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SALT LAKE CITY'S COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: A CASE STUDY

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BOTEC Analysis
C O R P O R A T I O N

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This case study is one of six case studies completed. These first six case studies include Baltimore, Boston, Columbia, Fort Worth, and Seattle. Six more case studies will be completed in the near future: East Bay, Hartford, Metro Denver, Omaha, Phoenix, and Wilmington. In addition, a Final Cross-Site Analysis Report is forthcoming.

Table of Contents

OVERVIEW	1
BACKGROUND CONTEXT	2
CITY PROFILE	2
CRIME PROBLEM	3
<i>Unified Crime Report Data</i>	4
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTEXT	5
PREVIOUS FEDERAL GRANTS AND GROUNDWORK	7
POLICE	8
COMMUNITY CONTEXT	9
CCP PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION	10
THE PLANNING PROCESS	12
CCP ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE	13
<i>CCP Coordinator</i>	13
<i>The Management Team</i>	13
<i>Community Action Team</i>	14
CCP BUDGET COMPONENTS	15
CCP STRATEGY	15
CCP PROGRAM	17
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY POLICING	17
ORGANIZATION FOR COMMUNITY INPUT	18
COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION: MOBILE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH	19
ORGANIZATION FOR SERVICE DELIVERY TO TARGETED CLIENTS AND NEIGHBORHOODS	21
<i>The Community Action Team</i>	21
<i>Youth and Gang Programs</i>	26
<i>Community Prosecution and Diversion</i>	26
<i>Community-Based Alternatives to Incarceration</i>	27
<i>Juvenile Drug Court with Diversion to Treatment</i>	29
NETWORK ANALYSIS	29
<i>Theory and Application</i>	29
<i>Boundary Specification</i>	30
<i>Data Collection Methods and Procedures</i>	30
<i>Salt Lake City Network Analysis</i>	33
SUSTAINABILITY	36
INTERIM SUMMARY	38
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS IN SALT LAKE CITY	38
OBSTACLES TO REFORM	39
AN EPILOGUE TO CCP'S SALT LAKE CITY'S CASE STUDY	44
INTRODUCTION	44
OVERVIEW	44
NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES IN CCP	45
<i>New Developments in CCP</i>	45
<i>Issues in CCP</i>	47

SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS OF CCP	51
SUSTAINMENT OF CCP	51
FINAL CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE SUCCESS OF CCP.....	52
APPENDIX A: PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS.....	54
APPENDIX B: NETWORK ANALYSIS STRATEGY.....	64

Overview

Salt Lake City's Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP), which began April 1, 1995, with a \$2.2 million grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, sought to create "a neighborhood-based model for the prevention, intervention, and suppression of crime" (CCP program brochure, 1995). The main mission of the Salt Lake City project was to "restructure our law enforcement and social services systems so they can effectively reduce violent youth crime in today's environment in a comprehensive way." At the core of the CCP initiative in practice were five innovative units called Community Action Teams (CAT). A CAT is a neighborhood-based problem-solving team comprised of representatives from relevant government and not-for-profit agencies which has responsibility for addressing crime-related community problems in a specific geographic area. In addition to these efforts to "reinvent" government and social service activity at the neighborhood level, Salt Lake City's CCP included a variety of programs directed at early intervention, treatment, community mobilization, and alternatives to traditional criminal justice approaches to processing offenders.

This case study of Salt Lake City's CCP program was written as a result of site visits made to various CCP programs and interviews with CCP participants between November, 1995 and January, 1997. It also incorporates data from BOTEC's CCP Coalition Survey and Community Policing Survey, as well as information contained in federal and local documents and reports. Follow-up phone calls were made during December, 1997 and January, 1998, to key participants in order to write the epilogue.

Background Context

City Profile

Salt Lake City is the oldest and largest incorporated city in the state of Utah. Located at the base of the Wasatch Mountains, with extensive recreation opportunities, the city is an attractive place to live, and will be the site of the Winter Olympics in 2002. The City had a 1990 Census population of 159,936, but is the hub of a larger metropolitan area with a population of 725,956 in Salt Lake County (the City's daytime population is estimated at over 300,000 as nearly half of the County's jobs are within the city limits). Salt Lake City has a strong mayoral form of government, with a City Council that serves seven Council Districts.

Economically, Utah has been defined as a "booming state" over the past six years. Approximately 25 years ago the city "bottomed out," declining in population from 225,000 to 150,000, with a corresponding drop in the school population from 50,000 to 25,000. Salt Lake City closed many schools, lost a significant amount of infrastructure, and gained many abandoned buildings. Over the past ten years, the Salt Lake City population has stabilized at around 160,000. Today, the city is again seeing a rapid increase in population, with new housing, new businesses, and the replacement of old buildings downtown with new high-rises.

Salt Lake City appears to have a solid economic base and unemployment is very minimal (i.e., below 3 percent). However, Utah suffers from the problem of "underemployment" (i.e., many jobs are low paying and part time). When this employment picture is combined with the preponderance of large families, the state and the city have a financial problem. The State also has the lowest per-pupil expenditure in the United States. As taxpayers, adult residents contribute as much to the schools as in other U.S. cities but, in Salt Lake, the disproportionate number of children overwhelms this tax base. (Note: This also creates a supervision problem, which weakens the capacity to exercise informal social controls and to provide social supports at the neighborhood level.) The political and economic realities of the 1990s dictate that mothers work more often, and in many cases, these are single-parent families. Compared to the rest of the nation, Utah has a higher-than-average percentage of working mothers with larger-than-average families.

Even though Salt Lake City is an urban environment, it is the capital of the state of Utah, and state politics are seemingly out of sync with the needs of the city. The city is facing what is believed to be a widespread problem in western states—referred to as the "cowboy caucus"—wherein, according to local officials, "rural legislators rule the roost." These "cowboys" have a

different agenda and a different emphasis than urban policy makers. For example, when urban policy analysts talk about "high risk kids," the rural lawmakers claim that rural areas have the same problems and do not see the need to spend a disproportionate amount of money in urban areas. This type of action can create contentious relationships between urban and rural areas. The future of cities in Utah looks bleak because urban legislators are not as numerous as their rural counterparts; therefore, when money becomes available in the form of block grants, much of it will be earmarked for rural areas regardless of what statistics might indicate about the relatively greater social problems facing urban communities.

Crime Problem

Despite Salt Lake City's positive national image as one of the most desirable places to live in the United States, it now faces a growing set of crime-related problems. The recognition of these problems provided the impetus for the city's participation in the CCP initiative.

A team of community leaders conducted a community needs assessment focusing on crime problems. The results of this community-generated assessment indicated violent crime had increased dramatically over the past twenty years. Actual crime statistics show that, while violent crimes against persons have increased in the past ten years, this increase has proceeded by fits and starts; jumping dramatically one year and then falling back almost as precipitously the following year. Murders, for example, hit a peak in 1990 (15.63 per 100,000), nearly halved in 1991 (8.52 per 100,000), and had steadily crept back up by 1995 (15.36 per 100,000). Most property crimes (Burglary and Theft) fluctuated moderately throughout the 1990s (theft falling fairly steadily since its peak in 1989), with the exception of Motor Vehicle Thefts which had more than doubled between 1985 and 1995. The Salt Lake City community and criminal justice personnel strongly believe that any of the aforementioned increases in crime can be ascribed to juvenile offenders, especially gang members.

Unified Crime Report Data

Salt Lake City Crime		1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
	Population	164,216	166,182	159,839	162,005	154,304	159,936	164,313	168,304	170,380	174,827	175,765
Murder*	Raw	14	20	13	15	18	25	14	14	19	20	27
	per 100,000	8.53	12.03	8.13	9.26	11.67	15.63	8.52	8.32	11.15	11.44	15.36
Forcible Rape	Raw	99	107	94	90	136	167	182	187	204	158	148
	per 100,000	60.29	64.39	58.81	55.55	88.14	104.42	110.76	111.11	119.73	90.38	84.20
Robbery	Raw	446	506	482	487	484	539	474	470	498	502	564
	per 100,000	271.59	304.49	301.55	300.61	313.67	337.01	288.47	279.26	292.29	287.14	320.88
Aggravated Assault	Raw	524	613	501	444	559	624	649	646	681	640	636
	per 100,000	319.09	368.87	313.44	274.07	362.27	390.16	394.98	383.83	399.69	366.08	361.85
Burglary	Raw	4002	3714	3997	3594	3854	3501	3460	3394	2823	3025	2950
	per 100,000	2437.03	2234.90	2500.64	2218.45	2497.67	2189.00	2105.74	2016.59	1656.88	1730.28	1678.38
Larceny-Theft	Raw	12881	14320	14863	16202	15510	13949	14602	14266	12831	12931	15467
	per 100,000	7843.94	8617.06	9298.73	10000.93	10051.59	8721.61	8886.70	8476.33	7530.81	7396.45	8799.82
Motor Vehicle Theft	Raw	1071	1002	923	932	1220	1197	1454	1368	1397	1716	2323
	per 100,000	652.19	602.95	577.46	575.29	790.65	748.42	884.90	812.81	819.93	981.54	1321.65

*Murder includes non-negligent manslaughter

The Salt Lake City Police Department became aware of the developing youth gang problem around 1989-90, and created a multi-jurisdictional task force with federal funding. According to local authorities, the gang problem "just keeps growing and growing." Standardized gang statistics for the county became available in 1992.¹ These data indicate that the number of gang members or associates increased from 1438 in 1992 to 3104 in 1995—a 116 percent increase over three years. (About half of the gang members reside in Salt Lake City proper). The racial composition of the gang problem in the area is unusually diverse. Of the 3104 members in 1995, Hispanics (45 percent) and whites (25 percent) comprise the majority, but there is significant representation among Pacific Islanders (11 percent), Blacks (9 percent), Asians (8 percent), and American Indians (2 percent). During the period from 1992 to 1995, the number of gangs in the county increased from 185 to 288 (a 56 percent increase). According to an earlier needs assessment report, a 128 percent increase in arrests for violent crime between 1987 and 1993 is believed to be the result of this rise in gang activity.

Three incidents in particular caused the public to realize that Salt Lake City had a serious problem: (1) a gang-related shooting at the State Fair; (2) a shooting at a concert at the Delta Center; and, (3) a double shooting at a grocery store in which two gang members killed each other. One CCP staff member put it this way: "There has been a lot of visible stuff that has shaken people's confidence in what they thought was a safe environment to live in." The financial effects are also noteworthy. The shooting at the State Fair in 1993 resulted in a 50 percent reduction in attendance, and calls that the Fair be moved from Salt Lake City to a rural location in the future.

¹Data provided by the Salt Lake Area Gang Project, a multi-jurisdictional gang suppression and diversion unit funded in part by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.

The number of gang-related criminal incidents has grown faster than the number of gangs or gang members, from 1741 in 1992 to 8496 in 1995 (a 388 percent increase). Graffiti has become the defining problem and a "symptom" of the growing gang activity (it accounted for 64 percent of the total gang incidents in 1995). As the former CCP Coordinator noted, it is the graffiti that "makes people furious"—more so than the violence, because people perceive violence as something that occurs outside their neighborhood to someone they don't know. Graffiti, however, is something that happens to them in their own neighborhoods. Graffiti cases in Salt Lake City rose over 1,000 percent from 1992 to 1995.

The needs assessment also pointed to domestic violence as a growing problem. Local data show the number of cases referred to the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office increased 94 percent between 1992 and 1993. Although some of this increase may be due to the formation of a Detective Unit that investigates domestic violence cases, the absolute size of the problem remains substantial.

Prostitution has become a major issue in Salt Lake City. Apparently, Salt Lake City "has developed a reputation as a 'soft' city, so the circuit girls have been showing up *en masse*." With limited jail space available, many prostitutes were being released to the streets without being booked—a fact that became a hot issue in the 1995 mayoral election, during which both candidates promised a crackdown.

The response of the criminal justice system to crime and disorder has been part of the problem. Similar to other cities, crackdowns in Salt Lake City led to overcrowding in the jails and state prisons. When it comes to addressing the problem of juvenile violence, this backlogged system has become a serious impediment to both justice and crime prevention over the past five years. In 1995, there were only 80 secure beds for juveniles in the entire state of Utah, which significantly impacted the state's ability to address juvenile crime. There were only about 100 detention beds in three counties. So, as violent juvenile crime continues to increase, Salt Lake City and surrounding areas are faced with a lack of facilities in which to house these offenders. As a result, the amount of time it takes to process juvenile offenders has gone from a couple of months to between nine and twelve months, according to experts. The need for alternative solutions is readily apparent.

Local Government Context

As noted above, the focal point of Salt Lake City's municipal government is the Mayor and a City Council serving seven districts. Both the Mayor and the City Council have fully staffed offices, and the staffs of the current Mayor and Council appear to have an open door policy toward the community and

encourage community involvement in civic affairs while maintaining a strong organizational structure and internal agency cohesion.

Coupled with this openness is a long history of grassroots-based involvement in government affairs, as reflected in strong neighborhood organizations. Recently, the structure of citizen involvement has been the subject of close scrutiny. For many years the Salt Lake Association of Community Councils (SLACC) was funded by the City Council (approximately \$90,000 per year), and this budget paid for a director, staff person, and mailing services. The purpose of this body was to "coordinate and service the 24 Community Councils in the city." The local Community Councils were designed to provide a primary opportunity for citizens to express their views about matters that affect their lives. Through the Community Council, citizens are given a voice on any zoning changes, planning changes, and other matters that may affect their neighborhood. Today, the Community Councils tend to focus on property management and development issues.

Over the past two-to-three years, the SLACC organization—the intermediary group—has become the subject of intense debate. Members of this umbrella group tended to serve for 10 to 20 years with no term limits, and were inclined to have a very strong land-use agenda. (Point of clarification: Each Community Council has its own chairperson, but these individuals are not on the SLACC). According to one city employee, City Hall and community leaders felt that the SLACC members "were trying to dictate everything that would happen in the city. They were suppose to represent the community councils, but they weren't." As a result, the City Council terminated the funding for SLACC in 1995. Alternatively, the City Council decided to fund the Office of Neighborhood Services, which provides services directly to the Community Councils.

The new model for community input brings City Hall closer to the neighborhoods. Rather than work with SLACC, the Mayor now holds monthly meetings (at 7:00 a.m.) with all 24 Community Council Chairs (these meetings started in the spring of 1995). Within this framework, communities now have direct access to the Mayor on a regular basis, and she reports their concerns directly to the City Council. Prior to the meeting, the Chairs and the Mayor jointly define the agenda, and report on neighborhood problems. City staff are present at the meetings to respond to community concerns and questions. The former CCP Coordinator stated that "this is the most direct form of participatory democracy I have ever seen. . . It has really re-energized the Community Councils." The Councils are able to talk about issues of concern to their neighborhoods, and go "straight to the top."

Previous Federal Grants and Groundwork

The Mayor and Police Chief have some prior experience working in collaborative, multi-agency settings on crime issues. Early in her administration, the Mayor created a county-wide gang task force that reported to her. This group coexisted with the Police Department's multi-jurisdictional gang task force. The Mayor, who is described as a "doer" by her staff, brought the "key people in the state to the table." (This happened approximately two years prior to CCP.) There were, therefore, existing forums in which a dialogue regarding juvenile justice issues and jail overcrowding had been established. Furthermore, as the former CCP coordinator noted, "there had been a lot of connections built and relationships and support created before we ever began the CCP process."

