



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-2500



March 1, 1994

This is the fourth edition of *National Guard Counterdrug Lessons* compiled by the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute. More than 2,500 after action reports were reviewed to develop the lessons recorded in this document.

Budget constraints have made it more important than ever to ensure that counterdrug funds are wisely spent. Each state's National Guard must constantly review counterdrug support operations to improve their efficiency whenever possible. The development and dissemination of *National Guard Counterdrug Lessons* is one method of improving the quality and efficiency of our counterdrug support. These bulletins are intended to help units share successful techniques, tactics, and procedures as well as provide information on mistakes to be avoided.

While the majority of these lessons were developed from reports submitted by National Guard counterdrug support elements, I encourage other organizations to also provide input. Information from law enforcement organizations receiving counterdrug support and the active military and reserves are very welcome. Please feel free to send the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute information regarding your experiences (whether they were positive or showed that improvement is needed) with the use of military counterdrug support. Their address is listed at the back of this bulletin. The Institute will gladly facilitate this exchange of information within the counterdrug community.

I would particularly like to express my appreciation to the Interagency Operations Security Support Staff, the National Security Agency's Operations Security Education Division, and Joint Task Force Six for their contributions to this document. By helping to improve operations security, their efforts will increase the safety of counterdrug personnel and help make counterdrug support more effective.

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(Note: The mission titles and numbers used in this document refer to the sixteen National Guard counterdrug support missions currently approved by the Secretary of Defense. For mission descriptions or further information, see National Guard Regulation (AR) 500-2/ Air National Guard Instruction 10-801 dated 30 September 1993. The mission descriptions are being reviewed for potential consolidation. New guidance may be issued for fiscal year 1995.)

Mission #1, Surface Reconnaissance

Observation. A marijuana eradication mission covering a large area was planned using multiple helicopters to insert and extract reconnaissance and eradication teams and to sling load marijuana to destruction sites. The aircraft arrived several hours late. Although a refueler was scheduled during the initial planning conference to support the operation, it failed to show up and the aircraft were forced to fly to an airport to refuel. (Apparently, there was confusion between the various chains of command for the aircraft, the refueler, and eradication ground teams concerning mission requirements and Additionally, some elements times. made unilateral changes to the support agreed upon during the initial planning conference without informing the other units involved in the operation.)

These events caused the operation to begin a day late. Once operations did begin, the aircraft would leave the area to refuel without coordinating with ground elements. All aircraft left at the same time to refuel together, causing

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gaps in aerial lift support. Eradication teams would request to be inserted or extracted and discover the aircraft had left the area to refuel.

Lesson(s).

--As with any tactical operations, units, personnel, and/or equipment dedicated to a counterdrug support mission should be either attached or in direct support (DS) to the National Guard team or task force headquarters providing counterdrug support. Unity of command must be maintained. One operations order should be written for all National Guard elements providing counterdrug support during a mission in order to synchronize operations and ensure unity of command and effort. Meanwhile, the senior law enforcement agency (LEA) representative is in charge of the operation and directs supporting military elements through the senior military member present.

--Consider designating an Air Mission Commander and/or air liason officers to control/coordinate aviation operations.

--Synchronize aircraft refueling with ground team operations. Develop a refueling schedule to allow ground teams to plan for times aircraft will be out of the area. If possible, stagger aircraft refueling to provide continuous aerial lift coverage during an operation. Ensure LEAs and military personnel have continuous communications capability.



Observation. Reconnaissance (and surveillance) missions often require making detailed notes. Making such

notes using pen and paper can be difficult in a field environment.

Lesson(s). Consider the use of a small tape recorder for taking notes during reconnaissance (and surveillance) missions.



Observation. During reconnaissance prior to marijuana eradication, the terrain prevented LEA officers from communicating with their dispatch. This problem was solved by using hand-held radios in a UH-1 helicopter to provide retransmission on the LEA net between agents on the ground and their dispatch.

Lesson(s). With appropriate communications equipment, helicopters can provide effective retransmission platforms. RAID aircraft are particularly well-suited for such missions



Observation. During a large-scale, highly publicized marijuana eradication operation, local citizens patrolled the area using all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles to look for counterdrug forces. When counterdrug forces were spotted, the information was passed on to a local radio station which broadcast warnings to marijuana growers.

Lesson(s).

--Plan for operations security (OPSEC) during all counterdrug missions, including eradication. (Further

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information on OPSEC is located in the appendices.) If marijuana growers or their allies are broadcasting the locations of counterdrug elements, monitor the appropriate radio stations as a means to evaluate OPSEC and make adjustments in plans if necessary.

--Consider the use of reconnaissance patrols as a means of terrain denial to scare marijuana growers away from their growing areas until eradication can be accomplished. Also, consider "false insertions" to confuse growers about the counterdrug area of operations.



Observation. During an eradication operation, National Guard helicopters were used to slingload an LEA's allterrain cycles (ATCs) into suspected growing areas. Use of the ATCs gave law enforcement officers greater range and mobility to locate and destroy marijuana growing sites.

Lesson(s). LEAs should consider the use of ATCs during eradication operations. National Guard aircraft have the capability to move a wide range of equipment into the vicinity of suspected marijuana growing sites or to support other types of counterdrug missions.



Observation. In support of an LEA marijuana eradication operation, a counterdrug support element used a reconnaissance team that had insufficient training and no prior experience in counterdrug operations. After the team

was unable to locate any marijuana, it was discovered that none of the team members knew how to recognize marijuana or the indications of a growing site.

Lesson(s). Ensure personnel are properly trained prior to deploying them on missions. The Drug Enforcement Administration has a training video for eradication operations. State National Guards should consider making this video part of mandatory training for personnel involved in eradication support.



Mission #2, Surface Surveillance

Observation. A listening post/observation post (LP/OP) deployed to a mission area with night vision goggles expecting to perform a mission only at night. Upon arrival, the team discovered the mission was actually to be performed during the day. Because they expected to operate only at night, the team didn't bring binoculars and weren't able to perform the mission at full effectiveness.

Lesson(s). Establish a standard equipment list for LP/OP missions. Since missions frequently change or may be extended, bring a standard equipment load to enable operations in all light conditions and likely weather.



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During an LP/OP Observation. mission, suspected smugglers used what appeared to be scout vehicles to test for the presence of law enforcement forces before sending vehicles actually carrying drugs (load vehicles) across the border. The LP/OP team reported the vehicles crossing the border and the law enforcement response team acknowledged in the clear. When the LP/OP made their observation report over the radio, a vehicle following the two scout vehicles immediately turned around and re-crossed the border. Law enforcement officers stopped the scout vehicles and found each contained a two-way radio and a scanner tuned to the LEA's frequency.

Lesson(s).

--Communications security (COMSEC) should be a priority during counterdrug operations. Assume that any message transmitted in the clear will be monitored by drug traffickers. (See the appendices for further information on OPSEC planning.)

--Locate LP/OP positions and plan named areas of interest (NAIs) in depth to counteract the use of scout vehicles vehicles. Good preceding load counterdrug intelligence preparation of the battlefield (CDIPB) can help identify countermeasures for drug trafficker attempts to avoid law enforcement actions. (For more information on CDIPB. see National Guard Counterdrug Lessons II, dated 7 January 1993 and National Guard Counterdrug Lessons III, dated 11 July 1993.)



Observation. A military counterdrug support element conducting a mission was unable to communicate operational information to the headquarters of another counterdrug support unit. One of the counterdrug support elements had a STU-III phone with them, but not the "Secret" crypto key.

Lesson(s). Information concerning ongoing counterdrug operations should only be sent using secure transmission, to include the use of the telephone. (See the appendices.) Communications planning should include secure communications with the supported LEA as well as higher and adjacent military units.



Mission #4, Aerial Reconnaissance

Observation. At the last minute, an LEA receiving support reduced the number of law enforcement officers who were designated to fly on a mission. Due to the number of passengers in the original support request, a UH-1 had been scheduled to fly the mission with the crew in a counterdrug active duty special work (ADSW) status. Following the change in the number of passengers, an OH-6 would have been a more appropriate and more economical An OH-6 and crew was aircraft. available; however, the State Aviation Officer (SAO) could not be reached and the flight facility commander did not have authority to change the aircraft. Despite the higher operating costs, the mission had to be flown in a UH-1.

Lesson(s).

--When practical, a liaison officer should contact the supported LEA to confirm mission requirements in time to make any necessary changes.

--Consider delegating the approval authority for changes in counterdrug mission aircraft to facility commanders or other appropriate individuals when the SAO is absent or unavailable.

--Use of an Air Mission Commander or liaison officer can facilitate planning and eliminate many of the coordination problems that can affect counterdrug support.



