


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
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531

Date filmed

9/29/75



AN EVALUATION OF

THE

IDAHO BUREAU OF NARCOTIC AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT

AN EVALUATION OF 1974

THE

IDAHO BUREAU OF NARCOTIC AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT

For

W. Anthony Park
Attorney General
State of Idaho

By

John C. MacIVOR
Director
Colorado Bureau of Investigation

Presented

January 1974

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The assistance and cooperation accorded the Consultant throughout this evaluation is greatly appreciated. Especial gratitude is extended to the following officials and their staff.

W. Anthony Park
Attorney General
State of Idaho

Robert C. Arneson
Director
Idaho Law Enforcement Planning Commission

Robert M. King
Chief of Bureau
Idaho Bureau of Narcotic and Drug Enforcement

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I

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 1968, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has consciously endeavored to provide technical assistance to recipients of LEAA funds. This technical assistance is made available upon request and may range from research and development to evaluation of programs or projects undertaken by criminal justice agencies, primarily those receiving LEAA financial support.

Of particular interest to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration are the new or innovative or demonstration programs, especially those requiring funding over a period of several years. Perhaps the category of grants which have generated the greatest interest are those in the area of organized crime and narcotics. This is largely due to a significantly high priority for funding allocated to these two major national crime problem areas. With the support of LEAA funds, law enforcement programs have been developed throughout the country. Hopefully through innovation and resourcefulness some of these new approaches will have a significant impact in reducing the problem.

Consistent with implementing new programs should be the establishment of a periodic evaluation process to determine whether or not the program is accomplishing its stated goals and objectives. These evaluations are beneficial not only to the agency concerned but may have national significance as well, for one of the goals of LEAA is to develop or identify model programs that have proved successful under actual operational conditions. Conversely, should problems be identified in a program, recommendations may be appropriate for consideration which could have a positive influence on its overall effectiveness.

At the request of The Honorable W. Anthony Park, Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and upon the encouragement of Robert C. Arneson, Director of the Idaho Law Enforcement Planning Commission, this writer has agreed to provide technical assistance to the State of Idaho. This assistance shall be in the form of an on-site evaluation of the Idaho Bureau of Narcotic and Drug Enforcement.

The scope of the evaluation, although more precisely quantified further in the report, will generally be limited to those areas enumerated in the letter of request by the Attorney General.



STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BOISE 83720

W. ANTHONY PARK
ATTORNEY GENERAL

September 28, 1973

Mr. John C. MacIvor, Director
Colorado Bureau of Investigation
1370 Broadway
Denver, Colorado 80203

Dear Mr. MacIvor:

I understand that you and Robert Arneson, Director of the Idaho Law Enforcement Planning Commission, have reached agreement relative to your coming to Idaho as a professional consultant retained by the Attorney General's office.

Therefore, the purpose of this letter is to formally request that you conduct an on-site evaluation of performance, policy, procedures, and administration of the Idaho Bureau of Narcotics and Drug Enforcement. The Bureau is under the general supervision and direction of the Idaho Attorney General's office and has statewide jurisdiction.


Mr. Arneson advises me that you have graciously agreed to perform these consultant services on an expense reimbursement basis only and will not accept a fee. I think your attitude, which I understand is based on your feeling that it is part of your job to improve law enforcement, is most commendable. However, please be advised that LEAA funds are available under a technical assistance grant to pay consultant fees and we remain ready and willing to do so.

Of course, the methods and procedures of your evaluation will be left entirely to your best professional judgment. Be assured that you will receive the utmost cooperation from my office and the Bureau personnel and will have a completely free hand to conduct your evaluation as you

Mr. John C. MacIvor
September 28, 1973
Page 2.

see fit. My only desire is that the evaluation be comprehensive and in depth. since I share your feeling that it is incumbent upon all of us involved in law enforcement to continue to strive for improvement and professionalism. Thank you.

Very truly yours,


W. ANTHONY PARK
Attorney General

WAP:gmi

cc: Mr. Robert Arneson

II

SCOPE OF EVALUATION

A. General

Certainly, the primary purpose of this evaluation is to determine if the Bureau of Narcotic and Drug Enforcement is accomplishing its stated goals and objectives. If it is, is it doing so in an effective, efficient, and professional manner? Should the agency be found to be deficient with respect to achieving its goals and objectives, then the evaluation report should include recommendations to be considered which may help to eliminate or reduce the problem.

In order to arrive at any conclusion with a high degree of confidence one must necessarily examine the Bureau from several perspectives. This would include inquiry into the administrative process, organizational structure, operational policies and procedures, personnel, records system, and training. These are only representative areas of exploration and the evaluation will necessarily address other facets of the overall operation as well.

B. Limitations

This evaluation is intended to assess the overall effectiveness of the Bureau from an operational point of view. In this sense it will be a measurement of success or failure. This evaluation is

not a fiscal audit, nor will it concern itself with those matters. This is an area routinely addressed by the State Auditor and is also a function of the Idaho Law Enforcement Planning Commission in that Federal LEAA funds to a great extent support the Bureau.

This evaluation is not intended to embrace the area of criminal misconduct on the part of any of its present or former employees. These are investigations presently being pursued by the appropriate authorities and are matters which, in some instances, have come to the attention of the courts. As such, it would be inappropriate to comment on those issues.

III METHODOLOGY

In order to acquire as much data as possible within reasonable time constraints, the approach to this survey involved three separate visits to the State of Idaho. The first being the Bureau headquarters in Boise, followed by an on-site inspection of the two regional offices in Pocatello and Coeur D'Alene.

During the course of these inspections, in-depth interviews were conducted with Bureau personnel, including supervisory, clerical, and undercover field agents. One area field office arranged an interview with a paid civilian undercover operator. In addition to questioning Bureau staff, considerable time was expended in discussions with local law enforcement administrators, elected public officials, prosecutors, and members of the Law Enforcement Planning Commission.

While the personal interviews provided invaluable insight with respect to the overall operation of the Bureau, the evaluation, to be comprehensive, required a close examination of reporting and records keeping procedures. All files of the Bureau were reviewed with special attention to case and intelligence files as well as those relating to accountability and statistical data.

Another area directly related to the agency's performance is the Bureau's official Manual of Instructions, more generally known as the policy and procedure manual. This document represents the foundation for performance by its personnel. It is the official yardstick or standard by which this performance may be measured. The manual as such is used as a tool to some degree in measuring the overall effectiveness of the Bureau in this evaluation.

IV

FINDINGS

A. Goals and Objectives

A review of the grant applications to the Law Enforcement Planning Commission for Federal funds indicate in a general sense some of the Bureau's overall goals and objectives.

"This project is a state-wide effort to overcome the fragmentation of law enforcement. This unit will, in both enforcement and prevention efforts, provide a capability of overcoming jurisdictional problems, reduce existing duplication of efforts and investigation, and develop effective programs where drug abuse and other major crimes are the greatest. The primary goal of the project has been the development of a sophisticated and coordinated intelligence system for collecting, storing, and disseminating information relating to narcotics traffic and organized criminal conduct and to provide supervision and direction to coordinate the State's narcotics and drug enforcement, prevention, education, and treatment efforts. Of equal importance to the project is the investigation into reports of corruption on the part of public officials and reports that police, prosecutors and/or judges are not effectively enforcing the law."

