If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. af Bureau of hive tigation (D)



In memory of the SIX
AMERICANS WHO DIED IN THE
WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING,
NEW YORK CITY, FEBRUARY, 1993

155912

U.S. Department of Justice National Institute of Justice

This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice.

Permission to reproduce this material has been

granted by Public Domain/FBI

U.S. Department of Justice

to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permission of the $\begin{tabular}{ll} \end{tabular}$ owner.

/559/2 1993 BOMB SUMMARY



Contents

		angalanga - 1 S. J. Spiller - angang semenjana - sama pangan kerangangan
	Mark Mark	
	Har	D Control
		- J
	265	
Staff:	Rick Redman	
	Project Mana	ager
	Susan Jacobs	
grander (* 1865) Ber	Editor	
	Helen Cimini	
	Editor	
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Raymond Rozy	rcki 😲
	Designer	
	<i>לרא</i>	15.4 3.7.2 - 24
		<07 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -

Introduction	2
Glossary of Terms	2
World Trade Center Bombing	3
Bomb Data Center	7
Hazardous Devices School	9
Postal Inspection Service	10
Postal Bomb Recognition	12
CHARTS	
Comments	13
Bombing Incidents	15
Incidents by Quarter and Day	16
Incidents by Time of Occurrence	17
Incidents by State – West	18
Incidents by State – South	19
Incidents by State - North Central	20
Incidents by State – East	21
Incidents by Region	22
Incidents by Target	24
Recovered Explosives	25
Improvised Explosive Devices	26
Filler Material	28
Explosive Fuzing	29
Incendiary Devices	30
Hoax Devices	31
Injuries and Deaths	32
Bomb Scene Card	33
Assassination Attempt	34
Aviation Explosives Security	36
Crisis Management	37
Bomb Threat Cards	38
Incident Report NCJRS	39

AUG 81 1995

ACQUISITIONS



Introduction

he FBI Bomb Data Center (BDC) collects and reports bombing information to public safety agencies, elected officials and other interested parties. The graphs and tables contained in the body of the summary reflect the use of explosive and incendiary devices by criminals in the United States. Statistics show criminals are increasingly using these devices to facilitate unlawful purposes. This places the public and law enforcement personnel at greater risk.

The information contained in the charts comes from bombing incidents that happened in 1993 in the United States and its territories. Also presented are statistics regarding hoax devices, recoveries of explosives and accidental explosions.

State and local public safety agencies make a significant contribution in reporting these types of incidents to the FBI. In addition, the BDC gathers information from the

Postal Inspection Service; Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal units; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

The BDC makes every effort to accurately report all bombing incidents to you. Special thanks go to the agencies mentioned above whose input makes our goal obtainable.

GLOSSARY

actual bombing:

An illegal detonation or ignition of an explosive or incendiary device. Included is the premature detonation or ignition of a device while it is being prepared, transported or placed.

attempted bombing:

An unsuccessful attempt to illegally detonate or ignite an explosive or incendiary device. The failure of a device to detonate or ignite resulting from the malfunction or the disarmament of the device prior to functioning.

explosive bombing:

An illegal detonation, either actual or attempted, of a device constructed with high or low explosive materials.

incendia_{ry} bombing:

An actual or attempted ignition of a device constructed with flammable materials that induce burning. Since incendiary bombings are commonly referred to as firebombings, they are often considered to be arson. However, the use of a bona fide device is considered to be a bombing regardless of the intent or resultant effects.

motive:

The impulse, emotion or desire that moves a person to perpetrate a violation of a federal, state or local law pertaining to the illegal detonation of an explosive or incendiary device.

time:


The time of day an actual bombing occurs. In an attempted bombing, the time of day is defined when the device is discovered after it malfunctions, or when the device is found and dismantled prior to detonation or ignition.





Federal Bureau of Investigation

World Trade Center Bombing



Scene from the World Trade Center after the bombing. The extensive damage to the complex caused by the explosion is evident.

riday, February
26, 1993, at 12:18 p.m., a massive explosion occurred on the B-2 level of the parking garage at the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City. By the next day, it had become eminently clear to law enforcement officials that a bomb caused the explosion, not a gas leak. The bomb consisted of approximately 1,200 pounds of explosives, making it one of the largest homemade devices ever seen in the U.S. It created a crater 150 feet in diameter and five stories high.

There were approximately

50,000 people in the WTC complex at the time of the explosion. The blast killed six and injured 15 people. Main and backup power generators went off-line because the blast shut off the WTC's exhaust system. This seriously compounded the number of smokerelated injuries—more than 1,000.

The bomb caused enormous damage to the underground parking area of the WTC and the connecting Vista Hotel. Located directly above the blast, the hotel took most of the force of the explosion. The

blast perforated six levels of the parking garage and destroyed cars as far as three or four stories below and 600 feet from the center of the explosion. Property damage amounted to over half a billion dollars. The WTC had to be closed for a month, causing severe problems for the 350 businesses within the complex. Due to the loss of life, numerous injuries, extensive damage, and economic loss, the bombing of the WTC is considered the single largest international terrorist incident ever conducted on U.S. soil.

Immediately after the bombing, a coordinated effort between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies began to process the crime scene to determine who was responsible for this incident. The United States Secret Service: the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); the United States Customs Service: the United States Department of State (USDS); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the New York City Police Department; the New York City Transit Police; the New York State Police; and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA-NYNJ) as well as other local agencies participated with the FBI in this investigation.

Forensic Science Work at the Crime Scene

Three hundred law enforcement officials were assigned to do the forensic examinations of the crime scene, including 70 specially trained FBI Agents. The PA-NYNJ provided the FBI with hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of equipment to process the crime scene and assigned 1,700 personnel to do the reconstruction work on the building once the forensic investigation was completed.

\$2,000,000 © REMARD

At approximately 12 noon on February 26, 1993, a massive explosion rocked the World Trade Center in New York City, causing millions of dollars in damage. The terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center murdered six innocent people, injured over 1,000 others, and left terrified school children trapped for hours in smoke filled elevators.

Following the bombing, law enforcement officials obtained evidence which led to the indictments and arrests of several suspected terrorists involved in the bombing. RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF, one of those indicted, fled the United States immediately after the bombing to avoid arrest. YOUSEF is now a fugitive from justice. YOUSEF was born in Iraq or Kuwait, possesses Iraqi and Pakistani passports, and also claims to be a citizen of the United Arab Emirates. Because of the nature of the crimes for which he is charged, YOUSEF should be considered armed and extremely dangerous.

The United States Department of State is offering a reward of up to \$2,000,000 for information leading to the apprehension and prosecution of YOUSEF. If you have information about YOUSEF or the World Trade Center bombing, contact the authorities, or the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. In the United States, call your local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or 1-800-HEROES1, or write to:

HEROES Post Office Box 96781 Washington, D.C. 20090 - 6781 U.S.A

RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF

DESCRIPTION

DATE OF BIRTH: PLACE OF BIRTH: May 20, 1967 and/or April 27, 1968 Iraq, Kuwait, or United Arab Emirates

HEIGHT: WEIGHT: BUILD: HAIR:

ALIASES:

180 pounds medium brown brown olive male

EYES: brown clive sex: male RACE: white

CHARACTERISTICS:

sometimes is clean shaven Ramzi A. Yousef, Ramzi Ahmad Yousef, Ramzi Yousef, Ramzi Yousef Ahmad.

Ramzi Yousef, Ramzi Yousef Ahmad, Ramzi Yousef Ahmed, Rasheed Yousef, Rashid Rashid, Rashed, Kamal Ibraham, Kamal Abraham, Abraham Kamal, Muhammad Azan, Khurram Khan,

Abdul Basit.



The investigation was dangerous and enormously complex. Before forensic analyses could even begin, crews had to make the area structurally sound. There were worries about dust and carcinogens in the air as well as the Freon tanks of the air-conditioning system bursting. Raw sewage, rotting food, and intermittent fires erupting from gas and fuel leaks complicated matters even more. Despite these hazardous condi-



tions though, only three people were injured among the 2,000 people involved in the crime scene processing and reconstruction of the building.

Law enforcement officials sifted through 2,500 cubic feet of rubble that weighed about 4,000 tons. Of this debris, the FBI transported about 3,000 pounds to their laboratory for further analysis. Thousands of photographs of the crime scene were taken, numerous documents and vehicles were seized, and thousands of fingerprints processed. Every section of the laboratory became involved in the investigation. This represented the largest crime scene on U.S. soil ever processed by the FBI Laboratory.

Despite the size of this formidable investigation and the dangers involved in the operation, by March 24, 1993, less than a month after the explosion, the FBI completed its investigation of the crime scene.

