


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LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531

Date filmed

10/24/75

ST/ LOUIS HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

FIELD REVIEW AND EVALUATION REPORTS

FOR

FOOT PATROL PROJECT, S-MPI-73-d1 (October 1, 1973)

HOME DETENTION PROGRAM, S-MP36-72-c2 (October 16, 1973)

BURGLARY PREVENTION PROJECT, S-MP3-72-d1 and S-MP39-72-d1
(November 29, 1973)

January, 1974

Missouri Law Enforcement Assistance Council
Region 5
812 Olive Street, Room 1032
St. Louis, Missouri 63101

Floyd D. Richards, Executive Director

*16900

Evaluation

INTRODUCTION

Field reviews are conducted for each Impact project at least once each award period. The field review, conducted by staff of the Missouri Law Enforcement Assistance Council - Region 5, consists of site visits by program, fiscal, and evaluation personnel, and analyses of data relevant to the project. Impact data, called for in each project's evaluation plan and designed to permit study of crime reduction and rehabilitative impacts, are analyzed by the High Impact Evaluation Unit and form the basis for a technical appendix to each review report. The entire report is then used to assist in preparing recommendations regarding future operations and funding levels for the project.

In St. Louis the Impact Evaluation Plan for a project has typically been developed during the project's first award period. Preliminary evaluation results and a field review of the project are used to make decisions regarding funding for a second award period. During the second period, if there is one, a full-scale technical evaluation of the project is conducted. The following field review and evaluation reports represent the results of three such full-scale technical evaluations for the first three of St. Louis's Impact projects to complete their second award periods. For the sake of brevity, the reports are presented without the related correspondence between project and Region 5 staff, and without the fiscal review report which routinely accompany them.



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REGION 5

FIELD REVIEW REPORT

<u>Project:</u>	Foot Patrol	<u>Grant Award:</u>	\$1,000,000
<u>Project Number:</u>	S-MP1-73-d1	<u>Subgrant Period:</u>	1/15/73 - 9/15/73
<u>Subgrantee:</u>	St. Louis Police Dept.	<u>Project Director:</u>	Captain John Walsh
<u>Date of Report:</u>	October 1, 1973	<u>Authorized Official:</u>	Colonel Theodore McNeal
<u>Prepared By:</u>	Joe Cavato, Program Analyst Reese Joiner, Fiscal Officer Dennis McCarthy, Evaluation Analyst		

SCOPE OF REVIEW

This review consisted of surveys of fiscal and programmatic records, limited tests of project records, and interviews with key personnel. The overall objectives of the field review are:

- 1) to review program and fiscal operations for compliance with LEAA, MLEAC Region 5 requirements and compliance with the provisions of the approved subgrant.
- 2) to determine that the project is conducted in an economical and efficient manner and that project objectives are met.
- 3) to determine if administrative and financial controls are adequate to provide accurate and reliable operating and financial reports required for project management and evaluation.
- 4) to determine whether the desired benefits are being achieved.

The field work for the review commenced September 11, 1973. Project personnel contacted included Captain John Walsh and his staff.

continued.....

BACKGROUND

In Phase II of its operation, the Impact Foot Patrol project was expanded to provide city-wide crime prevention services. Foot Patrol activity was to be targeted on the areas and at the times when the Impact crimes of burglary and robbery occurred with the highest frequency. From its initial phase providing foot patrolmen in six high crime Pauly Blocks, the project was expanded to include three components:

- 1) High Crime Pauly Area Patrol of 20 Pauly Blocks.
- 2) Omnipatrol, three "mobilized" foot patrol units which were utilized within the three Area Commands of the St. Louis Police Department.
- 3) Shopping Area Patrol, a complement of 37 patrol officers utilized on Friday and Saturday nights in 24 shopping districts.

The Phase II deployment of foot patrol was initiated on February 15, 1973. On the basis of the manning pattern described on the grant application, a full complement provided for a total of 771 watches each week or a total of 5,062 patrol hours each week.

In May of 1973, the operations of the project were re-evaluated and a major adjustment was made. A revised manpower allocation system was developed and approved based on 1973 statistics to specifically attack the target Impact crimes at the time and place of occurrence. The primary thrust of the revision was to provide a method of reducing daytime residential burglary, which had accounted for the greatest increase in crime in the first three months of 1973. The revised manning pattern provided four types of foot patrol, three of which were designed to reduce a specific type of Impact crime:

- 1) Day Residence Burglary Patrol, which included an eleven man Burglary Reduction Unit operating in casual attire and focusing on areas of high daytime burglary activity.
- 2) Robbery and Purse Snatching Patrol, operated from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m., six days a week.
- 3) Nighttime Burglary Patrol, operated from 6:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.
- 4) Shopping Center Patrol, which was retained as originally described in the grant.

The Pauly Blocks to be patrolled by each type of foot patrol were selected on the basis of frequency of the particular type of crime targeted for that patrol. Twenty-two Pauly Blocks were selected for patrol, with some blocks receiving more than one type due to a high ranking in more than one crime category. The new patrol pattern was implemented on May 28, 1973.

Another factor involved in the revision was the inability of the

project to man full complements of the patrol patterns originally planned for Phase II. The project was experiencing significant shortfalls (15-30%) in manning the Friday and Saturday night Pauly Block Patrols. Under the revised patrol patterns, the required complements were more easily manned because the total manning rate was significantly reduced. The total number of weekly watches became 662 (as opposed to the former rate of 771) and the number of patrol hours per week became 3,852 (down from 5,062). This represented a 24% reduction in the number of patrol hours manned weekly.

PROGRAMMATIC FINDINGS

Supplementary information on the project and a more detailed evaluation of its benefits are presented in Appendix I. Results of monitoring and evaluation are summarized in the following paragraphs.

1). Data on the manning of each patrol complement is maintained by the Foot Patrol Office. A summary of the manning experience of the project under the revised patrol patterns is attached as Exhibit 1.

As indicated in the exhibit, the only patrol with a serious variation from the planned manning rate is the Shopping Center Patrol, which has been undermanned by 26.6%. Because of this problem and a general evaluation of a lack of effectiveness of this component, the Department has plans to drop the Shopping Center Patrol.

Due to overscheduling of officers for the Robbery and Purse Snatching Patrol, this component had an average excess of nearly 8%. The two remaining modalities have been manned within one percent of the planned rates. Overall, the total manpower requirements of the revised patrol methodology have been met with a 1.6% shortage.

2). The activity of each watch conducted on the project is recorded and submitted by the individual officer. This data (number of arrests, field interview reports, building and pedestrian checks, etc.) is summarized and reported on a weekly and monthly basis by the project. A summary of the activity reported in Phase II is provided in Exhibit II.

Most of the data indicated on the daily activity report are reported at the discretion of the individual officers and is not supported by related documentation, (e.g., building and pedestrian checks, business interviews, etc.) Some of the more important data are supported by appropriate documentation, such as arrests and field interview reports.

In order to provide some comparison of the rates of activity experienced under the two types of patrol deployment utilized in Phase II, relative rates of activity have been developed and presented in Exhibit III. Since the number and length of watches was revised, the activity rates have been converted to a "per patrol hour" basis in order to provide a standard basis of comparison. Comparative statistics for selected categories of activity are reflected in Exhibit III.

The data generated regarding patrol activity is utilized by project management for monitoring and control purposes. In addition to its presentation in weekly and monthly reports, this information has been utilized to assess the performance of individual officers on the patrol.

3). The project has developed the basic operating systems required for the management and internal monitoring of grant activity. The major systems under utilization are:

- a) application procedure for officers seeking to work under the project, requiring written approval of the applicant's commanding officer and the Project Director.
- b) scheduling and assignment system. Using the department's recreation schedule as the basis for determining officer availability, a system of assignment to foot patrol duty has been developed and is effectively utilized.
- c) maintenance of attendance of data. Records of individual attendance are maintained in the foot patrol office. The incidence of "no shows" are recorded and suspension from foot patrol duty is utilized as a disciplinary measure for lack of attendance. Attendance verification is obtained by completion of rosters by the lieutenant supervising each shift. Rosters are cross checked against activity sheets submitted by the individual officers. In addition, daily tallies of over- and under-manning are maintained for each shift (as described in item 1 above).
- d) operating statistics provided by activity reports. As indicated in item 2, weekly and monthly reports of foot patrol activity are maintained and utilized for project monitoring.

In addition to the systems described above, the project also maintains a log of pertinent memoranda and correspondence, an "order book" of directives to foot patrol personnel, detailed records of all arrests made by foot patrol officers, and other records and information utilized in project management. The procedures and systems developed for the operation of the project were well-maintained and provided current and relevant information to the project staff.

4). During Phase II, from its start to the end of August, 1973, the number of Pauly blocks patrolled and the number of foot patrol hours per week increased with each change in patrol mode. At the same time, however, the average number of foot patrol manhours per patrolled block per day decreased from 29.4 at the end of Phase I to 14.9 at the end of Phase II (car patrol levels during the foot patrol hours are estimated to have remained constant at about 3 manhours per block per day). The number of arrests per week per 100 foot patrol manhours remained relatively constant at about 30 percent of the corresponding rate for car patrols.

5). Impact crimes in patrolled areas decreased relative to the city-wide throughout Phase I and Phase II's two periods of patrol operation, but the decrease became progressively smaller as the patrol modes shifted to less concentrated deployment. The type of Impact crime which appears to have been most affected by the Foot Patrol Project is burglary, especially day residence burglary. On the other hand, night business and night resi-

dence burglary, and Impact crimes in shopping areas, all selected as targets for foot patrol operations during patrol period II-B, appear to have been the least affected. The capability of foot patrol to reduce crimes against the person varied with the degree of patrol concentration, with the greatest reductions experienced at times when the patrols were most concentrated.

6). No conclusive evidence of displacement of Impact crime from patrol areas to non-patrol areas has been found, however, data from patrol period II-B suggests the possibility of displacement of person crime (especially suppressible person crime) within patrol areas from patrol hours to non-patrol hours.

Conclusions

Phase II of the Foot Patrol project has been implemented in accordance with LEAA, MLEAC, and grant requirements. No significant deviation from approved grant activity or major operating deficiency was noted. Foot Patrol activity has been targeted at areas and hours where a high incidence of Impact crime has been reported. Systems have been developed and implemented which provide for effective manning of designated patrol patterns and monitoring of performance.

There are several areas of program operation where a reassessment or re-evaluation is recommended, these areas are:

1). The current method of selection and assignment of foot patrol officers provide for random allotment of available officers to the various foot patrol assignments. Thus each patrol unit consists of a group of officers (lieutenant, sergeants and patrolmen) from various districts and bureaus within the Department. The randomness of this procedure provides several disadvantages:

- a.) difficulty in creating and maintaining supervising relationships among officers who do not regularly work with each other.
- b.) inability to provide specialized foot patrol training for officers used on the patrol. With nearly 1200 men scattered throughout the Department participating, a workable method of reaching participants with some form of specialized training for foot patrol activities has not yet been developed.
- c.) lack of familiarity by many officers with the areas they patrol under foot patrol assignment. This extends both to the physical and other characteristics of the areas and to the current types of criminal activity being experienced in the target area.
- d.) a lack of continuity of officers assigned to particular areas and types of patrol.

It is recognized that the manning of over 600 shifts of overtime activity presents a tremendous logistical problem. However, we would

recommend some consideration of addressing the problems discussed above in the planning of future foot patrol operations.

2.) As indicated above, a substantial change in patrol patterns and philosophy was made in the project in the form of the new deployment implemented May 28, 1973. This revision was made in response to crime statistics for the first three months of 1973 and in order to provide improved targeting on Impact crimes. On September 11, 1973 a request for a second revision of patrol plans was submitted to Region 5. This plan is designed to intensify foot patrol coverage due to an apparent lack of effectiveness in Phase II deployment in comparison to Phase I.

