 -- high increases in violent crimes in 1969 and 1970 and a sudden tapering off of

the rate of increase in such crimes in 1971 and 1972. Wide fluctuations within the city's rate, however, indicate changes in the accuracy of report writing as a result of team formation and reflect the hot summer of 1970. Although Holyoke's crime rate rose by 4.5% in 1972 as national and regional rates dropped, this is not as discouraging as it seems. The greatest decrease throughout the nation occurred in major population centers; areas comparable in size with Holyoke reported increases in 1972 in crime rate of approximately 1%. Again, accurate reporting in teams no doubt contributed to Holyoke's slightly higher rise in reported crimes in 1972. Further, although the city's crime rate rose, Team Area One experienced a 31% decrease in Part I offenses* in the 1972/1971 reporting period.

Although this figure is encouraging, the advent of Team Policing in the city during 1971 and 1972 cannot be absolutely correlated with Area One's sudden and large decrease in crime rate. This decrease, however, at a time when the crime rate for the city was on the rise does seem to indicate that Team One may have had a significant impact on crime patterns in the Ward 1 area over its two years of operation.

* Data on Part I offenses appearing in Tables in this report do not include criminal homicide as a category although it is included in the FBI crime index figure. The number of such crimes occurring per year in the city is so small however, that for all practical purposes crime data as categorized by the FBI and by this report are the same.

b. Administrative Data

This section includes data on numbers and types of calls being handled by team personnel, response times, and clearance rates.

1. Team Area One Performance Record for first and second action years.

1971. Table 3-VII shows records of calls received by Team One between March 1, 1971 (approximately 2 1/2 months after the team's inception) and February 28, 1972.

Service calls, which include complaints of barking dogs, downed street signs, transportation to hospitals, alarms sounded, open doors, downed wires, etc., comprise the largest category of calls to Team One averaging approximately 126 per month, or 8.4 calls per team member per month.

Part II offenses*, which are made up of narcotics cases, vandalism, motor vehicle violations, disturbances, false alarms and all attempts of the above, form the next largest police service category, with an average of 96 cases per month, or 6.4 per man. If one examines the Table from which Table 3-VII was developed (Table 3-VIII), one sees that the greatest type of call within Part II calls is disturbances (drunkenness, trouble with youths, suspicious persons, barking dogs, trespassing, disorderly conduct, etc.). Highest average per month figures for Team One in 1971 are thus in the service and disturbance categories.

* It should be noted that although all Part II offenses included in these tables fall within the FBI's Part II category, not all FBI Part II offenses have been included in tabulating calls to the department or teams. Only those types of calls found to occur most frequently (see Appendix D) were developed into tables which describe Team and Department performance. Thus, although Table 3-VIII shows that during the month of March 1971 Team One received a total of 304 calls, only 171 are listed on Table 3-VII.

Part I offenses, are the smallest category of crimes on this table, and include the crimes which are usually considered most serious -- breaking and entering, larceny, robbery, assaults, automobile theft, and attempts of the above. Out of the average figure of 61 Part I offenses handled per month in 1971 by Team One members, the largest single category is larceny (felonies and misdemeanors) which averages 27 per month.

Records collected on clearance rates for Team One during the first action year (clearance denoting a case no longer requiring police attention or investigation) do not allow a breakdown of clearance rates for the three categories of calls listed in Table 3-VII (service, Part I, and Part II calls). In this particular case of records collection and tabulation, clearance data was collected apart from type of call, and correlation is therefore impossible. Table 3-VIII does give monthly clearance rates and an average monthly rate of 84% for the first year of Team One. This figure is skewed, however, in a positive direction by both service call clearance rates, which are always high (most service calls are immediately cleared) and Part II clearance rates, which are largely disturbance calls and again are usually cleared immediately. Part I offenses, requiring in depth investigation for the most part, tend to have lower clearance rates. Thus, in order to accurately measure team performance, it is necessary to divide clearance rates into three categories, as was done for the second action year of Team One.

1972. Table 3-IX shows that in contrast to action year one, where service calls were the greatest in numbers, Part II offenses were the largest category of calls in 1972. This constitutes a rise of approximately 44% over the March - December 1971 figures. Table 3-X, upon which Table 3-IX is based, indicates that the rise is due to a 200% increase in disturbance calls to Team One during 1972. For the most part, average monthly figures for other kinds of Part II calls decreased slightly or remained the same between 1971 and 1972.

The question then arises as to whether increased numbers of disturbances in Area One denote an increase in community tension in 1972 or whether people were simply reporting more minor disturbances to their team.

A more detailed breakdown of disturbance calls shows that the greatest single category of calls (553) was in the "miscellaneous" category (ie., calls which were classified by the personnel collecting records data simply as "disturbances" with no accompanying explanation.) Other large categories were "trouble with youths" (171 calls) which includes such incidents as throwing snowballs, stones and bricks, breaking windows and possessing B.B. guns; "suspicious persons" (118 calls) which includes "Peeping Toms" and prowlers; and "disorderly conduct" (90 calls). "Drunkenness" accounted for 42 calls, "family disturbances" for 59, "loud noise" for 48, "unwanted guests" for 43 and "disagreements between neighbors or tenants" for 27. With such a large category of miscellaneous or undescribed disturbance calls, it is difficult to determine how many of these calls were of a serious nature (threats to lives, gang fights, near riots) and how many were less directly dangerous to lives and order maintenance.

Other data, however, do not suggest that a rise in disturbance calls denotes increased community tension or conflict in Area One. The average number of assaults per month has remained approximately the same from 1971 to 1972 and vandalism has decreased slightly from 1971 to 1972. One would expect concomitant rises in both these categories if area conflict were on the rise. Finally, interviews with team members and area residents indicate that the ward is "quiet" although confrontations between police and minority group citizens occur infrequently. One would thus conclude that the sharp rise in disturbances in Area One in 1972 was due to residents reporting more minor disturbances to team members, and is also an indication that residents may be more willing to use team members to help resolve disputes, minor conflicts, etc.

The most significant data included in Table 3-IX is the drop in Part I offenses from March - December 1971 to March - December 1972, a decrease of 197 calls or 31%. Within this category, the greatest decrease in average monthly rates occurred within the larceny category, with a slight drop in Breaking and Enterings. Other categories remained approximately the same. These data are compatible with national crime rate figures which also report sharp decreases in property crimes in 1972. The rate of decrease in Area One, however, is over 10 times that of the national rate (-3%) and is a significantly greater drop in crime than that reported nationally. One would not normally expect a decrease of this size in an impacted area such as Ward I, and this coupled with the fact that the crime rate of the city as a whole rose slightly would tend to indicate that Team One was a significant variable in the decrease in crime in Area One.

Clearance rate figures for 1972 in Team One are as expected: high rates for service calls and Part II offenses (mostly disturbance calls) and a lower rate for Part I offenses (54%) which more often than not require in depth investigation.

National and regional clearance rate data, as given by the 1970 and 1971 FBI Annual Crime Report, was also analyzed in order to provide a comparison with Team One figures. Although 1972 figures are as yet unavailable, the national clearance rate for Part I offenses was 20% in 1969, 20% in 1970, and 18.4% in 1971. New England reported the lowest clearance rates of any region in the nation -- 16.9% in 1970 and 16.9% in 1971. Other regions reported rates of approximately 20% for both years. In cities of 50,000 - 100,000 the 1970 rate was 18% and the 1971 rate was 19.7%.

Thus, clearance rates (number of cases cleared by arrest, refusal to prosecute, extradition) from across the country in 1969 - 1971 are clustered around 20%. 1972 data are not expected to be appreciably different. Data

Table 3-VII. Compiled Records of Performance in Team Area One
March 1971 - February 1972

First Action Year

	Service Calls	#Service Calls Cleared	Service Call Clearance Rate	Part I* Offenses	#Part I Cleared	Part I Clearance Rate	Part II** Offenses	#Part II Cleared	Part II Clearance Rate
March 1971	53			50			68		
April	76			69			103		
May	82			57			73		
June	101			81			139		
July	94	NO RECORDS COLLECTED	NO RECORDS COLLECTED	54	NO RECORDS COLLECTED	NO RECORDS COLLECTED	107	NO RECORDS COLLECTED	NO RECORDS COLLECTED
August	128			95			84		
September	141			80			129		
October	164			48			113		
November	165			41			76		
December	186			61			123		
January 1972	149			59			75		
February	178			34			67		
Average/Month	126			61			96		

* Part I Offenses for purposes of these tables are:
B&E, Larceny (misdemeanor & felony), Robbery, Assault
(all categories), Automobile Theft and attempts of
above categories.

**Part II Offenses for purposes of these tables are:
Narcotics, Vandalism, M/V Violations, Disturbance,
False Alarm, attempts of above categories.

Table 3-VIII. RECORDS OF PERFORMANCE IN TEAM AREA ONE
March 1971 - Feb. 1972

First Action Year

Month	Service	B & E	Larceny	Robbery	Assault	Narcotics	Vandalism	M/V Violation	Arrests	Disturb.	Stolen Cars	False Alarm	Total # of Calls	Total # of Cases Cleared	Clearance Rate	Average Response Time (Min)
March 1971	53	15	24	1	6	1	14	27	37	26	4	0	304	241	79%	2.2
April	76	14	32	1	13	4	29	34	23	36	9	0	360	279	78%	2.2
May	82	13	30	1	7	4	19	17	19	33	6	0	323	255	79%	2.4
June	101	16	46	1	10	7	31	8	27	93	8	0	455	373	82%	1.8
July	94	11	29	1	8	0	16	3	14	88	5	0	376	327	87%	2.2
63- August	128	40	31	1	16	2	7	13	29	62	7	0	357	290	81%	2.2
September	141	15	31	2	20	1	31	13	31	67	12	17	384	338	88%	2.0
October	164	4	22	2	13	4	21	10	25	69	7	9	345	303	88%	2.2
November	165	7	15	2	9	0	12	5	14	53	8	6	298	261	88%	2.1
December	186	13	23	3	14	1	21	14	22	79	8	8	394	341	87%	2.0
January 1972	149	22	24	0	3	2	12	18	11	38	10	5	299	255	85%	1.9
February	178	11	14	2	5	6	7	27	11	24	2	3	270	241	89%	1.7
Average/Month	126	15	27	1	10	3	18	16	22	56	7	4	347	292	84%	2.0

Table 3-IX.

Compiled Records of Performance in Team Area
OneMarch 1972 - December 1972
Second Action Year

	Service Calls	#Service Calls Cleared	Service Call Clearance Rate	Part I* Offenses	#Part I Cleared	Part I Clearance Rate	Part II** Offenses	#Part II Cleared	Part II Clearance Rate
March 1972	102	102	100%	35	22	63%	118	118	100
April	82	82	100%	51	28	55%	98	96	98
May	123	123	100%	49	29	59%	147	146	99
June	105	104	99%	54	29	54%	206	203	99
July	144	143	99%	62	38	61%	209	205	98
August	88	88	100%	46	34	74%	151	145	96
September	73	72	99%	27	15	56%	145	128	88
October	71	70	99%	39	13	33%	148	136	92
November	79	72	91%	27	13	48%	125	108	86
December	63	60	95%	49	16	33%	112	96	86
Average/Month	93	92	98%	44	24	54%	146	138	94%

Table 3-X.


RECORDS OF PERFORMANCE, IN TEAM AREA ONE
March 1972 - Feb. 1973

Second Action Year

Month	Service	B & E	Larceny	Robbery	Assault	Narcotics	Vandalism	M/V Violation	Arrests	Disturb.	Stolen Cars	False Alarm	Total # of Calls	Total # of Cases Cleared	Clearance Rate	Average Response Time (Min)
March 1972	102	8	16	1	10	6	5	0	13	107	0	0	356	327	92%	2.7
April	82	13	17	1	10	2	5	0	21	83	10	8	342	298	87%	2.4
May	123	10	23	2	7	5	3	1	24	124	7	14	413	380	92%	2.2
June	105	8	26	2	10	2	3	6	21	181	8	14	486	448	92%	1.7
July	144	5	23	3	20	3	10	7	34	185	11	4	550	509	93%	1.9
August	88	10	11	1	22	1	8	5	30	134	2	3	383	273	71%	1.8
September	73	5	9	1	7	0	17	28	0	100	5	0	301	265	88%	1.8
October	71	9	9	0	6	1	22	27	0	98	15	0	326	279	86%	2.0
November	79	9	5	1	10	4	23	22	0	76	2	0	286	236	83%	2.0
December	63	20	10	1	11	2	18	23	0	69	7	0	279	218	78%	2.0
January 1973	105	15	14	5	4	4	5	3	13	56	5	20	224	187	83%	1.6
February	115	15	24	1	9	0	7	10	18	75	1	19	250	204	82%	1.5
Average/Month	96	11	16	2	11	3	11	11	15	107	6	7	343	302	86%	2.0

Figure 3-I.

TEAM ONE PERFORMANCE RECORD FOR FIRST AND SECOND
ACTION YEARS
(March 1971-Feb. 1972 and March 1972-Dec.1972)



for Team One in 1972, however, indicate a clearance rate of 54% for Part I offenses, or over twice that of other areas across the nation. This is a significantly better performance level than that of most other police departments.

Referring to Tables 3-VIII and 3-X one sees that the average number of calls handled per month by the team has remained approximately the same over a two year period, with each man handling 23 calls per month in both 1971 and 1972. Average response time figures (time in minutes from the receipt of a call at team base to the arrival of an officer on the scene) are also the same, 2.0 minutes (average/month) in 1971 and 1972. Unfortunately, no national figures are available with reference to response time with which to compare Team One rates. Further, no records of response time were kept by non-team personnel in 1971 or 1972. Hence, comparisons in this vein are also impossible.

SUMMARY: Team Area One Performance Record for First and Second Action Years

Over a two year period in Team One we see that workload and response time has remained the same, with response time clustering around the two minute mark. The average number of Part I offenses per month has decreased 31% in Area One in 1972. Part II offenses have increased by 44% in 1972, due to a 200% rise in the number of disturbance calls. This rise does not indicate increased community tension, however, because there is no parallel rise in other indices. A possible explanation for the rise in such calls is an increased citizen willingness to call for police assistance in the event of minor quarrels, suspicious happenings, and disturbances of the peace. The average number of service calls per month dropped from 126 per month (1971) to 96 per month (1972) in Area One.

In general, changes in data between 1971 and 1972 in Area One indicate a possible trend toward decreasing numbers of Part I offenses (violent crimes against persons and also property crimes) and increasing numbers of disturbance calls (which tend to be less serious policing problems.) Both of these trends

are encouraging, indicating as they do a shift toward less serious crimes. However, without accurate data from other areas during the same time period, it is impossible to conclude that Team Unit One was the major variable in Area One which resulted in a changing crime pattern. The fact that the city as a whole experienced an increase in Part I offenses in 1972 would tend to support the conclusion that areas which had not had teams in operation (Areas three and four) or which had a team in operation for half a year (Team Area Two), experienced greater numbers of Part I offenses in 1972 over 1971. Data thus substantially favor the conclusion that continued team operation in Area One has changed crime patterns in that area.

Other performance measures (response time and number of calls handled) have not changed significantly in Team One between 1971 and 1972. Clearance rate comparisons between action year one and action year two will not be made -- the data collected in 1971 yields clearance rates for all calls only and thus does not allow a more meaningful breakdown into Part I and Part II clearance rates. Clearance rates from other areas in the nation, however, indicate that Team One had a clearance rate in 1972 of over twice that reported in other comparable cities, the New England States and the nation as a whole. This strongly indicates that Team One has not only a better reporting system, but more efficient police operations than other regions or cities.

Again, however, the reader must be cautioned that just as national and area crime rate data is subject to inaccuracies in reporting, so clearance rate data from other areas may be inaccurate. An examination of Holyoke police records tends to confirm this suspicion, for if clearance rates are compared for March - August 1972 between Team Area One and areas not served by teams (see Tables A-5 -- A-8 in Appendix B) one finds that reported Part I clearance rates are significantly higher in Team Area One than in the rest of the city (Non-team areas): 61% in Area One vs. 3% in Area Two, 3% in Area Three, and 5% in Area Four.

These data in Areas Two, Three, and Four are linked with comprehensiveness of reporting and not necessarily with actual police performance levels; thus, caution is advisable when drawing conclusions from national or regional data with reference to clearance rates.

2. Comparison of Team Two performance for first 5½ months of operation (August 13, 1972 - January 1973) vs. Team One performance during approximately the same time period (August 1972 - January 1973) vs. Team One performance for the first six months of operation (December 1970 - May 1971).

In order to assess the performance levels of Team Two, which began operations on August 13, 1972, data similar to that collected in Team Area One were collected for the first 5½ months of Team Two operation. Data include frequency and types of calls, response times and clearance rates. Two kinds of comparisons are made in this section: 1. a comparison between the first 5½ months of Team Two operation and the first six months of operation of Team One (December 1970 - May 1971) and 2. comparisons of these two groupings of data with Team One data collected during its second action year, (August 1972 - January 1973).

One would expect that performance levels for the first months of team operation would be comparable in Teams One and Two and that performance in both teams during this time would be at a lower level than that of Team One two years later (August - January 1973). During this two year period, Team One would have had the opportunity to familiarize itself with the team concept, investigative skills, the team area neighborhood and residents, all of which would contribute to higher levels of performance.

Unfortunately, the comparison of beginning months of operation is limited to a great extent in this case because initial operating periods occurred during different yearly periods, one primarily in the spring, the other in

clearance rates may be influenced more by seasonal variation than by team ability.

Keeping this limitation in mind, it would appear from Figure 3-II that the frequency of Part I offenses handled in Teams One and Two was approximately the same during their first months of operation (an average of 48 per month for Team One versus 45 per month for Team Two). Within this category, types of calls were very similar in frequency in the two team areas (see Tables 3-XIV and 3-XV) although a greater number of larcenies occurred in Team Area One during this time period.

A greater number of Part II offenses was handled by Team Two (an average of 90 per month as compared to an average of 73 per month for Team One during its first few months). Within this category, frequencies of types of calls (narcotics violations, vandalism, motor vehicle violations, false alarms) were similar in Team Areas One and Two, with the exception of disturbances which were greater in the Team Two Area during its beginning months (an average of 50 per month in Area Two versus 34 per month in Area One). Table 3-XV shows that the higher level of disturbance calls in Area Two was not simply a result of the hot summer weather which occurred during Team Two's first 5½ months: disturbance calls remained consistently higher than those of Area One throughout the entire period, even during the colder winter months of December and January.

Frequency of service calls was also greater during Team Two's first months than during those of Team One, averaging 80 calls per month from Area Two and 60 per month from Area One. The higher frequency of service calls to Team Two can be understood by looking at Table 3-XII which records total numbers of service calls per month in Area Two. We see from the table that during the first 1½ months of operation of Team Two, 226 service calls were received, a figure almost equal to the total number of service calls received during the next four months. It is likely that many of these calls were a result

of the curiosity of neighborhood residents as to what their team would be like. Team policing had been given a great deal of publicity by the local news media, and during this particular 1½ month period, a severe battle was being waged before the Board of Aldermen as to the merits and faults of the team concept. Ignoring these 1½ months, Team One and Two service call figures are similar, although Table 3-XIV indicates a slight trend toward an increase in service calls to Team One during its 4th, 5th, and 6th operating months, which has not occurred as yet in Team Two (Table 3-XV).

Tables 3-VII and 3-IX indicate that this increase in service calls has continued in Team One from its first year to its second. This may very well be due to increased rapport between citizens and their team unit as the unit continues to operate. That is, citizens may be more willing to call the team about non-crime related problems as their knowledge of and confidence level in the team grows. If this is true, one would expect Team Two to experience the same trend as its operation continues past its initial months. Continued monitoring of Team Two is therefore necessary.

In general, workload in terms of total numbers of calls handled per month by each team seems to be fairly comparable. Although records of the total number of calls per month were not collected during the first three months of Team One's operation, the figures for the last three months of operation seem to fall within the same general area as those for Team Two (see Tables 3-XIV and 3-XV). Team One figures on total calls during this period are somewhat higher, however.

Clearance rates for the three different crime categories (service, Part I, Part II) were not collected for Team One during its first year of operation; the only available figures are clearance rates for all types of calls, beginning in March 1971 as shown on Table 3-XIV. Comparing these figures with Team Two figures (Table 3-XV) we find that Team Two clearance rates for all calls in the last three months of the time period are higher than rates

in Team One for a similar period (90%, 86%, and 91% for Team Two; 79%, 78%, and 79% for Team One). These higher clearance rates for Team Two are in part the result of a greater number of disturbance calls to Team Two (which are usually cleared immediately) and to the slightly greater number of Part I offenses occurring in Area One at this time, particularly larcenies. Average response times in both teams are very similar, centering around 2- 2½ minutes.

SUMMARY: Teams One and Two. First Six Months of Operation

A comparison of Teams One and Two during their first months of operation indicates similar response times, number of calls handled per month and number of Part I offenses handled (with a slightly higher number being handled in Area One than in Area Two at the close of the period under investigation).

A greater number of Part II calls were received by Team Two than by Team One, the difference in numbers due mostly to a consistently greater number of disturbance calls received by Team Two. Frequency of service calls was also greater in Team Area Two, due in all probability to a large number of "curiosity" calls received in the beginning 1½ months of Team Two operations. In later months, service call frequencies in Area Two approached those of Area One. A slight trend toward increasing numbers of service calls was observed in Area One from March through May. No comparable trend was observed in Area Two. If such a trend is due to citizen confidence levels in their team, as has been hypothesized, one would expect Team Two service calls to increase in number over the course of the next year.

In general, performance data from Teams One and Two during their first months of operation were similar, with the few exceptions noted above.

The second set of comparisons to be made between Teams One and Two is of performance during similar yearly time periods (August 1972 - January 1973 for Team One* and August 12, 1972 - January 1973 for Team Two).

A comparison of Tables 3-XIII (compiled records of Team One) and 3-XII (compiled records of Team Two) shows an identical average number of service calls per month and an almost identical number cleared. Clearance rates for service calls are therefore quite close (96% for Team Two, 97% for Team One).

A closer examination, however, of numbers of service calls occurring on a monthly basis (Tables 3-XII and 3-XIII and Figure 3-III) indicates that although average per month figures are similar during August - January 1973 in Areas One and Two, monthly fluctuations of service call frequencies are not similar. That is, Team Two experienced a greater number of calls in its first one and a half months than it did in later months (indicating curiosity calls as we have stated previously), while Team One experienced a more consistently high level of service calls during each month of the August - January 1973 period. As we have stated before, this may have been due to increased confidence levels in citizenry with reference to their Team which had been in operation for almost two years at this point. Continued monitoring of Team Two as it continues operating may bear out this hypothesis.

* Clearance rate data for Team One are available for five months only; hence, average monthly rates have been calculated on a five month basis while frequency of calls per month has been calculated on a six month basis. Comparisons between the two are therefore slightly inaccurate but valid nevertheless.

Although it would have been possible to eliminate the month of January 1973, and calculate data for Team One on a five month basis, the resultant difference in average monthly figures from figures derived by counting January are so small that it was arbitrarily decided to include that month in our calculations when January data was available. Hence, in Table 3-XIII average frequency of calls per month are based on six months of data whereas average number of cases cleared per month and clearance rates are based on five months of a

Frequency of Part I offenses between August and January 1973 is lower for Team One than Team Two (an average of 39 per month vs. 45 per month). Tables 3-XV and 3-X indicate that within the Part I category, a greater number of larcenies (25) and automobile thefts (20) occurred in Area One, within a slightly longer period of time.