Observation. An air reconnaissance mission was disrupted because a flight facility commander refused to refuel a RAID aircraft because of concern that his account would not be reimbursed by counterdrug funds.

Lesson(s). Refueling arrangements must be planned and coordinated in advance, even when using army aviation support facilities.



Observation. A crew that had never before flown counterdrug support was assigned to fly an air reconnaissance mission. The law enforcement officers on the mission had previously flown with a crew experienced in counterdrug support and felt the new crew "didn't know what they were doing and were

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uncooperative, flying too high and too fast" to accomplish the mission.

During another mission (Surface Surveillance), an aircraft was used to insert a LP/OP team. In response to intelligence gathered by the supported LEA concerning a pending drug delivery, the team was to observe a clandestine airstrip. Despite the LP/OP team leader's instructions to the pilot, the aircraft flew over a nearby campground then placed the team directly on top of the planned LP/OP site in full view of the campground. No suspected drug activity was noted by LP/OP team.

The pilot-in-command Lesson(s). retains control over the aircraft and has final determination over the flight profile. However, counterdrug missions often entail special considerations that may differ from the training mission flights performed by most National Guard aviators. States should consider establishing counterdrug specific training, or at a minimum provide a counterdrug flight operations briefing before crews are assigned to fly counterdrug support missions.



Observation. A LEA requested two hours of flight time for an aerial reconnaissance mission. The mission would have actually required five hours to properly complete. Because of the two hour request, not enough blade time had been allotted to the mission to satisfy the LEA's requirements.

In another mission, an LEA requested "a Huey" to perform aerial recon-naissance for marijuana growing areas. Without performing a mission analysis, a UH-1 and crew was provided and used almost seven hours of blade time. An OH-58 would have been better suited for the mission and considerably cheaper to operate. However, it wasn't what the LEA asked for.

Lesson(s).

--Encourage LEAs to request a capability (i.e., "an aerial recon of fifty square kilometers between Mudville and Tinseltown to search for marijuana,") or mission type (aerial reconnaissance) rather than a specific piece of equipment or amount of blade time.

---If possible, use a liaison officer to assist LEAs in determining military support requirements and developing mission requests.



Observation. Prior to using aircraft for marijuana reconnaissance, the LEA observer performed a map reconnaissance to identify areas of likely cultivation and coordinated with other LEA agents assigned to those areas to develop air mission priorities. This procedure allowed the LEA observer and aircraft pilot to thoroughly plan the mission, pay extra attention to the areas of highest priority, and conserve blade time. Both the LEA and the National Guard aircrew providing support felt this mission was considerably more productive and efficient than previous air reconnaissance missions performed with little prior planning.

Lesson(s).

--LEAs and support National Guard counterdrug elements should conduct

intelligence preparation as part of the planning process for air reconnaissance missions. Pay particular attention to evaluating the area to be reconned and (if possible) use intelligence from law enforcement agents assigned to the area to help identify locations likely to contain illegal activity.

--Pre-mission coordination between aircraft pilots providing counterdrug support and supported LEA officers can make aerial reconnaissance more efficient and conserve blade time. An hour of pre-mission planning on the ground is well-spent if it results in saving even a few minutes of blade time.



Observation. During a marijuana eradication operation, a single UH-1 was used to identify marijuana, insert and extract eradication teams, and perform slingload operations. The time required to identify marijuana growing sites and then perform eradication enabled some growers to harvest their plants before eradication teams got to them.

Lesson(s).

--Consider using a separate, dedicated aircraft (an OH-58 is usually best) to scout for marijuana while a heavier aircraft (UH-1 or UH-60) performs eradication team insertion/extraction and sling loading. While requiring more aircraft, this technique may result in a lower total blade time requirement and/or lower total aircraft operating costs.

--Consider rappelling as a means to insert eradication teams.



Observation. Marijuana eradication operations were disrupted because the aircraft providing support was forced to leave for scheduled maintenance in the middle of the mission.

Lesson(s). When planning aerial lift support, check scheduled maintenance requirements when determining aircraft availability.



Observation. A military aircraft was assigned to support an LEA with aerial reconnaissance. By the time the aircraft departed its airfield, picked up the LEA observer at another airport, and arrived at the area to be reconned, half the blade time allotted to the mission had been consumed and the aircraft had to return without completing the reconnaissance.

Lesson(s). Consider ferry time (the travel to and from the mission site) when planning blade hours for counterdrug support missions. Also, it may be more cost effective to drive passengers to a central airfield rather than schedule several different pick-ups with aircraft.



Observation. An observer was assigned to an aerial reconnaissance mission for the first time. This mission was his first experience in aerial operations. Once the mission began, the

observer had difficulty navigating from the air but didn't say anything until he had been lost for a considerable period of time. The aircraft pilot, assuming the observer would handle navigation, didn't pay attention to the planned route prior to takeoff.

Lesson(s).

--In concert with the LEA observer, aircraft pilots should routinely perform a map reconnaissance of routes and areas prior to every flight.

--Prior to takeoff, pilots and LEA passengers should review the flight plan and mission profile together. At a minimum, they should agree on the area to be reconned, routes for getting there, and the altitude during the reconnaissance. Address special considerations, such as any concern that suspects will be aware that the area is being reconned. Planning time spent on the ground will pay off in the air.



Observation. A National Guard UH-1 was used to provide support to several LEA passengers during an aerial reconnaissance. Due to a limited number of intercom jacks, the aircrew could not provide all LEA passenger/ observers with headphones.

Lesson(s). Consider using a removable aircraft intercom system to provide communications for all LEA passenger/observers.



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Observation. A National Guard carried LEA helicopter several aerial passengers to perform reconnaissance of multiple areas. Because law enforcement officers interested in the same area sat on opposite sides of the aircraft, the pilot had to either directly overfly an area or make more than one pass to allow all LEA passengers to see 'each area of interest. Direct overflight and multiple aircraft passes increased the chance that suspects would be warned of future counterdrug operations and consumed additional blade time.

Lesson(s).

--Have law enforcement officers interested in a certain geographic area sit on the same side of an aircraft. Consider seating arrangements as part of premission planning and coordination. --When possible, observe areas targeted for aerial reconnaissance from a standoff distance, rather than flying directly

overhead, to reduce the possibility of detection by persons engaged in illegal drug activity.

Mission #5, Aerial Surveillance

Observation. A National Guard RAID aircraft with a law enforcement provided support observer using LORAN to determine position while law enforcement officers in vehicles on the ground used a global positioning system (GPS). The aircraft was unable to effectively communicate positions to the LEA ground team because the location given by LORAN was several kilometers off from position the provided by the GPS.

In another mission, two RAID aircraft had difficulty determining the location of a suspected marijuana site because the locations given by LORAN in each of the aircraft differed by more than a kilometer.

Lesson(s). In many cases, LORAN navigation will not have the precision necessary for aerial surveillance operations. Consider the use of handheld GPS in the aircraft or the use of street maps to communicate locations between aircraft and ground teams.



Mission #8, Cargo Inspection

Observation. Personnel from a military unit provided portable generators, light sets, and a command post (CP) van to support an LEA traffic checkpoint operation. One of the two generators wouldn't start at the beginning of the mission due to battery failure; a slave cable was not available. The generator that did work was not properly wired to run a light set. The majority of the personnel assigned to the mission did not know how to set up the CP van. The soldiers were billeted in a motel forty-five minutes away and worked twelve hour shifts. Most set-up and other physical labor requirements occurred when only one shift was on duty.

Lesson(s).

--Test equipment prior to deployment on counterdrug support operations and ensure all personnel are properly trained (and licensed if necessary) to operate it. Perform a train-up or practice exercise before conducting missions requiring a complex set-up or a large amount of equipment.

--Schedule shifts so that overlap occurs during periods when manual labor requirement are at their peak.

--Prior to deployment, ensure equipment is properly configured for the desired use. Plan for contingencies in case of equipment failure.



Mission #10, Aerial Photo Reconnaissance

Observation. A C-130 was used as a platform for aerial photography. Because of its operating altitude, the supported LEA felt the aircraft provided better OPSEC and drew less attention from suspects than previous missions using helicopters.

Lesson(s). The C-130 can be an effective platform for photo reconnaissance missions.



Observation. A LEA requested aerial photographs of a certain area. While processing the support request, the Air National Guard unit providing support discovered the area had been previously photographed at the request of another LEA. New prints were made from the results of the previous mission, satisfying the LEA's requirements without the need for additional flights.

Lesson(s). Maintain the negatives from photo reconnaissance missions and develop a reference file. Refer to previous missions before committing resources to fly new missions.



