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COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

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VOLUME ONE

National Sheriffs' Association
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Alexandria, Virginia 22314-3490

October 1995

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This publication is dedicated to the many loyal men and women who staff our nation's courts, jails, law enforcement and criminal justice agencies.

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FOREWORD

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Providing court security and the transportation of prisoners is a responsibility most often shared by the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, other criminal justice components and private security service agencies. We must all work together to ensure that justice can be administered in an environment free from the threat of danger.

I am confident our bailiffs, constables, deputy sheriffs/officers, marshals, and others charged with court security and the transportation of prisoners will find this publication a useful resource. This publication presents viable courses of action and is intended to help the total criminal justice community protect its courthouses and judicial systems.

The National Sheriffs' Association is proud to have taken the lead in the field of court security and the transportation of prisoners.



Charles B. Meeks
Executive Director
National Sheriffs' Association
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First, special recognition must be given to Bonnie Gowdy, our project monitor from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (NIJ). Dr. Gowdy, who oversees corrections and criminal sanction projects in NIJ's Criminal Justice Section, generously helped guide the project from the outset, offering support and invaluable suggestions regarding the direction the research should take. We are especially grateful for her help in developing the format in this book for the final presentation of research findings, as well as her encouragement to us to "keep on going" when we became discouraged at the massive amount of work still to be completed. For us, Dr. Gowdy has been much more than a project monitor--she has served as a true friend.

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Special recognition must be given to two teams of criminal justice system professionals who served on our Advisory Board Committee and Staff Review Committee for their dedication and perseverance throughout the development and publication of this book. Their insights into the problems involved in court security and the transportation of prisoners was invaluable.

Members of the Advisory Board Committee are: Rocco A. Pozzi, Commissioner, Westchester County Probation Department, White Plains, New York; Arne Schoeller, Senior Program Manager, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Reno, Nevada; Carolyn Kinelski, Associate Dean, University of Orlando School of Law, Orlando, Florida; Honorable John P. Forte, Justice Trial Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Roxborough, Massachusetts;

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October 1995

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

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Finally, our sincere appreciation to the countless individuals who so generously shared their knowledge and experience with us. The credit belongs to all who assisted us throughout this effort.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Scope:

The sharp rise in acts of violence in the courts, used as a means of expressing personal anger or public dissent, has caused us to re-evaluate our methods of safeguarding the judicial process and the transportation of prisoners. Attacks on the courts and other governmental facilities in recent years have ranged from minor disturbances and physical assaults to senseless acts of murder, injuries and mass destruction [see, for example, "A Typology of some Representative Courthouse Security Incidents," included in Chapter One of the full report, *Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners: A National Study*.] Many bailiffs, constables, deputy sheriffs/officers, marshals and others charged with court security and the transportation of prisoners are in some cases not fully prepared to meet this new and emerging challenge.

The potential exists for violence to occur in any court system, no matter its size or geographical location. No court system is immune from security problems or violence.

The purpose of this study is to assess the current state-of-the-art in court security and the transportation of prisoners, determine common areas where improvements ought to be made, and recommend methods for upgrading procedures for court security and

the transportation of prisoners. It has been the objective of the National Sheriffs' Association throughout this in-depth 18-month study to focus on recommendations applicable to all agencies which are responsible for court security and the transportation of prisoners, no matter how large or small the agency in terms of budget and personnel. The recommendations contained in this report are generic in nature and applicable to agencies of various sizes, depending upon the needs and resources of the agency. Our focus, as much as possible, was on practicality, suggesting procedures which, when implemented by trained personnel, would provide jurisdictions with a reasonable level of security for courts and the transportation of prisoners.

This project built upon the work NSA began in 1978 with its publication of two documents: *Court Security - A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures,* and *Court Security - Training Guidelines.* Further work in the field of court security was completed by NSA in 1991 with the publication of *Court Security Training Guidelines and Curricula.* This present study also focused on the transportation of prisoners, which in many aspects can be considered a component of an effective court security program.

While the focus of this study is on the role of sheriffs in providing for effective court security and the transportation of prisoners, since sheriffs generally have primary jurisdiction for

these duties throughout the nation, the study also provides useful information for the judiciary, law enforcement agencies and private security companies. These agencies may share responsibility for court security and the transportation of prisoners and as such, must work cooperatively with sheriffs' offices to ensure that justice can be administered in an environment free from danger.

This project is a direct result of recognition by the U.S. Justice Department's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) that improvements and recommendations may be necessary for court security measures and prisoner transportation in this violent era in which we are now living. Uniform guidelines could provide various types of courts with information to determine necessary levels of court security, the types of security measures and technology available, and the minimum steps which must be taken to safeguard people and property. This study focused on producing recommendations that could be used to develop operating standards and guidelines for sheriffs, judges and court administrators. The recommendations were derived from: an analysis of questionnaires administered to court security, probation/parole and sheriffs' personnel throughout the nation; research and an analysis of the existing literature and violent incidents occurring in courts over the past two decades; and input from the Project Advisory Board, Staff Review Committee and other criminal justice system organizations.

Methodology:

The research methodology involved these procedures:

1. An extensive review of the literature on court security and the transportation of prisoners, consisting of books; research studies; articles in professional periodicals; policy and procedures manuals from various sheriffs' offices, the U.S. Marshal's Service and courts; training manuals; catalogs of technological and security equipment; and personal correspondence between members of the NSA Project Staff and criminal justice system professionals throughout the nation.

2. Input from the Project Advisory Board, Staff Review Committee and various public/private agencies, organizations and criminal justice associations at a series of four meetings in Alexandria, Virginia, and San Antonio, Texas. Extensive reviews of preliminary project reports were conducted by members of the advisory committees and criminal justice organizations and written suggestions, critiques and materials for consideration were provided to the NSA Project Staff.

3. Three nationwide surveys to generate data on the state-of-the-art in court security and the transportation of prisoners. The objective of the surveys was to gather data to determine what needed to be included in the recommendations for improving court security and transporting prisoners. The confidential surveys were: Job Analysis Survey #1 and #2, Task Analysis Survey, and Probation and Parole Survey. Job Analysis Survey #1 and #2 contained 326 questions designed to elicit information on the priorities of court security and prisoner transport personnel in the performance of their jobs, analyzing the tasks they perform and rank-ordering the tasks in terms of importance. The Task Analysis Survey was designed to determine the existing situation in courts regarding such issues as educational levels of employees, training received, staffing patterns, job duties within the employee's span-of-control, need for additional training, and responsibility and authority for court security and the transportation of prisoners; the survey consisted of 350 questions. The Probation and

Parole Survey, consisting of 53 questions, sought both factual material and opinions regarding court security, job duties, risks and probation/parole issues.

Description of Surveys: The surveys, the primary data collecting instruments, were self-administered confidential mail questionnaires. Because of the immense variations between those to whom the questionnaires would be sent (sheriffs' office and other county law enforcement personnel, judicial services officials, and probation/parole administrators and officers), it was necessary for the NSA Project Staff to develop survey instruments that were clearly worded, substantive, and fairly simple to complete.

Several problems emerged in the initial design of the questionnaires:

- Differences in size of the agencies which would receive the questionnaires (e.g., from large metropolitan areas to rural counties);

- The need to obtain data that was quantifiable and which could be easily compared;

- The need to provide a questionnaire which did not require an overly long time period to complete on the part of agency personnel.

To overcome these problems, the NSA Project Staff decided to use a single confidential questionnaire which would be applicable to all variances between agencies rather than using an approach that tailored one or more questionnaires to the differences between departments. In order to speed the time required to complete the questionnaires and obtain quantifiable data, forced choice responses were used instead of open-ended questions. However, open-ended questions were employed in a few instances to obtain qualitative data such as the views and attitudes of respondents on specific matters.

Survey Population: The Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Task Priorities Analysis Survey was mailed in April and June 1994. Three agencies in each state and United States Territory were randomly selected by NSA Project Staff to receive the questionnaire. The questionnaire was mailed to a large, medium and small sheriff's department in each state. The return rate for the survey questionnaires was 79.27 percent.

The Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Job Analysis Survey was mailed twice - in April 1994 and in June 1994. Each survey was mailed to agency directors who were asked to have the survey completed by employees in the following job categories: bailiff, constable, court security officer, deputy, court aide, clerk of the court, court supervisor or facilities specialist.

Job Analysis Survey #1 was sent to two agencies in each state and U.S. Territory randomly selected by NSA Project Staff. Job Analysis Survey #2 was sent to three randomly selected large, medium and small agencies in each state and U.S. Territory. Both surveys contained identical questions. The return rate for the survey questionnaires was 80.38 percent.

The final survey questionnaire, Probation and Parole Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Survey, was mailed to a random sampling of probation and parole line officers chosen from the membership list of the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) by APPA executives. Due to the constraints of the project, the Probation and Parole Survey was from the outset designed to sample only a small portion of this vital component of the criminal justice system. The objective of this initial survey was to obtain preliminary data on how court security and prisoner transportation issues impact upon probation and parole line personnel. The results of this data gathering process could serve as a basic starting point for further research with a much more detailed survey instrument and larger sample population.

For the NSA survey, APPA officials sought to confirm reports that field safety is the primary concern today of probation and parole line officers and that more intensive training in safety measures is needed by officers.

To obtain a survey sample, APPA used its membership list of 3,500, which groups members by categories (e.g., Federal parole agent, state probation administrator, state parole line officer, etc.). Using the Statistical package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) protocol, APPA computer-searched its membership list to provide the names of members from each state and territory who served in line officer positions. The computer generated the names of all line officers in each state and was then asked to randomly select from among these names representatives of agencies of varying sizes, ranging from small to mega agencies. Agencies were defined by size as follows: small (0-99 full time employees); medium (100-850 full time employees); large (851-2,200 full time employees); and mega (2,201-13,000 full time employees). Survey questionnaires were mailed to 200 line officers in all 50 states and U.S. territories; 109 officers returned the completed survey forms to NSA, for a response rate of 66.06 percent.

In their review of the NSA survey analysis, APPA officials stated that this small survey held no surprises and confirmed what the Association had been hearing from its membership, i.e., that criminals on probation and parole have become increasingly violent in recent years, that personal safety in the field is the number one overriding concern of probation and parole officers, and that training in safety measures needs to be provided to officers.

The survey data was entered into a computer and analyzed with SPSS revision 6.0, with most data presented in the form of pie or bar charts. Survey questions were grouped by subject area for analysis to obtain information on such topics as: duties currently being performed by court security and prisoner transport officers; type of training provided; type of training needed; equipment provided; staffing of the court security function; background data on court security employees; responsibility and authority for the court security and transportation of prisoners functions; responsibility and authority for the extradition of prisoners; issues of concern to probation and parole officers; and priority ranking of tasks performed by court security and prisoner transport personnel.

Major Findings:

Based upon the data generated by the three surveys administered by the NSA Project Staff, the survey of the literature, interviews with court security personnel, and input from the various project advisory committees, the following major conclusions can be drawn (note: these conclusions are summaries of more detailed findings presented in the text):

1. Background of court security/prisoner transport personnel responding to the survey questionnaires: Most have attended college for at least one or two years, are males in the 40-50 age

group, and are employed by a county sheriff's office. The majority of the respondents have completed a certified training program in court security, transportation of prisoners, or the serving of civil or criminal process. The majority of court security officers have previous work experience in law enforcement.

2. Contract services: The survey questionnaires found that contract court security officers from private security firms generally are not employed outside the Federal system.

3. Training needs: Survey respondents indicated that training is most needed in the following areas: legal liabilities, legal responsibilities of supervision, firearms, vicarious liability, court functions/duties/security, the serving of civil or criminal process, and how to transport prisoners (with such training focusing on transportation in vehicles of all types).

4. Job satisfaction: The majority of court security and prisoner transport personnel who responded to the survey said they have a high job satisfaction, rating their jobs "very interesting" or "extremely interesting."

5. Probation and parole personal safety issues: The 109 probation and parole officers from small, medium and large agencies who responded to the NSA survey were most concerned about personal

safety issues. A majority felt that they should wear bullet-proof vests when conducting field work. A majority also felt that they should be permitted to carry firearms for field work and that the firearms should be issued by their agencies, which would also provide training in the use of firearms. At the same time, however, a slight majority of survey respondents believe that not all probation and parole officers should carry weapons while on duty. But the majority of agents believe that those agencies which do not have a firearms policy in effect should allow agents to carry alternative forms of protection. The majority of the agents stated that their agencies provide them with two items to enhance their safety while on the job: communications equipment and handcuffs. The majority of the agencies do not provide body armor, Mace or handguns to probation/parole agents. Since the majority of agents believe that their clients have increasingly become more violent-type offenders in recent years, they feel they need better equipment to reduce their chances of being harmed by clients.

6. Use of metal detectors: Probation and parole agents responding to the survey support the increased use of metal detectors outside courtrooms and probation/parole offices, stating that metal detectors add to their feelings of safety on the job.

7. Transportation of prisoners by probation and parole agents: A majority of the 109 probation/parole agents

participating in the survey believe uniformed officers should transport prisoners. However, most of the probation/parole agents have been required during the performance of their official duties to transport prisoners. But less than half of the survey respondents have ever received special and refresher training in prisoner transportation. Nor do most of the agencies have a vehicle that is specially equipped for prisoner transportation. While officers are required to transport prisoners, more than half of the agencies surveyed do not permit agents to submit their clients, gender appropriate, to a strip search for the agent's protection while transporting the client. It appears that probation and parole agencies are vulnerable to liability actions in the transportation of prisoners since less than half of the agencies provide training in how to transport prisoners safely, most agencies do not provide specially equipped transportation vehicles and more than half of the agencies do not permit agents to authorize gender-appropriate strip searches prior to transporting a client. Yet at the same time the majority of probation/parole agents are required to transport prisoners.

8. Inspection of security equipment by court security and prisoner transport personnel: Survey respondents rarely perform maintenance tasks, but over half inspect <u>some</u> security equipment and conduct inside and outside security checks. The devices and equipment inspected by more than half of survey respondents include

vehicles, weapons, doors, restraint devices, locks and general security equipment. However, the survey revealed that fewer than half of the survey respondents inspected the following types of equipment: scanning devices, alarms, bars and cameras. Perhaps the court agencies and sheriffs' offices in which the majority of survey respondents work do not have this technical equipment, thus accounting for the response that fewer than half of the respondents routinely inspect the equipment to determine that it is in proper working order. If the agencies do have this equipment installed (alarms, closed-circuit television cameras and scanning devices), then failure to periodically inspect it can lead to serious security problems and needs to be addressed by these agencies.

9. Access control to court facilities: Fewer than half of the court agencies and sheriffs' offices participating in the survey appear to place a high priority on access control, illustrating the need for improved security measures in many court facilities. This conclusion was reached from the survey data, which found that fewer than half of the survey respondents: monitor remote surveillance devices; patrol the exterior perimeter of the court facility; supervise and scan mail and packages entering the judicial or court facilities; approve and supervise passes for entrance into the judicial facilities; and supervise the usage of elevator service in judicial facilities.

10. Use of equipment and technology: The court duties of the sheriff involve the use of equipment and technology, which may include electronic or mechanical devices, such as a basic intrusion alarm system or walk-through or hand-held magnetometers, as well as more sophisticated items such as video arraignment, microwave alarms, closed-circuit television (CCTV), and infrared viewing and photography devices. However, the NSA Project Staff found in its research that equipment alone is not the solution to a security problem; at best, it is a supportive tool when used by trained personnel in a well-prepared plan or procedure.

11. Comprehensive security surveys of court facilities are a necessity in determining security vulnerabilities and equipment and training needs. A risk assessment, which identifies the potential for loss, injury to personnel, visitors and guests, or damage to property, is an integral part of all security surveys.

12. Training of court security and prisoner transport personnel: The "litigation explosion" has generated many costly lawsuits against law enforcement agencies which allege "negligent training" of personnel [see, for example, *City of Canton, Ohio, v. Geraldin Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 109 S. Ct. (1989) and "Supervisor Liability" in Dr. Betty Bosarge (ed.), *First/Second Line Jail Supervisor's Training Manual* (Alexandria, VA: National Sheriffs' Association, 1989, rev. 1993, pp. 1-2 of Addendum,

Chapter Two).] thus, every effort must be made by the sheriff's office to assure that employees can demonstrate capable performance of the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) needed to perform each task in their job description prior to being assigned to perform the job. Those agency administrators who fail to provide the necessary training may find themselves held vicariously liable when a subordinate performs negligently and as a result causes harm, or allows harm to be caused, to a prisoner, citizen, court employee or fellow officer/deputy. In addition, because the United States has become a much more violent nation in recent years, more intensive training in dealing with high-risk situations, as well as incident prevention measures, is now a necessity.

The NSA survey found that more than half of the agencies responding to the questionnaires are providing training in the following subjects: Developing contingency plans for courts; developing evacuation plans for the transportation of prisoners, courts and buildings; cardiopulmonary resuscitation and emergency cardiac care certification and recertification; firearms certification, recertification and day-time handgun use; use of some restraining devices, particularly waist chains and handcuffs; use of force (deadly, non-deadly and physical holds), and prisoner transportation procedures. However, fewer than half of the agencies participating in the survey are providing training in the operation of vehicles, a key area for liability actions in the

transportation of prisoners. Similarly, fewer than half of the agencies surveyed are teaching court security and prisoner transportation employees the proper use of several commonly used restraining devices, again leaving the agency open to liability actions for negligent training. The survey found that fewer than half of the court security and prisoner transport employees are taught to properly apply the following restraining devices: leg irons, flex cuffs, leg braces, straightjacket and straps.

The NSA Staff concluded that a basic training program for court security and prisoner transport personnel requires a minimum of 80 hours of classroom instruction. More effective training will be accomplished by lengthening the basic training program to four to six weeks, depending upon the previous law enforcement training and experience of those selected to serve as court security and prisoner transportation personnel. For legal protection of both the agency and its trainees, all trainees should be thoroughly tested to make certain that they have learned the necessary knowledge and skills to perform each task correctly.

13. Balancing physical security needs with the operation of the courts: To the maximum extent possible, the physical security system should not interfere with the activities of the courts being protected. The key objective for the security planner is to strike a balance between physical security and the operation of the

courts. Cooperation is necessary to develop a security system that is effective and has the support of those who will benefit from the system (e.g., judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys).

14. Court security policies and procedures: Once a court security plan has been developed, continual monitoring is one of the most important components of any effective court security program. In addition, it is necessary for the jurisdiction to develop a written policies and procedures manual and update it periodically, since the manual is the backbone of the court security function.

15. Assessing risk factors: The NSA Project Staff, in its review of incidents which have occurred in courts throughout the nation, found that an important component of the court security function is to assess the risk levels of all hearings and trials in order to determine what level of security to provide. Providing the correct level of security for specific judicial proceedings assures that security officers will be prepared for any violence or disruptions which may occur. At the same time, the risk assessment process helps keep the cost of security down by increasing manpower when it may be most needed and decreasing it for those judicial proceedings which are expected to be trouble-free.

16. Transportation of prisoners: The NSA Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees, a search of the literature, and interviews

with sheriffs and court security personnel, led the Project Staff to conclude that there seem to be no fixed rules or procedures throughout the nation governing the transportation of prisoners (with the exception of those rules established by the Federal Aviation Administration). Different jurisdictions have a variety of rules and procedures, and some jurisdictions have no established rules or procedures at all. Yet the transportation of prisoners is one of the most dangerous tasks in law enforcement and accounts for several deaths and injuries each year to escorting officers, bystanders and prisoners. The most important first step in preparing to transport a prisoner safely is to correctly classify the prisoner as to degree of dangerousness so that proper levels of care, custody, control and supervision are implemented for each individual prisoner. Every prisoner is a potential carrier of contraband and an escape risk.

17. Use of force when transporting prisoners: It should be the policy of any agency that unless there is a clear and present danger to staff and/or prisoners, every effort shall be made to peacefully resolve the situation. Force ranging from the use of restraining devices to deadly force, may be employed against a prisoner in defense of life and to protect property, to prevent an escape, or to maintain or regain control of a situation or an event. The force used shall always be the minimum amount necessary. The type of force used will be dictated by the

situation and will either increase or decrease as the situation or event requires. Force is to be used as a measure of control and should never be used as a means of punishment. Mechanical restraints should never be used as a method of punishment; about the head or neck of a prisoner; or in a way that causes undue physical pain, restricts blood circulation, or restricts breathing.

Recommendations:

The recommendations which follow were developed by the N.S.A. Project Staff in consultation with members of the Advisory Board, Staff Review Committees and APPA. They derive from an analysis of both the literature and major findings of the data collection surveys described in Chapter Three.

In addition, the Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees developed several recommendations during the course of meetings conducted to review and discuss the issues involved in court security and the transportation of prisoners. Committee members, individually and as a group, pinpointed security needs in specific areas and suggested solutions to common problems in jurisdictions of varying sizes throughout the nation.

The recommendations are grouped in categories and numbered by category for easy reference. They are not listed in the categories in any particular order of importance.

These recommendations are for advisory purposes only and are not "guidelines" or "standards". However, these recommendations could serve as the foundation for the development of future standards for the transportation of prisoners and courthouse security programs if

a national commission were to be established to develop a certification and accreditation program, similar to the program offered by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) or the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections (CAC). In the interim, these recommendations can assist court security administrators in evaluating their own facilities and programs to determine where improvements ought to be made.

Section 1

ADMINISTRATION

Recommendation 1-1: Each agency assigned jurisdiction for court facility security and the transportation of prisoners should have a written policies and procedures manual governing operations. These documents should be reviewed and updated annually. All agency personnel should receive training to assure that they understand the policies and can apply the procedures.

Recommendation 1-2: Each agency responsible for court security should have a current organizational chart describing the chain-of-command. This chart should be reviewed annually and updated as needed.

Recommendation 1-3: Each agency responsible for court security should develop a "mission statement" for the court security function.

Recommendation 1-4: Each governmental entity should establish clear jurisdictional authority for the court security function and determine whether a sole agency, such as the office of the sheriff, is to be given authority for court security both within the court buildings and on surrounding grounds.

Recommendation 1-5: The courthouse facility should have a public information program that is reviewed at least annually and updated as needed. This plan should include policies and procedures governing media access to the courthouse facility, consistent with the preservation of the rights of defendants, victims, witnesses, court and criminal justice system employees, as well as with the maintenance of order and security. These policies and procedures should conform with any state "Freedom of Information" statutes.

Recommendation 1-6: Each court facility should maintain an up-to-date inventory of all property and assets.

Section 2

EMERGENCY, HEALTH, AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Recommendation 2-1: An emergency plan should be developed for the courthouse facility in compliance with all Federal, municipal, county, state and/or regulatory entities. It should include plans for the following types of emergency situations: fire, bomb threat, general evacuation, natural disaster, civil disorder, power/utility failures, communications system failures, emergency medical aid, shootings and hostage incidents.

Recommendation 2-2: Emergency and evacuation plans should be posted throughout the courthouse facility for specific types of emergency situations (e.g., fire, tornado, hurricane, etc.).

Recommendation 2-3: The courthouse facility emergency and

evacuation plans should be sent to the following agencies to ensure cooperation and coordination during all emergency situations:

- Fire and rescue department;
- Fire marshal;
- Law enforcement agencies;
- Sewer and water departments; and
- Public utilities (gas and electricity).

Recommendation 2-4: The courthouse facility should have adequate first aid kits readily available throughout the complex.

Recommendation 2-5: The courthouse facility should have adequate centrally controlled lighting which meets security system requirements.

Recommendation 2-6: The courthouse facility should have a minimum and maximum temperature both to ensure comfortable working conditions and to meet the operational requirements of computerized security equipment.

Recommendation 2-7: The courthouse facility should provide adequate acoustical conditions to ensure that noise levels do not interfere with normal human activities and court proceedings.

Recommendation 2-8: The courthouse facility should be in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 *et. seq.*) and the Final Rule for State and Local Government Facilities, U.S. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, May 20, 1994 (36 CFR Part 1191.)

Recommendation 2-9: The courthouse facility should be soundproofed on external and internal walls, if feasible, with the appropriate sound absorption materials to assure that unnecessary noise does not interfere with the operations of courtrooms, jury deliberation rooms, grand jury rooms, chamber spaces, attorney conference rooms, holding cells and witness waiting rooms.

Recommendation 2-10: The courthouse facility should have a backup power supply to assure an uninterrupted power source, which is especially important to the continued operation of integrated access control and alarm systems during emergency situations.

Recommendation 2-11: The courthouse facility should have an internal data communication network for the security function as well as linkage to other county or state criminal justice databases.

Recommendation 2-12: The courthouse facility should have a room large enough to house all shared computer equipment or telecommunications equipment. Data communications closets should be provided on each floor of the courthouse, when feasible. Included should be electrical surge protection devices that protect computer equipment from power fluctuations, outages or natural disasters. An independent air conditioning unit with the necessary

plumbing and electrical services should be provided to service the room as required. An emergency warning light and intrusion alarm should be provided outside the computer room to indicate a malfunction, intrusion or shut down of the computer equipment. The computer room should be monitored 24 hours a day by a computerized integrated security system. The computer room should be located within the courthouse facility to assure appropriate security and to minimize the harm from natural disasters, fire, threats, theft or utility failures.

Recommendation 2-13: The courthouse facility should have ample conduits for current and future computer equipment needs, particularly since many security functions are now integrated into computer-based systems.

Recommendation 2-14: For computer security purposes, the computer room should house the central components of other administrative, case

tracking and judicial functions, video arraignment equipment, telephones, facsimile and computerized security system equipment.

Recommendation 2-15: The courthouse computer room should have an adjacent office and storage area for data processing, storage of computer supplies/parts, and centrally used printers. This room should have a high security classification with intrusion alarm systems. There should be limited access to the room to prevent tampering with equipment.

Recommendation 2-16: The courthouse facility should provide adequate structural support for all roof mountings of microwave and satellite dishes that may be required for video arraignment, training and other applications needed for the court security and transportation of prisoners functions.

Recommendation 2-17: The courthouse facility should include on

each floor of the complex adequate connections for state-of-the-art communications equipment (e.g., telephone, facsimile, computers, security and fire detection systems, video connectors, copying machines and teletype systems).

Recommendation 2-18: If the courthouse facility is more than one story in height, it should have a mix of elevators and escalators to enhance accessibility. However, consideration should be given to the need to separate each of the three circulation zones in most courthouse facilities (public, private and secured) and to the special needs of the disabled or handicapped. There should always be a separate for prisoners, which should not be used by the general public, visitors and courthouse employees.

Recommendation 2-19: New courthouse facilities should be designed and structured to provide access for persons who are handicapped or disabled and who may be either visitors to

the facility or employees. However, the elimination of architectural and transportation barriers for the disabled should not be permitted to create security problems.

Recommendation 2-20: The courthouse facility should have a program for sign utilization that harmonizes with the circulation zones of the facility (public, private and secure zones). They should be attractive, contemporary and legible signs of both a directional and an information character; they should be incorporated into the interior design of all public areas. The sign system should meet all nationally recognized standards, guidelines, codes and regulations. Signs should be posted where they can be seen easily. They should be multilingual when appropriate. Braille lettering and audio signals should be provided at elevators, entrances, exits and other appropriate locations throughout the court complex.

Recommendation 2-21: The courthouse facility should have an information booth and building directory located near the major public entrance. The information booth should feature a diagram that lists all major components in the building accessible to members of the public. It should never list the locations of judges' chambers, holding cell areas, or secure areas of the building.

Recommendation 2-22: The courthouse facility's public waiting areas should include adequate seating and be located as close as possible to the areas of highest public use. These seating areas should have easy access to restrooms, water fountains and telephones, as well as snack bars or vending machines, to discourage citizens from wandering around the building searching for these facilities.

Section 3

FIRE PROTECTION AND FIRE ALARMS

Recommendation 3-1: Integrated systems of fire detection and

suppression alarms, bells, and buzzers should be included in the design of all new and remodeled facilities. These integrated systems should comply with all state codes and regulations and the National Fire Protection Association standards, guidelines and recommendations.

Recommendation 3-2: The courthouse facility should comply with all Federal, local and state sanitation, safety and health codes.

Recommendation 3-3: The courthouse facility should have an adequate system of fire inspection. Testing of equipment by a local fire official should be conducted on a quarterly basis.

Recommendation 3-4: Accessible standpipes, working firehoses, and properly charged fire extinguishers should be placed at appropriately marked locations throughout the courthouse facility.

Recommendation 3-5: All courtrooms should install and maintain an automatic fire alarm, bell,

heat and smoke detection system which is approved by the state fire marshal. The system should be inspected monthly.

Recommendation 3-6: Continual monitoring of fire, heat and smoke detectors should be conducted by the integrated computerized security and alarm system on a 24-hour basis.

Recommendation 3-7: The courthouse facility should have exits which are distinctly marked, continuously illuminated and kept clear and in usable condition at all times in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state and local fire safety codes.

Recommendation 3-8: The courthouse administration's purchasing manager should acquire only those furnishings and materials which are flame-retardant and, where feasible, made of non-toxic substances.

Recommendation 3-9: Both sprinklered and non-sprinklered courthouse facilities should have the

necessary travel distance to exits as specified by the National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code, covering the following areas: holding cells and prisoner detention rooms; judges' chambers/suites; offices/work areas; courtrooms; jury rooms; lavatories; lobbies; hallways; storage rooms; library; utility/maintenance rooms; backup power supply room; cafeteria/snack bar; conference rooms/computer rooms; reception rooms; and communications and control center.

Section 4
PERSONNEL

Recommendation 4-1: Sworn courthouse employees should be selected and promoted on the basis of merit. They should have the ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing and should pass a background and medical examination.

Recommendation 4-2: All sworn personnel, including court security deputies, officers, bailiffs, and prisoner escort officers, should be provided access to and training in the agency's policies and procedures manual.

Section 5

TRAINING AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT

Recommendation 5-1: Each agency should develop a written training and staff development plan for all sworn and non-sworn employees.

Recommendation 5-2: All agencies should develop and provide basic (recruit) and in-service training programs for all sworn employees who work in the court security or transportation of prisoners functions.

Recommendation 5-3: All employees newly assigned to the transportation of prisoners or court security functions should receive a minimum of 80 hours of formal classroom instruction in the following subject areas:

- Report writing;
- Legal issues;
- Fire emergency and evacuation plan;
- First aid certification;
- C.P.R. certification;
- Communication skills;
- Dealing with the public;
- Rights and responsibilities of staff;
- Use of lethal and non-lethal force;
- Searches of cells, facilities, courtrooms, visitors, guests and defendants;
- Negligent release/negligent supervision;
- Operation of security equipment and technology;
- Litigation procedures;
- Patrol of courthouse and facilities;
- Understanding problems of prisoners:
    - Suicide prevention;

- ♦♦ Alcohol and drug emergencies; and
- ♦♦ Diabetes, epilepsy and infectious diseases;

♦ Supervising prisoners (males/females/juveniles);

- ♦♦ Principles and skills;
- ♦♦ Security; and
- ♦♦ Transportation;

♦ Media relations guidelines;

♦ The nature of court violence and security threats;

♦ The state court system and how it functions;

♦ Methods of intelligence gathering and threat assessment;

♦ How to handle court disruptions;

♦ Parking lot, parking garage, sallyport and perimeter security;

♦ Bomb, weapon and contraband search and identification;

♦ Defensive tactics;

♦ Firearms training and qualification, if this has not been included in a basic law enforcement course;

- Disguised and concealed weapons;
- Protecting persons at risk;
- Crowd control;
- Hostage situations;
- Handling sequestered juries; and

.es and duties of bailiffs.

security and prisoner
tion personnel should be trained
ied in the following areas:

ctronic non-lethal force
ipment;
earms [lethal force];
t equipment; and
ıods of applying physical force
control defendants.

security and transportation of
are two distinct areas of
employment in a sheriff's office, separate training programs focusing on the specific duties of each job should be offered. If, however, officers/deputies will most

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likely serve in both capacities depending upon the available manpower strength of the agency and the need to staff a particular post at a given time, then officers/deputies should be cross-trained to perform both the court security and prisoner transportation functions. This is particularly applicable to smaller agencies.

Recommendation 5-6: All officers/deputies assigned to the court security and transportation of prisoners functions should be provided with annual in-service training in compliance with the certification requirements of the state peace officer standards and training commission. A minimum of 40 hours of annual in-service training is recommended for all sworn personnel.

Recommendation 5-7: For legal protection of both the agency and its trainees, all trainees should be thoroughly tested to make certain that they have learned the necessary knowledge and skills to perform each task correctly.

Recommendation 5-8: The agency should keep complete written records on all trainees, specifying what they were taught when, how they tested, and whether the trainee was required to keep re-testing until the relevant skills were learned.

Section 6

INVENTORY AND PROPERTY CONTROL

Recommendation 6-1: All prisoners should be thoroughly searched before being placed in courthouse holding cells prior to trials and hearings.

Recommendation 6-2: An itemized inventory should be made of all personal property of prisoners, including the prisoners' legal paperwork.

Recommendation 6-3: Provisions should be made to secure and store all property belonging to prisoners, including money and other valuables. Prisoners should be given written receipts for all property stored by court security officers.

Recommendation 6-4: Provisions should be made to return all property belonging to prisoners when prisoners are released from the jurisdiction of the court after hearings or trials. Each prisoner should sign a receipt for his returned property.

Section 7
PHYSICAL PLANT

Recommendation 7-1: Prisoner reception and release areas should be located inside the security perimeter of the courthouse facility.

Recommendation 7-2: Adequate and secure parking for judges and prisoner transportation personnel should be provided at the court facility.

Recommendation 7-3: Weapons lockers should be located outside the secure areas where prisoners are detained. These lockers should be equipped with individual compartments, each with an individual lock and key. The lockers should be available to all sworn law enforcement personnel.

Recommendation 7-4: All court facilities should provide secure temporary holding cells to court trials or judicial hearings. Holding cells should contain, at a minimum:

- Sufficient fixed benches;
- Wash basins; and
- Toilet.

Recommendation 7-5: Holding cells should provide sight/sound separation of male, female and juvenile prisoners.

Recommendation 7-6: The holding cells should be located so that prisoners can be observed in the secure area by bailiffs or officers on a periodic or continual basis, if needed.

Recommendation 7-7: Holding cells should have at least 70 square feet of floor space.

Recommendation 7-8: The courthouse should have designated exits to permit prompt evacuation of prisoners, visitors and staff in any emergency.

Recommendation 7-9: Every courthouse should have provisions to evacuate prisoners in a secure manner in the event of an emergency.

Recommendation 7-10: Architectural plans for new construction or remodeling should be reviewed and certified to conform with nationally accepted standards for court facility security.

Recommendation 7-11: Appropriate recording and video equipment should be available in all courtrooms.

Recommendation 7-12: All courtrooms should have adequate seating capacity for those participating in the proceedings as well as visitors.

Recommendation 7-13: Space should be provided for law enforcement officers, witnesses, attorneys, probation and parole officers, media representatives and other parties to wait for hearings or court trials.

Section 8

SECURITY AND CONTROL

Recommendation 8-1: The courthouse should contain a command, control and communications center to ensure order and security and to monitor all security equipment.

Recommendation 8-2: A bailiff, officer or deputy should not enter a high security cell block area without backup assistance.

Recommendation 8-3: A bailiff, officer or deputy should have access to a working audio communication system between duty posts and the command, control and communications center.

Recommendation 8-4: A bailiff, officer or deputy should conduct a security inspection of the courtrooms each day before any judicial proceedings begin. The inspection should cover the following areas:

- Doors,
- Windows,
- Desks,

- Seats/benches,
- Trash cans,
- Locks,
- Cell block areas,
- Walls
- Ventilation and heating ducts; and
- Tunnel entrances.

Recommendation 8-5: All courtrooms should be locked and secured at the end of all hearings or trials.

Recommendation 8-6: There should be a key control plan to cover the entire courthouse facility.

Recommendation 8-7: There should be a complete set of emergency keys maintained in a secured area.

Recommendation 8-8: The security command, control and communications center should have available a complete set of updated floor plan drawings that indicate the location of all entrances, exits, windows and doors. These drawings should also indicate the location of:

- Perimeter fences, gates and sallyports;
- Fire hoses and fire extinguishers;
- Emergency equipment;
- First aid kits;
- Air packs and breathing apparatus;
- Mechanical and electrical rooms;
- Maintenance rooms;
- Numbered emergency exits and emergency key numbers to fit locks;
- Stand pipes; and
- Heat/smoke detectors.

Recommendation 8-9: The following agencies should be listed in the security command, control and communications center with up-to-date telephone numbers: gas company, water/sewer company, ambulance service, fire/rescue service, and local/state law enforcement agencies.

Recommendation 8-10: A security and control manual should be developed to include the following written policies and procedures:

- Court security duty posts;
- Job description and position responsibilities for each duty post;
- Court liaison duties;
- Courtroom external communications procedures;
- Courthouse population circulation patterns;
- Courthouse facility arrests and placing arrestees into custody;
- Courthouse security guidelines;
- Prisoner control and holding facility procedures;
- Prisoner transportation procedures;
- Weapons control;
- Courtroom search procedures;
- Prisoner escapes;
- Hand-carried article search procedures;
- Screening procedures;
- Facility evacuation plan;

- Facility evacuation plan court security response;
- Bomb threat procedures;
- Hostage plan;
- Major emergency/disaster plan;
- Special operations incident plan;
- Crowd control;
- High risk trial plan;
- Emergency medical assistance plan;
- Security survey guidelines and procedures;
- Inventory;
- Physical security plan incident reports;
- Authorized use of the stunning device [NOVA XR 5000];
- Remotely activated custody control (RACC) belt; and
- Authorized use of electronic riot shield.

Recommendation 8-11: A courthouse and facility security audit should be developed and conducted at least annually to include the following areas:

Exterior:

- Perimeter,
- Lights,
- Parking areas,
- Landscaping, and
- Exterior of building.

Building:

- Doors, windows, other openings;
- Ceilings and walls;
- Alarms;
- Fire protection;
- Attic, basements, crawl spaces, air conditioning, ventilation and heating systems;
- Elevator, escalators, dumb waiters, etc.;
- Storage areas, armories and dangerous substance storage areas;
- Community areas;
- Records storage areas;

- Public areas (waiting rooms, restrooms, hallway and visiting or interview area);
- Maintenance rooms.

Courtrooms and Related Areas:

- Courtrooms;
- Courtroom doors, windows, and other openings;
- Courtroom lights;
- Courtroom air conditioning, ventilation and heating systems;
- Courtroom furnishings;
- Courtroom security devices;
- Judges chambers and related offices;
- Witness waiting rooms;
- Attorney-client conference rooms;
- Jury deliberation rooms;
- In-custody defendant reception areas;
- Restricted and secured passageways;
- Temporary holding areas; and
- Security equipment storage areas.

Recommendation 8-12: An officer/deputy post should be located immediately adjacent to a cell block or detention cell area to permit personnel to hear and respond promptly to calls for help.

Recommendation 8-13: Audio or visual electronic surveillance should be located primarily in hallways, elevators, corridors, or at points on the security perimeter, such as entrances and exits.

Recommendation 8-14: All prisoners should be searched thoroughly whenever entering or exiting the security perimeter.

Recommendation 8-15: All violent incidents or acts which occur on court facility premises should be recorded for the record. Examples of such incidents or acts include:

- Verbal threats;
- Disorderly conduct;
- Physical assault and battery;

- Weapons display and use, including firearms, explosives, knives, chemical weapons, etc.;
- Suicides and suicide attempts;
- Physical assaults with weapons;
- Property damage;
- Rape and other sexual assaults;
- Carjacking in parking areas;
- Robbery, both armed and unarmed;
- Burglary;
- Break-ins to court computer system by "hackers";
- Electronic break-ins to court telephone systems; and
- Breaches in the security system.

Recommendation 8-16: Security officers should make complete written records of all disruptions or assaults which occur on court facility premises.

Recommendation 8-17: Each court facility should develop a written policy and procedure addressing the possession of weapons in the courtroom by sworn law enforcement officers. If no weapons are allowed in the courtrooms, then secure storage lockers should be provided.

Recommendation 8-18: Court security officials should provide cross-training for prisoner transport officers and the bailiffs to assure that both groups know the proper procedures to follow if an incident occurs in the courtroom.

Recommendation 8-19: All transport personnel should be provided with handheld radios to enable them to communicate with their respective agencies at all times while they are on duty.

Recommendation 8-20: All court agencies should provide duress alarms in courtrooms and judges' chambers.

Recommendation 8-21: All prisoner transport personnel and bailiffs who serve in a security capacity should be qualified in the use of intermediate force weapons and devices, such as batons, electronic restraints and oleoresin capsicum.

Recommendation 8-22: Criminal justice agencies in all states should work together to develop a

statewide or regional radio frequency to be utilized by prisoner transport officers. A common radio frequency is necessary for officer safety and to summon help in emergencies.

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

Description of Project:

In 1993, at its annual meeting, the National Sheriffs' Association (N.S.A.) Courtroom Security/Service of Process/Prisoner Transportation Committee developed a "Mission Statement" expressing a need for further research to develop guidelines for court security and the transportation of prisoners, pointing out that:

> Historically, the primary responsibilities of sheriffs have included courtroom security, prisoner transport, and service of process. We reaffirm our primary concern for these issues, as violence in the courtroom escalates, and deputies are increasingly exposed to violence as they transport prisoners and serve process. We believe that the National Sheriffs' Association must take a leading role in the foundation of our nation's response to this violence. The mission of this Committee is to educate the members of the NSA, and the country at large, as to the proper design of courtrooms, the proper training of deputies, the assignment of adequate personnel, and the issuance of proper equipment in order to effectively address these concerns.

To accomplish this mission, the committee called for the development of a comprehensive training program covering courtroom security, handling of prisoners and service of process; establishing an affiliate membership organization for court security officers; developing a correspondence course to certify court security officers; and adopting standards which agencies could meet in order to receive accreditation in the areas of courtroom security, service of process and prisoner transportation.

Developing standards is the necessary first step to achieve the other objectives described above. **This project is a direct result of recognition by the U.S. Justice Department's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) that standards and recommendations are necessary for court security and prisoner transportation deputies/officers in this violent era in which we are now living. Without a uniform set of guidelines applicable to the various types of courts in the United States, it is extremely difficult for individual sheriffs, judges and court administrators to determine what levels of security are necessary, the types of security**

measures and technology available, and what are the minimum steps which must be taken to safeguard people and property.

In its Concept Paper submitted to NIJ in 1993, NSA proposed developing guidelines for physical surveys and the operations of judicial facilities, as well as guidelines for the transportation of prisoners. NSA also sought to identify the number of courts in existence in the United States. The purpose of the guidelines would be to foster voluntary compliance on the part of the court and sheriffs' agencies to provide assistance in the following areas:

1. Health and life safety issues are being met;

2. Sound management;

3. Reduction of vulnerable court intervention and costly legal complications;

4. Assist in the safe, secure, supervision and humane conditions for staff, arrestees and the elected officials of the governmental entity.

At a subsequent meeting between NSA Project Staff and the NIJ Project Monitors in June 1994, it was suggested by NIJ Staff that NSA should not attempt to develop "standards" or "guidelines" but instead should focus on "recommendations" derived from: an analysis of questionnaires administered to court security, probation/parole and sheriffs' personnel throughout the nation; research and an analysis of the existing literature and incidents; and input from the Project Advisory Board, Staff Review Committee and other criminal justice system organizations.

Project Origins:

In the last 25 years, with intensified efforts by all levels of government to investigate and prosecute narcotics trafficking networks, career criminals and violent offenders, pressure has been placed upon criminal court systems during hearings, trials and sentencing procedures to provide security above what has been the norm.

Although most attention to improving security has focused on the criminal courts, family and civil courts are not exempt from violence. In recent years, societal and economic pressures contributing toward emotional and psychological disturbances in citizens have resulted in episodes of violence throughout the nation. Indeed, as the Twentieth Century draws to a close, one of

the most common laments is that violence in everyday life has become the norm. Places and situations once thought to be safe havens--churches, schools, government office buildings, restaurants, business offices, factories, police stations, courtrooms and quiet suburban shopping centers -- have become the scenes of deadly assaults by mass murderers, bombers and-mentally-unstable people bent on wreaking vengeance upon society for alleged "wrongs" done to them. America's citizens are now afraid that crime will strike them anywhere - even burst into their homes. They are putting pressure upon Congress and the President to "do something about crime." But no one seems to be quite sure what "doing something" really involves.

What is most troubling for judges, court administrators, sheriffs, and those who work in or visit the courthouse daily is that there does not seem to be a clearly visible pattern to courthouse violence. It can and does erupt anywhere and at anytime. Some incidents can be prevented, with careful attention to details, as in the escort of violent offenders. But other incidents are totally unpredictable, such as a sudden shooting rampage by an emotionally disturbed visitor in a quiet appellate court or the bombing of a Federal building by a person or group with a perceived grudge against the government. For example, in a letter to National Sheriffs' Association Executive Director Charles B. Meeks in November 1993, Louis W. McHardy, dean of the National College of Juvenile and Family Law in Reno, Nevada, stated:

> Security concerns are deeply troubling to judges with juvenile and/or family court jurisdiction. This is especially so in domestic relations matters where emotions run high and tragic and bizarre consequences frequently occur.

A cursory review of some of the many courthouse security incidents of recent years shows how disparate these incidents are and how unpredictable they can be.

A Typology of Sample Incidents: The 24 incidents described in the typology on the following pages occurred within a relatively short time frame - January 1994 to March 1995 - and reflect many of the different types of security breaches common in courthouses today. Figure I-2: "A Typology of Some Representative Courthouse Security Incidents, January 1994 - March 1995," analyzes a sampling of a variety of incidents. In the typology chart, the incidents are broken down into categories: date, city/state, type of court, type of incident, perpetrator, victim(s), weapon, and motive (if known).

These are but a few of the hundreds of incidents collected by the NSA Project Staff dating back into the 1980s.

As work was proceeding on this project, the April 19, 1995, dynamiting of the Alfred J. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in which 169 people died, including about 20 children in a Federal daycare center, focused the nation's attention on security problems in Federal buildings and the vulnerability of courthouses to attacks by terrorists and people with grudges against government agencies. Nationwide, Federal courthouses and buildings were put under increased security immediately after the Oklahoma City bombing on orders from the President. But state and local governments also increased security in office buildings and courthouses, especially since an "epidemic" of bomb threats occurred following the Oklahoma City massacre.

Unfortunately, if past incidents prove to be a precedent, security eventually will be **decreased** as memory of the Oklahoma City bombing fades. For example, after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City by a Middle Eastern terrorist group, security was increased at many government buildings and corporations throughout the nation. By 1995, however, much of this security once again was relaxed. That seems to be the trend in the United States, and only time will tell if the Oklahoma City bombing, combined with incidents at courthouses throughout the nation, will lead to permanent security enhancements.

FIGURE 1-2
A TYPOLOGY OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE COURTHOUSE SECURITY INCIDENTS, JANUARY 1994 - MARCH 1995

DATE	CITY/STATE	TYPE OF COURT/ LOCATION IN COURT	TYPE OF INCIDENTS	PERPETRATOR	VICTIM(S)	WEAPONS	MOTIVE (IF KNOWN)
3/15/95	Arlington, Virginia	United States Patent Court	Perceived threat to shoot fellow employees	Federal judge, age 64	Fellow employees at Federal Office building	Verbal threat (perceived)	Not known-judge reaching to a shooting in a United States Navy Facility
3/8/95	Rockville, Maryland	Montgomery County Circuit Court Building	Bomb Threat	Unknown	Courthouse employees, Visitors	Phone call	Unknown
3/4/95	Seattle, Washington	Domestic relations courtroom	Homicide of three (3) persons plus fetus	Husband, 47, involved in divorce hearing	Pregnant wife and two (2) female friends - three (3) dead	Handgun (semi-automatic)	He wanted an annulment but she was suing for divorce; husband alleged Filipino wife married him only for entry to U.S.A.
3/1/95	Kingwood, West Virginia	Criminal Court in session	While testifying, female sexual assault victim pulled handgun and pointed it at defendant; deputies wrestled gun away	Female sexual assault victim	Alleged perpetrator	Handgun hidden in purse	Anger at assailant

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A TYPOLOGY OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE COURTHOUSE SECURITY INCIDENTS, JANUARY 1994 - MARCH 1995

DATE	CITY/STATE	TYPE OF COURT/ LOCATION IN COURT	TYPE OF INCIDENTS	PERPETRATOR	VICTIM(S)	WEAPONS	MOTIVE (IF KNOWN)
2/17/95	Upper Marlboro, Maryland	Prince George's County District Court, corridor outside courtroom where hearing was being held	Fistfight after loud argument between relatives of victim and relatives of suspect in victim's murder; deputies broke up fight	Two women arrested; one dozen people involved	Several relatives of murder suspect	Fists	Anger during argument with relatives of murder suspect
2/1/95	Washington, District of Columbia	U.S. Supreme Court Building Federal Judge	Bomb threat	Unknown	Employees and visitors to building	Phone call to D.C. Police 911	Unknown
1/18/95	Cincinnati, Ohio	Federal Building, 6th Floor	Fake bomb found and letters sent threatening to detonate bombs in Federal Courthouse	Suspect is Federal inmate, 29, serving 61-year sentence at Marion Federal Penitentiary	Employees and visitors in building	Plastic case wrapped with tape to look like bomb	Extortion - demanded to be released from prison by 1 p.m. or bombs would be detonated
12/6/94	Kansas City, Missouri	U.S. Courthouse	Escapes of Federal prisoner	Michael Turner, 38, Federal prisoner; shot to death four days later by Kansas City, Missouri Police	2 Wells Fargo guards at Kansas City Power and Light robbed during escape of money and car	Took 2 pairs handcuffs and gun when escaping	Escape from Federal custody

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DATE	CITY/STATE	TYPE OF COURT/ LOCATION IN COURT	TYPE OF INCIDENTS	PERPETRATOR	VICTIM(S)	WEAPONS	MOTIVE (IF KNOWN)
10/18/94	Somerville, New Jersey	Somerset County Courthouse	Sheriff's Department cadets on guard duty leave post and put dummy in uniform at guard post	Sheriff's department cadet	Courthouse employees and visitors	None	Cadet needed to sleep
10/18/94	Dallas Texas	County Courthouse basement prisoner transportation loading area (underground garage)	Gun battle in escape attempt of prisoners	Wife of inmate who gave inmate a gun slain by sheriff's deputies; inmate fired upon officials	Wife of inmate shot to death; two inmates wounded; deputy wounded; 17 other prisoners in holding area during gun battle	Gun	Escape from custody while inmates being unloaded from transport van
9/15/94	Alexandria, Louisiana	Rapides Parish Courthouse (stairwell)	Deputy Sheriff shoots and kills wife, an employee of court clerk's office	Deputy Sheriff (19 years with department)	Deputy's wife (a court employee)	Handgun	Marriage was breaking up; wife had obtained re-straining order against husband said he was dis-traught before committing suicide in front of TV cameras

FIGURE 1-2
A TYPOLOGY OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE COURTHOUSE SECURITY INCIDENTS, JANUARY 1994 - MARCH 1995

DATE	CITY/STATE	TYPE OF COURT/ LOCATION IN COURT	TYPE OF INCIDENTS	PERPETRATOR	VICTIM(S)	WEAPONS	MOTIVE (IF KNOWN)
9/14/94	Hampton, Virginia	Hampton General District Court	Bomb threat shut down court; on previous day, three bombs found in court and disarmed (bombs made of cardboard tubes filled with explosives and pipes containing nails)	Virginia State Trooper, age 41, assigned with dog to to bomb detection unit; pleaded guilty on 1/5/95	Employees and visitors to courthouse	Bomb not primed to detonate	Trooper said he wanted to enhance his image as an expert at locating bombs with his dog and become a hero
7/13/95	Chicago, Illinois	Dirksen Federal Office Building, Chambers of Federal Judge	Security breach; man with a 7-inch knife walked into judge's chambers and threatened secretary	Man, 36, with long psychiatric history who had filed law-suits dismissed as frivolous	Federal judge, secretary	7-inch knife	Man said he came to stab another judge who dismissed a lawsuit he filed a year earlier as "frivolous"
6/9/94	Waterbury, Connecticut	Superior Court, Second-Floor Lobby	Teenager attacked by rival gang members	Five members of Latin Kings gang	19-year-old member of Latin Kings gang	Assault	Rival gangs
6/1/94	Williamsport, Pennsylvania	U.S. District Court (Courtroom)	Lawyer punched in face by inmate client	Inmate from Lewisburg Penitentiary	Court-appointed attorney	Fist	Inmate angry because lawyer asked judge to remove him from case in which inmate was charged with stabbing prison officer

FIGURE 1-2
A TYPOLOGY OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE COURTHOUSE SECURITY INCIDENTS, JANUARY 1994 - MARCH 1995

DATE	CITY/STATE	TYPE OF COURT/ LOCATION IN COURT	TYPE OF INCIDENTS	PERPETRATOR	VICTIM(S)	WEAPONS	MOTIVE (IF KNOWN)
5/17/94	Hackensack, New Jersey	Bergen County Superior Court	Convicted murderer tries to hire hitman to kill judge who sentenced him	Inmate, 27, in prison for murder and arson	Superior court judge	Attempted assassination	Inmate wanted judge killed because judge repeatedly denied requests for a review of the case
5/13/94	Hartford, Connecticut	Superior Court (outside on sidewalk)	Gang-related shooting of rival gang member	Five Latin Kings gang members	26-year-old member of Los Solidos gang wounded by gunfire; shot in back	Gun	Gang hostility: "Your colors don't match mine."
5/2/945	Bristol, Connecticut	Police Court Building (steps)	Gang-related shootings of one teen by another	Gang member, 15, from Los Solidos gang	Gang member, 17, from Latin Kings gang, shot to chest	.38 caliber handgun	Gang hostility
3/9/94	Euskirchen, Germany	Municipal Court (Courtroom)	Man convicted on misdemeanors return to courtroom, kills seven people (including judge and prosecutor), sets off bomb in courtroom	Yugoslav refugee, died in bomb blast	Seven people, including judge, prosecutor, spectators, self	Handgun and bomb in a backpack	Man convicted of minor crime. Left and then returned to courtroom with gun and bomb

FIGURE 1-2
A TYPOLOGY OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE COURTHOUSE SECURITY INCIDENTS, JANUARY 1994 - MARCH 1995

DATE	CITY/STATE	TYPE OF COURT/ LOCATION IN COURT	TYPE OF INCIDENTS	PERPETRATOR	VICTIM(S)	WEAPONS	MOTIVE (IF KNOWN)
3/3/94	Buffalo, New York	U.S. District Court (Courtroom)	Violent behavior and outbursts against witness	Jailed killer on trial for drug trafficking	Witness testifying on stand	Verbal abuse, attempting to hit witness with water pitcher	Says witness was lying about him
3/2/94	Knoxville, Tennessee	Knox County Attorney General's Office in City-County Building	Sophisticated mail bomb opened but did not detonate	Unknown, but threats had been received from a group over a period of three weeks	District attorney and staff; 1,500 government employees and citizens evacuated	Black gun-powder in metal container with explosive equivalent of stick of dynamite	Motive unknown, but threats had led to increased employees awareness
2/8/94	Fort Worth, Texas	Tarrant County Courthouse (Criminal Justice Center) and Civil Courts Building	Two telephone bomb threats	Unknown	All employees, citizens in both court buildings-courthouse evacuated	Telephone bomb threats (2)	Unknown
1/24/94	Hendersonville, North Carolina	Henderson County Courthouse (perimeter of building)	Possible bomb found in attache case with note saying it was for a judge hearing a child abuse case	Undetermined	Courthouse evacuated - all employees, citizens	Cylinder tube wrapped in duct tape with wires sticking out	Unknown, except for referral to judge hearing child sex abuse case involving eight people
1/12/94	Grayson, Kentucky	Carter County Courthouse (Firebomb tossed through window of Health Department, destroying office)	Firebombing	Three men, two with criminal records	District Health Office destroyed; damage estimated at $100,000.00	Molotov Cocktail	Witness said two men told him they could destroy their criminal records by burning down the courthouse

Responsibility and Jurisdiction for Court Security and Transportation of Prisoners:

Like death and taxes, the court system will always be with us. Historians cannot pinpoint where the first court originated. Nor can futurists predict whether humankind will ever be free of courts. Throughout a normal lifetime, the average man or woman in the United States may encounter several types of courts: domestic relations, juvenile, civil, bankruptcy, criminal, appellate, administrative law, traffic and state or Federal supreme courts. Even in death the citizen does not escape the court system. Probate court may divide up mortal goods if any were left behind, and tax court will be there to claim its share when the survivors try to keep much of their inheritance. For believers, the Old and New Testaments of the Bible and the Muslim holy book, the Quran, talk of a final court appearance and judgment before God, who rewards and punishes.

Both the court system in the United States and the office of the sheriff trace their origins to English common law, which was based upon natural law and Roman law. The English system of common law relied on the value of precedent and the consistency of decisions by its judges for the development of a legal philosophy and system; as a result, common law rules that are 700 years old are today applied in some Anglo-American jurisdictions.[1] The English judicial process, which was controlled by the King, was imposed upon the American colonies and became a point of contention in the American Revolution. In the writing of the U.S. Constitution, many of the founders insisted upon a separation of powers with the judiciary as one of the three independent branches of government; this pattern was adopted in several state constitutions as well.

As the young nation developed, so too did the system of courts. On the Federal level, judges were appointed for life. In the states, however, the Jacksonian era, with its emphasis on citizen participation in the democratic process, spawned a system of elected judicial officials who served fixed terms. Life on the bench was not easy for either Federal or state judges in the nineteenth century - they rode circuits in rural America, taking the court where it was needed.

Some trends in court administration emerged by the beginning of the twentieth century, most notably the development of the structure of the appellate and urban court systems. County seats became headquarters for courthouses when circuit-riding judges began to remain in one jurisdiction due to population increases. As the county law officer, the sheriff was directed to provide order in the courthouse, thus acquiring the role held today by most of the nation's sheriffs as the person responsible for court security and the transportation of prisoners.

Today each state has its own unique structure for its court system. However, all state court systems share one common structural element: hierarchy. "Hierarchy" refers to the ability of upper level courts to review and undo what lower level courts have done, with a court of last resort (in most states, the supreme court) at the top of the hierarchy.

The legal authority of a court to dispose of particular types of controversies is its "jurisdiction". Some courts have very specific jurisdiction (e.g., criminal, civil, traffic, family and domestic relations) while other courts have general jurisdiction.

A state court system usually has three tiers of courts:

1. **The appellate structure**, which reviews the decisions of the lower courts. At the top of the appellate structure is the supreme court, or court of last resort. In some states the supreme court hears appeals from the trial courts of general jurisdiction, although in many states which have large appellate workloads, there are intermediate appellate courts between the supreme court and the courts of general jurisdiction.

2. **Trial courts of general jurisdiction** have many different names in the various states but theoretically their duty is to try all cases and hear all justiciable controversies. In some states the criminal court is separate from the civil court while other states have established special courts to handle specific matters, such as juvenile law cases. In reality, general jurisdiction courts have the authority to hear all criminal and civil cases except those of a minor nature.

3. **Courts of special jurisdiction and limited jurisdiction** have been in a period of transition over the last three decades and are difficult to define clearly. Basically, though, these courts handle matters of lower value or lesser seriousness involving the same subject matter as the courts of general jurisdiction. Some examples of these courts include municipal, justice of the peace, police court and county court.

The Federal court system of the United States is a highly organized structure with jurisdiction in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.

The system is structured, from the lowest level to the highest, into district courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States.

Overseeing the management of the Federal court system is the Judicial Conference of the United States. Its staff activities are carried out by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, a coordinating agency which allocates support personnel, administers a salary system and prepares the budget for the court system, which is submitted to Congress for appropriations.

Number of Courts: How many courts are there in the United States today? One of the objectives of this study was to attempt to pinpoint the exact number of civil and criminal courts on the Federal, state and local levels. As a reference point, the N.S.A. Project Staff examined The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System conducted by the U.S. Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in August 1978.[2] Using 1974 data from Census Bureau directory files, and rounding the numbers, the Justice Department reported that there are **25,720 judicial process** agencies, which include state, county and municipal courts, prosecution and legal services and indigent defense services.[3] There were **14,990 courts**, broken down as follows:

- State courts: 1,550
- County courts: 6,330
- Municipal courts: 7,110 [4]

The study did **not** count the number of courts in the Federal system.

In this study, the N.S.A. Project Staff counted the following number of courts at the Federal, state, county and municipal levels:

- Federal courts: 800
- State/County/Municipal Courts: 17,825

The Project Staff did **not** count Federal military courts and tribunals, Bureau of Indian Affairs tribal courts, administrative law courts, U.S. Customs courts or patent courts.

The **types** of courts which can be found at the state, county and local levels include:

- County criminal courts (misdemeanors)
- Criminal district courts (felonies)
- Masters court
- District court
- Magistrates court
- Justice of the peace court
- County/city court at law
- Probate court
- Juvenile court
- Family court

- Youth court
- Small claims court
- Attorney general court (masters court/child support)
- Supreme court
- Court of appeals
- Special court of appeals
- Superior court
- Traffic court
- Domestic relations court
- Municipal court

The total number of **employees** in court systems in the United States in October 1990 are **224,778**, broken down as follows:

- Federal: 22,272
- State: 69,820
- Counties: 102,459
- Municipal/cities: 30,225[5]

[Note: These figures include all civil and criminal courts and activities associated with courts such as law libraries, grand juries, petit juries and the like. **Not** included are those who are employed in prosecution and legal services and public defense.]

The total number of judicial and legal employees working in the Federal, state and local governments full time as of October 1992 are 374,000, according to Public Employment: 1992, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census in September 1994. These figures are broken down as follows:

- Federal system: 51,000
- State and local governments: 323,000

[Note: These figures are **not** limited solely to court employees; they include all employees working in public legal functions, such as school board attorneys, public defenders, etc.]

Defining "Court Security": Beginning with the trial of the British soldiers after the Boston Massacre in 1770, there has been a need for security in the courts of the United States, both for routine daily operations as well as sensational "high profile" trials. The term **"court security"** is being defined in this study as **the procedures, technology and architectural features needed to ensure:**

1. **The safety of people and property within the courthouse and nearby grounds and**

2. **The integrity of the judicial process.**[6]

The focus of any court security program must be **prevention** and **control**. This means installing personnel, procedures and processes - the "3 Ps" of effective court security - to prevent or control such problems in the courthouse or courtrooms as disorderly conduct, verbal abuse, insults, swearing, physical violence, homicide, suicide, fires, thefts, bomb threats and attacks, escapes of prisoners, robberies of courthouse employees and visitors, sexual assaults on courthouse premises, hostage taking, demonstrations, kidnappings, sabotage, assassination and destruction of records.

Two key ingredients of any effective prevention program are **policies and procedures. Policies** are statements of guiding principles or the general course of action adopted by an agency. They provide guidance for determining present and future decisions and actions. They tend to be general, but they are directive and goal-oriented. **Procedures** are the detailed, step-by-step description of the sequence of activities necessary to implement the policy and achieve the stated goals. Simply stated, policies tell **"why and what"** whereas procedures indicate **"how, who, when and where."**[7]

The objective of all court security policies and procedures should be to reduce the opportunity for loss or threat of loss or, at a minimum, reduce the amount of any loss suffered.[8]

An effective court security program is necessary to preserve the constitutional rights of those participating in the judicial process; any disturbances in the courtroom threaten an orderly system of justice by interrupting the trial process and making it difficult for a defendant to obtain a fair trial.[9]

At the same time, the court security program must work to create a safe environment for court employees, litigants, and visitors, and to prevent the loss of property.

Responsibility for Court Security: In this report, the term "court security" refers to protecting both the court building and its surrounding grounds. Jurisdictional authority over these areas may rest with several different officials, making overall coordination of court security a difficult process. In the development of the National Sheriffs' Association Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, James L. McMahon found the responsibility for court security to be unclearly defined in too many jurisdictions:

> Responsibility for security in the courtroom and courthouse varies considerably throughout the country. In some cases, no one is specifically assigned either task, though some state laws assign the responsibility

for one or both to the sheriff. In other jurisdictions, sheriffs have assumed responsibility because they are the most logical choices and the best prepared people available. In still other cases, court security seems to be the responsibility of everyone, with no clear authority given.

Even when overall responsibility is given to one person, others have authority for specific areas and operations (see Figure 1-1).

If responsibility is shared, coordination is needed between officials responsible for various types of security. However, overall responsibility could effectively be given to a single official.[10]

Figure 1-1
TYPICAL AREAS OF AUTHORITY FOR COURT SECURITY IN LARGE JURISDICTIONS

Official	Area of Authority
Sheriff	♦ Courtroom security and order ♦ Transport of incustody defendant within the courthouse ♦ Public area security ♦ Nonpublic area security
Court administrator	♦ Building structure changes ♦ Supervision of court officers ♦ Purchase of equipment
Judge	♦ Courtroom procedures ♦ Structural changes in chambers ♦ Equipment used in chambers ♦ Changes in passageways, gates and parking facilities
Court	♦ Security of space for tenants other than the court ♦ Public area security ♦ Contract negotiations and performance standards for private guards
City police	♦ Law enforcement and protection for sidewalks and areas next to courthouse

The 1978 N.S.A. report concludes:

> It is obvious . . . that one person should be responsible for overall courthouse security. This person should provide protection and security for all the areas discussed here (courtroom, non-public areas near the courtroom, public areas outside the building) and should ensure the necessary coordination with other agencies, such as the city police department. As a professional security specialist, the sheriff is the logical choice for this responsibility.[11]

In several states the sheriff has statutory authority to provide courthouse security and transport prisoners. However, in a few states, judges assign the responsibility, most often to the sheriff. Those states which do **not** statutorily assign responsibility for court service to the sheriff are Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, North Carolina and Pennsylvania.[12]

The present day statutory responsibilities of sheriffs for court service and jail administration are derived from the English common law tradition imported to the American colonies by the first settlers. Under the common law system, the sheriff's "tourn" (or court) had criminal jurisdiction and was held twice a year; the sheriff was therefore responsible for the custody of accused persons from the time of arrest to the adjournment of court.[13]

Court Duties: The office of the sheriff exists in 49 states; Alaska is the lone exception. In the 49 states, the sheriff is responsible for performing certain court-related functions, which may include serving as bailiffs; attending court; serving summonses, warrants or civil process; and enforcing money decrees.

Jail Administration: Statutory authority for the sheriff as jailer exists in 45 of 49 states; approximately 86 percent of the sheriffs' agencies in these 45 states operate at least one jail.[14] The four states in which the sheriff has no jail responsibilities are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii and Rhode Island. The sheriff's responsibility as jailer derives from English common law which authorized the sheriff to keep the peace; conserving the peace is considered to include not only arresting violators but also detaining them through their trials. Because of this responsibility, sheriffs acquired the duty to **transport prisoners** back and forth to the courthouse and to state prison systems. In addition, most county sheriffs in the United States are the responsible official for the interstate transportation of prisoners.[15]

Project Methodology:

In addition to incorporating information obtained through a review of the literature and input from the Project Advisory Board, Staff Review Committee and various public/private agencies, organizations and criminal justice associations, the N.S.A. Project Staff conducted three nationwide surveys to generate data on the state-of-the-art in court security and the transportation of prisoners. The objective of the surveys was to determine what needs to be included in recommendations for improving court security and transporting prisoners.

The confidential surveys were:

- Job Analysis Survey #1 and #2
- Task Priorities Analysis Survey
- Probation and Parole Survey

Description of Surveys: The surveys designed by the N.S.A. Project Staff as the primary data collecting instruments were-self-administered confidential mail questionnaires. Because of the immense variations between those to whom the questionnaires would be sent (sheriffs' office and other county law enforcement personnel, judicial services officials, and probation/parole administrators and officers), it was necessary for the N.S.A. Project Staff to develop survey instruments that were clearly worded, substantive, and fairly simple to complete.

Several problems emerged in the initial design of the questionnaires:

- Differences in size of the agencies which would receive the questionnaires (e.g., from large metropolitan areas to rural counties);

- The need to obtain data that was quantifiable and which could be easily compared;

- The need to provide a questionnaire which did not require an overly long time period to complete on the part of agency personnel.

To overcome these problems, the N.S.A. Project Staff decided to use a single confidential questionnaire which would be applicable to all variances between agencies rather than using an approach that tailored one or more questionnaires to the differences between departments. In order to speed the time required to complete the questionnaires and obtain quantifiable data, forced choice responses were used instead of open-ended questions. However, open-ended questions were employed in a few

instances to obtain qualitative data such as the views and attitudes of respondents on specific matters.

To assist in the return of the confidential questionnaires, a self-addressed, postage-paid booklet was designed.

The review and finalization of the questionnaires before they were mailed to the survey population involved several steps:

1. Each confidential questionnaire was reviewed after the first draft by Project Staff members. Once these individual reviews were completed, a joint staff meeting was convened to incorporate changes and resolve possible problems.

2. Following the series of staff reviews, copies of the draft questionnaires were submitted to the Project Advisory Board and Staff Review Committee members. As practitioners with extensive professional backgrounds, these individuals provided a useful "sounding board" for this review process.

3. The confidential questionnaires were then site-tested in 12 agencies of various sizes in the mid-Atlantic section of the United States. N.S.A. Project Staff administered the confidential questionnaires to agency executives and other departmental personnel to determine, on a first-hand basis, the responsiveness and utility of both individual areas of inquiry and the structure of specific questions. Topical areas of interest were explored with each practitioner in order to provide insights into issues affecting the office of the sheriff, judicial personnel and elected officials - now and in the future.

4. A revised confidential questionnaire was subsequently reviewed in its entirety by the Advisory Board and Staff Review Committee during their first meetings with the Project Staff. This critical review provided many useful insights into the structure and content of specific topics.

Survey Population: The Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners **Task Priorities Analysis Survey** was

mailed in April and June 1994. Three agencies in each state and United States Territory were randomly selected by N.S.A. Project Staff to receive the questionnaire. The questionnaire was mailed to a large, medium and small sheriff's department in each state.

The Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners **Job Analysis Survey** was mailed twice - in April 1994 and in June 1994. Each survey was mailed to agency directors who were asked to have the survey completed by employees in the following job categories: bailiff, constable, court security officer, deputy, court aide, clerk of the court, court supervisor or facilities specialist.

Job Analysis Survey #1 was sent to two agencies in each state and U.S. Territory randomly selected by N.S.A. Project Staff. Job Analysis Survey #2 was sent to three randomly selected large, medium and small agencies in each state and U.S. Territory. Both surveys contained identical questions.

The final survey questionnaire, **Probation and Parole Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Survey**, was mailed to a random sampling of probation and parole agencies from a list provided by the executive director of the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA). The survey was sent to three agencies in each U.S. State and Territory - a large, medium and small agency.

By its nature, a self-administered mailed questionnaire does not typically yield a high response rate. However, the chances of experiencing a relatively high response in this instance were enhanced by the fact that the National Sheriffs' Association administered the survey as an effort "by and for the nation's 3,095 county and independent city sheriffs." Prior to mailing survey questionnaires, N.S.A.'s Executive Director Charles B. Meeks sent letters introducing the project to state sheriffs' association directors, members of the N.S.A. Executive Board and Board of Directors, and N.S.A. State Directors. These letters were designed to bring attention to the study and solicit respondent support in completing the forthcoming questionnaire.

All survey respondents were asked to return the completed questionnaire to N.S.A. within four weeks of receiving it. At the end of this initial cut-off period, several follow-up procedures were implemented to solicit a higher rate of return, including:

- A personal letter was sent by N.S.A. Executive Director Meeks to the director of each non-responding agency.

- N.S.A. Project Staff phoned individual sheriffs, N.S.A. state directors and directors of state

sheriffs' associations to solicit their assistance in convincing the directors of non-responding agencies of the importance of the survey and the need to respond.

- When these procedures did not prove effective in generating a response, additional letters were sent and phone calls made to the non-responding agencies until the final cut-off date of September 30, 1994.

As each survey questionnaire was returned by mail to the N.S.A. Project Staff, it was reviewed for accuracy and completeness. **All responding jurisdictions were assured of individual agency confidentiality in the use of the data they reported.**

Analytical Methodology: The Confidential Court Security and Transportation of Prisoners **Job Analysis Survey** was sent to 270 potential respondents and 217 surveys were returned to N.S.A., for a **return rate of 80.38 percent.** The responses were entered in the Prime computer at N.S.A. and then downloaded into a personal computer. The data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) revision 6.0.

The survey consisted of over 350 questions; 338 of which were entered into the computer. These questions ranged from yes/no (i.e., Have you ever completed a certain training course?), specific responses (sex and type of agency), multiple choice (years of school completed) to numeric responses (count of courts). Each question was analyzed to determine what the best representation for the question might be. In general, a pie chart was selected for those questions that had a few number of different responses (generally less than five); and a bar chart was used for those questions that had a larger number of different responses. All the numbers depicted in the charts are percentages on the return of 217 surveys.

Little or no interpretation of the numbers was done with the charts. If a response did not appear to be consistent with the question, no attempt was made to guess what the respondent had intended. The charts reflect the responses.

The Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners **Task Priorities Analysis Survey** was sent to 275 potential respondents and 218 surveys were returned to N.S.A., for a **return rate of 79.27 percent.** The responses were entered into the Prime computer at N.S.A. and downloaded to a personal computer. The data was analyzed using the SPSS revision 6.0.

The survey consisted of 326 questions. Each question described a function that the respondents may or may not perform in their daily duties and had a two-part answer. The first part asked whether or not the respondent performed the function; the second part asked the respondent to rate the priority of the function on a scale from 1 (very low priority) to 7 (very high priority).

The analysis presented this data in two forms: a pie chart for the first part of each question and a bar chart for the second part of the question. Both charts represent percentages of the responses rather than counts. The bar charts represent all of the]responses, not just those that had checked the function performed in part one. There may be some instances where a function was checked as being performed and no rating was given as well as a rating given when the function was not checked. However, in general, the data presented in the charts accurately represents the responses to the survey.

The **Probation and Parole** Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Survey was mailed to 165 agencies and 109 completed surveys were returned to N.S.A., for a **response rate of 66.06 percent.** The data was computer analyzed using the SPSS revision 6.0.

The survey consisted of 53 questions. With the exception of the questions seeking data on agency size, composition of courts, and personal characteristics of the probation/parole official who was answering the questionnaire, each question sought yes/no answers and then asked the respondent to explain the reason for the answer.

The analysis presented this data in two forms: pie charts and bar charts. Both charts represent percentages of the responses rather than counts. The results of the survey analysis are presented in Chapter Three.

Chapter One: Reference Sources

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5. Sue A. Lindgren, "Justice Expenditure and Employment, 1990," Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Justice Department, September 1992, p. 6.

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10. Ibid., p. 9.

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13. Ibid., p. 26.

14. Ibid., p. 41.

15. Ibid., p. 256.

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

CHAPTER TWO

SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON COURT SECURITY/TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

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COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY



CHAPTER FIVE

TRAINING AND LEGAL ISSUES

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CHAPTER FIVE

TRAINING AND LEGAL ISSUES

CHAPTER FIVE
SECTION ONE

TRAINING ISSUES: COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

In its 1991 study, Court Security: Training Guidelines and Curricula, the National Sheriffs' Association (N.S.A.), after analyzing the data collected from 243 Court Security Incident Reports, was able to develop useful information about the kinds of situations, locations and points in a judicial proceeding that are of higher than average risk.[1] The report's authors reached two conclusions regarding training:

1. Courts and court security officials should carefully analyze the duties traditionally assigned to the bailiff that do not relate to security, and should provide for those duties to be performed by a bailiff with no security duties or by a law clerk appointed by the court. Security duties should be assigned only to those persons who have no other responsibilities in the courtroom.[2]

2. Before entering into court security duties, court security officers should complete the basic training required in their state prior to service as a peace officer or corrections officer, and should complete a separate court security training program.[3]

The authors of the study went on to recommend three-or five-day training programs which they developed as part of the study. **However, N.S.A.'s current research study found that the necessary subject matter cannot be covered in sufficient depth in a three- or five-day program. A minimum** of two weeks of classroom instruction, but preferably four to six weeks, is necessary in order to teach court security and prisoner transportation officers/deputies the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) necessary to function competently and effectively in the routine duties required of their job positions, as well as to respond quickly, correctly and professionally to any emergency or out-of-the-ordinary situations which may occur.

The Survey of the Literature conducted by the N.S.A. Project Staff revealed that the court security and prisoner transportation functions have become much more complex since the 1980s, primarily because of the following reasons:

1. The **"litigation explosion"** has generated many costly lawsuits against law enforcement agencies which allege "negligent training" of personnel; thus, every effort must be made by law enforcement agencies to assure that employees can demonstrate capable performance of the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to perform **each** task in their job description prior to being assigned to perform the job. Those agency administrators who fail to provide the necessary training may find themselves held **vicariously liable** when a subordinate performs negligently and as a result causes harm, or allows harm to be caused, to a prisoner, citizen, court employee or fellow officer/deputy.

2. The United States has become a much more violent nation, and this violence is entering court facilities, occurring on courthouse steps, and making the transportation of prisoners a high-risk task. More intensive training in dealing with high-risk situations, as well as incident prevention measures, is now a necessity.

These recommendations for a longer period of training were reinforced by N.S.A.'s Advisory Board and Staff Review Committee members, as well as the Survey on Priorities, Task Analysis and Needs Assessment discussed in detail in Chapter Three. This chapter contains further discussions of the training needs generated by an analysis of the data in the survey.

How Training Is Provided:

Survey Number 3 (Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Survey on Priorities, Task Analysis and Needs Assessment), which is analyzed in detail in Chapter Three, Section 3, asked respondents **who** provides training in their agency. The 218 survey respondents stated that training is provided by the following sources:

A. Law enforcement academy (52.1%);
B. Correctional academy (19.6%);
C. Court/judicial academy (5.9%);
D. In-house staff (50.7%);
E. (POST) State peace officer standards and training commission (10.0%);
F. College or university (10.5%); and
G. Correspondence course (6.4%).

[Note: These figures add up to more than 100 percent since criminal justice agencies, particularly sheriffs' offices, receive several different types of training programs from a variety of sources. For example, recruit basic training may be provided by a law enforcement academy for 90 percent of the curriculum, supplemented with field training provided by in-house staff for the additional 10 percent of the basic training course. Much in-service training is provided by outside sources, such as one-week workshops and seminars at colleges and universities or special programs offered by the state POST, the National Sheriffs' Association, or the State Sheriffs' Association.]

