PERSPECTIVES ON POLICE ASSAULTS IN THE SOUTH CENTRAL UNITED STATES

VOLUME I

Samuel G. Chapman
PROJECT DIRECTOR

Charles D. Hale
ASSISTANT PROJECT DIRECTOR

C. Kenneth Meyer
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH

Cheryl G. Swanson
Patton N. Morrison
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE

The University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma 73069

PERSPECTIVES ON POLICE ASSAULTS IN THE SOUTH CENTRAL UNITED STATES
~~VOLUME~~ I

A Final Report Submitted to:

The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
U. S. Department of Justice

by:

Samuel G. Chapman — Project Director
Charles D. Hale — Assistant Project Director
C. Kenneth Meyer — Director of Research

Research Associates:

Cheryl G. Swanson
Patton N. Morrison

This project was supported by Grant Numbers 73-TA-06-0004 and 73-DF-06-0053 awarded the University of Oklahoma, Office of Research Administration by the United States Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended. Points of view, research techniques and methodologies, and opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and research associates and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

June 28, 1974

PREFACE

The Police Assaults Study was a project extending over a 20-month period conducted by the University of Oklahoma to develop research methods appropriate for the study of police assaults and to gather and analyze empirical data concerning assaults on police officers in five south central states. The project was financed by a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U. S. Department of Justice.

The findings of this research project are contained in three volumes. A fourth volume -- an Operations Research Manual -- has been published as a companion text to aid future researchers who may wish to replicate certain aspects of this study.

Volume I of the Final Report begins with an introductory section which describes the objectives of the project and the methodology used to accomplish those objectives. The second part of the first volume contains a discussion of a theoretical perspective of violence as it relates to assaults against police. It is a hypothetical statement about the underlying causes of violence against police and suggests that police assaults are an inevitable consequence of the police role in society. The final section of the first volume contains a descriptive profile of the assault event in which a number of characteristics concerning assaults on police are examined for both municipal police departments and state police and highway patrol agencies.

Volume II of the Final Report includes a discussion of the characteristics of assaulted and non-assaulted officers and analyzes those officer characteristics which differentiate assaulted officers and their non-assaulted counterparts. Following this discussion, personal characteristics, including age, rank and length of service, are examined utilizing correlation and multiple regression analysis to determine what factors are associated with and account for the largest amount of variation in assaults against police. The next section in Volume II includes a discussion of the characteristics of persons charged with assaulting police officers and their reasons for acting as they did. The final section in this volume discusses alternative methods for developing psychological tests that may help to identify personality characteristics associated with "assault prone" officers.

In the third and concluding volume of the Final Report, the study focuses on the police organization in an effort to determine whether or not assaulted officers perceive their working environment differently than non-assaulted officers. Next, the relationship between police assaults and 31 environmental and police activity characteristics are examined for 46 cities using correlation and multiple regression analysis techniques.

Following this, the results of a microanalysis of assaults on police in Austin, Texas are reported. The final volume concludes with a comprehensive bibliography of literature which, although selected from many diverse fields, nevertheless was found to be integrally related to the problem of police assaults.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Large scale enterprises invariably involve a host of persons in their execution. The Police Assaults Study proved no exception, and my enduring gratitude goes to each individual. Six persons constituted the full-time staff over much of the project's 20 months: Assistant Director Charles D. Hale; Director of Research C. Kenneth Meyer; Research Associates Charles G. Angie, Cheryl G. Swanson and Joe S. Cecil; and Administrative Assistant Lynn M. Garman. These persons, under the administrative leadership of Mr. Hale and the research direction of Professor Meyer, were instrumental in weaving an intricate fabric of research design and methodology into comprehensive field execution and subsequent data analysis.

The full-time research staff conducted this study with the assistance of a number of other persons. Among the 25 consultants who contributed their efforts, David A. Booth, Daniel C. Kieselhorst, Robert D. Curley and Denise L. Heller played highly prominent, though differing roles. In addition, police officials from the states of Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas and Louisiana committed substantial time, resources, and data to the project, as did municipal court and probation officials in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Help given by these persons who work in law enforcement was not only gratifying evidence of the concern which operational personnel have for the problems of assaults on police but was essential to the completion of this research as well.

Persons from two agencies within the United States Department of Justice -- the National Institute and the Technical Assistance Division -- contributed to the progress of the research also, but in sharply differing roles. Four project monitors from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, David R. Powell, Robert H. Macy, Jesse James and William J. Cox, maintained a working liaison with the staff and helped resolve several issues. Also, the LEAA Dallas Regional Office staff, especially Dale Purifoy, helped facilitate project progress. Moreover, staff members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting Section in Washington, D.C., under the leadership of Chief Robert D. Conger, were vital to certain aspects of the project. Their ability to assemble and provide a collection of data submitted by a variety of police forces across the nation was crucial to this research.

Other persons played roles which, while perhaps minor in title, were major in contribution. Prime contributors among these were Patton N. Morrison and Wesley Wilson who served in the capacity of research assistant. Lisa Smith contributed more than could be reasonably expected from any one person as she skillfully and patiently supervised the preparation of the manuscripts, taking nearly illegible copy and translating it into a finished product.

The names and roles of additional persons having more than casual association with the Police Assaults Study are given below. Finally, I accept full responsibility for those virtues or limitations which may accrue from this final report.

Samuel G. Chapman
Project Director
Norman, Oklahoma
June 28, 1974

Project Director

Samuel G. Chapman, Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Oklahoma

Project Staff

Charles D. Hale
Assistant Director

C. Kenneth Meyer
Director of Research

Charles G. Angie
Research Associate

Cheryl G. Swanson
Research Associate

Patton N. Morrison
Research Associate

Lynn M. Garman
Administrative Assistant

Lisa Smith
Secretary

Research Assistants

James L. Regens
Wesley R. Wilson
Sandra Brown
Gaylord Fisher
Kathleen Franklin
Carolyn Morgan
Paul E. Wilson

Clerical Staff

Nancy K. Cheek
Karen B. Hale
Lois C. Morrison
Nancy Scott
Tess Smith
Sidney Sue Black

Art Work

Bill Buchanan

Project Monitors (LEAA)

David R. Powell
Robert H. Macy
Jesse James
William J. Cox

University of Oklahoma,
Office of Research
Administration

Ralph Martin
Mark Elder

Consultants

Dr. David A. Booth
University of Massachusetts

Dr. Daniel C. Kieselhorst
Minneapolis, Minnesota

Dr. Denise L. Heller
University of New Mexico

Commander James Bannon
Detroit Police Department

Dr. Robert Boruch
Northwestern University

Sheriff Melvin G. Colman
Orange County (Orlando), Florida

Dr. Daniel B. Cruse
Miami University, Florida

Mr. Robert D. Curley
University of Oklahoma

Dr. George D. Eastman
Kent State University, Ohio

Mr. Mark Elder
University of Oklahoma

Dr. Winston Gibson
University of Cincinnati

Mr. Preston A. Horstman
Dallas Police Department

Mr. Willard H. Hutchins
Bureau of Criminal Statistics
Sacramento, California

Dr. Samuel A. Kirkpatrick
University of Oklahoma

Dr. Robert Krieger
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Dr. John Lamberth
Temple University

Dr. Frank V. Manning
University of Oklahoma

Professor Ralph A. Martin
University of Oklahoma

Mr. George Mendoza
University of Oklahoma

Dr. Bruce T. Olson
University of Southern California

Judge J. David Rambo
Norman, Oklahoma

Dr. Albert J. Reiss, Jr.
Yale University

Dr. Hans Toch
New York State University
at Albany

Dr. Newman Vosbury
Huntsville, Alabama

Dr. Jack E. Whitehouse
Artesia, California

Field Representatives in Major Participating Forces

Captain M. K. Alexander
New Mexico State Police

Lt. Paul Angleton
Abilene, Texas

Captain Joe Belvedresi
Pine Bluff, Arkansas

Assistant Chief Ed Barr
Galveston, Texas

Sergeant Richard Boyd
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Officer Greg Boynton
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Officer Willie Buffington
Monroe, Louisiana

Officer John T. Carr
Lake Charles, Louisiana

Major Gerald Emmett
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Lt. Ira Frisinger
Austin, Texas

Miss Vonnie Haynes
Bossier City, Louisiana

Captain Bill Holyfield
Oklahoma Highway Patrol

Deputy Chief Fred Johnson
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Sergeant Nelson Lohr
Tulsa, Oklahoma

Lt. Marvin Richardson
Amarillo, Texas

Mr. Robert A. Shaffer
Probation Department
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Captain Garland Smith
North Little Rock, Arkansas

Superintendent Donald J. Thibodeaux
Louisiana State Police
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Student Assistants

R. Lindsey Bailey
Stephen L. Bailey
Patricia H. Chapman
Dana De Witt
James D. Douglas
Neil S. Jacobs
Charles T. Ketchell, Jr.
Joseph W. Kittrell, Jr.
Nelson E. Lohr
William M. Malone
Kitty Mitchell
Andrew H. Moreton
Sally Parrish
Raymond D. Smith

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Professor Samuel G. Chapman
Project Director

Professor C. Kenneth Meyer
Director of Research

Ms. Cheryl Swanson
Research Associate

INTRODUCTION

Nationally, the incidence of assaults on police has grown steadily during the past 13 years.[1] The FBI statistics on police assaults show that the number of police officers killed during the period 1960-1972 has increased from 28 slain in 1960 to 112 in 1972, with an average of 69 deaths for each of the 13 years. During the same 13 year span, the total number of assaults against police officers ranged from a reported total of 9,621 assaults in 1960 to 37,523 assaults in 1972, averaging 26,564 assaults per year, as displayed in Table 1. The consistently large numbers of both fatal and non-fatal assaults have caused an increased awareness of and expressed concern about the occupational safety of law enforcement officers throughout the United States.

Obviously, some response must be made to this growing problem. It is unfortunate, though, that when confronted with the reality of such attacks, our instincts urge us to meet violence with violence. As natural and as warranted as this feeling may be, the history of human experience would suggest that a violent counter-offensive may entrap the police establishment in an ever-increasing spiral of violence leading only to more deaths and injuries as well as greater alienation from the community. A society characterized by fear and repression could be the result, and even the possibility of this result precludes taking the risk.

Even if we do not consider the violent counter-attack, we are attracted to brief, straightforward, and frequently simplistic answers to the problem of police assaults. But, as we have grown to realize through experience, complex problems are not resolved by simple solutions. Such solutions too often affect only the symptoms and not the underlying causes.

The sole alternative lies along the road of complexity, as an attempt is made to identify, analyze, and evaluate the relevant variables that have a bearing on the assault question. If the ultimate goal is the development of policies and techniques that will reduce the incidence of attacks against the police, our immediate objective must include a comprehensive awareness of the context in which such assaults occur.

Hence, such concepts as "police function," "violence," and "assault" will be set out in light of the needs and purposes of this study. The philosophical and psychological underpinnings of our culture, as they have contributed to the formation of present attitudes toward violence, will be reviewed. The values and practices of contemporary society which tend to sanction or increase recourse to violence will be explored. An analysis of the police function as it may currently encourage or invoke assaultive behavior will be provided.

TABLE 1

THE NUMBER OF ASSAULTS ON POLICE OFFICERS AND POLICE OFFICERS MURDERED, BY YEAR, AND ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE, OVER THE THIRTEEN YEAR SPAN 1960-1972

Year	Total Assaults	Rate Per 100 Officers	Percent Increase Over Year Previous	Assaults With Injury	Rate Per 100 Officers	Percent Increase Over Year Previous	Number of Police Officers Murdered	Percent Increase Over Year Previous
1960	9,621	6.3	--	NR*	NR	--	28	--
1961	13,190	8.3	37.1	NR	NR	--	37	32.1
1962	17,330	10.2	31.4	NR	NR	--	48	29.7
1963	16,793	11.0	(-3.1)	NR	NR	--	55	14.6
1964	18,001	9.9	7.2	7,738	4.3	--	57	3.6
1965	20,523	10.8	14.0	6,836	3.6	(-11.7)	53	(-7.0)
1966	23,851	12.2	16.2	9,113	4.6	33.3	57	7.5
1967	26,755	13.5	12.2	10,770	5.4	18.2	76	33.3
1968	33,604	15.8	25.6	14,072	6.6	30.7	64	(-15.8)
1969	35,202	16.9	4.8	11,949	5.7	(-15.1)	86	34.4
1970	43,171	18.7	22.6	15,165	6.6	26.9	100	16.3
1971	49,768	18.7	15.3	17,631	6.6	16.3	126	26.0
1972	37,523	15.1	(-24.6)	12,230	5.8	(-30.6)	112	(-11.0)
TOTAL	345,332			105,504			899	

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office). Data were extracted from each Uniform Crime Report for the years set out above.

*NR - Not reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Uniform Crime Reports until 1964.

In addition to providing a theoretical foundation for the study of violence emanating from police-citizen interaction, an empirical analysis of assault incidents will be undertaken. Variables such as personal characteristics of police officers and their offenders will be examined. In addition, environmental and situational variables will be studied in light of assault frequency. Through a systematic analysis of the correlates of assaultive behavior, we hope to lay the groundwork for the identification and implementation of approaches and techniques that will countermand the conditions now leading to assaults against police and move us substantially along the path toward an order of peace in our cities.

Police Assaults as a Subject of National Concern

Until 1973, efforts addressed to cope with the problem of assaults on law enforcement officers have largely centered around legislative and executive action. At the national level measures were introduced in 1970 by Senators Williams (Senate Bill 4325), Schweiker (Senate Bill 4348), Eastland (Senate Bill 4359), and the late Senator Dodd (Senate Bill 4403) which contained various provisions designed to bring federal resources and sanctions to bear upon those who kill or assault police, or encourage, incite, promote, or aid such actions. The subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee of the Judiciary held hearings in 1970 and considered legislation proposed to reduce violence directed against police.[2] These Senate hearings served to further focus attention upon and systematically document the problem of assaults on police officers as did other efforts, including periodic reports released by the Police Weapons Center of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Perhaps the most publicized single response, other than the Senate Subcommittee hearings, was the White House conference of June 3, 1971 during which President Nixon and members of his administration met with law enforcement personnel from across the nation. The President, indicating his concern over the upswing in police killings, proposed that the federal government pay a lump sum of $50,000 to the survivors of any police officer murdered in the line of duty.[4] Furthermore, the President asserted that, "All resources of the Department of Justice and the FBI are pledged by this Administration to assist you in discharging your responsibilities."[5]

President Nixon's pledge provided that upon specific request of chiefs or agency heads, the Federal Bureau of Investigation would actively participate in the investigation of the killing of police officers by working jointly with local authorities. The President's letter of June 14, 1971 formally advised local and state law enforcement officials throughout the nation of his pledge to help stop fatal assaults on police.[6]

On September 9 and 10, 1971, several lawmen from across America met in the District of Columbia and participated in The Attorney General's 1971 Conference on Crime Reduction. A subcommittee on police casualties, chaired by District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Chief Jerry V. Wilson, announced its support for the President's proposal to pay survivors. The conference participants also recommended that public policy statements be made by government officials and political parties denouncing assaults on police.[7] In spite of substantial lobbying, the Congress failed to pass the measure.

Review of the Literature

Despite the urgency of the assault problem, very little is known about assaults on police. The lack of a comprehensive set of data on the characteristics of police assaults prompted J. Shane Creamer and Gerald R. Robin to remark in an article appearing in a leading police journal:

> While statistics and background information on fatal assaults is very limited, long range information on nonfatal police assaults is non-existent...Actually all that can be done at this point is to alert the police to certain characteristics of the assault problem. Too little information is available to begin to solve this difficult problem of assaults on police officers.[8]

The national statistical data provided each year by the Federal Bureau of Investigation are extracted from forms submitted by police agencies to the FBI or from state bureaus of criminal statistics. The form developed by the FBI to collect data on assaults during the period 1960-1971 was very basic in design and was limited to gathering the following type of information: (1) the number of full-time officers killed in the line of duty; (2) the total number of police assaulted; (3) the total number of injury and non-injury assaults; and (4) the type of weapon utilized in the assault event.[9] Since January 1, 1972, the basic assault report was substantially revised and reflects a determined effort to assemble a more complete set of assault related information, such as the type of police activity the officer was engaged in and the type of officer assignment when the assault occurred. The "Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted" reporting form is shown in Figure 1.

The FBI assault statistics are pertinent to the study of police assaults in many ways. However, the FBI data are fundamental and limited in scope and do not adequately address the many questions pertaining to assaults which must be investigated in any thorough study of violence against law enforcement officers.

FIGURE 1

12-108 (Rev. 4-18-72)

Bureau Budget No. 43-R0500

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED OR ASSAULTED

It is requested this report be completed and transmitted with monthly crime reports to: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Washington, D. C. 20535. This form should be used to report the number of your officers who were assaulted or killed in the line of duty during the month. Additional information concerning officers killed will be requested by a separate questionnaire.

OFFICERS KILLED

Number of your law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty this month.

By felonious act _____

By accident or negligence _____

Officers Assaulted (Do not include officers killed) - See other side for instructions.

Type of Activity	Total Assaults by Weapon A	Type of Weapon: Firearm B	Knife or Other Cutting Instrument C	Other Dangerous Weapon D	Hands, Fists, Feet, etc. E	Type of Assignment: Two-Man Vehicle F	One-Man Vehicle: Alone G	One-Man Vehicle: Assisted H	Detective or Special Assign.: Alone I	Detective or Special Assign.: Assisted J	Other: Alone K	Other: Assisted L	Police Assaults Cleared M
1. Responding to "Disturbance" calls (family quarrels, man with gun, etc.)													
2. Burglaries in progress or pursuing burglary suspects													
3. Robberies in progress or pursuing robbery suspects													
4. Attempting other arrests													
5. Civil disorder (riot, mass disobedience)													
6. Handling, transporting, custody of prisoners. . .													
7. Investigating suspicious persons or circumstances													
8. Ambush - no warning . .													
9. Mentally deranged													
10. Traffic pursuits and stops.													
11. All other													
12. TOTAL (1-11)													
13. Number with personal injury . .													
14. Number without personal injury .													

15. Time of assaults . . . . AM / PM

12:01 2:00 4:00 6:00 8:00 10:00 12:00

DO NOT WRITE HERE	Initials
Recorded	
Edited	
Punched	
Verified	
Adjusted	

Month and Year | Agency Identifier | Prepared by | Title

Agency | State | Chief, Sheriff, Commissioner, Superintendent

Owing to the many problems inherent to gathering data on police assaults, few empirical studies have been undertaken. Prior to 1973 several reports on assaults were written by law enforcement officials and published in news magazines. These reports were highly impressionistic and were generally based on day-to-day observations by a police officer or investigative writer and focused on specific operational aspects of the problem. However, they did not provide a systematic treatment of the many factors surrounding assault incidents.[10]

An entire issue of The Annals[11] was devoted to articles dealing with violence, most of which were concerned with the psychological and sociological aspects of violent behavior. Only one article out of 14 dealt with aggressive crimes, and the writer concluded that the paucity of statistics available precluded the identification of trends in this area.

Another type of literature which is relevant to the problem of assaults on police officers is information which was published at periodic intervals by the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Gaithersburg, Maryland, and is abstracted from data collected by the IACP's Police Weapons Center. This information was presented in the form of statistical and summary reports on various operational aspects of police injuries and deaths which arose from combat situations across the nation. The Police Weapons Center was funded in part for its first year (1970) through a U.S. Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant. The purpose of the Police Weapons Center was to provide the information required by law enforcement agencies to formulate effective plans for the procurement and discriminate use of weapons systems, for the purpose of reducing the levels of violence associated with routine police operations and civil disorder.

Another IACP program, "Police Casualty Series," also funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, gathered data relating to assaults on police.[12] However, this data suffered from several limitations. First, the IACP-assembled data were taken from accounts reported in newspapers and public journals, posing problems of reliability. Second, the data are heavily weighted toward incidents where one or more police officers were injured or killed; incidents without police injuries/fatalities often receive little or no media coverage. This identifies a third factor, the unknown number of unreported assault cases. Fourth, although the data are broken down by region, there is no separation between urban and rural incidents, which may be an important factor in the assaults problem. Thus, for at least the above reasons, data gathered under the Police Casualty Series Program is of limited value in the construction of a valid and uniform data base.

Two studies completed in the mid and late 1960's represent a more

sophisticated research approach. The first investigated behavioral patterns in police-citizen contacts and focused on the nature and number of these contacts.[13] However, the usefulness of the results in considering assaults was limited by the fact that the study only included data on police-citizen contacts which were free of conflict. The second study, by Grant and Toch, attempted to formulate a typology of violence through a socio-psychological perspective in two special settings. It was useful as a foundation to the Police Assaults Study.[14] The primary objective of the Grant and Toch study was to identify recurring patterns of violence. Its second objective was to define the world of various kinds of habitually violent persons, to analyze the settings in which violence tends to occur, and to investigate the nature of the relationship between types of violent persons and types of violent incidents. Grant and Toch used content analysis of 444 police descriptions of assaults on themselves, then interviewed as many of the assailants and policemen as they could conveniently locate. A "peer interview" method was used in which the interviewer of a convicted assailant was himself a former violent felon.

The results of the study showed that most of the assaults followed a sequence of events. The most common sequence (found in 40 percent of the incidents examined) consisted of a police officer issuing orders or instructions to a person, the person expressing his contempt for the officer, and the officer pressing his demand. The final precipitating act found the officer placing his hands on the person after concluding that verbal injunctions were ineffective. Violence then ensued.[15] The second most frequent sequence (found in 27 percent of the incidents) was one in which violence was already manifest as the police officer entered the scene. The assault on the officer occurred when he attempted to restrain the violent person(s).

The authors concluded that violent behavior can be dealt with as a sequential component of interpersonal games or themes, and that present enforcement procedures do not recognize this aspect of violence and are thus apt to increase the probability of violence rather than reduce it. They suggested that many assailants use violent behavior to manipulate the controlling authority into doing something that would be of benefit to the assailants. In such cases, the authority's reaction, which focuses on the violent act itself and not on the motivation for the act, is easily predicted. It is this reaction which is the goal of the violent act. In such cases, police officers are unknowing contributors to violence directed against themselves by reacting in a predictable manner.

Although valuable, the Grant and Toch study was confined to a single geographic area in northern California and probed a relatively small number of cases. Therefore, its results seem too limited to be used as the basis for proposing remedial programs.

A later study by Toch delved further into the psychology of violent men, but did not concentrate on the problem of assaults on police.[16]

Another useful study was that of Professor Allen P. Bristow, who in a study of 110 officers injured by an assailant's gunfire, discovered that more officers are shot subsequent to an initial contact, e.g., during interrogation, citation, or while requesting a radio record check, than in making the initial contact with a suspect.[17]

Still another study of value dealt with the nature of police fatalities among officers in California over an 11-year span. It reported that of the 85 California peace officers slain on duty from 1960 through 1970, 39 percent were alone as opposed to 41 percent who had one partner and an additional 20 percent who were with two or more officers.[18]

The United States Senate was responsible for assembling some of the most relevant literature about assaults on police officers occurring during the 1960's. Two Senate subcommittee hearings on the issue in 1970 produced published transcripts of testimony. First, from July 15 through August 6, 1970 the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations held public hearings on riots, civil and criminal disorders. Part of the hearings included testimony by police and other public officials about assaults on police.[19] Next, the Senate's Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, a sub-unit of the Committee on the Judiciary, held public hearings on assaults on law enforcement officers from October 6 through 9, 1970.[20] The October hearings were intended to provide information and make recommendations concerning: (1) federal legislative proposals concerning the killing of police officers or firemen; (2) making assaults on state officers a federal offense; (3) applying criminal sanctions for urban terrorism; and (4) development of additional recommendations concerning the control and use of explosives. The five volumes which stemmed from these two Senate subcommittee hearings include abundant general information, but are deficient in addressing and analyzing the central issue of assaults against law enforcement officers.

This is a summary of the available literature through 1972 when the Police Assaults Study was initiated at the University of Oklahoma. Clearly the assault issue had not been subjected to a deliberate, adequate and systematic analysis of a broadly based nature.

Scope of the Research

The mounting numbers of officers assaulted and killed, the concern manifested at the national political level, the paucity of

meaningful literature on assaultive behavior make an incontrovertable case for conducting research to help identify and explain the assault phenomenon.

Definition of Assault

To insure uniformity in data collection it was necessary to provide a common and generally accepted definition of what constitutes an assault on a police officer. Therefore, an assault is operationally defined in this research as "any overt physical act that the officer perceives or has reason to believe was intended to cause him harm." An examination of assault incidents reported reveals that the majority of cases involved some form of physical contact between the officer and suspect. There were several cases, however, in which assaults were of a highly anonymous nature, e.g., snipings, ambushes, and the propelling of objects. Since the acts were clearly motivated with the intent to inflict bodily harm to an officer, even though the suspect in most cases was not identified, these events were included within the assault population under study. Finally, there were a small number of cases where the interaction between the suspect and officer was characterized solely by verbal abuse or mere threat of assault. These few cases were classified as constituting an assault since they clearly fall within the parameter of the assault's theoretical definition.

Research Objectives

This research attempted to answer several questions associated with a number of variables hypothesized to be related to police assaults. Since the empirical research was principally exploratory in nature, it was not designed to confirm or reject any existing theory of violence against police officers. However, some existing literature did provide an initial focus by suggesting that the assault problem might be analyzed by looking at the following four sets of variables: (1) situational and environmental; (2) actor; (3) process; and (4) triggering mechanisms.

The Situational and Environmental Variables:

- °What are the specific locales in which assaults take place?
- °In what kind of jurisdiction (municipal, county, state) are the assaulted officers employed?
- °What community social, economic and demographic characteristics are associated with assaultive behavior?

The Actor Variables:

- °What are the characteristics of the officers who get assaulted?

- °What are the characteristics of the alleged police offender?

The Process Variables:

- °What kinds of police functions and activities are most frequently associated with assaults?

The Triggering Mechanisms:

- °Which kinds of verbal and physical behavior are demonstrated by either the officer(s) or offender(s) that contribute in escalating a police-citizen interaction into a violent encounter?

To fulfill these objectives, the Police Assaults Study focused on six work products. The first work product, which is more comprehensive in design, develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of the nature and causes of violence directed against police officers. The remaining five work products,[21] which are more specifically oriented, include the following:

1. The development of socio-psychological profiles for assaulted police officers and police offenders.

2. A description of the environmental and situational factors which contribute to assaultive behavior.

3. The identification of common triggering mechanisms which may be related to the assault episode.

4. An analysis of the management and supervisory milieu within selected police organizations relative to police assaults.

5. Examination of the processes of police selection and police training within selected police agencies to discern ways in which assaults may be significantly reduced or prevented.

The master research plan utilized in completing the six work products is presented in Table 2. Table 2 arrays the work products by both study components and by the research methods and strategies employed. The various study components outlined in the master research plan are presented in this report. The data generated from these various study components constitute an empirical data base from which police operational techniques, procedures, training and equipment may be developed. These

TABLE 2

MASTER RESEARCH PLAN FOR FULFILLING WORK PRODUCTS BY RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND CORRESPONDING STUDY COMPONENTS*

POLICE ASSAULTS STUDY WORK PRODUCTS	Theoretical Framework (Search of the Literature)	Research Methods: Survey Research — STUDY COMPONENTS					Aggregate Analysis: Macro	Aggregate Analysis: Micro
	Search and Review of the Literature on Violence	Total Municipal Police Assaults Reported from 37 Police Agencies in the South Central U.S. (1973 Data Base)	Police Assaults Reported from the New Mexico State Police, Louisiana State Police and Oklahoma Highway Patrol (1973 Data Base)	Sociological-Psychological Characteristics of Police Officers and Offenders (1973 Data Base)	Study of the Individual Police Officers Personal Characteristics (1973 Data Base)	Survey of Officers Perception of Police Organization in which They Function in Three Selected Cities and a Profile of Assaulted and Non-Assaulted Officers for Selected Cities (1973 Data Base)	Analysis of Assaults on Municipal Police Officers in 46 South Central U.S. Cities (1970-1972 Data Base)	Assaults on Police in Austin, Texas (1970-1972 Data Base)
COMPREHENSIVE THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF VIOLENCE AS RELATED TO POLICE ASSAULTS	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
SPECIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF ASSAULTED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND POLICE ASSAILANTS	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS RELATED TO ASSAULT INCIDENTS	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
TRIGGERING MECHANISMS RELATED TO ASSAULT INCIDENTS	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISORY TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES RELATED TO ASSAULT INCIDENTS	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
POLICE SELECTION AND TRAINING RELATED TO ASSAULTS	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO

*This master plan indicates with a "yes" or a "no" which work products were satisfied using a particular method of research and included in one or several of the various study components. For instance, "Triggering Mechanisms Related to Assaults" were treated in a greater or less extent in each of the research methods and study components (yes), except in the instances when the case study and aggregate analysis methods were utilized (no).

developments could hopefully enhance the personal safety of law enforcement personnel.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Although the total number of reported assaults for the time from 1960-1972 indicates an upward trend, a decrease in police assaults over the previous year was evidenced during 1963 (-3.1 percent) and 1972 (-24.6 percent) respectively. For a more detailed assault distribution, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960-1972.

[2]United States, Congress, Senate, Committee of the Judiciary, Assaults on Police Officers Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Laws, on S. 1941, 92nd Congress, October 6 through 9, 1970. Senator James Eastland (D., Miss.), Chairman of the Subcommittee, opened the October 6-9 hearings:

> These vicious attacks on officers, the murder and maiming of lawmen, are assaults of the most dangerous nature upon the structure of law and order which support civilized society...

At the October 8th hearing, Senator Strom Thurmond (R., S. Car.) expressed his opinion on the issue:

> Without policemen, the people have no safety, without law enforcement officers we have an uncivilized society.

[3]Police Casualty Series, Police Weapons Center, Management and Research Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1970-71.

[4]The proposal to provide $50,000 to survivors of police officers murdered in the line of duty attracted support from several quarters. Then Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kliendienst testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee in late September, 1971. He asserted that it was important to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to enable the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to make payments from funds appropriated for that purpose. The lump sum payment would be in addition to any other state or local benefits due the survivors. See "Deputy Attorney General Testifies in Support of Bill to Aid Survivors of Slain Policemen," LEAA Newsletter, 2 (November, 1971), p. 12.

[5]"President Nixon Pledges Full Support to Stop Police Killings," The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 40 (August, 1971), p. 16.

[6]Ibid., p. 17.

[7]"Remarks of the Workshop Moderators," The Attorney General's Conference on Crime Reduction, 1971, (September 9 and 10, 1971), transcript, 17 pp. mimeo.

[8]J. Shane Creamer and Gerald D. Robin, "Assaults on Police," Police, 12 (March-April, 1968), pp. 82-87.

[9]Specifically, the FBI form asked for the following information:

OFFICERS KILLED: Number of full-time law enforcement officers belonging to your organization who were killed in the line of duty during the year_____.

OFFICERS ASSAULTED: Number of full-time law enforcement officers belonging to your organization who were assaulted in the line of duty during the year by use of the following weapons:

	Injury	No Injury
a. Firearm.....	_____	_____
b. Knife or cutting instrument.....	_____	_____
c. Other dangerous weapon.....	_____	_____
d. Hands, fists, feet, etc.....	_____	_____
TOTAL.....	_____	_____

[10]Examples of these kinds of publications include: Thomas J. Reddin, "Non-Lethal Weapons -- Curse or Cure?" The Police Chief, 34 (December, 1967), pp. 60-63. Also see: Henry A. Fitzgibbon, "The Sniper Menace," The Police Chief, 34 (November, 1967), pp. 40-42; and J. Edgar Hoover, "Police 'Brutality' -- Fact or Fiction?" U.S. News and World Report (September 6, 1965), pp. 37-39; Louise Cook, "Tempo Quickening in Assaults Against Policemen in U.S.," Pacific Stars and Stripes, (September 21, 1970), p. 11, column 1-4; and Katherine Hatch, "Eight Troopers Killed on Duty," The Daily Oklahoman, (February 19, 1971), p. 7, columns 4-8.

[11]"Patterns of Violence," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Thorsten Sellin, Editor, 364 (March, 1966).

[12]Police Casualty Series, Police Weapons Center, Management and Research Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1970-71.

[13]Donald J. Black and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Patterns of Behavior in Police and Citizen Transactions," Studies of Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas, 11, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1966, pp. 11-13.

[14]J. Douglas Grant and Hans Toch, A Typology of Violence According to Purpose, Sacramento: Institute for the Study of Crime and Delinquency, January, 1968.

[15]This phenomenon is amply described in: Julius Fast, Body Language, New York: Pocket Books, 1970, pp. 9-52. Also see: Robert Audrey, The Territorial Imperative, New York: Atheneum, 1966.

[16]Hans Toch, Violent Men -- An Inquiry into the Psychology of Violence, Chicago: Aldine, 1969, p. 285.

[17]Allen P. Bristow, "Police Officer Shootings: A Tactical Evaluation," The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 54 (March-April, 1963), pp. 93-95.

[18]Willard H. Hutchins, California State Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, "Criminal Homicides of California Peace Officers, 1960-1970," an address given in Los Angeles on March 5, 1971 before the California Homicide Investigators' Conference.

[19]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 92nd Congress, July 31 and August 4, 5 and 6, 1970.

[20]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee of the Judiciary, Assaults on Police Officers Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Laws, on s. 1941, 92nd Congress, October 6 through 9, 1970.

[21]In addition to the five specific work products outlined, the Police Assaults Study was initially charged with researching two additional substantive areas: (1) to analyze those personal defense systems, weapons, and techniques related to the handling of conflict situations and to make recommendations for the improvement of existing training programs; and (2) to provide for an analysis of the legal and regulatory codes that set forth directives which govern police-citizen interactions and to make recommendations concerning their improvement.

These two work products are not contained in this report. Owing to a variety of methodological problems, accompanied by funding constraints, the magnitude of research and technical skills needed for conducting an empirical investigation into these areas, and based upon outside professional evaluation and recommendation, a modification was requested and subsequently authorized by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration on January 18, 1974.

RESEARCH METHODS

Professor C. Kenneth Meyer
Director of Research

Ms. Cheryl G. Swanson
Research Associate

RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction

This chapter presents a general overview of the research methods, designs and instruments utilized in the study of assaults directed against municipal and state police officers in the south central region of the United States. It also provides a brief description of several data collection procedures and statistical procedures employed in the analysis of project data.

This discussion is intentionally brief since the data collection procedures, data processing and analysis techniques, questionnaire construction and design, master coding formats, and other data set characteristics are comprehensively treated in a companion project volume, the Operations Research Manual.[1] In addition, a synopsis of the major methodological procedures and data analysis techniques are presented in each of the study components included subsequently in this project final report, Perspectives of Police Assaults in the South Central United States.

Research Design and Methods

Over the course of the Police Assaults Study, six principal research designs have been employed. These include: (1) the construction of a theoretical perspective on violence against police officers; (2) the development of a profile of the assault incident for municipal and state police agencies; (3) an identification of the personal characteristics of assaulted and non-assaulted police officers; (4) a sociometric analysis of selected police organizations; (5) a description of alternative methods for the psychological testing of police officers; and (6) an analysis of the relationship between community environmental characteristics and police assaults. The research methods used to analyze the several assault dimensions outlined above are briefly discussed below.

A. A Theoretical Perspective on Violence Against Law Enforcement Personnel

The theoretical perspective on violence against police was the product of an exhaustive search and review of the literature on violence.[2] To develop a theoretical framework by which assaults against police could be more comprehensively understood, it was necessary to examine the sociological, psychological, religious, political and economic attributes associated with violence in general. The theoretical perspective on violence which emerged from this research was based on and supported by the observation

of some of the most reputable experts and students of violent behavior, such as Plato, Mills, Sorel, Freud, Maslow, Sibley, Baldwin, Fanin, and many others.[2]

B. Profile of the Assault Incident

In the study and analysis of the assault incident four general assault dimensions were identified. These dimensions provide a profile of the assaulted officer, a profile of the police assailant, a description of the assault environment and an analysis of the dynamics surrounding the assault incident.

To obtain data corresponding to these assault dimensions, survey research methods were employed.[3] The principal assault reporting instrument was the Physical Contact Summary (PCS) form. Assaulted police officers in participating study cities were requested to complete the PCS form. To insure uniformity in assault reporting the following operational definition of an assault was set out for officers in each participating agency: "Any overt physical act that the officer perceives or has reason to believe was intended to cause him harm."[4]

The PCS is comprised of seven principal sections. The type of questions contained in the PCS form are basically reflective of the stimulus-response paradigm[5] so widely employed in the behavioral sciences. Most of the questions, however, are of the stimulus-structured (SS) and response-structured (RS) variety, although a wide latitude was permitted for stimulus-free (SF) and response-free (RF) questions in Parts IV and VII of the Physical Contact Summary.

1. Instructions and Expression of Appreciation

Instructions printed on the cover of the Physical Contact Summary form are designed to clarify the questionnaire format for the responding officer and to insure, as much as possible, uniform recording and reporting of assault information. The cover also contains a note of appreciation to the respondent for participating in the Police Assaults Study research project.

2. Agency Identification

The information obtained by this section allows statistical control for: (1) type of law enforcement agency reporting assault information; (2) population of the city in which the assault took place; and (3) the state from which the assault data originates during the period of data collection (January 1 through December 31, 1973).

3. Officer Data

This section contains questions regarding law enforcement background, length of service, height, rank, duty status, duty assignment, race, the presence of other officers at the time of the assault, and other relevant information about the assaulted officer.

4. Suspect Data

This section solicits information not only about the physical and social characteristics of the suspected assailant but also includes questions concerning the suspect's being under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the incident.

5. Assault Data

This section gathers data on the general environmental and behavioral setting of the assault event by means of four descriptive categories:

a. Time-Space Properties: These questions solicit information concerning the data, day, time and location of the assault event.

b. Officer and Suspect Activity: These questions deal with the principal actors' activity prior to the assault event.

c. Triggering Mechanisms: These questions attempt to specify the exact physical acts and spoken words occurring immediately prior to the assault.

d. Violence Dimension: These questions concern the type of weapons employed and the level of violence manifested during the assault event.

6. Officer and Suspect Injuries

This section elicits information concerning the nature, location and level of injury suffered by the actors engaged in the assault event.

7. Training Background of Officer

This section is designed to allow an assessment of the training background of the assaulted officer. It contains questions related to the type of training received during various time frames (prior six months, prior 12 months, and more than 12 months). The type of training received ranges from "basic recruit" to "police community relations."

The PCS form was constructed after the staff had completed a comprehensive review of the literature in the field of assaultive behavior and had drawn on consultants' knowledge in survey research. This procedure was used for a variety of methodological considerations:

1. To insure that the language used in the schedule would be precise, that it would enhance communication, and that it would be useful for general quantitative measurement purposes.[6]

2. To minimize the problems of measurement specification in terms of time, place, and individualized items.

3. To standardize the measurement devices as much as possible for purposes of comparison, precision, and control of attributes, properties, and circumstances surrounding the assault event.[7]

4. To enhance the accuracy and control function of the questionnaire to insure as much "truth, validity, and confidence" as possible in the information transmitted on the questionnaire.[8]

5. To better understand the symbolic environment of the respondent and his organizational milieu.[9]

6. To guard against making errors of ambiguity, misunderstanding, and intentional or unintentional loading of the stimulus-response items.[10]

7. To survey the scientific literature encompassing the fields of assaultive, conflictive, aggressive, and stressful behavior to insure more complete familiarization with the subject matter under study.[11]

After satisfying the standard tenets of modern survey research methodology related to questionnaire construction, the PCS form was pre-tested during February, March and April, 1973 in 38 urban and rural police agencies throughout Oklahoma, including the Oklahoma Highway Patrol. The pre-test design solicited 1971 assault data. In all, 331 Physical Contact Summaries were completed by the 38 participating agencies and sent to the Police Assaults Study research staff.

These returned questionnaires were then analyzed for incomplete or missing information, loaded questions, double-ended questions, adequacy of the time allowed for questionnaire completion, discernment of multiple response items, level of vocabulary familiarity, and the need for additional questions to solicit a more complete description of the assault event. This pre-test and accompanying preliminary statistical analysis rendered a sizable

benefit in terms of long-range questionnaire applicability and uniformity in:

1. Sharpening the theoretical definitions.

2. Refinement of the various operational definitions and subsequent item construction. This resulted in modifying some of the questions used in the pre-test agencies and the addition of other questions which were either inadvertently omitted or not properly conceptualized.

3. Redevelopment of questionnaire deployment strategies which were more harmonious with the assault reporting procedures of all-purpose governmental police units (municipal, county and state) and law enforcement agencies in other political subdivisions (towns, villages, and hamlets).

4. Development of multiple-response information storage and retrieval systems.[12]

5. Incorporation of specialized computational packages to adequately treat missing data.[13]

6. Expansion of the scope of confidentiality and anonymity consistent with the advice and recommendations of a legal consultant and social research expert.[14]

Subsequent to the development, construction and pre-testing of the Physical Contact Summary form, the refined instrument was administered by research team associates to all assaulted officers from 37 municipal police departments in Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas and from three state agencies in Louisiana, New Mexico and Oklahoma during the data collection period which extended from January 1, 1973 through December 31, 1973.

The selection of police agencies for participation in this area of research was based on their willingness to cooperate in the study. Owing to the exigencies of police work, the law enforcement community is often hesitant to participate in research which closely examines the activities and operations of their respective departments. Therefore, it was necessary to obtain data on an availability basis. While this method of selection has some drawbacks, it is nevertheless recognized as a legitimate methodological approach. For example, in their discussion of sampling methods, Mueller et. al. note that:

> Although fully aware of the limitations of nonrandom sampling, sooner or later the experienced social scientist will realize that some form of it is the only alternative to abandoning the inquiry...Therefore, it would

> be pendantic to deny the uses of available opportunities, even though they do not yield ideal data.[15]

The principal techniques utilized in the analysis of data obtained from the PCS forms were descriptive,including percentages, means, standard deviations, and frequency distribution.[16] In addition, the municipal, county and state agencies were kept conceptually distinct for purposes of assault analysis.

C. Profile of the Personal Characteristics of Assaulted and Non-Assaulted Officers

This research was designed to provide for a comparison of the personal characteristics which differentiate assaulted officers from non-assaulted officers. To facilitate this comparison, data were collected on each police officer within participating municipal and state agencies for six categories. These categories consist of demographic data, educational data, professional data, employment history, physical data and assault data.

The principal research instruments used to acquire personal information were the Personal Data Inventory (PDI) and the Police Agency Personnel Profile (PAPP). These questionnaires were distributed to 13 south central municipal police agencies and one state police agency. The PDI forms were completed for all officers by a project field representative upon a search of the individual officer's personnel files. The Police Agency Personnel Profiles were completed by the individual officers under the direct supervision of the agency representative.

The municipal departments were selected relative to their rank order on the Index of Proneness to be Assaulted (IPA).[17] The IPA was developed by determining the ratio of total assaults to each 10,000 inhabitants for 46 south central cities, and then rank ordering the cities from low assault to high assault ratios. The agencies participating in this phase of the research ranked at either the low, middle or high end of the ranking spectrum. The ranking of the 46 cities is listed in Table 1.

Although the rank position of the municipalities on the IPA was a major criterion utilized for agency selection, these choices were largely conditioned by the willingness of the agency to cooperate in subsequent research with the project staff. The state agency was selected in order to discern if there are any major differences between the assaulted and non-assaulted officers by type of agency. However, the two agency types (municipal and state) remained conceptually distinct throughout the analysis.

In the analysis of the personal characteristics of police officers,

TABLE 1

INDEX OF PRONENESS TO BE ASSAULTED FOR 46 SOUTH CENTRAL CITIES
BY RATIO OF TOTAL ASSAULTS TO 10,000 POPULATION

Rank	City	Assaults per 10,000 Population	Rank	City	Assaults per 10,000 Population
1	Fort Worth	.3	24	Garland	2.2
2	*North Little Rock	.3	25	Irving	2.3
3	*Lake Charles	.5	26	Lubbock	2.5
4	*Abilene	.6	27	*Lawton	2.6
5	Midland	.7	28	**Oklahoma City	2.7
6	*Norman	.8	29	San Antonio	3.0
7	Odessa	.9	30	Mesquite	3.1
8	Corpus Christi	.9	31	Beaumont	3.1
9	Wichita Falls	1.0	32	Midwest City	3.3
10	Longview	1.1	33	Fort Smith	3.5
11	*Monroe	1.1	34	Pasadena	3.5
12	Victoria	1.2	35	**Tulsa	3.6
13	Tyler	1.2	36	Shreveport	3.6
14	Arlington	1.2	37	Grand Prairie	3.9
15	Port Arthur	1.2	38	Little Rock	4.1
16	Brownsville	1.3	39	San Angelo	4.2
17	Laredo	1.4	40	*Bossier City	4.6
18	Waco	1.5	41	*Amarillo	4.7
19	El Paso	1.6	42	*Galveston	4.9
20	Baytown	1.8	43	New Orleans	5.7
21	Dallas	1.9	44	Houston	5.8
22	*Pine Bluff	2.1	45	Baton Rouge	6.7
23	*Austin	2.2	46	Albuquerque	12.5

*Police jurisdictions which submitted the Personal Data Inventory.

