
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
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


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A STUDY OF POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT INTEGRATION IN SELECTED CITIES OF NORTH AMERICA

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James H. Barnett

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PREFACE

This study on police and fire department integration of selected cities in North America was conducted by Mr. Barnett as an independent study as part of his graduate work in political science at the University of North Dakota — The Bureau of Governmental Affairs is publishing the study as a part of its continuing program to provide information to governmental officials to assist them in their duties.

Lloyd B. Omdahl Director

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
PREFACE		i
INTRODUCTION		1
Chapter I	POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT INTEGRATION MIS- UNDERSTOOD	3
Chapter II	INTEGRATION ATTEMPTS THAT HAVE FAILED	13
Chapter III	SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION ATTEMPTS	19
Chapter IV	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	31
APPENDICES .		35

INTRODUCTION

A great deal of information has been written concerning integrating muncipal fire and police departments into a single operating unit. In the Mid-1960's, much of the news media devoted considerable attention to this project. The proposal was adopted in many communities and others conducted studies in varying degrees on the subject. This report is an analysis of these attempts and studies and will examine the ultimate success or failure of these ventures.

CHAPTER I

POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT INTEGRATION MISUNDERSTOOD

Municipalities in the United States and Canada that have been reported in newspapers, magazines, periodicals and other news media, as trying to integrate the fire and police departments were identified and fifty-two communities were chosen to participate in the sampling. A questionnaire was sent to the chief executive officer of each of these communities soliciting the results of the attempts at integration.

These cities ranged in size from 1,000 to 150,000 people. Villages smaller than 1,000 people usually had volunteer fire departments or had contracted for fire fighting services from neighboring communities. Cities larger than 150,000 all have separate fire and police departments except for some collateral staff positions. The larger cities are turning to specialty or emergency squads, which will be discussed in Chapters IV and V.

This report will confine itself to twenty-nine cities that responded to the sample questionnaire. A list of the cities contacted is attached as Appendix I. Appendix II is a list of all municipalities responding to the questionnaire including a synopsis of the results.

For the purposes of this report, a standard definition of "integration" must be established. "Integration" is the joining together, or merging, of the parts into a whole; to complete by joining together.

As it pertains to this report, "integration" will mean the combining, or merging, of the functions of police work and fire fighting into a single profession.

It is interesting to note at the onset of this report that four of the municipalities responding disclaimed any attempt at integration of their fire and police departments. These cities are Milton-Freewater, Oregon; Chicago Heights, Illinois; River Hills, Wisconsin; and Melvindale, Michigan. Each of these municipalities were listed in one or more periodicals, or reports, as having integrated their two services.

Two more cities have been erroneously reported as having integrated departments. St. James-Assiniboia, Manitoba, Canada, has a police department comprised of a chief and 90 policemen, working out of one central police station, and a fire department comprised of a chief and 85 firemen working out of three fire stations. These units have always been functionally separated but until the 1950's they did share one building. This should never have been interpreted as integration. The city of Palmer, Alaska, did have a police chief who served as a fire chief until the early 1960's but this is as close as the relationship ever came. Again, the city should never have been reported as having integrated departments.

Nine other cities have been reported as having integrated departments, and while there is some basis for the misunderstanding, they never should have been reported as integrated. Each of these will be reviewed and the reasons for the erroneous reports examined.

Monterey Park, California

The city of Monterey Park, California, attempted a test program of integration from January 1, 1955 to January 1, 1956. The basic plan was to develop a program of integration down to and including fire engineer and police sergeant. The plan got as far as combining the chief of police and the fire chief into the position of Director of Public Safety, as a single administrator for both departments.

Four men were hired as "guinea pigs" to undergo both police and fire training, but this training never materialized. The four men ultimately went into one or the other separate department.

The basic plan for integration failed to receive support in the fire and police departments or support of the citizenry, so the city council voted to terminate the program after the year trial period was over. The Public Safety Director was later appointed as chief of police and both departments reverted to their original status. All further attempts at integration have been abandoned.

Shorewood, Wisconsin

The village of Shorewood, Wisconsin, is another city that is thought to be integrated. Actually, it only has an integrated chief. On two occasions in the past (1956 and 1968), the city has tried to fully or partially integrate the two departments, without success. One of the prime obstacles to integration was the diverse and restrictive pension programs which were under state administration. Changing to an integrated department would have meant the loss of pension rights for one segment or the other. The integrated department would adopt one of the existing pension plans and the other group would lose all of their accrued rights and privileges.

To overcome rising costs, reduce working hours, and increase manpower, the village of Shorewood joined three other suburban communities
in a mutual response agreement for any fire that was indicated in a
business or apartment district or where possible life was in danger.
This solution has satisfied one of the objectives of integration, that
of increasing manpower for fire fighting, but it did not satisfy the
requirement of increasing men for the police department. The joint
police-fire chief has still to resolve this problem.