Content of Current Training Programs:

The Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Survey on Priorities, Task Analysis and Needs Assessment sought information about the **contents** of the training programs currently being offered in the mega, large, medium and small sheriffs' and court agencies participating in the study. The 218 survey respondents were asked to place a check mark next to all subjects in which training is provided, but were **not** asked to indicate at what level the training is conducted (i.e., pre-service, recruit or basic, or in-service). Figure 5-1, "Content of Current Training Programs: Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners," lists the percentages of agencies which do and do not provide training in each subject area.

Figure 5-1

Content of Current Training Programs:

Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners

Survey Findings

Subject Area	Agency Provides Training (Percentages)	Agency Does Not Provide Training (Percentages)
A. Contingency plans:		
1. Transport of prisoners	34.7	64.4
2. Courts	50.2	48.9
3. Buildings	46.6	52.1
B. Evaluation plans:		
1. Transport of prisoners	50.2	48.9
2. Courts	52.1	47.0
3. Buildings	50.2	48.4
C. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation and emergency cardiac care:		
1. Certification	53.4	45.2
2. Re-certification	58.9	39.7
D. Basic first-aid:		
1. Certification	52.5	46.1
2. Re-certification	45.7	53.0
E. Rolling of fingerprints.	44.3	53.4
F. Photographic ability to take detainment/arrest photos.	37.9	61.6
G. Fire protection and containment training.	40.6	58.4

Subject Area	Agency Provides Training (Percentages)	Agency Does Not Provide Training (Percentages)
H. Rescue training.	22.4	77.2
I. Special operations/S.W.A.T./ quick response training.	16.9	82.6
J. Firearms training:	60.3	38.8
1. Certification	62.6	35.6
2. Re-certification	56.6	40.6
3. Day time:	47.5	49.3
a. Handgun	42.5	54.3
b. Rifle	34.2	63.5
c. Shotgun	42.0	55.7
d. Gas/etc.	26.0	72.6
4. Night time:	28.3	69.9
a. Handgun	21.5	78.1
b. Rifle	23.7	75.8
c. Shotgun	12.8	86.8
d. Gas/etc.	16.9	82.2
K. Driving programs:	12.8	86.3
1. Defensive	20.5	78.5
2. C.D.L.	0.0	95.0
3. Van		
4. Bus		
5. Automobile		
6. Aircraft		

Subject Area	Agency Provides Training (Percentages)	Agency Does Not Provide Training (Percentages)
L. Testing of driver (C.D.L.) (15 or more passengers):		
1. 50% drug testing	5.9	93.6
2. 25% alcohol testing	6.8	92.7
M. Restraining devices:		
1. Leg irons	46.1	52.2
2. Waist chains	60.3	36.5
3. Handcuffs	64.4	32.9
4. Flex cuffs	38.4	59.8
5. Leg braces	31.1	68.0
6. Straitjackets	24.7	74.9
7. Straps	24.7	74.4
N. Use of force:		
1. Deadly	54.8	43.8
2. Non-deadly	62.1	35.6
3. Holds (physical)	56.6	41.6
O. Hot pursuits	29.7	70.3
P. Psychiatric and hospitalization procedures.	32.0	66.7
Q. Medical/hospital procedures.	38.4	59.4
R. Female transports.	57.1	40.2
S. Male transports.	58.4	38.8
T. Juvenile transports.	51.1	46.6

Subject Area	Agency Provides Training (Percentages)	Agency Does Not Provide Training (Percentages)
U. Legal process:		
1. Civil	40.2	58.9
2. Financial issues	23.7	75.8
3. Criminal	42.5	56.6
4. Attachments/sales	25.6	73.1
5. Medical commitments	34.2	65.3
V. Special transport situations.	30.6	68.9
W. Railway/commuter - passenger transport training.	0.0	99.5
X. Law Enforcement officials flying on commercial aircraft to include: (training identified):	16.9	83.1
1. Armed	18.3	81.3
2. Non-armed	13.2	86.3
3. Diet needs	16.0	84.0
4. Toilet needs	26.5	72.6
5. Requirements/credentials:	26.5	72.6
a. I/D photo	26.0	73.1
b. Employee signature	20.5	79.0
c. Official document requirement	18.7	80.8
d. Medical emergency	24.2	75.3
e. Evacuation/contingency plans		
f. Check-in procedures		

Subject Area	Agency Provides Training (Percentages)	Agency Does Not Provide Training (Percentages)
g. Baggage procedures	22.8	76.7
h. Ground security	17.4	82.2
i. Pilot-in-command role	11.9	87.7
j. Flight crew role	12.8	86.8

Analysis

More than half of the agencies surveyed are providing training in the following subjects:

1. Developing contingency plans for courts (50.2%)
2. Developing evacuation plans for:
   A. The transportation of prisoners (50.2%);
   B. Courts (52.1%) ; and
   C. Buildings (50.2%).
3. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation and emergency cardiac care certification (53.4%) and re-certification (58.9%).
4. Firearms training:
   A. Certification (60.3%);
   B. Re-certification (62.6%);and
   C. Day-time handgun use (56.6%).

5. Use of some restraining devices, particularly waist chains (60.3%) and handcuffs (64.4%).

6. Use of force:

   A. Deadly force (54.8%);
   B. Non-deadly (62.1%); and
   C. Physical holds (56.6%).

7. Transports:

   A. Female (57.1%);
   B. Male (58.4%); and
   C. Juvenile (51.1%).

Fewer than half of the agencies participating in the survey are providing training in the operation of vehicles, a key area for liability actions in the transportation of prisoners. While it is highly unlikely that most sheriffs' offices would need to train prisoner transportation personnel in how to fly aircraft, it is important to teach them how to safely operate the various types of vehicles used for prisoner transports. Yet the survey found that training is provided in defensive driving techniques by only 23.7 percent of the responding agencies, and only 20.5 percent of respondents teach proper automobile driving techniques. Even fewer agencies provide training in the proper operation of specialized prisoner transportation vehicles: van (16.9%) and bus (12.8%).

Similarly, fewer than half of the agencies surveyed are teaching court security and prisoner transportation employees the proper use of several commonly used restraining devices, again leaving the agency open to liability actions for negligent training. The survey found that fewer than half of the court security and prisoner transport employees are taught to properly apply the following restraining devices:

A. Leg irons (46.1% are taught proper procedures);
B. Flex cuffs (38.4%);
C. Leg braces (31.1%);
D. Straightjacket (24.7%); and
E. Straps (24.7%).

Training Needs Analysis: Minimum Requirements

Based upon the findings of the surveys analyzed in Chapter Three, which present data on the tasks performed most frequently by court security and prisoner transportation deputies/officers, training is **most needed** in the following functions:

A. **Court Facility and Prisoner Transportation Security,** to include:

1. Supervise movement of prisoners or visitors;

2. Apply restraint devices;

3. Submit written reports on any/all complaints when needed in court or transportation incidents;

4. Analyze suspicious activities or behaviors of individuals in the transportation of prisoners or judicial activities;

5. Conduct movement of people within facilities;

6. Participate in security detail in courts, judicial buildings, facilities or other court complex areas;

7. Conduct investigations when needed in court or transportation incidents;

8. Search detainees, prisoners or other persons;

9. Initiate direct action in any/all incidents;

10. Evaluate security needs;

11. Provide escort duties to judicial facilities, medical visits, prisons or jails and the transportation of prisoners;

12. Plan, organize and direct the search of transport vehicles, judicial facilities and courtrooms;

13. Search court buildings and facilities;

14. Conduct security check of detainee/cells, holding cells/rooms;

15. Check detainee/prisoner or visitor property upon entrance/exit of the judicial facilities;

16. Patrol interior perimeter;

17. Issue, or have the care, custody, control and supervision of facilities or transport vehicles' keys;

18. Use and operate security monitoring equipment in courts, judicial buildings and facilities;

19. Supervise property, evidence and weapons or potential weapons entering the judicial facilities;

20. Supervise and document status of detainees or prisoners in holding cells, hospital rooms/wards or court temporary detention cells;

21. Conduct detainee or prisoner counts to verify population under your care, custody, control and supervision;

22. Conduct movement of people outside the facilities;

23. Document periodic inspections of judicial facilities or transport vehicles;

24. Search transport vehicles;

25. Coordinate detainees or prisoners for courts, visitations, programs, counselling or medical visits;

26. Determine priorities for security services;

27. Patrol exterior perimeter;

28. Monitor the remote surveillance devices;

29. Supervise and scan mail packages entering the judicial or court facilities;

30. Supervise usage of elevator service in judicial facilities;

31. Approve and supervise passes for entrance into the judicial facilities; and

32. Supervise or monitor work details within judicial facilities.

B. **Perform Prisoner Service Functions** (both court security and prisoner transport deputies/officers), to include:

1. Answer detainee or prisoner questions and counsel them regarding rules, regulations and responsibilities while they are under your care, custody, control and supervision; and

2. Provide information to authorized persons about the status of the detainee or prisoner.

C. **Transportation of Prisoners**, to include:

1. Assures prisoner transport paperwork is correct;

2. Determines equipment needs;

3. Performs interstate extraditions;

4. Answers transport-related functions;

5. Performs intrastate extraditions;

6. Testifies in court;

7. Verifies documentation that a transport is needed;

8. Develops policies and procedures;

9. Handles notes, memorandums or personnel issues to staff;

10. Determines shift workload requirements;

11. Determines need for overtime or compensatory time;

12. Establishes priorities for transports of females;

13. Reviews reports;

14. Requisitions supplies and equipment;

15. Determines post/staffing level;

16. Establishes priorities for transport of males;

17. Establishes priorities for transport of juveniles;

18. Makes log or turns over notes/documentation;

19. Conducts roll calls to inform staff of events, assignments, concerns, etc.;

20. Drafts memorandums; and

21. Plans, develops or implements policy or its change.

D. **Personnel Management Functions of First/Second Line Supervisors** (both court security and prisoner transport deputies/officers), to include:

1. Discuss employee problems, grievances and suggestions with them;

2. Recognize employee for outstanding performance;

3. Discuss performance, strengths and weaknesses with employees to improve performance;

4. Inspect uniforms and appearance of employees;

5. Discuss employee performance, strengths and weaknesses with any/all personnel;

6. Resolve problems encountered by subordinates;

7. Prepare narrative reports to document employee misconduct;

8. Counsel employee re: work habits, problems, etc., with employees and mutually develop improvement plan;

9. Inspect at irregular intervals to observe work performance;

10. Counsel employees not meeting job performance requirements; and

11. Prepare and discuss appraisals or evaluations privately with employees.

E. **Training and Staff Development Functions** (both court security and prisoner transport deputies/officers), to include:

1. Establish, maintain or upgrade on-the-job training activities;

2. Instruct employee about rules, regulations, case law or other information that may impact transport or facility operations;

3. Study suggestions for training needs;

4. Plan training activities;

5. Conduct formal classroom training;

6. Establish, maintain or upgrade in-service training activities; and

7. Establish, maintain or upgrade field training activities.

F. **Perform Physical Checks, Safety and Sanitation Functions** (both court security and prisoner transport deputies/officers), to include:

1. Inspect vehicles;

2. Conduct inside and/or outside checks for security and safety;

3. Inspect weapons;

4. Inspect doors;

5. Inspect restraint devices;

6. Inspect locks;

7. Inspect security equipment;

8. Inspect scanning devices;

9. Conduct periodic inspections;

10. Inspect alarms;

11. Inspect bars;

12. Inspect cameras;

13. Develop emergency operation plans;

14. Review emergency procedures for fire, riot, medical, disturbance, evacuation or contingency;

15. Plan and conduct emergency evacuation drills; and

16. Replace equipment;

G. **Handle Prisoners who Present Special Problems** (both court security and prisoner transport deputies/officers), to include:

1. Prisoners who suffer from alcohol abuse and/or drug abuse;

2. Prisoners who have a mental illness;

3. Prisoners who are mentally handicapped;

4. Hearing-impaired prisoners;

5. Suicidal prisoners;

6. Juvenile prisoners;

7. Female prisoners;

8. Homosexual prisoners;

9. Gang members (who are either prisoners or who come to the courthouse for trials of gang members);

10. High-risk profile prisoners; and

11. Prisoners with infectious diseases.

In addition N.S.A.'s Survey of the Literature, as well as Advisory Board and Staff Review Committee members, pointed out that the following subjects also should be included in **basic training programs** for court security and prisoner transportation officers/deputies:

A. **The nature of court violence and security threats:** What types of incidents have been occurring throughout the United States? How vulnerable are local facilities to violent acts from individuals or groups? Where have local courts concentrated their security efforts (e.g., strictly on the criminal side,

neglecting juvenile and family courts, which can produce more violent incidents than criminal courts)?

B. **Discussion of the state court system:** Its duties, structure, responsibilities, types of cases handled, caseloads, various types of legal procedures handled by the courts, etc.

C. **Methods of intelligence gathering and threat assessment:** How to develop and implement a systematic program of intelligence and information gathering as part of the court security threat assessment planning and operations processes. These methods should also be taught to officers/deputies assigned to the prisoner transportation function.

D. **How to handle court disruptions:** What to do when a defendant or spectators create a disturbance in the courtroom or on the courthouse premises (e.g., two gangs encountering each other on the courthouse steps and proceeding to fight; the victim's family becoming engaged in a shouting, pushing and shoving match with the defendant's family in a hallway, etc.)

E. **Parking lot, parking garage, sallyport and perimeter security:** To cover such issues as security devices, crimes committed in these areas, access control, patrol techniques, high-intensity lights and after-hours security, etc.

F. **Bomb, weapon and contraband search and identification:** To familiarize trainees with various types of bombs and how they are disguised; how to search for bombs and weapons; and determine where bombs would most likely be placed on court facility premises.

G. **Security devices and how to operate and maintain them:** To cover magnetometers, closed circuit television (CCTV) and monitoring stations, alarms, high-intensity lights, gates, alarmed doors, fire detection equipment, hand-held metal detectors, computer-assisted dispatching systems, etc.

H. **Defensive tactics:** Use of the baton and martial arts devices, use of oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray), electric stun gun, the use-of-force continuum, hand-to-hand combat, and the legal issues surrounding the employment of defensive tactics.

I. **Firearms training and qualification, if this has not been included in a basic law enforcement course:** To include legal issues, use of handgun, use of off-duty weapon, shotgun qualification, and gas gun qualification.

J. **Disguised and concealed weapons:** How to identify "street and prison" weapons; various types of edged weapons; easily concealable handguns; how weapons are hidden in clothing, on the person, and in items the person carries into the courthouse; and the types of weapons which cannot be detected by metal screening devices.

K. **Protecting persons at risk:** Providing for the personal security of judges, prosecutors, witnesses and other potential targets of violence; the principles and techniques of "executive protection;" developing information about potential targets (questionnaires, etc.) in order to protect them from harm; protecting high-profile defendants; threat analysis; and protecting the homes of judges.

L. **Crowd control:** To teach trainees about the various types of crowd situations which may occur on court facility premises; how to assess danger in crowds; how to bring crowds under control; and the skills necessary to defuse demonstrations and riots.

M. **Hostage situations:** Trainees should learn about the various types of hostage incidents which can occur on court facility premises; who will respond to the incident; what to do if they become a hostage; actions to be taken by court security officers as a hostage incident begins to unfold (intervene, do not intervene, notify sheriff's office response team, escort everyone out of the facility, secure the building, etc.).

N. **Emergency procedures:** In addition to learning what to do if there is a fire, bombing or bomb threat, court security trainees should know what action to take in other types of emergency situations which may occur in particular locales, such as tornadoes, earthquakes, blizzards, hurricane-force winds, gas pipeline explosion, truck or train wreck which produces a toxic gas cloud, etc.

O. **High-risk trials:** Policies and procedures to be followed for such trials; role of court security officer; special surveillance procedures; screening visitors to the trial; escorting prisoners to the courtroom; threat assessment and potential for violence; dealing with mentally disturbed defendants; etc.

P. **Sequestered juries:** To instruct trainees in the special procedures, court orders, and reports necessary when a jury is sequestered.

Q. **Role and duties of the bailiff:** To cover general conduct, courtroom decorum, personal appearance, opening court, courtroom preparation, jury responsibilities, records and evidence, firearms policy, and emergency procedures (court security and medical).

The functions and duties listed above should be included in a basic training course for court security and prisoner transportation deputies/officers. These functions and duties have been identified during this research project as either: (1) the most frequently performed tasks and/or (2) special situations which may or may not occur but for which all officers/deputies must be prepared to act quickly and professionally.

These subject areas constitute the **minimum** recommended training needs for all court security and prisoner transportation officers/deputies, **with the following caveats:**

1. Training in other duties and tasks can be added by individual jurisdictions to meet specific local needs and/or to fulfill state-mandated training requirements.

2. When court security and prisoner transportation duties are two distinct areas of employment in a sheriff's office, separate training programs focusing on the specific duties of each job should be offered. If, however, officers/deputies will most likely

serve in both capacities depending upon the available manpower strength of the agency and the need to staff a particular post at a given time, then officers/deputies should be **cross-trained** to perform both the court security and prisoner transportation functions. **This is particularly applicable to smaller agencies.**

3. This is not a curriculum which can be easily taught in 40 hours (or five days). For officers/deputies to grasp the complexity of the subject matter and learn it well, **80 hours (two weeks) is the most likely minimum number of training hours needed; more effective training will be accomplished by lengthening the basic training program to four to six weeks,** depending upon the previous law enforcement training and experience of those selected to serve as court security and prisoner transportation personnel.

The lengthier period of training provides time for practicums in which trainees can practice such "hands-on" subjects as defensive tactics, searching a prisoner, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, perimeter security, operating surveillance devices and magnetometers, escorting a prisoner (fellow trainee) to court, etc.

Agency directors who feel that they cannot afford a four-to-six week training program should consider alternative means of providing the necessary skills development. In this era of costly liability lawsuits, it is wiser to spend the money up front for a well-developed training program which covers all the required job tasks rather than be faced with the possibility of multi-million dollar legal judgments for "negligent training."

Some possible methods of obtaining training if the agency by itself cannot afford a comprehensive four-to-six week training program are:

1. Developing a **regional program** for court security and prisoner transportation officers/deputies in conjunction with several other sheriffs' offices, thereby sharing the costs. The course can be conducted at either a regional law enforcement academy, at an academy operated by a participating sheriff's office, or at a community college.

2. Conducting the minimum recommended two-week academy, followed by on-the-job training under

> the direction of qualified **field training officers (FTOs)**, with periodic one-day or half-day in-service classroom instruction over the course of six months or a year until all the required subjects are thoroughly covered; in other words, teach the four-to-six week program but over a longer period of time.

For legal protection of both the agency and its trainees, **all trainees should be thoroughly tested to make certain that they have learned the necessary knowledge and skills to perform each task correctly.** The agency should keep **complete written records** on all trainees, specifying what they were taught, when, how they tested and whether the trainee was required to keep re-testing until the relevant skills were learned. Such measures can serve to help protect both the officers/deputies and their agencies from legal actions alleging negligence.

CHAPTER FIVE
SECTION TWO

LEGAL ISSUES:
COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

> "The court adjudicates cases, penalizes those found guilty of violating the law and protects the constitutional rights of those brought before it. Violence, or the threat of violence, in the court would have a profound negative impact on the court's ability to function. Therefore, appropriate levels of security should prevail in the court to protect the integrity of court procedures, to protect the rights of the individuals before it, to deter those who would take violent action against the court or litigants, and to sustain the proper decorum and dignity of the court. Appropriate levels of security should also exist outside the court on all court related functions to achieve these same ends." [Ohio Supreme Court Model Security Operations Manual, page III.]

What can be done about violence in courts and courtrooms and who can or should be doing it? These are questions which this section will attempt to answer. [**Note:** Because the laws and statutes governing violence in courts and courthouses vary from state to state and in the Federal system, we are approaching this subject in generic terms, citing those cases which have been used to establish precedent. Sheriffs and judicial personnel should consult their legal staffs for assistance with specific local cases.]

Inherent Power of the Court

The efficient administration of city, county, state, Federal and administrative courts has, since the inception of the United States, been the business of the judicial branch of government. The judges of these courts, acting within their Constitutional jurisdiction, have authority and powers which can be described as **inherent** and incidental to their judicial authority.

The inherent power of a court is not to be used in an arbitrary, extravagant or unwarranted manner. It is to be used reluctantly and only after requests and reason have failed to achieve the needed result of removing an impediment to the court's operation [see 59 A.L.R. 3d 569 for a discussion of the inherent power of a court to order the appropriation or expenditure of public monies for judicial purposes]. Courts have been held to have the inherent power to compel the payment of their operational expenses; the costs of various investigations and examinations; audits, and the payment of expenses related to remodeling or refurbishing courthouses and courtrooms to the extent necessary to

enable them to continue the efficient administration of justice. To hold otherwise would give the legislative branch of government the power to determine the extent to which the judicial branch could perform its responsibilities. All courts, no matter what their jurisdiction, have this inherent power to order the appropriation or expenditure of public funds when there is a vital or necessary need which is not being met.

Courthouse and courtroom security is certainly vital and necessary to the administration of justice and thus is an appropriate subject for the use of inherent powers if the legislative or executive funding authority has failed or refused to meet the perceived needs of the court.

Unruly Defendant

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the case of Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) that a trial judge has three alternatives for dealing with an unruly defendant in the courtroom. Justice Black, writing for the majority, said at page 343:

> "It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. **We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant. . . (1) bind and gag him (defendant) thereby keeping him (defendant) present; (2) cite him (defendant) for contempt; (3) take him (defendant) out of the courtroom until he (defendant) promises to conduct himself (defendant) properly.**"

Searching and Screening

Legal precedent for searching all persons entering the courtroom and requiring them to register for identification purposes was established by the Ohio Court of Appeals in 1934. In Pierpont v. State, 195 N.E. 264 (1934) the Court held: ". . . it does not appear that the public was excluded from the courtroom;

but every person who desired to enter the courthouse and pass the cordon of soldiers was required to have a pass signed by either the judge or the Brigadier General in command of the militia, or both. It does not appear that anyone was excluded who, after search and inquiry, was found to be a person of law abiding intentions. We think the right to a public trial was not denied the defendant in this case."

Other Security Measures

Other cases dealing with security measures include the **shackling and gagging of a defendant** when the necessity of doing so can be shown (see People v. Kimball, 55 P2d 483; and People v. Merkouris, 297 P2d 999).

The presence of a number of **armed guards in the courtroom** may be necessary to assure an orderly trial (see People v. Burwell 279 P2d 744).

When there is reason to believe the defendant might attempt to **escape**, the court could not ignore the defendant's history of escape. It was reasonable to believe that somewhat more than normal precaution was required to assure the defendant's continued presence and to maintain order [see State v. Stabler, 21 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1962)].

It has been held that the state has the power to **preserve the property** under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated (see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)]. Courthouses and courtrooms are certainly property within and under the control of the judicial branch of government and it is well within the authority of the judiciary to use whatever methods are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain those properties in a safe and secure condition.

Show of Armed Force

In the case of Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 580 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the presence of four uniformed and armed state troopers, in addition to two deputy sheriffs and six committing squad officers, was so inherently prejudicial that a defendant (among six defendants) was thereby denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. The court concluded that it did not. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, said that:

> ". . . the deployment of troopers was intimately related to the State's legitimate interest in maintaining custody during the proceedings and thus did not offend the Equal Protection Clause in arbitrarily

> discriminating against those unable to post bail or to whom bail had been denied."

However, consideration should be given to the case of Woods v. Dugger, 923 F2d 1454 (11th Circ.) in 1991 where a defendant alleged he was denied a fair trial due to the hostile atmosphere in the small rural community in which the trial took place and to the number of prisoner guards who attended the trial in full uniform. The court found that viewing the totality of the circumstances, there was no choice but to conclude that there was an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into play. As a result, the court held that the defendant had been denied a fair trial.

Metal Detectors

It has been held that the presence of a magnetometer just outside the courtroom and the presence of two surveillance cameras inside the same courtroom do not deny a defendant the right to a fair trial [see U.S. v. Whitehorse, 710 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1989)]. In that case the Court held that:

> "a magnetometer is no more than a precautionary device to make certain that unbalanced persons and others with an aim bent on mischief or worse will not disrupt the proceedings; it is known to the public as such; and it does not violate defendants' rights."

In addressing the issue of the presence of surveillance cameras, the Court stated that:

> "the purpose of the cameras in the courtroom is to permit Marshals' personnel to observe any disturbance in the well of the court or in the spectator section; to dispatch additional deputy marshals to the scene as needed; and to prepare a tape of any such incident that could later be used to identify those responsible and to serve as evidence should criminal charges be brought.

The Court concluded that:

> "these cameras should not be used for intelligence purposes. A court is a public place where justice is dispensed and it is a place anyone should be able to attend without fear that his attendance will be recorded and used to link him to criminals or others of interest to police or intelligence agencies. Safety from such practices is one of the characteristics distinguishing a free society from a totalitarian one."

McMorris v. Alloto, 567 F2d 897 (1978) is a similar case dealing with a state court. In that case all persons were required to pass through a magnetometer. A visitor who activated the device was free to leave the courthouse without further search and without questioning. If the visitor sought to enter the building, he could empty his pockets of metal and pass through a second time. But if the device continued to activate, he would not be permitted to enter the building without a pat-down search. The officers manning the device also inspected briefcases and parcels in which weapons or explosives could be concealed. The court in that case held that persons entering the courthouse were not physically coerced to submit to the magnetometer search or the briefcase and parcel inspection. They could leave the premises at any time, even after activating the magnetometer. They were given more than one opportunity to pass through the device and even after activating it, a person could not be subjected to a pat-down search unless he fully and voluntarily agreed to it. There was no compulsion to submit. Such a search was consistent with and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Justice v. Elrod, 832 F2d 1048 (1987), is a case which is in agreement with McMorris v. Alloto, supra. That case took the position that the reasonableness of a search depends not only on the need to search but also on how intrusive the search is in relation to the need. (See "Validity, Under Federal Constitution, of Search Conducted as Condition of Entering Public Building," 53 A. L. R. Fed. 888.)

The use of an electronic weapons detector known as a magnetometer and the scientific principals upon which its operation is based have become so accepted that at least one court has taken judicial notice of its accuracy [see U.S. v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (1971)].

Security within the Courtroom

In U.S. v. Whitehorn, supra, the defendants also complained about a courtroom partition which was actually a transparent screen made of plexiglass that separated the spectator section of the courtroom from the bar section. The defendants claimed that the partition was intrusive and an improper means to ensure courtroom security. The court did not agree and held

> ". . . within the bounds of the right of defendants to a fair trial, it is the court that is responsible for the security of the courtroom and it decides, first, whether any special security is needed and second, on the most appropriate security safeguards under the particular circumstance."

The court found that the defendants were not separated in any way by the partition or otherwise from the area occupied by the judge, the jury, the prosecutors and the witnesses; only the

spectators were on the other side of the partition. The partition did not single out the defendants in the courtroom and thus did not deprive them of a fair trial.

Another case dealing with a trial in a secure courtroom is Morgan v. Alspuro, 946 F2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1991). Here the courtroom had a wire-reinforced glass partition and bars separating the spectator area from the court area. The court held that the use of a secure courtroom did not restrain the defendant any more than any other participants in the trial. There was no reason for the jury to infer that the defendant was specifically the reason for the use of the secure courtroom and its use was not inherently prejudicial.

A review of the case law reveals that the U.S. Supreme Court and other Federal courts have upheld security measures that created an atmosphere far more inimical to the interests of a defendant. For example, in Allen v. Montgomery, 728 F2d 1409 (1984), the court held that there was no deprivation of the presumption of innocence where the defendant was brought into the courtroom in handcuffs by a large number of uniformed law enforcement officers. The handcuffs were removed as soon as the defendant was brought into the courtroom and he was not tried in shackles. The court observed that the necessity of courtroom security sometimes outweighs a defendant's rights to stand before the jury untainted by physical reminders of his status as an accused.

In Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F2d 349 (1976), the court held that there was no prejudice and no denial of the right to a fair trial where the defendant was required to be in court in manacles. Ordinarily, a defendant who, absent exceptional circumstances, is forced to stand trial manacled or in prison garb is denied due process. In this case, however, the fact that one or more jurors saw the defendant in manacles did not amount to a denial of constitutional rights, the court held. In Loux v. U.S., 389 F2d 911 (1968), the defendants appeared for trial in shackles which consisted of leg irons, handcuffs and a belt to which the shackles were attached by chains. While they could walk and move their hands, their movements were limited. Here it was held that the facts warranted such action for the protection of everyone in the courtroom and its vicinity. The trial judge in this case held a hearing on the issue of court security and whether to require the defendants to be shackled at trial. He placed his findings and reasons for the action taken on the court record.

Search of Packages or Briefcases

Courts may require that all persons entering a courthouse or courtroom submit any and all packages for inspection for bombs or other potentially harmful devices. Anyone who refuses to voluntarily submit packages, purses or briefcases for examination

may be denied admittance. Such a procedure at a courthouse can be applied to attorneys as well as members of the general public. See Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266 (1971) as well as Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F2d 1230 (1972) for cases dealing with such a requirement at a Federal courthouse. Also see Rhode Island Defense Attorneys Association v. Doo, 463 A2d 1370 (1983).

Other Security Measures

In the case of State v. Peyton, Wash. App. 630 P2d (1981), the defendants complained that certain security measures denied them a fair trial. Specifically, the defendants argued that the court should have granted a mistrial because of the "prison" atmosphere during the trial. They pointed to: (1) the presence of a police dog, which was used to search the courtroom for explosives prior to each day's proceedings and was in view as veniremen arrived in the morning; (2) jurors viewing a pile of handcuffs as they entered the courtroom; and (3) sheriff's deputies using a leash on one defendant as she was escorted from the courthouse during the noon hour (which jurors might have seen). The court held that a trial judge has broad discretion in regulating the conduct of a trial and may authorize reasonable security measures. They found that the judge made a conscientious effort to ensure courtroom decorum and security while affording the defendants a fair trial. The dog and the handcuffs were removed from view after they were brought to the court's attention and the court committed no error in denying a motion for mistrial due to security measures which were not shown to have impeded a fair trial.

Personal Search

In State v. Shelton, 243 S.E. 2d 455 (1987), a person brought a handgun with him when he entered a courthouse for a civil proceeding. The judge had been made aware by a reliable person of the fact that the person would be carrying a gun and was violent. When the person appeared in the hall adjacent to the courtroom, the trial judge ordered that he be searched as a security precaution. A loaded pistol was removed from his person. The court held that the search was reasonable and not in violation of the Constitution. The court found that a trial judge has the inherent power to preserve order in his court and to see that justice is not obstructed by any person or persons. He has the authority to take such measures as appear reasonably necessary to secure orderly proceedings and to preserve the security of those participating in the trial or lawfully attending the proceeding. The exercise of this authority is not inhibited by the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, which is not applicable to a courtroom in the exercise of a trial judge's authority and duty to preserve security and order.

While a great deal of discretion rests with a trial judge in determining when and how to employ security measures, the judge

must be careful to place upon the record his or her reasons for taking action.

Closing a Trial or a Hearing

The Sixth Amendment provides a defendant with the right to a public trial. Before a court can interfere with that right, there must be a finding on the record that: (1) the party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, and (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the hearing and it must make findings adequate to support the closure [see Walter v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984)]. See also "Exclusion of Public from State Criminal Trial in Order to Prevent Disturbance by Spectators or Defendant," 55 A. L. R. 4th 1170, as well as "Exclusion of Public from State Criminal Trial in Order to Avoid Intimidation of Witness," in 55 A.L. R. 4th 1196.

Civil Liability and the Transportation of Prisoners

Use of Deadly Force: In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), held that the use of deadly force by the police to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In so holding, the court set aside a Tennessee statute which authorized the use of "all necessary means" to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon. **The court held that deadly force could be used only when it is necessary to prevent the escape of a suspected felon and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.** In setting aside the common law standard, the court concluded that changes in the legal and technological context mean the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally applied.

Civil Rights Violations: Today, the question of civil liability most often arises as a result of an alleged violation of a party's federally protected rights under 42 USC Sec. 1983. The case of Morrell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) extends that liability to governmental entities as well as individual municipal employees and should be considered whenever official security policies are being developed.

Harm Done By Escaping Prisoner: The courts which have considered the matter of the liability of a public officer or body for harm done by a prisoner permitted to escape appear to recognize that there may be liability in appropriate circumstances to a third person for harm done by such a prisoner.

However, notwithstanding such potential liability, courts have generally found no liability on the ground that the negligent act which permitted the escape was not the proximate cause of the harm which resulted (see 44 A.L.R. 3d 899).

Harm Done By Negligently Released Prisoner: The issue of liability is also raised in cases where an injury is claimed to have resulted or been caused by an individual who was negligently released from custody. Officers generally have been held absolutely immune based on a common law immunity for quasi-judicial acts or on state statutes which specifically provide for immunity from the consequences of released determinations. A few cases have held that the immunity is not absolute but qualified. Gross negligence or a lack of good faith could defeat a claim of immunity (see 5 A.L.R. 4th 773).

Self-inflicted Injury or Suicide By Prisoner: The issue of civil liability is a much closer question when the claim seeks damages from jail or prison authorities for self-inflicted injury or suicide of a prisoner in their care. 79 A.L.R. 1210 addresses this issue in detail. **The general rule is one of reasonable care to keep a prisoner safe from harm.** If authorities know or should know that a prisoner might do harm to himself, then reasonable care must be used to assure that such harm does not occur. There are a number of factors which may come into play. Some of them are the prisoner's mental state (sane or insane, depressed, psychotic), or his physical condition (drunk or sober, helpless or alert). The outcome of such cases naturally depends upon the conduct of the authorities under the circumstances of each case (see also 14 A.L.R. 353).

Injures Caused By One Prisoner Who Assaults Another Prisoner: Closely associated with the question of civil liability for self-inflicted injuries is the question of civil liability for injuries caused to a prisoner who is assaulted by another prisoner. The issue here, absent a defense immunity, is the duty of care owed by sheriffs and other law enforcement officials to prisoners in their charge. That duty is once again **the duty of reasonable care.** The question of civil liability is largely one to be determined in accordance with the facts and circumstances of an individual case (see 41 A.L.R. 3d 1021).

Release of Dangerous Person Without Warning: Questions of civil liability can arise when a potentially dangerous individual is released from custody and no notice of that release or no warning of it has been given to third persons. In cases where there was a promise to warn of the release of an individual or where there was a special relationship between the releasing authorities and the third person that would impose a duty to warn, it has been held that civil liability would exist (see 12 A.L.R. 4th 722).

Injuries as the Result of a Police Chase: Another area of concern for the law enforcement community relates to injuries to third persons as the result of a police chase, such as when an occupant of a motor vehicle is injured or the vehicle itself is damaged as the result of the chase or when a bystander is shot by a police officer attempting to enforce the law. These cases generally allege negligence and thus turn on the particular facts involved in each case. See 4 A.L.R. 44th 865 and 76 A.L.R. 3D 1176 for a more thorough and complete discussion.

Training and Legal Issues: Reference Sources

1. William H. Petersen and Barbara E. Smith, Ph.D., Court Security: Training Guidelines and Curricula. Alexandria, VA: National Sheriffs' Association, 1991, p. 7.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

3. Ibid.

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY



CHAPTER SIX

COURT SECURITY

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CHAPTER SIX

COURT SECURITY

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COURT SECURITY

In its study of court security, the NSA Project Staff focused on the **physical security of court facilities**, particularly the following factors:

1. Defining physical security needs;

2. Conducting a physical security audit;

3. Developing a physical security policy and procedures manual;

4. Assessing risk factors for various types of judicial proceedings; and

5. Protecting judges and other high risk judicial personnel, including sequestered juries.

Defining Physical Security Needs in Court Facilities:

Physical security is a vital component of the overall court security plan. It is basically defined as a system of barriers designed to:

- **Detect** intruders within protected areas and inform security forces of the intruders' presence,

- **Delay** the arrival of intruders at their targets or prevent them from taking any action, and

- **Deter** potential intrusion.[1]

In most jurisdictions, the office of the sheriff provides security services to the judiciary, the court building and related court facilities. However, perimeter security outside the court facility is provided in many jurisdictions by local police departments. This requires that the sheriff's office and the police department work together to develop a comprehensive physical security plan for both the court building and its outside perimeter areas. Members of NSA's Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees stated that this is not done in many jurisdictions, unfortunately. In reality, no physical security plan will function at its maximum level of effectiveness unless all law enforcement agencies involved in various aspects of physical security work together to develop a comprehensive plan which clearly spells out the duties and responsibilities of each agency.

A complete physical security system involves both hardware and trained court security personnel - neither component can be totally effective or reliable when standing alone as the only security system. Physical security hardware includes such components as barriers, lighting and alarm systems, locks, gates, window bars, closed circuit television (CCTV), personnel identification systems, sensor devices and vaults. Trained court security personnel may be sheriff's or law enforcement officers, private security guards working under contract, or a combination of both.

The first component of the physical security system is a **barrier**, which can be:

1. **Natural:** These are topographical features of the building site, and include steep grades, ravines, rivers, etc. They are effective only when used with other types of barriers.

2. **Structural** barriers are man-made and include gates, parking lot access control systems, weapons screening devices, locks which open only when properly coded identification cards are inserted, etc. These barriers are effective only when monitored by trained security personnel, since determined intruders can get around most physical barriers.

3. **Human barriers** are the trained court security personnel who monitor CCTV screens, operate magnetometers, check ID cards and patrol the court facility looking for anything out of the ordinary.

4. **Animal barriers** are trained law enforcement canines which assist court security officers on patrol and act only when given commands by their handlers. Court system security personnel generally use trained dogs only for special situations, for example, searching for bombs and explosives or drugs, and to help with crowd control when there are demonstrations or riots outside a courthouse during a high profile trial.

In the last two decades, there have been drastic changes in the way many court systems function due to the increase of violence in society and threats to judicial personnel, witnesses appearing at trials, juries and victims. Where once courthouses were open and relatively unguarded, many larger urban courthouses today have become fortresses out of necessity. This trend towards increased security for the most part has not filtered down into rural and suburban court systems in many parts of the nation, the NSA Project Staff found. In every state there are courthouses, mostly in rural or semi-rural counties, with many unguarded entrances for court employees and members of the public, primitive physical security systems (e.g., locks on the doors and perhaps a burglar alarm), and

no trained security personnel on duty at entrances to the building or patrolling parking lots. These facilities leave themselves vulnerable not only to violent incidents, which have been occurring in **every** type of jurisdiction in the United States - including rural areas - but also to liability lawsuits for "failure to protect" and negligence.

The local criminal justice agency which is responsible for court security must strike a balance between providing effective security and ensuring that the courts themselves function with a minimum of intrusion from the security system. Basically, the security system, to the maximum extent possible, should not interfere with the activities of the courts which they protect. **The key objective for the security planner is to strike a balance between physical security and the operations of the courts.**

In those courts with little or no security systems in place, physical security can be improved at reasonable costs by adopting some or all of the following measures:

- ♦ External lights, alarms, buzzers, bells;
- ♦ Improved quality of locks, grilles, doors, windows;
- ♦ Intrusion alarms on doors, windows, safes, records rooms, and mechanical rooms;
- ♦ Duress alarms for judicial personnel;
- ♦ Landscaping which eliminates places for intruders to hide, particularly near windows and in parking lots;
- ♦ Fire safety systems;
- ♦ Development of comprehensive written security policies and procedures for the courthouse and facilities; and
- ♦ Training for all judiciary personnel.

One of the major problems which surfaces in any discussion of physical security measures in court facilities is the lack of unified opinions on the need for security. These issues arose over and over again in the NSA Project Staff's meetings with its Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees. Committee members pointed out that security directors, who are constantly aware of the possibilities for violence within the court facility and therefore seek high levels of security protection, are often at odds with judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys, who are more conscious of the rights of those involved in the trial process and who may feel that stringent or overly visible security measures might prejudice juries against defendants. However, when judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys are threatened - as happens more and more frequently in all areas of the United States today - they do not hesitate to insist upon the highest levels of protection possible for themselves. Some judges who have received threats may carry a handgun under their robes while on the bench.

As for citizens who visit court facilities, many prefer to see visible security present, especially since the April 1995 bombing

of the Federal building in Oklahoma City, which brought home to the nation the recognition that life as we used to know it in the United States is no longer what it once was: no place is safe from crime, terrorism and the threat of danger. As a consequence of Oklahoma City, citizens have come to expect high levels of security in certain public places, such as airport terminals and government buildings, and become alarmed when security is not visible. Citizens are learning to accept security measures that are "reasonable" with few complaints.

The Oklahoma City massacre, combined with several assassinations of judges and prosecutors in recent years, has also helped to convince judges and prosecutors of the importance of security measures.

The key to gaining support for a secure court facility is to strike a balance between the needs of the various interest groups. To do this, it is essential that court security planners consult with judicial personnel and defense attorneys (such as the local bar association) in planning for security needs.

Cooperation often is the key to developing a security system that is effective and has the support of those who will benefit from the system. Attempting to impose draconian security measures in an authoritarian manner may backfire, with judicial employees finding ways to circumvent security and refusing to cooperate with the security staff's efforts to protect them.

Conducting a Physical Security Survey:

The physical security survey is a primary component of any effective court security program. **It is not a one-time task, but must be on-going in order to assure continuity.** The purpose of the on-site physical security survey is to determine the present security status of the court facility complex (including outdoor perimeter areas), identify a lack of or an excessive amount of security and discover what protection is needed and how best to meet the need in a cost effective manner.

The comprehensive physical security survey is the first step in developing or improving a security program. It provides the facts necessary for the development of three necessary components of the court facility security program:

1. The security plan;

2. The court security policy and procedures manual, and

3. Standard operational procedures.

How to develop and conduct a physical security survey was described in detail in NSA's 1978 publication, *Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures*.[2] The key points are summarized below.

Survey Elements: A comprehensive physical security survey takes into account all aspects of a building and its nearby grounds, including both internal and external spaces, structural features, equipment, and the activities of building occupants. The elements include:

1. **Structure:** This includes all outside and inside building elements, e.g., lighting, doors, windows, entrances, hallways, stairways, offices, courtrooms, service areas, temporary holding cells, safes, vaults and records storage areas. The survey should include all spaces, including both public and restricted or controlled areas, regardless of their tenants.

2. **Equipment:** The availability and use of equipment and technology is a key aspect of physical security. A survey should identify the types of technology and equipment used, their effectiveness, and possible equipment needs.

3. **Perimeter:** Areas near the court building that may influence security, including parking spaces, public parks around the courthouse (often found in smaller communities), fences, gates and lighting.

4. **Noncourt Tenants:** When a courthouse is also occupied by noncourt agencies, it is better to conduct a comprehensive, building-wide survey rather than one limited to court areas. Many jurisdictions limit the study to courts and their related functions, but this could cause serious gaps in overall building security. The needs of all occupants can best be met by including them in the survey. It is important to convince noncourt agencies of the benefits of participating, and that the security survey can perform a needed service at minimal cost by identifying weaknesses and potential problems. Tenants with a strong internal security operation should participate through a joint venture arrangement, for example, as their special skills may contribute significantly to the overall study.

5. **Work Schedules**: Survey personnel should be thoroughly acquainted with the normal operating hours of all building occupants. Also important are the hours for closing all or part of a certain floor or the entire building, weekend operations, and any special

considerations (such as use of building space for civil functions).

Survey Activities: The survey's ultimate success depends upon how complete the basic pre-survey activities are. To ensure that the physical security survey is effective, it should include the following elements:

1. **Describe Survey Goals and Objectives:** The goals statement should be general, e.g., "to improve overall physical security by identifying specific areas needing attention and by recommending necessary courses of action." **Objectives** always must be realistic and achievable. They may include, for example, increasing security for the courtrooms, judges, and jurors; defining circulation patterns for prisoners, court officials, and the public; reducing thefts; developing a comprehensive alarm system; improving emergency response time; upgrading the security system by purchasing equipment; and improving temporary detention facilities or holding cells.

2. **Identify Authorizing Agency or Individual and Determine Responsibility for Carrying Out Recommendations:** The survey may have been authorized by the presiding judge, sheriff, court administrator, or county/city board of supervisors, commissioners or freeholders. One of those authorities may have to carry out the survey recommendations. There should be a clear intent to act on those recommendations, which may mean spending money and/or making manpower adjustments. Those requesting the study should understand that costs for implementing recommendations should be included in a regular budget or a special appropriation request. Similarly, the agency that will carry out survey recommendations needs a thorough understanding of the budget process and any fiscal limits which may affect implementation. For example, funds may be needed for more than one year. When there is a serious budget crisis locally, funds to conduct a physical security survey in the court system and implement the recommendations may be available through state participation in Federal criminal justice grant programs. To learn whether such funding is available, local court officials should contact the state criminal justice coordinating council or planning agency. In addition, technical assistance to develop and conduct a physical security survey often is provided by regional offices of the U.S. Marshal's Service.

3. **Select the Team:** The best qualified people available should be on the survey team. The groups should include persons with specialized skills (e.g., in communications

or alarms) and those with experience in managing and conducting security programs. Technical knowledge in court security methods would be desirable. Previous survey experience is helpful but not required. Team members may be drawn from other governmental agencies or private consultants could be hired. There should be security practitioners used in all aspects of the team work. Team members should be able to communicate well with others and other court personnel.

4. **Develop a Format**: Physical security experts have tried to develop a single model survey format and have concluded that this is not possible. We have included in this chapter a model survey instrument to use when conducting a physical security survey in a court facility (see Figure 6:1, Courthouse Security Audit).

5. **Gather Data**: Much information about a building is already available and can be gathered by the team before the actual survey begins. This information may include:

   - ♦ Previous survey reports or studies;
   - ♦ Floor plans from the building's engineers, manager or architect;
   - ♦ Inventory of all security equipment;
   - ♦ Incident reports from sheriffs or other local law enforcement or peace officers;
   - ♦ Operating regulations for the building;
   - ♦ Traffic volume (number of visitors, defendants, etc.) and number of trials (jury, non-jury);
   - ♦ Security or operating procedures established by the sheriff or building tenants; and
   - ♦ The community's fire code.

6. **Conduct the Survey**: Two or more people should conduct the survey whenever possible. This encourages the use of specialized skills in evaluating specific areas (e.g., fire safety and prevention, communications, integrated computer-based security systems and alarms) Teamwork also reduces the time needed to conduct the survey, evaluate findings, develop recommendations, and prepare the final report. The team concept helps stimulate thoughts and ideas, allowing professionals to discuss

their ideas with one another. Better recommendations often result. Along with the survey questionnaire, other aspects of the survey are personal observation, interviews and gathering documents not previously collected. In large multistory buildings, it usually is better to conduct the survey floor by floor. This may seem repetitious, but this meticulous procedure usually gives survey staff a clearer understanding of findings. It helps them develop better recommendations and offers a logical separation of security needs by tenant areas. The equipment inventory also should be verified at this time. All notes and questionnaires should be saved as part of the permanent record and as reference material. These materials should be combined with information collected in the pre-survey activities; the combined materials will be the basis for the final report.

Whether using the detailed Courthouse Security Audit developed by the NSA Project Staff or an audit form developed in-house, the following areas of a court facility and its premises should be inspected:

1. **Exterior:**

- ♦ Perimeter
- ♦ Lights
- ♦ Parking areas
- ♦ Landscaping
- ♦ Exterior walls, windows, doors, sallyport entrances

2. **Building:**

- ♦ Doors, windows, other openings
- ♦ Ceiling and walls
- ♦ Emergency power systems
- ♦ Alarms and integrated alarm access control systems
- ♦ Fire protection system
- ♦ Attic, basements, crawl spaces, air conditioning, ventilation and heating systems
- ♦ Elevator, escalators, dumb waiters, etc.
- ♦ Storage areas, armories and dangerous substance storage areas
- ♦ Community areas
- ♦ Records storage areas
- ♦ Public areas (waiting rooms, restrooms, hallway and visiting or interview areas)
- ♦ Offices which handle money (fines and fees)

- ♦ Maintenance rooms
- ♦ Evidence storage rooms
- ♦ Sallyports and underground garages

3. **Courtrooms and Related Areas:**

- ♦ Courtrooms
- ♦ Courtroom doors, windows and other openings
- ♦ Courtroom lights
- ♦ Courtroom air conditioning, ventilation and heating systems
- ♦ Courtroom furnishings
- ♦ Courtroom security devices
- ♦ Judge's chambers and related offices
- ♦ Witness waiting rooms
- ♦ Attorney-client conference rooms
- ♦ Jury deliberation rooms
- ♦ In-custody defendant reception
- ♦ Restricted and secured passageways
- ♦ Temporary holding areas
- ♦ Security equipment storage areas

1, COURTHOUSE SECURITY AUDIT

Adapted from the National Sheriff's Association Physical Security Checklist.

COURT:

I. EXTERIOR

A.	Perimeter (e.g., fences, gates)	YES	NO		N/A
1.	Is the perimeter of the courthouse grounds clearly defined by a fence, wall or other type of barrier?				
2.	Does the barrier limit or control vehicle or pedestrian access to the courthouse?				
3.	Are gates solid and not in need of repair?				
4.	Are gates locked properly?				
5.	Are gate hinges secure?				
	TOTAL			Out of	

B.	Lights	YES	NO		N/A
6.	Is the entire perimeter lighted?				
7.	Are lights on all night?				
8.	Are light fixtures suitable for outside use (i.e., weather and tamper resistant)?				
9.	Are lights and wiring inspected regularly?				
10.	Are exterior lights electronically controlled?				
11.	Are exterior light control switches inaccessible to unauthorized persons?				
12.	Do exterior or perimeter lights have an emergency auxiliary power source?				
13.	Excluding parking areas, are the building grounds:				
a	Fully illuminated?				
b	Partially illuminated?				
c	Not illuminated?				
14.	Is the exterior of the building (particularly entry points) sufficiently lighted to discourage unlawful entry attempts or placement of explosives against the walls?				
15.	Are public areas (including parking spaces and walkways) sufficiently lighted to discourage attacks against persons or vehicles?				

C	Parking Areas	YES	NO		N/A
16.	Is entry to and exit from parking lots or garages controlled by:				
a	A guard?				
b	An electronically operated gate?				
c	Other - Specify:				
d	Not controlled				
17.	Are adequate communications equipment and alarms located at guard stations in parking lots or garages?				
18.	Are guard or escort services provided for one hour before and one hour after normal business hours?				
19.	Are parking lots or garages monitored by CCTV?				
20.	Are frequent inspection made of parking lots or garages not guarded or monitored through CCTV?				
21.	Is there reserved parking for judges?				
22.	Is there reserved parking for court staff?				
23.	Is there reserved parking for jurors and witnesses?				
24.	Are reserved parking areas closed or locked during non-business hours?				
25.	Are reserved parking lots protected by a fence?				
26.	Are reserved parking areas clearly designated with:				
a	"RESERVED" signs?				
b	Numbers?				
c	Names?				
27.	Is emergency vehicle access to the court house unobstructed by reserved parking spaces or other temporary or permanent barriers?				
28.	Is there direct access for judges from parking lots or garages to non-public entrances, elevators or restricted corridors?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

D.	Landscaping	YES	NO		N/A
29.	Are landscape features designed such that there is no place for potential intruders to hide?				
30.	Are the court grounds free of items such as bricks, stones, or wooden fences pickets which could be used by intruders as weapons, missiles or tools?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

I.	EXTERIOR	
A.	Perimeter	out of
B.	Lights	out of
C.	Parking	out of
D.	Landscaping	out of
TOTAL		out of

II. BUILDING

A.	Doors, Windows, Other Openings	YES	NO		N/A
1.	Are all exterior doors at least 1 3/4 inch solid core wood, metal clad or metal?				
2.	Are all exterior doors properly equipped with cylinder locks, deadbolts, or quality padlocks and hasps?				
3.	Are all exterior doors equipped with intrusion alarms?				
4.	Are all hinge pins internally located, welded, or otherwise treated to prevent easy removal?				
5.	Are doors with panic, or emergency, hardware also fitted with anti-intrusion bars?				
6.	Do doors with panic locks have auxiliary locks for use when the building is not occupied?				
7.	Are exterior door frames built or locks designed so the door cannot be forced by spreading the frame?				
8.	Are exterior door locks firmly mounted so that they cannot be pried off?				
9.	Are exterior door bolts protected or constructed so that they cannot be cut?				
10.	Are exterior door padlock hasps installed so that the screws cannot be removed?				
11.	Are exterior door padlock hasps made with a grade of steel difficult to cut?				
12.	Are all unused doors permanently locked?				
13.	Are windows which could be used for entry protected with locks, metal bars or mesh?				
14.	Are window bars and mesh securely fastened to prevent easy removal?				
15.	Are windows that could be used for entry fitted with intrusion alarms?				
16.	Are windows on the ground floor made of tempered glass or ballistic plastic?				
17.	Are all windows not needed for ventilation permanently sealed or locked?				
18.	Are openings to the roof (doors, skylights, etc.) securely fastened or locked from the inside?				
19.	Do roof openings have intrusion alarms?				
20.	Is internal access to the roof controlled?				
21.	Is the roof inaccessible by means of a fire escape, another building, a pole, a tree, or other structure?				
22.	Are openings to the building (e.g., tunnels, utility/sewer manholes, service ports, etc.) properly secured?				
23.	Is a key control system in effect?				
24.	Are building entrance keys issued on a limited basis?				
25.	Are master keys kept securely locked and issued on a strictly controlled basis?				
26.	Can the key-control officer replace keys and locks at his/her discretion?				
27.	Are all keys clearly stamped "Do Not Duplicate"?				
28.	Is the number of entrance doors in use reduced to the minimum possible?				
29.	Do judges and court officers have a private entrance to the building?				
	TOTAL			Out of	

B.	Ceilings and Walls	YES	NO		N/A
30.	Do all interior walls extend to the ceiling?				
31.	Are all ceilings permanently fixed (i.e., not drop or removable)?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

C.	Emergency Power System	YES	NO		N/A
32.	Is the main power source dependable?				
33.	Is there a dependable auxiliary power source for emergencies?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

D.	Alarms	YES	NO		N/A
34.	Does the courthouse have an intrusion alarm system?				
35.	Does the intrusion alarm system meet Underwriters' Laboratories standards?				
36.	Is the intrusion alarm system regularly tested?				
37.	Is the intrusion alarm system covered by a service and maintenance contract?				
38.	Does the intrusion alarm system terminate in:				
a	the sheriff's or other local law enforcement office?				
b	a commercial control station?				
c	other location? specify:				
39.	Is there an auxiliary power source for all alarm systems?				
40.	Does the auxiliary power source automatically feed power to the alarm system?				
41.	Are records maintained of all alarm signals (e.g., time, date, location, cause, and action taken)?				
42.	Is the response to alarms in terms of time and manpower acceptable?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

E.	Fire Protection	YES	NO		N/A
43.	Does the courthouse comply with local fire codes?				
44.	Does the fire Marshall routinely inspect the courthouse?				
45.	Did the fire Marshall approve the courthouse at the last inspection?				
46.	Does the courthouse have fire alarms?				
47.	Does the courthouse have smoke detectors?				
48.	Does the courthouse have a sprinkler system?				
49.	Does the courthouse have fire extinguishers?				
50.	Does the courthouse have interior emergency fire hoses?				
51.	Does the courthouse have an adequate water supply?				
52.	Does the courthouse have standpipes?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

F.	Attic, Basement, Crawl Spaces, Air-conditioning and Heating Ducts.	YES	NO		N/A
53.	Do basement doors have intrusion alarms?				
54.	Are basement doors securely fastened or locked when not in use?				
55.	Are basements, utility rooms, boiler rooms, crawl spaces, and attics locked when not in use?				
56.	Are utility and plumbing access plates and doors locked or sealed when not in use?				
57.	Are air-conditioning and heating vent openings in public areas secure from tampering?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

G.	Elevators (multi-floor courthouse facilities only)	YES	NO		N/A
58.	Are private elevators provided for judicial officers?				
59.	Are certain elevators used exclusively for moving in-custody defendants?				
60.	Are in-custody defendant elevators marked "Not for Public Use"?				
61.	Is a key required to access and operate in-custody defendant elevators?				
62.	Are in-custody defendant elevators programmed to by-pass floors?				
63.	Are in-custody defendants separated from transport officers by metal bars or grilles within the elevator?				
64.	Are in-custody defendant elevators equipped with alarms or telephones or monitored by CCTV?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

H.	Storage Areas for Arms and Dangerous Substances	YES	NO		N/A
65.	Are all dangerous items such as weapons, ammunition, tear gas, and narcotics stored in a restricted and secure storage area?				
66.	Does the storage area have an intrusion alarm?				
67.	Is the storage area door solidly constructed?				
68.	Are hinge pins internally located, welded or otherwise treated to prevent removal?				
69.	Does the storage area door have an adequate lock?				
70.	Do windows in the storage area have steel bars or mesh or are windows permanently sealed?				
71.	Is the storage area adequately ventilated?				
72.	Does the storage area have smoke detectors and/or heat sensors?				
73.	Does the storage area have a sprinkler system?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

I.	Communications	YES	NO		N/A
74.	Is there more than one communications system used exclusively for security purposes?				
75.	Radios in the courthouse consist of:				
a	Sheriff's or local law enforcement base station				
b	Unit in security or bailiff office which nets to law enforcement base station.				
c	Hand held portables used by bailiffs, security or law enforcement officers.				
76.	Radios in the courthouse net with:				
a	Local law enforcement				
b	Sheriff's Office				
c	State Police				
77.	Is a service and maintenance contract in effect for radio equipment?				
78.	Do base stations have an auxiliary power source?				
79.	Is there a duress code signal?				
80.	Do all telephones go through a building switchboard?				
81.	Does the switch board have any security safeguards?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

J.	Records Storage Areas	YES	NO		N/A
82.	Do records storage areas have smoke detectors and/or heat sensors?				
83.	Are there sprinkler systems in all records storage areas?				
84.	Are storage areas where current records are located secured or locked during non-business hours?				
85.	Are records storage areas inaccessible to unauthorized persons?				
86.	Are check-out procedures in use for all records?				
87.	Is space available in or near the clerk's office for the public to review documents?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

K.	Public Areas (Waiting rooms, restrooms, hallways, etc.)	YES	NO		N/A
88.	Are public waiting rooms routinely searched?				
89.	Are waiting rooms inaccessible to courtrooms via drop or removable ceilings?				
90.	Are public restrooms routinely searched?				
91.	Are public restrooms inaccessible to courtrooms via drop or removable ceilings?				
92.	Are trash receptacles constructed to deter concealment of contraband?				
93.	Are emergency exit routes clearly posted in all public area?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

L.	Offices Handling Money	YES	NO		N/A
94.	Does the cashier's window have security features?				
95.	Is cash deposited daily so that large amounts are not kept in the office overnight or on weekends?				
96.	Is there and adequate safe, vault, or strongbox?				
97.	Is the safe approved by Underwriters' Laboratories?				
98.	Are safes weighing less than 750 pounds securely fastened to the floor, wall or set in concrete?				
99.	Are combinations changed when personnel leave?				
100.	Is the safe or vault protected by an intrusion alarm?				
101.	Is there a duress alarm in these offices?				
102.	Is the response to an alarm in terms of time and manpower adequate?				
103.	Are bank deposits handled by an armored car service or are employees escorted by an armed guard?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

M.	Courthouse Procedures	YES	NO		N/A
104.	Is there a security procedures manual for the courthouse?				
105.	Is the manual regularly updated and revised?				
106.	Are emergency plans current?				
107.	Is responsibility for declaring an emergency clearly fixed?				
108.	Is the authority and chain of command in emergency plans clear and accurate?				
109.	Are all emergency plans subject to periodic review and revision?				
110.	Is there a procedure for handling medical emergencies involving the general public?				
111.	Is first aid equipment, including oxygen, provided throughout the courthouse?				
112.	Is first aid equipment periodically checked and tested?				
113.	Is there a designated security officer for the courthouse?				
114.	Is there a security guard on duty after normal working hours?				
115.	Is there a procedure for routine daily inspection of the courthouse?				
116.	Are all courthouse tenants given periodic training on the various emergency procedures?				
117.	Are periodic fire and evacuation drills held?				
118.	Are periodic security training sessions held with:				
a	Judges?				
b	Attorneys?				
c	Court staff and other courthouse tenants?				
d	Supervisory personnel?				
e	Custodial personnel?				
119.	Are security procedures coordinated with appropriate local, state, and federal agencies?				
120.	Are written support agreements with other agencies in effect?				
121.	Are public, private, and in-custody defendant circulation patterns separate and well defined?				
122.	Is there routine inspection of packages and shipments entering the courthouse?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

II.	BUILDING	
A.	Doors, Windows, Other Openings	out of
B.	Ceilings and Walls	
C.	Emergency Power System	
D.	Alarms	
E.	Fire Protection	
F.	Attic, Basements and Crawl Spaces	
G.	Elevators	
H.	Dangerous Items Storage Areas	
I.	Communications	
J.	Records Storage Areas	
K.	Public Areas	
L.	Offices Handling Money	
M.	Courthouse Procedures	
TOTAL		out of

III. COURTROOM(S) AND RELATED AREAS

A.	Courtroom(s): Location	YES	NO		N/A
1.	Are spaces above, below and next to courtrooms controlled so as not to represent a security hazard?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

B.	Courtroom(s): Doors, Windows and Other Openings	YES	NO		N/A
2.	Are all unused doors secured?				
3.	Are the keys to all doors strictly controlled?				
4.	Are there separate entrances in the courtroom(s) for:				
a	Judges?				
b	In-custody defendants?				
c	Spectators?				
5.	Is the in-custody defendant door far enough from public seating to prevent passing contraband?				
6.	Are all windows draped to obscure vision (particularly of the bench) from outside?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

C.	Courtroom(s): Lights	YES	NO		N/A
7.	Is there emergency lighting?				
8.	Are lights key controlled?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

D.	Courtroom(s): Furnishings	YES	NO		N/A
9.	Is the main area or well separated from the spectator seating by a barrier?				
10.	Is the judge's bench closed at both ends to restrict access from the well?				
11.	Are the defendant's chair and the witness chair built to allow the use of restraints?				
12.	Are spectator seats solidly built and fastened to the floor?				
13.	Are potential weapons, such as drinking glasses, water carafes, etc. kept out of the defendant's reach?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

E.	Courtroom(s): Security Devices	YES	NO		N/A
14.	Are metal detectors available for use?				
15.	Are duress alarm buttons installed at:				
a	The bench?				
b	The clerk's station?				
c	The bailiff's station?				
d	Chambers?				
e	The judge's secretary's desk?				
f	Other? specify:				
16.	Does the duress alarm have an audio monitor capability?				
17.	Is the response to the duress alarms in terms of time and manpower acceptable?				
18.	Are routine checks made of:				
a	Alarms?				
b	Emergency lighting?				
c	Metal detectors?				
19.	Is the bench reinforced to make it bullet resistant?				
20.	Do all courtrooms have a telephone?				
21.	Do all courtroom have a public address system?				
22.	Do all courtrooms have a radio transmitter?				
23.	Are all bailiffs equipped with a portable transceiver?				
24.	Do the transceivers net with:				
a	Sheriff's or local law enforcement base station?				
b	Security office?				
c	Other? specify:				
25.	Are additional restraining devices available for use in the courtroom?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

F.	Courtroom(s): Security Procedures	YES	NO		N/A
26.	Is there a policy governing the carrying of firearms into the courtroom(s) by:				
a	Bailiffs?				
b	Law enforcement officer witnesses?				
c	Law enforcement officer spectators?				
27.	Are armed bailiffs, sheriffs deputies, or other security personnel present in the courtroom(s)?				
28.	Are bailiffs in uniform?				
29.	Are in-custody defendants kept in restraints except when in the courtroom(s)?				
30.	Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation from the courtroom(s) of:				
a	In-custody defendants?				
b	Judges?				
c	Jurors?				
31.	Do bailiffs understand procedures for emergency evacuation of in-custody defendants from the courtroom(s)?				
32.	Is there a procedure for a search screen operation for entry to the courtroom(s)?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

G.	Judge's Chambers and Related Offices	YES	NO		N/A
33.	Are judge's chambers routinely searched for contraband?				
34.	Is visitor access to chambers controlled by clerks, bailiffs and/or secretaries?				
35.	Are suspicious packages or letters examined before delivery to the judge(s)?				
36.	Do chambers have more than one means of entry and exit?				
37.	Do chambers doors have automatic closing and locking hardware?				
38.	Are chambers routinely locked when the judge is not present?				
39.	When occupied by the judge, are chambers doors usually closed or locked?				
40.	Are outside views, particularly of judges desks, obscured?				
41.	Are judges routinely escorted between parking areas, chambers and courtroom?				
42.	Are judges routinely escorted between parking areas, chambers and courtroom during high-risk trials?				
43.	Do chambers have duress alarms?				
44.	Is the response capability to alarms in terms of time and manpower acceptable?				
45.	Are judges prohibited from carrying firearms or keeping them in chambers or at the bench?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

H.	Witness Waiting Room(s)	YES	NO		N/A
46.	Are witness waiting rooms provided?				
47.	Is it possible to separate prosecution/plaintiff and defense witnesses?				
48.	Is public access to waiting rooms restricted?				
49.	Are waiting room light switches located inside the waiting rooms?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

I.	Attorney-Client Conference Room(s)	YES	NO		N/A
50.	Are rooms provided in the courthouse for attorney-client conferences?				
51.	Are these rooms secure?				
52.	Do the rooms have fixed ceilings (i.e., not drop or removable)?				
53.	Can the rooms be locked?				
54.	Are the rooms routinely searched for contraband before and after use?				
55.	Do the conference room doors have windows?				
56.	Are conference rooms which are used for in-custody defendant conferences equipped with restraining devices?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

J.	Jury Deliberation Room(s)	YES	NO		N/A
57.	Are jury deliberation rooms next to the courtroom(s) or accessible through a controlled, non-public, hallway?				
58.	Are jury deliberation rooms devoid of windows?				
59.	Are all windows in the jury deliberation room(s) draped?				
60.	Are restrooms provided as an integral part of the jury deliberation room(s)?				
61.	Are jury deliberation room soundproofed well enough to prevent unauthorized persons from eavesdropping?				
62.	Are jury deliberation rooms routinely searched for contraband before occupancy?				
63.	Are jury deliberation rooms locked when unoccupied?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

K.	In-Custody Defendant Reception Areas	YES	NO		N/A
64.	Are in-custody defendants brought directly from the jail to the courthouse by means of a secure elevator, stairway, tunnel, or hallway?				
65.	Do in-custody defendants brought from outside the courthouse enter through a private entrance or sally port?				
66.	Is there more than one means for vehicles to exit from the area?				
67.	Is the area equipped with gates that can close the are to the public?				
68.	Are gates electronically controlled from a remote station?				
69.	Is an interlocking system used so that the outer gate can be closed and locked before the door to the building is opened?				
70.	Is this area monitored by CCTV?				
71.	Is this area used exclusively for moving in-custody defendants?				
72.	Is the entrance for in-custody defendants out of public view?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

L.	Restricted and Secured Passageways	YES	NO		N/A
73.	Are restricted passages used by judges and court staff?				
74.	Are restricted or secure passageways monitored by CCTV?				
75.	Are law enforcement officers required to leave guns in locked cabinets before entering restricted or secure passages?				
76.	Are restricted passageways locked with keys that either cannot normally be duplicated commercially or are clearly marked "Do Not Duplicate"?				
77.	Are keys to secure passageways issued only to sheriff's or security personnel?				
78.	Are security staff forbidden to remove secure passageway keys from the building?				
79.	Are stairways used for in-custody defendant movement adequately lighted?				
80.	Are stairways and stairwells used for in-custody defendant movement enclosed with protective metal grilles?				
81.	Are stairways used for in-custody defendant movement monitored by CCTV?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

M.	Temporary Holding Areas	YES	NO		N/A
82.	Are temporary holding facilities located in the courthouse?				
83.	Are in-custody defendants moved from the reception area to a temporary holding area by a secure or restricted passageway?				
84.	Do temporary holding cells open directly into either a courtroom or a restricted passageway?				
85.	Are adequate toilet facilities available for in-custody defendants?				
86.	Are lights for temporary holding cells controlled from outside of the cells?				
87.	Do cells have emergency lights?				
88.	Do cell doors have observation ports?				
89.	Is at least one holding cell equipped for audio and/or visual coverage of courtroom proceedings?				
90.	Are cell doors locked electrically?				
91.	Are cell doors locked and unlocked from a remote command center?				
92.	Are keys to temporary holding cells issued only to sheriff's and security personnel?				
93.	Are temporary holding area locked with keys which cannot normally be duplicated commercially or are clearly stamped "Do Not Duplicate"?				
94.	Are cells and areas used by in-custody defendants routinely searched for contraband before and after use?				
95.	Are cells built securely and in a way that reduces opportunities for self-inflicted injuries by defendants?				
96.	Are law enforcement officers required to leave guns in locked cabinets before entering temporary holding areas?				
97.	Are in-custody defendants kept in restraints except when in the cell?				
98.	Are additional restraining devices available?				
99.	Are telephones available?				
100.	Are juvenile and adult defendants routinely separated?				
101.	Are female and male defendants routinely separated?				
102.	Are defendant feeding procedures designed to prevent escape opportunities?				
103.	Are there procedures for the emergency evacuation of in-custody defendants form temporary holding areas?				
104.	Do security and transportation officers understand procedures for emergency evacuation of in-custody defendants from temporary holding areas?				
105.	Is there a procedure for handling medical emergencies of in-custody defendants held in temporary holding areas?				
	TOTAL		Out of		

N.	Security Equipment Storage Area	YES	NO		N/A
106.	Is the number of weapon cabinets adequate?				
	Are weapon storage areas locked with keys that cannot normally be duplicated commercially or are clearly marked "Do Not Duplicate"?				
		TOTAL		Out of	

III.	COURTROOM(S) AND RELATED AREAS	
A.	Courtrooms: Location	out of
B.	Courtrooms: Doors, Windows, etc.	
C.	Courtrooms: Lights	
D.	Courtrooms: Furnishings	
E.	Courtrooms: Security Devices	
F.	Courtrooms: Security Procedures	
G.	Judges Chambers & Related Offices	
H.	Witness Waiting Rooms	
I.	Attorney-Client Conference Rooms	
J.	Jury Deliberation Rooms	
K.	Defendant Reception Areas	
L.	Restricted and Secure Passageways	
M.	Temporary Holding Areas	
N.	Security Equipment Storage Area	
TOTAL		out of

Survey Report: The final report is the most important component of the court security audit. It is a permanent record of findings, conclusions and recommendations and may include an implementation plan. The report gives management a clear understanding of current security conditions and what changes are needed. It provides a basis for improving security through additional manpower, training and equipment as well as structural changes. The survey report format is a matter of preference, and there are many acceptable styles. However, remember that the value of a report is lessened if it is not clear, concise, easy to read and well organized. A suggested format includes:

1. Background

   - ♦♦ Requesting agency and authority to conduct survey
   - ♦♦ Purpose of survey
   - ♦♦ Survey team
   - ♦♦ Dates survey conducted
   - ♦♦ Previous surveys and studies and preliminary assessment of security threats
   - ♦♦ The facility

     - Description
     - Agency responsible for security
     - Tenant agencies
     - Summary of security incidents

2. Summary of findings and conclusions

3. Summary of recommendations

4. Detailed findings, conclusions and recommendations

5. Appendices

   - ♦♦ Tenant agencies
   - ♦♦ Courtroom sketches
   - ♦♦ Security equipment inventory
   - ♦♦ Funding implications (by agency and category)
   - ♦♦ Other information which is pertinent

Agency Responsibilities for Implementing the Security Plan: In most jurisdictions, the sheriff's office has been designated as the agency which provides security for the courts. Thus, the sheriff will be responsible for implementing the recommendations of the court security plan. However, in order to implement a plan which is effective, the sheriff (or his designated court security management team) should meet with all officials in the court system whose operations will be affected by the security plan, including

judges, prosecutors, public defenders, the court administrator, probation and parole agency chiefs, clerk of the court, etc. At these meetings the sheriff and/or his staff will present implementation plans for the court security program, seek comments and suggestions from those who will be affected by the plan, and discuss basic mutual objectives. Especially helpful is a work plan describing resources and time frames to implement various phases of the program.

The sheriff must develop a follow up plan for periodic inspections. Many well conceived court security programs ultimately fall apart because no one assumed responsibility for periodic inspections of how the plan is functioning in reality. **The continual monitoring system is one of the most important components of any effective court security program.**

Developing a Court Security Policies and Procedures Manual:

There are three primary objectives in any court security program:

1. Maintaining the integrity of the court;

2. Providing a safe environment for the court facility's occupants and visitors; and

3. Securing the building and grounds.

In its 1978 study of court security, the NSA found that many jurisdictions, especially smaller ones, have not clearly spelled out these objectives by putting them in written form in a policies and procedures manual.[3] Other jurisdictions had documents, but they were out-of-date, the 1978 NSA study found.[4] In this current study, the NSA Project staff found similar results - many jurisdictions do not have policies and procedures manuals specifically for the court security function, relying instead on the general policies and procedures governing the operations of the entire sheriff's office. Other jurisdictions have court security policies and procedures manuals which have not been revised for years, despite many changes in operational methods, court facility use, facility and courtroom architecture and equipment replacements.

The written policies and procedures manual is the backbone of the court security function. It describes what to do, who is to do it and how to do it - all in one comprehensive format. The manual also serves as a legal defense mechanism against negligence lawsuits when trained employees follow the written procedures.

The NSA Project staff recommends that every jurisdiction, no matter the size, develop a written court security policies and procedures manual and update the manual periodically. Each jurisdiction must also exert strict control over all copies of the manuals, since the manual will contain much sensitive information that can be used to defeat the security system if the manual falls into the wrong hands.

There are many advantages to having a well-designed security manual, including:

- ♦ Serves as a legal defense mechanism in lawsuits alleging negligence;
- ♦ Reduces response time when dealing with security threats and emergencies and ensures early control of such situations;
- ♦ Increases the likelihood of preventing loss of life or injury because security personnel know what to do under stress situations.
- ♦ Pinpoints responsibility and helps prevent the need for repetitive judgments on routine matters;
- ♦ Encourages and promotes cooperation by defining work relationships clearly and also explains the work procedures, thereby reducing lost time when a person moves to a new position or a new person is brought in;
- ♦ Helps a supervisor play a more positive role and improve staff operations by becoming more fully involved in how the work is done; and
- ♦ Helps prepare people for changes that will occur within the department by presenting the plan in writing before it goes into effect.

Contents of the Court Security Policies and Procedures Manual: The NSA Project Staff recommends that the following subjects be addressed in the manual:

1. **General information:**
   - ♦♦ Key personnel and agencies;
   - ♦♦ Security staff organization and post assignments;
2. **Security in courtrooms:**
   - ♦♦ Records and evidence;
   - ♦♦ Judges;
   - ♦♦ Witnesses and their waiting areas;
   - ♦♦ Normal jury procedures;
   - ♦♦ Sequestered juries;
   - ♦♦ Handling in-custody defendants;
   - ♦♦ Special courtroom considerations(arraignment and sentencing, domestic court, unruly spectators, searches of litigants and defendants on bond, etc.);
   - ♦♦ Duties of bailiffs;

3. **Special operations plan for bomb threats, other violent incidents:**

   ♦♦ Search of courtroom and related spaces;
   ♦♦ Visitor control;

4. **Hostage situations;**

5. **High-risk trials;**

6. **Emergency evacuation procedures (fire, bomb, disaster, medical, etc.);**

7. **Post-incident review procedures;**

8. **Access control and alarm system operation and monitoring;**

9. **Handling threats to judges and other court employees;**

10. **Perimeter patrol procedures (parking lots, garages, walkways);**

11. **Job descriptions and position responsibilities;**

12. **Duties of sheriff's office court security liaison officer;**

13. **News media relations;**

14. **Court facility population circulation patterns;**

15. **Court facility arrests/placing persons into custody;**

16. **Security and procedures for prisoner holding cells;**

17. **Prisoner transportation policies and procedures;**

18. **Use of firearms and chemical weapons;**

19. **Procedures for handling escapes or attempted escapes of prisoners;**

20. **Procedures for searching visitors, attorneys, hand-carried articles, incoming mail and packages, and deliveries of supplies;**

21. **Crowd control on court facility premises;**

22. **Conducting periodic security surveys and audits;**

23. **Handling complaints from court employees and visitors;**

24. **Preparing a crime or accident incident report (mugging, robbery, burglary, rape, assault, vehicle collision in parking lot, injury, etc.);**

25. **Conducting an inventory of security equipment and supplies;**

26. **Use of the stunning device (NOVA XR 5000);**

27. **Use of the Remotely Activated Custody Control Belt (RACC);**

28. **Authorized use of electronic riot shield;**

29. **Firearms qualification procedures; and**

30. **Mandatory in-service training policy and procedures.**

Policy and procedures manuals should be in a looseleaf binder to facilitate periodic updating. In its 1978 study, NSA recommended that manuals be developed as follows:[5]

1. **Identify types of instructions and groups by subject:** Make it clear whether the policy or procedure being discussed is temporary or permanent. Grouping all instructions on a given subject in one area eliminates lengthy searching and reduces reliance on cross-referencing.

2. **Number by a pre-arranged system:** After choosing the manual's subjects, assign numbers to them. The system used must be flexible enough to cover the various types of procedures, to distinguish between continuing instructions on the same subject and to allow expansion of any one subject. Numbering each set of instructions will make a subject easier to locate, simplify control, establish a uniform sequence in the binder, and provide an automatic grouping by subject.

3. **Make the format standard:** A standard format is needed because usually more than one person will be preparing the manual.

4. **Use reference aids:** Aids that make the manual easier to use include cross-references, alphabetical subject index, numerical index, table of contents, tabbed divider sheets, and copies of any forms used.

5. **Draft the manual:** The responsibility for writing the procedures should be assigned to individuals with expertise in the matter.

6. **Date the instructions:** Date each list of instructions to show when it takes effect and ensure that all manuals are current.