As a result of the actions mentioned above, Phase II of the project will have undergone two major changes in patrol philosophy, manning levels and target areas and hours within eight months. Under these circumstances an adequate evaluation of the patrol concept being utilized may be difficult to achieve. With the emphasis on short term data evaluation and re-targeting, the results of any underlying patrol concept being tested may not be adequately tested.

3.) In response to the question of assumption of financial responsibility for the project, the grant application states that the department will attempt to determine how the foot patrol fits into its regular operations. As it is currently operated, the foot patrol continues to be an "add on" to regular Police Department activity. It is completely separable (budgetarily and operationally) from regular department functions.

Due to its size (approximate annual cost of \$1.5 million) and its nature, the Foot Patrol has assumed the status of a significant activity of the St. Louis Police Department. The LEAA funding provided by Impact funds are by definition available for only a fixed period. Assuming the project provides benefits sufficient to warrant its continuation, some provision should be made for the integration of the program's concept into regular Department operations.

4.) All foot patrol activity data (described in item 2, above) is manually summarized and accumulated from the individual activity reports prepared by each officer. This involves over 600 such reports each week. Since this data is regularly utilized by the project staff in various formats, it might be desirable to consider putting this data on data processing. Once each individual report was entered into some form of data on data processing device, it would be possible to produce summaries on the basis of any number of variables (activity for the week, month, by type of patrol, by individual). In addition to relieving the staff of a considerable clerical burden, the additional flexibility would provide for project management a wider range of analytical data.

5.) In view of the changing manpower deployment of the project it might be necessary to re-evaluate the equipment utilization required. For example, under the current patrol pattern, the maximum daily requirements of radios occurs on Friday and Saturday when 73 radios are needed. (The Monday through Thursday requirement is 52 radios). Due to the different patrol hours involved (one shift from 9 A.M. to 3 P.M., another from 6:30 P.M. to 12:30 A.M.), the maximum number of radios required at any one time is 49. The number of radios purchased and in use is now 87. A reassessment

of total equipment requirements in view of reduced peak manning levels is therefore recommended.

FISCAL REVIEW

The field review was conducted on September 11, 1973, and September 12, 1973. Reese Joiner, MLEAC auditor, completed the fiscal segment. His discussions were mainly with Messrs.: Ed Lanwerth, Jack Wilburn, and Captain John Walsh, all members of the St. Louis Police Department.

FISCAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

A payroll authorization "by exception" system is employed. This system is not considered appropriate for the payment of LEAA federal grant funds. A procedure should be established whereby staff employees prepare time and attendance reports indicating daily work hours for each pay period. These reports should be signed by the employees and approved by their supervisors.

FISCAL APPRAISAL

An effective accounting system is employed. Fiscal and internal controls are utilized that provide for adequate and full accountability of the receipt, expenditure, and use of federal and non-federal program funds.

Expenditures are made and reports prepared in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Federal and State governments.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Patrol manning levels should be returned to a more concentrated level of approximately four patrolmen per Pauly block per watch for at least the first half of Phase III. This will permit more reliable evaluation of the crime reduction capabilities of the patrols.
2. A planning element should be established during the first three months of Phase III to develop and examine alternative plans for the integration of foot patrol activities into Police Department operations and budgeting so that the Department will have a sound basis for a decision regarding whether or not to continue foot patrol at the end of Phase III. The Department may elect to contract with an outside organization (such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police or the Governmental Research Institute) for related consultation and technical assistance.

The planning effort should include the following activities:

- a. Identification of alternative modes of foot patrol operations (such as omni-patrol, burglary teams, etc.) and alternative manning levels.
- b. Review of the use of foot patrols in other cities. (Include travel plans.)
- c. Planning of experimental use of promising patrol modes during the last half of Phase III, using patrol alternatives selected by the planning effort during the first half of Phase III.
- d. Examination of the feasibility of computerizing foot patrol activity data.
- e. Investigation of solutions to the four problems relating to officer selection and assignment listed on page five, number 1, in the "conclusions" section.
- f. Planning relating to a program of public information, to be used if the Department chooses to discontinue foot patrol after Phase III, to explain the discontinuance to the public and to members of the foot patrol project.
- g. Planning for future equipment needs, including reallocation of equipment in case of project reduction or termination after Phase III.

3. Consideration should be given to forming a new Impact project to begin a public education and information service for residential burglary prevention measures.

This suggestion is made with two factors in mind: the apparent effectiveness of foot patrol operations with respect to decreasing residence burglary, and the apparent effectiveness of the target hardening operations of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department's Burglary Prevention Unit (for business burglary reduction).

The purpose of the project would be to continue and extend the residential burglary reductions achieved by foot patrol.

4. Due to the relatively small number of target crimes involved and to the apparent ineffectiveness of the night business and residence burglary patrol (6:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.) of Phase II-B, these patrols should be reallocated to a different target crime.
5. Evaluation results substantiate the Department's decision to discontinue the shopping center patrols.
6. The selection of Pauly blocks for patrol coverage should be based on total burglary and index crimes against the person rather than on the subset of these crimes which are classified suppressible. Although foot patrols may be more effective against suppressible crime, the volume of these crimes is very erratic and, therefore seems to be a poor indicator of the need for foot patrol coverage.
7. Based upon the field review and evaluation, it is recommended that the High Impact Foot Patrol be refunded for Phase III as recommended in the High Impact Plan Update with a federal share of \$1,327,937. The evaluation focuses on the need for contingency planning of Foot Patrol services during and beyond the Phase III grant period. The Department should use its planning resources, supplemented if necessary through the Phase III grant, in order to develop contingency plans.

EXHIBIT I

FOOT PATROL
Manning Experience

May 28 to August 25, 1973

<u>Type of Patrol</u>	<u>Daytime Residence Burglary</u>	<u>Robbery and Purse Snatching</u>	<u>Nighttime Burglary</u>	<u>Shopping Center</u>	<u>Total</u>
Regular Weekly Complement (# of Shifts)	270	156	156	80	662
# Weeks (5/28 to 8/25)	13	13	13	13	13
Total Shifts For Period	3510	2028	2028	1040	8606
# of Shifts Over or Short For Period	-35	+160	+16	-277	-136
% Over or Short	<u>-1.0%</u>	<u>+7.9%</u>	<u>+0.7%</u>	<u>-26.6%</u>	<u>-1.6%</u>

EXHIBIT II

FOOT PATROL
Summary of Activity Statistics
Under Phase II

	<u>2/27/73 thru 5/29/73</u>	<u>5/30/73 thru 9/10/73</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Building Checks	56,096	48,647	104,743
Pedestrian Checks	20,969	24,110	45,079
Business Interviews	27,731	31,896	59,627
Car Checks	14,849	17,141	31,990
Assist Motorists	5,361	10,363	15,724
FIR's	2,356	1,866	4,222
Parking Tags	547	871	1,418
Aided Districts	2,665	2,319	4,984
Peace Disturbances	51	25	76
Investigated Insecure Buildings	132	83	215
Arrests	125	160	285
Curfew Notice Issues	83	16	99
Recovered Stolen Vehicles	33	48	81
Sick Cases	0	0	-
Investigated Sounding Alarms	1	2	3

EXHIBIT III

FOOT PATROL ACTIVITY

COMPARISON OF DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGIES

February 27 to September 1, 1973

	<u>Initial Deployment</u>	<u>Revised Deployment</u>
Period Covered	2/27/73 to 5/29/73	5/30/73-9/1/73
Number of Weeks	13	14
Number of Patrol Watches per week	755	642
Total Number of Watches during period	9815	8988
Number of Patrol hours per week*	5062	3852
Total Number of Patrol hours during period	65,806	53,928

ACTIVITY REPORTED AND COMPARATIVE RATES

			<u>% Increase or Decrease In Rate</u>
Field Interview Reports			
Number	2356	1661	
Rate per patrol hour	.035	.031	-11%
Arrests			
Number	125	121	
Rate per patrol hour	.00189	.00224	-18%
Stolen Car Recoveries			
Number	33	45	
Rate per patrol hour	.0050	.00083	+66%

* Based on planned level of manning for both deployment patterns

APPENDIX I

EVALUATION OF THE BENEFITS OF THE
FOOT PATROL PROJECT

The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department's Foot Patrol Project represents a significant milestone in the continuing effort of law enforcement agencies to improve their capability to reduce crime and to better serve the public. For the first time since foot patrol operations were supplanted by motorized patrols decades ago, a major effort was undertaken to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of concentrated police foot patrols in areas whose emergency service and crime control needs were also being served by motorized patrols.

From the start, the foot patrol operations were well received by both the community and the police officers who manned them. It was felt that a new rapport between police and members of the public was becoming a reality, as officers were no longer isolated by their patrol cars. Improved police-community relations mean greater cooperation from the public in reporting crime and in assisting the police in carrying out their responsibilities.

Fear of crime is a part of everyday life in almost every major city in the country. The effects of this fear are many. Business drops off in neighborhoods where people no longer feel safe. People stay off the streets at night and may feel uncomfortable when walking alone, even during the day. The presence of police officers walking the streets of high crime neighborhoods is a powerful antidote to this fear. People feel safer knowing that help, if needed, is close at hand, and that the potential criminal will have second thoughts about his intended acts when an officer could be standing next to him at any moment.

In conducting its evaluation of the benefits of the Foot Patrol Project, the High Impact Evaluation Unit focussed its efforts on measuring the crime reduction impact of the patrols. First, and foremost, the evaluation sought to determine the extent to which Impact crimes could be prevented by the patrols. Would the patrols reduce crime city-wide? Would the patrols be effective in reducing some types of crime more than others? Would crime reductions in patrolled areas be offset by corresponding increases in the neighboring areas? All these questions were explored. The results of the analyses, based on the project's evaluation component, are given in the following section.

Many of the other benefits of foot patrol, besides crime reduction, were probably achieved by the Foot Patrol Project. Limited evaluation resources and limited time prevented the explicit measurement of the extent to which these other benefits were achieved. In that regard, the evaluation which follows presents only one facet of the many useful products of this project.

ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME REDUCTION IMPACT OF THE
FOOT PATROL PROJECT

Since the start of foot patrol operations on July 1, 1972 the basic mode of deploying the patrols has been altered twice. In the following analysis an attempt has been made to compare the crime reduction impacts of the patrols during each of the three periods when the modes of deployment were relatively constant. In general, two types of comparisons are made for each period. First, to expose trends in crime rates, the number of crimes committed during each period of patrol deployment are compared with the number committed during the same period one year earlier. The result is expressed as a percentage. For example, during the initial phase of patrol deployment Impact crimes decreased city-wide about one percent compared to the number reported during the same period one year earlier. To test the significance of such crime reductions, the number of crimes reported during the period one year prior to the start of the patrols is compared to the number reported during the corresponding period two years prior to the start of the patrols. Figures such as these, for example, show that Impact crimes decreased city-wide about 4.2 percent during the period one year before the start of the patrols, for the same months as those of the initial deployment mode, compared to the corresponding period two years prior to the initial deployment. Since this decrease is larger than that experienced once the patrols began, it is unlikely that the one percent drop observed once the patrols were underway represents a significant crime decrease attributable to the patrols.

The second type of comparison made relates trends in crime in patrolled areas to city-wide trends for the same time periods. Thus if crime increases city-wide by 10 percent during a given period, but increases only one percent in the patrolled areas during the same period, this may indicate that the patrols are in fact succeeding (by keeping crime increases to lower levels). The results of these comparisons are also expressed as percentages, which may be interpreted as rates of change in the patrolled areas compared to those experienced city-wide. For the figures just cited (+10% city-wide, +1% for patrolled areas), for example, the percentage computed for the patrolled areas compared to city-wide is -8.2 (i.e., relative to the city-wide increase, the crime trend in the patrol areas has decreased by 8.2 percent). The same procedure is used to test the significance of these percentages as was described above for the first type of comparison, namely the use of the corresponding percentage computed for the same time periods one and two years prior to the start of the patrols.