Mission #12, Marijuana Greenhouse/ Drug Laboratory Detection

Observation. During a marijuana eradication operation, a two-man team was dedicated to identify areas for eradication of ditchweed prior to employment of the "main force." Once eradication teams reached the growing sites, the recon team left to find the next site. This procedure appeared to save time and make more efficient use of the eradication team.

Lesson(s). Consider the use of a dedicated reconnaissance element to identify marijuana growing areas and to guide eradication teams to their location.



Mission #14, Administration, Information, Logistics, and Maintenance Support

Observation. A National Guard element provided an expandable van, generators, and lighting to support an LEA traffic checkpoint." The individuals providing support wore civilian clothes, making it difficult for officers of the supported LEA to distinguish National Guard personnel from the general public. The inability to quickly identify National Guard support personnel made coordination more difficult and may have posed a safety hazard.

Lesson(s). Carefully review plans that call for the use of Guard members in civilian clothes. If the supported LEA requests that Guard members do not wear uniforms, consider other methods of identification such as raid jackets, distinctive baseball caps, etc. If the supported LEA is concerned about the combative appearance of BDUs, consider the use of Class B uniforms or coveralls.



Operations Security (OPSEC)

Most law Observation. and enforcement officers military personnel perform OPSEC as a normal part of their operations; however, many law enforcement organizations and military units providing counterdrug support do not have an effective OPSEC program. The lack of OPSEC can allow drug traffickers to discover and evade counterdrug efforts and may also result increased counterdrug risk to in personnel.

Lesson(s). (Note: The following is not intended to provide a complete review of OPSEC planning and requirements. It focuses instead on only those aspects of OPSEC that may be pertinent to joint counterdrug operations, especially areas that may be of interest to law enforcement agencies receiving counterdrug support. For more information on OPSEC, see DOD Directive 5205.2, DOD Operations Security Program or Army Regulation 530-1, Operations Security (OPSEC).)

counterdrug operations, During OPSEC is a process used to prevent drug determining traffickers* from force capabilities and counterdrug thus evade law intentions and enforcement actions or present a risk to counterdrug personnel.

Prior to conducting a raid on a drug house, for example, law enforcement officers will want to prevent the suspects from being "tipped off" before the raid. The officers planning the raid will keep their details of their plans from personnel without a "need to know." Other OPSEC measures may include uniformed patrol regular keeping officers out of the area prior to the raid in order to avoid scaring the suspects off, using secure communications to prevent suspects with scanners from discovering the impending raid, and conducting pre-raid surveillance in a covert manner to prevent suspects from discovering they are being observed. Another example of OPSEC during law enforcement operations is keeping backup officers out of sight or in disguise during "sting" operations.

Each counter-drug organization or task force should assign a specific individual, preferably with both operations and intelligence analysis experience, to perform the functions of OPSEC planner.

The OPSEC process consists of three elements:

a) identification of counterdrug actions that drug traffickers can observe or detect by drug trafficker intelligence systems;

b) determination of indicators that might help traffickers identify counterdrug force capabilities and intentions in time to avoid drug seizures and arrests; and

c) selection and implementation of measures to eliminate or reduce the vulnerability of counterdrug forces.

Planning for OPSEC involves eight steps. Depending on the nature of the operation, these steps may be either brief or performed in detail:

- 1. Determine critical information.
- 2. Identify OPSEC indicators.
- 3. Determine OPSEC vulnerabilities.
- 4. Devise OPSEC measures.
- 5. Prepare OPSEC plans.
- 6. Brief participants.
- 7. Perform OPSEC measures and monitor the situation.
- 8. Perform OPSEC follow-up.

Determine Critical Information, which consists of specific facts that drug traffickers would find useful in evading or disrupting counterdrug actions. Most pertaining information to law enforcement and counterdrug operations is unclassified, but extremely sensitive. To determine critical information, the OPSEC planner must think like a drug trafficker and ask: "If I were a drug trafficker, what would I want to know potential law enforcement about activities?" Obvious examples include: --"Am I under surveillance?"

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^{*}The term "traffickers" in this section includes personnel involved in the production and distribution of illegal drugs as well as smugglers.

--"Are the cops planning to raid my drug lab?"

--"Will any law enforcement personnel be in the area when I smuggle my drugs across the border?"

--"What profiles are the U.S. Customs Service using to select vehicles and cargo containers for secondary inspection?"

Critical information will be different for each counterdrug operation. The working aid in the Appendix A gives useful ideas for determining counterdrug critical information.

Identify OPSEC Indicators. They are counterdrug force actions that drug traffickers can observe. gain or knowledge of through open sources such as newspaper articles or public records, then piece together to discover critical information: they are clues to counterdrug force plans, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. Examples could include the appearance of "strangers" in town with military hair cuts and/or rental cars, a change in uniformed patrol patterns within an area, the emplacement of remote sensors, and the presence of military personnel and equipment at a law enforcement agency headquarters.

The OPSEC planner prepares a list of OPSEC indicators and estimates drug traffickers' capabilities collect to information and intelligence. Considerations include drug trafficker ability to monitor counterdrug force communications. ability to observe counterdrug force movements-particularly through the use of night vision devices and enhanced optics, and the ability to detect counterdrug force use of radar and remote sensing devices. The list of indicators, the determination of critical information, and the results of the estimate of traffickers' intelligence

and information collection capabilities is provided to members of the counterdrug team for the upcoming operation as preliminary guidance for OPSEC planning.

Determine OPSEC Vulnerabilities. These are conditions in which drug indicators traffickers obtain mav concerning counterdrug force actions in time to evade or disrupt the planned operation. After receiving the initial OPSEC planning guidance, all members of the counterdrug force should visualize the planned operations from beginning (including the planning and coordination stage) to end determine **OPSEC** vulnerabilities.

Devise OPSEC Measures. These are methods and actions taken to prevent drug traffickers from discovering critical information. Such measures include use of secure communications, limiting information to those individuals with a "need to know," and ensuring mission participants do not engage in "loose talk." One standard measure is to protect the identities of counterdrug support personnel from release to the public.

Prior to implementing OPSEC measures, the OPSEC planner should perform a risk analysis to compare the expected costs of a measure (e.g., lodging counterdrug support troops in a motel several miles away from the mission area, the purchase of secure communications equipment, etc.) with the risk of mission compromise if the measures are not taken (e.g., traffickers may discover the presence of soldiers or might monitor counterdrug communications).

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An OPSEC Plan is prepared and used to Brief Participants. The plan address the information should determined to be critical. OPSEC the estimate of drug indicators. traffickers' intelligence collection capabilities, OPSEC vulnerabilities, and the OPSEC measures and selected responsibilities for implementing them.

Performance of OPSEC Measures takes place in accordance with the OPSEC plan. Monitoring the **Situation** is a continuous process of evaluating the effectiveness of OPSEC measures. Based upon the feedback obtained through OPSEC monitoring, counterdrug personnel may need to reinforce or adjust OPSEC measures to protect critical information.

OPSEC Follow-Up reviews the effectiveness of OPSEC plans. Key participants should be briefed on the success or failure of OPSEC efforts. After action reviews and reports should routinely address OPSEC effectiveness. Lessons learned concerning OPSEC are the basis for improvements in the counterdrug force OPSEC planning process, and should be shared.

It is especially important to use OPSEC lessons to validate OPSEC training programs. A force that is educated about OPSEC is less likely to inadvertently compromise their mission. Training and education is the most costeffective security measure to implement.



Appendix A

WORKING AID FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY CRITICAL INFORMATION

Overview. The following working aid was designed to prompt operation planners to identify and assess the critical information aspects of counterdrug operations during the planning stage. Its proponent is the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, which includes representatives from several federal law enforcement agencies. The working aid is purposely non-specific because every operation is different, each organization and agency has unique concerns, and every location and target has a different operating environment. It is not intended to constitute official guidance--the supported law enforcement agency retains the lead for making decisions concerning counterdrug operations while National Guard personnel will remain in a support role.

The working aid approaches the overall concept of critical information at two levels that are not mutually exclusive: Basic Operations (typified by many DEA and task force operations), and National Level Operations (such as joint task forces that combine Department of Defense and federal law enforcement agency assets). Within each of these two levels are three subgroups of information that may be relevant to an operation: activityspecific information, people-specific information, and support activity-specific information.

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The following charts are provided:

- Activity-Specific Information
- People-Specific Information
- Administration and Support Activity Information
- National Operations Vulnerabilities
- Example Drug Trafficker Intelligence Collection Strategy

2.