7. **Schedule periodic review and revision:** As conditions change, parts of the manual will need to be revised, so schedule a comprehensive review every year or two.

Assessing Risk Factors for Various Types of Judicial Proceedings:

An important component of the court security function is to assess the risk levels of all hearings and trials in order to determine what level of security to provide. Providing the correct level of security for specific judicial proceedings assures that security officers will be prepared for any violence or disruptions which may occur. At the same time, the risk assessment process helps keep the cost of security down by increasing manpower when it may be most needed and decreasing it for those judicial proceedings which are expected to be trouble-free.

Figure 6:2 depicts common risk levels for various types of judicial proceedings while Figure 6:3 identifies levels of risk at different stages of the judicial process.

Figure 6:2

RISK LEVEL/TYPE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

	Civil Trial	Criminal Trial
L O W	Admiralty Antitrust Bankruptcy Contracts Economic Stablization Energy Allocation Environmental Matters Freedom of Information Labor Suits Land Condemnation Personal Injury Product Liability Protected Property Small Claims Social Security Tort	Auto Theft Burglary Counterfeiting Embezzlement Forgery Fraut Grand Juries Larceny/Theft Motor Vehicle Violation Perjury Petit Juries Public Corruption
M O D E R A T E	Civil Rights (All Domestic Deportation Family Court Foreclosure Forfeiture and Penalty Tax	Arraignment Arscn Extortion Firearms Violations Juvenile Court Obstruction of Justice Organized Crime Preliminary Hearings Robbery (All) Sex Offenses (All) Treason
H I G H		Escape Homicide/Murder/Manslaughter Kidnapping Narcotics

Figure 6:3

JUDICIAL/COURT SECURITY/TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

Docket	Stage of Processing	Level of Risk by Type of Trial	Level of Risk by Courtroom	Anticipated Risk Environment
CIVIL	Pre-Trial			LEVEL 1
	Trial	Low		LEVEL 1
			Moderate	LEVEL 2
		Moderate		LEVEL 2
	Post Trial	Low		LEVEL 1
			Moderate	LEVEL 2
CRIMINAL	Pre-Trial		Low	LEVEL 1
			Moderate	LEVEL 2
			High	LEVEL 3
	Trial	Low		LEVEL 2
			Moderate	LEVEL 3
			High	LEVEL 4
		Moderate		LEVEL 3
			High	LEVEL 4
		High		LEVEL 4
	Post Trial			LEVEL 3
			High	LEVEL 4

After identifying the level of risk, a determination can then be made for the number of bailiffs, deputies and officers normally required during a court proceeding, using the following guidelines:

1. **Level 1:**

   - A bailiff, deputy or officer is **not** required to be present in the courtroom when a Level 1 risk environment exists. However, when information is received by court security officials indicating that there could be a security problem at a Level 1 proceeding, then a bailiff, deputy or officer should be assigned to the trial. If a judge or prosecuting

official requests a bailiff, deputy or officer to be assigned to the trial, then the criminal justice community should respond to this request.

- A Level 1 risk environment exists when the anticipated security risk of a particular civil proceeding is determined to be a low-risk or non-hazardous situation (i.e., there are no indications of potential disruption or violence in the courtroom). This level of court security also applies to criminal pre-trial proceedings when the defendant is not present in the courtroom, provided that there are no indications of a likelihood of disruption or violence in the courtroom.

2. **Level 2:**

- A bailiff, deputy or officer may be needed in a courtroom when a Level 2 risk environment exists. When a security risk is anticipated at a particular civil or criminal trial or proceeding, a bailiff, deputy or officer should be assigned to the trial. If a judge or prosecuting attorney requests a bailiff, deputy or officer to be assigned to the trial, then the criminal justice community should respond to the request.

- A Level 2 risk environment exists when the anticipated security risk of a particular civil proceeding is determined to be generally non-hazardous yet, at the same time, there are indications of some potential for disruption or violence in the courtroom. All criminal trial and post-trial proceedings at which the defendant is present start at this level of anticipated risk environment.

3. **Level 3:**

- At a minimum, a bailiff, one deputy or officer is required to be present in the

courtroom when a Level 3 risk environment exists.

- A Level 3 risk environment exists when the anticipated security risk of a particular criminal trial or criminal post-trial proceeding is determined to present a substantial opportunity for potentially disruptive or violent actions.

- If a judge or prosecuting official requests additional bailiffs, deputies or officers to be assigned to the trial, then the criminal justice community should respond to this request.

4. **Level 4:**

- More than one bailiff, deputy or officer is required to be present in the courtroom at all times during the trial when a Level 4 risk environment exists. The number of bailiffs, deputies or officers required shall be determined by the chief law enforcement or governmental official who is charged with providing court security and transportation of prisoners.

- A Level 4 risk environment exists when the anticipated security risk of a particular criminal trial or proceeding is determined to present a high degree of potential disruption or violence in and around the courtroom.

- This determination should be based upon an assessment of indicators which collectively suggest that the proceeding constitutes a high potential for disruption or violence in or around the courtroom.

How do court security officials develop information to determine the level of risk for specific judicial proceedings? **The key to completing this task effectively is an on-going intelligence gathering process.** Intelligence data can be gathered from a variety of sources and should include:

1. **The charges.**

2. **Background of the case,** including a description of the crime and defendant information.

3. **Trends or indicators of a potential disruption at this particular type of trial.** For example, if the leader of an outlaw biker gang is scheduled for trial on charges of murdering a leader of a rival gang, and there have been disruptions at other trials involving these gang members, then it is logical to assume that gang members may be planning to disrupt this trial as well.

4. **Status of the case:** Is it a preliminary hearing, a trial or a sentencing? These various stages of the judicial process each can present their own unique security problems.

5. **Have any threats been made?** For example, has the judge received a death threat? Have there been false bomb threats phoned in to the court? Have the news media been alerted to expect "a big story?" Have local law enforcement officers picked up any warnings from their informants?

All of these elements go into the intelligence gathering and analysis process in order to determine the appropriate risk level for a specific type of judicial proceeding.

Protecting Judges and Other High-Risk Judicial Personnel:

One of the major court security problems which has become more prevalent in recent years is the willingness of certain individuals and various groups to threaten, intimidate, assault, attempt to murder or assassinate judges and other judicial personnel. Several judges and prosecutors have been murdered, have received package bombs at their homes or offices, and have received threats warning that their family members - particularly children - will be kidnapped and killed. Even as this report is being prepared, judges have been appearing before U.S. Congressional committees and state legislatures asking for protection from para-military groups which have threatened to kill them and their family members.[6] The protection of judicial personnel was one of the major concerns of the members of NSA's Project Advisory Board, which contained representatives from the nation's leading judicial organizations and associations.

Judges can be protected inside courtrooms by architectural designs and equipment, along with proper screening for weapons by security officers of anyone who enters the courtroom. **Among protective devices and equipment recommended by NSA Advisory Board and Staff Review Committee members are:**

1. **Duress alarms**, which are small in size and can be discreetly worn under clothing by the judge or prosecutor. These alarms can be placed in all areas where the judges and prosecutors will be, such as on the bench, at the prosecutor's table and in the judge's chambers and prosecutor's office. The alarm summons an emergency response with the push of a hidden button, but is silent in the room where it is activated.

2. **CCTV cameras installed at ceiling level**, which monitor the entire courtroom from a security office observation post. By panning the camera to scan the courtroom,

security officers will be able to observe any imminent attack on the judge or court personnel as soon as the attacker begins to make his move. Security officers then can instantly activate a response team.

3. **Bullet-resistant vests** should be worn under robes by judges conducting high risk trials or who have received threats of any kind. Well-designed bullet-resistant clothing (suit, jackets and raincoat) are available for judges and prosecutors to wear outside the court facility if they find wearing a vest to be uncomfortable or conspicuous. However, judges and prosecutors must observe some cautions when wearing a bullet-resistant vest or clothing.

   - Do not tell other people (other than the director of court security) that you own a bullet-resistant vest or when you are wearing one.

   - Use your own private funds to purchase the vest, preferably in another city. The reason for this is to keep ownership of the vest secret; the news media may be able to obtain records of any public expenditures for vests.

   - Do not hang the vest on coat racks where others can see it.

   - In the face of threats, do not announce to the news media, friends, associates or citizens that you are wearing a bullet-resistant vest. This type of announcement simply advises assailants to aim for the head or neck.

   - If there have been threats made, wear the vest everywhere.

4. **Metal and acrylic plates in the judge's bench and bullet-resistant glass or acrylic screens help protect the judge during high-risk trials.** The armor-plated judge's bench is relatively inexpensive to install, yet it provides a safe hiding place which the judge can duck into quickly in the event that shooting erupts in the courtroom or an assailant rushes towards him with a knife or other weapon. Former Texas Judge Richard W. Carter, who wrote a security manual for judges and bailiffs, recommends that the armor plate be constructed as follows:

   - Not less than three sixteenths of an inch in thickness;

- ♦ Be capable of stopping at least a .30-06 rifle bullet with a 220-grain soft point, fired from at least 15 feet, zero degree of obliquity, with a muzzle velocity of 2,410 feet per second, producing 2,830 foot-pounds of energy upon impact;
- ♦ At a minimum, meet Mil-A 12560 Class 1 specifications;
- ♦ Be x-ray tested for workmanship;
- ♦ Be ultra-sonic tested;
- ♦ Be ballistics tested;
- ♦ Be hardness tested for penetrations; and
- ♦ Have any bends or folds made **prior to testing.**[7]

5. **Handguns** proved to be the most controversial personal security device available to judges, the NSA Project Staff found during the course of this study, some judges will not permit any guns at all to be carried in their courtrooms, even by sworn law enforcement personnel, while other judges carry personal firearms at all times, especially if they have received threats. **Throughout the course of this study, NSA's Project Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees could not reach a consensus on whether to recommend for or against the carrying of handguns by judges and prosecutors. Consensus could be reached, however, on recommending that any judge or prosecutor who finds it necessary to carry a handgun be trained in the proper use of the weapon and qualify with the weapon on a law enforcement agency firing range at a minimum of once per year.**

To provide proper protection to judges and prosecutors both in the court facilities and at their homes, court security personnel will need to gather confidential personal data from those being protected. Figures 6:4 through 6:9 illustrate the types of information necessary to design an effective personal protection program for judges, prosecutors and their families. **The information provided on these data forms must be kept absolutely confidential at all times by court security personnel.**

Figure 6:4

JUDICIAL PERSONNEL
[PROTECTIVE SECURITY]

CONFIDENTIAL

FULL NAME: LAST _____ FIRST _____ MIDDLE _____

NICKNAME: _____

TITLE: _____

DATE OF BIRTH: _____ PLACE OF BIRTH: _____

HOME ADDRESS: _____

OFFICE ADDRESS: _____

HOME TELEPHONE: _____ HOME FAX: _____

OFFICE TELEPHONE: _____ OFFICE FAX: _____

REGULAR WORK HOURS: _____ REGULAR WORK DAYS: _____

WEEKEND WORK AT OFFICE: _____ YES _____ NO

_____ DAY _____ EVENING _____ NIGHT

NUMBER OF PEOPLE RESIDING AT HOME: _____ ADULTS _____ YOUTHS

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: _____BEARD _____ HEIGHT _____ WEIGHT

_____ EYES _____ HAIR GLASSES - YES _____ NO _____

SCARS OR SPECIAL IDENTIFYING MARKS:

_____

TELEPHONE: _____ DATE COMPLETED: _____

Figure 6:4 (continued)

JUDICIAL PERSONNEL

PERSON TO NOTIFY IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY:

NAME:

ADDRESS:

CITY: STATE: ZIP:

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

MEDICAL CONDITIONS/ALLERGIC TO:

MEDICINE REQUIRED/INTERVALS:

BLOOD TYPE:

PHYSICIANS

1. NAME: SPECIALIZATION:
   ADDRESS:
   PHONE:
2. NAME: SPECIALIZATION:
   ADDRESS:
   PHONE:

LANGUAGES SPOKEN:

REGULARLY SCHEDULED EVENTS/LOCATIONS:

DO YOU OWN A HUNTING RIFLE? _____ YES _____ NO _____TYPE
DO YOU OWN A HANDGUN? _____ YES _____ NO _____TYPE

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

COMPLETED BY:

ADDRESS:

CITY: STATE: ZIP:

TELEPHONE: DATE COMPLETED:

Figure 6:5

JUDICIAL PERSONNEL VEHICLE INFORMATION

VEHICLE #1 - PRIMARY DRIVER: _____

MAKE: _____ MODEL: _____ YEAR: _____

COLOR: _____ STYLE: _____ # OF DOORS: _____

LICENSE PLATE NUMBER: _____ LICENSE PLATE STATE: _____

NOTE: CAR TELEPHONE: _____ YES _____ NO
CITIZENS BAND RADIO: _____ YES _____ NO
ALARM SYSTEM ON VEHICLE: _____ YES _____ NO

VEHICLE #2 - PRIMARY DRIVER: _____

MAKE: _____ MODEL: _____ YEAR: _____

COLOR: _____ STYLE: _____ # OF DOORS: _____

LICENSE PLATE NUMBER: _____ LICENSE PLATE STATE: _____

NOTE: CAR TELEPHONE: _____ YES _____ NO
CITIZENS BAND RADIO: _____ YES _____ NO
ALARM SYSTEM ON VEHICLE: _____ YES _____ NO

VEHICLE #3 - PRIMARY DRIVER

MAKE _____ MODEL _____ YEAR _____

COLOR _____ STYLE _____ # OF DOORS _____

LICENSE PLATE NUMBER: _____ LICENSE PLATE STATE: _____

NOTE: CAR TELEPHONE: _____ YES _____ NO
CITIZENS BAND RADIO _____ YES _____ NO
ALARM SYSTEM ON VEHICLE _____ YES _____ NO

Figure 6:6

JUDICIAL PERSONNEL RESIDENTIAL INFORMATION

ADDRESS: _____

CITY: _____ STATE: _____ ZIP: _____

TELEPHONE: _____ FAX: _____

TYPE OF BUILDING: **(PLEASE CHECK)**

Single Family Dwelling: ☐
Townhouse/Duplex: ☐
Multi-Family home: ☐
Apartments: ☐
Other: ☐
_____

TYPE OF NEIGHBORHOOD:

Urban population: ☐
Suburban-hi population: ☐
Suburban-secluded: ☐
Rural/Farm: ☐
Resort/Vacation: ☐
Other: ☐
_____

NUMBER OF FLOORS IN DWELLING:_____ GARAGE DOOR OPENER?___YES ___NO
LOWEST FLOOR OF DWELLING: _____ HIGHEST FLOOR OF DWELLING_____
NUMBER OF ENTRANCES TO RESIDENCE: _____
NUMBER OF DOORS TO PUBLIC CORRIDORS: _____
ACCESS TO DWELLING FROM BASEMENT? _____YES _____ NO
ACCESS TO DWELLING FROM ROOF? _____YES _____ NO
NUMBER OF SKYLIGHTS? _____
WINDOW & DOOR GLASS TYPE_____

TYPE OF ALARM SYSTEM: - COMPANY'S BRANDNAME: _____

Camera?	_____ YES	_____NO
Is it fully operational?	_____ YES	_____NO
Does it secure all entries to the dwelling?	_____ YES	_____NO
Does it have back-up for power failure?	_____ YES	_____NO
Does it detect smoke?	_____ YES	_____NO
Does it detect heat?	_____ YES	_____NO
Does it alert the law agency?	_____ YES	_____NO
Does it alert the fire department?	_____ YES	_____NO
Window bars?	_____ YES	_____NO
Door bars?	_____ YES	_____NO

TYPE OF DOOR LOCKS AND DEAD BOLTS?_____
MISCELLANEOUS HOME-RELATED INFORMATION: _____
_____

NAMES/ADDRESS/TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF TWO CLOSEST NEIGHBORS:
1._____
_____
2._____
_____

Figure 6:7

JUDICIAL PERSONAL HISTORY
(SPOUSE)

FULL NAME: LAST _____ FIRST _____ MIDDLE _____

NICKNAME _____

TITLE: _____

DATE OF BIRTH _____ PLACE OF BIRTH _____

HOME ADDRESS: _____

OFFICE ADDRESS: _____

HOME TELEPHONE _____ HOME FAX _____

OFFICE TELEPHONE _____ OFFICE FAX _____

REGULAR WORK HOURS: _____ REGULAR WORK DAYS: _____

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: _____ HEIGHT _____ WEIGHT

_____ EYES _____ HAIR GLASSES - YES _____ NO _____

Figure 6:7 (continued)

JUDICIAL PERSONAL HISTORY
(SPOUSE)

SCARS OR SPECIAL IDENTIFYING MARKS:

MEDICAL CONDITIONS/ALLERGIC TO:

MEDICINE REQUIRED/INTERVALS:

BLOOD TYPE:

PHYSICIANS:

1. NAME: SPECIALIZATION:
   ADDRESS:
   PHONE:
2. NAME: SPECIALIZATION:
   ADDRESS:
   PHONE:

LANGUAGES SPOKEN:

REGULARLY SCHEDULED EVENTS/LOCATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

COMPLETED BY:

ADDRESS:

CITY: STATE: ZIP:

TELEPHONE: DATE COMPLETED

Figure 6:8

JUDICIAL PERSONAL HISTORY (CHILDREN)

#1

FULL NAME: LAST _____ FIRST _____ MIDDLE _____

NICKNAMES/OTHER NAMES USED: _____

DATE OF BIRTH: _____

PLACE OF BIRTH: _____

HOME ADDRESS: _____

HOME PHONE: _____

SCHOOL/DAY CARE NAME: _____

SCHOOL/DAY CARE ADDRESS: _____

SCHOOL/DAY CARE TELEPHONE: _____

SCHOOL/DAY CARE DAYS AND HOURS: _____

DATE COMPLETED: _____

COMPLETED BY: NAME _____

ADDRESS: _____

CITY/STATE/ZIP: _____

TELEPHONE: _____

Figure 6:9

JUDICIAL PERSONAL HISTORY -
RELATIVE LIVING AT DWELLING

#1

FULL NAME: LAST FIRST MIDDLE

NICKNAMES/OTHER NAMES USED:

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

HOME ADDRESS:

HOME PHONE:

OCCUPATION:

WORK ADDRESS:

WORK PHONE:

REGULAR WORK HOURS:

DAYS WORKED:

Figure 6:9 (continued)

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____ _____

DATE COMPLETED: COMPLETED BY:

_____

ADDRESS:

_____

CITY/STATE/ZIP:

_____

TELEPHONE:

OTHER: (HOUSEKEEPING SERVICES/GARDENERS/MAIDS/BUTLERS)

#1

_____

FULL NAME: LAST FIRST MIDDLE

_____

NICKNAMES/OTHER NAMES USED:

_____

DATE OF BIRTH:

_____

PLACE OF BIRTH:

_____

HOME ADDRESS:

_____

HOME PHONE:

Figure 6:9 (continued)

#2

FULL NAME: LAST FIRST MIDDLE

NICKNAMES/OTHER NAMES USED:

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

HOME ADDRESS:

HOME PHONE:

#3

FULL NAME: LAST FIRST MIDDLE

NICKNAMES/OTHER NAMES USED:

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

HOME ADDRESS:

HOME PHONE:

DATE COMPLETED: COMPLETED BY:

ADDRESS:

CITY/STATE/ZIP:

TELEPHONE:

Figure 6:9 (continued)

MISCELLANEOUS/CONCLUSION INFORMATION:

**** CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ****

- **Attach Photographs if at all possible.**
- **Attach full length and front view if possible.**

Protecting Witnesses and Sequestered Juries:

Juries generally are not sequestered unless the trial is one which has received extensive media publicity that endangers the defendant's right to a fair trial (e.g., the nine-month long trial of accused double-murderer O.J. Simpson, which ended in Los Angeles, California, in October 1995 with a jury verdict of "not guilty"). Or the jury may be sequestered with their identities kept secret when those on trial are members of a criminal organization known to attempt to bribe jurors or intimidate them by threatening harm to the jurors or juror's family members (e.g., trials of high-level leaders of La Cosa Nostra, outlaw motorcycle gangs or terrorist groups generally involve sequestered juries with identities kept confidential).

When a jury is sequestered either throughout the entire trial (as in the O.J. Simpson case) or during deliberations only, this poses a large security burden for the sheriff's office, both in terms of the need to provide vigilant protection at all times and of the high costs for manpower, overtime, housing, special transportation vehicles, etc. Any jurisdiction which finds itself hosting a trial with a sequestered jury could see its entire annual court security budget swallowed up within a few weeks.

Court security officers also may be required to protect **witnesses** in high-risk trials. The witnesses will be placed in secure housing and kept under 24 hour a day guard by teams of officers. In many states the court will issue a *copias* or legal writ directing the sheriff to keep witnesses sequestered in order to protect them from being harmed by the defendant or his allies. Some sheriffs will house protected witnesses in special sections of the county jail during the trial both to provide added protection and to save money.

In its 1978 study *Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures,* the NSA offered guidelines for handling sequestered juries which remain valid today.[8] These guidelines include:

1. **Security Plans:**

   - Security plans and procedures for each trial should agree with existing court rules and should be presented to the presiding judge for approval. Deviations from the approved plans should be reported to the judge before they are carried out.

   - The court order for sequestration should discuss the conduct of jurors, plus appropriate restrictions and control measures (see Figure 6:10 for a sample order). Violations or suspected violations of the court order or any suspected attempt to influence a juror should be reported to the judge immediately and a written record made of the incident.

2. **Personal Conduct of Bailiff**: Bailiffs and security personnel should maintain a professional and courteous manner towards the jurors at all times. They should not discuss trial-related subjects nor allow others to do so, except by court order, and they should never express an opinion about the trial.

3. **Access to Jurors**: Access to juror's quarters should be given only to the security staff, those providing essential services or other persons authorized by the court. A visitor's identity, purpose of visit, and time of arrival and departure should be recorded in a log. Written authorization for visits should be retained for the record, and entries should be made in the log for verbal authorizations. (see Figure 6:11 for a sample visitors register and Figure 6:12 for a sample personnel log).

   Service personnel such as waiters and cleaning staff should be logged in and accompanied by a bailiff at all times while in the juror's quarters. They should be told not to talk to jurors. It is also a good practice to find out if any of the service personnel are related to trial participants. Finally, juror's laundry should be inspected by the bailiff before it is sent out and before being returned to the jurors.

4. **Accommodations and Meals**: To maintain security and control, hotels are better than motels because the court can get a block of rooms on a single floor that is isolated from the general public. An upper floor in the building is best, to reduce the possibility of communications from outside sources. (See Figure 6:13 for a sample jury register form). The following recommended guidelines should then be followed:

   - Remove or disable television sets and radios in jurors' rooms.
   - Control telephone so there are no unmonitored incoming or outgoing calls.
   - Generally assign two persons to a room, with the sexes kept separate.
   - If a private dining room is not available, use a spare room on the jury floor for meals. Escort jurors from the dining room to rest rooms.
   - At the discretion of the court, jurors may have a limited number of cocktails in the evening - usually two - at their own expense and only if they are not returning to court or deliberations that evening.

Bailiffs should never drink alcoholic beverages while on duty.

- Keep accurate financial records of meals, according to the court's standard procedures and payment policies.

5. **Transporting Juries:** During transportation to and from the courthouse, jurors are subject to possible physical harm and outside influences. If there is some reason to suspect an attempt on the jurors' physical well-being, an advance security force should scout the route and recommend detours or other tactics (a sample transportation log is illustrated in Figure 6:14):

   - Precautions are needed to make sure the jurors do not see newspapers, posters, banners and the like during the trip. Transport vehicles should be searched in advance for such materials, and jurors should not hear commercial radio broadcasts nor walk by newsstands or newspaper dispensers. It may even be necessary to cover vehicle windows with opaque material to keep jurors from accidentally seeing newspapers or similar materials.

   - Drivers should be told not to talk to jurors at all about the trial, and escort officers will need to prevent jurors from being interviewed during transport.

6. **Emergency Evacuation From Sequestration Site:** In case of fire, bomb threat, or any other emergency situation that might harm jurors, the bailiff should immediately evacuate them to a predetermined location. As mentioned before, jurors need not be informed of the reason for the move, only that it is necessary; they should be cautioned not to discuss the move or speculate as to the reason for it. Whenever a jury is sequestered or retired for the night during deliberations, suitable transportation should be available on a standby basis in case an emergency arises.

7. **Access to Media:** Court orders should specify which types of media sequestered jurors may see and hear. If authorized, a television may be set up in a common lounge; however, the bailiff should monitor the set continually and turn off scheduled newscasts, bulletins, and captions. Programs the jurors watch should not have a theme similar to the case being tried. If possible, videotapes can be made to ensure that no unauthorized material is seen, and there should be a record of all programs viewed. The television set controls should be locked when not in use or when the room is

unoccupied, and jurors may not have radio receivers or transmitters (a sample media registration log is depicted in Figure 6:15). The court may approve newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and books for the jury's use, provided those materials are censored first and records kept showing the items made available. Preferably two persons should review the publications beforehand, removing and filing any material about the trial or similar incidents.

8. **Communications with Others:** Occasionally the court may permit visits between jurors and family members on weekends or off-duty days. A record should be kept of all visitors, and a bailiff should be present to make sure there is no conversation on trial-related matters (see Figure 6:11).

   - Only court authorized telephone calls should be permitted. These calls should be dialed and monitored from the bailiff's room using special phones with monitoring features, which the telephone company usually can provide. Bailiffs should dial the numbers, identify themselves, warn the answering parties not to discuss the case, and advise both parties that the call is being monitored and will be terminated immediately if the warning is not heeded. Incoming calls should be handled similarly, after they are directed to the bailiffs' stations. Bailiffs should keep logs of all incoming and outgoing calls (see Figure 6:16 for a sample telephone log);

   - All mail and packages should be given to the bailiff for examination and censoring before they go to the jurors. Likewise, outgoing mail should be censored before mailing. If jurors do not agree to this procedure in writing, their mail may be withheld until the end of the case, or as ordered by the court (see Figure 6:17 and 6:18 for sample mail register logs; Figure 6:19 contains a sample mail censorship form).

   - During a prolonged trial, the judge may permit recreational trips, attendance at religious services, shopping, or business meetings. If so, recreational areas should be secluded and adequately protected. Clergy should be advised in advance of a juror's attendance and asked not to mention the trial in the service. Business meetings should be conducted only under close and constant security. Generally, the bailiff should do all shopping for jurors, being sure to keep a written record of expenses and money received. If allowed to shop for themselves, jurors must be under close supervision.

- ♦ The court may authorize barber or hairdresser services. If possible, this should be done in the juror's room and under close supervision, with service people advised not to discuss the trial. In a shop, the bailiff should be sure the juror has no access to newspapers or publications that have information about the trial.

9. **Medical Services:** It is wise to have a first aid kit available at the sequestration site. The court should be advised of the medications prescribed for jurors, possible medical problems, and medication that might be required (Figure 6:20 is a sample medication register).

10. **Incidents Involving Jurors:** Written records should be kept of all incidents involving jurors in order to avoid a mistrial or use of the incident during an appeal. Such incidents include jurors attempting to bribe a court security officer or hotel employee for favors, jurors getting into fights with each other, etc. A sample incident report is depicted in Figure 6:21.

Court Security: Reference Sources

1. James L. McMahon, *Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures:* Alexandria, VA: National Sheriffs' Association, 1978, p. 35.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-40

3. *Ibid.*, p. 12

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

6. See, for example, Stephanie Mansfield, "Nightmare in Big Sky Country: Why Judge Martha Bethel and Her Children Live in Fear," *Good Housekeeping* (November 1995), pp. 136-138, 216.

7. Judge Richard W. Carter, *Court Security for Judges, Bailiffs and Other Court Personnel.* Arlington, TX: Judge Richard W. Carter, 1992, p. 60.

8. See McMahon, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

Figure 6:10

SAMPLE COURT ORDER FOR SEQUESTERED JURIES

THE COURT OF THE STATE OF _____
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF _____

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF _____ CRIMINAL NUMBER_____

vs.

ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED this _____day of (month, year), that the jurors and alternate jurors in this case shall be sequestered and shall thereafter be kept in the custody of the Sheriff of _____County for the duration of this trial, or until further notice from this Court.

It is further ORDERED as follows:

1. The Sheriff shall make arrangements for appropriate accommodations for the jury during the trial, and shall provide for adequate security in the jurors' quarters beginning _____ day of _____.

2. The Sheriff shall make satisfactory arrangements to assist the jurors in securing apparel and personal items from their homes.

3. The Sheriff shall make appropriate arrangements for the furnishing of vehicles (including the hiring of vehicles, if necessary) for the transportation of jurors between their place of lodging and the County Courthouse.

4. During the period of sequestration, the Sheriff shall provide to each of the jurors and alternate jurors so sequestered, breakfast, lunch and dinner, a maximum of two cocktails during, or following, the evening meal (dinner) if they are not to return to the Courthouse following the meal.

5. The Sheriff shall maintain appropriate records during the trial providing:

   (a) A record of deputies' assignments to shifts and duty stations.

   (b) A record of jurors' quarters.

   (c) A record of persons entering the area of the jurors' quarters.

Figure 6:10 (continued)

(d) A record of telephone calls to and from the jurors' quarters.

The assigned Sheriff's personnel shall make certain that no member of the jury:

(a) Has any unauthorized contact with any outside person.

(b) Reads newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or listens to radio or television newscasts or bulletins pertaining to the trial or programs where the theme resembles the case being heard or decided upon.

(c) Has any discussion with any outside person pertaining to the case.

(d) Has any discussion of the case with other jurors before the case is submitted for deliberation.

(e) Has written or telephone communication with any person, except under the direct supervision of the assigned Deputy Sheriff, on matters not pertaining to the case.

(f) Any communication with the Court shall be made in writing and placed in a sealed envelope by the jury or individual juror, and upon being turned over to the sheriff's personnel will be promptly delivered to the Court.

Figure 6:10 (continued)

6. The sheriff shall make appropriate arrangements for suitable recreation for the jury.

7. Mail and packages, to and from jurors, shall be censored to ensure that no information relative to the trial is transmitted.

8. The Sheriff shall make arrangements to provide, at county expense, a nonalcoholic beverage (coffee, tea, milk, soda) on court days during the morning and afternoon recess, and also at the place of lodging after the evening meal.

9. The Sheriff, if necessary, shall provide laundry services to the jurors at county expense.

10. The Sheriff shall make provisions to transport any juror who has previously made such arrangements with the court to such medical doctors whose names the jurors shall furnish the Sheriff.

11. The Sheriff shall make provisions for the videotaping of television programs which will subsequently be shown to the jurors, thereby eliminating the possibility of hearing or seeing news bulletins.

12. The Sheriff shall, to the extent feasible, make suitable arrangements for jurors to attend religious services if such arrangement can be made under custodial supervision.

13. The Sheriff shall make satisfactory arrangements for barber shop and/or beauty salon services for the jurors, but always under proper custodial supervision.

Figure 6:10 (continued)

14. The Sheriff shall make provisions at county expense for recreational activities for the jurors, including: attendance at athletic events, the theater, picnics, and short trips for dining purposes, or to historical or scenic sites where overnight travel is not involved.

15. This Order may be altered, amended, and/or changed from time to time as in the Court's judgment as conditions warrant.

_____

Judge of the Court

VISITOR REGISTER

Case Number _____ State vs. _____

Date	Time Began	Time Ended	Juror	Visitor Name and Relationship	Deputy Present

Figure 6:12

PERSONNEL LOG FOR SEQUESTERED JURY SECURITY

Judge _____ Case Number _____

Day Shift: (Duty Hours)	Night Shift: (Duty Hours)
1. _____	1. _____
2. _____	2. _____
3. _____	3. _____
4. _____	4. _____
5. _____	5. _____

Personnel Assigned:

Date	Time Day	Time In	Out	Remarks

Figure 6:13

SEQUESTERED JURY REGISTER

Case Number_____ State vs. _____ Judge _____

Date Sequestered_____ Date Concluded_____ Housing Site_____

Room Number	JUROR A. Name B. Address C. Phone Number	NEXT OF KIN D. Name E. Address F. Phone Number, Relationship
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.
	A.	D.
	B.	E.
	C.	F.

TRANSPORTATION LOG

CaseNumber_____ Statevs._____

Date	Time		From	To	Vehicle and Tag No.	Driver	Escort Officers
	Dept.	Arr.					

NEWSPAPER AND PERIODICAL REGISTER

Newspaper or Periodical	Date of Publication	Number of Copies	Censored By

Case Number _____ State vs.

_____

Date	Time Began	Time Ended	Juror	Second Party and Relationship to Juror	Incoming (x)	Outgoing No. Called	Topic of Conversation	Monitor

OUTGOING MAIL REGISTER

Date Mailed	Juror	Addressee	Censored By

INCOMING MAIL REGISTER

Date Received	Juror	Received From	Censored By

Figure 6:19
MAIL CENSORSHIP CONSENT FORM

State vs. _____ **Case Number** _____

Court _____ **County of** _____

I, _____, do hereby authorize and consent to the opening of any and all incoming or outgoing mail matter, packages, correspondence, or other items addressed to me, marked for my attention or written by me, and to the censoring of the contents therein by the County Sheriff or his/her designee during the course and continuation of my sequestration in the above captioned trial.

_____
Signature of Witness Signature

_____
Title Date

I, _____, do hereby request the County Sheriff to forward or otherwise secure any and all mail matter, packages, correspondence, or other items addressed to me or marked for my attention in the following manner:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____
Signature of Witness Signature

_____
Title Date

MEDICATION REGISTER

CaseNumber _____ Statevs. _____

Date	Juror's Name	Type and Quantity of Medication	Pharmacy Name & Telephone Number	Prescribing Doctor and Telephone Number

Figure 8:21

INCIDENT REPORT FORM

Case No. _____ State vs. _____

Date _____ Time _____

Location _____

Deputy/Bailiff _____

Be accurate, brief, concise and fully explanatory.

Describe Incident: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Signature _____ Date _____

Supervisor _____ Date _____

Page _____ of _____ Pages

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

PICTORIAL SELECTIONS

CHAPTER SIX
COURT SECURITY

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

United States Supreme Court
[Washington, D.C.]





United States Supreme Court
[Washington, D.C.]





United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
[Washington, D.C.]





United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
[Washington, D.C.]





Federal Building & United States Courthouse
[Dayton, Ohio]



United States District Court
[Alexandria, Virginia]





Courts/Police Department
[Kettering, Ohio]





City of Alexandria
Police Department/Sheriff's Office/Magistrate's Office [Alexandria, Virginia]





Superior Court (New) for the District of Columbia
[Washington, D.C.]





Superior Court (New) for the
District of Columbia
[Washington, D.C.]





Superior Court (Old) for the District of Columbia
[Washington, D.C.]





Montgomery County Courts Building
[Dayton, Ohio]



Dayton-Montgomery County Courts
[Dayton, Ohio]



Courtrooms
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]





Courtrooms
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]





Courtrooms
[City of Alexandria, Virginia]





Reception/Information Desk
[City of Alexandria, Virginia]



Jury Room
[City of Alexandria, Virginia]



Courtrooms
[Baltimore City, Maryland]





Courtrooms
[Baltimore City, Maryland]





If at all possible, any mail that is addressed to the judicial functions should be screened before delivery. This includes: scanning, screening or x-ray. [Boxes, envelopes, packages or etc.]
[Baltimore City, Maryland]



Some courthouse facilities screen,
scan and x-ray any/all mail addressed
to any judicial function.
[Baltimore City, Maryland]





Audio or visual electronic surveillance should be located primarily in hallways, elevators, corridors, or at points on the security perimeter, such as entrances and exists and monitored on a continual basis.
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]





Audio or visual surveillance should be located primarily in hallways, elevators, corridors, or at points on the security perimeter, such as entrances and exits and monitored on a continual basis.
[Baltimore City, Maryland]





All courtrooms should have a duress alarm system. This should be monitored on a continual basis to report any/all emergencies.
[Baltimore City, Maryland]





Parole & Probation agency within the Beaver County Court facilities has a duress alarm to the local Office of Sheriff.
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]



All courtrooms should be locked and secured at the end of any/all hearings or trials.
[City of Alexandria, Virginia]





Continual monitoring of any/all hallways, entrances, exits and sallyports by video cameras is of the utmost importance.
[City of Alexandria, Virginia]





United States District Court and the entrance security screening program.
[Alexandria, Virginia]





Security screening of any/all persons entering a courthouse facility should be administered in a courteous and professional manner.
[City of Alexandria, Virginia]



Security screening of any/all persons entering a courthouse facility should be administered in a courteous and professional manner. A security post at any/all entrances is of the utmost importance.
[Baltimore City, Maryland]







Security screening of any/all persons entering a courthouse should be administered in a courteous and professional manner.
[Baltimore City, Maryland]



Audio or visual electronic surveillance should be located primarily in hallways, elevators, corridors, or at points on the security perimeter, such as entrances and and exits and monitored on a continual basis.
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]



Status Board as to cell block area, prisoner movements and locations.
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]

CHAPTER TWO

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON COURT SECURITY/TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

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SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON COURT SECURITY/TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

An exhaustive search of data sources for information on court security and the transportation of prisoners produced only a small amount of written materials when compared to the vast libraries which exist for other functions of the criminal justice system, such as law enforcement, juvenile justice, correctional administration and court administration. For example, the Criminal Justice Abstracts 1968 - 1993 CD-ROM disk (WinSPIRS™) contains four document entries on **"court security"** in a total of 8,089 entries on courts.[1] These entries date from 1971 to 1982. On the subject of **"court technology,"** there are three document entries, but none of them related to technology for court security purposes. There are no document entries for the subject **"court bailiff"** and none for **"court lockup,"** although 25 documents are listed for police lockups. A search for documents on **"prisoner transportation"** turned up three entries.

A similar search of the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), operated by the U.S. Justice Department, produced very few documents on court security or the transportation of prisoners; several of the documents were the same ones found in the Criminal Justice Abstracts 1968 - 1993. The NCJRS Custom Search on the topic **"court security"** found 17 documents, most of them articles. The articles appeared in the following publications: Police Journal, ABA Journal, Judicature, State Court Journal, Judges' Journal, Security Management (four articles), The National Sheriff (two articles), Pentacle (two articles) and Court Management Journal. Also included were abstracts of a report prepared by the Virginia Crime Commission, a privately published training manual, and a brochure published for public employees by the U.S. Marshals Service. The NCJRS Custom Search for **"transportation of prisoners"** found eight items, including four training documents, two articles and two brochures.

To obtain policies and procedures, training materials and analytical studies of court security and transportation of prisoners issues, the N.S.A. Project Staff relied primarily upon the Project Advisory Board and Staff Review Committee members, sheriffs' offices, and court and probation/parole agencies participating in the study. This search proved fruitful, producing policy and procedural manuals, training outlines, personnel selection policies, architectural guidelines and data on existing and emerging technologies for court security and the use of nonlethal force.

An additional search of selected non-academic publications such as Sheriff magazine and Corrections Today magazine produced numerous articles relating to court security and transportation of prisoners. Reports on various court security incidents were obtained from newspapers and The Associated Press.

Historical Background

A surprising finding during the literature review was the almost complete lack of interest in court security as an issue prior to the 1980s, when sensational incidents in courthouses throughout the nation began to bring the problem of "open access" to the forefront of concerns requiring the attention of the judiciary, sheriffs and the U.S. Marshals Service.

Two Presidential commissions conducted a massive analysis of the criminal justice system in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s, producing two separate volumes on the courts.

The first study was initiated by President Lyndon B. Johnson. His President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice issued its comprehensive General Report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, in February 1967.[2] Included as part of the study were nine separate task force reports on the various components of the criminal justice system (e.g. The Police, Corrections) as well as task force reports on the major issues of the day (organized crime, juvenile delinquency, narcotics and drugs and drunkenness).

A separate task force studied science and technology as it relates to the criminal justice system. Among the nine task forces, one focused solely on the courts, issuing its study, Task Force Report: The Courts, in February 1976.[3] In the eight-chapter report, only Chapter Seven deals with administration of the courts. While delineating what it perceives to be the defects of court systems in the United States, from lower courts to the appellate level, **the Task Force makes no mention at all of court security issues.** Nor did the Task Force consider any issues relating to courthouse lockups (security and conditions), transportation of prisoners, or courthouse architecture. The Commission's Task Force on the Police did not mention transportation of prisoners to court or security of prisoners while on courthouse premises.[4]

The second Presidential Commission which studied the criminal justice system began under President Richard M. Nixon in October 1971 and concluded its work in 1976. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals issued its Report on Courts in January 1993 and, like its predecessor, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, **did not consider court security to be an issue worth**

studying or even mentioning in the 358-page report.[5] The report focused on the court processing of those accused of crime, but also devoted seven chapters to the topic of "personnel and institutions," including such issues as computers and the courts, court-community relations and court administration. Its Standard 10.1, "Courthouse Physical Facilities," makes no mention of architectural designs for security, security checkpoints or courthouse lockups, focusing instead on lighting, heating and-air-conditioning; libraries for judges; location of food service facilities; and providing comfort for attorneys, witnesses and jurors.[6] The report makes no mention of prisoner transportation issues or courthouse lockups.

An examination of two related reports of the National Advisory Commission, Police and Corrections, produces no mention at all of prisoner transportation, escorting inmates to court, securing inmates on courthouse premises, or the role of the nation's sheriffs in providing for court security.[7] The only mention of law enforcement agencies providing prisoner transportation to court was one sentence in Police, which pointed out that in 1967, the Chicago, Illinois, Police Department used nearly 300 sworn officers to operate temporary holding facilities and to provide prisoner transportation; the Task Force on Police recommended that civilians be hired and trained to handle these duties, using sworn officers to guard and transport dangerous felons only.[8]

Studies of the office of sheriff conducted in the 1960s and 1970s also make little or no mention of the court security function, its nature and responsibilities. A study conducted for the U.S. Justice Department by the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA) in 1969 to develop a Manual on Training for Sheriffs **did not refer at all to providing training for court security duties or transporting prisoners.**[9] The manual recommends that recruits be taught how to use restraints on prisoners as part of defensive tactics training.[10] Another suggested block of instruction for recruits deals with the use of chemical weapons.[11] There is also a recommended instructional segment in the recruit program on the functions of the deputy in the serving of civil process and-quasi-criminal court writs.[12] The manual does not suggest the amount of time which should be devoted to teaching each of these subjects.

In 1978 the National Sheriffs' Association, with funding from the U.S. Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, conducted a statistical study of county law enforcement agencies. The resulting report, County Law Enforcement: An Assessment of Capabilities and Needs, was based upon data secured from 60 percent of all county law enforcement agencies in the nation--1,893 sheriffs, 28 county police departments and 19 independent city sheriffs.[13] The total number of employees (suburban and rural counties) as reported by county

sheriffs' agencies participating in the study is 88,788; the estimated total for the nation is 126,754 employees.[14] The 28 county police departments in the study listed a total of 16,197 employees; 19 independent city sheriffs' agencies reported they had a total of 794 employees.[15]

The study found that in most counties throughout the nation the sheriff is primarily responsible as the sole agent for the transportation of prisoners interstate.[16] Regarding the transportation of prisoners, the study also found:

> ♦ Sheriffs, county police and independent city sheriffs participating in the study report that they return more than 11,600 prisoners annually from another state.[17]
>
> ♦ Nationally, the average cost per return is $420 per prisoner, which includes transportation and manpower costs.[18]

The study found that in all 49 states where the office of sheriff exists, the sheriff is responsible for performing court-related functions.[19] These functions include:

1. Acting as bailiff;
2. Attending court;
3. Serving summonses, warrants or civil process; and
4. Enforcing money decrees such as those relating to garnishments and the sale of property.[20]

The report further states:

> As a court officer the sheriff is usually responsible to the general trial court of the state. In a few states, the sheriff of the county where the state capitol is located has served also as an officer of the highest court of the state. But this apparently no longer occurs even where such statutory responsibilities remain.
>
> The sheriff's general role as a guardian of the court is manifested in different ways in various states. In a few states, such as Mississippi, the sheriff is charged with management of the county courthouse. In 45 states, the sheriff or his deputy is required to attend court or act as bailiff. In all 49 states, the sheriff

is responsible for process service of one kind or another.[21]

Many states - by statute - also assign sheriffs other court - related duties.

The study also reported statistical data relating to court services functions in the following categories:[22]

1. Personnel (salaries of bailiffs by region);

2. Assignment of county sheriff sworn and civilian employees (including data on bailiffs/court officers and process servers);

3. Budgets for civil and court operations.

Chapter XVIII of the study focuses on interstate transportation of prisoners since most sheriffs in the nation have this responsibility. The study of the 1,132 agencies found:

1. The average number of fugitives returned in 1976 from other states per agency is 10; these agencies received a total of 11,673 prisoners.[23]

2. Of the county sheriffs who participate in interstate transportation of prisoners, 77 percent stated that they are the sole agency in the county that handles transports; 83 percent of the 23 county police departments and 80 percent of the 15 independent city sheriffs surveyed report they are the sole agency in the city handling the interstate transportation of prisoners.[24]

3. Transportation costs, which include airfare, meals and lodging, are highest in the Northeast, with transportation costs averaging $302 nationally.[25]

4. The national average for manpower costs involved in the transportation of prisoners is $157.[26]

5. Nationally, the total average cost per return, including both transportation and manpower costs, is $420.[27]

6. Regarding injuries to officers while transporting prisoners interstate, only one agency participating in the study reported a minor injury to personnel.[28]

Surprisingly, the study does not include a chapter on court-related duties of county sheriffs, nor does it consider the court functions in its final chapter, "The Needs of County Law Enforcement."[29]

Court security became an issue of concern in the mid-1970s when acts of violence began occurring with increasing frequency in courtrooms and on courthouse premises. From a panel discussion at a National Sheriffs' Association Annual Exhibition and Information Conference in the mid-1970s came the realization that there was no single document suitable for general use as a guide for practical court security procedures. A comprehensive review of the literature by NSA staff members in 1977, in conjunction with a court security project funded by the U.S. Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), showed a lack of material dealing comprehensively with court security; most publications made only brief comments on the subject, usually from a narrow perspective.[30] NSA Project Staff commented:

> Literature on court security is also relatively recent; no sources published before 1970 were found. Most of the works deal with technology, procedures and architecture as the solutions to court security problems. However, very little literature offers guidelines for assessing security problems, weighing various solutions, and deciding on the best solution under specific circumstances (such as judicial and fiscal limitations).[31]

Since none of the publications reviewed could be used by law enforcement planners as a single, comprehensive guide to security planning, the NSA Project Staff wrote Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, to help fill that gap. The manual was accompanied by a separate volume, Court Security: Training Guidelines.[32]

The Manual offers guidelines to help the law enforcement officials in charge of court security plan for both daily problems and the rare, but often deadly, sensational events. It is designed to be useful for other court officials with security concerns, such

as judges and court administrators. But, with such a diverse audience, the NSA Project Staff recognized that the Manual could not be all inclusive, stating:

> Instead, the suggestions here are meant to raise issues to be considered in current security plans and to offer possible ways to deal with these issues.[33]

The Manual provides solutions to existing and possible security problems while at the same time serving as a continual reference source for court security officials.

To develop the guidelines in the Manual, NSA Project Staff produced a list of major court security incidents and used the list to select 22 locations for field interviews. The sites were chosen based on their reported incidents, geographical spread and jurisdictional size. At each location, NSA Project Staff interviewed the sheriff's officers (or other agency in charge of court security), judges, prosecutors, and the court administrators. The purpose of the survey was to gather information on the following topics:

1. Existing physical and procedural security programs and problems;

2. Special circumstances or community pressures likely to cause an incident;

3. Views on the possibility of violence;

4. Additional security measures taken after an incident occurred;

5. The use of armed security officers in the courtroom; and

6. General information, such as the age of the courthouse, number of security personnel, training in and shared responsibility for court security.[34]

Based on its interviews conducted in 1977, the NSA Project Staff reached the following conclusions concerning the state of court security in the nation:

1. **Where incidents were occurring:** About half of the court incidents occurring in 1977 were in civil and domestic courts

but the level of security awareness and the precautions taken in these courts are often less than in criminal courts.[35]

2. **Impact of serious incidents on security procedures:** In its interviews, NSA Project Staff found intense security awareness usually only right after a serious incident, when the immediate response generally was more security procedures, funding and manpower. In many cases, these measures were either reduced or stopped completely after a few months, and the pre-incident level of security was resumed.[36]

3. **Use of existing security measures:** A major problem in some courthouses visited by NSA Project Staff was that security procedures and equipment were often adequate but not maintained or used effectively. For example, magnetometers (metal detectors) were understaffed, alarms were assumed to be false and thus not responded to, closed-circuit television (CCTV) was not monitored, and expensive equipment was inoperable because of poor maintenance. In many jurisdictions, security could be greatly improved by reallocating personnel and/or strictly enforcing procedures already in effect.[37]

4. **Courthouse construction:** NSA Project Staff found that a serious problem during courthouse construction is the frequent lack of input from court security personnel, often resulting in costly changes.[38]

5. **Training:** Every sheriff interviewed by NSA Project Staff noted the need for well-trained bailiffs and security officers. A well-trained staff able to anticipate and respond to different situations is one of the best deterrents to court

> incidents; thus, some formal court security training should be available for every law enforcement agency responsible for court security.[39]

The Manual makes specific recommendations in the areas of court security in general; developing policy and procedures manuals for bailiffs and court security officers; physical security surveys and how to conduct them; technological equipment; personnel selection, assignment, use and training; and architectural matters. Because of the in-depth analyses and recommendations provided by this 1977-78 study, it serves as the foundation upon which this present study builds.

Recent Publications

Several articles, studies and manuals have been published in recent years which proved to be useful in this present study. A sampling of the best materials follows:

Courthouse Security in General: In 1992, retired Judge Richard Carter of the Arlington, Texas, Municipal Court privately published a looseleaf manual with an accompanying video, Court Security for Judges, Bailiffs and Other Court Personnel, to serve as a reference tool for the protection of lives.[40] The 98-page manual contains an appendix with various forms that can be used in security audits, bomb threats and threat prevention. His manual is brief, but is nevertheless comprehensive and provides useful guidelines. Covered are such issues as: the need for security, the legal authority to order or control court security, assessing court security by survey, courthouse architecture, security equipment and devices, bailiffs and courthouse security officers, bomb threats and bombs, hostage and kidnap/extortion, psychological aspects of court security, court security and the news media, liability issues, and 101 (or more) ways to save a judge.

A briefer overview of court security in general is provided in "Security," a special focus issue of The Court Management and Administration Report published in 1990.[41] This 16-page report deals only with building and perimeter security, highlighting those elements which should be considered by court managers in reviewing security requirements.

Court Security Manuals, Policies and Guidelines: In August 1990, the National Center for State Courts Information Services in Williamsburg, Virginia, completed a 50-state telephone survey of state court administrators to determine the status of written security plans in state court systems.[42] Only three states - Alaska, Maryland and Vermont - failed to respond. The survey revealed that recent violent incidents against the legal community have led many state court systems to recognize the need for

extensive improvements in their court security. Specific written plans have been developed by California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Utah and West Virginia. Among some of the plans obtained and reviewed for this present study are:

1. Maine Judicial Department's Personal Security Guide: This two-part manual addresses appropriate responses to incidents of violence or threats of violence in the courthouse (Part I) and outlines general security measures to be taken by courthouse employees (Part II).[43]

2. Colorado Supreme Court Courthouse Security Committee's "Colorado Courthouse Security Guidelines" in the 1990 Colorado Facilities Plan: These guidelines were written to be flexible and are expected to be modified as local situations dictate due to the variety of different types of courthouses in the state.[44] The guidelines cover: general courthouse security; personal security of judges, court employees, lawyers, court security personnel, witnesses and jurors; prisoner handling; firearms policies; emergency policies for fire, bomb threat, theft, evidence handling, gangs and hostage situations; and architecture, new construction and remodelling.

3. **A Model Plan for Security in New Jersey Courts** was developed in 1984 by the Judiciary/Sheriff Liaison Committee to the New Jersey Supreme Court.[45] The purpose of this plan was to propose policies or standards on courthouse security, serving as a guide to help local court systems develop security plans. The use of the model is overseen by the Administrative Office of the Courts but all details are handled at the local level. The plan covers courtroom support; security outside the courtroom; transportation of prisoners and restraining devices; building surveys; and special conditions such as bomb threats, hostage taking, sequestered juries and high-threat trials.

4. State of Connecticut Judicial Department Security Manual: Published in 1989, this Manual is designed for the entire state court system.[46] Updating the Manual, providing surveys of facilities and following up on recommendations is the responsibility of the security specialist

of the Office of the Chief Court Administrators.

In addition to the state manuals described above, this study also relied for background material upon the United States Marshals Service (USMS) Policies and Procedures Manual, Volume X: Judicial and Court Security, updated in 1993.[47] This Manual is for official use only of the USMS, and covers court security in general, juries, protective services, judicial facility security and technical assistance.

Legal Issues: The State of Utah, in its Code of Judicial Administration, amended in 1990 and 1991, provides an excellent legal foundation for promoting the safety and well-being of judicial personnel and others.[48] Rule 3-414 establishes uniform policies for court security and delineates responsibility for various court security measures.

Court Security Technology: One of the most useful overall reference sources is Correctional Technology: A User's Guide, developed in 1993 by the American Correctional Association (ACA) for the U.S. Justice Department's National Institute of Corrections (NIC).[49] This looseleaf guidebook is designed to provide correctional administrators with a non-biased, objective source for evaluating different correctional technologies in use today. It contains chapters on perimeter security systems, locks and locking systems, internal detection systems, monitoring and surveillance systems, fire safety systems, communication systems and management information systems.

Training of Court Security Personnel: Two documents provided reference materials for this study. Court Security: Training Guidelines and Curricula, developed by the National Sheriffs' Association in 1991 with funding from the Federal Government's State Justice Institute, contains curricula for state and local agencies to use in training court security personnel.[50] On the local level, an excellent model recruitment and training policy is that of the Monroe County, New York, Office of the Sheriff. Its 1994 Court Security Bureau Manual includes personnel selection policies, rules and regulations, training curricula for recruit and in-service officers and recruit evaluation forms.[51]

Courthouse Architecture: The N.S.A. Project Staff faced difficulties in obtaining written materials on courthouse architecture but was able to locate two good sources for background information:

1. Courthouse Security Planning: Goals, Measures and Evaluation Methodology, prepared by Justice Planning Associates, Inc., in 1991, focuses on security planning

as part of the courthouse design process for both new buildings and renovations.[52] This 172-page report provides a methodological framework within which to define courthouse security in very precise terms; articulate specific goals which can be compared and to which relative values can be attributed; and within which specific measures can be somewhat exclusively listed (spatial, technological or operational).

2. In 1991, the Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts, published California Trial Courts Facilities Standards.[53] This 127-page manual includes guidelines for new court construction, although they are equally useful for remodelling or renovation projects. The guidelines establish standards that are significant to all courthouses, in both urban and rural environments, in order to meet the expectations of users and the functional requirements of the judicial process.

Transportation of Prisoners: The N.S.A. Project Staff could not locate any books or manuals dealing specifically with all the issues surrounding the transportation of prisoners. Useful guidelines, however, were located in several articles and policy statements, including:

1. "Models for Management: Transporting Prisoners in Custody," prepared in 1988 by the Policy Center of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP); this document sets forth a model policy for the transportation of persons in custody.[54]

2. "Transportation of Prisoners," published by the American Jail Association (AJA) in 1989 as a rollcall training bulletin, teaches jail officers to be constantly aware of proper security procedures when escorting inmates outside the secure areas of the jail.[55] It focuses on how to prepare and restrain inmates for transport; how to escort inmates to various places, such as courts; and how to escort inmates safely on commercial aircraft.

3. Los Angeles County, California, Sheriff Sherman Block in July 1994 wrote an article, "Inmate Transportation Poses Unique Security Challenges," focusing on how the transportation process affords the best opportunity for inmates to attempt to escape because of the minimal restraints.[56] In the article, published in Corrections Today magazine, Sheriff Block discusses three critical issues involved in transporting inmates outside of-hard-lock facilities: inmate supervision, vehicle and travel

route preparation, and transport policy/staff preparation.

4. Two recent articles, "Prisoner Transportation via ConAir" and "Transporting Prisoners: Support Available from the USMS," explain the policies of the U.S. Marshals Service in transporting inmates for state and local correctional agencies.[57]

5. Procedures for the interstate transportation of prisoners are fully explained in CAPTIS (Computer Assisted Prisoner Transportation Service): A Technical and Legal Assessment, published by the National Sheriffs' Association in 1980.[58] Included in the large volume is a CAPTIS User's Manual.

6. Two publications examined by the N.S.A. Project Staff deal with the transportation of prisoners on commercial airlines. Advisory Circular 108-2 of the Federal Aviation Administration Regulations, while not regulatory in nature, clarifies the regulation concerning accepting and transporting prisoners in the custody of armed law enforcement officers aboard aircraft.[59] In an article in The National Sheriff published in 1986, the policies and procedures for carrying firearms while escorting prisoners on six commercial airlines are explained; the information is slightly outdated, though, since one of the airlines, Eastern, no longer exists.[60]

7. A good overall review of prisoner transport policies and procedures can be found in The Jail Officer's Training Manual, first published by the National Sheriffs' Association in 1980 and last updated in September 1994.[61] Especially useful are the photographs and diagrams illustrating how to properly secure restraining devices on inmates prior to transporting them.

Policies Developed to Meet the Standards of the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies: The DuPage County, Illinois, Office of the Sheriff developed a Court Security Manual in accordance with CALEA Standards which apply to: Job descriptions and position responsibilities (Standard 73.1.1); court liaison (Standard 73.1.5); courtroom external communications (Standard 73.4.2.); courthouse population circulation patterns (Standard 73.2.1.c); court facility arrests/placement in custody (Standard 73.3.2); courthouse security (Standard 73.1.1); prisoner control and holding facility (Standard 73.2.1.c); prisoner transportation (no CALEA reference); weapons control (Standard 73.3.1); courtroom searches (Standard 73.2.1.c); prisoner escape

(Standard 73.2.1.c); hand carried articles (Standard 73.2.1.c); screening procedures (Standard 73.2.1.b & c); facility evacuation plan court security response (Standard 73.2.1.c); court facility evacuation plan, other locations (no CALEA reference); bomb threat (Standard 73.2.1.c); hostage plan (Standard 73.2.1.c); major emergency disaster plan (Standard 73.2.1.c); special operations incident plan (Standard 73.2.1.c); crowd control (Standard 73.2.1.b); high risk trial plan (Standard 73.2.1.c); emergency medical plan (Standard 73.2.1.b & c); security survey (Standard 73.2.1.a, b & c); inventory (Standard 73.2.1.a, b & c, 73.4.1); physical security plan (Standard 73.2.1.a, b & c, 73.4.1); incident report (no CALEA reference); authorized use of the stunning device Nova XR-5000 (Standards 1.3.1, 1.3.7, 1.3.13, 1.3.14); remotely activated custody control (RACC) belt (Standard 1.3.7); authorized use of electronic pilot shield (Standard 1.3.7); and emergency response plan (no reference).[62]

To summarize, **there is not an abundance of literature dealing with court security and transportation of prisoners issues, but what exists generally is of high quality from the practical standpoint.** Most of the literature has been developed since 1980 due to a nationwide increase in courthouse violence and the sensational aspects of some high-profile trials. (Additional books, manuals, policies, articles and videos are listed in the appendices.)

Project Advisory Board and Staff Review Committee

To assist with project development, in March 1994 NSA established a Project Advisory Board consisting of representatives of the following agencies and organizations: American Probation and Parole Association, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, National Judicial College, American Judges Association, U.S. Marshals Service, American Institute of Architects, Conference of State Court Administrators, National Center for State Courts, National District Attorneys Association, State Justice Institute, Association of Trial Lawyers, and National Center for Juvenile Justice.

The National Advisory Board met with NSA Project Staff and NIJ Project Monitors March 29, 1994, in Alexandria, Virginia, to discuss security problems in the court system and provide input for the development of survey questionnaires. The Advisory Board helped NSA Project Staff develop a framework for the project, focusing on the major security concerns of judicial agencies, inherent managerial problems, and how to reconcile security needs with the concurrent need for court systems that are accessible to the public.

On April 4, 1994, NSA Project Staff and NIJ Project Monitors met with the project's Staff Review Committee, composed of representatives of courts, sheriffs' departments, private security agencies, constables, jails, the Maryland Department of Corrections, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Marshals Service, to develop a job task analysis questionnaire and review existing guidelines on such issues as use of force, mutual aid pacts, organization and administration of court security operations, standard operating procedures, specialized assignments and training of court security personnel.

Court Security Problems and Issues

Advisory Board: The Advisory Board meeting focused on identifying information resources as well as key issues of concern to the various associations and agencies represented on the Board.

On the subject of **court security,** the Board members highlighted the following concerns:

1. **Education and training of court employees and participants in the legal system:**

   A. Should all law schools in the United States require a segment of instruction in court security for all future attorneys in order to help them become aware of the problems? (A two-hour instructional block was suggested).

   B. Everyone participating in the judicial process (court employees, attorneys) needs to receive periodic briefings about security awareness so that when an emergency occurs, they know what to do and don't panic.

   C. More security awareness training is needed for judges and other judicial services personnel.

   D. National court security training programs, focusing on management and tactical issues, should be developed; these programs should be similar to those offered by the National Institute of Corrections National Academy of Corrections in

Longmont, Colorado (offered by the Federal Government at little or no cost to state and local agencies).

E. Court security training in many jurisdictions is of poor quality or even non-existent; it needs to be more uniform and specialized within states and nationwide.

F. State systems ought to standardize training systemwide.

G. Security training for judges might need to be increased (the National Judicial College has been providing some security training for judges, but not a great deal; it includes a mandatory two-hour segment on court security in its course for new judges).

H. Violence in juvenile courts in urban areas is becoming more and more of a problem, yet training in court security for juvenile court judges and other personnel in these courts is either minimal or non-existent.

2. **Access Control:**

A. Jurisdictions should consider **mandatory** screening at entrances to court facilities.

B. Better policies and procedures are needed for access control in most court systems.

C. The location of the jail near the court facility is critical.

D. There should be mandatory screening of all mail entering judicial facilities to detect letter and package bombs.

E. Court security officers/deputies should be cross-trained to operate all access control equipment in the facility.

F. Too many court security managers neglect security in the public areas outside the courthouse walls, leaving the courthouse vulnerable to car and truck bombs, as well as robberies, rapes and carjackings in courthouse parking facilities.

G. Technology and equipment must be addressed in any court security program. It would be helpful to have a user's guide for court security access control equipment; this guide should cover what is necessary for a minimal access control program and what is ideal.

H. Court security audits are necessary to determine where the greatest amount of security is needed in different types of courthouses (e.g., courts with greatest numbers of security problems, public access problems, locations of holding cells, etc.).

I. Public relations programs may be necessary to explain to citizens why security and access control is being increased at the courthouse.

J. **Money is a problem** - too many judges do not see the need for effective access control programs and do not want to allocate the money for equipment, personnel, and the necessary training of personnel.

K. Should state and county court systems use public law enforcement personnel with full powers of arrest at access control checkpoints or contract out this duty to private security agencies? (The U.S. Marshals Service uses approximately 2,300 contract guards nationwide, paying them $12 to $15 per hour; policies, procedures and personnel rules are standardized from Washington, D.C.). As one

participant commented: "All private security employees working in courthouse security should be required to have at least three years of public law enforcement experience and you have to pay them well. You get what you pay for."

L. **Access control must be 24 hours a day.** Some courts use inmates on cleaning crews and have no security at all for cleaning crews or during off hours.

M. The Federal Government ought to test and evaluate hardware for court security access control; state and local governments usually do not have the resources to do this.

3. **Architecture:**

A. Structures in courtrooms should be retrofitted as necessary to be bullet-resistant so court personnel can drop behind them for protection if shooting erupts.

B. All new courtrooms should be designed to include bullet-resistant structures (e.g., jury box, judge's bench).

C. Existing courthouses should be surveyed to determine architectural weak points which allow intruders to gain entry and these areas should be either reinforced (such as steel burglar bars on basement windows), closed off if feasible (e.g., basement doors, side doors), or protected by security guards.

D. A security design guidebook is necessary to help architects who are designing new courthouses or renovating existing facilities (Note: The U.S. Marshals Service has produced an architectural design guide for Federal facilities).

E. There is a problem with historic courthouses in many parts of the nation. These buildings are on historic registers and any security changes have to be done carefully to blend in with the existing architecture. For example, in many of these buildings, it is not allowed to remove walls in order to improve design of courtrooms for more effective security.

F. In designing courthouses, there would be public resistance if the buildings were made to look like fortresses.

G. Probation and parole representatives said there needs to be an architectural focus on making offices secure - this is where many problems occur with volatile clients, yet most of the security efforts seem to focus upon the courtrooms instead.

H. While emphasis is placed on making criminal courtrooms more secure, some Advisory Board members feel that the greatest security problems occur in the family court areas (juvenile and domestic relations courts) due to the high emotions generated during many procedures in these courts.

I. Most courthouses in existence today have been designed and constructed with very little thought given to security needs.

J. With the changing nature of the types of clients and cases in today's courthouses (more violence, volatile emotions, etc.), architectural design is a very critical issue in court security planning - in some cases, architectural changes are forced by lawsuits.

K. Underground garages which allow public access can be major security problems -- are these underground garages necessary (with the exception of sallyports for prisoner transportation)?

4. Personnel Issues:

A. Courthouses need to develop mandatory entrance screening guidelines for all personnel (as well as members of the public). Some courthouse violence incidents have been created by employees who are not screened for weapons.

B. Nationwide, there are real inconsistencies regarding the carrying of firearms in courtrooms; many jurisdictions allow police officers to carry guns anywhere in the courthouse, yet several jurisdictions have had incidents where police officers shot judges and attorneys, as well as spouses, during family court hearings.

C. In many jurisdictions, probation and parole personnel do not feel they are being trained or equipped to deal with today's clients - about 75 percent of the people on probation today in some urban areas are felons.

D. Employees in courthouses in urban areas live in fear of violence, which appears to be increasing; this fear leads to high employee turnover and poor morale.

Staff Review Committee: The Staff Review Committee meeting April 4, 1994, focused on such issues as resources, training, prisoner transportation, protecting witnesses, personnel selection and intelligence gathering. On the subject of **court security**, the Committee members highlighted the following concerns:

1. **Education and training of court employees and participants in the legal system:**

A. While some court systems provide a 40-hour basic training course to new court security officers, annual in-service training often is non-existent.

B. Before hiring guards from private security companies, courts need to determine how much training the guards receive and assess the quality of the training. Courts also should require annual in-service training for guards from private security firms.

C. Standard training guidelines are needed for security officers in all types of courts.

D. In some states, the primary court security problem is the almost total lack of training for court services personnel, from judges on down.

E. Courthouse employees often say they want better security but then they say they don't want to be "inconvenienced" by being required to attend training programs.

F. Training of all court personnel to be security-conscious is necessary to avoid liability actions.

G. Court systems need to design effective standardized training programs covering basic, in-service and specialized training and conduct training programs on an ongoing basis.

H. Court security employees need to be trained to use security equipment properly.

I. More on-the-job training (with field training officers) is needed for newly-hired security personnel who have completed at least a 40-hour basic training program.

2. **Access Control:**

A. U.S. Marshals Service representatives on the Committee recommended that a standardized court security audit survey be developed since "standards often help you get the additional resources you need." The Federal Government has developed a security survey for all U.S. courthouses, but surveys based upon standards need to be developed for state and local courts as well.

B. In some courts, spectators are allowed access to inmates and pass contraband to them.

C. Since most state and local courts make known the dates and times for court appearances, the public knows where specific inmates will be at given times and this makes it difficult for court security officers to control access to prisoners or to prevent crowds from coming to the courthouse when well-known defendants are making appearances or are on trial; crowds intensify security problems (an example was the huge crowds that flocked to the Prince William County Courthouse in Manassas, Virginia, in 1993 and 1994 for the trials of John and Lorena Bobbitt, which were also televised nationwide). When crowds gather, the sheriff must allocate additional resources for crowd control.

D. One of the major problems hindering the development and implementation of effective access control programs is "politics." For example, law enforcement officials frequently "parade" major offenders before the media - what has become known as the "Lee Harvey Oswald Walk" - so that the officials can obtain the proper

"credit" for the arrest. Oftentimes, crowds of citizens are permitted to be present for the "Lee Harvey Oswald Walk" and in most cases none of the citizens are searched for weapons, thus endangering the lives of the suspect (who is sometimes innocent), the law enforcement officers and citizens in the crowd. Two sensational events in 1994 and 1995 resulted in "parading" the suspect in front of crowds when entering or leaving the courthouses - the October 1994 indictment of Susan Smith in Union, South Carolina, after she was accused of drowning her two sons, and the April 1995 transfer of Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing suspect Timothy McVeigh from local to Federal custody at the courthouse in Perry, Oklahoma.

E. The U.S. Marshals Service has found a lack of consistency among courts in different states regarding security; court administrators sometimes set their own agendas regarding how court security should function and access control procedures.

F. In many states, the physical layouts of the court buildings and courtrooms do not facilitate good security procedures, making access control programs difficult to implement and sustain.

G. Some judges prohibit the use of any restraining devices in their courtrooms. As one committee member remarked: "A lot of judges don't even ask you if this particular defendant is a security risk. They just say, 'I don't want any restraints in my courtroom.'"

H. Sometimes, in high-profile trials, judges seem to be more interested in

accommodating the media than in court security.

I. In most courthouses, people in uniform can walk past court security without even being challenged.

J. Judges often control the courthouse budget and don't see the need for security devices, such as magnetometers.

K. Many courthouses have too many entrances which are not controlled; judges must be convinced that effective security requires that all doors be alarmed, locked or controlled by security officers with magnetometers.

L. Most courts normally don't check anyone entering the court complex except when there are high-profile trials.

M. In too many court lock-ups, there are sight-sound problems: Juveniles, women and adult male offenders are all near each other and "the lock-ups resemble zoos."

N. "Everybody wants security in our court complex but nobody wants to be inconvenienced," one Committee member pointed out.

O. In some courthouses, prisoners ride public elevators with citizens and court employees; court security personnel are not permitted to block off an elevator solely for prisoner movement within the courthouse.

P. Implementing the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to provide easier access for the handicapped has created access control problems in some older courthouses where retrofitting was necessary.

Q. A controlled environment is an absolute "must" for effective court security.

R. An audit of access control and court security must be on-going, not once a year. Continuous audits help spot security problems and defects so that immediate action can be taken to remedy the problems.

S. An access control and security program should make widespread use of radios and audio alarms.

T. All court security personnel must be taught how to properly use all security equipment, particularly the high-tech devices.

U. Courts must standardize procedures regarding:

(1) Armed vs. unarmed security officers in the courthouse and court-rooms;

(2) Allowing law enforcement officers to carry firearms within the courthouse;

(3) Carrying of concealed firearms by judges and attorneys.

V. Courts should make use of such security devices as closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, panic alarms, sign in/sign out sheets at guard duty posts, photo identification cards for court employees, one-day visitor badges and other security devices and constantly monitor the proper use of these devices.

W. Where access control programs are difficult to implement, courts

should consider installing video arraignment systems to cut down on the number of prisoners being transported in and out of the courthouse.

X. Too many courts do not provide proper security for money that is being collected and stored within the building (fines, taxes, etc.).

Y. X-ray scanners should be used for all packages and mail, including packages which judges receive at their homes (judges should be encouraged to bring any unexpected or suspicious looking packages to the courthouse for scanning prior to opening the packages).

3. **Architecture:**

A. The U.S. Marshals Service has developed court design guidelines for architects to follow in renovating existing courthouses or designing new facilities.

B. Lock-ups in courthouses need to be designed so that male adults, women and juveniles are not placed in holding cells near each other in order to avoid any potential liability problems.

C. Many old, historic courthouses present serious security problems but laws governing the preservation of historic properties prevent renovations to improve security and access control.

D. Standardized design guidelines are needed for state and local court facilities.

4. **Personnel Issues:** The Committee focused its discussion on several issues related to the use of contract guards from private security agencies:

A. Who dictates the security standards which the guards enforce - the court or the private security firm?

B. Does the security firm hire inexperienced guards at the lower end of the pay scale or more experienced personnel (e.g., retired military and law enforcement officers) who receive higher pay for their skills?

C. When retired law enforcement officers are hired for court security duty, they do not need much supervision.

D. What **authority** is given to private contractors who provide court security officers?

E. Do the private security guards have police powers to enforce public laws on court property? If not, what liaison procedures exist to call local law enforcement personnel in emergencies?

F. Using private security guards may pose liability problems.

G. Will there be a high turnover rate in personnel if private security guards are used? Will institutional knowledge thus be lost, with a negative impact upon security?

H. Who sets and enforces training standards for private security guards?

Transportation of Prisoners Problems and Issues Advisory Board: The Advisory Board spent the majority of its time during the March 29, 1994, meeting focusing upon court security issues rather than the problems involved in the transportation of prisoners. Nevertheless, the Board did point out the following problems which need to be considered:

A. Effective security **outside** the court building in the perimeter areas is

critical to the safe transportation of prisoners.

B. All court system employees need to be trained to recognize security problems which could arise while prisoners are being escorted into, out of and within the court building; employees need to be made aware that they should not distract officers who are escorting prisoners.

C. The primary issues which need to be addressed in the area of transporting prisoners are:

(1) Types of vehicles used in transports;

(2) Responsibility;

(3) Authority;

(4) Control; and

(5) Supervision

D. Suicides in court lock-ups can occur if inmates are not watched carefully.

E. CCTV arraignments will help cut down on transportation costs and eliminate the security problems associated with moving prisoners back and forth from the jail to the courthouse.

Staff Review Committee: In contrast to the Advisory Board, the Staff Review Committee spent the majority of time during its April 4, 1994, meeting discussing issues involved in the transportation of prisoners, focusing on the following topics:

1. **General Issues:**

A. Too many jurisdictions have a shortage of trained transport employees; there are too many cases of one-person escorts. There should

be two escorts for each inmate/prisoner.

B. In most areas, inmates have access to telephones after sentencing. This creates a security breach since inmates are able to tell friends where they are going.

C. Many jurisdictions have to pay a lot of overtime to transport officers.

D. Guidelines need to be established governing the minimum and maximum number of officers used to transport prisoners to court (one to one, two to one, etc.)

E. There are too many different policies, procedures and guidelines in use today; many of them are not uniform or acceptable. For example, in one area there may be a regional jail, a state prison and a city lock-up, all with different policies and procedures governing prisoner transportation.

2. **Risk Management:**

A. Transporting officers need to be assured that they will receive confidential information about the risk factors before transporting inmates; this necessitates that the law enforcement agency operate and maintain an intelligence gathering system to determine which inmates pose risks for escapes, contraband possession, etc.

B. The safety of transporting officers must be a primary concern in determining how to transport specific inmates who pose risks.

C. Transporting inmates by commercial aircraft has many built-in problems; each airline has different policies and procedures and sometimes an

inmate must be transferred from one commercial carrier to another in order to reach the destination.

D. A nationwide Prisoner Identification Network is needed to alert transporting officers about those prisoners who pose the most risk.

E. Failure of law enforcement, prison and court agencies to share information about prisoners poses unnecessary risks for transportation officers.

F. Officers must be taught how to recognize how prisoners may fake injuries or illnesses while being transported in order to facilitate an escape attempt.

3. **Transport Vehicles:**

A. Types of vehicles used include automobiles, vans, buses and aircraft, and each type of vehicle presents its own safety and security problems; officers must be trained to recognize these safety and security problems.

B. Any officer who transports prisoners in vans or buses capable of carrying more than 15 passengers must obtain a commercial drivers license (CDL); the agency must follow CDL guidelines for drug and alcohol testing of drivers.

C. Each transport vehicle must provide equipment to clean up blood and body fluid spills and proper infectious disease protection gloves and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) devices for officers who may be required to administer emergency medical care to inmates; agencies must abide by the rules and regulations of the U.S. Labor Department regarding the protection

of officers from infectious diseases and bloodborne pathogens.

D. Agencies which transport prisoners should have a fleet management program to ensure that all vehicles are properly maintained in order to avoid breakdowns while transports are in progress.

E. Each transport vehicle must have the following equipment in working order:

(1) Radios capable of tuning in to frequencies of all law enforcement jurisdictions through which the vehicle will pass as well as state police frequencies;

(2) Telephone; and

(3) Pager.

F. All transport officers should receive training in defensive driving techniques, as well as periodic refresher training.

G. Each transport vehicle should be equipped with:

(1) Security screens;

(2) Doors that do not open from the inside;

(3) Related security equipment.

4. **Liability issues:**

A. Should transport officers be armed or unarmed?

B. If private contractors are used to transport prisoners, who assumes

liability? Is this carefully spelled out in contracts?

C. Does the agency provide a sufficient number of officers to transport high-risk prisoners safely?

D. Does the agency follow proper sight-sound procedures when transporting prisoners (i.e., male, female and juvenile prisoners separated)?

E. Does the agency foster potential liability problems by failing to assign female officers to transports involving female inmates?

F. Does the agency provide proper restraints for each transport?

G. Are all transport officers properly trained in the following areas, with annual retraining:

(1) Use of firearms;

(2) Use of restraining devices;

(3) Operation of transport vehicle;

(4) First aid?

H. Does the agency have written policies and procedures regarding the transportation of prisoners?

I. Do financial considerations take precedence over the training of officers and life safety issues?

5. **Transporting prisoners for special needs:**

A. **Medical/dental appointments:**

(1) Confirm all appointments with the medical office before transporting the prisoner.

(2) Use proper restraints when transporting inmates for medical treatment; it is a common ploy for inmates to fake illness or injury in order to facilitate an escape attempt.

(3) Never let the prisoner out of sight in dental and medical offices or hospitals.

(4) Each agency should have a plan to evacuate large numbers of sick or injured inmates in the event that a medical emergency occurs in courthouse holding pen, on a transport bus, or in the jail (e.g., mass food poisoning, fire, bomb explosion, chemical spill, tornado).

(5) The agency must provide for special medical needs of prisoners who are being transported (e.g., wheelchair, diet, breathing equipment, hearing or vision impaired, etc.).