The Bureau's Manual of Instructions quantifies more precisely its goals and objectives and establishes priorities as well.

"The Bureau is empowered to enforce all laws of the land, but the operational policy is directed towards the following objectives in the order of priority as follows:

- a. Detection and apprehension of major narcotic violators and sources of supply.
- b. Cooperating with and training of other enforcement agencies in the supervision of narcotics traffic at all levels.
- c. Chemical analysis of suspected narcotics and restricted dangerous drugs.
- d. Receipt, security and destruction of all narcotics and restricted dangerous drugs."

The manual further states, in part, in the section immediately following:

"The priorities as established will be adhered to in order to eliminate an assumption of the local jurisdiction's responsibility and to assure that major problems are not neglected for comparative minor problems in state trafficking."

Findings:
Narcotic Enforcement

With respect to its stated top priority objective, "Detection and apprehension of major narcotic violators and sources of supply.", one must unequivocally conclude that the Bureau has fallen far short in this endeavor.

This is not to suggest that there has been insufficient effort in narcotic enforcement throughout the State, for this is not the case.

During the period of February 1972 through September 1973, the Bureau made 1,302 narcotic cases resulting in 614 arrests. A close review of the agency's records disclose, however, that the vast majority of cases involved only small quantities of narcotics. In fact, the number of large seizures were found to be statistically insignificant and it is questionable whether any top level narcotic traffickers have been taken into custody. This conclusion is supported not only by the Bureau's statistics, but there was almost universal agreement among the many agents interviewed as well.

A close examination of some external and internal factors may account for the Bureau's deviation from the major narcotic dealer as its principal target, and to this extent their past performance is understandable but should not be perpetuated.

Since its inception, the Bureau has been operating under tremendous pressure. Expectations initially ran high. Requests for services far outstripped its ability to respond.

With a strong desire to succeed, it staffed up as quickly as possible in an effort to produce instant results. Also prevailing among the Bureau's staff was the false notion that in order to justify and receive second year LEAA funding it must be able to demonstrate dramatic success.

What was to follow was clearly predictable -- the Bureau was caught up in the familiar trap of playing the numbers game. Along with this was the yielding to demands for services by local law enforcement administrators without evaluating their problem as it related to the State's overall drug situation. The Bureau in many instances deployed agents simply on the basis of who called for assistance the loudest and longest. This resulted in providing services based upon political considerations without regard to its impact on major drug trafficking.

Upon analyzing this situation, it is not difficult to understand why one might succumb to these pressures. Take, for example, the police chief in a small rural community who is confronted with information that narcotics are floating around the high school and are readily available to anyone wanting them. This information may have come to the police chief or elected city officials from school teachers, students, or concerned parents. Whatever the original source, before long there is widespread community concern and rumors run rampant indicating a major drug problem when, in fact, there is probably nothing more than casual use of soft drugs by a relatively few individuals. At this point the truth of the situation becomes irrelevant. Concerned parents begin to apply pressure to the elected officialdom, who in turn point a finger to the chief saying, "Do something to save

our drug-riddled community from disaster." The chief then looks around at his three-man police department, all of whom are well known in the community, and lets out a loud cry of "HELP". The Bureau in an effort to respond to requests of all law enforcement officials sends in undercover agents who in turn buy all the narcotics in town. The evidence list reads, nine lids, four joints, and a handful of bennies. Those arrested, two teenagers and three young adults. The job finished, the agents move on to the next target with the whole episode repeated while attention to the major source of supply is again diverted.

While the community pressure applied to the local police chief in the sample situation was formidable, the pressure on the Bureau to respond to these requests is probably increased a hundred-fold. Thus it is understandable why the Bureau has been stamping out brush fires rather than addressing its chief goal -- the major trafficker.

It should be emphasized in the strongest way that buying narcotics at the street level is a logical and appropriate starting point in striving to reach the top level distributor. Information can be developed and cases can be plateaued until this objective is reached. Little is to be gained in controlling the overall problem if the enforcement effort stops with the lowest level user.

Findings:
Organized Crime

An examination of the Bureau's effort in the area of organized crime leaves one with the notion that no serious attempt is being put forth to either identify or resolve the problem if, in fact, one exists. Success in this area is automatically precluded if the approach as stated in the grant application is followed, "Of equal importance to the project is the investigation into reports of corruption on the part of public officials and reports that police, prosecutors and/or judges are not effectively enforcing the law."

Corruption of public officials and organized crime are offenses which are not generally "reported" to the police. These are criminal activities which must be "ferreted" out through intensive investigations, utilizing the most sophisticated approaches not commonly employed in traditional crimes. These cases require personnel capable of conducting net worth investigations, audits, and, in some instances, the ability to infiltrate the organization.

If the State is to be successful in curtailing organized criminal activity and public corruption, the Attorney General must have authority to impanel statewide grand juries with broad subpoena powers, witness immunity statutes, and, sensitive as this issue is, adequate wiretapping legislation. Without these "tools"

investigations in this area will be severely hampered.

Inspection of the Organized Crime Section disclosed several major problems. At the time of my visit, only one agent was committed full-time to the program while the organizational structure provided for three. A second agent was assigned to the section but was involved in the narcotic enforcement program in Pocatello at the time and there was some question as to whether he would ever return to the Organized Crime Section. The remaining agent assigned to the section had nine years of general law enforcement experience in patrol and jail duties. None of his local law enforcement experience included assignments to the intelligence or organized crime bureaus. This could hardly be considered adequate preparation for such a complex assignment.

The filing system contained 155 incident files, the majority of which did not allude to public corruption or organized criminal activity. A number of the files were responses to inquiries from other police agencies, both local and out-of-state. The filing system failed to provide for adequate cross-referencing, making retrieval of information by type of crime or geographical location impossible without an examination of each incident filed to ascertain if it contained the desired information.

During the course of interviewing the agent assigned to the

Organized Crime Section, it was disclosed that up to this point in time the unit had not specifically identified any individuals involved in organized criminal activity. The utilization of informants by this section was almost nonexistent.

Failure to develop a large pool of informants is overlooking a major resource for information that could uncover organized criminal activity which would not otherwise come to their attention. While it is recognized that there are those who feel that the use of informants, especially paid informants, is a despicable practice, it nonetheless is one of the most valuable tools in combatting organized crime.

B. Organization and Operational Effectiveness

The Idaho Bureau of Narcotic and Drug Enforcement was originally under the jurisdiction of the Board of Pharmacy. In February of 1972 the Bureau, its function, and authority were transferred to the Office of the Attorney General. The Bureau of Narcotic and Drug Enforcement is located organizationally within the Criminal Division of the Attorney General's Office and, in addition to the responsibility of enforcement of the Controlled Substance Act, it also has the responsibility of pursuing organized criminal activity throughout the State. Its role in organized crime is presently limited to intelligence gathering and is not prosecution oriented.