WORKING AID FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (LEA) CRITICAL INFORMATION

Developed by

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Introduction	There is an on-going requirement in the law enforcement community for guidance as to what should be considered sensitive and critical information according to the OPSEC process. To help meet this need, this working aid provides information and ideas for counterdrug (CD) planners to use in the OPSEC process.
	The main advantage of applying OPSEC to law enforcement and counterdrug activities is the unique insight provided through the use of the adversary point of view.
	Encouraging operations and OPSEC planners to think like criminals, traffickers, and other prime targets should enhance overall effectiveness of law enforcement assets and increase the probability of operational success where maintaining essential security and achieving the factor of surprise often plays a crucial role.
Definitions	<u>Operations Security</u> (OPSEC) is the process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with the planning and conduct of friendly operations and other activities.
	<u>Critical Information</u> consists of specific facts about friendly capabilities and intentions that may be used by an adversary to counter and defeat counterdrug operations.
	Indicators are friendly observable actions and open source information that can be interpreted and pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information.
Guidelines	Most information pertaining to law enforcement and counterdrug activities is unclassified, but extremely sensitive. Such information in the hands of an adversary could easily compromise operations and result in loss of life or failed operations.
	This working aid is UNCLASSIFIED.

Basic Operations

Examples

Basic federal law enforcement operations are planned and executed utilizing known techniques for surveillance and information gathering. Areas that should be evaluated for critical information at this basic level of activity include:

- * activity-specific information
- * people-specific information
- * support activity-specific information

ACTIVITY-SPECIFIC INFORMATION	EXAMPLES
CURRENT AND FUTURE INVESTIGATIONS	COVER NAMES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTIVITY PERSONS, PLACES, THINGS INVOLVED SCHEDULES, OBJECTIVES, GOALS IDENTIFYING LEADING ORGANIZATION ISSUE OF SEARCH/ARREST WARRANTS
SCOPE OF ACTIVITY OR OPERATION	INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES INVOLVEMENT OF MILITARY SERVICES STATE/LOCAL LEA INVOLVEMENT INTERNATIONAL LEA INVOLVEMENT
SPECIAL ASSETS OR EQUIPMENT IN USE	USE OF TRADITIONAL WIRETAPS USE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT USE OF AIRBORNE ASSETS USE OF BUGS, TRACKING DEVICES USE OF HIDDEN CAMERAS USE OF HIDDEN CAMERAS USE OF WIRES ON CIs/OTHERS USE/IDENTITY OF COVERT VEHICLES MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES/REQUIREMENTS SPECIAL LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS AIRCRAFT PAINT SCHEMES/TAIL NUMBERS AIRCRAFT FLIGHT PLANS BOAT NAMES/HULL'NUMBERS AUTHORIZATION TO USE SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FLIGHT PLANS ON FILE WITH THE FAA

Comment

Planners should be aware of any special logistical requirements that are associated with an operation. Certain resources are unique to specific equipment or systems, or may even be associated with a specific agency.

Example

When an agency has a skilled technician whose services are often in great demand to support "really important" high-visibility operations--that person becomes linked to that agency, and his/her presence is an indicator of agency involvement in a significant operation ("...when they care enough to send the very best...").

PEOPLE-SPE	CIFIC INFORMATION	EXAMPLES	
PERSONAL IN	أفار ويعتبرك أشكرته البلية المترك تتعاف بتجالك الكالة فالتكف توجها أكثر المتجه والبجوي والمورية ألمته والمرتبة والمرتبة ويروان أركاه	NAMES/COVER NAMES AGENCY/ORGANIZATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS ASSIGNED PARKING SPACES UNDERCOVER IDENTITIES PHONE/PAGER NUMBERS ADDRESSES/LOCATIONS VEHICLE DESCRIPTIONS/LICENSE NUMBERS PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS FAMILY INFORMATION ANY INFORMATION ABOUT CIS	
		HISTORY OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL PASSPORT/VISA INFORMATION	
SCHEDULE IN	FORMATION	DUTY ROSTERS BREAK SCHEDULES OVERTIME PAPERWORK TIMES/PLACES OF SCHEDULED MEETINGS TRAVEL PLANS/ITINERARIES TIMES/LOCATIONS OF OPERATIONS COMMUNICATIONS CHECK-IN SCHEDULES TIMES/PLACES OF ANY OTHER SPECIAL EVENTS	
COMMUNICA	ΓΙΟΝS DATA	TYPES OF COMMS AVAILABLE RADIO CALLSIGNS PAGER INFORMATION CELLULAR PHONE NUMBERS 'COVER' TELEPHONE NUMBERS	
Comments	the type of miscellaneous information in advertently over telephone or rad	of various law enforcement agencies has	
Example 1	One case on record shows where a criminal compiled information on federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel through monitoring unprotected radio communications, and supplemented the dossiers that he compiled with photographs of residences, vehicles, and family members. Fortunately, these files were seized before they were made available to other members of the criminal element.		
Example 2	Another area that is of great concern to LEAs is the protection of Confidential Informant (CI) sourcesa compromise of information that reveals their identity can lead to reprisal against the CI, frequently resulting in a loss of cooperation from that CI, and therefore, loss of the intelligence source to the LEA.		

SUPPORT ACTIVITY INFORMATION	EXAMPLES
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT	SENSITIVE DOCUMENT PREPARATION PAYROLL INFORMATION OVERTIME RECORDS AND REQUESTS TRAVEL PLANS AND RECORDS PASSPORT/VISA INFORMATION SPECIAL BANK/CREDIT CARD ACCOUNTS TELEPHONE BILLS LICENSING OF COVERT VEHICLES PARKING FACILITIES FOR COVERT VEHICLES PARKING PERMITS/ĞARAGE PASSES LEASING SPACE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL FILÉ INFORMATION ORGANIZATION CHARTS CONTRACT INFORMATION DEALINGS WITH D.A./U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICES EXTRADITION REQUESTS
COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT	TYPES OF COMMUNICATIONS AVAILABLE CALLSIGN INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS STRUCTURE/PROCEDURES COMMS ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC AGENCY SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH COMMUNICATIONS KNOWN EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITIES OUTAGES RANGE LIMITATIONS LIMITED SECURE/PROTECTED ASSETS UNIQUE COMMUNICATIONS/SIGNALS
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT	MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR COVERT EQUIP AIRCRAFT/BOAT VEHICLE MAINTENANCE STORAGE FOR LARGE EQUIPMENT STORAGE/DISPOSITION OF SEIZED ASSETS RESERVED VEHICLES PARKING SPACES SERVICE ACCOUNTS FOR CELLULAR PHONES SERVICE ACCOUNTS FOR PAGERS CONTRACTS FOR LOGISTICAL ITEMS HOUSING FOR PERSONNEL IN TDY STATUS
CommentsThe potential for compromise among support activities is high. Many of th traditionally low-paid, low-profile job priority list for training. These are th law enforcement OPSEC program, an training and awareness programs.GuidelinesNew legal rules, new technology, and	ese support personnel are in s and are usually low on the e people that are key to a successful ad should be a priority for OPSEC
change within the law enforcement co level. For this reason, each operation by-case basis, as there is no such thing	ommunity, especially at the street must consider OPSEC on a case-

National Operations

Introduction	This section addresses situations and challenges that would be found in a national, international, or Joint Task Force activity. The material in this section and that introduced in the Basic Operations section are NOT mutually exclusive. Specific technology applications that are in use or are planned for use in future operations. Also relevant to this category are types of technology that are in use, or are being considered for use, and their actual or potential applications.				
Technology					
	Protecting LEA involvement with research and development efforts in these fields and procurement/acquisition data about such technologies should be a priority.				
Example	An example of this concern could be the use of Global Positioning System technology to track a shipment of contraband.				
Resources	The number, capabilities, dispositions, and availability of resources available for counterdrug detection and interdiction. An observable shortfall of support assets may tip off a limited capability and reduce the effectiveness of an activity's mission.				
Example	How many planes, boats, helicopters, personnel, etc. are available to look for and catch traffickers? How fast can they go? How far can they see? Where are they located (or based)? Are they functional, and if not, when might they become operational?				
Communi- cations	Communications are often the weakest link in an operation and should be examined closely. Planners should look at communications very closely, and spend extra time and effort in coordinating the communications equipment support for an operation. A good communications plan may be able to compensate for weaknesses in other areas, but deficient communications may compromise an otherwise well-planned operation.				

Example

The scope of communications security concerns should include:

- * the types of communications gear in use
- * the disposition of those assets
- * the capabilities of the particular communications equipment
- * any inherent problems or limitations of the gear

Procedures for the use of all modes of communications should be examined. Patterns of use can be used as an indicator of impending activity by an adversary (e.g., "go secure just before...", "check in every hour on the hour," etc.). Patterns of radio silence may also be indicators.