Center Line, Michigan

The city of Center Line, Michigan has never attempted to integrate its fire and police departments, but because of an interesting mutual arrangement between the two departments, it has been reported falsely as being integrated. This city of 10,390 people has many of its police officers serving as volunteer fire fighters. The firemen, in turn, operate the police desk on night duty. This serves two purposes. It relieves the pressure on a limited staff in both departments and satisfies a state law that the fire department work on a twenty-four hour duty day.

Both the fire and police departments work under a commissioner of public safety. Firemen and policemen work under separate contracts but both enjoy the same wage and fringe benefits. There are no plans for combining these two departments further because the present operation is very successful.

Lincoln, Nebraska

Lincoln, Nebraska, with a population of 148,000 people was the largest city to respond to the questionnaire. Approximately twelve years

ago the city of Lincoln adopted a program where a fireman was assigned to ride in a police cruiser with a police officer, thereby reducing the number of police officers required to cover the city. After a trial period of approximately six months it was abandoned because of the reluctance of firemen to serve as police officers.

Hawthorne, California

Hawthorne, California, did have a fully integrated police and fire department during the depression years of the 1930's. At that time the police desk sergeant was also the fire engineer and responded to fire calls with the town's one and only pumper. A volunteer fire department served the city and the chief of police was also the volunteer fire chief. During this period, the city was carrying a rating of eight (poor) from the American Insurance Association for its fire fighting capabilities.

In 1942, after the onset of World War II, the city was financially able to hire paid firemen, augmented by volunteers. The police chief continued his dual roll as fire chief until 1953 when a fire chief was hired to head the department. The city council feels that the growth of commercial and industrial areas in the past fifteen years has been due largely to the excellence of their fire department and a favorable tax rate. The American Insurance Association presently rates Hawthorne as class three, or excellent.

Champaign, Illinois

Champaign, Illinois had a limited integrated police and fire department from 1960 to 1965. This was an operation in which seventeen patrolmen received some fire fighting training and were issued a small

amount of equipment to use in backing up the fire department. The participating patrolmen rode in station wagons and were placed in a pay classification one step above that of the ordinary patrolman.

After five years, the entire program was reexamined and found to be unsuccessful. It is interesting that the city felt that the largest problems were in coordinating the activities of the special patrolmen. Political pressures did not have a part in dropping this program, and no forces are attempting to have the program reinstituted.

Fremont, California

In 1958, the city of Fremont, California embarked on a program which would have resulted in a Public Safety Department had it reached maturity. This was not an attempt at integration, as has been reported in several periodicals, but a tailor-made program to fit their own particular situation. The program has a great deal of potential value and is worth examining thoroughly.

Fremont contains approximately ninety-six square miles within its boundaries and is the third largest city in area in the state of California. It is currently undergoing a growth rate of approximately eight to ten thousand new people per year. It was incorporated in 1956.

During the first two years of incorporation, Fremont had no Police Department of its own. Police services were furnished on a contract basis from Alameda County. At the time of incorporation, they did have five fire departments that were well housed, and well equipped, but very badly undermanned. In consolidating these five fire stations into one Fremont Fire Department, it became very apparent that, although the number of fires were few, there was a vast amount of territory to

protect. Recognizing the peculiar problems in a city of such a large area, it was decided to put some firemen in public safety patrol cars rather than have them remain at the stations.

Three radio-equipped fire station wagons were purchased and minor fire-fighting equipment installed in each of them. First aid and other safety equipment was also included in the package. After special training in traffic enforcement and basic police duties, the fireman's title was changed to public safety officer and the patrol inaugurated. The public safety officer's primary responsibility was fire prevention and fire fighting, and the patrol cars responded to all fires within their district.

The public safety patrol program had only been in effect a short period of time when an election was held in April 1958. Two councilmen who were elected in that election ran on a platform to abandon the public safety program. They made good on their campaign promises and at the council meeting of May 13, 1958, the program was abandoned.

According to Mr. Don Driggs, Fremont City Manager, "The public safety program did not receive a fair trial and was abandoned because of a strictly local political situation and not because of any defect in the program itself."

Fremont's program was not a program of integration, but it is a program that shows the feasibility of crosstraining fire and policemen in the other's specialty. Many of the world's largest cities have adopted public safety programs such as was tried in Fremont and are fully satisfied with them. They are known by many names, but their functions are the same: they are roving patrols that are the first to arrive at the scene of accidents and disasters.

Winston-Salem, North Carolina

The city of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, embarked upon a fire-police cooperative venture in September 1957. At that time, as a consequence of annexation, a new fire station was built and manned to serve the western sector of the city. A fire-police unit was made an adjunct of this new station. In June 1964, the city, again as a consequence of annexation, built another fire station combining fire-police operations. The present plan is to add additional fire-police units as annexation of new neighborhoods creates the necessity.

