

robbery and burglary victimology project

A study prepared for the High Impact Crime Program

Urban Studies Center
Portland State University
Portland, Oregon
November, 1972

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The Victimology Project was funded by contract with the City of Portland at the request of the City-County Justice Planning Office. Portland is one of eight cities nationwide to participate in the LEAA High Impact Program which is aimed at the reduction of stranger-to-stranger street crimes.[1] This study is but one segment of the information being gathered by the Justice Planning Office to assist in the design and administration of action programs designed for the prevention of these crimes.

In this study we have concentrated specifically on robberies and burglaries since these crimes constitute by far the largest percentage of stranger-to-stranger crimes in the City of Portland. We have gathered a large amount of information on what traditionally has been considered the passive role in stranger-to-stranger crimes--the victim. The hypothesis of this study is that the victim is not passive, but That there is something about a person (or a dwelling or business) that governs his becoming a victim rather than someone else. It may be a person's age, habits, living situation, socio-economic status, etc., the appearance of a dwelling, its location in relation to its surroundings, condition of the neighborhood, traffic patterns, security measures of a business, working hours, amount of cash carried at any one time, etc.

The project consisted of three distinct parts. The first part was an analysis of previous victim studies conducted nationwide to guide us in the determination of what information was available and what would have to be collected during the project. The second part is the analysis of existing

[1] See Appendix I for a description of this program.

information on the victims. The last segment was a survey of: (1) the victims of crimes that had been cleared, and (2) the victims of uncleared crimes.[2]

For the purposes of the project the victims studied were those who reported crimes during 1971. This is a severe limitation since nationally only approximately 40 percent of all victims report the crimes committed against them. The U. S. Bureau of Census recently completed a survey in Portland that will give more exact figures on unreported crimes in the City of Portland.

During 1971 there were 10,794 burglaries and 1,797 robberies reported. Of these figures the Police Department reports that approximately 16% of the burglaries and 23% of the robberies have been cleared. In the survey we have attempted to determine if there is a difference between the victims of cleared and the victims of uncleared crimes.

The sample drawn for the survey was selected by generating a random number table of the case numbers of the individual crimes. (See procedures section for a description of the sample size.)

---

[2]The terms cleared and uncleared generally refer to whether or not someone has been arrested for commiting that crime or has admitted commiting the crime after being arrested for a different offense.

Critical Summary of Previous Studies:

A critical summary of the professional literature concerned with criminal victimization does not present the researcher a particularly arduous task. In other words, although one is constantly hearing about an overwhelming concern for the victims of major crimes, few systematic attempts have been made to ascertain either the extent of the actual victimization or the critical physical and social components which might conceivably make a particular individual more vulnerable to criminal attack. It would follow that these studies would offer few guidelines, either to an individual or a law enforcement agency, for the actual prevention of crime. For example, it is well known that most crimes occur in or around the home, but how is this particularly beneficial to anyone concerned with prevention? It seems unlikely that arguing for particular prudence in or near one's dwelling unit would have any effect on the crime rate. By the same token, it is hard to believe that this fact would in any way mitigate the real fears about personal security. Given the lack of specificity, at least in terms of the present study, of the literature concerning criminal victimization, it is fair to ask what actually can be gained from these studies. (See Bibliography for a list of the studies referred to.)

. For one thing, the studies do point out the inadequacy of the present crime reporting methods. Not only do they highlight many of the deceptive aspects of the Uniform Crime Reports, they detail the extent on unreported crimes. For example, one study found that over 40% of the crimes revealed

to the researchers were not reported to the police.[1] However significant these figures are, they have little relevance to the present study. Since we were asked to deal solely with reported crimes, obtained from police statistics, it matters little that these statistics bear little resemblance to the actual extent of criminal victimization.

Second, for the most part, these studies were concerned with the extent of all crimes from consumer fraud to homicide. In our case, we were concerned with the two most prevelently reported crimes; namely, robbery and burglary. Thus, we were further constricted from forming any generalizations as to the overall crime picture in the City of Portland.

Third, all of the previous studies were, in a sense, public attitudinal studies concerning the conduct and efficacy of the police. For example, it was repeatedly noted that most people did not report crimes because they felt that the police could not or would not do anything to help them. We did include a question concerning the relative degree of confidence in the police before and after the occurrence of a crime. The important attitudinal questions, however, should be dealt with by another study that deals with the victims of unreported crimes as well.

Fourth, many of the studies attempted to enumerate the losses tothe individual victim of a crime, both in financial and psychological terms. Since we were dealing with reported crimes, it was deemed unnecessary to duplicate police statistics in terms of financial loss. As to the

---

[1] Criminal Victimization in Maricopa County, Institute for Local Self Government, Berkeley, 1969.

psychological aspects of an individual crime, we could find no adequate measures, other than those items in the questionnaires as attached, for quantifying the trauma and impact of a criminal contact. In fact, and in keeping with other studies in this field, we found that the saliency of a particular victimization rarely had special significance. In some cases victims could not even recall that they had been involved in the crime as reported.

By far the most helpful studies, in terms of their emphasis on immediate preventative measures, have been those which concentrated on the physical aspects of criminal victimization. For example, it has been shown that the lighting of commercial and residential properties and adjacent alleys, walkways, streets and parking facilities has a direct relationship to the commission of crimes. Further, the location of entry and exit points and the general maintenance and condition of buildings appears to be an imprtant crime factor. Also, the location of a structure on a given block seems to help determine its vulnerability to certain types of crimes. One study concluded that over 50 per cent of the robberies and over 70 per cent of the bunglaries occurred a corner or near corner sites.[2]

Finally, concealment is frequently a factor in criminal activities. Any object (such as trees, shrubs, fences, signs, advertising, and architectural design features) which prevents the observation of criminal activity has significance for preventive measures.

---

[2] Crime and the Physical City: A Riot Study prepared for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Luedtke (Gerald) and Associates, Detroit, LEAA NI69078, 91 pp., June, 1970.

It is to these immediate questions which we addressed ourselves. We attempted to design a questionnaire which would be a short term aid to law enforcement agencies and the public alike. It is our hope that from the composite victim profile and the physical factors treated in this study, a better understanding to the physical and social components of criminal victimization may emerge.

ANALYSIS OF EXISTING DATA

The existing data on robberies and burglaries in Portland came from two major sources: the report of the concentrated Crime Reduction Program (by Brad Shiley) and a computer tabulation of reported robberies and burglaries grouped by police reporting grids, taken from the Portland Police Bureau's planning and research department.

The second group of data presented a number of problems since the police keep records by patrol areas or grids. The information is not comparable to existing census data in this form. The boundaries of the grids do not coincide with census tract lines so it was necessary to group a number of grids or census tracts together to get the boundaries to fit as closely as possible. In most cases interpolation was necessary. The resulting areas are referred to as "reporting areas" in this study. The reporting areas and corresponding census tracts and corresponding crime rates are shown in the following table.

CENSUS TRACTS IN THE PORTLAND, OREG.-WASH. SMSA

INSET A - PORTLAND AND VICINITY



U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

1970 Census of Population and Housing
CENSUS TRACTS
PORTLAND, OREG.-WASH.
STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA
Final Report PHC(1)-166

2 OF 2

Code No.	Census Tract No.	Populat.	Non-Res. Burg.	Res. Burg.	Total Burg.	Total Rob.	Density Persons/ Acre
1	1	6,058	131	87	218	11	7.77
		*	21.61	36.0	35.97	1.81	
2	2	5,687	30	48	78	6	9.61
		*	5.27	19.2	13.70	1.05	
3	3.01	3,252					
	3.02	7,800					
		11,052	85	73	158	9	8.04
		*	7.69	20.9	14.29	0.81	
4	4.01	3,731	28	37	65	9	11.17
		*	7.50	26.8	17.42	2.41	
5	4.02	3,445	15	30	45	1	11.84
		*	4.34	23.3	13.04	0.28	
6	5.01	3,632					
	5.02	3,929					
		7,561	57	72	129	10	12.11
		*	7.53	26.3	17.06	1.32	
7	6.01	5,071					
	6.02	4,301					
	89	4,205					
		13,577	104	148	252	12	3.34
		*	7.65	39.7	18.55	0.88	
8	7.01	4,456	27	51	78	2	13.14
		*	6.05	31.0	17.48	0.44	
9	7.02	4,605	22	50	72	4	12.94
		*	4.77	31.0	15.61	0.86	
10	8.01	5,031	52	44	96	4	13.45
		*	10.33	23.5	19.08	0.79	
11	8.02	4,604	48	57	105	4	13.95
		*	10.43	31.4	22.82	0.86	
12	9.01	4,713					
	9.02	3,491					
	10.00	6,032					
		14,236	103	155	258	23	12.58
		*	7.23	27.7	18.11	1.61	

*Crimes per thousand population except for residential burglaries which is burglaries per thousand housing units.

Code No.	Census Tract No.	Populat.	Non-Res. Burg.	Res. Burg.	Total Burg.	Total Rob.	Density Persons/ Acre
13	11.01 12.01	2,313 4,747					
		7,060	87	141	228	43	13.81
		*	12.32	35.9	32.29	6.09	
14	11.02 12.02	1,835 3,592					
		5,427	80	71	151	19	10.89
		*	14.73	31.2	27.80	3.49	
15	13.01	3,980	41	86	127	9	21.75
		*	10.30	53.3	31.90	2.26	
16	13.02	3,403	20	31	51	6	18.60
		*	5.88	24.9	15.00	1.76	
17	14 18.02	5,283 3,180					
		8,463	60	118	178	14	14.34
		*	7.09	33.9	21.04	1.65	
18	15	3,833	22	35	57	4	5.21
		*	5.74	26.4	14.88	1.04	
19	16.01	6,174	35	60	95	12	8.39
		*	5.67	29.0	15.39	1.94	
20	16.02	4,663	48	61	109		10.36
		*	10.30	35.2	23.39		
21	17.01 18.01 19	6,833 3,848 6,372					
		17,053	149	264	413	18	13.74
		*	8.73	42.1	24.22	1.05	
22	17.02	3,982	14	37	51	7	11.92
		*	3.51	31.2	12.81	1.75	
23	20 25.01 25.02	5,782 5,690 4,080					
		15,552	149	233	382	30	16.28
		*	9.58	34.6	24.56	1.92	

*Crimes per thousand population except for residential burglaries which is burglaries per thousand housing units.

Code No.	Census Tract No.	Populat.	Non-Res. Burg.	Res. Burg.	Total Burg.	Total Rob.	Density Persons/ Acre
24	21	2,551	85	55	140	36	6.38
		*	33.33	38.2	54.90	14.11	
25	22.01	1,234	33	37	70	58	6.11
		*	26.82	62.2	56.91	47.15	
26	22.02	462	32	13	45	15	1.66
		*	69.56	49.4	97.82	32.60	
27	23.01 23.02	2,244 1,262					
		3,506	107	242	349	159	8.67
		*	30.48	128.9	99.43	45.29	
28	24.01 24.02	3,745 2,851					
		6,596	73	240	313	108	15.93
		*	11.06	87.3	47.42	16.36	
29	26	3,187	50	62	112	19	12.65
		*	15.67	55.8	35.10	5.95	
30	27.01 27.02 28.01 28.02 29.02	3,704 2,708 3,516 3,440 6,021					
		19,389	159	215	374	34	12.80
		*	8.20	28.3	19.28	1.75	
31	29.01	4,969	25	29	54	6	13.32
		*	5.03	18.3	10.86	1.20	
32	29.03	4,567	25	25	50	3	6.42
		*	5.47	18.5	10.94	0.65	
33	30 74 73	5,033 2,394 2,078					
		9,505	79	121	200	14	1.31
		*	8.30	293.7	21.03	1.47	

*Crimes per thousand population except for residential burglaries which is burglaries per thousand housing units.

Code No.	Census Tract No.	Populat.	Non-Res. Burg.	Res. Burg.	Total Burg.	Total Rob.	Density Persons/ Acre
34	31	4,924	48	108	156	14	15.44
		*	9.75	61.5	31.70	2.84	
35	32	4,534	51	186	237	55	16.08
		*	11.25	112.3	52.31	12.14	
36	33.01	3,050	34	128	162	51	16.49
		*	11.14	115.3	53.11	16.72	
37	33.02	2,708	23	152	175	42	15.30
		*	8.48	143.0	64.57	15.49	
38	34.01	3,531					
	34.02	2,858					
		6,389	84	355	439	215	14.72
		*	13.11	137.8	68.70	33.64	
39	35.01	3,784					
	44	71					
		3,855	33	100	133	29	2.86
		*	8.54	63.8	34.45	7.51	
40	35.02	2,488	33	81	114	41	10.03
		*	13.25	87.0	45.78	16.46	
41	36.01	4,641	39	191	230	45	11.49
		*	8.40	111.8	49.56	9.69	
42	36.02	6,989	77	192	269	32	12.99
		*	11.01	80.9	38.48	4.57	
43	36.03	1,897	22	27	49	11	8.62
		*	11.57	42.0	25.78	5.78	
44	37.01	4,136	38	79	117	10	11.36
		*	9.17	54.7	28.26	2.41	
45	37.02	2,861	34	81	115	41	13.56
		*	11.88	87.4	40.20	14.33	
46	38.01	3,246	38	42	80	9	9.96
		*	11.69	31.8	24.61	2.76	

*Crimes per thousand population except for residential burglaries which is burglaries per thousand housing units.