The three time periods under study, and the attributes of patrol operations during these periods are summarized in the following table.

	PATROL PERIOD		
	I	II-A	II-B
Foot Patrol Dates	7-1-72 to 2-14-73	2-15-73 to 5-26-73	5-27-73 to 9-1-73
One year earlier	7-1-71 to 2-14-72	2-15-72 to 5-26-72	5-27-72 to 9-1-72
Two years earlier	7-1-70 to 2-14-71	2-15-71 to 5-26-71	5-27-71 to 9-1-71
Blocks patrolled	6	20	22
Peripheral blocks	28	67	190
Patrol hours per week (patrolmen only, not including shopping patrols).	1240	2480 ¹	2808
Average foot patrol manhours per Pauly block per day	29.4	17.7 ²	14.9
Average car patrol manhours per Pauly block per day	-	-	3.04 ⁴
Foot patrol arrests per week per 100 patrol hours	0.31	0.36 ³	0.35
Car patrol arrests per week per 100 patrol hours	-	-	1.2 ⁴


¹ 1260 omni-patrol hours per week are excluded

² Omni-patrol hours are excluded


³ Based on 2480 patrol hours. If the 1260 omni-patrol hours per week were included, the arrest figure would be 0.23

⁴ An approximation based on an assumed four ninths of the 24-hour day car patrol manpower total being deployed during the hours of foot patrol operation.

The format of the graph used to compare crime trends from period to period is given below. The three periods of interest are indicated both for the months following the start of the foot patrol operations and for the corresponding months one year prior to each patrol period. The vertical axis indicates rates of change, in percentage points, for each period compared to the same period one year earlier. It is important to recognize that this type of graph does not show the number of crimes experienced in any given period, it shows only how this number compares with the number for the corresponding period one year earlier.




1. City-wide trend in Impact crimes -



Interpretation: Using the sum of Part I person crimes and burglary as a surrogate for Impact crimes, the generally decreasing rate of crime which preceded the start of the foot patrol reversed to a generally increasing rate of crime. If the period preceding the start of the patrol included unusually large crime decreases, then the increases later experienced may be in part due to a return to more average crime rates.


2. Impact crime trends in the patrolled areas relative to city-wide (all hours)-



Interpretation: When the Impact crime trends in the patrolled areas of the city are computed relative to the city-wide trend in Impact crimes, a generally decreasing trend prior to the implementation of the foot patrol accelerated to a relatively steeper decrease after the start of the patrols. During the three periods under study Impact crimes in patrol areas decreased at rates from one to fifteen percent faster than the city-wide trends. (These figures relate to 24-hour days, that is, they include both patrolled and unpatrolled hours of the day).

3. Looking at effects on person crimes and then on burglary -


a. Person crime trends in patrolled areas relative to city-wide (all hours)



Interpretation: Crimes against the person in the patrolled areas, compared to city-wide trends for person crimes, dropped sharply in the months preceding the start of the foot patrol. During Phase I of the patrol operations person crimes continued to drop faster in the patrolled areas (by about 15.5 percent) than city-wide. Phase I, which consisted of patrols concentrated in six Pauly blocks, was then replaced by Phase II operations which diffused patrols over a significantly larger proportion of the city. During II-A person crimes dropped 6 percent faster in patrolled areas than city-wide; during II-B they increased faster than city-wide. If the more

concentrated operations of Phase I produced its person crime reductions, then the effectiveness decrease during Phase II may be due in part to the less concentrated deployment of this period. (These figures also relate to 24-hour days).


b. Burglary crime trends in patrolled areas relative to city-wide



Interpretation: For the patrolled areas burglary had been decreasing faster than the city-wide burglary rate prior to the start of the foot patrols, but in the months immediately prior to the start of the patrols burglary spurted up in the patrol areas relative to city-wide. This trend reversed with the start of the patrols, with burglary dropping about 10 to 17 percent faster in patrol areas than city-wide for both Phase I and II. Since the number of burglaries generally exceeds the number of person crimes in the city by a factor of two to one or more, the burglary reductions during patrol operations appear more significant than the effects of person crimes (particularly during Phase II).

4. Are crime reductions greater during patrol hours?


a. Person crimes in patrolled areas during patrol hours compared to person crimes city-wide for all hours



Interpretation: This chart should be compared with the one given in 3a for person crimes in patrolled areas (all hours) compared to person crimes city-wide (all hours). The two charts are quite similar. During Phase I person crimes dropped 24 percent in the patrolled areas during patrolled hours, compared to city-wide. This represented a greater drop than the 15.5 percent decrease computed when all hours are used for the patrolled areas. After Phase I, however, when the patrol deployment switched to a less geographically concentrated operation, the patrolled areas showed virtually no decrease in person crimes during patrolled hours compared to city-wide (all hours). In fact, during the periods one year prior to II-A and II-B when no patrols existed the experi-


mental area showed fairly substantial decreases during "patrol" hours compared to city-wide (all hours) due apparently to the random fluctuation of crime rates.

b. Are suppressible person crimes reduced more by patrols than person crimes in general?



Interpretation: Suppressible crimes are those which occur in places visible to officers on routine patrol. They are considered more susceptible to reduction by patrol activities. Data for suppressible person crimes is available for periods I, II-A, and II-B (except for the period from 5-27 to 9-1-72), for patrolled hours in patrolled areas compared to city-wide (all hours). The data indicate no clear evidence of a greater impact by patrols on suppressible person crimes than person crimes in general. Since suppressible person crimes are fewer in number they exhibit more random fluctuation, as seen in the variations from +14 to -14 percent prior to the start of the patrols. Additionally, the relative reductions experienced once patrols started are not greater than those for person crimes in general, except for II-A.

5. Are patrols displacing crime from patrolled areas to neighboring areas (considering person crimes and burglary)?



Interpretation: The above chart presents total person crime and burglary in areas adjacent to patrolled areas (all hours) compared to city-wide totals (all hours). Since the deployment plans differed for the three time periods under study, the peripheral, or adjacent areas differed as well. These differences make direct comparisons difficult, however, as the chart indicates, no significant crime increases were experienced in these areas after the start of the patrols.

6. Are foot patrols displacing crimes against the person in patrolled areas from patrol hours to other times of day?

Crime data for period II-B permits a direct comparison of person crime trends in the patrolled areas during patrol hours with the corresponding figures for all non-patrol hours. In the following table the percentage changes in person crime during period II-B, compared to the same period one year earlier, and relative to the city-wide rates of change in person crime, are given for patrol hours, non-patrol hours, and all hours. Percentages for Index crimes against the person and for suppressible crimes against the person are given separately.

	Patrol hours	Non-Patrol hours	All hours
Person Crimes	+1.3	+20.9	+15.2
Suppressible Person Crimes	-1.1	+29.2	+19.0

Interpretation: While Index crimes against the person for all hours rose 15.2 percent relative to the city-wide rate, the increase appears to have occurred principally during non-patrol hours (when the corresponding increase was 20.9 percent; for patrol hours the increase was only 1.3 percent). Looking at suppressible Index crimes against the person indicates a similar result: the all hours increase, relative to the city-wide rate, was 19 percent, but during patrol hours a slight decrease was measured (-1.1 percent); during non-patrol hours an increase of 29.2 percent was registered. Although these figures are not conclusive, they do suggest that foot patrols provide their maximum deterrent capability during patrol hours, and that the effect may not carry over to hours of the day when no patrols are on duty.

7. Patrol specialization (Phase II-B)

Foot patrol operations during the period 5-28-73 to 8-31-73 were aimed at reducing specific types of Impact crimes. The day residence burglary patrol operated from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.; the robbery-purse snatching patrol from 4 p.m. to 10 p.m.; and the night business and residence burglary patrol from 6:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.. All three types of patrol operated Monday through Saturday in Pauly blocks where the specific target crimes were thought to be most likely to occur.

The following results represent percentage changes in the target crimes for the time period from June 1 to August 31, comparing 1973 data to 1972 and 1972 to 1971. The figures given represent a comparison of crime in patrolled areas during patrol hours relative to the city-wide crime rate (all hours).

	Day Residence Burglary	Robbery-Purse Snatching	Night Residence and Business Burglary
1973/1972	-35.5	+9.6	+58.2
1972/1971	+14.6	+7.5	-9.3

8. Shopping area patrols (periods II-A and II-B)

During phase II 24 shopping areas in the city were selected for periodic patrol by Foot Patrol officers. Each area was patrolled for one six-hour period every two weeks, either on a Friday or Saturday evening (from 4 to 10 p.m.). During the patrol hours a total of 34 officers were assigned to the shopping area (in four teams of eight to nine officers each) with four areas being patrolled on any given patrol night. Impact crime rates in the patrolled shopping areas (during patrol hours) for the period from February 17, 1973 (when these patrols began) to August 31, 1973, relative to the city-wide rate (for all hours), compared to the same period one year earlier, indicate a 41.0 percent increase. Making the same comparison for crime rates one year earlier compared to the same period two years earlier shows a relative decrease of 22.7 percent. It is quite likely that random fluctuations in the shopping area crime rates, and the fairly infrequent coverage of each area patrolled, can explain the apparent increase in Impact crimes after the patrols began. It is possible, of course, that the presence of the officers resulted in more crimes being reported to the police, but no evidence is available to prove or disprove this possibility.

Factors which may affect sections of the above analysis:

(1) The three time periods under study differed in length. Therefore, a comparison of performance in Phase I with that of II-A, for example, implies comparison of a seven and a half month period to a three and a half month period. All other factors being equal, one would expect more reliable evaluation results from period I, since it was the longest period.

(2) A different set of Pauly blocks, each set consisting of a different number of blocks, was patrolled during each patrol period (I, II-A, II-B). All other factors being equal, one would expect more reliable evaluation results from II-A and II-B, since these periods involved patrol of larger numbers of blocks.

(3) When Pauly blocks are selected for patrol because they have had the highest Impact crime rates for a specified period of time, the likelihood that these crime rates will remain the highest (or even remain at their current level) is rather small due to a tendency for the rates to return to a more normal level for those blocks (i.e., there can be a built-in tendency for crime decrease in the patrolled blocks; this phenomenon is called "regression artifacts").

(4) "Random" fluctuations in crime trends shown in the preceding charts may have inflated or masked the actual results, particularly if the actual crime reduction impacts are small. Numerous circumstances may contribute to these random fluctuations. For example, a large concentration of Operation Ident participants in a foot patrol area could contribute to a burglary reduction.

(5) The statistics used in this analysis are based on crimes reported to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department. It has been necessary to assume that the crime reporting rate has remained constant for the different time periods and areas of the city under the study.

(7) Since no data on stranger-to-stranger street crimes could be obtained from the computerized crime data base, Index crimes against the person have been used as a surrogate for this category.

Postscript

Data for this analysis were compiled from records kept by the Foot Patrol Project staff and other units of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and from the monthly crime tapes prepared by the police computer center. The High Impact Evaluation Unit would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Police Department's Impact Evaluation Unit, and the staff of the Foot Patrol Project in preparing parts of this evaluation. Computer programs used to analyze the crime data were written by the High Impact Evaluation Unit and run on the REJIS computer system.



missouri law enforcement

THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLICE • COURTS • CORRECTIONS

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REGION 5

Field Review Report

Project: Home Detention Program Grant Award: \$184,000

Project Number: S-MP36-72-c2 Subgrant Period: 12/1/72/ to 12/1/73

Subgrantee: Juvenile Division - Project Director Mr. Earl R. Baldwin
22nd Judicial Circuit

Date of Report: October 16, 1973 Authorized Official: Judge Gary M. Gaertner

Prepared by: Bob Taylor, Program Analyst
Dan Joyner, Fiscal Officer
Kathryn Ratcliff, Evaluation Analyst

SCOPE OF REVIEW

This review consisted of surveys of fiscal and programmatic records, limited tests of project records, and interviews with key personnel. The overall objectives of the field review are:

1. To review program and fiscal operations for compliance with LEAA, MLEAC, Region 5 requirements and compliance with the provisions of the approved subgrant.
2. To determine that the project is conducted in an economical and efficient manner and that project objectives are met.
3. To determine if administrative and financial controls are adequate to provide accurate and reliable operating and financial reports required for project management and evaluation.

