COMMUNITY CRIME CONTROL: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

Center for Policy Research

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Chapter I

STUDY RATIONALE AND DESIGN

This report presents the findings of an exploratory study of voluntary crime control programs. Its purpose was to specify some of the major sociological factors affecting the stability --that is, staying power--and responsibility or legality and legitimacy of such programs. The rationale for, design of, and sites used in the research will be discussed in this chapter.

Rationale

It is our belief that heightened and acute public concern about crime in the cities is very likely to lead to the proliferation of voluntary crime control programs during the next several years. Indeed, many such programs have already come into being.[1] Moreover, constructive voluntary efforts in the area of crime control are increasingly being encouraged by political leaders, and urban police departments are themselves encouraging such actions as a partial substitute for the shortage of police.

Given these conditions, a study specifying the factors which make for effective voluntary crime control programs could have important implications for public policy-making. Such a study could, hopefully, provide the basis for enlightened planning and

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[1] One estimate for New York City, for example, cites 20,000 members in a variety of organizations whose purpose is to reduce and deter crime. The Police and the Public: Partners Against Crime, Office of the Mayor and Office of Administration Report, City of New York, Feb. 1972.

guidance of the programs' growth and development and, thus, enhance their usefulness.

This policy-oriented focus led us to concentrate on two factors which seem particularly problematic and significant for voluntary crime control programs, their responsibility and their stability.

Responsibility

Voluntary crime control programs can be characterized according to the extent to which they are responsible or irresponsible. Responsible programs engage in legal activities, conceive of themselves as supplemental rather than in opposition to the police, and act in accord with the society's basic civil-libertarian values. Irresponsible programs, on the other hand, employ illegal means of crime control, infringe upon the sphere of activity that legally belongs only to the police, and are vigilante-like in their attitudes and actions, thus violating major social values. Given the intimate relationship between violence and crime, it is not surprising that some voluntary crime control organizations "take the law into their own hands."

The only previous research specifically in this area deals directly with the question of voluntary crime control programs' responsibility;[2] indeed, Marx and Archer view this factor as the most important characteristic of such programs. The research

[2]Gary T. Marx and Dane Archer, "Citizen Involvement in the Law Enforcement Process," American Behavioral Scientist (Oct.-Nov. 1971), pp. 52-72; also reported in Psychology Today (Jan. 1973), pp. 45-50.

reported here builds upon the classificatory schema developed by Marx and Archer in that we attempt to specify some of the aspects and characteristics of voluntary crime control programs that account for different degrees of responsibility.

We see two theoretically independent components of programs' responsibility. On one level are the members' or participants' vigilante proclivities, both behavioral and attitudinal. On another level are the attributes of the program as an organization which affect its degree of responsibility: goals, activities, rules, leadership and supervisory structure, relationships with public agencies, rewards and incentives for membership.

These two components must be kept separate conceptually and can vary independently. Thus, for example, the members of a particular program may be incipient vigilantes--for example, own guns, express vigilante attitudes--but be effectively constrained by the organization's rules so that the program remains responsible. This situation may be presented schematically as follows:

	PROGRAM	
MEMBERS	Engenders responsibility	Does not engender responsibility
Irresponsibly inclined		
Responsibly inclined		

Both components will be assessed here.

Stability

Voluntary crime control programs have considerable difficulty maintaining themselves and their members. They tend to come into existence and disappear with rapidity. Moreover, a program's predictability or reliability of operation is similarly problematic. Many programs become virtually defunct within a few weeks or months of their institution; even though they still exist "on-paper," they do not continue to engage in the crime control activities for which they were formed. We refer to this characteristic as stability.

Marx's and Archer's survey of 28 voluntary crime control organizations confirms their instability. "When the crisis subsides, these groups subside..."[3] Given this general trend toward instability, however, programs do vary in their relative stability, and this study attempts to specify some of the factors which account for relatively more stable programs. Hopefully, such specification will enable policy-makers to maximize the stability potential of voluntary crime control programs.

As with responsibility, the degree of stability of a particular program is the result of the meshing of characteristics of the membership with features of the program. Every organization, and voluntary crime control programs are no exception, devotes a certain portion of its resources to organization-maintenance activities, and the relative effectiveness of various strategies

[3] Ibid., p. 50.

will be assessed.[4]

As we shall see, each of the four organizations studied here draws its members from a fairly narrow socio-economic sector; that is, each membership is relatively homogeneous socio-economically. Voluntary crime control organizations exist, however, for all class and status categories, from the poor to the rich, and this research covers such variation.[5] We will, therefore, assess the consequences of member-attributes for the stability of the various programs.

Our discussion of stability will stress features of the programs more than attributes of the memberships, however. Given the policy-directed orientation of the research, we chose to concentrate on factors which are relatively malleable or subject to planned alteration, and organizational features are clearly more subject to change than, say, the status attributes or basic values of the members. We ask: given the constraining characteristics of the members--e.g., class background, special interests, attitudes toward participation--what are the optimal organizational arrangements for the encouragement of stable programs?

[4] Excessive concern with organization-maintenance can deflect resources from meeting the program's crime control goals, and the relationship between these two kinds of activities will be a focus of attention in this report.

[5] In this respect, voluntary crime control programs differ from most other voluntary associations, whose memberships tend to be largely, even exclusively, middle-to-upper-middle class. See, for example, F. Dotson, "Patterns of Voluntary Associations Among Urban Working Class Families," American Sociological Review 16 (1951), pp. 687-943.

The Sites

The research reported here is to be viewed as exploratory:[6] we hope to provide the basic categories and isolate the particular factors upon which to base a future, validating study. We, therefore, chose to study four voluntary crime control programs intensively, in depth, so that key issues, problems, processes and factors could be isolated. Further research must definitively confirm or deny the hypotheses suggested here. The four programs, operating within a large city in the eastern United States, will pseudonymically be referred to as Childguard, the Low Income Towers tenant patrols, Safeblock, and the Beachview civilian radio motor patrol.

Childguard

Parents of children who attend private schools in a fashionable, densely populated section of the city had become concerned about "mini-muggings" of children on their way to and from school. In an attempt to deal with this problem, the Parents Association developed a program of street patrols during the morning and afternoon hours in which children travelled. This program, Childguard, works very closely with the police and the schools and as of June 1973 boasted over 300 participants, almost exclusively upper-middle class parents. It is the largest of the programs studied here.

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[6] For a discussion of exploratory research, see Claire Selltiz et al., Research Methods in Social Relations, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, pp. 51-65.

Low Income Towers tenant patrols

Crime in public housing projects is such a dominant focus for the lives of the residents that many of them are virtually unwilling to leave their apartments. In response to this situation, the city's housing authority sponsors patrols for tenants of the various projects. We studied these patrols at one public housing project, Low Income Towers. The patrols sit in the building lobbies, monitoring entrances and exits and attempting to control access to the elevators, a major location for crimes. The patrol members in particular, and the project residents in general, are low-income Blacks and Puerto Ricans.

Safeblock

A few well-cared-for blocks of attractive private homes form a clearly defined and visible enclave within an area of the city characterized by the influx of Black residents, the turning of one-family homes into multiple occupant dwellings, and the retreat of most of the former residents to the suburbs. The enclave is the home of a group of upper-middle class people, primarily doctors and professors affiliated with a major university nearby. The enclave is a cohesive social unit, with considerable interaction among its residents.

Several years ago, a rash of robberies and assaults, culminating in several murders, aroused the residents to the point of forming Safeblock, a program whose major activity involved sitting in pairs in selected houses on Friday evenings watching the streets and reporting suspicious occurrences to the police.

Safeblock operated, somewhat sporadically, for more than four years and formally voted itself out of existence in the spring of 1973.

Beachview civilian radio motor patrol

The city's police department sponsors a network of citizen activities through the Community Councils of the various precincts. The radio motor patrol (CRMP) is one of the Council activities at the Beachview precinct. Its participants, working-class whites from primarily Jewish and Italian backgrounds, cruise the community's streets in cars and report untoward events back to the station house via short-wave radios. Unlike the other programs, the Beachview civilian radio motor patrol can be characterized as irresponsible, engaging in vigilante-like and illegal activities. Similarly, the attitudes of its members are irresponsible.

These four programs meet the following criteria:

1) The memberships present a wide range of class and ethnic background. Childguard members are primarily upper class and upper-middle class white Protestants. At the other end of the class structure are the Low Income Towers residents, poor by definition (there is an income limit for residents of public housing projects), often receiving public assistance, and belonging to minority groups. Safeblock members are middle to upper-middle class whites of various ethnic backgrounds. The members of the civilian radio motor patrol in Beachview are Jewish and Italian working-class people.

2) The four programs also differ according to the common attribute or base from which their members are drawn. Childguard's members share a common status--parent of a child who attends private school. The Low Income Towers tenant patrols are building-based programs. Safeblock draws its members from the residents of one small neighborhood. The radio motor patrol members come from a large area of the city.

3) Finally, the relationship of voluntary crime control programs to the police (and, for the Low Income Towers tenant patrols, to the housing authority as well) seemed particularly important for their stability and responsibility, and we chose programs with varying relationships. The Beachview radio motor patrol and the tenant patrols at Low Income Towers are virtually completely controlled and sponsored by outside authorities. Childguard, while formally independent, has established very close working relations with the police and is itself part of a larger organization, the Parents' Association. Safeblock, on the other hand, is completely independent and autonomous.[7]

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[7] These three criteria--class, other membership bases, and relationship to the police--were chosen because of their sociological significance; that is, we expected them to affect the programs' degrees of stability and responsibility. It should be noted, however, that it is our impression, gained through discussions with police and other officials and through following this issue in the mass media, that the four organizations studied here are not unrepresentative of the major type of voluntary crime control program currently in operation.

The following table schematically "plots" the four programs along the continua of our two major variables, stability and responsibility.

Stability	* Childguard	
	* Safeblock	
		Beachview civilian radio motor patrol *
Instability	* Low Income Towers Tenant Patrols	
	Responsibility	Irresponsibility

Each program will be the subject of one of the following chapters. First, though, a discussion of the methodology of the research is needed.

Chapter II

METHODOLOGY

This exploratory research consists primarily of case studies of the four voluntary crime control programs briefly described in the previous chapter. This chapter will discuss the methods of data collection used in the study, the sampling procedures employed, and particular methodological problems encountered.

Data Collection

This study was of one-year's duration and run on a small budget. Time and money considerations were, therefore, highly relevant in our choices of the kinds of data to collect. These data fall into two categories, the organizations and the memberships, and each of these will be be discussed in turn.

1. Organizational Data Collection

Organizational data include such factors as a program's history, goals, rules, activities, structure, problems, relations with other organizations, rewards and incentives for membership, leadership roles and patterns. That is, the characteristics of the program as a unit were assessed.

We obtained these data in the following ways:

a. Long conversations with the leaders and the more articulate members, as informants, were the first source of information. Beginning with the leadership also served the function of establishing good rapport and ensuring their cooperation in

the research. It should be noted that with one exception (as we shall see, Officer Roy, the community relations officer at the Beachview precinct, mounted some opposition to the research), the leaders of the various programs were extremely helpful to us. Access was not problematic.

b. The programs' files and whatever mass media coverage had been obtained were analyzed.

c. Representatives of the outside authorities with whom the programs dealt--e.g., the police--were interviewed.

d. We attended whatever meetings or training sessions were held during the approximately six-month period we were "in the field."

e. We went along on patrols and watches; that is, we participated in the various activities of the programs.

2. Collection of Data on Member Characteristics

We administered a lengthy, semi-structured interview[1] to the members of the four organizations. The same kinds of information were requested of each program's participants so that they could be compared; at the same time, the interviews for each organization differed sufficiently so that the particular character of the organization could be depicted. The Low Income Towers tenant patrol members, for example, were asked a series of questions about the management of the project; the radio motor patrol members were questioned in detail about their attitudes toward the police. We began to interview the members as

[1] See appendix for basic interview schedule.

respondents only after the organizational data had been collected so that our interviews could be informed about issues, problems, and areas of special concern.

The data collected about the members fell into two categories:

a) Information about participation in the organization. The following areas were covered here: reasons for joining and continued membership; attitudes toward goals, activities, and leadership; activities engaged in; perception of problems and difficulties; perception of effectiveness; perception of changes over time.

b) Information about relevant member attributes. Here we asked about: length of time in and ties to the community; attitudes toward and experience with crime and its control; attitudes toward violence and law and order; background data such as socio-economic status, ethnicity, political predispositions, family composition, religion, and education.

These data were coded, and frequencies and a few cross-tabulations obtained. They will be presented below not for their statistical significance (given the small numbers involved and the questionable sampling procedures used, they are next to useless in this sense) but because of the trends they indicate. Further research must determine their empirical validity. The interviews were also used to provide insight into the quality of participation in voluntary crime control programs, as well as to provide a sense of the impact of various aspects of the crime situation on the lives of urban dwellers.

We also did selected interviews with two other categories of people. First, we spoke with some former members of each organization: people who had belonged at one time but no longer participated. The former members, it was hoped, would provide information about problems and difficulties within the organization that the members either were unaware of or chose not to communicate. Moreover, we wanted some sense of the characteristics of people who continue to belong to these organizations as opposed to those who join and then drop out, a particularly important issue given our concern with the question of stability. Therefore, we administered Part II of our basic instrument, those questions dealing with background characteristics and attitudes, to the former members and an abbreviated form of Part I, the section on the organization itself. We also asked the former members a series of questions designed to get at their reasons for leaving the organization.

Second, we did a few interviews with potential members of each organization: people who shared the relevant membership characteristics with the organization members but were not nor had ever been members. Here, we were interested in such questions about the organization as: how had they heard of it? what did they know about it? why had they not joined? would they be interested in joining such an organization? As with the former members, we were also concerned with specifying the characteristics of members as opposed to non-members. We, therefore, administered Part II of our questionnaire to potential members as well.

These data will be used suggestively in the substantive

chapters on the four organizations. We had neither the time nor the staff to do more than a few of each kind of interview for three of the organizations. In Low-Income Towers, as will be discussed below, the distinction between former and present members is ambiguous, given the ebb and flow of the tenant patrols. Samples of both former and potential members ought to be systematically built into any future research in this area.

Sample Selection

It had been our initial intention to interview fifty members of each organization. We wanted as complete coverage of the memberships as the study's resources would permit, and fifty member interviews from each program would provide an adequate picture of the various memberships. This number would also allow for some simple statistical treatment of the data, as well as providing enough data so that the various memberships could be compared.

This aim was only partly realized, however, and the interview situation for each program will be discussed here.

Safeblock

Safeblock had thirty-five members at the time of our study, and we were able to interview each member. We, therefore, have data on the entire organization.

Childguard

Childguard had over 200 members by the time of our study. We selected at random 50 names from the membership list and were

able to interview 48 of these. Thus, we accomplished our aim here.

Low Income Towers tenant patrols

This situation is considerably more complex and requires some explanation. Initially, it was our expectation to study the project-wide tenant patrol organization. We found, however, that patrol members considered themselves participants only in their own building patrols and were largely unaware of activities outside of their own buildings, and that the experience and problems of the patrols varied significantly from building to building. We, therefore, chose to divide the resources for our study at Low Income Towers as follows: we would focus on whatever project-wide organization and activities existed, and on three particular building patrols seen largely as units in themselves. These three were selected from among six which were in operation during or had been in operation just prior to the time of our investigation, July '72 to February '73.

In choosing these three buildings, we sought both to represent something of the variety of experiences among patrols at Low Income Towers and to select the buildings which would contribute most to our understanding of the problems of stability.

Initially, we hoped to interview all of the currently active members of each of these patrols and some former members and potential members in each building. The patrols were not large, and such a strategy seemed feasible here. Unfortunately, however, we were never able to obtain complete membership lists.

No official lists were maintained, and the informal lists of names and apartment numbers provided by the building captains were far from accurate. In addition, a few people were unwilling to be interviewed, and others were never found at home.[2] In the end we supplemented the lists provided by the building captains with persons identified by the members whom we had already interviewed and with a bit of random knocking on doors, but our interviews cannot be said to represent either the total membership or a random sample of the tenant patrol membership in any of the three buildings or in the project as a whole.

The absence of official membership lists and inaccuracies in the lists provided by the building captains reflected a lack of clarity about membership which also complicated our efforts to differentiate between current and former members. This was a particular problem in two of the buildings where patrol operations dropped off sharply or ceased altogether during our study. Among persons no longer actively participating, those who did not expect to participate in the patrol in the future were interviewed as former members with a questionnaire which concentrates on reasons for leaving the patrol, while those who indicated an intention to resume participation if the patrol began operations again were interviewed as "members."

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[2] It is possibly a tribute to the general popularity of the patrol--and probably an indication of the extent to which crime is a high-priority issue for the tenants of Low Income Towers--that most of those with whom we sought interviews were willing to talk with us at considerable length. Contrary to the popular stereotype of urban poor people as "overinterviewed," hostile, and impatient, we found most patrol members and non-members alike both cooperative and hospitable.

In all, 66 persons were interviewed as respondents in Low Income Towers. Of these, 39 were members of the tenant patrols (actively participating or intending to participate again), 12 were former members, and 15 were non-members.

Beachview Radio Motor Patrol

While we had been out on patrol and had held many conversations with radio motor patrol members, we were unable to interview them.

The most important and compelling reason is that we were simply refused permission. After several weeks of discussions and meetings with both police and Community Council leaders, we were told that we would not be allowed to interview the patrol members. Many of the Council leaders felt "hurt" that we would ignore all of the other Council programs and concentrate only on the CRMP; they said that it would not be fair to the others to "single out" the patrol. Officer Roy led the opposition at the meeting. While "the decision" was, he stressed, not up to him but rather up to the Council, he "knew" that "these people" would not approve. Our request was "a slap in the face" to the Council, after we had been treated so courteously.

While this was never said openly, it was also highly likely that Officer Roy was somewhat uneasy about the kind of information we might obtain from CRMP members. As will become clear, our conversations with members and going out on patrol had uncovered some irresponsible activity. Moreover, our comings and goings in the station house were carefully monitored, and all of the relevant

policemen knew to whom we were speaking and what we had been doing. The extent to which this unease underlay the refusal is not known, but it is our judgment that it was very important to Officer Roy.

Even had we permission to do the interviews, the 30-or-so members of the CRMP had dwindled to a handful by the late fall. Many had returned to school and college. Another large group, in general the most active and involved members, had become Auxiliary Policement. The Auxiliary Police (AP) unit in Beachview is another citizen crime control program within the precinct. Unlike the Council programs, there is not even an on-paper independence of the unit from the police; the APs are entirely police-controlled. They are given a 12-week training course by the police, wear police uniforms (although are not authorized to carry weapons), and work under direct police supervision.

The training sergeant who supervised the APs did give us permission to administer our questionnaire to his men, and we decided to do so. By this point, we knew we would never be able to get CRMP interviews. Moreover, we knew that many CRMPs wished to become APs, and some had already done so. In fact, the problem of CRMP members becoming APs was viewed as so serious by the Council that it was decided that CRMPs must wait six months before applying for AP membership. Thus, though the following discussion is of the CRMP, our information on members is based on an analysis of the questionnaires of the 29 APs. These were administered to all of the APs as a group, with a researcher reading each question and explaining it, waiting for everyone to answer that question,

and then moving on to the next one. Each person received $10 for filling out the questionnaire. This method of questionnaire administration seemed to maximize both the efficiency of self-administered instruments and the completeness of interviews in that a researcher took the group through the questionnaire question-by-question. We, therefore, found fewer unanswered or incorrectly answered questions than self administration, particularly with a working-class population, usually provides. The individual interview method used for the members of the other organizations was not practicable for the APs, and this approach seemed to be the next best thing.

A second problem with the collection of the radio motor patrol data is the fact that we have little information on the extent to which irresponsible behavior occurs. That is, while we ourselves observed such behavior on the part of about a half dozen patrollers, and while we heard stories which implicate an equal number, we cannot definitively state that 90 per cent or 65 per cent or 50 per cent of the CRMP members are vigilantes.

This problem is clearly related to the difficulty in securing CRMP interviews. Had we been able to obtain such interviews, we might at least have been able to make a close estimate of the pervasiveness of irresponsible behavior.

Other reasons for this lack of information are also important, however. We did not expect to find vigilantes within the Beachview station house when we began our study. Although we suspected that some of the CRMP members might express vigilante

or irresponsible attitudes as individuals,[3] we expected that the police control of the program would make it relatively responsible as an organization. That is, we thought that the members would be constrained by the program and, thus, would act responsibly within its confines. Indeed, the chapter on Beachview will attempt to explain this paradox of an irresponsible program within a police-controlled setting.

As we began to find irresponsible activity, a series of ethical and practical problems presented themselves. Ethically, we were concerned about the issue of confidentiality. Having promised our respondents that their remarks would be treated as confidential, an investigation of the CRMP--as the result, let us say, of a complaint from a citizen its members had unlawfully harrassed or because the police department's internal investigatory unit was becoming suspicious--would leave us in the position of having to testify or face contempt-of-court charges.

Practically, veiled threats to members of the research staff --"if you ever repeat any of this, we'll come to get you"--were making us somewhat uneasy. Our movements within the station house were carefully monitored, and we became, frankly, a bit frightened of possible recriminations were an investigation to occur.

These problems encouraged us not to try to ferret out either

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[3] Political sociologists have long been demonstrating that working-class citizens are more likely than other groups to express vigilante-like attitudes. See, for example, S. M. Lipset, "Working-Class Authoritarianism," in his Political Man, New York: Anchor Books, 1963, p. 115 passim.

the precise amount of irresponsible behavior which occurred or all of the specific incidents. Moreover, sociologically, we had the information we needed to know. We knew, as the chapter on the radio motor patrol will explore, that irresponsible behavior occurred to a considerable extent, and that it was tolerated and accepted if not encouraged by the CRMP membership and leadership, the Community Council, and the policemen with whom patrol members come into contact. That is, while we needed to know what was happening in general, we felt that there would be more disadvantages than benefits in finding out more about what was happening specifically.

All of this raises the question: why did almost everyone connected with the CRMP talk so freely to us about clearly questionable matters? Leaving aside whatever skill we exhibited in gaining rapport and trust within this organization, our ease of access seems to make the following sociological point: given the homogeneity of characteristics and values, attributes and attitudes, goals and interests of the police and civilian Beachview leadership, and given that this homogeneity extends to the CRMP members as well (as we shall see in the chapter on the radio motor patrol), these people are socially isolated to such a high degree that they assume that everyone shares their values and orientations. Therefore, since we were polite, interested, friendly, and white, we would certainly approve of their attitudes and actions. As one policeman said in criticizing the Council's refusal to let us interview CRMP members, "we just knew you were one of us." This very quick acceptance of the research staff

was, paradoxically, combined with a fairly high level of suspicion of research in general. Yet once the Beachview people got to know us personally, they could trust us at the same time that they expressed hostility toward social science research.

The one exception to this situation was Officer Roy. He kept raising questions about our personal political views in the course of "friendly" conversations ("I bet you think we're all Birchers, heh, heh"), and it will be remembered that it was largely through his intervention that we were unable to interview CRMP members. Other policemen, however, reported that they kept trying to assure him of our good faith.

* * *

We now turn to discussions of each of the four programs studied here seen as units in themselves. The structure of each of the substantive chapters is essentially the same, although the emphases differ to reflect differences in the character and importance of various aspects of particular programs.

Each chapter, after a brief description of the program under consideration, begins with a discussion of the problem to which the organization is responding. This provides the context for the next section on the program's history. A discussion of the program's structure and activities follows, with subsections dealing with leadership and rewards and incentives for participation. The program is then placed within the network of organizations with which it regularly deals. Problems and issues related to the stability and responsibility of each program are then discussed. A section on the program's

membership follows, and each chapter concludes with an analytic section dealing with the study's two major variables.

A concluding chapter discusses the general implications of this study for the stability and responsibility both of programs and of members. A set of policy recommendations designed to encourage both factors is the last section of this chapter.

Chapter III

CHILDGUARD

> Can a mother and father wearing blue and white arm-bands make [a city] safe for private school children? Can a housewife and an accountant, armed with pads and pencils, stop cabs from jumping lights, buses from speeding and private motorists from making the reckless turns that threaten adults and children alike during the morning rush?
>
> [a major newspaper]

These four parents had in common their membership in an organization which we will call Childguard (CG). CG is a safety promotion and crime prevention program that operates daytime walking patrols designed to deter street crimes and traffic accidents involving children. Organized in April, 1972 by the Parents Association, an association of parents whose children attend the city's private schools, it now boasts some 300 members and fields two patrol shifts a day, five days a week, during the spring and fall terms. The group has grown steadily, and as of June 1973, each daily shift featured several two-person patrols that walk pre-planned routes in areas covered by four different police precincts.

The Problem

The problem of street safety for school children has been of particular concern to parents for the last several years. Children have been assaulted by groups of older youngsters who demanded money, bus passes, or articles of clothing. While the actual number of such incidents is unknown (most of them

were not reported to school or police authorities), these events occurred often enough to encourage a climate of fear and apprehension.

A related problem is traffic safety. Every school year, children have been injured by cars turning corners too quickly or failing to obey traffic lights, and by similar dangers. These issues are a part of the larger question of crime and safety in the city, and it is within this context that the growth of CG can be understood. Thus, an examination of the experience with crime of the CG members we interviewed is necessary. More than half of the 48 CG members interviewed mentioned their personal experiences with crime as a major reason for joining the patrol. Thirty-eight per cent had themselves been victims of crimes. Eighty-five per cent had friends or relatives who had been victims. And 38 per cent had witnessed crimes.

The most common experience was that of being robbed or mugged.

> "In the park last summer, two boys took my wallet. I was going to the tennis courts, and two kids (about 16-18) jumped out from behind the rocks. One kid had a knife and said, 'If you give us your money, we won't hurt you.' They took my money and then left."
>
> "We had a car broken into on South Avenue a few years ago. It happened in the middle of the day. A number of things were stolen.... We never recovered any of it."

More important for CG members is their children's victimization. Nineteen, or more than 40 per cent, of the members interviewed described incidents in which their children were involved. The following stories are typical.

> "My son was mugged three or four years ago coming home from school at 4 p.m. He was attacked from the back by four Puerto Rican boys. One had a stiletto knife. They took his watch. No one helped him, even though a doorman was standing right there."
>
> "My children have been molested in their school area. .....Other children have gone up to them and insisted that they give them their money."
>
> "Three girls, fourteen or fifteen years old, grabbed my daughter's hat when the two of us were walking."
>
> "My son was mugged on a bus five years ago when he was twelve. Five Negroes took all he was carrying."

It is against the background of such incidents that the formation and history of CG can best be explained.

The Development of Childguard

In the fall of 1971, the problem of street safety for children was raised at one of the Parents Association monthly meetings. The Parents Association (PA) is a non-profit organization whose membership is drawn from the parents of children who attend the city's private schools. Its services include school and camp referral lists, publications for parents, and a film series for children. Traffic accidents involving children going to and from school were discussed--e.g., "I saw a child knocked down by a cab," and many of the parents also reported harrassments of and attacks on children by gangs of older children.

Mrs. Harrington,[1] a PA member present at this meeting,

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[1]All of the names of persons and organizations used in the report are fictitious in order to protect the programs' anonymity.

offered to organize a child-safety project. As reported by one of the present leaders of CG, Mrs Harrington went

> ...to the police, to outside community organizations, and to schools, to talk about a program and to disseminate material which she herself had written on political action, on walking guidelines for children on the streets, and on the idea of a patrol that would go onto the streets.

Although her plans contained many of the basic features of the present CG, she did not at this time have PA authority for her actions; she was simply acting as an individual. Moreover, she was seen by the PA leadership as presenting her material in such an "alarming and hysterical" manner that she was doing considerable damage to the organization as well as to a potentially worthwhile project. Neither the PA leadership nor its office staff had much affection for Mrs. Harrington, and before long she was "gently eased out."

The child-safety project was, however, of considerable interest to the PA, and in November, 1971, it was taken over by Mrs. Gideon and Mrs. Steinfeld, two women close to the PA leadership. They prepared a proposal for CG and submitted it to the representatives of each of the PA member schools for approval. This proposal delineated three major areas of action: 1) to develop and distribute a walking guide which would denote safe routes to and from school and give general safety hints in a form that a child could easily understand; 2) to encourage interested citizens to write public officials about the reassignment of police to street patrols rather than to foreign consul duty, a particular problem in some CG neighborhoods; and 3) to establish an adult volunteer street patrol to serve as a deterrent to attacks on

children. The volunteers would be parents and other concerned citizens who would patrol the streets in pairs, wearing visible identification, in the mornings when children go to school and in the afternoons when they come home.

The volunteers would be required to patrol only one-and-one-half hours per week during the time schools were in session. Moreover, they were asked to commit themselves to the patrol for only one school semester. It was hoped that these minimal requests would encourage massive support from parents. The representatives of the member schools received the proposal enthusiastically and agreed to bring it to the attention of their headmasters and PTAs.

Mrs. Gideon and Mrs. Steinfeld then began to contact a large number of organizations such as the police, schools, churches, and civic groups. CG labelled this activity its "community outreach phase." The police suggested that CG begin with a pilot project in a small area with a heavy concentration of schools. CG and PA leadership approached some 50 parochial and public schools and various community groups in this area. The leadership maintained that the program could succeed only with the cooperation of the entire community; consequently, three months' work went into this activity.

The initial contact with the police resulted in a policy decision requiring police training for all patrol members. Training sessions lasted about an hour and were conducted by community relations police officers and CG leaders. The sessions describe the patrols, stressing such safety factors as the

necessity of patrolling in pairs and being cautious rather than heroic. The function of the patrol as a crime deterrent rather than as a criminal apprehending agent is emphasized, as is the importance of the patrol to child safety. Both the police and the CG leaders stress the police-related, law-abiding nature of the patrol.

In the more recent training sessions, the police have been urging the CG patrollers to note broken telephones and traffic lights, potholes in the street, traffic problems, debris, etc. This new "job" for CG has two very positive effects. First it provides the police with an easy and cheap method of obtaining such information. Second, and perhaps more important, it gives the CG members a sense that they are doing something worthwhile. Very few actual criminal events are ever observed, but street dangers are visible almost daily. Thus, CG members can feel useful and important if, for example, a traffic light is fixed. The relationship between CG and the police is one of the most interesting features of the program and will be explored in detail in a later section of this chapter.

There were four training sessions before the first patrol was launched on April 17, 1972. Two motorcycle policemen were assigned to "buzz" the patrol routes while patrols were operating, both to keep track of patrollers' activities and to be available if their assistance were required. Although there were no incidents, the emergence of parent patrols on the city streets was deemed newsworthy by the media and precipitated a good deal of news coverage. CG representatives appeared on five

different television networks that first spring, and in three local and two national newspapers.

CG patrols ceased with the closing of schools in June and did not resume operation until the following October. The leaders and many of the members left the city for the summer. However, the leadership did meet in order to plan the membership drive for the fall. A department store in the neighborhood of the first patrols offered to sponsor a "childguard week." As Mrs. Gideon put it:

> After all, it is the parents who will use that store and if they appear to be doing something for the community and for the children of that community, I think that is not only good for us, it is very good for them.

The recruitment drive was launched with a party at the store which also served to bring together and reactivate the old patrol members. The store donated 500 brightly colored raincapes to be worn by patrollers.

The "participating merchants" campaign was also started in the fall of 1972. CG contacted the local Chamber of Commerce, which was interested in promoting the idea of child-safety. Their 200 member stores, as well as other stores along patrol routes, were contacted, and merchants were allowed to place a CG sticker in their windows if they "will make their phones available to the patrol and will also serve as a refuge to any child who comes in in need of protection." There was almost complete cooperation in this activity.

CG Activities and Structure

Our study of CG began just prior to the program's second stint of operation in October, 1972. At this time, CG returned to the streets with six patrols (two new ones) and seventy-five active members. At 7:45 one chilly morning, two middle-aged men wearing their orange ponchos and identification armbands, began to walk back and forth within a four-block area of Henry Avenue. Over one hundred children passed by during the hour that the two men walked up and down alternating sides of the street. There were no incidents, and the patrollers said that they had never observed any. This was discouraging to them, but one said that "a good patrol is one where nothing ever happens." Half-way through the hour, the police scooter-patrolmen rode by and waved A patrol car driven by a local community relations officer also stopped, and everyone chatted for a few minutes. The policeman recounted an incident in which CG had precipitated an arrest.

> A woman walking a patrol spotted a 16 year old boy in a building that children were going in and out of. She saw him there for three or four weeks. She reported the information to the police who staked out the position, and eventually arrested him. He was a narcotics dealer who was pushing heroin to the children.

The story of this incident noticeably raised the spirits of the two patrollers, who discussed it for the next fifteen minutes. They said that such stories made them more optimistic about CG's effectiveness. The patrol ended at 8:45 when the CG members dropped off their "daily report form" at the "key store" participating merchant. The report listed the names of the two

patrollers and stated that a particular traffic light was not functioning properly.

The rank-and-file membership of CG participates only in a patrol like the one described above. Occasionally, a member will patrol both morning and afternoon or work as a substitute. Most members, however, are required simply to work one and one-half hours per week for a twelve week semester. It is important to note that even with this limited kind of participation, the members felt that they were an important factor in preventing crime against children.

