# NCJRS

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Date filmed 3/24/76

COPS or GUARDS?? — A Campus Dilemma

By: Bernard L. Gorda

A major problem that continues to perplex academic institutions today is that of determining the composition, objectives and authority of their campus protection organizations: "What do we need?" "What do we want?" "What do we dare?"

A close look as some universities' protection operations gives blatant evidence of the existence of this so-called police versus security dilemma; revealing organizational structures inappropriate to the task; that is to say, they appear to have been designed according to some preconceived notions of what "ought" to be, rather than through a clear recognition of both prevention and enforcement needs and logical analyses of their separate, peculiar and unique sets of circumstances. Extremes of such imposed structures may reveal, sophisticated and absolute police models (on the one hand); sometimes in situations where local law enforcement agencies are themselves reasonably supportive and responsive, and (on the other hand) purely night-watchman type operations; oft-times in poorly policed, high crime areas. Between these poles are various versions and perversions of police and security constructs; ranging from soft-image cops to hard-nosed guards. The existence of an extreme example of either model on a campus, is a good locator of the presence of power and a fair indicator of the absence of wisdom in he who has wielded it.

Campus protection organizations should be designed in a manner affording full recognition to the worthwhileness of both law enforcement and crime prevention needs; sacrificing neither, and giving emphasis to the one, or the other, as their unique situations would dictate. To consider one concept and ignore the other is folly. To give an unwarranted emphasis to either because of personal biases, fears,

suspicions or ambitions; or due to inadequate analysis, is irresponsible and will prove inefficient and costly in the long run.

Primarily, most academic institutions are concerned with internal protection of their particular environment and not necessarily with the apprehension and prosecution of criminals or with the enforcement of society's laws; except insofar as they perceive of such policing actions as being essential to the immediate protection and welfare of their visitors and community members - a kind of "passive", amoral position. On-going intelligence gathering functions, undercover investigative activities and other active, and sometimes overactive, covert measures, designed to discover or reveal the presence of crime or criminal elements are generally viewed as undesirable, whether performed by in-house units or by outside police agencies.

A primary motivation for the establishment of in-house law enforcement functions at some universities has been the existence of alledgedly uncooperative or "insensitive" local police departments; inducing universities to police themselves, rather then expose their students to harsh, non-flexible and often over-zealous enforcement from without. Most university administrators are quick to point out that personnel charged with enforcement functions on a campus must be unique; in the words of Rider College President, Frank B. Elliot: "they must possess flexibility to distinguish between actionable violations, high spirits and pardonable indiscretion."[1] Unfortunately, some administrators carry these special considerations too far, and have been willing to consider even offenses amounting to felonies as pardonable indiscretions; the point where amorality becomes immorality!

1. Gelber, Seymour: The Role of Campus Security in the College Setting (U.S. Dept. of Justice (NILECJ) Pamphlet; dated Dec. 1972) pp. 48-49.

Edward T. Kassinger, Director of Public Safety at the University of Georgia, recalls: "criminal acitivity has been swept under the rug for fear of embarrassment to the university involved. The perpetrators of crime, particularly students, (have been) handled administratively, if feasible, when identified. Campus Security organizations (have been) part and parcel to such a concept. "Police" (has) generally referred to those law enforcement agencies off campus who have the ugly civic responsibility of enforcing laws and arresting those members of the campus community identified as perpetrators of criminal acts only off campus."[2] Whatever the motivation - to muzzle or puzzle - emasculation of the in-house law enforcement activity, and the restriction of access to, and information from, the outside agencies, is paramount to no law enforcement whatever. Academic institutions as society's teachers have a moral obligation to insure the provision of effective, fair and impartial law enforcement within the confines of their real estate; be it provided from within or without. "No state legislature intended that the laws applying to society as a whole should not apply equally to all members of the academic community. Unless responsible individuals in academic communities assume such a posture, there will be persistence of disregard for law as a result of an insidious concept of the application of law on campuses."[3]

Once the administration has recognized and accepted as viable this obligation to insure the community is not deprived of law enforcement services, agreement must then be reached as to how much of these necessary policing functions are to be provided by the university and how much by the local government. This decision must

2. Kassinger, Edward T., "New Directions in Campus Law Enforcement" (Campus Law Enforcement Journal, dated May - June 1973) p. 6.

3. Ibib. Edward T. Kassinger; p.7.

be objectively based on the ability and willingness of local outside police agencies to provide quality law enforcement; to operate within mutually agreed to and explicitly defined tolerable parameters; to cope with the existing crime problem, and to adequately complement the crime prevention, or security arm of the protection operation.