B. **Hospital confinement of prisoners** involves several issues which must be addressed:

(1) Searches;

(2) Written policies and procedures;

(3) Use of weapons;

(4) Use of chemical agents;

(5) Restraining devices; and

(6) Less-than-lethal force.

C. **Funeral** details involve the following issues which must be addressed:

(1) Time of day and day of week;

(2) Should the inmate be transported or denied transport?

(3) Location of viewing and funeral service;

(4) Who pays for the cost of the transport?

(5) Special viewing for the inmate;

(6) Security - can an "information leak" lead to an escape attempt?

6. **Parking lots, garages and elevators:**

A. Elevators pose a security problem when there is no secure elevator in courthouses and hospitals and inmates must be placed on elevator available to the general public where weapons and handcuff keys can be hidden; officers should search an elevator before placing a prisoner in it and close the elevator to the public while the prisoner is being transported. Courts should provide key and button controls for elevators used to transport prisoners.

B. In non-secure parking lots at courthouses and hospitals, transport vehicles must be secured and watched.

C. Too many courthouses fail to provide adequate parking for prisoner transport vehicles and prisoners must be moved to the courthouse on foot in full view of citizens, creating dangerous situations for transport officers.

D. Members of the public should not be permitted to enter areas where prisoners are being loaded and unloaded into transport vehicles.

E. Officers should conduct a daily search of prisoner transport loading areas inside courthouse garages for hidden handcuff keys, weapons and bombs. Metal detection scanners, mirrors mounted on broom handles and bomb-sniffing dogs are some of the search methods which can be easily employed.

7. **Other issues of concern:**

A. **Restraining devices:**

(1) What types should be used?

(2) Types available (handcuffs, chains, leg irons, black box, leg braces, straightjackets).

(3) Does the agency have written policies and procedures governing the use of restraining devices?

(4) Are transport officers properly trained to use the various types of restraining devices? Do they receive periodic refresher training in the use of restraining devices?

(5) Is there a secure area in the court facility where officers can safely install and/or remove restraining devices?

B. Some courts do not have secure holding areas for prisoners.

C. Some courts have no bailiff, constable or court officer/deputy on duty when prisoners are brought to the court, necessitating that the transport officer remain to guard the prisoner.

D. What policies and procedures exist in each agency to provide for food and restroom needs of prisoners during long transports?

E. Who is responsible for the security of prisoners once prisoners have been delivered to the courthouse?

F. Some airports have inadequate holding facilities for prisoners who are being transported.

These issues were explored in detail in the survey questionnaires which N.S.A. developed and administered. The survey questionnaires are examined beginning in Chapter Three.

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COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

CHAPTER THREE

NATIONAL DATA COLLECTION SURVEYS: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

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CHAPTER THREE

NATIONAL DATA COLLECTION SURVEYS FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER THREE

SECTION ONE
COURT SECURITY OFFICERS
JOB/POSITION TASK ANALYSIS SURVEY I

The purpose of the Job/Position Task Analysis Survey I was to determine the existing situation in courts within all 50 states and the U.S. territories regarding such issues as:

- Educational level of court security employees;
- Amount of training in court security and transportation of prisoners provided to those who are working as court security officers;
- How agencies are staffing the court security function;
- Job duties within the employee's span-of-control;
- Employee's opinions concerning job duties, relevance of any training received, and need for additional training;
- Responsibility and authority for court security and the transportation of prisoners; and
- Responsibility and authority for the extradition of prisoners.

The survey, consisting of over 350 questions, was mailed to 270 potential respondents randomly selected in all 50 states and the U.S. territories. Respondents returned 217 completed surveys to the National Sheriffs' Association, for a return rate of 80.38 percent. Those who completed the surveys are employed in court security with such job titles as: bailiff, constable, court security officer/deputy, court aide, clerk of court, court supervisor and facilities specialist.

N.S.A. entered 338 of the 350 questions into the computer (omitted from computer entry were questions seeking such data as agency name; agency address, including separate entry lines for city, county, state, zip code, and telephone and fax numbers). The questions included yes/no, multiple choice and numeric responses. In general, a pie chart was selected for those questions that had a few number of different responses (generally less than five); and

a bar chart was used for those questions that had a larger number of different responses. All numbers depicted in the charts are percentages on the return of 217 surveys.

Sample Population Characteristics:

Responses were received from 50 states and territories.

In response to the question, "How long (have you been in your present job title and rank)," the median response from the 217 survey participants was seven years, as depicted in Figure I.E. The mean was 8.843 years.



The ages of the respondents ranged from 16 through 79, with the median age at 44 and the mean age at 42.931 years; seven of the respondents did not state their age (see Figure I.G).



When asked their sex, 88.9 percent of the respondents said they are males and 9.2 percent said they are female, while 1.8 percent described themselves as "other."

Most of the respondents have had some education beyond high school. The median number of years of formal schooling is 14 (junior college), with a mean of 13.627 years of education completed (see Figure I.H).



Four questions sought information about the type of training received by the court security personnel. When asked if they had completed certified court security, transportation of prisoners or

civil or criminal process training, 63.1 percent of the respondents answered in the affirmative, while 35 percent said no (see Figure I.1).



Question I.J asked respondents whether they had completed any certified specialized training in court security, transportation of prisoners, or civil or criminal process. Here the majority of the

respondents answered in the negative (46.1 percent) while only 45.2 percent said they had received such training (see Figure I.J).

Court Security & the Transportation of Prisoners Survey

I. Overview



Question I.J - Completed Specialized & Certified Court Security Training

Type of Agency and Staffing Levels: The majority of court security officers responding to the survey (90 percent) are employed by a county sheriff's office, with the remaining 10

percent employed by a constable, state agency, Federal agency or private contractor (see Figure II).



The number of full time employees in the agencies surveyed ranged from zero (31 agencies) to 24,000 (two agencies), with a median of 26 (see Figure III.A).



One hundred eighteen of the respondents said their agencies do not employ any part-time court security officers while three agencies each employ 200 part-time court security personnel. The majority of the responding agencies which do employ part-timers (44 agencies) indicated that they have hired from one to four part-time officers. Twenty-eight of the responding agencies contract for private security guards to staff the court security function, ranging from five agencies which hire one private security guard each to one agency which contracts for 2,200 private security guards. One hundred eighty-nine of the responding agencies do <u>not</u> hire contract guards.

Criminal Justice Employment Background of Court Security Officers: The majority of the 217 court security personnel responding to the survey stated that their work experience in the criminal justice system was in law enforcement (72.4 percent). The remainder of the population sample served in the military (2.3 percent), confinement or correctional services (5.1 percent) and judicial services (2.8 percent), while 17.5 percent indicated no previous experience in criminal justice prior to their current position in court security (see Figure VI).



The **median** length of experience for the 217 respondents in their present agency is 11 years (see Figure VI.A.1).



Eighty-eight of the 217 respondents do not supervise other employees, while of those who are supervisors (129 respondents), the **median** number of years as a supervisor is one. (See Figure VI.A.7).

Of the 129 respondents who stated that they were supervisors, 127 said they currently supervise other employees directly; the median number of employees supervised is three (see Figure VI.A.8).



Span-of-Control and Supervisory Responsibilities:

Section VII of the survey questionnaire examined each respondent's span-of-control over specific task areas, and asked the respondent to indicate those areas in which training is needed. The survey results are summarized in Figure VII [Note: Slight irregularities in percentages totalling 100 percent are due to rounding in individual categories; some categories will be plus or minus 0.1 percentage points over or under 100 percent.]

Figure VII
SPAN-OF-CONTROL

Subject Area	Within Respondent's Span-of-Control	Respondent Has Supervisory Responsibilities	Not in Respondent's Span-of-Control And No Supervisory Responsibilities	Respondent Feels Training Is Needed	Other
1. Administration	25.3%	9.2%	60.4%	5.1%	0.0%
2. Fiscal Management	14.3%	7.8%	72.8%	4.1%	0.9%
3. Personnel	29.5%	12.9%	52.1%	4.1%	1.4%
4. Training	31.3%	24.0%	32.7%	10.1%	1.8%
5. Staff Development	19.4%	17.5%	56.2%	6.0%	0.9%
6. Record Keeping	43.8%	14.3%	34.6%	6.5%	0.9%
7. Data Processing (Computers)	20.7%	15.7%	58.1%	5.1%	0.5%
8. Physical Plant	19.4%	4.6%	72.4%	3.7%	0.0%
9. New/Renovated Facility/Design	12.0%	6.5%	76.0%	5.5%	0.0%
10. Services	21.2%	7.8%	64.5%	6.0%	0.5%
11. Security and Control	32.3%	42.4%	16.1%	8.8%	0.5%
12. Supervision	37.8%	18.4%	39.2%	4.6%	0.0%
13. Special Management of Confined: Juveniles, Females, Males	24.0%	12.4%	56.7%	6.5%	0.5%
14. Reception-Orientation	19.8%	4.1%	71.0%	4.6%	0.5%
15. Release	19.8%	4.6%	70.5%	4.1%	0.9%
16. Property/-Evidence Control	23.0%	7.8%	64.1%	5.1%	0.0%
17. Classification	13.8%	5.5%	76.5%	4.1%	0.0%
18. Research/-Evaluation	14.3%	8.8%	71.4%	5.5%	0.0%
19. Investigations	15.2%	10.6%	68.7%	5.5%	0.0%
20. Transportation of Prisoners (overall transportation)	33.6%	32.3%	28.6%	5.1%	0.5%
A. Buses	17.1%	7.8%	71.0%	4.1%	0.0%
B. Vans	32.7%	16.1%	46.5%	4.6%	0.0%
C. Trucks	4.6%	0.9%	90.8%	3.7%	0.0%
D. Airplanes	11.1%	7.8%	74.2%	6.9%	0.0%
E. Automobile	37.8%	20.7%	35.0%	6.0%	0.6%
F. To Hospitals	29.0%	14.7%	49.8%	6.5%	0.0%
G. To Prisons	33.6%	13.4%	47.0%	6.0%	0.0%
H. To Jail	37.8%	14.7%	41.5%	6.0%	0.0%
I. To Lockups	25.8%	9.2%	59.0%	6.0%	0.0%
J. To Courtrooms	40.1%	24.4%	28.6%	6.9%	0.0%

Where Training Is Needed:

Section VII of the survey questionnaire also sought information on additional areas (other than those listed in Figure VII above) where respondents feel training is needed. The responses of the 217 survey participants are listed in Figure VIII.A below.

Figure VIII.A
AREAS IN WHICH TRAINING IS NEEDED

Area	Training Needed	Training Not Needed	No Response
1. Budget	24.4%	74.7%	1.0%
2. Correctional Law	38.2%	61.8%	0.0%
3. Interpersonal Communications	39.2%	60.8%	0.0%
4. Organizational Communications	33.2%	66.8%	0.0%
5. Conversational Spanish	33.2%	66.4%	0.5%
6. Firearms	45.2%	54.8%	0.0%
7. Identification and/or Fingerprinting	24.9%	75.1%	0.0%
8. Inmate Classification	16.6%	83.4%	0.0%
9. Instructor Training	29.5%	70.5%	0.0%
10. Criminal Investigation	25.8%	74.2%	0.0%
11. Participative Management	21.7%	78.3%	0.0%
12. Management by Objectives	18.9%	81.1%	0.0%
13. Goal Setting	20.7%	79.3%	0.0%
14. Legal Responsibilities of Supervision	49.3%	50.7%	0.0%
15. Legal Liabilities	59.4%	40.6%	0.0%
16. Recruit, Screen and Select Staff	25.3%	74.7%	0.0%
17. Reprimand, Suspend, Terminate Staff	30.9%	69.1%	0.0%
18. Privatization	6.0%	94.0%	0.0%
19. Media Relations	25.8%	74.2%	0.0%
20. Report Writing	39.6%	60.4%	0.0%
21. Photography	12.9%	87.1%	0.0%
22. Staff Supervision	26.7%	73.3%	0.0%
23. Riot Control	32.3%	67.7%	0.0%
24. Human Behavior	38.7%	60.4%	1.0%
25. Vicarious Liability	41.5%	58.1%	0.5%
26. Action Planning	25.8%	74.2%	0.0%
27. Labor Relations	15.7%	84.3%	0.0%

Opinions Concerning Job Satisfaction and Training Needs:

Survey participants were asked to check off from a multiple-choice list a determination of personal satisfaction in their current jobs. The forced choices ranged from "extremely dull" to

"extremely interesting." The majority of the respondents rated their jobs as "very interesting" or "extremely interesting." All 217 participants answered this question (see Figure VIII.A).



Participants were asked to assess the value of previous training (in confinement, courts, law enforcement, the military and specialized areas) which has helped them improve their job performance as court security personnel. Four of the 217 survey respondents did not answer this question. The multiple-choice responses, which ranged from "not at all" to "perfectly" are depicted in Figure VIII.B.



One of the most important questions in the survey questionnaire, from the point of view of generating factual data to support recommendations for training needs, concerned the need for training in specific areas directly related to court security and the transportation of prisoners. This question asked: Is there a need for training in these areas--court functions/duties/security; civil/criminal process servers; and transportation of prisoners (to include airports, airplanes, all vehicles, and hospitals)? The responses are summarized below:

1. There is a need for training in court functions, duties and security - 82.5 percent responded "yes."

2. There is a need for training in civil and criminal process serving--52.1 percent said "yes."

3. There is a need for training in the transportation of prisoners - 78.3 percent agreed.

More detailed information was sought on the need for training for specific types of prisoner transports, as summarized below:

1. Transportation to airports--27.2 percent of the respondents said they see a need for more training.

2. Transportation on airplanes--28.6 percent said more training is needed.

3. Transportation in vehicles of all types --61.3 percent said more training is needed.

4. Transportation to hospitals--more training is considered to be necessary by 49.8 percent of the respondents.

5. Transportation to confinement (prisons/jails) --16.6 percent say more training is needed.

Survey respondents were asked to check off whether they have received **certified training** in the following areas:

1. **Pre-service** - 17.5 percent said they had received training.

2. **Basic training** - 54.4 percent participated in a certified program.

3. **In-service training** - 53.9 percent have participated in certified programs.

4. **Specialized** - 30 percent have attended certified training programs in specialized areas.

Survey participants were then asked to assess how their talents are used by their agencies; the forced-choice responses ranged from "not at all" to "perfectly." Of the 217 survey respondents, 15 persons did not answer this question. The responses are summarized in Figure VIII.E.



Responsibility and Authority for Court Security:

The survey questionnaire asked respondents where the responsibility and authority for court security is derived.

For county governments, the responses by the percentage of answers in each category, are:

1. Statutory: 44.2%
2. Constitutional: 21.7%
3. Contractual: 0.0%
4. Ordinance/resolution: 0.0%
5. Code: 6.9%
6. Traditional: 22.6%
7. Other: 4.6%

The survey also sought information on the source of responsibility and authority for the transportation of prisoners by county governments. Responses, in percentages, were as follows:

1. Statutory: 46.5%
2. Constitutional: 20.3%
3. Code: 6.0%
4. Traditional: 23.0%
5. Contractual: 0.0%
6. Ordinance/resolution: 0.0%
7. Other: 3.2%

[Note: These percentages total 99 percent.]

Responsibility and Authority for Extradition of Prisoners:

Survey respondents were asked if their agencies participate in intrastate extraditions. All 217 respondents answered this question. The results are depicted in Figure XI.A.I.

Court Security & the Transportation of Prisoners Survey

XI. Interstate Authority



Question XI.A.1 - Participate in Intrastate Extraditions

The type of agencies used for the intrastate transportation of prisoners are primarily county sheriffs' offices, as Figure XI.A.3 illustrates (all 217 respondents answered this question).



Survey participants were asked whether their agencies participate in interstate extradition of prisoners and the type of agency which performs the extraditions.

According to the survey responses, 81.1 percent of the agencies participate in interstate extraditions (see Figure XI.B.I).



These interstate extraditions are performed primarily by county sheriffs' offices (65 percent), as Figure XI.B.3 illustrates.



The majority of the costs for all extraditions (both intrastate and interstate) are paid for by county governments (59.9 percent) and state governments (27.2 percent), with the remainder of the costs divided between the Federal Government (3.2 percent), city governments (6.0 percent) and others (3.7 percent).

Major Findings:

1. The majority of court security officers who responded to the survey questionnaire are males in the 40-50 age group with seven to eight years of service in their present jobs.

2. Most of the 217 survey respondents have attended college for at least one or two years.

3. Approximately two-thirds (63.1%) of the survey respondents have completed a certified training program in court security, transportation of prisoners, or the serving of civil or criminal process. Conversely, fewer than half (46.1%) have completed any certified specialized training in court security, transportation of prisoners, or the serving of civil or criminal process.

4. The majority of court security officers are employed by a county sheriff's office.

5. Contract court security guards generally are not employed outside of the Federal system (189 of the 217 responding agencies do not employ contract guards for court security).

6. The majority of court security officers (72.4%) have previous work experience in law enforcement.

7. Of the 129 survey respondents who said they supervise other employees, most have been supervisors for only a short period of time (the median number of years as a supervisor is one), and they supervise an average of three employees each.

8. Survey respondents indicated that training is most needed in the following areas: legal liabilities, legal responsibilities of supervision, firearms and vicarious liability (for each of these subject areas, over 40 percent of the survey respondents said more training is necessary).

9. About one-third of the survey respondents (30-39%) indicated that they need more training in the following subject areas: correctional law; interpersonal communications; organizational communications; conversational Spanish; how to reprimand, suspend and terminate staff; report writing; riot control; and human behavior. The majority of these subjects are those provided to first and second line supervisors in specialized training programs.

10. The majority of survey respondents indicated that they did <u>not</u> need additional training in the following subjects (0-29%): budgeting; identification and/or fingerprinting; inmate classification; instructor training; criminal investigation; participative management; management by objectives; goal setting; how to recruit, screen and select staff; privatization; media relations; photography; staff supervision; action planning, and labor relations. Many of these specialized subjects cover duties that would be handled by administrators or would not be the

responsibility of a court security officer or first/second line court security supervisor.

11. The majority of the survey respondents have a high job satisfaction, rating their jobs "very interesting" or "extremely interesting."

12. The majority of survey respondents (82.5%) said there is a need for training in court functions/duties/security.

13. Slightly more than half of the survey respondents (52.1%) said there is a need for training in the serving of civil or criminal process.

14. Slightly over three-fourths of the survey respondents (78.3%) said there is a need for training in how to transport prisoners, with such training focusing on transportation in vehicles of all types.

15. While slightly more than half of the survey respondents have participated in certified basic and in-service training programs (54.4% and 53.9% respectively), fewer than one-third of the respondents have participated in certified training programs in specialized areas (30.0%).

16. In county governments, the authority and responsibility for the court security function generally derives from three sources: statutory (44.2%); constitutional (21.7%), and tradition (22.6%).

17. In county governments, the authority and responsibility for the transportation of prisoners generally derives from the same three sources: statutory (46.5%), constitutional (20.3%) and tradition (23.0%).

18. Over 80 percent of the survey respondents reported that their agencies participate in intrastate extraditions, with the majority of the extraditions handled by county sheriffs' offices (65%).

19. Slightly over 80 percent of the agencies participate in interstate extraditions of prisoners, which are again handled primarily by county sheriffs' offices (65%).

20. Most of the costs for intrastate and interstate extraditions of prisoners are borne by county governments (59.9%) and state governments (27.2%).

CHAPTER THREE
SECTION TWO

PROBATION AND PAROLE COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS SURVEY

In one of the first surveys of its kind ever administered, the National Sheriffs' Association sought input from probation and parole officers about court security and the transportation of prisoners. Although the probation and parole function is a major component of the criminal justice system, the opinions of personnel working in these two vital functions are rarely sought, N.S.A. Project Staff was told by officials of the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA). The N.S.A. Project Staff felt that a study of court security and the transportation of prisoners should include probation and parole.

Working from a membership list of the APPA, N.S.A. Project Staff and APPA randomly selected agencies in each U.S. state and territory to receive the survey - mega, large, medium, small and private agencies. The survey instrument was mailed to 165 agencies and 109 completed surveys were returned to N.S.A., for a **response rate of 66.06 percent.** Surveys were returned from 45 states and the District of Columbia; none of the U.S. territories responded to the survey.

The survey consisted of 53 questions. Aside from initial questions seeking data about the personal characteristics of the probation/parole official who was answering the questionnaire, size and type of court, and agency size, the questions sought "yes/no" answers. The nature of the questions was two-fold: some sought **opinions** of the probation/parole official (e.g., "Do you believe the judicial and court systems are fully aware of the vast duties which probation and parole agents perform?"), while others focused on gathering factual data (e.g., "Does your department/agency offer special training for office or field safety?").

After being entered into a computer and analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) revision 6.0, the data was presented in two forms: pie charts and bar charts. Both charts represent percentages of the responses rather than counts. The data from the charts have been extracted for the most part to be included here as "yes/no" answers to questions.

Sample Population Characteristics:

Of the 109 probation/parole agents responding to the survey, their length of service in their **present job title** ranged from less than one year (five respondents) to 23 years (three respondents). The mean length of service was 7.2 years while the median was 6.0 years. The survey participants had been probation/parole agents for periods ranging from less than a year (five respondents) to 31

years (one respondent). The mean length of service as probation/parole agents was 12.789 years while the median was 12 years.

Asked for their average case load, the 109 respondents reported no cases at all (12 respondents who were administrators) to 500 cases (one respondent). The mean was 98.1 cases per officer while the median caseload was 85.

The responding officers were overwhelmingly male (63.3 percent). Thirty-three percent of the officers were female; 3.7 percent of the respondents did not answer this question.

The majority of the survey respondents were employed by state agencies (65.1%), with the others divided among county and city agencies. (See Figure Q.II.)

* See 90 A & B



Q.I.F - Sex



Q.II - Agency Type

Most of the probation/parole agents have attended from two to four years of college or university (see Figure Q.I.H.), with a large percentage having post-graduate education at the master's degree level (18 years of formal education).

* See 91 A & B

The survey sought to determine the size of the staffs in the responding agencies, including both full-time and part-time employees. The number of full-time employees ranged from zero (12 respondents) to 13,000 (1 respondent). This large agency with 13,000 full-time employees was an exception since the next highest number of full-time employees was 2,200 in one agency; two other agencies responding to the survey had more than 1,000 full-time


Probation & Parole Survey
Percent
40
30
20
10
0
6
4
37
22
28
0
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Q.I.H
Highest Grade Completed


Probation & Parole Survey
Highest Grade Completed vs. College Graduates
Percent
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
68
32
51
49
100
51
49
41
59
17
18
65
100
100
0
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Q.I.H
Highest Grade Completed
Q.V.J
Yes
No
No Answer

employees (1,294 and 1,426 respectively). Sixteen responding agencies reported staffs ranging from 100 to 850 full-time employees. The mean number of full-time employees for the 109 agencies responding to the survey was 232.9 while the median number of full-time employees was 14.0.

Most of the responding agencies do not employ part-time staff (75 agencies). Of those agencies which do have part-time employees, 17 agencies reported only one part-time staff member per agency. Twelve agencies stated that they employ from two to eight part-timers each; three agencies employ 10 to 25 part-time staff each; and two large agencies employ 50 and 60 part-time staff members each. The mean number of part-time employees reported by the survey respondents was 2.073 and the median was 0.0.

Opinions of Survey Respondents Regarding Probation and Parole Issues:

Several questions on the survey sought the **opinions** of the probation and parole agents regarding issues involving their role in the criminal justice system. Respondents were asked to provide "yes/no" answers. The questions and the cumulative answers (in percentages) are listed below (some answers below do not equal 100 percent due to rounding).

1. Do you believe probation, parole, intermediate punishment, alternative sentencing, etc., should be utilized to a greater extent than it is, in lieu of incarceration?

   A. Yes: 69.7%
   B. No: 28.4%
   C. No answer: 1.8%

2. Are probation and parole departments becoming the "catch-all" for the court systems in their respective geographic areas?

   A. Yes: 84.4%
   B. No: 14.7%
   C. No answer: 0.9%

3. Should probation and parole agents be given more than qualified quasi-judicial immunity in performing their duties?

   A. Yes: 74.3%
   B. No: 19.3%
   C. No answer: 6.4%

4. Do you believe the judicial and court systems are fully aware of the vast duties which probation and parole agents perform?

   A. Yes: 13.8%
   B. No: 86.2%

5. Is computerization the answer to solve the excessive caseloads which probation and parole agents now have?

   A. Yes: 47.7%
   B. No: 45.0%
   C. No answer: 6.4%
   D. Unknown: 0.9%

6. Should all agents be college graduates with their concentration of studies in the criminology, criminal justice or sociology areas?

   A. Yes: 73.4%
   B. No: 25.7%
   C. No answer: 0.9%

7. Do you believe that the financial aspect of the probation and parole field is the major reason for agents leaving this field of employment?

   A. Yes: 43.1%
   B. No: 43.1%
   C. No answer: 13.8%

Safety Issues:

The majority of the questions in the survey focused upon what can be termed "safety issues." These issues deal with carrying firearms, protection from dangerous clients, security within the court facility and infectious diseases. The questions and the answers are listed below, with the "yes/no" answers given in percentages for the 109 survey respondents (answers may not total 100 percent due to rounding).

1. Do you think probation and parole agents should wear bullet-proof vests while conducting field work?

   A. Yes: 61.5%
   B. No: 36.7%
   C. No answer: 1.8%

Priority Scale Rate Chart

The priority for placing this task in a Court Security/Transportation of Prisoners employee survey is:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Low Priority	Low	Fairly Low	Average	Fairly High	High	Very High Priority

Example

In the following example, the employee rated the **first task** 3 (Fairly Low) because preparing employee overtime and absence reports is not a day-to-day job performed by the court security or prisoner transport officer. Therefore, this rating best describes the priority as valued by him or her. The **second task** was rated 7 (Very High Priority) because the employee valued cardio-pulmonary resuscitation as a top priority for all court security and the transportation of prisoners employees to learn. The **third task** was not rated because the particular employee does not determine salary and wage benefits. The **fourth task** was rated 2 (low) since inspecting employee uniforms and appearance is low on the priority scale for training.

1. Prepare employee overtime and absence reports . . . . . ___ 3

2. Apply cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) . . . . . ___ 7

3. Determine employee salary and wage benefits . . . . . ___ 6

4. Inspect employee uniforms and appearance . . . . . ___ 2

The survey was sent to 275 potential respondents in mega, large, medium and small court agencies and sheriffs' offices in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and the U.S. territories. Responses were received by N.S.A. from 218 agencies, for a return rate of 79.27 percent.

The responses to each question were computer-analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 6.0. Data was presented in two forms: a pie chart for the first part of each question and a bar chart for the second part, with both types of charts representing percentages of responses rather than counts.

This analysis will discuss the **duties and tasks** performed by court security employees and prisoner transportation officers.

In its analysis of survey data, N.S.A. staff did **not** present survey findings as a complete whole or in the order the questions appeared on the survey instrument for the following reasons:

1. Several questions sought <u>data</u> only and did not deal with tasks (e.g., questions dealing with the content of training programs, who conducts training, etc.). This data has been extracted for use in Chapter Five, which deals with training.

2. Each category had open-ended questions in which the respondents were asked to list any tasks they performed that were not already listed. Since these data varied so widely in the type of tasks listed, it could not be quantified with any degree of accuracy. In addition, many survey respondents left these open-ended questions blank. The questions appeared on the survey instrument in the following format:

Function Performed Rating

***ADD Tasks you perform which are not listed:**

4. N/A .
5. N/A .
6. N/A .
7. N/A .
8. N/A .
9. N/A .

Useful data have been extracted to assist in determining security and training needs.

The training needs analysis is included in Chapter Five, which discusses training issues.

Duty A--Performing Administrative Functions:

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
1. Performs extraditions. A. Inter-state.	63.9	36.1
B. Intra-state.	61.6	38.4
2. Uses private vendor to make extraditions.	12.8	86.8
3. Uses state agency for extraditions.	20.1	79.5
4. Uses Federal agencies in extraditions (e.g., Marshals/Bureau of Prisons).	21.0	79.0
5. Plans, develops, or implements policy or its change.	50.2	49.3
6. Conducts staff meetings.	47.5	51.6
7. Coordinates investigative activities, RE: Transports only.	43.4	55.7
8. Performs staff inspections.	44.3	55.3
9. Establishes checklists and inventory control.	45.7	52.5
10. Establishes priorities for transports: A. Male	54.8	44.3
B. Female	56.2	42.9
C. Juvenile	54.8	44.3
11. Reviews reports.	56.2	43.4
12. Answers transport related functions.	63.9	35.6
13. Conducts roll calls to inform staff of events, assignments, concerns, etc.	51.1	48.4

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
14. Develops policies and procedures.	60.3	39.3
15. Determines posts/staff levels.	55.3	44.3
16. Determines equipment needs.	68.5	31.1
17. Determines vehicle usage daily for all transports.	49.8	49.3
18. Participates in promotion selection.	35.2	63.9
19. Gives speeches or conducts tours.	48.9	50.7
20. Recommends organizational changes.	46.1	53.0
21. Participates in the following: A. Mission Statement	39.7	59.4
B. Goals and Objectives	42.5	57.1
C. Hearings	32.0	67.6
22. Requisitions supplies, equipment, etc.	56.2	43.4
23. Drafts: A. Rules	44.7	54.8
B. Regulations	42.5	57.1
C. Memorandums	51.1	48.9
24. Applies case law decisions to transport issues, practices and procedures.	39.3	60.7
25. Testifies in court.	60.7	39.3
26. Handles notes, memorandums or personnel issues to staff.	58.4	41.1
27. Determines needs for overtime or compensatory time.	56.6	42.9
28. Makes log or turns over notes/documentation.	52.5	47.0

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
29. Assures prisoner transport paperwork is correct.	71.2	28.3
30. Verifies documentation that a transport is needed.	60.7	38.4
31. Reviews internal administrative forms.	47.5	51.6
32. Identifies administrative problems and formulates solutions for management.	46.1	53.4
33. Determines shift workload requirements.	57.1	42.0
34. Participates on promotional or disciplinary boards.	37.0	61.6
35. Prepares work orders to correct maintenance or other problems.	49.3	48.9
36. Prepares reports: A. Sick Time	47.5	50.2
B. Compensatory Time	44.7	54.3
C. Annual Leave Time	46.6	52.1
D. Jury Duty Time	29.2	69.9
E. Military Time	28.3	70.8
F. Time and Attendance	46.1	53.4

ANALYSIS

Priority Ranking of Tasks Involved in Performing Administrative Functions: Based on the percentages of responses for each task listed, the tasks can be ranked from those performed most frequently (by 50 percent or more of survey respondents) to those performed less frequently (0 to 49 percent of survey respondents).

The ranking of the most frequently performed tasks is as follows:

Most Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
1. Assures prisoner transport paperwork is correct.	71.2
2. Determines equipment needs.	68.5
3. Performs interstate extraditions.	63.9
4. Answers transport-related functions.	63.9
5. Performs intrastate extraditions.	61.6
6. Testifies in court.	60.7
7. Verifies documentation that a transport is needed.	60.7
8. Develops policies and procedures.	60.3
9. Handles notes, memorandums or personnel issues to staff.	58.4
10. Determines shift workload requirements.	57.1
11. Determines need for overtime or compensatory time.	56.6
12. Establishes priorities for transports of females.	56.2
13. Reviews reports.	56.2
14. Requisitions supplies and equipment.	56.2
15. Determines posts/staffing level.	55.3
16. Establishes priorities for transport of males.	54.8
17. Establishes priorities for transport of juveniles.	54.8
18. Makes log or turns over notes/documentation.	52.5
19. Conducts roll calls to inform staff of events, assignments, concerns, etc.	51.1
20. Drafts memorandums.	51.1
21. Plans, develops or implements policy or its change.	50.2

The ranking of the less frequently performed tasks (from highes lowest) is as follows:

Less Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
1. Determines vehicle usage daily for all transports.	49.8
2. Prepares work orders to correct maintenance or other problems.	49.3
3. Gives speeches or conducts tours.	48.9
4. Conducts staff meetings.	47.5
5. Reviews internal administrative forms.	47.5
6. Prepares sick time reports.	47.5
7. Prepares annual leave time reports.	46.6
8. Recommends organizational changes.	46.1
9. Identifies administrative problems and formulates solutions for management.	46.1
10. Prepares time and attendance reports.	46.1
11. Establishes checklists and inventory control.	45.7
12. Drafts rules.	44.7
13. Prepares compensatory time reports.	44.7
14. Performs staff inspections.	44.3
15. Coordinates investigative activities, RE: Transports only.	43.4
16. Participates in goals and objectives.	42.5
17. Drafts regulations.	42.5
18. Participates in mission statement.	39.7
19. Applies case law decisions to transport issues, practices and procedures.	39.3
20. Participates on promotional or disciplinary boards.	37.0
21. Participates in promotion selection.	35.2

Less Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
22. Participates in hearings.	32.0
23. Prepares reports on jury duty time.	29.2
24. Prepares reports on military leave time.	28.3
25. Uses Federal agencies in extradition of prisoners (e.g., U.S. Marshals, Federal Bureau of Prisons).	21.0
26. Uses state agency for extraditions.	20.1
27. Uses private vendor to make extraditions.	12.8

Duty B--Performing Fiscal Management Functions:

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
1. Could prepare preliminary budget.	31.5	68.5
2. Prepares annual budget.	24.2	75.3
3. Approves spending as to budget items.	21.5	78.1
4. Administers spending of budget funds.	26.0	74.0
5. Calculates costs:	17.8	81.7
A. Food	14.2	84.9
B. Housing	20.1	79.5
C. Services	25.1	74.4
D. Equipment	19.2	80.8
E. Functions	12.8	87.2
F. Depreciation	20.5	79.5
G. Staffing	14.2	85.8
6. Evaluates changes in operating budget.		

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
7. Identifies operational areas for budget priorities.	25.6	74.4
8. Inventories supplies and equipment.	40.2	59.8
9. Reviews and approves changes submitted:		
A. Contractors	12.3	87.2
B. Vendors	11.0	89.0
C. Repair Persons	11.0	89.0
D. Annual Maintenance Programs	11.4	88.6
E. Change Orders	10.0	90.0
F. Work Orders	11.9	88.1
10. Reviews purchases and expenditures.	24.2	75.8
11. Reviews time and attendance reports.	42.0	57.5
12. Prepares justification for budget.	27.9	72.1
13. Recommends salary and benefits for employees.	15.1	84.9
14. Participates in collective bargaining.	7.8	91.8

ANALYSIS

The majority of survey respondents were **line employees** who have very few duties and responsibilities in the area of fiscal management. Only two tasks in this category are performed by more than one-third but less than one-half of the respondents:

1. Review time and attendance reports (42.0%) and

2. Inventory supplies and equipment (40.2%).

Duty C--Performing Personnel Management Functions:

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
1. Reviews Equal Employment Opportunity and Americans with Disabilities Act guidelines for compliance.	23.7	76.3
2. Records information in personnel files.	36.1	63.9
3. Updates job openings, position descriptions and job descriptions.	22.8	76.7
4. Prepares reports on employee disciplinary action and counseling.	47.5	52.1
5. Administers disciplinary measures.	45.7	53.9
6. Conducts promotional interviews.	21.0	79.0
7. Interviews prospective employees.	37.0	61.2
8. Reviews personnel appeals.	21.9	76.7
9. Reviews personnel employment applications.	27.4	72.1
10. Evaluates performance rating procedures.	37.9	61.2
11. Reviews employee grievances.	38.4	61.2
12. Resolves problems encountered by subordinates.	52.1	47.5
13. Approves or denies compensatory time-off or vacation time.	48.4	51.1
14. Participates in personnel hearing boards.	18.3	81.3

2. Do you believe probation and parole agents should carry firearms, and if so, should these weapons be issued by the appropriate agencies (to include training)?

   A. Yes: 66.1%
   B. No: 32.1%
   C. No answer: 1.8%

3. Should probation and parole agents be given periodic hepatitis shots due to the nature of work in dealing with clients?

   A. Yes: 80.7%
   B. No: 9.2%
   C. No answer: 10.1%

4. Should the training, education and necessary medical precautions for agents be enhanced regarding the HIV virus?

   A. Yes: 88.1%
   B. No: 9.2%
   C: No answer: 2.8%

5. Do you feel that the potential for bodily harm to yourself has increased over the past few years?

   A. Yes: 86.2%
   B. No: 12.8%
   C. No answer: 0.9%

6. Do you feel your clients have become increasingly more violent-type offenders?

   A. Yes: 87.2%
   B. No: 12.8%

7. Do you feel that you need better equipment to perform your duties and decrease your chances of potential harm?

   A. Yes: 80.7%
   B. No: 15.6%
   C. No answer: 3.7%

8. Do you feel that the need for metal detectors outside of courtrooms, hearing rooms and parole and probation offices has increased?

A. Yes: 90.8%
B. No: 9.2%

9. Would these detectors add to your feeling of safety on the job?

A. Yes: 80.7%
B. No: 16.5%
C. No answer: 2.8%

10. Do you feel that all probation and parole officers should carry weapons while on the job?

A. Yes: 46.8%
B. No: 53.2%

11. If no firearms policy is in effect at a particular agency, should agents be able to carry alternative forms of self-protection?

A. Yes: 86.2%
B. No: 11.0%
C. No answer: 2.8%

12. Does your department/agency have a specialized unit for the execution of warrants for probation/parole violators?

A. Yes: 15.6%
B. No: 84.4%

13. Does your department/agency offer special training for office or field safety to agents and administrative staff?

A. Yes: 75.2%
B. No: 23.9%
C. Unknown: 0.9%

14. Does your department/agency mandate two-person teams for field work?

A. Yes: 12.8%
B. No: 87.2%

15. Are criminal justice personnel required to remove firearms when in the court building? (This includes <u>all</u> employees of the criminal justice system.)

A. Yes: 28.4%
B. No: 59.6%

C. No answer: 11.9%

16. Is there a system established to summon emergency assistance from other law enforcement officials when doing field work?

A. Yes: 48.6%
B. No: 50.5%
C. No answer: 0.9%

17. Is some type of official identification required to be worn when making a court appearance?

A. Yes: 25.7%
B. No: 72.5%
C. No answer: 1.8%

18. In sharing information with other law enforcement agencies, are there any legal limitations placed upon your agency?

A. Yes: 52.3%
B. No: 43.1%
C. Unknown: 0.9%
D. No answer: 3.7%

One question asked what items the department/agency provides to enhance the safety of probation and parole agents. Survey respondents were asked to mark all items (from a list of five) that apply. The results are depicted in Figure Q.V.

FIGURE Q.V
ITEMS PROVIDED TO ENHANCE SAFETY OF PROBATION/PAROLE OFFICERS

Item	Percent of Agencies Providing Item	No Answer	Percent of Agencies in which respondents stated items are not provided
Body armor	32.1%	55.0%	12.8%
Communications equipment	66.1%	31.2%	2.8%
Mace	34.9%	54.1%	11.0%
Handcuffs	60.6%	35.8%	3.7%
Handguns	29.4%	58.7%	11.9%

Transportation of Prisoners:

Six questions in the survey dealt with issues involving the **transportation of prisoners by probation and parole officers:**

1. Do you feel that transporting violators should be handled by uniformed officers?

   A. Yes: 67.0%
   B. No: 31.2%
   C. No answer: 1.8%

2. In limited circumstances, gender appropriate, can an agent submit clients, gender appropriate, to a strip search for the agent's protection?

   A. Yes: 40.4%
   B. No: 57.8%
   C. No answer: 1.8%

3. Should probation and parole agents be required to arrest and transport clients in their personal vehicles?

   A. Yes: 8.3%
   B. No: 89.9%
   C. No answer: 0.9%
   D. Unknown: 0.9%

4. Have you at any time in the performance of your official duties been required to transport a prisoner?

   A. Yes: 78.0%
   B. No: 22.0%

5. Have you ever received special training and refresher training on prisoner transportation?

   A. Yes: 47.7%
   B. No: 51.4%
   C. Unknown: 0.9%

6. Do you have a vehicle specially equipped for prisoner transportation?

   A. Yes: 26.6%
   B. No: 72.5%
   C. Unknown: 0.9%

Major Findings:

1. Of the 109 probation/parole agents responding to the survey, most have served in their present job title for less than 10 years, with a mean of 7.2 years of service and a median of 6.0 years. However, the respondents had been probation/parole agents for a longer period of time (both the mean and the median were in the 12-year range).

2. The probation/parole agents for the most part supervise heavy caseloads. The mean was 98.1 cases per officer and the median was 85 cases.

3. Most of the responding probation/parole agents are male (63.3%), are employed by state agencies (65.1%), and are college graduates with a large percentage having completed a master's degree.

4. Several questions in the survey sought the opinions of probation and parole agents about issues in the criminal justice system. The survey found that the 109 responding agents believe by a majority that:

   A. Probation, parole and intermediate sanctions should be used more frequently in lieu of incarceration (69.7%).

   B. Probation and parole departments have become the "catch-alls" for court systems (84.4%).

   C. Probation and parole agents should be given more than qualified quasi-judicial immunity in performing their duties (74.3%).

   D. The judicial and court systems are not fully aware of the vast duties which probation and parole agents perform (86.2%).

   E. All probation and parole agents should be required to hold at least a four-year college degree with a major in criminology, criminal justice or sociology (73.4%).

5. Probation/parole agents are very concerned about safety issues. A majority of the agents (61.5%) felt that they should wear bullet-proof vests while conducting field work. A majority (66.1%) also felt that they should be permitted to carry firearms for field work and that the

firearms should be issued by their agencies, which would also provide training in the use of the firearms. At the same time, however, a slight majority of survey respondents (53.2%) believe that not all probation and parole agents should carry weapons while on duty. But the majority of agents (86.2%) believe that those agencies which do not have a firearms policy in effect should allow agents to carry alternative forms of protection. The majority of the agents stated that their agencies provide them with two items to enhance their safety while on the job: communications equipment (66.1%) and handcuffs (60.6%). The majority of the agencies do not provide body armor, Mace or handguns to probation/parole agents.

6. Infectious diseases are a major concern of probation and parole agents. Of the 109 survey respondents, a majority (80.7%) felt that they should be given periodic hepatitis shots due to the nature of their work in dealing with clients. Similarly, a majority (88.1%) felt that their agencies should enhance training and medical precautions about the HIV virus.

7. Probation/parole agents responding to the survey say the nature of their clientele has been changing for the worse in recent years; a majority (86.2%) agree that the potential for being injured by a client has increased over the past few years. The majority (87.2%) stated that their clients have increasingly become more violent-type offenders. To reduce their chances of being harmed by clients, the majority (80.7%) of survey respondents said they need better equipment.

8. Probation/parole agents support the increased use of metal detectors outside courtrooms and probation/parole offices, with the majority (80.7%) stating that metal detectors add to their feeling of safety on the job.

9. Most of the probation/parole agencies with personnel participating in the survey do not have specialized units for the execution of warrants for probation and parole violators (84.4% responded that their agency does not have a specialized unit).

10. With regard to field safety issues, most of the agencies (87.2%) do not mandate two-person teams for field work. In addition, only 50.5% of the agencies have an established system for agents doing field work to summon assistance from other law enforcement agencies if an emergency arises.

11. **Most of the probation/parole agencies (75.2%) do provide special training in office or field safety to agents and administrative staff.**

12. **In the agencies served by the 109 survey participants, a slight majority of the courts in which these probation/parole agents appear with clients do not require criminal justice system personnel to remove their firearms while in the court building (59.6%). Nor do the majority (72.5%) of the court systems served by the agents participating in the survey require the agents to wear any type of official identification when making a court appearance.**

13. **A majority of the probation/parole agents participating in the survey believe uniformed officers should transport prisoners (67.0%). However, most of the probation/parole agents (78.0%) have been required during the performance of their official duties to transport prisoners. But only 47.4% of the survey respondents have ever received special and refresher training in prisoner transportation. Nor do most of the agencies (72.5%) have a vehicle that is specially equipped for prisoner transportation. While officers are required to transport prisoners, more than half of the agencies surveyed (57.8%) do not permit agents to submit their clients, gender appropriate, to a strip search for the agent's protection while transporting the client. It appears that probation and parole agencies are vulnerable to liability actions in the transportation of prisoners since less than half of the agencies provide training in how to transport prisoners safely, most agencies do not provide specially equipped transportation vehicles and more than half of the agencies do not permit agents to authorize gender-appropriate strip searches prior to transporting a client. Yet at the same time the majority of probation/parole agents are required to transport prisoners.**

SECTION 3

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS SURVEY ON PRIORITIES, TASK ANALYSIS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Introduction:

The purpose of this survey instrument was to measure the urgency, necessity and order of importance placed upon a task for inclusion in training programs for court security employees and prisoner transportation officers. The objective of the survey was to isolate those particular tasks which should have the highest priority in a training program. Because it would have been impractical to do so, the survey questionnaire did not attempt to include every possible task performed by court security employees or prisoner transportation officers.

The survey consisted of 326 questions. Each question, with the exception of those that permitted survey respondents to write in a response, described a function that respondents may or may not perform in their daily duties. Survey participants were given the following instructions.

> First, read each task to determine if you perform it in your PRESENT POSITION. If you perform a task in your present position, place a ( ), as **Step 1** in the box to the right in **Column 1**. After you have gone through the entire listing and checked only the tasks you perform, you are then asked to begin **Step 2 in Column 2**. Apply a rating as to what priority should be placed on this task for inclusion in this program for Court Security/Transportation of Prisoners employees based upon need and experience. Please rate each task you perform from beginning to end of the Task Inventory.
>
> You are asked to assess the priorities of any/all tasks you perform as a court security/ transportation of prisoners employee by using the following 7-point scale to make your ratings.

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
15. Participates on discipline review boards or committees.	23.3	76.3
16. Serves on promotion review boards.	24.2	74.9
17. Prepares personnel performance reports.	44.3	54.8
18. Submits recommendations for personnel retention or dismissal.	37.0	61.6
19. Counsels employees not meeting job performance requirements.	50.7	47.9
20. Inspects uniforms and appearance of employees.	53.0	46.1
21. Submits appraisals of probationary employees.	40.6	58.4
22. Discusses employee performance, strengths, and weaknesses with any/all personnel.	52.5	46.6
23. Discusses employee problems, grievances, and suggestions with them.	57.1	41.6
24. Responds to employee grievances.	49.3	49.3
25. Submits employee overtime and absence reports.	42.5	56.6
26. Refers employees to professional help for substance abuse, marital, or other personal problems.	34.7	64.4
27. Evaluates supervisors' ability to direct and supervise subordinates.	31.5	68.0
28. Reviews progress of subordinates with other supervisory staff.	42.0	57.5
29. Inspects at irregular intervals to observe work performance.	51.1	47.9
30. Prepares appraisals or evaluations of probationary employees.	40.2	58.4

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
31. Prepares disciplinary reports for employees not meeting performance requirements.	44.3	54.3
32. Discusses performance, strengths, and weaknesses with employees to improve performance.	55.7	43.4
33. Informs immediate supervisor of a subordinate's problem and actions taken to resolve problem.	48.9	49.8
34. Prepares and discusses appraisals or evaluations privately with employees.	50.7	47.9
35. Prepares narrative reports to document employee misconduct.	52.1	47.5
36. Prepares reprimands to document employee errors.	47.5	51.6
37. Recognizes employee for outstanding performance.	56.6	42.9
38. Maintains notes for employee performance and evaluation.	47.9	51.6
39. Counsels employee re: work habits, problems, etc., with employees and mutually develops an improvement plan.	51.6	47.5
40. Relieves employee for disciplinary reasons.	34.2	65.3
41. Initiates progressive discipline when necessary.	42.9	56.2

ANALYSIS

Priority Ranking of Tasks Performed in Personnel Management Functions: An analysis of the answers to the questions in this section once again confirms that the majority of survey respondents were either line officers or first/second line supervisors with few

administrative duties. Most personnel-related functions performed by survey respondents involve direct counseling or rating of employees in their work-related duties. Those personnel management functions performed by 50 percent or more of the survey respondents are rank-ordered below, from the highest to the lowest.

Most Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
1. Discuss employee problems, grievances and suggestions with them.	57.1
2. Recognize employee for outstanding performance.	56.6
3. Discuss performance, strengths and weaknesses with employees to improve performance.	55.7
4. Inspect uniforms and appearance of employees.	53.0
5. Discuss employee performance, strengths and weaknesses with any/all personnel.	52.5
6. Resolve problems encountered by subordinates.	52.1
7. Prepare narrative reports to document employee misconduct.	52.1
8. Counsel employee re: work habits, problems, etc., with employees and mutually develop improvement plan.	51.6
9. Inspect at irregular intervals to observe work performance.	51.1
10. Counsel employees not meeting job performance requirements.	50.7
11. Prepare and discuss appraisals or evaluations privately with employees.	50.7

The ranking of less frequently performed tasks--those performed by more than one-third (33.0%) but less than half (49.9%) of the respondents--is as follows (from highest to lowest):

Less Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
1. Respond to employee grievances.	49.3
2. Inform immediate supervisor of a subordinate's problem and actions taken to resolve problem.	48.9
3. Approve or deny compensatory time-off or vacation time.	48.4
4. Maintain notes for employee performance and evaluation.	47.9
5. Prepare reports on employee disciplinary action and counseling.	47.5
6. Prepare reprimands to document employee errors.	47.5
7. Administer disciplinary measures.	45.7
8. Prepare personnel performance reports.	44.3
9. Prepare disciplinary reports for employees not meeting performance requirements.	44.3
10. Initiate progressive discipline when necessary.	42.9
11. Submit employee overtime and absence reports.	42.5
12. Review progress of subordinate with other supervisory staff.	42.0
13. Submit appraisals of probationary employees.	40.6
14. Prepare appraisals or evaluations of probationary employees.	40.2
15. Review employee grievances.	38.4
16. Evaluate performance rating procedures.	37.9
17. Interview prospective employees.	37.0
18. Submit recommendations for employee retention or dismissal.	37.0

Less Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
19. Record information in personnel files.	36.1
20. Refer employees to professional help for substance abuse, marital or other personal problems.	34.7
21. Relieve employee for disciplinary reasons.	34.2

Duty D--Training and Staff Development Functions:

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
1. Establish, maintain or upgrade training activities: A. Pre-Service	54.3	44.7
B. Basic Service	21.5	77.2
C. In-Service	36.5	62.6
D. Specialized Service	32.4	66.2
E. Field Training	36.1	61.6
F. On-the-Job Training	49.3	47.9
G. Certifiers' Program	16.4	83.6
H. Certification	16.4	83.6
2. Plan training activities.	42.9	56.2
3. Study suggestions for training needs.	44.3	54.8
4. Conduct formal classroom training.	40.6	58.4
5. Conduct verbal or written tests to assess employee or potential employee's knowledge.	29.2	70.3

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
6. Initiate lesson plan development.	25.1	74.4
7. Initiate study or handout materials for training. (This will ensure training relevancy).	27.9	71.2
8. Develop situational problems to determine trainee actions and knowledge.	30.6	68.9
9. Interview employee as to knowledge of job skills and abilities.	27.4	72.1
10. Instruct employee about rules, regulations, case law or other information that may impact transport or facility operations.	47.5	51.6

ANALYSIS

Priority Ranking of Tasks Performed in the Training and Development Functions: Only one training task was performed by more than half of the survey respondents--that of establishing, maintaining or upgrading **pre-service** training activities (54.3%). The most frequently performed training tasks (performed by more than 33.0% and less 49.9% of the survey respondents) are rank-ordered as follows:

Most Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
1. Establish, maintain or upgrade on-the-job training activities.	49.3
2. Instruct employee about rules, regulations, case law or other information that may impact transport or facility operations.	47.5
3. Study suggestions for training needs.	44.3

Most Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
4. Plan training activities.	42.9
5. Conduct formal classroom training.	40.6
6. Establish, maintain or upgrade in-service training activities.	36.5
7. Establish, maintain or upgrade field training activities.	36.1

Duty E--Performing Physical Checks, Safety and Sanitation Functions:

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
1. Repair and maintain equipment.	20.5	79.5
2. Evaluate maintenance.	27.9	71.2
3. Evaluate future expansion.	26.5	72.6
4. Replace equipment.	33.8	65.8
5. Review emergency procedures for fire, riot, medical, disturbance, evacuation or contingency.	37.0	62.1
6. Supervise repair/maintenance operations.	19.2	80.8
7. Instruct others in the use and care of tools and equipment.	24.7	75.3
8. Conduct inspections.	45.7	53.4
9. Conduct inside and/or outside checks for security and safety.	56.6	42.5
10. Inspect equipment: Specific:		
A. Restraint Devices	56.2	42.9

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
B. Weapons	56.6	43.4
C. Vehicles	60.3	39.3
D. Doors	56.6	42.9
E. Locks	54.8	44.7
F. Bars	43.8	55.7
G. Security Equipment	54.3	44.7
H. Cameras	42.5	56.6
I. Alarms	44.7	53.9
J. Scanning Devices	46.1	53.4
11. Plan and conduct emergency evacuation drills.	37.0	62.6
12. Develop life safety codes.	22.8	77.2
13. Develop emergency operation plans.	42.0	57.5

ANALYSIS

Priority Ranking of Tasks Performed in the Physical Checks, Safety and Sanitation Functions: The tasks performed by more than half of the survey respondents (over 50%) involved **inspection of equipment** and **conducting security checks.** Fewer than one-third of the respondents performed maintenance tasks. The most frequently performed tasks are rank-ordered, from the highest to the lowest, as follows:

Most Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
1. Inspect vehicles.	60.3
2. Conduct inside and/or outside checks for security and safety.	56.6

Most Frequently Performed Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
3. Inspect weapons.	56.6
4. Inspect doors.	56.6
5. Inspect restraint devices.	56.2
6. Inspect locks.	54.8
7. Inspect security equipment.	54.3
8. Inspect scanning devices.	46.1
9. Conduct periodic inspections.	45.7
10. Inspect alarms.	44.7
11. Inspect bars.	43.8
12. Inspect cameras.	42.5
13. Develop emergency operation plans.	42.0
14. Review emergency procedures for fire, riot, medical, disturbance, evacuation or contingency.	37.0
15. Plan and conduct emergency evacuation drills.	37.0
16. Replace equipment.	33.8

Duty F--Performing Medical and Health Care Functions:

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
1. Determine physical conditions and mental state of prisoners or detainees.	28.8	70.8
2. Arrange medical-related appointments and verification.	27.4	72.1
3. Supervise or issue medications if authorized by the medical staff to detainees or prisoners.	26.5	73.1

ANALYSIS

As the responses from the survey respondents show, court security and prisoner transport officers rarely perform medical and health care functions for prisoners in their care.

Duty G--Performing Security Functions:

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
1. Conduct searches: Specific: A. Transport Vehicles	47.9	50.7
B. Court Buildings and Facilities	64.8	34.2
C. Detainees, Prisoners or other persons.	70.3	28.8
2. Participate in security detail in courts, judicial buildings, facilities or other court complex areas.	72.1	27.4
3. Use and operate security monitoring equipment in courts, judicial buildings and facilities.	57.5	42.0
4. Analyze suspicious activities or behaviors of individuals in the transportation of prisoners or judicial activities.	74.0	25.1
5. Conduct the movement of people within facilities.	73.5	25.6
6. Conduct the movement of people outside the facilities.	53.0	46.1
7. Initiate direct action in any/all incidents.	69.4	30.1
8. Conduct investigations when needed in court or transportation incidents.	71.2	28.3
9. Submit written reports of any/all complaints when needed in court or transportation incidents.	75.8	23.7

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
10. Supervise movement of prisoners or visitors.	82.2	17.4
11. Plan, organize and direct the search of transport vehicles and judicial facilities, to include courtrooms in search of weapons, contraband and other security measures for the protection of judicial system employees and citizens.	66.7	32.9
12. Evaluate security needs.	68.0	31.5
13. Conduct detainee or prisoner counts to verify population under your care, custody, control and supervision.	53.4	46.1
14. Conduct security checks of detainee cells, holding cells/rooms, etc.	64.4	34.2
15. Check detainee/prisoner or visitor property upon entrance/exit of the judicial facilities.	61.6	37.4
16. Supervise and scan mail and packages entering the judicial or court facilities.	38.8	60.3
17. Determine priorities for security purposes.	46.1	53.9
18. Supervise property, evidence and weapons or potential weapons entering the judicial facilities.	54.3	45.2
19. Document periodic inspections of judicial facilities or transport vehicles.	53.0	46.6
20. Supervise and document status of detainees or prisoners in holding cells, hospital rooms/wards or court temporary detention cells.	53.9	45.7

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
21. Apply restraint devices, (e.g. waist chains, leg irons, flex cuffs, handcuffs, black boxes, security jackets, leather straps, leg braces).	81.7	17.8
22. Approve and supervise passes for entrance into the judicial facilities.	35.2	64.8
23. Supervise usage of elevator service in judicial facilities.	36.5	63.5
24. Issue or have the care, custody, control and supervision of facilities or transport vehicles' keys.	58.0	41.6
25. Monitor the remote surveillance devices.	41.6	58.4
26. Patrol exterior perimeter.	42.0	58.0
27. Patrol interior perimeter.	61.6	37.9
28. Supervise or monitor work details within judicial facilities.	34.7	65.3
29. Coordinate detainees or prisoners for courts, visitations, programs, counseling or medical visits.	46.3	53.2
30. Provide escort duties to judicial facilities, medical visits, prisons or jails and the transportation of prisoners.	67.0	32.1

ANALYSIS

Priority Ranking of Tasks Involved in Performing Security Functions: The majority of survey respondents are directly involved with performing court security functions and transporting prisoners. The direct security functions performed by survey respondents are rank-ordered below, from the task performed by the greatest number to the task performed by the least number.

Rank-Ordering of Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
1. Supervise movement of prisoners or visitors.	82.2
2. Apply restraint devices.	81.7
3. Submit written reports on any/all complaints when needed in court or transportation incidents.	75.8
4. Analyze suspicious activities or behaviors of individuals in the transportation of prisoners or judicial activities.	74.0
5. Conduct movement of people within facilities.	73.5
6. Participate in security detail in courts, judicial buildings, facilities or other court complex areas.	72.1
7. Conduct investigations when needed in court or transportation incidents.	75.8
8. Search detainees, prisoners or other persons.	70.3 70.3
9. Initiate direct action in any/all incidents.	69.4
10. Evaluate security needs.	68.0
11. Provide duties to judicial facilities, medical visits, prisons or jails and the transportation of prisoners.	67.0
12. Plan, organize and direct the search of transport vehicles, judicial facilities and courtrooms.	66.7
13. Search court buildings and facilities.	64.8
14. Conduct security checks of detainee cells, holding cells/rooms.	64.4

Rank-Ordering of Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
15. Check detainee/prisoner or visitor property upon entrance/exit of the judicial facilities.	61.6
16. Patrol interior perimeter.	61.6
17. Issue, or have the care, custody, control and supervision of facilities or transport vehicles' keys.	58.0
18. Use and operate security monitoring equipment in courts, judicial buildings and facilities.	57.5
19. Supervise property, evidence and weapons or potential weapons entering the judicial facilities.	54.3
20. Supervise and document status of detainees or prisoners in holding cells, hospital rooms/wards or court temporary detention cells.	53.9
21. Conduct detainee or prisoner counts to verify population under your care, custody, control and supervision.	53.4
22. Conduct movement of people outside the facilities.	53.0
23. Document periodic inspections of judicial facilities or transport vehicles.	53.0
24. Search transport vehicles.	47.9
25. Coordinate detainees or prisoners for courts, visitations, programs, counseling or medical visits.	46.3
26. Determine priorities for security services.	46.1
27. Patrol exterior perimeter.	42.0
28. Monitor the remote surveillance devices.	41.6

Rank-Ordering of Tasks	Percentage of Respondents
29. Supervise and scan mail and packages entering the judicial or court facilities.	38.8
30. Supervise usage of elevator service in judicial facilities.	36.5
31. Approve and supervise passes for entrance into the judicial facilities.	36.5
32. Supervise or monitor work details within judicial facilities.	34.7

The rank ordering of the tasks performed in the security function by survey respondents confirms that the majority of survey respondents are line officers or first/second line supervisors who have few, if any, administrative or management duties. Most of the court security/prisoner transport personnel perform "hands-on" tasks involving direct encounters with prisoners, court employees and citizens visiting court facilities.

Five findings illustrate the need for improved security measures in many court facilities. Fewer than half of the survey respondents:

1. Monitor remote surveillance devices (41.6%);

2. Patrol the exterior perimeter of the court facility (42.0%);

3. Supervise and scan mail and packages entering the judicial or court facilities (38.8%);

4. Approve and supervise passes for entrance into the judicial facilities (36.5%); and

5. Supervise the usage of elevator service in judicial facilities (36.5%).

These findings show that fewer than half of the court agencies/sheriffs' offices participating in the survey place a high priority on access control.

Duty H--Perform Intake/Release Functions:

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
1. Perform administrative intake or release procedures.	32.1	67.4
2. Upon release from courts, make a computer check via N.C.I.C./C.J.I.S. of the detainee or prisoner.	39.4	59.6
3. Verify authenticity of commitment papers or other judicial-related documents as to intake/release functions.	48.2	50.9

ANALYSIS

Performing intake/release functions is not a high priority task of survey respondents. Most likely these tasks are performed by personnel in sheriffs' offices specifically assigned to the intake/release function.

Duty I--Perform Inmate Service Functions:

Function	Function Performed (Percentages)	Function Not Performed (Percentages)
1. Answer detainee or prisoner questions and counsel them regarding rules, regulations and responsibilities while they are under your care, custody, control and supervision.	55.0	44.5
2. Provide information to authorized persons about the status of the detainee or prisoner.	56.9	42.7
3. Coordinate any/all religious, counseling, diagnostic, medical, visitation, meals, attorney visits, bonding persons, etc.	33.5	66.5
4. Provide personal hygiene items if applicable.	32.1	67.4

ANALYSIS

Tasks 1 and 2 are related to the security function of transport deputies/officers, while Tasks 3 and 4 most likely would be performed by jail deputies/officers responsible for the detention of prisoners.

Additional Data Generated By Survey Instrument:

Several sections of the survey instrument sought data only, and did not involve analyzing tasks performed by court security and prisoner transportation personnel.

Section G of the survey instrument asked respondents if they **routinely handle prisoners presenting specific problems:**

Problem	Routinely Handle These Prisoners (Percentages of Respondents)	Do Not Routinely Handle These Prisoners (Percentages of Respondents)
1. Alcohol abuse	67.6	31.5
2. Drug abuse	76.3	22.4
3. Mental illness	76.3	22.8
4. Mentally handicapped	58.9	40.6
5. Blind	35.2	64.4
6. Deaf	40.2	58.4
7. Hearing impaired	47.9	51.1
8. Suicidal	74.4	23.7
9. Juvenile	74.0	25.1
10. Female	76.3	22.8
11. Homosexuality	60.7	38.8
12. Gang members	58.0	41.6
13. High risk profile prisoners	70.8	28.3
14. Infectious diseases	72.6	26.9

Analysis

Court security and prisoner transport deputies/officers routinely handle prisoners with special problems, some of whom are considered to be a danger to themselves, other prisoners, citizens and the deputies/officers (those prisoners with mental illness, suicidal tendencies and infectious diseases, as well as gang members and those who fit a high risk profile). Therefore, court security and prisoner transport deputies/officers should receive training (pre-service, basic, in-service and specialized) in how to handle these prisoners properly in order to prevent injuries and escapes.

Much of the additional data generated by the survey instrument involved training, and is included in Chapter Five.

Conclusions:

Based upon the data generated by the survey instrument, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. **The majority of the 218 survey respondents from mega, large, medium and small court agencies and sheriffs' offices are line employees or first/second line supervisors who have very few administrative or management duties. Most of their work involves direct provision of court security services or direct "hands-on" transportation of prisoners.**

2. **Of the <u>administrative</u> functions performed by the survey respondents, the most frequently performed tasks are:**

   A. **Assures prisoner transport paperwork is correct (71.2% of respondents perform this task);**

   B. **Determines equipment needs (68.5%);**

   C. **Performs interstate extraditions (63.9%);**

   D. **Answers transport-related functions (63.9%);**

   E. **Performs intrastate extraditions (61.6%);**

   F. **Testifies in court (60.7%);**

   G. **Verifies documentation that a transport is needed (60.7%); and**

   H. **Develops policies and procedures (60.3%).**

3. Most of the survey respondents do not perform any tasks related to fiscal management functions. Only two tasks were performed by 40 to 42 percent of the survey respondents: Review time and attendance reports (42.0%) and inventory supplies and equipment (40.2%).

4. The survey respondents do not perform many personnel management functions. The survey analysis revealed only 11 tasks performed by 50.7 to 57.1 percent of the survey respondents, with most of these tasks involving direct counseling or rating of employees in their work-related duties.

5. Only one training task was performed by slightly more than half of the survey respondents (54.3%)--that of establishing, maintaining or upgrading pre-service training activities.

6. Survey respondents rarely perform maintenance tasks, but over 50 percent inspect some security equipment and conduct inside and outside security checks. The devices and equipment inspected by more than 50 percent of survey respondents include vehicles (60.3%), weapons (56.6%), doors (56.6%), restraint devices (56.2%), locks (54.8%) and general security equipment (54.3%). However, the survey revealed that fewer than 50 percent of the survey respondents inspected the following types of equipment: scanning devices (46.1%), alarms (44.7%), bars (43.8%) and cameras (42.5%). Perhaps the court agencies and sheriffs' offices in which the majority of survey respondents work do not have this technical equipment, thus accounting for the response that fewer than half of the respondents routinely inspect the equipment to determine that it is in proper working order. If the agencies do have this equipment installed (alarms, closed-circuit television cameras and scanning devices), then failure to periodically inspect it can lead to serious security problems and needs to be addressed by these agencies.

7. Court security and prisoner transport deputies/officers rarely perform medical and health care functions for prisoners in their care.

8. **The majority of survey respondents are directly involved with performing court security functions and transporting prisoners, confirming that most respondents (at least 82.2%) are line deputies/officers or first/second line supervisors who have few, if any, administrative or management duties. Most of the court security/prisoner transport personnel perform "hands-on" tasks involving direct encounters with prisoners, court employees and citizens visiting court facilities.**

9. **Fewer than half of the court agencies and sheriffs' offices participating in the survey appear to place a high priority on access control, illustrating the need for improved security measures in many court facilities. This conclusion was reached from the survey data, which found that fewer than half of the survey respondents:**

   A. **Monitor remote surveillance devices (41.6%);**

   B. **Patrol the exterior perimeter of the court facility (42.0%);**

   C. **Supervise and scan mail and packages entering the judicial or court facilities (38.8%);**

   D. **Approve and supervise passes for entrance into the judicial facilities (36.5%); and**

   E. **Supervise the usage of elevator service in judicial facilities (36.5%).**

10. **Court security and prisoner transport deputies/officers routinely handle prisoners who are considered to be a danger to themselves, other prisoners, citizens and the deputies/officers. Therefore, court security/prisoner transport personnel should receive training (pre-service, basic, in-service and specialized) in how to handle these prisoners properly in order to prevent injuries and escapes.**

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

CHAPTER FOUR

ARCHITECTURE, TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT

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CHAPTER FOUR

ARCHITECTURE, TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT

CHAPTER FOUR

SECTION ONE

ARCHITECTURE

Security Issues in the Design of Court Facilities:

Effective security in a courtroom facility is a function of several factors. Overall architectural design, technology and staffing patterns all impact the security of any facility. Generally, court officials agree that the most effective security and control is best achieved through the direct supervision of staff supported by appropriate architectural and technological measures. Court facility security should be planned as a balance of all these measures.

Court officials also note that, to the degree possible, security should be unobtrusive. That is, while typical visitors to the facility should be aware of security and control measures, the presence of these measures should not unduly conflict with the efficient operations of the facility or the perception of an open, fair judicial process.

Effective and comprehensive security will be an integral component of the planning and design of any new courthouse facility. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to provide an outline of building security implications to be addressed relative to any courthouse development. This section is organized to provide a guide to security implications of a building-wide nature as well as in relation to the various functions which occur within the proposed new building.

Building-Wide Security:

In general, the building-wide security can be categorized as relating to perimeter security or interior security. Perimeter security, which involves the protection of exterior spaces surrounding the courthouse, includes such issues as overall site security, separate parking with access control for various courthouse functions, intrusion detection and alarm systems and building security glazing. Interior security, which principally pertains to the protection of personnel, property and documents within the courthouse, includes such issues as public entry screening into the courthouse, mail/package/material screening, appropriate monitoring of the service entrance/loading dock, access control to interior spaces, maintenance of separate movement and circulation patterns and provision of interior electronic security systems (e.g., CCTV, duress alarms, motion detectors).

Specific building-wide security implications relating to perimeter security include the following:

Site Development: Should provide for sufficient illumination and proper landscaping to facilitate protection of the public and court employees. Adequate lighting is required in and around parking areas, pedestrian pathways to the courthouse and at points of access where visual recognition is necessary. Building exterior details that invite placement of explosive devices should be avoided in the design. Building access points should be located within sight of a surveillance source and configured with unobtrusive barriers to prohibit violent vehicle or pedestrian entry.

Separate Parking Areas: Access/circulation control is required for judges and select court employees, prisoner transportation and service-related vehicles.

Intrusion Detection/Alarm Systems: Locations should be developed by the agency which is responsible for court security (e.g., sheriff's department, U.S. Marshal's Service, etc.). All perimeter doors should be included in this system as a means of detecting unauthorized entry. Additionally, ground-level (or otherwise accessible) windows should include glass break detectors or other similar sensor devices.

Perimeter Building Materials: Should preclude accessibility and minimize exterior line of sight into interior of the ground floor. In particular, where there is sight exposure, select glazing should be of a bullet-resistant nature. These treatments should be considered for areas such as judicial chambers and other sensitive offices or rooms. All ground floor windows should further be protected with shatter-resistant film on the interior face.

Specific building-wide security implications relating to interior security include:

General access (with the exception of judges and other select employees) should occur at a single entrance to be monitored by court security staff. Security screening of all individuals should be provided through magnetometer and x-ray equipment. Duress alarm activators should be located at the screening location(s) to summon additional security staff in the event of a disturbance.

Judicial access should occur by way of secure entrance from the secured parking area. This area should be provided with CCTV monitoring capability. The secure entrance area (or in some cases, secured elevator) should be equipped with a duress alarm.

Court personnel who utilize secured or non-secured parking should be provided a controlled access entrance into the building

to facilitate access to security screening or to exit the building.

Access to the facility service area (including the building loading dock) will occur from a single entry point with remote door controls linked to a security work station. The installation of CCTV and intercom systems at the loading dock entrance will serve to announce the arrival of delivery trucks.

Four distinct circulation systems (including vertical and horizontal movement) are required within most courthouse facilities. Full separation of the various circulation systems is integral in maintaining building-wide security:

1. **Public circulation accommodation** of visitors and the majority of staff should be limited to the public zones of the facility, extending vertically for multi-story buildings from the building lobby to designated, public-accessible floors. Horizontal public circulation in all courtroom facilities should be restricted to public zones on each floor (e.g., courtroom spectator seating areas, public restrooms, service counters, waiting areas, etc.)

2. **Dedicated judicial/staff circulation** is required within restricted zones of any court building. For multi-story buildings, vertical circulation must be provided via dedicated/restricted elevator(s). This will allow judicial officers and select staff to move from secured staff parking areas to all court and court-related floors, with circulation along restricted areas permitting horizontal movement (e.g., between courtrooms, chambers, suites, etc.). Serving jurors should also maintain the ability of moving throughout the facility utilizing the restricted circulation system.

3. **In-custody defendant circulation** is required within the secure zones of a courtroom facility. For a multi-story building, the secure zone should extend vertically from the vehicle sallyport entrance to the court holding unit(s). In those facilities where there is to be a centralized holding area, dedicated circulation must be provided from the central holding area to holding areas adjacent to the courtrooms. Horizontal in-custody movement should be limited to direct

movement from the holding cells into adjacent courtrooms.

4. **Service circulation** should be provided in a multi-story facility by a dedicated passenger/freight elevator, allowing vertical movement from the loading dock/receiving area to all floors, including any sub-levels and roof. Horizontal circulation should typically occur utilizing restricted rather than public circulation.

Throughout a courtroom facility there is a need for points requiring controller interface between separate circulation systems and controlled access/entry to individual functions. These points should be controlled through the use of key locks, card keys or key pads. As an alternative, these points could be controlled by remote release mechanisms supported by CCTV/intercom systems.

Supporting overall building-wide security should be an extensive alarm system, including the use of duress (panic) alarms placed at strategic locations. These alarms should be supplemented, where necessary, with the selective use of CCTV cameras to provide video surveillance.

Some areas might also require the use of intrusion alarms (such as motion detectors) which could be integrated with the duress alarm system.

Direct visual surveillance by roving security staff should complement the use of video cameras in order to ensure appropriate building-wide security.

Function-Specific Security:

Courtroom Security: Courtroom security is concerned with the protection of all court participants, including judicial officers and support staff, litigants, defendants, witnesses, jurors and public spectators during the conduct of the court proceedings. While the objective of courtroom security is to maximize safety within each courtroom, it should be developed in a manner that minimizes inconvenience and interference with the court process.

Specific courtroom security implications include:

1. As a means for alerting security personnel in the event of an emergency situation, silent duress alarms should be provided at the judge's bench, the courtroom clerk's station and the bailiffs' station (if included in the design). These locations should include a

flashing indicator which annunciates in the court facility security office.

2. CCTV cameras should be mounted in the rear and side walls of courtrooms, with connection to the court facility security control room.

3. The judge's bench should be lined with anti-ballistic material on the front and side vertical panels.

4. From a security perspective, courtrooms should be located within the interior zone of the courtroom floor(s). Should options for the introduction of natural light be considered, careful review of the relevant security issues should be completed.

5. Holding cells should be located adjacent to the courtrooms in order to house in-custody defendants prior to court proceedings and during brief court recesses. Where possible, location of the holding cells between pairs of courtrooms is preferable. Holding cell units located within the secure circulation zone can allow separate access to the courtroom for in-custody defendants. Non-contact attorney interview spaces should be provided in the holding cell area.

6. As a means for contending with disruptive defendants, all courtrooms should be provided with the capability for audio/video linkage to the adjoining holding cells and/or central holding area.

Chambers/Suites Security: The objective in considering security for the judge's chambers/suites is to provide protection for the judicial officers and their support staff when they are working in these areas. This objective can be achieved in large part by an effective entry control system as well as a means for summoning security assistance in the event of emergencies.

Specific chambers/suites security issues include the following:

1. An entry control system should be provided to monitor visitor access to the restricted circulation corridors. The entry control system should be operational from a workstation inside the chamber/suites, supported with a doorbell/intercom speaker.

2. As a means for contacting security staff in the event of emergency situations, silent alarm activators should be provided at the judge's desk in chambers, as well as at the secretary or assistant's workstations.

Clerk of Court Security: Security for the clerk of the court should be designed to address two primary objectives: protection of personnel and security of property and documents under the control of the clerk. These objectives can be effectively met through the use of public access control and selective alarm activation capability.

Specific security implications for the clerk of the court include the following:

1. Access from public circulation to entry and waiting areas within the clerk of the court office suite should be controlled by use of a secured door.

2. To control public access to the clerk staff areas, door(s) from a public area to the restricted staff circulation area should be controlled remotely.

3. As a means for summoning security staff, silent duress alarm activators should be provided at a public-access counter as well as at an enclosed office space (clerk's office). As an augmentation to this system, a CCTV camera could be mounted at the public counter in order to observe this area in the event of a disturbance.

4. Select rooms within the clerk's office suite should be securable by means of mechanical key locks, card keys, or key pad devices. Examples of the types of spaces considered for this treatment include private offices, exhibits and evidence storage rooms, computer room and central storage room. The exhibits and evidence storage room and financial room/vault require an intrusion alarm system. Additionally, the computer room, exhibit and evidence storage rooms and active and secure file storage rooms should include a dry chemical fire suppression system.

5. Staff access to the clerk's office suite should be available through the restricted circulation corridors, distinct from public circulation.

Jury Facilities Security: Jury facilities security involves the protection of potential and impanelled jurors within the jury assembly room as well as the trial jury suites located adjacent to the courtrooms. This protection should extend from the control of access to the capability of alerting security personnel, to the separation of juror movement from that of the general public and court participants.

Specific jury facilities security implications include:

1. Impanelled juror access from the jury assembly area to the courtrooms should occur by way of a dedicated staff elevator or passenger/freight elevator in order to minimize public contact. At the courtrooms, access to the trial jury suites should occur by means of a restricted circulation system. Jurors should be able to access the courtroom directly through a sound lock connecting to the trial jury suite.

2. To summon security response in the event of an emergency, silent duress alarm activators should be provided at the juror assembly area and at the trial jury suites.

Court Support Space Security: In addition to the building functions previously identified, a number of court support functions require specific security measures. Spaces which should be reviewed for security requirements include training rooms, conference rooms and the press room.

Specific court support space security issues include the following:

1. Training rooms should be securable with access from the restricted circulation corridors permitted via mechanical locks, card key or key pad entry systems.

2. Conference rooms, including judges' conference rooms, require controlled entry with access from controlled circulation to avoid public contact. Duress alarm activators should be provided within this space.

3. A press room does not require special security beyond typical locksets.

Prisoner Holding Areas Security/Security Administration: Courthouse facilities must include dedicated space related to building-wide security and operations pertaining to the secure

custody of prisoners. Security considerations address the vehicle sallyport, prisoner movement, prisoner elevators, court holding units and central holding area.

Specific security administration security concerns include:

1. Access into and out of a vehicle sallyport should occur through interlocked remote control overhead doors. Provision should be made for a local access control pedestal operable from the vehicle by means of a keypad/intercom system. Intercom, CCTV camera and duress alarm systems should be provided both on the exterior and interior of the sallyport. The sallyport requires storage for prisoner restraints and a multi-compartment gun locker for secure storage of weapons.

2. Adjacent to the vehicle sallyport, an interior pedestrian sallyport should be provided. This sallyport should lead to the prisoner circulation corridors and/or prisoner elevator. Doors entering and exiting this sallyport should be supplied with both key pad and remote control access. This space and associated corridors should also be equipped with intercom, duress alarm and CCTV surveillance systems to support the safe movement of in-custody defendants.