**Police jurisdictions which submitted the Police Agency Personnel Profile.

descriptive statistics were commonly employed. In addition, Pearson's product moment correlations were utilized to assess the relationships which exist between the independent variables and the frequency of officer assaults.[18]

D. A Sociometric Analysis of Selected Police Organizations

This study was designed to assess the individual officer's perception of the formal and informal characteristics of the organization of which he is a member. The analysis focused on the aggregate perceptions of the police officers surveyed. The Hemphill's Index of Group Dimensions questionnaire[19] was distributed to all commissioned officers of three selected agencies to determine the organizational perceptions of assaulted and non-assaulted officers.

The agencies surveyed were selected on the basis of several important considerations. First, Lake Charles, Abilene and Galveston were chosen as research sites due to their rankings on the IPA (two agencies indexed low and one agency indexed high). Second, these agencies expressed a desire to cooperate in this aspect of the research since they had participated in the other research components of the study. The Hemphill Index is a standardized self-administered questionnaire which was distributed to to all police officers in the three surveyed jurisdictions by an agency representative of the Police Assaults Study.

The data generated from this questionnaire were evaluated through the medium of descriptive statistics, utilizing comparison of means and frequency distributions.

E. Description of the Sociological and Psychological Characteristics of Assaulted Police Officers and Police Offenders

The socio-psychological research conducted during Phase I was oriented toward gathering data on the personality characteristics of law enforcement officers in several south central police jurisdictions.

A psychological test battery was administered to 147 officers. The test battery consisted of the California F-scale, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, the California Personality Inventory, the 16 PF, and the D-scale. No attempt is made in this section to describe the various tests which were administered, or what they were designed to measure since the component entitled, "Alternative Methods for the Psychological Testing of Police Officers," provides a comprehensive treatment of these tests. In addition, this essay presents a comprehensive review of the psychological

and sociological literature addressed to police personality testing, and a discussion of the various methodological designs and strategies employed for agency and respondent selection. Also included in this essay is a discussion of the methods utilized for test administration and scoring, test item reduction, as well as a statistical treatment and analysis of the collected data.

In addition to assessing the social and psychological characteristics of assaulted and non-assaulted police officers, a police offender study was conducted in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The primary objective of this research was to make a scientific inquiry into the interpersonal dynamics and circumstances surrounding the assault event. Therefore, during the five month period from August through December, 1973, this phase of the study focused principally on the sociological and psychological attributes of persons in Albuquerque charged with an assault against a municipal police officer, and the general circumstances related to the assault occurrence. The primary instruments utilized in acquiring offender data were an in-depth interview with the alleged offender, a police assailant questionnaire, and a presentence report. Comparison of means and univariate distributions were utilized in the analysis.

F. An Analysis of the Relationships Between Community Environmental Characteristics and Police Assaults

The final component of this report includes two studies which were designed to analyze the relationships between the environmental characteristics of communities and assault frequency. One of the studies which is macro in nature examines the social, economic and demographic characteristics as well as the level of police activity and selected police organizational characteristics among 46 south central U.S. cities in relationship to their corresponding assault levels.[20] The other study, micro in nature, utilizes a similar set of variables to examine assaults within one municipality.

The 46 cities studied represent nearly 90 percent of all the municipalities with a population of 40,000 or above in the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas. Although there were 52 cities which met the population requirement for inclusion in this study, six agencies did not keep assault related statistics and therefore were eliminated from consideration.

The city of Austin, Texas was singled out for in-depth analysis since its police reporting districts coincide with the census enumeration tracts. In addition, Austin ranked at the medium point on the Index of Proneness to be Assaulted. Both the micro and macro studies discussed above utilized multivariate analysis techniques on their respective aggregate data sets.[21] Specifically, multiple-linear (step-wise) regression procedures were

employed in an attempt to explain variation in assaults on police officers. The micro study in Austin also utilized causal modeling techniques to investigate the possibilities of infering sequential and directional relationships among the selected variables.

Confidentiality and Anonymity of Data

The questions of anonymity, confidentiality, and accessibility to project data were of primary concern to police agency representatives as well as officer participants during Phase I. Some of the following precautions have been utilized to address these extremely important questions. First, participants were identified by separate identification numbers in both the agency from which the data originated and in the project data files. The project staff and police administrations (excluding the designated agency representative) were not privileged to the identity of police respondents. Second, on the receipt of all assault information reported from participating agencies, the data was placed on computer tapes for security in storage and for easy project retrieval. Third, once the data was placed on magnetic tapes it could be "scrambled" to assure greater confidentiality and provide a greater assurance against the data being utilized by non-authorized persons. In addition, the scrambled data set is still readily accessible to project programmers, but it is essentially impossible to reconstruct the original data set without access to the program utilized for scrambling. Fourth, the data was stored at project headquarters and also in a tape library. This measure was taken to provide an additional precautionary device against unforseen events, such as damage by fire.

The project data security consultants are satisfied that the project took every measure to maintain the confidentiality, anonymity and security of the data. Judge J. David Rambo, a principle data security consultant to the project, concluded that "...recent federal enactments...coupled with the excellent staff design and direction, provides a complete shield for confidentiality of data collected and prevents (the) staff from being able to disclose any information." The letter from which the above quotation was taken and an opinion from the U.S. Justice Department General Counsel are provided in Appendix 18 of the Operations Research Manual.[23]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Samuel G. Chapman, C. Kenneth Meyer, Charles D. Hale, Cheryl G. Swanson and Patton N. Morrison, Operations Research Manual, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, June 28, 1974, 256 pp.

[2]For an interesting discussion of literature review as a research technique, see Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, pp. 539-544.

[3]For a discussion of the use and techniques of survey research methods, see C.A. Moser, Survey Methods in Social Investigation, London: Heineman, 1961; Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh, Survey Research, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963; and Herbert Hyman, Survey Design and Analysis, New York: Free Press, 1955.

[4]Samuel G. Chapman, Project Plan and Supporting Data to Investigate Assaults on Policemen, Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, January, 1973.

[5]Oliver E. Benson, Political Science Laboratory, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1969, pp.14-31; Delbert C. Miller, Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, New York: David McKay, 1970, pp. 76-83. These sources were particularly helpful in designing questions for field use.

[6]See Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology for Social Research, New York: Harper and Row, 1968, pp. 199-202; also, Stanley L. Payne, The Art of Asking Questions, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951.

[7]Kerlinger, op. cit., p. 310.

[8]For a more detailed treatment of these first four variables, refer to C.W. Churchman, "Why Measure?" in Betty J. Franklin and Harold J. Osborne, Research Methods: Issues and Insights, Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1971, pp. 129-139. Also see Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, The Language of Social Research, New York: The Free Press, 1955, Sections I and VI. In addition, see Thelma F. Batten, Reasoning and Research, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, a publication which presents some interesting conclusions on research planning and design in pp. 81-135.

[9]Sjoberg and Nett, op. cit., p. 198.

[10]Benson, op. cit., pp. 204-205, provides an excellent treatment of the common mistakes which emerge in questionnaire formulation. Also see Julian L. Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social Sciences, New York: Random House, 1969, pp. 100-108 for a sample of the problems which face the social scientist who has chosen to work with questionnaires.

[11]A good case for understanding as much of the real social world as possible, as well as knowing the theoretical and philosophical limitations of empirical methodology before commencing operational research activities, is made by Herbert Blumer, "Methodological Principles of Empirical Science," Sociological Methods, ed. by Norman K. Denzin, Chicago: Aldine, 1970, pp. 20-39.

[12]Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, The Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, OSIRIS II, Software Package, January, 1971.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Robert F. Boruch, "Problems in Research Utilization: Use of Social Experiments, Experimental Results and Auxiliary Data In Experiments," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 218 (June 22, 1973), pp. 56-77; for a brief examination of different models which might be used to assure anonymity of response and minimize accidental or deliberate disclosure of identifiable records, see Robert F. Boruch, "Assuring Confidentiality of Responses in Social Research: A Note on Strategies," American Sociologist, 6 (November, 1971), pp. 308-311. See also, Paul Nejeski and Lindsey Miller Leiman, "A Researcher-Subject Testimonial Privilege: What to Do Before the Subpoena Arrives," Wisconsin Law Review, 4 (1973), pp. 1085-1148.

[15]John H. Mueller, Karl F. Schuessler, and Herbert L. Costner, Statistical Reasoning in Sociology, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970, pp. 350-351.

[16]Chapman, Meyer, Hale, Swanson, and Morrison, Operations Research Manual, op. cit., Section IV, "Information Storage, Data Processing, and Data Analysis Techniques," for a discussion of the descriptive and multivariate statistics utilized throughout the Final Report.

[17]Ibid., see Section V, "Assault Indices," for a discussion of the characteristics which comprise the assault indices.

[18]For discussion of descriptive and inductive statistics, refer to Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, pp. 33-74, 144-147. Also see Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956; Richard Runyan and Audrey Haber, Fundamentals

of Behavioral Statistics, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1967; N.M. Downie and R.W. Heath, Basic Statistical Methods, New York: Harper and Row, 1970; R.J. Senter, Analysis of Data, Alenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1969; John Neter and William Wasserman, Fundamental Statistics for Business and Economics, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966; Dennis J. Palumbo, Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science, New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1969; Henry L. Alder and Edward B. Rossier, Introduction to Probability and Statistics, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1972; Freeman F. Elzey, A Programmed Introduction to Statistics, Belmont, California: Brooks-Cole, 1971; and Kenneth R. Hammond, James E. Householder, and N. John Castellan, Jr., Introduction to the Statistical Method, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970.

[19]Miller, op. cit., pp. 200-212.

[20]Demographic statistics for the regional cities were extracted from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report pc (1)-B38, Oklahoma, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report pc (1)-B45, Texas, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report pc (1)-B4, Arkansas, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report pc (1)-B33, New Mexico, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report pc (1)-B20, Louisiana, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Additional demographic data was extracted from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, Social and Economic Characteristics, for the states of Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico and Arkansas. For some variables, data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1972, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.

[21]For an elucidation of some of the multivariate techniques see David A. Aaker, Multivariate Analysis in Marketing: Theory and Application, Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1971, pp. 1-56; Allen L. Edwards, Experimental Design in Psychological Research, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, pp. 350-359; Woodrow W. Wyatt and Charles M. Bridges, Jr., Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, Boston: D.C. Heath, 1967, pp. 172-192; and Hubert M.

Blalock, Social Statistics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, pp. 273-358. Also see Robert B. Miller, Statistical Concepts and Application -- a Nonmathematical Explanation, Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1968, pp. 79-100 for an introduction to the notion of covariation, correlation and regression concepts.

[22]Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964. For an application of causal modeling see David R. Morgan and Cheryl Swanson, "Correlates of Selected Police Policies in Large U.S. Cities," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 25-27, 1974. Also see Thomas R. Dye and Newman Pollack, "Path Analysis Models in Policy Research," Policy Studies Journal, 2 (Winter, 1973), pp. 123-130; David R. Heise, "Problems in Path Analysis," in Edgar Borgotta, ed., Sociological Methodology, San Francisco: Jossey Boss, 1969, pp. 38-73.

[23]Chapman, et. al., Operations Research Manual, op. cit., Appendix 18, "Confidentiality and Security of Data."

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST POLICE

Dr. Daniel C. Kieselhorst
Minneapolis, Minnesota

ABSTRACT

Serving to complement the empirical components of this report, this study presents a normative approach to the problem of police assaults. First, such terms as "violence," "force," and "assault" are carefully defined. Then, drawing upon these definitions as well as the literature of violence, the author constructs a theory of the forces motivating an assailant. He concludes that in all but the most exceptional cases, e.g., insanity, social conditions cause the police to be assaulted because the police are the often unwitting participants in a struggle between the haves and the have-nots. Those whose needs for self-esteem and material success are denied tend to view the policeman as the representative of those who do the denying. The assailants do not respect the laws of society because they believe the laws act against them and only benefit those in power. If these are actually the circumstances underlying most police assaults, it is obvious that a significant reduction in these incidents can be achieved only through substantial social change. To do otherwise would be to merely treat the symptoms rather than the causes of police assaults.

INTRODUCTION

Mankind finds itself today in an unprecedented period of history which is characterized by rapid and monumental change. Ours is a world that is literally changing right before our eyes, and the effect of these alterations is extensive and exciting, but it is also quite frightening. It is obvious that we can attribute a great deal of this radical change to the technological discoveries that have proliferated in the past century and which seem to be multiplying at an increasingly rapid rate. Technology is changing the world and the environment, and in the process, man himself is undergoing a thorough transformation.[1]

The consequences of technology are all about us, and we find ourselves struggling to deal with our new and confusing environment. Medical technology has greatly affected human society by producing a population explosion which, paradoxically, threatens our very survival. Industrial and agricultural technology have enriched the lives of many people, while at the same time serving to pollute and destroy our physical environment. The technological strides made in the areas of transportation and communication have served to bring closer together the bourgeoning populations in disparate sections of the globe.

The consequences of shrinking the world by bringing more and more people closer and closer together have not been insignificant. The poor and disadvantaged people within a nation are constantly bombarded by the very sophisticated media, and in the process, many of them become painfully aware of life styles that they would wish to emulate, but which are not available to them. The fact that people are in a position to witness and learn about values, cultures, traditions, and social systems far different from their own has caused people throughout the world to reassess their own ideas, practices, and ways of life. This reassessment cannot help but raise questions and problems for which there are no ready answers. Thus, we see in many nations of the world, and particularly in the United States -- the problem is most likely greater here than in most other countries because our technological development exceeds that of most of the other nations -- we see the basic and fundamental values, customs, and institutions being called into question. For many people, the old ways are not fulfilling the new needs and aspirations, and new approaches are being suggested and demanded.

The fact of the matter is that conflict and turmoil abounds in a world that at times appears to be adrift. As men and women of all ranks, professions, classes, and ideologies seek for answers to the new and complex problems of our changing world, conflict inexorably dominates much of the human scene. Conflicts of needs, desires, interests, values, and creeds threaten to rend asunder the social

CONTINUED

1 OF 6

fabric in many nations of the world, and we have been forced to realize that this is particularly true in the United States. In many instances, these conflicts have gotten quite out of hand, and as a result, many people have suffered loss of property and position or have been physically injured or killed.

It is difficult to evaluate and make a comparison between the social strife today as compared to that in other periods of history. We have no conclusive statistics or measuring sticks to make such a comparison, but it is probably safe to say that this period of history is particularly conflict-laden and can be characterized as one of great violence and destruction. Recently, particularly in the United States, where no one claims that there has ever prevailed an environment of serenity or pacifism, there seems to have been unprecedented outpourings of violent and destructive behavior. The violence, of course, is manifested not only in this nation's relations with other nations, but also in the interactions of various members, groups, and classes within our own society. This violent conflict, frightening to behold and embarrassing to have to admit, threatens the very social-political-economic foundation on which this nation resides, and the voices that cry for change will not be silenced. The consequence is, of course, that the present established political system finds itself in a position where it must deal with the conflict, quell the turbulence, and repress the voices and the bodies which threaten the social structure.

A very critical component in this conflict and turbulence is the police system. If the conflict and violence pervading our society is to be dealt with and if the present structure of society is to be defended and maintained, there must be a policing mechanism to do the job. Also, there must be a mechanism to which is entrusted the duty of repressing those individuals and groups who are seeking to disavow the present power structure and those who are attempting to abolish it and establish a new one. This job falls on the shoulders of approximately 500,000 police officers who comprise the 14,806 police agencies at the federal, state, and local levels of government.[2] These are the protagonists in the violent social drama that is playing around us today, and these are the people who are expected to immerse themselves in the conflict and violence of a disoriented society with the aim of establishing some order and security in the threatening chaos.

Faced with this very difficult and very thankless task, the lives and welfare of these police officers are quite vulnerable. As primary contestants in the violent struggles of society, their job becomes an extremely hazardous and dangerous one. Again, it is difficult to quote and compare statistics where none are in existence, but it seems quite certain that the past two decades have ushered in an era of alarming increase in the amount and the severity of

violence directed against the police. Police officers have increasingly become the objects of violence of lesser and greater degrees, and their duty has become more and more hazardous as our society escalates the degree of conflict and violence in everyday life.

With this in mind, it seems imperative that some remedial steps be undertaken at once. In the first place, we must begin to study and analyze the violence that is being directed against police officers. We must try to understand the causes of assaults against police, and we must try to determine how these people can be protected. Police officers are recruited from the ranks of our society, and if we truly are concerned with the safety and welfare of all citizens and all people, we must not overlook the police.

Statement of Purpose

Consequently, it is our aim to examine and understand the variables that go into the assaults on police. It goes without saying that ours is only a beginning in this endeavor, and we are hopeful that we can furnish ideas and data that will serve as a heuristic device to spur others on to further research and understanding on this very critical problem. If we can be among the first to shed some light on police assaults, and if we can offer some tentative insights and suggestions for reducing assault, perhaps something very valuable and important can be accomplished. A major objective of the study, then, is to develop techniques, procedures, and equipment that will reduce the number of assaults on police and minimize the injuries resulting from such assaults.

To be sure, this is an ambitious undertaking, and it requires that we take a cautious and circumspect look at the total environment in which police assaults occur. That is to say that to understand why and how police are assaulted, we must understand more than the mere assaultive incident itself. We must be able to put the specific confrontations into a general framework and analyze the underlying elements of conflict which are not immediately obvious and visible to the casual observer. The total assaultive situation tends to be a complex one which goes far beyond the physical contact between a police officer and his assailant. We must attempt to discern underlying social, political, and psychological factors which build up to the precipitate attack.

In spite of the great amount of time, energy, money, and attention that has been devoted in recent years to the study of crime and violence in America, there has been a consistent failure to adequately deal with the total situational and environmental factors that produce them. Admittedly, various crime commission and violence commission reports have paid lip service to the existence of a violent

tradition in American society, and they have even gone to some lengths to point out social and economic injustices that have inadvertently arisen within our social system. What they have not done -- not to the extent that is necessary for an understanding of the problem -- is to look at and to reevaluate some of the basic values and assumptions that tie together our total social structure. Until we do this, and unless we are willing to make this comprehensive evaluation, we are bound to be frustrated in our efforts, and we are seriously limiting our effectiveness in proposing solutions that will provide a modicum of safety and security for the police officers all over the nation.

Organization of the Discussion

We might begin the analysis of police assaults by analyzing the two major concepts that comprise the subject of our investigation. That is, to understand "police assaults," we must be certain that we know what we mean by the term "police" and the term "assault." Consequently, it may not be amiss to analyze, first of all, the problem of "assault" by identifying it as an element within the general concept of "violence." One set of questions that we must then ask, is, "What are the causes, characteristics, and consequences of violence in general and of assault in particular?" Secondly, we must come to some understanding on the meaning and implication of that very complex concept of "police." We must analyze the role and function of the police and be consciously alert to the consequences that ensue from the carrying out of this role and function.

Therefore, the remainder of this discussion will be divided into three sections. In the first section, an attempt will be made to investigate and analyze the problem of violence in general in order to be able to talk meaningfully about assaults in particular. In the second section, we will undertake an analysis of the role and function of police organizations and police officers in our society. This will require at least a brief analysis of the nature of the social, political, and legal structures within which police organizations operate. Finally, in the third section, we will attempt to synthesize the discussion on violence and police roles by bringing them together and drawing some conclusions as to why police are assaulted. At that point, it will be incumbent upon us to make some suggestions and recommendations that are designed to be the first step in providing some security to those people who wear police uniforms.

At first glance, it might appear to be unnecessary to adopt this cautious and broad approach to the problem, but a moment's reflection may convince one of the necessity of such an analysis. If we truly care about the protection and welfare of police officers, we must be

willing to gain a perspective of the forest before examining the trees. What is more, we are obliged to take a bold, honest look at the total picture, even if it requires that we break new ground and make observations and analyses which run counter to traditional views on the subject. To do less is to admit a willingness to sacrifice those people who perform the police duties in our society to a violent and tragic fate. We must examine the totality even if it requires us to see and acknowledge some rather disturbing and uncomfortable facts and observations. Perhaps some of these observations will even be disturbing to some of the police officials who are not anxious to reevaluate traditional police attitudes and practices. Yet we cannot afford to be unimaginative for that reason, because it is so very apparent that traditional values and practices have resulted in an alarming increase of violence and assaults on police. For the sake of protecting and assisting police officers around the country, we may have to point out problems and issues that policemen do not want to hear about.

Bringing security to police officers and safeguarding them from violent assailants is not an easy task, and it cannot be accomplished overnight. It demands time and attention from concerned people in many different professions and walks of life. It requires courage to deal with the critical and controversial issues. It requires energy and imagination on the part of those who are concerned enough to study the problem. And, finally, it requires the cooperation between police workers and the public at large. To be satisfied with anything less is to admit our willingness to sacrifice a certain portion of our population to the exigencies of our social system.

THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE

Why Study Violence?

When we talk about assaults, what we are really concerned with is the violence that is inflicted on a police officer, or the threat of violence that is leveled against him. When we examine assaultive behavior, the behavior that we attempt to measure and analyze is violent behavior which has as its aim the injury or destruction of a police officer. An assault, then, is an act of violence, and we must examine it from that perspective.

In order to understand an assault on a police officer, it becomes imperative to grapple with the very complex and difficult ramifications of violence. We must first come to some understanding of what violence is. This requires that we be able to separate violence from nonviolence and violent behavior from behavior that is not violent. Surprisingly, this is not easy to do, so we will need to attempt to reach a definition of violence.

In addition to defining the term, however, we want to know, as far as is possible, what causes violence. We must ask ourselves why people resort to violent behavior, and we want to know what function and role violence plays in interpersonal relationships. Unless we can arrive at some conclusions on these questions, even if the conclusions are only tentative, it is impossible to make broad and general statements about police assaults. That is, it obviously is not particularly helpful to sit back and identify an assault or a violent act and then to categorize it and count it in among a number of other identifiable assaults. In order for our observations to be meaningful, we are obliged to examine and measure them in the context of some kind of causal relationship. Only by so doing can we hope to be able to predict and to anticipate violent behavior. For it seems that only if we can anticipate and predict assaults can we hope to bring about change in the present trend of violent behavior directed against police.

Finally, we must try to understand what the results or consequences of violence are. We want to do this not only to understand the violence that is used against police officers, but also to understand the violence that is sometimes used by the police against civilians. This leads us to ask if violence or violent behavior produces constructive and valuable results or if it is likely to be ineffective for being unable to produce desired ends.

In understanding what violence is, what causes or justifies it, and what its consequences are, we are taking only one small step in the attempt to understand police assaults in general. However, it is a necessary and very important first step that we should not overlook.

Perhaps understanding violence is also a necessary step in dealing with other aspects of life and social interaction in this country, but it certainly is an integral aspect of the totality of police assaults.

Violence in Philosophy

It is difficult to know where to begin in talking about violence. It is a phenomenon that is ever present in social interaction in spite of the fact that it seems to be a somewhat extraordinary form of behavior. It is extraordinary because it is behavior which in some sense departs from normal and usual methods of interaction. For, statistically, few people in our society are violence-prone; the rest of us lead lives relatively free of major physical strife.[3] Violence is, in most instances, behavior that is used as a last resort, or it is used when more normal and customary behavior has proved to be ineffective.[4] One need only refer to the media on any given day to realize that violence is continually operating, but then we must recognize that, by and large, it is the function of the mass media to report unusual events and phenomena. Perhaps if violent behavior were not relatively unusual, it would not receive as much attention as it does. It seems to be the case, then, that all people tend to act in nonviolent ways most of the time. Their daily interactions with other people are characteristically peaceful, or at least nonviolent, and a resort to violence suggests that some unusual or extraordinary motivation or stimulus is operating upon the violent individual. It is this extraordinary or unusual stimulus that needs to be understood.

Extraordinary though it may be, violence has been an important factor in human relationships for as long as man can remember. Even in the Garden of Eden story, which must in some sense reflect important beliefs and events that occurred in prehistory, we are told of Cain slaying Abel. Yet if one attempts to find any systematic and detailed analyses of violence, either in history books or social science research, he is very hard pressed to come up with very much useful information. Needless to say, our history books are full of descriptions of violent men and violent societies, but almost none of the great thinkers and philosophers devoted their attention to the analysis and understanding of violence itself.[5] It seems as if it is a phenomenon that is recognized, taken for granted, and then ignored. One wonders why some great philosopher like a Plato or a Hume or a Kant did not devote himself to an explanation of violence. Perhaps the closest we get to such an analysis is in the writings of some religious thinkers such as Augustine, who implies that violence is the result of man being damned and living in an ungodly world.[6] Godly men apparently would not resort to the use of violence. But even with Augustine we do not get any systematic discussion of violence which would define it and

separate it from other kinds of behavior. He simply gives us a somewhat mystical explanation of why it is used. That is, he attempts to explain "why" violence is used, but not "what" violence is.

The Tradition of Nonviolence

Yet to say that violence has been thoroughly neglected in the philosophical and scientific literature of western society is not to say that no one has been interested in the problem. Ironically, if one searches carefully, it is possible to accumulate a fairly sizable bibliography on nonviolence.[7] This is ironic when one considers that the condition of man throughout history has been one where violence was not only an acceptable form of behavior, within certain limits, but violence has historically been rather popular. This is not to deny that most people throughout history (including soldiers) have resorted to violence or acted violently only in rare and unusual circumstances, but violence has almost universally been tolerated. On the other hand, one must scan the history books in vain in attempting to find any sizable community that practiced nonviolence over any extended period of time. Still, the fact remains that the literature on nonviolence is more abundant (and, one might add, more intellectually compelling) than that dealing with violence.

There are very prominent strains of nonviolence in most of the world's great and lasting religions. Although there are some ambiguities in their doctrines, Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism all have very strong elements of nonviolence.[8] They stress the importance of avoiding conflict of all kinds, and they encourage their followers to persevere in the face of violence and conflict initiated by others. Even Judaism, which has a history of bitter conflict and violence, contains some very strong elements of nonviolence, particularly in the admonitions of some of the Old Testament prophets.[9] What is more, it is significant to note that the word "Islam," which means "submission," is the religion of the Moslems.

Probably the strongest appeal for nonviolence that is made by any religious group is to be seen in the doctrines and practices of Christianity. Although the extant sources on the life and thought of Jesus are brief and unsystematic at best, there is little room for doubt regarding his attitudes on the problem of violence. He was vehemently opposed to all forms of violence, whether it was used for acquiring power, for defending oneself, or even for punishment.[10]

Jesus' teachings on nonviolence were not insignificant nor incidental to his overall moral and social beliefs. For the first two or three centuries of its existence, the Christian religion held very firmly

to the doctrines and practices of nonviolence, with Christians even refusing, at the penalty of death, to serve as soldiers.[11] Only as the Christian religion has become temporally removed from the experience and teachings of its founders has it accommodated itself to political power structures and allowed itself to be reconciled to conflict, war, and violence.

Yet, we should not leave the impression that nonviolence has been exclusively a doctrine and a principle of religious saints and sages. Defenders of nonviolence are persuaded by such secular moralists as Socrates, who insisted that an uncompromising commitment to a moral life demands that a person recognize that it is a better thing to suffer an evil than to commit one.[12] This insight would lead one to believe that a person faced with the alternative of suffering an injury from another, or inflicting an injury in order to defend himself, is morally obligated to be injured rather than committing the immoral act of injuring another.

Although there have been a number of people who have theorized and practiced nonviolence, probably no one has been more strongly identified with this approach to social interaction than Mohandas K. Gandhi.[13] Gandhi had been strongly influenced in the development of his thought by religious writings and teachings (including Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu, and Christian) as well as by various secular thinkers. He openly admitted his intellectual debt to 19th-Century pacifists, such as Leo Tolstoy[14] and the American transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau.[15] In more recent times, Martin Luther King, Jr.,[16] has been recognized as a leading exponent of nonviolent thought and action.

Mankind has a long and distinguished moral and religious tradition which very clearly stresses a plea for peace, harmony, and nonviolence in human relationships. Yet it seems to be a characteristic of human beings to separate their actions from their ethical codes, at considerable individual and collective cost,[17] and so we see a world where violence is a common and acceptable means in the conduct of social interaction. The rhetoric and theory simply do not correspond to the actual practice.

In the process of analyzing and writing about nonviolence, these thinkers have necessarily discussed the nature and implications of violence also. In fact, most of that which is known about violence comes from the works of its opponents, because they must deal with violence in order to make a case for nonviolence. This literature is of value, but perhaps there are advantages in having a person do the exposition who believes in and is committed to his subject.

The fact remains, however, that systematic and informative treatments of violence, as opposed to nonviolence, are rather scarce. Still, we must make an effort to understand the complexities of violence.

We will divide our discussion of violence into sections according to the three general problem areas noted above. In the first section, we will attempt to define violence and explain what it is. In the second section, an attempt will be made to discover why violence is used or why people resort to violence instead of some other form of behavior. Finally, in the third section, we will attempt to deal with the effects or consequences of violent behavior. These, then, are our three general aims:

1. What is violence?
2. Why is violence used?
3. What are the effects of violence?

Defining Violence

The word "violence" is not an uncommon one, for it is a term that most adults use in their everyday conversation. People using the term seem to have no trouble with it, and most everyone certainly must feel that they know what it means. Yet, the term is used in very different ways by different people and at various times. In order to bring some precision and consistency to the use of the term, then, it might prove helpful to give a specific definition, which will serve as a working definition throughout the remainder of this discussion.[18]

Violence

Very simply then, Violence is an act in which one human being knowingly and intentionally inflicts physical pain, injury, or destruction on one or more other human beings. This definition, hopefully, is simple and to the point, and it reflects the usage that most people seem to give it when they utter or write the word. At the same time, it serves as a criteria to observe and analyze the kind of behavior that concerns us in this study. Having stated this simple definition, however, it may still be of some value to comment upon the definition and to emphasize some of the important considerations involved therein.

In the first place, violence is a human physical act. That is, it is a particular kind of behavior performed by a human being, and it is directed at another human being or at a number of human beings. This means that we cannot use the term in describing behavior performed by animals, nor does it refer to behavior that is directed against nonhumans. In other words, we may say without confusion that animals are mean, vicious, deadly, or even cruel, but we will

not describe them as being violent. Likewise, a person may be mean or cruel to an animal, but that person is not being violent.

This aspect of the definition may lead into some controversy, because it requires that we refrain from using the term "violence" when discussing a human action which aims at damaging or destroying nonhuman objects such as private property. No doubt an excellent argument can be made to sustain the contention that it is very wrong and unkind to destroy property, but it does not seem to be of any use to refer to such negative behavior as violence. To do so only confuses and complicates an already difficult problem.

One of the major difficulties involved in the discussion of violence[19] is the fact that the term is all too often used emotively. That is, people very often use the term in order to create an emotional effect on their listener. In such a situation, when a word is being used emotively, the intention of the speaker is not so much to convey precise and informative information, but rather to arouse his listener. For example, all too often a speaker uses the term "violence" not to convey any referential information, but instead he is implying that he disapproves of the act he is describing. For example, if the statement, "Tom used violence yesterday," is uttered, the intention is to condemn and to bring disrepute on Tom, and the specifics of the action become incidental to the attempt to make a moral judgment. Thus, we want to avoid as far as possible such a misleading use of the term violence; we want to use it referentially and not emotively. For this reason, violence will not refer to behavior which is directed at nonhuman entities. There are other good and useful terms which more accurately and precisely describe damage and destruction to property, and it would be well if we used them in their appropriate contexts.

In this same vein, it should be stressed that violence refers to a physical act and not to a psychological act. It seems obvious that there are situations in which a person can be just as mean and cruel by inflicting psychological pain or injury on another person, but we will not want to refer to this as violence. For example, one person might berate, swear at, embarrass, or belittle another, and this may have a very painful and injurious effect. To be sure, such behavior is repulsive and despicable, but it is not violent. Also, in a kidnapping, where the victim is not injured or killed, we see an example of serious mental deprivation, coercion, and even cruelty, but not violence. At the risk of belaboring the point, it must be emphasized that violence is not the only manner in which a human being can act in a contemptible and inhumane way.

To elaborate further on our definition, it is obvious that violence is inflicted only if the action is intended to bring pain, injury, or destruction (death) to the recipient. This is crucial to the whole definition, of course, and characterizes the basic nature of

the act. Along with this obvious observation, we should recognize the less obvious fact that in order for behavior to be labeled as violent, the actor must intend for his action to be painful, injurious, or destructive. A person who unintentionally causes pain, harm, or death to another may very well not be a violent person. If a man were to trip on a patch of ice while carrying a baby, thereby causing the baby to fall and be injured, we would not describe this as violent behavior, nor is the man necessarily a violent man.

Violence, then, is just one among many different kinds of human behavior. Although it is a somewhat unusual or extraordinary form of behavior, as mentioned above, it is one alternative among many that is available to human beings. Ordinarily, it is an action that is selected to serve as a means or as a tactic in order to achieve some end. The end may be virtuous or sinful, immediate or distant, conscious or unconscious, but it will be there in most instances, nevertheless. This is not to say that violent behavior is necessarily rational, constructive, or well thought out, but most of the time it is used to accomplish some goal, even if that goal is nothing more than an urge to express oneself in a dramatic manner.

If we are to make good on our intention to use the term "violence" in a referential context and still attempt to have the word represent the meaning that most people intend for it when they use it, we must make one more important observation. No matter how fair and objective we try to be, no matter how dedicated we remain to our scientific endeavor, we cannot escape the fact that "violence" retains a certain negative connotation.[20] To use the term, no matter how precise we might be, we are referring to some kind of objectionable and inhumane behavior. We simply cannot totally escape this, because it is built into the word and cannot be separated out. As long as all or most human beings value the life and welfare of other human beings, they must adopt a negative attitude toward behavior which by its very definition is designed to threaten those values. Rather than attempting to accomplish the impossible task of totally ferreting out all negative connotations of the word, we might better strive to include under the rubric of violence all behavior that fits our definition. This means that we must label as violence acts which traditionally are granted other labels, simply to escape reproach and blame. For example, we will be compelled for the sake of honesty and consistency to label as violent those things that policemen and soldiers (even the good guys on our side) often do.

Before leaving the discussion regarding the definition and use of the term "violence," it may be advantageous to look rather closely at several other concepts that are closely related to violence. It is not unusual to see such words as "force," "coercion," and "power"

used interchangeably with violence. Again, while seeking for workable definitions, we will attempt to remain as close to common and popular usage as is possible. It does appear, upon careful analysis, that each of these terms has a meaning and a use that is somewhat different from all of the others.

Force

First of all, the term "force"[21] can be defined as the application of physical energy or power to accomplish a task. This very simple definition allows us to use the term in both a positive and a negative way. A person may use force positively to boost a child up a tree so that he can pick an apple. On the other hand, force can be used to negate another person's actions, as when a man restrains a child from running out into traffic. Or force can be applied to prevent a man from entering a public conveyance. Force can thus be applied either with or without the other person's approval, and force may be applied either violently or nonviolently. If the energy is applied in such a fashion that the second party is intentionally harmed, it becomes an act of violent force. It is interesting to note that "force" does not carry within it a negatively emotive connotation as is the case with violence.

The use of the term "force" can be very misleading at times, and often this is the case because an attempt is made to camouflage a violent act. Two of the classical works that deal with violence have stressed the ambiguous way in which the terms "force" and "violence" are used. Georges Sorel in his Reflections on Violence[22] and Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth[23] point out that both terms are used by established members of society to describe the same kind of behavior. However, "force" is used when that behavior is committed by police or officials who are attempting to uphold the laws or the customs of the state, while "violence" is used when the very same kind of behavior is committed by people who are opposed to the state or to the status quo. In other words, people who are seeking change are charged with being violent, while people opposing change are looked upon as only applying "force." James Baldwin makes the same argument in comparing the violence done by ghetto dwellers with the violence (i.e., force) done by police.[24]

Such deliberate manipulation of words, of course, illustrates an attempt to justify some painful, harmful, and injurious acts, while condemning others. This is an obvious example of how "violence" is an emotive term, heavily laden with negative connotations. It is frightening to realize the very important impact that choice of words can have on social action and policy. With this manipulation of terms we have been taught that cowboys with white hats, American soldiers, and police officers use manly force, while Indians, Gooks, criminals, and revolutionaries use cruel violence. It is this kind

of inconsistency in terminology that we must avoid if we are to make any progress in coming to understand violence.

Coercion

"Coercion" means compelling another person to act contrary to his or her wishes. Coercion may be violent, as when one man twists another man's arm in order to compel him to enter an automobile that he does not wish to enter. On the other hand, coercion could be nonviolent, as when the child is compelled against his wishes to refrain from running into heavy traffic. That is, the compulsion can be applied without delivering any physical pain, injury, or destruction. Unlike both violence and force, coercion can be a psychological act or mode of behavior, as well as physical. People can be psychologically compelled to act against their wishes with no physical restraint or punishment of any kind being applied. For example, a wife might coerce her husband into giving up gambling by threatening him with divorce or infidelity. Threatening to employ violence without actually employing it is a form of psychological coercion which borders on violence. The point is, though, that a person may be coerced with violence, with force, with physical threats, with the threat or imposition of psychological punishment, or simply with the withdrawal of rewards. Violence is only one method of coercion,[25] and oftentimes it is an inefficient method.

Power

Finally, it seems to be necessary to define the concept "power" before ending this discussion.[26] "Power" is the capacity to modify another person's behavior. "Power" is a much broader and more inclusive term than the others we have defined. Violence, force, and coercion are all different types of power. That is, each one of them is a means for modifying other people's behavior. There are, of course, many means or tactics for gaining power, and we have been discussing only a few. It should be noted that persuasion, love, and sacrifice are other means of power -- that is, they are other methods for influencing people or modifying their behavior in some manner. Mohandas Gandhi was acutely aware of these latter, nontraditional means of power, but unfortunately, most politicians, social scientists, and laymen remain oblivious to their value and efficacy.

We might summarize this discussion by pointing out that violence is one means or one tactic that is used to achieve certain ends. It is a form of behavior that has similarities to force and coercion, but it also differs from both of them in certain fundamental ways. Violence, by definition, is behavior that is destructive to certain basic and fundamental human values, and the term carries a certain negative connotation, no matter how objective one may be. With these

thoughts in mind, we must proceed to a discussion of why violent behavior is selected from a number of alternatives. Why do people act violently, when they have the choice to act in some other manner?

Causes of Violence

In attempting to understand why people resort to violent behavior when, as we have already noted, it is unusual and extraordinary, we might divide our analysis into three parts. That is, there seem to be three broad, general categories that might be used to try to explain violent behavior. These categories of explanation, or perhaps of causation, are the following:

1. Cultural training and conditioning to violence (Violence as learned behavior)

2. Psychological aberrations or genetic defects in the actor (Violence as pathological behavior)

3. Violence seen as instrumental or utilitarian behavior (Violence as a goal-directed behavior)

Within these three categories, perhaps all possible examples of violent behavior can be placed. These three categories allow for the possibility that violence is a result of: 1) a sick or deranged environment; 2) a sick or deranged individual; or (3) that violence is not pathological at all, but is a rational, intelligent approach to human interaction. Hopefully, one or all of them together will allow us someday to better understand, and thereby deal with, violence. For now, all we can do is see the possibilities and the nature of the problem in order to ask some pertinent questions. The final answers will come only after people and institutions become convinced that the problem is critical.

Violence As Learned Behavior

The first category, then, for attempting to explain violent behavior is the one which suggests that it may be the result of cultural training and conditioning. That is to say that it may very well be the case that people resort to violent behavior because they have learned to act in this manner. The assumption here is that violence is a part of our culture, and the members of society tend to adopt the values and customs that are endemic in that culture. In speaking of our culture, we have reference to the predominant values and customs that are shared by the members of a society and which are passed on from generation to generation.[27] This approach assumes that violent patterns of behavior are not solely the result of

individual human idiosyncrasies but that they are established by the environment in which people live. The capacity for violence, as noted, exists within the individual, just as does the capacity for nonviolence, but the individual selects and makes choices according to the values that society imposes. A society with a violent tradition and one in which violent attitudes and values are passed on to the young is likely to be a society where many people are going to behave violently at times.

One need only make a cursory analysis of the United States in order to conclude that ours is, and has always been, a violent society. Within our culture it is easy to see that we have adopted some very violent attitudes and values, and we have created various mechanisms and institutions which function quite effectively in giving wide exposure to these values and in passing them on to the young. We might support this contention by taking a brief look, first at our violent attitudes and values, and then at the mechanisms that are used to express them and to pass them on to the young.

First, in terms of interpersonal relationships, our culture is rife with violence. One might go so far as to say that violence, in a subtle way, is tinged with aspects of honor and prestige. To be sure, there is a certain ritual and dogma attached to the use of violence, and certain ceremonies must be followed in its use, but it is there all the same. What seems to prevail is an implicit attitude that the use of violence is a mark of honor, prestige, or authority.[28] It is a form of behavior that people who are superior in some manner may use against their inferiors. This very insidious apotheosis of violence is probably extremely effective in establishing positive attitudes toward it in most people, although it is difficult to systematically measure these effects.

An obvious example of the respectability of violent behavior can be seen in the relationship between parents and their children. Most parents train and discipline their children by spanking or hitting them. Whether we like to admit it or not, such methods of child-rearing are examples of violence, because their aim is to inflict pain. Now this disciplinary relationship is clearly one of adult to child, and of superior to inferior. The child, on the other hand, has no right or opportunity to inflict pain on his parents. Consequently, such a right to use violence cannot help but signify a relationship of inequality, and the violent act itself becomes a symbol of the rights of mature, adult human beings who represent authority. At this very elementary level, then, violence creeps into the cultural value system. "Violent" discipline may appear to some to be a very significant and harmless practice, but its effects cannot be anything but far-reaching, especially when the prestige attached to the use of violence is reenforced in other ways. There is an abundance of literature in the field of psychology which

points up the close connection between aggression in the child and the parents' use of punishment.[29]

Violence is also a tactic that a teacher may employ on a student occasionally, again reenforcing the idea that violence is something that superiors inflict on their inferiors. As with the parent-child relationship, the student may not reciprocate by using violence against the teacher. The same type of relationship has existed between masters and slaves and, even to a certain extent, between native-born Americans and immigrants, and between white Anglo-Saxon Protestants and their racial and religious "inferiors." Finally, we see this attitude of violence being the monopoly of the superior members of society manifested in the relationship of governmental officials with ordinary civilians. Police officers and members of the military establishment are empowered, within limits, to use violence, but never can violence used by civilians against these representatives of authority be condoned.

These relationships are all very subtle, but for the masses of people who are seeking to establish their individual identities, who are attempting to develop self-images that they can respect, and who are attempting to gain the admiration and respect of their peers[30] -- they cannot help but wonder whether the use of violence, that symbol of prestige and authority, may not very well be a short-cut to success. Hans Toch describes this tendency to seek a favorable self-image on the part of people who have constantly found themselves in positions of submission and inferiority in their relationships with others:

> We have suggested that two types of orientation are especially likely to produce violence: one of these is that of the person who sees other people as tools designed to serve his needs; the second is that of the individual who feels vulnerable to manipulation. These two prospectives, when we examine them more closely, become faces of the same coin: both rest on the premise that human relations are power-centered, one-way affairs; both involve efforts at self-assertion with a desperate, feverish quality that suggests self-doubt.[31]

Frantz Fanon, the brilliant Black psychiatrist from Algeria, has written eloquently on this aspect of violence, showing how its use symbolizes power, prestige, and authority. Because violence is a sign of authority, Fanon would encourage the powerless and the downtrodden to embrace violence in order to free themselves and to gain equality. He refers to violence as a "cleansing force" which alone can free oppressed peoples from feelings of inferiority, from despair, and from inaction. Violence is the one method that conquered people have at their disposal to gain self-respect.[32]

In addition to these very subtle and pervasive interactions between individuals, the foundation for violence is built into our social institutions and structures. The willingness to employ violence necessarily requires that the actor look upon his victim as something less than an ultimate value.[33] It requires him to assume that that individual is not of great worth and value, or that somehow he is not too good to be assaulted. In other words, it requires an attitude that human life and welfare are not of supreme value. Now it can be argued that a certain amount of conditioning and training must intercede in order to lead people to downgrade the value of human life and welfare, especially to the extent that they are ready and willing to violate other people.

There have been some rather profound analyses of American society made in recent years, which have concluded that ours is a society that has become structured in such a way that human beings are no longer of ultimate value. In place of man at the top of our social value hierarchy, we have substituted technology, the machine, and the organization. Men, women, and children have been treated as inferior entities, who exist only as means for other people and their profit. Man has become an appendage to the machine, and his role -- the role of millions of Americans -- is to serve the machine. In discussing our economy of mass production, Lewis Mumford has addressed himself to this problem:

> The tendency in mass production is to transfer initiative and significance from the worker who once operated the machine to the machine that operates the worker. As the process becomes more highly rationalized, on its own narrow terms, the worker becomes, as it were, de-rationalized; and this applies on every level of organization.[34]

Directing his attention to the white-collar worker, rather than the laboring man, Robert Presthus is also disturbed by the alienation and dehumanization of man in modern society:

> Today, however, big organizations tend to view man instrumentally ... Administrators often try to reconcile the organization's interests with those of the individual, but they tend nevertheless to view human beings as instruments designed to achieve ends considered by the organization to be more important than those of any individual person.[35]

In such a topsy-turvy value hierarchy, where inanimate machines and organizations take precedence over the lives and welfare of real, living people, the preconditions for violence are established. To

demean and devalue people in this manner is probably a necessary prerequisite for setting the stage to treat people with violence. If they are not very important or valuable anyway, why should we worry about inflicting pain, injury, and destruction upon them? After all, even machines break down and are discarded eventually, so why not people who are subservient to machines? In a society where man has become depersonalized, dehumanized,[36] and degraded, one should not be surprised if violence results.