When this "whom-shall-provide" police problem has been resolved, decisions can then be made as to the composition of the campus protection organization; i.e., what portion of its resources is to be committed to crime prevention, and what portion to law enforcement. Universities will always find a need for at least two in-house law enforcement officers on duty at all times; irrespective of the quality of the external services available, to receive complaints, initiate necessary police reports, operate the communications console, maintain liaison with operational elements of local and state law enforcement agencies, ..etc.

Prevention and Enforcement are two distinct, but equally important and interdependent components of any good protection program. Rarely, would either of these components functioning alone prove an appropriate response to the needs of most academic institutions - which can usually be seen as two-fold, presenting the occasion for both forms of protection - and simultaneously. While outside police agencies may well meet the minimal law enforcement needs of some campuses, I cannot conceive of their providing the crime prevention needs; unless one considers police patrol presence (a current controversial issue) a deterrent. In any event, it is doubtful they would ever be allowed routinely into dormitories where a goodly amount of the crime occurs; or that the degree of omnipresence, essential to effective deterrence, would be tolerated anywhere on campus. Besides, police trained persons seldom possess the particular kind of expertise needed for internal security operations. "Police departments (according to Leo

Gulinello of the Boston Housing Authority) that are committed to 'horizontal' patrol methods, and in attempting to suppress crime in the streets, can offer only token protection against crimes that occur inside buildings. Many do not include the interior portions of buildings in their patrols. The lack of internal preventive patrolling has actually encouraged criminal elements to attempt more and more crimes within buildings."[4] Similarly the police contingents of an in-house protection organization, whose time is also committed to street and grounds patrol, to responding to incidents, crimes and distress calls, and to the reporting and administrative functions associated therewith, are likewise poor preventors of crime - in the deterrent sense; particularly within dormitories and other buildings of the university. Thomas Repetto (Associate Professor; John Jay College, C.U.N.Y.) contends: "much of police activity is directed toward maintenance of public order; not necessarily a crime reducing pursuit. They attempt to maximize something they call omnipresence in the belief that increasing the certainty of apprehension will deter crime."[5] Of course this is only partially effective; actually they function as a kind of retaliatory, after-the-fact, investigatory activity.

Consequently, a supporting activity, to fulfill the deterrent needs of the protection operation and to minimize the numbers of available opportunities, is a must. The decision as to emphasis to be afforded this security, or what I prefer

4. Gulinello, Leo; "Security Personnel", in Urban Design; Security and Crime (U.S. Dept. of Justice {NILECJ} pamphlet; Jan. 1973) pp. 17-18.

5. Repetto, Thomas; "Future Research Directions", in Urban Design; Security and Crime (U.S. Dept. of Justice {NILECJ} pamphlet; Jan. 1973) pp. 71.

to call: "crime prevention component", involves essentially an assessment of the institution's vulnerability, and should take into account the effectiveness of any internal and external law enforcement components as a first line of defense; the "softness" of the targets, and the extent to which this softness can be hardened. Aside from the possible employment of various electronic access control, and warning systems, positive locking devices and other target hardening measures, there will be "the need for specially trained 'vertical' patrols to complement the existing horizontal police. The police officer maintains a constant patrol of the outside area around the buildings, while the security guard(s) move throughout the interior portions of the same buildings. This type of patrol becomes a crime prevention weapon, because it brings to light various conditions that are conducive to successful crime operations."[6] Situations such as faulty door closers, broken locks, and other defective hardware, and weaknesses in the protection configuration, that may escape the eye of the non-familiar policeman during occasional, and often hurried walk-through inspections, would be obvious to the assigned crime prevention specialist.

These interior "vertical" patrols, entry controllers and operators of each of the individual security sub-systems should be members of the crime prevention component of the protection organization; not the law enforcement branch. Oscar Newman (Associate Professor of City Planning; N.Y.U.) observes: "Although police are a very useful group of people they have developed over the years certain modes of operation which make them quite incapable of providing security for residential environments. There is a fundamental difference between police who pursue and ap-

6. Op. cit. Leo Gulinello; pp. 18-19.

prehend criminals and those who prevent the invasion of the environment by criminals; to 'keep the gate' so to speak."[7]

In a nutshell, this writer is advocating a two pronged attack on the problem of crime on college campuses; in the form of an adequate, professional police contingent, for crime control needs, and equally as adequate; equally as professional "security" arm, for crime prevention needs. The instances of rape and other violent crimes taking place within buildings and dormitories of universities with demonstrably superior "police" operations, is stark evidence of serious neglect of the other vital protection component: "security". Numerous policemen in patrol cruisers cannot provide this preventive protection - it's that simple. Similarly, setting up security fortresses in essentially hostile territory (i.e.: non-policed campuses) is equally as fallacious. Not only does this approach ignore the fact that we must all eventually leave and travel between buildings - and at all hours - but it defeats the free-spirit objectives of academia by inducing introversion, if not paranoia.