Although we know that Area One was experiencing a decrease of 31 percent in its number of Part I offenses in 1972, there is no accurate baseline data on Team Area Two which would allow one to determine whether Part I offenses fell, rose or remained the same in Team Area Two during the first months of Team Two operations. It is probable, however, that a decrease in Part I offenses does not occur in the first months of team operation, but is rather a result of continued team operation within an area. One would expect from this hypothesis that continued operation of Team Two would lead to a decrease in Part II calls in Area Two over the course of the next one and a half years.

A slightly greater clearance rate for Part I offenses is recorded for Team Two than for Team One during this period, (53% for Team Two, 49% for Team One). Again, these clearance rates are significantly better than those recorded in the nation and parts of the country during 1969 - 1971. 1972 nationwide data are as yet unavailable.

The frequency of Part II offenses is greater in Area One than in Area Two during this time (an average of 128 per month in Area One vs. 90 per month in Area Two). Disturbance calls contribute most directly to these data: Team One received a total of 668 disturbance calls between August and January, while Team Two recorded only 273. As stated in a previous section, Team One experienced a sharp rise in disturbance calls in 1972. Although a greater number of disturbance calls occurred within the hot summer months, these months are not alone in having high numbers of disturbance calls. Comparing Team One's first

Table 3-XI.

Compiled Records of Performance in Team Area One
December 1970 - May 1971

First 6 Months of Operation

	December 1970	January 1971	February	March	April	May	Average/Month
Service Calls	43	47	60	53	76	82	60
#Service Calls Cleared	No Records Collected						
Service Call Clearance Rate	No Records Collected						
Part 1* Offenses	31	39	42	50	69	57	48
#Part I Cleared	No Records Collected						
Part 1 Clearance Rate	No Records Collected						
Part II** Offenses	60	65	66	68	103	73	73
#Part II Cleared	No Records Collected						
Part II Clearance Rate	No Records Collected						

Table 3-XII. . . Compiled Records of Performance in Team Area Two
March 1972 - January 1973

Implimentation of Team Unit 2

	Service Calls	#Service Calls Cleared	Service Call Clearance Rate	Part I* Offenses	#Part I Cleared	Part I Clearance Rate	Part II** Offenses	#Part II Cleared	Part II Clearance Rate
March	0	0	0%	26	2	8%	5	2	40%
April	0	0	0%	26	0	0%	7	0	0%
May	2	0	0%	22	0	0%	14	0	0%
June	0	0	0%	19	1	5%	9	3	33%
July	0	0	0%	16	0	0%	9	1	11%
August 1 - 12	0	0	0%	6	1	17%	1	0	0%
August 13 - 31	112	105	94%	43	22	51%	80	75	94%
September	114	106	93%	56	19	34%	95	75	79%
October	59	59	100%	39	22	56%	75	67	89%
November	52	52	100%	40	28	70%	80	78	98%
December	51	51	100%	37	22	59%	87	76	87%
January 1973	52	52	100%	35	23	66%	77	76	99%
Average/Month First 5½ Months	.4	0	0%	21	.7	3%	8	1	13%
Second 5½ Months	80	77	96%	45	24	53%	90	81	90%

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CONTINUED

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Table 3-XIII. Compiled Records of Performance in Team Area One
August 1972 - January 1973

Second Action Year

	Service Calls	#Service Calls Cleared	Service Call Clearance Rate	Part I* Offenses	#Part I Cleared	Part I Clearance Rate	Part II** Offenses	#Part II Cleared	Part II Clearance Rate
August 1972	88	88	100%	46	34	74%	151	145	96%
September	73	72	99%	27	15	56%	145	128	88%
October	71	70	99%	39	13	33%	148	136	92%
November	79	72	91%	27	13	48%	125	108	86%
December	63	60	95%	49	16	33%	112	96	86%
January 1973	105	*	*	43	*	*	88	*	*
Average/Month	80	72	97%	39	18	49%	128	123	90%

* Data not collected. Average/Month figures for these columns are based on 5 months of performance; other Average/Month figures are based on 6 months of performance.

Table 3-XIV.

RECORDS OF PERFORMANCE IN TEAM AREA ONE
Dec. 1970 - May 1971

First 6 months of operation

Month	Service	B & E	Larceny	Robbery	Assault	Narcotics	Vandalism	Violation	Arrests	Disturb.	Stolen Cars	False Alarm	Total # of Calls	Total # of Cases Cleared	Clearance Rate	Average Response Time (Min.)
December 1970	43	9	12	1	3	2	14	7	7	37	6	0				
Jan. 1971	47	8	14	0	13	3	5	24	24	33	4	0				
Feb.	60	8	14	0	15	2	12	14	16	38	5	0				
March	53	15	24	1	6	1	14	27	37	26	4	0	304	241	79%	2.2
April	76	14	32	1	13	4	29	34	23	36	9	0	360	279	78%	2.2
May	82	13	30	1	7	4	19	17	19	33	6	0	323	255	79%	2.4
Average/Month	60	11	21	.7	10	3	16	21	21	34	6	0				

Table 3-XV.

RECORDS OF PERFORMANCE IN TEAM AREA TWO
March 1972 - Jan. 1973

Implementation of Team Unit 2

Month	Service	B & E	Larceny	Robbery	Assault	Narcotics	Vandalism	Violation	Arrests	Disturb.	Stolen Cars	False Alarm	Total # of Calls	Total # of Cases Cleared	Clearance Rate	Average Response Time (Min)
A. March	0	15	9	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	2	0	38	9	24%	no rec.
April	0	2	19	3	2	0	4	0	0	3	0	0	39	2	5%	"
May	2	7	15	0	0	0	12	0	0	2	0	0	47	1	2%	"
June	0	2	12	0	2	0	5	0	0	4	3	0	43	10	23%	"
July	0	3	11	0	1	0	7	0	0	2	1	0	45	7	16%	"
August 1-12	0	0	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	12	5	42%	"
B. August 13-31	112	9	10	3	10	3	9	15	6	53	11	0	279	236	85%	2.2
September	114	7	27	3	7	5	26	18	10	46	12	0	348	264	76%	2.0
October	59	6	15	1	8	0	16	27	22	32	9	0	257	220	86%	2.5
November	52	16	10	0	8	0	13	18	17	48	6	1	261	236	90%	2.3
December	51	7	11	1	4	0	21	16	11	50	14	0	291	249	86%	2.3
January 1973	52	13	10	2	5	0	4	27	11	44	5	2	245	224	91%	1.9
Average/Month for first 5½ months	.4	5	13	.5	1	0	6	.2	0	2	1	0	41	6	15%	no rec.
Average/Month for second 5½ months	80	11	15	2	8	1	16	22	14	50	10	.5	287	260	93%	2.4

code:

- * team 1 calls (Aug.72-Jan.73)
- ** team 1 cleared cases (Aug.72-Dec.72)
- *** team 1 calls (Dec.70-May 71)
- **** team 2 calls and cleared cases (Aug.13,72-Jan.73)

COMPARISON OF TEAM TWO PERFORMANCE (# CALLS HANDLED AND # CLEARED) FOR FIRST 5½ MONTHS OF OPERATION (AUG.13,1972-JAN.1973) VS. TEAM ONE PERFORMANCE DURING APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME PERIOD (AUG.72-JAN.73) VS. TEAM ONE PERFORMANCE FOR FIRST 6 MONTHS OF OPERATION (DEC.72-MAY 71).

Figure 3-II.





Figure 3-III.

COMPARISON OF TEAM TWO PERFORMANCE (# OF CALLS HANDLED) FOR FIRST 5½ MONTHS OF OPERATION (AUG. 13, 1972-JAN. 1973) VS. TEAM ONE PERFORMANCE DURING APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME PERIOD (AUG. 1972-JAN. 1973) VS. TEAM ONE PERFORMANCE FOR FIRST 6 MONTHS OF OPERATION (DEC. 1970-MAY 1971).




code:
 ——— team 1 (Aug. 72-Jan. 73)
 - - - - team 1 (Dec. 70-May 71)
 - · - · t 2 (Aug. 13, 72-Jan. 73)

Time Blocks (by month)

Figure 3-IV.

COMPARISON OF TEAM TWO PERFORMANCE (# OF CALLS CLEARED) FOR FIRST 5½ MONTHS OF OPERATION (AUG.13, 1972-JAN.1973) VS. TEAM ONE PERFORMANCE DURING APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME PERIOD (AUG.72-DEC.72).



and second action years, (Tables 3-VIII and 3-X) one sees that, month by month, action year two records a greater number of disturbance calls than action year one. This rise was not interpreted as an indicator of neighborhood unrest but as part of a possible change in crime patterns in the area from more serious to less serious crimes.

Clearance rates for Part II offenses are identical in both teams (90%). Average response times for all calls are also similar in Areas One and Two (2.4 minutes in Area Two and 1.9 in Area One).

SUMMARY: Teams One and Two During August 1972 - January 1973

A comparison of Teams One and Two during the same time periods (August 1972 - January 1973) indicates that Team One, after two years of operation, had consistently greater numbers of service calls than Team Two, recorded fewer Part I offenses than Team Two (a total of 231 for a six month time period in Area One and a total of 250 for a shorter five and a half month time period in Area Two), and recorded over twice as many disturbance calls as Team Two. These data indicate: 1. Area One citizen willingness to call police about non-crime related matters and 2. possible changes in the nature of police problems within Team Area One (in a positive direction). Both of these states were goals specified by the Team Police Project and appear well on their way to fulfillment.

Data also indicate that the decrease in Part I offenses in Area One was not reflected in the 1972 crime index for the city, which rose slightly. This indicates that other parts of the city (which parts cannot be determined because of insufficient data) experienced an increase in Part I offenses. Because baseline data prior to Team Two formation is poor, it is impossible to determine whether Area Two experienced a decrease in Part I calls as a result of Team Two's creation. It is probable that such a decrease did not occur, however, the decrease being a result of continued operation of a team and not the very fact of creating one.

Clearance rates are similar for both teams for service, Part II and Part I offenses; and clearance rates for both teams are significantly higher than national or area rates. Again, the reader must be cautioned about the validity of national rates and the conclusions which can be drawn from them. Average response times for all calls are similar in the two areas (2.4 minutes in Area Two and 1.9 in Area One).

The major variable in these sets of data was the length of time of team operation, since Areas One and Two are demographically similar and the time periods in which data was collected were the same. Therefore, one would expect that similarly changed patterns of calls would occur in Team Area Two as occurred in Area One as Team Two continues its operation.

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GENERAL SUMMARY

The hypothesis with which we began, stated that one would expect the beginning months of Team One and Two performance to be similar to one another, keeping in mind the limitations to comparison posed by the differences in seasonal periods in which each team began. A second hypothesis was that performances of Teams One and Two during these beginning periods would be at a lower level than that of Team One two years later (1973), due to greater team experience and familiarity with the area. It was also hypothesized that Team Unit One would have made a positive impact on crime levels in the Ward I area in its two years of operation. All of these hypotheses are well supported by this data.

A comparison of Teams One and Two during their first months of operation indicates similar response times, numbers of calls handled per month, and number of Part I offenses handled (with a slightly higher number being handled in Area One than in Area Two at the close of the period under investigation). Frequency of Part II offenses, although greater in Area Two because of higher numbers of disturbance calls, are very similar throughout the beginning months of Teams One and Two. Service calls show greater variety due to initially high numbers of calls to Team Two (curiosity calls). After this one and a half month period, however, numbers of service calls approach one another in Areas One and Two. A slight increasing trend in numbers of service calls was noticed in Area One from March through May and this trend has continued throughout the second action year. No such trend has been observed in Team Two, although if such a trend is due to citizen confidence levels in their team, as has been hypothesized, one would expect Team Two service calls to increase in number over the course of the next year.

In general, one sees that the first months of operation were similar in both teams, with the few exceptions noted above.

A comparison of Team One during its second action year with Teams One and Two during their beginning months suggests a change in crime patterns in Area One in a positive direction, as measured by greater numbers of service calls and disturbance calls and a significant decrease in numbers of Part I offenses in Area One. Thus, at a time when the city as a whole experienced a slight increase in the crime index, Area One experienced a decrease (of 31%) over 1971 Part I figures. It is probable that the decrease in Area I resulted from continued operation of a team of fifteen men in that area.

Average response times are similar across teams and seasonal periods. Clearance rates of calls are almost identical for Team Two and Team One (second action year); clearance rate breakdowns are not available for Team One (first action year), but clearance rates for all calls appear lower in Team One during its first few months than in Team One (second action year) or Team Two (first months), largely because of fewer numbers of service and disturbance calls being handled by Team One during this initial period. Clearance rates of Part I offenses for both teams, regardless of time period, are over twice that of national figures.

Thus, the available data indicate that Area One, which has had a team in operation for a two year period, has experienced increased levels of less serious crimes (disturbances), increases in resident-police rapport* as measured by increased numbers of service calls, and a greatly reduced number of Part I offenses in that area. Similarities in demography and in performances of Teams One and Two in their beginning months would lead to the hypothesis that Area Two will follow a pattern within the next year and a half similar to that of Area One during its first two years.

*The hypothesis as to greater general resident-police rapport in Area I in 1972 is qualified by other data reviewed in this report, particularly data relating to community attitude measures.

These data strongly support the conclusion that team operations have been the major determinant of high clearance rates and changed crime patterns in Area One and have produced significantly improved levels of reporting, numbers of cases cleared, fewer numbers of Part I offenses, and increased numbers of service calls.

If Team Two data within the next year demonstrates similar patterns, it will provide additional confirmation of this success of the team police concept.

2. Sick Leave Information

Records of each Holyoke police officer's exercise of sick leave were obtained from the Chief's office and a comparison made between Teams One and Two and non-team personnel in 1972 and between Team One and non-team personnel in 1971. Sick leave data serves as a measure of group morale and as a suggestive, partial index of job performance.

Team One data was collected from January 1 - December 31, 1971 and from January 1 - December 31, 1972; Team Two data from August 13, 1972 (the commencement of Team Two operation) through December 31, 1972; and department (non-team) data from January 1 - December 31, 1972. See Tables 3-XVI and 3-XVII for presentation of data.

Table 3-XVI indicates that the rate of sick leave useage by Team One members in 1972 was significantly lower per man per month than that of both Team Two and non-team police personnel. The 1972 rate of sick leave useage, however, for Team One personnel is over twice that of the 1971 rate (an increase from an average of .27 sick days per month per man to .60 days per month per man). Department (non-team) sick day useage in 1972 also shows a marked increase over 1971 (an increase from .69 days taken per man per month in 1971 to 1.35 days per man per month in 1972).

Thus, although Team One rates for 1972 remain significantly lower than department rates for that year, there has been a two-fold increase in both Team One and non-team rates of sick leave useage in 1972.

The sick day useage rate of Team Two personnel over a 4½ month period in 1972 is significantly higher than that of Team One (twice as high), and slightly lower than the non-team (department) rate on a per man per month basis.

Table 3-XVI. Sick Leave Statistics for Teams 1 & 2

Police Personnel and Remaining Dept. Personnel, 1972

Unit	Total # Sick Days Taken	Ave. # Sick Days Per Mo. for Entire Unit	Ave. # Sick Days Used Per Man/Per Mo.	Ave. # Police Personnel Per Month in Unit
Team 1 (Jan. 9-Dec.1972)	105	8.75	.60	14.67
Team 2 (Aug. 13-Dec. 72)	108	24.00	1.29	18.67
Dept. Personnel Minus Teams 1 & 2 (Jan-Dec. 1972)	1487	123.92	1.35	91.50

3-XVII. Sick Leave Statistics for Team 1 Police

Personnel and Remaining Dept. Personnel, 1971

Unit	Total # Sick Days Taken	Ave. # Sick Days Per Mo. for Entire Unit	Ave. # Sick Days Used Per Man/Per Mo.	Ave. # Police Personnel Per Month in Unit
Team 1 (Jan.-Dec. 1971)	45	3.75	.27	14.08
Dept. Personnel Minus Team 1 (Jan.-Dec. 1971)	843	70.25	.69	101.33

Sick leave data would seem to support the fact that both Team One and non-team morale dropped in 1972 as compared to 1971, as interviews with team members and the results of a Police Job Satisfaction and Morale Survey have indicated. Causes for this change in morale level and interview and survey results are discussed in another part of this report.

Team One rates are still significantly lower than department rates, but the implications of these data are not as clear cut as might appear at first glance. As the 1971 Evaluation Report pointed out: "Since data for a previous similar period were not readily available, one cannot definitively infer a cause-effect relationship between team participation and reduced sick leave useage. In particular, since the officers who volunteered for Team (One) membership demonstrated themselves in other respects to be exceptional policemen (with reference to attitude in particular), it is entirely possible that they may have been atypical with respect to sick leave useage."

Team Two statistics (1.29 sick days taken per month per man) would seem to indicate that it is not enough to simply group men together in a team structure in order to affect morale in a positive manner. Outside forces may affect morale level even more than the team structure. Team Two sick leave rate is not significantly different from that of non-team members in 1972, indicating that as a group, Team Two shared the same level of morale as non-team members. The reasons for Team Two's identification with the department and not with Team One or the Team Policing concept are discussed in another part of this report. ("Morale and Job Satisfaction")

3. Team vs. Non-Team Performance as Measured by Interviews with Professionals : Associated with Policing.*

A basic goal of Team Policing is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of police service delivery. This goal, it has been hypothesized, can be accomplished in two ways: 1. improved training to raise the quality of officers servicing the city and 2. the team structure itself, which encourages higher levels of individual police initiative and accountability, a greater degree of community-oriented police planning, greater accessibility to residents in need of service, and greater knowledge of area problems, needs, and crime patterns.

The previous sections of Part III-C (Performance) have focused upon quantitative measures of police performance in Team areas and the city. In this section a qualitative measure of performance levels will be investigated: assessments of police performance made by professionals whose jobs bring them into daily contact with Holyoke police personnel. The two professionals interviewed were the Clerk of Courts and Prosecutor for the Holyoke District Court. Time schedules did not allow for interviews with other persons whose insight into and dealings with the Holyoke Police Department would have proved valuable for evaluation purposes; eg., representatives from the District Attorney's Office and the judges which sit at the Holyoke District Court. It is suggested that such persons be interviewed with reference to police performance as part of the 1973 evaluation report.

The structure of interviews with the Clerk of Courts and Prosecutor was geared to eliciting responses with reference to the quality of team performance levels as opposed to non-team levels. Specifically, the Prosecutor and Clerk

* Acknowledgement is made to Christine Angers for data presented in this section.

were asked if they were able to distinguish between team members who had received training at Holyoke Community College (on Massachusetts Statutes and Laws of Arrest, Investigation and Interrogation and Specialty Courses) from non-team personnel who had not received this kind of training. These professionals were also asked to comment upon the quality of affidavit preparation, familiarity with the law, expeditiousness of warrant serving, competence of team patrolmen as compared to Detective Bureau personnel, (particularly with reference to the quality of investigations and the preparation of reports), attitude of officers in court, and their general self presentation in court. (See Appendix E for interview format).

Both persons interviewed seemed to agree that, although police training had proved valuable and seemed to make a difference in terms of the quality of officers as witnesses and as investigators, training in and of itself does not necessarily make officers more responsive to their duties or better policemen. Time and experience coupled with practical or applied training is the determinant of efficient and effective police service. Individual officer personality is also of prime importance in determining levels of police performance. Interviewees seemed to feel that informal, in-house training such as reviewing case histories and incidents led by older more experienced personnel would be as valuable as formal courses with specifically practical application.

Affidavit preparation and report writing are in general well done according to interviewers (although at first reports were sometimes not submitted by team members), warrants are served and returned expeditiously, and officer attitude within the department in general is positive -- not sarcastic, and they are neat in appearance.

Both interviewees indicated that no real difference in the conscientiousness of Team patrolmen as compared to Detective Bureau personnel could be detected. As teams have gone into operation, the clerk has come into contact with more and more patrolmen in court, for they are now handling cases which traditionally were handled by Detective Bureau personnel. These patrolmen appeared comparable to Detective Bureau personnel both in conscientiousness and carrying out of duties properly and expeditiously.

It was also stressed by both professionals that newly appointed officers needed training, experience, and guidance. Greater cooperation among officers themselves in giving new recruits necessary informal training would be beneficial to all concerned.

In summary, interviews with the Clerk of Courts and Prosecutor indicated that team members seemed to be functioning on a par with Detective Bureau personnel, and that Department and team performance in general was "good" with reference to report writing, affidavit preparation, knowledge of laws, warrant processing, and officer appearance and attitude.

It was the consensus of both interviewees that training per se did not produce good policemen, but that experience of a practical nature over a long period of time aided the development of effective and knowledgeable personnel.

In general, team members were assessed to be no better or no worse than non-team personnel in terms of performance levels and quality of work.

D. COMMUNITY ATTITUDE.

1. Community Attitude Survey

An avowed goal of team policing is to effect a change in community attitudes toward police. Concomitant goals are to increase cooperation between the community and police and to increase the sense of security in the communities in which teams are operating.

DATA

To assess the attitude of residents toward team and non-team police in 1971 (the first action year) a Community Attitude Survey was administered to a random sample of households in Ward 1 and Ward 2 (the control district for Ward 1). Two phases were used to determine community attitudes, the first in December, 1970, upon the initiation of the team policing project, and the second in August, 1971, approximately eight months after Team One's initiation. The December, 1970 administration was presented to 92 people in Ward 1 (the experimental area) and 89 people in Ward 2 (the control area). The August 1971 post-test was administered to another random sample of 101 citizens in Ward 1 and 100 citizens in Ward 2.*

Survey data were collected through structured interviews consisting of 10-20 questions requiring relatively specific answers.

In 1972, a similar survey (several questions were added) was administered to random samples of residents in Team Areas Two, Three and Four in November and to Areas One and Two in March 1973.** Sample sizes were geared to yield

* It should be noted that the 1970 and 1971 survey samples were not large enough to reach statistical significance. That is, one could not generalize from these results to the Ward 1 and Ward 2 populations as a whole.

** See following page.

statistically significant results within each area, although weather conditions and minor problems with surveyor availability resulted in statistics at less than a .05 level of significance in Area Three. Significance at the .05 level was reached, however, in Areas Two and Four in November 1972 and Areas One and Two in March 1973. Sample sizes are recorded on the Tables in this section.

Data on Areas Three and Four, which is the result of one survey administration only, will serve as a baseline for future community attitude measures in 1973. Results from Area One and Two in 1972 and 1973 are compared in this section with data from Areas One and Two collected in 1970 and 1971.

In 1971 interviewers were selected, oriented, and supervised by Model Cities personnel. Interviewees were determined by using a table of random numbers to select the street and apartment. The interviewee was the first person over 16 who answered the door. In 1972, interviewers were selected by the Evaluation Coordinator and given an orientation to the questionnaire and ways to avoid biasing or influencing respondent's answers. Interviewees were selected by dividing voting lists into the four team areas (current and future) and selecting every eleventh, fifth, or fourth person (not related to a police officer and not connected with the Team Policing project).

** It was decided not to survey Area One in November 1972, as this area has been over-surveyed since the inception of Model Cities and Team Policing. One additional administration in March 1972 was considered sufficient to show continued trends or changed patterns in community attitude in this area. Further, it should be noted that Area Two in 1972 is larger than Area Two in 1970 and 1971 (the control district for the experimental ward). Area Two as a control consisted of Ward 2 (approximately 4,000 people). Area Two in 1972 and 1973 (Team Area Two) consists of Ward 2 and the Springdale-Ingleside area of the city (approximately 5,000 people). Although the area is not identical between years, the number of additional persons, it was felt, was not so great as to vitiate the validity of comparisons across time periods.