There is no long range plan to fully integrate all fire and police services. Each department is to retain its own identity. Individuals serving under fire-police units are hired for that specific purpose and receive training in both phases of activity since they are hired to perform dual functions. The city manager has concluded, based on their past experience, that an alert, intelligent, and dedicated individual can absorb the training in each field and perform satisfactorily in both areas. It is pointed out that the fire-police units are concentrated in low risk areas. This enables the better trained and more experienced police officers to concentrate their efforts in the higher crime areas.

A position of Director of Public Safety was created for a short time, but it was found that it served no useful purpose so it was abolished. The fire and police chiefs report directly to the city manager. The city manager estimates that the fire-police units create an annual savings of \$70,000.00 to the citizens of Winston-Salem.

Evanston, Illinois

The city of Evanston, Illinois does not operate under any form of police-fire integration, but they have developed and refined a program of police-fire cooperation that is extremely valuable. In 1956 when the 1957 budget was being formulated, Evanston was faced with the need to reduce the firemen's and policemen's work week by an average of seventeen per cent. This reduction would have necessitated the recruitment of as many as thirty new policemen and firemen if conventional shifts and operating methods had been retained. However, after considering a number of alternatives, it was decided to hire only fourteen new policemen and no firemen, and to institute a police-fire cooperative program under which the newly recruited policemen would assist firemen in fighting fires. Then, in early 1958, it was decided to increase the number of "cooperative police officers," as they were called, and over 100 policemen were given training in fire fighting and became eligible for a thirty dollar per month pay increase.

At present policemen in the patrol division are actively assigned to patroling the city's districts in police station wagons equipped with fire extinguishers, fire gear, and other fire fighting equipment. A minimum of two police patrol station wagons responds to each fire alarm immediately. In addition to patrol division policemen, officers in the traffic, detective, and some other divisions, according to established operating procedures, proceed to fires, following a prescribed response pattern related to the seriousness of the fire, and assist the fire companies if and as needed.

At the time the cooperative program was undertaken and in 1958, when it was given its present form, the following advantages were

expected to be derived from the program: (1) a faster and larger initial response to fires, because of police cars already in motion, as well as fire equipment proceeding from fire stations, converge in a well-designed plan; (2) more trained men available at major fires where more manpower is needed plus a very large trained pool of 200 men available for any disasters involving fires; (3) greater job satisfaction for policemen whose range of skills and duties was widened and whose compensation was increased accordingly; and (4) savings calculated at \$70,000.00 per year because the program allowed reducing the city's total force for the protection of persons and property by sixteen men.

One of the reasons this program was so successful was that the city manager developed a question and answer fact sheet and gave it wide distribution to all concerned parties. This fact sheet outlined the proposal, pointed out the objectives, costed the program, and generally proved the value to be received. In a way, he "sold" the program and followed it up each time there was a revision to it. While this Evanston plan is not an example of pure integration, it does show vividly what can be done when the subject of fire and police cooperation is brought up.

It is easy to understand the misunderstanding that has occurred concerning these nine cities. The important thing to note is that none of them ever attempted to fully integrate their public services. Yet, the various methods they have tried have made an important contribution to our society. This will become more evident as this study progresses through some histories of failures and successes in integration attempts.

CHAPTER II

INTEGRATION ATTEMPTS THAT HAVE FAILED

Buena Park, California

Buena Park, California, is an excellent example of a city that has tried integration and abandoned the idea. In July 1953, when Buena Park was incorporated, it had a population of five to six thousand people. The community was primarily residential with scattered light industry and businesses. No buildings were more than two stories high. At the time of incorporation, there was a complete integration of fire and police services.

Each police officer was issued a fireman's turnout suit which he carried both while on duty, in his vehicle, and while off duty wherever he happened to be. The patrol vehicles used were very similar to those used by any police department, and they were equipped with the usual police emergency equipment plus a pressure type fire extinguisher. In addition, the city purchased regular fire equipment, such as pumper trucks, ladders, hoses, etc., which were kept at two fire stations.

Upon receipt of a fire alarm, the district car would proceed to the fire, and other public safety units would proceed to the station nearest the fire and change from the regular police patrol cars to the fire trucks. Off duty personnel and volunteer fire fighters were alerted by telephone calls, or a large air raid siren, and proceeded to the station or the scene of the fire in their own vehicles. This particular

method of operation seems to have led to confusion and a loss of time in beginning the task of putting out fires.

At this time, the present chief of the Buena Park Fire Department was hired to train the personnel of the integrated department in fire fighting techniques. He found that there were men that wanted to be career police officers and men that wanted to be career firemen, and that it was impossible to keep the proper interest of these men in the respective alternate duties. He also found that the city equipment and apparatus was maintained poorly and had been badly neglected.

By 1956 the population of Buena Park had grown to 17,000. The American Insurance Association had given the city a rating of "7" and "9" (poor) which increased all insurance rates in the area. Most of the officers who were employed in that situation felt that it was next to impossible to remain proficient at both fire fighting and police work. Morale was low because most men felt that they were part of an unworkable situation.