Crime prevention personnel should be primarily and specially trained in the particular science of protection operations, deterrent techniques, the state-of-the-art and other measures designed to prevent the invasion of the varying types of environments by unwanted elements. The members of an in-house enforcement branch on the other hand should primarily receive training appropriate to their function, e.g.: laws of arrest, search and seizure, criminal law, etc.. Both branches, however, should receive some training in the functions of the other

7. Newman, Oscar; "Security Personnel'; in Urban Design; Security and Crime (U.S. Dept. of Justice {NILECJ} pamphlet; Jan. 1973) p. 21.

if they are to be mutually complementary. Each area, however, is viewed as a separate branch of the protection career field. It is preferable to allow each individual to concentrate on and master the knowledge and tasks of one of these areas, rather than spread him/her too thin and risk confusion of distinct functions. It is a serious mistake to view security operations as relatively non-dangerous. Unlike a policeman, he is rarely forewarned of a dangerous situation, and is more apt to surprise a person in the act of committing a felonious crime. When he does, he will usually be alone, and in isolated circumstances. It is the security guard and not the policeman who is most often perceived by a criminal as a barrier to a goal - one that must be dealt with if the crime is to be consummated. When one considers that traditionally security guard tasks have been performed by aged and physically handicapped persons; poorly trained and often ill-equipped, it is no surprise to learn that more and more criminals are retreating "inside" to pursue their careers.

The diverse and specialized nature of the prevention and enforcement functions accruing to a campus protection organization, are such as to render impractical - if not foolish - the use of contract guard services or non-trained students for either set of functions; certainly not both! Jack W. Powell (Executive Secretary of the International Association of College and University Security Directors) claims: "contract guards will not be able to provide the progressive, responsive, alert, imaginative and intelligent service needed to combat the main problem on campus today - crime! They are in most cases unmotivated, unskilled individuals who are working as contract guards because it is the only position open to them. Still another source is the police 'buff' who has been rejected by municipal and campus police departments for a variety of reasons. These 'buffs' can sometimes be dangerous on a campus because once they don a uniform they consider they have truly arrived and are now "Mr. Authority". The last and

probably most important weakness is that they just do not relate to a campus community."[8] A serious problem experienced by the Georgetown University Medical Center, with its $215,000 annual contract guard service, was coverage. Rarely were all of the eight positions called for in the contract fully covered; in fact, on several occasions, inspections by in-house staff revealed as few as two guards on duty. In some instances these absences had not been reflected on the logs. Constant supervision by in-house personnel was necessary to preclude paying out for "ghost" services; to keep those present on their posts, and to keep "new" guards briefed on their duties. As Jack Powell points out, the turnover was so high that few guards ever fully learn their duties or their geographical areas of responsibility. There is no interest or personal commitment. The fact is, these appear to be static conditions, peculiar to all contract guard agencies. Admittedly, some in-house security operations are little better; however, universities can act upon these problems. All they can do with the contract service, is to change the contract - not the service; different words - same music!

What I have described herein as crime prevention functions, actually fall within the type of prevention identified by Dr. Peter P. Legins (Chairman-Criminology Department, University of Maryland) as "mechanical prevention"; which includes all measures designed in anticipation of offenses, to place obstacles in the path of the criminal; as differentiated from "punitive prevention" (which serves to make more evident the threat of punishment; through such mechanisms as stricter laws and swifter justice) and "corrective prevention" (which

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8. Powell, Jack W. "Why You Should Not Rent-A-Cop"; in College Management, Nov/Dec 1974; pp. 33-36.

seeks to eliminate the causes of crime by manipulation of the social milieu).[9] The mechanisms of mechanical prevention (which, of the three is generally as generally regarded as the most immediate panacea) are defined by Legins as target hardening, increasing the risks of apprehension, and increasing the criminals' awareness of these risks; through such measures as mechanical and electronic devices, locks, patrol dogs, security guards and police. Law enforcement (on the other hand) is principally one of several types of control; "control" being the antithesis of prevention, according to Legins, and consisting of those steps taken after a criminal act has been committed, to stop or bring the offender under control; as opposed to preventive measures, taken before the criminal act has been committed, to forestall its occurrence.