The interviews conducted in Wards 1 and 2 in 1972 were designed to obtain information relating to three general areas:

1. Citizen perceptions of the attitudes and behavior of their police.
2. Citizen perceptions of the willingness of the people in their wards to assist their police.
3. Citizen perceptions of the quality of their police.

Interviews conducted in Team Areas Two, Three, and Four in 1972 and Team Areas One and Two in 1973 were designed to yield information in the above mentioned categories and

4. Citizen preferences with reference to blazer vs. traditional uniforms and marked vs. unmarked cars.
5. Citizen satisfaction with their team units in Areas One and Two.

HYPOTHESES 1971

The hypotheses put forward in the 1971 Evaluation Report was that pre-test community attitudes in Wards 1 and 2 and the post-test attitudes in Ward 2 would remain similar and constant, while post-test attitudes in Ward 1 would change in a positive direction. A change of attitude in a positive direction was to be interpreted as an indication of the success of the Team Police experiment.

The 1971 evaluation data are reviewed in greater depth later in this section. In brief, the 1971 data suggested the following:

"A comparison of the pre-test and post-test data obtained from interviewees in Ward 1 indicate that the attitudes of citizens in Ward 1 toward their police either remained constant or changed in a positive direction over the period of the experiment. On the other hand, a comparison of the pre-test and post-test interview data in Ward 2 indicates that the attitudes of the citizens in Ward 2 toward their police tended to remain the same or change in a negative direction... Data are sufficient to conclude that the project has had the predicted positive impact on citizen attitudes in Ward 1."

The unexpected, negative attitude change of citizens in Ward 2 toward their police was explained by the enhanced image which Team One members and Team Policing in general received in the local news media. Such positive publicity, which was not received by non-team police personnel, more than likely led to a negative shift in opinions as to the quality of non-team personnel.

HYPOTHESES 1972

The hypotheses put forward in 1972 were that Area One residents would continue to show improvements in attitudes toward police over 1971 and would show more positive attitudes toward police than Team Area Two residents. Team Area Two residents could be expected to demonstrate improved attitudes toward their team police -- at first approaching the 1970 baseline and then, in 1973, exceeding that baseline. It was expected that the baseline data collected in Areas Three and Four would compare favorably to data in Area One and Two, since predominantly white, middle class residential and business areas tend to have less antagonistic and more normalized relations with police than minority group areas have. It was also hypothesized, however, that greater numbers of residents in Areas Three and Four would demonstrate noncommittal attitudes toward policing (ie., check "neither agree nor disagree") than would residents in Areas One and Two, thus supporting the conclusion that such middle class areas are suffering from their own particular kind of police-community separation.

Data are presented below.

A. Citizen Perception of Police Attitudes and Behavior.

Questions in this part of the Community Attitude Survey were geared to seeking responses that would indicate how area residents viewed the attitudes and behavior towards citizens of police officers serving them.

Question 1 (Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1). "The police in our ward like people."

1970, 1971. In the first and second series of surveys (December 1970 and August 1971) Area One responses indicate virtually no increase (from 70% to 71%) in the percentage of people agreeing with the question and a slight decrease in the percentage disagreeing (from 6% to 2%). Team Area Two responses (the control area) also have remained virtually unchanged (from 63% in December 1970 to 64% in August 1971). Those disagreeing in Area Two also decreased slightly in percentage as they did in Area One. Although a greater percentage of residents in Area One agreed that their police liked people than did residents in Area Two, this difference is not statistically significant and does not justify the conclusion that team policing has significantly changed opinions in Ward 1.

1972. The results of the third administration of the survey in November 1972 indicate that Area Two residents suffered a negative change in opinion with reference to police friendliness -- 52% agreed with the statement in November 1972 (two months after Team Two was implemented in the Area) as opposed to 64% in August 1971. Area Two residents also recorded an increase in neutral answers (neither agree nor disagree), jumping from 30 and 31% in 1970 and 1971 to 43% in 1972, but no change in percentages of people disagreeing with the statement was recorded. This increase in neutral answers, with no concomitant increase in negative answers, would tend to indicate that Area Two residents had adopted a "wait and see" attitude about their team during its first few months of operation. Such a wait and see attitude does not seem to have been adopted by Team One residents in the first few months of that team's operation. A possible explanation for Team One's immediate positive impact could be the catastrophic Lyman Street fire which occurred one week before the 1970 administration of the survey and served to solidify Area One

I. PERCEIVED POLICE ATTITUDE TOWARD PEOPLE
IN TEAM AREAS

Q. The Police our Ward like People.

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
	Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3		Team Area 4			
	Dec. 1970 N=92		Aug. 1971 N=102		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970 N=89		Aug. 1971 N=100		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%*	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	64	70	72	71	246	68	56	63	64	64	179	52	316	82	178	76	259	70
Neutral	22	24	28	28	110	30	27	30	31	31	150	43	52	13	46	20	92	25
Disagree	6	6	2	2	4	1	4	4	3	3	12	3	11	3	7	3	13	3
No answer	0	0	0	0	4	1	2	2	2	2	5	1	7	2	3	1	7	2
TOTAL	92	100	102	101	364	100	89	99	100	100	346	99	386	100	234	100	371	100

* All Percentages on Community Attitude Tables are rounded off to the nearest percent. Total percentage figures may therefore not always equal one hundred.

I. Perceived Police Attitude Toward People
in Team Areas

Figure 4-I:

Q. The police in our ward like people.



residents in support of Team One. An explanation for the cautiousness of Area Two responses may be the public controversy raging at the time over team police expansion. This controversy and its impact is discussed in depth in another section of this report. The point is, however, that negative publicity more than likely affected responses from citizens just beginning to experience the Team Policing concept.

Area Three responses in November 1972 (before Teams Three and Four were in operation) indicated that most interviewees felt that their police liked people (76% in Area Three, 70% in Area Four).

Neutral answers in Areas Three and Four were in the 20-25% category and were significantly smaller than that recorded in Area Two (43%).

1973. The 1973 administration of the survey in Area One indicates no substantial change in community attitudes. An insignificant decrease was noted in the percentage of respondents agreeing that police in their ward like people (from 71% in 1971 to 68% in 1973). Neutral answers increased in Area One from 28% to 30% in 1972 - 1973.

While no significant difference in attitude was recorded in Area One, a significant change was noted in Area Two in March 1973. A large increase occurred in the percentage of respondents agreeing that police in their ward like people (from 63% in 1970, 64% in 1971, 52% in 1972, to 82% in 1973). Of all areas in the city, Area Two recorded the greatest percentage of people agreeing with the statement (82% in Area Two, 68% in Area One, 76% in Area Three, and 70% in Area Four). Neutral answers decreased considerably in Area Two in March 1973 and reached a level smaller than that previously recorded in the Area and smaller than that recorded in other areas across time spans.

These data indicate that after seven months of Team Two operation, a substantially greater percentage of Area Two residents had concluded that these police "liked" people. Area One residents, however, after two years of team policing operation, recorded a slight decrease in positive attitudes towards police and an increase in neutral answers. This was an unexpected finding.

Question 2 (Table 4-II, Figure 4-II). "The Police in our ward are polite."

1970, 1971. The first administration of the survey indicated that the percentage of Area One residents agreeing with this statement increased from 79% to 81% from December 1970 to August 1971. A small, positive attitude change was thus recorded in Area One. Area Two responses indicated a smaller percentage of people agreeing with the statement in 1970 (71%) than in Area One, and a sudden drop in percentage agreeing in 1971 (from 71% in 1970 to 52% in 1971.)

1972. The November 1972 administration in Area Two recorded a significant rise in the percentage agreeing with the statement (from 52% in 1971 to 81% in 1972), and a decrease in neutral responses in Area Two (from 38% in 1971 to 13% in 1972). These 1972 results from Area Two are an improvement; even beyond the 1970 baseline results in Area Two and are comparable to responses in Areas Three and Four during the same time period (1972) and with Area One in 1971 (after eight months of Team One operation). Data would seem to indicate that Area Two residents' views on police politeness were returning to normal (and indeed were slightly higher than normal) in 1972, after the decrease in public confidence in non-team police in 1971.

Areas Three and Four responses for 1972 indicate the same high level of pro-police ("agree") answers as in Area Two (79% for Area Three, 83% for Area Four), with more in Area Four agreeing than in Area Three.

Q. Police in our Ward are polite.

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	Team Area 1						Team Area 2								Team Area 3		Team Area 4	
	Dec. 1970 N=92		Aug. 1971 N=102		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970 N=89		Aug. 1971 N=100		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	73	79	82	81	310	85	63	71	52	52	282	81	321	83	186	79	308	83
Neutral	13	14	17	17	36	10	14	16	38	38	44	13	40	10	38	16	42	11
Disagree	5	5	3	3	11	3	7	8	2	2	13	4	17	4	7	3	11	3
No answer	1	1	0	0	7	2	5	6	8	8	8	2	8	2	3	1	10	3
TOTAL	92	100	102	101	364	100	89	101	100	100	347	100	386	99	234	99	371	100

Table 4-II. II. Police Manners

Q. Police in our ward are polite.





Table 4-III. III. Perceived Police Attitude Toward Citizen Equality

Q. Police in my ward tend to look down on most people.



Testing Periods

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1973. The 1973 administration in Area One indicates a continued increase in the percentage of people agreeing that police in the ward are polite (an increase of 4% over 1971). Neutral answers decreased by 7% in 1973, while those disagreeing remained the same.

In Area Two, a continued increase in percentages of people agreeing with the statement was recorded in 1973. From a drop to 52% in 1971, the "agree" answers increased to 81% in 1972 and 83% in 1973). Neutral answers, up in 1971 and then decreasing in 1972, continued to decrease in 1973 (to 10%).

Answers in Area One and Two in 1973 were in general very similar to answers recorded in Areas Three and Four in 1972. Continued improvement of community attitude was noted in Area One over 1970 and 1971 responses, and in Area Two over 1970, 1971, and 1972 survey results. These data would tend to indicate that Area One and Two residents had noticed a change in police courtesy toward citizens, courtesy which Areas Three and Four residents may have taken for granted.

Question 3 (Table 4-III and Figure 4-III). "Police in my ward tend to "look down" on most people."

1970, 1971. Responses to this statement during 1970 and 1971 indicate that Area Two (non-team) citizen attitudes remained constant (17% agreed and approximately 45% disagreed in both the pre and post tests). In the experimental ward (Area One), data revealed a significant positive change in the perceptions of interviewees about the attitudes of Team One officers toward people. 9% fewer respondents in Ward 1 agreed with this statement in 1971 as opposed to 1970, and 7% more respondents disagreed with it in 1971 than 1970.

Table 4-III, III. PERCEIVED POLICE ATTITUDE TOWARD CITIZEN EQUALITY

Q. Police in my Ward tend to "look down" on most people.

	Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3		Team Area 4			
	Dec. 1970 N=92		Aug. 1971 N=102		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970 N=89		Aug. 1971 N=100		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	14	15	6	6	32	9	15	17	17	17	60	17	35	9	13	5	29	8
Neutral	25	27	32	31	119	33	32	36	36	36	154	44	89	23	48	21	124	33
Disagree	52	56	63	63	211	58	41	46	45	45	129	37	256	66	170	73	213	57
No answer	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	4	1	6	2	2	1	5	1
TOTAL	92	99	102	101	364	101	89	100	100	100	347	99	386	100	233	100	371	99

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As evaluators indicated, this change in Ward 1 opinions was significant because it reflected the fact that members of the Ward 1 community had recognized a change in either the behavior or the attitudes of Team One police officers toward citizens. This was more than likely related to increased face to face contact between officers and the people in Ward 1, an important facet of Team Policing.

1972. The survey results in 1972 from Area Two indicate no substantial change in percentages of people agreeing that police look down on people (17%), but a significant decrease in "disagree" responses (from 45% in 1971 to 37% in 1972) and an increase in neutral responses (36% in 1971 to 44% in 1972). Again, these data, taken in the first few months of Team Two operation indicates that Area Two residents had adopted a cautious, neutral attitude about police officers until such time as the team could prove itself (or discredit itself) to area residents.

Area Three and Four disagreed with the statement for the most part (73% in Area Three and 57% in Area Four), with 3% more people agreeing that police look down on people in Area Four than in Area Three. There is a difference of 16% between Areas Three and Four in the proportion of respondents feeling that police do not look down on people (73% in Area Three, 57% in Area Four).

1973. In March 1973, a slight decrease was recorded in percentages of Area One residents who felt police did not "look down" on people (from 63% in 1972 to 58% in 1973). More people (an increase of 3%) agreed that police did look down on people in 1973 than in 1972, but the percentage was less than that recorded in 1970 (15%). Neutral answers increased slightly in 1973 (from 31% in 1972 to 33%), a trend also recorded in answers to other questions in the 1973 survey administration.

In Area Two, a substantial increase was recorded in the percentage of people who felt police did not look down on people (from 45% in 1970 and 1971 and 37% in 1972 to 66% in 1973). Neutral answers decreased by 21% in 1973 over 1972, and persons agreeing that police "looked down" on people decreased by 8% in 1973.

Thus, significant changes occurred in Team Area Two in 1973. Areas One and Two recorded similar percentages of "agree" answers (9%) in 1973, but Area One reported more neutral answers and fewer "pro-police" answers than in Area Two in 1973 or Area One in 1971. Responses in Area One remained, however, an improvement over 1970 levels.

Area Three recorded the "best" results of all areas in terms of greatest numbers of "disagree" (73%) and fewest numbers of "agree" (5%) and neutral (21%) answers. Areas One and Four are comparable with reference to results.

Question 4 (Table 4-IV and Figure 4-IV). "Police in my ward are anxious to help people."

1970, 1971. In the first series of survey administrations, Ward 1 residents showed an increase of 5% in percentage of respondents agreeing with this statement (from 62% in 1970 to 67% in 1971). Persons disagreeing with the statement (that is, people who felt police were not anxious to help people) dropped from 12% in Ward 1 in 1970 to 5% in 1971. The data suggests a positive attitude change on the part of citizens of Ward 1 toward police in their area.

Again, as in other parts of the 1970 - 1971 survey, the people in Ward Two became more unsure of their police during the period between the pre and post tests. The pre-test interviews indicated that approximately 61% of the interviewees agreed that the police in their ward were anxious to help people, but only 40% of the post-test interviews agreed with that conclusion. The most plausible explanation for this phenomenon has been offered previously -- the positive publicity given team police may have effected citizen attitudes in a

direction in the control area where traditional policing was utilized.

Table 4-IV. IV. ATTITUDE TOWARD POLICE CONCERN WITH HELPING PEOPLE

Q. Police in my Ward are anxious to help people.

	Team Area 1						Team Area 2								Team Area 3		Team Area 4	
	Dec. 1970 N=92		Aug. 1971 N=102		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970 N=89		Aug. 1971 N=100		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	57	62	68	67	280	77	55	61	40	40	207	60	287	74	161	69	246	66
Neutral	24	26	28	28	64	18	20	23	43	43	111	32	68	18	59	25	93	25
Disagree	11	12	5	5	16	4	14	16	15	15	23	7	24	6	10	4	25	7
No answer	0	0	1	1	4	1	0	0	2	2	6	2	7	2	13	6	7	2
TOTAL	92	100	102	101	364	100	89	100	100	100	347	101	386	100	243	104	371	100

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Table 4-IV. IV. Attitude Toward Police Concern with Helping People
 Q. Police in my ward are anxious to help people.





Table 4-V. V. Attitude Toward Police Use of Force
 Q. Police in our ward do not use force any more than they have to.



Testing Periods

1972. In the November 1972 administration of the survey, data for Area Two indicates a rise from 40% agreement in 1971 to 60% agreement in 1972. That is, in the first few months of Team Two operation, one finds a return of citizen attitude on this particular question to 1970 (pre-test) levels. This would tend to indicate that negative attitudes toward policing which had developed in Ward 2 during the course of the first action year had returned to "normal" in 1972.

Areas Three and Four recorded 69% agreement and 66% agreement respectively, slightly higher percentages than Area Two recorded in the same time period. Neutral answers were at the 25% level in both Areas Three and Four, as compared to 32% in Area Two in 1972.

1973. Area One recorded a significant increase in the percentage of people who felt that police in their ward were anxious to help people (from 62% and 67% in 1970 - 1971, to 77% in 1973). Neutral answers decreased by 10% with respect to 1972, and those who felt police were not anxious to help decreased by 1%. As Figure 4-IV indicates, a trend toward improved attitude with reference to this question has occurred in Area One from 1970 - 1973.

Area Two also records a greater percentage of residents who felt police were anxious to help people (from 61%, 40%, and 60% in 1970 - 1972 to 74% in 1973). Neutral responses decreased by 14% in 1973 over 1972, and the percentage of "disagrees" fell by 1%. Both Areas One and Two recorded greater percentages of people who felt police were anxious to help (in 1973) than did Areas Three and Four (in 1972). Fewer neutral answers and similar "disagrees" were recorded in Areas One and Two as compared to Areas Three and Four.

Question 5 (Table 4-V, Figure 4-V). "Police in our ward do not use force any more than they have to."

1970 - 1971. In the first series of survey administrations (1970 and 1971 in Areas One and Two), approximately 1/3 more respondents in Ward 1 than in

Table 4-V. V. ATTITUDE TOWARD POLICE USE OF FORCE.

Q. Police in our Ward do not use force any more than they have to.

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	Team Area 1						Team Area 2								Team Area 3		Team Area 4	
	Dec. 1970 N=92		Aug. 1971 N=102		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970 N=89		Aug. 1971 N=100		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	57	62	62	61	191	52	43	48	44	44	148	43	234	61	142	61	200	54
Neutral	21	23	29	28	143	39	31	35	43	43	121	35	99	26	69	29	128	35
Disagree	14	15	11	11	28	8	15	17	12	12	73	21	45	12	36	15	40	11
No answer	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	5	1	8	2	3	1	3	1
TOTAL	92	100	102	100	364	100	89	100	100	100	347	100	386	101	250	106	371	101

Ward 2 agreed in both the pre-test and post-test interviews that police do not use excess force. The data were not sufficient, however, for conclusions to be drawn by evaluators in 1971. The proportion of respondents who disagreed with the statement is constant in both Wards 1 and 2 during the pre and post tests. According to the 1971 evaluation report:

"It appears that the initial publicity before the pre-test may have caused a large proportion of the people in Ward 1 to take the position that the police in Ward 1 do not use excessive force; whereas, many people in Ward 2 chose to remain in the neither agree nor disagree category. Hence, these data do not tend to suggest a gradual, systematic change of citizen attitudes about the tendency of officers to use force. By the same token, evaluators stated that data also did not support the contention that a lack of supervisory personnel would result in excessive use of force by a non-supervised team."

1972. In the November 1972 administration, an increase in the percentage of persons who felt that police did use more force than they had to was detected in Area Two (up from 12% in 1972 to 21% in 1972). A decrease in neutral answers was also recorded, indicating that some people had formed negative opinions about police from 1971 to 1972 in this area. Those agreeing with the statement remained approximately the same.

Areas Three and Four recorded a greater percentage of respondents who felt that police did not use excess force as compared with Area Two (61% in Area Three, 54% in Area Four and 43% in Area Two). Areas Three and Four also recorded fewer "disagree" responses than Area Two in 1972 (15% in Area Three, 11% in Area Four, and 21% in Area Two), indicating more positive attitudes toward police with reference to use of force than in Area Two. Of all three areas surveyed in 1972, Area Two recorded the highest percentage of respondents who felt police used unnecessary force.

1973. In 1973, Area Two recorded a significant change in responses to the statement that police do not use excessive force in their area. People who felt that police did not use excess force increased from 43% in 1972 to 61% in 1973. Those who felt differently (police do use excess force), dropped

from 21% in 1972 to 12% in 1973. Neutral responses also decreased (from 35% to 26%). These percentages are in general similar to those recorded in Areas Three and Four in 1972, although Areas Three and Four did report more neutral responses.

In Area One a pattern similar to that uncovered in other 1973 survey responses is again evident in responses to the statement on excess force: pro police responses ("agree") fell from 61% to 52%, while neutral answers rose in percentage (from 28% to 39%). Respondents who felt police did use excess force also fell, however. The greatest percentage of neutral answers was recorded in Area One and the greatest percentage of "agree" answers (pro-police) was recorded in Areas Two and Three with Areas One and Four reporting similar percentages of "agrees".

These data would tend to indicate that citizens in Area Two had detected a positive change in police attitudes and practices with respect to the use of excessive force with the formation of Team Two. Although most people in Area One still felt police did not use excess force in 1973, continued positive attitude change was not noted. This would indicate that Area One residents are experiencing a degree of uncertainty with respect to this aspect of Team One operations in 1973.

Question 6 (Table 4-VI and Figure 4-VI). "Police in our ward often do more work than they have to."

1970, 1971. The 1970 results in Areas One and Two (pre-test) indicate that interviewees in both areas felt about the same toward the amount of work the police in their wards were willing to do (26% in Ward 1, 25% in Ward 2). The 1971 post-test indicated that the proportion of respondents in Ward 1 who

Table 4-VI. VI. ATTITUDE TOWARD POLICE WILLINGNESS TO WORK

Q. Police in our Ward often do more work than they have to.

	Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3		Team Area 4			
	Dec. 1970 N=92		Aug. 1971 N=102		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970 N=89		Aug. 1971 N=100		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	24	26	34	34	80	22	22	25	13	13	90	26	137	35	49	21	95	26
Neutral	42	46	46	45	195	54	42	47	55	55	156	45	183	47	117	50	170	46
Disagree	25	27	20	19	87	24	25	28	29	29	94	27	59	15	65	28	102	27
No answer	1	1	2	2	2	1	0	0	3	3	7	2	7	2	3	1	4	1
TOTAL	92	100	102	100	364	101	89	100	100	100	347	100	386	99	234	100	371	100



-115-

Table 4-VI. VI. Attitude Toward Police Willingness to Work

Q. Police in our ward often do more work than they have to.

Table 4-VII. VII. Do Citizens Assist Police?

Q. The police in our ward get alot of help from citizens.



felt that the Team Police officers often did more work than they had to do increased by 8%, and the proportion of interviewees in Ward 2 who felt this way decreased by 12%. This, as evaluators reported, represents a significant change in the attitudes of people in both wards. 21% more interviewees in the Team Policing area agreed in the post-test that their police often do extra work than interviewees in Ward 2. Only 19% of people in Ward 1 disagreed with the statement that their police often do more work, while 29% of the persons in Ward 2 disagreed.

Examining these results, evaluators in 1972 stated:

"... the data suggest that people in Ward 1 have more respect for the amount of effort that is made by the police in Ward 1 than do the people in Ward 2 ... One possible explanation for the favorable change in Ward 1 is that the decentralized Team Policing operation made the police more visible to their public, thereby enabling the people in Ward 1 to make an assessment that the citizens in Ward 2 could not make of their police."

1972. In November 1972 results in Area Two showed a significant rise in respondents agreeing with the statement (from 13% in 1971 to 26% in 1972). Persons disagreeing with the statement dropped from 29% in 1971 to 27% in 1972. This would indicate that attitudes in Team Area Two with reference to police willingness to work improved from their drop in 1971 to "normal" levels as measured in 1970.

Respondents agreeing that police do more work than they have to comprised 21% of Area Three and 26% of Area Four total responses. Most answers (50% in Area Three and 46% in Area Four) were "neither agree nor disagree." Percentage responses were thus very similar in Areas Two, Three, and Four in 1972; with Area Two responses returning to 1970 levels.

