TO MAKE THE WORLD SAFE FOR PICNICS:

THE 1972 POLITICAL CONVENTIONS IN MIAMI BEACH

by

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PROLOGUE

Come on Down!

Have Fun in the Sun!

Convention Capital!

In 1972, Miami Beach became the first city in 20 years (in fact, the only city besides Chicago) to host both the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. For Miami Beach this meant two additional tenants for the more than 300,000 square feet of buildings and the seven acres of land that make up the Miami Beach Convention Hall Complex. In terms of people it meant approximately 8,000 convention delegates, officials, and their families to help fill over 29,000 rooms in more than 360 hotels and to frequent its shopping malls, restaurants, and night clubs. These were accompanied by an army of over 7,000 convention followers known as the "media."

The presence of the two Conventions also provided Miami Beach with the opportunity to host a variety of visiting dissidents -- collectively called "non-delegates." In turn, the presence of the non-delegates encouraged the arrival in Miami Beach of numerous individuals and groups who came either to protect Miami Beach and the Conventions from the non-delegates and/or to protect the non-delegates from Miami Beach and the Conventions.
CHAPTER 1

Background on Miami Beach: What is a Miami Beach?

Miami Beach and How it Grew

In its primeval state, Miami Beach was a long narrow sand bar barely rising above the waters of Biscayne Bay and the Atlantic Ocean which almost surrounded it. As late as 1896, Ocean Beach -- as it was then called -- was merely a strip of crocodile-infested mangrove swampland separating mainland Miami from vast stretches of the blue Atlantic. There still are people who believe that it should have remained in this condition.

In retrospect, however, it appears that the Ocean Beach of swampland and saltwater crocodiles was destined by the Gods and nature to become the Miami Beach of lavish hotels and glittering nightclubs with over 3,000,000 tourists per year swelling its predominately retired resident population. The first step toward this transformation came in 1882 when Henry B. Lum (an ex-teacher, farmer, goldminer, and baker) initiated efforts to grow coconuts on Ocean Beach. Lum was soon joined by other entrepreneurs who together made an abortive attempt to turn the entire sandbar into a giant coconut plantation. Most of the coconuts failed to germinate. Those that did were quickly added to the diet of the natives -- deer, rabbits, and numerous small mammals -- or were crowded out by the indigenous mangroves. By 1890 the dreams of coconut plantations had died with the trees.
Enclosed please find a pre-publication copy of our study of governmental response to the potential for protest and/or violence during the 1972 political conventions in Miami Beach.

It has taken us a long time to complete the study and the final product is much longer than we originally expected it to be. We feel, however, that both the time and length are justified by the finished product. As you can see from the report itself we have not merely written a history of the conventions but have also provided conceptualizations that place the conventions in perspective and help account for the development and final outcome of events in Miami Beach.

We believe that this could be an important book in the area of social conflict. First, it deals with a success in that large-scale violence was avoided. Secondly, it deals with a success in that civil authorities generally fulfilled their dual responsibilities of preserving the public peace while protecting the rights of political dissidents. We need hardly point out that such successes are seldom given the recognition they deserve.

Third, because of the cooperation we have received from most participants (both establishment and non-establishment) we have been able to utilize the Rashomon effect of presenting many perspectives rather than creating "truth". Finally, we believe our study represents
April 25, 1974

Paul Estaver  
Associate Director  
National Center for Dispute Settlement  
1212 16th St., N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Paul:

Here is a preliminary copy of the Miami Report which Ralph Lewis and I have virtually finished. I am also enclosing copies of the letters we sent participants. We are now looking for a publisher and hope to have the final version publicly available during the summer. We would appreciate any comments you might have.

Best regards,

[Signature]

Jerome R. Corsi, Ph.D.
Politics and Philosophy
Six years later, the fate of the sandbar was sealed when John Stiles Collins (the man for whom the present gold coast main street is named) came to Ocean Beach. Collins, a retired farmer and businessman from New Jersey, had been an investor in the ill-fated coconut plantation. At the time of his arrival, Collins was already 59 years old. Despite his age, Collins spent the next 32 years helping to transform Ocean Beach into Miami Beach. Throughout his involvement with the commercial development of the Beach, Collins remained a farmer at heart. His primary interest continued to be the farm that he established along the western bank of the Beach's Indian Creek.

When Collins established this farm at the turn of the century, activities on the Beach were still extremely limited because of the Beach's separation from mainland Miami by several miles of Biscayne Bay. Collins had to ship all farm supplies and produce over ten miles of water at great expense both in terms of time and money. Even the sun-lovers who wanted to swim in the Atlantic surf had to be ferried across Biscayne Bay to what is now the South Beach. This situation was remedied in 1913 when John Collins built the first bridge between the mainland and the Beach. The bridge was a 2 1/4 mile-long wooden structure which had to be replaced in less than a decade by what is now the Venetian Causeway. Nevertheless, the transformation of the Beach had begun in earnest.

In 1915, Ocean Beach disappeared forever when the City of Miami Beach was officially incorporated. Presiding over its birth was a resident population of 300 of which 33 were registered voters. This was only somewhat
smaller than the city of Miami across the Bay which had been incorporated in 1896 with a population of 260 but which had grown into a metropolis of 5,471 residents by 1910.

Now that it was connected with the mainland, the Beach itself began to grow. The man most responsible for this growth was Carl Fisher. When he first came to the Miami area in 1910, Fisher was already a self-made millionaire whose career included bicycle and auto racing, ballooning, and the building of the Indianapolis Motor Speedway. Over the next 20 years, Fisher added to this list by becoming the primary force behind the building of the coast-to-coast Lincoln Highway, its north-south equivalent the Dixie Highway, and the prime developer of Miami Beach. For those who care, Fisher's only major failure came at the end of his career when he tried during the Depression to duplicate his Miami Beach success in the Long Island area of New York. In 1939, he died in relative obscurity in the very city he helped create.

Fisher's first involvement with the Beach came in 1912 when he loaned John Collins $50,000 to complete his bridge. Before he was finished, Carl Fisher had dredged six million cubic feet of sand out of Biscayne Bay to create much of the very land that is now Miami Beach. He also initiated a craze for man-made islands when he raised Star Island out of the very bottom of Biscayne Bay. Between 1912 and 1930, Fisher together with other land developers invested millions in the construction of opulent hotels such as the Flamingo, the Nautilus, and the Roney Plaza. Miami Beach became a winter retreat for the noveau-riche of the automobile industry and their friends. Fisher did much to determine the future lifestyle of the Beach. To promote his many investments, Fisher built polo fields and
boat marinas, staged yacht races, invented the bathing beauty, sponsored boxing matches in Flamingo Park, and even employed an elephant as a caddy for President Warren G. Harding.

Across the Bay, similar developments were taking place. By 1930, Biscayne Boulevard offered the comforts of such luxurious hotels as the Columbus, the Everglades, the McAllister, the Royal Palm, and the Watson. Miami itself had a resident population of 110,637. Equally significant for the future was the growth in the number of officially incorporated surrounding municipalities. The first incorporated area in Dade County was the City of Miami in 1896. This was followed by Homestead in 1913 and by Florida City in 1914. These were followed by Miami Beach (1915), Coral Gables (1925), Opa-locka (1926), Miami Springs (1926), and North Miami (1927). Between 1930 and 1950, eighteen more areas were incorporated, bringing the total number of independent municipalities to twenty-six. As late as 1950, however, only five of these cities had resident populations of more than 6,000. In fact, as late as 1970, sixteen of these municipalities still had less than 10,000 residents.

Tourists and Conventions

Whatever their reasons, people came to Miami Beach both as tourists and as residents. Despite a major hurricane in 1926 and the burst of the land boom in 1927, Miami Beach grew. By 1930 the City had a resident population of 6,494.
Not even the Depression could halt the growth of Miami Beach. By 1940 it had attracted a resident population of 28,012, a more than fourfold increase over its 1930 population. It was also during the Depression decade that Jews began to move into Miami Beach in large numbers, particularly in the area south of what is now 14th Street. For those who don't remember, this was the same era when most resort areas worked overtime to preserve their Gentile purity as well as to exclude non-whites. Similar efforts were made on Miami Beach but for a variety of reasons they either failed or broke down sooner. In any case, by 1940 Miami Beach had a resident population of somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 Jews.

Equally important as the population growth was the increase in the tourist trade. By 1940 the Beach was blessed each winter with an influx of over 75,000 visitors who were accommodated in more than 230 resort hotels. But the Beach was already beginning to move beyond merely being a winter resort for tourists. In 1941, the City established a special bureau to seek convention business and Miami Beach took the first step toward becoming "Convention Capital."

All serious progress in this direction was delayed, however, by World War II. During the next four years, 1941-1945, most of the tourists stayed home and the Beach's 230 hotels were converted into hospitals, barracks, and classrooms primarily for the Army Air Corps. It is doubtful that in the entire history of warfare any military force was equally blessed with such luxurious surroundings.
But the War came to an end and the Beach returned to its peacetime activities. First to emerge were the glamorous hotels that now dominate the Miami Beach skyline and almost totally obscure the ocean front. These places include the Diplomat, Sherry Frontenac, Saxony, Dilido, Doral, Carillon, Eden Rock, Deville, Americana, and the grand-daddy of them all the Fontainebleau. By 1970, the Beach had over 360 hotels and 30,000 rooms waiting for people to come down and have fun in the sun. In 1970, 3,000,000 tourists visited Miami Beach and added an estimated $825,000,000 to its economy.

Immediately after the War, Miami Beach also renewed its efforts to attract convention business. To begin with, a 3,600-seat auditorium was built to facilitate convention activities. By 1958, this facility was grossly inadequate and a new 16,000-seat convention hall was constructed. Five years later, Hank Meyer -- the Beach's public relations guardian -- helped bring the Jackie Gleason TV show to Miami Beach and even more facilities and equipment were added to the municipal auditorium. In 1968, Miami Beach hosted the Republican National Convention which nominated Richard Milhous Nixon and witnessed the "Poor People's" mule team being escorted into the Convention Hall by Miami Beach Police Chief Rocky Pomerance.

Immediately after the Republican Convention, the facilities were expanded again. By 1972, Convention Hall Complex covered over 7 acres and had seating capacity for over 37,000 conventioneers in its three main buildings. By the early '70's, this complex was attracting approximately 600 conventions and about 300,000 conventioneers to Miami Beach each year.
CHAPTER 2

The 1960's: A Heritage of Violence

The General Climate

The political atmosphere for the summer of '72 in Miami Beach was largely set by the social unrest, political turmoil, and domestic violence of the 1960's. This immediate history of the '60's helped determine everyone's hopes and fears regarding protest during the forthcoming conventions.

Social unrest and domestic violence were certainly not new creations in the '60's. In fact, both are well-established traditions in a history that includes at least nine wars, numerous outbreaks of collective violence (riots), and the consistent use of physical violence as a means of intimidating social competitors and political opponents. (Graham and Gurr, 1969) Most Americans suffer from historical amnesia, however, and the decade of the '50's had helped to create an appearance of relative social stability and calm.* This impression was shattered by a variety of events in the '60's.

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*The pervasiveness of this image was aided by the fact that acts of violence which did occur tended to be ignored by most Americans, perhaps because they were committed by members of the "establishment" or at least by supporters of the status quo (e.g., the anti-desegregation riots in Little Rock and Clinton, Tennessee).
During the early '60s, anti-civil rights disorders erupted in numerous Southern cities including: Portsmouth, Va. (1960); Jacksonville, Fla. (1960); Biloxi, Miss. (1960); Anniston, Ala. (1961); Birmingham, Ala. (1961); McComb, Miss. (1961); and Oxford, Miss. (1962). The Oxford Riot resulted from the enrollment of James Meredith as a student at the University of Mississippi and at least two persons had been killed before it was quelled by Federal troops. In 1963, serious race-related disorders took place in at least five cities: Birmingham, Ala.; Cambridge, Md.; Chicago, Ill.; Philadelphia, Pa.; and Savannah, Ga. (Kerner Commission Report, 1968)

In 1964, the total number of race-related disorders recorded jumped to 21, including major riots in Philadelphia, Pa.; Rochester, N.Y.; and Harlem, N.Y. (Jones, 1972, p.273) In 1965, Jones recorded 14 urban disorders including the Watts Riot in Los Angeles in which 34 people were killed. The figures for 1966 jumped to 48 including major events in Cleveland, Chicago, and San Francisco. (Jones, 1972, p.275) For the remainder of the decade the number of race-related recorded disorders* jumped even higher -- 1967 = 257; 1968 = 721; 1969 = 832. Even if only the most serious types of disorders are considered, their number was

* The reader should note that these are figures for all race-related civil disorders including those initiated by whites against blacks or where civil authorities appear to have been the primary initiators of violent actions.
significantly higher than during previous years -- 1967 = 144; 1968 = 267; and for 1969 = . (Lemberg Report #1) As late as the first two years of this decade the total number of reported disorders still remained dangerously high -- 571 and 240 for 1970 and 1971 respectively. (Lemberg Report #2) Beginning in the mid-1960's these events changed in character from events involving attacks by whites on black individuals or their property to violent attacks by blacks on property in black areas to contests between blacks and law enforcement officials in the heart of urban ghettos.

Civil rights were not the only issues, however, and central city ghettos were not the only sites of unrest. Demonstrations and violent confrontations in non-ghetto settings usually involved students as their primary participants and eventually spread to the "ivy covered towers" of the colleges and universities themselves. During the early years of the '60's, student activities were characterized by peaceful demonstrations and civil disobedience directed at targets outside of the university. This was the period of the lunch counter sit-ins which started in Greensboro, North Carolina, and the demonstrations against nuclear armaments by groups such as the Student Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and the Student Peace Union. When violence did occur, it was usually generated by civil authorities such as the behavior of the San Francisco police during demonstrations against the House Un-American Activities Committee in May of 1960 -- a behavior also recorded at numerous events throughout the South. (Stark, 1972) By 1964-65, students from a majority of four-year educational institutions participated in some form of protest activity during the school year. (Peterson, 1968)
In 1964, however, the pattern of student protest activities began to change as students started to relate their social and political concerns to the character of the university community itself. The most dramatic example of the shift was the emergence of the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley which focused on an effort to recruit members of the university community for off-campus civil rights activities and resulted in violent clashes between students and the police.

But Berkeley was only the beginning. Before the decade was over, violent confrontations between students and police had erupted at many schools including: Fisk and Tennessee A & I (Nashville, Tenn.); Texas Southern (Houston, Texas); Jackson State College (Jackson, Miss.); Howard University (Washington, D.C.); South Carolina State College (Orangeburg, S.C.); Columbia University (New York, New York); Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.); University of Wisconsin (Madison, Wisconsin); and Stanford University (Stanford, Cal.). One policeman was killed during the incidents at Texas Southern and students were killed at Jackson State (1) and South Carolina State (3). Even as recently as 1970-71, it is estimated that "over 1,000 (43 percent) of the 2,362 colleges and universities in the United States were the scene of some kind of campus unrest." (Bayer and Astin, 1971, p. 302)

Protests and violent confrontations continued into the '70's. The greatest concentration of these events was associated with the 1970 attack of enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia by United States and South Vietnamese forces. President Nixon announced the Cambodia invasion on April 30 and
student response was almost instantaneous. By May 10, 448 schools had either closed down or were participating in some sort of protest activities. By the end of May, over 800 different schools had participated in these events including Kent State where four people were killed in a confrontation with the Ohio National Guard, and Jackson State College where two students were killed in an encounter with local and state police.

The '60's were also characterized by an apparent increase in politically-related violence either random or terroristic in character. By the end of the decade three national political figures had been assassinated: John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy. Two lesser figures, Malcolm X of the Black Muslims and George Lincoln Rockwell of the American Nazi Party (NSWPP), also died at the hands of assassins. Even as late as May, 1972, Governor George Wallace, a candidate for the Democratic Party's Presidential nomination, was almost killed by an assassin.

Politically-related deaths were not limited to national figures, however. In the South, numerous individuals were killed by those who would halt the civil rights movement. Those killed included: Medger Evers (1963); Schwerner, Goodman, and Chaney (1964); Col. Lemuel Penn (1964); and Viola Liuzzo (1965). Other deaths that can be related to political activities have resulted from shootouts between law enforcement officials and members of militant black organizations such as the Black Panther Party and the Republic of New Africa.
Moreover, at least some portion of the recent increases in non-accidental police fatalities -- up almost 400 percent between 1960 and 1970 -- can be attributed to politically-motivated attacks. For example, "Ambush Attacks" resulted in the deaths of 18 police officers between July 1970 and June 1971. (IACP, Report #1)

Other individuals have died as the result of terrorist bombing activities. Those killed included four black children in the bombing of a Birmingham church, a janitor in the Faculty Club of the University of California at Santa Barbara, and a post-doctoral researcher in the Army Mathematics Center at the University of Wisconsin. Records collected by the United States Government indicate that as many as 40 people died because of bombings between January 1969 and April 1970 (McClellan #24, p. 5341); for the period of July 1970 through June 1971, the International Association of Chiefs of Police National Bomb Data Center recorded 17 deaths due to bombing activities. (IACP, Report #2)

Figures on fatalities, however, only represent a small fragment of the terrorist bombing activities that took place during the '60's. Unfortunately, we do not have statistical records for most of the decade but the available figures indicate the existence of a serious problem. For the 16-month period between January 1969 and April 1970, the U. S. Department of the Treasury recorded 4,330 actual and 1,475 attempted bombings.(McClelland #24, p. 5341) More conservative figures for the same period were recorded by Senator McClellan's investigation of riots and civil disorders, but even his committee identified 1,052 bombings and
136 attempts. (McClelland, #25, p. 5757) During the following year (July 1970 - June 1971) the National Bomb Data Center identified 1,858 bombing incidents. (IACP, Report #2)

The 1960's also witnessed the utilization of terrorist activities by organizations or groups with overt political orientations. From the political right, the Minutemen emerged as an anti-communist underground army which mounted terrorist attacks on the political left. When the Minutemen disappeared early in 1971, their place was soon taken by the Secret Army Organization (SAO). Unfortunately, we do not have any detailed statistics on the character and incidence of right-wing terrorist activities. It is our impression, however, that the number of such events may have been fairly large, but that many of them have been ignored because they have merely been recorded as attacks on private citizens or their property.*

Terrorist activities were also utilized by groups and individuals associated with the political left. The best known of these groups is the Weatherman faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) which claims credit (or is blamed) for a series of bombing attacks on "establishment" property during the early '70's. Despite their press coverage, however, left-wing terrorist activities clearly preceded the emergence of the Weathermen. In January 1971, Scanlans magazine estimated that there were at least 1,391 guerrilla acts of sabotage and terrorism in the U. S. between

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*Individuals interested in the occurrence of right-wing terrorist activities should read "Chronology of Terror in San Diego," Counter-Spy, Vol. 1, No. 1.
1965 and 1971. (Scanlans, Vol. 1, No. 8, p. 12) For the period 1969 -
1970, Scanlans recorded 1,049 such events. While Scanlans' figures may have
been high, even the Department of the Treasury attributed at least 673
bombings (actual attempts or threats) to white extremists between January
1969 and April 1970. (McClelland #24, pp. 5340-5341)

One final characteristic of the turbulent '60's that must be
emphasized is the ability of protest situations to attract large numbers
of participants: for example, events such as the March on Washington
(Washington, D.C., 1963), Detroit Civil Rights Protest (Detroit, 1963),
Spring Mobilization Against the War (New York City, 1967), Resurrection
all involve at least 100,000 participants. Throughout the decade numerous
cities had demonstrations that attracted between 10,000 and 100,000
participants. Although the overwhelming majority of these events were
non-violent in character, the mere number of participants often created
problems for civil authorities and commonly generated fears about the
possible eruption of violence.

The '68 Conventions

If the backdrop for the summer of '72 was provided by the general
social unrest and political turmoil of the '60's, then some of the most
striking scenes were provided by the 1968 political conventions.

In 1968, the Republican National Convention was held in Miami
Beach and was faced with many of the same law enforcement problems that
came to characterize the '72 Conventions. By any traditional standards, governmental response to problems on the Beach was a complete success. In fact, the Miami Task Force of the Presidential Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence was most explicit in its positive evaluation of the law enforcement effort on the Beach. Before and during the Convention itself, there was constant communication between police and organizations interested in demonstrating at the Convention. These groups made numerous demands upon the police force, and many demands were accommodated. When demands were rejected, the police tried to offer acceptable alternatives. If the police felt there were security problems in demonstrators going up one street, for instance, they suggested another street which might similarly serve the purposes of the demonstrators. Tampa garbage men, Cuban refugees, the elderly, several black groups, along with supporters of each candidate were permitted access to desirable locations in order to demonstrate. Demonstrators did not always get the places and the times desired, but they were not given times and places that were unacceptable. By such practices, the law enforcement officials did not place candidates or pressure groups in a position of direct confrontation and disagreement with the police and permitted most demonstrators to feel that they had had an opportunity to let off steam and support their candidate or cause in a reasonable manner. (Miami Report, 1968, p. 5)

The further one got from Miami Beach, however, the worse things became. During the closing days of the Republican Convention, there was a riot(s) across Biscayne Bay in the black ghetto of Miami (Liberty City).
The disorder first erupted just as Richard M. Nixon began his sweep to the presidential nomination and it did not end until well after he had delivered his acceptance speech to the final session of the Convention. Before the disorder was over, riot statistics indicated the deployment of over 1,000 National Guardsmen, at least $250,000 in property damage, 450 arrests, and three deaths (all blacks).

There is general agreement that the Liberty City riot was not directly related to the Republican Convention across the Bay -- i.e., the riot was neither caused by nor directed against the Convention. On the other hand, the Republican Convention was not totally without effect upon the development of events in Liberty City. The Presidential Commission's Miami Task Force identified at least six connections between the disturbances and the Convention. Two of these probably heightened tensions in the black community and increased hostility toward the white establishment. First, some black leaders resented what they felt to be totally inadequate black representation among the delegations to the Republican Convention. Second, local black leaders also resented the efforts by some government officials to attract the Democratic Convention from Chicago to Miami by emphasizing the contentment and passivity of local blacks.

The other connections between the Republican Convention and the Liberty City disorder identified by the Task Force were:

1. the City of Miami Police and the Dade County Public Safety Department had available smaller resources of personnel and supplies than normally because of assistance they were giving to the Miami Beach Police;
2. there was in Dade County a much greater concentration of news media of all kinds than normally and a much greater possibility of national publicity;

3. there was in Dade County a large concentration of city, county, and state political officials who could easily get to the area of the disturbances, in the hope of helping to quell them or to secure national coverage for themselves, or for both reasons;

4. there was at Miami Beach a concentration of national black leaders who played no part in originating the disturbances but whose presence may have caused local black activists to be more aggressive than usual in the hope that they would attract the attention of these national black leaders. (Miami Report, p. 6)

Three weeks after the Republican Convention and almost 1,400 miles away, the Democratic Convention was called to order in Chicago. Before the Democrats could nominate Hubert H. Humphrey for President and go home, the city was subjected to several days of violent confrontations between police and demonstrators, violence which even involved media representatives and by-standers. Official records indicate that these clashes resulted in 192 reported injuries to policemen, over 1,000 injuries to civilians, and 668 arrests.

Unlike Miami Beach, however, serious questions were raised concerning the behavior of civil authorities during these events:
During the week of the Democratic National Convention, the Chicago police were the targets of mounting provocation by both word and act. It took the form of obscene epithets, and of rocks, sticks, bathroom tiles and even human feces hurled at police by demonstrators. Some of these acts had been planned; others were spontaneous and were themselves provoked by police action. Furthermore, the police had been put on edge by widely published threats of attempts to disrupt both the city and the Convention.

That was the nature of the provocation. The nature of the response was unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence on many occasions, particularly at night.

That violence was made all the more shocking by the fact that it was often inflicted upon persons who had broken no law, disobeyed no order, made no threat. These included peaceful demonstrators, onlookers, and large numbers of residents who were simply passing through, or happened to live in, the areas where confrontations were occurring.

Newsmen and photographers were singled out for assault, and their equipment deliberately damaged. Fundamental police training was ignored; and officers, when on the scene, were often unable to control their men. As one police officer put it: "What happened didn't have anything to do with police work." (Walker, 1968, p. 1)

These conditions, both the general climate and the immediate history of convention-related violence, had to be considered by everyone (Republican, Democrat, politician, law enforcement officials, average citizens, and political dissidents) as they planned for the 1972 Conventions.
CHAPTER 3

How the Conventions Came to Miami Beach:

"I Can't Believe We're Going to Get the Whole Thing" (Governor Reuben Askew)

It is not at all clear what were the first events which ultimately led to holding the 1972 political Conventions in Miami Beach. In all likelihood, some people began to consider this possibility during the Fall of 1968 when they compared the peaceful atmosphere of the Republican Convention in Miami Beach with the riotous environment of the Democratic Convention in Chicago. Certainly, after the defeat of Senator Humphrey, many Democrats must have given serious thought to the possible advantages of Miami Beach as the site of the 1972 Democratic Convention.

We do know, however, that as early as the summer of 1970, Miami Beach officials under the leadership of Mayor Dermer had begun to express an active interest in becoming the host city for both the 1972 Democratic and Republican Conventions. Among other indications of this interest was $5,000 offered for the holding of a Democratic gala and a similar offer to the Republican party. On September 29, 1970, City Manager Clifford O'Key requested the City Council's guidance by suggesting that the Council reiterate or disavow its interest in attracting the Conventions to Miami Beach. By a vote of 4 to 0 the Council urged City Manager O'Key to explore to the fullest the possibility of becoming the host city.*

*Favoring the motion -- Mayor Dermer, Councilmen Goodman and Greene, and Vice Mayor Weinstein; Abstaining -- Councilmen Ciment, Magnes and Powell.
Five months later on February 17, 1971, events had progressed to the point that the Miami Beach City Council seriously discussed what the City was willing to provide to the Conventions in terms of funds, goods and services, and the use of facilities. During this meeting, the Council first expressed its ambivalence about hosting the Conventions.

City Manager O'Key advised the Council that it would cost the City approximately $1,000,000 in additional expenses to attract and provide for the Conventions. Members of the Council were in general agreement -- at least publicly -- that the Conventions should not be held in Miami Beach if they were going to cost the City any money. The Councilmen were divided, however, as to when this position should be made a matter of public record. One group -- Councilmen Goodman, Greene, Magnes, and Weinstein -- felt the Council should immediately declare that the City would "not raise taxes or cut services or make any financial appropriation to bring the Conventions to Miami Beach." Their opponents -- Mayor Dermer and Councilmen Powell and Rosen -- took the position that the only issue to be acted upon at that moment was whether or not the City was interested in obtaining the Conventions; that other matters could be acted upon at a later date. After some deliberation, the forces lead by Councilman Goodman appeared to have won the day. The following policy statement was unanimously passed:

This City will advise both Site Selection Committees that it is interested in obtaining both political conventions; that a public hearing is set for March 24, 1971, at 10:00 a.m. at which all sources of revenue people will be invited to determine what contributions they will make toward obtaining the conventions; and that this City by majority vote of the Council said that it will not expend any city funds towards obtaining these political conventions.
Having clarified its position, the Council then instructed the City Manager to advise the Site Committees of the Democratic and Republican Parties that Miami Beach was interested in hosting the 1972 political Conventions. However, in so doing, he was not expected to call to the Committees' attention at this time the conditions which were attached to the policy decision.

Also during this meeting, the issue of convention security was publicly raised by a member of the City Council. Councilman Greene stated that if the City hosted one or both Conventions, he would want to have absolute assurances from the State and Federal Governments that the City would have added police protection. This concern appears to have been ignored by other members of the Council. However, the problem of security was not totally being ignored by those in Miami Beach. By April 5, 1971, the Miami Beach Police Department submitted a grant application to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to support the "National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services Project."*

On March 24, 1971, the City Council held a special meeting with interested parties to discuss possible financial assistance should the City be selected as the host site for either or both Conventions. Persons

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*The Washington Office of LEAA approved a revised version of this proposal for $395,424 on November 6, 1971 (LEAA Grant No. 71-DF-1098).
appearing before the Council included representatives of the Florida Democratic Party; the City of Miami; the Miami Beach Tourist Development Authority (TDA); the Miami Beach Restaurant Association; the Southern Florida Hotel and Motel Association; Eastern, United, and Delta Airlines; Florida Power and Light Co.; Southern Bell Co.; private police and security companies; and the local tourist and recreational industry. All persons appearing before the Council encouraged the City to seek both Conventions. However, with the exception of the State Democratic Party and the Hotel Association, they were all reluctant to commit their organizations to specific levels of financial support.

During the next few months, the primary convention-related concerns of the City Council appear to have been financial. At their April 7 meeting, the Council voted to rescind its previous policy statement to the effect that the City would not make any expenditure for the purpose of hosting the 1972 Conventions.* In its place, the Council passed a resolution pledging the City to contribute $250,000 in goods and services to each Party.** This resolution also suggested that the TDA contribute $250,000, the hotel industry $100,000, and that the Parties, the air

*Voting yes to rescinding -- Mayor Dermer, Vice Mayor Weinstein, Councilmen Goodman and Powell; opposed to rescinding -- Councilmen Greene and Rosen.

**Favoring motion -- Mayor Dermer, Vice Mayor Weinstein, Councilmen Goodman and Powell; opposed to motion -- Councilmen Greene and Rosen.
lines, and affiliated industries together contribute a total of $400,000. On the basis of this resolution, the City of Miami Beach made formal bids to host both the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

While the city fathers of Miami Beach worried about how they could manage to host the Conventions without spending any money, representatives of both the Democratic and Republican National Committees were looking for homes for their respective events. Above and beyond the obvious requirements of hotel rooms, meeting space, and money, historical procedure has been to select convention sites in terms of their political utility. Thus, selection criteria have usually included the following: the preferences of presidential candidates; the political sympathies of mayors and governors; and the need to influence voters in a potential swing state. These factors were also present in the selection of host cities during the spring of 1971.

For the Republicans, the choice of San Diego appears to have been primarily in deference to President Nixon's desire to be renominated in "his lucky city." Additional points in its favor, however, certainly included the fact that it had a Republican Mayor, that the Governor was a Republican, and that California could be an important state to the Republicans in November, 1972.

The selection of Miami Beach by the Democrats also conformed to traditional patterns. According to representatives of the Democratic Party, the financial aspects of the bid were key considerations when the selection was made. For a party that had a large debt left over from its
last Presidential campaign, this was certainly a reasonable criterion. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Miami Beach was a Democratic city, that the Governor (Reuben Askew) was a Democrat, and that Florida was a potentially key state for the Democrats in the upcoming Presidential election.

For the Democrats at least, the problem of security also was an important concern in the selection of a convention site. Richard Murphy, Convention Manager, emphasized the basis for this concern:

While security is a matter of law in the local community and the Police Chief can't abdicate his responsibility for it, it was also a matter of tremendous importance to us in the potential outcome of our election as to whether or not we had a peaceful Convention or whether we were blamed for any violence that occurred. All of us, from the Chairman on down, are convinced that a very substantial portion of our loss in '68 is attributed to the way that Democrats were identified as being responsible for the violence in Chicago. (Interview, October 5, 1972)

In view of 1968, the Democratic National Committee was determined to approach the situation differently so as to avoid the mistakes made in Chicago. Thus, from the very beginning, Party officials sought to resolve conflicts and diffuse hostilities before tensions built into confrontation situations or broke out into violence. This approach was articulated by the Party's adoption of three goals for the Convention:

1. to maintain the peace and security of the Miami Beach Community;

2. to protect the right of the Democratic Party to put on a Convention and to be able to hold a Convention in a deliberative fashion;
3. to protect the right of persons to dissent in a peaceful way.

Representatives of the Democratic National Committee soon learned that these were also the goals of Rocky Pomerance, Chief of the Miami Beach Police Department. Moreover, Party officials were impressed with Chief Pomerance as a person, by his basic approach to the problems of security, and by his sensitivity to all of the issues related to the Convention. According to Convention Manager Murphy, "the personality of the Chief and our confidence in him were the security factors involved in the selection of Miami Beach."

Once the host cities had been chosen, events in Miami Beach tended to focus on the financial and technical problems of staging the Democratic Convention. Representatives of the Democratic National Committee and Miami Beach officials spent the summer negotiating a formal contract which was finally ratified by the City Council on September 15, 1971. Even as late as the first two weeks of April, 1972, the convention-related concerns of the City Council appear to have been directed toward such issues as: the acceleration of TDA payments to the Democratic National Committee; the construction of a podium, bandstand, and seats for Convention Hall; and whether or not the expenditures for the Convention would exceed the City's commitment.

During this period, officials of both the Democratic Party and Miami Beach shared a basic confidence concerning the prospects for demonstrations, protests, and violence even though they continued their efforts to develop appropriate security procedures for the Convention.
We did not have any great problem about confrontation from the beginning. This time, as opposed to '68, many of them (dissenters) were indicating to us that they had a different emphasis in approaching the Convention. They also did not want to have a lot of bloodied heads as had occurred in Chicago. (Interview, Richard Murphy, October 5, 1972)

The general public and a lot of professionals around the country were concerned about what was going to happen in 1972 because the 1968 Democratic Convention had become a debacle. I didn't share the fright that went with that concern because I realized that in 1968 the Democrats were the incumbents. Historically it is the incumbent administration that draws the protest. The Republicans hadn't done anything in four years. Why would they in '68 have been a target. If '68 was successful in Miami Beach now we felt that by analogy the '72 Democratic Convention would be successful. Except that there would be considerably more tense situations arising. But we felt that much of the tension would be on the floor of the Convention rather than on the streets of the city. (Interview, Chief Rocky Pomerance, May 4, 1973)

This confidence was shaken in the middle of April when it became known that the Republicans might be seeking to move their Convention from San Diego. The first inkling that this might be the case came on April 13 when a letter from Republican Convention Coordinator, Senator Robert F. Knowles, to the Vice-Chairman of the Republican Arrangements Committee, Richard Herman, was leaked to the press. This letter listed a number of problems in San Diego and urged that the Republican National Committee seriously consider changing sites.

As events progressed, the reasons people articulated as to why the Convention was moved came to reflect their political perspectives. Those close to the Republican Party focused their attention on such factors as:
1. San Diego's failure to raise $500,000 of its $600,000 pledge by the April 1 deadline;
2. the shortage of about 1,500 of the 12,500 hotel rooms pledged for the Convention;
3. labor difficulties with construction workers raising the possibility that the San Diego Sports Arena might not be ready by the time of the Convention;
4. and, a series of disputes with the Arena's owner, Peter Grahm, over the rent and the costs of installing facilities for delegates, guests, and the media.*

Those less friendly to the Administration stressed the effect of the adverse publicity received by San Diego when it was revealed that International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) had pledged as much as $400,000 to the Republican Party after receiving an extremely favorable out-of-court settlement of an anti-trust case being pursued against them by the Justice Department.

*For those interested in the viability of the last two reasons: 1. construction workers in the San Diego area did go out on strike on May 1, 1972 and remained on strike for sometime; 2. in personal correspondence with the authors, Mr. Grahm did not (or would not) refute the contention of officials in the Republican Party that they left San Diego because it was impossible to deal with him.
A third explanation focused on the desire of the Republican Party to escape the threat of massive anti-Administration demonstrations promised for San Diego. This explanation was certainly the way at least some radical groups interpreted the site change. Note, for instance, this quotation:

Nixon had chosen the sunny city of San Diego, California as the place where he would happily accept the renomination for the Presidency of the United States. But with the emergence of the ITT scandal, with the offensive, with an aura that was beginning to build in every region in this country that San Diego would be an event where thousands of young people would express their contempt and rage for a man and a system that tyrannizes the whole world -- Nixon decided to find another city. If Richard Nixon had come to San Diego, thousands of young people would have been waiting here for him.

Nixon decided to move the Convention to Miami -- hoping in a vain endeavor to confuse, mislead and drain us of our time and resources. (The Carpetbag Express, "See Dick Run," p. 5)

That Miami Beach was the primary candidate for the new site of the Republican Convention became public knowledge during the April 19 meeting of the Miami Beach City Council. Mayor Hall and City Manager O'Key left the meeting for about an hour.* When they returned, Mayor Hall announced:

...that during their absence he and the City Manager had met with a member of the Republican Party, whose name he was not at liberty to disclose, in Mr. Hank Meyer's office and this gentleman wanted to know if the city would welcome the

*At this time the Council was composed of Mayor Chuck Hall, Vice-Mayor Robert Goodman, Councilmen Jerome Greene, Herbert Magnes, Harold Rosen, Leonard Weinstein, and Leonard Haber.
Republican National Convention if it was decided to change the location. He said that he had advised him that they would not answer the question: that was a decision for the City Council but that he, as an individual, would certainly welcome them. He said that the City Manager has indicated that it can be done but that he would have to sit down with the proper individuals and discuss the financial terms. He said that, in his opinion, there was a great possibility that Miami Beach can have the Republican Convention if it wants it.* (Miami Beach City Council Minutes, April 19, 1972)

In the subsequent discussion, the City Manager revealed that Convention Hall had already been rented for a showing of 1973 Buicks on the scheduled dates of the Republican Convention (August 21-24). He suggested, however, that something could be done about this problem to allow the GOP Convention to come to Miami Beach.

*In reality, the feeling-out process had been more circuitous than we have indicated above. On the same day that the Knowles' letter was leaked to the press (April 13), Senator Knowles contacted a member of the Miami Beach Tourist Development Authority (Jesse Weiss) to check on the City's potential interest in hosting the Republican Convention. On Friday, April 14, Senator Robert Dole, Republican National Committee Chairman, also phoned Weiss to inquire about Miami Beach's interest in the Convention. Between April 14 and the April 19 Council meeting, Weiss and others began to develop support for bringing the Republican Convention to the Beach. Finally on Wednesday, Mayor Hall and City Manager O'Key met with Richard Herman's representative in the office of Miami Beach public relations expert, Hank Meyer.
Other members of the Council did not rush to grab the prize being offered by Mayor Hall. Councilman Greene immediately raised the issue of security and suggested that public hearings be held to determine whether or not the citizens of Miami Beach wanted the Convention. After a discussion in which most Council members expressed their lack of enthusiasm by raising the cost issue and suggesting the need for further study, the Council agreed that no action was required at that time.

While the Miami Beach City Council chose to postpone any action, second and third fronts were being opened in Washington, D.C. Richard Herman, Vice-Chairman of the Republican Convention's Arrangements Committee, publically indicated that the GOP was still trying to hold its Convention in San Diego, but that the GOP would be willing to receive an offer from Miami Beach if they (the Beach) were interested. This type of face-saving statement became part of a series of invitational games played by both GOP and Miami Beach officials, maneuvers which probably contributed to a delay in obtaining a formal invitation to Miami Beach.*

Behind the scenes, President Nixon's Campaign Manager, former U. S. Attorney General John Mitchell, talked with Florida Governor, Reuben Askew, about moving the Convention to Miami Beach. Mr. Mitchell told the

*By "invitational games" we refer to the efforts on the part of GOP Party leaders to have Miami Beach officials invite them to their city and the conflicting efforts on the part of Beach officials to have the GOP ask to be invited.
Governor that Party officials had already checked on the Buick showing and were satisfied that something could be arranged so the Convention could be held in Miami Beach. Later in the day, Mr. Mitchell held a press conference in which he admitted that there were real problems in holding the Convention in San Diego and stated "if the Convention is switched from San Diego, Miami Beach is the only alternative." (Miami Herald, April 20, 1972, p. 1-A)

A publicly-oriented campaign concerning the possible shift of the Republican Convention was also initiated on April 19. In fact, it actually preceded Mayor Hall's announcement of his meeting with a representative of the Republican Party. On the morning of the 19th, the Miami Herald published a story on the Republican Convention entitled "Chances '50-50' GOP will Switch to Beach." This story quoted unnamed but "key" Republican officials as being seriously interested in Miami Beach as a convention site. That afternoon, the Miami News published a story "GOP Open to Offer for Beach Convention" in which it quoted Richard Herman about the problems in San Diego and revealed the existence of previous contacts between representatives of the GOP and a member of the Miami Beach Tourist Development Authority. It is doubtful that either of these stories could have (or would have) been published without some advance knowledge of the events which were going to take place that day.

During the next few days, officials of both the Republican Party and Miami Beach were busy with convention-related activities. On Wednesday afternoon, Richard Herman flew to Chicago to discuss the GOP's problems
with San Diego Sports Arena owner, Peter Graham, in person. On Thursday morning, not having achieved any breakthroughs in Chicago, Mr. Herman flew to Florida to discuss the situation with Miami Beach officials.

Meanwhile on Miami Beach itself, City Manager O'Key and Mayor Hall made their own contribution to the dynamics of invitational games by stressing that the next move was up to the GOP and insisting that the City had to have a definite answer within a week. Additional negative elements were added when several Councilmen and the Chairman of the Tourist Development Authority publicly announced that they would welcome the Republican Convention if it had to come, but that they felt the City could not afford the give the Convention any large amounts of financial support. In addition, the issue of convention security was publicly stressed for the first time: first, in a newspaper story which emphasized the possibility of trouble because "the Republicans are the incumbent party" (Miami Herald, April 20, 1972, p. 21-A); second, in an announcement by Miami Snowplow Co. which urged that the GOP not be invited.*

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*Miami Snowplow Co. was the name given to a citizens group originally formed to help provide human services -- medical treatment, housing, food, etc. -- to "non-delegates" during the Democratic Convention. By the middle of April, the group had already spent several months attempting to develop and coordinate the plans for such services. Although composed of "establishment" types, this organization did have contact with and some acceptance by "non-establishment" groups such as...
Behind the scenes, however, Mayor Hall, the City Manager, TDA members, and other interested citizens were working to develop a formal bid for the Republican Convention. The main features of this offer involved shifting the convention dates to August 14-16 to avoid conflict with the Buick showing, $250,000 in goods and services from the City, an additional $250,000 from the Tourist Development Authority, and contributions from local business interests similar to those already promised to the Democrats. By Thursday afternoon, the pro-Conventionites were so confident of their prospects that Mayor Hall called an emergency City Council meeting for 1:00 p.m. Friday.

Had events progressed as planned, the Republicans probably would have received their invitation from Miami Beach on Friday April, 21. The first step in that direction was taken on Friday morning when the Tourist Development Authority met and voted in favor of providing $250,000 for the GOP Convention. Immediately before the Council meeting, as many as six Councilmen might have voted in favor of extending an invitation to the Republican Convention.* But when the meeting began, City Manager O'Key

nonviolent demonstrators, members of the counter-culture, and young people living in the Dade County area. A detailed description of Miami Snowplow Co. and its activities is presented below in our analysis of third-party organizations.

*At that time Mayor Hall clearly favored extending an invitation, Councilmen Goodman and Weinstein had voted in favor of the original invitations to both parties in April 1971, and Councilmen Goodman, Haber,
informed the Councilmen that he had just been told by representatives of the GOP that legal complications precluded their acceptance of the earlier dates for their convention.* O'Key emphasized that all negotiations with the GOP had assumed the utilization of earlier dates and he recommended that "the City not submit a bid until such time as the Committee advises that the dates available are acceptable to them."

Given this opening, opposition to inviting the Republican Convention quickly emerged. Council Goodman immediately revealed that although he had previously favored hosting both Conventions he was no longer in favor of inviting the Republicans because of "the escalation of the war and the protests and disension all over the country." Goodman also stressed that he felt that most citizens of Dade County were opposed to the idea of a second convention and revealed that he had consulted with the Chief of Police (Rocky Pomerance) and felt that the Chief was not in favor of undertaking this additional responsibility.**

Magnes, and Rosen had publicly indicated their willingness to host the GOP Convention if it would not involve the City in any large expenditures.

*According to GOP spokesmen the GOP could not accept dates earlier than August 21 because of legal requirements concerning the timing for the selection of Convention delegates. Specifically, Convention rules required that all delegates be chosen 35 days before the Convention -- and five states would not qualify if the Convention were pushed back to August 14.

**In fact, Chief Pomerance was opposed to inviting the GOP Convention for the rather obvious reasons of the problems it would create
Councilman Greene also expressed his concern about convention security and renewed his call for a public hearing before any decision to invite the GOP was made.

Councilman Haber questioned the wisdom of inviting the Republican Party and hosting both Conventions -- particularly in view of the current political situation and "the large number of people that might be here in between the two Conventions, waiting for the second Convention."

The defense for inviting the Republicans was at best varied. Mayor Hall emphasized that he was prepared to invite the GOP because he knew the City could handle two conventions in an enlightened manner and would emerge with the best reputation in the world. Given his interest in his own public image, it seems fair to assume that Mayor Hall also felt a successful outcome would enhance his own reputation. The Mayor tried to dismiss the security issue by stating that he wasn't worried about demonstrations and pointed out that, during the 1968 riots in Miami, "at the risk of my own life I went over there to quiet things."

Councilman Magnes also stressed the favorable publicity Miami Beach would receive throughout the world but added that it was the City's "patriotic duty" to host the Republican Convention.

for his Department. In private conversations, Chief Pomerance has stated, "for my part as a police chief I would have been much happier if we didn't have either Convention." (Interview, May 4, 1973)
Although concerned about the possible economic costs to the City, Councilman Rosen said that he also felt it was the City's duty to help the Government by inviting the Republican Convention.

The best defense, however, was provided by Councilman Weinstein who avoided the possibility the Council would vote to refuse the GOP an invitation by successfully moving that all action be deferred until the question of dates was resolved.*

Outside of the City Council chambers, the problem of invitational games emerged once more. On Friday, California Governor Ronald Reagan met with the Mayor of San Diego in support of efforts to keep the Convention in that city. In Washington, an unnamed GOP source was quoted as saying "the deadline (for San Diego) has been extended. The emotional tide to transfer to Miami Beach has subsided." In Flint, Michigan, Buick representatives announced that although no one had mentioned it to them, they would be willing to relinquish their Convention Hall dates to the GOP if asked.

As one might expect, Miami Beach officials were not happy about any of these developments and before the day was over some of them publicly questioned the sincerity of the GOP's original approach to the Beach.

*Favoring the motion -- Mayor Hall, Councilmen Magnes, Rosen, and Weinstein; opposing the motion -- Councilmen Goodman, Greene, and Haber.
During the next six days, all stops were pulled out in an effort
to obtain a speedy invitation to Miami Beach for the Republican Convention.
The target date for these efforts was a public meeting to be held at the
Fontainebleau Hotel on Thursday, April 27. The first step in this campaign
was to reestablish the credibility of the GOP with local officials.
On Saturday, April 22, Richard Herman flew to Tallahassee and enlisted
the public support of Governor Askew in favor of the GOP. At the same
time, Mayor Hall announced that he was now convinced that the legal
complications were real and that the Beach was not being used as
bargaining leverage against San Diego. On Sunday, Mayor Hall's statement
was reenforced by Senator Edward Gurney (Rep., Florida) who revealed that
it was his understanding that San Diego was "just plain out" and that the
GOP National Committee had selected Miami Beach as their new Convention
site.

On Monday, GOP Chairman Robert Dole issued a call for a special
meeting of the National Committee on May 5, to consider moving the
Convention from San Diego because of "almost insurmountable problems."
Later in the day, Chairman Dole stated that the GOP was serious about
Miami Beach and hoped the City "would issue an invitation to the
Republican Party." Mayor Hall responded to this overture by indicating
that he would probably call a special meeting of the City Council
within the week to consider extending a formal invitation for the
Republican Convention.
New efforts were also initiated on the financial front. On Monday, Miami Beach public relations consultant Hank Meyer flew to New York to try to raise money from the television networks. Locally, hotelmen were being asked to provide the GOP with $1 per delegate per night; other businessmen were being asked to raise an additional $100,000; and a rumor emerged that the Buick showing would be shifted to early September. On Monday night, however, Buick officials met with City Manager O'Key and made an arrangement to move their showing to another city.*

During this period local pro-Conventionites, the GOP, and the Nixon Administration also attempted to extend the base of support for bringing the Republican Convention to Miami Beach. It is doubtful that anyone will ever know the full extent of these efforts which relied so

*It has been suggested to us by several people that the Buick move was an unilateral decision by the General Motors Co. in response to efforts from high ranking officials in the Republican Party and the Federal Government. In fact, Councilman Magnes raised this issue publicly when he commented on "the somewhat slimy tactics used to influence General Motors to pull the Buick convention out of Miami." (Miami Herald, April 22, 1972, p. 2-A) In private correspondence with the authors, Buick representatives maintained that they moved "because they did not want to stand in the way of an event as important as a national political convention."
heavily upon informal communication networks. We do know, however, that in addition to pressure from other sources both within and outside of the Government, City Council members were informed that the White House had a "direct interest" in their final decision. Local businessmen and other politicians were also contacted by numerous sources to elicit their support. The character of these contacts varied, but they ranged from the promise of future reciprocation for cooperation to the threat that "Miami Beach might never host another large convention." Given the numerous contacts existent between business corporations and both the GOP and the Nixon Administration, those in Miami Beach could not dismiss such a statement as an idle threat.

Support for the GOP Convention continued to emerge. On Tuesday morning, the Miami Herald exercised its considerable influence in the Miami area by running an editorial strongly supporting the extension of an invitation to the Republican Party:

American political process requires that the parties hold conventions to pick their candidates. So the Republicans must hold a convention, and it is now obvious that Miami Beach is the only place that can accommodate it ...

Despite what the Republican Party leaders and the San Diego officials are saying, there is no doubt that the convention will have to find a new home. All that is needed for the logical new choice is an official invitation to the Republican Party from the Miami Beach City Council. (Miami Herald, April 25, 1972, p. 6-A)

Also on Tuesday, Governor Askew announced that he would fly to Miami on Thursday morning for a meeting with Miami Beach officials, and
that he would do whatever he could to bring the GOP Convention to Florida. Chief Pomerance and City Manager O'Key on the other hand left Miami Beach on Tuesday and flew to Washington to confer with Federal officials about the problems of security for the Conventions. By Wednesday they had received tentative approval of an almost $114,000 supplement to their original grant for the Democratic Convention. More important, however, was the fact that Government sources promised even more financial support if the City voted to host the Republican Convention. This promise was confirmed by a phone call to Governor Askew from LEAA head, Jerris Leonard.

The anti-Convention forces also began to develop their attack during this period. Councilmen Goodman, Greene, and Haber continued to publicly express their concern over the thousands of "non-delegates" who would be drawn to Miami Beach to protest against the Nixon Administration. Additional negative input was provided by Councilmen Rosen and Weinstein who said they were in favor of inviting the GOP but only if it didn't cost the City anything in new expenditures.

On Tuesday, the Tourist Development Authority met and withdrew its' $250,000 cash pledge to replace it with a pledge for $100,000 minimum. The primary reasons for this withdrawal of support were the failure of the GOP to accept the dates offered to them and anger over the unilateral decision by Buick to move its' convention from Miami Beach. In fact, the $100,000 pledge was a compromise because anti-Convention forces originally attempted to withhold the promise of any financial support for the GOP.
The Dade County Grand Jury also joined the opposition -- at least indirectly -- by publicly urging officials to provide sanitary facilities, medical care, and other services for the "50,000 uninvited guests expected to attend the Democratic Convention on Miami Beach" and stressing the need for "tight security precautions." We need hardly point out the negative impact this statement had on a general public which was being told that the GOP Convention would present an even greater threat to the security of the local community.

On Wednesday, two more groups appeared for the opposition. First, the Miami Beach Chamber of Commerce announced its opposition to extending an invitation to the Republican Convention.* Second, the Greater Miami Crime Commission announced its opposition to an event which might attract 100,000 "undesirables":

We are very much opposed to it. But there are conditions under which it would be tolerable. Those conditions would be the governments' agreement to provide a large and adequate contingent of backup military personnel to contain any possible threat to our domestic tranquility. (Miami Herald, April 27, 1972, p. 32-A)

*The reader should note that unlike the situation in many American cities the Miami Beach Chamber of Commerce is not the major representative of business interests in local politics. Their lack of influence appears to result from the fact that the Chamber is not the primary political vehicle for the most wealthy segments of the business community. Rather, it tends to articulate the concerns of the smaller shop keepers and even the elderly residents of the South Beach area.
Thursday, April 27, started out extremely well for the pro-
Convention forces. On the mainland, the Dade County Commission met and
reinstated a pledge for $105,000 in goods and services to help bring the
Republican Convention to Miami Beach.* The public meeting at the
Fontainebleau Hotel also began well when GOP spokesman Richard Herman
put his hat in his hand and as part of his opening statement said,
"I openly request and ask the Mayor and Council to tender us a bid."
Governor Askew also restated his support for bringing the GOP to Miami
Beach. But mere humility and the support of the Governor were not enough
to win the day.

Although the problem of finances was raised by many speakers,
the major obstacle to inviting the GOP was definitely the problem of
security. Outright opponents of the GOP invitation vividly spoke of the
potential for disruption and violence if the GOP came. A spokesman for
Miami Snowplow Co. for example emphasized the dangers during the six
week period between Conventions and said:

I am afraid the County Commissioners and the Miami Beach
Councilmen and the people at large simply don't realize
what's going to happen here. It's devastating to think
about.

* Dade County had originally pledged $105,000 to each Convention
when the bids were made to both the Democrats and the Republicans in
the spring of 1971.
Miami Beach officials were generally more restrained, but nevertheless they stressed that their primary concern was for the security of the Miami Beach community. City Manager O'Key, for one, stated that he would not recommend in favor of the GOP until he had guarantees from Washington about the whole range of security problems. Similar positions were articulated by most members of the Council.

The pro-Conventionites employed a variety of arguments in their efforts to overcome the security issue. Numerous speakers emphasized the importance of tourism and conventions to the Beach's economy and argued that the City's reputation would be harmed if it acted out of fear in the case of the Republican Convention. Ben Novak, owner of the Fontainebleau Hotel, said he wasn't afraid to risk his $50 million hotel "with its high priced chandeliers which aren't insured."* Great stress was also placed by many speakers on the "patriotic duty" of the City to provide a site for one of the critical events in the American political system.

The possibility of additional security assistance was met head-on by both Governor Askew and representatives of the Republican Party. Governor Askew assured Miami Beach officials that the State would supply all the help it could and emphasized his confidence that the Federal Government would provide all of the assistance required to insure the security of the Miami Beach community. Representatives of the GOP gave

*Before the Conventions had even begun, however, Mr. Novak had changed his mind and expressed great concern about the possibility of damage to both his hotel and his chandeliers.
their assurances that once the Convention had received an invitation, the Nixon administration would definitely support all efforts to obtain the necessary assistance from the Government.

The meeting fell apart, however, just after Convention Coordinator Richard Herman finished assuring Beach officials that the Republican Party would help in correcting whatever limitations there might be in terms of assistance for security. Having given these assurances, Mr. Herman concluded by urging the Beach officials to act by 5 p.m. the following day -- Friday, April 28.

Mayor Hall and other Beach officials apparently interpreted this statement as an ultimatum. They immediately responded that they would not extend an invitation to the GOP until the City received definite commitments from the Federal Government; they made it clear that no decision would be made for several days. Despite Mr. Hermans' explanation that he had in no way intended to issue an ultimatum, the meeting ended with Beach officials refusing to provide a yes-or-no answer by 5 p.m., Friday.

The outcomes of the Fontainebleau meeting are extremely difficult to understand. As expected, the anti-Convention forces came right out and stated their opposition to the Convention because of the potential threat to the security of the Miami Beach community. Unexpected, however, was the fact that Miami Beach officials -- even friends of the GOP -- would become adamant about the need for commitments from the Federal Government. Mayor Hall, for example,
stressed that the 1968 GOP Convention had brought riots to the black sections of the City of Miami when several days before he had played down any concerns about demonstrations and security. Even more unexpected was the reaction to what appeared to be a fairly innocuous effort to hasten the decision.

We do not have enough information on the motivations of any given individual to account for his behavior during the Fontainebleau meeting. We are in a position, however, to provide some insight concerning the factors that prompted Miami Beach officials to insist upon commitments from the Federal Government and the vehement response by these officials to what appeared to be the public use of pressure tactics. From the beginning, the primary basis of opposition to the GOP Convention was the potential threat to community security. Those who originally took this position maintained it throughout this period. Others did not take the threats of demonstrations and violence seriously to begin with, but became concerned about security as events progressed. For these individuals, insistence upon Government commitments was a legitimate expression of their new-found concern over the safety of their community, and/or an effort to protect their public image, and/or an excuse to refuse an invitation to the Republicans. In some cases, it appears that some officials merely ignored the issue of security until the GOP had so committed itself to Miami Beach that both the Republican Party and the Nixon Administration would have to support efforts to obtain additional assistance. Finally, we would suggest that some of the attention focused
on security was due to its selection as a socially and politically acceptable vehicle for individuals to express their anger over the manner in which the Buick convention was moved and their resistance to the various pressures being exerted upon them to invite the GOP.

On Friday, the anti-Convention forces played one of their trumps and produced a spokesman for the anti-war groups in San Diego, who urged officials not to invite the GOP Convention to Miami. This spokesman was flown in Thursday night from San Diego by Miami Snowplow Co. and anti-Convention officials from Miami Beach to help reinforce the opposition to the GOP Convention. While in Miami Beach, he met with numerous officials including the City Manager, Chief Pomerance, Councilmen Goodman, Haber, and Weinstein, and representatives of Governor Askew. During these visits, he informed everyone that anti-war groups wanted the Republican Convention to stay in San Diego because they had already begun their preparations for San Diego. But he warned them that demonstrators and protestors would go to Miami Beach if necessary:

If you invite this convention, I assume you will accept the responsibility of looking after the 50,000, 100,000 or more who will come. (Interview, November 21, 1972)

Also on Friday, the 5 p.m. deadline passed without any action on an invitation to the Republican Convention. But this was the last real victory that the anti-Convention forces were able to achieve.

On Saturday the pro-Convention forces regained the initiative when LEAA head Jerris Leonard announced in Washington that his agency would
provide $550,000 to cover the costs of security for the GOP Convention.*
Miami Beach officials were quick to point out, however, that they would be lucky if this money covered the costs of police training programs let alone the manpower overtime which would be required.

On the same day, the general outline of a security plan was released (leaked) to the press. This plan provided for:

1. a 1,000 member State task force made up of men from the Florida Highway Patrol and other agencies to be on duty in the Miami area from July 1 until after the Republican Convention;**

2. the LEAA Planning Council to assist Miami Beach in gathering intelligence about plans for demonstrations and protests;

3. the LEAA Planning Council to seek court injunctions if it believed that high levels of disruption and violence were likely;

4. a strong military presence in the Miami area as a backup for local and state law enforcement units. (Miami Herald, April 30, 1972, p. 1-A)

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*The final details for this announcement were arranged in Washington, D.C., on Saturday morning in a meeting between Federal officials and City Manager O'Key, Mayor Hall, Chief Pomerance, and Councilman Magnes.

**In early April when only the Democratic Convention was expected Chief Pomerance was making arrangements for a State task force of no more than 200 men, most of whom would be activated only for the period 7/9 - 7/14 (Highway Patrol, 100 men; Department of Beverage, 50 men; and Florida Marine Patrol, 46 men).
By Sunday, April 30, concern about convention security had clearly shifted to the issue of manpower and who would provide it. In fact, it had become obvious on Saturday that once Federal money was available, the primary target of Beach officials would be Governor Askew because of their desire for a vastly strengthened State task force. Apparently in response to this development, Governor Askew let it be known through the press that he had suggested that Miami Beach officials hire off-duty policemen from other states to help provide security during the Conventions. In return, Miami Beach officials -- particularly City Manager O'Key, Mayor Hall, and Chief Pomerance -- reiterated their need for additional manpower and stressed that they were turning to the Governor to help them obtain the necessary assistance.*

Monday's meeting between the Governor and Beach officials focused on the issue of additional law enforcement personnel. Governor Askew promised City officials that he would approve increasing the State task force from 200 to 400 men. Only Mayor Hall seemed to be reassured by the Governor's offer, and he announced that he would urge the City Council on Wednesday to invite the GOP.** Chief Pomerance on the other hand told

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*The reader should note that the press statement games on Sunday were part of a feeling-out process in anticipation of a meeting between the Governor and Miami Beach officials scheduled for Monday afternoon.

**Despite his consistent support for bringing the GOP Convention to Miami Beach, Mayor Hall pulled no punches about why he thought the Republicans wanted to leave San Diego: "The real reason the Republican
the Governor that San Diego had planned to field a force of almost 7,000 men but stated that he thought 5,000 men would be sufficient for Miami Beach.* Chief Pomerance also revealed that they had checked out the Governor's suggestion about using out-of-state policemen and found it to be impractical because such policemen could not be brought to Miami Beach soon enough.

On Tuesday, governmental officials at all levels continued their efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the need for additional law enforcement personnel. But despite these efforts, the question of whether or not the GOP would receive an invitation remained doubtful -- at least publicly. An informal poll of the City Council on Tuesday produced the following split:

Party wants to shift its convention away from San Diego is that President Nixon is in political trouble and there would be less chance of riots in Florida." (Washington Post, May 2, 1972)

*The magnitude of Chief Pomerance's request can only be appreciated when one realizes that in 1972 there were no more than 12,500 sworn law enforcement personnel at the municipal and county level in the entire State, and that the Florida Highway Patrol had a total of 1,000 men. Even counting the Department of Beverage, the Florida Marine Patrol, the Department of Law Enforcement, Chief Pomerance had requested a force of between one-fourth and one-third of all the civilian law enforcement personnel in the State of Florida.
definite yes -- Mayor Hall and Council Magnes
conditional no -- Councilmen Goodman, Haber, and Rosen
definite no -- Councilman Greene
undecided -- Councilman Weinstein  (Miami Herald, May 3, 1972)

On Wednesday morning, City Manager O'Key opened the City Council meeting by recommending that the City extend a bid to the 1972 Republican National Convention. Following O'Key's recommendation, Councilman Haber read a statement in which he expressed concern over the lack of sufficient non-military law enforcement personnel to meet the City's needs during and between the two Conventions.* As a solution to this problem, he proposed that the Federal Government create a "Convention Peace Corps" composed of 1,000 specially-selected young people on leave from the United States Armed Forces and trained in the peaceful management of confrontation situations to function under the jurisdiction of the Miami Beach Police Department. It was the Council's ultimate endorsement of this idea that lead to a majority vote in favor of the GOP Convention.

Councilman Goodman, who had also worked on the Peace Corps idea, offered a resolution to the effect that the City would extend an invitation to the GOP if Federal authorities would "give proper and satisfactory assurances, and take appropriate action for the establishment of a Convention Peace Corps." In support of his motion, Council Goodman

*For the reader who is interested in details, Chief Pomerance revealed during this meeting that he had definite commitments for no more than 650 men at that time.
revealed that he and Councilman Haber had just spoke with LEAA head, Jerris Leonard, and that Leonard's reaction to the proposal was extremely positive.

Opposition to Councilman Goodman's proposal came from two sources. Councilman Magnes stated that the idea of a special task force had been raised with Federal officials by Mayor Hall and they (the Federal officials) had rejected it on the grounds that it would be unconstitutional. Councilmen Greene and Weinstein took the position that the Council should first decide whether or not to extend an invitation and then, if the invitation was voted, the Council should deal with the Convention Peace Corps resolution. This position finally prevailed, with Councilmen Greene, Magnes, Rosen, and Weinstein voting to defer action on the Peace Corps resolution.

After additional discussion, Councilmen Goodman and Haber agreed that an invitation to the GOP need not be contingent upon the establishment of a Peace Corps, but they insisted that a resolution urging the creation of such a group be included with the GOP bid.* In return, Councilman Magnes offered just such a motion. This resolution passed the Council

*With all fairness to Councilmen Goodman and Haber we have not been able to determine the reasons for their actions during this meeting unless they were looking for a reason to vote in favor of the GOP bid. Had they just voted no or insisted that the invitation be contingent upon the establishment of a Convention Peace Corps, it appears that they would
by a 4-3 vote with Mayor Hall and Councilmen Goodman, Haber, and Magnes voting yes, and Councilmen Greene, Rosen, and Weinstein voting no.

(Miami Beach Resolution No. 13611, May 3, 1972.)

On Thursday, the GOP Arrangements Committee met in Washington and unanimously voted to recommend that the National Committee accept the bid to hold their Convention in Miami Beach.

Friday, May 5, Miami Beach officials came to Washington to hear the Republican National Committee vote to move their Convention from San Diego to Miami Beach and to receive Presidential assurances for the safety of their community delivered through LEAA head, Jerris Leonard:

I have been authorized by the highest authority in this government to try to assure that both of these conventions be carried on with a minimum of disruption to the conventions and the people of Dade County. (Miami Herald, May 6, 1973, p. 1-A)

have been part of a 5-2 majority which could claim that it saved the City from the problems of the Republican Convention. But by agreement to merely have a recommendation urging the creation of a Peace Corps, they became responsible for bringing the GOP to Miami Beach even though they had no guarantees that the very program they believed necessary for the peace and security of their community would ever be implemented.
CHAPTER 4
Theoretical Considerations

The purpose of this chapter is to present both the values and analytic frameworks which have been important to our study of the political Conventions in Miami Beach. What follows is our position to date on these questions. While these views are not in all instances identical to the views we began with, the differences are differences of refinement. We began and ended with the same values regarding rights to dissent. We began thinking about the analytic models we present here, however, reflection upon our Miami experience has enabled us to clarify and develop most of our conceptual framework. Hopefully this statement of theoretical considerations enables us to make explicit what otherwise in a less complete form would have remained implicit and enables the reader to know from the start the "prejudices" which permitted us to make distinctions between the "important" and the "unimportant" and which established the basis of our judgments.

Rights to Dissent

We believe a democratic system of government must permit its citizens meaningful opportunities for expression of political points of view. Free speech rights must include the right to organize and assemble those wishing to express either verbally or symbolically dissident opinions. However, we recognize that dissident rights do not exist in a vacuum. The peace and order of the society are also important. For this reason, the right to dissent does not extend to the point where any political message is tolerable.
Conceivably, directly threatening verbal incitement of others to illegal action can be punished without destroying free speech rights. Similarly, forms of dissent involving extraordinary disruption of community life or violence justify counter actions by civil authorities without signifying the emergence of an intolerant state. Finally, in cases of dissenting assemblies called against the meeting of another group, the rights of the original group must be acknowledged and protected. To permit dissidents to disrupt such assemblies is contradictory to the very principle which establishes a right to dissent in the first place.

Thus in a very real sense, the rights of dissidents, their opponents, and the general public are always inter-dependent and potentially in opposition. Because of this, sole concentration on anyone (or any one combination) of these values conceivably negates the remaining rights. For example, the most efficient and effective procedure (at least in the short run) for preserving public peace might be the prohibition of all forms of dissident activity. Conversely, dissidents may justify any form of behavior because of its alleged contribution to the achievement of a morally higher goal. Ultimately, however, these rights cannot be defined in isolation because each derive their justification from the context in which they occur and that context always includes the rights of other groups.

In general, we believe that civil authorities must strive to give dissidents the benefit of the doubt.* For this reason we believe authorities must not assume the existence of a zero-sum game such that the protection of one set of rights necessitates the negation of another set of rights. Thus

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*We have taken this position for several reasons: first, civil authorities have a constitutional responsibility to protect the rights of political dissidents; second, civil authorities generally represent established
authorities must view it as part of their responsibility to explore solutions which recognize the rights of all involved including the provision of meaningful opportunities for dissident activity.

Scheduled vs. Spontaneous Events

The potential for dissident activity derives from a variety of sources including the fact that our society contains multiple complexes of grievances against the entire political system and between various sub-groups within the system. Moreover, the resolution of these grievances often does not appear subject to quick relief within the constraints of existing institutional structures and societal values. Coming, as America does, from a liberal political tradition emphasizing public pursuit of particularistic goals through interest group involvement, we should not be surprised when individuals join with others to express their commonly-felt grievances. We should not be surprised that many individuals have come to view our time as a period of crisis which requires decisive and dramatic action.

Equally important, however, is the fact that numerous groups (ranging across racial and ethnic lines and from the left to the right of the political spectrum) have come to view the use of confrontation and harassment techniques as major vehicles in their efforts to protest and influence governmental policies. The use of these techniques has resulted in the continual generation values of the existing status quo (whatever that may be), and thus tend to define situations from the perspective of established interests; finally, civil authorities have such a monopoly on the various forms of power (including physical force) that they can ultimately overwhelm any dissident group.
of situations out of which violent outbursts may emerge -- particularly between groups of civilians and representatives of civil authority such as the police. Furthermore, given that these situations provide concrete events through which members of the body politic are made aware of various arrays of grievances, the manner in which they are resolved may actually decrease or heighten levels of community tensions and conflict. In short, the growing utilization of physical confrontation as a form of social protest has created a climate in which conflict and the potential for civil disorders of various types will continue to exist for some time to come.*

In terms of practical experience, there have been some changes in the character of the events with which civil authorities have had to deal in the past few years. The civil rights movement of the early sixties -- characterized by civil disobedience and minimal law enforcement violence -- was superceded by the ghetto riots of the mid-sixties. In turn, massive urban riots arising unannounced from ghetto conditions and tensions have now virtually disappeared. They have been replaced, however, by smaller-scale but still spontaneous violence (in cities of all sizes) involving a variety of racial or ethnic groups. In addition, the potential for civil disorder has spread beyond ghetto residents and other disadvantaged groups to include such diverse participants as students, construction workers, and veterans of the Vietnam War. The confrontation politics of recent social protest have introduced -- or at least accentuated -- uncertainties concerning

*What effect the apparent end to the Vietnam War will have on this potential cannot be determined at this time.
the responses of civil authorities and the effects of their behavior on the final outcome of the event.

In outbreaks of disorder such as the Watts' Riot of 1965, the element of spontaneity and surprise is intrinsic to the event's occurrence. However, once such a disorder begins, the character of the event is quickly identifiable. As a result, spontaneous disorders are essentially emergency situations for which civil authorities can plan contingencies in advance, even though they cannot predict the occurrence or scale of any given event. In contrast, political demonstrations are usually scheduled events -- their time of occurrence is known or anticipated. In the case of scheduled events, however, the actual character of the event may not be able to be determined in advance. Thus civil authorities are faced with a situation in which they know something is going to happen but are uncertain about which of a number of possible situations for which to plan responses.

The "uncertainty" factor in these scheduled or quasi-scheduled events stems from several sources. First, while there is sufficient time to plan ahead, the information concerning what to expect is often insufficient, inconsistent, and subject to constant revision. As a result, civil authorities are acutely aware of the need for some law enforcement presence during the coming event, but they are unable to determine the extent or character of the presence required. For example, it is usually not easy for authorities to determine in advance whether demonstrations and related activities -- despite the expressed intentions of organizers -- will actually be legal or illegal, disruptive or non-disruptive, violent or non-violent. Thus, civil
authorities are constantly threatened by the possibility that their plans will be inappropriate for the event as it actually develops.

Second, between the time that civil authorities and the general public first learn about a scheduled event and its actual occurrence, there is an opportunity for the mobilization of a much greater variety of actors (organizations, etc.) than is usually possible during spontaneous emergency situations. These actors may represent constituencies that have valid claims on civil authorities although they are often opposed to each other in terms of political ideology and other forms of vested interest. For example, at least some portion of the business community may view the event as an opportunity to make money and thus may support the civil treatment of participants. Others (businessmen included) may see no opportunity for financial gain and may actually view the event as a threat to their financial security as well as to the peace and security of the community. In any case, the mobilization of such diverse groups almost insures that civil authorities will be subjected to competing, if not conflicting, expectations for their handling of the coming event. Conceivably, some groups may even mobilize to counter-demonstrate, thus increasing the uncertainty problem regarding the possibility of disruption.

**Governmental Response Styles**

Despite the conflicts and uncertainties created by scheduled events, civil authorities must and ultimately do develop a basic approach or strategy for dealing with the anticipated event. It is our impression that in many cases they choose to protect themselves by erring on the side of
over-preparedness and actively planning for the worst. In fact, this approach will continue to be preferred by authorities as long as the costs of underestimating the threat continue to outweigh the costs of over-estimating the threat. This arrangement because it contains no incentive for even realistic estimates of threat encourages no governmental self-correction toward strictly efficient and effective response alternatives.

The response approach of civil authorities (whatever strategy characterizes that approach) will either increase or decrease the probability that the coming event will remain peaceful or escalate into hostile confrontations even to the point of full-scale disorders. Both the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (the Eisenhower Commission) have emphasized the critical role played by civil authorities in such events. For example, a staff report to the Eisenhower Commission emphasized the following regarding study team examination of 1968 disturbances in Chicago, Cleveland, and Miami: "It is often difficult to determine who was 'responsible' for the violence. The reports of our study teams, however, clearly suggest that authorities bear a major responsibility." (Skolnick, 1969, p. 3)

Regarding this point, we must stress two additional refinements: first, the ultimate outcome of scheduled events will be influenced by strategies adopted by authorities prior to the event as well as by the tactics employed during the actual event. In fact, the very selection of tactics may be determined by prior decisions regarding the character of the overall response style. Second, the response style will have an influence on the outcome of the event whether it is the consciously determined goal of
intentionally implemented plans or merely the product of isolated and uncoordinated decisions.

In attempting to characterize different kinds of response styles we have focused on two basic distinctions: (1) protest vs. disorder -- to what degree do civil authorities view the event as a "protest" as opposed to criminal behavior (such as a civil disorder)? (2) Reaction vs. initiation -- to what degree do authorities view their role as passive, merely responding to actions of protest organizers, or as active, with a responsibility themselves to begin setting the terms of protest situations? The results of combining these two dimensions are presented graphically in figure 1.

The horizontal axis in figure 1 represents the operational character of governmental response strategies on a continuum that ranges from reactive to initiatory. By "initiatory" we refer to the general willingness of public officials to make the first move -- to take action before dissidents act. Conversely by "reactive" we refer to the general tendency to let others initiate the action -- to take action only in response to dissident actions. By way of analogy, we are alluding to the distinction between being on the offense as opposed to the defense.

The vertical axis of the diagram represents a continuum based on the degree to which civil authorities view the event as a protest in contrast to mere criminal behavior such as a civil disorder. It is important to note that the attitudinal component relevant here is purely behavioral. The distinction relies strictly on how authorities view the event. Clearly we could argue regarding whether a given event fell within the constitutional protections of the First Amendment (e.g., whether the event fell within the
Definition of the Event as Protest or Disorder

Disorder

RESISTIVE       PRE-EMPTIVE

Operational Style of Response Strategy

Reactive       Initiatory

ACCOMMODATIVE FACILITATIVE

Protest

Figure 1. Classification of civil authority response strategies for scheduled protest.
definitional confines of the specification of rights to dissent). Even should we conceive of a situation where, for instance, authorities considered an event to be criminal disorder which we would argue was legitimate protest, the important variable here was the authorities' viewpoint. We make this distinction out of a conviction that meaning authorities attach to an event (their interpretation of that event) will influence (either as justification or rationalization) their choice of a cooperative or antagonistic response strategy. Important arguments on this question can and do occur between civil authorities and dissidents (often involving jurists, citizens, social analysts, etc.).

Given these two dimensions we have identified four different response styles or strategies: resistive; pre-emptive; accommodative; and facilitative. Both the resistive and pre-emptive styles represent situations in which civil authorities have defined the event (or anticipated event) as a disorder. The difference between them is that the resistive style is characterized by civil authorities who wait for the dissidents to make the first move. The pre-emptive style, on the other hand, represents a situation in which civil authorities tend to take the initiative. In terms of past events we would suggest that the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago is an example of the resistive style and that the governmental response to May Day (1971) activities in Washington, D.C. is an example of the pre-emptive response strategy.

Situations in which civil authorities define the event as a protest we have categorized as accommodative and facilitative. The accommodative style is characterized by a situation in which civil authorities do not
initiate positive interactions with dissidents despite the fact that they have recognized the event as a social protest. This style is represented by the response of governmental officials in Portland to the People's Army Jamboree's Anti-American Legion Convention during the summer of 1970. (Corsi and Lewis, 1972) The facilitative style represents those situations in which civil authorities have not only recognized an event as a protest but have initiated efforts to protect the civil rights of dissidents.

In the remainder of this report, we will present our reasons for concluding that the governmental response during the political conventions in Miami Beach during the summer of 1972 generally fell within the facilitative response style category.

Protest or Disorder

That an individual's (or groups') "definition of the situation" not only reflects his pre-existing values, norms, etc., but also determines how he will respond to the situation is a well established principle in social science. In fact, for any event there are many possible publics (both individuals and groups) which may have a variety of interpretations for many different reasons. This principle has recently been emphasized in an analysis of factors contributing to the perception of civil disorders and collective violence as expressions of social protest. (Turner, 1969)

In his study, Turner focused on the retrospective interpretation of civil disorders as acts of social protest. Moreover he tended to focus on spontaneous outbursts of violence, such as ghetto disorders rather than
planned disruptions or even scheduled events such as demonstrations. We on the other hand, are concerned with the manner in which public officials define the anticipated activities of political dissidents during scheduled events. Despite these differences Turner's work has provided some valuable insights which we have employed in our analysis of governmental response strategies in Miami Beach.

First, Turner has helped make explicit the various conditions implied by our definition of protest:

1. the action expresses a grievance, a conviction of wrong or injustice;
2. the protestors are unable to correct the condition directly by their own efforts;
3. the action is intended to draw attention to the grievances;
4. the action is further meant to provoke ameliorative steps by some target group;
5. and, the protestors depend upon some combination of sympathy and fear to move the target group in their behalf. (Turner, 1969, p. 816)

In short, an event is an act of social protest if it is viewed as an effort by a powerless group to communicate in which the specific actions of the participants (whether they be legal or illegal and/or violent or non-violent)

*For a detailed analysis of planned versus the spontaneous character of racial disorders see Baskin, Hartweg, Lewis and McCullough, 1971, pp. 37-40.
are considered to be the means of communication rather than the goal of the participants.

Second, Turner has helped focus our attention on the dynamics of a scheduled event by pointing out that the meanings attributed to an event are in great measure the result of the social interactions (past, present, and anticipated) between the various groups involved. As we shall see below this means that any interpretation any given group has given to an event can be influenced by the behavior of the other groups with which they interact.

Finally, Turner has suggested five specific factors which we have found helpful in determining why an event is viewed as an act of social protest or a civil disorder. Briefly these factors are:

I. **Credibility as Protest**
   Whether or not the events meet generally accepted notions of social protest;

II. **Balance of Appeal and Threat**
   The degree to which the event both appeals to the sympathies and threatens the well-being of individuals or groups;

III. **Conciliation-Conflict Resolution or Avoidance**
    The degree to which individuals (or groups) seek to avoid or discontinue conflict (injury to each other) without asking for or offering surrender on the substantive issues of disagreement;

IV. **Third-party Status -- Neutrality or Partisanship**
    The degree to which individuals (or groups) seek to preserve their "neutrality" from the threat of active involvement as a partisan;
V. Negotiations and Bargaining

The degree to which individuals (or groups) view negotiations and/or bargaining as an important part of the intergroup processes related to the event.

In Table 1 we have attempted to summarize for each of these factors some of the conditions which will influence civil authorities' interpretation of an event as a social protest rather than a disorder. Even the most cursory examination of Table 1 reveals that the emergence of any interpretation of an event (either protest or disorder) may be extremely complicated. For example, different conditions may actually be in opposition to each other. Thus the existence of the grievance may be well established but the failure of dissidents to obtain respectability in the community where the event is scheduled may result in the ultimate rejection by civil authorities of the event as an act of social protest. Because of such complexities we have not systematically or rigidly applied either the five factors or their influencing conditions to our analysis of the political Conventions. Such an approach would exert too deterministic an imprint upon our analysis; an attempt to so apply and refine Turner's framework would go far beyond our present objectives and capabilities. We have, however, employed these ideas as they appeared to improve our understanding of the dynamics of governmental response in Miami Beach.