Sixty per cent of the 48 members we interviewed evaluated their participation as "painless"; 34 per cent labelled it "somewhat inconvenient"; and only 5 per cent thought it was a "sacrifice." Ninety-six per cent of the respondents stated that they either never missed their assignments or were able to provide a "trained" substitute. Since a limited individual involvement was structurally built into the organization, each member could easily fulfill his commitment. Not only did the members donate a small amount of time per week, but they also were required to join for only one semester at a time. This situation is, as we shall see, quite different from the nebulous time demands made of members by other crime patrols and certainly has contributed to CG's expansion. In the case of CG, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the degree of bureaucratization of the organization and the extent of individual personal commitment required.

Leadership

The structure of this organization is relatively formal, created and run by a small, tightly knit group of leaders. All the decisions are made by this group of five people, each of whom is an active PA member.

Mrs. Ferris acts as a liaison person to one of the police precincts involved in the program and also administers all CG activities in this precinct. She recruits members, arranges schedules, meets with the schools, mimeographs literature and instructions, and in effect, does all the work of CG in this area. Mrs. Gideon, who was one of the original CG leaders (the other, Mrs. Steinfeld, has since withdrawn), does the same things for another precinct. Mrs. Hastings, the former PA president, runs the newest patrols and is primarily responsible for the fund-raising activities of CG. Mrs. Goodman became the paid CG co-ordinator in the spring of 1973, and she has relieved the other women of many of their day-to-day scheduling chores.

This group makes policy as well as practical decisions for CG. The time and effort they contribute to the program are enormous. Meetings of the leadership group occur quite frequently in the PA office, and their contents reveal the extent of the leaders' involvement in the program. Mrs. Ferris frequently uses the mimeograph machines of her children's school for CG business very late at night so that the school operations will not be inconvenienced. Mrs. Hastings recounts her hours of writing and rewriting proposals for outside funding. Until Mrs. Goodman was hired, these women

were on-call daily, and several of them substituted for absent patrollers two or three times per week. Moreover, each of them walks her own scheduled patrol as well.

We asked the members we interviewed to evaluate this oligarchy. One-fifth spontaneously mentioned "effective leadership" when asked what they liked most about the organization. One woman's response is typical: "These people are entitled to run the program since they instituted it. They should administer policy." In response to the question, "How much voice do you have in the running of the organization?", over 80 per cent of the members answered "little" or "none" but that this was "enough." No one we interviewed felt that she had "too little" voice in the running of the organization.

It would seem, then, that limited purpose organizations do not have to be democratic in a formal sense to be supported by their members. One of the stated advantages of CG is the minimal personal time commitment required. If decision-making responsibility were shared among the members, this commitment would be enlarged, and the members do not seem to want to do more. Moreover, 55 per cent of the members allude to the leaders' "openness" to sug- stion and to their general "responsiveness." Members seem to feel that should they wish changes in CG policy, their opinions would be heeded. Thus, they are quite amenable to relinquishing control and allowing someone else to govern. No one feels powerless, because the members think that they can always make themselves heard.

Rewards and Incentives for Participation

As with all voluntary associations, the rewards and incentives of participation both for members and for leaders are particularly important. Except for Mrs. Goodman, no one is paid, and most members do not want any money for participation. "If I were given [money], I'd donate it back to the organization." For a few, in fact, the voluntary aspect of CG reinforces an already inflated sense of class consciousness:

> "I'm a member of the 'privileged class.' My husband has an adequate income [in excess of $120,000 per year]. Our needs are sensible. I believe in people who are well educated and gifted and set doing exactly what they feel they must to help others at any time. It's the reverse sense of socialism."

Forty-four per cent of the members mention approving CG's community action and responsibility. Membership provides a feeling of being a useful citizen: "Totally rewarding. The goals, the enthusiasms of the people, the sense of being involved in important community work." Or, "I have a great feeling of accomplishment by 8:45. I feel like I've done something." These attitudes were common in spite of the minimal commitment actually made.

Sixty-two per cent of the members said they "enjoyed the patrol," with women being more likely to feel this way. Many of the people who enjoyed the patrol added that this was because they had a pleasant partner. The interpersonal rewards are important, and 42 per cent of the members said that they made new friends. CG, then, fulfills expressive as well as instrumental functions.

CG offers its leaders and members a way of dealing with alienation and with their feelings as parents helpless to protect their children from real and imaginary harm. One man stated, "this is a huge city and it [CG] helps me feel closer to having an impact." As we shall see in all of the organizations studied here, participation seems to make people feel safer, even if actual increased safety is difficult to demonstrate. We will return to this point below, in the discussion of the CG membership.

Because the organization is focused around child-safety, many parents related interview questions back to their own children. They talked about the confidence of knowing their children are safe and how CG "builds self-confidence in children." Perhaps even more rewarding is the appreciation children express to their parents for their involvement. As one member put it, "My kids think it's great. They're so impressed. Children are reassured by the sight of CG people." While we have no independent measure of the consequences of CG for the children who are the object of its program, we have no reason to question their parents' accounts. The children are most likely impressed, reassured, and grateful for the patrol, and their attitudes are a very strong reward for participation.

Almost all of them thought the overall reputation of the patrol was excellent. Besides being appreciated by their family, in the words of one woman, "people in the street would stop us and were very pleased with what we were doing."

The few people we interviewed who had left CG indicated that they did not feel appreciated for their participation, and

The Organizational Context

CG has extensive and intensive contacts with a variety of other organizations, and this interorganizational structure contributes considerably to CG's stability. We will, therefore, consider the organizational context in which CG operates.

The Police

CG gained prestige and legitimacy because of its strong police support. This mutually self-enhancing relationship is quite subtle and complex. First of all, a differentiation must be made between "downtown," the high-ranking police officials at central headquarters, and the local police attached to the various precincts within which CG operates. Moreover, there are different levels of CG involvement at each of the four relevant police precincts.

When PA was first considering the formation of CG, Mrs. Hastings, then PA president, spoke with a PA member who had been working for the police as a volunteer. She explained that while the police had not in the past been particularly interested in civilian participation in law enforcement, the present commissioner had let it be known that civilian groups were now to be encouraged. A meeting between CG leaders and "downtown" was arranged. As the PA police volunteer stated, "The police are set up like the army. To get anything done you have to go to the top." CG leadership credits the program's strong and positive relationship with the police to this advice. Since that

first meeting, the police have helped considerably to shape the general policy and procedures of the program. The contact with "downtown" has also enabled the CG leadership to exert more pressure on local precincts than most other community groups are able to muster. A "downtown" official helped organize the patrols and introduced the leaders to the precinct commanders. This official also instituted the training sessions and directed the leaders of CG to set up the two-man patrols. While this was originally primarily for reasons of safety, patrolling in pairs has had other important consequences for the program. Since two people were required, missing one's shift would mean that one's partner was inconvenienced, as she would not be able to patrol either. Thus, absenteeism was reduced, in that each partner exerted tacit pressure on the other member of the team to appear. Moreover, such pressure also worked to control excessive zeal and to encourage obeying the program's rules while on patrol. Finally, it has been mentioned that interpersonal rewards were important for the members, and these derived almost completely from a patroller's relationship with her partner.

What did the police hope to gain from this relationship? CG presented the police with an opportunity to gain access to a potentially large, affluent, influential group. The organization was to be focused around child-safety, and this goal certainly made for good publicity. While the average tenant patrol might have 50 members, CG now offers the police contact with over 300 people, as well as enhancing the contact of the "cop on the beat" with the participating merchants.

The police were able to use CG for public relations purposes. A press conference was held in the spring of 1973 at which CG presented a community relations police official with a citation for community involvement. This was attended by the police commissioner and other high officials and provided valuable publicity for both organizations. The police commissioner praised CG for its "dedication, devotion and commitment." This was followed by affectionate hugs and back-pattings, leaving no doubt as to the mutual appreciation between police and CG representatives.

Another example of the extent to which the police saw public-relations possibilities in CG occurred when one neighborhood staged demonstrations against the police for the failure to apprehend the person who sexually abused and then killed two young children. That precinct's community relations officer immediately called Mrs. Hastings to find out how fast CG could expand to the area. Previously, this precinct had been skeptical about CG. Mrs. Hastings reported that "although Officer X doesn't think that the program is that good, after the kid was killed he was on the phone instantly."

Many of the local officers are not as enthusiastic about community participation as their superiors, a situation we will discuss in Beachview as well. This negative attitude has caused some members of CG to feel "unappreciated" and has precipitated some to quit. Some of the members said that the "average cop" views them with condescension: "That's a nice thing for the ladies to do." Initially the patrols were put on the precincts' roll

call so that at least one scooter-patrolman would be "buzzing" them. This led to frequent "waves and hellos." The members indicated their pleasure at such contact, and many were upset when it became less frequent. The feeling of being appreciated was an important reward for the members, and they resented being ignored by patrolling police. It seemed that the novelty of the patrols was beginning to wear off, and that many of the police did in fact view them condescendingly. One sergeant suggested that if the CG members were "attractive girls rather than middle-aged matrons, the cops might stop to chat more often."

Mrs. Gideon said that the police coverage during the spring of 1973 was noticeably less adequate. She thought that other community activities were taking precedence over CG; therefore, pressure was not being put on precinct commanders to continue advising their men to "pay attention to the women." It seems to us that local police are pleased to have a volunteer deterrent force, but reluctant to assign their men to cover it. The logic approximates this: It is not the scooter-patrolman who acts as the deterrent. It is the CG patrol. So since the women are there, the police do not need to be.

CG leadership, however, interpreted the decreasing police contact as an indication of lessened police commitment to the program. Since some of their self-esteem in relation to CG comes from the praise given to them by the police, this can lead to serious problems. The leaders' feelings of being appreciated by the city through the police help maintain their involvement. The importance of this aspect of police-CG relations is particularly

apparent at the training sessions. At one session we observed, five policemen and four of the five CG leaders were present, a group twice as large as the audience. There was considerable conversation, with each of the CG leaders saying that one of the most important personal pay-offs of the program was getting to know policemen "as people," finding out "what wonderful guys" they were. The police responded in kind, with much talk about the "great gals" and "terrific ladies." Hugs and back-pattings were very frequent. Another training session was scheduled for later that day, and Mrs. Gideon suggested that some of the police and CG leaders were not needed since the turnouts had been quite small. Everyone assured her, however, that they wanted to come to the session anyway.

Although this personal contact seems to have decreased, the interorganizational connections between CG and the police have grown stronger, and the contact has become more formal. As well as meetings and mailings of police child-abuse suspect lists to CG, a new procedure has developed involving a daily exchange of paper. Each patrol fills out a daily report on which they indicate any suspicious observations and traffic safety hazards. It was because of this report that the "drug pusher" was apprehended, and numerous street lights and pot holes have been repaired. The report also has space for the patroller to indicate whether the policemen in the area stopped to "visit." In this way, a record indicating frequency of police contact was kept, which could be used later in discussions with high-ranking police officials. A copy of each of the daily reports was to be picked

up by the scooter-patrolman at the "key store" following the patrol, although CG leaders say that this was not always done. This report alleviated some of the negative feelings about seeming police apathy and also enabled the patroller to feel an even greater sense of community responsibility: "We act as checks on the police. They have to come around because we write it on our report. Puts the police on their toes."

This function of citizen crime control programs was operativ for Safeblock and Low Income Towers as well; i.e., the very presence of a patrol can encourage the police to provide improved services to a community, since the latter know that they are being closely watched in the performance of their duties. In this sense, the patrols, rather than substituting for the police, act as a prod to better police work. Their surveillance increases the visibility of police performance.

In this regard, almost ninety per cent of the CG members we interviewed thought that the program had a positive effect on police services to the community. The members also thought that CG participation improved the communication between police and themselves. This provided an additional reward for the police, since one-half of the 53 per cent of the members we interviewed who thought that the police were doing a good job had once felt differently. Some of the them had never talked to a policeman, and the new contact with the police precipitated the development of pro-police attitudes.

The Parents Association

Structurally, CG is a program of the Parents Association, and its organization-within-an-organization status has had significant consequences for the program's development.

The PA, whose history goes back to the nineteen-twenties, was primarily a social organization having luncheons and teas and often appearing on the society pages. During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, it began to provide a larger variety of services to its private school parent members: clothing and book exchanges, a summer camp and trip service, a film series for young people. Moreover, the PA put out various publications, which have become more socially relevant during the last decade and now cover such topics as drug use among children. Of the 48 CG members we interviewed, 28 also belonged to PA, and most of them said they joined PA to receive these publications and to use PA services.

PA was an important element in facilitating the rapid growth and expansion of CG. As was the case with all of the programs studied, the provision of a physical base of operations and equipment was to some degree problematic, and PA provided CG with these facilities from the outset: an office equipped with secretary, telephones, typewriters, etc. Second, PA gave CG important legitimacy, since PA was a long-standing, well-known organization; this legitimacy was especially useful in recruiting members. Third, the leaders of CG were able to use their status as member-school representatives to go to the schools' headmasters and recruit members. It is no accident that the

majority of the members of CG have children in the two particular schools for which Mrs. Gideon and Mrs. Ferris are the PA representatives. Fourth, the PA was able to give financial support to CG at the initial stages when, for example, the program needed money to buy whistles and armbands. These supports provided to CG by PA probably kept the program alive during its early weeks, and their importance cannot be overestimated.

There were some problems in the PA-CG relationship, however. CG was conceived as simply another PA program, but its rapid growth quickly raised its status to that of the major PA activity. This caused some PA members to express negative attitudes toward CG. They felt that CG, in the words of Mrs. Gideon, "had become the PA," and that other PA projects were being neglected. Mrs. Gideon reported that some PA members were "a little bit miffed at the fact that they could hardly walk into the office on any given day because of CG activity." Her solution was as follows: "with a small office, a paid part-time worker, and extra phone lines, our problems would be solved."

In fact, $1200 raised through 75 personal letters to "business friends" did allow CG to get its own telephone and pay a half-time salary to Mrs. Goodman. Thus, by June 1973, much of the friction had abated. CG no longer needed to rely on Mrs. Case, the PA's administrative assistant, who had been so inundated with CG work that she was unable to do anything for other PA programs.

In addition, the governing board of PA had become impressed with the dedication of the small group of CG leaders, and their support was firmly gained. The rapid growth of CG and the large

amounts of media coverage had given PA much publicity. The leaders of CG were sensitive to potential interorganizational conflict and tried to minimize its occurrence. For example, it was the new president of PA who made the televised citation presentation to the police, rather than the director of CG. Thus, friction was reduced by allowing PA to claim the rewards of positive publicity and public exposure.

Areas of Concern

As of Spring 1973, CG had grown dramatically. The following chart presents this expansion:

	Spring, 1972	Spring, 1973
members	50	300
routes	2	7
precincts covered	1	4
leadership	volunteer	1 paid person

Yet a balanced discussion of CG must cover the program's three major areas of concern. These problems--financial support, public vs. private scope of activity, and attrition--will be the subject of this section.

Financial Support

PA paid the initial CG expenses from its treasury of member dues ($12 per year) and occasional private contributions. An additional $700 was raised through a PA mailing designed specifically for CG, and CG opened its own bank account for this money

in September 1972. The $1200 that friends of CG leadership contributed managed to carry the program through the spring of 1973, but when CG disbanded for the summer, the financial problems were acute. Running the CG campaign next year would cost, it was estimated, $5,000-$7,000, and neither the PA nor CG can cover that amount. Sources of funds for CG are, therefore, being explored.

One potential source is CG members w , as we shall see in the section which discusses their characteristics, typically have family incomes of at least $50,000 per year. It is interesting that this source of funds was not even mentioned in the many discussions of the program's financial difficulties we observed. When we raised this possibility in interviews with CG leaders, it received at best a lukewarm reception. Mrs. Gideon did not think it was appropriate to try to solicit money from people who volunteered their time. Other leaders said that such a fund-raising campaign might be worth a try but were dubious about its possible success. Mrs. Hastings suggested asking people who do not volunteer their time to contribute financially, and such people may be contacted in the fall mailings to the member schools PA, however, is unlikely to support any advertising approach that might reduce their own private financial support, and support for CG might hurt contributions to PA. Recently, however, a suggestion has been made that a percentage of money collected for CG could be paid to PA for rental of office space. In this way, the remaining areas of conflict about PA's and CG's financial interdependence might be resolved.

Another possibility is to find some third party who would be willing to fund CG. Grant proposals have been submitted to public and private funding sources. At this point, the program has already been turned down by fourteen foundations who reportedly said that their priorities were in the area of public safety and not crime prevention for private school children. In order to get public funds, the program must show broad-based community support.

CG leaders consider the financial problems so crucial that they say they will field the program in October, 1973 but will quit permanently at the Christmas break if funds are not forthcoming. Given the centrality of the leadership to CG's operation, it is unlikely that the program could survive such a crisis. This issue will be further discussed in the section on CG's stability.

A Public or a Private Program?

A related problem, and one on which funding possibilities rest, is the extent to which CG is a program whose benefits are open to the public-at-large as opposed to private school children exclusively.

There are some ideological differences within CG about this issue. Mrs. Gideon and Mrs. Steinfeld, as will be remembered, spent three months talking with public schools, religious and civic groups, and other community organizations. It was their strongly held conviction that a program such as CG needed broad-based community support if it were to succeed. Mrs. Goodman, the present director, is far less concerned with making the program a community project. While she realizes the political necessity of community support, particularly with regard to funding, Mrs. Goodman lacks the fervor with which Mrs. Gideon approached this issue.

Such differences in attitude are strongly reflected in the program's recent activities. When new neighborhoods came under CG coverage last spring, they were not blanketed with community outreach work in the way the original areas had been. This variation is a good example of the extent to which particular leaders affect the character of programs such as CG.

CG has had tremendous success in gaining the cooperation of civic groups, police, and the mass media, largely as a result of this outreach effort. Yet the program has virtually failed to enlist parents of public school children, one of the outreach phase's major goals. Of the over 300 people "trained" from April 1972 to May, 1973, only 14 came from non PA-member schools. Thus, while on paper the program is open to the public school parents, in actuality its members are parents of private school children almost exclusively.

As we shall see in detail in the next section of this chapter, the members of CG are upper-middle-class or upper-class persons. People who send their children to public schools in the CG neighborhoods, on the other hand, are largely of lower or working-class background, and are typically Black and Puerto Rican as well. Thus, the public/private school difference is also a socio-economic and ethnic divergence.

CG leaders seem to be unaware of or indifferent to the objective problems lower-class people face in joining such an organization. Mrs. Ferris said that many of the mothers of public school children who attended outreach meetings said that baby-sitters for younger children were an especial hardship. She was

quite scornful of this attitude, however, saying that "we must make arrangements for pre-school children when we patrol, too. I have a two-year old child, and I don't even have full-time help right now." One CG member handled this problem by having her chauffeur attend a training session so that he could substitute for her if she were unable to patrol, an option hardly available to large segments of the city's population. It is likely that such attitudes and opinions as Mrs. Ferris expressed would not endear her or the program to many public school mothers.

Similar problems confront public school fathers. Unlike the business executives and professional men who currently participate, lower and working-class people do not often have the option of a quick taxi downtown or of getting to work a bit late.

Another explanation for the homogeneity of CG's membership rests in the data collected about reasons for joining CG. We have already discussed the outreach phase of the CG program. For three months, attempts were made to recruit members through almost one hundred schools, religious organizations, community groups, and media coverage. In addition, hundreds of dollars and hours were spent to put posters around the city. Yet 83 per cent of the CG members we interviewed heard of the program through the PA-member schools their children attended, the PA directly, or informally from friends. Only six members were recruited through outreach activities.

From the viewpoint of practical advice to CG leaders, it is clear that the time, effort, and resources that went into the

outreach phase were largely wasted in terms of its recruitment effect. And it is through such activity that public school parents would have become aware of the program.

Moreover, over 70 per cent of the CG members we interviewed knew other CG members before they joined, and one-third of these respondents admitted that they felt that social pressure from friends was a major reason for their participation. Given this fact that interpersonal methods of recruitment were more effective than formal means, and that class and ethnic differences between public and private school parents would considerably limit interpersonal relations between the two groups, it is hardly surprising that CG remains in practice a private program.

Finally, the very complicated racial issues in perceptions and control of crime are relevant as well. Our interviews contain some statements which are clearly and blatantly racist; e.g., "young Blacks are being taught that what the white man has is theirs--they should take it." The parents of these "young Blacks," the public school parents, are unlikely to be sought for membership by the speakers of such remarks.

Apart from such racism, most of the actual incidents of attacks on children reported by our respondents were perpetrated by minority-group children. The following comment is typical: "My daughter was beat up by older Black girls from Jerry Poorman high school. They then poured ice cream all over her." Whether or not the respondents express racist attitudes, they do see Black and Puerto Rican children as threats to their own children's safety:

> The fact that the municipal government equated racism with the basic desire of the community to maintain its safety is wrong. I've seen these bands of Black kids in the neighborhood. They had been bused...it's hurting the safety of the neighborhood.

Such perceptions hardly provide a favorable milieu for the real opening of CG to public school parents, and, indeed, it is unlikely in our judgment that CG will solve this problem in the near future.

Attrition and the Substitute System

During one week in May, 1973, only 11 of some 100 people failed to make their assignments. Equally significant was that all of these eleven called to report that they would be absent in order to arrange a substitute. Patrol members are responsible for finding their own substitutes, and a list of potential substitutes has been circulated to each of the members. This means that it requires some effort to be absent, as the patroller must telephone possible substitutes. This mechanism may well be a further prod to patrolling.

The substitutes were primarily people who were unable to take on a weekly commitment but wanted to support the organization. We heard frequent complaints that the "substitute system is not working." It was not originally intended to work well. Mrs. Gideon stated,

> "We circulated the list of substitutes to all of our trained patrols, and said O.K., you are responsible for finding your own substitute. Well, that kind of cuts substituting out, because when you know you have to get on the phone and hassle to find your own replacement, which is often more trouble than just getting out on the street for that hour, we had very little

problem there."

We heard complaints from substitutes about the frequency of calls. Since substitutes were unwilling to make the same time commitment as a regular member, 1 1/2 hours per week, it is ironic that the small number of substitutes meant that they might be called to patrol as many as four times a week. This caused many of them to become disenchanted with the entire process, and led to their refusal to participate at all. CG was in fact losing a viable auxiliary membership in this way. Mrs. Goodman instituted her own private sub-list when she became director in order to interrupt this dysfunctional process. She was the only one who knew of these individuals, and she would call them only in real emergencies; thus, they were not overburdened. This technique, although partially successful, still leaves CG with the structural problem of what to do with members who wish to participate in a more limited fashion.

One frequent pattern of participation is for a regular member to become a substitute for the following semester. At the beginning of the spring term of 1973, the 123 members who patrolled in the fall of 1972 were distributed as follows: 18 quit the organization completely; 25 became substitutes; 8 became Mrs. Goodman's "private substitutes;" and 72 remained active members. If the 33 substitutes are not to be lost to CG, some new method of dealing with members' decreased commitment must be initiated. Moreover, this is an attrition rate of almost 40 per cent for regular members. This fact, in an organization

which asks little of its members, does something seen as very worthwhile, and, in general, has all of the positive features discussed in this chapter, does not bode well for most other crime control groups.

This quite high rate of attrition is less of a problem for CG than it would appear. Even though it seems that an individual's commitment to participate over an extended time period diminishes,[2] CG is organized so that it simply needs to fill positions rather than maintain the participation of a particular group of people. Thus, while only 72 of the 123 fall members remained active, a much larger number of members was recruited for the spring. CG, unlike many other programs, could withstand a massive shift in membership, in part because of the high degree of bureaucratization. Moreover, unlike building or block-based programs, CG draws its membership from a very large base population: parents of private school children. There are a great number of potential members available. The extent to which recruiting new members, something of a problem already and an activity which consumes considerable energy and resources, will become even more costly and difficult once those most amenable to membership have been tapped is unclear. And, obviously, some as yet unknown number of potential members will be impossible to recruit. Will new potential members, people whose children start school, be sufficient to keep CG operating in the far future, or is there an end

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[2] If we looked at attrition rates from the first to the second year of operation they would be higher still.

point? It does seem likely, however, that the large membership base can certainly sustain the program for the next several years.

The Members

Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics

Of the 48 CG members we interviewed, 12 were men and 36 were women, aged between thirty and fifty. All but two of the members were parents of school-age children. All but one person live in the area in which they patrol, and tend to be long-term residents of their communities, with two-thirds having lived in their present neighborhoods for more than fifteen years.

The neighborhoods covered by CG are among the wealthiest and most fashionable in the city. Although there are blocks of tenements and occasional "pockets of poverty," these neighborhoods are primarily characterized by expensive private homes, luxury apartment houses, and blocks of fashionable and attractive shops.

CG members' family incomes reflect these neighborhoods. Two-thirds of our respondents reported incomes in excess of $50,000 per year; some acknowledged incomes of over $100,000 annually. The educational background of the membership was commensurate with the high levels of income. Eighty per cent had graduated from college, and 37 per cent had attended graduate and/or professional schools. Eighty-three per cent of the family heads were either professionals or business executives. Moreover, seventy per cent had parents whose occupations were of similarly high status, indicating that the members of CG were of established backgrounds

rather than being highly upwardly mobile.

An important characteristic for voluntary crime control organizations is the extent to which they can mobilize the groups from whom they draw their members. We, therefore, asked our respondents about their other organizational affiliations; were they politically active and "joiners," or were they inactive but drawn to CG because of its particularly important concern with child-safety?

All but three of the CG members interviewed were registered voters, with about half belonging to each of the two major political parties. More than 50 per cent do belong to other voluntary associations, and 70 per cent of this group said that they were actively involved in these organizations. Almost two-thirds of our respondents had taken part in some kind of civic or political action, and more than 80 per cent of them said that they had been actively involved.

The 26 members of CG with other organizational affiliations can be called "joiners" in that voluntary association membership is a usual behavior for them. Indeed, the literature on membership in voluntary associations supports the likelihood that upper-income groups tend to join such associations.

Twenty-two, or over 40 per cent, of our respondents did not belong to other organizations, however, lending support to the notion that crime-control groups, because of the very nature of the problem to which they address themselves and the concern about it, attract people who are not otherwise "joiners."

Why CG Members Joined: Perceptions of Crime

We have discussed our respondents' experience with crime in the beginning of this chapter, in an attempt to establish the context in which CG developed. Further discussion of this issue is also relevant here. Why would people who do not characteristically join voluntary associations join CG?

As was said earlier, most of the CG members we interviewed had been either victims of or witnesses to crimes, or had friends and relatives who had been victimized. Many of these accounts also contain indications of resentment toward the authorities, particularly the police, for failing to prevent them.

> My wife had her purse snatched...at 11:00 one night. Two boys took her purse and pushed her up against a wall. She ran into a bar and saw a police officer. She told him what happened, and while she was talking to him she spotted the two boys. She told the officer.... [but] he said, "Sorry lady, I'm on my coffee break."

Members were especially angry over the inability of the police to protect their children and take action against those who stole their bus passes and "mugger money" (the small change parents give their children to pay off "mini-muggers" and avoid physical injury).

"My son, Billy, was mugged by five kids. They tried to choke him. He got away. The police said they couldn't do anything because nothing was stolen."

Many members of CG related similar incidents of frustrating impotence in the face of danger and injustice, and it appears that one of the functions of an organization like CG is to provide a

vehicle for actively responding to the provocations, for "doing something," as so many expressed it. As one member put it, "I wanted to find a responsible way to stop feeling like a victim."

Many members of CG felt not only that the police were not able to deal with the problem of child-safety, but also that perhaps it is not even their job.

> My kid had his change stolen and was chased several times by older kids. It's not a police problem. One time he was at a bus stop not on his bus route and was robbed. It's naughtiness rather than criminal. Should be taken care of by parents.

The members of CG really believe it is their problem and are not merely paying lip service to the idea of citizen involvement. In fact, the incident quoted above raises the interesting question of whether or not such "mini-muggings" are the responsibility of the police at all.

The few interviews conducted with PA members who do not participate in CG point up CG member commitment to the notion of civic responsibility; they said they did not join CG either because they thought that paid guards could do a better job, or because the matter was best left to the police.

The majority of CG members, however, felt that "we can't buy security." Moreover, it should be iterated that they could easily financially afford to hire someone to walk their children to and from school, had they chosen this option. More than two-thirds of the CG members interviewed, however, said that they would not favor paid guards. It seems that feelings of personal security come mainly from direct personal involvement in preventing crime. This feeling revolves around two related variables:

trust, and a parent's vested interest in child safety.

"Hired guards can't be trusted. They probably promote robberies."

"Paid guards wouldn't be as responsible or reliable. Parents have a stronger sense of responsibility because it's their own kids."

Sixty-three per cent of the CG members interviewed thought that crime rates were rising in their neighborhoods, even though available figures (not presented here to preserve anonymity) indicate the reverse. Thus, the city's actual crime problem and the fear and anxiety about it must be viewed as at least theoretically independent factors.

We have behavioral as well as attitudinal indicators of concern with the crime problem: more than two-thirds of our respondents say that in recent years they have changed their day-to-day behavior because of the crime situation. The following statement is representative of the kind of specific changes mentioned:

> I don't carry a purse at night, if I have more than $20, I put the rest in my shoe. I don't carry all of my credit cards. I walk down certain streets--main streets--rather than others. I'm not alone after 9 p.m.

Besides personal precautions, an overwhelming 82 per cent have taken at least one of a variety of additional home security measures, including improved locks, improved lighting, and watch dogs. Even this relatively high figure does not provide a complete picture, because the elaborate building security systems in many of the apartment houses in which our respondents live

make individual home security precautions much less essential.

Additionally, when asked what they dislike most about the city, 77 per cent spontaneously mentioned the crime situation: "...because of the threat to my kids.... There's a problem in not creating fear in kids, but protecting them." Many did not leave the city because they felt that affluent suburban life was too sterile and caused children to have narrow outlooks on life. The most common way these city parents deal with potential danger is by demanding to know their children's whereabouts at all times. Many also try to have more planned activities in their homes, and encourage their children to use taxis when coming home in the early evening hours. Most parents seem seriously concerned with the problem of raising children safely in the city without creating a "fortress mentality" in them.

Thus, it is our suggestion that the magnitude of concern with the crime problem enables programs such as CG to draw members who tend not to participate in voluntary associations, as well as attracting the traditional "joiners." This very important aspect of voluntary crime control programs will be explored in the other substantive chapters of this report.

We now conclude this treatment of Childguard with a more analytic discussion of the two major variables of this study, responsibility and stability.

Responsibility

CG is a responsible organization, and its members for the most part express responsible attitudes. We will discuss both of

these aspects in turn.

The Organization's Responsibility

CG leadership was very concerned with the issue of responsibility from the outset. Mrs. Gideon and Mrs. Steinfeld stressed repeatedly that the program was not vigilante in character. They were very upset by one magazine account which implied that CG had a somewhat vigilante-like flavor, and a strong letter-writing campaign to this magazine resulted in a retraction of the charge.

The leaders' commitment to responsibility was institutionalized in CG's structure. The compulsory police training sessions contained many warnings against a prospective member taking the law into his own hands, both because such action was morally wrong and because it would be dangerous to the patroller. Thus, concern for personal safety was used as a responsibility-maintaining mechanism. The leaders saw the training sessions as particularly important because, as Mrs. Ferris said, "You have no way of screening....You may get some nut....The sessions act as a curtailment to some hot headed persons."

As was mentioned earlier, the two-person patrol structure also acted as a check on irresponsibility. Since partners could observe and control each other's behavior, both members of a patrol would have to concur were vigilante activities to occur.

The program's close relationship with the police was a further deterrent. Such a relationship was seen as essential by the program's leaders. "Since we are dealing with crime control, we have to work through the legal authority charged with that task. There's no other way." The fairly close, day-to-day

observation and supervision of the patrollers by the police would make irresponsible behavior difficult to practice. Indeed, the high visibility of the program--CG operates when there are literally hundreds of people on the streets, in broad daylight--is a strong responsibility-maintaining factor.

In the nearly two years of CG operation, only one irresponsible incident occurred. A man on patrol observed a Puerto Rican boy fighting with a Black boy. He ran over to them and sprayed both with an illegal can of mace. One of the boys ran away, while the other had to be hospitalized and treated for skin irritation. The patroller was arrested by the police and was discharged permanently from CG. The program's response to this incident can be viewed as evidence of its responsibility.

The Members' Proclivities

The program's responsibility is further encouraged by the generally responsible attitudes of its members. When asked under what circumstances they would be willing to "take the law into their own hands," our respondents indicated that they would "never" do so, or "only in extreme circumstances" in which their or someone else's lives were threatened.

Our data contain a behavioral indicator of the members' responsible proclivities. Only three of the CG members we interviewed owned any kind of firearm, and these were either hunting rifles or antiques. No one owned any type of handgun. "The idea of firearms is repellent to me as is violence." "I don't believe citizens should ever carry guns." Perhaps one woman, a mother of three children, best summed up the stance of the group

with her amusing but revealing statement, "I'm anti-gun. The gun lobby should be shot."

* * *

Thus, CG is responsible in each of the following ways:

1) The program's ideology stresses responsibility.
2) Structural and organizational factors encourage responsibility.
3) The members express responsible attitudes.
4) The members tend to behave responsibly.