The field work for the review commenced September 19, 1973.

Project personnel contacted included Mr. Earl Baldwin and Mr. John Pullman.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. The Specific Objectives of the Home Detention project are:

1. To keep the youths assigned to the project as trouble free and as available to the court for further study as those in the Detention Center,

Field Review

Page 2

2. To provide an intensive type of supportive supervision to the youths assigned to the program.
3. To provide a liason with the youths, their parents, the schools, and other appropriate community services.

B. The selection criteria used in assigning youths to the Home Detention project are:

1. The child has a home, either real or surrogate to which he may return;
2. The parents will, at a minimum, not be restrictive to close supervision;
3. The offense is not of a notorious or heinous nature which would render the child unacceptable to the community;
4. There is a Community Youth Leader (CYL) available who can take another case;
5. The location of the youths will not offer a geographic impediment to close supervision.

C. Modification of Grant Activities

The subgrant application as written and approved contains the following statements as to the operation of the program.

1. The Home Detention proposal seeks to demonstrate that it is both practical from (1) an operational point of view and (2) economical from a financial point of view to place youths, who would otherwise be detained in a secure facility, under the supervision of a "Home Detention Worker," whose maximum assignment will be five detainees, would be free from all other duties and responsibilities to work with his wards.
2. Using 14 Community Youth Leaders with a caseload of five juveniles each, the total normal caseload of the project is 70.
3. The CYL's will keep in daily contact with the youth, his parents, teachers, the police, and any others who are significant in his life. In addition, the CYL will attempt to involve the youth in constructive activities which would be aimed at assisting the youth in making a more adequate adjustment.
4. The Community Youth Leaders (CYL's) will have an ordinary limit of five (5) youths per person. The CYL's will have no prescribed hours of work and have no office. He would only have his car and be reimbursed for his mileage.
5. The time the CYL will spend with each offender is determined by individual need; however, a minimum of twelve hours weekly is a requisite. Maximum contact is further accomplished through group-type activities.
6. "Intensive Supervision" includes a minimum of three daily "eyeball" contacts at home or school by the CYL. Activities supervised are both informal (daily, normal life situations) and formal (i.e., formal recreation activities, drum and bugle corps., group counseling sessions, and church activities where possible.

The concept of Home Detention was expanded in several directions. Below are listed some of the program modifications that were not included in the approved subgrant application. Source: Special Report - Realignment and Assignment of Home Detention Program Staff - 3/21/73.

1. The Court on a limited selective basis began placing children under post-trial supervision into the program. This modification of the program appeared less expensive than employment of additional "highly trained" Probation Officers and supportive staff persons, and could be carried out without increased funding. Additionally, caseloads can be increased to ten (10) cases per worker over the present maximum of five (5) cases per worker.
2. Certain designated staff of the Home Detention program were assigned to the Probation Department and will work specifically in the supervision units of the Court's three Branch Offices. The CYL's will be assisting in post-dispositional services to youth placed on official court supervision who are in need of the highest structure and control. Each branch office will have two (2) Community Youth Leaders assigned to provide additional intensive supervision of youth who have been placed on suspended commitment to the Missouri State Training School for Boys (Booneville).
3. The Community Youth Leaders will be administratively responsible to the Director of the Home Detention program but will be directly supervised and evaluated by the Branch Office Supervisor.
4. The Home Detention Worker will be quartered in the Branch Offices and will basically use the same general work hours as other Court Staff. However, flexibility of hours must be considered as often the Home Detention Worker may be called upon to maintain alert supervision at hours other than the normal 9 to 5 time period.
5. The Home Detention Program Worker will be assigned a maximum of 10 cases each. It can be assumed that they all also involve youth with serious charges or "stranger to stranger" type offenses that will require the most intensive type of supervision.
6. It will be the responsibility of the Home Detention Supervisor to provide performance evaluations of the CYL's in the branch offices, taking into account those observations of the Supervisor, Unit Supervisor, and the D.J.O.
7. Monthly mileage reports (for those workers assigned to the field units) will be submitted through the Unit Supervisor for initial and signed approval to the Home Detention Supervisor.
8. The Home Detention Worker shall be accepted as a regular member of the Branch Office Staff and is to participate in all meetings, activities, etc. as designated by the Unit Supervisor and/or administration.

In addition to assigning the CYL's to post trial supervision and assigning them to the Branch Offices, two additional program modifications have been implemented.

1. The Juvenile Court has instituted a work program for youths on probation, and the Community Youth Leader(s) attached to the unit are responsible for the supervision of from 6-10 probationers during each four (4) hour period of work.
2. The Home Detention Program sponsored in conjunction with the St. Louis Juvenile Court and Detention Center an activity and recreation program which included:
 - A) The formation of 4 softball teams,
 - B) had a picnic,
 - C) had three field trips to the Cardinal Baseball games at Busch Stadium, and
 - D) participated in a swim party at the Page Park YMCA.

FINDINGS

A. Significant Activities Implemented

1. For the period January 1, 1973, to August 31, 1973, the Community Youth Leaders supervised 514 pre-adjudication cases.
2. For the same period as noted in item one above, 158 post-adjudication cases were supervised by the Community Youth Leaders.
3. Termination of the pre-adjudication cases during the time period March-August numbered 400 cases and were for the following reasons:

	Number	%
Placed on Probation	31	7.6
Committed to State Institution	62	15.5
Committed to County Institution	0	0
Case Dismissed by Court	219	54.7
Returned to Detention by CYL	28	7.0
Released from Program by Probation Office	6	1.5
Committed New Offense while in the Program	3	.8
Warrant Refused	49	12.3
Group Home Placement	1	.3
Consent Decree	1	.3

4. Three (3) of these cases which were terminated in item 3 above were because a new offense was committed while the youth was in the Home Detention Program. This represents .8% of the total cases supervised.

B. Below are listed areas of deficiencies in the programmatic operation requiring clarification or corrective action.

1. Utilization of Manpower

Attachment A indicates the organizational structure before the implementation of the post-adjudication activities and attachment B indicates the implied organizational structure after the implementation of the post-adjudication supervision.

As a result of the programmatic adjustments which produced the supervision of post-adjudication cases, the number of youths supervised per community youth leader is more than the maximum of five as stipulated

in the approved subgrant application and in the case of those Community Youth Leaders who have been assigned with a Field Unit the maximum caseload of 10 as stipulated in the special report dated March 21, 1973, has been exceeded. Attachment C lists the caseloads for the Home Detention House staff and probation staff as of September 26, 1973.

The approved subgrant application stipulates that the Community Youth Leaders will provide "Intensive Supervision" that involves a minimum of three daily "eyeball" contacts at home or at school. The application also states that the time the CYL will spend with each offender is determined by individual need; however, a minimum of twelve hours weekly is a requisite. The addition of post-supervision cases to the Home Detention Program resulted in the following:

Contact Information (Eyeball contacts)

We examined information on entrants to the program March through June, 1973. We have contact info. on 231 of 259 entrants.

Findings:

1. In only one case did a program enrollee have at least one day in which the number of eyeball contacts with CYL's was three or greater.
2. The 231 participants represented 3301 child care days in the program, and they had had 2048 eyeball contacts with CYL's. Thus the average number of eyeball contacts per child care day is .620, considerably less than the expected three specified in the grant.

Another major problem which could result in confusion and conflicting lines of authority is the apparent direct line supervision of the Community Youth Leader by the Field Unit Supervisors (Probation Staff) and the Project Director (Detention Staff). The Special Report concerning the Realignment and Assignment of the Home Detention Program Staff dated March 21, 1973, states:

- a. The Community Youth Leaders will be administratively responsible to the Director of the Home Detention Program but will be directly supervised and evaluated by the Branch Office Supervisors.
- b. It will be the responsibility of the Home Detention Supervisor to provide performance evaluations of the Home Detention Workers in the Branch offices, taking into account those observations of the Supervisor, Unit Supervisor, and the Deputy Juvenile Officer.

Attachment B illustrates the organizational chart by interpretation of the above listed paragraphs. Community Youth Leaders assigned to the field units are technically responsible to the Project Director of the Home Detention Program, but they also are supervised on a direct line basis by the Field Unit Supervisors. This is a very unusual and a confusing situation in that one employee technically is supervised by two individuals and those individuals represent two separate disciplines, detention and probation.

Another possible problem with the new organization that will be discussed is the possible under-utilization of the supervisory staff. As illustrated in attachment A, each of the Home Detention Supervisors were responsible for the supervision of seven community youth leaders. Under the present organization, six of the fourteen community youth leaders are assigned to the field units and the majority of their supervision is provided by the field unit supervisors. Furthermore, one of the Home Detention Supervisors is working primarily in the area of special projects (i.e., recreation and work programs), and only a minimal amount of his time is expended supervising the Community Youth Leaders. Lastly, the grant provides for two secretaries and one of the secretaries major responsibility is the preparation of the daily detention population report. Approximately 50% of this report is related to the Home Detention Program.

2. Duplication of Programs

At present, the St. Louis City Juvenile Court is the subgrantee for two additional projects which are designed as follows:

- a. Deputy Juvenile Officer Aide S-MP29-72-c2
There is a definite need to increase the intensity and effectiveness of the supervision or probation process by increasing contacts with youth and upgrading the surveillance and control aspects within the probation process.

Employ twelve (12) Deputy Juvenile Officer Aides to work fifteen (15) hours per week.

Function - To assist the Deputy Juvenile Officers in the following manner:

Primary

- (1) Monitor adherence to the general and specific rules of supervision including daily school and/or work attendance; compliance with restrictions relative to associates and places designated "off limits" and compliance with instructions as to restitution payments.

- (2) Provide brief written reports of weekly contacts and observations to the Deputy Juvenile Officer and Supervisor.

Secondary

- (3) Assist in acquiring information for background investigations.
- (4) Provide transportation of youths to appointments of various nature.
- (5) When situation warrants, provide close surveillance and control of youth as an alternative to detention prior to the Court Hearing.

It is projected that each aide will be assigned 15 supervision cases, thereby providing services to 180 youths within a six month-period. Largely services of the aides would be utilized for the initial intensive three-

month period of supervision, with emphasis on those youths under suspended commitments.

b. Special Probation Services V-AC43-73-c2

This program was designed to focus on two problem areas: (a) lack of adequate mental health service - both diagnostic and treatment - for children coming to the attention of the court, and (b) the need for alternatives to institutional placement. Below are listed the specific objectives which focus on the alternatives to institutional placement.

- (1) Accept for intensive supervision 140 of the "highest risk" cases in the Court, diverting them from institutions without undue risk to the community. This means an average of 20 cases per Special Deputy Juvenile Officer (currently 15) averaging one year in treatment.
- (2) Maintain the Supervisor and 7 Special Officers of the Diagnostic-Treatment Unit to provide intensive supervision for high risk cases. Increase their average caseload from 15 to 20 through greater use of aides and students to assist in contacts.