Besides noting that the governmental definition of an event depended upon interaction with dissidents (the credibility of the dissenting individuals and/or groups, the degree of threat involved in the event) and upon the nature of the grievance (the possibility of conciliation, negotiation,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Credibility as Protest</th>
<th>II. Appeal vs. Threat</th>
<th>III. Conciliation</th>
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<tr>
<td>a. existence of grievances well established (justified)</td>
<td>a. subject is not the primary target of threat (or character of threat minimal)</td>
<td>a. when there is some risk of injury to self that appears to be avoidable</td>
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<td>b. powerlessness of group to obtain direct redress obvious</td>
<td>b. subject's identification with primary target of threat high</td>
<td>b. when there are constraints (norms, values, laws, etc.) on injuring the other party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. solidarity with status equals</td>
<td>c. where there is no (or low) interdependence between participating groups</td>
<td>c. where there is no interdependence between groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>Disorder</td>
<td></td>
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<td>d. where the cost of engaging in conflict is high</td>
<td>d. where the cost of engaging in conflict is low</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. where the cost of conciliatory efforts is low</td>
<td>e. where the cost of conciliatory efforts is high</td>
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IV. Third-Party Status  

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<tr>
<td>a. threat of injury low</td>
<td>a. threat of injury high</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. identification with target group low</td>
<td>b. identification with target group high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. cost of conciliation low</td>
<td>c. cost of conciliation high</td>
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V. Negotiations and  

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<tr>
<th>Protest</th>
<th>Disorder</th>
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<tr>
<td>a. society positively values rights of dissidents and their humanitarian treatment</td>
<td>a. society that minimizes the rights of dissidents and their humane treatment</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. where community opposition to dissident activities is not clear cut</td>
<td>b. where community opposition to dissident activity is clear cut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. where civil authorities have the resources (money, manpower, technology, etc.) to overpower dissidents but community opposition is not clear cut (or where community supports dissidents)</td>
<td>c. where civil authorities have the resources and community opposition is clear cut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. where civil authorities lack the resources to overpower dissidents and community opposition is not clear (or where community supports dissidents)</td>
<td>d. where civil authorities lack the resources to overpower dissidents but community opposition to dissidents activities is clear cut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>Disorder</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. where there are specific issues (demands) which can be met within the context of the given situation</td>
<td>e. where the issues (demands) are so defuse that they are not subject to the influence of the participants of a given situation</td>
</tr>
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*Material in this table has been adapted from Turner's analysis of the perception of civil disorders as protests (Turner, 1969).*
and bargaining), this behavioral framework provided several additional insights which we found helpful, most notably:

1. governmental officials in the locale of the event need not be the direct target of dissidents; conceivably such governmental officials might themselves function as a "third party" merely setting the terms for the nature of the event and possibly even lending various forms of assistance (including police protection) to dissidents;

2. segments of the community may mobilize in various ways regarding dissidents; depending upon the degree of their sympathy or disagreement with dissident objectives and methods, segments of the community may be supportive, antagonistic, and/or neutral;

3. citizen-formed third-party groups may become impartially involved in negotiations, bargaining, and/or conciliation between dissidents, government, and/or other involved groups; the availability of such third-party groups may even facilitate governmental ability to view the event as protest.

The Structural Context of Governmental Response

Within our governmental system, the burden for coping with emergency situations (including major protest events and/or civil disorder) falls on the local government where the emergency occurs. Should the magnitude of the emergency exceed the capabilities and resources of local government, a chain of recourse to higher governmental authority exists. In many situations, local governments have mutual aid agreements with other local governments
for sharing of personnel and resources in times of crisis. If such agreements do not exist or if they are inadequate, appeal can be made to higher governmental structures -- the county, state, and even Federal systems. In some situations, advance warning may indicate inherent limitations in local resources and appeal to higher levels of government can be made in advance. In some situations, the nature of the emergency falls under the jurisdiction of more than one locality or under county, state, or Federal jurisdiction. For instance, many counties exercise jurisdiction over all or most major crime which occurs in localities within the county. In such situations, the possibility that planned protest may result in major violation of law involves the county government from the start. For these reasons, while the prospect of a planned protest may initially fall under the jurisdiction of a given locality, yet county, state, and Federal officials often are intimately involved in planning and managing governmental response.

Equally important to the legal structure defining city/county/state/Federal relationships are the informal patterns which have developed over time. Often cities assume county resources will be brought to bear on certain problems. In such situations, the initial involvement of county officials will be virtually assumed by local officials. Informal patterns may also determine which individuals or agencies within governmental structures are responsible for initiating and executing action. For example, in a particular setting the district attorney's office over time may have developed primary authority concerning law enforcement policy, while in another setting this responsibility may lie with the chief of police. Thus, differences in personality, style, and tradition as well as legal differences
regarding jurisdiction must be analyzed to understand which level of government and which individuals or groups within that level of government will respond to given emergency situations.

As this suggests, we view governmental structures as complex organizations (i.e., in a sense as social systems within larger social systems) which are subject to various internal and external influences. Our conceptual framework for understanding the structural context of governmental response to planned protest can be summarized in the following points:

1. Governmental units (i.e., city, county, state, and Federal governments) are social systems characterized by the existence of organizational goals, division of labor, and differential distribution of power among its members;

2. Within a governmental system, members (or subgroups) may contend with each other over specific issues involving both goals and means and compete for adjustments in the distribution of power;

3. In addition to internal influences, the behavior of system members is also influenced by external factors such as pressures and demands originating in other social systems (these other social systems may be other relevant governmental structures as well as various citizen groups of "the public at large");

4. Thus, governments are systems whose internal politics manifest elements of competition, cooperation, and conflict shaped by both internal and external influences;
(5) even during periods of crisis, such as the threat of civil disorder, these internal and external factors are operable and will influence the character of the strategies selected by civil authorities to respond to such threats;

(6) in preparing for forewarned emergencies, a working relationship between different levels of government will develop depending upon jurisdictional factors as well as informal patterns; responsibility for different aspects of managing the governmental response will be divided among levels of government as well as assigned to specific units within those governmental levels depending upon jurisdictional factors as well as informal patterns;

(7) the character of the strategies selected by civil authorities will influence the ultimate peaceful or disruptive outcome of the anticipated event (although the determination of the outcome also depends on the interaction between response strategies and other variables, such as the intentions of the protestors and the character of their protest).

Given these assumptions, we believe that any particular response strategy should be viewed as the outcome of a highly complicated decision-making process. We do not mean to suggest that the ultimate response strategy is only determined by rational processes. Rather, these strategies result from choices at both the individual and group levels which are influenced by rational, non-rational, irrational, and accidental factors.

Nevertheless, we believe that concepts concerning decision-making, bargaining,
communications; deterrence and/or limiting of conflicts may be applied to their analyses. We intend to utilize such concepts where appropriate. Thus, we are interested in variations in the goals and means advocated by different actors -- either individuals or groups; the range of alternatives considered in the selection of any given alternative; the identification of those actors having the greatest effect on the entire decision-making process; and determination of the implicit and explicit social values associated with the response strategy.

Decision theory involves systematic analysis of the influences bearing upon policy-makers as they make and implement choices. It serves to illuminate the range of options available in any given situation by specifying the full range of objectives being pursued, by identifying basic assumptions concerning the situation, and by helping identify misperceptions, incomplete information, and lack of feedback.

Bargaining and communications theory was developed to improve our understanding of conflict and the strategy of conflict resolution as practised by decision makers of contending parties. It is a refinement of game theory with adaptations from the labor-management field. Bargaining and communications theory operates on the assumptions that contending parties, even enemies, usually have some common interests and that skillful use of communications and sanctions can induce successful negotiations between adversaries. In short, they are based on the assumption that conflict resolution is not a zero-sum game -- that is, one side does not necessarily completely lose what the other side gains.
Deterrence theory involves the analysis of the various techniques employed by two or more parties in their efforts to preserve their own interests in the course of a conflict while utilizing the minimum threats of force necessary. Closely related are theories of conflict-limitation which, when deterrence fails, include notions of limiting objectives and of providing means by which the contending parties can de-escalate and ultimately terminate the conflict.

While we will not specifically write chapters based on applying these particular analytic frameworks to what we learned in Miami, these frameworks have been important in our process of determining points of interest and have been useful intellectual tools in our analysis.

In figure 2 we have identified symbolically the relationships we have in mind between various levels of government and the relationships between levels of government and six other important actors. While one path of influence between different foci is represented in the figure, a large number of different influence paths are computable from available permutations and combinations. For illustrative purposes, consider the three following possibilities.

A

B

C
Figure 2. Interrelationships between actors.
The number of permutations and combinations is virtually infinitely expanded if we permit for simultaneous influence paths originating from different foci, or for influence paths in sequential time periods (e.g., action/reaction influence paths, feedback effects, multiple simultaneous influence on one focus from several foci, etc.).

Once again, we want to emphasize that each of the foci could be broken down into behaviorally and analytically meaningful subgroups. For example, the "local government" is certainly not monolithic in character but is really composed of a number of smaller components such as elected officials, police officials, etc., who may favor very different response strategies. Additionally, interrelationships between foci need assume no one continuous pattern. Rather, interrelationships are part of an on-going interdependent system in which there is continual opportunity for each actor to influence and be influenced by the other.
CHAPTER 5

Inter-Governmental Coordination

Before the summer of '72 was over four different levels of government -- municipal, county, state, and Federal -- had become involved in efforts to prepare for the protests and protestors anticipated during the national political Conventions. At the municipal level, the primary participants were the Cities of Miami Beach and Miami. Miami Beach was involved as the actual location for the Conventions and the expected site for much protest activity. The City of Miami also had to plan for the Conventions because (1) protestors would have to go through Miami in order to reach Miami Beach, (2) it was expected that some protest activities would be scheduled within its jurisdiction, and (3) it was feared that a civil disorder could erupt in a local community just as it did during the 1968 Republican Convention. Similar concerns led to the involvement of the Metropolitan Dade County Government which exercised supplementary responsibility for all of the municipalities within its boundaries and primary jurisdiction over the unincorporated areas surrounding both Miami and Miami Beach. Both the State of Florida and the Federal Government were involved because of specific legislative mandates and because they would be called upon to provide resources which lower levels of government could not provide for themselves.
To make matters even more complicated, at every level of government numerous units (agencies or departments) were involved in preparing for or providing services to convention-related activities. Figures 1 - 7 identify the most important units and their relationships to each other for each level of government. Figures 1 and 2 show that at the lowest levels -- Miami Beach and Dade County -- these events involved almost all governmental units from City Councils through the criminal justice system to sanitation departments. Figures 3 and 4 present the composition of the Governor's Cabinet and identify the State agencies that had a major part in the Conventions. In addition there were at least ten Federal agencies involved in convention-related activities. Most important among these were the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), the Directorate of Military Support (DOMS), and the U. S. Secret Service (USSS). (See Figures 5 - 7)

That so many governmental structures (and their human representatives) could interact in a reasonably cooperative manner to develop similar concepts of what the official strategy should be and agree upon the role each should play in carrying out that strategy was by no means a foregone conclusion. The purpose of this Chapter is to identify the major participants in this process and to describe when, how, and why they became involved in the planning and management of the governmental response. The substance of specific areas of planning and response (i.e., law enforcement policy, the
Figure 1. Government of Miami Beach, Florida.
Figure 3. Government of the State of Florida (cabinet)
Figure 4. Government of the State of Florida
Governor and Cabinet (continued)
Reuben Askew

Department of Natural Resources
Executive Director
Randolph Hodges

Administrative Services

Interior Resources

Recreation and Parks

Governor's Council on Criminal Justice

State Planning Agency
Director
James R. Stewart

Program and Planning

Grant Administration

Department of Military Affairs
Adj. General
Henry W. McMillan

National Guard
Col. Hugo F. Windham

Marine Resources
Director
Harmon Shields

Game and Fresh Water Fish
Director
O. E. Frye

Marine Patrol
Comm. H. V.
Gibson

Division of Law Enforcement
Maj. Brantley
Goodson

Figure 4. Government of the State of Florida (continued)
Figure 6. Department of the Treasury.
criminal justice system, providing services to "non-delegates," etc.) will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Here the primary focus is the development of contacts between governmental participants (particularly within the State of Florida) and the establishment of a command structure for the conventions.

The Evolution of Command Responsibility: The Organizational Structure of Convention Planning

Miami Beach at Center Stage. Despite the large number of governmental units that came to be involved in the 1972 Conventions, the events which brought both Conventions to Miami Beach were unilaterally initiated by the City Fathers of Miami Beach itself. As we indicated above, Beach officials became interested in hosting both the Democratic and Republican Conventions as early as the summer of 1970 and during the next year actively worked to accomplish this objective.* From the beginning, however, the efforts to obtain the Conventions were almost solely a Miami Beach activity. Even after the Democrats accepted the invitation to hold their Convention in Miami Beach, preparations for the Conventions and for convention security planning remained the almost exclusive responsibility of Beach officials. This situation largely remained the same until after the Republican Convention had also been invited to Miami Beach.

*Some Miami Beach officials have revealed, however, that they were fairly certain all along that the Republican Convention would go to another city -- probably San Diego. This certainty may account for the fact that
Given the wisdom of hindsight, the failure to involve other units of government in convention planning sooner (or, from the perspective of other units, to insist upon becoming involved sooner) may appear to have been a gross mistake in judgment. We believe, however, that the actual development of inter-governmental coordination at the local level is not only understandable but basically reasonable given the conditions that existed between June 1971 and May 1972.*

To understand why Beach officials assumed the initial almost sole responsibility for convention preparation and security planning, several factors must be considered. First, Miami Beach is a fully incorporated city in the State of Florida and as such has original responsibility for and jurisdiction over any activities that might occur within its boundaries. The major exception to this authority would be extra-ordinary conditions such as riots or natural disasters. We need hardly point out that Miami Beach officials -- just like most officials in other cities or towns in the country -- are not going to voluntarily relinquish any of their responsibilities. Beach officials only prepared an LEAA proposal for security during the Democratic Convention even though they had submitted bids on both.

*During this period there appears to have been very good working relationships between the various departments of the Miami Beach Governments. This is not surprising when one considers the number of big conventions held in Miami Beach each year. On the other hand, large scale planning for conventions and community security was rather unusual. As a
their authority without strong evidence of possible benefit or serious threat to their community.*

Second, there was very little motivation for Miami Beach officials to give up any of their authority to someone else because there was neither visible benefit nor serious threat to them or Miami Beach.** Specifically, Miami Beach was accustomed to handling large conventions, and Beach officials -- including Chief Rocky Pomerance -- did not expect serious difficulties from demonstrators because the Democrats were not the incumbent party. Given this analysis, Beach officials were confident they could repeat the success they had with the 1968 Republican Convention. One indication of this confidence can be result, law enforcement concerns and preparations tended to dominate the extraordinary activities of Beach officials and because of his responsibilities and abilities Chief Pomerance began to emerge as one of the key officials on Miami Beach.

*Even when faced with serious threat governmental officials are often reluctant to admit they may not be able to handle a situation and/or to assume responsibility for bringing in additional forces. Note for example the games that were played between the Mayor of Detroit, the Governor of Michigan, and Federal officials during the 1967 civil disorder in Detroit (for details on this example see the Kerner Commission Report, 1968, pp. 47-61).

**Conversely, there were no conditions which would have motivated other governmental units such as the City of Miami or Dade County to give up any of their authority to Miami Beach.
inferred from the fact that as late as April 1972, Chief Pomerance indicated to Governor Askew that he planned to handle the Democratic Convention with his own men plus support from no more than 400 officers from other departments (Miami, Dade County, the Department of Beverage, the Florida Marine Patrol, and the Florida Highway Patrol).

Even officials from other jurisdictions did not expect Miami Beach to be the primary site for serious trouble. E. Wilson Purdy, Director of the Dade County Public Safety Department, emphasized to County Manager Ray Goode that he expected the worst problems somewhere other than Miami Beach:

It is our belief that based on the 1968 National Political Conventions, the Republicans -- Miami Beach, Florida, the Democrats -- Chicago, Illinois, disorders ranging from minor to major will result and with history as a guide, this will not occur at the convention sites but in the nearby communities. (Memo, January 24, 1972, from E. W. Purdy to R. Goode)

Finally, higher levels of government did not use their influence to require coordinated efforts between Miami Beach and the City of Miami and/or Dade County. In fact, both the State and Federal governments took positions which strengthened the notion that Miami Beach had primary if not exclusive responsibility for the Democratic Convention.

At the state level on August 13, 1971, Governor Reuben Askew wrote the following to Miami Beach Chief of Police Rocky Pomerance:

It is my pleasure to ask you to serve as Chief of Security for the State of Florida for the Democratic National Convention in Miami Beach in 1972.
Chief Pomerance accepted this designation of responsibility without hesitation even though the Governor's letter did not confer any authority beyond that which he already possessed as Chief of Police.*

Even more significant than the Governor's action, however, was the insistence by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration that it could only respond to "grant requests from the city specified as host to a National Political Convention."** In fact, when the Miami Police Department and the Dade County Public Safety Department submitted grant applications to LEAA they were advised to:

Contact the Chief of Police of Miami Beach, the City Manager of Miami Beach and request that they coordinate your grant request with their grant request from their city and incorporate your request into their stated needs and application for funding to this agency. This can be accomplished by the City of Miami Beach submitting a modified grant request. (Letter from Clarence Coster, Associate Administrator, LEAA, to Director Purdy, February 11, 1972.)

*The honorary character of this appointment can be inferred from the fact that copies were sent to representatives of the Democratic Party but not local law enforcement officials. In fairness to Governor Askew and Chief Pomerance, we must emphasize again that in August 1971, no one expected serious difficulties on Miami Beach during the Democratic Convention. Thus, the granting and acceptance of an honorary title was most reasonable even thought it proved to be unsuitable as events developed.

**During this period the central focus of Miami Beach and particularly Chief Pomerance was reenforced by the fact that Federal law enforcement agencies such as the Secret Service and FBI had to devote most of their attention to Miami Beach itself.
Needless to say, given this kind of support from the Federal Government, Miami Beach officials were not likely to give up any of their authority to other local governmental units.

It is clear that LEAA insisted upon dealing only with host cities as a means of avoiding being deluged with separate grant requests from every law enforcement agency which felt its community might be influenced by the Conventions. LEAA officials apparently took this position because they believed:

1. that most convention-related protest activities would take place in the host city;
2. that the host city was in the best position to determine the kind of assistance it would need;
3. that the host city was in the best position to coordinate activities with other governmental units including other law enforcement agencies.

In short, LEAA officials apparently assumed that if a city was big enough to host a National Political Convention, it must also be the dominate political unit in the area. For every other possible host city in the country, this assumption would have been correct. Table 1 shows that for Miami Beach it was wrong.* For example, Miami Beach had a total of

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*Some indication of the way in which the dependency of Miami Beach on other communities is viewed by residents of surrounding areas can be obtained from the following statement: "We Miamians furnish them with water, we burn their garbage, we house their servants, we furnish them
TABLE 1

Population and Law Enforcement Statistics

for Miami Beach and the Surrounding Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Miami Beach</th>
<th>Miami</th>
<th>All Incorporated Areas</th>
<th>Unincorporated Areas</th>
<th>Total Dade County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population - 1970</td>
<td>87,072</td>
<td>334,859</td>
<td>730,597</td>
<td>537,195</td>
<td>1,267,792</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Black - 1970</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land Area - 1960</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**SOURCE:** 1970 U. S. Census.

**Law Enforcement Employees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Miami</th>
<th>All Incorporated Areas</th>
<th>Unincorporated Areas</th>
<th>Total Dade County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>1,597*</td>
<td>3,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sworn Personnel</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>1,199*</td>
<td>2,855</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian Personnel</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>398*</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** 1972 Annual Report of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

**Offense Dade Indexed Crimes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Miami</th>
<th>All Incorporated Areas</th>
<th>Unincorporated Areas</th>
<th>Total Dade County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>129</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>3,372</td>
<td>1,829</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>3,674</td>
<td>2,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breaking and Entering</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>8,294</td>
<td>14,595</td>
<td>10,062</td>
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<tr>
<td>Larceny $50 and over</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>5,949</td>
<td>13,815</td>
<td>10,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>2,798</td>
<td>5,073</td>
<td>3,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** 1972 Annual Report of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

*These figures are the personnel totals for the Metropolitan Dade County Public Safety Department.*
225 sworn officers compared to 734 in Miami and 1199 in the Dade County Public Safety Department. By way of comparison the City of San Diego where the Republican Convention was scheduled had 1070 sworn officers and was by far the largest police force in the area. By insisting upon dealing with and through the host city, LEAA officials probably hindered a movement toward coordination. The effect of such insistence in the case of Miami Beach was to demand that the larger units become subordinate to Miami Beach, an event which was not likely to happen easily.

Despite the early dominance of Miami Beach, as the Democratic Convention drew nearer more and more governmental units became involved in convention planning. On February 17, 1972, Chief Pomerance presided over the first weekly meeting of agencies involved in preparations for the Convention. During the early spring, attendance at these meetings tended to be limited to representatives of the criminal justice system including the Miami Police Department, Dade County Public Safety Department, Florida Marine Patrol, Florida Highway Patrol, Florida Department of Beverage, Florida Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Florida National Guard, the United States Secret Service, and the Federal Bureau of

*This group came to be known as the Joint Convention Planning Committee.
Investigation. Even with all of these agencies involved, it was still generally assumed that Miami Beach and Chief Pomerance would have primary responsibility for convention-related security problems.

With the May 3 decision by the Miami Beach City Council to host the 1972 Republican National Convention, the problems of security and intergovernmental coordination became many times magnified. As Chief Pomerance told the May 12 meeting of the Joint Convention Planning Committee: "Planning is now back to point zero." As events developed, the coming of the Republican Convention had also pushed the creation of a command structure back to point zero.

A logical line of authority. The dominant position of Miami Beach in convention planning had been challenged. However, long before the threat of the Republican Convention materialized. The major source of this challenge was E. Wilson Purdy, who as Director of the Dade County Public Safety Department claimed the authority of the chief law enforcement official in Dade County. An early indication of his position can be seen in his August 20, 1971 response to Major General Henry W. McMillan, Adjutant General of the Florida National Guard. General McMillan had suggested the need for planning and coordination to Director Purdy. Director Purdy wrote in response:

By copy of this letter, we are recommending to Chief "Rocky" Pomerance of Miami Beach that because of the constitutional responsibility of the Sheriff and Director of the Public Safety Department, the basic liaison with the National Guard must be assumed by this department. This recommendation is also based on the need to establish a logical line of authority which will eliminate confusion. (Letter from Director Purdy to Major General McMillan, August 20, 1971.)
Chief Pomerance's reply to this letter never conceded Director Purdy's superior authority:

I hope that our mutual schedules will permit a pre-planning conference to begin coordinating the various law enforcement agencies who will be participating in the convention security. At that time, it would be most helpful if Major General Henry McMillan or his designated representative could attend, so that the full spectrum of (law) enforcement can be present.

I am also enclosing a copy of Governor Askew's letter requesting that I serve as Chief of Security for the State of Florida for the Democratic National Convention in Miami Beach in 1972. I have accepted this responsibility, and have so notified Governor Askew. (Letter from Chief Pomerance to Director Purdy, August 31, 1971.)

On April 18, 1972, Director Purdy wrote to LEAA Administrator Jerris Leonard the following regarding LEAA policy on the submission of grant proposals:

The management of this convention in terms of planning, training, coordination, staffing, etc., is a county-wide activity. The impact of participants and results of convention activities will be felt throughout the area, not just around the convention hall itself. Consequently, to divide the request for assistance to meet our anticipated needs would dilute and emasculate our county-wide obligations and responsibilities. The Constitutional Responsibilities of the Public Safety Department preclude such an approach.

On May 1, when it appeared that the Republican Convention would also be coming to Miami Beach, Director Purdy again wrote to Mr. Leonard:
The problems contingent upon the presence of two conventions will demand county-wide coordination and cooperation on a more formal basis for a prolonged period under conditions not first perceived by LEAA. Of particular concern to our community are those conditions which may result during the period of approximately six weeks between the two conventions. It is this period of time which perhaps identifies best that a national convention being held on Miami Beach is a community-wide problem rather than a specific problem of security at a particular location.

We are requesting, therefore, that any future planning or funding be consistent with the Constitutional responsibility of the Office of Sheriff (Director of Public Safety). This responsibility cannot be abrogated regardless of the desires or intentions of individuals or agencies involved. It is furthermore consistent with staffing and coordination of other county-wide agencies.

The potential problem of these two conventions is of such enormous magnitude that consideration must be given to a much broader-based assistance, funding and planning level than is now being experienced. Consequently, we are again placing before you for your consideration our request to be considered the primary funding, planning and coordinating agency for all security and associated law enforcement matters dealing with the impending political conventions.

The constitutional authority referred to by Director Purdy was based upon his claim to the Office of Sheriff as well as Dade County Public Safety Director. Under Florida law, the Office of Sheriff is an elected position and carries with it the authority of chief law enforcement officer in the county. Under this authority, the Sheriff may initiate actions where he believes local law enforcement is deficient or over-taxed, as well as declare a state of emergency where he believes conditions warrant such a declaration. Under these legal presumptions, a situation requiring the Florida National Guard would have already involved the Public Safety
Department either because Department forces had been invited or because Director Purdy had dispatched them himself.

Despite his insistence, there is reason to question the validity of Director Purdy's construction of the legitimate rights and responsibilities of the Office of Sheriff. During interviews with Florida officials from various levels of government, most respondents indicated they believed that the authority of the Office of Sheriff finally resided with the County Manager, Ray Goode. This ambiguity may stem from the several shifts between the Office of Sheriff and Public Safety Director since the Metropolitan Dade County government was established in 1957.

Under the original 1957 "Home Rule Charter" the elected office of Dade County Sheriff was abolished and replaced by the position of Director, Public Safety Department and Metropolitan Sheriff to be appointed by the County Manager.

Six years later in November 1963 the citizens of Dade County amended this section of the Home Rule Charter and reestablished the elected office of Sheriff. In January 1964 the County Attorney ruled that by this amendment the position of Public Safety Director had been superseded by the office of Sheriff and that the Sheriff's Office had been removed from the jurisdiction of the County Manager.

In November 1966 the citizens of Dade County voted to revoke the 1963 amendment and to reestablish an appointed position under the county manager. "On November 9, 1966 the office of sheriff is hereby abolished and the powers and functions of such office are hereby transferred to the County Manager, who shall provide for the continuation of all the duties and functions of this office required under the Constitution and General Laws of this State. The County Manager may delegate to a suitable person or persons the powers and the functions of such office."

(Home Rule Charter, Article 8, Section 8.01, D.)
Director Purdy was contending that all of the duties and functions previously assigned to the Sheriff's Office, as well as the duties and functions required by the Office of Sheriff under the Constitution and General Laws of the State of Florida, had been transferred to him when he was appointed Public Safety Director.* Other public officials -- including some in Dade County -- maintained that only the functions of Sheriff had been delegated to the Public Safety Director and that the Constitutional powers had been retained by the County Manager.

Whatever his constitutional authority, Director Purdy had sufficient reason to be concerned about any political conventions held on Miami Beach because in one way or another his Department was going to be involved with convention activities either in support of Miami Beach

*It should be noted that Director Purdy's claim to be the chief law enforcement officer in Dade County was shared by many responsible authorities. For example, as late as May 10, 1972, General McMillan wrote to Governor Askew: "Since it is my understanding that the basic responsibility for coordinating the maximum use of these civilian law enforcement capabilities in the entire county rests with the Director of Public Safety, I recommend that you authorize me to continue to work with Mr. Purdy in this regard, at the same time keeping close liaison and planning with Mr. Pomerance who, I understand, is responsible for security and law enforcement activities at the convention site and in Miami Beach."
and/or in areas directly under his authority.* Given that the Miami Beach Police Department had a total of 225 sworn officers, there was no way such a small number could be expected to cope with even a large scale but peaceful demonstration let alone a serious disturbance if one should occur. In fact, at least 100 Public Safety Department officers had been committed to duty in Miami Beach even when the Democratic Convention was the only convention expected.

As his letters to LEAA head, Jerris Leonard, reveal, Director Purdy maintained that convention planning and coordination should be a county-wide activity because the presence of the Conventions and related activities would be felt throughout the entire Dade County area. Director Purdy’s position on this matter was supported by the development of events during the 1968 Republican Convention. As we indicated above, in 1968 there was very little difficulty on Miami Beach itself during the Republican Convention; but on the Mainland, a major disorder erupted in the "Liberty City" section of Miami and lasted until both the Dade County Public Safety Department and the National Guard became involved. Moreover, the Liberty City disorder also reenforced Director Purdy’s believe in the need for coordinated pre-planning and clear cut lines of authority.

*Chief Garmire of the Miami Police Department had similar concerns about the involvement of his department. There was no way, however, in which he could claim responsibility for or authority over Miami Beach. As a result, Chief Garmire focused his attention on the problems that might develop within his jurisdiction and on providing a support force for Miami Beach.
During the early stages of that disorder, there were newspaper reports of police complaints about poor communications and almost no coordination between Miami Police and the Public Safety Department.* After the disorder had ended, Miami Police Chief Walter Headley -- who had been out of town during the actual events -- complained that Director Purdy had exceeded his authority by ordering Miami Police out of certain areas of Miami during the later stages of the riot. (Miami Herald, October 22, 1968, Section G, p. 1, "Pull Out of Riot? Not Headley"). Whatever the validity of these charges, it appears certain that Director Purdy did not want to face similar attacks after the 1972 Conventions.

The reader should note, however, that problems of command and control during the Liberty City disorder may have actually made it more difficult to achieve a coordinated effort in 1972. For example, several respondents -- none of them from either Miami or Miami Beach -- have suggested to us that Director Purdy delayed involving his men in the heart of the riot area until after he had been placed in complete command of the event by Governor Kirk. If true (and we have no hard evidence to support this charge), this action was not likely to convince other local officials that they could collaborate with Director Purdy as co-equals during the 1972 Conventions.

*These reports were publicly denied by both Director Purdy and Acting Chief Denham of the Miami Police.
Early support for a coordinated county-wide convention planning effort was also provided by the staff of the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice -- the State agency responsible for the control and distribution of LEAA funds within the state.*

According to their records, representatives of the Governor's Council met with Chief Pomerance and his staff in July 1971 to discuss the City's grant application for a "National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services Project." (A detailed discussion of LEAA funding of convention related projects is provided in Chapter .) At that time, the representatives of the Governor's Council revealed their concern over the limited inclusion of the Miami Police Department and the Dade County Public Safety Department in the funding and planning for the Democratic Convention and indicated that the State of Florida might not authorize the application unless efforts were made to produce a coordinated effort representing all three jurisdictions -- Miami Beach, Miami, and Dade County.**

*The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was established in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351) to channel funds to states to aid them in improving their law enforcement capabilities. Under this law, each state must have a "State Planning Agency" to act as the primary recipient of all LEAA funds.

**This ultimately became an idle threat because the original Miami Beach grant (LEAA 71-DF-1098) was directly approved by the Washington office of LEAA without even going through the State Agency. See Chapter for a detailed discussion.
During the next few months, representatives of the Governor's Council continued in their support of a county-wide planning effort even though they had lost all real control over the original LEAA grant to Miami Beach. This support included conversations with Chief Garmire and Director Purdy to determine the extent of their involvement in LEAA funding and planning for the Democratic Convention. In addition, Governor's Council representatives engaged in a variety of informal efforts to determine exactly how well Miami Beach was fulfilling the terms of their original LEAA grant. By April 28, 1972, these efforts resulted in a detailed memo to Governor Askew from Council Director James Stewart concerning the state of planning and coordination for the Democratic Convention.

In his memo, Mr. Stewart stressed the need for a coordinated planning effort but indicated his concern that no such effort was really being made. Based upon this evaluation, Mr. Stewart presented the following recommendations should future funding of Convention projects be considered:

1. future funding should be aimed at the reorganization of a planning effort within the Dade County area;

2. this planning operation should be under the control of all three department heads (Miami Beach Police Department, Miami Police Department, and Dade County Public Safety Department);

*Throughout his memo Mr. Stewart makes it clear that these recommendations were actually developed by a member of his staff and two people from the Miami Area who were involved in the criminal justice system.
3. a project director should be selected, perhaps on a state-wide level, to be temporarily under the direction of the three administrators;

4. the planning staff should be representative of all three departments, and should include at least two prominent administrative officials from each agency;

5. the location of the planning staff should be separate from the three principle agencies to insure autonomy;

6. there should be a commitment on the part of the three police administrators and their superiors, namely city/county managers and commissions;

7. all plans should be approved by these administrators;

8. there should be a direct commitment for a cooperative intelligence effort;

9. immediate action with the commitment of resources was urged to insure that within the next month and a half operational plans would be formalized; resources should be tapped at the federal, state and local level.

Having made these points, Mr. Stewart then brought the Governor right into the middle of the action.

It is the opinion of the three above-referenced planners that this approach is necessary and would be feasible only if a commitment from the LEAA, the Governor of the State of Florida and the Dade County area administrators be obtained. It is suggested that the Governor contact Jerris Leonard, Chief Pomerance, Chief Garmire, and Director Purdy separately, to obtain their commitment. (Memo from James Stewart to Governor Askew, April 28, 1972.)
As events developed, this is exactly where the Governor wound up -- right in the middle.

The Emergence of Civilian Government. Despite their great visability, police officers were not the only government officials who were concerned about the possible problems that could develop from hosting the Democratic Convention in Miami Beach. In fact, the concerns of other officials were often more pervasive than those of police officers, ranging beyond problems related strictly to convention security and law enforcement. As events developed in the early part of 1972, responsibility for the activities of civilian officials began to be concentrated (at least informally) in Metropolitan Dade County through the office of County Manager Ray Goode. Before the summer was over, however, County Manager Goode achieved formal authority over convention activities of both civilian and law enforcement officials in the entire Miami area.

Factors contributing to the early emergence of the County Manager as the primary civilian authority are at least two-fold. First, other civilian authorities, both elected and appointed, tended to avoid dealing with the possibility of convention-related problems. For example, while the law enforcement agencies of Dade County, Miami Beach, and Miami were involved in the planning effort for the Convention, among civilians, only the County Manager assigned major planning responsibilities to his senior staff. Neither Melvin Reese, City Manager of Miami, nor Clifford O'Key, City Manager of Miami Beach, involved their staffs to anywhere near the same degree. This lack of involvement came to concern the County
Manager's office which as late as May 15, 1972, considered writing to Manager O'Key recommending he appoint a member of his staff to full-time convention planning responsibility.

Second, Metropolitan Dade County was in the best position to assume responsibility for convention-related activities because it was the largest governmental unit in the area and because it already had responsibility -- either direct or indirect -- for providing on a county-wide basis many of the human services that could become important during the Convention.

Metropolitan Dade County covers approximately 2,000 square miles, stretching westward from Atlantic coast beaches to the heart of the Everglades. In 1970, the County had a total population of 1,267,792. Within the County, there were 27 incorporated cities ranging from the City of Miami with a population of 334,859 and almost 35 square miles in area to Islandia with a population of 8 and Golden Beach which covered .31 square miles. Overall, the 27 cities had jurisdiction over 119 square miles -- not quite one-tenth of the total area -- and approximately 731,000 citizens. In contrast, the Metropolitan Dade County government was solely responsible for almost 1,900 square miles of unincorporated territory and about 538,000 residents.

Under the Home Rule Charter of 1957, provisions were made for incorporated cities to maintain their separate identity and authority, even though they were to be included under the general jurisdiction of the new
Metropolitan County Government. As a result, the larger cities such as Miami or Miami Beach continue to directly provide most of the services of an urban community. Many of the smaller cities, however, have developed arrangements with larger municipalities or with Dade County to provide basic services for their citizens.

Thus, over the years, Dade County has come to provide a wide variety of services to individual cities including such things as police and fire communications, police and fire recruitment and training, fire protection, and jail operations. Moreover, the County Government provides many services without regard to place of residence. These services include responsibility for the operation of public hospitals, public health services, public welfare programs, surplus food programs, all courts, prosecution and public defender services, a public park system, the Metropolitan Transit System, and services for dependent or delinquent juveniles.

County Manager Goode's first formal involvement with convention planning came late in January 1972, when Director Purdy informed him that the Public Safety Department was applying for a $389,000 grant to help support its efforts to maintain law and order during the Democratic Convention. On February 4, County Manager Goode requested approval from the Board of County Commissioners to submit the Public Safety Department's grant proposal, "National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services Project," to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The County Commissioners ultimately approved the grant application on February 29, 1972, under Resolution R-365-72.
Actually the Governor’s involvement with the problems of convention security had been increasing throughout the early part of 1972. On February 16, he met with Chief Pomerance and representatives of the Secret Service and the Democratic National Committee to discuss convention planning. During this meeting Governor Askew asked Chief Pomerance to keep him informed of the status of his arrangements for support from both local and State agencies. On March 29, the Governor made a formal request for similar information in a letter from his General Counsel, Edgar M. Dunn, to Chief Pomerance. Both of these requests were formally fulfilled in early April but soon afterward it became known that the Republicans hoped to move their convention to Miami Beach.

During this same period, other State officials also became actively concerned about the character of convention planning -- particularly representatives of the Governor’s Council on Criminal Justice. On April 28, the Director of the Governor’s Council on Criminal Justice, James Stewart, submitted a detailed memo to Governor Askew in which he expressed concern that a coordinated planning effort did not exist between law enforcement officials in the Miami area. As indicated above, this memo also contained detailed proposals for new command and control procedures if additional LEAA funds were to be considered for the Conventions. Six days later on May 4, General Counsel Dunn submitted a memo to Governor Askew which basically supported the position taken by Director Stewart.

Governor Askew made his first formal move to establish state control over convention planning in a letter to LEAA head, Jerris Leonard, on May 5 -- the same day the Republican National Committee finally voted to move their convention to Miami Beach. Specifically the Governor informed Mr. Leonard that:
It would be appreciated if you would receive representatives of my office for a conference in Washington at a time convenient to you, preferably on Friday, May 12, to discuss participation by LEAA in the special project relating to the security of the national political conventions.

Until such time as representatives of my office have met with you and discussed in detail our revised plan, I would appreciate it if you would not entertain applications or engage in direct negotiations with prospective sub-grantees in this state. It is our position that the LEAA grant for this special project should be made to the Office of Governor, State of Florida and distributed as is done with other LEAA grants, to participating units of local government. The redistribution of LEAA funds by this state will be consistent with the plan and priorities established by the state.

Commissioner William L. Reed, Executive Director, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, has been designated by me as the "State Coordinator" for security and public safety. Chief Rocky Pomerance, City of Miami Beach Police Department, will continue to serve as the "Chief of Security" for the convention site and adjacent area. Other command and support responsibilities will be assigned consistent with the statutory and constitutional jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies and officers, and in accordance with our revised, comprehensive security plan. (Letter from Governor Askew to Jerris Leonard, May 5, 1972.)

Copies of this letter were also sent to:

Mr. William L. Reed, Executive Director, Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Mr. James Stewart, Administrator, LEAA
Mr. George Murphy, Regional Administrator, LEAA
Mr. Rocky Pomerance, Chief of Police, City of Miami Beach
Mr. Ray Goode, County Manager, Dade County
Mr. E. Wilson Purdy, Director, Department of Public Safety, Dade County
Mr. Bernard L. Garmire, Chief of Police, City of Miami
Mr. Wayne Hanewicz, Director, National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services Project, Miami Beach
Mr. Edgar M. Dunn, Jr., General Counsel, Office of the Governor

Thus, in one stroke of the pen, Governor Askew managed to inform all of the principals that he had assumed responsibility for the coordination of
convention planning. Even with the active support of the Governor, however, the achievement of coordinated convention planning did not come easy.

In an effort to insure the support of Miami area residents, Governor Askew also appointed a citizens committee -- the Dade County Community Coordinating Task Force -- to advise him on preparations for the Conventions. The members of this Committee included some of the most prominent and influential individuals in the entire county:

Ernie Seiler - (Chairman) - Executive Vice President of the Orange Bowl Committee

Alvah Chapman, Jr. - President, Miami Herald

Gwenn Cherry - State Representative

Herbert Cunningham - Student, Miami-Dade Junior College

Joyce Diffenderfer - Past President, League of Women Voters

Harry Douglas - Deputy Secretary of Department of Community Affairs

Lester Freeman - Executive Vice President, Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce

Jorge Luiz Fernandez - Publisher of the Spanish-language newspaper "Regresso"

Rev. Theodore Gibson - Miami City Commissioner

Rev. Edward Graham - County Commissioner

Barbara Golden - Student

Dr. Leonard Haber - Councilman, Miami Beach

Jay Janis - Chairman, Dade County Community Relations Board

Jim McKillups - County Commissioner

Sylvan Mayer - Editor, Miami News

Dr. Joseph Poiter - Pharmacist
Athalie Range - Secretary, Department of Community Affairs
Julius Shepard - Manager, Dupont Plaza Hotel
Hal Spaet - Director, Miami Snowplow

During the early weeks of May, Commissioner Reed and his staff spent most of their time with the simple task of becoming familiar with their new assignment because they had never expected to be major participants in the Conventions. In fact, as late as April 24, they had expected that the role of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) would be limited to (1) direct support to the United States Secret Service in providing personal security protection to designated attendees, and (2) the collection, analysis and dissemination of timely intelligence concerning the conventions.*

By the middle of the month, however, these individuals had begun to actively fulfill their responsibilities. On May 18, Commissioner Reed and all three FDLE division heads (Directors Kittle, Williams, and Trelstrup) met with Governor Askew to brief him on convention security matters and to receive additional instructions from him.

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*The Florida Department of Law Enforcement was established in 1967 as a state level equivalent of the FBI. Its duties include the investigation of criminal law violations in general, organized crime, rioting, narcotic and drug abuse violations, and the misconduct of public officials. Commissioner Reed was appointed as its first Executive Director by Governor Askew's Republican predecessor, Governor Kirk.
The next day, Commissioner Reed met with the major law enforcement participants at police headquarters in Miami Beach.* During this meeting Commissioner Reed advised everyone that:

1) as State Coordinator he intended to establish an intelligence center on Miami Beach and that all agencies with law enforcement roles relating to the Conventions would contribute to this center;

2) all grant applications should be coordinated, planned, and prepared locally, approved through the Office of County Manager, and forwarded to the Governor's office for processing and review.**

On May 24, FDLE Director Williams met with Mr. William Olsen, Assistant U.S. Attorney General in charge of the Internal Security Division, to make arrangements for the coordination of intelligence operations. Also on May 24, FDLE Director Kittle and members of the Governor's staff spent the day in a series of meetings with representatives of the Florida National Guard

*Agencies represented at this meeting included: Miami Beach - Police Chief Pomerance, Col. Cotzin, Capt. Kruidenier, City Manager O'Key; Miami - Police Chief Garmire; Dade County - Public Safety Director Purdy, Major Barney, Major Shelton, Mr. Rasmussen, County Manager Goode, Mr. vanWezel; States Attorney's Office - Dr. Gelber; LEAA - Mr. Donlan; Secret Service - Mr. Rund; FDLE - Commissioner Reed, Directors Kittle and Williams; Office of the Governor - General Counsel Dunn.

**By May 22, County Manager Goode had established a community planning office on the 21st floor of the County Courthouse.
discussing the role of the military at the Conventions. During this period, the Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Army (Ken Webster) informed State officials that the Acting Attorney General of the United States (Richard Kleindienst) was the chief civilian advisor to the President in the use of federal support. He advised them, however, that Assistant Attorney General Harlington Wood, Jr. had been designated as the senior civilian representative of the Attorney General in Florida. (A detailed discussion of the role of Federal agencies at the Conventions is presented in Chapter .)

Two days later state officials became actively involved with non-law enforcement issues when FDLE representatives met with County Manager Goode and his staff to determine:

1. the status of human services before and during the conventions;
2. if there were any non-LEAA grants underway to take care of the needs of non-delegates;
3. what else the State could be doing to aid in the coordination of human services.

In general, County Manager Goode took the position that the Dade County government could handle the coordination of human services for the conventions.* But he emphasized that State support would be necessary to

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*Mr. Goode and his staff had also been busy during the early weeks of May developing human services plans. Federal agencies contacted for help during this period included: Civil Defense officials, the Office of
obtain money and to help insure that State and Federal agencies would cooperate with the County. In addition, the County Manager indicated further planning was being hampered by the failure of Miami Beach officials to specify their position concerning campsites, demonstration, etc. Manager Goode stressed it was imperative that such decisions be made as soon as possible and suggested the State -- particularly the Governor's Citizen Task Force -- should help pressure Miami Beach to make these decisions immediately.

On June 5, 1972, with Executive Order 72-33, Governor Askew formalized the new command structure he had developed. In this order the Governor emphasized that he was taking these actions to:

... facilitate the preparation of the Florida comprehensive inter-agency plan for dealing with state/local public health, safety and welfare problems which may attend the holding of the national political conventions ...

Under this order, the Governor named Commissioner Reed as State Coordinator to "be responsible for overall coordination of all state non-military functions, services, and support in the areas of public health, safety and welfare." Major General Henry McMillan was named State Military Coordinator and was appointed "responsible for the coordination of state military functions and services, and all matters involving the Florida National Guard and any Federal military forces which may be required." Commissioner Reed was also

Emergency Preparedness, the Army, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. It should be noted, however, that some citizen groups such as Snowplow were not convinced of the seriousness of these efforts.
named as the Chairman of the State Coordination Group (composed of the Executive Director or Secretary of each participating state agency) and as the principal State liaison official with the U.S. Departments of Justice and Defense.

In the Miami area, the Governor's Executive Order named County Manager Goode to be Local Area Coordinator assigned with "overall responsibility for the coordination of all public health, welfare, and safety (including convention site security) within the Dade County area." Chief Pomerance was named Chief of Convention Site Security and given responsibility for security at the convention complex and Miami Beach and adjacent areas.

With this same Executive Order, Governor Askew formally named three task forces:

(1) Local Task Force for Support Services: this was composed of the chief administrative officers of the municipalities principally affected and the County administrative office, viz., R. Ray Goode, County Manager; Clifford O'Key, Miami Beach City Manager; and Melvin Reese, Miami City Manager. These officials and their staffs were designated to "coordinate the public health and welfare activities and support services in the Dade County area, consistent with and as part of the Florida Comprehensive Inter-Agency Plan."

For the most part, this task force functioned in name only. As described above, much of this planning had already been initiated by the County Manager's Office and continued to be so planned even after this task force was named. A subsequent examination of support services provided can be found in Chapter...
(2) **Local Task Force for Public Safety:** This was composed of Wilson Purdy, the Director of the DCPSD; Chief Pomerance, Chief of the MBPD; and Chief Garmire, Chief of the MPD. These officials and their staffs were charged to "coordinate all public safety functions and activities related to the political conventions, including both on-site and off-site, in the Dade County Area, consistent with and as part of the Florida Inter-Agency Plan."

In effect, this merely formalized the already developing joint law enforcement planning of these three agencies. Despite the formation of this task force, the Convention Planning Joint Staff Committee continued to meet and continued to be the locus of combined security planning. The substantive development of law enforcement policy is examined in Chapter .

(3) **Governor's Community Coordinating Task Force:** This task force (already in operation) consisted of 19 prominent members of the greater Miami community. Its purpose was "to facilitate and encourage a meaningful dialogue and exchange of information between the responsible municipal, county and state officials, and interested citizen groups, both resident and non-resident." The role of this task force in holding hearings and making recommendations will be examined below when we deal with the dissident/government negotiations concerning campsites.

By taking this action, the Governor finally established a command structure consistent with the law enforcement responsibilities of the State
preparedness and coordination for the Republican Convention that had been possible for the Democratic Convention. An elaborate scenario was considered wherein such officials wondered whether the Administration saw political desirability in disruptive protest beyond the control capabilities of law enforcement agencies during the Democratic Convention but desired a much more coordinated and equipped law enforcement potential to deal with protest planned for the Republican Convention. While we do not completely rule out the possibility that there may have been some validity to such speculations, we have no evidence which would prove that such a scenario existed. We report these speculations, however, because at a minimum they indicate the degree of distrust and/or bitterness which had developed among some county officials as a result of their involvement in the funding process.

How the money was spent. In all, LEAA approved fifteen convention-related grants for a total of $3,318,752. Table 2 lists these grants and presents a breakdown of how the Federal funds were to be used. Looking at Table 2, it is obvious that the biggest single expenditure was for personnel which accounted for sixty percent of all LEAA funds. Most of the personnel money was spent for the overtime compensation of law enforcement officials during the actual Convention periods ($1,735,576). Approximately $210,000, was spent on overtime compensation for participation in
training programs and less than $50,000 was spent on administrative staffs.*

In fact, however, personnel expenditures actually accounted for close to 80 percent of all LEAA funds because most of the money allocated for professional services and travel was actually spent to obtain or support law enforcement personnel. For example, under its original grant (#0098) Miami Beach spent approximately $21,000 for training consultants and instructors and $27,500 for three outside law enforcement officers to act as tactical consultants for the development of operational plans. Grant #0021 provided almost $42,000 for outside experts to evaluate the public health and safety programs during the Conventions. Most of the funds for professional services under Grant #0025 were spent to support the YMCA Outreach program of third party intervention. Grant #0031 allocated almost $100,000 under professional services to provide meals for State law enforcement officers during the Conventions, and Grants #0024 and #0030 provided about $167,000 to get these State officers to Miami and to provide their subsistence while in the Miami area.

*Consistant with the style of its early involvement with the Conventions and its great emphasis on training, the MBPD spent almost $180,000 on training overtime. In addition, it allocated $25,000 of administrative funds as the salary for a project director who would focus on their training programs.
<table>
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<th>Personnel</th>
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<th>Travel Subsistence</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Supplies</th>
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<td>111,623</td>
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*Revised budget.
The rest of LEAA's funds were allocated to supplies and equipment which combined accounted for about 20 percent of all direct Federal support. Most of the supply expenditures were primarily for such things as office space and furniture. The primary exceptions to this were Grant #0023 that included photographic, night vision, and first aid equipment, and Grant #0026 which included chemical riot control agents under supplies. The overwhelming majority of the money provided for equipment was spent on various forms of communications systems ranging from walkie-talkies to a mobile communications center for the Miami Beach Police Department. For example, the original Miami Beach grant (#0098) provided $148,648 for radio and communication equipment. In addition, the Dade County Public Safety Department allocated about $147,000 for communications equipment in Grant #0023 and the Florida Highway Patrol spent almost $80,000 for radio helmets.

Contrary to what some may have expected, a very small proportion of the LEAA funds were spent on what could be viewed as weapons or riot control equipment. The figures available to us indicate that no more than $85,000 was spent on such things as chemical riot control agents, riot batons, ammunition, helmets, face masks, and plastic handcuffs. Chemical riot control agents or their dispensers accounted approximately $75,000 of this figure. With the exception of shotgun shells for the MPD, the only ammunition requests approved by LEAA were clearly designated for training purposes. In short, with the possible exception of chemical
agents, LEAA did not encourage an arms buildup on the part of the law
enforcement agencies it funded.*

*Two final points about LEAA funding should be made. First, it
is our understanding that the State of Florida retained proprietary rights
to most of the equipment purchased under LEAA grants and that this
equipment has been used to stock a mutual assistance supply center for
Southern Florida Law Enforcement Agencies. Second, Dade County law
enforcement agencies also arranged to borrow equipment from the Department
of Defense rather than purchase it. As a result the cost figures for
equipment are somewhat lower than would be if everything had to be
purchased. An indication of the size of the borrowing is given by the
escrow agreement entered into by Dade County with the Federal Government
on July 6, four days before the opening session of the Democratic
Convention. By this agreement, the County transferred $350,000 of U. S.
treasury bills to a Dade County/U.S. Government Escrow Account at the
First National Bank of Miami. This provided the requisite collateral
for the equipment loan. Even here, we would hasten to add that the
equipment involved was of the same type as that purchased with LEAA funds.
A more detailed discussion of this equipment loan is provided at the
end of this chapter.
Law Enforcement Agencies and Civil Disturbance Operations

Law enforcement agencies. In addition to LEAA, other Federal agencies were also involved with the Miami Beach Conventions either as part of their regular operations or under the Federal Government's constitutional authority to protect each of the states against domestic violence. (U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 4) These agencies ranged from the Federal Communications Commission to the General Services Administration. The most actively involved, however, were those agencies whose normal duties included law enforcement responsibilities such as the:

Internal Security Division, U. S. Department of Justice -- which has general responsibility for the enforcement of laws and criminal prosecutions related to subversive activities, treason, espionage, sedition, organized terrorist activities, and which coordinates all Federal civilian activity in connection with civil disorders;

Federal Bureau of Investigation -- which has general responsibility for investigating all violations of Federal laws and collecting evidence for cases in which the United States is or may become a party of interest (with the exception of investigating those violations that have been assigned by law to other Federal agencies). Its jurisdiction includes espionage, kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery, civil rights matters, and assaulting or killing the President or a Federal officer;
United States Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice -- the 94 U.S. Attorneys and their staffs are responsible for assisting the Attorney General in the enforcement of Federal criminal laws and for representing the Federal Government in any civil suits in which it may be involved;

United States Marshal Service, U.S. Department of Justice -- the 94 U.S. Marshals and their staffs are representatives of the executive branch of Government but also function as officers of the Federal courts. In this dual capacity, the Marshal Service has responsibility for Federal property, the physical security of Federal courts, Federal judges and other court officers, the arrest and custody of persons named in Federal warrants from the time of their arrest until they are delivered to a correctional institution or freed by the court;

United States Secret Service, U.S. Department of Treasury -- which has overall responsibility for the protection of the President of the United States and his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice-President, the Vice-President-elect, major Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, former Presidents, the wives, widows, and minor children of former Presidents, the visiting heads of a foreign state or government, and officials of the United States performing special missions abroad. Specific activities include the physical security of
their protectees, the planning and development of advance security preparations (including arrangements for emergency sites such as hospitals), and the collection, evaluation, storage and dissemination of protective intelligence.

Representatives of all these agencies were present in Miami Beach for the Conventions. We have not attempted to provide any details concerning the activities of the agencies for several reasons. First, the Federal Government and its various agencies is not the focal point of our study. In fact, we have not even tried to collect anything but the most cursory information about most Federal agencies. Second, the general public is already aware of and familiar with the normal activities of agencies such as the FBI and to the best of our knowledge the operations of such agencies in Miami Beach were consistent with their normal responsibilities and their on-going activities throughout the country. Finally, it has been extremely difficult to obtain even the limited amount of information in which we were interested from Federal agencies. Given the fact that our study has covered the period of the Watergate and related scandals, this reluctance to cooperate with us is not particularly surprising.

Some indication of the potential for involvement by law enforcement agencies may be derived from a listing of some of the Federal statutes which could have been violated during the Conventions:
Exclusive or Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction*

Arson (Title 18, USC 81)

Assaults (Title 18, USC 113)

Malicious mischief, Government property or buildings (Title 18, USC 1365)

Robbery of personal property (Title 18, USC 2111)

Maiming (Title 18, USC 114)

Rape (Title 18, USC 2031)

Murder, manslaughter and/or attempted murder or manslaughter (Title 18, USC 1111-1113)

Federal Laws without regard to Jurisdiction of Land

Obstruction of proceedings before agencies or committees (Title 18, USC 1505)

Picketing or parading with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice (Title 18, USC 1507)

Mailing threatening communications (Title 18, USC 876)

Malicious mischief, Government property or contracts (Title 18, USC 1361)

Mutilation of records (Title 18, USC 2071)

Injury to communication lines used or intended to be used by the military or civil defense function (Title 18, USC 1362)

*These statutes apply to territory over which the Federal Government either has exclusive jurisdiction or shares jurisdiction with the state in which the property is located, i.e., government buildings and military bases.
Unlawful possession or receipt of firearms (Title 18, USC 922)

Transportation of explosives, radio active materials, and etiologic agents and other dangerous articles (Title 18, USC 832)

Interference with commerce by threats or violence (Title 18, USC 1951)

Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities (Title 18, USC 32)

Destruction of motor vehicles or motor vehicle facilities used on interstate roads (Title 18, USC 33)

Importing or conveying false information concerning direct violations of Title 18, USC 32 and/or 33 (Title 18, USC 35)

Assaulting or resisting Federal officers or employees (Title 18, USC 111)

Demonstration of the use of firearms, explosives, etc. with the knowledge that these techniques are to be used at a civil disorder, and/or the transportation or manufacture of such items so that they may be used in civil disorders, and/or any attempt to impede firemen or law enforcement officials from carrying out their duties during a civil disorder (Title 18, USC 231)

To travel in interstate or foreign commerce or use the mails, telephone, or broadcasting facilities to a) incite to riot b) promote to riot c) aid and abet in rioting (Title 18, USC 2101)

Rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States (Title 18, USC 2383)

Threats against the President and successors of the President (Title 18, USC 871)

Murder or attempted murder of Federal officials -- U.S. judges, U.S. attorneys, etc. (Title 18, USC 1111-1114)

Presidential assassination, kidnapping, or assault (Title 18, USC 1751)
Civil disturbance operations. Although enforcement of criminal law and the preservation of civil peace are primarily the tasks of state and local law enforcement agencies, Federal agencies were also involved with the Miami Beach Convention under the provisions of the Inter-departmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances. This plan, which was approved by President Nixon in 1969, is the result of an agreement between the Attorney General, John N. Mitchell, and the Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, for coordinated action in preparation for and response to serious civil disorders within the United States which might require the deployment of Federal military forces. Because the most unusual Federal involvement with the Miami Beach Convention was within the context of this threat, we have attempted to summarize the major features of this plan.*

Under the terms of this agreement, the Attorney General of the United States has been designated as the chief civilian officer in charge of coordinating all Federal Government activities related to civil disturbances. The Defense Department is responsible for carrying out

*The reader should note that Federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service continue to carry out their normal responsibilities although they too may be affected by the actual implementation of the civil disturbance plan.
all military preparations and operations. Various staffs within the Justice and Defense Departments are responsible for the implementation of the Interdepartmental Action Plan.

Within the Justice Department there are a number of high level officials who have been designated as the "Civil Disorders Group."* This group was organized to implement the responsibilities assigned to the Department of Justice, coordinate civilian activities related to civil disturbances, and to establish policies for Federal forces that may be used in a disorder. Moreover, if the Attorney General believes it is necessary, the Civil Disorders Group is activated and serves as his key advisory team. In this capacity, the Group keeps him informed of developing events and supervises all Justice Department activities during actual disorders.

Operationally, the Attorney General is usually represented by the Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG). Under the existing plan four Assistant Attorneys General and the Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration have been designated as SCRGs and head teams that may be sent to the scene of a civil disorder.

*The Civil Disorder Group is essentially a continuation of the "Civil Disturbance Group" established during the Johnson Administration under Attorney General Ramsey Clark.
anywhere in the country.* In the field, the SCRG is responsible to keep the Attorney General informed of all aspects of the situation and for the coordination of all Federal activities related to the disorder.

The Justice Department also has primary responsibility for the collection and dissemination of intelligence necessary for both preparing and carrying out the Federal role in dealing with civil disorders.** As the principal domestic intelligence agency, the Federal

*A sixth SCRG team is under the direction of the Deputy Attorney General and is responsible for the District of Columbia. SCRG teams include a senior attorney, a public information officer, a representative of the community relations service, and other personnel is added as needed.

**During the late '60's the U.S. Army became deeply involved in civil disorder intelligence operations but was forced to substantially reduce their activities in this area when they became known to the public. Department of Defense Directive 5200.27 as implemented by the Attorney General provides that under no circumstances will Army personnel collect, report, process, or store civil disturbance information on civilian individuals or organizations whose activities cannot in a reasonably direct manner be related to a distinct threat of civil disturbance exceeding the law enforcement capabilities of local and state authorities. Detailed information on the Army's domestic intelligence activities may be found in "Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, February and March 1971.
Bureau of Investigation is responsible for the collection of most information related to civil disorders. On occasion, other agencies such as the U.S. Attorney's office, U.S. Marshals, the Community Relations Service, and the Secret Service also provide some information related to civil disorders. However, responsibility for the analysis and dissemination of civil disorder information has generally been assigned to some other section of the Justice Department. During the Johnson Administration, Attorney General Clark established the Interdivisional Intelligence and Information Unit to develop systematic means of dealing with information about and to help anticipate the occurrence of civil disorders. At that time, both the Interdivisional Intelligence Information Unit and the newly created Civil Disturbance Group operated directly under the Deputy Attorney General. In 1971, responsibility for the analysis function was transferred to the Internal Security Division and assigned to the Intelligence Analysis Unit of the Analysis and Evaluation Section. This unit is now permanently staffed to receive and analyze civil disorder information 24 hours a day.

The role of the Defense Department in civil disorders is somewhat more complicated primarily because military personnel are prohibited from becoming involved with the maintenance of civil law and order except
with Presidential authorization.* Justification for the utilization of Federal military forces for civilian law enforcement activities is derived from the following constitutional and statutory provisions:

*The use of Federal military forces in civil disorders has a long history. They were first employed by President Washington against the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794. In the 19th Century, Federal troops were requested but refused during the Buckshot War (1838), Dorrs Rebellion (1842), San Francisco Vigilance Committee Uprising (1856), railroad strikes in Michigan, Wisconsin, and California (1877). Federal troops were employed, however, during the New York Draft Riot (1863), New Orleans Race Riot (1873), Ku Klux Klan riots in South Carolina (1876), Couer D'Alene mining disturbances, Idaho (1892), and the Pullman strike (1893). During the first 60 years of this century, they have been employed at least nine times: Nevada mining disturbance (1907); Colorado coal strike (1914); race riot in Washington, D. C. (1919); race riot in Omaha (1919); race riot in Gary, Indiana (1919); West Virginia Coal Mine Warfare (1921); Bonus Army (1932); Detroit Race Riot (1943); Little Rock school integration (1957). Since 1960, Federal troops have been employed at Oxford, Mississippi (1962); Selma, Alabama (1965); Detroit, Michigan (1967); Washington, D.C., Pentagon Demonstration (1967); Baltimore, Maryland (1968); race riot in Washington, D.C. (1968); and Washington, D.C., May Day (1971). In addition to these events Federal troops were prepositioned but not employed during the Democratic Convention in Chicago (1968); New Haven Black Panther Protests (1970); Washington, D.C., Anti-War Moritoriums (1970); and the Washington, D.C., Cambodia/Kent State protests (1970).
I. Constitution of The United States

ARTICLE II

Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; . . .

Section 3. . . . he shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed, . . .

ARTICLE IV

Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

II. Title 10 US Code, Chapter 15

Section 331. Federal Aid for State Governments.

Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.
Section 332. Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal authority.

Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.

Section 333. Interference with State and Federal Law.

The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it --

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.

Section 334. Proclamation to disperse.

Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time.

Within the Defense Department, the Department of the Army has primary responsibility for civil disturbance preparations and operations.

Under Department of Defense Directive 3025.12:
The Secretary of the Army is designated as the Executive Agent for the Department of Defense in all matters pertaining to the planning for and the deployment and employment of military resources in the event of civil disturbance. (Department of Defense Directive 3025.12, Employment of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances, June 8, 1968.)

The Secretaries of the other Services are expected to provide assistance if it is requested by the Secretary of the Army.

This Directive also provided that:

A DoD Civil Disturbance Steering Committee will be established to provide advice and assistance to the DoD Executive Agent concerning civil disturbance matters. The Committee Chairman will be the Under Secretary of the Army. Members will include:

Deputy Attorney General of the United States
Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Administration and Public Affairs
General Counsel of the DoD
Under Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and Air Force
Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
Representative of the JCS

and

A Directorate of Military Support with a joint service staff will be established under the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army by the DoD Executive Agent to plan, coordinate, and direct civil disturbance operations. The Department of the Army will provide the Director and the Department of the Air Force will provide the Deputy Director.

Operationally, it is the Directorate of Military Support (DOMS), within the office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, that has ongoing
responsibility for military involvement with civil disorders.* In
general, the Director of Military Support is expected to:

. . . Provide advice and information for the Chief of
Staff, US Army, and/or the DoD Executive Agent (if applicable)
in matters pertaining to military support operations. Be aware
of the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs) and provide him or his designated representative
with such information and support as may be required to fulfill
his responsibilities.

In terms of specific civil disturbance functions the Directorate of
Military Support:

(1) Coordinates the functions of all the Military Services
when Federal military aid to civil authority in civil disturbances
is required.

(2) Develops policies and procedures for--
   (a) Calling or ordering to active Federal service--
       1. The Army National Guard units or members required
to carry out the provisions of the Presidential Executive
       Order or other appropriate authority.
       2. The specific Air National Guard Units or members
required to carry out the provisions of the Presidential
Executive Order or other appropriate authority.
   (b) Providing military resources of the United States
Army, consistent with defense priorities, including--
       1. The military resources of the Army National
Guard called or ordered to active Federal service under
the provisions of (a) above.
       2. The military resources of the Army Reserve
ordered to active duty to carry out the purposes of
this regulation.
   (c) The employment of forces that may be required to
carry out the purposes of DOD Directive 3025.12.

(3) Develops Department of the Army civil disturbance plans
as required.

(4) Develops and establishes command and control facilities
for alerting, moving, prepositioning, and employing Federal
Armed Forces for civil disturbance operations.

*When it was established in April, 1968, DOMS was formally identi-
ified as the Directorate of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations (DCDPO).
Under this title, it was deeply involved in domestic intelligence operations
until such activities were restricted by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
(5) Provides for communications-electronics support for Department of the Army, Federal agencies, and Army task forces employed in civil disturbance operations.

(6) Receives determination by the Secretary or Under Secretary of the Army that there is a distinct threat of a civil disturbance beyond the capability of local and State authorities to control, and communicates authorization for employment of Army intelligence collection resources to ACSI.

(7) In coordination with appropriate Department of the Army and other Federal agencies, provides essential planning, operational, logistics, and intelligence data to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Military Service command centers on a timely basis to insure that the National Command Authorities and appropriate Military Service command authorities are adequately informed.

(8) Develops procedures for review and coordination of all DOD components' directives, instructions, and plans affecting civil disturbance planning and operations to assure conformity with DOD policies and DOD Executive Agent policies. (Army Regulation No. 500-50, April 21, 1972, p. 3-1)

In addition to its civil disturbance operations the Directorate of Military Support also has responsibilities for:

1. Natural disasters.

   A. Provide policy, supporting publications, and direction concerning plans, procedures, and requirements to all DoD components through Service command channels, for planning joint measures and operations in connection with DoD resources committed to actual or potential disaster relief operations.

   B. Establish reporting procedures to insure availability of current information during assistance operations as well as after action statistical and cost data.

2. Federal agency assistance.

   A. Provide plans, procedures, and supporting publications to disseminate guidance for military support operations in connection with assistance to other Federal agencies.
B. Determine requirements for, coordinate and direct military resources employed in support of other Federal agencies when directed by the Department of Defense.

C. Establish reporting procedures to insure the availability of current information during assistance operations as well as after action statistical and cost data.


   A. Provide policy, procedures, and support publications for the dissemination of guidance for Department of the Army support to the Secret Service within the CONUS.

   B. Process requirements and assign responsibility for Department of the Army support to the US Secret Service.

   C. Establish reporting procedures to insure availability of after action statistical and cost data.

4. Presidential support.

   A. Provide policy, procedures, and supporting publications to disseminate guidance for Department of the Army support to the President within CONUS.

   B. Serve as the principal Army Staff agency for coordinating all Army aspects of Presidential support.

   C. Process requirements and assign responsibility for Department of the Army support to the President.

   D. Insure that guidance developed concerning Presidential support is consistent worldwide (to be accomplished in coordination with DCSOPS).

   E. Establish reporting procedures to insure availability of after action statistical and cost data.

5. Support to the District of Columbia government.

   A. Provide policy and direction governing plans, procedures, and requirements to all DoD components having cognizance over military resources which may be employed in support of the District of Columbia government in combating crime.
B. Process requests and provide guidance on a case-by-case basis to DoD components concerning military resource support to the District of Columbia government.

C. Maintain statistics and cost data on assistance provided to the District of Columbia government in combating crime.


A. Provide policy and direction governing plans, procedures, and requirements to all DoD components having cognizance over military resources which may be employed in support of the MAST test project.

B. Provide the DoD representative to the Executive Sessions of the interagency MAST Study Group and the Department of Transportation MAST administrative staff.

C. Chair the DoD MAST working group and staff DoD actions relative to conduct of the MAST field tests.

D. Establish reporting procedures to insure availability of after action statistical and cost data.

In the field, the Secretary of Defense is represented by a Personal Liaison Officer Chief of Staff Army (PLOCSA), a Major General who is briefed by and is responsive to the Chief of Staff Army through the Director of Military Support. The PLOCSA is the military counterpart of the Senior Civilian Representative and works with him in making recommendation affecting military support. In addition, PLOCSA is expected to establish and maintain liaison with appropriate local and State civilian officials and with other military officials. The PLOCSA is supported in his activities by the Department of Army Liaison Team (DALT) which includes representatives of:
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics
Judge Advocate General
Provost Marshal General
Surgeon General
Chief of Information
Director of Military Support

The Interdepartment Action Plan for Civil Disturbances provides for the coordination of Federal activities during four operational phases: (1) pre-planning and early warning; (2) alert and early stages of disturbance; (3) employment of Federal forces; and (4) withdrawal of Federal forces.

PHASE ONE -- Pre-planning and early warning: During this phase the Attorney General is responsible for the establishment of all policies concerning Federal personnel -- both civilian and military -- committed to civil disturbances. In turn, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for the development of specific policies and operational plans for the involvement of military personnel. Also during this phase, the Attorney General is responsible for: advising state governors of the legal criteria for obtaining military support; processing requests for such support; and, the maintenance of civil disturbance intelligence capabilities.
PHASE TWO -- Alert: During this phase the Attorney General is made aware of an actual or potential disturbance either through the efforts of the Department of Justice Intelligence Operations and/or a request for Federal support from a state governor. Before a formal decision on Federal military support is made, the Attorney General -- and the Secretary of Defense -- may investigate the situation by sending their representatives to the scene of the event. If they consider it advisable, the Secretary of Defense may pre-position up to 500 men on Federal property. (The prepositioning of more than 500 men -- a battalion-sized unit -- requires the informal approval of the President.) Finally, if a governor makes a formal request for Federal troops and if the President decides the request meets the basic prerequisites, the President issues a proclamation and executive order authorizing the use of Federal troops.

PHASE THREE -- Involvement of Federal troops: While Federal troops are actually employed, the Attorney General is formally responsible for coordinating the activities of state and local officials as well as the activities of all Federal agencies. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for the conduct of military operations but consults with the Attorney General on all major decisions. (In practice, coordination of Justice
and Defense Department activities are carried out by the Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General and the Personal Liaison Officer, Chief of Staff Army.)

**PHASE FOUR — Withdrawal:** When a disturbance appears to have subsided to the point that local officials will be able to maintain law and order, the representatives of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense make recommendations to their superiors concerning the withdrawal of Federal troops.

Having provided the necessary background, we may now turn to a description of the implementation of the Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances and of the military's involvement in the 1972 political Conventions.

On May 12, 1972, the Acting Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst, wrote to Governor Askew to inform him that Harlington Wood, Jr., Assistant Attorney General Civil Division, would be his personal representative on the scene (SCRAG), and to outline the basis of Federal-State relationships in the event of civil violence:

*This letter is essentially a minor revision of the letter sent to the Governors of all 50 States on August 7, 1967, by Attorney General Ramsey Clark because of the confusion that developed around the race riot in Detroit in July, 1967.*
These are the three basic prerequisites to the use of Federal troops in a state in the event of domestic violence:

(1) That a situation of serious "domestic violence" exists within the state. While this conclusion should be supported with a statement of factual details to the extent feasible under the circumstances, there is no prescribed wording.

(2) That such violence cannot be brought under control by the law enforcement resources available to the governor, including local and State police forces and the National Guard. The judgment required here is that there is a definite need for the assistance of Federal troops, taking into account the remaining time needed to move them into action at the scene of violence.

(3) That the legislature or the governor requests the President to employ the armed forces to bring the violence under control. The element of request by the governor of a State is essential if the legislature cannot be convened.

These three elements should be expressed in a written communication to the President, which of course may be a telegram, to support his issuance of a proclamation under 10 U.S.C. 334 and commitment of troops to action. In case of extreme emergency, receipt of a written request will not be a prerequisite to Presidential action. However, since it takes several hours to alert and move Federal troops, the few minutes needed to write and dispatch a telegram are not likely to cause any delay.

Upon receiving the request from a governor, the President, under the terms of the statute and the historic practice, must exercise his own judgement as to whether Federal troops will be sent, and as to such questions as timing, size of the force, and federalization of the National Guard. It is recognized by all that the primary responsibility for maintaining law and order rests with the State and local authorities. The criteria in the past has been "that domestic violence exists in the State which the authorities of the State are unable to suppress."

Preliminary steps, such as alerting troops, can be taken by the Federal government upon oral communications and prior to the State's determination that the violence cannot be brought under control without the aid of Federal forces.
While the formal request must be addressed to the President, all preliminary communications should be with me. When advised by you that serious domestic violence is occurring, I will inform the President and alert the proper military authorities. You can reach me at my office, my home, or through the White House switchboard at any hour.

On May 24, Governor Askew and other State officials met with the Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Army, Mr. Ken Webster, and Major General Rowland Gleszer, Commanding General, Directorate of Military Support and Personal Liaison Officer, Chief of Staff Army, to discuss the role of the U.S. military during the national Conventions.* Mr. Webster explained the details of the Interdepartmental Action Plan and stressed that Defense Department recommendations are given primary consideration before any Federal military support is given even though formal authority is vested in the office of the Attorney General. Governor Askew informed Mr. Webster and General Gleszer of his desire to plan for the pre-positioning of Federal troops. In turn, Mr. Webster advised the Governor that the Department of Defense generally opposed pre-positioning unless there was substantial probability of serious

*By this time, representatives of the Federal Government had met with officials of the Miami area on many occasions and had explained to them at least informally the conditions under which Federal troops could be employed and the procedures that would have to be followed in order for such a request to be made.
violence that the state could not handle. Governor Askew maintained, however, that it was his responsibility to protect the State of Florida and that he felt it was necessary to at least plan for the pre-positioning so that if Federal forces were required they would be readily available.*

Despite the efforts of Federal officials to clarify the matter, confusion still existed at the local level concerning the utilization of military forces. For example as late as June 6, the City Manager of Miami Beach wrote to LEAA Administrator, Jerris Leonard, requesting additional guidance as to:

- who was the final local authority whose decision would be accepted by the Federal government to authorize deployment of Federal troops?
- what procedures would be followed in order to request Federal assistance?

*It is our impression that most military men at least formally oppose their involvement in domestic law enforcement operations -- including civil disorders. Overt military opposition to pre-positioning is clear-cut, however, perhaps because they are afraid that having pre-positioned troops the temptation to use them will be overpowering. Or, perhaps like other organizations, they are concerned about having to absorb and explain the costs involved in pre-positioning for an event in which they are not used.
who determined the number of Federal troops to be deployed?
to whom would Federal forces be responsible?

Additional efforts to overcome this confusion occurred during
the June 16 meeting of the Joint Convention Planning Committee when
both Assistant Attorney General Wood and General Gleszer explained the
conditions under which Federal troops could be employed. They stressed
again that any request for Federal intervention had to be made by the
Governor. Mr. Wood also advised local officials that he could see no
convention-related situations which would establish the basis for
Federal injunctions being issued to stop the activities of political
dissidents.* Instead, Mr. Wood stressed that local officials should
give additional attention to the negotiative process that took place
in Washington, D.C. In fact, Mr. Wood advised the group that it was
the position of Federal authorities to assist dissenting groups in

*The possible use of Federal court injunction against
dissident activities had been one of the points in the security plan
informally promised to Miami Beach officials by Federal representatives
when they were still deciding whether or not they would host the
Republican Convention. Mr. Wood advised the meeting that such a
procedure would be possible in Washington, D.C., because it is a
Federal city, but that it would not be possible in Miami because of
an extremely tenuous connection with Federal jurisdictions.
carrying out their objectives as long as their activities remained within the law. He saw no reason why this approach should not be continued in Miami.*

Whatever their desires, the potential seriousness of events in Miami Beach was too great for the military to avoid being involved with the 1972 Conventions. Thus, by June 20, Attorney General Kleindienst had requested and received Presidential authorization to pre-position four battalions (about 2700 men) in the Miami area during the Democratic Convention** This approach was recommended as a precautionary measure.

*The primary exception to the negotiative process stressed by Mr. Wood involved the Washington, D.C., May Day demonstrations in 1971. But this was a situation in which most of the protest leaders basically rejected the idea of negotiations. A detailed account of the negotiative process as it developed during the 1970 May Day Demonstrations is available from "Hearings on the Federal Handling of Demonstrations" before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, June, 1970.

**During the May 24 meeting with Mr. Webster and General Gleszer, Governor Askew had suggested that a force of at least 5,000 men should be considered. The task force actually sent to the Miami area was composed of three Army and one Marine battalions and totaled about 3,200 men including support personnel. Combined with a Florida National Guard force of 3,098 men, this meant the availability of an on-site military
so that the necessary forces could be located near the Convention site just in case events went beyond the capabilities of civilian law enforcement agencies.

The Directorate of Military Support under the Command of Major General Gleszer was responsible for the pre-positioning of Federal forces. Field command was assigned to Lt. Gen. John H. Hay of the Third U.S. Army, and the entire Convention task force was in position by July 8. Civilian law enforcement officials were able to handle all situations on their own, however, and Federal forces returned to their home bases the morning after the Democratic Convention was over without having been employed in any form whatsoever.

Both the arrangements and the outcome of events were similar for the Republican Convention. The Attorney General obtained Presidential authority to pre-position Federal forces, and by August 19, a Federal task force was again in position at Homestead Airforce Base. This unit was the same size as the one activated for the Democratic Convention and it too was backed up by a reserve force of 6,000 men. As with the Democratic Convention, nothing happened during the Republican Convention force of over 6,000 men. In addition, a reserve Federal force of 6,000 men had been alerted for Convention duty if needed.
that civilian authorities could not handle, and the Federal task force returned home on August 25 without ever being committed to any respect.*

The military was also involved in other convention-related activities. According to Directive 3025.12, the Department of Defense is authorized to make temporary loans of personnel, facilities, equipment and supplies to civilian authorities for use in connection with civil disturbances. Under the provisions of this Directive, military resources are classified in one of three categories:

Group One: military personnel; arms, ammunition; tank-automotive equipment; and aircraft;

Group Two: military equipment of offensive nature (used to enforce law and maintain order) not included in Group One such as riot control agents and concertina wire;

Group Three: fire fighting equipment; equipment of a protective nature (such as masks, helmets, armored vests); and other equipment not included in Group One or Two (such as clothing, communications equipment, search lights); and the use of Department of Defense facilities.

