National Process Evaluation of the Weed and Seed Initiative

Final Report
Part I: Cross-site Summary

Submitted to the
National Institute of Justice

Submitted by

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Institute for Social Analysis	*Police Foundation*	*American Prosecutors Research Institute*
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Background

The federal Weed and Seed initiative was launched in 1991 as a means of mobilizing a large and varied array of resources in a concerted effort to control crime and improve the quality of life in targeted high crime neighborhoods. In late 1992, the national evaluation of the Weed and Seed program began as a process study, designed to document program activities in nineteen demonstration sites, from the initial stages of organizing a steering committee through planning, development, and implementation of Weed and Seed strategies. The Institute for Social Analysis (ISA), Police Foundation, and American Prosecutors Research Institute (APRI) collaborated in this study, which is designed to describe the unique characteristics of the approaches taken by the demonstration sites and to examine these approaches comparatively as variants of a model. This report presents a summary of the implementation and first 18 months of operation of Weed and Seed programs in 19 cities.

Purpose and Background of the Weed and Seed Initiative

The purpose of Operation Weed and Seed, as described in the original solicitation announcement, is "to demonstrate an innovative, comprehensive and integrated multi-agency approach to law enforcement and community revitalization for controlling and preventing violent crime, drug abuse and gang activity in targeted high crime neighborhoods across the country" (BJA Program Solicitation, p. 39). This concept of a multi-agency approach involving a two-pronged strategy of first "weeding out" violent criminals and then "seeding" the area with a broad array of human services was developed by President George Bush's administration and introduced in March, 1991, at the Attorney General's Summit on Law Enforcement Responses to Violent Crime: Public Safety in the Nineties.

The initial conceptualization of Weed and Seed grew out of several programs in Philadelphia: the Violent Traffickers Project (VTP), an initiative involving a joint Federal-State multi-agency task force developed in 1988 as part of the President's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Project; the Federal Alternatives to State Trials (FAST) program, a collaboration between the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office and the Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that was funded in July, 1991, by the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA); a joint effort by residents of the Mantua neighborhood in Philadelphia and Federal, State and local government called Operation PEARL (for Prevention, Education, Action, Rehabilitation and Law Enforcement) for which BJA provided a planning grant (DOJ, *Operation Weed and Seed: FY 1993 Program Description*); and the anti-drug effort launched by government agencies and citizens in the Spring Garden neighborhood (additional information on this effort may be found in Philadelphia's site summary in Part 2 of this report).

Operation Weed and Seed was launched in August and September, 1991, with BJA funding of three pilot demonstration projects in Kansas City, Omaha, and Trenton. Grants were made to an additional 16 cities in 1992, selected on the basis of several criteria: the existence of a severe crime problem within the cities, demonstrated presence of successful anti-drug programs, the potential for strong and active participation by community groups, geographic diversity of sites, and balance of large and mid-size cities (DOJ, *Operation Weed and Seed: FY 1993 Program Description*). The national evaluation was conducted on the three original pilot projects and the sixteen additional demonstration projects. Soon after the evaluation began, North Charlotte, North Carolina, was awarded the 20th grant and the 21st grant, which was many times larger than the others, was made to Los Angeles following the riots that erupted after the trial of the defendants in the Rodney King case.

Background Literature

The comprehensive, multi-faceted nature of Weed and Seed initiative is grounded in a wide array of research and practical experience that is very briefly summarized below, organized by key program components.

Law enforcement tactics. Research on the effectiveness of various law enforcement tactics in the war on drugs has been inconclusive and mixed. Studies generally find that effective tactics and strategies typically have at least some unwanted side-effects or have effects that are of limited duration.

Police "crackdowns" have been shown to be effective deterrents during the intensive enforcement period, and there is some evidence of residual deterrence (Sherman, 1990). However, there is also evidence that drug markets adapt to crackdowns, particularly through displacement to other locations, and that intensified drug enforcement sometimes increases levels of predatory crime and drug-related homicide as a result of increased prices and competition for lucrative markets (Sherman, 1990; Moore, 1988; Reuter *et al.*, 1988). Research is also inconclusive regarding the relative efficacy of campaigns against retail-level street sales versus long-term investigations of wholesale distributors and importers (Moore, 1988; Annan and Skogan, 1992).

Limitations on what law enforcement operations can do to control drug markets suggest the need for police work to be supplemented by other measures, particularly community involvement, although mobilizing low-income and minority neighborhoods for crime prevention and suppression can be hampered by a lack of community organizations and negative attitudes toward the police (Moore and Kleiman, 1989; Uchida, Forst & Annan, 1990). On the other hand, studies by Skogan (1989) and Davis *et al.* (1991) document relatively high levels of community organization and anti-drug activism in high crime neighborhoods.

Prosecution strategies. Weeding strategies in the demonstrations sites will be able to draw on extensive experiences of previous operations involving cooperation between police and prosecutors and across government levels and jurisdictions. These experiences and evaluations of them have demonstrated the value of multi-jurisdictional task forces, cooperative investigation, vertical prosecution and the utilization of a full range of laws, from Federal firearms laws to nuisance abatement, eviction and anti-loitering statutes (Coldren & Sabath, 1992; Chaiken, Chaiken & Karchner, 1990; Schlegel & McGarrell, 1991). Research by the National Drug Prosecution Center has shown that prosecutors can have an effect on drug abuse and crime not just through enforcement, but also by mobilizing and working with community groups and social service agencies in neighborhood revitalization efforts.

The partnership approach to combating crime and drug problems. In addition to looking toward multi-agency task forces to design and implement weeding strategies, community partnerships for crime and drug control and seeding strategies will be developed. Little empirical research on the effectiveness of these partnerships has been completed, but the need for multi-agency, comprehensive strategies for drug prevention has been documented (Botvin, 1987). Two major process evaluations of community partnerships have been supported by the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (Cook *et al.*, 1993) and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Impact evaluations of these programs, CSAP's Community Partnership Program and RWJ's *Fighting Back* program, are underway.

Community policing. Community policing approaches take many forms, including decentralized service delivery, various means of police-citizen contact, community organizing, foot patrol, problem-solving, and neighborhood-based and mobile police stations. There is a growing body of empirical evidence, across different types of strategies and communities, that community policing efforts can have a variety of positive effects on communities, including decreases in fear of crime, reductions in particular types of crimes, and enhanced citizen perceptions of the quality of neighborhood life (see, for example, Uchida, Forst, & Annan, 1990; Cordner, 1986; Eck & Spelman, 1987; McElroy, Cosgrove, & Sadd, 1989; Goldstein, 1990; and Pate *et al.*, 1986). Both affirmative results and cautionary messages can be found in the writings within Greene and Mastrofski (1988) and Rosenbaum (1994).

Seeding strategies. "Seeding" target neighborhoods leads to the implementation of a wide variety of strategies for community crime prevention, community organizing and empowerment, drug prevention and treatment, economic development, and neighborhood revitalization. Community-based anti-crime measures have produced mixed results, often leading to reductions in fear of crime yet no lessening of resident victimization (Cirel *et al.*, 1977; Rosenbaum, Lewis, & Grant, 1986; Lavrakas *et al.*, 1989; Fowler & Mangione, 1982).

Similarly, while evaluations of drug prevention approaches based on information,

education, and alternatives have found scant evidence of effectiveness (Cook *et al.*, 1984; Schaps *et al.*, 1981), more recent theoretically grounded approaches have brightened a this rather bleak outlook (Bell & Battjes, 1985). In particular, the social influence model based on skills training for resisting drug use and peer pressure has produced promising findings (Botvin, 1987; Pentz *et al.*, 1989, Ellickson & Bell, 1990).

The neighborhood revitalization and development approaches aim for significant and long lasting changes in the target neighborhoods, including improved housing, increased employment, business growth, etc. Assessments of their effectiveness require long-term economic measures.

The Weed and Seed Initiative

Program management. The lead agencies in administering this program at the federal level have been the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). BJA and EOUSA supplied the 19 sites with grant funds totalling over $20 million, yet the coordinated mobilization of resources from a broad array of government agencies is one of the central tenets of the program. The Department of Justice has worked hand-in-hand with other federal agencies to provide guidance, technical assistance, and federal funding to participating Weed and Seed sites. Some of these cooperative federal initiatives and training and other assistance efforts are (Executive Office for Weed and Seed, *Reclaiming America's Neighborhoods*, March 1993):

- Safe Havens -- multi-service centers offering prevention, treatment, educational, recreational, cultural, and other activities for young people and services for families -- funded by the Departments of Justice, Education, and Housing and Urban Development.

- Community Policing in Public Housing, a training and technical assistance program supported by the Department of Justice and HUD.

- Race Against Drugs, a drug awareness and prevention program supported by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

- Boys and Girls Clubs, to provide children in public housing with organized recreational, educational, sports, social and vocational activities, funded by BJA through a grant to the Boys and Girls Club of America.

- The Wings of Hope anti-drug program, supported by BJA through a grant to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

- Step-up, a job and apprentice-training program for public housing residents and other low income persons, to be integrated into Weed and Seed sites under an interagency agreement signed by the Departments of HUD, Labor, and Justice.

- Other recipients of training and technical assistance funds and their federal funding agencies:
  - National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise (BJA).
  - National Conference of Black Mayors (BJA).
  - Operation PAR (Parental Awareness and Responsibility (BJA).
  - Business Alliance Program (BJA).
  - Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) Programs (BJA).
  - National Crime Prevention Council (BJA).
  - National organization for Victim Assistance (EOWS and the Office of Victims of Crime).
  - Small Business Administration Microloan program (SBA).

The Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Housing and Urban Development have developed ways to direct agency resources to Weed and Seed communities. These means include providing information and access to the sites, and giving the Weed and Seed sites preference in major programs such as HUD's Drug Elimination Grant Program.

The Executive Office for Weed and Seed also instituted an official recognition program designed to encourage the implementation of Weed and Seed programs in communities not receiving BJA/EOUSA demonstration grants. Communities that meet the criteria and are officially recognized are to be given special consideration in applying for funding from various federal agencies. The EOWS works with U.S. Attorneys to encourage program adoption and disseminate to interested individuals and community groups information about Weed and Seed and about resources available from the Department of Justice and other agencies. Ten cities have achieved official recognition and as many as 80 cities are candidates; the official recognition program was suspended in mid-1993 and may be re-started in early 1995.

Role of the U.S. Attorneys. A central feature of the Weed and Seed initiative is the key role assigned to U.S. Attorneys. Active participation by the local U.S. Attorney was considered vital for effecting the necessary coordination of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, making maximum use of federal law in weeding strategies, and helping mobilize resources for seeding programs from a broad array of federal agencies. Program guidelines thus called for local U.S. Attorneys to take the lead in encouraging new Weed and Seed initiatives and to be at the center of planning and

organizing representative steering committees and task forces.

Program goals and objectives. The goals of Operation Weed and Seed are simple and ambitious (*Operation Weed and Seed Implementation Manual*, p. 1-3):

- To eliminate violent crime, drug trafficking and drug-related crime from targeted high-crime neighborhoods.

- To provide a safe environment, free of crime and drug use, for law-abiding citizens to live, work, and raise families.

Underlying Operation Weed and Seed is the premise that these goals are interdependent and inseparable. Often described as not just a grant program but a *strategy*, the essential and defining characteristic of Weed and Seed is its emphasis on collective and coordinated action. This emphasis is captured in the program objectives (*Operation Weed and Seed Implementation Manual*, p. 1-3):

1. To develop a comprehensive, multi-agency strategy to control and prevent violent crime; drug trafficking and drug-related crime in targeted high-crime neighborhoods.

2. To coordinate and integrate existing as well as new Federal, State, local and private sector initiatives, criminal justice efforts, and human services and to concentrate those resources in the project sites to maximize their impact on reducing and preventing violent crime, drug trafficking and drug-related crime.

3. To mobilize community residents in the targeted sites to assist law enforcement in identifying and removing violent offenders and drug traffickers from their neighborhoods and to assist other human service agencies in identifying and responding to service needs of the target area.

The Department of Justice did not require sites to implement specific strategies or programs. Each site was required to develop its own approach to the central program elements of weeding, including prosecution; community policing; and seeding, including prevention, intervention, and treatment, and neighborhood restoration.

The Weed and Seed concept may be summarized as a kind of working hypothesis wrapped in an evocative metaphor:

Because the problems of crime and neighborhood deterioration are linked, so must be their solutions. To effect any significant change in the problem of violent and drug-related crime and make dangerous neighborhoods safer requires long-term investment in efforts to help people (through drug prevention and treatment, job training, etc.) and to revitalize neighborhoods that have experienced the downward spiral

of mutually reinforcing crime, physical deterioration and neglect. However, the seeds of renewal cannot germinate and be nurtured in an environment where crime and violence are rampant. Weed and Seed is predicated on the argument that a two-step social intervention is necessary (if not sufficient) to break what has become an insidious cycle. Step one is to weed out the worst of the violent and habitual offenders in the target area; this must be followed (more or less immediately) by the seeding of programs that will foster healthy personal, social and economic growth and thus inhibit the return of drug trafficking, violent crime and associated social pathologies.

The horticultural metaphor of weeding and seeding implies a need for strategies that are as carefully planned and executed as any successful gardener's program of cultivation and planting. To evaluate the Weed and Seed program is to subject its premises to scrutiny in light of the experience of nineteen demonstration projects. Is the working hypothesis behind Weed and Seed valid? Is the leadership role of the U.S. Attorney critical to successful implementation? Is weeding a necessary precursor to seeding? Do weeding strategies protect individual rights as they profess to protect communities? How are citizens involved in the planning and execution of Operation Weed and Seed? Are resources effectively mobilized to support the most needed neighborhood revitalization programs? Do these essential elements that define the Weed and Seed strategy make any difference in efforts to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in high-crime neighborhoods? Finally, what lessons from the demonstrations can be applied in other communities planning to implement similar programs?

The National Evaluation

Evaluation goals and objectives. The evaluation goals as stated by the federal funding agencies are:

- To understand the costs and value of Weed and Seed programs in urban settings.
- To inform policy makers, program developers and law enforcement agencies about new and promising innovative strategies and make recommendations for program development.

The evaluation objectives are:

- To collect and analyze data regarding the implementation of Weed and Seed projects and their elements.
- To collect and analyze data regarding the costs and value of Weed and Seed projects and their elements.

- To prepare a comprehensive report of this process evaluation for distribution to police departments, community groups and policy makers who are concerned with urban crime and drug problems.

Evaluation conceptual framework. Weed and Seed is a multi-faceted intervention targeted at selected neighborhoods where the needs for crime control and community improvement are great and the potential for success is promising. The intervention consists of mobilizing and redirecting resources for two kinds of services -- law enforcement and a broad array of other human services defined as either "prevention, intervention and treatment" or "neighborhood revitalization," which together make up the seeding strategies.

The law enforcement component of Operation Weed and Seed entails two interventions: first, the acute concentration of prosecutorial and police actions in a strategic plan to remove violent habitual offenders from the neighborhood; and second, introduction or intensification of community-oriented policing in the target area. A separable, but significant, element of weeding aims to apply the full extent of state and federal law to keep targeted offenders out of selected neighborhoods. This is to be accomplished via prosecution tactics to deny bail to offenders, obtain guilty pleas or convictions, and incarcerate convicted offenders under maximum sentences.

In the Weed and Seed model, weeding is to be followed or accompanied by the strategically planned introduction and/or intensification of human service programs -- seeding. The theory is that weeding, if successful, will facilitate seeding, that seeding will, in the long run, inhibit the return of violence, crime and drug-trafficking, and that community-oriented policing will alter the traditional, often hostile, relationships between police and residents. In this sense, community policing will become a "bridge" that links law enforcement with other social services in a common, mutually reinforcing effort to make troubled communities safer and healthier places to live, work, and raise families.

Figure 1 presents a simplified conceptual framework of the relationships among weeding, community policing, and seeding, and includes the program context and organization. As shown, all three components are considered interdependent. In the short term, the implementation of a Weed and Seed strategy is expected to result in the removal of violent offenders from the neighborhood, greater involvement by residents of the community, and mobilization of increased resources from a variety of sources. The long-term goals of Weed and Seed are to effect reductions in the levels of crime, violence, drug trafficking and fear, along with more jobs, better housing, improved quality of neighborhood life and reduced use of drugs and alcohol.

Overview of evaluation methodology. The two-year process evaluation documented the implementation and activities of nineteen demonstration projects. Cross-site analyses of Weed and Seed strategies and task force and community characteristics are supplemented by summary descriptions of the projects in each site.

Figure 1: Weed and Seed Simplified Conceptual Framework



The following elements were examined and contrasted:

- Target community characteristics (size, ethnicity, crime and drug problems, etc.).
- Program characteristics (overall strategy, staffing, use of grant funds, resource building, implementation processes, etc.).
- Task force characteristics (composition, size, structure) and functioning (policy development, planning, decision-making, coordination, etc.).
- Law enforcement and community policing strategies (nature, intensity, selection process), and immediate outcomes (number of arrests, severity of charges, etc.).
- Prosecution strategies (roles of local prosecutors and U.S. Attorneys, case processing tactics, coordination, etc.) and immediate outcomes (number and type of convictions by crime, lengths of sentences, use of pretrial detention, etc.).
- Seeding activities (nature of strategies, target groups, intensity, obstacles, etc.).

Information on these program elements was gathered via:

1. Site visits involving interviews with key staff, task force members, and community representatives, the collection of documents, and tours of target areas. A comprehensive site visit was made by either ISA or Police Foundation staff, and APRI staff interviewed prosecution staff at length during a second site visit or other opportunity.

2. A review and content analysis of basic information from materials gathered from the sites. These materials include the original and two subsequent applications submitted for Weed and Seed funding and routine programs materials including task force meeting minutes, annual reports, arrest statistics, program descriptions, media coverage, etc.

3. Surveys of key program staff to gather uniform cross-site information on program and target area characteristics, law enforcement and community policing activities, and seeding. The evaluation staff encountered obstacles in gathering cross-site data due to the lack of standard definitions of key program pieces (such as what constitutes a "Weed and Seed arrest"), absence of uniform reporting requirements, and the need to gather information retrospectively. Not all sites returned all forms, in spite of intensive follow-up efforts. Where possible, other program documents were used to provide missing information.

Site visit protocols used to guide the face-to-face interviews and copies of the cross-site survey instruments are included in Appendix A.

Present Status of the Weed and Seed Initiative and National Evaluation

Federal funding for the sixteen Weed and Seed demonstration sites totaled $1,100,000 per site for the first 18-month demonstration period, with different amounts provided to the three original pilot sites. Although the original applications sought the full $1.1 million, approximately $613,000 was provided to each site in April or May 1992, and $487,000 per site was provided in early 1993. The programs actually initiated operations between April 1992 and December 1992. Differences in start-up dates are due to a variety of local circumstances. The national process evaluation began in early 1993, retrospectively gathered information on program implementation, and traced program activities through to the end of the first demonstration period (roughly the end of 1993).

Changes in the executive branch of government had significant effects on the Weed and Seed program. The Weed and Seed program was initiated by the Bush administration's Department of Justice under the direction of then-Attorney General Barr. Election year coincided with the programs' first year of operation, and in January 1993, President Clinton took office. Throughout 1993, federal support for the program was uncertain, all U.S. Attorneys resigned and were replaced, and funds promised by the Bush administration for seeding never materialized. Under Attorney General Reno, federal support solidified and the program received additional support and direction. In mid-1994, the original 21 sites received an additional $750,000 for (presumably) their final year of federal funds. In late 1994, as this report is being written, fifteen new sites received funding. The guidelines for the new sites are very similar to those for older sites, except that substantially more money has been allocated to seeding activities.

Overview of this Report

This report is presented in two parts. Part I presents a cross-site summary which brings together information on program characteristics, weeding activities, community policing, and seeding activities across all 19 sites. These program elements are summarized in Chapters 2 through 6. The final chapter present conclusions and recommendations. Individual site summaries are presented in alphabetical order and bound separately as Part II of this report. The site summaries describe local program events and activities through 1993.

Chapter 2
Program Characteristics and Context

This chapter summarizes the characteristics of the nineteen sites in which Weed and Seed was implemented, the projects' overall organizational and management structures, and variations across sites in program emphasis and allocation of resources. The cities, grantees, and target areas are listed in Table 2-1.

Characteristics of the Demonstration Sites and Target Areas

The Weed and Seed demonstration project was implemented in nineteen cities which vary significantly in size, geographic location, and other characteristics. Taken together, the cities constitute a reasonable cross-section of urban America. As shown in Table 2-2, the number of people living in the most populous of the cities (Chicago) is almost two orders of magnitude greater than the smallest (Chelsea). The land area covered by any one of the five largest cities is greater than that of all the eight smallest combined. All four census regions are represented among the demonstration cities, as are all but one (East South Central) of the nine census districts.

Most of the demonstration cities chose to concentrate Weed and Seed efforts in one area; five had two target areas; one had three; and one had four.[1] The average (mean) population of the target areas for which data were available (24 target areas in 15 of the 19 cities) was 11,200. Average *combined* target area population in the 15 cities was 18,000 (see Table 2-4). The average geographic area (based on data for 17 target areas in 13 of the cities) was 2.2 square miles. Variance around these averages, however, is considerable, again reflecting the wide range of settings in which the demonstrations were implemented, from Fairhill Housing in Philadelphia -- a single public housing development in two high rise buildings on one city block -- to a 15-square mile section of Fort Worth with 33,000 residents. In several cities public housing developments constituted the entirety or a major part of one or more of the target areas. A major characteristic of these areas compared to others is extremely high population density. For example, in Chicago's Ida B. Wells housing development, where 5,000 people live in buildings covering less than one-tenth of a square mile, the population density is 80 times that of Forth Worth's target area. Population and size of target areas, to the extent the information was available, are summarized in Table 2-2 and 2-3.

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[1]Atlanta added a third target area, not originally planned, in 1993; Denver began implementing the program in two additional target areas, which were part of the original plan, in 1994; one of the four Philadelphia target areas was dropped in 1993.

Table 2-1
Demonstration Cities, Grantees and Target Area

Demonstration city	Grantee	Target area(s)
Atlanta	Atlanta Bureau of Justice	Thomasville Heights Englewood Manor
Charleston	Mayor's Office	Inner City
Chelsea	Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice	Shurtleff-Bellingham
Chicago	Chicago Housing Authority	Ida B. Wells
Denver	Mayor's Office	Cole/Whittier/Clayton Baker/La Alma
Fort Worth	Fort Worth Police Department	East Side
Kansas City	Kansas City Police Department	Ivanhoe, Broadway-Gilham Public Housing
Madison	Mayor's Office	South Beltline Northeast Neighborhood
Omaha	Mayor's Office	40th & Bedford
Philadelphia	Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice	Part of 26th Police District Part of 25th Police District Hunting Park Fairhill Housing
Pittsburgh	Mayor's Office	Hill District
Richmond	Metro Richmond Coalition Against Drugs	Gilpin Blackwell
San Antonio	San Antonio Police Department	Eastside
San Diego	Office of the City Manager	Southcrest
Santa Ana	Santa Ana Police Department	Grid 106
Seattle	Seattle Police Department	Central Area
Trenton	New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety	Special Enforcement Area 1-4
Washington, DC	Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice Plans & Analysis; ultimately transferred to the Office of Emergency Preparedness	Langston-Carver Terrace
Wilmington	Delaware Criminal Justice Council	West Center City Hilltop

Table 2-2
Population, Land Area and Density of Demonstration Cities

Site	Population	Size (sq. mi.)	Density (per sq mi)
Atlanta	403,085	32	2,990
Charleston	82,104	43	1,861
Chelsea	35,000	2	17,500
Chicago	2,811,478	261	11,172
Denver	479,468	153	3,050
Fort Worth	457,171	277	1,614
Kansas City	438,188	312	1,397
Madison	193,735	58	3,309
Omaha	338,987	101	3,338
Philadelphia	1,596,699	135	11,736
Pittsburgh	372,349	56	6,653
Richmond	206,292	60	3,379
San Antonio	955,905	333	2,811
San Diego	1,133,681	324	3,428
Santa Ana	299,860	27	10,839
Seattle	532,418	84	6,153
Trenton	89,017	8	11,516
Washington, DC	598,000	61	9,884
Wilmington	73,036	11	6,623

Source: U.S. Bureau of The Census, 1990 Census of Population and Housing: Summary Population and Housing Characteristics, March, 1992.

Table 2-3
Population, Size, and Density of Target Areas

Target Area	Population	Size (sq. mi.)	Density (per sq mi)
Atlanta[1]	2,150	.09	23,888
Charleston	12,542	4.00	3,135
Chelsea	.	.32	.
Chicago	5,660	.07	80,857
Denver 1	3,715	.41	9,061
Denver 2	5,247	.40	13,118
Fort Worth	38,770	15.00	2,585
Kansas City 1	12,676	.	.
Kansas City 2	10,898	.	.
Kansas City 3	9,375	.	.
Madison 1	2,634	.40	6,585
Madison 2	3,400	1.00	3,400
Omaha	.	4.00	.
Philadelphia 1	12,155	.	.
Philadelphia 2	20,271	1.20	16,893
Philadelphia 3	20,567	2.00	10,284
Philadelphia 4	717	.01	71,700
Pittsburgh	17,836	.	.
Richmond 1	3,578	.	.
Richmond 2	3,303	.	.
San Antonio	16,506	3.00	5,502
San Diego	31,337	3.20	9,792
Santa Ana	7,500	1.00	7,500
Seattle	12,460	1.20	10,383
Wilmington 1	4,475	.	.
Wilmington 2	11,897	.	.

[1] Two target areas combined.
Note: Data not available for Trenton and Washington, DC.

Table 2-4
Population, Size and Density
of Target Areas, Combined

Site	Total Number of Target Areas	Combined Population	Combined Size (sq. miles)	Average Density (per sq. mile)
Atlanta[1]	2	2,150	.09	23,889
Charleston	1	12,542	4.00	3,136
Chelsea	1	------	.32	-------
Chicago	1	5,660	.07	80,857
Denver	2	8,962	.81	11,064
Fort Worth	1	38,770	15.00	2,585
Kansas City	3	32,949	---.---	-------
Madison	2	6,034	1.40	4,310
Omaha	1	-----	4.00	-------
Philadelphia	4	53,710	4.2	12,788
Pittsburgh	1	17,836	---.---	-------
Richmond	2	6,881	---.---	-------
San Antonio	1	16,506	3.00	5,502
San Diego	1	31,337	3.20	9,793
Santa Ana	1	7,500	1.00	7,500
Seattle	1	12,460	1.20	10,383
Wilmington	2	16,372	---.---	-------

[1] A third target area was added in 1993.
Note: Data not available for Trenton and Washington, DC.