Code No.	Census Tract No.	Populat.	Non-Res. Burg.	Res. Burg.	Total Burg.	Total Rob.	Density Persons/ Acre
47	38.02	3,086	31	41	72	12	11.18
		*	10.03	32.8	23.30	3.88	
48	38.03	3,852	24	55	79	18	12.67
		*	6.23	34.6	20.51	4.67	
49	39.01	6,311					
	40.01	5,827					
		12,138	115	361	476	44	11.03
		*	9.47	87.8	39.20	3.62	
50	39.02	3,324					
	40.02	5,337					
		8,661	74	129	203	24	9.76
		*	8.54	94.6	23.44	2.77	
51	41.01	5,082					
	42	2,951					
		8,033	86	168	254	14	3.61
		*	10.70	60.4	31.63	1.74	
52	41.02	4,805	55	93	148	9	10.16
		*	11.43	52.8	30.76	1.87	
53	43	1,163					
	45	2,044					
	47	4,147					
		7,354	138	124	262	25	1.11
		*	18.77	34.4	35.64	3.40	
54	46.01	2,764					
	69	2,304					
		5,068	51	94	145	29	2.45
		*	10.05	62.0	28.59	5.71	
55	46.02	2,035	29	49	78	9	5.78
		*	14.21	61.6	38.23	4.41	
56	48	3,268					
	49	3,329					
		6,597	79	93	172	30	28.43
		*	11.96	20.4	26.06	4.54	
57	50	800					
	51	1,487					
		2,287	98	51	149	96	4.99
		*	42.79	39.4	65.06	41.92	

*Crimes per thousand population except for residential burglaries which is burglaries per thousand housing units.

Code No.	Census Tract No.	Populat.	Non-Res. Burg.	Res. Burg.	Total Burg.	Total Rob.	Density Persons/ Acre
58	52	3,516	30	36	66	22	22.54
		*	8.52	11.8	18.75	6.25	
59	53	2,047	259	53	312	66	13.65
		*	126.34	28.8	152.19	32.19	
60	54	963	84	21	105	73	9.08
		*	87.50	39.8	109.37	76.04	
61	55	1,222	42	59	101	7	13.28
		*	34.42	76.9	82.78	5.73	
62	56	2,778	39	28	67	11	22.22
		*	17.56	16.8	30.18	4.95	
63	57	1,015	68	52	120	23	3.55
		*	66.66	76.4	117.64	22.54	
64	58	5,640					
	60.01	938					
	61	1,989					
		8,567	52	66	118	3	4.72
		*	6.06	20.2	13.76	0.35	
65	59	2,730	18	11	29		4.31
		*	6.59	8.4	10.62		
66	60.02	2,332	20	21	41		6.80
		*	8.58	26.6	17.59		
67	62	2,812					
	63	4,524					
		7,336	37	62	99	11	3.00
		*	5.04	36.8	13.48	1.49	
68	65.01	3,312					
	66.01	1,910					
		5,222	16	50	66	1	3.99
		*	3.06	44.5	12.64	0.19	
69	65.02	3,103					
	66.02	4,053					
		7,156	58	101	159	10	6.46
		*	8.10	41.5	22.20	1.39	
70	67.01	2,593	9	24	33	1	5.71
		*	3.47	29.3	12.74	0.38	

*Crimes per thousand population except for residential burglaries which is burglaries per thousand housing units.

Code No.	Census Tract No.	Populat.	Non-Res. Burg.	Res. Burg.	Total Burg.	Total Rob.	Density Persons/ Acre
71	67.02	4,545	12	35	47	1	13.64
		*	2.63	22.5	10.32	0.21	
72	68.01	1,920					
	68.02	2,719					
		4,639	21	45	66	0	5.27
		*	4.52	33.4	14.22	0.00	
73	72	2,619	11	5	16	8	0.43
		*	4.19	17.0	6.10	3.05	

*Crimes per thousand population except for residential burglaries which is burglaries per thousand housing units.

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY



TOTAL ROBBERY



Currently the City of Portland does not aggregate information on victims of crimes. Crime statistics contain information about the criminal but not about the victim. The information on the victims exists in the police crime reports, but it is never coded and aggregated by the computer for use in decision-making. This restricts our analysis of victims to indirect measures of the characteristics of robbery and burglary victims. The available information used in this analysis was 1970 census tract data and the 1971 robbery and burglary tabulations by police reporting grids.

Both the census tract information and the crime incidence figures measure what is occurring in specified geographic areas. In a given area, variations in the social economic characteristics coincide with variations in robbery and burglary rates. The nature and strength of the relationships between robbery and burglary rates and socio-economic characteristics can be found by analyzing those variables in different parts of the city.

For each robbery or burglary there is a victim, hence a crime rate-victim rate. Analyzing the variations in the city's socio-economic characteristics and robbery and burglary rates reveals the strength and direction of the relationship of those characteristics with victim rates. For example, if median income is strongly negatively correlated burglary (as average neighborhood income goes up, everything else remaining the same) the number of burglaries will go down.

This analysis assumes that the characteristics of the victim are similar to his neighbors. If the victims of robberies and burglaries have substantially different characteristics from the rest of the

neighborhood, then this weakens the analysis. This analysis notes which socio-economic neighborhood characteristics change (and in what direction) as the number of victims per thousand population rises and it explains how much of the total variation in victim rates is explained by the characteristics used.

Variables Used in the Analysis

Data on robberies and burglaries were made available for use in the following categories:

1. Residential burglary
2. Non-residential burglary
3. Total burglary
4. Armed burglary
5. Unarmed robbery
6. Total robbery

Since the reporting areas vary greatly in size and population, in order to compare them we converted their crime incidence into rates per 1,000 population, and in one case of residential burglaries, we converted to crimes per 1,000 dwelling units. Population is the most widely used standardization rate and we based our analysis on it. However, if we had not converted to a crime per population rate, the strongest relationship would show crime is a function of the population of the reporting unit which isn't helpful in understanding what is happening in the city.

We also looked at crimes per acre and burglaries per housing units, but these measures were not useful in themselves, so their use is confined to where they support relationships found elsewhere.

The purpose of this study is to identify what things victims of robberies and burglaries have in common. In our analysis, 16 socio-economic characteristics were examined in reporting districts.

1. Median income
2. Median value of owner-occupied housing
3. Median rent
4. Percent white owner-occupied housing
5. Percent owner-occupied housing
6. Percent white renter-occupied housing
7. Percent negro renter-occupied housing
8. Percent renter-occupied housing
9. Percent population living in the same house from 1965 to 1970
10. Population density per acre
11. Residences per 1,000 population
12. Median number of rooms per housing unit
13. Percent total rental housing vacant for less than two months
14. Percent local housing vacant all year
15. Percent unemployed males over 16 in the labor force during 1970
16. Number of residences per acre

Methodology Used in This Analysis

The statistical method we used to analyze the data was stepwise regression. This statistical technique provides correlation coefficients, partial correlation coefficients, and the percent of the crime rate that is explained by the socio-economic characteristics (r^2). The correlation coefficients indicate how closely a change in one variable is related

to a change in another variable. Correlations can range from -1 to +1. A correlation of +1 is perfect: a given change in one variable will result in a given change in the other variable. With a negative correlation, as the value of one variable increases the value of the other variable decreases. Part of the relationship shown by a correlation may be due to the effects of one or more outside variables. To the extent that this happens the correlation is not an accurate measure of the relationship. In order to discover the true relationships, outside variable effects need to be controlled. Once the other independent variables are controlled, a partial correlation is what is left.

The partial correlations that are shown in this analysis are controlling the effects of the other independent variables in the analysis. Not all independent variables will appear in each of the analyses. In the stepwise regression program, the computer selects the variables which are most related to the dependent variables. This analysis results in an r^2 figure which may be read as the percent of the crime rate which the 16 particular census characteristics are explaining.

In the tables that follow, the partial correlations and the r^2 terms are the most important. These tell us how each social characteristic is related to the crime rate and the extent to which these relationships explain the crime rates. Included in the tables are the correlation coefficients and the amount of change that takes place when the effects of the other social characteristics are controlled for. Many of these differences were very large. When a large correlation is reduced to a partial near zero, the relationship between these characteristics and crime rates is almost totally due to the effects of the other variables.

In several instances the effects of the other social characteristics completely masked the relationship. When those other characteristics were contolled for, the partial correlation changed signs from the correlation coefficients. This means that what appeared to be a fairly strong positive relationship was due entirely to the effects of other characteristics and when they were controlled for the relationship reversed itself. Extreme caution should be taken in using correlation information of this type because it can mislead the user as to the nature and strength of the relationships of individual characteristics to crime or victim rates.

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY/1,000 POPULATION*

r2 = .7022

Independent Variables	Correlation	Partial Correlation	Difference	Percentage Change
Percentage unemployed males over 16 in labor force	.36	-.09	.45	125
Median income	-.23	.28	.53	230
Median value of owner occupied housing	-.25	-.26	.01	4
Vacant housing for rent less than two months	.33	-.11	.44	133
Percentage white owner occupied housing	-.52	-.49	.03	6
Percentage housing negro renter occupied	.71	.22	.49	69
Percentage housing renter occupied	.29	-.40	.69	238

*The closer a correlation approaches negative or positive 1.00, the stronger the relationship to crime rates. The smaller the percent change, the higher the reliability of the correlation.

Residential Burglary

Looking at the partials the strongest simple relationships are the -.49 Partial Correlation for the percent white owner-occupied and .26 partial correlation for median value of housing. As these rates increase residential burglary rates decrease.

There is virtually no relationship between residential burglary and the percent rental housing vacant for less than two months or the unemployment rates. The large changes between the correlation coefficients and the partial correlations for median income and percent renter occupied maybe interpreted as follows: There is a general trend for Residential Burglary rates to decrease as income increases; but when two neighborhoods have the same housing values and other characteristics, the neighborhood with the higher income will be victimized more. Similarly, for the percent renter occupied--throughout the City as the percent renter occupied increases residential burglary increases. However, if two neighborhoods are the same except the percentage renter occupied is higher in one than the other, the high renter occupied area will be victimized less. These are fairly strong relationships. All these variables taken together explain 70 percent of the residential burglary rates.

NON-RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY/1,000 POPULATION*

r^2 = .7773

Independent Variables	Correlation	Partial Correlation	Change	Percentage Change
Housing units/1,000 population	.66	.15	.51	77
Median income	-.32	.24	.56	175
Median number of rooms	-.62	-.14	.46	74
Median value of owner occupied housing	-.40	-.37	.03	7
Median rent	-.33	.31	.64	195
Vacant housing all year	.61	.42	.19	31
Vacant housing for rent less than two months	.75	.11	.64	85
Percentage renter occupied	.59	.09	.50	85
Percentage unemployed males over 16 in labor force	.61	.37	.24	39

*The closer a correlation approaches negative or positive 1.00, the stronger the relationship to crime rates. The smaller the percent change, the higher the reliability of the correlation.

Non-Residential Burglary

This table includes the commercial and institutional burglaries.

The variables explained more of the non-residential burglary rate than they did residential burglary rate. Seventy-eight percent of the non-residential burglaries are explained by the listed variables, as compared to 70 percent for residential burglary.

Looking at the partial correlation coefficients: median value of owner occupied housing, vacancy rates and unemployment show definite relationships to the crime rates. As vacancy and unemployment go up in an area, so does the non-residential burglary rate. This tendency is somewhat counter-acted as the value of the owner occupied housing goes up. The other variables appear to be only slightly related.

The large changes in Median income and Median rent indicate that, although for the City as a whole as income and rent increases, burglary rates decrease in neighborhoods with similar composition, the businesses and institutions in the wealthier neighborhood are more prone to burglary.

TOTAL BURGLARY/1,000 POPULATION*

r^2 = .8088

Independent Variables	Correlation	Partial Correlation	Difference	Percentage Change
Number of housing units/acre	.15	-.17	.32	240
Median income	-.34	.22	.56	164
Median value of owner occupied housing	-.41	-.28	.13	32
Median rent	-.41	.06	.47	114
Vacant housing all year	.67	.36	.31	46
Vacant housing for rent less than two months	.61	-.09	.70	115
Percentage housing white owner occupied	-.69	-.14	.55	80
Percentage housing owner occupied	-.60	-.05	.55	92
Percentage housing white renter occupied	-.04	-.35	.31	785
Percentage housing negro renter occupied	.38	.08	.30	79
Percentage housing renter occupied	.57	-.09	.68	119
Percentage unemployed males over 16 in labor force	.62	.07	.55	88
Percentage living in same house five years (65-70)	-.21	-.07	.14	67
Density (population/acre)	.008	.13	.122	1530
Number of housing units/1,000 population	.59	.25	.29	.49

*The closer a correlation approaches negative or positive 1.00, the stronger the relationship to crime rates. The smaller the percent change, the higher the reliability of the correlation.

Total Burglary

When residential and non-residential burglary are combined, the burglary incidence rates explained by the socio-economic characteristics increases from 70 and 78 percent to almost 81 percent. This would suggest that the characteristics related to burglaries are pretty much the same for residential and non-residential burglary. It is probably better to describe them together.

Looking at the partial correlation coefficients the characteristics of victims of burglary together, all year vacancy rates and the number of housing units/1,000 population are positively correlated. As these rates go up in an area, so do the burglary rates. As the median value of owner occupied housing and the percentage of white renters increases the burglary rates go down.