*To the best of our knowledge convention-related activities (7/10 - 7/15 and 8/21 - 8/24) cost the Defense Department approximately 5 million dollars — $2,700,000 in normal operating costs and $2,245,000 in additional costs. Overall, the expense was even greater because these figures do not include the cost for such things as the activities of the Directorate of Military Support or the training provided by the SEADOC program at Fort Gordon.
The level at which loan requests have to be approved varies depending upon the sensitivity of the item requested. Thus Group One resources may only be approved by the Department of Defense Executive Agent (the Secretary of the Army) or when designated by him for that purpose, the Under Secretary of the Army. Approval of requests for Group Two resources may be further delegated to the Director of Military Support or if necessary a task force commander. Group Three requests may be approved by Secretaries of Military Departments, Continental United States Army Commanders, Air Force Base Commanders, and the Commandants of Naval Districts. Given the circumstances surrounding the Conventions, the Directorate of Military Support became the clearing house and expeditor of all civilian requests for military resources. However, the formal requests were made to the Third U.S. Army.*

Coordination of effort on the civilian side was a little more difficult to achieve at least in part because no one wanted to assume the financial responsibility required before military resources could be obtained. Ultimately, Dade County assumed this responsibility and created a request for equipment, materials and supplies for all of the law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in the county.

*The Third U.S. Army is headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia, and its command area includes the State of Florida. As a result, it was the nearest source of supply for most military resources.
The original request for military resources was made on June 15 and was addressed to Mr. Robert Donlan of LEAA.* This request contained 46 items and ranged from 1500 mattresses to tear gas, smoke grenades, and riot batons. The estimated value of the material requested was $499,624.03. On June 21 representatives of the Third Army, LEAA, and the County Manager's office met to prepare a revised request for military resources. Table 3 presents a listing of the materials ultimately requested by Dade County officials and supplied by the Department of Defense.

In addition to its activities under the civil disturbance charter, the Directorate of Military Support also furnished assistance to the Secret Service. As indicated above, the specific responsibilities of the Directorate of Military Support include assistance to the Secret Service and coordination of all Army aspects of Presidential security. During the Conventions in Miami Beach this mission involved about 200 men directly supporting of the Secret Service in its protection of both Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates. Three hundred members of the Convention task force were also designated for Secret Service

*LEAA had assigned their property and facilities officer to assist local authorities in determining the availability of military resources and helping to expedite requests for them. His request that the agencies prepare and submit to him lists of needed items apparently created the false impression that LEAA would process the formal requests to the military.
### Table 3
Dade County: Supply and Equipment Requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>REQUESTED</th>
<th>ISSUED</th>
<th>TURNED IN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Grenade, Hand CS 1 M 25 A2</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>4,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Grenade, Hand CS M 7A3</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>4,512</td>
<td>2,964</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Riot Control Agent CS (lbs)</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>2,536</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Disperser, Riot Control Agent, M 106</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Gas Masks, Sizes: small 5%, med. 85%, large 10%</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,487</td>
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<td>6. Public Address Set PA Set AN/P1Q5A</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Floodlight Set, Electric, Portable, 6 light mast mounted, 5 KW 120/208 volts</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Protective Vests</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>938</td>
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<td>9. Mattress, air</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,494</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Helmets MI, w/liners and Headbands</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>675</td>
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<td>11. Face Shield, Plastic for MI Helmets</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>675</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Concertina Wire (coils)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Stakes, for Concertina Wire</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>450</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Work Gloves, Pr.</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>15. Riot Batons</td>
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Table 3 (continued)

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<th>ITEM</th>
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<td>16. Signal Illuminating, Ground Parachute, M-127, White Star Hand Held</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<td>17. Grenade, Smoke M-18</td>
<td>125</td>
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<td>Violet</td>
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<td>18. Grenade, Hand Smoke HC AN, M 8</td>
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<td>26. G P Tent, Medium w/poles &amp; pins</td>
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<td>27. Generators, diesel, 60 KW</td>
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*The total costs chargeable to Dade County were $62,351.22

(transportation $11,550.75; repair of equipment $21,576.03; shortages/expended $29,224.44).*
Unfortunately, LEAA's efforts did not produce the coordinated proposal they had hoped to receive from the Miami area. This failure appears to stem from at least four factors. First, LEAA officials seemed to have assumed that local agencies would be motivated to develop a coordinated effort for convention security. Without a serious threat of disruption or violence this assumption may not have been valid in either Miami or San Diego. Second, LEAA officials seemed to assume that the host city would be the dominate governmental unit in this area. This was definitely true for the City of San Diego which accounted for over half the population and which had the largest police force in its metropolitan area. But it was not true of Miami Beach which had a police force of 225 officers compared to 734 in the City of Miami and 1199 in Dade County and which accounted for less than seven percent of the area's total population. Third, LEAA officials may have misread Governor Askew's designation of Chief Pomerance as "Chief of Security for the State of Florida for the Democratic National Convention" and assumed that he had more authority than he really possessed.* Finally, LEAA officials appear to have ignored indications that joint planning was lacking in Miami — perhaps they too shared the belief that serious problems were not going to develop at the Democratic Convention and did not want to expend their energy on a low threat situation.

*For more detail on this appointment see the chapter on inter-governmental coordination.
Given the experience of the Republican Convention in 1968, however, it was not likely that either Chief Garmire or Director Purdy would view a political convention as a low threat situation nor would they be satisfied to be left out of the funding arrangements. Thus, on January 11, 1972, Director Purdy called a meeting of DCPSD command personnel to discuss suggestions regarding the Department's needs for effective operation during the Democratic Convention. During this meeting Director Purdy indicated that since the MBPD grant included no supplement for the DCPSD, the DCPSD intended to request a supplementary grant of approximately $300,000 "to reflect a realistic evaluation and analysis of potential county-wide problems and priorities."

On January 24, 1972, Director Purdy wrote County Manager Goode informing him that the DCPSD was applying for an LEAA Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act grant of $388,620 to be the Federal share of a $531,505 project to provide funds (1) to train DCPSD personnel and (2) to acquire necessary equipment "so we can effectively communicate and operate with other law enforcement agencies in time of emergency". On February 2, Director Purdy submitted this discretionary grant proposal to the Governor's Council and to LEAA Administrator, Jerris Leonard. In the letter of transmittal to Mr. Leonard, Director Purdy stated his concerns about the need for a county-wide law enforcement effort:

This grant reflects both convention site support and county-wide prevention and control concerns. It is our position that history indicates and geography dictates that if problems develop and disorders erupt the chances are great that they will occur not at the convention but across the Bay in other areas of this county. (italics in original)
During this same period, Chief Garmire had also been developing his own grant application for the City of Miami. On February 11, he submitted an application for a "Miami Police Disorder Response Project" to the Governor's Council and Mr. Leonard. Thus, by early February, LEAA officials were faced with the very situation they had hoped to avoid -- separate grant proposals for convention-related activities.

On February 11, Clarence Coster of LEAA acknowledged receipt of the DCPSD proposal, and informed Director Purdy:

It is the position and policy of this Agency that we can react only to grant requests in support of police involvement in the Convention cities that are submitted by the specified Convention cities. Therefore, in the case of this grant, please contact the Chief of Police of Miami Beach, the City Manager of Miami Beach and request that they coordinate your grant request with the grant request from their city and incorporate your requests into their stated needs and application for funding to this Agency. This can be accomplished by the City of Miami Beach submitting a modified grant request.

The policy of this Agency, and the procedure is necessary to ensure that no duplication or unnecessary expenditures take place and to further ensure that the greatest degree of cost effectiveness is applied to this effort.

As stated in my letter of December 8, it is questionable if this Agency has adequate funds to meet all of the needs of all the various jurisdictions participating in the Convention activities of the various parties. I can assure you that every effort will be made to support you through the City of Miami Beach in every possible way, but funding limitations do present us with a very serious problem.

Clarence Coster sent copies of the letter to MBPD Chief Pomerance, Miami Beach City Manager O'Key, MPD Chief Garmire, and Miami City Manager Reese.
During the next month, City of Miami and Dade County officials continued in their efforts to obtain funds for their convention projects while LEAA officials continued in their efforts to coordinate these projects. After receiving Mr. Coster's reply, Director Purdy forwarded a copy of his grant proposal to Chief Pomerance. In a letter to Director Purdy dated February 15, Chief Pomerance wrote:

I am in receipt of a copy of your grant proposal entitled "National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services Project." I understand it has been submitted for an LEAA discretionary grant.

In keeping with our historically close working relationship, I completely support your efforts to appropriately train your personnel. The Miami Beach training project is about to get underway and, in view of the similarity of our approach, I wish to again extend to you the availability of participation in our training program. In either event, however, I completely support your request for the training and education funding of personnel who will ultimately be assigned to the National Democratic Convention Security Mission.

This response from Chief Pomerance cordially invited DCPSD participation in the MBPD training program. However, given the procedure detailed by Clarence Coster's February 11 letter, Chief Pomerance's February 15 letter seemed to suggest only limited endorsement of the DCPSD grant request and/or a reluctance to directly enter into the DCPSD's process of submitting the grant to LEAA.

Mr. Coster remained in touch with Chief Garmire and Director Purdy during this period. For example, he telephoned Director Purdy on February 17 to discuss the problems of convention-related grants.
Director Purdy's file memorandum on this call makes it clear that LEAA was trying to work with other local agencies but within the limitations of its own resources:

Mr. Clarence Coster, LEAA, called today stating his purpose was to explain the letter he had written. He said it was a policy determination and not his and that he hoped I would understand his posture on this.

Mr. Coster said that if we need any help in generating request of grant ... any questions to short circuit to call him. I asked him what our procedure should be. He suggested that we go to our county board and explain our needs and the explanation of the funds going to Miami Beach. Emphasized that it was best to go through governing bodies when request is made to federal government.

He stated they were limited to one million dollars for the two conventions - San Diego received $587,000 and Miami Beach $400,000, so there wasn't much left. Told him that we weren't talking about a lot of money for our needs.

Mr. Coster said we should make our request to the city of Miami Beach to modify their grant to include us.

Based upon Mr. Coster's recommendation, Dade County officials revised their "National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services Project" grant application. This version called for $384,960 of LEAA support and was submitted to the Governor's Council and Mr. Leonard on March 2, 1972. At the same time, Director Purdy also sent copies of the grant application to Chief Pomerance either for his endorsement or
incorporation into supplemental grant application.*

Back in Washington, LEAA officials were still trying to avoid the proliferation of grant requests from the Miami area. On March 3, Mr. Coster talked with Major Schempp of the MBPD and advised him that LEAA was inclined to approve a supplemental grant to Miami Beach to include overtime pay for the MPD and DCPSD officers attending the Miami Beach training program.

Also on March 3, Major Ted Schempp of the MBPD spoke on the telephone with Paul Bohardt, Chief of the DCPSD Administrative Division, to convey to the DCPSD the substance of his discussion with Mr. Coster. Paul Bohardt summarized that conversation in a memo to Director Purdy:

At 1420 hours, this date, Major Ted Schempp of the Miami Beach Police Department called this officer and stated that he had just been in touch with Mr. Clarence Coster of the LEAA office in Washington, D.C., and Mr. Coster had advised him that LEAA was favorably inclined to approve a supplemental request by Miami Beach to pay overtime for officers of Public Safety Department to participate in the training program currently being administered by the Miami Beach Police Department and Florida International University.

*Some indication of the confusion that existed concerning LEAA funding may be inferred from the fact that even the City of Miami and Dade County continued to submit separate grant applications rather than a combined request. Moreover, all three agencies -- MBPD, MPD, and DCPSD -- were supposed to be participating in joint planning meetings at least since February 17, 1972. For a detailed discussion of these meetings see the chapter on law enforcement preparations: the development of the unified operations plan.
Mr. Coster stated that he would probably approve 68 hours of training for a limited number of Public Safety Officers. Consequently, Major Schempp and myself agreed that we would request 68 hours of training at overtime pay of time and one-half for five captains, seventeen lieutenants and sixty sergeants from this organization. In addition, Major Schempp relayed the information that Mr. Coster had told him that as of this date the attitude of LEAA for funding any equipment request would be negative. Major Schempp said he was writing the formal request and that subject to the approval of Chief Pomerance it would be forthwith transmitted to Washington, D.C., via U.S. Mail.

Major Schempp was informed that DCPSD personnel could not participate in the training program unless overtime funds were provided.

Early in March, LEAA administrator, Jerris Leonard, personally tried to resolve the funding problem. On March 8 he responded to Chief Garmire concerning the MPD's grant application and stressed that Miami Beach was the subgrantee for projects directly related to the Conventions. However, Mr. Leonard did raise the possibility that separate applications would be considered for those convention-related law enforcement problems which specifically affected different jurisdictions:

I am in receipt of your grant request in the amount of $160,140 entitled "Police Response Project, National Political Convention."

To ensure joint planning, cost effectiveness in the funding of all programs, and the greatest degree of economy in the funding of equipment purchases, I have sometime ago established a policy that this Agency can react only to grant requests from the city specified as host to a national political convention. Information concerning this matter has been transmitted to Director of Public Safety, E. Wilson Purdy of Dade County, Florida, and a copy of that correspondence was transmitted to you for your information.
I am returning herewith your grant request and advise you that before this grant can be staffed and considered by this Agency, it must be redrafted and submitted to this Agency with the City of Miami Beach as the sponsoring applicant. It is necessary to have a City Council action stating that the funds you request are within the anticipated convention needs of that city. I understand your grant also encompasses equipment for anticipated disorders within the limits of your city and you feel these disorders will arise from convention activities. It is suggested you separate the cost of these two separate activities, (1) support of Miami Beach during the course of the convention and transmit that through the City of Miami Beach with their official endorsement and (2) redraft the application and request specific support for any demonstrations or civil disorders you anticipate in your city as a result of the National Convention.

On March 15, Jerris Leonard wrote Director Purdy, sending him a copy of his March 8 letter to Chief Garmire and leaving the implication that the DCPSD grant also should be broken down into two similar components and be submitted to LEAA separately.

Following Mr. Leonard's suggestions the City of Miami made arrangements to fund participation in convention-related training through Miami Beach.* In addition, Chief Garmire developed a separate proposal

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*Miami Beach supplemental grant DF-72-99-0028 provides the following explanation concerning the need for these funds.

In the original Grant proposal, it was not contemplated that participating police officers of these agencies would be compensated from Grant funds. It is now apparent that these officers will bear heavy responsibilities generated from convention site assignments and directly related events.

The Cities of Miami or Coral Gables were not able to permit "on duty" attendance without severely depleting operational forces. Local budgetary resources had not been provided to cover off-duty compensation.
to train his men in psychological response to demonstration situations, utilization of non-lethal crowd control equipment, and tactical response to mass violence. On March 16, Chief Garmire submitted a revised grant application for $95,410 to the Governor's Council and to the LEAA office in Washington.

As we have explained above in our chapter on inter-governmental cooperation, Director Purdy had consistently maintained that given his constitutional responsibility as Sheriff of Dade County, the DCPSD ought to assume the primary and not a secondary role in convention-related law enforcement efforts. On April 18, Director Purdy responded to Mr. Leonard with an argument that the original proposal must remain intact and the suggestion that his department should be funded as the primary law enforcement agency in the Miami area:

Thank you for your letter of March 15, 1972. We are unsure, however, as to the exact nature of your intent. Although the letter does not specifically say so, it has occurred to us that you might be suggesting that Dade County also divide our National Convention Grant request into two parts. If this is the case, please be advised that we do not consider such an approach to be feasible.

Serious morale problems became apparent during the course of training implementation which could have led to an ineffective level of accomplishment.

During the interim, a local court decision has indicated that police agencies will be required to adequately compensate assigned police officers for off-duty time committed to police purposes.
Your letter has been staffed to a variety of specialists within the Dade County Public Safety Department and, after considerable evaluation and analysis, it is our opinion that it is impossible to separate the county needs into (1) Convention site security and (2) Non-Convention site security.

The management of this convention in terms of planning, training, coordination, staffing, etc., is a county-wide activity. The impact of participants and results of convention activities will be felt throughout the area, not just around the convention hall itself. Consequently, to divide the request for assistance to meet our anticipated needs would dilute and emasculate our county-wide obligations and responsibilities. The Constitutional responsibilities of the Public Safety Department preclude such an approach.

The provisions and expressed needs of our grant application still apply. The problem is that time is of the essence. Fifty (50) percent of the training program has been completed and we have been unable to participate without the requested funding.

Should there be any additional delay, we will be too late to participate in the training conducted by Florida International University, to obtain communications equipment through proper purchasing channels and, in general, to implement and administer our proposed planning, training and convention coordination responsibilities and functions.

While the Washington office was trying to make arrangements with the Miami area law enforcement agencies, members of the Governor's Council and the Regional office of LEAA in Atlanta were trying to learn exactly what was going on. In the middle of April, Mr. James Stewart, the Director of the Governor's Council, contacted Mr. Coster to find out LEAA's intentions concerning the funding of convention projects and to obtain a clarification of LEAA's role in this process. Mr. Coster advised him that LEAA had not reached a decision regarding funding. He indicated, however, that his staff was working on an application for
supplementary funds from the Miami Beach Police Department which would include overtime expenses for the training of City of Miami and Dade County police officers.*

On April 28, Mr. Stewart submitted a detailed memo to Governor Askew concerning LEAA funding of convention-related law enforcement activities. In this memo Mr. Stewart supported the following recommendations:

1. Future funding should be directed at the reorganization of a planning effort within the Dade County area.

2. The planning operation should be under the control of all three department heads. (Miami P.D., Dade County Public Safety Dept. and Miami Beach P.D.)

3. A project director should be selected, perhaps on a state level, to be temporarily under the direction of the three administrators.

4. The planning staff should be representative of all three departments, and should include at least two heavy weight administrative types from each agency.

*On April 28, representatives of the Public Safety Department were informed of a supplemental grant by Major Schempp of the Miami Beach Police Department. According to Public Safety Department records Major Schempp indicated that this grant would provide Dade County with almost $50,000 in training funds. This proposal was never submitted, however, although Miami Beach ultimately did receive a supplementary grant of over $400,000. Ths failure to include Dade County in the supplemental grant may have been due to Director Purdy's rejection of the two-fold funding process.
5. The location of the planning staff should be separate from the three Principle agencies to insure autonomy.

6. There should be a commitment on the part of the three administrators and their superiors, namely City/County Managers and Commissions.

7. All plans should be approved by these administrators.

8. There should be a direct commitment for a cooperative intelligence effort.

9. Immediate action must be taken with the commitment of resources to insure that within the next month and a half, operational plans be formalized. Resources should be tapped at the federal, state and local level.

It is the opinion of the three above-referenced planners that this approach is necessary and would be feasible only if a commitment from the LEAA, the Governor of the State of Florida, and the Dade County area administrators be obtained. It is suggested that the Governor contact Jerris Leonard, Chief Pomerance, Chief Garmire and Director Purdy separately, to obtain their commitment.

In early May, when it seemed likely the Republican Convention would be shifted to Miami Beach, the question of funding became even more critical. On May 1, Director Purdy wrote to Jerris Leonard, urging that especially in view of this new possibility the DCPSD must be regarded as assuming a more central role in convention-related law enforcement matters:

The problems contingent on the presence of two conventions will demand county-wide coordination and cooperation on a more formal basis for a prolonged period under conditions not first perceived by LEAA. Of particular concern to our community are those conditions which may result during the period of approximately six weeks between the two conventions. It is this period of time which perhaps identifies best that a national convention being held on Miami Beach is a community-wide problem rather than a specific problem of security at a particular location.
We are requesting, therefore, that any future planning or funding be consistent with the Constitutional responsibility of the Office of Sheriff (Director of Public Safety). This responsibility cannot be abrogated regardless of the desires or intentions of individuals or agencies involved. It is furthermore consistent with staffing and coordination of other county-wide agencies.

The potential problem of these two conventions is of such enormous magnitude that consideration must be given to a much broader-based assistance, funding and planning level than is now being experienced. Consequently, we are again placing before you for your consideration our request to be considered the primary funding, planning and coordinating agency for all security and associated law enforcement matters dealing with the impending political conventions.

Once the decision had been made to shift the Republican Convention to Miami Beach, Governor Askew quickly moved to assert the State's authority in the LEAA funding process. On May 5, the Governor wrote to Mr. Leonard to establish the State's position on the matter of funding:

It would be appreciated if you would receive representatives of my office for a conference in Washington at a time convenient to you, preferably on Friday, May 12, to discuss participation by LEAA in the special project relating to the security of the national political conventions.

Until such time as representatives of my office have met with you and discussed in detail our revised plan, I would appreciate it if you would not entertain applications or engage in direct negotiations with prospective sub-grantees in this state. It is our position that the LEAA grant for this special project should be made to the Office of Governor, State of Florida and distributed as is done with other LEAA grants, to participating units of local government. The redistribution of LEAA funds by this state will be consistent with the plan and priorities established by the state.

This letter also informed Mr. Leonard that Florida Department of Law Enforcement Director William Reed had been appointed State Coordinator for Convention Security and Public Safety.
Director Purdy on May 17 received a phone call from Bill Kittel of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). Mr. Kittel indicated that he wanted to meet with Director Purdy to discuss the status of convention planning. Director Purdy asked if this was as a result of the Governor's trip to Washington. Mr. Kittel said it was; the Governor had met with the Attorney General and appointed Bill Reed of the FDLE to be State Coordinator for the Governor regarding convention security, County Manager Goode was to be named the area coordinator for convention planning. As Director Purdy wrote in a file memorandum concerning his phone conversation with Bill Kittel:

One of the things they want to get together was a complete look on behalf of the governor regarding all grant requests so governor will be apprised of amount of money needed to cover all agencies. Stated the governor was doing this because everyone was going in their own direction regarding grant requests.

On May 19, Commissioner Reed attended the regular meeting of the Joint Planning Committee and confirmed his appointment as the Governor's Coordinator. Commissioner Reed advised the group that all future LEAA grant applications should be coordinated, planned, and prepared locally. Specifically, he indicated that such applications should encompass the needs of all participating agencies including monies for overtime as well as the total training requirements. Moreover, Commissioner Reed advised that upon the approval of County Manager Goode all grant applications
should be forwarded to the office of the Governor for review and processing.* Also during this meeting Mr. Robert Donlan, Assistant Administrator to Mr. Coster, announced that LEAA had set aside 2.5 million dollars to aid local communities in handling the Conventions and that no had been assigned to the Miami area to assist in the grant developing process. DCPSD officials rather safely assumed that Bill Reed's comments reflected the Governor's conclusions after his Washington meetings. Yet even here there were at least two levels of un clarity for DCPSD officials: (1) would the County Manager's office or the DCPSD bear the responsibility for the preparation of consolidated grants, and (2) would Bill Reed of FDLE or James Stewart, Director of the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice, express final approval or disapproval for the Governor concerning consolidated grant proposals?

At this same May 19 Joint Planning Committee Meeting, Chief Pomerance announced that a planning office at 920 Alton Road would be open effective May 22. Robert Dorlan who would be assisting the grant preparation process would locate his office in this Alton Road planning center. Bill Reed was also given office space in this same location. On May 25, County Manager Goode requested and obtained from James W. Stewart,

*In fact, the arrangements were such that Commissioner Reed was responsible for the review of all LEAA grant applications before they were turned over to the Governor's Council for normal processing.
Director, Governor's Council on Criminal Justice, the services of Tim Crow, a staff member of the Governor's Council, to assist Dade County and specifically the DCPSD in the preparation of grant proposals for submissions to LEAA.

In accordance with his understanding of the Governor's request for coordinated grant proposals, Director Purdy called for and chaired a meeting of all municipal police chiefs and the heads of other criminal justice agencies in Dade County. At this meeting Director Purdy indicated that his office had been charged with the responsibility to prepare grant applications that would include the requirements of the twenty-seven municipalities and those other elements of the criminal justice system seeking Federal fundings in connection with the political Conventions.*

Given this responsibility, Director Purdy advised the group that he needed information concerning the funds each agency required for training, equipment, and operational overtime.

*Although the Public Safety Department never really had the opportunity to fulfill this role, Director Purdy's understanding of his responsibilities was shared by other County officials. For example, in a June 12 request to the County Commission for authority to file LEAA grant applications, County Manager Goode gave the Dade County Commission a similar description of Director Purdy's responsibilities:

By executive order of the Governor of Florida, the County Manager, Metropolitan Dade County, has been named as coordinator responsible for "All Public Health, Welfare and
Thus, the first steps were taken toward preparing a consolidated grant proposal at the county level. Despite Mr. Reed's admonition that such a grant should come from the County Manager's office (and Jerris Leonard's previous similar request), it should not be surprising that this meeting was chaired by Director Purdy. In any consolidated grant prepared at the county level, the DCPSD input and share would be major. The County Manager could permit Director Purdy this primary responsibility providing members of his staff continued to be informed of decisions and developments. In such a structure, the County Manager would always retain final authority.

Based upon this information the Public Safety Department developed a consolidated convention grant application for over 2 million dollars.* According to DCPSD officials, copies of this proposal were

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Safety" including convention site security, within the Dade County area. To this end and in the protection of life and property, the Director, Public Safety Department has been charged with the responsibility to coordinate the grant requests for all other elements of the Criminal Justice System and the twenty-seven police agencies geographically located in Dade County.

*During this same period LEAA grant applications were also being prepared by the City of Miami County Manager's office, the Highway Patrol and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
submitted to Mr. Donlan on June 16 in his LEAA office on Miami Beach under the assumption that he would assume responsibility for processing the application. On June 19, Director Purdy forwarded a copy of the proposal directly to LEAA Administrator Jerris Leonard with the injunction that:

Expeditious endorsement and approval of this grant application will be greatly appreciated by all involved and concerned individuals due to the limited time available before these conventions are scheduled to begin.*

On June 21, the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice logged receipt of this Dade County consolidated proposal.

LEAA officials, however, refused to process the grant application until the procedures established by Governor Askew has been fulfilled -- particularly the review and approval by Commissioner Reed. Mr. Donlan verbally informed Public Safety Department representatives of this criterion on June 22. Four days later, on June 26, he wrote Director Purdy the following letter:

*Copies of this letter were sent to Clarence M. Coster, LEAA; Robert Donlan, LEAA; George Murphy, LEAA; James R. Stewart, GCCJ; Michael Samuel, GCCJ; William Reed, FDLE; Bernard L. Garmire, NPD; Rocky Pomerance, MBPD; Wayne Hanewicz, MBPD; and Governor Askew's General Counsel, Edgar M. Dunn.
Mr. Jerris Leonard has asked me to reply to your letter to him dated June 19, 1971, forwarding a copy of the Dade County Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice System Consolidated Convention grant application. As I have explained to you in the past, Convention grant applications must be submitted in accordance with the procedures established by the Governor in Executive Order 72-33. First of all, any grant application emanating from within Dade County must be endorsed by the Local Area Coordinator, County Manager Ray Goode. The application must be then sent to the Governor's State Coordinator, Commissioner William Reed. In turn, the grant must be approved and endorsed by Mr. James Stewart the Director of the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice. Only after that endorsement has been attached, can we consider such a grant application for funding. Accordingly, please submit your grant application through the above mentioned channels.

Upon receipt of the properly endorsed grant application, I will ensure that it receives expeditious review and appropriate action. If I may be of any further service to you, please do not hesitate to call me.

On June 28, Director Purdy wrote directly to Jerris Leonard in defense of the procedures he had followed.

We are in receipt of Mr. Robert R. Donlan's letter of June 26, 1972. Based upon previous instructions articulated to us by Mr. Donlan that he would expedite the endorsement, approval and funding process and, as indicated in our letter of June 19, 1972, five (5) copies of the Dade County Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice System Consolidated LEAA Grant Application were personally delivered to him that afternoon of June 16, 1972. It was our understanding that he would assume the responsibility of insuring that appropriate officials received one of these five copies.

Consequently, as also reflected in our letter to you on June 19, copies of this grant were sent to all individuals in any way involved in the convention grant application approval and funding process. Therefore, we can unequivocally state that all conditions and steps outlined in Donlan's letter have been complied with via the letter of transmittal of June 19.

As the conventions are approaching at an exceedingly rapid rate, we again renew our request for expeditious endorsement and approval. A great number of law enforcement executives
representing police departments in Dade County and other components of the criminal justice system are in need of a definitive answer so that they can plan accordingly in their respective areas of responsibility. Many people are depending on your affirmative response.*

Both Public Safety Department members and other county officials have indicated that they were confused by LEAA’s behavior. From their perspective, they could not understand what appeared to be bureaucratic insistence on red tape only two weeks before the opening session of the Democratic National Convention. It was at this point that at least some county officials privately expressed concerns that LEAA might consciously be attempting to interfere with the orderly progress of these final and critical preparation days. There was even speculation that there might be a desire on the part of the Republican administration to prevent full law enforcement preparation thereby increasing the likelihood of unmanageable civil disorder. At a minimum, these officials felt betrayed by Mr. Donlan who supposedly had been sent to Miami by LEAA to expedite the funding process and not to raise continual bureaucratic barriers.

To the best of our knowledge, however, the Public Safety Department’s problems with LEAA were not part of an Administration conspiracy against the Democratic Convention. Nor were they caused by stubborn insistence upon compliance with bureaucratic red tape even

*Delays in the funding process did represent a serious hinderance to each agency’s ability to develop its particular plans because no agency had formal assurance that their expenditures would be reimbursed by LEAA.
during a potential crisis. Instead, the problems seem in large part to have resulted from the efforts of State officials to exercise control over both the funding and law enforcement planning process and by the failure of Public Safety Department officials to recognize and/or accept that they had been superceded by the State.

As we indicated in our chapter on inter-governmental cooperation, State officials were very concerned by what they believed to be the failure of local law enforcement officials to develop a coordinated operations plan for the Conventions. Given this concern, Commissioner Reed utilized his control over access to LEAA funds as leverage to encourage local officials to develop the type of operations plan State officials believed necessary. For example, representatives of both the Miami Police Department and the Public Safety Department were advised by Commissioner Reed on June 22 that no grants other than those providing training to Dade County and municipalities would be approved until it could be demonstrated the grant conformed to a combined response plan developed by Dade County, Miami, and Miami Beach. In addition, access to LEAA funds was also used by Commissioner Reed to force Miami and Dade County officials to increase their manpower commitments to convention-related activities through the imposition of a "3/5 rule." This position was supported by Mr. Donlan who at the July 6 meeting of the Joint Planning Committee informed local officials that:

A police agency must commit 3/5 of its sworn personnel to a task force for the 5-day Convention period before it could become eligible for overtime funding through LEAA.
Whatever Public Safety Department officials believed to be the basis of their problems with LEAA, they were definitely aware that Commissioner Reed and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement had something to do with it.* In fact, DCPSD concerns in this area were made quite explicit in the Department's after-action evaluation of the LEAA granting process:

Tremendous difficulties were encountered in this department's relationship with Washington level LEAA officials in the Federal funding grant application process. Another problem was encountered in obtaining responsive answers and decisions from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement upon the advent of their insertion in the LEAA grant decision-making procedure. There were so many people involved and so many agencies involved in the funding activities that again confusion and uncertainty was the rule rather than the exception.

It is recommended that appropriate officials of Dade County aggressively and affirmatively continue in their attempt to obtain LEAA funding for convention-related expenditures. Other than the assistance provided by the staff of the Florida State Planning Agency -- the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice -- and military equipment coordination, LEAA generally failed to

*Questions about the role of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement were also raised by the MBPD when representatives of that Agency were included in a Governor's Council program audit of their original LEAA grant. Miami Beach officials made it clear at that time -- July 18 -- that they did not consider FDLE to be an impartial agency; these MBPD officials ultimately arranged to have the FDLE representatives removed from the auditing group.
perform the requisite services and provide assistance required by Dade County and the Public Safety Department.

It is recommended that should future LEAA grants be prepared, adequate guidelines be made available so that valuable resources are not dissipated through the grant preparation process.

It is also recommended that any law enforcement agency with a vested interest (Florida Department of Law Enforcement) should not have the responsibility of deciding the program and funding allocations of other law enforcement agencies. (Dade County Public Safety Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report.)

The period between Conventions brought an end to most of the technical and administrative difficulties which had plagued the LEAA funding process since the previous summer. Between August 14-17, Governor's Council Director Stewart submitted endorsements and received LEAA approval for eleven separate grant applications involving Miami Beach, Dade County, the Florida Highway Patrol and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.*

That LEAA funds were available so rapidly after the completion of the Democratic Convention led some County officials to continue their questioning of LEAA motivations. They privately wondered whether the sudden cessation of LEAA imposed procedural problems indicated a desire of the Republican Administration to see a higher degree of law enforcement

*Prior to that time LEAA had approved only three proposals -- the original Miami Beach grant and two proposals submitted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
and County Governments as well as the cities of Miami Beach and Miami. While this action merely formalized a pattern of involvement which had already begun to emerge, it nevertheless established by fiat what might have taken many uncertainties and arguments as well as much valuable time to work out otherwise. Significantly, this particular command structure retained local responsibility, merely extending the formal involvement from beyond Chief Pomerance to include relevant other officials of the County and the cities of Miami Beach and Miami. State official involvement was in an overseeing position, with continued authority over Florida law enforcement agencies (including the Florida National Guard). Federal officials were nowhere involved in this formal structure of command responsibility, but there was ample time and opportunity for them to exert an influence on the planning process.

That the Miami Beach Police Chief was appointed Chief of Convention Site Security while the County Manager was appointed Local Area Coordinator does reflect the authority each typically exerts within his particular level of government. Additionally, within the formal structure, there was sufficient latitude for personalities, initiative, and established informal patterns to exert an effect on how these command roles were exercised.

The formal command structure established by the Governor persisted throughout both Conventions but not without some difficulties. Despite the Governor's order (or perhaps because of the Governor's order) Miami Beach City Manager O'Key wrote to LEAA Director Jerris Leonard on June 6 for clarification of the Federal Government's role in the Conventions. The character of this letter made it clear that Mr. O'Key was not about to leave issues concerning command structure merely to the interpretation of the Governor:
Plans for the maintenance of civil order during the upcoming national political conventions in this city are advancing. We have reached that stage in our contingency planning where we must now specify a sequence of decisions and identify decision makers, in order that there will be no misunderstanding or room for error when commitment of the military to the scene to maintain civil order is necessary.

As I may have indicated to you heretofore (if not to you, then to your representatives and to the representatives of the Governor), that we must have such a specification of actions and sequence of decisions required: spelled out clearly for the guidance of our chief of police and for all those upon whom we rely to maintain civil order. I need not indicate to you the importance of this matter, and I would appreciate your prompt consideration of the following questions:

1) Who is the final local authority whose decision will be accepted by a representative of the federal government to authorize deployment of federal troops to the scene of civil disorder in this city in conjunction with maintaining order before, during and after the Democratic National Convention and during the Republican National Convention?

2) Outline for my guidance specific actions that must be taken and the documentation required to be prepared by such governmental authority in order to prepare for and present to those responsible federal authorities a request for deployment of:

   a. federal civilian law enforcement personnel;
   b. federal military forces.

3) Who makes the decision as to the numbers of federal military forces to be deployed?

4) To whom will such deployed federal civilian and military forces be responsible?

5) Indicate to me the sequential procedure to be followed and identify the decision maker to:

   a. make deployment of federal military and civilian forces without the request or approval of the Governor;

   b. outline for me the sequential decisions required utilizing a request of the Governor for such civilian and military federal forces to be deployed.

As we have discussed on a number of occasions, we have been assured that "adequate" law enforcement forces will be stationed in this vicinity and in a position to respond as the exigencies of the situation demand. It is now requested that we formalize these
commitments for the proper advice and guidance of all those responsible local officials concerned.

Should this request of you not be clear, or should you need further delineation of the subject matter I require to be specified, I would appreciate your prompt advice and I will come to Washington, D. C. to resolve this matter.

I want you to know that my associates and I appreciate your advice and guidance. (Letter from City Manager O'Key to Jerris Leonard, June 6, 1972.)

The most persistent difficulties, however, involved law enforcement officials and revolved around such problems as the number of men each agency would contribute to convention duty, the character of their assignments, and plans for their deployment -- in short, all of the substantive law enforcement points that had been at issue between them from the very beginning.* During the early weeks of June, however, these difficulties became even more obvious as officials attempted to develop a coordinated law enforcement operations plan. For example, Public Safety Department representatives began to press Chief Pomerance for specific assignments for their men and the Chief did not (or could not) comply.** On the other hand, Public Safety

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*The failure of Miami Beach officials to make decisions concerning their possible treatment of non-delegates also created serious difficulties. Because of its obvious importance to the whole process of negotiations with non-delegates we have chosen to discuss this problem in Chapter .

**In fact, Director Purdy and members of his staff had complained to FDLE representatives about the lack of any over-all law enforcement operations coordination as early as May 17.
Department representatives created doubts concerning the reliability of their commitment by continually stressing that they were only "a second line of defense" for the conventions and that they might have to pull out if there were any problems on the Mainland.* Miami Police Chief Garmire also made the same point regarding the commitment of his agency, but not as often nor as vehemently.

By the middle of June, State officials became convinced that local agencies could not or would not develop a coordinated plan for law enforcement operations voluntarily. Thus, on June 17 they formally approached the outside consultants on civil disorders -- Deputy Chief Theodore R. Sanders, Metropolitan Washington, D. C. Police Department, Lieutenant Roland W. Perry, Metropolitan Washington, D. C. Police Department, Lieutenant John Konstanturos, Los Angeles, California Police Department, and asked them to develop a more detailed combined response plan for convention security operations.**

On Monday, June 19, Governor Askew was briefed by Commissioner Reed and General Counsel Dunn on the status of convention planning. Later that day, the State Coordination Group also met to discuss convention planning.

*This issue was raised so often, that in a June 6 meeting of law enforcement officials Chief Pomerance pointed out that Miami Beach paid 26% of the County's taxes and stated that in return the County owed a certain amount of service to Miami Beach.

**These three men were originally hired as consultants by the Miami Beach Police Department under the supplement to LFAA Grant 71-DF-1098. They were reassigned to the State Coordination Staff, however, when planning did not progress as hoped for.
During this meeting, various members expressed concern regarding the lack of combined resources and response planning. Commissioner Reed stated that in his opinion:

Each major jurisdiction was developing separate and distinct plans without any definitive, joint agreements as to field command, priorities assignments, communications, equipment, reserve or any other area of combined, operational capability.

Reed then informed the group that because of the great risks to state officers in being the only force definitely committed to the Conventions:

The Governor, upon recommendation of this Office, has released the State from its commitment to Miami Beach Police Department and while the state will necessarily provide support, the utilization must be reasonable under the circumstances.

On Monday night, Governor Askew was again briefed on the status of convention planning. Among the points stressed during this briefing were the lack of support of Dade County, Miami and Miami Beach for adequate civilian law enforcement; the total absence of a combined response plan; and the failure of local officials to agree upon a field commander.* The next day Governor Askew flew to Washington to discuss convention planning with

*In private interviews several individuals have suggested that Miami Beach officials may have hoped to avoid the problems of coordinating local law enforcement operations by jumping directly to Federal intervention in the event of any major law enforcement problems. A careful reading of City Manager O'Key's June 6 letter to LEAA Head Jerris Leonard suggests that the letter may have been designed as the opening move in such a campaign.
Attorney General Kleindienst, Congressional leadership, and the Chairman of both the Democratic and Republican Parties. Some indication of the Governor's apprehensions concerning the Conventions can be derived from the fact that he formally requested the Attorney General's assistance in obtaining a support force of 500 Washington, D. C. policemen. This request was rejected on the grounds that such an action could seriously jeopardize the safety of the nation's capital.

On June 22, representatives of both the Miami Police Department and the Public Safety Department were advised by Commissioner Reed that:

No grants (LEAA) other than those providing training to Dade County and municipalities would be approved until the grant's conformance to a combined response plan was developed among Dade, Miami, and Miami Beach in direct support of the political conventions.

When DCPSD officials protested that they had never heard of this requirement they were informed that on two previous occasions the need for a joint and a comprehensive plan was stated as a prerequisite to any approval by the Governor, and that Director Purdy, Chiefs Garmire, and Pomerance were all in attendance. On the following day, June 23, County Manager Goode was informed of this meeting and the State's intention to insist upon a joint response plan.

During this same period, Chief Zanders and the other consultants were busy developing a coordinated response plan. During the Joint Convention Planning meeting on June 16 Chief Zanders made arrangements to meet with each agency's convention field commander during the week of
June 19th. By the end of the week, Chief Zanders was able to submit a skeletal version of a coordinated response plan to the State Coordinator. The primary feature of this plan was the suggestion that a convention force of almost 1800 men could be created if local law enforcement agencies devoted 3/5 of their men to convention assignments. These figures were achieved by the following line of reasoning:

It takes 5.1 officers to staff a position through three tours of duty, taking into consideration days off, annual and sick leave. In reverting to a 12 hour, 7 day work week, two officers are required to staff a given position. Therefore, under such maximum overtime conditions, 2/5 of a given force should be capable of delivering normal police services to a community without loss of efficiency or effectiveness.

Needless to say not everyone agreed with this analysis. In fact, the 3/5 rule became the basis of obtaining additional commitments for Convention duty only because LEAA took the position that:

A police agency must commit 3/5 of its sworn personnel to a task force for the five-day convention period before it could become eligible for overtime funding.

On Sunday June 25 Governor Askew and his staff met with local officials to express his desire that a coordinated response plan be developed and implemented. The Governor noted that in his opinion the Miami Police Department and the Dade County Public Safety Department had not made sufficient commitment of forces to directly convention-related problems. At the same time, Governor Askew amplified his Executive Order by recommending the integrated command structure presented in Figure 8. By July 6 specific assignments were formalized as follows in the Unified Operations Plan for the Democratic National Convention:
Figure 8. Suggested field command structure proposed by Governor Reuben Askew.
State Coordinator:

The Executive Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Commissioner William L. Reed, shall be responsible for overall coordination of all state non-military functions, services and support in the areas of public health, safety and welfare. He will be the principal state liaison official with the Office of the Governor and with the U.S. Departments of Justice and Defense. He shall work in close coordination with the local area coordinator.

Local Area Coordinator:

County Manager, Mr. Ray Goode, will have overall responsibility for coordination of all public health, welfare and public safety functions within the Dade County area including convention site security. He will be chief of the public safety command post located in the County Courthouse, City of Miami. As such he will personally direct the assignment of police reserve task force units across jurisdictional lines on the basis of priority of need. Field commanders shall channel all requests for police support services through the local area commander, including support requests for the Florida National Guard and Federal military forces.

Responsibility of the Miami Beach Police Department:

The Miami Beach Police Department shall be responsible for the handling of all security, traffic and crowds within the City of Miami Beach, to include the convention complex.

Chief of Police Rocky Pomerance will personally direct all police arrangements and details in connection with these events. He will exercise personal control over all police personnel, however, supervisory personnel of outside agencies shall remain in command of their respective forces and receive functional assignments rather than direct supervision.

Responsibility of the Miami Police Department:

The Miami Police Department shall be responsible for the handling of all security, traffic and crowds within the City of Miami.
Chief of Police Bernard Garmire will personally direct all arrangements and details in connection with events, scheduled or unscheduled, within the City of Miami. He will exercise personal control over all police personnel, however, supervisory personnel of outside agencies shall remain in command of their respective forces and receive functional assignments rather than direct supervision.

Responsibility of the Dade County Department of Public Safety:

The Dade County Department of Public Safety shall be responsible for the handling of all security, traffic and crowds within the Dade County area with the exception of those areas delineated in Sections III and IV of this order. [above]

The Director of Public Safety, Metropolitan Dade County, Director E. Wilson Purdy will personally direct all arrangements and details in connection with events, scheduled or unscheduled, within the Metropolitan area of Dade County as delineated in this section (Section V).

Responsibility of the Florida Highway Patrol and Salt Water Conservation Agency:

The Florida Highway Patrol and Salt Water Conservation Agency shall be responsible for direct support to the Miami Beach Police Department in convention related activities.

A. Commissioner William L. Reed, Executive Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement shall personally direct all arrangements and details necessary to carry out the provisions of this order.

B. Major Charles C. Reynolds shall have general supervision over all arrangements and details necessary to carry out the provisions of this order.

Command Centers:

In order to facilitate coordination and control by the field commanders, the Dade County Manager shall establish a command center at the Dade County Courthouse. This command center
shall be operational from 0800 hours on July 9, 1972, until relieved by the County Manager. This center shall exercise manpower allocation control for all personnel within the Metropolitan area of Dade County. This C.P. shall be designated C.P. "Alpha."

In a similar manner, the Chief of Police, Miami Beach Police Department shall establish a command post at the convention complex. This command center shall be operational from 0800 hours on July 9, 1972, until relieved by the Chief of Police. This center shall coordinate the convention complex security and all field activity within the City of Miami Beach. This C.P. shall be designated C.P. "Beta."

(Unified Operations Plan, written by Deputy Chief Theodore Zanders, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C.)

This structure had the advantage of including all of the major participating agencies and involving them in a manner consistent with their normal responsibilities. With minor modification this structure served as the formal organization of field command responsibility throughout both Conventions.

Command Operations During the National Conventions

During the Democratic National Convention, seven different major command centers were in operation:

(1) The County Manager's Command Post: County Manager Goode, Area Coordinator during the Conventions, established a command center on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd floors of the County Courthouse in downtown Miami. State Coordinator William Reed was headquartered here. Representatives from all participating law enforcement agencies (local, State, and Federal), the National Guard, and the
Army were stationed here. Should convention-related law enforcement problems develop beyond the convention complex area on a massive scale on Miami Beach the County Manager could assume direct control from this command center. This command center was code-named Command Post Alpha.

(2) **The Civil Defense Center: Local Government Command Center:** The Local Government Command Center was activated at the Civil Defense Center (located at S.W. 56 Street and S.W. 87 Avenue in Miami) to provide a coordination center for all of the County's public service departments (excluding strictly law enforcement). Thus, agencies from Budget, Public Safety, Public Works, Fire, Corrections and Rehabilitation, Youth Services, Traffic and Transportation, Parks and Recreation, Public Health, and Civil Defense were represented here. Additionally stationed here were personnel from Jackson Memorial Hospital and the Red Cross. This center, under the direction of County Budget Director William Hampton, was established to implement public service requirements of the County Manager during the Democratic National Convention.

(3) **DCPSD Command Post:** DCPSD maintained its own command post on the fifth floor in the Communications Room of the DCPSD Headquarters at N.W. 14 Street and N.W. 14 Avenue in Miami. This Command Post functioned under the direction of Chief H. W. Barney, Executive Assistant to DCPSD Director E. Wilson Purdy.

(4) **Convention Center Complex Command Post:** This served as the operational headquarters for Chief Pomerance, Chief of Convention
Site Security. As with the County Manager's Command Post, all participating law enforcement agencies (including the National Guard and the Army) stationed representatives here. This command center, located inside the convention complex in the basement of the Jackie Gleason Auditorium, was code-named Command Post Beta.

(5) **Intelligence Center Command Post:** This center was located in the basement of the Jackie Gleason Auditorium adjacent to C.P. Beta and its Communication Center. Stations were provided here for the intelligence units of the DCPSD, MBPD, and MPD, as well as the FDLE, the FHP, the FBI and the USSS. National Guard and Justice Department Liaisons were assigned here.

(6) **Florida National Guard Command Post**

(7) **U. S. Army Command Post**

In addition to having communications equipment permitting Liaisons to communicate with their represented agencies and permitting commanders to issue field orders, each command center had a situation room with sufficient facilities for monitoring developments in the field and (where necessary) sufficient facilities for command personnel to meet for joint consultation and discussion. While this list notes the combined and major command centers, the list is by no means complete. Even within departments, command posts were established. For instance, the DCPSD Organized Crime Bureau established a command post within its Bureau offices to disseminate intelligence information to other County command posts and to gather information related to the Democratic National Convention coming from DCPSD District stations.
The following comments from the Democratic National Convention After-
Action Report of Lt. John Konstanturos (consultant to Chief Pomerance on loan from the Los Angeles Police Department) give an indication of how the command centers functioned during the Democratic National Convention:

The problem of compartmentalization of activities within the agencies involved was particularly evident in the number of command posts which existed throughout Dade County. Adding to the obvious problem of considerable duplication of effort, were several not so transparent problems such as:

* Compounding the demands for information, and by creating this "busy work", placing unreasonable burdens on people in key assignments -- burdens which would in a more active field situation, impair their effectiveness.

* Multiplying the chances of error by weakening the unity of command and control.

* Enhancing the possibility of quickly spreading rumors, or incomplete information.

* Wasting manpower.

Ideally, there should have been only two command posts actually operational for convention related duties -- the Miami Beach Command Post, and the Area Command Post. The National Guard and Federal Military Command Posts might also have been better served if they were collocated with the Area Command Post. However, they would still require separate rooms.

And from the same document:

During the first two days of the Convention (DNC), command post systems (at the Miami Beach Command Post) were not well organized and coordinated, to the extent necessary services could not be adequately provided to tactical commanders. Information flow to and from tactical commanders and the Area Command Post was unreliable and cumbersome, and there were several duplications of functions. However, by the end of the second day, and throughout the remainder of the Democratic Convention, several of these deficiencies were corrected to varying degrees of effectiveness.
The command structure of the Miami Beach Command Post in the basement of Jackie Gleason Auditorium (Command Post Beta) was tightened to provide more coordination of effort. An Executive Officer was appointed under the direction of the Field Commander (Chief Pomerance) to coordinate all functions within C.P. Beta, thus relieving the Field Commander of the technical aspects of the command post operations. The Executive Officer was also responsible for liaison with other law enforcement agencies including the National Guard and the Army. An Operations Officer was assigned to coordinate the functions of the C.P. Beta situation room. He was responsible for coordinating all available intelligence information and police tactical responses, maintaining a current situation map. Also appointed were a Logistics Officer to coordinate fulfilling requests for police equipment and supplies as well as the use of police transportation, a Personnel Officer responsible for maintaining an accounting of all personnel assigned to the jurisdiction of the Field Commander, an Intelligence Officer to coordinate the intelligence section of the C.P. Beta, an Area C.P. Situation Report Officer assigned to disseminate information processed through the C.P. Beta situation room to the Area C.P. and accordingly to the National Guard and Army Command Posts.

As much as possible, the same basic personnel were retained in all command post operations during both conventions. During the first few days of the Democratic National Convention, it became clear that operational difficulties needed to be worked out during operational functioning. Not all problems could be anticipated in advance. Formal structures needed to
One of the primary factors contributing to difficulties was the tendency for involved agencies to operate separately, rather than as a single functional unit. Some of the participating agencies used their respective Hudson offices in the command post as their own command post rather than relying on the Miami Beach Command Post. (Memo from Lieutenant J. G. Konstanturos to County Manager Goode, dated July 27, 1972, subject: "After-Action Comments re Public Safety Aspect of Democratic National Convention.")

As a result of the command post experience during the Democratic National Convention, several modifications occurred in the County command post structure for the Republican National Convention. The Civil Defense Center Local Government Command Post was organizationally and functionally merged with the County Manager's Command Post at the County Courthouse. On the 21st floor was located both the County Manager's Command Post and a logistics office. The logistics operation was under the direction of William Hampton, County Budget Director, and concerned itself with support services (medical, sanitation, public works, etc.) regarding dissident activities. The 20th floor became the Area Command Post staffed with representatives of all involved security agencies. Major Richard Shelton of the DCPSD was appointed to serve on the 20th floor with County Manager Goode and to function as the Manager's Chief of Operations for security activities. John van Wezel and others named by the Manager as needed were appointed to work with Major Shelton to remain updated regarding all law enforcement activities, and to consolidate all intelligence information for the benefit of County Manager Goode. The Civil Defense Center was to be maintained in readiness and manned by the Civil Defense staff so that it could function as a command post in the event of a major civil disorder or a natural disaster.
be supplemented with informal arrangements generated by the personalities involved and with workable as opposed to rigidly pre-conceived methods of operation. Conceivably, if a given command post or a set of command posts were to be in operation for a considerable length of time, a standard operating procedure yielding efficient performance of assignments could develop and persist.

However, the complexity of the command structure persisted throughout both Conventions. With time and the experience of two operations, the efficiency of command post operations increased. Still, there was considerable duplication of effort and simultaneous multiple monitoring of all situations.

Despite the elaborate command structure, command personnel attempted as much as possible to direct tactical responses from the field. It was not unusual to see Chief Pomerance, Director Purdy, or another high level command officer at the site of a demonstration. Ultimately, the direct on-the-scene command proved most effective. When command had to be issued from the isolation of a command center, final tactical decision-making always resolved upon whoever was in command in the field. As police response became more desperate, less centralized, so too command "collapsed" to lower levels, finally ending in extreme situations to the initiative of the individual officer himself. However, throughout both Conventions, the majority of police response situations were sufficiently central to permit top commanders to be in the field to direct tactical responses.

While the situation never deteriorated to the point of worst fears (e.g., simultaneous protest violence on Miami Beach and civil disturbance on the Mainland), it is conceivable that such extreme contingencies would have-
put severe strains on the order of this command structure. Conflicting information, conflicting issuance of orders and demands for personnel, in short, mass confusion could easily have pervaded one if not all of the command centers. While coordination ultimately might have occurred with the C.P. Alpha taking responsibility for the disturbances on the Mainland and C.P. Beta taking responsibility for the disturbances on the Beach, the early hours of establishing this coordination might well have been problematic. Even if some coordination under extreme contingencies had developed, conceivably C.P. Alpha and C.P. Beta could have competed rather than cooperated regarding available law enforcement resources, each believing its needs the most extreme. In situations where a singular unified command structure is not established, the jurisdictional pressures reflected in multiple loci of command may yield confusion and paralyzed or contradictory action under extreme demands for response. However, to have established such a command structure here would have entailed ignoring constitutional and traditional operating procedures among the law enforcement agencies involved as well as disregarding the autonomy of command each agencies command personnel sought over their own forces.

Various aspects related to the command post operations will be presented in the next chapters when discussing the development of the unified command plan, the law enforcement manpower utilization, and the communications and intelligence structure.
The Aftermath

Despite all of the efforts which went into the creation of a command structure, not everyone was satisfied with the results. After the Democratic Convention, for example, Miami Beach officials were still concerned about the status of the planning team, the lack of a truly integrated response plan, and the number of law enforcement officers available for the Republican Convention. Consider the following comments:

As noted on the face sheet of the Unified Operations Plan, only one section of the plan was completed. This section simply depicted manpower allocation and established areas of responsibility. The development of a full plan was inhibited by a time factor directly related to the decision making process. Even though a planning team was established, there was insufficient delegation of authority to its members to resolve points at issue. This planning team merely represented a courier service for persons in positions of responsibility, rather than a viable group endowed with self determination. (Miami Beach Police Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report.)

Based on the above, we again recommend that a complete unified operations plan be formulated for the upcoming Convention. To facilitate the writing of this plan, it is imperative that each agency involved with convention security designate a representative to be assigned to an inter-agency planning staff. Each representative should have the authority delegated to him by his agency to make planning decisions, and thus fully represent his agency in all matters concerning convention security. (Miami Beach Police Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report.)

As we have repeatedly stated, a fifteen hundred (1,500) to two thousand man task force would be the most basic type of force needed to handle initial crowd management problems stemming from a large contingent of non-delegate demonstrators. Having been unsuccessful in drawing a force of this size together in the past, it is our recommendation that the majority of the State Highway Patrol be committed to bolster the present task force that was used for the Democratic Convention. (Miami Beach Police Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report.)
Unfortunately none of the material that has been made available to us -- including the Miami Beach Police Department After-Action Report for the Republican Convention -- provides any insight as to how Miami Beach officials evaluated the entire planning process, particularly regarding their assessment of the role played by State officials.*

In contrast to Miami Beach Police Department officials, Public Safety Department personnel were quite specific in their criticism of the planning process:

Another consideration which significantly affected the proper and complete execution and implementation of this Unified Operations Plan was the lack of direction and timeliness of the decision making process on the part of the individuals and organizations directly involved in the management of this plan. From the very beginning of the planning process, beginning February 17, 1972, it had been extremely difficult to obtain definitive and specific decisions in response to requests. Vagueness and uncertainty prevailed. This unwillingness to exercise command, control and coordination responsibility resulted in continuous fluctuations in plans and decisions which created and perpetuated an almost constant state of confusion and uncertainty.** (Dade County Public Safety Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report, "Evaluation and Analysis").

As the following comments indicate, Public Safety Department officers were also highly critical of the role played by State officials -- especially the Florida Department of Law Enforcement:

*Officials from most other law enforcement agencies also seemed reluctant to make any serious criticisms of their colleagues either in after-action reports or in private interviews with the authors.

**This statement includes a bitterness aimed at the process of developing a tactical law enforcement plan and the attempts to obtain funding as well as at the development of the command structure. The following chapters discuss these additional areas of concern.
It is not to belabor the subject to state that different members of the Public Safety Department have attended innumerable meetings during the past four months relative all aspects of convention planning. Our individual and collective recollections, as well as a review of our files, fail to reveal any assignment being given, or even discussed, with the exception of a statement made by Florida Law Enforcement Bureau Commissioner William Reed on June 22, 1972, to Public Safety Department Planning and Research Supervisor Howard Rasmussen, to the effect that proposed LEAA grant requests would not be acceptable unless accompanied by a comprehensive police operational response plan. Allegedly, this nebulously identified plan had been requested at some prior, but not identified, date. Without any additional guidance, information or explanation, it is obvious that it would be impossible for the Public Safety Department Personnel to initiate a multi-agency, locally integrated law enforcement comprehensive operational plan. (Memo from Walter J. Lougheed, Chief, DCPSD Police Division, to Director Purdy, July 3, 1972, subject: "Convention Operational Plan").

Accepting the fact that a multitude of plans, counter-plans, re-plans, and updated plans have been proposed, discussed, evaluated, revised, discarded, re-submitted and re-evaluated with a minimum of positive action thus far, it may be that somewhere in this maze of verbiage the concept of inter-agency police operational plan was proposed or discussed by someone, somewhere, at some time. If this is so, then those who proposed it should be able to submit the necessary documentation and thus prevent continued confusion and abrasive misunderstanding about areas of responsibility and lack of cooperation. If, in fact, no such plan was ever realistically and competently proposed, discussed and responsibility for preparation assigned, then it should be so admitted and cease to be a topic of needless reference. (Memo from Walter J. Lougheed, Chief, DCPSD Police Division, to Director Purdy, July 3, 1972, subject: "Convention Operational Plan").

The first draft of the Unified Operations Plan was received by the Public Safety Department on Saturday, July 1, 1972, one week prior to the convention. This caused serious problems for the Public Safety Department in order for it to properly train, orient, implement and execute as smoothly and expeditiously as possible this major modification of the original plans which had been developed over a period of several months. The suddenness of this new plan forced the department to develop a crash training program and orientation program and thus a significant amount of money was spent by the county in overtime in order to implement this plan in the short period of time that was available. In order
to accomplish such a rapid implementation, the department was subjected to an almost monumental task. (Dade County Public Safety Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report, "Evaluation and Analysis," pp. 8-9.)

The final point that needs to be made in terms of complete evaluation and analysis of the Unified Operations Plan is that this plan was forcefully imposed upon local law enforcement officials without representation or participation in the planning process. Combining this "clubbing" approach with the vacuum in the decision-making process created a situation where law enforcement in Southern Florida was forced to acquiesce. A better approach would have been the formulation of a group planning unit comprised of representatives of each of the affected law enforcement agencies who, under proper guidelines, could as a team, develop a more responsive, comprehensive plan for the policing of this area during the conventions. (Dade County Public Safety Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report, "Evaluation and Analysis," p. 9.)

Pre-convention planning was progressing in a reasonably satisfactory manner with local agencies participating and cooperating at an acceptable level. Each agency understood its role and responsibility and final plans were well underway. At this point, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and other out-of-state advisors arrived and involved themselves in the planning, revising, redoing, etc., and confusion reigned. (Dade County Public Safety Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report, "Evaluation and Analysis," p. 10.)

Tremendous difficulties were encountered in this department's relationship with Washington level LEAA officials in the Federal funding grant application process. Another problem was encountered in obtaining responsive answers and decisions from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement upon the advent of their insertion in the LEAA grant decision-making procedure. There were so many people involved and so many agencies involved in the funding activities that again confusion and uncertainty was the rule rather than the exception. (Dade County Public Safety Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report, "Evaluation and Analysis," pp. 10-11.)

It is recommended that, in the future, should federal and state agencies intend to intervene in the planning process they should do so sufficiently ahead of time to allow full participation and involvement of officials of all local law enforcement agencies and also to allow adequate time for proper preparation and implementation. (Dade County Public Safety Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report, "Evaluation and Analysis," p. 11.)
It is obvious that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement are not qualified, based upon training and experience, to plan and administer local law enforcement responses to this or similar events. Their role should be the provision of assistance in their respective areas of responsibility and in the future they should not impose themselves or their opinions into areas where they lack appropriate and adequate expertise. (Dade County Public Safety Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report, "Evaluation and Analysis," p. 11.)

And they were also quite clear as to how they thought the entire problem should have been handled.

The relationships between the law enforcement agencies and Dade County, both in the planning process and also in the implementation stages, would have been less confused and better coordinated had the Executive Order from the Governor allowed the area commander to designate a law enforcement commander to assume command, control and coordination responsibilities of all law enforcement personnel in Dade County. Anytime personnel must be responsive to three law enforcement executives some interrelationship difficulties are bound to occur. A more unified command and organizational structure could have alleviated these interrelationship and interjurisdictional problems. (Dade County Public Safety Department, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report, "Evaluation and Analysis," p. 11.)

Thus in the end we have returned to the beginning and the issue of who would command. If the Governor had assigned total law enforcement command to Director Purdy, another set of problems would have arisen concerning Chief Pomerance's lack of direct authority over MBPD and supplementary security forces at the convention complex. It is difficult to imagine Chief Pomerance in such circumstances accepting a subordinate command role. Clearly the DCPSD did not accept the situation when Chief Pomerance had been assigned sole law enforcement command. Given the constitutional
interrelationships existing between the DCPSD, the MBPD, and the MPD, the
law enforcement command structure which the Governor finally established
seems most practical despite the fact there never was the simplicity in
planning and implementation which may result from singular command
responsibility.
Chapter 6

The Federal Role

As indicated in the previous chapter, numerous Federal agencies also were involved with the 1972 political Conventions in Miami Beach. For our purposes the most important of these agencies were those whose activities were closely related to law enforcement problems such as the U.S. Secret Service, the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Army Directorate of Military Support, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The purpose of this chapter is to identify these agencies and to provide the reader with some description of how and why they became involved with the Conventions.

In section one, we have focused attention on the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's (LEAA) funding of convention-related activities -- particularly the problems of developing a comprehensive grant program and an analysis of how the money was spent. In the second section we have focused attention on the normal law enforcement activities of Federal agencies and on the activities of the U.S. Departments of Justice and Defense under the provisions of the "Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances."

The reader will note that we have devoted most of the second section to a summary of the Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil
Disturbances, the procedures required to involve Federal military forces in state or local law enforcement operations, and the Defense Department's capability for responding to such requests. Given the facts that serious disturbances did not breakout and the Federal troops were not employed during the Conventions, our coverage of this material may seem excessive at first glance. We have chosen to include this material because the potential involvement of Federal troops did influence events in Miami Beach in three ways. First, we believe that the potential availability of unlimited support helped to convince state and local officials that their forces would not be overwhelmed if trouble did breakout and thereby increased their willingness to negotiate with and accommodate non-delegates whenever possible. Second, it appears that the reality of being so totally out-numbered may have convinced at least some non-delegates that disruptive and/or violent activities would be almost physically impossible as well as politically inappropriate. Third, and perhaps most important, the general lack of knowledge (even among civil authorities) concerning the potential involvement of Federal troops added to both the confusion and mistrust that often existed in Miami Beach. Given the need for clarity during conditions such as existed in Miami Beach, we believe it is important to improve generally understanding of the Federal military role during such events.
LEAA Funding

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was established by Congress under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351) to initiate the first comprehensive national attack on crime in the country's history. Under this law, LEAA was assigned the responsibility to reduce crime and delinquency by providing massive federal funding to state and local governments for crime prevention and crime reduction programs. A detailed description of LEAA -- its responsibilities, organizational structure, and program activities -- is publicly available in its most recent annual report. In this Chapter we have only attempted to provide the reader with a brief overview of LEAA and its activities.

In practice, LEAA operates by providing block grants to State Planning Agencies (SPA) in 55 jurisdictions -- the 50 states, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Grants are given to an SPA only after LEAA has received and approved a comprehensive plan for the reduction of crime.* In turn, the SPA allocates funds to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies within the jurisdiction for projects consistent with the overall objectives of its comprehensive plan.

*The Federal Government through LEAA provides 75 percent of the cost of most action programs and the states generally provide 25 percent on a cost sharing basis.
In fiscal year 1971, LEAA allocated almost $343,000,000 to state planning agencies. Table 1 shows a breakdown of the over $11,000,000 received by the State Planning Agency for Florida, the Governor’s Council on Criminal Justice, during this period.

In addition to the block grant program, LEAA was authorized to award up to 15 percent of its total action funds at its own discretion for programs in which it is particularly interested. During fiscal year 1971, LEAA awarded $70,000,000 in discretionary grants. Even under this program, however, all grant applications must first be processed through the appropriate state planning agency. However, LEAA always retains the authority to make final decision on such applications. Thus, LEAA remains in a position to overrule a state planning agency and to make awards directly to what it believes are qualified applicants.

Although the central purpose of LEAA is to provide Federal funds to state and local units of government, it also provides technical assistance and support services. As a result, advisory personnel are available to assist criminal justice agencies in the development of new programs and techniques for dealing with their problems. LEAA also encourages criminal justice practitioners to pursue higher education through their Law Enforcement Education Program and helps improve professional competence through both sponsoring national conferences and supporting training programs such as the Senior Officers Civil Disturbance Orientation Course (SEADOC) taught by the U.S. Army at Fort Gordon, Georgia.
TABLE 1

LEAA Support of Block Grant Programs for Florida and the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Florida</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading personnel</td>
<td>$1,351,907</td>
<td>$34,010,483</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevention of crime</td>
<td>108,019</td>
<td>21,649,430</td>
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<td>Juvenile delinquency</td>
<td>1,366,113</td>
<td>44,504,862</td>
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<td>Detection and apprehension of</td>
<td>4,217,435</td>
<td>76,905,328</td>
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<tr>
<td>criminals</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prosecution, court and law</td>
<td>770,528</td>
<td>31,098,129</td>
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<tr>
<td>reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correction and rehabilitation</td>
<td>1,560,987</td>
<td>46,192,867</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organized crime</td>
<td>387,590</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community relations</td>
<td>17,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riots and civil disorders</td>
<td>264,000</td>
<td>6,895,543</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>748,983</td>
<td>31,064,814</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research and development</td>
<td>372,938</td>
<td>20,672,619</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning funds</td>
<td>773,000</td>
<td>26,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SPA Allocations</td>
<td>11,166,000</td>
<td>342,458,000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Allocation of funds by program categories and by state, LEAA 3rd Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1971, Table 1, 267-268.
For the Summer of '72, Who Gets the Money?

The first official involvement that LEAA had with the 1972 political Conventions was initiated on April 5, 1971, when the City of Miami Beach submitted an application for a grant of $334,525 to support their "National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services Project". Before the Conventions were over, however, LEAA had become deeply involved with various Florida law enforcement agencies and had approved grants totaling more than $3,200,000. The original Miami Beach grant application was submitted directly to the LEAA office in Washington, D.C., as a discretionary grant meeting the requirements of a "riot control and disorders program" as described in the 1971 LEAA Guide for Discretionary Grant Programs.*

On May 4, 1971, LEAA informed Chief Pomerance that it had not approved this application because:

*Until 1971, applications for discretionary grants were administered directly out of Washington. In 1970, the procedures were changed so that all applications had to be submitted to and confirmed by the state planning agency although LEAA retained the right to make a final decision. These changes were made as part of an effort to improve the character and quality of the comprehensive planning being carried out by state planning agencies.
the city of Miami Beach had not actually been selected as a
convention site;

the application had not been certified by the state planning
agency -- Governor's Council on Criminal Justice;

because a proposal to train police officers in how to handle
political conventions did not appear to meet the discretionary
grant program objective of offering supplemental support for
projects directly addressed to the law enforcement and criminal
justice needs of large cities.

Even though the original Miami Beach proposal had been rejected,
the issue of financial support to a city hosting a political convention
had been raised and LEAA officials were aware that the issue could no
longer be ignored. Moreover, they were aware that if funds were made
available to Miami Beach (the likely site of the Democratic Convention)
they would also have to be given to San Diego (the likely site for the
Republican Convention). Thus, by the middle of June, LEAA officials
assured representatives of the Governor's Council that money would be
provided to assist convention cities and that all arrangements would
proceed through the normal channels of discretionary granting.

On July 7, Chief Pomerance wrote to the Governor's Council
requesting that the convention project application be reactivated. The
next day, he wrote directly to LEAA officials in Washington to inform
them of changes in the status of his grant application. Specifically, he pointed out that:
Miami Beach had now been selected as the host city for the Democratic Convention;

he had asked the Governor's Council to reactivate the proposal and that he was certain that certification would be forthcoming;

in a period of great social unrest such as presently existed, he was certain that his efforts to provide the protection of maximum law enforcement while maintaining the rights of political dissidents must meet the criteria for financial support by LEAA.

In response to Chief Pomerance's letter, representatives of the Governor's Council contacted the regional LEAA office in Atlanta and were authorized by that office to negotiate the Miami Beach grant request down to the $100,000 limit of the program under which the application had been submitted. On July 13, Governor's Council representatives met with Chief Pomerance and his staff to discuss the status of his grant application. During this meeting Chief Pomerance made it clear that the $100,000 limit was unacceptable to him and that he would directly contact Federal officials to seek an exemption to this restriction. In accordance with his position, Chief Pomerance submitted a revised proposal for $283,688 directly to Washington on August 3, 1971.

During this same meeting, the representatives of the Governor's Council expressed concern over what they felt to be the limited involvement of the Dade County Public Safety Department (DCPSD) and the City of Miami Police Department (MPD) in the planning efforts and the
failure to request funds to pay officers from these departments.* Chief Pomerance assured them that a greater participation of these departments in the planning process was unnecessary because they would have a minimal involvement in the actual law enforcement process at the Convention. Chief Pomerance also pointed out that it would not be necessary to provide overtime pay to officers from other departments because of a traditional arrangement under which each department could send without cost their officers to a training program developed by another department but each department had to assume all financial responsibilities such as overtime for their officers participating in the program.

Back in Washington, LEAA officials had become increasingly sensitive to the problems of funding convention-related law enforcement activities. Because of these concerns, Washington officials decided to exercise greater direct control over the funding process and the regional offices were notified that all negotiations for Convention grants would be conducted in Washington. Immediate responsibility for these negotiations was assigned to LEAA Associate Administrator, Clarence St...

*Similar concerns about the Miami Beach proposal submitted on 8/3/71 were ultimately expressed to Washington by members of the LEAA regional office in Atlanta even though they considered the proposal to be well prepared and Chief Pomerance and his staff most competent.
Coster.* In accordance with his new responsibilities, Mr. Coster wrote to the principal law enforcement officials in the San Diego and Miami areas requesting a meeting to provide cross-information to all jurisdictions facing this "encounter" and to discuss the involvement of LEAA in support of related law enforcement efforts.

On September 10, 1971, Mr. Coster met with Chief Pomerance (MBPD), Chief Garmire (MPD) and Director Purdy (DCPSD) from the Miami area and law enforcement officials from California -- San Diego Police Chief Hoobler, San Diego County Sheriff Duffy, and California Highway Patrol Commissioner Sullivan. During this meeting, participating officials were informed that LEAA had set aside one million dollars to be split evenly between Miami and San Diego area agencies for convention-related projects. They were also advised that LEAA would fund only agencies in convention cities; however, all proposals were to be based on a joint planning effort and were to reflect the needs of all agencies likely to be involved with convention-related law enforcement activities. It was agreed at this meeting that the current Miami Beach proposal did not adequately include provisions for the City of Miami Police Department and the Dade County Public Safety Department.

*The original legislation establishing LEAA stipulated the Administration would consist of one administrator and two associate administrators and that it would be the duty of all three administrators to exercise all of the functions, powers, and duties of LEAA. Thus Mr. Coster's involvement meant that the highest level of LEAA officials had assumed directly responsibility for Convention funding.
Five days later, on September 15, Chief Pomerance phoned Mr. Coster to inform him that a revised proposal which would include the needs of other cooperating agencies was being prepared. Based on this information, Mr. Coster recommended that processing of the Miami Beach application be suspended until the revision was received. On October 8, Miami Beach officials submitted a revised proposal to LEAA for $395,424. This proposal requested over $84,000 to compensate 200 off-duty Miami Beach police officers for attending training sessions but provided no compensation for the 100 officers from other agencies expected to attend the training sessions. Nevertheless, this proposal was approved on November 8 as discretionary grant 71-DF-1098.*

The decision by LEAA to make host cities the subgrantee for any convention-related funds provided applications reflected a joint planning effort was apparently motivated by many objectives including the desire to:

- discourage unnecessary applications from every law enforcement agency that might be influenced by the Conventions;
- provide a comprehensive plan for convention security but one that would be coordinated and controlled at the local level;
- avoid becoming involved in the intramural politics of state and local governmental units.

*It should be noted that the decision to centralize control of convention grants in Washington apparently resulted in serious communication problems both within LEAA and between the various agencies involved. For example, none of the other agencies -- the City of Miami Police Department, the Dade County Public Safety Department, the Governor's Council, or the Atlanta office of LEAA -- knew about the October 8th application by Miami Beach until it was on the verge of approval in Washington.
back-up in case civilian resources were exhausted. The military also loaned the Secret Service supplies and equipment that ranged from beach umbrellas to tear gas grenades and provided them with the services of thirteen helicopters.

In view of all the scandals that have developed in connection with the Federal government, the Watergate break-in, and the 1972 political campaigns, we feel compelled to say a few words about the activities of the Justice and Defense Departments under the provisions of the Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances. To the best of our knowledge, the individuals directly in charge of these operations (Assistant Attorney General Harlington Wood and Major General Rowland Gleszer) consistently re-enforced a moderating influence on local officials. Mr. Wood continually encouraged local officials to negotiate with non-delegate leaders and to assist non-delegates in any way possible as long as their activities remained within the law.* In turn, General Gleszer made it clear to local officials that the military would come to their aid if necessary, but that the military expected all reasonable efforts -- including negotiations -- to be taken.

*Since the Conventions, Mr. Wood was deeply involved in the negotiations between the Federal Government and members of the American Indian Movement at Wounded Knee, South Dakota.
to avoid such a necessity. Thus, while providing local officials with the assurance of overwhelming support, General Gleszer also discouraged them from taking any actions that would require the utilization of that support.
APPENDIX to Chapter 6

1. Grant No.: 71-DF-1098

Title: National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services Project

Implementing Subgrantee: Miami Beach Police Department

Date of Award: 11/8/71

Amount of Award: $395,424

Project Summary: The purpose of this proposal is to train and equip law enforcement officers in the handling of a National Political Convention.

This project will research and document requirements for law enforcement services during National Political conventions. It will concern itself with the recognition, evaluation and control of individuals and groups who pose a threat to the orderly conduct of convention proceedings, the general welfare of the community and the personal safety of delegates and candidates.

Key personnel and operational procedures of agencies providing services during prior political conventions will be consulted. Innovative techniques in conflict management developed by police departments will be analyzed.

Emphasis will also be given to evaluation and acquisition of on-site communications, non-lethal control systems, surveillance and identification procedures, and equipment.

Following the research and documentation set forth above, in-depth training curricula will be developed and implemented to upgrade the abilities of all local law enforcement personnel who will participate in providing convention security. Equipment which has been acquired will be introduced into local operational convention procedures, in accordance with the most effective and promising methodology developed by our research.
The final phase of this project will document and review all preceding stages, up to and including law enforcement services performed during the 1972 National Political Convention. Dissemination of the documents generated, will be made in accordance with LEAA recommendation.

2. Grant No: 72-DF-0011

Title: Miami Police - Disorder Response Project

Implementing Subgrantee: Miami Police Department

Date of Award: 8/14/72

Amount of Award: $84,559

Project Summary: A number of unfortunate conditions exist or are developing which, in combination, predisposes the City of Miami to the possibility of major civil disorder during July 1972. Briefly, these conditions include: (1) A neighboring city, Miami Beach, is hosting the Democratic Political Convention, (2) This convention is attracting thousands of dissenting groups, some with peaceful past performance history but many groups have a history of past violent behavior. We must, from this, predict future violent behavior, (3) This is the core city of a metropolitan area with our own blighted area, discontented minority groups and the worst history for violent crime in the U. S., (4) A huge security force at the convention site will preclude violent dissent there, so history may well normally repeat itself and the violent factions will come to Miami to dissent, (5) Due to our need to control violent crime and improve relations with our minority groups, training has been focused upon these objectives. We are just beginning to see beneficial results in actual improvement of crime conditions, and now we are faced with a crisis for which we have not had the time or resources to prepare, and (6) Miami Police have not had training in psychological response, unarmed response or non-deadly weapons response to mass violence. This project consists of an emergency crash program to provide the training necessary to prevent or control major conflagration in Miami in July 1972.
3. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0015

Title: State Law Enforcement Officers' Training in Preparation for Security and Control at 1972 National Political Conventions

Implementing Subgrantee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Date of Award: 8/14/72

Amount of Award: $30,039

Project Summary: The State of Florida is facing a unique challenge during the summer of 1972 as host State to the National Conventions of both the Democrat and Republican Parties. Past experience in Dade County and in other jurisdictions throughout Florida and other states dictates the need for well-trained, professional and disciplined law enforcement officers to effectively handle situations that may occur due to crowd or mob behavior.

It is the purpose of this grant to provide all state law enforcement officers, assigned to the conventions, with proper training to provide security, prevent riotous conditions, and if need be to effectively handle any problem whether man-made or natural.

Personnel from five different State agencies will be trained prior to assignment in Dade County. Officers will be housed in Tallahassee and receive their training from Federal, State and County officers.

4. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0021

Title: Governor's Task Force to Evaluate Public Safety and Related Support Services at the 1972 National Political Convention

Implementing Subgrantee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Date of Award: 8/12/72

Amount of Award: $46,259

Project Summary: This application proposes the establishment of an independent task force, to be appointed by the Governor, which will evaluate the public health and safety programs at the national conventions and advise the Governor and the State Public Safety Coordinator. Of primary concern is the public safety.
The Task Force will evaluate public safety planning and programs of responsible local, state and where appropriate, Federal participation and assistance, during the convention periods. An assessment of public safety accomplishments during the first convention will be completed in the interim period, along with recommendations for improved operations during the second convention. After the completion of both conventions, a full assessment and evaluation of activities which occurred relating to the public health and safety will be completed. Task Force findings will be made available to the Governor and the State Public Safety Coordinator. Additionally, all findings, conclusions and recommendations will be made available to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, for analysis dissemination to other Federal, state and local agencies which might be faced with similar public health and safety missions and problems.

5. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0022

Title: Florida Department of Law Enforcement Radio Communications Conversion (conventions)

Implementing Subgrantee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Date of Award: 5/26/72

Amount of Award: $50,385

Project Summary: The purpose of this project is to provide Ultra High Frequency (UHF) capabilities for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement's assigned responsibilities for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions to be held in Miami Beach, Florida.

FDLE has been directed by the Governor of Florida to participate in providing security for the Presidential candidates at the Democratic and Republican Conventions, and also public safety and welfare of the surrounding area. This security is supplemented by intelligence gathering capabilities to provide adequate protection. This security effort will be integrated into special teams which will have Agents from the United States Secret Service assigned. An Intelligence Command Center is being created with the Department being the coordinator for all intelligence information gathered by municipal, county, state and federal law enforcement agencies.
By utilizing the current UHF capabilities of this Department, security of radio is improved considerably when considered in the light of highly sensitive, confidential communications to be made.