The allocation of radio frequencies may be exploitable by an adversary and should be an item of concern to planners.

Comment

Planners seeking the factor of surprise should consider "borrowing" frequencies from other non-LEA agencies for brief periods to deceive those adversaries who have the known lists of assigned LEA frequencies programmed into scanners and receivers.

Organizations using protected/encrypted communications need to address interoperability concerns, as all participants should be able to communicate securely.

Secure Comms The use of secure or protected communications can be a great benefit but also a potential liability. Planners need to track the dispositions, extent of use, types, and interoperability issues associated with secure communications.

The presence of encrypted communications on the air is an indicator of LEA and/or military activity. Encrypted communications on known LEA assigned frequencies have been used in the past as a barometer of LEA activity.

Encrypted signals from various equipment have very unique characteristics and can be identified and tied to specific organizations.

Encrypted communications can also be monitored for the volume of radio traffic--occasional transmissions would indicate a low level of activity, whereas a burst of activity would be a heads-up that something was happening or about to happen.

The use of low probability of intercept equipment along with encryption may decrease some of the above risks.

Comment

The most secure form of communication is no communication at all. However, the costs of reduced ability to coordinate and the reduction in tactical flexibility must be weighed against the benefits of restricting this potential indicator.

Task Force Makeup	Composition of special groups or task forces. Identification of the main participants of a joint task force or special operation makes the job of an adversary easier, as the adversary may already have personnel lists or have associated certain organizations or persons with specific activities or special operations.	
	Knowing details about the LEA (and supporting military) organizational structure and hierarchy would be useful to an adversary, as the presence or absence of known high-ranking personnel could easily be an indicator.	
Sources and Methods	ANY details about our intelligence gathering/collection/analysis capabilities, and most importantly, HOW MUCH WE KNOW ABOUT A TARGET!	
	Divulging intelligence sources and methods can not only compromise national-level intelligence assets, but may also endanger personnel and upset delicate diplomatic arrangements. What we know and how we know it is the essence of intelligence, and as such, should be protected as extremely sensitive (or even classified) information.	÷
Schedules	Places/dates/schedules/itineraries related to operations. Dates can be implied through a number of different information sources that are very effective indicators.	
	Travel and lodging arrangements can accurately reflect an operation's timetable.	
	Time sensitive procurement activities, required legal documents, and other logistical requirements such as rented spaces and vehicles can indicate schedules and agendas.	
	Casual references to personal schedules made via radio or telephone can provide tip-offs to activity schedules.	
Known Vulner- abilities	Where and what are our known vulnerabilities. This is an extremely sensitive subject area, especially vulnerabilities that could result in single point failure of an operation.	
	Vulnerabilities include areas of limitations and weaknesses associated with other LEA resources, such as boats, aircraft, vehicles, communications, radar coverage, available intelligence, and other critical areas.	

Specific links with support activities. Many federal LEA assets rely on non-LEA or non-federal support facilities to make their missions possible. These include military or civilian installations, military/civil airfields, commercial/official marinas, state and local LEA facilities, etc. Many of these facilities are not enthralled with the idea of being closely associated with a counterdrug or other LEA function and would like their association to be kept low-key.

Personnel at these support locations may also present an OPSEC threat by insisting on posted work schedules, including advance notification of overtime or late work hours, as well as other formalities that the LEA community has traditionally overlooked.

Warrants

Support

Elements

As a legal document, the warrant is essential to the search, arrest, and prosecution of criminals. The warrant has a number of aspects of sensitive information that are unique to the law enforcement process.

The existence of a warrant is an indicator of an operation that is close to completion--the LEAs feel that they have sufficient evidence to take the case to court and are able to convince a judge or magistrate of this fact.

The warrant document contains what may be sensitive information:

- * the full name of the person to be arrested
- * the address of the property to be searched
- * the nature of the crime committed or suspected
- * the scope of the search
- * a detailed account of the source of information
- * why there is reasonable cause to take the case to court

The time constraints placed upon the warrant by the issuing authority are also considered sensitive (prior to serving the warrant). Warrants are handled by a large number of people during the course of preparation, granting and serving, so many people potentially have access to this information.

There is a real concern about protecting sources and methods of information, particularly in the case of a CI. The affidavit for the warrant details exact dates, times, and places that the CI observed the reported activities. This information is frequently detailed enough that the person who is the subject of the warrant can determine the identity of the CI and take measures to suppress or retaliate against the CI.

Details concerning cover and deception. If there are counterdrug personnel in a foreign country, their cover must be protected. This includes:

and Deception

Cover

Note

- * identities
- * affiliations
- * locations
- * associations with U.S. and other nations' agencies
- * contacts with foreign national informants
- * means of reporting
- * schedules for reporting
- * specific targets
- * purpose for being in the country
- * special assets and means available to them

Additional care and planning are mandated for an operation that involves some sort of deception activity. A deception must not have any detectable flaws.

Planners should also bear in mind that a deception that worked very well before may not work a second time, as an adversary may have figured out what we did and how we did it. Also remember that deceptions may not transplant well between different countries, cultural groups, and operational environments.

If used with care and great caution, deceptions are a very effective tool but need to be planned exhaustively by all parties involved.

The use of military personnel for deception operations must receive careful legal review, preferably including a military attorney, prior to the operation. Military counterdrug support personnel are prohibited from working undercover. Deliberate release of misinformation by military personnel is also generally prohibited. An example of anacceptable use would be to have military personnel support a high visibility surveillanceor reconnaissance mission as terrain denial on one part of the border in order to channel potential drug traffickers into a different area where law enforcement interdiction is actually planned to take place.

Example of Hostile Collection Strategy

WHAT THE TRAFFICKER NEEDS TO KNOW	HOW THEY CAN FIND OUT
KNOW THAT THERE ARE DEDICATED INTERDICTION ASSETS	INFORMATION READILY AVAILABLE THROUGH OPEN SOURCE MATERIAL AND OBSERVATION
KNOW THE DETECTION AND MONITORING AREAS OF OPERATION	SOME INFORMATION FROM OPEN SOURCES HUMINT SOURCES COMMUNICATIONS MONITORING OF RADIOS VISUAL OBSERVATION OF SHIPS AND PLANES
KNOW THE CAPABILITIES OF THE DETECTION AND MONITORING RESOURCES	HUMINT SOURCES ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATIONS PATTERNS ANALYSIS OF SCHEDULES OPEN SOURCE MATERIAL KNOWLEDGE OF PROFILES USED BY LEAS
KNOW WHEN CD RESOURCES ARE NOT AVAILABLE AND ROUTES ARE SAFE TO USE	HUMINT SOURCES COMMUNICATIONS MONITORING VISUAL OBSERVATION OF CD ASSETS

11.12

Other information that would be useful to traffickers would include:

AircraftNumber of operational aircraft, pilots, types of aircraft, and locations.DetailsThis can be learned through open source and human intelligence (HUMINT)
methods such as observation, inquiries, getting access to flight schedules,
duty rosters, maintenance schedule, etc.

SOPs Flight procedures (SOP): roles of interceptor, tracker, and helicopter. They can find this through open source and communications monitoring of U.S. counterdrug frequencies as well as of air traffic control frequencies, visual observation, and insider knowledge obtained legally or otherwise.

Communications Communications used by counterdrug participants (frequencies, callsigns, procedures, and networks). Much of this information is available through open source information from a wide variety of sources. Additional information can be acquired through continuous monitoring of counterdrug communications and becoming familiar with schedules, callsigns, and routine activities, even to the extent that the monitors acquire voice recognition of individual counterdrug personnel.

Fixed radar coverage/profile. Some information is available from open source. Additional information can be acquired by exploratory flights accompanied by devices such as the "Blue Box," or even a standard radar detector, to determine the operating parameters of the system.
Insight can also be gained through communications monitoring, such as hearing remarks concerning the limits of radar assets made in conjunction with routine detection/intercept operations. HUMINT can observe whether aerostat radars are up and functioning, and established aerostat operating patterns based on weather conditions are well-known.

CD Capabilities

Radar

Coverage

Counterdrug force ground and airborne capabilities and procedures. The concerns are the same as above, with additional input from visual sources regarding the operational status of aerostat radar (if it's up, then it's probably working--if there is a chance of high winds, it's down and that part of the coast is clear). Also, the visual observation of AWACS aircraft being prepared/taking off is significant information. FAA radar coverage is available through open source info, as all acronautical navigation maps have FAA air traffic control radar zones marked as part of their standard information. AWACS and other radar information (operating frequencies, characteristics, etc.) can be obtained by checking through *Jane's* reference books.