Finally, we can clearly see violent values and attitudes infusing our decisions and practices on public policy. In both our domestic and foreign policy, social and political decisions are built around, and enforced with, violence or the threat of violence. Domestically, our penal system clearly works to inflict pain and injury on human beings,[37] and up until very recent times, we condoned the rational, premeditated practice of the death penalty.

In terms of our foreign policy, a national commitment to violence is an overriding characteristic of our current stance. We are a nation which has become deeply ingrained with militant and violent institutions which maintain us in a condition of perpetual military mobilization.[38] We stand ready at all times to deliver a nuclear attack on any nation that should threaten our interests and security. Such readiness assumes that we are quite prepared and quite willing to bring about the annihilation of tens of millions of people in other lands, while accepting the internal consequences that would result from our attack. The consequences, of course, would be a counterattack by our opponents that would result in the deaths of at least fifty million Americans.[39] The masses of American society are not oblivious to these policies, nor to the value implications involved therein.

Also, as a perpetually mobilized nation we have been willing in the past to draft the young men of this country into our armed forces, and we have required them, at the risk of severe punishment, to kill or be killed in wars in which they may not have wanted to participate.[40] This is not the time or place to discuss the merits and demerits of war, deterrence, the draft, mass annihilation, and brinksmanship, but regardless of one's attitudes on these issues, it would be very difficult to deny that our present social and political posture is one that is inextricably tied to the commitment to use and to unleash violence in very extreme ways.

Reinforcing the policy of violence around which our social system pivots, we must take account of the speeches and policy positions of our respected political leaders who continually justify our violent policies by speaking of honor and pride. "Peace with honor,"[41] and refusing to "cut and run" mean that we must demonstrate our integrity and our strength of national character by demonstrating to the rest of the world that we, better than any other nation, can be effective in our violence. And should a final conflagration be

reached that ends in almost total world destruction, we can take pride in knowing that the world's last survivor is an American.

These illustrate some of the basic values and attitudes that are so deeply ingrained in our culture. Certainly, we cannot overlook the fact that a great many words and speeches are directed to the American people, explaining the virtue and desirability of peace. Nobody takes this rhetoric very seriously, however, and least of all the people who utter such inanities. It is part of the game to speak of peace, but the hypocrisy of such rhetoric is apparent to all but the most extremely naive, because more often than not these "nonviolent" speeches are used in justifying or calling for more violence. This has been a tactic of most of the Presidents in our nation's history, and it represents the rhetoric of a majority of our legislative leaders as well. Consequently, the message comes through loud and clear: We will pay lip service to the virtue of peace and nonviolence, for to be sure they represent our moral and religious traditions, but after all is said and done, "violence is as American as cherry pie."[42]

In discussing what our cultural attitudes and values are regarding violence, we have implicitly indicated ways in which those values are passed on to the people. Still we might attempt to explicitly indicate how these values are imposed on society, ensuring that all or most people will be of one accord. Perhaps the most important and effective method of establishing violent values and attitudes is through child-rearing practices. An individual's approach to social life and social interaction begins with his care and training within the family situation, and it starts as soon as the child is born. Many of the attitudes that are developed in infancy will never be changed, and with violence constituting an integral part of the rearing process, violence becomes integral to the total social process.

Violent attitudes learned in infancy within the family environment are reinforced within the child's peer group. Using and demonstrating violence may very well be a method of attaining honor and prestige among the child's friends. After all, such methods symbolize mature, adult behavior and indicate that the violent person is in some sense superior. Consequently, peer group relationships serve to support the values that have been learned in the family and which are representative of the total society.[43]

The educational system also plays an important part in the violence-conditioning process. In this way, the values of society are thoroughly and systematically passed on to the younger generation. The glories of war and military heroics are established ingredients of the curriculum, and notions of corporal punishment are shown to be necessary and proper elements of social organization. Also, the educational system is entrusted with the job of acquainting the child

with the historical traditions of his society, in order that he may understand what is expected of him in his social roles. In a society that has a long and spectacular violent tradition, the historical lessons are bound to inculcate violent attitudes and values.

Considerable attention has been directed recently to the violent tradition of American society, including two extended reports by staff members of a Presidential Commission on Violence.[44] These studies have dispelled any doubts that might ever have existed as to the violent character of our nation's history. It would serve no purpose to attempt to add to or improve upon these extensive treatments, but we might very briefly remind ourselves of some of the salient features in the tradition of American violence. The history of the North American continent begins with very violent experiences. White Europeans explored and settled on the land in utter disregard of the wishes and rights of the native population that inhabited it. The understandable resistance on the part of American Indians to European encroachment and occupation was overcome by violence and deception. Some of the most brutal and violent episodes in world history were committed by Europeans against Indians in the process of conquering this territory. Although our history books tend to focus on the violent nature of the resisting Indians, recent scholarship has demonstrated the almost unprecedented cruelty and violence that was used by Europeans against the Indians.[45] This is how our history began -- in an environment of violence, theft, and treachery. This may be a harsh way of describing our history, but no reputable scholar will any longer deny its authenticity.

After the white man had succeeded in taking the land from the Indians, our new and independent nation was founded in a violent and bloody war of revolution. Having been successful in our revolution, the nation was secured during trying times of turbulence and revolt by violent repression of rebellious groups, culminating in the extremely destructive Civil War of the mid-19th Century. In terms of total deaths and casualties, this was the fourth most violent war in all of human history, exceeded only by World Wars I and II and the Tai-P'ing Rebellion of 1851-1864.[46] In the process of fulfilling our "manifest destiny" to bring the North American continent under our control, the United States engaged in bloody and destructive wars against various Indian nations, as well as against Spain, Mexico, Great Britain, and France.

Having founded, maintained, and extended our new nation by the use of violence, the United States embarked upon the policy of active intervention in international affairs in the 20th Century. The history of 20th Century United States is almost a continuous chronology of war and violence, culminating in the two World Wars. It is significant that of the four most bloody and violent wars in human history, the United States, a virtual infant among the nations of the world, has been deeply involved in three of them.[47] Without attempting to

deal with the question of "blame" and causation in regard to this tradition, it is quite obvious that the tradition that children learn in our school system is a very violent one. If these children are expected to conform to this tradition and the value system on which it is based, we must be ready and willing to face the fact that many of these children are going to express violent tendencies. What is more, these tendencies will not always be expressed in heroic ways, but this does not negate the effect of our "heroic" cultural influence as an explanation of their behavior.

Another mechanism that plays an important part in inculcating violent values and attitudes in the masses of the American population is the military establishment. Up until very recently, all male members of the society were required to serve a minimum of two years in a branch of the armed forces. The basic training for all of the branches is very clearly designed to produce violent skills and attitudes in the recruits. This is perhaps the most obvious and direct approach taken by the society to condition its members in violence, and obviously, such conditioning is not automatically nullified when an individual takes off his uniform.

A final means for transmitting the message of violent values and attitudes to the members of society is through the media.[48] Our radio, television, movies, newspapers, and periodicals have proved themselves to be quite efficient in reporting and dramatizing violence. This is not to say that the media somehow create emotions or urges in people that compels them to go out and commit some violent act.[49] Rather, the media conditions individuals to accept certain values, and they offer behavior models that serve to influence the value system of the viewer. Therefore, it would be very difficult to show that violence on television, for example, caused a person to commit a certain act, but certainly it helped to instill values and attitudes which made violence an acceptable alternative, among others, for that person's act.

We have been arguing in this section that cultural training and conditioning are important factors in the behavior patterns of members of society. We have not attempted to argue that a violent culture inevitably and necessarily causes all individuals to act violently. This would be patently absurd, because all members of society are not violent, and no member of society acts violently very often. What we do wish to emphasize here, however, is that through its values and attitudes, society offers to the individual certain violent models for behavior, and by so doing, society assures that some individuals, some of the time, are going to be influenced by this conditioning and training and are going to choose to act violently. It would be very unusual and perplexing, indeed, if this were not the case. In fact, a careful consideration of our cultural values might very well lead us to ask the question, "Why is there not more violence in this society?"[50] It seems that with our training and conditioning we ought to be even more violent than we are. Perhaps

the answer is that although our training and conditioning make violent behavior a viable and acceptable alternative, they do not absolutely determine our behavior. Thus, we must look elsewhere to supplement our attempt to explain the cause of violence.

Violence As Pathological Behavior

A second possible explanation for the use of violence deals with psychological and genetic defects that are present in the violent actor. The assumption that is made from this perspective is that violence occurs because something is wrong with the person. Either he has some sort of psychological aberration -- that is, he is mentally or emotionally unbalanced -- or otherwise he has some genetic or chemical defect which has destined him to act in a destructive and antisocial manner. Some people would argue that all violent behavior can be traced to emotional instability, and the implication seems to be that healthy, well-balanced individuals never would or could resort to violence.[51] Violence, from this perspective, by its very definition (a definition we do not accept, incidentally) is always irrational, immoral, and insane. It necessarily indicates a serious defect or malfunction in the violent person, and consequently, the immediate environmental factors that precipitate the violent act are incidental and irrelevant.

Freudian psychology in general, as well as various other approaches to psychoanalysis and psychiatry, must be considered in this category. Although our first reaction is to want to disregard such explanations for violence, perhaps it is necessary to at least consider and be aware of the possibility. Freudian psychology has made a deep and lasting impact on modern society, and its disciples are legion, which is reason enough to respect its method of analysis. To be overly brief, possibly to the point of distortion, we might characterize the Freudian view of violence in the following manner. All male children go through the Oedipal stage of growth and development, wher in they must deal with some critical and inevitable conflicts. This is a universal phenomenon, Freud argued, for all people are determined by their biological nature to be involved in such a relationship.[52] The crisis centers around the male infant's love for his mother -- his first love affair -- and his fear of his father who is his overpowering competitor for his mother's love. Because of this love-hate conflict, the child develops ambivalent feelings toward his father, who comes to symbolize all power and authority. He loves and respects his father on the one hand and acknowledges his power, wisdom, and authority, but on the other hand, he fears and hates him, because he stands between the child and the mother. Accordingly, Freud insisted, all male children have an unconscious desire to kill their father, which would free them from the fear that immobilizes them. As boys mature to manhood, this hateful figure of authority is transferred to other people who are in positions of authority -- to teachers, bosses, policemen, and political

leaders. In the depths of the subconscious, these symbols of authority replace the father as the hated and feared threat to their safety and security. Consequently, that man who has failed to develop through and resolve his Oedipus complex in a healthy and constructive manner is capable of and likely to vent his hate and destructive urge on members of society who represent authority to him. Thus, policemen, among others, become vulnerable to the sick and deranged anxieties of many members of society.

Freud's analysis is more complicated than this, of course, and it becomes even more ambiguous when we take into account his later theories of an innate and universal death instinct which oftentimes manifests itself by redirecting urges for self-destruction to other people.[53] Also, his analysis of female development is rather detailed and complicated, and for the purposes of this study, there is probably no advantage in attempting to analyze the so-called"Electra complex"(the female version of the Oedipus complex).[54] What is important here is that it becomes obvious that this very widely accepted analysis of man and psychology has a very definite point of view in explaining violence. It seems to imply that all people are violence prone and that those who actually commit violence were destined to do so because of their failure to resolve their Oedipal complexes. Any attempts to explain violence as a healthy and normal reaction to a cruel and harsh environment are discarded out of hand. The social and political status quo is automatically justified by this view, and blame can only be placed on individual pathology.

It is true that various "neo-Freudians" have altered some of Freud's conclusions, while retaining some of his basic insights. Such neo-Freudians as Wilhelm Reich,[55] Harry Stack Sullivan,[56] Karen Horney,[57] Erich Fromm,[58] and even Abraham Maslow[59] were very conscientious in making alterations in Freud's system that would allow us to emphasize environmental factors in such human behavior as violence. These thinkers are important, but because they do not accept the fact of genetic or psychological defects as the necessary cause of violence, we need not discuss them here. Nevertheless, the psychoanalytic view of Sigmund Freud does represent one very sophisticated and respected approach to an explanation of violence, and it is one that no one can afford to ignore entirely.

Another theory that focuses upon the notion of the innate defectiveness of the violent actor is the recent genetic theory that certain people are born violent because of a chromosome imbalance. It has been found that certain particularly violent and horrible crimes have been recently committed by males with an extra Y chromosome. These people, characterized by their unusual XYY chromosome, are said to be distinguished, among other ways, by their predilection to extreme violence. Richard Speck, who murdered eight nurses in Chicago in one mass murder episode, is cited as the prime example of this theory.

It should be pointed out that there are serious shortcomings in using this genetic theory to account for violence. In the first place, subsequent investigation has failed to give any clear evidence that people with XYY chromosomes actually are more violence-prone than any other people, and some studies have even shown them to be less violent.[60] What is more, people with XYY chromosomes have been estimated to constitute only about 0.15 percent of the male population,[61] and certainly that segment of the population does not even begin to become significant in a society where violence is such a widespread pattern of behavior. It is interesting to observe the great amount of attention this new theory has received, for it seems to indicate an attempt to return to the old Lombrosian notion that crime and antisocial behavior can be accounted for by the fact that certain people are just born bad.

Cesare Lombroso was an Italian psychiatrist and anthropologist who went to great lengths to try to show that criminals are born and not made.[62] His daughter, who attempted to summarize his work, argued that "heredity is the principle organic cause of criminal tendencies ... Arthritis and gout have been known to generate criminality in the descendants."[63] This view, though tempered somewhat, has been argued by students of antisocial behavior in more recent times. Hans J. Eysenck has argued that although it may be questionable as to whether people are born criminals, nevertheless it seems certain that predispositions to antisocial behavior are innate.[64]

It does not seem to be very helpful when investigating the causes of violence to adopt this Calvinistic view of man. To divide humanity into two groups, one of the damned and the other of the virtuous, is a very questionable tactic at best. Even if it were possible to define criminality, we certainly cannot separate our population into categories of sinful and virtuous on the basis of their approach to violence. The fact of the matter is that some of the most respected and representative members of society, including a number of our political leaders, have distinguished themselves through their valiant and violent behavior during periods of war. If we are to grant that there is an innate predisposition to violence in some individuals, it seems that we would have to include virtually the totality of the past and present American population. It seems that all, or almost all, people have the innate capacity to employ violence, so we must look elsewhere for explanations as to why this capacity is exercised by some but not by others. This means that we will also ignore any notions of special racial predilections for violence, because if methods cannot be conceptualized for comparing innate violence tendencies in individuals, there certainly does not seem to be any way to compare races. We are forced to attribute, then, any racial differences in violent behavior to social and environmental conditions rather than to genetic factors.

Although it would be shortsighted to categorically rule out all considerations of psychological aberration and innate predispositions in searching for the etiology of violence, still it seems to be an area of limited explanatory potential. Among some students of violence there is a certain appeal in this direction, because in assuming that violence results from an individual human defect, there is no possibility of indicting the social and political status quo. In this manner, conformity to the system is justified and made admirable, for social structures and practices are released from blame. One must remain alert to the conservative bias of such explanations, but in so doing, we cannot afford to totally ignore the possibilities in this area. Undoubtedly, there are some instances of violence which can be accounted for by no other explanation than that of individual pathology. That is, some people at times commit irrational, nonsensical violence which they cannot even explain themselves. However, it is probably the case that violence of this pathological and irrational kind accounts for only a minute percentage of all known violence.

Violence As Goal-Directed Behavior

This leads us to our third and final category for explaining why people use violent behavior. In this discussion, we will argue that violence is instrumental or utilitarian behavior. It is a form of action that is used because the actor sees it as being an efficient and useful way of gaining some reward or of accomplishing some end. This perspective is in direct contradiction to the second category in which we considered violence to be some sort of irrational behavior. According to the instrumental view, violence may be quite rational. It may be selected as a mode of action after very careful consideration and calculation.

In the controversy between those who insist that violence and aggression are human instincts[65] and those who deny such contentions, members of the latter group are often inclined to argue that aggressive and violent behavior result from frustration. That is, they feel that when certain basic needs are not fulfilled or are denied expression, aggressive tendencies well up. However, the manner in which an individual will react to frustration depends on his training and conditioning, as well as on his inclination to think through his frustrating problem. This theory of violence resulting from frustration[66] seems to be quite useful in explaining much of the violent behavior we observe, but unfortunately, it cannot account for all violent behavior, nor can it explain why frustration sometimes leads to violent behavior, while other times it leads to nonviolent actions.

A. Individual Goals

As a response to frustration, violence occurs on two different levels in human interaction. Either it represents a reaction to frustrating and inhibiting conditions for the individual human being, or otherwise it is an expression of group frustration and group dissatisfaction. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to look at a violent incident and determine whether it is an example of group-oriented violence, or if it is a case of simple individual violence. The problem is compounded by the fact that the individual himself is not always totally aware of what the basis of his action is. For example, a member of a minority racial group may commit an act of violence on his own in response to his frustrating individual environment, but perhaps his frustration is caused by his group identity. Fanon, for example, points out that the frustration of colonized people first manifests itself in violence against one's own people and associates. Only later, after people are made aware of the cause of their frustration, can their violence be more constructively directed against the cause of their frustration.[67] With this difficulty of distinction in mind, we might note some of the goal-oriented factors involved in the commission of individual violence.

Most of the violence that people act out on the individual level can be analytically categorized into several broad areas. That is, individuals appear to act violently or to initiate violent behavior for these broad, general reasons. Perhaps the factor that explains most individual violence is that people so act when they perceive their basic needs as being threatened. Violence from this perspective is simply behavior that results from need-frustration. Yet there seems to be some instances of violence where need-frustration simply cannot account for the behavior. Some people have been known to employ violence, not for their own benefit or welfare -- in fact, possibly even at the risk and danger to their own welfare -- but in order to aid or assist others. A policeman intervening in a fight, a stranger coming to the aid of an assaulted child, or a white political activist committing violence for what he considers to be the benefit of oppressed Blacks or Vietnamese peasants -- all of these are examples of non-need fulfilling goal-oriented violence.

Also, we should not overlook the obvious fact that violence tends very directly to breed more violence. People who have violence directed against them are very likely to employ violence themselves. Again, using violence as a reaction to violence is not strictly a means of achieving a need, because it is not essential that any need be threatened in order for violent reaction to erupt.

We have suggested above that violence is a somewhat unusual and extraordinary form of behavior. It is behavior that is not recognized as an acceptable means of ordinary, everyday social interaction. It is socially acceptable only in unusual circumstances, and it is

socially tolerated only when it is used to deal with exceptional problems or threats. It seems, in other words, that there is a kind of social inertia operating in human social relationships, and that inertia is characterized by nonviolent behavior. It takes a rather strong or unusual stimulus to overcome the inertia of nonviolence, for this stimulus must be powerful and influential enough to push the actor to a different and less customary level of behavior, that is, to motivate him to resort to violence.

However, once this inertia has been overcome, once violence has been initiated in a social interaction, that violence creates a new social inertia. That is, once violence has been introduced into an encounter, violence becomes the dominant characteristic of that interaction. Once one member of a social encounter breaks the inertia of nonviolence and resorts to violence, it becomes very easy and acceptable for other members of that encounter to act violently also. It is as if their violence is made easy and acceptable, because the normal situation has been nullified, and a new atmosphere has been created. The person reacting to violence then is not forced to overcome the inertia of nonviolence, so he quite easily and naturally conforms to the newly created atmosphere, with little mental or emotional effort, by acting violently.

What this means is that once violence has been introduced into a social encounter, it is more than likely going to produce violent reactions. In fact, it takes an unusual stimulus or motivation to prevent an individual's initial reactions within this newly created violent environment from being temporarily violent. Within a violent encounter, it seems that only very strong and principled individuals have the capacity to break through the mental and emotional inertia of the violence and respond to violence without themselves being violent. In other words, a Gandhi or a Martin Luther King may possess the strength of character and will to overcome violent inertia and thereby act nonviolently in a violent encounter. Unfortunately, most people have not disciplined themselves to achieve this strength and integrity, and consequently, we can expect most people to act violently within a direct violent encounter.

Somewhat related to the tendency to react violently to violence is the use of violence as a means of individual revenge. Some people will inflict violence on another in retribution for a wrong that has been done to them, and this revenge need have no bearing on the individual's basic needs. The principle of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," of course, is not peculiar to contemporary American society.

Finally, there must be a miscellaneous category of individual violent behavior, because there are occasional instances of violence that do not seem to fit any general pattern. Within this category we would have to place the pathological violent behavior discussed above.

Perhaps violent behavior is even resorted to now and then, simply out of boredom or because the weather is hot.[68] The violent acts in this miscellaneous category appear to be somewhat rare and unusual, but they deserve to be recognized nonetheless.

It has been hypothesized that all individual goal-oriented violence can be explained by saying it is behavior which aims at satisfying some basic human drive or need.[69] In a broad, general sense, then, people choose to act violently because they feel threatened in some sense, and they consider violence to be a useful means of removing a restriction or an inhibition to their need gratification. This immediately raises the question of what constitutes a need or a drive.[70] James C. Davies, borrowing from the work of Abraham Maslow, suggests that there are four levels of human need.

First, there are the most basic needs which might be referred to as survival needs. These include the needs for food, water, rest, physical security, and perhaps sex. These are the needs that must be satisfied before any of the other can even be considered. Without their satisfaction, there simply will be no organism.

Second, there are what Maslow refers to as the love and belonging needs. The contention here is that every human being has a need to love and be loved above and beyond his desire for physical sexual satisfaction. A human being is a social animal, and he remains healthy and stable only so long as he has other people to identify with and with whom he can interact. To deprive a person of these needs is to force him into a state of alienation and emotional instability. People will oftentimes fight as violently to protect these needs as they will to satisfy survival needs.

Third, there are the esteem needs. In addition to an individual being accepted into a group and being allowed to identify with it, a person seems to have a need, in some sense, to distinguish himself as an important or worthy member of that group. He must be allowed to express himself in such a way that the group will recognize him as being something individual and unique while remaining a member of the group. This need may manifest itself in various ways, such as a will to power, a flair for comedy, artistic expression, a capacity to aid and assist others, etc. It is at this level that a person seems to require such political rights as power, freedom, and equality. Without these, he or she cannot adequately satisfy the esteem needs that are very important to most of us. It is also at this level, perhaps combined with level two, that males are very sensitive about masculinity. To be loved and accepted and to be esteemed necessitates, for men, that they be allowed to demonstrate those qualities which are typically considered to be masculine. "Violence feeds on low self-esteem and self-doubt ..."[71] To threaten a man's image of his own masculinity often leads to a very violent confrontation. It is a need which most men are not able to have

blocked without becoming extremely frustrated. It seems to be at this level, also, that Fanon directs his claims that violence is a cleansing force which allows oppressed people to cast off their feelings of inferiority in order to gain freedom, equality, and self-respect.

> At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.[72]

The fourth and final level of human need, according to Maslow, concerns development and creativity needs. These needs seem to be somewhat related to esteem needs, but they go beyond them. At this level, the individual strives to develop his innate potentialities, whatever they might be, or the individual strives for what Maslow referred to as "self-actualization." These self-actualizing needs, as distinguished from esteem needs, are not pursued for the sake of impressing others or for gaining prestige within the group. Rather, they represent individual needs, similar to the survival needs, where the individual seeks realization simply for his own health and happiness.

With these four categories of human needs in mind, we can probably account for a large percentage of the incidents of violence. Certainly, it is not always immediately evident what level of need is motivating a particular act of violence, but if we could devote time and attention to each incident, it seems likely that many of them would fit into one of these four categories. It would seem that a great deal of time and attention needs to be devoted to this kind of analysis, for it might offer valuable insight into understanding violence in our society as well as offering potential remedies for violence. If, for example, it were to be discovered that violence in this country is the result of deprivation of esteem needs, or if we were to discover that police officers tend to be assaulted most often when their assailants' esteem needs are threatened, perhaps we could find some remedies.

In suggesting that many instances of violence might be explained in terms of need deprivation, we are not attempting to condone violence, nor to suggest that it is admirable or legitimate. Rather, it is imperative to point out that such behavior is an understandable phenomenon within the general social context. Perhaps nonviolent tactics would be more rational and more effective in the long run, but for an individual to adopt nonviolent attitudes and inclinations would require a great deal more thought, effort, and sophistication than most of the members of our society -- particularly the more violent-prone members -- can be expected to have. Such an attitude

would require a super self-actualized individual (in Maslow's terms) who is able to resist a great deal of cultural conditioning. There just are not very many Gandhis around, and we should not expect there to be, within the present environment.

B. Group Goals

We must also consider the motivation for goal-directed violence from the point of view of group action. That is, it certainly seems to be true that in many instances of violence, we cannot meaningfully account for it by referring to strictly personal or individual needs, at least not directly. Instead, there seems to be some group aim or need operating, and in most instances of this kind of violence, we are referring to political violence. In fact, some students of violence in America are of the opinion that political violence is definitely on the upswing, as opposed to individual violence.[73]

From this perspective, violence must be viewed as a political act, and the aims that are being sought through the violent behavior are likely to be political aims. In most instances, such group or political violence can probably be interpreted as an effort to effect change. Certain groups and their leaders have apparently come to the conclusion that violent actions will be effective in bringing about certain political goals.[74]

We can see specific examples of this motivation for violence in the actions and writings of various groups and their spokesmen. For Fanon, violence is a political act, as well as a form of individual self-expression. He sees it as a necessary and proper method, (performed by the oppressed and powerless people in the colonized nation), of removing the oppressive burden of colonialism. According to Fanon, the colonial regime has been established by outsiders with the use of violence, and it is the violence that has "legitimized" that regime. Violence maintains and protects that regime, and therefore, Fanon assumes, the only thing that a colonizing power understands or respects is violence. Consequently, the violent power must be dealt with violently.

> ....the policeman and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their frequent and direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle butts and napalm not to budge. It is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force. The intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with

> the clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the home and into the mind of the native.[75]

Fanon's remarks arise out of a colonial environment in which a society is being ruled and occupied by some external political force. Yet his insights and observations are not irrelevant to nations such as ours, where, ostensibly, there is no foreign occupation. James Baldwin insists that Black Americans are in a situation very similar to the colonized Algerians under French control which Fanon was describing. Baldwin states that Blacks are aware of their inferior and subservient position in American society, and many of them view the established white political system as an occupying force. The police and public officials who represent that colonizing power, particularly in the ghetto, are seen as enemy soldiers whose role is to enforce the regime of the invader and to oppress the native inhabitants.

> He (the policeman) moves through Harlem, therefore, like an occupying soldier in a bitterly hostile country; which is precisely what, and where, he is, and is the reason he walks in twos and threes.[76]

If there is any validity in Baldwin's remarks, we must assume that members of other racial minorities, and perhaps even poor and dispairing white people, find themselves in similar circumstances. These political acts of groups of people who feel themselves as outsiders, or who do not consider themselves to be within the favored and powerful ranks of society, may very well be attempts to gain the basic changes that are necessary to fulfill their needs. Their group has needs, and they as individuals within that group have needs. If these needs are thwarted, violence is a very likely alternative to be used by these desperate people.

This explanation of violence certainly must account for a great deal of the turmoil in our society, but it is one that is very difficult to subject to empirical analysis. To be able to accurately measure and evaluate the phenomenon from this point of view, it would be necessary that we have some means of determining when people are acting strictly as individuals, and when they are acting as a member of a group. Most likely, the violent individuals are not themselves always aware of their motivation. Some group membership in this respect is conscious and deliberate, but sometimes it may be unconscious and unperceived. Do all colonials recognize their group plight? Do all Blacks, or even all ghetto Blacks, perceive themselves as living in a colonized nation? Obvicusly, the answer to both questions is no, but this does not negate the idea. Even if

only a significant minority are at such a stage of consciousness, such a phenomenon is critically important in understanding group violence.

It appears that at this level, people are aspiring to such abstract concepts as freedom, equality, and justice; and history has shown time and again that people will fight and die for these abstractions. Undoubtedly, many people feel that unusual and extraordinary means are justified in their pursuit. In addition, in such a struggle, violent behavior is selected because people see it as a symbol of their commitment and their dedication. Violence is an extreme and irrevocable act, which once done cannot be taken back. Consequently, it symbolizes unconditional and total allegiance to a cause. Fanon felt this to be one of the great virtues of violence, for he felt that absolute and total commitment was the only means by which a subjugated people could throw off their bonds and achieve their noble goals.[77]

Another justification that is sometimes given to the use of political violence is that it is a necessary retributive device. That is, an unjust society that has brutalized and destroyed others, itself deserves to be brutalized. Violence is utilized for the pure and simple aim of revenge. According to Hannah Arendt, sometimes the only way to ensure justice is to repay violence with violence.[78] The Weathermen faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) took this position when they decided that justice demanded that violent America have violence inflicted upon it for the destruction that it had delivered upon an innocent and helpless nation like Vietnam.[79]

Ordinarily when one thinks of political violence, attention is directed toward rebellious groups seeking change within a society. However, it is important to emphasize that political violence is just as likely to be employed by defenders of a political system. Although the euphemism of "force" is usually adopted to explain the violence of those groups attempting to maintain the status quo, the basic elements of the behavior are the same. History, in this country and around the world, is replete with examples of governments and elite groups using violent methods to repress social elements that would challenge their superiority. Violence, then, is commonly used to maintain and extend privileges and advantages that are already enjoyed, as well as its use in challenging them. It is a premeditated tactic of groups who are seeking to avoid change, as well as a tactic for change-seekers. Individuals and groups that benefit from a prevailing distribution of power and privilege throughout history have shown themselves to be unwilling to allow these advantages to be shared or taken away without a violent struggle.[80]

For examples of this truism, we need not look very far back in our history. The Ku Klux Klan has existed throughout the 20th Century while committing violence against those who would advocate and seek racial and political change. The Chicago Police in 1968 initiated what a government investigation was to characterize as a "police riot,"[81] in order to quell peaceful protestors who were seeking broad political change. Police and FBI purges of the Black Panther Organization have illustrated governmental use of violence to repress a movement seeking radical change.[82] And, of course, American foreign policy since the end of World War I has been founded on the goal of using any and all means to prevent an alteration in the international balance of power.

In summary, it seems that in trying to understand the motivation and causation for violent behavior, it is helpful to distinguish between individual acts of violence over against group violence. Under each of these broad divisions, there are a number of categories that allow us to classify different causes of violent behavior. The following listing seems to account for most of the violence that occurs in our society:

A. Individual Goal-Oriented Violence

1. Violence as a reaction to need deprivation
2. Violence used to assist others
3. Violence as a response to violence
4. Violence as revenge
5. Miscellaneous violence

B. Political or Group Goal-Oriented Violence

1. Violence as a means of securing freedom, equality, and justice
2. Violence as a symbol and a commitment
3. Violence as group revenge
4. Violence as a means of preserving and extending power and privilege

We have attempted to focus, in this section, on the causal factors that lead to violent behavior. We have concluded that cultural training and environmental conditioning play very important parts in supplying the violent actor with attitudes and values that make violence a meaningful alternative. Such training and conditioning is perhaps a necessary cause of violence, but by itself is not a sufficient cause. The culture can supply the predisposition to act violently, but it is obvious that some other ingredient must be present to allow this predisposition to be activated. Otherwise we would not be able to account for the fact that there is not more violence in our society.

The necessary ingredient that suffices to trigger the violence is either an innate psychological or genetic predisposition within the actor himself, or else it is a defect in the environment which causes people to become sufficiently desperate to use the unusual and exceptional violent alternative. It is our feeling that to look for violent causation by seeking to uncover psychotic aberrations in the individual human being, while not being without some merits, has limited value for several reasons. The most important reason is that violence of this kind seems to represent a minute percentage of the total violent acts committed in our society. Consequently, the major emphasis has been placed on explaining violence as a rational, goal-directed type of behavior, operating, of course, within a value system which accepts violence as an acceptable and rational method of dealing with conflict. To say that violence is rational is not to deny that it may be conducted with a great deal of emotion. Reason and emotion are not mutually exclusive, and it is very possible, and even likely, that a person can be quite emotional in his reasoning processes. In fact, it would be extremely unusual if a person witnessing a mugging or a massacre did not become very angry and upset as he rationally prepared to intervene.

These observations are somewhat tentative by necessity, because sufficient time and meaningful research has not been devoted to this extremely critical problem. It is essential that social scientists and scholars begin to recognize violence and violent behavior as an important legitimate field of study. By so doing, the conclusions offered here could be more elaborate and more securely founded.

Consequences of Violence

Having discussed the causes of violence, we are led to a consideration of the results of violence. It would be helpful to know what the effects are -- what problems violence solves and what problems it creates. If most violence is goal-oriented behavior, we cannot help but ask how effective it is in achieving these goals. Unfortunately, this is another area where far too little time and research has been devoted. The first broad, thorough, and systematic analysis of the effects of violence is still to be undertaken, but perhaps we can make some tentative and introductory observations on the problem.

We simply want to ask very generally what the consequences of violence are -- other than the fact that recipients of violence get hurt or killed. The practitioners of violence are wont to enlarge upon its positive effects, while its detractors have emphasized shortcomings. We might start by looking at the positive results, and then pass on to the reputed negative effects.

Positive Consequences of Violence

An advantage that violent behavior has over most forms of behavior is that it is very conspicuous. Violence grabs people's attention and forces them to look at an issue or a problem that they might otherwise ignore. It is a dramatic and even fascinating form of human action, and practically nobody can resist its mysterious, though frightening, appeal. Thus, we see individuals and groups resorting to violence who have for years attempted to get attention or help in other ways, for there probably is no better way to demonstrate that a problem exists and that people are upset about it.[83]

We see, then, examples of individuals who have been ignored in their plea for love and attention, striking out violently as a last resort in order to get others to pay some attention to them. Also, recent racial upheavals have exploded as means of bringing attention to the deplorable conditions of the ghettoes and of Black America in general.[84] Of course, it is tragic that people and institutions will deal with critical human problems only after they have been frightened by violent outbursts, but unfortunately, this often has been the case. It would be very difficult to deny the attention-grabbing value that inheres in violent behavior.

Some people seem to feel that violence is rather effective in accomplishing immediate and short-range goals. To the extent that this is correct, it is probably related to the previously mentioned fact that violence commands attention. Thus, Black militants have argued that burning and rioting in ghettoes have brought more positive reaction on the part of the white establishment than all the years of peace marches, sit-ins, demonstrations, and other nonviolent tactics.[85] Local and federal politicians have been forced to deal with the issues, crime commissioners have been assembled to investigate problems, and laws have been passed that aim at immediate, if not far-reaching, remedies. One could produce a long list of examples where group or political violence has produced immediate, short-range results, but on the individual level, it is more difficult to demonstrate that even this has been effectively accomplished through violence. For individuals, perhaps the most prevalent and most positive gain in the use of violence is that it allows the actor to release pent-up emotion and anxiety. That is, it may very well serve as a psychological catharsis that allows a frustrated individual to return to a near normal state of emotional equilibrium. Beyond this, it is difficult to show any significant results from the use of individual violence.

Georges Sorel, again focusing primarily upon group and political violence, suggests at least three overriding advantages that violence has over nonviolence. He feels that the act of violence serves to keep the classes separate and thus prevents members of the higher classes from mingling with members of the depressed classes. This is an advantage, because he feels that the elite classes have been

effective in dampening the fires of revolutionary fervor with their tactics of infiltrating the ranks of the depressed classes. Violence used by the proletariat against the capitalist class creates a rift which prevents any such commingling, and thereby the revolutionary prospects remain viable.[86]

Sorel goes on to argue that nations which have grown passive and lethargic are able to recover their former energy and vitality by using violence. Apparently he sees violence as a catalyst vitalization and reinvigoration of the oppressed and depressed masses of society.[87] Fanon seems to concur with this observation when he argues that, "for the colonized people this violence, because it constitutes their only work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities."[88] They are suggesting that violence is very effective in arousing the masses, shaking them out of their resignation, and inspiring them to action that will bring about the fundamental social and political changes that are so badly needed. In short, Sorel and Fanon seem to be saying, violence is a good way to get the revolution started.

Related to this is Sorel's observation that violence is irrevocable.[89] Once a person or a group has acted violently, they have made a commitment which cannot be canceled. The damage is done, there is no way to undo it, and therefore, the revolution is strengthened. There is no turning back once violence has been used.

Sorel sees these characteristics of violence as being advantages and as being positive results. It is difficult to evaluate his remarks, however, because it is very difficult to subject arguments of this kind to empirical observation. On the level of individual violence, these observations become somewhat academic.

Negative Consequences of Violence

Having pointed to some of the more important arguments regarding the advantageous effects of violence, we must also refer to some of the obvious disadvantages. One disadvantage has already been alluded to when we suggested that violence, by its very definition, carries with it certain negative moral connotations. If human beings value human life, health, and welfare, violence, which is a tactic designed to threaten these values, cannot help but be immoral in some sense. There simply is no way of escaping this simple fact. Of course, the argument will usually be made that some threat to human life and welfare is justified if it is done in order to protect other lives. In a sense, the defenders of violence are suggesting that any means justifies a noble end. This may or may not be an acceptable argument, but obviously defenders of violence are so convinced. Gandhi argued that although mankind should remain steadfast in the pursuit of the truth, it is essential to recognize that human beings can never be absolutely certain as to what constitutes truth.[90] There

is always some doubt or some possibility of error, and until man becomes God, this possibility persists. Because violence is an irrevocable act, it becomes an unsatisfactory means of social interaction, because it fails to acknowledge the possibility, no matter how slight, that the other person's position may be right. Thus, in direct contradiction to the position of Sorel and Fanon, Gandhi would condemn violence, among other reasons, because it is irrevocable. It is an action which cannot be rectified if one finds himself in error.

Gandhi also condemned violence in terms of its consequences, by insisting that the users of violence have failed to recognize the necessary connection between ends and means. He felt very strongly that the methods that people use in seeking any kind of goal will very directly and profoundly affect those goals. If noble goals of love, brotherhood, and human life and welfare are to be pursued, it is not merely immoral to use violent means, it is also stupid. For very practical reasons, he would condemn the use of violence, because its consequences will inevitably lead to the perversion and distortion of one's original aims.

> Your belief that there is no connection between the means and the end is a great mistake. Through that mistake even men who have been considered religious have committed grievous crimes. Your reasoning is the same as saying that we can get a rose through planting a noxious weed...the means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree...We reap exactly as we sow.[91]

It has been argued that a further negative consequence of violence is the deleterious effect it has on the personality of the individual who uses it. Violent acts seem to harden the user and to dull his moral sensitivities. Having once used violence, a person is more likely to use it again, and he thus removes himself from a humane approach to social interaction. Hans Toch contends that violence becomes habit forming, and consequently, the individual becomes callous and ends up brutalizing himself as well as his victim.[92]

Violence is also counter-productive in that it tends to encourage more violence. We have noted earlier that violence is one of the causes of violence. If we accept the fact that violence is an immoral and inhumane form of behavior, it can be argued that it is wrong to employ it even as a temporary means of social control, because its effects are likely to produce more immorality and inhumanity.

Related to this observation, finally, it must be pointed out that violence is a very questionable form of behavior because it almost never deals with the causes of a problem or a conflict. Violence almost always deals with symptoms and not with the reasons that created the problem. This is the case at all levels of violence, including the child who is spanked, the criminal who is beaten up by a policeman, and the policeman who is stoned by a political activist. In each of these cases, violence becomes an "easy" and ineffective substitute for dealing with the real problem. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., went to great pains trying to make people understand that love, brotherhood, human health, happiness, and welfare cannot be promoted through hate, brutality, and destruction.[93]

Even if violence is effective in bringing about short-range changes and results, it is doomed to failure in the long run, because it is incapable of dealing with the underlying causes. Spanking a child may temporarily settle him down, but it certainly doesn't deal with the problem that causes his tantrum in the first place. Beating up a rapist may temporarily pacify him, but it doesn't make a loving, secure human being out of him. Stoning a policeman may bring momentary revengeful glee, but it will not begin to deal with the problems of injustice and inequality in society. Behavior that by its nature is capable of dealing only with superficial symptoms, but which cannot deal with causes, is questionable as a useful and constructive approach to social interaction.

THE POLICE FUNCTION

Having attempted in the previous section to define and analyze the very difficult concept of violence, we must next try to understand the police function in its broadest social context. Unless we can form a clear picture of what the police officer is and unless we can clearly delineate what his role is in society, it will be difficult to make any sense out of assaults against him. Police assaults occur within a total social pattern, and the motivation and cause of violence directed against police is bound to be related to the role of the police within that pattern. Again, then, the struggle for understanding demands that we look at the broad and abstract elements within society, before focusing in to study and understand the particular details. We are convinced that if we bear in mind what it is the police officer is required to do, we will have a much better grasp on the problems and dangers that confront him.

The duties and obligations of policemen, as a number of commentators have explained, are many and diverse. Activities all the way from getting a kitten out of a tree to having a shoot-out with a hardened criminal fall within the policeman's purview, and there are many shades of responsibility in between. There exists a sizable amount of literature dealing with the various specific duties and obligations of the police, and these analyses of the police function, though differing in details and in methods of exposition, seem to be quite similar and consistent.[94] Interpolating from these police role descriptions, it seems that it is possible to delineate three broad categories within which fall all but the most unusual police activities. These three categories of function encompass all of the roles of the policeman and allow us to make an analytic evaluation of their position within society.

The first, and probably the most obvious, function of the police is to enforce and to uphold the law. In this role, they serve as the mechanisms of force and coercion which underlie the constraining influence of law. The police in this role represent the Hobbesean conviction that "covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."[95] The second function of the police is to serve as the agent whose duty it is to deal with and mediate conflict whenever and wherever it arises in society. That is, society is rife with conflicts of many degrees and kinds, and it is a primary function of the policeman to go out and deal with these conflicts. And finally, the police in our society have a role of performing community service functions. That is, police are supposed to perform a variety of tasks which are aimed strictly at giving aid and assistance to the members of the community. To be sure, there are points where these three categories may overlap, and there may be some police duties which would seem to fit

THE POLICE FUNCTION

Having attempted in the previous section to define and analyze the very difficult concept of violence, we must next try to understand the police function in its broadest social context. Unless we can form a clear picture of what the police officer is and unless we can clearly delineate what his role is in society, it will be difficult to make any sense out of assaults against him. Police assaults occur within a total social pattern, and the motivation and cause of violence directed against police is bound to be related to the role of the police within that pattern. Again, then, the struggle for understanding demands that we look at the broad and abstract elements within society, before focusing in to study and understand the particular details. We are convinced that if we bear in mind what it is the police officer is required to do, we will have a much better grasp on the problems and dangers that confront him.

The duties and obligations of policemen, as a number of commentators have explained, are many and diverse. Activities all the way from getting a kitten out of a tree to having a shoot-out with a hardened criminal fall within the policeman's purview, and there are many shades of responsibility in between. There exists a sizable amount of literature dealing with the various specific duties and obligations of the police, and these analyses of the police function, though differing in details and in methods of exposition, seem to be quite similar and consistent.[94] Interpolating from these police role descriptions, it seems that it is possible to delineate three broad categories within which fall all but the most unusual police activities. These three categories of function encompass all of the roles of the policeman and allow us to make an analytic evaluation of their position within society.

The first, and probably the most obvious, function of the police is to enforce and to uphold the law. In this role, they serve as the mechanisms of force and coercion which underlie the constraining influence of law. The police in this role represent the Hobbesean conviction that "covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."[95] The second function of the police is to serve as the agent whose duty it is to deal with and mediate conflict whenever and wherever it arises in society. That is, society is rife with conflicts of many degrees and kinds, and it is a primary function of the policeman to go out and deal with these conflicts. And finally, the police in our society have a role of performing community service functions. That is, police are supposed to perform a variety of tasks which are aimed strictly at giving aid and assistance to the members of the community. To be sure, there are points where these three categories may overlap, and there may be some police duties which would seem to fit

comfortably in either of two or even all three; but taken as a whole, they seem to account for all of a police officer's duties and activities. This breakdown of police functions into three general categories, incidentally, seems to correspond very closely with the divisions made in a staff report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence prepared by James S. Campbell, Joseph R. Salind, and David P. Stang.[96] We will analyze each of these categories in some detail in our effort to understand the police officer's role in society:

1. Enforce and uphold the law
2. Mediate conflict
3. Perform community service tasks

Enforcing Law

Perhaps the most obvious and characteristic role of the policeman is that of enforcing and upholding the law. This is probably the role in which he is most typically identified by most of the members of society. In evaluating this role, it is absolutely imperative that we have a clear understanding of what law is. At a quick glance, this appears to be a minor and superficial problem -- defining and characterizing law -- but unfortunately, it is not simple and unimportant at all. In fact, one could convincingly argue that one of the major shortcomings of every report by Presidential commissions on crime and violence has been the failure to take a long, hard, and courageous look at the concept of law. Either law and the structures which surround it are taken for granted -- assuming that everyone knows what law is and where it comes from -- or else a very unrealistic and distorted view of it is given. Yet, to assume a Pollyanna view of law is to assure superficial and unsatisfactory conclusions on social and political problems.