Due to the multi-frequency capabilities offered by this communications equipment, the primary objective that is critical for the success of this operation must be that adequate communications be available in the light of life and death situations occurring. The use of the Ultra High Frequencies assigned to this Department will allow for such coverage.

6. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0023

Title: Dade County National Convention Services Project

Implementing Subgrantee: Dade County Public Safety Department

Date of Award: 8/14/72

Amount of Award: $1,258,502

Project Summary: This project envisions the overall increase of the capabilities of various law enforcement and related criminal justice agencies in preventing and controlling riots and civil disorders. The project will encompass the following:

1. The provision of overtime compensation for Criminal Justice System personnel involved in convention related activities.

2. The conduct of a five faceted training program including tactical training - crowd control, defensive operations tactics training, mass arrest procedures, prisoner identification training, and prisoner information center training.

3. The provision of overtime compensation for replacement of those criminal justice personnel who will be involved in the training programs.

4. The purchase and use of critically needed equipment for communications and identification and processing.

With Dade County having been selected as host for the Democratic and Republican Conventions, certain conditions have developed which will require (and have required during the Democratic Convention) that both the City of Miami Police Department and the Dade County Public Safety Department utilize police
personnel and support personnel far beyond levels of normal usage. Though Public Safety Department's original grant, P717, reflected a decision by City and County officials not to pay captains, lieutenants and civilians overtime, concerned officials have recently recinded this policy in favor of a decision to pay police and related personnel overtime regardless of job classification. This decision was based on the City and County's desire to be fair and just. If patrolmen and sergeants are compensated for time spent on convention related activities in excess of forty hours per week, is it then realistic not to recompense captains, lieutenants and civilians for similar expenditures of time and effort? Since the cost of this overtime would not be accrued by either the City or County were it not for the National Political Conventions being held in Dade County, it would seem appropriate at this time to request that Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, as a federally financed agency, accept the responsibility for this additional cost.

7. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0024

Title: Overtime Compensation and Subsistence for State Law Enforcement Personnel During the 1972 Democratic and Republican Conventions

Implementing Subgrantee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Date of Award: 8/16/72

Amount of Award: $646,412

Project Summary: During the summer of 1972, law enforcement personnel in Florida faced with a unique and demanding challenge, both the Democratic and Republican National Political Conventions will be held in Miami Beach, Florida, within a two-month period. In addition to the normal law enforcement problems associated with a large gathering of people, all advance signs indicate that this particular convention period will be one filled with demonstrations, unruly crowds, marches, parades, assemblies and threats of violence, any one of which could result in actual violence, bombing, shooting, rioting, arson, assaults, looting and general civil disorder.

Past experience has proven that underestimation of potential civil disorders, mishandling of large demonstrations, incapacity to adequately handle demonstrations and disorders, lack of planning for civil disorders, lack of trained resources
to combat civil disorders and failure to intelligently analyze and assess potential and actual situations of riot and civil disorder will result in violence, serious injury or death of persons, damage to property, a breakdown of law and order and a general loss of respect for law enforcement, the criminal justice system and governmental authority.

It is the purpose of this grant to provide one major part of the overall law enforcement resources necessary for adequate protection of the public health, welfare and safety during the national convention period. Additional law enforcement manpower must necessarily be mobilized during the convention period. State-level law enforcement/correctional agencies have been called upon to provide a major policing and security force at the convention. Funds are requested to pay for per diem (room and board) and overtime expenses of the state force.

8. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0025

Title: National Conventions Community Services Project

Implementing Subgrantee: Metropolitan Dade County

Date of Award: 8/16/72

Amount of Award: $103,220.

Project Summary: The National Convention Services Project is a coordinated, area-wide effort to preserve peace and order during the National Political Conventions this summer on Miami Beach. Under the sponsorship and direction of the Dade County Manager, this program will center around prevention of disorder by providing the following capabilities: (1) Rumor verification; (2) Information gathering and dispersal; (3) Referral services; (4) Crowd and area monitoring. It is expected that the efficient utilization of these capabilities will contribute significantly to the prevention of the type of disturbances which marred the 1968 conventions.
9. **Grant No.**: 72-DF-99-0026

**Title**: Purchase of Supplies to Control Civil Unrest, Disturbances and Riotous Situations at the 1972 National Political Conventions

**Implementing Subgrantee**: Florida Department of Law Enforcement

**Date of Award**: 8/16/72

**Amount of Award**: $24,786

**Project Summary**: Chemical, riot control agents are required to dispense mobs or crowds and to protect life and property. The present state supply of tear gas is not adequate.

It is the purpose of this grant application to obtain a sufficient supply of non-military riot control agents to effectively handle riotous situations after the present supply of tear gas is exhausted and to arm plain clothes officers with other than deadly weapons.

10. **Grant No.**: 72-DF-99-0027

**Title**: Portable Helmet Radios for Tactical Squad Members

**Implementing Subgrantee**: Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles

**Date of Award**: 8/16/72

**Amount of Award**: $79,795

**Project Summary**: During the Democratic National Convention at Miami Beach on July 10--13, 1972, the Florida Highway Patrol assigned five (5) tactical squads to the detail. This is a total of 250 men. Lack of communication among the squad members was a major problem during this event. An additional 75 men will be assigned to the Republican National Convention.

The Department feels the helmet type portable radio would have been of great benefit to this project. In view of the pending Republican National Convention to be held on Miami Beach during August, this equipment is desperately needed.

All squad members would be equipped with portable receivers and all squad leaders and supervisors with transceivers.
11. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0028

Title: National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services
       Project (71-DF-1098) Supplement

Implementing Subgrantee: Miami Beach Police Department

Date of Award: 8/16/72

Amount of Award: $422,188

Project Summary: This attached supplemental request for 71-DF-1098
is, basically, a result of significant and far reaching
implications brought on by the addition of the second National
Political Convention (Republican) in Miami Beach during the
summer of 1972. The presence of the second convention will
alter significantly such elements as the control and logistical
movement of an increased number of delegates and non-delegates
expected in Miami Beach and contiguous areas, and the expanded
time frames within which police and related services will be
required. This request will expand and complement the designated
intent of the original Discretionary Grant (1098) awarded to
the City of Miami Beach in November of 1971.

Funds requested in the attached proposal will provide for
increased and extended law enforcement coverage and related
services including: (1) Operational Overtime for 304 police
officers and support personnel from the Miami Beach Police
Department; (2) Training Overtime for police officers assigned
to deploy and use specialized equipment, as well as overtime for
classroom training in crowd and/or disorder confrontation and
control; (3) Additional Support Personnel at both the Convention
Planning Office and the Convention Hall; (4) Contractual Services
required to secure and protect the Miami Beach Police Department
Buildings, the booking and processing site, and increased
intelligence operations within the Convention Hall; (5) Equipment,
specifically photographic and identification equipment and
peripheral supplies, as well as needed, additional crowd control
and dispersal equipment; and, (6) Supplies, inclusive of office
materials and increased telephone communications requirements.

Research and documentation of all grant related activities will
be maintained with a continued emphasis on evaluation of all
training techniques, training curricula, operations methodology,
and equipment application.
12. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0029

Title: State Law Enforcement Officers' Training in Preparation for Security and Control at 1972 National Political Conventions (72-DF-99-0015) Supplement

Implementing Subgrantee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Date of Award: 8/17/72

Amount of Award: $5,977

Project Summary: This is a supplement to Federal Grant #73-DF-99-0015 entitled, "State Law Enforcement Officers' Training in Preparation for Security and Control at the 1972 National Political Conventions."

The need for an additional one hundred and twenty State Law enforcement officers to be trained and properly disciplined for convention duties is based on a review of our resources, planning and intelligence information.

The need for a debriefing/briefing session for the command personnel of the participating State agencies is deemed to be necessary based upon a critical analysis of the administrative and operational procedures utilized during the Democratic National Convention.

The need for a debriefing/briefing session for Florida Department of Law Enforcement personnel is also recognized.

13. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0030

Title: Enhancement of Intelligence Assessment Capabilities During the 1972 National Political Conventions

Implementing Subgrantee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Date of Award: 8/17/72

Amount of Award: $99,733

Project Summary: As host state of both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions, the State of Florida is facing a unique challenge during the summer of 1972.
The collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence information relating to possible means and methods of riot, civil disorder, revolution, confrontation with authority, disruption and violent protest is crucial to the maintainence of public safety, health and welfare, and law and order.

It is the purpose of this grant application to provide an intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination process designed to produce information to be utilized for command decisions which will affect all forms of police action at the Conventions.

The Governor of the State of Florida has directed the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to fulfill Florida's commitment to provide adequate law enforcement planning and control necessary for an orderly convention atmosphere.

14. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0031
   Title: Dade County Area Commander Omnibus Grant
   Implementing Subgrantee: Dade County
   Date of Award: 8/17/72
   Amount of Award: $153,943

Project Summary: This project is designed to establish an Area Command Center for Dade County, including the City of Miami, and the City of Miami Beach and surrounding municipalities, to coordinate federal, state and local resources to maintain public safety and welfare and provide related support services as required.

Additional funds are requested to cover unanticipated costs incurred or to be incurred for Convention related projects and activities.
15. Grant No.: 72-DF-99-0032

Title: Emergency Medical Aid During the 1972 National Political Conventions

Implementing Subgrantee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Date of Award: 8/17/72

Amount of Award: $2,112

Project Summary: During the summer of 1972, law enforcement personnel in Florida are faced with a unique and demanding challenge; both the Democratic and Republican National Political Conventions will be held in Miami Beach, Florida, within a two-month period. In addition to the normal law enforcement problems associated with large gatherings of people, all advance signs indicate that this particular confrontation period will be one filled with demonstrations, unruly crowds, marches, parades, assemblies and threats of violence, any one of which could result in actual violence, bombing, shooting, rioting, arson, assaults, looting, and general civil disorder.

The purpose of this project is to provide medical assistance to those state personnel assigned to the National Political Conventions in Miami Beach, Florida. This medical assistance will be provided by Dr. Robert P. Johnson during each week of the National Conventions.

Medical assistance will be provided during the peak hours of conventions activities and Dr. Johnson will be on call 24 hours a day during this time frame. The medical assistance which will be offered is to include such things as stress and strain, minor lacerations and wounds possibly occurring and treatment of common disorders such as colds, fevers, influenza, etc.

This assistance will be rendered at the Convention site and will be directed to assist and aid those state officers and those employees who require medical attention.
CHAPTER 7

Law Enforcement Preparations:

The Development of the Unified Operations Plan

Even before a final decision was made as to a host city, officials of both the Democratic Party and Miami Beach were actively concerned about the problems of security and the potential for violent protest during the Democratic Convention. This concern was real even though both groups agreed that the probability of serious difficulties would be greater in San Diego which was scheduled to host the incumbent Republican Party. Many officials of the Democratic Party were convinced that the violence during their Convention in Chicago had contributed to their loss of the 1968 Presidential Election. As a result, they were intent upon avoiding a similar event in 1972. Miami Beach officials on the other hand were concerned about the safety of their community and their image as an attraction for tourists and conventions. Thus, from the Spring of 1971 forward, various public officials devoted their attention to questions regarding law enforcement during the Convention.

According to officials of the Democratic Party, the primary reasons for selecting Miami Beach as the host city involved financial considerations and the availability of housing. Beyond that, however, they were convinced that the problems of protest and security could be handled better in Miami Beach than anywhere else in the country. What the
Democrats wanted was a situation in which authorities tried to defuse the potential for disturbance rather than let events build up into confrontation situations. They were convinced that Miami Beach Police Chief Rocky Pomerance would take such an approach.*

From the beginning, the Democratic National Committee had articulated three goals regarding security:

1. that the peace and security of the Miami Beach Community would be protected;
2. that the right of the Democratic Party to put on a Convention and be able to hold a Convention in a peaceful way would be protected;
3. that the rights of persons to dissent in a peaceful way would be protected.

**Early Preparations — Effective and Humane Policing**

The earliest activities we have discovered of law enforcement officials in connection with the Democratic Convention were the efforts by Miami Beach Police Chief Rocky Pomerance to achieve what he came to call the effective and humane policing of a convention. As early as July 8, 1971, Chief Pomerance indicated his concerns about the possibility for problems at the Convention and his commitment to these goals in a letter to LEAA officials:

*Chief Pomerance's approach was known because he had made a presentation before the Site Selection Committee along with other Miami Beach officials.*
Law enforcement needs have never been greater than during the contemporary period and I firmly believe that the governmental limitations of our American Democracy will be taxed to their greatest capabilities during this historic convention when the eyes and ears of the world are on Miami Beach.

In the proposed grant I am sure you know that we have delineated our primary needs as being in the areas of upgraded information resources, sophisticated skills, and advanced education rather than tanks and fire power equipment.

I look forward to the cooperation of your agency in our mutual efforts to achieve maximum law enforcement while maintaining recognition for the rights of dissenting groups.

The ongoing commitment of Miami Beach officials to these goals is supported by the character of their original LEAA grant (71-DF-1098). The proposal for this grant describes its purpose as follows:

Part I  GOALS

The primary goal of this proposal is to enhance local police capabilities in providing effective law enforcement services for, and during National Political Conventions.

Part II  IMPACT AND RESULTS

This project has vital significance in many distinct areas.

The awesome responsibility of law enforcement to uphold the Constitutional Guarantees of freedom of speech and of assembly is never greater than when these fundamental rights are exercised within our political system to select candidates for our highest public office.

Past experience has demonstrated that those Americans who represent our electors, and the host community itself, are most likely to be placed in the shadow of intimidation by the disaffected within our society who would escalate the right of dissent into public disruption.
It is no exaggeration to say that the eyes and ears of the world are focused upon the host community and its highly visible law enforcement resources during this enactment of contemporary history.

It is clear that the highest degree of professional competence and sophistication is most urgently needed to meet so serious a challenge.

Further, it is inescapable that ours is the front-line agency most fundamentally and directly responsible for maintaining the safety of delegates, party officials, candidates for the office of President, and the entire community under conditions which are exceedingly critical and complex.

The impact of our program includes, but also goes far beyond law enforcement. Both positive and negative implications occur.

As an example, should local law enforcement fail to function adequately in this context, it is most probable our system for selecting candidates for our nation's highest office will of necessity be drastically modified.

In a positive sense, of course, we seek to achieve resounding success in providing police services for the convention to the credit of all law enforcement and of our Nation.

Even more convincing than a mere description of project goals, however, is the manner in which Miami Beach officials intended to spend the money they received from the Federal government. Table 1 presents the budget for the original Miami Beach grant (71-DF-1098). An analysis of this grant reveals that Miami Beach officials had definitely rejected the tanks and firepower approach. Just over 45% of this grant ($178,486) was allocated for equipment, but less than 2% of the total ($4,585) was budgeted for what could be called "armory". The overwhelming majority of the equipment allocation was intended to be spent on radio and communications equipment.
Table 1

Budget Breakdown for Miami Beach LEAA Grant 71-DF-1098

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Original Budget</th>
<th>Revised* Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Director (salary)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Director (FICA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,295</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Personnel (training sessions)</td>
<td>84,328</td>
<td>84,328</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Services</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instructors</td>
<td>11,385</td>
<td>11,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance Consultants</td>
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<td>19,539</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transportation Subsistance</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instructors</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>2,325</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance Consultants</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research Team</td>
<td>4,243</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Photographic</td>
<td>3,684</td>
<td>3,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three post mugging camera;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>movie camera, lens, etc.;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polaroid cameras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armory</td>
<td>4,585</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>face shields for helmets;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gas hopper grenades; grenade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>launchers; gas dispensers;</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gas dispenser refills; gas and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smoke generators; metal detection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sweeper; metal detection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friskers; plastic retaining cuffs;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marking pens</td>
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</tr>
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Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Original Budget</th>
<th>Revised Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Night Vision and Optical</td>
<td>19,138</td>
<td>19,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>night viewing devices; TV adaptors; camera adaptors; binocular viewers;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assorted lens; high intensity lights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Finger Print Kit</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gym and Physical Conditioning</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio and Communications</td>
<td>178,486</td>
<td>148,648</td>
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<tr>
<td>portable radio units ($50,700); radio crystals ($6,000); helmet radios</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($7,950); radio paging system ($15,600); mobile command van ($42,300);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radio scrambler system ($22,621); closed circuit TV ($33,315)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minibus</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphic Display Devices</td>
<td>2,725</td>
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E. Supplies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Original Budget</th>
<th>Revised Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office Space</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telephones</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>1,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Equipment</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio-visual</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>1,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classroom Remodeling</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 395,424 395,424

The revised budget was prepared in the late Spring of 1972 in order to provide technical assistance consultants who had previous operational experience with civil disorders. The funds allocated for them had originally been budgeted for helmet radios and a radio scrambler system.
On the positive side, this proposal provided almost $85,000 (22% of the total budget) for the training of Miami Beach police officers in a program designed to promote both the effective and humane policing of the Democratic Convention.* According to the proposal this program was to provide training in:

crowd psychology
intelligence operations
equipment familiarization
management of conflict
personal defense
tactical force training.

The Evolution of the Unified Operations Plan for the Democratic Convention

At the initial February 17 meeting of the Convention Planning Joint Staff Committee,** Chief Pomerance informed the authorities present that he

*More specifics on the training program are discussed in a subsequent chapter on police training.

**This group included representatives of all of the law enforcement agencies expected to participate in the Democratic Convention and was called together by Chief Pomerance to discuss and formulate the law enforcement policy and operational plans for the Convention. During the early months of 1972, the following agencies regularly submitted participants: the Miami Beach Police Department, Miami Police Department, Dade County Public Safety Department, State Attorney's Office, Florida Highway Patrol, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Secret Service.
anticipated the manpower needs for the 1972 Democratic Convention to be double that required for the 1968 Republican Convention. From this rather general feeling of greater urgency due to anticipated dissent and possible other related or simply coincident disturbances, all the specifics of law enforcement policy remained to be developed. What would be the policy regarding law enforcement posture, reaction, use of equipment, etc. during the Convention? What manpower requirements would be allotted to each of the law enforcement agencies? What assignments would each agency's personnel receive? How could a communications network linking participating agencies be established? How could a cooperative intelligence structure and a joint communications system be designed? Would the manpower of all agencies receive similar training? What would this training include?

That Chief Pomerance had called together the participating agencies to discuss and formulate law enforcement policy indicated a desire to see unified planning emerge from a combined effort. Yet, once again, it was highly unlikely that so many agencies would have mutually consistent needs and similar views of problems, or would agree on which solutions were feasible. Still, a joint planning framework presented a forum in which different perspectives and disagreements could be presented and in which workable solutions could hopefully be fashioned.

The early meetings of the Joint Planning Committee served mostly to identify areas where decisions needed to be made. Despite the inevitable vagueness at this stage of discussion, some concrete expressions of acceptable policy began to emerge. For instance, the DCPSD
minutes of the second meeting of the Joint Planning Committee on February 24, recorded the following comments regarding participating agency manpower requirements:

The meeting was concluded without a mission being assigned to the individual police agencies. However, Chief Pomerance indicated that his department would be assigned to the most critical areas at the Convention site. These areas would include Washington Avenue and the front of the Convention complex. It was further indicated that police recruits would be assigned to non-sensitive posts ...*

Chief Pomerance was advised that the Public Safety Department is unique with respect to total responsibility for the entire County and therefore should remain flexible and in position for withdrawal from the Convention site without endangering the Convention security should the need arise.

Thus from these first meetings forward, the position of the Department of Public Safety was openly expressed. According to its representatives, the Department retained law enforcement responsibility throughout the entire county and was unwilling to see its manpower tied irrevocably into convention-site security. Underlying this position was the conviction that the County Director of Public Safety had Constitutional authority over law enforcement activities throughout the county, and that he rather than Chief Pomerance should have overall responsibility for the development and coordination of convention planning.

*The possibility of utilizing recruits was considered because of the envisioned strain convention duty would place on normal law enforcement operations. However, the actual use of recruits was largely limited to service-type assignments (e.g., bus driving, etc.).
On March 15, Colonel Larry Cotzin, Assistant Chief of the MBPD, presented to the Joint Planning Committee a proposal for the basic convention-related assignments of each law enforcement agency. The "tentative missions" were as follows:

Miami Beach Police Department
40 uniformed officers

Convention site security along Washington Avenue and the Northern perimeter along Dade Boulevard. Washington Avenue was expected to be the primary location of demonstration activity. However, the northern perimeter of the complex was separated from Dade Boulevard not only by the convention complex fence, but also by a canal making this side of the complex virtually inaccessible.

Miami Police Department
100 uniformed officers

Convention site security along 17th Street and the west perimeter along Meridian Avenue. These locations were expected to be the secondary location of demonstration activity.

Dade County Public Safety Department
90 uniformed officers
10 intelligence officers
10 detectives

Security along Jackie Gleason Boulevard (a limited access highway on Miami running into the General MacArthur Causeway which joins Miami at N.E. 13th Street with the southern end of Miami Beach at 6th Street), security for the Command Post within the Convention Center Complex, and vital installation security.

Florida Highway Patrol
100 uniformed officers

Tactical back-up force to remain within the Command Post area. Squads to ride with MBPD units and supervisors in regular patrol cars for off-site disturbances.
State Beverage Department
50 plain-clothes officers

Interior Convention Hall security and security at candidates hotels.

Secret Service

Convention Hall security and candidate security.

Conservation Patrol

Off-site security.

Based upon this proposal, the MPD allotment of 100 uniformed officers represented approximately 15% of its sworn personnel while the DCPSD allotment of 90 officers represented a commitment of about 9%. The MBPD commitment of 40 uniformed officers -- although smaller in number -- represented about 18% of the available manpower. Still, this arrangement would have left the majority of MBPD, MPD, and DCPSD forces available for routine police work as well as for responding to potential disturbances on Miami Beach away from the Convention Complex on the Mainland.

No basic alternatives or firmer commitments seem to have been made upon these tentative missions and manpower allocations until after the May 5 decision of the Miami Beach City Council to accept the Republican National Convention. The first hint of alteration came from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) in a series of meetings around May 19 when officials of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) notified other officials that the Governor had appointed William Reed, Executive Director of the FDLE, to be the Law Enforcement Coordinator for
for the Governor's office during the period of the two Conventions. During these meetings, FDLE officials announced that the Governor was providing more than the originally anticipated number of state law enforcement personnel for convention security duty.

Specifically, the Governor had increased the State commitment to 394 officers by drawing manpower from the following agencies:

Florida Highway Patrol (FHP): 250 uniformed personnel.
Department of Natural Resources: 46 uniformed personnel.
Game and Fresh Water Departments: 48 uniformed personnel.
State Beverage Department: 50 uniformed personnel.

The 250 FHP officers would include that department's entire riot control task force. Officers from other agencies would be mainly used for off-hours Convention Complex security. Additionally, the FDLE would commit approximately 130 officers for the on-the-spot intelligence gathering. This increased manpower allotment reflected the Governor's determination to have a greater State role in security given greater apprehension over security resulting from the decision to hold the Republican Convention in Miami Beach.

The second observable change in law enforcement operational planning is attributable to the influence of Deputy Chief Zanders of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department, who arrived in Miami at the end of May to begin his consulting assignment.* At the June 2

*Chief Zanders, along with Lt. Roland W. Perry of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department and Lt. John Konstanturos of the Los Angeles, California, Police Department, were brought to Miami Beach because of their extensive experiences in dealing with civil disorder and protest situations. The process of bringing these three to Miami Beach will be more fully discussed in the chapter on the Federal role.
meeting of the Joint Planning Committee, the first such meeting attended by Deputy Chief Zanders, he suggested a need to re-examine the existing presumptions about the nature of law enforcement operations during the Conventions. Based upon his previous experience Chief Zanders proposed that consideration must be given to the establishment of consolidated tactical efforts under united command through a pyramid of organization. He stated that this would place a level of combined responsibility on all departments performing the same missions at the Convention site. These comments indicated the desirability of merging the law enforcement personnel committed by various agencies to convention duty into a single body of forces under a hierarchical chain of command, rather than merely assigning specific roles to specific agencies and leaving each agency to command its own forces in the carrying out of the assigned roles as the original tentative missions had suggested.

On June 5, Chief Pomerance called a meeting of all law enforcement agencies involved with the Conventions. The Public Safety Department's records contain the following summary of the meeting:

Chief Pomerance opened the meeting indicating that after consulting with Deputy Chief T. Zanders, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department and Lieutenant J. Konstanturos, Los Angeles Police Department, for the past few days, it was decided there was an obvious need to structure an organization of those police personnel from the various agencies assigned to the convention activities on Miami Beach. Included in the organization should be a unified platoon system each platoon consisting of an equal number of personnel irregardless of the police agency involved.
Chief Pomerance introduced Deputy Chief Zanders who reviewed some basic concepts in planning for mass demonstrations. Chief Zanders offered three major concerns of a police agency in dealing with demonstrations.

1. The type of demonstrations involved.

2. The general enforcement policy of the concerned police agency in dealing with the different types of demonstrations.

3. The operational plans for the police agency designed to carry out the enforcement policy.

Over the past several years there have been several different types of demonstrations experienced by police agencies throughout the country. The police agencies have generally attempted to handle the incidents through the application of standard riot/crowd control formations. We have discovered during the recent years, however, that demonstrations groups have become more fluid in their activities, using hit and run tactics whether their actions are passive or militant. Subsequently, the tactical formations utilized by police have proven to be inadequate and several departments have had to come up with fluid type responses whereby tactical forces can be mobilized and dispatched to areas with speed and efficiency.

Chief Zanders read ten (10) minutes of transcript of a communications tape of a Washington, D.C. police frequency during the May Day demonstrations in 1971. The transcript reflected approximately fifteen requests by field commanders at different locations throughout the city for police personnel to respond to incidents involving groups of demonstrators ranging in numbers from fifty to one thousand who were blocking intersections, trashing streets, etc. The Chief indicated it would have been impossible to handle all the described situations with the resources available had it not been for his department's fluid task force organization.

The Chief discussed those problems inherent with a cooperative effort of several agencies where each agency has its tactical force organized differently, such as the number of squads to a platoon, the number of men to each squad, etc. He suggested that unless all agencies structure their respective tactical forces uniformly the commanding officer in charge of the entire operation will not know how many officers or supervisors will be responding to his request for a platoon to respond to a situation. He briefly described his department's organizational structure of its tactical units and squads.
Chief Zanders expressed his opinion that there is a need to structure the available personnel resources of the several police agencies assigned to the convention into an organizational pyramid with different units being identified for utilization as fluid tactical forces as the need arises. He offered as an example, if a situation develops at a main intersection in Miami Beach where a thousand demonstrators block traffic by sitting in the roadway a mobile task force would be sent to the location to handle the situation; the task force being pulled from the main group of personnel resources preidentified as available fluid tactical personnel. (Memo from Walter J. Lougheed, Chief of the DCPSD, Police Division, to E. Wilson Purdy, DCPSD Director, February 28, 1972, subject "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")

Thus, in addition to desiring a unified pool of police personnel under an established chain of command, Deputy Chief Zanders was presenting a rationale for dividing the available manpower into standardized units with a pre-established number of these units prepared to react in a mobile fashion as opposed to assuming stationary assignments. The attempt to structure law enforcement personnel available for convention duty into a pattern copied from Washington, D.C., was an obvious conclusion from the comparative method of Deputy Chief Zanders' presentation. The reaction of DCPSD officials was instant and predictable. Continuing from the same Public Safety Department summary:

Chief Lougheed (Chief, Police Division, DCPSD) indicated that the Public Safety Department personnel were originally assigned to the convention as a second line of defense because of its responsibility to the entire County and the possibility that we may have to pull out of the convention assignment and respond to other areas in the County. If our personnel were involved in field activities on Miami Beach they would not be readily available for response to a situation in the unincorporated area of the County should the need arise. In addition, the Public Safety Department does not have the mobile equipment necessary for a fluid operation as discussed by Chief Zanders. Chief Lougheed indicated further that the community is concerned about what the level of law enforcement
in the County will be during the period of the convention and he explained what steps have been taken in order to maintain an acceptable level of service.

Director Purdy indicated that we need to know what will be the available resources of the various State agencies to the County so that we can get into specific plans in preparing for any contingency. We are aware of the tactical needs for the convention complex but we need to know what can or will be done for the rest of the County. The Public Safety Department has the handicap of planning not only for the Convention site itself, but for the entire County including any municipality that may require assistance.

Chief Zanders' presentation had not been entirely persuasive. The meeting ended at a virtual stalemate, with no final answers as to the number of men each agency would commit, the missions to which they would be assigned, or how the entire operation would be organized. That this situation developed is not at all surprising. From the very beginning each of the local agencies had expressed concern about and struggled to retain its own organizational integrity. To voluntarily merge personnel as Chief Zanders had in mind was very much against the grain of previous Miami area mutual law enforcement assistance situations which had permitted participating agencies to retain their identity.

Behind the scenes, State officials had become convinced that the local law enforcement agencies either could not or would not voluntarily develop a coordinated plan for law enforcement activities during the Conventions. Thus, on June 17, they formally approached Chief Zanders and asked him to develop a detailed combined response plan. During the next two weeks State officials exercised whatever influence they possessed to insure that this plan was accepted by the Miami area agencies.
On June 20, Director Purdy invited Deputy Chief Zanders and Lt. Perry to meet with him and other DCPSD officials at the DCPSD Headquarters in Miami. According to DCPSD minutes, the meeting was called at the request of Director Purdy so that we would have an opportunity to explain in detail the total responsibility of the Public Safety Department to the some 2,000 square miles total County responsibility as well as our commitment of manpower and other resources to the City of Miami Beach for convention related purposes. Manpower deployment and numbers of personnel assigned not only to the convention but to the entire County were also discussed."

(Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, June 21, 1972, subject, "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.") At the conclusion of the meetings, Deputy Chief Zanders and Lt. Perry were given a tour of the Public Safety Building.

On June 25, Governor Askew and members of his immediate staff met with County Manager Goode to impress upon the County Manager the need for a written county-wide integrated law enforcement response operational plan. On June 26, the County Manager chaired a meeting of the Joint Planning Committee to relay the Governor's message. According to DCPSD minutes:

(County Manager Goode) related that the Governor had expressed his concern to formulate and implement a fully coordinated planning document relating to local manpower deployment and response of forces involving the total commitment of local police. The Governor felt that the planning had not included a sufficient distribution of deployment of manpower toward direct convention problems, especially manpower allocation of the City of Miami and Dade County Public Safety Department forces. (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, June 28, 1972, subject "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")
The Governor had also proposed the integrated command structure framework discussed in the previous chapter.

Deputy Chief Zanders took this opportunity to reiterate his previous position. From the DCPSD minutes:

(Deputy Chief Zanders) stated that he has recommended the combining of total manpower strength of local and state forces and placing them on standby status within the convention complex, as well as stationing them in surrounding strategically located areas, until needed to quell disturbances. However, these same combined forces could be pulled out at any time by companies, platoons and/or squads if disorders occur on the mainland or in the unincorporated area. (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, June 28, 1972, subject "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")

MPD Chief Garmire commented that the previously specified number of MPD forces had totally committed the MPD such that "further commitment of forces would deplete his manpower completely."

Although questions were raised about the possibility of utilizing manpower from other agencies in the area (i.e., Hialeah, Coral Gables, North Miami, North Miami Beach, Miami Springs, South Miami, and Miami Shores), County Manager Goode under the authority of his designation by the Governor as Area Commander instructed the FHP, the MPD, and the DCPSD to submit additional manpower appropriations for their agencies.

At this point, the opening session of the Democratic National Convention was only two weeks away. The Joint Planning Committee in subsequent days met daily, often with follow-up meetings between individuals representing the law enforcement agencies on the Committee.

On June 27, at a morning meeting of the Joint Planning Committee chaired
by County Manager Goode, additional force commitments were made by the MPD and the DCPSD as the Governor has requested.

MPD Chief Garmire indicated that his Department would allot 300 additional men for convention duty. Of these forces, he would assign 100 to Miami Beach and station the remaining 200 at strategic locations in the City of Miami. Chief Garmire again stressed that "if his submitted plan is accepted, it would strip down his services to the citizens of Miami to a bare minimum." Director Purdy indicated that the DCPSD could allot an additional 150 men to convention duty. Major C.C. Reynolds of the FHP indicated that an additional 100 - 150 state personnel may be committed to convention duty depending upon the orders of the Governor. Lt. Konstanturos, the special consultant from the Los Angeles Police Department, stated that he had conferred with Commissioner William Reed and had been assured that an additional FHP force would be so assigned. This would bring to 544 the total of state personnel assigned to convention security. Additionally, Major Reynolds indicated that 70 assigned Florida Highway Patrolmen would be performing their normal patrol duties in the greater Miami area during the Convention. The neighboring cities had been surveyed as requested and had universally indicated they could not spare any personnel for convention assignments. The County Manager suggested that participating agencies, particularly the DCPSD, MPD, and FHP, have their planners research their manpower resources and meet again to formalize a county-wide master plan relating to the unification of combined forces, deployment of manpower generally, and the deployment of the special task forces.
On the afternoon of June 27, at the Alton Road Planning Office, a meeting between MBPD, MPD, DCPSD, and FHP officials was presided over by Deputy Chief Zanders. The afternoon meeting was to follow-up on the morning meeting commitments by the MPD, DCPSD, and FHP of additional police personnel. According to DCPSD minutes, the purpose of the meeting was "to review the total strength of law enforcement personnel assigned to Miami Beach and to discuss tactical plans." (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, June 30, 1972, subject "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")

Deputy Chief Zanders produced the following lists of law enforcement personnel committed to convention duty:

Original number of personnel committed to the security of the convention complex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Florida State Agencies</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBPD</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional commitments as of June 27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FHP</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Deputy Chief Zanders' opinion, the original number of personnel assigned would be needed for adequate convention complex security and the additional personnel would be "formed into task forces responsive to incidents outside
of the complex whether it be within the City of Miami Beach or on the mainland." While Deputy Chief Zanders wanted the additional 150 DCPSD forces stationed on Miami Beach, Chief Lougheed of the DCPSD indicated that at least 50 of these would most probably have to be stationed on the Mainland. The MPD held to its intent to station 100 of their personnel on Miami Beach and retain the other 200 on stand-by within the City of Miami. At the end of the meeting, Deputy Chief Zanders requested the agencies prepare and submit to him on the following morning the configurations of their respective task forces identifying command personnel.

At the June 28 morning meeting of the Joint Planning Committee, Deputy Chief Zanders presented tentative tactical plans regarding the various task forces now assigned to Miami Beach. He felt that the FHP task force should be stationed west of the Convention Complex, the MPD task force north, and DCPSD task force south. Immediately following this morning meeting, Deputy Chief Zanders called a short meeting of the field commanders of the various agencies. As the DCPSD minutes recorded:

Chief Zanders reviewed the organizational configurations of the task forces of the various departments. He suggested it was necessary to have all the task forces organized in a uniform manner in order to facilitate the developing of an operational plan. He indicated each company or task force should have an equal number of platoons, squads and men per squad. (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, July 7, 1972, subject "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")

Deputy Chief Zanders closed the meeting indicating he would prepare an operational plan.
On June 30, Chief Pomerance presided over a morning meeting of the Joint Planning Committee. Deputy Chief Zanders presented the following list of manpower commitments:

**Original manpower apportionments within the convention complex**

| State    | 300 |
| MBPD     | 40  |
| DCPSD    | 72  |
| **Total**| **412** |

**Additional task force numbers**

| State    | 200 |
| MBPD     | 0   |
| DCPSD    | 100 for Miami Beach |
|          | 50 to be stationed at the Public Safety Building |
| MPD      | 100 for Miami Beach |
|          | 200 to be stationed in the City of Miami |
| **Total**| **1052** |

From this, he generated the following assignments:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>South Beach Community Center 833 6th Street, Miami Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>PSD Building, Miami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>40 Patrol Units (4 men per patrol vehicle) at St. Patrick's Church, 39th Street and Garden Ave., Miami Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>VFW, 6th Street and West Ave., Miami Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>Undetermined site within City of Miami limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Within convention complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>MBPD</td>
<td>Within convention complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>Within convention complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Grand Total 1052</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subsequent to this June 30 meeting of the Joint Planning Committee, Deputy Chief Zanders convened a smaller meeting of DCPSD and MPD officials "to discuss task force operational concepts." The DCPSD minutes note:

Chief Zanders expressed varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the fact that task force configurations of the participating agencies were different. Ultimately, it became necessary for members of the Public Safety Department to individually and collectively advise Chief Zanders that in terms of such factors as recent additional manpower assignments, expanded training needs and the time constraints that currently exist, it would be necessary for us to retain our current task force organizational configurations which were submitted to him on June 29, 1972. (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, July 3, 1972, subject "Convention Operational Plan.")
Yet what most upset the DCPSD officials attending this meeting was the following:

During the course of the meeting Chief Zanders made reference to the fact it appeared he had the responsibility to prepare an operational plan. Specific reference was also made by Chief Zanders to the effect that on June 25, 1972, the Governor had been advised that the need for a tactical operational plan existed and that one was being, or had been prepared. It is with these latter factors this writer is primarily concerned inasmuch as if allowed to go unchallenged it might appear either now, or at a future time, that members of the Public Safety Department were derelict in not preparing the alleged requested plan. (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, July 3, 1972, subject "Convention Operational Plan."

On July 1, a morning meeting of the Joint Planning Committee was chaired by County Manager Goode. At this meeting, Robert Donlan, a representative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, stated that a police agency to be eligible for overtime funding must commit 3/5 of its sworn personnel for convention duty.* The DCPSD minutes recorded County Manager Goode's reaction as follows:

County Manager Ray Goode stated that he would personally contact Governor Askew to determine exactly how the deployment formula was computed, as the three major law enforcement agencies, i.e., DCPSD, City of Miami, and City of Miami Beach, have fully committed their available forces. In addition, these same agencies must still

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*In the previous chapter on Intergovernmental Coordination we discussed in detail the derivation of this formula as well as its place in an effort by Governor Askew to place the State in a dominate role in coordinated convention planning -- an effort which coincided with the interests of both Deputy Chief Zanders and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
provide protection of life and property to their jurisdictional and geographical responsibilities. The expected activities at Miami International Airport District alone (with the arrival of the candidates) will create a steady drain of manpower and related resources. (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, July 6, 1972, subject "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")

At the conclusion of the meeting, the County Manager announced that this was the last of the unified county-wide response operational meetings before the Democratic Convention. Deputy Chief Sanders submitted his draft of the unified operations plan to the participating agencies for their comments. Subsequent meetings concerning unified operations would be held at the level of the participating police agencies.

At a meeting of police officials on July 5 chaired by Chief Pomerance, Major Reynolds of the FHP announced that his Department would not be able to free the 150 additional Florida Highway Patrolmen as previously offered. This eliminated the proposed task force to be stationed at St. Patrick's Church on Miami Beach, leaving a gap in the operational deployment of forces. That afternoon the County Manager held a meeting in his office with DCPoSD officials. The County Manager had spoken with the Governor and received confirmation that the Florida Highway Patrolmen in question would not be available. The Governor felt that given this situation, additional police should be committed from local resources. A number of possible solutions were considered, although a decision awaited a similar meeting the following day in the County Manager's office. At this time, it was decided that commitment of additional forces would be extremely difficult. Rather, 100 of the 200 MPD forces originally scheduled to be
stationed in the City of Miami should be transferred to Miami Beach to partially fill the void created by the non-available 150 Florida Highway Patrolmen.

William Reed, Director of the FDLE, attended this second meeting on July 6 in the County Manager's office. After a discussion of the extent to which the DCPSD forces were strained by convention assignments, Director Reed offered to recommend to the Governor that an additional 50-75 state law enforcement personnel from the Beverage, Conservation, and Game and Fresh Water Departments be assigned to the DCPSD to help fulfill mundane assignments and to release another 50 DCPSD police for task force duty. The meeting concluded with the County Manager being advised by DCPSD officials that "the manpower left in our districts in order to comply with the 3/5 of sworn personnel quota set by the FDLE, was at an unsafe level and further cuts would be ill advised." (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, July 6, 1972, subject "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")

The Plan

On July 6, with the opening day of the Democratic Convention scheduled for July 10, Deputy Chief Zanders submitted to the participating agencies his final draft of the Unified Operations Plan. In addition to continuing the command structure discussed in the previous chapter, this document provided for the following assignment and positioning of task force units:
A. Task Force "Beach"

Task Force "Beach" was to be a combined unit commanded by Chief Pomerance and assigned to stage within the convention complex. Its primary mission was the security of the convention complex and reinforcement of the complex's perimeter fence. Its composition was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Platoon #</th>
<th>Compliment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MBPD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>112 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>207 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources (state)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42 officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

409 officers

B. Task Force "County"

Task Force "County" was to consist of two DCPSD units:

1. One unit was to report to Chief Pomerance and to be staged at the South Beach Community Center, 833 6th Street, Miami Beach. Its primary mission was "timely response to unusual occurrences that originate in areas outside the convention complex."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Platoon #</th>
<th>Compliment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>106 officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. A second unit was to report to Director Purdy and to be staged in the City of Miami at the discretion of the Director.
C. Task Force "City"

Task Force "City" was composed of two units of MPD personnel.

1. One unit was to report to Chief Pomerance and to stage at the VFW Clubhouse, 650 West Avenue, Miami Beach. Its primary mission was "timely response to unusual occurrences that originate in areas outside the convention complex."

2. A second unit was to report to Chief Garmire and to be staged in the City of Miami at his direction.

This arrangement provided the following distribution of forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th># of officers staged on Miami Beach</th>
<th># of officers staged in the City of Miami</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Beach&quot;</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;County&quot;</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;City&quot;</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>832 officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The participating agencies were committed as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MBPD</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHP</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources (state)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>832</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Abstracted from the Unified Operations Plan, written by Deputy Chief Theodore Zanders, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C.)

Many aspects of the manner in which this final Unified Operations Plan was developed disturbed DCPSD officials. Deputy Chief Zanders re-arrangement of the original plans seemed to the DCPSD insensitive to the informal patterns which had developed among the law enforcement agencies in the Miami area and neglectful of constitutional responsibilities these agencies bore to maintain normal police functions and to respond to emergencies other than those which might develop in the immediate vicinity of the Convention Complex. Given these resentments, it was possible for DCPSD officials to view Deputy Chief Zanders as an outside consultant who came to Miami not to advise but to take over. DCPSD officials maintained the final plan was a copy of the Washington, D.C., formula which might work fine there but was ill-suited to the Dade County situation. In combination with these sentiments existed a resentment for the FDLE which together with the Governor's office and officials from LEAA had put continual pressures on the local agencies to commit more manpower to convention duty.
At the same time, the FHP was permitted to allot fewer forces than pledged -- a loss for which the local agencies were in turn urged to compensate from their own resources. In view of these factors, it is no surprise the Democratic Convention After-Action Report of Major Shelton, DCPSD Convention Planning Coordinator, contained the following comments:

Pre-Convention planning was progressing in a reasonably satisfactory manner with local agencies participating and cooperating well. Each agency understood its role and responsibility and final plans were well under way. At this point, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and other out-of-state advisors arrived and involved themselves in the planning, revising, redoing, etc., and confusion reigned.*

... Outside agencies should be brought into the planning from the beginning if they are to be part of the operation.

And, from the DCPSD's "Evaluation and Analysis" section of the Agency's Democratic Convention After-Action Report:

... this plan was forcefully imposed upon local law enforcement officials without representation or participation in the planning process. Combining this "clubbing" approach with the vacuum in the decision-making process created a situation where law enforcement in Southern Florida was forced to acquiesce. A better approach would have been the formulation of a group planning unit comprised of representatives of each of the affected law enforcement agencies who, under proper guidelines, could as a team, develop a more responsive, comprehensive plan for the policing of this area during the conventions.

*This quotation and some of the following were included at the end of the previous chapter concerning the development of Intergovernmental Cooperation. For emphasis and the development of the analysis, we run the risk of repetition.
As this last quotation suggests, the imposition of the Unified Operations Plan made DCPSD officials consider in retrospect the whole process of the Joint Planning Committee a sham -- a forum in which decision could be announced rather than in which policy could be formed. The "vacuum in the decision-making process" referred to in the above quotation is expressed in the paragraph preceding that quotation as follows:

From the very beginning of the planning process, beginning February 17, 1972, it had been extremely difficult to obtain definitive and specific decisions in response to requests. Vagueness and uncertainty prevailed. This unwillingness to exercise command, control and coordination responsibility resulted in continuous fluctuation in plans and decisions which created and perpetuated an almost constant state of confusion and uncertainty.

What was at stake was more than a choice between two different modes of police response organization (stationary Convention Complex assignments maintained by commitments of personnel remaining under the control of their own departments vs. a task force/mobile response strategy with unified command). A question of professional competence and responsibility was involved. An instance of this element can be seen in the reaction of Chief Lougheed of the DCPSD when he realized that a unified operation was required by the Governor and would be written by Deputy Chief Zanders. In a July 3 memorandum to Director Purdy, Chief Lougheed denied that the Governor had ever transmitted this request to the DCPSD, yet he felt such a plan should have been the Department's responsibility. He wrote:
Accepting the fact that a multitude of plans, counter-plans, replans, and updated plans have been proposed, discussed, evaluated, revised, discarded, re-submitted and re-evaluated with a minimum of positive action thus far, it may be that somewhere in this maze of verbiage the concept of inter-agency police operational plan was proposed or discussed by someone, somewhere, at some time. If this is so, then those who proposed it should be able to submit the necessary documentation and thus prevent continued confusion and abrasive misunderstanding about areas of responsibility and cooperation. If, in fact, no such plan was ever realistically and competently proposed, discussed and responsibility for preparation assigned, then it should be so admitted and cease to be a topic of needless reference.

Would the DCPSD be held responsible for not generating such a plan? As Chief Lougheed speculated "it might appear either now, or at a future time, that members of the Public Safety Department were derelict in not preparing the alleged requested plan."

Then, too, the late timing of the writing of the Unified Operations Plan produced considerable consternation within the DCPSD which had for months been operating on different premises. From the "Evaluation and Analysis" section of the Democratic National Convention After-Action Report of the DCPSD:

The first draft of the Unified Operations Plan was received by the Public Safety Department on Saturday, July 1, 1972, one week prior to the convention. This caused serious problems for the Public Safety Department in order for it to properly train, orient, implement and execute as smoothly and expeditiously as possible this major modification of the original plans which had been developed over a period of several months. The suddenness of this new plan forced the department to develop a crash training program and orientation program and thus a significant amount of money was spent by the county in overtime in order to implement this plan in the short period of time that was available. In order to accomplish such a rapid implementation, the department was subjected to an almost monumental task.
To Public Safety Department officials, it seemed as if the elements of coercion and the urgency of the Convention deadline offered them no alternative but to concede and to massively shift gears at the last moment. Contributing to the air of haste and confusion was the form in which the participating agencies received the Unified Operations Plan. Although the Table of Contents of the Plan listed 4 parts, the participating agencies only received Part I entitled "Organization and Manpower Allocation for Reserve Units." Part II -- "Organization and Manpower Allocation for Complex Security, Traffic Control and Related Fixed Posts," Part III -- "Communications Systems," and Part IV -- "Command Post Organization" were never received. In fact, for the Democratic Convention, these sections were never written.

The requirement of the Unified Operations Plan that each agency produce platoon/squad groupings to assign into created task force units generated further confusion by necessitating that each agency pull personnel from many different locales and job functions to participate in convention duty. It is virtually impossible to produce an exact accounting of the number of law enforcement personnel who participated in convention security. The DCPSD, for instance, to fulfill its convention assignments created 4 task force groupings and gave them names other than that assigned by the Unified Operations Plan. The result can be presented as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DCPSD designation</th>
<th>DCPSD manpower designation</th>
<th>DCPSD assigned staging area</th>
<th>Unified Operations Plan designation</th>
<th>Unified Operations manpower designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force &quot;A&quot;</td>
<td>116 officers</td>
<td>convention complex</td>
<td>Part of Task Force &quot;Beach&quot;</td>
<td>112 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force &quot;B&quot;</td>
<td>106 officers</td>
<td>South Shore Community Center</td>
<td>First unit of Task Force &quot;County&quot;</td>
<td>106 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force &quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>41 officers</td>
<td>Dade County at DCPSD Director's discretion</td>
<td>Second unit of Task Force &quot;County&quot;</td>
<td>41 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force &quot;D&quot;</td>
<td>57 officers</td>
<td>VFW Clubhouse, Miami Beach</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(This listing was compiled by comparing the Task Force sections of the Dade County Public Safety Department's Democratic National Convention After-Action Report with the Unified Operations Plan prepared by Deputy Chief Zanders.)

The most grave discrepancy (other than the multiple name descriptions) is Task Force "D" which according to DCPSD records was stationed at the location where the Unified Operations Plan has stationed the first unit of Task Force "City". However, the Unified Operations Plan specifically designates this unit as composed entirely of MPD officers. Undoubtedly, changes were made in the final moments before the Convention and throughout the Convention for which there was no reason to write a new document. However, this does make an attempt to accurately determine which police officers were where or even precise total numbers of committed forces now virtually impossible and at the time undoubtedly confusing.)
The Democratic National Convention After-Action Reports from the various DCPSD District Commanders do document the actuality of seriously depleted forces for normal police work and the resultant decline in police service to the County. Consider these statements:

Removing the motorcycles from the district substantially reduced traffic enforcement. Accident investigation normally provided by the motors was handled by patrol units, thereby reducing preventive patrol activities.

In the assignment of all male police officers to the convention detail, it became necessary for the suspension of all but the most critical cases. These were handled by the two policewomen assigned to the day shift. (Capt. Frank Clifton, DCPSD, Commander North District, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report.)

Vice investigations were suspended during the entire period, and the detachment of all Vice, Intelligence and Narcotics personnel and all General Investigators Unit personnel except three policewomen left the units' operational ability at an extremely low level. No arrests were made as the policewomen merely skimmed the surface rather than thoroughly investigate case reports. Follow-up investigations were conducted only on those felonies of a more serious nature. Even in these cases, delays occurred as other work, assistance to uniform units, and citizen complaints and requests were honored on an extremely limited basis. (Capt. D. O. Butterbrodt, DCPSD, Commander South District, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report.)

Manpower allocation for the Democratic Convention allowed the district to function with a minimum of reduced services through the extensive utilization of overtime. The equivalent manpower allocation to the Republican Convention will result in the same level of service. (Capt. Richard Smith, DCPSD, Commander West District, Democratic National Convention After-Action Report.)

While both the DCPSD and the MPD increased the number of forces they had assigned to convention duty subsequent to the requests of the Governor, the directive of LEAA, and the planning of Deputy Chief Zanders,
the MBPD did not undergo a similar increased depletion of its ranks for task force duty. The original MBPD allotment had been 40 officers; only one MBPD platoon was included in the task force assignments of the Unified Operations Plan. While it is possible to argue that the MBPD, the smallest of the three forces, was decidedly taxed by "normal" police duty in light of the presence of the Convention, we should note that DCPSD and MPD officials had unsuccessfully attempted similar arguments.

In reflecting upon the desirability of the law enforcement response strategy of the Unified Operations Plan, we might consider this statement from DCPSD Capt. James Ross, Commander, Central Division, in his Democratic National Convention After-Action Report:

The unified operations plan seemed good for the most part, however, the total force concept has certain disadvantages to the men due to isolation and inactivity. Officers who could be better utilized in a complex area coverage concept were instead rendered totally non-productive. They could be, and it was at first planned, to deploy them in useful activity in such a way as to have them immediately available for response to a troubled area. This could still be done if properly planned.

Ultimately, the validity of the DCPSD objections to the Unified Operations Plan depends upon the necessity for such a large, pre-stationed, mobile police force placed in standardized units under hierarchical command. While we have at this point identified several DCPSD-expressed costs and considered one other option (namely the originally established tentative missions, a "complex area coverage concept" in the words of DCPSD Capt. Ross), one is not in a position to make a judgment upon this question until
several other relevant factors have been considered (e.g., the degree of credible dissident threat and the feasibility of other response strategy options).

National Guard and U.S. Army Democratic Convention Duty

On April 28, Colonel Windham, Convention Planning Coordinator for the Florida National Guard, met with representatives of the MBPD, MPD, and DCPSD to discuss the convention involvement of National Guard forces. Three conditions were presented for National Guard utilization: their purpose would be to contain and/or disburse crowds as required; they would be called into the situation only if local police should be unable to control the situation; and, a regular police officer would be assigned to a group of Guardsmen and would make all arrests and all charges as required.

Colonel Windham indicated that although it was too early to make a manpower commitment, there seemed to be no difficulty concerning mobilization by land from the Miami Mainland to Miami Beach via the various connective express/causeways. The National Guard would have available ten Huey helicopters and five Jet Ranger helicopters with Miami Beach Senior High School tentatively selected as a helicopter site during the Democratic Convention. There was discussion of responsibility regarding a Guard call-up. Major Shelton of the DCPSD indicated that if anyone other than the County Sheriff (DCPSD Director E. Wilson Purdy) attempted to activate the Guard, State law would be contravened.
On May 15, a meeting of participating law enforcement agencies was requested by officials of the 3rd U.S. Army. Lt. Col. Michael Boos of the 18th Airborne Corps presented the following three phase involvement of the 18th Airborne:

1. Quick React Force - 4 battalions, approximately 2400 men;
2. Task Force Eighteen - 2 brigades, approximately 3600 men;

The activation of the 18th Airborne would be at the request of the Governor but only subsequent to the determination that police and National Guard could not handle the situation. The 18th Airborne desired to take a "low-key" approach by "assuming guard positions at key installations and take front line positions with minimal support as the situation develops." Lt. Gen. John Hay of the 3rd Army would assume command should phase three be implemented. Potential bivouac sites on the mainland of Dade County were proposed. Additionally, Army officials expressed a desire to use the Miami Beach Dog Track on the south part of the Beach as heliport air mobilization assembly point, and the small triangular area on the west part of the Beach bounded by Purdy Avenue, 18th Street and Dade Boulevard as a land mobilization assembly point.

On May 16th, a meeting was held in the County Manager's office between members of the County Manager's staff, representatives of the DCPSD, and officials of the U.S. Army 18th Airborne Corps., Ft. Bragg Operations, N.C., to discuss potential bivouac sites. Lt. Col. Michael Boos of the 18th Airborne indicated that the Army was in the initial stages of preparing to
move 8600 Federal troops into the Dade County area if the nature of protest-related events escalated to a point where this was justified. Lt. Col. Boos preferred to billet the troops at strategically located public high school buildings throughout the County. Such locations should have access to major arterial highways leading to Miami Beach. DCPSD officials emphasized the possibility of disturbances occurring on the Mainland, an additional reason why mainland bivouac areas would be desirable. Several alternative open sites in the County would also be considered.

On May 11, National Guard officials met at the National Guard Armory in Miami with DCPSD and Dade County Public School officials. Col. Windham of the National Guard indicated that the Guard was interested in using six of nine proposed school locations in the County. The schools were selected because of their proximity to possible disturbance areas and their facilities (i.e., kitchens, restrooms, gyms, locker rooms, office space, electrical outlets, air conditioners, and telephones). Fred Kline, Assistant Superintendent of the Dade County Public Schools, stated that the School System would fully cooperate with the Guard as well as the DCPSD. Summer school classes could be cancelled once the Guard made a firm decision on which sites it desired. Facilities if needed could be made available for the ten week period spanning both Conventions. At a previous meeting of the School Board approval was given to allowing school buses to be used for transport of police personnel. Arrangements had been made with Chief Pomerance to loan eight buses to the MBPD; similar arrangements could be made with the Guard.
On June 7, representatives of the National Guard met with the Joint Planning Committee at MBPD Headquarters. Major General Henry McMillan, Florida National Guard, presented "the time phase frame involved in escalating his resources to meet and satisfy the needs of potential and actual confronted problems." The DCPSD minutes recorded this plan as follows:

PHASE I - First call up will involve the immediate contingent of local forces performing their annual split two week military training in the Miami area and weekend drill units fulfilling their monthly obligations. The split two week military training period relates to the convention weeks, i.e., 7 days for the Democratic Convention and 8 days for the Republican Convention. This phase will include a small ready force of approximately 590 troops involving one to two hours response time.

PHASE II - This encompasses the recall of outlying National Guard resources in the South Eastern portion of Florida. This phase includes a total call up of 1,215 men, 8 Hueys (Helicopters) capable of transporting 8 men each and will require a response time of two to four hours.

PHASE III - Will reach out to the West coast of Florida as far North as Sarasota and into Central Florida as far North as Orlando. This phase takes into account a total of 1,955 troops or a total Phase I and Phase II complement of 3,170 National Guard personnel. The Phase III call up will require a response time of twelve hours.

PHASE IV - Gathers the entire state and 53rd Infantry Brigade. This phase incorporates a total call up of 1,471 troops or a total Phase I, Phase II and Phase III call up 4,661 troops. The Phase IV call up will require a response time of forty-eight (48) hours. The men will arrive fully equipped and will have complete mobility capabilities. This Phase covers 85% of assigned allocated (strength) positions of all the National Guard units. (quoted in a memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, June 8, 1972, subject "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")

Major General McMillan indicated that the above schedule would remain flexible and was subject to change "depending on existing conditions and
circumstances." MPD Chief Bernard Garmire raised the question why the entire Florida National Guard forces were not conducting their split two week training periods in the Miami area instead of merely utilizing local units as presented in Phase I of the plan. However, no modifications of the Guard plan were made at this meeting.

At the June 27 morning meeting of the Joint Planning Committee, County Manager Goode announced that General Sikes and Colonel Windham of the Florida National Guard had been working closely with Major Shelton of the DCPSD regarding the Guard's convention duty. The County Manager indicated that a decision had been reached to station three thousand Guardsmen at high schools throughout the County during the periods July 9-15 and August 19-26.

At the June 30 morning meeting of the Joint Planning Committee, General Sikes presented more complete information about the Guard's convention duty. Approximately 850 Guardsmen would be stationed at the Miami Beach Senior High School (across Dade Boulevard from the Convention Complex), 200 at the South Beach Elementary School, and another complement of Guard personnel at Nautilus Jr. High School in the northern section of Miami Beach. In addition, several Guard contingents would be situated on the Mainland.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Manpower Allocation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Coral Gables Senior High</td>
<td>400 - 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Miami Central High School</td>
<td>400 - 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. North Miami Armory</td>
<td>200 - 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hialeah-Miami Lakes High</td>
<td>500</td>
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</tbody>
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If an escalation of forces were to be required, Federal troops would occupy the high schools which the Guard would vacate en route to their mission. Federal troops to begin with would be prepositioned at Homestead Air Force Base, Tamiami Park, Opa Locka Airport, and the Miami Beach Coast Guard Station. The Miami Beach Dog Track would remain available to Federal troops if it should be needed.

The *Democratic National Convention After-Action Report* of the Florida National Guard listed the number of Guardsmen stationed in the Miami area prior to the Democratic Convention as 3,068, of which approximately 700 were involved in command and staff, administrative, logistical, or maintenance support.

**Operations Policy and Tactical Considerations Prior to the Democratic National Convention**

Deputy Chief Zanders devoted part of the Unified Operations Plan to a consideration of operations policy. Important sections of that discussion we present here in their entirety:
Policy:

It shall be the policy to deploy personnel in a low profile manner, with task force units held from public view. If an incident occurs, a ranking official should respond to the scene and attempt to resolve the issue by persuasion and/or negotiation. Most problems can be resolved at this level. If a situation fails to respond and continues to escalate, it shall further be the policy to utilize minimal personnel and minimal force to neutralize same. Chemical devices shall only be utilized upon the command of an official and their use shall promptly be discontinued upon similar order. Officers assigned to squads and platoons shall maintain unit integrity and follow the command of their squad leaders, taking no individual action of their own violation [sic]. The levels of force are as follows:

1. Persuasion and negotiation
2. Orders to disperse
3. Show of force
4. Arrest
5. Crowd Management formations
6. Chemical munitions

Levels of force generally include the terms "selected firepower" and "full firepower." These tactics have no place in crowd management and therefore have been deleted from the above.

The list does not imply a field commander must commence his operation at Step 1 and proceed through each subsequent level of force. For example, if looting is taking place upon arrival at the scene, the field commander could immediately implement Steps 4 and/or 5, depending upon all facts known to him and the resources available. The level of force is simply a uniform policy statement to assist the commander in the field.

Uniform and Equipment:

The uniform for the convention details will be the standard uniform of the day. However, officers shall bring with them in addition to their regulation soft uniform hat, their helmet, riot baton and gas mask. These items shall be kept in reserve until
needed. Members of task force units will be equipped with gas devices and gas delivery systems. Task force units shall not be equipped with rifles and shotguns.

The Florida State Highway Patrol shall provide two anti-barricade teams, with normal equipment for 24 hour response to barricade problems. These units shall be staged well away from the demonstration areas and shall be the only personnel authorized to resolve such special occurrences.

Courtesy:

Officers in handling the many unusual circumstances that may arise, shall be patient, discreet, and solicitous of the citizens and visitors to this area. Officers shall be cognizant of the fact that their actions and deportment are being viewed and analyzed by the entire Nation via television and news reports. (from the Unified Operations Plan, written by Deputy Chief Theodore Zanders, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C.)

Such a policy is extremely flexible. Its presentation might suggest to some a "soft" approach yet it contains sufficient latitude to generate a tough response if dissident actions should become threatening. There is no need to begin the police response at "persuasion and negotiation."

Helmets, riot batons, and gas masks were to be close at hand. While there would be no gunfire, tear gas devices and gas delivery systems would be standard task force equipment. One could argue, however, that the latitude of the plan is designed to permit police an appropriate response to whatever protest or disorder situation they should face.

Prior to the Democratic Convention, William Reed in his capacity of State Law Enforcement Coordinator, Ray Goode acting as Area Commander, and Major Reynolds, FHP Field Commander, issued to all State law enforcement personnel a firearms policy "to establish uniform procedures for carrying
and use of firearms by authorized personnel assigned to law enforcement
duties at the Democratic and Republican Conventions." The policy established
was as follows:

I. Policy:

A. Police Officers are limited by law to use only the MINIMUM
amount of force necessary to effect an arrest. The use
of a firearm by an officer illustrates application of
MAXIMUM force. Members of State Law Enforcement Units
assigned to convention duties shall exhaust every other
reasonable means before resorting to the use of firearms.

B. Deadly force should never be used on mere suspicion that
a crime, no matter how serious, was committed or that the
person being pursued committed the crime.

II. Regulations:

A. An Officer shall not discharge firearms in the performance
of his police duties, except under the following
circumstances, and after all alternatives have been
exhausted, and there is no substantial danger of his hitting
innocent bystanders.

1. When it is absolutely necessary to protect yourself or
other persons against death or great bodily harm.

2. To effect a felony arrest, to prevent the escape of a
felon or to recapture an escaping felon when all other
means have failed, and

a. The felony for which the arrest is sought is a serious
crime, such as murder, armed robbery, or arson,
wherein there has been the use or threatened use
of deadly force, and

b. There is a substantial risk that the person whose
arrest is sought will cause death or great bodily
harm if his apprehension is delayed, and,
c. The officer should either have witnessed the crime or should have sufficient information to know, as a virtual certainty, that the suspect committed an offense for which the use of deadly force is permissible.

d. Firearms shall not be discharged under the following circumstances:

1. In any case where the life of an innocent bystander might be substantially endangered by discharge of the firearm.

2. As a warning.

3. At any fleeing vehicle unless absolutely necessary to protect the life of an officer or an innocent party.

(Memo from William L. Reed, State Coordinator; Ray Goode, Area Commander; and Major C. C. Reynolds, Field Commander to all State Law Enforcement Personnel for the Democratic and Republican Conventions; subject, "Firearms Policies for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.")

Despite Deputy Chief Zanders' directives in the Unified Operations Plan, the possibility remained that firearms might have to be used. This directive attempted both to emphasize to State law enforcement personnel that such circumstances must be extreme and also to impose strict conditions on firearms use. The directive further provided for an investigative procedure to be utilized whenever a firearm was discharged, even if done so accidentally. The language of the directive emphasized that task force members were bound by the prohibitions of the Unified Operations Plan as well as by the regulations of the directive itself. Regarding task force situations, the directive noted:
Crowd Management Situations

A. Except in unexpected or unanticipated circumstances and whenever possible, all officers engaged in crowd management or control shall first unload any firearm carried by such officer. Unloading of the weapon shall be done in a secure and private place prior to becoming engaged and the cartridges placed in a pocket or other secure place about the officer's person.

Use of Special Weapons

A. Special weapons such as shotguns, rifles, gas launchers, or automatic weapons shall not be carried or displayed except upon specific authorization of the Field Commander or his designee.

Use of Gas or Chemical Agents

A. No officer will use any gas or chemical agents except upon specific order of the ranking supervisor or official on the scene.

National Guard firearms policy as established in its natural disaster/civil disorder operations plan, OPLAN EMERALD (Operation Plan for Emergency Actions, Liaison and Deployment) was similar to that established for State law enforcement personnel. The decision to issue rifle and shotgun ammunition was reserved for the Adjutant General or, in his absence, the Senior Troop Commander. Once issued, such ammunition was to be kept in the Guardsmen's ammunition pouches until the Commander of Troops at the scene authorized or directed specific individuals to lock and load their weapons. The directives noted that "it may be beneficial to issue the order to load using a bullhorn and in plain view of dissidents." All ammunition was to be accounted for by individual Guardsmen to whom the ammunition was issued. Ammunition was to be withdrawn from each Guardsman
at the end of his relief "to insure no one retains a round while not on duty." Authority to fire ammunition was reserved to a narrow set of circumstances involving genuine risk of death or serious injury and lesser force is ineffective or unavailable. (Headquarters, Florida Department of Military Affairs, Operation Plan for Emergency Actions, Liaison and Deployment.)

Regarding the use of riot control chemical agents, the National Guard directives specified:

The objective in the use of riot control chemical agents is to cause the participants in the disturbance to cease riotous behavior, disperse and not reform as a mob. Riot control agents achieve this purpose by causing varying degrees of discomfort or incapacitation among the rioters. To assure quick and maximum effectiveness, a large portion of the mob should be exposed to the discomfort caused by these agents.

The decision to employ chemical riot control agents was reserved for the Senior Troop Commander in the area of operations and was to be coordinated with the Adjutant General if time permitted. The directive noted: "the indiscriminate use of grossly excessive amounts must be avoided due to the long lasting characteristics and problems of decontamination." Strict control and accountability was demanded for the storage, issuance, use and turn-in of riot control equipment "in order to avoid any improper usage of these items and prevent their falling into the hands of unauthorized persons."

The DCPSD planning meeting minutes record several tactical discussions by law enforcement planners regarding the utilization of the various law enforcement forces which were being made available. At several
points, in a consideration of assignments, it was suggested that the Florida National Guard might fulfill either fixed-post guard duties or assume after-hours security of the Convention Complex. Either duty, if assumed by the Guard, would relieve some additional local law enforcement personnel for task force duty. Planners determined at several discussions that the Guard should be able to perform such duties without the Governor declaring an emergency. Ultimately, however, the Guard was not called upon to perform such duties.

Chief Zanders proposed several different scenarios in planning sessions, giving an indication how he saw the various law enforcement personnel would interact. At the June 27 afternoon planning meeting between MBPD, MPD, DCPSD, and FHP officials presided over by Deputy Chief Zanders, the following discussion was recorded:

Tactical maneuvers were reviewed by Chief Zanders in dealing with large dissident groups of demonstrators. He presented some hypothetical situations and how we would respond. Generally, the thought is that if large numbers of demonstrators have to be moved in masses attempts would be made to move the demonstrators north of Dade Boulevard and isolate the groups from the convention complex by the positioning of National Guard troops. (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, June 30, 1972, subject "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")

Again, subsequent to Deputy Chief Zanders report to the Joint Planning Committee at the morning meeting on June 30, the following discussion was noted:
To counteract a large scale confrontation, plans are being formulated to mobilize a human fence of Florida National Guard troops along the Lincoln Road Mall and 17th Street on the South Side of the complex, Meridian Avenue and Pennsylvania Avenue on the West Side of the complex, and Washington Avenue on the East side of the convention complex. This will isolate the commercial area and will seal off the convention center on all sides. The inside perimeter of the complex will be protected by the task forces located within the center itself.

With the combined efforts of the National Guard and the tactical forces, the dissidents would be driven north over the bridges crossing the canal on Alton Road, Meridian Avenue and Washington Avenue, to the open park area located at the Bayshore Golf Course. The escalation of forces will create a high visibility of control forces during the saturation or driving attempt, and in the final analysis the dissident groups should be fragmented and contained.

These same task forces could be utilized to meet and combat any expected and/or emergency type situations that may occur on the mainland or in the unincorporated area.

The law enforcement tactical forces will be low keyed as they will be wearing soft hats and carrying only their standard side pieces, batons and CS gas. They will not be carrying rifles and/or shotguns.

... The Florida National Guard's primary mission is to defend the convention site and it has been determined that it will take at least 2,000 guardsmen to perform this function. Of the 2,000 total, it is estimated that at least 1,400 men will be utilized to fence off the Lincoln Road Mall. (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, July 5, 1972, subject, "Planning for the Democratic National Convention.")

Once again, a potential conflict with the DCPSD is suggested by Deputy Chief Zanders' thinking regarding the utilization of the Guard.

One of the primary benefits the DCPSD saw from the billeting of Guard forces throughout the County was their ready accessibility to sites of potential disturbance throughout the County. However, Deputy Chief Zanders' discussion seems only concerned with a massive disruption on Miami Beach around the Convention Complex. Conceivably had other possibilities arisen, he could
have operated with the full recognition that as Guard forces were being called into action, plans provided for Army troops to occupy sites vacated by the Guard. If we take into account the possibility of calling upon Guard and Army contingents, lack of troops was hardly a problem. Difficulties occurred only in relatively extreme scenarios which tried to postpone or resist declaring an emergency to utilize Guard and Army forces. Perhaps a DCPSD concern could be expressed as follows: given the extent to which DCPSD forces were tied into convention duty would any disturbance on the mainland simultaneous with dissident activity on Miami Beach be by definition just such an emergency requiring National Guard and Army involvement. To say nothing of DCPSD resentment at having its forces tied up in Miami Beach should problems on the Mainland require Guard or Army involvement, response time under such a structure would inevitably be lengthened.

The Communications System Established for the Democratic National Convention

At a June 27 meeting of communications specialists from the DCPSD, MPD, MBPD, and FHP, Lt. Konstanturós, the special consultant from the Los Angeles, California, Police Department, expressed grave concern that a single operational communications frequency had not been selected for all agencies to use during the Conventions. The early thinking had envisioned a system to monitor the communications of various agencies and a central communications facility at the Beta CP. However, Lt. Konstanturos insisted that this was inadequate. The DCPSD minutes of that meeting record the following:
Lieutenant Konstanturos disagreed with the plan and stated that a new approach has been announced. The State Representatives insist all operations, regardless of department, agency, or government, be conducted on one frequency. (Memo from Joseph F. Scoggins, Supervisor in the DCPSD Communications Bureau, to Major Shelton, June 28, 1972, subject, "Convention Planning.")

This demand was discussed, however, to implement such a system at this point seemed out of the question:

Due to the many frequencies in use by state, county, and municipal organizations, it is virtually impossible at this late date to procure the necessary equipment to equip all agencies to operate on a single frequency regardless of how much money is made available.

However, DCPSD specialists attempted to find a solution. A duplex frequency cross band triple repeater system was designed by Joseph Scoggins, Supervisor of the DCPSD Communications Bureau, to patch together the communications frequencies of the major participating agencies. This would permit the DCPSD, MPD, and MBPD to operate as if they were on the same frequency. Due to a massive effort by the DCPSD Communications Bureau, the system was operational by July 8, two days before the opening of the Democratic National Convention. Technical difficulties prevented the FHP from being integrated within this communications system at this time. On June 28, Joseph Scoggins reported to the Joint Planning Committee that to integrate the FHP into this system would require supplying FHP personnel with approximately 65 radios compatible with the MPD, MBFD, or DCPSD.

The system functioned well technically, however, there was an initial tendency for each agency to rely on its own separate communications
system. Lt. Konstanturos' Democratic National Convention After-Action Report analyzed the difficulties encountered:

Although considerable effort had been expended in the development of a single tactical frequency, there was a tendency by some agencies to revert back to a separate frequency which isolated each agency during field operations. Accordingly, coordination of the activities was very awkward [sic] for the field commander and tactical commander. The fact there were no major problems resulting from this practice, can only be attributed to the absence of active and sustained utilization of tactical units.

Ironically, representatives of some of the same agencies complained they "did not know what was going on." This occurred for two reasons: not using the tactical frequency as intended; and compartmentalization of the intelligence functions ...

Some of the more significant problems which resulted from the occasional use of separate frequencies included:

*It was difficult for the tactical commander (905) to quickly contact the commanding officers of each of four groups of men assigned from the several agencies to Miami Beach.

*The chances of duplication of effort or failure to react are multiplied considerably.

*Command and control is weakened because the tactical commander cannot monitor all frequencies, and because other commanding officers in the field are not aware of the tactical operations of other agencies. (Memo from Lieutenant J. G. Konstanturos to County Manager Goode. delivered through MBPD Colonel Larry Cotzin, July 27, 1972, subject, "After Action Comments re Public Safety Aspect of Democratic National Convention."

Lt. Konstanturos recommended solutions to these difficulties as well as emphasizing the severity of the problem:

When the agencies which comprised the mobile task force were operating on the tactical frequency, there was a tendency for the three groups to communicate with their own dispatcher in the communications center.
Accordingly, the dispatchers were separately providing service to their respective agency. The physical separation of one of the three radios compounded the potential for error, duplication, noise, and created an unnecessary job of coordinating the actions of three separate dispatchers who were operating on the same frequency.

It is again recommended that there be a central or single dispatching system used for the tactical frequency, and that all three radios and dispatchers be located together. If one dispatcher becomes too busy then the others can assist with some of the duties such as message writing, etc. -- regardless of who or what agency they are communicating with.

It is imperative that field unit supervisors (Platoon Leaders, Company Commanders, etc.) use assigned radio designations rather than their own separate designations. If the field situations becomes busy, command and control can be seriously impaired when units cannot be readily identified.

Finally, Lt. Konstanturos saw a definite utility to making the scout frequency* available to commanders from the DCPSD, MPD, and FHP in a manner which resembled the merging of their tactical channels.

In addition to the tactical frequency, it is recommended that the commanding officers from each agency share the frequency used by the scouts, and use it as a command frequency. The tactical commander (905) used the "scout" frequency to monitor reports on the activities of demonstrators. The commanding officers of the contingents assigned to Miami Beach from Miami, the Public Safety Department, and the Florida Highway Patrol should have the benefit of reports from the "scouts", and the ability through this frequency to communicate with 905 regarding command level tactical assignments.

*The operation of scout activities is discussed in the subsequent chapter concerning the development of a law enforcement intelligence system.
Deputy Chief Zanders and Lt. Perry in their Democratic National Convention After-Action Report to the County Manager tersely commented on communications in a manner which indicated agreement with Lt. Konstanturovs:

... some overlap is noted in the communications net. The original concept envisioned a common operational frequency, however, in practice, each agency reverted to an independent channel, resulting in command decisions being transmitted by personal contact and/or telephone. This delay inhibited the timely movement of line personnel.

Security Inside Convention Hall During the Democratic National Convention

Both uniformed and plainclothes police officers from the MBPD, MPD, and the DCPSD were assigned duties relating to traffic control within the Convention Complex and to security duty within the convention facilities. The DCPSD, for instance, supplied ten uniformed personnel to guard nine fixed posts (8 posts within the Convention Hall or the Jackie Gleason Auditorium, 1 post in the lobby of the Octogon Towers), ten plainclothes officers to provide security within the Convention Hall (these personnel not to assume fixed posts), and twenty-eight recruits, twenty-two of whom were assigned to direct traffic within the Convention Complex, four assigned to Jackie Gleason Drive for traffic control, and two assigned to assist in the CP Beta operations. The plainclothes officers were to support the Democratic Party's security officers within the Hall. Any decision regarding credentials or admission/rejection of individuals from the convention floor were to be made by the Democratic Party's security officers. If arrests
within the Convention Hall were required, the actual arrests would be made
by MBPD officers with affidavits filled out by the Democratic Party's
security personnel. Additionally, the FBI and Secret Service assumed
plainclothes duties within the Convention Hall.

There was considerable reluctance to permit the personal bodyguards
of top political officials to carry their weapons into the Convention Hall.
However, Florida officials argued that through consideration of the future
treatment afforded to Governor Askew should he attend political conventions
outside the State, personal bodyguards ought to be permitted to carry their
weapons inside the Hall. Chief Pomerance, the FBI, and the Secret Service
agreed, providing that this was to be accomplished by prior notification
to the MBPD so that passes could be issued indicating that the bodyguards
in question were in legal possession of specific weapons.

Also, considerable thought was devoted to the possibility that
stink bombs might be exploded within the Convention Hall and/or that tear
gas used outside the Hall might be drawn into the Hall through the air
conditioning system. Various solutions were considered. Lead acetate would
remove the odor of stink bombs and the residue could be vacuumed off through
the ventilation system. Various forms of commercial deodorizers would
assist. Ultimately, aerosol sprays were obtained to combat stink bombs.
Charcoal filters were considered to cover the outside air intake ducts of
the Hall's air conditioning system. However, this option was rejected due
to the $60,000/filter cost involved. Instead, plastic drops were purchased
to cover the air conditioning intakes should tear gas be utilized. Technicians
considered this feasible as the plastic drops could remain in position for a considerable period of time without having to shut down the air conditioning system.

Finally, all personnel associated with convention duty were issued proper credentials either by the Democratic Party (when duty within convention complex buildings was required) or by the various agencies involved. At the March 10 meeting of the Joint Planning Committee, the FBI advised that "with the new laws restricting the FBI process of civilian fingerprints it will be necessary that all civilian employee fingerprints by submitted to the FBI Identification Department through the Secret Service in their capacity as providing security for Presidential candidates."

Utilizing this procedure, the FBI checked approximately 7,000 fingerprints, resulting in approximately 900 "hits".

Modification of the Unified Operations Plan for the Republican Convention

In many respects, the Democratic Convention served as a "dry run" of security arrangements. Given the low level of dissident activity at the Democratic Convention, security procedures were not severely tested. Still, the security operations during the Democratic Convention did indicate several areas for possible refinement and improvement. The nearly six week period between Conventions did not see law enforcement planners undergoing a steady constant consideration of security procedures for the Republican Convention. Rather, attention to Republican Convention security was considerably more intense in the weeks immediately preceding the opening
of the Convention. As the Republican Convention drew nearer, a degree of urgency was added by intelligence reports which indicated the likelihood of much more aggressive dissident activity than had been witnessed during the Democratic Convention. Intelligence officers anticipated acts of civil disobedience and were concerned with reports that demonstrators would try to block traffic and entrances to the Convention Complex in an attempt to disrupt and delay the August 23 Republican National Convention session (scheduled time of the President's acceptance speech).* A review of the DCPSD and MBPD records of security planning during this period indicates that at no point was a radical readjustment of security policy seriously considered. Instead, the type of mobile task force response strategy settled upon for the Democratic Convention seemed in the interim a fait accompli to be clearly repeated during the Republican Convention. The merging of police forces under unified command was an accepted premise. The only questions involved improvements of procedures and security demands specially generated by the nature of the Republican Convention in view of the protest it was likely to generate.