The people of Buena Park recognized the problems, and, in a special proposition of the 1956 elections, public safety was voted out and was replaced by separate police and fire departments. With this change, it is reported morale and efficiency of the officers in the police and fire departments showed a great improvement. There is no question that the citizens are now receiving better protection from each of the separated services. At the present time, the population has expanded to approximately 64,000 people, yet the insurance classification has been reduced to "4" (good), resulting in a large savings in insurance rates.

At first glance, it would seem that the city of Buena Park had simply outgrown its integrated fire-police department. But closer

scrutiny reveals deeper underlying causes. In a small community of 5,000 people it was probably the popular thing to do, being a fireman and policeman at the same time. But the r quirements of the job increased tremendously once the population tripled. At the same time, great technological advances were being made in both fire and police administration and operations. The individual officers of the Public Safety Department of Buena Park were either unable to, or had no desire to, cope with the changing times. The situation might have been salvaged had the city fathers foreseen the problems at an early time. By the time they took action, and hired a qualified man to organize and train the integrated department, the unrest had already set in. None of the employees were identifying themselves as public safety officers.

If the position of public safety officer had been developed as a prestige position, giving the proper training and recognition for the job they were doing, and compensated in accordance with their greatly increased responsibilities, possibly the individual officers concerned might have been more cooperative in learning and accepting their new duties. As Mr. Verbeck, Fire Chief of Buena Park points out, "The psychological makeup of a policeman and a fireman is different, creating the problem of adaptability." This problem of adaptability is also apparent in the next case history.

Spartanburg, South Carolina

The city of Spartanburg, South Carolina, integrated two fire substations approximately eight years ago. This integration consisted of having two men on duty at the substation as firemen and two men patrolling a restricted area around the substation as police-fireman. These men were trained in fire and police operations and carried first-aid, fire, and

police equipment in their station wagon. On numerous occasions the station wagon with the two men would reach a fire ahead of the fire truck and have the fire under control by the time the truck arrived. This operation was very successful from an operating standpoint, but was resented by all old firemen and policemen.

The operation was discontinued approximately two years ago after being utilized for over six years. The discontinuance of the operation was the result of an inspection made by the American Insurance Association and a study made of the police activities by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Both of these organizations recommended abandoning the program. The American Insurance Association inspectors gave Spartanburg deficiency points for each of the two substations. They gave only half credit for the two men patrolling the area and answering fire calls for these two stations in a station wagon. The decision to end the operation was primarily a matter of taking the advice of professionals in their respective fields and Spartanburgs effort to acquire a class 3 rating from the American Insurance Association.

Again, the resentment of old time firemen and policemen was present. Is it possible that some of this resentment is carried over into two organizations such as the American Insurance Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police? There can be no question that both are attempting to maintain the integrity of their own professions.

Oregon City, Oregon

An attempt at complete fire-police integration was made by Oregon City, Oregon in the late 1950's. The same undertones were present there. The integration was attempted in the belief that a savings would be created

in administrative costs by combining the budgeting and purchasing under one department head. The city planners felt that by having more trained firemen on call, fire insurance rates would be reduced. This was not to be the case. At the same time, it was believed that there would be more police assistance available in case of a police emergency by having firemen trained in police procedures. The Department of Public Safety was created and a complete organizational chart outlining specific duties of all individuals was drawn up and distributed to interested parties.

When it was put into effect, plans were made by each department for training the other's personnel. Mr. Robert L. Chester, Oregon City Chief of Police says, "From the start these plans failed when the firemen's union demanded extra pay for training in the police service and the Fire Rating Bureau indicated that if the officer in charge of the Fire Division didn't have absolute control over his operations, the fire ratings would suffer."

This was enough to scare the city fathers off, so the plan was abandoned in 1958 and the services returned to separate departments. Again the influence of outside organizations can be seen on the city's decision to abandon the program. The wisdom of that decision might be questioned after a thorough examination of the following successes in police-fire integration.

CHAPTER III

SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION ATTEMPTS

There are many examples of very small villages using a combined fire and police system with great success. The reasons for their success deserve some consideration in this study to help determine at what point integration becomes an insurmountable problem. To understand these reasons it is necessary to examine the similarities between these municipalities.

Sewickley Heights, Pennsylvania and Grosse Pointe Shores, Michigan

Two of these villages are Sewickley Heights, Pennsylvania and Grosse Pointe Shores, Michigan. Both communities have populations under five thousand people and both are almost entirely residential communities in the higher income bracket. The quality of construction of the residences gave them a certain immunity from many of the common fire hazards. Because of the nature of employment of the citizens who live in these two communities the organization of a volunteer fire department was impractical. However, the borough of Sewickley Heights has now organized a volunteer unit of fifteen men, who work on the large estates, to assist in fire calls.

The Fire-Police Department in Sewickley Heights today is an offspring of an original protective association set up by the residents of the borough. All of its officers are dually trained in fire and police operations.