Within the concept of mechanical prevention, a distinction can be seen between those measures that function to dissuade or deter disobedience of the law and those action that operate to persuade, or compel obedience to the law. Specifically, the dissuasive measures are seen as those designed to harden or isolate the target, and the persuasive actions as those employed to caution, admonish, censure and otherwise secure compliance - in anticipation and in deterrence of an offense. Persuasive prevention, in the academic situation, can be performed by both contingents, security and police - in fact, in-house police units are seen as having a greater obligation for persuasive prevention (i.e.: keeping the students out of trouble) than would ordinarily outside police agencies. This consideration should not (as it has at some universities) be permitted to transcend police "control" responsibilities; else respect for the law will be lost.

9. Legins, Peter P.; "The Field of Prevention"; in Delinquency Prevention by Amos and Wolford; Prentice-Hall, dated 1967; pp. 1-21.

It is my contention, that confusion of these functions: (before-the-crime) prevention and (after-the-crime) control processes, is at the root of the cop-guard dilemma in most universities. If the control functions are not to be performed by an in-house contingent, (usually a poor decision) it is not a police operation and should not be so entitled. Security (or crime prevention) personnel may, with adequate external police support, be able to satisfactorily perform both the dissuasive and persuasive functions and need not thereby suffer any delusions as to their special role in the protection schema; once these distinctions have been made clear to them. The key word here, however, is "adequate". The response, and backup support from the external police activity must be as good as could be reasonably expected from a trained in-house police contingent; an unlikely condition. As earlier stated, it is desirable to have at least two in-house police officers available at all times; often there will be a need for more. For sure outside police agencies will seldom provide: immediate response to distress calls; continuing investigations of reported or observed suspicious persons and circumstances; intensified patrol of statistically verified trouble spots and other such sensitive personalized and concerned police services of the quality or quantity due to, and expected by, these peculiar institutions - peculiar in the sense that they gather into defined and congested "enclaves" a victim prone population, and an extensive inventory of valuable property and equipment. Few other demographic situations offer conditions as ideal for criminality. Few, if any, municipal or county law enforcement agencies are prepared to offer universities a level of policing commensurate with their crime problems; particularly when such attention operates to reduce or deprive off-campus neighborhoods and communities of police coverage - after all, who pays their salaries? For these reasons, rare would be the campus, where all policing operations could be intelligently deferred to outside agencies.

Referring to stulified, constrained campus mock-police models as security is
as unfair and damaging to the crime prevention aspects of a university's protec-
tion efforts as it is to its law enforcement endeavors. Security becomes a dirty
word when it refers to the psuedo-policemen who are neither one thing or the other;
who, trying desparately to see themselves at policemen, are at the same time viewed
by others as guards - rather, as "mickey mouse cops". Likewise, expecting profes-
sional police behavior and response in times of need from ill-equipped, untrained
campus counterfeit cops is unrealistic, and potentially dangerous. "They're not
paying me to take those kinds of risks" is not an uncommon comment from campus
security persons; particularly those who are not really sure what is expected of
them, or who too often have been flatly informed they are not policemen, and
should therefore not act like policemen. Consequently, they have been known to
casually walk away from a rape in progress and from personally dangerous situa-
tions. Be it one or twenty, any in-house personnel committed to police functions,
must be honestly identified as law enforcement officers; not by any of the various
euphemisms bandied about today-which have the effect of appearing almost apologetic.
What is there to be ashamed of? Is not law enforcement a control mechanism of
imperfect societies? Are law enforcement officers to bear the brunt of society's
guilt for its own imperfectness? Here, enforce the law but I don't want to know
anything about it." It would be better to defer all law enforcement needs to out-
side agencies than to set-up bogus internal operations, to which one or more un-
suspecting members of the community may one day; in critical need, mistakenly turn
for help. Campus law enforcement officers must therefore, be fully appraised of
the expectations attendant to this special role of society, and be properly
trained and equipped in accordance with existing or expected threats and hostil-
ities.

On the other side of the coin, there can never be any justification for an
over-zealous, overbearing, "cop-happy" police operation - even if it only appears
to be so. It is my contention that some of the motivation for muting or masking
police functions stems from a subconscious (or perhaps conscious) dislike for the
gaudy, flaunting, ostentatious kind of law enforcement prevalent in the United
States today; in contrast to the non-pretentious, dignified approach of other coun-
tries - for instance: the British Bobby, whose quiet authority has traditionally
inspired trust and respect. There is something rather stagy, vulgar and even
frightening about a militarily garbed, embellished and ornamented policeman; fit-
ted out with various exposed, at-the-ready, tools of death and violence. The es-
poused reasoning behind this image, should you ask, would be "presence", and its
supposed effect as a deterrent. In truth, there are more citizens put off of law
enforcement in this manner than there are criminals put off of crime. It falls
to university administrators to strike the proper balance here: honestly identify
and provide effective enforcement, but don't "ram it down their throats".