On July 28, a meeting of the Joint Planning Committee was chaired by MBPD Assistant Chief Larry Cotzin. Several items were discussed. The problem of poor quality food had been a persistent complaint of the law

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*A more complete recording of such information is contained in both the subsequent chapter on the development of an intelligence system and the chapter on protest events during the Republican Convention.
officer was to collect and coordinate all incoming intelligence, to control dissemination of all evaluated information to appropriate tactical commanders and other Command Posts, and to coordinate the posting of a current situation map and the preparation of situation reports; the intelligence officer in these functions was to work closely with the operations officer who was to monitor all messages routed to the situation room, to monitor the scout and tactical frequencies, and to review all current intelligence for the purpose of advising the tactical commander when a response is required or what type of response is feasible. The operations officer was responsible for recording, coordinating, and advising all operational movements of law enforcement personnel. The situation room also included a Miami Beach situation officer to assist the operations officer in the updating of the operational law enforcement posture and an Area CP situation report officer responsible for the dissemination of information processed through the situation room to the Area CP, the Army CP, and the National Guard CP. Additionally, the scout coordinator and dispatcher were located in the CP Beta Situation Room.

These procedures were designed to consolidate the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information within CP Beta and to provide a functional tactical frequency facilitating the orderly dissemination of command decision and a separate scout frequency to provide the field and tactical commanders with instant reporting on developing situations.

In an attempt to permit officials at CP Alpha to more closely monitor demonstration activities on Miami Beach, arrangements were made for the closed circuit television system operated by the Secret Service to be
channeled to the Area CP. Additionally, the DCPSD prepositioned a camera on the roof of the Washington Federal Building at 17th Street and Meridian adding a sixth camera to the five the Secret Service already had prepositioned around the Convention site. On a selection basis, one of these six signals was transmitted back to the Area CP via microwave. While this ability to view demonstration activity around the Convention Complex was appreciated by those stationed at the Area CP, the Secret Service priorities for where the cameras were directed and focused did not always match the viewing interests of CP Alpha personnel. Occasionally, the Secret Service would respond to a request from CP Alpha for a particular view or area panorama. Additionally, the County Manager's office again placed the CRB X-ray units in the field to transmit tactical information back to the Area CP regarding demonstration activities.

How Well Did it Work?

In general, public officials were more than satisfied with the output of their strategic intelligence operations which they felt enabled them to successfully anticipate both the numbers and the intentions of the non-delegates who attended the Conventions. For example, Emory Williams, Director of the FDLE Division of Intelligence and Information, was unequivocal in his evaluation of the information output of the intelligence operation:

There was not a single incident that occurred during either the Democratic or Republican Convention that operations police commanders did not have notice that it was going to occur before it did. (Interview, May 17, 1973)

But this success was not achieved without some difficulty.
As long as they were only dealing with the Democratic Convention, law enforcement officials never really believed that large numbers of political dissidents would be attracted to Miami Beach nor were they seriously concerned about the possibility of widespread violence. Yet, as late as April 1972, public officials anticipated that somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 protestors might come to Miami Beach for the Democratic Convention. We must remember that at the same time figures between 100,000 and 200,000 were seriously being discussed for the Republican Convention in San Diego. The original intelligence estimates for Miami Beach were revised when the Republicans decided to move their Convention from San Diego.

As soon as it became known that the Republicans were considering the move, law enforcement officials rushed to obtain new information on the number and character of the protest groups which might be attracted to Miami Beach should the Beach also host the Republican Convention. When the City of Miami Beach formally extended an invitation to the Republican Convention, official reports estimated that the Convention on the Beach might attract between 50,000 - 100,000 protestors -- about half the number estimated for San Diego. During the month of May, this estimate was constantly reinforced by the statements of both public officials and dissident spokesmen.

In general, it was extremely difficult from May until the end of June to obtain reliable information on dissident groups and their possible activities. As late as June 9th, for example, the FBI reported to the Joint Planning Committee that in terms of the Youth International Party (YIPPIES):
It is very difficult to determine the expected number of members intending to be here for the Democratic Convention. The Party has the potential of being able to gain a lot of support and draw a lot of people.

Similar problems existed with most of the other groups.

By the end of June, however, intelligence reports indicated that despite the expected presence of most major dissident organizations, there would be no more than 6,000 dissidents at the Democratic Convention. Immediately prior to the Democratic Convention even this figure was adjusted downward:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Estimated Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gay Liberation</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Coalition for Peace and Justice</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami Convention Coalition</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam Veterans Against the War</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth International Party</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPPIES</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Welfare Rights Organization (for July 10th only)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Christian Leadership Council</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Tenants Organization</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Party</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The number of unaffiliated non-delegates actually present during the Democratic Convention was somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,000. Thus the total on this estimate is quite accurate given that the National Welfare Rights people were not in Miami throughout the Democratic Convention. (Estimate of the Combined Intelligence Operation, July 10-11, 1973.)
These figures were very close to the actual number of individuals who were active during the Democratic Convention.

The intelligence system did equally as well in predicting the number of non-delegates who would come to Miami Beach for the Republican Convention. On July 28th, the Weekly Intelligence Estimate reported:

It is difficult at this time to estimate the number of demonstrators that will be present at the Republican National Convention. However, left-wing groups have estimated that their support will reach 10,000 to 20,000. Based on available intelligence, it is believed they are capable of gaining only approximately 5,000 non-delegates.

Early in August, Rennie Davis of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice wrote to the Miami Beach City Council that the movement's projection of non-delegates was 5,000 to 10,000 persons. By August 10, Chief Zanders informed a meeting of state law enforcement officials that he expected only 2,500 - 3,000 non-delegates, but that they would be the hard core types.

Law enforcement officials attribute most of the success of their strategic intelligence system to covert operations -- particularly the activities of informers and undercover agents. This emphasis is clearly stated in the MBPD After-Action Report for the Republican Convention:

In further developing the intelligence gathering function, a need was seen for gathering information particularly on a national scale. The most significant aspect of this entire intelligence operation was the infiltration of the non-delegate groups by undercover agents and the development of informants within these groups. The information gained through these undercover agents and information sources was very accurate and provided in-depth strategic and tactical intelligence. The movement of task forces was based on this information on a daily basis.
Basically, law enforcement officials argue that the real "nuts and bolts" of what was going to happen during the '72 Conventions came primarily from covert operations. This they maintain was true even though a large amount of information on dissident groups and their intentions for the Conventions was publicly available -- particularly through the news media. In fact, law enforcement officials argue covert operations provided a necessary check on the validity of news stories. For example:

Suppose we read in a newspaper about a group from California which says it's going to bring 40,000 people to the Conventions. We get in touch with an informer who is familiar with that group and ask him how much they have in their treasury. When we find out that they only have $99.00 we can be reasonably sure they're not going to do anything unless they get a windfall immediately prior to the Conventions. (Interview, May 1973)

Not all public officials, however, agree with this stress on the value of covert intelligence operations, particularly in preparation for the Democratic Convention. In fact, George Rodericks, Civil Defense Director, Washington, D. C., has suggested that at least for a while in June the various intelligence systems had broken down. As a result, law enforcement officials had begun to believe the worst estimates available to them. Because of his experience in dealing with demonstrations through the Mayor's Command Center in Washington, Mr. Rodericks had been brought to the Miami area as a consultant to County Manager Goode. From his experience with demonstrations in Washington, Mr. Rodericks had developed at least a speaking relationship with many individuals who were active in the civil rights and/or the peace movement. Through these individuals, Mr. Rodericks
was kept informed of the non-delegates' general intentions for the Convention. Toward the end of June Mr. Rodericks met with local law enforcement officials and informed them that no more than 6,000 non-delegates would be coming to Miami Beach for the Democratic Convention and that the number probably would be smaller. It is his impression that serious downward revisions of intelligence estimates concerning the anticipated number of non-delegates began to appear after this meeting. Whatever Mr. Rodericks' contribution may or may not have been, we do know that it was not until June 30th that Chief Pomerance reported to the Joint Planning Committee the number of non-delegates intending to come to Miami Beach for the Democratic Convention was decidedly less than previously expected and that the number might not exceed 6,000.

We should also point out that, in general, covert operations are not without limitations -- especially in terms of the opportunity they present for exaggerations to enter the intelligence systems. Despite all of the efforts employed to avoid errors -- such as obtaining information from multiple sources -- information received from covert sources still may be inflated. Most of these errors may result from sources who are poorly trained or who for personal reasons want to hurt members of the target group. Additionally, there are conceivable motivations for informers and undercover agents to inflate their reports concerning the potential criminal and/or violent acts of the groups they are watching. In the first place, if the target group is not at least potentially dangerous there is no need for covert operations regarding it. Moreover, informers and agents are aware that the more threatening the information they provide the more important
they become to their supporting agency. Conversely, informers and agents are also aware that if they do not report threatening information their superiors may question whether or not they are doing their jobs properly. This factor is most likely to be operating in situations where the superiors have made it clear that they expect to receive threatening information about a group. Finally, even when publicly available information contradicts the information supplied by informers and agents, law enforcement officials may choose to believe the covert sources if only because they themselves are biased in favor of the secretive and need to justify the need for the existence of a covert system.*

*Related concerns have also been expressed by the sociologist Morris Janowitz in relation to surveillance of secretive terrorist organizations:

It is very difficult to contain terrorist eruptions of political violence. The toll is small at a given point and therefore does not produce a violent public reaction. The tactics and organizational plans are more secret and only official surveillance and covert penetration supplies an effective technique of management. The forms of organization are those of a combination of a conspiratorial and predatory gang and a paramilitary unit with overtones of a "liberation" outlook. The more secret and cohesive the group, the greater the problems of surveillance. Even though many of these paramilitary groups will break into factions, the task of control will become extremely difficult. It bodes ill when it is necessary to rely on covert operators. The control of secret operations is at best difficult; in the United States, it is very difficult. The task becomes even more complex and troublesome when these surveillance agencies develop the conception, as they often do, that to collect information is not enough. They begin to believe that they must act as active agents of control, particularly in spreading distrust within these organizations. The task becomes endless and dangerous if the operators play a game without an end or develop an interest in maintaining the groups when they are supposed to be monitoring. (Janowitz, 1969, p. 414)
It now seems likely that law enforcement officials may have received inflated reports concerning the possible violent activities of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) during the Conventions in Miami Beach — particularly the Republican Convention. Almost from the beginning, public officials were concerned about the possibility of violence by members of this group. And, almost from the beginning, at least four law enforcement agencies had established covert operations to help keep track of the VVAW: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the Dade County Public Safety Department, and the City of Miami Police Department.

As early as June 9th, the FBI representative informed the Joint Planning Committee the Vietnam Veterans Against the War was a "most violent and dangerous group." (quoted in a memo from DCPSD Chief Lougheed to DCPSD Director Purdy, June 12, 1972) On June 20th the Organized Crime Bureau of the Public Safety Department issued a bulletin concerning the possible use of "wrist rockets" by VVAW members.

The pictured "wrist rocket" or "wrist slingshot" is a very powerful, dangerous weapon capable of accurately firing ball bearings, slugs, or other projectiles with devastating effect. Construction is of aluminum tubing, with surgical rubber being utilized for launching power.

The slingshots sell for about $3.98, and if concealed or displayed in a threatening manner are a violation of Section 21-14 of the Metropolitan Dade County Penal Ordinance.

It is believed that up to one thousand of these weapons will be in the hands of some non-delegates attending both political conventions and may be utilized against police, vehicles, or other select targets if violence occurs.*

*Lemberg Center observers did not see "wrist rockets" used in either Convention.
By early July, it was public knowledge that a Federal grand jury was hearing evidence about the possibility of violent actions by the VVAW at least during the Republican Convention. In fact, an FBI informer, William L. Lemmer, had been known to VVAW leaders since late May when he made a tape recording detailing his activities as an informer for the FBI.*

Immediately prior to the Democratic Convention (July 7) VVAW members uncovered agents in their midst. They turned out to be Sgts. Harrison Crenshaw and Gerald Rudolph of the Dade County Public Safety Department.**

On July 13, Federal indictments were handed down against six VVAW leaders: Scott Camil, John W. Kniffen, William J. Patterson, Peter P. Mahoney, Alton C. Foss, and Donald P. Perdue.*** The indictments charged that these six conspired:

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** Rudolph and Crenshaw came to be identified by VVAW members as salt and pepper because one of them was black and the other white.

***Scott Camil - VVAW coordinator, Southeastern U.S. and Florida Chairman;

John W. Kniffen - VVAW Regional Coordinator, Texas;

Alton C. Foss - Dade County Coordinator.
to organize numerous fire teams, to attack with automatic weapons, fire, and incendiary devices police stations, police cars and stores in Miami Beach;
to fire lead weights, fried marbles, ball bearings, cherry bombs, and smoke bombs by means of wrist rocket slingshots and crossbows;
to disrupt communication systems in Miami Beach.

Between Conventions, most of the intelligence units continued to receive information about the potential violent activities of the VVAW. One agency, for example, received the following information about the VVAW:

Reportedly veteran ________ ________ has worked with the CIA and is allegedly an expert in assassinations. (8/9/72)

VVAW have been observed in possession of "sporting type" weapons. (8/9/72)

Information received from the Chicago Police Department related that members of the VVAW supposedly have a boat docked somewhere in the Pompano Beach area. That boat is loaded with explosives, rifles, and a variety of automatic weapons for use during the Republican Convention. (8/14/72)

By August 16, however, the Combined Intelligence Center's Weekly Estimate contained the following report:

Because of the indictment of six leaders and much publicity, the majority of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) will probably avoid massive civil disobedience or violent situations. However, because the VVAW has been given another "issue" more veterans from across the nation are expected at the Republican National Convention.
From the beginning, VVAV members insisted that they never intended to initiate any violence during either Convention. In fact, VVAV members countered the indictments by charging the Government was only trying to keep them away from or at least minimize their effectiveness during the Conventions in Miami Beach. Among other things, they pointed out that Lemmer had a history of instability. Moreover, they maintained that he had established a reputation as one of the group's more militant and vociferous members whose suggestions for violent activities were constantly rejected by the group. (John Kifner, New York Times, August 14, 1972, and Donner, 1972, pp. 54-65)

The behavior of VVAV members during both Conventions would seem to support their commitment to non-violent activities. On the final day of the Republican Convention when it became known most VVAV members were planning to leave the Miami area, even the Combined Intelligence Operation's Daily Estimate had to note:

The VVAV will likely take part in civil disobedience tonight, but refrain from violence. While there are those among its membership who could be incited to violence, the organization as a unit should refrain from such action. The VVAV is a well disciplined group that has been instrumental in maintaining order in some past demonstrations.

But it must be born in mind -- and law enforcement officials insisted upon this interpretation -- that the original indictment may have forced the VVAV to change their plans.

On October 18, the Justice Department dropped the July 13th indictments and announced the reinindictment of the original six plus two others (John King Briggs and Stanley K. Michelson) on similar charges. Collectively, this group came to be known as the "Gainesville Eight." At their arraignment on November 6, 1972, all eight pleaded "innocent". 
Before they actually came to trial, however, additional information concerning covert intelligence operations became public. Late in 1972, Alton Foss -- one of the original defendants -- revealed a complicated story in which he accused the FBI and the Dade County Public Safety Department of attempting to force him to become an informer. (Rob Elder, Miami Herald, 10/8/72; Rob Elder, Miami Herald, 10/22/72; Rob Elder, Miami Herald, 12/13/72; and William Banks, The Daily Planet, 1/10/73)

On May 25, 1973, Major Adam Klimkowski of the Miami Police Department publicly confirmed reports that VVAW members had not responded to offers to help them buy machine guns made by one of their informers, Pablo Fernandez:

Ironically, Klimkowski agreed that for all his efforts, Fernandez never brought back anything damaging to the veterans on whom he spied.

"In fact, I guess he might make a good defense witness," the police officer said. (The Miami Herald, May 26, 1973, Rob Elder)

On June 8th, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement confirmed the existence of a female informer, Mrs. Angelica Rohan. According to newspaper accounts:

She was present when Fernandez offered to supply the VVAW with Cuban weapons which "could be turned into machineguns by putting in a little piece of metal."

According to Mrs. Rohan, the veterans were not interested: "There was no indication whatsoever that they wished or desired to purchase one single bullet." (Rob Elder, Miami Herald, June 8, 1973)
Even during the trial of the Gainesville Eight, informers and undercover agents gave conflicting testimony concerning the activities planned by the VVAW. Both Mr. Lemmer and Charles Henry Becker III -- another FBI informer -- testified for the prosecution but were often vague concerning details. Louis Bernard Anchill -- a self-described source of information for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement -- testified that Scott Camil had told him of plans to attack police with rifles, hand grenades, bows and arrows and chemical filled ballons.

But when Assistant U.S. Attorney Jack Carrouth tried to pin down Anchill for details of the plan, the witness looked blank. Legal sources said Anchill had given the FBI a four page, single-spaced, typed statement including alleged plots and activities he said were outlined by Camil but about which he did not testify yesterday.

"Were there any other discussions about violence?" Carrouth asked in apparent frustration at one point.

"No, not really," Anchill said. (Timothy S. Robinson, Washington Post, August 17, 1973)

On the other hand, Dade County Public Safety Department undercover agents Crenshaw and Rudolph both testified that VVAW members did have violent plans for disrupting the Republican Convention. In fact, Sgt. Crenshaw testified that they were so obvious about it that ...

He said at the first meeting he attended the veterans talked of financing an arsenal, including antitank guns, through the sale of marijuana, and of blowing up underwater telephone lines and throwing rotten pigs' blood at the police "to make them physically ill." (John Kifner, New York Times, August 24, 1973)
Yet, another FBI informer -- Emerson L. Poe -- testified under cross-examination that ...

Under cross examination the F.B.I. informer, Emerson L. Poe, said the only convention plans he heard from Scott Camil a defendant, were laid out in a newsletter of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War that made no mention of a scheme to attack the police with slingshots while simultaneously launching rifle and homemade bomb attacks in Miami, as the Government charges.

That newsletter mentions the possible use of powerful slingshots, homemade bolo's and ammonia-filled balloons, saying that these would be "defensive" measures against an attack by the police. But the rest of the newsletter is filled with cautions that violence would play into the hands of the Nixon Administration. (John Kifner, New York Times, August 22, 1973)

Whatever the validity of the information originally obtained on the VVAV, the trial jury was not convinced that the Government had proven its case. After only four hours of deliberation, the jury voted the Gainesville Eight not guilty on all charges.

Given the relative safety of our position, we have no desire to make judgments concerning the validity of information or the correctness of covert intelligence during the 1972 Conventions. On the other hand, we feel compelled to warn that regardless of the potential value of covert operations, such operations may well produce distorted information which can be operationally dysfunctional and which can in turn damage those against whom the information was developed as well as call into question the credibility of the very Government they were design to protect.
Our criminal jurisprudence has developed important safeguards based on the arrest process as the mechanism which activates the full judicial machinery. Thus, arrest brings into play carefully developed procedures for the protection of individual rights.

Some suggest that the judicial system must respond to the riot emergency by short-cutting those procedures. Such suggestions, usually referred to as "preventive arrest" or "preventive detention," involve extending the police power to include detention without formal arrest, broadening summary enforcement procedures, and suspending bail hearings and pre-trial procedures for sorting out charges and defendants.

We reject such suggestions. Rather, we urge each community to undertake the difficult but essential task of reform and emergency planning necessary to give its judicial system the strength to meet emergency needs. We make the following recommendations.


(Kerner Commission, 1968, pp. 186-187. Italics in original.)

Those in the Miami area were aware of the mass arrest preventive detention tactics that were utilized in Washington, D. C., during the 1971 May Day demonstrations. There the Washington, D. C., Metropolitan Police in response to dissident plans to disrupt traffic and "close down" the city's normal routine of business arrested approximately 13,400 individuals in four days, 7,200 of them in a single day. The police concern during May Day was clearly to remove from the streets anyone who looked like a dissident. No sufficient detention facilities were provided for those arrested. Most efforts to effect legitimate arrest procedures were generated after the fact of arrest. Ultimately, the
courts held the entire process unconstitutional. Miami area criminal justice officials were anxious to avoid such instances. Instead, these officials followed the advice of the Kerner Commission by working in advance to prepare a comprehensive plan for the possible emergency operations of their criminal justice system.

The Normal Operation of Florida Criminal Courts

The Governor's Council on Criminal Justice in 1971 prepared a document entitled Florida's Comprehensive Plan. This contained a detailed presentation of the Florida criminal court system. We reprint here with special reference to Dade County relevant descriptive segments of that document.

II. CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM

The state criminal court system is the result of years of amendment, expansion and addition to the basic constitutional court structure. There are numerous kinds of courts and varying jurisdictions. Often the same type of court will have different jurisdictions from county to county, or even within the same county.

However, the court system does have a basic structure. At the beginning of any criminal court activity is the committing magistrate. He checks search warrants, arrest warrants and arrests to verify that there is probable cause for the action. Next comes the court handling misdemeanors or felonies. The court's decisions are appealable, and a system of appellate courts has been established for that purpose. Juveniles are handled in a separate court system.

The chart of the criminal system (Figure 1) shows all the state courts that have criminal jurisdiction. Courts having only civil jurisdiction (such as the small claims court) have
Figure 1. Florida Criminal Court System.

Legend: "Constitutional Questions" referred to the Supreme Court include construction of constitutional provisions and those involving validity of state or federal statutes.
been omitted from the chart. The figure in each block indicates the number of that type of court in the state. The courts are placed on different levels and connected by lines. Lines represent appeal routes and levels are somewhat indicative of jurisdictional importance.

The eight courts located on the lowest level function as committing magistrates or handle misdemeanors of persons seventeen years old or up. Decisions of these courts are appealed to the circuit court. The three courts on the next sub-level handle felonies (and sometimes misdemeanors, also). Felony appeals are made directly to the district court of appeal; misdemeanor cases are appealed to the circuit court.

The circuit courts are organized on the basis of twenty judicial circuits created by the legislature. Each circuit court has several courts and court is held in each county at different times. These courts serve as appellate courts for lower county courts and handle felonies or capital cases exclusively. Circuit court decisions are appealed to the district court of appeal.

Juvenile courts are shown on the same level as the circuit courts because they also appeal to the district courts. The juvenile court is a separate court located in each county to handle dependent and delinquent children under seventeen years of age. The court may retain jurisdiction until the juvenile reaches the age of twenty-one, however.

**Circuit Courts**

The courts of the most general jurisdiction in this state are the Circuit Courts, each of which is presided over by a Circuit Judge, now elected every six years by the qualified electors of their respective judicial circuits. The Constitution now provides that there shall not be more than twenty judicial circuits in the state, with one Circuit Judge for every fifty thousand inhabitants or major fraction thereof as determined from time to time by a census.

The Circuit Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in equity; in all cases at law not cognizable by inferior courts (that is, which an inferior court does not have jurisdiction to try); and in all cases involving the legality of any tax, assessment, or toll. Such courts also have exclusive original jurisdiction of the action of ejectment and of all
other actions involving the titles or boundaries of real estate. They also have exclusive original jurisdiction of all criminal cases not cognizable by inferior courts, as well as original jurisdiction of actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

Circuit Courts have final appellate jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising in the County Courts or before a County Judge, of all misdemeanors tried in Criminal Courts and of all cases arising in municipal courts, small claims courts, and courts of justices of the peace.

Circuit Judges also have the power to issue the "extra-ordinary writs" such as the writs of mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, to which we have above referred in the discussion of the Supreme Court, and all other writs proper and necessary to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction.

CRIMINAL COURTS OF RECORD

The Constitution authorizes the Legislature to establish a Criminal Court of Record in any county. The jurisdiction of Criminal Courts of Record extends to all criminal cases except capital offenses. The judges of such courts are elected by the qualified electors for terms of four years.

The Legislature has established Criminal Courts of Record in the counties of Dade, Duval, Hillsborough, Monroe, Orange, Palm Beach, and Polk.

JUVENILE COURTS

In accordance with a constitutional amendment adopted at the general election in 1950, the Legislature in its 1951 session passed the Juvenile Court Act, which provides for the establishment of a Juvenile Court in any county or in any district consisting of two or more counties. In those counties where no separate Juvenile Court is established, the County Judge's Court exercises the jurisdiction and performs the judicial functions imposed by the Juvenile Courts Act. Presently, 12 counties have established separate Juvenile Courts which employ 20 full-time judges and three judges who are allowed to engage part time in the practice of law.
Juvenile Courts are vested with exclusive original jurisdiction of dependent and delinquent children under the age of seventeen years, although this jurisdiction may be transferred to the appropriate court which would have jurisdiction of an offense if the child were an adult, at the discretion of the Juvenile Court Judge. When a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with a capital offense, transfer is compulsory.

COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEMS

Each of the sixty-seven counties in the state has a unique court system. This is due to the fact that the original court system was set up by the Constitution of 1885. As the state grew, changes became necessary, and were instituted in a variety of ways. Some courts were added by amending the Constitution. Others were achieved by the legislature under authority granted by subsequent amendments to the Constitution.

Following are charts detailing the jurisdiction and appellate structure of the criminal and juvenile courts of each county. (Figure 2 is the chart for Dade County) The size of the county usually controls the number of different courts, with some of the smaller counties having near-identical court systems.

Basically, each county has at least one judge with committing magistrate powers, a misdemeanor court, a court with felony jurisdiction, a juvenile court, and a circuit court. Appeals are made to the district court of appeal and the Supreme Court. The number of the county's judicial circuit is located in the circuit court block. The county's appellate court district is given in the district court of appeal block.

The court blocks on each chart are connected by lines representing appeal routes. When a caption (such as "Constitutional Questions") is next to a line, this indicates that appeals are limited to the caption descriptions. Uncaptioned lines indicate appeals are allowed on most matters.

The level of each court is also representative of the appellate structure. Lower courts are equivalent in that appeals are normally made to the circuit court. The felony and criminal courts of record take felony appeals directly to the district courts of appeal.

Each chart lists all the local courts up to and including the circuit court, and includes each court's criminal jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURTS

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE . . . . . . . COMMITTING MAGISTRATE
CRIMINAL COURT OF RECORD . . . . . . . ALL EXCEPT CAPITAL
JUVENILE COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . DEPENDENT AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN
CIRCUIT COURT (11TH) . . . . . . . . . . . . . CAPITAL

Figure 2. Dade County Criminal Court System. 1970 Population: 1,267,792.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE

The prosecution of criminal cases in the State of Florida is accomplished by public officials known as prosecuting attorneys. These official representatives of the State include the Attorney General, State Attorneys, County Prosecutors, and County Solicitors. Each office's particular area of responsibility varies from county to county, and there are numerous statutory and constitutional variations. Generally, the Solicitors handle cases in Courts of Record, which always have at least felony jurisdiction. The Prosecutors normally handle cases in the county courts, which generally have misdemeanor jurisdiction. And the State Attorneys work in the Circuit Courts, which always have at least capital case jurisdiction.

Following is a brief synopsis of each official's duties:

The Attorney General and his assistants represent the State in criminal actions before the Florida Supreme Court, the State District Court of Appeals and all Federal Courts.

A State Attorney is authorized for each of the 20 judicial circuits in the State. His duties include representing the State in the Circuit Court.

County Prosecutors represent the State in the County Judge's Court of the County Court.

The County Solicitor is the State representative in the various Courts of Record.

There are numerous exceptions to these basic descriptions. The Constitution and the statutes give many additional and overlapping duties to the state's prosecuting officials. For example, in Dade County and in Duval County, the State Attorney is the prosecuting attorney in the Criminal Court of Record, the County Solicitor's office having been abolished. And in Manatee County the County Prosecutor handles misdemeanors in the County Court and the Court of Record, while the State Attorney prosecutes felonies in the Court of Record and the Circuit Court.

ATTORNEY GENERAL - DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS

The Attorney General of Florida is an elected Cabinet member under the Florida Constitution and heads the Department of Legal Affairs as created by the 1969 Florida Government
Reorganization Act. (See Figure 3) He is the State's Chief Legal Officer, legal advisor to the Governor and performs such other legal duties as may be prescribed by law. The legal authorization for the Attorney General of Florida is Article IV, Sections 4-C and 5-B of the new Florida Constitution of 1968.

The Attorney General derives much of his power from the common law, still in effect in Florida except where modified by the written law. At common law, it is the duty of the Attorney General to appear on behalf of the State in all suits in the appellate courts in which the State may be a party or is in any manner interested. He is also empowered to appear in the courts in behalf of the public's rights. He must prosecute all actions necessary to protect state property and revenue and he may exercise all the power and authority as the public interest may require.

The staff of 37 assistants to the Attorney General work in areas of specialization under the guidance and directions of the Attorney General.

STATE ATTORNEY

The office of State Attorney was created for each judicial circuit of the State. Each State Attorney is an elected official and as prosecuting officer he has four major areas of responsibility, as follows:

1. Duties before the Court. Prosecute or defend in the Circuit Courts of his judicial circuit on behalf of the State all suits, applications or motions (civil or criminal) in which the State is a party.

2. Duties before the Grand Jury. Examine witnesses in the presence of the Grand Jury and act as their legal advisory in any matter before them for consideration. He also prepares the bills for indictment.

3. Assisting the Attorney General of the State. Assisting the Attorney General includes the preparation and presentation of all appeals to a court of higher jurisdiction from Circuit Courts in which the State is a party.

4. Habeas corpus and criminal trials. The State Attorney shall represent the State in all cases of habeas corpus arising in the respective judicial circuits of the state.
Figure 3. Table of Organization: Department of Legal Affairs
The Development of Emergency Mass Arrest Procedures for the Conventions

Dr. Seymour Gelber, a prosecuting attorney from the State Attorney's Office on loan as a special assistant to Chief Pomerance during the pre-Convention and Conventions period, assumed the responsibility for forming sub-committees of the Joint Planning Committee to consider these legal questions. Judge Thomas E. Lee, Jr., Circuit Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, had recently chaired for the Florida Bar Association an Ad Hoc Committee charged with developing a master plan dealing with the administration of justice in major civil disturbance situations.* As the Eleventh Circuit encompassed the Miami Area, and Judge Lee's court was situated in the Dade County Courthouse located in downtown Miami, Dr. Gelber sought to utilize Judge Lee's expertise. At Dr. Gelber's request, Judge Lee agreed to chair a Criminal Justice Procedures Committee (CJPC) to design law enforcement and judicial procedures to use in mass arrest situations. CJPC meetings were regularly attended by Dr. Gelber, representatives from the DCPSD, MBPD, and MPD, the County Manager's administrative staff, Dade County Corrections and

Court Administration Departments, the Dade County Juvenile Court and Division of Youth Services, the Public Defender's Office, the Florida Division of Youth Services, and the American Civil Liberties Union. In June, Circuit Judge Rhea Grossman was assigned to the CJPC to assist Judge Lee. The CJPC first met on March 21. By June 12, the Committee had developed a Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department Emergency Plan for the forthcoming Conventions. The plan outlined procedures for every step of the mass arrest process from field arrest to judicial decisions regarding detention or release of those apprehended.*

The procedures developed were as follows. The County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department would be responsible for the transportation of those arrested from the scene of the arrest to a place of confinement. To accomplish this, three staging areas on the Mainland and one in Miami Beach were established for 27 vehicles and personnel. For instance, the

*Actually, two documents are relevant here: (1) "Rough Draft, Criminal Justice Procedures, 1972 Political Conventions," an early version of the final document listed next, (2) Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department Emergency Plan, submitted by Judge Thomas E. Lee, Jr., Chairman of the Criminal Justice Procedures Committee, to Jack Sandstrom, Director, Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department, on June 12, 1972. Procedures discussed subsequently are drawn from these reports and from interviews/correspondence with those who drafted the plan.
Miami Beach Park Department Nursery on the Bay Shore Golf Course (2300 Meridian Avenue) was the staging area for four Corrections and Rehabilitation Department vans (40 person capacity each), Department drivers and supervisor, and identification teams from the MBPD, MPD, and DCPSD. In addition, four chase cars with drivers from the State Fresh Water Fish and Game Commission and a police sergeant supervisor from the DCPSD were stationed here as well. The identification teams and chase cars were to accompany each dispatched prisoner transportation van.

In mass arrest situations, arresting officers were to complete a specially-developed short field arrest form. Identification units were to take a polaroid photograph of the arresting officer and the prisoner with the identification number on the back of the field arrest form visible in the photograph. Additionally, identification teams were to search the arrestee, and to identify and tag property held as evidence. If these procedures could not be completed in the field, an arresting officer would accompany the prisoner to a processing area. When these identification procedures had been completed, the arresting officer would return to the field.

At the processing area, prisoners were to be segregated according to age and sex. All male arrestees, adult and juvenile, were to be taken directly to the Dade County Jail. Adult female arrestees were to be transported to the Metro Jail Annex (the City Jail). Juvenile females were to be transported separately to the Dade County Jail. When the prisoners were brought to detention centers, an officer in charge was to
take field arrest forms, prepare a special Booking Log and two control cards.

In the respective jails, prisoners were first to be taken to specially selected detention areas. In groups of ten, prisoners subsequently were to be taken to designated courtroom areas. The Officer in Charge was responsible for making sure all appropriate forms accompanied the prisoners. Judges, State Attorneys to represent the State, and Public Defenders to represent the defendant would be on hand. Local lawyers had volunteered to assist both the State Attorneys and the Public Defenders. At these hearings, the judges would either charge the defendants with misdemeanors and/or felonies, or release them. All cases would be heard under Florida statutes. An opportunity to post bond would be given. Defendants unable to post bond or ordered held for a full hearing would be returned to detention locations separate from locations where incoming prisoners were being detained.

If juvenile arrestees were to be released, they would be released to the custody of their parents or to the temporary custody of the Florida Division of Youth Services for transportation to the juvenile's home. Transient juvenile arrestees were to be returned without delay to the jurisdiction where they reside except where serious criminal charges were to be filed. Dade County was to make funds available for the return of these juveniles. An order would be entered directing the reimbursement by the parents to Dade County for the transportation funds expended. Transportation reservations and the delivery of juveniles to the point of embarkation was the responsibility of the Florida Division of Youth Services.
An Emergency Information Center under the direction of Judge Rhea Grossman was set up in the County Jail to disseminate information concerning all arrestees from the time of booking through the disposition of their appearance before a magistrate. Two telephone numbers were made available to the public, one for information on adult arrestees, one for juveniles. Five phones (on a rotary line system) were established for each number. The Metropolitan Court Clerk designated 44 persons of his staff to serve on 12-hour shifts at the Emergency Information Center, 22 on a shift. Records regarding the disposition of prisoners was collected in the Information Center, typed onto forms, and systematized for quick reference by the telephone operators.

Special emergency procedures were also designed. An emergency situation would exist when the number of prisoners being brought to the Dade County Jail rendered it impossible to bring each prisoner before a judge at the County Jail. A less likely emergency possibility was considered to be a situation where the volume of arrestees rendered it impossible to bring prisoners to the Jail itself. The determination that such conditions existed would be made by Jack Sandstrom, Director of the Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department. Subsequent to such a determination, arrangement would be made to bring a magistrate and sufficient Court personnel to outlying areas so each prisoner could quickly be brought before a magistrate. As Judge Rhea Grossman noted:
The sole purpose of the emergency legal procedure was to insure that each individual was brought before a magistrate either at the jail or in an outlying area if the situation arose where it was impossible to transport prisoners to the jail. (Letter to the authors from Judge Grossman, April 3, 1973.)

Also, subsequent to such a determination, an administrative order issued by Marshall Wiseheart, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida on the recommendation of Judge Lee, would direct that all persons incarcerated at the Dade County Jail charged with one or more of certain offenses (loitering or vagrancy, profanity, unlawful assembly, violation of a curfew, and disorderly conduct) or any similar misdemeanor not involving violence or destruction or property be automatically released on their own recognizance upon signing a promise to appear for trial unless the State Attorney designate otherwise. The objective of these procedures was to release from custody those charged with the least serious offenses so that those charged with serious offenses could be brought before a judge and so more normal procedures could be returned to as soon as possible. As a draft of the CJPC Plan noted:

It is recognized that a considerable number of defendants, particularly non-residents, released on their own recognizance pursuant to the emergency procedure, may not reappear for trial. However, in an emergency situation, the objectives of reducing a dangerously overcrowded jail, and of effecting arrests of minor violators which remove them from a disturbance scene, outweigh the goal of assuring subsequent court appearances.
Judge Grossman observed with regard to the provision for such an order by Judge Wiseheart that its purpose was "to enable the jail to operate and carry on its function without overcrowding and without the possibility of having prisoners try to destroy the even flow of our judicial process." (April 3 letter of Judge Grossman)

To facilitate the operation of these procedures, all jury trials and all trials involving the appearance of an officer were suspended in the County and in the Cities of Miami and Miami Beach during the period of the Conventions. Court personnel so released were re-assigned to various duties under these mass arrest procedures.

A Command Center was established in the Director's office on the first floor of the County Jail to oversee all operations related to mass arrests. The Miami Beach Garden Center processing area served as a field command post. Transportation units were equipped with radios which connected them with the tactical frequency. Additionally, a separate radio network of a base station and 15 transceivers was borrowed from the U.S. Bureau of Prisons to provide direct contact with the Courthouse Command Center, the field command post, and mobile units.

A major purpose of Judge Lee's Committee was to insure that exigencies of convention-related security did not result in a breakdown of the legal system in the Miami area. Additionally, the Committee sought to secure legal arrests, to respect the legal rights of defendants, and to provide public information regarding the disposition of arrestees. A primary emphasis was placed on speed and efficiency, in designing the
operation of each step of the mass arrest procedure. Considerable effort was given to attempts to discover in advance potential difficulties and to design remedies. The establishment of the conditions and procedures for declaring an emergency situation, for instance, is evidence of such scrutiny. Universally, the members of this committee were pleased with the results of their planning which they attributed in a large extent to the quality of Judge Lee's chairmanship.

**Arrests Made During the Conventions**

The mass arrest procedures were not utilized during the Democratic Convention. Only two convention-related arrests were made. One demonstrator was arrested at Convention Hall and charged with assault and battery on a police officer. The subject grabbed a police officer and attempted to kiss him. The second arrest occurred when a demonstrator jumped the Convention Complex fence at 17th Street and Jackie Gleason Drive and attempted to open a door and gain entrance to the Jackie Gleason Auditorium. He was originally charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit misdemeanor. The charge was reduced to trespassing; the arrestee was found guilty and placed on six months probation. Both arrests were made by MPD officers and in each instance a van was dispatched to transport the prisoner to the detention facilities. Several times during the Democratic Convention detention vans were dispatched but no arrests were made.
The Democratic Convention after-action evaluation of mass arrest procedures considered the plan functional and recommended no major alterations. However, several minor improvements in procedures were affected in the interim between Conventions. For instance, it was noted that the telephone numbers of the Emergency Information Center were not made sufficiently public during the Democratic Convention. Ruth Kassewitz of the County Manager's Staff made sure that the phone numbers were publicized through the news media during the Republican Convention.

During the Republican Convention, the mass arrest procedures were more seriously tested. On Monday, August 21, there were no convention-related arrests processed through the special procedures. The MBPD made seven arrests of individuals whom they kept at the Miami Beach Jail and subsequently released on bond without notifying the Emergency Information Center as to their names, charges, case disposition, or amount of bond. Information regarding these seven individuals was never filed with the Emergency Information Center. No calls regarding them were received, however, no information was available had it been necessary.

On Tuesday, the following arrests were made: 180 males, 36 females, 11 juveniles. On August 23/24, the totals were: 727 male, 180 female, and 21 juvenile arrestees. Statistical breakdowns of arrestees by sex, disposition of case, and charge are included as Table 1.
TABLE 1

Convention-Related Arrests During the Republican National Convention
(Compilation prepared by Judge Rhea Grossman)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female Arrests</th>
<th>August 22, 1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Female Arrests (Miami Jail Facility)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges: (all misdemeanors)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlawful assembly</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disorderly conduct</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposition:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $50.00 bond</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $25.00 bond</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>released in court on own or in custody</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dismissals</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bonds posted 4; amount collected $200.00. No bonds were reduced; all (9) released on recognizance on the morning of August 23. No convention-related arrestees remained in jail facility by noon on August 23.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female Arrests</th>
<th>August 23/24, 1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Female Arrests (Miami Jail Facility)</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges: (all misdemeanors)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlawful assembly</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contributing to the delinquency of a minor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trashing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obstructing traffic</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disobeying police</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disorderly conduct</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (continued)

Disposition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bond Amount</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>placed on $500.00 bond</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $100.00 bond</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $50.00 bond</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $25.00 bond</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $15.00 bond</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $10.00 bond</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $5.00 bond</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>released in court on own or in custody</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dismissals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bonds posted 60; amount collected $517.00. All bonds were reduced to $10.00 at approximately noon on August 24. None were posted at that time.

All (83) were released on recognizance on the morning of August 25. No convention-related arrestees remained in the jail facility by noon on August 25.

Male Arrests
August 22, 1972

Total Male Arrests (Dade County Jail) 180

Charges: (all misdemeanors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charge</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>disorderly conduct</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obstructing a police officer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resisting officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disobeying officer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defective equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>failure to obey</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resisting arrest</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disposition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bond Amount</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>placed on $250.00 bond</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $50.00 bond</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $45.00 bond</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placed on $40.00 bond</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bond Amount</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$35.00 bond</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25.00 bond</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.00 bond</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1.00 bond</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released in court</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or in custody</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismissals</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bonds posted, 134; amount collected, $3,246.00. All males remaining in custody after bond hearing were transported to Dade County Stockade for evening. All bonds were reduced to $10.00 on the morning of August 23. At this point 159 were released directly from the stockade upon posting bond; 15 were released on recognizance. No convention-related arrests remained in Jail Facility or Stockade by noon, August 23.

Male Arrests
August 23/24, 1972

Total Male Arrests (Dade County Jail) 727

Charges: (misdemeanors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charge</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly conduct</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitting on street</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocking cars</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocking traffic</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach of peace</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstructing street</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusing to move</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trashing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying concealed weapon</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road block</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespassing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault &amp; battery</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful assembly</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocking intersection</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resisting arrest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loitering</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erecting barricades</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disobeying officer</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (continued)

improper change of lane 1
no valid driver's license 1
unauthorized use of 
motor vehicle 1
impeding pedestrian 
movement 1
indecent exposure 1
demonstrations 2
mass sit-in 1
open profanity 1
loitering and prowling 2

Charges: (felonies)

assault with a deadly 
weapon 1
possession of heroin 1
possession of marijuana 1

Disposition:

placed on $3000.00 bond 1
placed on $2500.00 bond 1
placed on $1500.00 bond 1
placed on $1000.00 bond 5
placed on $750.00 bond 2
placed on $500.00 bond 22
placed on $250.00 bond 46
placed on $150.00 bond 16
placed on $100.00 bond 25
placed on $50.00 bond 81
placed on $25.00 bond 45
placed on $20.00 bond 1
placed on $15.00 bond 8
placed on $7.00-$10.00 
bond 120
placed on $5.00 bond 19
placed on less than 
$5.00 bond 14
released in court on own 
or in custody 204
dismissals 116
Table 1 (continued)

Bonds posted 99; amount collected $2,229.50. At 7:00 a.m. on August 25, 1972, a total of 162 males remained in Jail; at 7:00 a.m. on August 25, 1972, a total of 146 remained in Stockade. All were released on recognizance on the morning of August 25, except one serving a thirty day contempt sentence and three felonies booked separately.

Juvenile Arrests
August 22, 1972

Total Juvenile Arrests (transported to Juvenile Hall) 9 male
                                          2 female
                                          11

August 23/24, 1972

Total Juvenile Arrests (transported to Youth Hall) 18 male
                                          3 female
                                          21
                                          32 Total

Final Juvenile Statistics:

transients                        16
Florida residents                 16

Ages:

16 years                         14
15 years                         11
14 years                         5
13 years                         2

released in custody of local parents 11

Charges:

runaway                           4
disorderly conduct                20
unlawful assembly                 6
trespassing                       1
disobeying officer               1
Post-Republican Convention after-action analysis of the mass arrest procedures indicate that in general the process was successful. Some field arrest forms were not properly or completely filled out. With the exception of two or three "John Doe" arrests, every field arrest form was matched with an arrestee. (Judge Rhea Grossman, "Emergency Information Center, Republican National Convention, After-Action Report," September 11, 1972.) On one occasion during the arrests on the evening of August 23, demonstrators attempted to release the prisoners being held in one of the rental trucks at 21 Street and Collins Avenue. The two technicians and truck driver on the scene were able to prevent the prisoners from being released. However, the truck driver and one of the technicians received scalp lacerations in the process. There were complaints that the rental trucks did not have sufficient ventilation. This was especially a problem for arrests made on the afternoon of August 22. Many of those arrested on the evening of August 23/early morning of August 24 refused to post bond and leave jail. In a rather organized fashion, prisoners concluded that no one would leave jail until all arrested were released. However, on the morning of August 25, all prisoners who had not been released (with the exception of one male who was held for contempt of court and 3 felonies booked separately) were released on recognizance and expelled from the jails.

During the early hours of August 25, undercover agents of the DCPSD Organized Crime Bureau who had been assigned to convention activities since December 1971, served several warrants on individuals who had been
active in the leadership of various protest groups. These warrants resulted from cases made during the Conventions; the arrests were predominately for drug-related charges. These arrests were made through normal procedures and did not involve the special mass arrest teams which by August 25 had been disbanded. (Steven Bertucelli, Commander, DCPSD Organized Crime Bureau, "After-Action Report Republican National Convention," August 31, 1972.)

At the end of October, 1972, Metro Judge Robert Deehl dismissed misdemeanor charges against all but 115 of the approximately 900 arrested during the Republican Convention. Public Defender Phillip Hubbart had successfully argued before Judge Deehl that most arrests were not based on warrants properly witnessed. Under the Florida speedy trial law, which specifies that cases must be brought to trial in 90 days or less, the remaining 115 cases had to be tried by November 22, 1972.

On Monday, November 20, the Dade State Attorney's Office set 47 of the remaining 115 cases for trial. However, only two of these 47 individuals appeared at Court. Judge C. P. Rubiera found one of these two, Barbara Slack, guilty of disorderly conduct. However, he imposed no sentence, instead asking Ms. Slack to report back to him in three months. Judge Rubiera ruled that the other individual who appeared for trial was being tried for an offense (refusing to end his sit-in on a Miami Beach street) that did not fit the charge for which he was arrested. Of the other 45 demonstrators, Judge Rubiera confiscated the bonds placed by 20 and officially closed their cases. Bench warrants
were issued for the 25 others who posted no bonds. However, police noted that many demonstrators had given fictitious names when arrested and would be hard to find. A court official was quoted as saying: "Ms. Slack was tried because she showed up and the police officer showed up. She was the honest one of the group." (Miami Herald, November 23, 1972; Washington Post, November 24, 1972.)

On Wednesday, 32 more cases were called before Judge Rubiera but none of the defendants appeared. Of these cases, the Judge confiscated the bonds of the eight defendants who had posted bonds and issued warrants for 20 who posted no bond.

Legal Guidelines

Prior to the Democratic Convention, a manual entitled Guidelines for Demonstrations was prepared under the signature of MBPD Chief Rocky Pomerance, and distributed to all law enforcement personnel who might be involved in convention-related security. The document was drafted by a group including Lionel Barnett, Assistant City Attorney, City of Miami Beach, Colonel Larry Cotzin and Captain Ozzie Kruidenier of the MBPD, Major Richard Shelton of the DCPSD, Captain Eugene Gunn of the MPD, Wayne Hanewicz and Robert Hayes of the MBPD Convention Planning staff. The manual was modeled after a similar manual prepared by Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy for the New York City Police Department.

The document stressed the rights of demonstrators and the need for police to accommodate these rights. While recognizing the possibility
of conflicting rights and the emotional nature of protest situations, a neutral role was prescribed for policemen:

A policeman must give precisely the same treatment to demonstrators supporting causes which he or even the vast majority finds personally or politically obnoxious as he does to those who support the most popular cause. That is, of course, required by the Constitution and our laws. It is also consistent with the American belief in fair play and is a basic principle of professional, effective law enforcement. For once a policeman loses his objectivity, or even appears to do so, his very presence may increase tensions, and then his work and the work of his fellow officers is made harder.

Police were instructed that a demonstration did not convey a license for illegality to demonstration participants. Still, officers were cautioned that making an arrest if demonstrators were violent might "divert limited manpower or be unnecessarily risky and therefore significantly reduce the ability of the police to perform their duties most effectively." In such situations, arrests could be postponed. The arrest of a single violent or few violent demonstrators would not necessarily provide justification to arrest all demonstrators. However, in situations where individuals sought to prevent the arrest of other demonstrators this obstruction is a cause for arrest. Also, there are situations where entire groups may be violent and subject to arrest. However, in all instances, officers were instructed to avoid unnecessary confrontations with demonstrators, to make arrests with the minimum force necessary, and to remain calm.
Patrolmen were instructed not to act unilaterally and to maintain unit/squad integrity at all times. Superior officers were to be at the scene to directly supervise police response. Contact with demonstrators was encouraged:

Whenever possible, discussion should also be had in advance with leaders of the demonstrating group. Contact during the demonstration is useful. The leaders of many groups will understand a particular police problem when explained to them and then can be helpful in reducing tension. This is just a specific example of the general rule that the police role in demonstration situations is most effective when it is understood to be fair. (italics in original)

The law regarding demonstration rights was explained. Angry speech was to be tolerated, although incitement was criminal: "... it may be incitement to shout to the crowd 'let's go right now and burn down the corner liquor store,' but it is not incitement to state facts about or an opinion concerning the liquor store owner which makes the listeners furious and thus possible likely to resort to violence."

Demonstrators had a right to utilize streets and sidewalks; some obstruction to normal pedestrian/traffic patterns was an unavoidable part of demonstration activity. Only when the obstruction presented a serious safety hazard or a determined attempt to block building entrance/exit, for instance, did the legality of the demonstration come into question. Even in such situations, police were encouraged to first ask demonstrators to move, perhaps even suggesting acceptable and reasonable demonstration alternatives. In such situations where judgements of this
type were required (involving place and time of demonstrations, size of crowd, etc.) police were encouraged to consider "the desirability of responsiveness and reasonableness rather than confrontation."

Police were advised that they were likely to be subjected to verbal harassment. However, such behavior was not illegal unless the language was indecent or obscene. In verbal harassment situations, police were asked to keep control of themselves in view of such "criticism" likely to be personally abusive and hard to tolerate:

Such behavior by demonstrators is silly, unrelated to democratic persuasion, and self-defeating -- because it loses support of their cause. That is, it is self-defeating unless policemen over-react to verbal taunts by responding with swinging sticks or flying fists, or by trading taunts. Of course, that is precisely what such demonstrators often want -- to goad policemen into over-reaction so that the impact of the event will be a picture of some young person about to be hit with a club instead of the boring repetition of childish taunts or obscene curses. So an important reason for the rule of self-restraint is that self-restraint and strong unit integrity prevents such demonstrators from achieving that objective.

A constant attempt of the manual was to get policemen to retain some distance and objectivity despite their involvement in tense situations which would be likely to evoke strong personal reactions. With an ability to take a longer perspective on demonstration situations, policemen would be more likely to remain calm and in control. Constantly, the document reminds policemen "not to allow yourselves to be used as pawns." A natural and impulsive reaction might not be the wisest reaction.
Legal Authority of Police Officers in Convention-Related Duty

A recurring question in the early Joint Planning Committee meetings concerned the arrest authority police from contributing agencies could have while on convention-duty in Miami Beach. The discussion got to the point where participating agencies were assured that if necessary they could be deputized to operate on Miami Beach. A legal opinion on the question was sought.

On May 23, 1972, Robert L. Shevin, Florida Attorney General, wrote to State Attorney Richard E. Gerstein, answering that it would not be necessary to deputize the police officers of various agencies who would be performing convention-related duty on Miami Beach. Attorney General Shevin referred to the following Mutual Aid Act sections of Florida Statutes:

(1) Whenever the employees of any political subdivision are rendering aid outside and pursuant to the authority contained in this part, such employees shall have the same powers, duties, rights, privileges, and immunities as if they were performing their duties in the political subdivision in which they are normally employed. (Florida Statutes, Section 23.127(1), Part VII.)

Thus, the Florida Attorney General concluded:

The police officers of other jurisdictions are "employees" thereof within the contemplation of said statutory provision and therefore they would have full arrest powers in Miami Beach while rendering aid there pursuant to the authority contained in said Part VII, without any necessity for being deputized by the City of Miami Beach. (emphasis in original)
The Florida Attorney General also noted that the Florida Mutual Aid Act would apply to the upcoming Conventions even without a determination of an immediate emergency situation. The Act was written to apply to a "state of extreme emergency" which means "conditions of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property." (Florida Statutes, Section 23.122 (1)) Attorney General Shevin interpreted this as follows:

The obvious intent of the Legislature in adopting the Mutual Aid Act was to prepare adequately for civil disturbances before they reach uncontrollable proportions. I do not believe it is necessary for one of the three designated conditions to be in actual progress before the act can take full effect. It is my opinion that local chiefs of police, pursuant to Section 23.125 (e), "may request law enforcement mutual aid from other jurisdictions and agencies in accordance with established procedures;" whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that one of the three conditions is likely to occur in the foreseeable future. That determination is initially within the reasonable discretion of the local chief of police who requests assistance, although his determination can later be overturned in a court of law. In the absence of such a judicial reversal, police officers serving in other jurisdictions and agencies in response to a request by the local police chief under the Mutual Aid Act would retain arrest powers so long as they remain in the jurisdiction pursuant to the Act.

It is my understanding that the facts giving rise to your opinion are occasioned by apprehension over the upcoming National political conventions in Miami Beach. Surely the large number of persons anticipated in connection with the conventions, coupled with the recent history of civil disturbances surrounding the conventions, are sufficient warning signs to warrant requests for mutual assistance by Miami Beach pursuant to Section 23.125 (e).
CHAPTER 10

Third Party Interveners

One result of the social unrest of the last decade is that our society has begun to develop a tradition for the emergence and utilization of third party interveners (individuals or groups) in social conflict situations. In practice, the very use of the term "third party role" has come to suggest an adversary process in which an individual or group seeks to place itself between two contending parties. Thus, those seeking to play a third party role tend to envision themselves as outside the contention which has brought the two adversary parties together.

Several organizations were formed or came to play such third party roles during the political Conventions in Miami Beach. In examining third party roles for this study, we have attempted to provide information about their origin and development as well as their activities during the Conventions. We have chosen to concentrate on what we believe to be the most important groups rather than expend our energy on every third party group which developed. We are aware that our decision is somewhat limiting because hundreds of individuals made significant contributions to convention-related activities. We believe, however, that we have managed to select those individuals and groups that had the most influence on the overall governmental response style and/or the development of events during the actual convention periods.
In reality, the role of third party interveners is nowhere near as simplistic as our initial comments might suggest. First, most social conflicts (or potential conflicts) do not occur in situations in which there are only two parties contending with each other. Thus, what we call a third party for the sake of convenience may actually be a fourth or even a twenty-fifth party. More important, however, is the fact that third party interveners can never be totally outside of the conflict between contending parties because at some point the conflict may impinge upon their own values or access to status, power, and other scarce resources.

Finally, there is a great deal of ambiguity concerning the behavior of third party interveners. In practice, organizations calling themselves third party or crisis interveners range from the Justice Department's Community Relations Service through organizations such as the National Center for Dispute Settlement to community patrols during ghetto disorders. Their specific activities have included:

- efforts to aid one of the parties by increasing their awareness of the situation, by improving their organizational structure, and/or by providing access to information and technical skills;
- attempts to narrow the distance between contending parties through formal negotiation, sensitivity sessions, human relations laboratories, etc.;
observing and recording of the issues at dispute as well as monitoring the interactions between the contending parties; and even providing basic human services such as food, housing, and medical care.

Within the context of this study we have no intention of dealing with all of the issues that can be raised concerning the nature of social conflict, its causes, the alternatives for settlement and resolution, or variations and similarities in its manifestation at different social system levels. Nor do we intend to deal with all of the questions that one could raise concerning third party interveners. An exhaustive treatment of such issues is better left to a more theoretically-oriented study. Nevertheless, we feel it is necessary to provide the reader with a basic conceptual framework against which he or she may view the activities of third party interveners in Miami Beach.

**Intervener Roles**

Throughout this section we will assume the existence of a fairly simple situation in which there are only two participants to a conflict. We will use the term "third party intervener" to refer to any non-participant whose presence or actions influences the relationships between participants and helps shape the outcome of the conflict. Thus, the term "third party" will be used regardless of whether the intervener helps move the conflict toward victory for one side or the other or towards a mutually agreeable compromise.
Also, throughout this chapter we shall rely on Lewis Coser's definition of social conflict as:

A struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which the claims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals. (Coser, 1968, p. 232)

In figure 1, we have attempted to present the developmental sequence of events associated with the social conflict process. At Phase 1 we have a situation in which there may be conditions such as the differential distribution of resources or power or even the failure to share the same social norms or values. However, the parties (individuals or groups) involved accept the legitimacy of these differences. Thus, we have a period of equilibrium that may be identified as providing the potential for social conflict. Whether or not this potential will be realized depends upon a variety of factors ranging from climatic conditions to the emergence of political leadership.

Phase 2 represents the point at which the legitimacy of these differences is rejected by either or both of the parties involved. This phase is also characterized by the emergence of serious difference between them in their assessments of their relative power.* In fact, it is

*By the term power we refer to the ability to influence or produce the desired effect in an opponent even if against his will (coercive). We include within this definition appeals to morality and public opinion as well as the more traditional factors such as legal authority or physical force.
Figure 1. Developmental sequence of social conflict phases.
doubtful whether the legitimacy of existing differences will ever be rejected unless the rejector believes that present conditions no longer reflect the true distribution of power between himself and his opponent. In recent years, we have come to associate the rejection of existing conditions with the actions of societal underdogs such as minority group members, etc. The reader should bare in mind, however, that the powerful may also come to reject existing conditions and initiate efforts to obtain even more benefits for themselves.

Phase 3 represents a period of struggle -- overt contests -- between contending parties during which they test each other's strength and seek to gain an advantage for themselves. Specific activities during this period may range from low key appeals for support and redress of grievances to physically violent attacks upon each other. In fact, different types of activities may occur at the same time. On the other hand, the character and intensity of these activities may vary over time. Thus, it is possible for a conflict to be characterized by physical violence at one point, by non-violent contests at a later date, and then by the reemergence of violent activities. For example, a cease-fire (whether from warfare or verbal attacks) represents a situation in which the adversaries have agreed to restrict the types of activities in which they will engage. Additionally, such settlements tend to usher in a period in which the participants evaluate their position to determine whether or not they are satisfied with it. Such arrangements may or may not lead to the actual resolution of the conflict.
Phase 4 represents the actual resolution or termination of a conflict. This phase is characterized by the fact that both parties have come to an agreement concerning their relative power and the legitimacy of the differences between them. We must emphasize that the resolution of a conflict does not preclude the possibility that another conflict will develop between the same parties. In fact, the resolution phase for one conflict actually represents the conflict potential phase for a new conflict and the beginning of another sequence.*

The behavior of third party interveners in actual social conflict settings is very much dependent upon their own orientation to the conflict and the character of their relationships with the contending parties. In figure 2 we have used these two factors to provide the reader with some

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*The reader will recognize that in reality the developmental sequence is not nearly so direct nor are the distinctions between phases so clear cut. For example, participants in conflict may agree to a settlement convinced that they understand the new balance of power between them only to have one or both parties reinitiate the testing process hoping to gain additional advantages. It is difficult to determine whether this represents the continuation of the original conflict or the emergence of a new one. In addition, the ability to make such judgment is complicated by the fact that either or both parties may agree to a settlement merely as a device to develop their strength and to continue the conflict rather than to end it.
insight into the possible range of third party roles.* Specifically we have used the concepts of partisanship and power to develop a role classification system for third part interveners.

The horizontal axis in figure 2 represents partisanship or the degree to which a third party is an adherent to one of the participants and their cause. This dimension provides insight into the character of the interveners' own orientation to the conflict because the further away from non-partisanship he moves, the greater the convergence of his own goals with the goals of the party he is supporting. The vertical axis in this figure represents the relationship between conflict participants and third party interveners in terms of the power that the intervener is able to exercise over the adversaries. One end of this continuum we have identified

*Technically the term "role" or "role expectations" refers to the pattern of behavior associated with the rights and obligations of a particular status (social position) within a social group. This definition infers that within the group there is at least general agreement on the existence of a position and the behavioral patterns associated with it. Neither of these criteria is necessarily met in terms of third party interveners. In fact, the kinds of interactions out of which recognized social positions emerge are relatively new and we have just begun to consider the rights and obligations that may be associated with them. Thus, what we have now are really first approximations of role development and such roles should technically be called "archetypes" or "proto-roles".
as influence, the ability to affect others through persuasion or example. At the other end we have coercion as characterized by legal authority and/or physical force.*

Using this scheme we have identified seven different third party roles. Three of these roles may be classified as non-partisan: exploiter, intermediary, and arbitrator-enforcer. The four remaining roles involve commitment to one or the other of the participants and are characterized by a focus on that party's realization of its objectives or goals. The primary distinction between the partisan roles involves the degree to which the third party associates itself with the party it is supporting. Briefly, the partisan third party roles are:

**Advocate-Supporter**: one who defends or pleads the cause of one of the participants but who retains his own identity and acts on his own initiative. In fact, he may have almost no contact with the party he is supporting and his influence (if any) is usually derived from his membership in or acceptance by the opponents of the groups he is supporting;

*We are aware that partisan third parties may exercise considerable power over the party they have chosen to support and therefore could be placed much higher in our power axis. They do this, however, at the cost of losing power over the other party. Thus, our placement of them indicates their power in the total system not merely with one of the participants.*
Advisor-Consultant: one who gives technical and expert advice to one of the participants concerning the best ways to achieve his objectives. The advisor-consultant may or may not be personally committed to the specific objectives of the party he is supporting although too great a discrepancy between those objectives and his own will minimize his effectiveness;

Advocate-Champion: one who defends and/or pleads the cause of one of the participants by making their cause his own and acting in their stead (a proxy). His primary function is to provide the group he is supporting with knowledge and technical skills which are lacking among members of the group;

Ally: one who unites or forms a partnership with one of the participants in order to carry on a common cause against the other participant but who retains his own identity and ability to act on his own initiative if so desired.*

Now let us examine the three non-partisan roles: exploiter, arbitrator-enforcer, and intermediary. The primary difference between these three non-partisan roles is determined by the degree of power which the third party is able to exercise over the contending parties and by the

*In contrast to the concept of alliance which implies both wide-ranging agreement and stability over time, it is possible to view the three other partisan roles as representing more limited coalitions between the intervener and one of the participants.
objectives they set for their own involvement. These roles may be characterized in the following manner:

**Exploiter (Tertius Gaudens*)**: one who focuses on the conflict between the contending parties and who attempts to draw personal advantage from it. He may or may not have coercive power over the participants. He is non-partisan because he is not concerned about the welfare of either participant but only in the opportunity to protect and enhance his own interests.

**Arbitrator-Enforcer**: one who focuses on the substantive issues and interests in dispute between the participants and attempts to balance their mutual claims. He has coercive power -- either legal authority or physical force -- and ultimately shares with the participants the responsibility for achieving at least a temporary settlement if not a resolution to their conflict. He is non-partisan because he stands above the particular issues and interests being disputed, and/or because he is equally interested in both participants, and/or because his own vested interests require a settlement or resolution to the conflict.

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*The term "Tertius Gaudens" is derived from the work of the German sociologist Georg Simmel and literally means "the third who enjoys".*

(Simmel, 1950)
Intermediary: one who focuses on the conflict process itself and the relationship between the participants. His primary concerns are to minimize hostile and to maximize peaceful interactions between the participants until they can arrive at a resolution or a settlement that is mutually satisfactory to both of them. He has no coercive power over the contending parties and even his involvement with the participants is dependent upon their approval. He is non-partisan either because he stands above the particular issues and interests being contested or because he is equally interested in the welfare of both participants.

Because most of the third party interveners in Miami Beach attempted to play the role of intermediary it is important that we elaborate upon our description of this role. The most critical characteristic of the intermediary role is that even though the intermediary is non-partisan in terms of the participants, he is not neutral concerning the range of solutions which are acceptable to him. Almost by definition, the intermediary is committed to the principle of compromise and to the development of solutions which are mutually satisfactory to both contending parties. Conversely, he rejects zero-sum definitions of the situation in both its implications - that something harmful to one party must improve the well-being of the other party and the corollary of this argument that anything which improves the well-being of one party must be harmful to the other party. In short, the intermediary is opposed to the notion of "total victory" for either contesting party.
When first considered, the intermediary's devotion to compromise may appear to be the ideal goal for third-party interveners. The reader should be aware, however, that there are some limitations even to this approach. By his mere presence in a situation, the intermediary may contribute to a shift in the distribution of power between the participants -- usually a shift in favor of the weaker party. As a result, the conflict participant which feels his strength has been diminished (or threatened) may view the intermediary's presence as interference and interpret it as an indication of partisanship in favor of his opponent. Equally important is the possibility that intermediaries may become over-committed to the principle of compromise. Because the intermediary is primarily concerned about the character of the relationship between contending parties (and his ability to relate to them) he can become less than sensitive to the principles of "truth and justice" as articulated by the participants.

Despite limitations, third party intermediaries may facilitate -- make easier -- the temporary settlement or even resolution of social conflicts. At the most general level, he helps to convince both sides that they can and should attempt to deal with each other peacefully. In fact, his presence may actually legitimize the exploration of compromise solutions. In addition, he assists by increasing and improving the positive communications between contending parties. Finally, he may help to provide or secure such things as meeting facilities, technical information, and expert skills.
More specifically, the third party intermediary is able to make positive contributions to both the substantive (issue-oriented) and the affective (emotion-oriented) dimensions of social conflict. As indicated above, we define social conflict as being characterized by two separate components: a substantive component of the competition over claims to status, power and other scarce resources; and an affective component, the desire to inflict injury upon opponents. In terms of the substantive domain, intermediaries act as mediators by focusing attention on the substantive issues and attempting to demonstrate that settlement or resolution is mutually advantageous; helping the participants to remain flexible and to consider a variety of alternative goals, interpreting the participants to each other; and, in general, providing the basis for negotiations between the contending parties.

On the other hand, third party intermediaries can also influence the affective domain by acting as conciliators and helping to overcome the hostilities between the participants. In this area of activity the intermediary's contributions may include: providing physical and emotional distance between the participants; helping the participants to overcome their mutual mistrust by bringing them to believe they can communicate and negotiate with each other; neutralizing the emotional factors involved by "objectively" formulating and presenting the issues and interests being disputed; and by offering proposals for potential solution.*

*It should be obvious to the reader that in practice a third party intermediary must be capable of performing the functions of both a mediator and a conciliator in the same situation. Which of the two functions he fulfills at any given time will depend upon many factors including his own definition of the situation as well as the actual behavior of the contending parties.
Until now we have written as if the distinctions between the various third party roles were clear cut, easily recognized, and generally agreed upon ideal types. In reality, the situation is exactly the opposite: the distinctions between roles (particularly adjacent roles) are not clear cut; there is usually a great deal of slippage between roles even for the same actor and we are just beginning to come to some agreement concerning the behaviors associated with each role. Thus, what we really have is an extremely fluid (or dynamic) situation in which any given third party intervener may perform some of the activities associated with one or more of the possible roles* For example, an advocate-champion may also try to improve the relationships between contending parties by encouraging the cessation of overt hostilities, or an intermediary may plead the principle of "justice" as defined by one of the participants.

In fact, the most serious problems faced by third party interveners are often manifestations of what could be called role conflict: i.e., how to act in a manner consistent with the role they have selected for themselves, as well as how to get the contending parties to concur with them as to which role they think they are performing.** These problems occur most often between

*The reader should also bear in mind that there may be great discrepancies between the role an intervener intends to perform and the consequences (functions) that his involvement actually has on the conflict.

**Technically role conflict may refer to different behavioral expectations for the same individual because he occupies more than one role at the same time, or the failure of an individual to behave in a manner consistent with the expectations associated with a specific role, or the lack of agreement on the behavior associated with a specific role.
roles that are adjacent to each other such as, for example, ally and advocate-champion, or intermediary and advocate-supporter. Role conflict problems are particularly acute, however, for intermediaries because they are attempting to act in behalf of the welfare of both participants from a position right in the middle while possessing no coercive power over the contending parties. As a result, to be successful, intermediaries must meet not only their own expectations of their role but also the expectations of both of the contending parties.

In its ideal form, the task of the intermediary is impossible. No one can totally ignore their own welfare forever nor can they be absolutely non-partisan all of the time. What really happens is that intermediaries operate within a range of relative non-partisanship and minimal expressions of vested self-interest. This means, however, that they are always in danger of slipping (or being perceived as slipping) into another role, particularly the adjacent roles of advocate-supporter or exploiter. The primary determinates of such slippage are the degree to which the intermediary is accepted by and/or shares social characteristics with either or both of the contending parties. The social characteristics shared may range from ascribed characteristics such as race or ethnicity, sex, and age, to position-related characteristics including socioeconomic status, norms, values, political beliefs, life style, aspirations, and even physical proximity.*

*Although we do not intend to test it in this study we do offer the following proposition for the readers' consideration: the greater the similarities between intermediary and participant the greater probability of partisanship in his behalf.
Finally, the same resolution of conflict which an intermediary seeks may in given situations be unachievable, at least for a time. Two parties in contention may understand each other fully and what they understand is that conflict between them is necessary and/or desirable. Additionally, the actual distribution of power between two contending parties may be so unclear that one or both parties may view conflict as desirable. In such situations, both parties may view the intermediary as meddling simply because the intermediary does not want them to engage in conflict. Ironically, in such situations, the only unity between contesting parties that the intermediary might achieve could well involve a decision by the contending parties that they will join together to eliminate the intermediary before they engage each other in conflict or perhaps even instead of engaging each other in conflict.

The Interveners: What did they do?

Having presented a model of social conflict in which two clearly identifiable antagonists are overtly contending with each other, the first thing we must do is emphasize that this was not the case in Miami Beach. Instead, there were numerous individuals and groups all of which were capable of falling into or out of at least minor conflicts at any time. At the extreme, however, the situation may be characterized as having two fluid and loosely knit coalitions represented by pro-establishment forces (government agencies, etc.) on one side and by anti-establishment elements on the other.
Modifications in Command Post Beta Operations and the Intelligence Structure and Communications for the Republican National Convention

The various after-action reports analyzing CP Beta Operations and the intelligence structure during the Democratic National Convention were critical for improving procedures for the Republican National Convention. An executive officer within CP Beta was assigned to coordinate all command post operations and to relieve the field commander of all concern that these operations were smoothly functioning. The functions of CP Beta were divided into three major sections: a situation room, an intelligence section, and a communications facility. To begin with, a single tactical frequency was created for the DCPSD, MPD, and MBPD task force units. This frequency was to be used by the field and tactical commanders in communication with the tactical officers of task force units. Thus, when task force units of these three forces were in platoon or company strength, squad units were not to use the tactical frequency unless special permission was given by the captain or company commander in charge. One dispatcher in the CP Beta communications room would handle all communications on this tactical frequency. The FHP and Florida Marine Patrol operated on a separate combined frequency with the same operational instructions and with their own CP Beta dispatcher. The scout units would operate on their own frequency and have their own CP Beta dispatcher. The field and tactical commander would monitor the scout frequency and could use it for brief communications.

The CP Beta situation room revolved about two critical officers: the intelligence officer and the operations officer. The intelligence
CHAPTER 9

Law Enforcement Preparation:
The Criminal Justice System

Early discussions of the Joint Planning Committee revealed uncertainty over various legal questions. What procedures would be initiated in the event of mass arrest situations? What was the status of the law concerning demonstration activity and law enforcement response to protest situations? What powers of arrest would law enforcement personnel from various agencies have when they were on convention-related duty in Miami Beach?

Such questions are of fundamental importance in a criminal justice system committed to principles of individual rights. During the emergency conditions of mass protest or civil disorder, a temptation will always be present to suspend individual rights and to initiate "efficient" procedures for removing people from the streets. In 1968, the Kerner Commission considering the administration of justice during ghetto riots rejected such a solution and insisted that individual rights must be protected even during community crisis conditions:

In a period of civil disorder, it is essential that our judicial system continue firmly to protect the individual constitutional rights upon which our society is based.
side.* Internally, both of these coalitions were subjected to intensive struggles over such things as leadership, goals or objectives, the appropriate means to achieve their goals, and how they should relate to representatives of the opposing coalition. In short, Miami Beach was an ambiguous and confusing setting for the activities of third party interveners.

We must also stress that in general the adherents of both coalitions were committed to avoid violence if not to minimize completely all conflict with each other. Chief Pomerance, for example, had stated time and time again his intention of protecting the rights of free speech and political dissent as well as the rights of Convention attendees while preserving the peace and tranquility of the Miami Beach community. Dissident organizers prior to the Conventions emphasized continually that their only interest was in peaceful presentation of their views. Thus, all third party intermediaries had to do was help the principals achieve their own objectives. As it turn out, even this was not easily accomplished.

Miami Snowplow Company

One of the first third party groups in the Miami Area emerged during the early Fall of 1971, and ultimately called itself the Miami

*Because of the diversity of opinion within them, the terms pro-establishment and anti-establishment are really too strong and too absolute to accurately describe either coalition. Nevertheless, we shall continue to use these designations as a kind of conceptual shorthand.
Snowplow Company. This group was an outgrowth of the Center for Dialogue, a non-governmental youth-oriented social services center furnishing a free medical clinic and abortion counseling service in addition to housing Switchboard, a volunteer drug-overdose-treatment program.* Snowplow's seven member steering committee included the coordinators of the Center for Dialogue, the chairman of the Dade County Youth Relations Board, and the owner of two radio stations with a predominant youth orientation. Snowplow claimed affiliation with over 30 community groups and at the height of its operation claimed 432 volunteer workers.

From the beginning, Snowplow presented itself as a youth-oriented coalition of social service organizations intended to assist non-delegates, visitors, tourists, and youth groups coming to the Miami area for the Democratic National Convention. It identified the following areas as its concerns: housing, food, medical care, legal assistance, child care, communications assistance, entertainment, drug testing, sanitation, and transportation for non-delegates; the training of marshalls -- peace mentors; assistance in police sensitivity training; and a pre-Convention speaker's bureau to acquaint the community with Snowplow and to obtain volunteers and donations.

*The Center for Dialogue's interest in political conventions actually stemmed from the 1968 Republican Convention in Miami Beach when the Center was suddenly called upon to provide food and shelter for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Poor People's March.
Also from the beginning, Snowplow stressed its desire to be non-political -- i.e., not endorsing what people were doing but protecting their right to do it. By our terms, they were trying to perform the role of an intermediary or at most an advocate-supporter.

During the last few months in 1971, Snowplow representatives devoted their activities to initiating contacts with both pro-establishment and anti-establishment organizations and exploring the availability of social services during the Democratic Convention. Early in January 1972, Snowplow sponsored a series of meetings and established several subcommittees to focus on the various problems with which they were concerned. These meetings were widely attended, including representatives of the Dade County Public Safety Department, the Dade County Health Planning Office, the County Manager's office, the Miami and the Miami Beach Police Departments. As a result of these activities, most of the Snowplow leadership became convinced that civil authorities -- particularly the County Manager's office -- were not appropriately concerned about the problems of social services and they spent the next four months trying to push public officials into becoming more active.*

*There are serious questions concerning the amount of attention civil authorities were devoting to the problems of providing human services to non-delegates. According to official records, County Manager Goode had started assigning responsibilities in this area at least as early as March 2, 1972. Members of the Snowplow steering committee have indicated to us, however, that even in early May, County officials claimed they had no plan
Early in 1972, Snowplow's leadership began to experience the repercussions of their non-political position. On one side they were attacked by some officials and many citizens as being at least fools if not subversives for inviting those hard-core trouble-making free loaders to Miami Beach. On the other side, anti-establishment leaders were not convinced about the appropriateness of being non-political. For example, Rennie Davis told a Snowplow meeting on February 10, that issues such as campsites and the training or employment of marshalls were clearly political in character. Thus, he warned, whether they liked it or not, Snowplow was going to be involved in political controversy.

These and similar issues were to be raised again and again over the next few months. By mid-March they had become serious enough that one of the steering committee members circulated the following memo concerning Snowplow operational alternatives:

#1. Snowplow joins an organizational regrouping with the local political groups, i.e., V.Vets, MLF, Fla. Peoples Platform and expresses a clear committment to their ends, the Platform, and against imperialism, racism and sexism. It calls for demonstrations and actions in Miami and identifies its constituency as the powerless counterculture people. It makes an open and definite commitment to the "Movement" and accents a role in coalition decision making with Movement organizations.

but were working on a list of what resources might be necessary -- "either they were fooling us or they were not doing it." It is possible that county officials were fooling Snowplow because they had a close-to-the-vest operational style and avoided committing themselves in public.
Possible results and implications: **BAD**

1. No establishment funding or support.
2. Disengagement by the liberal community.
3. Little or no movement money because committed to San Diego.
4. Co-optation by national movement groups because of the relative weakness of local movement activity.
5. Possible personal harassment and difficulties to Snowplow leadership.
6. Involvement in activities inimical to personal philosophy of present Snowplow persons.
7. Limited aid from WBUS because of political orientation of Snowplow. (reality of FCC)
8. Injury to Center for Dialogue's advocacy and brokerage role for Miami powerless.
9. Little role for Snowplow as an ongoing organization for local people after the Convention.

**GOOD**

1. A voice in the activities planned by local and state action groups.
2. Credibility with the national movement.
3. A cohesive political voice for Miami at the Convention.
4. A coalition of change groups and agencies to continue when the Convention is over.
5. Radicalization of individuals and groups working in this framework.
6. Alteration of the Center for Dialogue's role of "safety valve" for the establishment into a directly political center.
7. Assistance from outside the city to deal with logistical problems.

#2. Snowplow rejects the political role and identifies its constituency as those who either are local non-political youth or incoming unorganized young people, while attempting to offer itself as a service organization to Movement and political groups as well if they can use us. It continues as an autonomous service organization, recognizing that it must cut down its role in communications and marshalling because of the intense political orientation of those activities.

Possible results and implications: **BAD**

1. Distrust by local and national Movement groups, as an arm of the establishment.
2. Difficulties in recruitment of volunteers to work with us for services.
3. Logical scapegoat for local authorities if disaster occurs.
4. Inability to deal with local police and authorities because no clearly identified constituency.
5. No "muscle" to use on outside groups to clear their plans or actions through us.

GOOD

1. Assistance from those official and unofficial areas of the community that see the need for service organization for youth at Convention.
2. A voice for the unorganized counterculture.
3. Unmistakeable tie in with the needs of local youth and minorities.
4. Possible influence and mediators role in conflict between "outsiders" and police establishment.
5. Access to all the "co-optation" efforts of the Dem. Party and the community for Snowplow goals.
6. WBUS as community radio in a full service role.

I believe it to be true that a "neutral" or "nonpolitical" organization is not trusted by the Movement, particularly one where liberals play such a large part. I believe it to be possible that neutrality is an idle fantasy. On the other hand, I also believe that well organized services available to all would not necessarily be ignored by the Movement. While the police can ignore us because we have no constituency to pressure them, they also can trust us in a broker's role for that very same reason. In Chicago, in 1968, the majority of those injured and involved in the violence were local people for whom no movement organization spoke.*

Very quickly, however, Snowplow reiterated its original non-political position. By mid-April this position was being publicized in an official Miami Snowplow Company news release:

*One extremely interesting thing to notice in this memo is that only two alternatives were considered, either a non-political or anti-establishment position. Thus, it articulates what many civil authorities tended to believe, namely that Snowplow was really partisan in favor of non-delegates.
The goal of the Miami Snowplow Company is to insure that the basic services needed to cope with this stress on the community will be mobilized and prepared to react in a positive and generous way which will reflect the community's belief in a peaceful, democratic process that expresses the views of all the people of this land. The Miami Snowplow Company is a non-partisan service agency. Composed of concerned citizens cooperating with numerous other groups, to meet these basic needs: medical care, legal aid, child care, information service, emergency food and special preparatory training for public servants and citizens. We will coordinate these services for whoever needs them.