1973. Area One recorded a decrease in the percentage of people who felt police did more work than they had to in 1973 (from 34% in 1971 to 22% in 1973). This reading was also below the 1970 level of 26%. Neutral responses

rose from 45% in 1971 in Area One to 54% in 1973 and constituted the highest percentage of neutral answers of all four areas. Also in Area One, 5% more people felt police did not do more work than they had to in 1973 as compared to 1971; Areas Three and Four recorded greater percentages of "disagrees" however, (approximately 27% each) than did Area One.

Area Two scored greater "pro-police" responses than either Areas Three or Four. These data indicate that more Team Area Two residents felt that their police were working harder than before Team Policing was initiated in the area. Other data suggest, however, that Team Two members felt they were not working harder (except in the sense of additional paper work) than they had previously. Citizen attitude changes, therefore, most likely resulted from the increased visibility of team members in the area. It is also possible that citizens may have been pre-conditioned to expect more work from team members by advance publicity received by Team One in 1970 - 1971. The negative publicity which Team Policing received in 1972, however, more than likely vitiated the effects of positive advance publicity. It would seem, therefore, that the team concept does create improved levels of positive attitudes with respect to police workload, at least in part, due to the fact that police are more visible in an area of the city.

The question on workload, however, received a greater percentage of neutral responses than positive responses in Area Two. This would tend to indicate that although Team Police visibility contributed to some changed citizen attitudes with reference to workload, most residents were uncertain as to whether Team Two workload was greater than other police workloads.

Summary: Citizen Perception of Police Attitudes and Behavior.

Several clear trends were indicated in responses to this section of the Community Attitudes Survey administered in 1972 and 1973.

Area One residents responded with smaller percentages of "pro-police" answers on four out of six questions administered in 1973 as compared with those administered in 1971. Fewer residents felt that their police liked people, more felt that police did look down on people, fewer felt that police did not use excessive force and fewer felt that police did more work than they had to. In three of these four questions, area responses fell below percentages recorded in 1970, the pre-test phase of the evaluation. Responses to the statement on being "looked down upon" did not fall below 1970 levels. Most favorable responses decreased only slightly (by approximately 2-3%) from 1971 to 1973, but a significant decrease in favorable responses (10%) did occur on the question referring to excess use of force. This would tend to indicate some disillusionment of Area One residents with respect to this facet of the team.

Although fewer Area One residents checked pro-police response to these four questions, this did not result in increased levels of negative feelings about police. Indeed, in all but one question, the percentage of negative answers decreased slightly in Area One.

In examining data from Area One, then one finds that neutral answers increased in all four questions, from as little as 2% to as much as 16% from 1970 to 1973. Thus, it would seem that residents in Area One may be moving to a slightly more neutral or "unsure" position with respect to these four questions -- on police liking people, looking down on people, using excessive force, and working harder. Police workload and use of force in particular seemed to be questioned by area residents. There are several reasons which could explain these findings:

1. Morale in Team One has dropped slightly in 1972 for reasons discussed in this report. Close police-community contact in terms of joint projects

were curtailed for lack of time and compensatory monies. Team One is thus slightly more isolated from the community now than in its first action year and this, coupled with some resentment over monetary problems, shabby uniforms, poor facilities, etc. has produced a change in police demeanor (in some cases). When occurring in the presence of community residents, such a change would naturally affect citizen feelings about police.

2. Changes of personnel on Team One have brought officers with different attitudes with respect to the use of force into the Team. Interviews revealed that one or two officers felt that court may be held "on the streets" in some instances. There is no doubt that such a police attitude would negatively affect citizens who came to know about it. Peer pressure is, however, a strong force against such attitudes and may be able to alter these police attitudes in time.
3. The failure of the Area One Community Relations Council and Crime and Delinquency Task Force to disseminate information on Team Policing to area residents has resulted in a "communication gap" between Team One and some elderly and white citizens in the area. It is difficult for them to understand why the police do not arrest all troublemakers, why the storefront may at times be empty (the radio is covered by headquarters in this event), and why door checks have been reduced in priority. This gap has resulted in several complaints being voiced about Team One's "workload" and hence, no doubt affected responses to the survey statements.

The two remaining questions in this section (on police politeness and police anxiousness to help citizens) indicate a citizen attitude change in a much more positive direction in Area One. A greater percentage of residents in Area One (most residents) indicated that police were polite and anxious to help citizens.

These data indicate that although citizens felt the team wished to help them, the police attitude in general was less "community-conscious" than previously noted in 1971.

Area Two residents recorded significantly improved attitudes toward police in 1972 and 1973. 1972 results in general returned to "normal" levels (using 1970 as a baseline) after a negative attitude change in 1971. Neutral responses also increased in 1972 as residents adopted a "wait and see attitude" with reference to their new Team Police Unit. In 1973, positive responses to all questions increased substantially and neutral answers decreased, indicating that residents had more definite, positive views toward policing after seven months of Team Two operation. Although it is possible that Area Two residents were influenced by outside variables, such as the "good" publicity received by Team One in its first action year, 1972 was a year in which Team Policing was severely criticized in the city. The fact that such a demonstrable change occurred in that year in citizen attitude indicates that Team Two personnel made a strong impact in terms of their cooperative and friendly attitude toward citizens.

Area Two also recorded responses in 1973 which were similar to responses in Area One in 1971. That is, after each team had been in operation for 7 - 8 months, comparable community attitude changes were recorded. This data would seem to indicate another explanation for the increasing numbers of neutral responses recorded in Area One in 1973: team policing is no longer a "New" idea in the area. As novelty wears off, as it certainly must after two years of operation, residents are quicker to complain, to expect more and demand more of their police. Issues which seemed insignificant compared to the 1970 crisis faced in Area One, now loom larger. Unless continued effort is made to improve police-community contact from year to year and not let that contact or the team police image slide, the police image will not remain at

high levels. Although one does not know what the state of citizen attitude toward police would have been had Team One not been formed, data indicates that Area One residents are slightly more conservative with respect to their feelings toward the Team Police Unit, this year as compared to last year.

Areas Three and Four in general demonstrated attitudes that fell between percentages recorded in Areas One and Two. Responses in Three and Four were favorable to police, although a greater percentage of people in Areas One and Two felt police were anxious to help and were more polite than in Areas Three and Four. Further, residents in Area Two felt police were more willing to do extra work and liked people than in Areas Three and Four.

Neutral responses in Areas Three and Four were in general the same as or smaller than such responses in Area One. Neutral responses in Areas Three and Four were greater than those in Area Two, however. Thus, the hypothesis that residents of Areas Three and Four would have favorable attitudes toward police is borne out, but the hypothesis that neutral responses would be higher in Areas Three and Four than in Areas One and Two cannot be proved or disproved by these data.

B. Do Citizens Assist Police?

Question 7 (Table 4-VII and Figure 4-VII). "The police in our ward get a lot of help from citizens."

1970, 1971. In the first series of survey administrations (1970 and 1971), the percentage of respondents in Ward 1 who agreed that citizens in their ward help police remained constant in the pre and post test interviews, but those who disagreed dropped by approximately 8%. Evaluators stated that "while there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to conclude that there was an improvement in Ward 1 citizens' willingness to help police, there is also insufficient evidence to indicate a negative change in the situation."

Table 4-VII. VII. DO CITIZENS ASSIST POLICE

Q. The Police in our Ward get alot of help from citizens.

	Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3		Team Area 4			
	Dec. 1970 N=92		Aug. 1971 N=102		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970 N=89		Aug. 1971 N=100		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	38	41	40	39	127	35	30	33	31	31	96	28	171	44	84	36	138	37
Neutral	28	30	39	38	182	50	36	40	49	49	188	54	143	37	112	48	178	48
Disagree	25	28	20	20	51	14	23	26	17	17	56	16	64	17	35	15	45	12
No answer	1	1	3	3	4	1	0	0	3	3	7	2	8	2	3	1	10	3
TOTAL	92	100	102	100	364	100	89	99	100	100	347	100	386	100	234	100	371	100

As with other data, respondents in Ward 2 appeared to become less certain about the quality of policing in their area and hence, post test results in 1971 show an increase in neutral attitudes (from 40% in 1970 to 49% in 1971). As evaluators stated,

"Although the data do not provide any strong evidence to indicate that the Team Policing project has improved the community's willingness to assist police, a larger proportion of people in Ward 1 than in Ward II feel that the people of the ward provide a lot of help for police. There is nothing in the data which indicates that the Team Policing project had either a positive or negative impact on the cooperation of the community with police."

1972. In the next administration of the survey (November 1972), an even larger percentage of Area Two residents chose a neutral answer (neither agree nor disagree), an increase from 49% in 1971 to 54% in 1972. This tendency towards greater neutrality is consistent with the wait and see attitude adopted by Area Two residents on other questions in the 1972 survey. A slight decrease in those who agree that citizens help police a lot was recorded in Area Two, while those who disagreed remained approximately the same.

In Areas Three and Four in 1972, most people (48% in each area) gave a neutral answer, with 36% answering "agree" in Area Three and 37% giving the same answer in Area Four.

1973. A smaller percentage of respondents in Area One felt police received a lot of help from citizens (25% in 1973 vs. 39% in 1970). This is a lower percentage than that recorded in 1970 in Area One prior to Team One initiation. Neutral answers increased substantially (from 30% and 38% in 1970 and 1971 respectively to 50% in 1973), while negative answers continued to decrease (from 28% in 1970 to 20% in 1971, to 14% in 1973).

Area Two once again recorded significant changes in a positive direction with reference to citizens helping police: 44% agreed that citizens help in 1973, vs. 28% in 1972 and 33% in 1970. Neutral answers decreased substantially while negative answers indicated no significant change in percentage.

Summary: Do Citizens Assist Police?

As in the previous section of the attitude survey, one finds an increasing percentage of neutral answers in Area One in 1973, with a slight decrease in the percentage of people who feel police do get help from citizens, and a continued decrease from 1970 to 1973 in those who felt police do not get help. Area One data, therefore, do not suggest that Team Policing has either a positive or negative effect on citizen willingness to assist police.

Area Two responses, however, would seem to indicate a slightly more positive conclusion with reference to citizen willingness to help police. Persons agreeing that police get help increased by 11% from 1970 to 1973, and increased by 16% from 1972 to 1973, after a slight drop in 1972. No such positive trend was recorded in Area One during Team One's development. This percentage of persons agreeing that police get assistance is higher in Area Two than in Areas One, Three, or Four. Neutral answers are also higher in Areas One, Three and Four than in Area Two. Greatest neutral answers again occurred in Area One.

Data indicate that the formation of Team Two has altered citizen attitude in a positive direction with reference to assisting police. Such a change did not occur in Area One, however, and hence one cannot state that Team Policing was a unilateral impact in this direction. Areas without teams show fewer positive responses than Area Two, but greater positive responses than Area One.

C. Attitudes About the Quality of Police.

Question 8 (Table 4-VIII and Figure 4-VIII). "The police in our ward are better than police in other wards."

1970, 1971. The basic purpose of the Team Policing project was to improve the overall quality of policing in the experimental area. This seems to have been accomplished in the eyes of Ward 1 citizens in 1971. In the pre-test (1970), responses in both wards were the same or similar. In Ward 1, 18% agreed, 62% were neutral, and 20% disagreed; in Ward 2, 13% agreed, 66% were neutral and 19% disagreed. Significant attitude change was detected, however, between the 1970 pre-test and 1971 post-test. In Ward 1, those agreeing that their police were better than other police jumped from 18% to 32%; those who disagreed fell from 20% to 8%. In Ward 2, the attitudes toward police quality changed in a negative direction (a 7% negative change in attitude), with a greater percentage of respondents choosing a neutral answer (66% in 1970 and 74% in 1971).

The conclusion reached from this data by evaluators in 1971 was that the public believes that the Team Police Unit is doing a better job than the police in other wards of the city.

1972. The 1972 survey in Area Two indicates a positive change in attitude in that area. The percentage of people agreeing that their police were better than other police increased significantly from 5% to 18%, while those disagreeing dropped from 19% to 11% in 1972.

In Areas Three and Four, the 1972 survey indicate that only 10% of the people in each area felt that police were better, a smaller percentage than in Area Two during the same time period. Again, neutral answers were high (60% and 65%). A greater percentage of people in Areas Three and Four disagreed with the statement, however, than in Area Two (29% and 26% in Area Three and Four respectively; 11% in Area Two).

Table 4-VIII.

VIII. ATTITUDE TOWARD QUALITY OF POLICE

Q. The Police in our Ward are better than Police in other wards.



	Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3		Team Area 4			
	Dec. 1970 N=92		Aug. 1971 N=102		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970 N=89		Aug. 1971 N=100		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	17	18	32	32	115	32	12	13	5	5	63	18	87	23	24	10	36	10
Neutral	57	62	61	61	215	59	59	66	74	74	236	68	221	57	140	60	234	63
Disagree	18	20	9	8	30	8	17	19	19	19	38	11	74	19	68	29	97	26
No answer	0	0	0	0	4	1	1	1	2	2	10	3	4	1	2	1	4	1
TOTAL	92	100	102	101	364	100	89	99	100	100	347	100	386	100	234	100	371	100

Table 4-VIII. VIII. Attitude Toward Quality of Police

Q. The police in our ward are better than police in other wards.

Table 4-IX. IX. Attitude Toward Honesty of Police

Q. The police in our ward are honest.



Testing Periods

This would indicate that with the formation of Teams One and Two, citizen attitudes towards the quality of their police improved greatly over previous measures, and that a greater percentage of team area residents felt their police were of higher quality than non-team area residents. Non-team areas also recorded greater percentages of negative responses toward the statement than did Team Area Two.

1973. In 1973, Area One recorded no change in the percentage of respondents who felt that police in Area One were better than other police. No change was recorded in "disagree" answers and only a 2% decrease in neutral answers was recorded in 1973 over 1972.

In Area Two, an increase of 5% was noted in pro-police responses, but an increase of 8% was noted in negative responses (people who did not feel that their police were better than other police). This figure, however, is the same as that recorded in Area Two in 1970, and thus has not dropped below pre-experimental levels.

Both team areas recorded greater percentages of respondents agreeing that their police are better than other police, than Areas Three or Four recorded. But 1973 brought no improvement in attitude in Area One, and data from Area Two were inconclusive with respect to the impact of the team on citizen attitude with references to quality of police.

Question 9 (Table 4-IX, Figure 4-IX). "The police in our ward are honest."

1970, 1971. Although the attitudes in Ward 1 were more favorable overall than the attitudes in Ward 2 in the first series of surveys, both wards reflected a negative attitude change between 1970 and 1971. Concomitantly, neutral answers increased from pre to post-test periods. As evaluators stated,

"While (we) have no explanation for this negative change, the change is significant enough to cause us to suspect that sometime between the pre and post-test interviews something occurred in Holyoke that shook the confidence of people of the city in the integrity of the members of the police department."

Table 4-IX.

IX. ATTITUDE TOWARD HONESTY OF POLICE

Q. The Police in our Ward are honest.

	Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3		Team Area 4			
	Dec. 1970 N=92		Aug. 1971 N=102		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970 N=89		Aug. 1971 N=100		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	70	77	70	69	284	78	58	65	53	53	252	73	312	81	172	74	277	75
Neutral	18	20	29	28	59	16	25	28	40	40	68	20	51	13	50	21	69	19
Disagree	4	4	3	3	17	5	6	7	5	5	22	6	14	4	9	4	20	5
No answer	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	2	2	5	1	9	2	3	1	5	1
TOTAL	92	101	102	100	364	100	100	100	100	100	347	100	386	100	234	100	371	100

1972. Results in 1972 in Area Two indicate a significant jump in positive responses from 1971 to 1972 (53% to 73%) with a concomitant decrease in neutral responses. Those who disagreed remained approximately the same.

Responses in Areas Three and Four were very similar to each other and to Area Two: approximately 75% agreed in each area, 20% were neutral and 5% disagreed.

1973. 1973 results in Areas One and Two continue to indicate a rise in the percentage of people who feel their police are honest (up 9% in Area One over 1971 and up 8% in Area Two). Percentages of people agreeing that police are honest in Areas One and Two are higher than those of Areas Three and Four in 1972. Neutral answers also decreased in Areas One and Two and were lower than similar categories in Areas Three and Four.

Summary: Attitudes about the quality of police.

After seven months of Team One operation and three months of Team Two operation, Areas One and Two residents recorded significant increases in the percentages of people who felt their police were better than other police. This would tend to indicate that Team Policing, at least in its initial stages has an impact on the attitude of citizens toward their police. In 1973 Area One showed no change in attitude while Area Two recorded an increase in pro-police feelings with reference to police quality. Area Two also recorded a greater percentage of negative answers, however, which attenuates the conclusions one can draw from this data.

In general, team policing does seem to produce improved community attitudes with reference to police quality, at least in the first months of team policing operation. Team areas also experienced significantly higher percentages of pro-police response than non-team areas. Results over a longer period of time, however, (two years in Area One) showed neither an improvement nor a worsening

of community attitudes with reference to this statement.

In 1973, both Areas One and Two reported increases in the percentages of people who felt police were honest. These percentages were slightly higher than those recorded in non-team areas in 1972, indicating that after an initial problem in 1971, Team Area residents felt some improvement in police honesty.

D. Uniform and Car Preferences of Citizens

Question 10 (Table 4X)

"How would you prefer to see police-

men in your ward?"

This question was asked for the first time in November 1972 in Areas Two, Three, and Four. The question was also accompanied with an opportunity for respondents to explain their reasons for preferences in uniform.

1972. In November 1972, most respondents in Areas Two, Three, and Four desired traditional uniforms and unmarked patrol cars (49% in Area Two, 50% in Area Three and 52% in Area Four). Approximately similar percentages in each area preferred blazers and unmarked cars, but percentages were significantly lower than those for traditional uniforms or the combination of traditional uniforms and blazers depending on the situation.

1973. In 1973, Area One and Two residents reported a preference for traditional uniforms and marked cars (39% in Area One and 49% in Area Two), but an almost equal percentage of Area One residents stated that they preferred blazer uniforms and unmarked cars (35%). This would indicate that after experimenting with the blazer uniform for two years, Area One citizens are equally divided with reference to type of uniform preferred.

It is interesting to note that a larger percentage of citizens in Area One (35%) preferred blazers than in Area Two (11%). This difference in percentages was more than likely the result of citizen experience with police

Table 4-X.

X. ATTITUDE TOWARD MODE OF DRESS AND CAR MARKINGS

Q. How would you prefer to see policemen in your ward?

	Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3		Team Area 4			
	Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		Nov. 1972 N=347		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972 N=234		Nov. 1972 N=371	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
traditional uniforms/Marked Cars					142	39					170	49	189	49	118	50	192	52
lazer Uniforms marked cars					127	35					64	18	44	11	34	15	71	19
oth					81	22					79	23	130	34	70	30	84	23
ther					9	2					14	4	14	4	10	4	17	5
o answer					5	1					20	6	9	2	2	1	7	2
total					364	99					347	100	386	100	234	100	371	101

in a blazer uniform for a period of two years. Team Area Two residents were not exposed to the blazer and hence did not chose it as a preferred mode of dress. Citizens who had been exposed to the new non-military uniform found that police could operate as or more effectively with this uniform. Further, when specifically asked why the blazer uniform was preferred, residents stated they felt more "comfortable" in the presence of non-traditional uniformed police officers and that police could get closer to people, thus substantiating the hypothesis behind the use of blazer uniforms.

A significant attitude change was also recorded in Area Two with reference to uniforms. Although equal percentages of citizens preferred traditional uniforms in 1972 and 1973, more people stated a preference for both types of uniforms being used, according to the situation in 1973 (up 11% from 1972). It would seem that although only 11% of Area Two residents desire a team totally dressed in blazer uniforms, a greater percentage in 1973 are willing to experiment with both types of uniforms and cars in the future.

As police planners have indicated, experience with the blazer uniform might alter opinions with reference to uniform preference. Although no base-line data exist for Area One which would prove or disprove this hypothesis, Team Area Two data do seem to indicate that citizens are becoming more receptive to experimenting with both types of uniform and car.

Similarly, although most people in Areas Three and Four (approximately 50%) preferred traditional uniforms and marked cars, a significant percentage also felt that both could be used at different times. Experimentation in this direction therefore would seem appropriate.

Citizens in Areas One and Two in 1973 were asked to explain their reasons for preferring one uniform or the other. Reasons cited confirm the hypothesis that some citizens do feel more comfortable with officers who are in blazers, a principal reason for the initiation of the blazer uniform in Team One.

Most respondents did feel, however, that the traditional uniform could be spotted more easily and hence afford more protection to area residents.

Reasons given by respondents in both Areas One and Two for preferring either the traditional uniform, the blazer, or both were very similar. Those preferring traditional uniforms and marked cars did so because (in terms of priorities): 1. policemen could be identified more easily and 2. traditional uniforms elicited feelings of authority, respect, trust, confidence and security in citizens. Others just liked the way traditional uniforms look.

The most common reasons for preferring blazer uniforms and unmarked cars were that they afforded: 1. an element of surprise which allows apprehension of criminals, and 2. a more human approach to policing.

Reasons given for selecting both traditional uniforms and blazer uniforms were a combination of reasons given for the first two choices (blazer and traditional uniform) and the fact that each kind of uniform had certain advantages which were particularly applicable to different situations.

These data suggest that the hypothesis behind blazer uniforms is correct: some people (35% in Area One, 11% in Area Two, 15% in Area Three, and 19% in Area Four) feel that the police are more human and able to do a better job in a blazer uniform than in a traditional uniform. Team Area One, which has experienced the blazer concept, records the highest number of persons preferring the blazer. Other areas, although preferring the traditional uniforms, seem open to experimentation with both types of uniforms, depending on the circumstances.

Whether such experimentation is feasible must be left to police planners and government officials. It would seem worthwhile, however, to initiate a "Blazer Patrol" composed of three or four police officers in Teams Two, Three, and Four who would perform the duties of regular team officers, but would do so

in non-traditional dress with unmarked cars (if these cars are available to the city). Teams and citizens (Community Relations Council and Crime and Delinquency Task Force) together should develop guidelines for cases which these "Blazer officers" could handle more easily than uniformed officers. Such a situation would provide: 1. more controlled experimentation with the blazer concept and 2. close police-community cooperation on a specific problem area (defining policies with reference to blazer useage).

E. Citizen satisfaction with Teams One and Two

Statements in this section of the Community Attitude Survey were geared to eliciting specific opinions on citizen satisfaction with the service they had received from their Team Police Units. These last six questions were administered in the March 1973 survey and hence were asked of Areas One and Two residents alone.

Q11 (Table 4-XI). "Do you think Team Policing is a good idea for your ward?"

Residents in both Team Areas One and Two indicated overwhelmingly that they thought Team Policing was a good idea for their areas. 91% of Area One residents said "yes" as did 88% of Area Two residents. Only 3% of residents in each area felt that Team Policing was not a good idea, while 4% in Area One and 7% in Area Two expressed neutral answers.

Q12 (Table 4-XII). "Are you in general satisfied with the service you are given by your team policemen?"

Again, answers were overwhelmingly positive with reference to this question. Team Area One reported 84% "yes", and Team Area Two, 78%. As in the previous question, Area One recorded a higher percentage of positive responses than Area Two. These data support the hypothesis that Area One which has had a team in operation for two years would report more positive answers than Area Two, whose team has been in operation for less than one year.

Small percentages of people were not satisfied with service from their Teams (3% in Area One and 4% in Area Two). 6% more people in Area Two than Area One indicated that they had had no real contact with team members and so could not state a preference for or against Team Policing. This was to be expected due to the shorter duration of Team Two operation.

Table 4-XI.

XI. CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH TEAM POLICE SERVICE.

Q. Do you think Team Policing is a good idea for your ward?

	Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3		Team Area 4			
	Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		Nov. 1972		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972		Nov. 1972	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree					333	91							339	88				
Neutral					16	4							28	7				
Disagree					11	3							11	3				
No answer					4	1							8	2				
TOTAL					364	99							386	100				

Table 4-XII.