CCP staff believe that Salt Lake City was chosen as a CCP site because of its vision and its prior experience in working with the community. The Mayor was very articulate and supportive of the program, and Chief Ortega had developed a national reputation based on his work in community policing in Phoenix. Hence, the grant was seen as an opportunity to expand the capacity of a Police Department with a long history of involvement in crime prevention and community policing.

Further, the U.S. Attorney in Salt Lake City received funding as a "Weed and Seed" program by the Justice Department. Weed and Seed is a cooperative program between multiple agencies and has a strong education/employment opportunity component. Even though Salt Lake City's cooperative efforts did not initially receive Weed and Seed funding, the structures Salt Lake City were establishing for both CCP and Weed and Seed were considered so promising that Salt Lake City began receiving Weed and Seed funds shortly after they were named a CCP site. (Note of clarification: Weed and Seed focuses intensively on low-cost cooperative efforts that are sustainable in the long term; it is therefore very common for a Weed and Seed site to receive funding only after programs have already begun and have established some "track record.")

School-based prevention programs that required partnerships have been developed for high-risk kids with other funding. Seven of the Salt Lake City schools with high-risk populations have already implemented a multi-agency program called Project Hope, funded by the state of Utah. This project brings together health and human services, mental health, and educational services. It targets 30 high-risk kids in each school, kindergarten through third grade. This effort is the state's first at collaboratively providing services to children and families. The CCP coordinator meets with staff from these partnerships, and the CCP CAT Teams (described below) are familiar with these service providers. In sum, Salt Lake City has a rich history of federal, state, and local funding for collaborative, multi-agency ventures directed at the

prevention and control of crime. This experience and capacity has provided a fertile environment for the introduction and growth of CCP partnerships.

Police

The Salt Lake City Police Department is fundamentally traditional in structure, organization, and philosophy. As in many other urban areas, the Department serves a diverse community that includes the upper-income neighborhoods of the foothills and the disadvantaged blocks of the central city, a large state university, and the financial and business core of the state. And, as in many other departments over the past five years, Salt Lake City has acquired some of the features associated with community policing.

The ground floor of one of two Department buildings houses the Community Support Division which is an accessible network of offices for sworn personnel, the Mobile Neighborhood Watch offices, and community mobilization specialists (civilian members of the CATs). There are also meeting rooms which can be used for CAT meetings as well as other community and/or Department purposes. Also housed in this low-rise building is the Department's crime analyst, who tracks trends, maps "hot spots," and helps to coordinate the internal flow of data in the Department and between the Department and the community. A handful of specialized sworn personnel—including community police officers, bicycle patrol officers and a mobile tactical problem-solving program entitled WIN—operate primarily out of this office, as well as from more than a half-dozen storefront offices scattered around the city. These storefront offices, although intended to be inviting to the public, tend to function as convenient sites for officers to congregate and prepare paperwork and are not staffed on a full-time basis.

The Police Department began hosting citywide community-oriented policing meetings about two years prior to the start of CCP. The meetings were open to the public and held every week. Many Divisions of the Police Department participated in this process—Vice, Gangs, Drugs, and Patrol. Neighborhood council members, "who were fit to be tied," would come to register their complaints. This system of meetings was the beginning of a partnership with the public and the foundation of police accountability, according to CCP staff. As one person observed, "a lot of synergy began to develop around solving problems and not just busting a drug house, but dealing with end-of-the-line issues—what is going on and why are we having this problem? . . . That laid the foundation for the CCP concept."

Neighborhood patrols by citizens were getting started around this same time, preceding the actual introduction of CCP. This program, Neighborhood Mobile Watch, has since expanded with support from the CCP program (see description below).

Community Context

Since July 24, 1847, when Brigham Young arrived in the valley, Salt Lake City has been the home of the Mormon Church—the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints (LDS). Urban life in Salt Lake City cannot be fully understood without appreciating the importance of the Church to the city and to the state. As one member of CCP said, “the Church is everywhere.” The LDS Church is considered by many to be Salt Lake City’s greatest asset, but also one of its biggest liabilities. With its international headquarters in Salt Lake City, the LDS Church sends out 50,000 missionaries every year, and draws people from hundreds of countries who participate in world-wide meetings. The Church is a magnet for people from around the world, but its strength is also its weakness. The Church, as one member described it, provides “strong family values and a strong religious base, but it also creates some significant barriers for people who are not LDS.” In addition, the offspring of some newly arrived LDS ethnic groups have found it difficult to make the adjustment to urban life in Salt Lake City and, consequently, have contributed to the growing problems of youth violence and gang activity. Nevertheless, the Church, with its structure and vast resources, has a religious organization with representatives on nearly every block in the city, and therefore has the capacity to exert significant influence when needed. The Church provides an array of social services and activities to support individual families and neighborhoods. The LDS Church also has a strong working relationship with the municipal government of Salt Lake City.

CCP Planning and Organization

Salt Lake City was one of sixteen sites invited by the Bureau of Justice Assistance to apply for both planning and implementation funding to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to combat crime. As stated in BJA's *Fact Sheet on the Comprehensive Communities Program*, "(t)he two defining principles of the CCP are (1) that communities must take a leadership role in developing partnerships to combat crime and violence, and (2) that State and local jurisdictions must establish truly coordinated and multi-disciplinary approaches to address crime and violence-related problems, as well as the conditions which foster them."² Each site was mandated to include jurisdiction-wide community policing and community mobilization prevention initiatives in their strategy. In addition, sites were asked to create programming, based on the area's needs, in the areas of youth and gangs, community prosecution and diversion, drug courts with diversion to treatment, and community-based alternatives to incarceration.

The Comprehensive Communities Program was implemented in two phases. Under Phase I, the invited jurisdictions submitted an application for approximately \$50,000 of planning funds to support the design and development of a comprehensive strategy. All proposals for Phase I funding were due April 29, 1994. Most of the sites were notified within a month that they were awarded funding for Phase I. During this planning phase, technical assistance in the form of workshops and meetings were offered to the sites. During July, 1994, representatives from each site were mandated to attend a two-day Phase II (Implementation Phase) Application Development Workshop. All Phase II applications were due to BJA on August 15, 1994. The first and second year implementation grant process is discussed in the next sections (below).

The chart on the next page presents a timeline detailing the administrative history of Salt Lake City's CCP program. It documents the grant planning period, budgeting stages, and CCP project staffing changes.

² Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Fact Sheet Comprehensive Communities Program*, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994.

Salt Lake City Timeline


1994

1995


1996

1997


Planning Grant



First Year Implementation Grant



Second Year Implementation Grant



Other Important Dates



The Planning Process

After the Bureau of Justice Assistance invited Salt Lake City to participate in Phase I of the CCP program, the Mayor organized a small team of leaders to begin the planning process. This group of five included Deedee Corradini (Mayor), Ruben Ortega (Chief of Police), Andrew Valdez (Judge, Third District Juvenile Court), Nancy Valdez (Director of Pupil Services, Salt Lake City Schools School District), and Colleen Minson (community leader). This team attended BJA's planning meeting in Washington, DC (May 22-23, 1994), and worked hard to convince the Justice Department that: (1) Salt Lake City did indeed have some serious and growing crime problems; and, (2) Salt Lake City had the capacity to develop an innovative and comprehensive set of strategies for addressing these problems.

Assisted by approximately \$50,000 in BJA funds, a formal planning process was initiated for CCP. This process called for "the participation of all segments of our community in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the project" (SLC grant proposal, p. 2). Hence, a 25-member Steering Committee was formed, which quickly expanded to more than 40 "stakeholders," including neighborhood residents, public agencies, not-for-profit organizations, the religious community, businesses, and elected officials. The primary purpose of the Steering Committee was to conduct a needs assessment and to make sure that the goals, objectives, and strategies of CCP remained "on track" in addressing the city's priority problems.

The Steering Committee decided the focus of the program would be to strengthen youth and families, and not to isolate youth-based problems from the family context. The Committee tried to design a truly comprehensive model that "creates a neighborhood-based process for problem-solving in communities and brings together a broad variety of individuals from different agencies and puts them into a team approach" (CCP Coordinator). The final product of this process was the development of Community Action Teams.

Colleen Minson worked closely with others to prepare the CCP grant proposal. Bringing together so many different agencies and individuals was no easy task. With this type of collaborative venture, there are many differences in management style, motivation, organizational culture, and theories of crime control. For example, the Salt Lake City Police Department and the Salt Lake City Boys' and Girls' Club held different views of the youth crime problem and how to address it. One of the indirect benefits of CCP, according to the initial CCP coordinator, is that "people begin to educate each other and to get a more complete, realistic view of kids' needs and how we get to the root issues."

After Phase II (the implementation phase) of Salt Lake City's CCP was funded in November, 1994, it quickly became apparent that the Steering

Committee was too large to be of much help with program implementation and could not function as a "coordinating body." Nevertheless, someone had to carry out this "monstrous thing." Hence, a new administrative structure was established for this purpose.

CCP Administrative Structure

CCP Coordinator

In December, 1994, Colleen Minson was asked to serve as Project Coordinator because she was a key actor in the proposal writing and planning stages of the grant, and because she was a community leader with little "political baggage" who could work with diverse groups throughout the city.

The decision was made to house CCP in the Mayor's Office even though the Police Department felt it was a law enforcement grant and, therefore, belonged with them. However, as one staff member observed, "In order to have this type of institutional change happen, you need the authority of the Mayor's Office." For Minson, this locus helped immensely; especially when she called someone seeking assistance and said she is from "the Mayor's Office"—"I just get a lot better attention. People call me back and do the kinds of things that they wouldn't do otherwise." Also, Minson attended the Mayor's staff meetings and was able to brief them on everything happening with the CCP.

Based, in part, on an outside consultant's report (see below), and with an eye to the long-term sustainability of CCP, the overall coordination of CCP was split into two positions in October, 1996. The financial responsibility for CCP management was assigned to Sherrie Hansen of the City's Budget Staff. This assignment brought the financial management of CCP into line with other grants handled by the city (CCP funds had been the only grant moneys not handled by regular City Budget Staff). Overall administrative coordination, while remaining in the Mayor's Office, was assigned to Jeanne Robison, an Assistant Prosecutor in the City Prosecutors Office and an original, enthusiastic member of the CAT program. Colleen Minson, the initial CCP Coordinator, moved to a part-time position in the Police Department working closely with the Captain in charge of the Community Support Division.

The Management Team

A Management Team to oversee the implementation of the CCP was created. This group included key people from each of the agencies that received CCP money plus a few other individuals who were involved in other program components. The Team started with seven members and expanded over

time. It included the CCP coordinator, staff from the City Council Office, the Police Department, the City Prosecutors Office, the Chief Intake Officer of the Juvenile Court, the Salt Lake City Probation Supervisor, school representatives (the Truancy Center and community education components), and the Boys' and Girls' Club. The participants tended to be from the middle-management and supervisory levels of each agency. Meetings have been informal and membership in the group has changed over time. From the beginning, the Management Team has encountered some difficulties; these are discussed in the section on "Integrated Service Delivery" below. However, by late 1996, after personnel in several key leadership positions changed, it began to appear as if the Management Team had been re-engineered to operate in a more goal-oriented, productive fashion.

Community Action Team

The core operational unit for CCP is the Community Action Team (CAT), which is a neighborhood-based, collaborative, problem-solving structure. The members of this Team include sworn and civilian personnel from the Police Department, a Youth and Family Services case manager from the Boys' and Girls' Club, a representative from the Mayor's Office, a Probation Officer, an Assistant City Prosecutor, and a Juvenile Court Intake Officer (their respective functions are described below). This team is a creative vehicle for redefining government at the neighborhood level, but each member of the team is still employed by a parent agency with its own organizational and supervisory structure. Criminal justice agencies are heavily represented on the CAT groups, but social services are also present.

The relationships between Salt Lake City agencies involved in the pursuit of CCP objectives are complex. In the present case study, we attempt to describe the relationships between the members of the CAT unit; between CATs and other entities, including its supervisory Management Team; and, between CATs and other CCP components and City Hall.

The selection of target areas for the CAT units was a challenging part of the CCP planning process. The planning team struggled with questions such as "How do we define a neighborhood?" The planners settled on the use of Council District boundaries because members felt that, for this particular grant, "political accountability was really important." (Note: Community Councils, to a large extent, fall within City Council Districts).

Originally, the CCP Plan called for the creation of seven CAT units, one for each City Council District. However, insufficient funding (when the grant period expanded from 12 to 15 months) forced them to implement only five Teams. The Planning Group decided to combine the east and north side, which have lower rates of delinquency than other districts. The two Districts covering the central-city area were also combined into one CAT target area

because the city received COPS funding for community policing officers in these two areas.

CCP Budget Components

Salt Lake City received a total of \$2,193,000 for a 15-month period, beginning April 1, 1995, and ending June 30, 1996. Because CCP in Salt Lake City is truly a multi-agency initiative, program components do not always coincide with neat budget categories. In fact, the key program component, the Community Action Team, is a collaborative structure comprised of representatives from different city agencies and not-for-profits. Below is an outline of how the CCP money was allocated by agency, followed by a description of the key program components.

Mayor's Office (\$126,566): This money supported the salaries of the CCP Coordinator and one staff person from the Mayor's Office of Community Affairs, as well as operating costs for the grant, such as travel, equipment, and office supplies.

Police Department (\$1,195,900): These funds covered 14 new police officers, their cars and equipment; three new civilian Mobilization Specialists to serve on CATs; one secretary for the Neighborhood Mobile Watch and CCP activities; and, equipment for the Neighborhood Mobile Watch units.

City Prosecutor's Office (\$192,200): This money funded three assistant prosecutors to serve on CAT teams, clerical support, alternative dispute resolution programs, and a Family Peace Center.

Boys' and Girls' Clubs (\$250,000): This money funded five Youth and Family Specialists (YFS) to serve on the CATs, work on the Job Placement Mentoring Program, and the Alternatives to Incarceration efforts.

Third District Juvenile Court (\$303,334): This money funded two new probation officers and five deputy probation officers to serve on the CATs, as well as a model drug court with diversion to treatment for juveniles.

School District (\$125,000): This money funded a Truancy Center for one year, and school-based alternative dispute resolution programs.

CCP Strategy

The overall CCP strategy is to establish linkages between resources and service providers in order to more comprehensively serve the needs of children and families in Salt Lake City. Salt Lake City may be singularly well-suited to support such an effort due to its history of community-government involvement, the structure and cohesion afforded by the LDS Church, the high level of outreach and community involvement sustained by the school district, and the growing capacity for cross-agency collaboration.

In theory, many CCP components would be brought into this greater synergy through the Management Team which would provide and support inter-agency cooperative agreements and act as a supra-agency decision-making body. Theoretically, the CATs should also, as the primary service delivery mechanism, seek out and introduce new resources into the CCP framework as well as help to forge new linkages between the community and existing resources.