Stability

CG is the most stable of the four voluntary crime control programs studied here. It has grown considerably since its inception, is moving in the direction of routinizing and bureaucratizing its operations, and has, in our judgment, a high probability of maintaining itself as an organization.

While many of the factors which encourage CG's stability have already been discussed in other contexts, we will summarize them here.

1. Its interorganizational relationships with the police, the PA, various private schools, and the "participating merchants provide the program with a wide range of stability-engendering supports. These include physical and financial facilities and resources, information about and skills in voluntary crime contro legitimacy, approval and appreciation, and favorable publicity. The coverage the program received from the mass media also provides such supports.

2. The program's goal reflected a dominant community value: safety for children. Eighty-eight per cent of the members stated that what they liked most about CG was its goal. Mrs. Gideon accounted for the program's success in this way:

> "I think, first of all, something directed towards the safety of children going to and from school, which should be such an unalienable right of the child, has to basically get support."

Here was an issue which could be and was supported by politicians of various political persuasions and by all the other persons and groups already mentioned. Certainly the universal appeal of child-safety must not be underestimated in explaining CG's stability.

3. Voluntary organizations often develop as the result of the activities of one or a few persons whose dedication and commitment are extremely high. Yet it is a sociological commonplace that organizations which rely upon such leadership tend to persist only so long as the leaders maintain such commitment and dedication.

CG has in part translated the intense involvement of the leaders into a bureaucratic structure which helps to insure the program's perpetuation. There is now an overall paid director, and three other sub-leaders co-directing each of four police precincts involved. There is a chart in the office indicating when and where each of 300 people are to be located on the city streets. There are also extensive files and records. These files will, for example, facilitate recruitment since all of the materials for brochures, manuals, etc. are already available.

On the other hand, a small group of leaders is still

devoting many hours and much effort to the program, and these women have begun to get restive. It has already been mentioned that the leaders maintain that they will, as Mrs. Hastings put it, "chuck the whole thing" if funds for a "real" office and staff have not been collected by December, 1973.

It is not at all clear that CG could survive the loss of the present leadership at this point. When the CG members we interviewed were asked to evaluate the amount of time they spent working in the program, almost all of them said it was "just about right." It is far from certain that several people would come forward to volunteer their time for the thirty-or-so hours per week that the present leadership spends during the weeks that the patrol is operating. Thus, the program's future is, in this regard, an open question.

If funds are forthcoming, however, CG seems to have a high potential for routinizing itself into a long-term operation. The machinery has already been set up for such bureaucratization.

4. Many voluntary organizations develop in response to a crisis which results in citizen mobilization in order to deal with it. As we shall see, such was the case with the other upper-middle-class program studied here, Safeblock. Yet when the crises abate, many of these programs quickly lose their impetus and cease operations. CG has dealt with this problem by requiring a minimum of individual commitment from its members. A high level of mobilization is, therefore, not required.

Moreover, members report strong desires to report for their patrols; even if there were 75 other members on the street that

day, an individual's patrol could be covered only by himself. Therefore, each individual feels that his participation is important.

CG limited its activities to avoid attendance problems. The following quote from a flyer illustrates this point: "Because mid-winter weather deters street dangers, patrols will function from mid-October through mid-December; and will resume from mid-March through mid-June." "Mid-winter weather" would also deter many members from participating, and many CG patrollers take winter vacations at this time. Rather than be confronted with huge absentee rates, however, the leaders avoid the issue with a convenient and only partly accurate rationalization. They are, of course, exchanging coverage for stability in this instance.

If normative rewards serve to maintain the stability of the membership, as previously mentioned, the absence of such rewards frequently leads to a member's termination. The nature of a particular individual's personal experience was, not surprisingly, the most significant factor in determining his length of membership and level of commitment. While most of the current members felt appreciated, the former members we interviewed expressed different attitudes: "I expected people to come up and pat me on the back and say 'what a nice thing you're doing,' but rather they look at me as an oddball in my orange cape."

The former members also mentioned not getting along with their partners as a reason for leaving CG. As opposed to the other programs studied, the only other member that a CG volunteer routinely met was his patrol partner. The relationship between these two people often determined whether either one or both of

them would return for another semester. Perhaps CG would be wise to try to pre-select partners where possible, rather than leaving it to the chance factor of finding people whose free time periods match. Since most of the members offer more than one time alternative, this would be feasible to initiate.

5. Finally, CG's upper-middle class membership base is an important statility-producing factor that must not be overlooked. As was mentioned earlier, it is this status category which most typically joins and maintains voluntary associations.

* * *

Thus, our assessment of Childguard ranks the program as being quite high on the stability and responsibility continua. Although it has several quite serious problems which may limit the program's further expansion, it is our judgment that its potential for survival is considerable. We now turn our attention several blocks to the north and west of some of the Childguard neighborhoods and to the other end of the city's class structure to consider the tenant patrols at Low Income Towers.

Chapter IV

LOW INCOME TOWERS TENANT PATROL

> For those who have taken part in it, the growth of tenant patrols has been an exciting adventure. Where ever the patrols were given a fair try, they have contributed greatly to project security.... They have all, to some degree, provided a meaningful additional avenue for tenant participation in project life. Many tenants are learning that...they can indeed be effective in improving their environment.
>
> [A tenant patrol unit brochure]

This chapter reports on the Low Income Towers (LIT) tenant patrol, a group of project residents organized on a building-by-building basis in an attempt to improve security at Low Income Towers. According to the city's tenant patrol unit,[1] it is one of several scores of such patrols throughout the city. Patrols began at LIT in 1968, when the city's housing authority began a campaign to organize them at all projects. They consist primarily of residents sitting in the building lobbies, surveying entrances and exits.

Low Income Towers is one of many public housing projects in the city. It is composed of medium (6-story) and high (16-story) rise brick buildings and occupies a several-block tract of land in a poverty area. Like the adjoining neighborhood, the project provides homes almost exclusively for Black and Puerto Rican families of relatively low income. LIT has a population of over

[1] Interview with tenant patrol unit director. Throughout this report, sources of information are left unspecified to preserve anonymity.

four thousand residents.

The Problem

Low Income Towers has a "crime problem." Although crime statistics are notoriously difficult to interpret and compare,[2] the precinct in which Low Income Towers is located is generally thought of, by both the police and the public-at-large, as a high crime district. A city study of housing project crimes showed that Low Income Towers has one of the highest rates of crime complaints per 1,000 residents.

The testimony of the 66 LIT residents we interviewed is convincing. Forty-one per cent had themselves been victims of crimes, and two-thirds of these had had additional experience with crime as witnesses or as close friends or relatives of crime victims. Another 23 persons, or 35 per cent, had not themselves been victims but had witnessed crimes, had close friends or relatives who had been victimized, or had had both these indirect experiences with crime. Only 16 of the 66 respondents, or 24 per cent, had had no experience with crime.[3]

Fear of crime was a persistent theme in many of our interviews. Two-thirds of the LIT respondents said that they believed the crime rate in their neighborhood was rising, and slightly

[2]See concluding chapter for a discussion of crime statistics.

[3]It is interesting to note that these figures are quite similar to the Childguard data. Crime experience, in this case, clearly cuts across class li es. Moreover, they are also similar to those crime rates reported in national surveys. See Philip Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States, (NORC: Chicago, 1967).

more than half reported that they had changed their day-to-day behavior because of the crime situation. Most of these responses indicated a decrease in activities outside the home as the major such change:

"We don't go out at night. Our son, 17 years old, rarely goes out at night. When he does, all we do is worry all night. It's awful how we have to live in fear."

Respondents reported dropping evening church activities, cutting out after-dark shopping, refraining from visiting friends, and quitting late-night jobs. Even persons who reported no change in their habits indicated substantial fear of crime--particularly of mugging and personal assault: "I'm so afraid. I can feel the pain of landing on the street, falling from that roof when some guy takes me up there to rape me."

The physical design of Low Income Towers probably contributes to the crime and fear of crime which limit the lives of its residents. Jane Jacobs[4] has argued convincingly that the safety of big city streets is primarily maintained not by law enforcement officials but by ordinary citizens who watch the streets, deterring criminals and reporting or intervening in the crimes which do occur. The pre-conditions of such safety include not only citizens willing and able to report or intervene in street crime, but also buildings with windows close to and facing the street, and pedestrian traffic

[4]Jane Jacobs, The Life and Death of Great American Cities. Architects are now making similar points and, hopefully, new public housing projects will come to be designed with security taken into account. For the best known treatment of this subject, see Oscar Newman, Defensible Space (New York: MacMillan, 1972).

or other street activity sufficiently interesting to bring residents to their windows.

If Jacobs is correct in this assessment, then Low Income Towers (like many big city housing projects) might well have been designed as "Mugger Haven." The project's buildings are set back from the street, surrounded by lawns, playgrounds, and parking lots. Unlike the front stoops of the neighboring tenements, the outdoor LIT sitting areas do not face the streets. Most of the project's residents live above the fifth floor, too far from the street to shout a warning to a pedestrian or frighten off a would-be attacker. The carefully planned absence of commercial establishments from the project and the lack of stoop-sitting neighbors probably limit residents' interest in the sort of street-watching which is so much a part of life in the adjacent tenements--and so necessary for street safety. A number of the LIT residents we interviewed reported having been attacked on the streets which intersect or surround the project.

Another aspect of the project's physical design which provides opportunities for unobserved crime is the combination of public-access lobbies and slow-moving elevators. Until very recently, the door to the buildings had no locks. Anyone could enter a building and use its elevators and corridors. Since these are overlooked by no windows at all, they are not subject to any protection afforded by public surveillance. During the course of this study, front door locks and a phone-buzzer system were installed, but frequent visits to the project after installation support tenants' claims that the locks are

functionally inadequate, and the doors are still almost never locked. Once inside the building, a would-be mugger has only to step on an elevator with a potential victim to have a near-perfect opportunity for crime. The elevators move slowly; they stop only on every other floor (one serves the even-numbered floors, one the odd); and they sometimes fail to stop at the floors requested by passengers. Due to the composition of the project's population, they are likely to carry only women and children. Occasionally, of course, the elevator might stop mid-crime and deliver the assailant into the hands of waiting policemen (as actually happened in one incident described to us by a respondent) or of other tenants ready to intervene, but the chances of this good fortune are very limited.

It comes as no surprise, then, that the elevators were a major focus for tenants' concern about crime at Low Income Towers. Most of the mothers with whom we talked mentioned that they worried about their children's use of the elevators, and a substantial number regularly meet their children in the lobby after school so that they will not have to ride up alone. Fear of the elevators also complicated the lives of adults in the project; "I don't get on the elevators with strangers" was a fairly common remark, and several persons mentioned that they sometimes waited in the lobby for a recognizable neighbor rather than take the elevator alone.

These fears of the elevator seem to have a substantial basis in fact. Although we did not obtain complete information on the location of all crime incidents described by residents, the partial

record from tenant patrol members in a single building, building C, is revealing. Among the 13 patrol members interviewed, 9 people reported that they or their close friends or family had been victims of at least one crime occurring within the project (apartment burglaries; robberies in the hall, lobby, or elevators). Six of these 9 people reported crimes which occurred in an elevator of their own building (and a seventh reported that his sister had been mugged in the elevator of a nearby project).

The physical design of LIT is not the only factor determining its serious crime problem. Various aspects of the social context of project life are intrinsic to the situation.[5] After taking into account the residents' poverty and the high rates of crime and drug addiction which characterize the neighborhood, one primary fact of this social setting seems to be residents' widespread unwillingness to report crimes.

A major explanation for this failure to report crime is a distrust of the police, which seems to take several forms. Many residents are simply not sure that the police will come when they are called.[6]

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[5]For a further discussion of the community context in which fear of crime develops, see Albert D. Biderman et al., A Report on a Pilot Study in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes Toward Law Enforcement. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.)

[6]Other research supports these data. Furstenberg and Wellford ("Calling the Police," Law and Society, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring, 1973), found a "lower level of satisfaction with police services" among Blacks, and also that "Blacks experienced a longer response time" when summoning the police (pp. 400-401), in their Baltimore study. Hawkins ("Reporting Criminal Victimization," op. cit.) surveyed a random sample of Seattle households, and found that 55 per cent or "a majority of the cases of victimization did not come to the attention of the police." (p. 432)

There are two police forces with which LIT residents regularly deal, the city police and the housing police. For the 39 patrol members for whom we have these data, evaluations of police services break down as follows:

	Good Job	Undecided	Bad Job
City Police	18	14	7
Housing Police	24	4	11

These data are interesting in two ways. First, when asked what they thought "doing a good job" meant, our respondents almost unanimously said that this involved coming when they were called. Moreover, this meaning remained constant regardless of the particular ratings the respondent gave. It would not seem that LIT residents were making overly heavy demands of police services; they simply wanted the police to respond when summoned.

Second, the respondents clearly differentiated in their evaluations. Rather than expressing the stereotypical across-the-board negativity to the police expected from this population, the patrol members interviewed were more likely, for example, to view the housing police as doing a good job than the city police, and were more likely to make a judgment about the former than about the latter.

Such differentiation suggests that minority-group, lower-class people are not as firmly enmeshed as usually seen in the

generally negative context in which the police are viewed in their communities. They are sufficiently open and "rational" to differentiate among policemen, and, thus, would be more amenable than is often assumed to being appreciative of high-quality police protection.

As well as questioning whether the police will respond to a call, many LIT residents do not think that the police would take effective action even if they came. One woman who told us that both her son and her husband had been mugged gave a typical response when asked if these incidents had been reported: "What can you do about it? You don't know them (i.e., the muggers). The police will do nothing." The same woman had earlier reported an apartment burglary with no visible result: "My apartment was burglarized. I reported it but the police did nothing. I never heard from them--nothing like on TV--it was a waste of time to report it."

Respondents' feelings of police inefficacy were particularly acute in regard to drug traffic and drug-related crime: "I tried to stop the drug traffic; I contacted the precinct captain, gave names, dates, and incidents. Nothing happened. What can we do?" While a few residents believe that the police are simply waiting until they have sufficient evidence to clean up the drug traffic, others feel that they just don't care: "They only give tickets to parked cars; they do nothing to pushers and junkies. If police turn their heads, so can I."

When asked a series of hypothetical questions about their likely responses if they witnessed a variety of crimes in progress,

a number of respondents indicated their willingness to alert police to crimes if they did not have to give their names. For some, this was the common desire to avoid the inconvenience of police questioning or the expense of missing work to testify in court: "I'd have called the police, but police ask too many questions. You have to go through the third degree yourself."

For others, however, there was a fear that the criminal would somehow be told who had done the reporting, especially in regard to drug-related crime: "I'd call police, but I won't give my name because then people get you back." "I'd call police, but it's not that easy because if they find out, you know it will happen to you. They'll get you." Clearly some Low Income Towers residents felt that the police themselves are involved in crime. One respondent put it bluntly: "I don't trust them; they're worse than we are."

Even residents who trusted the police reported that the fear of reprisals or the negative reactions of neighbors deterred them from reporting or intervening in crimes. Several stated or implied a fear of organized crime: "If I saw it, I can say nothing--because if you say something you make trouble. They make revenge on your family. I say 'That's life'. This is a free country. Mind your own business; you live longer." "You can report it, but there is a problem if people know it and they get you on the street for squealing. Drugs are very dangerous."

A final variation of the theme of failure to report or intervene in crimes came from a respondent who had seen a woman being mugged: "There was no reaction; it was like instinct. I know

what would happen. What could I do? I knew this guy and I've got to live here." Although the experience of clearly recognizing a neighbor as an assailant in a crime was limited, the general feeling that much crime is of local origin and "I've got to live here" is widespread. This is a very different situation from that of Childguard, where the members feel that they represent an enclave of good folk who must defend themselves against threats from outside enemies. While for Childguard members, crime is seen as an invader of the community, the Low Income Towers residents must deal with it from within, as a central facet of their immediate environment--one's next-door neighbor may be the local drug pusher, and one's child's school friend may rob local merchants in the evenings. The extreme fear and apprehension expressed by our LIT respondents must be viewed in this context.

In Low Income Towers, then, it seems that neither the physical setting with its opportunities for unobserved crime nor the social setting, characterized not only by a high crime rate but also by unwillingness to report or intervene in crime is conducive to the sort of street safety mentioned above: safety maintained by ordinary citizens who deter crime by watching the streets and passages in which crime might occur and reporting or intervening in criminal incidents.

A major response to this situation has been the organization of the Low Income Towers tenant patrols, and they will be the subject of this chapter.

Description

Although it had been our expectation to study the LIT tenant patrol as a whole, we found that the patrol in each building was largely a unit in itself. Each building patrol commanded considerable autonomy, and the patrol members defined the patrol as being attached only to their buildings. We, therefore, chose to study three particular patrols as distinct organizations. This situation proved advantageous, for it afforded the opportunity to compare various patrols.

The three buildings discussed here will be identified as A, B, and C and can be described briefly as follows:

Building A: the building patrol with the longest record or relatively continuous operation at Low Income Towers.

Building B: a building in which a patrol has been started several times but has never lasted more than a few months (a common pattern).

Building C: the largest patrol at LIT, with, at its peak, more members than any other building in the project and more hours of coverage.

These buildings were chosen to reflect differences in our major variable, stability. Differences in levels of participation were also assessed.

Although we had hoped to interview all of the members of the three patrols, the distinction between members and former members at LIT was very blurred, and membership lists were neither valid nor reliable. We, therefore, were unable to meet this expectation. Although we interviewed more former members and non-

members at LIT than was the case for the other organizations studied here, we were not able to locate all of the members of the three patrols.

The distribution of our interviews among the three buildings is as follows:

Building	Members	Former-Members	Non-Members	Total
A	8	4	2	14
B	18	3	5	26
C	13	5	8	26
Total	39	12	15	66

The discussions of the patrol members are based on the 39 member interviews, although we used the former and non-member data as well wherever applicable.

Organizational Structure

The complexity of the organizational structure in which our three building patrols operated is presented schematically on the following page. This structure affected every aspect of the patrols' operations.

There are three levels of organization which must be taken into account. First there are the individual building patrols, which were the reality of the tenant patrol for most members. That is, almost without exception, the patrol members interviewed saw themselves as members of the patrol only in their own building. They had no sense of belonging to a larger organization serving the project as a whole. Although many members were aware that



other LIT buildings also had patrols and were able to name the man who coordinates and supervises the various building-based groups, the patrol in their own building was "the patrol" to them.

At the other end of the chart is the tenant patrol unit of the housing authority. This unit organized tenant patrols at projects throughout the city, and it provided a variety of ongoing support services for these patrols. Conceptually it was not a "part" of the organization under study, but practically its policies, decisions, and activities influenced, and controlled, many of the factors of concern to us to such an extent that it must be considered in any discussion of the patrols. Most significantly, the unit payed a project resident to serve as the tenant patrol supervisor, to organize and coordinate patrol activities at Low Income Towers.

While it is correct to speak of a project-wide LIT tenant patrol, it is not an organization in usual terms--it has no members other than the members of the various building patrols and they, as we have noted, do not see themselves as members of a group reaching beyond their own building. Neither does it have officers, meetings, or a charter. It exists primarily in the mind and activities of one man--the LIT tenant patrol supervisor, George Rios--and in the organizational charts and literature of the central tenant patrol unit.

Nevertheless, the project-wide LIT tenant patrol does undertake activities; during the past year it sponsored a Christmas dance for patrol members and helped in the planning of a "fiesta" for project residents and in the distribution of

free lunches for children during the summer. When its activities required the participation of more than Mr. Rios alone, he simply asked the captains of the various building patrols to join him. Given what we shall see as the great instability of the individual building patrols, this middle level of organization is important and should be understood as something more than a sum or composite of the individual building patrols but less than a fully independent organization.

In a functional sense, perhaps the most interesting thing about the three levels of organization is the extent to which the various levels failed to perceive each other accurately. Most of the members interviewed did not know that the central unit existed at all, and a substantial number knew little or nothing about the overall structure at Low Income Towers (for instance, while a majority of members knew that George Rios had something to do with patrols, few knew his responsibilities or that he was paid for his work). In part, this is a question of the visibility of the various organizational components to each other. As we shall see, one result is fairly widespread mutual misunderstanding of goals, practices, and problems.

Rios seemed to know the situation in the individual buildings quite well but had only a hazy notion of the tenant patrol unit. He had been the supervisor for more than a year, for example, before he found out that the central unit had staff available to help him organize patrols. The central unit was geared to deal with local project managers and tenant patrol supervisors, but not with

individual building captains or members. This arrangement presumed a degree of organization at the project level which simply did not exist at Low Income Towers.

Goals

None of the three levels of tenant patrol organization identified had an "official" statement of goals. We asked the members we interviewed to describe the goals of the tenant patrol and, not surprisingly, most answered in terms of their own buildings: "To protect the building and the people"; "to keep the building safe"; "to protect the people who live here." There was considerable congruence of response: 35 of the 39 gave some variation of the basic theme of safety and protection from crime. While the major concerns of members seemed to be muggings and apartment burglaries, several also mentioned protection of the mailboxes and prevention of vandalism. Approximately one in four mentioned a concern about the cleanliness of the building in addition to its safety.

The three buildings studied did not differ markedly in their conceptions of goals, although the members in building B placed significantly greater emphasis on stopping vandalism and keeping the building clean and were more likely to mention the need to protect children. This difference reflected the building captain's particular concern with the appearance the building presented to visitors. The emphasis on children stems from the fact that the building B patrol, unlike the two others studied, was composed primarily of young mothers.

At the project level, a dual set of goals existed. In theory

the basic goal might be stated in terms of the improvement of security or reduction of crime in Low Income Towers as a whole, and a number of George Rios' ideas and activities reflected a broad concern about project-wide security. He suggested the installation of additional lights and fences, cooperated in the preparation of a brochure of safety hints, and repeatedly tried to establish a youth organization to patrol the project's grounds.

When asked about the goals of the tenant patrol, however, his responses reflected a conception of purposes firmly rooted in the strategy of building-by-building organization: "To have building patrols in all of the buildings, or at least all of the high-rise buildings." It is unclear whether this represents a conclusion that the building patrol strategy is the best available option, or a failure to conceive consistently of a more generalized notion of project security. It does seem clear that the building-patrol extension goal is supported and reinforced by Mr. Rios' supervisors in the central tenant patrol unit.

Like the local tenant patrol, the housing authority had no single official statement of goals. It is clear that the central unit was concerned with controlling crime and vandalism in the projects; its organizing literature encouraged residents to join the patrol in order to make their building "a safer, cleaner and more decent place to live." It is equally clear that the authority was seeking to control the cost of law enforcement in public housing. Originally, the central unit was established in part as a response to tenants' demands for additional housing policemen, and the tenant patrol program can be interpreted as a lower-cost

alternative to the expansion of this police force. Finally, the housing authority's literature and our conversations with several of its staff members indicated that the housing authority valued tenant organization and participation, improved relations with management, and an increase in positive interactions among tenants as ends in themselves.

Practically, the purposes of the central unit seemed to be to expand tenant patrols to new projects as residents desired them, and to provide ongoing support and guidance--and additional organizing activity as needed--to projects where patrols were underway.

Activities

The activities of the patrol were primarily but not entirely directed toward the goal of increased security discussed above. For purposes of analysis, patrol activities may be divided into three groups: (1) crime-related activities, those aimed directly at deterring, preventing, or reporting crime; (2) other task-oriented activities, such as those directed toward cleaning up the buildings; and (3) organizational maintenance activities, aimed at recruiting and maintaining membership, ensuring compliance with rules and norms, and enhancing relations with non-members and other organizations.

The Buildings

(1) Most of the actual security-related activities occurred at the building level, and are relatively simple. Groups of patrol members take turns sitting in the lobby, primarily during the

evening hours. By their presence, patrol members hope to deter crime in the lobby and its immediate vicinity. Thus, they fill the same role as doormen in upper-income apartment houses or the stoop sitters and window watchers whose absence from the project was previously discussed. Since visitors generally cross the lobby in order to reach the elevators or stairwells, a lobby patrol partially controls access to the elevators and to the unobserved corridors of upper floors. Lobby patrols are encouraged to establish such control of access by asking strangers to "sign in" with name and destination. Although this procedure does not totally eliminate the hazards associated with using the elevators, it substantially reduces them. Finally, the lobby patrols have plug-in telephones which can be used to notify police of problems or "suspicious" situations. The availability of this phone, and the whole atmosphere and set of expectations associated with the patrol, serve to counteract the unwillingness to report crime discussed earlier. On the whole, this set of activities seems remarkably well suited to dealing with the major intra-building hazards described in the initial section of this report.

Patrol members may supplement these basic activities with a range of more limited tasks. Some patrols provided an elevator escort for residents who came in alone. Others checked the basements for loiterers or evidence of suspicious activity. A few replaced broken or burned-out light bulbs in elevators and stairwells. Occasionally, patrol members followed a visitor who refused to sign in, recorded the number of the apartment to which he went, and subsequently visited the recorded apartments to ask

residents to encourage their guests to cooperate with the patrol. These tasks varied not only from building to building but from member to member in the same building. Activities such as following strangers or providing elevator escorts were more often undertaken by men.

In building A, the captain established two additional procedures which he perceived as security precautions: the elevators, when not in use, were returned to the lobby floor, and children were not permitted to play in the lobby. In building C, the captain instituted a new procedure of filing reports with the management office when a resident's visitors were uncooperative and/or abusive toward the patrol.

The hours of coverage of the lobby patrols varied from building to building and week to week. Most aimed for coverage of the evening weekday hours--approximately 8 P.M. to midnight or 1 A.M., Monday through Friday. It was deemed so unlikely that a patrol would be available for weekends that Saturday and Sunday coverage was usually not even sought. In addition, most buildings have experimented with daytime patrols at some point in their history.

The three buildings which we studied are cases in point. Building A: the building captain and one or two other members usually covered the evening hours on week nights; until a month o so before our study began, an elderly woman had maintained a regu weekday morning patrol to prevent the mailboxes from being burglarized. Building B: the building captain attempted to organiz coverage from 11 A.M. to 11 P.M., Monday through Friday, but foun the late afternoon and supper hours very difficult to cover. Thi

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patrol at the time of our study operated only sporadically. The patrol "came down early" and made a special effort to cover the daytime hours on "check days" when welfare and social security checks arrived in the mail. Building C: the patrol tried for coverage from approximately 8:30 P.M. until the early morning hours on Monday through Friday; a daytime patrol had operated fairly regularly during the first few months after the patrol was organized, again especially on check days, but dwindled to a two-hour shift on Monday afternoons by two staunchly faithful volunteers. This patrol also attempted Saturday evening coverage.

(2) In addition to their security-related activities, patrols occasionally undertook other substantive tasks. The most ambitious of these was the effort by members of the building B patrol to create a sort of community center in their basement. They hoped for a place where informal day care could be provided for the children of patrolling mothers and which could be used as a study hall and recreation area by teenagers in the evening. They cleaned out several large basement rooms and went to the management to ask for paint. The request was turned down on the grounds that the basement facilities were not suitable for the care of young children and that recreation space could not be made available to teenagers without formal supervision. Needless to say, the members were disappointed, and several seemed to have lost interest in the patrol as a result.

Most other tasks which were not related directly to crime prevention focused on building maintenance and clean-up. Patrol members sometimes removed grafitti from lobby walls, reported the

need for repairs to management, or removed trash. Patrol members also provided a sort of information service for residents and visitors: "If my brother comes by, tell him I've gone to the store," and so forth.

(3) All of the building patrols also engaged in activities which were aimed at maintaining the organization: recruitment, recreation, refreshments, and, in some cases, meetings. The serving of refreshments occurred in all buildings: the tenant patrol supervisor, Mr. Rios, provided coffee in the winter and soft drinks in the summer with funds from the housing authority. Individual patrols often supplemented what Mr. Rios brought, either by collecting money from members for the purchase of additional supplies or through donations of food. In a building in which we conducted a pretest of our questionnaire, we found that patrol members had turned the patrol into sort of a pot luck supper. Other organizational maintenance activities varied markedly from building to building.

Building A. Recruitment was carried on through periodic building meetings, announced by posters and fliers, at which the wor of the patrol was explained and prospective members were invited to join. During the first two years of the patrol's existence, these meetings were held every few months, as new members were needed; for approximately the last year, no such recruiting meetings have been held, and participation has dwindled to less than a dozen "hard core" members, almost all of whom were among the original or early volunteers. When they were held, these recruiting meetings also served as business meetings for the patrol. While on patrol,

members in building A amused themselves by card games, dominoes, and conversation, and occasionally a radio or television was made available by a first floor resident.

Building B. Initial recruitment was carried on by a door-to door campaign and a series of floor meetings, and during the first few weeks there were several meetings to discuss patrol business and explain the patrol to new members. After this early burst of activity, however, recruiting became more informal and meetings were no longer held. This patrol operated only sporadically during our study, but when the patrol was in operation recreation took a wide variety of forms: card games, checkers, dominoes, needlework, listening to radios and tapes, singing, talking, and joking. Among the three buildings studied, the building B patrol, when in operation, was the most likely to have more than two or three members in the lobby at once and had the most party-like atmosphere. As one member put it, "We'd crochet and show each other stitches and have coffee and we'd be friendly. It was nice."

Building C. Initial recruiting occurred at a building meeting; all subsequent recruiting was informal, by word of mouth. Volunteers for this patrol were "screened" by the building captain: he checked with the management to make sure there was nothing in the files to indicate that a volunteer was "unsuitable" for patrol responsibilities. During the first year or so of operation, this patrol held regular monthly business meetings; these were discontinued because the patrol dwindled to 15 members who saw each other quite regularly. Card games and conversation were the

major forms of recreation. In the past, the building C patrol had occasionally held birthday parties for members.

Comparing the organizational maintenance activities of the three patrols, two sets of useful generalizations can be made. The first concerns the variation of organizational maintenance activities over time. In each patrol, an initial period characterized by formal recruitment activities and some form of patrol meetings was followed by a cessation of patrol meetings, a switch to informal methods of recruiting, and a decline in the size of the membership. The length of the initial "organized" period and the general extent and effectiveness of organizational maintenance activities depended primarily upon the skill and interest of the building captain.

The second set of generalizations concerns the recreational activities of the various buildings. In all buildings studied, the recreational activities, which reportedly added a great deal to the enjoyment of members and probably aided in attracting new recruits, were basically compatible with the crime-prevention activities of the patrols. Because the lobby patrols functioned primarily as deterrents, the presence of members in the lobby was all that was necessary, and neither recreational activities nor business meetings (when held in the lobby) necessarily detract from the accomplishment of the basic security goals. Such activities helped populate the lobby. Thus, the lobby-patrol form of organization can avoid the conflict which is said to occur in so many organizations between "instrumental" or goal-oriented and "expressive" or social-emotional activities. Here, the two

are complementary.

The Project

At the project level, activities can also be grouped into those aimed at increasing project-wide security, those directed toward other substantive tasks, and those aimed at organizational maintenance, including activities designed to give support to the individual building patrols. As we noted earlier, activities at the project level were in reality primarily the activities of the supervisor, George Rios, assisted at times by the captains of the various building patrols, a volunteer whom he called "my secretary," and other friends.

Over the four-and-one-half years that the tenant patrol at Low Income Towers has been in operation, the major security-directed activities have been the organization of new building patrols and the establishment of two youth patrols (neither of which was in operation at the time of this study).[7] In keeping with the usual pattern of tenant patrol organization in the city, Mr. Rios was hired as tenant patrol supervisor shortly after the patrol in his own building, the first in the project, had been organized, and the expansion of the patrol to additional buildings was described as a major part of his job. In the intervening years, he attempted to start patrols in almost all of the project's buildings, and met with some success in eight of the nine high-rise

[7]The historical data presented here were provided by lengthy and repeated interviews with Mr. Rios and representatives of the housing authority, whom we thank for their patience and cooperation.

buildings but in none of the six-story buildings. Occasionally, one or more tenants from a building has come to Rios with a request for help in organizing a patrol, but usually he has taken the initiative. In addition, Rios initiated or cooperated with attempts to reorganize patrols which have fallen apart in four buildings.

Efforts to organize or reorganize a building patrol usually began with the distribution of fliers urging residents to attend a building meeting to discuss ways of making the building safer; these fliers were standardized forms supplied by the central unit. Usually a representative of the central tenant patrol unit and sometimes building captains or members from buildings with successfully operating patrols attended to explain the patrol program and encourage residents to start a similar operation. If sufficient interest were expressed, the names of volunteers were recorded, a building captain appointed or elected, and the new patrol considered organized. There was frequently a brief waiting period while a phone was installed and a table and chairs ordered from the housing authority. Once a new patrol got underway, Mr. Rios tried to visit it frequently to provide a sort of informal on-the-job training for members and to find out about any problems the new patrol has encountered.

The organization of the two youth patrols involved a different sort of process. As Rios put it: "You don't have to recruit kids; all you have to do is tell one kid, and soon you'll have the whole project." In both instances, Rios simply issued an invitation to an already extant group of young people--in one case

a group of ham radio enthusiasts with who he had been in radio contact, and in the other a group of young men who had been participating in a youth program sponsored by a local anti-poverty agency. Both groups patrolled grounds and parking lots and assisted lobby patrols that were shorthanded. In each case, Rios tried to provide some supervision for the young people and worked to obtain funds so that they could be paid for their work (as are youth patrols in several other housing projects in the city).

