BOSTON'S COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: A CASE STUDY

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This case study is one of six case studies completed. These first six case studies also include Baltimore, Columbia, Fort Worth, Salt Lake City, and Seattle. Six more case studies will be completed in the near future: East Bay, Hartford, Metro Denver, Omaha, Phoenix, and Wilmington. In addition, a Final Cross-Site Analysis Report is forthcoming.

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Overview

On February 19, 1997, President William Clinton announced his 1997 Juvenile Crime Bill in Boston. Boston was selected because his national strategy drew on several successful Boston initiatives. In making the announcement, President Clinton said:

> It is really a national framework to give other communities the chance to get the resources to do what you're trying to do in Boston. That is all it is. Tough when you should be tough; smart when you should be smart; compassionate when you should be compassionate.

For Boston, its achievements and recognition came after decades of struggle with competing models of policing, spates of corruption and abuse, flawed leadership, and extraordinarily rancorous management-union relations.

The Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) played a pivotal part in Boston's achievements, most notably by funding an unusually intensive planning process. This planning process brought together the Boston Police Department (BPD), community leaders, citizens, criminal justice agencies, and social service providers in each of Boston's police districts over an extended period of time during which neighborhood problems were identified and tactics were developed to solve them. This planning process also laid the groundwork for an ongoing accountability process in each of the districts.

To achieve these goals, long-standing suspicions, indeed even antagonisms among participants, had to be overcome and/or managed. While this did not happen overnight, and while the BPD's and other organizations' capacities were strained by their new experiences and responsibilities, for the most part, problems were overcome. They were overcome in large part by the self-consciousness of the BPD: that is, by its willingness to learn from its experiences and its attempt to find new ways of solving problems, be they neighborhood or program administration problems.

This case study of Boston's CCP program was written as a result of site visits made to various CCP programs and interviews with CCP participants between September, 1995 and April, 1997. It also incorporates data from BOTEC's CCP Coalition Survey and Community Policing Survey, as well as information contained in federal and local documents and reports. Follow-up phone calls were made during December, 1997 and January, 1998, to key participants in order to write the epilogue.

Background Context

City Profile

The storied history of Boston stretches back to the early seventeenth century, making it one of the oldest cities on the East Coast. Boston has retained many of its historical quirks, among them dense housing, narrow streets, and in some areas cobble-stoned walks. Boston's compact layout, despite years of backfilling the Boston Harbor, makes it an eminently walkable city. The Green Line subway was the first in the United States, and in the years since that line's opening, the Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority has expanded to provide excellent public transportation throughout much of the city.

Boston is also a city that prides itself on education: over 40 college and university campuses dot the metropolitan area. These colleges and universities contribute to the culture of the city and also transform its demographics. Most obviously, the population varies greatly between periods when school is in and out of session. This youthful population also lowers the average age in the city. Furthermore, while Boston traditionally might be associated with an established white Protestant population and a large American Irish Catholic diaspora, Boston's international representation expands due to the presence of many world-renown universities.

Nor should Boston's minority communities be overlooked, as they constitute a significant slice of Boston residents. Approximately 37 percent of Boston's half million inhabitants are a member of a minority group. These communities also contribute to the culture of the city. Boston supports a Chinatown district near the financial heart of the city. Malcolm X is one of several historically important minority Bostonians. However, as with many American cities, the minority population is concentrated in a few neighborhoods in the central and southern parts of the city.

Boston is a city of legendary neighborhoods. Bostonians do not just live in Boston; they live in the South End, Dorchester, Roxbury, Back Bay, Mattapan, Southie, Charlestown, Roslindale, Hyde Park, East Boston, West Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, and Beacon Hill. This social/political/historical reality, and the Boston police strike of 1919, have largely shaped the culture and functioning of the Boston Police Department during most of the twentieth century. Comprehensive Community Program funds were awarded to the Boston Police Department at a critical moment in its history. Arguably, CCP funds facilitated an historic reconciliation between Boston's neighborhoods and the emerging strategy of the BPD. Some background is required to understand the full significance of the changes now underway in

the BPD—a significant portion of which had their origins in the planning process funded by CCP.

The Crime Problem in Boston

Currently, Boston is enjoying its lowest level of property crime in 25 years, while at the same time grappling with a changing structure of violent criminal activity. In 1993, reported incidents of robbery, which the Boston Police Department cites as a key indicator of the general level of public safety, fell to the lowest level since 1974, 34 percent below the twenty-year average. [1] In 1994, robberies increased slightly, but declined even further in 1995.[2] Taken as a whole, in 1993, crimes against property in Boston occurred at a rate about 21 percent below the twenty-year mean. The figures for 1994 and 1995 were even better.

Simultaneously, violent crimes decreased 6.5 percent, although a comparison of violent crime rates still places Boston tenth out of 22 major US cities. This overall statistical measurement of violent crime masks certain trends that concern the Boston Police Department. Although homicides remain just under the recent historical average of 100 per year, in 1993, aggravated assaults took place with a frequency 22 percent above the twenty-year mean. Rape and attempted rape also exceeded the 20-year mean by two percent.

Boston Unified Crime Report Data

Boston Crime		1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
	Population	573,131	574,107	575,882	579,921	580,095	574,283	572,454	572,822	553,870	556,724	550,715
Murder*	*Raw*	87	105	76	93	99	143	113	73	98	85	96
	per 100,000	15.18	18.29	13.20	16.04	17.07	24.90	19.74	12.74	17.69	15.27	17.43
Forcible Rape	*Raw*	532	516	550	558	483	539	486	537	480	453	379
	per 100,000	92.82	89.88	95.51	96.22	83.26	93.86	84.90	93.75	86.66	81.37	68.82
Robbery	*Raw*	6232	6225	5408	5233	5866	6022	4784	4765	4081	4245	3597
	per 100,000	1087.36	1084.29	939.08	902.36	1011.21	1048.61	835.70	831.85	736.82	762.50	653.15
Aggravated Assault	*Raw*	5036	5549	5920	6291	6471	6960	6446	6297	6184	5881	5497
	per 100,000	878.68	966.54	1027.99	1084.80	1115.51	1211.95	1126.03	1099.29	1116.51	1056.36	998.16
Burglary	*Raw*	11470	10485	10412	9163	9882	10238	10029	8718	7982	6799	6671
	per 100,000	2001.29	1826.31	1808.01	1580.04	1703.51	1782.74	1751.93	1521.94	1441.13	1221.25	1211.33
Larceny-Theft	*Raw*	26938	26553	26791	28542	30794	29642	26726	24598	24798	24375	26002
	per 100,000	4700.15	4625.10	4652.17	4921.70	5308.44	5161.57	4668.67	4294.18	4477.22	4378.29	4721.50
Motor Vehicle Theft	*Raw*	17778	19574	18260	16698	16408	14513	13455	11491	11932	11240	10036
	per 100,000	3101.91	3409.47	3170.79	2879.36	2828.50	2527.15	2350.41	2006.03	2154.30	2018.95	1822.36

*Murder includes non-negligent manslaughter

But the most concerning trend in Boston centers on the identity of the violent offenders. Boston's violent crime, as in other cities around the United States,

[1] These figures are from the Boston Police Department, *Comprehensive Communities Program Phase I Application*, April 29, 1994.

[2] Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Unified Crime Report*, 1994; Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Unified Crime Report*, 1995.

is increasingly committed by young men. The Boston Police Department reports that 20 percent of 1993 homicides were committed by individuals under the age of 17, and one-third of the 98 homicides were committed by men under the age of 20. The age of murder victims parallels that of the offenders: since 1990, 31 percent of homicide victims lived less than 20 years. Even more disturbing, the average age of juvenile murder victims in 1993 was 12. Juvenile homicide victims also concentrate in a certain demographic group. Boston's population is nearly 26 percent African-American, yet a staggering 53 percent of juvenile murder victims in Boston are African-American.[3]

The Boston police believe this increase is due, at least partially, to the increase in gang activity in the city and the greater availability of handguns. Approximately 2000 individuals participate in the 78 gangs operating throughout the city. When coupled with a study by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, which concluded that handguns were as available to 13 to 17 year olds as to their older counterparts (23 to 27 year olds), teenage gang violence emerges as the important criminal justice issue in Boston.

Unsurprisingly, much of the criminal activity in Boston occurs in a geographically defined area—largely in the central city districts. Roxbury (District 2) has the city's highest violent crime rate, an area where 13.6 percent of Boston's population lives and 24 percent of Boston's violent crimes take place. Twenty-five of Boston's 78 gangs operate within District 2. Roxbury houses the largest number of persons under 24 of any district and has the unfortunate distinction of possessing the highest poverty rate in the city. Half of all children under 17 live beneath the poverty line in Roxbury. In keeping with the Boston Police Department's concern about the availability of handguns, homicides involving handguns in Roxbury have recently increased from 14 (1993) to 20 (1994) to 28 (1995).[4] It should be noted though, that these totals remain below some recorded in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Next to Roxbury is District 3, which incorporates Mattapan and Western Dorchester. Although only eight percent of the city's population lives in this area, 14 percent of all violent crime is committed there. Another 16 of the city's gangs have turf within District 3. As with Roxbury, the population is disproportionately young, unemployed, and impoverished.

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[3] United States Commerce Department, 1990 *Census*.

[4] These and following figures on specific Boston Police Districts are from the Boston Police Department, *Comprehensive Communities Program Phase II Application*, August 15, 1994; Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Unified Crime Report*, 1994; Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Unified Crime Report*, 1995.

The diverse District 4, which includes the South End, Fenway, and Back Bay neighborhoods of Boston, encompasses both low-income groups, who tend to be minorities living in the South End and Fenway, and higher-income, white residents of the Back Bay. Aggravated assaults involving firearms increased in District four from 66 to 85 between 1993 and 1995. This District has the third highest rate of violent criminal activity in the city.

Finally, Dorchester (District 11) also contributes to the violent crime problem in Boston. Most notable in this district is the influx of Asian immigrants and the rise of Asian street gangs. This district has the fourth highest rate of violent criminal activity.

To summarize, Districts 2, 3, 4, and eleven account for two-thirds of violent crime in Boston despite housing only about 45 percent of the city's inhabitants. Leaving out the fairly populous District 4 makes the 1995 statistics even more sharp: 53 percent of violent crime happens in Districts 2, 3, and 11, where only about a third of the city's population live. In years to come, these four districts will likely continue to dominate the records of violent criminal activity in the city.[5] Furthermore, the home turf of 53 percent of Boston gangs is located within Districts 2 and 3. Unequivocally, violent criminal activity in Boston concentrates in these certain central city areas. Therefore, the Boston Police Department targets its Comprehensive Community Program at these "trouble" spots.

Yet despite those "trouble" spots, Unified Crime Report data published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation shows a promising trend for Boston: Part I crime has decreased in number each of the last five years. Whether perceptions of crime have decreased accordingly remains murky.

Local Government Context

At the head of Boston's city government is the Mayor and a 13-member City Council. The Mayor appoints the Boston Police Commissioner. The current Mayor, Thomas Menino, has served since 1994, and the current Police Commissioner is Paul Evans. Evans' predecessor was William Bratton, who left Boston to head New York City's Police Department in 1993. It was Bratton who began the implementation of the St. Clair Commission's recommendations to develop Neighborhood Policing in Boston. Bratton was recruited—largely for this purpose—in 1992 by Mayor Menino's predecessor, Mayor Ray Flynn.

Mayor Flynn, who took office in 1983, shifted the focus of city governmental involvement towards the neighborhoods. His predecessor Kevin White

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[5] Boston Police Department, *Comprehensive Communities Program Alternatives to Incarceration Network Progress Report*, November 15, 1996.

(mayor from 1968-1983) had championed the building up of the downtown and waterfront areas. Mayor Menino has continued Flynn's emphasis on the importance of the neighborhoods, an emphasis which has aided the coalition-building central to the Comprehensive Communities Program.

Police Context: A History of the Boston Police Department

The Early Years

The early twentieth-century BPD had a well-deserved reputation for honesty, effectiveness, and efficiency. Raymond Fosdick, author of *American Police Systems,* dubbed Boston as one of the best police departments in the United States in 1915.[6] Although the political struggles between early settlers and later waves of Irish, Italian, Jewish, German, and other immigrant groups for control of police that characterized most American cities affected Boston as well, two strong leaders—Chief Edward Savage (1870-1878) and Commissioner Stephen O'Meara (1906-1918)—were able to establish policing traditions in Boston that were enviable. Even representatives of the London Metropolitan Police, Scotland Yard, came to Boston to study the BPD's methods during the Savage administration.

These policing traditions had their roots in early Boston history. The town was founded in 1630; provisions for the "watch"—a system of policing by citizens themselves—were made in 1631. The City of Boston incorporated in 1822. On April 15, 1838, a bill passed the General Court allowing the City of Boston to hire policemen. The Harbor Patrol was established in 1853 as part of the police department. On May 26, 1854, the Boston Watch (the hired night watchmen who replaced the original civilian watch) and the Boston Police were merged, creating the Boston Police Department as now known. By 1858, each district station was connected by telegraph to the office of the Chief of Police. With great debate, police adopted uniforms in 1859. In 1878, a police pension system was initiated and in 1884, with little debate, firearms were issued to all police officers. Also in 1884, Boston elected its first Irish mayor, Hugh O'Brien. The next year, in action not unrelated to the election of an Irish mayor, home rule for police—the authority for Boston to manage its own police department—was vacated by the state legislature. (In 1960, home rule for Boston police was re-established.) The state legislature created the position of Police Commissioner in 1906. It was filled by First Commissioner Stephen O'Meara.

Behind these events, political and social forces operated that shaped both the city and the new police institution. Throughout the second half of the

[6] See, Thomas Repetto, *The Blue Parade,* The Free Press, New York, 1970, p. 105.

nineteenth century, old-line Protestant Yankees attempted to maintain political and social control of the city; yet Irish Catholics gradually eroded their power. Republicans gained control over state government and Democrats over city government. Liquor and vice laws and control of police were central to their dispute. For political and social elites, liquor was at the heart of almost every community problem: drunkenness, poverty, vice, unemployment, riot, and assimilation of immigrant groups into communities. Immigrant groups resented and opposed both the laws intended to regulate their behavior and police attempts to enforce them. Yankee Republicans and Irish Democrats competed for control over police. Attempts to aggressively enforce vice laws, for example by the flamboyant law-and-order Chief Tukey (1846-1852), consistently failed. More in line with Boston's spirit was Chief Savage: reformist, but not zealous, practical, but concerned about corruption; nativist, but sympathetic to the sufferings of immigrants; and pro-Temperance, but restrained in the enforcement of liquor laws. This legacy was adopted, as well, during the long and successful tenure of Commissioner O'Meara from 1906 to 1918, a halcyon epoch in the history of the BPD.

The Boston Police Strike

Six months after O'Meara died in office from a stroke, however, an event occurred that shaped the BPD's culture for most of the remainder of the twentieth century: the Boston police strike of 1919. Into the 1990s, the Boston Police Department would attempt to regain its luster, only to lurch through recurrent waves of crisis, external study, and attempted reform.

Boston police were not the first to strike—London (England) and Cincinnati police had struck earlier without major disorder. But in 1919, after negotiating for one-and-one-half years for a $200 raise during a period of steep inflation, the Boston Police Social Club voted to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Although the issue of affiliating with organized labor festered during O'Meara's tenure, he managed to stave it off. Two months after his death, however, officers declared themselves in favor of affiliation. In response, the new commissioner Edward Curtis, a Boston Brahmin inexperienced in either policing or administration, ruled that police were prohibited from affiliating with any other organization. Confronted shortly thereafter with the Club's formal approval of affiliation, Commissioner Curtis suspended its 19 leaders. The membership voted to strike. Seventy percent of the department—1,117 of 1,544 officers—walked out. They were fired.

Urban chaos resulted: during several nights of rioting, seven people were killed and 167 were injured. The military ultimately restored order.

Those sympathetic to the police pointed to a lack of leadership by Governor Coolidge and Commissioner Curtis in preparing for a possible strike, the

refusal of the city to provide pay increases despite high levels of inflation, and the national "Red Scare" hysteria (a post-WW I purge of what were considered to be radical individuals and groups). Those opposed to the police rallied behind Governor Coolidge's now famous adage: "There is no right to strike against the public safety anytime, anywhere."