The Police Department handles all the fire fighting operations for Grosse Pointe Shores and there is no separate fire department operation. This is one point of difference in these two communities. However, the advantages of a combined fire and police operation are the same.

These advantages are: (1) Knowledge of every home and its surroundings, (2) Knowledge of road access to every home, (3) Knowledge
of hydrant location and other sources of water supply, and (4) Knowledge
of all entrances to each home. It should be immediately apparent that
these advantages will begin to disappear as the community grows larger.

However, there are two additional advantages that both communities have brought out. The managers of both villages state that they have been able to furnish more fire fighters when needed than a separate department could, and that the ventures were financially successful. Grosse Pointe Shores manager, Mr. Thomas K Jefferies, says, "Financially, we would be unable to support a separately organized Fire Department and provide the level of other services we now provide."

It is quite evident that full integration can work in the very small community, but what happens as the size of the community increases. Correspondingly, the problems of fire and police protection get larger, but are by no means impossible. In the 5,000 to 15,000 population class there are four good examples of successfully integrated departments.

Oakwood, Ohio and Fox Point, Wisconsin

Oakwood, Ohio has such a department and the primary reason that it has worked is described as a "good administrative climate." The village of Fox Point, Wisconsin has a small, but complete, Department

of Public Safety. Like Sewickely Heights and Grosse Pointe Shores, this municipality has few old dwellings or commercial properties, and no industries. As a part of the Department of Public Safety, they have a volunteer fire unit that augments the fire division. These volunteers serve in the Department of Public Works as their normal profession, but are fully trained augmentees in fire fighting techniques. The village manager says: "Integration has dispelled the notion that only policemen can do police work and firemen can do fire work. It has forced a more cooperative attitude between the two departments and a respect for the job of each department."

Huntington Woods, Michigan

Huntington Woods, Michigan is a town of 9,000 people. It instituted its integrated departments as a financial solution to depression problems and has kept it intact. Again, the city has no factories or high rise buildings to contend with, and is 98% residential.

Farmington, Michigan

Farmington, Michigan also has no heavy industry or high rises that might adversely affect an integrated department. This city of 12,000 people integrated its departments in 1956 and it has proven very successful for a twofold reason. It allows the city to put more patrol on the streets as their actual work is 95% police and 5% firefighting. Secondly, the city has saved thousands of dollars yearly, avoiding the expensive operational cost of reciprocal fire departments. The city manager, Mr. John D. Dinan, was very explicit in furnishing that information. His answer to the question, "If integration was successful, what was the main obstacle that was overcome?" is quoted in its entirety:

We believe that the initial reorganization of the department, converting the policemen into police and firefighters was the main obstacle. This was accomplished through the inducement of additional wages for a more skilled and qualified public safety officer who works with police and as a firefighter. The second obstacle was gaining citizen confidence in this concept that our patrolmen are properly trained and can fight fires on a professional level.

Since the program has been so successful it is obvious that the city council gave the concept its full support and confidence. Sufficient funds were allocated to recruit and train the caliber of public safety officer that was needed to win the confidence of the citizenry.

Mr. Dinan makes one final observation: "It should be noted that the city of Farmington has received two national awards for fire prevention programs and the consolidation of police and fire function is ideal for our particular situation."

Grosse Pointe Woods, Michigan and Granby, Quebec

In the population class of 25,000, there are two excellent examples of successful program. These are Grosse Pointe Woods, Michigan and Granby, Quebec, Canada. This report will examine one of these in depth.

The city of Grosse Pointe Woods has had a combined police-fire service since 1944, when it was a village with 3,000 people. Presently, the city's 3.28 square miles are inhabited by an estimated 22,714 population. The city is residential in character, with an assessed valuation of \$118,286,840.00.

The Department of Public Safety has a fully integrated organization with no firemen or policemen as such, although all necessary police and fire specialties are provided by assignment of public safety officers.

The personnel and ranks are:

1 - Director of Public Safety

- 1 Captain (Deputy Director of Public Safety) in charge of investigations, training, recruiting, and special services
- 3 Lieutenants in charge of uniformed shifts
- 3 Sergeants as alternate shift commanders
- 3 Corporals as shift supervisors and to meet the fire grading requirements for on-duty commanders
- 1 Corporal assigned to Investigation Bureau
- 2 Public safety officers assigned as investigators
- 6 Public safety officers assigned as fire apparatus engineers
- 1 Public safety officer assigned as school and traffic safety officer
- 4 Public safety officers assigned as school liaison and youth officers
- 22 Public safety officers in the patrol force
- 1 Civilian dog warden who fights fires and enforces the parking and dog ordinances
- 4 Civilian clerk dispatchers
- 3 Civilian female clerks
- 2 Civilian female meter maids
- 57 Total Personnel

All public safety officers, meter maids, and dog wardens work a 40-hour week. The civilian clerk dispatchers work a 42-hour week and the civilian clerks work a 37½ hour week. Two public safety officers on each 8-hour shift are assigned to drive and operate one 750 gallon per minute pumper and a 65 foot snorkle with 1,00 GPM pump, full hose bed and full complement of ladders.