Median income changes from a positive to a negative correlation, indicating that the trend in the entire City is for burglary rates to decrease as income increases. This indicates that the overall trend for the City taken as a whole is for burglary rates to decrease as income increases. If other variables are not controlled, but that in an area where all other variables are equal, the area with the highest median income will be burglarized more.

It is interesting to look at the large number of variables that lose almost all effect when the other characteristics are controlled for. Many strong relationships drop out as is shown by the number of large correlations of .4-.6 that are reduced to virtually nothing. The result is that there are a few things that are related to burglary rates

in a fairly strong way, .3-.5, and many elements that are barely related to location even though they may show strong correlations when the other variables are not controlled for.

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY/1,000 RESIDENCES

$r^2 = .46$

Variable Homes	Partial Correlation
Median income	.08
Median value of owner occupied housing	-.05
Median rent	-.16
Vacant all year	-.17
Vacant for rent less than two months	-.12
Percentage white owner occupied housing	-.19
Percentage owner occupied housing	.10
Percentage negro renter occupied housing	.18
Percentage renter occupied housing	-.07
Percentage unemployed males over 16 in labor force (1970)	-.05
Percentage living in the same place for five years (65-70)	.08
Population/acre	.17
Housing units/1,000 population	.40
Housing units/acre	-.25

Residential Burglary Rates Per 1,000 Housing Units

This crime rate isn't related very much to the socio-economic characteristics that were used. Fourteen variables explained only 46 percent of the variation in burglary rates. That is almost half as much as is explained by using burglaries per 1,000 population. The only variables that show any sort of relationship are the two characteristics which are housing rates and might be considered components of burglary rate.

Housing units per 1,000 population and housing units per acre should be disregarded. Residential burglary rates per residence may be an important measure but it is not related to the measures we used.

The existing data for robbery contains several problems which complicate and confuse the analysis. First there is the problem of locating the victim. The crime statistics that we have report the incidence of robbery or burglary in a grid. In the case of burglary the address of the crime is the address of the victim. This is not the case for robberies. What is reported is where the crime occurred not where the victim lived or how far from home he was. An analysis of the incidence information like burglarly yields a description of the characteristics of areas where people are likely to be robbed. That is the most that is possible using the incidence figures. The second theoretical problem is that robbery is a category which encompasses a very large number of illegal acts with very different characteristics. The City of Portland offense code lists 14 different classifications for robbery.

The robbery incidence statistics that we had aggregated the 14 categories into two categories: armed and unarmed robbery. It is impossible to combine that many categories and get any accurate picture of what is going on. It is almost impossible to conceptually justify that there should be similar socio-economic characteristics between the elderly victim of a mugging and say a bank robbery, but are both considered armed robberies. These could not be divided in the data that we had.

The third problem was a statistical one. The distribution of robbery rates is so skewed that it totally violates several basic assumptions of the analysis. As a general rule, this tends to exaggerate the

size of the correlations. Combined with the small amount of the total variation of robbery rates that the regression explained, the analysis of robbery rates is totally untrustworthy.

Recommendations

The available information on the victims of crimes could be greatly expanded through a number of changes in the police record keeping. A small number of changes could result in a great deal of important information. We recommend the following:

1. Compilation of victim characteristics such as address, age, sex, race, income and occupation in a retrievable form.

This would enable Justice Planning to monitor the types of people who are victimized and be able to notice changes in rates and compositions.

2. Develop a method of identifying and separating those persons who are multiple victims over a five year period. Perhaps if only by asking victims how many times they had been victimized in in the past five years.

This group is especially interesting because there are things about them that have for some reason made them more prone to become victims of crime than others. It is quite possible that this group would demonstrate which social characteristics or behaviors are more like to be associated with victimization rates.

3. Reporting "grids" should be made more compatible to census tracts for use in comparing social characteristics and crime rates.

The gathering of governmental statistics could be made much more useful and effective simply by having the reporting units of various types of statistics compatible. Overlapping boundaries make many statistics useless for comparison. CRAG may be the most appropriate body to do this sort of thing.

INTERVIEWING PROCEDURE

After our usual procedure for canvassing for available interviewers, we hired ten people from a group of about thirty who applied for the jobs. Five of the ten were experienced interviewers, eight were women, eight were in their twenties, one was in his thirties, one was in her forties, and one was black.

We held a six-hour training session for the interviewers, during which we studied the residential burglary and individual robbery questionnaires, making sure that each person understood what we wanted to find out with each question. We ended the session by holding mock interviews with a person who was experienced in confronting all types of people playing the role of the respondent and portraying the kinds of difficult persons the interviewers were likely to confront.

Later we trained four people (three women and a man) to administer the commercial robbery and burglary questionnaires. We felt there was no point in familiarizing every interviewer with them because many couldn't work for us during the day. Furthermore, there weren't many commercial victims in our sample, and we thought we'd get better results by having four people do all the interviews.

Because one of our goals was to minimize interview time, we sent an introductory letter to respondents prior to sending out interviewers (see Appendix II). We sent the letters via bulk mail in three batches with an "Address Correction Requested" order on each piece, so that we'd know which respondents had moved (by their return envelope) and thereby not waste an interviewer's time on a bad address.

If the returned envelope had a new address on it, we mailed again to that address, and we were fairly successful in locating and interviewing those people (see below for a breakdown of the sample). The majority of our return mail, however, gave us no new address. The Post Office told us that this was because many people never file change of address forms when they move. Also, after one year from the moving date, the Post Office destroys change of address forms that people do file with them. Thus, if a victim had moved and filed a change of address form prior to October, 1971, the Post Office had no record of his new address when we mailed to him in October, 1972. Since the study was to be confined to 1971 victims there was a much larger loss factor than anticipated.

Our interviewers were equipped with letters of introduction from the Mayor's Office (see Appendix II). We advised them not to push a person who refused an interview. Once it appeared that nothing could get a person to talk, the interviewer was to leave courteously. If the unsuccessful interviewer was able to give us an idea of why he had been refused, we sent someone else. For instance, if a black person refused an interview to a white interviewer, we sent our black interviewer. Or if an older woman wouldn't talk to a younger man, we sent an older woman to get the interview. We were fairly successful in avoiding refusals and in turning refusals into completed interviews. We finished with 22 refusals. As a percent of the sample (589), that is 3.7 percent, a lower rate than surveys generally achieve, according to Dave Yaden of Campaign Information Counselors.

Based on Yaden's advice, we set three visits as our maximum number of attempts to get an interview. If an interviewer made three attempts

to find a respondent at home (taking care to arrive at different times of the day and evening and leaving messages) and was unsuccessful, he dropped the interview. These numbered 50, or 8.5 percent of the sample.

Here is a breakdown of our sample (the 589 people we mailed to):

Category of Response	Number	Sample Percent of SA
Completed interviews	310	52.6
Refusals	22	3.7
Terminated efforts after three attempts	50	8.5
Address from police records not good*	20	3.4
Moved**	147	25.0
Others***	19	3.2
Terminated efforts because of deadline	21	3.6
Total Sample	589	100.0

*These were particularly troubling since the address we got from police files simply did not exist. These were doublechecked with Mrs. Myer in the Police Bureau Records Department to be sure they weren't copied incorrectly.

**These 147 don't represent the total number of the sample who moved since their burglary or robbery. Thirty-two of the completed interviews were people who had moved, and ten from other categories were people who had moved since the crime occurred. Hence, the total moved category includes 189 victims, 32 percent of the sample.

***Eight of these people could not remember a crime having occurred or were part of the sample because they reported a neighbor's crime. Two were people who were unavailable because of a long absence from their home address. Three were addresses that interviewers couldn't find. Three were homes and an apartment where the interviewer couldn't determine whether anyone lived there. One was a man who claimed we'd interviewed him (it was probably the U. S. Census crime survey). One was a Safeway Store manager who wouldn't talk to us without approval from a higher Safeway authority. One was unknown to anyone at the store he was supposed to have worked at.

Interview Results:

After each interview was conducted, the completed survey form was coded and the data keypunched so that the responses to individual questions could be correlated with other question responses. The total number of similar responses were totaled and comparisons made between cleared and uncleared incidents.

There are two serious differences in the data presented here. Even though the sample size is adequate for the victims of reported robberies and burglaries, there is no information on the incidents not reported to the police. In a criticism of its own methodology the Washington, D.C. study on Criminal Victimization in the United States reports that incidents " . . . are more often reported by renters than owners, those paying lower rents, the "poor" on our SES measure, those divorced and separated, those with insurance against theft and those who carry weapons, and females. Widows and widowers and those over 55 years of age are less frequently represented among the victims of recent incidents."* From this it can be concluded that even though our sample is random for victims who reported crime but not random for all victims.

The second problem deals with the ability to make statements regarding differential vulnerability given the results of the survey. Again we can make statements about victims but can say nothing about how they differ from the general population. For example, we can say that the largest percentage of victims of residential burglaries are acquainted with three or more neighbors but we don't have figures on what percent of all Portland

*President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Pilot Study on Victimization and Attitudes Toward Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Field Surveys No. 1, U.S. G.P.O., Washington, D.C., 1967.

residents know that among neighbors. We also can say that the largest percentage of robbery victims were walking alone at night but cannot say that they differ from other people who walk at night. What is required to clarify these inabilities is a control group of people who were not victims of robberies or burglaries during 1971.

We can, however, make valid statements about victims of selected crimes and legitimately discuss the differences between the cleared and uncleared cases. Comparisons can be made between victims and the general population where data exists from the 1970 census.

In the following sections we describe the data obtained in the survey. As with the formulation of the questionnaires, the data for robberies and burglaries are separated into several different categories. We found it necessary to separate individual robberies and residential burglaries from commercial robberies and burglaries. The division for this separation was made from the assumption that the circumstances are quite different accompanying a purse snatcher than robbing a major bank or burglarizing a home than a large manufacturing plant. The original sample of 600 was not controlled for this since it was felt that given the fact that sample was random the number of commercial robberies and burglaries selected would be in the correct proportion to individual incidents. The result of this was that the sample yielded very small numbers of commercial cases. This will be described more fully in the following sections.

The graphs prepared from tabulated responses to the surveys were prepared for the questions in which number of responses was high enough to compute percentages that would have some meaning. For example, if a

question has a selection of five answers and only four people respond to the question and two pick different responses and two others pick a third response, we would have to report that 25% answered one way, 25% a second way, and 50% a third way. In these cases we felt that there was not enough information to make any conclusions so the question was deleted from the graphs.*

*See Appendix III for a complete list of questions.

Residential Burglaries:

There were 117 surveys completed for cleared residential burglaries and 98 completed for uncleared cases.

As mentioned previously there were 144 cases in which the victim had moved and whom we could not locate after the standard measures were executed. (See section headed Interviewing Procedure.) This group consisted of 94 burglaries, approximately 55% of which were uncleared and 45% cleared cases. Although the loss of interviews through moving was unexpectedly large and resulted in smaller samples, the loss is fairly evenly distributed between cleared and uncleared. A comparison of responses of this basis thus retains validity, but the percentages between responses may change. For example, Graph I shows that in 15.2% of the cleared and 23.3% of uncleared cases the victims were rentors. If the information on the moved victims were added, the difference (approximately 8%) would remain the same but the percentage of rentors versus owners would probably change assuming that a larger percentage of the "movers" would rent or lease their home rather than owning it. The high number of moved victims has further implications in that this may be a significant indication that victims of burglaries may be more transitory than the average citizen. This would indicate that he would live in less established neighborhoods, be acquainted with fewer neighbors, live in houses of lower value, and tend not to carry burglary insurance (since most burglary insurance is written as on attachment to homeowners policies).

It would also be interesting to see how the people would respond to the question related to moving. Was their decision to move in fact affected by the incident? Further study of this segment of the population of victims

should be done with a more concentrated effort made to locate them than was possible given the timing of this project.

At the beginning of this study we expected to find differences between cleared and uncleared cases. However, a study of the graphs for residential burglaries reveals few significant differences between the cleared and uncleared cases. The assessed valuation of the home of the victims who were owners is an exception to this (see Graph II). In the categories under $20,000 one finds 71.8% of the uncleared crimes but only 59.0% of the cleared crimes. This would indicate that the lower the housing value the lower the chances that a burglarly would be cleared, and is further substantiated by a look at victims owning homes valued at more than $20,000 (41.0% of the cleared, only 28.3% of the uncleared).

Other obvious differences are that 24.0% of the victims of uncleared cases were away on vacation or other prolonged absence as opposed to 16.4% of the cleared cases and that the larger percentages (37.0) of cleared burglaries occurred while the victims were gone during regular working hours* (see Graph IV). This would indicate that a burglar has a greater chance of successfully burglarizing (not getting caught) a home while the occupant is away on vacation. This indicates a need for more security measures being taken during these periods of absence.

Response time of the police also seems to have an effect on the clearance of burglaries in 54% of the cleared cases the police arrive less than five minutes as compared to 42% of uncleared cases within this time limit. This factor cannot be solely attributed to the

*It should be noted, however, that no significant differences appear between cleared and uncleared as to time of day of the burglarly (see Chart II).

police but also depends on when the incident was finally reported. It is noted, for example, that the neighbor reported burglaries constitute 15.6% of cleared cases, but only 5.9% of the uncleared (see Graph IX).