The Bureau has, as its administrative head, a Chief, with a total personnel complement of thirty-four. Organizational structure for the Bureau is set forth in the Manual of Instructions. Briefly described, it is divided into three area offices; namely, Boise, Pocatello, and Coeur D'Alene, with the Boise office as its headquarters. The Organized Crime Section of the Bureau is also located in the Boise office manned with a staff of three agents and a secretary when operating at full complement.

As indicated on the Organizational Chart on page 37, each

regional office is commanded by an area supervisor. Immediately subordinate to the area supervisor are two Agent II's, classified as field supervisors. The field supervisors are, in turn, jointly responsible for the activities of five undercover agents, with the exception of the Boise office where the number is six. What this then amounts to is each regional office has three supervisors managing five field agents. This ratio represents an inefficient utilization of supervisory personnel. However, with this level of supervision, field agents should be functioning at peak capacity with minimal deviation from established practices and procedures.

Upon closer examination one finds that the supervisors spend the vast majority of their time in the office while the undercover agents remain in the field. The end result in this arrangement is that field agents receive only minimal supervision. When questioning the supervisors on this point the response was that they were available to answer any questions a field agent may have over the telephone and, if he needed guidance, all he had to do was call the office. This philosophy in and of itself perhaps explains some of the infamous conduct attributed to certain Bureau personnel. The field supervisors for the most part were performing the role of a coordinator of activities rather than that of supervision.

The duties performed by the area supervisor became even

more elusive. The manual states that he shall maintain close personal contact with all law enforcement agencies within their area of supervision. Except for the city in which the area office was located, personal contact with local law enforcement was extremely minimal and infrequent. He is also the custodian for the special funds of the office. In actual practice, this responsibility, along with a number of other tasks, was found to have been delegated to the office secretary. The area supervisor is also responsible for the proper disposition of narcotic evidence. An examination of the narcotic evidence in the Coeur D'Alene office disclosed that some narcotics had been in the office over five months and as yet was not forwarded to the laboratory for analysis. The evidence logbook which is used to record the status of all narcotic evidence was not kept current. This in and of itself presented no major problem as there was ample documentation in the investigation case files which provided required information as to disposition of evidence. The logbook, however, is a good method for keeping this data in a concise format for ready-reference and quickly identifies cases where additional follow-up may be needed. It also serves as a tickler system for the periodic destruction of evidence no longer required for court. The logbook is a valuable record and should be kept current in order to be utilized effectively.

While the area supervisors are directly responsible to the Chief of the Bureau for the overall operation, performance and

conduct of their respective office, they appear to be in a state of confusion as to where to begin in resolving the Bureau's problems. At the present time the area offices appear to be in a state of limbo, almost like waiting for the other shoe to drop. This attitude prevailed among almost all personnel interviewed. After having been under a constant barrage of criticism from the news media over the past year, with no one rallying to their support, one might expect to find this feeling of helplessness.

My visit to the Pocatello office indicates that apathy may have crested and the office is bouncing back, with moral here rapidly on the upswing. Credit for this change should be directly attributed to William Rodenbaugh who recently had been reassigned from the Organized Crime Section in Boise to head the Pocatello office. Agent Rodenbaugh was found to be a reserved, seasoned, law enforcement officer with natural leadership abilities. From the outset, he has commanded the respect and cooperation of the personnel assigned to this office. With his awareness of the problems there is a strong probability this office will take a leadership role in establishing a respectable image for the Bureau. Evidence of his administrative capabilities are apparent in the memorandums which he has initiated clearly defining responsibilities and establishing policies within his scope of authority.

At the top of the agency's organizational structure is the

Chief of the Bureau, along with a Deputy Chief who also serves as the supervisor of the Boise area office. The Bureau Chief maintains an office in Boise and is physically located in the same suite of offices housing the Boise area operational staff.

While the Bureau Manual of Instructions enumerates the duties and responsibilities of the Chief, in summary, he is the individual who is ultimately accountable to the Attorney General for the Bureau's overall operation. As the administrative head, the success or failure of the agency to accomplish its goals and objectives necessarily rests squarely upon his shoulders. Exception is noted in those areas of fiscal and legal constraints over which he may exercise little or no control.

In the discharge of his duties, as the executive head, he must organize the Bureau into a viable force. This requires an administrator who possesses certain dominate personality traits. To be successful he must, all in one, be an appraiser and evaluator, a communicator and interpreter, and, a decision maker and risk taker.

His ability to respond to situations in the eyes of those whose judgment must be respected will, in part, determine his success. In this situational environment he clearly sets the stage for

evaluation, not only by his superiors and subordinates, but also those upon whom the decision will have an impact. The degree of impact that a decision may carry is not the criterion upon which he should be judged as a decision maker and risk taker but instead, more significant, is the ability to make the appropriate decision when forced to choose from several unpopular or questionably acceptable alternatives. Should he fail in the role of decision making, it is questionable that he will ever be perceived as a strong leader.

As a part of his profile, he must project an image to those around him an aura of confidence but not over-confidence, that of feeling genuinely secure or comfortable amidst his responsibilities. In order to project this image, he must develop a high degree of self-confidence. This self-confidence, however, must also be coupled with competency in order to be effective. There follows what, I believe, is a natural progression. Competence leads to self-confidence, which in turn enables the administrator to withstand the stress and pressures incumbent upon his position. The inability to take "the heat" has been the demise of many a Chief.

While the foregoing represents somewhat of an hypothesis for managerial success, this does not mean that, in my opinion, success is limited to this criteria. To the contrary, it embraces much more than this. This is merely a guideline or set of standards

with which to measure the incumbent's degree of success.

Robert M. King, Chief of the Bureau, brings to this agency a wealth of law enforcement experience. Having spent 27 years with the Ventura Police Department in California, he retired at the rank of Assistant Chief. During ten of these years he was assigned to intelligence and narcotics. This exposure has undoubtedly been a great asset in his present position. Immediately prior to assuming command of the Bureau, he spent approximately fourteen months in law enforcement at the local level in the State of Idaho.

With this impressive array of experience one would expect the Bureau to ascend from its inception, to a position of success and respectability. In order to understand why this may not have been the Bureau's good fortune, it is essential to realize that one arrives at this conclusion only when considered from one's own particular vantage point; i.e., the public, the local law enforcement community, or internally by its own staff.

A survey conducted by the Idaho Law Enforcement Planning Commission of 44 sheriffs and 52 police chiefs in May of 1973 produced some rather interesting data. Ninety-three percent of the respondents indicated the Bureau should be continued, two percent felt it should be modified, while none thought it ought to be dis-

continued. Lack of communication was the Chief complaint followed by insufficient assistance and shortage of manpower.

Assessment of the public's attitude toward the Bureau becomes more difficult. In the absence of a public opinion survey, and inasmuch as the Bureau operates in an atmosphere of secrecy, one might logically conclude that public opinion would be a reflection of the Bureau's exposure through the news media. If this be the case, then the Bureau's image is rather tarnished as most of media's coverage of its activities have been rather negative.

Of the three vantage points, perhaps the one from within best discloses its overall effectiveness. In-depth interviews with the Bureau personnel, both agents and clerical, supervisory and nonsupervisory, reveals a high degree of unanimity as they perceive its problems.