In practice, the CCP has in fact strengthened and enhanced such linkages as those between the schools and the Police Department (e.g., the Truancy Center) and between the various components of the criminal justice system (particularly between probation and the juvenile court staff). And new resource partners have, in fact, been introduced into the CCP framework through both the CATs and other CCP participants. However, as will be explored further below, these linkages have been established in the absence of (and not because of) any formalized inter-agency agreements and with little or no guidance from the Management Team. Further, an entity that may be a resource partner for one CAT may be virtually unknown to another CAT, as knowledge sharing at the citywide level has been limited. Thus, in Salt Lake City, as in other jurisdictions struggling with these issues, some linkages occur more as a result of personal relationships and happy coincidence than as a result of program objectives and strategies. While the role of personal relationships and coincidence in establishing effective coalitions should not be discounted, in the long term, they might not take the place of formal tools and strategies, such as inter-agency agreements and a supra-agency decision-making body.

CCP Program

Implementation of Community Policing

In Salt Lake City's CCP, "community policing" can be operationally defined by the presence of "community-oriented police officers" (COPs) as members of the CAT teams (as described below) and by the involvement of similar officers in mini-stations or "Neighborhood Police Stations" across the city. Although 14 COP officers were hired under the CCP grant, only five are CAT members. The remaining nine officers are in the Patrol Division, but are assigned to Neighborhood Police Stations. These COP officers still respond to calls, but spend "some time" on problem-solving.

We saw little evidence that the COP officers involved in CAT teams were integrated with other units in the police department or other COPS officers in Neighborhood Police Stations. In fact, the isolation of the CATs became a major source of conflict within CCP and within the police department. Two COP officers resigned from their CAT teams in 1996 because they were "very frustrated and very outspoken." One of their concerns was the unresponsiveness of the department's gang unit to their CAT's request for assistance. Apparently, the gang unit felt it was too busy dealing with its own problems, and management did not force them to address the CAT team's request. (Reports indicate that internal resistance and communication blockage at the level of middle management were limiting responsiveness to community problems.) This was especially problematic in light of reports that "CAT team members are much more loyal to each other than they are to their own agencies." Feeling that the police department has not been supportive, CAT members decided to register their complaints with community residents, city council members, and the Mayor's office.

Although the Chief of Police is a recognized advocate of community policing philosophies, the Salt Lake City Police Department did not appear to have the organizational structure, climate, or channels of communication needed to adequately support the openness and collaboration required by the CCP. To improve the situation, the Chief made several personnel changes in 1996, including the assignment of a new Captain in the Community Support Division. As one employee noted, "he understands the need to connect the CATs with the rest of the department," including the Neighborhood Police Stations, Gang Crimes, Vice, and Youth bureaus. The original plan (yet to be implemented) was to have the lead beat officer serve as a liaison with the CAT team in his/her area. They were expected to talk about local problems and determine what needed police action.

To some degree, the police department is moving in the direction of making community policing the job of all police officers, but the agency has yet to establish performance measures or some type of accountability system to encourage this new style of policing at the street level. As one employee stated, "it is pretty general and fuzzy, so the officer does what he thinks is the right thing to do."

Training is considered one of the cornerstones of community policing reform. The CCP grant for the first year indicated a plan to provide "specific training outcomes and some organizational incentives for community-oriented policing." Some training did occur. For example, the chief provided his officers with a philosophical overview of the concepts involved, but their training in problem solving or community engagement has been limited.

The new captain of the Community Support Division sees the importance of problem-oriented policing in a consistent and organized manner. He sees the role of the Community Support Division as "the solvers of chronic problems." His office is beginning to keep files on "chronic locations," defined as high-call addresses. With the nuisance abatement ordinance recently expanded from drugs to any "chronic criminal activity," the door is now open for more enforcement of various disorder problems. This approach is expected to serve as a partial solution to the "gang house" and other chronic problems. The ordinance is expected to be "a huge tool for targeting places with lots of calls for service."

Over time, the police expect a reduction in calls for service, especially if the CAT teams and other agencies are deployed in a comprehensive manner. The new model, if fully implemented, calls for the utilization of a wide range of services beyond enforcement. For example, on July 1, 1996, the Division of Child and Family Services was decentralized and now works with one CAT team to provide weak or absent social services in that neighborhood. As the former CCP Coordinator notes, "This is the next phase. We are ready for it. At the beginning, I don't think we would have been ready for it." Now that the program is fully operational and many of the interagency issues have been resolved, CCP is in a better position to expand the array of services and problems. CCP is prepared to have other service providers sit at the table.

Organization for Community Input

There has been considerable discussion about how community residents should participate in the CAT framework, since CAT is the focal point of Salt Lake City's CCP and its primary vehicle for linking agencies and community organizations. Although they were part of the original plan, local residents or community leaders have not been invited as regular team members to date. This decision is attributed primarily to confidentiality issues surrounding individual cases. Much of the work that transpires at CAT

meetings involve discussions about individual offenders or families in the neighborhood—their criminal histories, emotional problems, clinical and social service plans, etc. City Attorneys are working on this confidentiality problem.

To date, the community role on the CAT team has been seen as an “open slot.” People come and go at the meetings, depending on the issue at hand. For now, the community representative is seen as a changing *ad hoc* position rather than as a regular core position. Church leaders are one example of *ad hoc* participants in CCP: Salt Lake City is experiencing problems with the Tongan “Crip” gang, whose members are physically intimidating to other kids in particular neighborhoods; Church representatives have attended CAT meetings and have agreed to help address this problem.

This apparent limitation on citizen participation in CAT meetings should be placed in the proper context of general community involvement in public life in Salt Lake City. There are numerous opportunities for citizen input (far more than most cities) at various community meetings and members of the CAT team regularly attend these meetings. Every month, for example, CAT members attend the Community Council meetings. To enhance citizen awareness and involvement in CAT activities, a member of the team will typically make a brief presentation. Apparently, Community Council leaders and members are beginning to learn that “CAT is where their grassroots people are to go and get stuff done.” So, “we have something now that is 100 times better than what we had before.” Citywide, it is now possible “to connect the Community Councils to the Community Action Teams”—something not in place at the start of the grant. Apparently, however, there is some variation in the degree of involvement and strength of the relationship between CATs and Community Councils in different areas of the city.

The focus of the CATs has been community-oriented services, and the ideal arrangement, according to CCP staff, is that “residents are part of this problem-solving process.” Although community members are not part of the exchange of confidential information, they are expected to step forward and help. For example, a youth may need a mentor or a summer job. The community is expected to “develop some ownership and begin to break down the isolation.” How often this actually happens is uncertain at this point because “we are still putting the train tracks together.”

Community Mobilization: Mobile Neighborhood Watch

The large-scale and highly-organized Mobile Neighborhood Watch (MNW) program is an excellent illustration of community members mobilizing to bridge the gap between the police and the community in Salt Lake City. MNW is a private, non-profit corporation organized and operated by Salt

Lake City residents. MNW, in close partnership with the Salt Lake City Police Department, works to insure that patrol volunteers are adequately trained and have a solid working relationship with the police on duty. The MNW program provides residents with a structured opportunity to participate in a collective crime prevention activity (i.e. by being the "eyes and ears" of the police). Citizens complete a 16-hour training program before going on patrol in their neighborhood. They patrol by car, in pairs, for a period of either two or three hours. Their cars are marked with magnetic signs on the doors to identify them, and they have mobile phones for direct calls to the police dispatcher or field commander. The role of the MNW is to report suspicious and criminal activity in progress and to document problems in the neighborhood. Members are expected to file a report in their neighborhood COP offices at the conclusion of each shift for follow-up by beat officers.

The MNW program was in existence when Salt Lake City prepared the CCP application. At that time, there were an estimated 450 members in the group. With funding from CCP, the membership climbed to around 600 by the middle of 1996 and 800 by January, 1997. Initially, AT&T and Cellular One provided free phones and air time. CCP has supported MNW with \$14,000 in equipment, a secretary to help manage the volunteers, and a COP officer to serve as a liaison to the police department.

The MNW program in Salt Lake City is considered "very effective" and will be the model for a state-wide program supported by AT&T. The CCP coordinator likes it because: (1) "it gave the citizens an education about how the police department works and why, and what the real issues are;" and (2) "collectively, it created a large body of people out there who are advocating issues." Participating citizens now pay attention to problems when they drive around—"it is beginning to generate citizens who have a bigger picture and have a lot more ownership." Also, there is an improvement in police-community relations, at least among those citizens who actively participate. Thus, the benefits reach beyond crime prevention.

The civilian originator of MNW and the secretary have offices on the first floor of the Police Department. From this post, Departmental information regarding incidents and crime trends flows freely both in and out of MNW with MNW responsible, at least in part, for flagging hot spots and dispersing those reports to Department personnel as well as distributing incident information to the community. Although MNW is still viewed with skepticism by some Salt Lake City officers, MNW personnel believe they have earned credibility by effectively intervening in crimes in progress without interfering with the officers' actions. MNW also achieved success with numerous problem-solving projects in which MNW served as the catalyst to closing down "dump sites" for stolen vehicles, re-routing traffic in problem

areas, apprehending a car theft operation, and initiating programs to curb illegal parking in handicapped spots and apprehending DUIs.

Community Mobilization Specialists (see description below) played a major role in organizing MNW participants and sustaining their involvement. Community Policing Officers also worked with residents to support these efforts, but their involvement appears to be more a matter of personal inclination than a regular role.

Organization for Service Delivery to Targeted Clients and Neighborhoods

The most innovative and challenging aspect of CCP in Salt Lake City is the effort to create new organizational structures that will facilitate the coordination and integration of a comprehensive, neighborhood-based service delivery system. The first year was very taxing to all involved, as independent agencies in city and county government, the criminal justice system, the school system, and other social service groups worked hard to define roles and relationships. The concept of multi-agency partnerships and linkages is widely praised, but rarely has it been attempted to this extent. Salt Lake City is a significant experiment in reinventing government and service delivery at the neighborhood level. Clearly, there have been conflicts over crime control strategies (reflective of institutional cultures and orientations), turf and ownership of the program, and personality differences. Despite these obstacles, Salt Lake City remained strongly committed to the concept of creating an integrated, multi-agency service delivery system. Two new structures were created to achieve this goal—Community Action Teams at the neighborhood level, and a Management Team to provide oversight and direction at an administrative level.

The Community Action Team

The Community Action Team (CAT) is the core group of service professionals, representing different agencies and areas of expertise, who meet weekly to address crime and disorder problems within a targeted geographic area. The Team essentially employs a problem-solving approach to prevention, intervention, community mobilization, and a wide range of law enforcement approaches to disorder and crime problems. The uniqueness of this multi-agency approach lies in its capacity to apply a wide range of resources in a creative and efficient manner.

Police Officer

One member of the CAT unit is a Police Officer from the Salt Lake City Police Department's Community Support Services Division. This Community Policing Officer brings his/her expertise in law enforcement strategies and access to police resources to address specific problems (e.g., gangs, narcotics, and other special units, as well as communication with beat officers). When Salt Lake City wrote the original grant proposal, the idea was to have four or five Police Officers assigned to each Team. However, prior to implementation, some members of the Planning Team expressed concern about "creating a special squad" of police officers, rather than making problem-solving the responsibility of all police personnel. This concern, along with budgetary restrictions, resulted in the assignment of only one officer per CAT.

To distinguish this model from other community policing approaches, where individual police officers are expected to do virtually everything, the police role in the CAT model has been described by CCP staff in the following way: "police officers are not social workers. Some are good at it, but most are not. What they need is the ability to connect with all the other problem-solving tools. Law enforcement is not the only answer to every problem . . . so we have tried to create a model that would allow us to use police officers appropriately." The basic concept is to create a mechanism where the police "are able to access, at least in theory, all the local, state, and federal resources needed to solve the problem." But planners point out that all resource agencies don't need to attend every meeting: CATs would otherwise be too large and unmanageable, therefore "Only if they are needed are they brought in." If, for example, the CAT is facing a serious gang problem, it would be appropriate to bring in a Salt Lake City Gang Crimes Officer.

Community Mobilization Specialist

Technically, this position is not new in the Salt Lake City Police Department. As one police interviewee put it, "this is our old crime prevention person, but now it is a civilian with added responsibilities." For years, a police officer in this capacity worked with block leaders, churches, and community groups, providing crime prevention information on behalf of the Police Department. The primary role of the Community Mobilization Specialist (CMS) is to serve as a community organizer and trainer. According to the job description, this individual "facilitates problem-solving for citizens and enhances citizen involvement in their communities and neighborhoods to reduce risk factors and increase protective factors." The CMSs have been very active in organizing residents to participate in the Mobile Neighborhood Watch program (see below). This person is also expected to be the City Council member's contact or liaison with the Police Department—a linkage the

Council requested about in 1994. When asked how the Police Chief feels about this arrangement, the response was, "we have had some problems but, so far, it has been OK." Some City Council members are close to their CMS, while others have been less inclined to develop this relationship. The CMS is also expected to serve as a liaison within the Police Department (along with the officer on the CAT) to secure the participation of appropriate law enforcement resources.

Although crime prevention remains a responsibility of the CMS, their role has expanded in the context of the CATs and modern-day community policing. The CMS staff are learning how to use resources in the community to define and solve problems. The role expansion has been a challenge for some CMS staff (e.g., "How can I do a good job on crime prevention with all these additional responsibilities?"). Such mapping out of roles and responsibilities is part of CCP's internal and ongoing evaluation process.

Youth and Family Specialist

The only entirely new position funded by the CCP grant is that of Youth and Family Specialist, employed by the Boys' and Girls' Clubs of Salt Lake City. One of the primary roles for Youth and Family Specialist staff is to link young offenders with alternatives to incarceration. A big concern in Salt Lake City is that "kids were not getting on probation until they've committed 20 offenses." Then, when a juvenile committed a serious offense, the full force of the criminal justice system would come down on them unexpectedly. Hence, CCP Planners and CATs decided to target kids with between two to twelve offenses who look like they are "headed down that road."

Youths who fit this description are referred to the Youth and Family Specialist by other agencies or other CAT members. A needs assessment is conducted and a "success plan" developed which matches each youth's problems/needs with available educational and social services. Each case is managed in full consideration of the unique neighborhood and family variables in the youth's environment. Because the Youth and Family Specialists are employed by the Boys' and Girls' Clubs, they are presumably best suited to get their clients involved in alternative education programs, job placement mentoring programs, late night recreation, family support nights, and other structured programs run by their parent organization.

As a member of the CAT, the Youth and Family Specialists are expected to develop working relations with other members of the Team and with existing resources for youth and families. Site visits indicate that the potential for this position is virtually unlimited, but current funding levels are inadequate to expand the program or even retain qualified personnel.

Probation Officer

Prior to CCP, probation officers managed cases all across the city. Under the CAT concept, a probation officer is assigned to a geographic area (although there is some evidence that geographic integrity is not always possible). A primary function of the CCP Probation Officer is to provide information to the CAT about probationers, or other court-supervised juveniles, and to manage these cases. Officers develop treatment and correctional plans for probationers, and provide counseling and supervision. For juvenile cases in which further judicial action is not appropriate, the Probation Officer can adjust the case with restitution, community service hours, or detention. The ultimate hope, according to the CCP Coordinator, is that the CAT structure will allow Probation Officers "to link their kids and their families to these other services more effectively." Given that: (1) probation is by far the most common criminal sanction in the United States; (2) probationers typically remain in the "the hood" as high-risk offenders; and, (3) traditional sanctions have been ineffective in reducing recidivism, the Salt Lake City model makes good sense. That is, a proactive, prevention-oriented probation officer should play a critical role in any neighborhood-based anti-crime initiative.