Law and the State

It has been the tradition in Western society, and it certainly is common today, to cloak law in robes of justice, morality, and freedom. We tend to talk of law as if it were a set of rules designed to promote liberty, equality, and justice for all. A contemporary text in criminal studies defines law as "an ordinance of reason, directed to the common good."[97] According to this popular view, laws are simply rules used to guide the behavior of the members of society, and these rules are arrived at by forming a compromise between all of the many interests and ideas within that grouping. Every member of society benefits or suffers from the rule of law to the same extent as every other.[98] Anyone who would violate a

law, then, anyone who would commit a crime by his very act proves his antisocial nature and demonstrates his selfishness and his utter contempt for other people.[99]

According to this pervasive view of law, because crime and law breaking automatically reflect antisocial and unhumanitarian behavior, people who do break the law are considered to be somehow evil and base. The people who break the law must be defective, and law becomes necessary to protect society from base men. This assumption of the evil nature of man on which legal systems are established and which upholds the sanctity of the rule of law[100] seems never to question whether the law itself might not be at fault rather than men. Thus, a whole society remains perplexed about violations of and contempt for law. Executive Order #11412, "Establishing a National Commission on the Causes and Preventions of Violence," finds former President Lyndon B. Johnson directing money and attention to finding answers to the question, among others, of:

> b) The causes and prevention of disrespect for law and order, of disrespect for public officials, and of violent disruptions of public order by individuals and groups.[101]

The sincere manner in which this question is so naively posed illustrates a totally unrealistic view of the enigmas of law and order, and it shows that even a former President lacked a basic understanding of the "lawlessness" in our society. What we must do, then, is to take the sugar coating off of the concepts of law and order and describe them as they really are. Only in this manner can we gain any insight into the police officer's part in the process, and only by understanding his role can we hope to protect him from the dangers and the violence that threaten him in his daily routine.

As opposed to such abstractions as natural law, or physical laws of nature, the law that policemen deal with are the local ordinances and state and federal statutes, as well as the legal structures that surround them. These are the laws that need to be defined and analyzed for the sake of clarification. Very simply, laws are those rules which are designed to organize and control the behavior of the members of the state and which are sanctioned by force and coercion.

According to this definition, only that political mechanism called the state, or an official subdivision thereof, possesses the power and the authority to make law. Or as Max Weber states it, "Today legal coercion by violence is the monopoly of the state."[102] Individuals without power and authority lack the capacity to pass law, at least in contemporary American society, and so do other organizations and institutions such as churches, clubs, fraternities, unions, etc. The fact that only the state may make law is obvious,

although it may not be so obvious why this is the case. In defining law, we indicated that laws are rules which are sanctioned by force and coercion. If anyone should decide not to obey a law, he will be compelled to do so, either through threat or actual use of force or coercion. Laws are the only rules and mechanisms aiming at public organization and control that do have this kind of sanction.[103] All others, such as habits, customs, traditions, mores, religious strictures, and union and club bylaws, lack the sanction of physical force and coercion.

The point is that the state is a mandatory organization of societal members which holds a monopoly of force in that society. Or as Max Weber described it, "A state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."[104] This monopolization of force characterizes all states, and it is the factor which distinguishes the state from all other social organizations. In a sense, it puts the state above all other forms of association, because the others exist and operate at the sufferance of the state.

This amounts to the fact that the power and authority of the state is legitimized by the state's ability to be superior in the use of force, coercion, and violence. In this superiority, it forms a monopoly by forbidding the use of all force and violence which is not first approved or permitted by the state. Thus, we may talk, and for centuries philosophers have written, as if the authority and the legitimacy of the state rests on consent, a social contract or agreement, natural law, or as if it is just plain in the nature of things for the state to exist. The fact remains that what brings the state into being, and what ultimately preserves and perpetuates it, is the capacity for those in control to use and monopolize violence and coercion. Any violence not sanctioned by the state is a danger and a threat to the existing political power structure, and thus it is by definition illegal and unconstitutional.

The 18th Century Americans, who initiated actions of force and violence in an effort to rid themselves of British rule and gain independence, found themselves challenging the British monopolization of force. During the hostilities, the Colonials were acting illegally, unconstitutionally (contrary to the British Constitution), and in a revolutionary manner. However, because they succeeded in their attempt to be more forceful, coercive, and violent than their opponent -- that is, because they won the war -- their actions became legitimate.

This points to the irony of the state and its use of violence. All violence and coercion which is not sanctioned by the state is illegitimate and illegal, unless or until it succeeds in overcoming the state's power. A state gains legitimacy only after the fact, and no group can claim legitimacy for its violence or for its rule until after it has succeeded in monopolizing force. Then the very

fact of having a greater capacity to impose force and violence legitimizes that violence, and consequently the state.[105] Whether we like to admit it or not, force is the ultimate legitimizing factor in politics, and mankind does now, and throughout history has always, operated on the theory that might makes right. As long as there are states, legitimacy, by definition, is determined by violence and force.

This is neither the time nor the place to go into a detailed analysis of who controls the state and for what reasons.[107] The very fact that there are struggles to gain control of the state suggest that certain advantages are to be gained. Perhaps it is instructive to point out, however, that those people who succeed in their capacity to monopolize force and violence are those who have the social and economic power which allows them to recruit people to their cause, as well as producing the materials and equipment that are necessary for successful violence. This would lead us to guess that the desire for control of the state is based on some desire to gain and maintain certain social and economic advantages and privileges.

Again, Max Weber's analysis of the state sheds light on the issue when he states:

> A compulsory political association with continuous organization will be called a "state" if and in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.[108]

Weber's statement suggests that a state exists in order to impose some specific "order" on society. The state exercises control and regulation over the lives of all members of society, and it does this in order to accomplish ends which are deemed to be necessary or important.

Law is perhaps the most important mechanism used by the state to control the behavior of people in order to establish a particular order or system. The laws of any state, then, reflect the values and attitudes of that group that is powerful enough to monopolize the means of force and coercion. They command behavior on the part of all citizens that will serve to advance the advantages and privileges of what John Stuart Mill referred to as the "ascendant class."[109] That is, laws are drawn up in such a manner that a social and economic environment prevails that benefits the ascendant group in society.

In addition to establishing these norms on a society-wide level -- the norms promoting elitist values[110] -- laws are designed to assure a modicum of harmony and security within this environment. It is one thing to legislate a socioeconomic system, such as capitalism, but additional laws are required to make it possible for people to

operate within that environment. These laws, designed for harmony and security within the system, bring "order" to society. These laws promoting order are rules which forbid people to do those things that most people would not do most of the time even if there were no such laws. For example, laws against murder, rape, and assault as well as laws for public convenience, such as many traffic regulations, are designed to promote order and security within the social system which the state erects.

The legal system of any society, comprised of the many and varied individual laws, is designed to create a particular kind of environment or "system" that is advantageous to the ascendant class. Laws and legal systems are not designed to promote the interest and welfare of the whole society, nor even of the majority. They are not designed to promote liberty, equality, and justice for all of the members of society. On the contrary, law establishes conditions that give advantages to the class that controls the state, and thus, in a sense, law assures that inequality will prevail.

> Notions of legitimacy, and especially of legality, result in recognizing the decisions of political power as valid because of their form, not their content, because of the power held by government leaders, not their ability or sense of justice.[111]

Law requires many members of society to do things that they would not otherwise do, and it requires them to act in ways that are contrary to their own interests[112] (e.g., draft laws, censorship laws, mortgage and contract laws, tax laws, laws that require a destitute man to respect the private property of the wealthy, etc.).

What seems obvious is that law too often takes from the poor and needy members of society, while giving advantages to the members who least need help. Robert F. Kennedy, who should know whereof he speaks, having been Attorney-General of the United States, indicated that he recognized this tendency in the law when he said:

> ...to the poor man, "legal" has become a synonym for technicalities and obstruction, not for that which is to be respected. The poor man looks upon the law as an enemy, not as a friend. For him the law is always taking something away.[113]

To be sure, there are many instances of law where poor and needy people are not abused. Laws are not intended to be used to bring pain and misery on the many, but rather to bring advantages to the few. The best laws, in terms of efficiency and good will, are those that aid the members of the ascendant class without hurting or angering the majority of society's members. The interests of the

ascendant class and the interests of the rest of society are not always in conflict, but when these interests do conflict, law serves to mediate in favor of the elite.

In a sense, then, law is a command from a superior to an inferior, sanctioned by the veiled threat of force.[114] What renders law particularly effective, however, is its characteristic of appearing to be impersonal. Law is subjectively designed to benefit certain people, but objectively it is applied in a general and universal manner. Laws appear to be impartial because of the universality of their application. After all, as Anatole France is reputed to have observed, it is a crime for a rich man to steal a loaf of bread, just as it is for a poor man; and a rich man has no more right to find lodgings under a bridge than does a homeless transient. The point is, of course, that universal and impartial application of the law does not lead to justice and equality if the content of the law is slanted in favor of a particular group or groups.

> For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members in a society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.[115]

The impersonal and general character of law renders it very effective as an instrument of political organization and control. Although force, coercion, and violent reaction underlie the whole legal system -- that is, in spite of the fact that noncompliance to a law will be met with some kind of physical enforcement -- the impersonality and remoteness of it encourages people to accept it. The overwhelming majority of people in any society would certainly endorse the institution of law. To the extent that a political system is characterized by injustice, inequality, and repression of various groups, law and the legal system camouflage these inequities.[116] People have never known a life outside of law, and they accept it without question, just as they accept inconveniences in nature. People do not consciously oppose law, then; not even those who suffer from its effects. Most people obey the law, not because of the threat of physical sanctions, but rather out of habit or custom.[117] Many obey law because they fear the disapproval of other members of society should they not obey.

> The broad mass of the participants act in a way corresponding to legal norms, not out of obedience regarded as a legal obligation, but either because the environment approves of the conduct and disapproves of its opposite, or merely as a result of unreflective habituation to a regularity of life that has engraved itself as a custom.[118]

If it is true that most people act according to custom and peer approval, one must wonder about the need for laws which command obedience as an escape from physical coercion. Maurice Duverger contends that an important factor in explaining widespread obedience to law -- even to laws that are contrary to people's interests -- is the almost universal desire on the part of people to want to believe that all is well and that law is a means of ensuring the general welfare. That is, he feels people obey law because they are seeking a panacea, and they place their faith in the ubiquitous power of the law.

> The dream of order, justice, harmony, and solidarity that all men share, the great yearning to escape from loneliness and find fulfillment in a genuine community, in a truly integrated society, serves the aims of the governing power. We always see things somewhat as we want them to be.[119]

The tendency to glorify the concepts of law and order is not peculiar to this country. Yet we should be aware that such apotheosis can be self-defeating. The truth of the matter is that a regime which rigidly clings to the precepts of law and order is not necessarily a desirable one. Democratic forms of government are not assured by such methods, and on the contrary, the most rigid, stultifying, and dictatorial states have been those which have maintained a strong commitment to law and order. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia placed great emphasis on law and order. In fact, there is probably no environment more characterized by law and order than a prison. Obviously, then, by themselves, law and order are of no particular value or charm. Order without justice may be a treacherous condition, and the history of Western political thought can be interpreted as a long and unsuccessful effort to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable concepts of Justice versus Law and Order.

It is interesting to note that a recognized authority in the field of criminal justice has suggested that law and order may themselves be incompatible. "Law is not merely an instrument of order, but may frequently be its adversary."[120] The point seems to be that at times law can create inequities that disturb the otherwise peaceful and orderly relations among members of a community.

Law and the Police

All of this leads us to ask what the role of the police is in this politico-legal environment, although the answers seem to be rather obvious. The police force is the mechanism which is employed to enforce the law. It is the means of applying the ultimate sanction -- the force, coercion, and violence which may be necessary to control the behavior of those who have not become habituated to legal behavior.[121] For those who will not conform or who will not submit to the prevailing norms and structures of the established system, the police are called in to impose compliance and obedience. The police force, in other words, serves as the coercive and violent mechanism which stands behind the law and gives it an ultimately mandatory and unchallengeable authority.

> ...the role of the police is best understood as a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiably coercive force employed in accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies.[122]

Force and violence being the ultimate legitimization of the state, and of the rules, or laws, which organize and structure that state, the police are the incarnation of that legitimacy. Along with the armed forces, the police are instruments of force and coercion, whose role is to defend the prevailing state system's claim to existence and to legitimacy.

A. Political Role of the Police

The police role, by its very nature, in addition to being militant, is political. The police are a political weapon used by a group that is concerned with maintaining the status quo in society. The law establishes a system based on the values and attitudes of the ascendant class, and the police serve to protect and preserve that system. In helping to impose the values and attitudes of the elite upon society through the enforcement of law, the policeman is expected to act always in the interest of that elite. In fact, one analyst of criminal justice believes that the police role of enforcing the law is subordinate, in some instances, to the role of protecting the interests of the dominant class.

> The police function (is) to support and enforce the interests of the dominant political, social, and economic interests of the town, and only incidentally to enforce the law.[123]

This is not a unique point of view, for other observers would concur.

CONTINUED

2 OF 6

> The police official's job is dependent upon his having radar-like equipment to sense what is the power structure and what it wants enforced as law.[124]

In this respect, then, a police officer's job is political in nature, because he is entrusted with the job of defending the interests and ideology of a particular group in society.

This is not a new or original insight into the character of the police role. One need not be an expert political analyst to be aware of the fact that politicians use their police forces in political roles, both on the federal and local levels of government. It is no mere coincidence that in many cities changes of the chief of police occur with changes in administration. A newly elected mayor is granted the right to select a new police chief, because he must have a man in that position who can be trusted to enforce the values and attitudes of his political superiors. On the national level of government, although the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is not removed from his office with a change in administration, his nominal boss, the Attorney-General, is.

The Chicago police force, apparently with the blessing of Mayor Daley, were assuming a very definite political role in their handling of the Democratic National Convention in 1968. Police officers are expected to alter their tactics and their routine when political changes occur in society. For example, police officers were often instructed to go easy and be more permissive toward law-breaking Blacks during the political crisis following ghetto riots and Martin Luther King's assassination. Changes in the political environment call for changes in the police officer's methods of operations.[125]

Unfortunately, policemen are usually not in a position to see the political character of their jobs, and they often tend to resent orders which seem to them to be a confusion of their repressive and law-enforcing duties.[126] Just as soldiers and armies have been used politically, as in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, police are also used in this manner. Not being able to recognize or understand the role of political pawn they are often forced to play, they understandably resent the limitations that are placed upon their actions.

From the point of view of many members of society, policemen serve as symbols of oppression and of the injustices of society. They are the visible representation of the injustices that pervade the system, those which are particularly painful to the weaker and poorer segments of the population. As such, they receive the brunt of the reaction and animosity that the inequities of society foster. The fact that the police officer has not created the inequities, and

the fact that there is little or nothing that he can do about them,[127] is lost on most poor people and ghetto dwellers. They are looking for causes to their misery, and all they can see and all they can blame is the policeman. This point has been very well stated in the Kerner Report, which attempted to explain the ghetto riots of 1966 and 1967.

> The policeman in the ghetto is a symbol not only of law, but of the entire system of law enforcement and criminal justice. As such, he becomes the tangible target for grievances against shortcomings throughout the system... against the basic inequities imposed by the system on the poor.[128]

Studies have shown that policemen feel alienated from the people with whom they interact.[129] They feel that the public does not appreciate the service that they perform. This is especially uncomfortable for the officer on the beat, because the people who distrust and dislike him the most are the people that typify the social and economic background from which policemen emerge. That is, the working class population is most likely to feel oppressed by the established system that the police officer represents, and yet the majority of policemen come from working class families.

> Police are recruited from a narrow segment of society. They are generally white and come from lower middle-class or working-class families. Their values are the values of their class background -- traditional and conventional. God, country, the flag, hard work, self-reliance, and "toughness" are valued...Most simply do not like blacks; in fact, most cultural and racial minorities are disliked.[130]

In a sense, then, they find themselves being used as a force of political oppression against their own kind of people. The alienation resulting from such hostility further embitters the policeman,[131] often motivating him to be more callous and unsympathetic, and thus the vicious cycle of violence and resentment is created with harsher and more bitter consequences.

The bias of the police function in favor of the owning class and against the working and poorer classes is seen in the fact that law enforcement is not performed in an even-handed manner. The police fail to provide the order and security for the ghetto dwellers that is granted to the "better" members of society.[132] Crime and disorder in the ghetto are tolerated so long as they remain inside the ghetto and do not affect other segments of the population. Those who suffer from this lack of protection resent the police and become further

alienated, because they assume that the police do not care about the lives and welfare of the poor. Niederhoffer, commenting on this phenomenon, states that, "Incidents that would cause commotion and consternation in quiet precincts seem so common in ghetto neighborhoods that they are often not reported."[133] The police do walk the ghetto areas and the poorer precincts, but they do so in order to maintain the repression and to keep violence and crime from spreading to the better areas. Their role, in fact, seems to many residents to be that of an occupying force which represses but does not provide protection or security for the colonized people.[134]

In summary, then, in terms of his role in enforcing the law, the police officer is expected to protect and support, oftentimes unwittingly, the interests and values of the ascendant class. The performance of this function requires him to repress the efforts of rebellion and change on the part of the disadvantaged members of society. It requires him to intervene, with force and violence, if necessary, when people who find themselves at a disadvantage due to the law and the political system attempt to gain personal satisfactions outside of the legal system. The police officer becomes a political instrument used in the class struggle,[135] and the instrument that he becomes is a coercive, violent one. He becomes an occupying force in a portion of society that feels frustrated, embittered, and alienated from the more privileged members of society. His job is to serve "as a buffer in insulating and protecting existing political and social structures,"[136] standing between the violent and conflicting societal interests. It is a dangerous assignment, and it is a violent one.

Mediating Conflict

The second broad function of the police organization is to mediate conflict. In the myriad of human relationships that constitute the basis of daily social life all over the nation, there inevitably arise a great many problems and conflicts. The conflicts differ in intensity, in scope, in duration, but they all create problems that must be dealt with and solved. For those conflicts which seem to become dangerous or insoluble, it is oftentimes necessary to bring in an umpire or a mediator. This mediator is expected to deal with the conflicts in such a manner that they do not spread and do not become destructive. In our society, it is the police officer who is assigned the task of going out to deal with the many and diverse conflicts that society produces.

The conflicts with which a policeman must deal are many and varied. One large, general category of conflict which draws police attention concerns the problems of equity that arise between individuals and groups. In such situations, for which there usually are no hard and fast solutions, the police officer must intervene, attempt to restore a semblance of peace and order and, hopefully, help to establish a means of resolving the conflict. Consequently, when neighbors feud over property rights, or their children's activities, or any one of a number of other issues, the policeman is expected to mediate and resolve the conflict. More often than not, he must do this in an atmosphere of agitation, anger, hate, contempt, fear, and even violence. The people involved in such disputes are likely to be in a highly unstable emotional state, often aggravated by overconsumption of alcohol, and yet the police officer must rush into this hostile atmosphere.

He often finds himself in a very similar atmosphere when he is called in to deal with such conflicts as family quarrels,[137] street fights, bar brawls, and political confrontations. In each case, people are found in a highly emotional and highly volatile conflict situation, which most people would think twice about before entering. When the situation becomes too complex or too dangerous for anyone else to enter, as mediator, the job falls on the police officer by default. In fact, a considerable portion of the policeman's workload is devoted to this activity of mediating conflict, and this is the case in spite of the fact that most police officers judge this to be their most disliked type of duty.[138]

In the situations mentioned above, the police officer mediates conflict to which he is an impartial, uninvolved third party. However, there are some conflicts in society that the policeman must deal with, to which he is an involved and participating actor. That is, there are many instances where he either initiates or helps to precipitate the conflict. Thus, in his role of enforcing law -- and particularly in enforcing the "victimless crime" laws -- the police officer helps produce a conflict with which he must deal. This is also the case when he performs his role of issuing citations for traffic violations. In so doing, he helps to produce an emotionally charged conflict situation which he is expected to resolve.[139]

The consequences that follow from these interventions into conflict situations are obvious and inevitable. The police officer very often finds that he himself becomes an object of anger, frustration, and violence, and animosity that may originally have been directed at the two members of the dispute very easily can become redirected toward the police officer. This is even a stronger likelihood in those conflicts to which the policeman is himself a participant. Entering into a belligerent and violent atmosphere, he is very openly and directly subjecting himself to the dangers of violence and assault.[140] Professor James Q. Wilson uses the term "order

maintenance" to describe the function of police activity that we have referred to as conflict mediation. Discussing this role of the police, he states that it is "one in which sub-professionals, working alone, exercise wide discretion in matters of the utmost importance (life and death, honor and dishonor) in an environment that is apprehensive and perhaps hostile."[141]

We have noted above that the likelihood of violence being used is very greatly increased once a violent situation has been created. Thus, upon entering a scene -- say a domestic quarrel where husband and wife are battling -- where the inertia of nonviolence has already been superseded, the chances of violence being used against the policeman are vastly increased. If violence has already occurred, and the inertia of violence has established itself in the situation, it even becomes likely, almost expected, that violence will continue to be used. With the police officer standing in the midst of such a confrontation, he finds himself a ready target for assault. This is the case regardless of how the officer handles the situation, no matter how patient, kind, and understanding he may be. Certainly, there are better and worse ways to handle conflict situations, but there are often situations where the atmosphere has become so hostile that even a saint could not avoid a violent eruption.

In summarizing the conflict mediation role of the police, it is difficult to reach any very optimistic conclusions. As the agents who are assigned to deal with conflict, conflict is going to be the perpetual and inevitable companion of the police officer. He will find himself constantly facing the difficult consequences of conflict which will include hate, animosity, anger, insult, and violence. That is the nature of the job. That is what the police officer is for.

Performing Community Services

The third general division of the police function is that of performing community services. This is a broad and amorphous category for police performance, for it includes a great diversity of actions and activities. It is definitely distinct from the two previously mentioned roles, however, at least analytically, because unlike them, the police are performing nonadversarial duties. In enforcing the law and dealing with conflict, the police officer is typically involved in imposing force or some kind of restraint upon the people with whom he is interacting. That is to say, he is usually seen as an opponent or an adversary of the citizens he is dealing with, and his behavior is very likely to be punitive and restrictive in such encounters.

In his community service role, however, his activities are not adversarial or competitive. Instead of imposing restraints, the policeman is seeking to aid, assist, or cooperate with people. People with needs of various kinds must often look to the police officer

for assistance, and from a public relations point of view, this role helps create positive attitudes toward police. In campaigns that are designed to promote support and respect for the police, it is this community service function that is emphasized. For example, some very striking billboards have been designed which depict a policeman holding an unconscious child in his arms and giving the child mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. Under this scene is written: "Some people call him 'pig.'" Now this is a very effective and emotion-packed attempt to gain sympathy and support for police officers by demonstrating their very valuable and humane role in providing help and assistance to the community.

The different activities that comprise police community service are almost limitless. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice lists the following as important examples of police community service:

> ...direct and control traffic, watch the polls on election day, escort important visitors in and out of town, license taxicabs and bicycles, and operate animal shelters. Policemen assist stranded motorists, give directions to travelers, rescue lost children, respond to medical emergencies, help people who have lost their keys unlock their apartments.[142]

Herman Goldstein, writing on community services performed by police, lists several other important activities such as crowd control at various kinds of events, rescuing animals, locating missing persons, providing escort service at weddings and funerals, and processing lost and found property.[143]

Another activity that should be included in the community service role is that of dealing with neighborhood and family quarrels. We discussed this chore when describing the conflict mediating role, but this seems to be one of those problems that overlap the categories of our analytic model. In dealing with domestic disputes, for example, the police officer, in addition to repressing physical conflict, also finds himself in the role of a social worker trying to suggest remedies to the dispute.

These diverse activities require a great deal of flexibility and versatility on the part of the police officer, and what is more, they require a great deal of his time and attention. In fact, studies have shown that the largest part of the policeman's working day is spent in the performance of nonadversarial activities.[144] The costs of performing and administering these service activities tend to consume a disproportionately large percentage of police budgets, and this demand on time and money limits some of the possible innovations that might be made to improve their adversarial efficiency.

Perhaps the most serious problem regarding the community service function is that police officers are not qualified to perform them. At least it seems that there are other people, in other professions, who would be better qualified to deal with them. For example, it is rather obvious that a policeman cannot be expected to conduct personal and marital counseling as effectively as a trained psychologist or social worker. It seems that people other than police could perform very adequately and with more expertise functions that are presently being handled by police.[145] This is not to say that police officers could not handle these jobs if they trained for them and could focus strictly on a given problem area. Toch found that police in a special program did very well in handling family disputes,[146] and the New York City Police Department has had success with a family counseling unit. Still, the fact remains that "it might be desirable for agencies other than the police to provide community services that bear no relationship to crime or potential crime situations."[147]

Police officers tend to dislike performing many of the community service duties.[148] This distaste for the duty probably doesn't increase their effectiveness, and this may further tarnish the police officer's image in the eyes of the public. The difficulty is, of course, that the police are the only public agency that has people on duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.[149] Because local governments will not spend the money that would be necessary to allow these services to be handled by qualified specialists, they are handled inadequately by the police. The blame for this inadequacy should certainly not be laid at the feet of the police, and yet they are the ones who are ridiculed.

What is more, no matter how concerned and sympathetic police may be in performing community services, their effectiveness is bound to be handicapped to some extent simply because they are police. To the extent that they have assumed a negative image because of their adversarial roles, this image is bound to prejudice those people with whom they come into contact in nonadversarial situations. It would seem also that the military demeanor, equipment, and uniform of the policeman is not conducive to effective interaction with people in service roles. Certainly, personal and family counseling are not areas where military regalia is conducive to peaceable and amicable solutions to difficult problems.

In summarizing the role and function of the police in society, clearly their lot is a difficult one at best. They are assigned the tasks to impose force, coercion, and violence on society, and they are expected to go out and attempt to deal with unauthorized and illegal conflict and violence when it erupts. In other words, they are the special agents who are expected to immerse themselves in society's violence. They are the state's violence officials, and the distracting and time-consuming duties in the area of community services do not make their dangerous and vulnerable lives appreciably safer.

THE CAUSES OF POLICE ASSAULTS

In the preceding pages, we have attempted to analyze and place in perspective the problems of violence and police functions. In so doing, we have defined and assessed the characteristics of violence, and we have reached some tentative conclusions regarding the causes of violence. We have also attempted to understand the part that police officers play in social interaction, for by so doing, we shall be better able to understand the feelings and reactions that are assumed by members of society against them. We have gone to such lengths, in a somewhat detailed and indirect manner, because we have been convinced that a broad perspective is absolutely essential to understanding the specific assaults on police.

Building An Assault Model

Having established this broad and general framework within which police assaults occur, we can now proceed to make some more specific conclusions regarding the cause of assaults. It is our hope that in establishing a framework for analysis of assaults, and by establishing a conceptualization of the assaultive incident, we will be better able to anticipate problems in the future. That is, the analytical model for assaults may help us to predict assaultive behavior and may allow for changes to be made and for remedies to be prescribed that will lead to the reduction of police assaults. We are not so confident that we feel that such progress can be made immediately, but with more time and attention directed toward the relevant problem areas, there do seem to be possibilities for constructive change.

In constructing our causal model for assaults, we will build a three-tiered structure. That is, we shall separate our categories of causation into three different levels. These different levels or categories of analysis will distinguish not only between different kinds of explanation, but they will also differentiate between scope and degree of explanation. Each level of analysis will represent a greater or lesser scope of explanation, and each will be more or less comprehensive than the others. In other words, the model represents an heirarchy of causation, with the first level offering the greatest scope and the widest or most comprehensive degree of explanation, while the second and third levels will progressively narrow the possibilities for identifying the causes of police assaults.

It is our belief that the factors that constitute each of the three levels or categories of explanation can be observed and measured systematically. It has been the aim of this research project to analyze and measure some of these factors, and by so doing, we have made a step toward removing some of the mist that engulfs the police assaults problem. Needless to say, much more still needs to be done by other researchers and other projects. The three levels of

causation, in the order of their importance and comprehensiveness in regard to police assaults, are the following:

1. Factors Related to the Police Function
2. Social - Cultural Factors
3. Police Personnel Factors

Factors Related to the Police Function

The causes of police assaults that are related to the function that police fulfill in society are the factors that offer the broadest scope for explanation. The causes of assault viewed from this perspective are perfectly obvious, and in fact, they follow logically from the definition of terms. To say that the causes are obvious and simplistic, however, is not necessarily to conclude that everyone is consciously aware of them. In the analysis of many aspects of human interaction, people have a tendency to overlook the simple and obvious in order to search for the more complex. This seems especially to be the case when the simple and obvious reflect insights and information which is uncomfortable and contrary to established values.

In the first place, then, police officers are the targets for assault because they are the people who are assigned the task of forcibly upholding the law. The reaction to this role of law enforcement on the part of members of society is often to strike out at police. As long as society maintains practices and social structures that cause people to be deprived of their needs, and as long as police officers enforce the laws that support these practices and structures, police are going to be the objects of violent action. This is the case whether the deprivation is in the area of basic survival needs or is of a higher level, such as belonging, esteem, or self-actualization needs. With such social practices operating, the people whose needs are being threatened or denied, as well as people who are in sympathy with them, are going to be threats to policemen.

By the same token, as long as society, by means of legal and extralegal practices, tends to oppress the freedom and equality of various groups and classes in society, the police officer remains vulnerable. He remains vulnerable because his is the duty of imposing the oppression. As long as he performs this law-enforcing duty, he remains as a symbol and a representative of the oppressing and hateful system, and his presence is a visible, tangible, and vulnerable reality to those who are striking out. The fact that the system has not been created by the policeman, the fact that he is not at all to blame for the injustice and inequities that may prevail in society, matters not at all. He is there, visible, threatening, and available, and thus he becomes the logical target for violence. Those people in society who

are seething with frustration, hate, resentment towards authority, and a desire for revenge, often find the policeman as the most logical and most readily available target for their personal or political catharsis.

In addition, it is important to bear in mind that violence is conducive to violence. As long as police, in upholding and enforcing the law, are empowered and authorized to be violent, they must inevitably produce violent reactions in some of those with whom they deal. As long as policemen shoot, club, and beat people, which is what they are instructed to do under certain circumstances, they will themselves be shot, clubbed, or beaten. Uncomfortable though it may be to face up to it, this is what is expected of any person who decides to put on a badge.

Enforcing and upholding the law, however, is only one part of the police function. We must also consider the officer's role as a mediator of conflict. Again, we must assume that the very nature of the job leads to violent situations and dangerous confrontations. As long as there are conflicts in society and as long as the policeman is assigned the task of dealing with them, he is going to be subject to assault. It is much the same as the prospects facing members of the armed forces. As long as there are armies and wars, there are going to be soldiers who are going to be injured and killed. With the police, the war assignment is internal to the nation, but it is the same kind of problem. It seems that we must conclude that the nature of the police job requires that those fulfilling it will be assaulted. The only possibility for totally eliminating police assaults would be to eliminate the conflict, oppression, inequities, and injustices within society. If these could be eliminated, there would be no reason to assault a policeman; but, ironically, if we ever reach the point where injustice, inequality, oppression, and conflict are totally removed from society, there will be no need for policemen. In short, police officers will cease being assaulted when the need for their services no longer exists and their jobs have been abolished.

It is at this level of explaining the cause of police assaults that our conclusions achieve the greatest scope. All police assaults can be accounted for, in one manner or another, by considering the role of the police function. Only because they are police, carrying out the duties and roles that have been assigned to them, do they get assaulted. The more contacts that they make with conflict situations and the more contact that they make with people in their duties of enforcing and upholding the law, the more likely they are to be assaulted. This level of causation is comprehensive, then, and relates to any and all possible or actual assaults. In terms of proposing remedies for assaults against police, action in this area is very difficult and complex. To seek a comprehensive plan for eliminating assaults would require some very basic reevaluation of contemporary society's most sacred and unquestioned values, attitudes, and

institutions. As a consequence, remedies are not being sought at this level. In fact, the issues are not even really being discussed in the media or in the literature on crime and violence in the United States. Because of this failure, we must acknowledge a willingness on the part of our society to tolerate a certain amount of assaults on police.

Social - Cultural Factors

The second category of explanation, which represents another level of causation of police assaults, deals with the social-cultural factors that inhere in the environment. These social-cultural factors allow for a broad view to be taken on the subject of violence, but they are less comprehensive and of somewhat narrower scope than the police function factors. They help us to account for many, or perhaps even most, assaultive incidents, but they cannot furnish a priori explanations for every single occurrence. At this level, we are dealing with factors that tend to explain why violent behavior was resorted to in an assault situation, rather than some other types of behavior.

The social-cultural factors to which we have reference are those mechanisms, structures, and practices within society that endorse violence. We have shown earlier that ours is a violent society, which, in many subtle ways, approves of, and even glorifies, the use of violence. Violence is an acceptable and noble form of behavior within our culture, and to use violence is a subtle mechanism for displaying one's prestige, authority, maturity, and superiority, and as such, it is a behavior pattern that many people are going to incorporate. We have noted how each individual is imbued with these insidious violent values and attitudes in his family environment, in his peer group, in his formal educational experience, and in his contact with society at large, either directly or through the mass media. The fact that individual members of our society are taught and conditioned to use and respect violence means that under certain circumstances and within certain self-perceived crises, they will employ those strategies that they have learned and absorbed. This means, of course, that policemen, who must deal with conflict and various kinds of crises situations, are going to find people using violent behavior against them. To expect otherwise would be to expect that social training, conditioning, and education had no effect and were, in fact, totally useless. Very simply, then, police may be assaulted because our society and culture has taught its members that violence is a useful and legitimate form of behavior.

We must emphasize that this level of explanation is only a partial explanation. It is a partial explanation for the overwhelming majority of assaults, perhaps, which makes it fairly comprehensive in scope, but it is not a total explanation. Social-cultural factors go very far in explaining predispositions to violence, and thus to police assaults, but they do not allow us to explain the precipitating

cause of the assault. Without the predisposition to violence, the assault would not occur, but the predisposition, alone, does not precipitate the incident. We must realize that all, or almost all, people have been conditioned and trained to have a predisposition to violence, and yet only a small minority of the population initiates assaults against policemen. What is more, even the assailants act upon their predisposition only on rare occasions.

It seems likely that police assaults could be radically reduced if fundamental changes were made in our social and cultural environment. That is, if we were to eliminate the practices and mechanisms which serve to teach and condition members of our society to value violent behavior, and if we were to instill new and more constructive nonviolent values and attitudes, it seems certain that police assaults would be drastically reduced. It is probably unrealistic to assume that all police assaults could be eliminated by this radical alteration in our social values, if other conditions were to remain the same, but a significant reduction would be almost inevitable. This, of course, is another area of causation that gets a certain amount of lip service and then is ignored. We talk about the violence of our culture, presidential commissions document it, and politicians deplore it with awe-inspiring rhetoric, but no one makes the least little effort to do anything about it. Thus, here again, our refusal and failure to deal with pervasive and complex problems leaves the police officer in a very vulnerable position.

Police Personnel Factors

The third and final level of assault causation deals with factors relating to police performance of duty. These factors tend to be much more specific than is the case with the first two categories. They allow us to focus on a specific incident and to observe the overt behavior involved in an assault. Yet, in a sense, these factors are the least comprehensive. They allow us to make some conclusions on specific events, but they say very little about the broad and general causes of assaults. From the perspective of a specific assault, we might refer to them as causes, but looked at in a broader perspective, they are merely symptoms. That is, the assaults that occur upon the overt mishandling of a conflict situation are symptomatic of deeper and more pervasive causes. The factors at this level of explanation are symptoms of the problems which are caused at the two higher levels. If the problems were solved regarding the assaults caused by the police function and by the social-cultural environment, there would be no need to talk about assaults caused by malfeasance of duty; there simply would be no assaults.

Attempts to explain disturbances between police and the public at this level of causation are quite in vogue,[150] however, and this leads to many misconceptions and distortions of the problem. By concentrating on the inadequacies of police performance, an

impression is conveyed that somehow the police are responsible for assaults on themselves. This point of view can be extended to allow for police to be blamed for the violence, the crime, and the total disruption that are rampant in society. The fact of the matter is, as we have tried to stress earlier, that the police could not eliminate violence and assault no matter how wisely and efficiently they handled their duties. As long as the police function factors and the social-cultural factors are not dealt with, police are going to be assaulted even if patrolmen are recruited from the ranks of saints and sages.

In spite of the fact that this third level of causation, even if well handled, offers the least possibility for meaningful reform, it is the level at which most time, attention, money, and rhetoric is directed. The people, parties, and pressure groups that are responsible for dealing with social problems and for making decisions on public policy have shown no inclination to deal with the basic social and legal structures that form our society. There has been no indication to suggest that the basic, fundamental problems that cause violence and crime in our society are going to be called into question. Instead, our approach has been to impose more stringent and more efficient coercion on the seething elements of society. It is the old story of trying to screw the cover more tightly on the boiling pressure cooker, rather than reducing or eliminating the fire from underneath.

Consequently, we can talk about incompetence in police performance, and certainly there are things that can be improved. In so doing, however, we must bear in mind that these are the least constructive ways of dealing with the problem. They reveal only a limited amount of meaningful information, and they offer no opportunity to make a large, significant reduction in police assaults. Yet, we may concentrate on this area because it is one where no sacred cows are endangered. The police and their performance may be called into question, but the basic structures and values of society may not. With these reservations in mind, we will identify three different factors regarding the police performance of duty that may lead to violence and assault:

1. lack of competence on the part of police officers
2. errors in judgment by police officers
3. negative attitudes and prejudices on the part of police officers

The first category referring to a lack of competence on the part of police officers covers a broad array of issues. It accounts for such things as intelligence, education, training, experience, physical capacity, and other factors that define a police officer. Our

assumption is that if a policeman should be lacking in any of these traits, his chances for encountering violence and assault are increased. In other words, because of poor performance in his duty, traceable to some shortcoming in himself, a police officer stands a good chance of being assaulted.

Secondly, an error in judgment can very well lead to violent confrontation which results in some kind of assault. This category differs from the first insofar as it is possible for an officer to be very competent and very well trained, and yet he could misread or misperceive a situation and thereby make a decision that leads him to a bad result. Even wise men can make poor judgments now and then. In both of these first two categories relating to the police officer's performance of duty, there arises the problem of how a police officer approaches his task. We know that there are times that a policeman will act in a careless and perfunctory manner, and such attitudes illustrate instances of incompetence or poor judgment.

Finally, a police officer who is invested with certain prejudices or starts out his relationships with people with a negative attitude toward them probably increases his chances for being assaulted. For example, white policemen who have strong prejudices against non-whites may very well cause the tension and anxiety of an encounter to be increased and allow it to become violent. Treating people with contempt, or ignoring their feelings of dignity or individuality, may very well precipitate a violent reaction.

Very briefly, and quite tentatively, then, we have constructed a model for analyzing police assaults. Within this model, we believe that all but the most rare and unusual assault can be classified and analyzed. So much more study needs to be done on all these levels of this framework, and until more time, money, and attention are spent on them, police officers are going to continue to be assaulted in increasingly large numbers.

The Causes of Police Assaults

I. Factors Related to the Police Function

A. Assault as an inevitable reaction by citizens to the policeman's role of forcibly upholding the law.

1. When law leads to need-deprivation

a. Assaults by needy

b. Assaults by people "aiding" the needy

2. When law and order serves to oppress various groups and classes

3. When policeman is viewed as a symbol of the oppressive system

4. When policeman's violence creates violent reactions

B. Assault as the inevitable consequence of the policeman's being society's conflict mediator

1. Conflicts in which the officer is an impartial third party to the original conflict

2. Conflicts in which the officer is a participating party

II. Social-Cultural Factors

A. Culture and tradition endorse violence as an effective and acceptable form of behavior -- to be used against police as well as others

III. Factors Relating to Police Officer's Performance of Duty

A. Lack of competence

B. Errors of judgment

C. Negative attitudes and prejudices

Footnotes

[1]For an analysis of this transformation, see Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, New York: Bantam Books, 1972; Rene Dubos, So Human An Animal, New York: Scribner's, 1968, pp. 27, 66ff.; Gerhard and Jean Lenski, Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974, p. 473.

[2]A "statistical summary" from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., Stock Number 2700-0076. For a somewhat different set of figures which are drawn from earlier studies and which are probably less accurate, see Task Force Report: The Police, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 1.

[3]Hans Toch, Violent Men: An Enquiry Into the Psychology of Violence, Chicago: Aldine, 1969, p. 7.

[4]See Elaine Morgan, The Descent of Woman, New York: Bantam Books, 1973, pp. 69-70; Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape, New York: Dell, 1969, Chapter 5.

[5]In pointing to the inadequate attention given to the subject of violence, Hannah Arendt points out that the latest edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences fails to include an entry for the subject of Violence. See her On Violence, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1969, p. 8.

[6]On Augustine's views, see The City of God, Marcus Dods, trans., New York: Hafner, 1948. See also The Political Writings of St. Augustine, Henry Paolucci, ed., Chicago, Regnery, 1962, p. 1 and Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine, New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, pp. 50-53, and Mulford Q. Sibley, Political Ideas and Ideologies: A History of Political Thought, New York: Harper and Row, 1970, pp. 188-9.

[7]For references to various approaches and problems of nonviolence, see William Robert Miller, Nonviolence: A Christian Interpretation, New York: Schocken, 1966; Joan Bondurant, Conquest of Violence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958; and Gene Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston: Extending Horizons, 1970. All of these works have very useful bibliographies on the theory and practice of nonviolence.

[8]See Peter Mayer, ed., The Pacifist Conscience, Chicago: Regnery, 1967, pp. 31ff.

[9]See Sibley, Political Ideas and Ideologies, op. cit., pp. 26-7.

[10]See Matthew 5:9, 38-39; Matthew 18:35; Matthew 26:52; Mark 9:50; Luke 6:27-31.

[11]Sibley, Political Ideas and Ideologies, op. cit., p. 161.

[12]Quoted in Mulford Q. Sibley, Unilateral Initiatives and Disarmament, Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1962, p. 54.

[13]For studies on Gandhi's approach to nonviolence, see Louis Fischer, Gandhi, New York: Mentor, 1954; Louis Fischer, The Essential Gandhi, New York: Vintage, 1962; Mohandas K. Gandhi, An Autobiography, Boston: Beacon, 1957; Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance, New York: Schocken, 1961; G. Ramachandran and T. K. Mahadevan, eds., Gandhi: His Relevance for Our Times, Berkeley: World Without War Council, 1967; and for a useful bibliography, as well as for its analysis, see Joan Bondurant, op. cit.

[14]Gandhi, An Autobiography, op. cit., pp. 137 and 160.

[15]See Walden and Civil Disobedience, New York: Harper and Row, 1958.

[16]For King's approach to nonviolence, see his following works: Stride Toward Freedom, New York: Harper and Row, 1958; Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community, New York: Harper and Row, 1967; Why We Can't Wait, New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

[17]Louis H. Masotti, et al., A Time To Burn? Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, pp. 141-51. See also Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, New York: Harper and Row, 1944, pp. 1-112.

[18]For other discussions of the concept of violence, see Ronald B. Miller, "Violence, Force and Coercion;" Robert Audi, "On the Meaning and Justification of Violence;" and Robert L. Holmes, "Violence and Nonviolence," all in Jerome A. Shaffer, edit., Violence, New York: David McKay Co., 1971. See also Lynne B. Iglitzin, Violent Conflict in American Society, San Francisco: Chandler, 1972, and Hannah Arendt, On Violence, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969.

[19]For a discussion of emotive use of language, see A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, London: Victor Gollancz, 1946.

[20]See Robert Audi, op. cit., p. 66.

[21]For discussions of the concept of force, see Arendt, op. cit., pp. 44-45; Holmes, op. cit., pp. 107ff; and Iglitzin, op. cit., pp. 25ff.

[22]Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, New York: Collier, 1961.

[23]Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York: Grove, 1966.

[24]James Baldwin, Nobody Knows My Name, New York: Dial Press, 1971.

[25]See Ronald B. Miller, op. cit., p. 27.

[26]There is a vast array of literature dealing with the concept of power. Some of the important works are the following: Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 947-952; Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), 632-642; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950; H. D. Lasswell, C. E. Merriam, and T. V. Smith, A Study of Power, Glencoe: Free Press, 1950; Charles A. McLelland, Theory and the International System, New York: Macmillan, 1966; Charles E. Merriam, Political Power, New York: Collier Books, 1964; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961.

[27]Lenski and Lenski, op. cit., pp. 16, 20-21; Marvin Harris, Culture, Man, and Nature, New York: Crowell, 1971, pp. 137-141.

[28]See Alphonso Pinkney, The American Way of Violence, New York: Vintage Books, 1972, pp. 184-185.

[29]Iglitzin, op. cit., p. 39. See also Arnold H. Buss, The Psychology of Aggression, New York: John Wiley, 1962, where he presents an extensive summary of various studies that have been made concerning punishment and its tendency to produce aggressive tendencies in children.

[30]See H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, p. 60.

[31]Violent Men, op. cit., p. 183.

[32]Fanon, op. cit., pp. 43 and 53.

[33]Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit.

[34]Lewis Mumford, In the Name of Sanity, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1954, p. 53. See also Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966.

[35]Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society, New York: Vintage Books, 1965, p. 25. See also William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1957.

[36]For further discussion on the problem of depersonalization and dehumanization of man in modern society, see Erich Fromm, The Sane Society, Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1955, Chapter 5; R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience, New York: Ballantine Books, 1967, Chapter 3; Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America, New York: Bantam Books, 1971, Chapter 6; Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969, p. 232.

[37]For a discussion of American prisons, see Daniel Glaser, The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969. For examples of violence within our prisons, see Russell G. Oswald, Attica -- My Story, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1972; and William R. Coons, Attica Diary, New York: Stein and Day, 1972.

[38]See Erich Fromm's analysis of this problem in May Man Prevail?, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961, Chapters 1 and 7. For a British perspective on a perpetually mobilized society, see Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the Nuclear Age, London: Victor Gollancz, 1958, and Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race, London: Atlantic Books, 1958.