While all employees interviewed voiced a genuine high regard for the Chief, and felt rather strongly that he was eminently qualified to administer the Bureau, they at the same time freely discussed internal and external problem areas that directly reflected upon his competency as a manager.

The foremost concern expressed was an almost total absence

of communication in every respect. Exchange of information between the area offices with respect to activities and general welfare was nonexistent. Only required reports are transmitted, and then only from the two remote offices to headquarters in Boise. Occasionally a directive or memorandum would emanate from the Chief's office, often only to be found in conflict with the Bureau manual. The general attitude among the staff in the Pocatello and Coeur D'Alene offices was that headquarters neither knew nor cared what went on in the field offices. The net result being that they operated as an autonomous entity.

The second major concern was the severe lack of experienced supervisors. Agent II's, (the field supervisors), readily admitted they were not prepared to assume the supervisory responsibilities thrust upon them. Most all expressed the need and desire for additional training.

Next was the feeling that the Bureau did not possess the organizational cohesiveness necessary to function properly, and with this was the overriding dismay and concern for the high turnover of personnel. During the period of February 1972 through September 1973 the attrition rate was in excess of 100%, certainly an unacceptable level for any organization and a reliable indication of severe internal problems.

To state the problems more succinctly, the direction from the Chief appears much too casual, with supervision exceedingly thin even though numerically strong, and processes too decentralized to meet the canons of sound administrative practice.

The Chief's skill as an appraiser and evaluator is in question as demonstrated by the Bureau's responses to the many adverse situations it has been confronted with, which in turn reflects on his ability as a decision maker. To be effective and survive, he must be able to take criticism against the Bureau without withdrawing into the agency itself, and he must be able to correct operational faults as a result of constructive criticism.

Next in command to the Bureau Chief is the Deputy Chief who also serves as area supervisor for the Boise office. One of the Deputy Chief's major responsibilities is providing training and educational programs both for law enforcement and community groups. As with Chief King, the Deputy Chief, Gene Lee, also has an impressive law enforcement background. He served 17 years on the Boise Police Department and attained the rank of Captain of Detectives. Prior to joining the Bureau, he served one and one-half years as Director of the POST Academy.

While most of the personnel interviewed freely discussed the

Bureau problems, there was an obvious intentional avoidance to converse about the friction which exists between the Bureau Chief and his Deputy. Upon pressing the issue, most conceded that a rather severe personality clash existed between the two and to a great extent contributed to the Bureau's morale problem. They felt it had a polarizing effect upon the personnel, especially those in the Boise office. The feeling was prevalent that the hiring of the Deputy Chief was a political compromise on the part of the Bureau Chief since there was some criticism over the employment of a substantial number of agents from out-of-state. The hiring of Gene Lee, a local law man, was apparently intended to counter some of the dissatisfaction expressed by local police officials over the Bureau's disproportionate number of "imports."

The last category of the professional staff to be addressed is that of Narcotic Agent I. The duties of this position are defined in the manual.

"A Narcotic Agent I will basically be that of an undercover agent and will always work under the immediate direction and supervision of an Agent II or a Senior Narcotic Agent."

While the manual states these agents will always work under the immediate direction and supervision of a senior officer, interviews with undercover "Narcs" indicate almost universal non-

compliance with this Bureau policy. The Bureau's decentralized organizational approach; i. e., three regional offices, contributes to this situation. This, coupled with memorandums establishing office policy with respect to Agent II's being available in-house as well as their other field responsibilities, precludes all but the most minimal supervision. The following are two directives issued by the Bureau:

"Effective December 1, 1973, there will be an Agent II working in the office, and an Agent II will be working in the field.

The Agent II working in the office will assist in answering the phone, checking reports, time sheets, vouchers, and doing follow-up on reports; such as obtaining pictures of suspects, vehicle registrations, or any other information that needs a follow-up on. He will also make supplements on all cases he obtains information on.

The Agent II working in the field will supervise and assist the undercover agents when requested. He will also respond to any call from other law enforcement agencies. During his tour of duty, he will also make contact with Idaho State Police and notify them where he can be contacted if needed."

- - - -

"All persons present were advised that when the Bureau is again full staffed, one of the Agent II's in each office will work the day shift and one will work the night shift. Rotation of this schedule will be left up to the area supervisor."

The foregoing are examples of memorandums and directives establishing duties and responsibilities for Agent II supervisors. Aside from being in conflict with one another, more importantly, it demonstrates the weight accorded the role of supervision. Supervision

upon request is akin to no supervision at all.

Further compounding the problem is the manner in which undercover agents are deployed. In a given area office, undercover agents may be "working" communities separated by distances of several hundred miles. These agents, often working alone in remote areas of the State, obviously are not in the best position to summon assistance when critical decisions must be made on a timely basis. This arrangement of supervision via telephone necessarily promotes a process of "Learning by Mistakes." No one is more acutely aware of the pitfalls inherent in this procedure than the undercover agents themselves.

The interview sessions with the undercover agents afforded the opportunity to explore the Bureau's inability to make a significant impact on the major narcotic trafficker. The agents interviewed were found to possess a reasonably sound background in basic law enforcement although most did not have any great exposure to narcotic enforcement prior to their appointment with the Bureau. Exhibited without exception was a strong motivation for the Bureau to succeed in its mission. Their personal commitment to this objective, in light of the overwhelming criticism against the Bureau, is to be commended. This same enthusiasm unfortunately was not evident among the supervisory personnel.

Of paramount concern among these agents was the need for training and competent supervision. Several expressed dismay that command personnel are apparently unconcerned that inexperienced undercover agents are working alone in the field, especially in remote areas without supervision or back-up assistance. This is a dedicated group of young men who admittedly have made numerous errors in judgment. It behooves top management to reevaluate the deployment of its first line supervisors.

While the Bureau's stated top priority objective is the detection and apprehension of major narcotic violators, operational policy precludes its accomplishment. The customary approach utilized in making narcotic cases is to make a series of small quantity purchases of narcotics, generally about three, from a given individual and then move on to another subject. When questioned whether attempts were made to buy in quantities beyond an individual's capability to supply, the response was a firm negative. In fact, any purchase in excess of one hundred dollars requires the "cover" of a supervisor. In any event, these "buys" are frowned upon as being too expensive. Probing further it was discovered that undercover agents have had several opportunities to plateau cases into larger ones, leading to major narcotic dealers. These instances required making an initial good faith buy costing approximately one thousand dollars, after which the suspect would introduce the agent

to his source wherein he would be able to deal direct at this higher level. Informal Bureau policy precluded pursuing these cases, labeling them too expensive. While there is always the possibility that the cash outlay in the case cited may not result in moving up to a major supplier, still one must, upon evaluating all the information, be prepared to take that risk if the Bureau's goals are ever to be achieved.

While purchasing narcotics in small quantities is an acceptable tactic in the development of major cases, it holds no promise for success as a singular approach in resolving the drug trafficking problem as a whole.