Criminal Investigative Developments

On February 28, 1993, a few days after the blast, investigators found a charred piece of metal they determined to be part of the vehicle that carried the bomb. Further examination of the metal revealed a partial series of impressions from the manufacturer known as a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). With the partial VIN and other information, investigators determined that the vehicle was a yellow Ford Econoline van owned by the Ryder Truck Rental Company. MOHAMMED AMIN SALAMEH rented this van on February 23, 1993, from a Ryder facility in Jersey City, New Jersey.

On February 26 at 4:00 a.m., several hours before the bombing, Salameh and RAMZI AHMED **YOUSEF** were identified in the van at a Shell gas station. A Lincoln Town car accompanying the van carried MAHMUD **ABOUHALIMA** and two others.


Later that afternoon, Salameh went to the Ryder truck rental facility and demanded his deposit back, claiming the van had been stolen. They told him that he needed a police report to get a refund, so Salameh filed one with the Jersey City Police Department

On March 4, 1993, FBI Agents requested that Salameh return to the Ryder facility to receive his refund at which time they arrested him. In Salameh's possession was an airline ticket to Jordan scheduled to depart the U.S. the next day as well as the business card of NIDAL **AYYAD**.

Investigators conducted a search of Abouhalima's residence in Avenell, New Jersey. The FBI's suspicions were raised about Abouhalima's involvement because witnesses identified him with Salameh and others at the gas station just hours before the bombing. He also had ties to Salameh's and Yousel's address in Jersey City, New Jersey. Abouhalima, however, left the country headed for Saudi Arabia on March 2, 1993. A short time later, Egyptian authorities arrested Abouhalima in Egypt and turned him over to American officials.

On March 5, 1993, an employee of a storage center in Jersey City, New Jersey, identified Salameh as having rented a storage locker from them. An investigation revealed that Salameh, and several others, made multiple trips to the facility the day before the bombing. A search of the locker revealed hundreds of pounds of chemicals, in addition to filter paper, fuses, tubing, beakers, and other pyrotechnic materials.

Also on March 5, the New York Times received a letter from the "Liberation Army, Fifth Battalion" claiming responsibility for the bombing. In the letter they said that the bombing was in retaliation for "American political, economical and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator coun-




tries in the region." They demanded the severing of American ties to Israel, or else military and civilian targets in the U.S. would be hit by "more than a hundred and fifty suicidal soldiers" of the Liberation Army. The FBI later linked the letter to Ayyad and arrested him on March 10. Ayyad, an employee of Allied Signal, Inc. of Morriston, New Jersey, has a degree in chemical engineering from Rutgers University.

Legal Developments

About one month after the blast, formal legal proceedings were initiated against several subjects involved in the bombing. On March 17, 1993, a Federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York indicted

had books and video tapes describing bomb construction and how to conduct terrorist operations. He also had literature from the known terrorist organizations Hizballah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Ajaj was incarcerated at the time of the bombing, but he and Yousef are considered the masterminds of the plot.



World Trade Center.

Bombing damage to the PATH station entrance at the

On October 4, 1993, the trial began for defendants Salameh,

Ajaj, Abouhalima and Ayyad. After a five-month trial on March 4, 1994, the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York handed down a guilty verdict. The defendants were convicted on all counts (a total of 38 counts). This verdict stands as an unmistakable message that the U.S. will not tolerate terrorism.

The Judge sentenced each defendant to 240 years in prison with no chance of parole. In addition, they have to pay restitution in the amount of \$100,000,000 each: \$50 to a victim's compensation fund; and a \$100 fine. In the words of President Clinton, "The signal should go out across the world that anyone who seeks to come into this country to practice terrorism will have the full weight of law enforcement brought against them."

This investigation was successful, in part, because of the unprecedented level of cooperation between the federal, state, and local agencies involved. This U.S. law enforcement endeavor has set a standard of excellence for the investigative work performed and in meeting the unparalleled challenges posed in the investigation of the worst act of terrorism ever conducted on U.S. soil.

Salameh and Ayyad and charged them with "unlawfully, will-

fully and knowingly, and with malice, [aiding and abetting] the damage and destruction of, by means of fire and an explosive, a building used in interstate and foreign commerce and death did result (a violation of Title 18, USC, Sections 844 i and 2)." Several days later, the grand jury indicted Abouhalima on the same charges. On March 25, 1993, all were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty. The Judge ordered them held without bail.

A federal grand jury indicted Yousef on March 22. He, however, fled the U.S. immediately after the bombing. In April the FBI named Yousef as a Top Ten Most Wanted Fugitive. The USDS announced that it was offering up to \$2 million dollars reward money for information leading to Yousel's arrest. As of this writing, Yousef is still at large.

On May 6, 1993, MOHAMMED AHMED AJAJ was charged in federal district court with conspiring to damage and destroy, by means of fire and explosive, a building used in interstate commerce (violation of Title 18, USC, Section 371). Ajaj entered the U.S. in 1992 on the same Pakistani flight with Yousef. Upon arrival, the INS detained him for using a fraudulent Swedish passport. At the time of his detention, Ajaj



History

The Bomb Data Center (BDC) began as the National Bomb Data Center in 1970. It was funded through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Congress tasked the LEAA with sponsoring a bomb technicians training course for civilian public safety personnel.

Initially, the International Association of Chiefs of Police managed this program, but in July of 1972 the administration of the program was transferred to the FBI. In 1976 technical supports from the U.S. Army's Picatinny Arsenal ended when LEAA funding ceased. The FBI BDC then took over responsibility for technology transfer, training and publications.

The BDC was assigned to the FBI's Laboratory Division in 1985 and in 1991 relocated to the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia. The responsibilities of the BDC include the technical training of public safety bomb disposal technicians; preparation and dissemination of explosive related publications and bombing incident summaries; technical research and development into the positive use of explosives, advanced equipment and better render safe procedures and techniques; sharing of technical information and bombing incident statistics with foreign bomb data centers and legal attaches; and providing technical support in special event and crisis management situations.

Technical Training

Congress designated the BDC as the administrator and financial sponsor of the FBI Hazardous Devices School (FBI HDS), Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama, in March of 1981. This school is the only one in the U.S. that trains and certifies local public safety officials as bomb technicians.

Besides the training associated with FBI HDS, the BDC conducts regional bomb technician seminars for FBI HDS trained technicians.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Bomb Data Center

Publications

X.

Bomb Data Center

Romb Data Center

PECIAL TECHNICLANS EQUALITY 92-4

NICIANS CULLETIN 874

The BDC collects, collates and disseminates technical and statistical information about improvised explosive and incendiary devices; render safe procedures; explosives research; and bomb technician equipment. In addition to an annual summary, the principle publications of the BDC are as follows:

Special Technicians Bulletin (STB) - contains technical information intended for the trained bomb technician. The STB details render safe techniques. specialized equipment, unusual improvised explosive devices and technical safety information.

Investigators Bulletin - contains technical

information useful to the public safety officer trained to conduct a bombing crime scene investigation. This technical data includes information on bomb construction and potential crime scene hazards.



- sets forth the results of private tests on bomb handling and detection equipment, general evacuation procedures and the elements necessary for good physical security.

Operational Support

In those instances involving spe-

cial events or major cases, the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of an FBI field office can request operational support in explosive related matters. These requests may be initiated by local public safety organizations to the SAC of their geographical area.

In response to such requests, the BDC possesses two bomb disposal trucks and total containment vessels. The total containment vehicles consist of a bomb containment sphere that can withstand the pressure, heat and fragmentation of an explosive



device. Each bomb truck contains all the necessary render safe equipment, to include a bomb disposal robot, bomb protective suits, screening and disruption equipment. This equipment provides a response package with a variety of low risk options for a render safe operation. The technical support offered is in keeping with the philosophy of using remote and safe



Law enforcement personnel conducting a crime scene search of a location where bombing components were located.

procedures unless a life threatening situation leaves no other alternative.

In 1993 the BDC gave operational support during President Clinton's Inauguration festivities, the World

University Games in Buffalo, New York, and Pope John Paul II's visit to U.S. this summer. The BDC was also operationally supportive during many of the major crises of 1993 to include the Waco, Texas, standoff with the Branch Davidians, the World Trade Center bombing disaster in New York, and the riots prison Lucasville, Ohio.



Foreign Cooperation

The BDC operates as a clearinghouse for information on bombing incidents and new render safe procedures. Contact is maintained with bomb data centers in the following countries: England, Canada,

Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Switzerland and Spain.