Regardless of one's view of the strike, the rioting that followed, or the firing of the strikers, the consequences for Boston were staggering: the elan and pride that had distinguished the BPD, the legacy of Savage and O'Meara, was shattered. Labor/management relations were soured in Boston for generations of police. Cycles of vast cohorts moved through the BPD creating "age lumps" and either feast or famine for officers hoping for promotion. Most ominously, a department comprised almost totally of new recruits, was confronted immediately with what was to become perhaps the most corrupting influence on American policing to that time: Prohibition.

In 1920, the Eighteenth Amendment and Volstead Act were passed and America ostensibly "went dry." Individual states passed laws strengthening federal legislation. Yet, enforcing Prohibition laws remained a problem for city police. Eliot Ness myths to the contrary, only 3000 federal agents and a smattering of state police were available to enforce prohibition. The burden of enforcing prohibition fell on city police. Enforcing local liquor laws had been tough enough for them in spite of the relatively small-scale of vice operations involved. Prohibition changed this. The profits from illegal liquor operations and associated vice were simply too great for criminal entrepreneurs to ignore. A cottage industry grew into organized crime.

If many police found the penny-ante opportunities for corruption prior to Prohibition hard to resist, many more found the lavish opportunities Prohibition offered irresistible. The Boston Police Department, decimated by firings, its culture destroyed, and staffed by inexperienced rookies hired in haste, was now no exception: many officers fell victim to the enormous amount of money available to compromise police, courts, and prosecutors. The BPD, once able to keep corruption at a minimum, now suffered from the same level of corruption that afflicted most other major police departments—*i.e.,* New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago.

Surveying the BPD

Police surveys—administrative studies of police departments—developed as a means of attempted reform of police departments in the United States during the 1920s. Those conducting the studies were among the elite of legal and police scholars and included, among others, Felix Frankfurter, Roscoe Pound, Raymond Fosdick (author of *American Police Systems*), Bruce Smith (he alone studied more than 50 departments between 1924 and 1955), and August Vollmer.

The formula for reform was uniform across cities: remove police from political influences; provide tenure to police chiefs; regionalize police; centralize police administration and reduce the power of precinct/area commanders; increase patrol by cars; improve technology, especially use of two-way radios and cars; improve recruitment and training of officers; create specialized anti-crime units; improve record keeping; and remove police from non-law enforcement functions. This agenda typified the first survey conducted in Boston. Harvard Law School Professor Leonard Harrison, who conducted the *Harvard Law School Survey of Crime in Boston* between 1927 and 1934, published in 1934, the first, but by no means the last, survey of the BPD: *Police Administration in Boston.*

Harrison's agenda was not mere organizational enhancement or improved efficiency of the BPD; the agenda proposed by Harrison was a basic redefinition of the function of policing and the establishment of the structural, managerial, and personnel systems required to meet this new business of policing. While complete articulation of this new philosophy of policing would await the publication of O. W. Wilson's *Police Administration* in 1950, the goal was to reposition police departments **from** decentralized, broad service agencies, accountable to local government, **to** centralized, law enforcement agencies, accountable to law and professional knowledge.

The motivations of reformers such as Harrison were multiple, but their two key goals were to remove political influences from policing—in Boston, a residue of the long struggle in Boston between the Yankee Republicans and Irish Democrats—and to control line police officers—an issue that became critical in Boston given the systemic corruption that developed during the post-strike and Prohibition era. And so, for the next two-and-a-half decades the BPD operated in continuing tension: Should the number of precincts (districts) be reduced? How should police patrol, by car or foot? How much authority should district commanders have relative to central command? Experts and outsiders might want basic changes in the BPD, but precinct captains, line officers, and neighborhood residents, for the most part, wanted little to do with them and were able forestall changes. The BPD remained a decentralized neighborhood-oriented police department into the 1960s.

In 1961, the issue of control through centralization and "professionalization" exploded again with the Columbia Broadcasting System nationally televised "Biography of a Bookie Joint." It alleged that a dozen-or-so Boston police officers shown going into a Back Bay bookie-joint were betting and collecting pay-offs. Public indignation followed and former FBI official Edward McNamara was named as the new chief by Mayor John Collins—the first commissioner to be named by a mayor under the newly reestablished home rule. He commissioned another survey of the BPD by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), with Quinn Tamm as its executive director.

In contrast to the cautious tone of Harrison's analysis of the BPD, the IACP report excoriated the city and its police department: ". . . a mobile criminal element . . . is grateful to police agencies that persist in the antiquated procedure of assigning a large portion of the members to foot patrol." It admonished the city: the department was too large; officers were assigned to non-law enforcement functions; records were inadequate; supervision and inspection needed to be improved; and the department was ill-equipped. If the means of improvement suggested by the survey were adopted, according to the IACP, departmental personnel could be reduced by 600 officers. Yet the fewer officers would be well trained and equipped, better paid, and their integrity ensured. Organized crime would find it difficult to operate in Boston. More police would patrol in automobiles (the IACP considered foot patrol nothing more than a reserve pool of officers), allocation of patrol officers would be based on crime and traffic analyses, and thus more crime would be prevented and more cases would be solved. The report concluded that all of this could be accomplished at an annual savings of $1,675,000 (1962 dollars).

Despite the crisis of corruption, the IACP study, and the external pressure for change, the resistance to, and alliance against, change by mid-management (especially precinct captains), line personnel, and neighborhood residents continued to be so formidable that a 1969 Mayoral Task Force commissioned by then-Mayor Kevin White found that the BPD had only been reduced in size by 142 officers; still had 13 stations and two sub-stations (as against the IACP's recommendation of five stations); still maintained too many non-law enforcement functions; and, in addition to other shortcomings in its managerial and personnel practices, still had too many officers on foot patrol.

In 1972, the department was again rocked by corruption when several top departmental officials were implicated by bookie sheets discovered in a gambling raid. Commissioner McNamara refused to resign; however, at the end of his term, White named Robert di Grazia commissioner.

Modern Traditions

Di Grazia, formerly the chief of East St. Louis, Illinois, was the quintessential reform administrator: anti-union, a firm believer in patrol by automobile and rapid response to calls for service, committed to centralization of function and command and control, and part of a professional network of "police progressives" that extended into the Police Foundation, a Washington-based police think-tank headed by Patrick V. Murphy (New York City's police commissioner under the Lindsey administration). Supported by a young group of civilian "whiz kids," Di Grazia closed stations, ended foot patrol, abandoned services such as the harbor patrol, transferred top commanders, transferred lieutenants and sergeants, threatened to transfer virtually every patrol officer (although it

never came to that), civilianized administrative positions, and centralized special units. By these means the BPD was wrenched into adherence with the model of policing first advocated by Harrison and later by the IACP. The business of the BPD would be "fighting crime" by riding around in cars and rapidly responding to calls for service. Demand for police services was centralized when 911 and computer aided dispatch (CAD) was installed and, if citizens preferred to call their remaining area stations, their calls were routed to centralized dispatch.

To be sure, important improvements were made in many of the BPD's systems. The police academy became as innovative and creative as any in the country. Supervision and command and control improved. Corruption was greatly reduced. Important experiments in team policing were conducted in the Fenway and other areas, however, they ultimately ended as calls for service escalated and, for reasons noted below, the number of officers in the department declined. A shift away from a neighborhood orientation to a "professional" orientation was clearly evident.

But the BPD was being hit hard during this era. Regardless of the merits or goals of bussing, the bussing conflicts in Boston pitted police against citizens in neighborhood after neighborhood. Moreover, many in the BPD believed that policing bussing had at least two other troublesome consequences. First, the prolonged and heavy use of overtime to ensure sufficient personnel created circumstances in which officers became accustomed to, and reliant on, the money accruing from overtime. Second, for reasons that are not immediately apparent, the distinctions among ranks broke down over time as police managed the bussing conflict. Many believe that this administrative breakdown crept into routine policing in the BPD as well.

Other changes also had dramatic consequences. First, the Boston police union emerged as a potent political force during the 1970s, discovering that it could gain benefits through political action that it could not gain at the bargaining table—most notably a 4/3 schedule (4 days on, three days off) in trade for political support—further worsening an extraordinarily bad management/line relationship while reducing substantially the level of policing. Second, the department came under court order regarding affirmative action that stalled promotions for years, further complicating the administrative problems noted above and ultimately creating a sense among personnel that politics, not merit, controlled what opportunities for promotion existed in the department. Finally, Proposition 2 1/2, a tax limiting bill, ultimately resulted in a forced layoff, the first in the history of the department, with the number of officers declining from 2,028 in 1980 to 1,555 in 1981.

Consequently, the BPD was viewed throughout most of the 1980s and into the 1990s as an extremely troubled organization. Line/management relations were as bitter and hostile as any in the country; police relations

with communities deteriorated, especially in minority communities where charges of brutality and racism were rife; a pervasive sense of futility seemed to be the BPD's dominant mood; and "starts"—innovations such as proposed implementation of foot patrol in 1983—merely "fizzled." Finally, after a rash of media exposes, especially by the *Boston Globe,* of alleged bungled investigations, racism, and brutality Mayor Raymond Flynn created the Boston Police Department Management Review Committee—known popularly as the St. Clair Commission (after its chairman, James D. St. Clair, a prestigious Boston attorney)—in May of 1991. The St. Clair Commission had two basic charges: to review "the recent *Boston Globe* series on police procedures" and to "review the basic management and supervision systems and practices of the Boston Police Department."[7]

The St. Clair report tore into the BPD and its leadership: "Commissioner Roache and his command staff . . . have failed to provide effective leadership;" "the department has adopted a reactive posture, merely drifting from crisis to crisis;" "We found that the department actually operates as many separate and nearly autonomous police departments, each with its own priorities and informal rules;" "A substantial majority of the citizens and police officers we spoke with believe that Commissioner Roache and his command staff lack the necessary managerial skills and experience to run the department effectively. We agree;" "the department has been unable to implement new programs or effectively manage many existing programs;" "Perhaps most striking is the near total lack of accountability within the department;" regarding citizen complaints—"our study revealed an investigative and hearing process characterized by shoddy, halfhearted investigations, lengthy delays, and inadequate documentation and record-keeping."[8]

While the St. Clair report documented many other specific problems, two additional contentions of the Commission, however, are of special significance and of particular relevance to this report. First, the Commission called for the resignation or termination of Commissioner Roache. Second, the Commission pushed for the implementation of community policing:

> Equally troubling is the department's latest effort to adopt community policing. Although the department has been exploring and experimenting with the concept of community-oriented policing for many years under a variety of labels, the most recent effort illustrates some of the problems with Commissioner Roache's style . . . [T]he department announced

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[7] Letter from Mayor Raymond L. Flynn to James St. Clair, Appendix A. "Report of the Boston Police Department Management Review Committee," January 14 1992.

[8] "Report of the Boston Police Department Management Review Committee," January 14 1992, pp. 4-8.

> its adoption of community policing this past February with considerable fanfare. However, almost none of the many police officers we interviewed during this past summer and fall had any understanding of this new policing strategy, and even fewer were consulted during its development. Understandably, most officers view the new policy with skepticism and see it as little more than City Hall's most recent "public relations stunt." . . . While we fully support the evolving strategy of community policing as it is understood by leading police executives and recommend it for Boston, we fear that the Department's current effort may do more harm than good.

The MRC survey brought the BPD full circle: a police department that, within the memory of many current police officers and managers, had been ridiculed for being antiquated and out of touch for attempting to maintain neighborhood stations, foot patrol, and other close linkages to neighborhoods—and had struggled for three generations of police to abandon or substantially modify such linkages—was now being taken to task for its inability to implement and return to a neighborhood strategy.

Mayor Flynn, while rejecting the idea of firing his commissioner, nonetheless sought a compromise position: that is, he recruited William Bratton, then chief of New York City's Transit Police, to return to Boston and become Superintendent-in-Chief, the highest ranking sworn position in the BPD (January 16, 1992). His specific charge was to implement the bulk of the other recommendations of the St. Clair Commission.

Bratton moved swiftly to reorient the department and to respond to the St. Clair Commission. Within a month, he published the "30 Day St. Clair Implementation Report" that delineated point by point responses to the Commission's recommendations. Most importantly, he committed the department to move forward in its shift to community policing. To this end, Bratton promised that a strategic plan would be produced in six months. "Neighborhood Policing: A Plan of Action for the Boston Police Department" was published in September 1992—as scheduled. Most important to this report, the section entitled "Level Three: Implementing Neighborhood Policing" contained section "A. Local Strategies." Task one sets forth the "Development of District Neighborhood Policing Plans": "Each strategy must be developed in concert with the residents of each district and include: [selected] a proposed schedule of meetings to solicit community input (especially through existing organizations) on local problems within each beat where an officer has volunteered; and a process for marshaling resources inside and outside the BPD to attack the first problem selected for resolution within the beat." While the document contained many more specific plans, recommendations, and implementation timetables, for our purposes, this was

the heart of the BPD's strategic plan. A planning process would be established that would shift the BPD to community policing.

The strategic plan laid out by Bratton and his staff was a pretty big mouthful. It would be a pretty big mouthful for any police department and, frankly, many long time observers of the BPD, including Kelling, one of the authors of this document, were skeptical about its chances for implementation. For many, its chances of implementation were increased when Mayor Flynn announced his planned resignation to become the United States Ambassador to the Vatican, Commissioner Roache resigned to run for Mayor (June 23, 1993), and Flynn, in one of his last official acts, named Bratton as Commissioner (June 29, 1993). Bratton, in turn, named Paul Evans Superintendent-in-Chief. But, of course, shortly after Bratton was appointed Commissioner, newly-elected Mayor Rudolph Giuliani recruited Bratton to head the New York City Police Department.

Clearly Bratton had contributed much to stabilizing the BPD. In a sense, the Bratton administration took care of the past. It rejuvenated and re-rationalized the moribund BPD, gave it some highly visible administrative successes and laid out a plan for strategically realigning the department with neighborhoods. The question remained whether Commissioner Paul Evans (appointed by acting Mayor Thomas Menino on February 14, 1994) and newly-elected Mayor Menino could implement a complicated planning process that would, in turn, implement community policing.

Finally, Paul Evans is probably a classic case of the right person at the right time. His low key administrative style has allowed the competence that has accumulated over the years – especially in the rank of captain – to finally emerge. Probably more than anything else, Evans is seen as fair. In a department that was fraught with dissension as a result of political maneuvering, no single trait was of more importance. Mayor Menino has recently reappointed Evans as Commissioner for another five year term.

Community Context

Boston has a long history of developing "grass roots" organizations, both in the social service sector and at the neighborhood level. Many of these organizations had sprouted over the past two decades as a result of frustration with both state and city governments' inability to adequately deal with crime and other problems in Boston's neighborhoods, especially minority ones. As mentioned previously, the focus of the White administration had been on developing downtown Boston, and it wasn't until the mid 1980's that the focus was slowly moved back to the neighborhoods. Grass roots organizations had been created by churches, small groups, and individuals to deal with gang problems, housing issues, domestic violence, and neighborhood crime. The latter was the beginning of community

mobilization, as small groups, made up of neighbors, met in their homes to discuss local crime. Because of these grass-roots efforts, of which there were too many to count, Boston was ripe for institutionalized community mobilization.

In 1985 the Boston Police Department spearheaded the Neighborhood Crime Watch Program. Begun as a one-person outfit, it metamorphosed throughout the next decade, was overseen by various BPD bureaus, and has resulted in a six-person unit housed under the Bureau of Field Services. Since its inception, over 700 crime watch groups were started, and crime watch staff, along with other officers stationed in various neighborhoods, took part in hundreds of meetings in homes, churches, or precinct meeting rooms. Police met and continued to meet with residents to identify and solve the most imminent crime problems, but also to teach crime-prevention methods and to address quality-of-life issues.

The BPD has in certain districts expanded on the Neighborhood Crime Watch, institutionalizing it into larger geographic areas. Neighborhood Advisory Councils have been established in eight out of ten districts, all at varying stages of development. The most sophisticated of the councils, at the time the BPD applied for CCP funding, was in District 11 in Dorchester. As stated in the BPD's CCP Phase II Application, "(T)he Neighborhood Council, composed of representatives from each of the District's ten neighborhoods, is intended to advise, assist, and support the Area commander and District Commander in the design, implementation, operation, and evaluation of Neighborhood Policing in Dorchester." (Appendix D)

The council is not only organized geographically, but includes issue-based collaboratives, and ad hoc groups that meet about specific problems. One of the most significant achievements of this Neighborhood Advisory Council has been the creation of a grant-supported community prosecution effort in a targeted high-crime section of Dorchester. The Safe Neighborhood Initiative (SNI) in Dorchester was a collaborative among representatives from District 11, the Suffolk County District Attorney, and the Massachusetts Attorney General. This model program brought police, neighbors, and prosecutors together to prioritize crime and quality of life issues for targeted prosecution. When Attorney General Janet Reno visited Boston in February, 1994, she commented, "I haven't seen any community in the country that involved so many different disciplines—hospital workers, police, community activists, social services—as Dorchester."