XI. CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH TEAM POLICE
SERVICE.

Q. Are you in general satisfied with the service you are given by
your team police?

Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3	Team Area 4				
Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		Nov. 1972		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972		Nov. 1972	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
				305	84							301	78				
				21	6							16	4				
				11	3							14	4				
				23	6							47	12				
				4	1							8	2				
				364	100					386	100						

-139- Agree

Neutral

Disagree

No Contact

No answer

TOTAL

Q13 (Table 4-XIII) How satisfied are you with the police service you are receiving now from your team, as compared to the police service you received before Team Policing began in your ward?

Responses to this question were again predominantly positive in both Areas One and Two (80% in Area One and 77% in Area Two). Respondents who felt dissatisfied with Team Police service as compared to traditional police service were small in numbers (5% in Area One and 3% in Area Two). A greater percentage of neutral answers were recorded in this question than in previous questions in this survey section (12% in Area One and 17% in Area Two).

Q14 (Table 4-XIV) Would you like Team Policing to continue in your ward?

Responses recorded in both areas were very much in favor of continued Team Police services in Areas One and Two. 91% of Area One residents and 85% of Area Two residents stated that they would like Team Policing to continue in their area. Neutral and negative responses were low in both areas. Again, one finds that residents are satisfied with Team Policing and wish it to continue. Area One records a greater percentage of positive responses than Area Two, as was predicted according to the hypothesis that Area One residents would have had a longer association with Team Policing.

Q15 (Table 4-XV). "Do you have any complaints about the team police in your ward?"

Answers to this question indicated that most Area One and Two residents had no complaints about their Team Police Units. 86% of Area One residents and 90% of Area Two residents voiced no complaints. 11% of Area One residents and 6% of Area Two residents indicated that they had complaints.

Table 4-XIII.

XI. CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH TEAM POLICE SERVICE.

Q. How satisfied are you with the police service you are receiving now from your team, as compared to the police service you received before team policing began in your ward?

	Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3	Team Area 4				
	Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		Nov. 1972		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972		Nov. 1972	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Satisfied					292	80							298	77				
Neutral					43	12							66	17				
Dissatisfied					18	5							11	3				
No answer					11	3							11	3				
TOTAL					364	100							386	100				

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

Table 4-XIV.

XI. CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH TEAM POLICE
SERVICE.

Q. Would you like Team Policing to continue in your ward?

Team Area 1						Team Area 2								Team Area 3		Team Area 4	
Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		Nov. 1972		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972		Nov. 1972	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree				331	91							330	85				
Neutral				16	4							39	10				
Disagree				11	3							10	3				
No answer				6	2							7	2				
TOTAL				364	100					386	100						

Table 4-XV.

XI. CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH TEAM POLICE SERVICE.

Q. Do you have any complaints about the Team Police in your ward?

Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3	Team Area 4				
Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		Nov. 1972		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972		Nov. 1972	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
				41	11							23	6				
				312	86							348	90				
				11	3							15	4				
				364	100					386	100						

-143-
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
No answer
TOTAL

When asked what these complaints were, said respondents in Area One stated (in order of priority):

1. Team members are not seen enough and don't walk beats enough (10 people)
2. Team members show bias (favorable or unfavorable) towards minority group members (5 people)
3. Team members don't answer calls fast enough (4 people)

The 6% of Area Two respondents who had complaints against team members indicated that:

1. Team members are not visible enough (2 people)
2. Team members do not look for stolen property (ie. don't conduct investigations)

Although percentages of respondents who had complaints about Team Policing were very small in both team areas, some respondents in both areas indicated that they felt team members should be more visible. This attitude corresponds with other measures of community feelings which have indicated that some people in both areas feel team members should be checking doors and walking beats. The Team Policing concept, however, has not stressed either of these two policing alternatives, but rather has concentrated on automotive patrol and immediate availability of officers for answering calls to team headquarters. In both team areas, some residents have not understood the rationale behind this approach, indicating a gap in communication which the Area Community Relations Council and Crime and Delinquency Task Force should attempt to alleviate. In Area Two, the Community Relations bodies have responded to this problem area by encouraging merchants to enlist in a community wide burglar alarm system which would protect their establishments and allow team police members to concentrate their efforts on answering calls and patrolling the area rather than checking individual doors.

Q16. "How secure do you feel in your ward?" (Table 4-XVI)

Most Area One and Two respondents indicated that they felt more secure in 1973 than during the previous year (56% of Area One respondents and 59% of Area Two respondents). 35% in Area One and 32% in Area Two indicated that their sense of security had not changed from last year to this year and a few people in each area stated that they felt less secure this year.

Summary: Citizen Satisfaction with Teams One and Two.

Responses to questions in this section of the community attitude survey indicate that almost all residents surveyed in Team areas One and Two were satisfied with service given by Team members, thought Team Policing was a good idea, felt they were receiving better service under team policing than under traditional policing, wanted team policing to continue in their areas, had no complaints about their teams, and most residents felt more secure this year than last year -- an overwhelming endorsement of the Team Police concept by Area One and Two residents. The few complaints that were voiced by Area One and Two residents centered around the fact that team police members are not visible at all times and that more walking beats should exist. Walking beats have recently been re-instated in all team areas at citizen request. It is necessary, however, that the Community Relations Council in Area One seek ways to disseminate information on the team police philosophy with respect to walking beats and door checks. These issues should be the subject of joint police-community discussion and planning in all team areas.

In most instances, Area One recorded more responses which were positive to Team Policing than did Area Two residents, as was hypothesized. (Area One residents had experienced team policing for a longer period of time).

Table 4-XVI.

XI. CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH TEAM POLICE SERVICE.

Q. How secure do you feel in your ward?

-116-

Team Area 1						Team Area 2						Team Area 3		Team Area 4			
Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		March 1973 N=364		Dec. 1970		Aug. 1971		Nov. 1972		March 1973 N=386		Nov. 1972		Nov. 1972	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
				205	56							228	59				
				18	5							23	6				
				128	35							123	32				
				13	4							12	3				
				364	100					386	100						

re than last year
 ss than last year
 e same as last year
 answer.

TOTAL

Q17. "What facets of Team Policing do you like/dislike the most?"

This question was asked in order to determine which facets of the Team Police structure had had the most impact on citizen attitudes toward police.

In both Areas One and Two, most respondents indicated that the proximity of police was the most popular facet of team policing, (139 responses in Area One, 136 in Area Two). Residents felt that police were there and hence that their areas were more protected under the Team Police concept. A related category and the one selected next most often by Area One and Two residents was the fact that with team policing people felt more secure than previously (40 people in Area One and 66 people in Area Two). Another category, one related to these two, was that people felt team members answered calls more promptly and that the police were more easily reached now (32 in Area One, 55 in Area Two).

The next highest category selected by residents was that fewer crimes seemed to be occurring in their areas and that their communities were more orderly now, more peaceful (54 responses in Area One and 38 in Area Two).

Other facets of team policing which people in Areas One and Two liked were: 1. the sociability of team members and their trying to do a good job (35 in Area One, 28 in Area Two) 2. the interest in the problems of citizens which team members exhibit and the understanding and improved community relations which have been the result (10 in each area).

All of these responses were attitudes which team policing hoped to encourage, but the most popular facet of team police units seemed to be the fact that police were closer to people in terms of access. Although some people felt that team policing induced greater police-community understanding, most people were more concerned with the fact that police are more easily reached under the Team Police concept.

Of the small percentage of people in Areas One and Two who expressed dissatisfaction with their Team Police Units, reasons were: Team Policing is too costly (1 person), is unnecessary police force in one area (1 person), show favoritism to minority groups (1 person).

GENERAL SUMMARY: COMMUNITY ATTITUDE

Areas One and Two residents expressed strong support for the Team Police concept in 1973, indicating that they felt more secure, were receiving better service, had no complaints, and in general thought team policing was a good idea. The structural aspect of team policing which was most appreciated by team area residents was the fact that police were located in storefronts which were nearer to residents and could therefore respond more quickly to calls for service. This is an important facet of the Team Police concept. Equally important, however, is the stress on better police-community understanding developing out of police proximity and police-community projects. This facet of team policing, although noted by some area residents, did not seem to rank as highly in importance to residents as the fact that police were physically closer to the area.

Of the small percentage of complaints made about team policing in both areas (11% in Area One, 6% in Area Two) most seemed to center around the fact that team members were not seen on walking beats.

Although this subject should be a topic of discussion and planning at joint police-community relation council sessions in all team areas, some steps have already been taken to alleviate the problem. Police personnel have been instructed to resume walking beats for 15 minutes out of every hour during certain shifts in order to increase visibility. If police, however, continue to feel that this is wasted effort or time, the subject should be discussed with area residents, who may not understand the importance of police mobility.

Residents also felt the team areas had "quieted down" considerably as compared with pre-team policing days. Area One demonstrated more positive results in this direction than did Area Two, as was expected, due to the longer duration of Team One operation.

Area Two residents in 1973 demonstrated significant attitude changes with reference to their perception of police attitudes toward residents, indicating that citizens had found Team Two members more courteous, anxious to help citizens, less authoritarian, and less likely to use excessive force than previously experienced. This reaction occurred after a "wait and see period", in 1972 during which neutral answers to survey questions were the most predominant answers. After seven months of Team Two operation, residents had formed definite positive opinions on the police in their area. Although it is possible that Team Area Two residents were pre-conditioned by the favorable national and local publicity on Team One in its first action year, it is doubtful that such pre-conditioning was primarily responsible for the attitude changes noted in Area Two in 1973. 1972 was a year in which Team Policing received severe examination and criticism in the city of Holyoke by police and aldermanic officials. The fact that a demonstrable attitude change occurred in spite of this, indicates that Team Two personnel and their proximity made a strong impact on community attitudes.

Area One had also experienced marked positive attitude changes in its first action year with respect to perception of police attitudes toward citizens. It would thus appear that team policing has a strong positive impact on community attitudes within the first year of team operation. More particularly, citizens perceive police officers as being friendlier, more cooperative, more polite, less prone to excessive force, less authoritarian and harder workers than previous to team formation.

Data, however, on Team Area One in 1973 do not allow one to conclude that continued team operation leads or does not lead to continued improvement in community attitude toward police. Although more residents did state that police were anxious to help and were polite (indicating a continued improvement in community attitude), positive responses fell slightly on other questions in this section and neutral answers increased. Negative responses, however, did not increase for the most part, (indeed, they decreased) indicating that Area One residents had not turned away from their police, but rather were unsure as to their feelings with respect to police attitudes toward citizens.

There are several reasons which explain why community residents would experience this leveling off of positive attitudes:

1. Resentment over monetary problems and changes in Team One structure have affected team members' attitudes, and have, in some cases produced if not changes in the attitude of individual officers with respect to citizens, then certainly changes in the outward demeanor of officers. Such a change would naturally be reflected in citizen feelings about police.
2. Changes of personnel on Team One have brought officers on board who do not share the same attitudes which original Team One members had with respect to the use of force, the importance of police-community relations, etc.

3. The failure of the Area One Community Relations Council and Crime and Delinquency Task Force to act as information dissemination bodies has resulted in a communication gap between the team and some residents who may not understand the concept.

These data indicate that although citizens felt Team One members wished to help them, the police attitude in general was less "pro-community" than previously perceived (1971). Data point out that although the team structure (i.e., the immediate presence of a police storefront in a community with permanent personnel assignments) may increase citizen security and confidence in police, structure alone does not insure positive community attitude change, particularly after the first action year when the novelty of the Team Police Concept has worn off. Team members, if they are to continue to improve police-community relations, must consistently work to that end.

Team One community involvement and team morale have both decreased in 1972, and the affect on citizen attitudes is obvious. It is hoped that as the wage dispute and other monetary problems are resolved, team members will actively engage residents in police-community projects. One such project has already taken place (a sport event involving team and community residents). The Community Relations Council and the Crime and Delinquency Task Force must be used as information bodies, seeking out groups of people (particularly the elderly in Area One and perhaps in Area Two) and explaining the Team Police mode of operations to them. As was indicated previously, peer pressure already seems to be at work in guiding the re-orientation of one or two Team One members who have had some difficulty in accepting organized police-community contact or the Team Police view of police-community relations. These measures should begin to repair the changes in community attitude noted in Area One in 1972.

With reference to quality of police, the same pattern as that described above was noted: improved community attitude in the first year of Teams One and Two operations, but a leveling off of opinion in Area One in 1973. Attitudes about police honesty, however, have continued to rise in both areas in 1973.

The hypothesis that Areas Three and Four would, in general, have positive attitudes toward police was upheld, although Area Two responses were in general more positive toward police than Area Three and Four responses. This is a strong statement about the impact of Team Policing in Area Two, particularly since that area is a predominantly minority-group or foreign-language population which had suffered negative changes toward police as short a time ago as 1971.

It was believed that Areas Three and Four would demonstrate high numbers of neutral responses, indicating their own form of dissillusionment or indifference toward police. In most questions, this hypothesis was not substantiated.

Finally, the majority of Area Two, Three, and Four residents expressed preference for traditional uniforms and marked police vehicles, but Area One residents were divided in preference with almost equal percentages of people stating preferences for traditional uniforms and marked cars, and for blazer uniforms and unmarked cars. This indicates that exposure to the blazer concept has made area residents more open to this type of uniform, as had been hypothesized by police planners. Other areas, with traditionally uniformed police officers, indicated that approximately 22-34% of each area would prefer both types of uniform and car. Experimentation toward this end should be considered by police planners and city officials.

In summary, Team Policing in general has made a marked positive impact on citizen attitudes toward police in both Areas One and Two, although Team One must re-establish itself in the eyes of Area One residents before any further attitude change takes place. Citizen attitude is already pro-police in Areas Three and Four, but is below that of Area Two. Team Policing should bring attitudes in these areas to higher levels than either Areas One or Two, given the strong foundation of pro-police feelings already existing in Areas Three and Four.

2. Interviews with Residents

Team Policing is geared to changing the attitudes of community residents toward their police. One measure of attitude change was a community attitude survey administered in pre and post-test phases in Areas One and Two and as a baseline test in Areas Three and Four. A second measure is discussed in the following section: informal statements from community residents in Areas One and Two.

In Area One, the vehicle for eliciting opinions on Team Policing was Model Cities Task Forces (composed of community volunteers) and in Area Two individual conversations between the Evaluation Coordinator and Community Relations Specialists for the Team Police Project and residents and property owners in the area.

It is emphasized that these data are the result of a very small number of informal, unstructured interviews, and hence cannot be generalized to represent citizen opinion in the entire Team One/Team Two Area. Results are offered merely as a complement to those results already recorded in the Community Attitude Surveys in Areas One and Two and in the analysis of the Community Relations Office which is included as a Supplemental Report.

Statements from residents were recorded during the week of January 29, 1973, in Area Two. Statements representing Ward 1 Task Force and resident opinions were solicited from the Model Cities Task Force Coordinator during the week of February 12, 1973, and were based upon her close contact with community residents during the course of 1972, and her experience as a permanent resident of the Ward 1 area.

Area One. The overall feeling in Ward 1 is one of "greater security" compared with times previous to Team Policing's arrival in the area. The longer the team continues to operate, the greater is that sense of security, according to the Task Force Coordinator. Problems have arisen, however, which have been brought to the attention of both CIS staff members and Team 1 by Model Cities representatives. As the Task Force Coordinator points out, these problems have been the result in most instances of citizens misunderstanding or misinterpreting police duties and actions. For example, citizens could not understand why during a specific instance* certain troublemakers were not arrested on the spot by Team One police. It was necessary to explain at a later date to these citizens that discretion was being applied by officers on the scene. A basic part of the Team Police Concept is that officers be allowed leeway to solve crisis situations through means other than immediate arrest. It was the officers' opinion that had an arrest been made at that time, a disturbance would have occurred, creating danger for innocent bystanders. An arrest could be made at another time, involving fewer risks to the community. This is exactly what happened. Two days later two men were arrested for their part in the disturbance.

Police-citizen misunderstanding does occur in Area One, but vehicles exist through which such problems can be resolved, in particular the Model Cities Task Forces and the Community Relations Council. The Task Force Coordinator stressed that continued orientation sessions for Area One residents on the Team Police concept, policies and policing duties in general, would greatly contribute to increased police-community understanding. In particular, The Task Force Coordinator suggested that the "Model Cities Reporter" (a monthly newsletter published by Holyoke Model Cities) be used to present a public safety or police information column describing citizen and police duties, safety suggestions, etc.

* a breach of peace complaint in this case

This information collected from the Ward 1 area would tend to indicate that although the sense of security in the neighborhood has increased greatly from pre-team policing levels, information about Team Policing and the Community Relations Council and Crime and Delinquency Task Force may not be reaching a wide enough public in the Ward 1 area. Hence, questions about team policies and duties arise. It is stressed that most misunderstandings are of a nature which can be resolved through open discussions or explanations.

It would indeed be unfortunate if doubts were allowed to continue because of lack of information flow. Specifically, the Area One Council and Crime and Delinquency Task Force need more direction in the area of information dissemination. Attempts over the past year to do just this have not proved successful for a number of reasons. (See Supplemental Report A).

Area Two. A total of 13 establishments (mostly small businesses) were visited in the second team area -- a small number to be sure and hence not necessarily representative of the entire Area Two population.

The only complaints voiced against Team Two were related to parking tickets given out by the team (interviews were conducted in February, a time when winter parking regulations were being strictly enforced). Such enforcement, business owners felt, was sometimes annoying to their customers and hence detrimental to business. Enforcement was also sometimes inconvenient for community residents. Other than parking ticket complaints, which are perennial in policing, people who were interviewed were satisfied with the work the team was doing and with the presence of the team in Area Two, although several owners had had no real contact with the unit.

Bar owners or employees were particularly happy with the proximity of the team. Three small businesses which were contacted had experienced breaking and enterings in recent months and expressed satisfaction with team service (property was recovered).

Although, as in Ward 1, responses were in general positive, especially from people or businesses that had had direct contact with the team, an impression received from these interviews was that knowledge about team operations, the team concept and a better understanding of policing in general had not been sufficiently developed in the area. Contact with the team and information about the team occurred as a result of complaints (eg. a breaking and entering) or a call for service or from newspaper articles. Little information stemmed from either the Area Two Community Relations Council or the Crime and Delinquency Task Force.

It must be noted, however, that these two bodies were formed in the second team area in December 1972, and hence had had little or no chance to learn about the team itself or to define their own functions by February, when these interviews were conducted. Since that time, the Area Two bodies have shaped themselves into action bodies, geared to playing an important role in the community. There are plausible reasons why this kind of operation has been successful in Area Two and not in Area One, and they are discussed under the Community Relations Program section of this report (Supplemental Report A).

Summary

One goal of Team Policing is to foster better police-community contact. Toward these ends, an area storefront, Community Relations Council, and Crime and Delinquency Task Forces have been established in each team area. Interviews in Area One would seem to indicate that even in an area where a team has been in operation for two years, misunderstandings continue to arise

between police and residents -- most particularly within the realm of police duties and responsibilities.

It is doubtful that any structure can completely eliminate police-community misunderstandings, but it is believed that existent structures in Area One are not being put to full useage in spreading information about the team to area residents and bringing residents' misunderstandings and complaints to the attention of the team. Suggestions for improvement are offered in the section of this report entitled "Supplemental Report A".

In Area Two, residents interviewed did not voice complaints about Team Two (except with reference to overzealousness in serving parking tickets) and seemed particularly pleased about police proximity to their businesses and homes.

E. MORALE AND JOB SATISFACTION

In order to assess morale and job satisfaction of team and non-team personnel two measures were employed in 1972: a police survey, given to all personnel (team and non-team) in October - November 1972, and interviews conducted with Team One and Two members in January - March 1973.

As has been stated previously, the strong feelings within the department for and against team policing have, no doubt, greatly affected these measures. Variables which have nothing to do with the Team Police concept itself, such as the contract dispute between city officials and police negotiators during 1972, have also had an immeasurable impact on general levels of morale and job satisfaction.

The results of the Police Survey are particularly contaminated by such variables as indicated by the small number of surveys returned completed by police personnel. Although these survey results can therefore not be generalized to represent either department or team attitudes, they do indicate some problem areas which have affected morale.

Interviews with team members specifically addressed the issue of identifying morale and job satisfaction levels in 1972 as compared with 1971 and then determining to what extent these levels had been influenced by team structure or by outside variables.

1. General Level of Department (team and non-team) Morale. (November 1972)

The results of the Police Job Satisfaction and Morale Survey have been appended to this report (see Appendix G). They serve as a partial, but inexact indicator of attitudes within the department and Teams One and Two during the Fall of 1972.

The police department survey was run at a time when the department was in a state of suspension between two forces, and when bitterness over wage

disputes was becoming more open. Although this situation has stabilized somewhat since the formation of Teams Three and Four, it is still difficult to assess the impact of team structure on police attitudes and job satisfaction in isolation from many outside variables.

In order to provide better understanding of these variables and some basis for statements about general levels of department morale in 1972, the sections of the Police Survey which are specifically related to problem areas identified by police personnel are presented. Surveys were distributed to all department (team and non-team) personnel, across ranks. Although the original evaluation format called for comparisons of responses between Teams (One and Two combined) and non-team personnel, and among ranks, such detailed analysis of these results was deemed inappropriate in light of the small number of responses which were received. Of 113 surveys handed out to police personnel during roll calls,* only 47 completed surveys were received, among which four were not identified as either team or non-team. Teams submitted fifteen responses and non-team personnel, twenty-eight.

The Police Survey was divided into four sections: perceived community attitude and cooperation; job satisfaction; morale; and department structure, policies and priorities. Problem areas affecting morale and job satisfaction were drawn from responses in all four sections of the survey. The problem areas cited are in agreement with those cited in the Police Department Management Study conducted in 1971 and with general observations made by the evaluation coordinator in her day to day contact with police personnel. Four major areas of discontent were cited by team and non-team personnel. Problem areas cited by team and non-team personnel are similar and hence no separation is made by the two groups in presenting these data.

*A formal testing situation was decided against, due to department resentment over such tests in previous trials (first action year). It was felt that, given the general attitude within the department at that time, a survey administered in an informal manner, to be filled out by the entire department by order of the Chief of Police, but on off-duty hours, would be the least offensive manner of seeking information from the department.

1. Pay Scale. Personnel have not received an increment in wages since January 1971, when the police-city wage dispute began. Police are particularly bitter over stalled contract negotiations coming at a time of not only high inflation, but intense departmental change, when demands for increased productivity were and are being made. Closely linked with the pay raise issue is a controversy between Patrolmen's Union representatives and the Mayor over the police education incentive bill. Again, the result of the dispute has been monies withheld from police personnel, which in their eyes, is rightly due them. These issues have not only provided negative reinforcement for the changes being made within the department and demands for increased police productivity, but they have increasingly widened the gap between the Mayor (as the city's chief negotiating authority) and the police department. Such a situation bears directly on attitudes with reference to Team Policing (the "Mayor's project") and general police morale levels (team and non-team).
 2. Politics. "Politics" is used by police personnel to refer to several levels of "interference" in the workings of the department.
 - a. A weak chain of command which has resulted from cliques within the department. According to police personnel responding to the survey, the chain of command is not followed by a large number of personnel. The immediate cause of this problem has been the lack of a manual of Rules and Regulations* which would clearly define department policy with reference to chain of command and establish definite disciplinary measures to deal with infractions of these rules. Two underlying causes leading to abrogation of the chain of command were identified in the Police Survey: human nature (friendships have
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- *A Rules and Regulations Manual has been prepared by the Chief's Staff and will be put into effect in June 1973.

developed over the course of years of working together which encourage officers to by-pass immediate supervisors and contact personal friends) and political factions created during the city's election season.