Research

The BDC manages a variety of research programs involving remote render safe technology, explosives detection, diversionary devices and neutralization techniques for explosive devices.

Bomb Squad Commander Conference

In keeping with its mission for the safety and professionalism of bomb technicians, the BDC periodically hosts a Bomb Squad Commander Conference at the FBI Academy. These conferences are held approximately every eighteen months and

are attended by bomb squad commanders from across the United States. The conference includes lectures, demonstrations and workshops covering topics to include bomb squad management and safety; domes-

tic and international bombing trends; and an overview of bomb disposal techniques.

The latest Bomb Squad Commander Conference was held in October of 1993. One hundred and forty commanders from 47 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico met and discussed major case management. Conference highlights included an overview of the World Trade Center bombing, UNABOM briefing ("University and Airline bombing", a series of 14 unsolved bombings in the U.S. that began in 1978) and a presentation by bomb squad commanders from the United Kingdom, Spain and Columbia addressing the appropriate and safe mitigation of the vehicle bomb.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Hazardous Devices School



L he Hazardous Devices School (HDS) began in 1971 as a response of the U.S. Congress to the large number of bombings in the 1960's. Congress tasked the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration with sponsoring



HDS students participating in a class on D.C. basic electricity.

a bomb technicians training course for civilian public safety personnel. They selected the U.S. Army to provide this instruction at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, and in 1981 directed the FBI to assume administrative and financial responsibility for the

HDS. This task was assigned to the Bomb Data Center (BDC). After which, the school became known as the FBI HDS.

The FBI HDS basic course provides the new bomb technician with four weeks of intensive training involving classroom and range instruction in explosive technology,

construction of improvised explosive and incendiary devices, render safe techniques and training with specialized equipment for the detection and handling of explosive devices. The FBI HDS teaches this course eight times per year enrolling twenty-four students in each class. Attendees must meet certain physical and other requirements, and their nominating organizations must

Display boards depicting bomb components prior to and after a blast.

supply them with the essential equipment to execute their tasks safely. Each basic course graduate receives certification as a bomb technician.

The FBI HDS also conducts 12 one-week refresher courses per year with 16 bomb technicians in each class. The bomb technicians are placed in a variety of simulated exercises to test their areas of expertise. In addition, basic principles are reviewed and current developments in bomb disposal are discussed. Public safety bomb technicians are




HDS students receiving instruction on safe and proper demolition procedures.

also encouraged to attend BDC technician training seminars held throughout the U.S.

For 22 years, the FBI HDS has provided the civilian bomb technician community with an evolving, yet consistent, instructional program. As of December 1993, 4,770 bomb technicians have graduated from the basic course and 3,526 technicians have received refresher training. All FBI HDS certified bomb technicians have been trained in the same way and use the same tech-

niques. This commonality of instruction facilitated the establishment of National Guidelines for bomb technicians and the development of standard operating procedure models for bomb squads. This process has been well supported by the U.S. Army Ordnance Munitions and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal. FBI HDS will continue to serve the bomb technician community in its focus for the preservation of public safety.





United States Postal Inspection Service

Deadly Delivery

he likelihood of receiving a mail bomb is extremely remote. Of the 170 billion pieces of mail delivered by the United States Postal Service (USPS) in 1993, only 10 of those contained bombs.

Although the chance of receiving a mail bomb is slight, the injury, death and destruction they cause are devastating. Those who survive such a traumatic experience carry with them physical and emotional scars for the rest of their lives. The USPS gives the highest investigative priority to the investigation of mailed bombs. As the investigative arm of the USPS, the Postal Inspection Service has the responsibility for apprehending the individuals who commit these crimes.

A particularly disturbing aspect of mailed bombs is how the anticipation of opening an unexpected parcel can be transformed into a nightmare. Once such incident occurred in Minden, Nevada, on September 8, 1993, when Highway Patrol Officer Kenneth Gager and his wife returned home after an evening walk.

They brought in the day's mail including a large package. When the officer opened the package it

opened the package it exploded causing severe abdominal injuries, the loss of

his arm below the elbow, the loss of his left eye and partial blindness in his right eye.

In November of 1993, one individual was arrested and charged with mailing this explosive device. A joint task

force consisting of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service along with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Douglas County Sheriff's Office, the Nevada Highway Patrol and the Nevada Division of Investigations successfully resolved the case. A second individual is currently being held in state custody on burglary and weapons charges.

Mail bombings are particularly serious because they not only threaten the intended victim but also innocent bystanders. Such was the case when Patricia Wilkerson, a secretary, was killed by a mail bomb in 1980.

The bomber intended the parcel to go directly to her employer, Brenda
Crouthamel, the owner of ProWest Computer
Corporation in Manhattan
Beach, California. It came disguised as a new computer device and had a letter instructing the recipient to plug the computer in to see a demonstration. The device detonated when the secretary




The destructive force of the Minden, NV, parcel bomb is evident. The area shown is the kitchen of the officer's house.

followed the instructions.









A wealthy real estate developer was the prime suspect in the case. U.S. Postal Inspectors and members of the Vancouver Police Department arrested him in Canada on November 23, 1993, several days after Postal Inspectors received a tip on his whereabouts. At the time of his arrest, the suspect was living in a basement suite in Vancouver, British Columbia. He had been a fugitive since his indictment for the thirteen-year old crime in August 1993.

The suspect had been involved in civil litigation over a real estate dispute with Crouthamel, the intended target, shortly before the bombing. Days before she was to give a deposition in the

case, he allegedly hired Robert Manning to murder Crouthamel.

Postal Inspectors found Manning in Israel. The Government of Israel extradited him in July 1993—this was first time Israel has extradited a suspect to the U.S.





An FBI demonstration of the potential destructive force of a package bomb.

Although motives and methods of the bomber may vary, no geographic area of the country is inimune to mail bomb attacks. If there is a possibility that you or your organization could be the target of a mail bomb, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service has produced a video for use by mail room and security personnel. In this video the Postal Inspection Service describes common characteristics of mail bombs and gives instructions for the safe handling of suspicious parcels. Posters and pamphlets are also available. Direct requests to:

U.S. Postal Inspection Service Office of Congressional & Public Affairs 475 L'Enfant Plaza West, SW, Room 3140 Washington, D.C. 20260-2175

Letter and Package Bomb Indicators Excessive Restrictive Markings Mailed from Postage Foreign Country 雲||雲|| No Return Misspelled Address Words Addressed SpeciAL D Eli veRY G ENER AL DU N N FT. DI XON N. Y . to Titled Only 135078 Rigid Badly or Bulky Strange Odor Typed or Written Protruding Wires Treat It Wrong Title with Name as Suspect! Isolate It! Lopsided PRECAUTIONS 1. Never accept mail, especially packages, at your home in a foreign area Oily Stains 2. Make sure family members and clerical staff on Wrapper know to refuse all unexpected mail at home or office 3. Remember - It May Be A Bomb -Treat It as Suspect LETTER AND PARCEL BOMB RECOGNITION POINTS ☐ Excessive Postage Lopsided or Uneven Envelope ☐ Incorrect Titles Protruding Wires or Tinfoil ☐ Titles but No Names ☐ Visual Distractions Foreign Mail, Air Mail and Special Delivery ☐ Misspellings of Common Words Restrictive Markings such as Confidential, Oily Stains or Discolorations: Personal, etc. No Return Address ☐ Hand Written or Poorly Typed Addresses ☐ Excessive Weight **Excessive Securing Material such** as Masking Tape, String, etc. ☐ Rigid Envelope FBI BOMB DATA CENTER (703) 640-1504



wo thousand nine hundred and eighty bombing incidents were reported to the Bomb Data Center in 1993. This is less than a one percent decrease over 1992's reported bombing incidents (2,989).

The use of explosives in bombings accounted for 76% of the incidents. The remaining twenty-four percent of the incidents were incendiary.

Actual and Attempted Bombings

In 81% of the bombing incidents, the devices were "successful", defined as either detonating or igniting, and 19% were "unsuccessful." Explosive devices detonated as planned 83% of the time and incendiary devices ignited 74% of the time.

Injuries and Deaths


In 1993 casualties from bombings numbered 1,372, forty-nine of those individuals died from the injuries they sustained. This figure includes 1,042 persons who were injured when a bomb went off in the World Trade Center building in New York City on February 26, 1993.

Places

Of the 2,980 bombing incidents for 1993, 1,023 (34%) occurred in the Western states. Twenty-nine percent of the incidents occurred in the Southern states (858) which includes Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico and 28% (830) in the North Central states. The Eastern states endured nine percent of the bombings, two hundred and sixty-nine.