Race and ethnicity. The racial and ethnic composition of the demonstration cities varies considerably, as it does in American cities generally. Among the demonstration cities are several in which African-Americans comprise more than 50% of the population (Atlanta, Richmond, Washington, D.C., and Wilmington). Hispanics make up more than half the population in San Antonio and Santa Ana and 43% in Chelsea, according to 1990 census data, which excludes some unknown, but probably significant, number of undocumented immigrants. The cities of Madison, Omaha, Pittsburgh, and Seattle have predominantly non-Hispanic white populations. The demonstration cities' racial and ethnic population distribution are presented in Table 2-5.

Table 2-5
City-wide Racial and Ethnic Composition

City	% White	% Black	% Hispanic	% Asian	% Other
Atlanta	30	67	2	1	0
Charleston	58	41	0	0	1
Chelsea	43	7	43	7	0
Chicago	39	38	19	4	0
Denver	61	12	23	2	1
Fort Worth	56	22	20	0	2
Kansas City	67	30	4	0	0
Madison	89	4	2	4	1
Omaha	83	13	3	1	0
Philadelphia	52	39	6	3	0
Pittsburgh	72	26	1	2	0
Richmond	43	55	1	1	0
San Antonio	36	7	56	1	0
San Diego	59	9	21	11	1
Santa Ana	23	2	65	9	1
Seattle	74	10	4	11	1
Trenton	37	47	14	1	9
Washington DC	27	65	5	2	0
Wilmington	41	52	6	0	0

*Rows may not add up to 100% due to rounding errors and some overlap in categories

Source: U.S. Bureau of The Census, 1990 Census of Population and Housing: Summary Population and Housing Characteristics, March 1992.

The target areas also vary in their racial and ethnic composition, but, on the whole, they tend to have relatively high concentrations of minorities, as illustrated in Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3. (These figures present data for 19 target areas in 14 of the demonstration cities. Data were unavailable for Atlanta, Omaha, Pittsburgh, Trenton, and Washington, D.C.) In fact, only in Madison is the combined target area population predominantly non-Hispanic white. This fact reflects well-documented connections between race and ethnicity and the kinds of economic and social conditions Weed and Seed was designed to ameliorate. But irrespective of sociology and explanations of causality, the negative reaction to the implementation of Weed and Seed in some of the cities was in large part due to the perception that a federal program with significant law enforcement component was "targeted" at predominantly minority neighborhoods.

Figure 2-1. Percent Black in Demonstration Cities and their Target Areas.



Figure 2-2. Percent Hispanic in Demonstration Cities and their Target Areas



Figure 2-3. Percent Non-Hispanic White in Demonstration Cities and their Target Areas



Crime and related problems. Many of the demonstration cities have struggled with the problems of crime, poverty, social disorganization and urban decay for a considerable length of time. For others, however, these are more recent, and relatively less serious, problems. Some of this variation is illustrated by comparative data on Part I crimes, as shown in Table 2-6. For example, Madison, a city of just under 200,000 people, reported a total of 770 violent crimes in 1991, while the slightly larger city of Richmond, Virginia, reported 3,414 violent crimes. Atlanta, with twice the population of Madison, reported 21 times as many violent crimes.

Crime rates in the target areas also varied considerably and were in most cases substantially, and sometimes dramatically, higher than the corresponding citywide rates. These findings are not definitive because not all sites collected Part I crime data for target areas, and in some that did it is not clear that the collection of target area population data and crime data was based on a common definition of target area boundaries. However, some of the range of variation is suggested by the partial data presented in Table 2-7.

Less quantifiable are the various problems of physical deterioration, social distress and economic disadvantage in the target areas. However, it is clear from program documents and site interviews that the nature and severity of these problems vary significantly across sites and that all the target areas have suffered from relatively high levels of substance abuse, drug trafficking, including open-air drug markets, and drug-related crime and violence. Gang activity is prevalent and implicated in the drug trade in many of the target areas. In addition, the target areas all generally suffer from the interrelated problems of socioeconomic distress including poverty and unemployment, family disintegration, teen pregnancy, domestic violence, inadequate and substandard housing, very low levels of education, and high drop-out rates.

Physically, the sample of target areas covers a range from declining older middle and working class neighborhoods to severely blighted districts looking like war zones, with large numbers of abandoned, burned out buildings, relentless graffiti, trash, litter and junk cars on the streets. Some projects deliberately targeted the "worst" neighborhoods in their cities; others chose to concentrate on a declining area where large numbers of concerned residents were determined to stop and reverse the process of deterioration. In virtually all sites, the selection of target area(s) was based on a combination of serious problems and the existence within the area of community resources that offered the potential for improvement and revitalization.

Table 2-6
Part I Violent Crimes in 1991
for Demonstration Cities

Site	Number	Per 100,000
Atlanta	16,289	4,041
Charleston	1,062	1,293
Chelsea	423	1,209
Denver	5,034	1,050
Fort Worth	8,914	1,950
Kansas City	12,413	2,833
Madison	770	397
Omaha	3,242	956
Philadelphia	22,481	1,408
Pittsburgh	4,294	1,153
Richmond	3,414	1,655
San Antonio	7,573	792
San Diego	13,830	1,220
Santa Ana	3,306	1,103
Seattle	7,221	1,356
Trenton	1,833	2,059
Washington DC	14,665	2,452
Wilmington	1,351	1,850

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation: Uniform Crime Reports, 1991. (Comparable data not available for Chicago.)

Table 2-7
Part I Violent Crimes in 1991
Target Areas

Target Area	Number	Per 100,000	Ratio of Target Area to City-wide rates
Charleston	381	3,038	2.35
Chicago	423	7,473	.
Fort Worth	2037	5,254	2.69
Kansas City 2	546	5,010	1.77
Kansas City 3	205	2,187	.77
Madison 1	136	5,163	12.99
Madison 2	35	1,029	2.59
Pittsburgh	214	1,200	1.04
Richmond 1	143	3,997	2.41
Richmond 2	104	3,149	1.90
San Antonio	198	1,200	1.51
San Diego	891	2,843	2.33
Santa Ana	157	2,093	1.90
Seattle	556	4,462	3.29

The diversity of these demonstration sites is beneficial for evaluation purposes because it permits observations to be made of how different circumstances may affect the implementation process, or, alternatively, how certain common problems or typical processes may be observed irrespective of differences in setting.

Organizational and Management Structures

The Weed and Seed grants were awarded to and administered by a variety of agencies and organizations. Most are municipal agencies, including the office of the mayor or city manager (eight sites: Charleston, Denver, Madison, Omaha, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Diego, and Washington, DC), the city police department (six sites: Atlanta[2], Fort Worth, Kansas City, San Antonio, Santa Ana, and Seattle), and the local

[2]Atlanta Bureau of Justice.

housing authority (Chicago[3]). Three grantees are state law enforcement agencies (Chelsea: Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice; Trenton: New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety; and Wilmington: Deleware Criminal Justice Council). One grant was awarded to a non-profit organization affiliated with the United Way (Richmond: the Metro Richmond Coalition Against Drugs).

A wide variety of organizational structures and management approaches were used to implement the Weed and Seed program. In some cases the original organizational structure, designed according to the guidelines set out in the Implementation Manual, was modified along the way as it proved to be unworkable or unsuited to the local circumstances.

Committees. The overall policy-making bodies went by a variety of names--Steering Committee (most common), Executive Committee, Strategy Committee, Weed and Seed Board -- and ranged in size from fewer than ten to several dozen members. The average size was about 20 members. Usually the U.S. Attorney was the chair of this committee. The U.S. Attorney was also, along with the Chief of Police, the official most frequently represented on steering committees. Others, in order of frequency, were the District Attorney, Mayor, and LECC Coordinator. Most steering committees included one or (usually) more representatives of other federal law enforcement agencies, police department representatives other than or in addition to the chief, and residents of the target neighborhood and/or community organizations. The frequency of Steering Committee meetings also varied widely. Some met only two or three times; others met on at least a monthly basis throughout the project. The median number of Steering Committee meetings through the end of 1993 was 10. Three sites reported that the Steering Committee was inactive or defunct as of the end of 1993.

Weed committees also went by a variety of names -- Law Enforcement Task Force, Weed Steering Committee, Law Enforcement Steering Committee, Weed Committee, Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee, and Law Enforcement Committee. These ranged in size from 5 to 22 members and also met with widely varying frequency. Membership usually consisted of several federal law enforcement agents, local police, and the District Attorney. Federal agencies involved were usually the U.S. Attorney's Office, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Other agencies represented on some weed committees were the State Attorney General's office, the Sheriff's office, state law enforcement, and the local housing authority.

Most sites also had some kind of seeding committee, variously called Neighborhood Revitalization Coordinating Committee (or Task Force), Community

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[3]In addition to Chicago, where the Chicago Housing Authority is the grantee, there is Housing Authority involvement in Omaha. While the grantee is the Mayor's Office, the Omaha Housing Authority administered the seeding component.

Advisory Council, Neighborhood Action Committee, Neighborhood Council, Seed Steering Committee. These committees ranged in size from 10 to 59 members, typically including numerous residents and representatives of community organizations, along with police and other local and federal officials. The structure, role and activities of Seeding Committees is described more fully in Chapter 6 under "Organization and Management of Seeding."

The actual manner in which programs were organized and directed was even more diverse than is suggested in the preceding discussion of program committees. In fact, program leadership sometimes resided in the steering committee, sometimes in one or a small number of members of the Steering committee, and sometimes in a different committee. Some sites established a kind of management or executive committee, smaller than the steering committee, for the purpose of providing more direct program management and coordination, leaving to the steering committee responsibility for overall policy-making and planning. In one variant of the Weed and Seed model as originally envisioned, community-based advisory committees (among the seeding committees discussed above) worked closely with community police officers and other program officials to make some of the decisions that were originally seen as being in the purview of the steering committee.

Role of the U.S. Attorney. The U.S. Attorney's Office was instrumental in initiating and planning the demonstration programs in all sites, and continued to be significantly involved at a policy level in most sites. In many sites with active U.S. Attorney participation, the U.S. Attorney had the authority and ability to pull together representatives from federal, state, and local levels. In at least one site with minimal U.S. Attorney involvement, the U.S. Attorney's office felt it had little business running an essentially community-based program. Because of turnover resulting from the change of administrations, there was discontinuity of involvement on the part of the U.S. Attorneys themselves, and in many cases it was the LECC Coordinator who participated most directly and actively in Weed and Seed administrative, management and decision-making functions. Other circumstances affected the extent and nature of the U.S. Attorney's participation. Two examples will illustrate some of the diversity across sites in regard to the U.S. Attorney's role. In Philadelphia, the current U.S. Attorney and his predecessor have been the key players in the planning and implementation of Weed and Seed; other program participants agree that the U.S. Attorney is the acknowledged leader of the effort and holds central decision-making authority. In contrast, the U.S. Attorney in Boston deliberately maintained some distance between the Chelsea Weed and Seed program and his office, partly because of an ongoing federal investigation of corruption on the part of Chelsea police and former city officials.

Staffing. Staff coordination of Weed and Seed was handled in a number of different ways. Most sites hired an overall project director or administrator, or assigned these duties to existing personnel. In most cases, this person devoted less than full time to Weed and Seed. Police departments were the most common location for these

positions; most other Weed and Seed project directors worked in other city agencies and departments, such as the Mayor's office. The project director position was usually supported by agency or other funding sources rather than the Weed and Seed grant. Police departments also employed most of the weed coordinators and several of the seed coordinators. These positions were more likely to involve full-time commitments to only Weed and Seed.

Program Emphasis

Weed and Seed programs varied across the sites in their relative emphasis on the three program components -- weeding, community policing, and seeding. One way to measure this variation is in terms of different amounts of Weed and Seed grant funds allocated to each program element; however, this is at best a crude measurement, for a number of reasons. First, a wide array of other funds and in-kind resources were also a part of weeding, seeding and community policing efforts. Indeed, the mobilization and leverage of these other resources was one of the intents of the Weed and Seed demonstration. Unfortunately, data on these additional resources are incomplete and useless for cross-site comparisons and generalization. Moreover, the operational boundaries of the weeding, seeding, and community policing are not clearly or consistently defined. Consequently, a particular activity and its associated costs may be considered by one site part of its community policing element, while another site would consider the same activity a part of seeding, and account for it as such.

With these caveats in mind, Weed and Seed grant funds were used, on the average, primarily to support community policing, weeding, and seeding, in that order. Based on data provided by 13 of the 19 sites, the means for each program element were (rounded): $457,352 for community policing, $434,145 for weeding, and $273,177 for seeding. These averages, of course, conceal considerable variation among the sites. In Seattle and Philadelphia, for example, seeding was more heavily funded than either of the two other elements, while Fort Worth, San Antonio, San Diego and Santa Ana all reported allocating well over half their total to weeding.

There was also variation within the three major allocation categories in how funds were spent, although clearly police overtime and other law enforcement personnel costs were the major items. The extent to which the Weed and Seed demonstration grants provided cities with personnel funds to support newly established and expanded community policing programs is discussed more fully in Chapter 5.

Within the seeding category, grant funds were used to support the salaries of program staff, prevention and treatment providers, and a great variety of community activities. Several sites employed some type of mini-grant process to support small grass-roots and community-based programs with Weed and Seed funds. Even more than with the other two program elements, the amount of Weed and Seed grant funding allocated to seeding is an incomplete and imperfect indicator of the level of seeding efforts.

Seeding typically involved a mixture of programs and activities funded fully or partially from other sources, including national organizations, federal programs and local and state social services. These are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

Chapter 3
Law Enforcement Tactics and Issues

Approaches to Law Enforcement

The demonstration sites employed a wide variety of law enforcement tactics to accomplish the weeding objectives of their grants. In some cases, the sites continued or enhanced efforts that existed in the target areas prior to receiving Weed and Seed funding. In other cases, the sites redirected or expanded existing strategies which had not previously been applied in the target areas. Finally, in some sites, new approaches were implemented for the first time.

The relative emphasis placed on law enforcement efforts compared to community policing also varied across sites. In some programs, such as that in Atlanta, the primary focus throughout the program was on intensive law enforcement activities. In others, such as Chelsea, Denver, Omaha, and Seattle, community policing received the primary attention. Finally, in some sites, such as Charleston, Chicago, Fort Worth , San Diego, and Santa Ana, the law enforcement and community policing components were melded together interchangeably.

Before presenting information on the specific strategies used, three significant issues are discussed. These are interagency cooperation, target crimes, and the timing of initial weeding efforts.

Interagency cooperation. Cooperation between Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies was to be a central feature of Weed and Seed programs. In some cases, such as Charleston and Fort Worth, local law enforcement agencies had developed close working relationships which could be drawn upon in implementing the new program. In other cases, as in Atlanta, relationships between State and local law enforcement agencies were created for the first time as a result of the Weed and Seed program. In a limited number of places, such as Trenton, cooperation between local, state, and Federal agencies had begun before Weed and Seed became operational. In some sites, such as Atlanta, Charleston, Chicago, Madison, San Diego, and Santa Ana, the involvement of probation and parole officers was considered important to the implementation of the program.

The central role assigned to United States Attorneys in the Weed and Seed program provided the first opportunity for that office to become extensively involved in local law enforcement activities to such a great extent.

Because few sites had demonstrated much cooperation with Federal agencies prior to the implementation of the Weed and Seed program, the effort provided valuable opportunities for exchanging information and expertise. The extent of cooperation with agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation was particularly noteworthy in several sites. Extensive cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration, on the other hand, was less common.

Target crimes. Most Weed and Seed sites focused their attention on drug-related, violent, and gun-involved crimes. Focus on gangs was rare because few of the sites encountered a serious gang problem. The tactics and strategies utilized by each site were determined, to some extent, by their choice of targets. For those sites that targeted drug trafficking, some, such as Washington, DC, focused on relatively high level operators, while most addressed street level dealers. Some sites, such as Madison and Trenton, divided targets among law enforcement agencies, with distribution and inter-state trafficking handled by a multi-agency task force while street sales were handled by local law enforcement agencies. Again, the techniques used to address these different targets varied depending upon the level of the drug market being addressed.

Initial efforts. Many of the sites conducted major enforcement efforts soon after receiving Weed and Seed funding. Others, such as Chicago, actually conducted such efforts before the funding arrived. Often through inter-agency efforts, law enforcement officers then identified and arrested known offenders in the target areas. In some cases, such as Washington, DC, a lengthy period of intelligence gathering occurred before these arrests were made. In others, such as Chicago, law enforcement officers conducted "sweeps" without collecting such extensive information.

In some sites, this initial effort was the major enforcement component of the program. In other sites, however, these early efforts served as the starting point for continuing efforts to identify and arrest drug-related offenders in the target areas.

For some communities, plans for the initial "crackdown" and subsequent weeding activities appeared to be perceived by the residents of the target areas as a message that the police cared about their welfare and were ready to address their concerns; this message led to an increase in citizen willingness to cooperate with the police in particular and to become involved in improving their quality of life in general. In other sites, such as Seattle, these intensified enforcement plans created negative reactions among local residents. In some of those cities, these reactions served as the impetus to rethink and redesign the overall Weed and Seed initiative. As a result, certain programs greatly increased the involvement of residents in their planning process and enhanced the seeding component of the program.

Nature of law enforcement activities. Table 3-1 presents a summary of the law enforcement activities implemented in the 19 evaluation sites, based on the results of a survey administered by the evaluation team. As that table indicates, four activities were implemented in all 19 sites: high visibility/saturation patrols which incorporate a significant increase over the usual number of officers, "buy-bust" operations, identification/apprehension of probationers/parolees, and identification and securing of "trouble spots." Another six activities were implemented in all but one site: "controlled

buys" by informants, enforcement of nuisance ordinances, enforcement of disorderly conduct laws, asset forfeiture, anti-truancy activities, search/arrest warrants, and identification/apprehension of felon fugitives. Search/arrest warrants may refer to the serving of old warrants in a back log or the serving of warrants resulting from sweeps or other intensive undercover operations.

Seventeen sites indicated they had implemented stop and search operations and a drug tip hot line. Sixteen sites implemented electronic video surveillance. In addition, fourteen sites implemented reverse stings, enforcement of health and safety codes, and identification and apprehension of aliens.

The least frequently implemented law enforcement activities, according to the survey, were "jump out" squads (often a group of trained officers conducting a surveillance from a van or other concealed place) and electronic audio surveillance, utilized in 13 sites.

Extent of Law Enforcement Activities

To provide a better estimate of the use of various tactics, program officials at each site were requested to complete a questionnaire on which they rated the extent to which they utilized each of 19 different tactics. In their ratings, "0" indicated they did not use the tactic at all, "1" indicated that the tactic was "used very little," "2" suggested that the tactic was "used some," and "3" signified that the tactic was "used extensively." The questionnaire results are summarized in Table 3-2.

As the table indicates, the extent of use of these 19 tactics varied considerably across the demonstration sites. Only three sites (Atlanta, Charleston, and San Diego) indicated that they utilized all 19 tactics to some extent. Another three sites (Denver, Fort Worth, and Trenton) reported that they utilized 18 tactics. The multifaceted nature of the approaches is demonstrated by the fact that even the sites that utilized the fewest tactics (Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh) indicated that they used at least 15 different activities.

Table 3-3 provides a rank ordering of the tactics in terms of the average frequency rating of each tactic and the total number of sites reporting the use of each. As that table indicates, the most frequently utilized tactic was to identify and secure "trouble spots" in the target neighborhoods. This tactic received a rating of 2.89 and was used by all 19 programs responding. The second highest rating, 2.84, was received by high visibility/saturation patrol, which was reportedly used by all 19 responding programs. Search/arrest warrants received the third highest rating of frequency of use, 2.63, and was reported to have been used by 18 programs. Five tactics, making "controlled buys" by informants, identification and apprehension of felon fugitives,

Table 3-1
Presence of Law Enforcement Activities in Weed and Seed Sites

Site	Activity																		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Atlanta	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Charleston	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Chelsea	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+
Chicago	+	+	+	+			+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+
Denver	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+
Fort Worth		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kansas City	+	+					+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Madison	+	+	+			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Omaha	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+
Philadelphia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+				+		+	+	+	+	+	+
Pittsburgh		+			+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Richmond	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+
San Antonio	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+		+	+	+	+		+	+	+	
San Diego	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Santa Ana	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Seattle	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+
Trenton	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Washington	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Wilmington	+	+			+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Number Using	17	19	15	13	16	13	19	18	18	15	18	18	17	18	15	18	19	19	17

Code	Activity
1	Stop and search operations
2	High visibility/saturation patrol
3	Reverse stings
4	Electronic audio surveillance
5	Electronic video surveillance
6	"Jump out" squads
7	"Buy/bust" operations
8	"Controlled buys" by informants
9	Enforcement of nuisance ordinances
10	Enforcement of health/safety codes
11	Enforcement of disorderly conduct laws
12	Asset forfeitures
13	Anti-truancy activities
14	Search/arrest warrants
15	Identification/apprehension of aliens
16	Identification/apprehension of felons
17	Identification/apprehension of probationers/parolees
18	Identify and secure "trouble spots"
19	Drug tip hot lines

Table 3-2

Extent of Rated Use of Law Enforcement Activities in Weed and Seed Sites

Site	Activity																		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Atlanta	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	2	3	1	3	3	3	2
Charleston	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	2
Chelsea	2	3	2	1	1	0	1	3	2	3	2	1	2	0	2	2	2	3	3
Chicago	2	3	2	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	2	3	2	2	1	0	1	3	3
Denver	1	2	1	3	1	2	3	3	1	1	1	2	2	3	0	2	1	2	3
Fort Worth	0	3	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3
Kansas City	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	2
Madison	3	3	1	0	0	1	2	2	3	3	2	1	1	3	1	2	3	3	3
Omaha	2	3	1	0	2	1	1	3	2	2	3	2	1	3	0	2	2	3	2
Philadelphia	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	1	0	0	0	3	0	3	3	3	2	3	3
Pittsburgh	0	2	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	0	3	2	2	3	1	3	2	3	3
Richmond	2	3	2	0	1	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	0	3	3	3	2
San Antonio	3	3	3	2	2	0	3	3	2	0	2	3	2	2	0	2	2	3	0
San Diego	2	2	2	3	3	1	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	3	2	3	3	3	1
Santa Ana	3	3	2	2	2	0	2	2	3	2	2	0	1	3	3	3	3	3	2
Seattle	3	3	2	1	1	0	3	3	3	2	3	1	0	3	3	3	1	3	3
Trenton	3	3	0	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
Washington	1	3	1	3	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	0
Wilmington	2	3	0	0	2	2	2	0	3	2	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	3	2
Average	2.05	2.84	1.32	1.42	1.68	1.47	2.37	2.42	2.32	1.74	2.37	2.00	1.68	2.63	1.58	2.42	2.26	2.89	2.16

Code	Activity
1	Stop and search operations
2	High visibility/saturation patrol
3	Reverse stings
4	Electronic audio surveillance
5	Electronic video surveillance
6	"Jump out" squads
7	"Buy/bust" operations
8	"Controlled buys" by informants
9	Enforcement of nuisance ordinances
10	Enforcement of health/safety codes
11	Enforcement of disorderly conduct laws
12	Asset forfeitures
13	Anti-truancy activities
14	Search/arrest warrants
15	Identification/apprehension of aliens
16	Identification/apprehension of felons
17	Identification/apprehension of probationers/parolees
18	Identify and secure "trouble spots"
19	Drug tip hot lines

"buy/bust" operations, enforcement of disorderly conduct laws, and enforcement of nuisance ordinances, received ratings of higher than 2.30. The least frequently used tactics were reverse stings, electronic audio surveillance, identification/apprehension of aliens, and "jump out" squads.

Table 3-3
Rank Order of Frequency of Use of Law Enforcement Activities

Activity	Rating	Number Using
Identify and secure "trouble spots"	2.89	19
High visibility/saturation patrol	2.84	19
Search/arrest warrants	2.63	18
"Controlled buys" by informants	2.42	18
Identification/apprehension of felon fugitives	2.42	18
"Buy-bust" operations	2.37	19
Enforcement of disorderly conduct laws	2.37	18
Enforcement of nuisance ordinances	2.32	18
Identification/apprehension of probationers/parolees	2.26	19
Drug tip hot lines	2.16	17
Stop and search operations	2.05	17
Asset forfeitures	2.00	18
Enforcement of health and safety codes	1.74	15
Anti-truancy activities	1.68	17
Electronic video surveillance	1.68	16
Identification/apprehension of aliens	1.58	15
"Jump out" squads	1.47	13
Electronic audio surveillance	1.42	13
Reverse stings	1.32	15

Street level enforcement and patrol. Most of the programs increased the amount and visibility of patrol in the target neighborhoods. They did this in a variety of ways.

Many, for example, increased the numbers of personnel assigned to the target areas. In some programs, some or all of these personnel were organized into teams that were exclusively or primarily responsible for policing activities in the target area. In other programs, these officers were augmented by regular patrol officers, special drug enforcement teams, or problem-solving units.

In Charleston, Chicago, Madison, San Diego, and Santa Ana, the inclusion of probation and parole officers on the law enforcement teams noticeably facilitated the apprehension of previously convicted offenders.

Patrolling methods varied across sites. In some, the officers patrolled primarily or exclusively on foot. In others, they patrolled in marked or unmarked patrol vehicles. In yet others, such as Denver, these officers patrolled on bicycles or scooters. In some sites, such as Fort Worth, street level enforcement was enhanced by the development of citizen patrols.

Investigations. Most of the law enforcement task forces sought to stimulate inter-agency investigative and enforcement activities. In most sites, the inter-agency operations seem to have been most pronounced during planning and implementation of the intensified enforcement efforts that usually initiated program activities. Most investigations after that time appear to have been conducted by the local police department, although some sites instituted "metro" units that include investigative personnel from two or more local agencies; in some of those, assistant prosecutors have provided legal advice to these units.

Investigations of street-level cases (which constituted the largest number of cases in all sites) rested primarily with the local police department; cases involving large amounts of drugs and suppliers and interstate activity were more likely to involve state and federal agencies.