[39]Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, New York: Free Press, 1969, p. 20. See also general discussions of our nuclear deterrent by Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1962; Linus Pauling, No More War, New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1958; and Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State, New York: Collier Books, 1962.

[40]Bill Davidson, "Combat Soldiers Fail To Shoot," Colliers, Nov. 8, 1952, pp. 17-18.

[41]Speech of President Nixon on May 8, 1972, printed in The New York Times, May 9, 1972, p. 18.

[42]H. Rap Brown, quoted in H. L. Nieburg, op. cit., p. 25.

[43]For a discussion of the learning of violent and aggressive attitudes, see Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. There is a useful bibliography on this issue beginning on p. 329.

[44]See Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, New York: Ballantine, 1969; Violence In America, A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, prepared by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, New York: Bantam Books, 1969; William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966; Masotti, et al., op. cit., pp. 138-141; Allen Grimshaw, "Lawlessness and Violence in America," Journal of Negro History, Vol. 44, 1959.

[45]See Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, New York: Bantam Books, 1971, and Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins, London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969.

[46]Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 3.

[47]Ibid.

[48]For an analysis of the effect of the media on social values and practices, see Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, and Quenton Fiore and Marshall McLuhan, The Medium Is the Message, New York: Random House, 1967.

[49]Some students of violence do contend that the media can have a direct emotional effect on people that can cause them to be more aggressive and destructive. See Leonard Berkowitz, "Studies of the Contagion of Violence" in Violence As Politics, Herbert Hirsch and David C. Perry, edits., New York: Harper and Row, 1973, p. 41.

[50]Kenneth B. Clark addresses himself to this kind of a question in "The Wonder Is There Have Been So Few Riots," New York Times Magazine, Sept. 5, 1965, p. 10.

[51]E. Victor Wolfenstein attributes violent and revolutionary tendencies in individuals to the fact that they have not resolved Oedipal guilt but have transferred the conflict from their fathers to political authority symbols. From this point of view, violence is a pathological form of behavior. Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 307.

[52]For the explanation of the Oedipus complex, see Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, New York: John Wiley, 1961, pp. 260ff; Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, New York: Washington Square Press, 1952, pp. 333-346.

[53]For an explanation of the death instinct, see Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, New York: Bantam Books, 1959, and Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, New York: Norton, 1962.

[54]For Electra complex, see The Interpretation of Dreams, op. cit., pp. 260ff. Freud does not use the term "Electra complex," but the term was coined by his successors. See Patrick Mullahy, Oedipus: Myth and Complex, New York: Grove, 1948, pp. 49, 136-7, 143.

[55]On Wilhelm Reich, see Selected Writings, New York: Noonday Press, 1961, with a bibliography of his works.

[56]See The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, New York: Norton, 1953.

[57]See New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York: Norton, 1939; Self-Analysis, New York: Norton, 1942; Neurosis and Human Growth, New York: Norton, 1950.

[58]See Escape From Freedom, New York: Discus Books, 1968; The Sane Society, op. cit.; The Art of Loving, New York: Bantam Books, 1963; The Revolution of Hope, New York: Bantam Books, 1968.

[59]See Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper, 1954; Toward a Psychology of Being, Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1962.

[60]Richard G. Fox, "The XYY Offender: A Modern Myth?", The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 62, No. 1, March, 1971, p. 64.

[61]Ibid., p. 63.

[62]Crime: Its Causes and Remedies, Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, (1911), 1968.

[63]Gina Lombroso Ferrero, Criminal Man, New York: Putnam's, 1911, pp. 137-8.

[64]Crime and Personality, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964.

[65]See Beyond the Pleasure Principle, op. cit.; Civilization and Its Discontents, op. cit.; Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, New York: Bantam Books, 1967; Anthony Storr, Human Aggression, New York: Bantam Books, 1970; Robert Ardrey, African Genesis, New York: Delta, 1961.

[66]For one point of view, which contends that all violent behavior can be traced back to the frustration of some kind of goal-directed activity, see Roland S. Parker, ed., The Emotional Stress of War, Violence, and Peace, Pittsburgh: Stanwix House, 1972, p. 89.

[67]Fanon, op. cit., pp. 52-4.

[68]See Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972, pp. 26-27.

[69]See James C. Davies, "Political Violence: The Dominance-Submission Nexus," in Violence As Politics, op. cit., pp. 52ff.

[70]Toward a Psychology of Being, op. cit., p. 25.

[71]Toch, op. cit., p. 220.

[72]Fanon, op. cit., p. 94.

[73]Peter A. Lupsha and Catherine Mackinnon, "Domestic Political Violence, 1965-1971: A Radical Perspective," in Violence As Politics, op. cit., p. 14.

[74]Of course, we must not overlook the fact that all members of a group do not have identical motivation. Different individuals join a group or an organization for many diverse reasons.

[75]Fanon, op. cit., p. 38.

[76]Baldwin, op. cit., p. 66. See also The Kerner Report, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, New York: Bantam, 1968, where the police are referred to as an "occupying force" in the ghetto, p. 301. See also Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, New York: Vintage Books, 1961, pp. 31-2.

[77]Fanon, op. cit. Barbara Deming agreeing with Fanon's argument that total commitment toward social and political change is necessary and desirable, nevertheless, insists that it can be accomplished without resort to violence. See "On Revolution and Equilibrium" in Delivered Into Resistance, New Haven: Advocate Press, 1969, pp. 18-48.

[78]Hannah Arendt, op. cit., pp. 63-4.

[79]David Horowitz, "Revolutionary Karma Versus Revolutionary Politics," Ramparts, March, 1971, p. 29.

[80]Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, op. cit., p. 16. For a discussion of the distinction between violence used for change and violence used for preserving the prevailing system, see Monica D. Blumenthal, et al., Justifying Violence: Attitudes of American Men, Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1972, Chapter 8.

[81]Quoted in "Chicago: Verdict on the Violence," Newsweek, December 9, 1968, p. 29.

[82]For the war between the police and the Black Panthers, see "The Panthers and the Law," Newsweek, February 23, 1970, pp. 26-30.

[83]Skolnick Report, op. cit., p. 16.

[84]Kerner Report, op. cit.

[85]See Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power, New York: Vintage Books, 1967, and Julius Lester, Look Out, Whitey! Black Power's Gon' Get Your Mama, New York: Dial Press, 1968.

[86]Sorel, op. cit., p. 92.

[87]Ibid.

[88]Fanon, op. cit., p. 93.

[89]Sorel, op. cit., p. 275.

[90]Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance, op. cit., pp. 40-1.

[91]Ibid., p. 10. See also Mulford Q. Sibley on the problem of relating ends to means regarding violent behavior in "Revolution and Violence," Peace News, London, 1967.

[92]Toch, op. cit., p. 228.

[93]See, for example, King, Where Do We Go From Here?, op. cit., p. 72.

[94]See Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield, New York: Anchor Books, 1969, p. 11; Richard A. Myren, "The Role of the Police," Police Patrol Readings, Samuel G. Chapman, ed., Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1964, pp. 20-22; Task Force Report: The Police, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 13; Herman Goldstein, "Police Functions Peripheral to the Task of Preventing and Controlling Crime" in Police Patrol Readings, p. 42; William A. Westley, Violence and the Police, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970, Chapter 1; A. C. Germann, et al., Introduction to Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1962, p. 23.

[95]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott, ed., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957, p. 109.

[96]Law and Order Reconsidered, Report of the Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, New York: Bantam Books, 1969, p. 286.

[97]A. C. Germann, et al., op. cit., p. 16.

[98]This is the point of view expressed in Law and Order Reconsidered, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

[99]A. C. Germann, op. cit., p. 19.

[100]Law and Order Reconsidered, op. cit., p. 6.

[101]Violence In America, op. cit., p. ii.

[102]Max Weber On Law In Economy And Society, Max Rheinstein, ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 14.

[103]Ibid.

[104]"Politics As A Vocation" in From Max Weber: Essays In Sociology, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 78.

[105]Thomas Hobbes in his great work Leviathan presents a brilliant analysis of social and political interaction, and he goes to great lengths in his attempt to find some sort of legitimacy for the existence of the state and for the right of some people to rule over others. When he has finished, however, we are left with the very obvious conclusion that the state is based on and justified by its superiority of violence. Contrary to his own wishes, Hobbes' system tends to justify violent revolution on the part of those who can gain superiority in the use of violence. Revolution is forbidden only to those people who cannot monopolize violence. See Leviathan, op. cit.

[106]For a philosophical discussion of this issue, see Plato, The Republic, Jowett Translation, New York: Modern Library, pp. 19-44.

[107]For a discussion of the ruling class in the United States, see C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University

Press, 1959; G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America?, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967; G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles, New York: Vintage Books, 1971; Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and The Super Rich, New York: Bantam Books, 1969. See also Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956; Robert Dahl, Who Governs?, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

[108]Max Weber, "Types of Social Organization," in Theories of Society, Vol. I, Talcott Parsons, et al., eds., New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 227.

[109]John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, New York: Dutton, 1951, pp. 91-92.

[110]For a discussion of elitism and the control of society by special groups, see Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society, 4 vols., New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935; Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939; Roberto Michels, Political Parties, New York: Collier Books, 1962; and C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, op. cit. For a critique of elitist theory, see Robert A. Dahl, Democracy in the United States, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967, p. 29; Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

[111]Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics, New York: Thomas Crowell, 1972, p. 244.

[112]See Donald A. Strickland, et al., A Primer of Political Analysis, Chicago: Markham, 1968, p. 8.

[113]Quoted in Law and Order Reconsidered, op. cit., p. 27.

[114]For a critical discussion of this point of view, see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961, pp. 20ff.

[115]Quoted in Svetozar Stojanovic, Between Ideals and Reality, New York: Oxford Press, 1973, p. i.

[116]Duverger, op. cit., p. 244.

[117]Hart, op. cit., pp. 23, 50ff.

[118]Max Weber quoted in Rheinstein, ed., op. cit., p. 12.

[119]Duverger, op. cit., p. 243.

[120]Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, New York: John Wiley, 1966, p. 7.

[121]See James Eisenstein, Politics and the Legal Process, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, p. 85.

[122]Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society, Rockville, Maryland: National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, 1970, p. 46.

[123]Westley, op. cit., p. 16.

[124]Dan Dodson quoted in Niederhoffer, op. cit., p. 12.

[125]Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, op. cit., p. 277.

[126]Ibid.

[127]The Challenge of Crime In A Free Society, Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, New York: Avon Books, 1968, p. 242.

[128]The Kerner Report, op. cit., p. 6.

[129]See Westley, op. cit., p. 5. See also Hans Toch, Training Police Officers for Violence Reduction, Unpublished Report to the National Institute of Mental Health, Project MH 12068, April, 1972, Chapter 1.

[130]126. Eisenstein, op. cit., p. 88. See also Niederhoffer, op. cit., p. 41.

[131]On feelings of alienation, see Toch, Training Police Officers for Violence Reduction, op. cit.

[132]The Kerner Report, op. cit., pp. 307-309.

[133]Niederhoffer, op. cit., p. 65. See also Martin Luther King, "Beyond the Los Angeles Riots," Saturday Review, Nov. 13, 1965, p. 34.

[134]The Kerner Report, op. cit., p. 301.

[135]Skolnick in The Politics of Protest, op. cit., cites examples of police-initiated violence designed to suppress peaceful protest, pp. 243-9.

[136]Arthur Niederhoffer and Abraham S. Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force: Perspectives on the Police, Waltham, Mass.: Ginn and Co., 1970, p. 7.

[137]For a discussion of the police role in domestic quarrels, see Toch, Training Police Officers for Violence Reduction, op. cit.

[138]Ibid.

[139]Skolnick in Justice Without Trial, op. cit., p. 55, explains that police officers do not like speed traps and ticket quota policies, because they receive the brunt of the public's anger resulting from them.

[140]Eisenstein, op. cit., p. 87.

[141]James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 30.

[142]The Challenge of Crime In A Free Society, op. cit., p. 252.

[143]In Chapman, op cit., p. 42.

[144]Wilson, op. cit., p. 18. See also Charles D. Hale, Police Community Relations, Albany: Delmar, 1974, Unit 1; Chapman, op. cit., p. 4; Task Force Report: The Police, op. cit., p. 121.

[145]Task Force Report: The Police, op. cit., p. 15.

[146]Toch, Training Police Officers for Violence Reduction, op. cit.

[147]Task Force Report: The Police, op. cit., p. 14.

[148]Toch Study, op. cit.; see also Robert C. Trojanowicz, "Police Community Relations," in The Urban Policeman in Transition, John R. and Homa M. Snibbe, eds., Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1973, pp. 119ff.

[149]Task Force Report: The Police, op. cit., p. 14.

[150]Examples of this tendency can be seen in The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, op. cit., Chapter 4, and The Kerner Report, op. cit., Chapter 11. In both of these reports, although a friendly and sympathetic attitude is adopted toward the police, their recommendations on the policing function give the impression that significant and far-reaching change can be affected in this area.

A DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF THE ASSAULT INCIDENT

Professor Samuel G. Chapman
Project Director

Ms. Cheryl G. Swanson
Research Associate

Professor C. Kenneth Meyer
Director of Research

ABSTRACT

Descriptive Profile of the Assault Incident: Municipal Agencies

This study explores the set of characteristics most typical of assault events occurring in 37 south central municipalities. Data were gathered on 1143 assault incidents. The characteristics analyzed include the officer's and assailant's personal characteristics, the time and place of the assault, the original purpose for police intervention, and the actual event that precipitated the assault. The findings indicate that a certain set of circumstances are more likely to result in an attack on a police officer. For example, non-white individuals who are unemployed and have been drinking are disproportionately represented in the assailant population. The negative findings are as important as the positive. For example, the data do not indicate that officers are safer when patrolling in pairs, or that an officer's imposing build helps prevent an assault.

Profile of the Assault Incident: Municipalities with Populations of Over and Under 100,000 Residents

The same variables used in "Descriptive Profile of the Assault Incident: Municipal Agencies" are analyzed, but a further differentiation is made between cities over and under 100,000 in population. Thus, the general effect of city size in reference to the characteristics of assaults on police is considered. The major differences found between the two groups of cities are the exact time of the assault within the arrest event, and the number of assaults occurring after the arrest during suspect transportation and jailing.

Descriptive Profile of the Assault Incident: State Police and Highway Patrols

Again, the same variables are analyzed, but south central state police and highway patrols, in addition to municipal agencies, provide the data. Accordingly, the differences in assault characteristics between state and municipal police agencies are explored. The findings indicate no significant differences existing between the agencies when their respective roles are considered.

DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF THE ASSAULT INCIDENT: MUNICIPAL AGENCIES

Objectives

This report is designed to describe a set of characteristics which most clearly typify events in which police officers are assaulted. A principle hypothesis of this study is that assaults on law enforcement personnel are not random events. Instead, it is argued that through an empirical analysis of a number of assaults, it will be possible to identify those attributes most common to the assault incident. This information, in turn, can be utilized by the law enforcement community toward the ultimate goal of reducing violent attacks on police personnel, thereby increasing the occupational and personal safety of law enforcement officers.

To obtain a descriptive profile of the characteristics most indicative of the assault situation, a total of 37 municipal law enforcement agencies in five south central states were asked to submit a complete report on all assault incidents occurring within their respective agencies for the calendar year of January 1, 1973 through December 31, 1973.[1] While most of the reporting cities were located in Oklahoma, 11 additional cities in New Mexico, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas cooperated in this phase of the research. Participating cities ranged in size from Gore, Oklahoma with a population of 344 to Oklahoma City with a population of over 360,000.

In each reporting city all assaulted officers were asked to complete a Physical Contact Summary form describing in detail the circumstances surrounding the assault event.[2] A total of 1143 municipal assault incidents in 1973 were reported to the Police Assaults Study.[3] Using the information provided in the Physical Contact Summary form, the Assaults Study staff was able to compile a general descriptive profile of assaults on police officers which includes the following assault dimensions: I) officer characteristics, II) assailant characteristics, III) the assault environment and IV) the dynamics of the assault event. This report consists of a detailed analysis of each of these assault dimensions.

I. Officer Characteristics

A descriptive profile of officer characteristics is designed to deal with the problem of whether or not a lack of competence on the part of police officers is directly related to assault incidents. The category of law enforcement competence covers a broad array of issues including such factors as physical capacity, experience, training, education, and any additional attributes which seem characteristic of a police officer. The underlying assumption is that when a police officer is deficient in any of the traits

listed above, the officer's probability for encountering an assault is increased.[4]

To examine the hypothesis that officer characteristics are related to assault behavior, assaulted officers were analyzed in terms of their height, build, age, rank, tenure and training.[5] In addition, assaulted officers were categorized by sex and race. While there is no evidence that sex and race are related to job performance, women as well as members of minority groups have been the victims of job discrimination in a variety of professions. Since women and minorities have been excluded from many positions of responsibility in our society, including law enforcement, one can only conclude that race and sex have been utilized as criteria related to competence. For this reason, race and sex are incorporated into the analysis of officer characteristics.

A. Officer Height

The law enforcement community is currently faced with an array of social and legal pressures related to the minimum height standards employed in their police recruitment practices. These pressures stem largely from an administrative directive issued by the Office of Civil Rights - LEAA which deals with the use of minimum height standards for police personnel selection in those agencies which receive LEAA assistance funds. The ruling directs agencies employing minimum height requirements to demonstrate a relationship between height and job performance. If this relationship cannot be verified, then the minimum height standard is considered to be in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In an attempt to clarify the height issue, the Police Assaults Study has collected data on the height of assaulted officers in selected cities for 1973. Table 1 shows the distribution of assault incidents by officer height. The data indicate that officers assaulted range in height from a low of 64 inches to a high of 80 inches. The greatest frequency of assaults (21.4 percent) involve officers who are 71 inches tall. The majority of assaults (69.1 percent) include officers who fall within the height range of 70-73 inches. When officer height is divided into two categories of "shorter" officers (68 inches and below) and "taller" officers (69 inches and above), we find that 10.7 percent of the incidents involve officers who are within the former category while 89.4 percent of the incidents involve officers in the taller group.

Of course the statistics cited above cannot be interpreted as evidence that taller officers are more likely than shorter officers to be assaulted. The percent distribution may be a more accurate reflection of the distribution of officer height among police departments in general. Moreover, before any firm conclusions can be made concerning the probability of shorter or taller officers being assaulted, it will be necessary to obtain data on the height distribution of all non-assaulted officers. This informa-

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER HEIGHT

Height (In inches)		Number	Percent
64		1	.1
65		2	.2
66	(5 feet, 6 inches)	5	.4
67		15	1.3
68		99	8.7
69		101	8.9
70		216	19.0
71		244	21.4
72	(6 feet)	177	15.6
73		149	13.1
74		62	5.4
75		37	3.3
76		23	2.0
77		1	.1
78	(6 feet, 6 inches)	1	.1
79		1	.1
80		4	.4
	Total	1138	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

tion has been collected for selected southwestern cities and is presented in a subsequent section of the Police Assaults Study Final Report.[6] However, the data at this stage of the analysis does not support the premise that shorter officers have a greater probability than taller officers of being assaulted.

B. Officer Build

Officers who were victims of assaults were asked to categorize their physical build as slender, medium or heavy. Table 2 indicates that most of the assault incidents involve officers with medium builds. Again, as in the case of officer height, the fairly high incidence of assaults on officers with medium builds is probably a reflection of the distribution of officer builds among those police departments surveyed. The remaining assault cases are fairly evenly distributed between officers characterized by slender and heavy builds. While the findings are not conclusive at this point in the analysis, they suggest that officer build is not directly related to assault proneness.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER BUILD

Build	Number	Percent
Slender	219	19.2
Medium	688	60.4
Heavy	232	20.4
Total	1139	100.0

C. Sex of Officer

Of the 1140 assault incidents reported by sex only four of the officers assaulted were female. The low number of females assaulted is more a reflection of the extent to which females are represented in law enforcement agencies and their role during 1973 than an indication of a low probability of assaults among women officers.

When female officers were assaulted, their assailants were women in all four cases. Two of the assaulted female officers were assigned to jail duty and were searching the offender prior to the assault. The remaining two officers were on routine patrol duty. One officer was assaulted by a burglary suspect who was supposedly in the custody of another police officer (a male), and the other officer was attacked by a distraught housewife while attempting to mediate a family dispute.

Since few women officers are members of the assault population, it is not possible at this point to reach any conclusions concerning women officers and proneness to assault. One police chief from a populous western city has suggested that female officers are less prone to assaults in traffic situations and family disputes, particularly when the suspect is a male. Further research on the performance of female officers in hazardous situations is definitely warranted.[7]

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SEX OF OFFICER

Sex	Number	Percent
Male	1136	99.6
Female	4	.4
Total	1140	100.0

D. Race of Officer

As in the case of women officers, only a small percentage (8.0 percent) of the assault incidents involve non-white officers. At this point in time, national data describing the extent to which minority groups are represented in law enforcement agencies is not available. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether non-white officers are over or under represented in assault incidents.

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY RACE OF OFFICER

Race	Number	Percent
White	1046	92.0
Mexican American/ Spanish American	33	2.9
Black/Negro	27	2.4
American Indian	31	2.7
Total	1137	100.0

The Assaults Study has, however, collected data on minority representation among police departments in 13 southwestern cities between the population of 40,000 and 360,000 as well as from one state highway patrol agency in the south central region. Data from these agencies indicate that members of minority groups comprise 7 percent of the law enforcement personnel. While statistics from these agencies are not directly comparable to those for agencies submitting Physical Contact Summary reports for each assault, they nevertheless provide a crude yardstick by which proneness to assault among minority officers can be measured.

As noted above, minority officers from those agencies participating in the Physical Contact Summary are representative of 8 percent of the assaulted officers. Since the percent of minorities represented in 14 selected south central agencies is 7 percent, it may be tentatively concluded that on the whole non-white officers are not any less likely than their white counterparts to be assaulted. Again, caution must be exercised in the interpretation of these statistics, since they are comparable only on a regional rather than on an agency by agency basis.

E. Officer Rank

In the majority of assault incidents (88.2 percent) the victim is a patrolman. The high frequency of assaults among patrolmen is not surprising, since officers in this rank are subject to a greater amount of exposure and risk than those officers holding the rank of sergeant or higher. Detectives and sergeants together were assaulted in 10 percent of the cases, while lieutenants were attacked in but one percent of the incidents. Officers with the rank of captain or higher were victimized in only .9 percent of the cases, and no assaults on majors or assistant chiefs were reported.

TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER RANK

Rank	Number	Percent
Patrolman	1006	88.2
Detective	52	4.6
Sergeant	61	5.4
Lieutenant	11	1.0
Captain or Higher	10	.9
Total	1140	100.1

*Percentage total does not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Only one case involved an assault on a police chief. This incident is atypical of activity in most of the departments surveyed, since it occurred in a small police department where the police chief is expected to engage in routine patrol duties. In this particular instance, the police chief was attempting to arrest a suspect for drunk driving and had followed the suspect to his home. When the chief formally placed the suspect under arrest, he was assaulted with a hammer. No serious injuries resulted to either party, and the assailant was later found by the court to be mentally ill. The circumstances surrounding this particular event point to the fact that even when a high ranking officer such as a police chief engages in routine patrol duties, it is certainly possible that his assault potential may be increased.

Thus, on the whole, the data seem to point to a relationship between proneness to assault and contact with the public. That is, the more an officer is dealing with conflict and social problems, the greater his potential for being assaulted, even if he is experienced and seasoned.

F. Officer Age

The mean age of the assaulted officers is 27.9 years. Using the average age of 28 years to differentiate "younger" from "older" officers, 58.7 percent of the assaulted police personnel were under 28 years old while 35 percent of the assaulted victims were older than the mean age.

Although officers who are older than 28 were less frequently assaulted, the data do not suggest that age per se is related to assault proneness. Since officer age is likely to be correlated with tenure and, in turn, with officer assignment and rank, these possible intervening relationships must be examined before any firm conclusions can be made concerning the relationship between age and assaultive behavior.[8] As shown earlier, officers holding the rank of patrolman are the most frequently assaulted. It is not unlikely that officers between the ages of 19 and 27 are highly represented within this group. On the other hand, the older the police officer, the more likely it is that he will be assigned to an administrative position or to some other duty which involves less contact with conflict situations. Thus older law enforcement officers are not as likely to be assigned to duties where a great deal of risk is involved.

Some comparisons can be made between the age distribution of police personnel in 14 southwestern law enforcement agencies and the age distribution of the officers completing the Physical Contact Summary. Among the selected south central agencies, 37.2 percent of all officers are under the age of 28 in contrast to the 58.7 percent of the assaulted officers who fall within this age group.

Another method for describing the age distribution of assaulted officers is to use FBI age categories for number of arrests.[9] The FBI age classification will ultimately allow for comparisons between assailant age and arrest rates by age group. It is utilized here to provide consistency in the reporting of data for the ages of both officer and assailant. Moreover, the FBI age breakdown is one which is familiar to police administrators, providing a standard reference point by which comparisons can be made among police agencies.

The frequency distribution of assaulted officers by FBI age categories indicates that officers in the 25-29 age bracket suffer the greatest number of assaults, whereas officers over the age of 29 are less frequently assaulted (See Table 7).[10] Again, the data on the age distribution of assaulted officers should be interpreted with caution, since possible intervening relationships must be considered, such as shift and assignment.

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER AGE

Age (In years)	Number	Percent
19	1	.1
20	2	.2
21	13	1.2
22	44	4.1
23	98	9.1
24	100	9.3
25	131	12.2
26	124	11.5
27	118	11.0
28	69	6.4
29	75	7.0
30	60	5.6
31	49	4.5
32	21	1.9
33	41	3.8
34	32	3.0
35	7	.6
36	28	2.6
37	11	1.0
38	9	.8
39	5	.5
40	5	.5
41	6	.6
42	7	.6
43	3	.3
44	3	.3
45	4	.4
46	3	.3
47	2	.2
48	1	.1
49	0	0
50	0	0
51	0	0
52	0	0
53	3	.3
54	0	0
55	0	0
56	0	0
57	0	0
58	0	0
59	0	0
60	1	.1
Total	1076	100.1

*Percentage total does not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS FOR OFFICER AGE BY FBI AGE CATEGORIES

Age (In years)	Number	Percent
19[a]	1	.1
20	2	.2
21	13	1.2
22	44	4.1
23	98	9.1
24	100	9.3
25-29	517	48.1
30-34	203	18.8
35-39	60	5.5
40-44	24	2.3
45-49	10	1.0
50-54	3	.3
55-59	0	0
60-64	1	.1
65 and over	0	0
Total	1076	100.1*

[a]FBI age categories actually begin with age ten and under. However, the lowest age represented among assaulted law enforcement personnel is age nineteen.

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

G. Officer Tenure

Officer tenure is examined as a possible correlate of assaultive behavior on the premise that seasoned, experienced officers may be more capable of avoiding assault situations. Officers involved in assault incidents were requested to submit the number of years they have been employed in police service. Officer tenure ranged from one month of service to 25.4 years on the force. The average tenure for an assaulted officer was 44.4 months (3.7 years). Sixty-four percent of the assaulted officers fall below the mean while 35.4 percent of the incidents involve officers who have been members of the department for longer than 44.4 months.

To facilitate description of the tenure variable, length of service was collapsed into five year intervals. Table 8 indicates that 79.3 percent of the incidents consist of officers who have served five years or less on the force. Officers with more than five years tenure are less representative of assault population.

TABLE 8

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY LENGTH OF SERVICE IN YEARS

Length of Service	Number	Percent
5 years or less:	888	79.3
0.0 - .5 years	69	7.8
.6 - 1.0 years	195	22.0
1.1 - 1.5 years	70	7.9
1.6 - 2.0 years	140	15.8
2.1 - 2.5 years	58	6.5
2.6 - 3.0 years	139	15.7
3.1 - 3.5 years	45	5.7
3.6 - 4.0 years	86	9.7
4.1 - 4.5 years	29	3.3
4.6 - 5.0 years	57	6.4
Sub-Total	888	100.1
6 - 10 years	169	15.1
11 - 15 years	46	4.1
16 - 20 years	11	1.0
21 - 25 years	5	.4
26 - 30 years	1	.1
Total	1120	100.0

While the data ostensibly suggest that officers with less experience are more likely to be assaulted, the relationship between tenure and assaults may be confounded by a number of additional variables. For example, officer tenure was found to be highly correlated with officer rank.[11] As noted earlier in the report, officers holding positions higher than patrolmen are less likely to be assaulted. Furthermore, it is not unusual for police departments to allocate preferential beat assignments by officer tenure. Thus assignments valued by veteran employees may be of relatively low risk.

Since the majority of assaults involve officers who have served five years or less in police work, this category was examined more closely by division into six month intervals. Those categories representing the highest frequency of assaults include officers with length of service ranging from .6 to 1 year, 1.6 to 2.0 years and 2.6 to 3.0 years.

H. Officer Training

Officer training is examined as a final characteristic which may be related to officer competence. Officers who had been assaulted during 1973 were asked to designate whether they had received (1) no training whatsoever prior to the assault incident, (2) training within the last six months prior to the incident, (3) training

within 12 months previous to the incident, and finally, (4) training extended beyond one year prior to the assault. In addition to basic recruit training, officers were asked to designate their experience in specific areas which might be related to the dynamics of an assault incident.

TABLE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER TRAINING

Type of Training	Number	Percent
Basic Recruit		
No Training	25	2.2
Within last 6 months	92	8.1
Within last 12 months	212	18.7
Longer than 1 year	803	70.9
Total	1132	99.9
Arrest Procedures		
None	105	9.3
Within last 6 months	152	13.5
Within last 12 months	239	21.2
Longer than 1 year	631	56.0
Total	1127	100.0
Prisoner Handling		
None	118	10.5
Within last 6 months	107	9.5
Within last 12 months	229	20.3
Longer than 1 year	672	59.7
Total	1126	100.0
Police Community Relations		
None	118	10.5
Within last 6 months	153	13.6
Within last 12 months	251	22.3
Longer than 1 year	603	53.6
Total	1125	100.0
Defense Tactics		
None	111	9.9
Within last 6 months	106	9.4
Within last 12 months	222	19.7
Longer than 1 year	686	61.0
Total	1125	100.0

Of those officers involved in assault events, very few indicated that they had received no training. However, most of the officers who were assaulted had not received police training in any of the training areas within one year prior to the assault event. Of the cases surveyed, fewer incidents involve officers who had received training within the last year prior to the assault, and even fewer incidents include officers who had received training within six months prior to the incident.

While the data suggest that training may be related to assault behavior, a number of possible confounding variables must be examined before conclusive findings can be reached concerning the relationship between training and proneness to assault. For example, there may be a strong relationship between training, officer tenure and officer assignment. That is, many of the officers who have received training within six or 12 months prior to an assault have probably served on the force for a shorter period of time than the officers who have not received training within one year before the assault occurred. It is also possible that officers who have less experience on the force are given lower risk assignments or at least are placed in lower risk situations than more seasoned officers. If this is the case, tenure and assignment may be more strongly related to assaults than training as such.

Summary and Conclusions

The evidence and data that have been accumulated in regard to the characteristics of individual police officers point to some interesting hypotheses. They seem to indicate that factors such as the officer's height, build, age, rank, experience, training, sex and race may be related to assault proneness, but only minimally.. That is, the data seem to show that assaults occur at all levels of these characteristic indices, and that assaults are not directed at any one particular kind of police officer. As long as police officers are out meeting the public and performing their duties, the possibility for assault exists. This is not to say that police officers should not be constantly striving to improve their competence and expertise in the performance of their duties. The data only suggest that the officer characteristics examined do not seem to be strongly related to assault behavior. It is possible that additional officer attributes which have not been examined in this Report are related to the assault event.

II. Assailant Characteristics

In addition to officer characteristics, a profile was developed for the assailant based on data provided in the Physical Contact Summary form. While a comprehensive analysis of the backgrounds,

attitudes, motivations and personality characteristics of offenders is beyond the scope of this study, it was possible to construct a profile describing certain characteristics of persons responsible for assaults on police officers. This information may be useful in assisting police officers to recognize and defend themselves against those persons who are most likely to threaten them with physical violence. Toward this end, a number of physical characteristics including suspect height, sex, age and race are examined as possible correlates of assaultive behavior.

Of equal importance to the analysis of assailant attributes is the identification of those characteristics which may be related to broader social issues and problems present in contemporary American society. While police officers as individuals or as a group have little impact on these social problems, the social dynamics of American society nevertheless impact greatly on the performance of the police function. It is important that those who hold positions of influence in America recognize these problems, particularly as they relate to law enforcement.

A number of characteristics which can be linked to broader social concerns are included in the analysis of offenders. Alcohol and drug involvement as well as employment status are examined as variables which fall under the rubric of "social dimensions." Several of the physical characteristics outlined above, particularly race, may also be considered as attributes having social significance.

A. Suspect Height and Build

Suspect height was examined to determine whether persons of certain physical stature are more likely to assault law enforcement officers. Numerous psychological theories exist concerning behavior patterns of shorter people. Most notably, adherents to the "Napoleon complex" hypothesize that shorter individuals are more sensitive to power relationships and are prone to engage in self-assertive and aggressive behavior. While little empirical evidence exists to substantiate theories relating height to behavior, height was identified as a variable which should be considered in the discussion of assailant attributes.

The range in height is somewhat greater for assailants than for police officers. The shortest assailant was 54 inches tall, while the tallest assailant measured 79 inches. In 56.1 percent of the incidents the assailant falls within the height range of 68-72 inches. Dividing the assailants into shorter and taller categories, we find that 41.3 percent are in the shorter group, while 58.9 percent of the incidents involve suspects who are taller than 58 inches.

TABLE 10

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENT BY ASSAILANT HEIGHT

Height (In inches)	Number	Percent
60	6	.6
61	9	.8
62	18	1.7
63	30	2.8
64	58	5.3
65	46	4.2
66	81	7.4
67	86	7.9
68	115	10.6
69	150	13.8
70	113	10.4
71	117	10.7
72	115	10.6
73	67	6.2
74	49	4.5
75	12	1.1
76	9	.8
77	4	.4
78	2	.2
79	2	.2
80	0	---
Total	1089	100.2*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

The 41 percent figure for shorter assailants can be contrasted with the ten percent figure for officers who stand below 59 inches. Of course, officer height is inflated in our population, since many police departments have traditionally maintained minimum height requirements.

Since a number of the offenders in the assault population were female, it is possible that the percent distribution of assailant height is somewhat biased on the shorter end of the spectrum. When the distribution of male heights is controlled, males 5'8" and below are representative of 33.8 percent of the assailants (Table 11). Thus the number of shorter suspects decreases somewhat when female offenders are not considered.

The only conclusion that can be drawn concerning height and proneness to assaultive behavior at this point in the analysis is that while shorter individuals are not more likely to attack police personnel than taller individuals, shorter persons are nevertheless well represented in our population of assault events.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY HEIGHT OF MALE SUSPECT

Height (In inches)	Number	Percent
60	2	.2
61	5	.5
62	4	.4
63	9	.9
64	32	3.3
65	26	2.7
66	63	6.6
67	77	8.0
68	108	11.2
69	146	15.2
70	111	11.6
71	117	12.2
72	115	12.0
73	67	7.0
74	49	5.1
75	12	1.2
76	9	.9
77	4	.4
78	2	.2
79	2	.2
Total	960	99.8*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

To determine whether assailants "choose" their victims by height, a correlation analysis was performed on officer and assailant height. An extremely low correlation of .05 suggests that there is no relationship between officer and assailant height. In other words, there is no evidence that shorter individuals attack taller officers or that taller persons victimize shorter police officers.

Another aspect of the assailant's stature is his physical build. Table 12 shows that proportionately, the distribution of offender builds is similar to that for officers, although a smaller percentage of assailants were classified in the category of medium build than was the case for officers.

TABLE 12

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY ASSAILANT BUILD

Build	Number	Percent
Slender	272	25.2
Medium	545	49.4
Heavy	280	25.2
Total	1097	99.8 *

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

B. Suspect Sex

Females were suspects in approximately 12 percent of the assault incidents. Conversely, in 88.3 percent of the cases the suspect was male.

TABLE 13

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SEX OF SUSPECT

Sex	Number	Percent
Male	996	88.3
Female	132	11.7
Total	1128	100.0

The percent distribution of female assailants is lower than the national arrest figures for the female population. In 1972, total arrests for women were recorded as 15.1 percent in contrast to the 11.7 figure for female assailants in selected south central cities. Males account for a greater percentage of the assaults than arrest figures would indicate. Men represent 84.9 percent of all arrests and are offenders in 88.3 percent of the assault cases.

While the data base for national arrests and regional assaults are not strictly comparable, the statistics nevertheless suggest that when women come into contact with law enforcement officers, they are somewhat less likely than males to physically abuse the officer. One possible explanation for the relatively low number of female offenders is that esteem needs of women are not fulfilled through aggressive behavior. On the other hand, the use of physical force is often linked to the demonstration of one's masculinity. The data suggest that socially defined roles of mascu-

linity and femininity should be considered in explaining differences in assaultive behavior by sex. Of course, since women as a group have less contact than males with law enforcement officials, the probability that women will participate in an assault is greatly reduced.

TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ARRESTS BY SEX, 1972

Sex	Number	Percent
Male	5,955,783	84.9
Female	1,057,411	15.1
Total	7,013,194[a]	100.0

[a]Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States -- Uniform Crime Reports, 1972, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, August 8, 1973, p. 129.

C. Suspect Race

Table 15 shows the distribution of assault incidents by suspect race. Fifty-eight percent of the cases involve white assailants while 41.6 percent of the suspects are classified as non-white. The non-white category is comprised of Blacks, Spanish/Mexican Americans, and American Indians.[13]

TABLE 15

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY RACE OF SUSPECT

Race	Number	Percent
White	658	58.4
Mexican/Spanish American	116	10.3
Black-Negro	260	23.1
American Indian	89	7.9
Other	3	.3
Total	1126	100.0

The data indicate that more assaults are committed by whites than non-whites. However, since

non-white individuals comprise approximately 15 percent of the U.S. population, the data suggest that members of minority groups are over-represented in the offender population[14] of a ratio of almost three to one. Comparison of national statistics on total arrests (Table 16) with the Assault Study findings support the conclusion that race is an important variable in assault situations.[15] As mentioned above, 58.1 percent of the assailants in selected southwestern cities are white. However, the FBI reports that 69.5 percent of the individuals arrested in 1972 were white.

While the percent of total arrests for caucasians is higher than their percent distribution in the assault population, the adverse is true for non-whites. Non-whites comprise 30.5 percent of the total arrests for 1972 but represent 41.6 percent of the assailants. Thus, a non-white individual is more likely to assault a policeman.

TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ARRESTS BY RACE, 1972

Race	Number	Percent
White	4,664,220	69.5
Non-white	2,042,730	30.5
Total	6,706,950[a]	100.0

[a]Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States -- Uniform Reports, 1972, p. 131.

D. Suspect Age

Suspect age is also examined as a variable which may possibly be related to assaultive behavior. Of particular interest is the extent to which young adults participate in assaults. A number of social scientists have commented on the propensity of young persons to engage in aggressive and assertive behavior. For example, in Childhood and Society, Erik Erikson describes the behavior of the young adult as motivated by a fear of ego loss. The young adult is inclined "to destroy those forces and people whose essence seems dangerous to one's own, and whose territory seems to encroach on the extent of one's intimate relations."[16] Extrapolating from Erikson's description of ego problems faced by the young adult, one can hypothesize that a police officer's attempts to interfere with the expressive behavior of young individuals may be met with resistance.

To analyze the relationship between age and assaults, data on assailant age was collected from police departments in the 37 southwestern communities. The age for offenders ranged from a youth of 13 to a 72 year old individual. The average age of the

CONTINUED

3 OF 6

assailant is 28.2 years which is somewhat higher than the mean age of assaulted police officers.[17] Approximately 56 percent of the assailants are under 28 years old, while 41.3 percent of the suspects are above the mean age.

The data on the age distribution of assailants is presented in Table 17. Age categories are adopted from the FBI classification of arrests by age to enable comparisons between assailant age and arrests for individuals falling within certain age groupings.[18] Table 17 indicates that 4.8 percent of the assailants are under the age of 18 while the national arrest figure for this particular age group is 25.5 percent (Table 18). Thus, while individuals below the age of 18 frequently have contact with law enforcement officers in an arrest situation, they represent a very low percentage of assaults on police officers.

TABLE 17

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS FOR ASSAILANT AGE BY FBI AGE CATEGORIES

Age (In years)	Number	Percent
10 and under	0	0
11-12	0	0
13-14	4	.4
15	10	.9
16	14	1.3
17	23	2.2
18	52	4.9
19	72	6.8
20	53	5.0
21	62	5.9
22	67	6.3
23	84	7.9
24	57	5.4
25-29	228	21.5
30-34	109	10.2
35-39	72	6.8
40-44	64	5.9
45-49	31	3.1
50-54	27	2.6
55-59	12	1.2
60-64	9	.9
65 and over	9	.9
Total	1059	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 18

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ARRESTS BY AGE, 1972

Age (In years)	Number	Percent
10 and under	80,551	1.1
11-12	149,785	2.1
13-14	435,551	6.2
15	359,504	5.1
16	403,311	5.8
17	365,282	5.2
18	352,707	5.0
19	318,227	4.5
20	288,896	4.1
21	285,833	4.1
22	262,982	3.7
23	232,559	3.3
24	216,690	3.1
25-29	736,398	10.5
30-34	533,588	7.6
35-39	450,929	6.4
40-44	433,116	6.2
45-49	381,191	5.4
50-54	299,747	4.3
55-59	192,199	2.7
60-64	119,412	1.7
65 and over	101,775	1.5
Not Known	12,991	.2
Total	7,013,194[a]	99.8*

[a]Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States -- Uniform Crime Reports, 1972, pp. 126-27.

*Percentage total does not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

For purposes of analysis, Erikson's category of "young adults" outlined above is translated into an age bracket of 18 to 29.[19] The young adults category comprises almost two thirds (63.7 percent) of the assault population. On the other hand, individuals between the ages of 18 and 29 represent approximately 40 percent (38.3 percent) of total arrests for 1972. The data lend support to the hypothesis that confrontations between relatively young individuals and police officials may result in violent behavior.

Finally, 31.6 percent of the assaults are committed by persons over the age of 29. These individuals are representative of 36 percent of the 1972 arrests.

E. Suspect Employment Status

The employment status of assailants is examined on the premise that knowing an individual's job status may tell something about his values, attitudes and life style. These factors may, in turn, be related to the manner in which the individual will react to a confrontation with the police. For example, political scientist Edward Banfield suggests that the values of the lower class -- the strata of society which is most likely to be unemployed -- are supportive of violent behavior. Furthermore, when comparisons are made between blue collar and white collar workers, Banfield would postulate that the former are more likely to engage in violent behavior.[20]

Table 19 shows the distribution of assault incidents by the assailant's occupation and employment status. Focusing first on employment status, it is found that 31.2 percent of the offenders are unemployed, and conversely 68.8 percent of the suspects are gainfully employed. These statistics indicate that it is not more likely that a policeman will be attacked by unemployed persons than by individuals holding a job. However, comparison of the unemployed assailants with the national unemployment rate suggests that an unemployed person has a greater probability of assaulting a law enforcement officer than the employed individual. Since the national unemployment rate fluctuates around five percent, the percent distribution of unemployed assailants is six times higher than the national average.

TABLE 19

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY ASSAILANT OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Occupation -- General Categories	Number	Percent
White Collar	140	17.9
Blue Collar	293	37.6
Student	42	5.4
Retired	5	.6
Housewife	18	2.3
Juvenile	39	5.0
Unemployed	243	31.2
Total	780*	100.0

*N is less than 1143 due to a large number of cases with missing data.

Focusing on those offenders who are employed, almost forty percent (37.6 percent) of the suspects are employed in blue collar occupations. White collar individuals comprise 17.9 percent of the assailant population. Students, juveniles, housewives and the retired, account for a small percentage of the assaults. The data indicate that those situated at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder are more prone to assault law enforcement personnel. When the blue collar and unemployed categories are combined, one finds that individuals in these two categories are responsible for 68.8 percent of the assaults.

The reasons for the frequency of assaults on police by persons of low socio-economic status are complex and open to interpretation. Some, like Banfield argue that the presence of a "lower class culture" fosters violent behavior. Others maintain that members of the lower class are frustrated because their perceived needs are not met; persons within this social sector vent their frustrations on the police officer -- a convenient and readily available scapegoat. While the data do not specify why individuals within certain social strata attack law enforcement personnel, the high participation of lower class individuals in assault events suggests a need for further research on the relationship between social class and assaultive behavior.

F. Suspect Involvement with Alcohol and Drugs

Alcohol and drug involvement are also examined within the context of the assault event. Police officers were requested to identify whether their assailant(s) was under the influence of alcohol, whether the offender had been drinking, and finally whether the suspect had indulged in non-alcoholic drugs.

Table 20 shows that in over half of the assault incidents (55.8 percent) police officers described their assailant as under the influence of alcohol. An even higher percentage (63.9 percent) of suspects were identified "as having been drinking." (Table 21) Thus, alcohol is present in almost two-thirds of the assault cases surveyed. Overall, the relationship between alcohol and assaults on police officers parallels in many ways the long known, and very frequent relationship between alcohol abuse and some other forms of violence.