One problem cited by CAT members is the frequent inability of probation officers, with their large case loads, to participate in the CAT meetings. Shortly after taking charge of the Office in July, 1996, however, a new (but experienced) Supervisor implemented a new protocol whereby probation officers attend CAT meetings on a monthly and "as-needed" basis during which all probation-related matters are discussed. Also, a decision to hold CAT meetings at the Probation offices helped to increase attendance. Other internal adjustments were made to probation officers' schedules by January, 1997, and CAT matters were, in general, given a higher priority by the Supervisor, thus eliminating questions about Probation's involvement in, or commitment to, CCP.

Mayor's Office of Community Affairs

One staff member from the Mayor's Office of Community Affairs (called Community Relations Coordinators in the grant proposal) is assigned to each CAT to "serve as liaison between the public and city government" (Job description). This individual is expected to work with relevant city agencies (other than the Police Department) such as code enforcement, health, traffic, public works, and recreation. In some respects, the Mayor's staff try to serve as ombudspersons for the communities—working closely with the Community Councils and listening carefully to citizens' concerns and complaints. The Community Relations Coordinators also have direct access to the Mayor and, consequently, can provide immediate feedback to, and receive direction, from the Mayor herself.

City Prosecutor

Each CAT team has been assigned an Assistant City Prosecutor to be a legal advisor, file cases for prosecution, and develop alternatives to prosecution when this approach seems warranted. The City Prosecutor's Office handles Class B and C misdemeanors, which the City Prosecutor argues are "very predictive of larger neighborhood problems." The offenses handled by the City Prosecutor include prostitution, fledgling domestic violence cases, the first three Driving-Under-the-Influence offenses (DUI), and all neighborhood disorders. Both the CCP Coordinator and the City Prosecutor talked at length about addressing crime problems "more creatively," about their belief in the "Broken Windows" hypothesis, and about opportunities to prevent future problems through public education and early prosecutorial intervention. The Prosecutor describes the new approach this way: "We want to change the way Prosecution does business. Rather than x days in jail or x dollars in fines, let's give them the skills to change their behavior." The goal is the prevention of future contacts with the criminal justice system, which the Prosecutor wants to achieve by "giving them a choice" between signing up for skill-building and educational programs or facing traditional sanctions (e.g., see Peace Center programs).

Under the CCP grant, three Assistant City Prosecutors were hired on contract (now part of the City's budget). Assistant City Prosecutors were initially scheduled to participate in CAT meetings, at least part-time. According to CCP staff, these prosecutors would "help to identify ordinances, prepare letters to judges, and do research that would use the legal system to help solve problems." While the concept is laudable, this is one area where some implementation problems were immediately apparent. While the City Prosecutor was supportive of the idea, her CCP employees felt their court schedules prevented them from being full participants on the CAT team (other team members complained as well about their absence). In the second year, however, the City Prosecutor was responsive to this problem and prosecutors on the CAT were noticeably more satisfied with the arrangement. And, by the end of 1996, the City Prosecutor had assigned two additional Assistant Prosecutors to CATs thus reducing each CAT prosecutors' workload to one CAT team each (two had been working with two CAT teams each). Although one CAT prosecutor acquired extensive additional responsibilities in late 1996 when she was appointed the new CCP Coordinator, she was also one of the Assistant Prosecutors able to reduce her CAT team duties from two to one and appeared to be coping well with the workload. From the standpoint of the CAT teams, each now has its own prosecutor.

Youth and Gang Programs

One could argue, convincingly, that nearly every component of the CCP grant, as well as several other grants received by the city, is focused on the reduction of youth crime and gang involvement. In Salt Lake City, however, the program components are not promoted as "anti-gang" initiatives, *per se*. Two sets of strategies are employed: (1) enforcement efforts to remove gang crime and gang houses from the neighborhood through a new nuisance abatement ordinance and through criminal prosecution; and, (2) a wide range of prevention and early intervention programs designed to provide alternative education, employment skills, parenting skills, recreation, and treatment. These interventions are described in other sections of this case study, particularly in the infrastructure of community-based alternatives to incarceration.

Community Prosecution and Diversion

In addition to the important role that prosecutors play in helping to solve neighborhood problems as members of the CAT teams (described above), the City Prosecutor works with the schools, the YWCA, and new CCP staff to introduce a new way of thinking about law violators. In an attempt to modify the future behavior of certain offenders, the community prosecution model in Salt Lake City is sending a clear message to violators: "Instead of prosecuting you, we will give you the option of taking this 10-week class. If you complete the class successfully, we won't charge you with the crime." This helps the community to begin to address the "root causes" of problems such as domestic violence. Furthermore, this model is noteworthy because "we are taking resources that are out there and beginning to link them in ways they have never been linked before."

The key to community prosecution in Salt Lake City is alternative education. As noted earlier, a primary objective in this area was to provide individuals with the skills and knowledge necessary to avoid future prosecution. To advance this objective, the CCP planners proposed to focus on conflict mediation and family peace. Numerous planning meetings took place in the fall of 1995 to brainstorm the possibilities. The result of those meetings was the Community Peace Services (CPS) program, which provides a framework for integrating a range of community services pertaining to families. The purpose of CPS, according to a member of the planning team, is "to provide alternatives to prosecution and to build skills that can prevent future problems from occurring." The program includes preventive education, intervention, and mediation, and serves as both a provider and broker of services in the community.

An important sign of progress toward implementation of CPS was the hiring of a full-time program coordinator in January, 1996. He was selected from

among 42 applicants by a four-member search committee. The committee looked for someone with a vision who could build linkages with other agencies. This individual has proven to be outstanding.

Community-Based Alternatives to Incarceration

Pre-Probation and Intensive Supervision

The Pre-Probation component of CCP is supervised by Probation Intake personnel at the Third District (County) Court which has primary jurisdiction over juvenile cases and exclusive jurisdiction over all felonies and drug-related charges. The CCP grant funds one Pre-Probation Officer, who is a member of all five CATs, plus three Probation Intake staff who provide support services. At the beginning of 1997, an additional Pre-Probation Officer and two additional support staff were assigned to the program, thus reflecting the State's support for the CCP program. The supervisor of Probation Intake is also largely responsible for the Juvenile Drug Court effort and other intensive probation efforts, and works closely with both Juvenile Drug Court personnel (judges and counselors) and regular Probation staff.

The genius of Pre-Probation, in addition to the leverage over juveniles and their families derived from continued Court authority over the case, is the comprehensive problem-solving approach to case management undertaken by the Pre-Probation Officer. The Pre-Probation Officer, in collaboration with other members of the CAT Team, sets skill-building objectives for the subject, and usually the entire family, that are designed to help the subject(s) address the underlying causes of disorderly behavior. Referrals are made to the school district, social service and counseling agencies, mental health and medical facilities, etc., and, in some cases, to the CATs themselves for supervision of any community service required of the subject(s). Individual objectives are specifically tailored to address the problems and behaviors presented by each case and progress (or lack thereof) toward these objectives is scrupulously documented and discussed. When the Pre-Probation subject(s) are deemed to have substantially achieved the objectives established—or, in some cases, have no hope of success—the Pre-Probation Officer then makes his recommendation to the Court. Thus far, the Court has overwhelmingly followed the recommendations made by Pre-Probation.

Youth and Family Services Case Management

One of the primary actors in the management of cases diverted, at some point, from the judicial system, is the Youth and Family Specialist (YFS) housed at the Salt Lake City Boys' and Girls' Clubs. These CAT members

are considered to be an important link in any alternative to incarceration because they are: (1) based in neighborhoods or, at least, in Council Districts; and, (2) have direct access to the education and employment opportunity programs, as well as the counseling and recreational programs, housed at the Clubs. Although adjustments have been made in other troubled areas of the CCP network, the problem of hiring and retaining qualified personnel persists for the YFS.

Job Placement and Mentoring Program

The Boys' and Girls' Clubs of Salt Lake City take an integrated, three-tiered approach to providing youth and family services: Prevention, which focuses on general youth development and enrichment; Early Intervention, for younger juveniles who may have had some contact with the justice system; and Targeted Intervention, for older youth who have had contact with the justice system but are not yet considered "hard-core." Both the Youth and Family Specialists and the Job Placement and Mentoring Program (JPMP) are considered Targeted Intervention programs. Although the "first phase" of JPMP was funded by CCP, JPMP fits seamlessly into the Boys' and Girls' Clubs long-range service goals and is, in fact, well on its way to significant expansion that should continue well beyond the CCP-funded timeframe.

Truancy Center

The Truancy Center is a joint project of the Salt Lake City School District and the Salt Lake City Police Department. It is staffed during business hours (approximately 10 AM to 2 PM) by a counselor from the School District, a paid volunteer (who, in this case, is a former police officer) who primarily handles the administrative duties involved in processing truants, an average of two unpaid volunteers, and two juvenile officers on extra duty or overtime. The police officers are specially selected and usually have some prior experience in the schools or with juveniles. Truants are always kept in police custody in accordance with both state laws and city ordinances; other Center personnel are not allowed to transport truants.

Although CCP has provided some funding for the officer overtime necessary to the Truancy Center, the on-going financial support of the officers has been a point of contention between the Police Department and the School District.

As of January, 1997, this issue had not been resolved and was of considerable concern to Truancy Center staff.

Juvenile Drug Court with Diversion to Treatment

The Juvenile Drug Court is premised upon sentencing alternatives that focus on prevention and early intervention. This approach is seen as representing a radical departure from the traditional emphasis on serious, hard-core offenders and, as such, has encountered some difficulties in winning the support of a largely conservative bench.

The establishment of this long-planned District Court branch was, to some extent, hastened by the CCP grant. CCP funding enabled Third District Court personnel to hire one Deputy Court Clerk and one Deputy Probation Officer (who works with three other DPOs funded by the Salt Lake City School District) to assist in handling felony cases involving juveniles in Salt Lake City indicted for DUIs and drug possession (please note that, although the Third District Court handles all such juveniles cases throughout the county, the Juvenile Drug Court program *inter-agency agreement* currently extends only to juveniles within Salt Lake City). In addition, professional counselors with extensive juvenile experience provide on-site counseling and a wide variety of referral services to Drug Court offenders and their families.

Network Analysis

Theory and Application

Network analysis has emerged as a popular analytic strategy for understanding social relations, and is an appropriate tool for shedding light on CCP partnerships. Network analysis has a long history of use in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology (see Scott, 1991), and has now been used in other fields such as political science and education. The network approach assumes that (1) individuals are not isolated but rather function as part of a social system whereby their behavior is influenced by others, and (2) these social systems are structured and organized, and therefore, can be analyzed as predictable patterns of interaction. Thus, network analysis allows us to examine the structural properties of social relations by examining the interactions between individuals actors in a social network. Knoke & Kuklinski, (1982, p. 10) describe the two essential qualities of network analysis as "its capacity to illuminate entire social structures and to comprehend particular elements within the structure."

Recent advances in the theory and techniques of network analysis have been substantial (see Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1993; 1994 for reviews). Despite these advances, the utilization of these techniques and models for the study of community action and public elites has been limited (see Knoke, 1993).

The Comprehensive Communities Program was designed primarily as a vehicle to facilitate the development of citywide networks and partnerships—collective entities that were hypothesized to improve the odds of preventing urban violence and disorder above and beyond what could be expected from individuals and agencies working independently. In the context of the present study, network analysis is an important strategy for identifying patterns of interaction among those who play key roles in each CCP coalition. These wave one network data provide an empirical look at the relationships and social networks that were taking shape early on in five CCP cities.

Boundary Specification

Specifying the boundaries of the network in advance of data collection is an important part of network analysis. Unlike typical random sampling approaches, limits on the population or the sample must be carefully imposed. Essentially, we adopted a “realist” (Laumann et al., 1982) approach to boundary specification by allowing each CCP site to define their own network.³ The CCP proposals (prepared by the sites) were used by the research team to identify a preliminary list of potential actors and organizations within the CCP network. These lists were mailed to the CCP project director for review, who then recommended deletions and additions. The realist approach uses the criterion of “mutual relevance” to decide who belongs in a network. Here, the assumption is that individuals and groups are included in the network if they have a mutual interest in the CCP project and some capacity to influence the outcome. Indeed, there is reason to believe that individuals were included in the proposal (or later included in the network) because of their position in particular organizations or projects associated with CCP.

Sampling was not necessary in this study because the network populations were relatively small. Hence, all identified members of each network were included in the data collection effort.

Data Collection Methods and Procedures

The network data in this case study were collected as part of our Coalition Survey. The Coalition Survey was sent to sites from September, 1995 to June, 1996, depending on the site. This network analysis then is a snapshot

³The realist approach can be contrasted with the nominalist view. With the latter, network boundaries are determined by the researcher's theoretical framework.

of the relationships and social networks during the first half of the CCP implementation phase.

To measure CCP-related networks, respondents were given a list of individuals who were believed to be affiliated with the CCP coalition in their respective cities, and then asked how often they have contact with each individual on the list. Possible response options were "daily, weekly, monthly, every few months, never."

To enhance the network analysis, individual cases were dropped when they did not have sufficient contact with other members of the network. Including persons with rare or occasional contacts in the network would have distorted the results by causing more dense (and therefore less interpretable) clustering of the remaining actors. Hence, after examining the frequency distributions, a decision was made to include only respondents who reported having contact with at least 10% of the total network "at least every few months." The effects of applying this inclusion criterion are described separately for each site. The analysis strategy can be found in Appendix B.

Salt Lake City Network Analysis

Fieldwork in Salt Lake City suggests that a true network of partnerships was created as a result of the CCP initiative and was sustained as an integral feature of the daily operations of this venture. The network analysis confirms this conclusion and helps to clarify the nature and frequency of these contacts.

A total of 116 persons were evaluated in the original network matrix. Persons in the network had contact with anywhere from 4% to 46% of the total network (with a median of 16%). Because the network is relatively large, 15% of the total network (18 people) did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion in the analysis, i.e., having contact with at least 10% of the total network "at least every few months." At the other extreme, approximately 14% (16 people) had this minimum contact with at least one-third of the total network. As might be expected, people reported the most contact with the CCP coordinator (46% of the network), and the second most contact with the Mayor (42%). However, frequently-contacted persons were not all located in the Mayor's office. They included several individuals from the Police department and the Prosecutor's office, suggesting that key persons in the network worked outside the Mayor's office.

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used as the best way to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic was satisfactory. The stress value is .19 and the R^2 value is .81. The dimensions can be interpreted as a reflection of different approaches to public safety as reflected by different types of organizations. The vertical dimension (y axis) seems to distinguish between groups that focus on neighborhood improvement activities, with special attention to victim-oriented crime prevention (positive scores near the top), versus those who focus on offender-oriented crime prevention, especially alternatives to incarceration for at-risk youth and known offenders (negative scores near the bottom). This dimension may also reflect a philosophical or ideological difference about how to solve the crime problem in Salt Lake City. At one end (positive scores) are the citizen patrols and community groups who believe that neighborhood surveillance and enforcement play an important role in preventing crime and disorder. At the other end of this continuum are staff from the Boys and Girls Club, Juvenile Court, and Probation whose main objective is to prevent recidivism and help young offenders (and their families) avoid further contact with the criminal justice system.