Being "in" according to either of these two criteria has traditionally resulted in clique membership and hence in favorable extra work assignments and relaxed discipline in general.

b. Promotional Policies. As long as no established and objective promotional policies are employed, and as long as the chief appointing authority for the department is the Mayor, promotional decisions will be subject to attack as "politically" influenced, regardless of the validity or non-validity of these charges. Although Civil Service examinations and grades determine the field from which promotions are made, other capability measures such as field experience, quality of field work and reports, leadership capability, etc, are not necessarily taken into consideration or given proper weight. Who one knows often counts for more than what one has done or can do professionally, according to police responses.

c. Chief Appointed by Mayor. The politically charged atmosphere within the department is encouraged by the Mayor's power to appoint the Chief of Police. Men point out that such power gives the Mayor an opportunity to dictate policies for the department and thus undercut the authority of the Chief. This situation is a major contributing factor to the weak chain of command in the department. If there is no real authority at the top, those at the bottom cannot be expected to respect this authority or follow a chain of command which eventually leads outside the department.

3. Discipline and Workload Assignments. This problem area is closely related to "politics" in the department. The chain of command has been weakened by a promotional policy which does not allow for lateral entry of police command level personnel. Hence, sergeants lieutenants, and captains within the department must be appointed from the ranks, and then are expected to govern ex-partners, and friends, with equanimity and objectivity. By the same token, lower echelons are expected to follow a chain of command and not appeal to ex-partners and friends, who now hold higher ranks.

A related factor but one not noted by police personnel is that according to City Ordinance the Chief of Police must have been a resident of the City of Holyoke for at least two years prior to appointment. This ordinance severely limits the prospective field from which capable administrators can be appointed and contributes to the unprofessionalism of the department.

A chain of command weakened by political ties or ties of friendship, is translated into lax disciplinary policies and favoritism with preference to workload assignments, according to officers responding to the Police Survey. Men who completed the survey recognized this problem as a serious morale issue:

"It's discouraging to see other policemen who are not doing their share of work.....they are giving us a black eye," and "There are men on patrol who have never issued a parking or moving citation and who do not know how to write a 2.6(report).....someone should shake the dust from the department by ordering officers to perform or get out."

4. Lack of Information Flow within the Department and Outside Interference. This category relates specifically to the Team Police Project and changes occurring in general in the department in 1971-1972. Some police officers responding to the survey felt that the Chief's Staff were political appointees, were inexperienced in police matters and

have contributed to the sense of confusion in the department.

Part of this confusion has been a result of lack of information flow within the department, particularly with reference to Team Policing, according to department personnel. Several respondents expressed confusion as to exactly what implications the project would have with reference to individual officers and the department as a whole. Confusion and mistrust of staff personnel have no doubt contributed to general feelings of frustration and resentment within the department.

These major problem areas were cited by department personnel as contributing to their general dissatisfaction and low morale levels in 1972. Many personnel indicated however that they would not be on the job if they did not find police work itself intrinsically rewarding. The problem areas, it seems, relate not so much to the police job as to the department structure within which that job must be performed: cliques, an unprofessional promotional policy, a weak chain of command, an oftentimes titular Chief of Police, no official Rules and Regulations Manual until June 1973, etc. It is interesting to note that these departmental inadequacies which were noted by police personnel, are the same ones which the Police Management Survey uncovered in early 1972. That is, police personnel (C.O.s and patrolmen) recognize just as outside evaluators did, that many aspects of the department are unprofessional and detrimental to "good" policing (and morale and job satisfaction).

Although one objective of the Master Plan for the department is to try to correct some of these problem areas through mid-management training, preparation of a Rules and Regulations Manual, etc., real improvement cannot take place until major structural aspects of the department are altered. And that must come through Charter revision.

Police officers themselves have suggested possible alternatives to current

practices which the Charter Revision Committee should examine carefully:

1. A standard promotional policy based on an assessment of police personnel according to established criterion such as: a) performance in the field as evaluated by supervisors, b) grade on civil service exam, and c) educational credits.

A fixed formula should be established and followed which would allow objective and fair promotions. Justifications for promotional decisions should be a matter of record: written documents stating the specific qualifications or accomplishments which Officer "A" had which led to his promotion should be kept on file.

Performance files, which have been established for provisional police officers, should be established for all police personnel. These individual files would contain commendations, disciplinary actions, and measures of the quality of work shown by the individual officer. One form that such evaluation could take is a sergeant's daily log, consisting primarily of a chronological account of the sergeant's daily contacts with police personnel and prepared by each team shift sergeant. The system has been employed successfully in the Los Angeles Police Department and is described in Patrol Administration by A.D. Gourley and A.P. Bristow.*

Because each team will be supervised by more than one sergeant, as sergeants take days off and are replaced by other sergeants, a composite and perhaps more objective picture of individual and team performance would be accumulated.

Further, these logs would act as a source of information and means of supervision for the C.O.s and Chief to insure that sergeants are making proper contact with officers in the field. Care must be taken, however, that in following up on calls the sergeant does not

*Gourley, G. Douglas and Allen P. Bristow, Patrol Administration Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1971, Page 125

"take over" or handle the call himself unless two or more units are involved and coordination becomes necessary.

Review of sergeants' logs and individual officer files should be conducted on a continual basis by the shift commander. He should also be expected to supplement such reports with his own observations in the field of personnel on his shift.

2. A new administrative structure for the department. It is essential that one body, and preferably one which would not be subject to partisan influences, be designated as the governing body of the Police Department. A new structure might take the form of a Board of Police Commissioners and a Chief appointed by them and under contract to the city. Whatever the structure however, it is of primary importance that the police administrator not be subject to appointment or dismissal by the city administration (Mayor or Board of Alderman) until the termination of his contract or term of office or as a result of a public grievance hearing. The Police Department must be separated from politics in order to run efficiently and effectively.
3. Permission for lateral entry into the department at all ranks and not just within the rank of patrolman.
4. Abandonment of the two year residency requirement for candidates for the office of the Chief of Police to assure a wide field of selection.

These are issues relating to Charter Revision. Other departmental problem areas must be handled in-house:

1. disciplinary policies, now established in the Rules and Regulations Manual, must be enforced by the Chief of Police. Discipline must begin within command level personnel and extend down the chain of command, particularly with reference to unnecessary use of sick time,

reluctance in making reports, and influences of the informal organization (clique structure). Discipline must also be accompanied with training methods, which will assure the department that the unfavorable incident will not recur.

2. a series of police task forces might be established on an experimental basis. Allow personnel to group themselves (the team structure might be followed here) to work on problems of their own and the department's choosing, such as a new grievance policy, improving court notification procedures, etc. Results of the Police Survey indicated that personnel who responded had a clear grasp of problem areas and what might be done to solve those problems. It would seem logical to use this in-house talent to work for the department. Committees of this kind will be meaningful, however, only if they are entered upon seriously by both department administrators and police personnel, and if their conclusions carry weight and are likely to be implemented.

As the Chief's Staff is phased out within the next year, these groups could assume planning, training, and public relations functions.

Of course, one step which will alter morale and go a long way in encouraging police personnel to give extra time to task forces, is the resolution of the wage dispute and educational incentive issue. Without this, it is unrealistic to assume the personnel will cooperate in any venture.

As stated previously, the morale situation in the department was a determining factor in the decision to step up city wide team police implementation. Feelings seem to have leveled off to some extent with the formation of Teams Three and Four in the spring of 1973, and the department has appeared to adopt a "wait and see" attitude toward the new form of organization.

Interviews should be conducted with Teams Three, Four, and Five personnel during the early Fall to determine whether attitude changes with reference to job satisfaction, morale and the Team Police concept in general have occurred. To date, the facet of Team Policing which seems to have appealed to Team Three and Four members is the greater degree of independence afforded individual officers in a storefront setting.

2. Team One Morale and Job Satisfaction.

In 1973 (January - March) individual, informal interviews were conducted with police personnel on Team One. (see Appendix H for interview format). Almost to a man, Team One members indicated that they were experiencing more satisfaction as police officers under the team concept than they had before they joined the team. Reasons for this were four-fold:

1. Most officers enjoyed the opportunity to follow cases through to conclusion. Knowing that a case is "yours" translates itself into greater effort to solve that case. Being allowed to spend more time on a case, especially cases such as domestic disputes, which require understanding on the part of individual officers, also has increased job satisfaction.
2. The opportunity to work in a small group, the team unit, was cited as contributing to greater job satisfaction. Esprit was particularly high within shifts, with closer identifications formed among shift-mates than among shifts. Although some rivalry occurs among shifts, the situation is controlled and contributes to the close identification of team members within a particular shift.
3. The opportunity to get to "really know" what is happening in Ward One. Officers expressed satisfaction from seeing situations, relationships, and attitudes in general developing and changing in the area, and from being able to "tell" what is happening by changes in expressions

or daily patterns. That is, involvement over a two year period (for most Team One personnel in the area) has increased their knowledge of that area, both in terms of normal and abnormal situations. This, it was felt, contributed to not only better policing, but more job satisfaction on the part of police officers.

4. The easy style of the team concept allows officers more freedom to define their own roles and duties and to relate more closely with community residents. Although this factor was cited by most Team One personnel, others felt that less flexibility was permitted in 1972 as compared to the first action year, and a decrease in job satisfaction resulted. This will be discussed in more detail below.

Most Team personnel also indicated that they were more effective now as police officers, under the Team concept, than previously. Reasons were three-fold and were closely related to previous answers on job satisfaction. That is, if an officer felt he had greater job satisfaction because he was allowed to follow a case through to conclusion, he also tended to indicate that he was more effective as a police officer for the same reason. This would seem to substantiate the hypothesis that individual officer satisfaction is related to officer effectiveness, particularly in the eyes of the officer himself. By increasing one, the other is positively affected — one goal of the Team Police project.

Feelings of increased effectiveness resulted from:

1. the knowledge that the case a team member was on was his alone and that he would be responsible for the eventual disposition of that case. The job of a policeman is more of an "accomplishment" now according to one Team One member.
2. The development of greater expertise by individual team members as a result of training and experience.
3. Increased knowledge of the area and a better knowledge of community

residents.

- 4. The change in uniform, from traditional brass and blue to a blazer uniform, which allows closer community contact and hence, greater knowledge of the community. One man also felt that the uniform change helped change his attitude toward community residents (he felt less authoritarian) and hence contributed to the improvement in police-community relations in the area.

Team One personnel felt in general that their workloads were greater as team members than previously, particularly with reference to report writing. Although no one objected to increased workloads, some resentment over pay, overtime, incentives, and changes in team structure was expressed. Although morale is still high, officers were eager to express dissatisfaction with certain situations and decisions which had occurred in 1972. Specifically:

Incentives and Overtime. In the 1971 evaluation report, Galvin and Angell cited monetary difficulties accruing to team members as one negative aspect to team policing in Holyoke. In 1972, this problem reached epic proportions in the department as a whole, affecting morale levels in all units, including Team One.

Having chosen to give up a \$10.00 per week incentive pay differential in lieu of regular overtime pay, team members (both Team One and Two) then found that "legitimate" overtime was in the process of being redefined by the department. As a result, a period of time ensued when team personnel received no overtime monies. A similar situation had also occurred in Team One during the first action year when a backlog of accrued over-time monies was substituted with "time owed". Confusion over "legitimate" overtime and doubts as to what form, if any, compensation would take, have led Team One members to doubt the department's willingness to pay for overtime investigations (an integral facet of the generalist/specialist concept).

This, coupled with the police wage dispute in 1971 - 1972 has provided little reinforcement for extra effort in handling cases, and was cited by Team One members as a chief reason for the falling off of police-community projects (athletic events, dances, etc.).

Relocation. The demoralization process in Team One was furthered by the successive moves of Team One headquarters: first from a local storefront to the much more elaborate basement of the Model Cities Service Center (August 1971). The location was not easily accessible to neighborhood residents, and so the team was moved again to another storefront location (July 1972). Although most members agree that the move to a storefront location was a wise one in terms of attracting more residents to the headquarters, the surroundings themselves are shabby and small. Necessary renovations were delayed for approximately six months until Model Cities and police planners could negotiate terms. Physical surroundings are important with reference to morale levels and the condition of this new location was cited as one reason for a slight drop in morale.

Uniforms. Original team members were badly in need of new uniforms in 1972, as were new members. Confusion as to whom should pay for the uniforms (Model Cities or Governor's Committee Funds), whether monies were available, and whether the team would be allowed to continue to wear blazer uniforms, delayed the acquisition of new uniforms for several months.

As one team member said in 1972, "It just seemed as if everything was either delayed or taken away from us".

Peer Pressure. Peer pressures were also cited as a reason for a slight morale drop in Team One. Several team members cited a November 1972 vote (60-10) against Team Police expansion by the 75 member Patrolmen's Union, as a source of Team One concern. Members do feel, however, that department feelings have leveled off and, now that other teams have been formed, harassment is lessening.

Changes in Team Structure. Most original Team One members expressed dissatisfaction with what they saw as the increased regimentation of Team One personnel. Individual team members, it was felt, had less flexibility now than in 1971, due to increased supervision by ranking officers. Fewer decisions were made by the team as a unit, and more by sergeants or lieutenants assigned to teams. This situation was exacerbated by an experiment in rotating sergeants from team to team, which began in March 1973 and has subsequently been discontinued. Rotation, initiated for the purpose of greater coverage of teams by command level personnel, resulted in a break of continuity (hence knowledge) between the team and its sergeant or lieutenant and led to arbitrary decision-making on the part of most C.O.s. This was strongly resented by Team One personnel who had been afforded a high degree of independence in 1971. Other command level decisions had been made in 1972 with the overall aim of increasing the coordination of teams and increasing the knowledge which each shift commander had of his teams. Although reasons for such experimentation may have been valid, as will be discussed in the section entitled "Team Model", the sudden decrease in Team One independence was cited as a reason for changes in morale level on that team.

Most Team One members acknowledged the necessity of providing a ranking officer on each shift to make certain command level decision or to solve minor personnel problems, but some members did feel that the line between problem-solving and autocracy had been overstepped and that the hierarchy and rank consciousness which were to be minimized in Team Policing, had crept back in, in 1972.

Staffing. Some team members felt that under-staffing had contributed to a decrease in morale. On some shifts, only one police officer may be manning the storefront, due to sickness or vacations. Although such situations occur rarely, there is a feeling that C.O.s do not shift personnel appropriately at such times, preferring to man headquarters at the expense of Team One and other area teams.

Changes in Community Relations. Because of both a lack of free time and monetary problems which forced most team members to hold second jobs during their off-duty time, public relations projects which had begun in 1971 were discontinued in 1972. As indicated in the 1971 interviews with Team One members, basketball games, block dances, soft ball games, etc. which were organized by Team One personnel in the first action year, greatly contributed to the high levels of satisfaction and morale within the team. As these activities were curtailed in 1972, officers expressed regret that such contact was not taking place. Officers felt in general that community contact had decreased slightly because of this, because of the move to the Model Cities basement, and because of a lack of monies for coffee hours with neighborhood residents.

Team One members continued to address students in the Ward One school, however, and participated in a program designed to curb racial hostility among school children. In the Spring of 1973, a move back in the direction of volunteer police-community projects was made in a joint Team One and Two effort: "Hood" vs. police softball games were held on two consecutive weekends.

SUMMARY. In general, Team One members felt greater job satisfaction and increased effectiveness as police officers due to the team structure; particularly those parts of the structure encouraging greater independence and individual flexibility. Following cases to conclusion, greater knowledge of an area and its people and team spirit within shifts were cited as having a positive impact on job satisfaction and morale. Although workloads were seen as generally greater, this was not in itself resented. The fact that overtime, time owed, incentive and pay raise disputes had resulted in no monetary incentives, had however, affected morale level in a negative direction in 1972. Increasing departmental control over the team, moves from one

headquarters to another, shabby uniforms, negative department attitudes, understaffing at times, and less time for community projects also contributed to more open dissatisfaction with team operations in 1972 than in 1971.

Some of these problems have been resolved: renovations of the storefront have taken place, new blazer uniforms have been purchased, rotating sergeants have been suspended in favor of permanent assignment to a team, approximately twenty new officers have been added to the force, and joint team-community projects have been renewed. It is also anticipated that as department feelings about team policing stabilize, morale in Team One will be positively affected.

A problem area which has not been resolved is defining the fine line which must exist between team independence and departmental (commanding officer) control over the team. Although team members recognize the necessity of supervision within each shift and of coordination between the team and headquarters, it is felt that team independence (and hence morale) has been needlessly sacrificed for the sake of a centralized command. That is, team members would like the right and responsibility to schedule their own vacations and make their own personnel assignments as they did in 1971. Impromptu rotation of personnel into and out of Team One is especially resented, breaking up as it does, the unity of the group. The problem of changes within team police structure which have increasingly occurred in 1972, will be discussed in more detail in the section entitled "Team Model". It is emphasized however, that this problem area and that of overtime and wages are the ones which pose the most immediate threat to the team concept, not only because they have injured morale levels, but because they tend to encourage a precinct model of policing as opposed to a team model.

In summary, it would appear that to the extent that team policing increased individual independence and decision-making powers, reduced rank

consciousness, and encouraged community-police projects, morale levels were high; when these facets of team policing were altered, morale fell and alterations were specifically cited as one reason for this decrease in morale.

3. Team Two Job Satisfaction and Morale.

Team Two feelings and attitudes toward team policing are similar to those expressed by non-team members in the Police Survey administered in November 1972. Besides resentment over policies and fear of being undermanned in summer months, Team Two personnel expressed resentment at being ordered onto the team and the team concept itself. Duplication of services and extra cost to the city, resentment of staff personnel, and poor inter-team communications were cited as reasons for anti-team feelings. A repeated question was, "Is this (team policing) really necessary in Holyoke?" Problems which were irritants in Team One, developed into major morale issues in Team Two, possibly because this new team was formed at a time when department feelings were running strongly against the project. For example, confusion over overtime policies for team members led for a time to overtime monies being substantially curtailed for teams. In Team One, the result was increased griping and lower morale, but overtime investigations in general continued. In Team Two, the result was a minimization of investigations carried into overtime for a 1 - 2 month period. How much of this was due to a reserve of morale and team spirit in Team One which was lacking in Team Two, and how much to personalities of team members, is impossible to determine, although both factors were probably working in these diverse reactions to similar situations.

The greatest morale problem according to Team Two personnel was the wage issue. Members for the most part enjoyed working together (within shifts) and the informal atmosphere of the team setting, but resented increased paperwork which came with team policing, and particularly resented doing more work for the same amount of pay.

In general, Team Two members had experienced less or the same degree of job satisfaction as team members than they experienced before they joined the team. Reasons were three-fold:

1. less pay and more work.
2. no difference could be discerned between team policing and traditional modes of policing.
3. doubts as to the necessity of team policing, storefronts and decentralization in general.

These last two reasons are closely related to one another. Team Two personnel stated consistently that 1. they could see no real difference between team policing and traditional policing and hence 2. could see no real need for team policing. Several factors contributed to Team Two's inability to distinguish between team policing and traditional policing: Team Two's structure and training was and is quite different from that of Team One. In many ways (as will be discussed in a later section) Team Two is following a precinct model, not a team model and other teams are approaching this point.

Training was not received by all Team Two personnel, and most members do not feel qualified to be labelled "specialists" in any field. Although most members do consider themselves "generalists", there is a tendency to call in Detective Bureau or Team One personnel to investigate cases. This is particularly so because Detective Bureau testimony and that of certain experienced Team One personnel, are the only testimony acknowledged by the court as "expert". This, coupled with overtime problems, has meant that Team Two members do not necessarily follow cases to conclusion. Team meetings have only recently gotten off the ground, after having died out when members were no longer paid to attend. Team Two, although more independent of

headquarters control than non-team personnel, has never experienced the degree of freedom given to Team One during its first action year: decisions with reference to training needs, uniforms, and policies had been mapped out prior to Team Two formation by Team One members or staff planners.

Thus Team Two went into a team situation with not only a negative attitude, but with few of the advantages that Team One had in terms of training, orientation, and independent decision-making. Some important aspects of team policing were not able to become integral parts of the team concept in Team Two. Hence, no real difference in police service delivery can be cited by these men because job structure is, in fact, not very different from traditional policing. One reason that no discernable change in job satisfaction is expressed, may be due to the fact that for many on Team Two, the job really has changed very little.

In summary, although Team Two members enjoy working with one another within shifts, general levels of job satisfaction and morale are lower than or the same as satisfaction and morale levels of non-team members and substantially lower than Team One levels in 1971 and 1972. Team Two has never had an opportunity to develop into a team. Created at a time of deep bitterness over departmental changes and team police expansion, the team is composed mostly of non-volunteers (indeed, some men felt they had been assigned to Team Two as punishment) and has faced problems with overtime and incentive pay, lack of training, changes in team structure, and little organized police-community contact. All of these factors have served to 1. dilute the actual functioning of the team concept and 2. contribute to general dissatisfaction among Team Two members.

Although it may be true that Team One personnel are a sub-group within the department and are generally more open to change and flexibility, as 1971 attitude tests demonstrated, other factors also contributed to significant differences in job satisfaction and morale levels in Team One and Team Two.

First and foremost was the general department attitude toward team policing during the creation of Teams One and Two. Team Two members, non-volunteers for the most part, shared attitudes which were generally similar to those of non-team members (bitterness over team policing). Team policing was also a subject of controversy during the formative stages of Team One, but Team One members did not share in the doubts about team policing and in some ways were more closely united as a team because of the controversy surrounding their unit.

Team One volunteers were also afforded more independence and responsibility for their team unit's structure and policies, involved as they were in renovations of their storefront, organizational committees, the preparation of a manual of procedures, and the selection of new uniforms. In depth orientation on the goals of team policing, methods of handling crisis situations, family disputes, etc. were given to Team One members. All members received training in conducting investigations, the laws of the state, and specialty courses. Further, Detective Bureau personnel were ordered out of the Team One area except in the case of homicide. The team operated for all intents and purposes independently of headquarters supervision and members were directly answerable to either the team as a unit or to the team commander. Original Team One members are unanimous in stating that such independence and involvement in the formation of the team contributed greatly to the high degree of morale demonstrated by members in 1971. The fact that dissatisfaction has resulted from decreasing freedom and increasing cen-

tralized control, lends weight to the conclusion that participation in setting up the team structure, and a greater degree of independence, greatly increased morale in Team One.

This helps explain the low level of satisfaction found in Team Two. The second team has never achieved the independence of Team One; personnel received minimal orientation to the goals of and reasons for team policing, and have in some cases, not received training in investigative skills. Thus, Detective Bureau or Team One personnel are used to conduct investigations in the Team Two area. Monetary problems resulted in difficulties in receiving overtime monies and hence, overtime investigations and team meetings were curtailed.

Because of these differences in structure and operations between Team Two and the original Team Police model, it is difficult for Team Two members to distinguish between team and traditional policing, except for the obvious difference of de-centralization, (unnecessary duplications as Team Two members see it).

It is impossible to say whether or not Team Two satisfaction and morale would have been better if more independence, decision-making and team orientation and training had been afforded them. One can hypothesize, however that the fact that Team Two members can see little difference between team structure and traditional policing, has contributed to their skepticism over the necessity of the Team Police project.

As we have stated, although morale remained high in Team One in 1972, some change in a negative direction was noted by members as a result of structural changes and command level decisions which have decreased Team One independence and decreased incentives to perform and expend extra effort.