The existence of the task forces and the cooperative work done to conduct the initial intensified enforcement efforts appear in many places to have resulted in greater and easier sharing of information among agencies and across jurisdictions. In some places, information sharing among units of the same agencies also increased, despite considerable bureaucratic resistance. In many sites, neighborhood officers came to provide more information to drug investigators than was the case before the Weed and Seed initiative began.

Some sites, such as Omaha, instituted hot lines for citizens to use to report drug sales and other crime, and some used cameras to record transactions. Depending on the specific problems in a community, some sites implemented special investigative efforts or teams directed at weapons or gangs.

Estimated Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Activities

Representatives at each site were asked to rank what they considered to be the five most effective law enforcement activities they had implemented. In Table 3-4, the rank order assigned to each of 19 law enforcement activities is indicated, where "1" equals most effective, "2" equals second most effective, "3" equals third most effective, etc. The last row at the bottom of the table indicates the number of times each activity was rated among the five most effective activities.

Table 3-5 provides a listing of the law enforcement activities, ranked ordered by the number of times each was ranked among the top five most effective activities. As that table indicates buy/bust operations was ranked among the top five most effective activities by 13 sites, the highest number among all 19 activities. High visibility saturation patrols was listed among the five most effective activities by 12 sites, while search/arrest warrants was listed among the top five by 11 sites. Controlled buys by informants was ranked in the top five most effective activities by ten sites, and identifying and securing trouble spots was so ranked by seven sites. Three activities, identification/apprehension of probationers and parolees, "jump out" squads, and reverse stings each were ranked among the top five activities by five sites. All other activities were ranked among the top five most effective strategies by fewer than five sites each. One activity, electronic audio surveillance was not ranked in the top five activities by any of the sites.

The fact that an activity was not frequently ranked among the top five is not necessarily evidence that it was not highly effective under certain circumstances. Anti-truancy activities, for example, were undertaken in several sites, but only in Charleston was this approach rated as the most effective. Charleston reported a "dramatic reduction in daytime crime" during the period this tactic was used. Unfortunately, the nature of information available within and across sites does not permit a determination of whether effectiveness was a result of the magnitude of need being addressed or a function of the nature and quality of the program.

There are other approaches that are not ranked across sites because they were unique to a given city. In Fort Worth, for example, the officers working in the target areas were cross-trained in search warrant preparation, high-risk warrant tactics, surveillance operations, buy/bust operations, use of confidential informants, and use of community resources to close drug houses. This approach was considered a highly effective strategy that resulted in rapid problem solving and almost immediate responses to identified drug-dealing locations. To our knowledge, Fort Worth was the only city that used cross-training of officers to this degree.

In Santa Ana, enforcement in the target areas was based on a "no tolerance" policy for <u>any</u> infractions. Again, use of this approach appears to have been limited to one site, making rankings across sites impossible.

Table 3-4

Rank Order Assigned to Five Most Effective Law Enforcement Activities

Site	Activity																		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Atlanta	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
Charleston	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	5	-	-
Chelsea	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	3
Chicago	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denver	-	4	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-
Fort Worth	-	4	-	-	-	5	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Kansas City	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	5	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	-
Madison	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	4	-
Omaha	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	4	-	-	3	-	-	-	1	-
Philadelphia	-	3	-	-	-	-	2	-	5	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Pittsburgh	-	1	-	-	-	3	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-
Richmond	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	4	-
San Antonio	-	3	1	-	-	-	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
San Diego	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	5	5	-	-
Santa Ana	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	5	5	1	-
Seattle	-	1	5	-	-	-	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Trenton	-	2	-	-	-	3	4	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	5	-	-	-	-
Washington	-	-	-	-	3	5	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wilmington	-	1	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	-
Times Ranked in Top Five	2	12	3	0	1	5	13	10	3	1	3	1	1	11	2	4	5	7	2

Code	Activity
1	Stop and search operations
2	High visibility/saturation patrol
3	Reverse stings
4	Electronic audio surveillance
5	Electronic video surveillance
6	"Jump out" squads

Code	Activity
7	"Buy/bust" operations
8	"Controlled buys" by informants
9	Enforcement of nuisance ordinances
10	Enforcement of health/safety codes
11	Enforcement of disorderly conduct laws
12	Asset forfeitures
13	Anti-truancy activities

Code	Activity
14	Search/arrest warrants
15	Identification/apprehension of aliens
16	Identification/apprehension of felons
17	Identification/apprehension of probationers/parolees
18	Identify and secure "trouble spots"
19	Drug tip hot lines

Table 3-5
Law Enforcement Activities Rank Ordered by Number of Times They Were Selected Among Five Most Effective

Activity	Times Ranked in Top Five
"Buy-bust" operations	13
High visibility/saturation patrol	12
Search/arrest warrants	11
"Controlled buys" by informants	10
Identify and secure "trouble spots"	7
Identification/apprehension of probationers/parolees	5
"Jump out" squads	5
Reverse stings	5
Identification/apprehension of felon fugitives	4
Enforcement of nuisance ordinances	3
Enforcement of disorderly conduct laws	3
Drug tip hot line	3
Stop and search operation	2
Identification/apprehension of aliens	2
Enforcement of health and safety codes	1
Asset forfeiture	1
Anti-truancy activities	1
Electronic video surveillance	1
Electronic audio surveillance	0

Arrest Statistics

Table 3-6 provides a summary of the arrest statistics information provided by the various Weed and Seed sites. Although these data provide insight into the arrest activity within each site, cross-site comparisons are tenuous at best, because of differences in local statutes, procedures, and criteria, as well as differences in target area size and the nature and extent of drug and other crime problems. As the table indicates, a total of nearly 39,000 arrests were reported to have been made during the project period. Of those, 9,743 (25%) were for felony drug crimes, 7,508 (19%) were for violent crimes, 6,206 (16%) were for possession of narcotics, 1,631 (4%) were for firearms violations, and the remainder were for other types of offenses. Nearly 50 arrests were made under racketeering and continuing a criminal enterprise laws, with a majority of them reported by Santa Ana.

Table 3-6 also shows the enormous variation across sites with regard to the number of total arrests and the nature of those arrests. In certain sites, such as Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Pittsburgh, a large number of arrests were made in the target area. In others, such as Omaha, few if any arrests were made from June of 1992 through the end of 1993, although arrests before June are not represented here.

Further examination of Table 3-6 shows a great deal of variation in the nature of target area arrests. In San Antonio, for example, over 69 percent of those arrests were made for felony drug crimes. Similarly, over 50 percent of the target crime arrests in Trenton were for such crimes. On the other hand, felony drug crime arrests made up less than 15% of the total number of arrests for Seattle and Wilmington (also of note is that Wilmington reported over three times more violent crime arrests than any other site). Similar variation occurred with respect to arrests for possession of narcotics. In Madison, for example, 45.9 percent of target area arrests were made for possession of narcotics, the highest among all sites. On the other hand, none of the target area arrests in Charleston were for possession of narcotics.

A Summary Note of Caution and Explanation

This chapter is limited, as are the others, to being descriptive in nature because an evaluation of effectiveness of strategies -- whether within or across sites--was beyond the mandate of this evaluation. As is apparent from the data summarized in this chapter, most sites used combinations of several enforcement strategies. It not possible to disentangle the relative contributions of each of these strategies. Further, because of the nature of the evaluation, it was not possible to obtain a full understanding of the actual operations of each strategy. Instead, what is known about these strategies is limited to the "labels" by which they were identified and some indicators of the number of personnel engaged in these activities, the number of hours expended on those activities, and the number of resources devoted to those activities. We know little, however, of the quality of these activities.

Table 3-6
Target Area Arrests:
June 1992 Through December 1993

Site	Type of Arrest							
	Continuing Criminal Enterprise	Felony Drug Crimes	Violent Crimes	Firearms Violations	Possession of Narcotics	RICO	Other Offenses	Total
Atlanta	0 (0.0)	302 (37.9)	21 (2.6)	31 (3.9)	96 (12.1)	0 (0.0)	347 (43.5)	797 (100.0)
Charleston	0 (0.0)	550 (32.5)	910 (53.8)	106 (6.3)	0 (0.0)	2 (0.1)	123 (7.3)	1691 (100.0)
Chelsea	0 (0.0)	247 (34.9)	178 (25.2)	18 (2.6)	180 (25.5)	1 (0.1)	83 (11.7)	707 (100.0)
Chicago	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Denver	0 (0.0)	182 (20.5)	92 (10.4)	105 (11.8)	312 (35.2)	0 (0.0)	196 (22.1)	887 (100.0)
Fort Worth	0 (0.0)	1253 (25.6)	653 (13.3)	325 (6.6)	852 (17.4)	0 (0.0)	1818 (37.1)	4901 (100.0)
Kansas City	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Madison	0 0.0)	240 (24.4)	48 (4.9)	17 (1.7)	451 (45.9)	0 (0.0)	226 (23.0)	982 (100.0)
Omaha	0 (0.0)	32 (21.5)	10 (6.7)	15 (10.1)	32 (21.5)	0 (0.0)	60 (40.3)	149 (100.0)
Philadelphia	0 (0.0)	2602 (30.7)	919 (10.8)	351 (4.1)	723 (8.5)	0 (0.0	3882 (45.8)	8477 (100.0)
Pittsburgh	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	881 (32.2)	60 (2.2)	752[1] (27.5)	0 (0.0)	1043 (38.1)	2736 (100.0)
Richmond	3 (0.1)	798 (37.0)	83 (3.8)	135 (6.3)	706 (32.7)	0 (0.0)	433 (20.1)	2158 (100.0)
San Antonio	0 (0.0)	648 (69.2)	33 (3.5)	51 (5.5)	170 (18.2)	0 (0.0)	34 (3.6)	936 (100.0)
San Diego	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	224 (23.7)	67 (7.1)	216[1] (22.8)	0 (0.0)	440 (46.5)	947 (100.0)
Santa Ana	41 (2.2)	509 (27.7)	35 (1.9)	27 (1.5)	308 (16.8)	0 (0.0)	916 (49.9)	1836 (100.0)
Seattle	0 (0.0)	490 (13.4)	535 (14.6)	238 (6.5)	540 (14.7)	0 (0.0)	1866 (50.9)	3669 (100.0)
Trenton	0 (0.0)	1020 (50.6)	6 (0.3)	32 (1.6)	545 (27.0)	0 (0.0)	415 (20.6)	2018 (100.0)
Washington	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Wilmington	0 (0.0)	870 (14.6)	2880 (48.2)	53 (0.9)	323 (5.4)	0 (0.0)	1846 (30.9)	5972 (100.0)
Total[2]	44 (0.11)	9743 (25.07)	7508 (19.32)	1631 (4.20)	6206 (15.97)	3 (0.01)	13728 (35.32)	38,863 (100.0)

[1]Includes felony drug offenses.

[2]Totals do not include missing or unavailable data.

In addition, it cannot legitimately be assumed that the interpretation of survey response categories is the same across sites. With respect to reported levels of usage, for example, "frequently" might mean one thing in one site and something else in another. Actual numbers are also subject to varying interpretation across sites. For example, 30 hours of foot patrol implemented in a neighborhood unfamiliar with this strategy might be perceived as significant, whereas the same number of hours in an area where such patrol had previously existed might go virtually unnoticed.

Arrest statistics cannot serve as valid, comparable outcome measures across sites for several reasons:

1. The nature and magnitude of the problems being addressed varied greatly across sites. As a result, the same number of arrests made in Madison and Chicago could be expected to have enormously different impact on the drug business in those two sites. Arrest data would be more meaningful if they could be analyzed in terms of the number of opportunities for arrests, so that a figure might be calculated for the percentage of active drug dealers arrested. Such calculations, however, are not possible.

2. Criteria for enforcement activity differed greatly across sites. In Seattle, for example, enforcement was driven largely by demand from the community, with the result that seeding activities far outweighed weeding activities. Yet Seattle reported twice the number of arrests as Santa Ana, which had a policy of zero tolerance for all offenses in the target area. Across these sites, then, a comparison of the percentage of all arrests that were felony drug arrests would be difficult to interpret.

3. Baseline data did not exist for the sites. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether there were substantial increases in arrest activity within sites and, obviously, no way to compare increases in arrest activity across sites.

4. We know from prior research that, across departments and even within reporting districts of the same department, different criteria are commonly used to determine whether an arrest is made and how to label the arrest.

These limitations on the data in this chapter do not render these data valueless to other cities. For other communities interested in applying lessons from these initial Weed and Seed experiences, the most effective way to do this may be for the interested community to first identify what it considers to be the causes or dominant characteristics of its problem. (Is the drug problem primarily one of street sales? Is it the activity of organized gangs? Who are the buyers?) The next step is to specify strategies that, theoretically, should be effective in dealing with the particular characteristics of the problem in the given site. Data in this chapter could be used to identify other communities that used the proposed strategy and considered it highly effective. The next

step would be to read the full case study about the site or sites. And the next -- in the case of enforcement strategies -- would be to contact the police departments that rated a strategy of interest as being highly effective to obtain information about the precise nature of a strategy and the way in which it was implemented. For example, a community that thinks it has a serious crime and drug problem that may be related to truancy probably would want to learn more about Charleston's truancy program.

This kind of study cannot produce all the answers that might be desired about program effectiveness, but it can point the reader in the direction in which to seek information directly relevant to the reader's situation.

Chapter 4
Cross-site Analysis of Prosecution Activities

Although detailed descriptions of Weed and Seed prosecution activities are provided in the individual site visit summaries, examination of underlying similarities and differences between sites is highly informative. The following section reviews the cumulative experiences of local prosecutors, state Attorneys General, and U.S. Attorneys with respect to their involvement in Weed and Seed planning and implementation activities. The purpose of this section is to present and discuss the differing levels of prosecutor participation, problems or obstacles encountered and resolved, and the general impact of the prosecution efforts on the participating offices and communities.

The discussion is divided into four primary topic areas: (1) program planning; (2) implementation; (3) problems/obstacles; and (4) general impact. Each topic area addresses the combined experiences of local and federal prosecution personnel (and where applicable, state level prosecutors), and discusses specific issues such as case processing approaches, program administration concerns, and inter-agency relations. Assessing the collective experiences of the original nineteen sites will help current prosecution personnel learn from one another, and provide future weed and seed prosecution personnel with knowledge necessary to avoid similar pitfalls and incorporate successful approaches.

Planning and Implementation Issues

Interagency cooperation in Weed and Seed planning was found to be varied. Fundamentally the types of planning experiences can be broken into three categories (1) where earlier pre-Weed and Seed cooperative efforts were in existence and served to ease and facilitate cooperative Weed and Seed efforts (e.g., San Antonio, Atlanta, Denver, Fort Worth, Philadelphia); (2) where Weed and Seed presence facilitated a cooperative relationship with agencies (e.g., Washington, D.C., Trenton), and (3) where cooperative efforts were informal/nonexistent and remained so throughout.

The strength of pre-existing relationships between District Attorneys' (DA) offices and U.S. Attorneys' (USA) offices appeared to be positively related to the degree of cooperation in Weed and Seed operations and to the level of satisfaction experienced by DA's in these relationships. More precisely, there seemed to be a greater solicitation and inclusion of the local prosecutor's input into the planning process and, more specifically, in the selection of the Weed and Seed locations in sites where relationships with the USA office were characterized as "close." The steering of a portion of Weed and Seed funds toward the support of local prosecutor personnel positions in some of these sites (e.g., Wilmington, Denver) served to provide greater incentive for local prosecutor participation in a host of Weed and Seed activities. In less common situations, like in Washington, D.C., the encouragement of inter-agency cooperation as part of the Weed and Seed program helped reverse a history of past resistance to

collaborate on joint control endeavors.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, were several instances where, for a number of reasons, local prosecutor and USA offices were distanced, and where local prosecutors were, in effect, excluded from meaningful Weed and Seed program planning (e.g., Pittsburgh, San Diego). In these jurisdictions, local prosecutors reported that the Weed and Seed efforts were presented by the USA offices as federal programs in the strictest sense of the term. DA's here perceived their roles as being inexplicably minimalized in a fashion that ignored the realities of the program's focus on the "weeding" of local level offenses that would be inevitably handled by DA's[4]. The extent of local prosecution participation in the Weed and Seed programs in these sites paled in comparison to other sites in which USA offices employed methods of local DA inclusion in early planning stages.

The level of formality of agreement on the structure and the types of relationships that were to exist between DA's offices, USA offices, and other relevant law enforcement and community groups covered a broad range. Once again, the level of inter - agency cooperation existing *prior* to Weed and Seed initiation appeared to be a more important determinant of the effectiveness of steering committees than was the level of formality of structure of these committees. In some cases, committees proved unsatisfactory in achieving program goals despite being highly structured and formally organized. Chelsea's formal plan stressing DA, USA, and State AG coordination was reported as being little more than a facade behind which was scant evidence of cooperation. The USA in Wilmington found that the Weed and Seed Committee there tended to defer *too much* authority to its leader, the USA. And, in two sites (i.e., Trenton, Chicago), steering committees were reported by local prosecutors as being out of touch with the most pertinent Weed and Seed issues. In Trenton, the inability of bureaucratic leaders, representing the three major prosecutorial entities on that committee, to come to terms on planning issues prompted line personnel from each of the participating agencies to construct a parallel committee that quickly expedited previously delayed Weed and Seed implementation events.

One area of the planning of the Weed and Seed program that was of special concern to some local prosecutors interviewed was the issue of the actual selection of the Weed and Seed site and the reverberations emanating from site selection decisions. In some sites, like Denver, prosecutors reported a general community skepticism directed toward the true intentions of those engineering the program (e.g., fear that there was a politically based ulterior motive to the program). In other sites (e.g., Chicago) there was an overt opposition to the sites selected voiced by members of other community districts who believed their areas were slighted and were more entitled to the funds. Local

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[4]This characterization of the types of criminal cases prosecuted under the Weed and Seed program was supported by the consistent responses across sites reporting highest proportions of Weed and Seed cases prosecuted locally rather than federally.

prosecutors, U.S. Attorneys, and other Weed and Seed personnel in these sites were, thus, faced with the task of convincing these groups of the wisdom of selection for the sites chosen.

Besides the level of participation local prosecutors were permitted at the planning stage, a threshold issue that had a significant impact on how local DA's implemented their Weed and Seed programs was whether they, in fact, supported the concept of differential treatment of Weed and Seed cases. In sites like Chicago and Fort Worth, local DA's objected to the differential treatment of crimes committed in the Weed and Seed area above all other non-Weed and Seed crimes. In these jurisdictions, prosecution involvement in the Weed and Seed program was relatively minor, particularly in relation to community-based activities. In most other sites, however, the underlying concepts of the Weed and Seed program were supported by local DA's and it was common to find individual assistant prosecutors assigned responsibility for the effective prosecution of these cases. In sites like Atlanta, assignments were specialized with some prosecutors being responsible for the screening and assignment of Weed and Seed cases while others were responsible for the administrative oversight of these cases. In other sites, like Charleston, prosecutors responsible for Weed and Seed cases vertically handled all aspects of these cases.

There was little consistency among offices regarding how Weed and Seed cases were treated through the prosecution process. Sites like Atlanta, San Antonio, Philadelphia, and Omaha treated Weed and Seed cases as "targeted" cases that demanded special attention for enhanced penalties and mechanisms designed to prevent further violations by Weed and Seed offenders. Other sites (e.g., Madison, Pittsburgh, Seattle) addressed Weed and Seed cases in much the same manner they would any criminal cases with the exception that the office may "mark" the case for tracking purposes. Several sites (e.g., Chelsea, Trenton) indicated that their differential treatment of these cases -- or even the appearance of differential treatment -- met with intense opposition from other actors in the courtroom. This manifested itself in the withdrawal of support by the judiciary and claims of unconstitutionality by the defense bar.

From the prosecutors' perspective, it can be said that the most successful implementations of Weed and Seed programs were where local prosecutors actively adopted the role of community leader in the promotion of the seeding dimensions of the programs. In jurisdictions like San Antonio, Fort Worth, Chelsea, Philadelphia, Trenton, and Washington, D.C., where local prosecutors' offices had been invited early into the mainstream of program execution, the program was to benefit from the experience of proven community coalition building abilities of DA's. Here, local prosecutors, working with Weed and Seed personnel in other agencies (e.g., U.S. Attorneys' offices, local police departments, and community development organizations) were found to treat the Weed and Seed program in the context of a wider, long-term commitment to address crime control issues in an "open systems" vein; one that highlights the pivotal roles of community interaction and support. In vivid demonstrations of resourcefulness,

prosecutors were to imaginatively fold in local programs with names like *Save Our Streets*, *Safe Havens*, and *Domestic Violence Roundtable* with the mission of Weed and Seed. By doing so, these prosecutors were able to work with their Weed and Seed counterparts in other agencies to capitalize on their past achievements in community development and confidently guide the fusion of crime suppression and community revitalization interests. In fact, many successes in these sites were the by-product of the prosecutors' close collaboration with community policing representatives, Law Enforcement Coordinators in USA offices (LECCs), and other local program development personnel.

Obstacles to Prosecution Activities

Evaluation activities revealed a range of problematic issues and circumstances that local prosecutors and United States Attorneys encountered during the planning and implementation stages. Although the problems differed from site to site, certain issues were common to multiple Weed and Seed efforts, while others were symptomatic of site-specific political and social contexts. Prosecution personnel within each site coped with these obstacles with different levels of success.

This section of the report outlines the problems and obstacles encountered in the nineteen Weed and Seed sites. It is important to understand that, in many instances, several of these problems existed at the same time. Consequently, it was often difficult to discern the independent impact of each one on the planning and implementation activities. In fact, it was often found that the problems or obstacles were closely intertwined. The following list provides a summary of the problems and obstacles reported by staff from the U.S. Attorney's offices and local prosecutor's offices:

- Limited local prosecutor input into the planning (e.g., proposal and program development) and implementation (e.g., strategy development and enactment) stages.

- Local prosecutor inability or reluctance to concentrate significant percentage of limited resources on one geographic area.

- Limited or non-existent "weeding" funds to support the prosecution functions.

- Pre-existing inter-agency conflict or lack of communication.

- Pre-existing political issues that limit prosecutor participation.

- Opposition from neighborhood residents, community activists, and other representatives (e.g., local defense bar).

- Federal election year influences, which affected personnel replacement, decision-making, funding dispersal, and other local Weed and Seed processes.

- Vague or unevenly applied definition of Weed and Seed offenses (by law enforcement and prosecution personnel).

- Changes in caseload related to Weed and Seed enforcement activities.

- Questions regarding U.S. Attorney's leadership role and issues arising from federal program sponsorship.

- Traditional delays associated with court case processing capabilities, judicial exercise of sentencing discretion, and limited jail and prison resources.

To facilitate their presentation, the above problems and obstacles will be grouped into related areas for the ensuing discussion.

Involvement in Weed and Seed planning processes. Discussions with prosecution staff in each Weed and Seed site reveal the critical role that planning activities play in eventual program outcomes. As related earlier, local prosecutors state that they were dissatisfied with their roles in this stage (e.g., Denver, Ft. Worth, Pittsburgh, Seattle). Local prosecutors offered several reasons for the importance of their participation: (1) local prosecutors are responsible for prosecuting the majority of Weed and Seed cases[5]; (2) they can provide expert input regarding the potential impact of and relevant legal issues for "weeding" strategies; (3) they are in a unique position to respond to community concerns regarding sentencing recommendations; and (4) they can marshall resources for community development efforts that other governmental entities might not be able to raise. In several sites, local prosecutors limited their office's involvement in planning activities because they were philosophically opposed to concentrating a disproportionate amount of their limited resources in a single geographic region. In such instances, the local district attorney consciously refrained from participation in planning activities.

Closely associated with the lack of participation by local prosecutors is the relative absence of Weed and Seed dollars to support their functions. When discussing reasons for their limited involvement in Weed and Seed activities, local prosecutors uniformly pointed to the lack of financial resources. As a review of their applications and discussions with prosecution staff in both the local prosecutors' and U.S. Attorney's offices reveals, relatively small amounts of money were earmarked to support prosecution activities at the local level. Despite the anticipated influx of "new" Weed and Seed cases, prosecutors' offices were not generally allocated monies to support their

[5]Local prosecutors and assistant US Attorneys in each all sites agreed that the local prosecution staff handled the majority of cases. In fact, the most commonly cited breakdown was 95% local and 5% or less federal prosecutions.

prosecution activities.

In sites where a Weed and Seed prosecutor was funded, prosecution staff indicated that it would be impossible for that individual to handle all Weed and Seed cases (e.g., San Diego, Philadelphia, Charleston). Prosecution staff in at least one site (from both the U.S. Attorney's office and the local prosecutor's office) indicated that a unilateral decision to eliminate funds for local prosecution had been made with no input or forewarning. The funding shift was simply announced with little debate at a steering committee meeting.

Weed and Seed prosecutors also indicated that they were often hampered by the lack of clerical support to assist in case processing responsibilities. This issue was particularly significant in sites that attempted to implement specialized case processing strategies (e.g., enhanced bail recommendations, stiffer sentences, larger fines). The lack of support was exacerbated by the expectation that Weed and Seed prosecutors, whether project-funded or not, were also expected to participate in community meetings and forums, and identify and respond to residents' concerns. Prosecutors in site where the U.S. Attorney and the local prosecutor played active roles often expressed frustration over the hectic pace of the job, and the multiple --and often conflicting-- expectations placed upon them by the public and other Weed and Seed agencies.

Pre-existing organizational relations. As indicated in the planning/ implementation discussion, several sites were forced to cope with negative pre-existing inter-agency relations which impeded Weed and Seed efforts. Prosecution staff were able to address these problematic relations with varying degrees of success. In places such as Chelsea, Madison, and Kansas City, the working relations between the U.S. Attorney's offices and the local prosecutors' offices were limited to basic prosecution necessities (e.g., formal case referral, information inquiries, etc.). The situation in Chelsea was complicated by an ongoing public corruption investigation directed by the U.S. Department of Justice, which engendered a great deal of distrust between local and federal entities.

With the exception of Madison, where the local prosecutor and the U.S. Attorney have failed to improve cooperative relations, the other sites made meaningful attempts to improve their interactions. Their efforts were characterized by multiple meetings between agency representatives and ongoing dialogue on problematic issues. They were also aided by the change in U.S. Attorneys that accompanied the 1992 presidential, which provided an opportunity for renewed dialogue between the offices. Anecdotal observations provided by local prosecution and U.S. Attorney staff in both Chelsea and Kansas City indicated that relations had improved over the grant's first year.