Generally speaking, campus police and security directors and like professionals,
will lean toward a police model of organization-given the option; whilst most other
university administrators will likely favor a guard or watchman model. The reasons
for this are obvious in some instances; more subtle in others. Campus Security
and Police Chiefs and Directors, failing to receive recognition from within, for
legitimate prevention efforts, often seek their last vestige of prestige from with-
out; from among their professional peers, where productivity is too often gauged
"by the accomplishment of illegitimate goals--arrests, traffic citations, field
interrogations, etc.--rather than legitimate achievements--prevention and diversion

of crime--although the former is easier."[10] Considerations of control become paramount to prevention. The institution suffers.

Compounding the problem, at some universities are various factions--particularly student life types--who concern themselves less with the ends than the means; less with a prevention systems' achievements than with its imperfections; giving little credit for the absence of major person-to-person crimes, but lots of criticism for malfunctions in the system's hard- or software. A number of Security Directors feel they are better off to avoid implementing and operating complex security systems (which are rarely perfect, and never so in residential situations) than to sustain the criticisms and complaints of the occupant/users - particularly when they and their residence hall "landlords" disclaim any responsibility for its success or for their own protection. Many Directors feel much more confident in the control areas of response, pursuit and apprehension. Of course, whether or not her attacker is caught, is of little consolation to a raped coed. The apprehendor, however, looks good--he is a hero in the eyes of the university and a true professional among his peers. Is it any wonder then, that protection personnel quickly turn away from the unseen, unexciting, unappreciated security systems maintenance tasks, to the publicized, glamorous and rewarding police pursuits. Oscar Newman tells of problems with the New York Housing Authority Police who, hired as interior security guards, sought and eventually gained police status and consequently returned the game to "start". They no longer patrol the interiors of the projects.[11]

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10. Murphy, Patrick V.; Address to Criminal Justice Symposium--Lehigh University; August 1974.

11. Op. cit. Oscar Newman; pp. 21,22

Sound familar? Some methods must be devised for providing campus protection personnel--in fact, all public safety professionals--with as much reward for inducing the absence of crime as for reducing its presence; lest prevention be forsaken in favor of cure as protection's prime objective. Official recognition of both components of the operation: law enforcement officers and crime prevention specialists as co-equals; and both - in turn - as the equals of their local police counterparts, is a step in the right direction.

To be sure the prestige attendant to Society's roles is directly relevant to the rewards associated therewith; e.g.: compensation, power, etc. An individual's self-esteem is in part a reflection of the prestige enjoyed by all persons in his position; a segment of the "looking glass self" - an explanation of behavior as propounded by Charles H. Cooley. In essence, we see ourselves as we imagine or have reason to believe others see us; and we tend to behave or react accordingly. Campus protection personnel, underpaid, "de-powered", downgraded, and ridiculed will eventually lose respect for themselves; see themselves as "flunkies", and act accordingly. The institution will consequently get the protection it deserves. Any determination as to the compensation for these protection roles must be based more on the clientele's expectations and demands, than on any peer-group comparison criteria. If the community members indeed expect to have their property and their persons protected, and demand the provision of an agency equal to the task, then they must pay for it! In the words of Ray Bisson, Wage and Salary Administrator at Georgetown University: "Where do we want to be?" This must be based on formalized protection plans, themselves arising from the desires and expectations fo the populace, as assessed, and on absolute needs, as ascertained; i.e.: where it is concluded the university wants to be, and should be at a given particular time. Comparative salary studies fail to provide an adequate yardstick for determination of structure position or salary rates; unless one is making comparisons

only with successful, committed protection operations. Unfortunately, the usual practice is to compare in-house operations to all rent-a-cop and security operations in the local economic area; good, bad or otherwise, in order to be competitive. Why compare or compete with failure? It is well-known, that within the security guard "profession" there are numerous "floaters" - persons who drift from contract agency to institution, back to agency in quest of the highest dime per hour. This is why compensation must not be set at a level that only attracts this "sour cream of the spoiled crop" - rather at a level providing reward sufficient to procure a much higher caliber performer, equal to the complex, sophisticated functions earlier described. One should not be shocked if this compensation exceeds that of local police agencies. Jack Powell, Ed Kassinger, and many others in the field, believe University Protection should be the exception - not the rule, by setting an example for the profession.