Personnel of the department are supplemented by a volunteer fire group of twelve men who seldom fight fires but are invaluable in cleaning up and overhaul so that the patrol personnel can get back on patrol promptly after a fire is extinguished. The volunteer group is no longer

necessary to the city's daily fire protection but provides a valuable reserve for emergencies. A police auxiliary of twenty-five men also serves at public events, but is not needed for normal protection.

Fire prevention is conducted by one engineer on each shift during the week. His fire truck is then driven in his absence by a stand-by officer. The captain also conducted fire prevention inspections and prepares pre-fire plans for the target hazards.

The department has had exceptionally good recruiting procedures for many years which have included written examinations, interviews, psychological interviews, and other screening. The current salaries are:

			1970		19/1
Director of Public Safe	ety	•	\$18,275	- '	\$19,450
Captain			16,575	- '	17,800
Lieutenant			15,625		16,800
Sergeant		•	13,750		14,438
Corporal			13,125		13,781
Public Safety Officer			12,500	-	13,125

These salaries include premium pay to all officers for the dual duties and responsibilities they perform.

Fringe benefits include fully paid hospital and medical insurance for employees and their dependents; \$10,000 life insurance; time-and-a-half overtime pay for all overtime including training; longevity of \$100 for the first five years' service and an additional \$125 for ten years service with an additional \$125 after fifteen years' service--to a maximum of \$350; severance pay of half value of unlimited accumulation of unused sick leave at time of separation with more than ten years' service; retirement at 55 years of age after a minimum of 20 years' service at 2% of

final average compensation times number of years to 25 plus 1% of final average compensation times years over 25.

The city participates with the other four Grosse Pointes and with Harper Woods in highly developed written police and fire mutual aid pacts. The fire pact includes first alarm response to target hazards and commercial areas among cities desiring it. The police pact includes an inter-city tactical unit for mob or riot duty. The six cities share a single public safety radio system under an inter-city contract. A mutual assistance agreement with the Detroit Fire Department is also in effect.

In summary, this city has found police-fire combination to be an effective plan for the public safety services of the city. There are certain operational problems that had to be overcome in the combined operation. A principal problem was that of training, particularly in fire operations. Grosse Pointe Woods used platoon drills on off-duty time which, in that part of the country, had to be compensated. Police training was accomplished during duty hours and it was considered essential to maintain a balance among the police and fire training programs.

Another problem was that of assembling the men at a fire alarm. This was accomplished by a pre-planned standard operating procedure which ensures that the basic duties for the personnel of an arriving company are provided for to the greatest extent possible. The combined operation requires a superior level of officership. The command officers possess the knowledge and ability to direct and coordinate all functions of the combined systems for a successful operation.

As the cities examined become larger in population, the number having successful, combined operations decrease. The tendency is to

have a separate fire division, police division and an emergency division, trained in both fire and police methods. Cities that have always had integrated departments tend to adopt this feature as they increase in size. Municipalities that integrate their forces tend to do the same thing. They retain most of their presently existing departments intact and cross-train new or selected individuals in both techniques. A cursory look at the larger city will indicate how this is developing.

Trois-Rivieres, Quebec

Trois-Rivieres, Quebec is a city of nearly 70,000 and is the second oldest city in North America. It has had a combined force since the need for police and firemen was felt in 1857. This is the largest city in Canada using a combined force. The present strength is 155 police-firemen and 12 civilians and the 1970 operating budget was \$1,638,000.00.

Mr. Guy-Paul Simard is the city's police and fire director. His background includes fifteen years with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and five years in associated fire and police work. He makes the following observation:

I tend to agree with modern police experts that police and firemen should be separated for more efficiency in a city of this size and in this difficult day and age. However, both services cannot be split in the middle because we cannot let go more than 10 per cent of our police strength for a long period of time. It would, therefore, be very expensive to separate police and fire services all at once and when we do, it will have to be done either gradually or with m. ssive government grants.

Mr. Simard indicates that it is just a matter of time until this separation takes place. At the present time, some of the sections are operating as full time policemen and some as full time firemen. Men in the detective and traffic divisions are not trained to fight fires.

It would appear that the only ones performing the dual function at this time are the patrolmen in prowl cars. It is easy to imagine these patrolmen in the roll of a nucleus for an emergency squad.

Dearborn, Michigan

Like most cities, Dearborn, Michigan continually strives to improve municipal operations and services. The gradual combining of interrelated police and fire functions was begun by Mayor Orville L. Hubbard in 1957 as a means of providing a more efficient operation which would offer better protection, at no appreciable cost increase, for the taxpayers.

Fourteen years after the program's introduction, Dearborn still operates separate police and fire departments, but today has dually-trained men who are basically policemen with firefighting experience.