Current Threat Detecting counterdrug aircraft while airborne. This may be done by monitoring interdiction frequencies while airborne, use of radio frequency detection devices such as radar detectors or the Blue Box, and visual observation by the pilot of the target aircraft, by spotters on the ground, on ships, or in other aircraft.

For questions regarding this working aid, please contact Annette Brooker-Grogan, National Cryptologic School OPSEC Education Division, (410) 859-4594.

Appendix B

MILITARY COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) GUIDE

Introduction. The following guide is intended to help military planners identify critical information and OPSEC vulnerabilities that may be associated with counterdrug support missions. The guide, however, is a generic example of OPSEC considerations. It may not cover every situation. The suggested countermeasures might not be appropriate in every instance. Use this document as a tool to help plan and execute OPSEC programs. Commanders must determine what OPSEC measures to implement based upon their own risk assessment.

CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES	COUNTERMEASURES
1. Dates/times of missions.	Unsecured telephonic	Telephone monitoring by	Use secure phones.
	coordination w/LEA.	Drug Trafficking	
	Increased phone traffic as	Organizations (DTOs).	Encourage LEA to practice
	start date approaches.		good OPSEC procedures.
	Opening new radio nets with	Radio monitoring with	Use LEA terms/codes or use
	LEA at mission startup.	scanners by DTOs.	secure voice communications.
	Units receiving intel via	DTOs monitor telephone lines	Do not FAX intel over
	unsecured FAX.	for a copy of intel FAX.	unsecured line.
	Units receiving intel via US	Observation by relatives,	Hand carry.
	Mail or private carrier.	friends of DTOs working in	
		postal work force.	Have intel mailed to LEA or
			sanitized post office box.
			Use DoD personnel to
			hand carry.
2. Identification of	Unit representatives visiting	Observation by relatives/	Meet LEAs outside area of
supporting unit.	LEA & area of operations	friends of DTOs (viewing	operations.
	(AO) for counterdrug	personnel w/LEAs).	
	intelligence preparation of the battlefield (CDIPB) data.		
3. Military support assets	Providing copies of TDY	Observation by relatives/	Do not provide copies of
working CDIPB.	orders for car rental/lodging.	friends of DTOs at car rental	TDY orders to anyone. If
		agencies/hotels (viewing TDY	government rates are refused,
		orders).	pay premium cost.
		1	

MILITARY COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT OPERATIONS SECURITY GUIDE


INDICATORS Use of DoD phrases, terms, jargon, and rank. Use of government tax	ENEMY CAPABILITIES Relatives/friends of DTOs overhearing discussions. Observation by relatives/friends of DTOs at car rental agencies/hotels.	Coordinate in closed door sessions only. Never dise iss mission near administrative, custodial or non-mission essential personnel.
	Observation by relatives/friends of DTOs at car rental	Never dise iss mission near administrative, custodial or non-mission essential
Use of government tax	of DTOs at car rental	administrative, custodial or non-mission essential
Use of government tax		
Use of government tax		4
exempt forms.		Do not use tax exempt forms.
Having pre-op intel/info mailed to LEA.	Observation by relatives/friends of DTOs.	Have mail sent to a post office box number.
	Workers at Post Office.	Do not use military return address.
The wear of unit headgear, t- shirts, crests and/or display of unit specific notebooks, letterhead, luggage, etc.	Observation by relatives/friends of DTOs in target area.	Visiting unit personnel sanitize travel profile when in mission AO.
Congregation of DoD personnel & LEAs, e.g., at lunches, dinners, especially in public.	Observation by DTO relatives, friends, or associates.	Eliminate excessive, large, and/or unnecessary public gatherings w/LEAs.
	mailed to LEA. The wear of unit headgear, t- shirts, crests and/or display of unit specific notebooks, letterhead, luggage, etc. Congregation of DoD personnel & LEAs, e.g., at lunches, dinners, especially in	 mailed to LEA. of DTOs. Workers at Post Office. The wear of unit headgear, t-shirts, crests and/or display of unit specific notebooks, letterhead, luggage, etc. Congregation of DoD personnel & LEAs, e.g., at lunches, dinners, especially in of DTOs. Workers at Post Office. Observation by relatives/friends of DTOs in target area. Observation by DTO relatives, friends, or associates.

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CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES	COUNTERMEASURES
	Leaving mission related info	Observation by DTO	Take mission related info/
	& material in hotel room.	relatives, friends, or associates	material with you, leave it at
		working at hotel.	the site under DoD control, or
			store in field safe. Never leave
			mission information
			unattended.
	Requesting CD intelligence	Overhearing by DTO	Do not attempt to acquire
	from LEAs not	relatives, friends, or associates	intelligence from LEAs not
	knowledgeable of SR.		associated with mission.
			Mala and a familiated to
			Make requests for intel to
			LEA you are supporting.
5. Location of objective	Taking of video/photographs	Can observe something out of	Recons should be kept to a
area.	in Area of Operation.	the ordinary or overhear	minimum.
		conversations.	
	Talking w/LEA at his office.		Limit exposure to a select few
			in areas away from AO &
			LEA's workplace.
6. Military intent to support	Private Land Use - Research	HUMINT Direct	Have LEA get land use
LEAs.	in county court for land	observation	agreement. Obtain long term
	owner identification; Request		agreements.
	to land owner to operate on		
	their land; Land use request		
	goes to area Corps of		
	Engineer Office.		
	Taking of video/photographs		Recons should be kept to a
	in Area of Operation.		minimum.
<u>Harris and a second seco</u>		<u> </u>	B-4








CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES	COUNTERMEASURES
	Unusual amount of LEA presence in his HQ (agents		Planners should meet with LEAs in person to reduce
	are normally in field). Assembling of "key" LEAs		uncovered phone line discussions.
	for joint planning.		
	Paperwork related to military support handled by others		
	who don't have a need to know (secretaries, clerks, distribution personnel, etc.).		
	Solicitation of unit support ability - Mission is discussed and messages are sent to multiple HQs. Major HQs in turn disseminate info to subordinate units.	Threat access to this info is limited. However, open source documents may become available to the threat.	Use STU III to contact possible supporting HQs. Reinforce to commands that mission info is sensitive.
	Initial Site visit with requesting LEA - LEA and supporting unit personnel conduct activity in the mission AO prior to operation.	HUMINT sources can observe activities of site recon.	Request LEA meet with military support unit outside the mission AO.
	Unit uses rank & military unit when contacting LEA.		

CERTICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES.	CARCERING PROPERTY OF
	Use of rental vehicles	Identification of size of rental	Limit number of people and
		vehicles associated with LEA.	rentals on site survey.
	Use of government credit		
	cards.	Rental agency used by military	Determine if it is wise to meet
		can be determined.	LEA in his HQs.
	Use of government rates at		
	hotels.		Use LEA vehicles in AO.
	X7. Jac and add to be to		C total states in LTA
	Video and still photo		Conduct aerial recons in LEA
	equipment used in prep of mission.		A/C or in military A/C if common in AO.
	mission.		common in AO.
			Avoid all private property
			until deemed essential to
			obtain land use agreement.
			obtain fand use agreement.
8. Mode by which the main	Large group of personnel	HUMINT Direct	Have small group arrivals.
body arrives and time of	arriving at a small airport.	observation by populace.	Jan Start St
arrival.			Stagger arrivals.
	Inquiries at airport about		
	arrival data.		Arrive out of AO or at
			military base.
	Convoys of rental vehicles at		
	airport to move personnel.		
9. Air staging location.	Mass of military people in	Obtains knowledge of military	Change site to military base or
	area.	movement, organization, &	airport out of AO.
		intent via HUMINT.	
			B-7

CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES	COUNTERMEASURES
10. Location of billeting &	Several young, short haired	Can observe something out of	Use military base for support.
messing of the advance party.	individuals arriving at the	the ordinary or overhear a	
	same time & obviously not	conversation that something is	Use a base of operations
	from the local area.	being planned or is in	outside AO.
	25. State of a stat	progress.	
			Move/change locations
			occasionally.
11. How initial movement	Large number of DoD	HUMINT Direct	Travel in civilian clothes; use
from arrival airfield to AO	personnel traveling	observation by populace.	low visibility travel
(base of operations) will be	commercially or using	observation by populated.	arrangements.
conducted.	military air.		g
	Mission numbers placed on		Do not leave document laying
	travel orders.		around.
12. Selection of Staging	High profile military/LEA	HUMINT Direct	Operate from secure sites or
Area.	operations signature (increase	observation of Military and	DoD facilities.
	in personnel, vehicles,	LEA Agents	
	equipment).	GIOD TT · · ·	Disperse personnel for
	Targe contracting estimity	SIGINTscanner equipment	messing, billeting.
	Large contracting activity.	smugglers.	Operate well off-site location.
	Unusual racial composition	IMINT photographic	Operate wen on-site location.
	for locale.	surveillance of site.	Use cash transactions and
		Sur vemanee or site.	multiple contracting.
	Operations/military		
	information left in hotel		Control off-duty time.
	rooms.		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
			Relax grooming standards
	Increase in transmissions on		(if approved by
	radio freq. used by LEAs		Commander/TAG).



CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES	COUNTERMEATURES OF
		Can observe something out of	Control distribution of orders.
		the ordinary or overhear	
		conversations.	Recons should be kept to a
			minimum.
			T • • •
			Limit exposure to a select few
			and in areas away from AO & LEA's workplace.
			LEAS workplace.
	Pre-mission training.	HUMINTDirect	Conduct training at a secure
		observation by threat	location/away from area of
	Combined DoD/LEA training		operations.
	sessions.		
			Conceal special equipment.
16. Intent to provide military	Scheduling of facilities/		Work in small groups.
support to LEA & location of	training areas.		recupe.
AO.	······································		
17. Transportation into and	Large group of obvious	HUMINTDirect observation	Limit number of vehicles
out of operation area.	outsiders arriving.	of military and LEA agents.	gathering or driving to area of
			operation.
	Several rental cars (in		
	convoy).		Have military
			vehicles/equipment travel
	Military vehicles/equipment moving on roads.	1	during evening hours.
	moving on roads.		Rent older vehicles or vehicles
	Military equipment visible in		more indigenous to the area.
	vehicles.		more mulgenous to the area.
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17. Identity of mission/target area.	Wearing uniforms in mission area. Visitors to mission sites.	Observation by relatives, friends of DTO associates, and the local populace. Observation by DTO relatives,	Unless visibility is desired, limit wearing of uniform to mission area.
	Visitors to mission sites.	Observation by DTO relatives	-
		friends, or associates, and the local populace.	Restrict on-site visits to mission essential.
	Presence of support/mission preparation intel equipment.	Observation by DTO relatives, friends or associates, and the local populace.	Limit the use of intel prep equipment at mission AO, e.g., tape recorders, camcorders, cameras, etc.
	Group reservations at hotels/group travel, especially by van.	Observation by DTO relatives, friends or associates, and the local populace.	Use multiple hotels recommended by LEAs and stagger routes and times of travel to and from mission area of operation.
	Dismount points too close to mission site.	Surveillance of mission AO. Observation by relatives, friends of DTO associates,	Use brushy or rocky areas to conceal dismount points. Infiltrate during periods of
		and the local populace.	limited visibility.
	Pre-op intelligence over flights of target areas.	Observation by relatives or DTO associates, and the local populace.	Don't conduct pre-op flights over target area unless high altitude intel packages are used.

CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENERY CAPABILITIES	COUNTERMEASURES
			If used, ensure immediate reporting to ground teams
			during operational flights.
			Avoid unsecured airfields.
	Releasing too many maps of target area.	Observation by DTO relatives, friends, or associates, and the	Restrict maps & target data to need to know basis.
	larget area.	local populace.	need to know basis.
		Capability to access/exploit	
		open source documents.	
	Requesting CD intelligence from LEAs not	Overhearing by DTO relatives, friends, or	Do not attempt to acquire intelligence from LEAs not
	knowledgeable of SR.	associates, and the local populace.	associated with mission.
		Monitoring of unsecure phone	Make requests for intel to LEA you are supporting.
		traffic.	LEAT you are supporting.
	Dissemination of intelligence products to non-mission	Observation/access by DTO relatives, friends, or	Limit distribution of intelligence reports or
	essential personnel.	associates.	products to DoD/LEA elements who are directly
			involved in operation.
18. Use of military vehicles in support of CD mission.	Military vehicles operating outside habitual training	HUMINTDirect observation by the local populace.	Use only civilian vehicles.
In support of OD mission.	areas.		Conceal vehicles during

ERITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENCAY CAPABILITIES	COUNTERMEASURES
19. Movement of personnel	People conjugating at same	Knowledge of military	Move only at night;
in & out of base of operations.	locale & time.	movement.	Deception movement plan in and out of primary AO.
			No convoy movement in AO.
			Use infiltration tactics.
			Vary meeting sites and times.
			Keep to minimum.
20. Vehicular parking.	Late model & military vehicles in area.	Knowledge of military movement	Spread out the number of vehicles in area.
21. Billeting.	Reservations for large group of people during off-peak time frame.	Knowledge of military movement.	Avoid contracting for billeting.
	Army people at AF base, etc.		When possible, billet at different locations out of AO.
	ID signature of military units.		
22. Billeting/messing of the visitors.	Short-haired/military looking.	Observe something out of the ordinary or overhear a conversation that something is up.	Don't identify yourself as government employee if normal rate is less than per diem.

CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES	CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR
23. Transportation of visitors in/around base of operations/AO.	Obviously not from the local area.	Observe something out of the ordinary or overhear a conversation that something is up.	Don't allow LEA to visit CP in marked vehicles. Eliminate mention of mission on TDY orders.
24. Activity around base of operations.	Communication gear (292/SATCOM) outside. Additional people/vehicles.	Observation. HUMINT.	Camouflage/hide location of communication gear. Avoid use of military communications equipment.
			Limit number of people in area. Use military base for CP.
25. Location of chain of command (COC).	Activity surrounding a command post.	Threat can detect presence and size of military unit.	Locate COC away from the area of operations; use civilian clothes; employ "blend-in" techniques such as renting RV trailers.
26. Visitors.	New faces, especially visitors of importance attract attention	Can determine presence of military unit.	Minimize visitors, especially to area of operation. Restrict chain of command visitors.
27. Press releases.	Local officials may release information regarding a mission to local papers for political or other reasons.	Can gather considerable information about the mission.	Good prior coordination by unit commander with supported LEA is the best preventative measure. Ensure unit adherence to PAC guidance.

CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY LAPARILITIES	COUNTERMEASURES
28. Casual conversations.	Any contact with locals can result in inadvertent release of information.	Possibility of gathering detailed information. Local smuggling organizations, if alerted to the presence of military personnel, will deliberately target bars, restaurants, and other likely spots to learn what they can. They will also gather information from local people who may come into contact with troops.	Minimize such contacts by restricting liberty, billeting personnel in military facilities, etc. Positive control of individuals through a healthy command structure is the key.
29. Military Radio Procedures.	Use of military jargon during unsecure radio transmissions	Can determine callsigns, number of recon teams, and areas of operation. This has been one of the most significant compromises to military support.	Military support teams should use secure communications. For uncovered nets (LEA frequencies) adopt LEA callsigns and procedures, i.e. avoid the use of military jargon such as "out here", grid coordinates, etc.
30. Unexpected encounters.	When operating in remote areas, military personnel may encounter local law enforcement personnel who are unaware of the operation; local residents also.	Publicity resulting from such an encounter would alert smugglers to a military presence. Smugglers or growers could even arrange for an "accidental" encounter to take place.	A letter of introduction or written paper prepared by the supported LEA explaining permission to conduct military training with a telephone number could resolve legitimate encounters with other LEAs.