Before concluding this section on Organization and Operational Effectiveness, the activities of the clerical staff should be addressed. Three secretaries are assigned to the Boise office with Coeur D'Alene and Pocatello each having one. The distribution of work in the Boise office was such that each secretary appeared to have well-defined tasks, and the workload relatively evenly distributed with no single individual being particularly overtaxed.

The workload situation in the area offices of Pocatello and Coeur D'Alene bore little resemblance to that of Boise. The volume of work assigned to the secretaries in each of these two offices far

exceeded their capabilities. Not only was the sheer volume of work overwhelming, but the myriad of responsibilities delegated to these secretaries was incredible. Placing this position in its proper perspective requires enumeration of some of the duties they were performing at the time of my visit.

1. Maintained entire filing system, including arrest, investigation, and intelligence files. This includes compiling a master name index, follow-up on dispositions, and closing out cases when indicated.
2. Maintain long distance telephone log on all calls placed from office, forwarding a report to headquarters.
3. Arranges appointments for office supervisors and other personnel.
4. Transcribes reports from tapes of five field agents as well as all clerical work for two Agent II's and the area supervisor.
5. Read, process and route all incoming mail, prepares outgoing correspondence, often originates letters for

supervisor's signature.

6. Takes and types minutes of all staff meetings.
7. Maintains the office daily log, including an entry of all incoming and outgoing phone calls and public contacts.
8. Reads newspaper daily and clips articles of interest to the Bureau.
9. Review and proof all reports for accuracy and detail.
10. Serves as office contact in the absence of the supervisor. This includes handling of telephone calls requiring immediate attention, often relating to intelligence matters.
11. Maintains the office bookkeeping system, being responsible for three checking accounts for the agents' travel, investigation, and narcotic buy money. This requires the issuance of checks and balancing of accounts along with the processing of required vouchers.

12. Provides assistance to State and Federal auditors.
13. Responsible for maintaining of inventory of office supplies and reorders when short.
14. Compiles data for weekly, monthly, and quarterly statistical reports, reflecting man-hours worked, cases investigated, narcotics purchased, etc.
15. Maintains subpoena logbook and serves subpoenas to agents, also notifies agents in other offices of court hearing dates.
16. Assists agents in arrests and searching of female suspects.
17. Types criminal complaints, search warrants, arrest warrants and other legal forms. Also serves as the office Notary Public.
18. Takes statements and confessions from arrested persons and criminal suspects, later transcribed and typed into final form.

19. On occasion, accepts evidence from field agents and later must be available to testify in court as to chain of custody.
20. Does routine janitorial work around the office, including cleaning bathrooms, vacuuming and dusting.


At first glance one might conclude that a disproportionate amount of attention has been spent addressing the secretarial function. It is only upon closer examination of these two offices that their role is fully appreciated. Citing from a memorandum initiated by an area supervisor with respect to office procedure, further alludes to the credibility and importance accorded the position.

"Any questions regarding the procedures of the office paperwork, such as vouchers, time sheets, etc., will be directed to the secretary, as she knows what the office headquarters in Boise wants."

During the course of interviewing agents in these two offices, the most consistent response to questions in areas in which they were uncertain was, "Ask the secretary, she knows more about the Bureau's operation than anyone else." A follow-up with the secretaries on these matters proved them to be quite correct.

In summary, the secretaries in the Coeur D'Alene and Pocatello offices were found to be functioning as office managers or administrative assistants who generally possessed greater knowledge of the overall operation of the office and Bureau policy than any of its assigned personnel. It should be noted that the salary of these two positions is not commensurate with the duties and responsibilities incumbent upon the job. Both secretaries appear eminently qualified and their work performance is worthy of commendation.

ORGANIZATION CHART



C. Reporting and Filing System

A review of the Bureau's records system indicates an acute awareness of the need for adequate documentation of its activities. The systematic recording of pertinent information is essential to sound management and the Bureau has done a commendable job in this area. Perhaps the only constructive criticism one could offer is a recommendation that much of the information could be consolidated thus avoiding excessive duplication. The need for compiling daily, weekly, and monthly activity reports is questionable when one monthly report would suffice. A similar situation was noticed in the criminal case reports. A single case file could well contain all information or recorded and filed in three or four separate locations. Consolidation of information would simplify and expedite its retrieval. The compilation of statistical data is thorough, but again duplication of effort should be avoided.

The only area requiring file expansion was in the intelligence files. This information is filed by the assignment of an intelligence number and cross-referenced on a master name index card. In the absence of a known name, this information becomes almost irretrievable. A simple cross-referencing by type of crime and geographical area could result in a very effective intelligence filing system.

The system if maintained properly, by which travel, investigation and confidential funds are accounted for is sound but is very cumbersome for the agents in the field. Travel and investigation funds are drawn separately from confidential funds and are required to be expended as such without any co-mingling. In practice an agent needs three pockets; one for travel and investigation purposes, one for confidential funds or "buy" money, and one for his own personal money. Comical as it sounds, this is exactly the way the agent operates. A simpler method is a single cash draw with an accountability and crediting to the appropriate activity as the funds are expended. I suspect the present cumbersome method may have been mandated by the Law Enforcement Planning Commission in an effort to clearly identify expenditures even though a simplified approach would accomplish the same objective.

Another area which should be of great concern to the Bureau is the transmittal of confidential information transmitted along with expense vouchers to the auditor's office. These forms contain confidential information with respect to the Bureau's operation. Once these forms leave the Bureau's office no control can be exercised over their future confidentiality. While sound accounting practice demands documentation of expenditures, this documentation should be properly retained within the Bureau, subject to frequent inspec-

tion by the auditor without prior notice.

Physical security of the files was generally good. Each office is equipped with an intrusion alarm system which provides adequate protection. The only exception found was in the office used by the Bureau Chief's secretary, however, the area slated to be alarmed in the immediate future. This office should also be provided with door locks which provide a higher degree of security than those presently in use.

The Bureau's overall effort in records and filing is excellent. By streamlining some of its areas, one could expect to reduce the work effort of both agent and clerical personnel while also improving retrieval of information.

D. Personnel

The Bureau was found to be in a rather unique position with respect to personnel hiring practices in that they are exempt employees under the Idaho Personnel Commission. This is a luxury not generally afforded many state agencies. This policy is certainly a departure from the norm. The Commission and those responsible for this waiver are to be complimented for such a progressive approach to a difficult problem. In this instance, exemption from the rule is justified.

This "freedom" from the "system", however, imposes a tremendous responsibility upon the Bureau Chief. He can no longer fix blame for personnel incompetence with the State's hiring and recruiting practices. He must be constantly vigilant that only those with proven excellence in this specialized area of law enforcement be selected for appointment. This option provides him the opportunity to "pirate" the cream of the country's "narcs." Failure to do less, with this latitude, is inexcusable.

Narcotic enforcement is one of the most difficult policing tasks an administrator can be confronted with. Inattention to the problem causes public outcry, while at the same time they find the tactics required to strike at the heart of the problem personally repugnant. Narcotic agents must of necessity work undercover,

requiring them often to live, eat, and breathe with those who most people consider the scum of the Earth. In order to be effective, they must take on a similar appearance and mode of life. This at once makes them social outcasts, or freaks in our society. When at home with their family, usually once or twice a week, and often less, they are shunned by their neighbors. Should the wife and children preserve his anonymity and protect his cover, they too are isolated from the community. The same is equally true if disclosure is made, particularly if the children are in junior high or high school. The cruelty imposed upon children, whose father is a narc, by their peer group can only be appreciated by those who have been through it.