Time

Of the 2,980 bombing incidents, the time of occurrence was recorded in 2,545 incidents. Fifteen percent of time the hour of the attack was not known.







The majority of the incidents, seventy-four percent, happened between six in the evening and six in the morning. Eighty-one percent of the incidents against private property occurred during this time frame. Seventy-eight percent of the postal facility bombings, 79% of the vehicular bombings, and 75% of the bombs targeting commercial operations also happened during the evening and early morning hours.

Fifty-nine percent of the time, bombs targeting educational

facilities occurred during the day.

Property Damage

Damage to properties in 1993 was calculated at approximately 518 million dollars. This figure accounts for the astronomical destruction (510 million dollars) to the World Trade Center building by a bomb in Fecruary of 1993.



Recoveries of Devices

The Bomb Data Center tabulated recoveries only if certain criteria were met:

They must be either explosive or incendiary devices.

At the time of the recovery, the device must have been without a target, for example, seized during a search or traffic stop. If the device was mailed, placed, thrown or projected at a target the incident was tabulated as an attempted bombing.

Recoveries of items such as dynamite and electric blasting caps were not counted as a recovery unless, for example, the dynamite was primed with the electric blasting cap.

There were 811 incidents involving the recovery of devices. Ninety-three percent of the time public safety agencies recovered explosive devices. The remaining seven percent involved the recovery of incendiary devices.

Hoaxes


There were 404 incidents involving hoax devices in 1993. Thirty-three percent were preceded by a threatening note, letter or telephone call to the establishment or individual target. For our purposes, "suspicious packages" were not tabulated, e.g., unclaimed luggage in an airport.

Financial Institutions received some type of threat prior to the incident half of the time and commercial/retail establishments 47% of the time. Offices were warned 27% of the time, academic facilities 26% and residential property owners were warned prior to a hoax 24% of the time.




Bombing Incidents.

\ \ /			1983	1984	1985	1286	1987	1988	1789	1990	1991	1992	1993
	R	Total	687	803	847	858	848	977	1208	1582	2499	2989	2980
	D.	xplosive tendjany.	442 127	518 127	575 102	580 129	600 104	593 156	641 203	931 267	1551 423	1911 582	1880 538
	2	xplosive cendiary	77 41	118 40	113 57	101 48	102 42	161 40	243 91	254 130	395 130	384 112	375 187
		Property Damage	6.34	5.61	6.35	3.40	4.20	2.26	5.00	9.60	6.44	12.50	*518
2)		Persons Injured	100	112	144	185	107	145	202	222	230	349	*1323
		Deaths	12	6	28	14	21	20	11	27	29	26	49



Incidents by Quarter and Day




Theidents by Time or Occurrence


	12:01am =6am	601am -Noon	112:01pm =6pm	Midnight Midnight	Unitanoxyani
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES	þ				
Private Residences	220	33	38	141	37
Mailboxes/Other Private Property	272	63	117	405	241
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES					o
Financial Institutions	6	2	3	4	
Commercial/Retail	57	15	16	55	25
Restaurants	/ 9	_	2 °	₅ 14	2
Offices	7	211	2		
Other Commercial Operations	23	8	6	22	7
VEHICLES					
Automobiles	148	36	28	95	35
Other Vehicles	7	2	2	6	6
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROPERTY					W ANG S
Postal Facility/Equipment	15	2	7	16	/ / 2
Law Enforcement/Judiciary	1	2			
Military Facilities	1	5	1	· /	
Other Federal Government	3		1		
UTILITIES					
Electric Facilities		. 1	3	4	2
Nuclear Facilities	-		_ 1		
Water/Sewer	2			2	
MEDICAL FACILITIES					
Hospitals				4	
Abortion Clinics	3	1	2		1
Other Medical Facilities	3				
OTHER TARGETS					
State/Local Government Property	12	5	12	. 11	
Law Enforcement/Judiciary	9	3	5	11	4
Bridge/Highway	7	3	12	17	6
Academic Facilities	25	49	33	32	26
Church/Synagogue/Temple	4	• -		6	3
Vending Machines	15	2	. I	7	
Open Area	12	_7	32	47	21
Other	35	35	33	56	12
Accidental Detonation/	7	5	18	22	3
Unknown Target	004		-	A *** A	, a , a , a , a , a , a , a , a , a , a
TOTALS	904	291	376	974	435

Incidents by State

STATE	EXPLO actual	SIVES attempt	NCEN actual	DIARIES attempt	STATE	EXPL()SIVES attempt	\\CE\\ actual) ARIES attempt
ALASKA	5	0	0	0	NEVADA	10	4	5	1
ARIZONA	148	7	3	1	NEW MEXICO	32	5	2	0
CALIFORNIA	324	80	112	25	OREGON	22	8	1	0
COLORADO	55	8	23	11.	UTAH	10	6	0	0
GUAM	1	0	0	0	WASHINGTON	44	9	1	1
HAWAII	22	6	1	0	WYOMING	8	1	3	0
IDAHO	4	2	0	0	TOTALS	696	136	152	39
MONTANA	11	0	1	0	1 3.17 160	3.0			•




incidents by State



STATE	EXPLO actual	SIVES attempt	\ CE\ [actual) ARIES attempt	STATE	EXP[(actual	OSIVES attempt	INCEN actual	DIARIES attempt
ALABAMA	15	2	2	1	MISSISSIPPI	10	2	10	0
ARKANSAS	11	1	5	1	NORTH CAROLINA	17	2	12	1
DELAWARE	3	0	0	0	OKLAHOMA	19	7	3	5
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	3	1	1	0	SOUTH CAROLINA	8	0	1	0
FLORIDA	188	30	17	10	TENNESSEE	21	4	2	1
	17	1	9	2	TEXAS	101	12	65	19
GEORGIA	7	7	6	2	VIRGINIA	37	7	3	7
KENTUCKY	. 7	,	•	_	WEST VIRGINIA	12	2	1	1
LOUISIANA	29	6	4	0	PUERTO RICO	14	4	9	3
MARYLAND	32	3	15	5	FORKIO WICO	1 1	ť	,)
					TOTALS	544	91	165	58


Incidents by State



STATE	EXPL actual)SIVES attempt	\\CE\\ 'actual	DIARIES attempt	STATE	EXPL()\$ VE\$ attempt	\\(\(\bar{\chi}\) actual	NDIARIES attempt
ILLINOIS	125	31	120	50	Nebraska	12	3	3	0
INDIANA	42	5	2	3	NORTH DAKOTA	3	0	0	0
IOWA	51	6	9	4	OHIO	61	13	· 12	4
KANSAS	12	1	2	1	SOUTH DAKOTA	5	1	0	0
MICHIGAN	69	18	15	5	WISCONSIN	15	7	0	0
MINNESOTA	62	5	16	3	TOTALS	474	95	187	74
MISSOURI	17	5	8	4	101/100	. , .			* *.


Incidents by States

STATE	EXPL() actual)SIVES attempt	\\CE\\ actual)(ARIES attempt	STATE	EXPL(actual)\$ \/E\$ attempt	\\(CE\\ actual) ARIES attempt
CONNECTICUT	8	12	3	2	NEW YORK	78	19	15	5
MAINE	1	1	0	0	PENNSYLVANIA	33	6	13	3
MASSACHUSETTS	11	5	0	0	RHODE ISLAND	3	0	0	2
NEW HAMPSHIRE	5	0	0	0	VERMONT	3	0	1	1
NEW JERSEY	24	10	2	3	TOTALS	166	53	34	16






WESTERNSOUTHERNNORTH CENTRALEASTERN





Incidents by Region




Incidents by Target

(D) ************************************			
TARGET	EVDIAGIVE	AINIGENIAIN DV	PROPERTY DAMAGES
RESIDENT/ALGERCHEINTER			
	175	229/4	\$2,138,105
Mailipoxes/Outrar (Pulvate, Property)	96	109	290,953
COMMINICOVAL (RECEIPERATES)	o re		in alpha in a signa in a
Finangal/ត្រឡាយ៧០ភាន	່ ປອເ ເຄດດ		43,350 43,66
. Commercial/Recill	21	57	1,370,585 137,010
Restaurants Offices	11	6	*510,008,650
Other Commercial Operations	51	15	240,500
VEHICLES 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18	, J,	13	240,300
Automobiles	211	131	728,445
Other Vehicles	15	8	16,690
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROPERTY_			
Postal Facility/Equipment	37	5	55,147
Law Enforcement/Judiciary	3	_	126,500
Military Facilities	6	1	
Other/Federal Government	4	_	102,200
UTILITIÉS		- 12	
Electric Facilities	9	1 0	20,300
Nuclear Facilities	1	-	100
Water/Sewer	4	_	1,500
" MEDICAL FACILITIES			
₩ospitals	1	_	100
Abortion Clinics	2	5	141,650
Other Medical Facilities		4	2,000
OTHER TARGETS			34.050
State/Local Government Property	36	5	31,050
Law Enforcement/Judiciary	24	8	138,800
Bridge/Highway	41 143	4	5,250
Academic Facilities	145	22 5	1,121,286
Church/Synagogue/Temple Vending Machines	26)	2,900 15,325
Open Area	99	20	1,770
Other	156	15	674,236
Accidental Detonation/	54	1	463,800
Unknown Target	34		705,000
TOTALS	2,255	725	\$517,878,202
0			