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CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES	COUNTERMEASURES
31. False responses.	Smugglers will be alerted to	Threat can determine presence	False or erroneous reporting
	the fact that an area is being	of military personnel and area	usually occurs when military
	watched when a false LEA	of operation by noting LEA	personnel are unfamiliar with
	response occurs; or if a	responses.	local terrain and normal local
	smuggler escapes if LEA		activities. Countermeasures
	responds to the wrong place.		include several days of pre-
			mission train-up with LEA,
			ride along, and good intel
			prep. Personnel manning
			LP/OP positions must give a
			good intel prep. Also,
			personnel manning LP/OP
			positions must give a good
			changeover brief to relief
			teams. Ensure military and
			LEA personnel use same maps
			and designations of critical
			locations (e.g., LP#1, Hill
			502, etc.).
			502, 6(0.).
32. Errors and	When an operation does not	Threat can detect presence of	Several days of pre-mission
Miscommunication	go smoothly, the recovery	military personnel and	train-up is vital to minimizing
	process may involve clear-	locations of LP/OP sites by	errors and miscommunication,
	voice transmissions, sudden	picking up on the unusual	and will improve OPSEC.
	scrambling of personnel, and	activity or the resulting	Team cohesion can be
	other reactions that can	discussions.	enhanced with Situational
	compromise the mission.	alleyddiolld.	Training Exercises (STXs).
	Such events tend to be		Military can teach small-unit
	extensively (often angrily)		tactics to LEA: LEA teaches
	discussed after-the-fact.		advanced tracking techniques
			to military at formal sessions
			or informal gatherings.
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CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES	COUNTERMEASURES
33. Cellular telephones.	Unsecured transmissions.	SIGINT. Interception of	Use operational/brevity codes.
		transmissions. Cellular	
		telephone calls can be	Limit number and length of
		intercepted with off-the-shelf	transmissions.
		radio scanners.	
			Use secure cellular telephones.
	Overtly transporting cellular	HUMINT. Military personnel	Keep cellular telephones
	telephones.	carrying cellular telephones in	concealed and protected.
		public may arouse suspicion	Note that vehicles with
		or invite theft.	cellular telephones are
			targeted by thieves.
34. Military radios.	Unsecured transmissions.	SIGINT.	Use NSA approved electronic
5 1. Mintary radios.		Interception of transmissions.	(on-line) encryption devices.
		Military radio transmissions	
		can be intercepted with off-	Use burst transmission
		the-shelf radio scanners.	devices. While technically not
			secured these devices offer a
			reasonable amount of security.
			Use Operational/Brevity codes
			when not using on-line
			encryption devices.
			T
		SIGINT. Direction finding	Limit number and length of
		and jamming employed against	transmissions.
		radios appears to be minimal.	Use appropriate ECCM
			techniques.
			- comingator.
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CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENERGY CAPABILITIES	COLORIDADIA SURVEY
	Overt placement of military	HUMINT. The profile of	Use low profile antennas.
	radios and antennas.	military radios and antennas in	
		a non-military environment	Keep military radios out of
		will arouse suspicion and	sight.
		compromise locations.	
			Use military facilities
			whenever possible to mark
			operations.
5. LEA radios.	Unsecured transmissions.	SIGINT. The majority of	Use DES/electronic (on-line)
		LEA radio systems are	encryption whenever possibl
		unsecured. Notable	
		exceptions are USCS and	Avoid using LEA radio
		some USBP systems.	systems except in an
			emergency or to coordinate
		SIGINT. Traffic analysis.	with the LEA.
			Use operational/brevity code
			when not using on-line
			encryption devices.
			Use LEA (not military) call
			signs and radio procedures.
			Attempt to blend in with
			normal LEA traffic.
			Limit number and length of
			transmissions.

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CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENERAL CAPABILITIES	COUNTERALEANIZEN
36. Pagers	Unsecured transmissions.	SIGINT. Signals to pagers are difficult to intercept.	Pagers are a valuable means of communications and may be employed in lieu of other less secure means. The pager can be used to transmit operational/brevity codes.
	Overtly carrying pagers.	HUMINT. Military personnel carrying pagers in public may arouse suspicion and invite theft.	Keep pagers concealed and protected.
37. Telephones.	Unsecured transmissions.	SIGINT/HUMINT. Personnel must assume that all unsecured telephone lines are being monitored.	Use STU-III telephone whenever sensitive information is being discussed or faxed.
			Use operational/brevity codes when not using on-line encryption devices.
38. FAX.	Unsecured	SIGINT. FAX transmissions can be intercepted.	Use secure FAX whenever sensitive/classified information is being transferred. B-19

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	CRITICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS		COUNTERMEASURES
	39. COMSEC Material.	Protection of COMSEC	SIGINT. Counterdrug	Adhere to DoD regulations
1.		material.	COMSEC material varies in	when handling COMSEC
			classification from UNCLAS	material.
			to TS. The UNCLAS material	
			is designed to be used with	
			LEA's that do not have a	
			security clearance. All	
			COMSEC material must be	
			protected from compromise.	
1	40. MREs/Tray Packs	Carrying around in plain sight	HUMINT. Can detect signs	Hide packages/trash, police
		on civilian rentals.	of military presence and	areas of operation.
			activity by size of trash	
		Trash.	disposed of.	
	41. Batteries	Trash wrappers.	Can determine types of	Police trash.
	(Civilian/Military)		communications gear.	
	·	Disposal.	C	Dispose of expended batteries
				at military DRMOs.
		Purchase from local vendors.		Purchase away from area.
				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	42. Construction material for	Carried in civilian rental	Can detect positions.	Recover all class IV.
	tactical positions (i.e., barbed	vehicles.	1	
ः श	wire, sand bags, etc.)		Can detect presence of DoD	Conceal when transporting.
		Left behind when changing	personnel.	sector in the sector sector is a sector in the sector is a sector
		position.	por sonnor.	
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43. Class V	Carried in plain sight in civilian vehicles.	Can detect presence of DoD forces.	Conceal Class V when transporting.
	Expended pyrotechnics, brass, packaging not policed	Can detect types of weapons.	Police all expended brass.
	up from AO.	Can detect LP/OP positions.	
44. LBE/TA-50/782 Gear.	Carried in plain sight in civilian rentals.		Conceal during movement to AO.
	Military type clothing, i.e., corfram shoes		
45. Rental Vehicles	New vehicles.	Can detect DoD presence.	Contract at large cities away from the AO.
	Same types/makes.	Can glean number of personnel, dates of exercise,	Request varied types of rentals and ensure local license plates
	Contracted with local vendors.	and key personnel off the contract.	are on vehicles.
	Refuel/repair.	Local fuel/tire shops deal with military.	
	Rental company markings.		en de la service de la serv La service de la service de
	Rental license plates.		
46. Medical	Use of civilian facilities to treat DoD personnel.	Can detect DoD personnel.	Ensure medics/corpsmen are prepared for all emergencies.
			Use civilian hospitals only in emergencies.

CONTRICAL INFORMATION	INDICATORS	ENEMY CAPABILITIES (COLUMN TRACK
	Discarded medical trash with military markings.	Can detect positions.	Police AO.
47. Laundry.	Use of civilian vendors/cleaners.	Can glean presence of military units.	Do own laundry.
48. Port-A-Johns/Dumpsters.	Use of civilian vendors.	Location of units.	Use slit-trenches/cat holes.
	Obvious presence of military forces.	Number of personnel. Can glean presence of military	Place waste receptacles away from sensitive mission sites.
		forces.	Carry out.
49. Additional supplies.	Increase in volume for certain items.	ID equipment & supplies of unit.	Have unit order supplies or ship their supplies in advance.
		Arouse curiosity.	
50. Movement of military personnel from billeting or support base to AO.	Vehicle patterns, helicopters on horizon, landing zones, entry/exit routes.	Knowledge of AO, ingress/egress points.	Vary location, use deception routes.
		Patterns established.	Insert for longer duration.
51. Time.	Daily/or set pattern for time of day, every 3d/4th day, etc.	Patterns established.	Vary time & days of ingress/egress.
			Use helicopters only for necessity, not convenience.
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For Further Information...

The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI), a federally funded activity of the National Guard Bureau, was established December 12, 1990 by the California National Guard with the approval of the Department of Defense. NICI supports the National Drug Control Strategy by training representatives of law enforcement, military organizations, and the drug demand reduction community; and by analyzing tactics and procedures, establishing a repository of lessons learned, and disseminating information on counterdrug- and drug demand reduction-related issues, seminars, and conferences.

The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI) provides management-level training in the planning and conduct of joint counterdrug operations to both military and law enforcement personnel. The <u>Counterdrug Managers' Course</u> (CMC) is a five-day course presented by NICI approximately ten times a year. This tuition-free course is designed to enhance the interoperability of military and drug law enforcement agencies. (Students pay only for transportation, lodging, and meals.) NICI also provides a <u>Drug Prevention and Demand Reduction Course</u> (DPDR) approximately four times a year. This five-day course trains military and law enforcement personnel, public officials, business and community leaders, educators, counselors, and military family support group members to develop effective counterdrug programs within their communities. There is no tuition charged to attend this course. (Students pay only for transportation, lodging, and meals.)

NICI classes are conducted at San Luis Obispo, California and various other sites across the United States. Individuals interested in attending NICI courses should contact NICI student services at (805) 549-3966 or DCTN 630-9966.

The Research and Analysis (R&A) Division of NICI publishes *National Guard Counterdrug* Lessons at least once per year. They also publish a bi-monthly *NICI Bulletin* to provide information to the counterdrug and drug prevention/demand reduction community on drug prevention/demand reduction- and counterdrug-related conferences and seminars. To be placed on the mailing list for *National Guard Counterdrug Lessons* and the *NICI Bulletin*, or to have information on your conference or seminar included in the bulletin, contact the NICI R&A Division at (805) 549-3968 or DCTN 630-9968.

The NICI Research and Analysis Division also maintains an extensive library of materials on joint counterdrug operations and general drug policy issues. The Division offers a Request for Information service free of charge to the counterdrug community. Contact them to obtain copies of publications or to ask questions concerning military support to counterdrug operations.