In order to improve the morale situation in both teams, two major decisions must be made by police administrators:

1. Where should the line be drawn between centralized command and coordination, and team independence and decision-making? Although this will be discussed more fully in the section entitled "Team Model", it should be noted that the team model is changing to a precinct model of policing. Although adaptations in the concept may have been necessary to institute Team Policing on a city-wide level, planners must recognize that they may very well end up with something other than Team Policing if alterations continue. How much of the team concept can be altered before the model becomes a precinct, and whether or not "precincts" are necessary in a city of 50,000 people, are decisions which should be made immediately.
2. How much money can the department spend on overtime pay? Department administrators must realize that if the generalist/specialist concept is to work, officers must be allowed to conduct investigations, if necessary, after their tour of duty is completed, and that they must be compensated for legitimate overtime. This could very well mean additional expenditures within the department budget, but it is naive to assume investigative work will be continued into off-duty hours if overtime monies are difficult to come by. Criterion for legitimate overtime must be established in order to clarify when monies will be paid to team members. If such compensation is not available, the generalist concept becomes meaningless. Given the general morale level of most department personnel, "volunteer" overtime will not be forthcoming and investigative work by most team personnel will be curtailed.

It is also necessary that investigative skills be taught to new Team One members and Team Two members who have as yet received no training. Detective Bureau personnel with investigative experience, should be assigned to all

1. assist inexperienced or unsure team personnel in investigations at the request of the officer assigned to the case or the team leader (specific plans for utilization of Detective Bureau personnel should be a decision made at team meetings) and
2. provide informal training to team members who need skills up-grading. Although formal and in-service training programs will provide courses in investigations, interrogations, Massachusetts Statutes and specialty courses, Detective Bureau personnel will provide a different and very valuable training device: teaching the techniques of experienced investigators.

Before Detective Bureau personnel are assigned to teams, however, administrators must face the issue of pay scales. Team personnel will be learning and eventually acquiring the skills of Detective Bureau personnel, but will be paid substantially less. Should overtime policies and pay scales be altered to provide more equity between team and Detective Bureau personnel or are differences between the two units valid at the present time? This issue should be addressed squarely now, before monies again become a morale issue, this time separating Detective Bureau personnel and team officer.

In general, what is necessary now, is a clear decision as to what form team policing will take in Holyoke: precinct or team. If team policing is the choice, then investigative training, overtime monies, and a degree of real decision-making authority must be given to teams, for as Team One personnel indicated, these factors contributed to the high morale levels and hence to the effectiveness of that team in its first year.

F. THE TEAM POLICE MODEL: TEAM OR PRECINCT?

1. Original Team Model.

The original grant request for Holyoke's Team Police Project envisioned six major innovations in the traditional policing model.

1. Assignment of personnel on a permanent basis to a team area.
2. Decentralization and relative independence of the team from headquarters control.
3. Democratic decision-making within the team on operational and organizational issues.
4. A task-oriented approach to area problems and a flexible formulation of police activities.
5. A generalist/specialist model of police service delivery.
6. Close community-police contact in resolving policy matters, in order maintenance and in informal situations.

In projects of this nature and size however, it is rare that modifications in the original concept do not occur as the project is implemented. Compromises and tradeoffs must be made between the hypotheses, assumptions and goals of the planner, and the operational and political realities with which his plan is confronted. If one is skillful or, perhaps, lucky, the original concept will not be altered so drastically as to negate its impact on project goals. But a particularly watchful eye must be kept on decision-making with reference to project policy— it is quite conceivable that a myriad of minor decisions, each in itself not seen as detrimental to the project, could in combination substantially alter the structure of that project and in so doing undercut the goals toward which the project originally strove.

The structure of team policing in Holyoke has been altered substantially during the course of its two year history. Change has come, not from decisions deliberately geared to altering the team model, but from several small exper-

iments, compromises, concessions, etc.

The impact of such alterations has been stated heretofore: a slight but noticeable decrease in the job satisfaction of Team One members who prefer the team concept as it was first developed in 1970 - 1971, and an increase in the sense of confusion and bitterness in Team Two members who find it difficult to distinguish between team policing and traditional policing. Further, we have seen that changes in Team One morale levels have in all probability affected citizen attitudes with reference to Team Unit One. In a Community Attitude Survey run in Ward One, greater percentages of neutral answers and smaller percentages of pro-police answers occurred in questions referring to police attitude in 1973 than in 1971, and in some instances, than in 1970. The morale changes in Team One, which no doubt contributed to this growth in citizen neutrality with reference to police, were cited by Team One members as at least in part a result of structural and conceptual changes in the team model.

This segment of the evaluation report examines in detail what alterations have occurred in the team model since December 1970, why these changes have occurred and what their impact has been on progress toward project goals. Possible alternatives to current practices will be discussed as well as the merits of a team vs. precinct model of policing in the City of Holyoke.

2. Action Year One

In its first action year (December 1970-1971), Team One closely followed the original model. Fifteen patrolmen were selected by the Chief of Police and Project Director from a pool of police volunteers, and then approved by neighborhood residents working with the Model Cities Agency. These men were assigned to Ward One on a permanent basis and remained a stable group during the first action year (two members did resign at the end of the year, however, giving financial hardship as their reason).

Team members, held organizational meetings prior to the actual implementation of the team and mapped out their responsibilities. Members decided amongst themselves that only in cases of homicide would Detective Bureau personnel be authorized to intervene in Team One investigative operations. It was also decided by the Chief and Project Director that Crime Prevention Bureau operations, which often require concentrated activity, and maximum security, would be allowed to continue, independent of Team One in the Ward One area. With the exception of these two cases, total responsibility for area crimes and police services were accepted by the team as a unit.

Headquarters assistance was sometimes, but rarely, requested by the team. Detective Bureau personnel were called upon infrequently to assist team members in lifting and classifying prints. No homicides occurred in 1971 in Area One, hence detectives did not often enter the team area. Although most team members felt they could call upon department specialists at any time for help, the team as a whole handled its own cases and even assisted headquarters personnel when detectives were unavailable.

Democratic decision-making within the team occurred on the level of organizational and policy-making issues. Committees of three to four team members were formed prior to Team One initiation, to identify and deal with problems and make recommendations with respect to communications, equipment, community relations, record-keeping and the relationship with the rest of the department.

Democratic decision-making in operational matters, however, was less successful in action year one and eventually, through a team vote, a hierarchical structure was superimposed upon the team model. Many team members found that it was difficult to speak with equals about their work habits or to settle minor operational decisions (such as whose turn it was to answer bothersome or tedious complaint calls). It was decided that a designated

shift leader was necessary in order to make just such decisions and to insure the smooth functioning of the team.

A few men felt that rank-consciousness had never really been reduced and that group decision-making was sometimes a meaningless procedure because of a strong team director, but most members stated their approval of the designated leader concept (usually the man of greatest seniority on the shift) and felt that the team director allowed sufficient flexibility and individual decision-making to accomplish major project goals.

Task-definition was also carried out by the team. Original team members stated that the team as a unit sought to define policing priorities in the Ward One area. Tasks which the team (or individual members) specifically identified centered primarily around the internal workings of the team itself (e.g., equipment needs) and police-community relations (the need for athletic programs, block dances, etc.). Other tasks were in general similar to those established in the original model description: answering service calls, investigating recent crimes, assisting community residents with problems and assisting the community in maintaining order.

Specific problems were also identified and resolved. For example, speeding on "A" street was a constant policing problem and the team as a group assigned an officer to cover that area; ticketing policies were reviewed and standardized within the team area; and emergency ambulance service was defined and explained to area residents by team members. School speaking engagements and local activities were also planned by team members in response to the community relations aspect of the program.

The generalist/specialist model of policing was followed closely in Team One in its first action year. Original members stated that training and experience together was sufficient to allow members to handle most investigations, although little opportunity was provided for practicing spec-

ialty techniques throughout the course of the year. Hence, members often had to maintain or up-grade their own skills on their own time.

Finally, community input into police policies and procedures was not as great in 1971 as police planners had envisioned. Citizen contact with police centered primarily around informal visits to the team storefront and the athletic events and neighborhood dances organized by the team.

The two community bodies (the Community Relations Council and the Crime and Delinquency Task Force) met at first with two to three team representatives, but little or no feedback from these groups reached the remainder of the team.

Thus, although the team concept envisioned joint police-community responses to major problem areas, the structure of problem resolution more often than not took the form of individual complaints to the team and then, an organized team response to the problem.

In summary, the democratic model of decision-making was not particularly successful in operational matters and community input into problem resolution was not as great as had been planned. In general, however, the original model was followed quite closely in Team One's first action year. With the exception of the problems with overtime money and the totally democratic model, the members experienced great satisfaction with the team structure and demonstrated high levels of morale.

3. Action Year Two

During the course of 1972, however, the team model changed slowly until, with the formation of Teams Two, Three, and Four, the model came to more closely resemble that of a precinct.* Reasons for model change were threefold:

1. Concessions to the Board of Aldermen.

The original team model as envisioned by police planners specified that non-traditional (blazer) uniforms were to be worn by Team One personnel. Team members also decided that unmarked cars would be used in the Team One area. It was assumed by planners that, if blazer uniforms and unmarked cars proved to be satisfactory in Area One, they would similarly be successful in Area Two (a demographic twin of Ward One).

Severe opposition to the blazer-unmarked car experiment developed within the Board of Aldermen, however, just prior to Team Two formation. Board objections centered around their belief that:

1. area two residents did not wish a police uniform change and
2. police would not be easily recognizable without distinct and traditional dress and cars.

It was decided by police planners and the city administration that this facet of the team concept could realistically be sacrificed in order to assure passage of the Team Police expansion program. It was also believed that at a later date, Area Two residents could be canvassed in order to more accurately determine their own feelings with reference to police uniforms and cars. Hence, Team Two

*A precinct refers to a model of policing in which personnel are assigned to an area of a city, but remain under the direct supervision of centralized headquarters and follow a traditional model of police delivery and service.

and all subsequent teams went into operation with traditional uniforms and marked cars.

2. Problems in Defining the Responsibilities of Commanding Officers.

During the first action year, departmental command level personnel had been effectively isolated from Team One operations largely because of intense rivalries between Team One and non-team leaders. As city-wide team policing became a reality, it suddenly became necessary to involve these men in the operation of the teams and to define, with them, the responsibilities and duties of Commanding Officers under a team model. These definitions, however, have not been clearly specified as yet, in part because no city-wide team model has heretofore existed in the nation. Experimentation has been initiated in various areas in order to discover the proper balance between command level authority and team independence. Unfortunately, at this point in time, team integrity seems to have been sacrificed for the sake of centralized control. An inability of team project leaders and departmental command level personnel to communicate effectively with one another has also contributed to confusion and misinterpretation of Commanding Officers' duties with respect to the five teams.

Specifically, shift commanders have been given authority to schedule vacations and days off for all team members on their shift, in order to assure that the city will receive proper coverage. For the same reason, commanding officers have been allowed to re-assign team members from one area to another at will and in some cases have assigned uniformed police to Area One, a non-uniform area. Further, a tendency has developed at headquarters to staff Team Five (a back-up team) with personnel at the expense of area teams (i.e., re-assigning men from Teams One, Two, Three, or Four to assist head-

quarters but rarely, if ever, reversing this procedure).

Planners and command level personnel also decided during 1972 that, to the extent possible, each shift on each team would have its own sergeant who would serve as the "designated leader", resolving operational and management problems. Sergeants are directly responsible to their shift commander, reporting to him on a daily basis and assisting team personnel in report-writing, investigative procedures, dispensing or recommending disciplinary proceedings, etc. Further, for a period of time, sergeants were assigned to headquarters and then dispatched to teams on a rotating basis in order to eliminate cliques or loyalties which might possibly have formed between sergeants and "their" teams.

These changes have meant increased centralized supervision of area teams, with less opportunity for men to work at their own pace. Team One members, who had experienced greater independence in action year one, resent increased centralized authority. Other team members who have not experienced similar decision-making opportunities, can see little difference in 1972 between Team Police and traditional policing with respect to decision-making. Designating a ranking officer (sgt.) as the team/shift's immediate supervisor has vitiated the goal of reducing rank consciousness among team members. Team One members in particular have expressed dissatisfaction with the increased hierarchial structure of their team in 1972.

Furthermore, temporary re-assignment of team personnel to cover shortages in other teams or to bolster the headquarters force, disperses the team unit, making it more difficult for team members to form an identification with each other, and to develop in-depth knowledge of one area and of other team members. Again, Team One personnel expressed great dissatisfaction with such policies, feeling that they were less of a team and less efficient because of such

reassignments.

Similarly, the rotation of sergeants among teams was seen as an unwise move by Team One and Team Two members; continuity of knowledge of the area and the team itself was broken as sergeants were required to supervise various teams at the C.O.'s order.

3. Political Realities.

As the division over Team Policing grew within the department, police planners recognized that immediate action was necessary to salvage the project and the department. Immediate city-wide expansion, the chosen solution, also added problems to an already weakened team model.

The speed up in team formations has meant that Teams Three and Four and some members of Team Two have not yet received training or in depth orientation in the team concept. Furthermore, the team format, policies, storefronts and uniforms were predetermined by either Team One or political forces before Team Two's formation; hence Teams Two, Three, and Four members did not participate in the shaping of their own teams.

Problems with overtime monies, which had occurred in Team One during its first action year, continued into 1972. "Legitimate overtime", was not clearly defined and team personnel (Team Two in particular) developed a reluctance to investigate cases into their off-duty hours.

Contract disputes over police pay raises embittered most policemen affecting their attitudes to the project in general, but more importantly, severely limiting their desire and ability to "volunteer" their time to community projects.

Team meetings fell off in 1972 as reimbursement for meetings was cancelled. Happening at the initial stages of Team Two formation,

this meant that task definition did not take place among team members as a whole, although policing problems were discussed by shift mates and solutions for problems were reached in this fashion.

These circumstances have greatly affected the development of Team Unit Two. Members feel that they are generalists, but that they are not qualified to be labelled specialists. Hence, Detective Bureau personnel are regularly called into the Team Two area to assist in investigations, fingerprinting, and photography. Problems with overtime monies have seriously curtailed investigative operations which entail extra work during off-duty hours, and this has weakened the police generalist concept. No real team identification has as yet been formed among Team Two personnel; no real commitment to the team concept exists. Members were assigned to the team and for the most part resented the Team Police experiment prior to these alterations in the model. But such changes have contributed to Team Two's inability to detect any significant differences between their current job as Team Police and their past job as traditional police.

Teams Three and Four experienced a similar development, although members demonstrated less open hostility to the Team Police concept.

These then are the changes which have occurred in 1972 in the team model as it exists in Holyoke. Two major areas of change, the decision to postpone the blazer experiment in the rest of the city and those problems accruing from the speed-up in city-wide expansion (e.g., problems with insufficient training, confusion over overtime policies, insufficient time to permit each team to shape its own policies, select its own site, etc.), were unavoidable for the most part. These problems are recognized by police planners and administrators; and those that can be corrected, will be (e.g., formal training programs will begin in the Fall of 1973).

But the remaining area of change, alterations in the team concept stemming from command level policies, are of a much more serious nature, for such policies have already and will continue to affect project goals unless clear-cut decisions are made immediately. Incentives to team members have grown smaller, affecting both job satisfaction and morale; team and individual decision-making on policy and operational matters has been seriously foreshortened; team autonomy is decreasing in Team One and has never existed in Teams Two, Three, and Four; rank consciousness has remained unchanged; personnel can be and are assigned in and out of team areas at the discretion of the Commanding Officer.

Although both Teams One and Two have made substantial progress toward project goals with reference to community attitude and improved police service to areas one and two, these goals, too, could be adversely affected by continued alterations in the structure. We have already seen some impact in this respect on Community Attitude in Area One in the current action year. Further, team efficiency and effectiveness, which is dependent upon group and individual initiative and morale, citizen cooperation, and in-depth knowledge of an area will more than likely be affected by current practices within the department.

At this point in time, then, it has become necessary for police planners and administrators to decide what kind of policing model they desire for the next year in Holyoke: the highly centralized model with which the department is now operating or a model more closely resembling that of action year one.

At the heart of this issue is a problem which has never been specifically dealt with in Holyoke: what are to be the duties and responsibilities of Commanding Officers with reference to teams. This problem area is a direct threat to the Team Police Model for it has been allowed to thwart the goals of team autonomy. Coupled with other problem areas, particularly that of overtime monies, this alteration in the team model has substantially vitiated

that model until little more than a precinct operation exists at present in the city. And in a city of 50,000 people, it is doubtful that a five-precinct mode of police service delivery is necessary, more efficient, or worth the extra money that such a decentralized system would cost the city.

If the Holyoke Police Department (planners and command level personnel) cannot realistically plan for and approach a modified but still meaningful team model, particularly with respect to team autonomy, it makes little sense to continue to "experiment" with the Team Police Model, for it is unlikely that project goals will be reached through what is really no more than a precinct plan.

Reviewing the situation in the Holyoke Police Department in 1973, it would seem that the following suggestions could be realistically implemented and would contribute to a strengthened Team Police Model.

4. Alternatives.

a. Supervision of Teams. Given the experience of Team One in its first action year, the level of discipline extant within the department and the fact that twenty new and untrained provisional police officers have been added to the force in 1972, it seems unrealistic to assume that a totally democratic decision-making model can exist in Holyoke's Five Team Police Units. Some degree of supervision within shifts and within teams is necessary for operational decision-making, reviewing reports and in general, insuring the quality of police services within the team area during each shift. The current practice of assigning sergeants to serve as team supervisors has not proven satisfactory, however, because of the emphasis on continued rank-consciousness and autocratic decision-making which such a situation encourages.

At this time in the department it would be unrealistic to assume that non-ranking personnel could assume this function in teams, however. Therefore, it is suggested that all sergeants receive in-depth orientation sessions with reference to their duties on the team. These sessions may be repetitious for sergeants who served previously as Team One patrolmen, but such reiteration would seem necessary given the fact that even these personnel have, to a degree, stepped back into a more traditional and hierarchical role pattern.

It is suggested that these orientation sessions clearly establish that the sergeant's duty under the Team Police concept is to guide not supervise in the traditional sense. The sergeant is there to add his input to an investigation, but not to conduct that investigation for the officer answering the call. His should be the final authority in resolving issues which the team as a unit cannot resolve (such as a consistent disciplinary problem), or in resolving an issue which requires immediate and firm action. The sergeant should not be allowed to become,

however, the primary means of problem-solving within the team. After immediate action has been taken, the group as a unit should discuss the problem and its resolution, determine why the problem arose and why the team could not handle it, and then establish a guideline to use in similar circumstances.

The sergeant's primary responsibility should be field observation of team personnel. In another section of this report, it was suggested that the shift sergeant compile a daily log of officers and their conduct which the sergeant has observed during his tour of duty. Such a log would provide a written record of performance levels of each officer, and thus assist in promotional discussions, in disciplinary and commendatory action, in clarifying training needs.

Further, each sergeants' days off would ensure that more than one sergeant will be reviewing the performance of each shift in each team; in this manner it is hoped that personal biases will be evened out and objective performance reports will be collected for each police officer. A clear and concise explanation of what the sergeant's log is to be used for, what qualities are expected of police personnel and who would be reviewing the log, should be given to all police officers.

A traditional duty of the sergeant is to review reports made during his shift and offer suggestions for improvement, tips on possible investigative techniques, etc. This function is particularly important in the department now due to the large percentage of provisional police officers who have recently become members of the department, and to the fact that some older officers are inexperienced with reference to good report writing.

It is suggested that the team as a unit be held accountable for the quality of its reports, and that one man on each shift should be designated by the team as its "reports officer." This man should be someone experienced in accurate report-writing and investigation, and it is probable that detectives assigned to the team would be the most likely persons to fill this position. It should be emphasized, however, that a qualified patrolman would also be an appropriate "reports officer." This system would allow the sergeant to spend more of his time in the field, a function vital to patrol and management operations.

The "reports officer" would read all reports submitted by officers and return those reports which are inadequate. He would make recommendations to the team and individual members as to how reports could be improved and in team meetings would, with the sergeant, review specific reports. As the team develops its report-writing capabilities, the teams could appoint officers to fulfill the report-officers function on a rotating basis.

b. Team decision-making. The emphasis in action year three should be a reassertion of team decision-making authority. Clear guidelines should be drawn up as to which decisions rightfully belong to the team and which decisions must be handled by supervisory personnel. Thinking with reference to resolving this problem should be along two lines: what decisions can the team make in order to govern its own operations, and what decisions can teams contribute to with reference to the operation of the department.

1. Team Operation. Teams should be given authority to schedule their own days off, subject to the review of the commanding officer, who could alter the plan only if, as a whole, team schedules jeopardized the coverage of the city. Guidelines for defining what would "jeopardize coverage" should be drawn up by

commanding officers, planners, and team representatives. It would also seem possible for teams to schedule their own vacations, given the stipulation that vacations within individual teams must be spread out over the course of the year.

It has been suggested at one time that teams be given responsibility for management of their own overtime monies — i.e., each team would be allocated a share of department overtime funds, perhaps on a quarterly basis, and would be allowed to assign priorities to various investigative tasks. All uses of overtime would be reviewed by the team, and by sergeants, Commanding Officers, and the Chief of Police on a weekly basis to insure strict and proper overtime useage. Teams should clearly understand that any mismanagement of overtime monies would result in discontinuance of this policy and a return to the former system.

2. Department Operations. The department has now been divided into five operating units. It would seem feasible to use these structures as centers for problem identification and resolution for the department as a whole. In a previous section of this report, it was suggested that committees be formed to propose policies or improvements with reference to departmental matters such as new equipment, vehicle maintenance, grievance policies, training needs, local supply procedures, communication needs, etc. Commanding Officers and the Chief would then take recommendations from team committees under advisement in planning for the department. Committees might take one of two forms: One team as a unit could be involved with one or two departmental problems, or representatives from each team could meet to form a committee in order to resolve a certain problem area. Reports with attached recommendations would be submitted directly to the Chief of Police.

Again, if such committees proved to be a waste of time or merely a platform for protest or political gain, without contributing reasonable and well thought out recommendations for problem resolution (as assessed by team and command level personnel) they would have to be discontinued.

If the above suggestions are implemented, it should be clearly understood by department personnel that overtime monies will not accrue to them as a reward for their activities. This must be seen as an opportunity for department personnel to participate in the organization and functioning of their team and their department. If such responsibility is not desired, other means for department planning must be found.

c. Duties and Responsibilities of Commanding Officers. Duties and responsibilities of Commanding Officers should center around 1) the coordination and overseeing of team activities, 2) organizational and functional planning for the department (based upon recommendations from department personnel), 3) formal planning for the handling of non-routine activities, 4) performance assessments of police personnel (reviewing the sergeants log and conducting field checks and recommendations for promotions), 5) overseeing the organization and planning of police committees, 6) disciplinary action, and 7) report reviewing.

It should be made clear to Commanding Officers that Area Team personnel should not be re-assigned to other teams in the event of personnel shortages. The headquarters or back-up team must cover this eventuality. The Commanding Officer should, however, have the authority to recommend personnel reassignment for disciplinary reasons, or if he feels better team operation could result from such a change. Such recommendations would be made in writing to the Chief of Police.

Commanding Officers, policeplanners, and the Chief must review

all of the above areas and lay down explicit guidelines for commanding officer responsibilities, for only in this way can command level personnel be held accountable for their actions.

SUMMARY. The importance of clear and precise definitions of individual duties for all departmental personnel cannot be emphasized too strongly. Individuals cannot be held accountable for their actions unless guidelines have been established for all to see. Planners cannot hope to have their program carried through effectively unless the underlying purpose and method of its attainment is clearly understood from the top of the organization down to the level of execution. 1972 has been a difficult year, a year of experimentation in many ways, but too often planning has been hesitant or indecisive. As a result, the department stands somewhere between a precinct model and a team model of policing. Clear directives for the department must be established immediately in order to end confusion and avoidance of responsibility.