Above-the-average compensation will not alone insure the self-image needed for good morale, and enthusiastic performance. There is a tendency at some universities to view protection personnel (police and security) as servants, whose principle functions are to lock and unlock office doors, turn lights on and off, and numerous other housekeeping and maintenance chores; with which other members of the institution would rather not concern itself. In some cases campus security personnel have even delivered newspapers. This situation operates as a barrier to a crime prevention posture. All such tasks of a securing nature are viewed by the security component, collectively as menial functions, because of their too long association with janitorial and other such services. To avoid the tasks, is to avoid the labels. Unfortunately to avoid the tasks essential to the planned configurations of close-in systems is to negate security. These tasks must be divorced from service tasks, and identified as special skilled and critical functions, if the crime prevention role is to escalate in its significance

and the night watchman image is to fade away.

Perhaps there exists within some persons, a sadistic need to subordinate, or retain in a lowly servile capacity, a faction that elsewhere in society has symbolized authority and repression - a need perhaps even beyond the oft-cited fears (genuine and otherwise) of police power. Let's face it; today there is rebellion against every type of traditional control: parental, parochial, etc. Erosion of the en-loco-parentis doctrine on university campuses is another example of this - and one that displaces to a considerable degree, student disciplinary problems onto law enforcement agencies. Again, if there is no legitimate in-house law enforcement activity, and outside agencies are kept out, there is a group of citizens being deprived of, and exempted from, the law.

Credibility can only be provided to the campus protection organization by removing it from classification with the recognized service functions, such as janitorial, maintenance, etc. Of course, there are those who argue that law enforcement and crime prevention are - in fact - services; however, they are human oriented services, that act upon -and directly out of- relationships with human beings; not with objects. In this sense, protection is no more or less a service function than teaching, counselling, medical aid, and like-human service responsibilities; which themselves, at times, accrue to protection personnel to perform (in such forms as security education programs; verbal admonishments and warnings; ministering of first aid; etc.). "It is hard to overstate the intimacy of the contact between the police and the community. Police deal with people when they are both most threatening and most vulnerable, when they are angry, when they are frightened, when they are desparate, when they are drunk, when they are violent or when they are ashamed. Every police action can effect in some way, someone's dignity, or self-respect, or sense of privacy or consti-

tutional rights."[12] The delicacy and complexities of human interactions, in the numerous conflict situations, which arise out of the struggle to maintain the maximum degree of individual liberty; consistent with maintenance of social order (eg: law enforcement with fairness; security with freedom of movement) are such, that those whom we elect to handle, mediate, and resolve them must be respected, and empowered representatives of the community; and thereby sufficiently confident of themselves and their leaders to make intelligent; timely and impartial judgement. Such decisions require in many instances the exercise of discretion. Fearful, bewildered officers, operating under severe proscriptions, cannot provide effective prevention or enforcement. The autonomy essential to the willing exercise of discretion can only emanate from the genuine, delegated authority of those in control, in the University hierarchy.

Placement of the protection operation within a university's physical plant department - the absolute in service oriented operations - is to render all but impossible any chance of shaking the old night watchman image. "We all know that college security started with watchman under the Buildings and Grounds or Department of Physical Plant. Their concern was, and largely still is, the protection of the plant against broken pipes, fires, and other maintenance emergencies. This is why today so many security heads answer to the manager of buildings and grounds. To me this is like the chief of police in a town or city answering to the director of public works. The head of a university or college police department should only answer to the President, Provost or Chancellor of the University.

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12. Presidents Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice; In "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society"; Chapter 4, p. 91.

He should be able to make his own decisions and run his own department without interference from individuals who are experts in their own field - but their field is not security."[13] In most instances these administrators are not sufficiently prepared - emotionally or technically - to reckon with the crises common to a conflict position (such as that of a police or security chief). Not only are they ignorant of the types of problems and their appropriate response, but are either too proud or too distrustful to accept the advice of the hired professionals - after all, whose neck is out farthest? This situation results in an inordinate amount of interference into the day-to-day management functions, the pre-empting of positive efforts, loss of morale and loss of confidence in the professional managers of the protection department. There is a tendency on the part of some physical plant administrators to justify their very existence by accommodation - if not acquiescence; sometimes confusing service and subservience. The consequences of casting a protection operation in this mold is to compromise their very integrity. The reference "our security department" should imply fondness - not ownership.