CCP Planning and Organization

Boston was one of sixteen sites that was invited by the Bureau of Justice Assistance to apply for both planning and implementation funding to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to combat crime. As stated in BJA's *Fact Sheet on the Comprehensive Communities Program*, "(t)he two defining principles of the CCP are (1) that communities must take a leadership role in developing partnerships to combat crime and violence, and (2) that State and local jurisdictions must establish truly coordinated and multi-disciplinary approaches to address crime- and violence-related problems, as well as the conditions which foster them."[9] Each site was mandated to include jurisdiction-wide community policing and community mobilization prevention initiatives in their strategy. In addition, sites were asked to create programming, based on the area's needs, in the areas of youth and gangs, community prosecution and diversion, drug courts with diversion to treatment, and community-based alternatives to incarceration.

The Comprehensive Communities Program was implemented in two phases. Under Phase I, the invited jurisdictions were asked to submit an application for approximately $50,000 of planning funds to support the design and development of a comprehensive strategy. All proposals for Phase I funding were due April 29, 1994. Most of the sites were notified within a month that they were awarded funding for Phase I. During this planning phase, technical assistance in the form of workshops and meetings were offered to the sites. During July, 1994, representatives from each site were mandated to attend a two-day Phase II (Implementation Phase) Application Development Workshop. All Phase II applications were due to BJA on August 15, 1994. The Boston Police Department received notice of its award during January, 1995.

Boston's Year One implementation grant stretched out over much more than a single year. As the timeline below graphically indicates, Boston was enmeshed in a long series of BJA and COPS readjustments in the grant. The grant officially ended in January, 1997. By then, the second year grant had begun. Money for the second year of implementation began in October, 1996. The Year Two grant is initially proposed to extend until September, 1997.

According to BPD staff, the six months given sites for planning (Phase I) was woefully inadequate for a city like Boston that has dozens of neighborhoods, hundreds of established community-based programs, many neighborhood groups, and the will to really involve the citizens of Boston. In addition to

[9]Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Fact Sheet Comprehensive Communities Program*, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994.

the 400 people involved in the Strategic Planning Process, another 60 people were at the table in planning both the YSPN and ATIN networks. Therefore, Boston's Phase II grant application requested more time for planning and developing all aspects of its CCP programming. One BPD staff person working on CCP repeated her assertions to BJA staff, "We will do (all of these things you want, but) if you want us to do it right, if you don't want this to be a lie, you need to give us the time and space to do it." For the most part, BJA went along with Boston's request for more planning time, approving their Phase II application.

Boston Timeline



The Planning Process

The planning process for CCP involved a great deal of networking and reaching out to social service agencies, community leaders, and neighborhood residents. The planning was carried out at two separate levels as described below: the Strategic Planning Process and the development of the networks and other program-oriented CCP components.

The Strategic Planning Process

In April, 1994, Jim Jordan (Director) and Maria Schneiderman (Assistant Director) of BPD's Office of Strategic Planning and Resource Development (OSPRD) initiated the Strategic Planning Process[10] that involved over 400 participants. Sixteen planning and implementation teams begun an unprecedented planning process —the largest single segment of Boston's CCP efforts. Some of the key players and institutions to be involved as well as some of the design of the planning process, however, had their origins in the strategic planning process initiated in response to the St. Clair Commission. The teams represented ten geographical districts, five BPD functions (investigative services, administrative services, internal investigations, special operations, and operations/911), and one citywide effort. Their purpose was to implement community policing—district by district and function by function. Supported by the Boston Management Consortium (BMC), a consulting group formally linked to the City of Boston, and Northeastern University's Center for Applied Social Research, teams met on the average of twice a month. Although not originally planned as such, the planning was divided into two phases (the reason for this adjustment will be discussed below). Phase I concentrated on the identification of neighborhood problems that needed to be dealt with to improve the quality of neighborhood life. Phase II commenced September 21, 1995 and concentrated on developing the strategies, tactics, and resources to manage these problems. (These phases are not to be confused with BJA's CCP funding phases.)

The planning teams had their origin in Commissioner Evans' idea of "same cop, same neighborhood." Clearly, as Jim Jordan understood and makes

[10] One of the strengths of the CCP effort in Boston is that it has been remarkably well documented. Readers of this document are strongly encouraged to read the 16 documents that were published by the BPD in July, 1996, especially the "Citywide Strategic Plan," Boston Police Department, which summarizes the planning effort, examines goals across districts, identifies the players (who range from corporate leaders to neighborhood residents), and lays out the standards and principles that should guide strategic planning processes. Our purpose here is not to regurgitate or paraphrase what the BPD has produced: to do so would not only be repetitious, it would detract from the freshness of the original documents. We view this document as a commentary on the original materials developed by the BPD.

clear, "same cop, same neighborhood" is not a set of tactics, it is a method of deploying police. The content of what police are to do once "same cop, same neighborhood" is accomplished has to come from somewhere else. Is this a centralized responsibility? If district commanders are involved, how much ownership should they have? If they are to have ownership, how can this be achieved? Should citizens be involved? Which citizens and where? What role should special units play? Internal affairs? An opportunity to answer these questions systematically presented itself when, within six weeks of Evans' appointment, Boston was selected as one of the sixteen CCP sites. From the point of view of the BPD, CCP represented an opportunity to bring a variety of people on board—certainly trainers, facilitators, and researchers, but more important, citizens and other social service agencies.

The Boston Management Consortium and Northeastern were to play key roles. The lead person for BMC was Dr. Joan Sweeney; for Northeastern, Mr. Jack McDevitt. The intimate involvement of these two persons was significant because they link CCP into earlier efforts. Moreover, especially in the case of McDevitt, his involvement says something about how the department was changing. Mr. McDevitt has a lengthy history with the BPD that goes back to the 1980s. McDevitt was known as a "good friend of the department," instrumental both in helping the department conduct its planning and research and in developing and supporting Boston's pioneering "hate crimes unit." As part of the later, along with Deputy Superintendent Bill Johnston, McDevitt represented the BPD throughout the country.[11] In 1991, however, McDevitt became one of the lead staff persons for the St. Clair Commission—a move that did not endear him to many elements of the BPD, especially its then-leadership. Nonetheless, McDevitt has become an especially important player in the CCP effort. Two factors facilitated his "rehabilitation" in the BPD: Jim Jordan believed that the relationship between Northeastern University and the BPD was essential for the future development of the BPD and included Northeastern and McDevitt both in planning activities and proposals; and, internally, McDevitt had "champions" in the BPD like Captain Robert Dunford, commander of the Dorchester District, who rallied behind him and supported his re-involvement in the BPD. Consequently, Northeastern, under McDevitt's leadership, has provided technical assistance, writing and research, and facilitation to the BPD.

[11]Deputy Johnston was known as an innovator and program advocate within the BPD, and had enormous support in the community, but was largely viewed within the BPD as a outcast before Bratton. Now, he heads the multi-department Youth Violence Task Force (YVTF), which while not funded through CCP has been an integral part of Boston's community strategy, especially with its creative Operation Nite Lite—a trend-setting collaboration between the Massachusetts Department of Probation and the YVTF.

Dr. Joan Sweeney, whose specialty is organizational consultation, was first recruited to work with the BPD Superintendent-in-Chief Bratton to help plan, develop, and produce his strategic plan. The planning processes that she utilized during these early stages of her involvement became the Process Facilitation Model adopted by the BPD for its Strategic Planning and Community Mobilization effort. Her efforts included facilitating, training, and developing materials.

The decentralized planning process was designed to "give district commanders their heads:" that is, it was designed in a way that exposed district commanders to the demands, concerns, and resources of a broad base of constituents. Moreover, district commanders were to be given resources—researchers, facilitators, programs (see below). The emphasis was that as long as they adhered to the values of the department and the process of strategic planning, they were in charge of their districts. In some respects, central administration's commitment to this principle was tested when districts completed what came to be Phase I—identifying problem priorities—originally conceived as the end of the planning process. Many then believed that central administration would become involved in planning the strategies and tactics that would be used in districts. District commanders, some now in deadly earnest, pulled back. Commander Sullivan in East Boston was typical. His position was that if they really "owned" the process and the problems, they should own the solutions as well. Consequently, the planning process was extended as Phase II—a focus on strategies, tactics and resources. The Boston Management Consortium completed its work with the end of Phase I; Northeastern, along with centralized units, continued to provide technical assistance to the teams. Captains felt a strong need for professional staff to help them with technical aspects of the effort, especially keeping detailed accounts of the team activities and writing the final report.

The resulting documents, first, are impressive and, second, for someone familiar with areas of Boston, seem to be authentic. By authentic, it is meant that the strategic planning documents reflect what one would guess are genuine neighborhood concerns. For example, the Allston area of Boston has the densest concentration of students and young persons in Boston. Graffiti on Harvard Avenue was identified by the district team as a primary problem. The overall goal (#1 in the document) was to "Improve the appearance and vitality of Allston and Brighton" (p. 7). Objective "A" under "Goal 1" is "By the end of the year, reduce graffiti with the cooperation of businesses and the community ensuring that graffiti is painted over as quickly as possible." Thus "Strategy 1" is to "Strictly enforce graffiti ordinances and organize removal efforts." Five tactics, including having a walking officer on Harvard Avenue; district staff including the captain will try to mobilize the Department of Public Works (DPW), etc.; retail stores will be reminded of their responsibility under the law to control the sale of paints and markers; rewards will be offered for turning in graffitists; and volunteers will be

recruited and utilized to remove graffiti. For each of the five tactics, resources/partners are listed: business owners, DPW, retail stores (that sell markers and paints), the Chamber of Commerce, the Allston and Brighton Board of Trade, and the Boston College Neighborhood Center. Other objectives of "Goal 1" are also identified with parallel strategies, tactics, and resources/partners identified. All goals are similarly delineated.

Another interesting example—one that was probably predictable—was in District A-1 (Downtown, Downtown Crossing, Charlestown, Bay Village, Beacon Hill, and Chinatown). The problem was Boston's "Big Dig"—the extraordinarily complicated conversion of the downtown expressway from an elevated to an underground system—and its consequences on neighborhood life and safety. (This was priority #6. Priorities #1 and #2 dealt with more effective allocation of police to deal with problems and the need to improve the morale of officers.)

Many strategic plans, moreover, reflected on their own work and tried to develop their own variation on the core planning method. From District A-7, East Boston:

> The first phase of this process had both strengths and weaknesses. This team was very strong due [to] the dedication of its members. . . . The weakness of the first phase was that it was too long (12 meetings) and the team was not as racially diverse as the neighborhood.

Later the document continues in an evaluative mode:

> In comparison to the first phase, the team members were very pleased with the work done in the second phase. The process used in this district was that a draft of the plan was created after the first meeting. This was then used as a working document and revisions and amendments were made in the following meetings. All of the members have a lot of faith in this process and are committed to seeing it come to fruition.

Likewise, District E-5—West Roxbury, Roslindale, and Jamaica Plain evaluated its process.

> Among the major strengths of the District five Strategic Planning team were a commitment to making changes by working together, the ability to reach consensus, creativity and innovation, cooperation, and a continuing investment by partners in the implementation phase. There was also the start of a frank and honest exchange of information between police and civilians, and a genuine willingness on the part of community members to learn about the realities of police management and dedication. Among the weaknesses were a

> growing lack of involvement toward the end of the process and minimal involvement by minorities. Suggestions for future attempts at this process center around more minority outreach, greater identification of and invitations to "key players" in the community, and better communication about dates and times of meetings.

In sum, the teams not only produced high-quality products, they appeared to have learned from the process itself—making adjustments as the need arises.

Planning Boston's Other CCP Components

Initially, CCP efforts in Boston were focused on the Boston Police Department's Strategic Planning Process. However, in looking at the Bureau of Justice Assistance's (BJA) other CCP components, BPD staff realized that they raised, in fact, issues and initiatives that were priorities in the BPD. For example, the BPD was one of numerous participants in the Boston Coalition, a coalition of leaders in criminal justice, business, health, education, religious institutions and the community that had been working on a drug court for Boston for two years before the CCP initiative started.

While Boston did not have community prosecution *per se*, community prosecution was one of the main components of both the Dorchester and East Boston Safe Neighborhood Initiatives. Just prior to BJA coming out with its CCP application process, Mayor Menino had approached the BPD to develop a Safe Neighborhoods Initiative for Roxbury. Thus, CCP provided the impetus and some initial resources to begin the initiative in a particularly needy area. The outcome was the Grove Hall Safe Neighborhood Initiative, Grove Hall being one of Boston's most crime-impacted neighborhoods in Boston.

CCP's requirement to develop programs to address youth violence and gangs fit perfectly with the BPD's desire to support and develop youth violence prevention programs. When BPD staff looked at BJA's requirements for youth programs—comprehensive services, partnerships, coalition-building, resource sharing—they concluded that what was required was a network. This CCP initiative led to the creation of the Youth Services Providers Network (YSPN). Many of the YSPN participants interviewed were pleasantly surprised at the BPD's initiative on setting up a providers network for at-risk youth.

Initial YSPN planning sessions were met with excitement and enthusiasm by providers. One of those participants mentioned that even at the planning stage, things looked extremely positive and expectations were high as the relationships between the providers and the police appeared good. Initially, the Boston Police Department's Office of Strategic Planning and Resource

Development staff invited many youth service programs to participate in the planning of the network. Many of the programs were city-wide because the initial plan was to develop a city-wide network. After a number of meetings, it became clear to all parties concerned that it would be unrealistic, in terms of logistics and resources, to develop a city-wide program all at once. As a result the decision was made to pilot the network in the B2 and B3 Districts, essentially in the Roxbury, Dorchester, and Mattapan areas.

During the planning stage, OSPRD staff recruited Advocates for Human Potential (AHP) to help with the design and development of the network, as well as to facilitate at YSPN meetings. During its involvement, AHP staff witnessed a high level of commitment on the part of service providers to the collaboration. They saw in the YSPN providers a strong group committed to participating in this novel effort with or without money. BPD staff members agreed. As one put it "When people first came to the table, I knew it was about money. But now it's not like that anymore. I'm sure they'd love to get some money. I'm not understating it, but I also know that they're going to be at the table either way at this point because they've been at the table since the beginning." Some of the agencies that were involved throughout the planning process, despite not receiving funds, included Boston Against Drugs (BAD), the Justice Resource Institute (JRI), and the Office of Jobs and Community Services within the Economic and Industrial Corporation (EDIC). The other agencies that both participated in the planning and subsequently received money were the Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston, Greater Boston One to One, Bridge Over Troubled Waters, Boston Community Centers Streetworker Program, and the United Methodist Urban Services, Inc.

According to an AHP staff member, the community groups and service providers recognized the bureaucratic obstacles that YSPN faced. An example of one such situation was the police union contract that barred officers from receiving overtime for attending meetings not scheduled during their regular shifts, thus affecting police officers' regular involvement in the YSPN planning process. Nonetheless, she found relations between BPD and member agencies quite good and noted how the agencies seemed really pleased to see the police taking the lead in the process.

The only CCP component that was not at the planning/thinking stage prior to the CCP process was the community-based alternatives to incarceration. Because several of these types of programs already existed in Boston, the BPD developed a plan to link them together into the Alternatives to Incarceration Network (ATIN). Staff in the OSPRD invited representatives from a number of private criminal justice agencies, as well as key staff from the Department of Youth Services, area probation offices, and Parole to help plan a viable network of alternatives to incarceration for offenders in Boston. The private agencies involved both at the planning and implementation

stages were the Boston Drug Diversion Court, Roxbury Youthworks, the Crime and Justice Foundation, Massachusetts Halfway Houses, Inc., and Make Peace With Police.