The shifting of the Republican Convention to Miami Beach only complicated life for the Miami Snowplow Company. The decision to host the Republican Convention definitely increased the probability that large numbers of anti-establishment non-delegates would be coming to the Miami area and would be in need of basic human services. Snowplow's leadership was still convinced, however, that civil authorities had not really begun to face this problem. Moreover, the pressure to choose one side or the other had also increased. From the establishment side (not necessarily public officials) there were increasing attacks on Snowplow as an instigator of and co-conspirator with the anticipated hordes of barbarian free loaders and rioters.* On the other side, non-delegate spokesmen became even more

*Snowplow's credibility with civil authorities may have been weakened however, when they helped some Miami Beach officials secretly bring a non-delegate spokesman to Miami Beach to speak against accepting the Republican Convention. The ability of a so-called non-partisan group to produce a spokesman from the opposing camp may have indicated too much influence or contact with the non-delegates.
insistent that in time of conflict they could not afford to place control of their basic human needs in the hands of so-called non-partisans.

By mid-May, Snowplow became convinced that it was being set up as the scapegoat for anything that might go wrong with the delivery of social services to non-delegates during the Conventions. According to Snowplow spokesmen, this conviction was based on the fact that governmental officials were telling everyone who asked that Snowplow was handling these problems even though many of these same officials knew that Snowplow had no financial resources whatsoever. Snowplow leaders saw this as an attempt by civil authorities to use their organization as an excuse for doing nothing about services for non-delegates while still having someone to blame if anything went wrong.

Having arrived at this conclusion, Snowplow's leaders decided to preside over their own demise and go out in a blaze of controversy if not glory. Thus on May 21, the steering committee announced that they had voted to disband and released the following statement to the press:

There will be tens of thousands of non-delegates who will be coming to Miami this summer. The authorities have not even begun to make any practical, sensible plan for this influx. For four and one-half months of its existence, Miami Snowplow has tried to make clear the extent of the Dade County responsibility which arises from the invitation extended to both major parties. Miami Snowplow was concerned with the conventions that a non-governmental community group was necessary in order to cope with the massive challenge of the coming summer. The response from private citizens, from professional organizations and volunteer groups has been prompt and praiseworthy. The recognition which the media have given to Miami Snowplow's efforts has been gratifying. But the lip service from every branch of government, betrayed as it is by
enforcement personnel assigned to convention complex duty during the Democratic Convention. Better quality food was requested for the Republican Convention. Col. Cotzin announced that a new plan was being formulated for law enforcement manpower deployment during the Republican Convention. MPD Chief Garmire noted a lack of planning on police response if the fence surrounding the complex should be breached. He discussed the Democratic Convention problems of intelligence dissemination and noted that vantage point observers had not been used effectively. He suggested that observers be placed on observation towers within the Convention Complex behind the fence. He recommended that squad leaders and assistants with units assigned to convention complex perimeter duty be given quart-size canisters of mace. Colonel Cotzin responded that planning contingencies were being updated but that no breach of the fence would be tolerated; fifty additional cans of mace were on order. Col. Cotzin also noted that the Republican Convention plans to hold platform hearings on Miami Beach beginning August 14 and the scheduling of double Convention sessions on August 21 and 22 from 1:00 to 3:00 p.m. and 8:00 to 10:30 p.m. presented additional security demands. DCPSD Police Division Chief Lougheed stated that the Presidential complex at Key Biscayne would demand a law enforcement manpower allocation during the Republican Convention. Also he felt more attention should be given to off-session convention complex security. Chief Lougheed also requested a solid commitment regarding State personnel to be assigned to convention duty. The Secret Service announced it would have ten VIP protectee security details during the Republican Convention (2 more
than during the Democratic Convention). Major Reynolds of the FHP indicated that 75 additional Florida Highway Patrolmen and 20 officers from other State agencies would be assigned to convention security, bringing the number of State personnel committed to Republican Convention security to nearly 500. Colonel Cotzin stressed that while the Alton Road Planning Office had continued in operation, only the MBPD and FDLE had assigned representatives in evidence there.

An August 4 meeting of the Joint Planning Committee was chaired by Chief Pomerance. At this meeting, Deputy Chief Zanders reviewed the tentative plans regarding the prepositioning of task force units. Two MBPD officers would be assigned to man each gate of the Convention Complex (14 gates in all). The MPD task force of 150 personnel would be responsible for security of the perimeter fence along Washington Avenue and along half of 17th Street. The DCPSD Task Forces A, B, and D, 273 personnel, would maintain the security of the perimeter fence along the remainder of 17th Street and along Meridian Avenue. The MBPD, 20 personnel, would be responsible for fence security along Dade Boulevard. Additionally, 100 FHP forces would be retained within the Convention Complex "to back up any of the perimeter positions or to provide security to the convention hall, if necessary." This would yield a total of 443 law enforcement personnel prepositioned within the Convention Complex as opposed to the 409 officers so stationed in the Democratic Convention Unified Operations Plan. The major difference between this approach and the previous approach consists in the larger MPD unit assigned to convention complex duty (250 men as
opposed to 27 in the Democratic Convention Unified Operations Plan) and the smaller FHP contingent so assigned (100 men as opposed to 207), with the FHP contingent's Democratic Convention fixed-post fence perimeter duty now being assumed by the MPD so that the FHP contingent could be organized into a mobile task force.

Outside the Complex, Chief Zanders envisioned a 150-man FHP task force stationed at St. Patrick's Church on Miami Beach and another 150-man FHP task force prepositioned in the South Miami Beach area. The MPD task force of 200 personnel and the DCPSD task force of 41 personnel (DCPSD Task Force C) would remain stationed in the City of Miami until needed.

Deputy Chief Zanders proposed that National Guard contingents could be utilized to provide "a security corridor from the hotel areas to the convention complex to insure an open avenue for the delegates to the convention." Paul Rundle, Assistant Deputy Director of the Secret Service, recommended instead that an alternative be developed in case the request for National Guard forces is denied. He suggested that protestors be denied access to Meridian and 17th Street with only Washington Avenue being open for demonstrations. Deputy Chief Zanders felt this could be accomplished with available law enforcement personnel provided the number of demonstrators did not exceed 5,000.

Paul Rundle also noted that intelligence had revealed a greater number of threats upon Republican Convention principals than had been revealed in a similar period prior to the Democratic Convention. The U.S.
Marshal's office announced that it intended to assign 100 of its personnel to convention security.

On August 9, Paul Rundle met with Director Purdy to discuss DCPSD security and escort duty which the Secret Service was requesting in relation to the protection of Republican Convention principals. On August 10, Paul Rundle formalized his requests in a letter to Director Purdy. The most demanding requests were for 50 uniformed DCPSD personnel to be on an immediate ready standby status on a 24-hour basis for Key Biscayne Presidential Compound duty; 25 uniformed personnel to be on a five minute recall ready standby status on a 24-hour basis for the Vice Presidential Compound in Coral Gables; a commitment of the motorcycle task force (Task Force C, 42 personnel) for security, escort duty, and traffic control at Miami International Airport at the time of the Presidential and Vice Presidential arrivals. The availability of the motorcycle task force was also requested for certain scheduled convention-related events.

The only forces available to the DCPSD to fulfill these requests were personnel already assigned to convention-related task force duty. Subsequent to a meeting between County Manager Goode and Chief Lougheed, Director Purdy planned to take platoons from the DCPSD task forces assigned to convention complex fence perimeter duty and transfer them to the assignments requested by the Secret Service. One hundred and fifty personnel from the MPD 200-man task force originally to be stationed within the City of Miami could be re-assigned to take the convention complex duty of these DCPSD forces. Director Purdy envisioned that this transfer would
entail MPD forces assuming fence perimeter duty all along 17th Street. The only other alternatives involved either a request for additional Florida Highway Patrolmen or the activation of the Florida National Guard.

On August 11, a meeting of the Joint Planning Committee was chaired by Chief Pomerance. Regarding the platform hearings scheduled to begin on August 14, Chief Pomerance indicated that the MBPD would assign a 39-man task force unit to the Fontainebleau Hotel as security. He reported that every effort was being made to convince Republican Party officials that single Convention sessions (as opposed to the planned two sessions per day on August 21 and 22) would be preferable from a security point of view. Paul Rundle noted that in addition to the DCPSD forces which the Secret Service had requested, an additional contingent of 6 plainclothes officers and 10 uniform MBPD officers would be needed during the Convention for security outside the Fontainebleau Hotel and 15 uniform MBPD officers for security within the Hotel.

Chief Lougheed suggested that National Guard forces might be utilized to maintain off-session security at the Convention Complex. However, Deputy Chief Zanders reported that General McMillan in a recent meeting with him had indicated that Guardsmen could not be used for this purpose. Colonel Cotzin announced that MBPD intended to assume its Convention posture as of August 19 and encouraged other agencies to do likewise. Major Reynolds advised that the FHP troopers would be arriving in Miami on August 17 and forces from other State agencies would be arriving on August 18 and 19. Chief Garmire said the earliest the MPD forces could
be committed to convention duty was August 21. The CP Beta operations were scheduled to begin on August 19. The up-dated Unified Operations Plan was being finalized and would be available prior to the next planning session. Forty-seven scout teams (as opposed to 16 during the Democratic Convention) would be operational during the Republican Convention.

On August 18, Chief Pomerance chaired a meeting of the Joint Planning Committee. Director Purdy commented that the activities of the Republican Convention scheduled away from the Convention Complex (i.e., at Key Biscayne, the Vice Presidential Compound, Miami International Airport, the Americana Hotel, the Fontainebleau Hotel) would result "in handling various situations in a flexible manner due to anticipated appointment changes." Chief Pomerance noted that the manpower commitment necessary to guard Republican Convention VIPs produced a definite strain on security forces. The Ft.Lauderdale Police Department had been asked to supply personnel to assist in off-session convention complex security. Two Convention sessions definitely would be held on August 21 and 22, necessitating longer working shifts for assigned personnel. On the brighter side for security personnel, County Manager Ray Goode announced that the Florida National Guard would deliver hot meals and box lunches to security personnel with convention complex duty. The quality of the food had been greatly improved.

On the morning of August 19, Deputy Chief Zanders in a meeting at CP Alpha outlined for the command personnel of participating agencies the updated Unified Operations Plan which he had prepared. On the afternoon of
August 19, subsequent to the MBPD taking command of the Convention Complex, a meeting was held at the Jackie Gleason Auditorium to review security measures with representatives of local, county, State, and Federal law enforcement personnel. Task force commanders, platoon and squad leaders, as well as top departmental personnel attended. Deputy Chief Zanders announced the tactical assignments as follows:

1. **City of Miami Police Department** - North to south along Washington Avenue and west on 17 Street to Gate #9 - 165 men

2. **Dade County Public Safety Department** - West on 17 Street from Gate #9 to Meridian Avenue, Meridian Avenue north to Dade Boulevard - 128 men

3. **Miami Beach Police Department** - Dade Boulevard/Collins Canal east to Washington Avenue - 7 men

4. **Florida State Composed Standby Task Force** - Within complex - 95 men

5. **Florida Highway Patrol** - Platoon/Squad configuration stationed at St. Patrick's Church - 148 men

6. **State Composed Standby Task Force** - Stationed at the V.F.W., Miami Beach - 150 men

7. **Miami Police Department Standby Task Force** - Stationed in the City of Miami - 200 men

8. **Dade County Public Safety Department** - 42 man motorcycle task force - will be assigned on a daily basis in accordance with Republican V.I.P. activities

9. **Dade County Public Safety Department** - Key Biscayne, Presidential Compound, 100 men or 50 men per 12 hour tour

10. **Dade County Public Safety Department** - Fontainebleau detail - 30 men or 15 men per 12 hours shift

(quoted in a memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, August 21, 1972, subject "Planning for the Republican National Convention.")
This configuration provided for the release of certain DCPSD forces from convention complex duties as requested by the Secret Service without pulling any of the 200 MPD task force from the City of Miami.

The DCPSD minutes of this meeting also record a discussion of the protection of the convention complex perimeter fence. Director Purdy stated that the use of mace and/or gas would be a supervisor's decision depending upon extenuating circumstances (e.g., a breach of the fence). "Gas will be used when all other means of containment have been exhausted, and again, this will be the decision of the highest ranking supervisor on the scene." The State Composed Standby Force would be assigned to backup of any breach of the fence which could not be held by perimeter forces. The DCPSD Task Force A would be responsible "for keeping the delegate entrance gates located on the Meridian Avenue side open for traffic at all times."

Off-session security would primarily be provided by a force of 60 Fish and Game Commission Officers and a small contingent of DCPSD and MBPD officers. The FHP and Florida Marine Patrol personnel would be housed within ten to fifteen minute response time and could be called as reinforcements for the off-session security forces at the Convention Complex. The Secret Service would supply 50 agents to protect the Convention Hall during off-session hours.

The Florida National Guard was planning to station 800 Guardsmen at the Miami Beach Senior High School across Dade Boulevard from the Convention Complex. If a disturbance occurred in the City of Miami, the
Guardsmen could replace the forces within the Convention Complex. "In this case, the local and state police agencies will patrol the city and quell any disturbances caused by dissident movement groups." The escalation of perimeter fence forces was to depend upon "the size of dissident groups milling around the fences and entrance posts." (Memo from Chief Lougheed to Director Purdy, August 21, 1972, subject "Planning for the Republican National Convention.")

The Republican Convention Unified Operations Plan specified manpower assignments as follows:

A. Task Force "Beach"

As during the Democratic National Convention, Task Force "Beach" was to be a combined unit commanded by Chief Pomerance and its primary responsibility was to be convention complex perimeter security. Its composition was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Platoon #</th>
<th>Compliment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MBPD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>128 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>165 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>95 officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

393 officers
B. Task Force "County"

This unit was to be commanded by DCPSD Director E. Wilson Purdy and was to be staged within the City of Miami at the Director's discretion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Platoon #</th>
<th>Compliment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41 officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Task Force "City"

Task Force "City" was to report to MPD Chief Bernard Garmire to be staged in the City of Miami at his discretion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Platoon #</th>
<th>Compliment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200 officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Task Force "State"

This unit was to be composed of personnel from the FHP and the Florida Marine Patrol and was to report to Field Commander Rocky Pomerance. The entire force would be mobile with all officers assigned to police vehicles. Thirty-six vehicles would stage at St. Patrick's Church at 3700 Meridian Avenue, Miami Beach; 36 vehicles would stage at the VFW Clubhouse on 650 West Avenue, Miami Beach. Its primary mission was "timely response to unusual occurrences that originate in areas outside the convention complex."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Compliment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FHP and Florida</td>
<td>2 units of</td>
<td>296 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Patrol</td>
<td>36 vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This arrangement provided the following distributions of forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th># of officers staged on Miami Beach</th>
<th># of officers in the City of Miami</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Beach&quot;</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;County&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;City&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;State&quot;</td>
<td>296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 930 officers

(Abstracted from the Unified Operations Plan written for the Republican Convention by Deputy Chief Theodore Zanders, Metropolitan Washington, D. C., Police Department.)

The additional state commitment and a slightly larger MPD commitment increased the total number of officers available for Republican Convention duty as opposed to Democratic Convention duty. The major difference in the two Unified Operations Plans pivots around disposition of the State forces. For the Republican Convention, fewer State forces were assigned to Task Force "Beach" convention complex perimeter duty. Instead, the State officers removed from convention complex duty were combined with the additional State personnel to form the 2-unit Task Force State, a mobile response force with one unit staged where during the Democratic Convention a unit of Task Force Beach had been staged and the second unit staged where during the Democratic
Convention a unit of Task Force City had been staged. The DCPSD and MPD personnel thus freed were then reassigned to Task Force Beach convention complex perimeter security. This process resulted in releasing the DCPSD personnel which had to be assigned as requested by the Secret Service. These juggling of personnel can be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DCPSD personnel</th>
<th>Democratic Convention</th>
<th>Republican Convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Beach (convention complex)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force County (staged in Miami Beach)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force County (staged in City of Miami)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>259 officers</td>
<td>169 officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MPD personnel</th>
<th>Democratic Convention</th>
<th>Republican Convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Beach (convention complex)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force City (staged on Miami Beach)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force City (staged in City of Miami)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>303 officers</td>
<td>365 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State personnel</td>
<td>Democratic Convention</td>
<td>Republican Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Beach</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(convention complex)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force State</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(staged on Miami Beach)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249 officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>391 officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MBPD personnel</th>
<th>Democratic Convention</th>
<th>Republican Convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Beach</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(convention complex)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By making an increase of approximately 150 State personnel and about 150 MPD personnel assigned to task force duty, even given the withdrawal of 100 DCPSD personnel for duty as required by the Secret Service, the total task force size increased by 100 men. Approximately the same number of forces were left staged in the City of Miami. The effect of the juggling was more force mobility as the State forces staged in the City of Miami Beach during the Republican Convention were more mobile than the DCPSD and MPD forces so staged during the Democratic Convention. Even within the Convention Complex, Deputy Chief Zanders' August 19 discussion of force utilization indicated that the 95 State officers assigned to Task Force Beach would be held in reserve as a mobile reinforcement unit instead of being assigned fixed perimeter security duty.

The Republican Convention Unified Operations Plan (much more completely drafted than the Democratic Convention Plan) specified security assignments within Convention Hall. The purpose of this internal security detail was:
... to insure admittance to those persons possessing proper credentials, to protect honored persons and distinguished guests, to maintain order on the convention floor in conjunction with the Sargant-at-Arms, Republican National Committee, and to protect property and promote the general welfare of all persons in attendance.

Manpower allocations to the internal security detail were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBPD</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Beverage</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An outside security detail was charged with the following assignment:

... to assist the Andy Frain Agency in initially screening those persons seeking admittance on proper credentials, to maintain order at the entrance gates, to secure or open individual gates, as directed by proper authority, and to safeguard vital installations and property.

Forty-eight MBPD officers comprised the outside security force. A traffic and parade escort force was established to operate within the Convention Complex and to handle traffic flow within the City of Miami Beach as demonstration conditions might demand. These duties required a force of 84 officers and cadets from the DCPSD, MPD, and MBPD. Twenty-eight miscellaneous fixed-post assignments mostly in the Convention Complex and the Octagon Towers were assigned, given predominately to State Beverage Agents. The general duty portion of the MBPD was assigned into 2 shifts,
an A shift of 41 officers to work from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., and a B shift of 34 officers to work the remaining 12 hours. The total manpower allocation of these non-task-force security details (including the MBPD normal patrol assignments) was distributed as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MBPD</td>
<td>165 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCPSD</td>
<td>36 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>48 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverage Agents</td>
<td>24 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>273 officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the majority of MBPD officers fulfilled either non-task-force security convention-related assignments or normal patrol duty. In all the plans proposed, the percentage of the MBPD assigned to specifically convention-related duty (i.e., excluding the normal patrol assignments) had consistently been lower than the similar percentage-of-total-force commitments made by the MPD and the DCPSD. While the MBPD force was the smallest of the three, there seems to have been greater reluctance to reduce its normal patrol capability. This seems consistent with a concern that Miami Beach would suffer the most disruption of community order during the Convention period, or at least to reflect a decision that the primary local, county, and State law enforcement response capability would be invested in Miami Beach.
As far as we know, the operations and firearms policies articulated prior to the Democratic Convention remained operable during the Republican Convention.

**Modifications in the Communications System for the Republican Convention**

The various after-action reports analyzing the communications system in operation during the Democratic Convention were critical for improving procedures for the Republican Convention. To begin with, a single tactical frequency was created for the DCPSD, MPD, and MBPD task force units. This frequency was to be used by the field and tactical commanders in communication with the officers of task force units. Thus, when task force units of these three agencies were in platoon or company strength, squad units were not to use the tactical frequency unless special permission was given by the captain or company commander in charge. One dispatcher in the CP Beta communications room would handle all communications on this tactical frequency. The FHP and Florida Marine Patrol operated on a separate combined frequency with the same operational instructions and with their own CP Beta dispatcher. The scout units would operate on their own frequency and have their own CP Beta dispatcher. The field and tactical commanders would monitor the scout frequency and could use it for brief communications.
CHAPTER 8

Law Enforcement Preparation:

The Development of an Intelligence System

From the beginning of their various involvements, one of the major problems faced by government officials was to obtain reliable information "intelligence" on the scope and character of potential protest and/or possible violent activities during the national political Conventions. Such information was critical to law enforcement officials because of its importance to the creation of their operations plans. As events developed, however, this information also became important to civilian officials. For example, information on the number of non-delegates expected in Miami Beach and the general character of their intentions was a critical factor in the decisions to allow them the use of Flamingo Park as a campsite. In this Chapter we will attempt to provide some insight as to how this information need was met.

What is "Intelligence?"

Before turning to a description of the intelligence system which ultimately emerged for the '72 Conventions, we believe it is necessary to provide the reader with some idea of what is meant by the term "intelligence." Our reasons for this decision are two-fold. First, in common usage there is confusion about the term "intelligence" because its meanings range from reference to a specific piece of information to the description of the activities of specific individuals and/or organizations. Second, for most
Americans -- including law enforcement officials -- the term "intelligence" is extremely limited because it tends to conjure up deep dark secret images of spies and counterspies. Because of the nature of this study we will focus attention on the intelligence process as it relates to political demonstrations, the activities of "extremist" groups, and the occurrence of civil disorders. The reader should bear in mind, however, that merely by changing the character of the target individuals or groups this process can be made apply to such diverse activities as organized crime or foreign espionage.

In its broadest use, the term "intelligence" refers to the complicated process through which raw information is converted into reliable descriptions of existing conditions in the area being studied. In turn, the end products of this process often are developed into assessments concerning the probability of future events and decisions regarding immediate operational decisions.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police has utilized this concept in their manual on civil disorders:

Intelligence is not the same as mere information. Intelligence is derived from information through a special process or system. Items of information taken singly, are not much more than simple data. Through simple and continuous examination of these individual items -- considering their time and space relationships -- we very often gain insights into their larger and more significant meaning. This process is intelligence. (Smith and Kobetz, 1968, p. 14)

The U.S. Department of Justice has been even more explicit in its description of the intelligence process:
Accurate and complete information is essential for the planning necessary to achieve peaceful demonstrations and for dealing with disorders. It is not only important to know how many are coming at a particular time, but who they might be and why they are coming. This kind of relevant information is freely available to anyone; it is only necessary to collect it in one place and, having collected it, to evaluate it in order to make value judgments and to formulate a plan of action. To provide the concerned departments and agencies with reliable information there has been established within the Department of Justice an Interdivisional Information Unit (IDIU) and an Intelligence Evaluation Committee. Whenever the information indicates a large demonstration may occur, all intelligence concerning that potential demonstration is reviewed by the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. The Intelligence Evaluation Committee is composed of officials of the Executive Branch experienced with demonstrations and in assessing the potential for disorders. The Intelligence Evaluation Committee weighs all of the available information and reports its conclusions regarding the potential for disorder to the Attorney General. (Federal Handling of Demonstrations, Hearings before Senate Subcommittee on Administration Practice and Procedure, 91st Congress, 1970, pp. 52-53.)

The major components of the intelligence process are:

Collection: the gathering of information -- regardless of its sources;

Evaluation: judgments concerning the validity of the information and the reliability of the source;

Collation: the systematic ordering and storing of isolated pieces of information so as to maximize the possibility of discovering relationships between them;

Analysis: the assembling of bits and pieces of information from many sources and putting them together in such a manner as to show pattern and meaning;

Reporting: the reduction of all elements in the process to an oral or written form;

Dissemination: the distribution of the finished product (report) to appropriate individuals or organizations where they will be used;

Reevaluation: continual assessments of the effectiveness of the system. (Godfrey and Harris, 1971)
Nor are intelligence activities limited to the hidden world of secret agents and spies. The International Association of Chiefs of Police, for example, lists the following sources as possible channels of information concerning community tensions and civil disorders:

- uniformed beat and traffic men;
- detective, juvenile, and community relations personnel;
- community leaders;
- community organizations and agencies;
- minority group leaders;
- public news media staff;
- labor and trade union personnel;
- businessmen;
- school officials and students;
- allied agencies, such as parole, probation, welfare, etc.;
- informants;
- rumors. (Smith and Kobetz, 1968, p. 16)

The United States Army has a similar listing of possible sources of information on civil disorders:

- civil law enforcement agencies at Federal, state and local levels;
- newspapers, magazines, radio, television, and other news media;
- maps and photographs;
- aerial reconnaissance;
- ground reconnaissance, and patrol observations;
unit personnel who reside in area;
military units and/or personnel stationed in area;
civil defense and related organizations;
individual members of the task force. (U.S. Army Field Manual No. 19-15, March 1972, pp. 6-8.)

In general, information sources can be grouped under one of two categories -- overt or covert -- according to the means by which the information is collected. Overt sources include: regular police activities, other agencies' public documents, and the media. Covert operations involve the collection of non-public information on subjects who are not aware of these activities. Covert sources of information include:

physical surveillance -- observation of target subjects;
extronic surveillance -- observation of target subject with electric equipment -- including eavesdrop, body recorder, camera, and wiretap;
informers -- associates or friends of the target subject(s) and/or members of the target organization (not a regular member of a law enforcement agency although he may be paid for his services);
infiltiration -- the use of regular law enforcement officers as undercover agents.

Law enforcement officials also tend to agree on the kinds of information that are needed. In its manual on civil disorders the International Association of Chiefs of Police emphasized the need for information about:
community:

probable cause of disturbances;
composition of groups who will be involved;
location of disturbances;
known leaders or organizations who may become involved;
estimated number of people who may become involved;
organizations and individuals who are active in the community;
prominent individuals living in the community who may influence
the crowd;
possible locations of arms, equipment, and supplies available
to groups;
temper of groups;
objectives or purposes of groups;

preplanning:

location of assembly areas for crowds;
types of buildings in area;
type of area involved, topographical features;
location of all important buildings;
location of fuels, explosives, arms, equipment and supplies
which if left unguarded might be seized and utilized
by rioters;
condition of streets and routes into area;
location of premises vulnerable to looting;
access routes;
medical facilities in the vicinity, night illumination available,
diagrams of public utility systems;
fire stations;
likely screening or check points;
potential command post sites;
possible escape routes for crowd or officers;
location and type of traffic devices in the vicinity;
possible mobilization, staging or rest areas for disorder
control personnel;
vital or sensitive institutions requiring protection;

disturbance period:

establish the cause of the disturbance;
identification of leaders and groups involved;
ongoing reports on the activities of participants;
ongoing reports on the scope and magnitude of the event. (Smith
and Kobetz, 1968, pp. 16-20)

Similar recommendations on the types of information needed have been
made by the U.S. Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Internal Security Division of the Justice Department and [before the Army was forced out of the domestic intelligence business] by the U.S. Army's Directorate of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations (DCDPO).

Despite the wide range of material involved, information entering an intelligence system may be placed in one of two categories -- tactical or strategic -- depending upon how it is used. By "tactical intelligence," we refer to information about target subjects -- usually their present activities, plans for the immediate future, etc. -- that is, information used to design immediate responses to achieve the immediate objectives of its possessor. By "strategic intelligence" we refer to information regarding the target's capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities that is used by its possessor to develop long range plans for dealing with the target subject(s). The reader should note, however, that the distinction between tactical and strategic intelligence is not absolute. In fact, there tends to be multiple use of information depending upon factors such as when information is collected and the objectives of those who have obtained the information.

The Establishment of an Intelligence Structure for the Democratic National Convention

In general, local law enforcement agencies are not capable of carrying out large scale intelligence operations, particularly if a situation has national ramifications and involves political dissidents. Prior to the summer of '72, Dade County law enforcement agencies shared this limitation with most of their counterparts throughout the country. This was not a
matter of competence but rather a reflection of the fact that they are not
normally called upon to perform such tasks and as a result have not developed
their capabilities in this area. Under normal circumstances, the
"intelligence" operations of local police agencies tend to be limited to
vice squads and/or organized crime bureaus and to be focused on the day-
to-day criminal investigation needs of the department. Thus from the very
beginning there was a critical need to create an intelligence system which
would provide reliable information concerning the range and character of
protest groups that might be present at the Democratic National Convention.
This need was greatly magnified when the Republican National Committee
decided to move their Convention to Miami Beach.

From very early in the planning process, many different agencies
other than the MBPD were involved in the collection of information
regarding possible dissident activities in the Miami area during the
Democratic Convention. For instance, the FDLE initiated some intelligence
activities during the Fall of 1971. On November 9, 1971, Chief Pomerance
met with representatives of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to
discuss the problems of intelligence gathering. By December, the
Organized Crime Bureau of the Dade County Public Safety Department* had

*The Organized Crime Bureau is the unit with the Public Safety
Department which is normally responsible for investigations regarding and
the gathering of intelligence concerning the enforcement of vice and narcotic
laws and for investigating the criminal behavior of activist groups.
begun compiling information on militant groups and others planning demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention and assignment of personnel to undercover operations. At the same time, Federal agencies such as the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Justice Department's Internal Security Division continued their normal involvement in terms of domestic intelligence activities.

Some of the major problems faced by government officials stemmed from the fact that so many different agencies were involved with their own intelligence system. Would these agencies openly share information? Would they compete with one another regarding whose information (and, by deduction, whose agency) was the best? In the absence of cooperation would a bias operate to generate more threatening information because the agency with the most threatening reports might attract the most attention?

In a larger range view, cooperation was in the best interests of all agencies involved because it could produce the best intelligence. Moreover, if all agencies worked together to generate combined intelligence reporting, then each agency would no longer risk its reputation in isolation. On the other hand, an agency could still have its professional competence challenged by having some of its information questioned or even denied by another agency. Finally, even if a combined operation were created, there was no assurance that agencies would really participate rather than continue to rely on their own isolated system.

Throughout the early months of 1972, most intelligence activities were carried out separately by the various agencies involved. The major exception to this approach involved the efforts by Federal agencies to keep
Miami Beach officials informed of developments on the national level. Beginning in the first week in March, participating agencies initiated a series of intelligence meetings to exchange information and to make decisions concerning operational procedures, information flow, systems of communications, fundings, manpower commitments, and evaluation and dissemination procedures. The importance of these inter-agency meetings was greatly increased in April when it became known that the Republicans wanted to move their Convention to Miami Beach.

One of the products of these inter-agency meetings was the decision to conduct intelligence activities at three separate geographical levels: the entire United States, the State of Florida, and Dade County itself. Primary responsibility for these levels was assigned to:

**United States:** Federal Bureau of Investigation
    U.S. Secret Service
**Florida:** Florida Department of Law Enforcement
    Florida Highway Patrol
    Florida Division of Beverages
**Dade County:** Dade County Public Safety Department
    Miami Beach Police Department
    Miami Police Department

According to the **MBPD After-Action Report** for the Republican Convention:
By separating the intelligence gathering into the three geographical areas enabled the Intelligence Center to provide comprehensive strategic and tactical intelligence reports on all non-delegate groups. These reports also reflected the methods by which national protest organizations organized their activities and tied their efforts together with the state and local protest organizations. In analyzing all reports from the three geographical areas it was possible to accurately predict numbers of non-delegates, their movements, and their plans.

This arrangement also tended to minimize inter-agency competition by assigning each agency primary responsibility within its normal jurisdiction. Early in May, public officials moved toward greater coordination of intelligence activities under the direction of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The selection of the Department of Law Enforcement to play this role was most reasonable; the FDLE had considerable experience in the intelligence field and control remained in the hands of a non-Federal agency. Through its Division of Intelligence and Information, for example, the FDLE:

... maintains an active intelligence capability in both the area of militant or extremist groups and organized crime and racketeering.

Militant and extremist intelligence activities have been designed to assess potential problem areas, and to provide law enforcement agencies having prime responsibilities to maintain order an accurate assessment of the problem. Another of the most important responsibilities of this capability is to assess for the Governor the true nature of requests for State uniformed assistance and/or National Guard by local authorities or at the Governor's initiative.

The Department has developed the Florida Crime Information Center (FCIC) which provides a statewide information system for law enforcement agencies and an interface to the FBI for over 250 terminals throughout the State. (Abstracted from official description of FDLE functions.)
Under direction from Governor Askew, the Department of Law Enforcement began to develop a plan for the coordination of intelligence activities for the Conventions. This plan called for:

I. INTELLIGENCE CENTER

This operational function will provide a central facility for each law enforcement agency represented to develop and revise collection plans; evaluate and exchange information; and develop assessments upon which command decisions for immediate responses to potential problems affecting the security of the candidates and/or the general safety and public welfare of the surrounding area can be made. This facility will house the intelligence communications center and is to be situated in the basement of the Miami Beach Convention Hall. The facility space is being provided by LEAA.

II. FDLE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FUNCTION

The Intelligence Support Function is designed to provide a strategic or long-range assessment of problems in relation to the above mentioned responsibilities. This function will produce a more complete analysis of activity rather than a tactical solution to an immediate problem. Response on a strategic basis allows a course of action to be prepared, affecting potential problems which may arise. This function will be separate from the Intelligence Center and will be staffed and controlled by FDLE on a 24-hour basis. This is an extension of the analysis function that began in early 1972, in regard to the Democratic Convention.

III. FDLE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION TEAM

This area of operation is designed to develop intelligence information regarding the intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of extremist groups in the South Florida area. This will be achieved through penetration, surveillance and the developing of confidential sources.

Figure 1 presents the intended flow of information under this plan for coordinated intelligence activities. This diagram makes it clear that each participating agency would maintain the independence of their operational units while contributing information to and receiving information from a
Figure 1. Proposed intelligence flow in the Florida Department of Law Enforcement's Plan for a combined intelligence operation.
combined intelligence center. Within the center, representatives of all the agencies would participate in evaluation and analysis activities.

By June 14, a combined intelligence center was established in the basement of the Jackie Gleason Auditorium in the Convention Complex. At this point weekly summaries of combined intelligence were prepared for command personnel. These reports attempted to present information regarding dissident plans for protest, their capabilities regarding the number of people various groups might be able to draw and the potential of these individuals and groups for disruptive action. By July 3, the preparation of intelligence summaries became daily. On July 6, the intelligence center became operational on a 24-hour basis for the duration of the Democratic National Convention.

Once the Democratic Convention had begun, law enforcement commanders realized that while intelligence units had generated information regarding the planned activities of groups under observation, there was no system for monitoring the actual movement of groups and individuals once demonstrations had begun. To fill this gap, after two days of the Democratic Convention, a scout system was established whereby 16 scouts were put in the field (with automobile mobility and a special scout communications frequency) to report on group activity to Command Post Beta within the Convention Complex. Scouts were deployed in two fashions. Some were assigned to zones at "high risk" areas (such as Flamingo Park) where the need was continual. Others were assigned on a roving basis "to move with crowds and problems." The assignments of the roving scouts were flexible and were coordinated by a scout coordinator in the intelligence section of the Beta CP situations room.
Lt. John Konstanturos, Law Enforcement Special Consultant from the Los Angeles Police Department, submitted a detailed Democratic National Convention After-Action Report to County Manager Goode in which he gave careful consideration to the operation of the intelligence system prior to and during the Democratic Convention. His report contains a detailed analysis of difficulties in the flow of intelligence information during the Democratic Convention. The initial days of the Democratic National Convention revealed several serious problems in this regard. For instance, inter-agency intelligence cooperation was initially lacking:

Practically all of the federal, state, and local police and military organizations participating during the Democratic National Convention were involved in gathering and forwarding strategic intelligence. Several were participating somewhat, in the gathering of tactical intelligence, but there was little forwarding to the persons who needed the information most -- the tactical commanders. The tendency for intelligence personnel to service their respective agency, without consolidating and comparing information has already been described in preceding comments on the command posts. Particularly during the first two days of the Democratic Convention, the compartmentalization and concomitant duplication of intelligence activities was monumental. Yet the sum total of information produced was not available with a single source.

... Coordination of the multi-agency participation in the strategic intelligence system is a massive challenge. Each intelligence group understandably has a responsibility to inform officials in their respective agency, and other top officials higher up the ladder -- officials to whom the agency itself is responsible. There exists a natural tendency to make a good impression, and in many instances to virtually justify ones existence. The result is an intense air of competitiveness which in some respects is beneficial, but generally complicates coordination and control.

However, if each of these officials is the recipient of partial, hurried, and unverified information, then the intelligence system has failed. This observation is also true of tactical intelligence.
Particular problems developed in regard to the dissemination of tactical information during the operational time of the Convention itself. Consider, for example, the problems related to intelligence flow to the Area CP. Initially, County Manager Goode was relying upon information provided from the DCPSD and from field observation operations utilizing 20 members of the Dade County Community Relations Board (CRB) organized in five squads of two two-man teams. The County Manager's staff code-named those "X-ray Units" and directed the mobile two-man teams to locations of potential tension. The X-ray units were in radio communication with the County Manager's staff at the Area CP. As Lt. Konstanturos noted regarding the intelligence received by the Area CP:

... effective information flow systems were not functioning within the Intelligence Center and the Miami Beach Command Post until the latter part of the second day of the Convention. As a result, information flow to the area C.P. was fractional, sparse, uncoordinated and uncontrolled. Reports were being forwarded by several sources, but primarily by the RDLE 2740, and separately by the Dade County intelligence officer. No one had access to the complete picture. An evaluation of the information forwarded during the first day and a half revealed that those forwarding the information separately had access to less than half of the significant information.

As a result, the Area Commander was relying on the information from PSD intelligence from the beginning, and continued to do so throughout the Convention. Unquestionably, during the first day and half that might have been the best source -- despite the fact that information was far from complete. However, once information flow had been routed from the communications room, the Intelligence Center, the scouts, and the operations officer to the Intelligence Officer in the Beta C.P. situation room, all significant information was available in that room. That was the only location where the entire picture, or at least most of it was available.

There was thereby an opportunity created for coordinating and controlling the dissemination of all information through a single source, for minimizing duplication and controlling rumors. Accordingly it is from that single source that information should flow to the Area C.P. Although there are still some
deficiencies to be corrected at both the Beta and Alpha C.P.'s, by the end of the second day information was beginning to flow much more accurately and efficiently from that single source to the Area C.P. Primarily information was being forwarded by the 2740, telephone, and by monitoring the scout frequency by the Area C.P. intelligence officer.

Subsequent sections of Lt. Konstanturos' report contain a more complete description of how the process of intelligence gathering and dissemination was tightened at C.P. Beta:

During the second day of the Convention all the representatives of involved agencies at the intelligence center agreed to write their incoming reports on the tri-copy message forms. They retained one copy for purposes of relaying the report to their respective agency and forwarded the other copies via messenger to the intelligence officer in the Miami Beach situation room. Arrangements had already been made to have messages similarly forwarded from the communications center and the operations officer. Later that day, the intelligence officer also had the benefit of reports coming in to his scout coordinator.

The intelligence officer was thus ultimately able to maintain maps and summaries on both strategic intelligence and the continuously changing tactical intelligence picture. Once this capability was developed, he could coordinate and control the dissemination of information; he could hold back messages that were unimportant or duplication; easily verify messages through the scouts, or if of a strategic nature through the coordinator of the intelligence center; and most important, compare notes with the operations officer to ensure action was being taken on all problems reported.

The majority of messages received from all sources were being forwarded without delay. The intelligence officer would approve distribution with a check mark, and submit the original to a messenger who would make copies for the Miami Beach intelligence representatives, and the 2740 operator (the FDLE intelligence representative).

The Miami Beach intelligence representative would forward reports other than scout reports to the tactical commander. The 2740 operator played a key role in forwarding a continuous report on the situation to the Area C.P., the National Guard, and the military. After the message flow was being routed through the intelligence officer, reports forwarded by the 2740 operator and the Miami Beach intelligence representative were considerably more accurate, and
encompassed a combined and much more descriptive relating of all significant activities by demonstrators and police. This information, coupled with the monitoring of scout reports by the tactical commander and the Area C.P., bridged the previously existing and dangerous gap between intelligence and operations.

Even after the intelligence system was refined to the point where the intelligence officers of the various agencies were routing all incoming information to the intelligence officer in the Beta C.P. situation room, problems of inaccurate information persisted. Still when intelligence officers of the various agencies received information they continued to advance this information to their departments without waiting for confirmation to return from the intelligence officer in the situation room. As Lt. Konstanturos describes:

Although controls have now been implemented over the intelligence information flow to the tactical commander and to top officials via the 2740 and scout frequency, there still exists a problem of outgoing information which is partial and frequently unverified. Many of the agencies in the Intelligence Center continue to submit reports directly to their respective agencies either before or immediately after forwarding a message to the intelligence officer in the Beta situation room. This is their responsibility, and in itself does not create the problem. The problem comes as a result of the immediate forwarding of information to their respective agency. Experience has shown that practically all of the messages of this type need not be instantly forwarded. However, this immediacy is particularly unnecessary when one considers the fact most of the agencies receiving this information do not have a responsibility to react tactically. There are a few exceptions, such as those infrequent situations where agencies such as the FBI or Secret Service must react immediately to an incident which they are responsible for controlling. These incidents are rare, and most of the eight or ten agencies represented would not have to react to such situations.

This situation can be resolved very easily. Since copies of these messages are forwarded to the intelligence officer in the situation room, a Xerox copy of that message and all significant messages from all other sources is distributed to each agency after it has
been compared, evaluated and/or verified. The messages are usually returned in less than 5 minutes. It is recommended that all agencies can benefit from this comparison of information, by waiting until after the intelligence officer has processed the message and returned a Xerox copy to agency representatives before forwarding the report to their own agency. The delay is insignificant when compared to the overall benefit of minimizing partial and/or inaccurate reports. This consideration has special significance when one realizes that the agency which forwards or receives an inaccurate report is usually the one which suffers the greatest consequence. Speed is a factor, but not at the expense of reliability.

Lt. Konstanturos emphasized that only the tactical intelligence system needed improvement to function well during the Democratic Convention. The strategic system had been well organized prior to the Convention and there was no quarrel with the process of preparation or the quality of the weekly and then daily intelligence summaries. However, given the importance of accurate tactical intelligence information to field commanders and department representatives monitoring the situation, this intelligence function needed to proceed cooperatively and with the highest degree of speed reliability would permit. Lt. Konstanturos summarized the problems regarding the CP Beta intelligence operation:

The primary factors which contributed to these problems were the lack of a clear cut understanding as to who was actually responsible for providing tactical intelligence, and the fact there was not a single overall command post coordinator or executive officer. In addition to the coordinator for the Intelligence Center, there should be a single coordinator for command post functions to include the communications center, the situation room, the field commander's office, and the agency liaison rooms.

Lt. Konstanturos' assessment of the intelligence system was substantively in agreement with the conclusions of Deputy Chief Zanders and Lt. Perry. In their Democratic National Committee After-Action Report to the County Manager, they wrote:
Duplicate and independent intelligence systems were established with no apparent common objective other than to service staff officers with an information service even though such officials were not engaged in tactical operations. While this in itself is not too critical, no junction point was established to channel the flow of information through a common distribution source so that all interested parties could have timely access to the total data collected. As a result, no agency had access to total information, with operational personnel entirely divorced from the process. As noted previously, operations and intelligence should be brought together as a functional unit with direct input into operational units and secondary input into staff units.

We should not underestimate the difficulty of coordinating and controlling the collection of tactical information. The finally-functioning tactical intelligence apparatus was enormous. In addition to the CRB X-ray units and the CP Beta scouts, the County had in the air two STOL propeller aircraft. The Secret Service manned four Army helicopters. The top floor of the Octagon Towers located on Washington Avenue between 17th and 18th Streets was rented for security purposes. Agents with high-powered cameras and a parabolic microphone were stationed here. The possibility of all these agents plus police units in the field reporting to their commanders uncoordinated and unevaluated information is an intelligence dream turned nightmare. The system needed to be channeled to a single point where incoming information could be compared, checked, and evaluated before becoming the basis of tactical decision-making. Even given this enormous and elaborate attempt to extend the human senses, commanders still attempted as much as was feasible to be personally on the scene to issue tactical orders.
repeated postponements, buck-passing and evasions, puts a burden on Snowplow no volunteer organization can bear, and raises expectations, not only from the non-delegates, but from the political parties which no volunteer organization can possibly meet.

The Democratic Convention is less than two months away. The County Manager's office has yet to produce a viable plan or even an estimate of the unavoidable costs of the support services which it has been Snowplow's mission to urge as a preferable alternative to riot. The Council of the City of Miami Beach extracted promises from the Federal Government so vague as to be meaningless and empty. The City Council, and the County Manager are waiting, in effect, upon Richard Kliendiendst who presumably is waiting on God with prayers for rain. No branch of government has dared to make the few phone calls required in order to assemble estimates of costs for minimal services because any such estimates would be eloquent testimony to the recklessness of Miami Beach's invitation to the Republican Party and to the thoughtlessness of our local government in neglecting to prepare. Instead there have been vague and ostensibly friendly references to Snowplow. A conservative estimate of the cost in goods and services which the inactivity of local and federal government thrust upon Snowplow is well over six million dollars. The choice is clear: either these agencies must come up with a check in that amount or must admit to their cynical use of Snowplow as a catspaw and scapegoat.

Our objection is not so much to being badly used ourselves. Our strenuous objection is to the willful deception by all agencies of government of young people, minority groups, the disenfranchised and the deprived and elderly on the one hand, and on the other, the citizens of Dade County who will be made in one fashion or another to pay for the gross derelictions of their government, which it explicitly supposed to serve them.

The Miami Snowplow Company will not be a party to such a fraud. An itemized budget of the true dollar cost, assembled from commercial sources, has been made. By its publication here, we hope to alert the citizens of Miami Beach and Dade County to the package their representatives have brought for them and to help those representatives with their long overdue homework.
While most government officials concluded that Snowplow's six million dollar estimate of required services was exaggerated, they generally accepted graciously the role Snowplow had played. On May 23, County Manager Goode was quoted in the *Miami Herald* as acknowledging the utility of Snowplow's role:

They may have completed the most important part of their business, because the community is alerted, we are responding and I think appropriate plans will evolve. (quoted in Rob Elder, "Snowplow Bows Out, Citing Disorganization," *Miami Herald*, May 23, 1972, p. 1-A.)

The Religious and Community Leaders Concerned (RCLC)**

In July, 1971, staff members of the Christian Community Service Agency, Inc. (CCSA), an organization under which the six Protestant denominations in

*The Snowplow estimate of service costs was based upon the figure of 50,000 non-delegates often quoted by law enforcement officials and included funds for operating expenses, $23,900; child care $28,000; communications, $103,640; food $2,800,000; water and sanitation facilities, $307,065; transportation $1,589,511; legal assistance, $42,000; and medical and drug treatment, $463,057. When one considers that law enforcement agencies received and spent over 2 million dollars in Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funds, that the Florida National Guard spent $1,100,000, and that the United States Army spent over $2,000,000 above their normal operating costs, plus the financial cost to local governments, the figure of $6,089,044.21 for 50,000 non-delegates may not really have been excessive.

**Much of the information for this section is drawn from, "Religious and Community Leaders Concerned: A response of the religious community to the National Political Conventions of 1972," a report written by the Rev.
the greater Miami area coordinate their support of local community organizations and service projects, met to discuss the potential involvement of the religious community during the forthcoming Democratic Convention. As a result of this discussion, a letter was sent by the CCSA on July 15 to national and local religious representatives. This letter called for a meeting of concerned individuals and organizations in Miami. This meeting was finally held on December 6, 1971.

At this meeting, a decision was reached to form an organization centered around two concerns: (1) the peace and stability of the greater Miami community during the Democratic Convention, and (2) the right of citizens and organized groups to free speech. A steering committee was formed of sixteen local representatives and one national representative (Rev. John Adams, Department of Law, Justice and Community Relations, Board of Church and Society, United Methodist Church). The key CCSA staff on this steering committee devoted nearly full time to the emerging organization now known as Religious Leaders Concerned with the Democratic Convention. Rev. John Adams functioned to put the Miami religious into contact with national religious groups as well as with religious community groups in San Diego concerned with the Republican Convention scheduled for their city.*

John Adams and presented to the Department of Law, Justice and Community Relations, the United Methodist Church.

*The assistance of Rev. Adams had been requested by Superintendent of the San Diego District of the Methodist Church, and between January and May he was involved with groups in both cities.
Ultimately three coordinators, Rev. Jack Cassidy, Minister of the Metropolitan Mission of the United Church of Christ, Miss Joan Gross, Executive Vice President of CCSA, and Rev. Adams, were approved by the steering committee to serve as coordinators for the Religious Leaders Concerned.

In the following weeks, a series of meetings were held between representatives of the Religious Leaders Concerned and the Security Advisory Committee established by the Democratic National Committee, Daniel Walker (the Chicago lawyer who had headed the committee which had been commissioned by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence to study protest at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago), various non-delegate groups, and Chief Pomerance of the Miami Beach Police Department. In fact, it was Chief Pomerance who convinced RCLC leaders to expand their goals to include "providing an atmosphere in the Greater Miami Community which will enable the democratic process to work effectively through the political Convention." (Adams, 1972, p. 13)

On February 1, the Religious Leaders Concerned opened an office at 420 Lincoln Road on Miami Beach to be run on a full-time basis by a staff appointed by the steering committee. From this time on, the organization increasingly became known as Religious and Community Leaders Concerned (RCLC). This office became the operating base and communications center for RCLC personnel during both Conventions.

Between December 1971 and June 1972, RCLC was involved in obtaining financial support for their activities. Local organizations were providing in-kind contributions that included office space, equipment, and staff. But
this was not enough. Starting in December, RCLC staff were involved in an on-going process of writing and re-writing proposals for financial support and submitting these proposals to the religious community through the Joint Strategy and Action Committee of the Protestant Board of Missions. Even though the early attempts of RCLC to obtain funding did not meet with instant results, RCLC remained committed to obtaining funds from the national or local religious community so as to retain a status independent of government or non-delegate identification.* Ultimately, RCLC received over $44,000 in financial support from the religious community.

Throughout this formative period, the RCLC steering committee was looking for relevant activities which the religious community could and should fulfill during the forthcoming Convention. Ultimately, RCLC came to articulate its goals as furnishing a religious and citizen presence during the Convention. Thus one of the first RCLC activities was to arrange with the Democratic National Committee to obtain a room within the Convention

*During early meetings with civil authorities, members of RCLC had become very concerned about being co-opted by law enforcement officials. They were particularly worried about becoming part of the intelligence network for the police even though they wanted full and open communication with the police. One of the most interesting characteristics of these adversary settings is that everyone wants the other party to trust him even though he reserves the right to distrust everyone else. Conversely, the police were not exactly thrilled about the possibility of becoming involved with religious "do-gooders".
Complex to establish an Interfaith Center.* This would provide a pastoral ministry to the more than 3000 delegates and nearly twice that number of newsmen scheduled to attend the Democratic Convention. Thus RCLC would establish a religious and citizen presence within the Convention Center, and would furnish a base of communications with the outside.

The development of other RCLC activities did not come as easily as the establishment of an Interfaith Center. The question of providing emergency assistance to youth and poor people was raised during the December 16 steering committee meeting. In general, RCLC members did not want to develop a big program in this area and thereby invite people to Miami. On the other hand, they felt that local churches should be prepared to provide whatever assistance -- food, shelter, health facilities, etc. they could as part of their traditional role of service to needy people. Finally one of the steering committee members who was also on the staff of the Center for Dialogue agreed to chair a task force to work on the problem of providing emergency services.

From that moment on, RCLC and what came to be Snowplow apparently drifted apart. According to RCLC records, they believed that their interest in support services was being expressed and developed by their task force. However, the records suggest that people from the Center for Dialogue used

*Similar arrangements were ultimately made with the Republican National Convention.
the task force as an opportunity to create a totally independent organization under their own direction. By the time RCLC became aware of this development, Miami Snowplow Company was already in operation and RCLC decided to try and work with Snowplow rather than go into competition with it. By the time Snowplow went out of existence it was too late for RCLC to develop its own program in this area.

Snowplow spokesmen have a different recollection of these events. According to them, RCLC was too timid and traditional to become involved in the development of a serious emergency services program. As a result, these spokesmen were relieved when someone else assumed responsibility for this area of activity.*

Assuming that someone (either the task force or Snowplow) was working on the problems of support services, RCLC could then focus its attention on the greater Miami community and its orientation to and possible

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*The reader should be aware that RCLC and Snowplow had very different constituencies and this had a great influence on what the two organizations wanted to do and could do for the Convention. RCLC was a loose-knit grouping of individuals from traditional religious organizations who both represented and served a fairly conservative adult community. Snowplow on the other hand grew out of a non-traditional social service agency which was already committed to working with youth and members of the counter-culture.
involvement with the Democratic Convention. The primary RCLC activity in this area was the organization of a community-wide briefing and recruitment session on March 8, 1972. This meeting, called an Awareness Seminar, provided the opportunity for local officials -- particularly Chiefs Pomerance and Garmire and Director Purdy -- to speak with the community and for individuals in the community to explore a variety of possibilities for citizen involvement.*

During the Awareness Seminar, Wesley Pomeroy, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee's Advisory Committee on Security, appealed to members of the religious community to furnish assistance to the Andy Frain Ushering Service which had received the contract for supervising gate admittance to the Convention Complex and for providing private internal security operations.** Discussion promptly led to the thought that RCLC

*During the week of June 26, 1972, RCLC also sponsored an "Awareness Week" in the churches and synagogues of greater Miami. This activity was designed to focus attention on convention concerns and to increase community support for the RCLC goals.

**The reader must remember that there was considerable trouble concerning access, etc., inside the Hall during the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. Democratic officials were concerned that similar problems could develop in Miami Beach.
members could observe interactions within the Convention Complex between Andy Frain employees, delegates, the press, etc. This idea became expanded to include observation of the gate entrances and fence perimeter, observation of street demonstrations and police response, etc. As John Adams describes the decision to adopt an observer function for RCLC:

... the concentration of resources of RCLC in "Observing" was questioned. The movement representatives wanted to know for whom RCLC would be observing, and just what it would be doing with the information that it would obtain. Some police representatives were cool to having RCLC concentrate on observing closely the police actions on the streets. Many members of the religious community itself, felt that "observing" was far too neutral a role for the religious community to play in such a potentially violent scene. Others felt that the religious community should be an issue-advocate and should actually march with the protesters. Others believed that the church and synagogues should primarily support the police and should help protect rather than protest.

The observer role was not determined as a priority by effecting a compromise. It was deliberately selected as a primary role that the religious community could most effectively perform and which would have the effect of reducing police over-reaction, inhibiting potentially violent types of protests, monitoring the activities of the communications media, while furnishing a disciplined orientation for a sizeable and representative segment of the local community. (Adams, 1972, p. 29)

Having reached this conclusion, RCLC devoted a considerable amount of time explaining its decision to groups such as demonstrators, the media, and the police, attempting to gain their understanding and acceptance of that role. RCLC observers were given extensive training emphasizing reporting without interjecting personal bias. If RCLC were to play such a role, the maintenance of an independent, non-partisan stance became even more critical. But maintaining their independence was not easy. In his
report, Rev. Adams records that throughout the spring,

RCLC staff repeatedly said to movement leaders, government officials and police representatives -- who seemed to want to shape the roles and direction of RCLC - "Let us be who we are. Let us plan as we can plan. Let us develop and maintain our institutional integrity, and we will be able to assist you far more than if we respond to your immediate demands and specific requirements." (Adams, 1972, p. 35)

In March, the office space of RCLC was expanded to include two additional offices on the same floor of the Lincoln Road address. Prior to the Democratic Convention, RCLC established its operating procedure. The offices were designated according to the following functions: (1) a Coordination Center with office space for full-time RCLC staff; (2) an Operations Center which was the base to which RCLC observers reported for shifts, from which they were assigned, and to which they returned for de-briefing and re-orientation; (3) a Communications Center with six telephones for in-coming calls and two for out-going calls, all used to maintain contact with RCLC observers reporting on situations as they developed in the field. Information received from field observers could be used to dispatch more observers, relocate those on assignment, call additional groups or agencies as needed, and/or attempting to "discretely and appropriately have some available influence exerted upon the critical scene."

Written reports submitted after-the-event by observers were matched with one another and with phone messages recorded during-the-event. A daily composite summary of protest action was prepared and distributed to non-delegates, government officials, the news media, etc.
At the height of its observer operation during the Democratic Convention, RCLC had approximately 100-150 observers trained and operative. Between Conventions, the full-time staff of RCLC evaluated the performance of observers; observers who had proven their competence were invited back for the Republican Convention. The Republican Convention operation of RCLC involved approximately the same number of observers, the vast majority of whom had also served during the Democratic Convention. Most RCLC observers were clergy or lay participants recruited through their church or synagogue.

Over the months between the creation of their organization and the end of the Republican Convention, RCLC leaders became involved in activities that went far beyond objective observing during the Conventions. These activities ranged from helping the Southern Christian Leadership Conference locate a base of operations, to soliciting food, housing, and other resources for protest groups, to identification with civil authorities or non-delegates by advocating specific policies or actions.* In fact, within the overall context of their intermediary role, RCLC's leadership engaged in activities that were as partisan as those of an advocate-champion and which had enough influence to border on them becoming arbitrator-enforcers.

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*We must emphasize that this extensive range of activities would not have been possible had RCLC leaders not already established their basic credibility as non-partisan and had their actions not been known by and approved by the leadership of both establishment and non-establishment coalitions.
All of RCLC's most prominent extra-intermediary activities involved the negotiations over the creation of a Miami Beach campsite for non-delegate groups. From the beginning, non-delegate groups had requested a campsite on Miami Beach near enough to the convention site so that it could be used as a staging ground for demonstrations. This idea was supported by RCLC and many governmental officials including Governor Askew, County Manager Goode, and even Chief Pomerance. But throughout the month of June and even early July, the Miami Beach City Council refused to issue a campsite permit to protest groups. Working behind the scenes, RCLC ultimately helped negotiate an arrangement under which a campsite permit was issued to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference with the understanding that the site would also be available to other non-delegate groups. After the campsite, Flamingo Park, was approved, RCLC members worked with non-delegate representatives on the development of site plans and regulations for its use.

Between the Democratic and Republican Conventions, RCLC intervened in direct support of the Miami Beach Police Department when it was threatened by other members of the pro-establishment coalition. During the Democratic Convention, the President of the Crime Commission of Greater Miami wrote to the Foreman of the Dade County Grand Jury complaining about the widespread use of drugs in Flamingo Park and demanding "an immediate investigation to determine if these flagrant violations of the state drug laws were committed and to pinpoint responsibility for any lack of law enforcement." Needless to say, substantiation of these charges would have seriously endangered the prospects for a non-delegate campsite during the Republican Convention.
Along with many others, RCLC leaders testified in support of the police before the Grand Jury. On August 1, the Grand Jury issued a report which concluded:

We are now convinced that the allegations made against the local police agencies are not only without justification, but did not merit the publicity that certain so-called concerned citizens, who were not even present at the campsite, seemed eager to receive.

Ultimately, RCLC was virtually forced into the position of landlord for the Flamingo Park campsite during the Republican Convention. This development was caused by a change in the character of the non-delegate coalition. During the Democratic Convention, non-delegate groups had been dominated by organizations such as the National Tenants Organization, National Welfare Rights Association, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, all of which represented the poor and/or black communities. However, all of these organizations planned to have only token representation at the Republican Convention and hence did not intend to use a campsite. As a result, the non-delegates came to be dominated by anti-war and counterculture organizations such as the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, the Effeminist Caucus, the Youth International Party and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

To many, such groups were "radical" and "UnAmerican" organizations and it was by no means certain that the Miami Beach City Council would approve a campsite permit for them. Working under this apprehension, Chief Pomerance approached Rev. Adams with the suggestion that RCLC become the
umbrella landgrant organization for the Republican Convention by applying for the park permit and coordinating land use if the permit were approved. After extensive discussions within its own organization, with civil authorities, and with leaders of the major non-delegate groups, RCLC agreed to assume this responsibility. On August 14, the Miami Beach City Council approved an arrangement under which the campsite permit would be issued to RCLC. In turn, RCLC made arrangements for a "land government" of non-delegate camp residents to actually supervise activities within the campsite.

Despite all of these efforts, RCLC -- or at least Rev. Adams -- still came to play a quasi arbitrator-enforcer role.* In his report on the Conventions, Rev. Adams apparently came to a similar evaluation:

RCLC's role in reference to the park, as it is examined in retrospect, was one of providing a "Responsible" organization with which the city administration could deal, furnishing a comparatively firm position on certain park regulations against which the various groups could effect their own compromises; while supporting flexible management of the park by non-delegates themselves. It allowed for functional compromises to be made between the non-delegate groups during the potentially critical pre-convention week, which was a time when the groups were competing for leadership and were struggling with their strategies of protest. (Adams, 1973, p. 68)

*From the beginning RCLC had tried to insulate its "objective" observer role from more complicated activities by limiting these other activities to the highest levels of leadership within the organization. This was particularly true of Rev. Adams' involvement with campsite activities.
The Community Relations Service

The Community Relations Service (CRS) was established as a separate entity within the United States Department of Justice under Title X of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. According to this legislation, CRS has no investigatory or enforcement responsibilities, but it is mandated to help local communities cope with "disputes, disagreements, or difficulties" stemming from racial and/or ethnic discrimination. Over the years CRS's primary activities have been: 1) an administration of justice programs focused on the inequitable treatment of minority citizens in their relationship to the law; and 2) a crisis conciliation program designed to maintain or restore racial peace in communities by helping to establish positive communications between contending parties and to help develop programs to eliminate the underlying causes of racial tensions and hostilities. In our terms, CRS has generally attempted to operate as a third party intermediary between minority groups and their local governments.

Given that most of the Agency's work has been on minority problems, CRS's formal interest in the Miami situation centered around the potential involvement of several black organizations in convention-related protest as well as the counter-protest activity imaginable from several Cuban groups. While CRS's major effort and credibility rests with minority groups, CRS officials feel that techniques they have identified for conflict mediation apply with equal validity in a variety of other protest contexts. Consequently they were anxious to share knowledge with Miami area government officials...
and to develop private third-party organizations. As it turned out, however, CRS convention-related direct work with citizen protest groups was by and large limited to minority interests.

In late January/early February, 1972, CRS officials met with San Diego and Miami officials to explain CRS's activities and to offer assistance. CRS emphasized that it viewed its role as ancillary; that is, the primary responsibility for dealing with protest situations must remain at the local level. Officials from both cities welcomed CRS assistance. Given the decision to shift the site of the Republican Convention, this report will only concentrate on the development of the CRS role in Miami.

Between February and the end of June, CRS officials frequently visited Miami. The Director of the CRS Atlanta Regional Office served as primary CRS contact during this period. With each visit, CRS officials attempted to establish contact with local minority groups in Miami's black and Cuban communities. It also began to provide government officials with a series of guidelines which the Agency had developed regarding various aspects of governmental planning preparatory to involvement in protest politics (e.g., guidelines on communications systems, rumor control and citizen information services, necessary legal powers and emergency legal procedures, provision of various services to protesters, police training and police utilization considerations, etc.). Several of these guidelines provided beneficial information to Miami area officials who were just beginning to confront such problems. Additionally, CRS personnel with expertise in technical areas (e.g., specialists in communications, rumor
control, administration of justice, conflict resolution, etc.) were brought by CRS to Miami to help advise local officials.

One of CRS's early concerns was that Miami officials were not cooperating with each other in a consolidated planning effort. To spur movement in this direction, CRS offered to sponsor a series of visits by Miami officials to observe the physical operation, equipment, and emergency planning evidenced by the Civil Defense Office in Washington, D. C., which had been involved in a considerable number of large scale demonstrations. Among other things, these visits resulted in an arrangement to obtain the assistance of George Rodericks (the D. C. Civil Defense Director) for the County Manager's office during the Convention period.

In observing other aspects of the planning by Miami officials, CRS identified several other concerns:

-- The Miami Beach Police Department had virtually no minority officers; CRS felt this situation should be altered if the MBPD were to increase its credibility with minority protest groups;

-- Law enforcement planning was developing to be within the purview solely of Miami area law enforcement officials and outside law enforcement experts; CRS felt some minority and/or general community direct input into the planning process would help generate law enforcement planning more sensitive to the legitimate needs and expectations of protest groups;

-- The Dade County Community Relations Board (CRB) was not taking the fore in third party mediation/provision of services planning; rather, several private groups (Snowplow, RCLC, YMCA) were each attempting to take the lead in such operations, ultimately duplicating one another; CRS felt that such coordination, planning, and third party involvement should be predominantly governmental -- a role the CRB could play.
To rectify the lack of minority officers in the MBPD, CRS offered to obtain the assistance of the minority officers from the community relations section of the Orlando Police Department or to recruit and finance the involvement of minority officers from around the country. When neither of these offers was accepted, CRS discussed the possibility of involving a group of such officers in the YMCA Outreach Program. Directors of the YMCA Program initially received the idea favorably, however, ultimately felt such involvement might jeopardize the tone they wanted to get with the Outreach program. In fact, some YMCA officials viewed this suggestion as a not too subtle effort to infiltrate their organization with law enforcement agents. Nor did CRS ever succeed in getting the law enforcement planners to accept direct minority/community input. In fact, their own activities in this area were limited. After they accepted one invitation to attend a meeting of the Joint Law Enforcement Planning Committee, that Committee voted to limit future attendance strictly to law enforcement personnel. CRS did, however, assist the CRB in the development of its citizens' information/rumor control program and its X-ray observation efforts; however, CRB never accepted the type of active over-all role CRS thought desirable.

Specific CRS initiatives met with limited success throughout the pre-Convention period. At the suggestion of Wayne Hanewicz, the Florida International University professor who was heading the police training program, CRS officials developed a considerable presentation to emphasize (1) how to avoid tense situations and prevent confrontations from developing,
(2) alternatives to the use of force, and (3) how "not to act" in confrontation situations. At one point, law enforcement personnel suggested this training also be given to State officers being trained in Tallahassee. For a variety of reasons, both these requests were ultimately withdrawn. Florida Department of Law Enforcement Director William Reed, however, did accept CRS guidelines in the development of procedures to process any citizen complaints against law enforcement officers which might result from convention-related activities.

Thus, CRS was present with guidelines and suggestions which supported those Miami officials who wanted to move in the direction of conflict resolution and provision of services to protestors. CRS supported and spoke for the early provision of a campsite for protestors in the belief that the longer campsite approval was delayed, the more disorganized and potentially disruptive demonstrators were likely to be. Specific CRS experts were able to assist solving specific planning difficulties in a variety of areas. CRS devoted substantial time and effort contacting and developing rapport with Miami area minority groups.

During the Conventions, CRS operated in Miami with a staff of 20. Individuals were selected for this team based upon their expertise in law enforcement or administration of justice matters or their experience in working with black and Spanish-American groups. CRS operational and communications headquarters during the Conventions was established at 420 Lincoln Road on Miami Beach. CRS activities during both Conventions periods included continued contacts with governmental and law enforcement officials, contacts with area minority groups and with third party organizations, and
the monitoring of campsite activities and protest activities. CRS field personnel maintained walkie-talkie contact with their Lincoln Road Headquarters, and were identified by a round metal iapel emblem.

Unfortunately, the CRS Convention operation suffered from serious problems. During the pre-Convention period, no CRS personnel were permanently assigned to the Miami area to advise and work with Convention planners. This created a "here again/gone again" impression of CRS's involvement and made it almost impossible for CRS personnel to follow the details of an extremely complicated situation or to establish their credibility. Thus, while CRS officials initially created the impression of being an enormously valuable resource, they were never able to live up to the expectations they had created. Instead, they came to be regarded as outsiders who continually repeated initial observations but who were unable to keep up with the developing situation and who were never around when they might be needed.

Equally important was the apparent inability (or unwillingness) of CRS representatives to go beyond racial or ethnic minority groups in their recommendations for the Conventions. This approach particularly annoyed Miami Beach officials to whom CRS continually pointed out the need for more minority officers -- specifically blacks -- on their police force. Miami Beach officials did not expect large numbers of minority group protestors and were not seriously worried about this problem. Moreover, regarding the one minority group that law enforcement officials were worried about (Cubans), CRS, in the estimate of these officials, had little contact
or influence. In fairness to CRS, we should point out that their mandate is for events involving minority group members and this may account for their pre-occupation with establishing the event as a minority group problem. Also, CRS can point to several specific successful efforts both in assisting the development of Convention planning and in reducing the potential for disruption among Miami area minority groups. The next section of this Chapter discusses one such successful CRS effort.

The Mayor's Command Center: Washington, D. C.

In late February, 1972, members of the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice (CRS) met for the first of many times with officials of Dade County and Miami Beach. The purpose of these meetings was to offer assistance and suggestions regarding comprehensive government planning regarding the expected protest during the Democratic Convention. In these meetings, CRS presented a series of guidelines related to particular problem areas and provided the services of various members of its staff with expertise on certain technical aspects of planning (e.g., communications problems, etc.). One of their specific suggestions was that Miami area officials visit the Mayor's Command Center in Washington, D. C.

This Command Center, under the direction of the District's Civil Defense Director George R. Rodericks, serves as the coordination center from which the Mayor of Washington, Walter E. Washington, manages the City's response to demonstrations, civil disorders, and natural emergencies. Specifically, the Command Center provides a central facility where:
1) threats to the welfare of the District of Columbia and its citizens are forecast and anticipated;

2) key District and Federal Government officials, military commanders, and private sector executives or their representatives communicate quickly with each other as required during an emergency;

3) decisions by the Mayor and Deputy Mayor are made, premised upon the most complete and accurate information available;

4) emergency action is coordinated, in order to effect the optimal utilization of resources.

CRS felt it would be beneficial for Miami officials to observe this type of unified command center. The Washington Command Center is equipped with sophisticated communications equipment including hot line ties to the White House. When operational, the Command Center provides liaison between District Agencies such as Human Resources, Environmental Services, Fire Department, Police Department, Corrections Department, and Federal agencies such as the National Guard, Directorate of Military Support, Military District of Washington, General Service Administration, and the U.S. Park Police. As a result, the Center has developed an efficient system for information exchange, connecting decision-makers with one another, and maintaining contact with those managing governmental response in the field. CRS's hope was that visiting this Center would prompt Miami officials to establish a similar command center from which to monitor protest situations and manage governmental response during the Democratic Convention.
On March 20, 1972, John van Wezel of the County Manager's office along with the Director of Dade County Civil Defense, and Major Shelton (the Public Safety Department's Convention Coordinator) met with various officials in Washington, D. C., and examined the Mayor's Command Center. On April 13, Colonel Cotzin and Major Schempp of the MBPD visited Washington for the same purposes. On May 21, representatives of the Dade County Public Safety Department returned to Washington to view the City's actual response to anti-war demonstrations. This provided opportunity to observe the Mayor's Command Center in operation. The result of these visits was positive though, ironically, somewhat different from CRS's original intent. Both County and the Miami Beach observers concluded that the command center concept was so valuable they each desired to establish their own.

After their initial visit to the Command Center, County officials became interested in drawing upon the experience and skill of Civil Defense Director Rodericks.* Thus, when CRS offered to arrange bringing Director Rodericks to Miami to assist with Convention planning, County officials were anxious to pursue the offer. Ultimately, it was arranged for Director Rodericks to spend a considerable amount of time in Miami from early May until late August and that CRS would assume responsibility for his financial support.

*Actually, Mr. Rodericks' involvement with the Conventions pre-dated the CRS activities by many months because before the end of 1971 he had tentatively accepted an invitation to spend some time in San Diego which was preparing for the Republican Convention.
Two problems with this arrangement soon developed. First, it was unclear to whom Director Rodericks would be directly responsible -- the County Manager's office, the MBPD, or the Joint Law Enforcement Convention Planning Committee? As a result of their visits to Washington, there was some competition between the County Manager's office and the MBPD for his assistance. Second, on May 12, the Miami Herald printed an interview with Director Rodericks. CRS policy specifically required those acting under CRS auspices to refrain from public comment. The situation was resolved when County Manager Goode wrote directly to Mayor Washington requesting the services of Director Rodericks and offering to pay his salary and expenses from County funds. Mayor Washington accepted this arrangement, thus setting the terms for Director Rodericks' consultation in Miami until the completion of the Republican Convention.

Before the Conventions were over, however, Mr. Rodericks' third party activities went far beyond those of the civil defense and communications expert. Over years of experience in Washington Mr. Rodericks had not only worked with civil authorities, he had also developed credibility and rapport with many civil rights and peace movement leaders throughout the country. These relationships were based on his openness in dealing with and efforts to assist them during demonstrations in Washington, D. C. Ultimately, many of these same "movement" leaders came to be active in Miami during the Conventions. Thus, Mr. Rodericks was in the middle of a potential communication system which included Federal authorities, national level
non-delegate leaders, and civil authorities from the Miami area, a position which permitted him to legitimize each group with the other.

Because of his unique situation, Mr. Rodericks not only provided technical support concerning communication systems and the delivery of human services to non-delegates, he also operated as an intermediary between the whole array of organizations involved. In this capacity, his activities were extremely varied. Late in June, for example, he was able to provide accurate estimates on the number of non-delegates coming to the Democratic Convention (a maximum of 6000) that helped convince law enforcement officials to publicly support granting a non-delegate campsite in Flamingo Park. He was also involved in helping to produce the arrangement under which the campsite permit was granted to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Early in August, his support helped convince both civil authorities and non-delegates of the utility of granting a Flamingo Park campsite permit to RCLC for the Republican Convention. His influence was also critical in helping the YMCA Miami Outreach Program obtain communications equipment it needed for its medical service from the Federal Government. Overall, however, his activities can best be described as trying to help the various parties involved to work together without compromising each other.
YMCA Miami Outreach*

The impetus for the YMCA's Convention involvement began in San Diego. The Executive Director of the San Diego YMCA asked Robert Harlan, the Executive Director of the National Board of YMCA's, whether the National YMCA could assist the San Diego YMCA in developing a conflict mediation program for YMCA involvement in the protest situation anticipated during the August Republican Convention. The National YMCA responded with a proposal to make available to the San Diego YMCA 100 alumni of the Chicago-based YMCA National Training Center for Youth Outreach Workers.** These people were at work in over 70 community agencies across the country; they specialized in informal work with youth on the streets and were experienced with drug and other social problems of youth. A similar proposal was made by the National YMCA to the Miami YMCA. Before plans could be further developed, the Republican Convention was shifted to Miami Beach.

*Much of the information for this section is drawn from "Evaluation of Miami Outreach: Summer 1972," submitted by the evaluation team from the School of Education, Loyola University of Chicago, to Richard Batchelder, Associate Executive, Research and Development Division, National Board of YMCAs, and from an interview with the Miami Outreach Management Team conducted on January 4, 1973.

**In the previous year, the National YMCA had explored the possibility of establishing a national network of people trained in conflict mediation who would be available to any YMCA in the midst of community conflict. The
In pursuing the possibilities of establishing an Outreach effort in Miami during both Conventions, YMCA officials checked with the National Training Center in Chicago to see if sufficient Outreach workers could be recruited and a training program provided for the Miami operation. Additionally, RCLC officials were contacted to see if proposed YMCA conflict mediation efforts would conflict with planned RCLC observational efforts. The results of both contacts were encouraging, and David Hume, President of the Board of Directors of the Greater Miami YMCA, called a special meeting at his home on May 11 to develop a detailed proposal. That meeting was attended by representatives from the YMCA's National Headquarters, the Southeast Region, and the Miami YMCA Board. At this meeting three areas of activity were specifically developed:

1. information services and rumor control -- providing all parties with access to "complete and accurate information concerning the activities on the streets and in the convention hall";

2. life support services -- providing "direct services such as first aid and medical resources in the camping areas," acting "as a referral resource to other life support services provided by the county and other organizations";

The idea was pursued no further when most local YMCA's reported they were not interested in taking such an active conflict mediation role in their communities.
3. conflict intervention -- operating "as direct third party interveners in situations of potential or actual crisis and conflict" to be accomplished by "helping to conduct negotiations between conflicting groups, helping groups explore various options for action other than violence, and in some cases taking direct actions to try to prevent the outbreak or escalation of violence."

The Miami YMCA Board accepted the project under three conditions:

1. the program was to be cleared with Ray Goode, the County Manager, who was officially designated coordinator of all services to the non-delegates;

2. funding required must be raised from sources other than the normal YMCA budget;

3. the National Board of YMCA would assume the legal liability for the project. (from the Report of the Loyola Evaluation Team)

A May 30 meeting secured County Manager Ray Goode's approval of the YMCA project. After negotiations with the National Board, the third condition was fulfilled. Appeals for funds were sent to corporations and foundations; all YMCAs were asked for assistance both in contributing money and in donating the services of their Outreach workers. As the Loyola Evaluation team noted:

The needed funding was never clearly in hand in advance to cover all the needs. Nevertheless, the Miami Outreach project finally was conducted at both the Democratic and Republican Conventions. (from the Report of the Loyola Evaluation Team)
The YMCA funding difficulties were not finally alleviated until the August 16, 1972, awarding of a $103,220 grant from LEAA to the Governor’s Council on Criminal Justice, with Dade County specified as the subrecipient (Grant Number 72 DF-99-0025). This grant, which had been developed by the County Government to fund its own information gathering and dispersal, referral services, and crowd monitoring operations, included a request for $40,237 in LEAA funds to be given to the Miami Outreach operation. The Outreach budget submitted with this grant proposal to LEAA placed the total Outreach fund need at $245,549.

Headquarters for the Outreach Program were established at the YMCA building in downtown Miami. This served as the office location of program directors, the Communications Center for field operations, and the temporary residence of the out-of-town Outreach workers. The field operation was to consist of 200 Outreach workers being divided into 100 2-person teams (one professional outreach worker plus one local volunteer).* Additionally, 10 mobile vans were rented and coordinated with the street worker pairs as follows: a unit supervisor was assigned to each van; each van contained communications equipment in direct contact with the communications facility at the downtown Miami YMCA; worker-pairs were equipped with walkie-talkies to permit continual contact with vans in the field. Worker-teams were in the field 24-hours/day, assigned in three overlapping 9-hour shifts.

*Ultimately the emphasis on local volunteers was dropped from the program primarily because it was virtually impossible to get volunteers with enough time to devote to these activities.
The information flow in the communication system was designed to go both from the street workers through the vans to the Headquarter's Communications Center and from these to needed community service agencies, governmental agencies, law enforcement agencies, etc., as well as to flow in the reverse direction. This system was designed to facilitate the accurate collection and dissemination of information and to assist the contact between individuals and needed services. Additionally, the van mobility, the unit supervisor/street worker walkie-talkie system, and van/Headquarters communication link-up were designed to provide the rapid relocation of street workers as protest situations demanded.

Street workers were equipped to provide basic first aid ranging from sunstroke treatment to drug overdose problems, and to establish referral assistance calls through the YMCA communications network for more serious cases. Conflict mediation was to include the provision of accurate information in situations where exaggerated or false information might be inflammatory, facilitating negotiations between demonstrators and law enforcement personnel or governmental officials on the scene; ability to contact service agencies or operations, law enforcement commanders or governmental authorities when their assistance might be needed; and direct on-the-scene utilization of tension-reducing crowd management techniques.