The horizontal dimension (x axis) seems to distinguish between those who provide municipal government services (negative scores to the left) and those who provide community-based or school-based services (positive scores to the right). At the extreme left are activities emanating from the Mayor's office

and the Police Department, while at the extreme right are activities supported by the School District and by grassroots neighborhood organizations.

While these interpretations may offer a partial explanation for the observed patterns, what is also clear from the two-dimensional configuration is that distinct clusters can be identified in the different quadrants, typically emerging around key actors. (To some extent, these clusters help to refine, or establish limitations on, the above general conclusions.) In the upper left quadrant, the Chief of Police and the City Prosecutor provide the focal point of this cluster, which we have labeled "Citizen Patrols." This cluster is defined by an army of citizen patrols who serve as the "eyes and ears" of the police department and who have regular interaction with both Police and Prosecution units. In the upper right quadrant, there is a cluster of community council leaders who interact primarily with each other (labeled "Community Council"). These community councils provide a unique form of community-based government in Salt Lake and their level of interaction is enhanced by regular monthly meetings with the Mayor.

To the far right is a cluster labeled "School-Based Services." Members of this cluster are employed almost exclusively by the School District and participate in the Alternative Dispute Resolution group. Leading the charge is a District employee in charge of Community Education and a member of the CCP Management team.

At the bottom of the network is a cluster labeled "Youth Offender Services." This group is defined almost equally by representatives of the Boys and Girls Club and the Probation Department. However, it also includes key people from the School District, the Juvenile Court, and the City Council. In essence, this cluster reflects a diverse, working partnership whose members share a common goal of helping young offenders and their families stay out of trouble.

Finally, to the far left is a cluster labeled "Mayor and Community Policing." The Mayor and the Commander of the Police Department's Community Services Division were the anchors for this cluster during the first year. The plot indicates that they are surrounded by Community Policing Officers involved in the original Community Action Teams (CAT), and by a few members of the Mayor's staff. This configuration seems to reflect the Mayor's "open-door policy" and her centrality to the CCP initiative, as CAT teams represented the most visible component of CCP in Salt Lake City and had direct links to the her office.

Several general observations about the network results in Salt Lake City are in order. First, the CCP Coordinator is not at the core of any cluster or the

entire network—she appears somewhat isolated in the lower left quadrant. This outcome probably reflects her equal involvement with two clusters during the first year—the Mayor/Community Policing group and Youth Offender Services. Second, the pattern of results that emerged from Salt Lake City is consistent with the “hollow core” phenomenon described by Heinz and Manikas (1992). That is, the network is not centrally controlled or managed (like a wheel with a hub and spokes), but rather is shaped like a doughnut with a hollow center. Third, the wheel is held together, and the clusters are linked, by administrators and managers who appear to be on the margins of the five sub-networks. In reality, they are deeply involved in multiple clusters, so they appear marginal in multi-dimensional space. For example, administrators from the Boys and Girls Club and Probation provide the nexus between the Schools and the Youth Offender clusters. Similarly, administrators from the Mayor's Office and Prosecution serve as the linkage between the Mayor/Community Policing cluster and the Youth Offender group. Fourth, while adjacent clusters have some common members, clusters opposite each other on the circular network are likely to have limited contact. Fifth, while some clusters are fairly homogeneous (e.g. especially Community Councils and Schools-Dispute Resolution), at least one showed strong inter-agency cooperation (Youth Offender Services). Also, the Mayor's staff members were clearly represented in 3 of the 5 clusters, thus demonstrating her desire to oversee and link the major components of the CCP initiative. This helped to improve communication in the network.

Sustainability

One of the first tasks of the new CCP coordinator was to direct the efforts of the Management Team to formulating a sustainment plan for CCP. As of the end of December, 1996, the Team had succeeded in producing a first draft which was scheduled to be presented to a steering committee in January, 1997. The Mayor's existing Gang Task Force, which consists largely of leaders from area (including county and state) criminal justice agencies plus representatives from other agency and community groups, is currently serving as the Management Team's steering committee.

The sustainment plan has three major goals: 1) to sustain CCP beyond the federally funded period; 2) to refine CCP to make it more responsive; and, 3) to expand CCP to include new partners and resources (Sustainment Action Plan Draft, pp.1,2,5). As has been noted above, at least some of Goal 1's funding objectives have already been accomplished, including the two additional Community Mobilization Specialists in the Police Department's Office, the almost certain funding of the Juvenile Drug Court through an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention grant, and continued fund-raising for more YFSs through the Boys and Girls Club. Other funding, such as clerical staff, one additional Community Mobilization Specialist (for a total of six), overtime for Truancy Center staff in the Police Department's budget, and funding for Community Peace Services appears to be less certain. Although the sustainment plan lists inter-agency agreements *obtained in March, 1996*, as the second objective necessary to sustainment (goal 1), whether these agreements had, in fact been concluded was still in question in January, 1997. Because the inter-agency agreements are designed to formally establish cooperative, information-sharing relationships that will outlast the grant, the lack of such agreements was often cited by CAT members and other CCP participants as a major obstacle to CCP's post-grant future.

The second plan goal, that of refining the CCP process, focuses on the objectives of documenting and publicizing CCP efforts, developing a case management system for CATs' efforts, sharing information between CATs, better management of CAT meetings, and plotting a more active role for the Management Team. Everyone connected with the CCP program cited this final objective—a more active role for the Management Team—as essential to the ongoing viability of CCP. As has been implicitly and explicitly expressed throughout this report, the Management Team appears to be key to whether or not the CCP survives inter-agency tensions and turf wars, and the inevitable vagaries of politics.

The third and final plan goal addresses, in a systematic way, the need to expand the CCP network to include new partners and to create new linkages

between existing participants. Perhaps one of the most important, and most logical, tasks in this area is the planned establishment of a regular role for the school district—not just the various school-based programs currently linked to CCP—as a major participant in CCP. Also, the continued strengthening of relations with social service agencies who target at-risk populations, such as the Division of Child and Family Services, should pay off in the long run.

The CCP sustainment plan confirms the general impression that Salt Lake City has the resources, background, and vision necessary to move the CCP forward into the future. Their continuing desire to include the community in the process and their awareness of possible obstacles to health and growth all bode well. The key, however, may well be what the sustainment plan terms “Cooperation vs. Competition: In order for the CCP process to be sustained, partners must work toward a true collaborative . . . [A]gencies cannot compete with each other for limited resources, but work together to maximize resources available for all.” Salt Lake City has thus far been a model of such cooperation but the true test of CCP may come as outside funding dwindles and partner agencies are asked to share more of the financial and administrative burdens at the same time CCP services are becoming more in demand. Whether there is an effective or ineffective Management Team in place may well be the deciding factor.

Interim Summary

Summary of Progress in Salt Lake City

In the fall of 1995, CCP was off to a strong start in Salt Lake City. At the street level, staff from different agencies worked together effectively to solve specific neighborhood problems and, in fact, developed strong social bonds as members of the five CAT teams. However, at the management level, a structure was still struggling to define itself, and to establish working relationships between and within key CCP agencies. CAT team members were also feeling some frustration regarding a perceived lack of support either from their own parent agency or the Management Team.

By the end of 1996, CCP continued to make significant progress at the programmatic level. A number of educational programs were developed and implemented as referral services for high-risk youth, and as alternatives to prosecution and incarceration for known juvenile and adult offenders. Everyone affiliated with the CCP program continued to be excited about the Pre-Probation Program in the Juvenile Court. Because this new Program catches youth early in their offending career, it holds considerable promise for preventing recidivism and further contact with the criminal justice system.

Indirect evidence of CCP's success in Salt Lake City can be found in the city's commitment to maintain existing organizational changes and personnel, and include them in the 1996 City Budget (approximately \$1 million). This inclusion illustrates the commitment of the City Council, Mayor, and relevant department heads to the concept of integrated, neighborhood-based services. Salt Lake City is on the cutting edge of efforts to reinvent government at the neighborhood level. The Mayor's Office and the many governmental and community-based agencies participating in this venture should be commended for "pushing the envelope" in their effort to create new structures and services that are likely to prevent future criminal activity and reduce the demand for police and other criminal justice services.

Looking at success from a quantitative perspective, we are forced to rely on traditional police statistics to assess the impact of CCP on neighborhood crime rates. In 1995, the overall volume of gang-related crime began to decline slightly after years of strong increases (1994: 8516 vs. 1995: 8496). The most dramatic drop (35 percent) occurred in 1996 when the number of gang-related incidents fell to 5547 (non-graffiti incidents also dropped). Unfortunately, the number of drive-by shootings has continued to increase from 123 in 1994 to 208 in 1996.

Looking at the total crime picture, Salt Lake City has experienced a steady decline in the rate of violent crime after 1993, but property crime began to increase again in 1995. The problem of domestic violence persists, but community prosecution and education programs had not existed long enough to expect an impact on these figures.

Regarding the objective of reducing neighborhood problems, we have observed the CAT teams at work, and have noted some success with specific problems. These teams, by drawing on a wide variety of resources (ranging from other agencies to city ordinances), have been able to effectively impact prostitution, gang houses, drug dealers, and numerous incivilities (something at which they are quite good). However, we also observed that, because the CAT team is heavily staffed with criminal justice personnel (police, prosecution, courts), there is a tendency to rely on enforcement-oriented solutions. When they reach in their "tool box" of resources for a solution, they often pull out the enforcement or punishment hammer. Much time is spent on how to obtain evictions, what to do about violations of probation, etc.

Obstacles to Reform

The price of reform is having to face the many obstacles resulting from efforts to change the status quo. By the fall of 1995, CCP managers were learning "what works and doesn't work" with the original CCP plan. Some program components were working well, but as one CCP staff stated, "this collaborative process surfaces a lot of stuff that tends to be ignored and not dealt with." A prime example was the conflict between the Police Department and Mayor's Office. Early in the implementation process, they struggled over questions of "who's the boss?" Given that most of the funding went to the Police Department, yet the overall management was housed in the Mayor's Office, leadership often seemed to be up for grabs. Exacerbating this situation were the dramatically different management styles and institutional cultures of the two entities. The Police Department, despite a Police Chief with a progressive, community-oriented reputation, is characterized by a very traditional organizational structure and style of management, with rigid lines of reporting, a lack of openness to new solutions, punitive responses to mistakes, and other characteristics that were not conducive to an open dialogue with other agencies. In contrast, the Mayor's Office has an internal and external "open door" policy. The mission statement for the Mayor's Office includes values such as, "We freely share information. We openly express insights, experiences, issues, and frustrations. We encourage brainstorming, risk-taking, and open-mindedness. We recognize that each member of the team has equal and inherent value. We consciously engage the talents of every team member."

Despite these problems, the key actors "had developed enough ownership in the program that they wanted it to work right." Hence, to resolve problems, they contracted with Strategic Planning Services (a management consulting firm) in the fall of 1995 to assess organizational issues and identify issues that needed to be addressed, "so that we can move ahead successfully." Unfortunately, little came of the consultant's report. CCP managers did not feel the results were useful or the consultants would be available to help them implement the recommendations.

One useful recommendation, however, concerned the need for more direction and leadership of the Management Team and the CATs. Essentially, the Management Team served as an informal group of middle managers who did not have the authority to deal with policy issues affecting the CAT teams. The consultants recommended the creation of a formal governing board that would include the Mayor, Police Chief, and other CEOs. Upon the receipt of the consultants' report in the winter of 1996, some felt the need to implement this recommendation immediately. Because the CCP Coordinator did not have the authority to enforce the needed changes, there was a perceived need to establish the Mayor as the head of the Team. Also, given the inevitable withdrawal of federal funds, an empowered Management Team would be necessary to address the issue of sustainability.

The existing Management Team has created some interesting dynamics within the CCP structure. There is always some "sniping" at the people above: members of the CATs complain that "management never talks to us. We never see them. We need the heads above directing this. We can't be the tail wagging the dog." Above all, there is a continuing frustration with internal institutional barriers, especially within the Police Department. The street-level CATs program personnel are extremely invested in what they are doing with the community on a daily basis. As one manager pointed out, "They get so angry when the police or another agency says, 'No, we can't do that' . . . They get so angry with the institutional barriers that they personalize it." The frustration stems, in part, from recognizing that Salt Lake City has created an exciting, promising program and "we can't stand the fact that it's not all that it could be." The stresses created by coalition building and creating new management structures lie at the heart of the problem.

A key problem with the Management Team is that the "mechanism is not there" for it to be responsive to interagency issues created by CCP. In reality, the Team is a new organizational entity that is larger than the individual components, but cannot override them. The dilemma is this: on the one hand, policies guiding interagency functions are necessary to the success of the CATs and the overall CCP effort. On the other hand, no single organization or department can set such policies, nor does the interagency Management Team have the authority to impose policies on its constituent

agencies. Although the new CCP Coordinator had attempted to provide the Management Team with clear goals and objectives at the end of 1996, CCP participants were still looking for stronger leadership and clear policies from this interagency organizational structure.⁴

To some extent, structural issues were both relieved and exacerbated at the end of 1996 by the severing of the CCP Coordinator's position into two areas of responsibility: one purely financial and re-located to the City's Budget Office, and the other administrative and remaining in the Mayor's Office. Although the new CCP Administrative Coordinator quickly gained the respect of both the Management Team and other CCP participants with her exceptionally strong organizational skills, CAT team experience, and sheer common sense, the CCP Coordinator continues to lack any authority whatsoever over the Management Team or any other CCP entity. To further confuse the issue of authority and accountability, the current CCP Coordinator is an Assistant City Prosecutor and, as such, is subject to the supervision of the City Prosecutor (a key member of the Management Team the Coordinator is attempting to re-energize and make more accountable); in other words, the Coordinator is in the awkward position of attempting to manage her supervisors. Finally, because the CCP Coordinator is an employee of the City Prosecutor's Office but, as the CCP Coordinator she sometimes works out of the Mayor's Office, the potential for even greater confusion exists if the Coordinator's position and authority are not clarified in the future.

Accompanying the re-definition of the CCP Coordinator's position, the original CCP Coordinator moved to a new position within the Police Department. In this capacity, the former Coordinator will act as the civilian assistant to the Captain in charge of the Community Support Division. Because the Captain and former Coordinator share a vision of the Department and community policing and problem-solving, this new position may have a substantial positive impact upon CCP and the future of the Department itself. On the other hand, the movement of the highly-visible former CCP Coordinator into the Police Department has the potential to fuel any existing "who's the boss?" tensions between the Department and the Mayor's Office.

In addition to the structural issues, cultural and institutional barriers to full implementation also arise. The Police Department, as noted above, is a

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One plan calls for the creation of a "Mayor's Criminal Justice Advisory Council" to "coordinate all juvenile and adult crime control efforts," but this may be too broad to meet the needs of the present neighborhood-based service delivery system.

different type of organization than the Mayor's Office. The police organization is a quasi-military operation with a clear chain of command. As one employee said, "You don't skip over anyone, or heaven forbid." The Mayor's Office was described as "exactly the opposite." Persons assigned to this project from the Mayor's Office are Community Liaisons, whose job it is to report back directly to the Mayor's Office. When anything happens, "the Mayor knows about it immediately." She will contact the Chief, and often, he will not yet know about the problem. Within the police organization, information "gets filtered from him—not on purpose, but it is part of the process—they don't want anyone to look bad." The former CCP Coordinator's new position within the Police Department may have the potential to "open up" this quasi-military orientation.