In about 62% of the cleared cases the victims were not aware that an arrest had been made in connection with their case. Many of the people interviewed felt that this has a definite effect on the public's attitudes of the police.

In terms of confidence in the police prior to the incident there was little difference between the cleared and uncleared cases (Graph XIII). Seventy four point eight percent (74.8%) of the victims of cleared cases and 76.1% uncleared cases responded positively. After the incident the percent of positive responses drops to 71.7% of cleared and 64.2% of uncleared cases.

The typical victim of residential burglaries in our sample (as reflected in the higher number of responses to contain questions) has lived at the same address over five years, owns his own home which is worth $15-20,000, was burglarized between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m., was not at home at the time of the incident, made a conscious effort to lock his doors and windows before leaving. He did not ask anyone to keep their eyes on the house, knows three or more families on the block but they were unaware that the burglary had taken place, reported the incident to the police himself, carried burglary insurance and reported the incident to the company. He did not have an alarm system, he had not marked any of the stolen items but did have serial numbers listed where available, the incident did not affect him enough to consider moving as a result of it. He felt that nothing could have been done to prevent the particular

incident but had taken further security measures as a result of it, usually the addition or changes of locking devices. The burglar forced or broke into a locked door or window that was located in a spot not visible from the street. The victim's residence was sound* as was his neighborhood which had satisfactory* lighting. However, if the residence was on a corner location, its vulnerability was increased. The residence usually was different in some way from those around it. It may be in better shape than those around it or in worse shape. In a neighborhood with lower valued homes it had a higher value, in a neighborhood with high value homes it had a lower value. If in a well kept neighborhood, it was unkempt, in an unkempt neighborhood it was well kept.

The burglar has 84 chances out of 100 of not being caught.

*For a definition of terms, see the Physical Survey form in Appendix III.



Graph I



Graph II



Graph III



Graph IV



Graph V



Graph VI



Graph VII



2Percentages totaling over 100 are due to multiple responses of individual victims.

* Cleared
\- Uncleared

Graph VIII



* Cleared
\- Uncleared

Graph IX



Graph X



[3]N is too small for uncleared cases for any significant figures.

Graph XI



Graph XII



Graph XIII



Graph XIV



Graph XV

PHYSICAL SURVEY

Block Location of Residential Burglary

North

6.0% *4.0%*	7.4% *6.3%*	7.4% *4.0%*	4.0% *8.6%*
7.4% *9.1%*	2.0% *1.1%*	---- ----	6.0% *6.3%*
8.7% *10.3%*	.6% *2.2%*	.6% ----	14.1% *9.1%*
12.1% *11.4%*	12.8% *8.0%*	2.7% *8.0%*	7.4% *9.7%*

West — East

South

Gothic lettering: Cleared
Italic lettering: Uncleared

Graph XVI

Commercial Burglaries:

In interpreting the statistics on commercial burglaries, we do not have to take into account a large number of moved victims that we were unable to contact. Because of this we can be more sure of its randomness and its statistical significance. The graphs include only those questions with an adequate number of responses to determine differences between cleared and uncleared cases.

Again the response differences between the cleared and uncleared cases are few. In some of the questions, the patterns do not follow what would be expected. For example, a much larger percent of uncleared crimes than cleared crimes are committed against commercial establishments which have been in their present location between 1-5 years (Graph I). The percentage of uncleared crimes drops down in the next category--6 to 10 years in the same location--and goes back up in those business which have been at the location 10 years or over. One of the largest indicators of the clearance factor for commercial burglaries is whether or not there is a burglar alarm (Graph III). Seventy seven point one percent (77.1%) of the uncleared burglaries occurred in places that did not have an alarm.

An interesting, but difficult to explain, phenomenon occurs in the question regarding confidence in the police (Graph VIII). As would be expected in the cleared cases, the percent indicating they are very confident in the police increased from 66.7% prior to the incident to 69.0% afterwards. However, 48.6% of the victims of uncleared cases indicated they were very confident in the police prior to the incident and a larger percent, 54.3% were very confident after the incident even though the incident was uncleared.

The physical survey reveals that the burglaries that were cleared occurred mainly in areas consisting of mainly commercial or industrial land uses whereas the uncleared cases occurred on areas that had a larger percentage of residential and mixed land use. This may be due to the fact that areas with mixed land usage is more accessible to the burglar. For example, he would arouse more suspicion if walking in an area late at night where there are only commercial establishments, most of which would be closed than he would in areas where there would be several reasonable destinations available to him.

The "typical" victim of commercial burglaries in our sample has been in business at the same location, which he owns, for over ten years. The incident occurred between midnight and 6 a.m. which was not during regular business hours. There was no one on the premises at the time. The burglar broke in through a window. It may or may not be visible from the street (there is no significant difference between the two). The business did not have an alarm system.

There is an equal chance that the stolen items were not marked for identification. The stolen merchandise was not recovered in most cases although the recovery rate for cleared cases was 53.6%. In the cases where the stolen items were recovered, the victim felt that the identification marks, serial numbers, etc., did not assist in its recovery. The victim carried burglary insurance and reported the incident to the insurance company. The business had been the victim of multiple burglaries in the past five years. The prevalent attitude of the victims of commercial burglaries is that "it (victimization) is something that you have to expect and there isn't much that you can do about it."

The incident occurred in an area with satisfactory* street lighting, occurred in a deteriorating* area, but the actual building where the incident occurred was considered to be sound*.

---

*See Appendix III for definition of items.


Years at present location
7.9**** less than one
5.6---
15.8******** 1-5
41.7----------
39.5********** 6-10
8.3----
36.8********** 10+
44.4----------
Own, rent, or lease building
25.0********** rent
17.2---------
32.1********** lease
27.6----------
42.9********** own
55.2----------
Time criminal entered
3.6** 6 a.m.-6 p.m.
14.7-------
21.4********** 6 p.m.-midnight
17.6--------
71.4********** midnight-6 a.m.
55.9----------
3.6** unknown
11.8-----
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph I
* Cleared
- Uncleared


Anyone on premises
6.9*** yes
23.5----------
93.1 ********** no
76.5----------
Reason no one on premises
96.4 ********** after regular business hours
93.3 ----------
3.3-- short-term absence
.1- vacation, etc.
3.6** other
3.3--
Method of criminal entry
10.0***** unlocked door
8.8---
10.0***** unlocked window
5.9---
33.3********** broke window
32.3----------
30.0********** forced door
26.4----------
16.7******** other
20.6---------
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph II
* Cleared
- Uncleared


Entry point visible from street
46.4********** yes
48.4----------
53.6********** no
51.6----------
Alarm system
41.4********** yes
22.9----------
58.6********** no
77.1----------
Did alarm go off
50.0********** yes
62.5----------
50.0********** no
37.5----------
Security measures
31.5********** locking doors
34.9----------
31.5********** locking windows
31.4----------
9.8***** turned on alarm
8.1----
27.2********** light burning
25.6----------
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph III
*Cleared
-Uncleared


Who reported burglary
39.3********** yourself
57.6----------
14.3******* neighbor
9.0-----
46.4********** employee
33.3----------
.9- other
How long before police arrived
12.0****** 1 hour
16.1-------
40.0********** 2 hours
38.7----------
20.0********** 3 hours
6.5---
8.0**** 4 hours
12.9-----
16.0******** 5 hours
12.9-----
4.0** 6+ hours
12.9-----
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph IV
* Cleared
- Uncleared



Graph V



Graph VI


30.0**********| 1
16.7--------
23.3**********| 2
22.2----------
10.0*****| 3
30.6----------
36.7**********| 4+
27.8----------
2.8-| don't know
Number of burglaries in last five years
6.9***| 1
10.3-----
17.2*********| 2
6.9---
58.6**********| 3+
58.6----------
Number of people acquainted with in block
3.4**| none
6.9---
13.8*******| unknown
17.2---------
6.9***| yes, considered
3.2--
3.4**| yes, moved
3.2--
Considered moving due to burglary
89.7**********| no
90.3----------
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph VII
* Cleared
- Uncleared


66.7**********| very
48.6----------
20.0**********| somewhat
31.4----------
6.7***| undecided
2.9-
3.3**| not very
8.6----
3.3**| none
8.6----
Before burglary
69.0**********| very
54.3----------
17.2*********| somewhat
25.7----------
3.4**| undecided
2.9-
3.4**| not very
8.6----
6.9***| none
8.6----
After burglary
Confidence in Police
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph VIII
* Cleared
- Uncleared



Graph IX

PHYSICAL SURVEY

Block Location of Commercial Burglaries

North

13.1%	2.6%	5.2%	7.8%
6.3%	*15.6%*	*12.5%*	----
-----	-----	-----	2.6%
-----	-----	-----	*12.5%*
2.6%	-----	13.1%	7.8%
-----	*3.1%*	-----	*9.3%*
13.1%	15.7%	7.8%	7.8%
3.1%	*9.3%*	*9.3%*	*18.7%*

West East

South

Corner locations--42.1%
32.0%

Gothic lettering: Cleared
Italic lettering: Uncleared

Graph X

Robberies:

There were 36 completed interviews with victims of individual robberies, there were an additional 50 robbery victims selected in the original sample of 600 that we would not locate. A substantial majority of these were individuals rather than commercial robberies. In the group of 50 not contacted 31 were uncleared and 19 were cleared. The large difference between these numbers is enough to cause some doubt as to the randomness of the final sample. Once again it is important to take into consideration that this high moved rate strongly indicates a high transitory nature of the victims of reported robberies in the City of Portland.

The commercial robberies in the sample totaled nine, four cleared and five uncleared. These were separated from the individual robberies due to the fact that there are, for example, large differences between robbing a market and a purse snatch, both of which are considered robberies in police statistics. The number of commercial robbery cases is not high enough to make any valid statements about differences between cleared and uncleared cases. The only unanaimous response of the 9 cases is that nothing could have been done to prevent the incident.

The physical survey for individual robberies indicates that the incidents occurred in areas of highly mixed use with retail commercial establishments and multi-family residential dwellings being the highest and open space and institutional being the next highest land use. Street lighting in the immediate vicinity of the incident was satisfactory*. The area could be characterized as deteriorating in most cases.

---

*For definition of terms, see Appendix III.

Due to the lack of data on commercial robberies a cab company was interviewed since a number of the incidents in the sample involved cab drivers. The interview is included in Appendix V of the report.


How long at address (N-36)
11.0****** less than 1 yr.
11.0------
33.0********** 1-5
38.5----------
16.5******** 6-10
5.5---
38.5********** 10+
44.0----------
Rent, lease, own your home (N=36)
38.5********** rent
38.5----------
0 lease
61.5********** own
61.0----------
Time of day (N=36)
0 don't know
55.5********** day
50.0----------
33.2********** evening
28.0----------
11.3****** night
22.0----------
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph I
* Cleared
- Uncleared


How far from home (N=36)
31.5********** 1 block
27.5----------
10.5***** 2-5
27.5----------
10.5***** 5-10
11.0------
42.0********** 10+
27.5----------
5.3*** don't know
5.5---
What were you doing there (N=35)
21.0********** to or from work
5.5---
31.5********** shopping
38.5----------
11.0------ visiting
5.3*** taking a walk
0 don't know
42.0********** other
44.0----------
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph II
* Cleared
- Uncleared



Graph III



Graph IV


Why do you think this person robbed you (N=34)
50.0********** needed the money
62.5----------
0 personally disliked you
11.0****** happened to be there
12.5------
27.5********** other
12.5------
11.0****** don't know
12.5------
Robber have weapon (N=36)
38.5********** yes
44.0----------
61.0********** no
56.0----------
Robber threaten you (N=36)
47.0********** yes
56.0----------
53.0********** no
44.0----------
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph V
* Cleared
- Uncleared


See weapon (N=34)
25.0********** yes
44.0----------
75.0********** no
56.0----------
What was weapon (N=18)
38.0********** knife
30.0----------
25.0********** gun
50.0----------
25.0********** stick, rock, bottle etc.
12.0****** other
20.0---------
Robber hit or attack you (N=36)
50.0********** yes
50.0----------
50.0********** no
50.0----------
Did you resist (N=34)
47.0********** yes
35.0----------
53.0********** no
65.0----------
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph VI
* Cleared
- Uncleared


Were you injured (N=33)
50.0********** yes
77.0----------
50.0********** no
23.0----------
Yell or call for help (N=36)
42.0********** yes
23.0----------
58.0********** no
77.0----------
Reason for not calling for help (N=25)
16.5******** too frightened
31.0----------
41.5********** felt no one would respond
15.5--------
16.5******** not enough time
24.0********** other
53.5-;----------
0 don't know
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph VII
* Cleared
- Uncleared


Anyone see you robbed (N=37)
37.0********** yes
16.5--------
63.0********** no
83.5----------
Who called police (N=37)
42.0********** victim
44.0----------
5.3*** witness
11.0-----
10.5***** relative
5.3---
10.5***** neighbor
16.5--------
32.0********** other
0 don't know
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph VIII
* Cleared
- Uncleared

When were police called (N=35)

89.0 / 88.0 immediately after robbery
11.0 / 12.0 more than an hour after robbery
0 day after robbery
0 don't know

How long did it take police to arrive (N=36)

21.0 / 17.5 less than 5 minutes
26.3 / 35.0 5-10 minutes
31.5 / 29.5 10-30 minutes
5.3 / 11.5 30 minutes to 1 hour
5.3 more than 1 hour
0 didn't show up
10.5 / 5.9 don't know