During the planning phase, ATIN members were willing to come together, especially since there was opportunity for funding. At the same time, they were somewhat leery of two issues—working with the Boston Police Department, whom they had traditionally viewed as the "enemy" of their clients and sharing clients among themselves in the criminal justice context. Regarding the latter, ATIN clients are probationers, parolees, and DYS-committed youth who are mandated to participate in alternatives to incarceration as either a requirement of their sentence or as a stay of execution. Because of this, the court or agency assigns legal responsibility of the client to one agency—there can be no shared responsibility/liability. Therefore there was an initial reluctance to refer clients to other agencies for services, thus not having total control over one's clients. During the ATIN planning process, agencies began to both learn about and trust each other and the Boston Police Department. That alone was a big step forward for Boston's criminal justice agencies.

CCP Administration Structure

Boston's CCP program was developed, implemented, and administered by the Office of Strategic Planning and Resource Development, headed by Jim Jordan. Other important players included Maria Schneiderman, who was involved in virtually all of the program components; Jen Williamson, who coordinated both the Youth Services Program Network and the Alternatives to Incarceration Network, as well as serving as liaison to the Drug Court and Mayor's Office; and Dana McGillicuddy, the CCP Financial Manager. It should be noted this strategic planning unit is not a fringe unit concerned about uniform materials or the minutia of rules and regulations; the strategic planning office is both literally and symbolically directly adjacent to Commissioner Evans' office—involved in developing the core competencies and activities of the BPD.

While the staff of the OSPRD developed, implemented, and administers Boston's CCP initiative, once it was initiated, they happily let the Strategic Planning Process roll along its own course. Jordan oversaw the City-Wide Planning Team, and kept in touch with all of the district and bureau commanders regarding their teams' progress. However, the BPD's Strategic Planning Process took on a life of its own. A good example of this was the difficulty the OSPRD staff had in the creation of a list of all CCP participants for this evaluation. Both at the beginning and follow-up stages, OSPRD staff had to request an updated list of participants from each team leader.

Needless to say, this process took much longer than any other single city site, yet it demonstrates the decentralized nature of the process.

CCP Budget Components

Boston received $1,255,187.00 for their first year of CCP implementation from October 1, 1994 to January 31, 1997. As mentioned previously, CCP in Boston is broken up into two initiatives: the Strategic Planning Process and the service provider networks. Similarly, CCP money was allocated from two different sources: BJA and the COPS office. As one might expect, COPS money was utilized for the Strategic Planning Process (the community policy component), while BJA money funded the program initiatives. Below is an outline of how the CCP money was allocated by agency.

Strategic Planning Process

Boston Management Consortium ($154,522.00) This consultant worked closely with BPD's OSPRD staff to facilitate the design and implementation of the Strategic Planning Process. Funds were utilized to plan the process, select team facilitators and other core staff, provide training to facilitators and team leaders (including a senior management retreat), and the actual preparation and facilitation of sixteen Strategic Planning Teams during the planning stage.

Northeastern University Center for Applied Social Research ($99,140.00): These funds were utilized during the implementation phase for the development of strategies to meet the problems identified during the previous phase. In addition to some technical assistance and training, the funds paid for facilitators and writer-researchers who actually helped each team write their workplans.

Boston Police Department

Personnel and Overtime ($661,276.00): CCP funds were utilized to hire five BPD staff—a geo-mapping consultant, a CCP Project coordinator, a CCP Financial Manager, and two Community Service Organizers for Districts E-5 and B-3. In addition, it paid overtime for police personnel in the Strategic Planning Process and officers in Operation Nite Life.

Other Expenses ($85,063.00): Other BPD expenses included postage, mailing, computer equipment, and travel required to CCP meetings and some conferences.

YSPN Network

Advocates for Human Potential ($56,000.00): This agency was hired to help facilitate the Youth Services Provider Network and to provide training.

Greater Boston One to One ($2,000.00): This agency provided mentoring training for the 25 network participants.

Network Institute ($10,000.00): This agency provided a one-day training.

United Methodist Urban Services ($46,855.00): This money funded their Police and Partnerships Program, which is a community-based empowerment program for youth.

Bridge Over Troubled Water ($46,574): These funds paid for Bridge staff, such as intake managers and counselors to staff and to operate a van which provided health and other services to youths in the target area.

Boston Community Center ($14,056.00): This paid for an additional streetworker in the target area.

Greater Boston Boys and Girls Club ($67,550.00) These funds were utilized to hire a licensed clinical social worker to be housed in the B-3 District, as well as other staff such as intake workers and outreach staff.

ATIN Network

Boston Drug Diversion Court ($195,271) CCP funded the substance abuse treatment for this court's clients during its first year.

Roxbury Youthworks ($54,982) CCP funds were utilized to expand the number of at-risk, court-involved teens serviced by this agency.

Crime and Justice Foundation ($103,638) CCP funding was shared by two of the Foundation's programs: Project Turnaround, an agency servicing high-risk, high-need chronic youth offenders, and the Metropolitan Day Reporting Center, which services only adults.

Massachusetts Halfway Houses, Inc. ($56,135) The funds were utilized to hire a full-time case manager and to pay for a small number of additional beds to be allocated to ATIN clients in transition.

Make Peace With Police ($68,797) The funding for this new initiative paid for the facilitator who oversaw meetings between serious youth offenders and police officers, as well as the overtime for the police participants.

Start-Up Funding

The Comprehensive Communities Program funding did not reach participating agencies and programs quickly or efficiently during their first year of operation. Delays caused a number of groups to begin work before being paid. Most service providers in the networks were unhappy with the way in which the Boston Police Department disbursed funds, and believed that it placed a disproportionate burden on small organizations and programs. This unhappiness derived from two major concerns: one, red tape and bureaucracy concerning subcontracts, and two, the cost-reimbursement structure of the financial system. Not surprisingly, OSPRD staff pointed to the start-up funding as the single largest problem that the BPD had in facilitating the CCP process. As one put it, "One of the lessons we learned from the CCP is that there is such a thing as subcontract hell."

Comprehensive Communities Program funding for Boston came from two sources: the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the COPS Office. Due to several staffing changes in the latter agency, decisions about the funding of certain Boston CCP initiatives changed over time, causing delays and ultimately, resulting in Boston requesting funding from BJA for those initiatives. Regardless of the two sources, it was considered one contract and therefore, the City of Boston could not create an account for an internal budget that would allow for external funding until they received the final grant adjustment notice from both agencies. Though the initial award letter was received in June, 1995, the final grant adjustment notices were not received until December, 1995.

At the same time, the Boston Police Department had no experience with subcontracting before the CCP and it only had one contract person who was not only responsible for running all of the BPD contracts with the state and federal government, but became responsible for about fifteen subcontracts to provider agencies. The inexperience and lack of sufficient staff unsurprisingly created troubles and delays in funding the various parts of the Youth Service Providers Network and the Alternatives to Incarceration Network. The ATIN Coordinator at the BPD noted that the individual in charge of the subcontract simply could not keep up with the demands of the many new subcontractors. The BPD believes that it resolved those procedural issues by the later part of the first funding year, and plans on subcontracting to a single vendor for each of the networks in fiscal year 1997 to reduce the administrative burden on the BPD. Funding for the ATIN will go to Northeastern University's Center for Criminal Justice Policy and Research who in turn will subcontract to other agencies, and to the Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston for the YSPN.

One of the YSPN providers lamented that the program's development was so delayed pending the arrival of funding, that providers spent too much time waiting and focusing on funding issues rather than working on building a

truly collaborative network. Most of the service providers in the CCP networks began limited operations without funding during the early stages of the program. Several program directors pointed out that while the BPD and Northeastern University can cover periodic delays in receiving money because of their large size, the small organizations are subject to cash-flow shortages and cannot operate without a dependable source of income. Indeed one of the programs that began early lost staff and the program was temporarily derailed as a result of this problem.

CCP Strategy

The CCP strategy in Boston was planning—that is, planning for city-wide community policing (or Neighborhood Policing, as it is called in Boston) and community mobilization. The BPD administration wanted a process that was both comprehensive geographically and comprehensive in that it wove community mobilization into the community policing efforts. The Strategic Planning Process resulted in a further devolution of authority to the district commanders, as well as the bureau chiefs. Each was expected to work with representatives of their community to identify the most imminent crime problems and to develop strategies to solve them. However, included with this new authority came expectations that the commanders and bureau chiefs would now be accountable to both their communities and to the Commissioner for the successful implementation of those strategies. In this area, CCP funding was expended on the facilitation of the planning process and on overtime for police participation. Only a couple of new positions were created.

The Boston Police Department's OSPRD staff utilized most of BJA's other mandated CCP components to further projects that were either in the idea or initial planning stages. Thus, CCP funds were used to expand the Safe Neighborhood Initiatives to another geographic area, to help the Boston Drug Diversion Court get off the ground, and to create a mechanism by which police officers can refer at-risk youth in their districts for social services. In the program area, some of the money was utilized to facilitate the planning of the two networks, but most of the money was funneled directly to the service providers.

CCP Program

Implementation of Community Policing

In this site, it has been difficult to divide up Boston's work on community policing and community mobilization into the planning phase and the implementation phase, since the essence of the Strategic Planning Process is indeed planning. Since that has been described in detail, this section will offer examples of the results of this process, and highlight other aspects of community policing in Boston.

The evaluators attended a number of District and Bureau Strategic Planning Team meetings. Each was interesting it its own way. In the D-4 District which covers the Back Bay, about fourteen participants met with the Captain running the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to update the team on the district's timetable for meeting its goals. Although the report was generally favorable, the plan to improve police allocation by reconstructing beats was slightly behind in its schedule—primarily because of problems getting "downtown" to finish its allocation plan. Nonetheless, specific dates were given when the reallocation and its implementation would be completed. Considerable time was spent as well with specific crime problems raised by citizens. The most interesting feature of the meeting was how the Captain clearly felt a sense of accountability to citizens, even in a matter that traditionally had been departmental "business"—allocating officers.

A meeting attended in East Boston reflected a specific strategy that had been developed in the plan: "Use the existing, monthly, Grove Hall Safe Neighborhood Initiative meetings as a vehicle to discuss repeat offenders, current issues, and suggestions about restitution." (p. 5) District Attorney Ralph Martin and Commissioner Evans, along with Captain Robert Cunningham, were at the meeting and involved in reporting to the community how plans for East Boston were developing. Several interesting features were noted in this meeting, most notable was that the District Attorney was providing leadership in community efforts, that the issues included quality of life (as against processing of cases), and finally, that linkages were being forged with other criminal justice agencies, including in East Boston, the courts—a point especially relevant in an evaluation of CCP.

The final meeting was with the Captain and several officers from District B-3, and with service providers—a meeting set up especially for the evaluators. Most of the discussion concentrated on the work of the Social Worker who was now assigned to District B-3. The most fascinating part of the conversation—and one that should be pursued in the future—was the extent

to which service providers "borrow" from each other's credibility. Various actors, but especially the Social Worker and line police officer, talked about the extent to which their alliance opened doors, improved access, gave importance, and in other ways, added to their credibility. Agency participants of the ATIN also discussed that despite their initial hesitations, their alliance with the BPD has lent them a certain credibility with judges who must make the referrals.

In a nice touch, but one that is probably highly significant in its own right, the BPD's 1995 annual report reflects the processes described above. The report is structured around districts with each district putting forth a summary version of its goals—goals largely derived from the district planning teams. After a description of the neighborhoods that comprise each district, it delineates 1996 goals, officers who make a difference in the neighborhoods, the community in action (with citizens named), and an "outstanding neighborhood partner"—a gracious thing to do. Moreover, it symbolizes what has occurred in the BPD. The Boston Police Department, by every indicator evaluators can think of, has strategically realigned itself with Boston's neighborhoods. As one Captain has put it again and again, "the genie is out, there is no putting him back." Evans allowed, and in some cases forced, district commanders, police officers, and citizens to assume responsibility for what was happening in neighborhoods. Even the Boston police union—for so long estranged from the management—was involved in the planning process.

Much more is going on in Boston and the BPD than is detailed in this document. "Youth Violence: A Community-Based Response," published by the Department of Justice (September 3, 1996), identifies these efforts. Recounted in this publication is the story of agencies and citizens developing a level of coordination to deal with problems that heretofore was unheard of in Boston.

Three levels of coordination stand out and are reflected in this document as well. First, the historical inability of the Boston Police Department to manage itself internally, as noted by the St. Clair Commission, has been overcome. Remarkably, it has come about as the department has shifted from a functionally organized department to a geographically organized one. Their ability to do this testifies both to the skill and leadership of the BPD. Second, while Boston city government continues to be organized functionally, city bureaus, such as the DPW, have been able to collaborate successfully with the BPD to deal with neighborhood problems in a timely fashion. Again, this testifies to commitment out of the Mayor's Office, not to mention bureau heads. Finally, from neighborhood groups, to Northeastern University, to the Kennedy School of Government (KSG) at Harvard University, to the office of District Attorney Ralph Martin, unusually productive collaborations have resulted—the Safe Neighborhood Initiatives (SNI) with the District Attorney,

the planning efforts with Northeastern, and the Boston Gun Project with the KSG. The list could go on and includes Operation Nite Lite and numerous other collaborations. To be sure, some collaborations remain troublesome—Grove Hall SNI efforts detailed below, for example—but the department and its collaborators are struggling to work out these problems and get the efforts on track.

In sum, the achievements of the BPD in their shift to community policing has been impressive, not just in reference to their recent history of disarray, but by any standard. The BPD has exploited Boston's history of decentralized government and its infrastructure of neighborhood facilities to ease the shift to a neighborhood-based strategy. Adding to the power of this shift to community is that the Suffolk County District Attorney is making similar decentralization and community prosecution the core of his agenda as well. By the contacts we have had with officers, both by riding and by foot patrol, a new consensus seems to be developing among the rank and file that these are changes that just have to be made.

Organization for Community Input

In describing the Strategic Planning Process and giving examples of some of its outcomes, the story of community mobilization in Boston has mostly been told. The teams, for the most part, are beyond the planning process and have begun implementing and monitoring their solutions. Many have evolved over time, breaking down into sub-committees and often reaching out to other residents/businesses/social services to become involved in the implementation of specific goals.

As documented above, neighborhood representatives were deeply involved in the Strategic Planning Process and continue in their collaboration with the BPD and participating agencies. This interaction more recently operated on a decentralized level, with district commanders regularly reporting to participants in the planning process. Some district commanders, believing the strategic plans have to be updated, reconstituted the original process and began reviewing and renewing the strategies. During the evaluators' visits to various meetings, it was not unusual to see private citizens and community activists in friendly human exchanges, talking with police staff about "this and that" as if they were neighbors. While this type of exchange may seem like an expected minor accomplishment, it was a refreshing alternative view of police/community relations for one who had lived in Boston for over a decade. Before 1994, the *Boston Globe* was full of accounts of police brutality and mismanagement of cases, the community's outrage, and the inadequate responses by the BPD administration. Indeed, the BPD's new openness to the community, represented most clearly through the Strategic Planning Process, ushered in a new era for the city of Boston.

These gains in communication bode well for the effectiveness of the police department as well as the satisfaction of Bostonians.

Organization for Service Delivery

In response to BJA's requirement of a comprehensive strategy to fight crime and address the fear of crime, the Boston Police Department planned, developed, and implemented four initiatives, again with considerable community input, mostly from the social service sector. They are the Grove Hall Safe Neighborhood Initiatives (GHSNI), the Youth Service Providers Network (YSPN), and the Alternatives to Incarceration Network (ATIN) which includes the Boston Drug Diversion Court. Brief descriptions of each of the components and their unique issues are provided below. Lengthier descriptions of each of the Networks' programs can be found in the Appendix.

Grove Hall Safe Neighborhood Initiative

The Grove Hall Save Neighborhood Initiative has been one of the more frustrating efforts of the CCP. A program innovation of both Attorney General Scott Harshbarger and District Attorney Ralph Martin (respectively a Democrat and a Republican), SNIs are attempts to link citizens, police, and prosecutors into a team to identify and respond to neighborhood concerns about crime. Successful first in Dorchester and then again in East Boston, SNIs have been the source of considerable conflict in Grove Hall. Explanations of the reasons for this SNI's lack of success—indeed inability to get off the ground in Grove Hall—despite its progress in other communities, are rife. Virtually everybody agrees that the shooting death of the Assistant District Attorney, who was initiating the GHSNI, was a genuine loss in the attempt to organize this troubled neighborhood in Roxbury. For most, a basic mistake was made early in the attempts to develop the program there: insufficient citizen representation that resulted in one radical group's ability to derail all attempts to establish true community participation. Consequently this group established itself "at the table" and insisted not only that they solely represented the community but that they should control all programs and funds that were developed in the Grove Hall area. The legitimacy of these claims are questionable, yet they largely derailed attempts at program development in Grove Hall. Despite the original setbacks, experienced Assistant District Attorneys have been assigned to restart this important initiative.