3. As noted under "building-wide security," in-custody defendant movement should occur by means of a secure circulation system which is separate from public, restricted or service circulation. This secure circulation should extend from the vehicle sallyport to the courtroom holding units.

4. Prisoner elevators may incorporate a distinct prisoner area, divisible by a security screen. The security staff area should include a CCTV camera telephone and duress alarm connected to the security control room within the courthouse.

5. Courtroom holding units should be accessible directly from prisoner elevators and/or prisoner corridors. The holding units should include controlled access into the adjoining courtrooms. CCTV cameras should be placed to provide full visual monitoring of the holding units.

The holding units must utilize appropriate detention-type construction regarding the partitioning, door, plumbing, and HVAC/lighting fixtures.

A central security room should be designed to serve as the point of security coordination and communications control. Select monitoring capability and alarm annunciators should be located in this area. Finally, this room can serve as an "area of refuge" for judges. Because of the nature of the functions to be provided in this area, controlled access must be provided.

Building Support Space Security: Certain rooms and areas within a courthouse will likely be under the control of building maintenance staff and may require selective security provisions. Consideration should be given to the public entry area, fire control room, building offices, receiving and storage:

1. The fire control room, building offices and storage rooms will not usually require special security provisions beyond the typical lockset.

2. Where other offices (e.g., defender or prosecution) are provided within the court facility, public access must be controlled. Silent duress alarms should be provided at receptionists' areas in these offices to summon a security response.

3. Select rooms within these office suites should be securable through mechanical key locks, card key/key pad devices. Such rooms would include private offices, computer rooms, equipment storage rooms, tape and records storage rooms.

CHAPTER FOUR
SECTION TWO

TECHNOLOGY

In all 49 states in which the office of sheriff exists, the sheriff is responsible for performing court-related functions. These functions may include acting as bailiff; attending court; jury duty; serving summonses, criminal warrants or civil process; and enforcing money decrees such as those relating to garnishment and the sale of property.

As a court officer, the sheriff and his staff usually is responsible to the general trial court of the county, municipality or state. In a few states, the sheriff of the county/city where the state capitol is located also has served as an officer of the highest court of the state. But this apparently no longer occurs even where such statutory responsibilities remain.

The sheriff's general role as guardian of the court is manifested in various ways in different states. In a few states, such as Mississippi, the sheriff is charged with the management of the county courthouse. In 45 states the sheriff or his deputy is required to attend court or act as bailiff. In all 49 states, the sheriff is responsible for process service of one kind or another.

The court duties of the sheriff involve the use of equipment and technology, which may include electronic or mechanical devices, such as a basic intrusion alarm system or walk-through or hand-held magnetometers, as well as more sophisticated items such as video arraignment, microwave alarms, closed-circuit television (CCTV), and infrared viewing and photography devices. **However, equipment alone is not the solution to a security problem; at best, it is a supportive tool when used by trained personnel in a well-prepared plan or procedure.**

Closed Circuit Television/Video Arraignment Programs:

In a study by John Rockwell of the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) in 1993, a survey was conducted to determine the use of closed circuit television/video arraignment programs on a nationwide basis. The Information Service of the NCSC was asked to provide information about the use of audio-visual communication links between the courthouse and the jail. These systems have been installed to permit first appearances, arraignments, bail bond hearings, and sentencing, with the defendant remaining in the jail and the judge in the courthouse. **While the start-up cost is substantial, these systems have proven to be cost effective because they save the expense of transporting defendants to and from court, and the audio-visual recording can provide the record without the necessity of a court reporter.**

Other advantages that are described in the NCSC study include: eliminating security problems connected with transportation; avoiding bringing shackled prisoners through public corridors in courthouses; shortening prearraignment detention time, and eliminating waiting periods in crowded holding cells at the courthouse.

Several hundred video arraignment installations have been made nationwide to date, ranging geographically from California and Washington to Vermont and Florida. A recent survey of 96 courts by the NCSC's Court Technology Service indicated an increasing interest in video arraignments (see "Video Technology Applications," Court Technology Bulletin, November/December 1992). In 1993, approximately 32 states were utilizing some form of video arraignment at different locations, the NCSC survey found. A brief review of the programs in several states follows:

1. **Florida:** The Dade County court system began using closed circuit television for misdemeanor first appearances in 1982. In 1984 the Office of the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council conducted an evaluation of the experiment that became the basis for a law review article, "The Use of Closed Circuit Television for Conducting Misdemeanor Arraignments in Dade County, Florida," (Silbert, Newman, and Kalser, University of Miami Law Review, July 1984). The project was considered a great success.

   The authors describe the system and its many advantages. In addition to enhanced security through elimination of transportation of prisoners, other advantages include personnel savings through elimination of a court reporter and liaison officer, savings of time for correctional officers, and reduction in number of judges used to hear first appearances. Attendance by friends and family members of the accused is facilitated through additional space in the courtroom. The evaluators report that these advantages outweigh the disadvantages of lack of person-to-person contact between the defendant and the judge, and occasional malfunction of the equipment.

   In "Video in the Misdemeanor Court: the South Florida Experience," (Judicature, June-July 1985), the authors, W. Clinton Terry III and Roy Surette, review the Dade County video arraignment project and report that the

judges, the prosecutors and the defendants generally approve video use with only the public defenders being opposed. The public defenders argued that the traditional courtroom atmosphere has been diminished. They also objected to the elimination of person to person contact between the judge and the defendant.

A discussion in the University of Miami Law Review article cited above of the legal issues concludes that the defendant's rights to be informed of the charges, to have the benefit of counsel, and to confront witnesses, are preserved. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that due process does not require the personal presence of a defendant in a courtroom, before a judge, for arraignment when, through audio-visual means, he can see the judge and the judge can see him. Both felony and misdemeanor arraignments can be conducted either personally in open court or by audio-visual device, at the discretion of the court. [In re Rule 3.160 (a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, July 14, 1988, 528, So. 2d 1179, F 1988.]

After the successful evaluation of the use of closed circuit television for misdemeanor first appearances in Dade County in 1984, the court experimented with use of video for felony first appearances. A study, "The Evaluation of the Use of Closed Circuit Television in Felony First Appearances" (Office of Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council, October 1985), concluded that such use should be made permanent on a seven-day week basis.

2. California. There are at least 14 jurisdictions in California with video arraignment systems. In 1983 the California Penal Code was amended by adding Section 977.2, authorizing a pilot video project to arraign defendants who are brought to Municipal Court on felony charges. Subsequent legislation enlarged the scope of the project.

The 1991 "Report to the Legislature on Video Arraignment Projects" (Judicial Council of California) contains a review of the legislation, descriptions of the 14 projects

and the benefits observed by the participants. Included is a description of the 1991 amendment to Section 977.2 of the Penal Code which requires that a defendant charged with either a misdemeanor or felony, and who pleads by video, must sign a waiver of the right to be physically present in the courtroom and must have his attorney present when the plea is entered. The Report states that the participants enthusiastically support video arraignments. While the Report does not analyze cost savings, it points out that cost avoidance is more important than cost savings. Costs are avoided through eliminating transportation of prisoners, incurring fewer security risks, and time savings by allowing public defenders and probation and parole officers to confer with their clients by video.

In an article, "TV Arraignment Breaks New Ground to Streamline Courts" (Fred James and Tom Probst, Government Technology, July 1989), the authors report on the 1983 installation and subsequent development of a video arraignment system in the San Bernardino Municipal District Court. Net savings realized from the use of video arraignment in the 1986-87 fiscal year were between $196,000 and $226,000. A marked reduction in tension levels among correctional/court security officers also was noted.

3. **Colorado.** In order to cope with projected increases in operations due to anticipated jail population growth, the Denver Sheriff's Department developed an interactive television system linking the detention facility and the courthouse. The system is described by Walter R. Smith in "Video Court Appearances: The Concept and its Use in Denver," (American Jails, July/August 1992). Smith also discusses the legal issues involved; these include the defendant's due process right to "be present" in court, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to effective representation by counsel. The 1984 Florida evaluation (supra) is cited by Smith in his article to conclude that there are no legal problems with the use of closed circuit television that cannot be properly solved. The article contains lists of additional

articles on video court appearances and jurisdictions using such appearances.

4. **Michigan.** Judith K. Cunningham, court administrator/judicial assistant in the Circuit Court in Oakland County, describes the development and use of a video arraignment system in Oakland County Circuit Court in a paper entitled, "Merging Video Record With Video Arraignment in Oakland County, Michigan." She makes it clear that cooperation with defense attorneys is necessary and that the participants must be instructed in the use of the system.

   In "Criminal Proceedings by Closed Circuit Television: Efficiency Takes Center Stage" (Criminal Defense Newsletter, October 1992) Joan Ellerbusch Morgan discusses pilot video arraignment programs in Michigan and the constitutional problems that could arise if the programs were to be expanded beyond arraignments to include pleas and sentencing.

5. **Kentucky.** In a letter to the National Center for State Courts in 1991 about court technology, James S. Chenault, Chief Circuit Judge of Kentucky's 25th Judicial Circuit, describes the use of video arraignment in Madison County District Court. Video is used for arraignment, appointing counsel, and setting bail. A split-screen monitor permits the prisoner and the judge to see each other. A large screen faces the audience in the courtroom.

   The use of the video system in the 25th Judicial Circuit has improved court and jail security, reduced the man-hours of deputy jailers in preparing prisoners for court and receiving them on re-entry, relieved the deputy sheriffs of the task of transporting prisoners, and eliminated the paperwork of logging prisoners out and back into jail. Though prisoners are given the choice of court or video appearance, none to date have chosen the court appearance.

Where video arraignments are specifically authorized by statute, rule of court, or administrative order, various restrictions are imposed. Some states permit the use of closed circuit television for all arraignments. Others limit its use to

misdemeanor charges only. In Idaho and California, guilty pleas may not be made by video. Some jurisdictions require that the defendant's attorney be present with the defendant. Public viewing of the proceedings may be required. In Florida, Criminal Rule 3.160 provides that arraignment shall be conducted in open court or by audio-visual device. In Arizona, Criminal Rule 14.2 states that the defendant shall be arraigned personally before the trial court or by video. In Idaho, Criminal Rule 43.1 provides that appearances before a judge or a magistrate may be made by video for first appearance, bail hearing, arraignment and plea in a misdemeanor case, and by video arraignment and plea of not guilty in a felony case.

In Michigan, Administrative Order 1991-2, "Video Arraignment," requires each court requesting authorization for video arraignment must submit a proposed local administrative order to the State Court Administrator. The Administrative Office of the Courts has issued a model administrative order which authorizes the use of closed circuit television for initial criminal arraignments, criminal pretrials, criminal pleas, criminal sentencing for misdemeanors, and show cause hearings. Public access to all closed circuit television proceedings is required, and a private, separate, closed circuit television must be available for use by the attorney and client. Facsimile (FAX) equipment is to be available for transmission of documents necessary to the proceedings.

The NCSC's research indicates that California and Virginia are the only states where the use of closed circuit television for arraignments is authorized by statute (Report to the [California] Legislature, supra, and Sec. 19.2-3.1, Criminal Procedure, Code of Virginia). Section 977.2 of the California Penal Code permits video arraignments on felony or misdemeanor charges except where the defendant has been indicted by a grand jury. The defendant has the right to choose between video arraignment or physical presence before a judge and must sign a waiver of the right to be physically present if video arraignment is chosen. The statute requires that if the defendant is represented by counsel, counsel must be present with the defendant when the plea is entered. The comment to the statute states that a judge may not accept a plea of guilty or no contest from a defendant charged with a felony who is not physically present in the courtroom.

Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages of Video Arraignment: To summarize, the NCSC's study found the following **advantages** in making closed circuit television video arraignments available:

- Saving transportation expenses;
- Elimination of security problems;
- Reduction in number of jail personnel needed;
- Reduction in tension by eliminating movement of prisoners and waiting in holding cells;

- Savings through use of video tape as the record;
- Reduction in judge hours spent on first appearances;
- Improved viewing by interested persons and public;
- Ability of public defenders and probation officers to confer with clients by video; and
- Approval of use of video by defendants and most of the other participants.

The NCSC study noted the following **disadvantages** when closed circuit television video arraignments are used:

- Public defenders object that courtroom formality is lacking;
- Lack of face-to-face contact between judge and defendant;
- Feeling by public defenders that they are less effective advocates on video; and
- Possible failure of equipment.

Various restrictions were noted in the NCSC study:

- Restriction of video arraignment to misdemeanor charges;
- Use of video restricted to "not guilty" pleas;
- Use of video restricted to arraignments and prohibited for sentencing;
- Defendant given choice of in person or video hearing;
- Requirement of signed waiver by defendant of physical appearance before the judge;
- Private separate closed circuit television for use by attorney and client;
- Presence of defendant's attorney at jail during video appearance;
- Facilities for viewing by interested persons; and
- Availability of FAX for transmission of documents.

In a report in the Court Technology Bulletin (November/December 1992, page 5), a brief survey of the "Video Technology Application" revealed a high level of use of this technology and a strong interest in future applications.

The survey described eight applications of video technology: the use of video cassette recorders; security; court reporting; arraignment and conferencing within the courthouse; arraignment and conferencing between the court and other facilities; prerecorded videotaped trials; televised court events; and public information systems. Respondents to the Court Technology Bulletin Survey were asked if the right applications were in use today, under development, or planned. They were also given the opportunity to request additional information on the subject, which was interpreted to be an interest in using the technology.

Developing Policies and Procedures for Video Arraignments: One agency has used video arraignments for several years to an overwhelming success. The City of Las Vegas, Nevada, Department of

Detention and Enforcement, has reported the use of closed circuit television in bond hearings as significantly beneficial to the taxpayers, staff of the courts and the agency.

Las Vegas has found the following advantages generated by its video arraignment program:

- Saving in transportation costs;
- Enforced security;
- Staffing patterns are more effective and efficient;
- Less tension among judicial, law enforcement, and correctional personnel;
- Less paperwork because of the use of video tapings;
- Reduction in caseload and hours of judges on arraignments;
- Less tension among defendants;
- Assists prosecutors, public defenders, attorneys for defendants, and other legal participants;
- Improved record keeping;
- More cost effective;
- Requires less space in the holding cells and detention rooms;
- Less space needed to conduct video arraignments;
- Better access of public, victims and witnesses; and
- A more humane treatment of defendants awaiting a preliminary hearing or bond hearing.

The City of Las Vegas has an elaborate policy and procedure that is used daily in their video arraignment process. It is printed below to serve as a model policy for other agencies (Figures 4:1 and 4:2).

Figure 4:1

CITY OF LAS VEGAS

Department of Detention & Enforcement
3300 East Stewart Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Video Court at the Detention Center

3.26.000

Inmates scheduled for court will be properly assembled and processed as efficiently as possible.

3.26.001 DEFINITIONS

Video Court is conducted Monday through Sunday at approximately 0800 hours (plea hearings), 1100 hours (Department 4

competency hearings), 1100 hours and 1400 hours (Department 6 answers to charges pending), and 1500 hours (Department 9 answers to charges pending). Inmates scheduled for plea hearings will be seen during the 0800 session.

At approximately 0500 hours, the shift 1 shift supervisor shall ensure that a court roster is generated (DET system, DPRT screen). This roster shall remain with the control room operator until verified with Municipal Court.

At approximately 0630 hours, a clerk from Municipal Court will call the control room operator and verify the court calendar. The court roster will be compared with the court calendar, and differences will be resolved with the court clerk. Names and other information will be added to the court roster.

Unless the court calendar is identified as Department 6 or 9 (afternoon court) or Department 4 (late morning), the calendar is for Departments 1, 2, 3, or 5 (morning court).

Copies of the court roster will be distributed as follows:

- Each unit officer
- Shift supervisor
- Court officer, shift 2
- Classification technician

Shift 2 unit officers will assemble inmates for court. The officer will verify the identity of the inmate by comparing the identification bracelet and the photograph on the identification card, and comparing the identification number on the card against the identification number on the court roster. The officer shall ensure that the unit log is updated to reflect the correct count in each unit.

- Inmates for Departments 1-5 are to be moved to the video courtroom in the programs building.
- Inmates for Department 9DC are scheduled for appeal at District Court and will not be moved.
- Inmates for Departments 6 and 9 will not be moved to the programs building until the afternoon.
- Inmates in isolation status will not be relocated until coordinated with the court officer. Restraints will be used as appropriate.

The court officer will explain court procedures to each inmate and require complete cooperation.

All documents for inmates will be delivered to them as soon as possible.

3.26.003 CONDUCTING COURT

When court begins, the first person on video will be the public defender. That official will give the court officer the name of the inmate to be seen.

The court officer will have the inmate step up to the microphone and will inform the public defender of the total days the inmate has been incarcerated.

This format will continue until the public defender has seen all the inmates scheduled.

During the court hearing, the court officer will record the disposition of each case on the court roster. This information will subsequently be delivered to an intake aide in order to initiate sentencing/release paperwork.

When court is concluded, prior to returning inmates to their units, the officer will verify the identity of each inmate by checking the photograph on the identification card and comparing the identification number on the card against the identification number on the court roster. The officer will ensure the unit log is updated to reflect an accurate count.

Figure 4:2

CITY OF LAS VEGAS

Department of Detention & Enforcement
3300 East Stewart Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Video Court at the City Hall Jail

3.27.000

Inmates scheduled for court will be properly assembled and processed as efficiently as possible.

3.27.001 DEFINITIONS

None.

3.27.002 PROCEDURES

Video court is conducted Monday through Friday as follows:

0800 - Plea hearings
1100 - Dept. 4 competency hearing

1400 - Dept. 6 plea hearings
1500 - Dept. 9 probable cause and status checks

NOTE: On Saturdays, only probable cause hearings are scheduled. The time is 1400 hours.

The intake aide, shift 1, will generate a court roster (DET system) each day court is to be conducted. This document will be compared against the court calendar provided by the Municipal Court. The intake aide will resolve discrepancies by coordinating with the court intake services officer. Additions to the court roster will be manually added. After reconciliation, copies will be prepared for distribution as follows:

- Court officer
- Each cell block officer
- Control room officer - City Hall Jail
- Classification technician - City Hall Jail

On Monday through Thursday, cell block officers, shift 1, will assemble inmates for court. The cell block officer will verify the identity of the inmate by comparing the photograph on the locator card and comparing the identification number on the card against the identification number on the court roster and wrist band. Inmates will have all jail property in their possession. The cell block officer shall ensure that the log is updated to reflect the correct count in each cell block.

- Cell block A day room - All female inmates scheduled for court other than Departments 9 and 6 (p.m. court), or Departments 4 and 6 (competency hearings).
- Cell block B day room - All male inmates scheduled for court other than Departments 9 and 6 (p.m. court), or Departments 4 and 6 (competency hearings).
- On Fridays, relocation of inmates scheduled for court will take place in the morning, regardless of the department/time.

NOTE: Inmates housed in an isolation status will not be relocated until their actual court time.

- The cell block officers, shift 1, will annotate a copy of the court roster, indicating those inmates in an isolation status and not relocated. The annotated roster and locator cards will be given to the court officer, shift 2.
- The cell block officers, shift 2, will coordinate with the court officer for the relocation of inmates in an isolation status. Restraints will be used as appropriate.

The court officer will explain court procedures to each inmate and require complete cooperation.

All court documents for inmates will be delivered to them as soon as possible.

Conducting court:

- When court begins, the first person on video will be the public defender. That official will give the court officer the names of inmates he will want to talk to.

- As the names are called, the court officer will annotate the court roster with the number sequence. The inmates will then be lined up in that numerical order for the public defender to interview.

- During the court hearing the court officer will record the disposition of each case on the court roster. This information will subsequently be given to an intake aide in order to initiate sentencing/release paperwork.

- When the court is concluded, the court officer will return sentenced inmates to their cell blocks. The locator card for those inmates will be given to the cell block officers. Inmates to be released will remain in cell block B or be returned to cell block A, moved to the initial holding cell, or returned to their original cell block, depending upon such factors as facility population, number to be released, number of inmates scheduled for the p.m. court, etc. An effort will be made to isolate releases in order to better coordinate ordering of meals and feeding. Inmates to be released to other agencies will be placed in a holding cell. The cell block officer shall assist with the relocation and ensure the log reflects the correct count.

- The court officer will make copies of the court roster with dispositions noted and distribute as follows: intake aides, medical, and control.

Cost of Technology:

The cost of any technology should be calculated in the following manner.

Example:

Problem Identification: Video Court Proceeding in the Bond Hearing/Probable Cause Stage of Adjudication.

Solution One: Use of closed circuit television for conducting misdemeanor/felony/bond hearings.

Estimated Cost:

- ♦ Initial cost $ _____
- ♦ Installation $ _____
- ♦ Training $ _____
- ♦ Additional supplies etc. $ _____
- ♦ Operating costs $ _____
- ♦ Maintenance $ _____
- ♦ Personnel $ _____
- ♦ Other direct costs $ _____
- ♦ Indirect costs $ _____
- ♦ Personnel costs to monitor technology/-equipment, etc. $ _____
- ♦ Equipment depreciation $ _____
- ♦ Building depreciation $ _____

Grand Total $ _____

Solution Two: Use the existing system that is now in place.

Estimated Cost Issues:

- ♦ Personnel $ _____
- ♦ Fringe benefits $ _____
- ♦ Indirect overhead $ _____
- ♦ Contractual $ _____
- ♦ Supplies $ _____
- ♦ Consultants $ _____
- ♦ Telephone/Fax $ _____
- ♦ Postage, etc. $ _____
- ♦ Audits $ _____
- ♦ Printing/photocopying $ _____
- ♦ Maintenance $ _____
- ♦ Equipment depreciation $ _____
- ♦ Building depreciation $ _____

Grand Total $ _____

CHAPTER FOUR
SECTION THREE

EQUIPMENT

Equipment is another important component of court security and the transportation of prisoners. This section provides guidance on what equipment is needed and potential guidelines for choosing the right items.

Key Planning Issues:

Planners must consider many factors before purchasing and installing a protection system. To prevent serious budgetary problems, planners should evaluate needs, cost-effectiveness, and personnel requirements before deciding to purchase and install a specific type of security system. A security systems expert can design a secure, sophisticated protection system using the latest developments in alarms, CCTV, sensor devices, physical barriers, x-ray devices, video arraignment, walk-through metal detectors, handheld scanning devices, infrared view devices and photo identification systems. However, no matter how sophisticated the system is, **equipment is seldom a complete substitute for personnel. It is a supportive instrument when used by a trained employee.**

To determine the cost effectiveness of a security system or instrument, the following formula is a useful guide.

Cost of Equipment

The cost of any or all items within the category of equipment could be calculated in the following manner.

Example:

Problem Identification: Metal detection at the entrance level of courthouse.

Solution One: Use of metal detection equipment to scan persons entering the courthouse.

Estimated Cost:

- Initial costs $_____
- Installation $_____
- Training $_____
- Additional supplies, etc. $_____
- Operating costs $_____
- Maintenance $_____

- ♦ Personnel $_____
- ♦ Other direct costs $_____
- ♦ Indirect costs $_____
- ♦ Personnel costs to monitor technology/equipment, etc. $_____
- ♦ Building depreciation $_____

Grand Total $_____

Solution Two: Use of existing system that is now in place.

Estimated Cost Issues:

- ♦ Personnel $_____
- ♦ Fringe benefits $_____
- ♦ Indirect overhead $_____
- ♦ Contractual $_____
- ♦ Supplies $_____
- ♦ Consultants $_____
- ♦ Telephone/Fax $_____
- ♦ Postage, etc. $_____
- ♦ Audits $_____
- ♦ Printing/photocopying $_____
- ♦ Maintenance $_____
- ♦ Equipment depreciation $_____
- ♦ Building depreciation $_____

Grand Total $_____

Cost of Living = Estimated annual increase.

Number of years = Projected life of equipment.

Operating costs = Estimated annual cost of supplies, power, etc. multiplied by the established equipment life in years.

Maintenance = Estimated or actual cost of annual service contract multiplied by the estimated equipment life in years.

Another way to estimate a sample cost comparison would be to use the following formula:

Security problem: How to maintain security in a restricted corridor.

Solution Number 1: Use of a CCTV or another instrument to monitor the specific corridor.

Estimated manpower cost

(Salary + overhead + cost of living increase) x number of persons involved x number of years = TOTAL ESTIMATED PERSONNEL COST.

Estimated equipment cost

Initial cost + installation + operating costs + maintenance = TOTAL ESTIMATED EQUIPMENT COST.

Salary = Average annual deputy sheriff's/officer's or bailiff's salary.
Overhead = 40% to 53.15% of average salary.

Includes:

- F.I.C.A.
- State unemployment tax
- Federal unemployment tax
- Health insurance
- Long term disability
- Short term disability
- Deferral plan
- Vacation/holidays
- Retirement
- Liability insurance
- Etc.

SAMPLE COST COMPARISON

Estimated Cost:

- Initial costs $_____
- Installation $_____
- Operating cost $_____
- Maintenance $_____
- Manpower costs to monitor equipment, respond in case of emergency $_____

TOTAL ESTIMATED EQUIPMENT COSTS $_____

Solution Number 2: Have deputies/bailiffs patrol the corridors.

Estimated Costs:

Salary = Average annual deputy sheriff's or bailiff's salary.
Overhead = 40% to 53.15% of average salary.

Cost of living = Estimated annual increase.

Number of years = Projected life of equipment.

Operating Costs = Estimated annual cost of supplies, power, etc. multiplied by the established equipment life in years.

Maintenance = Estimated or actual cost of annual service contract multiplied by the estimated equipment life in years.

[Salary + overhead + cost of living increase] x number of personnel to patrol corridors and respond to all emergency situations x number of years = Total Estimated Personnel Costs.

When the two total estimated costs are computed over the expected lifetime of the equipment (perhaps five years), one can determine which solution will cost less.

To summarize, major equipment purchases should be part of a thorough and well-documented budget plan. Required personnel estimates should be in line with equipment procurement projections to keep the security section from having too much equipment and not enough personnel to use it properly.

Finally, all equipment and supplies issued to an agency should be recorded in a proper accountability record system, which will be the basis for inventories and audits. Records should be kept of all requisitions, purchases, deliveries and related correspondence. Good records will provide a supervisor with readily available information on quantities in stock, what has been issued to whom, and what needs to be reordered.

Equipment Selection Process:

To select the best equipment at the lowest cost, security planners should follow certain guidelines:

NEED: The need for equipment may be apparent after a security survey or change in operating procedures and practices. The determination can be made independently or with the aid of a security equipment expert, who often can help prevent needless expenditures. The need should be clear and easy to explain, so that the right equipment can be matched to that need. This is important to assure the purchase of an effective item that does not have costly extra features. When determining security needs, the following areas should be analyzed:

1. **Exterior:**

   - Perimeter

- Lights
- Parking areas
- Landscaping

2. **Building**:

- Door, windows, other openings
- Ceiling and walls
- Emergency power systems
- Alarms
- Fire protection
- Attic, basements, crawl spaces, air-conditioning, ventilation and heating systems
- Elevator, escalators, dumbwaiters, etc.
- Storage areas, armories and dangerous substance storage areas
- Community areas
- Records storage areas
- Public areas (waiting rooms, restrooms, hallway and visiting or interview areas)
- Offices handling money
- Maintenance rooms.

3. **Courtrooms and Related Areas**:

- Courtrooms
- Courtroom doors, windows, and other openings
- Courtroom lights
- Courtroom air conditioning, ventilation and heating systems
- Courtroom furnishings
- Courtroom security devices
- Judge's chambers and related offices
- Witness waiting rooms
- Attorney-client conference rooms
- Jury deliberation rooms
- In-custody defendant reception
- Restricted and secured passageways
- Temporary holding areas
- Security equipment storage areas

Suitability and Performance: Performance specifications should be drafted from the needs statement and in detail so that the equipment chosen meets the agency's needs. These detailed requirements will define what a piece of equipment is expected to do and will help determine the best kind of equipment to buy.

Reliability, Obsolescence, and Availability: The items purchased should have proven reliability and credibility. Ask other buyers about their experiences and identify agencies that utilize the equipment products.

Design Limitations: All electromechanical equipment has built-in design limits. These should be identified before purchase and a judgment should be made as to whether the limitations will keep the devices from performing a job well. Also to be considered is how easy it will be for agency personnel to use the equipment.

Compatibility: Compatibility with existing equipment is a prime consideration for new purchases. Compatibility reduces inventory requirements for items such as portable lights, desk lamps, battery-operated equipment, cameras, and office machines that use expendable supplies.

Cost: The cost of all items should be calculated through the formulas that are discussed earlier in this chapter.

Personnel Impact: Most major pieces of equipment have personnel requirements which must be considered before purchase. Equipment also should be examined in terms of its ease of operation and maintenance and any training that might be needed. Sophisticated equipment such as bomb detectors may require either specifically trained and skilled operators or maintenance personnel for proper use. Many sheriffs' offices and other criminal justice agencies provide at least routine maintenance of vehicles, weapons, radios, and alarm equipment. Unless this is done by civilian staff, it takes sworn officers away from their primary law enforcement duties and could hamper the security of the judicial and court functions.

Space Needs: Both operating and storage space are important. If space is not available in the court facility, it may be necessary to store certain equipment elsewhere. In this case, the additional factors of transportation and time must be considered.

Installation and Maintenance: The ease and cost of installation should be considered when selecting equipment. A special installation team means more expense, and long delays may occur if there is an installation waiting list for the equipment. Check the backlog of installations and decide whether the waiting period is acceptable.

Select equipment that does not need frequent servicing: Ask current users of the equipment how often service is required and how long it takes. New equipment almost always requires some servicing, but long-term maintenance needs can be reduced. Avoid items that may need frequent maintenance because of faulty engineering or sensitivity to heat, cold, or shock, or those that are easily damaged when operated by unskilled employees.

Service should be readily available, and done locally if possible, especially for routine maintenance. More complex and regular service may require a service contract. Many national companies provide service for several states on a regional basis.

This type of coverage increases the service costs and the possibility of excessive delays, both of which have a negative effect on security programs.

The service company should have enough spare parts. A good company can accurately estimate the failure rate of components in the equipment it services and will usually maintain an adequate inventory of spare parts. However, some firms try to save money by getting spares from a main supplier; this nearly always results in delay. Moreover, foreign products may involve ordering parts from another country, which could cause months of waiting.

Equipment Used For Security:

Over the past decade the use of security equipment by court systems has progressed rapidly. Research and development and improved testing of equipment has resulted in many new and improved products. The various types of security equipment most commonly used in court facilities is described below.

Hardware and Locks: An easy and inexpensive way to improve security is to replace inferior locks and hardware with quality items. During remodeling or new construction, the additional cost is usually negligible if security planners insist on these items. The following types of equipment should be considered:

- Key-operated locks on windows;
- Door locks with removable cylinders that allow keys to be changed periodically;
- Dead-bolt locks with at least a one-inch throw;
- Specially armored locks made virtually breakproof for external use;
- High-quality padlocks with changeable combinations;
- Keyless push-button locks to secure entry into restricted areas (preset combinations can easily be changed by installing replacement slides);
- A system which allows court security personnel to change locks in seconds without calling a locksmith; this system saves money when there are security breaches or high employee turnover (the system is patented in the U.S. as No. 4, 741, 188, issued May 3, 1988). The system works by allowing a security manager to re-key a building's locks in seconds. All the security director needs to do is insert a change key into each lock (including padlocks), turn it once, and the old key is rendered useless. Then the security director hands out the next level of keys that has been locked up in his safe, signs and drops a postcard in

the mail, and the job is done. The lock system manufacturer's dealer verifies the signature, then cuts the next level of keys and mails them back to the security director, ready for the next change. Operating level keys can be changed without disabling master keys, and vice-versa.

Lighting, Ventilation, Heating, Air Conditioning Systems: The use of minimum standards in this area must be addressed. Guidelines and standards established by the following agencies and professional organizations should be utilized: National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Fire Protection Association, American Institute of Architects, National Institute of Corrections and the National Institute of Justice.

Lighting plays a major role in securing the outside perimeter of the court facility, parking lots and parking garages. Security directors should consider installing high-intensity vandal resistant (VR) lighting systems which provide exceptional night time illumination. Available on the market are various types and sizes of compact fluorescent, H.I.D., linear fluorescent and LED lamp sources with wattages and performance characteristics that will suit any need. VR lighting systems feature an extra-thick 0.130" lens, recessed tamper-proof screw heads and rugged mounting plates, as well as shock absorbing gaskets.

Bars, Grills, Windows and Doors: All of the items discussed in this category should meet the same rigid guidelines and standards as discussed in the above section. Most forced entries are made through windows or doors. If a door is too fragile, it can break easily or the lock can be forced from its strike plate. Solid wooden doors should be at least 1 3/4 inches thick for all exterior doors; metal or metal-reinforced doors offer even better protection. Any window needed in a door should be of tempered glass or shatter-resistant plastic. Double-cylinder, double-keyed locks should be used on doors that have any glass. Local fire codes must be considered.

Safes and Vaults: Safes have been rated by the Underwriters' Laboratories (UL) for resistance to fire and penetration. If possible, a safe should be securely fastened to a surface of the building; this is easiest to do in newer facilities with concrete floors. Upon request, safe manufacturers can offer additional advice on immobilizing safes.

Vaults are expensive and should be built by professionals. They should be installed only if a cost effectiveness study supports the need for them. Manufacturers of vault doors often give advice on design and construction and may even provide architectural drawings to ensure that their products will fit properly and function well.

The court security director should participate in the selection and purchase of safes, vaults and security cabinets for

the court facility. Various types of equipment currently available include:

- Fire-resistive vaults for the protection of heat-sensitive data or documents, computer data tapes, floppy disks, videotapes and film. The insulated vault can also house costly computer hardware for an integrated access control and alarm system. These vaults can be constructed to fit available space; thus, the court security office needs to buy only what is needed to suit current fire-protective storage needs. Modular systems are constructed of insulated panels which can be configured to meet a variety of storage requirements. Unlike a poured-in-place vault, the system can be expanded to accommodate growth or relocated elsewhere in the court facility. The lightweight panels are heat resistant and can withstand temperature of 2000-plus degrees Fahrenheit. They cool down almost immediately after a fire is extinguished. The outer layer of insulated panels is designed specifically for the protection of vital records. Inside, a humidity barrier, duct and seal system maintains a constant climate-controlled environment. Only those vault designs which comply with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) guidelines should be purchased.

- Lightweight modular vault systems which have met the rigorous testing standards for superior torch and tool attack resistance in three Underwriters' Laboratories-listed classifications--Class 1 - 1/2 hr., Class 2 - 1 hr., and Class 3 - 2 hrs. The modular vault system can often be installed on the upper floors of high-rise court buildings where the weight of a concrete vault was previously prohibitive. The structural reinforcement usually necessary for concrete panels or cast-in-place vaults is usually reduced or often eliminated. The thin-wall design of the vault panels adds both interior and exterior space.

- Government security files and cabinets.

Alarms: The Underwriters' Laboratories also has approved alarm standards which were developed by a committee that included representatives from alarm manufacturers, insurance companies, and the UL. The standards are revised periodically and represent the **minimum** acceptable requirements for the design and performance of alarm equipment. In many cases, products often exceed these standards, so one system may be far superior to another in actual performance although both are rated the same.

Alarm systems usually fall into these four categories:

1. **Local Alarm System:** A system in which the protective circuits in the secured area are directly connected

to a bell or siren. The sounding device is prominently displayed on the outside of the building. The bell is fully protected against weather and tampering, connected to the control panel by tamper-proof cable, and audible for at least 400 feet.

2. **Central Station Alarm:** A system in which the secured area is directly connected, via a pair of leased telephone wires, to an alarm panel in a centrally located alarm receiving station. Generally, this system is run by a private security firm. Upon receiving an alarm, the company dispatches its guards to the secured area and notifies the police. Alarm installations of this type can only be approved by UL when the protected premises are within 10 minutes travelling time from the central station.

3. **Proprietary Alarm:** An installation similar to a central station alarm, except the alarm panel is located within a guard room maintained for the owner's internal security operations. The security agents operate the system and respond to all alarms.

4. **Law Enforcement Connection:** An alarm monitor installed in a nearby criminal justice agency and directly connected to the alarm system via a pair of telephone wires. The alarm also can be connected to local or proprietary systems for additional protection.

Alarm systems used for courtroom security have features from one or more of the above categories. Many courtrooms are equipped with duress alarms, which the judge, bailiff, or clerk can use to summon help during emergency situations. These alarms are inaudible in the courtroom and sound at a manned post which can dispatch a response force. Or the alarm in a courtroom may be a simple buzzer terminating in the sheriff's office, jail, command center, central alarm station or communications center.

As far as technology will allow, an alarm system should include a means to confirm that the signal is not a false alarm. After all, the effectiveness of an alarm system is directly related to how believable it is, and systems with very high false alarm rates eventually may be disregarded by those who must respond to them.

Because of the variety of alarms and alarm systems available, it is important for planners to pinpoint their needs and state their performance requirements clearly before any purchase. Without this caution, it is possible to purchase either too much or too little alarm capability.

Following are a few general guidelines for buying an alarm or alarm system:

- Deal with a reputable company. These firms usually will be listed by UL or in reputable trade journals.
- There is no such thing as a burglar-proof system, so be suspicious of any sales agent who claims to sell one.
- The system must have a reserve power source in case the main power is shut off.
- Do not buy or lease a system from a company that does not offer a contract for continuing maintenance and service, usually on a two- to five-year basis.

Premise Alarms: Premise alarms protect doors, windows, and other openings by means of contact devices, switches, metallic foil tape or some other materials. If anyone tries to enter through one of the protected points, the circuit will be broken and the alarm set off.

Capacitance Alarms: The protected object acts as part of the capacitance of a tuned circuit (as a capacitator or condenser). If a change occurs in the region of the protected object (e.g., if someone approaches), there will be a sufficient change in the capacitance magnitude to upset the balance of the system and cause an alarm. Capacitance alarms are used to protect objects that require a high degree of security, such as safes, file cabinets and other metallic storage containers. The system is fairly flexible and can be used to connect several items in the same area to one alarm.

Photoelectric Alarms: Photoelectric cells or electric eyes normally are used with other forms of alarm equipment. Their

operation depends upon the interruption of breaking of a beam of light between a projector and a light-sensitive receiver some distance away. When the light is cut off from the receiver, an alarm relay is activated in a control cabinet within the secured area. Since white light is easily detected, infrared beams are better for these systems.

Ultrasonic Systems: The protection of an enclosed space often can be achieved effectively by using space alarm equipment. The best known type of system in this category is popularly called **ultrasonic**, although it actually operates just within the upper limits of the audio frequency spectrum. The apparatus generates a train of high-frequency sound waves (too high for humans to hear) which fill an enclosed area with a pattern of standing waves. A sensitive receiver connected to an electronic amplifier picks up the waves; if they are of the same frequency as the sound emitted by the transmitter, the system will not sound an alarm. Any motion within the protected area will send back a reflected wave differing in frequency from the original transmission. This change in frequency is detected and amplified in the control unit, and the alarm signal is then activated.

Audio Systems (Rooms): Audio systems, unlike ultrasonic, can tolerate air movement and other types of motion as long as the noise created is relatively low. Where fans or other noise-producing items are a fixed part of the room, cancellation microphones located close to the noise-producing items can nullify those sounds. The sensitivity of these systems can be adjusted to detect a very small amount of noise; however, in most installations this adjustment will result in false alarms.

Audio Systems (Vaults): The detection of sound or vibration caused by an attack upon the walls, ceiling or floor of a protected structure is the primary function of this system. A microphone and amplifier are installed within the secured enclosure. Sensitivity is adjusted so that normal sounds will not trip the alarm. However, noises above this level will be amplified enough to activate the alarm relay.

Because the system responds to all noises within the audible range, it is best adapted to vaults or other solid-walled enclosures which require a reasonable amount of force to enter. Most bank vaults are protected by audio alarm systems. These bank installations represent the highest grade of alarm systems recognized by Underwriters' Laboratories.

Radar or Microwave Systems: Radar units generally are used to protect interior areas. The principles used in this system closely parallel the operation of the ultrasonic system, with some notable exceptions. Radio waves are highly penetrating and not easily confined within a closed area, such as a room or building. A train of waves is produced and partially reflected back to the antenna.

If all objects within the range are stationary, the reflected waves return at the same frequency; if they strike a moving object, the waves return at a different frequency. The difference in the transmitted and received frequency appears as a low frequency signal which is detected and used to trip an alarm relay. The area covered by the radiation field may be controlled by the number of placements of antennas, while sensitivity is controlled by adjusting the amplifier.

Digital Motion Detection Systems: Available on the market since 1993 is a new generation of digital motion detection devices, which are very useful for outdoor surveillance of courthouse perimeters and parking lots, particularly at night. These systems are available as either one channel or with up to 16 individual channels. The systems offer more than 262,000 individual detection points per channel, day and night time settings, trace motion, and a display of motion activity. Digital technology increases system accuracy and reliability, overcoming many of the objections to using motion detection.

Alarm Control Units: Most facility alarm control units being manufactured today rely upon computerization with compact keypads, printers and LED monitoring screens integrated into one unit. With state-of-the-art advanced multiplex technology, components are smaller and less expensive. The newest systems are easy for trained operators to use. Software can be customized to meet the needs of the court facility. LED displays on illumination keypads provide descriptive presentations in English text which spells out alarm information clearly, virtually eliminating the time lost looking up codes. Many software systems feature easy-to-use prompting to direct the operator through a menu of options. With these systems, hard copies of information can be saved on disks for future reference and analysis. Software is also available to allow security directors to remotely program alarm control panels by using a modem and desktop PC.

Wiretap Detector Alarm Systems: A new low-cost system became available in 1994 which automatically detects wiretaps placed on court facility phone lines. The Wiretap Detector Alarm System is a fully automated diagnostic instrument. Its advanced electronics allow extremely accurate phone line monitoring for the subtle electrical changes indicative of wiretapping. Upon installation, the system measures several key electrical values and stores these in its memory. From that point on, when the unit senses a change in these values, the user will be alerted with a distinct beeping tone. This technology can interface with other forms of security devices and encryption systems. The microprocessor controlled system continuously monitors dedicated phone lines connected to telephones, FAX and answering machines and computer modems and protects them from unauthorized and illicit wiretaps. The small unit snaps into place easily and can be checked remotely. If purchasing such a unit, make certain that it is in compliance with Federal Communication Commission (FCC) standards.

Communications: So many different types of communication equipment are available today that it is important for planners to assess their needs and the performance they want before making any purchasing decisions. Many manufacturers will provide free consultation to help in this task. The following questions should be considered when adding communications equipment to a court security system:

- Is the new equipment compatible with existing systems?
- Are maintenance and repair easily available at local facilities, or must items be returned to the factory for service?
- Is the equipment powerful enough to function effectively in the courtrooms and courthouse?

Ideally, each court security officer should have a portable, hand-held transceiver (radio transmitter-receiver) which is linked to a central command station or the sheriff's base station. If traffic is heavy on the agency's assigned frequency, another compatible frequency should be obtained and monitored by the base station.

If transceivers are beyond the agency's budget, less expensive one-way receivers are available. Even lower in price are the individual "pager" or "beeper" units that, when activated, notify the wearer to call a predetermined phone number or take certain actions.

Also available are devices that can be worn unobtrusively or carried in a pocket. When activated, the palm-sized devices transmit a radio signal notifying a base station about an emergency situation. These devices have been used by judges and others under the threat of kidnapping or physical violence. They have obvious limitations, such as their short range of signal transmission. Also, since those wearing the devices may be on the move, determining their exact location sometimes is not possible. Devices currently on the market are low cost and are capable of producing at 93 db tone. These devices can also be worn by court security officers on patrol in remote areas of the court facility complex, such as basements, underground garages and parking lots.

Another communication tool which is useful in a court facility is a solid state fiber optic intercommunications system intended for use in environments where secure, interference free communications are essential. Systems which are available today consist of various components designed to allow full duplex intercom systems from two to as many as 576 individually addressable and identifiable local stations to be easily configured. Interconnections may be made by means of interference free, secure fiber optic cable or by conventional copper wire in

less critical installations. All components are "upward compatible," meaning that systems can be easily expanded without obsoleting previously installed local stations or cabling. Operation at local stations is "hands free," while base stations may be used with push-to-talk microphones, or combination microphone/headsets as desired. Local stations are available for use indoors, outdoors in dropped ceilings, or with horn-type speakers for noisy areas, such as holding cells and sallyports.

Magnetometers: Magnetometers come in three basic models: permanently installed, portable walk-through, and hand-held. Some of these detectors locate only ferrous or iron-bearing metal, while others locate both ferrous and nonferrous metal. Costs vary widely according to quality and performance.

A combination of walk-through and hand-held models is sometimes used in courthouses. The first type signals the presence of a metallic item, and the second determines its exact location.

The quality of magnetometers varies widely. The U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Marshals Service have tested various models and identified those that meet their requirements. In addition, the National Institute of Standards and Technology has developed standards for magnetometers; these are available upon request.

Advantages and Disadvantages of General Types of Magnetometers

Types of Magnetometers	Advantages	Disadvantages
Permanently installed model	Not obtrusive	Immobile
Portable walk-through model	Movable High visibility may have psychologically deterrent effect	Needs storage space
Hand-held model	Indicates exact location of metal objects	More time consuming

Personnel Scanner System: In 1992, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved for sale in interstate commerce a personnel security scanner system. The official authorization

followed an extensive review process covering system design, operating specifications, and performance and safety test data. The equipment is designed for use in sensitive, high security facilities (e.g., for high-risk trials) where truly effective methods for screening people for explosives, weapons and drugs are critical.

This new technology significantly advances the state of the art in access control equipment for personnel screening. It is unique in its ability to detect both metal objects, like guns and knives, and nonmetal objects, such as plastic explosives and drugs concealed on individuals. After a three-second scan, the device displays a computer-generated image identifying the location of any object carried on the person or his clothing, so that the security officer can determine whether further search is necessary. The system provides a fast, thorough screening method and eliminates the need to subject people to time-consuming and uncomfortable body searches, except where the scan indicates further investigation is warranted.

Conducting inspections is a simple matter. The subject stands in front of the scanner and the operator presses the scan start button. In only three seconds, the computer enhanced image appears on the video monitor. Rear and side scans can also be conducted for more thorough inspections.

The monitor is easily positioned so that only an inspector can view the images. Operators can quickly learn to identify suspicious items with the system, which requires no special technical or computer training or operator license. In fact, the scanner operates with a single scan activator button. Image archiving and other scanner functions are controlled through two additional buttons with easy-to-understand on-screen instructions.

For serviceability, the rear cabinet opens fully. The system's internal design provides for easy access to all moving parts and electronic assemblies. The system operates from standard 110-volt wall outlets.

X-Ray Screening Devices: These devices are used throughout the world and come in many configurations. Units for screening mail and small packages use drawers that can accommodate items up to 18" x 12" x 16". Larger units are stationary and pass items by the screening device on a conveyor belt. **Although these devices are highly effective, cost is the principal factor limiting their use.** Thus, some agencies with limited budgets consider them to be impractical. However, such devices should be required in urban court systems, and all court systems should consider purchasing x-ray devices capable of screening mail and packages, since letter and parcel bombs are sent to judges in rural court systems as well as major cities.

Explosives Detectors: Explosives detectors usually are portable and the size of small suitcases. They are highly sensitive to vapors emitted by explosives and respond to vapor traces preprogrammed into a unit's memory. Some early models gave false reactions to such items as shoe polish, deodorants, and perfume. However, later developments have increased sensitivity and selectivity, largely eliminating this problem.

Since the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in December 1993, research efforts to develop more sophisticated explosive-detection devices have been on the fast track, especially since the U.S. Congress passed legislation requiring major airports to put such systems in place by end of the decade. Instruments are being designed to detect the dangerous explosives used by terrorists, particularly the easy to conceal and hard to detect plastic explosives. Some of the systems currently available are:

- **Systems which use vapor/particle detection technology and high-speed chemical analyses to identify trace amounts of explosives,** including the plastics that have been impossible to detect using conventional security measures.

  One portable explosives-detection system has been designed to identify the presence of explosives on a parts-per-billion basis. Initially, the U.S. Department of State funded the development of this vapor-based detection system capable of identifying plastic explosives in order to provide increased security for U.S. embassies overseas. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has also participated in the development of this system as part of its mission to provide protection against the threat of terrorist bombings.

  The system consists of a free-standing analytical unit and lightweight, hand-held sampling unit. The sampling unit draws in an air sample from the object being screened. The sampling unit is then plugged into the analytical unit, the "analyze" button is pushed, and the system begins its 18-second analysis to determine whether explosives are present in the sample and, if so, what those explosives are.

  The entire process (i.e., detecting the presence of an explosive and identifying it based on a unique chemical signature) has been

computerized. All that the operator needs to look for is a green "clear" signal or a red "alarm" signal. In addition, the system can be easily transported from one location to another; it requires no operator interpretation; and it has consistently demonstrated a high "find" rate with a very low false-alarm rate.

- **Ion-trap and ion-scan systems:** In 1994, a corporation in the United Kingdom patented the Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometer (ITMS), which has a sensitivity to detect various concealed plastic explosives. It is primarily being used in airports to screen baggage. The ion-scan systems also detect narcotics. The systems are powerful analytical tools which can "sniff out" and detect minute traces of narcotics and explosives on a person's clothing, skin or object he has been in contact with or from a package containing drugs or explosives. Ion-scan systems can be used in fixed, portable or mobile modes, including in a van to scan a number of multi-location sites in and around large court complexes. There are some low cost ion-scanning systems available on the commercial market. These portable systems are microprocessor-controlled, have user-friendly software, high sensitivity, a fast response, high efficiency, a low false alarm rate, automatic calibration and safe operation.

- **Portable plastic explosives detector:** This system has been designed to provide high security at an affordable price. The instrument is microprocessor controlled, providing automatic signal processing and decision logic which eliminates false alarms. It has been specifically designed to be extremely easy to operate by non-technical users when searching for concealed explosives. The system is a quad column GC (gas chromatograph) using ECD (electron capture detection) to identify explosives. Additional selectivity is obtained by using a semi-permeable membrane. Specific identification of target compounds is achieved with neural network software. This device is useful for scanning incoming mail and packages sent to court facilities and judges.

Bullet-Resistant Plastic and Glass: Court security planners are increasingly using transparent bullet-resistant plastic shields in courtrooms. For some high-risk trials, a temporary or permanently fixed barrier is placed between the spectator section and the well of the court. A 12- to 18-inch shield is sometimes placed around the top of the bench for the judge's protection.

The two principal plastics used are polycarbonate and acrylic. Acrylic sheets can be shaped to various forms, while polycarbonate is rigid molded plastic. Acrylic also offers better light transmission: 92 percent, compared to 66 percent for polycarbonate. By comparison, bullet-resistant glass transmits only 55 percent of white light. Underwriters' Laboratories has rated both plastics for bullet resistance, and 1 1/4 inch acrylic is rated highest for resisting bullets from medium-power small arms, including .45 ACP, .38 super auto, and 9 mm Luger. Since both these plastics are combustible, building codes should be checked before they are used.

Also available is **security film.** One brand available commercially provides a 10-mil, three-ply invisible shield which resists impacts of up to 400 pounds, including blows from rocks, hammers, 12-gauge shotguns, pipes, glass cutters, baseball bats and hatchets. Windows and doors covered with security film are as clear as glass. If the glass is shattered, the security film holds the broken glass in place, protecting people from flying glass shards. The film is also available in 12-mil. The 12-mil security film, when tested in 1994 by the Tampa, Florida, Police Department Bomb Squad, performed flawlessly when tested with blasts from one-pound TNT charges set off three feet and six feet away from the glass covered with the film. The film did crack during the tests, but held in its frame and contained all the glass shards from the large window to which it was mounted.

See-Through, Convex and Hemispherical Mirrors: These products, developed for use in retail stores to help security personnel spot and deter shoplifters, can be useful to court security personnel who want to observe specific areas of the facility (e.g., holding cells, courtrooms) without appearing to be intrusive. Available commercially are mirrored acrylic devices which are easy to install, use and maintain without the weight, danger and poor optics of glass or the complexity of cameras. Mirrors can be custom cut to suit the installation restraints of each facility and heavy duty versions are available for exterior use. Acrylic security mirrors are shatterproof and virtually unbreakable and usually do not fade, yellow or require repair. Various brands available have excellent optics and high resolution (20 percent brighter than glass mirrors).

Bomb Disposal Items: The recent increase in bombings of public installations has resulted in many new devices to dispose of explosives. Some are gimmicks, but most are serious attempts to

give law enforcement agencies additional tools to handle this dangerous problem. The devices range from simple bomb blankets and baskets for moving suspected explosives to remote-controlled, self-propelled robotic vehicles that, when operated by qualified technicians, can open suspicious packages and remove their contents.

Unless the potential bomb threat is significant, only minimal disposal equipment should be bought by the court security administrators. An experienced bomb disposal technician should help develop a list of required items. If the sheriff's office or local police department does not have such specialist skills available, then nearby resources should be tapped, such as another law enforcement agency, a U.S. Army or National Guard unit, the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), U.S. Marshals Service or the State Fire Marshals office.

Closed Circuit Television: CCTV systems are available in all price ranges and capabilities and are usually designed to meet individual needs. Most systems available today use computer software to control cameras and store digitized film. Cameras range from simple, fixed installations to remote-controlled units requiring minimal light and equipped with a telephoto or zoom lens. Many systems also have audio capabilities.

CCTV systems currently available use fiber optic transmission systems which are designed to send video, audio and mount control signals over a single optical fiber. CCTV panels today are easy to install and maintain. They combine functions to minimize space requirements, diagnostic software and surge/transient power protection. Systems can handle 200 or more cameras with automatic camera phasing. Also included in state-of-the-art CCTV systems are audio communication and intercom systems with preprogrammed alarm messages. New software available to run systems includes touch screen interactive control capabilities.

Many CCTV systems use building block architecture to ensure meeting present needs with economical plug-in cards for future expansion. Systems are available with either color or black-and-white monitors.

CCTV cameras can be designed to be concealed in high-tech fixtures, permitting discreet monitoring of specific areas, such as holding cells, corridors, lobbies and crowd surveillance. Some systems are designed to resemble contemporary lighting fixtures which conceal the camera assembly so that it is unnoticed. The domes of the acrylic housing for the lighting fixture camera can be recessed in a ceiling, mounted flush to the ceiling or hung from a built-in mount. Cameras are available with selectable shutter speeds from 1/60 to 1/10,000 second. They come with F/1.4 + auto-iris vari-focal lens with optional 3mm wide angle lens adapters available.

For outdoor areas, such as parking lots, new micro-sized, high resolution, high speed CCTV domes are available. Domes are designed to operate in all weather conditions, from - 40° Fahrenheit to 122° F, and will withstand wind driven rain in gusts of up to 50 miles per hour, and incorporate surge protection against lightning strikes. Some domes are equipped with advanced defogger/defroster
systems that ensure clear 360° visibility even in the worst winter weather. The dome systems are available in over the roof, wall, pole or ceiling mounts. An entire system can be serviced with a Phillips-head screwdriver, including removal of the camera, simplifying maintenance and upkeep.

Also available are wireless technology systems to protect court employees and visitors in remote parking lots. These systems are designed to interface with the existing CCTV and control system within the court facility. They support remote pan and tilt camera control without hard-wiring, and deliver high quality pictures from the color cameras monitoring the parking lot.

Firefighting and Detection Equipment: Increased arson incidents in public buildings make installation of firefighting and detection equipment a necessary investment. Although the purchase and maintenance of this kind of equipment is the primary responsibility of a building engineer or manager, the security administrator should ensure that minimum local fire codes are met. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has available, for a nominal cost, standards for various types of fire alarm systems.

"Talking" detectors are now available which sense when a cigarette is lit in a "no-smoking" area and verbally warn the smoker to put out the cigarette. If the smoker does not comply, the detector alerts security personnel, either by a silent remote alarm or by sounding an audio alarm.

Court security administrators should also consider installing carbon monoxide detectors in areas where high levels of carbon monoxide gas can build up and become dangerous, such as sallyports and underground garages.

Access Control Personnel Identification Systems: Personnel identification systems available today range from inexpensive paper badging systems to computer-readable cards and high-technology biometic systems. All systems are designed to control access to a building or specific areas of the building. Access control personnel identification systems of one type or another ought to be in place in every court system.

One of the lowest cost systems uses identification badges which automatically expire after a certain period. These temporary "VOID" badges are ideal for controlling contractors, temporary employees and visitors in the court facility. Many temporary employees and contractors are issued employee-type photo ID badges

that are difficult to collect after months of use. "VOID" badges eliminate the problem of uncollected badges by requiring a validating time sticker that self-expires automatically.

"VOID" ID badges are made with an area of the badge that shows VOID. This prevents the credential from being used without a validating sticker over the VOID area. Validating time stickers are available for one day, one week, and one month intervals. With the time sticker covering the VOID area, the credential is white and remains valid until the time sticker shows red EXPIRED words.

"VOID" Badges offer the following benefits:

- The photo ID badge is only made once, but can be renewed at will.
- The badge automatically expires after the authorized time period.
- Lost badges cannot be reused, so the facility's entire set of visitor badges does NOT have to be replaced.
- The design of the validating time sticker can be changed frequently without having to change the expensive laminated IDs.
- Generic visitor and temporary badges can be reused forever by simply replacing the validating time sticker each time it is issued.

For multiple month use of "VOID" IDs, one simply obtains a new one-time sticker at the end of each month. If the new validating time sticker is applied by security personnel, this renewal procedure will not only confirm that the photo on the badge is correct, but it prevents lost or terminated temps from reusing their badges the following month.

Also available is a one-write single sign-in system that uses a carbon form which becomes a permanent sign-in record. The visitor simply fills in the data on his individual record and automatically makes out his own visitor badge. This new sign-in combination provides many benefits over conventional visitor sign-in systems. The single sign-in system prevents visitors from "looking back" to see data provided by previous visitors. This is important in locations where the identity of prior visitors should be protected. The clip-board holds the sign-in form on the writing surface along with a ball point pen, allowing faster visitor sign-in. The one-write single sign-in system is low cost and easy to handle. It can be used with stock or custom printed ID designs. These IDs include clip-on visitor badges, self-expiring temporary ID badges and temporary parking permits.

A second type of access control system, geared primarily toward employees, involves the use of plastic cards which are scanned by computerized card reader systems.

Some systems allow users to design custom photo identification and access control cards. The systems run on personnel interface (GUI) for card and background color design, video and graphic capture, image compression and manipulation and database management. The systems are designed to give users complete latitude in card design by combining cardholder and personnel information, full-color graphics, scanned images and captured video images into integrated, graphic data files. Files are then stored on an interactive data base where they can be edited, updated and finally printed to resilient, PVC plastic. The high-quality prints can then be cut and laminated to any standard card key surface.

The base software packages are capable of supporting a cardholder data base of up to 250,000 records on a single computer with the appropriately sized hard disk or other storage device. Software is capable of supporting a virtually unlimited number of cardholders with the appropriate hardware configuration.

Another system available commercially uses digital security imaging technology designed specifically for Windows™ software operating environments. This advanced system electronically captures portraits, signatures and other data on one place for instant retrieval, updating, badge issue and reissue. The system enables users to customize ID cards and stored data bases for multiple levels of security. The system's open architecture means it can easily become part of a wider security or database network. With this verification software, a user can instantly verify identities, access codes or security clearances at local or remote access sites.

The system features separate customizable data entry screens for each database. These could include, for example, screens for employees, visitors and contractors. This functionality increases efficiency by allowing security managers to tailor data entry to the type of card required and produce separate management reports for each database.

Advanced database query capabilities allow users to search databases by cardholder name, security clearance, badge number or other database criteria. This not only facilitates better management of the security database, but also yields more versatile and informative management reports.

For those agencies which cannot afford the computerized card access control systems, camera systems are available for low-cost "all-photo" instant identification imaging. These systems are portable and easy to use. They produce highly secure, tamper-resistant instant color photo-identification cards with portrait, signature and identifying data. One or two different ID photos can be imaged per a single sheet of film. Designed as a simple point-shoot-laminate system, current systems can issue up to 150 standard

horizontal ID cards per hour. Validation plates that come with the system allow 10 different portrait/data configurations. Logos and other graphic data can be incorporated into the badge for a customized look.

One of the newest weapons in the security industry is the credit card-sized optical card, which is a convenient, durable and reliable means of ensuring positive identification, protecting privacy and confidentiality, and providing effective countermeasures against fraud and impersonation. The optical card delivers tamper-proof data storage to accommodate, for example, a card holder; biometric templates; access, entry and exit logs; permits, etc. This information is stored securely and cannot be changed or deleted.

In addition, the optical card is immune to the effects of magnetic fields, radio frequency emissions and static electricity discharge. These forces, which are commonly found, for example, around magnetometers and other scanning devices, can corrupt or obliterate data which is stored on cards using electronic or magnetic data storage media.

The optical card systems are designed to integrate virtually seemlessly into standard personal computer systems running DOS, Windows or MacIntosh software.

For positive identification at a manned security station, the optical card can deliver a high resolution, full color image of the card holder to a video screen for visual comparison. By virtue of the card's optical data storage system, this image cannot be fraudulently altered or substituted.

For higher security requirements, including unmanned access points, the optical card can store one or more biometric templates such as for fingerprint, voiceprint, retinal scan, facial image or signature dynamics for identification. When the template is stored on the card and verification is conducted locally, the cost and time penalties of accessing the central database are eliminated. And for applications involving the general public, the unacceptable "Big Brother" stigma of large central databases is avoided. The card holder retains and protects his own identification medium.

Unauthorized card duplication or issuance can be prevented using a number of security techniques applied to the optical card and its reader which can also be programmed to reject cards which do not return a particular challenge response.

For the printing of standard PVC cards, high speed digital color printers are available. In a one-step process, the printer will print and automatically laminate an industry standard (ISO 7810) PVC card. A 256-color gradation laminated print can be

produced in approximately 68 seconds, while a 128-color gradation print with lamination can be produced in 40 seconds. The printer is equipped with a digital interface for rapid data transfer from computer to printer.

As many as 100 blank PVC cards can be stored in the standard card magazine, and expanded up to 200 cards when used with the optional card stacker. One system introduced in 1994 utilizes Sony's dye transfer sublimation thermal printing technology, a process in which thousands of tiny heating elements come into contact with the print ribbon. The amount of heat from each element controls the amount of dye transferred to the PVC card. Sony's thermal head lamination technology also applies a protective lamination layer to the printed area immediately upon completion of the printing process, providing near-photographic quality, laminated prints with over 16 million color variations at 300 dots per inch (dpi) resolution.

To scan the access control cards, a proximity reader device is necessary. These readers are now available with read ranges of eight to nine inches.

New proximity readers provide high reliability, consistent read range characteristics and low power consumption. Multicolor LED, compatibility with all typical interface access control systems, and internal control or host control of the LED and beeper are standard. A single, easy-to-install package, small proximity readers will mount directly on metal with no loss of read range performance. The reader comes with a lifetime warranty. Dimensions of some current readers are 4.7 x 3 x .5 inches. Operating temperature is -22° to 150°F (30° to 65°C).

If a large court facility has more than one access control proximity reader, the individual readers can be tied in to a controlled system as a stand-alone access control system. The controller in turn can be integrated into a larger access control system simply by networking with additional controller units and relaying data to a host computer. The controller has its own database, which eliminates the need for real time communication with the host processor. As for memory storage and record-keeping, the controller has two-way dial-up capability. The unit stores all transactions, then uploads all priority events as they occur. The controller will also upload all transactions when its memory approaches capacity. Permanent records may be kept on the hard/floppy disk. Additional expansion boards are also available to enhance the system's alarm and relay capabilities as well as to increase the card capacity.

The latest developments in access control focus on biometrics, which includes scanning the unique identification characteristics of a person's hands, eyes and face.

Because each person's hands are distinctive, a computer can tell with 99 percent accuracy whether the hand belongs to the person whose handprint has previously been stored in the computer's data bank. The computer runs a security check in approximately two seconds. The three-dimensional hand geometry concept is quite simple. A solid-state digital camera is used to capture a TV-like image of the hand. Both a top view, which provides length and width information, and a side view, which gives a thickness profile, are obtained. The image captured by the camera is converted into a digital electronic video signal that is transferred to the microprocessor memory. This video data is represented in memory as a series of black and white dots. Each bit in memory represents one dot, or pixel. Approximately 32,000 pixels of information are analyzed to extract the identifying features of the hand.

To verify the identity of the user, the current hand picture is compared to the stored template which indicates a good or poor match. The system can be operated by a trained security officer. A person's clearance to enter the building can be revoked by a security officer by a keypad stroke. The basic hand reader is a complete, single-door access control station capable of handling more than 20,000 users without peripheral equipment. If necessary, multiple hand readers can be connected to a simple network.

Other biometric systems being developed, such as eye and face readers, employ similar principles to identify people.

Integrated Access Control/Alarm Systems: The focus in security today is on **computer-driven integrated access control and alarm systems** which combine a variety of security monitoring functions. Fully integrated security management systems include electronic access control hardware and software as well as full color card printers which produce ID cards of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) or polyester (PET). These cards are pre-encoded with magnetic stripes, personal identification numbers (PINS), or other identifiers. Interface card reader modules process the data encoded in the cards and communicate with access and alarm processors. The card readers may be used in many combinations to simultaneously monitor door positions, door strikes and exit push buttons. Integrated systems have been designed to function in remote configurations for wide area networks (WANS) or local area networks (LANS) for larger agencies.

But lower-priced, single station, PC-based security systems for access control, identification management and a combination of the two on a single computer data base can be purchased by small to medium-sized facilities which need economical security solutions with options for system expansion. These small PC-based systems electronically grant or deny access, store and manage individual

access records and events, monitor alarms and are compatible with a variety of card reader technologies.

A variety of commercially-available software is designed around the principle of open systems architecture. This type of security software allows users to build their own custom interfaces, incorporating data entry fields of their choice in their language of preference, and assembling record search ranges that suit their specific requirements.

For example, here's how one DOS-based integrated security management system works: It allows the system user to define a specific route or "tour" a court security officer on patrol must take, including the time allowed between each station. This enhanced system has 999 tour definitions with a maximum of 99 trouble stations each. In addition, all history from the tour is logged to disk for retrieval at a later date. The program allows all system functions to be executed at each workstation connected to a LAN, including the ability to monitor alarms simultaneously. In addition, data base integrity is protected because the host's database is referenced and updated with each transaction. "Live" graphics show the changing status of alarm inputs and outputs and the current status of all cardholders as they use entry and exit readers. Time and attendance enables the system operator to print basic time and attendance records of individual cardholders on a daily/weekly basis. The records will consist of start time, stop time and total time. This particular system is a DOS-based access control and alarm monitoring system that works in conjunction with local intelligent controllers to provide maximum security at single or multiple sites. It operates on standard, off-the-shelf personal computer hardware and software and employs a simple-to-use, intuitive user interface. Fully configured, the system can control up to 35,000 card holders, 50,688 alarm inputs and 6,336 readers. The system is compatible with virtually all reader technologies, offering customers a wide range of card and coding choices and making the system easily backward compatible.

Integrated systems have also been developed for **electronic article surveillance.** Although these systems are used primarily in retail stores, they have many uses as part of a court security program, particularly in safeguarding equipment which can be stolen by court facility visitors or employees (e.g., computer hardware, communications equipment, etc.) or to protect records and evidence.

Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS) systems detect items concealed in bags, attache cases and other enclosures. Triggered by the EAS alarm, exception monitoring video identifies personnel with protected items. This integrated systems approach is ideally suited for use in court facilities where losses of high-value print documents, information media and computer equipment is a primary

concern. The key to an EAS system are tape security labels and strips. The smallest label available commercially measures 0.6" x 0.94". Security labels can be barcode printed, combining information recovery with security, and saving the added labor costs of applying separate bar codes. The labels' small size makes them suited for documents, files, and recorded magnetic media such as data storage cartridges, computer diskettes, microform and optical disks. Because they are so small, the labels can be concealed beneath file, diskette or cartridge labels.

Used in conjunction with a family of accessories, which include custom-designed, hand-held scanner hood desensitizers and table-top resensitizers, bar codable security labels enhance circulating document control with security, reinforcing the established check-in/check-out procedures.

Alternatively, tape security strips can be placed in the spine of file folders. When used with a newly available selfcheck system, document file circulation management with built-in security becomes fully automated. The selfcheck system works like an ATM machine. The user is instructed via on-screen prompts to first scan the barcode on a "library card," and then to scan the barcode on the materials. Only after user authority is confirmed does the built-in desensitizer turn off the security strip, permitting the "patron" to exit through the EAS detection system at the door of the document center -- just like a library.

Security labels and strips work in conjunction with panels placed at exit doors. The panels will sound an alarm if an unauthorized attempt is made to remove information or assets from a controlled area. The most advanced systems in the EAS industry feature digital signal processing technology and self-diagnostics for reliable performance. In addition to video systems, the detection systems can be integrated with access control and central station monitoring, providing alarm event date and time stamping.

Security strips can also be placed on or in computers and other office equipment kept in a document center or other storage area. They will not only help prevent loss of a physical asset, but, in the case of sensitive information stored on a computer's hard drive, loss of an information asset as well.

Computer Information Security: With many functions of contemporary court security programs computer-based, one of the major concerns of court security managers must necessarily be protecting the information stored in the computer system from "hackers" who break into systems electronically and steal data. Of concern in protecting information stored in computers are virus detection programs, password management, network security, privacy, disaster recovery and data encryption. There are software programs available to meet all these needs.

One software program, for example, contains the following security management procedures: pre-boot DOS platform; automatic installation; easy set-up and maintenance; virus activity report and virus alert broadcast; and centralized administration control. The software is designed to manage local area networks (LANs) and incorporates several unique data security features:

- Password protection -- Each user can be assigned a unique password that must be entered to access a workstation. Password expiration dates can also be selected.

- Diskette encryption control -- A single user or group of users can be assigned a token number that automatically encrypts any diskette formatted by the users. Only users sharing the same token number can access these diskettes.

- Restricted hard drive access -- With the hard disk protection option, a user's ability to access certain hard drives and hard drive partition tables is restricted. One or all drives can be made Read Only, unformattable or totally inaccessible.

- Restricted floppy drive access -- Users can be prevented from copying data to diskettes, in effect, transforming the workstation into a diskless LAN station.

- Restricted directory and file access -- Users can be denied access to selected files and directories.

Other security features include a screen saver enabling option that prevents other users from viewing displayed data; a resource control that restricts data transfer or printing access to all or selected COM and printer ports; and flexible settings that can allow a single workstation to be used by several people or allow a single user to access more than one workstation. Anti-virus features include:

- Pre-boot virus check;
- Rule-based boot virus trap;
- Pre-boot virus pattern scanner;
- Boot sector and partition table rescue capability; and
- Selective virus protection features.

Another data protection program which became available in 1994 is a non-proprietary remote access management and control system

that supports industry standard modems and controller cards. The system runs on IBM and compatible personal computers and with a high-density communications platform designed for wide area connectivity.

This particular program is a dial-back security system with an architecture that isolates incoming phone lines from the host. In addition to being faster and more flexible than existing hardware-based security systems, this software system works together with modem controller systems to provide extensive management and reporting capabilities.

This system was the first network security product designed for today's sophisticated distributed networks. The trends toward open systems and mobile computing have changed how and where people use computers, and forced organizations to take a more critical look at network access and security risks. More than ever, organizations need reliable, affordable solutions to protect their networks from security breaches that can cause damages running into hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Many security products still on the market were developed in the 1980s for centralized mainframe environments. But they haven't kept up with the rapid changes in networking and they can't adapt to new developments in modem technology. They're unable to protect the network's most vulnerable entry points for unauthorized access: modems and their telephone lines. Current hardware-based security systems have incoming phone lines connected directly to the network file server or host computer, leaving organizations exposed to security violations in which unauthorized individuals can access the court system's database, electronic mail system, or critical court security applications. The software based system eliminates this threat because it isolates the security system from the host and ensures that no connection can be made with system resources before a remote user's access authorization is verified. Once a user's identification and password information have been verified, the system calls the user back at an authorized telephone number. The software system routes the return phone call to the user through a modem that links the user to the host system for network access. An optional pass-through module that allows secure direct dial-in access is also available. As a software-based solution to network security concerns, this new software program offers a number of advantages over hardware-oriented systems, including:

- Simplified installation and maintenance, and lower overall costs; the software system minimizes the number of hardware components needed.

- The ability to control multiple systems from a centralized location. As local area networks

have evolved into wide area networks, access points have been dispersed over large geographic areas. One user's access point may be a LAN access server; other users may gain access via a mainframe connection in a remote location. The software system allows the network manager to assign optimal connection routing by user, by resource and by line-speed considerations.

- The means to leverage security features such as data encryption and authentication cards. Such features can be used together with passwords to ensure correct user identification.

- Extensive real-time reporting capabilities. The software system continually logs, monitors, and analyzes all system access activity to provide real-time information for effective network management. It provides audit trails, modem and system diagnostics, user analyses, and system loading histographics. By monitoring line and modem status, the system tracks who is dialing in and how long calls are lasting, and records peak traffic times.

- No limitations in modem compatibility. Hardware-based systems are limited in their modem compatibility to those technologies for which they are designed. The software system is fully compatible with all modem technologies supported by the host communication system, including digital services.

Parking Lot Access Control and Patrol: A facility's parking lots and garages are one of the most vulnerable areas for liability lawsuits alleging negligent security. It is in these areas that robberies, burglaries, vandalism, assaults, murders, rapes and carjackings can easily occur unless there are stringent security measures in place. These measures include pole-mounted CCTV, adequate lighting, security telephones, frequent and random patrol and access control.

To facilitate patrol, electric security vehicles were introduced at the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) annual conference in September 1994. These energy conserving vehicles are designed for off-road use.

To control access to parking lots and garages, Texas A&M University in College Station (the nation's largest university-based parking department) in 1994 began testing an innovative radio frequency identification (RFI) technology to increase safety campus-wide for tens of thousands of students and faculty. To eliminate inconvenient and time consuming swipe card machines, the Parking Traffic and Transit Services (PTTS) department of Texas A&M has been evaluating registration and identification system technology in one of its garages. The system creates a completely automatic and safe entrance and exit system by using advanced radio frequency transponders mounted inside the car. Drivers authorized for the garage are provided with a passive, or battery-free low-frequency transponder which is placed on the windshield or rearview mirror. As the vehicle approaches the garage entrance, a radio frequency reader transmits a signal to the transponder, which returns a unique code stored within it. The reader then sends the information to a central computer, which searches its database of codes to verify that the vehicle is authorized for access to that particular garage. The system will not allow the gate to open if no transponder is present or if the correct code is not received or recognized. This entire authorization and access process takes less than a second. In a one-year test, the system proved to be successful. There were no problems and no maintenance was required.

Controlling Prisoners in Court: An elastic belt which can be hidden under a prisoner's shirt is now being used as an alternative to handcuffs in some court systems. The prisoner is controlled by a battery pack which can give him a burst of 50,000-volt current into his back if he tries to flee or attacks someone. The remote control sensor that triggers the electrical change is held by the deputy sheriffs or bailiffs who are escorting the prisoner to and from his court appearance. In court, the prisoner looks like a free citizen; there are no shackles, handcuffs nor leg irons. Some criminal defense lawyers like the zapper because it takes the edge off adverse pretrial publicity that shackles can help create. Around the nation in 1993, three prisoners were zapped by the belt. While the effect was devastatingly painful while it lasted, there was no permanent damage. What the zapper does is send an eight-second burst of 50,000-volt current into the prisoner's back muscles, disabling him completely for 30 seconds or more. The zapper is attached to a four-inch elastic belt that fastens around the prisoner's waist with Velcro; a battery pack rests above one kidney. If the prisoner misbehaves or attempts to flee, the officer holding the remote control simply needs to press a button and the prisoner will be zapped. The device is similar to a garage door opener. Some defense lawyers, however, are opposed to use of the device, arguing that is amounts to punishment without benefit of a hearing by an officer who is making a split-second decision. Nor is the device allowed everywhere. For example, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Michigan and Hawaii bar the use of "stun

technology," both by civilians and law enforcement. The belt was created by a police officer, Dennis R. Kaufman, a 25-year veteran of the Warrensville, Ohio, Police Department. The zappers cost $600 each.

Conclusions:

It is highly recommended that each agency charged with the protection of court facilities should conduct a comprehensive security survey. These surveys should assure the following areas are addressed:

1. Collect information on building designs, characteristics, the number and composition of building occupants, judicial services provided and features of the building users.

2. Compile inventories of security resources, equipment and technology.

3. Identify vulnerable areas of the building and alternate security measures needed.

4. Assure that building floor plans, photographs and other supporting documents are readily available.

5. The judicial facility or courthouse security program should provide for the deployment and use of security systems and security equipment. Bailiffs, deputies or officers providing security for the court facility and its premises should be properly trained to use all security equipment.

6. The risk assessment, which identifies the potential for loss, injury to personnel, visitors and guests, or damage to property, is an integral part of all security surveys.

7. Appropriate policies, procedures and guidelines regarding the use of security equipment should be developed by agency administrators.

Technology and equipment purchases can be made in a very cost effective manner by following the basic guidelines discussed in this chapter, which include:

1. Identify security equipment and technology needs.

2. Assure that the equipment or instruments to be used in the court facility have a track record of effective performance in other agencies by checking with users of current products.

3. Prepare clear and complete bidding specifications.

4. Seek professional guidance if needed from the following organizations:

   - National Fire Protection Association;
   - National Institute of Corrections;
   - National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice;
   - U.S. Military Services;
   - U.S. Marshals Service;
   - Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF);
   - Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
   - Federal Aviation Administration (FAA);
   - State Fire Marshals Office;
   - National Fire Chiefs Association;
   - Underwriters' Laboratories (UL);
   - Central Station Alarm Association;
   - International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP);
   - National Sheriffs' Association (NSA);
   - National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST);
   - American Institute of Architects (AIA);
   - National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges;
   - American Bar Association (ABA);
   - National Judicial College;
   - American Probation and Parole Association (APPA);
   - State Justice Institute (SJI);
   - National Center for State Courts (NCSC); and
   - National Center for Juvenile Justice.