Aside from its social implications, narcotic enforcement is becoming increasingly dangerous. Fifteen years ago one seldom found a narcotic user in possession of a gun. Today it is commonplace among the drug-trafficking cult. This only compounds the necessity to select only those of the highest caliber and greatest experience.

The nature of narcotic enforcement is so personally demanding that it requires individuals of strong moral and personal integrity. It also requires extensive training and supervised field experience in this specialized area. General law enforcement experience in

and of itself is not a sufficient background to qualify an individual for this sensitive area of enforcement.

Perhaps the greatest single criticism of the Bureau, as a result of this survey, is the failure of the Bureau Chief to seize upon the opportunity afforded to select highly skilled, experienced narcotic enforcement officers. The freedom to select the finest the field has to offer is an administrator's dream. A once-in-a-lifetime opportunity slipped through his fingers. With no disrespect intended to the present staff, for many have impressive general police backgrounds, the Bureau is almost void of experienced narcotic agents. Most of the personnel interviewed were highly motivated, well-intentioned officers bent on performing the best they knew how, yet they still lacked the necessary experience required for the task.

Had greater emphasis been accorded recruitment of trained narcotic officers, there is little likelihood the Bureau would be the subject of the adverse criticism experienced throughout the past year.

E. Training

It is the Bureau's policy to conduct one in-service narcotic training seminar each year. This program is of two weeks duration and addresses the typical areas of concern; i.e., criminal law, pertinent case decisions, narcotic identification, investigative techniques, etc. The program is well structured and is a valuable tool in upgrading job performance.

In addition to the Bureau's own training effort, there exists a State peace officers' training academy. It is the agency's intention to have each member not already P O S T certified to be so, through the Academy, within 18 months of hiring. To date only five or six have attended this program. The Drug Enforcement Administration also conducts training seminars for State and local law enforcement personnel. The Bureau plans to take advantage of these schools to the extent possible. Funds have been allocated for this purpose.

One of the functions of the Bureau is the training of local law enforcement officers in the area of narcotic enforcement as well as conducting public information programs for citizen groups. Significant progress has been made in this area and there is every indication that this will continue to improve.

F. Policies and Procedures

Bureau policy, rules, regulations, and procedure are all set forth in the "Manual of Instructions". This manual is comprehensive in that it covers most every facet of the Bureau's activities. As with many manuals, an attempt is made to anticipate every eventuality and formulate a policy or procedure to cope with it.

This approach, although not uncommon, is a subject of controversy among law enforcement administrators. There are those of us who believe rules and regulation manuals should be drafted in broad terms to deal with principles rather than attempt to develop a paper approach to resolve real problems. In any case, there is ample justification for either approach so it then becomes more of a matter of personal choice. This manual, because of its completeness, leaves little room for an individual to exercise discretion or innovation.

Perhaps the greatest pitfall to this approach is that actual practice often mandates frequent departure from formulated policy and procedure. As the frequency of departure increases, the effectiveness of the manual as a management tool decreases, often making it a subject of rejection and ridicule.

After reading the manual and interviewing the Bureau

personnel there appears to be limited relationship between the manual and actual practices.

V

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Goals and ObjectivesRecommendations:
Narcotic Enforcement

1. Establish an Advisory Board to the Bureau of Narcotic and Drug Enforcement. The composition of the Board should be comprised of three sheriffs and three police chiefs whose judgment is respected among the law enforcement community. They should be representative of the three geographical areas serviced by the Bureau's field offices. In addition to the local law enforcement members, the Board should also include the Bureau Chief.

Duties of the Board

- a. The Board should be advisory only.
- b. They should meet on a regularly scheduled basis.
- c. They should be the vehicle to communicate the Bureau's activities to their colleagues in their respective jurisdictions and through the various law enforcement associations.
- d. The Board should assist the Bureau in clearly defining realistic goals and objectives.

- e. They should make recommendations for establishing priorities and selection of target areas.
 - f. The Board can provide valuable assistance in establishing rapport and opening up lines of communication with the news media with respect to the Bureau's activities.
 - g. The Board establishes a true state-local partnership essential for an effective state-wide program.
 - h. The Board should issue periodic progress reports as a public information service. The report should include, but not be limited to an assessment of the State's overall narcotic problem.
2. Once the Bureau's goals and objectives have been formulated, the Bureau should continually strive for their accomplishment.
 3. Paramount priority must be accorded the major narcotic supplier. This mandates close cooperation with all levels of law enforcement. It may necessitate Idaho State Narcotic Agents travelling to other states in order to bring a case to a successful conclusion.
 4. In addition to establishing an Advisory Board, the Bureau must adopt a philosophy that the public has a right to know of the Bureau's activities. This does not infer premature disclosure of pending investigations

but there is a duty to freely communicate with the news media on a timely basis in order that the public be kept informed. An overt effort on behalf of the Bureau to establish a working relationship with the news media must be instituted. If the effort is sincere, a mutual trust will evolve.

Recommendations:
Organized Crime

1. The organized crime effort should be removed from the Bureau of Narcotic and Drug Enforcement and placed immediate to the Attorney General. Its present location in the Bureau causes the program to be subordinated to the narcotic effort. When personnel shortages occur in the Narcotic Section there has been a tendency to borrow from the Organized Crime Section. There is also insufficient financial support for the program in its present situation.
2. In addition to staffing the Organized Crime Unit with competent investigators, there is need for one permanent, full-time Assistant Attorney General to be assigned to the unit.

3. Adequate financial resources must be allocated for support of the organized crime effort on a continuing basis.
4. The legislature should give strong consideration to the enactment of laws providing the tools essential in the pursuit of organized criminal activity. If statutory authority does not presently exist in the areas of statewide grand juries, witness immunity, wiretapping and electronic surveillance, then an effort should be initiated if an effective program is to be implemented.
5. The Organized Crime Section should become case prosecution oriented in addition to intelligence gathering.
6. The unit should identify as early as possible the extent of organized criminal activity in the following areas:
 - a. Gambling
 - b. Prostitution
 - c. Public Corruption

- d. Labor Racketeering
 - e. Arson
 - f. Vending Machines
 - g. Infiltration of Business
 - h. Pornography
 - i. Fencing
 - j. Credit Card Frauds
 - k. Loansharking
 - l. Drug Traffic
 - m. Horse Racing
7. Establish a strategy of attack in those areas where organized criminal activity is identified.
 8. Create an order of priorities of target areas and establish timetables for results.
 9. Prepare periodic reports of findings and publish a "white paper" for public information.
 10. Exchange intelligence information with appropriate law enforcement agencies.

B. Organization and Operational Effectiveness

Option I

Serious consideration should be given to the abolishment of the Bureau's present decentralized approach; i.e., the operation and deployment of personnel into three area offices. Since recommending centralizing the Bureau in Boise represents a radical change from its present structure, it necessarily requires justification. While recognizing centralization will not resolve all of the Bureau's problems, I believe the advantages enumerated below far outweigh the disadvantages.