Recovered Explosives



TOP FIVE STATES FOR **RECOVERIES**

IDAHO 1,218

1,612

ARKANSAS 1,151

GEORGIA

TEXAS 969

OKLAHOMA 879

TOP FIVE STATES FOR POUNDS

IDAHO

ARKANSAS

IJ, 27/6

NEBRASKA

IJ, 112/5

KENTUCKY

9/6/8

GEORGIA

9/49

TOP FIVE STATES FOR **DETONATORS**

Information courtesy of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Number of Incid ts 1.350

Pounds of High Street Explosives 6.803

Pounds of Low. Explosives 313

Number of Detonators 11.689

Feet of Detonating Cord/ Safety Fuse 80,862

Number of Grenades
615

Number of Simulators 344



Low Explosive Fillers

Container	BLACK POWDER	SMOKELESS POWDER	MATCH HEADS	PYROTECHNICS/ FIREWORKS	IMPROVISED MIXTURE	CHEMICAL MIXTURES	OTHER	UNKNOWN
PIPE/METAL TUBE	380	463	19	57	23	6	75	345
PIPE/PLASTIC TUBE	136	213	23	52	15	4	6	128
CARDB OA RD/PAPER TUBE	79	49		461	2	4	2	46
BOTTLE—GLASS	17	19	7	8	2	60	1	16
BOTTLE – PLASTIC	4	11		6	2	733	1	
ВОХ	3	5	# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	Section 2		1	\$ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	9
BAG	1	1	1	2			1	4
CAN	19	11		7	4	4	1	5
VEHICLE BOMB		-					X	1
IMPROVISED MILITARY ORDNANCE	13	50	and the second of the second o	6,	1		1	24
NONE					1	1	, many	1
OTHER	28	50	3	94	4	2	12	39
UNKNOWN	6	5		15		3	-	187
TOTAL	686	877	53	708	54	818	100	



Improvised Explosive Devices

					ig	Jh	E			09	SIVE	e Fi		ers			
TOTAL		DYNAMITE	PRIMERS/ BOOSTERS		ANFO	TOAG CIVONIO	EXPLOSIVE		LNI-		C-4	BLASTING CAP DETONATOR	OTHED		UNKNOWN	TOTAL	
1,368	}	3	1		2	As a property of the state of t		A Company of the Comp	F		-	1		2	2	11	
577	7	4	-		lons:		1		jess		4	1		1			
645	3	_	4		mai		1		to the same				dan managan in production and		2	7	
130)				2				pag.		iamba .				Email 1	2	
0)		-		Naca .						Mod			1		1	
16	}	6	past		2				BASI		•	-		-	To the second se	9	
10)					W	1		m i				i	1		2	
51		1	383		iden .		1					1				3	
Í			-	1000	2005		i special		es es			-		1	Action of the control	1	
91)	16	_				rang		5	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	- (1)	1		1	3	26	
# E	}	17			1		1	A Company of the Comp	1000	10 may 10	4	15	and the second	2	1	41	
232	2	2	1		-		1		6			2		2	9	23	
216	7)	3	1	1000	<u> </u>		1		444		1			1	3	10	

11

52

★ Totals reflect improvised explosive devices used in bombings as well as devices that were recovered, e.g., in a search of a residence.

147 *


12


21

9

21

Filler Material in Exprosive Devices





* Totals reflect improvised explosive devices used in bombings as well as devices that were recovered, e.g., in a search of a residence.

Explosive Euzing

TYPE OF FUZING FOR IMPROVISED EXPLO	OSIVE DEVICES					
Electrical	265					
Non-electrical	3,555					
Unknown 441						

INITIATING METHODS FOR IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES					
Delay	3,548				
Booby-trapped	112				
Command-remote control	53				
Radio controlled	6				
Unknown	542				

FUNCTIONING OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES						
Impact	49					
Clock/Mechanical delay	43					
Burning delay	2,620					
Chemical delay	818					
Electrical/Electronic delay	143					
Pressure activated	8					
Pressure release activated	39					
Pull/Push activated	46					
Tension release activated	1					
Unknown	494					

Numbers reflect improvised explosive devices used in bombings as well as devices that were recovered, e.g., in a search of a residence.

1993 BOMB SUMMARY

Incendiary Devices

and Riller

Fillers

Containers

700000	
GASOLINE	CARDBOARD/PAPER TUBE
PYROTECHNICS/FIREWORKS	PIPE/PLASTIC TUBE BOTTLE – GLASS/PLASTIC
PROPANE, BUTANE, ETC.	. \ / \ / pro
OTHER FLAMMABLE SOLID	CAN CAN
OTHER FLAMMABLE LIQUID 3	VEHICLE BOMB VISED MILITARY DEVICE NONE
OTHER	NONE NONE
LINUADOWAL	/X / \ OTHER
TOTAL	UNKNOWN
LIOIAL X	TOTAL
\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	/ \\ 3\\ /\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
9KD 3/3/	
\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	× × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×
	X
	31/33/81
	DELAY 214
lar	IMPACT 792
BOC	BY TRAPPED 11
Incendiary	OTHER 7
Incendiary BOC Devices	UNKNOWN 17

 \star Totals reflect improvised incendiary devices used in bombings as well as devices that were recovered, e.g., in a search of a residence.



integents involving Hoax Devices

HOAX DEVICES BY TARGET

TARGET	PRECEDED BY A THREAT	NO . THREAT
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES	13	41
COMMERCIAL/ RETAIL	26	29
OFFICES	5.5	8
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS	43	43
ACADEMIC FACILITIES	14	39
GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES	ં	14
UTILITIES	<u>@</u>	5
VEHICLES		17
MEDICAL FACILITIES	4	6
LAW ENFORCEMENT	2	13
BRIDGES/ HIGHWAYS	9	12
OTHER		44
TOTAL	165	727/1
	Programme Artist Williams Company	

TOTAL

404



HOAX DEVICES BY QUARTER


		1500	or o	1400	r jar	ANV	T/A	r) V	-24-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-
1) E			-		岩宗	
a.			æ.			킛	an Alterna	Alk	M. 1877
ै	20	77.3	1/4 1/29	15.	aiAi	4,00	Ç,	W	1.2 4

		مساحة مناسقهم مناسبة		والمار والمناورة والمناورة والمارية
148 148 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1.55 A	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	The second secon	CONTROL SEC.
			Service Comment	100
机 多种混合物		10.00		
A		A TO A PARK	AND THE PARTY OF T	
Let in				
	AND IN THE	1000		A PARTY OF THE PAR
				10 × 10 × 10 × 10 × 10 × 10 × 10 × 10 ×



100 ÖCTÖBER ... DEGEMBER

33% of incidents involving Hoax devices were preceded by a threatening note, letter or telephone call.




Injuries Vand Deaths



STATE	INJURIES D	EATHS	STATE	INJURIES E	DEATHS	STATE I	njuries de	ATHS
AL	4		KY	1	1	ОН	5	1
AK	· ·	1	LA	1	1	OK	3	_
AZ	3	e	ME	55004		OR	2	_
AR	1	medi	MD	5	1	PA	17	-
CA	35	4	MA			PR	9	_
CO	6	_	MI	9	1	RI	anian,	
CT	3		MM	2	- Inches	SC	. 2	16/100
DE			MS	3	2	SD	-	-
DC	•••	_	MO	5	3	TN	E1000	-
	24	1	MT	1	-	TX	21	1
GA	. 2	-	NE	. .	-	UT		
GU	4		NV	4	_	VI		· -
HI	1	-	NH			VA	9	
ID	1	-	NJ	5	2	WA	10	6
	29	4	NM	3		WV	3	1
IN	4	1	* MY	1,065	15	WI	4	-
IA	2	1	NC	2	1	WY	9	
KS	4	1	ND	· <u></u>		TOTAL	1,323	49

 $^{^{}st}$ 1,042 people were injured and six were killed in the World Trade Center bombing.