5. Balance personnel and specialized training needs against equipment or technology purchases.

6. Develop sound maintenance and service contracts.

7. Maintain a good working relationship with all governmental entity procurement officials.

8. Do economical comparisons on all potential purchases and usage.

9. Assure that adequate and current policies and procedures are in effect governing equipment usage and the training of all personnel who are assigned to operate the equipment.

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY



CHAPTER FOUR

ARCHITECTURE, TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT

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COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

CHAPTER FOUR

UNITED STATES COURTROOM DESIGNS AND NATIONAL SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION'S COURTHOUSE DESIGN AND FACILITIES

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COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

UNITED STATES COURTROOM DESIGNS

Includes:

- **Section A - General Information and Assorted Designs**
  - **Courtrooms, Offices and Facilities**
- **Section B - General Information as to space, courtrooms ancillary facilities and design needs**
- **Section C - Judges' Chambers/Suites**
- **Section D - Ancillary Facilities**
- **Section E - Jury Facilities**
- **Section F - Court Library**
- **Section G - Clerk's Offices**
- **Section H - Judiciary - Related Offices**
- **Section I - Building Support Facilities**

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SECTION A

GENERAL INFORMATION

AND

ASSORTED DESIGNS

- Courtrooms/Offices
- Facilities

Special Notation: General spatial relationship, accessibility and circulation (SRAC) diagrams.

Source: U.S. Courts Design Guide
Washington, D.C., 3/12/91


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RESTRICTED CIRCULATION
SECURE CIRCULATION
PUBLIC CIRCULATION
CIRCULATION/ACCESS CONTROL POINT
S
SECURE VERTICAL CIRCULATION
R
RESTRICTED VERTICAL CIRCULATION
P
PUBLIC VERTICAL CIRCULATION
F
FREIGHT VERTICAL CIRCULATION


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JUDGE'S SUITE
CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE'S OFFICE
JUDGE'S SUITE
CONF ROOM
ROBING
PANEL COURT ROOM
PUBLIC WAITING
ATTORNEY LOUNGE
BUILDING SERVICES
BUILDING SERVICES
JUDGE'S SUITE
STAFF TOILETS
CONFERENCE TRAINING AREA
JUDGE'S SUITE
CONF ROOM
ROBING
EN BANC COURT ROOM
PUBLIC WAITING
ATTORNEY LOUNGE
CAFETERIA
JUDGE'S SUITE
MAIN PUBLIC ENTRY
COURT LIBRARY
STAFF ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
CLERK'S OFFICE


KEY TO SYMBOLS
RESTRICTED CIRCULATION
SECURE CIRCULATION
PUBLIC CIRCULATION
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
BUILDING SERVICES
COURT LIBRARY
COURT RECORDS/ RECORDS
JUDGE'S SUITE
COURT ROOM
JURY ASSEMBLY
COURT ROOM
JUDGE'S SUITE
PUBLIC ENTRY
CLERK'S OFFICE
MAGIS-TRATE JUDGE'S COURT ROOM
MAGIS. JUDGE'S SUITE
MAGIS-TRATE JUDGE'S COURT ROOM
CAFETERIA
PROBATION OFFICE
MAGIS. JUDGE'S SUITE
GRAND JURY
PRETRIAL SERVICES
CENTRAL CELLBLOCK
OFFICE
MAGIS-TRATE JUDGE'S COURT ROOM
ATTORNEY

Bankruptcy Court and Related Facilities SRAC Diagram




COURT ROOM
COURT ROOM
COURT LIBRARY
JUDGE'S SUITE
JUDGE'S SUITE
OFFICE
BUILDING SERVICES
JURY ASSEMBLY
CLERK'S OFFICE
CAFETERIA
PUBLIC ENTRY

Courtroom Floor Plans

Sample floor plans are furnished for illustrative purposes only and are not meant to serve as standards for design. For example, for each courtroom plan, the shape of the room, the arrangement of furniture, the size of the courtroom well, the number of seats provided, the arrangement of exits, and other features are design decisions to be made to accommodate local custom and specific requirements. However, the floor area and ceiling height designated for each courtroom are guidelines intended to be prescriptive.

Seven floor plans are presented in this section:

- Court of Appeals, En-Banc Courtroom
- Court of Appeals, Panel Courtroom
- District Court, Special Proceedings Courtroom
- District Court, Regular Courtroom
- Magistrate Judge, Courtroom
- Bankruptcy Court, Courtroom
- Jury Room

Sample plans for a variety of other layouts for courtrooms and grand jury rooms are available from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

Court of Appeals
En Banc Courtroom



Area: 3,000 N.S.F.

Ceiling Height: 18'-0"

Bench Type: Semi-Circular

Notes:

1. This is a sample plan for illustrative purposes only and is not meant to serve as standard for courtroom design.
2. Sample plans for a variety of other layouts for courtroom are available from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

Court of Appeals
Panel Courtroom

Area: 1,800 N.S.F.

Ceiling Height: 16'-0"

Bench Type: Semi Circular



Notes:

1. This is a sample plan for illustrative purposes only and is not meant to serve as a standard for courtoom design.
2. Sample plans for a variety of other layouts for courtrooms are available from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

District Court
Special Proceedings Courtroom



Area: 3,000 N.S.F.

Ceiling Height: 18'-0"

Bench Type: Center

Notes:

1. This is a sample plan for illustrative purposes only and is not meant to serve as a standard for courtroom design.
2. Sample plans for a variety of other layouts for courtrooms are available from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

District Court
Regular Courtroom

Area: 2,400 N.S.F.

Ceiling Height: 16'-0"

BenchType: Center



Notes:

1. This is a sample plan for illustrative purposes only and is not meant to serve as a standard for courtoom design.
2. Sample plans for a variety of other layouts for courtrooms are available from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

Magistrate Judge Courtroom



Area: 1,500 N.S.F.

Ceiling Height: 14'-0"

BenchType: Corner

Notes:

1. This is a sample plan for illustrative purposes only and is not meant to serve as a standard for courtroom design.
2. Sample plans for a variety of other layouts for courtrooms are available from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

Bankruptcy Court
Courtroom

Area: 1,800 N.S.F.

Ceiling Height: 16'-0"

Bench Type: Off-Center



Notes:

1. This is a sample plan for illustrative purposes only and is not meant to serve as a standard for courtoom design.
2. Sample plans for a variety of other layouts for courtrooms are available from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
3. The necessity for a jury box should be confirmed.

Grand Jury Room

Area: 800 N.S.F.

Ceiling Height: 10'-0"





Notes:

1. This is a sample plan for illustrative purposes only and is not meant to serve as a standard for grand jury room design.
2. Sample plans for a variety of other layouts for grand jury rooms are available from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

SECTION B

GENERAL INFORMATION AS TO SPACE COURTROOMS, ANCILLARY FACILITIES AND DESIGN NEEDS.

Source: **U.S. Courts Design Guide**
Washington, D.C., 3/12/91

Court of Appeals
En Banc Courtroom and Ancillary Facilities
SRAC Diagram




JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
STAFF TOILETS
R
GALLEY
JUDGES' CONF. RM.
JUDGES' ROBING RM.
TLT
TLT
SOUND LOCK
EQUIP STOR
COURT OF APPEALS EN-BANC COURTROOM
SOUND LOCK
P
ATTORNEY'S LOUNGE
WORK AREA
PUBLIC WAITING


JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
STAFF TOILETS
R
GALLEY
JUDGE'S CONF. RM.
JUDGE'S ROBING RM.
SOUND LOCK
EQUIP STOR
COURT OF APPEALS PANEL COURTROOM
SOUND LOCK
P
ATTORNEY'S LOUNGE
WORK AREA
PUBLIC WAITING

Court of Appeals
Panel Courtroom and Ancillary Facilities
SRAC Diagram



Figure 3.3
U.S. District Court
Courtrooms and Ancillary Facilities
SRAC Diagram




JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
12-PERSON TRIAL JURY SUITE
12-PERSON TRIAL JURY SUITE
STAFF TOILETS
JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
SHARED WKRM
TYPIST
TYPIST
STOR
STOR
COURT REP/REC
COURT REP/REC
CTRM DEPUTY CLERK
SHORT TERM LKUP
EQUIP STOR
EQUIP STOR
SHORT TERM LKUP
CTRM DEPUTY CLERK
SL
CIR/CONT
SL
CELL
CELL
REGULAR COURTROOM
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS COURTROOM
ATTY CONF/ WITNESS RM
SOUND LOCK
ATTY CONF/ WITNESS RM
ATTY CONF/ WITNESS RM
SOUND LOCK
ATTY CONF/ WITNESS RM
COURTROOM WAITING AREA
COURTROOM WAITING AREA
R
S
P

D.C. Magistrate Judges
Courtrooms and Ancillary Facilities
SRAC Diagram




MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
STAFF TOILETS
SHORT-TERM EXHIBITS STORAGE
6-PERSON TRIAL JURY SUITE
6-PERSON TRIAL JURY SUITE
SHARED
CTRM DEPUTY CLERK
EQUIP STOR
EQUIP STOR
CTRM DEPUTY CLERK
SHORT-TERM EXHIBITS STORAGE
TYPIST
TYPIST
STOR
STOR
COURT REP/REC
COURT REP/REC
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S COURTROOM
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S COURTROOM
ST
CIR/CONT
ST
CELL
CELL
ATTY CONF/ WITNESS RM
SOUND LOCK
ATTY CONF/ WITNESS RM
ATTY CONF/ WITNESS RM
SOUND LOCK
ATTY CONF/ WITNESS RM
COURTROOM WAITING AREA
COURTROOM WAITING AREA

Bankruptcy Court
Courtrooms and Ancillary Facilities
SRAC Diagram




JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
6-PERSON JURY TRIAL SUITE
STAFF TOILETS
JUDGE'S CHAMBERS SUITE
SHARED
EQUIP STOR
SHORT-TERM EXHIBITS STORAGE
CTRM DEPUTY CLERK
BANKRUPTCY COURTROOM
ATTY CONF / WITNESS RM
SOUND LOCK
ATTY CONF / WITNESS RM
COURTROOM WAITING AREA
SHORT-TERM EXHIBITS STORAGE
CTRM DEPUTY CLERK
EQUIP STOR
BANKRUPTCY COURTROOM
ATTY CONF / WITNESS RM
SOUND LOCK
ATTY CONF / WITNESS RM
COURTROOM WAITING AREA

Courtrooms
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE Type	STORAGE Size	FINISHES H equals 16' and higher; S equals 8-16'; use of a dot (■) denotes special design. Walls	Floor	Ceiling	Height
COURT OF APPEALS								
En Banc Courtroom	3,000	Built-in: Judges' bench (5 LF/judge), stations for courtroom deputy clerk, law clerk(s), bailiff, spectators (120+) Movable: Attorneys station	Equipment, exhibits	Closet	Highest quality paint/ wall covering: paneling, wall paper, millwork	Durable high quality carpet	■	18' min.
Panel Courtroom	1,800	Built-in: Judges' bench (3 @ 5 LF/judge), stations for courtroom deputy clerk, law clerk(s), bailiff, spectators (40-45) Movable: Attorneys station	Equipment, exhibits	Closet			■	16' min.
DISTRICT COURT								
Special Proceedings Courtroom	3,000	Built-in: Judges' bench (1-3 judges, 5 FL/judge, 12 feet min.), stations for courtroom deputy, court reporter/recorder, witness,, law clerk(s); jury box (18 persons), spectator seating (120+) Movable: personnel, interpreter, attorney & clients (4-20+) stations	Equipment, exhibits	Closet	Highest quality paint/ wall covering: paneling, wall paper, millwork	Durable high quality carpet	■	18' min.
Regular Courtroom	Std: 2,400 Min: 2,000	Built-in: Judge's bench (12 feet min.), courtroom deputy clerk, court reporter/ recorder, witness, law clerk(s); jury box (18 persons), spectator seating (40-80) Movable: personnel, interpreter, attorneys & clients (4-10) stations	Equipment, exhibits	Closet			■	16' min.
Magistrate Judge, Courtroom	1,500	Built-in: Magistrate judge's bench (12 feet min.), stations for courtroom deputy clerk, court reporter/recorder, witness, law clerk; spectator seating (40-45) Movable: personnel, interpreter, attorneys & clients (4-6) stations	Equipment, exhibits	Closet			■	14' min.
BANKRUPTCY COURT								
Jury Courtroom	Std: 1,800 Min: 1,500	Built-in: Judge's bench (12 feet min.), stations for courtroom deputy clerk, court reporter/recorder, law clerk, witness; jury box (8 persons), spectator seating (75-85) Movable: Attorneys & clients (6+) stations	Equipment, exhibits	Closet	Highest quality paint/ wall covering: paneling, wall paper, millwork	Durable high quality carpet	■	16' min.
Non-Jury Courtroom	Std: 1,800 Min: 1,500	Minimum: 1,500 Built-in: Judge's bench (12 feet min.), stations for courtroom deputy clerk, court reporter/recorder, law clerk, witness; spectator seating (75-85) Movable: Attorneys & clients (6+) stations	Equipment, exhibits	Closet			■	16' min.
COURTROOM USER STATIONS								
Judge(s)	—	Built-in: Bench 3 steps (21") above floor level, bookshelves judges, footrest, provision for CRT Movable: Swivel tilt chair(s)	Drawers		Hard sound reflectance	Durable high quality carpet		
Courtroom Deputy Clerk	—	Built-in: Station 1 step (7") above floor level, provision for CRT and printer Movable: Swivel chair	Filing cabinet, drawers		Hard sound reflectance			
Witness	—	Built-in: Stand 2 steps (14") above floor level Movable: Swivel chair (chairs to be adjustable height)			Hard sound reflectance			
Interpreter	—	Movable: Swivel chair						

Courtrooms
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page: PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS: CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOM	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE (MECH.	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS	GENERAL REMARKS
COURT OF APPEALS																(1) Provide a duplex receptacle outside the public entrance to each courtroom, used to power a relocatable walk-through metal detector to accommodate high-threat proceedings.
En Banc Courtroom	3	3			☐					3☐			☐	☐		
Panel Courtroom	3	3			☐					3☐			☐	☐		
DISTRICT COURT																
Special Proceedings Courtroom	3	3	2		☐					3☐			☐	☐	USDC crms may provide audio-video link to cell area for remote viewing of proceedings by defendant, with intercom link from cell to defense counsel table; typical system may include 2 crm cameras and link to crm PA system. Also, in high-threat situations, video may be continuously monitored or may be activated by duress alarm system.	
Regular Courtroom	3	3	2		☐					3☐			☐	☐		
Magistrate Judge's Courtroom	3	3	2		☐					3☐			☐	☐		
BANKRUPTCY COURT																
Jury Courtroom	3	3	2		☐					3☐			☐	☐		
Non-Jury Courtroom	3	3	2		☐					3☐			☐	☐		
COURTROOM USER STATIONS																
Judge(s)		3					☐								Provide bench armor	Provide drawers for storage of minor supplies. In appellate courtrooms, provide duress alarm stations at three central judges' stations.
Courtroom Deputy Clerk		1					☐									
Witness	2	1														Station must accommodate interpreter with separate microphone and movable chair.
Interpreter																

Public 1: Unscreened access (uncontrolled entrance to the building and spaces). Public 2: Screened access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Screened access, (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Uncontrolled access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes). Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window service.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only. Secure 2: Security staff and prisoners.

Courtrooms
Acoustics and Communications

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA					ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS														
	BACKGROUND NOISE (NC)	REVERB. TIME (Reverb)	R.A.S.T.I.	WALL ISOLATION (dB INC)	REMARKS	PA/RB MICROPHONE	PA/SYS. LOUDSPEAKERS	PA/RB/CONTR./RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLETS	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORD./PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	REMARKS
COURT OF APPEALS																			
En Banc Courtroom	25	0.6-0.8	0.8	65	All courtrooms assumed to be interior spaces. Fabric upholstery should be used to stabilize reverberation time at times of low occupancy. NIC greater than 55 dB implies masonry partition walls slab-to-slab. Maintain 20' minimum separation between jury box and judge's bench in all jury courtrooms, for privacy of bench conferences.		☐			☐					☐				Courtroom telephone systems should be ti with sound reinforce and electronic record systems
Panel Courtroom	25-30	0.6-0.8	0.8	60			☐			☐					☐				
DISTRICT COURT																			
Special Proceedings Courtroom	25	0.6-0.8	0.8	65			☐			☐					☐				
Regular Courtroom	25-30	0.6-0.8	0.8	65			☐			☐					☐				
Magistrate Judge's Courtroom	30-35	0.5-0.7	0.8	60			☐			☐					☐				
BANKRUPTCY COURT																			
Jury Courtroom	30-35	0.5-0.7	0.8	60			☐			☐					☐				
Non-Jury Courtroom	30-35	0.5-0.7	0.8	60			☐			☐					☐				
COURTROOM USER STATIONS																			
Judge(s)					Provide reflective surface behind judge.	☐ (1)		☐	☐		☐	☐	☐	☐					Speaker phone. Pro microphone cut-off switch at judges stat to ensure privacy of bench conferences.
Courtroom Deputy Clerk					Use absorptive materials in vicinity.	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	☐	☐					Provide 3 clean outl PC/ terminal, printer, amplifier.
Witness						☐													
Interpreter																			

Courtrooms
HVAC and Lighting

PACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING									LIGHTING						GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION Min. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	SOUND CRITERIA (NC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	LEVEL (FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		
	S	W	S	W							FLUOR.	INC.AND	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER	
COURT OF APPEALS																(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bulb and coincident wet bulb.
n Banc Courtroom	70-74 (1)	70-72 (2)	45-55 (3)	25-35 (4)	20	6-8	80-85	25-30	☐	40-75	I/D	D	I	☐	☐	
anel Courtroom	70-74 (1)	70-72 (2)	45-55 (3)	25-35 (4)	20	6-8	80-85	25-30	☐	40-75	I/D	D	I	☐	☐	(2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99% design dry bulb.
DISTRICT COURT																(3) Outdoor air at design temperature.
pecial Proceedings ourtroom	70-74 (1)	70-72 (2)	45-55 (3)	25-35 (4)	20	6-8	80-85	25-30	☐	40-75	I/D	D	I	☐	☐	(4) Outdoor temperature is ASHRAE 97.5%.
egular Courtroom	70-74 (1)	70-72 (2)	45-55 (3)	25-35 (4)	20	8-10	80-85	25-30	☐	40-75	I/D	D	I	☐	☐	(5) Manual activation of smoke purge fan.
agistrate Judge's Courtroom	70-74 (1)	70-72 (2)	45-55 (3)	25-35 (4)	20	8-10	80-85	25-30	☐	40-75	I/D	D	I	☐	☐	(6) Provide an emergency "over-ride" switch to restore full brightness instantaneously during a dimming sequence.
BANKRUPTCY COURT																
ury Courtroom	70-74 (1)	70-72 (2)	45-55 (3)	25-35 (4)	20	6-8	80-85	25-30	☐	40-75	I/D	D	I	☐	☐	
on-Jury Courtroom	70-74 (1)	70-72 (2)	45-55 (3)	25-35 (4)	20	6-8	80-85	25-30	☐	40-75	I/D	D	I	☐	☐	
COURTROOM USER STATIONS																
udge(s)									☐	40-75	I/D	D	I	☐	☐	
ourtroom Deputy Clerk									☐	40-75	I/D	D	I	☐	☐	
itness										40-75	I/D	D	I			
nterpreter																

Courtrooms
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE Type	STORAGE Size	FINISHES (N equals 10' and higher; S equals 8-10'; use of a dot (■) denotes special design. Walls	Floor	Ceiling	Height
COURTROOM USER STATIONS (cont'd)								
Jurors 2-person: magistrate judges/ 6-person)	—	Built-in: Jury box (12-person: 3 tiers; 6-person: 2 tiers) 1st tier at floor level; fixed swivel tilt chairs (12-person: 14-18; 6-person: up to 8)			Hard sound reflectance	Durable high quality carpet		
Court Reporter/ Recorder	—	Built-in: Workstation/worksurface for equipment, storage (court reporter station may be movable); provision for CRT Movable: Swivel chair	Drawer (cabinet)		Hard sound reflectance	Durable high quality carpet		
Attorney & Clients	—	Movable: Min. four 3'-6" x 7'-0" (minimum) tables, up to 8 chairs each; provision for CRT			Hard sound reflectance			
Attorney Waiting Area	—	Movable: Chairs or benches			Sound absorbent			
Law Clerk(s)	—	Built-in: Station 1 step (7") above floor level, provision for CRT and printer Movable: Swivel chair(s)	Drawers		Hard sound reflectance			
Bailiff	—	Built-in: Station 1 step (7") above floor level, provision for CRT and printer Movable: Swivel chair	Drawers		Hard sound reflectance			
Personnel	—	Movable: Chairs			Hard sound reflectance			
Spectators	—	Built-in: Benches or theater chairs			Sound absorbent		■	
OTHER SPACES								
Equipment Storage Room	100	Built-in: Shelves, open floor space		12" deep shelves	Paint	Vinyl	Paint	S
Short-term Exhibit Storage	50	Built-in: Shelves, open floor space	Securable	12" deep shelves	Paint	Vinyl	Paint	S
Lectern	—	Movable: (May be built-in in USCA courtrooms) Adequate worksurface, adjustable height, substantial in design, with shelf storage below (microphone in USCA courtrooms)	Attorney files					
Exhibit Display	—	Built-in: Display unit with screen, tackboard, lightbox, whiteboard (magnetic); drop-down screen; provision for VCR and monitor	Drawers					
Soundlock	80				■	Durable high quality carpet	■	S
Public/Attorney Coat Rack	20		Coat rod, shelf					

Courtrooms
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page				SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS												GENERAL REMARKS
	PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOM	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE MECH.	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS		
COURTROOM USER STATIONS (cont'd)																	
Jurors 12-person; magistrate judges/ 6-person)		1															Consider provision of local "white noise" system at jury box, to provide sound masking during bench conferences; activated by judge. Refer to Acoustic Criteria.
Court Reporter/ Recorder		3															
Attorney & Clients		1															
Attorney Waiting Area		1		In well, near rail													Also may be used by security personnel escorting in-custody defendants.
Law Clerk(s)		1					☐										
Bailiff		1					☐										
Personnel		1	2														
Spectators	2																In Bankruptcy courtrooms only, provision should be made for removal of front row(s) of spectator seating to allow expansion of the well area.
OTHER SPACES																	
Equipment Storage Room		3		Accessed from well													Storage for projectors, easels, and other display equipment.
Short-term Exhibits Storage			1	Accessed from well													Storage for variety of types of exhibits: charts, files, contraband, etc.
Lectern	2																Must accommodate attorney's files.
Exhibit Display	2																Locate primarily for viewing comfort of judge, jury, witness, and attorneys and clerks.
Soundlock	3			Courtroom vestibule													May be provided with window(s) to allow view of courtroom without entering.
Public/Attorney Coat Rack	2																May be alcove; may be omitted in warm climates.

Public 1: Unscreened access (uncontrolled entrances to the building and spaces). Public 2: Screened access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Screened access, (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Uncontrolled access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes). Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window service.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only Secure 2: Security staff and prisoners.

Courtrooms
Acoustics and Communications

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA					ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS													
	BACKGROUND NOISE (NC)	REVERB. TIME (Seconds)	R.A.S.T.I.	WALL ISOLATION (dB NIC)	REMARKS	PA/EMS MICROPHONE	PA SYS. LOUDSPEAKERS	PA/EMS CONTROL/RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLETS	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORD./PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	REMARKS
COURTROOM USER STATIONS (cont'd)																			
Jurors 12-person: magistrate judges/ 6-person)					Locate within 15' of wall with reflective surface.							□				□			
Court Reporter/Recorder (USDC/USBC)					Provide control of elect. recording system	□		□			□	□	□				□		
Attorney & Clients						□						□	□		□	□			Provide fiber outlets prescribed locations.
Attorney Waiting Area	35-40			45															
Law Clerk(s)					PA speaker in vicinity.				□		□	□	□	□					
Bailiff					PA speaker in vicinity	□			□		□	□	□	□					
Personnel									□										
Spectators					Ceiling finishes & design to maximize hearing at spectators.										□				
OTHER SPACES Equipment Storage Room																			
Short-term Exhibits Storage																			
Lectern						□						□							Provide floor box at prescribed locations
Exhibit Display						□						□				□			
Soundlock					8' min. between doors; overlap & gasket doors; absorptive finishes.														
Public/Attorney Coat Rack																			

Courtrooms
HVAC and Lighting

SPACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING									LIGHTING						GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION Min. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	SOUND CRITERIA (NC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	LEVEL (FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		
	S	W	S	W							FLUOR.	INC AND	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER	
COURTROOM USER STATIONS (cont'd)																(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bub and coincident wet bub. (2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99% design dry bub. (3) Outdoor air at design temperature. (4) Outdoor temperature is ASHRAE 97.5%. (5) Provide an emergency "over-ride" switch to restore full brightness instantaneously during a dimming sequence.
Jurors 12-person; magistrate judges/ 6-person)										40-75	I/D	D	I			
Court Reporter/ Recorder (USDC/USBC)										40-75	I/D	D	I			
Attorney & Clients										40-75	I/D	D	I			
Attorney Waiting Area										40-75	I/D	D	I			
Law Clerk(s)										40-75	I/D	D	I			
Bailiff										40-75	I/D	D	I	☒	☐	
Personnel										40-75	I/D	D	I			
Spectators	70-74 (1)	70-72 (2)	45-55 (3)	25-35 (4)	20	6-8/ 8-10	85	25-30		30-40	I/D	D	I			
OTHER SPACES																
Equipment Storage Room										30-40	D		I	☐		
Short-term Exhibits Storage										30-40	D		I	☐		
Lectern										75		D	I			
Exhibit Display										75		D	I			
Soundlock										30		D	I	☐		
Public/Attorney Coat Rack																

SECTION C

JUDGES' CHAMBERS/SUITES

Special Notation: Spatial relationship, accessibility and circulation (SRAC) diagrams, design guide tables, and specific design guidelines for the judges' chambers and suites.

Source: U.S. Courts Design Guide
Washington, D.C., 3/12/91

Court of Appeals
Judge's Chambers Suite
SRAC Diagram





Note:

1. Each judge is allocated a total resid chambers area of 2,3 NSF (exclusive of internal circulation requirements), to be subdivided in any wa desired as conditions require. This diagram illustrates only one s potential layout of chambers suite space

District Court
Judge's Chambers Suite
SRAC Diagram





Note:

1. Each judge is allocated a total reside chambers area of 1,99 NSF (exclusive of internal circulation requirements), to be subdivided in any way desired as conditions require. This diagram illustrates only one su potential layout of chambers suite spaces

District Court
Magistrate Judge's Chambers Suite
SRAC Diagram





Note:

1. Each magistrate judge is allocated a total resident chambers area o 1,560 NSF (exclusive of internal circulation requirements), to be subdivided in any way desired as conditions require. This diagram illustrates only one such potential layout of chambers suite spaces.

Bankruptcy Court
Judge's Chambers Suite
SRAC Diagram





Note:

1. Each judge is allocated a total reside chambers area of 1,56 NSF (exclusive of internal circulation requirements), to be subdivided in any way desired as conditions require. This diagram illustrates only one su potential layout of chambers suite spaces.

Judges' Chambers Suites
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE		FINISHES (H equals 10' and higher; S equals 8-10'; use of a dot (■) denotes special design.			
			Type	Size	Walls	Floor	Ceiling	Height
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUITES								
Judge's Chambers Suite	2,340 See Gen. Remarks							
Judge's Chambers Suite	1,980 See Gen. Remarks							
Judge/ Magistrate Judge's Chambers Suite	1,560 See Gen. Remarks							
Visiting/Non-Resident Judge's Chambers Suite	900 See Gen. Remarks							
JUDGES' CHAMBERS								
Judge	—	Movable: Desk, swivel tilt chair, guest chairs (2), secondary work surface, coffee table, side tables, bookshelves (10 ranges*), conference table, conference chairs (6), sofa, floor/table lamps, provision for CRT and printer			Highest quality paint/wall covering: paneling wall paper millwork	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	H
Judge	500	Movable: Desk, swivel tilt chair, guest chairs (2), secondary work surface, coffee table, side tables, bookshelves (10 ranges*), conference table, conference chairs (6), sofa, floor/table lamps, provision for CRT and printer			Highest quality paint/wall covering: paneling wall paper millwork	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	H
Judge/ Magistrate Judge	400	Movable: Desk, swivel tilt chair, guest chairs (2), secondary work surface, coffee table side tables, bookshelves (5 ranges*), conference table, conference chairs (4), sofa, floor/table lamps, provision for CRT and printer			Highest quality paint/wall covering: paneling wall paper millwork	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	H
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUPPORT AREAS								
Study	—	Movable: Desk, swivel tilt chair, guest chairs, secondary work surface, coffee table, side tables, bookshelves (5 ranges), conference table, conference chairs, sofa, floor/table lamps, provision for CRT and printer			Highest quality paint/wall covering: paneling wall paper millwork	Highest quality carpet	acoustic	H
Vestibule	50				Highest quality paint/wall covering: paneling wall paper millwork	Highest quality carpet	acoustic	S

*Where used on this table, the term "range" refers to a shelving unit for books, 7-shelves high and 36" wide, providing a total of 252 lineal inches of shelving.

Judges' Chambers Suites
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION (For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page)				SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS												GENERAL REMARKS
	PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOM	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE MECH.	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS		
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUITES																	
Judge's Chambers Suite																	Each USCA judge is allocated a total resident chambers area of 2,340 NSF, to be subdivided in any way desired as conditions require.
Judge's Chambers Suite																	Each USDC judge is allocated a total resident chambers area of 1,980 NSF
Judges' Magistrate Judge's Chambers Suite																	Each USBC judge and USDC magistrate judge is allocated a total resident chambers area of 1,560 NSF
Visiting/Non-Resident Judge's Chambers Suites																	Each visiting or non-resident judge's chambers suite is allocated a total area of 900 NSF, to be subdivided in any way desired as conditions require
JUDGES' CHAMBERS																	
Judge		1					☐						☐	☐	If located at ground floor level, exterior windows may use ballistic-resistant glazing		Each USCA judge is allocated a total resident chambers area of 2,340 NSF, to be subdivided in any way desired as conditions require. The types and sizes of areas set forth here are intended to provide guidance only.
Judge		1					☐						☐	☐	If located at ground floor level, exterior windows may use ballistic-resistant glazing		Each USDC judge is allocated a total resident chambers area of 1,980 NSF, to be subdivided in any way desired as conditions require. The types and sizes of areas set forth here are intended to provide guidance only.
Judge Magistrate Judge		1					☐						☐	☐	If located at ground floor level, exterior windows may use ballistic-resistant glazing		Each USBC judge and each USDC magistrate judge is allocated a total resident chambers area of 1,560 NSF, to be subdivided in any way desired as conditions require. The types and sizes of areas set forth here are intended to provide guidance only.
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUPPORT AREAS																	
Study		1		Off of chambers			☐						☐	☐			
Vestibule		1		Off of chambers													May provide second egress from chambers to private circulation

Public 1: Unscreened access (uncontrolled entrance to the building and spaces). Public 2: Screened access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Screened access, (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Uncontrolled access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes). Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window service.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only. Secure 2: Security staff and prisoners.

Judges' Chambers Suites
Acoustics and Communications

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA					ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS													
	BACKGROUND NOISE (NC)	REVERB. TIME (Seconds)	R.A.S.T.I.	WALL ISOLATION (dB NIC)	REMARKS	PA/EIB MICROPHONE	PA/SYS. LOUDSPEAKERS	PA/EIB CONTR./RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLETS	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORD./PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	REMARKS
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUITES																			
Judge's Chambers Suite																			
Judge's Chambers Suite																			
Judge Magistrate Judge's Chamber Suite																			
Visiting/Non-Resident Judge's Chambers Suite																			
JUDGES' CHAMBERS																			
Judge	35	0.4-0.6		50	Requires acoustically rated doors				☐	☐	☐	☐	☐					☐	Provide MATV or cabl outlet in each judge's chambers
Judge	35	0.4-0.6		50	Requires acoustically rated doors				☐	☐	☐	☐	☐					☐	Provide MATV or cabl outlet in each judge's chambers
Judge Magistrate Judge	35	0.4-0.6		50	Requires acoustically rated doors				☐	☐	☐	☐	☐					☐	Provide MATV or cabl outlet in each judge's chambers
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUPPORT AREAS																			
Study	35	0.4-0.6		50	Requires acoustically rated doors				☐	☐	☐	☐	☐					☐	Provide MATV or cabl outlet in each
Vestibule												☐							

Judges' Chambers Suites
HVAC and Lighting

SPACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING									LIGHTING						GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION Min. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	SOUND CRITERIA (NC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	LEVEL (FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		
	S	W	S	W							FLUOR.	INCAND	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER	
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUITES																(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bulb and coincident wet bulb. (2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99% design dry bulb. (3) Outdoor air at design temperature. (4) Outdoor temperature is ASHRAE 97.5%. (5) Each judge and his/her designer will determine lighting types and controls.
Judge's Chambers Suite																
Judge's Chambers Suite																
Judge/ Magistrate Judge's Suite																
Visiting/Non-Resident Judge's Chambers Suite																
JUDGES' CHAMBERS																
Judge	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				50-100	(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	
Judge											50-100	(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	
Judge/ Magistrate Judge											50-100	(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUPPORT AREAS																
Study	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				50-100	(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	
Vestibule											20-25	(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	

Judges' Chambers Suites
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE Type	STORAGE Size	FINISHES H equate 10' and higher; S equate 8-10'; use of a dot (•) denotes special design. Walls	Floor	Ceiling	Height
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUPPORT AREAS (cont'd)								
Private Toilet	50	Built-in: WC, lavatory, medicine cabinet, towel rack, paper holder, paper towel dispenser/disposal, soap dispenser, base cabinet w/drawers, mirror; shower may be provided at the discretion of the judicial officer (if a shower is provided, it should be equipped with a soap dish, a shampoo shelf, a wash cloth bar, and a shower curtain and rod or a glass shower door)	Medicine cabinet, storage cabinet	18" deep	Durable medium quality wall covering	Vinyl/ cer tile	Paint/ acoustic	S
Closet	10	Built-in: Shelves, coat rod	Shelves	18" deep	Paint	Highest quality carpet	Paint/ acoustic	S
CLERICAL/SUPPORT AREAS								
Reception Area	100	Movable: Lounge chair(s)/sofa(s) (minimum seating capacity: 6), side tables, coffee table, floor/table lamps			High quality paint/wall covering	Highest quality carpet	acoustic	S
Coat Closet	10	Built-in: Shelves, coat rod	Shelves	18" deep	Paint	Vinyl/Highest quality carpet	Paint/ acoustic	S
Secretarial Workstation	120	Movable: Desk, swivel chair, secondary worksurface, CRT & printer, typewriter	Drawers		High quality paint/wall covering	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	S
File Storage Area Magistrate Judge	140 60 80	Movable: File cabinets	Lateral files				Acoustic	S
Facsimile Machine Area	10	Movable: Work surface/stand, storage below	Cabinet				Acoustic	S
Copier Area	50	Movable: Copier stand with supply shelves, work table	Paper storage shelf				Acoustic	S
Storage	80	Built-in: Shelving on 2-3 walls	Open shelves	12" deep	Paint	Vinyl	Paint/ acoustic	S
Galley	20	Built-in: Counter, sink, cabinets above and below Movable: Accommodation for microwave oven AND refrigerator	Storage cabinets for supplies	18" deep	High quality paint/wall covering	Vinyl/Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	S
LAW LIBRARY/ CONFERENCE ROOM								
Judge	400	Movable: Bookshelves (18 ranges*), conference table, conference chairs			High quality paint/wall covering	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	H
Judge/ Magistrate Judge	300	Movable: Bookshelves (14 ranges*), conference table, conference chairs					Acoustic	H
OTHER SUPPORT OFFICES								
Law Clerk's Office	150	Movable: Desk, swivel chair, guest chair, bookshelves (5 ranges*), secondary work surface, provision for CRT and printer	Filing cabinets		High quality paint/wall covering	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	S
Courtroom Deputy Clerk's Office	150	Movable: Desk, swivel chair, bookshelf (1 range*), secondary work surface, provision for CRT, printer, and typewriter	Filing cabinets	Lateral, 5-drawer			Acoustic	S

* Where used on this table, the term "range" refers to a shelving unit for books, 7-shelves high and 36" wide, providing a total of 252 lineal inches of shelving.

Judges' Chambers Suites
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION (For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page)				SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS												GENERAL REMARKS
	PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOM	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE MECH.	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS	
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUPPORT AREAS (cont'd)																	
Private Toilet		1		Off of vestibule													If shower is provided, it should be equipped with a soap dish, a shampoo shelf, a wash cloth bar, and a shower curtain and rod or glass shower door
Closet		1		Off of vestibule													
CLERICAL/SUPPORT AREAS																	
Reception Area		2		Off of private circ											Provide CCTV camera & security intercom outside entry to reception area		
Coat Closet		1		Off of reception													
Secretarial Workstation		1		Adjacent to reception		☐	☐	☐				☐					USCA judge/USDC chief judge: 2 secretaries each; other judges/ magistrates: 1 secretary each
File Storage Area Magistrate Judge		2		Near secretary													
Facsimile Machine Area		1															
Copier Area		1															
Storage		1															Supplies storage
Galley		1															
LAW LIBRARY/CONFERENCE ROOM																	
Judge		1		Accessed from chambers and staff circulation													
Judge/ Magistrate Judge		1		Accessed from chambers and staff circulation													
OTHER SUPPORT OFFICES																	
Law Clerk's Office		1				(3)☐	(3)☐	(3)☐				(3)☐			(1) Provide second set of security devices at only one law clerk's office		USCA: 3, USDC: 2, magistrate: 1, USBC: 1, USDC chief judge: 3
Courtroom Deputy Clerk's Office		1															May be located with chambers or at Clerk's Office, depending upon local preference

Public 1: Unscreened access (uncontrolled entrance to the building and spaces). Public 2: Screened access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Screened access, (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Uncontrolled access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes) Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window service.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only. Secure 2: Security staff and prisoners.

Judges' Chambers Suites
Acoustics and Communications

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA				REMARKS	ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS													REMARKS
	BACKGROUND NOISE (dBC)	REVERB. TIME (Seconds)	R.A.S.T.I.	WALL ISOLATION (dB NIC)		PAGING MICROPHONE	PAGING LOUDSPEAKERS	PAGING CONTROL/RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLETS	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORD/PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUPPORT AREAS (cont'd)																			
Private Toilet					Treat all pipe penetrations for high transmission loss							□							
Closet																			
CLERICAL/SUPPORT AREAS																			
Reception Area	40				High masking level to increase privacy from interior				□	□	□	□							
Coat Closet																			
Secretarial Workstation	35			40					□		□	□	□	□					
File Storage Area Magistrate Judge																			
Facsimile Machine Area									□	□	□	□							
Copier Area				40	Should be sound isolated from office work stations				□	□	□	□							
Storage																			
Galley												□							
LAW LIBRARY/CONFERENCE ROOM																			
Judge	35	0.5-0.6	0.8	60					□	□	□	□	□	□					
Judge/ Magistrate Judge	35	0.5-0.6	0.8	60					□	□	□	□	□	□					
OTHER SUPPORT OFFICES																			
Law Clerk's Office	35	0.5-0.6		45					□	□	□	□	□						
Courtroom Deputy Clerk's Office	35	0.5-0.6		45					□	□	□	□	□						

Judges' Chambers Suites
HVAC and Lighting

SPACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING									LIGHTING						GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION (Min. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person)	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	SOUND CONTROL (NC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	LEVEL (FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		
	S	W	S	W							FLUOR.	INC./HID	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER	
JUDGES' CHAMBERS SUPPORT AREAS (cont'd)																(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bulb and coincident wet bulb. (2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99% design dry bulb. (3) Outdoor air at design temperature. (4) Outdoor temperature is ASHRAE 97.5%. (5) Each judge and his/her designer will determine lighting types and controls.
Private Toilet	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85					(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	
Closet												(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	
CLERICAL/SUPPORT AREAS																
Reception Area	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				50-75	(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	
Coat Closet																
Secretarial Workstation											80-75					
File Storage Area Magistrate Judge											80-75					
Facsimile Machine Area											80-75					
Copier Area																
Storage											20-30					
Galley	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				20-30					
LAW LIBRARY/CONFERENCE ROOM												(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	
Judge	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				80-75					
Judge/ Magistrate Judge	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				80-75					
OTHER SUPPORT OFFICES																
Law Clerk's Office	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				80-75	(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)	
Courtroom Deputy Clerk's Office	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				80-75					

SECTION D

ANCILLARY FACILITIES

Special Notation: Space, Furniture, Finishes, Access Control and Security, Acoustics and Communications, HVAC and Lighting.

Source: U.S. Courts Design Guide
Washington, D.C., 3/12/91

Ancillary Facilities
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE		FINISHES N equals 10' and higher; S equals 8-10'; use of a dot (■) denotes special design.			
			Type	Size	Walls	Floor	Ceiling	Height
COURT OF APPEALS								
Judges' Conference Room En Banc Courtroom	250 min + 50/judge	Built-in: Display unit with screen, display boards Movable: Conference table, swivel chairs (lounge chairs, sofa)	Closet	AV equip, etc.	Highest quality paint/wall covering: paneling wall paper millwork	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	■
Galley	50	Built-in: Counter, sink, cabinets above and below Movable: Accommodation for microwave oven and refrigerator	Cabinets, shelves	18" deep	Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Vinyl/ ceramic	Acoustic	S
Panel Courtroom	200	Built-in: Display unit with screen, display boards Movable: Conference table, swivel chairs (lounge chairs, sofa)	Closet	AV equip, etc.	Highest quality paint/wall covering: paneling wall paper millwork	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	■
Galley	50	Built-in: Counter, sink, cabinets above and below Movable: Accommodation for microwave oven and refrigerator	Cabinets, shelves	18" deep	Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Vinyl/ ceramic	Acoustic	S
Judges' Robing Room	100 + 25/judge	Built-in: Lockers for robes Movable: Chairs, side tables	Lockers	24" deep	Highest quality paint/wall covering: paneling wall paper millwork	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	S
Toilet	2 @ 50 ea	Built-in: WC, lavatory, paper holder, paper towel dispenser/disposal, soap dispenser, base cabinet, mirror (provide for entry from soundlock)	Cabinet, shelves		Durable, medium quality paint/tile/wall covering	Vinyl/ ceramic	Paint	S
Attorneys' Lounge	250	Movable: Lounge chairs, coffee/side tables, sofa, armchairs			Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Medium quality carpet	Acoustic	S
Work Area	100	Movable: Work table or carrels, chairs	Cabinet storage				Acoustic	S
Public Waiting Area: En Banc Courtroom	750	Movable: Benches, side tables			■	■	■	■
Panel Courtroom	300	Movable: Benches, side tables			■	■	■	■
Judicial Staff Toilets	As Req'd. Min 2 @ 50 ea.	Built-in: WC, lavatory, paper holder, paper towel dispenser/disposal, soap dispenser, base cabinet, mirror (provide for entry from soundlock)	Cabinet, shelves		Durable, medium quality paint/tile/wall covering	Vinyl/ ceramic	Paint	S

Ancillary Facilities
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page				SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS											GENERAL REMARKS
	PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOM	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE MECH.	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS	
COURT OF APPEALS																
Judges' Conference Room En Banc Courtroom		3		Adjacent to robing room			☐							☐	Provide 2 duress alarm stations in room	
Galley		3		Adjacent to conference room												
Panel Courtroom		3		Adjacent to robing room			☐							☐	Provide 2 duress alarm stations in room	
Galley		3		Adjacent to conference room												
Judges' Robing Room		3		Adjacent to courtroom												
Toilet		1		Adjacent to robing room												
Attorneys' Lounge	3															Equipment provided by attorneys
Work Area		1		Off of attorneys' lounge												Not required if lounge is adjacent to conference room
Public Waiting Area: En Banc Courtroom	3			Outside courtroom												
Panel Courtroom	3			Outside courtroom												
Judicial Staff Toilets		1		Off of restricted circulation												

Public 1: Uncontrolled access (uncontrolled entrances to the building and spaces). Public 2: Screened access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Screened access, (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Uncontrolled access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes). Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window service.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only. Secure 2: Security staff and prisoners.

Ancillary Facilities
Acoustics and Communications

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA					ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS													
	BACKGROUND NOISE (NC)	REVERB. TIME (Seconds)	R.A.S.T.I.	WALL ISOLATION (dB NIC)	REMARKS	PAGE/INTERCOM/NOTE	PA SYS. LOUDSPEAKERS	PAGE/CONTROL/RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLETS	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORD/PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	REMARKS
COURT OF APPEALS																			
Judges' Conference Room En Banc Courtroom	30	0.5-0.6	0.8	55	Line HVAC ducts with 1" fiberglass for 12' min. to minimize sound transfer between rooms.				☐	☐		☐							
Galley					Treat pipe penetrations of wall to assure high transmission loss for privacy. Assure that plumbing does not cause noise in adjacent spaces.							☐							
Panel Courtroom	30	0.5-0.6	0.8	55	Line HVAC ducts with 1" fiberglass for 12' min. to minimize sound transfer between rooms.				☐	☐		☐							
Galley					Treat pipe penetrations of wall to assure high transmission loss for privacy. Assure that plumbing does not cause noise in adjacent spaces.							☐							
Judges' Robing Room	30	0.5-0.6		55					☐	☐		☐							
Toilet												☐							
Attorneys' Lounge	35	0.5-0.6		40					☐	☐		☐							
Work Area									☐	☐	☐	☐	☐						
Public Waiting Area: En Banc Courtroom	40	0.5-0.6		45						☐		☐							
Panel Courtroom	40	0.5-0.6		45						☐		☐							
Judicial Staff Toilets												☐							

Ancillary Facilities
HVAC and Lighting

SPACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING									LIGHTING						GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION Min. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	BOARD CRITERIA (AC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	LEVEL (FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		
	S	W	S	W							FLUOR.	INCAND	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER	
COURT OF APPEALS																(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bulb and coincident wet bulb. (2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99% design dry bub. (3) Outdoor air at design temperature. (4) Outdoor temperature is ASHRAE 97.5%.
Judges' Conference Room En Banc Courtroom	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			60-75	D	D		☐		
Galley																
Panel Courtroom	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			60-75	D	D		☐		
Galley																
Judges' Robing Room	70-74 (1)	70-75 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			40-50	D			☐		
Toilet																
Attorneys' Lounge	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			30-40	D	D		☐		
Work Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			60-75	D			☐		
Public Waiting Area: En Banc Courtroom	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			30-40	D	D		☐		
Panel Courtroom	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			30-40	D	D		☐		
Judicial Staff Toilets																

Ancillary Facilities
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE		FINISHES (N equals 10' and higher; S equals 8-10'; use of a dot (■) denotes special design.			
			Type	Size	Walls	Floor	Ceiling	Height
DISTRICT/BANKRUPTCY COURTS								
Judges' Conference Room	25/judge, 150 min	Movable: Conference table, conference chairs			High quality paint/wall covering	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	H
Galley	20-100	Built-in: Counter, sink, cabinets above and below Movable: Accommodation for microwave oven and refrigerator	Pantry, cabinets, shelves	18" deep	Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Vinyl	Acoustic	S
Attorneys' Conference/ Witness Waiting Room	2 @ 150 per courtroom	Movable: Conference table, conference chairs (4), lounge chairs, side tables			■	Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	S
Public Waiting Area	400 per courtroom	Movable: Benches, side tables			■	■	■	■
Press/Media Room	50/person, 150 min	Movable: Desks, chairs (provided only in larger facilities)	Filing cabinets, closet		Paint	Durable, easily maintained carpet/ vinyl	Acoustic	S
Judicial Staff Toilets	As req'd. Min 2 @ 50 ea.	Built-in: WC, lavatory, paper holder, paper towel dispenser/disposal, soap dispenser, base cabinet, mirror (provide for entry from soundlock)	Cabinet, shelves		Durable, medium quality paint/tile/ wall covering	Vinyl/ ceramic	Paint	S
COURT REPORTERS/RECORDERS								
Court Reporter/Recorder Office	150	Movable: Desk, chair, secondary work surface, shelves, provision for CRT, printer and typewriter	Tape storage shelves	6" deep	Paint	Medium quality carpet	Acoustic	S
Court Reporter/Recorder Storage	50	Movable: Tape storage shelves (6" deep) and/or box storage on 2-3 walls	Shelves	6"D (tapes) 25"D (boxes)	Paint	Vinyl	Paint/ Acoustic	S
Shared Work Room	100	Movable: Work tables, workstations	Shelves	18" deep	Paint	Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	S
Transcriber/Typist Workstation	50	Movable: Desk, chair, provision for CRT, printer and typewriter			Paint		Acoustic	S

Ancillary Facilities
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page				SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS											GENERAL REMARKS
	PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOMS	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE MECH.	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS	
DISTRICT/BANKRUPTCY COURTS																
Judges' Conference Room		3					☐							☐	Provide 2 duress alarm stations in room	
Galley		3		Adjacent to conference room												
Attorneys' Conference/ Witness Waiting Room	3	3		Adjacent to courtroom												
Public Waiting Area	3			Outside courtroom												
Press/Media Room	3	3		May be remote												Closet(s) for equipment storag
Judicial Staff Toilets		1		Off of restricted circulation												
COURT REPORTERS/RECORDERS																
Court Reporter/ Recorder Office		3														
Court Reporter/ Recorder Storage		3		Near ct rep/rec's office												Area should be securable
Shared Work Room		3		Near ct rep/rec's office												When required; shared by up to four court reporters/ recorders
Transcribe/Typist Workstation		3		Near ct rep/rec's office												When required

Public 1: Unscreened access (uncontrolled entrance to the building and spaces). Public 2: Screened access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Screened access, (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Uncontrolled access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes). Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window service.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only. Secure 2: Security staff and passers.

Ancillary Facilities
Acoustics and Communications

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA					ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS													
	BACKGROUND NOISE (NC)	REVERB. TIME (Seconds)	RATIO	WALL ISOLATION (dB NIC)	REMARKS	PA/EVS MICROPHONE	PA SYS. LOUDSPEAKERS	PA/EVS CONTROL/RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLETS	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORD./PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	REMARKS
DISTRICT/BANKRUPTCY COURTS																			
Judges' Conference Room	30	0.5-0.6	0.8	55					□	□		□							
Galley												□							
Attorneys' Conference/Witness Waiting Room	35	0.5-0.6		55					□	□		□							
Public Waiting Area	40	0.5-0.6		45						□		□							
Press/Media Room	35			45					□	□		□							
Judicial Staff Toilets												□							
COURT REPORTERS/RECORDERS																			
Court Reporter/Recorder	35			45					□	□	□	□							
Court Reporter/Recorder Storage												□							
Shared Work Room	35			45					□	□		□							
Transcriber/Typist Workstation	35			45					□	□	□	□							

Ancillary Facilities
HVAC and Lighting

SPACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING									LIGHTING						GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION Min. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	SOUND CRITERIA (NC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	LEVEL (FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		
	S	W	S	W							FLUOR.	INCAND.	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER	
DISTRICT/BANKRUPTCY COURTS																(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bulb and coincident wet bulb. (2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99% design dry bulb. (3) Outdoor air at design temperature. (4) Outdoor temperature is ASHRAE 97.5%.
Judges' Conference Room	70-74 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			50-75	D			☐		
Galley																
Attorneys' Conference/Witness Waiting Room	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			50-75	D	D		☐		
Public Waiting Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			20-30	D			☐		
Press/Media Room	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			50-75	D			☐		
Judicial Staff Toilets																
COURT REPORTERS/RECORDERS																
Court Reporter/Recorder	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			50-75	D			☐		
Court Reporter/Recorder Storage																
Shared Work Room	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			50-75	D			☐		
Transcriber/Typist Workstation	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85			50-75	D			☐		

SECTION E

JURY FACILITIES

Special Notation: Contains spatial relationship, accessibility and circulation (SRAC) diagrams, design guide tables and specific design guidelines for the jury assembly areas, the trial suites and the grand jury suite. Space, furniture, and finishes, access control and security, acoustics and communications, HVAC and lighting is overviewed.

Source: U.S. Courts Design Guide
Washington, D.C., 3/12/91

Jury Assembly
Jury Facilities
SRAC Diagram




JUROR ORIENTATION
15 NSF/PERSON
SMOKER'S LOUNGE
20 NSF/PERSON
JUROR LOUNGE
20 NSF/PERSON
VENDING
15 NSF/MACHINE
GALLEY
100 NSF
TOILET
AS REQ'D
TOILET
AS REQ'D
EQUIP STORAGE
150 NSF
JURY CLERKS OFFICE
100 NSF
RECEPT CHECK-IN
150 NSF
SUPPLY STORAGE
50 NSF
COATS
20 NSF

12-Person Trial Jury Suite
Jury Facilities
SRAC Diagram




COAT CL
20 NSF
VIDEO
10 NSF
GALLEY
20 NSF
TRIAL
JURY
ROOM
350 NSF
SOUND
LOCK
50 NSF
TLT
50 NSF
TLT
50 NSF
JURY
CUSTOD.
50 NSF
1
3

6-Person Trial Jury Suite
Jury Facilities
SRAC Diagram




COAT CL
20 NSF
VIDEO
10 NSF
GALLEY
20 NSF
1
1
1
TRIAL
JURY
ROOM
250 NSF
SOUND
LOCK
50 NSF
3
1
1
TLT
50 NSF
1
TLT
50 NSF
JURY
CUSTOD.
50 NSF
1

Grand Jury
Jury Facilities
SRAC Diagram



Jury Facilities
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE		FINISHES (H equals 10' and higher; S equals 8-10'; use of a dot (•) denotes special design.			
			Type	Size	Walls	Floor	Ceiling	Height
JURY ASSEMBLY AREA								
Check-in	100	Built-in: Counter Movable: Jury clerk's workstation			Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	S
Jury Clerk's Office	100/clerk	Movable: Desk or workstation, chair, ID card storage, provision for CRT, printer, and typewriter	Filing cabinet, (files, records)				Acoustic	S
Coat Closet	3 lin. in./juror	Built-in: Shelves, coat rods	Shelves	12" deep		Durable, easily maintained carpet/vinyl	Paint/ acoustic	S
Jurors' Toilets	Per code	Built-in: WC, lavatory, paper holder, paper towel dispenser/disposal, soap dispenser, base cabinet, mirror (provide for entry from soundlock)			Paint/ Cer tile	Vinyl/ Cer tile	Paint/ acoustic	S
Galley	100	Built-in: Counter, sink, cabinets above and below Movable: Accommodation for microwave oven &refrigerator	Cabinets	18"-24" deep	Paint/ Cer tile	Vinyl	Paint/ acoustic	S
Vending Area	15/machine	Movable: Vending machines, waste containers			Paint	Vinyl	Paint/ acoustic	S
Juror Lounge	20/person	Movable: Chairs, lounge furniture, magazine racks, carrels, TV monitors			Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	S/H
Assembly Area	10/person	Movable: Chairs, tables, lectern, screens, TV monitors					Acoustic	S/H
Equipment Storage	150	Built-in: Shelves on 2-3 walls	Open shelves floor space	18" deep	Paint	Vinyl	Paint	S
Smoker's Lounge	20/person	Movable: Chairs, lounge furniture, magazine racks, carrels, TV monitors			Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	S
Supplies Storage	50 min.	Built-in: Shelves on 2-3 walls	Open shelves	12" deep	Paint	Vinyl	Paint	S
TRIAL JURY SUITE								
Soundlock entry	50 min				Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	S
Jurors' Toilets	2 @ 50 ea.	Built-in: WC, lavatory, paper holder, paper towel dispenser/disposal, soap dispenser, base cabinet, mirror (provide for entry from soundlock)			Paint/cer tile	Vinyl/ Cer tile	Paint/ acoustic	S
Coat Closet	20	Built-in: Shelf, coat rod	Shelf	12" deep	Paint	Vinyl	Paint/ acoustic	S

Jury Facilities
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page				SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS												GENERAL REMARKS
	PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOM	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE MECH.	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS		
JURY ASSEMBLY AREA																	
Check-in	3			Adjacent to reception													Part of jury clerk's office
Jury Clerk's Office	3	3		Adjacent to reception			□										
Coat Closet		1		In reception area													May be scaled down in warmer climates
Jurors' Toilets		1		Adjacent to assembly area													
Galley		1															
Vending Area		1		Adjacent to kitchenette/coffee prep area													
Juror Lounge		1		Adjacent to assembly area													
Assembly Area		1															
Equipment Storage		3		Adjacent to assembly area													A/V equipment storage
Smoker's Lounge		1		Adjacent to assembly area													
Supplies Storage		3		Adjacent to jury clerk's office													
TRIAL JURY SUITE																	
Soundlock Entry			1														
Jurors' Toilets		1		Off of soundlock													
Coat Closet		1		In soundlock													

Public 1: Unscreened access (uncontrolled entrance to the building and grounds). Public 2: Screened access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Screened access (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Unscreened access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes). Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window screen.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only. Secure 2: Security staff and prisoners.


VIDEO
10 NSF
GRAND JURY
HEARING ROOM
600 NSF
WITNESS
ROOM
200 NSF
SALLYPORT
S
35NSF
TOILET
40 NSF
GALLEY
20 NSF
CLOSET
20 NSF
WITNESS
ROOM
120 NSF
SECUR.
50 NSF
ENTRY
50 NSF
R

Jury Facilities
Acoustics and Communication

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA					ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS													
	BACKGROUND NOISE (NC)	REVERB. TIME (Seconds)	R.A.S.T.I.	WALL ISOLATION (dB NIC)	REMARKS	PA/FIRE MICROPHONE	PA SYS. LOUDSPEAKERS	PA SYS CONTROL/RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLET	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORD./PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	REMARKS
JURY ASSEMBLY AREA																			
Check-in	40	0.6-0.8		40					□	□		□							
Jury Clerk's Office	40				Movable partitions at workstations; provide for transmission loss of 25-27 dB.	□			□	□	□	□	□	□					
Coat Closet																			
Jurors' Toilets							□					□							
Galley							□					□							
Vending Area							□					□							
Juror Lounge	40	0.6-0.8		40			□			□	□	□						□	
Assembly Area	35	0.6-0.8	0.8	40		□	□			□	□	□						□	
Equipment Storage												□							
Smoker's Lounge							□			□		□						□	
Supplies Storage												□							
TRIAL JURY SUITE																			
Soundlock Entry				65															
Jurors' Toilets					Treat all plumbing penetrations for high transmission loss & assure acoustic privacy							□							
Coat Closet																			

Jury Facilities
HVAC and Lighting

SPACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING										LIGHTING						GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION (lbs. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	SOUND CRITERIA (NC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	REMARKS	LEVEL(FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		
	S	W	S	W								FLUOR.	INC.AND	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER	
JURY ASSEMBLY AREA																	(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bulb and coincident wet bulb
Check-In	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				30-40	D			☐	☐	
Jury Clerk's Office					20	8	80-85				60-75	D				☐	
Coat Closet																	(2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99% design dry bulb.
Jurors' Toilets																	(3) Outdoor air at design temperature
Galley											30-40	D				☐	(4) Outdoor temperature is ASHRAE 97.5%.
Vending Area											30-40	D				☐	
Juror Lounge	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				30-40	D	D			☐	
Assembly Area					20	10	80-85				30-40	D			☐	☐	
Equipment Storage																	
Smoker's Lounge	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	6	☐			100% exhaust; fan to operate only when room is occupied.	30-40	D	D			☐	
Supplies Storage																	
TRIAL JURY SUITE																	
Soundlock Entry	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				20-30	D				☐	
Jurors' Toilets																	
Coat Closet																	

Jury Facilities
Space, Furniture and Fixtures

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE Type	STORAGE Size	FINISHES (H equals 18" and higher; S equals 6-18"; use of a dot (■) denotes special design. Walls	Floor	Ceiling	Height
TRIAL JURY SUITE (cont'd)								
Trial Jury Room	250 (6) 350 (12)	Movable: Conference table, conference chairs (7-18)			Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Medium quality carpet	Acoustic	S
Galley	20	Built-in: Counter, sink, cabinets above and below Movable: Accommodation for microwave oven & refrigerator	Cabinets				Acoustic	S
Exhibits Display	—	Built-in: Screen, tackboard, whiteboard (magnetic)		18" deep 24" deep	■			
Video Equipment	10	Movable: Video monitor station with provision for VCR			Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Medium quality carpet	Acoustic	S
Sworn Jury Custodian Station	50	Movable: Desk, chair	Drawer				Acoustic	S
GRAND JURY SUITE								
Entry Area	50				Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	S
Jurors' Toilets	2 @ 50 ea.	Built-in: WC, lavatory, paper holder, paper towel dispenser/disposal, soap dispenser, base cabinet, mirror (provide for entry from soundlock)			Paint/ Cer tile	Vinyl/ Cer tile	Paint/ acoustic	S
Galley	20	Built-in: Counter, sink, cabinets above and below Movable: Accommodation for microwave oven & refrigerator	Cabinets above and below		Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Medium quality carpet	Acoustic	S
Security Work Station	50	Movable: Desk, chair	Drawer				Acoustic	S
Witness Room	1 @ 200 1 @ 120	Movable: Lounge chairs, coffee/side tables, conference table, conference chairs					Acoustic	S
Hearing Room	600	Built-in: 21 fixed-base swivel tilt chairs with work surfaces, arranged in 3 tiers with 1st tier at floor level; U.S. Attorney station; Grand Jury foreperson and secretary stations; witness station; court reporter/ recorder station; Movable: Attorney swivel chairs, Grand Jury foreperson and secretary swivel chairs, witness swivel chair, court reporter/recorder swivel chair			Highest quality paint/wall covering; paneling wall paper millwork		Acoustic	10
Exhibits Display	—	Built-in: Screen, tackboard, whiteboard (magnetic)		18" deep 24" deep	■			
Video Equipment	10	Movable: Video monitor station with provision for VCR			Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Medium quality carpet	Acoustic	S
Closet	10	Built-in: Shelves	Filing cabinet				Paint/ acoustic	S

Jury Facilities
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page				SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS												GENERAL REMARKS
	PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOM	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE MECH.	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS		
TRIAL JURY SUITE (cont'd)																	
Trial Jury Room		1															
Galley		1		In jury room													
Exhibits Display				In jury room													
Video Equipment				In jury room													
Sworn Jury Custodian Station		1		Off of entry area													
GRAND JURY SUITE																	
Entry Area	3	1															
Jurors' Toilets		1		Off of entry area													
Galley																	
Security Work Station		1		Off of entry area													
Witness Room		3															
Hearing Room		3	1														
Exhibits Display				In hearing room													
Video Equipment				In hearing room													
Closet		1															

Public 1: Unscreened access (uncontrolled entrance to the building and spaces). Public 2: Screened access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Screened access (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Uncontrolled access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes). Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window service.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only. Secure 2: Security staff and prisoners.

Jury Facilities
Acoustics and Communication

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA					ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS													
	BACKGROUND NOISE (NC)	REVERB. TIME (Seconds)	S.T.C.	WALL ISOLATION (dB STC)	REMARKS	PA/EVAC MICROPHONE	PA/EVAC LOUDSPEAKERS	PA/EVAC CONTROL/RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLET	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORDER/PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	REMARKS
TRIAL JURY SUITE (cont'd)																			
Trial Jury Room	30	0.4-0.6	0.8	65	Use acoustically rated door assembly. Line all ducts.					□	□	□							Provide buzzer system between delib. room and jury custodian's station
Galley												□							
Exhibits Display												□							
Video Equipment												□							
Sworn Jury Custodian Station									□	□	□	□	□	□					
GRAND JURY SUITE																			
Entry Area																			
Jurors' Toilets												□							
Galley												□							
Security Work Station									□	□	□	□	□	□					
Witness Room		0.5-0.7		65								□							
Hearing Room	30	0.5-0.7	0.8	65		□	□	□	□	□		□							Provide separate P.A. system for hearing room.
Exhibits Display												□							
Video Equipment												□							
Closet																			

Jury Facilities
HVAC and Lighting

SPACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING										LIGHTING						GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION Min. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	SOUND CRITERIA (NC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	REMARKS	LEVEL(FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		
	S	W	S	W								FLUOR.	INCAND	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER	
TRIAL JURY SUITE (cont'd)																	
Trial Jury Room	70-74 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	6	☐			100% exhaust; fan to operate only when room is occupied.	40-60	D			☐	☐	
Gallery																	
Exhibits Display																	
Video Equipment																	
Sworn Jury Custodian Station	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	6	80-85				40-60	D				☐	
GRAND JURY SUITE																	
Entry Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	6					20-30	D				☐	
Jurors' Toilets																	
Gallery											20-30	D				☐	
Security Work Station	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	6	80-85				40-60	D				☐	
Witness Room					20	6	80-85				30-40	D				☐	
Hearing Room					20	6	☐			100% exhaust; fan to operate only when room is occupied.	40-60	D			☐	☐	
Exhibits Display																	
Video Equipment																	
Closet																	

(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bulb and coincident wet bulb.

(2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99% design dry bulb.

(3) Outdoor air at design temperature.

(4) Outdoor temperature is ASHRAE 97.5%.

SECTION F

COURT LIBRARY

Special Notation: Spatial relationship, accessibility and circulation (SRAC) diagram, design guide tables and specific guidelines for the court library. [Main, the satellite and the unstaffed library.] Additional details as to space, furniture and finishes, access control and security, acoustics and communication, and HVAC and lighting.

Source: U.S. Courts Design Guide
Washington, D.C., 3/12/91

Court Library
SRAC Diagram




STUDY CARRELS
STACKS AREA
STUDY TABLES
STUDY ROOM
COURT PERSONNEL WORK AREA
PERIODICAL AREA
CASUAL READING AREA
PUBLIC COPIER
CIRC DESK CONTROL
ENTRY
COATS
AUDIO STAFF
PROF STAFF
PROF STAFF
REFERENCE / CARD CATALOG AREA
RARE BOOK / COURT ACHIVES ROOM
RECEPT
DEPUTY CIRCUIT LIBR'N
CIRCUIT LIBR'N
PRIVATE TOILET
STAFF CALR
FAX
MAIL
TECHNICAL SERVICES
TECH STAFF
SHELVING AREA
SUPPLY STORAGE
COPY
MICROFICHE DUPLICATOR
STAFF LOUNGE
STAFF TOILETS
GENERAL STORAGE
FREIGHT STAGING AREA
FREIGHT ELEVATOR
COAT
PUBLIC CALR
MICRO-FICHE AREA
R
F

Court Library
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE		FINISHES (N equals 10' and higher; S equals 8-10'; use of a dot (■) denotes special design.			
			Type	Size	Walls	Floor	Ceiling	
LIBRARY SPACES								
Public Entry/Lobby	100/200 * (1)	Movable: Lounge seating			Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	
Circulation/Control Area	150/300* (1)	Built-in: Stand-up counter, bookshelves, book cabinets, provision for CRT, printer, typewriter and facsimile machine Movable: Staff workstation	Bookshelf units			Durable, easily maintained carpet/vinyl	Acoustic	
Periodical Area	450/900* (1)	Movable: Periodical shelving units, newspaper racks					Acoustic	
Reference/Card Catalog Area	500/1,000* (1)	Built-in: Reference bookshelves, staff counter Movable: Card catalog, desks, chairs	Bookshelf units			Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	
Casual Reading Area	150/300* (1)	Movable: Lounge chairs, side tables, magazine racks, low bookshelf units	Low shelf units				Acoustic	
Computer Aided Legal Research (CALR) — Public Access	100 min + 70/station (1)	Movable: Desk/workstation, provision for a PC terminal, modem, and printer	Shelves				Acoustic	
CALR — Staff Access	100 min + 70/station (1)	Movable: Desk/workstation, provision for a PC terminal, modem, and printer	Shelves				Acoustic	
Stack Area: General	9/21 lin.ft.	Built-in: Open double-sided bookshelf units, typically 3'-0" wide and seven shelves high Movable: PC/CD-ROM stations	Shelves				Acoustic	
Study Room	100	Movable: Table, chairs (4)					Acoustic	
Study Area: Table	35/person	Movable: 4' x 8' tables, chairs (4 per table)					Acoustic	
Study Area: Carrel	35/person	Movable: Study carrels, chairs (1 per carrel)					Acoustic	
Court Personnel Work Area	70/staff	Movable: Conference tables or study carrels, chairs, provision for CRT, printer and typewriter					Acoustic	
OFFICES								
Circuit Librarian	300	Movable: Desk, swivel chair, bookshelf units (4), file cabinets (2), guest chairs (2), provision for CRT, printer and typewriter	Bookshelves		High quality paint/wall covering	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	
Private Toilet	50	Built-in: WC, lavatory, paper holder, paper towel dispenser/disposal, soap dispenser, base cabinet, mirror (provide for entry from soundlock)			Durable, medium quality paint/tile/wall covering	Vinyl	Paint	
Deputy Circuit Librarian	250	Movable: Desk, swivel chair, bookshelf units (4), file cabinets (2), guest chairs (2), provision for CRT, printer and typewriter	Bookshelves		High quality paint/wall covering	Highest quality carpet	Acoustic	
Professional Staff	150	Movable: Desk, swivel chair, bookshelf units, side chair, provision for CRT, printer and typewriter	Bookshelf		Durable, medium quality paint/wall covering	Medium quality carpet	Acoustic	
Technical Staff	55	Movable: Desk/workstation, swivel chair, provision for CRT, printer and typewriter				Medium quality carpet	Acoustic	

* The net square footages shown apply to a satellite library and central library respectively.
** The net square footages shown apply to an unstaffed library, satellite library and central library respectively.

Court Library
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION (For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page)				SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS												GENERAL REMARKS
	PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOM	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE SECOL	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS		
LIBRARY SPACES																	(1) The proposed square footage in several of the areas has been determined by whether it is a central library, a satellite library, or unstaffed library serving a particular district.
Public Entry/Lobby	3																
Circulation/Control Area	2	1		Adjacent to public entry													
Periodical Area	2			Near circ/control and casual reading areas													
Reference/Card Catalog Area	2	1		Adjacent to circ/control area													
Casual Reading Area	2			Adjacent to reference area													
Computer Aided Legal Research (CALR) — Public Access		3															
CALR — Staff Access		1															
Stack Area: General	2																
Study Room	3																
Study Area: Table	2																
Study Area: Carrel	2																
Court Personnel Work Area		1															
OFFICES																	
Circuit Librarian		1					☐										
Private Toilet																	
Deputy Circuit Librarian		1					☐										
Professional Staff		1					☐										
Technical Staff		1		Located in technical service area													

Public 1: Unscreened access (uncontrolled entrance to the building and spaces). Public 2: Screened access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Screened access, (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Uncontrolled access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes). Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window service.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only. Secure 2: Security staff and passcard.

Court Library
Acoustics and Communication

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA: BACKGROUND NOISE (NC)	REVERB. TIME (Seconds)	R.A.S.T.I.	WALL ISOLATION (dB NIC)	REMARKS	ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS: PAGING MICROPHONE	PA/SYS. LOUDSPEAKERS	PAGING CONTROL/RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLETS	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORD./PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	REMARKS
LIBRARY SPACES																			
Public Entry/Lobby	40	0.5-0.8																	
Circulation/Control Area	40	0.5-0.8							□	□	□	□	□	□					
Periodical Area	35	0.5-0.8																	
Reference/Card Catalog Area	35	0.5-0.8																	
Casual Reading Area	35	0.4-0.6			Use sound absorbent furniture														
Computer Aided Legal Research (CALR) — Public Access	35	0.4-0.6			Place sound absorbent material around terminals				□	□	□	□	□	□					
CALR — Staff Access	35	0.4-0.6			Place sound absorbent material around terminals				□	□	□	□	□	□					
Stack Area: General	40								□	□	□	□	□	□					
Study Room	30	0.4-0.6	0.8	50						□		□							
Study Area: Table	30	0.4-0.6		50															
Study Area: Carrel	30	0.4-0.6		50							□	□	□						
Court Personnel Work Area	35	0.6-0.8		50					□	□	□	□	□	□					
OFFICES																			
Circuit Librarian	30	0.4-0.6		50					□	□	□	□	□	□					
Private Toilet	30	0.4-0.6		50					□	□	□	□	□	□					
Deputy Circuit Librarian	30	0.4-0.6		50					□	□	□	□	□	□					
Professional Staff	35	0.4-0.6							□	□	□	□	□	□					
Technical Staff	35	0.4-0.6							□	□	□	□	□	□					

Court Library
HVAC and Lighting

SPACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING										LIGHTING							GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION Min. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	SOUND CRITERIA (NC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	REMARKS	LEVEL (FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		REMARKS	
	S	W	S	W								FLUOR.	INCAND.	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER		
LIBRARY SPACES																		(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bu and coincide wet bulb. (2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99 design dry bu (3) Outdoor a at design temperature. (4) Outdoor temperature ASHRAE 97.5%.
Public Entry/Lobby	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				30-40	D			☐			
Circulation/Control Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				40-60	D			☐			
Periodical Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				60-75	D			☐			
Reference/Card Catalog Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				60-75	D			☐			
Casual Reading Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				40-60	D			☐			
Computer Aided Legal Research (CALR) — Public Access	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				30-40	D			☐			
CALR — Staff Access	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				30-40	D			☐			
Stack Area: General	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				40-60	D			☐			
Study Room	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				60-75	D			☐			
Study Area: Table																		
Study Area: Carrel															☐		Provide task lighting	
Court Personnel Work Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				40-60	D			☐			
OFFICES																		
Circuit Librarian	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				60-75	D			☐			
Private Toilet																		
Deputy Circuit Librarian																		
Professional Staff	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				60-75	D			☐			
Technical Staff	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				60-75	D			☐			

Court Library
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	STORAGE		FINISHES (■ equals 10" and higher; ▪ equals 8-10"; use of a dot (▪) denotes special design.			
			Type	Size	Walls	Floor	Ceiling	Height
OTHER SPACES								
Copier — Coin-Op Public	80 per copier	Movable: Copier, work surface, supplies storage	Supplies cabinet		Durable, medium quality paint/vinyl covering	Vinyl	Acoustic	S
Copier — Staff	50/80/120 ea.** (1)	Movable: Copier, work surface, supplies storage	Supplies cabinet			Vinyl	Acoustic	S
Microfiche Area — Public & Staff	35/machine + 12/cabinet	Movable: Microfilm reader/printer, work surface, chair, microfilm storage cabinets	Microfiche cabinets			Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	S
Supplies Storage	100 min.	Built-in: 12" deep shelves on 2-3 walls	Shelved supplies	12" deep	Paint	Vinyl	Paint	S
Technical Service Area	200/400 min. (1)	Movable: Bookshelf units, work surfaces, swivel chairs, book carts, special equipment (including OCLC terminal)	Supply cabinets		Durable, medium quality paint/vinyl covering	Vinyl	Acoustic	S
Microfiche Duplicator	55	Movable: Microfiche duplicator, operator chair				Vinyl	Acoustic	S
Rare Book/ Court Archives Room	Special design	Built-in: Specialty designed bookcases Movable: Display cases, conference table, arm chairs			■	Durable, easily maintained carpet	■	S
Coat Storage — Public	10 min.	Built-in: Shelves, coat rod	Coats, personal effects		Durable, medium quality paint/vinyl covering		Acoustic	S
Coat Storage — Staff	10 min.	Built-in: Shelves, coat rod	Coats, personal effects				Acoustic	S
Storage Area	200/400 min.* (1)	Built-in: 18" deep shelves on 2-3 walls	Shelves	18" deep	Paint	Vinyl	Paint	S
Mailroom	75/150 min.* (1)		Bulk & equipment storage		Paint	Vinyl	Paint	S
Freight Staging Area	75/150 min. (1)		Bulk & equipment storage		Paint	Vinyl	Paint	S
Shelving Area	8/shelf unit	Built-in: Bookshelf units	Shelving	12" deep	Durable, medium quality paint/vinyl covering	Durable, easily maintained carpet	Acoustic	S
Toilet: Staff	As req'd., min 2 @ 50	Built-in: WC, lavatory, paper holder, paper towel dispenser/disposal, soap dispenser, base cabinet, mirror (provide for entry from soundlock)			Durable, medium quality paint/tile/wall covering	Vinyl	Paint	S
Staff Lounge	40 gallery + 10/staff	Built-in: Counter, sink, cabinets above and below Movable: Dining chairs, tables, lounge chairs, accommodation for microwave oven and refrigerator	Cabinet			Vinyl	Paint	S

*The net square footages shown apply to a satellite library and central library respectively.
**The net square footages shown apply to an unstaffed library, satellite library and central library respectively.

Court Library
Access Control and Security

SPACES	SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS, ACCESSIBILITY & CIRCULATION For explanation of numbers, see bottom of page				SECURITY & ALARM SYSTEMS												GENERAL REMARKS
	PUBLIC	RESTRICTED	SECURE	REMARKS	CCTV CAMERA	CCTV MONITOR	DURESS ALARM	SECURITY INTERCOM	DOOR CONTACT	WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR	X-RAY MACHINE	REMOTE DOOR RELEASE MECH.	EMERGENCY POWER	EMERGENCY LIGHTING	REMARKS		
OTHER SPACES																	
Copier — Coin-Op Public	2																
Copier — Staff		1															
Microfiche Area — Public & Staff	2																
Supplies Storage		3															
Technical Service Area		1															Colocate with technical staff
Microfiche Duplicator		1															Colocate with technical staff
Rare Book/Court Archives Room	3	3															May be used as court staff conference room
Coat Storage — Public	2			Near entry/lobby													
Coat Storage — Staff		1		Near staff entry													
Storage Area		1															
Mailroom		1		Next to tech. services & freight staging areas													
Freight Staging Area		1		Next to tech. services area and mailroom													
Shelving Area		1		Adjacent to technical services													
Toilet: Staff	2																
Staff Lounge		1															

Public 1: Unsupervised access (uncontrolled entrances to the building and spaces). Public 2: Supervised access (public passes through a security check point). Public 3: Supervised access, (locked under certain conditions).
Restricted 1: Uncontrolled access. Restricted 2: Remote access control (as in CCTV and electric door strikes). Restricted 3: Direct access control. Restricted 4: Counter/Window service.
Secure 1: Authorized staff only. Secure 2: Security staff and passcard.