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph IX

* Cleared
- Uncleared

Which of these details could you tell police about robber

100.0 / 100.0 age
100.0 / 100.0 sex
100.0 / 100.0 race
84.0 / 65.0 clothes
78.0 / 53.0 height
48.0 / 53.0 weight
58.0 / 35.0 physical build
32.0 / 35.0 facial features
10.5 / 5.9 other

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph X

* Cleared
- Uncleared



Graph XI



Graph XII



Graph XIII



Graph XIV


5.0*** under 15
5.0*** 15-20
5.5---
15.0******** 20-30
16.5------
20.0********** 30-40
15.0******** 40-50
11.0------
15.0******** 50-60
22.0----------
5.0*** 60-70
27.5----------
20.0********** 70+
16.5-------
0 looking for work
38.5********** working full-time
52.0----------
16.5-------- working part-time
0 work part-time/keep house
0 work part-time/ school
16.0******** keep house only
5.5---
16.0******** retired
3.3--
16.0******** other
5.5---
Victim's work status (N=37)
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph XV
* Cleared
- Uncleared


22.0********** under 2,000
11.5------
5.5*** 2,000-2,999
11.5------
16.5******** 3,000-4,999
17.5---------
11.0****** 5,000-5,999
5.9---
5.5*** 6,000-6,999
5.9---
5.5*** 7,000-7,999
5.9---
11.0****** 8,000-9,999
5.9---
16.5******** 10,000-14,999
17.5---------
5.5*** 15,000-19,999
17.5---------
0 20,000+
0 don't know
0 refused
Victim's yearly income (N=37)
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Percent
Graph VI
* Cleared
- Uncleared

Victim's age (N=38)



Graph VII

APPENDIX I

DESCRIPTION OF HIGH IMPACT CRIME PROGRAM. LEAA

High Impact Anti-Crime Program

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

U. S. Department of Justice

I BACKGROUND

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 for the purpose of improving the law enforcement and criminal justice system in the United States. Its principal means of fulfilling this task is through the award of grants to states, local agencies, private research organizations and universities. LEAA's FY 1971 budget, the bulk of which is devoted to grant activities, was well in excess of $400 million; LEAA's FY 1972 budget amounts to nearly $700 million. Of the funds available for action grants, 85% is given to the states according to their population ("block" grants). The remaining 15% is awarded by LEAA at its discretion. Additional funds ($21 million in FY 72) are budgeted for research purposes.

In past years, LEAA discretionary funds have been awarded for numerous, relatively small projects. In 1971, there were forty-five discretionary grant programs and over 650 awards were made within those categories. In 1972 a new initiative against crime -- The Impact Program was begun. This new program channels a substantial portion of discretionary and research funds to meet problems which LEAA has determined to be of highest priority. The Impact Program involves every component of LEAA as well as the selected cities and the corresponding State Planning Agencies. For the first time, many of the different LEAA grant categories (e.g. discretionary, research, block) are being used in a large scale coordinated effort. The success of the effort depends upon the degree of coordination that can be achieved, the innovativeness of approach, and the availability of a wide variety of resources.

II THE SELECTION OF CRIME TARGETS

Funding of the Impact Program involves the concentration of substantial resources on two specific types of crime: stranger-to-stranger crime and burglary. The following definition is used for stranger-to-stranger crime: homicide, rape and robbery, as defined by the Uniform Crime Reporting Standards, when such crimes do not involve relatives, friends, or persons well known to the victim. Data on robbery is used as a surrogate for stranger-to-stranger crime.

These two types of crime were chosen because they are:

A. Statistically a significant part of the total crime picture.

B. Crimes that can be affected by a concerted effort of the criminal justice system.

C. A major concern of the general public.

Robbery occurs most frequently of all violent crimes and 55% of all robberies occur in the street. Burglary is the most widespread of all serious crimes; there were slightly over 2 million reported burglaries in 1970. The total crime rate for index crimes is expected to rise 21% from 1971 to 1972. Of all index crime, the greatest increase in incidence rates will be in robbery (31%). Burglary is expected to increase 18% during the same period. Thus, in terms of reported crimes and the projected rates of increase, burglary and stranger-to-stranger crime (the latter measured by the robbery index) are very significant.

It is possible for the criminal justice system to take action against burglary and certain kinds of violent crime. Tactical analysis can provide

a basis for prevention and deterrence; improved police capabilities can increase detection and apprehension of offenders; adjudication and post-adjudication decisions can influence recidivism. Therefore, such target crimes are amenable to a concerted attack by the system and the community.

A number of studies have found that the public is most concerned with crimes of violence and that this relates specifically to a fear of strangers. Both robbery and burglary pose the threat of violence; sixty percent of all robberies involve an armed assailant.

III SELECTION OF TARGET CITIES

Urban areas were selected for the Impact Program because the highest proportion of crime victims live in cities. It is there that the incidence of crime continues to increase significantly. Burglary, for example, is about three times as prevalent on a per capita basis in large cities (250,000+) as in small towns (under 10,000). Robbery or street crime is even more an urban event. In 1970, the robbery rate per 100,000 for cities above 250,000 population was 595. For metropolitan suburban areas, it was exactly 1/10 of that or 59. Further, for small cities under 10,000 the robbery rate dropped to 24 per 100,000 population. It is clear that in order to make an impact on street crime, the target areas must be the relatively large central cities.

The first selection criterion, therefore, was that the cities be over 250,000 in population. Because of the limited funds available, it was unlikely that a significant crime reduction could be achieved in the nation's largest cities. The six cities over one million in population were, therefore, not considered. It was important to provide adequate resources for the program (about $20 million per city) so it was decided that eight of the fifty cities with populations between 250,000 and one million would be chosen. Selection was based on the following assumptions:

(a) The greatest reduction could be achieved in those cities with the most serious robbery and burglary problems.

(b) The program should have a broad geographic distribution.

(c) Strong local administrative support could be expected.

Based on these criteria, Newark, Baltimore, Atlanta, Cleveland, Dallas, St. Louis, Denver and Portland were selected.

IV PROGRAM DESIGN

The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the research arm of LEAA, was responsible for the overall design of the program and for the development of a resource document, Planning Guidelines and Programs to Reduce Crime, for the use of the cities.

To assist the cities in developing their impact programs, a general analysis of the target crimes was made. Each city is to undertake its own specific crime analysis. The Institute's effort is simply a suggested approach for crime specific planning.

A. Problem Analysis

To provide a meaningful framework for addressing the problems of stranger-to-stranger crimes and burglary, it is necessary to define the key dimensions of the problem. The Institute staff used the following matrix to array the various factors that should be considered.

system response / factors	Prevention	Deterrence Detection Apprehension	Adjudica-tion	Post Adjudica-tion
OFFENDER				
VICTIM				
ENVIRONMENT				

A listing of the relevant questions and major issues within each segment of the matrix was then undertaken. Many of the issues that resulted from this approach (eg., vocational training as a preventive program) are not directly related to the criminal justice process. They are, however, of major importance and must be addressed in any comprehensive attack on crime.

The next task was to determine which problems to address. The objective was to maximize impact by selecting those factors most amenable to influence and those most likely to have the greatest effect on the problem. To determine these factors, the following questions were asked:

a. What statistical evidence is available on offenders, victims and the environment in robbery and burglary? Do these data provide a focus for an action program?

b. Apart from statistical data, what are the informed judgements of experts in the field of criminal justice with regard to these two crimes?

c. What research has been or is being undertaken that is relevant to those crime areas?

d. What approaches to the problems have been taken by the criminal justice community? Have demonstration programs been funded under discretionary or block grant awards that have proved successful. Can models be developed from such programs for intensive use in combatting crime?

e. Within a framework of the above criteria, what programs could be implemented, tested, and evaluated within the time and cost constraints of the demonstration?

Based on the above, the Planning Guidelines suggests the following "targets" to provide a common basis for action throughout the system:

(1) Persons who have committed street crimes and burglary and are likely to be recidivists.

FBI data on repeaters by type of crime indicate that burglars

had a 76% recidivist rate and persons committing robbery had a 57% recidivist rate. A number of predictive strategies can be used to identify and define those offenders who are most likely to commit these crimes again. For example, a Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study indicates that less than 10% of the delinquent population is responsible for 60 - 70% of the serious offenses; these people are classifiable as chronic recidivists. A considerable amount of research has been done which demonstrates the feasibility of predicting delinquent behavior.

(2) Certain juveniles and young adults constitute "high risk" groups - drug addicts, the unemployed male and truants and dropouts.

Nearly half of those arrested for index crimes are under eighteen. In addition, there appears to be a rapid growth of juvenile crime. For example, in comparing arrest trends for different age groups between 1960 and 1970 the following major trends emerged: (a) for violent crimes juvenile arrests increased almost 3 times faster than adult arrests; (b) although drug arrests jumped for all age groups during the 1960's the increase exceeded 3,000% for juveniles under 18. With regard to recidivism, the FBI found that of the offenders under 20 released in 1965, 74% were rearrested by the end of 1968. This was the highest recidivism rate of all age groups. In addition, data on arrest by age and specific crime indicate that persons under 21 years of age account for 57% of the total robbery arrests and 70% of the total burglary arrests.

(a) Drug addicts: While more research is necessary on the role of drugs in crime, there is little doubt that addiction causes a great deal of crime and that its reduction can be expected to reduce crime. A New York City study, in 1967, revealed that "41% of those arrested for burglary were admitted users." In addition, drugs and alcohol may provide a stimulus for crime; a study of armed robbers indicated that such was the case in 71% of the "spur-of-the-moment" robberies.

(b) The unemployed young man: The able-bodied young man who is unemployed and unoccupied is a prospect for serious criminal activity. If he already has a criminal record, he is likely to be a recidivist. In two studies of convicted robbers by the Pennsylvania Board of Parole, it was found that 57% of those involved in the 1950 study and 74% in the 1965 study were unemployed at the time the robbery was committed.

(c) Truants and dropouts. If the unemployed young adult is a probable offender, the truant child is a potential delinquent. National studies of delinquency emphasize the critical nature of a youth's educational experience in the development and avoidance of a delinquent and criminal career. Not only are school truants and dropouts overly represented in the delinquent population, but delinquents are far more likely to have had unsuccessful school experiences. Special efforts must be made to reach truants and school dropouts in order to provide learning and work experiences that will reduce the incidence of delinquent and criminal behavior.

(3) Those people who are most likely to be victimized.

There is a need to identify those people or businesses with

characteristics that make it more likely that they will be crime victims. Research findings and the judgments of law enforcement officials will contribute to a better understanding of victimization and provide a basis for deterrent action by law enforcement agencies.

(4) Those settings which are found to be "high risk" locations.

Several studies are currently underway that will contribute significantly to our knowledge of the settings of crime.[1] Mapping techniques can be used to determine crime patterns within a city to permit more effective resource allocations. Public housing projects are known high crime areas, and a series of Institute studies[2] have developed architectural design and target hardening techniques to reduce these crime problems.

B. Sample Projects

The Planning Guidelines includes a description of a number of projects that might be of interest to the impact cities. The list of projects is only one of the resources available to the cities for planning their program. The Guidelines contains programs in:

1. Prevention and Post-Adjudication
   a. Adult and Juvenile Rehabilitation and Control Programs.
   b. Narcotic Addiction Treatment
   c. Vocational Rehabilitation of Unemployed Young Men
   d. Truants and School Dropouts
   e. Correctional Service

1 Notably NI 72-002 "Burglary: A Study of its Character, Correlates, Correctives and Causes" and NI 71-026-142 - A joint LEAA-HUD study of Crimes in and Around Residences.
2 NI 70-015, 70-082, and 71-127 "Physical Design for Improving Security in Residential Environments, New York.

2. Deterrence, Detection and Apprehension -- Community Action
   a. Police-Community Cooperation
   b. Hardening of Potential Targets
   c. Non-Police Tenant Patrol
   d. Emergency Assistance
   e. Personal Property Identification
3. Deterrence, Detection and Apprehension -- Police Action
   a. Police Patrol Allocation
   b. Police Communication, Command and Control
   c. Police Investigation
   d. Criminalistics Laboratories
   e. Police Department Organization and Management
4. Adjudication
   a. Court Delay
   b. Witnesses and Jurors
   c. Court Recording
5. Impact Program Publicity Campaign

V PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Goals

The objective of the Impact Program is to affect a tangible reduction in the incidence of the target crimes in the selected cities. Specifically, the aim is to halt the increase in these crimes and to achieve a 5% reduction in two years and a 20% decrease in five years.

B. Management

The major responsibility for developing the impact program lies with the city. The basic data for planning, implementation and

evaluation will be developed by the cities.

The LEAA Regional Offices and the State Planning Agencies will play a significant role in the overall design of the program, in monitoring its progress and in evaluating its effects.

C. Crime Specific Planning

The program will focus on the three basic elements of any criminal act: the offender, the victim, and the crime setting. It will also stress development of an appropriate criminal justice system response in terms of prevention, deterrence, detection and apprehension, adjudication and post-adjudication processes. The target crimes will provide direction for the actions taken within the system.