The above-listed objectives for the Special Probation Services and the Deputy Juvenile Officer Aide grants are very similar to the present operations of the Home Detention Program. It must be pointed out that each of the grants are operated by a separate section in the juvenile court:

Home Detention Program - Detention
Deputy Juvenile Officer Aide - Probation
Special Probation Services - Diagnostic/Treatment Center

3. Cost Effectiveness of Home Detention Program

One of the major objectives of the Home Detention Program is to prove that it is both practical from an operational point of view and economical from a financial point of view to place youths in the Home Detention Program rather than secure detention. As stated earlier, the Home Detention Program was designed to provide supervision to pre-disposition youths. To compare the cost per child care day at present with the cost per child care day computed, January 31, 1973; December 1, 1972, and March 17, 1972, only the pre-disposition cases will be used.

a. Present Cost

Secure Detention
72-73 Budget: \$688,440. For Jan.-April (4 mo.)=\$229,480
73-74 Budget: \$946,175. For May-Aug. (4 mo.)=\$315,392

Months	Budget	Child Care Days	Cost per Day
Jan. thru April, 1973	\$229,480	10,929	\$20.99
May thru August, 1973	\$315,392	10,985	\$28.71

Home Detention
Phase II grant: \$245,659

During Jan.-August (8 months) two thirds of CYL time was spent on pre-disposition cases, one third on past-disposition. Thus, the pre-disposition HDP budget was estimated to be 2/3rds of the total of the 8 month amount of \$164,591, and hence to the \$110,276.

Months	Budget	Child Care Days	Cost per Day
Jan.-August	\$110,276	8,559	\$12.88
b. Dec. 1, 1972 to Jan. 31, 1973 ¹			
Home Detention Program		\$20.79 per child care day	
Secure Detention		\$20.76 per child care day	
c. July 1, 1972 to Dec. 1, 1972 ²			
Home Detention Program		\$ 9.48 per child care day	
Secure Detention		\$14.79 per child care day	
d. March 17, 1972 ³			
Home Detention Program		\$ 8.22 per child care day	
Secure Detention		\$17.54 per child care day	

¹St. Louis High Impact Unit - Preliminary Evaluation

²Ibid

³Research Analysis Corporation Evaluation

CONCLUSION

The Home Detention Program as presently operated represents a major deviation from the approved method of operation as presented in the application. A revised narrative submission requesting the programmatic changes must be submitted to justify those changes that have taken place in the program.

The operation of the Home Detention Program, if it is to remain as presently constituted, overlaps programmatically and administratively with both the Deputy Juvenile Aide Program and the Special Supervision Unit program. Consideration should be given to consolidating these programs under one administrative section rather than continuing the fragmented operations under which the programs are operated presently. This reorganization would possibly eliminate, without detrimental effect on the program, the number of supervisory personnel and lessen the cost of the programs.

The present operations of the Home Detention Program contain both a work and recreation program. This is a major deviation from the approved application and this, along with increasing the caseload of the Community Youth Leaders, has resulted in less daily supervision and fewer "eyeball contacts" although the youths are supervised in group activities for greater periods of time. Consideration should be given to eliminating the recreation program and possibly the work program since the St. Louis Impact Program is funding the Police Youth Corps, Team Counseling-Hard Core Delinquents, and the Student Work Assistance Program which are primarily work/recreation related programs.

Further evaluation and possible recommendations will be forthcoming with the evaluation of the St. Louis High Impact Programs.

Assistant Superintendent
Detention Center

Project Director

Secretary


Secretary

Supervisor


Supervisor

Community Youth Leader
CYL

Community Youth Leader
CYL



DETENTION STAFF



PROBATION STAFF

ATTACHMENT D

EVALUATION OF THE HOME DETENTION PROGRAM

Program House Staff

September 26, 1973

Community Youth Leader	Cases Assigned
James Barrett	9
Cornelius Pullman	0
Walter Rucker	11
Sherry Herring	2
Mark Boullion	3
Wesley Jackson	9
Joyce Johnson	8
Ferrell Petty	9
Unassigned	1

Post-Disposition Staff

Community Youth Leader	Cases Assigned
Unit A	
Robert Nicholson	13
Frank Howard	14
Sherry Herring*	1
Unit B	
Harold Lewis	19
Russell Nowhouse	17
Unit C	
Barry Cannon	13
Lamar Howard	11
Ferrell Petty*	1

* Not assigned to a field unit.

The St. Louis City Juvenile Court's Home Detention Program began operation in 1971 but did not receive MLEAC funding until June 1972. This program was designed to work with youths in the predisposition stage of the judicial process. To be assigned to the program, a juvenile had to be both recommended by the Detention Hearing Officer and then approved by the Juvenile Court Judge. This assignment was in lieu of spending time in the Juvenile Detention Center awaiting court action on a referral. The program has since been expanded to provide supervision to juveniles after their court disposition. The bulk of this report, however, will be concerned with the pre-dispositional phase.

The objectives and potential benefits of the Home Detention Program (hereafter referred to as the HDP) examined by the evaluation study were:

1. To keep those youths assigned to the project as trouble free and as available to the Court as those in the Detention Center.
2. To provide an intensive type of supportive supervision to the youths assigned to the program, namely a minimum of three "eyeball" contacts (in-person visits) with each youth per day.
3. To provide a liaison between the youths, their parents, the schools and other appropriate community services.
4. To provide an economical alternative to secure detention.
5. To reduce overcrowding in the Detention Center.

Because systematic records have been kept on the HDP since its inception, several comparisons can be made indicating trends in the project over time. In particular, profile information on age and most recent offense, average time spent in Secure Detention and the HDP, and reason for termination can be compared for several time periods.

I. PROFILE OF HOME DETENTION PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The population served by the HDP has remained just under 90 percent male (89.2, 88.5, and 88.4 respectively, for each evaluation period). The age distribution, however, has been shifting downward with each evaluation period. Analysis of Table 1 presented below indicates that the median age dropped from fifteen in the first two evaluation periods to fourteen for the current period (the current average age is 13.9). The cumulative percentages reflect this trend in yet another way: the percentage of the enrollees under fourteen years of age increased from 27.6 percent in the first evaluation period to 39.4 percent in the second and 55.0 percent in the third. This shift to a younger population may be due to a shift in the population referred to the Juvenile Court, or it may indicate that those assigned to the HDP have become an

II. PROGRAM SERVICES PROVIDED

The HDP seeks to 1) provide intensive supervision to youths in the program, 2) provide collateral contacts with parents, schools and other appropriate community agencies, 3) find jobs for enrollees, and 4) return them to school and to place them in special programs. We examined each of these areas of service.

A. Eyeball contacts. A rather idealistic goal of three daily contacts per juvenile was set by the project staff. The data for January to August 1973 indicates that this goal was hardly ever achieved. We found only 39 instances in which there were three or more contacts for a given juvenile in a single day, and only 34 instances in which two contacts were made. We examined the ratio of eyeball contacts to days in the HDP for each youth for whom we had contact data (N=414). Table 4 below indicates the percent of youths in each ratio range. For instance, almost one fourth (21.3 percent) of the youths were found to have from 0 to 0.40 eyeball contacts per day. The table shows that the large majority (84.1 percent) have 0.80 contacts per day or less, far short of the expected three a day.

TABLE 4

Percent of Youths with Given Ratio of Eyeball Contacts to Days in the Home Detention Program

Ratio of Eyeball contacts to Days in HDP	Percent of Youths
0 - 0.40	21.3%
0.41 - 0.80	62.8%
0.81 - 1.20	11.3%
1.21 - or more	4.6%
	<u>100.0%</u>

B. Collateral Contacts. In order to provide a liason with youths, parents, schools and other appropriate community agencies, CYLs were encouraged to make contacts with people other than the youths themselves. We found that the average number of such contacts per case was 35, or 2.04 per case day. The nature of the contacts was examined to determine if cases generally received collateral contacts across several categories of contact or if case contacts were generally limited to one or two categories of contact. The categories used were: parents, other relatives, school, neighbors, health service agencies, employers, job corps, and vocational training agencies. Table 5 indicates the number of different categories of contact which each juvenile received. The table shows that just over 60 percent of the cases received contacts in three or more categories.

TABLE 5

Number of Different Categories* of Contact For Each Juvenile

Number of Categories	Percent of Juveniles
0	1.0
1	14.1
2	24.2
3	40.5
4	17.7
5	2.2
6 or more	0.2

An examination of the percent of cases which had each different type of contact (see Table 6) demonstrated that the major types of contact were with parents and other relatives. Persons in several of the contact categories were rarely contacted.

TABLE 6

Percent of Juveniles with Each Different Kind of Contact

Type of Contact	Percent of Cases in Which At Least One Contact Occurred
Parents	90.0%
Other relatives	79.8%
Neighbors	28.5%
School	18.7%
Employer/potential employer	2.6%
Health Service Agency	1.7%
Vocational Training Agency	0.7%
Job Corps	0.2%

(N=417)

For instance, in 90.0 percent of the cases a parent was contacted whereas in only 2.6 percent of the cases was an employer or potential employer contacted.

Since parents and other relatives were contacted in such a high percent of the cases, we were interested in examining the fraction of collateral contacts which parent and other relative contacts represented for each youth. It could be that although in nearly all cases the parent and other relatives were contacted, they received a relatively small number of contacts.

TABLE 7

Parent and Other Relative Contacts as a Fraction of all Collateral Contacts

Fraction of Collateral Contacts which are with Parents or other Relatives	Percent of Youths
0 - .20	0.2
.21 - .40	6.3
.41 - .60	27.1
.61 - .80	27.1
.81 - 1.0	39.2

Table 7 indicates that in a large percent of the cases the majority of contacts were with parents and other relatives. It is possible that this concentration of contacts with parents and other relatives was an inadvertent outcome of attempts to contact the youth, that is, that the CYL went to the home in hopes of making a contact with the youth and instead was met by a parent or other relative. If this is the case, considerable energies of the CYL are apparently spent in trying to make contact with the youths.

The small percent of juveniles in Table 6 for whom contacts were made with an employer or potential employer, as shown, indicates very little job assistance has been provided by the program. In 23 cases, (out of 514), CYLs indicated they had helped the youth find a job. These numbers must be interpreted cautiously, however. The age distribution shown in Table 1 indicates that the program is dealing increasingly with youths who are not job candidates because they are too young.

C. Services Provided: Returning Youths to School, Enrollment in Special Programs. CYLs are instructed to attempt to enroll the HDP youths in appropriate programs and to help them return to school or stay in school. The evaluation examined CYL behavior in both of these areas, using activity reports routinely completed by CYLs. In 9.5 percent of the cases the CYL indicated that there was a referral made to another program. The offense history figures presented earlier for the sample of HDP youths, showed a wide variation in offense history--from virtually no offenses to very many. This would appear to qualify these youths for a wide range of programs (e.g. programs requiring first offenders, as well as those set up for "hard-core" delinquents).

The low percentage of youths referred to other programs might possibly be explained in several ways. For one, youths are in the program an average of 17.5 days, which gives the CYL very little time to determine the youth's needs and interests, and to find an appropriate program. Also, as shown later, most of the youths terminate from HDP either because a warrant is refused or the case is dismissed. The Court and the CYL at that time lose control over the youth and have no authority to require him to remain in the assigned program. Furthermore, the recreational program within the HDP was set up during the most recent phase of the program and it has, according to staff workers, cut down on referrals to other programs.

How effective were the CYLs in getting youths back into school or keeping them in school while they were in the HDP? Fifty-nine percent said they did so. The evaluation attempted to validate CYL claims that they helped a youth return to school, with attention to whether or not the youth was in school when he/she entered the HDP. It was found, as indicated in Table 8 below, that most of the attempts in this area were attempts to keep the youth in school, that is, they occurred among youths already in school, and not attempts to return youths to school.

TABLE 8

CYL Efforts to Improve School Attendance Behavior
Given by Youth's Original School Status

		Did CYLs Help Youths Return To or Remain In School ?		TOTAL
		NO	YES	
Was Youth in School When he Joined HDP?	YES	38	235	273
	NO	149	44	193
TOTAL		187	279	466

Thus, of those in school when they joined the HDP (273), 235, or 86.1 percent, were helped to remain in school while of those not in school when they joined the HDP (193) only 22.7 percent (44) were helped to return. It may be that it is extremely difficult to help a youth return to school and the limited time the youth is in the HDP largely precludes this, while facilitating behaviors to help a youth stay in school are more realistic within the time the CYL usually has to work with the youth.