1. Centralized Structure: This would retain an office in Coeur D'Alene and Pocatello with headquarters located at Boise. The offices in Pocatello and Coeur D'Alene would be considered field offices with space requirements significantly less than present. Staffing of the field office would be limited to one agent and a secretary. The agent assigned to the field office should not be of a supervisory level. The position does require one who possesses an overall knowledge of the Bureau's operation as well as being well oriented in narcotic enforcement.

2. Field Office Functions:

- a. Develop narcotic intelligence information from communities within the office's area of responsibility, forwarding same to headquarters.
- b. Maintain close working relationship with local law enforcement and news media.
- c. Conduct narcotic training and educational programs for local police and community organizations.
- d. Develop informants for use in future enforcement programs.
- e. Conduct follow-up investigations and run investigative leads requested by headquarters.
- f. The field office would be the Bureau's contact point for law enforcement within the office's jurisdictional area.
- g. The secretary would, in addition to routine clerical work, be available to answer the phone during the absence of the agent.
- h. Field office agent would be available to conduct preliminary narcotic tests for local police when requested.

3. Headquarters Organization: All Bureau personnel with the exception of those assigned to the field office would work out of the Boise office.
 - a. Administration would consist of the Bureau Chief, Deputy Chief, and a secretary.

- b. Records Section would require five stenographers.
- c. Operations would consist of three teams of eight agents including a supervisor over each team.
- d. Teams may be split or combined from time-to-time depending upon the nature of the operation.
- e. Teams would be mobile and could be deployed on a systematic basis throughout the State. Total operational force would be flexible to respond to any given situation.

4. Advantages to Centralization:

- a. Greater utilization of available manpower.
- b. Six additional agents released from former in-house duties to field assignments.
- c. Additional protection available to those working undercover. This system permits agents working undercover in teams of two or three.
- d. Greater corroboration of evidence resulting in better cases.
- e. Working out of one office affords a greater opportunity for exchange of information and ideas. Moral should increase.
- f. Information in files readily available to all personnel.
- g. Transfer of personnel eliminated. All the usual hardships are no longer present; i.e., changing schools; selling and buying homes, often at a substantial cost to the agent; problem of job opportunities for working wives is minimized. Family life is more stabilized.

- h. Transportation costs may increase since agents would at times be travelling greater distances. This may be offset when considering they would be working more in teams of two or three thus reducing the number of cars on the road in many instances.
- i. Absence from home should not change significantly. Under the present system, agents are away from home four or five days out of the week. Even though the distance traveled may be greater at times, the agents presently stay in motels while away from the field office. Thus under the centralized approach nothing changes in this aspect.
- j. Centralization provides excellent opportunity for frequent staff meetings, which is a necessity in resolving present communication problems.

Option II

- 1. Retain the decentralized approach if deemed more desirable with the following changes:
 - a. Each area office should have only one supervisor in charge of the overall operation.
 - b. The present Agent II's, field supervisors, should be placed into the field to work in an undercover capacity along with the Agent I's. The Agent II's should be relieved of their supervisory responsibility.
 - c. The position of secretary in the area offices located in Pocatello and Coeur D'Alene should be reclassified to that of office manager or administrative assistant, with an increase in salary commensurate with the job responsibilities.

- d. Each of these two aforementioned offices requires an additional secretary or typist to handle routine clerical and filing matters.

2. Disadvantages to decentralization:

- a. Severe coordination and communication problems between headquarters and field offices.
- b. Agents eventually "burn out" in a given area requiring frequent transfers to another office with all the attendant problems.
- c. Agents run the risk of assignment to areas deemed undesirable. Centralization affords an opportunity to minimize this. At least they would be of short duration.
- d. Bookkeeping effort is triplicated under present system. Each office keeps its own set of financial records and checking accounts.
- e. Office space is more expensive under present system.
- f. Decentralization requires excessive number of long distance phone calls to carry out daily business transactions.
- g. Frequent staff meetings required for effective operational cohesiveness are not presently held due to extensive travel required.
- h. For optimum utilization of information, each office would require its total criminal and intelligence files be reproduced and distributed to the other two offices. This would create a paper merry-go-round of monumental proportion.

C. Reporting and Filing System

In order to maximize effectiveness of the field agents, the present reporting system must undergo a major renovation. Accurate reporting of activities is the backbone of good law enforcement and even the most efficient system sacrifices operational time. Effective and efficient reporting systems are designed to maximize the officers' exposure to field operations while still meeting the necessary informational requirements of sound management. As indicated earlier in the report, the Bureau is currently performing an excellent job in compiling information required for its operation. So much so that it is literally buried under paper. The following recommendations should decrease the reporting workload and increase efficiency as well.

1. Consolidate all criminal investigation information with respect to a given individual into a single case file. Much of the present information contained on several report forms can be either eliminated since it is duplicatory or consolidated into one format. The chief benefits to be derived is reduction of agent and clerical time in executing the myriad of forms and rapid retrieval of information since it would all be contained in a single file.

2. Intelligence reports must be cross-referenced by name, type of criminal activity, and geographical location if it is to be retrievable in any meaningful way. This information must be disseminated to each area office. This can be accomplished easily by utilizing NCR 3-ply forms.
3. All criminal and intelligence information should be indexed in the master name index file.
4. The daily and weekly activity report should be discontinued and the information instead reported on one monthly report.
5. Analyze present reporting system as a whole and evaluate their worth in terms of cost/benefit. Discontinue those providing marginal benefit. An example might be the public contact report. While time-consuming it provides little information with respect to the Bureau's operation.
6. Develop a field officer's statistical report form which provides needed data while at the same time requires minimal time to execute, keeping narrative responses as close to zero as possible.

7. A system must be developed for processing travel expense vouchers which does not include attachment of confidential information. This information must be well documented but of necessity cannot be permitted to leave the Bureau's control. A procedure could be established whereby the State Auditor would make frequent on-site inspections of the Bureau's files to assure appropriate documentation is maintained. Presently, certain information and supporting documentation processed with travel expense vouchers, if analyzed, discloses the Bureau's confidential undercover activity. Improper disclosure of this information could result in the failure of its many operations as well as subjecting the undercover agents to additional unnecessary hazards.
8. A single cash draw-reimbursement system for travel, buy money, and investigation expenses would eliminate the present overly complicated system. The accountability would be essentially the same with a high degree of fiscal integrity except it would be simpler and less time-consuming for all concerned. The present system provides no additional fiscal integrity over the recommended approach.

9. As new file cabinets are added they should be of a fireproof type with a class "D" rating.

D. Personnel

The area of personnel selection and promotion strikes at the heart of the Bureau's problems. As indicated previously, the attrition rate since February of 1972 has exceeded one hundred percent with only five or six of the original staff still remaining with the Bureau. I am confident that should the Bureau acquire a complement of experienced narcotic investigators it will rise above its present problems.