Suspect involvement with non-alcoholic drugs seems less prevalent than with alcoholic beverages. Victimized officers reported that the offender was under the influence of drugs in only 10.5 percent of the cases. However, in over one-third of the incidents the officer reported that he did not know whether the assailant was indeed under the influence of drugs. In addition to indicating a fairly low percentage of drug involvement among assailants, the data also point to the fact that police officers experience difficulty in identifying drug users. The non-alcohol drug involvement data seem sufficient, however, to declare that blaming

TABLE 20

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

Suspect Under Influence of Alcohol	Number	Percent
Yes	630	55.9
No	390	34.6
Don't know	107	9.5
Total	1127	100.0

TABLE 21

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SUSPECT DRINKING

Suspect Been Drinking	Number	Percent
Yes	721	63.9
No	260	23.0
Don't know	147	13.0
Total	1128	99.9 *

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

assaults on police on drug use and addiction does not seem warranted. This appears to parallel the findings stemming from a five-year research project on America's drug abuse problems conducted at Yale University.[21]

TABLE 22

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY DRUG INVOLVEMENT

Suspect Under Influence of Drugs	Number	Percent
Yes	118	10.5
No	629	56.0
Don't know	377	33.5
Total	1124	100.0

While statistics on suspect drug involvement are open to interpretation, the data clearly indicate that alcohol plays an important role in the assault event. Although alcohol in itself is not

the actual cause of police assaults, it may nevertheless serve as a catalyst to assault -- a medium through which the inhibitions of the short individual, the young adult, the minority group member or the unemployed individual are lowered. When the inhibitions of the frustrated individual are effectively reduced through the use of alcohol, aggressive behavior directed toward other human beings -- in this case police officers -- may result.

Summary and Conclusions

The data on assailant characteristics indicates that police officers are assaulted by individuals who exhibit a wide variation of physical and social attributes. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that members of the lower socio-economic classes are disproportionately represented in the assault population. In addition to certain physical and socio-economic characteristics, alcohol involvement was identified as a salient factor associated with assault behavior.

III. The Assault Environment

A third dimension examined by the Police Assaults Study pertains to the environmental circumstances in which the assault event occurs. While in many cases it is not possible to "change" the environment in which assaultive behavior is directed against law enforcement personnel without undertaking fundamental and comprehensive changes in society, increasing the line officer's awareness of the typical assault environment may contribute to police officer safety. For example, it is possible that officers may enter certain environment where assaults frequently occur with an extremely complacent attitude.[22] Thus, officer awareness of these "high assault" environments may ultimately result in assault reduction, or at a minimum in a reduction of the severity of assault-inflicted injuries.

In considering the milieu in which assaults occur, a number of factors such as the time frame within which a majority of assaults takes place,the location of the assault incident, the officer's unit assignment, the number of officers and civilian witnesses present during an assault episode, as well as the officer's familiarity with his assailant are analyzed in this section and considered components of the assault environment.

A. Time Frame of the Assault Incident

The time frame in which the assault incident occurred is reviewed by hour of day, day of the week, and month of the year. Table 23 shows the distribution of assault occurrences by time of day.

To facilitate description of the hour of day when officers are most frequently the victims of assaults, the data from Table 23 was collapsed into shifts commonly utilized by urban law enforcement

TABLE 23

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY TIME OF DAY IN WHICH THEY OCCURRED

Time of Day	Number	Percent
1:00 a.m.	106	9.3
2:00 a.m.	113	9.9
3:00 a.m.	75	6.6
4:00 a.m.	32	2.8
5:00 a.m.	18	1.6
6:00 a.m.	5	.4
7:00 a.m.	12	1.1
8:00 a.m.	10	.9
9:00 a.m.	5	.4
10:00 a.m.	7	.6
11:00 a.m.	12	1.1
12:00 p.m.	37	3.2
1:00 p.m.	26	2.3
2:00 p.m.	31	2.7
3:00 p.m.	30	2.6
4:00 p.m.	35	3.1
5:00 p.m.	58	5.1
6:00 p.m.	49	4.3
7:00 p.m.	55	4.8
8:00 p.m.	69	6.1
9:00 p.m.	96	8.4
10:00 p.m.	75	6.6
11:00 p.m.	98	8.6
12:00 a.m.	86	7.5
Total	1140	100.0

agencies. When the data are arrayed by shift, the following distribution emerges.

TABLE 24

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SHIFT

Shift	Time	Number*	Percent
Day	8 a.m.- 4 p.m.	158	13.8
Afternoon	4 p.m.-12 p.m.	535	47.0
Graveyard	12 p.m.- 8 a.m.	447	39.2
Four Watch	8 p.m.- 4 a.m.	718	63.0

*Totals are not shown due to overlapping shifts.

As would be expected, the fewest number of incidents occurred during the day shift (13.8 percent). Forty-seven percent of the assaults took place during the afternoon shift and 39.2 percent of the assaulted officers were assigned to the "graveyard shift" or "dogwatch." Thus, the majority of the assaults occur under cover of darkness. Moreover, it is not surprising that 63 percent of the assault events took place during the "four watch," when the incidence of reported crime and street activity is particularly high in urban communities. Of course, the time of day when assaults most frequently occur is commensurate with leisure and drinking hours. As noted earlier in this report, alcohol appears to be highly associated with assaultive behavior.

The distribution of assaults by the day of the week on which they occurred is presented in Table 25. Over one-third (36.6 percent) of the assault events took place on Saturdays and Sundays. Assaults are also somewhat higher for Thursdays and Fridays than for Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays. However, with the exception of Saturdays which account for 21.2 percent of the attacks on police personnel, assaults are fairly evenly distributed throughout the week.

TABLE 25

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY THE DAY OF THE WEEK ON WHICH THEY OCCURRED

Day of Week	Number	Percent
Sunday	163	14.3
Monday	137	12.0
Tuesday	137	12.0
Wednesday	122	10.7
Thursday	168	14.7
Friday	173	15.1
Saturday	242	21.2
Total	1142	100.0

A final element in the analysis of assaults and the time frame within which they occur is the frequency of assaults by month of the year. Table 26 indicates that July accounts for the greatest frequency of assaults. The warmer months of June through September are representative of 40 percent of the assaults. While fewer assaults occurred during the winter than summer months, officers were nevertheless the victims of assaults during the period of December through March in almost one-third (28.2 percent) of the cases.

TABLE 26

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY MONTH OF ASSAULT

Month	Number	Percent
January	52	4.5
February	85	7.4
March	102	8.9
April	88	7.7
May	81	7.1
June	91	8.0
July	139	12.2
August	108	9.4
September	119	10.4
October	104	9.1
November	89	7.8
December	85	7.4
Total	1143	99.9 *

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

B. Location of the Incident

A major element of the assault environment is the location in which the event occurred. Table 27 shows that over one-third of the assault incidents took place on a street or highway. The high incidence of assault activity in this particular location is suggestive of certain types of activity which the officer may have engaged in pursuant to an assault, e.g., enforcing traffic laws, drunkenness laws and laws related to disturbing the peace. The assaulted officer's action prior to the assault will be examined in a subsequent section of the report.

The second highest frequency of assaults occurred in a private residence. Since the private residence is likely to be the scene of a family dispute, the data confirm a hypothesis set forth by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice that marital and family disputes are a major setting for assaults on police.[23]

A surprisingly high percentage of assaults (13.6 percent) were also recorded for the jail and booking area. Since suspects are supposedly subdued and under control by the time they reach the jail area, the fact that over 10 percent of the assaults occur in this location should be of major concern to police administrators.

Finally, private clubs and other commercial premises are locations which each account for approximately 8 percent of the assaults. From the incidents surveyed, officers were least likely to be assaulted in open areas, at schools or colleges and in hotels-motels.

TABLE 27

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY LOCATION OF THE ASSAULT EVENT

Location	Number	Percent
Private club	92	7.8
Other commercial premise	98	8.3
Recreation facility	16	1.4
Jail booking area	160	13.6
Open area	67	5.7
Street-highway	374	31.7
School or college	19	1.6
Private residence	259	21.9
Hotel-motel	18	1.5
Other	77	6.5
Total	1180*	100.0

*N is greater than 1143 due to multiple reporting of cases.

The data on the location of assault incidents may be interpreted as evidence that traditional police training practices should be evaluated and perhaps revised. The training environment often consists of a relatively open, clutter-free area. However, only 5.7 percent of the incidents observed occurred in what would be defined as an open area. The fact that the majority of assault events take place in streets, highways, private residences, jail/booking areas and commercial premises suggests that officers are coping with environments which are often foreign to their training experience.

C. Officer Assignment

Most of the assault incidents (78.4 percent) occurred among officers assigned to auto patrol. The high percentage of assaults inflicted on officers working in auto patrol is no doubt a reflection of the proportion of officers assigned to this task on the typical police force as well as the degree of exposure and risk involved in this particular assignment.

The assignment which accounted for the second highest frequency of assaults was traffic patrol. The relationship between enforcing and investigating traffic laws and assaults will be examined in a subsequent section of the report. While duties related to vice and detective work may be of a hazardous nature, officers assigned to these tasks accounted for only 4.6 percent of the assault incidents. Finally, law enforcement personnel working in the jail, foot patrol, and juvenile division are representative of only a small percentage of the total assault cases reported.

TABLE 28

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT

Assignment	Number	Percent
Auto Patrol	895	78.4
Traffic patrol	79	6.9
Foot patrol	12	1.1
Vice, detective	53	4.6
Jail	41	3.6
Juvenile	1	.1
Other	60	5.3
Total	1141	100.0

D. Unit Assignment of Officer

The unit assignment of assaulted officers is of particular interest in light of the one-man, two-man motor patrol controversy. Advocates of two-man cars argue that officer safety is greatly enhanced when officers work as partners. On the other hand, proponents of one-man cars maintain the two-man unit is inefficient. Since salaries usually consume approximately 90 percent of the police budget, the two-man motor patrol is an expensive proposition because under this system a police department can put only half as many cars on the street.[24]

The unit assignment of assaulted officers is examined here as part of the environment in which assaults occur. Table 29 indicates that from the assault population, the greatest percentage (63.1 percent) of assault incidents took place when officers were assigned to one-man units. Over one-third of the assaults (36.9 percent) involve officers assigned to two-man cars, yet while the majority of assault events involve personnel assigned to one-man cars, the data should not be interpreted as evidence that one-man units are necessarily more hazardous. The number of assault events involving officers assigned to one-man units is probably a reflection of the proportion of one-man cars in the typical police department. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice reports that the one-man system generally predominates among law enforcement agencies. From 1946 to 1964 the percentage of large cities utilizing only two-man cars dropped from 62 to 20 percent. The percentage of all cities using one-man cars exclusively rose from 18 to 41 percent. Almost one half of the smaller cities employ one-man cars only.[25]

Thus, before conclusions can be drawn regarding the relationship between unit assignment and proneness to assault, it will be necessary to review the distribution of both assaulted and non-assaulted

personnel to particular unit assignments. Data on the proportion of officers assigned to one-man and two-man cars should be collected and analyzed in subsequent research efforts.

TABLE 29

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY UNIT ASSIGNMENT
(ONE-MAN, TWO-MAN CARS)

Unit Assignment	Number	Percent
One-man unit	643	63.1
Two-man unit	376	36.9
Total	1019	100.0

Statistics on the presence of other officers during the assault event is another element of the assault environment which must be considered in conjunction with the officer's unit assignment. Table 30 indicates that no other officers were present during the assault in only 12.4 percent of the incidents. Conversely, in 87.6 percent of the cases at least one other officer was present at the event. These findings suggest that the presence of more than one police officer is not necessarily a deterrent to assault. The greatest percentage of assaults occurred when one (37.3 percent) or two (29.3 percent) other officers were present during the conflict.

TABLE 30

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT

Number of Other Officers Present	Number	Percent
None	137	12.4
1	411	37.3
2	323	29.3
3	132	12.0
4	45	4.1
5	26	2.4
6	12	1.1
7	13	1.2
8	2	.2
Total	1101	100.0

The data on the presence of other officers at the time of the assault is particularly relevant to the one-man/two-man motor patrol controversy. The figures suggest that while more assaulted officers are assigned to one-man rather than two-man units, those assigned to one-man units are usually not alone when the assault incident occurs. Thus, those assigned to one-man units do not seem to be assaulted because they lack the necessary back-up support.

The findings do, however, raise some interesting questions which should be the topic of further research. For example, are lone policemen more cautious and as a result less likely to be assaulted? Or are accompanied police officers more prone to "show off" in the presence of their peers, making an assault event more probable? These questions can best be answered through the use of more refined and sophisticated research techniques.

E. Witness and Suspect Involvement

Another aspect of the assault environment is the presence and participation of both witnesses and suspects in the assault event. Table 31 indicates that in 38.6 percent of the assault cases no civilian witnesses were present. Since in the majority of cases one or more civilians witnesses the event, the data suggest that the presence of witnesses is not necessarily a deterrent to assaults on police officers.

TABLE 31

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT

Number of Civilian Witnesses Present	Number	Percent
0	293	38.6
1	202	26.6
2	95	12.5
3	54	7.1
4	14	1.8
5	15	2.0
6	10	1.3
7	3	.4
8 or more	74	9.7
Total	760*	100.0

*N is less than 1143 due to a large number of cases with missing data.

When witnesses were present during the assault, they remained passive or neutral in over 60 percent of the cases. If an individual did become involved in the incident he was more likely to assist the officer than the assailant. Witnesses were reported to have assisted the officer in 22.5 percent of the cases, in contrast to only 7.4 percent of the incidents when one or more witnesses came to the aid of the assailant. Thus, civilian support for the officer involved in a conflict situation is three times higher than support given to the assailant.

TABLE 32

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY WITNESS INVOLVEMENT

Witness Involvement	Number	Percent
Present, not involved	472	62.4
Agitated suspect	49	6.5
Assisted suspect	56	7.4
Assisted officer	170	22.5
Agitated officer	0	0
Other	10	1.3
Total	757	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

In terms of suspect involvement, Table 33 indicates that in the majority of cases (85.8 percent) only one suspect participated in the assault event. These figures can be contrasted with the number of officers present during the incident (Table 30). As noted earlier more than one officer was present in 87.6 percent of the cases and furthermore, in two thirds of the incidents (66.6 percent) two or three officers were on the assault scene. Whether or not the presence of more than one officer precipitates assaultive behavior cannot be determined at this point in the analysis. It is possible that the lone suspect may feel more compelled to "prove himself" in the presence of more than one officer than would be the case if he confronted a single officer. At any rate the data does suggest an interesting hypothesis which should be the subject of further research.

From the practical or operational end of the spectrum the data on suspect and officer involvement point to assault situations where a two-to-one or three-to-one confrontation is the norm. In light of this information, the data suggest that traditional training practices which emphasize defense in one-to-one situations should be reevaluated.

TABLE 33

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY TOTAL NUMBER OF SUSPECTS INVOLVED

Number of Suspects Involved	Number	Percent
1	939	85.8
2	107	9.8
3	29	2.7
4	14	1.3
5	5	.5
Total	1094	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Since more than one officer is usually present during an assault, the extent to which other officers are assaulted is of interest. Although other officers were present in 87.6 percent of the cases observed, these additional personnel were assaulted in only 45.1 percent of the incidents. While the data is certainly not definitive at this point in the analysis, it tentatively suggests that when police officers come to the aid of one of their peers, they are fairly effective in subduing the assailant.

TABLE 34

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY MULTIPLE ASSAULT CASES

Other Officers Assaulted	Number	Percent
Yes	513	45.1
No	624	54.9
Total	1137	100.0

However, the fact that 45 percent of the other officers present were assaulted suggests the need for additional scientific investigation of alternative and/or improvement of assault reduction techniques. As mentioned above, review of traditional training practices which emphasize one-on-one situations appears to be in order.

F. Officer Familiarity with Suspect

A final element of the assault environment considered in this report is officer familiarity with the offender. While in the majority of cases the suspect was not known to the officer prior to the assault, in 21 percent of the incidents the officer was acquainted with the assailant.

TABLE 35

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY OFFICER PRIOR ACQUAINTANCE WITH SUSPECT

Suspect Known to Officer Prior to Assault	Number	Percent
Yes	236	21.0
No	890	79.0
Total	1126	100.0

In a subsequent section of this report officer familiarity with his assailant will be cross-tabulated with the level of injury suffered by both officer and suspect to determine whether prior acquaintance with the suspect is related to the level of violence.

Summary and Conclusions

The data on the assault environment suggests, not surprisingly, that assaults occur in those places and during those times when the police most often meet the public -- either upon their own initiative or as a result of a citizen's call for assistance. That is, police officers are assaulted whenever they are performing the police function of mediating conflict -- wherever that conflict occurs and where police can see it occurring.

Of particular interest to police administrators is the officers' environment as it relates to the number of officers present during the assault event. At present, the data do not support the premise that officer safety is enhanced through the use of two-man motor patrol assignments.

IV. Dynamics of the Assault Event

In describing the dynamics of the assault event the primary focus is directed towards assessing both officer and suspect activity prior to the assault as well as the interchange between officer and suspect immediately before the assault took place. The

analysis of the dynamics of the incident also includes a description of the level of violence directed against the officer in addition to a description of the weapons utilized by both suspect and officer. Finally an account of the injuries sustained by both officer and offender is included in this section of the report.

It should be noted that the data that was available for analyzing the dynamics of the assault event was obtained exclusively from the Physical Contact Summary completed by assaulted police officers. In other words, the analysis is based on data which was obtained by only one member of the assault conflict (i.e., the police officer), and does not reflect the assailant's version of the incident. For this reason, it must be assumed that at least a minimal amount of bias has entered into the reporting of the assault event.

A. Officer's Action Prior to the Assault

Police officers were asked to indicate the duties they were performing or the type of case they were investigating prior to the assault. Table 36 indicates that the greatest number of assaults occurred when officers were engaged in the following activities: routine patrol duties, enforcing/investigating traffic laws, investigating a public disturbance, transporting and booking prisoners, investigating family disturbances and investigating/enforcing drunkenness laws.

Officers were least likely to be assaulted when they were investigating or enforcing offenses against persons, offenses against property, drug laws, suspicious persons or circumstances, liquor law violations, civil disorders and transporting the mentally ill.

B. Suspect's Action Prior to the Assault

The highest frequency of assault incidents occurred when the assailant was in the act of committing a crime or when the assailant was in custody. These two categories of suspect activity are descriptive of 41.5 percent of the incidents. Traffic violations and attempting escape were also frequently cited as descriptive of the offender's behavior prior to the assault. (Table 37).

Since the category of committing a crime accounts for over 20 percent of the cases, the specific charges filed against the assailant were examined to more accurately determine the suspect's actions prior to the assault. For purposes of analysis, charges filed against the suspect were divided into FBI categories of Part I and Part II Offenses. Part I offenses are also termed Crime Index Offenses by the FBI. According to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, crime index offenses are "all serious crimes,

TABLE 36

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY OFFICER ACTION PRIOR TO ASSAULT

Officer Action	Number	Percent
Transportation/booking prisoner	176	9.3
Transporting suspect mentally ill	5	.3
Routine patrol	533	28.1
Investigating/enforcing traffic laws	227	12.0
Investigating/enforcing drug laws	30	1.6
Investigating/enforcing drunkenness laws	181	9.5
Investigating/enforcing liquor laws	21	1.1
Investigating/enforcing offense against property	69	3.6
Investigating/enforcing offense against person	88	4.6
Investigating/enforcing public disturbance	217	11.4
Investigating/enforcing family disturbance	163	8.6
Investigating/enforcing suspicious person/circumstances	71	3.7
Investigating/enforcing civil disorders	9	.5
Other	107	5.6
Total	1897*	99.9**

*N is greater than 1143 due to multiple reporting of officer activity.

**Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 37

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT EVENTS BY SUSPECT ACTION
PRIOR TO ASSAULT

Suspect Action	Number	Percent
Traffic violation	178	13.6
Committing crime	306	23.4
Suspicious behavior	92	7.0
Interfering with officer	158	12.1
Being transported	53	4.0
Attempting escape	156	11.9
In custody	237	18.1
Appear mentally ill	31	2.4
Other	98	7.5
Total	1309*	100.0

*N is greater than 1143 due to reporting of multiple actions.

either by their very nature or due to the volume in which they occur."[26] Part II offenses include crimes which do not fall within the FBI classification of serious crimes as defined by their nature and/or frequency.

It is significant to note that the charges filed against the suspect fall within the category of FBI index crimes in only 8.9 percent of the incidents. (Table 38). Thus in over 90 percent of the cases the assailant is not suspected of committing an index offense, but rather is charged with an offense of lesser consequence.

TABLE 38

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SUSPECT FOR PART I AND PART II OFFENSES/TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS

Charges Filed	Number	Percent
Part I Offenses	214	8.9
Part II Offenses/Traffic Violations	2189	91.1
Total	2403*	100.0

*N is greater than 1143 due to filing of multiple charges.

In terms of the types of Part I offenses which were allegedly committed by assailants, 64 percent of the index crime charges were for aggravated assault. (Table 39). Since the study consists of assault incidents, it is not surprising that a majority of the Part I charges involve aggravated assault. Charges for burglary account for the second highest number of Part I violations. No charges were filed for forcible rape, while criminal homicide accounts for only 1.9 percent of the Part I offenses.

Table 40 shows the distribution of charges filed against suspects for Part II and traffic offenses. As in the case of Part I offenses where aggravated assault predominated, misdemeanor assault represents the majority of charges (55.5 percent) for Part II offenses. Examples of other Part II offenses for which charges were filed include driving under the influence, drunkenness, and disorderly conduct.

To more accurately assess the type of activity the suspect was engaged in before the assault, charges filed for Part II offenses and traffic violations were retabulated with the omission of assault incidents. Table 41 indicates that in over one-third of the incidents the suspect was charged with public drunkenness.

TABLE 39

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SUSPECT FOR PART I OFFENSES (FBI INDEX CRIMES)

Charge Filed: Part I Offense	Number	Percent
Criminal Homicide	4	1.9
Forcible Rape	0	0.0
Robbery	14	6.5
Aggravated Assault	137	64.0
Burglary	30	14.0
Larceny over $50	11	5.1
Larceny under $50[a]	13	6.1
Motor Vehicle Theft	5	2.3
Total	214	99.9*

[a]For purposes of classification, larceny under $50 is included in Part I offenses by the FBI and was therefore included in the totals for Part I offenses. However, in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, larceny under $50 is not included in the Crime Index totals.

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

When figures for driving under the influence of alcohol are combined with public drunkenness charges, alcohol-related charges describe over 40 percent of the incidents (43.7 percent). Thus the importance of alcohol as a catalyst in assault situations is confirmed by the data on suspect offenses. It warrants notice that the suspect was charged with violation of non-alcoholic drug laws in only 2.3 percent of the incidents. Thus, when comparisons are made between assailants who are charged with the violation of drug laws and those who indulge in alcohol prior to the assault event, the latter overwhelmingly predominates.

The second highest frequency of assaults was recorded for traffic violations. It is reasonable to suggest that many officers may not expect a violent confrontation to ensue from a routine traffic stop. However, almost one of every five (18.6 percent) of the charges filed against assailants involved traffic offenses. Perhaps the amount of discretion involved in enforcing traffic violations is related to violent reactions illicited from suspects when they are charged with a traffic infringement. For example, it is possible that the motorist may become extremely irate when he is apprehended by a police officer for speeding, because throughout the week the motorist has seen dozens of speeders go unapprehended. At any rate, the high frequency of traffic-related assaults suggests the need for further research in this area.

However, assaults stemming from traffic stops may be related to more serious criminal activity. The Justice Department's

TABLE 40

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SUSPECT FOR PART II OFFENSES AND TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS

Charge Filed: Part II Offenses and Traffic Violations	Number	Percent
Other Assaults	1215	55.5
Arson	6	.3
Forgery and Counterfeiting	3	.1
Fraud	1	.1
Embezzlement	--	0.0
Stolen Property	3	.1
Vandalism	4	.2
Weapons, Carrying, Possessing	19	.9
Prostitution and Commercialized Vice	6	.3
Sex Offenses	6	.3
Narcotic, Drug Laws	22	1.0
Gambling	4	.2
Offenses Against Family and Children	--	0.0
Driving Under the Influence	102	4.7
Liquor Laws	20	.9
Drunkenness	323	14.8
Disorderly Conduct	172	7.9
Vagrancy	--	0.0
Suspicion	--	0.0
Curfew and Loitering Laws (Juvenile)	2	.1
Runaway (Juvenile)	7	.3
All Other Offenses	93	4.2
Traffic	181	8.3
Total	2189*	100.2**

*N is greater than 1143 due to reporting of multiple charges.

**Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 41

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SUSPECT FOR PART II OFFENSES AND TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS EXCLUDING CHARGES FOR ASSAULT

Charge Filed: Part II Offenses and Traffic Violations	Number	Percent
Arson	6	.6
Forgery and Counterfeiting	3	.3
Fraud	1	.1
Embezzlement	--	0.0
Stolen Property	3	.3
Vandalism	4	.4
Weapons, Carrying, Possessing	19	2.0
Prostitution and Commercialized Vice	6	.6
Sex Offenses	6	.6
Narcotics, Drug Laws	22	2.3
Gambling	4	.4
Offenses against Family and Children	--	0.0
Driving Under the Influence	102	10.5
Liquor Laws	20	2.1
Drunkenness	323	33.2
Disorderly Conduct	172	17.7
Vagrancy	--	0.0
Suspicion	--	0.0
Curfew and Loitering Laws (Juvenile)	2	.2
Runaway (Juvenile)	7	.7
All Other Offenses	93	9.5
Traffic	181	18.6
Total	974	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals reports that:

> ...There is a close interrelationship between traffic activity and all other police activities. ...The situation where an arrest for serious nontraffic offenses occurs as a result of a stop for a traffic offense, is common.[28]

Charges of disorderly conduct represent the third highest frequency among assault incidents. It is possible that many of the disorderly conduct charges are alcohol related. The remaining charges for Part II offenses each account for two percent or less of the total assault incidents and are displayed in Table 41.

An overview of the types of activities the assailant was involved in prior to the assault strongly suggests that in most cases the suspect was apprehended for committing a misdemeanor. Since the officer is confronting an assailant on the basis of violation of a minor crime, the suspect may question the legitimacy of the officer's action. If the suspect does not perceive his action as a violation of the law, he may resist the officer's attempts to interfere with his behavior. Thus, the initial act of questioning the officer's authority may lead to resisitng arrest, which in turn may escalate into an outbreak of violence.[29]

C. Assaults and Time Sequence of the Arrest Event

Another aspect of the dynamics of an assault is the time frame within which the assault occurred in terms of the interchange between officer and suspect. In this unit, analysis is focused on whether the assault took place before the officer formally placed the suspect under arrest, during the process when the officer was actually making an arrest, or finally, after the officer had formally placed the suspect under arrest; i.e., the suspect was in the custody of the officer. Table 42 shows the distribution of assault incidents according to the time sequence of the arrest procedure. Data for this section of the analysis was obtained by analyzing the last thing the officer said or did prior to the assault.[30]

The greatest percentage of assaults (41.4 percent) occur prior to the officer's attempt to place the suspect under arrest. Examples of activities engaged in by the officer during this time frame include talking with or questioning the offender, talking with or questioning someone else, approaching the suspect, or awakening the prospective assailant. It is reasonable to suggest that prior to making an arrest, the officer is least likely to be given any warning that he will be assaulted. Much of the activity in this category could possibly be classified as assault for no apparent reason. However, since activity in this category

TABLE 42

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY TIME SEQUENCE OF ARREST EVENT

Time Sequence	Number	Percent
Prior to Arrest	469	41.4
During Arrest	327	28.8
Following Arrest	327	28.8
Unknown	11	.1
Total	1134	99.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

also includes verbal interchange with the suspect, the officer's demeanor and conduct may serve as a catalyst to assault during this stage of the arrest procedure. This particular aspect of police behavior undoubtedly deserves closer scrutiny in further research efforts.

Almost 29 percent of the assault events occurred while the officer was in the process of making an arrest. Officer behavior within this classification includes verbally informing the suspect he is under arrest, disarming the suspect, arresting someone else, or removing the suspect from a vehicle. As is the case with assaults prior to arrest, many of the assaults in the "during arrest" category might best be described as attacks without warning or assault for no apparent reason. However, since this phase in the arrest procedure involves verbal and sometimes physical interchange with the suspect, the officer's demeanor and conduct may again play an important role in the dynamics of the assault event.

Finally, 28.8 percent of the assaults occurred after the officer had made a formal arrest. Activity in this category includes transporting the suspect to the jailing/booking area, moving the suspect to a police vehicle, or placing the prisoner in a jail cell. The high incidence of assaults which occur after the suspect has been formally placed under arrest suggests at a minimum the need to focus on the improvement of prisoner custodial training and procedures. In many instances the officer may be less careful once he feels the suspect has been arrested and is "under control." However, the data suggest that if a false sense of security or a sense of complacency does exist after the suspect is placed under arrest, it certainly is not warranted.

D. Triggering Mechanisms

Data on officer and suspect activity immediately prior to the assault was gathered for the purpose of identifying possible assault triggering mechanisms. Triggering mechanisms do not necessarily represent the underlying causes of assaultive behavior. Instead, a triggering mechanism may be described as an action, gesture or verbal exchange which causes an angry individual behaving in a nonviolent manner to become an angry individual acting in a violent manner. In other words, a triggering mechanism is a catalyst to violence rather than an underlying cause of violence against police.

After analyzing what was reportedly the last thing the suspect and officer did immediately before the assault, a number of categories describing general types of activities for both policemen and offender were constructed. Table 43 shows the distribution of assault cases by the officer's last action prior to assault. The greatest percentage (15.4 percent) of assaults occur when the officer initially places the suspect under arrest; i.e., when the officer verbally informs the suspect that he is under arrest. Thus, the actual expressed intent of an officer to place an individual under arrest seems to serve as a triggering mechanism or catalyst to assault. It may also be important to discern the manner in which the officer initiates the arrest procedure since this may be related to his assault potential.

The second highest frequency of assault events (12.4 percent) followed the officer's giving of an order or command. The giving of an order or command may serve as a catalyst to assault in cases where the suspect feels that "he doesn't take orders from anybody." As noted earlier in the report, many of the assailants are characterized as persons who may experience ego problems. For these individuals, any attempt by an officer to regulate their behavior through verbal injunctions might be perceived as a just cause for physical violence. The officer's conduct and demeanor when giving an order or command may also bear on the suspect's reaction to the command.

A fairly high incidence of assaults (10.4 percent) occurred under circumstances where the officer reportedly was transporting the suspect, processing an arrest or booking, jailing and guarding the suspect as his last action prior to the assault event. This information, in addition to data reported in a previous section of this report, indicates the need to advise officers of potential hazards once the suspect is placed under custody and is supposedly subdued. The data also questions whether or not this particular area of police activity has received sufficient consideration by police administrators and training officers.

Officers listed intervening as a third party to a conflict as their last action prior to assault in 10.1 percent of the

TABLE 43

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER ACTIVITY PRIOR TO ASSAULT

Last Action	Number	Percent
Giving Order or Command	141	12.4
Handcuffing (applying, loosening or removing)	115	10.1
Applying Pressure or Force to Suspect	110	9.7
Intervening as a Third Party to Conflict	114	10.1
Assault by a Non-Suspect	52	4.6
Assault for No Apparent Reason	39	3.4
Transporting Suspect, Processing an Arrest or Booking, Jailing, Guarding Suspect	117	10.4
Talking to or Questioning Suspect	59	5.2
Placing Suspect Under Arrest	175	15.4
Attempting to Overtake Suspect	42	3.7
Searching/Disarming Suspect	71	6.3
Traffic Stop	25	2.2
Miscellaneous, Other, Unknown	74	6.5
Total	1134	100.0

incidents. In third party cases the officer often finds himself in a potentially explosive situation. An officer is called upon to mediate a conflict, but once the officer arrives at the scene of the dispute, his presence may be resented by the parties involved. The officer's attempt to intervene in what the parties involved perceive as a "private" affair is in itself a catalyst to assault.

Assaults are also fairly high (10.1 percent) in instances where the officer is applying, loosening or removing handcuffs from a suspect. It is reasonable to suggest that the application of handcuffs may serve as a triggering mechanism to assault. The suspect may perceive the application of handcuffs as demeaning, unnecessary or a violation of his rights. Thus, it is conceivable that an action designed to protect the officer, in many cases serves to increase the risk that an officer will be assaulted.[31] At any rate, the data suggest that officers should be extremely cautious during the handcuffing stage of the arrest procedure.

The data on handcuffing also warrants investigation of training

as well as policy guidelines given to patrolmen on the use and application of handcuffs. For example, some departments allow a great deal of discretion to the officer in handcuffing, while others require that all suspects be handcuffed regardless of the charge filed against them. An illustration of the importance of officer discretion in handcuffing as well as the need for policy guidelines in the use of this discretion is provided by an in-depth interview with an assailant in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The offender in this particular case was a young Mexican American who was initially confronted by two policemen for public drunkenness (the suspect had been drinking at a wedding party). The assailant was a Viet Nam veteran and at the time of the arrest was suffering from a shrapnel wound which was healing very slowly on his right hand and wrist. When the officers arrested the suspect they attempted to lock his wounded and swollen wrist into the handcuffs. According to the assailant, his cries of "my hand, my hand" were either not understood or not heeded by the policemen. As a result, to relieve the pain, the offender attacked the officers with his free hand.

The above is, of course, an extreme example of how officer sensitivity to the particular circumstances of an arrest, especially as those circumstances relate to handcuffing, might have prevented an assault. Moreover, while the illustration is not representative of conditions present during the "normal" course of events when a suspect is handcuffed, it nevertheless effectively points to the need for a closer examination of the policies governing handcuffing among law enforcement agencies.

The category of applying pressure or force to the suspect accounts for 9.7 percent of the officer's last actions prior to being assaulted. This category is descriptive of instances where the officer is trying to detain or restrain the suspect or where after arresting an individual, the officer is attempting to move the suspect to a police car, booking area, etc. The application of pressure or force suggests that the suspect may be recalcitrant to begin with. Of course, applying pressure or force to the suspect involves physical contact with the individual and may be construed by the suspect as a violation of his territorial imperative. Body contact between officer and suspect must be considered as a very likely triggering mechanism to assault.

Of the remaining categories of officer activity immediately prior to assault, each accounts for less than seven percent of the incidents. These include talking to or questioning the suspect, searching/disarming the suspect, assault by a non-suspect,[33] attempting to overtake a suspect, assault for no apparent reason, and a miscellaneous category.

As noted above, the data stem from asking officers about assaults on themselves and thus are not necessarily an impartial and unbiased description of the incident. An obvious result of this

is the fact that none of the police officers reported that the assault upon them was caused by their own initiation of violence on the suspect. Yet when suspects in Albuquerque[34] were interviewed, a sizeable proportion of them insisted that their violent behavior toward police officers was a protective reaction to the policeman's violent assault. Therefore it is impossible to include a category which discusses assaults in the context of a suspect resorting to violence as a reaction to police initiated violence.

The preceeding unit has described those triggering mechanisms which may emanate from police officer behavior. Next a description of the last thing the assailant did or said prior to the assault is outlined in Table 44 which shows the distribution of the suspect's activity immediately before the officer was assaulted.

TABLE 44

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY LAST THING SUSPECT SAID OR DID PRIOR TO THE ASSAULT

Activity	Number	Percent
Verbal: Cursing, Swearing, Arguing with Officer, Verbal Threat, Challenging	344	30.5
Fleeing from Officer, Custody	106	9.4
Attack without Warning, Attack for No Apparent Reason	308	27.5
Resisting Officer/Ignoring Officer's Command	176	15.6
Threatening Officer with Firearm, Knife, Weapon	40	3.5
Involved in Fight with Third Party	71	6.3
Firing on Officer/Attempting to Seize Officer's Firearm	19	1.7
Other	63	5.6
Total	1127	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

The greatest frequency of cases involves some form of verbal abuse by the suspect. Indeed, in over one third of the incidents the assailant engaged in cursing, swearing, arguing, threatening, or challenging the officer prior to the assault. However, the

data presently available do not allow any conclusions regarding the officer's reaction to this type of stress situation to be drawn. Rather, additional research should include a more accurate description of the interchange between officer and suspect. It will then be possible to determine whether the officer's reaction to verbal abuse serves to precipitate assaultive behavior.

Based on the officers' reporting of the last thing the suspect did or said prior to the assault, over one fourth of the incidents were classified as an attack without warning or assault for no apparent reason. This category includes suspect behavior such as sleeping, responding to the officer's command, striking the officer with no warning, acting complacent and saying or doing nothing. While it appears that a fairly large percentage of the cases are difficult to describe in terms of triggering mechanisms or warning signals, it is possible that through techniques such as in-depth interviewing it would be possible to more accurately describe the events immediately preceeding the assault.

The third highest incidence of assaults occurred when the suspect resisted or ignored an officer's command. Again, conclusions at this stage of the analysis are limited since it is not possible to determine the officer's reaction to the suspect's behavior. The act of resisting an officer or ignoring an officer's command is likely to be followed by the officer's attempt to use force or pressure. As mentioned previously, physical contact between officer and suspect may in itself be a significant triggering mechanism to assault.

In 9.4 percent of the cases the officer reported that prior to the assault the suspect was fleeing from the officer (either before or after being placed under arrest). In this situation the suspect and officer apparently became involved in a scuffle once the officer overtook the suspect. The remaining categories of suspect activity account for 17.1 percent of the incidents. These include involvement of the suspect in a conflict with a third party, threatening the officer with a weapon, firing on an officer and a category of miscellaneous activities.

E. Weapon Used by Suspect and Officer

A major aspect of the dynamics of the assault incident is the amount of violence exercised by both offender and officer. Table 45 shows the level of violence directed by the suspect against the officer. In only 2.2 percent of the cases was an officer shot or shot at by an assailant. In 84.8 percent of the incidents the assailant wrestled with or struck the officer. When a weapon was used by an offender, the officer was more likely to be shot at with a firearm than cut or stabbed.

The data on the level of violence directed against the officer suggests that suspects utilized weapons in a very small percentage of the cases. Table 46 displays the distribution of assault

TABLE 45

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY LEVEL OF VIOLENCE OF SUSPECT

Level of Violence of Suspect	Number	Percent
Threat and Attempt Only	128	11.4
Wrestled	477	42.4
Struck Officer	477	42.4
Cut/Stabbed Officer	18	1.6
Shot/Shot at Officer	25	2.2
Total	1125	100.0

incidents by the type of weapon used by the offender.

TABLE 46

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY TYPE OF WEAPON UTILIZED BY SUSPECT

Suspect's Weapon	Number	Percent
Hands, Feet, Teeth, Fists	999	85.0
Officer's Stick or Sap	12	1.0
Rock, Brick, Bottle	19	1.6
Clubbing Instrument	20	1.7
Cutting or Stabbing Instrument	30	2.6
Motor Vehicle	16	1.4
Spray Can Contents	1	.1
Other	78	6.6
Total	1175*	100.0

*N is greater than 1143 due to reporting of multiple weapons use.

In the majority of the incidents (85.0 percent) the suspect relied on his hands, feet, teeth or fists to assault his victim. Cutting or stabbing instruments were used in 2.6 percent of the cases. The "other" category includes cases where firearms were utilized. As Table 47 indicates, firearms were used against police officers in only 5.3 percent of the cases.[35] In these incidents where firearms were utilized, a handgun was involved in the majority of the events.

TABLE 47

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY FIREARM USE AND TYPE

Firearm Use and Type	Number	Percent
No Firearm Used	1066	94.7
Handgun	50	4.4
Shotgun	8	.7
Rifle	2	.2
Total	1126	100.0

In the cases where suspects did use a firearm, the weapon was reported stolen in only 10.6 percent of the incidents. However, officers reported that they did not know if the weapon was indeed stolen in well over one third (37.9 percent) of the cases.

In terms of the level of violence utilized by the officer, in most cases (86.4 percent) the officer used neither his firearm nor his club to repel the assailant. Moreover, in one of every 20 incidents (5.4 percent), the officer utilized his firearm. Generally, the officer defended himself with his hands or feet and in a nominal percentage of the assault events (8.2 percent) relied on his stick as indicated in Table 48.

TABLE 48

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY TYPE OF WEAPON UTILIZED BY OFFICER

Weapon	Number	Percent
Officer's Stick	95	8.2
Hands or Feet	945	81.2
Firearm	63	5.4
Other	61	5.2
Total	1164*	100.0

*N is greater than 1143 due to reporting of multiple weapons use.

Thus considering the weapons used by the majority of the assailants, officers do not appear to overreact in terms of the type of weapon

they use in response to an attack.

Another point of interest is the direction from which the officer was assaulted. Table 49 indicates that in the majority of incidents the officer was attacked frontally.

TABLE 49

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY POSITION FROM WHICH OFFICER WAS ASSAULTED

Position	Number	Percent
Front	849	77.0
Side	134	12.2
Rear	76	6.9
Other (Combinations)	43	3.9
Total	1102	100.0

F. Officer and Suspect Injury

In this section assault incidents are examined in terms of whether or not parties to the conflict were injured, the type of injuries sustained, and the part of the body injured during the confrontation.

Table 50 indicates that in 54 percent of the cases the officer received no injuries. When officers were injured, they were most likely to have received a bruise or cut/puncture wound. In none of the incidents reported from municipal agencies were officers killed.

The statistics on the part of the officer's body which was injured during an assault should be of interest to police administrators, particularly as the data relate to personal defense training. Table 51 and Figure 1 show that while the part of the body injured is fairly evenly distributed among the cases observed, head injuries do appear to be the most common inflicted by assailants (31.3 percent).

The figures on suspect injuries are similar to those for the officers. Fifty-six percent of the offenders were not injured, and when suspects did sustain an injury it was most likely to be a bruise or cut and puncture wound, as displayed in Table 52.

In contrast to officer injuries, suspects clearly suffered greater injury to the head (61.2 percent) than to other parts of the

FIGURE 1

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL INJURIES



TABLE 50

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY TYPE OF INJURY SUSTAINED BY OFFICER

Injury Sustained	Number	Percent
None	650	54.1
Bruise	356	29.6
Cut/puncture	138	11.5
Fracture/broken bone	24	2.0
Gunshot wound	2	.2
Killed	0	0.0
Other	32	2.7
Total	1202*	100.1**

*N is greater than 1143 due to reporting of multiple injuries.

**Percentage totals do not equal 100.0 due to rounding.

TABLE 51

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY PART OF BODY SUSTAINING THE INJURY - OFFICER

Location of Injury	Number	Percent
Head	184	31.3
Torso/body	155	26.4
Hands/ feet	121	20.6
Arms/legs	128	21.8
Total	588	100.1*

*Percentage totals are not equal to 100.0% due to rounding.

anatomy (Table 53 and Figure 2). In light of the frequency of head injuries incurred by assailants, further research is warranted. Of particular interest is the fact that in most officer training programs officers are instructed to repel an attacker by aiming for the torso, arms, or legs rather than the head. Furthermore, the high number of head injuries among suspects is of additional importance since the infliction of head injuries by law enforcement officers is most likely to precipitate charges of police excess.

FIGURE 2

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL INJURIES



TABLE 52

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SUSPECT INJURY

Injury	Number	Percent
None	657	56.3
Bruise	237	20.3
Cut-puncture	229	19.6
Fracture/broken bone	12	1.0
Gunshot wound	16	1.4
Killed	5	.4
Other	12	1.0
Total	1168*	100.0

*N is greater than 1143 due to reporting of multiple injuries.

TABLE 53

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY PART OF BODY SUSTAINING THE INJURY - SUSPECT

Injury	Number	Percent
Head	346	61.2
Torso/body	126	22.3
Hands/feet	37	6.5
Arms/legs	56	9.9
Total	565	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

While basic information on injuries to both officer and assailant is presented in Tables 50 through 53, a more detailed overview of assault injuries is outlined in Tables 54 through 139. These tables consist of a cross tabulation of injuries by a number of variables such as height, build, race, training, alcohol/drug involvement, presence of other officers and witnesses, officer assignment, location of the incident, officer familiarity with the assailant, officer activity prior to the assault and handcuffing. In most instances data on both officer and assailant characteristics were included, but in some cases information on only officer injuries is tabularly displayed.

Although no definitive conclusions can be made concerning the relationship between injuries and the variables described above

at this stage of the analysis, the tables are presented to enable the reader to focus on those relationships which may be of interest to him.

Summary and Conclusions

One of the most difficult tasks encountered by the Police Assaults Study was capturing the dynamics of the assault event through the use of standard questionnaire techniques. In spite of inherent difficulties in the research method, some interesting findings resulted from the procedure. For example, the identification of possible triggering mechanisms to assault provides a basis from which further research can proceed. Furthermore, the description of injuries sustained by both officer and suspect should be helpful to those concerned with enhancing the safety of law enforcement personnel as well as the citizens with whom they come into contact.