Rios eventually asked both groups to stop patrolling. He variously attributed this decision to the opposition of the project manager, complaints from adult residents about the behavior of youth patrol members, and his inability to obtain the hoped-for funds. Rios remained convinced that it was possible to enlist the energy of young people in the cause of increased security, and that the lack of a youth patrol at Low Income Towers may turn this same energy against the regular lobby patrols.

Rios' interest in a mobile patrol which could cover the outdoor areas of the project was reflected in some informal and very sporadic adult patrolling. He occasionally collected some of the building captains and together they checked the parking lots and grounds. Sometimes they used walkie-talkies to keep in touch with a lobby patrol and its phone. While this was certainly not a major activity of the Low Income Towers tenant patrol--it probably occurred about two or three times a month--it was indicative of a direction in which Rios wanted to move, toward greater cooperation among the building units and greater coverage of the outdoor areas.

As noted above, Rios also expressed his concern for the overall security of the project by suggesting to the manager the installation of additional lights and fences and by cooperating in the creation of a brochure of safety hints for tenants.

Several non-security tasks were also undertaken at the project level. The tenant patrol cooperated with the tenants association as an official sponsor of the free summer lunch program. The lunches were prepared under the supervision of the local anti-poverty community corporation with funds provided primarily by the United States Department of Agriculture, and were delivered every day to the "front porch" of the management office where volunteers from the patrol and the tenants association supervised their distribution to the various buildings by youth corps workers. In each building, another volunteer, frequently the tenant patrol building captain, supervised distribution to children playing in the area.

The LIT tenant patrol has also cooperated with the tenants association, a team of social service workers, and a neighborhood social club in sponsoring an all day cookout and fiesta which was held shortly after this study began. The LIT tenant patrol was not able to contribute any large amount of money to the program, but recruited many of the volunteers who did the actual work. Cooperation between the tenant patrol and other organizations was very informal--primarily a matter of discussions and verbal agreements between Mr. Rios and the heads of other groups. Furthermore, since the president of the tenants association was a co-captain of a now dormant building patrol, and since Mr. Rios had encouraged tenant patrol members to attend tenants association

meetings, the lines between these two organizations were somewhat blurred.

Organizational maintenance activities at the project level fall into two groups. Mr. Rios' cooperation with other groups in the project, his participation in activities such as the fiesta, his efforts to keep in touch with youth leaders and to find summer jobs for them can be seen as efforts to maintain a positive image for the patrol. Similarly, his cultivation of contacts with anti-poverty leaders and other agents of the community surrounding the project and his development of friendly relations with the housing policemen were in part an effort to strengthen the position of the patrol--and perhaps also to make certain that he retained his job as supervisor.

A more extensive and important category of organizational maintenance activities was aimed at strengthening the individual building patrols. Mr. Rios almost nightly visited patrols, chatting with members and encouraging them in their work, and he tried to attend all patrol meetings and building recruiting meetings. Weekly, he collected a list of participants from each building captain to forward to the central unit where similar records are kept from all local patrols for insurance purposes. He purchased and delivered coffee or soft drinks to the buildings and ordered equipment (fans, heaters, coffee-pots, games, replacements for chairs, tables or phones as needed). He also ordered the various insignia--armbands, buttons, T-shirts, jackets--available from the housing authority. Since this ordering could not be done directly but had to go through the project management, he met

occasionally with the manager or one of the assistant managers of Low Income Towers.

There were no regularly scheduled, project-wide tenant patrol meetings of any sort, but occasionally Rios called together building captains, sometimes accompanied by co-captains or other particularly active volunteers, to discuss common problems. Mr. Rios was also responsible for planning or helping management to plan any project-wide recognition ceremonies or parties for patrol members. This process had not yet been smoothly worked out, and there had been only two such events, even though each project was entitled to an annual "awards dinner" paid for by the housing authority.

Mr. Rios' style of leadership had both negative and positive consequences for the maintenance of patrols. It is our judgment that he was far more effective in his direct contact with patrol members and potential members than in the various bureaucratic tasks which required phone calls, letter writing, scheduling, precision, and persistence. His informal style and sporadic pace of work were acceptable, probably even preferrable, to many of the project's tenants but were annoying to the management and of limited effectiveness in obtaining the cooperation of the bureaucracies on which he relied for funds, supplies, and other forms of support.

The Housing Authority

The housing authority's tenant patrol unit also undertook

a number of tasks which, while not activities of the Low Income Towers patrol, should also be briefly noted here. They provided three consultants to assist in the organization of new building patrols and the reorganization of old ones. This was a particularly important service for the patrol at Low Income Towers; even though Mr. Rios was quite capable of explaining the patrol program, he found that residents were far more likely to turn out in substantial numbers for a meeting if they were told that a representative of the housing authority would be present. The three consultants were themselves residents of various housing projects where they have been active in the organization of successful patrols, and they were effective public speakers.

The central unit also attempted to provide ongoing supervision of the local supervisors. The weekly insurance rosters provided the central office with basic information on the number of tenants participating and the number of buildings in operation. This information was supplemented by occasional site visits in which the consultants talked with patrol members, their neighbors, the tenant patrol supervisor, and sometimes the project manager to check on the progress of the patrol. The three consultants were, however, only part-time employees, and there are many projects with tenant patrols, so site visits occurred only infrequently, about two or three times a year. An additional opportunity for training and supervision was provided by the monthly supervisors' meetings held at the housing authority headquarters. Policies were explained at these meetings and questions answered, but the majority of the time was devoted to the discussion of

common problems and the sharing of new ideas.

The central unit also maintained contact with local project managers, providing information and advice concerning tenant patrols and other security-related matters. Ideally, the unit prefers to work through managers in its normal communications with tenant patrol supervisors, but managers vary significantly in their willingness to take on the task of guiding the project tenant patrol supervison. At Low Income Towers, the manager, Mrs. Porter, was extremely reluctant to become involved with the patrol, considering it an administrative "burden." The tenant patrol unit has no authority to compel the cooperation of local managers and was reluctant to go over the manager's head to secure compliance, so it generally avoided making demands on Mrs. Porter. The unit also served as a liaison between the local patrols and other branches of the housing authority, notably the housing police.

A major function of the central unit is to search for solutions to the various common problems identified by consultants' reports, supervisors' meetings and conversations with project managers. For example, Low Income Towers shared with numerous other projects the problem of unlocked--and apparently unlockable--basement doors; these unlocked doors defeated one of the major purposes of the patrols by offering would-be intruders an alternative to the lobby as a means of access to the building stairwells and, thus, to the upper floors and elevators. The maintenance department's inability to provide secure and permanent

locks resulted in the central unit's petitioning for a relaxation of the city's code prescribing the sorts of doors which can be used in public housing projects, and research into alternative locks and doors is being carried out.

In addition to organizing, supervision, liaison, and problem-solving, the central unit also administered a variety of tangible and "moral" supports for local patrols. It arranged for a group insurance policy to cover tenants while on patrol. It published a newsletter which reports on innovations at the various projects and hails a "Patrol of the Month." It provided fliers and posters appropriate for various stages of tenant patrol organization and reorganization, and shirts, buttons and armbands. It reviewed requisitions for more substantial supplies --chairs, tables, fans, etc.--submitted by local projects and forwarded these to the supply and procurement branch of the housing authority. And it assisted managers and local supervisors in planning annual awards dinners for patrols. One member of the central staff--the director, the assistant director, or one of the three consultants--tried to attend each of these ceremonial affairs.

While some of these activities had little effect on the patrol at Low Income Towers, (e.g., there had not been an awards dinner), it seems clear that the patrol could not have survived long without the sort of organizational and administrative support the tenant patrol unit provided.

Leadership

The leadership structure of the Low Income Towers tenant patrol was simple and informal. At the top was George Rios. Rios was paid by the housing authority as a part-time staff member, but, as we have seen, in many ways his style and relationships to tenants and to management were more characteristically those of an elected leader of a voluntary association. Mr. Rios was assisted in some of his paperwork by a volunteer, Daisy Brown,[8] whom he called "my secretary" or "the tenant patrol secretary." Her position was totally unofficial and informal. In addition, Mr. Rios was frequently accompanied and assisted in his work by one of his building captains, Ben Watkins. Mr. Watkins often attended the downtown supervisors meetings with Mr. Rios, helped in the organization of several building patrols, and was seen by many members as a leader beyond his own building. As Mrs. Brown put it: "If George Rios isn't around, they get in touch with Watkins; if they can't find Watkins, they look for me."

There was no ongoing steering committee or other official leadership body at the project level, but on two occasions when Rios needed support in a conflict with management, he called together his building captains, his secretary, and several other particularly active volunteers under the name "tenant patrol committee." The building captains met occasionally at Rios' invitation, and they played at least minimal leadership roles beyond their own buildings.

[8]It should be reiterated that all of the names used here are fictitious.

Within the individual buildings, the building captain was clearly in charge; Rios was available to help out, and he tried to make suggestions and provide subtle guidance, but he felt very strongly that captains put in a lot of time and should be permitted, in his words, "to run their own show." Some policies, of course, were established by the central unit; volunteers were to deter and report crime but not to "play policeman" by getting involved; patrol members were requested to sign an insurance roster. Most day-to-day procedures, however, were left for determination at the local level, and Rios gave this authority to the building captains. They decided the hours and schedule of patrol operations, whether and how often to have meetings, and what activities to undertake. For example, Mr. Watkins in building A decided to close his patrol for a month or so during the summer; Mr. Smith in building C decided that his patrol would not follow strangers who refused to follow the sign-in procedures.

Captains had the option of sharing this decision-making power with co-captains, other leaders, or the general patrol membership. We found little such sharing of power, however. Several of the buildings had one or more co-captains, but in only one of the buildings that we studied did the co-captains share in the decision-making and then only in a limited sphere: in building C, co-captain Jose Santiago was in charge of the day patrol which operated for a few months. The day patrol was reduced to a single Monday afternoon shift by the time of our study, but Mr. Santiago still had the authority to re-establish the day patrol if he wished to do so. In

building A, the same man held the title of co-captain for several years, but he was only minimally involved in the patrol; a similar situation existed in building B.

There were informal leaders as well. We asked members to name the leaders of their patrol, and in every building, persons other than the captain or official co-captain were named.

There was no further elaboration of the leadership structure beyond the captains and co-captains. There was no steering committee or any other form of committee structure in any of the buildings. Thus, the captain not only held all of the formal power in his individual building patrol, but was also the only organized source of action. That is, with no elaboration of the leadership structure, no refreshments committee or recruiting committee, the captain was responsible for almost anything that got done, and the activity level of the patrol was more of a reflection of the captain's energy and available time than of any other factor.

To varying degrees, this "centralization of action" extended even to the basic work of watching the lobby; the actual work of patrolling usually began only after the captain came down to the lobby, set up the table and chairs, plugged in the phone, and called some of the members. In building A, this was true to such an extent that Mr. Watkins simply kept the table and chairs in his own apartment when he was not on patrol, and several of the members interviewed reported that "no one will come down unless Mr. Watkins is there." In building B, where the table and chairs were kept in a first floor apartment and were available to any patrol member on request, the patrol was more independent of the captain's presence, but she was still the person most likely to set things up and

initiate a particular patrol session. In building C, equipment remained set up in a patrol headquarters on the first floor, but only the captain had a key; a patrol could get underway without his physical presence, but only under the leadership of someone to whom he was willing to entrust the key.

Given the importance of the captain's role, it is interesting to note the way in which captains were selected. This varied somewhat from building to building and over time, but one pattern was dominant. At the organizing meeting for a building patrol, Mr. Rios asked for volunteers for the position. Usually there was only one--who was promptly appointed. Then Rios tried to persuade a person from another ethnic group to serve as co-captain. Sometimes there was a later election to ratify these choices. The selection of Mr. Smith in building C followed this pattern exactly. In building A, where the patrol organization process was less hurried, a temporary captain and co-captain were appointed on an interim basis for a month, at the end of which they ran against each other and Mr. Watkins, the interim co-captain, won. He has been re-elected annually without opposition ever since. In building B, Mrs. Ortiz was appointed by Mr. Rios after a captain and co-captain who had earlier been elected had both stopped participating.

The lack of effective voice for the general membership which was reflected in the leadership selection process also carried over into the conduct of patrol business. As indicated earlier, the captains determined how often meetings took place, and while all of the groups we studied conducted meetings during their first few months of operation, none had any sort of business meetings

at the end of our study. Without such meetings, there was little opportunity for members to participate in decision-making. When asked how decisions were made, however, most of the members in buildings A and C and some in B referred to the early meetings and said that choices were made by majority rule; these members seemed unaware that decision-making had continued even though the meetings had stopped. On the whole, members were fairly well satisfied with their limited participation. We asked them how much voice they had in the running of their patrol, and then whether this amount was enough, too little, or too much. Among 39 members, 19 reported that they had little voice or no voice at all, 15 reported that they had "some" voice, and 4 indicated that they had a lot of voice. Only three people reported feeling that they had too little voice in the running of the group.

Because the leadership structure was so informal and unelaborated, and because the members had so little effective voice, a great deal depended upon the personality, attitudes, and leadership style of the individual leader. Therefore it seems useful to make a few observations about the leaders with whom we were in contact. In general, they were less likely to be Black, less likely to be female, and less poor than the general membership, and they have lived in the neighborhood even longer, were more likely to have completed high school or gone on for further education, and were more likely to be members of other organizations than the average member. With these generalizations as background, let us look at the specific characteristics which affect their effectiveness as leaders.

Both the role of building captain and the role of tenant patrol supervisor require their occupants to "work with people." These leaders must spend a lot of time talking with volunteers and explaining the program to potential volunteers; ideally, they should be able to listen well in order to understand the needs and problems of the patrols, and to speak effectively and generate enthusiasm and confidence.

Mr. Rios was certainly friendly and expressed concern about his volunteers and building captains; he was able to sense the feelings and concerns of patrol members. He certainly did not have a great deal of personal authority, however; he inspired considerable loyalty by his concern and appearance of extensive effort, but he did not generate a great deal of enthusiasm. Fortunately, the central unit's consultants were available to supply the missing enthusiasm when it was most needed, in the organizing phase.

The building captains varied markedly in terms of their ability to get along with members and potential members. Mr. Watkins in building A had a somewhat abrasive personality; people used terms like "cranky" and "ornery" to describe him, and the experience of our interviewers lends support to this characterization. He inspired considerable respect from some of his patrol members, but no one mentioned enjoying his company, and several people reported that potential members, especially Puerto Ricans and young people of both races, had been alienated by his personality. As one member put it: "Young people especially don't like Mr. Watkins and the way they are treated; I can't really blame them--I'm uncomfortable with Mr. Watkins also." Mrs. Ortiz,

building B's captain, was vivacious, persuasive and lively, and her personality seemed to attract potential members. Mr. Smith of building C had some of these qualities but became very hostile when he was challenged or felt threatened.

The social skills and attributes of all the leaders were meshed in a set of attitudes toward their neighbors which had multiple effects on the performance of their roles. All of the three building captains in one sense or another were condescending toward the residents of their buildings. Mr. Watkins, in building A, thought that the project had deteriorated rapidly in recent years because the management had been letting in "a lower quality of tenant"; he complained about "welfare chislers" and mothers who did not keep their children from marking up the walls; and he believed that within a few months, his neighbors would turn even a luxury dwelling into a slum. These attitudes were partly responsible for the alienating behavior described above, but they are also reflected in his assumption of the major responsibility for the work of the patrol. His commitment to the patrol has clearly contributed to its stability, and Mr. Watkins' patrol was the oldest in the project.

Mrs. Ortiz had more sympathy for the culture of the area, having grown up in the neighborhood, but she had a particular antipathy toward "lazy people," and, by her definition, anyone who had not volunteered for the patrol was lazy. This attitude resulted in a sharp decrease of recruiting efforts after an initial canvas--she felt that people who did not join the first time around were probably not worth having.

The top of the scale of condescension, however, was represented by Mr. Smith in building C who thought that most of the residents of his building were probably "not suitable" for the patrol. He included in this designation not only anyone with a criminal record, but any male who was not employed and could not be "excused" on grounds of age or disability. When he was first appointed captain, he tried to screen potential members by giving them a test but was eventually dissuaded from that procedure; he then found a new way way of screening members by sending their "applications" to the management office for acceptance or rejection on the basis of the information in the files. While Mr. Smith's negative feelings toward his neighbors were probably the strongest of the three, they were not as obvious, and, thus, did not as immediately affect his interactions with potential members as did Mr. Watkins' behavior, because Smith's general mien was far more friendly and outgoing.

In contrast to the building captains, the tenant patrol supervisor, Mr. Rios, identified wholeheartedly with the residents of Low Income Towers. He had a particular ability to differentiate between the crime which he was trying to prevent and the relatively harmless pranks of teenagers, and he regarded all residents of the project except those actively involved in criminal activity as potential patrol members. At times, his openness toward his neighbors may have gone too far; he reported that in one of his earlier organizing efforts he appointed as building captain a man who was later identified by residents as the building's chief drug pusher. The man had been using the position of captain to assure his clients and suppliers safe conduct across the lobby. In general, however,

Rios' attitude towards his neighbors was an asset to him in his work.

In regard to basic organizational skills the situation was just the opposite. All of the building captains had, to varying degrees, the persistence, the sense of organization, and the mastery of basic organizational methods (scheduling meetings and announcing them, keeping records, remembering details) which are necessary to keep an organization functioning. Watkins, particularly, was careful and reliable. Ortiz was quite innovative in regard to organizational methods but less persistent and more likely to get diverted from the patrol by her numerous other activities. Smith seemed to have a good grasp of bureaucratic procedures and dealt more effectively than most building captains with the project management, though his interest in applying his skills to the patrol seemed to have decreased after he was criticized by some former patrol members. Rios, the tenant patrol supervisor, on the other hand, was notably lacking in this sort of organizational skill. He would place an order for some equipment and then not check up on it for several months; he worked sporadically in bursts of energy; he did not seem to understand much about bureaucracy; he called meetings on the spur of the moment; he kept few records.

There is one organizational skill, however, with which Rios was well endowed, in sharp contrast to his building captains. He found it very easy to delegate power; as noted above, he gave the building captains virtually complete control over their own buildings. The captains, in turn, were singularly unable to share

this authority with others. They seemed to lack the confidence--in their own arrangements and positions, but more importantly, in the capacities and diligence of their neighbors--to let go of any of the power which had been conferred on them. To some extent this was structural--the lack of any committee structure or other elaboration of the patrol organization made the sharing of power and responsibility difficult. But it seems likely that the three building captains would have had difficulty in working with any sort of committee structure, even if it had been available.

The personality traits and attitudes of the three building captains have been important to the experience and development of their individual patrols, but they have a relevance beyond the specific case. The basic qualities that the three captains have in common are related to class. They are closer to the middle class than their neighbors in terms of education and income; theyseem to have internalized many middle-class values; and they would like to be middle class--i.e., they have upwardly mobile aspirations. They reject the lower-class idenfification implied by residence in public housing and many of the value and behavioral aspects of lower-class life. They are marginal people, neither middle class nor lower class, not able to draw support from the kinship networks and other vital parts of the lower-class culture, yet prohibited by income, occupation, race and residence from feeling at ease in the middle-class world. It appears that this middle-class orientation was closely linked to their willingness to take on the rather demanding job of the building captain. To some extent, the authority of the building

captain's role and the general civic-mindedness and uprightness of the whole affair are likely to appeal primarily to persons who share this marginal status. Similarly, the organizational skills which the patrols so desperately need are more likely to be found among persons who have had the sort of education and work or other organizational experience which may also produce middle-class aspirations and values.

Rewards and Incentives

The tenant patrol provides a variety of rewards and incentives to encourage participation. The foremost among these is the members' feelings of increased safety; all but one of our respondents indicated that they believed the patrol was effective in improving security, and a large majority, 31 of 39, mentioned protection or safety when asked what they liked most about the organization: "I like to see the people sitting there for protection and to protect the elevator and that they check in strangers--and to learn people to keep the building clean."

Most respondents also mentioned other rewards. "I liked the whole thing--getting out of the house, breaking the monotony, something different to do, and the protection." The most extensively and enthusiastically described reward was the opportunity to socialize with other residents, mentioned by 22 of the 39 members interviewed: "I got to know the people. It was something to get out the house. Everybody was nice; the officers were nice; it was exciting to get ready for it." Building B, the building in which the captain, Mrs. Ortiz, was particularly

gregarious and the patrol most likely to take on the appearance of a party, was the building in which socializing was most important to the members. Judging from the number of comments referring to the opportunity to "get out of the house" or to "see other people for a change," however, the patrol seemed to meet socio-emotional needs for the residents of all three of the buildings studied.

For some members, the socializing associated with the patrol may have long-term benefits: 30 of 39 members interviewed reported that they had made new friends through their involvement with the patrol. The importance of socializing and making friends as rewards is stressed by the fact that three of the four people who reported that they did not enjoy their patrol activities did not make friends. Among the 35 who did enjoy their activities, only six (17 percent) failed to make new friends.

In addition to breaking the monotony of the daily routine and providing opportunities for new friendships, a number of members thought that the social interaction engendered by the patrol, both among members and between members and other residents, was important to tenants' security. They said that neighbors who know each other are more likely to look out for each other's safety, and that it is important to know who lives in the building: "I get to see the new people and their family and friends. Then I know who lives here and who doesn't belong." Several people mentioned that because they recognized more of their neighbors, they were less afraid, even when the patrol was not in the lobby.

A sizeable number of patrol members reported deriving satisfaction from the feeling that they were doing their part, being constructive: "It gives me a good feeling to be a part of something as important as this; this is not a children's game; it has to be done." Several emphasized their approval of the general idea of tenant participation in community improvement: "We are doing something to keep up our building."

Some patrol members derived satisfaction from the sense that their friends and neighbors appreciated their efforts on behalf of improved security, but this did not seem to be important to most members. Approximately three-quarters of those interviewed said that their family and close friends liked the patrol, but when asked about the general reputation of the patrol among building residents, results were less positive. Among 38 who answered the question, 18 felt the general reputation of the patrol was good; 16 thought it was bad, and four suggested that it varied from time to time or group to group. In other words, less than half felt that the patrol was generally well received. Almost all of those interviewed felt the housing police supported and appreciated the patrol, but few had any sense that the project management did so.

As noted above, a few tangible rewards--refreshments, armbands, buttons, jackets, T-shirts, and the supposedly annual awards dinner--were provided by the housing authority. In general, these seemed to add to the enjoyment and visibility of the patrol but were not major incentives for participation. No one mentioned them in responding to the question about what aspects

of the patrol they liked best, though several people did mention enjoying refreshments at other points in the interview. The T-shirts and jackets are frequently visible around the project, suggesting that their owners enjoy them, but they do not appear to be a decisive factor in any way. These tangible rewards are also intended to convey to patrol members a sense of the housing authority's support and appreciation for their efforts, but since most of the members interviewed were completely unaware of the authority's role, that sense of appreciation has probably not been effectively communicated. The awards dinner is the major channel through which such communication normally occurs, and Low Income Towers has had a dance and a party but no awards dinner.

Tenant patrol members were not paid for their efforts, but since this option has been suggested by some housing project managers and others as a means of expanding and stabilizing the patrols, we discussed it with the members we interviewed.

Only a third felt that they should be paid, and a slightly larger proportion felt that "regular participants" should be paid. Some of those who favored paying members did so as a matter of principle: "Nobody should work for nothing." Some simply argued that they deserved to be compensated: "We get a lot of abuse; we need money; some of us can't work elsewhere." Most, however, were pragmatic. They felt that paying members, or giving them a small rent reduction, would be an effective inducement to participation: "More people would be interested;""maybe they'd come more often;" "we'd get the whole building down."

This belief was shared by a number of members who opposed pay.

They felt that such additional participants would not share the commitments or uphold the standards of volunteers: "with money, it might be worse--not from the heart," or "if you pay a person to do a job, they'll do only what is required; volunteers do more." Other members opposed paying patrols in principle: "It's for their own benefit;" "We should all be interested;" "I enjoy it; anything I enjoy, I shouldn't be paid for."

There were three sets of circumstances which were associated with the feeling that patrol members should be paid. First, people who had no other employment were more likely than employed people to feel they should be paid; perhaps they were simply more in need of the extra money--or of the affirmation that their time and effort were worth remuneration. Second, people who felt that the patrol was something of a burden or a sacrifice and that they spent too much time on it were likely to feel that they should be paid. Third, people were more likely to be responsive to the idea of paying members if they felt that their patrol was likely to die from non-participation. In general, the interviews expressed a great deal of ambivalence toward the idea of paying patrol members. Many members believed that payment would increase participation, but most found the idea offensive to their sense of volunteer pride. Most preferred to do without payment if possible, but quite a few were willing to consider it as means of preventing the demise of the patrol.

It was an original assumption of this research that paying volunteers, particularly in low-income areas, would ameliorate the instability of voluntary crime control programs. Yet LIT residents

were, for the most part, not interested in such remuneration and, in fact, tended to express feelings of civic responsibility very similar to those stated by the wealthy Childguard members. Future research should compare programs with paid members to voluntary efforts, so that the consequences of remuneration could be systematically assessed.

Building captains, also, were unpaid at Low Income Towers, but here the results of our discussions were quite different. In response to the open-ended question "Who should be paid?", over half of the members suggested the building captain. On further probing, only five members specified that the building captain should not be paid, and members seemed generally receptive to the idea.

Building captains, of course, shared in all of the rewards described above in regard to regular members: increased protection, opportunities to socialize with and get to know other tenants, the normative rewards of voluntary participation in something worthwhile and approved, the support of friends and relatives, and the tokens of support provided by the housing authority. It seems likely that the normative rewards, the feeling of "doing one's part" and "making a contribution," were even greater for building captains than for regular members. Similarly, building captains were more likely to be aware of the support and appreciation of the housing authority. And building captains certainly achieved a level of recognition, appreciation, and decision-making power through their work.

Nevertheless, building captains at Low Income Towers have

been hard to keep and difficult to replace. It appears that the demands of the task, the time and energy required for scheduling and recruiting, the nagging necessity of "opening up" the patrol (getting out chairs and tables, percolator, etc.) which has usually fallen to building captains at Low Income Towers, and the responsibility and blame if anything goes wrong or if neighbors are antagonized have outweighed the rewards available for most occupants and potential occupants of the building captain's role.

For the tenant patrol supervisor, on the other hand, the rewards seem to have been ample. While Mr. Rios occasionally grumbled that he payed for many of the refreshments "out of his own pocket," put in long hours, and got no cooperation from management, he did not mention the possibility of quitting. Indeed, he seemed quite concerned that he might lose his job or that his 20 hours a week at $2.50 an hour might be cut back to 10 hours. In addition to this financial incentive and to the rewards described above in regard to patrol members, it was clear that Rios had gained a measure of power and influence through his work--he spoke of "pulling strings" downtown or in the local anti-poverty agency to obtain summer jobs for project youth--and that he genuinely enjoyed the rewards of knowing and being known by so many project residents. As he put it in an early interview:

> "One of the real advantages of a patrol is that you get to know people. Before I started on the patrol, I had lived here for 12 years, I only knew 4 people. Now I know everyone. Everyone knows me, my family."

Areas of Concern

This section will focus on the areas of concern to patrol members and leaders and to other project residents. These can be grouped as problems with physical facilities; problems in relationships--among members and between members and other residents; the problem of insufficient participation; and the problem of physical danger.

Physical Facilities

The inadequacy of physical facilities was a constant source of irritation to patrol members and contributed to a limitation on the stability of the patrol. The building lobbies, the primary loci of patrol activity, are inhospitable. Because there is no place to sit, patrols are unlikely to get underway on a given evening until someone arrives with chairs and a card table. Several members reported that while they had initially made a practice of going to the lobby at the time appointed for the patrol, they had found waiting there so unpleasant that they now wait in their apartments until they are informed that a patrol has begun. This increases the burden of the captain who must not only bring the chairs and other equipment but must also telephone patrol members.

The difficulties of "opening up" the patrols are magnified by the lack of convenient storage space for patrol equipment. In building A, the captain, Mr. Smith, keeps the chairs, table percolator, fans, and phone in his own upper-floor apartment. In building B they are stored by a first floor resident. Only in

building C is a first floor room available where patrol equipment can be conveniently stored and retrieved without necessitating the disturbance of a resident. In order to obtain this room, however, patrol members found it necessary not only to petition the local manager, but to back up their petition with a six-week "strike" and to involve central unit staff in settling the dispute. The local manager has been similarly slow to cooperate in a range of other matters involving physical facilities, and many members see this as evidence of an uncaring and unappreciative attitude on her part--a symbolic problem which magnified the physical inconveniences.

The physical problem which had the greatest negative effect upon the largest number of individual building patrols was the basement door problem noted above in connection with the housing authority's problem-solving role. All of the high-rise buildings at Low Income Towers have basement doors which are accessible from the project grounds and provide entrance to the building stairwells. When these doors are unlocked, intruders have a means of reaching the upper floors and elevators which does not involve crossing the lobby, and the effectiveness of the lobby patrol is thus greatly diminished. Unfortunately, these doors are governed by fire regulations which specify that they must remain unlocked from the inside at all times, and they are very difficult to lock securely from the outside. Neither the local management, whose efforts have been limited, nor the housing authority has been able to find a lock which can both meet the legal safety requirements and withstand the treatment given basement doors, secluded

as they are from public view. The locks are usually broken.

At Low Income Towers, several building patrols refused to patrol until some solution to the problem is found, and several others continued to patrol with reduced effectiveness. Many members blamed management for the consistently broken locks and saw them as evidence of the manager's lack of interest in the patrol. The manager, on the other hand, felt that tenants broke the locks and so should not complain about the problem; she especially resented what she saw as efforts by several building groups to pressure her into taking action by refusing to patrol. Only one effective solution has been found to the basement door problem to date, and it is illegal. Mr. Watkins, in building A, simply padlocked the door with a chain at the beginning of each patrol and removed the padlock when patrol members left the lobby for the night.

Interpersonal Relations

These physical problems were the setting for a variety of problems in human relations. Some were relatively minor conflicts among patrol members. Non-smokers did not like to sit on the patrol with smokers. Some members, especially those from fundamentalist religious backgrounds, disapproved of card playing on the patrol; as one elderly man put it, "It doesn't look right." Similar complaints were voiced by members who felt that patrols should be quiet and serious and avoid a party-like atmosphere, and by members who objected to the patrol's having a lot of food in the lobby if passers-by were not to be invited to join. In

addition, there were some personality conflicts; some members just did not enjoy the company of some other members and would not stay with them in the lobby. Members in all of the buildings mentioned gossip as a problem, and almost all mentioned the building captains as the source of the problem. In building B, several members and former members mentioned feeling that there was a clique or "in-crowd" from which they were excluded. Most members, however, were able to find at least a few others whose company they enjoyed, so these problems were generally not insurmountable. Moreover, such conflicts can have consequences for increasing a group's social cohesion. They do not appear to be responsible for the demise of any of the groups.

Members also had conflicts over more substantive issues of patrol procedure. In one building, a number of people were alienated by the captain's refusal to allow them to use the patrol phone to communicate with their families upstairs even though he used it himself to order pizzas and for other non-emergency purposes. There were some arguments over the practice of making non-residents sign in; some members felt that all outsiders should be asked to sign in, while others said that only strangers unknown to anyone on the patrol should be requested to register. The major substantive issue revolved around the question of who should patrol. In buildings B and C, there were arguments about the advisability of allowing teenagers to participate. One woman in B described the issue this way:

> "They didn't want teenagers down there because they claim they would cause trouble and that there would be gang members hanging out in the lobby; but

> instead they were like young adults because we treated them that way. It kept them busy and out of trouble."

Opposition to the participation of teenagers ranged from a relatively mild concern that the younger volunteers would not be conscientious--that they would play around and fail to pay attention to the work of the patrol--to a real fear that the lobby would be taken over by one of the numerous local teenage gangs, or become the site of conflicts between and among gangs. In building C, this issue became a major one because a number of members felt that a particular teenager who was permitted by the captain to sit with the patrol regularly was himself a source of crime in the building and that he and his friends were part of a large gang which had been making life miserable for project residents. Several reported that they had stopped patrolling for this reason: "I don't go anymore because I don't like some of the kids who hang around; they are the same ones we were trying to protect against and now they're on the patrol." The building captain was aware of the members' antagonism, but said that the young man in question should be made welcome as long as there was no "trouble" associated with his sitting on the patrol.

Few of the people with whom we talked mentioned the issue of race, and the captains and the tenant patrol supervisor insisted that there were no major problems in race relations on the patrols, but we got the impression that there was an undertone of racial suspicion, and Black-Puerto Rican conflicts are hardly rare in ghetto areas. In building A, the patrol was almost entirely Black, and one member reported that Mr. Watkins did not like

Puerto Ricans, who in turn did not like the patrol. In building B, a woman told us with considerable pride that their patrol had been complimented for having Blacks and Puerto Ricans sitting together on the same shift--suggesting that at some point this must have been a problem. In building C, the teenage gang which was most active was Black, and most of the members who had stopped patrolling because of its pressure were Puerto Rican. In general, there seemed to be a tendency for people to perceive the teenagers of the other race as frightening gang members and the teenagers of their own race as playful youngsters.