Youth Service Providers' Network

In its report to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (September 27, 1996), the Boston Police Department describes the Youth Service Providers Network

(YSPN) as "a vehicle for front line officers to use to refer at-risk Roxbury, Mattapan, and Dorchester youth to desperately needed services." Initially envisioned as a network of youth services providers which would be utilized as a support system for the Strategic Planning Teams, it has evolved into a separate entity that has successfully been woven into police work within the District B-3 Area. After a year of implementation, it has been institutionalized as a partnership between the Boston Police Department and the Boston Boys and Girls Club. Because Boys and Girls Clubs are located in various Boston neighborhoods and a strong working relationship has developed between the two agencies, it was only natural that plans for expanding the partnership throughout Boston's neighborhoods have since been forwarded. Indeed, in their 1995—1996 Annual Report, the opening comments by the Chairman and President of the Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston points out this new relationship and its importance. It reads, "The foremost example of our broader outreach is the Youth Service Providers Network (YSPN). A result of the Strategic Plan for Neighborhood Policing and spearheaded by Boston Mayor Thomas Menino and Boston Police Commissioner Paul Evans, the YSPN is a partnership of many of Boston's leading youth service and city organizations. Collectively, the organizational partners address many of today's most critical youth issues: teenage runaways, drop-out prevention, mentoring, job training and placement, tutoring, and leadership skills building."

When the YSPN began, police officers could refer an at-risk youth or his family to the District Community Service Officer, who would in turn make a referral to one of the appropriate service agencies. However, it soon became clear to all concerned that the complexity and wide-ranging problems of the referred youths necessitated the involvement of a clinical social worker in order to make an appropriate referral. While there was no money for such a position, the Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston came forward with an offer to initially fund the position. In the end, the BPD did secure funds to reimburse and then maintain the position. During the fall of 1996, a Licensed Clinical Social Worker (LCSW) was hired by the Boys & Girls Club to work in the B-3 District in Mattapan. Plans are underway to hire similar social workers in the B-2 District Area, which encompasses parts of Roxbury and Dorchester.

Referral Process

To make a referral, police officers simply make one phone call to the District's Social Worker, providing him with the name and phone number of the youth at risk. The Social Worker in turn reaches out to the youth and family to develop a service plan utilizing local provider agencies. Many of the interviewees have attested to the fact that the Social Worker has reached out to officers, explaining his role and the network, and convincing them to refer cases to him. Between the start date in June, 1996 and March, 1997, 220

youth have been referred by officers to YSPN. Most of the officers making the referrals are patrol officers, not just the Community Service Officers that one would expect to make referrals. Although many of the referring officers are the younger ones who have received training in community policing, they have varied by race, age, and gender. Once word spread in the community, parents and other family members have brought their kids into the District Police Station to make a referral. Family members seeking help for their children at the District Police Station is truly a revolutionary step forward for the BPD. Many believe that the forward-thinking of the District commander, coupled with the work of the YSPN, has made this possible. The YSPN has created a post-card size voucher certificate for police officers to pass on to youth. On one side it is a voucher for a free membership in the Boston Community Centers and the Boys & Girls Clubs, with the name of the referring officer. On the reverse side are listed these agencies staff and phone numbers, as well as the number for the Community Service Officers in B-2 and B-3, and emergency referral information for the Bridge Over Troubled Waters.

Youth referred to the YSPN coordinator fall into one of three categories. The first are the "quick referrals"—those youth whose needs are easily identified and met with one or two referrals to appropriate agencies. The next category of youth involves those who require "case stabilization." That is, they need to be followed for a month or so by the Social Worker or the Club's Client Advocate until there is a determination that the youth's problems are well on their way to being met. The final category is "intensive case management" and includes about a dozen youth who at any given time need either individual counseling or intensive monitoring of behavior and compliance with services. Currently the Social Worker assigned to B-3 shares the case management of about 60 youth with the Client Advocate.

Most of the youth that have been referred are 13 to 16 year-olds with whom police have come into contact as a result of a 209A (domestic dispute) call in the residence. The majority of the youth are African American, with others being West Indian, Hispanic, white, and Asian. Many of the youth are already on probation or are already recognized as status offenders or abused children whose parents are afraid they will lose custody of their children.

In its brochure on YSPN, the BPD lists fifteen agencies that agreed to work with youths identified as needing services. Types of services include recreation, tutoring, job training/placement, mentoring, emergency housing, health services, and various types of counseling (e.g. substance abuse, mental health, rape crisis, etc.). Over half of the youths have been referred to either the Blue Hill or Roxbury Boys & Girls Clubs for recreational services. About a third of the youth required coordinating services to agencies for counseling, health services, and drop out prevention. Still other referrals were made for employment services, summer camp, and community service.

More detailed descriptions of specific YSPN programs that received CCP funding during first year implementation can be found in Appendix A.

YSPN Issues and Problems

A number of recurrent themes and problems emerged from the interviews with participants of both networks and those are discussed in a later section. However, three issues were particularly relevant to the YSPN: the importance of collaboration; YSPN expansion; and adequate resources for the anticipated overload of cases.

If the purpose of BJA's requirement of coalition-building was to create new collaborations among community organizations and city agencies, Boston was surely a success. Although many interviewed believe that a good amount of reaching out to community-based agencies still needs to take place, the Boston Police Department can certainly be credited with making a good faith effort at the beginning of this process. Ten years ago, had someone suggested that Boston would do this, most BPD staff and providers would have laughed. However, the collaboration has not been an end unto itself, in that it has spun-off collaboration and resource-sharing among other agencies, ideas for new collaborations between the BPD and providers, and made officers feel that they are indeed part of the community. One provider cited the huge potential in YSPN "to humanize the police force" and to foster understanding between youth and the officers. The experience has also given BPD OSPRD staff more experience and confidence to search for new funding sources, and to partner with community-based organizations. To keep this spirit of collaboration alive, BPD staff must somehow institutionalize their relationships with community-based service providers.

The Boston Police Department has short-term plans to expand YSPN to District C-11 (Dorchester), in addition to District B-2 (Roxbury), and long-term plans to do so city-wide. Despite a short orientation period where everyone was becoming comfortable with the idea of this program, the consensus is that YSPN has worked especially well. However, many of those same people point to B-3 as a "special place" in terms of its officers and commander. Many of the service providers credited its Captain and certain of his key staff with understanding the objective and providing unconditional support to the network. The Captain has provided resources for the Boys & Girls Club Social Worker and pushed officers to make referrals to the network. Many have cautioned that the expansion into B-2 and subsequent Districts must be carefully monitored and supported by BPD Central Headquarters.

Despite the OSPRD's need to focus on the expansion effort, as it is doing, staff must keep a close eye on the program in B-3 to ensure its smooth continuation. In the words of one of many interviewees, "resources in the

Mattapan community are tapped out." As the only funded direct service provider, the Boys and Girls Club is being burdened with overwhelming responsibility. Likewise, the project's B-3 Social Worker and client advocate have a full caseload less than a year into the project. Several of those interviewed pointed to the potential downside of this successful program—that as more officers and community members recognize the value of the YSPN and make referrals, the system will be unable to handle the volume of cases. One interviewee expressed concern that the system would "get snowed with referrals as word of mouth spreads that the Social Worker is doing a good job. Cops talk. The cops in B-3 are learning that they can trust this program."

YSPN Future Needs

The Boston Police Department OSPRD staff recognize additional needs of the YSPN system. The first is to "meet and greet every service provider—health service provider, youth service provider—that is physically located in those neighborhoods, to get them on the network, and make them a part of the system." Because the network was originally conceived as a city-wide network, many of the programs brought to the table initially were either city-wide programs or outside of the B-2 and B-3 areas. This concern was echoed by some service providers who believe that the YSPN needs to find out about all of the "little grassroots programs" that exist in the community. This might also help with the anticipated overload in cases.

Another need identified by OSPRD staff was the creation of a database for the network that would not only help the Social Worker manage his caseload, but could help the department identify general areas of youths' needs in the community. Finally, OSPRD staff would like to see some training for both officers and service providers to ensure success. This would certainly help to alleviate concerns about expansion into other districts, as well as to ensure continued success in B-3.

Alternatives to Incarceration Network

The Alternatives to Incarceration Network (ATIN) links together various local and state criminal justice agencies with Boston area service providers. This network refers offenders who face imprisonment to alternative programs where they receive counseling, substance abuse treatment, job skills training, and/or some form of monitoring (generally more intensive than that offered by probation or parole). The network formally operates only in the Roxbury, Dorchester, and West Roxbury District Courts. Individuals enter the ATIN as the condition for a stay of execution of their sentence or as a condition of

their probation or parole. The network therefore has great coercive power over its population.

The network operates as a streamlined referral process, whereby individuals about to be incarcerated but fitting certain criteria are identified and redirected to programs that better fit the offenders' needs. There are actual ATIN referral forms and materials that describe the services offered by the member service providers which can be used by judges and probation officers at any time. The individual service providers in turn attend district court sessions and convince probation officers and judges to send good candidates to appropriate ATIN programs. Offenders diverted to the ATIN remain accountable to probation and the courts.

According to BPD staff, presentations to each of the three district courts in the target area were made by ATIN participants, along with the ATIN Coordinator and the Deputy Superintendent in charge of Special Operations. ATIN participants also "reached out" to the Parole Board and to DYS using brochures, booklets, and referral vouchers. Many agree that these initial meetings were instrumental in starting the initial flow of offenders into the network.

Referrals do not solely travel from public criminal justice agencies to service providers; they are also made between parallel service providers. The Metropolitan Day Reporting Center might refer a client to the Massachusetts Halfway Houses, Community Resource Center for a class held there if the caseworker believes it would be beneficial. Roxbury Youthworks and Project Turnaround plan joint field trips to avoid redundancy. The attempt is to give the maximum amount of service to each client within the ATIN. A description of the ATIN service providers follows this general discussion of the network in Appendix A.

All of the participants in the network believe the ATIN strengthened the bonds between the many agencies and organizations attempting to handle offenders in Boston. Where weak ties once existed, now strong cooperative relationships link service providers. Roxbury Youthworks and Project Turnaround, two youth-oriented programs, base their activities down the street from one another, yet had few interactive programs before the network. Now they share clients and coordinate their programming. Where resistance to alternative programs once dominated thought, now greater willingness to consider innovative programs exists. Probation officers in the Roxbury, Dorchester, and West Roxbury District Courts now consider the ATIN as a possible sentencing option for certain types of offenders. Participants in the network agree that the ATIN has increased the quality of service offered to offenders.

Referrals occur more frequently, and in some cases for the first time, between service providers and particularly from agencies like probation to the ATIN

service providers. Several groups provide services to the same client. Programs share information and plan to avoid redundant programming. According to one service provider, before the ATIN individual caseworkers had to make connections with other agencies and groups on their own, and once those connections were made, the connections were best kept to oneself so as to not exhaust their usefulness. Now, more options exist and people share ideas and contacts more willingly. Many, but not all, officials within the groups offering service to offenders report either the elimination of or a decrease in competition and "turf battles" since the implementation of the network. The ATIN therefore increased the number of referrals made to ATIN service providers, as well as enhanced their ability to ably treat the individuals placed under their supervision. These successes stem significantly from the Boston Police Department's support for the network.

The Boston Police Department's endorsement of the ATIN transformed the many scattered alternatives into a linked, and more respected, mosaic of unconventional options for sentencing. All of the service providers give the Boston Police Department, and particularly the Police Commissioner, high marks for its strong support of the program. One caseworker reported a significant change in the attitude of the police themselves. She believes that police officers are much more willing to help kids they encounter on the beat than they were even a few short years ago. Others concur, stating that there currently exists a greater spirit of cooperation between groups involved in criminal justice activities. Again and again, officials from service providing groups mentioned the credibility their organization gained from the ATIN. The service providers, without altering their programs, gained important legitimacy in the eyes of the criminal justice agencies capable of making referrals because of the BPD support for the network. Simply put, the BPD-backed, unified front presented to the district courts and probation officers more effectively convinced them of the viability of the ATIN programming and services.

The Loose Network Structure of the ATIN

The Alternatives to Incarceration Network remains a mosaic of loosely tied together individual programs; it is not a tightly knit and formalized network. The strength of ties between groups and agencies involved in the network is greatest between the referral sources, such as probation, and individual service providers, such as the Metropolitan Day Reporting Center (MDRC). Links between parallel service providers, while certainly stronger than before the network developed, remain weak. As one adult caseworker points out, the ATIN requires effort, and service providers "get back what they put into the network." Those who try to develop contacts reap benefits while those who fail to use the network are not held accountable and do not get the benefits of cooperation. As another person, this time working with youths,

noted, the system is not without tradeoffs: although clients receive attention from many groups, no single group now coordinates a client's program. Technically, one agency is legally responsible for an ATIN participant because the clients are ordered to participate in the network by the courts. However, one goal of the ATIN is to break down this "one service provider per client" system in order to expose troubled individuals to as many services as possible. It seems then that while the ATIN retains a legal designation of responsibility for each offender, the network, by design, has shared that responsibility between the service providers. Most service providers believe that most clients' care has benefited from the shift.

The ATIN initially intended on holding monthly case conferences with agency representatives and the Network Coordinator, especially to coordinate the services of clients with more complex issues. However, after doing so for several months, they decided against that approach because discussions were often redundant and the process was deemed to be a waste of time. Some clients deal with only one agency and therefore do not need a more coordinated treatment program. The service providing agencies generally do not think that clients receiving care from a number of service providers would be aided by a more general case conference between ATIN service providers despite the success of similar programs in other locations.

Initially, there were plans to hire coordinators for both the ATIN and the YSPN. Instead, a single coordinator, Jen Williamson, was hired for both the networks during November, 1995. Participants in the network do not agree about the effect of that decision, which further decentralized the network. Some believe that a stronger leader would provide more direction and add strength to the ATIN, while others believe the network works because most of the money allocated to it can be directed at the clients, not administration costs. However, early on a decision was made by the ATIN members not to have the coordinator attend court sessions to lobby judges to make ATIN referrals, since most of the agencies already had representatives doing just that in court on a regular basis.

The loose formulation of the ATIN has repercussions in the manner in which it operates. Despite the planning process, which envisioned more formalized procedures, the groups within the ATIN retain a great amount of autonomy and therefore the number of procedural problems within groups were small and were fixed locally. Most participants in the ATIN identified few operational problems with the network. The single exception to this general trend was the difficulty with start-up funding discussed earlier in this report.

Boston Drug Diversion Court

The Boston Coalition, a large group of business and community leaders from around Boston, began to formulate an alternative Drug Diversion Court

before the Comprehensive Communities Program. In its application for CCP grant funds, the Boston Police Department integrated the program within the Alternatives to Incarceration Network. Funding from CCP was directed toward the provision of substance abuse services.

The Drug Court accepts non-violent offenders with admitted substance abuse problems from the Dorchester District Court. Potential clients are identified by probation officers and recommended to the program at their arraignment. Those clients who agree to participate in the program then enter a two-week orientation period during which the program's requirements and processes are explained. Thereafter, the clients begin a 48-week program split into four, twelve-week phases that focus on the detoxification and stabilization of the participants. More details about this initiative can be found in the Appendix. Currently the Drug Court makes referrals to other ATIN agencies. Specifically, clients who are not deemed appropriate for the Drug Court are referred to the Metropolitan Day Reporting Center. Other Drug Court clients are referred to ATIN agencies for other types of services.

Make Peace With Police

Make Peace With Police (MPWP) is a unique, creative program that was grouped under the umbrella of the ATIN, but was not in reality an alternative to incarceration. In its final report to Commissioner Evans, it is described "as a program designed to create a non-confrontational opportunity for dialogue and interchange on issues that are relevant to improving the relationship between juvenile offenders and police, including order maintenance, violent crime, stereotyping, arrest procedures, and victimization."[12] The program involves bringing together serious juvenile offenders with police officers in an attempt to dispel stereotypes, increase trust, and improve communication among members in each group.