Prosecution personnel in several other sites cited occasional interagency conflicts as minor concerns during the program start-up period (e.g., Atlanta, Trenton, Seattle). Disagreements generally focused on funding allocation decisions, strategy selection, and

leadership roles of the respective agencies. These concerns were often inter-related, and based on lack of communication between agencies or vaguely stated program goals and objectives. While they initially created problems, the prosecution personnel did not consider them unsurmountable and actively worked to limit their negative influences.

Preliminary perceptions of program activities. Due to its comprehensive nature, the announcement of Weed and Seed program activities -- particularly the enforcement operations -- raised the concerns of target area residents, community activists, and other concerned parties. The public misunderstandings and misinterpretations were frequently manifested in open hostility to the program and its primary "actors" (e.g., the prosecution and law enforcement agencies). The animosity and distrust directed towards local and federal prosecution staff hampered their efforts in several ways: (1) it limited community cooperation with investigations and prosecutions; (2) it raised unsubstantiated suspicions regarding the motives of prosecution personnel who participated in community forums; and (3) it raised legal concerns regarding the constitutionality of prosecution tactics that are differentiated on a geographic basis (e.g., Trenton, Denver). In Seattle public outcry over the initial weed/seed funding distribution (which was originally 80% weed/20% seed), caused the city council to initially reject the money and, finally, revise the allocations to a 55/45 split.

Prosecution staff in many sites combined their efforts with representatives from the U.S. Attorney's office (usually the LECC) and members of local law enforcement agencies to ensure that accurate information about the program's goals and objectives were distributed, and to win the trust and support of community residents. Over several months, prosecutors used their actions to help dissipate opposition and increase community support. As residents saw that their civil rights were not being trampled and that enforcement and prosecution resources were targeting the most violent offenders, almost all cites reported enhanced community-prosecutor relations.

In addition to initial public distrust, the prosecution function was affected by organizational perceptions of the Weed and Seed program as an "election year ploy." Prosecutors in several sites indicated that their office's were initially reluctant to commitment too much time or too many resources to an effort that might not last more than a year. Although this perception was eventually dispelled, the change in presidential administration continued to fuel those fears. In fact, prosecutors in almost all Weed and Seed sites blamed the change in administration for causing funding lags and complicating the application process for second year support. Prosecutors that, in many sites, received limited funds were asked to commit resources to a program whose future was uncertain.

Generalized issues related to case prosecution. Problems associated with Weed and Seed planning were exacerbated by problems that occurred during program implementation. Implementation obstacles were characterized by traditional justice system obstacles (e.g., court backlog, limited prison/jail resources, and judicial discretion)

as well as program-specific concerns such as the use of uniform criteria for defining a Weed and Seed case. In the latter instance, prosecution staff throughout the nineteen sites expressed frustration over the lack of a more circumscribed definition. When asked how they and local law enforcement defined a "weed and seed case," most prosecutors stated that any arrest occurring within the geographic boundaries of the target neighborhood was eligible for inclusion. In fact, although the majority of the sites do not track their weed and Seed cases, the general perception was that any offense in the Weed and Seed neighborhood would be classified a Weed and Seed case.

It should be noted that the Executive Office of Weed and Seed and the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys issued a specific case definition at several points during the planning and implementation phases. For unspecified reasons, most sites chose to use their own definitions. Resistance to the use of a uniform case definition hampered prosecutors' efforts to track Weed and Seed cases and compile summary statistics. The broader definition also limited prosecutors' abilities to use specialized case processing tactics. In many sites, the number of cases that qualified as Weed and Seed offenses was so large, that specialized attention would have been impossible.

Another generalized problem involved the role played by the U.S. Attorney in each site. The administrative design of the Weed and Seed concept called for the U.S. Attorneys to assume a leadership role in developing and implementing "weeding" and "seeding" strategies. Prosecution staff in many cites questioned this role, arguing that the U.S. Attorney often lacked intimate knowledge of the communities' problems and concerns, which limited their ability to make the effective decisions. Interestingly, prosecution staff in several U.S. Attorney's offices raised similar criticisms of their offices' leadership role -- particularly when discussing the seeding efforts.

Among the traditional justice systems obstacles mentioned by local and federal prosecution staff, court backlog and lack of prison resources were the most commonly cited. In cites such as Philadelphia, Richmond, and Fort Worth, local prosecutors expressed frustration over the pace of litigation and the undercutting effects of court-ordered prison capacity caps. In these and many other sites, prosecutors attempts to "fast-track" cases and impose stiffer prison penalties were frequently thwarted by justice system capacities beyond their control. A limited number of local prosecutors also expressed concern over the local judiciary's sentencing patterns. In several instances, judges departed from recommended sentences (either guidelines or those recommended by the prosecutor's office) as a result of their objection to the geographic focus of the Weed and Seed program. To remedy this situation, prosecutors actively educated local judges regarding Weed and Seed goals and objectives, community support for the enhanced sentencing efforts, and other concerns.

The problems and obstacles encountered during Weed and Seed planning and implementation ranged from simple miscommunication to fundamental flaws in program design. Similarly, efforts to remedy these concerns produced mixed results. Some of the

problems were considered so significant that they permanently tainted the Weed and Seed prosecution efforts. In such situations, local and federal prosecuting entities tended to adhere to traditional roles and were reluctant to "buy into" the Weed and Seed concept. In other sites, ameliorative efforts proved quite successful and forged stronger working relations between the local prosecutor's and U.S. Attorney's offices, as well as the prosecuting agencies and community residents.

Impact of Prosecution Activities

Preliminary impact of the Weed and Seed program on the prosecution function can be measured in a variety of direct and indirect ways. The direct measures focus on hard indicators such as numbers of cases prosecuted, numbers of convictions obtained, types of incarcerative sentences, and other quantitative statistics. Upward or downward trends in any of these indicators can reflect positive and negative influences of the prosecution activities. Subtle measures of preliminary impact are based primarily on observational data offered through discussions with prosecution staff and community residents. These measures center on issues such as enhanced inter-agency cooperation, community participation in the prosecution functions, and resident's perceptions of safety and crime reduction.

The following section summarizes the general impacts of Weed and Seed prosecution activities on both the participating prosecution agencies and the respective Weed and Seed communities. The issues listed below reflect the types of impacts wrought by local prosecutors' and U.S. Attorneys' offices through their participation in the Weed and Seed initiative. Issues contained in the list will be discussed in greater detail throughout this section.

- Changes in the time required to process violent offenders.
- Changes in the number of cases processed by the local prosecutors' offices.
- Enhanced cooperation between prosecution agencies (e.g., local prosecutor's and local U.S. Attorney's offices), with local law enforcement personnel, and community residents.
- Local prosecutors and Assistant U.S. Attorneys became much more aware of the communities' crime problems, public safety needs and concerns, and relations with prosecution entities.
- Anecdotal reports of increased perceptions of safety and reductions in crime by Weed and Seed representatives (particularly violent crime).
- Specialized focus operations had most noticeable impact on crime problem and community perceptions of crime problem.

- Pre-existing programs were incorporated into specific Weed and Seed sites.

Impacts on case processing abilities and inter-agency relations. The primary determinant of case processing impact is the level of participation and commitment to Weed and Seed program goals and objectives exhibited by the prosecuting agency. Prosecutors' offices that used specialized prosecution strategies for Weed and Seed offenses tended to report a significant impact on their case processing abilities (e.g., Philadelphia, Wilmington, Omaha, and Santa Ana). These sites maintained a "weed and seed prosecutor" to handle all weed and seed cases. In reality, these individuals are able to devote specialized attention to only a fraction of the total weed and seed cases. Due to their overwhelming caseloads, prosecutors tended to focus their limited resources on the removal of the worst offenders (e.g., most violent, highest recidivist, largest narcotics amounts) from the community. Although the remainder of the Weed and Seed cases were handled by the office's felony trial unit, they were still designated as Weed and Seed offenses --though they were not likely to receive any kind of specialized attention.

Prosecutors reporting minimal impact on their case processing capabilities were characterized by limited involvement "weeding" or "seeding" activities. These offices generally did not receive any Weed and Seed funds, did not designate a "weed and seed prosecutor," and did not employ any specialized case processing tactics (e.g., Denver, Madison, Chicago, Atlanta, and Pittsburgh). In essence, these local prosecutors' offices accepted and handled Weed and Seed cases as they would any other offense occurring within their respective jurisdictions. Prosecutors in several of these offices stated that because the target area already garnered a great deal of enforcement resources, that the numbers of arrests did not increase dramatically. Consequently, the prosecuting agencies were not forced to absorb an inordinate amount of additional cases.

In addition to the numbers of cases handled, prosecutors also discussed changes in the speed with which cases are disposed. Once again, mixed results were found across the sites that specifically targeted this issue. Sites such as Seattle and Trenton reported no significant changes in the time required to dispose of a Weed and Seed versus a conventional felony case. Other Weed and Seed sites (e.g., Charleston, San Antonio) report significant decreases in case processing times based on the development of "fast track" approaches for Weed and Seed cases.

Within the U.S. Attorneys' offices, caseload increases were minimal and easily accommodated. U.S. Attorneys prosecuted less than ten percent of all Weed and Seed offenses, and were prepared to handle the more serious offenders. In several sites, the U.S. Attorney reported prosecution of only a handful of cases (e.g., Chicago). Instead of providing prosecution services, these offices devoted the bulk of the personnel resources to administrative functions such as organizing and overseeing steering committee meetings and participating in community development (e.g., seeding) efforts.

One of the most significant, yet difficult to measure, impacts of the Weed and

Seed program was its impact on cooperation and communication. Changes in these issues were most apparent in the following two areas: (1) improvements in inter-agency cooperation (e.g., between the local prosecutor's office and the U.S. Attorney's office or local law enforcement agency); and (2) between the prosecuting agencies --both local and federal-- and the target communities. The former change was an indirect result of participation in planning and implementation meetings, steering committee activities, and other Weed and Seed forums. In contrast to many of their prior encounters, prosecutors communicated on a regular basis with their counterparts and, due to limited funding, were forced to work out a variety of compromises in the best interest of the community. Increased levels of cooperation helped to reduce investigative and prosecutorial duplication, improved the "quality" (e.g., soundness and completeness of evidence, use of proper investigative techniques) of the Weed and Seed cases presented for prosecution, and encouraged earlier coordination/input during the strategy planning stages.

Prosecution impact on the community. The next impact, improved community awareness and relations, an articulated program goal, was also the result of increased interaction between prosecution personnel and community residents. Interestingly, regardless of their levels of participation, all prosecution respondents reported improved levels of inter-agency cooperation. In contrast, only those offices that incorporated community "outreach" efforts reported improved community relations.

Enhanced awareness of community needs and concerns helped local prosecutors and U.S. Attorneys to establish prosecution priorities and longer range program objectives. For example, in Washington, D.C., the U.S. Attorney's office's discussions with local residents led to a special investigation and prosecution focus on homicide cases. Improved community relations also affected other prosecution activities. The trust engendered through familiarity allowed prosecution personnel to gather better investigative information and made residents more willing witnesses.

Prosecutors in several sites stated that residents saw that the worst offenders receive stiffer prison sentences, which encouraged them to come forward to report other crimes. More importantly, a great number of the Weed and Seed residents indicated to prosecution representatives that there communities were safer places to live. Although perceptions of safety do not always reflect actual crime trends, they do reflect "quality of life" considerations that the Weed and Seed program is intended to target. For example, the City Attorney's office in San Diego made extensive use of nuisance and abatement statutes to restrict drug gang activities. While it did not necessarily eliminate the drug trade, it did make the surrounding community safer for children and other law abiding residents.

Use of specialized and pre-existing prosecution initiatives. Although limited data are available through the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, anecdotal impressions of prosecutors and community residents reflect decreases in specific types of crime (e.g., violent crime in Seattle; gang-related offenses in San Diego; and drug-related offenses in

Philadelphia) in many of the Weed and Seed communities. In many instances, these reductions are directly attributable to specialized enforcement and prosecution initiatives that were implemented with Weed and Seed funds. Specialized operations were often used to "kick-off" the weeding activities and set the tone for future enforcement efforts. Despite their success in removing larger numbers of specific offenders, the impact of specialized prosecution activities were limited in duration. The more traditional prosecution activities used to process the bulk of the remaining cases produced equivocal results. Crime trends for each of the sites tended to be mixed depending on the type of offenses examined. Decreases in crime within the Weed and Seed areas were often accompanied by increases in adjacent neighborhoods (e.g., Chicago, Pittsburgh, Chelsea).

In addition to specialized Weed and Seed prosecution programs, the incorporation of existing programs (developed prior to the start of Weed and Seed) impacted the prosecution function. Examples of these programs include: (1) FAST, the Philadelphia District Attorney's cross-designation program designed to facilitate federal prosecution of serious offenders; and (2) DART, a Kansas City program designed to close "drug houses" and rehabilitate the buildings for community use. Prosecution staff also played integral parts in a variety of joint enforcement/prosecution endeavors such as Seattle's Operation Hardfall; Wilmington's Operation Roundup; and Madison's Operation Blue Blanket. Each operation was planned prior to the onset of Weed and Seed activities, yet established a strong precedent for enforcement and prosecution activities.

Prosecution Statistics

The above discussion outlines the impact that Weed and Seed prosecution activities have had on the participating prosecuting agencies and the target communities. The results include both intended and unintended consequences, and demonstrate the wide ranging effects of varying levels of participation on the part of local and federal prosecutors. While preliminary, they indicate the positive and negative aspects of Weed and Seed initiatives on prosecuting agencies. They also highlight the pitfalls and accomplishments that prosecutors must be conscious of when developing and implementing Weed and Seed prosecution strategies. Finally, they demonstrate the obvious benefits of engaging in non-traditional prosecution activities such as on-going dialogue with community representatives.

The tables contained on the following pages provide a summary of the prosecution activities in each Weed and Seed site. The statistics were provided by the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys and cover the period from June 1992 through February 1994. Information on prosecution activities was provided primarily through local law enforcement agencies (e.g., city police departments), a limited number of local prosecutors' offices, and all participating U.S. Attorneys' offices. Because reporting procedures were considered a significant obstacle and Weed and Seed case definitions varied within and among respective sites, the data are provided as rough estimates of prosecution activities, and should not be used to make comparisons between sites. In

addition, examination of the data should also take into consideration on-site enforcement and prosecution goals and objectives, the Weed and Seed dollars allocated to individual tasks and agencies, and other contextual issues as indicated in the close of the prior chapter on law enforcement activities and data.

Attempts to gather case-specific, summary data from prosecutors' offices were unsuccessful due to the lack of uniform reporting requirements and the inability to collect such information retrospectively without incurring substantial costs. Data collection was also complicated by the fact that many offices did not use a separate Weed and Seed designation and several sites involved overlapping police jurisdictions, which make it impossible to track cases without individual searches of each case records file.

Examination of the tables reveals great disparities between sites in terms of the numbers of cases handled, sentences and fines imposed, and assets seized. Differences may be attributable to use of divergent case definitions, under-reporting of prosecution activities in specific sites, and other contextual influences including size of area and size of problem. The absence of state level (e.g., local prosecutor's office) statistics for prosecution activities does not necessarily mean that the were no efforts in this area (e.g., Chicago's data reflects no state level convictions). To the contrary, many sites simply engage in Weed and Seed activities, but refrain from the compilation of aggregate data.

The first table summarizes the following prosecution measures: (1) the number of defendants charged, convicted, sentenced, and sentenced to prison; (2) the aggregate length of prison sentences for all Weed and Seed offenders; and (3) the total dollar value of fines levied and assets forfeited. Data are provided for state and federal activities in each of these areas.

The second prosecution table offers a breakdown of the Weed and Seed offenses charged by local prosecutors and the U.S. Attorney's office in each site. Offenses are sorted by seven general crime areas: (1) continuing criminal enterprise; (2) felony drug crimes; (3) violent crimes (e.g., assaults, robberies); (4) firearms violations; (5) possession of narcotics; (6) RICO offenses; and (7) "other" offenses. Subtotals are provided for each site and offense category, and state and federal data are displayed together to permit review of all prosecution activities within each site.

The final table contains a brief summary of three primary prosecution stages: charged offenses, trial dispositions, and sentencing dispositions. While this information is included in the previous two tables (in a different format), it is displayed side-by-side to allow examination of several basic issues (e.g., what percentage of Weed and Seed cases were dismissed?; How many defendants were sentenced to state or federal prison?). Again, interpretation of this and the preceding tables should not be done without a complete understanding of each site's history. Consequently, it is essential to review site

summaries and other materials to place the reported numbers in the proper context.

The charging and prosecution patterns illustrated in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 reflect many of the idiosyncrasies represented in the range of Weed and Seed programs throughout all nineteen sites. In Table 4-1, expectedly, there is a marked difference in the ratio of locally prosecuted cases to federally prosecuted cases that remains fairly consistent across all sites. But, there are also notable disparities evident among the sites with regard to the volume of Weed and Seed cases prosecuted by local DA's. While some of this disparity can be attributed to variations in jurisdiction population, arrest practices, and actual criminal activity, it is safe to assume that a significant amount of the disparity can be concluded to be a result of other contextual factors or combinations of those factors. For instance, there is some cause to believe that local prosecutor's active roles in previously existing Weed and Seed "like" programs in some sites (e.g., San Antonio, Fort Worth, Philadelphia), may have had some impact on offices directing more attention to these cases and, hence, affecting numbers of prosecutions upward. The devotion of specialized assistant prosecutors to the exclusive handling of Weed and Seed cases in sites like Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Omaha, may have also been a factor in influencing prosecution decision-making to move forward with greater numbers of Weed and Seed cases as an adherence to the objectives of the program. On the other hand, the dedication of individual assistant prosecutors to the screening of Weed and Seed cases at other sites (e.g., Atlanta, Charleston), could conceivably have contributed to lower prosecution volumes but, at the same time, served to raise the ratio of convictions for a smaller population of higher quality Weed and Seed cases.

Data displayed in Tables 4-2 and 4-3 highlight a final contextual factor that is likely to have a significant influence on the presentation of data on offenses charged. The definition of a Weed and Seed case -- or more precisely how jurisdictions and agencies within jurisdictions vary in these definitions -- has a distinct bearing on patterns of Weed and Seed charging by offense category. As pointed out in Table 4-3, over a third of the total State offenses charged in the Weed and Seed sites fell into an "other" category divorced from those offenses typically identified with the Weed and Seed program (e.g., drug offenses, violent crime, firearm offenses). A review of a distribution of these "other" charged offenses by jurisdiction in Table 4-2, reveals noticeable differences among prosecutor offices in the ratio of "other" offenses to the more conservatively defined Weed and Seed cases. This finding serves to accentuate how attention to diversity in definitional parameters at the enforcement and prosecution levels can help explain what may appear to be, at first blush, inconsistencies in the use of discretion in decision making practices.

Table 4-1
Weed and Seed Prosecution Activities
State and Federal Case Statistics (thru 2/94)

SITE	(State/Federal)	# of Def.'s Dismissed (State/Federal)	# of Def.'s Convicted (State/Federal)	# of Def.'s Sentenced (State/Federal)	# of Def.'s Sent to Prison (State/Federal)	Aggregate Prison Sent.'s (State/Federal)	Total Fines in Dollars (State/Federal)	Value of Asset Forfeitures ($) (State/Federal)
Atlanta, GA	547 / 5	0 / 0	248 / 2	1 / 0	1 / 0	15 / 0	MD / $0	$199,655 / $0
Charleston, SC	341 / 15	67 / 1	234 / 13	234 / 5	234 / 5	408.1 / 31.9	MD / $0	MD / $0
Chelsea, MA	628 / 25	106 / 0	174 / 13	173 / 14	68 / 9	150.9 / 50.7	$1,430 / $529,000	$710 / $865,000
Chicago, IL	513 / 0	MD / 0	MD / 0	MD / 0	MD / 0	MD / 0	MD / $0	MD / $0
Denver, CO	593 / 0	149 / 0	212 / 0	174 / 0	42 / 0	140.1 / 0	$70,692 / $0	$0 / $0
Fort Worth, TX	4,267 / 88	672 / 9	916 / 55	851 / 46	536 / 43	4,472 / 390.6	$46,853 /$1,026,250	$311,331/$700,000
Kansas City, MO	25 / 33	3 / 2	13 / 25	13 / 14	5 / 14	40 / 40	MD / $25,000	MD / $10,000
Madison, WI	855 / 31	44 / 2	592 / 28	592 / 27	263 / 26	700.8231.1	$470,036 / $0	$286,400 / $26,325
Omaha, NE	1,020 / 66	549 / 0	379 / 15	379 / 6	134 / 4	102.9 / 35.9	$25,215 / $250	$10,000 / $4,832
Philadelphia, PA	8,937 / 653	MD / 14	MD / 382	MD / 377	MD / 354	MD / 4,629	MD / $810,620	$673,263/$303,905
Pittsburgh, PA	199 / 41	7 / 2	35 / 38	36 / 34	17 / 32	45.5 / 154.9	MD / $0	MD / $0
Richmond, VA	1,266 / 28	33 / 0	535 / 25	431 / 18	209 / 18	1,020 / 222.6	$46,310 / $0	$92,356 / $102,000
San Antonio, TX	650 / 55	22 / 2	397 / 8	340 / 24	163 / 21	2,157.5 / 205.2	$134,325 / $1,600	$0 / $0
San Diego, CA	723 / 12	124 / 0	608 / 11	420 / 8	296 / 8	307.1 / 26.2	$99,831 / $0	$0 / $0
Santa Ana, CA	677 / 0	121 / 0	400 / 0	397 / 0	112 / 0	426.1 / 0	$800 / $0	$0 / $0
Seattle, WA	175 / 0	33 / 0	49 / 0	48 / 0	41 / 0	7.8 / 0	$6,205 / $0	$0 / $0
Trenton, NJ	712 / 49	93 / 5	172 / 37	165 / 30	120 / 27	585.9 / 241.2	$179,875 / $0	$63,909 / $0
Washington, DC	1,107 / 24	296 / 3	203 / 13	174 / 7	90 / 7	MD / 0	MD / $0	MD / $0
Wilmington, DE	942 / 22	MD / 0	MD / 16	MD / 14	MD / 14	MD / 0	MD / $0	$51,665 / 123,351$
PROGRAM TOTALS:	**24,177 / 1,147**	**2,319 / 40**	**5,167 / 681**	**4,428 / 624**	**2,331 / 582**	**10,579.7 / 6,259.3**	**$1,081,572 / $2,392,720**	**$1,689,289 / $2,135,413**

Note: MD = missing data

Table 4-2
Weed and Seed Charges by Offense Type
State and Federal Case Statistics (thru 2/94)

SITE	Continuing Criminal Enterprise (State/Federal)	# of Felony Drug Crimes (State/Federal)	# of Violent Crimes (State/Federal)	# of Firearms Violations (State/Federal)	# of Drug Possession Crimes (State/Federal)	# of RICO Offenses (State/Federal)	# of Other Offenses Charged (State/Federal)	Total # of Weed and Seed Offenses Charged (State/Federal)
Atlanta, GA	0 / MD	377 / MD	21 / MD	47 / MD	109 / MD	0 / MD	370 / MD	924 / 5
Charleston, SC	0 / 0	114 / 11	83 / 0	24 / 4	97 / 0	0 / 0	31 / 0	349 / 15
Chelsea, MA	0 / 0	247 / 0	178 / 0	13 / 5	180 / 0	0 / 1	66 / 17	684 / 23
Chicago, IL	0 / 0	492 / 0	0 / 0	19 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	511 / 0
Denver, CO	0 / 0	183 / 0	96 / 0	111 / 0	326 / 0	0 / 0	204 / 0	920 / 0
Fort Worth, TX	0 / 2	1,363 / 63	732 / 2	365 / 12	978 / 7	0 / 0	1,989 / 22	5,427/ 108
Kansas City, MO	0 / 0	13 / 26	0 / 3	5 / 11	4 / 3	0 / 0	0 / 3	22 / 46
Madison, WI	0 / 0	293 / 50	57 / 0	17 / 4	483 / 0	0 / 0	266 / 0	1,116 / 54
Omaha, NE	0 / 5	217 / 196	0 / 0	379 / 23	363 / 0	0 / 0	417 / 17	1,376 / 241
Philadelphia, PA	0 / 25	3,560 / 575	1,007 / 0	398 / 44	777 / 439	0 / 0	4,356 / 1,167	10,098 / 2,250
Pittsburgh, PA	0 / 0	134 / 41	0 / 0	0 / 0	105 / 0	0 / 0	64 / 0	303 / 41
Richmond, VA	3 / 0	869 / 30	90 / 0	151 / 1	772 / 0	0 / 0	487 / 2	2,372 / 33
San Antonio, TX	0 / 0	498 / 70	33 / 0	42 / 5	169 / 30	0 / 0	36 / 10	778 / 115
San Diego, CA	4 / 0	20 / 11	171 / 0	61 / 1	197 / 0	0 / 0	412 / 0	865 / 12
Santa Ana, CA	0 / 0	659 / 0	6 / 0	10 / 0	193 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	868 / 0
Seattle, WA	0 / 0	18 / 0	69 / 0	21 / 0	24 / 0	0 / 0	66 / 0	198 / 0
Trenton, NJ	0 / 0	1,040 / 42	7 / 0	41 / 10	591 / 1	0 / 0	532 / 0	2,211 / 53
Washington, DC	0 / 0	213 / 7	241 / 0	227 / 1	307 / 3	0 / 0	774 / 4	1,762 / 15
Wilmington, DE	0 / 0	452 / 42	56 / 0	41 / 8	366 / 0	0 / 0	760 / 3	1,675 / 53
PROGRAM TOTALS:	**7 / 32**	**10,762/1,164**	**2,847 / 5**	**1,972 / 129**	**6,041 / 483**	**0 / 1**	**10,830 / 1,245**	**32,459 / 3,064**

Table 4-3
Charging, Adjudication, and Sentencing Activities
State and Federal Case Statistics (thru 2/94)

Offenses Charged			Trial Dispositions			Sentencing Dispositions		
	State	Federal		State	Federal		State	Federal
C.C.E.	7	32	Dismissals	2,319	40	Prison	2,331	582
Felony Drug	10,762	1,164	Convictions	5,167	681	No Prison	2,097	42
Violent Crime	2,847	5	Pendings	16,691	431			
Firearms	1,972	129						
Possession	6,041	483						
RICO	0	1						
Other	10,830	1,245						
TOTAL	**32,459**	**3,059**	**TOTAL**	**24,177**	**1,152**	**TOTAL**	**4,428**	**624**

Chapter 5
Community Policing Tactics and Issues

Approaches to Community Policing

Across cities, there was substantial similarity in the general approach to community policing. In all cities, target areas were served by one or more officers who were specifically assigned to work as community policing officers in that area. The officers, typically referred to as neighborhood police officers, represented an opportunity for police and residents to become acquainted with each other -- or at least recognize each other -- and for officers to become very familiar with the areas served. Beyond this general similarity, there was substantial diversity among approaches with respect to several key issues.