One consequence of these tensions is that City powers have, at times, felt a "disloyalty by the ranks." Management maintains frustrated street-level employees have been "telling the community what to tell City Hall." In essence, members of certain CAT teams were organizing community residents against city government. Management began to say, "Wait a minute, we're on the same team—we're not the bad guys!" To a large extent, this type of response should be expected when government agencies attempt to create a decentralized, multi-agency neighborhood-level service delivery system. In essence, Salt Lake City has struggled with "underlying core issues" that could undermine the program if it were not for the strong commitment to the basic concepts at the highest level.

At the operational level, the CAT team concept is working quite well with many improvements taking place by the beginning of 1997. Prosecutors and probation officers, for example, were either staffed up or released from more conventional responsibilities in order to give their full attention to neighborhood-based problem solving and rarely missed CAT meetings (formerly a common complaint from other team members). With regard to the flow of information between agencies, the only weak link in the CAT team appears to be the drug court, and that is because the court process occurs in a separate environment and the program is new. As one CAT member noted, "We have to figure out how to get reports from the CAT team into the drug court." However, the other agencies seem to be well-connected and working as a coherent unit.

As noted earlier, the CAT teams have been successful at addressing specific neighborhood concerns. Generally speaking, enforcement strategies have been effective at achieving the goal of the CATs and the communities they serve; namely, to rid the neighborhood of immediate problems. CAT members argue (and we have no reason to question them) that local residents are ecstatic when the drug house or loud music is removed, and that community satisfaction is the primary measure of success. However, they also admit that the problem is often moved to another neighborhood. Hence,

we would encourage them to give more attention to the components of CAT that have the potential to have a *lasting* impact on the community. These include the Youth and Family Specialists, and the efforts behind the Pre-Probation and Juvenile Drug Court Program. These are innovative efforts to link younger offenders and high-risk kids to needed services, and to do so with the threat of the criminal justice system compelling the participation of both the juvenile offender and his/her family. This innovative approach of early intervention/prevention, backed by a real threat of criminal justice enforcement for noncompliance, should be a model for the rest of the country.

Finally, the extent of community mobilization in Salt Lake City and the opportunity structures that have been created for citizen input is also a model for other cities. Salt Lake City, perhaps due to the exemplary role of the LDS Church, is one of the best organized communities in the country. Some of this can be replicated.

In sum, Salt Lake City has made a strong commitment to reduce violence and improve the quality of residential life by creating innovative partnerships and new organizational arrangements. These unique structures and agreements are designed to coordinate and apply the complementary expertise and resources of different organizations, agencies, and individuals. Salt Lake City has demonstrated the political will to tackle organizational problems that other cities in the United States, despite their lip service to the concept of "partnerships," are afraid to confront. In the 1990s, many municipal and criminal justice agencies have been willing to form a "partnership" with the community on their own terms, but rarely are they willing to establish a true partnership with each other that requires a new set of superordinate organizational policies, the sharing of blame and credit for program outcomes, and the resolution of differences at all levels of the partnership. Salt Lake City is a model of a truly comprehensive communities program.

An Epilogue to CCP's Salt Lake City's Case Study

Introduction

Salt Lake City's Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP), which began April 1, 1995 with a \$2.2 million grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, sought to create "a neighborhood-based model for the prevention, intervention, and suppression of crime." (CCP program brochure, 1995) The main mission of the Salt Lake City project is to "restructure our law enforcement and social services systems so they can effectively reduce violent youth crime in today's environment in a comprehensive way." At the core of the CCP initiative in practice are five innovative units called Community Action Teams (CAT). A CAT is a neighborhood-based problem-solving team comprised of representatives from relevant government and not-for-profit agencies, which has responsibility for addressing crime-related community problems in a specific geographic area. In addition to these efforts to "reinvent" government and social service activity at the neighborhood level, Salt Lake City's CCP includes a variety of programs directed at early intervention, treatment, community mobilization, and alternatives to traditional criminal justice approaches to processing offenders.

Overview

Nearly two years after their introduction, the CAT teams remain both the centerpiece and the foundation of innovation in Salt Lake City. CAT teams now appear to be the accepted way of doing business in Salt Lake City and have accrued support from a growing number of state and local government, social service, education, and community-based agencies, as well as from community residents. Further, growth in both the depth and breadth of overall support for the CCP approach has manifested itself in a number of tangible ways, including the level of active participation, the development of new CCP programs, and the provision of financial support to expand and sustain CCP-based initiatives. Although some issues (largely at the management level) that were previously identified as obstacles continue to trouble many participants, CCP's ability to flourish — despite some very public and potentially devastating challenges — bodes well for CCP's continued viability.

New Developments and Issues in CCP

New Developments in CCP

The primary locations of growth within the CCP framework have been identified as: 1) more active participation by more agencies in the CAT teams, 2) the development of more alternative programs under the aegis of the Community Peace Services (CPS), and 3) the expansion of the Juvenile Drug Court and other juvenile-oriented programs and services in the Third District Court (funded, however, with state monies).

Growth of the CAT Teams

By all reports, more agencies – particularly city agencies – participate in the CAT teams on a regular basis. Attendance at CAT team meetings is said to have doubled in the past year.

Many of the CAT teams initially established their credibility through successful efforts to close down drug houses, address general disorder at problem locations, and, on a city-wide basis, have some impact on a high-profile prostitution problem. CAT team successes won the gratitude of Salt Lake City residents who had been intimidated by problems in their neighborhoods and empowered those residents to become actively involved in the projects undertaken by the CATs. Successes also attracted the attention and support of other government and non-government agencies that had previously been frustrated in their isolated attempts to address many of the same situations that the CATs had favorably impacted. And, as many other jurisdictions have found, a problem for one government agency very frequently is a problem for other agencies; e.g., buildings that violate health and building codes often are in arrears for taxes and fees, have failed to pay water bills, house problem tenants, etc. When the relevant agencies and services work together to solve a common problem, they almost always are more successful than when those same agencies are working in isolation. The success and the camaraderie generated by the original CATs has proven to be both highly empowering to participants and highly attractive to agencies and individuals who had previously taken a “wait and see” attitude.

Development of Community Peace Services Programs

All of the Community Peace Services (CPS) programs in place at the time of our last report (end of 1996) had grown or developed in some way in 1997. The “Choices” counseling program for victims of domestic violence had expanded, as projected, to include special classes for juveniles and victims of

"date rape." Citizenship classes for immigrants remains a popular tool for the City Prosecutor and City Courts to divert those legal and illegal immigrants who have been found guilty of traffic and other specified misdemeanor violations away from counter-productive fines and/or incarceration and toward more responsible citizenship. The Teen Tobacco program remains popular and HARMONY, a conflict resolution program for juveniles, has experienced dramatic growth.

HARMONY has, in fact, spawned a number of related efforts. HARMONY classes initially took place one evening per week at the Boys and Girls Club. The Utah State Bar has since recruited attorneys to extend this program to day and evening classes at Salt Lake City schools. There is also a legal education program, again supported by the Utah State Bar that is expanding into the schools. And, in cooperation with the City Prosecutor's Office and the Police Department, CPS is developing a neighborhood law class that will be offered to Community Councils and Neighborhood Watch groups.

The coordinator of CPS, Raymond Christy, entered the position with a wealth of professional contacts and relationships that have proven to be invaluable to the growth and development of CPS programs. Christy has continued to cultivate new resources and coordinate existing resources in an effort to provide services without duplicating effort and expense. Christy now regularly attends CAT meetings and the CCP Management Team meeting, and acts as a conduit for services and contacts for both CAT teams and CCP members.

Expansion of Juvenile-Related Programs in the Third District Court

The Juvenile Drug Court, along with the Third District Court's heavy emphasis on juvenile diversion to treatment and holistic approach to addressing family-based problems, is being expanded state-wide. The key elements facilitating this expansion are:

The model Juvenile Drug Court and other related juvenile programs had to be approved by the Utah State Bar and the court system all the way to the state level *at their inception*, thus familiarizing state-level officials with the concept and laying the groundwork for the current expansion.

Duane Boudreaux, affiliated with the Boys and Girls Club of Salt Lake City and one of the original CCP partners, has recently been elected to the state legislature, giving CCP-based programs an advocate at the state level.

At the local level, the key players at the Third District Court and in the Probation Department have excellent and long-standing working relationships, and are also well-respected individually. These relationships

have greatly facilitated the success of the juvenile-related programs and have earned the program credibility beyond the boundaries of the Third District. It is important to note that these players continue to be involved long past the point when their CCP funding has ceased.

Utah, and the Salt Lake City area in particular, is experiencing a dramatic increase in population and in cultural diversity. Juvenile crime has been a concern for at least five years and there is some reasonable apprehension that the anticipated increases in population and in cultural diversity may contribute to the juvenile crime situation. The model programs instituted in the Third District give some hope of proactive intervention before juvenile disorder does, in fact, become juvenile crime.

Issues in CCP

CCP participants interviewed in late February 1998 cited no new problems or issues that had arisen in 1997. Further, interviewees unanimously agreed that improvements had been made in almost every area that had been cited as an "Obstacle to Reform" in the final case study. Although some concern was still voiced regarding two long-standing issues—the role and the perceived efficacy of the Management Team, and the relationship between the Mayor's Office and the Police Department—the continued growth of the CAT teams and the expansion of the depth and breadth of commitment to CCP far outweighs these largely administrative and political concerns.

Improvement in the Relationship between the CATs and the City Council

By the end of 1996, CATs had become enormously popular at the neighborhood level and there was some feeling that the CATs had developed a "to hell with City Hall, we'll do it ourselves" attitude. Communication between City Council members and the CATs working in the Council members' districts was generally poor. This lack of communication contributed to tension and mutual mistrust between the CATs and the Council—particularly when Council members would find out about a high-profile CAT project in their area through the local media instead of from the CAT team.

Today, CATs communicate regularly with the Council and a collaborative, mutually supportive relationship has developed. Council members receive the minutes of CAT meetings on a weekly basis, and Council members and City Hall staff confer with CATs regarding staffing and management issues. In addition, an array of CAT members, Council members, and City Hall staff meet weekly with the Mayor to address specific issues and coordinate

activities. To some extent, communications between a CAT and its Council member are now considered better than the communications between CATs. City Council members are reported to have recognized over time that many problems might not have been solved but for the CATs. This recognition led the Council to accept, value, and support the CATs. Interviewees cited the Council's vote to provide funding for the Youth and Family Specialists (YFS), the hiring of additional City Prosecutors to work with CATs, and the support of Community Peace Services, as tangible proof of the Council's support. And, perhaps most importantly, continued funding for CCP initiatives beyond the life of the grant would have been extremely difficult to obtain without strong Council support.

It is important to note that the Council's adoption and support of the YFSs successfully addressed serious concerns regarding that position voiced throughout our initial case studies. The YFSs, originally funded and managed through the Boys and Girls Clubs, were perceived as vital actors in the identification of and intervention in youth and family problems; one of the primary goals of CCP. It soon became apparent, however, that original funding levels were inadequate to retain qualified individuals in these positions; CCP could support neither the salaries nor the benefits considered appropriate. The adoption of the position by the City Council has established YFSs as City employees with salaries and benefits both more secure and more commensurate with the importance of their role to CCP.

The Role of the Management Team

The role of the Management Team has long been an issue in the Salt Lake City CCP. An independent consulting firm did, in the fall of 1995, cite the structure, direction, and leadership of the Management Team as one of the organizational issues that CCP needed to address. Since that time, the Management Team is reported to have made significant structural improvements. Some fundamental concerns regarding the leadership of the Management Team, however, have persisted.

At the time of our prior studies, inter-agency agreements were considered essential to the continued viability of the Management Team and, indeed, to continued collaboration between CCP partners. Almost everyone involved in CCP deemed inter-agency agreements necessary to formalize and ratify the new relationships created between agencies and, if possible, to aid in resolving some of the inevitable "turf" issues that had arisen. Although these agreements were often said to be "in the works", none were in evidence at the end of 1996. Then, in 1997, the new CCP Administrative Coordinator made inter-agency agreements a high priority. As of February 1998, Memorandums of Understanding were in effect between the Mayor's Office,

Police Department, City Prosecutor's Office, Third District Juvenile Court, School District, Boys & Girls Clubs, United Way, Division of Child and Family Services, Housing Authority, and Mobile Neighborhood Watch.

There is no question that inter-agency agreements constitute a great step forward in the long-term institutionalization of CCP and the Management Team. Currently, however, the day-to-day role of the Management Team remains an open question. First, in its role as a vehicle for management, communication, and coordination between CATs, the Management Team is considered to be only marginally effective. CAT teams still duplicate the efforts of other CAT teams and regularly "re-invent the wheel" due to, as participants termed it, "not meeting regularly enough to know what's up with different projects." Communication and coordination between CCP agencies represented on the Team was also perceived as uneven, with some agencies (perhaps quite naturally and inevitably) working closely together while other agencies sometimes "drifted." Second, the new (since the end of 1996) CCP Administrative Coordinator has proven to be well-respected, highly organized, and has succeeded in accomplishing a number of administrative tasks (chiefly the aforementioned inter-agency agreements) necessary to the evolution of CCP. She is also an experienced and creative member of the CAT teams and thus ensures that the voice of the CATs will be heard. On the other hand, the Administrative Coordinator's primary role as an Assistant City Prosecutor, with an office in the City Prosecutor's Office, continues to be problematic. Although the physical detachment of the Administrative Coordinator from the Mayor's Office was acknowledged to be an "oddity", the perceived efficacy of the Administrative Coordinator does not appear to have been hampered by this "oddity." What is problematic is the Administrative Coordinator's lack of authority over either the Management Team or its constituent members. And, as cited in our earlier case study, issues of authority and accountability are further confused because the Coordinator "is subject to the supervision of the City Prosecutor...; in other words, the Coordinator is in the awkward position of attempting to manage her supervisor." As one interviewee put it, the Coordinator is "just not up high enough." To help remedy this situation, funds are being sought to establish a "CAT Manager's" position in the Mayor's Office (where the original Administrative Coordinator's office was). Without the prerogatives of leadership and authority - and with "Coordinators" located in the Prosecutor's Office, Police Department, and Mayor's Office--there is some question as to whether this new position will help to close the perceived leadership gap or exacerbate an existing "who's the boss?" atmosphere.

In a final note, many of the supra-agency issues discussed above were once planned to be referred to a group of Management Team representatives who would have the authority to negotiate and decide upon cross-agency policy and

procedure. Because almost all of these Management Team representatives were already on the Mayor's Gang Task Force, it was deemed unnecessary to duplicate these meetings and the Gang Task Force was projected to evolve into an Interagency Coordinating Council. As of February 1998, however, interviewees were either unaware of or unclear regarding the relationship between this Task Force/Council, the Management Team, and the CATs.

The Relationship between the Mayor's Office and the Police Department

As was noted in our earlier case study (and as is not uncommon), the Mayor's Office and the Police Department have distinctly different organizational cultures. The Mayor's Office tends to encourage open participation and "brain-storming" while the Police Department tends to be hierarchical and quasi-militaristic. In efforts to implement change, the Police Department has received agency-wide training in TQM and community policing, has instituted differential response strategies and made other organizational innovations, and, above all, is a key player in the CATs. Despite these efforts, most of the Department's problem-solving strategies remain enforcement-oriented (with an emphasis on the use of nuisance abatement ordinances), the expansion of problem-solving beyond special units and divisions remains slow, and, as reported in the media, the Department's newest "community policing" initiative is the control of gangs.