Court Library
Acoustics and Communication

SPACES	ACOUSTIC CRITERIA					ELECTRICAL, AUDIO, VIDEO, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA TRANSMISSION REQUIREMENTS													
	BACKGROUND NOISE (NC)	REVERB. TIME (Seconds)	R.A.S.T.I.	WALL ISOLATION (dB STC)	REMARKS	PAGING MICROPHONE	PAGING LOUDSPEAKERS	PAGING CONTROL/RECORD.	TELEPHONE/INTERCOM	CLOCK	CLEAN POWER OUTLET	REGULAR OUTLETS	PC TERMINAL	COMPUTER PRINTER	VIDEO CAMERA(S)	VIDEO MONITOR	VIDEO RECORD./PLAYER	MATV/CABLE TV OUTLET	REMARKS
OTHER SPACES:																			
Copier — Coin-Op Public													☐						
Copier — Staff													☐						
Microfiche Area — Public & Staff	40	0.4-0.6							☐	☐		☐	☐	☐					
Supplies Storage																			
Technical Service Area									☐	☐		☐							
Microfiche Duplicator									☐	☐		☐							
Rare Book/Court Archives Rm																			
Coat Storage — Public																			
Coat Storage — Staff																			
Storage Area																			
Mailroom	45			50					☐	☐		☐							
Freight Staging Area												☐							
Shelving Area													☐	☐					
Toilet: Staff												☐							
Staff Lounge	40			50						☐		☐							

SECTION G

CLERK'S OFFICE

Special Notation: Spatial relationship, accessibility and circulation (SRAC) diagram, design guide tables and special design guidelines for the clerk's office.

Source: U.S. Courts Design Guide
Washington, D.C., 3/12/91

Court Library
HVAC and Lighting

SPACES	HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING										LIGHTING							GENERAL REMARKS
	TEMP (degrees)		HUMIDITY (Perc.)		VENTILATION Min. Outdoor Air, CFM/Person	MAX. TOTAL ACH SUPPLIED TO AREA	RECIRCULATED, Max. Percent	SOUND CRITERIA (NC)	EMERGENCY SMOKE PURGE	REMARKS	LEVEL (FTC)	TYPE: I = Indirect D = Direct			CONTROL		REMARKS	
	S	W	S	W								FLOUR.	INCAND	METAL HALIDE	SWITCH	DIMMER		
OTHER SPACES																		(1) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 1% design dry bub and coincident wet bub. (2) Outdoor temperature equal to ASHRAE 99% design dry bub. (3) Outdoor air at design temperature. (4) Outdoor temperature is ASHRAE 97.5%.
Copier — Coin-Op Public	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				40-60	D			□			
Copier — Staff	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				40-60	D			□			
Microfiche Area — Public & Staff	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				40-60	D			□			
Supplies Storage	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)														
Technical Service Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				40-60	D			□			
Microfiche Duplicator																		
Rare Book/Court Archives Room	- - - -	-								Special Design							Special Design	
Coat Storage — Public																		
Coat Storage — Staff																		
Storage Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)														
Mailroom	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				60-75	D			□			
Freight Staging Area																		
Shelving Area	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)							40-60	D			□			
Toilet: Staff																		
Staff Lounge	74-76 (1)	70-74 (2)	45-55 (3)	30-40 (4)	20	8	80-85				30-40	D	D					

Building Support Facilities
Space

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)
DELIVERY, DISPOSAL AND STORAGE AREAS	
Loading Dock	min 2 @ 300 ea.
Temporary Storage	as req'd.
Dock Master's Office	120
Refuse Bay	min 1 @ 300 ea.
Secure Refuse Bay	Size varies with size of building
Bulk storage area	As req'd.
Archival storage area	As req'd.
Explosion-resistant mail/ parcel inspection	As req'd.
MAINTENANCE STAFF AREAS	
Supervisor Office	150
Locker Room	10/locker, 60 min
Break/Meeting Room	10/person + 40 galley
Staff Toilet	As req'd., min 2 @ 50
Maintenance Shop, Bulk Building Services	As req'd.
Maintenance Shop, Equipment & Furniture	As req'd.
Maintenance Shop, General Surplus Material	As req'd.
EQUIPMENT ROOMS AND RISERS	
Electric	As req'd.
Telephone	As req'd.
Data	As req'd.
H.V.A.C.	As req'd.
Elevator	As req'd.
Fire	As req'd.
Plumbing/Drainage	As req'd.
OTHER AREAS	
Public Toilets	Per code requirements
Janitorial Closets	30/closet, min 1/floor
Public Stairs	As req'd.
Public Circulation Corridor	As req'd.
Public Elevator Lobby	As req'd.
Main Public Lobby	Size dependent upon building design
Pay phones	15


REFUSE BAY
LOADING DOCK
LOADING DOCK
DOCK MASTER'S OFFICE
EXPLOSION-RESISTANT MAIL/ PARCEL INSPECTION
AS REQ'D.
SECURE REFUSE BAY
VARIES
F
TEMPORARY STORAGE
AS REQ'D.
MAINT. SUPERV. OFFICE
BULK STORAGE AREA
AS REQ'D.
MAINTENANCE SHOP, BULK BLDG SERVICES
AS REQ'D.
MAINT. STAFF BREAK/MEETING ROOM
MAINTENANCE SHOP, EQUIP & FURNITURE
AS REQ'D.
MAINT. STAFF LOCKER ROOM
ARCHIVAL STORAGE AREA
AS REQ'D.
MAINTENANCE SHOP, GEN'L. SURPLUS
AS REQ'D.
MAINT. STAFF TOILETS
AS REQ'D.
R

Building Support Facilities
Delivery, Disposal, Storage and Maintenance Staff Areas
SRAC Diagram



SECTION H

JUDICIARY - RELATED OFFICES

Special Notation: Spatial relationships, accessibility and circulation (SRAC) diagrams, design guide tables, and specific guidelines judiciary - related offices. Details include for office of staff attorney, office of circuit executive, pre-trial services, public defender, space, furniture and finishes.

Source: U.S. Courts Design Guide
Washington, D.C., 3/12/91

Clerk's Office
Space and Finishes (continued)

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	FINISHES Unless otherwise noted refer to PBS P 3638.1A: Chapter 3 Architectural Elements	
			Walls	Floor
GENERAL SPACES (cont'd)				
Evidence vault	min. 150			
Equipment storage				
Large office	min. 150			
Small office	min. 50			
Work area				
Large office	15 /staff, min. 200			
Small office	15 /staff, min. 100			
Copier area, per copier	50/80/120 (low, med., high vol.)			
Mail work area				
Large office	min. 200			
Small office	min. 100			
Computer room				
Large office	min. 300			
Small office	min. 200			
Conference room	25 /person, 120 min.			
Fax work station	10			
Shared VDT/printer	50			
Safe	20			
Shredder	25			
Forms storage	min. 150			
Bulk storage	Refer to Chapter 11: Court-Related Facilities			
Supplies storage, short term				
Large office	300			
Small office	150			
Staff lounge/break room	10/staff + 40 kitchen			
Coat storage	20			
Staff toilets	As req'd., min. 2 @ 50			
Vendor copying service	200-300 (where provided)			

Clerk's Office
Space and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	FINISHES Unless otherwise noted refer to PBS P 3000.1A: Chapter 3 Architectural Elements.	
			Walls	Floor
OFFICES				
Private offices				
Clerk of Court, w/private toilet	300 + 50		High quality paint/wall covering	Highest quality carpet
Senior staff	250			
General staff, incl. pro se attorneys	150			
Semi-private offices				
Supervisor	120			
General staff	70			
Open work stations				
General staff, depending on equipment used[1]	Std: 70 Min: 45			
Counter and cashier work stations	45			
PUBLIC AREAS				
Queuing/work area	15 /person, min. 105			
Counter (including cashier stations)	5 LF/staff position	Built-in: Stand-up counter		
Accessory stand-up work counter	25 /person, 100 min.	Built-in: Stand-up counter		
Coin-operated copier area	50			
Microform reader/printer	35			
Records exam area	25 /person, 125 min.			
Public access computer station	35			
Public pay facsimile machine	10			
GENERAL SPACES				
Records storage				
Secured records	8 /10 LF			
Active records	9 /21 LF			
Inactive records	9 /21 LF			
Financial vault	min. 150			
Microform storage area	12 /cabinet			
Microform reader/printer	35			
Exhibit storage				
Large office	min. 300			
Intermediate-size office	min. 225			
Small office	min. 150			

[1] Note: Space sizes for open workstations do not include allowances for internal circulation. See "Smaller Open Work Stations" in Chapter 13 for areas less than standard.



NOTE: In this area, the space types indicated with dashed lines would be required to support the activities of the USDC Clerk's pro se clerks, where provided.

Clerk's Office
SRAC Diagram



SECTION I

BUILDING SUPPORT FACILITIES

Special Notation: Spatial relationship, accessibility and circulation (SRAC) diagram for delivery, disposal, storage, maintenance, building support facilities space.

Source: U.S. Courts Design Guide
Washington, D.C., 3/12/91

Judiciary-Related Offices
Space, Furniture and Finishes (continued)

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE/STORAGE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Moveable furniture is noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	FINISHES Unless otherwise noted refer to PBS P 3426.1A Chapter 3 Architectural Elements: Walls	Floor
GENERAL OFFICE SPACES (cont'd)				
Work area	15 /staff, min. 105			
Copier area (per copier)	50/80/120 (low/med./high vol.)			
Conference rooms	25 /person, 125 min.			
Library	9 /21 LF of shelving + 25 /person + 70 /CALR station			
Fax work station	10			
Shared CRT/printer area	50			
Vault/safe	20-60			
Microform reader/printer	35			
Microform storage cabinet	12 /cabinet			
Shredder	25			
Galley	40			
Staff lounge	see Chapter 11: Court Related Spaces			
Staff toilets	see Chapter 11: Court Related Spaces			
SPECIAL OFFICE SPACES				
Toilet for urinalysis sample collection	50	See Design Requirements		
Urinalysis supplies storage	25	See Design Requirements		
Urinalysis testing (EMIT) lab & sample storage	175	See Design Requirements		
Electronic Monitoring office	400 (for 2 officers)	See Design Requirements		
Electronic Monitoring equipment storage/repair room	95	See Design Requirements		
Secure computer terminal/printer room	150			
Vestibule	10			
Audio tape listening room	300	See Design Requirements		
Jail file	30 /cabinet			
Client property storage room	100	See Design Requirements		
Returned exhibits storage room	100	See Design Requirements		

Judiciary-Related Offices
Space, Furniture and Finishes

SPACES	SIZE (NSF)	FURNITURE/STORAGE (Built-in furniture is to be considered required. Movable furniture as noted here for illustrative purposes only for determining dimensions of spaces.)	FINISHES (Unless otherwise noted refer to PBS P 3000.1A Chapter 3 Architectural Elements)	
			Walls	Floor
OFFICES				
Private office				
Executive, w/private toilet	300 + 50		High quality paint/wall covering (circuit and district executive's office only)	Highest quality carpet (circuit and district executive's office only)
Senior staff	250			
General staff	150			
Semi-private office				
Supervisor	120			
General staff	70			
Executive secretary/ receptionist (incl small reception/waiting area)	170			
Open work station				
General staff, depending on equipment used	Std: 70 Min: 45			
Counter and cashier work stations	45			
GENERAL OFFICE SPACES				
Reception/waiting	15 /person, min. 100			
Counter/screening	5 LF/staff position	Built-in: Stand-up counter (U.S. Probation Office, Pre-Trial Services Office, Federal Public Defender) with break-resistant design and glazing (U.S. Probation Office, Pre-Trial Services Office only)		
Records storage				
Secured records storage	8 /10 LF			
Active records storage	9 /21 LF			
Inactive records storage	9 /21 LF			
Transfer box storage	50 min.			
Work table	90			
Supplies storage				
Large office	100			
Small office	50			
Equipment storage				
Large office	150			
Small office	50			

* Note: Space sizes for open workstations do not include allowances for normal circulation. See "Smaller Open Work Stations" in Chapter 13 for areas less than standard.



NOTE: SPACES SHOWN ON THIS DIAGRAM ARE PROVIDED FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES. THE ACTUAL NUMBER AND TYPE OF EACH SPACE SHOULD BE DETERMINED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE JUDICIARY-RELATED OFFICE.

Judiciary-Related Offices
Federal Public Defender
SRAC Diagram




SECURED REC STOR
VAULT
GEN'L STAFF PRIV OFC
GEN'L STAFF PRIV OFC
GEN'L STAFF PRIV OFC
TRANSFER BOX STOR
GALLEY
WORK ROOM
GEN'L STAFF PRIV OFC
GEN'L STAFF PRIV OFC
GEN'L STAFF PRIV OFC
GUNLOCKER
IN-ACTIVE RECORD STOR
SUP STOR
EQUIPMENT STORAGE
SHRED
COPY
GEN'L STAFF PRIV OFC
GEN'L STAFF PRIV OFC
GEN'L STAFF PRIV OFC
SENIOR STAFF PRIV OFC
SEMI-PRIVATE WORKSTATIONS
OPEN WORKSTATIONS
STAFF CONF RM
EXECUTIVE PRIV OFC
TLT
FAX
SECR
SHARED VDT
RECEPT COUNTER
ELECTRONIC MONITORING OFFICE
MICRO RDR/PTR
RECEPTION/ WAITING
ELECTRONIC MONITORING STOR/REPAIR
URINALYSIS TEST (EMIT) LAB
URINALYSIS TOILET
URINALYSIS SUPPLY STORAGE
NOTE: SPACES SHOWN ON THIS DIAGRAM ARE PROVIDED FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES. THE ACTUAL NUMBER AND TYPE OF EACH SPACE SHOULD BE DETERMINED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE JUDICIARY-RELATED OFFICE.

U.S. Probation Office
Pre-Trial Services Office
SRAC Diagram





NOTE: SPACES SHOWN ON THIS DIAGRAM ARE PROVIDED FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES. THE ACTUAL NUMBER AND TYPE OF EACH SPACE SHOULD BE DETERMINED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE JUDICIARY-RELATED OFFICE.

Judiciary-Related Offices
Office of the Staff Attorney
SRAC Diagram





NOTE: SPACES SHOWN ON THIS DIAGRAM ARE PROVIDED FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES. THE ACTUAL NUMBER AND TYPE OF EACH SPACE SHOULD BE DETERMINED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE JUDICIARY-RELATED OFFICE.

Judiciary-Related Offices
Office of the Circuit Executive and Office of the District Executive
SRAC Diagram



COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

NATIONAL SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION

COURTHOUSE DESIGN & FACILITIES

Includes:

- **Section J - General Circulation Routes**
- **Section K - General Circulation: Example 1**
- **Section L - General Circulation: Example 2**
- **Section M - Clerk of the Court's Office**
- **Section N - Layout of Courtroom and Newly Space**
- **Section O - Adjacent Courtroom Areas**
- **Section P - Judge's Chambers with Two Exits**
- **Section Q - Design for Limited Space**
- **Section R - Redesigned Criminal Courtroom**
- **Section S - Courtroom in the Round**
- **Section T - Model Courtroom**
- **Section U - Model Courtroom with Additional Security Features**
- **Section V - "Courtroom of the Future": A Center for Legal Advocacy**

INDEX

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SECTION J

GENERAL CIRCULATION ROUTES

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

GENERAL CIRCULATION ROUTES



The general circulation system of a courthouse consists basically of public and security circulation routes. As shown above, the two systems should not intersect. Prisoners should be brought in and moved through the facility without ever coming in contact with the public. In this case, there is a holding space on the lower level and offenders are moved to courtrooms via a security elevator.

Source: National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, **Guidelines for the Planning and Design of State Court Programs and Facilities,** *Monograph B-5:* **Trial Court Facility** *(Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, p. 79. All figures are reproduced with permission of the clearinghouse.*

SECTION K

GENERAL CIRCULATION: EXAMPLE 1

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

GENERAL CIRCULATION: EXAMPLE 1



This building section illustrates some of the important relationships to remember in the layout and planning of a courts building. Higher volume activities such as the clerk's office, dining and cafeteria, jury assembly, information, and public services should be on the lowest floors. Probation and the district attorney's offices should be near the main entrance. The courts and chambers areas should be on the upper floors, away from the higher volume activities. Parking and security access should be on the lowest floor, away from the general entrance and circulation spaces.

In many situations, a separate floor might be considered as part of the initial construction process, so that if space needs have been underestimated new courtrooms or offices can be built quickly.

Source: National Clearinghouse, **Trial Court Facility,** *Monograph B-5, p. 85.*

SECTION L

GENERAL CIRCULATION: EXAMPLE 2

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

GENERAL CIRCULATION: EXAMPLE 2



This plan shows a courthouse scheme in which both courts and judicial offices are located on the same floor. Centered on n open courtyard, the public circulation areas are in the middle of the building. Judicial offices are on a perimeter, to give xterior views. This design allows for a private corridor to serve the judicial staff and also provides access for the public.

Source: National Clearinghouse, **Trial Court Facility,** *Monograph B-5, p. 84.*

SECTION M

CLERK OF THE COURT'S OFFICE

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

CLERK OF THE COURT'S OFFICE



This plan shows a layout for a small office. It is highly accessible to the public, with a form table and reading area adjacent to the public desk. The desk itself is divided into separate activity areas and is served by clerks positioned at right angles to the desk. The chief clerk's office, conference/lounge space, and microfilm/copy room are in areas having little public access. Movable file shelves, on tracks to reduce space needs, are centrally located for the convenience of the entire office.

Source: National Clearinghouse, **Clerk of the Court,** *Monograph B-8, p. 19.*

SECTION N

LAYOUT OF COURTROOM AND NEWLY SPACE

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

LAYOUT OF COURTROOM AND NEARBY SPACE



This plan shows a cluster of two courtroom spaces with attorney/client conference rooms and a joint vestibule entrance. The public circulation area has alcove waiting and lounge areas. The judges' chambers are connected to the courtrooms via a security corridor, along which the witness waiting rooms are also located.

Source: National Clearinghouse, **Trial Courtroom Environment,** *Monograph B-6, p. 38.*

SECTION O

ADJACENT COURTROOM AREAS

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

ADJACENT COURTROOM AREAS



This plan for a single courtroom shows some of the important considerations for a trial courtroom environment. A small alcove space off the public circulation route lets people wait comfortably for court proceedings. The vestibule entry to the courtroom provides an acoustical buffer to prevent corridor noises from interrupting proceedings when someone enters the courtroom. The attorney/client conference space opens off the vestibule, allowing use from both the courtroom and corridor areas.

Source: National Clearinghouse, **Trial Courtroom Environment,** *Monograph B-6, p. 42.*

SECTION P

JUDGE'S CHAMBERS WITH TWO EXITS

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

JUDGE'S CHAMBERS WITH TWO EXITS



This plan of a judge's chamber includes areas to accommodate all persons and functions associated with a judge's ac tivities: secretarial/waiting space, personal work and relaxation area, conference room for discussions and meetings, an separate work space for law clerks. The spaces are interconnected and there are two entry/exit points out of the chambers one for general and more formal use, and one for the judge's private use. A clear view of the judge at his desk or in th conference room (see arrows) is restricted by landscaping. The secretary/waiting area has a window to enable viewing an screening of individuals wanting to enter the chambers (see arrow).

Source: National Clearinghouse, **Trial Courtroom Environment,** *Monograph B-6, p. 92.*

SECTION Q

DESIGN FOR LIMITED SPACE

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

DESIGN FOR LIMITED SPACE



This floor plan was designed for a rural Indian jurisdiction which had a very small space, yet needed to provide for the judge's chambers, jury deliberation and judge's conference area, a flexible trial courtroom, clerk's offices, and public services. The courtroom areas are right next to the jail, and secure passage between the jail and courthouse was required. The above polygon courtroom scheme successfully provides for most of the design features required today in a modern courthouse.

Source: National Clearinghouse, **Trial Courtroom Environment,** *Monograph B-6, p. 24.*

SECTION R

REDESIGNED CRIMINAL COURTROOM

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

REDESIGNED CRIMINAL COURTROOM*



* *Developed by Judge George H. Boldt, federal judge for Washington state.*

Source: Allan Greenberg, **Courthouse Design: A Handbook for Judges and Court Administrators** *(Chicago, Illinois: American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, 1975), figure 15 (reprinted with author's permission).*

SECTION S

COURTROOM IN THE ROUND

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

COURTROOM IN THE ROUND*



* *Architects: Lyons, Mather, and Lechner, AIA*

Source: Greenberg, figure 14.

SECTION T

MODEL COURTROOM

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.



Source: National Clearinghouse, **District of Columbia Superior Court Model Courtroom Evaluation,** *p. 5.*

SECTION U

MODEL COURTROOM WITH ADDITIONAL SECURITY FEATURES

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

MODEL COURTROOM WITH ADDITIONAL SECURITY FEATURES



Source: National Clearinghouse, **District of Columbia Superior Court Model Courtroom Evaluation,** *p. 41.*

SECTION V

"COURTROOM OF THE FUTURE": A CENTER FOR LEGAL ADVOCACY

Source: National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures, Alexandria, Virginia.

"COURTROOM OF THE FUTURE": A CENTER FOR LEGAL ADVOCACY



Source: Diagram provided by and reproduced with the permission of Dean Gordon D. Schaber, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, Sacramento, California.

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

CHAPTER SEVEN

TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

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CHAPTER SEVEN

TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

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TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

A major focus of this study has been to determine proper procedures for transporting and escorting prisoners in a variety of situations, including to courts, hospitals, state correctional facilities, funeral homes and mental health facilities. Prisoners throughout the United States are continually in transit by automobile, bus, van, private plane and commercial aircraft.

The N.S.A. Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees pointed out that there seem to be no fixed rules or procedures throughout the nation governing the transportation of prisoners. These comments were affirmed by a thorough search of the literature, which found a variety of procedures and rules for different jurisdictions, including many jurisdictions with no established procedures or rules at all.

Yet the transportation of prisoners is one of the most dangerous tasks in law enforcement and accounts for several deaths and injuries each year to escorting officers, bystanders and prisoners.

When escorting a prisoner, the officer/deputy may be providing the prisoner with his first exposure to the outside world in a long time. There is always a potential threat of escape, harm to the prisoner by unknown persons, or an attack upon the officer by accomplices or friends of the prisoner. In many cases, carelessness on the part of the escort officer or the inappropriate classification of the prisoner facilitates an escape or escape attempt. N.S.A. Advisory Board and Staff Review Committee members cited several other factors which contribute to escapes and escape attempts: improper application of restraint equipment, failure to properly search a transport vehicle, escorting without weapons, and not using enough employees to transport a prisoner adequately, as well as improper supervision during the escort.

How, then, can escort duty be conducted while ensuring the public safety and the safety of the officer/deputy? Based on a review of the literature and an analysis of the policies and procedures of several agencies, the N.S.A. Project Staff developed 10 areas which need to be considered by agencies charged with the task of transporting prisoners:

1. Classification procedures;

2. Preparing prisoners for transports;

3. Developing transportation policies and procedures;

4. Conditions of transportation;

5. Post orders for transports;

6. Transporting prisoners by auto- mobile, van and bus;

7. Transporting prisoners by air;

8. Types of escort situations;

9. Lock-ups and holding cells; and

10. Use of force.

Classification Procedures:

The most important first step in preparing to transport a prisoner safely is to correctly classify the prisoner as to degree of dangerousness so that proper levels of care, custody, control and supervision are implemented for each individual prisoner. Taking the necessary time at the outset to properly classify a prisoner can result in fewer - if any - problems in the future.

In classifying a prisoner for transport, the **degree of security** to be utilized should be based upon the following factors:

- Escape risk
- History of serious institutional, disciplinary or behavioral problems
- Charge: Felony, misdemeanor or protective custody
- Sex: Male or female
- Age: Juvenile or adult
- Physical appearance
- Health issues/special needs
- Suicide attempts
- Criminal history
- Bond/detainers/warrants
- Prior arrests
- Case status: sentenced/un-sentenced
- Hostile attitude towards any person(s)
- Speak or read and understand English
- Uses aliases
- Past known address(es)
- Citizenship
- Special considerations: under investigation by a deputy/officer/agency; court order to keep the prisoner separate from other prisoners, victims, witnesses, etc.

Sheriffs' offices and other agencies which transport prisoners should develop written policies and procedures governing the classification of prisoners by security-risk levels.

Preparing Prisoners for Transports:

N.S.A.'s research determined that **the most important factors in preparing a prisoner for transport are:**

1. Thoroughly searching the prisoner prior to **each** transport (i.e., before being transported to court and before being transported from court back to the jail);

2. Using the proper restraining devices depending upon the security classification level of the prisoner;

3. Following proper legal guidelines when searching and restraining prisoners; and

4. Providing a proper number of officers/deputies to search and transport each prisoner safely, depending upon both the security classification level of the prisoner and any special needs (i.e., the prisoner is injured, vision-impaired, mentally ill, etc.).

Searching the Prisoner: Improper searches of prisoners prior to transports are one of the leading causes of deaths and injuries to transport officers as well as citizens when prisoners attempt to escape or do successfully escape. There are numerous incidents on a daily basis throughout the nation involving prisoners who have secreted handcuff keys, homemade knives (shanks) and even guns on their person, and who use these keys and weapons to overpower officers/deputies while the transport is in progress. **Every prisoner is a potential carrier of contraband and an escape risk.**

The care, custody, control and supervision of any prisoner being transported is the full-time responsibility of the escort officer. The security of the area where the prisoner is to be taken (i.e., courtroom, hospital, etc.) and the safety of the transport officers and other prisoners while in transit can be assured only when each prisoner being transported is searched thoroughly.

Every sheriff's office and agency which transports prisoners should develop written policies and procedures governing searches of prisoners prior to transport. These policies and procedures should cover the number of officers/deputies conducting the search (preferably two), methods of searching a prisoner, privacy of the prisoner during the search, searching female prisoners, life-safety issues for officers/deputies (i.e., officers/deputies wearing protective gloves, masks, etc., to avoid contracting contagious or infectious diseases), life-safety issues for sick or injured prisoners, and liability issues (e.g., use of force).

The prisoner should be searched for concealed contraband, weapons, and to determine whether there is an existing medical problem. All prosthetic devices such as arms and legs should be removed and examined. Hollowed-out sections in these devices may conceal drugs, guns, knives, handcuff keys, hacksaw blades, or money. When a prisoner is wearing a cast, special care should be taken to determine whether it is false and perhaps concealing contraband. Careful examination may reveal whether the cast has been tampered with. A person with a cast should be referred to a jail physician for examination. It may be necessary to x-ray the area of the cast to remove any doubt that the cast is concealing contraband.

All searches of prisoners by officers/deputies should be conducted with maximum respect and minimum physical discomfort to the prisoner. If the prisoner resists or refuses to cooperate, the officer should contact his superior immediately for instructions. Officers/deputies should use only the force necessary to conduct the search.

Two types of searches are normally used: (1) basic frisk search; and (2) skin or strip search. Procedures for conducting these two types of searches are described in detail in *The Jail Officer's Training Manual* (Chapter Eight), published by N.S.A. in 1980 and revised in 1994.[1] Proper search procedures are also described in detail in the American Jail Association's *Jail Operations Bulletin*, "Transportation of Prisoners."[2]

The basic skin or strip search can be used for both men and women. Any further searching, such as internal rectal and vaginal checks, is a matter of policy to be set by each jurisdiction. *The officer/deputy must be aware of this policy and any female must be searched in private by a female officer/deputy.*

All types of contraband drugs and weapons have been found hidden on prisoners. Prisoners can conceal evidence and contraband anywhere upon their bodies or in their clothing. Thus, it is imperative to always conduct a systematic and thorough search.

ALL SEARCHES SHOULD INCLUDE THESE POINTS:

- Have a backup officer/deputy when conducting all searches.
- Maintain control of the prisoner at all times during the search process.
- Position the prisoner during the search to your advantage.
- Continual alertness and observation are critical.
- A thorough search is a must. Search and re-search to assure that nothing is missed.
- Always search systematically, using the "W" pattern: left to right and right to left.
- Search with one hand only. The other hand should be in contact with the prisoner for control.
- Inventory all evidence, contraband, weapons and personal effects.

Although not always possible, it is desirable to have a back-up officer present to provide protection for the officer who is conducting the search. The back-up officer's responsibilities are:

- Protect the searching officer from outside interference;
- Provide physical assistance to the searching officer if it becomes necessary; and
- Provide continuous observation of the prisoner from a position of safety.

Use Proper Restraining Devices When Escorting A Prisoner: There are several types of restraining devices which can be used when transporting prisoners:

1. **Swivel, non-locking handcuffs:** The most popular type of handcuff, their light weight, ease of application, and versatility make for a practical device that can be used in most situations for restraining a prisoner.

2. **Hinged handcuffs:** A popular type of handcuff used for a high level of security of a prisoner. This handcuff restricts the prisoner in tampering with the rachet and locking mechanism.

3. **Waist chain/belts:** The waist chain is used in conjunction with handcuffs. The chain encircles the prisoner's waist and is pulled through a large link to create a snug fit and is secured either with a separate lock or a clip. Handcuffs are then attached to the chain, using the procedure outlined above. This is a most effective restraining device because it lessens the mobility of the prisoner's hands.

HUMANE TRANSPORT BELT



4. **Restraining straps [Flex-cuffs]:** Used when officers/deputies need extra handcuffs in an emergency situation. This type of restraining device can be used on legs or ankles.

5. **Restraining straps [leather]:** Are usually made of leather, vinyl and other materials and are designed to secure a prisoner on a bed, chair or other object which is similar to the manner in which a restraining sheet is used.



AMBULATORY

WRIST-WAIST RESTRAINTS

6. **Restraining sheet:** A canvas sheet with straps designed to secure a prisoner to a bed. In addition to security, it prevents a prisoner from injuring himself when circumstances make it necessary for him to remain in bed.

7. **Bed restraints:** Used to restrain a prisoner in a secure manner to a stationary bed.

BED RESTRAINTS



8. **Ambulatory restraints [leather]:** Used primarily to make a prisoner immobile in his movements. Most often used around the ankles and wrists.

9. **Straitjacket:** Used on the violent prisoner and is designed to restrict all movements and to completely immobilize the prisoner. However, prisoners can more easily free themselves from a straitjacket than from handcuffs and ankle shackles.

HUMANE-LYNCH STRAIT JACKETS



Front View Rear View

10. **Leg brace:** When transporting a prisoner by air, a leg brace is an excellent device to use. It is an orthopedic knee cage with a ring lock that impedes the prisoner's leg movements. It can be worn under the trouser leg.



Handcuff Prisoners Properly Prior To Transporting Them: Several handcuffing techniques can be utilized when transporting prisoners:

- **Securing bracelets to wrists:** This method requires the handcuffs to be secured to each wrist of the inmate as he holds his hands in opposite directions. The key aperture should be to the rear facing the prisoner's body or facing his head. Each cuff must be double-locked to prevent the prisoner from opening it by using a thin piece of metal. The escorting officer/deputy should apply any restraining devices; however, before they are applied, they should be checked for any breaks or

malfunctions and the prisoner's wrists should be checked to make sure he has not greased them. In all cases, the officer/deputy should resolve all doubts in his own favor, and double check the restraints after he has applied them. Handcuffs should be properly applied, tight enough to prevent them from slipping off, but not so tight that they cause discomfort or pain. An officer/deputy can be considerate without violating security. **Harsh or inhumane treatment should be avoided.**

- **The interlocking method:** This method gives added security by passing one cuff through the other one in a chain-like manner before locking. Facing hands in opposite directions before using this method will restrict the inmate's use of his hands and arms and cause discomfort with any undue exertion. However, the facing of hands in opposite directions is very uncomfortable and is not recommended for prolonged periods.

- **Behind the legs method:** In this method both arms are placed under the legs and the wrists cuffed, which in effect has the prisoner in a doubled-up position with his leg in the loop formed by his arms. This method is very effective in immobilizing the prisoner and is ideal in situations where an officer/deputy is alone with a prisoner and there is a possibility of an escape attempt. However, this position is also uncomfortable for a prisoner and should be discontinued as soon as possible.

Restraining equipment should be a standard brand to minimize the number of keys necessary during transports.

Prisoners should not be shackled to a stationary object or a vehicle. There is too much possibility of injury.

Developing Transportation Policies and Procedures:

Every law enforcement or court agency which transports or escorts prisoners should develop written policies and procedures to be learned and followed by all transport personnel. Written policies and procedures, when fully disseminated and enforced, help protect the agency in the event of liability lawsuits alleging negligence. In addition, such policies and procedures help assure the proper care and treatment of prisoners with regard to life safety issues, the proper use of restraints and safety.

Agency administrators developing written policies and procedures may wish to consult the "Model Policy: Transportation of Prisoners" developed in 1990 by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) National Law Enforcement Policy Center and reprinted here as Figure 7:1.

FIGURE 7:1
TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

---------- Model Policy ----------

	Effective Date May 1, 1990	Number
Subject: Transportation of Prisoners		
Reference	Special Instructions	
Distribution	Re-evaluation Date April 30, 1991	No. Pages 2

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to provide guidelines on the transportation of all persons in custody of a law enforcement officer.

II. POLICY

It shall be the policy of this law enforcement agency to take the precautions necessary while transporting prisoners to protect the lives and safety of the officer, public, and the person in custody.

III. PROCEDURES

A. Vehicle Inspection

1. At the beginning and end of each tour of duty, all vehicles regularly

used for prisoner transport shall be inspected for readiness as follows:

a. The safety screen shall be securely in place and undamaged.

b. All windows shall be intact, and outer door latches in proper working order;

c. Rear seat door handles and window controls should be deactivated; and

d. The interior shall be thoroughly searched to ensure that no weapons or contraband have been left or hidden within the vehicle.

2. Prior to placing a prisoner in the vehicle for transport, the transporting officer shall again inspect the interior for weapons or contraband. The vehicle shall be searched again after the prisoner has been delivered to the detention facility or other destination.

B. Handcuffing

1. Officers shall handcuff (double locked) all prisoners with their hands behind their back and palms facing outward.

2. The officer may handcuff the prisoner with his/her hands in front, or utilize other appropriate restraining devices where the prisoner:

a. Is in an obvious state of pregnancy;

b. Has a physical handicap; or

c. Has injuries that could be aggravated by standard handcuffing procedures.

3. Prisoners shall not be handcuffed to any part of the vehicle during transport.

4. Additional approved restraint devices may be used to secure a prisoner who violently resists arrest or who manifests mental disorders such that he poses a threat to himself or to the public.

C. Transport

1. Prior to transport, all prisoners shall be thoroughly searched for any weapons or tools of escape.

   a. If practical, the protective search should be conducted by an officer of the same sex as the prisoner; and

   b. The transporting officer should search the prisoner, unless a search was conducted in his presence.

2. When transporting prisoners, the officer shall provide the communications center with the following information when possible:

   a. Identity of the prisoner;

   b. Arrest location and destination of transport; and

   c. Time and mileage readings before and after transport.

3. The officer should use care when assisting a prisoner into the vehicle for transport.

4. Prisoners shall be transported in the following manner:

   a. Where the vehicle has a security screen, but only one transporting officer, the prisoner shall be placed in the back seat on the right side of the vehicle. When the vehicle is not equipped with a security screen and has only one transporting officer, the prisoner shall be placed in the right front seat.

   b. When a prisoner is being transported in a two-officer vehicle without a security screen, the prisoner shall be placed in the right rear seat. The second officer shall sit in the left rear seat behind the driver.

   c. Leg restraints shall be used when an officer believes the prisoner has a potential for violent behavior.

   d. One transporting officer should not attempt to transport more than one prisoner in a vehicle without a security bar- rier, but should request transport assistance.

   e. All prisoners shall be secured in the vehicle by proper use of a seatbelt.

5. Any wheelchairs, crutches, prosthetic devices, and medication should be transported with, but not in the possession of, the prisoner.

6. Prisoners shall not be left unattended during transport. Any

escape shall be immediately reported to the communications center.

BY ORDER OF

_____
CHIEF OF POLICE/SHERIFF

The IACP Model Policy on Transportation of Prisoners was developed under the auspices of the Advisory Board to the IACP/BJA National Law Enforcement Policy Center. It is intended to serve as a guide for the law enforcement executive who is interested in formulating a written procedure to prevent and resolve potential prisoner transportation problems. The law enforcement executive is advised to refer to all Federal, state, and municipal statutes, ordinances, regulations, and judicial and administrative decisions to ensure that the policy he seeks to implement meets the unique needs of the jurisdiction.

The development of this model policy was supported under funding by the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance under Grant No. 87-SN-CX-K077. The points of view or opinions stated in this document are the results of work performed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

A carefully written policy and procedures statement on the transportation of prisoners should cover the following procedural elements: Use of restraint devices; security and custody levels for transports; and legal liability issues (use-of-force, safety of prisoners and safety of community).

Use of restraint devices: The written policy statement should specify the types of security restraint devices which may be used within the agency. The policy statement should include procedural descriptions of how to properly apply each type of restraining device, which types of restraining devices will be made available to the transport officers, and who (by job function) will control the restraining devices (storage, issuance, inventory control, repair and replacement). The procedural statement should also include the following points:

- The correctional officers to whom a restraining device is issued shall inspect the

restraint to ensure that it is in proper working order before it is used on a prisoner.

- Restraining devices shall not be used as punishment and shall be applied only for the length of time necessary.

- If **oleoresin capsicum** has been used to subdue a prisoner prior to transport, officers should not restrain the prisoner in a manner in which the prisoner can become asphyxiated. Recent studies conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) for the U.S. Justice Department's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) show that prisoners who have died in custody after being sprayed with oleoresin capsicum (OC or "pepper spray") died as the result of **positional asphyxiation.** In almost all the deaths studied by the IACP, the prisoners at autopsy were found to be under the influence of drugs and had continued to struggle after being sprayed.[3] In most cases when deaths occurred, police had used severe physical restraints, such as shackles.[4] IACP's study concluded that "positional asphyxia" caused by restraints was responsible for 18 of the 22 deaths studied; the asphyxiation occurs when a prisoner, under the influence of drugs and who may be obese, is sprayed with OC, which may cause breathing difficulties, and then is placed in a transport vehicle in a prone position while shackled.[5] The IACP study concluded that **pepper spray is safe and effective as long as precautions are taken when transporting prisoners who have been sprayed.**[6]

- Restraint devices other than those specifically designated in the agency's policy are not authorized and may not be used.

The policy should also describe the type of training that all transport personnel are provided to ensure that they know how to use the authorized types of restraining devices properly.

Security levels for transports: Each agency should establish written procedures for transporting prisoners of varying security levels to assure the safety of the transport officers, other prisoners and members of the public. Figure 7:2, which depicts the risk level of prisoners participating in various types of judicial proceedings, can serve as a useful guide in determining the risks involved in transporting individual prisoners.

Figure 7:2

RISK LEVEL/TYPE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

	CIVIL TRIAL	CRIMINAL TRIAL
LOW	Admiralty Antitrust Bankruptcy Contracts Economic Stabilization Energy Allocation Environmental Matters Freedom of Information Labor Suits Land Condemnation Personal Injury Product Liability Protected Property Real Property Small Claims Social Security Tort	Auto Theft Burglary Counterfeiting Embezzlement Forgery Fraud Grand Juries Larceny/Theft Motor Vehicle Violation Perjury Petit Juries Public Corruption
MODERATE	Civil Rights (All) Domestic Deportation Family Court Foreclosure Forfeiture and Penalty Tax	Arraignments Arson Extortion Firearms Violations Juvenile Court Obstruction of Justice Organized Crime Preliminary Hearings Robbery (All) Sex Offenses (All) Treason
HIGH		Escape Homicide/Murder/Manslaughter Kidnapping Narcotics

Most correctional institutions and law enforcement agencies nationwide use the following five levels of security to classify prisoners as to the degree of danger which they present as escape risks or someone who could cause harm to themselves, transport officers, other prisoners or citizens:

- **Super Maximum** - the highest level of security. Extremely limited movement, constant observation and limited prisoner-to-staff and prisoner-to-prisoner contact.

- **Maximum** - the second highest security level. Maximum security provides control of the behavior of prisoners who pose a high risk of violence, are significant escape risks, have a history of serious disciplinary problems or are likely to have serious disciplinary or psychological problems.

- **Medium** - the third highest security level. Medium security provides control of prisoners who pose some risk of violence, are moderate escape risks or have a limited history of institutional or disciplinary problems.

- **Minimum** - the fourth highest security level. Minimum security provides control of prisoners who have fewer security features for prisoners and who pose less risk of violence or escape and have a minimal history of institutional or disciplinary problems.

- **Pre-Release** - the fifth highest level of security. Pre-release security has the fewest security features for prisoners who present the least risk of violence and escape and have a record of satisfactory institutional or disciplinary behavior problems.

The agency administrators should ensure that all personnel assigned to the transport function understand and can apply the proper procedures for classifying prisoners according to degree of perceived risk.

The procedural guidelines should also describe custody factors which affect the degree of supervision each prisoner receives while being transported. These factors include such conditions as moving the prisoner during daylight or at night, whether a meal must be provided during the transport, weather conditions, and other factors which may necessitate close supervision of each prisoner being transported (i.e., one-on-one supervision).

Legal liability issues: No policy and procedures statement on the transportation of prisoners would be complete if it failed to discuss legal liability issues pertaining to the proper use of restraining devices, humane procedures for securing and transporting sick or injured prisoners, the use of force when a prisoner attempts to escape or becomes unruly or violent, search

guidelines, separation of prisoners by sex and age, prisoner well-being (life safety issues involving the proper handling of prisoners who are ill, injured, intoxicated, depressed, suicidal, mentally unstable, etc.), seatbelt use, male officers transporting female prisoners, leaving prisoners unattended, and prohibitions against shackling prisoners to stationary objects (such as fences) or vehicles.

Conditions of Transportation:

The conditions involved in transporting prisoners vary according to each situation - every prisoner transport is unique in many ways, or "one of a kind." However, the N.S.A. Project Staff, based on its Review of the Literature and Advisory Board and Staff Review Committee meetings, was able to identify certain conditions common to most transport situations and develop **generic guidelines for the safe and secure movement of prisoners.**

First, if groups of super maximum, maximum or medium security level prisoners are being transported, the supervisor should ensure that the following functions are carried out:

1. Making certain that the inmates are transported in a secured vehicle;

2. During mass movement from the vehicle to a secure holding area, assure that one armed officer/deputy is positioned to the front of the group, one to the rear of the group and, if there are other officers/deputies available, position them to the side of the group;

3. Assign to escort duty at least one officer/deputy of the same sex as the prisoners being transported; and

4. If minimum or pre-release security level prisoners are included in the group, ensure that they are restrained in the same manner as the super maximum, maximum or medium security level prisoners.

Second, if the entire group of prisoners being transported is minimum or pre-release security level, the supervisor may allow the officers to transport them without restraints.

Third, officers/deputies assigned to escort or transportation of prisoners duty should be qualified (with current certification)

in the use of firearms, trained and experienced in transporting prisoners, and familiar with good security procedures.

Fourth, experienced officers should directly and closely supervise any probationary officer/deputy who is assigned to escort/transportation duty.

Fifth, for each escort, officers should obtain escort identification cards for the prisoners they are transporting and return the cards to the Escort/Transportation Office when the prisoners are returned to the facility. If, during the transport process, the prisoner is left in the custody of a law enforcement officer or other authorized persons, the transporting officer should obtain a written receipt for the prisoner.

Sixth, while transporting prisoners, officers should not permit them to make any telephone calls or receive personal visitors, money, or gifts (such as food, drinks, cigarettes).

Seventh, and perhaps most important, **the transport officer should keep his assigned prisoners in view at all times.**

Post Orders for Transports:

Administrators in all law enforcement agencies which have the responsibility of transporting prisoners should develop **detailed written post orders describing proper transportation procedures.** Clearly written post orders assure continuity in the transportation process and -- if the post orders are followed by all personnel -- are useful tools in defending the agency and its personnel in the event of a lawsuit for negligence.

When developing post orders, administrators will realize that it is almost impossible to outline each particular duty in total detail. Officers/deputies must exercise a high degree of initiative and discretion, since each transport situation is unique.

However, it is possible to develop some **general procedural guidelines for prisoner transports** which administrators can incorporate into the post orders that they design to meet the specific needs of their individual agencies.

Post orders could include the following points:

1. Transport officers/deputies should wear appropriate dress for all escorts/transports [civilian clothing or regulation uniform attire].

2. When a prisoner transport is requested, the supervisor in charge should assure that the prisoners are searched, properly dressed and restrained for the trip [e.g., handcuffs, waist chain, leg irons, cuff box, locks or any other appropriate equipment authorized to be used.] Check/inspect all restraining devices for their operating condition before taking control of a prisoner for transportation.

3. Officers/deputies escorting prisoners to community health services, court, etc., must clearly inform the prisoners before departing from the agency that they must be on their best behavior. Any prisoner who displays inappropriate behavior or rude or non-compliant behavior, uses rude or obscene language, should immediately be removed from the premises and returned to the originating agency. If such behavior is displayed at any community resource for treatment, the prisoner's appointment will be canceled and the medical record should reflect this incident.

4. All escorting officers/deputies shall be currently qualified in the use of firearms, trained and experienced in transporting prisoners, and familiar with good security practices. Weapons will be drawn from the armory for the trip. For lengthy trips, a credit card will be issued to cover any necessary expenses.

5. Officers/deputies must have a valid class ["B"/"C"] Commercial Driver's License (C.D.L.) when appropriate and obey all traffic laws.

6. In most instances, two armed officers/deputies should be assigned to transport any prisoner. However, the number of officers assigned depends upon the number of prisoners being transported and the classification level of the prisoners.

7. One of the transporting officers/deputies will be the same sex as the prisoner being transported.

8. Prisoners will be under constant direct supervision at all times, except when they can

be secured in a holding cell. Restraining equipment will be removed only when absolutely necessary [e.g., medical treatment, etc.].

9. If it becomes necessary to either remove or adjust the restraining equipment during the course of the transport, the officer/deputy who will come in direct contact with the prisoner will relinquish his weapon to the second transporting officer.

10. If holding areas are used for court appearances at any court facility, it is the responsibility of every officer/deputy to ensure that appropriate security of prisoners is maintained at all times.

11. Officers/deputies providing escort for prisoners being transported by ambulance (riding in the ambulance with the prisoner to or from a medical facility or agency), will wear side arms in accordance with the provisions of agency policy and procedures. The prisoner will continue to be restrained while in the ambulance, in accordance with current agency policy. The second officer/deputy will follow in an agency vehicle and shall also be armed.

12. Escorting officers/deputies shall obtain a written receipt or a death certificate (if appropriate) for any prisoner turned over to the custody of another authorized agency.

13. The Medical Section of the agency must inform transporting officers of any communicable or infectious disease that the prisoner may have. Should any prisoner have to be transported who has a communicable or infectious disease, a summary of the guidelines transporting officers should take will be communicated to the officers/deputies prior to transport. These precautions may include enteric precautions, blood or body fluid precautions, and some indication of how the officer may attend to those needs, following the guidelines mandated by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

14. When escorting prisoners to courts, hospitals, institutions, etc., the officer/deputy must

familiarize himself with security procedures of the facility where the prisoner is being taken.

15. Be advised that medical information about an individual is privileged and confidential. If information which an officer has affects or is believed to affect the agency's security operation, then the officer should communicate this information to appropriate supervisors. Officers are NOT to discuss with ANY PERSON the condition of, treatment of, or the destination of the prisoner/patient.

16. When escorting prisoners to medical clinics or hospitals, officers must familiarize themselves with security procedures as outlined in the Patient Prisoner Policy for the hospital.

17. When escorting prisoners on funeral details, the officer/deputy must maintain appropriate security at all times.

18. When an agency transport vehicle is involved in an accident, these procedures should be followed:

- ♦♦ Stop as close to the scene as is safely practical. Avoid blocking traffic and take whatever steps are necessary to minimize potential danger to others;
- ♦♦ If necessary, notify emergency medical and/or fire rescue personnel for service;
- ♦♦ Notify the local law enforcement agency or assure that notification has been made. The law enforcement officer responding to the scene should be asked to make a formal report to the transport officer's agency;
- ♦♦ Notify the on-duty supervisor at your agency of the accident, injuries or property damage, etc.;
- ♦♦ Protect property;

- ♦♦ Provide identification and insurance information to involved parties;

- ♦♦ Cooperate with law enforcement and emergency medical personnel;

- ♦♦ Avoid admitting negligence/guilt or offering settlements;

- ♦♦ Obtain the names and addresses of witnesses/involved parties;

- ♦♦ Maintain full and complete control of your prisoner at the accident scene, hospital, etc.; and

- ♦♦ Officers/deputies involved in any accidents should complete and submit a written report that addresses the accident and related circumstances.

19. All prisoners who are being transported should be monitored continuously to assure that no medical emergency occurs (unconsciousness, seizure, apparent heart attack or medication reaction). If a medical emergency does occur while the transport is in progress, appropriate actions must be taken by officers/deputies.

20. Officers/deputies should be in communication with their agency (car phone, radio, etc.) whenever they are in a governmental vehicle being used for a prisoner transport.

21. Prisoners shall not be permitted to select routes of travel, rest stops, or in any other manner influence the travel itinerary.

22. Prisoners will not be permitted to possess or expend any funds while in transit.

23. Prisoners will not be permitted to converse with anyone except other prisoners and custodial authorities while in transit.

24. Prisoners will not be permitted to place telephone calls while in the custody of agency personnel.

25. Prisoners will not be permitted medication except that prescribed by a physician or as indicated by the institution. Medication which must be administered by hypodermic syringe will be injected only by medical personnel.

26. Handcuff and leg iron keys will not be carried on the same key ring as motor vehicle ignition keys or other generally used keys.

Transporting Prisoners by Automobile, Van and Bus:

The most common method of transporting prisoners locally or regularly is to use an automobile, van or bus, depending upon the number of prisoners being transported. Agencies should use the most cost-effective method of transportation.

Loads/Capacity: A full load for automobile trips is three prisoners in the rear seat of a screened vehicle and two prisoners in the rear seat ((with an unarmed officer/deputy) of an unscreened vehicle. A full load for buses or vans is in accordance with the passenger seating configuration for each vehicle used. The number of prisoners assigned to a vehicle should not exceed the designed passenger load of that vehicle.

Each automobile trip ideally should be handled by a minimum of at least two officers, if manpower allocation permits. When the number of prisoners to be transported is sufficient to require transportation by bus or van, the number of security personnel required should be left to the judgment of the officers/deputies assigned to the transport or their supervisors. However, a minimum of two officers/deputies always should be assigned to each van or bus.

Vehicle Safety: Vehicles must be searched prior to being used for prisoner movements and after each prisoner trip. The search should include not only an inspection of the prisoner area but the entire interior of the vehicle, front and back. If the trip involves more than one day, the search should be completed prior to loading prisoners at the beginning of each day and at the end of each day's trip.

One or more armed officers/deputies should be positioned at vantage points outside the vehicle during the loading and unloading of prisoners.

The inside rear door handles should be removed or rendered inoperable on all automobiles used for prisoner transport.

The driver and all security officers/deputies should be separated from prisoners by security screens constructed of plexiglass or steel mesh if at all possible. However, if a vehicle used for prisoner transport has no security screens, the following procedures should be implemented if at all possible:

1. No more than two prisoners should be transported in an unscreened automobile.

2. Prisoner #1 should be seated in the right rear and prisoner #2 should be seated in the middle rear.

3. No prisoner should be transported in the front seat of a sedan.

4. An **unarmed** officer/deputy should ride in the left rear seat (i.e., behind the driver). The unarmed officer's weapon should be secured on the driver's person or locked in the trunk of the automobile.

Other Passengers: Guests, hitchhikers, persons not serving in an official capacity, or other persons not in the custody of officers/deputies should not be permitted in vehicles under any circumstances while prisoners are being transported.

Rest Stops: Vehicles should be parked as close to the rest rooms as possible. Law enforcement, correctional or jail facilities should be used when possible. Rest areas on interstate highways should be avoided and facilities should be selected at random--after departing the interstate highway system. Other important considerations include:

1. Prisoners should not be left unguarded at any time. All prisoners must remain under close surveillance at rest stops, both in the vehicle and in the rest rooms.

2. A thorough search of rest stop facilities should be conducted for contraband, items that may be used as weapons, and any item that may be used in an escape attempt prior to permitting prisoners to use the facility.

3. Restraining devices should not be removed. Each time a prisoner is placed in or removed from a vehicle, all restraints should be thoroughly checked to determine that each device used is secured.

Transportation Security/Safety Tips:

1. An officer/deputy must never assume that a prisoner is helpless with handcuffs and shackles on. The prisoner's head is still a powerful battering instrument that can do considerable damage to the officer. Officers must never take any chances or believe a prisoner can be trusted to behave himself.

2. An escort officer must be especially alert in applying or removing handcuffs or other restraining devices since this is a likely time for a desperate prisoner to make an escape attempt. At such a time the officer is extremely vulnerable.

3. The transporting officer should use extreme caution at all times when handling a mentally disturbed or violent prisoner.

4. For safety reasons, prisoners should never know which officer/deputy is carrying the handcuff keys. Knowledge of who has the keys will tempt some prisoners to attack an officer.

5. Each officer/deputy should be provided with sufficient refresher training in the use of restraining devices to ensure continued proficiency so that he acts correctly in an emergency situation.

6. **Constant vigilance is necessary at all times.** When driving, a transporting officer/deputy should adhere to all motor vehicle laws. It is also helpful to know where hospitals along the route are located.

7. If the officer must stop for meals, restaurants should be pre-selected. An officer should **never** stop at a restaurant suggested by the prisoner. When available, the transporting officer should use a drive-in restaurant; it is preferable to have the prisoners eat in the vehicle rather than take them into a restaurant, especially if they present a security risk. The officer should also make sure that the prisoners do not hide salt, pepper or sugar. These ingredients, if thrown into the officer's eyes, can momentarily blind him and give the prisoner

an opportunity to escape. To prevent this from happening, the officer should ask the prisoners how they want their food seasoned and do it for them.

8. It is also wise for the transporting officer to check continuously to make sure he is not being followed. If he observes a car in distress, the officer should not stop to provide assistance but instead should radio local police. Prisoners who have planned escapes often advise their friends to set up a "motorist-in-distress" situation to get the unwary officer to stop.

9. While walking with a prisoner, the officer/deputy should walk alongside but slightly behind the prisoner. Never let the prisoner lag behind. In addition, the officer should not allow anyone to pass between him and the prisoner. If two officers/-deputies are escorting, the prisoner should walk between them.

10. **Firearms Storage**: Weapons should be stored in a safe and secure location or given to another officer/deputy when close physical contact with a prisoner is possible or likely. When prisoners are on board the bus, at no time should any bus/van personnel enter the interior cage of the bus/van armed, nor should the restraining doors to the interior cage be unlocked and opened until all weapons have been removed from the appropriate crew area of the bus/van.

11. **Layover Storage**: During overnight layovers at correctional facilities, firearms should be stored in the agency or facility armory. During layovers at any other location, all firearms should be secured inside a portable locked steel box. The box should be secured inside the interior cage of the bus/van.

12. **Protective Vest**: All bus crews **should** wear protective vests if available.

13. **Chemical Agents:** Each bus/van should be equipped with CS canisters or oleoresin capsicum (OC) canisters and three gas masks. The bus/van supervisor should have the

authority to approve the use of chemical agents when necessary in emergency situations.

14. **Restraining Devices:** It is the bus/van supervisor's responsibility to maintain an adequate supply of all types of restraining equipment, to include handcuff covers. All equipment should be the authorized brand name used by the agency and it should be maintained in good operating condition. Each bus/van should carry at least two sets of modified leg irons for use as handcuffs for large inmates. A chain and padlock should be available in the event a mass emergency evacuation of the bus/van is required. This chain should be stored in a location where it can be immediately retrieved if needed. All restraining equipment should be inspected daily while the bus/van is operational. This inspection will minimize having to use restraining equipment that may have been altered during a previous trip.

Special Bus Equipment: Each bus/van should be equipped with:

1. A radio with a telephone type headset obtained from an authorized vendor and a beeper.

2. A radio capable of communication on the law enforcement radio frequency.

3. Citizen band (CB) radios, authorized for use in buses/vans with operational capabilities on all channels. These radios are to be operated only in emergency situations, after it is determined that assistance cannot be obtained by the use of official frequencies or telephone. Bus/van officers should realize that any message transmitted via a CB radio can be monitored by anyone within range having a CB receiver.

4. Portable radio units should be used to maintain direct contact with the bus/van crew. Any officer/deputy who has reason to leave the bus while transporting prisoners should carry a portable radio unit.

5. A security-type door and a locking fuel cap.

6. Windows in the passenger compartment secured so they cannot be opened. These windows should be equipped with cold rolled steel bars mounted on the inside and tinted in a fashion to prevent people from seeing inside the bus/van.

7. A set of bolt cutters large enough to cut and remove window bar and restraint equipment in an emergency. Bolt cutters are to be removed from the bus and stored with the bus weapons locker when the bus/van is out of service at the agency.

8. Various items for minor repairs such as fuses, fan belts, oil, jack, wrench, small hand tools, flashlight, fire extinguishers, property boxes, tape and marking pencils.

9. Foul weather coats and/or blankets, stored on the bus for use by prisoners in transit. These items are to be returned to the bus/van for use on future trips. Coats and blankets should be marked for identification, and thoroughly searched following each overnight stop.

10. An adequate supply of disinfectants for the toilets. They should be stored where prisoners do not have access to them.

11. First aid kits to treat minor injuries while in transit. Treatment should be documented and the injured prisoner provided with medical care, if necessary, at the first agency where the bus/van arrives.

Bus/Van Identification: Each bus/van should be appropriately marked. Agencies should equip each bus/van with a siren. The siren should be activated only in a major emergency to attract the attention of citizens and/or law enforcement personnel. Specific instructions should be incorporated into the Post Orders regarding the proper use of the siren.

Bus Security While Not in Use: The bus/van supervisor will be responsible for ensuring that the bus is not left unlocked when at an agency or any point en route. A staff member, preferably a bus/van crew member, must provide direct supervision over any prisoners working on the bus. The bus/van should never be left unattended by staff while unlocked.

Security Records: Before the start of each day, the bus/van must be thoroughly searched, inspected and a maintenance check completed. The agency should require a written report for each safety and maintenance inspection. Before departing the institution, agency or facility, the Bus/Van Route Form should be completed and left at the base agency. Buses/vans should travel alternate routes when practical. If a change of route is necessary, this information should be promptly transmitted to the base institution. Upon arriving at an agency, the Notice of Arrival and Departure Form should be completed. This will advise the staff of the arrival of the bus/van and inform them of the bus crew's needs for the following day's trip.

Prisoner's Personal Property: Personal property of prisoners who are being transferred must be inspected for contraband, inventoried, and packed prior to travel. A personal property manifest must be prepared to contain the prisoner's name, register number, destination and the total number of packages to be placed aboard the bus/van. The bus/van crew should check the manifest against the number of packages by name and register number before signing the property form or placing the packages on the bus/van.

Pre-Departure Security Inspection and Supervision: Alert and diligent supervision is required in the transportation of all prisoners regardless of the mode of transportation and the number of prisoners involved. The following procedures are recommended:

1. **Staging Area:** The bus/van supervisor or transport officers should ensure that the holding area in the staging area is clear of all contraband prior to prisoners being allowed to enter this area. No prisoners should be permitted in this area except those departing on the bus/van.

2. **Prisoner Search:** The bus/van supervisor or transport officers must be present when the prisoner(s) are dressed out and thoroughly searched. No part of the body where keys, razor blades, or small bits of metal, etc., might be concealed should be overlooked in the search. Each prisoner's hair, mouth, between the fingers and toes, and the soles of feet, as well as all bandages, dentures, custom-built shoes, canes, crutches, artificial arms and legs, etc., must be thoroughly inspected. When the search is completed, an entirely different outfit of inspected clothing should be furnished to the prisoner. Great care must be taken to ensure that the prisoner does not acquire any unauthorized items after the search is completed. Unless the prisoner is

taken into custody from another law enforcement agency, correctional facility or institution, the transport officers/deputies should check the prisoner's personal effects for possible concealed weapons. A metal detector can be used to check all body areas.

3. **Prisoner Clothing (Departure):** A metal detector could be used to search all clothing prior to its issuance to prisoners. Prisoners departing on buses/vans should be provided with a complete set of clothing. **No** prisoner should be dressed in clothing which he had in his possession while in the correctional institution population. The agency's prisoner transport clothing and approved shoes worn in transit should be removed from the prisoner upon delivery to a correctional institution for an overnight holdover and placed in a secure area. This clothing may be reissued after a thorough search when the prisoners are preparing to continue the trip.

4. **Identification of Prisoners Before Loading:** Positive identification of all prisoners to be transferred shall be conducted using a photo identification card. Each prisoner should be summoned to the bus supervisor by his last name and asked to give his first name and register number. A comparison of the picture with the prisoner's face to ensure positive identification should be made.

5. **Movement from Staging Area to the Bus/Van:** The movement from the staging area to the bus/van should be accomplished by moving the entire prisoner group to the designated exit of the correctional facility. Upon command from the bus/van supervisor, prisoners should be released from the main institution to the bus/van. Armed officers should be posted at the right front and rear of the bus during loading and unloading when prisoners are processed outside a secure perimeter area. One bus/van crew member should be stationed inside the front of the bus/van.

6. **Seating Arrangement:** MAXIMUM custody prisoners should be placed close to the front of the bus/van. Prisoners with medical needs should be placed in an area of the bus/van where they can be closely watched by transport officers or helped if needed.

For example, a prisoner on crutches should be placed near the bathroom. However, crutches and canes should not be permitted inside the cage areas. Seating assignments for all prisoners will be at the bus/van supervisor's discretion.

7. **Instructions to Prisoners:** The bus/van supervisor should give instructions regarding proper conduct to prisoners being transferred.

Departure and Arrival Notices:

1. The net facility on the bus/van route should be the contact point and should have the monitoring responsibilities for the bus/van's estimated time of arrival (ETA).

2. When a scheduled overnight stop is made at a facility, the sending agency should transmit the ETA for the overnight stop to the receiving agency.

3. Upon departure from the overnight stay, the bus/van supervisor should telephone the ETA to the receiving agency.

4. The bus/van supervisor should telephonically report any delay to the receiving institution.

5. The bus/van supervisor should notify the receiving agency of the bus/van location every three hours after departure.

6. Each receiving agency should establish a log to note each communication received or sent regarding the bus/van. The time, exact location of the bus/van, and summary of the communication will be noted.

7. Each agency expecting the arrival of a bus/van should take steps to locate any bus that is more than one hour overdue from the most recent ETA or scheduled call.

8. Each agency, facility or institution should establish written procedures to be taken to locate an overdue bus/van.

Safety: The bus/van supervisor is responsible for the safety of all passengers and is to ensure that the bus is operated safely

and in strict accordance with all agency rules and regulations, as well as local and state traffic ordinances.

The interior rear cage door must be kept locked when prisoners are aboard. One bus/van crew member should be responsible for making the door accessible during an emergency, bearing in mind the need to ensure safe custody of the prisoners. All bus/van crew members should carry keys to the rear exit and interior rear cage doors.

Stops: Bus/van stops should be kept at a minimum and of the shortest duration practical. The outside of the bus/van must be supervised during stops to ensure that no one contacts prisoners or introduces contraband. Prisoners should not be permitted to leave the bus/van except during transfer or in an emergency. Ordinarily, two officers/deputies will remain on the bus/van when prisoners are aboard.

Bus/van stops for staff lunches should be kept to a minimum by obtaining carry-out lunches for all crew members. These lunches should be eaten on the bus/van.

Meals: Prisoners' meals shall be served while en route and on the bus/van under close supervision. No eating utensils (including plastic), such as spoons, forks, or butter knives should be issued to prisoners.

Restrictions: Bus/van personnel should not permit prisoners to make contact with the public, make telephone calls or mail letters. The use of tobacco products, in any form, by prisoners on buses/vans should be prohibited for safety and health reasons.

Illness: In the event that a prisoner becomes sick and requires medical attention, but when the prisoner does not appear to be in acute distress, the services of medical personnel should be obtained **when practical** without jeopardizing the security of the transport. However, in an **emergency**, the services of the nearest physician or hospital must be obtained. Appropriate life saving procedures should be implemented to the extent that security will permit. The receiving agency should be notified about the emergency as soon as possible.

Assaults and/or Fights: If a fight, assault or general disturbance occurs on the bus/van, the bus/van supervisor will be confronted with a variety of serious decisions that must be made. Each decision should be based upon the seriousness of the incident and the number of prisoners involved. Each bus/van supervisor should plan for a variety of situations that could occur and the options available to handle them.

Supervisors should use their best judgment, relying on their experience, knowledge and training, in deciding how best to handle

the problem. Consideration must be given to all available options, including sending bus personnel into the secure compartment, the use of chemical agents or the use of firearms. The bus/van supervisor must always keep in mind the consequences, both physical and legal, of his decision, and also must realize that he must act consistent with his agency's policies.

In each serious incident, first consideration should be given to obtaining assistance from any available local law enforcement agency. Every effort should be made to refrain from the use of chemical agents, deadly force, or entering the compartment until assistance arrives, if possible.

Once an incident is under control, additional consideration must be given to the feasibility of continuing the regular bus/van run or diverting to an approved facility to remove some or all prisoners.

Escapes: Escapes are best prevented when existing policies and procedures are followed, restraints are properly applied, thorough shakedowns are conducted, and bus crews are alert. In any emergency, knowledge of policy and good custodial practices coupled with common sense and discretion, will provide staff with the best solutions to the problem.

Should an escape occur from a bus/van, the supervisor should follow these guidelines:

1. **Seek assistance**. Contact the nearest criminal justice agency by radio and ask them to notify local and state police. Give them all available information regarding location, prisoner description, direction of escape, and manner of dress, etc.

2. If direct notification to local law enforcement agencies is necessary, wait for assistance to arrive and then go to the nearest available telephone and notify the agency immediately.

3. Determine the avenue of escape and assess the extent of damage to the bus/van, if any. If unable to secure the bus/van to prevent further escapes, request an escort from the local law enforcement authorities to the nearest approved correctional facility.

Mechanical Problems: When mechanical problems occur, these steps should be followed:

1. Drive the bus/van off the highway as far as possible.

2. Attempt to contact the closest law enforcement agency by radio for immediate assistance.

If it becomes apparent that the prisoners must be housed, attempt to locate an approved jail. If the mechanical problems are such that an extended delay for making repairs is evident, efforts should be made to have another bus/van go to the breakdown site and continue the transport run with the prisoners.

Trip Termination: Instructions should be given to the prisoners before unloading so that they may be moved from the bus/van in an orderly fashion. The transport officers should obtain a receipt from the receiving agency for the personal property of the prisoners. All restraining equipment should be removed from the prisoners, inventoried and secured. Once the prisoners have been unloaded, a transport officer should thoroughly search the bus/van, ensure that maintenance procedures are followed and that the bus is left in a clean condition.

Overnight Stops at Agencies: Some bus/van trips will require overnight layovers. In an emergency, what was a routine run could result in an unexpected overnight layover. When overnight stops of either nature are made, these procedures should be followed:

1. The jail administrator, sheriff, prison warden and staff should be asked to handle the agency's prisoners in the following manner:

   - ♦♦ Visitors are not permitted.
   - ♦♦ Letters written by the agency's in-transit prisoners should not be mailed but must be given to the bus/van supervisor before departure.
   - ♦♦ Prisoners should not be permitted to receive telephone calls, packages, money, or any other articles from anyone.
   - ♦♦ Jail staff should be requested not to allow contact between bus/van prisoners and other jail prisoners.

2. The bus/van supervisor shall discuss with jail staff the security concerns in preparing lunches for the next day's departure.

3. Depending upon the circumstances, the bus/van supervisor should decide whether to leave the bus/van at the jail facility or drive it to the place where the bus/van staff will be lodged for the night.

Transportation of Juveniles: A juvenile is defined as a person under 18 years of age. Juveniles must be provided special handling in order to reduce the possible detrimental influence of adult prisoners while in transit. Juvenile prisoners should be transported and handled separately from adult offenders.

Prisoner Property: Strict limitations should be set on the type and amount of personal property a prisoner may have in his possession while being transported.

Allowable Property:

1. Legal papers or materials relevant to the current court proceeding.

2. Religious medals. One medal may be retained but only if it is of a size and weight which poses no threat as a potential weapon or escape device. Roman Catholic prisoners should be permitted to carry Rosary beads, but only if the Rosary beads are strung with lightweight string or thin metal which breaks apart easily; no Rosary beads which use fishing line or heavy plastic should be permitted, since they can be used as a weapon to strangle someone.

3. Eye glasses or contact lenses with case.

4. Prescribed medicine and health items.

5. Plain wedding band. Rings with stones should not be authorized. No other rings should be permitted.

Agency policies and procedures may further restrict the types or quantities of property a prisoner may retain in his possession or in storage. Any other property which may be custodial contraband, weapons, etc., should be disposed of according to agency policy and procedures.

Transporting Prisoners By Air:

On April 23, 1995, Public Law 301-411 became effective. This law, "Federal, State, Municipal and University Aircraft Operators,"

was signed by President Bill Clinton on October 25, 1994, and requires compliance by Federal, state, county and municipal public safety agencies which transport prisoners by air.

The law changes the statutory definition of "public aircraft" and requires government aircraft operators to comply with certain Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). As of April 23, 1995, passenger-carrying government aircraft will no longer be considered public and will have to comply with FAR Parts 91 and 43. In addition, if a governmental unit is receiving compensation for operating its aircraft, compliance with FAR Part 135 and/or 121 may be required. [Sections of the public law, regulations and guidelines are quoted in their entirety within this section.]

On June 15, 1994, at its Annual Conference in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the National Sheriffs' Association adopted a resolution supporting compliance with Federal Law 301-411.

Relevant sections of Public Law 301-411 which pertain to the transportation of prisoners by air are explained in the material which follows.

Sworn law enforcement officers or deputies [LEOs] who are required to transport a prisoner by air must comply with the special rules and procedures established by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as well as the airline on which the officer/deputy and prisoner are flying. Commercial airline companies have special policies and procedures for the transportation of prisoners on their aircraft. These commercial airlines can refuse to transport prisoners if FAA regulations or their policies and procedures are not met by the sworn law enforcement officer and his agency.

The commercial airline procedures supplement the FAA rules for proper security in transporting prisoners, such as: a thorough strip search of the prisoner and his clothing before leaving law enforcement detention facilities, assuring any medical conditions, needs and medications of the prisoner are met; making sure that all restraining devices used are in proper working order and have been placed on the prisoner correctly; certifying that escort officers have qualified with the firearm being used while transporting the prisoner; assuring that escort officers are trained and experienced in transporting prisoners and are familiar with good security practices, certifying that the escort officer has completed the two-hour course entitled **"Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) Flying Armed" [June 1994/A.C.P.-100].**

Course Description:

The sworn LEO will learn the proper methods for transporting firearms and the procedures to be followed when flying armed. The LEO will also learn the dangers of a firearms discharge on board

aircraft and will be made aware of the flight crew's role and training in the event of a disturbance by a passenger.

Carriage of Weapons and Escorted Person: Federal Aviation Regulation Part 108 prohibits all certificate holders from accepting for transportation any person who has on or about his person or property, a deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed, accessible to him while aboard an aircraft **except** for the following persons:

- ♦♦ Federal law enforcement officials;
- ♦♦ Law enforcement officials other than Federal [state/county/municipal];
- ♦♦ Armed escorts for a foreign dignitary; and
- ♦♦ Armed individuals approved by the FAA.

Definition of Escorting/Transporting a Prisoner: The sworn law enforcement officer/deputy shall have control, care, custody and supervision of another person (prisoner) when traveling aboard a commercial airline or within an airport terminal or facility.

Definition of LEOS: FAR Part 108 defines a law enforcement officer as a Federal agent or a full-time, sworn state, county or municipal officer/deputy, currently a state certified law enforcement employee, who is authorized to enforce the public law.

When transporting any prisoner on a commercial aircraft and using any terminal or airport facility, the sworn law enforcement officer/deputy must be knowledgeable of the requirements of FAR 108. **However, since each air carrier's internal procedures could be different, transport deputies/officers should contact the respective air carriers reservations personnel or the customer service agent prior to any actual flights in order to learn how to comply with the specific policies and procedures of the individual carriers.**

Policies and Procedures of Commercial Air Carriers: Following is a brief summary of the guidelines, regulations, policies and procedures of several commercial air carriers. All sworn law enforcement officers who are transporting prisoners must comply with these procedures.

Most commercial airlines accept prisoners for transportation under conditions required by the FAA and each specific airline's regulations, guidelines, policies and procedures, which include:

1. Law enforcement officers/deputies must present a letter stating their flight itinerary and that they have a legitimate need to be armed

on a flight. The letter must be written on the letterhead of the employing jurisdiction and signed by a supervisory official.

2. When reservations are made for the sworn law enforcement officer/deputy and prisoner, advise the reservations agent if the sworn LEO will be armed and if the prisoner is maximum risk or non-maximum risk. Seats should be selected at this time, with seats to be on the rearmost "available" row of the aircraft. The prisoner will not be seated on the aisle but only in inside or window seats.

3. Escorted prisoners may be accepted for transportation provided the sworn law enforcement officer/deputy checks in at the ticket counter and his agency advises the commercial airline at least one hour before departure. This notification must include the escorted prisoner's name, trip routing, the escort officers' names as well as agency information which includes address, city, state, zip code, telephone number, and fax number.

   ♦♦ Airlines will require the following: badge, seal, credential number, agency identification card with signature of deputy/officer and a recent photo-identification. Furthermore, the risk classification of the prisoner must be given to airline personnel.

   ♦♦ Commercial airline forms for prisoner transportation escorts and firearms carry on authorization forms must be completed.

   ♦♦ Escorting deputies/officers should not carry Mace, tear gas, stun gun, OC, pepper fog or similar devices on board any commercial aircraft. Electronic less-than-lethal equipment is not permitted in some instances on commercial airlines.

4. Officers/deputies traveling armed will be required to read and sign a **"Notice to Armed Individual"** form for each flight. This form will be completed at the ticket counter at the

origination point and must contain a copy for each segment of the escort or transport trip.

5. Your carriage of a weapon, your identity and seat location will be made known to ground personnel who need this information to process you on board without challenge. The information will also be given to the captain, cabin attendants, and other armed officers/deputies aboard your flight.

6. Prior to boarding, the armed individual should be advised by the airline of the carrier's procedure for possessing a deadly or dangerous weapon aboard its airplane.

7. The use of handcuffs and other such restraining devices is acceptable only on some airlines and only if they are not visible to the public. Some airlines will not allow restraining devices to be used under any circumstances. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the wearing and removal of any restraining devices takes place out of public view. Restraining devices should not be visible in any terminals, concourses, gates or aircraft; however, handcuffs may be worn on aircraft if completely hidden from view and deemed necessary by sworn law enforcement officers/deputies. Prisoners and sworn LEOs who do not comply with an airline's guidelines concerning visible restraining devices may be denied transportation.

8. Some commercial airlines require that all prisoners must be escorted by armed officers/deputies and must occupy the rearmost available seats in the aircraft. Neither window nor exit row nor aisle seating is permitted.

9. Some commercial airlines require all escorted prisoners to be handcuffed at all times, including enplaning/deplaning and while on board the aircraft. Handcuffs must be secured to the prisoner's belt or to a chain around his waist. The prisoner also may be shackled at the ankles at the discretion of the armed escort. [Restraining devices shall not be exposed to the general public; in some airlines, the use of restraining devices is left to the discretion of the LEO, depending upon the risk category of the prisoner.]

10. The LEO is responsible for assuring the commercial airlines that any escorted prisoner does not have in his possession or have access to deadly or dangerous weapons and that the LEO has adequate restraining devices to use if the occasion arises.

11. Some commercial airlines require that prisoners be restricted from moving about the commercial aircraft, either aloft or on the ground, including the use of lavatories. For this reason, prisoners will not be accepted on some airlines with scheduled flying times of four hours or more. Some airlines will not permit the prisoner to leave his seat without an escort. LEOs should ask prisoners to use lavatory facilities prior to flight boarding in order to preclude inflight lavatory visits.

12. Some commercial airlines require that prisoners will not be served food or beverages unless the accompanying LEO assists the prisoner, since handcuffs cannot be removed in flight.

13. The acceptance of an escorted prisoner on one airline does not mean that the escorted prisoner will be accepted by another airline if a transfer is necessary to reach the destination. Specific approval must be given in advance by any other airlines involved in the transportation of the prisoner on other segments/flights to the final destination.

14. Neither the escort officer/deputy or prisoner may consume alcoholic beverages under any circumstances.

15. In the event of an unrelated disturbance aboard the aircraft, the LEO is not to take any action unless specifically requested to do so by the captain.

16. On commercial airlines, the captain of the flight has final authority on the boarding of all escorted prisoners, but his decision should be in compliance with FAA regulations and the airline's corporate policies. It is important that the pilot-in-command be notified in a timely manner that an armed person is expected to be on board. The pilot and other appropriate crew members will be

notified by ground personnel of the location of each armed person aboard the aircraft. In the event that more than one armed person is aboard a flight, each armed person must be notified of the seat location of other armed person(s).

17. On some commercial airlines, unruly prisoners may be manacled by escorting deputies/ officers. The prisoner and the LEO may be deplaned at intermediate points at the direction of the pilot-in-command. When this occurs, continuing transportation may be arranged on an "involuntary rerouting" basis with escorting officers/deputies; the customer service agent of the commercial airline will make the arrangements.

18. Most commercial airlines require at least one hour early check-in prior to the departure time of the flight. Furthermore, the sworn LEO should provide to the customer service agent at the airport verbal assurance that he has in his possession the necessary equipment to restrain the prisoner if he becomes unruly on board the commercial aircraft. The officer/deputy must comply with the airline's luggage and equipment check-in procedures.

19. On most commercial carriers corporate policy and procedures require that the boarding agent notify the senior flight attendant and captain of the aircraft **before boarding** that an armed LEO will be on the flight.

20. Commercial airlines will not accept a prisoner who is violent, who resists the sworn LEO or who expresses to company employees his objections to the flight. Commercial carriers will not accept prisoners who are objectionable because of physical conditions (i.e , appearance, body odor or contagious disease).