Prior experience with community policing. This opportunity for police and citizens to develop a relationship was a new experience in some communities (e.g., Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Wilmington) and a familiar one in others (e.g., Madison, Santa Ana, San Diego, and Seattle). In some cities the Weed and Seed funding was the opportunity to introduce community policing while in others it provided resources to further develop a practice already in place, either by increasing the number of officers involved or by extending community policing services into additional parts of the city. In some cities where community policing already was established (e.g., Madison and Santa Ana) the Weed and Seed emphasis on the reduction of drug sales moved community policing officers into a more active relationship with drug enforcement units and investigators.

Numbers of community policing officers. The number of "dedicated" officers ranged from one in each of six neighborhoods in Madison to twenty-two officers plus two sergeants in Chicago; there were teams of three, six, eight, ten or twelve officers in other cities. The large number in Chicago represents coverage across three shifts; in Madison and some other cities, the Neighborhood Officers worked during only one shift or at varying times, depending on the scheduling of community activities.

Composition of teams. The number of "dedicated" officers does not tell much about the police service provided in the target area. For example, in Madison the one officer was teamed with a county social worker, a probation officer, public health nurse, and two school principles to form a community service team. The Neighborhood Officer served in addition to the patrol officers who regularly worked in the area. Service also was provided by the "Blue Blanket" team, a street-sale drug enforcement unit that also made door-to-door contacts, when possible, in the neighborhoods.

Similarly in Fort Worth, the Six Neighborhood Patrol Officers were supported during the second year of the grant by a Strategic High Impact Team that spent four

hours a day, seven days a week, working to reduce drug sales and other crime in the area. These officers used a variety of tactics including foot, bicycle, and motor patrol; and plainclothes and uniform operations.

In Charleston, the three Neighborhood Patrol Officers and their sergeant worked closely with two truancy officers, probation and parole officers, a juvenile investigator and agents from ATF.

In San Antonio, the ten community policing officers were augmented by a gang unit, a special operations unit that provided saturation patrolling and undercover operations, the Traffic Control Division and a motorcycle unit for DWI enforcement. There was overtime funding for as many as 300 other officers who participated for short periods in specific community policing projects in the target area.

Six sites (Atlanta, Charleston, Chicago, Madison, San Antonio and San Diego) reported the value of linking probation and parole officers with the community policing teams. The advantages were mutual; community policing officers knew where people were that the probation and parole officers might be seeking and the probation and parole personnel had the power to quickly remove people from the streets who were creating problems in the neighborhoods and were guilty of violation of probation or parole conditions.

Duties. In most communities, the neighborhood officers focused on non-enforcement aspects of community policing. They were responsible for community contacts, youth activities, community organizing, problem identification and problem solving. In some sites they also were key sources of information about trouble sites and perpetrators for the drug and other enforcement units. In most cities, the neighborhood officers answered calls when not engaged in other activities or when patrol officers working in the area needed back-up; however, most were not required to respond to calls. In Chicago, San Diego and Santa Ana, however, the community officers were full service officers. In Santa Ana, this raised some debate about whether officers could effectively perform both community policing and enforcement activities.[6] (Community policing officers had not traditionally been involved in enforcement.) The community policing officers themselves did not seem uncomfortable with the full range of responsibilities and officers in other cities who performed all police functions (e.g., Chicago, San Diego) did not seem to experience stress.

Problem solving. Problem solving was explicitly mentioned as a function of the community policing officers in at least nine of the sites, although we have no measures of the type or the extent of problem solving done or whether or how well officers were

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[6]This debate has always struck this writer as interesting since the same people who doubt that police can perform a full range of functions are never heard to question whether parents should be able to mesh care-taking and disciplinary functions.

trained in this activity. San Diego has been involved in problem solving policing for several years and included in the community policing activities landlord training and problem solving training for residents.

Training for police personnel. The nature, extent and timing of training for officers involved in community policing varied considerably across sites. For example, the personnel in Richmond participated in multiple training sessions throughout the project. In Charleston all personnel received three days of training. In Washington, DC only the supervisors were trained and in Atlanta, the training was not delivered until near the end of the project. Observers believe that training was one of the factors that contributed to the apparent greater success of community policing efforts in some sites.

Training for citizens. There was an even wider range of training experiences for citizens. In many sites, there was no special training for citizens. In some, citizens attended citizen police academies. San Diego trained landlords and gave problem solving training to residents. Fort Worth and San Antonio provided leadership training for residents in the target area and in Fort Worth citizens were trained to participate in citizen patrols. Citizen training also appeared to be a very valuable implementation strategy.

Nature of Community Policing Activities

Table 5-1 indicates which community policing activities were implemented in each of the Weed and Seed evaluation sites. As that table indicates, seven sites, Fort Worth, Kansas City, Richmond, San Antonio, San Diego, Seattle, and Wilmington, implemented all ten activities. Another six sites, Atlanta, Denver, Omaha, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Santa Ana, implemented nine of the activities. Four sites, Charleston, Chelsea, Madison, and Trenton, implemented eight community policing activities. Chicago and Washington, DC implemented six of the activities.

The most frequently utilized community policing activities were foot patrol, community organizing, and door-to-door contacts, which were implemented by 19 sites. Two activities, community meetings and neighborhood police offices, were used in 18 sites. Seventeen sites implemented problem-solving tactics and youth activities. Community surveys were used in 16 sites. The least frequently implemented community policing activity was bicycle patrol, which was used in 11 sites.

Extent of Community Policing Activities

Representatives of each program were given the opportunity to rate the extent to which they utilized each of ten community policing activities. In their ratings, "0" indicated they did not use the activity at all, "1" indicated that the tactic was "used very little," "2" suggested that the tactic was "used some," and "3" signified that the tactic was "used extensively." The questionnaire results are summarized in Table 5-2.

Table 5-1
Presence of Community Policing Activities in Weed and Seed Sites

	Activity									
Site	Foot patrol	Bike patrol	Comm. mtgs.	Comm. org.	D-to-D contacts	P-S tactics	Comm. Surveys	Bus. Surveys	Nbrhd office	Youth Acts.
Atlanta	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Charleston	+	+	+	+	+	+			+	+
Chelsea	+		+	+	+		+	+	+	+
Chicago	+		+	+	+				+	+
Denver	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+
Fort Worth	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kansas City	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Madison	+		+	+	+	+	+		+	+
Omaha	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Philadelphia	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pittsburgh	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Richmond	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
San Antonio	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
San Diego	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Santa Ana	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Seattle	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Trenton	+		+	+	+	+		+	+	+
Washington	+		+	+	+	+	+			
Wilmington	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Number Using	19	11	18	19	19	17	16	14	18	17

Table 5-2
Extent of Rated Use of Community Policing Activities in Weed and Seed Sites[1]

	Activity									
Site	Foot patrol	Bike patrol	Comm. mtgs	Comm. org.	D-to-D contacts	P-S tactics	Comm. Surveys	Bus. Surveys	Nbrhd office	Youth Acts.
Atlanta	3	0	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3
Charleston	3	2	3	3	3	3	0	0	3	3
Chelsea	2	0	3	3	2	0	1	2	2	2
Chicago	3	0	3	2	1	0	0	0	3	3
Denver	3	3	3	1	2	3	1	0	3	3
Fort Worth	1	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3
Kansas City	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	2
Madison	3	0	2	1	3	2	3	0	3	2
Omaha	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	2	3	0
Philadelphia	3	0	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3
Pittsburgh	3	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Richmond	3	1	2	3	2	3	2	1	3	3
San Antonio	3	3	3	3	2	3	1	1	3	3
San Diego	3	2	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	2
Santa Ana	3	1	0	3	2	2	1	1	3	1
Seattle	3	2	3	3	1	3	1	1	1	3
Trenton	3	0	3	3	3	3	0	2	3	3
Washington	3	0	2	2	1	3	1	0	0	0
Wilmington	3	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
Average Rated Use	2.84	1.21	2.68	2.63	2.32	2.58	1.58	1.37	2.42	2.32

[1](0 = Not used, 1 = Used very little, 2 = Used some, 3 = Used extensively)

Table 5-3 provides a list of the ten community policing activities rank ordered according to the average use rating it received. As that table reveals, the most commonly used activity was foot patrol, which received an average use rating of 2.84, indicating that it was used extensively. Slightly lower average ratings were provided to community meetings, community organizing, and problem-solving tactics, which had ratings of 2.68, 2.63, and 2.58, respectively. Neighborhood police offices received an average rating of 2.42, compared to 2.32 for door-to-door contacts, and 2.32 for youth activities. The lowest ratings of extent of use were provided to community surveys (1.58), business surveys (1.37), and bicycle patrol (1.21).

Table 5-3
Community Policing Activities Rank Ordered by Ratings of Frequency of Use

Activity	Average Rating of Use[1]
Foot patrol	2.84
Community meetings	2.68
Community organizing	2.63
Problem-solving tactics	2.58
Neighborhood police office	2.42
Door-to-door contacts	2.32
Youth activities	2.32
Community surveys	1.58
Business surveys	1.37
Bike patrol	1.21

[1]Higher score means used more.

Estimated Effectiveness of Community Policing Activities

Representatives of each program were asked to rank order ten community policing activities in order of their estimated effectiveness, where "1" represented Most Effective and "10" represented Least Effective. The results of that ranking are presented in Table 5-4. As that table shows, the rankings provided to the activities varied considerably across sites. Foot patrol, for example, was ranked as most effective by nine sites, but as the least effective by one site.

Table 5-4
Effectiveness Ratings Given to Community Policing Activities[1]

SITE	Foot patrol	Bike patrol	Comm. mtgs.	Comm. org.	D-to-D contacts	P-S tactics	Comm. Surveys	Bus. Surveys	Nbrhd office	Youth Acts.
Atlanta	1	10	3	7	6	4	8	9	5	2
Charleston	1	8	2	6	7	5	9	10	3	4
Chelsea	1	10	4	3	8	2	9	5	7	6
Chicago[2]	1	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	2	1
Denver	5	2	6	8	7	3	9	10	1	4
Fort Worth	10	9	2	3	4	1	6	7	8	5
Kansas City	2	5	9	6	3	1	7	8	10	4
Madison	4	10	5	7	3	2	6	9	1	8
Omaha	2	3	4	5	6	1	7	8	9	10
Philadelphia	1	10	3	4	6	5	7	8	2	9
Pittsburgh	1	10	4	5	2	3	8	9	6	7
Richmond	2	9	6	7	4	1	8	10	3	5
San Antonio	3	6	2	7	8	1	9	10	4	5
San Diego	3	6	1	8	5	2	4	9	7	10
Santa Ana	1	10	2	4	6	5	7	9	3	8
Seattle	1	2	9	10	3	4	8	7	5	6
Trenton	1	8	2	3	5	4	9	10	6	7
Washington[2]	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
Wilmington	4	10	3	1	7	2	5	6	8	9
Average	2.37	7.53	3.83	5.28	5.29	2.67	7.41	8.47	5.00	6.11

[1]1 = Most effective, 10 = Least effective.

[2]The Chicago and Washington sites indicated the rank order of the top 2 or 5 activities (with ties, in Chicago's case) rather than rating all activities.

Table 5-5 provides a list of the ten community policing activities rank ordered by the average ranking provided to each. As that table reveals, the community policing activity receiving the highest average ranking was foot patrol, with an average ranking of 2.37 The second highest ranking of effectiveness was given to problem-solving tactics, which had an average ranking of 2.67. The average ranking of 3.83 assigned to community meetings was the third highest among the ten activities. The fourth highest average ranking was 5.00, provided to neighborhood police office, slightly higher than the 5.28 and 5.29 given to community organizing and door-to-door contacts, respectively. The lowest average rankings of effectiveness were provided to youth activities, community surveys, bike patrol, and business surveys.

Table 5-5
Community Policing Activities Rank Ordered by Perceived Effectiveness

Activity	Effectiveness Rating[1]
Foot patrol	2.37
Problem-solving tactics	2.67
Community meetings	3.83
Neighborhood police office	5.00
Community organizing	5.28
Door-to-door contacts	5.29
Youth activities	6.11
Community surveys	7.41
Bike patrol	7.53
Business surveys	8.47

[1]Lower score means more effective

Chapter 6
Seeding Strategies and Activities

Of all the central elements of the Weed and Seed concept, seeding is arguably the most diverse and complex. As shown in Chapter 2, the target neighborhoods have deeply rooted social and crime problems and the majority contain thousands of residents at or below the poverty line. While the sites allocated an average of 25-30% of their budgets to seeding activities, this amount (based on data provided by 13 sites, approximately $273,177 was the average, with a range of $100,102 to $566,758) was spread thinly to cover coordinator salaries and small community projects. Pursuing major neighborhood revitalization and economic development strategies could only take place through a variety of optimizing strategies involving partnerships, leveraging, and interagency coordination. Most programs were unable to move beyond the planning stage in this area.

In this chapter, we first discuss the vehicles under which seeding activities and strategies were launched. "Vehicles" are broadly defined to encompass seeding committees, coordinators, and funding mechanisms.

Seeding strategies and activities are then discussed, beginning with a summary of the broad directions taken by the sites. As will be shown in tables and text, the sites were encouraged by federal sponsors to take an inclusive view of seeding activities, and thus seeding services and activities in target neighborhoods have a variety of relationships to the Weed and Seed program. Some were funded directly by grant funds, in whole or in tiny part. Others were coordinated or sponsored by seeding staff or committees with no provision of funds, or were simply one activity of an agency or organization with some tie to the Weed and Seed program. Still others pre-existed Weed and Seed and had little to do with the program beyond being located in the target neighborhood and counted as a seeding strategy. These lines are often difficult to draw; in listing the seeding activities per site, we have adopted the same inclusive view as the program directors but have strived to indicate where Weed and Seed funds were applied.

Seeding Management and Coordination

At least twelve of the sites had named seed coordinators, many of them full-time. In other sites, seeding efforts were managed by grants coordinators, city agency staff, or an LECC. It appears that most of them were employed by (even if the W&S grant paid their salary) and housed within the police department or other city agency; the few that worked within the target neighborhoods were appreciative of their location and felt it aided their work. Most of the sites did not plan a full-time seed coordinator, but found the position necessary as the activities expanded. A number of seed coordinators were hired very late in the project period. For the most part, turnover was low, although in a few sites, turnover and incompetency hampered seeding efforts.

Every site except Omaha established a seed committee to plan and oversee seeding strategies, although their authority and activity varied substantially. The seed committees ranged in size from 10 to 59 members. The majority of the committees were dominated by agency representatives, with just a few community representatives or neighborhood residents. Many of seed committees were weak and in turmoil much of the time. Several seed committees, however, were strong, active, and wielded considerable authority. These sites tend to be those in which the seed committees included substantial numbers of community representatives and had decision-making power over the spending of seed funds.

Federal agency seed committees were formed in at least two sites, Denver and Philadelphia. Regional representatives of agencies such as HUD, the Department of Labor, and Health and Human Services met periodically to share information and assist where possible. Yet as one representative related, these agencies had no funds allocated for Weed and Seed target areas and no mandate to give Weed and Seed areas priority in existing grant programs; the federal agency representatives were able to provide the communities with information and access, but not money.

In most sites, however, federal seeding agencies were uninvolved in the program and did not work together the way the federal law enforcement agencies did. State agencies were also rarely represented except for state's attorney general office's in several sites. The participation of local city and county agencies in seeding varied from site to site. City services were readily provided in a few cities, yet absent in others.

The seeding programs in several sites had quite rocky starts (Atlanta, for example, and Chicago, who overcame it). There were a variety of reasons for troublesome starts, but a common one was community opposition to the imbalance of funds directed toward weeding and seeding. In several cities, community opposition was quite vocal, and directed at the very concept of Weed and Seed program. To varying degrees, citizens in Seattle, Omaha, and San Diego opposed the program's emphasis on arrest and prosecution, some viewing it as the targeted oppression of minorities. The opposition in these sites forced local Weed and Seed decision-makers to put more funds into seeding and let the community have more say in the program.

Means of Support for Seeding

Weed and Seed grant funds to support local programs and services. Approximately a third of the seeding funds was distributed to local organizations to conduct programs and services in the target areas. In several sites, local projects were awarded "mini-grants" through a competitive and empowering process conducted by seed committees. Seeding activities were also supported by in-kind contributions from local agencies and organizations and private businesses.

Programs receiving direct federal support. The seeding programs in the Weed

and Seed sites included several national programs funded directly or indirectly by the federal government. These programs and their sponsors include the Safe Havens (under the sponsorship of Cities in Schools), Boys and Girls Clubs (the Boys and Girls Club of America), the Race Against Drugs program (the National Child Safety Council and FBI), the Wings of Hope program (the Southern Christian Leadership Program), and the Step-Up program (Department of Labor). These programs are described below.

Government resources directed to the target neighborhoods. HUD and other local and state authorities are supporting a number of development projects and general renovation and rehabilitation efforts in Weed and Seed target areas. These development and renovation projects account for a huge portion of the leveraged funds tallied by the Weed and Seed sites, and most of the planning and implementation of them pre-dated the Weed and Seed program.

Local, state, and federal agencies also continue, as they have in the past, to support a wide variety of services and resources that fall under the seeding umbrella. Examples include the DARE program, Police Athletic Leagues offered by local police departments, city support for summer jobs for target area youth, VISTA volunteers placed in community organizations, the provision of social services through community centers, and many others.

Yet there was virtually no *new* federal agency seeding funds allocated to the Weed and Seed sites. Although the Bush administration had proposed spending at least 500 million federal dollars directly on seeding strategies, these funds were never authorized. Nor were federal seeding agencies such as the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Education, Transportation, and Agriculture given any official directives to support seeding activities, redirect programs funds to the target areas, or give priority to Weed and Seed sites in competition for existing programs. Yet there were many messages delivered to the sites about federal support for seeding. In Table 1 of the 1992 *Report to the Attorney General: Seeding America's Neighborhoods*, for example, in excess of 1.4 *billion* dollars are listed as the FY 1991 "federal spending for seeding programs" (p. 41) in the 19 Weed and Seed cities from the six agencies listed above.

In reality, these federal funds were for such programs as the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), Job Corps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Head Start, Community Development Block Grants, Adult Education, and the WIC Nutrition program, all of which were already allocated to the Weed and Seed cities and had no connection to the program itself. During the Bush administration, the Weed and Seed grantees were repeatedly asked to document "leveraged" funds for weeding and seeding activities. This exercise led to such extreme situations as the Pittsburgh site reporting over $100 million in leveraged seeding funds, mostly for housing rehabilitation and new construction in or around the target area that was planned years before Weed and Seed was created, and the San Diego site tracking and reporting 19 private sector

contributions between $13 and $260 for a 10K run through the target neighborhood organized by the community police officers. Under the Clinton administration, this type of recording exercise has eased and more program emphasis and funds have been directed toward seeding in the second program phase, but no additional federal monies, outside of the Weed and Seed grants and programs specified above and herein, were allocated to the existing sites during this first program period.

The most serious consequence of these misleading federal messages was that community distrust of "another federal program" was multiplied in a significant number of sites. Community leaders and grassroots organizations that supported the Weed and Seed concept because of the emphasis they perceived on prevention, intervention, neighborhood revitalization, and economic development felt betrayed. Community participation in Weed and Seed activities was more difficult to achieve, and several sites spent months regaining citizen support. Regional representatives of key federal seeding agencies were reduced to explaining the real situation to angry community representatives, and limited to providing information, rather than providing substantial program support.

Finally, this situation has led to what we might call the kitchen sink of seeding -- many sites have continued to list and count every social service, every alternative program, every job opportunity in their target neighborhoods as part of the seeding end of their Weed and Seed program. It has prevented the national evaluation from accurately accounting for what seeding has been supported or truly spurred by the Weed and Seed endeavors.

Asset forfeiture. Early in the Weed and Seed initiative, the Department of Justice altered asset forfeiture policy to enable real property forfeited according to federal law because of connections with illegal activity to be transferred to private non-profit organizations for use in support of the Weed and Seed program. The new transfer authority has led to the application of seized and forfeited property to seeding uses, including transferring ownership of buildings directly to community organizations and renovating seized property with forfeited money to be sold to low-income neighborhood residents. This policy has resulted in permanent assets in several target communities, including three buildings now owned by community organizations in Philadelphia and used to house Safe Havens, organization activities, and victim/witness services. In other sites, forfeited property has remained in the hands of law enforcement officials but has been used to benefit the community directly.

Training and technical assistance. The following training and technical assistance programs were to be offered to the Weed and Seed sites:

- Community Policing -- training and technical assistance to law enforcement and housing officials to implement community policing.

- Wings of Hope -- training and technical assistance to be provided by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to implement effective strategies for drug-free, safe environments in the Weed and Seed target areas.

- Operation PAR (Parental Awareness and Responsibility) -- training and technical assistance to provide comprehensive drug treatment services to offenders on probation and parole.

- National Conference of Black Mayors -- to train mayors to better understand the purposes and goals of Weed and Seed and aid implementation.

- National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise (NCNE) -- to help community groups participate in Weed and Seed and to establish anti-drug programs.

- DARE.

- Business Alliance program -- to establish business alliance programs and to enhance its drug-free workplace assistance program.

- National Crime Prevention Council -- to provide training and technical assistance in community organizing.

- National Organization for Victim Assistance -- to provide training and technical assistance to expand or supplement existing victim assistance programs.

- Workshops for the promotion of prosecutorial strategies, for local prosecutors, U.S. Attorneys, and Weed and Seed coordinators.

The extent of technical assistance provided was not formally tracked, but it is apparent that the sites received less training and technical assistance than originally envisioned.

Seeding Programs, Activities, and Services

Table 6-1 presents a list of 68 seeding activities and programs and information on the number of sites where they are found in the target area. These seeding activities and programs may or may not have been fully or partially supported by Weed and Seed grant funds; this information is provided on a site by site basis in Table 6-2 located at the end of this chapter on pages 82-86. The Seeding Programs Checklist completed by the sites was the central source of information. Supplemental data gathered through interviews and program materials were included as well, because three sites never returned the Checklist and others checked only the activities and programs receiving Weed and Seed grant funds. (In the latter situation, the services and programs already in existence in the target neighborhoods were not represented in a few sites -- San Diego, for example, originally checked just five activities, all supported by Weed and Seed funds, while

Philadelphia, for example, checked 54 seeding activities, most of them not supported by Weed and Seed funds.) The case studies in Part 2 of this report also reflect the seeding information gathered through interviews and program materials.

Table 6-1
Prevalence of Central Seeding Activities

Name of program or activity[1]:	Number of sites present in[2]: (N=19)
Substance abuse services and programs:	
TASC and other diversion programs	4
DARE	15
Race Against Drugs	3
Drug rehabilitation and treatment programs	11
Substance abuse referral programs	12
Prevention and education	19
Alternative activities for youth:	
Boys and Girls Clubs	16
Safe Havens and similar programs	19
Police Athletic League	9
Scouting	4
Summer camps	12
Sports clubs	10
Midnight basketball and similar programs	12
Cultural and entertainment programs	16

[1]These programs or activities are present in the target neighborhoods. Most are not supported directly by Weed and Seed funds.

[2]This information was drawn from several sources, including the Seeding Programs Checklist completed by the sites, on-site interviews, and program materials. A site-by-site listing is contained in Table 6-2 at the end of this chapter, and indicates which activities are fully or partially supported by Weed and Seed funds.

Health and nutrition:

Food providers network	6
WIC services in the target area	11
Pediatric AIDS service	2
Hot meals or similar for seniors	10
Health clinic locations in target area	10
Farmers market	4

Jobs and jobs training:

Summer and/or after school jobs for youth	14
Job placement	12
Skills training	13
Self-employment programs	5
Entrepreneurship training	12
Youth employment for reclamation and revitalization	10
Step-up Program I	7
Job fairs	8

Improved access to services:

Reference manuals	13
Locating multi-service centers in target area	10
Other centralized sources of information	10

Education and personal and family development:

Head Start Programs	9
GED preparation	12
Tutoring	13
Incentives for graduating from high school	7
Academic enrichment programs	11
Science and computer education	8
Career awareness and guidance counseling	10
Basic education and personal skill development	15
Parenting, family, and child development	14
Role modeling and mentoring	14
Teen leadership development	13

Victim assistance and protective services:

Victim/witness assistance	15
Victim/witness assistance for domestic violence I	12
Victim advocacy	9
Programs for latchkey children and elderly	7

Community crime prevention:

Wings of Hope anti-crime and drug programs	1
SOS Crime Watch	2
Neighborhood watch and block watches	15
Anti-drug marches and vigils, citizen patrols, reporting, etc.	12

Homeownership:

Rehabbing seized property for affordable housing	5
Rehabbing abandoned property for affordable housing	6
Low interest loans	10
Training in homeownership and crime prevention skills	11

Renovation, rehabilitation and redevelopment:

Property acquisition and renovation	9
Community clean-ups and community gardens	16
Housing authority redevelopment projects	8
New housing or commercial development	6
Incentives to property owners for making improvements	7
Intensified code enforcement	12
Streamlined eviction processes	6
Improve appearance and security of property	9
Remove visible signs of disorder	8
Capital improvements and neighborhood restoration	12
Local business partnerships for economic revitalization	8
Designation of State or Federal enterprise zones	9

Overview. Two broad categories of seeding strategies were originally identified by federal program planners -- (1) prevention, intervention, and treatment services, and (2) neighborhood revitalization and economic development. The central categories within prevention, intervention, and treatment services displayed in Table 6-1 are substance abuse service and programs, alternative activities for youth, health and nutrition, improved access to services, personal and family development and education, victim assistance and protective services, and community crime prevention (which also links to neighborhood revitalization efforts). Neighborhood revitalization categories include jobs and jobs training, homeownership, and renovation, rehabilitation, and redevelopment efforts.

Seeding activities and programs aimed at prevention/intervention (with the exception of health and nutrition services) were more prevalent in the target areas than neighborhood revitalization and economic development activities. Weed and Seed grant funds were much more apt to be directed to discrete prevention/intervention activities

than revitalization efforts, although planning for these latter activities was commonplace among agency-dominated seeding committees.