The program's progress is gradual and long-range for two basic reasons. First, while basic fire fighting training is a must for all new police recruits, the dual training has not been forced on incumbent policemen. Secondly, by invoking the gradual method, the city has been able to refine and improve the training without any major upheavals.

Dearborn, the fourth largest city in Michigan with a population of over 115,000 residents, is organized as one police precinct. Police cars are dispatched to the scene of all fire alarms by two-way radio. Naturally, they will arrive at the scene first, and the dually-trained policemen can take care of small blazes before they can flare into big ones. They are also able to assess the fire situation and, if the alarm is false, or does not warrant it, intercept the big fire equipment enroute to the scene.

In large fires, the dually-trained officers are immediately on the spot to execute important preparatory steps such as spotting and preparing hydrants, assisting in emergency rescue work and moving bystanders to a safe location. These officers are under the supervision of the police chief at all times, with the exception of fire situations when the fire chief take command.

Since the program's beginning, all new police recruits have been assigned to the Dearborn Fire Department for training before being transferred to the Police Department where they begin police training. As openings occur in the Police Department, recruits are selected to fill the vacancies on the basis of recruit seniority. Fire training is conducted in accordance with instructions outlined in the regular Fire Department Training Manual and First Aid training in accordance with the standard set forth in the Red Cross First Aid textbook. Neither incumbent police or firemen have been forced to take this dual training and, perhaps consequently, this is why there is no known opposition among members of either department.

The use of police patrolmen in the dual role has made it possible to reduce the number of employees in the Fire Department from 135 to 115 since 1957. This was done through normal retirements and resignations. This slow process has enabled the city to develop its program free from outside influence. The end result is that they now have an elite special group of patrolmen who can function in either capacity. The idea has a great deal of merit and is adaptable for any size city.

Fort Lauderdale, Florida

The city of Fort Lauderdale, Florida evolved a program similar to Dearborn's in the ten year period from 1955 to 1965. This city of

140,000 population established a "Security Patrol" to function in the same manner as described above. These "Security Patrols," trained in police, fire and first aid operations, were credited with aiding the survival of many persons suffering from heart attacks or involved in serious accidents. Area physicians, as well as the general public, were aware that these specially marked patrol cars carried inhalators/ resuscitators and other first aid equipment and often reached the scene minutes ahead of an ambulance, which resulted in excellent public relations for the department.

In 1965, the entire program was re-evaluated and it was determined that:

- (1) At the scene of a large fire, security patrol officers were used for traffic control,
- (2) All police officers in the department were being given the same fire training as the security officers,
- (3) Inhalators/resuscitators and large first aid kits and emergency equipment had been installed in all police vehicles.

It was concluded that the operation of a separate unit in the Police Department was no longer necessary, and during 1965 this operation was phased out by transferring members of the Security Patrol to the patrol and traffic divisions of the department. The net effect of this experiment was to point out the advantages of providing fire and advanced first aid training to police officers and the inclusion of special emergency equipment in police vehicles.

The information obtained from studying the successful operation of the "Security Patrol" was used by the city administration to justify the capital expenditure necessary to equip each police unit and the cost

in time and money for the additional training each police officer received. Unlike Dearborn, it took Fort Lauderdale only ten years to determine the worth of having dually-trained police officers in the patrol vehicles.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There has been a good deal of misinformation published concerning integrated fire and police departments in various cities throughout North America. All too often, cities have been reported as having combined forces when the facts are simply that, in the interest of efficient management, they have developed a cooperative program between their police and fire departments. Much of the dissatisfaction with integrated forces may be due to the fact that the actual system is not adequately explored.

There are three ways in which integration can take place. First, there is complete integration, under which there is a complete elimination of separate police and fire departments. The personnel in this type of integration are known as Public Safety Officers, or some similar title, and are equally capable in performing police and fire functions. In this organizational scheme, there is very little specialization. Actually, firemen and policemen lose their identity in this program.

Secondly, there is partial integration, where the Public Safety Department combines the operation of the police and fire departments, but retains them as separate divisions of the larger organization. In this type organization, generally administrative functions, such as personnel recruiting, payroll, purchasing, etc., are combined, but specialization still exists at the operational level.

The third type of integration is an integrated department augmented with a volunteer Fire Department. This type of organization is generally found in small communities where the Police Department handles fire functions supplemental to their police work.

It is quite understandable why complete integration is so distasteful to older policemen and firemen. It is also easy to see why the American Insurance Association and the International Association of Chiefs of
Police do not recommend this type organization. The identity of these
two professions must be kept intact. Any attempt to merge these two
identities into one will meet with insurmountable resistance. Because
of the antagonistic implications, any municipality which is considering
a reorganization of its safety services, i.e., fire and police departments, would do well not to use the term "integrated" in any way.

The city of Fremont, California is an excellent example of this resistance to integration. The firemen who were retrained in police duties had their titles changed to Public Safety Officers, thus losing their identity as firemen. The rest is history. The program was abandoned because of a "strictly local political situation." If the Public Safety Officers had been recruited for that position, leaving intact the Fire Department, the outcome might have been vastly different.