Bomb Scene Card

Available from the **Bomb Data Center** upon request.

BOMB CRIME SCENE OPERATION

- S Seal off area/save crime scene.
- Command center established in safe area: mandatory control point for personnel and evidence.
- E Evacuate injured; leave obviously dead.
- N No unnecessary disruption of bombing crime scene by non-investigative personnel.
- E Essential personnel only within cordon area; full awareness of secondary devices.

THIS IS THE SCENE OF A SERIOUS CRIM FORENSIC EVIDENCE WILL BE IMPORT

FBI Bomb Data Center

Bomb Threat Operation

Suspect Item Located

Bomb Crime Scene Bomb Technician Operation

Bomb Threat/Warning

Operation

BOMB THREAT OPERATION

- T Target assessment: accurate information on site and occupants; i.e., controversial, political, prominent, etc.
- H How to search; coordinate a systematic search.
- R Remote command center established at a safe perimeter.
- E Evaluate if necessary based on threat analysis.
- A Awareness of other targets; beware of secondary devices.
- T Tape and man appropriate cordons; keep people out at all costs,

DO NOT TOUCH OR MOVE SUSPECT ITEM BOMB TECHNICIANS TO BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY MEDICAL AND FIRE PERSONNEL ON ALERT

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Assassination Attempt of Former President George Bush



n April 14 through 16, 1993, former President George Bush visited Kuwait to celebrate the Allied victory in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. During his visit, authorities of the Government of Kuwait arrested 16 people and charged them in a conspiracy to kill Bush. On June 5, 1993, the trial of the alleged plotters, most of whom face the death penalty if convicted, opened in a state security court in Kuwait.

Shortly after the government of Kuwait reported the arrests, the FBI sent a team of investigators on several trips to Kuwait City, Kuwait, and other countries. They conducted interviews and examined the evidence against the plotters. These teams were asked to find out if evidence existed supporting the alleged assassination plot and if so, who was responsible.

In May 1993, FBI personnel were sent to Kuwait to conduct interviews of the subjects. During the interviews two subjects, RA'D 'ABD AL-AMIR 'ABBUD **AL-ASADI** and WALI 'ABD AL-HADI 'ABD AL-HASAN **AL-GHAZALI** admitted their own involvement and the government of Iraq's direction of the plot.

Iraq's initiation of the plot began with Al-Ghazali. He had connections to the Iraqi military having served in both the Iran/Iraq and Persian Gulf Wars. During the second conflict, he received basic training in the use of explosives.

On April 8, 1993, an operative of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) took Al-Ghazali to a hotel in Basra, Iraq. On April 9, 1993, a man who identified himself as ABU **RAFED** met with Al-Ghazali telling him of a




mission that he (Al-Ghazali) could not refuse. Appealing to Al-Ghazali's patriotism, Rafed said that George Bush had to be killed because of his part in the destruction of the Iraqi Army during the Persian Gulf War. Rafed went on to explain that Bush was now a private citizen journeying to Kuwait presenting Al-Ghazali with the perfect opportunity to assassinate the former President. Al-Ghazali said that he tried to protest the mission, but Rafed insisted that it could not be refused.

On April 10, 1993, Rafed took Al-Ghazali to a building guarded by the military. He showed him a Toyota Landcruiser equipped with explosives, which he (Al-Ghazali) was to drive into Kuwait and detonate. Bush would be at Kuwait University to receive an honorary degree. It was there that he was to kill Bush with the car bomb.

Rafed showed Al-Ghazali several ways to detonate the device. If he could not get close enough to Bush at the University, Rafed instructed him to detonate the car

bomb on "Bush"
Street in Kuwait
City. As a last resort,
he gave Al-Ghazali a
belt laden with
explosives that he
was to use against
Bush in a suicide
attack.

Meanwhile, on April 10, 1993, Al-Asadi, a smuggler, said he was approached by an Iraqi identified as MUHAMMAD JAWWAD also in Basra, Iraq. Jawwad asked Al-Asadi if he would be crossing the



These are some of the cube-shaped exposive devices that were to be detonated in places of commerce around Kuwait. This tactic was designed to create fear and confusion in the hope that Kuwait would ask that international sanctions against Iraq be lifted.



Iraq/Kuwait border any time in the near future. Al-Asadi told him that he would shortly be taking contraband alcohol into Kuwait. Al-Asadi said that he had seen Jawwad in the company of several known IIS informants.

The next day, Jawwad contacted Al-Asadi and told

him he had a car and driver that needed to be smuggled into Kuwait. He offered him money and alcohol in payment. Al-Asadi met with his smuggling partners and they agreed to accept the offer.

On April 12, 1993, Al-Ghazali and Al-Asadi first met each other in Zubayr, Iraq. The IIS contact told Al-Asadi that he was to guide Al-Ghazali to Kuwait University. The IIS contact provided Al-Asadi with ten explosive devices and told him that he was to detonate these



Toyota Landcruiser that housed the explosives.

devices at places of commerce around Kuwait. This tactic was designed to create fear and confusion in the hope that Kuwait would ask that international sanctions against Iraq be lifted.

Al-Asadi placed these devices in his car and other weapons in the Landcruiser laden

with explosives. The IIS contact gave the group Kuwaiti license plates to be placed on the vehicles before they crossed the border.

After dark the group crossed over the Kuwaiti border and camped for the night. On the morning of April 14, 1993, they went to retrieve the Landcruiser from the warehouse where they had stored the vehicle the day before. What they found, however, was the warehouse surrounded by Kuwaiti police.

Forensic Evidence

While in Kuwait FBI officials had the opportunity to examine some forensic evidence associated with the assassination plot. This included the Toyota Landcruiser that housed 80 kilograms of explosives. FBI experts concluded that this car bomb had a lethal radius of about 400 yards. The bomb could be detonated by remote control, by a time-delay system or by a "suicide switch", detonating the bomb instantaneously.

The specific mechanics of the bomb strongly point to Iraqi involvement in the plot. Components of the bomb confiscated were virtually identical to components of other known Iraqi devices. The FBI also determined that the same person or persons constructed the remote control fusing systems used in the device. The fusing system was also similar to other devices associated with the government of Iraq. The explosive used in the device was

contained in a explosive devices used by Iraqi operatives in Manila, Philippines; Bangkok, Thailand; and Jakarta, Indonesia.

A CONTRACTOR OF THE STATE OF TH

The FBI's investigation of this case led the U.S. government to conclude that the IIS was responsible for the assassination attempt of former President George Bush. After reviewing the evidence collected by the FBI as well as the U.S. intelligence available concerning this incident, on June 26, 1993, President Bill Clinton ordered two American warships to launch tomahawk cruise missiles against the IIS headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq, in retaliation for the plot.

The FBI's State Sponsors of Terrorism Unit wrote this article in conjunction with the FBI's Terrorist Research Analytical Unit.

Federal Aviation Administration

Aviation Explosives Security Program



The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has an active Aviation Explosives Security Program (AESP) that covers a variety of civil aviation security-related explosives topics. Headquarters and field-based Special Agents conduct airport explosives security surveys. They also provide airports and air carriers with explosives recognition and bomb threat management training.

Aviation Explosives Security Special Agents at the National Flight Security Field Division, Dulles

International Airport, Washington, D.C., respond to emergency requests for assistance 24 hours a day should an aircraft encounter an explosive device inflight. They also assist the National Transportation Safety Board in conducting aircraft accident investigations where explosions or explosive

devices are the suspected cause.


Research and development efforts are an integral part of the AESP. The FAA is the international focal point for aircraft explosives incident duplication, in-flight explosives countermeasures development and blast effects analysis involving commercial airplanes.

The FAA Explosives Detection K-9 Team Program celebrated 20 years of service in 1992. The FAA

will provide all dogs, initial training, logistics sup port, annual certification and refresher training to all participants. This is done through interagency agreements with the U.S. Air Force and the local law enforcement agency involved. This FAA program continues to serve as a major national program countering the threat of explosives and improvised explosive devices to the flying public.

The FAA has Aviation Explosives Security training for local law enforcement, Explosive Ordnance Disposal

units and K-9 personnel at least twice a year. The FAA conducts this training at the FAA Academy, Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, OK. These classes provide students with aviation-specific training to improve their ability to respond to airports and other civil aviation facilities.



An explosive test on a baggage compartment.

For further information on FAA Aviation Explosives Security Programs, contact SA Ed Kittel or SA Calvin Walbert at (202) 267-7457/8672, or for K-9 matters, contact Ms. Mary Carol Turano at (202) 267-8041.

Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Explosives Security Unit (ACS-53) 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591





Federal Bureau of Investigation Crisis Management

he World Trade Center bombing, the Waco, Texas, standoff, Three Mile Island, Pan Am 103 and the 1993 Midwest Floods names a few of our country's prominent crises. They have taught us that tragedy can occur with little or no warning! It is not paranoia, but merely an acceptance of reality to assume that the next crisis is just over the horizon.

Cockpit segment from ill-fated Pan American flight 103.

Unfortunately, none of us are completely safe from those low-probability, high-consequence events known as emergencies and/or disasters. Whether in business or government, this point has often been spectacularly emphasized. The potential for disaster emanating from a crisis is high. Government and business should begin or increase the training necessary to have sound crisis planning, able crisis managers, crisis teams and assets. There

are a wide range of possible disasters from product tampering, hostile take-overs, hazardous waste problems to terrorism, natural disasters and kidnapings.

The terms "crisis" and "disaster" are not synonymous. In Webster's Dictionary, a crisis is a "decisive moment" or "crucial time" a "turning point for better or worse." So when a crisis occurs do not view it as a time when all is lost, but with deter-

Police officers and FBI agents conducting a crime scene search at a location where bombing components were located.

mination and a realization that you have an opportunity to influence the results of the crisis.

We would prefer our crisis to end in a totally successful, positive result. We must realize, however, that circumstances beyond our control often dictate otherwise. You should view successful crisis management within the context of how much more negative the outcome had

good sound crisis management principles not been applied.

The FBI, because of the operational environment and its responsibilities therein, recognizes that sound crisis management is an essential tool. The FBI has greatly enhanced its operational crisis management assets technologically and tactically. We use these assets routinely in major crisis events occurring within our jurisdiction. Because of this, we have formally incorporated this type of training into our Management Training Program. Successful crisis management by the FBI in many major cases has been recognized worldwide.

Whether you are in private business or local, state or federal government, seriously assess whether a poorly handled crisis would be unaffordable and disastrous to you. Do you need to have a crisis management plan and a crisis management organization as well as the assets necessary to effectively implement them? If the answer is yes, then you must seek out the assistance you need. There is written material available that is disaster or crisis-specific.

There are also various centers, usually associated with public institutions of higher learning or with the federal government, that can furnish information or training. There are also private consultants who specialize in this subject matter.

Do not wait for a crisis to occur

only to find that you are not ready. Preparation is your best chance to avoid disaster or mitigate its effects upon you and your organization.





QUESTIONS TO ASN. Loud Laughter Crack Crysing Diagly Normal Acct Distinct Part Normal Stured Whilepete	Bomb Data Center
3. What does it look into: 4. What kind of bomb is it? 5. What will cause it to explode? 6. Did you place the bomb? 7. Why? 8. What is your address? 9A System Music Looks In Journal Is your name? 1. What is your name?	Factory machinery Animal noises Clear State Local Local Local distance Booth FD-730 (5-6-67) FO-730 (5-6-67) FO-730 (5-6-67)
Report C Sex of caller: Race: Phone 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2.	FBI BOMB DATA CENTER FBI BOMB DATA CENTER FONGA ESTA TARMETA DERAID DE SU TELEFOND PREGUNTAS A HACER: At qué hora explotará la bomba? Dónde está ahora mismo? Cómo es? Auté lipo de bomba es? PRUIDOS EN EL FONDO: Trastes Magumaría de oficina Misica Motor Puticos calejeros Motor Partus Presida Presida Risidos Risidos Magumaría de oficina Misica Magumaría de oficina Misica Motor Puticos calejeros Motor Presida Presida
and in Spanish Sexo de la persona Raza: Edad Ilamada: recibió la Ilamada: Hora:	Notifique flamada immediatamente a



he public safety agencies contributing bombing statistics should note that the BDC has modified the Incident Report Form. We intend the changes to improve the reporting process. It is of the utmost necessity that your departments use the new forms exclusively and immediately because of our computer programming and the inefficiency of transposing the information from obsolete forms or individual department's reports.

The BDC appreciates the thoroughness that public safety agencies consistently practice when reporting bombing incidents to our center. The public safety community uses the information presented in this summary as a guideline for the allocation of resources to bomb squads for equipment and personnel.

Please duplicate the incident report form found on the next pages. Report incidents involving actual or attempted explosive or incendiary devices; recoveries of devices and explosives; and when a hoax device is discovered.

Our space is limited so we cannot store much paperwork. Do not send in police reports, but rather fill in the narrative section of the report. In this section you can clarify the nature of the incident.

Submit the form directly to the BDC within one month of the incident. It is helpful if the reports are sent in on a timely basis rather than a single submission at the end of the year. Send the incident reports no later than February 1, 1995, or they will not be counted in the 1994 calendar year.

If you have any questions about the form contact the BDC directly at (703) 640-1504 or 1505.

INCIDENT REPORT

	◯ Initial Submission	Supplemental	
Return to:	Reporting Agency and State		
FBI Bomb Data Center		- Landers - Land	
FBI Academy	D 1 0 171 16		
Quantico, Virginia 22135			
Nature of Incident	Case Number		
The following information is submitted in connection with (cl	eck applicable item);		
Explosive Bombing (complete all items, except B)	Actual Bombing	Attempted Bombing	
Incendiary Bombing (complete all items, except B)	Actual Bombing	Attempted Bombing	
○ Hoax Device (complete items A, C, J-T) ○ Recovery of an Improvised Device (complete items A, C-F, I	1/-T)		
Recovery of Explosives (complete items A and B)			
Recovery of Military Ordnance (complete items A and C)			
A. Occurrence	complete each blank):		
1. Date 2. Day of the Week	3. Time		
4. Location		12:01 am to 6:00 am	
a. City/Township of Occurrenceb. County of Occurrence		○ 6:01 am to Noon ○ 12:01 pm to 6:00 pm	
c. State of Occurrence		6:01 pm to Midnight	
d. NCIC Agency Identifier (9 Characters)			
B. Explosi	es Recovered:		
High Explosives pounds Low Explosives			
C., Natu	re of Device:		
1. Explosive(s) (number of devices)	2. O Incendiary (number of devices)	
a. O Improvised	a. Molotov Cockta		
b. U.S. Military Ordnance	1. Self-ig	niting	
1. ○ Grenade 2. ○ Surplus/Modified Grenade	2. Wick		
3. Projectile	b OIIS Military		
4. Training Simulator	b. U.S. Military 1. Grenae	de	
	1. ○ Grenac 2. ○ Projec	tile	
5. Other (please specify)	1. ○ Grenac 2. ○ Projec c. ○ Other (please sp	tile	
5. Other (please specify) c. Unknown	1. ○ Grenac 2. ○ Projec	tile	
5. Other (please specify) c. Unknown 3. Hoax Device(s) (number of devices)	1. Grenac 2. Projec c. Other (please sp d. Unknown	tile	
5. Other (please specify) c. Unknown 3. Hoax Device(s) (number of devices) D.	1. ○ Grenac 2. ○ Projec c. ○ Other (please sp	tile	
5. Other (please specify) c. Unknown 3. Hoax Device(s) (number of devices) D. 1. Explosive/ Incendiary	1. Grenac 2. Projec c. Other (please sp d. Unknown	tile	
5. Other (please specify) c. Unknown 3. Hoax Device(s) (number of devices) D. 1. Explosive/ Incendiary	1. Grenae 2. Projec c. Other (please sp d. Unknown Fuzing: c. Initiation (Triggering):	tile	
5. Other (please specify) c. Unknown 3. Hoax Device(s) (number of devices) D. 1. Explosive/ Incendiary a. Type:	1. Grenae 2. Projec c. Other (please sp d. Unknown Fuzing: c. Initiation (Triggering):	tile pecify) ectrical/Chemical/Mechanical)	
5. Other (please specify) c. Unknown 3. Hoax Device(s) (number of devices) D. 1. Explosive/ Incendiary a. Type: 1. Electrical	1. Grenae 2. Projec c. Other (please sp d. Unknown Fuzing: D. Initiation (Triggering): 1. Time Delay (El	ectrical/Chemical/Mechanical)	
5. Other (please specify) c. Unknown 3. Hoax Device(s) (number of devices) 1. Explosive/ Incendiary a. Type: 1. Electrical 2. Non-Electrical	1. Grenace 2. Project c. Other (please spectrum) d. Unknown Fuzing: D. Initiation (Triggering): 1. Time Delay (Elegano) 2. Booby-Trappect	tile pecify) ectrical/Chemical/Mechanical) d (victim initiated) note Control	
5. Other (please specify) c. Unknown 3. Hoax Device(s) (number of devices) 1. Explosive/ Incendiary a. Type: 1. Electrical 2. Non-Electrical	1. Grenace 2. Project c. Other (please spectrum) d. Unknown Fuzing: 5. Initiation (Triggering): 1. Time Delay (El 2. Booby-Trappect 3. Command-Ren	tile pecify) ectrical/Chemical/Mechanical) d (victim initiated) note Control	