To assist the impact cities in the indepth analysis of target crimes that is needed for program development, the Statistics Division of the National Institute has suggested the adoption of certain data collection and audit procedures. These recommendations include the following:

(1) Incident data: information from incident reports and arrest records should be organized differently and in more detail than is generally done by police agencies. The first requirement is that the victim-offender relationship be determined. Second, the distribution and characteristics of specific criminal events are needed. It is useful to have data available for small geographic areas, and a precinct or police district is the minimum acceptable for planning purposes. Strategies will vary by the location of crimes; the type of place in which off-street crime occurs, and the type of neighborhood. In addition, information on the number of offenders, apparent age, weapons, and apparent motive can also prove useful.

(2) Arrest data: characteristics of the arrestee should be examined along with the offense. These characteristics in aggregate can provide useful insights into the target population.

The Division is also suggesting formats that will facilitate the processing of incident and arrest data. It recommends that an independent audit of the statistics be carried out routinely since the maintenance of integrity and credibility of the statistics is essential.

VI EVALUATION

The Impact Program is designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of comprehensive programs to reduce stranger-to-stranger crimes and burglary. The value of this two-year effort depends on three elements: effective planning, consistent implementation and rigorous evaluation.

The National Institute will assist in the design of a comprehensive evaluation program that will measure the actual effect of the program on crime rates in the impact cities and the effectiveness of the action projects in achieving the program goals.

Three levels of evaluation will be required to adequately assess the program. Each project in the impact program will contain an evaluation component, and the cities will be responsible for this effort. The second level of evaluation will involve groupings of projects, both

within a city and across all eight cities. The Institute will perform these comparative evaluations. The final level is a "macroscopic" evaluation to determine the extent to which crime reduction goals are met. The latter will be accomplished by a large scale victimization survey conducted for the National Institute by the Census Bureau. Interviewing will take place in a probability sample of some 10,000 - 12,000 households in each city. The first survey will cover July 1971 - July 1972, the "before" measurement. A second survey will be conducted in January 1975 for the period January - December 1974. Evaluation of crime reduction will be based on victimization rather than reported crimes.

APPENDIX II

LETTER TO VICTIMS ADVISING OF SAMPLE SELECTION

INTRODUCTORY LETTER FOR INTERVIEWERS

PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY
p o box 751
portland, oregon 97207
503 229-4015

urban studies center

Dear Friend:

The Urban Studies Center at Portland State University is conducting a survey at the request of the Portland High Crime Impact Task Force. The topics included in the survey include characteristics and experiences of victims of robberies and burglaries during 1971.

Your household has been selected by scientific sampling methods to be included in the survey. An interviewer from the Urban Studies Center will call on you shortly to ask you some questions. Your participation in this voluntary survey is very important since your household has been chosen to represent many other households. The information you provide will help the Task Force to plan new programs and evaluate existing ones.

Your answers to the Urban Studies Center interviewer are confidential and will be used only to produce statistical totals. If you have any questions, please call the Urban Studies Center (229-4015) and ask for the Crime Survey Project.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Leon R. Arens
Project Director

LRA/jc

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
CITY HALL

TERRY D. SCHRUNK
MAYOR

CITY OF PORTLAND
OREGON

HOWARD P. TRAVER
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT

DAVID H. DOCKHAM
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT

KEITH L. JONES
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

MARY V. TOBKIN
ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY

October 19, 1972

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to introduce Marcia Angelos. She is a member of a research team sponsored by the Portland High Crime Impact program, and she is authorized to conduct interviews with selected 1971 victims of robberies and burglaries in the City of Portland. The goal of the project is to provide more information to assist in the reduction of crime in the city.

Your cooperation in this interview will be appreciated.

Yours truly,

Keith L. Jones
Administrative Assistant

KLJ.p

APPENDIX III

QUESTIONNAIRE

PHYSICAL SURVEY

Type of crime
(cleared or uncleared) _____

Victim's name _____

Victim's address _____

Address of crime _____

Date of crime _____

Case number _____

INTERVIEWER'S RECORD

Interviewer's name _____

Contacts	1	2	3
Completed interview			
Not at home			
Other (specify)			

Time interview began _____

Time interview ended _____

VICTIM'S RESIDENCE

Single family home ___

Duplex ___

Rooming house ___

Mobile home ___

Other (specify) _____

Apartment House:

up to 8 units ___

9 to 20 units ___

over 20 units ___

If it's a business or an institution, describe the building.
Such as: service station, school, store, etc.

_____

1. How long have you lived at this address?
   a. less than one year *Go to Q. 2*
   b. 1 to 5 years *Go to Q. 3*
   c. 6 to 10 years *Go to Q. 3*
   d. more than 10 years *Go to Q. 3*

2. How many times have you moved in the past year?
   a. one
   b. two
   c. three
   d. four or more

3. Do you rent, lease, or own your home (apartment)?
   a. rent *Go to Q. 5*
   b. lease *Go to Q. 5*
   c. own *Go to Q. 4*

4. What is the assessed valuation of your home?
   a. under $5,000
   b. $5,000 to $10,000
   c. $10,000 to $15,000
   d. $15,000 to $20,000
   e. $20,000 to $25,000
   f. $25,000 to $35,000
   g. $35,000 to $55,000
   h. $55,000 and above
   i. don't know
   j. refused

5. What is your monthly rent?
   a. under $45
   b. $45 to $85
   c. $85 to $110
   d. $110 to $130
   e. $130 to $155
   f. $155 to $185
   g. $185 to $225
   h. $225 to $300
   i. over $300
   j. refused

6. I understand that you were the victim of a burglary on _____, 1971.
   About what time did it happen?
   a. don't know
   b. day (6 a.m. to 6 p.m.)
   c. evening (6 p.m. to midnight)
   d. night (midnight to 6 a.m.)

7. Was anybody in your home when it was burglarized?
   a. yes *Go to Q 10*
   b. no *Go to Q. 8*

8. Why weren't you at home?
   a. regular working hours
   b. vacation or prolonged absence
   c. just stepped out for a moment
   d. regular short-term absence
   e. other (specify) _____
   f. don't know

9. Before you left, do you remember: *Mark each and every appropriate category*
   a. closing and locking all the doors
   b. closing and locking all the windows
   c. leaving a light burning
   d. asking the neighbors to keep an eye on the place
   e. other (specify) _____
   f. none of the above
   g. don't know

   Go to Q. 11

10. How many people were there at the time
    a. one
    b. two
    c. three
    d. four or more

11. Did you know that a burglary was taking place?
    a. yes
    b. no

12. What did you do?
    a. call the police
    b. call a neighbor
    c. wait quietly until the burglar(s) had left
    d. other (specify) _____
    e. don't know

13. Did you see the burglar(s)?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 14*
    b. no *Go to Q. 18*

14. How many were there?
    a. one
    b. two
    c. three or more
    d. don't know

15. Which of the following details could you tell the police about the burglar(s)?
    a. age *If so, ask how old*
    b. sex *If yes, ask which sex and note*
    c. race *If yes, ask which race and note*
    d. clothes
    e. height
    f. weight
    g. physical build
    h. facial features
    i. other (specify) _____

16. Had you ever seen this person before?
    a. yes
    b. no

16a. Did your neighbors see the burglar?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 17*
    b. no *Go to Q. 18*
    c. don't know *Go to Q. 18*

17. Had any of your neighbors seen this person before?
    a. yes
    b. no

18. How did you find out that you had been burglarized? *Note each and every appropriate category.*
    a. saw evidence of the break-in
    b. noticed that property was missing
    c. police notified me
    d. neighbor notified me
    e. other (specify)_____
    f. don't know

19. How did the burglar(s) get in?
    a. entered unlocked door
    b. entered unlocked window
    c. broke or forced window
    d. broke into locked door
    e. other (specify) _____
    f. don't know

20. Can you see the place where the burglar broke in from the street?
    a. yes
    b. no

21. Do you have an alarm system in your house (apartment)?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 22*
    b. no *Go to Q. 25*

22. Is it a silent alarm or a noise alarm?
    a. silent
    b. noise

23. Did the alarm go off during the burglary?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 25*
    b. no *Go to Q. 24*
    c. don't know *Go to Q. 25*

24. Why not?
    a. malfunction
    b. alarm wasn't turned on
    c. entry point was not connected to alarm system
    d. burglar disconnected alarm
    e. other (specify) _____
    f. don't know

25. Who reported the burglary to the police?
    a. victim
    b. companion
    c. observer
    d. neighbor
    e. other (specify) _____

26. How long did it take the police to arrive?
    a. less than 2 hours (specify) _____
    b. 2 to 5 hours
    c. within 24 hours
    d. 2 to 5 days
    e. never showed up
    f. don't know

27. When the police arrived, what was the first thing that they did?
    Interviewer probe: what was the next thing, etc.

28. How soon after the burglary did the police make an arrest?
    a. immediately or while the burglar was in the act
    b. within 2 hours from the time of the burglary
    c. between 2 and 24 hours after the burglary
    d. within a few weeks
    e. don't know *Go to Q. 30*
    f. never did *Go to Q. 30*

29. How were the police able to find the person(s) who burglarized you?
    a. victim's physical description of the burglary, or description by member of the household
    b. neighbor's physical description of the burglar
    c. clues left at the scene of the crime
    d. identification of stolen items
    e. don't know

30. Did the stolen items have any identifying marks?
    a. yes
    b. no
    c. don't know

31. Had you marked any of the stolen items for identification?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 32*
    b. no *Go to Q. 34*

32. How were they marked?
    a. list of serial numbers
    b. engraving
    c. Other (specify) _____
    d. don't know

32a. Were any of the stolen items recovered?
    a. yes
    b. no
    c. don't know

33. Did the identification help the police to recover the items?
    a. yes
    b. no
    c. don't know

34. Do you have burglary insurance?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 35*
    b. no *Go to Q. 36*

35. Was the loss reported to your insurance company?
    a. yes
    b. no

36. How many times has your home been burglarized in the past five years?
    a. one
    b. two
    c. three
    d. four or more

37. How many of those burglaries were reported to the police?
    a. one
    b. two
    c. three
    d. four or more
    e. don't know
    If some were not reported, go to Q. 38. If all were reported go to Q. 39

38. Why didn't you report that (those) burglary(s)?
    a. nothing could be done - lack of proof
    b. didn't think it was important enough
    c. police wouldn't want to be bothered
    d. didn't want to take the time - too inconvenient
    e. private or personal matter - didn't want to report it
    f. didn't want to get involved
    g. afraid of reprisal
    h. reported it to someone else
    i. other (specify)_____

To finish up the interview, I have a few background questions for you.

39. In the block where your house is, how many different families or households do you know well enough to speak to once a week?
    a. one
    b. two
    c. three or more
    d. none
    e. don't know

40. Were you confident in the police before the burglary?
    a. yes, very confident
    b. yes, somewhat confident
    c. undecided
    d. no, not very confident
    e. no, no confidence at all
    f. other (specify)_____

41. Were you confident in the police after the burglary?
    a. yes, very confident
    b. yes, somewhat confident
    c. undecided
    d. no, not very confident
    e. no, no confidence at all
    f. other (specify _____

42. Have you considered moving (or did you move) out of the neighborhood because of the burglary?
    a. yes, considered moving
    b. yes, did move
    c. no
    d. don't know

43. Have you or other members of the household changed any of your habits because of the burglary?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 44*
    b. no *Go to Q. 45*
    c. don't know *Go to Q. 45*

44. What have been the changes? *Note answer*

45. Is there anything you can think of now that might have prevented the burglary? *Note answer*

46. *If no* Why not?

47. *Note victim's sex*
    a. female
    b. male

48. *Note victim's race*
    a. white
    b. negro
    c. other

1. How long have you lived at this address?
   a. less than 1 year *Go to Q. 2*
   b. 1 to 5 years *Go to Q. 3*
   c. 6 to 10 years *Go to Q. 3*
   d. more than 10 years *Go to Q. 3*

2. How many times have you moved in the past five years?
   a. one
   b. two
   c. three
   d. four or more

3. Do you rent, lease or own your home (apartment)?
   a. rent
   b. lease
   c. own

4. I understand you were the victim of a robbery on _____, 1971 About what time did it happen?

   a. don't know
   b. day (6 a.m. to 6 p.m.)
   c. evening (6 p.m. to midnight)
   d. Night (midnight to 6 a.m.)