As mentioned previously, this program was misplaced under the umbrella of the ATIN. Because it was not, in fact, an alternative to incarceration, but instead a potentially important resource for the Boston Police Department, it should have been absorbed as an initiative under the Strategic Planning Process. Although youth crime and violence are issues of imminent importance to the BPD, amazingly there is little training on how to interact and respond to juveniles in the Boston Police Academy. Admittedly, there are officers in the community and in certain programs (e.g. Operation Nite Lite) that know how to interact with youths and have an excellent rapport with them, but they have had to learn how to interact with these juveniles on their own or from each other on the job. Indeed, after a number of sessions

[12]Kim Godfrey, Susan Guarino-Ghezzi, Paul Bankowski, *Make Peace with Police: A Communication Program to Bridge the Gap Between Juvenile Offenders and Police,* 1997, p.2.

were held, program and police staff involved decided that it should be made a part of the training of new recruits in the Academy. A pilot session with the recruits was conducted and included three components: 1) speakers from DYS and two BPD initiatives in which officers worked with youths; 2) role playing between recruits and juvenile offenders; and 3) an opportunity for recruits to work a shift at DYS facilities. Although there are hopes that this initial training will be formalized and integrated into a curriculum about dealing with juveniles, no explicit plans have been made. Although it did not receive second year CCP funding, OSPRD staff are exploring alternative sources of funding with the Deputy Superintendent in charge of the Boston Police Academy, for the support and institutionalization of this program. Hopefully, this initiative will receive the funding needed to move the BPD forward in a crucial area where it has been historically deficient.

ATIN Issues and Problems

A number of recurrent themes and problems emerged from the interviews with participants of both networks and those are discussed in later sections. However, two issues were particularly relevant to the ATIN: information sharing and evaluation mechanisms.

The sharing of information between the participants in the ATIN has significantly increased, but issues remain unresolved. Until greater trust develops or specific outlines are generated, reports one project director, some service providers will stay wary of disclosing all of their information about certain clients to the BPD. A small number of the agencies are struggling to retain their identities as an alternative to the police now that they are acting in conjunction with them. Therefore, some information gathered by service providers may be deemed inappropriate to pass on to the police. Even though the agencies participated in the creation and approval of the intake forms, some of those interviewed were still wary about disclosing information, sometimes as simple as client names, to the BPD. Nevertheless, the data is kept in a master database maintained by the ATIN Coordinator at the BPD, and all information is reported in aggregate form and is kept confidential.

Another issue identified as one for the network to grapple with is to refine the current system of outcome evaluation, according to at least one director of a program within the ATIN. He would like to see outcomes measured on individual client levels rather than in aggregate statistical charts. Numerous service providers report successes in individual clients that may not be represented in statistical totals. The BPD reports quarterly on a wide number of demographic factors, and maintains information on a number of other factors in cases. The BPD also relates specific case histories in their quarterly reports, which moves in the direction of what a few of the service providers are looking for in the outcome evaluations. It appears that there

exists a difference of opinion within the network about what constitutes appropriate outcome measures for the network.

Expansion and Inclusion of Other Groups and Areas

Overall, participants in the ATIN advocate the expansion of the ATIN beyond the confines of Roxbury, Dorchester, and West Roxbury. The only group to successfully do so is the MDRC, which is now accepting referrals from all of Suffolk County. Enthusiasm for the spread of the ATIN varies from cautious to exuberant: some wish to see it spread slowly to incorporate the rest of metro Boston, while others would like to see the alternative sentencing built into the sentencing grid for the entire Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Beyond this general expansionist enthusiasm, participants in the network identify three areas for inclusion and growth:

- Prosecutors are not involved in the ATIN referral process. Service providers believe that prosecutors would be a valuable component within the network. The BPD reports that during the planning phase involving prosecutors was discussed and discarded because it seemed as if the prosecutors would refer less serious clients, clients not truly facing imprisonment for their offense, to the ATIN. The BPD has indicated that it may "revisit" this decision to exclude the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, especially now that the ATIN has a track record of being able to work with more serious offenders.
- Network participants would like to further integrate individual police officers into the ATIN. A decision was made early on in the planning not to seek police referrals since those referred would not be under any legal obligation to participate. However, the BPD is considering allowing police officers working for Operation Nite Lite to refer probationers not meeting the conditions of probation to the ATIN.
- Observers fear that women and girls do not receive enough specialized programming and attention. Some steps to correct this problem were taken with the initial CCP money. Project Turnaround utilized their funds to hire a female caseworker to work with women and girls at the program. Still, several participants believe that pregnancy counseling and other gender-specific health issues should be incorporated into the ATIN service offerings. Others note that this lack of gender-specific programming is endemic to the entire service-providing system, and that the ATIN has at least taken a few steps toward creating more programming.

That service providers are eager to identify areas for ATIN expansion should be regarded as good news—as a sign that ATIN participants view the network not just as a funding device and an umbrella over existing services,

but as a vehicle for improving intermediate sanctions for offenders. It is obvious that the collaborations created among the participating agencies and between the agencies and the Boston Police Department, especially the OSPRD office, will have lasting repercussions.

Sustainability

Ingredients for Sustainment

New initiatives and components require certain ingredients for success. Key ingredients include widespread support, quality staff, sufficient resources, and good communication. These ingredients were clearly evident in Boston during the planning and implementation of CCP. Below is a discussion of some of these ingredients including the concerns of those interviewed, and BPD's future plans in these areas.

Widespread Support

It was evident to the researchers during interviews, focus groups, and meetings that there was widespread support for the CCP initiative from all sectors of the Boston Police Department, the criminal justice and social service agencies, and from the community. This is one of the big "wins" of the BPD. Even agencies which, for one reason or another, kept themselves at a considerable distance from the BPD are now proud of their affiliation with it. The Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston are an example: in their annual report (in the form of a calendar) they tout their relationship to city government and the BPD. Referring to YSPN, the Chairman of the Board and President and CEO write:

> A result of the Strategic Plan for Neighborhood Policing and spearheaded by Boston Mayor Thomas Menino and Boston Police Commissioner Paul Evans, the YSPN is a partnership of many of Boson's leading youth service and city organizations. Collectively, the organizational partners address many of today's most critical youth issues: teenage runaways, drop-out prevention, mentoring, job training and placement, tutoring, and leadership skills building.

Without elaborating on the point here, the response of the Boys and Girls Club appears to be typical: agencies are discovering that they both give credibility to the Boston Police Department, and they gain credibility from it.

Importance of Key Staff

One of the resounding themes noted in interview after interview was the importance of key staff to the CCP components. Many of the providers praised Commissioner Paul Evans for his forward thinking in general, and his willingness to include the community in particular. He was viewed as an

individual who genuinely understood the problems and needs of at-risk youth. Boston Police Department's OSPRD staff pointed to the integral part that Jack McDevitt (Northeastern University), and the directors of both the Boys & Girls Clubs and the Crime and Justice Foundation's Project Turnaround played in helping to design and move the networks forward. Northeastern University's Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research was instrumental in both the Strategic Planning Process and the Alternatives to Incarceration Network, including the Boston Drug Diversion Court. Both YSPN providers and OSPRD staff also credited District B-3's Captain for his openness to and support of YSPN, without which the program would be floundering.

While these people have played extremely important roles in the planning and support of Boston's CCP efforts, there are two individuals with whom everyone agrees were the "lynch pins" of CCP. Maria Schneiderman was the BPD staff person charged with creating, facilitating, and implementing Boston's CCP program components. That she was variously considered the "spark plug" or "glue" of the YSPN planning process, was both a benefit, but temporarily a setback for the project during a temporary leave of absence. Even though BPD staff anticipated the effect her leave would have on YSPN and subsequently hired an outside consulting firm (AHP) to fill the void, the YSPN planning floundered until her return. As one consultant said, "Maria was the charismatic one, the energy behind things. She was the one who would call up the providers and say, 'we need to meet, be there.' And they would." The other key person in all of this has been Jim Jordan. His role in developing and coordinating the Strategic Planning Process has been pivotal and he has filled it with a sense of thoughtfulness and helpfulness that would be hard to match.

Another stand-out key person mentioned by literally ever person interviewed from YSPN was the Licensed Clinical Social Worker assigned to B-3. Initially the spokesperson from the Justice Resource Institute, he was hired by the Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston for the social work position case managing the YSPN cases at District B-3. Although he is a young looking white male, working in a largely African American/West Indian community, he has reportedly earned the respect and trust of young people, parents, and the police. Fortunately, he has been paired with another outstanding youth worker, the Client Advocate from the Blue Hill Boys & Girls Club who helps to screen youths referred to the network and make the appropriate referrals.

Sustainment of the CCP initiative will require that BPD staff continue to identify quality staff both internally and externally. This will be true both in the Strategic Planning Process, where teams are at the difficult stage of implementing their workplans, as well as in the networks which are at the point of institutionalization and expansion.

Communication

As noted in the early sections of the case, the evaluation staff was initially skeptical about the ability of the BPD to carry out what was a very complicated planning process. However as cumbersome as they appeared, they led not only to detailed workplans for each team, but increased communication among participating groups.

Also as mentioned previously, the planning of the networks also involved bringing many players to the table and continuously meeting over a period of time. Participants of both networks were appreciative for this opportunity and were delighted to have communication opened up between themselves and the Boston Police Department. ATIN and YSPN participants were concerned that meetings in general between the network participants had become rather infrequent. One caseworker believes that while many of the participants got to know one another during the planning phases, others like himself who were hired after the planning sessions in order to implement the ATIN have not had an adequate chance to get to know the other participants. Minutes of ATIN group meetings support that claim, showing a large number of meetings in the planning stages of the ATIN, but not a single meeting since March 26, 1996. Similarly, the entire YSPN Network has not had a general meeting since its kick-off event in June, 1996, despite many meetings between the main provider (Boys & Girls Clubs) and the BPD.

Boston Police Department OSPRD staff have countered the criticism of infrequent meetings with claims that many smaller meetings between their staff and the main YSPN provider have taken place on a weekly basis, as do informal meetings between ATIN participants. However, it was clear from interviews with participants of both networks that more communication, information-sharing, and reflection on lessons learned are needed to sustain the networks. This would be especially important in the areas where these networks plan to expand.

Future Funding and Resources

Looking to the future, most of the groups are frustrated by the dwindling level of federal and state support. A few mentioned the danger of the ATIN becoming one of the many discarded programs that lasted two or so years and then had all of the funding pulled. The BPD would like to see the networks become totally self-sufficient through private funding sources, and a few of the service providers agree that more could be done in terms of raising outside funds. However, a significant group does not believe that the ATIN or the YSPN have the ability to raise private funds, arguing that the current political climate is unsympathetic to programs like those in the networks. This contingent believes that the public at large expects the government to deal with law and order issues, not private businesses. Instead, this group

proposes that the networks be integrated into the normal operating budgets of police departments and district attorney's offices. Institutionalization is key to the survival of the networks, according to several program directors, and only government agencies can provide that. Within the two networks then, individuals hold conflicting goals about where they would like to receive funding: one group wants private industries to shoulder the financial burden of the programs because the government is unreliable, while another wants the government to pay for the programs because private industries will not provide funds. Despite the inevitable cuts for the second year of CCP, OSPRD staff were trying to come up with creative ways of continuing funding because they had an investment in maintaining ties with the providers.

The Boston Sustainment Plan

Each of the CCP sites were required by BJA to submit a sustainment plan for the future. The Boston Police Department, as the primary Comprehensive Communities Program grantee, has formulated an extensive sustainment plan for the services and programs developed through CCP funding. The plan reflects the BPD's and the City of Boston's commitment to a comprehensive and inclusive approach to governing the city's many neighborhoods. The BPD believes it has integrated the fundamental principles of the CCP, neighborhood policing and the ready use of partnerships, into its approach to public safety. Therefore, many of the programs strengthened or created by the CCP funding are planned to be integrated into the BPD's operations.

The Boston Police Department's stated goals in their plan are threefold: to continue the "collaborative crime prevention and intervention" already initiated, to expand the Youth Service Providers and Alternatives to Incarceration Networks, and to create and foster new resources and ideas."[13] The BPD plans to achieve these goals through a number of mechanisms.

In order to maintain neighborhood policing, the BPD plans to increase "discretion at patrol and district command levels and institutional support for risk taking among patrol officers in terms of new strategy development."[14] Additionally, the department plans on developing the "Same Cop, Same Neighborhood" concept in order to enable long-term planning between police officers and residents. To increase services at the local stations, Licensed Clinical Social Workers from the Boys & Girls Clubs will be placed at each district station. Finally, in an effort to continue innovation at a local level,

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[13] Boston Police Department, *Sustainment Outline Submitted to the Bureau of Justice Assistance*, December, 1996: 2.

[14] BPD, 4.

the BPD proposes to "support... neighborhood-based strategic planning teams through strategic planning implementation grants."[15]

The Boston Police Department also plans on increasing the scope of its two networks, the Youth Service Providers Network and the Alternatives to Incarceration Network. The YSPN will expand into new areas of the city, and the ATIN will increase the number of clients it services while reducing the recidivism rates of the clients with whom it works. Both of these networks will manage their funding through a single subcontract from the BPD: the YSPN subcontractor will be the Boys and Girls Clubs of Boston, and the ATIN subcontract will be Northeastern University.

The Boston CCP Sustainment Plan also acknowledges the importance of monitoring and evaluating the current program. The Boston Police Department plans on assessing the neighborhood policing program and its various partnerships through a collaborative venture with Northeastern and Harvard Universities. This joint effort will develop an "Objective Performance Review for Community Policing."[16] The BPD also envisions the Citywide Strategic Planning Team's evolution into a monitoring and supportive role as the Citywide Steering Committee. A National Institute of Justice-sponsored Phase II public safety survey will be conducted by the BPD in order to gather data difficult to capture at the district and neighborhood level.

Of course, funding is always at the bottom of any plan; the Boston sustainment plan is no different. The Boston Police Department plans on continuing its neighborhood programs by allocating Bureau of Justice Assistance Block Grant money to programs in order to partially compensate for losses in CCP funding. It also plans on expending 30 percent of its Block Grant on the Strategic Planning Implementation Grants program to spur local innovation and community partnerships. Finally, the BPD's commitment to the CCP concept will be backed up by "the adoption of CCP-funded staff positions by the BPD operating budget, including CCP management and coordination positions."[17]

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[15] BPD, 4.

[16] BPD, 7.

[17] BPD, 6.

Interim Summary

Boston's CCP efforts had their origins and their overall management in the Boston Police Department. The program had its origins during a period when the BPD had been struggling to overcome the consequences of a failed overall strategy that had burdened the department for decades. Moreover, the department was still responding to an acute crises of mismanagement and scandal—not a corruption scandal, but a scandal of incompetence. Yet, as the St. Clair report noted, the BPD was loaded with talented persons—many of whom have now found their place in leadership positions, including the current Commissioner—that given the opportunity to flourish, could. CCP, in the judgment of the evaluators, provided the department with the "slack resources" to spend the time to carefully think through its rejuvenation. One lesson to be learned from Boston's experience is that perhaps funding of such exercises, while certainly not on an annual or regular basis, ought to be a legitimate expenditure for legislative bodies confronted by crises such as that confronted by the City of Boston and its police department. There are other lessons, of course—political and organizational leadership, partnerships, the need for technical assistance, etc.—but having the funds to systematically "think" about strategy ought not to be under-emphasized.

The experiences of Boston in the planning and implementation of the CCP program components have certainly emphasized lessons learned from other program evaluations. That is, programs that have key charismatic and enthusiastic leaders, sufficient resources, widespread support, and open channels of communication among participating parties will succeed. Of the three CCP program components spearheaded by the Boston Police Department (the Boston Drug Diversion Court was begun earlier by the Boston Coalition), clearly the Youth Service Providers Network is a shining example of how a program was initially made a success. While it did have its setbacks (delay due to some indecision, temporary absence of the leader, and delays in start-up funding) as all new projects do, it was fortunate to have the necessary four ingredients. It certainly had key staff at both the planning and implementation stages. It received valuable resources and expertise (often free) from the service providers and consultants, as well as sufficient CCP funds. Widespread support was given by the BPD Central Headquarters in general and the OSPRD in particular, to the B-3 District Captain and his staff, and the youth provider community at large. Finally, the lines of communications that were established were revolutionary and led to a feeling of mutual trust and respect. It is hoped that the BPD does not fall into the trap that many great programs fall into—that is, pulling or overloading valuable staff, decreasing resources without attention to its effects, assuming that initial outward support will carry the program, and

ending the open lines of constant communication, such as regularly scheduled meetings. These have proven to be the death of many exemplary programs.