 Explosive/Incendiary (cont.) 				
c. C Functioning:		6. Pressure Activated		
1. O Impact		7. Pressure Release Activated		
2. Clock/Mechanical Delay		8. Pull/Push Activated		
3. O Burning Delay		9. Tension Release Activated		
4. Chemical Delay		10. Other (please specify)		
5. CElectrical/Electroni	c Delay	11. O Unknown		
	E. Filler:	76		
1. Explosive – If known				
a. Low Explosive(s):				
1. O Black Powder/		3. Pyrotechnics/Fireworks/Flash Powder		
Smokeless Powder/Pyrode	2x	4. Improvised Mixture		
2. O Match Heads		5. Other (please specify)		
b. High Explosive(s)		8. Sheet Explosive		
1, O Dynamite		9. O Water Gel		
2. Primers/Boosters		10. C Emulsion		
3. CANFO		11. O Shock Tube		
4. ODetonating Cord		12. Blasting Cap/Detonator		
5. Two-Part Explosive	e (Binary)	13. Chemical Mixture		
6. OTNT		(i.e., Nitroglycerin, Methyl Nitrate)		
7. 🔾 C-4		14. Other (please specify)		
c. Chemical/Mechanical:				
1. O Dry Ice				
2. Chemical Acid/Alu	minum			
3. Other (please specij	y)			
2. Incendiary – If known				
a. Gasoline	d, ○ O	ther Flammable Solid		
b. O Pyrotechnics/Fireworks	b. Pyrotechnics/Fireworks e. Other Flammable Liquid			
c. Propane, Butane, etc. f. Other (please specify)				
	F. External Con	tainer:		
1. Pipe/Metal Tube	8. OBox-Metal	15. Letter/Envelope		
2. Pipe/Plastic Tube (c.g., PVC)	9. O Box-Plastic	16. Improvised Military Device		
3. Cardboard/Paper Tube	10. \bigcirc Bag-Paper	(e.g., Surplus Grenade)		
4. Class	11. OBag-Cloth	17.		
5. Plastic	12. OBrief Case/Lugg	gage 18. Other (please specify)		
6. Box-Cardboard	13.			
7. C Box-Wooden	14. O Vehicle Bomb	19. C Unknown		
	(Where Vehicle	is the Container)		
G. Placemen	t of Device (complete	for all structures bombed):		
1. O In a secured area	3. O Inside building			
2. O In a public access area	· ·			
Please specify location:				

	H. Delivery of Device:	
1. Mailed/Shipped 2. O	Placed 3. O Thrown/Pro	ojected 4. O Unknown
	l. Damages:	
 Personal Injury – number of person(s) Distribute Total to Items Below: a. Police/Firemen 	2. Death – number of person(s) Distribute Total to Items Below: a. \times Police/Firemen	3. Property Damage Figure – \$
b. Intended Victims c. Innocent Bystanders d. Subjects	b. Intended Victims c. Innocent Bystanders _ d. Subjects	
J. N	lature of Target (check applicable	e item):
Residence: 1. Private Residence 2. Other Private Property (e.g., MacCommercial Operation: 3. Bank/ATM 4. Hotel/Motel 5. Restaurant 6. Industrial Establishment 7. Office Building 8. Commercial/Retail 9. Airport/Bus/Rail Station 10. Other (please specify) Vehicle: 11. Aircraft 12. Automobile/Van/Pickup Truck 13. Other Vehicle (please specify)	20. Water/Sewer Other Targets: 21. Radio/Television 22. Bridge/Highwar 23. State Governm 24. Local Governm 25. Law Enforcem 26. Fire Departme 27. Academic Facing 28. Person 29. Refinery/Fuel 30. Construction S	ron/Telecommunications ay nent Property ment Property nent/Judiciary ent ility Farm Site/Equipment
Federal Government Property: 14. Military Facility 15. Postal Facility/Equipment 16. Law Enforcement/Judiciary 17. Other (please specify)	34. Vending Mach 35. International (36. Open Area 37. Other (please s 38. Unknown/Acc	Government Establishment specify) cidental (Premature Detonation)
1. No	e Incident Preceded by a Threat	or Warning?
2. Yes a. Written Threat (1) Mailed (2) Unmailed		elephone


1. OFBI	4. Employee
2. Other Law Enforcement Agency	5. Victim
3. News Media	6. Other (please specify)
	M. Appears to Involve: ◆
1. O Juvenile	7. Terrorism Group (International)
2. Organized Crime	8. Racial/Bias/Ethnic Group
3. Acquaintance/Neighbor	9. Orug/Narcotic Related
4. O Domestic/Love Triangle	10. Class (class world)
5. Gang Related	11. Other (please specify) 12. Unknown
6. O Terrorism Group (Domestic)	
	N. Apparent Motive:
1. Personal Animosity	7. Revenge
2. Extortion/Bank Robbery/Robbery	8. Sabotage/Subversion
3. Intimidation	9. Protest
4. Mischief	10. Terrorism
5. Vandalism	11. Other (please specify)
6. Publicity	12. O Unknown
o	. Disposition of Device:
(Complete for attempted bombings, recoveries of device	
1. Onsite	2. Offsite 3. Other (please specify)
a. C Hand Entry	a. O Disrupter
b. O Disrupter	b. Counter Charge
c. Counter Charge	
P. Personnel Inv	olved in the Disposition of the Device:
(Complete for attempted bombings, recoveries of device 1. Trained Technician:	es and hoax devices)
a. Public Safety	
b. Military	
c. Combination of Military and Pu	blic Safety Personnel
2. Other (please specify)	·
· O. I	nvestigatory Participation:
1. Referred to the FBI	4. C Local Investigation
2. Referred to ATF	5. State Investigation
3. Referred to Postal	6. No Action
	?. Subject(s) Identified:
	Subject(s) identined.
1. O No	
2. Yes	
Total Subjects (number)	
For Subjects Identified, please provide: Full Name,	Date and Place of birth, Sex, Race and FBI Number (if applicable).

99.9

S. Narrative Statement:. Brief description of device and circumstances of the incident; attach additional pages if necessary.
Bref description of device and circumstances of the incident, attach additional pages of necessary.
T. Unusual Properties or Characteristics of the Device:
Complete only if applicable; include photographs, if available. Examples of unusual properties or characteristics of a device are a gas enhanced device; unusual fuzing of a device; or
machined components of a device, etc.

\$1,000,000 REWARD

call UNABOM Task Force 1-800-701-BOMB (1-800-701-2662)



1.	University of Illinois at Chicago, IL 5/25/78	(1 injured)	8.	Boeing Aircraft, Auburn, WA 5/8/85	
2.	Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 5/9/79	(1 injured)	9.	University of California, Berkeley, CA 5/15/85	(1 injured)
3.	American Airlines, Flight 444, Chicago, IL 11/15/79	(12 injured)	10.	University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 11/15/85	(2 injured)
4.	President United Airlines, Chicago, IL 6/10/80	(1 injured)	11.	Rentech Company, Sacramento, CA 12/11/85	(1 death)
5.	University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 10/8/81		12.	CAAM's Inc., Salt Lake City, UT 2/20/87	(1 injured)
6.	Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 5/5/82	(1 injured)	13.	Physician/Researcher, Tiburon, CA 6/22/93	(1 injured)
7.	University of California, Berkeley, CA 7/2/82	(1 injured)	14.	Professor, Yale University, New Haven, CT 6/24/93	(1 injured)

Explosive devices have been either placed at or mailed to the above locations. This activity began in 1978, and has resulted in one death and 23 injuries. The last two devices were mailed in June of 1993 from Sacramento, California.

The **UNABOM** Task force will pay a reward of up to \$1,000,000 for information leading to the identification, arrest and conviction of the person(s) responsible for placing or mailing explosive devices at the above locations.

Do you know the UNABOMBER?

Please contact the UNABONI Task Force at 1-800-701-BOMB/1-800-701-2662.

U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBI Bomb Data Center FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135

Official Business
Penalty for Private Use \$300

Address Correction Requested

BULK RATE
Postage and Fees Paid
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Permit No. G-168

BOMB SUMMARY