Narrative CYL activity records were examined for a sample of youths to determine what kind of supportive documentation existed in cases in which the CYL had indicated that he had helped the youth return to or remain in school. There were 46 cases in the sample in which the CYL had indicated that he had so helped a youth. In 24 of these cases we could find no such narratives in the youth's file. In the remaining 22 cases, there were 10 instances in which there was no mention of school in any narrative, 8 mentioned school but did not indicate any facilitating behavior by the CYL, and in only 4 cases did the CYL indicate specifically how the youth had been helped. These figures may not indicate that the CYL did not help the youths but if such assistance is being given it certainly is not being recorded by the CYLs. Since liaison work with schools and help in improving school attendance were important aspects of the program, such efforts should be noted in the records as they occur.

III. PERFORMANCE OF HDP YOUTHS

The HDP set several goals for the youths involved in the program. The principal ones were: to keep youths as trouble free and as available to the Court as those in Secure Detention; to have a rate of absconding from the program of 5% or less; to have 5% or fewer complaints regarding the youths behavior from parents; and to have 5% or fewer complaints from schools. Reported below are current evaluation period results,

It was found that only 20 youths, or 4 percent, had absconded from the program. Of these, 3 were in group homes and ran from them. Complaints were received from parents in 32 cases and from schools in 35 cases, with an overlap of 19 cases in which both parents and school complained about the youth's behavior. The resulting percentages are 6.6% for complaints from parents, and 7.2 percent for complaints from school officials, both slightly high in comparison to project goals.

To examine whether or not the youths remained as trouble free as those in Secure Detention, records of incidents occurring in Secure Detention and records of new violations occurring while youths were on HDP were examined*. It was realized that the reporting rate for offenses occurring in Secure Detention is likely to be near 100 percent, while that for youths on the HDP would be much less. There were only 4 instances in which HDP youths committed a new offense. This represents 0.77 percent of the entrants to the program, or .0005 offenses per child care day. None of the offenses were Impact offenses. In the Secure Detention facility there were 96 incidents involving 152 different youths. Some youths were involved in more than one incident; the total number of youth incidents was 162. The offense rate relative to the number of admissions to Secure Detention was 6.96 percent, or .007 offenses per child care day. The incidents included 89 youths involved in fights, 34 involved in assaults, and 6 involved in attempted escapes, clearly not offenses of a purely minor nature. It is interesting to note that many of the youths involved in offenses while in the Secure Detention facility were later placed in the HDP. Namely, 30 of the 152 youths were placed in HDP, including 21 percent of those who had been involved in fights and 15 percent of those who have been troublesome before, an impressive finding given the relatively trouble free experience of the HDP.

* It was not possible to obtain comparative numbers on offenses during detention for control groups such as youths released to parents, or youths similar to HDP youths in age, sex and prior referral history, as outlined in the Evaluation Component. This was because it proved to be practically impossible to designate such populations using information in the Juvenile Court Computer Information System. At present, information indicating to whom a child is released is not available on the computer for the time period of interest and prior referral histories at the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's are not sufficiently reliable to be valid for these purposes.

The rate at which HDP youths attended their court hearings and appointments was also examined. It was found that the percentage was 99 for both hearings and appointments. It was not possible to obtain similar data for Secure Detention youths, but it was generally felt by Detention staff that the attendance rate would be perfect, save for those who escaped from the facility. The rate attained by the HDP seems to indicate that they are quite successful in keeping their youths available to the Court for further study or adjudication.*

Data regarding reasons for termination from the HDP are available for the three evaluation periods. Termination reasons which can be considered program failures, namely, "Return to Detention" and "Committed a New Offense," have seen a relative decrease in each evaluation period. Table 9 below gives specifics.

TABLE 9

	Terminations from HDP		
	First Evaluation Period	Second Evaluation Period	Current Evaluation Period
Normal Court Disposition (warrant refused, case dismissed, committed or referred to an Institution)	73.8%	90.1%	93.0%
Returned to Detention	21.0%	7.2%	6.0%
Committed a New Offense	5.2%	2.7%	1.0%
	(N=252)	(N=334)	(N=509)

New offenses committed during this evaluation period were: tampering with an auto, riding in a stolen auto (2 youths), and driving an auto without the owner's consent. None are of a serious nature, in contrast to Impact offenses committed during the previous evaluation period.

A large majority of youths terminated during the current evaluation period because warrants were refused or their cases were ultimately dismissed. (This occurred in 359 cases, which represents 70 percent of all terminations, and 76 percent of the cases terminated by a normal court disposition.) This is an interesting figure in that the program is providing an alternative to Secure Detention for a large percent of youths who ultimately have their cases dismissed by the Court. This appears to be an appropriate diversion from the security and restrictions of the Detention Center. It should be noted, however, that it is possible that the youth's selection for and involvement in the HDP may affect the Court's ultimate decision in the case. For example, HDP-supplied information regarding the youth's adjustment and behavior in the community during the pre-adjudication period may have disposed the Court to use less severe methods of handling some cases.

* It should be noted that a considerable number of youths never had court appointments or court hearings. In particular, 376 youths had no appointments and 78 had no hearings. Of those with appointments, 98% made all appointments, and of those with hearings 98% made all hearings.

IV. HOME DETENTION AS AN ECONOMICAL ALTERNATIVE TO SECURE DETENTION, AND ONE WHICH REDUCES THE OVERLOAD IN SECURE DETENTION.

The HDP seeks to provide services to youths as an economical alternative to Secure Detention. In previous evaluations of the HDP, most notably that completed by the Research Analysis Corporation, a comparison of average daily costs was made using the Secure Detention Budget divided by the child care days provided in Secure Detention, and the HDP Budget divided by the child care days provided by the HDP. Such comparative figures are presented in the November 1973 Field Audit report and indicate that the Secure Detention Costs have varied from \$14.79 to \$28.71 per child care day, while HDP costs have varied from \$8.22 to \$20.79 per child care day. With the exception of one brief evaluation period (December 31, 1972 to January 31, 1973) the HDP has been more economical by these estimates.

In addition to these estimates, an alternative set of figures was considered because of the assumptions used in deriving the first set. The additional figures are based on estimates of the child care cost if all the youths had remained in detention (i.e., if the HDP had not existed, Secure Detention would have had to handle all child care days of the HDP). Furthermore there are items in the Secure Detention Budget which are listed as in-kind contributions on the HDP grant and these should be excluded from the Secure Detention budget before calculations are made. The resulting figures for the most recent evaluation period would thereby be:

TABLE 10

	Cost Comparison Figures		
	Effective Budget	Child Care Days	Cost Per Child Care Day
Secure Detention			
Jan. - April	\$212,690	14,566	\$14.60
May thru August	\$298,618	15,905	\$18.77
Home Detention Program	\$110,276*	8,959	\$12.88

Using this more rigorous comparison, the HDP still appears to be an economical alternative to Secure Detention.

* The Home Detention Budget used in calculations here is less than the actual grant. After examining the percent of time the CYLs were spending on predispositional cases it was decided to take only that percent of the budget as representative of the amount of grant money spent on predispositional phase. It was thus assumed that the percent of clerical and supervisory time, and use of supplies is proportional to the fraction of total time spent by CYLs on predispositional activities.

During the current evaluation period, the combined population of the Secure Detention Facility and the HDP exceeded each day the Detention Facility capacity of 80 youths. The percent of this overload handled by the Home Detention program was 71. There were three months during this evaluation period, March, April, and July, when the HDP handled a high percent of the overload each day in addition to providing care to juveniles who would not have caused an overload had they been in Secure Detention. Thus, for instance, in March, there were 323 child care days (out of a total of 1014) provided by the Home Detention Program which would not have been days of overload for Secure Detention. The attached (Graph 1) depicts this by indicating months in which the average daily capacity of the Secure Detention Facility fell below the capacity figure of 80. During these periods there was thus room in the Secure Detention facility for youths released on the HPD. Were the low Secure Detention figures a continuing trend, part of the rationale for the Home Detention program would be threatened. However, current figures indicate that the Detention Center population has turned upward again in recent months. The new addition to the Secure Detention Facility scheduled to open this fall, however, could resolve the overload problem at the Secure Detention Facility, thus eliminating one of the benefits of the HDP.


Two additional lines on Graph 1 should be noted. One is labeled "HDP population with caseloads of 5 youths per CYL" and indicates the average daily population of the HDP expected if each CYL had his/her prescribed caseload. With the current assignment of eight CYLs to predisposition work this line is constant from February on at 40 youths. The second line is the actual daily HDP population, labeled "average HDP population." Of note is that the expected line is generally above the actual line. This indicates that although here could have been days in which one or several CYLs had caseloads of more than five, there has not been a general problem of case-overload for the program. Clearly the shift of CYLs from pre- to postdisposition work (shown by the drop in the expected line -- "HDP population with caseloads of 5 youths per CYL" -- from January to February) was warranted in terms of the project's average daily caseload. Had all CYLs stayed with the predisposition work the project would certainly have been overstaffed.

V. CONCLUSION

Figures developed for this evaluation period suggest several conclusions regarding the Home Detention Program. First, the program has shown general improvement in the most recent period as compared to the previous two periods studied. Improvements have occurred in several areas -- most importantly in keeping the youths trouble free (a smaller percent of HDP participants committed offenses in this evaluation period than in any previous one). It could, of course, be that the population of youths with which the HDP works was, in the most recent period, "less risky" than those previously in the HDP. However, there is no evidence to support such a possibility. It was found that the age distribution of the HDP population is changing to younger participants but whether or not this shift is to a less risky population is not clear. HDP, it should be noted, has no control over the people assigned to the project; all are placed in the HDP by the Judge, and the HDP accepts all so ordered.

Statistics on youth attendance at court hearings and appointments, available for the first time in this evaluation period, indicate that almost all HDP participants have attended all their hearings and appointments.

Less impressive from the point of view of program goals, are the findings regarding the frequency of CYL contacts with the youths, and the small variety of types of contacts made with collateral individuals. It was found that the number of eyeball contacts CYLs made with youths was far less than the goal of three a day, and that collateral contacts were heavily concentrated among parents and other relatives.



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The reasons for the observed level of performance are not known. Possible explanations might include:

- (1) responsibilities in bringing the youth to Court or coordinating with the regular DJO on the case perhaps cause unanticipated burdens on the CYLs;
- (2) difficulties in locating the child may be accentuated by inefficient geographical assignment of youths to CYLs;
- (3) resistance by the youths to a less official Court worker could frustrate attempts to contact the youths;
- (4) failure to set up an efficient meeting schedule with assigned youths might create for the CYL a considerable transportation problem.

Other findings in the area of program services provided include a seemingly low percent of cases (9.5%) in which the CYL referred the youth to a special program and a low percent of cases (22.7%) in which a youth was helped to return to school. The main area of youth performance in which program goals were not met was behavior causing complaints from both school officials and parents.

In general, it appears that the HDP has reached important performance goals for the youths in the program even though it has not provided the intensity of service that had been planned. This level of success is an important finding particularly for any other Secure Detention Facility considering a program such as the one in St. Louis. Moreover the St. Louis experience would indicate that it is probably not necessary to provide the intensity of services originally projected. Less ambitious supervision schedules are probably realistic.