The Director of Security, Chief of Police or whatever the title, should be so placed in the University hierarchy as to reflect authority and considerable prestige. "He should not be so low in the chain of command that he is 'second guessed' by faculty, deans, business managers, or other administrative officials. This usually leads to disaster when something goes wrong, and all the 'second guessers' melt into the darkness leaving the spotlight on the man left holding

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13. John W. Powell, "The Future of Campus Security"; in Security World Magazines October 1967; p. 81.

the bag - the security chief."[14] It does not take long for even the lowest man in the organization to realize the extent of his boss's authority and the relative prestige his position holds in the community. Failing to provide proper backing; over-reacting to incidents or in response to irrational cries from the community; circumventing supervisors' authority by dealing directly with their subordinates; hesitating to bring to the attention of other departments failings on their part that contribute to or create, protection problems are examples of difficulties experienced by university police chiefs and security directors that are suffered to function through operational level department heads of other vocations or disciplines. He must always, in this case, act in the name of another. He cannot shoulder a responsibility without considering the wishes (sometimes egocentric) of a third person - a layman; a person who, although he would be wont to admit it, would rather the decision making responsibilities rested elsewhere; at a higher level. In any case, decisions beyond a specialist nature will usually involve matters of general policy (in most cases proscribed) and will eventually accrue to a high placed administrative generalist for resolution; so why gum up the works with middlemen; who are neither specialist nor generalist.

Universities, as open to-the-public, free institutions, cannot (unlike military installations and industrial complexes) effect strong perimeter control, such as security fencing, dog patrols, etc. Consequently, such "mechanical" preventive

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14. John W. Powell, "The Future of Campus Security"; in Security World Magazines October 1967; p. 30.

protection measures must be applied individually to each -of the several campus buildings- according to its needs. Obviously, these needs will be different for residential buildings than for business buildings, and simpler for classrooms than for science laboratories. This concept of individual living and working space security places the emphasis where most of the crime is occurring - in the buildings. The Uniform Crime Report Statistics of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reflect that more than 50% of reported crimes occur off the streets - that is to say, inside buildings and dwellings. "Certain types of crime occur more often than others and cause the greatest amount of damage and hardship; these crimes, both impulsive and premeditated, belong to the group of burglary, robbery, larceny, rape, assault, etc., which take place inside buildings and dwellings."[15] The close-in systems approach is one that seeks elimination of the opportunity for crime, by closing off those areas wherein the opportunities abound. Applying strong close-in protection measures to each of the campus buildings serves to release the police component of the protection force, for response to emergencies, and for patrol of the usually vast grounds and the several building exteriors; secure in the knowledge that the complex inner mazes of the building interiors are reasonably safe. Even strong perimeter security cannot alone assure this; for entry to the grounds must in any event be permitted to a diverse and very large number of persons; who, once inside the protected outer shell, are relatively free to circulate at will.

The modular plan of protection, as described herein, is based on the assumption that manpower alone cannot provide a secure environment and imagines the

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15. Op. cit.; Guilinello, p. 1.

development of several security sub-systems, each located within larger and de-
fined police patrol sectors; wherein: mechanical and electronic devices, man-
power and procedural methods, combine and complement one another in pursuance
of optimum efficiency and economy. It does not suggest total replacement of
policemen with security personnel, nor does it suggest total replacement of the
latter with technological devices. It does suggest, however, that greater effi-
ciency can be realized through inter-complementary, interdependent utilization
of all resources; which will, no doubt, in some situations, prove more economical.
Allocation of manpower resources between crime prevention and law enforcement
essentials as determined by a thorough protection analysis; and augmentation
of this manpower with physical security systems and devices, will positively
improve the protection posture of an institution, and should hold constant, or
even reduce manpower requirements. Such savings could thereby, and more effec-
tively be applied to increased salaries, and advanced professional training for
this smaller and -what could be- elite cooperative.

Rare would be the protection situation where technological devices negate
the need for human monitoring and fail-safe intervention. Even through the ap-
plication of technology may reduce, to some extent, the size of the crime preven-
tion factions, such hardware must not be looked to as the primary component, or
as a complete alternative to human systems. "Reliance on hardware has several
significant limitations", says Dr. Wm. H. Brill, (U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development). First the criminal or the vandal also has access to tech-
nology. We should not assume that we alone control the dimensions of the conflict
or determine its limits. The criminal can escalate too, and this is the danger
with a hardware based security program. Another limitation is, it may be viewed
by residents as being directed against them - as an example of their institu-

tional environment. It can also create anxiety by making people feel less se-
cure.[16] Each of the close-in systems should balance, optimally, convenience
and protection, and each individual plan should "capitalize on the natural
mechanics of the physical design and architecture of the building by: delimit-
ing paths of movement; circumscribing areas of activity and zones of influence,
and providing for natural opportunities for visual surveillance of living areas
by residents";[17] thus reducing the need for excessive and ominous hardware,
superfluous controlled entrances and other obtrusive measures that tend to make
fortresses out of structures; impeding their functions and inducing a conscious-
ness of fear; rather than a rational awareness.