In addition to these common cultural differences, the fact that a substantial portion of CCP funds went to the Police Department while general management was originally housed in the Mayor's Office created some conflict. Although this conflict was long kept in the background, in 1997 an unrelated situation precipitated the "acting out" of tension between the Mayor and the Police Chief in public. Although this public conflict could have debilitated CCP, it is a testament to the commitment of *all* CCP partners (including the Mayor and Police Chief), and the support that the CATs enjoy in the community and with the Council, that the situation was not allowed to affect CCP. As of February 1998, both the Mayor and Police Chief are reported to be very popular with the community and both remain fully committed to CCP.

The transition of CCP from a grant-based initiative to a locally funded and supported institution does not appear to be in question (see below). The *way* in which future CCP-based efforts are funded and maintained may, however, have implications for CCP partner relationships; particularly that of the Mayor's Office and the Police Department. As has been noted, the City, led by the Mayor and the City Council, have been instrumental in "stepping up" to undertake the current and future funding of CCP-related personnel and program costs. Although some of these personnel are housed in the Police

Department, a significant number of other personnel and programs – e.g., in the City Prosecutor's Office, CPS, Boys and Girls Clubs, and the Mayor's Office itself – are not. The Police Department, on the other hand, plans to develop a Comprehensive Community Policing Development Program that builds upon CCP and has solicited funding from the COPS to support this venture. And, as has also been noted above, the original, single CCP Administrative Coordinator housed in the Mayor's Office will soon develop into one "Coordinator" each in the Mayor's Office, Police Department, and City Prosecutor's Office. This spread of funding and management across two of the principal CCP agencies may again, as in the early days of the CCP implementation process, create a "who's the boss?" atmosphere. Given the CCP's prior experience with this type of tension, it will be interesting to note whether that experience enables CCP partners to control or avoid any possible future conflict.

Synergistic Effects of CCP

The real genius of CCP is the capacity it created to foster synergistic effects at different levels. The primary example of this is the synergies created between individual representatives of different agencies at the CAT team level. Then there were the synergies harnessed by a single agency, such as CPS, to provide social services in an efficient and effective manner. And, finally, there was the synergistic effect produced by the pooling of resources and efforts among a handful of agencies, such as the Third District Court and the Probation Department, to create new regional programs that were expandable to a statewide level.

CCP also created a new process paradigm that stimulated individual agencies to marshal the resources necessary to "push the envelope." As alluded to above, the Salt Lake City Police Department has submitted a proposal to COPS for a Community Policing Demonstration Center based, at least in part, upon the foundation built by CCP. Although the Department can and does plan to build upon a long history of community involvement and cohesion in Salt Lake City (as did the CCP proposal), the centerpiece of the Department's COPS proposal is the CAT teams and the problem-solving efforts that have been undertaken by the CATs. The Department plans to make far-reaching infrastructure improvements that will facilitate the Department's ability to "push the problem-solving envelope."

Sustainment of CCP

CCP is a dynamic, engaging initiative that has changed the way that government and non-government agencies, community-based groups, and

community residents do business in Salt Lake City. The CAT teams, in particular, have stimulated a move toward what one participant called "community-based government." The CATs have successfully tapped into a long history of community involvement and cohesion while the CCP planning process gave a new structure and purpose to the interactions of police service, government services, and community-based groups. Moreover, individuals and agencies that had taken a "wait and see" attitude are now "jumping on the bandwagon" and enjoying a new sense of empowerment, camaraderie, and accomplishment as a result. CCP initiatives and the CCP approach are well integrated into the political landscape of Salt Lake City from the neighborhood to the City Council. And each and every CCP initiative – from the CATs to the Juvenile Drug Court to the CPS—has garnered strong political, financial, personal, and ideological backing. Although CCP has encountered obstacles and may continue to be hampered by management issues, there can be little doubt that CCP is flourishing.

Due in equal part to strong popular support and good planning (and a healthy local economy), continued funding of CCP initiatives beyond the life of the grant has been anticipated, discussed, and provided for on an on-going basis. There is no hint of "planned obsolescence" about CCP. As mentioned above, the Mayor's Office and City Council have consistently come forward to undertake the financial burden of un- or under-funded CCP personnel – additional Assistant City Prosecutors, Youth and Family Specialists, additional Community Mobilization Specialists, administrative support (for taking and distributing minutes of CAT meetings and doing CAT paperwork) – and programs such as CPS. Further, the Police Department and other City agencies pursue grants and other sources of funding expressly to enhance or expand CCP-based initiatives, and have a strong record of successful proposals to build upon.

Final Conclusions Regarding the Success of CCP

From a strong start in late 1995, CCP has maintained and built upon a Salt Lake City history of community involvement and cohesion. The CAT teams introduced a new, effective way to problem-solve at the neighborhood level that energized local government agencies, the school district, the court system, the City Council, the faith community, and the residents themselves. Despite some on-going frustrations with management and leadership issues (which is surely to be expected when trying to re-invent government so that it is more community-based and -oriented), important progress was made in the form of inter-agency agreements. And, in fact, most management and leadership issues paled beside the strong support and tangible successes enjoyed by the CATs.

Salt Lake City, like many other innovative jurisdictions, may soon face the challenge of institutionalization and evolution. In addition, the Salt Lake region is projected to be at the beginning of a period of dramatic demographic and economic growth that will present problems of scale and diversity hitherto unknown in the area. For Salt Lake City to maintain the excitement and promise generated by CCP, they must make a commitment to continue to "push the envelope" while meeting the challenges presented by a changing demographic and economic landscape. In addition, key players must be mindful of the possibility that unresolved management and leadership issues, and the tendency for even the most innovative of agencies to fall back upon reflexive (i.e., enforcement-oriented, unanalyzed) responses could still prove fatal to CCP. However, given the capacity and commitment demonstrated by CCP thus far, the CCP partners will prove equal to the challenge.

Appendix A: Program Descriptions

Community Peace Services

Because the mission of the Community Peace Services (CPS) Program is to integrate existing community services to families, as well as to identify unaddressed needs, CPS linked up with an established, well-respected YWCA domestic violence course called "Choices." This ten-week course is offered as an alternative to prosecution. There are separate tracks for men and women. Students can enter at any point in the first seven weeks under open enrollment. While this arrangement meets the needs of the courts, the open enrollment and relatively short duration of the course may be incompatible with needs of the victims to share experiences and develop a self-help group. The first group of seven graduated on July 22, 1996. A new pilot program offers similar classes to prostitutes in jail. And a course in "Choices" for young people is also on the drawing board.

One outgrowth of the CPS is the development of a "Citizenship Skills" class that began in the fall of 1996. The City Prosecutor's Office identified a need for the education of citizens who would otherwise be prosecuted repeatedly for non-insurance, non-registered plates, or no driver's license. Immigrants are often arrested for these violations because of ignorance and fear: being fearful of the INS, many will not fill out any paperwork. As one CCP staff noted, "they don't register their kids, don't immunize their kids, and don't get their license. Because they don't have a legal immigration card, you can't have a social security card, which means you can't have a driver's license." Yet because these individuals need to work to support their family, they often drive illegally.

Today, when such violators are apprehended, they are allowed the option of a "plea-in-abeyance" (PIA) whereby the case is dismissed (in six months) if the defendant complies with all specified requirements, including the completion of the Citizenship Skills course. Other requirements often include proof that the vehicles is insured or sold, proof of vehicle registration, court fees (with credit for the cost of the Citizenship course), and six months of good behavior on probation. One prosecutor described the benefits this way: "The dismissal of the charges should enable them to obtain insurance more readily and at a lower cost than if a conviction showed on their record. It should also make it easier to obtain a driver's license for the same reason." Most importantly, the Citizenship course is designed to help local residents become law-abiding citizens and reduce their likelihood of future contact with the criminal justice system.

One of the CPS Coordinator's accomplishments was a Teens Tobacco program which he developed as an interactive prevention education curriculum at the high school. He identified teachers or facilitators who lead four sessions, 1.5 hours each, that cover the consequences of smoking, life skills, decision making, communication skills, and other topics. Parent attendance is required. Although participants are court-referred (by an intake officer or judge), some judges do not believe that cigarettes are a gateway drug or that smoking is addictive. One judge has, however, been very supportive and in the near future, CPS will need to introduce a cessation program.

The CPS Coordinator has developed a violence reduction course for students, HARMONY, which was scheduled to begin in the fall of 1996. The program is projected to enroll kids who violate the Safe Schools Policy (e.g., carrying a weapon to school) or who are facing criminal charges in court (the relationship with the courts is currently being finalized). The course teaches youths about alternatives to violence, especially those involving improved communication skills. The school district superintendent's only directive was to make the program "responsive, accessible, and non-bureaucratic." The program will consist of four two-hour sessions.

All of the above court-ordered classes requires the education of court personnel regarding the need, purpose, and use of these services. CPS has provided this education, and has developed forms for use by judges, court officers, and prosecutors. Court personnel simply check the course on the form. The CPS program is becoming accepted by court supervisors and others, and will probably be used more extensively in the future.

There are multiple providers and potential users of these programs, but CPS must cultivate relationships with each agency, develop awareness, and offer a specific remedy for dealing with law-related problems facing children and families. After relationships and partnerships have formed and developed, the participants often undergo a significant increase in their awareness of the ways in which needy families might be served. As one school official observed, people begin to ask, "if you're doing this, then could you do this?" Now that programs are started, program staff are beginning to see the need for additional, follow-up services.

All CPS programs are available for referrals from CAT groups. The CPS Coordinator makes presentations before the CATs, Community Councils, and other groups to make them aware of the services available. Thus far, the most popular CPS service utilized by CATs is the mediation program.

In the long term, CPS courses are designed to be self-sustaining. A sliding scale fee may be charged for some of the programs, which can help to subsidize other programs (Note: court-imposed fees for such programs will be lower than the alternative fine resulting from a conviction). The overall plan

is to run the CPS as a business that pays for itself. In the meantime, the city and the School district are talking about sharing the Coordinator's salary.

The school district—which provides many of the material resources for CPS in collaboration with the City Prosecutor's Office—has been progressive in promoting partnerships between criminal justice and social service agencies in order to better serve the needs of children and families in Salt Lake City. The district is also working with the courts to discuss the possibility of making court-ordered referrals to the schools for counseling.

Finally, on the subject of alternative education, we should note that the Boys' and Girls' Clubs offer some important classes for high-risk youth. In addition, the city has built a major new high school exclusively for alternative education. This high school will house and educate students who have difficulty with traditional educational environments. Although this school is not supported with CCP funds, some linkages have been established for referrals.

Community-Based Alternatives to Incarceration

Pre-Probation and Intensive Supervision

Pre-Probation provides case management for individuals, as well as their families, who have been deemed appropriate subjects for early intervention and prevention services. Guidelines regarding appropriate cases for referral to Pre-Probation are straightforward: one or, at most, two prior contacts with the Court; no drug-related felonies; and no sexual assaults and/or arrests indicating habitually violent behavior. Cases are, however, viewed in their entirety and Pre-Probation personnel do not apologize for concentrating upon those clients considered most likely to benefit from this approach. In fact, all personnel clearly and consistently emphasized prevention and early intervention in "borderline" cases versus the more traditional focus on punishing "hard-core" cases.

One key to Pre-Probation (as well as the Juvenile Drug Court and other intensive Probation efforts) lies in the continued authority the Court retains over the subject. In sharp contrast to a traditional "diversion" scenario, cases deemed appropriate for Pre-Probation enter a plea in abeyance which suspends judicial proceedings pending a recommendation from the Pre-Probation staff to either dismiss (when conditions are fulfilled) or impose a traditional sentence (when conditions are not fulfilled). This Pre-Probation recommendation is generally based upon the completion and/or satisfaction of multiple objectives set by Pre-Probation staff. Attainment of Pre-Probation objectives takes between a few weeks to a few years. Throughout this time, the Court retains full jurisdiction over the case and can proceed to try and

sentence the Pre-Probation subject immediately upon the recommendation of Pre-Probation staff. This sanction has proven to be highly effective thus far: whereas a percentage of juvenile cases—recently as high as 20 percent—was expected to recidivate within three-to-four months after Court contact, this has been reduced to a 2-3 percent rate of recidivism among Pre-Probation subjects during a recent 10-month period.

The success of the Pre-Probation component may, without conscientious supervision, be its downfall. Judges have been so enamored of Pre-Probation's success that they have both quantitatively and qualitatively overburdened the small staff (particularly the lone Pre-Probation Officer). Pre-Probation was designed to provide intensive case management to between 20 and 25 active cases; at one point, this rose to 48 cases and has leveled out—at a personal request to the judges made by the Probation Intake Supervisor—to between 30 and 35 cases. A few judges have also seen fit to somehow re-sentence cases already assigned to traditional Probation and back to Pre-Probation, in one circumstance, from actual incarceration to Pre-Probation. The aforementioned additional staff, plus continued diligent guidance from the Intake Supervisor and a close working relationships between the Intake Supervisor and the new Probation Supervisor, appeared to have brought this potentially overwhelming situation well under control by the beginning of 1997.

Youth and Family Services Case Management

Youth and Family Specialists, housed at the Salt Lake City Boys' and Girls' Clubs, provide neighborhood-based case management for juveniles diverted from the criminal justice system.

The grant-funded YFS positions are filled by individuals with varying degrees of educational and practical experience. And, although similar inequities suffered by other CAT members were addressed early in the program, YFS personnel remain the least well-paid and the only CAT participants who do not receive benefits. Therefore, not only does the perceived efficacy of YFS personnel vary widely, but YFS personnel—competent or not—are difficult to retain at such low salaries.

Adding to the YFS problem, CCP Management has reassigned YFSs to different CATs with (what CAT members consider) no apparent rhyme or reason: for example, leaving one particularly high-volume CAT without a YFS for an extended period of time and assigning a Spanish-speaking YFS to a CAT that served little or no Spanish-speaking residents. Compounding this unfortunate circumstance is the propensity of competent YFSs to quit when they find a better job; in fact, by January, 1997, only three YFSs remained with the program.

Despite the serious and continuing problems cited above, the YFSs who are considered competent have reportedly been highly successful in managing cases diverted from the judicial system. These YFSs are described by their fellow CAT members as overwhelmed, underpaid "saints" who are likely to be lured away by better compensated jobs at the many other social service agencies with which they deal. Furthermore, other CAT members do not understand why the YFS position does not seem to be a priority at CCP planning and management levels. (In fact, their parent agency—Boys' and Girls' Clubs has been accused of treating YFS employees like "at-risk" staff rather than professionals, having them punch a time clock, etc.) Often CAT members stated that the YFS slot is one of the most important, if not *the* most important position on the CAT team if the goal is to solve and prevent neighborhood-based problems. Consequently, Salt Lake City is exploring the option of making YFS staff permanent city employees in an attempt to address problems of salary, benefits, and job security—problems which currently interfere with the retention of qualified personnel.

Job Placement and Mentoring Program

The Boys' and Girls' Clubs of Salt Lake City house both the Youth and Family Specialists (above) and the Job Placement and Mentoring Program (JPMP).