YMCA Outreach personnel received training conducted by the National Center for Youth Outreach Workers. The training held at the downtown Miami YMCA offices was conducted on the days between July 4-8 and August 15-19.
In each session, the first day of training was devoted solely to volunteers. The remaining three days included both volunteers and the 100 professional Outreach workers from out-of-town. The training concentrated on the following areas: orientation to Miami geographically, ethnically, and politically; the ramifications and implications of the third party role; non-judgmental interpersonal interaction; decision problem-solving; mediation techniques; crisis intervention; crisis response; law enforcement and legal aspects of Miami Outreach; street experience. Training techniques involved both lectures and role-playing. Emphasis was also given to the fundamentals of first aid, equipment maintenance (truck and communications equipment repair), and operational logistics.

During its formation period, Miami Outreach was in many ways an organization in search of both an identity and a constituency. Although Outreach had stated that they were going to provide services for non-delegates they were not at all clear who they meant to include within this term. In May, Outreach had pretty much decided that they were not going to work with "movement" people because it was assumed that movement people would take care of their own needs. Instead, Outreach planned that its primary activities would be directed toward the youth spectators who were not involved in movement groups or have a clear-cut political design, but who were expected to come to Miami Beach just to participate in the event. Despite these decision, the overall goals of Outreach ultimately pushed them into extremely close relationships with movement groups.
At the beginning of June, the Outreach management staff was on full-time duty in Miami. During this period, they were responsible both for finalizing operational arrangements and for establishing contacts with civil authorities, non-delegates, and with other third party organizations. During most of June, however, these contacts were primarily limited to other third party groups and civil authorities. This emphasis was modified when late in June Outreach representatives were confronted by movement leaders during a public meeting of the "Dade Alliance for Safer Streets" which had been called to discuss what various organizations would be doing during the Democratic Convention. As the Outreach spokesman began to explain what their organization was about, he was attacked by movement leaders over their concept of third party roles, neutral observers, crisis prevention, sources of funding, and lack of contact and credibility with movement people.* Ultimately all of these questions had to be resolved with non-delegate leaders.

*Non-delegate leaders had heard vague rumors to the effect that the Outreach program had an elaborate communications system and all kinds of money presumably from the Justice Department. As a result, they had come to the meeting prepared to attack the Miami Outreach concept. The non-delegate spokesmen involved in this meeting were not high-visibility national leaders. They were part of a highly skilled band of movement technicians who over the preceding years had accumulated much experience in the development of support services for movement activities.
Non-delegate concerns at this point about the Outreach program were at least threefold. First, they were concerned that the Outreach interest in crisis prevention or even in "neutral" observation would work to the advantage of the establishment if only because Outreach workers might inadvertently get in the way. These concerns were based on the assumption that Outreach was too well connected with the establishment and the belief that in time of crisis -- particularly if violence was involved -- Outreach would expect compromises that really favored civil authorities. In response to these objections Outreach agreed to drop crisis prevention as one of their stated goals. Moreover, they agreed that Outreach would not interfere with any negotiations which the non-delegates would have with the police or other officials so that if a political decision were made by non-delegates to have a confrontation with the police, Outreach would withdraw.*

Second, movement leaders were absolutely opposed to the idea of relinquishing control over support services to any so called "neutral" third Members of the Outreach management team admit that they probably would have rejected this type of condition if it had been imposed upon them not by the non-delegates but by civil authorities. Thus, Outreach's acceptance of this arrangement is one more example of how truly difficult it is for third party intermediaries to be completely non-partisan.
party.* From the perspective of these movement leaders, control over such things as food supplies, medical services, and communications systems have great political significance because they may be used to the advantage or disadvantage of contending parties. Needless to say, movement leaders were concerned that if a confrontation situation developed, "neutral" third parties would tend to act in a manner which would favor the establishment even if they did not mean to do so.

Third, we must note that the movement groups were not as well organized as Outreach leaders had originally assumed. In fact, movement leaders were actively trying to attract followers while at the same time looking for some organization which they could trust and work with to develop support services for non-delegates.

Ultimately, the Outreach communication system provided a mutual point of interest around which non-delgates and Outreach leaders could interact and test each other. Non-delegates were interested in the Outreach

*In taking this position, movement leaders were not only assuming responsibility for members of politically-oriented groups but also for non-affiliated individuals, the youth spectators Outreach had identified as their constituency. Given this development, and because non-affiliated individuals are difficult to identify and even more difficult to contact, Outreach was placed in the position where it could either deal with movement spokesmen and develop a constituency or be totally deprived of any significant contact with all types of non-delegates.
communications system because of its potential value in rumor control and in coordinating medical services during demonstrations or even during violent confrontations. However, they wanted to insure that the system functioned properly* and therefore insisted that one of their own group be assigned as radio dispatcher. Because they lacked personnel experienced in this area, Outreach agreed to use non-delegate experts as their dispatchers. The positive relationships that developed out of the negotiations about and actual implementation of this activity were a significant factor in helping Outreach establish its credibility with non-delegates and thus have an opportunity to provide the services it had set as its goals. On the other hand, the creation of a joint venture also pushed Outreach in the direction of becoming a potential partisan on the side of the non-delegates.

During the Conventions, Miami Outreach was involved with activities related to all three of their goals. In terms of information services, Outreach published a daily newsletter, "Street Sheet," which provided a schedule of planned events for the day, listed organizations and their

*Non-delegates were concerned both about violations of FCC laws and about the possibility that inexperienced operators would broadcast information harmful to non-delegates. For example, they argued that direct reference to drug overdose should be avoided because it might attract policemen seeking to make an arrest.
telephone numbers, and provided medical information about such things as sunstroke and bad drugs. In addition, Outreach used its communication system to help control rumors among non-delegates and to help individuals obtain information about the availability of social and legal services.

Outreach workers were also actively involved in achieving their second goal, providing life support services to those in need. During both the Democratic and Republican Conventions, Outreach maintained a first aid tent and a drug problems recovery tent in Flamingo Park. Through their communication system, they coordinated medical services with the County Government and were able to arrange for people to be taken to hospitals by ambulance if they needed more than first aid. During the Democratic Convention, the county helped provide street medical teams and Outreach began to use their radio to dispatch these teams. Because of their activities during the Democratic Convention, Outreach established their utility and credibility with both non-delegates and the Dade County government.* As a result, during the Republican Convention, Outreach became the primary dispatching center for non-delegate street medical teams and was designated by the County as the official coordination agency for all first aid and ambulance services related to the Convention.

*In fact, non-delegate leaders were so favorably impressed with Outreach that they helped Outreach obtain a new radio system and walkie-talkies for the Republican Convention.
Although Outreach had renounced crisis prevention as a formal goal, they also were involved in intervention activities during demonstrations. At its most elementary level, this function was performed just by the presence of Outreach workers in Flamingo Park and in the streets during demonstrations. By their mere presence, Outreach assured non-delegates that assistance was available if needed, helped legitimize the activities of non-delegates with civil authorities, and probably inhibited outbreaks of violence among both non-delegates and police officers. In terms of specific activities, Outreach became very involved in facilitating negotiations between contending parties and helping to control rumors among non-delegates. These activities ranged from helping to establish negotiations between non-delegates and members of the American Nazi Party who had seized a speakers stand in Flamingo Park to verifying for county officials that the medical tent in Flamingo Park had been attacked with gas by a group of renegade policemen on the final night of the Republican Convention. Finally, Outreach workers even reached the point where they helped physically separate contending parties by assisting in the formation of buffer zones between potential combatants. This activity was always restricted to encounters between non-delegate groups and potentially hostile civilian organizations such as the American Nazi Party and the Miami Area Anti-Castro Cubans. Moreover, such physical intervention was generally carried out with the agreement of both parties to the dispute and always within the context of Outreach's agreement not to interfere if non-delegates had decided to create a confrontation for political reasons.
Other Third Party Efforts

A legal ombudsman program was sponsored jointly by the Dade County Bar Association and the Public Defender's Office and organized by Miami Attorney Allen Milledge. This ombudsman program operated during both Conventions, fielding approximately 100 Miami area attorneys and law students. These ombudsmen were to provide a crisis intervention presence of individuals capable of advising demonstrators of their legal rights, suggesting possible legal consequences of protest activity, and recommending legal protest alternatives. An arrangement first made by the Democratic Party to split the cost of the ombudsman program 50-50 with the Bar Association and the Public Defender's Office was duplicated with the Republican Party for their Convention.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) fielded approximately 75 observers during both Conventions. ACLU observers were specifically instructed to avoid participation or intervention in any protest activity or protest/law enforcement clashes. Their purpose was simply to record incidents in which rights or laws may be violated. Such observation could then serve as the basis for deposition material or court testimony should any legal action be taken by any party involved in the incident. Miami ACLU lawyers also worked with a Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press which sought to inform newsmen of their legal rights.

In addition to private groups, some branches of the Dade County Government also became involved in what should be described as third party
activities. Among these was the Citizens' Information and Service (CIS) Division of the County Manager's office, an on-going Dade County operation which handles approximately 7,000 telephone inquiries per day in addition to filling requests made in person or by letter. The normal duties of the CIS Division include referral, information dispersal, follow-up and other problem-solving activities. The Division maintains contact with approximately 65 public and private agencies at the local, County, and State levels.

Beginning in April, 1972, DeWayne Little, Director of the CIS Division, was assigned responsibility for developing plans for CIS convention operation. On May 30, a memo from Boyd Arp, an assistant to the County Manager, specified utilizing CIS capabilities to provide information, referral, and rumor control services during the Convention periods. A special Information Center was established on the 9th floor of the Justice Building in Miami; the entire operations were under the direction of Boyd Arp. A rumor verification unit under the direction of DeWayne Little utilized a 20-line rotary telephone system with a specially advertised number set up for all Information Center operations. A staff of 20 operators and four supervisors received in-coming calls, checked information requests, and directed appropriate referrals. While the information, referral, and rumor verification functions were considered separate, the same convention facilities and operators were utilized for all operations. The operation became known as the Citizens' Information Service and Rumor Verification System. From the Justice Building Information Center, hotlines were established with the Civil Defense Command Post and the County Manager's Command Post.
During the actual days of the Democratic Convention, this information/rumor verification operation functioned on a round-the-clock schedule.

To establish an accurate source of information, contact was established between the CIS operation, the County Community Relations Board (CRB), and the County Parks and Recreation Department personnel in the field. Additionally, contact was established with non-delegate groups to explain the purpose of the operation, to open up sources of information verification, and to establish the referral possibilities of the system.

During the Democratic Convention the CIS Rumor Center received approximately 500 calls. Of these, about 40 could be considered to be about rumors and the rest were calls for information concerning convention-related activities. Most of these calls were from Miami area residents, not non-delegates. In fact, one of the more serious problems faced by CIS was its inability to establish itself as a credible organization among non-delegates. This is an extremely common problem for government-sponsored rumor centers no matter how well intentioned.

As a result of after-action evaluation following the Democratic Convention, some alterations were made in the CIS operations. DeWayne Little was to act as "Campsite Manager," operating from a trailer located within the campsite. This would provide a direct on-site link between the campsite and the CIS operation in the Justice Building. Additionally, DeWayne Little was responsible for coordinating services provided to non-delegates and for handling necessary referrals. Greater emphasis was placed on establishing a more systematic standard operating procedure for
the entire information/rumor verification process. The staff was familiarized with detailed instructions as to what to expect, how to properly maintain an information flow, and how to fill out forms. A log book was utilized to record rumors and to note reply time. In addition, CIS continued to stress the importance of establishing an information flow between the CIS operations and non-delegates. For this purpose, an arrangement was made for a member of the Miami Outreach staff to report on a regular basis to the CIS rumor verification center concerning non-delegate activities. The on-duty CIS supervisor was given the responsibility of making sure this report was made. Once again, the County Parks and Recreation Department and CRB personnel were utilized as information sources and outlets in the field.

During the Republican Convention, the CIS rumor verification system logged 397 calls, again mostly from Miami residents. Perhaps the most appropriate evaluation of the rumor center's value is contained in the CIS Department's own After-Action Report:

While no serious violence occurred on these days, citizen expectation of such violence in such high levels would necessitate the existence of a Rumor Verification system in any similar situation. It is, therefore, the expectation of a crisis, not a crisis itself, which justified such a system.

The one other Dade County Agency that also functioned as a third party intervener was the Community Relations Board (CRB). Normally the CRB operates with a small professional staff who are responsible for conducting forum discussions, open meetings, and hearings between or with community groups and public officials for the purpose of overcoming discrimination and
for preventing group conflict. Early in 1972, members of the CRB became actively concerned about the possible problems associated with hosting the Democratic Convention in July. As part of their effort to draw both official and citizen attention on this problem, CRB sponsored a Community Forum on February 2, 1972. At this forum, Chief Pomerance presented his three goals for the Convention and talked about the training program being developed for police officers. In addition, Mrs. Slavitt of Snowplow and Miss Gross of RCLC described their organizations and announced their plans for the Democratic Convention.

During this early period, CRB's concerns were twofold: that civil authorities would not be adequately prepared for the Convention (particularly regarding the social service needs of non-delegates); and that government preparations would be oriented to law enforcement problems and dominated by law enforcement officials. In an effort both to encourage a speed-up in pre-Convention planning and to maintain civilian control, CRB officials developed a position paper on Convention preparations which was circulated among County officials at the end of March. Their primary recommendation was that the County Manager's office appoint a senior administrator as a Convention task force coordinator for reasons of:

ability to coerce all department officials to extend their resources to the Democratic Conventions preparations;
(to) offset a totally police orientation along a military model;
(to) provide people-oriented opportunity for true negotiations of issues, such as park curfews, overnight camping, and housing areas.
Also during this period the U.S. Community Relations Service was encouraging the County Government to take the lead in the coordination and planning of third party involvement. Moreover, they continually suggested that the Dade County Community Relations Board should play a major role in these activities. The CRB, however, never functioned in this major coordination capacity.

Despite being by-passed in terms of the overall coordination both of social service and of third party activities, CRB did get involved with convention-related operations. Late in May, the County Manager authorized CRB "to establish teams of field observers which will be composed of County employees borrowed from other county departments, for the Convention periods." This directive led to the formation of ten two-man observation teams code-named "X-Ray Units" (a name borrowed from a similar operation utilized by the Washington, D.C., Office of Civil Defense). The function of these teams was to provide civilian authorities with a non-police perspective on events. One radio car was assigned for every two units; each X-ray unit was equipped with walkie-talkie equipment. X-ray units were in direct communication with both the Citizens' Information and Rumor Verification Center and the County Manager's Command Post. Additionally, a five-man CRB team was provided for involvement in confrontation/negotiation situations. All CRB operations were conducted during both Conventions under the control of the CRB Director. Although X-ray teams did monitor all protest events during both Conventions, their direct contact with non-delegates was minimal.
Discussion

As we have tried to indicate above, the development of third party groups in Miami was neither smooth or direct. There was frequent unclarity within as well as between groups as to what role would be desirable to play, what each group would be doing, and how the groups would interact with each other. At times in the pre-Conventions period it appeared as if observers would be observing observers and coordinators would be coordinating coordinators. That several different third party groups did develop for the most part separately led to considerable over-lap of function and duplication of effort.

Interestingly, there were times when third parties intervened on behalf of one another. Thus, for example, RCLC helped CRS obtain office space when CRS was having difficulty finding suitable available space near the Convention Complex. In return, CRS was able to advise RCLC on organizational and operational aspects of the RCLC program.

A definite competitive spirit developed among the various third party groups. Part of establishing separate group identity seemed to be to define one's group in contrast to perceived deficiencies in other groups. Removed from considerations which might be attributable solely to such rivalry, real differences did exist between the various groups. At the extreme these differences are best characterized by the differences between RCLC and Miami Outreach, the two groups that were most active during the Conventions.
Throughout their entire operation, RCLC maintained a serious effort to retain an "objective" stance of observation. Individual members of RCLC who might get caught up in a protest situation and intervene in some form or other were often subject to reprimand or dismissal issued by RCLC leaders. RCLC made a largely successful effort to limit its membership to clergy and church-affiliated adult lay persons; non-delegate membership in RCLC was out of the question. When John Adams assumed responsibility for accepting the campsite permit during the Republican Convention, this caused serious discussion in RCLC as to the possible role compromise involved. RCLC finally agreed to this course of action predominately because it seemed the only sure way of obtaining a reasonable non-delegate campsite which RCLC officials had all along considered essential to maintain peace.

In contrast, the YMCA Outreach Program more closely aligned itself with the non-delegate protest elements. By age and belief, YMCA Outreach workers were closer to the majority of protestors than RCLC. During the Democratic Convention and increasingly during the Republican Convention, members of non-delegate groups rode in Outreach vans and assisted with the operation of YMCA outreach services on the scene. YMCA Outreach officials argued that such non-delegate involvement made the programs more credible to movement groups and enhanced their ability to play a successful intervention/tension reduction role. Possible liabilities to such involvement arguably were minimal. "Operation" of the Outreach Program, loss of credibility with law enforcement personnel, identification as part of movement elements in any conflict situation, and hence reduced effectiveness in an intervention/tension reduction role.
This closer YMCA alignment with non-delegate interests did arouse some law enforcement suspicion. At the third briefing of law enforcement commanders during the Democratic Convention, concern was expressed that YMCA vans were monitoring police positions, movements, and number. County Manager Goode took responsibility for arranging a meeting at 3:00 p.m. that afternoon (July 11) between YAF leaders and officials from the MBPD and MPD. At that meeting the police concerns were clearly expressed. Representatives from the Federal Communications Commission were present to caution the YMCA officials regarding the dissemination of police movement information.

On the other hand, RCLC was not necessarily well-liked by non-delegates despite all of its activities in their behalf. Part of the reason for this may have been that RCLC represented the very middle-aged middle-class liberal America from which many of the non-delegates had come and in which they had lost faith. There were more specific reasons, however. Non-delegates were generally convinced that if difficulties arose RCLC would ultimately side with the establishment. This belief was strengthened by RCLC's insistence upon its central status in a situation that non-delegates defined as requiring a commitment to truth and justice and by RCLC's failure to provide any directly observable services to non-delegates. Even RCLC's involvement as camp site coordinator did not enhance their reputation with non-delegates. In fact, many of the non-delegate leaders resented this involvement because they felt the camp site should have been given directly to them just as it had been given to Rev. Abernathy and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. To non-delegates of this opinion the utilization of RCLC as a respectable front only emphasized the lack of acceptance and influence which they as non-delegates had with the establishment.

In general, representatives of the various third party organizations were continually present at the Flamingo Park Campsite and clearly present at virtually all non-delegate protest events. At times, the numbers of observers and uniformed personnel clearly outnumbered the number of non-delegates present at a protest event. If we add in those operating in one or another government service operation and those who appeared to be plain-clothes officers from one agency or another (conspicuous because of walkie-talkie equipment, earphone, or lapel metal insignia), the official "non-participants" at times badly overwhelmed the handful of non-delegates present. (Such calculations are observed without attempting to discern which of the non-delegate types were actually undercover agents or to include the presence of news reporters on the scene.)

There were clear situations where the intelligent action of individuals or groups of individuals from one or more third party groups helped reduce the tension in a potentially violent police/demonstrator or leftist-oriented, non-delegate group/rightest-oriented, non-delegate group clash. The mere awareness that so many observers would be present seemed by itself to exert a calming influence on potential combatants. We cannot say with certainty that the predominant lack of violence was due to the third party presence during the Conventions. However, despite problems of coordination and duplication of effort, we saw commendable effort put forth
by the individuals who organized third party groups as well as by those who participated in the groups.
CHAPTER 11

Human Services

In addition to the law enforcement problems, the 1972 political Conventions also raised problems concerning the provisioning of services to meet the basic human needs of the large number of political dissidents expected to accompany the Conventions. From the beginning, both civil authorities and dissident leaders knew that large numbers of demonstrators would create a situation seriously straining normal human service delivery systems in both Miami Beach and San Diego even should protest activities remain non-violent.* For example, the sanitation facilities in both cities were totally inadequate to meet the needs of large numbers of people if they chose to camp out rather than live in motels or hotels. Similarly, health facilities were not designed to accommodate vast increase in the volume of even routine medical problems let alone medical emergencies such as food poisoning and drug overdoses.

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*The fact that everyone seemed to agree that San Diego would be the focal point of protest activity did not preclude the possibility that the number of demonstrators expected in Miami Beach could still be large enough to overburden existing human service delivery systems.
Moreover, everyone also knew that they could not depend upon protest-related events remaining non-violent although they often disagreed as to who was thought likely to initiate violence. Thus, preparations also had to be made to provide demonstrators with basic human services (particularly medical care) under emergency or even hostile conditions. For example, individual demonstrators might have to be treated for injuries inflicted by the police at the same time police were carrying out operations to disperse or arrest other demonstrators. Although exact numbers from previous incidents are not available, the potential for injuries to civilians during violent demonstrations is high. Some indication of the potential for injury can be derived from the figures which do exist for the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. According to official records, 192 policemen reported injuries related to the demonstrations. These same records indicate 101 demonstrators treated in hospitals, 425 treated at temporary medical stations staffed by the Medical Committee on Human Rights, and 200 treated by mobile medical teams. (Walker Report, pp. 351-354)

By the Fall of 1971, there were at least three distinct groupings of individuals and organizations concerned about the human service needs of demonstrators during the Conventions. These groupings can be characterized briefly as: 1) civil authorities ranging from law enforcement officials to representatives of the various service fields; 2) third-party interveners; and 3) the dissidents themselves. During the following months, the continual crossing of their paths often ended
in collisions between different groups. Nevertheless, by the time the Conventions were over, representatives of all three groupings had come together to provide a variety of human services for those individuals and organizations identified as non-delegates. In this chapter, we focused our attention on the developing relationships between these different groupings and how they influenced the character and range of human services ultimately available to non-delegates.

The most important determinants of these outcomes were apparently twofold. First, the situation was unusual and very few of the people involved had any real experience in dealing with the types of problems they were encountering. As a result, they had to create new policies and procedures for service delivery activities rather than merely rely on previous experience. Second, the situation required the interaction and cooperation of a large number of individuals who had very little contact with each other and who represented a variety of vested interests. As a result, these individuals often found themselves in conflict with each other over issues that have become standardized in other settings.

In Table 1 we have summarized the most unusual problems associated with providing medical services to non-delegates in Miami Beach by comparing the characteristics of "institutionalized" and "non-institutionalized" setting.* By institutionalized settings, we

*We have chosen for the sake of example to limit this summary to the problems associated with medical services. We believe, however, that most of the problems involved apply equally as well to the provisioning of other types of human services.
### TABLE 1

Comparison of Factors Influencing the Delivery of Medical Services in Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Settings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutionalized Setting</th>
<th>Non-Institutionalized Setting</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>System Capabilities</strong></td>
<td><strong>System Capabilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The need for service is generated by many independent causes (usually accidents or acute illness) each with a single or very limited number of victims.</td>
<td>1. The need for service is generated by a single or limited number of interrelated causes (usually natural disasters, major accidents, but also including large scale demonstrations and civil disorders) with many victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a result, victims (or the need for services) are widely distributed in time and space.</td>
<td>As a result, victims (or the need for services) are concentrated in time and space and may overload existing service facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Causal factor unexpected in terms of particular events or individuals; therefore no opportunity for warning and preparations to meet the needs of specific incidents and victims.</td>
<td>2. Causal factors relatively unexpected for unscheduled events such as natural disasters and spontaneous civil disorders; therefore little time for warning about the preparation for specific event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal factors may be anticipated for scheduled events such as rock concerts and demonstrations; therefore there is warning about and opportunity to prepare for specific events.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. The incidence and character of service needs for any given time period predictable from previous experience.</td>
<td>3. The incidence and character of service needs for any given time basically unpredictable because causal factors unexpected and/or previous experience extremely limited or non-existent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutionalized Setting System Capabilities</th>
<th>Non-Institutionalized Setting System Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because of this predictability, ongoing medical delivery systems have been developed to provide both on-site and in-hospital services.</td>
<td>Lack of predictability has hindered the development of ongoing medical systems — either on-site or in-hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability of incidence and character of cases provides the opportunity for necessary staff to be routinely available.</td>
<td>Lack of predictability does not allow for necessary staff to be routinely available.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequent recurrence of events provides the opportunity to develop trained staff experienced in dealing with the problems involved.</td>
<td>Minimum recurrence of events limits the opportunity to develop a staff experienced in dealing with the problems involved.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Social Relationships</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Definition of the situation shared by all individuals who need to interact with each other regardless of their positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Over time, the patterns of relationships between system members have become standardized (roles) so that members are in general agreement concerning their mutual rights and obligations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The unusual nature and limited occurrence of events minimizes the opportunity for relationships to become standardized so that members are often unclear if not in actual disagreement concerning their mutual rights and obligations.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
refer to situations where most of the people involved know what to expect in terms of service needs, when such needs will arise (or where to find treatment), and how and by whom these needs are to be met. Most regular human service systems -- including ongoing emergency medical systems -- are included in this category. For example, almost everyone would agree that the victim of a serious auto accident would be taken to a hospital and treated by doctors even if the accident were his fault. Moreover, they could reasonably expect the hospitals and doctors to be capable of providing the necessary treatment.

In direct contrast, non-institutionalized settings are characterized by uncertainty and even disagreement concerning the above considerations. At a minimum, such settings tend to strain the capabilities of existing facilities because these facilities have usually not been designed to meet sudden increases in the demands placed upon them. In general, however, people are able to adapt existing facilities to meet these new demands as long as there is general agreement among the individuals involved concerning their assessment of the situation and their mutual rights and obligations. Thus, most communities are able to overcome the technical limitations of their existing medical facilities and adequately respond by working together to the service needs created by non-controversial events such as hurricanes or earthquakes.

The element of agreement, however, is usually lacking during events such as protest demonstrations or civil disturbances. As a result the delivery of human services during such events is often
hindered by the failure of the individuals involved to concur upon what should be done and who should do it. Many people, for example, tend to view providing human services to protestors as tantamount to giving "aid and comfort to the enemy" and are vehemently opposed to it. In turn, many protestors view control over human service delivery systems as major political issues and are uncomfortable with any arrangements that leave such control in the hands of the establishment. Thus, the critical problems during such events are not so much technical as they are social and political in character.

The Actors

As we reported in our chapter on third party interveners, citizen groups such as the Miami Snowplow Company and Religious Community Leaders Concerned (RCLC) expressed an early interest in the human service needs of those individuals who came to be called non-delegates. However, with the exception of RCLC's involvement with campsite issues and the YMCA's participation in the medical systems, such groups did not become as involved with these activities as had originally been anticipated. Instead, the major participants in the development and operation of human service systems came to be a group of individuals directly representing the interests of non-delegates and representatives of the County Manager's office. As a result, we have focused our attention in this chapter on the emergence and activities of these latter two groupings. The reader should note, however, that many more individuals and groups were involved in these activities.
One of the first groups to become actively concerned about the human service needs of protestors during the Conventions was an organization based in Washington, D.C., calling itself "Operation Medic". This organization was an informal collection of "Movement" oriented individuals who shared the conviction that access to human services was a basic right of even political protestors. These individuals had become highly skilled as paramedics and logistical organizers out of their experiences in helping to provide such services during numerous large scale demonstrations in the nation's capital. Ultimately, members of Operation Medic helped form the nucleus of the non-delegate groups responsible for the development of human service systems.

Some form of non-establishment street medical program (usually associated in some way with the Medical Committee for Human Rights) has been connected with large scale demonstrations since at least 1965. Over the years, these activities have expanded to include other services such as providing legal aid, sanitation, shelter facilities, and developing communication systems for protest groups.

Early in 1970, a group of individuals experienced in these activities organized the Emergency Medical System (EMS) to insure that such services would continue to be provided from within the community during crisis situations. Over the next year and a half, this group helped provide services to demonstrators during the Cambodian-Kent State Demonstrations, Dewey Canyon I, the National Peace Action Committee March, May Day 1971, the Nixon Eviction Campaign, and the Children's
March for Survival. During this period EMS also came to develop contact with government agencies such as Public Health and Civil Defense agencies and even the police.* Out of this experience, EMS members became convinced that liaison and negotiations when possible with these agencies helped provide superior services to their constituents. It was from EMS that Operation Medic had developed.

During the latter part of 1971, EMS members began to think about the summer of 1972 and how they might apply their expertise to demonstrations during the national Conventions. By December 1971, they had adopted the name Operation Medic and had begun the planning and to seek the funding that would allow them to transfer and adapt their activities to the Conventions -- particularly the Republican Convention in San Diego.

*Civil authorities in Washington have also had extensive experience in this area. As early as 1963, the District of Columbia Civil Defense Agency became involved with the service needs of the early civil rights marches. Since that time, the D.C. Civil Defense Agency's activities have been expanded to include an emergency command center -- the Mayor's Command Center. In that capacity it has attempted to insure the availability of non-controversial human services to everyone during protest demonstrations. As a result of this orientation, the Command Center has continually attempted to develop and maintain working relationships with citizen groups such as EMS.
Despite their relative success in dealing with civil authorities in Washington, however, the original Operation Medic proposal was based on the assumption that civil authorities in both Miami Beach and San Diego either could not or would not provide the services likely to be needed during the Conventions. Thus, from the very beginning, Operation Medic made it clear that government agencies were at least suspect and that their control of human services for demonstrators would be unacceptable.

There is not one city in the United States today that has a community-oriented emergency medical program. Existing programs, usually under the direction of Public Health, Civil Defense, or the Red Cross, are authority oriented, and work only to serve the need of the government to pacify—not help—the people.

Past experience has proven that Public Health, Civil Defense, and Red Cross emergency programs are totally incapable of providing the medical and health services needed in a community crisis situation. These existing programs have been unable to perform even their limited designated duties when large numbers of people have been involved in crisis situations. From rock concerts to demonstrations, government agencies and their emergency programs have not served the people or the community.

These existing programs have failed to provide even adequate services not because they do not have the money, the supplies, or the personnel (although this may be true in some cases), but because these programs were created to contain the community not to help it. These programs are designed to attend to the medical needs of the people only to the point of pacification.

The agencies that direct these programs are interested in preserving themselves not in helping the community. They are insensitive to the community. They have no real ties with the community. They do not know the community. They do not eat or sleep or live or love or laugh in the community. How can they plan for or help the community when it is sick and despairing, or hurt and dying? We believe we have found our own way to provide the community with emergency medical services that the existing agencies cannot and will not provide.
At the same time that Operation Medic was emerging in Washington, movement activists and/or third party interveners had begun to organize in both Miami and San Diego to consider the service needs of Convention demonstrators. In Miami, these early efforts were dominated by third party groups such as the Miami Snowplow Co. and Religious Community Leaders Concerned. As events developed neither of these groups played service delivery roles during the Conventions, but individuals associated with both groups did become involved in these activities. In contrast, service delivery efforts in San Diego tended to be dominated by a coalition of peace activists first called the Saturday Coalition and later known as the San Diego Convention Coalition. When the Republican Convention was shifted to Miami Beach, some of the Coalition's members also shifted their activities to the Miami area.

During the early months of 1972, members of all three groupings maintained contact and whenever possible supported each other's activities. As a result, an integrated team of non-delegate service experts was able to emerge almost as soon as the Republicans began to explore the possibility of moving their Convention to Miami Beach.* Several factors resulted in

*Although no list can ever be complete, sentiment if nothing else requires that we record the names of at least some of the non-delegates who were involved in these activities. They include Steve Sacks, Shelly Lullkin, Tim Butz, Chris Stevens, David Beals, Robin, Bill and Rap Kittridge, Laurie Sandow, Cathy Howard, Scotty Reimer, Tom Turner, Terry Franklin, and Mike Drobinaire.
this team being dominated by individuals who were members of or at least associated with the Washington-based Operation Medic. These factors included:

1. greater experience and expertise in developing and operating human service systems;
2. greater experience in negotiating and working with civil authorities;
3. being known and accepted by nationally recognized protest leaders such as Rennie Davis;
4. being known and accepted by many of the Washington-based officials who became involved with the Conventions;
5. the fact that their most recent experience of liaison, and negotiations with civil authorities was consistent with the approach being taken by local officials in Miami.

The involvement of Miami area civil authorities and service professionals with Convention activities also extended over many months. Early in 1972, the Miami Snowplow Company and RCLC began to urge local officials to become actively involved in planning for the human service

*Similar efforts were also initiated in San Diego during this period. Unfortunately, we cannot provide the reader with any detail about these activities because San Diego officials have never responded to our requests for information.
needs of demonstrators during the Democratic Convention. Although these efforts were not major determinates of official policy, they did serve to inform the general public about the range of problems which might develop during the following summer.

On March 2, County Manager Ray Goode held a breakfast meeting with key personnel from various county departments. At this meeting, the possible convention involvement of the various departments was discussed. While the general consensus was that the largest responsibility would fall upon the DCPSD, the County Manager asked each department with potential involvement to appoint a representative for convention planning and coordination with the DCPSD. On April 19, the County Manager met with the Directors of the Departments of Public Safety, Public Works, Parks and Recreation, Community Relations, Budget, Traffic and Transportation, and members of his own staff. The County Manager opened the meeting by explaining that he would like those present to serve as a "kitchen cabinet" for convention planning. He named John van Wezel to be Convention Planning Coordinator. Ultimately, John van Wezel, Robert M. Cason, on loan from his position as the Chief Administrative Officer of the County's Model Cities Program, and several other members of the County Manager's Office formed a small convention planning and coordination staff, devoting full time to these responsibilities.

As the County planning effort developed, the County Manager's Convention Planning Staff worked primarily on problems involved with providing necessary services for expected demonstrators. Where could a
suitable campsite be found? How should the County be involved in providing dissidents with health care, child care, and possibly food? What types of public information facilities would be established especially in the areas of rumor control and media contact? Special committees (involving County departments affected, hospital officials, etc.) were formulated to develop workable plans in these service areas. The County Manager's Convention Planning Staff monitored and coordinated the planning of services, usually with members of the staff critically participating on the working subcommittees formed. Additionally, the County Manager's Convention Planning Staff monitored the planning efforts of the DCPSD, attended meetings of the Law Enforcement Joint Planning Committee, and participated on Judge Lee's Criminal Justice Planning Committee. Beginning approximately May 1, the County Manager's Convention Planning Staff worked full-time on these activities from a specially set-up County Convention Planning Office on the 21st floor of the County Courthouse in downtown Miami. These activities were formalized with the shift of the Republican Convention to Miami Beach and the active involvement of State officials. At this point, Governor Askew named County Manager Goode to be Local Area Coordinator and assigned him overall responsibility for the coordination of all safety, public health, and welfare within Dade County.

There was, however, substantial community sentiment in the Miami area that the dissidents were unwelcome during the Conventions, that no services ought to be provided for them. In a statement written around
Memorial Day for delivery to the Governor's Community Coordinating Task Force (a task force of 19 prominent citizens established by the Governor's June 5 Executive Order), County Manager Goode expressed his philosophy behind the provision of services to non-delegates:

... there are substantial numbers of persons in this community who are very much opposed to accommodating in any way the potentially large numbers of "non-delegates" who will be coming to the area to express their dissent or political agendas. Rather than easing the level of law enforcement in order to prevent potentially disruptive incidents, many local people would like to see even more intense enforcement of vagrancy, hitchhiking, jaywalking and similar types of laws. Some have suggested the force feeding of paragoric at the County line or the stopping of persons with different dress or grooming styles at the Florida border. This type of rhetoric can have long range divisive effects on this community. As we will detail later, we believe that this committee can play a major role in educating the community towards accepting the need to work in the arena of supportive services, as a means towards maintaining peace in the County this summer.

This position was to dominate throughout the summer as local officials went about the task of trying to provide human services for non-delegates.

Campsites

From the beginning, non-delegate organizers in Miami made clear their preference for a campsite on Miami Beach within walking distance of the Convention Complex.* Throughout the early summer, however, the Miami __________

*The locations given prime consideration were Flamingo Park in the South Beach area running from 11th St. to about 15th Street in a "" shape spanning four blocks at its widest end and about two blocks
Beach City Council steadfastly refused to give camping permission to non-delegate groups for any municipal property. The reasons for this position were at least fourfold. First, most of the councilor's were personally opposed to the political orientations and life styles of the non-delegates. Thus, they looked upon the idea of providing a campsite as catering to the whims of free-loading trouble-makers. Second, it was obvious to the councilors that they would be held accountable by their constituencies if they approved a campsite and the non-delegates used it as a base of operations to create large-scale disruptions. On the other hand, it would be difficult to hold the City Council responsible for any trouble if the Council refused to provide non-delegates with easy access to Miami Beach. Third, the councilors had been advised by experts that campsites near the Convention Complex would tend to place law enforcement

for the remainder, and Lumus Park, a narrow beach park on the Atlantic running about a block in width from 6th Street to 14th Street. Additionally, across Dade Boulevard from the Convention Complex are a Par Three Golf Course and the Bay Shore Golf Course, both Municipal property sufficient in size and convenient in location for camping sites. Also at this location on Dade Boulevard (actually between the Dade Boulevard faces of the two Golf courses) is the Miami Beach Senior High School with its sizeable property being a possible site.
officials in a tactical disadvantage in case of trouble. Finally, the councilors had been advised by experts that the formal granting of a campsite would serve as an "invitation" tending to increase the number of individuals and groups planning on coming to Miami Beach. As a result, Miami Beach officials were encouraged to stall any decision until the last minute.*

The County Manager's office, and a number of other officials such as Miami Beach Mayor Chuck Hall, however, took the position that early negotiations and well-timed settlement of the campsite issue would enhance the probability of peaceful demonstrations during the Conventions. They were concerned that the Miami Beach City Council might remain recalcitrant or at least withhold their cooperation beyond the point of being useful. This position was supported by many including Daniel Walker,

*The reader should be aware that non-delegate interest in campsites was also influenced by political and logistical considerations. For example, the mere granting of a camping permit was tantamount to formal recognition of their activities. Additionally, a site on Miami Beach would make it almost impossible for law enforcement officials to cut off their access to the Convention Complex.
now Governor of Illinois, who lead the Federal Government Task Force which investigated the disorders during the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. Among other things, Mr. Walker advised a RCLC representative early in January that:

full and open communication needs to be established with all prospective protest groups at the earliest possible time; the providing of a campsite for the demonstrators is an important factor. The campsite should be comparatively near to the site of proposed demonstrations; the timing of the issuance of a campsite permit by a city is important. To issue the permit too early would seem to invite a massive youth response. To issue the permit too late, precludes a well-organized camp and a positive response to regulations for the use of the site.

Because of their uncertainty over the possible actions of the Miami Beach City Council, the County Manager's office took the initiative and requested the County Parks and Recreation Department to survey County property suitable for camping. Four sites were given considerable attention in May: Haulover Beach Park in Sunny Isles north of Miami Beach; Crandon Park on Key Biscayne; Virginia Beach on the Virginia Key; and Greynolds Park in North Miami Beach on the mainland to the northeast of Haulover Park. All of these parks were examined regarding available drinking fountains and toilet facilities. Plans were developed for
providing additional drinking facilities and positioning of portable toilets. One state-owned property, the Interama site on the mainland directly across from Haulover Beach was given similar attention by the County Parks and Recreation Department. Late in the process, Watson Park, a County property on the Douglas MacArthur Causeway, was added to the County list.

In addition to uncertainty over the final action of the Miami Beach City Council, County planning was complicated by uncertainty over the number of non-delegates who would require campsites. Estimates ranged as low as 10,000 but in late May and early June a figure of 100,000 did not seem out of the question particularly for the Republican Convention. A fairly small number of non-delegates could be accommodated fairly easily. But a large number would require multiple campsites and a considerable transportation system to get non-delegates back-and-forth from demonstration areas to campsites.

During this period numerous individuals and groups encouraged -- perhaps "pressured" is the more appropriate word -- the Miami Beach City Council to grant a campsite on the Beach. Those supporting the campsite permit included Mayor Hall of Miami Beach, the County Manager's office, the Democratic Convention Manager, several radio and television stations, the Miami Herald and the Miami News, and the Governor's Convention Task Force. Despite the encouragement of campsite supporters, the councilors refused to approve a campsite throughout the entire month of June.
Behind the scenes, however, events were developing which ultimately insured that a campsite permit would be granted. The most important of these developments was the realization by everyone involved that the Democratic Convention was not going to attract large numbers of non-delegates. In fact, by June 30, Chief Pomerance reported to the Joint Planning Committee that the number of non-delegates expected for the Democratic Convention might not exceed 6,000.* Moreover, most authorities also became convinced that the great majority of individuals who would come as non-delegates merely planned to exercise their right to peaceful dissent. In short, the threat of Miami Beach being overwhelmed by hordes of violent protestors had disappeared.

At the same time, the aversion to granting a campsite to trouble-making free-loaders was overcome as an acceptable grantee began to emerge in the form of Dr. Ralph David Abernathy and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). On June 28, Dr. Abernathy made a presentation before the City Council in which he requested Flamingo Park as the site of what he called Resurrection City II. During this meeting it became apparent that many of the other non-delegate groups were coalescing behind the leadership of Dr. Abernathy. As a result, local officials began to

*The details of how these figures were developed are presented above in our chapter on the law enforcement intelligence system.
consider an arrangement in which a camping permit would be formally issued to the SCLC and in turn SCLC would informally operate as the organizer and coordinator of space for all non-delegate groups.

Over the weekend, proponents of this strategy began to campaign for support. Among others, Miami Beach Police Chief Pomerance, and outside consultants such as Mr. George Rodericks (Director of Civil Defense, Washington, D.C.), and Chief Zanders (Deputy Chief, Washington, D.C., Police Department) all urged City Manager O'Key to recommend that Flamingo Park be approved as a campsite for non-delegates. Early in the following week, Dr. Abernathy added additional support to these efforts by personally contacting key members of the City Council and the editor of the Miami Beach Sun Reporter, Mr. Paul M. Bruun.*

On Wednesday July 5 -- just five days from the opening of the Democratic Convention -- the Miami Beach City Council met to formally consider the non-delegate campsite issue. Before the day was over, the Council spent most of a six and one-half hour session on the campsite issue. As planned, Dr. Abernathy reiterated his request for the use of Flamingo Park to construct Resurrection City II. Deputy Chief Zanders

*The Sun Reporter is widely read by the residents of Miami Beach and exerts some influence with members of the City Council. Throughout the month of June, Mr. Bruun had taken a position in opposition to granting a campsite on Miami Beach.
testified that because of the small numbers and apparent peaceful intentions of non-delegates, he had changed his mind and that if the decision and responsibility to issue a permit to use Flamingo Park as a campsite were his, he would grant the permit. Both City Manager O'Key and Chief Pomerance also recommended that Dr. Abernathy's request for Flamingo Park be approved.

In his original presentation, Dr. Abernathy made it clear that he was only speaking for the three organizations which had joined together in a specific coalition, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the National Welfare Rights Organization and the National Tenants Association. At the same time, however, he made it clear that he was not opposed to this coalition serving as an umbrella agency for campsite activities as long as it was agreeable to other non-delegate groups. Representatives of the other non-delegate organizations appearing before the Council indicated that they would accept the leadership of SCLC as the umbrella agency for the Flamingo Park campsite.*

*The formal application for campsite locations in Flamingo Park contained the following statement concerning the status of SCLC: "That the Southern Christian Leadership Conference shall be recognized as the coordinator of planning for the utilization of that area of Flamingo Park that has been designated for campsites." The City Council, in approving Flamingo Park as a temporary campsite area, assumed that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference would be the "host" to other non-delegate groups.
Given these assurances, the City Council voted 4 to 2 to allow a non-delegate campsite in Flamingo Park for the Democratic Convention.*

During all of the discussions about campsites for the Democratic Convention, almost everyone avoided making any commitments for the Republican Convention. Dr. Abernathy, for example, emphasized that he was not making a request for a campsite during the Republican Convention but only for the Democratic Convention. Similarly, both Chief Pomerance and Deputy Chief Zanders indicated that their support of a campsite was limited to the Democratic Convention and that intentions, numbers, and geography would have to be considered again for the Republican Convention.

Between the two Conventions, however, all prospects for a non-delegate campsite during the Republican Convention were threatened by two developments. First, the president of the Crime Commission of Greater Miami wrote to the foreman of the Dade County Grand Jury complaining about widespread use of drugs in Flamingo Park during the Democratic Convention and demanding an immediate investigation. Needless to say, substantiation of these charges probably would have precluded approval of any non-delegate campsite by the Miami Beach City Council. When the Grand Jury issued its report, however, it stated:

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*Favoring the motion: Mayor Hall, and Councilmen Goodman, Greene and Haber; opposed, Councilmen Magnes and Rosen.
We are now convinced that the allegations made against the local police agencies are not only without justification, but did not merit the publicity that certain so-called concerned citizens, who were not even present at the campsite, seemed eager to receive.

Equally threatening to the prospects of obtaining a campsite was a change in the character of the non-delegate coalition. During the Democratic Convention, the non-delegate coalition had been dominated by organizations such as the National Tenants Organization, National Welfare Rights Association, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, all of which represented the poor and/or black communities and had a certain kind of respectability. But these organizations planned to have only token representation at the Republican Convention and hence did not intend to request a campsite. As a result, the non-delegates came to be dominated by anti-war and counter-culture organizations such as the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, the Effeminist Caucus, the Youth International Party, and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. To many, such groups were "radical" and "un-American" organizations and it was by no means certain that the Miami Beach City Council would approve a campsite permit with them as the grantees.

Working under this apprehension, Chief Pomerance approached Rev. Adams of Religious and Community Leaders Concerned with the suggestion that RCLC become the umbrella land-grant organization for the Republican Convention by applying for the park permit and coordinating land use
if the permit were approved.* After extensive discussions within its own organization, with civil authorities, and with leaders of the major non-delegate groups, RCLC agreed to assume this responsibility. Once again provided with a respectable grantee, the Miami Beach City Council approved an arrangement on August 14 under which the campsite permit would be issued to RCLC. In turn, RCLC made arrangements for a "land government" of non-delegate camp residents to actually supervise activities within the campsite.

Campsite Facilities

As soon as the Flamingo Park site was approved by the Miami Beach City Council, the County Manager's office assumed responsibility for its operation.** Drinking water was provided by attaching pipes

*Throughout July and August, civil authorities were reasonably confident that the number of non-delegates coming to the Republican Convention would be small and that the majority of them would have peaceful intentions. Thus, Chief Pomerance's assumption that a campsite should probably be approved was based upon a realistic assessment of the situation.

**It is generally agreed that waiting to the last minute to approve a campsite was a major disadvantage to those individuals (both government representatives and non-delegates) who were responsible for developing a campsite. For example, campers were already moving in as county officials attempted to install facilities and non-delegate leaders had to devote most of their attention to campsite logistics.
with hoses to the underground piping within the campsite area.
Sanitation facilities were provided by two trailer toilets (one for men, the other for women) which were moved right into the campsite area.* A third trailer toilet (partitioned with separate sections for men and women) was positioned on Washington Avenue, south of 17th Street, near the Convention Complex.

Officials from the Environmental Health section of the County Department of Public Health began inspections of Flamingo Park almost as soon as it became available as a campsite. After their first visit to Flamingo Park on the morning of July 8, they reported on their observations as follows:

They (the two toilet trailers) had been connected to the public water supply and to city sewers, however the sewer connection was malfunctioning and sewage had overflowed on top of the ground and in a permanent restroom area located immediately to the south of the trailers, according to the city-plumbers, who were trying to correct this problem, this had repeatedly occurred during the night. A point of interest, is that although the permanent fixtures were overflowing and there were other facilities properly functioning within 300 ft., campers continued to use the clogged facilities even after they had to wade through fecal matter to get to them. The plumbing in the trailers

*Each trailer had a total of 24 toilets and 20 hand-wash basins.

In addition to the trailer units, 10 portable toilets were positioned at other locations within the park. The number of toilets provided was based on the estimate that one toilet would be needed for every 500 campers.
themselves appeared to be of very poor quality, since numerous leaks were observed from the sewer lines. Also the pitch of these lines were not conducive to easy flow. The seats in the commodes were not of the approved open fronts, as required for public use.

An inspection on the subsequent morning indicated that although the sewage lines from the trailers had continued leaking, 7 or 8 individuals had camped underneath the trailers. The portable toilets had not yet been serviced and their tanks were nearly filled to capacity. Drinking water sources were estimated insufficient for the approximately 500 persons then camping in the Park. Garbage and trash containers in the park were filled to overflow and many paper bags filled with trash were observed in the vicinity of camping tents.

On July 10, Dade County Public Health officials met with a special consultant of the Florida Division of Health and City of Miami Beach officials at the Miami Beach City Hall to determine who would assume responsibility for servicing the portable toilets, add drinking fountains, and increase the number of trash containers. At the meeting, it was decided that the City of Miami Beach would increase the number of drinking fountains and supply additional trash containers. However, the County would have to see that the portable toilets were serviced. Subsequent to this meeting, these conditions were attended: the City of Miami Beach provided more drinking points and trash containers; the County Manager's office made sure the portable toilets would be serviced daily; the County moved a water truck into the north end of the park.
On July 11, County Public Health Department officials again visited the park, reporting:

... conditions at the portable toilets had improved considerably, since they had been serviced, however, conditions were far from satisfactory since the wash water from these toilets was being dumped on the ground. The installation of the drinking facilities was very poor from the stand-point of sanitation since they consisted of a faucet with an attached length of hose approximately 5 ft. long, which laid on the ground. There were no provisions made for draining the area. Several individuals were observed putting the end of the hose in their mouths to drink from it. At one location a little boy was observed taking a bath from one of these hoses in the company of his pet dog, the dog was observed voiding himself in the area. Contact was made with the City of Miami Beach officials to correct the deficiencies in the water supply, by fixing the hoses so that they could not touch the ground, which had become muddy and subject to standing water.

On the same visit, the health officials noticed that the Duval County mobile medical unit in the park had not been connected to the water supply or the sewer system; "the toilet in the unit was filled to the brim and there were no facilities to service it." On a subsequent visit to the camp, the health officials learned that the problem in the medical unit was the toilet itself which would not discharge.

On a July 13 visit to Flamingo Park, water samples from the water truck were tested and found to have no chlorine residual. Water from the hose within 30 feet of the truck was found to have 0.3 p.p.m. of chlorine residual.

These observations led the County Public Health personnel to make several recommendations for the sanitary and water facilities provided non-delegate campers during the Republican Convention. These officials
felt that only water stations set up by the City of Miami Beach Water Division and connected to the City water system should be permitted. Water trucks should not be utilized as their contents become stale and chlorine residuals cannot be maintained. In relation to this last point, the Democratic Convention After-Action Report of the County Public Health observers noted that 15 cases of gastroenteritis were reported from a VVAVW camping area which had used water from the truck. If hoses were to be used in water stations, the hoses should be secured in an upright position to avoid the possibility of contamination from being dropped on the ground. The ground approximately four feet square in area around each water station should be excavated to a depth of several inches and filled with sand or pea rock to assist drainage and prevent the area from becoming muddy and collecting a body of stagnant water. All portable toilets should be serviced daily within 24 hours of their being placed in service. The wash-down solution used to clean the interior of portable toilets should be mopped up instead of drained on the ground. More frequent pick-up of garbage from trash containers was encouraged.

Observation of the campsite during the Republican Convention by County Public Health personnel indicated significant improvement along the lines of most of their suggestions. Reporting on their first campsite inspection on August 17, health officials wrote:
Sanitation facilities were up-graded over previous use in that plumbing on the toilet trailers was tight and not leaking. Bubbler drinking fountain heads were installed at all water stations along with a separate faucet for drawing water into containers. Water stations had to be moved frequently as the recommendations to provide a gravel or sand drainage area at each station was not implemented. Portable toilets were subject to twice daily pumpout and wash down as per recommendation following the first Convention resulting in better odor control and unit cleanliness.

Waste control service and grounds maintenance was good. Adequate containers were provided and frequent pick up and removal from the area was established by the City Waste Division. The campers themselves did a good job of grounds cleaning.

Food

One of the most politically sensitive issues regarding services to non-delegates concerned the provision of food. While public officials felt they could politically afford to support a campsite and develop systems to provide non-delegates with medical care, child care, sanitation and water facilities, they did not feel equally sure about providing non-delegates with food. County Manager Goode expressed an intent to obtain food for non-delegates despite community sentiment. In the statement he wrote on Memorial Day weekend to deliver to the Governor's Community Coordinating Task Force, he said:

Food -- This is an area where community philosophical differences can become a factor. While there are many who will strenuously object to the provision of free or minimal cost meals, we recognize that this may become necessary and are developing plans for an adequate response to this need. Our efforts to date have included a formal request through the Governor's Office to the Federal government for mobile kitchens, food service personnel and surplus foods.
We are presently attempting to quantify these requests for the purpose of re-submittal at several governmental levels. These requests will include detailed surplus commodity food needs and O.E.O. application for Emergency Food and Medical Program Funds.

Ultimately, however, the County did not pursue any of these or other avenues (such as providing free food stamps) for obtaining food to give non-delegates. All free food at the campsite was provided by various non-delegate groups, by area self-help groups, or by food cooperatives sympathetic to non-delegate goals. During the Democratic Convention, Green Power, a mass feeding group from the West Coast, was responsible for most of the food distribution activities. During the Republican Convention a group called the Coconut Coop emerged and helped to obtain food donations and prepare meals. In addition, some commercial vendors brought their vans near the campsite and did a seemingly good food business during both Conventions.

County Public Health officials did observe the type of food services offered at the camp with some disdain. The report on their July 11 visit commented:

Two different types of food operations were observed at the camp today, one was being handled by a group called Green Power, it consisted of an open area in which there were 200 to 300 packages of assorted bread and rolls stacked on the ground, this bread was being distributed with a slice of balonga in it. There were no facilities whatsoever to wash hands nor to refrigerate the meat, also a bucket of cool-aid was observed being dispensed in paper cups, however the cups were being reused. The other feeding operation was being handled by the Southern Christian Leadership Council. They were serving hot foods from pots and
pans, no cooking on premises was observed, into paper plates and disposable spoons. This meal consisted of grits, scrambled eggs, sausage, baked beans. There were no hand washing facilities here either nor any facilities to protect the food from vermin, dust or any other type of contamination, there was no attempt to control food temperature. While on the premises a truck from Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. was observed passing out approximately 50 cases of canned soft drinks. Outside of the Pepsi-Cola the sources of all other foods was unknown to this department.

It should be noted, however, that despite serious limitations in the sanitation facilities associated with the preparation and distribution of food, very few of the non-delegates were treated for food poisoning.

**Campsite Management**

Although the formal permit for the Flamingo Park campsite for the Democratic Convention was issued to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the actual management of the campsite was organized through a cooperative land government composed of the various organizations and constituencies living in the park and working on convention-related projects.*

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*The reader should be aware that despite this cooperative approach SCLC did take and maintain leadership within the land government. In addition to the fact that SCLC had obtained the formal permit, this leadership role was enhanced because SCLC (1) had the largest organized group of supporters in the park, (2) had leadership experienced in negotiating with civil authorities, (3) was recognized as a respectable poor people's organization by almost everyone, (4) was a black organization and not easily attacked by the whites who dominated the other groups, and finally, most of the other organizations had their attention focused on the upcoming Republican Convention.
This arrangement was supported by a representative of the County Manager's office, Mr. DeWayne Little, head of the County Citizen Information Service, who became responsible for coordinating the County's efforts in setting up the various services needed on the land area. In addition, County Manager Goode made Mr. George Rodericks available as an advisor to both County officials and to the non-delegate land government. During the course of the Democratic Convention a team operation developed which utilized members of various non-delegate groups, County officials, YMCA Outreach workers, RCLC observers, and Mr. Rodericks. Whether it was nudity in the pool, or threats of Cuban militants coming into the land area, this team worked together in a serious attempt to deal with campsite problems.

As a result of the experience of the Democratic Convention, George Rodericks advised that the County ought to provide a coordinator on a 24-hours a day schedule at the campsite. In Director Rodericks' opinion, this coordinator ought to be provided a Winnebago-type mobile office with adequate telephone and/or radio connections to the County Manager's Command Post. These recommendations were followed. DeWayne Little was selected by the County Manager to serve as Park Manager during the Republican Convention. He was equipped with a Winnebago office, open on a 24-hour a day basis and equipped with communications tie-in with all posts and various County departments.

DeWayne Little as Park Manager was charged with three specific responsibilities:
1. responsibility for all park security and physical facilities;
2. location and operation of all medical units; and
3. liaison with non-delegate groups for the purpose of crowd control.

Mr. Little was chosen by the County Manager for this job because of his interest in campsite management during the Democratic Convention and his compatibility with non-delegates.* A concensus of non-delegates and County officials alike was that DeWayne Little performed his responsibilities as Park Manager admirably. He assisted in resolving several questions of land utilization, he initiated a land government council (composed of leaders of the various groups plus the Park Manager) to assume responsibility for park security and crowd control, and he assisted in continual coordination of protest marches, working to make protest schedules compatible and to enable law enforcement officials to understand non-delegate protest intents.

The actual management of the campsite government was somewhat more complicated during the Republican Convention. The primary reasons for this were the greater diversity in the character and commitments of non-delegate groups and the inability of one group to dominate the situation.

*It should be noted that Mr. Little's position as the County's coordinator placed a buffer between the various non-delegate groups and RCLC which had formally been granted the campsite permit. It is our impression that this arrangement helped avoid direct confrontations between RCLC and the actual residents of Flamingo Park.
As a result, land government meetings tended to be longer, more vocal, and less harmonious. While a given group of non-delegate leaders did emerge and many campsite decisions were made by these leaders in conjunction with RCLC and County officials (most notably Rev. John Adams and DeWayne Little), many important land decisions were left to public meetings where anyone who attended was permitted to vote. The actual results of a given land government meeting were strongly influenced by who knew of the meeting, the constituency with most numbers in attendance, and the patience of those submitted to long and at times chaotic discussions. Such public land government meetings considered a variety of issues ranging from use of the land for various activities (e.g., loud speakers and music, films, etc.) to policy regarding those who were dealing in "death drugs".

Health Services

As indicated above, by the end of 1971, movement-oriented groups such as the D.C.-based "Operation Medic" had become actively concerned about the need to provide medical and health services to Convention demonstrators. Throughout the winter and spring of 1972, members of these groups (particularly Operation Medic and the San Diego Convention Coalition) worked together to develop and fund an independent movement controlled medical services unit which could be interfaced with the existing health services systems in the Convention cities. From their perspective, such an approach seemed critical in order to avoid a situation in which government agencies or private organizations could cut off the delivery
of services for political reasons. Such as disagreement with the protest tactics being employed by demonstrators. After the shift of the Republican Convention to Miami Beach, all of these activities were also shifted to the Miami area. Despite this concentration of effort, it became apparent by early June, 1972, that a totally independent effort would be impossible. As a result, movement representatives began to explore the degree to which they would be able to coordinate their activities with those of governmental agencies.

Any decision of this nature, however, was not made without serious consideration of its political and tactical implications. After the Conventions were over, one of the individuals most responsible for the development of human services for non-delegates articulated the ambivalences inherent in cooperation with establishment sources:

The government's rationale for these services was simply that people will come in any event and that it is much more advantageous to maintaining a good tone and non-violence to set up adequate service systems. From a security standpoint it was a lot easier to have all the protestors camped in one area where they could be readily observed and infiltrated rather than spread out all over the Miami area. Thus one might in fact characterize the cooperation of governmental authorities in this type of situation as a form of "pacification". However, those who were involved in organizing activities had been through similar situations and knew that some form of government aid was necessary for prolonged gatherings. The non-delegate groups did not have sufficient funding to care for human services and the lack of government support in this situation would have tragically affected the non-violent mood so important for our political success in Miami Beach.
Civil authorities, medical professionals, and interested citizens were also involved in the development of health service systems for the Conventions during most of 1972. As we reported above in our chapter on third-party interveners, these early efforts in the Miami area were initiated by citizen groups such as the Miami Snowplow Company and RCLC. By February, these groups received hearings before the Dade County Community Relations Board and the Comprehensive Health Planning Council. These early efforts, however, did not gain much support.

Thus, on April 26, County Manager Goode wrote to W.C. McCue, Executive Director of the Comprehensive Health Planning Council of South Florida (HPC) requesting that he convene "a representative group of the major providers and consumers of emergency health and public health services and other affected jurisdictions and organizations to develop a plan for the delivery of needed hospital and health services during the period of the Democratic National Convention and the Republican National Convention, if it is decided that it will be held on Miami Beach in late August." The County Manager further authorized C.W. Nordwall, Director of the Dade County Department of Public Health, and Hall Tennis, Senior Administrative Assistant to the County Manager to participate in this effort. Katherine Wood, who was joining the County Manager's Convention Planning Staff in May, would also be assigned to health care planning. Later, Keith Taylor of the County Manager's Convention Planning Staff also joined this planning effort.
Subsequent to this directive, the HPC appointed a 30-member Ad Hoc Committee to formulate a health plan for the Conventions. Since the Democratic and Republican Parties each intended to provide health facilities for Convention delegates, the primary focus of this Ad Hoc Committee was to be non-delegates.

The first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on May 17, was attended by more than 40 persons. This group designated Dr. Milton Saslow to be Chief of Operations and appointed a 16-member steering subcommittee. Another subcommittee of seven members was appointed to draft a plan for delivering emergency personal health services during the convention periods. As it was apparent that the main responsibilities for the provision of these health services would fall upon Jackson Memorial Hospital, Dade County's only public hospital, upon the Dade County Department of Public Health, and on the County Manager's Convention Planning Staff, the seven man subcommittee was composed of representatives of these three organizations plus representatives of an interested medical student group called the Health Student Consortium, the Dade County Medical Association, and Switchboard of Miami, a youth-oriented drug treatment and crisis intervention service. Dr. David Rosenfield, a resident in the Department of Family Medicine at the University of Miami School of Medicine (representing the Health Student Consortium and later also the Medical Committee on Human Rights) drafted an emergency health care proposal which served as the basis of the plan developed by the working subcommittee in the six weeks between its creation and the beginning of the Democratic National Convention.
In a report drafted after the Democratic Convention, Dr. Rosenfield posed the problem facing the working subcommittee as follows:

In early 1972 it became apparent that the Miami medical community would have the responsibility of providing medical care for an unknown number of people, mostly youth, who would be coming to Miami during both the Democratic and Republican Convention to voice their protests, frustrations, and needs to the political powers and, via the media, to the nation at large. It was incumbent upon the medical community to provide this care for two main reasons. From a purely practical standpoint, inadequate planning could slow local hospital emergency rooms if large numbers of people, unable to obtain private medical care because of lack of resources, were forced to turn to the emergency rooms for routine care, or even totally paralyze the emergency rooms if injured tear gas victims were brought into the emergency departments without adequate prior decontamination. An equally important reason, however, to provide this care was to insure that the human needs of the non-delegates were served.

And:

Going into the first planning meeting, there were many unanswered questions. Predicting the exact numbers coming was difficult, estimates ranging from 10,000 to 200,000. It was known that they would mostly be young and healthy, suffering most commonly from sunburn, respiratory infections, minor trauma, and possibly drug abuse problems. Whether the congregation would be peaceful or violent was not known, making contingency plans for treating tear gas victims a necessity. The duration of each convention was known, four days for the Democratic, three for the Republicans, and the best guesses were that the inhospitable Florida summer heat would discourage the non-delegates from staying in Miami during the inter-convention period. It was expected that the mass of young visitors would be staying in designated campsites and that the County would provide the necessary water and sanitary facilities.

Working from these presumptions, Dr. Rosenfield's original proposal envisioned an emergency health care system considered elaborate and somewhat infeasible by several members of the working subcommittee.
However, modifying Dr. Rosenfield's proposal, the working subcommittee developed a plan which the HPC Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the County Manager on June 27.

The plan developed by the Ad Hoc Committee was based on the expected influx of 20,000 demonstrators and emphasized primary care by teams of health professionals operating in the areas where non-delegates congregated. Dr. Saslow was designated Operational Chief and the Committee recommended that physicians be in charge both of the system's management and of the various teams providing health care. The plan called for one stationary primary care unit and five mobile care units all located in demonstration or non-delegate living areas. The stationary care unit was to be staffed by a physician, two registered nurses, three medical students, one medical corpsman, three lay persons and drug counselors. Its functions included triage of injuries for referral, primary medical care, drug treatment, tear gas detoxification, headquarters for mobile units, a communications center, and a pick-up and delivery point for ambulances. The five mobile care units were to be composed of a physician, one registered nurse, three volunteers, and a driver. These teams were to travel out from the stationary unit to observe events, provide first aid, and triage patients for more complicated treatments.

To compensate for the uncertainty involved, the basic plan was developed for up to 20,000 non-delegates. If more than 20,000 were present a multiplier system was to be used to expand the basic plan: i.e., if there were 40,000 non-delegates present, all health care manpower, facilities, and resources, would be doubled, etc.
While the Ad Hoc Committee's plan was being developed, movement-oriented human service organizers had begun to set up their operations in the Miami area. Almost as soon as they arrived, these organizers began to express their dissatisfaction with the organization of medical services -- particularly with the apparent failure of local officials to include movement people in the planning and control of the medical system. After the Conventions, these concerns were expressed in an interview with one of the non-delegates responsible for the health care system:

It is important to note that these health professionals were relying on established values and practices in a crisis situation. These practices were designed for optimum efficiency and were not concerned with meeting the political needs of movement people. This is not to state that this Ad Hoc Committee was not genuinely concerned with meeting an expected crisis. They were concerned. But the lack of experience in dealing with protest situations and the uncritical acceptance of the traditional role of the physician as being the supreme commander of health services in a male-dominated setting helped generate conflicts between the health professionals and non-delegates.

This statement provides the basis for highlighting some of the differences between health professionals and non-delegates in terms of their definitions of the situation and their characterization of mutual rights and obligations. From the standpoint of the health professionals, the problems to be faced during the Conventions were essentially technical in nature and could best be solved by medically competent personnel. For the movement organizers, however, a satisfactory health service system could only be achieved through a combination of medical competence
and political responsiveness. For example, it is an unwritten principle among anti-war protest organizers that if you bring people into a situation then you are responsible for their general welfare. Thus, movement organizers wanted a health delivery system over which they had some control and which was not dependent upon the unilateral actions of governmental officials. In short, movement organizers were concerned with how they could maximize the quality of medical services available to their constituents while minimizing their vulnerability to potential political enemies.*

Despite such differences, the non-delegate organizers and the health professionals did come to cooperate with each other. Above and beyond their mutual good will and need for each other, the emergence of cooperation was significantly aided by the availability of individuals or groups to help bridge the gap between them. One of the major vehicles for this accomplishment was the employment of George Rodericks as a special human services consultant to the County Manager. Because of his previous experience dealing with the human service

*An additional factor must also be considered here. Movement organizers view correct politics as the primary factor in the world and believe that everything else (including medicine) must be used to help achieve their political objectives. This is a philosophic position very similar to that taken by mainland China and other countries where a common ideology is still being developed. The second, and more practical reason is that they want the active support of the persons with whom they deal as a form of protection if difficult situations do arise.
problems of large-scale demonstrations, Mr. Rodericks' competence was accepted by local officials and health professionals. On the other hand, Mr. Rodericks was also trusted by the non-delegate organizers because of his openness in dealing with them or their counterparts during protest demonstrations in Washington, D.C. Thus, Mr. Rodericks not only helped provide linkages between the various groups but between the issues of technical competence and political responsiveness as well.

As events developed, the YMCA Miami Outreach Program also came to serve a similar function. Non-delegate organizers were originally very suspicious of the YMCA program because they were afraid that it would be used as a pacification program designed to keep confrontations at a minimum without regard for the political purposes of the demonstrations.* On the other hand, the Outreach program had the active support of the County government which meant they had a kind of legitimacy and a potential access to resources which might otherwise not be available to protest groups. Thus, non-delegates had to give serious consideration to the idea of working with the Outreach program. On its part, the YMCA wanted to avoid being taken over by either non-delegates or civil authorities but saw its prime constituency to be the demonstrators and was more than

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*A detailed description of the relationships between non-delegates and the Outreach program is available above in our chapter on third party interveners.
willing to consider operating a combined service delivery system with non-delegates. Once they were assured that such an effort would not necessarily jeopardize their standing with County officials, the Outreach staff joined forces with movement organizers to provide services in the campsite area as well as to support street medical operations.

The decision of the Miami Beach City Council to provide Flamingo Park as a campsite for the Democratic Convention served as an impetus to operationalize the HFC medical plans. Through the County Manager's office, the gymnasium of Ida Fisher Junior High School (located approximately three blocks west of Flamingo Park and ten blocks from the Convention Complex) was obtained to function as the stationary primary care unit. An adjacent facility containing lockers and showers was utilized as the gas detoxification center.

Considerable effort had been devoted toward obtaining mobile medical care facilities. The Red Cross had one mobile medical care unit in the area; there was a possibility that other such units could be transferred to Miami for the summer. The County Parks and Recreation Department had a first aid van that was considered. The County Manager's office requested the State Civil Defense office to make available four Packaged Disaster Hospitals (200-bed units stored in four locations in the County), however, Claudius Walker, the Health Mobilization Coordinator, Office of Emergency Government, turned down this request. Instead, Mr. Walker offered two National Disaster Hospitals (50-bed units) located in Key West and Tavernier. Additionally, Mr. Walker indicated that
stretchers, cots, and blankets could be obtained from the Civil Defense stockpile in Prairie, Mississippi. Ultimately, the County Manager's Convention Planning Staff contacted the various county governments of Florida and obtained two mobile medical care units: a trailer/tractor unit from Broward County, and a Winnebago unit from Duval County.

Given that medical care planners had narrowed their crowd estimates to 7,000 non-delegates as the Democratic Convention approached, these two mobile units were considered sufficient. Reasoning that demonstrators mainly congregate in greatest numbers near campsites and major objects of protest, planners situated the Duval County unit at Flamingo Park and the Broward County unit on the west side of Washington Avenue, just north of Lincoln Mall about one block from the Convention Complex. Additionally, a large tent supplied with ten cots was positioned next to the Duval County unit in Flamingo Park.

There was considerable difficulty in obtaining medical supplies for the Democratic Convention emergency health care operation. Problems centered mostly around mistakes in communications concerning who would deliver which supplies when. For instance on June 23, medical planners met with representatives of the U.S. Public Health Service and the Army. A list of requested supplies was presented and both agencies assured planners that their available stocks could be utilized to fulfill the requests. Five days after a written request had been submitted to the Public Health Service, the County Manager's convention planning
representatives received a call from the Service saying that a final list of those items which could be supplied was not available at that time. Two days later, the Public Health Service indicated that smaller items would be sent from depots in the Eastern part of the U.S.; the remainder would be taken from the depot in Prairie, Mississippi. All items except those from Prairie, Mississippi, could be shipped free of charge. The County Manager's representatives then contacted a Florida Department of Law Enforcement representative who arranged for the Florida National Guard to fly to Prairie to pick up the supplies. After not hearing for several days from the FDLE, the County Manager's office called to discover that those supposedly working on the project had not done so. Finally, the County Manager's office authorized the Public Health Service to truck the supplies from Prairie at County expense. This was done; the supplies arrived on the morning of July 10, the first day of the Democratic Convention. Despite the fact that the U.S. Public Health Service and the Civil Defense had committed medical supplies, medical planners had to commercially purchase supplies in Miami when needed items were not arriving in time.

Medical planners made provision for the transportation of volunteers and patients. To prevent the possibility that confrontation and traffic situations might hamper volunteers from reaching Miami Beach posts, the County Manager's office arranged for two MTA buses to run from the south lot of the Orange Bowl to Miami Beach via Jackson Memorial
Hospital between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m.; and one MTA bus to make this run in the remaining hours. Ambulatory patients could rely on this bus transport if they should need treatment at Jackson Memorial Hospital. Arrangements were made with Randle-Eastern, a commercial ambulance service in the Miami area, to transport emergency cases.

Both lay and professional volunteers for the health system were obtained through the efforts of several agencies. All United Fund agencies were notified of the personnel need; the nursing and medical staff at the University of Miami School of Medicine and its main teaching hospital, Jackson Memorial Hospital, were notified through official and unofficial channels. The Dade County Medical Association sent out letters to its members. Newspapers and radio advertisements were placed; attempts were made to involve interested non-delegates. These efforts produced a higher proportion of professional medical personnel than planners had estimated would be recruited.

Training was handled differently for the two types of volunteers. However there was overlap as some nurses and medical students also attended the non-professional training sessions. Training for non-professionals was organized into three parts: (1) an eight hour drug abuse workshop organized by Switchboard of Miami and the Dade County Comprehensive Drug Treatment Program; (2) an eight hour Red Cross supervised multi-media course on first aid; and (3) a four hour course on "street medicine" taught by a member of the Washington, D.C., Chapter
of the Medical Committee on Human Rights to acquaint volunteers with crowd psychology and police tactics. Professional training centered around eight hours of videotapes prepared by Dr. Eugene Nagel of Jackson Memorial Hospital. The tapes shown in four hour segments on two successive nights covered topics ranging from first aid and care for sun-related problems to drug treatment and medical surgical emergencies. Approximately 150 people went through the non-professional training and 200 through the professional training.*

One major addition to the original plan, however, was the creation of a "street medic" program which involved the active participation of the non-delegates themselves. From the beginning, non-delegate spokesmen had wanted a street medic program over which they had direct supervision as the first line of medical care at all non-delegate camping and demonstration sites. The original Ad Hoc Committee plan did not provide for such an arrangement although various members of the Committee emphasized the need to communicate with non-delegates. After consulting with outside experts, however, County officials became convinced that a

*It should be noted that some of the non-delegate technicians were highly critical of the training program particularly because it drew many of its examples from industrial first aid rather than street medical situations and because it did not require the volunteers to participate in training activities designed to improve their information about and sensitivities to particular constituencies such as the Gays and Women's Liberation.
street medic program run by non-delegates would provide a valuable link between the medical service system being developed by the County and its intended beneficiaries, the demonstrators. In accordance with this decision, an addendum "Definitions and Functions of Medics" was added to the original plan on June 14. This document identified street medics as "an integral part of a plan for delivery of primary care services in that they assist in drug counseling, triaging in the mobile and stationary units and triaging on the streets where crowds of persons are gathered."*

The County's acceptance of the street medic program also helped make it possible for non-delegate technicians and YMCA Outreach to begin cooperation in the development of various forms of human services intended for non-delegates. Particularly important here was the medical communications system. Shortly before the beginning of the Democratic Convention, a decision was reached by medical planners to link the medical communication system into the communication system established by YMCA Outreach for its own program. This replaced the original

*The non-delegate technicians always had a more complicated conception of the street medic program. In addition to protecting the welfare of demonstrators and assisting in a first-aid capacity, many non-delegates also saw the program as making a valuable contribution to rumor control and tension reduction by providing a direct link between government officials and protest organizers.
communications plan which called for a central communication office to be located in the stationary primary care unit to receive information gathered in the field, to monitor other radio networks, to dispatch field teams, and to perform rumor control functions for the medical team. The medical communications center was to have direct telephone lines to the County Civil Defense Office, to the DCPSD command center where a Randle-Eastern Ambulance dispatcher would be located, and to the mobile primary care units located in the field. One member of each street medic team was to have a UHF or Citizen's Band hand radio unit linked with the Medical Communications Center.

A primary reason for modifying the plan was the unavailability of needed equipment. Under the revised arrangement, the medical communications center was situated in the YMCA building in downtown Miami where the YMCA Outreach program had already established a mobile radio system for contacting YMCA Outreach vans operational in the field. The County subsidized the installment of direct telephone lines from the YMCA to the County Civil Defense office, the DCPSD Command Center (for ambulance dispatch) and to the primary care medical units on Miami Beach. Street medics would rely upon YMCA Outreach vans for transport and communication; they would not have UHF radio units.

During the Democratic Convention, the medical program treated a considerably smaller number of patients than had been expected. Formal charts were made on 270 patients (accounting for 309 visits) at the three
primary care stations. The most common problems were minor trauma and upper respiratory problems. Drug problems were surprisingly few. Of these 270 patients, 24 were referred to Jackson Memorial: 2 for drug overdose, 15 for specialty consultation (including laboratory tests), 4 for x-ray, 2 for suturing, and 1 for personal medical supplies.*

In addition to these 270 charted patients, there were 405 "patient encounters" at the three main units. Medicine in these instances was dispensed for preventive care (i.e., salt tablets) or symptomatic relief of a variety of conditions. Over 2/3 of these encounters were for sun-related problems or minor trauma; only 3 of these encounters were drug-related. No statistical record was kept on the work of street medics. A detailed statistical breakdown of medical treatment during the Democratic Convention is attached as an appendix to this chapter.

The low number of non-delegates receiving care from this medical system was attributed to several causes: the small number of non-delegates present, the availability of preventive medicine (especially salt tablets and sunburn lotion), and the care given non-delegates by medical units which they established for themselves. The low instance

*Only one patient was hospitalized, a 34-year old Chilean world traveler who arrived in Miami one day before his admission. He had recently traveled the Amazon River and was complaining of chills and fever; he was thought to have an enlarged liver.
of drug problems was seen as related to concerted efforts by the non-delegates themselves to eliminate "death drugs" from the campsite, the YMCA Outreach daily publication of information concerning harmful drugs which were being sold at the campsite or in the area, and the desire of non-delegates either to handle minor drug problems themselves or to take such problems to the YMCA Outreach program tent established in the park for dealing with drug problems. Case load figures are not available separately, but during the course of the two Conventions the YMCA Aid Rescue Program treated more than 50 people for bad drug trips and overdoses. They also performed more than 45 drug analyses of capsules and pills being passed on the streets and in Flamingo Park.

A series of problems plagued the operations of the medical care system. Given the number of dissidents in the area for the Democratic Convention, the entire program was overstaffed. This presented a serious morale problem, especially during the first two days of the Convention when (according to one After-Action Report) "There was simply nothing for the medics or doctors to do." The personnel had been recruited and trained to perform an important function. In a sense they were disappointed there weren't more medical problems. There is an irony to this which Dr. Rosenfield noted in his Preliminary Report after the Democratic Convention: While facilities could have easily handled an estimated five times as many patients, there were no reserve facilities had the number of non-delegates been larger or had the granted campsites been scattered.
The late arrival of supplies delayed putting the street medics into the field at the beginning of the Democratic Convention. Some supplies were never utilized during the Democratic Convention simply because their late arrival provided no time for personnel to unpack, inventory, and distribute them. An analysis of supplies which had been in demand during the Democratic Convention indicated that original requisitioning had overestimated the need for some items and underestimated regarding others. As Ms. Wood wrote:

Many of the more sophisticated supplies ordered (IV set sutures) were left totally unused during the Democratic Convention. Most commonly used items were tape, gauze, band aids, antiseptic, Solarcaine and antibiotic ointments, thermotabs and analgesics such as aspirin. Certain injectile medications such as penicillins and tetanus toxics proved also to be needed.

Also, supply inventory procedures were not regularly followed. As a consequence, supplies of some items became exhausted and urgent orders had to be placed for their replenishment.

Several problems resulted from the late decision of the Miami Beach City Council to grant a campsite and from permitting non-delegates to camp before service facilities had been established. The Duval County Winnebago mobile medical unit was brought into Flamingo Park and unknowingly placed upon land claimed by the Gay Liberation groups. The infringement of territoriality was exacerbated by the exhaust fumes which the Winnebago generated in the direction of a medical tent which
the Gay groups had set up. An argument was resolved when County personnel agreed to assist the Gays in moving their medical tent. Given this, the Gays decided to tolerate the presence of the Winnebago.

However, to make matters worse, County personnel who had promised to assist moving the tent failed to show up to do so. When the mobile medical units were finally in place, there were some non-delegates requests for care before the units had been supplied. Also, the installation of electrical wires and telephones had to await the physical presence of the units.