The top nine seeding activities in terms of the percentage of sites they are found in and their broad seeding category (P/I = prevention/intervention, NR = neighborhood revitalization) are:

Prevention/education activities	100%	P/I
Safe Havens	100%	P/I
Boys and Girls clubs	84%	P/I
Cultural/entertainment activities	84%	P/I
Community clean-ups	84%	NR
DARE programs	79%	P/I
Basic education and skill developm't	79%	P/I
Victim/witness assistance	79%	P/I
Neighborhood/block watches	79%	P/I

The nine least commonly found seeding activities are:

Self-employment programs	26%	NR
Rehabbing seized property	26%	NR
Farmers Markets	21%	P/I
Scouting programs	21%	P/I
TASC programs	21%	P/I
Race Against Drugs programs	16%	P/I
Pediatric AIDS Services	11%	P/I
SOS Crime Watch programs	11%	P/I
Wings of Hope	5%	P/I

[Note: We reiterate that no particular seeding activities or programs were required to be implemented, and the implementation of some programs, such as the Race Against Drugs, was intended to be limited.]

Additional information about activities and programs within seeding categories is provided below. The case studies also add details for programs within sites.

Substance abuse services and programs. All of the Weed and Seed target neighborhoods report serious problems with drug abuse, in addition to problems of drug dealing and drug-related crime, and each has dedicated some of its seeding effort to new or expanded substance abuse prevention, intervention, and/or treatment programs. Prevention and education services are most common, offered by every Weed and Seed site. These prevention and education services take a tremendous variety of forms, including counseling, classes covering the effects and consequences of drug use, support groups, peer resistance exercises, help with reading, and a number of

prevention/education activities also subsumed under the aegis of other programs. For example, Safe Havens and Boys and Girls Clubs typically provide prevention services in the form of alternatives, sports, mentoring, tutoring, and the like.

With the exception of a few sites, substance abuse treatment services were not expanded in the target neighborhood as a result of the Weed and Seed program. The only sites to devote Weed and Seed dollars directly to treatment services were Chelsea, Madison, Pittsburgh, and Seattle. In Chelsea, a full-time substance abuse treatment professional was hired to provide bilingual, bicultural treatment services on demand. Alcohol and other drug treatment was provided to target area women and children in Madison. In Pittsburgh, inpatient detoxification and outpatient care was provided to adolescents, most of whom reportedly used alcohol and/or marijuana. TASC (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime; an alternative title used by some programs is Treatment Alternatives for Special Clients) programs were also found in a small number of Weed and Seed sites.

DARE programs, in which uniformed police officers teach drug education classes typically to 5th or 6th graders, were commonplace in the Weed and Seed sites. The central aim of DARE classes is to teach youth techniques to resist peer and other pressures and help them refrain from drug, alcohol, and tobacco use. Some Weed and Seed grant funds were used to support several DARE programs.

Race Against Drugs. The Race Against Drugs (RAD) is a national drug education and prevention program supported by the National Child Safety Council, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and over 20 American motor sports organizations. RAD is designed as an in-school program, with activities designed to complement existing curricula. Using a motor sports theme, children between 10 and 12 participate in activities designed to promote general health, fitness, and safety, and encourage positive peer selection and team building. Drivers and crew members from leading motor sports organizations visit the school, and youth may attend racing events and participate in activities that bring motor sports and drug prevention together (e.g., essay writing). Prizes and scholarships are awarded to winning students.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance provided grant funds to RAD to have the program implemented in four Weed and Seed sites. The RAD central office estimates that 1300 youth were involved in the program in the four Weed and Seed sites through middle schools and a college preparatory academy in Seattle, Kansas City, and Richmond, and through the Eastern Branch Boys and Girls Club in Washington, D.C.

Alternative activities for youth. All of the Weed and Seed sites included alternatives for youth within their seeding strategies, and the majority devoted a portion of grant funds to them, typically through small grants made to community organizations and others sponsoring the alternatives.

Safe Havens. Safe Havens were founded in each site through a major grant given to Cities in Schools, Inc., by BJA, HUD, and the Department of Education. Cities in Schools (CIS) is a non-profit organization dedicated to the development of public-private partnerships for coordinated service delivery. Safe Havens, originally planned as facilities within schools, are designed to be multi-service centers where a variety of youth and adult services -- including education, family assistance, law enforcement, health, and recreation services -- are co-located in a facility that is protected against crime and illegal drugs. Providing alternative and support activities for high-risk youth and their families and coordinating service delivery are central Safe Haven objectives.

Each Weed and Seed site received a $95,000 grant from CIS to support a Safe Haven in the target neighborhood. The Trenton Weed and Seed program received additional funds for Safe Havens. Safe Havens were the central component of their 1991 Weed and Seed pilot program, and Safe Havens have been opened in schools near all four target neighborhoods in Trenton.

In location, structure, staffing, and activities offered, each Safe Haven was individually designed to meet the needs of the target neighborhood population and adapt to local conditions. Perhaps the most common structural change from CIS' original vision of Safe Havens is that few of them are located in schools. Schools were envisioned as existing, secure, non-threatening facilities in which to house Safe Havens. Many sites, however, encountered difficulties in obtaining space due to the cost and need for after-hours security and janitorial services. Each Trenton Safe Haven, for example, has three regular staff, two security guards, and one community police officer; Richmond found the cost of security and limited hours allowed by the schools prohibitive and moved Safe Havens into rent-free churches. Safe Havens in other sites are located in public housing buildings and community, youth, and recreation centers. These latter facilities tend to have the special spaces needed, from quiet rooms to basketball gyms, and are open after school, many evenings, and weekends.

Other structural arrangements were made to accommodate local conditions and decisions. In Philadelphia, for example, four community or public housing organizations were a formal part of the seeding strategy, and the $95,000 CIS grant was split among them. This resulted in small-scale Safe Havens located at three community centers and one public housing building, offering a variety of tutoring, recreational, cultural, and athletic activities.

Some Safe Havens, such as that operated by Fairhill Housing in Philadelphia, focus on elementary school children. Others, such as Santa Ana's, serve adolescents and young teenagers. The number of children and youth participating in Safe Havens is not available from all sites. Typically, however, hundreds of kids use the Safe Havens over a long period, with a smaller core group participating regularly.

It is difficult to summarize activities across sites, but most Safe Havens offer an

after-school facility where children and youth go to complete homework and participate in sports and recreational activities. A few sites offer only these activities. Others offer additional activities in addition to homework help, sports, and recreation, such as cultural activities, mentoring, summer camps, field trips, parent education, peer counseling, and conflict resolution.

Several Safe Havens have become truly multi-service centers, offering a wide variety of needed services and programs. Re-locating or establishing services in Safe Havens that were formerly housed elsewhere has taken longer to achieve than providing education and alternatives to local youth, but there are many successful experiences. Services for families in need, such as the WIC program, health services, emergency food and clothing, and employment referrals are often found. Some Safe Havens have incorporated scout troops, Boys and Girls Clubs, academic enrichment programs, gang prevention programs, community crime prevention programs, and other drug prevention-related programs into their facilities; see, for example, Chelsea and Santa Ana. Trenton's Safe Havens are older than the others, and present a well-rounded approach to the Safe Havens concept, as described in the case study. A number of the Safe Havens also provide meeting space for community organizations and support groups.

Boys and Girls Clubs. The majority of the Weed and Seed sites had Boys and Girls Clubs located in or near the target neighborhoods, with at least five them partially supported with Weed and Seed grant funds. The Boys and Girls Clubs of America received Weed and Seed funds to establish Clubs in public housing in Weed and Seed sites. The Clubs provide children with the opportunity to engage in organized recreational, educational, sports, social, and vocational activities outside of school.

Other alternative activities for youth. Other popular alternative activities for youth are sports, scouting, summer camps, and cultural and entertainment activities, as shown in Table 6-1. Half of the sites have active Police Athletic League programs, often an extension of community policing and involving community police officers. Midnight basketball, where basketball teams composed of target neighborhood youth play official league games in the late night and very early morning hours, exists in several sites. Young men in their late teens and early 20s often participate in these basketball leagues.

A few sites offer sports and other activities for specific target groups. For girls only, for example, the Omaha program has organized a Girl Scout troop and taken one sizable all-girl group on a fishing expedition, and one Philadelphia group has organized an all-girl drill team. In Chicago's Ida B. Wells housing complex, the community police officers organized horseshoe tournaments popular among the older male residents.

Cultural and entertainment programs run the gamut, from cultural arts and theater projects to teen dances to trips to local attractions.

Health and nutrition programs. Health and nutrition programs -- aiming at basic

prevention and health promotion -- are found locally in about half of the target neighborhoods. Aid to Women, Infants, and Children (the WIC program) and health clinics are found in over half the sites. These services may be found in Safe Havens or other multi-service centers, typically offered on a limited basis. Health clinics, for example, may be open one evening a week at a Safe Haven location. The federal Department of Agriculture sponsors the WIC programs and helped organize Farmers Markets in several Weed and Seed sites.

Jobs and job training. Job referral and skills training of many kinds were emphasized in a majority of the Weed and Seed sites, although direct funding of these activities was rare. Actual job placement and the creation of new jobs were difficult objectives given the economic status of the target neighborhoods. Where it occurred it occurred on a small scale.

Older teenagers and young adults were often the main targets of the efforts to find jobs and provide job training; several sites offered the same to parolees, probationers, and ex-gang members. Summer jobs for youth were provided by a number of sites, often applying youthful energy to neighborhood clean-up and reclamation efforts. Skills training ranged from the most basic job readiness skills (basic employer expectations, how to write an application, how to approach an interview, etc.) to skills training in contemporary fields such as video, radio station management, and computer repair.

Several innovative jobs programs were introduced in target areas by Weed and Seed programs. One is the Step-Up Program, sponsored by the Department of Labor, which provides employment and training opportunities to public housing residents and other low income persons in diverse working environments, often on neighborhood revitalization projects. Another is Operation Clean Sweep, in which youth are hired to do reclamation and revitalization jobs in the target neighborhood. In Madison, a private sector initiative, Future Madison, appears quite promising. Several major businesses and local banks purchased six apartment buildings. With Community Development Block Grant funding, they hired a good management company and are supporting local residents through NEON (see below) wherever possible to rehabilitate them; similar efforts are planned for the future. The Madison police department also worked with a major local employer to establish a plan in which the company will hire and train 6 to 10 target neighborhood residents yearly. The department is working to expand this Neighborhood Employment Opportunities Network (NEON) to other interested companies.

Improved access to services. Improving target area residents' access to services includes the development of service directories, typically done by seed coordinators, and providing centralized sources of information regarding available services and assistance, often at Safe Havens and the multi-service centers described below.

Safe Havens in many sites provide a neighborhood-based "one-stop" facility for providing residents with needed social and other services. In several sites, in addition to a Safe Haven, centers were created within the target areas to house multiple services for area residents. These multi-service centers are designed to be permanent resources for residents and may house services not typically found in Safe Havens.

A Criminal Justice Service Center was opened in the Ida B. Wells public housing complex in Chicago's Weed and Seed site. The Criminal Justice Service Center houses the TASC program, an office of the Safer Foundation which provides skills training to residents, probation officers, and Weed and Seed coordinators. Located behind the Wells police substation, the Center provides an unusually good opportunity for police and probation personnel to share information and work together. Multi-service centers in Madison's two target areas offer referral services for residents, recreation, neighborhood organizing, public safety, and public health assistance. Atlanta's Weed and Seed program had planned similar centralized "One Stop Shop" facilities on the periphery of each target housing development, but a variety of obstacles have delayed their implementation.

A variety of seeding activities, including a cycling club, basketball league, neighborhood block parties, neighborhood clean-ups, and graffiti removal, are operated out of Denver's storefront community centers, designed as neighborhood mini-stations for community policing purposes. Other community policing mini-stations, such as Philadelphia's mobile van, also service as multi-service centers in the target neighborhoods.

Personal and family education and development. Education for personal and family development was viewed as primary prevention by the Weed and Seed sites, and many supported a variety of programs in that area. These programs included established programs such as Head Start, GED programs, and traditional tutoring. Some of the innovative programs include those which emphasize science, computer, and media knowledge and skills; programs which combine tutoring with mentoring, prevention education, personal growth experiences, career exploration, and other social and cultural enhancements (as in Santa Ana's Adopt-A-Kid program); and the vast variety of parenting and personal education provided to families and residents. Just a few of these are conflict resolution training, youth leadership classes, and self-esteem libraries.

In some target areas, neighborhood youth have had very limited experiences. Santa Ana's target neighborhood is maybe eight miles from the beach but some children there have never seen the ocean. To expand youthful horizons and give them some incentives for continued participation in prevention programs, children in some sites were taken on field trips to wilderness areas and entertainment parks. A "one-of-a-kind" development experience offered to a group of Atlanta target area kids was a formal sit-down dinner.

Victim and witness assistance and protective services. Victim/witness assistance and advocacy services bring together the areas of seeding and prosecution. The majority of the Weed and Seed sites felt victim/witness services were key elements of their program, and a few sites included special victim/witness assistance staff on their Weed and Seed team. Victim/witness assistance for domestic violence was a part of seeding in over half of the sites, and some sites included domestic violence prevention and education in their family development programs. Special protective services were also created for latchkey children and senior citizens.

Community crime prevention. Community crime prevention programs exist in most of the sites, with neighborhood and block watches being the most common form. High intervention strategies such as marches, vigils, citizen patrols, and surveillance and reporting efforts have also become more commonplace as drug dealing and drug-related crime have motivated citizens to action. Many of these efforts pre-date the Weed and Seed program but have received financial help from the grant funds and technical support from community policing teams. In Philadelphia, for example, grassroots community organizations received grant funds to support two staff. One worked as a community organizer, continuing and expanding the anti-drug activities already underway, and the other worked hand-in-hand with the community police officers.

Community policing and community crime prevention efforts tend to be closely linked in the Weed and Seed sites. Community police officers provide training to community organization staff and volunteers, participate in the direct activities, provide security where needed, educate citizens and businesses in prevention strategies, and help with community outreach to increase citizen involvement in prevention efforts. Community police officers routinely attend community meetings to share information and provide assistance. The flip side of this equation is the help target area residents provide to the police, through community police officers and directly to patrol and narcotics officers. Citizens provide information on drug dealing locations and individuals, report crime incidents, and monitor hot spots.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference was funded to provide Weed and Seed sites with training and technical assistance to develop a Wings of Hope program. The Wings of Hope Anti-Drug programs aim to create community-police partnerships to develop and implement community-based strategies to reduce crime, violence, and the demand for illicit drugs, with a special focus on diverse populations in high-risk neighborhoods. At least one Weed and Seed site, Fort Worth, has a Wings of Hope program.

A note on community empowerment. Community empowerment is an objective in many community-based anti-drug and anti-crime efforts, and Weed and Seed is no exception. Community empowerment is also a phrase with many meanings, but the notion usually refers to neighborhood residents having the knowledge, power, and ultimately resources to get community needs met -- knowing where and how to get

assistance if needed, having the power to get things done in their community, and ultimately having the wherewithal to take care of things themselves.

Another phrase bandied about in community-based programs is citizen involvement, which was also desired in Weed and Seed sites. As discussed early in this report and this chapter, citizen involvement in planning and early decision-making was nearly absent due to the timing of grant announcements and proposal due dates and the means by which the Department of Justice left the decision-making reins solely in the hands of U.S. Attorneys and city officials.

Yet several sites made notable strides in true citizen involvement and community empowerment. At times, these strides were the result of residents pushing the grantees to change the program structures that resulted from the grant letting process. Some of these sites accorded decision-making powers to seeding committees dominated by community representatives and gave them the authority to award and monitor grants for seeding activities. Some of the sites provided leadership and management training to neighborhood residents and, in the face of vocal community resentment, continued to work with residents until they felt an integral part of the Weed and Seed process. The sites that stand out in this regard are Fort Worth, Philadelphia, San Diego, and Seattle.

Homeownership. Strategies to increase homeownership for low income families were not commonplace in the Weed and Seed sites. As shown in Table 6-2 at the end of the chapter, providing low-interest loans, providing training to neighborhood residents, and rehabilitating seized and abandoned properties are strategies implemented to increase homeownership.

Renovation, rehabilitation, and redevelopment. Neighborhood revitalization through renovation, rehabilitation, and economic development, although stymied by the lack of substantial financial support, was a clear objective of the Weed and Seed programs and there were signs of progress. Simple and (relatively) low cost neighborhood improvements through community clean-ups, converting vacant lots to gardens, and environmental design changes aimed at crime prevention (improved lighting, graffiti removal, abandoned car towing, etc.) were the most common renovation efforts. These efforts often involved a wide swath of individuals -- residents, community police officers, steering committee members, and youth -- with equipment and contributions donated by local businesses. Several sites approached neighborhood clean-ups and physical changes with unique crews of high-risk youth, ex-gang members, or parolees. One site even assigned a "chain gang" of local jail prisoners to a target area clean-up.

Civil remedy approaches to drug and crime problems were also instituted in a number of sites, in which building and safety codes were enforced and drug-involved tenants were evicted. The buildings given to the communities through new asset forfeiture policies have already been discussed.

It has not been possible to gauge progress in planning, coordinating, and developing promising economic development strategies, but it is clear that much is underway in some sites. Private Industry Councils and similar groups in Madison, Philadelphia, and several other sites are working with seed committees to spur economic development. Half of the target areas are within state enterprise zones.

Finally, major redevelopment projects are underway in a number of the Weed and Seed sites, including Chelsea, which has benefitted, oddly, from going bankrupt). The planning and funding of these new housing starts and capital improvements, for the most part, pre-date the Weed and Seed programs.

Table 6-2
Seeding Activities by Site[1]

	Substance abuse Services and programs						Alternative activities for youth							
	TASC	DARE	Race Against Drugs	Treatment programs	Drug referral programs	Prevention and education	Boys & Girls Clubs	Safe Havens	Police Athletic League	Scouting	Summer Camps	Sports Clubs	Midnight Basketball	Cultural/ Entertainment programs
Atlanta		✓				✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓
Charleston		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Chelsea		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
Chicago	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Denver	✓					✓	✓	✓				✓		✓
Fort Worth	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Kansas City		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓						
Madison		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓			✓		✓	
Omaha		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Philadelphia		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Pittsburgh		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					
Richmond			✓			✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓
San Antonio	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
San Diego				✓		✓		✓				✓	✓	✓
Santa Ana		✓				✓	✓	✓						✓
Seattle		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓		✓	✓
Trenton		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓
Washington, DC		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓
Wilmington					✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓

[1]Shaded areas represent activities supported directly in full or in part with Weed and Seed grant funds.

Table 6-2 (p.2)

	Health and Nutrition						Jobs and jobs training							
	Food providers network	WIC	Pediatric AIDS service	Meals for Seniors	Health Clinic	Farmers Markets	Summer/ after school jobs	Job Placement	Skills training	Self-employment programs	Entrepreneuership training	Youth jobs revitalization	Step-up	Job Fairs
Atlanta														
Charleston	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓
Chelsea	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓					✓
Chicago	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Denver					✓				✓		✓			
Fort Worth		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Kansas City	✓											✓		
Madison		✓					✓	✓				✓		
Omaha		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Philadelphia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pittsburgh					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
Richmond		✓					✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		
San Antonio	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
San Diego				✓										
Santa Ana							✓	✓	✓				✓	✓
Seattle		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			
Trenton		✓					✓					✓		✓
Washington, DC				✓					✓		✓	✓		
Wilmington		✓		✓	✓		✓				✓		✓	✓

Table 6-2 (p.3)

	Improved access to services			Education and personal and family development										
	Service directories	Multi-service centers	Centralized information sources	Head Start	GED Prep.	Tutoring	Graduation Incentives	Academic enrichment programs	Science/ Computer education	Career counseling	Personal skill development	Parenting and child development	Mentoring	Teen Leadership development
Atlanta											✓			
Charleston	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Chelsea					✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
Chicago	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Denver						✓							✓	✓
Fort Worth	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Kansas City														
Madison	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
Omaha	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
Philadelphia	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pittsburgh	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Richmond	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
San Antonio	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
San Diego	✓							✓						
Santa Ana	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Seattle	✓				✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Trenton								✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Washington, DC		✓									✓	✓		✓
Wilmington	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓						✓	✓	✓

Table 6-2 (p.4)

	Victim assistance & protective services				Community crime prevention				Homeownership			
	V/W assistance	Domestic violence (V/W)	Victim Advocacy	Special population programs	Wings of Hope	SOS Crime Watch	Neighborhood/ block watch	Marches, vigils, patrols, reporting	Rehabbing seized property	Rehabbing abandoned property	Low-interest loans	Training in homeownership
Atlanta	✓											
Charleston	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓
Chelsea	✓	✓				✓	✓					✓
Chicago	✓	✓	✓					✓				
Denver	✓						✓					
Fort Worth	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓
Kansas City	✓	✓	✓				✓			✓		
Madison		✓		✓			✓				✓	✓
Omaha	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Philadelphia	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pittsburgh	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Richmond							✓	✓	✓			
San Antonio	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
San Diego		✓						✓				
Santa Ana	✓						✓				✓	✓
Seattle							✓	✓				
Trenton	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Washington, DC												
Wilmington	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓			✓	✓

Table 6-2 (p.5)

	Renovation, rehabilitation and redevelopment											
	Property Acquisition/ renovation	Clean-ups, gardens	Housing Auth. Redevelopment	New housing/ commercial development	Incentives for improvements	Intensified code enforcement	Eviction proceedings	Improve appearance/ security	Remove visible signs of disorder	Capital improvements and restoration	Economic revitalization through partnerships	State/Fed. Enterprize Zones
Atlanta	✓	✓										
Charleston		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓				
Chelsea	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓		✓		✓
Chicago		✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Denver		✓										
Fort Worth		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Kansas City	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓			
Madison	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Omaha		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Philadelphia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pittsburgh		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Richmond		✓								✓	✓	✓
San Antonio	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		
San Diego						✓						✓
Santa Ana	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Seattle												
Trenton	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓				✓		
Washington, DC		✓								✓		
Wilmington	✓											

Chapter 7
Conclusions and Recommendations for the Future

From a federal blueprint which set program goals and objectives, outlined program structure and management, and listed the type of weeding and seeding activities to be implemented, each of the 19 Weed and Seed sites developed a customized program for their unique target communities. Although these communities varied dramatically in size, number per city, demographics, and severity of crime and drug problems, and each city's history of interagency law enforcement cooperation, community policing, and community empowerment differed, each was given the same level of federal funds along with the same guidelines manual. Thus, diversity among sites was more common than uniformity. Yet despite the differences across sites, and, in some instances, due to these differences, a number of important lessons can be distilled from the Weed and Seed demonstration programs.

Chapters 2 to 6 of this volume are cross-site summaries presenting the central findings of the process evaluation in each of the major program elements of program characteristics, law enforcement, prosecution, community policing, and seeding. In this final chapter, we present overall conclusions about the Weed and Seed concept and these major program elements. Because the national evaluation has focused on program implementation and processes and our resources have placed limitations on the methods used, we cannot make conclusions about the effectiveness of the Weed and Seed concept at this stage. In most instances, the conclusions made below are grounded in the commonalities we saw among programs. Yet for every finding or conclusion made, there is typically an exception or two, or even more, due to the diversity among programs. There are also scores of "promising approaches", such as Madison's Joining Forces for Families and Fort Worth's cross-training for patrol officers, that are innovative and promising strategies that seem to strengthen the local program and which are worthy of a deeper look. These noteworthy practices are often idiosyncratic to one site, and can be reviewed in the case studies. This report ends with recommendations to improve and strengthen the implementation and operation of Weed and Seed-like programs, with an eye to providing information to policy makers and practitioners at federal, state, and local levels that will help launch and sustain prevention and enforcement programs in troubled neighborhoods.

Conclusions

Is the Whole Bigger than the Sum of Its Parts?

Throughout this report we have described the Weed and Seed program processes element by element. Yet the Weed and Seed Initiative is not just a collection of disconnected program elements. It has an overarching philosophy and management structure that brings together the seemingly disparate program elements, such as

intensive arrest practices and a prevention orientation, into an approach that promises more than the individual elements could on their own.

One of the important messages delivered by the Department of Justice in its design and shepherding of the Weed and Seed Initiative is that there is no one approach to resolving a community's crime and drug problems. Rather, these seemingly intractable problems are best addressed in a comprehensive fashion, involving all professionals and lay people concerned with these problems (from narcotics officers to prevention specialists to concerned parents) and the full range of interventions from prevention to incarceration. Comprehensive, community-based programs such as the Community Partnership Program and *Fighting Back* are demonstrating this collaborative, inclusive model in the prevention realm. The Department of Justice has taken the model one step further, advocating a holistic, concentrated approach that holds the promise of long-term positive change.

In the context of the current heated policy debate over whether to provide funding for incarceration or prevention, the Weed and Seed program serves as a demonstration that the sensible answer is both. If nothing else, the Weed and Seed sites have demonstrated the sensibility and promise of this dual approach, embodied by community policing, where law enforcement officials and neighborhood residents work together to understand and resolve a community's crime problems. Community policing is the bridge, the hub, the tie that links enforcement and prevention.

Simply put, much of what we observed in the demonstration sites that was good would not have happened without the Weed and Seed Initiative. Groups of people who ordinarily do not talk to each other -- such as prosecutors and community residents, police officers and recreation directors -- came together to solve problems, share resources, and coordinate their efforts. The reasons and capacity for getting together existed prior to Weed and Seed, but the motivation and vehicles for doing so resulted from the program's implementation. Perhaps one of the lingering legacies of the Weed and Seed program will be ongoing coordination and collaboration among key groups, such as the federal and local law enforcement officials, federal and local prosecutors, social service and law enforcement agencies, municipal offices and private businesses, and community residents and all levels of government agencies. Since many of the key coordinators and leaders are permanent staff in these agencies, these powerful relationships may continue. Community policing and community prosecution efforts, if they adhere to their oft-spoken principles, have undeniable appeal and promise.

Finally, despite the problems in federal funding of seeding activities, several communities discovered the resources within themselves to launch a number of significant prevention and restoration efforts. It is unlikely that they would have done this so quickly without the focus and coordination offered by the Weed and Seed program.