Boston is one of several CCP sites studied where evaluators believe the story is not yet finished. It is yet to be seen if the individual Strategic Planning Teams can maintain their momentum, carry out their goals, and sustain the support and participation of its community members. For the program components, it will be necessary to further monitor the two networks' ability to institutionalize and expand their initiatives without targeted federal funding. In some ways, the year after CCP funding ends might be the most telling regarding the success of CCP in Boston.

An Epilogue to Boston's CCP Case Study

New Developments and Issues in CCP

The Boston Police Department implemented its Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) in a manner that broke with traditional policing in this city. The cornerstone of Boston's program was the Strategic Planning Process, which was a community mobilization and planning process that took place in each of eleven police districts and in headquarters and included over 400 people who met over a period of two years. The programmatic side of CCP in Boston, spawned two provider networks (the Youth Services Provider Network and the Alternatives to Incarceration Network) which opened up communication and fundamentally changed the way the Boston Police Department would view crime prevention and offender services. CCP also allowed the BPD to lend support to the Boston Coalition's Drug Court and to the Grove Hall Safe Neighborhood Initiative, a community prosecution program. This epilogue gives examples of the Boston Police Department's expansion and sustainment of CCP during 1997 and the beginning of 1998. There is also a discussion of some of the synergistic effects of CCP in Boston, as well as the lasting impact of the program.

Expansion of CCP in Boston

Boston's Strategic Planning Process

The Strategic Planning Process is still on-going in the Boston Police Department with the Strategic Planning Teams still meeting on both the district and police headquarter levels. In addition, the Strategic Planning Process has spun off a new initiative, the Strategic Planning Implementation Grants Program. During fiscal year 1998, the Police Department allocated a little over one million dollars from its Law Enforcement Block Grant to 35 community-based organizations to each implement at least one of the many goals identified during the Strategic Planning Process. During this first round of funding, a diverse, five member board reviewed 70 applications for funding before choosing the 35 successful applicants. The next round of funding ($621K) will most likely be allocated to the organizations that have been successful in the implementation of their initiatives. While the administration of this program has been difficult, many of the initiatives themselves have proved exemplary.

Youth Service Providers Network

The Youth Service Providers Network (YSPN) was initially begun in BPD District B-3, in Mattapan in June, 1996. Although it began as a network with about a dozen agencies involved, it evolved into a partnership between the Boston Police Department and the Boys and Girls Clubs of Boston. The Boys and Girls Club hired a social worker and youth advocate to work in the actual building of the police department's District B-3. Police officers, and eventually youth's families, were able to refer at-risk youth to the social worker for an assessment, referral to services, and case management, whatever was deemed appropriate. In July, 1997 the YSPN expanded to District C-11 in Dorchester. As of February, 1998, plans for expansion to yet two more districts, C-6 in South Boston and B-2 in Roxbury, were being implemented. Staff in the Office of Strategic Planning and Resource Development (OSPRD) believed that YSPN's existence in these four districts covered a good part of the city that needed help with its juveniles. During the past year there had been a rash of suicides in South Boston, and Roxbury was, like Mattapan, an area where violence and gangs were problematic. Both new districts also had problems with drug-dealing and drug use.

While Boston Police Department Office of Strategic Planning and Resource Development staff and Boys and Girls Club staff were excited and eager to expand the program, they did so in a very informed and measured manner. Realizing that one of the keys to success in District B-3 was the Captain's support, care was taken to ensure that the Captains in the expansion districts understood the program and were willing to provide the same type of philosophical and resource support given in B-3. Meetings were set up between the B-3 Captain and the Captains in the expansion districts, and then between the B-3 social worker and the Captains. Discussions centered on the advantages of having a social worker located in the station and the kinds of successes that had been met in B-3 with at-risk youth. In addition, care was taken that the Captains felt that they had a say in their new program by discussing everyone's role in the hiring and training process of the social worker and youth advocate. As a result of the expansion, the social workers and youth advocates in YSPN began conducting both weekly staff meetings and weekly supervision to guarantee continued success.

Facing Problems/Issues Both Old and New

Administrative Issues

When asked about any new problems or challenges that had arisen in the past year, Jim Jordan, the Director of the Office of Strategic Planning and Resource Development, lamented that there had been some administrative

problems in the start-up of the Strategic Planning Implementation Grants Program. As he said, "our ideas were way ahead of our administrative capacity." Most city agencies in Boston, and especially the police department, are not set up to partner and fund other agencies. Their administrative structure is set up to absorb money and then spend it. The BPD initially faced difficulty early on in CCP when OSPRD staff developed the two agency networks that required them to subcontract money to participating agencies. However, the launching of the Strategic Planning Implementation Grants Program caused an even greater headache. In this initiative, over one million dollars were doled out through grants to 35 community-based organizations. While the process of setting up the bureaucratic mechanism to achieve this goal was painful, Jordan believed that ultimately it was successful, and that the next round of funding should proceed much more smoothly.

Although he believed that the goal of partnering was too important to abandon due to bureaucratic problems, he cautioned that allocating money to outside agencies is a lot more work than the conventional process of securing and spending money within BPD. Besides the logistics of making and managing those grants, other issues came up, such as how to legally allocate money to a church for its youth prevention programs, without violating laws regulating the separation of church and state. The launching of these grants affected not only the Boston Police Department's structure, but also the corresponding fiscal structure in City Hall. Jordan would recommend that other police departments who are contemplating similar partnerships understand the up-front effort needed to deal with the logistics of such an endeavor.

Unintended Consequences of Success

The process of partnering, strategic planning, and collaborating with outside agencies resulted in two unintended consequences not anticipated by OSPRD staff. The first is that the synergy created by CCP, especially by the Strategic Planning Process and by YSPN, has led to an inundation of ideas from staff both inside and outside the department. On the one hand, this is a very exciting time to be working in policing in Boston. However staff in the OSPRD Office, the hub of the BPD's CCP effort, are somewhat overwhelmed by their desire to follow up on possible collaborations, apply for federal and state initiatives, launch off-shoots of programs, and maintain CCP and other initiatives in Boston. To their credit, they have taken a measured and cautious stance to expansion, yet have been open to the ideas of anyone who wishes to express them.

To exacerbate the issue, Boston's success has brought it national and world-wide recognition and the department has been host to hundreds of state and local law enforcement officials yearning to learn about Boston's initiatives and reasons for success. Having hosted dozens of these visits, and not being able to keep up with the requests, BPD staff hosted a three-day forum, inviting all those who had contacted the department about a visit. Visitors were taken to program sites and met with many participants from CCP and other BPD initiatives. This outpouring of requests, while appreciated, put a strain on OSPRD and other BPD staff, already deluged with managing current initiatives, while planning new ones. These two unintended consequences demonstrate how the successful implementation of an initiative can take on a life of its own.

Synergistic Effects of CCP

Throughout this evaluation of the CCP program, researchers have found that, in many instances, a synergy develops among the agencies involved that is both infectious and leads to collaborations in areas outside of the CCP realm. It appears sometimes that the combined action of the varied groups involved is greater in total effect than the sum of each of the components' effects.

Boston's CCP program, especially its Strategic Planning Process and its YSPN program, have opened up collaborations, built community trust in the Police Department, and spawned new initiatives. While CCP planners had hoped that the process would have an effect on the way the Police Department thinks about crime and would build relationships with outside agencies, nobody anticipated the extent of those achievements. The Police Department has interwoven the CCP initiatives in with other programs such as Operation Cease Fire and Operation Night Light. Because of the synergy that has developed within CCP and between CCP and these other police initiatives, it is difficult to calculate where the effects of one program end and another begin.

Alternatives to Incarceration Network

The Alternatives to Incarceration Network (ATIN) was one component of Boston's CCP initiative. Since there were several of these types of programs in the Boston area, the Boston Police Department decided that they would provide funding for the expansion of these programs and the development of a network within which the programs would work. Unlike YSPN, there are no plans for expansion of the ATIN and except for $25,000 from the law enforcement block grant to Roxbury Youthworks (one of the original programs in ATIN), there are no plans for continued funding of the network.

However, there was a lasting impact of the ATIN—the sustainment of the relationship among most the network members and the synergistic effects between some of those members and other agencies/initiatives.

For example, because of the relationship that was developed between the Boston Police Department and the Crime and Justice Foundation (CJF), the Director and other managerial staff of that agency have been asked by the BPD to join in on roundtables with outside local and national agencies, opening up new opportunities for possible collaboration. In addition, the YSPN has contacted the Day-Reporting Program of CJF to possibly collaborate on an initiative whereby the children of offenders in the Day-Reporting Program are referred to a social worker from YSPN as a preventative measure. Since children of offenders are at a high risk of becoming involved in crime themselves, this initiative would be a win-win situation for the children, their families, and potentially for public safety sake.

Youth Service Providers Network

In addition to the partnership that evolved between the Boston Police Department and the Boys and Girls Clubs of Boston, which is well-documented in the case study, other relationships have been forged between YSPN participants and entities outside of the CCP circle. An example of this is a relationship that has been developed between the social workers of the YSPN and Simmons School of Social Work. An agreement has been worked out whereby Simmons is able to place three of their graduate students to work under the wings of the YSPN social worker. Simmons then provides clinical supervision, not only to those graduate students, but also to the YSPN social workers. This is clearly another win-win situation for the students, for Simmons, and for YSPN and its clients. Not only does YSPN benefit from three extra person-days, but the quality of social work services is ensured by the supervision of the program's clinical work. With the expansion of the network to two more districts (and possibly to seven more in the future), YSPN planners are trying to find funds for a clinical manager's position for Simmons and hope to barter for some program evaluation from the school.

Another example of the synergy developed by YSPN is Project Pivot, a program of the BPD's Youth Violence Strike Force. This program was created to provide services for first time offenders who often fell between the cracks in the juvenile justice and social service system. Initially a Strike Force youth service officer and a youth streetworker would make two visits to the homes of youths who had just been arrested for the first time. However, after beginning the program, it became evident that these youths had more serious problems that warranted the attention of a social worker. Because of YSPN's reputation, Strike Force staff approached the YSPN coordinator

about providing a social worker, who would be able to assess the juvenile's need for services, make the referral, and monitor the progress if appropriate. Recently, a trial run has begun with a social worker from District C-11 a few days a week. Because YSPN staff are aware that overloading social workers would undermine their main program, they are hoping to hire a full-time social worker to be assigned to Project Pivot.

Sustainment of CCP in Boston

Sustainment of Processes Begun Under CCP

The Strategic Planning Process

Over two years after it was begun, the Police Department's Strategic Planning Process is still operating in all eleven police districts and within headquarters. Despite the drop in crime in the last two years, BPD staff is wary of the dangers of becoming too complacent with the status quo. They are planning to invigorate the Strategic Planning Process by conducting another round of planning over a three month period that focuses on the BPD's community policing strategy of "Same Cops, Same Neighborhoods." Jim Jordan underscored the need for the police districts and the neighborhood residents to rededicate and redouble their efforts to fight crime and to acknowledge that this process is an on-going venture. The "Same Cops, Same Neighborhoods" strategy will group city blocks into beats and assign officers regularly to those beats, to work on problems with residents. It is hoped that the new round of strategic planning meetings will build a consciousness of turf ownership in both police personnel and neighborhood residents. This in turn will hopefully help the implementation of the new strategy which is being implemented by the Bureau of Field Services with the help of the Boston Management Consortium. The long-term goal of the Strategic Planning Process is to institutionalize the Police Department and the city in general to strategically talk about the problems and needs of Boston.

Alternatives to Incarceration Network

As mentioned previously, there have been no plans to expand or sustain the ATIN in the same way that YSPN was sustained. However, the exercise of funding the programs and insisting that they work together as a network resulted in the sustainment of the relationships that were forged during the year of planning and two years of implementation. There have been no recent formal meetings, yet BPD staff and ATIN agencies still meet in different configurations on an informal basis about their clients and working

together on new initiatives. In addition, agencies now have better information about the various types of services that exist for their clients. Many have come to realize that it is in their clients' and their agencies' best interest to share appropriate information, resources, and clients, rather than to compete against each other. Police officers have also begun to make direct referrals to these agencies, which five years ago would never have happened. Finally, the trust that has developed among the agencies and the Boston Police Department is refreshing, especially in contrast to the mistrust and miscommunication that existed before the CCP process began.

Sustainment of Programs and Initiatives

The biggest challenge the Boston Police Department faces in its attempt to sustain many of its CCP initiatives, is finding the financial resources. During the past year and a half, the BPD has provided continued funding for some of CCP's components through its federal Law Enforcement Block Grant. Indeed, out of the department's nearly three million dollar grant, well over one million went to sustaining or expanding initiatives and programs initially funded by CCP. When the grant is broken down by category, well over one million funded crime prevention—a category that would surely not have been found in BPD budgets for grants five years ago.

YSPN

Commissioner Evans would like to see YSPN expanded to all of the police districts. Consequently, there will be a one-time Strategic Planning Session for the YSPN during early spring, 1998 to discuss the feasibility and process of expansion to seven more districts. The session will include all of the district captains, OSPRD staff, YSPN social workers and youth advocates, Boys and Girls Club staff, and police officers who have referred youth to YSPN social workers. Obviously, this program is one that the BPD not only plans to sustain, but to expand city-wide.

Financially, all CCP funding of YSPN will end in May, 1998. However, the BPD has already begun to utilize grant money from its Law Enforcement Block Grant and from the Department of Social Services, to expand YSPN. The plan is to eventually institutionalize the program by funding it totally from the BPD budget. The Strategic Planning Session in the spring will address the funding issue, and there is some discussion of trying to secure private funding for a few years in order to stabilize the program until full institutionalization is feasible.

Other Program Components

In addition to youth programs and alternatives to incarceration, BJA had suggested drug courts and community prosecution. Because both types of programs were on the drawing board in Boston already, Boston Police Department dedicated some of their CCP funding to these two initiatives. The Dorchester Safe Neighborhoods Initiative (SNI) and then the East Boston SNI were community prosecution programs that were developed as a collaboration among the police department, local district attorney, and community groups to fight neighborhood crime. Boston's CCP program provided seed money to begin a similar program in the Grove Hall section of the city. Although the CCP money for it has run out, the police department is still funding a small part of the initiative through its block grant. Not as successful as its predecessors, the Grove Hall SNI is being helped by the District Attorney's office.

Boston's CCP program provided funding for the treatment portion of the Boston Drug Court. The Drug Court has been operating successfully for over a year and has had its first graduation. The BPD is currently providing some funding from its block grant that helps with program administration.

Final Conclusions about the Success of CCP in Boston

CCP has impacted crime prevention and crime-fighting on many levels, according to CCP respondents interviewed. For those working in the ATIN, the lasting impact has been the expansion of intermediate sanctions (albeit for a short period of time), the creation of relationships among the participating agencies and with the Boston Police Department, and the legitimization of the idea of intermediate sanctions. The Strategic Planning Process has mobilized many community groups and neighborhood residents to become involved in the fight against crime. It has begun to break down the old top-down structure of the Boston Police Department and slowly rebuild a more horizontal structure that allows police officers, captains, and community members to have more say in how they will address crime. For those working in the YSPN, there has been an institutional change in the way police view youth, in that they now recognize that many have underlying problems which contribute to the crime problem. Another effect is that families who before were afraid of police, are now calling the police station for help with their at-risk children.

While each participant approached had some unique perspectives on CCP's lasting impact, for the most part there was a consensus on its most profound effects.

Moving Toward Partnership

When asked about the lasting impact of the CCP initiative in Boston, most respondents said "partnership." As one agency provider put it, "people who weren't speaking before are speaking every week or at least they know who to go to for information that they need." Relationships, some very strong, have been developed between the Boston Police Department and a bevy of outside groups and agencies including clergy, private business groups, community groups, other state and city law enforcement agencies, other city agencies, social service providers, and universities.