TABLE 54

OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER HEIGHT

OFFICER INJURED	OFFICER HEIGHT																	
	64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	0	0	1	50.0	3	60.0	5	33.3	53	53.5	50	50.0	77	35.6	93	38.3	80	45.2
Non-Injured	1	100.0	1	50.0	2	40.0	10	66.7	46	46.5	50	50.0	139	64.4	150	61.7	97	54.8
TOTAL	1	100.0	1	100.0	5	100.0	15	100.0	99	100.0	100	100.0	216	100.0	243	100.0	177	100.0

OFFICER INJURED	OFFICER HEIGHT															
	73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	67	45.0	27	43.5	18	48.6	11	47.8	1	100.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	1	25.0
Non-Injured	82	55.0	35	56.5	19	51.4	12	52.2	-	0.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	3	75.0
TOTAL	149	100.0	62	100.0	37	100.0	23	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	4	100.0

TABLE 55

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER HEIGHT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER HEIGHT																	
	64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	--	0.0	1	100.0	3	100.0	3	50.0	37	69.8	37	74.0	58	73.4	69	70.4	58	63.7
Cut/puncture	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	2	33.3	15	28.3	12	24.0	17	21.5	26	26.5	27	29.7
Fracture/ broken bone	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	1	16.7	1	1.9	1	2.0	4	5.1	3	3.1	5	5.5
Gunshot wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	1	1.1
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	--	0.0	1	100.0	3	100.0	6	100.0	53	100.0	50	100.0	79	100.0	98	100.0	91	100.0

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER HEIGHT															
	73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	44	62.0	21	75.0	12	63.2	8	66.7	1	33.3	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Cut/puncture	20	28.2	7	25.0	6	31.6	4	33.3	1	33.3	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Fracture/broken bone	6	8.4	--	0.0	1	5.3	--	0.0	1	33.3	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Gunshot wound	1	1.4	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	71	100.0	28	100.0	19	100.1	12	100.0	3	99.9	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0

TABLE 56

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER HEIGHT

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER HEIGHT 64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	--	0.0	2	66.7	4	80.0	13	81.2	12	21.0	25	35.2	32	31.4	35	29.9	29	31.9
Torso	--	0.0	1	33.3	--	0.0	2	12.5	14	24.6	18	25.4	32	31.4	31	26.5	25	27.5
Hands/feet	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	1	6.2	12	21.0	11	15.5	16	15.7	22	18.8	23	25.3
Arms/legs	--	0.0	--	0.0	1	20.0	--	0.0	19	33.3	17	23.9	22	21.6	29	24.8	14	15.4
TOTAL	--	0.0	3	100.0	5	100.0	16	99.9	57	99.9	71	100.0	102	100.1	117	100.0	91	100.1

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER HEIGHT 73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	14	23.3	6	25.0	7	30.4	1	10.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Torso	19	31.7	7	29.2	4	17.4	--	0.0	1	50.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Hands/feet	14	23.3	7	29.2	5	21.7	7	70.0	1	50.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	1	100.0
Arms/legs	13	21.7	4	16.7	7	30.4	2	20.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	60	100.0	24	100.1	23	99.9	10	100.0	2	100.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	1	100.0

TABLE 57

SUSPECT INJURY BY OFFICER HEIGHT

SUSPECT INJURED	OFFICER HEIGHT																	
	64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	-	0.0	-	0.0	3	60.0	8	53.3	46	47.4	42	42.9	81	37.9	85	35.6	82	47.4
Non-Injured	1	100.0	2	100.0	2	40.0	7	46.7	51	52.6	56	57.1	133	62.1	154	64.4	91	52.6
TOTAL	1	100.0	2	100.0	5	100.0	15	100.0	97	100.0	98	100.0	214	100.0	239	100.0	173	100.0

SUSPECT INJURED	OFFICER HEIGHT																	
	73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Injured	60	41.4	25	41.0	15	42.9	9	39.1	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	25.0		
Non-Injured	85	58.6	36	59.0	20	57.1	14	60.9	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	3	75.0		
TOTAL	145	100.0	61	100.0	35	100.0	23	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	4	100.0		

TABLE 58

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY BY OFFICER HEIGHT

TYPE SUSPECT INJURY	OFFICER HEIGHT																	
	64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	44.4	24	51.1	25	52.1	46	54.1	36	38.3	40	45.4
Cut/puncture	-	-	-	-	3	60.0	4	44.4	23	48.9	21	43.8	35	41.2	50	53.2	42	47.7
Broken bone	-	-	-	-	2	40.0	1	11.1	-	-	2	4.2	1	1.2	3	3.2	1	1.1
Gunshot wound	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3.5	4	4.2	3	3.4
Killed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1.2	2	2.3
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	5	100.0	9	99.1	47	100.0	48	100.1	85	100.0	94	100.1	88	100.0

TYPE SUSPECT INJURY	OFFICER HEIGHT																	
	73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Bruise	30	46.2	14	53.8	10	62.5	4	44.4	1	50.0	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Cut/puncture	32	49.2	10	38.5	5	31.2	2	22.2	1	50.0	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Broken bone	-	-	1	3.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	100.0		
Gunshot wound	2	3.1	1	3.8	-	-	3	33.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Killed	1	1.5	-	-	1	6.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
TOTAL	65	100.0	26	99.9	16	99.9	9	99.9	2	100.0	-	-	-	-	1	100.0		

TABLE 59

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY BY OFFICER HEIGHT

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	OFFICER HEIGHT																	
	64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	-	-	-	-	1	20.0	6	54.5	34	73.9	28	50.9	62	60.2	68	64.8	59	61.5
Torso	-	-	-	-	1	20.0	3	27.3	5	10.9	17	30.9	26	25.2	20	19.0	22	22.9
Hands/feet	-	-	-	-	3	60.0	-	-	2	4.3	5	9.1	4	3.9	6	5.7	8	8.3
Arms/legs	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	18.2	5	10.9	5	9.1	11	10.7	11	10.5	7	7.3
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	5	100.0	11	100.0	46	100.0	55	100.0	103	100.0	105	100.0	96	100.0

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	OFFICER HEIGHT															
	73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	46	60.5	19	67.8	13	61.9	6	66.7	1	100.0	-	-	1	100.0	1	100.0
Torso	15	19.7	6	21.4	6	28.6	2	22.2	-	-	1	100.0	-	-	-	-
Hands/feet	6	7.9	2	7.1	1	4.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Arms/legs	9	11.8	1	3.6	1	4.8	1	11.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	76	99.9	28	99.9	21	100.1	9	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0	1	100.0

TABLE 60

OFFICER INJURY BY PHYSICAL BUILD OF OFFICER

OFFICER INJURED	PHYSICAL BUILD OF OFFICER					
	Slender		Medium		Heavy	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Yes	61	38.9	179	41.3	56	38.9
No	96	61.1	254	58.7	88	61.1
TOTAL	157	100.0	433	100.0	144	100.0

TABLE 61

OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER RACE

OFFICER INJURED	RACE OF OFFICER			
	White		Non-white	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	457	43.8	32	35.2
Non-injured	587	56.2	59	64.8
TOTAL	1044	100.0	91	100.0

TABLE 62

TYPE OF INJURY BY OFFICER RACE

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	RACE OF OFFICER			
	White		Non-white	
	N	%	N	%
Bruise	334	68.3	21	72.4
Cut/puncture	133	27.2	5	17.2
Fractured/broken bones	21	4.3	3	10.3
Gunshot wound	1	.2	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	489	100.0	29	99.9

TABLE 63

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER RACE

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	RACE OF OFFICER			
	White		Non-white	
	N	%	N	%
Head	176	31.8	8	23.5
Torso/body	142	25.7	12	35.3
Hands/feet	111	20.1	10	29.4
Arms/legs	124	22.4	4	11.8
TOTAL	553	100.0	34	100.0

TABLE 64

RACE OF SUSPECT BY OFFICER INJURED

OFFICER INJURED	RACE OF SUSPECT			
	White		Non-white	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	267	40.7	218	46.6
Non-injured	389	59.3	250	53.4
TOTAL	656	100.0	468	100.0

TABLE 65

RACE OF SUSPECT BY TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	RACE OF SUSPECT			
	White		Non-white	
	N	%	N	%
Bruise	195	70.7	158	66.4
Cut/puncture	66	23.9	71	29.8
Fractured/broken bones	15	5.4	9	3.8
Gunshot wound	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	276	100.0	238	100.0

TABLE 66

SUSPECT INJURY BY SUSPECT RACE

SUSPECT INJURED	RACE OF SUSPECT			
	White		Non-white	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	258	39.6	200	43.8
Non-injured	393	60.4	257	56.2
TOTAL	651	100.0	457	100.0

TABLE 67

SUSPECT TYPE OF INJURY BY SUSPECT RACE

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY	RACE OF SUSPECT			
	White		Non-white	
	N	%	N	%
Bruise	129	45.6	107	50.2
Cut/puncture	141	49.8	86	40.4
Fractured/broken bones	4	1.4	8	3.8
Gunshot wound	7	2.5	9	4.2
Killed	2	.7	3	1.4
TOTAL	283	100.0	213	100.0

TABLE 68

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY BY SUSPECT RACE

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	RACE OF SUSPECT			
	White		Non-white	
	N	%	N	%
Head	202	62.7	141	58.8
Torso/body	73	22.7	53	22.1
Hands/feet	20	6.2	17	7.1
Arms/legs	27	8.4	29	12.1
TOTAL	322	100.0	240	100.1

TABLE 69

SUSPECT INJURY BY RACE OF OFFICER

SUSPECT INJURED	RACE OF OFFICER			
	White		Non-white	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	433	42.2	28	30.8
Non-injured	592	57.8	63	69.2
TOTAL	1025	100.0	91	100.0

CONTINUED

4 OF 6



TABLE 71

OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE BASIC RECRUIT TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

OFFICER INJURED	TYPE OF TRAINING: BASIC RECRUIT							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	13	54.2	41	45.1	79	37.3	352	43.8
Not Injured	11	45.8	50	54.9	133	62.7	451	56.2
TOTAL	24	100.0	91	100.0	212	100.0	803	100.0

TABLE 72

OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE FIREARMS TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

OFFICER INJURED	TYPE OF TRAINING: FIREARMS							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	5	62.5	188	52.5	162	40.5	130	35.7
Not Injured	3	37.5	170	47.5	238	59.5	234	64.3
TOTAL	8	100.0	358	100.0	400	100.0	364	100.0

TABLE 73

OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE ARREST PROCEDURE TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

OFFICER INJURED	TYPE OF TRAINING: ARREST PROCEDURE							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	39	37.9	81	53.3	115	48.1	250	39.6
Not Injured	64	62.1	71	46.7	124	51.9	381	60.4
TOTAL	103	100.0	152	100.0	239	100.0	631	100.0

TABLE 74

OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE PRISONER HANDLING TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

OFFICER INJURED	TYPE OF TRAINING: PRISONER HANDLING							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	48	41.4	61	57.0	106	46.3	270	40.2
Not Injured	68	58.6	46	43.0	123	53.7	402	59.8
TOTAL	116	100.0	107	100.0	229	100.0	672	100.0

TABLE 75

OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

OFFICER INJURED	TYPE OF TRAINING: POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	49	42.2	84	54.9	122	48.6	229	38.0
Not Injured	67	57.8	69	45.1	129	51.4	374	62.0
TOTAL	116	100.0	153	100.0	251	100.0	603	100.0

TABLE 76

OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE DEFENSIVE TACTICS TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

OFFICER INJURED	TYPE OF TRAINING: DEFENSIVE TACTICS							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	46	42.2	59	55.7	102	45.7	278	40.6
Not Injured	63	57.8	47	44.3	121	54.3	407	59.4
TOTAL	109	100.0	106	100.0	223	100.0	685	100.0

TABLE 77

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE BASIC RECRUIT TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	TYPE OF TRAINING: BASIC RECRUIT							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	8	66.7	32	78.0	62	68.1	251	67.5
Cut/Puncture	3	25.0	8	19.5	28	30.8	98	26.3
Fracture/Broken Bone	1	8.3	1	2.4	1	1.1	21	5.6
Gunshot Wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	2	.5
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	12	100.0	41	99.9	91	100.0	372	99.9

TABLE 77

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE BASIC RECRUIT TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	TYPE OF TRAINING: BASIC RECRUIT							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	8	66.7	32	78.0	62	68.1	251	67.5
Cut/Puncture	3	25.0	8	19.5	28	30.8	98	26.3
Fracture/Broken Bone	1	8.3	1	2.4	1	1.1	21	5.6
Gunshot Wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	2	.5
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	12	100.0	41	99.9	91	100.0	372	99.9

TABLE 78

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE FIREARMS TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	TYPE OF TRAINING: FIREARMS							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	4	100.0	143	71.1	106	60.6	100	73.5
Cut/Puncture	--	0.0	48	23.9	57	32.6	32	23.5
Fracture/Broken Bone	--	0.0	9	4.5	11	6.3	4	2.9
Gunshot Wound	--	0.0	1	.5	1	.6	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	4	100.0	201	100.0	175	100.1	136	99.9

TABLE 79

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE ARREST PROCEDURE TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	TYPE OF TRAINING: ARREST PROCEDURE							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	28	70.0	59	72.8	84	66.7	182	67.7
Cut/Puncture	8	20.0	20	24.7	36	28.6	73	27.1
Fracture/Broken Bone	2	5.0	2	2.5	6	4.8	14	5.2
Gunshot Wound	2	5.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	40	100.0	81	100.0	126	100.1	269	100.0

TABLE 80

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE PRISONER HANDLING TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	TYPE OF TRAINING: PRISONER HANDLING							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	35	71.4	41	68.3	82	68.3	195	67.9
Cut/Puncture	10	20.4	17	28.3	32	26.7	78	27.1
Fracture/Broken Bone	2	4.1	2	3.3	6	5.0	14	4.9
Gunshot Wound	2	4.1	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	49	100.0	60	99.9	120	100.0	287	99.9

TABLE 81

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	TYPE OF TRAINING: POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	36	73.5	61	71.8	93	67.9	162	66.7
Cut/Puncture	9	18.4	23	27.1	39	28.5	65	26.7
Fracture/Broken Bone	2	4.1	1	1.2	5	3.6	16	6.6
Gunshot Wound	2	4.1	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	49	100.1	85	100.1	137	100.0	243	100.0

TABLE 82

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY TIME ELAPSED
SINCE DEFENSE TACTICS TRAINING PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	TYPE OF TRAINING: DEFENSIVE TACTICS							
	No Training		6 Mo. or Less		12 Mo. or Less		Over 1 Year	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	35	74.5	43	74.1	78	65.5	197	67.5
Cut/Puncture	8	17.0	12	20.7	38	31.9	79	27.1
Fracture/Broken Bone	2	4.3	3	5.2	3	2.5	16	5.5
Gunshot Wound	2	4.3	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	47	100.1	58	100.0	119	99.9	292	100.1

TABLE 83

OFFICER INJURY BY NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT

OFFICER INJURED	NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT							
	0		1		2		3 or More	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	56	40.9	161	39.3	138	42.9	113	49.1
Not Injured	81	59.1	249	60.7	184	57.1	117	50.9
TOTAL	137	100.0	410	100.0	322	100.0	230	100.0

TABLE 84

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY
BY NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT							
	0		1		2		3 or More	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	45	70.3	118	72.0	95	64.6	81	67.5
Cut/Puncture	18	28.1	38	23.1	41	27.9	35	29.2
Fractured/Broken Bone	1	1.6	8	4.9	11	7.5	2	1.7
Gunshot Wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	2	1.7
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	64	100.0	164	100.0	147	100.0	120	100.1

TABLE 85

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY
BY NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT							
	0		1		2		3	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	21	27.3	65	33.3	49	30.4	40	31.7
Torso/Body	23	29.9	55	28.2	35	21.7	34	27.0
Hands/Feet	13	16.9	28	14.4	44	27.3	30	23.8
Arms/Legs	20	26.0	47	24.1	33	20.5	22	17.5
TOTAL	77	100.1	195	100.0	161	99.9	126	100.0

TABLE 86

SUSPECT INJURY BY NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT

SUSPECT INJURED	NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT							
	0		1		2		3 or More	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	55	40.1	141	34.8	153	48.1	98	44.7
Not Injured	82	59.9	264	65.2	165	51.9	121	55.3
TOTAL	137	100.0	405	100.0	318	100.0	219	100.0

TABLE 87

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY	NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT							
	0		1		2		3 or More	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	29	50.9	76	50.7	81	49.1	44	41.1
Cut/Puncture	24	42.1	66	44.0	76	46.1	52	48.6
Fractured/Broken Bone	--	0.0	6	4.0	4	2.4	1	.9
Gunshot Wound	3	5.3	1	.7	3	1.8	9	8.4
Killed	1	1.8	1	.7	1	.6	1	.9
TOTAL	57	100.1	150	100.1	165	100.0	107	99.9

TABLE 88

LOCATION OF INJURY TO SUSPECT
BY NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT							
	0		1		2		3 or more	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	109	75.7	124	66.3	37	35.9	32	39.5
Torso/Body	19	13.2	38	20.3	36	35.0	29	35.8
Hands/Feet	7	4.9	10	5.3	13	12.6	6	7.4
Arms/Legs	9	6.3	15	8.0	17	16.5	14	17.3
TOTAL	144	100.1	187	99.9	103	100.0	81	100.0

TABLE 89

OFFICER INJURY BY NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT

OFFICER INJURED	NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT																	
	0		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	129	44.0	85	42.1	46	48.4	25	46.3	6	42.9	10	66.7	5	50.0	2	66.7	52	70.3
Not Injured	164	56.0	117	57.9	49	51.6	29	53.7	8	57.1	5	33.3	5	50.0	1	33.3	22	29.7
TOTAL	293	100.0	202	100.0	95	100.0	54	100.0	14	100.0	15	100.0	10	100.0	3	100.0	74	100.0

TABLE 90

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY
BY NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT																	
	0		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	85	62.5	60	69.0	32	65.3	19	79.2	6	60.0	10	50.0	5	83.3	1	100.0	41	75.9
Cut/Puncture	41	30.1	22	25.3	13	26.5	5	20.8	4	40.0	10	50.0	1	16.7	--	0.0	11	20.4
Fracture/ Broken Bone	8	5.9	5	5.7	4	8.2	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	2	3.7
Gunshot Wound	2	1.5	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	136	100.0	87	100.0	49	100.0	24	100.0	10	100.0	20	100.0	6	100.0	1	100.0	54	100.0

TABLE 91

LOCATION OF INJURY TO OFFICER
BY NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT																	
	0		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	46	31.5	28	28.6	15	30.6	9	31.0	2	28.6	5	62.5	1	25.0	1	33.3	18	26.5
Torso/Body	37	25.3	23	23.5	15	30.6	10	34.5	2	28.6	2	25.0	1	25.0	--	0.0	25	36.8
Hands,Fists Feet,Teeth	35	24.0	23	23.5	11	22.4	4	13.8	--	0.0	1	12.5	--	0.0	1	33.3	7	10.3
Arms/Legs	28	19.2	24	24.5	8	16.3	6	20.7	3	42.9	--	0.0	2	50.0	1	33.3	18	26.5
TOTAL	146	100.0	98	100.1	49	99.9	29	100.0	7	100.1	8	100.0	4	100.0	3	99.9	68	100.1

TABLE 92

SUSPECT INJURY BY NUMBER
OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT

SUSPECT INJURED	NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT																	
	0		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	119	41.9	91	46.2	41	43.2	28	51.9	5	35.7	10	66.7	2	22.2	2	66.7	34	47.2
Not Injured	165	58.1	106	53.8	54	56.8	26	48.1	9	64.3	5	33.3	7	77.8	1	33.3	38	52.8
TOTAL	284	100.0	197	100.0	95	100.0	54	100.0	14	100.0	15	100.0	9	100.0	3	100.0	72	100.0

TABLE 93

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY	NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT																	
	0		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	48	40.0	38	40.4	16	36.4	16	47.1	2	40.0	7	63.6	1	50.0	--	0.0	21	52.5
Cut/Puncture	63	52.5	51	54.3	24	54.5	9	26.5	3	60.0	4	36.4	1	50.0	2	100.0	16	40.0
Fracture/ Broken Bone	1	0.8	1	1.0	1	2.3	5	14.7	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	2	5.0
Gunshot Wound	6	5.0	4	4.3	2	4.5	2	5.9	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	1	2.5
Killed	2	1.7	--	0.0	1	2.3	2	5.9	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	120	100.0	94	100.0	44	100.0	34	100.1	5	100.0	11	100.0	2	100.0	2	100.0	40	100.0

TABLE 94

LOCATION OF INJURY TO SUSPECT
BY NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT																	
	0		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	91	73.4	71	55.5	31	63.3	21	51.2	2	33.3	7	53.8	1	16.7	--	0.0	18	26.5
Torso/Body	28	22.6	17	13.3	11	22.4	11	26.8	2	33.3	4	30.8	2	33.3	--	0.0	25	36.8
Hands/Fists Feet,Teeth	--	0.0	30	23.4	--	0.0	2	4.9	--	0.0	1	7.7	--	0.0	1	100.0	7	10.3
Arms/Legs	5	4.0	10	7.8	7	14.3	7	17.1	2	33.3	1	7.7	3	50.0	--	0.0	18	26.5
TOTAL	124	100.0	128	100.0	49	100.0	41	100.0	6	99.9	13	100.0	6	100.0	1	100.0	68	100.1

TABLE 95

OFFICER INJURY BY SUSPECT
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

OFFICER INJURED	SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	367	58.4	226	57.9	650	56.9
Non-Injured	261	41.6	164	42.1	491	43.1
TOTAL	628	100.0	390	100.0	1141	100.0

TABLE 96

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY
BY SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	196	71.8	112	62.2	42	75.0
Cut/puncture	66	24.2	57	31.6	13	23.2
Fracture/broken bone	11	4.0	11	6.1	1	1.8
Gunshot wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	273	100.0	180	99.9	56	100.0

TABLE 97

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY
BY SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	90	29.1	65	15.8	25	37.9
Torso/body	90	29.1	50	12.2	14	21.2
Hands/feet	61	19.7	43	10.5	15	22.7
Arms/legs	68	22.0	47	11.5	12	18.2
TOTAL	309	99.9	410	100.0	66	100.0

TABLE 98

SUSPECT INJURY BY SUSPECT
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

SUSPECT INJURED	SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	259	41.6	153	40.2	48	44.9
Non-Injured	363	58.4	228	59.8	59	55.1
TOTAL	622	100.0	381	100.0	107	100.0

TABLE 99

TYPE OF INJURY TO SUSPECT
BY SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY	SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	128	45.4	86	51.8	22	45.8
Cut/puncture	145	51.4	68	41.0	14	29.2
Fracture/broken bone	5	1.8	7	4.2	--	0.0
Gunshot wound	3	1.1	3	1.8	10	20.8
Killed	1	.4	2	1.2	2	4.2
TOTAL	282	100.1	166	100.0	48	100.0

TABLE 100

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	204	68.5	114	54.0	28	50.9
Torso/body	56	18.8	57	27.0	13	23.6
Hands/feet	16	5.4	17	8.1	4	7.3
Arms/legs	22	7.4	23	10.9	10	18.2
TOTAL	298	100.1	211	100.0	55	100.0

TABLE 101

OFFICER INJURY BY SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING

OFFICER INJURED	SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	294	40.9	104	40.0	85	57.8
Non-Injured	425	59.1	156	60.0	62	42.2
TOTAL	719	100.0	260	100.0	147	100.0

TABLE 102

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY
BY SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	219	70.4	66	60.0	65	73.0
Cut/Puncture	79	25.4	34	30.9	23	25.8
Fracture/Broken Bone	13	4.2	10	9.1	1	1.1
Gunshot Wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	311	100.0	110	100.0	89	99.9

TABLE 103

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY
BY SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	105	30.3	41	31.8	34	32.4
Torso/Body	97	28.0	35	27.1	22	21.0
Hands/Feet	72	20.8	26	20.2	22	21.0
Arms/Legs	73	21.0	27	20.9	27	25.7
TOTAL	347	100.1	129	100.0	105	100.1

TABLE 104

SUSPECT INJURY BY SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING

SUSPECT INJURED	SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	300	42.3	88	34.6	72	49.0
Not Injured	410	57.7	166	65.4	75	51.0
TOTAL	710	100.0	254	100.0	147	100.0

TABLE 105

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY	SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	157	49.0	42	44.2	37	46.2
Cut/Puncture	155	48.3	46	48.4	26	32.5
Fracture/Broken Bone	4	1.2	3	3.2	5	6.3
Gunshot Wound	4	1.2	2	2.1	10	12.5
Killed	1	.3	2	2.1	2	2.5
TOTAL	321	100.0	95	100.0	80	100.0

TABLE 106

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	235	64.6	63	53.4	48	58.5
Torso/Body	75	20.6	36	30.5	15	18.3
Hands/Feet	22	6.0	10	8.5	5	6.1
Arms/Legs	32	8.8	9	7.6	14	17.1
TOTAL	364	100.0	118	100.0	82	100.0

TABLE 107

OFFICER INJURY BY SUSPECT
UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS

OFFICER INJURED	SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	62	52.5	246	39.2	173	45.8
Non-Injured	56	47.5	381	60.8	204	54.1
TOTAL	118	100.0	627	100.0	377	99.9

TABLE 108

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY
BY SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	47	74.6	183	68.3	119	66.5
Cut/Puncture	15	23.8	74	27.6	48	26.8
Fracture/Broken Bone	1	1.6	11	4.1	12	6.7
Gunshot Wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	63	100.0	268	100.0	179	100.0

TABLE 109

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY
BY SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	21	29.2	105	34.2	55	27.5
Torso/Body	18	25.0	73	23.8	62	31.0
Hands/Feet	20	27.8	54	17.6	46	23.0
Arms/Legs	13	18.1	75	24.4	37	18.5
TOTAL	72	100.1	307	100.0	200	100.0

TABLE 110

SUSPECT INJURY BY SUSPECT
UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS

SUSPECT INJURED	SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	66	55.9	214	34.6	179	48.1
Not Injured	52	44.1	405	65.4	193	51.9
TOTAL	118	100.0	619	100.0	372	100.0

TABLE 111

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY SUSPECT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY	SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	28	42.4	133	55.9	75	39.1
Cut/Puncture	36	54.5	91	38.2	100	52.1
Fracture/Broken Bone	1	1.5	10	4.2	1	.5
Gunshot Wound	1	1.5	2	.8	13	7.0
Killed	--	0.0	2	.8	3	1.5
TOTAL	66	99.9	238	99.9	192	100.2

TABLE 112

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF DRUGS					
	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	49	66.2	171	58.6	125	63.8
Torso/Body	15	20.3	67	23.0	43	21.9
Hands/Feet	4	5.4	23	7.9	10	5.1
Arms/Legs	6	8.1	31	10.6	18	9.2
TOTAL	74	100.0	292	100.1	196	100.0

TABLE 113

OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT

OFFICER INJURED	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT													
	Auto Pat.		Foot Pat.		Traffic		Juvenile		Detective		Jail		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	388	43.4	5	41.7	29	36.7	1	100.0	24	45.3	20	48.8	23	38.3
Not Injured	505	56.6	7	58.3	50	63.3	0	0.0	29	54.7	21	51.2	37	61.7
TOTAL	893	100.0	12	100.0	79	100.0	1	100.0	53	100.0	41	100.0	60	100.0

TABLE 114

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT													
	Auto Pat.		Foot Pat.		Traffic		Juvenile		Det./Vice		Jail		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	228	64.6	3	60.0	21	72.4	1	100.0	13	56.5	11	50.0	18	72.0
Cut/Puncture	108	30.6	2	40.0	6	20.7	--	0.0	9	39.1	9	40.9	3	12.0
Fractured/Broken Bone	16	4.5	0	0.0	2	6.9	--	0.0	1	4.3	2	9.1	3	12.0
Gunshot Wound	1	.3	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	1	4.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	353	100.0	5	100.0	29	100.0	1	100.0	23	99.9	22	100.0	25	100.0

TABLE 115

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT													
	Auto Pat.		Foot Pat.		Traffic		Juvenile		Det./Vice		Jail		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	143	30.4	3	50.0	10	33.3	1	100.0	7	25.0	9	42.9	10	33.3
Torso/Body	123	26.2	1	16.7	10	33.3	--	0.0	9	32.1	4	19.0	8	26.7
Hands/Feet	95	20.2	1	16.7	7	23.3	--	0.0	8	28.6	3	14.3	6	20.0
Arms/Legs	109	23.2	1	16.7	3	10.0	--	0.0	4	14.3	5	23.8	6	20.0
TOTAL	470	100.0	6	100.1	30	99.9	1	100.0	28	100.0	21	100.0	30	100.0

TABLE 116

OFFICER INJURY
BY OFFICER UNIT ASSIGNMENT

OFFICER INJURED	UNIT ASSIGNMENT			
	One-man Unit		Two-man Unit	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	292	45.5	145	38.7
Non-Injured	350	54.5	230	61.3
TOTAL	642	100.0	375	100.0

TABLE 117

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY
BY OFFICER UNIT ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	UNIT ASSIGNMENT			
	One-man Unit		Two-man Unit	
	N	%	N	%
Bruise	228	71.7	96	65.8
Cut/puncture	80	25.2	40	27.4
Fractured/broken bone	9	2.8	10	6.8
Gunshot wound	1	.3	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	318	100.0	146	100.0

TABLE 118

LOCATION OF INJURY TO OFFICER
BY OFFICER UNIT ASSIGNMENT

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	UNIT ASSIGNMENT			
	One-man Unit		Two-man Unit	
	N	%	N	%
Head	114	31.3	50	30.9
Torso/body	95	26.1	42	25.9
Hands/feet	64	17.6	44	27.2
Arms/legs	91	25.0	26	16.0
TOTAL	364	100.0	162	100.0

TABLE 119

SUSPECT INJURY
BY OFFICER UNIT ASSIGNMENT

SUSPECT INJURY	UNIT ASSIGNMENT			
	One-man Unit		Two-man Unit	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	258	41.0	157	42.6
Non-injured	371	59.0	212	57.4
TOTAL	629	100.0	369	100.0

TABLE 120

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY OFFICER UNIT ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY	UNIT ASSIGNMENT			
	One-man Unit		Two-man Unit	
	N	%	N	%
Bruise	136	49.3	81	47.1
Cut/puncture	122	44.2	79	45.9
Fractured/broken bone	9	3.3	1	.6
Gunshot wound	7	2.5	9	5.2
Killed	2	.7	2	1.2
TOTAL	276	100.1	172	100.0

TABLE 121

LOCATION OF INJURY TO SUSPECT
BY OFFICER UNIT ASSIGNMENT

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	UNIT ASSIGNMENT			
	One-man Unit		Two-man Unit	
	N	%	N	%
Head	190	67.4	119	63.0
Torso/body	38	13.5	36	19.0
Hands/feet	22	7.8	13	6.9
Arms/legs	32	11.3	21	11.1
TOTAL	282	100.0	189	100.0

TABLE 122

OFFICER INJURY BY LOCATION OF ASSAULT INCIDENT

OFFICER INJURED	LOCATION OF INCIDENT									
	Private Residence		Hotel/Motel		Private Club		Other Commercial Premise		Recreation Facility	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	119	46.1	7	38.9	40	43.5	55	56.7	7	43.8
Non-Injured	139	53.9	11	61.1	52	56.5	42	43.3	9	56.3
TOTAL	258	100.0	18	100.0	92	100.0	97	100.0	16	100.1

OFFICER INJURED	LOCATION OF INCIDENT									
	Jail/Booking Area		Open Area		Street/ Highway		School/ College		Other Location	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured	71	44.4	21	31.3	131	35.0	9	47.4	54	70.1
Non-Injured	89	55.6	46	68.7	243	65.0	10	52.6	23	29.9
TOTAL	160	100.0	67	100.0	374	100.0	19	100.0	77	100.0

TABLE 123

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY LOCATION OF ASSAULT INCIDENT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	LOCATION OF INCIDENT									
	Private Residence		Hotel/Motel		Private Club		Other Commercial Premise		Recreation Facility	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	84	63.6	5	62.5	27	71.1	44	78.6	6	85.7
Cut/Puncture	42	31.8	2	25.0	11	28.9	11	19.6	--	0.0
Fractured/Broken Bone	6	4.5	1	12.5	--	0.0	1	1.8	1	14.3
Gunshot Wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	132	99.9	8	100.0	38	100.0	56	100.0	7	100.0

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	LOCATION OF INCIDENT									
	Jail/Booking Area		Open Area		Street/ Highway		School/ College		Other Location	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	51	66.2	16	69.6	94	71.8	5	55.6	42	71.2
Cut/Puncture	21	27.3	4	17.4	34	26.0	2	22.2	14	23.7
Fractured/Broken Bone	5	6.5	3	13.1	3	2.3	2	22.2	1	1.7
Gunshot Wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	2	3.4
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	77	100.0	23	100.1	131	100.1	9	100.0	59	100.0

TABLE 123

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY LOCATION OF ASSAULT INCIDENT

TYPE OF LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	LOCATION OF INCIDENT									
	Private Residence		Hotel/Motel		Private Club		Other Commercial Premises		Recreation Facility	
Head	64									
Torso/Body	14									
Hands/Feet	26									
Arms/Legs										
TOTAL										

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	Jail/Lockup/Prison		Open Area		Highway/Road		Public Conveyance		Other	
Head	38									
Torso/Body	28									
Hands/Feet	17									
Arms/Legs	15									
TOTAL	97									

TABLE 124

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY BY LOCATION OF ASSAULT INCIDENT

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	LOCATION OF INCIDENT									
	Private Residence		Hotel/Motel		Private Club		Other Commercial Premise		Recreation Facility	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	48	33.1	5	45.4	10	20.4	23	35.9	3	33.3
Torso/Body	31	21.4	4	36.4	16	32.6	15	23.4	5	55.6
Hands/Feet	37	25.5	2	18.2	11	22.4	12	18.8	--	0.0
Arms/Legs	29	20.0	--	0.0	12	24.5	14	21.9	1	11.1
TOTAL	145	100.0	11	100.0	49	99.9	64	100.0	9	100.0

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	LOCATION OF INCIDENT									
	Jail/Booking Area		Open Area		Street/ Highway		School/ College		Other Location	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	28	36.4	5	20.8	39	24.8	4	44.4	20	31.3
Torso/Body	19	24.7	8	33.3	42	26.8	3	33.3	20	31.3
Hands/Feet	17	22.1	7	29.2	32	20.4	1	11.1	6	9.4
Arms/Legs	13	16.9	4	16.7	44	28.0	1	11.1	18	28.1
TOTAL	77	100.1	24	100.0	157	100.0	9	99.9	64	100.1

TABLE 125

OFFICER INJURY BY SUSPECT
KNOWN PRIOR TO ASSAULT

OFFICER INJURED	OFFICER FAMILIARITY WITH SUSPECT			
	Known Previously		Not Known Previously	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	120	51.1	364	40.9
Non-injured	115	48.9	526	59.1
TOTAL	235	100.0	890	100.0

TABLE 126

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY
BY SUSPECT KNOWN PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER FAMILIARITY WITH SUSPECT			
	Known Previously		Not Known Previously	
	N	%	N	%
Bruise	79	64.8	273	69.8
Cut/puncture	36	29.5	102	26.1
Fractured/broken bones	7	5.7	16	4.1
Gunshot wound	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	122	100.0	391	100.0

TABLE 127

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY
BY SUSPECT KNOWN PRIOR TO ASSAULT

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER FAMILIARITY WITH SUSPECT			
	Known previously		Not known previously	
	N	%	N	%
Head	39	29.5	143	31.8
Torso/body	27	20.4	127	28.2
Hands/feet	40	30.3	79	17.6
Arms/legs	26	19.7	101	22.4
TOTAL	132	99.9	450	100.0

TABLE 128

SUSPECT INJURY BY SUSPECT
KNOWN PRIOR TO ASSAULT

SUSPECT INJURED	OFFICER FAMILIARITY WITH SUSPECT			
	Known Previously		Not Known Previously	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	107	45.7	353	40.3
Non-injured	127	54.3	522	59.6
TOTAL	234	100.0	875	99.9

TABLE 129

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY SUSPECT KNOWN PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY	OFFICER FAMILIARITY WITH SUSPECT			
	Known Previously		Not Known Previously	
	N	%	N	%
Bruise	70	60.9	166	43.3
Cut/puncture	42	36.5	187	48.8
Fractured/broken bones	2	1.7	10	2.6
Gunshot wound	1	1.0	15	3.9
Killed	--	0.0	5	1.3
TOTAL	115	100.1	383	99.9

TABLE 130

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY
BY SUSPECT KNOWN PRIOR TO ASSAULT

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	OFFICER FAMILIARITY WITH SUSPECT			
	Known Previously		Not Known Previously	
	N	%	N	%
Head	79	69.3	267	59.3
Torso/body	23	20.2	103	22.9
Hands/feet	3	2.6	34	7.6
Arms/legs	9	7.9	46	10.2
TOTAL	114	100.0	450	100.0

TABLE 131

OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER ACTION PRIOR TO ASSAULT

OFFICER INJURED		OFFICER ACTION											
		Transporting/ booking prisoner		Transporting suspect - mentally ill		Routine patrol		Investigating/ enforcing traffic laws		Investigating/ enforcing drug laws		Investigating/ enforcing drunkenness laws		Investigating/ enforcing liquor laws	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Injured		83	47.2	2	40.0	282	51.1	106	38.4	18	60.0	79	43.9	9	42.9
Non-Injured		93	52.8	3	60.0	270	48.9	170	61.6	12	40.0	101	56.1	12	57.1
TOTAL		176	100.0	5	100.0	552	100.0	276	100.0	30	100.0	180	100.0	21	100.0
Injured		30	43.5	42	47.7	101	46.5	77	47.5	40	56.3	5	55.6	63	55.8
Non-Injured		39	56.5	46	52.3	116	53.5	85	52.5	31	43.7	4	44.4	50	44.2
TOTAL		69	100.0	88	100.0	217	100.0	162	100.0	71	100.0	9	100.0	113	100.0

TABLE 132

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY BY OFFICER ACTION PRIOR TO ASSAULT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER ACTION															
	Transporting/booking prisoner		Transporting suspect - mentally ill		Routine patrol		Investigating/enforcing traffic laws		Investigating/enforcing drug laws		Investigating/enforcing drunkenness laws		Investigating/enforcing liquor laws	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	60	69.0	--	0.0	209	69.9	84	76.4	15	88.2	65	75.6	7	77.8
Cut/Puncture	22	25.3	2	100.0	78	26.1	22	20.0	2	11.8	20	23.3	2	22.2
Fractured/Broken Bone	5	5.7	--	0.0	12	4.0	3	2.7	--	0.0	1	1.2	--	0.0
Gunshot Wound	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	1	.9	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	87	100.0	2	100.0	299	100.0	110	100.0	17	100.0	86	100.1	9	100.0

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER ACTION													
	Investigating/enforcing offenses against property		Investigating/enforcing offenses against persons		Investigating/enforcing public disturbance		Investigating/enforcing family disturbance		Investigating/enforcing suspicious persons/circumstances		Investigating/enforcing civil disorder		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bruise	16	44.4	29	61.7	74	72.5	55	61.1	29	69.0	1	16.7	45	70.3
Cut/Puncture	16	44.4	17	36.2	24	23.5	31	34.4	12	28.6	3	50.0	13	20.3
Fractured/Broken Bone	3	8.3	1	2.1	4	3.9	4	4.4	1	2.4	2	33.3	6	9.4
Gunshot Wound	1	2.8	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	36	99.9	47	100.0	102	99.9	90	99.9	42	100.0	6	100.0	64	100.0

TABLE 133

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY
BY OFFICER ACTION PRIOR TO ASSAULT

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER ACTION													
	Transporting/booking prisoner		Transporting suspect - mentally ill		Routine patrol		Investigating/enforcing traffic laws		Investigating/enforcing drug laws		Investigating/enforcing drunkenness laws		Investigating/enforcing liquor laws	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	34	37.8	1	50.0	97	28.2	35	28.0	7	35.0	26	27.4	3	30.0
Torso/Body	22	24.4	--	--	96	27.9	37	29.6	7	35.0	30	31.6	2	20.0
Hands/Feet	17	18.9	1	50.0	73	21.2	23	18.4	3	15.0	16	16.8	1	10.0
Arms/Legs	17	18.9	--	--	78	22.7	30	24.0	3	15.0	23	24.2	4	40.0
TOTAL	90	100.0	2	100.0	344	100.0	125	100.0	20	100.0	95	100.0	10	100.0

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	OFFICER ACTION												
	Investigating/enforcing offenses against property		Investigating/enforcing offenses against persons		Investigating/enforcing public disturbance		Investigating/enforcing family disturbance		Investigating/enforcing suspicious persons/circumstances		Investigating/enforcing civil disorder		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head	9	25.0	21	38.9	46	37.7	27	29.7	13	27.1	4	80.0	24	30.4
Torso/Body	6	16.7	11	20.4	26	21.3	22	24.2	9	18.8	--	--	22	27.8
Hands/Feet	5	41.7	11	20.4	20	16.4	21	23.1	9	18.8	1	20.0	15	19.0
Arms/Legs	6	16.7	11	20.4	30	24.6	21	23.1	17	35.4	--	--	18	22.8
TOTAL	36	100.1	54	100.1	122	100.0	91	100.1	48	100.1	5	100.0	79	100.0

TABLE 134

OFFICER INJURY
BY HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT

OFFICER INJURED	HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT			
	Handcuffed		Not handcuffed	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	57	48.7	415	42.1
Non-injured	60	51.3	570	57.9
TOTAL	117	100.0	985	100.0

TABLE 135

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY
BY HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT

TYPE OF OFFICER INJURY	HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT			
	Handcuffed		Not Handcuffed	
	N	%	N	%
Bruise	46	79.3	295	66.9
Cut/puncture	10	17.2	123	27.9
Fractured/broken bones	2	3.4	22	5.0
Gunshot wound	--	0.0	1	.2
Killed	--	0.0	--	0.0
TOTAL	58	99.9	441	100.0

TABLE 136

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY
BY HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT

LOCATION OF OFFICER INJURY	HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT			
	Handcuffed		Not Handcuffed	
	N	%	N	%
Head	15	24.2	162	32.1
Torso	13	21.0	135	26.8
Hands/feet	11	17.7	107	21.2
Arms/legs	23	37.1	100	19.8
TOTAL	62	100.0	504	99.9

TABLE 137

SUSPECT INJURY
BY HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT

SUSPECT INJURED	HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT			
	Handcuffed		Not Handcuffed	
	N	%	N	%
Injured	51	43.6	401	41.4
Non-injured	66	56.4	567	58.6
TOTAL	117	100.0	968	100.0

TABLE 138

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT

TYPE OF SUSPECT INJURY	HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT			
	Handcuffed		Not Handcuffed	
	N	%	N	%
Bruise	33	62.3	195	44.9
Cut/puncture	16	30.2	210	48.4
Fractured/broken bones	2	3.8	10	2.3
Gunshot wound	2	3.8	14	3.2
Killed	--	0.0	5	1.2
TOTAL	53	100.1	434	100.0

TABLE 139

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY
BY HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT

LOCATION OF SUSPECT INJURY	HANDCUFFING OF SUSPECT			
	Handcuffed		Not Handcuffed	
	N	%	N	%
Head	40	66.7	297	60.1
Torso/body	13	21.7	112	22.7
Hands/feet	3	5.0	34	6.9
Arms/legs	4	6.7	51	10.3
TOTAL	60	100.1	494	100.0

FOOTNOTES

[1]In addition to municipal police agencies, three state agencies and fourteen county agencies participated in this phase of the analysis.

[2]The five cities which returned the greatest number of Physical Contact Summary forms were Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Albuquerque, Austin and Santa Fe.

[3]In most cases the total N is greater than or less than 1143 due to multiple reporting of cases or due to missing data. Those instances where the total N deviates greatly from 1143 are noted with an asterisk.

[4]See Daniel C. Kieselhorst, "A Theoretical Perspective of Violence Against Police," in Perspectives on Police Assaults in the South Central United States, Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, June, 1974.

[5]See Charles D. Hale and Wesley R. Wilson, "Personal Characteristics of Assaulted and Non-Assaulted Officers," Perspectives on Police Assaults in the South Central United States, Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, June, 1974.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Interview with police administrators attending Police Assaults Study Conference, February, 1974, Norman, Oklahoma.

[8]The correlation coefficients between age, tenure and rank are as follows:

	Age	Tenure	Rank
Age	1.00		
Tenure	.72	1.00	
Rank	.45	.53	1.00

Correlation coefficients between the above variables and the assignment variable are not shown since the assignment variable is comprised of a nominal level of measurement.

[9]Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1972, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 8, 1973, pp. 126-127.

[10]In the fourteen south central cities officers between the ages of 25 and 29 comprise 34.2 percent of all sworn personnel.

[11]The correlation coefficient between tenure and rank is .53.

[12]The analysis of the height distribution of assailants would have been enhanced if comparisons were made between offender heights and the height distribution of males in the United States. However, the only available national figures on height are HEW statistics for 1960. The average male height in 1960 was 5'8". Since the World Almanac reports that the average height for 18 year old males in 1970 was 70.2 inches, the 1960 figures appear to be inadequate for comparison with the assailant population. See Public Health Service, "Vital and Health Statistics," Series 11, No. 14, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972; and The World Almanac and Book of Facts, New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1973.

[13]The other category is comprised of suspects identified as Arab as well as those with mixed parentage.

[14]The 15 percent minority figure is inclusive of Mexican-Americans. The non-white figure exclusive of Mexican-Americans is approximately 12 percent.

[15]Comparisons are not strictly comparable since arrest data is nationally based while assailant data is regional.

[16]Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, New York: W.W. Norton, 1963, p. 264.

[17]The mean age of assaulted officers is 27.9 years.

[18]Again, data are not strictly comparable since arrest figures by age are nationally based while the assault data was collected from the south central United States.

[19]Erikson does not outline an absolute age breakdown for the "young adult." However, from his description of the kinds of issues and problems confronted by the young adult, e.g., finding an occupational niche as well as uncertainties in terms of choosing one's life style, it can be concluded that persons between the ages of 18 and 29 would appropriately fall within Erikson's classification.