With respect to most student populations, this concept of close-in security
serves to protect them in spite of themselves; for all are not - because of their
youth - and other reasons, aware of the need for self-protection; they are thusly
prime for crime. "Preliminary studies indicate that over 75% of today's crime
occurs as a result of avoidable victim inaction, or action which presents to the
offender the opportunity to commit the crime."[18] In fact, just as critical as
human and physical resources to these protection systems is the cooperation of
the user/occupant and their commitment to reasonable protective measures and to

16. Brill, Wm. H., "Security in Public Housing: A Synergistic Approach" in Deter-
rence of Crime In and Around Residence (U.S. Department of Justice {NILECJ}
Pamphlet dated June 1973) pp. 34.

17. Newman, Oscar; "Defensible Space"; in Deterrence of Crime In and Around Resi-
dences (U.S. Dept. of Justice {NILECJ} Pamphlet, dated June 1973) pp.63-66.

18. Rau, Richard M.; "Introduction" Urban Design; Security and Crime (U.S. Dept.
of Justice {NILECJ} Pamphlet, dated January 1973) p. 1.

the restrictions and inconvenience associated therewith. Without the informal and formal sanctioning process of a concerned involved community, no sensible protection plan will prove adequate in the long run. "The problem of security in public housing also stems from the weak social structure of the residents, the absence of supporting groups and a lack of interpersonal trust - all factors that inhibit people from protecting and helping each other."[19] If, in fact, a university does not desire to employ sanctioning mechanisms, or pursue any methods of securing respect for and cooperation with the system, then additional manpower for persuasive prevention functions will be necessary; an expensive price to pay for the failure to discipline and educate.

Security education and indoctrination can offset to some extent the failure of an institution to accept responsibility for securing compliance. Cooperation can be achieved somewhat in bringing to the attention of community members, the dangers inherent to apathy and disconcern, by describing and highlighting the types of activities that contribute to criminal acts, some personal methods of crime prevention, and the services available through the protection organization. "Studies show that citizens themselves are confused about their role in crime prevention. They have been taught to rely too extensively on insurance for protection, and they are neither aware nor instructed in the available means to protect themselves or their property; and the tendency of both citizens and the police to view crime as a police problem divorces the citizen from his role in crime prevention."[20]

19. Op. cit. Wm. H. Brill; p. 27.

20. Rybert, Wilbur; "Crime is a Thief's Business - Prevention is Yours"; in Deterrence of Crime In and Around Residences. (U.S. Dept. of Justice {NILECJ} Pamphlet, dated June 1973) pp. 66-67.

It is highly improbable that any two academic institutions would be alike in all of the characteristics one should consider in an adequate protection survey. Institutions that may at first appear quite similar because of their size, locations and other apparent characteristics (and therefore, consequently presumed to have parallel problems) will likely, on careful analysis, prove quite dissimilar; often predicating the need for drastically different approaches to their protection plans. Some of the variable characteristics, to be considered in determining the emphasis that is to be given to each of the fundamental components - law enforcement and crime prevention - are: (1) Size of the institution: to include total acreage numbers, types, purposes, groupings, ages and architecture of its buildings; the presence of special purpose facilities, medical centers, etc.; (2) Population: to include categories by number (staff, students, faculty), number of on-campus residents, socio-economic status, political orientations, attitude biases and expectations; (3) Location of Institution and its physical characteristics: to include whether urban, rural, ghetto, etc.; proximity to city streets and adjacent non-university housing or business; streets and highways traversing the grounds; quality of outside lighting; natural barriers and fences; presence of nearby wooded areas, parks, amusement centers, bars, clubs; (4) Crime Experience: to include types, locations, sources, frequencies, ascertained cause, projections; (5) External Support: i.e.; ability and willingness of local law enforcement agencies to provide effective and timely police support.

These and other factors, which serve to individualize academic institutions and peculiarize their needs, must be balanced against the amounts and specific kinds of protections each concept can achieve; and a determination made as to how much emphasis should be afforded to each. A realistic protection plan, an accommodating organizational structure and a functionally oriented training program may then and therefrom be logically derived.