5. Remembering back to that time, would you please describe as fully as possible where and how the robbery took place? *Interviewer probe: be sure to find the exact location of the robbery.*

6. How far from your home did the incident take place?
   a. one block
   b. two to five blocks
   c. five to ten blocks
   d. over 10 blocks
   e. don't know

7. What were you doing there?
   a. en route to or from work/business
   b. shopping, running an errand, etc.
   c. visiting a friend or acquaintance
   d. taking a walk
   e. don't know
   f. other (specify) _____

8. Were you alone?
   a. yes *Go to Q. 10*
   b. no *Go to Q. 9*

9. Who was with you?
   a. member of the family
   b. friend or acquaintance
   c. pet or watch dog
   d. other (specify) _____

10. How often did you walk or drive past that spot before the robbery occurred?
    a. every day
    b. a few times a week
    c. monthly
    d. rarely
    e. never before
    f. don't know

11. In the block where the robbery took place, how many people do you know well enough to speak to once a week?
    a. one
    b. two
    c. three or more
    d. none
    e. don't know

12. Now, speaking of the robbery itself, did you see the robber before he(she) actually held you up?
    a. yes
    b. no

13. How did the robber(s) approach you? *Interviewer probe: where was he before the robbery - where did he come from? Note answer.*

14. How many robbers were there?
    a. 1
    b. 2
    c. 3
    d. 4 or more
    e. don't know

15. Did you know the robber(s) before the robbery?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 16*
    b. no *Go to Q. 17*

16. How is that you knew this person?
    a. family member
    b. relative
    c. neighbor
    d. acquaintance
    e. fellow worker
    f. other (specify)_____

17. Why do you think this person robbed you?
    a. needed the money
    b. personally disliked you
    c. just happened to be there
    d. other (specify) _____
    e. don't know

18. Did the robber threaten you?
    a. yes
    b. no

19. Did the robber have a weapon?
    a. yes
    b. no

20. Did you see a weapon?
    a. yes
    b. no

21 What was the weapon?
    a. knife
    b. gun
    c. stick, rock, bottle, etc.
    d. other (specify) _____

22. Did the robber(s) hit or attack you?
    a. yes
    b. no

23. Did you resist?
    a. yes
    b. no

24. Were you injured?
    a. yes
    b. no

25. During the robbery did you call or yell for help?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 27*
    b. .no *Go to Q. 26*

26. Why didn't you call for help?
    a. too frightened
    b. felt no one would respond
    c. not enough time
    d. other (specify) _____
    e. don't know

27. Did anyone see you robbed?
    a. yes
    b. no

28. Who called the police?
    a. victim
    b. witness
    c. relative
    d. neighbor
    e. other (specify) _____
    f. don't know

29. When were the police called?
    a. immediately after the robbery
    b. more than an hour after the robbery
    c. a day after the robbery
    d. don't know

30. How long did it take the police to arrive
    a. less than 5 minutes
    b. from 5 to 10 minutes
    c. from 10 to 30 minutes
    d. from 30 minutes to an hour
    e. more than one hour
    f. didn't show up
    g. don't know

31. When the police arrived, what was the first thing they did?
Interviewer probe: what was the next thing, etc.

32. Which of the following details could you tell the police about the robber(s)?
a. age *if so, ask how old and note* _____
b. sex *if so, ask which sex and note* _____
c. race *if so, ask which race and note* _____
d. clothes
e. height
f. weight
g. physical build
h. facial features
i. other (specify) _____

33. How soon after the robbery were the police able to make an arrest?
a. immediately
b. within a few hours
c. within a few days
d. within a few weeks
e. don't know

34. How many times have you been robbed in the past five years?
a. one
b. two
c. three
d. four or more
e. don't know

35. How many of these robberies were reported to the police
a. one
b. two
c. three
d. four or more
e. don't know
If some weren't reported, go to Q. 36; if all were reported, go to Q. 37

36. Why didn't you report that(those) robbery(s)?
a. nothing could be done - lack of proof
b. didn't think it was important enough
c. the police wouldn't want to be bothered
d. didn't want to take the time - too inconvenient
e. private or personal matter - didn't want to report it
f. didn't want to get involved
g. afraid of reprisal
h. reported to someone else
i. other (specify) _____

37. Were you confident in the police before the robbery?
a. yes, very confident
b. yes, somewhat confident
c. undecided
d. no, not very confident
e. no, no confidence at all
f. other (specify) _____

38. Were you confident in the police after the robbery?
a. yes, very confident
b. yes, somewhat confident
c. undecided
d. no, not very confident
e. no, no confidence at all
f. other (specify) _____

39. To finish up the interview, I have a few background questions to ask you.
Are you:
a. single
b. married
c. divorced
d. widowed
e. separated

40. Do you have any children living with you?
a. yes
b. no

41. What was the highest grade or year of regular school you attended?
a. never attended school
b. elementary (1-8)
c. high school (9-12)
d. college

42. What is your age? *Note answer* _____

43. At the time of the robbery, were you:
    a. looking for work
    b. working full time
    c. working part time
    d. working part time and keeping house
    e. working part time and going to school
    f. keeping house only
    g. retired
    h. other (specify) _____
    If victim works at all or is retired, ask Q's 43 and 44. If victim does not work, move to Q. 45

44. What type of business or industry did you work in?
    Note answer

45. What was your exact job at the time of the robbery?
    Note answer

46. In what general group shown on this card did your total family income fall last year, before taxes?

a. Under $2000	g. $8000 to $9999
b. $2000 to $2999	h. $10,000 to $14,999
c. $3000 to $4999	i. $15,000 to $19,999
d. $5000 to $5999	j. $20,000 or more
e. $6000 to $6999	k. don't know
f. $7000 to $7999	l. refused

47. Have you considered moving (or did you move) because of the robbery?
    a. yes
    b. no

48. Do you feel differently about the neighborhood since the robbery?
    Note answer

49. Is there anything that you can think of now that might have prevented this robbery? *Note answer*

50. *If no* Why not?

51. Have you or other members of the household changed any habits as a result of the robbery?
    Note answer

52. *Note victim's sex*
    a. male
    b. female

53. *Note victim's race*
    a. white
    b. negro
    c. other

COMMERCIAL ROBBERY

1. How long has this business been at this location?
   a. less than 1 year
   b. 1 to 5 years
   c. 6 to 10 years
   d. more than 10 years
   e. don't know

2. I understand that you were the victim of a robbery on _____, 1971. Remembering back to the incident, would you please describe as fully as possible when and how the robbery took place?

   Note as many details as possible, especially the time of day or night and the date.

3. Who called the police?
   a. yourself
   b. owner
   c. co-worker
   d. witness
   e. other (specify) _____
   f. don't know

4. How long did it take the police to arrive?
   a. less than 5 minutes
   b. from 5 to 10 minutes
   c. from 10 to 30 minutes
   d. from 30 minutes to an hour
   e. more than an hour
   f. didn't show up
   g. don't know

5. When the police arrived what was the first thing that they did?

   Interviewer probe: What was the next thing, etc.
   Note response

6. Which of the following details could you tell the police about the robber(s)?
   a. age *If so, ask how old* ____
   b. sex *If so, ask which sex* ____
   c. race *If so, ask which race* ____
   d. clothes
   e. height
   f. weight
   g. physical build
   h. facial features
   i. other

7. How soon after the robbery were the police able to make an arrest?
   a. immediately
   b. within a few hours
   c. within a few days
   d. within a few weeks
   e. don't know

8. How many times have you or this business been robbed in the past five years?
   a. one
   b. two
   c. three
   d. four or more
   e. don't know

9. How many of these robberies were reported to the police?
   a. one
   b. two
   c. three
   d. four or more

   If some of the robberies weren't reported, go to Q. 10. If all were reported, go to Q. 11

10. Why didn't you report that (those) robbery(s)?
    a. nothing could be done - lack of proof
    b. didn't think it was important enough
    c. the police wouldn't want to be bothered
    d. didn't want to take time - too inconvenient
    e. private or personal matter - didn't want to report it
    f. didn't want to get involved
    g. afraid of reprisal
    h. reported it to someone else
    i. other (specify) _____

11. Were you confident in the police before the robbery?
    a. Yes, very confident
    b. Yes, somewhat confident
    c. Undecided
    d. No, not very confident
    e. No, no confidence at all
    f. Other (specify) _____

12. Were you confident in the police after the robbery?
    a. Yes, very confident
    b. Yes, somewhat confident
    c. Undecided
    d. No, not very confident
    e. No, no confidence at all
    f. Other (specify) _____

13. Have you considered moving (or did you move your business) because of the robbery?
    a. Yes, considered moving
    b. Yes, did move
    c. No
    d. Don't know

14. Before the robbery, did you have any security devices to prevent robberies?
    a. Yes *If so, ask what they were and note answer*
    b. No

15. Have any other security devices or security precautions been added since the robbery?
    a. Yes *If so, ask which devices or what precautions and note them*
    b. No

16. Is there anything else you can think of now that might have prevented this robbery?

17. If no, why not?

1. How long has this business been at this location?
   a. less than 1 year *Go to Q. 2*
   b. 1 to 5 years *Go to Q. 3*
   c. 6 to 10 years *Go to Q. 3*
   d. more than 10 years *Go to Q. 3*

2. How many times have you moved in the past year?
   a. one
   b. two
   c. three
   d. four or more

3. Do you rent, lease or own this location?
   a. rent *Go to Q. 4*
   b. lease *Go to Q. 4*
   c. own *Go to Q. 5*

4. What is your monthly rent? *Note answer.*

5. Approximately what is the dollar value of your building and your inventory?

   Note answer.

6. On what days of an average month do you have the largest amount of cash here?

   Note answer.

7. I understand you were the victim of a burglary on _____, 1971. About what time did it happen?
   a. Don't know
   b. Day (6 a.m. to 6 p.m.)
   c. Evening (6 p.m. to midnight)
   d. Night (midnight to 6 a.m.)

8. Was anybody here when you were burglarized?
   a. Yes *Go to Q. 9*
   b. No *Go to Q. 14*

9. How many people were here at the time?
   a. 1
   b. 2
   c. 3
   d. 4 or more
   e. don't know

10. Who was there?
    a. yourself
    b. employees
    c. watchman
    d. other (specify) _____

11. Did you (they) know that a burglary was taking place?
    a. yes
    b. no

12. Did you (they) see the burglar(s)?
    a. yes
    b. no

13. Which of the following details were you able to tell the police about the burglar(s)?
    a. age *If so, ask how old* _____
    b. sex *If so, ask which sex* _____
    c. race *If so, ask which race* _____
    d. clothes
    e. height
    f. weight
    g. physical build
    h. facial features
    i. other (specify) _____

    Go to Q. 17

14. Why wasn't anyone there?
    a. after regular business hours
    b. short term absence (lunch, etc.)
    c. vacation or prolonged absence
    d. other (specify) _____

15. Before you left, do you remember: *Mark each and every appropriate category*
    a. closing and locking all the doors
    b. closing and locking all the windows
    c. leaving a light burning
    d. setting the burglar alarm
    e. asking neighbors to keep an eye on the place
    f. other (specify) _____
    g. none of the above
    h. don't know

16. How did you find out that you had been burglarized? *Mark each and every appropriate category*
    a. saw evidence of the break-in
    b. noticed that property was missing
    c. police notified me
    e. other (specify) _____
    f. don't know

17. How did the burglar(s) get in?
    a. entered unlocked door
    b. entered unlocked window
    c. broke or forced window
    d. broke into locked door
    e. other (specify) _____
    f. don't know

18. Can you see the place where the burglar broke in from the street?
    a. yes
    b. no

19. Do you have an alarm system in your business?
    a. yes
    b. no

20. Is it a silent alarm or a noise alarm?
    a. silent
    b. noise

21. Did the alarm go off during the burglary?
    a. yes — *Go to Q. 23*
    b. no — *Go to Q. 22*
    c. don't know — *Go to Q. 23*

22. Why not?
    a. malfunction
    b. alarm wasn't turned on
    c. entry point wasn't connected to alarm system
    d. burglar disconnected alarm
    e. other (specify) _____
    f. don't know

23. Who reported the burglary to the police?
    a. yourself
    b. companion
    c. observer
    d. neighbor
    e. other (specify)_____

24. How long did it take the police to arrive?
    a. 2 to 5 hours
    b. within 24 hours
    c. 2 to 5 days
    d. never showed up
    e. don't know

25. When the police arrived, what was the first thing they did?
    Interviewer: probe; what was the next thing, etc.
    Note response

26. How soon after the burglary were the police able to make an arrest?
    a. immediately or in the act
    b. within a few hours
    c. within a few days
    d. within a few weeks
    e. don't know

27. How were the police able to find the person(s) who burglarized you?
    a. your (or an employee's) physical description of the burglar
    b. your neighbor's physical description of the burglar
    c. someone else's description of the burglar
    d. clues left at the scene of the crime
    e. identification of stolen items
    f. other (specify) _____
    g. don't know

28. Were any of the stolen items recovered?
    a. yes
    b. no

29. Had you marked any of the stolen items for identification?
    a. yes *Go to Q. 30*
    b. no *Go to Q. 32*

30. How were they marked?.
    a. list of serial numbers
    b. engraving
    c. other (specify) _____
    d. don't know

31. Did this help the police to recover the items?
    a. yes
    b. no
    c. don't know

32. Do you have any burglary insurance?
    a. yes
    b. no
    c. refused to answer *Go to Q. 34*

33. Was the loss reported to your insurance company?
    a. yes
    b. no

34. How many times has your business been burglarized in the past five years?
    a. one
    b. two
    c. three
    d. four or more
    e. don't know

35. How many of those burglaries were reported to the police?
    a. one
    b. two
    c. three
    d. four or more
    e. don't know
    If some were not reported, go to Q. 36. If all reported, go to Q. 37

36. Why didn't you report that (those) burglary(s)?
    a. nothing could be done - lack of proof
    b. didn't think it was important enough
    c. police wouldn't want to be bothered
    d. didn't want to take time - too inconvenient
    e. private or personal matter - didn't want to report it
    f. didn't want to get involved
    g. afraid of reprisal
    h. reported it to someone else
    i. other (specify) _____

37. To finish up the interview I have a few background questions for you.

    In the block where your business is located, how many people do you know well enough to speak to once a week?
    a. one
    b. two
    c. three or more
    d. none
    e. don't know

38. Were you confident in the police before the burglary?
    a. Yes, very confident
    b. Yes, somewhat confident
    c. Undecided
    d. No, not very confident
    e. No, no confidence at all
    f. Other (specify) _____

39. Were you confident in the police after the burglary?
    a. Yes, very confident
    b. Yes, somewhat confident
    c. Undecided
    d. No, not very confident
    e. No, no confidence at all
    f. Other (specify) _____

40. Have you considered moving (or did you move your business) out of this neighborhood because of the burglary.
    a. yes, considered moving
    b. yes, moved
    c. no
    d. don't know

41. Have you or other members of the business changed any of your habits as a result of the burglary?
    a. yes
    b. no

42. What have been the changes?

    Note response

43. Is there anything you can think of now that might have prevented the burglary?

    Note response

44. *If no* Why not

45. *Note victim's sex*
    a. male
    b. female

46. *Note victim's race*
    a. white
    b. negro
    c. other

PHYSICAL SURVEY

Type of Crime _____
(cleared or uncleared)
Victim's Name _____
Victim's Address _____
Address of crime _____
Case Number _____
Census Tract Number _____

INTERVIEWER: For ROBBERY - COMMERCIAL (except for robbery of a cab driver), BURGLARY - RESIDENTIAL, and BURGLARY - COMMERCIAL, before entering the premises, take note of the area immediately surrounding the victim's home or business establishment. For ROBBERY - INDIVIDUAL, check out the immediate area where the robbery actually occurred after the interview is completed. In all cases you need not leave the target block, but do include the areas directly across the street from all four sides of that block. We appreciate your cooperation as this will help us to typify the neighborhood environment.