Important to note, however, is that we have no evidence that the particular schedule of supervision was the contributing factor to the youth's relatively good performance. That is, we have no evidence of a casual link between the services provided and the outcome achieved. Were these same youths released without CYL supervision, it is possible that their performance would have been equally good. What we do know is that the Court has indicated that it would not have permitted their release without the assurance of supervision by a CYL.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1) Eyeball contacts. The possible reasons for the observed level of contacts mentioned in the conclusion section, as well as any reasons the HDP staff consider important, should be examined and resolutions to difficulties attempted. The staff might of course decide that the original goal (three eyeball contacts daily) was unrealistically high, and that a lesser number (perhaps one a day) is both more reasonable in terms of staff resources and adequate to achieve program goals. Information from this evaluation period would largely indicate that to be true. If such a judgement were made, the staff would want to revise their goals in the area of contacts as stated in the project grant.
- 2) Collateral contacts. In the area of collateral contacts, CYLs should be encouraged to make more facilitating contacts with individuals and agencies other than parents and other relatives. In particular, there should be much greater efforts made to contact school personnel, especially in those cases in which the youth is not in school. A major contribution of the CYLs could be in the area of returning youths to a school situation, including possibly recommending them for enrollment in an alternative school (such as SWAP or Providence) if a regular school setting seems inappropriate.
- 3) Referrals to other programs. It would surely appear, as noted in the our analysis of the sample of youths whose complete records were studied, that there are many types of programs for which the HDP youths would be eligible. Since many criminal justice programs for juveniles are underenrolled, CYLs should be made aware of them and be strongly encouraged to enroll youths in appropriate programs.
- 4) Postdispositional work of the HDP. All the statistics presented thus far deal only with the predisposition program. In February of 1973 six CYLs were assigned to postdispositional work and began working in the regular Field Units of the Probation Department. The shift was a wise one in that the program did have an oversupply of CYLs in relation to both the number of youths assigned to the program and the length of stay of these youths in the program. However, since the postdispositional work done by the CYLs is identical in form to the work done by the D.J.O. Aides and since the work of the pre and post dispositional worker has different specific goals and is in a different work environment, recommendations suggesting the merger of the postdispositional phase of the HDP with the D.J.O. Aide project seem worthy of serious consideration.



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FIELD REVIEW REPORT

Project: Burglary Prevention (Phase I & II) Grant Award: Phase I - \$50,000
Phase II - \$100,000

Project #: S-MP3-72-dl Subgrant Period: 5/15/72 - 11/30/73 (Phase I)
S-MP39-72-dl 3/11/73 - 12/30/73 (Phase II)

Subgrantee: St. Louis Metro Police Dept. Project Director: Sgt. Eugene Broaders

Date of Report: November 29, 1973 Authorized Official: Col. Theodore McNeal

Prepared by: Mr. Bob Taylor, Program Analyst
Mr. Bill Taylor, Program Analyst
Mr. Reese Joiner, Fiscal Officer
Mr. Dennis McCarthy, Evaluation Analyst

SCOPE OF REVIEW:

This review consisted of surveys of fiscal and programmatic records, limited tests of project records, and interviews with key personnel. The overall objectives of the field review are:

1. to review program and fiscal operations for compliance with LEAA, MLEAC, Region 5 requirements and compliance with the provisions of the approved subgrant.
2. to determine that the project is conducted in an economical and efficient manner and that project objectives are met.
3. to determine if administrative and financial controls are adequate to provide accurate and reliable operating and financial reports required for project management and evaluation.

The field work for the review commenced on November 15, 1973.

Project personnel contacted included Sgt. Eugene Broaders, Ptn. William Ward, and Ptn. Donald Cognata.

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Field Review Report
Burglary Prevention (Phase I and II)
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The specific objectives of the Burglary Prevention (Phase I) Project are:

1. Reduce business burglary by 5% in two years and 20% in five years, in conjunction with the operation of other components of the Impact program.
2. Acquaint 50 businessmen with the benefits of protecting their premises with alarms.
3. Develop sound selection techniques for installing alarms temporarily based upon police department computer data.
4. Examine the feasibility and requirements of an automated information system on business burglary.
5. To make presentation to 25 business groups on security and burglary prevention.
6. To develop a film presentation for the police officers in-service training program.

The project began on May 15, 1972 and was originally scheduled to terminate on November 15, 1972. However, due to a series of difficulties in obtaining alarm equipment from manufacturers, it was necessary to extend the termination date four times: to 1/31/73, 3/1/73, 10/1/73 and 11/30/73.

This equipment was finally delivered on 11/12/73 and Phase I may now be closed out.

A field review of this project was accomplished by Region 5 staff on November 20, 1972, at which time all significant programmatic activities had been set in motion except for those which required the utilization of the aforementioned equipment. The use of this equipment will be a part of the scope of the Phase II grant.

For these reasons the emphasis of this report will center on Phase II and rely on the previous field review of the Phase I activities.

The specific objectives of the Burglary Prevention (Phase II) project are:

1. Reduce business burglary by 5% in the first two years and by 20% in five years.
2. Conduct approximately 1,000 surveys of businesses.
3. Acquire and install wireless alarms at selected businesses. Alarms will remain at each selected site for a period averaging 60 days.
4. Install the ten dialer alarms at approximately twenty different sites during this phase of the project.
5. Give burglary prevention lectures to the Department's In-Service Training classes. (2,500 commissioned personnel.)
6. Upon request, conduct surveys of those businesses requested by the Small Business Administration.

The project began on March 1, 1973 and was originally scheduled to terminate on September 3, 1973. However, it was necessary to extend the termination date to December 31, 1973. The project is now expected to proceed without further major delays.

The evaluation of this project is being carried out by the St. Louis High Impact Evaluation Unit and is included in this report.

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FINDINGS:

A. Significant Activities Implemented:

- 1) All budgeted equipment has finally been delivered and may now be utilized by the Burglary Prevention Unit.
- 2) On February 1, 1973 Burglary Prevention Unit personnel began their formal lecture series in the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department In-Service Training Program and have, to date, addressed 46 classes on burglary prevention. These lectures total approximately 92 hours exclusive of preparation time. The series will continue through April 18, 1974. An average of 25 police officers attend each of these lectures.
- 3) Since March 1, 1973, Burglary Prevention Unit personnel have spoken to 29 business and civic groups such as the American Association of Retired People and the Kiwanis Club. Furthermore, Sgt. Broaders and Ptn. Ward have appeared on radio and television programs a total of five times during this period.
- 4) During Phase II 1,530 surveys of local businesses have been carried out, mostly by overtime patrolmen. The original subgrant period ran from March 1, 1973 thru September 30, 1973. During this time 1,163 surveys were accomplished as compared to 1,000 which were called for in the application.
- 5) A sample of 300 businesses surveyed by BPU were burglarized 587 times during the twelve-month period prior to being surveyed and only 250 times in the 12 months after being surveyed. No cause and effect relationship is being implied; however, these figures may serve as a rough indicator of the value of the services provided by this project. The High Impact Evaluation Unit has explored this area more fully in their report (Appendix).
- 6) The Impact Evaluation Unit at the Central Police District is in the process of plotting areas in which burglaries are highly probable. This information will be used by BPU personnel to determine where alarm devices will be installed.

B. Below are listed areas of deficiencies or areas that could be improved which would strengthen the program.

- 1) There has been a great time lag between project inception and delivery of equipment.

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- 2) The dialer alarms funded by the Phase I grant and in use in Phase II operations seem to be far inferior to the more sophisticated portable (wireless) alarm equipment funded by the Phase II grant.
- 3) The new alarm transmitters were manufactured without a carrier signal (coded squelch) compatible to the Metropolitan Police Department's radio system. This has resulted in further delay while the equipment is being modified.

C. Impact evaluation indicates project is succeeding in reducing burglary rates and increasing clearance rates for surveyed businesses. Details of the evaluation are given in the Appendix; a summary follows:

- 1) Over the period 1965-1973 non-residential burglary in St. Louis peaked in 1969 and has dropped steadily since then, except for a slight increase expected for 1973. The city-wide impact of the Burglary Prevention Unit's activities is not yet observable in city-wide non-residential burglary totals, but may become clearer as the number of surveyed businesses comes to represent a more substantial fraction of the business sites in the city.
- 2) The Unit has almost tripled its survey rate (measured in businesses surveyed per month) under the Impact Program, compared to its rate for the period prior to Impact.
- 3) The total number of businesses surveyed up to October 1, 1973 is 2782. The relative change in the burglary rate for these businesses, comparing the rate since the survey to the rate for the year preceding the survey, amounts to a remarkable 41.5 percent decrease. When compared to the city-wide trend for non-residential burglaries, the decrease amounts to 45.6 percent.
- 4) The business burglary rate as a function of survey age (time elapsed since the survey was conducted) is fairly erratic, but a relationship is apparent between the rate before survey and survey age. Those businesses whose surveys are the oldest appear to have the highest before-survey rates. This is because the businesses were selected to be surveyed on the basis of their burglary history, beginning with those with the highest burglary rates. Consequently, these businesses also have, in general, the greatest burglary rate reductions following their survey.
- 5) An analysis of 217 businesses not surveyed by the Unit, each selected as a "control business" matched to one of a sample of the surveyed businesses, indicates that no significant changes in burglary rates are being experienced by non-surveyed businesses. This lends fur-

ther support to the conclusion that burglary rate reductions at surveyed businesses are due to the activities of this project.

- 6) An estimate of the number of business burglaries "prevented" at surveyed businesses during the 21-month period from January 1, 1972 to October 1, 1973 was obtained by projecting the burglary rate of surveyed businesses during the year before survey into the period since the survey and subtracting the number of burglaries actually experienced during that period at the surveyed businesses. The results indicate an impressive 755 burglaries "prevented". Using the average figure for burglary dollar losses at surveyed businesses since their surveys, this amounts to "prevented" losses of about \$230,000 (not counting the cost of police services, or subsequent business costs related to filing insurance claims, etc.)
- 7) The clearance rate for burglaries which have occurred at surveyed businesses since their surveys was compared to that for burglaries at these businesses during the year preceding the survey. The results of this analysis indicate a very favorable 53.5 percent improvement in the clearance rate (from an average rate of about 30 percent before the surveys to about 45 percent since the surveys.) Consequently, it appears that this project is also facilitating arrests and the "solving" of burglaries which have occurred at surveyed businesses.

CONCLUSION

This project is operating within the guidelines set forth in the original grant application. Its impact on the target crime of business burglary is clearly demonstrated by the very encouraging reductions in burglary rates and increases in clearance rates for surveyed businesses. In fact, the crime specific impact of this project appears greater than any of the other Impact projects evaluated to date.

While the project is operating quite well with respect to its burglary survey objectives, many of the other services proposed have not yet been fully implemented due to the difficulty in acquiring the full complement of alarm equipment.

The same delay in receiving and putting this equipment into operation has been experienced in both the Phase I and Phase II grants. It is understood that a transaction involving technical equipment may give rise to complex problems. However, it would seem that some sort of coordination should have been effected to eliminate the delay in receipt of Phase II equipment, especially after the experience of Phase I.

The dialer alarm equipment purchased under the Phase I grant is definitely inferior to the portable (wireless) alarm cases utilized in Phase II and the project

personnel have pointed out serious limitations in the older, less sophisticated dialers.

A survey taken in 1971 showed that of approximately 22,000 alarms initiated between January 1, 1971 and October 1, 1971, over 19,000 turned out to be false. There is no indication that the dialer contributes to a reduction in the rate of false alarms. Therefore, it would seem that more care should have been exercised in selecting this equipment. Not one on-sight burglary apprehension has been made due to dialer alarms. The new wireless equipment should cut false alarms to a minimum and significantly improve on-site burglary apprehension rates.

The service provided by the Burglary Prevention Unit is far superior to that offered by private alarm companies which merely rent or sell their alarm devices to businesses and then call the police when an alarm is triggered at their headquarters. The Burglary Prevention Unit offers much faster service and also makes alarms available to small businesses which could not otherwise afford them.