Conflicts between the patrol and non-members also occurred with some frequency. A number of members reported with concern that their fellow tenants thought they were in the lobby to "snoop." Mrs. Ortiz mentioned engendering the hostility of residents who keep pets in violation of project rules: "A lot of people here don't like the tenant patrol because we see their dogs and cats; because of the patrol, someone thought I had reported her dog." Members also reported that their neighbors did not like them to know who their guests were and resented the sign-in procedure as an invasion of privacy. In one building, a family crisis was precipitated when a man came home late in the evening, glanced at the patrol's roster of visitors, and found that another man had been visiting his wife. Patrol members tended to feel that such opposition came only from people "who have something to hide," and they were often rather self-righteous about the matter, a trait which probably engendered further hostility on the part of some non-members. Some people thought that the sign-in

procedure was not administered fairly. One former member reported that she had quit "because I didn't like the way they asked nice, decent people to sign in, but didn't stop the vandals because they came in with a resident of the building."

Non-members on the first floor of one of the buildings complained about the noise associated with the patrol. Families of teenagers in building A--and other residents as well-- did not like the way Mr. Watkins spoke to teenagers or his unwillingness to have them "hang out" in the lobby. The husbands and wives of some members were reportedly jealous of the time their spouses gave to the patrol and unhappy about their association with members of the opposite sex.

To some extent, the general atmosphere of annoyance, irritation and complaint which is described here reflects minor human relations problems which are likely to occur in any group of people. It seems to us, however, that the level of such aggravations was higher than might be expected as "normal." The patrol seemed to become the focus for all of the little conflicts in the building, probably because people who live under the same roof and share common space, especially in the crowded conditions of a public housing project, are likely to get in each others' way, and there was no other organizational outlet for the expression and resolution of such normal conflicts. The tenant association at Low Income Towers was a small and relatively ineffectual organization, and it was not organized on a building-by-building basis, so the patrol inherited all the accumulated freight of years of unexpressed neighbor conflicts and hostilities.

Non-Participation

Despite the conflicts and mutual antagonisms between patrol members and non-members, the former very much wanted to have more of their neighbors join. Two-thirds of the members interviewed expressed resentment of their neighbors' non-participation: "I was more involved than I should have been; others should have played their part....it wasn't fair. The burden fell on a few of us for the whole building." Even those who were not angry or embittered strongly believed that more residents ought to participate: "We're protecting their family; they should help." When asked whether they thought the patrol could do more than it has already done, most members specified lack of participation as the factor limiting their activities. "If we had more people, they could have taken turns patrolling the building, but we did pretty well with what we had."

The determinants of the non-participation problem will be explored below as one aspect of the stability question. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to point out the results of the lack of participation. Not only did a lack of manpower limit the activities of the patrol, but a number of the original members decreased their own participation, unwilling to put in long hours if others were not going to "do their share," or if the patrol was not to be there to assist them when they needed it: "I figured we would get more people involved; instead they didn't bother.... All the time I put in--and when I wasn't there, there wasn't a patrol for me when I came into the building." After a while, some of the members who had given the most time and energy began to feel foolish. Mr. Smith, the captain in building

C, reported that he sometimes felt the non-members were "sitting in the comfort of their homes in the winter laughing at us."

Danger

Occasionally, members reported feeling that the people they encountered while on patrol regarded them with something more threatening than amusement. Several of the women with whom we talked said they were sometimes really afraid while on patrol, and bemoaned the fact that there were frequently no men around to assist them: "In the beginning it was dangerous; the door was open; there were only two of us at first, and it was women. We had nothing to defend ourselves, only women." The fear of physical abuse seemed to center on "rough-looking" strangers and on the notion that local muggers were "out to get" the patrol because it interfered with their work: "You don't know really who is coming in or what they'll do. Some pretty rough characters come in; some pretty rough characters live in this building and their company is rough." Older members were especially prey to fears of attack: "A little fellow like me, old as I am, they would run over me..." Several people linked their fears to the unlocked basement doors: "A guy could come in and hit us on the head."

These fears seem to have only a minimal basis in fact. No one had ever been hurt while on patrol at Low Income Towers, although several members were verbally threatened, and one member almost certainly risked getting hurt by intervening in an incipient gang fight in her building's lobby. In general, it appeared that the fear of physical assault was a significant problem only for a relatively small number of patrol members. Nearly half replied in the affirmative when directly asked if the work was

ever dangerous, but very few brought up the subject spontaneously.

The Members

This section will provide basic socio-economic and descriptive data about the members of the Low Income Towers tenant patrol, and some selected information about their participation. Additional data about members' ideas and attitudes have been presented in other sections of this chapter.

The notion of membership in the Low Income Towers tenant patrol is very vague. The number of members varied not only from week to week but also from definition to definition. One clear distinction which can be made is between "actual participants" and "enrolled members." The number of actual participants, discrete individuals who spent time sitting in the lobby, was tabulated by the housing authority each month from the insurance rosters submitted by the tenant patrol supervisors. During the period in which this study was in progress, an average of 129 persons per month actually participated in the patrol at Low Income Towers. This figure represents a range from a high of 165 persons in July, 1972 to a low of 74 persons in February, 1973.

"Enrolled members" are people who have filled out forms volunteering for the patrol and indicating the hours they are available. This number is generally much higher than the number of active participants, both because some of those who volunteer never participate and because some of the enrolled members live in buildings where the patrol has stopped operating.

Mr. Rios reported that he had 485 members, and he estimated that all but 50 of these have at some time participated. There is no process for removing the names of inactive members, however, so the names are carried from year to year.

The tenant patrol does not systematically gather information on the characteristics of members, so the members described here will be the 39 members from three buildings we interviewed.

(1) Most of them are Black. We interviewed 23 Black, 15 Puerto Rican and 1 Jewish member, and the tenant patrol supervisor reported that throughout the project, more Blacks than Puerto Ricans participate. In some cases, Puerto Ricans among the non-members we interviewed cited language difficulties as a reason for not joining, and this may partially explain their lower rate of participation.

(2) Most of them are women. Again, Mr. Rios confirmed that women are more active than men, although not to the extent reflected in our interviews (30 women, 9 men). Census data for the tract in which Low Income Towers is located show that there are considerably more women than men in the general population; among persons aged 15 or over, women outnumber men 3 to 2. (Low Income Towers residents account for approximately two-thirds of the residents of the census tract which also includes several blocks of tenements with a population similar to that of the project and several high-income apartment buildings.)

(3) Most of them are poor. Seventeen or slightly less than half of our respondents reported yearly incomes of less than $5,000 annually, and only 4 people said their family incomes

were $10,000 or more per year. Clearly these figures are indicative of patrol membership in general, since Low Income Towers is a public housing project and is restricted by law to families in the lower income range. The 1970 census showed a median income of $5,217 for the LIT census tract.

(4) Most do not have full time jobs. Among the 39 persons we interviewed, 12 are employed on a full time basis, 8 have part time jobs, and 19 are not employed. Many of those not employed are young mothers who are either receiving public assistance or have husbands who are employed.

(5) Most did not finish high school. Fully 25 per cent had received no high school education at all. Only 36 per cent had finished high school. Again, the census data for the population of the area lend credence to this finding: only 35.6 per cent of the residents 25 years old and older are high school graduates.

(6) Most have lived in the neighborhood for many years. Twenty-five of those interviewed had lived in the neighborhood for 15 years or more, and only 4 had lived there for fewer than 5 years. Similarly, 18 had lived at Low Income Towers for 15 or more years, and only 5 for fewer than 5 years. About three-fourths of those interviewed reported that they had close friends or relatives living in the neighborhood, and 64 per cent were rated as moderately or well satisfied with the neighborhood.

(7) Most are not "joiners." Although 30 of the 39 interviewed are registered voters, the overwhelming majority reported that they belonged to no other civic or political

organizations and had never participated in any other political or social action. In fact, the response to these questions was so low that we suspect that the question was not always fully understood, but it is certainly clear that the tenants we interviewed did not have many organizational affiliations.

Thus, even more strongly than was the case with Childguard, the patrols have a potential of attracting people who are not otherwise involved in voluntary associations. Such membership, contrary as it is to the literature on voluntary association participation, underscores the importance of safety to LIT residents, and the patrols can be viewed as a way of tying relatively isolated individuals into a functioning associational network.

(8) Most have had direct or indirect experience with crime. Sixteen of those interviewed or two-fifths had themselves been victims of crime. Another 15 had had less direct experience as witnesses of crime or as close friends or relatives of crime victims. Only a fifth of the members interviewed had had no such experiences at all.

Why Members Joined

Members of the Low Income Towers Tenant Patrol also have one other major characteristic in common: they joined the patrol in order to make their buildings safer. In response to an open-ended question about reasons for joining, all but one of the members interviewed mentioned a crime-related motivation. "I thought it was helpful, would prevent muggings," or, "I live in the building; I think everyone should join because it's for our

protection" were typical answers. About one-quarter of our respondents also indicated that they joined to help protect the buildings from vandalism as well.

Only four members mentioned social pressure from friends or relatives as a contributing factor in their decision to join, but several mentioned a sense of obligation. "I felt it was something I should do--I wanted to feel safe and I felt I should do it. You have to be interested in it if you want to get anything out of it."

About a quarter of the members also mentioned the opportunity to see other tenants and get out of their apartments: "Something to occupy my time. I'm home all day with two kids and sometimes I start to go bananas."

> "To get out of the house, really. I thought it would be a good idea--I live here and you find out who are nice people. It's more like socializing while maintaining the building at the same time.

For the most part, members believed that others had also joined the patrol in order to improve the security of the building. This emphasis on crime-related reasons for joining is not surprising when the extensive crime experience of members is recalled. Three-fourths of the members felt that crime rates in their neighborhood were rising, and three-fifths had changed their day-to-day behavior because of the crime situation. Two-thirds of those with children indicated that they were worried about their children's safety.

Among the members we interviewed, there were also many similarities in the nature of participation in the patrol. Most (27 of 39) were "old members"; they had joined the patrol when

it was first organized. Most had heard about the patrol through formal means--meetings, recruiting fliers, or door-to-door recruitment--rather than informally from friends. Most put in a great deal of time: twenty-two participated more than once a week (or had done so when they were active), and another fifteen participated about once a week; only two participated less frequently. Most were fairly well satisfied with the amount of time they spent. Seven felt they spent too much time and five, too little, but twenty-seven felt the time they put in was "just about right." Almost all of the members enjoyed patrol activities and felt the organization was effective. In this case, the sociability consequences and activities of membership were not only not inimical to the patrols' instrumental functions but complemented them. People sitting in the lobbies both to meet new friends and to protect the buildings' residents act as an effective patrol.

Responsibility

The Low Income Towers tenant patrol was highly responsible. This judgment will be specified, the data upon which it is based briefly presented, and explanations offered below.

We found no evidence of illegal behavior or of inclination toward the use of illegal means of crime control. Our many visits to the patrols yielded no observation of irresponsible acts. None of the sixty-six persons we interviewed reported any incidents of irresponsible behavior, even though several of the former members and non-members were quite critical of other

aspects of the patrol. Neither did the manager, the tenant patrol unit, nor the community relations division of the housing authority police have any complaints about the responsibility of the patrol, although the central unit did report that patrols at a few of the other projects had been involved in irresponsible actions.

The explanation for this high degree of responsibility is threefold. First, the predispositions of the members were distinctly averse to violence, force, or lawlessness. Second, the policies of the central unit encouraged responsibility. Third, irresponsibility was not necessary to achieve what the members perceived as effectiveness.

Members' Proclivities

On every measure used, both behavioral and attitudinal, the members of the Low Income Towers tenant patrol appeared disinclined toward violence. Only three of the 39 interviewed owned guns. While several others said they would like to have guns if they could obtain permits, the large majority were unwilling to possess them. Many indicated that they were afraid of firearms, did not know how to use them, or feared that they, or their children, would turn out to be the targets. "You might be tempted to use it in the wrong way," and "they might use it on me" were typical comments. While these responses are more "practical" and less ideological than those offered by Child-guard members, the result, not owning firearms, is the same.

We asked members whether people were ever justified in taking the law into their own hands, and later in the interview

we asked them how they thought they would react in a series of hypothetical situations in which they witnessed or heard about crimes. On the basis of their answers, we then ranked members according to these attitudes as follows:

Would take law into own hands:

Never	17
Only to save themselves or someone else	15
Whenever provocation exists	7
At random	0

Organizational Activities

The housing authority has been only partially clear in its policies toward responsibility. The following statement is indicative:

> Patrol volunteers are asked to remember that they are primarily to act only as the "eyes and ears" of police. They are strongly urged to avoid confrontation and any unnecessary direct involvement in potentially dangerous situations. The telephone is to be utilized as often as necessary to summon the police for assistance or investigation.
>
> [housing authority newsletter]

While this quote and other materials specify an "eyes and ears" role for volunteers, and the use of weapons is strictly prohibited, the central unit is ambiguous about exactly what would be condoned if a crime were to occur. That is, it is clear that patrol members are encouraged to avoid intervention, but not what would happen if they did intervene. They are told not to "play policeman"--and that the insurance coverage provided by the housing authority does not extend to injuries incurred while "playing policeman"--but this term is not clearly defined. The general feeling of many members was aptly stated by one woman:

"If someone was getting hurt in front of us, we'd have to help right then, not wait around."

No such incidents have ever occurred at Low Income Towers, nor do they seem likely to happen frequently. Since most of the buildings are not covered at any given time, a would-be criminal could probably find some other, less dangerous spot to carry on his activities. There is no need to commit violent crimes right in front of a lobby patrol, and thus far, at Low Income Towers, no one has done so. In other words, the patrol does act as a deterrent. Moreover, since the patrol operates as a group activity, all of the members on duty at a given time would have to concur in vigilante activity if it were to occur. Each member's visibility of performance, as in Childguard, acts as a spur to responsibility.

Thus, even though the policy of the patrols is less strongly insistent on responsibility than is Childguard's, the result is the same. This again suggests that the ideological and often moralistic "superstructure" of Childguard and its members is less likely to be found in lower-class based programs and is not necessary for the maintenance of responsibility.

Stability

Lack of stability is the major problem of the Low Income Towers tenant patrol. Among the eight buildings in which patrols have been established, only three have had organizations which lasted more than a year. Most building patrols have been active for only a few months.

The process of patrol disintegration seems to be quite regular. During the initial phase of operation, the original schedule of weekday evening coverage is faithfully maintained. After a few weeks or months, such coverage breaks down, with the patrol on duty only a few evenings per week, with little predictability about which evenings are to be covered. Coverage then becomes more and more sporadic, until the patrol can be said to no longer function. Unlike Childguard, which has institutionalized a three-month winter and another three-month summer break into its structure, the LIT patrols originally set very ambitious coverage goals for themselves. The result is that these quite quickly become unrealizable, and the patrols disintegrate. Patrols at the project have usually atrophied either because their captain has quit or because participation has gradually dwindled away. This section will attempt to answer four questions about the instability of patrols: (1) Why do captains quit? (2) Why do patrols so seldom survive the loss of a captain? (3) Why do members quit? (4) Why do new members fail to volunteer to replace old ones who leave?

Why do captains quit? Captains quit, we suggest, because the demands, frustrations, and personal costs of the job outweigh the rewards. In order to be effective, a captain must do a lot of work--recruit members, plan schedules, publicize and conduct meetings, keep track of insurance rosters and supplies, find a place for patrol equipment, and open up the patrol. In addition, a captain bears the brunt of the complaints of neighbors who are unfriendly toward the patrol and neighbors whose

expectations are not met. All of the captains with whom we talked complained that their neighbors called them when things went wrong in their apartments or when their mailboxes were vandalized; in each building, some tenants seem to have mistaken the captain for a sort of building superintendent, and all of the captains have had difficulty dispelling this notion. In one building, several tenants went so far as to complain by letter to the management that the tenant patrol captain was not doing his job. As we pointed out above in our discussion of rewards, the captain shares in the rewards available to members, and may gain a measure of power and influence through the leadership role, but in general the additional rewards seem to be few.

Historically, the captains who have quit at Low Income Towers offered a variety of reasons. One was hospitalized for illness, one returned to work after a long strike, one was threatened by her former husband. George Rios quit as the captain in his own building in order to devote more time to organizing new patrols, and his wife, who succeeded him, quit after she was hurt in a fight in the lobby. One captain refused to patrol any longer unless the basement doors were fixed. Only a few have simply quit with no specific reason.

At first, these reasons might seem to contradict the analysis offered above, but we believe that in most of the cases cited, the captains would have continued in the role if it had been made worth their while. Thus, a system of paying the building captains, perhaps specifically to "open up" the patrol, should be

tried. Paying the captains would provide a utilitarian reward, thus making the rewards more commensurate with the demands, and would allow some kind of control of the captains. Thus, for example, captains might be less hostile to non-members if a salary were dependent upon their friendliness.

Why do patrols seldom survive the loss of a captain? The primary reason is that the leadership structure is so unelaborated that there is no one ready to fill in if the captain quits. In none of the buildings we studied was there a real co-captain ready to assume the role of captain. In addition, the captain's authority is largely personal. People refer to the patrol by the captain's name--Mr. Watkins' patrol, Mrs. Ortiz's patrol. It would be difficult for another patrol member to take on this role without appearing to be a usurper unless he were designated to do so by the captain. In buildings where patrols have completely dissolved after captains quit, Mr. Rios has found it necessary to wait 4 or 5 months--until the association of the patrol with a particular captain has weakened--before attempting to reorganize. Similarly, the lack of routinization which characterizes the ongoing business of the patrols contributes to their inability to survive when the captain quits. Since there are not regularly scheduled meetings or formal group decision-making processes, patrol members really have no way of getting together to decide what to do about the situation unless the outgoing captain or Mr. Rios calls a meeting. Finally, captains usually quit when things have not been going well for the patrol, so morale is generally low; the captain's decision to leave may

be the final blow to members' motivation.

To some extent, the patrol's failure to survive the loss of a captain also reflects the heavy demands and insufficient rewards of the captain's job as described above. Mr. Rios has been finding it increasingly difficult to recruit new captains in buildings where he has tried to reorganize patrols. In one building, all of the patrol members flatly refused, specifying that they were unwilling to take on the responsibility of "opening up" every day. Finally, he coaxed a group of five co-captains to agree to share this responsibility, but without a designated leader this group never got sufficiently organized to get the patrol underway again. It seems possible that some combination of a captain to take the initiative and keep things going, and a group of co-captains to share the "opening-up" task on a rotation basis, might ease the demands of the captain's job, provide a leadership structure to carry on the patrol if the captain should leave, and groom new leadership to fill the captain's role in such an instance.

Why do members quit? Most of the building patrols at Low Income Towers have started out with enough volunteers to provide substantial coverage, without placing an enormous burden on any one member. Most have gradually dwindled to only a few members putting in large amounts of time. In building A, this latter state appears to have been fairly stable; Mr. Watkins' patrol has been operating for the last year or so with less than a dozen members. In building B, however, this state was a precursor to the complete demise of the patrol; the captain and the last remaining faithful members became disgusted

at the lack of participation and stopped their work altogether. In any case, the loss of former volunteers severely limits stability of the patrols.

We interviewed 12 former members, and their answers when asked why they left the patrol are very revealing. The most common response, mentioned by 6 of the 12, was that there were not enough other people: "Too much the same people all the time. You see other people not going, you don't go. More people should join." Several of the people who made this complaint, and several others as well, mentioned that the frustrating experience of arriving in the lobby and finding no table set up had discouraged them. One woman pointed to the lack of a schedule ("they just tell you to come anytime") and complained that even though she had put in considerable time, the patrol never seemed to be there when she needed it.

Only two of the former members gave purely personal reasons for dropping out--ill health in one case and a change of work hours in the other. Three of the 12 mentioned feeling afraid of attack while on patrol: "It's so frightening because when people come to do harm, they don't come empty-handed."

Finally, four different people mentioned human relations problems as reasons as quitting. In Mr. Watkins' building, one woman had left the patrol because it had made enemies of the teenagers: "I'm not a mean person. I can't tell them not to stand around the lobby." In the other two buildings, however, respondents mentioned the presence of "irresponsible" teenagers on the patrol--or the patrol's failure to keep a strict eye on

young people--as a reason for leaving.

Why do volunteers fail to replace those who leave? Why do more people not join? As noted above in the section dealing with problems, lack of participation is seen by members as a problem apart from the stability issue. They resent their neighbors' failure to cooperate, and frequently attribute it to laziness. But clearly the limited size of the initial pool of volunteers and the failure of new people to replace the old ones who drop out are also problems in maintaining a patrol over time.

The responses of the 15 non-members, when asked why they had not joined, were markedly different from those of former members when asked why they had quit. Two-thirds of the non-members interviewed gave basically personal reasons for not participating--they had small children at home, or they were sick, or they were caring for sick relatives, or their husbands would not let them join, or they were at work while the patrol was on duty. Although some of these may have been "excuses", many were convincing. It is easy to believe that a woman with seven young children could not find time for the patrol.

Four people cited human relations problems--e.g., "the tenant patrol people are nasty to young people and strangers"--and three indicated that they had never been asked to participate or felt they were not really needed. This last factor--a feeling of being unnecessary--was mentioned by other people as well in other contexts. It appears that when the building patrols were first established, the number of participants at any given session was fairly large, and some people drifted away, feeling they were not needed. Unfortunately, many of these people were never "retrieved" after the patrol had decreased in size.

* * *

In conclusion, the tenant patrols at Low Income Towers are highly responsible but have severe stability problems. It is our judgment that considerable attention must be devoted to devising stability-producing patrol arrangements if the patrols are to continue. If their stability can be increased, however, the tenant patrols seem to be an effective deterrent to much of the crime and fear which plague the residents of Low Income Towers.

Chapter V

SAFEBLOCK

> For several years we have watched our streets ...on Friday nights in an attempt to...increase the safety of our neighborhood.... We are under no illusions that the watch is more than a gesture, but we have prevented several crimes, the police appreciate our support, and the shared effort does promote neighborhood concern and surveillance.
>
> [A Safeblock flyer]

Safeblock, the subject of this chapter, was a crime control group that worked at improving neighborhood security from January, 1969 to May, 1973. During that time, its 30-odd members took turns sitting in strategically located houses on Friday nights and watching the street. Since the research reported here covers the disbanding of Safeblock, the program affords a good opportunity to assess the conditions under which voluntary crime control organizations cannot withstand the problems of stability that afflict them. Moreover, as we shall see, the program's relative independence from external sponsorship or support makes it unique among among the organizations studied here.

The neighborhood which Safeblock tried to protect and from which it drew its members is unique to its area of the city. Covering several blocks, it is an enclave of white, affluent people living within an area whose lower-middle and working-class white residents are moving out to make way for Black families of similar class position. Safeblock's enclave consists of one and two-family houses and well-kept yards which stand in sharp contrast

to the old attached houses and small apartment buildings that crowd most of the area's streets. The residents of this neighborhood are for the most part white, professional people and their families; most of the men are M.D.s or Ph.D.s affiliated with a nearby university. Each family owns its house and by covenant cannot rent it or rooms in it to others.

Unlike the Childguard members, whom Safeblock participants most closely resemble demographically, the neighborhood covered by Safeblock enjoys a strong sense of community and much social interaction. "This is a small, close knit community," asserted one long-time resident, and many other members made similar comments. The neighborhood supports a number of other organizations, including an Arts League and a Swim Club, and the extensive participation of its residents is the main reason why the local civic association is the most active in the area.

There are several explanations for this level of social integration. Most of the surrounding area is extremely heterogeneous economically, racially, and socially. The residents of the Safeblock area, on the other hand, are homogeneous educationally and occupationally, and send their children to the same nearby private school.

Furthermore, their physical environment is exceptionally conducive to neighbor interaction. The large and well planted yards keep residents working near each other on weekends; a large commons lane between the backs of houses on two parallel streets provides an excellent place for children to play and adults to meet. The enclave nature of the neighborhood adds to

the self-consciousness; unlike most nearby sections, there exist distinguishable neighborhood boundaries. Moreover, many residents consciously rejected suburban living and chose their present neighborhood as a less sterile alternative that combined nice homes with the attractions and conveniences of urban habitation. And despite concern about crime and frustration over city services, a remarkable 83 per cent of Safeblock's members remained well or moderately satisfied with their neighborhood. This satisfaction provided additional incentive to neighborhood preservation and thus further stimulated community solidarity and organization, especially when the main threat, crime, was seen as coming from outsiders, primarily the nearby Black ghettos.

The Problem

The outstanding fact about the members of Safeblock was the amount of crime they had experienced. Twenty-four of the 35 members interviewed, or nearly seventy per cent, had been victims of crimes at least once, a far higher proportion than in any of the other groups we studied. The following accounts are typical:

> "I have been the victim of burglaries three times.... Twice the burglar cut through the screen and stole my wife's pocketbook; once he came through the window but I surprised him and scared him away. They were amateurs.... They couldn't have gotten a total of more than one dollar in the three trips. They didn't even keep the credit cards.
>
> My house was robbed while I slept upstairs. Another time the upstairs was robbed while the family was talking downstairs.
>
> While unlocking my car door, I was pinned to the car and my wallet was taken. I was badly bruised."

Yet Safeblock members seemed less anxious than were the members of our other groups. When asked whether they had changed their day-to-day behavior, most said no, but that they had always been cautious. Within the group, those who had had the most experience with crime were, paradoxically, most likely not to have changed their behavior or to have added new security devices to their houses.

The explanation for this seeming lack of excessive concern may well be the fact that two-thirds of the members of Safeblock did not believe that the local rate of crime was rising. They thought it was high but that it had been so for some years. Evidently, people do adjust, not only behaviorally but also psychologically, to a situation characterized by the extensive experience with crime of most Safeblock members. Moreover, as we shall see in the discussion of Safeblock's history, relative changes in the amount of victimization may have greater consequences for people's anxiety and attitudes than absolute rates of crime. After the abatement of the initial rash of murders which resulted in Safeblock's formation, subsequent frequencies of crime, while still high, were viewed as less threatening.

It is within this context that Safeblock's growth and decline are to be understood. We now turn to a discussion of Safeblock's history.

History of Safeblock

Safeblock was first organized in December of 1968, in

response, according to its founding members, to a series of murders and muggings in the vicinity. Dr. Jones and his wife arrive home from a weekend in the country to learn that the latest killing had just taken place a block from their doorstep. There was a great amount of anxiety in the neighborhood, and although no one openly discussed arming, some Safeblock members now admit feeling privately that the situation had reached the point of getting a gun or moving out. "People were talking about guns and vigilantes in the street," recalled one founding member. Thus, it was not surprising that at a holiday party, Dr. Jones and a few of his neighbors began talking about the problem and decided to meet more formally to discuss possible courses of action. Between ten and fifteen people attended that first meeting in the Jones' living room. Accounts of the meeting indicated that discussion fluctuated between crime story-swapping and debate over various possible courses of action. Some people favored hiring a guard; others wanted to start a citizen patrol; but the prevailing feeling was one of helplessness and futility. It was at this point that Professor Johnson suggested a covert surveillance system from corner houses. There was no consensus on this approach either, and the meeting ended without any group decisions. However, a few of the men who liked Professor Johnson's idea agreed among themselves to meet at Johnson's house to pursue this alternative.

There were only about seven individuals at that second meeting, including friends not at the first one, but they planned a watch rotation and initiated a feasibility study of a communications system. Professor Johnson had already learned from the police that Friday night was the prime crime time, and the first watch was held on the last Friday in December. Soon after, a private phone line was installed to enable anyone on watch to ring the others and communicate instantly.

The members took turns sitting in pairs in strategically located, darkened corner houses from 10 P.M. to 1 A.M. Each person sat watch every third or fourth week. As a recruiting flyer explained, "watching consists of looking out the window of one of six houses, calling the other houses if anything suspicious occurs," and calling the police if any action seems necessary.

Each watch station was equipped with a flashlight and a light billyclub purchased at the Army-Navy store. Those who could be mustered for duty by Mrs. Jones or Mrs. Smith (and members were called frequently those first months when the group was still small) would meet beforehand for a few minutes, determine who would sit at which of the houses originally involved, and then disperse in pairs to sit and watch from darkened rooms. "Sign-on," mid-watch, and "sign-off" checks on the "hot line" were performed conscientiously, and one man went so far as to keep a record of all pedestrians, cars, dogs, policemen, and "kooks" that passed. Suspicious persons were not only carefully watched but also reported to the other watchers by way of the special phone. In case of a mugging, the plan was for one watcher to rush to the rescue with the billyclub while the other called the police.

Original members of Safeblock claim that there was a surprising amount of strange activity taking place on the streets of their neighborhood that first year, and that such activity reinforced their convictions about the importance of the program. The private phone line was in frequent use, and the police were called to investigate something suspicious almost every Friday night. On one occasion, Mrs. Smith spotted an auto theft in progress and, after consulting with the other watchers on the "hot line," called the police. (The latter came quickly, but failed to apprehend the would-be thieves.) Initially, some Safeblock members also patrolled their area by car, but soon abandoned that practice as ineffective. Dr. Smith jokingly explained the auto patrol experiment as appealing for adventure's sake.

Safeblock remained small, informal, and secret during its first few months of operation. Efforts were made to recruit trusted friends, but no flyers or any other publicity were produced and circulated. The first explanation offered for this secrecy involved concern that the criminal community would learn which night and from which houses Safeblock operated. Mrs. Jones reported that there was a general feeling among members then that "this neighborhood had been selected and that <u>they</u> were out to get us." "They," of course, referred to the Blacks living north, south, and west of the enclave, and this concern strengthened the enclave nature of the community and the we/they feelings expressed by Safeblock members. Mrs. Jones admitted that this anxiety extended even to fear about what the

maids might overhear.

The second reason given for Safeblock's early secrecy was apprehension that the group would be considered local vigilantes by some of their neighbors, an image the founding members found very distasteful, as we shall see below in our discussion of responsibility.

The smallness and informality of the group proved a source of satisfaction to the original members in one sense but a source of frustration in another. They enjoyed being part of a small band of involved individuals. The smallness and informality contrasted noticeably with the impersonal routine of more bureaucratized organizations. There were few lists, schedules, or memos; Mrs. Jones or Mrs. Smith made the arrangements for each Friday by phone, remaining flexible on times and responsive to individual preferences for watch partners. Yet, the small size of the group meant that members had to sit watch frequently, and the two women grew tired of managing the schedule by phone.

After a few months of operation, enthusiasm began to ebb. The novelty and excitement wore off for some of the members. After several eventless Friday nights, it seemed pointless to others. "I expected it to be more exciting," explained one member. Then, in March of 1969, a particular incident served to powerfully reinforce the Safeblock concept and organization. Dave Jackson, an enclave resident who had previously refused to be part of Safeblock, was out walking his dog one night when two strange men started to follow him. He crossed the street, they did likewise; he crossed back and they followed. He crossed

again, and when they followed he began to run and shout for help. They ran after him and were on the verge of overtaking him, arms upraised to smash downward, when a couple of Safeblock members came to the rescue and the assailants fled. By a fortuitous combination of circumstances, it was a Friday night, Jackson ran right towards one of the watch houses, and the Safeblock people were on the "hot line" at that moment anyway. The response was immediate. Those men closest to the scene grabbed their billyclubs and charged into the street. Others called the police. The two assailants escaped via a getaway car that was driven by a third man, but some members of Safeblock took note of the license number and gave chase in their own autos. The police joined the pursuit but when the getaway car was finally caught and the driver apprehended, the two assailants had fled on foot. Nevertheless, the members were elated by their success and the word got around that Safeblock had saved Dave Jackson's life.

The Dave Jackson incident marked a turning point in the evolution of Safeblock. For one thing, many more enclave residents learned of the group's existence, and some neighbors who had been indifferent or negative to Safeblock began to view it in a more favorable light. Recruiting suddenly became easier. Dave Jackson changed his previously skeptical attitude and became a member. And shortly thereafter, Mrs. Jackson agreed to take over the burden of scheduling. She reorganized the group somewhat, expanding the membership and setting up a more automatic rotation of duty. This slight routinization was accompanied by a de-emphasis on the action approach that characterized the first few months of Safeblock's operation and which inhibited, for the most part, the participation of all but healthy men. Women became more active, and the billyclubs were forgotten. One of the new joiners was a man the original group had thought to be too old; he, himself, reported feeling more comfortable about the idea of participating after Safeblock's policy took this shift from active intervention towards simple watching and reporting.

One reason for this shift was a growing realization that the crime situation was not as serious as imagined. As one founder put it:

> "Three and a half years ago, we began with the idea that dangerous people were always in the neighborhood. This wasn't so. A more realistic sense of the relative lack of danger in the neighborhood developed, and we began to see the watch as more a vehicle of neighborhood cohesion than a crime-deterring necessity."

There were other changes also. One of the new members was a military veteran who offended many of the original members with his efforts to seize leadership, his aggressive recruiting, and his insistence on organizational discipline. At the same time, some of the most active original members moved out of the area for professional or personal reasons that had nothing to do with their feelings about the group.

Thus, while the Jackson incident did serve to strengthen Safeblock and to reassure its members of the value of their vigilance, it only postponed the eventual decline of the group. It may have even contributed to Safeblock's demise by attracting new members who joined only out of a sense of obligation, and who

made the tone of the group more like that of a community organization than an informal club, thus decreasing, as we shall see, the satisfaction of many members with the program.