It is obvious that those cities that have been most successful in creating a workable arrangement between the fire and police departments have done so over a long, extended time. The natural resistance to change was overcome by the creation of a new elite position for which new recruits had to apply. The key seems to be in the voluntary nature of the new position. At the same time, the general public had to be educated to the progress that was being made. An excellent example of this

was the approach used by the City Manager of Evanston, Illinois in submitting to the general public a question and answer fact sheet outlining the program and its progress. Winning the support of the public and the city council is a major factor in any attempt at integration.

When the public is educated to the creation of a new elite force that is operating for their benefit, recruits are easier to obtain.

Any hint that the new position will be forced on existing police officers and firemen will invariably lead to severe resistance. By making the new position optional, increasing the compensation for the increased responsibilities, and increasing the prestige of those selected for its members, resistance can be kept at a minimum.

At this point, some mention should be made of what the duties of this elite force should be. Throughout this report, one thing is evident. In all attempts at integration, it seems that the police officer assumes more of the fireman's duties than the fireman assumes police duties. In fact, in nearly every case, the fireman learns only the patrolman's functions and does not become involved in the other aspects of criminology while police officers learn all phases of firefighting. As the size of the city increased there is a developing tendency to have only patrolmen cross-trained in firefighting duties. The programs developed by Fort Lauderdale and Dearborn clearly show this. Both cities have, over a long period of time, merged many of the fireman's functions with that of police patrolmen in the formation of an elite force. The result has been a reduction in the number of firemen necessary, through normal retirements and resignations, without a loss of protection.

Many of our nation's largest cities have created special elite squads comprising the functions of both of these departments. Often

times they also include a highly trained medical technician. Yet these cities still retain independent fire and police departments in their organizational structure. The elite squads should make it possible for city administrators to increase the efficiency of the independent departments, with fewer numbers of employees.

It should be clear that the lessons learned from this report can be effectively and economically applied to many municipalities throughout North America. The method and degree of police-fire cooperation will depend on the unique circumstances in each community. However, the challenge is there for all public administrators.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

CITIES CONTACTED

Beverly Hill, Michigan Boyne City, Michigan Center Line, Michigan Dearborn, Michigan Essexville, Michigan Farmington, Michigan Garden City, Michigan Gibraltor, Michigan Grosse Pointe Shores, Michigan Grosse Pointe Woods, Michigan Oak Park, Michigan Manistique, Michigan Huntington Woods, Michigan Palmer, Alaska Fremont, California Sunnyvale, California Fort Lauderdale, Florida Champaign, Illinois Chicago Heights, Illinois Evanston, Illinois Elgin, Illinois Glencoe, Illinois Highland Park, Illinois Edina, Minnesota Oakwood, Ohio Milton-Freewater, Oregon Oregon City, Oregon Edgewood, Pennsylvania Winston-Salem, North Carolina North Augusta, South Carolina Spartanburg, South Carolina Fox Point, Wisconsin Sewickley Heights, Pennsylvania River Hills, Wisconsin Shorewood, Wisconsin Chicautimi, Quebec, Canada Granby, Quebec, Canada Montreal-North, Quebec, Canada Shawinigan Falls, Quebec, Canada Trois Rivieres, Quebec, Canada

East Kildonan, Manitoba, Canada St. James, Manitoba, Canada Buena Park, California Hawthorne, California Monterey Park, California Sanger, California Melvindale, Michigan West Miami, Florida Waukegan, Illinois Lincoln, Nebraska St. Jerome, Quebec, Canada Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada

APPENDIX II

CITIES RESPONDING TO SURVEY

Milton-Freewater, Oregon Chicago Heights, Illinois River Hills, Wisconsin Melvindale, Michigan St. James-Assiniboia, Manitoba Palmer, Alaska Monterey Park, California Shorewood, Wisconsin Center Line, Michigan Lincoln, Nebraska Hawthorne, California Champaign, Illinois Fremont, California Winston-Salem, North Carolina Evanston, Illinois Buena Park, California Spartanburg, South Carolina Oregon City, Oregon Sewickley Heights, Pennsylvania Grosse Pointe Shores, Michigan Oakwood, Ohio Fox Point, Wisconsin Huntington Woods, Michigan Farmington, Michigan Grosse Pointe Woods, Michigan Granby, Quebec, Canada Trois-Rivieres, Quebec, Canada Dearborn, Michigan Fort Lauderdale, Florida

No attempt made No attempt made No attempt made No attempt made Shared one building Combined Police and Fire Chiefs Attempted and failed Attempted and failed Police are volunteer firemen Abandoned program Abandoned program Attempted and failed Attempted and failed Partially successful Partially successful Abandoned program Attempted and failed Attempted and failed Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful Formed elite corps.

Formed elite corps.

7 Mess Potters