Program Context and Organization

The nineteen sites we studied were all found to have implemented the Weed and Seed program, although exactly what they did and how they did it varied tremendously. The sites offered a very broad range of settings for demonstrating the Weed and Seed initiative. The population of the largest of the cities (Chicago) is almost two orders of magnitude greater than the smallest (Chelsea). Some sites have long-standing, extremely serious crime problems, like Philadelphia and Washington, D.C.; for others, like Madison, crime is a more recent concern. Similarly, the size and demographic characteristics of the target neighborhoods vary widely, as does the seriousness of crime and other problems. The Weed and Seed program in the Ida B. Wells public housing development faced a rather different set of challenges than the program in Chelsea, Massachusetts.

Program emphasis also varied widely, from mostly weeding to mostly seeding to mostly community policing, and the programs that "seemed to work" were not limited to just one of the categories. In the federal guidelines and in the perception of many of those involved in early implementation activities, weeding was believed to be required before effective seeding activities could take root, as it were. A few sites (notably Seattle), did not accept this belief and placed little emphasis on weeding and rather jumped right into seeding and further expansion of community policing strategies. Some program representatives, including a number of those from the target communities, hold the view that *all* that is needed is seeding -- that successful prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood revitalization will make weeding unnecessary. We hasten to add that there are other community representatives who believe their residents had become virtual prisoners in their homes, and were grateful to be rescued by weeding efforts which they took as indications that police were now ready to take their neighborhood and its problems seriously. Some of these areas were starved for police service -- and one of the major complaints with police has not been harassment but the fact that their problems were not addressed.

One variant of the Weed and Seed concept is a kind of empowerment model that made use of small, active, continuing community-based committees ("neighborhood partnership teams", etc.) to maintain ongoing liaison between citizens in the target area(s) and key program participants -- community police teams, seeding coordinators, U.S. Attorney office representatives, etc. Several of these established neighborhood-based Weed and Seed offices -- store-front locations in the target neighborhood that provided a tangible, visible reminder of the program and a central point for access to services. In other sites, Safe Havens and multi-service centers offer similar services.

Most sites went through a transition process from initial implementation (or proposed implementation) of a program closely modeled after the federal guidelines to something quite different in structure and/or program emphasis. Often modifications were in response to negative reactions from people in the target neighborhoods, resulting

in increased seeding funding, a de-emphasis on weeding, and increased citizen participation and authority in oversight committees. A wide range of organizational structures and management approaches were used, most of them departing from the original plans, which turned out to be unworkable or unsuited to local circumstances. Whether the U.S. Attorney was more or less actively involved does not appear to have been a critical factor. What did seem to matter was continuity in program management and accountability wherever it was located (the U.S. Attorneys office, Mayor's Office, Police Department, or elsewhere). It appeared that programs that had the most problems were those with ineffective people or significant turnover in key positions. The flip side of this can be seen in other sites -- where program strategies were expeditiously and effectively implemented and coordination and communication were high, due, in part, to the dynamic, experienced, effective, and well-regarded individuals in significant management positions.

Most of the sites were initially organized along the lines of the federal guidelines, with a steering committee overseeing two subcommittees, one concerned with coordinating weeding and the other directed toward planning and implementing seeding activities. Typical evolutionary paths were to expand the steering committee to include more community representatives, to decrease the size of these committees to some form of executive steering committee, to delegate more power and authority to seeding committees, and to designate separate individuals as lead staff over weeding and seeding. In some cities, steering committees and weed subcommittees got smaller and met less often as the program continued, less weeding was done, and more emphasis was placed on seeding.

Most of the programs had slow and rocky beginnings for a number of reasons, including the following: (1) problems with organizational infrastructure -- cumbersome city government bureaucracies, elaborate contracting rules, etc.; (2) phasing problems such as the need to complete a storefront or other facility, reliance on the implementation of Safe Havens to provide seeding programs, etc.; and (3) disagreements with BJA about how funds could be used, particularly the initial limitations placed on the percentage of federal funds that could be allocated toward seeding.

U.S. Attorney's offices were instrumental in the planning and implementation of the Weed and Seed program in many sites. Their involvement facilitated interagency cooperation, and appeared to help in getting the comprehensive program underway expeditiously. U.S. Attorney involvement -- sometimes in the person of the appointed U.S. Attorney, other times from respected staff, especially LECCs -- also contributed to focusing attention and resources on weeding rather than seeding.

Law Enforcement

In most sites federal and local law enforcement agencies forged working relationships that members of the various agencies viewed as valuable and successful

undertakings. Cooperation with agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was particularly noteworthy in several sites; extensive cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration, on the other hand, was less common. It would be useful to monitor some of these new relationships over time to see whether they outlast the Weed and Seed program and the turnover of personnel. Perhaps the effects will be longest lasting in those sites where the interagency efforts continued through the life of the project rather than in those sites where the interagency efforts occurred primarily in the first week of the project.

Most of the law enforcement strategies employed familiar tactics of enforcement and investigation, yet their use was enhanced by interagency collaboration, targeted enforcement, additional personnel, coordinated direction, and state-of-the-art technology. The central change due to Weed and Seed was in the level of enforcement that was achieved due to additional funds for overtime, additional officers, buy money, equipment, and interagency coordination.

In some sites, citizens complained about the intense involvement of the police in the community, arguing that it was unequal distribution of justice and even harassment. Yet other citizens argued that it was only the trouble makers who were protesting. In Fort Worth, police video-taped a group who complained at a City Commission meeting and used the film to later demonstrate to the commission that the protestors were also visible as suspects or arrestees in video tapes of drug operations. Many neighborhood residents welcomed the weeding efforts with open arms.

Law enforcement efforts resulted in thousands of arrests in the target neighborhoods, with charges ranging from minor, non-drug-related misdemeanors to federal racketeering violations. The number of arrests per site ranged from 149 to 8477 over the 18-month demonstration period; three sites reported over 5,000 arrests. Across sites, 44% of the arrests were for violent crimes or felony drug crimes. Yet differences in target area size and problems, law enforcement policies and criteria, and program philosophies make cross-site conclusions unwise at best.

There are at least six observations about enforcement approaches that merit mention:

- There were sites that used video taping effectively to increase the strength of their buy/bust cases and to document and analyze problems at drug dealing sites.

- The sites that included probation and parole officers in the weeding efforts reported significant satisfaction with this partnership.

- The cross-training in narcotics enforcement of all patrol personnel working the Weed and Seed area in Fort Worth seems to have been a highly effective investment of resources. Without having to wait for special units, personnel

familiar with the area could learn of a drug problem and often act against it within the same shift. Residents were aware of and impressed with the swiftness of the police response.

- In several sites, enforcement and community policing were successfully integrated, either because the same officers performed both functions or because there was a close working relationship between community policing and enforcement personnel.

- Enforcement efforts appear to be more acceptable to the community when they are done in the context of community policing. Community residents in troubled areas welcome the efforts to clean up their streets when they have reason to believe that the efforts are conducted by police who know and care about the area and its people.

- There is anecdotal evidence to support the proposition that enforcement efforts are both more efficient and effective in a community policing context. Community policing officers and residents have information about the problem areas and problem people that enforcement personnel who are not integrated into the community cannot as easily obtain.

Prosecution

In 1990, Harvard University's *Executive Session for Local District Attorneys* advocated several new professional roles that local prosecutors should aspire to in an effort to adopt a holistic approach to crime control in the community. If adopted, this change could entail a sharp departure from the traditional DA functions as *pure jurist* (i.e., concern with efficiency and equity in case processing), and *sanction setter* (i.e., reliance on punishment and price of crime to effect deterrence). The three new roles encouraged at the 1990 session were that of *problem solver* to control crime at its source and to marshall full range of available enforcement/regulatory tools to do so; *strategic investor* to expand professional boundaries of the position to areas previously untouched by DA's (e.g., community groups) to build long term crime reduction boundaries; and *institution builder* to leverage the first two roles to improve the vitality of full range of local institutions (e.g., family unit, schools, commercial community).

From the perspective of local prosecutors interviewed for this study, it is fair to say that some of the underlying principles of the Weed and Seed program dovetail with the evolving role of the modern-day prosecutor, as set forth by Harvard's Executive Session for Local District Attorneys, and, in fact, help facilitate this genesis. Perhaps the most encouraging conclusion drawn from the local prosecutors and U.S. Attorneys interviewed is that participation in the Weed and Seed program often evoked levels of interagency collaboration that had not been attained prior to the program's implementation. Further, local and federal prosecutors expressed a deeper

understanding of viewpoints of the general public, as well as other law enforcement agencies with regard to local crime problems. In some cases, the imposition of the Weed and Seed program "forced" interagency relationships that, were it not for the program, might not exist at all. Predictably, in some cases, pre-existing agency parochialism was impossible to overcome. However, in other instances, both interagency participants of steering committees and the local community became grateful beneficiaries of the introduction of the collaborative forces induced by the Weed and Seed program.

Questions persist, however, on how well the Weed and Seed programs were orchestrated in acknowledging the importance of the role of the local prosecutor in helping to galvanize the efforts of key program participants toward the achievements of program goals. Through the eyes of some local prosecutors, not enough energy was expended by U.S. Attorney offices on the type of team building that, intuitively, would have solicited the participation of local prosecutors from early planning stages to the final stages of execution of Weed and Seed programs. A most striking continuity of responses is that many local prosecutors did not feel part of the local Weed and Seed "team" either because they saw their role as being subtly trivialized by program leaders, or overtly omitted from critical decision-making participation (e.g., site selection, planning). Exacerbating these feelings, according to local prosecutors, was a perceived denial of the reality that the vast majority of Weed and Seed cases would inevitably be processed not by U.S. Attorneys, but by local DAs themselves. In some cases, the absence of funding that could be used as a supplement to actively prosecute these cases served to further lower any enthusiasm local prosecutors might have for the Weed and Seed program.

The extent to which the most violent and problematic offenders were removed from target neighborhoods is unknown. Of the thousands of Weed and Seed arrest cases that were prosecuted, the majority were reported as pending at the end of the demonstration period. Over 95% were prosecuted by local district attorneys, many of them in locations in which jail caps and prison overcrowding may limit the length of sentences even where convictions were obtained. Yet it is also certain that a number of criminals were convicted under federal law and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Anecdotal evidence and some reported crime statistics in a small number of sites indicate some measure of success in offender removal.

Community Policing

Across the sites, community policing appears to have been a positive experience for both the community and the police agencies engaged in it. In cities or neighborhoods that experienced it for the first time (e.g., the target areas in Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Chicago), both residents and police reported vastly improved relationships and citizens commented both on improved service delivery and on improved conditions in the neighborhoods. In Chicago, when a gap in funding led the Housing Authority Police Department to disband the community policing unit, intense

pressure from the community led to its reinstatement. In Fort Worth, when an Anglo police officer was shot, the African-American community he served was outraged and organized itself to support the officer's family. Police said it was "a good thing citizens hadn't got their hands on the assailant." This was in an area where officers used to respond to calls in groups of four and five officers because they feared the community. In Omaha, prosecutors noted the contributions of community policing to better cases.

In some sites, citizens complained about the intense involvement of the police in the community, arguing that it was unequal distribution of justice and even harassment. Yet other citizens argued that it was only the trouble makers who were protesting. In Fort Worth, police video-taped a group who complained at a City Commission meeting and used the film to later demonstrate to the commission that the protestors were also visible as suspects or arrestees in video tapes of drug operations.

The Weed and Seed program appears to have helped spread and reinforce the idea of community policing. It was the impetus for beginning community policing in some communities and was the reason for expanding community policing roles in some cities that had already initiated community policing. The "weeding" emphasis on enforcement in the target areas caused community policing officers to become more involved in enforcement efforts than they might have without this emphasis, and the experience helped demonstrate that enforcement efforts can be enhanced by close contacts with the community and that enforcement (or protection) and service are not necessarily incompatible policing functions.

In fact, it is our impression that either is most effective when paired with the other. When citizens attend community meetings, the officers they prefer to meet and discuss issues with are the ones who actually deliver services in their community. The speaker from the chief's office or the community service office of the police department is not "their" cop. Whether enforcement is accomplished by the persons designated as community policing officers or by patrol officers or special units who work closely with the community policing officer, enforcement appears to be more effective as a result of the combined role or the collaborative effort. Effective and efficient enforcement relies on accurate information about problem people and problem areas, information which good community policing officers possess or can quickly elicit from citizens. In addition to being more effective and efficient, enforcement appears to be more acceptable to the community when citizens understand that it is being done in response to the concerns they have expressed about problems and is being done by officers who know the community and share their concerns about conditions there. It appears that community policing can make the difference between enforcement that feels like it is conducted by an occupying army and enforcement that feels like it is conducted by a concerned community caretaker.

Seeding Strategies

By and large, seeding strategies focused on primary prevention for young kids and intervention activities with older kids. Primary prevention activities include those incorporated in Safe Havens, drug education efforts (e.g., DARE), tutoring, recreational and cultural alternatives, and the like. Prevention/intervention activities include those of the Boys and Girls Club, organized sports of all kinds (e.g., Midnight Basketball, soccer leagues, etc.), job readiness training, summer employment, recreation, arts and crafts, mentoring, and educational enhancements. Treatment services were not expanded by Weed and Seed, with the exception of one site.

Neighborhood revitalization and economic development strategies were present in a number of sites, but most were either (1) not a result of Weed and Seed, but were initiated and funded prior to this program; or (2) in the early planning and coordination stages. Community clean-up was common. Leveraged funds for major seeding strategies (such as housing renovations) during the grant period were rare. A very small number of sites focused on coordinating and enhancing the delivery of social and other city services, and a smaller number concentrated on empowering the community.

Federal agency involvement in seeding was minimal. Seeding funds promised by the Bush administration were never allocated, and there was no federal directive to encourage agencies such as HUD, Labor, and HHS to become involved in seeding activities. As a result, (1) federal seeding coordination paled in comparison to federal weeding coordination and (2) seeding services were the primary responsibility of city agencies (and in cities with financial problems, the target areas received little). Generally, new funds available for seeding-type of activities seemed dwarfed by the seriousness of the target neighborhoods' drug and social problems, extent of physical deterioration, and severe economic depression.

Seeding committees, in the main, began as suggested by federal guidelines, heavy with weeding-type agencies and a few social service agencies on Neighborhood Revitalization Coordinating Committees. Many were weak and ineffectual, and either slowly died away or were reconstituted to fit local conditions. The central change in effective efforts was to place more community representatives and residents on the committees and grant the seeding committees more decision-making authority.

Safe Havens were implemented in each site and similarly functioning multi-service centers were opened in a few. In the full-blown version of these centers, such as is found in Trenton, these programs promise to bring many needed services to distressed neighborhoods, such as after-school tutoring and activities for youth and health clinics and nutrition classes for families.

Recommendations

Program Structure, Context, and Organization

Without impact data, it is difficult to make recommendations concerning the size, number, and type of target areas for which the Weed and Seed concept is most suited. Intuitively, with large and/or multiple target sites, one expects diluted treatment as federal funds and staff time are spread thinner. It *may* be wise to start the program in a single, manageable neighborhood and expand as resources allow.

It has been said many times that it is critical to bring the right people "to the table" from the start, as the program is planned and implemented. This is true for the Weed and Seed program. Representatives from the district attorney's offices and target neighborhoods were those most often left off the start-up team. Future endeavors of this type should include these key representatives. As several Weed and Seed sites learned, neighborhood residents must be included in the early processes -- it is counter-productive to continue to thrust federally-designed programs on neighborhoods without bringing the target population into the process early.

With the above recommendation in mind, we also see the U.S. Attorney's Office as an appropriate leader of the Weed and Seed effort (this is not to preclude individual circumstances where other officials might be equally effective). The U.S. Attorneys' leadership ensured quick starts, multi-level interagency coordination, and official sanctions needed for proceeding with the intensive enforcement efforts.

We recommend staffing patterns include separate weed and seed coordinators. It appears best that these individuals be knowledgeable people with existing working relationships with other key representatives rather than new hires.

Federal program management caused a number of serious problems for the sites that in some cases took months to remedy. Sites were stymied by gaps in funding, inconsistent messages about how the money could be spent, and federal guidelines concerning program leadership and committees. The national evaluation was hindered by a late start and subsequent inability to enforce uniform data collection. These problems in large federal grant programs are not new or unique, but as they are repeated again and again, we again make the following recommendations:

- Promises made about funding and neighborhood improvements should be delivered, or not made in the first place.

- The level of funding should be known from the start and not changed between the time of the solicitation and the time of grant award, and demonstration programs should not be funded in uncertain increments. Program continuity is better achieved when a program is planned to run (for example) for three years, with each annual grant award made as a result of demonstrated progress.

Requirements that lead to lengthy proposals on an annual basis should be drastically streamlined.

- Continue to structure guidelines with enough flexibility to enable communities to do what they think is needed within their neighborhoods, as they will do it anyway.

- Begin the evaluation before the program starts, require uniform data collection as well as funds to collect them and closely monitor the collection, and provide evaluation funds commensurate with program funds and the level of effort required.

Law Enforcement

Based on the experiences of those involved in the Weed and Seed weeding efforts, interagency committees or task forces consisting of all relevant federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies are highly recommended to support and coordinate these efforts. In the planning and early implementation efforts, these committees are probably best staffed with high level representatives from these agencies. Over time, those involved with day-to-day operations may capably carry out the weeding strategies. A substantial portion of Weed and Seed funds went to support overtime for police officers, enabling them to conduct more intensive weeding strategies than would otherwise be the case. Mechanisms must be considered to enable these types of intensive tactics to be launched.

Further work should be done to document the enforcement efforts that were innovative and were reported by the sites that used them to have been particularly effective. For example, special case reports on the cross-training in Fort Worth, the pairing of probation/parole officers with patrol or community policing officers in several sites, the use of video tapes, the truancy program in Charleston, and the no-tolerance enforcement in Santa Ana could be produced. The details of implementation and evidence of effectiveness of the individual tactics were beyond the scope of this present report but could be of substantial value to other cities that are unfamiliar with details of such efforts. Additional research on the overall quality of arrests, final disposition of cases, community response to weeding, community impact, and protection of individual rights is also recommended.

Prosecution

If local prosecutor reports are accurate, the lack of recognition of the powerful role prosecutors could play in the Weed and Seed program was only one part of a larger problem that, if left unaddressed, could hinder the effectiveness of the implementation of future Weed and Seed operations. Reports of a lack of local prosecutor role appreciation, public skepticism regarding Weed and Seed site selection, and interagency

inconsistencies in the definitions of Weed and Seed case criteria raise serious concerns about the extent and quality of planning for change that went into Weed and Seed program development.

A meaningful lesson that can be learned from local prosecutor responses is the danger of minimizing the importance of the creation of a collaborative climate in the execution of such an unconventional concept as the Weed and Seed approach. Obviously, in locations where long term working relationships had already existed among local crime control agencies, collaborative climate development efforts were not as essential to Weed and Seed program success. But, generally, it must be assumed that successfully linking the interests of historically competing agencies into a collaborative team will, ordinarily, be a formidable feat. It is therefore incumbent upon Weed and Seed program leaders to explore mechanisms, with the help of team participants, that promote an enthusiastic unification in pursuit of *common* Weed and Seed objectives rather than individual agendas. Such a unification must be built upon a mutual trust that acknowledges the professional roles of all team participants. Failure to include key participants in decision-making activities, even unintentionally, can erode that trust and lead to resistance and the closing of lines of communication necessary to reach agreement on such fundamental issues as the definition of criteria used for identifying exactly what constitutes a Weed and Seed criminal case.

Peeling back the many layers of information obtained through local DA and U.S. Attorney interviews, it becomes apparent that a central consideration Weed and Seed leaders should have is how to not only supply *philosophical* support for the program, but how to most effectively supply *structural* support as well. Based upon prosecutor responses, productive collaboration within the Weed and Seed teams is associated with high program performance. On the other hand, competitive climates and the pursuit of individual agendas within Weed and Seed teams are associated with less than satisfactory results according to district and U.S. attorneys.

The recommended path that the Weed and Seed program should take is to examine methods for enhancing the sense of empowerment local prosecutors can have within the formal structure of Weed and Seed teams. The most dramatic shift that would help ensure prosecutor support to the program would be to recognize the local prosecutor's role by financially supporting their work. This would represent an acknowledgement of the functionary effects of the program on the prosecutors to the same extent it acknowledges the effects on the role of the local police. Beyond this, it is recommended that formal, standardized awareness programs be fashioned for respective Weed and Seed leaders that promote effective team developing skills.

The emphasis of such a program would be on how to effectively plan and execute a Weed and Seed team approach that allows *all* participating agencies to assume an active part in shaping the destiny of the team's efforts. Leadership of such a participatory team would clearly be more than just putting a "spin" on the Weed and

Seed collaborative approach. It would open the way for local prosecutors to genuinely fulfill their function as local problem solver, strategic investor, and institution builder by making them feel connected to the mainstream of the Weed and Seed program. Most important, it would help instill self-confidence in them, encouraging them to take appropriate risks in the name of the program and, in short, to become effective Weed and Seed leaders themselves.

For the future, local prosecutors have the power to play a central role in generating information that can enlighten the criminal justice community on exactly what effects prosecution of Weed and Seed cases has on criminal activity in Weed and Seed areas. Such information could include insight into prosecutorial decision-making leading to the prosecution of Weed and Seed cases, rates of convictions in these prosecutions, and types and lengths of sentences ultimately served by Weed and Seed offenders. This valuable data could, eventually, be linked to offender follow-up information to help gauge levels of recidivism and the extent to which offenders commit subsequent offenses in Weed and Seed locations. Regrettably, we presently have little knowledge on these subjects. Local prosecutors equipped with resources to generate data on the aforementioned indicators can be instrumental in answering pivotal questions on Weed and Seed program outcome.

Community Policing

Based on observations across sites, a model community policing effort would share a number of characteristics. Both citizens and police should be trained in community policing concepts and skills, including leadership and organizing skills. Police personnel should possess a sense of "ownership" of the area they serve, achieved by assigning officers to neighborhoods for long periods, recruiting police officers as residents, or other means.

Community policing officers may be responsible for the full range of police service or work in close cooperation with personnel who handle calls and enforcement activities. Having one supervisor or manager responsible for all these functions within a geographic area would help ensure such service integration. Community policing personnel should also work closely with other service providers and enforcement personnel in the area (e.g., probation officers, social workers, public health workers, school personnel). Community policing principles and practices should be advocated and supported by the police department and city government, with appropriate recognition, compensation, and room for advancement incorporated.

Community policing strategies -- whether they involve neighborhood-based stations, foot patrols, attending community meetings, or other proactive activities -- should enable citizens to know the police personnel who serve their area, and to work with police and other agencies to identify and resolve area problems.

Seeding

Prevention, intervention, and treatment services and neighborhood restoration are vital to the Weed and Seed concept. It is recommended that a number of steps be taken to encourage and support the types of activities seen in the target neighborhoods. Direct federal funding for a long but limited length of time is one approach, but additional emphasis should be placed on re-directing existing and leveraged federal, state, local, and private funds to target neighborhoods that need them most. This strategy is integral to the Weed and Seed concept as designed; while it was not successfully implemented in the demonstration programs, it appears that time and the new program guidelines may make this strategy a reality.

The dual approach of prevention and restoration within seeding appears to be on target and should be continued. The target neighborhoods need both prevention, intervention, and treatment services to curb the demand for illicit substances, and the physical environment and infrastructure of these neighborhoods -- so clearly connected with neighborhood crime and the cycle of deterioration -- require amelioration.

Training and technical assistance for neighborhood residents in leadership, community planning, and program management is suggested to spur empowerment and ownership of the community's problems *and* solutions. Leaving an empowered citizenry behind when program funds and national attention end will ensure that the important legacies of Weed and Seed are continued.

In Closing...

The Weed and Seed initiative has brought together many of the best ideas and proven strategies for drug prevention and enforcement, policing, partnerships, and neighborhood revitalization that have been articulated and tried over the past decade. We are supportive of the continued expansion of the initiative to funded and, through the recognition program and independent local efforts, unfunded sites.

The sites have much to learn from each other, and we believe additional vehicles are needed to share information among existing sites as well as disseminate the information to other interested jurisdictions. A working conference structured to enable new sites to learn from existing ones, a technical assistance program that encourages site visits among programs, and the development of strategies to disseminate promising approaches to all sites in a timely manner are recommended.

This primarily descriptive account of the implementation and operations of nineteen demonstration sites provides an overview of what has been accomplished in the first phase of the program. The Weed and Seed programs offer the criminal justice and substance abuse prevention fields with fertile opportunities to test and assess the many facets of the Weed and Seed concept, as well as evaluating the impact of the

comprehensive program. We are strong advocates of additional research on these programs and the strategies they encompass.

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Appendix A

Instruments

Weed and Seed National Evaluation
Weed and Seed Coordinator
Interview Protocol

Site:_____
Date of interview:_____
Name of respondent:_____
Position:_____

REVIEW AND VERIFICATION OF DATA FROM ROUTINIZED FORMS

- Target area characteristics.
- Resources provided by member agencies.
- Resources provided by other sources.

TASK FORCE FORMATION AND COMPOSITION [*Ask the following for each policy level task force, steering committee or coordinating committee.*]

1. What was the process by which this task force was formed? Who was involved in selecting members?

2. Are there any groups or agencies not represented on this task force that you think should be? [*If so*] Why are they not included?

3. Do you think some members are especially essential to the success of the Weed and Seed project? Which ones? Why?

ROLES

4. What do you see as the major role(s) of the U.S. Attorney in this project?

5. Do you consider the U.S. Attorney the overall leader of this initiative? If not, who is? Is your opinion commonly held?

6. What difference do you think the involvement of the U.S. Attorney has made?

7. Has the involvement of the U.S. Attorney led to greater inter-agency coordination and collaboration?
8. Have there been any particular problems associated with the U.S. Attorney's involvement in this project?

9. What effect if any has the political transition had on the Weed and Seed project? [*This question needs to be tailored to specific local events -- particularly, whether the U.S. Attorney has changed.*]

PROGRAM PLANNING

10. What do you see as the central purpose of the Weed and Seed project; what are you trying to accomplish?

    [*Probe*] In the short term:

    [*Probe*] In the long term:

11. Who was involved in developing the weeding strategies? To what extent were the plans developed by:
    Local and state law enforcement officials?
    Federal law enforcement officials?
    Others?