All this is not to deny that in the short run, the Jackson incident gave Safeblock a fresh lease on life--several leases, perhaps, since it would be referred to again and again in future survival crises. "We saved one man's life" became the rallying cry of those who successfully resisted the recurring moves to disband. Members tended to know each other less well before joining, and the lack of informal ties necessitated more formal governing mechanisms. This meant a bureaucratization that a number of former members criticized. The new members also tended to be less prestigious in the neighborhood than the founders of Safeblock. The remarks of one former member who moved into the neighborhood in March, 1969 are indicative of many aspects of the changes in the character and appeal of Safeblock:

> "We joined because of social pressure and because we wanted to get to know the leaders in this neighborhood. We didn't know how effective it would be. At first people really looked out the windows and used the phones conscientiously; now they just talk. Safeblock continues to exist for social reasons but is not so much fun socially now. It has expanded and there are too many non-university types with whom I have little to talk about. Some of the best people have dropped out and the quality and vitality of Safeblock have slipped."

Enthusiasm, then, appears to have steadily declined from the high point of the Jackson incident in March, 1969. Yet Safeblock survived for four years, even with limited enthusiasm among its members and with repeated attempts to disband the

group on the part of some of the members. In fact, the results of an internal questionnaire administered in November, 1970, showed fourteen of the fifteen respondents saying that complete disbanding was unacceptable and that continuing the watch one night a week was preferable to hiring a guard or instituting a patrol. Safeblock even grew after its first year to include 30-odd members, a size it maintained until its disbanding in the spring of 1973.

In April, 1971, Larry Simpson, a graduate student who had recently moved into the neighborhood, agreed to take on the job of coordination. Particularly sensitive to charges of elitism and concerned with the dangers of racial isolation (as will be remembered, Safeblock had, at the time, only white members), he endeavored to attract a more diverse membership. He had limited success, but the participation of the few Blacks and "non-university types" he did attract further diminished the appeal of Safeblock to some other potential members. Simpson worked hard at the leadership of Safeblock, scheduling, recruiting, and communicating vigorously, and was able to maintain the membership at around thirty-six and keep the watch functioning in spite of considerable turnover and growing problems of morale and absenteeism. He believed strongly in the participatory nature of Safeblock and opposed proposals to hire a guard or to take members who paid but did not sit watch.

Liked and respected, Simpson's preferences were followed as long as he was willing to do the work. It was not too surprising, however, that when he and his wife decided to move to

the country in June, 1972, there developed another crisis of continuity. No one was willing to take Simpson's place as coordinator, and the watch actually stopped functioning. Simpson announced that Safeblock was presently defunct and called a general membership meeting to discuss the situation. There was considerable debate over the effectiveness of Safeblock. One group argued that crime had declined considerably in the neighborhood, and that there was no longer any need for Safeblock. Another group countered that the decline in local crime was a tribute to Safeblock's effectiveness and demonstrated the importance of continuing. Alternative security plans were suggested, but a straw vote revealed that a majority still favored continuing the watch if a leader could be found. By the meeting's end, one man had volunteered to do the scheduling for a while, but the future remained uncertain. The only consensus was to postpone any decisions until after a meeting with leaders of other citizens' safety groups in the area to see what could be learned about their programs.

Safeblock sponsored a general community meeting in July, 1972. About thirty people were present, including several Black women and other strangers, mostly from blocks beyond the boundaries of the Safeblock neighborhood. A representative of a nearby block association explained that group's patrols and related safety programs, and one Black person stressed Safeblock's vigilante reputation among the Blacks and advocated a general neighborhood association. He recommended a de-emphasis on security

programs, arguing that security would improve anyway if people got to know each other better. A wide variety of other opinions was expressed, but this man's views prevailed and those present decided to form a neighborhood association. Officers were appointed and committees established, but, not surprisingly, the two operating committees, the social and the security, continued to reflect a long-standing difference in the orientations of the members of Safeblock, the original members who joined to fight crime and the newer ones who wanted to meet people and get involved in the neighborhood.

There were no further meetings during the summer, a traditionally slow time for Safeblock, but the security committee met in October. The six or seven people present (about one-fifth of Safeblock's membership), after debating several proposals, especially one for auto patrols, decided there was no better alternative to Safeblock's watch system. A former member reluctantly agreed to act as coordinator and began making phone calls to organize a new rotation. By the third week in November, the watch was operating again, for the first time since the previous May. It continued much as before--Friday nights, 10:00 to 1:00, with a short meeting beforehand--throughout the winter and spring.

The chief change was that the new Safeblock served less of a social function than the old one, for the neighborhood association had pre-empted that role and co-opted those people who had belonged to Safeblock for social reasons. This change hurt Safeblock, depriving it of one of its key incentives for participation. As the new coordinator put it in January: "Safeblock

seems to have found its new niche, but with the loss of its social role, it seems less stable now." He expressed reservations about how long it would survive.

In fact, Safeblock was living on the proverbial "borrowed time" while the new neighborhood association developed. During the winter, the latter evolved into a general purpose block association, led by a steering committee of nine block captains, four general officers and two committee chairmen. Block captains took responsibility for recruiting members; one dollar per year dues were assessed, but all community members were invited to meetings and social events through mimeographed flyers distributed door-to-door. The energetic young couple in charge of social events "made the association go," in the words of one resident, by sponsoring several successful activities, from street clean-ups followed by block bar-b-ques to Christmas caroling. The only problems, interestingly, centered on differences of opinion between younger and older residents about just how formal an organizational structure was required for the neighborhood association. The older members stressed the need for elections, officers, committees, and official stationery, while the younger ones emphasized a less organized, a more informal and friendly approach. The security committee, which included the new coordinator of the reorganized Safeblock, continued to develop a neighborhood-wide security system.

In May, 1973, Safeblock's coordinator told the assembled members that Safeblock was no longer relevant, that it had served its purpose while the new neighborhood association and its security committee established themselves, but that a new

era and a better organization had mitigated the need for it, and that he would no longer serve as coordinator. The intercom system had already been foresaken as too expensive. Many members agreed with him, and with no one volunteering to take up the reins of leadership, the fate of Safeblock was sealed. The members of Safeblock officially voted to terminate their organization and to pursue their security objectives through the neighborhood association. As of this writing, the former coordinator of Safeblock was expressing enthusiasm about the security committee's emerging plan for neighborhood safety. He would not reveal details about the plan but did make it clear that resumption of the watch was out of the question. A patrol also seemed unlikely. Rather, the emphasis seemed to be shifting to a more general alert neighbor system that called for a little participation by all community residents and depended on growing neighborhood solidarity and cooperation.

Thus, while Safeblock per se was no longer in existence, many Safeblock members and the program's goal of improved neighborhood security became assimilated into a multi-purpose association. We will discuss the implications of this situation in the section on Safeblock's stability.

Organizational Structure

The structure of Safeblock was quite simple throughout the program's history. While Safeblock became larger and its operations became less secret and informal, there never existed charters or written rules, and the only division of labor

involved the position of coordinator.

Safeblock, unlike the other programs studied here, was run democratically, with decisions made at general membership meetings. It is interesting, for example, that the program voted itself out of existence. As one member put it, "everyone is equal."

Recruiting was done by word-of-mouth and by the occasional distribution of flyers to all neighborhood residents. Ninety-four per cent of the members interviewed reported first hearing of Safeblock by informal means, and over three-quarters said that some of their friends had been members before they themselves joined. Thus, unlike Childguard and the Low Income Towers patrols, Safeguard remained an informal, neighborhood program.

Rewards and Incentives

The rewards and incentives for participating in Safeblock varied with the individuals involved: 59 per cent, when asked what they like most, mentioned socializing; 44 per cent cited the satisfaction of assuming community responsibilities; only 21 per cent mentioned Safeblock's effectiveness as a crime deterrent. Although slightly less than half of the members gave an unqualified "yes" in response to the question: "Do you enjoy your activities in the organization?", more than two-thirds evaluated the time spent as "reasonably painless", and none regarded it as a "considerable sacrifice." It is instructive to compare the above statistics to those of the reasons cited for joining Safeblock. Only 17 per cent of the members said they

joined the group for social reasons, while over 60 per cent mentioned civic responsibility. It appears that many people joined out of a sense of obligation to support the group, often somewhat reluctantly, but later came to enjoy their participation.

The neighborhood responsibility reason was cited especially often by those who joined Safeblock shortly after its inception. The founding members of the organization were serious about combating crime, but those they recruited to assist them were more often motivated by a sense of neighborhood citizenship: "The community is a good one, and I want to live here," explained one such man; "and it (participation) is a form of fulfilling civic responsibility."

Usually such feelings appeared to stem from the participatory values of the individual, but occasionally group pressure was also mentioned: "I had this feeling of being nagged about doing my share," complained one member; "pressure from my wife--that it was my minimal duty as a neighbor and citizen," commented another. Over the years, however, all the above reasons for joining--security, responsibility, and pressure--gave way to the social reason, and almost all the later joiners of Safeblock said they joined to meet people and get involved in the neighborhood.

Yet, whether members joined for social reasons or not, they tended to mention socializing as what they liked most about belonging. The man who reported joining because of the pressure from his wife said, "I enjoyed getting to know and conversing with interesting neighbors on watch." One woman who joined "because I was scared" said that "it was fun to sit and talk;

sometimes things get very intimate, like little kids with the lights off talking in the dark." This is not to argue that the main function Safeblock served for its members was a social one, for in many cases individuals were simply making the best of their committed time, but rather to suggest that the social pleasures of participation prevented or at least delayed the decline in morale that might otherwise have accompanied the growing skepticism about the organization's effectiveness as a crime deterrent. We will return to this subject when we discuss stability, but it is important to note that while sociability was important as an incentive for participation in Childguard and the tenant patrols, it appears even more significant in explaining Safeblock's long tenure.

In part, this is because Safeblock had none of the supports from other organizations and agents which were such an important real and symbolic reward and incentive for the other memberships. Safeblock had no formal relationship with any official authorities. There were efforts initially to inform the police of Safeblock's existence, but when a meeting was finally arranged, the attending officer apparently showed little interest. The policemen on the local squad car patrols evidently did not learn of Safeblock until their investigation of an attempted auto theft reported by two members on watch during the first few months of operation.

The members were roughly split as to whether the police were "doing a good job," but over 60 per cent felt that Safeblock encouraged improved police services and responsiveness. They saw Safeblock as a check upon and spur to better police coverage

in that the police knew that someone was watching their performance, and were called more frequently.

Members believed that the police supported them, but beyond the lukewarm approval of the precinct community relations officer, there is little evidence one way or the other. No other organization had any relationship with Safeblock, and the program certainly did not have the total or partial sponsorship the other programs we studied maintained.

Given the importance of such relationships--the housing authority to the LIT patrols; the police and the PA to CG; the police and the Community Council, as we shall see, to the radio motor patrol in Beachview--it is interesting to note the relatively long life of Safeblock without any such support. We will explore the explanations for this situation later.

Another interesting aspect of this issue of external rewards for membership and supports for the program is the question of appreciation. As we have seen, both Childguard and the tenant patrol members expressed a need to feel that their communities appreciated their efforts. Safeblock members, on the other hand, were less likely to see the program as having a good reputation (fewer than half said yes) in the community. The lack of rewards in this area strengthened the importance of sociability and community-responsibility incentives for Safeblock members.

It is ironic that the few interviews conducted with non-members indicated that Safeblock did in fact have a good reputation in the community. Although one self-proclaimed radical said that the group was vigilante-like, in general the members seem

to have thought that Safeblock's reputation was worse than it was. Given the "enclave mentality" that characterized some members--"the hostile ghetto residents outside are trying to harm us"--this incorrect sense of being disliked by parts of the community probably reinforced the we/they feelings described earlier in this chapter and served to increase enclave solidarity.

Finally, an important reward of membership in all of the programs studied here is a greater sense of security. Given Safeblock's extremely limited coverage of the neighborhood--one three-hour period per week--the juxtaposition of estimates of actual effectiveness as a crime deterrent with the members' subjective feelings is especially interesting. For while nearly one-half of the members we interviewed did not think that Safeblock was <u>objectively</u> effective, nearly everyone said that their participation made them <u>feel</u> safer. As with Childguard and tenant patrol members, participation made people feel less victimized, more actively engaged in doing "something," anything, to ameliorate their situations. We will discuss this consequence of citizen crime control programs at length in the concluding chapter.

A related incentive was mentioned by many Safeblock members. As one woman said, "I feel safer because I know the people in the neighborhood better." She referred especially to local Blacks, of whom, before she knew them, she had been suspicious and fearful. It may well be that getting to know ones's neighbors better is helpful objectively as well. It is a basic and reasonable assumption of many citizens' crime groups that the best deterrent is neighborhood solidarity, that if neighbors know each other,

they will look out for one another, notice and report suspicious strangers, and act corporatively in a crisis. And it was the potential for serving this neighbor-meeting function more adequately than Safeblock that attracted many members and non-members to the new neighborhood association. The association was better designed to do precisely those things which were regarded as crucial side-benefits of Safeblock, an organization whose main activities were increasingly seen as an inefficient way of introducing neighbors and raising security consciousness.

<u>Leadership</u>

The main problem that plagued Safeblock during its four years of operation was leadership. It was not that the various men and women who acted as coordinators at one time or another lacked the requisite skills or resources, but rather that the way the leadership role was organizationally defined made it too time-consuming to be attractive to the people involved. Although Safeblock members were quite conscientious about their duties--all but one member answered never or rarely to the question, how often are you unable to participate?--they still needed last-minute reminders (post cards or phone calls), as well as advance schedules of the watch rotation. The coordinator was also expected to organize meetings, recruit new members, find substitutes for members who could not make a particular watch, and represent the group to the outside world, including the police, the courts, and various civic associations and special conferences.

Larry Simpson estimated that he spent at least four hours

a week managing Safeblock. He found that much time a considerable sacrifice, and he reaped few rewards, tangible or of the prestige and power type. As the title "coordinator" implies, the leader of Safeblock was regarded by the members as strictly an equal, socially and with respect to decision-making. His position was more analogous to that of a hired manager of a club in which all the members are on the board of directors than to that of an elected leader. Important decisions were made by the group, and any influence or prestige that accrued to the coordinator flowed from his or her personality rather than the office. Well socialized into the non-authoritarian values of this social stratum and undesirous of adding to their responsibilities, the coordinators themselves minimized their importance. Consequently, there existed virtually no incentive to serve in a leadership position. The job of coordinator was the proverbial "thankless task" and was widely recognized as such.

The role of coordinator was critical to the functioning of Safeblock, as was all too evident from the crises of continuity that occurred whenever a coordinator resigned. One important reason for this weakness was the structure of the organization. Similarly to the LIT tenant patrols, the founders of Safeblock provided for only one office--no committees or assistants--no division of managerial labor. Everything was put on the shoulders of the coordinator who, consequently, had to work very hard while the other members simply took their turns on watch. There were undoubtedly some advantages to this structure--

simplicity, informality, flexibility, the non-bureaucratic structure desired by the founding members, and perhaps even efficiency from the organizational point of view--but the cost was evident in the reluctance of members to serve as leader.

One other recurring phenomenon that proved troublesome to Safeblock was the annual summer break. Many of the members were professors who had long summer vacations that they spent elsewhere, so it was probably wiser to let the watch lapse during July and August than to overtax the few members who remained available. Nevertheless, the loss of momentum always made it difficult to get going again in the fall. As one former member explained, "I simply failed to become reinvolved after the summer break." In the chapter on Childguard, it is suggested that long breaks during the summer and winter contribute to the high morale of the patrollers, that otherwise they would weary of their duties, but the Safeblock experience suggests some dysfunction of this practice.

The Members

Socio-economic Characteristics

Of the 34 members of Safeblock interviewed, 25 were men and 9 were women. Like Childguard members, they tended to be between thirty and fifty years old. Over 80 per cent were college graduates, and 26 or almost three quarters of the members held professional degrees and had professional occupations. Most of the professionals were either M.D.s or Ph.D.s.

The income levels of Safeblock were considerably lower than

those of Childguard, even though the former's educational backbround was higher: One-half of the members had incomes of between $16,000 and $30,000 annually, with the remaining members being equally just above or just below that income category. This difference obviously reflects the lower salaries paid by universities as opposed to private enterprise.

Safeblock members are quite liberal politically, with over 60 per cent classifying themselves as such and only two self-appointed conservatives in the group. Correspondingly, almost 90 per cent of the members are registered Democrats. Moreover, they tend to be more politically active than the memberships of the other organizations, with one-half saying that they have engaged in political or civic action (e.g., boycotts, peace marches). Two-thirds belong to other voluntary associations, a higher percentage than in the other groups studied and a further indication of Safeblock members' activism.

Safeblock members have lived in the Safeblock neighborhood for shorter periods than the members of our other programs. Only eight, or less than one-qaurter, have lived in the area for as many as ten years, and almost half are relative newcomers, having been in the neighborhood for four or fewer years. The high degree of integration in the neighborhood discussed earlier is particularly interesting given the fact that most members have not lived there for very long. This social cohesion is underscored by the fact that more than half of those interviewed say that they regularly exchange services with their neighbors, a higher percentage than was found in our other memberships.

Reasons for Joining

The activism and civic responsibility of Safeblock members were reflected in the voluntarism and idealism evidenced in such statements as "whether it's effective or not, it's good for people to get together and take some responsibility for their common problems." Not one member of Safeblock thought he or she should be paid, and less than a third said that they preferred paid guards to a citizen-staffed program. Most members of Safeblock said they joined because they felt participation would actually help deter crime, or because they felt obliged to contribute to the effort, whether it helped or not. Former members aand non-members seemed to evaluate the costs rather than the benefits slightly differently. The four former members interviewed regarded the time spent sitting watch as either somewhat inconvenient or a considerable sacrifice, while over two-thirds of the members found giving one night every three or four weeks reasonably painless. But, interestingly, three of the same four former members regarded Safeblock as somewhat effective as an anti-crime force. Both of the non-members interviewed also thought Safeblock was somewhat effective and expressed approval of its efforts; they cited time problems and schedule irregularities as the reasons they did not themselves participate.

In analyzing Safeblock, it is important, however, not to maintain a static view. There seems to have been a tendency for members to downgrade their evaluation of Safeblock's effectiveness over time and to grow increasingly conscious of the sacrificed time and inconvenience of membership. To some extent,

this seems to have been caused by an actual decline in the seriousness with which members watched, as mentioned earlier, but the point here is that people's commitment to a new venture often wanes after an initial period of enthusiasm, and that the founders and earliest members of voluntary associations and social movements are often more dedicated than those who join later.

Thus, it is not so surprising that the greatest attitudinal differences among the members of Safeblock are not related to class, politics, sex, or age but rather to length of time in the organization. Eighty-five per cent of the "old members" (those who were original members or who joined in the first six months) compared to only 25 per cent of "new members" (those who joined in the year preceeding the interview) joined for crime-related reasons. Three-quarters of the old members thought Safeblock an effective anti-crime force; only half of the others did. Twice as many old members as new indicated that what they liked most about Safeblock was the satisfaction of engaging in community action and assuming one's social responsibilities. New members, on the other hand, were much more likely to mention socializing as what they liked best. Old members had less experience with crime; yet, as we have seen, they were more anxious about the crime situation. Moreover, 85 per cent of them evinced unfavorable attitudes toward the police in contrast to none of the new members. In short, the new members were less concerned about crime and thus less committed to the watch. Eighty-eight per cent of them were in favor of Safeblock's

involvement in additional activities, compared to only 25 per cent of the old members. Thus, it is not surprising that Safeblock slowly gave way to a more general and multi-purpose neighborhood association.

Responsibility

Safeblock was a responsible program. Even in its most aggressive, billyclub-carrying stage, its primary activity was watching the street and calling the police if necessary. We spoke with several Black and leftist non-members who said that Safeblock was a vigilante group, but their assessment was based on its all-white membership and on the secrecy surrounding its early operation. Even these people reported no incidents which could be characterized as irresponsible, and, as far as we could tell, there were not even any rumors alleging such. The program was extremely self-conscious about this issue, and its recruiting flyer proclaimed "We are not vigilantes."

The responsibility of Safeblock is particularly interesting given the limited visibility of its activities--as we shall see in Beachview, supervision of such activities is difficult--and its independence of the controls of other agencies such as the police control of Childguard and the housing authority's supervision of the tenant patrols at Low Income Towers. This lack of visibility and supervision could, we suggest, result in an irresponsible program were its members irresponsibly inclined.

This was far from the case for Safeblock, however. Most of the members of Safeblock were extremely averse to the idea

of carrying a gun. Not one member reported owning a gun. Larry Simpson, one of the co-ordinators, subscribed to The Center Magazine and wanted considerable assurance that this study was not funded by the F.B.I. or the Defense Department. Several original members said that one of the major reasons for establishing Safeblock was to preempt any more drastic reactions to the precipitating rash of crimes. Many members saw Safeblock as a positive step toward the solution of urban problems. They argued, at times defensively, that it is constructive to defend one's neighborhood, that whites will stay in the cities only if cities provide a viable alternative to the suburbs. "It does no one any good--neither us, nor the drug addicts, nor society--for people to passively tolerate rapes and rip-offs," said one man; "it simply encourages the bad trends already existing." Many members were critical of police inefficiency, corruption, and racism but believed that there were no acceptable alternatives in law enforcement. Most also agreed that the police were in a difficult position and somewhat overwhelmed, and felt that it was simply self-interested citizenship to help them.

Thus, Safeblock was a responsible, legitimate citizens' group that was accurately characterized by its members as supplemental to the police. While its ideology was responsible, the nature of its activities and its independence from external authorities would, we suggest, allow for irresponsibility. It is a testament to the strength of the members' responsible proclivities that the program was a responsible one.

Stability

As the earlier section on Safeblock's history demonstrated, the major problem that continually troubled the program was instability. Despite a life of more than four years, Safeblock was never a very stable organization. There were two serious survival crises, both of which were associated with the departure of a coordinator and with difficulties in finding a replacement. The watch was normally discontinued during the summer months, and it took a major effort to get it organized and active again. Maintaining membership remained a problem and required constant recruiting to compensate for the slight but steady attrition.

It is important, in this consideration of Safeblock's stability, to understand what kept Safeblock operating for over four years and why it finally collapsed. What kept Safeblock going was a combination of the social function it served and its early success in the Jackson rescue. As discussed above, the social function was that of providing an opportunity to make new friends, something that would be important to lonely people and to newcomers to a neighborhood. Safeblock could not have performed that function so successfully had it not involved pairs of people sitting watch together in darkened rooms for three or four hours at a time. Pre-watch meetings were also important in this regard. And it would not have appealed to so many people socially had it not represented an elite enclave of mobile and busy, professional people. The elite enclave aspect was critical. Newcomers

often moved into the area because of its reputation as a superior community of sociable intellectuals, and Safeblock seemed to provide access to the social center of that community. The mobility factor was important too; professional people move often, especially young ones. There was a high turnover of residents in the area and consequently a steady stream of potential Safeblock members. This was especially important to Safeblock given the drop-out rate of those who felt that they had made the introductions and contacts they wanted to establish after a year or so of participation. In other words, a transient neighborhood may actually prove supportive to an organization, one of whose main functions is to help people meet each other and get involved in their neighborhood. The transiency provides a pool of potential members as old members, for a variety of reasons--boredom, moving, etc.--quit.

The last point, however, suggests one of the destabilizing features of Safeblock: its ability to accomplish socially whatever it might for an individual fairly quickly. Two Safeblock couples complained that it became a bore; "it wasn't fun anymore." And something was needed to compensate for the stringent participation requirements of Safeblock, for sacrificing every third Friday night to stare out of a window, besides the vague satisfaction of doing something. It could be argued that people expected too much from Safeblock, or, perhaps more strongly, that Safeblock demanded too much for what it offered. As one founding member who had quit after eight months explained:

> "I had done my share; I had questions about the organization's effectiveness. The demands on my time increased, and the pay-off for the amount of time was small. I was tired of paying a babysitter so that I could watch."

If the anti-crime effort had shown more obvious and recurring pay-offs, attitudes may have been different. Certainly, the Jackson incident was a powerful reinforcement. But even there, it seems as though the influence of that success was greater in the pious atmosphere of reassessment meetings than in the private thinking of individuals. Few dared to publicly challenge the one man who regularly invoked the saving of Dave Jackson's life. Yet many confided that they felt Safeblock was ineffectual, both in concept ("one night a week is absurd") and in practice ("nobody really watches anymore").

A couple of ex-members tried to prove their view of Safeblock's ineffectuality. One Friday night, two people "broke into" their own home, across the street from a Safeblock house, and the watchers did not notice. Another Friday evening, two people "ran through the neighborhood in a wet suit," and there was no Safeblock reaction. These incidents illustrate both the decreased vigilance of Safeblock and the extent to which it was coming to be viewed as a ludicrously modest and foolish way to deter crime.

Another aspect of Safeblock that annoyed many members was its increasingly formal character. Yet scheduling and organizing were the only practical ways to run such an operation. And even so, the burden of leadership proved the ultimate destabilizing factor. Thus, Safeblock required too much input for too little

output to prove viable in the long run. That it lasted as long as it did is indicative of the importance of such reinforcing incidents as the Jackson one, of the social functions it fulfilled, and of the seriousness of the crime problem and the depth of concern and desire to do something, anything about it.

* * *

Thus, Safeblock is a responsible program. Even though its structure and activities would permit the expression of irresponsible attitudes, the responsibility of its members was sufficiently strong to keep the organization responsible. Even though Safeblock existed for over four years, however, it had severe stability problems throughout its history and finally succumbed to the tendency toward instability which existed throughout the program's life.

Chapter VI

BEACHVIEW CIVILIAN RADIO MOTOR PATROL

> It has often been said that people get the kind of police service they deserve. A community of volunteers working side by side with their police deserve the best. This is our goal - to provide the people...with the best possible police service--with a department working in harmony with the people they serve.
>
> [A Beachview flier]

Beachview, a decade or so ago, was one of the few areas of the city in which one could escape the fears and frustrations of urban life. Since the community is located in an outlying section of the city, property values were relatively low; many families could afford to buy their own homes. In fact, Beachview today still looks much more like a suburban town than a major metropolis, with its aging downtown and several new shopping centers, and its quiet streets of one and two-family houses.

Beachview is a largely white, largely working and lower-middle class community. Its more than 80,000 residents are predominantly of Jewish and Italian origin, with a few thousand Black people living in low-income public housing within its borders. The average family income in Beachview is a little over $12,000 per year, indicating financial stability but not affluence, with most people struggling to make ends meet. Only 7 percent of the population is officially classified as poor. The extent to which the district is working and lower-middle class is further indicated by the fact that only about 7 per cent of the residents are college-

educated.

A police-sponsored citizen crime control program in Beachview, the Civilian Radio Motor Patrol (CRMP), will be discussed in this chapter. CRMP members patrol the community in their automobiles, relaying relevant information back to the precinct house via radio.

The Beachview CRMP differs from the other programs studied here in two major ways. First, it can be characterized as irresponsible. That is, as we shall see in detail below, the CRMP's activities include the illegal stopping and searching of citizens, the harrassment of minority group members, the impersonation of police officers, and countless traffic-law violations. Moreover, some of the members can be characterized as irresponsible as well, both in their attitudes toward the use of violence and toward taking the law into their own hands, and in their behavior. More than half of the people interviewed own guns, for example, as opposed to the negligible gun ownership found in the three other programs.

The second major difference in Beachview is the fact that unlike our other organizations, the CRMP is wholly police-sponsored and controlled. The CRMP is one of a number of activities of the Beachview Community Council, the vehicle for police-run citizen crime control efforts in the community.[1] The CRMP's base

[1]And, indeed, throughout the city--each precinct has its own Council, and the various Councils are more or less active depending upon the particular precinct captain's efforts and wishes. The Beachview Community Council is characterized, both by the Beachview police and by central police headquarters, as one of the city's most active and effective. Its members call themselves "a model precinct."

radio is located in the station house itself.

The central question to explore is clear: what factors account for the operation of an irresponsible voluntary crime control program within the tightest controls of any program studied here?

We will attempt to answer this question, and the focus of this chapter necessitates a somewhat different format and content from the preceding ones. Given the close and significant relationships the CRMP maintains both with the Beachview Community Council and with the police, we will begin this discussion with these two essential components to an understanding of the seemingly contradictory situation we uncovered.

The Organizational Context

The Community Council

The Beachview Community Council is composed of some eighty voting members, community residents who have attended three or more monthly meetings during one year. These meetings have an agenda which includes a particular speaker or program--e.g., a policewomen will discuss shoplifting--an opportunity for members or interested parties to express their safety concerns, and information about Council activities. They are open; anyone can attend.

The Council also has an executive committee composed of the officers and the chairmen of the committees which are responsible for the various Council activities. It is this group which does the actual work of the organization. Moreover, these people exert political control as well; new Council officers are chosen by

a sub-group of this committee, with the membership-at-large simply ratifying the choices.

The Council runs a number of activities, which fall roughly into three areas: first, youth activities, such as athletic events and dances; second, public relations in the form of awards, newsletters, etc.; and third, activities directly related to civilian crime control, such as the CRMP. The Council also raises several thousand dollars annually to support its own work and to fund police work that cannot be supported in other ways. For example, packs of unpleasant, ownerless dogs were roaming the area, frightening residents. The Community Council purchased a tranquilizer dart gun which policemen used to subdue these dogs so that they could then be rounded up. During the time we were studying the organization, there was considerable discussion about buying a portable respirator for policemen to use to administer emergency first aid. These purchases are usually suggested by the captain, and the Council attempts to meet each of his requests.

We interviewed eleven or almost all of the Council's officers and committee chairmen. They are, without exception, working-to-lower-middle class white people. Incomes in this group range from twelve to eighteen thousand dollars a year, with, usually, both the husband and wife working. Only one person is a college graduate (the rest have high school diplomas); occupations include postman, butcher, salesman, and building superintendent for the men and, almost exclusively, typist for the women.

Six are women while five are men. Only two of the 11 have lived in Beachview for fewer than twelve years, and all of them

have extensive social and familial ties to the community. All but one person owns his or her home ("in partnership with the bank," as one person put it). There is a wider variation in age than in any other background factor; they are relatively evenly distributed in the 30-60 range.

Politically, the committee chairmen and officers are quite conservative. In an area of the city that is overwhelmingly Democratic, only one is a registered Democrat. The rest are either Republican or Conservative Party members. They see themselves as "conservatives" or "middle-of-the-road."

Six of the 11 executive committee members interviewed expressed what can be characterized as racist attitudes. Dissatisfaction with the neighborhood centered around the fact that Blacks and Puerto Ricans were moving closer to it, that the area was "changing" and becoming problem-ridden like the rest of the city. The Beachview precinct actually covers two other communities composed primarily of Black and Puerto Rican residents. Yet the leadership of the Council is drawn only from Beachview proper, at most one or two Blacks and Puerto Ricans are ever visible at general membership meetings, and both police and Council people talk about Beachview and tend to ignore the rest of the precinct's jurisdiction.

The lack of participation of Black and Puerto Rican precinct residents is a sensitive Council issue. There was considerable discussion about finding a "token" minority group member for the executive committee. "Even if he doesn't do anything, it will

look good," one officer explained. "All we have to do is give him a title."

Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Council leaders is their participation in community life. Every one of these eleven people is involved in other civic activities, and most of them have four or five additional voluntary association memberships, usually officerships. The two organizations which predominate are the American Legion and the church or synagogue, with civic associations, the P.T.A., and youth activities also mentioned very frequently. These people, then, are "joiners." Most of them say they go to one meeting or another nearly every weekday evening, and that they give upwards of 15 to 20 hours per week to community activities. Moreover, they all express strong commitment to voluntary work. None of them would like to be paid for their participation, and they were very offended when we raised this question. Finally, they express high degrees of civic responsibility on the order of "it's our community; if we want to make it better, we must do it."

The Council leaders, then are a remarkably homogeneous group in terms of both their background characteristics and their civic orientations and behavior. It is their preferences and positions which shape the character of the Council organization in general and, in large part, the CRMP.

The Police

Three policemen work extensively with the Beachview Community Council--the crime prevention officer, the precinct's captain, and

especially the community relations officer, the most important member of this trio. While on paper the Council is an independent civilian organization--and its independence was to be delineated further by its formal incorporation just as we finished our investigation--in practice the police exercise considerable control over it.

In part, the substantial degree of police control was due to structural and ideological factors. Since the Council sees itself as an agent to help interpret the police to the community and vice-versa, and since its members chose to work in a police-sponsored crime control program, it is to be expected that police attitudes would be taken very seriously among Council members. Moreover, as the community relations patrolman, Officer Roy, pointed out, since the police department might well be legally liable and would certainly be held accountable by the public for misconduct on the part of the Council, the department is very concerned about keeping the Council in line.

This concern focuses on the question of the kinds of people welcome to participate in the Council. The community relations officer indicated that he originally fingerprinted volunteers for the Council; anyone with a police record was automatically suspect, and it was made very difficult and awkward for him to continue as a member. Moreover, there was a question of "perverts and degenerates" being permitted to work with young people in the various Council-sponsored athletic events. Since what the community relations officer called "the civil rights movement," fingerprinting has become a violation of a person's civil rights. New members

are, however, "put through" the department's files and are again discouraged if they have any kind of record. Moreover, "politicians"--i.e., anyone with a political point of view unacceptable to the police--are also discouraged from becoming active in the Council, as a safeguard against its becoming a political forum or soapbox and, thus, embarrassing the precinct.