The goal of JPMP is to provide 100 jobs for 100 kids between the ages of 16 and 21. This effort began at one of the five Boys' and Girls' Club sites and a campaign to expand JPMP to all five sites (500 jobs for 500 kids) was scheduled to begin in Fall, 1996. Although this expansion is projected to require an additional \$20,000-\$30,000 in funding for each additional site, it appears as if both the necessary funding and other resources have been secured. The availability of the number of adult mentors that would be required for expansion is, however, somewhat in dispute. Because Salt Lake City seems to evidence a higher-than-average level of community volunteerism, there is some reason for optimism regarding the availability of mentors. On the other hand, because some mentors are expected to be "long-term," the JPMP staff believe that it would be wise to aggressively create a large pool of possible volunteers to compensate for the inevitable attrition. Also, because many potential volunteers have unwarranted fears and prejudices about working with delinquent youth, the challenge to find good help is even greater. College students, staff, faculty, and alumni at the University of Utah are actively encouraged to participate (and, in some cases, there are incentives for participation) and Rotary Club members and corporate professionals have been targeted for recruitment as well.

The majority of current JPMP juvenile participants were referred by either the courts, CATs, local high schools, Colors of Success (a Boys' and Girls' Club Early Intervention Program), or friends who are already registered in JPMP.

Juveniles may participate while they are incarcerated and JPMP Staff visit three juvenile detention facilities each week for case management and support. The needs of the juvenile are assessed and an Individualized Plan (IP) is developed. The IP acts "as a contract guiding interactions between JPMP participants, staff and other supportive community members" (JPMP literature). The Boys' and Girls' Club provides up to 70 hours of job training during which the juvenile earns the minimum wage, and can also earn community service hours, school credits, and up to \$300 toward any court-ordered fines or restitution. During this period, the juvenile has contact with community mentors—usually from area businesses—and University students who assist the participant with basic skill-building as well as specifically job-oriented training. The training provided is designed primarily to prepare these youths for getting and keeping a job. They are also placed in classes needed to receive their GED.

While the juvenile is in the training portion of JPMP, staff are seeking both a mentor and suitable job opportunities for the participant. (The Rotary has agreed to help identify "career-oriented jobs.") JPMP staff and, if possible, the mentor provide almost any support necessary for the participant to identify and apply for jobs: transportation, help filling out applications, writing letters of recommendation, and accompanying the participant to job interviews. Once the juvenile has obtained a job, a support team—ideally, JPMP staff, the mentor, University student mentor, and job supervisor—will maintain contact with the participant and with parents/guardians on a bi-weekly basis.

As of July 22, 1996, the JPMP reported that 202 youth were currently registered in the program, and 27 mentors were enrolled in the program while 13 University and community mentors were actively participating in the program. The JPMP also became a member of the Utah Mentoring Network and was the focus of a three-hour public television program in October, 1996.

Because the Boys' and Girls' Clubs are involved, they have the staff to work with high-risk kids after they are finished with the job placement program. For example, CCP (CAT teams) can begin using Boys' and Girls' Clubs as a placement for juvenile court referrals for youths who are under strict supervision. These youths would be required to come into the facility in the morning, be supervised during the day, return home after 3:30 on house arrest or electronic monitoring, then possibly return in the evening for tutoring or recreation. The important point is that law enforcement agencies in Salt Lake City are now linked with the necessary resources in the community—especially such stable resources as the schools and the Boys' and Girls' Clubs—who can do what the justice system is not equipped to do. CCP must continue to build stronger linkages between these community resources

and the court system so that coordinated supervision and communication can be guaranteed on a consistent basis.

Truancy Center

The Truancy Center is a joint project of the Salt Lake City School District and the Salt Lake City Police Department, and is staffed by a mixture of School personnel, juvenile officers, and paid and unpaid volunteers.

When officers find a possible truant, they ask for identification and any evidence of a legitimate absence excuse. The officers then take the truant to the Truancy Center where the staff may have to ascertain the truant's identity and attempt to contact the truant's parents. Truants are not released to anyone other than their parents and the parents (or someone designated by the parents) must come to the Center to pick them up.

If truants are not retrieved by the end of business hours, the officers transport them to the Youth Services Center. The Center has access to Salt Lake City school computers in order to help ascertain information regarding the truant's parents/home. When the Center detains truants from suburban districts—which occurs often because Salt Lake City is a popular destination for suburban youth—they must call those districts to try and obtain truant information. When the Center corrals out-of-state runaways, they attempt to contact the police departments in the truant's home jurisdiction.

Truants who are at the Center through the lunch hour are given a bag lunch and, when deemed appropriate, are given some disciplinary task to complete. Truants are required to observe the Center's rules of behavior (such as "no feet on the furniture") and may be assigned a disciplinary task or isolated from the main room if these rules are not observed. While they are at the Center, the truants are interviewed by the officers in the main room so that a truancy report can be made and the parents can be charged. The school counselor also takes the truants into a separate room for individual interviewing and preliminary counseling. The counselor can then make immediate referrals, if necessary, and subsequent follow-up. When the parents come to pick up the truants, the counselor also interviews both child and parent before the child is released.

The Center averages 30 students per school day and believes truant demographics to be proportionate to the demographics of the general Salt Lake City area population. The Center keeps an alphabetical list of truants (including name, school, date, gender, and other vital statistics) in order to catch repeat truants and, hopefully, deal with recidivists accordingly. Although Center staff were realistic about the ability and/or willingness of the justice system to creatively or aggressively address the problem of chronic truancy—especially when parents were not interested or involved—they felt they could still have some impact if only because they could make

recommendations regarding whether a case was referred to Truancy Court or to classes that would serve as an alternative to incarceration. The Center, however, claims that approximately 90 percent of parents are grateful that their child has been picked up and retained at the Center. The Center also contends that a dip in daytime commercial crime has occurred since the inception of the Truancy Center and hopes that this phenomenon will stimulate area merchants to help fund the Truancy Center in the future.

Based on a random sampling of juveniles who had been detained by the Truancy Center, the Center determined that school attendance had improved in 65 percent of the cases and that only 8 percent of juveniles have had subsequent contact with the Center. Center interviews and subsequent counselor follow-ups have led the Center to estimate that approximately 85 percent of truants have substance abuse problems. Center personnel also hope that their impact, in terms of decreasing incidents and of solving the Department's problem of what to do with truants once they are apprehended, will help the Police Department to justify the overtime expenditures for the officers (the School District cannot afford to fund the officers).

Juvenile Drug Court with Diversion to Treatment

Prior to receipt of CCP grant, the Third District Juvenile Court had invested considerable time and effort on the revision of state statutes regarding juveniles and the establishment of a stronger intervention/prevention component within the court itself. And, having learned of successful innovations made in other juvenile courts across the country, Court personnel began directing their efforts to instituting a Juvenile Drug Court. CCP provided a framework for the Third District Juvenile Drug Court, as currently constituted, to "provide neighborhood services that maximize and coordinate resources and build ownership for problem solving within the community" as an alternative to probation and incarceration.

Because the Juvenile Drug Court requires the identification of offenders by the third offense (for earlier and more effective interventions), a whole new workload has been created at the Court Intake level. In mitigation of this burden on Intake, Court personnel favorably contrast the new grant-generated linkages and efficiencies with the current system which takes an average of 90 days to reach a single disposition. Under the proposed regimen, the judge may divert juveniles to CCP-based alternatives at any point after the juvenile comes under the jurisdiction of the court (from pre- to post-adjudication). Chiefly through the CAT teams, more diverse resources and more consistent and coordinated case management will be possible. It is hoped that the emphasis on intervention will prevent and/or suppress juvenile offenders from escalating their activities to the criminal level; at

least until the natural maturation process has a chance to ease them from irresponsible adolescent behavior to responsible adulthood.

The nature of the judicial system has had a profound impact on the implementation of CCP-related initiatives. The Third District Court, as most other courts, is subject to two overriding (and sometimes conflicting) impulses: 1) judges tend to value and protect their autonomy, both from each other and from other segments of the criminal justice system; and, 2) the court is bound, both technically and culturally, by procedure and precedent. Convincing judges to act in concert, thereby surrendering some of their autonomy, can be difficult under the best of circumstances. And, particularly because the judge who is the prime mover behind the Juvenile Drug Court is new, she is facing a very difficult job in convincing her colleagues to unite in support of the program. Although a few judges did try it, the other judges quickly reverted to concentrating almost exclusively on "hard-core" juveniles.

Drug Court Staff (primarily counselors), who have borne the brunt of demands from the Juvenile Drug Court, were nonetheless enthusiastic regarding the potential of this initiative. Based on their previous experiences as employees of various Court-related agencies, they view the connection between the school districts and the Drug Court as particularly strong because it builds upon an existing community/school-based management team. Staff believe the linkage between juvenile problems and other family problems is strong and consider elementary school enrollments one of the better ways to track these highly-mobile, potentially-distressed families. The criminal justice system, in collaboration with the schools, thus has an excellent opportunity to identify and address these problem students/families. CAT teams are seen as providing a comprehensive, community-based supplement to the wide variety of other, more traditional resources that can provide alternatives to juvenile probation or incarceration. These other resources include state and private hospitals and clinics for substance abuse, health problems, and pregnancies, counseling programs, and alternative educational programs. Although many of these resources were, at least theoretically, previously available, the staff feel that CCP has provided the type of leverage that compels faster action from these agencies: on average, 14-17 days.

When a juvenile is screened by Court Intake (as opposed to Probation Intake or Youth Services Intake Staff), a determination regarding the suitability of the case for alternatives to detention can be made prior to adjudication and, in some circumstances, is successfully diverted from the judicial system at this stage. Further, if a situation requires immediate intervention—for example, if a juvenile is pregnant or addicted—quick action can be taken to address the problem. The juvenile, and his/her family, then undergo a prevention assessment. This assessment typically includes recommendations regarding counseling, rehab programs, restitution efforts to victims,

community service, education and school attendance, and referral to a CAT team or other community-based group. Assessments almost always include some clear guidelines and recommendations for the family as a whole and there is a great emphasis on the responsibility of the family for the behavior of all family members. According to Court Intake Staff, families do in fact take the prevention assessment recommendations seriously. In addition, the Juvenile Drug Court program has unique sanctions to encourage sticking with detention alternatives: although cases handled alternatively are monitored by the Court for a longer period of time than traditional cases, alternative cases have access to drug rehabilitation and counseling services at much lower and/or sliding rates even if the traditional cases have some of the same drug rehabilitation/counseling components.

Between November, 1995, and July, 1996, the Drug Court staff had been halved in number. This enabled the Juvenile Drug Court program to extend its original funding over a two-year period. Although this would appear to be a significant cutback, staff did not believe this reduction had affected the delivery of services to offenders and their families. Indeed, the demand for Drug Court services is probably not as high as it would be if all judges—not just one—were utilizing it as an alternative to prosecution. Drug Court staff considered their caseload to be manageable and, because they both appear to be able counselors and well-connected and knowledgeable regarding other resources and services, they continued to have a great deal of success in even the most complex situations throughout 1996.

Based on their successes, Drug Court Staff would like to see an expansion of the program to a two-tier approach which would address the needs of slightly more "hard-core" juveniles. And, because of their successes and the continuing efforts of the Intake Supervisor to pursue funding for the program, there is reasonable hope that resources to continue and expand the program will be forthcoming.

Appendix B: Network Analysis Strategy

Distances among the targets were measured using a structural equivalence approach (cf. Lorrain & White, 1971), which overcomes some of the shortcomings of the conventional graph theory. Following the lead of Heinz and Manikas (1992), distances among the targets were measured by determining the overlap of acquaintances for any two actors, defined here as "the degree to which the persons who are in contact with each of them are the same people (p. 840)." The main benefit of this structural equivalence approach is that it circumvents the problem of missing data and allows us to compare patterns of contact for individuals who are not interviewed. This is only possible because our sample includes a sufficient number of respondents who know both individual targets. The alternative approach (i.e. the graphic theoretic approach, which measures similarity by counting the number of links in the communication network to get from person A to X) would require the collection of data from all people in the chain.

Multidimensional scaling was used to analyze our network data. As Scott (1991, p. 151) observes, "The mathematical approach termed 'multidimensional scaling' embodies all the advantages of the conventional sociogram and its extensions (such as circle diagrams), but results in something much closer to a 'map' of the space in which the network is embedded. This is a very important advance." For the present analysis, we have used the non-metric multi-dimensional scaling technique called "smallest space analysis," which uses asymmetrical adjacency matrix of similarities and dissimilarities among the targets. (See Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Scott, 1991 for a discussion of advantages over metric MDS). The data have been recoded to binary form, so that 0 indicates person X has had no prior contact with person Y and 1 indicates that X and Y have had some contact, i.e. at least "every few months." The non-metric MDS program is able to produce a matrix of Euclidean distances (based on rank orders) which is used to create a metric scatter plot. These plots are displayed as the two-dimensional figures below.

The output of MDS is a spatial display of points, where each point represents a target person in the network. The configuration of points should inform us about the pattern of affiliations and contacts in the network. The smaller the distance between two points, the greater the similarity between these two individuals with respect to their social contacts. The location of person X in multidimensional space is determined both by X's own social connections and by the connections of those who have chosen X as an affiliate. The MDS analyses were performed using SPSS Windows 6.1.

Technically, the data could be analyzed at either the individual or organizational level and each approach has some advantages. At this time, we have decided to analyze the results at the individual level, primarily because of some highly visible individuals who played central roles in the conceptualization and implementation of CCP programs. Still, we are able to connect individuals to organizations, and tend to view them as representatives of the organizations with which they are affiliated. We are likely to use organizations as the unit of analysis for a planned longitudinal analysis because of the attrition problem in network and panel data.

To determine the appropriate number of dimensions for the data, a series of analyses were performed and a "stress" statistic was calculated for each solution. In MDS, stress is the most widely used goodness-of-fit measure for dimensionality, with smaller values indicating that the solution is a better fit to the data (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).⁵ By plotting the stress values for solutions with up to four dimensions, it became apparent that the "elbow" point (i.e. where any additional increase in the number of dimensions fails to yield sizeable reductions in stress) occurs at two dimensions. This pattern was evident at all five sites, and hence, we elected to use a two-dimensional solution across the board. Beyond relative stress levels there is the issue of absolute stress values. Stress values ranged from 18 to 20 percent, with one exception (25%). These values are considered acceptable in the literature, although figures above 20 percent suggest a weak fit (see Kruskal, 1964; Scott, 1991).

The data were analyzed, presented, and interpreted separately for each CCP site. Statistics reported include stress values calculated from Kruskal's Stress Formula 1 and the squared correlation (R^2). The R^2 value indicates the proportion of variance of the disparity matrix data that is accounted for by their corresponding distances.

After calculating the solution and mapping a multidimensional configuration, the final step is interpretation. This involves assigning meaning to the dimensions and providing some explanation for the observed arrangement of points in space. In other words, what do the clusters of points mean and how should they be interpreted? As Scott notes (1991, p. 166), "...this process of

⁵Technically, stress is defined as "the square root of a normalized 'residual sum of squares.'" Dimensionality is defined as "the number of coordinate axes, that is, the number of coordinate values used to locate a point in the space." (Kruskal & Wish, 1978, p. 48-49).



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