21. Some commercial airline carriers' policies differ in the below mentioned areas. The sworn law enforcement officer/deputy should check with the specific carrier regarding the following types of persons who are to be transported:

- ♦♦ AWOL: AWOL (Absent Without Leave) military personnel who have been in custody for not reporting for military duty on time or whatever reason, may be escorted to the airport by military police. However, in some cases they will not be accompanied during the flight. Representatives from the military will meet the passengers on arrival at their final destination.

- ♦♦ Juveniles: Juvenile authorities also send unescorted minors by air, usually within a given state. Such minors are not considered prisoners. Unescorted juveniles may sometimes be runaways who are being returned to their parents' custody. They are usually escorted by an officer/deputy to the airport. However, in some cases it is not necessary for an escort to travel with the juvenile since the juvenile will be met by parents or a court representative on arrival.

- ♦♦ Deportees: Fall under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or Border Patrol. All deportee transportation shall be coordinated with the INS, Border Patrol, the airline's customer service agent, the pilot-in-command and the appropriate crew members.

22. In the event of a hijack attempt, prisoner escort officers are not to take any action unless specifically requested to do so by the pilot-in-command.

23. Carriage of Firearms and Ammunition in Checked Baggage: The following procedures should be followed:

    - ♦♦ Loaded Firearm: No person may transport or offer for transport nor may any certificate holder knowingly permit the transport of a loaded firearm in checked baggage under any conditions.

♦♦ Unloaded Firearms: No person may transport or offer for transport nor may any certificate holder knowingly permit any person to carry a firearm in checked baggage unless the passenger notifies the certificate holder before checking baggage that a firearm is in the checked baggage and that it is **unloaded**. The carrier must obtain a declaration either orally, or in writing, from the person that the firearm is not loaded.

♦♦ Small Arms Ammunition: Small arms ammunition must be packed so that the primers are protected. This may be done by using the manufacturer's original container, aftermarket ammunition boxes or including rounds in a magazine.

24. Usually one of the transporting officers/deputies should be of the same sex as the prisoner being transported.

25. In most instances two armed officers/deputies should be assigned to transport a prisoner. More officers/deputies could be assigned depending upon the number of prisoners being transported.

26. In most cases only one maximum risk prisoner can be transported or escorted on one commercial flight. For a discussion of the risk classification levels of prisoners, please refer to the section earlier in this chapter entitled "Developing Transportation Policies and Procedures." **[These generally accepted classifications should not be confused with the FAA or airline classifications concerning escorts or prisoner transports.]**

27. Upon landing, the other passengers will get off the plane first. The LEO should remain seated with his prisoner or prisoners until he is actually ready to deplane. Presumably, the officer or his supervisor will have made arrangements in advance for the officer to be met at the plane. However, the LEO should request and receive proper identification from

anyone claiming to be a sworn representative of any law enforcement agency.

28. In a crowded place, such as the terminal building, the officers/deputies should stay with the prisoner at all times and not be distracted by any activity. One moment of carelessness on the officer's part is all that is needed for the prisoner to disappear into the crowd and escape. The escorting job is not over until the prisoner has been delivered and the officer has obtained a proper written receipt from the receiving officer. ***The prisoner is the escort officer's responsibility every minute while in transit.***

29. Escort officers should not use food as a reward or disciplinary measure at any time during a prisoner transport.

30. Assure that all meals and refreshments are served under the direct supervision of the LEO.

31. Each time a prisoner is transported by air, the pilot must be notified. If the officer/deputy complies with proper procedures, including proper advance notice to the airline, then airline personnel will make sure the pilot knows. Like the captain of a ship, a pilot is responsible for the safety of all persons on board his commercial airline. **In an emergency, the officer/deputy may not have time to hold a conference with the pilot; however, he should talk with the pilot before taking any action which might endanger other passengers. All LEOs should be aware that discharging any firearm in a crowded, pressurized aircraft can be fatal to all on board.**

32. **Medication for Prisoners:** The LEO should follow these procedures:

    ♦♦ The LEO should assure any medication is administered only upon a licensed physician's orders.

    ♦♦ Officers/deputies must assure that any used disposable needles and syringes are properly removed and destroyed after usage. The LEO must

also keep an inventory of the number of destroyed needles and syringes, along with the signatures of the officers responsible for destroying them.

33. **In-Flight Meals:**

- ♦♦ Special or religious diets as prescribed by appropriate medical personnel should be given to prisoners who are being transported upon request. [The customer service agent of carriers or the law enforcement agency's travel agent/reservations office should be notified of special diet requests at the time of airline ticket bookings.]

- ♦♦ Law enforcement officers/deputies should assure that there is no more than a 14-hour time lapse between the evening and breakfast meal.

- ♦♦ A minimum of three nutritionally balanced meals, two of which must be hot, should be given to prisoners in transit every 24 hours.

34. In the event that a transporting officer/deputy has to wait at an airport for a connecting flight, he should be aware that many airports in major metropolitan areas now have a small, secure detention facility. The officer may want to arrange for use of this lockup in advance by contacting the airport security office or airport law enforcement agency. However, when picking up a prisoner at such a lockup, the transporting officer should thoroughly search the prisoner and check all restraining devices before leaving the area and continuing the trip. [This includes all segments of the trip.]

35. Deputies/officers should remember that transporting prisoners by air is a great responsibility with the safety of many people at stake. At all times, the officer/deputy should follow good prisoner transport procedures and the special commercial airline rules and FAA rules involving escorts.

Escort duty is dangerous and officers/deputies must be cautious. The main objective of this section of the report has been to provide the escort/transportation officer with proper knowledge of the procedures to follow when escorting prisoners on commercial airlines or within the airport terminal or facility. Carelessness on the part of escort officers is the major cause for prisoner escapes and subsequent injuries and deaths of law enforcement employees or citizens.

To prevent prisoner escape attempts, deputies/officers must adhere to proper search and restraint procedures. The escorting officer/deputy is legally responsible for the prisoner. He must conduct a thorough strip search of the prisoner before transport, check restraining devices, apply them carefully, search transport vehicles (with the exception of commercial airliners), and carefully supervise the prisoner at all times during the transport.

All criminal justice agencies should contact the Corporate Security Services of the commercial airline carriers listed below to obtain their specific carrier policies and procedures, regulations and guidelines to assure agency compliance with the carriers being used.

Managing Director,
Corporate Security
American Airlines
P. O. Box 619616, MD 5555
DFW Airport, TX 75261

Director, Corporate Security
Continental Airlines
15333 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Suite 430
Houston, TX 77032

Director of Security
Northwest Airlines, Inc.
Department A4420
5101 Northwest Drive
St. Paul, MN 55111-3034

Staff Executive - Security
United Airlines, Inc.
P. O. Box 66100
Chicago, IL 60666

Manager, Security
Air Canada
25th Floor
1166 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036

Director, Corporate Security
U.S. Air, Inc.
2345 Crystal Drive
Arlington, VA 22227

Director, Corporate Security
Delta Airlines, Inc.
Hartsfield-Atlanta
International Airport
Atlanta, GA 30320

Manager, Systems FAA
Security Support
Trans World Airlines
P. O. Box 20126
Kansas City, MO 64195

Manager, Ground Operations
Department
Southwest Airlines Company
P. O. Box 36611
Dallas, TX 72532-1611

Director of Security
Reeve Aleutian Airways
4700 W. International Airport
Road
Anchorage, AK 99502

Director of Security
American Trans Air
P. O. Box 51609
Indianapolis International
Airport
Indianapolis, IN 51609

Manager, Postal & Regulatory
Affairs
Alaska Air
P. O. Box 68900
Seattle, WA 98168-0900

Manager - Security
Aloha Airlines
P. O. Box 30028
Honolulu, HI 96820

Criminal justice training academies and state associations of sheriffs/chiefs of police should contact the Federal Aviation Administration and request the lesson plan entitled: Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs), Flying Armed, June 1994, [A.C.P. 100], for review, training and usage by the agency. This will assist each agency in the development of policy and procedures, guidelines, standard operational procedures or general orders for this specific function:

- Federal Aviation Administration
  Civil Aviation Security
  [Office of Policy & Planning - ACP-100]
  800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
  Washington, D.C. 20591

Figure 7:3 illustrates the form to be completed by law enforcement prisoner escort officers who will be flying armed on commercial aircraft.

The following form shall be used in all instances when a sworn law enforcement agent/officer/deputy is flying armed on all commercial aircraft.

FIGURE 7:3
NOTICE TO ARMED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

NAME	**BADGE/CREDENTIAL NUMBER**
AGENCY **PHONE NUMBER**	**PLEASE INITIAL ONE OF THE FOLLOWING**
AGENCY ADDRESS	[ ] LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL REQUIRED TO REPORT TO NEW LOCATION, ARMED, AND IMMEDIATELY PREPARED FOR DUTY
FLIGHT NUMBER **SEAT NUMBER**	[ ] PRISONER ESCORT
FROM **TO**	[ ] FBI SPECIAL AGENT
IF ESCORTING A DIGNITARY/WITNESS/PRISONER **NAME** **SEAT NUMBER**	[ ] PROVIDING A PROTECTIVE SUPPORT

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES: (October 1995)

1. If you are authorized to carry a concealed weapon, you are requested keep it concealed at all times.
2. Other armed passengers, the flight attendants and captain will be informed that you are armed.
3. Our flight attendants and pilots have been instructed to handle passenger disturbances without assistance from other passengers and do not expect your help. Discharge of a firearm aboard an aircraft could cause a situation far more dangerous than the original disturbance -- and this includes hijacking.
4. A person having a weapon accessible in flight will not be served nor should request alcoholic beverages and should not have consumed any alcohol beverages within 8 hours before departure.
5. If you are a law enforcement officer escorting a prisoner the following procedures apply in addition to items 1 through 4 above.
   a. You must be equipped with adequate restraining devices. Restraining devices may be used in flight if deemed necessary for adequate control of the prisoner or safety of others.
   b. You normally will be pre-boarded, and you will be assigned to the rear-most available row of passenger seats in the cabin. You must sit between the prisoner and the aisle.
   c. You must accompany the prisoner if a visit to the lavatory is required.
   d. At your destination you must remain seated until all other deplaning passengers have left the aircraft.
   e. Your prisoner will not be served and may not drink any alcoholic beverages.

BY YOUR SIGNATURE BELOW AND BY PRESENTING PROPER DOCUMENTS YOU ARE IDENTIFYING YOURSELF AS BEING AUTHORIZED, HAVING A NEED TO CARRY SUCH WEAPONS, HAVING RECEIVED TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FLYING ARMED AND BEING ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS FOR THE AGENCY NAMED ABOVE.

Passenger's Signature_____ **Date:**_____

STATION IDENTIFICATION CHECK: I HAVE REVIEWED THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE AND VERIFIED THE INDIVIDUAL IS A SWORN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WITH THE AGENCY NAMED ABOVE.

Manager or Designated Representative_____ **Date:**_____

Types of Escort Situations:

There are normally six locations to which prisoners are escorted:

1. To court;

2. To other jails or correctional agencies because of warrants or transfer orders;

3. To a hospital in the outside community for specialized treatment;

4. To a mental health institution either due to an order by the court for institutionalization or if a prisoner has been declared psychotic;

5. To a funeral home to view the body of a deceased relative; and

6. To a hospital or home to visit a critically-ill relative.

The type and amount of equipment used in transporting a prisoner depends upon the procedures at the agency and the degree of security risk each prisoner represents.

Control Board for Escort or Transportation Tracking: A control board which lists the prisoners and their escort destinations (e.g., court, hospital, etc.) should be in the central escort or transportation office. The size of the board depends upon the size of the prisoner population. The board can be constructed from a piece of one-quarter inch Plexiglass secured over colored pieces of cardboard corresponding to the designated color codes assigned to particular prisoners being transported. A wax crayon or china marker can be used to print in the name of the prisoner assigned to the specific court, hospital, etc. A daily roster of the prisoner population can be compiled from this board and it can also be used as a check against the daily counts of prisoners and their locations.

It is imperative that a single employee on each duty tour be assigned the responsibility for updating this record. When the employee completes his tour of duty, the employee who relieves him should acknowledge the accuracy of the board by initialing the lower right hand corner. The status of prisoners who are outside the jail must be indicated on the board.

The establishment of a control board system is a relatively inexpensive method of improving prisoner control procedures. However, in large agencies where a great deal of daily movement occurs, the control board probably will be impractical to maintain.

Instead, control of the status of escorted prisoners should be placed on the jail's computer system; in these larger agencies, a computerized central file of prisoner locations and daily status takes the place of the control board.

Escorting Prisoners to Court: Whenever possible, two officers/deputies should be assigned to escort a prisoner to court, with one designated the officer-in-charge (normally the senior officer). The other officer is the driver. However, the number of officers/deputies used may vary, depending on the number of prisoners who are being escorted.

A movement order will be initiated by the jail and generally is self-explanatory. The movement order will contain: general information such as the inmate's name, number, purpose of movement, sentence, and necessary files that are to accompany him (jail or medical records); and any writs, commitments, or indictment papers. In addition, orders also may indicate whether or not personal property, valuables, or monies are to accompany the prisoner. The transporting officer should make sure that the movement order is authorized by the proper authority.

Upon arrival at the courthouse, the officers/deputies will normally secure the prisoner in the courthouse bullpen or lockup. The officers should place their sidearms in a secure weapons locker before entering the lockup to remove the restraining devices from the prisoner. After the prisoner is safely secured, the officers then can deliver the necessary documents to the court clerk or to the prosecutor.

When notified that court is to convene to hear the case, one officer should enter the lockup and handcuff the prisoner *before* proceeding to the courtroom. Normally, the restraining devices will be removed from the prisoner prior to entering the courtroom. The prisoner will sit at the defense table with his attorney.

Once the prisoner is seated with his attorney, the officers/deputies should visually survey the courtroom and decide where they are going to sit during the trial. All possibilities should be considered in making this decision: avenues of escape, prior escape attempts of the prisoner, presence of the prisoner's friends or relatives in the courtroom, etc. The officers should position themselves to prevent any escape attempts, remembering that **unless they are officially relieved of the responsibility, they are responsible for the prisoner.**

Upon conclusion of the trial proceedings each day, the officers/deputies must prepare the prisoner for transport back to the jail. Before leaving the courtroom, the prisoner should be handcuffed and then returned to the lockup area where officers can apply additional restraining devices safely. One of the officers should search the vehicle before the prisoner enters it, even if

the vehicle was locked all day. The reason for this is obvious. Only when this procedure is completed should the officers transport the prisoner back to the jail.

Transport To Another Correctional Institution: The movement order will provide the officer/deputy with necessary information about material or property to accompany the prisoner who is being transferred to another jail or correctional agency. After delivering the prisoner to his destination, the transporting officers/deputies should obtain a written receipt for the prisoner from the receiving agency. Generally, officers should follow the guidelines described earlier in this chapter for transport by authorized vehicles.

Hospitals and Clinics: In escorting a prisoner to a hospital or clinic, the movement order should provide necessary information about any material or property accompanying the prisoner. Transporting officers/deputies should make certain that they have the prisoner's medical card and appointment slip.

While at the hospital, the officers/deputies should be particularly vigilant - waiting rooms are crowded, seating space is limited and, in general, conditions are ideal for an attempted escape or for creating a disturbance that could lead to an escape.

The officers/deputies should stay with the prisoner throughout the medical procedure if the prisoner is an out-patient.

If the prisoner is admitted to the hospital, then the agency should provide officers/deputies to guard him; one officer should accompany the prisoner whenever he is moved around the hospital for tests. If the prisoner is undergoing surgery, the officer should wait outside the operating room, not letting the prisoner out of his sight. At no time should an officer guarding a prisoner in a hospital leave the prisoner unattended.

There may be rare instances when officers will be required to escort a prisoner who is in some way incapacitated; because of his physical condition, it may be necessary to move him by a stretcher. In cases like this, officers should check their transport van and make sure that necessary tie-down equipment is available in the van to prevent the prisoner from falling off the stretcher and further injuring himself.

A law enforcement agency most likely will be responsible for the safekeeping of prisoners remanded to its custody while prisoners are confined to public or private hospitals. The agency should determine on a case-by-case basis the status and level of security required for prisoners requiring hospitalization or outpatient medical care. The issue of officers carrying chemical agents, electronic non-lethal equipment and firearms on hospital premises must be decided by officials of the criminal justice

agency, hospital management and the hospital security force. All law enforcement agencies should develop policies and procedures governing this special detail.

When guarding a prisoner confined to a hospital, the scope of work could include:

1. Assume custody of the prisoner.

2. If escorting the prisoner to the hospital, check the prisoner into the room and search the room for unauthorized personnel or contraband.

3. Escort the prisoner to surgery, x-ray, and diagnostic tests.

4. Secure the prisoner to the bed with leg irons and/or handcuffs as appropriate and as directed by the agency's policies and procedures.

5. Prevent unauthorized individuals from visiting the prisoner, contacting him by a telephone, or delivering mail or packages.

6. Maintain surveillance of the prisoner's room, bathroom facilities and adjacent hospital areas at all times.

7. Return the prisoner to the proper authorities or agency in accordance with instructions from your own agency.

8. If the prisoner is allowed to have visitors, the security officer/deputy shall record all names, addresses, telephone numbers, relationship to prisoner, time, date, and termination of visit. The officer will screen the visitors (i.e., request that adequate identification be presented to establish an individual's identity) and search all visitors to ensure against unauthorized contraband being passed to the prisoner.

9. The security officer/deputy on duty shall not leave a prisoner tour of duty until relieved by another officer from his department.

10. A written security officer watch log book shall be maintained for all prisoner confinements at the hospital. All incidents

should be included in this watch log book; possible incidents may include:

- ♦♦ Visitors [all];
- ♦♦ Meals served;
- ♦♦ Medication times;
- ♦♦ Telephone calls, mail, and messages received;
- ♦♦ Brief comments relating to a prisoner during the tour of duty;
- ♦♦ Searches conducted and who was searched;
- ♦♦ Movements within the medical facility; and
- ♦♦ Restraints applied during tour of duty.

The prisoner is the security officer's responsibility every minute while confined in the hospital or while receiving medical care at an outpatient clinic or physician's/dentist's office.

Escort To A Mental Health Institution: The movement order should provide necessary information concerning what material or property is to accompany an inmate to a mental health institution. In the event that the prisoner is highly disturbed, transporting officers/deputies should be told about his condition and how to handle him. The medical doctor or supervisor should decide whether or not the prisoner is to be moved in a straitjacket or restraining sheet. In this day and age, however, a movement of this nature is very rare; the use of sedative drugs practically eliminates the need for a straitjacket and restraining sheet while moving a prisoner to a mental health institution. Once the prisoner is delivered to the institution, the transporting officers/deputies should make sure they obtain a signed receipt for him.

Escort To A Funeral Home: Attendance at funerals is considered a privilege granted by the county attorney, chief of police, sheriff, jail administrator or judge to prisoners who are not considered to be serious escape risks. Since the prisoner and the officer/deputy will be in a public place, certain supervisory criteria should be kept in mind. These criteria include:

1. **Deciding which persons are "family" members for a prisoner to make a funeral or deathbed**

visit, or to attend a private viewing at a funeral home: An immediate family member is defined as the father, mother, husband, wife, child, brother, or sister of the prisoner. However, court orders may be received by the criminal justice agency for a prisoner to make a deathbed visit or attend a private viewing of a person who is not, by normal definition, considered to be a member of the immediate family. Step-parents, aunts, uncles, or other individuals who performed a parental role or who resided with the prisoner in a family type relationship may be given consideration. The prisoner or his legal representative must clearly establish the relationship to the satisfaction of the criminal justice agency.

2. Permitting a prisoner to attend funeral services held in a church, funeral parlor, crematorium, or cemetery is risky from a security viewpoint. The behavior of the prisoner, his family and friends is likely to be governed by the emotional impact of such observances and the risk of escape or assaultive behavior is increased. The drain on available resources in order to properly secure such an environment is beyond the capability of most law enforcement agencies.

3. Requests for deathbed visits or private funeral viewings from state prisoners under the temporary custody of a local correctional agency should be directed to the proper state authority for concurrence and approval.

Before approval is granted for funeral or deathbed visits, the following criteria must be met to the satisfaction of the concerned criminal justice agency:

1. The individual is a prisoner in the agency's custody pending court action or sentence, or under custody pursuant to a writ.

2. The prisoner has no pending writs of removal, detainers, or other actions which would impede the judicial process.

3. The request is valid and can be verified by the criminal justice agency.

4. The dying or deceased person is within the definition of immediate family.

5. The prisoner has no record of past escapes, escape attempts or history of violent behavior. A security check with the local police department and FBI should be made to determine if any family member or associate is an outstanding fugitive from justice, or if such persons would pose a threat to the prisoner.

6. The prisoner is willing to comply with the terms and conditions of the visit that may be imposed by the criminal justice agency to ensure the safety of the transporting personnel and the general public.

7. The criminal justice agency has sufficient available personnel to accomplish the visit.

8. The district attorney assigned to prosecute the prisoner has no specific objection.

9. The judge assigned to the case has no specific objection.

The chief of police, sheriff, jail administrator or judge should strictly limit the viewing or visit to the prisoner, the transporting officers/deputies, the funeral director or medical personnel, and the deceased or dying person. In some cases the prisoner's attorney, family, or friends may not be allowed to be present. Necessary procedures include:

1. The prisoner will be properly restrained while being escorted to and from the detention facility.

2. The length of the visit is discretionary but should be limited to a maximum of one hour. However, the transporting personnel may terminate the visit at any time if conditions indicate a security problem that threatens the custody of the prisoner or the safety of the public.

3. Neither the prisoner, his family, attorney, nor any person acting on his behalf shall receive any advance notice concerning the date or time of the visit.

4. A minimum of two officers/deputies will be used on any such detail. The officers will

augment the detail with additional staff as necessary to ensure total security.

The first step in escorting a prisoner to a funeral home is to tell both the prisoner and his family what is expected of them during the visit. The officer/deputy in charge of the prisoner should advise family members and the prisoner of two rules which must be followed:

1. The prisoner may not leave the room where the event is being held without being accompanied by the escorting officer/deputy.

2. No special requests will be considered from family members.

The escorting officer/deputy should try to remain as inconspicuous as possible while watching his prisoner. He should sit in the back of the room where he can keep the prisoner under observation at all times. The best policy to follow is for the officer to tell the prisoner where he will be and to warn him not to move out of sight. A prisoner should be told that if he becomes careless and wanders out of the officer's sight, then his family might be caused some embarrassment when the officer is forced to search for the prisoner. The prisoner should be aware that if he disappears from the officer's sight, then the officer can make only one assumption - that the prisoner must be escaping.

The officer should never leave the prisoner in anyone else's care. The officer's duty is the safekeeping of the prisoner and he has no other concerns at the funeral.

When a prisoner is allowed to mingle with other people in a public place, it is almost impossible for an officer to prevent the passing of contraband. In this case the prisoner must be searched before he is placed back into the escort vehicle, which also must be searched for contraband.

In all special prisoner visiting situations, the escorting officer/deputy should present a calm, authoritative appearance. Since many of these occasions become highly emotional, the officer should be prepared to act quickly and decisively if necessary.

In summary, during a special visit to a funeral or deathbed, the escorting officer/deputy should:

1. Search the prisoner before returning him to the jail;

2. Keep a careful but inconspicuous watch on the prisoner during the visit;

3. Assume that if the prisoner is not present in the room, he has escaped; and

4. Explain to the prisoner and his family what is expected of him during the visit so that family members will not seek special considerations.

Escort To Visit A Critically-Ill Relative: The procedures to be followed here are much the same as with a funeral visit. The main thing to be concerned with, as in the funeral visit, is the highly emotional atmosphere.

The escorting officer/deputy must remember that **no set of rules or procedures can be written to cover all situations.** What has been presented in this chapter are basic recommended procedures. The officer/deputy is not dealing with machines but with human beings, so he should stay alert at all times.

In conclusion, it is important to re-emphasize that **escort duty can be very dangerous.** An officer/deputy can minimize the danger by following proper escort procedures. The prisoner is the escort officer's responsibility every minute while in transit.

Transporting Female Inmates: Because of the high potential for allegations of misconduct against a male officer/deputy stemming from the transporting of female prisoners, **there should always be a female officer/deputy participating in the escort. Under no circumstances should a female prisoner be transported by one or two male officers.** The implications of such an action, while obvious, are often overlooked because of the pressure of staff constraints, the fact that transport may require only a short period of time, or that the situation otherwise did not warrant assigning both a male and female officer/deputy at the same time.

The male officer who permits a situation to develop in which he finds himself the only escort present during a female prisoner transport is asking for trouble. It is conceivable, however, that circumstances might dictate such a situation and, if so, there are some steps that can be taken to minimize the possibility of a misconduct allegation being made by the prisoner.

The exact time and precise location of the transport should be recorded. If a vehicle is being used, the exact mileage on the transport vehicle should be recorded at the time the transport begins and ends along with the total lapsed time consumed during the transport. The radio dispatcher should be notified of the time and given the nature of the transport; for example, the escort officer/deputy might tell the dispatcher upon beginning the transport, "Unit 42 taking one female prisoner to court, beginning at 27,501 miles on vehicle number 27. The time is 1303 hours." When the officer arrives at his destination, he should again call

the radio dispatcher and provide his unit number, the number of miles on the vehicle's odometer, the exact time, and the fact that he is now taking the female prisoner into the courthouse. Such data is verifiable and can be used to demonstrate the lack of void in time and mileage during the transport process. Officers/deputies also should be aware that **female prisoners present *the same security risks* as males**, and they should be restrained using the techniques mentioned earlier.

Prudence on the part of a male officer/deputy when transporting a female prisoner -- even when accompanied by a woman officer -- is essential. Rough language, curt behavior, and rough handling of the prisoner could be the cause of an unpleasant incident. This is particularly important if the prisoner "makes a scene" or becomes unruly in front of civilians at the courthouse or hospital. The sympathy of the onlookers may be with the prisoner at the outset or could be shifted to her if less than prudent restraint is shown by the male officer/deputy. His actions will be watched closely by the onlookers and could be misinterpreted as unprofessional; some of these onlookers could later accuse the male officer of official misconduct. Such "witnesses" are formidable in any legal or administrative proceedings that may stem from the "incident."

Lockups and Holding Cells:

All agencies should develop written policies and procedures to be followed in the management of holding cells, lockups, detention cells or courthouse holding areas. The policy and procedures and written directions should contain some of the following issues governing the care, custody, control and supervision of prisoners:

1. Correctional law;
2. Legal rights and responsibilities within the detention environment;
3. Security and control;
4. Admissions/discharges and release;
5. Key control;
6. Patrol and continual security checks;
7. Escort of prisoners;
8. Hostage incidents;
9. Visiting and mail procedures;
10. Meal/food service procedures;

11. Alcohol, drug or medication withdraw or problems;

12. Psychological disorders;

13. Suicide prevention;

14. Supervising prisoners (male/female/juvenile);

15. Court security principles;

16. Property control;

17. Medical and health care in emergency situations;

18. Classification;

19. Prisoner rules. regulations, and discipline;

20. Safety and sanitation in holding cell areas;

21. Use of force:

    - ♦♦ Lethal force;
    - ♦♦ Non-lethal force;

22. Escapes and attempted escapes; and

23. Evacuation plans for disasters and emergencies.

The following guidelines should assist agencies in developing policies and standard operational procedures for all lockups, detention cells and holding cells.

Visitors to Holding Cells: Visitors should not be taken into cell or holding areas; access to these areas must be limited to authorized personnel. However, because prisoners being detained in holding cells will need to meet privately with their attorneys or members of the attorney's staff, there should be a room set aside in the secure area of the holding cells where these private meetings can be conducted. To keep track of visits made to prisoners by attorneys and occasionally other persons (such as a personal physician if the prisoner has a heart condition, for example), the agency should maintain a log book for the holding cell block area, entering data about each visitor in the log. All visitors, without exception, will be required to make appropriate entries on the log. These entries should contain, at a minimum:

- Name of visitor;
- Relationship to prisoner (attorney, physician, etc.);
- Prisoner visited;
- Time in and time out; and
- Purpose of visit.

Patrolling the Holding Cell Area: An officer/deputy assigned to these areas should constantly patrol the area, checking each lockup, holding cell or detention area at least every 15 to 20 minutes, but always varying his routine so that prisoners cannot establish a pattern for the officer. It is imperative that officers make an additional check of all holding cell areas at the end of their tour of duty to secure a prisoner count and assure that the confinement areas have no holdover detainees who could be abandoned overnight. Several incidents of abandonment of prisoners in courthouse lockups occurred nationwide in 1994 and 1995. In one Virginia jurisdiction, for example, a prisoner was left abandoned for five days in a courthouse lockup over Labor Day weekend. The prisoner, who suffered from various disabilities, had no food, was forced to drink water from a toilet, and tried in vain to summon help by pressing a buzzer in the holding cell; the buzzer system, which connected to the sheriff's office, was broken. While the deputy who claims he "forgot" this prisoner was fired after an investigation by the sheriff's department, the department still faced a lawsuit for negligent supervision because of the holding cell mishap.

To prevent this type of situation from occurring, the N.S.A. Project Staff recommends that supervisory controls be established to account for all prisoners taken to courthouse lockups, making certain that more than one person is responsible for assuring that each prisoner taken to a courthouse lockup is either returned to the jail when court ends for the day or is otherwise accounted for (i.e., a written record if the prisoner is released by the court and does not return to the jail).

Key Control: One duplicate set of keys for the confinement facility must be maintained. One set will be placed in an easily accessible but secure area to be used in emergency situations only. The other set will be kept by the personnel responsible for working the confinement areas. Personnel should never leave keys hanging in locks, on desks or in drawers. Personnel must be held accountable for key control at all times. Failure to return keys to designated security areas after use, misplacing keys, careless handling of keys, or carrying keys home overnight should be a basis for disciplinary action.

At least annually, an operational set of keys should be exchanged with the emergency keys mentioned above. The purpose is to ensure that all keys and locks will become worn at practically

the same rate and avoid a situation where a brand new key will no longer be compatible enough to open a worn lock.

Keys utilized for entry to office space or emergency exits should not be allowed in cell block areas.

Conducting Searches: All prisoners must be searched prior to entering and when leaving holding cell areas. Special caution should be taken when prisoners return from:

- ♦♦ Authorized visits with attorneys or others; and
- ♦♦ Court or interviews.

Prisoners should not be searched by officers/deputies of the opposite sex, unless the officer is using electronic search devices not requiring body contact. In addition, all articles for prisoner use should be inspected prior to being given to prisoners. Such articles could include blankets, notepads, pens, Bibles, magazines and soft drinks.

Securing Entry to Holding Cell Areas: Where possible, prisoners should not be processed in areas utilized by deputies and court administrative personnel. The court should establish separate entry and exit corridors for holding cell areas. However, if movement of prisoners through an administrative work area cannot be avoided, the time spent in this area should be held to a minimum. Prisoners should be placed in holding cells as soon as possible. They should not be allowed to spend any great length of time outside the cell area. **A minimum of two officers/deputies should be present whenever prisoners are being moved into or out of the holding cell area.**

Weapons, Ammunition and Non-Lethal Equipment Control: Weapons and ammunition must be stored in a secure area outside the cell area. Lockers should be used to secure all weapons, including blackjacks, tear gas canisters, and ammunition. Weapons, ammunition, chemical mace, or other items which could be used by prisoners to help them escape should never be allowed in holding cell areas.

Inspection of Holding Facilities: Cell areas must be searched for contraband prior to prisoner arrival each day as well as prior to securing the cell block for the day. For preventive maintenance purposes, personnel assigned to conduct the inspections should also check the following:

- ♦♦ Locks;
- ♦♦ Cell doors/grills;
- ♦♦ Screened areas;
- ♦♦ Bars;
- ♦♦ Modesty screens;

- Toilet facilities;
- Drain openings;
- Chairs, benches, beds;
- Lighting;
- Ceilings;
- Air flow/heat and air conditioning systems;
- Mechanical and maintenance areas;
- Officer/deputy office areas;
- Key security cabinet;
- First aid kit; and
- Lethal and non-lethal weapons storage.

Should an area in need of repair or maintenance be noted, it should be reported immediately in writing to the appropriate supervisor in charge of maintenance at the sheriff's office or court. All necessary repairs should be made without delay.

Females and Juvenile Prisoners: Separate holding facilities should be utilized for females and juvenile prisoners. In those instances where this is not practical, alternative measures should be employed. Female and juvenile prisoners should not be placed in a holding cell with adult male prisoners under any circumstances. Extra care and discretion shall be used when adequate facilities are not available to insure humane and reasonable treatment of female and juvenile prisoners.

Fires and Bomb Threats: In cases of fires or bomb threats, prisoners shall not be removed from holding cell facilities **unless imminent threat exists.** If removal is necessary, full restraints should be used and adequate personnel assigned. Officers/deputies should be vigilant for possible escape attempts, since the threat may be a hoax designed to afford an opportunity for the prisoners to escape. Prisoners should be returned to the court lockup as soon as the area has been properly searched and rendered safe.

Medical Care: Arrangements should be made for medical emergency assistance (e.g., hospital, fire department, health department, physicians, ambulance and rescue squads).

Cell Block Disorders: In the event of disorders, officers/deputies should attempt to learn the cause. It may be possible to halt the disorder by listening to a prisoner's complaint. Prisoners not participating in disorderly activities should be removed or separated when possible. Force or chemical agents should be used as a last resort. When force or chemical agents are used, notification of agency supervisors is mandatory. Appropriate descriptions of the incident must be recorded in the log book and incident reports.

Escapes and Attempted Escapes from Holding Cells: If a hostage is used in an attempt to escape, all personnel should have clear instructions that any orders given by a hostage are not to be considered as valid. Under no circumstances should a prisoner be permitted to escape from the detention area.

In cases involving hostages, notification must be made as soon as possible to the agency supervisor in charge of the confinement area. Such potentially hazardous incidents require maximum consultation between the senior supervisors and the field to minimize personal injury and to effect a prompt resolution of the situation.

Contraband: It should be the policy of the sheriff's office that any prisoners who possess contraband in lockups or holding cells will be referred for prosecution or disciplinary action on charges of possessing contraband.

Food and Meal Service: The officer-in-charge or his designee should ensure that all prisoners detained in holding cells are provided with sufficient food during meal hours. Meals should be ordered by assigned personnel from the designated agency supplier for all prisoners detained during the breakfast, lunch and dinner hours. A minimum of three nutritionally balanced meals, two of which must be hot, should be provided to prisoners every 24 hours.

The meals and menus used by the agency should be approved in writing by a qualified dietician as meeting the standards of dietary nutritional balance. Prisoners who need special meals should be accommodated when prescribed by a certified physician. Inmates who have religious beliefs requiring them to follow dietary laws may be provided with a special diet if requested. There should be no more than 14 hours elapsing between the evening and breakfast meals.

Food should never be used as a reward or disciplinary measure. All meals for prisoners should be served and supervised by officers/deputies. In addition, all meals and food service should be in compliance with all applicable Federal, state and local health laws, regulations and statutes. A daily inspection of the food service and equipment should be conducted by the officer/deputy in charge of the confinement area. All food service facilities and equipment must meet established safety and protection standards and requirements. Appropriate meals that are served with utensils and dining trays necessitate that counts of the utensils must be conducted before and after meal service. If anything is missing, there should be an immediate search of the holding cells, the food service area and the prisoners. Last, but not least, a clean food service area and personal hygiene on the part of food service workers is of paramount importance.

Use of Force:

The term "use of force" is defined as the act or action of one or more staff members functioning individually, collectively or as a trained unit to apply force against a prisoner(s) for the purpose of: self-defense; defense of a third party; enforcing compliance with orders, rules or regulations; preventing an escape; preventing destruction of property; or quelling a disturbance within the correctional facility. The types of force are:

- **Deadly force:** Level of force which has a great likelihood of inflicting serious bodily harm or death upon the recipient. The use of firearms is considered to be deadly force.

- **Non-deadly force:** Level of force which causes neither death nor serious bodily harm, such as the use of chemical agents or physically restraining an individual.

Chemical Agents: Are gas-based substances and/or products. They include chemical mace, Cap-stun, stun guns, pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum) and tear gas. These chemical agents are designed to immobilize a person or otherwise lessen a person's ability to act out.

Forced Cell Extraction: This term refers to the use of trained officers to remove an inmate from his cell in an orderly fashion. Forced cell extraction is employed when the prisoner refuses to leave the cell when asked to do so.

Categorical Use of Force: The use of force is divided into four categories which define the cause of the force:

1. **Category A**: Instances where force is used to defend oneself against attack, to restrain a prisoner against his will, to enforce an order, to quell a disturbance, etc.

2. **Category B**: Instances where force is used to break up a fight between two or more prisoners with little or no resistance on the part of the prisoners. **NOTE:** If one or more of the prisoners, in turn, attacks an officer/deputy, this situation could become a Category A.

3. **Category C**: Instances where force is used to restrain a mentally ill prisoner to prevent injury to staff, the prisoner or the destruction of property.

4. **Category D**: Instances where force is used by an organized unit of officers such as a Forced Cell Extraction Team or Tactical Unit.

Use of Force Policy: It should be the policy of any agency that unless there is a clear and present danger to staff and/or prisoner(s), every effort shall be made to peacefully resolve the situation. Force may be employed against a prisoner in defense of life and to protect property, to prevent an escape, or to maintain or regain control of a situation or event. The force used shall always be the minimum amount necessary. The type of force used will be dictated by the situation and will either increase or decrease as the situation or event requires.

Excessive use of force is strictly prohibited. Any officer/deputy or staff member having knowledge of an unreported use-of-force incident is duty bound to report this information to the chief of police, sheriff, warden, or facility administrator without delay and by whatever means is appropriate under the circumstances.

The use of force should be authorized **only after** reasonable non-forceful solutions have failed and then only to the extent necessary to control or regain control of the situation when there is a clear and present danger to staff, the public and/or prisoner(s). Non-force methods should be employed first where time and circumstances permit.

Authority for Use of Force: Authority for approving the use of force at the institution, facility or agency level should be in descending sequence, as follows:

- Warden/jail administrator
- Assistant warden/jail administrator
- Chief of security
- Shift commander
- Sheriff

In an emergency or in a situation where it is not possible or practical to seek authorization, an employee must use the appropriate force. As soon as possible, however, he should describe and document the situation in a written "Use of Force Report" to the agency supervisor.

The supervisor and/or the correctional institution's warden or facility duty officer shall be notified immediately when the use of force results in injury to either staff or prisoner(s), or substantial property loss/damage.

Force is to be used as a measure of control and should never be used as a means of punishment.

Conditions for Use of Force: Physical force may be used as necessary in the following situations:

1. A prisoner fails to comply with a legitimate order or standing institutional procedure;

2. Verbal persuasion is impractical or fails to achieve compliance;

3. There is a clear and present danger to staff, the public and/or prisoner(s);

4. Standard disciplinary sanctions are insufficient to enforce compliance;

5. It is necessary to protect a third party (i.e., another employee, prisoner, or visitor);

6. Self-protection by staff;

7. The prevention of suicide or bodily harm by a prisoner to himself;

8. The prevention of escape(s);

9. The enforcement of institutional, agency or facility directives, rules or orders after non-forceful methods have failed and circumstances require forceful intervention;

10. Prevention of crime(s); and

11. The protection of property.

Physical force of a minimum nature involves applying physical restraints in a controlling manner. Mechanical restraints may be used in the following general situations:

1. During transport or movement of prisoner(s) inside or outside of a secure institution, facility or agency;

2. When past and/or present behavior or the apparent emotional state of the prisoner creates the likelihood that bodily injury to any person, destruction of property or escape by the prisoner will occur; and

3. Under orders given by a qualified medical or psychological practitioner to prevent the prisoner from harming himself or others.

Mechanical restraints should never be used:

1. As a method of punishment;

2. About the head or neck of a prisoner; or

3. In a way that causes undue physical pain, restricts blood circulation, or restricts breathing.

Only restraints authorized and/or issued by the institution, agency or facility should be used. In-cell restraints such as leg irons, waist chains, and handcuffs may be used when the senior supervisor on duty has determined that a serious threat of violence or other injurious acts are being carried out on a continuous basis. Restraints may be used to shackle a prisoner to a stationary object within a cell or other area when the senior supervisor on duty has determined the prisoner continues to be disruptive and represents a threat of violence to himself or others. A prisoner who is in restraint **must be** closely monitored in accordance with any institutional, agency and facility standard operational procedures and policies.

Use of chemical agents to disable or otherwise control an individual or crowd: Chemical agents could be used in the following general situations if authorized by written policies of the agency:

1. As part of the application of physical force, either prior to or after its use, in order to assist in the immobilization of the prisoner;

2. To effect a forced cell extraction to move or control an aggressively acting-out prisoner and then only after the prisoner is informed prior to its use;

3. The use of chemical agents in a forced cell extraction must be approved by the supervisor in charge;

4. Chemical agents must never be used as a method of punishment;

5. Medical treatment shall be given to all persons exposed to chemical agents;

6. Officers/deputies using chemical agents must be provided with adequate training in their use prior to employing these substances;

7. Only the **minimal** amount of chemical agents necessary shall be used in a given situation.

Chemical agents used in an enclosed or confined area have a lasting linger. Furthermore, chemical agents can flow into air ducts, air conditioning systems, and air ventilation systems, thereby creating danger and harm to any adjoining areas.

Use of water hoses: High pressure water hoses, where available, may be used if lesser force has failed in controlling large groups of prisoners, provided that the following conditions are met:

1. The warden, jail administrator or sheriff or the duty officer should approve the use of water hoses; and

2. Care should be taken not to aim at the prisoners' head or neck areas.

Batons and riot sticks: Riot batons or riot sticks may be used in a non-deadly manner under appropriate circumstances, such as the delivery of a blow to stop or control a prisoner, or to forcefully remove a prisoner from a cell or other location. Batons and riot sticks may be used in the following situations:

1. Prior to the use of deadly force to prevent an escape or to prevent injury to oneself or others;

2. As part of the equipment of a specially trained tactical unit employed during times of emergency;

3. To subdue an armed prisoner(s);

4. As a backup weapon for the forced cell extraction team;

5. The warden, jail administrator or sheriff or duty officer must approve the issuance and use of these devices; and

6. Blows should **never** be aimed at the head, kidney, liver or genital areas.

Deadly force, such as a firearm can be used as appropriate under the following circumstances:

1. As part of the planned intervention to quell a riot or major disturbance and there is clear

and present danger to staff or other prisoners;

2. At a prisoner or other person carrying a weapon or attempting to obtain a weapon by force if the officer has reason to believe there is a clear and present danger that the prisoner or other person presents a risk of causing death or serious bodily harm;

3. At a prisoner or other person the officer/deputy has observed killing or seriously injuring any person, who refuses to halt when ordered to do so, and there is a clear and present danger to others; and

4. At an escaping prisoner **under some circumstances** if it is reasonably clear that the escape can be accomplished and deadly force is a means of last resort.

Authorization from the sheriff, jail administrator or duty officer should be obtained prior to the use of deadly force where time permits its use as part of a planned and organized response; such a circumstance would involve the planned response to a hostage incident or cellblock riot. Under clearly emergency conditions, where the loss of life is imminent and/or where time does not permit seeking the approval of supervisors, such as an incident where a prisoner who is being transported grabs an escort officer's handgun from its holster, the officer may exercise the use of deadly force:

1. Warning shots could be used within the jail compound or from a tower to quell a riot, preserve life and/or protect property, if the institution's policies and procedures permit;

2. Warning shots should not be fired under any circumstances in the community, courts, hospitals or other public areas;

3. Only weapons and ammunition authorized by the agency may be used; and

4. During situations of planned and organized intervention with the use of firearms -- such as in a riot -- weapons shall be discharged **only on order of the official in command** of the intervention as set forth in emergency operation plans.

Reporting procedures when force is used: All instances of the use of force, except routine use of mechanical restraints for transport or movement, should be investigated and documented as follows:

1. The senior officer/deputy at the scene is responsible for completion of the report in instances where a team of officers is employed. Any individual officer/deputy using force is likewise responsible for completion of an incident report.

2. All personnel involved in the use of force or who have direct knowledge of the incident shall submit supplemental reports which shall become a part of the complete report. All evidence must be submitted along with the report. The report should describe the individual officers' assignment, personal actions and observations.

3. All reports should be completed no later than the conclusion of the work shift and in every case before the involved staff leave the facility, unless they are medically unable to do so.

4. The report(s) shall be submitted to the shift commander for preliminary review and then forwarded to the warden, jail administrator or sheriff for review and follow-up.

5. All reports should be forwarded to the agency's legal counsel for review and other appropriate actions.

6. All reports on use of force should be retained as prescribed by state, county and local law.

Firearms Policies:

Every law enforcement agency should develop policies and procedures governing the control, use and storage of firearms to ensure safety and security, diminish liability concerns and enhance training. These policies should include, at a minimum:

1. Persons appointed to positions in the officer/deputy classification series must **meet and maintain all state and Federal requirements** regarding authorization to possess firearms which are issued by a government agency as part of the equipment

necessary for performance of the assigned job function.

2. It should be the policy of the agency that all officers/deputies, regardless of rank, meet the minimum firearms qualification requirements approved by the state peace officer standards and training commission (POST) prior to assignment to any duty involving the issuance of a firearm.

3. It should be the policy of the agency that all weapons, ammunition and accessories issued for training or duty assignments be standardized.

4. It should be the policy of the agency that a secure armory for the storage and maintenance of firearms be maintained.

5. All officers/deputies shall achieve and maintain certification in the standard firearms equipment utilized by their agency. All officers/deputies, regardless of section, shall maintain certification for all weapons in order to be able to respond appropriately to other institutions as necessary under emergency plans.

6. **Storage, issuance and maintenance of firearms and ammunition:**

   - ♦♦ Each agency shall establish a secure, controlled armory. This armory will be situated outside prisoners' living and activity areas.

   - ♦♦ Each agency should establish written procedures governing control, access, and operation of its armory.

   - ♦♦ Policies and procedures should include the following basic elements for operation of an armory and for control of firearms/weapons, etc.:

     - Designation of a sworn employee to be responsible for the operation of the armory inventory and maintenance

of firearms, ensuring that any repairs are completed;

- Determination of agency needs for firearms and their security;
- A written monthly inventory for all equipment located in or assigned to the armory, which includes provision for a review by the agency head or designee;
- Any discrepancy noted in the monthly inventory will be investigated;
- A listing of all firearms by make, type, and serial number;
- A designation of ammunition which is to be used for training purposes only;
- A daily accounting for ammunition expended;
- Restricting armory access to authorized personnel;
- Method of issuing and receiving of equipment from the armory which includes:
  * A list of staff authorized to remove equipment;
  * A check-in and check-out log to note:
    ** date
    ** time
    ** signature of issuing officer/deputy
    ** name of person who receives and is responsible for the return of the equipment in its issued condition;

* The separate issuing of firearms and ammunition, i.e., no loaded firearms shall be issued;

* Procedure by which documentation exists for inventory of all accessible firearms and equipment at the change of each shift;

* Provisions for the storage of employees' privately owned firearms;

* Provisions for storage of weapons for an employee of another agency visiting the agency in an official capacity.

7. **Firearms Training:** Each agency head or designee shall ensure that:

♦♦ There is a sufficient cadre of **certified** firearms instructors available to train and certify all officers/deputies at the agency in the use of the standard weapons used at the agency;

♦♦ The agency's approved qualification course is used in both the pre-service and in-service firearms programs;

♦♦ All officers/deputies qualify **at least annually** with the standard firearms used in the agency;

♦♦ Any officer/deputy who is inadvertently assigned to a post requiring the use of a firearm for which he is not qualified shall **immediately** inform his supervisor;

♦♦ **Entrance Level (Pre-Service) Training:** Each agency head shall ensure that:

- Newly hired officers/- deputies receive firearms training as part of the pre-service sequence of training, which includes

orientation, firearms and academy instruction. The firearms training requirement shall be completed prior to the officer's assignment to the training academy, if at all possible;

- Newly hired officers/- deputies who fail pre-service firearms qualification should receive a written notification from the agency head or designee;

- Remedial training should be rescheduled in a prompt and timely manner;

- An entry level officer/deputy who fails the firearms training and remedial training should be rejected on probation;

- All qualification failures must be fully documented.

♦♦ **Annual (In-Service) Training:**

- All officers/deputies should successfully complete in-service training and qualify for all standard weapons used in the agency;

- Qualification should occur prior to the expiration date of that officer's/deputy's current firearms certification;

- The agency head or designee should ensure that all officers/- deputies who fail to qualify during annual in-service training are:

a. Removed from any weapon-carrying assignments of the weapon for which qualification was not achieved (e.g., if the officer fails to qualify with a shotgun, he should not be given any assignments which require the use of a shotgun);

b. Rescheduled within 30 working days for remedial training;

- The agency head should ensure that officers/- deputies who fail the first remedial training should be rescheduled for a second remedial training session within 30 working days;

- Employees who fail both remedials shall be given written notice by the instructor of their deficiencies with the weapon(s). Until employees meet the firearms standards, the following conditions will apply:

a. They will receive unsatisfactory overall annual efficiency ratings;

b. Their annual increment could be denied;

c. They should not be eligible for promotion;

d. They could/should not be assigned to a post which requires handling of the weapon(s) for which they are not qualified; and

e. All qualification failures shall be fully documented;

- Those employees who are reinstated as officers/deputies shall:

  a. If certification has expired, attend and successfully complete the pre-service firearms training;

  b. If certification has not expired, attend an in-service firearms training session.

♦♦ Authorized discharge of firearms should include the following circumstances:

- Approved scheduled firearms training;
- Agency-sanctioned firearms competition events; and
- Use of force, if necessary.

♦♦ A firearm discharged in any situation except those listed above should be reported and investigated as an unauthorized discharge.

♦♦ Supervisors should ensure that officers/deputies involved in an incident where a firearm has been discharged and personal injury may have resulted are given an opportunity to discuss the incident with appropriate employee assistance and/or psychological services personnel.

Chapter Seven: Reference Sources

1. Dr. Betty B. Bosarge, Francis R. Ford and Dr. Kenneth Kerle (editors), *Jail Officer's Training Manual*. Alexandria, VA: National Sheriffs' Association, 1980 and 1990, pp. 77-80.

2. John M. Sells, "Transportation of Prisoners," *Jail Operations Bulletin* (Vol. 1, No. 10). Hagerstown, MD: American Jail Association, 1989.

3. See "IACP Finds Pepper Spray To Be Safe and Effective," *Crime Control Digest* (Vol. 29, No. 32), August 11, 1995, pp. 1-2. To receive a copy of the Executive Summary of the "Pepper Spray Evaluation Project," contact the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 515 North Washington Street, Alexandria, VA 22314-2357. Phone: 800-THE-IACP or 703-836-6767. Also see "Controversy Continues Over Use of Pepper Spray," *Crime Control Digest* (Vol. 29, No. 34), August 25, 1995, pp. 1-2.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

PICTORIAL SELECTIONS

CHAPTER SEVEN
TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

This information is provided as a research service for its readers, and the publisher and editors do not purport to furnish legal advice or assistance. While a professional effort is made to insure the accuracy of the contents, no warranty is expressed or implied.

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

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ty of Alexandria, Virginia]





Audio or visual electronic surveillance should be located primarily in hallways, elevators, corridors, or at points on the security perimeter, such as entrance and exits and sallyports. Continual monitoring of these areas is of the utmost importance. [City of Alexandria, Virginia]







Weapons Storage for the Criminal Justice Center, Detention Facility or Courthouse should be located outside the secure areas where prisoners are detained. These lockers should be equipped with individual compartments, each with an individual lock and key. The lockers should be available to any/all criminal justice personnel.
[City of Alexandria, Virginia]



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[Baltimore City, Maryland]





Marked Transportation Van



A marked vehicle for the transportation of prisoners. [City of Alexandria, Virginia]



Adequate and secure parking for the prisoner transportation personnel should be provided at any courthouse facility.
[Baltimore City, Maryland]



Adequate and secure parking for the prisoner transportation personnel should be provided at any courthouse facility.
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]





The care, custody, control and supervision of any prisoner being transported is the full-time responsibility of the escort officer. The security of the area where the prisoner is to be taken (i.e., courtroom, hospital, etc.) and the safety of the transport officers/-deputies, citizens and other prisoners while in transit can be assured only when each prisoner being transported is searched thoroughly and under the control of escorting officers and deputies.

- Continual alertness and observation are critical.
- Provide continuous observation of the prisoner from a position of safety.

[United States Marshals Service
Alexandria, Virginia]





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



State of Nevada
Prisoner Transport Bus
[Property Storage]





State of Nevada
Prisoner Transport Bus
[Emergency Exits/V-8 Engine]





State of Nevada
Prisoner Transport Bus
[Interior Security]





Los Angeles County, California
Prisoner Transport Bus





Los Angeles County, California
Prisoner Transport Bus
[Interior Security]





Prisoner Control & Officer/Deputy Safety is
of the utmost importance in any/all transports.
[City of Alexandria, Virginia]



Prisoner Control & Officer/Deputy Safety & Security within the lockup, cellblock, holding facility is of the utmost importance.

All prisoners should be searched thoroughly whenever entering or exiting the security perimeter. [City of Alexandria, Virginia]





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[City of Alexandria, Virginia]





All prisoners should be searched thoroughly and under the control of an officer/deputy at all times.
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]





A separate elevator should be used solely for the judges' usage.

A prisoner transportation elevator should be used for prisoners and not the judicial staff or general public.
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]





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[Baltimore City, Maryland]





All prisoners should be searched thoroughly whenever entering or exiting the security perimeter and during the booking and admission process.
[Baltimore City, Maryland]





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



All prisoners should be searched thoroughly whenever entering or exiting the security perimeter and during the booking and admission process.
[Baltimore City, Maryland]





All prisoners should be searched thoroughly whenever entering or exiting the security perimeter. Furthermore, any prisoners that enter a jail, lockup, detention facility, cell block area or holding cell should be searched and during the booking and admission process. [City of Alexandria, Virginia]





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[City of Alexandria, Virginia]





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



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



Communications and security of the cellblock, lockup, holding facility and control center is of the utmost importance.
[City of Alexandria, Virginia]







A secure central control room for courthouse facility is of a major importance to courthouse security. [City of Alexandria, Virginia]



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[City of Alexandria, Virginia]







- Holding cells should always provide the sight/sound separation of any/all male, female and juvenile detainees.

- Making on-the-scene supervision checks of holding cells, lockups and detention facilities as effective as possible requires flexibility and even imagination on the part of the patrolling officer/deputy. Officers/deputies should consciously make frequent patrol of these areas at irregular times which cannot be predicted by detainees.
  [City of Alexandria, Virginia]



The courthouse facility, including the holding facilities or cell block areas, should comply with all Federal, local and state sanitation, safety and health codes.

The courthouse facility, including the holding facilities or cell block areas, should have an adequate system of fire inspection. Testing of equipment by a local fire official should be conducted on a quarterly basis.

Accessible standpipes, working firehoses, and properly charged fire extinguishers should be placed at appropriately marked locations throughout the courthouse facility and the holding facilities or cell block areas.

The courthouse facility, including the holding facilities or cell block areas, should have adequate first aid kits readily available throughout the complex.

[City of Alexandria, Virginia]



Prisoner reception, booking and admission and release areas should be located inside the security perimeter of the lockup, holding facility, cellblock or courthouse facilities.
[Beaver, Pennsylvania]



ESCORTING/TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS ON COMMERCIAL AIRLINES





Escorted prisoners may be accepted for transportation provided the sworn law enforcement officer/deputy checks in at the ticket counter and their agency advises the commercial airline at least one hour before departure. This notification must include the escorted prisoner's name, trip routing, the escort officers'/deputies names, as well as agency information which includes address, city, state, zip code, telephone number, and fax number.

Airlines will require the following: badge, seal, credential number, letter of authorization, agency identification card with recent photo-identification. Furthermore, the risk classification of the prisoner should be given to airline personnel.

Commercial airline forms for prisoner transportation escorts and firearms carry on authorization forms must be completed.

Special Notation:

Early check-in at the ticket counter is of the utmost importance.



Officers/deputies travelling armed will be required to read and sign a **"Notice to Armed Individual"** form for each flight. This form will be completed at the ticket counter at the origination point and must contain a copy for each segment of the escort or transport trip.



Officers/deputies and escorted prisoners as well as any/all hand carried articles must be checked thoroughly by airport or airline security.



Officers/deputies and escorted prisoners must check-in at the Information Counter of the airline carrier prior to reporting to the gate area.





Officers/deputies and escorted prisoners must check-in at the Boarding Gate of the airline carrier.





All seats should be selected at the rearmost "available" row of the aircraft. The prisoner will not be seated on the aisle but only in the inside or window seats.





Some commercial airlines require that all prisoners must be escorted by armed officers/deputies and must occupy the rearmost available seats in the aircraft. Neither window nor exit row nor aisle seating should be permitted.





Some commercial airlines require that prisoners be restricted from moving about the commercial aircraft, either aloft or on the ground, including the use of lavatories. For this reason, prisoners will not be accepted on some airlines with scheduled flying times of four hours or more. Some airlines will not permit the prisoner to leave their seat without an escort. LEOs should ask prisoners to use lavatory facilities prior to flight boarding in order to preclude inflight lavatory visits. In the event lavatory privileges are needed, the prisoner must be escorted to the lavatory so as not to breach escort duties.

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

CHAPTER EIGHT

RECOMMENDATIONS

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CHAPTER EIGHT

RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER EIGHT

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations which follow were developed by the N.S.A. Project Staff in consultation with members of the Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees. They derive from an analysis of both the literature and major findings of the data collection surveys described in Chapter Three.

In addition, the Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees developed several recommendations during the course of meetings conducted to review and discuss the issues involved in court security and the transportation of prisoners. Committee members, individually and as a group, pinpointed security needs in specific areas and suggested solutions to common problems in jurisdictions of varying sizes throughout the nation.

The recommendations are grouped in categories and numbered by category for easy reference. They are **not** listed in the categories in any particular order of importance.

These recommendations are for **advisory purposes** only and are not "guidelines" or "standards". However, these recommendations could serve as the foundation for the development of future standards for the transportation of prisoners and courthouse security programs if a national commission were to be established to develop a certification and accreditation program, similar to the program offered by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) or the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections (CAC). In the interim, these recommendations can assist court security administrators in evaluating their own facilities and programs to determine where improvements ought to be made.

Section 1

ADMINISTRATION

Recommendation 1-1: Each agency assigned jurisdiction for court facility security and the transportation of prisoners should have a written policies and procedures manual governing operations. These documents should be reviewed and updated annually. All agency personnel should receive training to assure that they understand the policies and can apply the procedures.

Recommendation 1-2: Each agency responsible for court security should have a current organizational chart describing the chain-of-command. This chart should be reviewed annually and updated as needed.

Recommendation 1-3: Each agency responsible for court security should develop a "mission statement" for the court security function.

Recommendation 1-4: Each governmental entity should establish clear jurisdictional authority for the court security function and determine

whether a sole agency, such as the office of the sheriff, is to be given authority for court security both within the court buildings and on surrounding grounds.

Recommendation 1-5: The courthouse facility should have a public information program that is reviewed at least annually and updated as needed. This plan should include policies and procedures governing media access to the courthouse facility, consistent with the preservation of the rights of defendants, victims, witnesses, court and criminal justice system employees, as well as with the maintenance of order and security. These policies and procedures should conform with any state "Freedom of Information" statutes.

Recommendation 1-6: Each court facility should maintain an up-to-date inventory of all property and assets.

Section 2

EMERGENCY, HEALTH, AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Recommendation 2-1: An emergency plan should be developed for the courthouse facility in compliance with all Federal, municipal, county, state and/or regulatory entities. It should include plans for the following types of emergency situations: fire, bomb threat, general evacuation, natural disaster, civil disorder, power/utility failures, communications system failures, emergency medical aid, shootings and hostage incidents.

Recommendation 2-2: Emergency and evacuation plans should be posted throughout the courthouse facility for specific types of emergency situations (e.g., fire, tornado, hurricane, etc.).

Recommendation 2-3: The courthouse facility emergency and evacuation plans should be sent to the following agencies to ensure cooperation and coordination during all emergency situations:

- Fire and rescue department;
- Fire marshal;
- Law enforcement agencies;
- Sewer and water departments; and
- Public utilities (gas and electricity).

Recommendation 2-4: The courthouse facility should have adequate first aid kits readily available throughout the complex.

Recommendation 2-5: The courthouse facility should have adequate centrally controlled lighting which meets security system requirements.

Recommendation 2-6: The courthouse facility should have a minimum and maximum temperature both to ensure comfortable working conditions and to meet the operational requirements of computerized security equipment.

Recommendation 2-7: The courthouse facility should provide adequate acoustical conditions to ensure that noise levels do not interfere with normal human activities and court proceedings.

Recommendation 2-8: The courthouse facility should be in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 *et. seq.*) and the Final Rule for State and Local Government Facilities, U.S. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, May 20, 1994 (36 CFR Part 1191.)

Recommendation 2-9: The courthouse facility should be soundproofed on external and internal walls, if feasible, with the appropriate sound absorption materials to assure that unnecessary noise does not interfere with the operations of courtrooms, jury deliberation rooms, grand jury rooms, chamber spaces, attorney conference rooms, holding cells and witness waiting rooms.

Recommendation 2-10: The courthouse facility should have a backup power supply to assure an uninterrupted power source, which is especially important to the continued operation of integrated access control and alarm systems during emergency situations.

Recommendation 2-11: The courthouse facility should have an internal data communication network for the security function as well as linkage to other county or state criminal justice databases.

Recommendation 2-12: The courthouse facility should have a room large enough to house all shared computer equipment or telecommunications equipment. Data communications closets should be provided on each floor of the courthouse, when feasible. Included should be electrical surge protection devices that protect computer equipment from power fluctuations, outages or natural disasters. An independent air conditioning unit with the necessary plumbing and electrical services should be provided to service the room as required. An emergency warning light and intrusion alarm should be provided outside the computer room to indicate a malfunction, intrusion or shut down of the computer equipment. The computer room should be monitored 24 hours a day by a computerized integrated security system. The computer room should be located within the courthouse facility to assure

appropriate security and to minimize the harm from natural disasters, fire, threats, theft or utility failures.

Recommendation 2-13: The courthouse facility should have ample conduits for current and future computer equipment needs, particularly since many security functions are now integrated into computer-based systems.

Recommendation 2-14: For computer security purposes, the computer room should house the central components of other administrative, case tracking and judicial functions, video arraignment equipment, telephones, facsimile and computerized security system equipment.

Recommendation 2-15: The courthouse computer room should have an adjacent office and storage area for data processing, storage of computer supplies/parts, and centrally used printers. This room should have a high security classification with intrusion alarm systems. There should be limited access to the room to prevent tampering with equipment.

Recommendation 2-16: The courthouse facility should provide adequate structural support for all roof mountings of microwave and satellite dishes that may be required for video arraignment, training and other applications needed for the court security and transportation of prisoners functions.

Recommendation 2-17: The courthouse facility should include on each floor of the complex adequate connections for state-of-the-art communications equipment (e.g., telephone, facsimile, computers, security and fire detection systems, video connectors, copying machines and teletype systems).

Recommendation 2-18: If the courthouse facility is more than one story in height, it should have a mix of elevators and escalators to enhance accessibility. However, consideration should be given to the need to separate each of the three circulation zones in most courthouse facilities (public, private and secured) and to the special needs of the disabled or handicapped. There should always be a separate

for prisoners, which should not be used by the general public, visitors and courthouse employees.

Recommendation 2-19: New courthouse facilities should be designed and structured to provide access for persons who are handicapped or disabled and who may be either visitors to the facility or employees. However, the elimination of architectural and transportation barriers for the disabled should not be permitted to create security problems.

Recommendation 2-20: The courthouse facility should have a program for sign utilization that harmonizes with the circulation zones of the facility (public, private and secure zones). They should be attractive, contemporary and legible signs of both a directional and an information character; they should be incorporated into the interior design of all public areas. The sign system should meet all nationally recognized standards, guidelines, codes and regulations. Signs should be posted

where they can be seen easily. They should be multilingual when appropriate. Braille lettering and audio signals should be provided at elevators, entrances, exits and other appropriate locations throughout the court complex.

Recommendation 2-21: The courthouse facility should have an information booth and building directory located near the major public entrance. The information booth should feature a diagram that lists all major components in the building accessible to members of the public. It should never list the locations of judges' chambers, holding cell areas, or secure areas of the building.

Recommendation 2-22: The courthouse facility's public waiting areas should include adequate seating and be located as close as possible to the areas of highest public use. These seating areas should have easy access to restrooms, water fountains and telephones, as well as snack bars or vending machines, to discourage citizens from wandering around the building searching for these facilities.

Section 3

FIRE PROTECTION AND FIRE ALARMS

Recommendation 3-1: Integrated systems of fire detection and suppression alarms, bells, and buzzers should be included in the design of all new and remodeled facilities. These integrated systems should comply with all state codes and regulations and the National Fire Protection Association standards, guidelines and recommendations.

Recommendation 3-2: The courthouse facility should comply with all Federal, local and state sanitation, safety and health codes.

Recommendation 3-3: The courthouse facility should have an adequate system of fire inspection. Testing of equipment by a local fire official should be conducted on a quarterly basis.

Recommendation 3-4: Accessible standpipes, working firehoses, and properly charged fire extinguishers should be placed at appropriately marked locations throughout the courthouse facility.

Recommendation 3-5: All courtrooms should install and maintain an automatic fire alarm, bell, heat and smoke detection system which is approved by the state fire marshal. The system should be inspected monthly.

Recommendation 3-6: Continual monitoring of fire, heat and smoke detectors should be conducted by the integrated computerized security and alarm system on a 24-hour basis.

Recommendation 3-7: The courthouse facility should have exits which are distinctly marked, continuously illuminated and kept clear and in usable condition at all times in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state and local fire safety codes.

Recommendation 3-8: The courthouse administration's purchasing manager should acquire only those furnishings and materials which are flame-retardant and, where feasible, made of non-toxic substances.

Recommendation 3-9: Both sprinklered and non-sprinklered courthouse facilities should have the

necessary travel distance to exits as specified by the National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code, covering the following areas: holding cells and prisoner detention rooms; judges' chambers/suites; offices/work areas; courtrooms; jury rooms; lavatories; lobbies; hallways; storage rooms; library; utility/maintenance rooms; backup power supply room; cafeteria/snack bar; conference rooms/computer rooms; reception rooms; and communications and control center.

Section 4

PERSONNEL

Recommendation 4-1: Sworn courthouse employees should be selected and promoted on the basis of merit. They should have the ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing and should pass a background and medical examination.

Recommendation 4-2: All sworn personnel, including court security deputies, officers, bailiffs, and prisoner escort officers, should be provided access to and training in the agency's policies and procedures manual.

Section 5

TRAINING AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT

Recommendation 5-1: Each agency should develop a written training and staff development plan for all sworn and non-sworn employees.

Recommendation 5-2: All agencies should develop and provide basic (recruit) and in-service training programs for all sworn employees who work in the court security or transportation of prisoners functions.

Recommendation 5-3: All employees newly assigned to the transportation of prisoners or court security functions should receive a minimum of 80 hours of formal classroom instruction in the following subject areas:

- ♦ Report writing;
- ♦ Legal issues;
- ♦ Fire emergency and evacuation plan;
- ♦ First aid certification;
- ♦ C.P.R. certification;
- ♦ Communication skills;
- ♦ Dealing with the public;

- Rights and responsibilities of staff;
- Use of lethal and non-lethal force;
- Searches of cells, facilities, courtrooms, visitors, guests and defendants;
- Negligent release/negligent supervision;
- Operation of security equipment and technology;
- Litigation procedures;
- Patrol of courthouse and facilities;
- Understanding problems of prisoners:
    - Suicide prevention;
    - Alcohol and drug emergencies; and
    - Diabetes, epilepsy and infectious diseases;
- Supervising prisoners (males/females/juveniles);
    - Principles and skills;
    - Security; and
    - Transportation;
- Media relations guidelines;

- The nature of court violence and security threats;
- The state court system and how it functions;
- Methods of intelligence gathering and threat assessment;
- How to handle court disruptions;
- Parking lot, parking garage, sallyport and perimeter security;
- Bomb, weapon and contraband search and identification;
- Defensive tactics;
- Firearms training and qualification, if this has not been included in a basic law enforcement course;
- Disguised and concealed weapons;
- Protecting persons at risk;
- Crowd control;
- Hostage situations;
- Handling sequestered juries; and
- Roles and duties of bailiffs.

Recommendation 5-4: All court security and prisoner transportation personnel should be trained and certified in the following areas:

- Electronic non-lethal force equipment;
- Firearms [lethal force];
- Riot equipment; and
- Methods of applying physical force to control defendants.

Recommendation 5-5: When court security and transportation of prisoners are two distinct areas of employment in a sheriff's office, separate training programs focusing on the specific duties of each job should be offered. If, however, officers/deputies will most likely serve in both capacities depending upon the available manpower strength of the agency and the need to staff a particular post at a given time, then officers/deputies should be cross-trained to perform both the court security and prisoner transportation functions. This is particularly applicable to smaller agencies.

Recommendation 5-6: All officers/deputies assigned to the court security and transportation of prisoners functions should be provided with annual in-service training in

compliance with the certification requirements of the state peace officer standards and training commission. A minimum of 40 hours of annual in-service training is recommended for all sworn personnel.

Recommendation 5-7: For legal protection of both the agency and its trainees, all trainees should be thoroughly tested to make certain that they have learned the necessary knowledge and skills to perform each task correctly.

Recommendation 5-8: The agency should keep complete written records on all trainees, specifying what they were taught when, how they tested, and whether the trainee was required to keep re-testing until the relevant skills were learned.

Section 6

INVENTORY AND PROPERTY CONTROL

Recommendation 6-1: All prisoners should be thoroughly searched before being placed in courthouse holding cells prior to trials and hearings.

Recommendation 6-2: An itemized inventory should be made of all personal property of prisoners, including the prisoners' legal paperwork.

Recommendation 6-3: Provisions should be made to secure and store all property belonging to prisoners, including money and other valuables. Prisoners should be given written receipts for all property stored by court security officers.

Recommendation 6-4: Provisions should be made to return all property belonging to prisoners when prisoners are released from the jurisdiction of the court after hearings or trials. Each prisoner should sign a receipt for his returned property.

Section 7

PHYSICAL PLANT

Recommendation 7-1: Prisoner reception and release areas should be located inside the security perimeter of the courthouse facility.

Recommendation 7-2: Adequate and secure parking for judges and prisoner transportation personnel should be provided at the court facility.

Recommendation 7-3: Weapons lockers should be located outside the secure areas where prisoners are detained. These lockers should be equipped with individual compartments, each with an individual lock and key. The lockers should be available to all sworn law enforcement personnel.

Recommendation 7-4: All court facilities should provide secure temporary holding cells to court trials or judicial hearings. Holding cells should contain, at a minimum:

- Sufficient fixed benches;
- Wash basins; and
- Toilet.

Recommendation 7-5: Holding cells should provide sight/sound separation of male, female and juvenile prisoners.

Recommendation 7-6: The holding cells should be located so that prisoners can be observed in the secure area by bailiffs or officers on a periodic or continual basis, if needed.

Recommendation 7-7: Holding cells should have at least 70 square feet of floor space.

Recommendation 7-8: The courthouse should have designated exits to permit prompt evacuation of prisoners, visitors and staff in any emergency.

Recommendation 7-9: Every courthouse should have provisions to evacuate prisoners in a secure manner in the event of an emergency.

Recommendation 7-10: Architectural plans for new construction or remodeling should be reviewed and certified to conform with nationally accepted standards for court facility security.

Recommendation 7-11: Appropriate recording and video equipment should be available in all courtrooms.

Recommendation 7-12: All courtrooms should have adequate seating capacity for those participating in the proceedings as well as visitors.

Recommendation 7-13: Space should be provided for law enforcement officers, witnesses, attorneys, probation and parole officers, media representatives and other parties to wait for hearings or court trials.

Section 8

SECURITY AND CONTROL

Recommendation 8-1: The courthouse should contain a command, control and communications center to ensure order and security and to monitor all security equipment.

Recommendation 8-2: A bailiff, officer or deputy should not enter a high security cell block area without backup assistance.

Recommendation 8-3: A bailiff, officer or deputy should have access to a working audio communication system between duty posts and the command, control and communications center.

Recommendation 8-4: A bailiff, officer or deputy should conduct a security inspection of the courtrooms each day before any judicial proceedings begin. The inspection should cover the following areas:

- Doors,
- Windows,
- Desks,
- Seats/benches,
- Trash cans,

- ♦ Locks,
- ♦ Cell block areas,
- ♦ Walls
- ♦ Ventilation and heating ducts; and
- ♦ Tunnel entrances.

Recommendation 8-5: All courtrooms should be locked and secured at the end of all hearings or trials.

Recommendation 8-6: There should be a key control plan to cover the entire courthouse facility.

Recommendation 8-7: There should be a complete set of emergency keys maintained in a secured area.

Recommendation 8-8: The security command, control and communications center should have available a complete set of updated floor plan drawings that indicate the location of all entrances, exits, windows and doors. These drawings should also indicate the location of:

- ♦ Perimeter fences, gates and sallyports;

- ♦ Fire hoses and fire extinguishers;
- ♦ Emergency equipment;
- ♦ First aid kits;
- ♦ Air packs and breathing apparatus;
- ♦ Mechanical and electrical rooms;
- ♦ Maintenance rooms;
- ♦ Numbered emergency exits and emergency key numbers to fit locks;
- ♦ Stand pipes; and
- ♦ Heat/smoke detectors.

Recommendation 8-9: The following agencies should be listed in the security command, control and communications center with up-to-date telephone numbers: gas company, water/sewer company, ambulance service, fire/rescue service, and local/state law enforcement agencies.

Recommendation 8-10: A security and control manual should be developed to include the following written policies and procedures:

- ♦ Court security duty posts;
- ♦ Job description and position responsibilities for each duty post;

- Court liaison duties;
- Courtroom external communications procedures;
- Courthouse population circulation patterns;
- Courthouse facility arrests and placing arrestees into custody;
- Courthouse security guidelines;
- Prisoner control and holding facility procedures;
- Prisoner transportation procedures;
- Weapons control;
- Courtroom search procedures;
- Prisoner escapes;
- Hand-carried article search procedures;
- Screening procedures;
- Facility evacuation plan;
- Facility evacuation plan court security response;
- Bomb threat procedures;
- Hostage plan;
- Major emergency/disaster plan;

- Special operations incident plan;
- Crowd control;
- High risk trial plan;
- Emergency medical assistance plan;
- Security survey guidelines and procedures;
- Inventory;
- Physical security plan incident reports;
- Authorized use of the stunning device [NOVA XR 5000];
- Remotely activated custody control (RACC) belt; and
- Authorized use of electronic riot shield.

Recommendation 8-11: A courthouse and facility security audit should be developed and conducted at least annually to include the following areas:

Exterior:

- Perimeter,
- Lights,
- Parking areas,

- Landscaping, and
- Exterior of building.

Building:

- Doors, windows, other openings;
- Ceilings and walls;
- Alarms;
- Fire protection;
- Attic, basements, crawl spaces, air conditioning, ventilation and heating systems;
- Elevator, escalators, dumb waiters, etc.;
- Storage areas, armories and dangerous substance storage areas;
- Community areas;
- Records storage areas;
- Public areas (waiting rooms, restrooms, hallway and visiting or interview area);
- Maintenance rooms.

Courtrooms and Related Areas:

- Courtrooms;
- Courtroom doors, windows, and other openings;
- Courtroom lights;

- ♦ Courtroom air conditioning, ventilation and heating systems;
- ♦ Courtroom furnishings;
- ♦ Courtroom security devices;
- ♦ Judges chambers and related offices;
- ♦ Witness waiting rooms;
- ♦ Attorney-client conference rooms;
- ♦ Jury deliberation rooms;
- ♦ In-custody defendant reception areas;
- ♦ Restricted and secured passageways;
- ♦ Temporary holding areas; and
- ♦ Security equipment storage areas.

Recommendation 8-12: An officer/deputy post should be located immediately adjacent to a cell block or detention cell area to permit personnel to hear and respond promptly to calls for help.

Recommendation 8-13: Audio or visual electronic surveillance should be located primarily in hallways, elevators, corridors, or at points on the security perimeter, such as entrances and exits.

Recommendation 8-14: All prisoners should be searched thoroughly whenever entering or exiting the security perimeter.

Recommendation 8-15: All violent incidents or acts which occur on court facility premises should be recorded for the record. Examples of such incidents or acts include:

- Verbal threats;
- Disorderly conduct;
- Physical assault and battery;
- Weapons display and use, including firearms, explosives, knives, chemical weapons, etc.;
- Suicides and suicide attempts;
- Physical assaults with weapons;
- Property damage;
- Rape and other sexual assaults;
- Carjacking in parking areas;
- Robbery, both armed and unarmed;
- Burglary;
- Break-ins to court computer system by "hackers";
- Electronic break-ins to court telephone systems; and
- Breaches in the security system.

Recommendation 8-16: Security officers should make complete written records of all disruptions or assaults which occur on court facility premises.

Recommendation 8-17: Each court facility should develop a written policy and procedure addressing the possession of weapons in the courtroom by sworn law enforcement officers. If no weapons are allowed in the courtrooms, then secure storage lockers should be provided.

Recommendation 8-18: Court security officials should provide cross-training for prisoner transport officers and the bailiffs to assure that both groups know the proper procedures to follow if an incident occurs in the courtroom.

Recommendation 8-19: All transport personnel should be provided with handheld radios to enable them to communicate with their respective agencies at all times while they are on duty.

Recommendation 8-20: All court agencies should provide duress alarms in courtrooms and judges' chambers.

Recommendation 8-21: All prisoner transport personnel and bailiffs who serve in a security capacity should be qualified in the use of intermediate force weapons and devices, such as batons, electronic restraints and oleoresin capsicum.

Recommendation 8-22: Criminal justice agencies in all states should work together to develop a statewide or regional radio frequency to be utilized by prisoner transport officers. A common radio frequency is necessary for officer safety and to summon help in emergencies.

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

REFERENCE SOURCES

[BOOKS, REPORTS, POLICY MANUALS AND DOCUMENTS]

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