The community relations officer also exerts considerable authority over choices of Council activities. If he favors one particular course of action strongly, this course is the one that is adopted. If he disapproves of an idea, it is dropped. In other words, he is the actual leader of the Community Council.

Much of his authority can be characterized as personal as well as official. Officer Roy has been doing community work in the Beachview precinct for over 20 years. He knows all of the community leaders and resources. Moreover, his interpersonal skills are considerable. Differences of opinion among the Council officers, ranging from hurt feelings to open opinion clashes, are resolved tactfully and skillfully through his intervention. Not one of the 11 Council officers and committee chairmen we interviewed had a single negative thing to say about Officer Roy. They all acknowledged both his influence and authority in the Council, and they spoke almost adoringly of him. Not only did they feel that the Council's successes were largely a result of his dedication, but they felt that he had helped them a good deal personally. One woman, for example, gave Officer Roy the credit for overcoming her shyness and fear of speaking in public; another

felt that he had solved her problems in dealing with her adolescent son.

Officer Roy had a quite different perception of his role. He denies that he exerts any authority; the Council members, he said, "are private citizens and this is a civilian group. They make their own decisions." He does admit, however, that he must veto activities which will be unacceptable to the commanding officer. At meetings, he often makes his own case for whatever is the subject of discussion beforehand to one or two of the members so that they can be his spokesmen without his having to contradict the group's sentiments openly. Or he summarizes the proceedings in such a way that his own position is favorably presented.

The community relations officer is structurally in a somewhat difficult position within the precinct. Many policemen are less than positive in their attitudes toward citizen participation. Their routine work with the more unsavory elements of the community gives them a rather pessimistic view of "human nature." This is further reinforced by the fact that they tend to be socially isolated from ordinary citizens, spending their leisure as well as their work time with other policemen. They regard police work as their prerogative and are likely to resent civilians roaming around the precinct house. Moreover, particularly with regard to citizen patrols, they are both resentful of possible usurpation of police functions and scornful of people who "must be crazy to put themselves in danger for free." Finally, they are afraid that civilians will "do something stupid out there, have to be rescued, and get us shot in the course of helping them."

This very brief summary of general police attitudes toward

civilians needs to be systematically expanded in further research in this area. Here, it provides some background for the Council activities in general and for understanding the position of the community relations officer in particular. For his fellow policemen tend to view him as a representative of the community rather than of the police, and Officer Roy also defined his role in this way. He said that he would have quit the force long ago were he simply an "ordinary patrolman," that his own "self-respect" comes from his ties to "the good people here." He spoke almost wistfully of his classmates at the Police Academy who "studied" and were high up in the department ranks by now, but maintained that he would rather be doing his particular job than any other work.

Structurally, Officer Roy is isolated from the rest of the precinct. He has his own office and telephone in another part of the precinct house (which Council leaders also use), and he almost never wears a uniform. He reports directly to the captain rather than participating in the squad system. Moreover, captains come and go (there were three different captains of the Beachview precinct during the eight-month period were out there), while he stays. He is, therefore, heavily relied upon to provide information about the community to new captains, to introduce them to community leaders, and to provide community support and acceptance for them. He also presents the captains' ideas to the Council. As such, he is in a position to be very influential indeed.

The captains who were in command of the precinct during our investigation were also actively committed to Council activities. Given a noticeable favoring of community relations activities on

the part of the Police Commissioner's office, it was clear that an active Council was seen as one way of indicating that the captain was doing a good job, and, thus, as an important basis for promotions. One of the captains who left Beachview during our study received just such a promotion, and Council leaders expressed considerable pride that, as he told them, "you have helped me move up."

The concern of the various captains with the Council was manifested in several ways. First, the community relations officer and the Council leadership were always "checking with the captain" before undertaking projects, etc. When we indicated our interest in studying the Council, for example, we were told that a letter describing our study would have to be sent to the captain for his approval. Second, the captains suggested pet projects for the Council. Since both Council and police subscribed to the myth of Council independence ("we are not a part of the department, we can make our own decisions" and "I can't tell the Council what to do"), these projects were not ordered. But none of the Council leaders we interviewed could imagine a situation in which the captain's wishes would not be accepted. One captain, for example, suggested an open house at the precinct complete with elaborate exhibits (the Police Department's armored bomb squad truck was there) and demonstrations. This activity required a large expenditure of time and effort for the Council, but there was not a single word of hesitation expressed by the leaders. They were, in fact, honored that the captain would ask this of them.

Finally, the various captains attended many city-wide Council activities along with the civilian Council officers. It seemed

that they were very eager to be known as community-oriented captains and considered this to be an important part of their job.

A young crime prevention patrolman is also very closely tied to Council activities. As part of his job, he gives talks to school and community groups about security and safety. He also attends Council meetings, fills in for the community relations officer when he is on vacation, and in general is being groomed to replace Officer Roy when the latter retires. Patrolman Foster is aware that his job places him in a somewhat difficult position vis-a-vis the rest of the force. Like Officer Roy, he is not part of the squad system of the precinct; he reports directly to the captain. Also like Officer Roy, he is not overly bothered by this situation. He simply likes community work better than routine police work. Patrolman Foster "moonlights" as a physical education teacher and says that he would prefer to teach full-time but cannot afford to do so, since he has a young and growing family.

In summary, Beachview has an active Community Council with a committed and active leadership. This Council, is, in theory, an independent civilian organization but is, in fact, controlled to a very considerable degree by the police. Three policemen--the captain, the community relations officer, and the crime prevention patrolman--in particular work closely with the Council and exercise considerable authority over its membership and activities.

The Civilian Radio Motor Patrol

Operation and Structure

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the CRMP is the extent to which stated and actual principles and practice diverge. That is, the on-paper program bears only tenuous relationship to the CRMP's actual activities. We will, therefore, present this discussion of the patrol in terms of these major differences.

Beachview Council literature describes the activities of the CRMP as follows:

"A base-station radio located at the Precinct Station House manned by a qualified civilian radio operator, monitors calls from mobile units. The mobile units are portable and temporarily installed each night in cars with two civilians (one to drive and one acting as an observer), patrolling various segments of the Precinct. An Auxiliary Policeman is assigned at the base radio in the Station House whose function is to evaluate information received. If necessary, the Auxiliary Policeman reports this information to the desk officer who in turn takes appropriate police action."

Thus, civilians cruise the area in cars and report suspicious agents and actions back to the station house. "Within eight weeks of the program's institution in November, 1971, the program had over 50 volunteers with two or three patrols out every night." CRMP leaders and police personnel view this figure of 50 as something of an exaggeration; "around 30" was the highest membership

estimate we encountered. Moreover, by the time of our study, which began in the summer of 1972, there were not enough members to send out cars every night. By the autumn, it had been decided to schedule CRMP operation for only two evenings a week. And as winter approached, the organization was for all actual purposes defunct; it still existed on paper, but there were fewer than a half-dozen members who ever appeared at the station house. We will discuss the CRMP's stability later in this chapter.

"Training sessions are held as to procedures taken by members of this program." While this may have been the case during the program's first weeks, no such training sessions were held during the time of our study, even though new members were recruited. Rather, the process of bringing in new members was carried out much more informally, with older, more experienced members telling the newcomers how the program operated and taking them out on patrol at first. This informality was possible largely because the organization was small and because the leaders were sufficiently involved in the program to be present in the station house nearly every evening. One of the consequences of the lack of training, however, may well have been the considerable extent to which many of the rules of the organization were bent, ignored, or flagrantly disobeyed. We will present each of the major rules in turn in the form in which it was given to the membership and then discuss what actually happened out on patrol.

1. NOTIFY THE PATROL DUTY OFFICER NO LESS THAN 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE IF YOU CANNOT MEET YOUR FOUR HOUR TOUR OF DUTY.

A schedule was kept of the members' tours of patrol duty, and a

member was expected to notify the supervisor at the station house one day in advance if he could not attend. This rule was almost universally ignored. Members came and went as they pleased, with several people going on patrol two or three or four nights a week while others came to patrol only every few weeks. We never observed even one member telephoning to say that he could not be there. Clearly, such a situation has major consequences for the patrol's reliability, for its result was that the patrol functioned when there were enough members at the station house to get one car out on the street, and did not operate when there were not enough members to do so. Moreover, it was impossible to predict from one evening to the next whether the CRMP would be in operation. These problems of coverage, as will be recalled, are very similar to those encountered by the tenant patrols at Low Income Towers and will be assessed in the concluding chapter of this report.

This lack of predictability of CRMP operation existed on several levels: the number of evenings per week to be covered; the particular nights that would be covered; and the amount of coverage--i.e., the number of cars on the street. And this situation was mentioned by many of the policemen we interviewed as adding to their generally negative or indifferent attitudes toward the CRMP. "How can we depend on them if we never know if they're on patrol?" asked one officer.

2. ALWAYS USE CODED IDENTIFICATION WHEN MAKING REGULAR OR EMERGENCY REPORTS TO THE PRECINCT RADIO MONITOR.

This rule was consistently violated. Patrol members would use their own names with far greater regularity than the coded identification numbers. Moreover, many times they simply called in to chat or because they were bored with the fact that nothing untoward was happening on the street. We were told that in the first few months of CRMP operation, patrol members' reports were routinely immediately turned over to the desk officer on duty, and that he typically would send a patrol car to the scene of a suspicious event. There were so many erroneous reports, however, that the police became angry about endangering themselves by speeding to false alarms. It was then decided that an Auxiliary Policeman would evaluate the reports and use his discretion about ignoring the most unlikely prospects. This was seen by many CRMP members as a downgrading of the patrol, and they resented having to report to the AP.

3. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL PATROL MEMBERS INTERVENE IN ANY CRIMINAL ACTIONS. OBSERVATION AND RADIO REPORT ONLY ARE TO BE USED REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

The extent to which this important rule was violated is perhaps the most significant aspect of the CRMP. A number of stories were recounted to us indicating flagrant disregard for this regulation. At one point, for example, we were told about a CRMP patrol which found teenagers pushing printing and duplicating equipment down the street late at night. This occurrence was made doubly

suspicious by the fact that the teenagers were Black.[2] The youths were chased and "roughed up" with billyclubs, then held at gunpoint until the police arrived. It turned out that the CRMP car had found them right after they had robbed a school building.

Or, to take another example, a Black couple was apprehended because the patrol member "just knew" they were carrying drugs. While we got fewer stories about attacking citizens who were innocent--one particular account comes to mind of terrorizing a Black woman who was out on the street late at night because,since the neighborhood was overwhelmingly white, it was assumed that she was up to no good while in fact she was simply out walking her dog--it is not unlikely that such incidents also occurred frequently but were reported only reluctantly.

Moreover, these incidents occurred during the early morning hours, although the patrol is officially in operation only during the evening. One of our researchers was present during what some members call "the real patrol," which begins when the official CRMP stops. Since the base radio is not even in operation during that time, it is obvious that the members do not make any pretense of obeying this rule.

4. AUTOMOBILE MOVING VIOLATIONS ARE NOT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE RADIO MOTOR PATROL AND THEREFORE ARE NOT TO BE FOLLOWED UP BY ACTIONS SUCH AS CHASING AND STOPPING. IF THE VIOLATION CAUSES PROPERTY DAMAGE AND/OR INJURY, LICENSE PLATES SHOULD

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[2]We will explore the racism which pervades police-sponsored crime control programs in Beachview later in this chapter.

BE NOTED AND REPORTED TO THE PRECINCT.

5. RADIO MOTOR PATROL VEHICLES WILL OBSERVE ALL MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS WHILE ON DUTY. THIS PERTAINS TO KEEPING WITHIN LEGAL SPEED LIMITS AND OBEYING ALL TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES.

We observed the very frequent violations of these rules. Some patrol members stop motorists and demand to see their registrations and drivers' licenses. Many "hot rod," speed, ignore red lights, and cut through corner parking lots as they chase moving cars. In addition to failing to obey these regulations, CRMP members carry such unauthorized items in their cars as police-type flashing lights, sirens and bullhorns.

A researcher had a chance to observe the use of the light and siren during one patrol. Joe, the CRMP member with whom the researcher was riding, drove down to the part of the beach where residents normally go at night to "park." Joe said that the area was one of his routine stops, that he tried to leave the "kids" alone but was really "after" the "homosexuals and rapists." He "scared cars away" by using his flashing light. One CRMP member was knocked down by one of the occupants of a car he approached at the beach. The police and CRMP leadership found his complaints very amusing, but he was not disciplined for his actions.

6. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS A PATROL VOLUNTEER TO FALSELY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AS A REGULAR OR AUXILIARY POLICE OFFICER.

Yet obviously this is the intent of the sirens and lights the CRMP members mount on their cars. Weapons ranging from billy-clubs and handguns to rifles are carried, and some members' cars are equipped with gun mounts. A member of the research staff was

present when a CRMP member identified himself as being "with the Beachview precinct" with the clear intent of impersonating an officer. In fact, CRMP members consistently pressed for more visible means of identification that would tie them to the police even more closely. They were very envious of the AP's uniforms, for example.

Some CRMP members, by their own accounts and as a result of our direct observations, not only consistently and flagrantly disregard the program's rules but also the law, and engaged in illegal and quasi-legal activities which violated the civil rights of their victims.

In the rest of this chapter, we will attempt to explain the phenomenon of finding what can be considered a vigilante group within the most tightly-controlled setting we studied, a police precinct. We will explore three sets of explanatory factors: the program's goals, the supervisory structure, and the characteristics and predispositions of the members.

Goals

The sharp divergence between stated and actual which characterizes the CRMP's rules/behavior relationship is also operative in terms of the patrol's goals. While formally the CRMP is to act simply as the "eyes and the ears" of the police, this is the real goal of the program for at best very few of the relevant people. As was mentioned above, the police scarcely rely heavily on the patrol; most policemen with whom we spoke could have done very nicely without it.

The Council leadership tends to see the patrol less as a serious crime control effort than as another star in its crown

of activities. The leaders are very committed to the expansion and growth of the Council, and the CRMP is, to them, simply another step in that direction. The captain tends to feel the same way. Success for Council programs in general, including the CRMP, is perceived largely in public-relations rather than crime-control terms. A good Council is one which has a lot of programs and members, raises a lot of money, and generally improves the police "image" in the community.

The community relations officer, Officer Roy, spoke of the CRMP as being a "safety valve" for vigilantes. Seen in this way, the goal of the patrol is to provide some controlling structure for "young hotheads."

This set of diverse goals, we suggest, encourages the kind of behavior discussed in the previous section. That is, since the rules were determined according to a goal which is, at best, operative only on paper--being the "eyes and ears" of the police--processes of organizational goal-attainment are only operative to a very limited extent. This allows the members to behave in ways which are conducive to meeting their own needs and goals; thus, the program goals do not effectively constrain the members' behavior.

Leadership

A more important set of explanations for the actual operations of the CRMP can be found in the leadership and supervisory structure of the program. Formally, the CRMP has a chairman, Tony Scalzo, who has been in charge of the program since its beginnings. Tony is also an officer of the Council and has been involved in Council

activities for several years. He said that he particularly liked to work with young people, and his previous activities were in this area: athletics, drug awareness programs, etc.

Tony has been responsible for whatever stability the CRMP has acheived. When he was ill for several weeks during the winter, the patrol virtually ceased to operate.

The CRMP formally has supervisors for each evening of the week whose job it is to man the base radio and generally take charge of the operation on a day-to-day basis. In fact, however, Tony and Joe, his deputy, tend to do daily supervision themselves, with each of them being at the station house several nights per week.

The Council's executive committee as a group makes the policy decisions insofar as the patrol is concerned. Tony discusses his problems with them, and they make some judgement about what ought to be done. The major problem discussed at these meetings is recruitment: how can the CRMP recruit new members? Tony spends a good deal of time going to various meetings in the community trying to find new CRMP members. At none of the meetings at which we were present were any other problems related to the CRMP discussed, and there was no reference made to the questionable behavior previously described. That is, Tony did not initiate discussions of the vigilante behavior within the CRMP; nor did the Council leaders raise questions.

The extent to which the Council leadership as a whole rather than Tony Scalzo makes policy decisions for the CRMP is illustrated by the process by which we were refused permission to interview CRMP members. Even though lip service is paid to Tony's authority--

"it's up to him; it's his program"--Tony himself was in favor of giving us permission and argued vehemently for it. Yet the Council overruled his objections.

Officer Roy, the AP's training sergeant, and various members of the AP perform some supervisory tasks for the CRMP. This is not so much a formal arrangement as happenstance; they tend to be in the station house at the time the patrol is in operation.

The obvious question then becomes: given that the CRMP does have a formal leadership and supervisory structure, and that various policemen are acting in supervisory capacities, why is there such faulty supervision?

First, the CRMP has much the same problem that police departments face. Since the members patrol in pairs out in the street, and the supervisor is in the station house, close hour-to-hour supervision is virtually impossible. Organizationally, this is the problem of supervising a geographically dispersed operation.

Even more important is the fact that the Council leadership, --including Tony Scalzo, the other executive committee members, the captain, and the community relations officer--is more concerned with what we can call the "public relations" function of the CRMP. Its presence makes the Council and the precinct look good. Such statements as "our Council looks unbalanced; we need more crime-control activities" are typical of this orientation.

Much of the activity of the CRMP leadership, therefore, concerns program-maintenance. The emphasis on recruitment was mentioned earlier. The attempt to provide incentives for joining or

staying a member of the CRMP also occupies a considerable amount of supervisor attention. The members, for example, felt strongly that they at least be provided expense money for their participation. Although the Council bought the radios and the FCC license necessary for the program to operate, the members were required to buy their own gas and take care of any auto repairs that occurred in the line of duty. Given the driving habits and scofflaw proclivities of many of the members, such repairs are far from infrequent. The Council views this desire for expense money as legitimate and spends considerable meeting time trying to devise ways to provide it. To take another example, identification cards with the police department's seal on them were seen by the members as very important, and the Council made this expenditure. The fact that these cards were often used to impersonate police officers was never even raised in meetings.

Within every organization, there is a problem of the allocation of resources (money, time, energy) between maintenance activities--in our terms, activities leading toward increasing an organization's stability--and goal-attainment activities--here, enforcing the rules so that the on-paper goal of the CRMP becomes the actual goal. Voluntary associations have particular problems with survival, and the CRMP is hardly unique in this respect; it is not surprising that so many of the program's assets are expended in this way. On the other hand, voluntary associations tend to be tangential or supplementary to the societal institutions charged with the major responsibility for the realization of whatever goals are involved. Thus, the police do not depend on the CRMP to be

of much help. This further focuses leaders' attention on maintenance rather than goal-attainment concerns. The result of this state of affairs has been minimal supervision of CRMP members.

Another way in which the focus upon organization-maintenance limits supervision of patrol members is the hesitancy to antagonize. Tony and Officer Roy both agreed that since "these people are volunteers," they would quit if we made it "too hard on them." Moreover, the fact that membership was voluntary meant that discipline on the part of the leaders was viewed by them as in some sense illegitimate, that they did not have the right to exercise control over member behavior because the members were not being paid. In fact, the only sanction the leadership could use was dismissal or suspension from the patrol, a sanction they were very reluctant to employ since it would be in direct contradiction to their major real goal, the survival of the program.

The next question that must be raised is this: does the inadequate supervision and lack of discipline mean that the leadership, both Council and police, is ignorant of what the patrol members are doing?

The first answer to this question is that in one sense it does not matter.. Irresponsible behavior is not checked in the CRMP; this result still stands whether the leadership be uninformed, only partly aware, or completely informed about it. The rules are not being enforced, for whatever reasons.

We do have some impressions about the leaders' levels of awareness, however. Officer Roy's suspicions, as discussed in the chapter on method, seem to make sense only insofar as he was

aware that there was something to hide. Moreover, his "safety valve" theory--that "these boys would be even worse on their own"--suggests that he knew what was happening, at least to some extent.

One policeman with some de facto supervisory functions vis-a-vis the CRMP admitted that there were "stories" that some of the members were carrying weapons, stopping citizens, and, in general, "playing cop," but added that so long as the police were not required to confront these charges "officially," they were simply ignored. "I don't want to know," he said.

The CRMP members who actively participate in irresponsible behavior have a different story. They say that they got "into trouble" on at least two different occasions, and that "the police covered it up." While they were somewhat reluctant to go into detail for us, in one case we were told that "the cops told her (presumably, the victim) that we were undercover agents."

Although we obtained no information from the Council leadership about this situation, Tony Scalzo told us that he knew "the boys" speeded, stopped cars, and engaged in many traffic violations. He said he told them to "cut it out," but admitted that he "did the same thing himself" when out on patrol, and that the rule which dealt with a CRMP member staying in his own car was "always violated." As was mentioned earlier, Joe, Tony's deputy, was observed by the research staff in the course of unauthorized behavior. He, therefore, was hardly in a position to try to enforce the rules with any rigor.

The fact that no one has ever been suspended or expelled from

the CRMP seems very important here. Along with the above-mentioned hesitancy to antagonize members, it seems clear that while the precise nature and extent of irresponsible CRMP behavior may not be known to the supervisory personnel, that such behavior does occur must be known and, if not encouraged, accepted and tolerated.

In summary, then, part of the explanation for the CRMP's irresponsibility lies in the supervisory and disciplinary structure. The real goal, survival of the organization, encourages the operation of processes to satisfy the members rather than control their behavior. Structurally, supervision of such a decentralized program is difficult at best. And, finally, the personal attitudes and values of the CRMP leadership are not inimical to vigilante behavior. The third major explanatory set of factors is to be found in the attitudes and attributes of the CRMP membership. For reasons given earlier, these are not constrained by the organization. Rather, the members are allowed to act on the basis of their predispositions. That is, instead of acting as a "safety valve," the CRMP provides a structure and a milieu conducive to, supportive of, and encouraging to the members' proclivities.

The Members

We administered questionnaires to 29 members of the Beachview AP, virtually the entire AP unit. As will be remembered, we were unable to interview CRMP members formally. Fortunately, CRMP members with whom we had talked and patrolled were by this time AP members. The data obtained from these questionnaires were processed and tabulated, and the results will be presented here.

The AP members were overwhelmingly white (only one was Black) working-class people. Only three of the 29 for whom we have data had family incomes above $15,000 per year. Only five were college graduates. And only four had occupations which could be characterized as technical or semi-professional. Fifteen of the 29 were Jewish; eleven were of Italian origin. As a group, they were very well integrated into the Beachview neighborhood. Almost 80 per cent had lived in Beachview at least five years, almost three-quarters exchanged services with their neighbors, and more than half said that most of their family and close friends lived in the community.

Most of the AP members liked living in Beachview, with racist remarks given frequently as explanations. "I like it here because it's mostly white," or "I'm glad it's segregated" are common responses. Although Beachview is not considered by the police to be a high-crime area, and although crime rates have been dropping significantly in the community, 54 per cent of the respondents felt that crime rates were rising, and that Blacks were responsible. "The crime situation has made me more prejudiced," was one fairly typical remark.

Nine, or less than one-third, had themselves been victims of crimes, and another third had been witnesses or had family members or friends who were victims. This is a smaller proportion than in the other memberships studied. Yet fifteen, or more than half, of the AP members admit to owning guns, a remarkably high figure. Many of these weapons were illegally held. As one member put it, "I may be going to jail, but I'm staying alive." And those who do not own guns offer practical reasons such as being too young to

obtain a permit rather than the ideological, anti-weapon remarks common among members of the three other organizations studied here. Several of the members seem to have virtual arsenals in their homes. The following list was offered by one AP member (who was a former CRMP member):

357 magnum	308 winchester bolt action
M1 carbine	7.62 Russian bolt action
30-30 winchester (2 of them)	1884 springfield
44 magnum	2 pellet guns
12 gauge riot gun	22 semi-automatic
12 gauge double-barrel shotgun	30.06 semi-automatic

This same person describes his car as "supercharged, with red lights, sirens, oxygen, the works." He feels that citizens must intervene because the police are "held back too much," and that he is "ready" because "there's going to be a war." While this person is more extreme both in his views and his possessions than most AP members, it is interesting that he is tolerated within the organization.

Apart from guns, the AP members seem to have been a highly security-conscious group. They have taken the following security precautions:

improved locks	17 (59%)
improved lights	11 (38%)
installed alarms	10 (35%)
have guard dogs	10 (35%)
installed other hardware precautions (e.g., gates)	5 (17%)

Moreover, fourteen or almost half of the AP members have done three or more of these things, and only two members have done none of them.

Several interesting things about the characteristics of the AP members just presented seem worthy of discussion. It is important to note that the ethnic and socio-economic characteristics of the AP's are very similar to those of the Council leadership--white, working-class people. Moreover, while we did not do independent data collection on the Beachview police, these characteristics are also descriptive of New York City policemen as a whole. This suggests considerable homogeneity of population; they share many attributes.

There are some differences between the AP members and the Council leadership, however. The APs are somewhat less politically oriented, with 10 of them failing to vote in the 1972 election as opposed to none of the eleven Council leaders we interviewed. Oddly enough, they are also somewhat less politically conservative with more than half of the APs registered Democrats and four of them calling themselves liberal as opposed to none of the Council leaders. Most important, the AP members are not "joiners" like the Council leadership. Twelve of the 29 belong to no other organizations, and the rest tend to have one other organizational affiliation, with gun clubs and auto clubs being among the most popular. Moreover, the APs are much less likely to express voluntaristic sentiments; one-half of the members feel they should be paid for their participation in the AP--"you put a lot of hours in and sometimes get no thanks"--and all but two members feel that

they should at least be reimbursed for expenses. Few of them mention feelings of community responsibility which are so commonly and frequently expressed by Council leaders.

Thus, the AP members seem to be motivated to participate for a quite different set of reasons, even though they are similar socio-economically to the Council leadership. Eighteen, or almost seventy per cent, want or at some time wanted to be policemen, and joined the organization in order to get closer to police work. One person "tried and failed the medical so I'm becoming a private investigator." Another joined the AP to be able to do better on the police examination, but feels that he does not have much of a chance because "they don't take the best, all they want now is Blacks." Moreover, several of those who say they do not want to become policemen have technical reasons such as "not enough pay" but indicate that they really would like police work.

Another related reason for joining is the opportunity to do police work. One person says he joined "to get into trouble sometimes and then hassle to get out of it." And 21 or over 70 per cent want some "police action." More than half of the members spontaneously mention their resentment of the rule which prohibits their carrying guns, and one-quarter openly admit to breaking this rule.

Thus, the AP members are striking examples of what can be characterized as vigilante or irresponsible attitudes and attributes. Most tend to be racists. They tend to be somewhat paranoid about the crime situation in that they take more security precautions and own more guns than the other memberships even though Beachview is the only one of the communities studied here that is classified by

the police as a low crime area. What they like about the AP is its tie to the police, particularly to the dangerous aspects of police work. As one member put it, "I don't like dance patrol because I feel there is no way of protecting my community watching teenagers dance." They want to be "out on the street, where the action is."

While, as was said above, it is our judgement that AP and CRMP members resemble each other to a considerable degree, there is one major difference that must be specified here. The AP is an old unit within the police department, and 10 of our respondents have been members for more than four years. Moreover, and largely for this reason, AP members tend to be older than CRMP members, with fifteen of them being over 30. The CRMP members, with only one or two exceptions, were under 30 years old. Therefore, they fall into that group of 14 or almost 50 per cent of the AP who are 29 or younger. And it is important to note that our data indicate that it is the younger AP members who are the most vigilante-like in their attitudes.

The following two cross-tabulations are indicative:

		AGE		
		under 29	30+	
WANTS TO DO DANGEROUS POLICE WORK VERY STRONGLY	YES	7	2	9
	NO	7	12	19
		14	14	

		AGE		
		under 29	30+	
MENTIONS RESENTMENT ABOUT WEAPONS' BAN	YES	10	2	12
	NO	4	10	14
		14	12	

Of the nine who express very strong proclivities for "police action," seven are in the younger group. And of the twelve who resent the rule against carrying guns, ten fall into this younger group.

The AP members who were part of the CRMP, those under thirty years of age, were noticeably more vigilante-like than the older members. Several of the older members, in fact, characterized them as "young hotheads." Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that CRMP members were, if anything, even more irresponsibly inclined than the AP membership as a whole.

When this fact is viewed in the light of the situation discussed in this chapter, the finding of a vigilante-like crime control group within the physical and control structure of a police precinct is understandable. The CRMP members have noticeable vigilante proclivities. There is no screening out of potential members and virtually no disciplining of actual members. Structurally, it would be difficult to provide adequate supervision even if this were an actual goal of the CRMP. Since it is not, there is practically no supervision of any kind. Vigilante behavior is not inimical to the values and attitudes of the Council leadership, even if it is formally disapproved. And active discouragement of it would most likely lead to even greater stability problems for an organization which has real trouble surviving anyway, and survival of the CRMP is the police's and Council's primary goal. Thus, the CRMP as an organization does not constrain the members' behavior. Rather, such behavior is encouraged.

Stability and Responsibility

As was mentioned several times during this discussion, the CRMP has major problems with regard to its stability; in fact, at the time of our study, its membership was rapidly dwindling and the patrol was not in operation for days at a time.

Given the wide range of support services offered to the program as a result of its police and Council sponsorship, these problems are very significant indeed. The CRMP had a physical base and equipment right in the station house. The leaders were extremely dedicated and giving of their time and energy. The members were provided with identification and visible symbols of membership as these were requested. They were not antagonized by disciplinary procedures. They were permitted to behave in ways that expressed their real interests in such a patrol rather than being forced to conform to rigid and constraining rules. Why, then, was the future of the patrol in jeopardy?

The members' complaints are interesting indicators of some of the problems. It is clear from their responses that the question of expense money for gas and car repairs was crucial; many of the members said simply that this amounted to several dollars a week that they could ill-afford. More important, and what perhaps underlies the expense-money question as well, is the issue of police appreciation for their work. Most of the members expressed resentful awareness of the fact that policemen were not particularly favorably disposed toward the patrol. While the extent to which the members' perceived lack of appreciation contributed to the patrol's instability is unknown, the instability itself seems to

have contributed to the police's scepticism, so there may well be a "vicious circle" process in operation here.

Moreover, the very limited degree of stability the CRMP has maintained has been purchased, as we have argued here, at the cost of responsibility. That is, the leadership focus on program-maintenance, or stability-producing, activities has been carried out at the expense of devoting attention to rule enforcement or disciplinary procedures to curb the members' irresponsibility. For the CRMP, then, there seems to have been an inverse relationship between stability and responsibility. Whatever stability has been maintained has in fact encouraged the program to be irresponsible. This raises the question of whether the cost of CRMP stability has not simply been too high.

Chapter VII

STABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE PROGRAMS AND THE MEMBERSHIPS VIEWED COMPARATIVELY

This concluding chapter will assess the factors which encourage voluntary crime control programs that are stable and responsible. For these purposes, the programs and their memberships will be viewed comparatively. This discussion must be seen as preliminary and tentative; future research must confirm or deny its validity and establish its generalizability.

We will begin with a consideration of the programs; next, the memberships will be discussed. This chapter will conclude with a set of policy recommendations for the encouragement of stable and responsible voluntary crime control programs.

The Programs' Stability

The major finding of this research can be stated as follows: instability is the central problem confronted by voluntary crime control programs. To varying degrees, each of the programs studied here had difficulty maintaining itself as an organization. Beachview was virtually defunct at the completion of our investigation; Safeblock voted itself out of existence; the tenant patrols at Low Income Towers dissolved. Childguard, the most stable organization, was likely to face serious funding and leadership problems in the near future.

Similarly, each program had difficulty maintaining coverage.

Safeblock held its watch only one night per week and recessed for the summer. Childguard patrolled only three hours a day and took a three months' break during the winter term and another in the summer. In both of these cases, the absences were formalized and justified and were not viewed by the leadership as coverage lapses. Rather, they were seen as enabling the programs to realize reasonable goals. Safeblock's explanation that most crime occurred on Friday nights is particularly interesting from this viewpoint. Obviously, some criminals commit crimes on other evenings, or after 1 A.M., but the leadership saw the very limited watch as a way of maximizing impact without overusing available resources. Childguard's statement that crime against schoolchildren decreased during the winter is an explanation for a problem that the organization had to face, even if a convenient rationalization were not available. Bad weather and winter vacations would deter many members.

Partial coverage took a different form for the Beachview CRMP and the tenant patrols at Low Income Towers. In both cases, it meant an unpredictability of operation, both in terms of the hours to be covered and the amount of coverage. These programs did not specify precise and partial coverage from the outset, as did Safeblock and Childguard. Rather, they were going to be "out there" on all weekday evenings. As it became clear that constant coverage was not occurring, scheduling procedures for both groups broke down, with members coming and going irregularly and unpredictably. From the viewpoint of their formal goal of being the "eyes and ears" of the police, such unreliability would render

the police blind and deaf for much of the time, were they to count on and plan their own activities around the support the programs were intended to provide. As a result, the police tended not to view the programs in a particularly favorable light. In turn, the lack of appreciation on the part of the police may well be an important factor in further undermining the programs' stability.