The recommendations which follow will in all probability meet great resistance and will be the subject of considerable controversy. Be that as it may, in my judgment, such drastic action is justified in light of the Bureau's present posture and for the common good of the State and the future of the Bureau as well.

1. The present "exempt" hiring practices should be retained in order to freely recruit the best qualified without the bureaucratic constraints.
2. Compile new job specifications for each position in the Bureau. Included in the job description should be the prerequisites with respect to education and experience. Experience and training in narcotic enforcement should be given paramount consideration.

3. The drafting of the new specifications must be accomplished without regard to those employees presently filling the positions. Caution must be exercised not to build the specifications around the employees. Consultation with other nationally recognized narcotic bureaus could provide guidance in this area.
4. Once job specifications have been established, evaluate present bureau personnel. Those meeting the standards should be afforded the first opportunity to fill the positions. Every effort should be made to locate employment in other state agencies for those who fail to meet the standards. This failing, each employee should be afforded a reasonable period of time to seek other employment, ninety days is probably sufficient.
5. An active recruitment program must be undertaken. While it is desirable to hire local people, no compromise in the standards should be tolerated in order to do so. Since narcotic enforcement is primarily limited to only the largest police agencies in Idaho, it is probable that most new personnel will necessarily be from other states.

6. The position of Agent I and Agent II should be retained, however, the position of Agent II should not be supervisory. The chief difference between the two should be the degree of experience and training. The retention of Agent II provides an opportunity for career development and recognition of advanced training and experience. Agent II's would normally be expected to work along with Agent I's and, in addition, would be assigned more complex cases. Both positions are principally undercover agent positions. Agent II's would normally be assigned to the field offices in Pocatello and Coeur D'Alene under the proposed centralized organizational approach.
7. The Bureau Chief has the overall responsibility for the operation of the Bureau. In fairness to this responsibility, the Bureau Chief should have complete control over hiring of all subordinate personnel along with authority to discipline for cause, including termination, without outside interference.
8. The selection of Bureau Chief obviously rests with the Attorney General and rightfully so.

E. Training

1. Increase emphasis on training of Bureau personnel.
The Bureau's annual school should be continued.
The attendance of specialized narcotic seminars should be increased.
2. Training of local law enforcement personnel should be excellerated. A fundamental knowledge of narcotics is an asset to all police officers.
3. The publication of a monthly bulletin to be distributed to all law enforcement agencies in the State is an effective means of keeping local police abreast of current trends in narcotic enforcement. Topics carried in the bulletin might include recent court decisions, new contraband drugs, field testing techniques and other items of interest.
4. The Deputy Chief is perhaps in the best position to implement and coordinate the Bureau's training effort.

F. Policies and Procedures

A thorough reevaluation of the Bureau's Manual of Instructions is indicated. Serious consideration should be given to its revision. As it presently stands actual Bureau operation is in constant conflict with the manual. Worthy of consideration is that the manual deals more with principles rather than try to provide a specific course of action for every eventuality. A great deal of effort has gone into the preparation of the present manual and much of its contents should be salvaged.

VI

CONCLUSION

The law enforcement community and the citizens of Idaho support the Bureau of Narcotic and Drug Enforcement not necessarily because they wish to, but because they must do so in their own interest. In Idaho at least, the Bureau, though needed, is resented; while perhaps not really wanted, must be considered indispensable. The reasons for such feelings are history, and will continue in the absence of radical change in the administration of the Bureau.

The rural-urban composition of the State of Idaho mandates strong State involvement in the pursuit of narcotic trafficking and organized criminal activity. The Bureau must be continued in order to provide an effective offensive against this area of criminality. Only the State can be expected to provide these highly specialized services, with Boise perhaps being an exception.

The national crime picture is indeed grim. The only positive claim this country can make is that crime appears to be increasing at a declining rate, a proclamation hardly worthy of jubilation. The only requirement for continued increase in narcotic traffic is for the State to do nothing. The real concern here is that the present ambivalence surrounding the Bureau cannot persist if revitalization is to be expected.

The administrative system of the Bureau has been clearly vulnerable to public criticism by providing little effective check on personnel misconduct and by failing to respond to early evidence of deviant behavior. The slow response by the Bureau's leadership unconsciously encouraged internal dysfunction, dissent and dissatisfaction. And, while its selection procedure provided an avenue to recruit the most proficient personnel, its failure to do so reflects upon the administration's ineptness.

The Bureau recently has demonstrated an awareness of its problems and is diligently working toward improving its image. The accomplishment of this can only be realized through a concerted effort of everyone associated with its operation, particularly the administrative staff.

There must be a recruitment of a new breed of professional narcotic agents if the Bureau expects to rise to the level of a professional organization.

The responsibility for developing a truly professional Bureau is a tremendous task and the stakes are indeed high with many obstacles to overcome. The first step must be a realization and concern for what was, and is, and what conditions must be present to implement change.

In the final analysis, the inevitable question must be raised. Is the continuation of the Bureau of Narcotic and Drug Enforcement appropriate in terms of the State's present narcotic problem and future trends?

In view of the burgeoning drug problem and an inadequate understanding of the basic dynamics of its cause, the answer to the question is an unequivocal "yes". However, the approach to the problem must be orderly with emphasis on finding innovative solutions to a most urgent situation.

The State, in the past, has demonstrated its concern for the welfare of the citizenry. Its continued and expanded commitment to this program assures a reasonable line of defense to the encroachment of the drug menace.

VII

A P P E N D I X

The Consultant

The following is a biographical sketch of the Consultant,

John C. MacIVOR.

Educational Background:

Associate of Arts Degree, Police Science Major
Bachelor of Science Degree, Police Science Major
Master Public Administration Degree

Relevant Specialized Training:

First Narcotic Institute, Los Angeles, California
Organized Crime Seminar, San Diego, California
Organized Crime Seminar, Norman, Oklahoma
Advanced Organized Crime Seminar, New Orleans, La.

Teaching Experience:

Arapahoe Community College, Chairman, Police
Science Department, also Lecturer on Narcotics,
Vice, Organized Crime Subjects. Received the
College and Community Award for 1968.
United States Air Force Academy, Lecturer on
Narcotics and Organized Crime Subjects.
University of Colorado, Boulder Crime School,
Lecturer on Narcotics.
International City Managers' Association - Member
Teaching Staff on Municipal Police Administration.

Professional Experience:

1970 - Present
Agency: Colorado Bureau of Investigation,
State of Colorado
Position: Director

1968 - 1970
Agency: Governor's Council on Crime Control,
State of Colorado
Position: Executive Director

1961 - 1968

Agency: Littleton Police Department, Littleton, Colorado
Position: Chief of Police

1955 - 1961

Agency: San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department,
San Bernardino, California
Position: Detective - Primary assignment Narcotics and
Intelligence.

Professional Organizations:

Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) 15-year affiliation.
Colorado Association of Chiefs of Police - Past President
International Association of Chiefs of Police
American Society for Public Administration
Metropolitan Law Enforcement Association, Colorado
Colorado Sheriffs' and Peace Officers' Association

Board Appointments:

Governor's Organized Crime Advisory Council, Colorado
Governor's Criminal Justice Supervisory Board, Colorado

Consultant:

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

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