Moving Toward Crime Prevention

The Boston Police Department's embrace of crime prevention as a necessary compliment to law enforcement was viewed as another lasting effect. One BPD staff person said, "(I)t has changed the styles of doing business in the Police Department from reaction to prevention and has gotten a whole lot of outside people involved in this who otherwise wouldn't have been (involved)." Some police officers have become catalysts of prevention—a novelty for the Boston Police Department.

Along with the move toward crime prevention is the realization of the value that social workers can bring to police officers. Where police officers before might have been frustrated by a lack of resources and/or knowledge about what to do with at-risk youth, many are now able to do something concrete by making a referral to their in-house social worker.

The reinvigoration of the Boston Police Department is one of the most impressive public sector organizational turnarounds on record. Currently, the BPD is an award-winning organization, recognized by President Clinton and considered to be an innovative department worthy of organizational and programmatic emulation. In addition, many BPD staff point to a reduction in crime during the last two years as evidence of the Department's success with CCP and other initiatives.

While this joint community policing/community mobilization effort had been "on the drawing board" for some time, the discretionary resources to conduct the planning were not available prior to the availability of CCP funds. In addition, had BJA not mandated the provision of services to youth and adult offenders in a collaborative framework and provided the funds, the Youth Service Providers Network would not exist today. Although it is impossible to tease out the specific impact that CCP had on crime control and crime prevention in Boston, it most surely has added to the overall synergism of these efforts.

Appendix A: Descriptions of Network Service Providers

Youth Service Providers Network Participants

Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston

The Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston has played a major role in the design, development, and implementation of the Youth Service Providers Network. Boys & Girls Clubs in general were formally named by BJA as an agency that would be involved in the overall CCP initiative to aide youth at risk. The Boston Police Department OSPRD staff had initially been told that approximately $200,000 was going to be earmarked for the Boys & Girls Club for the Boston CCP Project. The Boys and Girls Club was very involved in the planning phase, helping BPD staff with proposal writing and program creation. However, two days after Janet Reno came to Boston to announce the CCP award, BPD staff realized that the approved budget did not include the anticipated money for the Club in Boston. After inquiries, it was learned that all money earmarked for the Boys & Girls Clubs had been directly awarded to the organization, and that the organization, in turn, had awarded the money to whomever it wished. In Massachusetts, the money went to Clubs not involved in the CCP project. As one can imagine, this bureaucratic snafu strained the developing relationship between the BPD and the Boston Clubs. However, after much communication and the realization that the problem did not originate in Boston, the two agencies were able to move on. Ultimately, the BPD, in revising their implementation plan, was able to move a block of money into the Boys & Girls Clubs of Boston for the YSPN.

That money paid for network liaison staff, intake/case managers, outreach/intervention staff, and ultimately for the social worker who is stationed at District B-3. The intake/case managers positions are off-shoots of a Club initiative (Teachable Moments) which has put social workers in the Boys & Girls Clubs. In the YSPN, the outreach and intervention workers attempt to establish nurturing relationships with youth, and to eventually link the most needy to other Club support systems. The intake/case managers provide the structure and follow by providing small group and individual counseling and support. YSPN funds these positions at both the Blue Hill and the Roxbury Boys & Girls Clubs. Although the Social Worker stationed at B-3 works for the Boys & Girls Clubs through a subcontract, the network participants thought that it was essential that he be stationed in the police station to facilitate relationships with the police, social service agencies, and the community.

Greater Boston One to One

Greater Boston One to One is the local affiliate of a national non-profit organization committed to teaching equality, mentoring, and promoting economic self-sufficiency. One to One was mostly involved in the planning stages of YSPN and conducted a training on mentoring. A staff member believed that the BPD sought One to One's involvement in YSPN because of the organization's experience in networking and because BPD was interested in working with One to One down the road on a related project involving its gang unit. Agency staff had considerable praise for the process YSPN has created, "Interagency collaboration requires a traffic light sort of concept that allows members to operate off of each others efforts. Everyone brings something different to the table." One to One's involvement has already fostered other collaborations—specifically, with Boston Against Drugs in Roxbury, who also attended YSPN meetings.

Bridge Over Troubled Waters

Bridge Over Troubled Waters provides a range of services to runaways, homeless youth and other youth at risk. Its services include transitional living for 16-20 year olds at a facility in the South End, a teen mother program in Brighton, emergency housing for the homeless, family intervention, medical and dental services, educational/vocational (GED) classes, and long term counseling. Bridge's main office is just off the Boston Common at 47 West Street. Most of those it serves are "living" in the downtown area.

Bridge has always had a relationship with the BPD but the grant has strengthened that bond. According to Bridge staff, Bridge's involvement in YSPN has greatly enhanced the organization's appreciation of the needs of Mattapan, Roxbury, and Dorchester. It estimates that some 200 kids have come into the Bridge as a result of the strengthened relationship with the BPD and the agency's new profile. Nonetheless, Bridge staff would like more direct referrals from the network. Because Bridge is not located within the pilot areas, it has utilized its CCP funding to provide a medical van and three street workers to Dudley Station on a weekly basis.

Worth noting is the fact that Bridge (an organization staffed largely by Anglos) views YSPN as an entrée of sorts for it into the city's African American and Latino communities. As one Bridge staffperson said, "(as a result of YSPN,) the program has gotten a reputation as a safe house of sorts for minority, gang-involved kids."

Boston Community Centers Streetworker Program

The Boston Community Centers Streetworker Program, launched in 1990, helps Boston youth and their families gain access to a wide array of health and social services, including education, recreation, intervention with substance abuse, food, and shelter. The program has 35 streetworkers who work city streets from noon to eight p.m. talking to youth, providing them with information, and making appropriate referrals. CCP funds paid for a streetworker to specifically work District Areas B-2 and B-3 to dovetail and enhance the efforts of the BPD Social Worker.

United Methodist Urban Services, Inc.

The United Methodist Urban Services (UMUS) provides links between the service ministries of the Boston churches and agencies in such areas as violence prevention, education, and community empowerment. Through CCP, it created the Youth & Police In Partnership (YPP)—a program that it had worked to get off the ground for some time. The program attempts to improve the relationship between inner-city youth, community residents, and the Boston Police Department to address community problems through a problem-solving methodology. At present there are two sites: one in a predominantly black neighborhood and another in an Hispanic neighborhood. YPP employs 24 peerleaders, aged 14 to 17 who live in the neighborhoods and are supervised by a paid site coordinator. YPP builds relationships between the peerleaders and youth service officers through round table discussions, provides training in peerleading and problem-solving methodology, and provides mentoring from adults from the community.

While not a direct service provider, UMUS staff were very involved in the initial planning of the YSPN network and remain a resource for it. One staff member had nothing but praise both for YSPN's social worker and for the BPD's overall CCP effort.

Alternatives to Incarceration Network Participants

Boston Drug Diversion Court

As mentioned previously, the Boston Drug Diversion Court had been in the planning stages two years prior to CCP. While the Boston Coalition had identified funding for operation of the court, CCP came through with money to pay for the substance abuse treatment for its clients.

During Phase I, offenders meet three times a week at individual and group counseling sessions. Clients undergo needs assessment and individualized

service plans are developed. Phase II continues the same treatment but adds job counseling services. Phase III emphasizes job readiness and individualized treatment. Phase IV plans for aftercare and the eventual release of the client. Participants must take random urine drug tests, attend all programming, and actively search for employment. Optional treatments during the phases include acupuncture, educational programs, family counseling, and residential placement. In December, 1996, the Drug Court began to refer clients to the Metropolitan Day Reporting Center.

The judicial review of each of the clients occurs each Friday morning. The Boston Coalition attempts to cultivate a friendly, but respectful, culture. All participants are required to observe the entire proceeding, which is less formal than a standard courtroom.

Roxbury Youthworks

Roxbury Youthworks' target population is 14-18 year-old, at-risk, court-involved youths. Through the ATIN, Roxbury Youthworks deals with clients between 13-19. CCP money was used to service more kids. Roxbury Youthworks has two main branches: the court clinic and outreach and programming. The court clinic was established by a juvenile judge in 1981. It assesses and provides a psychological and background evaluation of each youth in the Roxbury Juvenile Court. It provides judges with additional information, not included in the police blotter, from which to make decisions.

The outreach and programming side of Roxbury Youthworks is the part involved with the ATIN. This branch was designed to provide and ensure that juveniles were receiving programming help. The programming at Youthworks is broken into three categories: vocational, recreational, and psycho-social.

Psycho-Social Programming: Includes clinics, substance abuse programs, and groups for men and women. There are at least ten different group formats. These meet twice a week for a period of 10-12 weeks.

Recreational Programming: Efforts aimed at outreach—"getting people in the door." Youthworks runs a highly-successful ten-team basketball league, a fitness group, and a swimming program that leads to lifeguard certification. There is no mandatory attendance at these events.

Vocational Programming: Youthworks operates an entrepreneurial class that teaches business skills and teaches the clients how to start their own business. This program started last summer and two small businesses were started. A "work matters" class teaches job readiness, resume preparation, interviewing skills, and the expectations that come with employment. The work crew, which is tied in with other programming, allows clients to work at various places doing maintenance and cleaning (mostly at apartment

buildings). Three years ago Youthworks created a transitional work program in suburban Franklin, MA, with the Franklin Distribution Center (an investment business). Youthworks has six spaces in the mail room that clients are placed in for up to six months. There is potential for permanent employment.

Additionally, a parent action committee involves the parents of clients in the politics of their neighborhood and issues that they and their children are confronting. Finally, for the "top-notch crew" of clients, a young citizens Council meets and directs community service projects.

Crime and Justice Foundation

According to its annual report: "The Crime and Justice Foundation advances rational public policy and practical strategies for the criminal justice system. The Foundation envisions a system that is effective, fair, and humane in controlling and preventing crime. To achieve this vision, the Foundation develops and implements innovative programs, promotes sound practices, and serves as a resource to the criminal justice community."

The Crime and Justice Foundation has two programs that are part of the ATIN: Project Turnaround and the Metropolitan Day Reporting Center. These programs are described below.

Project Turnaround

Part of the Crime & Justice Foundation, Project Turnaround expanded with the coming of the ATIN. Before the network was instituted, Project Turnaround only interacted with the Roxbury District Court. The ATIN money ($62,700) allowed Project Turnaround to hire another caseworker who now services the West Roxbury and Dorchester District Courts. Project Turnaround hired a female case manager to help handle the girls in the program.

Project Turnaround is open from one p.m. to nine p.m. Tuesday through Saturday. It services high-risk, high-need chronic offenders in court between the ages of 14 and 17, although a few youths have been as young as 12 years old. All youths referred to the program must sign a contract in the presence of a parent or guidance counselor. Among the provisions of this contract are mandatory school attendance, a 10 p.m. curfew, and a promise to treat Turnaround counselors with respect.

Project Turnaround attempts to provide activities to educate, provide counseling, and involve the kids in their communities. A significant component of the counseling is provided by Conflict Management, Inc., of Cambridge, an organization that teaches mediation techniques to the

Turnaround clients. Lawyers and DA's lead the program, which involves showing movies, role-playing, and finding nonviolent resolutions to conflict.

Turnaround also participates in a psychotherapy group run by a Roxbury Court clinic social worker. The program recently started a Level of Service Inventory (LSI) testing system to help assess the needs of its clients as well as measure relative advances made in specific cases.

Turnaround holds art classes that concentrate on helping the clients express themselves through art in a therapeutic manner. The youths are asked to explain their art and look beyond the "face value" representations. The art is shown in a gallery at the end of the 16-week course.

Turnaround takes field trips as well in an attempt to encourage positive peer interactions. The program has gone to the Museum of Fine Arts, the Aquarium, and participated in the Ride for Kids Walkathon.

Project Turnaround supports a young men's group at the Bethel AME Church in Roxbury. These clients meet to discuss important issues in their lives, such as the role of faith in everyday life.

In January, 1997, Project Turnaround will begin a Virtually Wired program to educate Turnaround youths about computers and keep them up-to-date in terms of INTERNET exposure and skills.

Turnaround sends its clients to the entrepreneurial class and "work matters" program at Roxbury Youthworks. It also sends clients to a basketball league operated by Project LEEO at Madison Park High School.

Metropolitan Day Reporting Center (MDRC)

This Crime & Justice Foundation program services only adults. The MDRC sends representatives to the Dorchester, West Roxbury, and Roxbury District Courts to acquire clients. In November, the MDRC placed a case worker at the Boston Coalition's Drug Diversion Court to recruit those individuals who are inappropriate for the Drug Court but who would be appropriate for its services. The MDRC was already working with the Courts before the establishment of the ATIN. The ATIN therefore did not create the service, the funding ($40,938) instead allowed the MDRC to expand its role in Boston by taking referrals from all of Suffolk County.

The Metropolitan Day Reporting Center is one of the two direct services administered by the Crime and Justice Foundation. Operating since December, 1987, the MDRC began its service concentrating only on sentenced offenders. Approximately four years ago, it began operating as an intermediate sanction by accepting probationers. MDRC exists to serve as an innovative program, with goals to: a) provide an intermediate sanction within the criminal justice system, and b) provide a transition option to get inmates back into the community.

The program offered by MDRC for both sentenced offenders and probationers is similar: highly active monitoring of client activities and whereabouts. For sentenced offenders, the planning and monitoring is more intense (planned to 15 minute intervals, checking in at least three times a day) than for probationers (curfew imposed, monitoring of activities but not free-time).

The clients accepted by the MDRC need more supervision than other clients in the ATIN. MDRC is less service-oriented than other agencies in the network. Instead, MDRC refers clients out to other agencies for services, although it does perform drug testing. Probation can send clients to MDRC when they need more supervision than a probation officer can provide.

Community Resource Center (CRC), at Massachusetts Halfway Houses, Inc.

This program was formerly known as COERS. CCP funds allowed a full-time case manager to be hired and a small number of additional beds to be allocated to ATIN clients in transition to self-sufficiency. Massachusetts Halfway Houses, Inc. (MHHI) offers services to adults (18 and older) who are either under supervision in probation or parole and to individuals who are in pre-release.

Most referrals to the CRC come from Probation and Parole, in that order, although the Drug Court, a few attorneys, and a judge has made direct referrals as well. In order to simplify this referral system, the ATIN caseworker developed a referral information packet for the Community Resource Center at MHHI. It contains referral forms and information about MHHI's services.

Most of the caseworker's effort is directed at job development. These efforts range from checking the Sunday *Boston Globe* each week to establishing and maintaining relationships at job training locations and educational institutions like local community colleges. The caseworker also designed and teaches a job development workshop, which is offered once a week for an hour and a half. The complete program takes five weeks. The weeks progress as follows: 1) "Putting Bars Behind You" video on obtaining a job with a criminal record, 2) resume workshop, 3) skills and interests development, 4) a trip to the Boston Public Library Higher Education Resources Center, and 5) active job search, including cold calling, and looking in the paper.

The caseworker has recently been certified to teach a class on "Reasoning and Rehabilitation" which is taught to develop cognitive skills such as problem-solving and anticipating consequences. Normally taught to persons in "pre-release." The class will begin in January, 1997, at the West Roxbury Courthouse to probationers.

Make Peace With Police

Make Peace With Police was an initiative whose purpose was to facilitate better understanding and communication between youthful offenders and police officers. Begun as a collaborative experiment in 1992 between Susan Guarino-Ghezzi from Stonehill College and Deputy Superintendent Paul Bankowski of the Boston Police Department, its goals were to "reduce stereotyping, to increase trust, to reduce the likelihood of personal payback in the community, to improve communication skills as the first step to improved interactions and information sharing between police and youths." ("Make Peace With Police: A Communication Program to Bridge the Gap Between Juvenile Offenders and Police;" 1/1997) During the two 1992 pilot sessions, male juvenile offenders committed to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) and officers from District C-11 were brought together at a DYS facility. As a result of the positive feedback generated by the two sessions, Guarino-Ghezzi was invited to submit a proposal to continue the program under the Comprehensive Communities Program.

Between April, 1995, and December, 1996, a total of 41 sessions were held between 70 serious juvenile offenders and 35 police officers. There were pre- and post-test surveys of the youths, as well as evaluations of the session by the participating officers. While the sessions certainly gave the youths an opportunity to discuss topics not otherwise covered in their programs, it did not provide a constructive experience that changed the views of each group toward the other. This was due to a number of factors, including the youth's highly negative opinions of police, and the fact that program staff were not able to schedule as many repeat sessions for police officers as anticipated due to police officer rotations.