The two different approaches to problems of partial coverage might be viewed as alternative strategies of operation for citizen crime control programs. In the first case, it is assumed from the outset that it will not be possible to provide patrols for all the relevant time segments. It is also assumed that it is important to regularize patrol operations. These two factors are then "balanced" in such a way as to schedule patrols in accord with an achievable situation and to justify incomplete coverage so that morale and feelings of usefulness can be maintained. The second strategy assumes that it is possible to get relatively full coverage and provides no mechanisms to deal with the situation which occurs when such coverage is not forthcoming. At this point, scheduling breaks down, reliability and predictability of operation wane, morale declines, and, in both Low Income Towers and Beachview, the patrols disbanded completely, either temporarily or permanently. Thus, in these cases, problems of coverage precede and may in fact lead to crises of survival. This process we call destabilization.

The extent to which instability is a major problem is further emphasized by the fact that we studied four very different organizations. The memberships range from lower to upper socio-

economic groups. The organizational structures vary from the informality of Safeblock to the relatively highly bureaucratized Childguard. In terms of almost every major factor--for example, goals, activities, sponsorship, and size--our programs were quite different. Yet none of them is what could be called a very stable program. From the viewpoint of the future of citizen crime control efforts, this fact is the most pessimistic finding of the study.

Given this relatively negative stability situation, there are, nevertheless, a set of mechanisms which, we suggest, does encourage more stable organizations. Each of these will now be discussed in turn. It should be iterated, however, that we are making few claims for their power; they seem to be necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the survival of citizen crime control organizations.

1. Dedicated Leadership

All of our organizations began operation as the result of the hard work and commitment of their respective leaders. The Low Income Towers tenant patrols had considerable difficulty surviving the loss of building captains. The CRMP stopped operation when its leader was ill. Safeblock disbanded temporarily twice when two leaders withdrew. It is unlikely that Childguard could withstand the loss of its leaders.

In all cases, it is the leaders who perform the organization-maintenance tasks that are so crucial to the survival of voluntary associations. They devote considerable attention to membership-recruitment and maintenance. They initiate whatever

interorganizational contacts are important to the programs. They do whatever scheduling occurs. They tend to establish the goals and activities.

Most of the members of every organization felt that they had "enough" voice in running the program, even though they admitted that this was not very much (with the exception of Safeblock, which was more "democratic"). That is, the members acknowledged that the leaders made most of the important decisions but that this was acceptable since it meant that they themselves would not have to spend time doing so.

It is interesting that Childguard, the program which formalized its activities to the greatest extent, even to the point of having a paid coordinator, still relied heavily on its founders. Moreover, these women themselves did not think the program would persist if they ceased their own involvement in it. As one of them said, "if we don't get any money, we'll chuck the whole program after December." Thus, both leaders and members alike acknowledged the crucial role played by the leadership.

It seems that citizen crime control organizations need the resources of people of strong commitment and involvement. These resources seem to compensate for the lack of pay or other such incentives that non-voluntary organizations use to obtain compliance from their members.[1] Since they must rely on volunteers,

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[1]For a discussion of compliance structures in organizations, see Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), especially Pt. I.

it appears that only people whose intense dedication to the program (for whatever complicated psychological and ideological reasons) means that they spend a good deal of time and energy on its maintenance will be satisfactory leaders. That is, a certain number of "true believers" is necessary so that the bulk of the membership can meaningfully participate without devoting a large portion of their time to the program, an unreasonable demand of volunteers.

A further distinction must be drawn here. While involved, dedicated leadership is necessary, these qualities need not be embodied in the same person throughout a program's history; conceivably, leaders can change. For such change-overs to occur smoothly, however, organizational mechanisms must be developed to sustain the programs during the transitions. Safeblock and the LIT tenant patrols clearly did not have these mechanisms. The leadership has shifted somewhat in Childguard, but several members of the original leadership group maintained their involvement so there were no leadership gaps.

2. Compatible Organizational Structure

It was our expectation that the most stable crime control organizations would be those whose structures were the most highly bureaucratized and in which leadership was the most routinized. The previous section makes the point that routinization of leadership has not occurred and is perhaps not possible, that only intensely dedicated people will be willing to do all of the work necessary for a program's survival. Our

expectation about degrees of bureaucratization was similarly overturned.

Childguard is the one program which has a relatively bureaucratic organizational structure. Safeblock operated for several years with the antithesis--roughly, a primary group--and had difficulty whenever the membership grew and the structure became more formal. Both the CRMP and the tenant patrols began with on-paper formal structures that very quickly failed to function very well.

While we have little evidence to support this, it would seem that the most successful organizational structure for such programs is one which aligns members' interests and expectations--i.e., the most powerful incentives for membership--with efficient ways of getting whatever activities they set for themselves accomplished. Thus, for example, the housewatch model of Safeblock was very well suited both to the task of neighborhood surveillance and to the members' interest in social interaction.[2] When the members felt they had gotten to know each other, and that the watch was now "boring," the program's difficulties began.

Childguard, our most bureaucratic program, demanded the least from its members (1 1/2 hours per week for twelve weeks). Future research should explore the extent to which the degree of bureaucratization is inversely related to the kind of member commitment required.

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[2]See below for a discussion of this issue.

The data we obtained from Low Income Towers and Beachview confirm the notion that working and lower class people have some difficulty meeting highly bureaucratized demands. Thus, for example, the CRMP rule to notify the patrol leader of an absence was universally ignored. Perhaps programs which draw their memberships from these class groupings would be more stable if their structures encouraged rather than discouraged members' predispositions. Rather than setting up a rigid patrol schedule which is quickly disregarded, efforts to enlarge the membership to the point at which it is likely that enough people will gather each night to serve as a patrol would constitute one such strategy. For stationary patrols such as those at Low Income Towers, the provision of physical facilities which would be conducive to friendly gatherings would be another possibility.

3. Rewards and Incentives

Clearly, if stability is to be enhanced, the rewards and incentives for membership must be somehow commensurate with the time and energy demands placed on members. Rewards are, therefore, most accurately viewed as a relational concept. The following list of rewards should be considered only a partial roster.

a. Pay

It is clear that most of the CRMP and many of the Low Income Towers tenant patrol members would have welcomed pay for their work. It is equally clear that Childguard and Safeblock participants would not. This difference is obviously related to socio-economic differences; Low Income Towers and Beachview residents simply

express fewer "volunteerist" sentiments and clearly need the money more.

The consequences of paying lower socio-economic status members of voluntary crime control organizations are broader than simply providing an incentive for participation. One of the major reasons such organizations have difficulty maintaining their stability is that they have no effective sanctions to insure continued participation. Pay could be one such sanction, to be withheld for non-participation. It is interesting to note in this regard that all but one or two of the members of the Beachview AP unit arrived at the station house on the night we administered our questionnaire because they knew that they would receive $10 for filling it out. According to the training sergeant, it was the highest turnout ever obtained.

Perhaps the main obstacle to using pay as a reward is its cost. One of the advantages of voluntary crime control organizations is that they are inexpensive, and paying members might negate that advantage. What alternative rewards, then, are available?

b. Effectiveness

Much of whatever stability the organizations maintained can be seen as a result of their perceived effects on crime. While we will describe these perceptions in more detail in the section discussing the members, it should be mentioned here that

the early stability of Safeblock particularly was closely related to the fact that a very serious rash of muggings, murders and assorted crimes stopped during the first few months in which the watch operated. Childguard leaders remarked ruefully that part of the problem of the considerable attrition of members was due to the fact that "no incidents had occurred recently."

The problem with this kind of incentive for participation is its temporary and self-limiting nature. The kind of abnormally high crime situation that often precipitates the formation of such groups is almost by definition short-lived. Routine normalization processes are likely to take effect. Moreover, if the program is actually effective as a deterrent, even fewer incidents are likely to occur. The patrols will then become tedious, and members will tend to feel that they are unnecessary.

This raises the question of the effectiveness of voluntary crime control programs, and assessing their effectiveness was not one of the purposes of the research reported here. Several observations on this issue became relevant in the course of this study, however.

Any consideration of a program's effectiveness should take into account two meanings of the term. First, there is the extent to which it has had a real impact on the crime whose reduction was its primary goal. This kind of effectiveness can be characterized as a program's "objective" consequences. Second, a program's effectiveness in terms of allaying the anxieties of its members, its "subjective" effects, should be assessed. These two kinds of effectiveness should be kept analytically distinct and can vary

independently. The first kind of effectiveness will be discussed in this section; the second will be one of the major foci of attention in the section dealing with the organizations' memberships.

The most obvious way of measuring a program's effectiveness is to look at relevant crime statistics before the program's institution, look at them again when the program is in full operation, and measure the differences. This is not to be done here, however. First, the unreliability of crime statistics is notorious. Second, some of the activities to which our patrols address themselves--for example, fights among schoolchildren or vandalism in housing projects--would not have been reported as crimes in the first place. In fact, particularly in Low Income Towers, the reluctance even to call the police to report crimes is well known. Third, we have no way of controlling for other explanatory factors in assessing the programs' impact. Changes in police reporting procedures, random fluctuations in crime rates, the institution of other means of crime control--such factors as these could explain at least as much, if not more, of the variation in crime rates than the patrols.

Another way to assess effectiveness is to obtain the judgments of the relevant public authorities. By this measure, all of our organizations were effective. Beachview police leadership (although not the rank-and-file policemen) considered the Civilian Radio Motor Patrol an effective crime deterrent. The housing authority expressed the same feelings about the LIT tenant patrols. The precinct's community relations officer thought

Safeblock was "doing a good job." Childguard was loudly and vociferously applauded by the Police Department at all levels.

Yet this kind of measure has obvious shortcomings as well. All of our organizations are viewed by public authorities as legitimate. Moreover, with the exception of Safeblock which was virtually independent of the police, the other three organizations were actively encouraged if not openly sponsored by an official agent. It was, therefore, in the officials' interest to tout the programs' success. In fact, particularly with Childguard and the CRMP and, to some extent, for the Low Income Towers patrols as well, the programs are used by the police for public relations purposes. They are, therefore, unlikely to be described by these authorities as ineffective.

It is interesting to note in this context that Safeblock, our most independent organization, is also the group most ignored by the police. Apart from statements that it is effective, obtained as a result of prodding and probing, police attitudes can best be described as lukewarm. This leads to the hypothesis that the police (and other relevant authorities) are more likely to see a citizen crime control program as effective, and to be enthusiastic about it, the more the program is officially sponsored and can therefore be used for public-relations purposes. The program's actual effectiveness must be assessed independently of police perceptions in this regard.

All of the organizations pointed to particular crimes they prevented, to particular criminals they helped to apprehend. Although Safeblock's claim that "it was all worthwhile since

we saved one life" was perhaps an exaggeration, part of the problem of assessing these programs' effectiveness does rest in the difficulty of answering the question: how much do they have to accomplish to be considered reasonably effective?

Moreover, the latent consequences for crime reduction of these programs are even more difficult to measure than their manifest ones. That is, Safeblock and Childguard explicitly, and the other two implicitly, pointed to the fact that they have raised the security consciousness of their members. Children have become more careful about walking on the streets; Low Income Towers residents are better able to identify neighbors and strangers; Safeblock published directives for increasing the security of the neighborhood's homes.

Discussions of effectiveness must also take into account the very major differences between the on-paper program and the actual situation. That is, the relationship between effectiveness and stability is a very close one. Serious stability problems limit a program's effectiveness in several ways. Their amelioration requires considerable attention to be devoted to organization-maintenance rather than goal-attainment activities. In some cases, like Low Income Towers, the two kinds of activity are not necessarily opposed; holding recruiting meetings in the lobby, for example, means, that the lobby is "covered" for at least as long as the meeting is in session. In other cases, however, attention to one kind of activity means that the other will be neglected. The stance of the Beachview leadership is a clear example. Stability in terms of predictability of operation is

another effectiveness-related factor; for all of the organizations we studied, the more hours covered, the more effective the patrol. At the extreme, a program will by definition be completely ineffective because it is unable to survive.

Finally, any judgment of a program's effectiveness must also assess the program's costs. Irresponsible programs may have such negative consequences for the society's political and social system and values that the cost of maintaining them is inherently too high. They should simply be disbanded. The extent to which a public agency should provide resources for citizen crime control groups is also dependent on an assessment of what they accomplish (or could accomplish) in relation to what they cost to maintain.[3]

As well as the costs of a program to the society, the community, and the (if any) sponsoring agent, the costs to the members must also be taken into account. What kind of time and energy demands can reasonably be made of volunteers in relation to the programs' results, and in terms of the general crime situation (and, thus, the need for the patrol) in the neighborhood?

Clearly, these observations about a program's effectiveness raise more problems than they resolve. Yet their relevance to

[3] It must be noted here that such assessments are not to be based on the simple-minded cost-benefit analysis model. They must also judge the costs of alternative approaches to the same problem. Thus, for example, doubling the amount of support given to the Low Income Towers tenant patrols will still cost the housing authority considerably less than hiring one or two additional housing patrolmen. If, therefore, increasing patrol support services will increase the efficacy of the patrols, this may well be a worthwhile effort.

the two factors assessed here, stability and responsibility, is direct and important, and future research should systematically concern itself with the issue of effectiveness.

c. Appreciation

To return to our discussion of rewards and incentives to encourage stability, the issue of community appreciation for the work done by voluntary crime control programs is an important one. Pay for the members of the tenant patrols at Low Income Towers and the CRMP, while viewed as important in itself, was also seen as symbolic of the regard in which the wider community held the programs. "If the community saw the work as important, it would be willing to pay the members." Childguard members, while not interested in pay, were very concerned about whether or not the police appreciated what they were doing. It will be remembered that the former members with whom we spoke--people who had quit the program--gave as one of their reasons for leaving their felt lack of appreciation by the police and the community.

Appreciation as a stability-producing factor is especially significant given its relatively low cost. That is, while pay for the members, for example, is expensive to the community and/or the official agency concerned, the amount of appreciation given to a particular program can be increased very cheaply through such symbolic means as awards ceremonies, letters of commendation, etc.

d. Socializing

All of the programs studied here obtained and maintained memberships in part because of the opportunities for socializing

they provided. This incentive was especially powerful for Safeblock and the Low Income Towers patrols, in large part because the nature of their crime-control activity was not inimical to or in conflict with socializing. Sitting in a neighbor's house or a building lobby and keeping watch can be accomplished just as well if the sitters enjoy each other's company and have a nice time. For Childguard and the CRMP, this was less the case. The members did not congregate as part of their patrol tasks. Yet even in these two organizations, members said that their enjoyment of participation had a good deal to do with how well they got along with their partners.

Thus, stability for voluntary crime control programs could probably be considerably enhanced if their structures and activities encouraged socializing. It would seem that instrumental and expressive foci of attention should be situationally merged as much as possible.

4. Organizational Context

The Low Income Towers tenant patrols were officially sponsored by the housing authority. The Beachview Community Council sponsored the CRMP. The Parents' Association served the same function for Childguard, and the program's relation to the police almost amounted to sponsorship. Only Safeblock was a virtually independent program, and it is our assessment that its strong neighborhood base, the extremely serious crime problem which led to its formation, and its unusually "activist" and well-educated membership allowed such independence.

Our data suggest that sponsorship enhances stability; in fact, it seems to be very difficult for voluntary crime control organizations to survive without close relationships to other agencies. The tenant patrols received a paid supervisor, consultants, jackets and other such symbols, refreshments, furniture, and whatever tangible assets they had from "downtown." Organizational skills and assistance were also provided. The patrols had very great difficulty surviving with such help, but it is clear that they would not exist without it. This same point seems to hold for Childguard and the CRMP.

As was said earlier, the four factors discussed here--leadership, organizational structure, rewards and incentives, and organizational relationships--are to be viewed as necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the stability of voluntary crime control organizations. The potential for and ways of achieving greater stability for such programs are as yet unknown.

The explanation for the situation is, however, clear. Unlike many other voluntary associations, crime control organizations require a considerable amount of time and energy from their members. Unlike a chess club or an American Legion Post, the realization of their goals requires continued and concerted action over long periods of time. While such commitment from large numbers of volunteers is possible in the short run, as responses to disasters[4] or various social movements attest, it is extremely difficult to routinize over the long run. Thus, if

[4] Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster (New York: Anchor Books, 1969), p. 301.

crime control organizations manned by volunteers are to persist, there must be sufficiently strong and powerful rewards and incentives for membership, stronger than those needed for most voluntary associations because the demands on members are greater and the need for compliance if the program is to survive more compelling. In fact, it is indicative of the overwhelming concern with crime that voluntary crime control programs have achieved any degree of stability at all.

Responsibility

Engendering responsibility in voluntary crime control organizations was perceived as a major problem and as an important variable to be assessed in this research. Since the members would be private citizens unfettered by formal controls, it seemed likely that some programs would "take the law into their own hands." For three of our organizations, however, this does not seem to have been the case. The Safeblock, Childguard, and Low Income Towers patrols were not irresponsible; nor did their members, as we shall see in detail in the next section, express irresponsible attitudes.

All four of the programs studied here were responsible on paper. Their members were to act simply as the "eyes and ears of the police," a phrase actually used by the four leaderships. Yet what mechanisms to enforce this dictum existed within the organizations?

For Childguard, the extreme visibility of the operation made irresponsible behavior unlikely; the members patrolled in

broad daylight, when the streets were crowded with people. The required training sessions stressed the lawful nature of the patrols. The leadership was extremely sensitive to charges of vigilante tendencies, and they were always concerned about this issue. One of the major reasons they found Mrs. Jones, the P.A. member who first began to develop CG, so distasteful was the hysterical and racist way in which she presented the problem. It seems clear that vigilante-like behavior would not have been tolerated by the CG leaders, that it would very quickly have become visible to them, and that the program's responsibility is likely to be maintained.

Irresponsible behavior on the part of members of the Low Income Towers tenant patrols would also be difficult to achieve because of their visibility. Not only do residents obviously use the lobbies a good deal, but the patrol members work in groups and, thus, act as checks on each other. All the patrol members on duty at a particular time would have had to concur if that patrol were to be irresponsible. Moreover, given the extent to which patrol members were afraid even to ask people to sign in, fear of reprisals also acted as a significant constraint.

It was our initial hypothesis that relationships with official agencies, primarily the police, would be a powerful responsibility-producing factor. Both Childguard and the LIT patrols maintained such relationships. Given the situation we found in Beachview, however, the program most closely tied to and controlled by the police, this hypothesis was not supported.

Safeblock would seem to have had the greatest potential

for irresponsibility. Its patrols were the least visible, consisting of sitting in houses late at night. Patrol members could have left the houses and roamed about at will without anyone's knowledge. Its independence did not provide the at least formal constraint of public control. Yet the program was highly responsible, largely as a result of its members' predispositions.

Beachview, the one irresponsible program studied here, has already been discussed in detail in Chapter VI. As we have seen, a combination of members' and leaders' interests, inadequate supervision, and attention to public-relations goals brought about this situation.

Thus, with one exception, responsibility has not proved to be as problematic for voluntary crime control organizations as our original expectations led us to believe. Stability, on the other hand, was an even more major difficulty, and its absence severely limited the programs' effectiveness.

The Members

This section will discuss the members of our four organizations taken as a group. Consequently, the study's major ommission is most significant here. Since we were unable to interview more than a few potential members, people who shared the relevant membership characteristics with the programs' participants but who had chosen not to join--for example, parents of children in PA-member schools, or Low Income Towers residents--we do not have the data to specify the differences in the attributes of members from those of non-members. To put it more tersely, we cannot answer the question: who joins? Do members, for example, have more personal crime experience? Do they have more leisure time? A stronger sense of community responsibility?

The question is important from the viewpoint of public policy. That is, if voluntary crime control programs are to be encouraged, which are the prime target groups of potential members to which to address organizing efforts? Future research should systematically concern itself with this issue.

Another important qualification must be noted. Although we will discuss the members of the four organizations as a group, we certainly do not consider them a statistically or even substantively adequate sample of the universe of such memberships. This section, then, must be considered preliminary and tentative. It should be reiterated, however, that while the membership of each organization is socio-economically homogeneous, seen as a whole the members are quite heterogeneous. That is, lower, working, middle, upper-middle, and upper class persons are included.

This is in itself an interesting finding. As was stated earlier, voluntary associations are largely a middle and upper-middle class phenomenon in the United States; lower and working-class people are much less likely to join. Yet they can be mobilized to participate in crime control programs, making such programs a potential mechanism for involving lower and working-class people in the voluntary association network.

Much of the data on the members of the four organizations studied here have already been presented in the preceding chapters. In this section, we will hold the many obvious and class-related differences among the various memberships constant and discuss a set of selected similarities among them.

Crime Experience and Attitudes

Given that we are talking about the members of citizen crime control organizations, it is hardly surprising that they have had considerable direct experience with crime. Of the 151 people for whom we have data:

67 have themselves been victims;

54 have witnessed crimes; and

94 have family members or friends who have been victimized.

In large part, then, these organizations draw their memberships from people whose personal experiences have deepened their anxiety about a situation which has so captured the concern of urban residents in general that it has become a major political issue: the crime problem.

We have other behavioral indicators of the extent of this

concern. Ninety-two, or about 60 per cent, say that they have changed their day-to-day behavior because of the crime situation. These changes range from simply becoming more cautious to severe self-limitations imposed on freedom of movement or activity. "I never leave the apartment except to do my shopping," is somewhat extreme, but many of our respondents say that they almost never go out at night, visit friends, or allow their children to move freely throughout their neighborhoods. The consequences of such constrictions for the quality of urban life cannot be understated.

The consequences of the fear and anxiety which underlie such changes in daily life are also significant. Eighty-seven of our respondents spontaneously mentioned crime when talking about their neighborhoods. Thus, crime appears almost to have become a part of people's lives in the same way as friendliness or good schools or convenience or attractiveness or good property values or any of the usual things one talks about in discussing one's neighborhood.

The number and kind of security precautions taken by our respondents is interesting (we have a group of 111 here, since these questions were not asked for Low Income Towers where it is illegal to tamper with the locks, install alarms, have dogs, etc.):

70 have improved their locks.

39 have improved lighting (almost everyone who owns a home).

19 have installed alarms (again, mostly homeowners).

24 have guard dogs.

25 have taken other security precautions, such as gates.

21 own guns (almost exclusively in Beachview).

Given the fear and anxiety of this group, the fact that only CRMP members opted for arming themselves as a way of dealing with the problem is especially important. This further reinforces our conclusion that responsibility is not as great a problem for voluntary crime control organizations as we had expected. For a program to be irresponsible, it would seem that both the members must be irresponsibly inclined and the organizational structure conducive to the expression of irresponsible behavior. By this latter dimension, we mean not the formal stance taken by the organization but the actual supervisory arrangements. This can be represented schematically as follows:

		ORGANIZATION	
		Engenders responsibility	Does not engender responsibility
MEMBERS	Irresponsibly inclined		Beachview
	Responsibly inclined	Childguard Low Income Towers	Safeblock

Only Beachview meets both of these conditions. Safeblock's structure can be viewed as conducive to irresponsible behavior, but the members were not so inclined. Both Childguard and the Low Income Towers tenant patrols meet neither condition.

In the case of Low Income Towers, it is important to note that while it is to be expected that upper-middle-class people would have the education and ideology not to espouse vigilante attitudes, very poor people do not necessarily espouse them either. It is a working-class population, in accord with sociological knowledge, which expresses such attitudes, and for organizations which draw their memberships from such a population, the problem of providing a supervisory and disciplinary structure which would prohibit irresponsibility seems particularly important. Such a structure might have "moved" the Beachview CRMP from cell 1 to cell 3.

Attitudes Toward the Organizations

One hundred twenty, or nearly 80 per cent, of our members saw their programs as effective. This is the subjective "sense of effectiveness" mentioned earlier. What seems to be meant is that people feel safer as a result of their participation. Doing something about a problem makes these people feel less victimized by it. While the extent to which these feelings of increased safety carry over into everyday life is unknown--and, given the intense concern and behavior changes these data indicate, this is probably hardly considerable--participation in voluntary crime control organizations might well be one way of improving people's attitudes toward city life. And, if there is some spill-over into behavior, this improvement might actually lead to real changes in the quality of urban life as well.

Along with helping people feel safer, a related consequence of participation in voluntary crime control organizations is the

extent to which the members actually become safer from crime, apart from the major goals of the program. That is, getting to know people in the neighborhood (and over 2/3 of our respondents say they have made new friends through their participation in the programs) so that neighbors can be distinguished from strangers, becoming more security-conscious about one's home, family, and person--such consequences ought not to be underestimated. Safeblock became convinced that these were in fact the major effects of the program and voted itself out of existence to become part of a block-association network in which these would be the major and not subsidiary goals. Childguard emphasized these aspects of their program and formalized them in a "walking guide" with safety instructions for schoolchildren. Seen in this way, voluntary crime control programs are not to be assessed so much as programs in themselves but rather as a means of raising the personal security consciousness of the relevant membership bases. The extent to which the Safeblock history is typical and ought to be encouraged must await further research, but it is clearly one strategy worthy of exploration.

Our data indicate a considerable reservoir of volunteer energy which can be tapped for some purposes. Of the 111 asked to evaluate the time they spent working in the program (this question was not asked for Low Income Towers), 71 said it was painless to donate time. One hundred fourteen did not think they should be paid for their participation. And in response to an open-ended question about why a member joined such a program, 80, or more than half, spontaneously offered reasons of community

responsibility. "It's our community; we must try to help." These responses are promising for the future of voluntary crime control organizations, but they are also somewhat paradoxical, given these organizations' enormous stability problems. They do indicate, however, that different and more effective stability-producing mechanisms may prove helpful, that perhaps the problem is not endemic and insoluble.

These voluntaristic sentiments are even more interesting when one considers the fact that our respondents cannot on the whole be characterized as being the traditional "joiners." Only sixty-eight, or fewer than half, have ever belonged to any other voluntary association. Thus, voluntary crime control organizations, probably because of the importance to people of the problem with which they are concerned, can draw members from groups who do not tend to belong to such organizations in general--another fairly hopeful portent for their future.

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APPENDIX

Crime Control Organization Member Questionnaire

I.D. # _____

Name _____

Address _____

_____

Organization _____

1. How did you first hear of this organization? When did you hear of it?

2. How long have you been a member? What does "joining" consist of? (Probe for dues, official identification, etc.)

3. Who are the leaders of the organization? (Probe for indications of status as well as names.)

4. Do you think you know all_____ most_____ half_____ some_____ or few_____ of the other members?

5. Were any of these people friends before you joined?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: how many?

a. How many of your close friends and relatives are members? Which ones?

6. Have you made any new friends through the organization?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: how many?

7. What are the organization's major activities? (Probe to get range.)

8. In which of these do you participate?

9. How much time do you spend each month working in the organization?

10. Do you find giving that much time reasonably painless_____ somewhat inconvenient_____ or a considerable sacrifice_____?

11. Do you think you should be paid for your work? Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: By whom? Why? For what? Should everyone be paid?

If no: Why not?

12. How often do you find that you are unable to do your assignment, or attend meetings, or participate in other organizational activities?

13. If you are absent, what happens? (Probe for organizational mechanisms for obtaining compliance, getting replacements vs. subject's responsibility vs. nothing happening at all.)

14. Did you receive any kind of training for your job in the organization?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: What was it?

15. As you look back on it, why do you think you joined the organization? (Probe for social pressure from friends, family, and neighbors; self-initiative; doubts about joining; a particular precipitating incident; excitement or danger; civic responsibility. Make sure to get details.)

16. Why do you think most of your fellow members joined? (Probe same as 15.)

17. Do you enjoy your activities in the organization?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: What?

If no: What?

18. Is you work ever dangerous?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: In what ways?

If no: Did you expect it to be dangerous when you joined?

19. Would you favor paid guards rather than civilian members doing the work?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Why?

If no: Why not?

(Probe for enthusiasm for voluntarism, where the money should or would come from.)

20. Many of your neighbors do not participate. Why do you think they don't? How do you feel about their not participating? (Probe for civic responsibility, altruism vs. resentment, people getting a service for nothing.)

a. How do you think most of your neighbors view the organization? Your friends? Family? The police? Local community leaders? (Probe for organization's "reputation.")

21. What are the organization's goals and purposes? (Probe for whole range and get two most important.)

22. Do you think there are any other goals the organization should adopt?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Which ones? Why?

23. Do you think there are any other activities the organization should engage in?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Which ones? Why?

24. Do you think the organization is engaging in some activities it should not be?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Which ones? Why?

25. How much voice do you think you have in the running of the organization?

Is this enough_____ too much_____ too little_____?

(Probe for their assessment of the organization structure.)

26. How are decisions made within the organization? (Get examples as well as general discription.)

27. What do you like most about the organization? Why? (Probe for philosophy, organizational form, tactics, leadership, other members.)

28. What do you like least about the organization? (Probe same as 27.)

29. Some crime control efforts have been criticized for taking the law into their own hands. Have you heard such criticism? What do you think of it?

30. Are there any circumstances under which taking the law into your own hands is justified?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: What?

31. Has your oganization considered this issue?

Yes ___ No ___ DK ___ NA ___

If yes: With what result(s)?

32. Does your organization have any contact with the police?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: What kind? (Probe for meetings, letters, liaison officer -- extent to which police controls and initiates organizational activities.)

33. Do you think your organization has had any effect on the quality of local police services?

If yes: What?

If no: Why not?

34. Has the organization changed since you first joined?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: How? (Probe for increase vs. decrease in size and interest; changes of leadership and policy and philosophy; morale, membership, activities.)

35. What do you think the organization has accomplished? (Probe for effectiveness as an anti-crime force. Get criteria for judging effectiveness.)

36. Do you think the organization could have done more?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: What? How?

If no: Why not?

37. You must have had some expectations when you joined; how have they been realized?

General Questionnaire (members, former members, non-members)

To be asked of members, former members, and non-members:

1. How long have you lived in this neighborhood? In your present apartment or house?

2. What are some of the things you like about this neighborhood?

3. What are some of the things you don't like?

4. Would you like to move to another neighborhood?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Why?

If no: Why not?

5. Do you think crime rates are rising in your neighborhood?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: What kinds of crime?

6. How do you account for this increase? (Probe racism vs. "sociological sophistication.") (If don't mention increase, ask instead, What kinds of crime are most frequent? Who is responsible for most crimes?)

7. Do you think the police are doing a good job?

Yes_____ No_____ DK _____ NA _____

If yes: How?

If no: Why not?

8. Have you acquired or installed any of the following?

a. Improved locks _____
b. Special or extra lights _____
c. Burglar alarms _____
d. Security gates _____
e. Dogs _____
f. Weapons (which) _____
g. Other _____

9. How would you respond in the following situations?

a. Your wife points out the men who mugged her in the park, (ask of men only).

b. Your child gets beaten up and his money stolen in the school lavatory.

c. You see a kid breaking the antenna on your neighbor's car.

d. You see a woman being attacked on the street when no one else is around.

e. You find someone trying to sell drugs to teen-agers in your building's lobby.

f. You surprise burglars who are trying to get into your friend's house.

(In all of the above, probe for the extent to which respondent would act on his own as opposed to getting the authorities, and the extent to which he would act violently.)

10. Have you ever been the victim of a crime?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: describe incidents (3 most recent, if more). How did you respond?

11. Have you ever been witness to a crime?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: describe incidents (not more than 3).

How did you act in these situations? How did you respond?

12. Have any members of your family or close friends been victims of a crime?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Describe incidents (not more than 3).

13. Do any of your close friends or relatives live in this neighborhood?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Which ones?

If no: Where do they live?

14. Would you say people around here are pretty friendly _____ or do they keep to themselves_____?

15. Do you find yourself exchanging services with some of your neighbors?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Which ones? How often?

16. Are you more frightened than you used to be?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

17. Have you changed your day-to-day behavior because of the crime situation?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: How? (Probe)

18. Are you worried about your children's safety? Under what circumstances?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: What measures have you taken in this regard?

19. Have you considered buying a gun?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Have you done so? Why?

If no: Why not?

20. Are you a registered voter?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

21. Are you a Republican_____ Democrat_____ Independent_____ Other (specify)_____?

22. Did you vote in the 1972 primary?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

23. Do you consider yourself a liberal_____ conservative_____ middle-of-the-road_____ other (specify) _____?

24. Do you belong to any (other, for members) civic or political or social organization(s)?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Which ones? How active are you in the organization(s)?

25. Have you ever engaged in any other political or social action?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: What? How actively?

26. Some people consider themselves Irish-Americans or Jewish-Americans. Do you consider yourself as belonging to a particular ethnic group?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: Which one?

27. What is the last grade in school you completed?

28. What is your occupation (husband's occupation if respondent says housewife)?

29. What was your father's occupation?

29a. (If father NA) what was your mother's occupation?

30. Who are the members of your household? (Get ages and statuses).

31. What is your age? (estimate if respondent reluctant).

32. Can you estimate your yearly family income?

33. Do you own or rent your house (only if ambiguous)?

34. In what religion were you brought up? What is your present religious preference?

35. Do you attend religious services regularly_____ often_____ seldom_____ never_____?

36. Have you ever served in the Armed Forced?

Yes_____ No_____ DK_____ NA_____

If yes: What branch, what rank(s)? Did you volunteer or were you drafted? Did you enjoy your military experience, on balance? Do you ever regret getting out of the service? Frequently_____ sometimes_____ never_____?

END