1. Indicate a rough approximation, expressed in percentages, of each type of land use found in your area (for example, single family residential 50% , multifamily buildings 25% , etc.

    a. single family residential _____
    b. multifamily buildings
        (1) high rise _____
        (2) low rise _____
    c. commercial retail _____
    d. commercial wholesale _____
    e. industrial/manufacturing/warehouse _____
    f. open space
        (1) parks _____
        (2) playgrounds _____
        (3) other (specify) _____
    g. institutional
        (1) education _____
        (2) cultural _____
        (3) medical _____
        (4) religious _____
        (5) public administration _____
    h. entertainment _____
    i. vacant land _____

2. How adequate is the street lighting in the area? (Note: It is generally accepted practice to have street lights on each intersection and spaced 120-160 feet apart throughout the block.)
    a. excellent - lights at each intersection and spaced throughout the block
    b. satisfactory - lights at each intersection and some lights irregularly spaced throughout the block.
    c. unsatisfactory - lights at intersections only
    d. poor - lights at some intersections or no lights at all

3. How would you characterize the overall physical condition of the area?
   a. sound - housing and buildings well maintained (i.e., paint not peeling or walls crumbling), lawns and parks trimmed and uncluttered, etc.)
   b. deteriorating - some housing and buildings showing wear, unkept lawns and open space.
   c. dilapidated - most of the housing and buildings poorly maintained or abandoned, lawns and open space cluttered (garbage, abandoned autos, etc.) and unkept (tall grass, weeds, etc.).



INTERVIEWER: Fill in the following using the map above

4. The incident occurred in square _____.
   NOTE: Mark square on the map with an X

5. Locate each street light in the area with an O on the map

6. There are _____ total street lights in the area.

7. Write in the street names on the map (Ex., Street D = E. Burnside)

Please answer the following for all categories except ROBBERY - INDIVIDUAL

8. How would you characterize the physical condition of the house or building where the incident occurred?
   a. sound - house or building well maintained (i.e., paint not peeling or walls crumbling), lawns or parking area well kept and uncluttered)
   b. deteriorating - house or building shows some wear, surrounding area in some disarray.
   c. dilapidated - house or building clearly beyond repair, surrounding area cluttered and unkept.

9. Is there anything unusual about the house or building which sets it apart from the surrounding neighborhood?

Please answer the last question for all categories.

10. Is there anything else that you noted which would be of particular value in typifying the neighborhood?

APPENDIX IV

OBSERVATIONS OF A PROJECT INTERVIEWER

The following report is by Beryl Linn, one of the project interviewers. She was asked to write about the significant things she noticed that perhaps would not show up on the questionnaire.

During the victimization survey, I interviewed primarily in the Northeast and Southeast sections of Portland. I interviewed black and white people, very rich to very poor and young to elderly. In this section I will note some interesting things that were perhaps not covered in the questionnaire--some things that fit a pattern or that I saw repeating themselves.

I noticed a lot of racism, especially in the areas peripheral to Albina. Whites of all ages and income levels said that crime in their neighborhood was caused by blacks. Some people were blatant about it, saying that "because there are a lot of coloreds around here people get robbed."

Others would say, "It is the neighborhood. You know how the neighborhood has changed. Now I haven't got anything against a mixed neighborhood, but . . . well, you know." In neighborhoods like Irvington and Alameda, just about everyone I interviewed pointed out their proximity to Albina. Even if victims had been robbed or burglarized by a white, they would say they had expected the criminal to be black.

Interviewing in Albina, I found that blacks would say that the crime problem was caused by population density or the economic status of the neighborhood. One man said, "It's a ghetto. What do you expect?" Another said, "There's so many people. If you live where there's lots of people, I guess you can expect to get hit."

In close-in Southeast there was considerable reference to hippies as the cause of neighborhood deterioration and crime.

In cases where the burglar or robber had been identified, it was almost unanimously young males in their teens or early twenties. Females were identified in only two of the cases I interviewed, and they were both estimated as being of eighth grade age.

In Northeast Portland, most of the victims I interviewed told me about neighbors who had been victimized and often they told me about burglaries and robberies in just about every house along their street.

In both Northeast and Southeast, victims I interviewed were upset about the crime rate. They didn't cite statistics or studies, but seemed upset because of experiences they or their neighbors had had.

Some victims I had interviewed had taken protective measures: two had installed elaborate electronic alarm systems, two had installed bars across sliding patio doors, some had put double locks on doors and nailed windows shut and some were involved in informal and formal organization with other neighbors for the purpose of watching each other's property (this was especially true in upper income white areas). In the older neighborhoods closer in, most respondents said they wouldn't go out alone at night, and some older women said they were afraid to go out in the daytime for fear of having their purse snatched. Everyone I talked with seemed to be careful about locking up, even if they were home during the day.

Without going back through the questionnaires to count, it seems to me a significant proportion of burglary entries were made at locations clearly visible from the street. In a few cases the victim came home to find his front door broken in. In one especially interesting case the burglarized house sat fairly close to a usually busy through-street, with

no shrubbery concealing it. To gain entry the burglars knocked the front door in, so that the victim found it lying shattered in the living room.

With regard to the question about the victim's confidence in the police, several times when I was interviewing a family, the parents would say that they were confident in the police and the child would make faces and say that they didn't like the police. The parents would reprimand the child and reaffirm their confidence in the police. One woman whose daughter was present said she was confident in the police and then told the daughter to go outside and play. Then she said that she didn't want her daughter to hear how she really felt and that when her son had been in trouble the police had treated her, the mother, as though she were the criminal.

People who said they had no confidence in the police usually said they felt that way because the police weren't deterring burglaries and robberies. Those who said they were confident in the police usually added that the police couldn't do much about deterring crimes. Whites often held negative attitudes about the police because they felt the police hadn't done as much as they could have in following up information. Blacks of moderate income had somewhat the same complaint, but added that they didn't expect much. Several poor blacks laughed loudly when asked about their confidence in the police.

A few victims complained that the police treated them more like a criminal than they did the real criminal. In explaining their lack of confidence in the police, a black family told me about their daughter coming home to find there were burglars in the basement. She ran to a neighbor's house to get her husband. The neighbor called the police and

her husband ran home and pulled his gun out of a drawer. The husband met the police at the door, telling them the burglars were in the basement. Spotting the gun in his hand, the police drew their guns on the husband, handcuffed him, his wife and the neighbor and took them down to the police station while the burglars continued to work. It was not easy for the three to be released and the burglars were never apprehended.

From interviewing some victims of commerical robberies (Plaid Pantry stores and other late night groceries and gas stations), I found that robbery seems to be an expected hazard of such businesses. I talked to a store manager about two robberies and he had trouble remembering their details because there had been so many.

The manager had an interesting idea for a security device he thought would be safe and effective: a flashing red light on the top of the store. It could be activated by a foot button to notify neighbors or passersby or patrolmen that a robbery was happening.

While the questionnaire didn't ask it, I thought that the property stolen most often was significant. Those items most often mentioned were television sets, stereo equipment, radios, cameras, binoculars, jewelry and cash. Victims often said that burglars had virtually ransacked their homes, dumping out things like sugar bowls, powder boxes and drawers attempting to find cash.

The most significant thing I noticed during the survey was how up-tight people are about crime and how frightened many of them are of being victimized, not just of losing property but of being physically hurt. I was also astounded at how blatant some of the robberies and

burglaries were in terms of the time of day and the visibility of the crime. I was impressed with the degree that people seem to be watching for suspicious activity around them. As more than one person said, "What's this world coming to!"

APPENDIX V

INTERVIEWS WITH COMMERCIAL VICTIMS

Interview with Floyd Woody, Manager, Broadway Cab, December 6, 1972.

Mr. Woody has been manager of Broadway Cab since November, 1971. Since that time, the company has sustained between 20 and 25 cab robberies. Except for two of them, they occurred in Albina and were done by blacks. The two outside Albina were at S.E. 82nd and N.E. 82nd and Fremont.

When Woody arrived at Broadway Cab, his dispatchers weren't sending cabs into Albina. He changed that, but he says that a driver still has the right to refuse to take a call. If a driver arrives at his address and finds no porch light on and no one in sight, he will probably leave immediately.

When a driver picks up a fare who gives him a fictititous address (such as under the Steel Bridge) or says "just start driving, I'll tell you where later," he knows he's got a robber aboard. In both cases, the cabby will stop the cab until the fare gives him a good address.

If a driver starts toward a destination with a fare aboard and suspects that the person is a robber, he can alert the dispatcher, who will alert other cabs in the destination area to cover the victim cab. A cabby will also turn his inside light on as a clue to police or other cabs that he is in danger.

Woody said that in about a year Broadway Cab will have an elaborate piece of equipment, costing about $30,000, that will help protect drivers. Each cab will have an accessible, but not discernable (to the passenger), switch that will trigger a warning light in the dispatcher's office. The cabby will be able to use it in case of either a robbery or an accident.

Broadway has 115 cabs, and about 95 percent of them are out during the daytime and 85 percent are out during the night. Between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. only about ten cabs are out.

When a cabby goes on duty, he has enough change for his first fare, between $10 and $20. Cabs don't drop their cash at any time during their runs. Robbers generally try to time their robbery at the end of the cabby's shift, when he has the most money. They try to figure that out by how much is written on the cabby's trip ticket, so cabbys turn it upside down as a preventative measure. The biggest robbery during Woody's tenure has been $200, and the average is about $30. July and August are the biggest robbery months.

The robbers are almost always armed, carrying either a knife or gun. When Woody arrived, cabbys were carrying guns, and he stopped that.

Out of the 25 robberies in the past year, there have been 3 or 4 apprehensions. They were cases where police or cover cabs were on the scene. The robberies are reported only if the amount of cash taken was significant and if there were enough clues.

None of the cabs are insured against robbery--there is no insurance for it.

Woody says that an equally serious problem the cabs have is the "no pay" customer, again in the black community. In these cases, either the fare runs away at the end of the trip or he tries to create a scene, attracting other blacks and outnumbering the white driver. Woody says these happen at a rate of three or four a day.

Interview with Mel Cline, Superintendent of Radio Cab Co. The Manager of Radio Cab was hospitalized because of a heart attack.

Mr. Cline didn't have a clear idea of how many robberies Radio Cab had sustained during the last year. His first answer was 3 or 4, but he agreed that it must be on par with Broadway, which had about 23 robberies, according to its manager. Cline did say that Radio simply doesn't keep track of the robberies.

Radio Cab has 105 cabs in its fleet, and an average of 95 are on the streets all the time, except for the early morning hours.

Radio does use one preventative measure that Broadway does not. A Radio driver won't stop if he's flagged down in the middle of Albina. But Radio drivers do respond to calls to good addresses in Albina.

Cline said that Radio's attitutde toward robberies is that as long as the driver isn't hurt, the cash taken is negligible. A Radio driver was killed four or five years ago on a run to Vancouver, but the company has been lucky since then with none of them hurt.

A typical robbery seems to be the same as with Broadway, with the robber holding a knife at the driver's throat or a gun at his head. Cline said that robbers seem to be 50% white and 50% black. He said that drivers who are robbed generally go straight to the police station to look at mug shots.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Street Robbery Victims in Oakland, Center on Administration of Criminal Justice, University of California, Davis, 1972.

Criminal Victimization in Maricopa County, Institute for Local Self Government, Berkeley, June, 1969.

Crime and the Physical City. A Pilot Study prepared for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Luedtke and Associates, Detroit, LEAA N169078, 91 pp., June, 1970.

A Study of Crime Prevention Through Physical Planning for the Southern California Association of Governments. SUA, Los Angeles, Sept., 1971.

"Urban Crime Patterns," Sarah L. Boggs. American Sociological Review, Vol. 32, pp. 899-908, 1969.

Report on a Pilot Study in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes Towards Law Enforcement, Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., prepared for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Field Surveys No. 1, 1967.

Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Report of a National Survey, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, prepared for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, May, 1967.

END