G. MASTER PLAN STAFF

With the establishment of a decentralized mode of police service delivery in the City of Holyoke, it became obvious to police planners and administrators that a centrally located staff would be necessary to support the teams administratively, provide assistance in planning for departmental improvements and provide continued monitoring of team operations.

The staff, reporting directly to the Chief of Police, was to specifically concern itself with initiating basic institutional changes within the police establishment. These changes were to center around the expansion of the Team Police concept throughout the department, and the identification of homogeneous communities within the city which would house team units. Centralized planning for training programs, records and communication improvements and data collection was to be provided by the staff, as well as proposals for the solution of problem areas identified in team units and in the department as a whole. The overall objective of all programs proposed by the staff was to be a more professionalized police department.

In line with the staff's duties with reference to the coordination of the area team units, the staff was also charged with coordinating team and department planning and actions. Specifically, the staff was to work to improve the relations and communication between team units and the remainder of the department. Orientation and information sessions were to be conducted with both line and command personnel and ranking officers were to become actively involved in proposing solutions to planning, training, and record-keeping problems. The aim of joint planning and information sharing was to reduce the bitterness and strife with reference to institutional change which was extant within the police department in 1972.

A final goal of the Master Plan Staff was to inform the community as to the Team Police concept, mode of operations and the rationale for change within

the Holyoke Police Department. A Speakers Bureau, composed of staff members, was to be established with this aim in mind.

In conjunction with the above activities, the staff was to avail itself of federal, state, and local conferences or training programs within each staff member's particular area of interest, in order to upgrade staff capabilities. In such a manner, a residual core of personnel experienced in various police administrative fields would accrue to the department at the conclusion of the project period.

In summary, the staff was charged with:

1. Providing planning, training, records and communication improvement, coordination of teams, and data on team and departmental performance in order to promote the professionalization of the Holyoke Police Department.
2. Increasing communication and information flow between team and non-team personnel and between staff and line personnel by:
 - a. involving ranking officers in planning for Team Police expansion and departmental programs, and
 - b. by providing orientation sessions with reference to project goals for non-team personnel.
3. Providing information to residents of Holyoke with reference to the Team Police concept through information campaigns and speaking engagements.

This segment of the evaluation report will assess the extent to which the Master Plan Staff has been able to accomplish these goals. Without doubt, this section of the report has been the most difficult to write. Objectivity, when dealing with figures, percentages, or other people's attitudes is fairly easy to attain. When one must assess performance only on the basis of one's own observations, objectivity becomes more difficult. This evaluator has worked closely with members of the staff for almost twelve months, during

which time differences of opinion with reference to attitudes, policies and actions have occurred between the evaluator and various staff personnel. By the same token, friendships have also been formed between the evaluator and staff members. It would be less than honest to say that personal biases have suddenly been eliminated from the evaluator's mind when dealing with staff performance.

It would also be less than honest for this report not to discuss the role of the Master Plan Staff during the course of 1972. In many ways, opposition to Team Policing within the department has been restructured at this point in time into opposition to the staff. It is therefore doubtful whether a unified department, structured around a Team Police model of police operations can be achieved through the continued presence of a Master Plan Staff.

What follows is an attempt to list the accomplishments which the staff as a whole has made, and to list those problems which the staff as a whole has not been able to resolve. Individual performances will not be assessed, for personal bias would be difficult to eliminate on that level.

Before any final assessment is made as to staff performance, however, it is strongly suggested that an independent evaluation be made by a person or group which has not been a part of the staff itself.

1. Accomplishments

In reviewing the events of 1972, and particularly the sudden speed up in the implementation of a city-wide Team Police Program, it is obvious that the staff has accomplished one major goal under difficult conditions: establishment of four additional team units during the course of 1972. A four month period from August 7, 1972-December 5, 1972, was spent in identifying appropriate team areas, planning the deployment of police personnel and equipment and in justifying the expansion proposal in weekly meetings with the Board of Aldermen. Within three months of the Board of Aldermen's decision, the fifth team unit was formed. Citizen councils and task forces have been established in all team areas except

Area Four, which is currently in the process of organizing its citizens groups. Although, as this report has indicated, the Team Police model is not being closely followed in all units at this time, the major step of actually creating the teams has taken place and this was no mean accomplishment.

A one week in-service training program, the first in the history of the Holyoke Police Department, ran for a ten week period in September-November 1972, and was attended by all patrolmen. Courses ranged from laws of arrest and narcotics to discretion and planning. A one hour orientation session on the Team Police concept was also presented as part of the training program. Police personnel stated their general satisfaction with the program, although attitudes toward the Team Police course were mostly negative.

A second in-service training program began in April, 1973, and is geared to teaching provisional police officers the elements of policing procedures, particularly laws of arrest. Classes are held three times per week and will continue until the instructor, a sergeant in the Holyoke Police Department, and police administrators feel that provisionals are capable of handling most arrest situations.

Firearms training for provisionals and regular police personnel is also conducted once a week. Men attending these courses receive four hours of instructions on revolver safety measures, nomenclature, position, grip and firing practice. Officers are graded according to performance by their instructors, members of the Holyoke Revolver Club.

A Rules and Regulations Manual has been prepared by the Project Director and is scheduled to be distributed as of June 1. Although this manual will be a working document and subject to revision, it will hopefully serve to define departmental policies which have heretofore often been nebulous.

A \$50,000 grant request has been submitted for the establishment of a centralized records keeping system within the Police Department which will go a long way toward alleviating data and planning problems discussed previously in this report.

Finally, the Project Director, Assistant Director and Community Relations Specialists have actively participated in speaking engagements throughout the city, explaining the Team Police concept to community residents. A thirty minute film on Team Policing in Holyoke has greatly aided this part of the program. A "Policing Booklet" has also been prepared by the staff for community wide distribution.

In summary, the Master Plan Staff has provided the basic planning and public justifications necessary for a speed-up in the implementation of a city-wide Team Policing Program in the City of Holyoke. Without a centralized planning board, it is highly doubtful that Team Policing would have moved beyond the initial team in Ward One.

2. Problems.

Within many of the staff's projects, problems and delays have occurred, largely because the staff has not been able to overcome opposition to itself from within the department.

Opposition has stemmed from two primary sources:

1. natural rivalries and suspicions arising from the division between staff and line functions, and opposition to change agents working within a traditional organizational structure, and
2. actions and attitudes on the part of the staff which have tended to alienate both command level and non-ranking police personnel.

For both of these reasons, staff capabilities for promoting project goals have become severely limited.

The first basis for opposition to the staff has been discussed in a previous section of this report. Staff personnel not only receive higher prestige and salaries than line personnel, but also represent the Team Policing concept and the threat of rapid, unspecified change within a heretofore traditional organizational structure. Further opposition, however, stems from the fact that in forming the staff, several highly skilled department personnel were "passed over" and other personnel appointed to positions on the staff. Although staff membership was supposed to be a "learning experience" for those appointed, one wonders if such a stance was appropriate: 1. given the monumental tasks facing the staff in 1972 and 2. given the reaction to these appointments within the department. Charges of political favoritism have clouded the staff's credibility within the department and sometimes even in its own eyes.

The second source of departmental resentment of the staff has stemmed from actions or decisions of the staff itself which have done little to ease the tension within the department in 1972. More particularly, little real effort has been made by the staff to ease the transition from traditional to Team Policing. An attitude which has permeated the staff is that transition was bound to be difficult, particularly because of negative attitudes toward Team Policing within the department; and therefore orientation, explanation, etc. would be wasted effort. Although several attempts were made to orient police personnel in 1971 and 1972 (usually through brief meetings with C.O.s or informally with patrolmen), effort in this direction was not sustained. As a result, personnel were sent into teams with little or no concrete direction as to what was expected of them.

In-depth orientation and organizational sessions could have been conducted with personnel on Teams Two, Three, and Four, certainly not to the extent provided Team One, but enough to familiarize team members with specific duties and responsibilities. Team formations were separated enough in time to allow individual attention for each team. This was not forthcoming from the staff, however. As a result, skepticism about the need for the new form of operations and for the staff, and resentment over initial operational problems (a new records system, communications problems) continued to grow among new team members. Face-to-face contact between staff personnel and future teams during the few weeks prior to each team's formation, and during the first weeks of each team's operation might have demonstrated staff concern and conscientiousness, two qualities which most police personnel do not attribute to the staff.

More orientation, role definition, and assistance in policy formation from the staff would have aided new teams in their transition from traditional to Team Policing. Coordinated departmental planning and decision-making would also have eased the transition. For example, assignment of Detective Bureau personnel to teams for purposes of training and assistance was often discussed at staff meetings, but the Chief and staff could not come to any clear decision with reference to this. Further, because job responsibilities of the staff and commanding officers with reference to teams were not clearly fixed, team members often found it difficult to determine who was accountable for solving operational problems. For a time neither commanding officers nor the staff took full responsibility for the teams or their problems.

The split which has existed in the department between team and non-team personnel became translated into a split between command level and staff personnel in 1972, and this gap has never really been closed. The result has

been split level planning, slow decision making and difficulty in affixing responsibility for problem resolution.

Although responsibility for this situation must be shared with the Chief of Police and his Commanding Officers, the staff itself has contributed to the problem by assuming a rather "elitist" attitude when dealing with commanding officers and in minimizing information sharing between itself and commanding officers. Thus, the staff has become a rival command hierarchy often assuming responsibilities which would in another department belong to its commanding officers (eg., planning for expansion, designing a new records system, etc.). Although it may be true that without a centralized planning body these projects would not have become reality, it is also true that meaningful involvement of commanding officers at the start of and throughout the action year would have greatly eased some of the opposition to the staff and team policing within the department in 1972.

A clear example of the breakdown in communication which has occurred between the staff and line commanders has been the fact that a highly centralized Team Policing model currently exists in Holyoke. Clear guidelines as to commanding officer responsibilities and team prerogatives have not as yet been defined by staff personnel and commanding officers. The strained relationship between these two forces largely explains why such definition has not taken place.

Another example of the problems created by a split decision making structure in the department has been the continuing difficulty in resolving problem areas brought to staff and commanding officer attention by patrolmen. Consistent complaints by non-ranking personnel concern such things as cruiser maintenance, equipment selection and control, the court notification system, the grievance system, and promotional policies. Reactions to these complaints and resolution of such problem areas has been slow.

The inability of staff members and commanding officers to resolve their differences and coordinate department planning is a continuing problem area. Another and related problem has been the staff's inability to promote easy and on-going information flow between staff and line personnel. The staff has not seemed to be cognizent of the fact that many misunderstandings, suspicions, and frustrations extant within the department could have been eased by sharing information with department personnel. A simple system of memoranda (and of course regularly scheduled meetings with commanding officers and non-ranking personnel) would have allowed the staff to explain contemplated actions, decisions, reasons for delays or changes in policies. Too often, department personnel have had no knowledge of what stage problem resolution has been at or whether the problem was simply being ignored.

This was particularly obvious during the late summer and fall of 1972. The reasons for delays in renovations at Team Unit One, ordering Team One uniforms, and problems in cruiser maintenance, were not explained to the team as a whole and deep frustrations developed within the team as a result. How initial communications problems could and would be resolved, why training has been delayed, why provisional officers have received training prior to community service officers, why team trips have been cancelled -- all of these decisions need to be adequately explained to department personnel. Even now, it is extremely doubtful that department members are aware of what kind of records system they will soon become involved in and how such a system will aid them in their jobs.

Thus, although bitterness over the Team Policing concept itself seems to have eased, at least on the surface, as a result of city-wide expansion, two other problem areas are as serious in 1973 as they were in 1972: the poor relationship between commanding officers and the staff, and the mistrust of

staff personnel by non-ranking personnel within the department. That is, the bitterness over Team Policing seems to have been concentrated into resentment with the staff as a whole. As stated previously, natural divisions between staff-line functions, residual bitterness over Team Policing and fast-paced innovative change, and perhaps some personal rivalries and jealousies have contributed greatly to this situation.

But the staff itself must be held accountable in many ways for the extent to which their credibility has deteriorated. Some staff members have demonstrated an "elitist" attitude when dealing with department personnel, thus contributing to natural staff-line rivalries. Commanding officers in particular have resented this attitude. Further, the staff, quite naturally, has identified closely with Team One and is proud of its accomplishments; but this pride has been translated into disparagement of other teams and the department as a whole. This attitude, too, when reflected in staff words or actions causes resentment within the department.

The staff, often under bitter attack in 1972, has tended to isolate itself, its actions and planning until after the fact. Open dialog between staff and line personnel has not come about, largely because the staff has suspected subversive or disruptive reactions to their suggestions. In practice this has meant little or no information flow between the staff and department personnel until a decision has already been made. Commanding officer resentment with their exclusion from the decision-making process has been understandably great. Even now, when meetings are on-going between commanding officers and the mid-management consultant (a former Holyoke Captain), easy dialog and frank discussion of problems are difficult to maintain. Commanding officers feel, quite naturally, that their input will continue to be ignored, that the staff has already determined its decisions with reference to specific problem areas, and that serious discussions are a waste of effort. As long

as this feeling continues, it is unrealistic to expect either coordinated planning or substantial improvement in support for the Team Police concept to take place. The supervisor who does not or will not understand the purpose and nature of a plan does not support it; this attitude, quickly reflected in his subordinates, almost invariably causes the plan to fail. Police planners and administrators have an obligation to see that policies and procedures are understood and harmoniously followed through the whole department, regardless of how much extra time and effort must be put into this venture. For the Master Plan Staff, this implies close contact with commanding officers in meaningful decision-making situations, where commanding officer input is given equal footing with staff input. It also implies drastically improved information flow between the staff and line functions. Without these improvements, little hope can be seen for the re-unification of the department.

Finally, the staff faces another problem area: training. Training programs have gotten off to a slow start. Negotiations with Holyoke Community College, stalled police contract talks, and a question about how much mid-management personnel and patrolmen should be paid for attending training programs have hindered program development. Staff personnel cannot be faulted for these delays, and other training methods (such as in-service firearms and provisional training) have been instituted as "stop-gap" measures until formal training can be initiated.

At the beginning of the action year, however, other training devices had been suggested. These have not been implemented to date. Typical suggestions were a monthly training bulletin and a daily police bulletin which would keep officers abreast of police related events in the city or state. Utilization of Detective Bureau personnel or sergeants as on-going training resources has also not been seriously investigated. Such personnel are the most likely training resources at this time when formal courses in investigative techniques

have been delayed. If the generalist concept is to work, team members must be given the skills to follow-up most cases and detectives could provide some of this training. The staff recognizes this, but has as yet been unable to persuade department administrators to re-assign detective personnel to teams.

It is essential that the staff, the Chief and commanding officers meet to discuss training priorities in the department and informal training solutions to delays in formal programming. It should be clearly understood by personnel involved in the planning of training courses that a two fold emphasis must be given to most programs: 1. upgrading traditional policing skills and 2. developing skills related to team policing. That is, courses must not only relate to laws of arrest, narcotics identification, and motor vehicle violations but must also be concerned with conflict resolution, crises management, the use of discretion, etc. This latter emphasis has received less attention in recent months than have more traditional policing subjects. Although it is true that firearms training and instructions to provisional police officers are necessary in this department, it is essential that equal emphasis be placed on the social relations courses received by Team One in its first year. Both types of courses are necessary to good policing.

Summary. The Master Plan Staff has been successful in several program areas. Four additional Team Police Units were established in 1972 after a four month long hearing on the merits of the concept. Representative citizen groups have been formed in team areas and the staff has, throughout the year, disseminated information to city residents on the Team Police concept. In-service training programs have been initiated for the first time in the department and a Rules and Regulations Manual is in the process of being distributed. Planning for a centralized records system has been completed and monies have been committed for this project by the funding agency.

Several major problem areas have not been resolved, however, and as a result, the staff's effectiveness has been severely limited. The staff has been unable to establish itself as a credible part of the police organization. Despite the fact that most persons on the staff are police officers, the attitude persists in the department that staff personnel are outsiders fulfilling unnecessary jobs. The staff has tended to operate in a vacuum, an over-reaction to the opposition faced by the project in 1971-1972. Information-sharing has been minimal between staff and line personnel. As a result, commanding officers have largely been excluded from the decision-making process and planning and designation of responsibilities has been segmented. Chronic complaints by non-ranking personnel have been dealt with slowly, largely because of the inability of commanding officers and staff personnel to communicate effectively with one another. The clearest example of the effect of segmented guidance on the department is the highly centralized Team Police operation now in existence in the city. Related to these problems is the fact that little decisiveness in resolving problem areas relating to Team Policing has come from the office of the Chief of Police. This has usually meant lengthy confrontations between staff and line personnel over problem areas.

3. Alternatives

The staff has in essence lost its credibility with most department members. It is difficult to determine at this point whether that credibility can be regained. It is essential, however, that clear and concise decision-making take place with reference to the problems facing the Team Police experiment discussed in this report. It would thus seem that some kind of review and planning mechanism must be retained in the department if the department is to continue in its experiment with Team Policing.

Possibly the best alternative and one under serious consideration by the staff would be the phasing out of the staff, with police personnel returning to active duty in the department. Responsibility for planning, training, and records improvement would then be decentralized and assumed by the department as a whole, broken down into committees whose representatives report directly to the Chief and the commanding officers. The Chief and commanding officers would assume final responsibility for maintaining the impetus for improvement now existing in the department. In the end, success or failure of departmental improvements must rest on the Chief's shoulders, however, and not on a "staff" considered to be apart from the department.

Clear direction must be given by the Chief as to his commitment to Team Policing, the form he wishes to see that model take in this city, and the direction future programs should take. Unfortunately, it is highly unrealistic to expect such authority to emanate from the Chief's office, given the structure of the police department as it now exists. If the staff is dissolved, it is likely that Team Policing may follow shortly thereafter for lack of support within the department. If the staff remains, divisiveness and resentment of the program will probably also continue, regardless of improvements in department attitudes toward the Team Policing concept itself.

The dilemma is a difficult one and perhaps other alternatives are feasible. It is essential that city and police administrators face this problem squarely, for in resolving this issue, the future of Team Policing in the city could very well be decided.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations contained within this report are concerned primarily with two problem areas: the alterations in the Team Police model and continued divisions between Staff and line personnel.

a. The Team Police model. In order to approach a team model more closely geared to attaining project goals, the following steps are suggested:

1. Orientation sessions for all sergeants assigned to Team Police Units, stressing the reduction of rank-consciousness and restructuring of traditional hierarchic role model. Emphasis should be placed on team decision-making and problem resolution as opposed to command level decision-making. The sergeant's primary responsibility should then be restructured into field observation of team personnel.
2. A daily log prepared by each sergeant, listing his contacts with team personnel. Such a log would be useful in disciplinary and promotional decision-making. Data collected should be included in individual performance files for each department member, and could be the basis for a more objective promotion system.
3. A "reports officer" on each team could be appointed by team members to review reports submitted by team members and make recommendations to individual members as to how reports could be improved. Such an officer would be able to release the sergeant from one of his duties and allow him more time for field observation.
4. Emphasis on team decision-making. Clear guidelines should be drawn up as to which decisions rightfully belong to the team and which decisions must be handled by supervisory personnel. It is suggested that teams be given authority to schedule their own days off, subject to Commanding Officer review and alteration only in the event that team schedules jeopardize coverage to the city. Guidelines defining "jeopardized cov-

erage" should also be drawn up. Teams should be allowed to schedule their own vacations, with the same stipulations. An experiment in giving teams responsibility for their own overtime monies might also be initiated.

Teams should be allowed to participate in departmental planning. Team committees could provide a center for problem identification and resolution, particularly with reference to training needs, supply procedures, communication needs, equipment and vehicle maintenance, and other operational problems now occurring within teams. Committees would report directly to Commanding Officers or to the Chief of Police.

5. Define duties and responsibilities of Commanding Officers, particularly with reference to:

- a. the coordination of team activities,
- b. organizational planning for the department,
- c. formal planning for handling non-routine activities,
- d. assessing performance of police personnel,
- e. overseeing the organization and planning of police committees,
- f. reviewing reports, and
- g. recommending and administering disciplinary and commendatory actions.

It should be clearly understood by Commanding Officers that Team Five personnel are to be used as a "back up" group for area teams, and not vice versa. At all times, emphasis should be placed on maintaining the area team as a unit, unless re-assignments are deemed necessary for disciplinary or personal reasons.

6. Re-assign Detective Bureau personnel to area teams to provide informal training in investigative skills to personnel who have not received formal training at Holyoke Community College. Thought should also be given to the current difference in detective and non-detective

pay scales and a decision reached with reference to the appropriateness of such differences, in order to prevent rivalries between detective personnel and team members.

7. Re-assess training needs of the department, ensuring a two-fold emphasis in the training program: the teaching of traditional police skills and more socially oriented courses such as conflict management.

8. Re-orientation of Area One and Two Community Relations Councils and Task Forces, emphasizing a more programmatic response to area needs and closer council-team contact. Particular attention should be paid to re-structuring the Area One Council and Task Force in the event that programmatic responses are not forthcoming from the groups.

9. Orientation sessions should be held during team meetings, concerning the duties and responsibilities of Community Service Officers. Particular attention should be paid to clarifying the dual role of a Community Service Officer (police assistant and community liaison), defining the proper role of a Community Service Officer in crisis situations and emphasizing the rights of individual citizens with reference to Community Service Officer authority.

10. Team One members should be informed as to the current trend of opinion in Ward One with reference to police attitudes toward citizens. Appropriate action should be taken by the team to regain some of the lost ground e.g., more athletic events with area young people, more police contact with the Community Relations Council and the Task Force and with elderly residents.

b. Divisions between staff and line personnel. It seems unrealistic to assume that staff-line relations will improve substantially within the next year. It is therefore suggested that:

- 1. Planning for phasing out the Master Plan Staff be continued and that

police committees be formed to provide input into the planning mechanism, with the Chief and his Commanding Officers held accountable for the success or failure of innovative change within the department.

2. Until the staff is phased out, information flow within the department must be improved (through memoranda, committee meetings, meetings with Commanding Officers) and Commanding Officers must be involved on an equal basis with the staff in the decision-making process. Decentralized planning, centered around the team units, and reviewed by the Chief and Commanding Officers, should be the eventual goal of current re-organization.

Finally, it is suggested that some form of project evaluation continue, preferably in the form of an in-house evaluator. Since Team Policing is a project with national significance, it is essential that measures of performance levels, crime patterns, community attitudes, etc., continue in 1973-1974 in order that other cities may benefit by Holyoke's successes and mistakes. If continuation of such a position is not deemed appropriate by the city, it is recommended that the state or federal government provide the evaluation mechanism.

Specific attention should also be given to assessing the department attitude with reference to the project. It is suggested most strongly that unless substantial progress is made in 1973-1974 in improving department attitudes toward participation in Team Policing, in involving Commanding Officers in a meaningful and satisfactory decision-making role, and in reviewing the current team model in light of its ability to accomplish project goals, continued funding of the project in 1974-1975 should be seriously questioned. Although 1972-1973 data indicates that the concept is capable of approaching certain important project goals, continued goal attainment is highly unlikely unless current police attitudes and the team model itself are substantially repaired.

In many ways, 1973 will be the most crucial year in terms of the projects future status. Not only must damage done to the project in 1972 be repaired, but the work of the Charter Revision Committee will begin. Their recommendations will bear heavily on the future structure of the police department and to a great extent, on the success of current innovations within this structure.

END