12. Would you say the planning was a largely collaborative effort, or was it dominated by one or two people/agencies?

13. What about the seeding strategies? Who have been the lead agencies/individuals in deciding what programs to include?

14. To what extent and in what ways were residents of the target area(s) and/or other citizens involved?

15. Why was __(area)__ selected as a/the target area for this program? What about that area makes it especially suitable for Weed & Seed? [*Ask for each target area.*]

16. If you had it to do over again, how would you suggest changing the planning process? What would make the process work better?

IMPLEMENTATION AND INITIAL EFFECTS

Weeding

17. What is your own opinion of the weeding strategies? Do you think they had the intended effect? Why (not)?

18. What has the initial response to weeding been on the part of the residents of the

target area? On the part of other citizens, community groups, the local media, etc.?

Community Policing

19. How much progress has been made so far in implementing community policing in the target area(s)? (Was in place already before Weed and Seed? No plans to implement community policing? No progress, but planned? Well under way?)

[*If some degree of progress:*]

20. What has been the community response to this initiative?

21. Have citizens become more involved in law enforcement efforts? How? Have they become more cooperative with the police?

22. Have the police become more involved in community affairs? How?

23. Have police and citizen relations noticeably improved with the introduction of community policing?

24. Materials describing the Weed and Seed initiative often refer to community policing as a "bridge" between weeding and seeding. What do you take this idea of "bridging" to mean?

Seeding

[*Begin by identifying the major (or some sensible subset of all) seeding strategies/activities/programs. For each of these:*]

25. At what stage are you now with respect to this activity? (Early planning, development, initial implementation, well under way, has long history pre-dating W&S, etc.)

[*Note: re-word following questions as necessary to fit current stage of activity. E.g., is/was; will/did, etc.*]

26. What is your opinion of this activity as a component of the Weed and Seed strategy? Do you think it is the right thing to be doing? Will it help significantly? Is it a waste of money?

27. Is it being adequately funded? If not, what can/should be done?

FINALLY

28. Describe any unexpected positive or negative outcomes associated with the Weed and Seed initiative. [*Probe: for example, complaints about civil rights violations, infusion of private sector funds. . . .*]

29. What is your overall assessment of the value of Weed and Seed as a model for urban crime control and neighborhood revitalization?

30. [*If it is worth replicating elsewhere*] What are some of the main points, key elements, or important lessons to emphasize in communicating the results of this demonstration to communities planning their own Weed and Seed initiatives?

31. We plan to survey some community leaders who are both well informed about the Weed and Seed initiative here and in a position to report on the opinions of area residents. Can you suggest some people you think would be good sources?

Weed and Seed National Evaluation
Task Force Members
Interview Protocol

Site:_____
Date of interview:_____
Name of Weed and Seed task force:_____
Name of respondent:_____
Agency or group affiliation:_____

TASK FORCE FORMATION AND COMPOSITION

1. When were you appointed to this task force:_____

2. How did you come to be selected to serve on this task force?

3. Are there any groups or agencies not represented on this task force that you think should be? [*If so*] Why are they not included?

4. Do you think some members are especially essential to the success of the Weed and Seed project? Which ones? Why?

5. [*If not already mentioned*] What about the U.S. Attorney?

ROLES

6. What do you see as your role(s) on this task force? [*Probes: coordinate W&S with own agency/group; help obtain financial support; lend credibility. . .*]

7. What do you see as the major role(s) of the U.S. Attorney in this project?

8. Do you consider the U.S. Attorney the overall leader of this initiative? If not, who is? Is your opinion commonly held?

9. What difference do you think the involvement of the U.S. Attorney has made?

10. From the point of view of your agency, has the involvement of the U.S. Attorney led to greater inter-agency coordination and collaboration?

11. Have there been any particular problems associated with the U.S. Attorney's involvement in this project?

12. What effect if any has the political transition had on the Weed and Seed project? [*This question needs to be tailored to specific local events -- particularly, whether the U.S. Attorney has changed.*]

TASK FORCE FUNCTIONING AND DYNAMICS

13. In what ways has this task force affected your working relationships with other agency representatives on the task force: for example, has it led to more collaboration, cooperation or sharing of information?

14. How much and what kind of interaction do you have with other task force members? Has this changed as a result of the Weed and Seed project?

15. Would you say that the Weed and Seed project has made your job and the work of your agency easier? more difficult?

PROGRAM PLANNING

16. What do you see as the central purpose of the Weed and Seed project; what are you trying to accomplish?

    [*Probe*] In the short term:

    [*Probe*] In the long term:

17. Do you think these goals are appropriate? feasible?

18. Who was involved in developing the weeding strategies? To what extent were the plans developed by:
    Local and state law enforcement officials?
    Federal law enforcement officials?
    Others?

19. Would you say the planning was a largely collaborative effort, or was it dominated by one or two people/agencies?

20. What about the seeding strategies? Who have been the lead agencies/individuals in deciding what programs to include?

21. To what extent and in what ways were residents of the target area(s) and/or other citizens involved?

22. Why was _(area)_ selected as a/the target area for this program? What about that area makes it especially suitable for Weed & Seed? [*Note: ask for each target area.*]

23. Who was involved in making the decision to target _(area)_? [*Note: ask for each target area.*]

24. If you had it to do over again, how would you suggest changing the planning process? What would make the process work better?

IMPLEMENTATION AND INITIAL EFFECTS

Weeding

25. What is your own opinion of the weeding strategies? Do you think they had the intended effect? Why (not)?

26. What has the initial response to weeding been on the part of the residents of the target area? On the part of other citizens, community groups, the local media, etc.?

Community Policing

27. How much progress has been made so far in implementing community policing in the target area(s)? (Was in place already before Weed and Seed? No plans to implement community policing? No progress, but planned? Well under way?)

[*If some degree of progress:*]

28. What has been the community response to this initiative?

29. Have citizens become more involved in law enforcement efforts? How? Have they become more cooperative with the police?

30. Have the police become more involved in community affairs? How?

31. Have police and citizen relations noticeably improved with the introduction of community policing?

32. Materials describing the Weed and Seed initiative often refer to community

policing as a "bridge" between weeding and seeding. What do you take this idea of "bridging" to mean?

Seeding

[*Begin by identifying a small number of seeding strategies/activities/programs with which respondent is at least reasonably familiar. For each of these:*]

33. At what stage are you now with respect to this activity? (Early planning, development, initial implementation, well under way, has long history pre-dating W&S, etc.)

[*Note: re-word following questions as necessary to fit current stage of activity. E.g., is/was; will/did, etc.*]

34. What is your opinion of this activity as a component of the Weed and Seed strategy? Do you think it is the right thing to be doing? Will it help significantly? Is it a waste of money?

35. Is it being adequately funded? If not, what can/should be done?

FINALLY

36. Describe any unexpected positive or negative outcomes associated with the Weed and Seed initiative. [*Probe: for example, complaints about civil rights violations, infusion of private sector funds. . . .*]

37. What is your overall assessment of the value of Weed and Seed as a model for urban crime control and neighborhood revitalization?

38. [*If it is worth replicating elsewhere*] What are some of the main points, key elements, or important lessons to emphasize in communicating the results of this demonstration to communities planning their own Weed and Seed initiatives?

39. We plan to survey some community leaders who are both well informed about the Weed and Seed initiative here and in a position to report on the opinions of area residents. Can you suggest some people you think would be good sources?

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR WEEDING APPROACHES

NAME OF RESPONDENT:
ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION OF RESPONDENT:
RESPONDENT'S POSITION RELATIVE TO TACTICS:
SITE:
ADDRESS:
RESPONDENT'S PHONE NUMBER:
RESPONDENT'S FAX NUMBER:
DATE AND TIME OF INTERVIEW:
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW:
INTERVIEWER:

THIS RESPONDENT IS #__ OF __ SEPARATE RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED ABOUT WEEDING TACTICS DURING THIS SITE VISIT.

INTERVIEWER: I would like to begin with a general discussion about the combination of approaches that are being used to accomplish "weeding" in your target areas. According to the documents we have reviewed, this community planned to do the following:

(LIST WEEDING STRATEGIES)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

OTHER:_____

_____

_____

1. Is there anything we have missed, or that has been developed since the proposal was written, that you would add to this list?

   YES 1
   NO 2

   IF "YES," What are those? (INTERVIEWER ADDS TO THE LIST.)

2. Are there any of these approaches or tactics that were initially proposed that have not been used here?

   YES 1
   NO 2

   (FOR EACH TACTIC THAT IS LISTED AS NOT HAVING BEEN USED, THE INTERVIEWER WILL ASK WHY THAT TACTIC WAS NOT

3. How was this particular combination of approaches selected? Who in the department was involved in planning it? What, if any, role did citizens or other agencies play in the selection of the approach? What kinds of data, if any, were used? What information, if any, was provided by other agencies?

4. Many of the individual approaches we will discuss in greater detail depend on close cooperation among a number of agencies, organizations, or community groups that have a tradition of working rather independently in many cities. How would you describe the experience here in getting these various entities to cooperate? Have you found any significant difference between the commitment to cooperate at the tops of the organizations and the degree of cooperation that has occurred at the operational level? What have you done to encourage/promote greater cooperation?

5. Would you please identify for me the other agencies, organizations, or community groups that are involved in community policing under this grant and give me the names and telephone numbers of the primary contact persons in those groups? (NOTE: THIS MAY BE SOMETHING THE RESPONDENT PROVIDES IN WRITING THAT THE INTERVIEWER WILL FILL IN AFTER THE INTERVIEW SESSION.)

AGENCY	NAME	TELEPHONE

Now I would like to ask a series of questions about each of the major community policing approaches you have identified. If, for any of these, you feel there is someone in this organization or in another organization that could provide more extensive information, please feel free to refer me to that individual.

9. Was this an approach with which the department had experience prior to the funding of Weed and Seed?

YES 1
NO 2

10. If "YES," for how long had you been using this tactic before the Weed and Seed program began?

_____ months/years

11. Is this an approach that is used in an on-going way, is it conducted periodically, or was it used for some period of time but is not being used now?

On-going 1
Periodic 2
Not used now 3

12. Who are the personnel (division, unit, experience, etc.) who conduct this tactic?

13. Did the personnel involved in this tactic receive any special training?

YES 1
NO 2 [SKIP TO Q. 15]

14. Please describe the training. How many hours of training was given? What topics were covered? Who provided it?

15. Is there (any/any other) training that you would recommend in preparation for this tactic?

16. What are the resources needed to implement this tactic? (e.g., equipment, personnel, money)

17. Have the necessary resources been available to you?

YES 1
NO 2

18. Are other department, agencies, citizens groups or individuals supposed to be participating with the Department in this particular approach?

YES 1
NO 2 [SKIP TO Q. 23]

19. If "YES," what are they?

20. FOR EACH AGENCY LISTED: Has this joint participation worked as anticipated? (PROBE)

AGENCY	PARTICIPATION AS ANTICIPATED? NO	YES
_____	1	2
_____	1	2
_____	1	2
_____	1	2
_____	1	2
_____	1	2

21. What, if any, have been the problems of coordination?

22. What, if any, have been the advantages of coordination?

23. How effective do you feel this tactic is proving to be?

Very effective 3
Somewhat effective 2
Not effective 1

24. How would you characterize any community response to this approach? (PROBE FOR WHETHER THE LEGALITY HAS BEEN QUESTIONED, WHETHER IT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED AS OVERLY AGGRESSIVE, DISCRIMINATORY, ETC.)

TACTIC TWO: _____

1. Now I would like to discuss: (tactic).

2. (ALL THE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FIRST TACTIC ARE REPEATED FOR THIS SECOND WEEDING TACTIC AND FOR AS MANY OTHERS AS HAVE BEEN NAMED.)

INTERVIEW CLOSING:

AFTER ALL THE TACTICS KNOWN TO THE INTERVIEWER HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED, THE INTERVIEWER THAN ASKS:

1. We have now discussed (number) different approaches to weeding. What, if any, problems have you seen in terms of conducting many of them simultaneously—either in terms of resources, coordination, or complimentarily of goals?

2. If you could choose to conduct only one of these tactics, which you choose for its effectiveness?

3. Which would you choose for ease of implementation and management?

4. Which would you choose as being the most acceptable to the community?

5. Is there anything else you feel this organization has learned in the process of designing and implementing weeding efforts that you would like to pass on to other agencies?

THANK YOU

AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE

"Weed and Seed" Program Questionnaire:
The Local Prosecutor and "Weed and Seed" Planning, Development, and Implementation

I. "WEED AND SEED" PLANNING/DEVELOPMENT

1. To what extent was the DA's office made part of "Weed and Seed" planning and implementation? What did that involvement or input consist of?

2. If the local prosecutor's involvement was not solicited (or not offered), why was this the case?

3. How did prosecuting agencies (e.g., U.S. Attorney, State Attorney General, District Attorney) interact with each other during the planning stages? During the early stages of Weed and Seed implementation? How does this compare to the interaction now?

4. What other community groups has the prosecutor's office been involved with while implementing Weeding activities? Seeding activities? What was the nature and extent of interaction with the outside organizations mentioned above?

5. What efforts has the prosecutor's office made to determine community responses to the D.A.'s Weed and Seed efforts? (Is this an issue that the prosecutor is interested in determining?)

6. Have any interagency agreements been drafted to govern interaction between prosecuting agencies and between prosecuting agencies and law enforcement agencies? Are there any official, written agreements that define what cases the local prosecutor will prosecute (versus those cases that will be prosecuted in federal court)? Have any verbal agreements been made?

7. How are Weed and Seed cases defined/designated by law enforcement? by the prosecutor's office? Do each of the law enforcement agencies involved in Weeding activities use the same definition? How were these definitions derived? Are there differences between the law enforcement and prosecutor definitions? What are the differences?

8. Are Weed and Seed designated arrests handled differently from other "conventional" arrests by the prosecutor's office? If yes, how? (processing, requested sanctions, etc.)

9. What role, if any, does the judiciary play in designing, planning, or implementing Weed and Seed activities?

4. Seed Committee:

Status (*check one*) ☐ currently active ☐ currently inactive or defunct ☐ never existed

Name of committee_____

Size of Committee (number of members)_____

Number of meetings through December, 1993_____

Date of most recent meeting (prior to 1994)_____

Membership. Indicate the number of members from each of the following. (Don't count replacements as additional members; i.e., indicate the maximum number representing an office or category at any one time.)

(number:)

_____ U.S. Attorney's office
_____ Federal law enforcement
_____ Federal agencies other than law enforcement
_____ State Attorney General's office
_____ State law enforcement
_____ State or local agencies other than law enforcement
_____ District Attorney's office
_____ Sheriff's office
_____ Mayor's office
_____ Police Department
_____ School district
_____ Local public housing authority
_____ Resident(s) of the target neighborhood
_____ Community organizations.
_____ Others (labor unions, religion, corporate sponsors, foundations, etc.)

D. Staffing

1. Project director (overall responsibility for the project)

Name of incumbent_____

Position title_____

Employed by what agency (check one:) ☐ Mayor's office ☐ Police Department ☐ Other city agency
☐ State or county government ☐ Community organization ☐ Federal agency

Percent time on W&S_____

Source of support (check one:) ☐ BJA/EOUSA ☐ Agency ☐ Other_____

In position since what date_____

Number of previous people in position since grant award_____

2. Project administrator or manager (involvement in all aspects of project, but not first echelon)

Name of incumbent_____

Position title_____

Employed by what agency (check one:) ☐ Mayor's office ☐ Police Department ☐ Other city agency
☐ State or county government ☐ Community organization ☐ Federal agency

Percent time on W&S_____

Source of support (check one:) ☐ BJA/EOUSA ☐ Agency ☐ Other_____

In position since what date_____

Number of previous people in position since grant award_____

3. Weed coordinator

Name of incumbent_____

Position title_____

Employed by what agency (check one:) ☐ Mayor's office ☐ Police Department ☐ Other city agency
☐ State or county government ☐ Community organization ☐ Federal agency

Percent time on W&S_____

Source of support (check one:) ☐ BJA/EOUSA ☐ Agency ☐ Other_____

In position since what date_____

Number of previous people in position since grant award_____

4. Seed coordinator

Name of incumbent_____

Position title_____

Employed by what agency (check one:) ☐ Mayor's office ☐ Police Department ☐ Other city agency ☐ State or county government ☐ Community organization ☐ Federal agency

Percent time on W&S_____

Source of support (check one:) ☐ BJA/EOUSA ☐ Agency ☐ Other_____

In position since what date_____

Number of previous people in position since grant award_____

5. Other staff

Not including the above four positions, how many people from each of the following are (or at some time have been) supported at least partly by W&S grant funds? (FTE's)

Mayor's office_____

Community Police officers_____

Other Police Department_____

Other city agencies_____

District Attorney's office_____

State agencies_____

Community organizations_____

Funding and support

Please provide actual or estimated amounts for the period from the beginning of the Weed and Seed grant through the end of 1993.

FEDERAL GRANT FUNDS

BJA/EOUSA funds expended for weeding

$_____ Total

Amount spent on

$_____ Police overtime

_____ Other personnel

_____ Equipment

_____ Other

BJA/EOUSA funds expended for community policing

$_____ Total

Amount spent on

$_____ Police overtime

_____ Other personnel

_____ Equipment

_____ Other

BJA/EOUSA funds expended for seeding

$_____ Total

Amount spent on

$_____ Personnel

_____ Grants to programs (pass-throughs)

_____ Other

LOCAL FUNDS AND IN-KIND SUPPORT

Local police

$_____ Total funds or in-kind provided

Amount used for

$_____ Weeding

_____ Community policing

_____ Seeding

LOCAL FUNDS AND IN-KIND SUPPORT (cont.)

City agencies other than police

$_____ Total funds or in-kind provided

Amount used for

$_____ Weeding

_____ Community policing

_____ Seeding

Local prosecution

$_____ Total funds or in-kind provided

Amount used for

$_____ Weeding

_____ Community policing

_____ Seeding

U.S. Attorney's Office

$_____ Total funds or in-kind provided

Amount used for

$_____ Weeding

_____ Community policing

_____ Seeding

Federal law enforcement agencies

$_____ Total funds or in-kind provided

Amount used for

$_____ Weeding

_____ Community policing

_____ Seeding

Federal agencies other than law enforcement

$_____ Total funds or in-kind provided

Amount used for

$_____ Weeding

_____ Community policing

_____ Seeding

City_____

LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FOR WEED AND SEED PROGRAM

1. Listed below are tactics that your agency may have used for "weeding" in your target area during the project period (June 1992 through December 1993). Please circle one response that comes closest to how extensively each tactic was used, in terms of personnel time.

		Used EXTENSIVELY	USED SOME	USED VERY LITTLE	ACTIVITY NOT USED
a.	Stop-and-search operation	3	2	1	9
b.	High visibility/Saturation patrol	3	2	1	9
c.	Reverse stings	3	2	1	9
d.	Electronic audio surveillance	3	2	1	9
e.	Electronic video surveillance	3	2	1	9
f.	"Jump out" squads	3	2	1	9
g.	"Buy-bust" operations	3	2	1	9
h.	"Controlled buys" by informants	3	2	1	9
i.	Enforcement of nuisance ordinances	3	2	1	9
j.	Enforcement of health and safety codes	3	2	1	9
k.	Enforcement of disorderly conduct laws	3	2	1	9
l.	Asset forfeiture	3	2	1	9
m.	Anti-truancy activities	3	2	1	9
n.	Search/Arrest Warrants	3	2	1	9
o.	Identification/apprehension of criminal aliens	3	2	1	9
p.	Identification/apprehension of felon fugitives	3	2	1	9
q.	Identification/apprehension of probationers/parolees	3	2	1	9
r.	Identifying and securing "trouble spots"	3	2	1	9
s.	Drug tip hot line	3	2	1	9

(5/5/94)

2. Now, which five of the "weeding" tactics you used in the target area did you find to be most effective for your weeding process? Please list the five tactics below and rank them from 1 to 5 such that *1 = Most Effective and 5 = Least Effective.*

NAME OF TACTIC		RANK
a.	_____	___
b.	_____	___
c.	_____	___
d.	_____	___
e.	_____	___

3. The list below presents some community policing activities that your department may have used in your target neighborhood during the project period (June 1992 through December 1993). Please circle one response that comes closest to how extensively each community policing activity was used, in terms of personnel time.

		USED EXTENSIVELY	USED SOME	USED VERY LITTLE	ACTIVITY NOT USED
a.	Foot patrol	3	2	1	9
b.	Bike patrol	3	2	1	9
c.	Community meetings	3	2	1	9
d.	Community organizing	3	2	1	9
e.	Door-to-door contact	3	2	1	9
f.	Problem solving tactics	3	2	1	9
g.	Community surveys	3	2	1	9
h.	Business Surveys	3	2	1	9
i.	Neighborhood police office operations	3	2	1	9
j.	Youth activities (e.g., PAL, Scouting)	3	2	1	9

4. How would you rank the effectiveness of the community policing activities you used in your target area? Please rank order these activities, assigning a number from 1 to 10, such that *1 = Most Effective and 10 = Least Effective.* Please use each number only once.

NAME OF ACTIVITY		RANK
a.	Foot patrol	___
b.	Bike patrol	___
c.	Community meetings	___
d.	Community organizing	___
e.	Door-to-door contacts	___
f.	Problem solving tactics	___
g.	Community surveys	___
h.	Business surveys	___
i.	Neighborhood police office operations	___
j.	Youth activities (e.g., PAL, Scouting)	___

5. Please provide the definition of a "Weed and Seed Case" (as used by your department), and send us a copy of the Weed and Seed arrest statistics your department kept for the project period (roughly June 1992 through December 1993).

6. Please provide the number of arrests for the following offenses in the Weed and Seed target area during the program period (June 1992 through December 1993).

TYPE OF OFFENSE	NUMBER OF ARRESTS
a. Continuing Criminal Enterprise	_____
b. Felony Drug Crimes	_____
c. Violent Crimes	_____
d. Firearms Violations	_____
e. Possession of Narcotics	_____
f. RICO	_____
g. Other Offenses	_____

7. How many of the arrestees are considered gang members?

Number of Gang Members Arrested _____

8. Please indicate the total amount (**grams**) of drugs that were seized in the target area during the program period (June 1992 through December 1993).

TYPE OF DRUG	AMOUNT
a. Cocaine HCL	_____
b. Crack	_____
c. Heroin/Morph./Opium	_____
d. Cannabis	_____
e. Hallucinogen	_____

9. Please indicate the total number of asset seizures and/or forfeitures in the target area during the program period and estimate the dollar amount of the assets.

TYPE OF ASSET	NUMBER OF SEIZURES	DOLLAR VALUE
a. Currency	_____	_____
b. Vehicles	_____	_____
c. Real property	_____	_____

DISTRICT: _____

REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF _____ 199__

DATE OF REPORT SUBMISSION: _____

NAME/PHONE OF PERSON SUBMITTING REPORT: _____

REPORTABLE CASES:	Current Month		Program Totals	
	Federal Cases	State Cases	Federal Cases	State Cases
# OF DEFENDANTS CHARGED				
# OF DEFENDANTS DISMISSED				
# OF DEFENDANTS CONVICTED				
# OF DEFENDANTS SENTENCED				
# OF DEFENDANTS SENTENCED TO PRISON				
AGGREGATE PRISON SENTENCES	Yrs. Mos.	Yrs. Mos.	Yrs. Mos.	Yrs. Mos.
TOTAL FINES (dollar amount)				
VALUE OF ASSET FORFEITURES (dollar amount)				
Offenses Charged:				
Continuing Criminal Enterprise				
Felony Drug Crimes				
Violent Crimes				
Firearms Violations				
Possession of Narcotics				
RICO				
Other Offenses Charged				

II. For each of the items checked above, please write in the name of the program/activity, or a brief description, along with the item number and letter. For activities that were supported fully or partly by Weed and Seed grant funds, please write in the amount of support provided during the period from the beginning of the grant through the end of December, 1993.

Examples:

#	Name or description of program/activity	Amount of W&S support
1b	*DARE*	$
2e	*summer camp for target area children*	$ *7500*
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$
		$

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR COMMUNITY POLICING APPROACHES

NAME OF RESPONDENT:
ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION OF RESPONDENT:
RESPONDENT'S POSITION RELATIVE TO TACTICS:
SITE:
ADDRESS:
RESPONDENT'S PHONE NUMBER:
RESPONDENT'S FAX NUMBER:
DATE AND TIME OF INTERVIEW:
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW:
INTERVIEWER:

THIS RESPONDENT IS #___ OF ___ SEPARATE RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED ABOUT COMMUNITY POLICING TACTICS DURING THIS SITE VISIT.

3. How was this particular combination of approaches selected? Who in the department was involved in planning it? What, if any, role did citizens or other agencies play in the selection of the approach? What kinds of data, if any, were used? What information, if any, was provided by other agencies?

4. Many of the individual approaches we will discuss in greater detail depend on close cooperation among a number of agencies, organizations, or community groups that have a tradition of working rather independently in many cities. How would you describe the experience here in getting these various entities to cooperate? Have you found any significant difference between the commitment to cooperate at the tops of the organizations and the degree of cooperation that has occurred at the operational level? What have you done to encourage/promote greater cooperation?

5. Would you please identify for me the other agencies, organizations, or community groups that are involved in community policing under this grant and give me the names and telephone numbers of the primary contact persons in those groups? (NOTE: THIS MAY BE SOMETHING THE RESPONDENT PROVIDES IN WRITING THAT THE INTERVIEWER WILL FILL IN AFTER THE INTERVIEW SESSION.)

AGENCY	NAME	TELEPHONE
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

Now I would like to ask a series of questions about each of the major community policing approaches you have identified. If, for any of these, you feel there is someone in this organization or in another organization that could provide more extensive information, please feel free to refer me to that individual.

3. Weed Committee:

Status (*check one*) ☐ currently active ☐ currently inactive or defunct ☐ never existed

Name of committee_____

Size of Committee (number of members)_____

Number of meetings through December, 1993_____

Date of most recent meeting (prior to 1994)_____

Membership. Indicate the number of members from each of the following. (Don't count replacements as additional members; i.e., indicate the maximum number representing an office or category at any one time.)

(number:)

_____ U.S. Attorney's office
_____ Federal law enforcement
_____ Federal agencies other than law enforcement
_____ State Attorney General's office
_____ State law enforcement
_____ State or local agencies other than law enforcement
_____ District Attorney's office
_____ Sheriff's office
_____ Mayor's office
_____ Police Department
_____ School district
_____ Local public housing authority
_____ Resident(s) of the target neighborhood
_____ Community organizations.
_____ Others (labor unions, religion, corporate sponsors, foundations, etc.)