[20]Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City, Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, pp. 45-66.

[21]Robert M. Press, "Blaming Crime on Drug Addiction Draws Fire," The Christian Science Monitor, November 16, 1973.

[22]For a discussion of complacency as it relates to law enforcement, see Clarence M. Kelley, "Message from the Director," The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 43 (February 1, 1974), p. 1.

[23]The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 92.

[24]Ibid., p. 117. For a further discussion of the one-man, two-man motor patrol controversy see Samuel G. Chapman, Police Patrol Readings, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1970, pp. 171-177.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1972, op. cit., p. 1.

[27]Ibid., p. 61.

[28]The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 227.

[29]For a discussion of arrests for misdemeanors as it relates to resisting arrest, see Albert J. Reiss, The Police and the Public, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 57.

[30]Samuel G. Chapman, C. Kenneth Meyer, Charles D. Hale, Cheryl G. Swanson and Patton N. Morrison, Operations Research Manual, Appendix I, "Physical Contact Summary," Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, June, 1974.

[31]Of the cases surveyed, in 10.7 percent of the incidents, the assailant was handcuffed before the assault took place, while in 89.2 percent of the cases the assailant was not handcuffed.

[32]This incident was described in an interview with a police assailant in Albuquerque, New Mexico. For the complete analysis of offender interviews, see Denise L. Heller, Samuel G. Chapman, Daniel C. Kieselhorst and C. Kenneth Meyer, "An Analysis of Police Assaults in Albuquerque," Perspectives on Police Assaults in the South Central United States, Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, June, 1974.

[33]Although the category of assault by a non-suspect does not constitute an action on the part of the officer, it was reported by a number of officers as their last action prior to assault and is therefore included in this portion of the analysis.

[34]Heller, et. al., op. cit.

[35]The 5.3 percent figure is higher than the figure for shooting or shooting at an officer because it includes threatening an officer with a weapon in addition to the act of actually firing the weapon.

CONTINUED

5 OF 6

PROFILE OF THE ASSAULT INCIDENT: MUNICIPALITIES WITH POPULATIONS OF OVER AND UNDER 100,000 RESIDENTS

Since the preceding in-depth analysis of variables surrounding the assault incident is inclusive of cities ranging in population from 344 to 360,000 persons, police assaults were analyzed within population groups of cities: 1) over 100,000; and 2) under 100,000 to determine whether similar relationships were operating when controlling for population size.

The data for cities over 100,000 and cities under 100,000 population closely parallel the findings for all 37 cities.[1] In addition, there are no appreciable differences in assault characteristics on the basis of population size. The few differences which do exist between smaller and larger municipalities warrant some description.

Looking first at officer characteristics in cities below 100,000 population, about three times as many shorter officers (21.2 percent compared to 6.8 percent) were assaulted than was the case for officers employed in larger cities. A probable explanation is that police departments in smaller cities may have less stringent height requirements than their more populous counterparts, increasing the probability that shorter officers will be more proportionately represented in the assault population.

There are also some disparities between the larger and smaller cities in terms of the rank of assaulted officers. Police departments in smaller cities had approximately seven times as many incidents (4.8 percent compared to .7 percent) where officers with the rank of lieutenant or higher were victims of assaults. The greater proportion of higher ranking police personnel who are assaulted in smaller municipalities is almost certainly a product of their role within these communities. In smaller cities higher ranking officials are more likely to engage in the kinds of activities, e.g. patrol duties and field observation, where assaults on officers are most likely to occur.

A final difference between the two groups in terms of officer characteristics emerges for officer training. On the whole, assaulted officers in cities below 100,000 population are less likely to have received instruction in the selected training areas than was the case for officers assaulted in the more populous municipalities. The findings, however, do not necessarily suggest a relationship between training and proneness to assault. The data are probably more descriptive of the fact that police officers in smaller cities are less likely to receive as much training as their peers in larger communities.

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER HEIGHT FOR CITIES OVER AND UNDER 100,000 POPULATION

	Cities over 100,000 Population		Cities under 100,000 Population	
Height (Inches)	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
64	1	.1	0	.0
65	1	.1	1	.3
66	0	.0	5	1.6
67	5	.6	10	3.3
68	50	6.0	49	16.0
69	71	8.6	30	9.8
70	179	21.6	37	12.1
71	190	22.9	53	17.3
72	125	15.1	52	16.9
73	118	14.2	31	10.1
74	43	5.2	19	6.2
75	25	3.0	12	3.9
76	17	2.0	6	2.0
77	0	0.0	1	.3
78	1	.1	0	.0
79	0	0.0	1	.3
80	4	.5	0	0.0
Total	830	100.0	307	100.1*

*Percent totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Turning to assailant characteristics, for the most part there are few differences between the over and under 100,000 groups. However, one of the differences is that women were far less represented in the assailant population for smaller cities than for larger communities (6.8 percent as compared to 13.6 percent). In terms of suspect race, 35.7 percent of the assailants were non-white in the smaller municipalities compared to the 43.6 percent figure for more populous cities. The somewhat higher percentage of non-white assailants in cities over 100,000 population is not surprising since minority group members usually represent a greater proportion of the resident population in larger cities.

The distribution of assailants by employment status is similar for both city size categories. However, the combined percentages of unemployed and blue collar offenders is even higher for cities

TABLE 2

ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER RANK FOR CITIES OVER AND UNDER 100,000 POPULATION

	Cities over 100,000 Population		Cities under 100,000 Population	
Rank	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Patrolman	744	89.3	261	85.3
Detective	42	5.0	10	3.3
Sergeant	41	4.9	20	6.5
Lieutenant	2	.2	9	2.9
Captain or Higher	4	.5	6	1.9
Total	833	99.9*	306	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

under 100,000 population than for the larger municipalities (86.0 percent compared to 70.9 percent).

The characteristics surrounding the assault environment do not vary substantially between the cities over and under 100,000 population. The only major disparity in the findings for the two population groups is officer familiarity with the offender. The officer had made a prior acquaintance with his assailant in 34.0 percent of the cases among smaller cities, while the figure for the more populous municipalities is 16.4 percent. The 18 percent difference is not surprising, since the very nature of smaller communities is more conducive to personal associations between the police and the public.

Again, differences between the two population groups are not striking in terms of assault dynamics. However, in smaller cities assailants were more likely to be charged with Part I Offenses (11.8 percent) than in cities over 100,000 (6.2 percent). This difference probably results from the fact that offenders in smaller communities are more frequently charged with aggravated assault -- (75.0 percent) -- a Part I Offense[2] -- than was the case for more populous cities (46.3 percent). These findings suggest that: 1) assaults in smaller communities tend to be of a more serious nature; or 2) police officers in smaller communities perceive assaults as a more serious offense than their counterparts in larger cities. Since injuries sustained by officers do not deviate substantially between the two population groups, the latter explanation is more easily supported by the data.

Finally some differences between cities over and under 100,000

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER TRAINING FOR CITIES OVER AND UNDER 100,000 POPULATION

Type of Training	Cities Over 100,000 Population		Cities Under 100,000 Population	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Basic Recruit				
None	7	.8	18	6.0
Within last 6 months	41	4.9	51	17.1
Within last 12 months	151	18.1	60	20.1
Longer than 1 year	634	76.1	169	56.7
Total	833	99.9*	298	99.9*
Arrest Procedures				
None	4	.5	101	34.2
Within last 6 months	113	13.6	39	13.2
Within last 12 months	170	20.5	68	23.1
Longer than 1 year	544	65.5	87	29.5
Total	831	100.1*	295	100.0
Prisoner Handling				
None	4	.5	114	38.8
Within last 6 months	73	8.8	34	11.6
Within last 12 months	168	20.2	60	20.4
Longer than 1 year	586	70.5	86	29.3
Total	831	100.0	294	100.1*
Police Community Relations				
None	6	.7	112	38.2
Within last 6 months	121	14.6	32	10.9
Within last 12 months	172	20.7	78	26.6
Longer than 1 year	532	64.0	71	24.2
Total	831	100.0	293	99.9*
Defense Tactics				
None	7	.8	104	35.5
Within last 6 months	63	7.6	43	14.7
Within last 12 months	151	18.2	71	24.2
Longer than 1 year	610	73.4	75	25.6
Total	831	100.0	293	100.0

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY ASSAILANT OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Occupation -- General Categories	Cities Over 100,000 Population		Cities Under 100,000 Population	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
White Collar	73	12.8	25	10.0
Blue Collar	228	40.0	107	43.0
Student	37	6.5	5	2.0
Retired	4	.7	1	.4
Housewife	17	3.0	1	.4
Juvenile	35	6.1	3	1.2
Unemployed	176	30.9	107	43.0
Total	570	100.0	249	100.0

population emerge for assaults in relationship to the time sequence of the arrest event as well as the officer's action immediately prior to the assault. Looking first at assault incidents by time sequence of the arrest event, the data indicate that proportionately more assaults occurred prior to arrest in small cities than was the case for cities over 100,000. Conversely, more assaults took place following the arrest in large cities than in smaller municipalities.

TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY TIME SEQUENCE OF THE ARREST EVENT FOR CITIES OVER AND UNDER 100,000 POPULATION

Time Sequence	Cities Over 100,000 Population		Cities Under 100,000 Population	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Prior to Arrest	336	40.4	63	21.2
During Arrest	260	31.3	74	24.9
Following Arrest	229	27.6	157	52.9
Unknown	6	.7	3	1.0
Total	831	100.0	297	100.0

Turning to the last thing the officer said or did before the assault, officers were more likely to be assaulted in cities over 100,000 population following the giving of an order or command and after formally placing the suspect under arrest than was the case in cities with under 100,000 residents.

While a number of additional disparities can be found between the two population groups, a major difference emerges for assaults which occur during the transporting, booking or jailing of the offender. Officers in smaller cities are apparently victimized much more frequently than their peers in larger municipalities after the suspect has been placed in custody. In light of these findings, emphasis on training practices relating to the transporting and processing of arrested persons seems of particular importance for those police officers working in smaller communities.

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT ACTIVITY BY OFFICER ACTION IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ASSAULT

	Cities Over 100,000 Population		Cities Under 100,000 Population	
Officer Action	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Giving Order or Command	86	10.3	3	1.0
Handcuffing (applying, loosening, removing)	78	9.4	10	3.4
Applying Pressure or Force to Suspect	78	9.4	30	10.1
Intervening as a Third Party to a Conflict	90	10.8	13	4.4
Assault by a Non-Suspect	44	5.3	3	1.0
Assault for no Apparent Reason	33	4.0	25	8.4
Transporting Suspect, Processing an Arrest or Booking, Jailing, Guarding Suspect	89	10.7	143	48.1
Talking to or Questioning Suspect	36	4.3	2	.7
Placing Suspect Under Arrest	125	15.0	6	2.0
Attempting to Overtake Suspect	35	4.2	4	1.3
Searching/Detaining Suspect	65	7.8	44	14.8
Traffic Stop	21	2.5	0	0.0
Miscellaneous, Other, Unknown	51	6.1	14	4.7
Total	831	99.8*	297	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF THE ASSAULT INCIDENT; STATE POLICE AND HIGHWAY PATROLS

Introduction

In addition to collecting assault data for municipal agencies, the Physical Contact Summary form was distributed to assaulted officers in three state law enforcement agencies within the south central region. Information on 141 assaults for the year 1973 was collected from the Oklahoma State Highway Patrol, the New Mexico State Police and the Louisiana State Police.[1] Information is tabularly displayed for the four assault dimensions which include officer characteristics, assailant characteristics, the assault environment and the dynamics of the assault event.

Since the data for state agencies closely parallels the findings for municipal police departments, the statistics for state agencies are discussed in less detail than was the case for the municipal assault incidents. The findings are for the most part reported in terms of comparisons between the two agency types. Prior to discussion of the research findings, however, a delineation between the two agency types will facilitate a better understanding of how the differing functions of municipal and state agencies may impact on the assault situation.

Role of the State Police and Highway Patrol

The role of state police and highway patrol agencies differs sharply from municipal forces. State forces were originally formed in the early 1900's to deal with the problems of automotive traffic safety and auto theft. While a few state agencies are still restricted to a mission of enforcing traffic laws and protecting life and property on the highways, most have been granted general statewide policing authority in criminal matters.[2]

Even though legislatures have broadened the legal jurisdiction of their state patrols to extend beyond the enforcement of traffic laws, traffic enforcement continues to be the principle function performed by highway patrol or state police departments. The summary provided in Table 1 confirms this fact.[3]

Some agencies that originally had only traffic law enforcement functions have increased their personnel numerically to meet increased traffic volume and regulation activities. In addition, state agencies have assumed broadened regulatory functions under a general public safety department. Such a department typically handles all general police activities such as criminal identification, communications, training, and other miscellaneous activities.

Therefore, the highway patrol, as traditionally structured, is generally a division of the state public safety department which

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATION
ACTIVITY OF TOTAL PERSONNEL

Type of Agency	Traffic Functions	Other Traffic Related Activities	Traffic Subtotal	Other Activities	Total Percentage
State Police	47.4	26.7	74.1	25.9	100.0
Highway Patrol	51.0	46.2	97.2	2.8	100.0

concentrates on traffic supervision, safety education, driver examinations, vehicle inspection and in certain departments, vehicle size and weight enforcement activities. In addition, the state highway patrol may assist other general purpose police jurisdictions in criminal investigations when requested to do so.

I. Officer Characteristics

Table 2 shows the distribution of assault incidents by officer height. Only 5 percent of the assaulted officers working in state law enforcement agencies were 5'8" or below compared to the 10.7 percent figure for municipal police departments. The fewer number of assaulted officers who fall within the shorter category is probably a reflection of more stringent height requirements found among state law enforcement agencies.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY OFFICER HEIGHT

Height	Number	Percent
68	7	5.0
69	17	12.1
70	28	20.0
71	23	16.4
72	30	21.4
73	16	11.4
74	12	8.6
75	2	1.4
76	3	2.1
77	0	0.0
78	2	1.4
Total	140	99.8*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Of those officers assaulted, 69.2 percent fall into the 70-73 inch height range. Although data are not available on the height distribution of all officers within the three state forces, it is not unlikely that a large percentage of the officers fall within this range. The data on state agencies compare favorably with municipal departments where 69.1 percent of the assaulted officers were between the heights of 70 and 73 inches.

When the build of assaulted officers is considered, the majority (64.3 percent) fall into the self-classified category of medium build. These statistics are comparable with the municipal data where 60.4 percent of the victimized officers were of medium physical build.

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY OFFICER BUILD

Officer Build	Number	Percent
Slender	17	12.1
Medium	90	64.3
Heavy	33	23.6
Total	140	100.0

There were no assaults reported for female police officers among state agencies. The 100 percent figure for male assault victims parallels the findings at the municipal level where 99.6 percent of the assaulted officers were male.

The race of assaulted officers was collapsed into white and non-white categories. White officers represent 90.1 percent of the assaulted policemen with non-whites accounting for the remaining 9.9 percent. For municipal departments the white officers

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY RACE OF OFFICER

Race	Number	Percent
White	127	90.1
Non-white	14	9.9
Total	141	100.0

accounted for 92 percent of the assault victims while non-whites comprise the other 8 percent. As is the case at the municipal level, data are not available on the distribution of non-whites among the state agencies examined.

Data on the rank of assaulted state law enforcement personnel is similar to that for city agencies in that most of the assault victims were among the ranks of those who are subject to the greatest amount of exposure and risk. Among the three state agencies, 92.9 percent of the assaulted officers fall within the "patrolman, deputy trooper" category, while 7.1 of the victims were sergeants or field supervisors.

Consideration of officer age reveals that the mean age for assaulted members of state agencies is 31.2, which is slightly higher than the average for municipal departments.

TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY OFFICER AGE

Age	Number	Percent
23	3	2.3
24	2	1.5
25	13	9.9
26	14	10.7
27	17	13.0
28	8	6.1
29	12	9.2
30	5	3.8
31	3	2.3
32	4	3.1
33	15	11.5
34	2	1.5
35	5	3.8
36	12	9.2
37	3	2.3
38	1	.8
39	2	1.5
40	2	1.5
41	2	1.5
42	1	.8
43	0	0.0
44	1	.8
45	0	0.0
46	1	.8
47	0	0.0
52	1	.8
65	2	1.5
Total	131	100.2*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Applying FBI age categories, the age distribution of assaulted personnel is found to be very similar between municipal and state types of agencies. For both groups of assaulted officers, the 25-29 year range accounts for the greatest frequency of assault incidents.

The distribution of assault incidents by tenure does not differ substantially between municipal and state agencies, although one disparity does emerge. Overall, assaulted state police officers have less tenure than their municipal counterparts. For example, 63.8 percent of the assaulted officers from state agencies had five years or less in tenure while the statistics at the municipal level are 79.3 percent.

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
FOR OFFICER AGE BY FBI AGE CATEGORIES

Age	Number	Percent
23	3	2.3
24	2	1.5
25-29	64	48.9
30-34	29	22.1
35-39	23	17.6
40-44	6	4.6
45-49	1	.8
50-54	1	.8
55-59	0	0.0
60-64	0	0.0
65 and over	2	1.5
Total	131	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY LENGTH OF SERVICE IN YEARS

Length of Service	Number	Percent
5 years or less:	88	63.8
0 - .5 years	3	3.4
.6 - 1.0 years	12	13.6
1.1 - 1.5 years	6	6.8
1.6 - 2.0 years	14	15.9
2.1 - 2.5 years	4	4.5
2.6 - 3.0 years	16	18.2
3.1 - 3.5 years	3	3.4
3.6 - 4.0 years	13	14.8
4.1 - 4.5 years	5	5.7
4.6 - 5.0 years	12	13.6
Sub-total	88	99.9*
6 - 10 years	33	23.9
11 - 15 years	13	9.4
16 - 20 years	4	2.9
21 - 25 years	0	0.0
26 - 30 years	0	0.0
Total	138	100.0

TABLE 8

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY OFFICER TRAINING

Type of Training	Number	Percent
Basic Recruit		
No basic training	5	3.5
Last 6 months	12	8.5
Last 12 months	18	12.8
Longer than 12 months	106	75.2
Total	141	100.0
Arrest Procedure		
No arrest procedure training	11	7.8
Last 6 months	29	20.6
Last 12 months	17	12.1
Longer than 12 months	84	59.6
Total	141	100.1*
Prisoner Handling		
No prisoner handling training	13	9.2
Last 6 months	22	15.6
Last 12 months	21	14.9
Longer than 12 months	85	60.3
Total	141	100.0
Police-Community Relations		
No police community relations training	14	9.9
Last 6 months	29	20.6
Last 12 months	16	11.3
Longer than 12 months	82	58.2
Total	141	100.0
Defensive Tactics		
No defensive tactics training	14	9.9
Last 6 months	26	18.4
Last 12 months	21	14.9
Longer than 12 months	80	56.7
Total	141	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Finally, no striking dissimilarities between the state and municipal statistics on officer training were found. For both groups most of the assaulted officers had experienced some training in the selected areas, and in most cases the assaulted officers had received no training within one year prior to the assault. Officer training characteristics are displayed in Table 8.

II. Assailant Characteristics

In this section, many of the physical characteristics which were examined for the assaulted officer are similarly reviewed for the assailant. Some additional information including alcohol/drug involvement and employment status is also outlined.

The analysis of suspect height parallels closely with that for suspects who assaulted municipal officers. For state agencies, 42.4 percent of the offenders (male and female) were classified as 5'8" or below, while the figure for city departments is 41.3 percent.

TABLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAILANT INCIDENTS
BY SUSPECT HEIGHT

Suspect Height in Inches	Number	Percent
59	1	.7
60	2	1.4
61	0	0.0
62	0	0.0
63	4	2.9
64	5	3.6
65	11	7.9
66	12	8.6
67	13	9.4
68	11	7.9
69	16	11.5
70	16	11.5
71	15	10.8
72	18	12.9
73	6	4.3
74	5	3.6
75	2	1.4
76	2	1.4
Total	139	99.8*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

The comparison of suspect build for the two types of agencies reveal similar distributions -- the majority of suspects were classified as having medium builds. However, among the state agencies, more officers categorized their assailant as slender (39.3 percent) than was the case for municipal departments (25.2 percent).

TABLE 10

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SUSPECT BUILD

Suspect Build	Number	Percent
Slender	55	39.3
Medium	63	45.0
Heavy	22	15.7
Total	140	100.0

The sex ratio of state law enforcement assailants is almost identical to that of municipal officer assailants. The statistics between agency types are also remarkably similar for race of the offender. At the state level, 41.7 percent of the suspects were non-white, while the non-white figure for municipal agencies is 41.6 percent.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SEX OF SUSPECT

Sex of Suspect	Number	Percent
Male	125	88.7
Female	16	11.3
Total	141	100.0

Data on the age distribution of offenders is presented in Tables 13 and 14. Only .8 percent of the assailants are under 18 years of age in contrast to 4.8 percent of the suspects at the municipal level. While the young adult is well represented in the assailant population, the percent distribution is somewhat lower for state agencies than for city departments (53.8 percent and 63.7 percent respectively). Thus, officers from state agencies are more likely to be assaulted by individuals who are slightly older than those

TABLE 12

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY RACE OF SUSPECT

Race of Suspect	Number	Percent
White	81	58.3
Non-white	58	41.7
Total	139	100.0

who victimize municipal police personnel. The disparities in age between the two groups may be a reflection of differences in types of contacts made by the state and municipal officers.

Assailant characteristics can be further examined by looking at such factors as employment status. As is the case with municipal agencies, unemployed and blue collar workers predominate, but at the state level the percent distribution is much higher than for the municipal group. As noted earlier, among city departments the blue collar and unemployed comprise 68.8 percent of the total. For the state agencies this particular social class accounts for 87.1 percent of the assaults; conversely, white collar workers are less representative of the assailant population for state agencies, comprising 10.3 percent of the total. The comparable figure for municipal agencies is 17.9 percent.

The involvement of suspects with alcohol and non-alcoholic drugs was evident to a greater extent for offenders of state officers than was the case for municipal police officer assailants. For municipal agencies 55.9 percent of the assailants reportedly were under the influence of alcohol, as compared with 74.3 percent of state police assailants.

The incidence of non-alcoholic drug involvement is again somewhat higher for state than municipal law enforcement departments. The figure for assailant drug involvement for the state police is 16.3 percent in contrast to 10.5 percent at the municipal level. This difference is perhaps attributable to the types of citizen contacts made by state law enforcement personnel, particularly the contact with suspects who demonstrate some alcohol involvement.

III. Assault Environment

A major aspect of the assault environment is the time frame within which the assault occurred. Table 19 shows the distribution of assault events by time of day and Table 20 outlines assault events by shift. Comparing the state and municipal agency assaults, the data indicate that more assaults occur in daylight hours for the former group. For municipal departments, the break-

TABLE 13

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY SUSPECT AGE

Age	Number	Percent
17	1	.8
18	7	5.4
19	3	2.3
20	9	6.9
21	7	5.4
22	6	4.6
23	10	7.7
24	5	3.8
25	4	3.1
26	8	6.2
27	4	3.1
28	4	3.1
29	3	2.3
30	3	2.3
31	5	3.8
32	5	3.8
33	1	.8
34	6	4.6
35	6	4.6
36	3	2.3
37	2	1.5
38	1	.8
39	2	1.5
40	3	2.3
41	2	1.5
42	4	3.1
43	2	1.5
44	0	0.0
45	2	1.5
48	2	1.5
51	3	2.3
53	1	.8
54	1	.8
56	1	.8
59	2	1.5
64	1	.8
71	1	.8
Total	130	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
FOR ASSAILANT AGE BY FBI AGE CATEGORIES

Suspect Age in Years	Number	Percent
17	1	.8
18	7	5.4
19	3	2.3
20	9	6.9
21	7	5.4
22	6	4.6
23	10	7.7
24	5	3.8
25-29	23	17.7
30-34	20	15.4
35-39	14	10.8
40-44	11	8.5
45-49	4	3.1
50-54	5	3.8
55-59	3	2.3
60-64	1	.8
65-69	0	0.0
70-74	1	.8
Total	130	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 15

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY
OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Occupation/General Categories	Number	Percent
White Collar	12	10.3
Blue Collar	52	44.4
Student	2	1.7
Retired	0	0.0
Housewife	1	1.0
Juvenile	0	0.0
Unemployed	50	42.7
Total	117	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY
SUSPECT UNDER INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL

Suspect Under Influence of Alcohol	Number	Percent
Yes	104	74.3
No	21	15.0
Don't Know	15	10.7
Total	140	100.0

TABLE 17

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY
SUSPECT BEEN DRINKING

Suspect Been Drinking	Number	Percent
Yes	113	80.1
No	16	11.3
Don't Know	12	8.5
Total	141	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 18

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY
DRUG INVOLVEMENT

Suspect Under Influence of Drugs	Number	Percent
Yes	23	16.3
No	73	51.8
Don't Know	45	31.9
Total	141	100.0

down for the day, afternoon, and graveyard shifts are 13.8 percent, 47.0 percent, and 39.2 percent respectively. On the other hand, the distribution of assault events by shift for state agencies is 21.6 percent, 52.5 percent, and 25.4 percent.

TABLE 19

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY TIME OF DAY IN WHICH THEY OCCURRED

Time of Day	Number	Percent
1:00 a.m.	15	10.8
2:00 a.m.	12	8.6
3:00 a.m.	2	1.4
4:00 a.m.	3	2.2
5:00 a.m.	0	0.0
6:00 a.m.	1	.7
7:00 a.m.	0	0.0
8:00 a.m.	3	2.2
9:00 a.m.	0	0.0
10:00 a.m.	2	1.4
11:00 a.m.	4	2.9
12:00 p.m.	7	5.0
1:00 p.m.	5	3.6
2:00 p.m.	3	2.2
3:00 p.m.	6	4.3
4:00 p.m.	3	2.2
5:00 p.m.	3	2.2
6:00 p.m.	6	4.3
7:00 p.m.	10	7.2
8:00 p.m.	16	11.5
9:00 p.m.	8	5.8
10:00 p.m.	9	6.5
11:00 p.m.	12	8.6
12:00 a.m.	9	6.5
Total	139	100.1

*Percentage total does not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 20

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SHIFT

Shift	Time	Number	Percent
Day	8 am - 4 pm	30	21.6
Afternoon	4 pm - 12 pm	73	52.5
Graveyard	12 pm - 8 am	36	25.9
Four Watch	8 pm - 4 am	70	50.4

The distribution of assault events by the day of the week on which they occur also differs somewhat for the two agency types. While for municipal departments assaults are fairly evenly distributed throughout the week with the exception of Saturdays, for the state group, almost one-third of the incidents (27.1 percent) occur on Sundays. Apparently the nature of state police work brings law enforcement officers into more contact with the public on Sundays. For example, highway patrolmen no doubt increase their number of contacts on Sundays when weekend traffic flow is heavy. Almost 70 percent of the assaults took place on a weekend when Friday, Saturday, and Sunday are grouped together.

TABLE 21

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT EVENTS
BY DAY OF WEEK ON WHICH THEY OCCURRED

Day of Week	Number	Percent
Sunday	38	27.1
Monday	11	7.9
Tuesday	12	8.6
Wednesday	7	5.0
Thursday	14	10.0
Friday	27	19.3
Saturday	31	22.1
Total	140	100.0

A final aspect of the analyses of assault events and the time frame within which they occur is assault frequency by month of the year. The figures for state and municipal agencies do not differ radically from each other, although there is one disparity on a month-to-month basis. This involves November where at the state level it accounts for .7 percent of the assaults. At the local level, 7.8 percent of assaults occurred during that month.

Another element of the assault environment is the location in which the assault event took place. Due principally to the differing nature of police work requirements, assaults occur much more frequently (51.6 percent) on a street or highway among the state agencies than among municipal agencies (31.7 percent). The next highest frequency of incidents is in the jail and booking area (12.7 percent) which is essentially similar to the figures for municipal agencies (13.6 percent).

When the assignment of the officer is considered as an integral aspect of the assault environment, the data indicate that almost all assault victims were assigned to auto or traffic patrol. This

TABLE 22

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY MONTH OF ASSAULT

Month	Number	Percent
January	12	8.6
February	9	6.4
March	17	12.1
April	9	6.4
May	17	12.1
June	15	10.7
July	17	12.1
August	13	9.3
September	9	6.4
October	11	7.9
November	1	.7
December	10	7.1
Total	140	99.8*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 23

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY LOCATION OF THE ASSAULT EVENT

Location	Number	Percent
Private Residence	13	8.3
Hotel-motel	1	.6
Private Club	1	.6
Other Commercial Premises	13	8.3
Recreation Facility	5	3.2
Jail or Booking Area	20	12.7
Open Area	7	4.5
Street or Highway	81	51.6
School or College Ground	4	2.6
Other	12	7.6
Total	157	100.0

is hardly surprising when the mission of state forces is acknowledged.

In terms of unit assignment, a greater percentage of assault victims were assigned to one-man units (73 percent) in state agencies than in municipal departments (63.1 percent). However, as in the case of the municipal group, state law enforcement personnel

are usually not alone when they are assaulted.

TABLE 25

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS PRESENT

Number of Other Officers Present	Number	Percent
None	34	26.4
One	46	35.7
Two	23	17.8
Three	14	10.9
Four	2	1.6
Five	1	.8
Six	3	2.3
Seven	5	3.9
Eight or More	1	.8
Total	129	100.2*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Witness and suspect involvement are also important aspects of the assault environment. Data on the presence of civilian witnesses parallels that for municipalities. For state agencies, civilians witnessed the assault event in 64 percent of the cases and for city departments the figure for civilian witnesses is 61.4 percent.

TABLE 26

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY NUMBER OF CIVILIAN WITNESSES PRESENT

Number of Civilian Witnesses Present	Number	Percent
None	36	36.0
One	16	16.0
Two	9	9.0
Three	9	9.0
Four	3	3.0
Five	4	4.0
Six	5	5.0
Seven	4	4.0
Eight or More	14	14.0
Total	100	100.0

As was the case with municipal police officers, when state law enforcement personnel are assaulted and civilian witnesses are moved to intervene, they are far more likely to aid the officer than the offender. However, in most cases, witnesses remain passive or uninvolved, as in municipal assault incidents.

TABLE 27

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY WITNESS INVOLVEMENT

Witness Involvement	Number	Percent
Present -- Not Involved	49	57.0
Agitated Suspect	5	5.8
Assisted Suspect	9	10.5
Assisted Officer	22	25.6
Agitated Officer	0	0.0
Agitated and Assisted Suspect	0	0.0
Present -- Not Involved/ Assisted Officer	1	1.2
Total	86	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

While in most cases more than one state officer was present during the assault, usually only one suspect was involved in the incident. The record for multiple assaults is somewhat better for state law enforcement personnel than for local police officials. Among municipal departments other officers were assaulted in 45.1 percent of the cases, while the figure for the state group is only 34.3 percent.

TABLE 28

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY NUMBER OF SUSPECTS INVOLVED

Number of Suspects Involved	Number	Percent
One	118	85.5
Two	17	12.3
Three	3	2.2
Four	0	0.0
Five	0	0.0
Total	138	100.0

TABLE 29

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS
BY MULTIPLE ASSAULT CASES

Other Officer Assaulted	Number	Percent
Yes	48	34.3
No	92	65.7
Total	140	100.0

A final variable considered in the assault environment is whether the assaulted officer was acquainted with his assailant before the incident. State law enforcement officials were slightly more likely to know their attackers than municipal agents. State police officers were familiar with the offender in 27.7 percent of the cases while the statistic for local police is 21.0 percent.

TABLE 30

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT EVENTS BY
OFFICER PRIOR ACQUAINTANCE WITH SUSPECT

Suspect Known to Officer Prior to Assault	Number	Percent
Yes	39	27.7
No	102	72.3
Total	141	100.0

IV. Dynamics of the Assault Event

A final dimension discussed in the analysis of state agency assaults is the dynamics of the assault incident. Of initial concern is the comparison between municipal and state agencies in terms of the officer's action prior to the assault.

With a few exceptions, the officer's actions before they were assaulted are similar between agency types. For example, owing to the nature of state police work, one would expect a greater number of cases where officers were investigating or enforcing traffic laws than would be the case among municipal police personnel. Moreover, the lower number of state police assaults following the investigating or enforcing of public disturbances

is not surprising. The percent distribution for assaults following the transporting and booking of prisoners is similar for both groups. In 11.0 percent of the cases state police were performing this function prior to the assault while the figure for municipal officers is 9.3 percent.

TABLE 31

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY OFFICER ACTION PRIOR TO ASSAULT

Officer Action	Number	Percent
Transporting or booking suspect	33	11.0
Transporting suspected mentally ill person	0	0.0
Routine patrol duties	92	30.7
Investigating and Enforcing		
Traffic laws	73	24.3
Drug laws	3	1.0
Drunkenness laws	52	17.3
Liquor laws	5	1.7
Offense against property	2	.7
Offense against person	9	3.0
Public disturbance	11	3.7
Family disturbance	3	1.0
Suspicious person or circumstances	2	.7
Civil disorder	1	.3
Other	14	4.7
Total	300	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Turning to the suspect's action before the assault took place the only major difference between the two agency types is again the frequency of traffic violations. For municipal agencies the officers reported that suspects were involved in traffic violations in 13.6 percent of the cases. On the other hand, state police personnel reported that offenders committed traffic violations in almost one-third of the incidents.

Looking at the specific charges filed against assailants of state officers, the data indicate a remarkable similarity between the two agency types for the breakdown of Part I and Part II Offenses/ Traffic Violations. Charges for Part I offenses accounted for

TABLE 32

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SUSPECT ACTION PRIOR TO ASSAULT

Suspect Action	Number	Percent
Traffic violation	57	31.8
Committing crime	4	2.2
Suspicious behavior	9	5.0
Interfering with officer	23	12.8
Being transported	12	6.7
Attempting escape	12	6.7
In custody	27	15.1
Appeared mentally ill	10	5.6
Other	25	14.0
Total	179	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

8.8 percent of the total state agency assaults and 8.9 percent of the total municipal assaults. Similarly, the percent distribution for Part II Offenses/Traffic Violations among state and municipal agencies is 91.2 percent and 91.1 percent respectively. Thus, for both groups, assailants are likely to be committing less serious crimes before they assault police personnel. A more detailed breakdown for the charges filed against the offender is presented in Tables 33 through 36.

TABLE 33

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SUSPECT FOR PART I AND PART II OFFENSES TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS

Charges Filed	Number	Percent
Part I Offenses	28	8.8
Part II Offenses/Traffic Violations	289	91.2
Total	317	100.0

TABLE 34

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY
CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SUSPECT FOR PART I OFFENSES
(FBI INDEX CRIMES)

Charges Filed -- Part I Offenses	Number	Percent
Criminal homocide	2	7.1
Forcible rape	0	0.0
Robbery	3	10.7
Aggravated assault	23	82.1
Burglary	0	0.0
Larceny		
Under $50.00	0	0.0
Over $50.00	0	0.0
Motor vehicle theft	0	0.0
Total	28	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

As was the case for municipal agencies, a large percentage of the charges filed against the suspect were for assault. To obtain a more accurate description of the specific crimes offenders allegedly committed, Part II Offenses and Traffic Violations are tabularly displayed excluding assault charges. Comparing agency types, the percent distribution of charges is similar for both with only a few minor exceptions. Charges for driving under the influence represent a greater percentage of the total assaults for state agencies than for the municipal group. On the other hand, charges for disorderly conduct comprise a greater percentage of the total for city police.

Another component of the dynamics of the assault incident is the time sequence when the assault occurred during the arrest process. The percent distribution for assaults occurring prior to arrest is similar for the two agency types. Assaults which occurred during the arrest are slightly higher for state agencies (32.8 percent) than for municipal ones (28.8 percent). Assaults which took place after the arrest comprise 25.2 percent of the total at the state level and 28.8 percent at the municipal level.

In considering the possible triggering mechanisms to the assault incident, the analysis is focused on the officer and suspect's action immediately prior to the assault. In terms of officer activity, state policemen are more likely than their municipal counterparts to be giving an order or command before the assault took place. In addition, state officers were more likely than municipal personnel to be placing the offender under arrest

TABLE 35

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SUSPECT FOR PART II OFFENSES AND TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS

Charges Filed -- Part II Offenses and Traffic Violations	Number	Percent
Other Assaults	136	47.1
Arson	1	.3
Forgery and Counterfeiting	0	0.0
Fraud	0	0.0
Embezzlement	0	0.0
Stolen Property, Buying, Receiving, Possessing	1	.3
Vandalism	2	.7
Weapons, Carrying, Possessing, etc.	2	.7
Prostitution and Commercialized Vice	0	0.0
Sex Offenses	0	0.0
Narcotic Drug Laws	3	1.0
Gambling	0	0.0
Offenses Against Family and Children	0	0.0
Driving Under the Influence	52	18.0
Liquor Laws	8	2.8
Drunkenness	39	13.4
Disorderly Conduct	6	2.1
Vagrancy	0	0.0
Suspicion	0	0.0
Curfew and Loitering Laws (Juveniles)	0	0.0
Runaways (Juvenile)	0	0.0
All Other Offenses	5	1.7
Traffic Violations	34	11.8
Total	289	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 36

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SUSPECT FOR PART II OFFENSES AND TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS EXCLUDING CHARGES FOR ASSAULT

Charges Filed -- Part II Offenses and Traffic Violations	Number	Percent
Arson	1	.7
Forgery and Counterfeiting	0	0.0
Fraud	0	0.0
Embezzlement	0	0.0
Stolen Property, Buying, Receiving, Possessing	1	.7
Vandalism	2	1.3
Weapons, Carrying, Possessing, etc.	2	1.3
Prostitution and Commercialized Vice	0	0.0
Sex Offenses	0	0.0
Narcotic Drug Laws	3	2.0
Gambling	0	0.0
Offenses Against Family and Children	0	0.0
Driving Under the Influence	52	34.0
Liquor Laws	8	5.2
Drunkenness	39	25.5
Disorderly Conduct	6	3.9
Vagrancy	0	0.0
All Other Offenses	5	3.3
Suspicion	0	0.0
Curfew and Loitering Laws (Juvenile)	0	0.0
Runaways (Juvenile)	0	0.0
Traffic Violations	34	22.2
Total	153	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 37

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY TIME SEQUENCE OF ARREST EVENT

Time Sequence	Number	Percent
Prior to Arrest	54	39.4
During Arrest	45	32.8
Following Arrest	35	25.5
Unknown	3	2.2
Total	137	99.9*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

before the assault, and less likely to be applying pressure or force to the assailant.

For reasons not clearly identifiable, state patrolmen were more likely than municipal officers to be attacked by a handcuffed suspect. Among municipalities, law enforcement officers were assaulted by handcuffed individuals in 10.7 percent of the cases while the statistics for state police personnel are 21.2 percent.

TABLE 38

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT ACTIVITY BY OFFICER ACTIVITY PRIOR TO ASSAULT

Last Action	Number	Percent
Giving Order or Command	37	27.0
Handcuffing (applying, loosening, removing)	13	9.5
Applying Pressure or Force to Suspect	2	1.5
Intervening as a Third Party to a Conflict	2	1.5
Assault by a Non-Suspect	5	3.6
Assault for No Apparent Reason	4	2.9
Transporting Suspect, Processing an Arrest or Booking, Jailing, Guarding Suspect	14	10.2
Talking to or Questioning Suspect	7	5.1
Placing Suspect Under Arrest	32	23.4
Attempting to Overtake Suspect	6	4.4
Search, Disarming Suspect	2	1.5
Traffic Stop	6	4.4
Miscellaneous, Unknown, Other	7	5.1
Total	137	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Turning to suspect activity immediately prior to the assault, the data indicate that the assailant was most likely engaged in directing verbal abuse against the officer prior to the assault occurrence. For state departments the verbal abuse category accounted for 47.4 percent of the total while the figure at the city level was lower at 30.5 percent. The percent distribution for the remaining categories of suspect activity are similar between agency types, although suspects were less likely to have resisted arrest or ignored an officer's command among state agencies than municipal departments.

TABLE 39

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY
LAST THING SUSPECT SAID OR DID PRIOR TO THE ASSAULT

Activity	Number	Percent
Verbal: cursing, swearing, arguing with officer, verbal threat, challenge	64	47.4
Fleeing from Officer Custody	11	8.1
Attack Without Warning, Attack for No Apparent Reason	37	27.4
Resisting Officer/Ignoring Officer's Command	10	7.4
Threatening Officer with Firearm, Knife, Weapon	2	1.5
Involved in Fight with Third Party	0	0.0
Firing on Officer, Attempting to Seize Officer's Firearm	7	5.2
Other	4	3.0
Total	135	100.0

The weapons utilized by suspect and officer are also considered in the analysis of assault dynamics. State police assailants were somewhat less likely than municipal assailants to assault their victims with hands, fists, teeth or feet. Otherwise, the weapons used by assailants compared favorably between agencies. Policemen were threatened with firearms in 9.4 percent of the state cases and in 5.3 percent of the municipal incidents.

Similar to municipal police, state officers were most likely to use their hands or feet to repel their assailant. State police personnel found it nominally more necessary to use their firearms (8.9 percent) than were city law enforcement agents (5.4 percent) which is perhaps linked to the fact that state troopers

were threatened with firearms somewhat more often than their municipal counterparts.

TABLE 40

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY TYPE OF WEAPON UTILIZED BY SUSPECT

Suspect's Weapon	Number	Percent
Officer's Stick or Sap	0	0.0
Hands, Fists, Teeth, Feet, etc.	118	78.7
Rock, Brick or Bottle	2	1.3
Clubbing Instrument	3	2.0
Cutting or Stabbing Instrument	4	2.7
Motor Vehicle	2	1.3
Spray Can Contents	0	0.0
Other	21	14.0
Total	150	100.0

TABLE 41

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY FIREARM USE AND TYPE

Firearm Use and Type	Number	Percent
Non-Firearm Used	125	90.6
Handgun	9	6.5
Shotgun	0	0.0
Automatic Weapon	0	0.0
Explosive Device	0	0.0
Incendiary Device	0	0.0
Rifle	4	2.9
Imitation Weapon	0	0.0
Total	138	100.0

A final aspect of assault dynamics is the injuries sustained by both officer and suspect during the encounter. In contrast to the municipal group where no officers were killed, there was one fatality for state agencies. Otherwise, the percent distribution of injuries between the two agency types are quite similar.

In terms of the part of the body where the officer sustained an injury, Table 44 indicates that 40.3 percent of the state police

TABLE 42

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY TYPE OF WEAPON UTILIZED

Weapon	Number	Percent
Officer's Stick or Sap	7	5.2
Hands or Feet	100	74.1
Firearm	12	8.9
Other	16	11.9
Total	135	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 43

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY TYPE OF INJURY SUSTAINED BY OFFICER

Injuries Sustained	Number	Percent
None	84	56.4
Bruise	46	30.9
Cut or Puncture	14	9.4
Fractured or Broken Bone	2	1.3
Gunshot Wound	0	0.0
Killed	1	.7
Other	2	1.3
Total	149	100.0

TABLE 44

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY PART OF BODY SUSTAINING THE INJURY - OFFICER

Location of Injury	Number	Percent
Head	27	40.3
Torso/Body	15	22.4
Hands or Feet	9	13.4
Arms or Legs	16	23.9
Total	67	100.0

received head injuries while the figure for municipal law enforcement agents is 31.3 percent. State officers were less likely to have suffered injuries to the torso, hands and feet than their municipal counterparts.

Turning to suspect injuries one finds that suspects were more likely to be injured in an encounter with state police (41.6 percent non-injured) than with municipal officers (56.3 percent non-injured). The percent distribution for bruises, gunshot wounds and fatalities is also higher at the state level. Among other possibilities, this seems to indicate a different kind of conflict in cases where state officers are involved.

TABLE 45

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY SUSPECT INJURY

Injury	Number	Percent
None	62	41.6
Bruise	57	38.3
Cut or Puncture	21	14.1
Fractured or Broken Bone	0	0.0
Gunshot Wound	4	2.7
Killed	4	2.7
Other	1	.7
Total	149	100.1*

*Percentage totals do not equal 100.0% due to rounding.

Finally, comparison between the two agency types for the part of the anatomy injured during the confrontation indicates no major disparities between groups. As was the case for municipal assaults, offenders were most likely to receive head injuries following physical violence with a state policeman.

Summary

A comparison between municipal and state agencies suggests that the similarities between the two types of organizations in terms of assault behavior are much more apparent than the differences. In those instances where there are disparities in the assault characteristics between the two types of law enforcement agencies, these differences can usually be attributed to the differing roles of the respective agencies.

TABLE 46

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS BY
PART OF BODY SUSTAINING THE INJURY -- SUSPECT

Location of Injury	Number	Percent
Head	57	57.6
Torso	20	20.2
Hands or Feet	9	9.1
Arms or Legs	13	13.1
Total	99	100.0

FOOTNOTES

[1]For the three state agencies the number of assaults reported for each agency are as follows: Oklahoma Highway Patrol, 89; Louisiana State Police, 20; New Mexico State Police, 32.

[2]The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, pp. 6 and 8.

[3]Thomas W. Cooper and Edward A. Gladstone, State Highway Patrols: Their Functions and Financing, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Office of Planning, 1966, pp. 20-21 and Table 4. For a detailed description of the genesis and early development and role of state police and highway patrol forces, see Bruce Smith, The State Police: Organization and Administration, New York: The National Institute of Public Administration, 1925, pp. 36-80.

END