It is recommended that any future purchases of equipment made on the present or subsequent grants be more carefully administered to prevent further delay and technical difficulties in implementing project objectives.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

The evaluation and review staff would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Burglary Prevention Unit staff, and Mr. Barry Weismantle and the staff of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department's Impact Evaluation Unit, especially in connection with collection of activity and crime data.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the impact evaluation analyses and the field review of this project, the following recommendations are made:

- 1) The Unit consider expanding its survey activities sufficiently to approximately double the number of surveys per month being made under Phase II. It is understood that such an increase would require an increase in the project's personnel resources.
- 2) The Unit, together with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department's Impact Evaluation Unit, and the MLEAC-Region 5 High Impact Evaluation Unit, develop a plan to study the reasons for increased clearance rates for burglaries at surveyed businesses.
- 3) A study be conducted by the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, in conjunction with the Burglary Prevention Unit, to develop and examine alternative plans for the integration of Unit activities into Police Department operations and budgeting so the Department will have a sound basis for a decision regarding whether or not to continue Unit activities (and at what level) at the end of Phase III.

The planning effort may include the following activities:

- a. Identification of alternative manning levels for continued operation, and associated costs.
 - b. Plans for experimental operation at various manning levels under study during the second half of Phase III, to permit refinement of operation plans prior to the end of the award period.
 - c. Planning relating to any public or internal information activities which may be required at the end of the project (e.g., to explain changes in operations or discontinuance to the public and to the project personnel)
- 4) Refunding the Burglary Prevention Unit project for Phase III is recommended at a level sufficient to permit operation at the proposed increased rate of surveys.

APPENDIX


EVALUATION: BURGLARY PREVENTION UNIT

Figure 1 shows the number of non-residential burglaries reported annually to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department for the years 1965 through 1973. After peaking at over 8000 in 1969, the number of reported incidents dropped to fewer than 6000 in 1972. An estimate for 1973, based on data for January through September, indicates a slight increase over 1972.

The number of non-residential sites in the city is not known. City of St. Louis business license statistics indicate that there are about 14,000 licensed businesses in operation (with no data being available on unlicensed businesses). Since its inception, the Burglary Prevention Unit has surveyed over 2700 businesses. While this is a substantial accomplishment, it appears unreasonable to expect a clearly indicated decrease in city-wide, non-residential burglary as yet, since probably fewer than 10 percent of the non-residential sites have been surveyed. Consequently, the best test of survey effectiveness at the moment is examination of the burglary experience of the surveyed sites only, comparing burglary rates prior to and following the survey.

Figure 2 indicates current trends in city-wide, non-residential burglary rates. The periods indicated are related to Burglary Prevention Unit grant periods. In each case, the burglary rate for the period shown is compared to the same period one year earlier. For example,

Number of Non-Residential Burglaries Reported Annually (City-Wide)



*1973 total is estimated from data for January through September.

Figure 1

Time Periods

Phase I (7-1-72 to 3-1-73): project's first award period under Impact Program

Phase II (3-1-73 to 10-1-73): second award period under Impact, up to data cut-off date of 10-1-73

A (7-1-71 to 3-1-72): same as Phase I, but one year earlier

B (3-1-72 to 10-1-72): same as Phase II, but one year earlier

Percent Change in Non-Residential Burglaries Reported in the Indicated Period, Compared to the Same Period One Year Earlier (City-Wide)




Figure 2

the 2.6 percent decrease shown for Phase I (the project's initial award period under the Impact Program) results from comparing the rate for the period from July 1, 1972 to March 1, 1973 to the rate for the period from July 1, 1971 to March 1, 1972.

The figure shows a slight increase in city-wide totals for non-residential burglaries during Phase II, in spite of the overwhelming decrease in the burglary rate measured for surveyed businesses, which will be seen in subsequent figures. Figure 2 indicates the same reversal in city-wide crime trends shown on an annual basis in Figure 1.

Figure 3 indicates the number of businesses surveyed each month for the period from January, 1972 through August, 1973. The number of surveys per month, which averaged 69 during the "pre-Impact" period in 1972, increased to an average of 142 during Phase I, and increased again to an average of 182 in that portion of Phase II for which data was available. In short, the project has almost tripled its survey rate under the Impact Program, compared to its rate for the period prior to Impact.

Figure 4 presents survey and burglary rate information by police district and city-wide.

Column 1 shows the number of initial surveys accomplished in each police district prior to October 1, 1973, including those performed during the pre-Impact operations of the Burglary Prevention Unit.




Figure 3

District	Number of Businesses Surveyed up to Oct. 1, 1973	District-Wide Non-Residential Burglary Trend, Mar. 1 to Oct. 1, 1973 vs. Mar. 1 to Oct. 1, 1972 (percent change)	Decrease in Burglary Rate for Surveyed Businesses for Period Following Survey Compared to Year Preceding Survey (percent decrease)	Decrease for Surveyed Businesses Relative to District Trend (percent decrease)
	(Column 1)	(Column 2)	(Column 3)	(Column 4)
1	226	+10.5	66.6	69.8
2	216	+25.3	53.1	62.6
3	567	- 5.1	50.8	48.2
4	240	+34.0	32.4	49.6
5	355	+ 1.2	31.3	32.3
6	270	+17.0	29.4	39.6
7	310	+15.8	38.1	46.5
8	259	- 4.4	44.8	42.2
9	339	- 0.9	27.1	26.4
Total (City-Wide)	2782	+ 7.5	41.5	45.6

Figure 4

Column 2 indicates the trend in non-residential burglary in each police district for Phase II (obtained by comparing the rates for the period March 1, 1973 to October 1, 1973, to the rates for the same period one year earlier).

Column 3 indicates the decrease in burglary rate for surveyed businesses for the months following their survey compared to the year preceding the survey. The burglary rate was measured in terms of burglaries per business month. Substantial decreases in the burglary rates of surveyed businesses were found in all police districts, ranging in value from 27.1 percent to 66.6 percent, with a city-wide average decrease of 41.5 percent.

In Column 4, the burglary rate decreases for surveyed businesses are given relative to the corresponding district-wide trend for non-residential burglary. These figures may be interpreted as the decrease in burglary rate for surveyed businesses relative to the burglary rate experience for all non-residential sites in the same district. On a city-wide basis, the 2782 surveyed businesses experienced a burglary rate decrease of 45.6 percent since the date of their survey, compared to the preceding year, when measured against the city-wide trend in non-residential burglary. This truly remarkable impact on the burglary experience of surveyed businesses is marginally inflated by the procedure by which businesses were selected to be surveyed --

namely, that most had shown high burglary rates in the recent past. In mathematical terms, this will make the burglary rate for the year preceding the survey look marginally higher for these businesses than if the one-year period had been chosen at random (it is not, however, based on the supposed "truth" that high burglary rates one year mean low rates the next, since this has not proven out in actual experience). The extent to which this phenomenon effects the present results is unknown, but the magnitude of the burglary reductions are so large that it is most unlikely that they could be due to the inflation effect alone.

Figure 5 indicates the variation in the average burglary rate for surveyed businesses (measured in burglaries per business per month) as a function of survey age (measured by the number of months elapsed since the survey); also shown is the variation in average burglary rate for the year prior to the survey as a function of survey age. The graph was constructed to attempt to answer two questions:

- Does the burglary rate for surveyed businesses drop for successive months following the survey due to increased compliance with recommendations made in the survey report? And,
- Were the businesses surveyed when the project first began ones with higher burglary rates than




Figure 5

those surveyed later in the project (as measured by the rate of burglaries in the year preceding the survey) ?

The answer to the first question is found by examining the shaded part of the graph. No clear trend in burglary rate since the survey is in evidence, although businesses surveyed 17 to 21 months prior to the 10-1-73 data cutoff date seem to show lower rates than those whose survey age is not as great. The answer to the second question may be found by examining the line topping the unshaded part of the graph. Here a more definite pattern is indicated -- with the burglary rate for the year preceding the survey increasing almost uniformly with increases in the survey age. Apparently, the businesses surveyed when the project first began were those having shown the most serious burglary histories at that time; as these were completed by the Unit they moved on to other businesses with progressively less serious (but significant) burglary histories.

Another approach to examining the effect of the surveys on the burglary rate for surveyed businesses, as a function of the survey age, is shown in Figure 6. This graph depicts the percent decrease in burglary rate for surveyed businesses, comparing the burglary rate since the survey (for the number of months indicated by the survey age) with the rate for the same set of businesses for the year preceding




Figure 6

A-11

their surveys. The graph indicates progressively greater burglary rate reductions with increasing survey age, although the curve is fairly erratic. This result may be partially explained by the more serious burglary histories of those businesses surveyed early in the project, compared with those surveyed later on, but it may also be true that progressive compliance with survey recommendations has led to fewer and fewer burglaries in the later months following the surveys.

In order to determine the extent to which burglary reductions in surveyed businesses might be due to more wide-spread burglary reductions in their neighborhoods (i.e., local trends), a sample of 217 non-surveyed businesses was selected and studied. The selection procedure involved locating a business in the neighborhood of a surveyed business (using a reverse telephone directory), confirming that it had never been surveyed by the Unit, and assigning it a hypothetical "survey date" identical to that of the neighboring surveyed business to which it was paired. This procedure was carried out for every twelfth surveyed business. An analysis of burglary rates during the year preceding, and the months following the hypothetical "surveys" for this control group of non-surveyed businesses was then made and compared to a similar analysis for the surveyed businesses. The results are presented in Figure 7. While the surveyed businesses experienced a 41.5 percent decrease in their burglary rate after being

	Surveyed	Non-Surveyed
Burglary rate for the year before survey (burglaries per 100 businesses per month)	10.199	2.112
Burglary rate since survey (burglaries per 100 businesses per month)	5.976	2.137
Percent change (after/before)	-41.5	+1.1

Figure 7

surveyed, the control group showed virtually no change (a 1.1 percent increase). In short, this analysis indicates that the burglary reductions for surveyed businesses are almost certainly due to the impact of the surveys, and not to general burglary rate reductions in their neighborhoods.

Figure 8 is based on only those surveys conducted between January 1, 1972 and October 1, 1973. During that period 2714 businesses were surveyed. The district-wide totals are shown in Column 1.

Column 2 presents estimates of the number of burglaries "prevented" at surveyed businesses since the date of the survey. For each district a projected number of burglaries is obtained by multiplying the average burglary rate for the year before survey (in burglaries per surveyed business per month) by the cumulative number of survey months for the district (the sum of the number of months since survey for each surveyed business in the district). The number of burglaries "prevented" is obtained by subtracting the actual number of burglaries since the survey date from the projected number.

By multiplying the number of burglaries "prevented" in each district by the average dollar loss per actual burglary since the survey date, the total dollar amount "saved" is estimated for each district. (Column 3)

Column 4 contains changes in clearance rates, obtained by comparing the clearance rate for those burglaries occurring at surveyed

District	Number of Businesses Surveyed Between Jan. 1, 1972 and Oct. 1, 1973	Estimated Number of Business Burglaries Prevented	Estimated Dollar Amount Saved (thousands)	Change in Clearance Rate (percent increase)
	(Column 1)	(Column 2)	(Column 3)	(Column 4)
1	222	103	35.863	119.6
2	209	80	30.424	26.6
3	548	196	33.684	107.0
4	234	25	38.059	86.9
5	349	61	16.151	31.3
6	264	34	9.550	81.3
7	305	76	11.740	7.7
8	252	87	22.797	8.7
9	331	93	30.978	40.5
Total (City-Wide)	2714	755	229.246	53.5

Figure 8

businesses since the date of the survey to the clearance rate for burglaries occurring at those businesses the year before survey. As shown in the row labeled Total (City-Wide), an increase of 53.5 percent is indicated by the data (from an average clearance rate of about 30 percent prior to the surveys to an average rate of about 45 percent since the surveys). From the data at hand it was not possible to pinpoint the reasons for this very favorable increase in the clearance rate. Possible reasons might include greater cooperation by surveyed businesses in regard to investigations of burglaries at those sites, and an increase in arrests arising from improved security equipment at these businesses.

END