The Broward mobile unit was not genuinely operational until Sunday, July 9, despite the opening of the campsite and the presence of many non-delegates several days previously.

The phone-line contact between the YMCA medical communications center and the DCPSD where a Randle-Eastern ambulance dispatcher was located generated complications. On the first day of the Democratic Convention, a request from the Ida Fischer facility to get an ambulance for a drug overdose problem resulted in a response from the Miami Beach Fire Rescue and a police car, but no ambulance. The police searched the patient before transporting him to Jackson Memorial -- a situation hardly conducive to building non-delegate trust. As a result, medical personnel decided not to mention a drug problem if that should be the
cause of an ambulance request.* However, while this tactic obtained the ambulance required, the Miami Beach Fire Rescue continued to respond and then became angry when they were not required. The medical coordinator at the YMCA finally began calling Randle-Eastern directly.

The MTA bus system to transport volunteers between the mainland and Miami Beach worked well. However, there was generally considerable unused space on the buses and twelve-passenger mini-buses would have sufficed. Also, there was reluctance of the medical personnel to continually tie-up YMCA vans in transporting patients between units and to Jackson Memorial Hospital when an ambulance was not required. Medical personnel would have preferred the availability of one or two station wagons to perform this function. While some thought concerning this had been evidenced before the Democratic Convention, the County Manager's staff had been unable to locate any vehicles which could be utilized for this purpose. On several occasions during the Democratic Convention, medical personnel used their private vehicles for such transporting duties.

Several issues of "professional care" created tensions between professional and non-professional members of the medical care system.

*To the non-delegate organizers, both this event and the friction between Winnebago medical unit and the Gay groups were perfect examples of why they had to control their own health services. From their perspective, the difficulties with the Gays demonstrated a potential hostility to all non-establishment types, and the failure to keep the police from the scene represented a political naivete which could have been extremely dangerous to the non-delegate groups.
Many professionals were concerned that lay volunteers (especially the street medics) were making medical decisions and providing care they were not trained to give. Throughout the planning discussions the question of medical liability (especially given the number of non-professional volunteers expected to have patient contact) concerned the medical professionals involved. There was some shortage of doctors at medical units, as doctors had to juggle hospital schedules and private patient appointments to find time for convention-related work. Some of the County Manager's staff felt the majority of the doctors who originally volunteered tended to treat their commitment rather lightly.

Additionally, the political persuasions of many who volunteered were considerably more conservative than the attitudes of the non-delegates. In the same vein, the medical ethic of "objective" doctor-patient relationship was somewhat incompatible with the type of human relationships valued by non-delegates. These problems interferred with the development of positive "medic credibility" in the eyes of many non-delegates. The question of drug usage tended to be the type of issue where a gap in attitudes was most noticeable. Such attitudinal problems continued to underlie a fairly common dissident preference for medical care offered by various non-delegate groups or by the YMCA Outreach workers with whom many dissidents felt a closer ideological affinity.

Throughout the planning and operationalization of the emergency medical care system, personality conflicts were an important source of
friction. One of the County's Democratic Convention After-Action Reports commented as follows regarding the way in which the HPC working subcommittee functioned:

During the many meetings of this group, very little in terms of substantive planning was accomplished; rather, semantics and nitty gritty details became the rule of the game. The whole question was approached in a very strange manner -- instead of determining what is within the realm of possibility, the group formulated an elaborate plan and became extremely frustrated when some elements of the plan could not be implemented. They made the whole health delivery system a much more difficult problem than it really was.

On the other hand, many of the professional medical personnel involved in planning and implementation felt that Katy Wood and Keith Taylor of the County Manager's Convention Planning Staff were involved in an operation that demanded more than their training and experience had prepared them to handle. The various after-action reports submitted after the Democratic Convention by personnel in the medical system gives the definite impression that those involved were constantly questioning one another's competence -- a problem perhaps endemic to a profession which does demand specialized training and which has a highly organized hierarchical authority structure. No persuasive cooperative spirit seems to have developed in putting together these medical services for the Democratic Convention.

On July 28, the Ad Hoc Committee held a meeting to assess the difficulties and successes of the medical care system implemented during the Democratic Convention. As a result of this and several additional
meetings, several modifications were introduced into the health care system for the Republican Convention. Planners preparing the medical care system for the Republican Convention worked on the assumption that Flamingo Park would again be designated as a legal campsite for non-delegates. The command responsibility structure of the system was tightened: Dr. Saslaw, director of the Dade County Department of Public Health, retained overall medical responsibility; Dr. Clifford Findeiss continued as the Medical Operations Director with responsibility for recruiting and scheduling needed physicians and nurses; Jay Weinstein of Jackson Memorial Hospital was assigned overall responsibility for medical supplies with on-site responsibility for the medical supply depot at Ida Fisher Junior High School assigned to Robert Wynn of Jackson Memorial Hospital. William Hampton, County Budget Director, was named as the County Manager's liaison officer with the medical care delivery system. All major policy decisions (excluding professional medical decisions) would be cleared with the Budget Director.*

During the Republican Convention, Ida Fisher Junior High School did not function as a primary care unit (its sole utilization was as a

*It is our understanding that Mr. Hampton was appointed to this position because of a lack of coordination between the various components of the medical service system. Whatever the reasons, non-delegates were extremely pleased with his appointment and performance. After the Conventions, one non-delegate concluded: "One of the most beneficial and important changes which were made was the appointment of Bill Hampton to oversee the medical services."
supply depot). Instead, the primary care facilities at Flamingo Park were expanded. In addition to stationing the Duval County mobile medical unit at Flamingo Park, a large Army tent was set up adjacent to the Duval County Winnebago. The Broward County mobile unit returned to the same Washington Avenue site near the Convention Complex. The medical services at Flamingo Park were available 24-hours a day; the Broward County unit was operational only during the time of demonstrations at the Convention Complex. Dr. Findeiss was appointed to personally function as an on-site physician at Flamingo Park between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and midnight. He designated a chief physician for each shift to be in charge of operations during his absence. When physicians were not in the primary care units, a registered nurse would be present; if in such situations a physician were required, the registered nurse would be responsible for contacting on-call physicians. Street medics were headed by Keith Taylor of the County Manager's Planning Staff; however, Dr. Findeiss was expected to provide medical guidance for street medics.

During the Republican Convention, medical supplies were issued to authorized persons at 9:00 a.m., 1:00 p.m., and 6:00 p.m. at the Ida Fisher medical supply depot. Prescription drugs were only issued at the direction of the Medical Operations Director or his physician designee. A Unit Administrator at each of the Flamingo Park and the Broward County units supervised the daily pickup of medical supplies at the designated times; Keith Taylor coordinated the daily pick-up of backpack supplies by street medics also at the designated times. Supplies were inventoried daily at the Ida Fisher depot; the unit Administrators daily inventoried supplies at the two primary care units.
While the county health professionals were finalizing these changes, non-delegate technicians were also making changes in their operations plans. Expecting civil disobedience during the Republican Convention, they were extremely concerned that the street medic program be as competent and as politically credible as possible. In accordance with these goals, they resumed negotiations with YMCA Outreach and Dade County in an effort to develop a more satisfactory logistical coordination system for health services. Because of the good will and trust which had been built up during the Democratic Convention, this turned out to be a fairly easy task. As a result, the Outreach program was substantially redesigned to play a much more active role in the street medic program as well as in other aspects of service delivery.

One area in which major changes were made was the medical services communications system. Since coming to the Miami area, members of the original Operation Medic had tried to establish a special UHF radio network to coordinate all non-delegate human services. The idea for this system came from Washington, D.C., where on several occasions a special demonstration radio network had been supported by the Federal government and based in the Mayor’s Command Center.* Given the high

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*In fact the White House Communications Agency often helped supply this equipment. When questioned about the advisability of accepting communication equipment from government agencies, non-delegate
degree of cooperation between different groups it seemed natural to them that such a system should be employed during the Conventions.

Prior to the Republican Convention, Mr. Rodericks arranged to provide such a system through the White House Communications Agency. All parties finally agreed that the base station for this system would be located in the Miami Outreach Communications Center but that it would be run by movement organizers who had previous experience in coordinating such a system in Washington, D.C. A remote control unit was installed in the Flamingo Park recreation office used by Mr. Rodericks. Ten UHF handi-talkie units were supplied to the street medics. Access to this special medical communications system was strictly controlled with only a specified group of trained and experienced street medics cleared to carry the hand units.

There were few restrictions on the actual use of the system. Obscenity could not be used on the air and the network could not be utilized to enhance the tactical effectiveness of civil disobedience. These were the same terms that had been imposed on the utilization of spokesmen indicated that they saw no harm in accepting such equipment since the government had the capacity to monitor or jam any communications system which they could set up on their own. Since the activities to be organized were supposed to be non-violent, non-delegate technicians saw no reason why not to use such a communications system for the negotiated purpose.
this equipment in Washington, thus non-delegate spokesmen had no
difficulty accepting them. The entire radio network was plugged into
the White House signal board at the Doral Hotel and was monitored by
John Dean, Special Counsel to the President, members of the White
House Communications Agency, and the Secret Service. If any misuse
of the network had occurred, these officials were in a position to
pull the plug and thereby disconnect the entire medical communications
system.

In actuality, the medical communications system was really
three systems. The first system - the one described above - was
used by the street medics. The second linked the Flamingo Park and
the Broward County primary medical care unit at the Convention Complex.
The third was the YMCA system which operated from a base station and
nine mobile units and connected with the YMCA communications center
at the YMCA building in downtown Miami. A YMCA van was placed adjacent
to the Duval County Winnebago in Flamingo Park to interface these three
systems. The YMCA van was equipped with a street medic handi-talkie
unit and a YMCA unit; the Winnebago was equipped with the radio unit
linking the two primary care centers. Two YMCA mobile vans in the
field also carried street medic handi-talkies. The medical communication:
center at the YMCA building in downtown Miami had hot-line telephone
links to the County Manager's Command Post, the County Civil Defense
Center, the DCPHD Communication Center, the Dade County Citizens
Information Service, and the Broward County primary care unit.
During the Republican Convention, the health care system provided a larger volume of medical treatment. Health planners estimated that the number of non-delegates in Flamingo Park during the Republican Convention to be approximately 5,000 as opposed to 2,000 during the Democratic Convention. The Flamingo Park primary care unit charted 496 patients. As during the Democratic Convention, the most common problem was minor trauma (including cuts, scrapes, blisters, and bruises); the next most common problem was upper respiratory problems. A total of 28 were referred to Jackson Memorial Hospital: 12 for specialty consultation (including laboratory tests), 10 for x-rays, 3 for dental extractions, and 3 for suturing. The only referred patient admitted to Jackson Memorial was an individual submitted to psychiatric care after he was found acting bizarrely and carrying a gun on the campgrounds. On the last night of the Republican Convention, approximately 1,000 people suffering from tear gas exposure were treated by the two primary care units and the street medics. Ambulance and fire rescue services carried about 30 tear gas victims to local hospitals. Once again, there was no accurate accounting on street medic distribution of salt pills and first aid materials. The incidence of drug problems continued to be small. As was done during the Democratic Convention, non-delegates organized their own security force to keep pushers of harmful drugs out of the park. Medical units established in Flamingo Park by the
YMCA and the VVAW handled many minor medical problems. A statistical breakdown of the 496 charted patients who sought medical care at the Flamingo Park primary care unit during the Republican Convention is appended to this chapter.

The last night of the Republican Convention was the most dramatically chaotic time of the conventions period for all including the medical system. Distribution of gas masks was rigidly controlled because of fear they would be stolen. This resulted in an approximately two-hour delay between the time they were called for on the last night and the time when they were received by volunteers in the field who needed this protection to continue functioning. Unfortunately, police units operating on the last night in front of the Convention Complex were observed to throw tear gas cannisters under and around the Broward County primary care unit on Washington Avenue.

The concensus of those who had been involved in planning and implementing the medical care system was that the operation had been successful and that the experience during the Democratic Convention led to many important improvements for the Republican Convention operation. Although neither convention period had severely tested the established procedures, those evaluating the system remained confident a substantially greater volume of patients could have been treated. Moreover, there appeared to be some recognition that the gap between
health professionals and non-delegates had been bridged. In his After-Action Report, Dr. Saslaw, for instance, wrote:

One weakness appears evident. The "street medic" seemed to operate with greater freedom than might be in the best medical interest of the population being treated. However, it is recognized that the subject population has, to a large extent, rejected conventional approaches to medical care. The independent action of the "street medics" perhaps is not sanctioned by the medical authorities, but by virtue of this independence, was more acceptable to the non-delegate visitors.
Effects for 270 charted patient medical visits of non-delegates during the 1972 Democratic National Convention; prepared by David Rosenfield, MD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minor Trauma</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Respiratory Infections (including ear infections)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun-related problems</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastro-intestinal</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatological</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuro-psychiatric* (including seizure disorder and headache)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gynecological and Genito-urinary</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal Disease</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug-related Problems</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ophthalmological</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Respiratory Infections (including asthma)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol Related Problems</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infection (not including gastroenteritis)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Arthritis 2
Pediatric 2
Metabolic (hypoglycemia) 1

*One patient with epilepsy and hysterical seizures was seen each day during the medical care program's operation and had to be kept under almost constant observation the last 2 days when she refused hospital treatment.*
Causes for 496 charted patient medical visits of non-delegates during the 1972 Republican National Convention; prepared by David Rosenfield, MD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minor Trauma</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Respiratory Infections (including ear infections)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dermatological</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastrointestinal</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun-related Problems</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug-related Problems</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal Disease</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Respiratory Infections (including asthma)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuro-psychiatric</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including seizure disorder and headache)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gynecological and Genitourinary</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ophthalmological</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abscess</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pediatric</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractures</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistaxis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypertension</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angina Pectoris</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 12

Protest During The Democratic National Convention

Given the advance hearinging and the many expressions of community concern, the actual demonstrator turnout for the Democratic National Convention was disappointing. In this same context of anticipation and prior apprehension, the actual demonstration events were tame. The demonstrators initiated no large-scale property damage; neither demonstrators nor police engaged in noteworthy physical violence; the city streets of Miami Beach did not erupt in riot. Much community concern during the Democratic National Convention centered around the marijuana smoking and nude swimming which occurred in Flamingo Park. This was despite the fact one had to go to the Park to encounter those smoking marijuana and additionally climb a flight of stairs to observe those swimming nude. Played off against the lack of substantial and threatening demonstrations, the side-show aspects of the Flamingo Park campsite could easily be seen as the main attraction. In fairness, we must emphasize that this "let's have a good time" attitude was not limited to the non-delegates. Rather, such an attitude also characterized the majority of delegates to both Conventions. One of the most fascinating demonstrations of this fact came when one left the carnival atmosphere of Flamingo Park with its under-costumed young people on marijuana highs to attend any one of a number of by-invitation gatherings sponsored during their Conventions by the Democrats or Republicans at one of the fashionable Beach hotels where one could see the over-costumed over-thirtys on alcoholic highs.
Still, many serious people came to Miami Beach to engage in political protests. Prior to the July 10 opening of the Democratic National Convention and the arrival of a substantial number of Flamingo Park residents (July 9), the majority of non-delegates in Miami Beach consisted of those present to attend the National Welfare Rights Organization Convention held at the Coronet Hotel. Given the concurrent and later presence of the National Tenants Organization and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, black representation among the non-delegates was considerable. A number of protest appearances by poor people's representatives and private meetings between poor people's representatives and Democratic National Convention officials occurred prior to the opening of the Convention as part of an effort by these representatives to obtain 750 seats to attend the Convention.

With the arrival of the majority of non-delegates and the opening of the Democratic National Convention, most protest activity consisted of nightly marches to Convention Hall with planned protest programs in the designated demonstration areas marked off by indentations of the fence on the Washington Avenue side of Convention Hall. For daytime protest activity groups would occasionally organize a march from Flamingo Park to the Convention Hall or some other attractive protest site. Hotels which hosted convention activities or housed candidates were usually the focus of such daytime protest appearances. Given the daytime heat of the Miami Beach summer and the arduous nature of even afternoon/evening marching, many non-delegates remained in Flamingo Park during the day to rest and conserve strength.
We make no attempt here to list or describe each and every protest event. Such an effort would extend this report to an unmanageable size. Rather, we have concentrated on five protest events we feel are indicative of the type of protest evidenced. In our selection process, we chose the most dramatic incidents, the events we feel most influenced the character of the protest activity during the Democratic National Convention and most demonstrated the law enforcement response available. We decided not to write our own narrative of these events. Instead, we placed side-by-side narratives and logs made available to us by different sets of actors. We do this to emphasize the different points of view and construction of events which were inevitably generated when so many individuals and groups interacted. To have tried to present a narrative of our own by reconciling the different accounts available to us would be to assume each protest event involved a singular "reality" such that the "truth" of what happened could be culled from the various accounts. By our method of presentation, we wish to emphasize that several different views of these events were possible and legitimate. Conceivably, there could be as many different views of an event as there are participants. We have presented as many significantly different perspectives as we were practically able to collect and present.* The discussion comments added on to the end of each event's narratives are not meant to be a definitive statement of what happened.

*We doubt, however, that all actual viewpoints of a given event (even if it were practically possible to collect and present them) would be significantly different to warrant separate presentation.
in each event. Rather, these comments are the viewpoints of our field observers on the scene and/or our observations regarding the significance of the events.
NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION (NWRO) AND
NATIONAL TENANTS ORGANIZATION (NTO)
MARCH TO CONVENTION HALL

JULY 8, 1972
Around 4:45 p.m., a group variously estimated at from 400 to 750 marchers left the Sharon Hotel at 20th Street and Collins Avenue to march to Convention Hall. Among the marchers were members of NTO, NWRO, SDS, VVAM, WAM, SCLC, PCPJ, Yuppies, Zippers, and the National United Committee to Free Political Prisoners. The purpose of the march was to voice the demand for 750 seats in the convention to protect poor people's rights, as well as their concerns over higher wages and better housing. The march went without incident, with the assistance of uniformed police who stopped traffic at four intersections. A few spectators and representatives of various opposing opinions watched along the way. Numerous media representatives, several policemen, representatives of other security groups, and at least nine RCLC observers accompanied the march.

At 5 p.m., the marchers reached Convention Hall, and, although there had been no plans and no permission for them to enter, they did so without incident and sat down. The somewhat tense situation was handled well, tempers were kept cool with much joviality and chanting, and no incident occurred. Inside, some leaders of the demonstrators vowed to

At 5 P.M., a march and demonstration was scheduled by leaders of the National Welfare Rights Organization (N.W.R.O.) and the National Tenants Organization (N.T.O.). The purpose was to dramatize their request for 750 seats on the Convention floor for their representatives. Starting at the Sharon Hotel, 110 20th Street, Miami Beach, where many of the N.W.R.O. people were staying, the march was to proceed up Collins Avenue to the Convention Complex where a brief demonstration would take place.

About 800 people were participating in the march as it reached the Convention Complex shortly after 5 P.M. When it was noticed that there was no security guard at the 20th Street and Washington Avenue gate, the group spontaneously abandoned its previous plan and marched through the gate and onto the Convention Complex. Marching into the North Convention Hall, where workmen were busy making last minute adjustments to equipment, they seated themselves and vowed to remain until representatives of the Democratic National Committee appeared to speak with them. While waiting, they listened to speeches given by demonstration leaders. At 6:30 P.M., they marched once around the inside of the Hall and left, many intending to attend an 8 P.M. rally at the Dupont Plaza where Senator McGovern was to speak.
remain until representatives of the
Democratic National Committee appeared.
In their absence several short speeches
were made by demonstration leaders and
by Mayor Chuck Hall. The group then
got up, marched around the inside of
the hall, and prepared to leave.
About that point a group of some 300
more demonstrators entered the gates
shouting. Again there was potential
for difficulty, but some leaders of
those already in the hall discussed
with the new arrivals and all decided
to leave, which they did around 6:30,
many of them intending to attend the
8:00 rally at Dupont Plaza, where
Senator McGovern and others were to
speak.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
NWRO AND NTO MARCH TO CONVENTION HALL, JULY 8, 1972

1. Lemberg Center observers reported that when the marchers reached Convention Hall, they were surprised to find the Hall unguarded and open. The decision to enter the Hall seemed spontaneous.

2. The second group of approximately 300 demonstrators arriving at Convention Hall as the first group was leaving the Hall seemed to have made a scheduling mistake. The black leadership of the first group encountered the white leadership of the second group and admonished them for arriving too late to participate in the demonstration. The black leaders of the first group virtually ordered the second group to leave the Convention Complex with them and return to Flamingo Park.

3. In an interview with Richard Murphy, Convention Manager of the Democratic National Convention, on October 5, 1972, Mr. Murphy expressed his concern that the Hall had been left so unguarded:

We could not afford to hire a large number of trained guards to put on the Hall that far in advance. We were to take over the building on Sunday afternoon. The City refused to help us out. There was no way of stopping these people from coming into the Hall. Anybody could have wandered through the Hall. In fact, the previous evening someone had stolen from the Hall the picture of Lyndon Johnson. It had been lying on the floor while the workmen were hanging the other pictures. I used to come over to the Hall to inspect it when I finished up at the office around 12 or 1 a.m. I'd find all kinds of people in there. It was frightening because anyone could destroy a photo or plant a bomb.

Mr. Murphy squarely placed blame for this lack of security on Miami Beach City Manager O'Key:
The City was reluctant to provide security because of money. The City Manager would never spend a dime -- that was his attitude throughout. He constantly rejected any requests made.

He stated his belief that City Manager O'Key personally made the decision not to "help out" the Democratic National Party.
DEMONSTRATION AT THE PLAYBOY PLAZA

JULY 9, 1972
Some 200 SDS demonstrators attempted to block the passage of cars arriving at the Playboy Club. The club was closed for the evening as a safety precaution. The demonstration was noisy but peaceful until some demonstrators began placing SDS stickers on cars, pounding on the tops of cars, and defacing the property. The police made no effort to stop the demonstrators, and the tourists were left to enjoy the show.

At 7:00 P.M., the Tactical Commander requested that four prisoner vans be positioned in front of the hotel. The prisoners were to be moved out of the area. The demonstrators complied, and the prisoners were moved to a safe location.

The demonstration had been very peaceful, with no arrests being made. The police were able to keep the peace and ensure that the event went off without a hitch.
At 9:25 P.M., buses met those demonstrators who had walked to the Fontainebleau and brought them back to Flamingo Park. About 75 did not board the buses but walked back to the Playboy Plaza Hotel. Once there, they remained out front for a few minutes, then dispersed in all directions of their own accord. At 10:10 P.M., Public Safety Department platoons 14 and 15 were secured from the hotel and returned to their assembly area.
COMMAND POST "BETA"  
COMMAND POST LOG  
DADE COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY DEPT.  

DADE COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY DEPT.  
COMMUNICATIONS LOG  
YMCA MIAMI OUTREACH  
LOG SHEETS  

4:04 p.m. We were advised by Chief Zanders that fifty people from Captain Ford's Task Force were to be assigned duty at the Playboy Plaza, 56th Street and Collins Avenue, at 6:00 p.m., relative to a scheduled demonstration.

4:47 p.m. Task Force "A" was advised to be on standby alert, per Colonel Cotzin.

5:44 p.m. Captain Ford advised his Task Force arrived at the Playboy Plaza.

6:10 p.m. Sergeant Oller, OCB, called Command Post, advised intelligence personnel with SDS have been informed that approximately 45 to 50 people will be leaving Flamingo Park at approximately 7:15 p.m. enroute to the Playboy Plaza and supposedly are planning to crash into the dining room at the hotel.

6:14 p.m. Captain Ford advised of above information and he indicated he would notify Secret Service. Captain Ford further advised he would be available at 865-1500, Ext. 3312.

5:05 p.m. To Captain Ford from Colonel Cotzin: Have his people change time from 6:00 to 5:30 p.m.

5:44 p.m. Captain Ford arrived Playboy Plaza.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMAND POST &quot;BETA&quot;</th>
<th>DCPSD COMMUNICATIONS LOG (continued)</th>
<th>YMCA MIAMI OUTREACH LOG SHEETS (continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6:30 p.m. Captain Ford requested prisoner transport vehicles be dispatched to 5300 block of Collins Avenue to stand by in case arrests are made at the Playboy Plaza.</td>
<td>6:40 p.m. Captain Senk contacted Sgt. Urspruch at Prison Processing Center on Meridian Avenue and requested a van and I.D. team to the 5300 block of Collins Avenue per request of Captain Ford.</td>
<td>6:30 p.m. SDS demonstration scheduled for 7:00 PM. PC rally at Flamingo Park now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:40 p.m. Jails &amp; Corrections Officer Urspruch was contacted by Captain Senk via telephone at the Meridian Avenue Prisoner Processing Center and was relayed the above information. He indicated requests would be complied with.</td>
<td>6:40 p.m. Chief Lougheed left Command Post enroute to Playboy Plaza.</td>
<td>6:39 p.m. 75 people headed toward Washington SDS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:07 p.m. Chief Lougheed left Command Post enroute to Playboy Plaza.</td>
<td>7:04 p.m. Colonel Cotzin to Captain Ford: Come to front of Playboy Plaza with six men. Message given to Sgt. Askew at 7:05 p.m.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20 p.m. Intelligence Unit Policewoman Costello called Communications Bureau and advised that approximately 25 to 30 people were at the outside entrance of the Playboy Plaza Hotel. No unusual incidents reported.</td>
<td>7:14 p.m. Sgt. Lyons was contacted at Playboy Plaza, 865-1500, Ext. 3312, and advised that 40-50 SDS were enroute by bus. Platoons 14-15 at Playboy Plaza.</td>
<td>7:40 p.m. Van 6 requires assistance at Playboy Club. Van 8 dispatched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:05 p.m. Captain Bertucelli reported that approximately 150 SDS demonstrators were marching back and forth in front of the Playboy Plaza and blocking driveway.</td>
<td></td>
<td>8:08 p.m. Sent more units to Playboy; getting nasty. Everything blocked.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8:30 p.m. Received via Intelligence information that demonstration groups requested medical teams and communication teams to be sent to the Playboy Plaza in support of their demonstrations at that location.

9:00 p.m. SDS marching from Playboy Plaza towards the Fontainebleau slicing car tires on the way.

9:20 p.m. Captain Alsbury, per Colonel Cotzin, contacted and advised to pull his prison vans out of the area and secure.

9:25 p.m. Policewoman Costello advised that the group at the Fontainebleau is leaving and taking shuttle bus service to convention center and then back to Flamingo Park. They did not break windows at the Fontainebleau, but tires were cut. They were unconfirmed reports of arrests at the Playboy Plaza. Policewoman Costello will call Major Shelton. Jerry Rubin is at the Fontainebleau

9:36 p.m. Received information from Miami Beach Communications that a group of 50 to 75 demonstrators were returning to the Playboy Plaza from the Fontainebleau. Command Post requested location of Captain Ford's

9:15 p.m. Captain Ford advised to release prison vans and ID team from Playboy Plaza.

8:23 p.m. Medics dispatched to Plaza by County Car

8:32 p.m. State Police and paddy wagons sent to Playboy Plaza

8:43 p.m. Riot squad moving south to Fontainebleau

8:55 p.m. x-ray units asking for observers between Playboy and Fontainebleau

9:08 p.m. 2 more cars at Fontainebleau

8:57 p.m. No arrests at Fontainebleau

8:45 p.m. SDS staging sit down strike in driveway of Playboy Plaza. Arrests are being made.

9:37 p.m. Highway patrol and demonstrators leaving Fontbl.

9:30 p.m. 75 SDS moved from Fontainebleau by Highway Patrol. Moving south.

9:24 p.m. Nat. Guard blocking entrance to Fontainebleau
Crowd 100-150

9:20 p.m. Fontainebleau area dispersing for park rally at 9:30

9:20 p.m. DYC people advise police lines up at Fontainebleau
9:36 p.m. (continued) task force. He indicated they were in the Playboy Plaza.

9:40 p.m. Captain Bertucelli advised the Intelligence Unit has been monitoring 154.54 frequency which was being used for communications by demonstration groups. Information received through monitoring indicates they are aware of tactical maneuvers of our task units, their numbers, modes of transportation and type of equipment. Demonstration groups are utilizing their own vans for transportation and at this time are enroute back to Flamingo Park. Monitoring of said frequency has proved beneficiary to law enforcement for intelligence purposes.*

10:00 p.m. Informed by Colonel Cotzin that Captain Ford's task force returned to assembly area.

11:15 p.m. Radio secured.

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*Radio frequency referred to is that of the YMCA Outreach Program.

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**Entries appear in order of listing in the YMCA Log.
DEMONSTRATION AT THE PLAYBOY PLAZA, JULY 9, 1972 (continued)

FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL
INVESTIGATION REPORT

Date 7-9-72

Time 8:00 p.m.

Playboy Plaza Hotel

Contact ---- No

Injuries --- No

Damages ---- No

Number of demonstrators ---- 150

Number of police ----- 3 FHP Platoons (7-8-9)

Chief Zanders requested crowd to be moved from the front door and drive ramp to sidewalk.

Lieutenant Burnham ordered to disperse

Case # D-72-1

Report by Lieutenant J.E. Walden
DEMONSTRATION AT THE PLAYBOY PLAZA, JULY 9, 1972 (continued)

After Action Report
prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation

Approximately 150-200 persons gathered in front of the Playboy Plaza after marching or riding in buses from Flamingo Park. The group included 10 SDS, 10 PLP, (hard core members) 6 VVAW and WAM representatives. Most of those in the group were independent non-delegates. Slogans were indicative of the Communist line and were identical to those used by the PLP at the AFL-CIO Convention held in Miami.

At the Playboy Plaza the group held a demonstration that was considered "successful" by the participants. This success will likely result in other demonstrations being undertaken and the group will probably gain a great deal of support. There is already evidence that the SDS is becoming the "in" group and many factions are attempting to align themselves with the SDS. The SDS will be selective in which groups it allows in and will have complete control over their actions.

The demonstrators were dispersed by FHP Troopers and each time they ran and walked south. It was then announced by bullhorns that they would proceed to the Fontainebleau and demonstrate there. A short rally was held at the Fontainebleau after which the demonstrators boarded buses and proceeded back to Flamingo Park for an SDS rally to be held at the SDS tent.

The FHP Troopers seemed to have a persuading effect on the demonstrators and undercover officers stated that the Troopers are "feared" by the demonstrators. They obviously meant business and the demonstrators did not wish this type of confrontation.

Upon returning to Flamingo Park, a mass nude swim-in took place. With swimmers and observers, the park was quite crowded and campers attempted to keep non-delegates away from the park. Wholesale use and dispensing of drugs in rampant in the park.

The SDS held a closed meeting at which it was decided to join SCLC in their march this evening, July 10, 1972, at 6:00 p.m., at Convention Center. Attitudes are, in general, becoming more militant and it is felt that groups are waiting for the chance for an open confrontation with police.
DEMONSTRATION AT THE PLAYBOY PLAZA, JULY 9, 1972 (continued)

FROM A MEMO BY COUNTY MANAGER R. RAY GOODE TO PARTICIPANTS DATED JULY 10, 1972,
SUBJECT: "SUMMARY OF SECOND BRIEFING AT AREA COMMAND POST, MONDAY, JULY 10, 1972."

Chief Pomerance then reported on the major July 9 activities on Miami Beach. The SDS demonstration at the Playboy Plaza was covered in some detail, because it represented the first situation calling for the active use of the combined forces of MBPD, DPS, and FHP. The major problem encountered in handling this situation related to the communications network. There was some time delay in all parties being informed of the deployment of the FHP at the hotel site where DPS and MBPD had been positioned earlier. In addition, the Area Command Center had not been apprised of the removal of the DPS task force from the South Beach location to the Playboy Plaza. Chief Pomerance reported that steps have been taken to insure that appropriate communications will be made to all parties on a timely basis. The Area Commander reiterated the fact that the corrective measures are being taken only to keep all parties appropriately informed, and not as a means to pass judgment on or countermand orders given by the Miami Beach field commander and staff.

Ed Dunn (of the Governor's staff) requested an elaboration on the MBPD decision-making process as it related to the SDS incident, with a question as to whether the timing of key police actions should not have been earlier and whether or not the public and the movement groups will consider the outcome of the incident as being favorable to SDS. Col. Cotzrin and Chief Zanders gave a step-by-step description of the decision-making process, noting that the police action was taken on private property; that the owner of the hotel did not request a more aggressive police action; and that the decision to disperse the crowd was made only after SDS members began making physical contact with the automobiles attempting to enter the driveway and after SDS members increased their hassling of visiting guests.

The Area Commander expressed to all attendees the consensus of the group that the judgment of the supervisors and the conduct of the police officers were excellent in this situation.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
DEMONSTRATION AT THE PLAYBOY PLAZA, JULY 9, 1972

1. During the course of this demonstration there were several instances of "misperceptions" -- the confusion regarding buses taking demonstrators back to Flamingo Park and the reports of arrests (which are reflected in the YMCA log) being a notable instance. Also, when the fire equipment arrived to handle two instances of reported fire within the Playboy Plaza, some demonstrators were convinced the fire trucks had arrived to hose the demonstrators away from the Plaza area.

2. Lemberg Center observers reported that the police on the scene took a generally defensive stance, responding only when demonstrators began attacking cars and harassing individuals trying to enter the Plaza. The arrival of the Florida Highway Patrol in cars with lights flashing and sirens on heightened the tension at the protest scene.

3. Demonstrators seemed selective regarding which cars were attacked: expensive cars were targets of abuse while "poorer" cars were let pass.

4. According to Lemberg Center observers, several SDS organizers were disturbed by the attacks on cars and harassment of individuals. At several points it seemed as if SDS organizers had lost control of the demonstration. SDS members began encouraging demonstrators to move to the Fontainebleau as a means of breaking up the demonstration and removing protestors from the front of the Playboy Plaza. These SDS individuals seemed concerned that a police/demonstrator confrontation would take place here before the Democratic National Convention had even begun unless they could end the demonstration.
5. This demonstration as well as subsequent protest activity led law enforcement officials to conclude that SDS was the most potentially violent group present. The July 11 "Miscellaneous Information for Field Commanders" prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation commented as follows:

SDS members have taken the lead in inciting violence, with leaders manipulating others for their own purposes. They are emerging as the leaders in protest demonstrations, although their actual numbers are small (30-40).
DEMONSTRATION AT CONVENTION HALL;
FENCE INCIDENT

JULY 10, 1972
At 6 p.m., the Poor People's March left Flamingo Park for the Convention Hall, led by Dr. Abernathy, Dr. Wiley, and Sister Martha. Other groups fell into the line and the march proceeded to the Hall with between 1000 and 2000 participants. Speeches were made in small groups in front of the hall until about 7:30. SCLC marshalls then directed the demonstrators to return to the park, and the bulk of the marchers followed the instructions. At about 8 p.m., a group of some 500 Yippies, Zippies, and others, under the sponsorship of SDS and WAM, elected to remain, however, insisting that the work of the evening had but begun. They apparently attempted to gain entrance through several gates but were prevented by police. At one point, 50 state cars arrived with lights flashing. Police piled out in full riot gear. Finally a section of fence collapsed and a group of demonstrators surged toward it. Police formed a wall, effectively preventing entrance except by one person. One person was arrested and taken to the Miami Beach Police Station and subsequently to the Dade County Jail. He was treated to no abuse other than some verbal. Bail was set at $1000. Police pushed the fence back into place. Two policemen were slightly injured by thrown rocks, cans, and bottles. A few demonstrators

At 5:27 P.M., information was received from Flamingo Park that about 2,000 were attending a rally there sponsored by the Poor People's March and that their intention was to march to the Complex for a demonstration. People were also gathering at Manor Park in Miami. There they boarded buses and were brought to the rally at Flamingo Park. It was reported that several S.D.S. members were trying to recruit demonstrators at Flamingo Park for an attempt to crash the gates and enter the Convention Hall itself. At 5:50 P.M., between 1,500 and 2,000 marchers left Flamingo Park going north on Meridian Avenue toward the Complex, led by Dr. Abernathy, Dr. Wiley, and Sister Martha. They marched north on Meridian Avenue until they reached Espanola Way, then turning east, they marched to Washington Avenue, they continued moving until they were in front of the Convention Complex. There they halted and listened to various speakers including Mrs. Coretta King, Dr. Spock and Gloria Steinem.

Because of the rumored gate crashing attempts, all gates on Washington Avenue had been closed, and Public Safety Department platoons 2, 3, 4, and 5 were assembled at the rear of the Auditorium. When the rally ended, shortly after 7:30 P.M., about 500 Zippies and Yippies separated from the main group and headed south on Washington Avenue. S.C.L.C. marshals asked the rest of the demonstrators to return to the park and most of them did; but the Zippies and Yippies continued down Washington Avenue until they reached Gate 5X at 18th Street. There they began to push on the gate in an attempt to enter the Complex. Public Safety Department platoons 2 and 5 were brought up to support the officers on post there. Unsuccessful in their efforts to force open the gate, the demonstrators moved around the corner to Gate 6X on the 17th Street side of the Complex and again attempted to force the gate open.

Public Safety Department platoons 2, 3, 4, and 5 were at this time, distributed along the 17th Street fence between Gates 6X, 7X, 8X, 8AX and 9X respectively; and at 8:19 P.M., the Florida Highway Patrol troopers staged in the Auditorium were positioned along the
were affected by a chemical propellant used by City of Miami police, but there was no widespread or general use of mace or other chemicals. Numerous individuals, acting on their own, moved to cool the crowd, and a rain shower assisted in dispersing the demonstrators at about 9:30 p.m.

fence between Gates 9X and 10X. The locking mechanism on the gate (Gate 9X) was broken by the pushing of the crowd, but the officers stationed there were able to prevent them from entering the Complex. A message was sent to the Commander of Florida Highway Patrol platoons 7, 8, and 9 staged at St. Patrick's Schools, requesting that he bring his units to the Complex; and two Miami Beach motorists were sent to escort. Two officers were injured while the Florida Highway Patrol units were responding to the Complex. Miami Beach Patrolman Robert Hanlon, escorting the motorcade on his motorcycle, had to lay his motorcycle down in an attempt to avoid a collision and bruised his left leg and left wrist. He was taken to Mt. Sinai Hospital for X-rays and treatment. He was not seriously injured and returned to work two days later. Also injured in the same incident was Florida Highway Patrol Corporal Moan who struck his head on the interior of his vehicle but did not require medical attention.

The mob continued west on 17th Street, throwing rocks, bottles, and pieces of metal at the officers and attempting to force each gate as they came to it. The demonstrators had apparently brought things with them to throw at the officers, since the entire area around the Complex had been checked and cleared of just such potential weapons and missiles. At Gate 8aX, Miami Beach Sergeant Joseph Spoto received a severe laceration over his left eye when he was struck with a gate while attempting to secure it after the crowd had forced it open a second time. He was taken to Mt. Sinai Hospital for treatment.

The demonstrators continued to push against the gates and fence as they made their way westward down 17th Street. At Gate 9X, mace had to be used to move them away from the fence when several tried to climb over it. One demonstrator, Ernest L. HERRON, succeeded in climbing the fence and entering the compound, but he was immediately apprehended and arrested by Miami Police Sergeant Lawrence Hoffkins. Sgt. Hoffkins was injured while making the arrest and had to be taken to Mt. Sinai Hospital for
X-rays and treatment. At the time of this report he is a patient in Baptist Hospital with a cracked rib.

At 8:48 P.M., Florida Highway Patrol platoons 7, 8, and 9 arrived at the Complex through Gate 11X and parked their cars along Meridian Court not far from Gate 10X. As they were exiting their cars, the demonstrators succeeded in pulling down about 100 feet of fence between Gates 9X and 10X. Before they could take advantage of the opening they had created, troopers from platoons 7, 8, and 9 were moved into the breach to form a human fence and the integrity of the compound was again intact. The demonstrators had been throwing rocks, bottles and cans at the officers and two of the Florida Highway Patrol officers were injured: Colonel James E. Beach, Director of the Florida Highway Patrol, was struck on his left elbow with a rock and had to be taken to Mt. Sinai for X-rays and treatment; and Trooper R. D. Lewis was struck on the shoulder with a rock and did not require medical attention.

Two feet lengths of chain were obtained and thereafter used to chain and padlock the gates to prevent demonstrators from forcing them open the way they could an ordinary gate latch.

At 8:56 P.M., the Public Safety Department platoons at the Community Center were alerted and asked to board their buses for rapid response if needed.

The demonstrators continued their earlier westward movement, throwing stones and cans at the officers as they went. They stopped at Gate 10X and continued their barrage. Six of the large "Mark 9" mace dispensers were requested by the squad at the gate, and upon their arrival, the crowd began to move eastward on 17th Street toward where the fence had been pulled down. They had apparently seen the mace being delivered and decided to leave the area rather than risk its use on them.
The Southern Christian Leadership Conference marshals had been trying to keep the crowd away from the fence and were continually urging the demonstrators to go back to the park. They were joined by someone using a bullhorn and their combined efforts began to have an effect. At about 9:25 P.M., there were obvious signs that the crowd was less organized and beginning to disband. It began to rain a few minutes later and the demonstrators dispersed, most heading back toward the park.

At 9:34 P.M., a status check was made of each post and all reported conditions quiet and under control. At 9:44 P.M., all tactical squads were advised to return to their off-Complex staging areas, and at 9:46 P.M., all task force units were returned to their on-Complex staging areas. At 9:48 P.M., police units on the street reported that the group causing the trouble on 17th Street had returned to Flamingo Park.

Officers at the gates were ordered to reopen closed gates and by 9:54 P.M., all gates were open and functioning. A fence repair crew had arrived and was making the necessary repairs. It was found that the wire fasteners holding the fence to the fence posts were weak, allowing the fence to be easily pulled away from the posts. Additional reinforcement was added at each fence post around the entire compound. At 10 P.M., word was received from the park that agitators were claiming indiscriminate use of mace and trying to rally a group; but Vietnam Veterans Against the War members were attempting to calm the crowd and Students for a Democratic Society members had admitted to the crowd that there was no police brutality.
5:50 p.m. Miami Beach Police Department Intelligence reports approximately 1,000 demonstrators leaving Flamingo Park, north on Meridian.

6:35 p.m. Task Force A ordered assembled at rear of Jackie Gleason Auditorium.

6:43 p.m. Miss Reichardt of Intelligence called Captain Senk to advise that 1,500 to 2,000 demonstrators were outside the convention hall gates.

7:00 p.m. Peaceful demonstration in front of convention hall on Washington Avenue uneventful.

7:40 p.m. All task force commanders advised to meet within the compound on Washington Avenue. Captain Senk and Chief Lougheed responded.

7:45 p.m. Miami Beach requested assistance to Gate 5 in reference to a large number of demonstrators pushing on gate. Public Safety Department Platoons 2 and 5 responded with support from Miami Beach Police Department. Public Safety Department Platoons 3 and 4 remained on nearby standby.

7:50 p.m. Demonstration groups turned west on 17th Street pushing on gates and fences.

8:00 p.m. Locks on Gates 6 and 9 (17ths Street) broken by pushing of demonstrators. Public Safety Department Platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5 distributed to Gates 5N, 9N, 8N and 6N, respectively.

8:05 p.m. Demonstrators walked back and forth on 17th Street yelling and throwing objects as police personnel.

8:25 p.m. Demonstrators pulled down approximately 100 feet of fence on 17th Street between Gates 9X and 10X. Public Safety Department Platoon 4 and Florida Highway Patrol Platoon immediately responded and secured. Maintenance crews requested to repair fence and to supply chains for gates.

8:45 p.m. Public Safety Department Task Forces B and D were requested to mobilize and respond to convention complex and position themselves at the rear of the Jackie Gleason Auditorium.

8:55 p.m. Task Forces B and D arrived at complex.
9:00 p.m. Demonstrators split up and began to roam the area. One reported arrest made by a Miami Police Department officer.

9:30 p.m. Demonstrators returned to Flamingo Park. Comments overheard from members of group suggested that they would be back tomorrow night. Repairing of fence completed.

9:35 p.m. Task Forces B and D ordered back to their respective assembly areas.

9:55 p.m. All complex task forces secured and returned to respective quarters.

10:20 p.m. Captain Ford advised that Task Force B was at the Community Center. Captain Taylor reported that Task Force D returned to the VFW Hall.
POOR PEOPLE'S RALLY: Sponsored by NWRO, NTO, and SCLC, left Flamingo Park at 6:00 p.m., numbering approximately 1200. These groups were joined by members of YIPS, ZIPS, and SDS. The group marched to the Convention Center and held a rally. Speakers were: Dr. Ben Spock, David Dellinger, Barry Romo, Rev. Ralph Abernathy, George Wiley, Hubert James, Marsha Monastai (Boston SDS), and Jackson Pride (Houston WAM).

The group grew in size, and estimates were that as many as 2500 persons were present. As the crowd became unruly, Black members left the Convention Complex. Approximately 1200 demonstrators (all white) remained. At 8:20 p.m. this group began to attempt to climb the fence and break the gates. Between this time and 9:30 pm, reinforcements responded to the Convention Complex for security purposes. A section of fence (approximately 15 yards) on the south side of the Convention Complex was torn down. Two police officers were injured (minor) and some rocks and bottles were thrown at police, one arrest was made.

At 9:30 pm, all demonstrators were dispersed and officers returned to their normal assignments.

Intelligence information indicates that this group was led by SDS agitators from Chicago. These agitators were using bullhorns and have stated that the demonstration on July 10, 1972 was only a drill and that they will return tomorrow night. Leaders have stated that tomorrow night they will know which locations are the most vulnerable and that they will get inside the complex.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
DEMONSTRATION AT CONVENTION HALL; FENCE INCIDENT, JULY 10, 1972

1. Almost all on-scene observers (including those from the Lemberg Center) reported that when the fence actually gave in, everyone seemed surprised, demonstrators as well as police. The best description is that the fence seemed to give in from the mere pressure of demonstrators pushing against it rather than from serious attempts to breach it. In fact, even while shaking the fence demonstrators described their actions as "rattling the cage".

Once the fence gave way, there was no rush by demonstrators to enter the Convention Complex grounds. Rather, demonstration marshals and third party mediators immediately acted to restrain the most active demonstrators. In general, demonstrators offered no resistance to such efforts. Conversely, police officers moved up to block access to the Convention Complex but they made no move against the demonstrators. Police pushed the fence back in position. Outside the fence, various groups -- including as many as 15 people wearing SDS t-shirts -- worked to convince everyone to return to Flamingo Park.

2. The collapse of the fence highlighted one of the major law enforcement concerns. Law enforcement planners had consistently worried that demonstrators would make an effort to charge gates or otherwise violate the security of the fence perimeter. This concern may have been exacerbated when as early as June 5 Chief Pomerance warned law enforcement planners that the fence was particularly weak should a large number of people try to
storm it. In any case, law enforcement reports evidence a continual concern
over dissident tactical discussions which seem to have such an entry in
mind. Law enforcement authorities were determined to prevent any breach of
the perimeter fence security.

3. Subsequent to this incident, the fence was reenforced by
attaching plastic handcuffs around the fence at the fence's supporting poles.

4. Finally, we must make a point concerning the throwing of rocks,
bottles, etc. by demonstrators. According to the Miami Beach Police
Department Log, demonstrators had apparently brought things with them to
throw at the officers, since the entire area around the complex had been
checked and cleared of just such potential weapons and missiles. There is
no question that various types of missiles were thrown at police officers.
On the other hand, police officials may have overstated the planned
maliciousness and intensity of these attacks. One indication that this may
be true is that Lemberg Center observers noted a large pile of two-inch
gravel stones which remained untouched just outside the Convention Hall
fence (near the Meridian Avenue and 17th Street corner) during the entire
Democratic Convention.
DEMONSTRATIONS AT CONVENTION HALL;
CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO MARCH

JULY 11, 1972
About 600 Cubans gathered between 5 and 6 p.m. at Burdine's Department Store parking lot at 17th and Meridian Ct. Shortly after 6:00 p.m. they marched east on 17th to Washington and north on Washington to the 'free speech area' in front of Convention Hall. Police and Cuban marshalls kept the group separated from the other demonstrators on Washington. Just before 7:00 p.m. a group of some 60 Gay Activists marched south on Washington toward the Cubans, and a group of Cubans broke from their march and started toward the Gays yelling "Communists". A police sergeant cleared a way for the Gays to march along the east edge of the street, and there was no confrontation. Soon afterward the Cubans circled the Convention Hall, coming back down Park Avenue. Again there was a near-confrontation, this time reportedly with Yippies, but it was averted with the help of Cuban marshalls. At 7:55 the buses arrived at 22nd St. and Park Ave. and the Cubans left.

All the groups at Flamingo Park generally worked out an agreement for a unified rally at 6:00 p.m. to march to Convention Hall. The group gathered at Flamingo Park where they waited until 6:20 p.m. before commencing the march to Convention Hall. This delay was to avoid conflict with the Cuban March.

A considerable amount of advance planning had taken place prior to the marches and demonstrations scheduled to occur at the complex this evening, and a number of meetings had been held between members of the Miami Beach Police Department and leaders of the groups involved. The two largest groups marching held differing views, and violence was feared inevitable should their paths cross while the marches were taking place. Timing was felt to be the key if each group to march and present an effective demonstration in behalf of its beliefs, and the police department was determined to assist in every way possible to avoid confrontations between the groups. The leaders were in agreement that confrontations should be avoided and a schedule was arranged which would allow each group to march and demonstrate without interference from the other. The Vietnam Veterans Against the War and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference had each chosen fifteen of their members to act as marshals during the march. The Cuban group also had formed a security contingent of about twenty-five people who would wear dark blue slacks and white shirts with a patch on the left arm for ready identification. Several would be equipped with handie-talkies. A Miami Beach patrol car would lead each parade.

The majority of the Cuban marchers were expected to meet at the Orange Bowl Stadium in Miami. From there they would be bused to Miami Beach to rendezvous with other Cuban marchers at 17th Street and Meridian Court, their staging area. The schedule called for the Cuban groups to march from 17th Street and Meridian Court starting at 5:00 p.m. to the north demonstration area. After their demonstration they would move northward on Washington Avenue to Dade Boulevard where their buses would be waiting for them.

The anti-war marchers would stage in Flamingo Park at 5:30 p.m., and march to the south demonstration area, arriving there just after the Cuban marchers had passed through it.
already in progress. The group reached Convention Hall at approximately 7:00. VVAW and SCLC marshalls were at the front of the group, and with the police (MBPD) were observed as being particularly adept at keeping the Flamingo Park group separate from the remaining Cuban marchers. There was one potential altercation between a small group of the Cubans and the Flamingo Park group and marshalls successfully intervened. Along the route of march to Convention Hall the marshalls also dealt adequately with some disruptive Jesus people.

About 50-100 Gay Alliance persons had conducted a separate march to Convention Hall from the Park, and passed peaceably through the Cuban March at the 'free speech area', and returned during the Poor People's Rally. After several speeches it was announced that the group would begin a march around Convention Hall and return to Flamingo Park. Of the total group of demonstrators (approx. 400), 150-200 (SCLC, VVAW, Gay Alliance and Zippies) followed instructions, proceeding around the north end of Convention Hall, south on Meridian to Flamingo Park. Police escort was good all the way.

The remaining group of demonstrators was led in a rally by SDS and Yippies which lasted until about 9:30 p.m.

Because several thousand protesters were expected to demonstrate at the complex and because trouble at the Americana or Fontainebleau Hotels would probably draw upon our manpower reserves, a decision was made at 3:30 p.m. to call the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission personnel back to the convention complex. (They had worked their twelve hour off-session security detail the evening before and had been relieved at 1:00 p.m., only 2 1/2 hours earlier.) The Miami task force, Platoons 18, 19, 20 and 21 was also called at this time and asked to stage within the convention complex instead of in Miami as previously planned. At 4:12 p.m., Public Safety Department Platoons 14 and 15, previously pre-positioned at 37th Street and Garden Avenue, were also called to the complex since things were under control at the Americana and quiet at the Fontainebleau.

At 4:15 p.m., there were approximately 200 Cubans waiting to board buses in the Orange Bowl parking lot. At 10th Street and Ocean Drive, in Lummus Park, Students for a Democratic Society members were holding a rally with approximately 150 people in attendance. Speeches were being given while bullhorns and gas masks were being distributed.

At 5:00 p.m., there were about 100 Cubans waiting at 17th Street Street and Meridian Court for the Miami group to arrive (the Miami group had not yet left the Orange Bowl). Meanwhile, the group at 10th Street and Ocean Drive had gone to Flamingo Park to join the Southern Christian Leadership Conference marchers, and Students for a Democratic Society members were erecting a sound system in front of the convention complex.

At 5:30 p.m., a report was received that about 400 Cubans had left the Orange Bowl for Miami Beach. Approximately 200 were waiting to join them at 17th Street and Meridian Court. In Flamingo Park, approximately 800 people were attending a rally. Group leaders had delayed the start of their march until 6:00 p.m. because they had been informed that the Cuban marchers were running late.
At 5:55 p.m., Florida Highway Patrol Platoons 7, 8 and 9 were called at their staging area and requested to come to the complex and stand by.

At 6:00 p.m. the buses arrived at 17th Street and Meridian Avenue from the Orange Bowl and the size of the combined groups was estimated at between seven hundred and eight hundred people. In Flamingo Park an estimated crowd of one thousand to 1,500 people was gathering at the Meridian Avenue gate, preparing to move out.

At 6:08 p.m., word was received that about five hundred marchers had left Flamingo Park and were moving north on Meridian Avenue, and at 6:10 p.m., the Cuban marchers started moving east on 17th Street from Meridian Court. Miami Platoons 22 and 23 were pre-positioned on the Washington Avenue side of the perimeter from Dade Boulevard to gate 5X, while Florida Marine Patrol Platoon 10 and Florida Highway Patrol Platoons 11 and 12 were pre-positioned between gates 9X and 10X. Public Safety Department Platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5 were in position on the fence from gate 5X to gate 9X, and Public Safety Department Platoon 24 was in position along the fence on the Meridian Avenue side of the complex. Miami Beach Platoon 1 had responsibility for the fence along Collins Canal on the north side of the complex.

At 6:15 p.m., a second, larger group left Flamingo Park. A mixture of Zippies, Gays, and Vietnam Veterans Against the War, this group contained about one thousand people and followed the same route as the earlier group north on Meridian Avenue to 15th Street and east on 15th Street to Washington Avenue.

The Cuban group, meanwhile, had become very disorganized and was strung out all along 17th Street from Washington Avenue to Meridian Court. The lead marchers had stopped at Washington Avenue and were waiting for the slower marchers to catch up. Word of the Cubans slow progress was transmitted to the police radio car leading the marchers from Flamingo Park, and at 15th
Street and Washington Avenue the group sat down in the street and began to chant anti-war slogans. This delay gave the Cuban group time to form up its ranks and move around the corner onto Washington Avenue. When the Flamingo Park group at 15th Street resumed its march to the complex, the last of the Cuban group had passed through the south demonstration area and into the demonstration area reserved for it. By the time the Flamingo Park group approached the south demonstration area, the Cubans had completed their demonstration and were moving north on Washington Avenue toward Dade Boulevard where their buses were waiting for them.

Two minor confrontations did take place between the Cubans and other groups, but there was no physical contact. The first confrontation occurred at about 19th Street and Washington Avenue. The Cubans, marching north, were passed by fifty members of a gay activist group who were marching south. A shouting match ensued, but physical contact was averted by fast action on the part of the Cuban marshals who kept their group together.

The second confrontation also occurred at 19th Street and Washington Avenue. Several Cubans, who did not board the buses for the return trip to Miami, circled around the block and came back onto Washington Avenue at the north end of the Flamingo Park group’s demonstration area. Marshals from the Flamingo Park group linked arms and formed a human fence to keep the groups separated and again physical contact was avoided.

The Cuban group had made no attempt to even approach the fence, but had been content to march past the side and front of the complex displaying numerous banners and placards. Conditions were not expected to be so peaceful during the Flamingo Park group’s demonstration. Intelligence reports had been received which forecast an attempt at storming the complex. A diversionary attack was to be launched at gate 5X to draw police manpower to that area, then gates 6X, 9X and 11X were to be attacked simultaneously.
As a general rule, gates would be closed upon the approach of
demonstrators, remain closed as long as there were demonstrators
close enough to pose a potential threat, and be opened again after
the demonstrators had cleared the area. The decision to close or
open gates was made by the tactical commander. At 6:35 p.m.,
because of the advance of the two large groups towards the east
side of the complex and several smaller groups moving around on the
south and west sides of the complex, all gates were closed except
11X at 18th Street and Meridian Avenue. They were still closed
at 6:53 p.m., when the Flamingo Park group approached the southeast
corner of the complex. The group marched quietly up Washington
Avenue to the south demonstration area, between 18th and 19th
Streets, where most of the group settled down to listen to a few
speakers. Small groups, spurred on by Students for a Democratic
Society members, moved along the fence and several reports were
received of the fence strength being tested as well as that of
several of the gates, but no serious attempt was made to force
either. Reports were also received that attempts were being made
at several points to cut the fence, but these were apparently
unfounded (except for one call when City employees were found to
be working on the fence by the Collins Canal and they failed to
notify the command post).

At about 7:30 p.m., another group of about 200 marchers left
Flamingo Park for the complex. A contingent of migrant farm
workers, members of Organized Migrants in Community Action (OMICA),
had come from Homestead, Florida, to demonstrate while Governor
Askew delivered his keynote address. They marched from the park
to 15th Street, east on 15th Street to Washington Avenue, and then
North on Washington Avenue to the south demonstration area where
they joined the demonstrators already there.

By 8:00 p.m., the speakers had finished and a large number of the
demonstrators had started back for Flamingo Park where a free
rock concert was to be held later that evening. Moving north to
Dade Boulevard, the marchers circled the complex and headed south
on Meridian Avenue. About 400 people remained in the south demonstration area, but they were causing no problems. The OMICA group marched from the south area to the north area and back again calling for Governor Askew to come out, but they were peaceful and caused no trouble.

At 8:43 p.m., about 200 of the people in the south area moved out and went south on Washington Avenue. Turning west onto 17th Street, they taunted the officers near the fence and several attempted to spray the officers with a substance from aerosol dispensers. Continuing west on 17th Street to Meridian Avenue, and turning south on Meridian Avenue, they, too, headed back toward Flamingo Park.

At 8:45 p.m., Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Division personnel were relieved so they could return to their motel. At 8:53 p.m., the Public Safety Department Platoons 7, 8, 4 and 5 were returned to their staging area, as were Miami Platoons 22 and 23. Miami Platoons 18, 19, 26 and 21 returned to their staging areas, and at 8:58 p.m., Miami Beach Platoon 1 was returned to its staging area. Public Safety Department Platoons 15, 14, 16 and 24 were placed on routine stand-by, but retained at the complex. By 9:07 p.m., the last group had returned to Flamingo Park and the only demonstrators remaining at the complex were the OMICA marchers sitting quietly in the south demonstration area and ten or twelve Vietnam Veterans Against the War parading around and chanting by gate 6X. At 9:15 p.m., the OMICA group's transportation arrived and they left.

At 9:55 p.m., Public Safety Department Platoon 24 returned to its staging area at 650 West Avenue, and at 11:30 p.m., Public Safety Department Platoons returned to their staging area at 833 - 6th Street.
2:00 p.m. A meeting was held at Command Post "Beta" with representatives from each law enforcement agency attending. Purpose of the meeting, called by Colonel Cotzin, Miami Beach Police Department, was to formulate tactical plans and to preposition task forces within the complex in preparation for expected stepped-up demonstrations by non-delegates during the afternoon and evening. It was decided that Miami Police Department "Beach" Task Force would be responsible for maintaining security of the perimeter along Washington Avenue frp, Dade Boulevard south to Gate 5X. Public Safety Department Task Force A (Platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5) would be responsible for perimeter from Gate 5X (Washington Avenue) to Gate 9X (17th Street). Florida Highway Patrol Task Force to be responsible for security of perimeter fence from Gate 9X (17th Street) to Meridian Avenue. Public Safety Department Task Force D to be responsible for security of perimeter fence along Meridian Avenue. Miami Beach Police Department Task Force to be responsible for Dade Boulevard perimeter fence. Prepositioned within the complex in ready reserve would be Miami Police Department "Miami" Task Force and Public Safety Department Task Force B, Platoons 13 and 16.

3:30 p.m. Intelligence from undercover agent indicates SDS demonstration group of 2,200 is expected to demonstrate in front of Gates 6, 9, 11, and rally around Gate 5. Approximately 300 demonstrators are now at the Americana Hotel.

4:25 p.m. 90 Cubans at Orange Bowl with four buses.

SDS left Youth Center for Flamingo Park. There they will join with SCLC and other groups to hear speeches, then proceed to convention center, ETA by 6:00 p.m., at same time as Cubans. Intelligence reports they are organized, have gas masks, PA systems and a lot of strength.

4:45 p.m. Cubans now estimated to be approximately 190 in number preparing to go to convention complex.

5:30 p.m. Report from Sgt. Oiler, Intelligence: About 200 Cubans at Burdines, 175 at Orange Bowl. There are several well-known agitators in the crowd. One heard to say, "We will have problems with the hippies."

5:50 p.m. Intelligence reports diversionary attack will be made on Gate 5X with simultaneous attacks on Gates 6, 9 and 11. Platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5 were put at their positions on the fences.
6:20 p.m. Intelligence received from Miss Reichardt that 500 Cubans are marching peacefully on N.E. 17th Street from Burdines carrying flags and coffins. SDS has left the Park with two U-Haul trailers with first aid equipment from 18th and Washington. SDS plans a confrontation with the Cubans.

6:30 p.m. Captain Bertucelli reports that approximately 1,500 in the Poor Peoples Group are marching to the convention complex, approximately 500 Cubans are demonstrating in front of the complex at this time, and there are approximately 500 Chicanos on the way to the convention complex.

The following is a log of activity as related through Command Post Communications:

6:30 p.m. Communications Command Post advised that the first group has just reached the front gate.

6:35 p.m. Communications Command Post advised that Unit 252 spotted approximately three blocks of marchers in the area of Washington and 18th Street.

6:50 p.m. Communications Command Post Advised that Cuban group was fighting with unknown group in front of the convention hall. Number unknown at this time. (Near the north demonstration area).

7:00 p.m. Command Post Communications advised that Washington was blocked off for vehicle traffic. Approximately 400 to 500 in front of convention hall.

7:05 p.m. Colonel Cotzin requested Captain Ford to take two platoons to Gate 2X. Captain Ford advised he was enroute with Platoons 14 and 15.

7:10 p.m. Platoons 14 and 15 in position and ready.

7:14 p.m. Colonel Cotzin requesting a third platoon to Gate 2X. Captain Ford sending Platoon 16. Colonel Cotzin advised he did not make this request. Miami Beach advised it was Captain Whittaker that made the request. Colonel Cotzin was at Gate 2X at the time and advised to cancel the request.

7:20 p.m. Platoon 14 on the west side of Jackie Gleason Hall.

7:23 p.m. Chief Lougheed advised Captain Ford that Platoon 15 was back at Jackie Gleason Hall.
7:55 p.m. Colonel Cotzin requested Lt. Evans, Task Force D, be advised of 150 SDS moving west on Dade Boulevard toward Meridian. Lt. Evans advised by radio.

8:20 p.m. Communications Command Post advised all groups were headed back toward Flamingo Park. Request to know whether 252 was to stay in service.

8:25 p.m. Chief Lougheed advised for 252 to secure but stand by. Communications Command Post advised.

8:50 p.m. Captain Senk advised that approximately 350 SDS were south on Washington from 17th Street and appeared to be leaving the area.

9:04 p.m. Captain Senk requested men from Platoons 2, 3, 4, and 5 that were out, to return and secure until further notice.

9:00 p.m. Captain Taylor advised Platoon 24 to put his men on the buses and come in, letting half of each bus take a break.

9:12 p.m. All of the personnel in Task Forces A, B and D relieved of perimeter posts, secured in auditorium area.

9:55 p.m. Task Force D was relieved from complex area and returned to VFW Hall, arriving at 10:10 p.m.

10:35 p.m. All gates have been secured for egress or ingress except Gate 11.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
DEMONSTRATIONS AT CONVENTION HALL; CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO MARCH, JULY 11, 1972

1. Law enforcement authorities had been concerned for some time in advance of a possible leftist demonstrator/Cuban anti-Castro supporter clash during the Democratic National Convention. When the Cuban demonstration plans became known, the July 9 Daily Intelligence Estimate prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation noted the following:

A potentially threatening situation could develop July 11 as a result of a Cuban demonstration in an area on the route of the JOINT PEACE ACTION COALITION (JPAC) march. The JPAC is a coalition of the NWRO-SECLC-NTO-VVAW-PCPJ. Some leaders of both these groups have contacted each other seeking to avoid any violence during the period of the DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION.

The Cuban leaders believe that the two conventions offer excellent opportunities to call attention to the continued presence of the Castro government in Cuba and the exiled Cuban's commitment to his overthrow and their return to their homeland. But there are divergencies among the Cubans on how best to gain attention. The older leaders appear to believe that a peaceful demonstration will suffice. Others believe more militant action is required.

... The majority of Cuban demonstrators will not go to the Convention to be disruptive, but rather, to present their grievances. Neither is violence a planned tactic. Cubans will not join with other groups in demonstrations, but will retain their own unity and identity.

Nevertheless, there is the possibility that provocations could occur with confrontation between left-wing groups and the Cubans. In addition, there are reports of provocateurs within the Cuban groups with the apparent goal of disrupting the DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION and then to discredit the Party.

The coalition of Cuban groups planning the demonstration on the 11th does not include the younger or military elements. Disruptive and possibly violent tactics may be employed by these later elements at either convention, especially if the leftist groups are aggressive and creating disturbances.
2. Lemberg Center observers reported that members of third party
groups, notably YMCA Outreach workers, played an important role in establishing
lines separating the Cuban demonstrators from the other demonstrators. The
intervention of such individuals to establish distance seemed to give both
groups of demonstrators a face-saving way of avoiding clash without appearing
to have "backed off."

3. VVAW members played a prominent role among the "Flamingo Park
group" marshals who intervened when the two groups of demonstrators
threatened to clash. This role was typical of the peace-keeping, "police"
role non-delegates called upon the VVAW to play throughout the Democratic
National Convention. Such a role by the VVAW seemed in direct contradiction
with the intelligence reports prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation
during the Convention. Those intelligence reports available to the Lemberg
Center have continual reference to expectations (often furnished from
undercover sources) that VVAW members intended to engage in violent protest
activity. We must emphasize, however, that the reports made available to
us did not mention any of the more serious charges which were ultimately
made by Federal officials in the trial of the "Gainesville Eight".
DEMONSTRATION AT THE DORAL HOTEL

JULY 12, 1972
At 2:10 p.m. approximately 100 demonstrators (including SDS and Zippie members) arrived at the Doral. Security guards there would not let those in who were not wearing shoes, and a minor hassle ensued. Around 2:15 50 riot-equipped state police arrived, marched in, and shoved people out, not distinguishing between demonstrators and McGovern supporters. One policeman hit a person behind the ear without apparent provocation. The injured person was attended by a medic. In terms of both the numbers and actions of the demonstrators, observers reported that police seriously overreacted to the situation. After 15-30 minutes the police with riot gear left the hotel. Soon afterward the crowd (demonstrators and McGovern supporters) began to chant: "U.S. out of Southeast Asia; cops out of Doral."

The demonstrators remained in and around the Doral all afternoon and into the evening. Among the groups represented were: SDS, Zippers, Yippies, World Unity, SCLC, NWRO, United Farm Workers, Gay Liberation, and PLP. Their objective was to protest what they believed was a change in McGovern's position on pulling troops out of Viet Nam and to have him speak to them on this and other issues. At several times they stated their intentions not to leave until he had spoken to them.

At 12:54 P.M., word had been received from the Doral Beach Hotel that a few non-delegate demonstrators had arrived and were waiting out front. Other non-delegates continued to arrive and at 1:30 P.M., several buses left Flamingo Park bound for the hotel. At 1:47 P.M., Florida Highway Patrol platoons 7 and 8 were alerted and asked to come to the front of the hotel. The buses arrived from Flamingo Park at 1:55 P.M., unloaded, and headed back to the park to pick up more demonstrators.

At 2 P.M., when the Florida Highway Patrol platoons arrived at the Doral Beach Hotel, there were about 100 demonstrators in the hotel lobby, chanting, distributing leaflets, making speeches, and causing a lot of confusion. The troopers were asked by the tactical commander to clear the lobby of demonstrators, and at 2:04 P.M., they entered the hotel and moved the demonstrators out of the lobby and onto Collins Avenue. Two buses arrived with SDS and SCLC people on board as the lobby was being cleared. But these people were also moved off the hotel ramp by the Florida Highway Patrol troopers.

At 2:23 P.M., Doral Beach Hotel management personnel and Senator McGovern's campaign advisors requested that the troopers be removed from the area of the hotel. This request was complied with by the convention tactical commander, and at 2:26 P.M., the troopers were enroute to their staging area. At 2:25 P.M., as the troopers were leaving, demonstrators once again entered the hotel lobby, and by 2:31 P.M., there were an estimated 200 to 300 non-delegates in the lobby and they had effectively closed down the elevators and blocked all stair cases. There were no uniformed police on the scene and none returned later.
or to go up to see him if he did not
come down by a given time. There was
massive press coverage of the
demonstration, so much so that the
press probably exacerbated the situation,
both by their numbers and in that the
demonstrators played up to the TV
cameras. Counting demonstrators, media,
McGovern people and onlookers, some 500
persons were in and around the lobby.
Some demonstrators took the role of
provocateurs, others sought to calm
things during the wait.

Just before 6:00 the demonstrators
began shouting loudly. About the
same time McGovern aides jammed the
stairs to the mezzanine. There was a
false move to storm the stairs, with
general tension all around, as the
McGovern people blocked demonstrators.
Gradually most of the demonstrators
moved away from in front of the
elevators. Several McGovern aides
appeared, in turn, to offer explanations
and compromise suggestions to the
demand that the Senator appear. Each
in turn was booed and treated rudely
by the demonstrators. At 8:15 or
8:20 Senator McGovern came down and
stood on the stairs behind a phalanx
of secret service men and surrounded
by the media. For a half-hour he
answered questions to mixed applause
and boos. After he returned upstairs
most people left, generally orderly.
By 9:30 most had dispersed.
After Action Report
prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation

Doral Beach Hotel

At approximately 1:00 PM the SDS and VVAW met at this hotel to question McGovern on his stand not to withdraw troops immediately from Vietnam. They were told McGovern was not available. At 1:36 PM two buses left Flamingo Park with supporters of SDS. At 2:00 PM, approximately 75 ZIPS, SDS, and VVAW entered the lobby and were removed by FHP Troopers. At this time, FHP was requested by McGovern's Committee and the hotel staff to leave. They complied with the request.

Immediately after FHP's withdrawal, the group re-entered the lobby and began demonstrating (speeches, chanting, etc.) The demonstrators increased in numbers, reaching 400-600. They were placed in the ballroom where they stated they would not leave the hotel until they spoke with McGovern. The group appeared ready to vandalize the hotel and delivered an ultimatum to McGovern: "Arrive in 15 minutes or they would not be responsible for any acts of violence." The group blocked the entrances, stairways and elevators. As delegates moved through the crowd, demonstrators removed identification tags and Convention passes from them. The group was composed of other groups (mainly SCLC, PLP, and GAA). The GAA members held a sit-down in the center of the lobby. There was open use of drugs by demonstrators.

At 7:00 PM the demonstrators were catered food by the Green Power Group. The elevators and stairways remained blocked until:

Speeches were made by Dana Beal, Larry Weiner, and other group leaders. The group demanded the following:

1. McGovern talk to them.
2. McGovern to sign anti-racism bill
3. McGovern to act to assist the n/f

At 8:15 PM McGovern met with the group and this meeting was televised live. McGovern was shouted down by a crowd of 500-600. At 8:50 PM the majority of the group left the lobby. At 11:00 PM reports showed 160 people were at the Doral, preparing to leave.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
DEMONSTRATION AT THE DORAL HOTEL, JULY 12, 1972

1. When it became clear that George McGovern was likely to win the Democratic Presidential nomination, law enforcement officials concluded that the likelihood of disruptive protests was considerably diminished. The Daily Intelligence Estimate of July 11, 1972 prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation had noted the following:

Senator George McGovern, the preferred candidate of the left-wing and most black nondelegates, seems assured of the Democratic nomination. Therefore, the threat of massive and violent demonstration at the conclusion of the Convention has been diminished.

The July 12 demonstration at the Doral was then somewhat of a surprise. But, then too, so was Senator McGovern's statement concerning his intent to leave a residual military force in Indochina should he be elected.

2. Lemberg Center observers reported that the removal of the FHP considerably reduced the tension in a situation building toward angry confrontation. Throughout the demonstration, the extensive news coverage seemed to provide some demonstrators an incentive for prolonging and dramatizing the protest. However, even without extensive news coverage, the reaction of the non-delegates to Senator McGovern's statement could have generated a substantial demonstration response.
CHAPTER 13
Protest During the Republican National Convention

As had been generally expected, a greater number of demonstrators came to Miami Beach to protest during the Republican National Convention. As had also been expected, the protests themselves were more intense and angry than those experienced during the Democratic National Convention. By the beginning of the Republican Convention, the number of serious protestors in Flamingo Park clearly outnumbered those present for reasons other than political. One end of the Park was reserved for a series of exhibits under the name Expose '72. These exhibits housed in tents concentrated for the most part upon discussing the implications of the U.S. policy in Indochina. As will be clear from the following accounts of protest events, counter-demonstration groups were present to a considerable extent during the Republican National Convention although the impact of such efforts during the Democratic National Convention had been negligible.

The method of presentation in this Chapter remains the same as was utilized to describe and discuss protest events during the Democratic Convention. For the sake of brevity, we have not included the Command Post Beta Log entries concerning protests. However, we have added the intelligence estimates prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation. These estimates are interspersed among the protest event narrations and discussions at the appropriate chronological place. We have also included excerpts from the Manual and Revised Manual which were prepared by non-delegate organizers.
to serve as the overall plan for Republican National Convention protests.
When these manuals were published, copies were handed over to George
Rodericks, the Washington, D. C. Director of Civil Defense who was assisting
and advising the County Manager in his dealings with non-delegates. These
documents were considered public. The non-delegate writers expressly
intended George Rodericks to provide copies to governmental officials
including John W. Dean III, the Special Counsel to the President who had
been serving as the White House official responsible for monitoring protest
events. We have grouped together excerpts from the two non-delegate
tactical manuals and from the intelligence estimates into sections called
"anticipations" because we wanted to present the reader with material which
would give some indication how both non-delegates and officials expected
themselves and one another to behave.

Once again, we wish to emphasize that several different views of
each protest event are possible and legitimate. The discussion comments
added on to the end of each event's narratives are the viewpoints of our
field observers on the scene and/or our observations regarding the
significance of the events. While we have attempted to include protest
events we considered important, we make no claim that the following is a
definitive accounting of each and every protest event during the Republican
National Convention.
ANTICIPATIONS:
THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION
PART I:

EXCERPTS FROM
THE MANUAL FOR THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

PREPARED UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF THE
EFFEMINIST CAUCUS
MIAMI CONVENTIONS COALITION
MIAMI WOMEN'S COALITION
PEOPLES' COALITION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE
YOUTH INTERNATIONAL PARTY

THE SUMMER OF '72

Summer of '72... Rainy season in Indochina... Liberation offensive continues... Imminent flooding in North Vietnam... Confronting Republicans in Miami Beach...

Miami Beach was not chosen by the "movement" as THE PLACE for the Summer of '72. Neither was it chosen to be the site of the coronation of the 37th U.S. President by the people who live there.

Miami Beach was chosen by Richard Milhous Nixon. As the record shows, it was not his first choice. Beset by an increasingly hostile organized population and an inability to prevent an epidemic of financial and political scandals from reaching public view, the Nixon "Inner Circle" decided late in May to abandon San Diego, California as the site of the G.O.P. gathering. Through quiet political manipulation, the Republicans rode 3,000 miles into Miami Beach, Florida, the scene of their last political assemblage, amidst a deeply divided City Council and a hostile senior citizen's community.

Shortly after the Democratic Convention, Republican spokesmen called on McGovern to harness "his" anti-war forces so that the Republicans might have their convention in quiet. Republicans suggest that people should just "wait it out" -- at a time of unprecedented air attacks against all of Indochina... and while North Viet Nam braces against catastrophic summer flooding because of Pentagon rainmaking and dike-bombing policies. The question of Viet Nam's independence struggle cannot and will not yield to the manipulation spectacle of U.S. presidential politics.

Instead of "waiting it out" people should heighten resistance to this administrations' policies. The demonstrations planned for Miami Beach should initiate activity through the election period to expose and isolate Nixon and other Administration spokesmen.
We should not be intimidated by the seemingly awesome power of the beast, for as the Vietnamese are fond of saying, "We are not afraid of Mr. Nixon's massive use of terror against our country because we have known for a long time that the water buffalo always kicks and struggles hardest just as it is about to die."

Be free. Seize the time!

THEORY INTO PRACTICE: A DISCUSSION OF TACTICS

Miami Beach, Florida is the culmination of four years in America under Richard Nixon's rule. For our own purposes, it is important to recognize that the progression of events to this date is the result of the development of political, social and economic conditions. The 4,000 year history of Vietnamese resistance and revolution is coming to a climax with the most recent series of popular uprisings in South Viet Nam. Meanwhile, round-ups and political trials are increasing daily in America. Adequate medical care for the elderly and adequate income for the poor is dwindling at a moment when the problem is most severe. More bombs fall on the dikes in North Viet Nam, as U.S.-seeded clouds pour catastrophic rains onto the Tonkin Plain.

Our presence in Miami Beach from August 18 to 23 is thus political; the purpose is not the tactical or military defeat of the Republican Party or of Richard Nixon. The objective of our protest is to focus the attention of the American people on the war to encourage active resistance on their part. Our purpose is to signal America's refusal to accept a war criminal as a Presidential candidate. Our aim is to smash the Nixon myth that his term in office represented four years of domestic tranquility; it is to state that Richard Nixon represents only more division and discontent in this country. Our ultimate political objective is to isolate and defeat Richard Milhouse Nixon, 37th President of the United States.

THEORY INTO PRACTICE: A DISCUSSION OF TACTICS

As a result of many discussions, we chose to describe the tactics for this demonstration as "militant nonviolent confrontation." This means that we always express ourselves in the strongest manner possible; that we remain nonviolent, which means we don't trash or attack police, National Guard or GI's; and that we remain confrontational.

Those of us who have spent a good deal of time in Miami Beach have come to realize that the objective situation demands that we make a pledge to the Miami Beach community. That pledge has been made. It is a pledge that says: we are committed to non-disruption of the senior citizen community.
In return, we have won the support and confidence of a large segment of the Miami community. The consequences of the lack of such support are all too clear. At present, large numbers of senior citizens are involved in a common struggle with us through their own activities aimed at isolating and defeating Nixon. We have achieved a political victory in that large numbers of the local community are hostile to Nixon’s presence in Miami Beach, and support our struggle here. It would be a betrayal of those people living in Miami Beach if we did not really respect their needs and demands. It would be a decisive weakening of our own political position and accountability if we did not act in a disciplined and responsible manner to the senior citizen community.

We can assume that Richard Nixon will try to seize every opportunity to divide and isolate the people of Miami Beach from the planned actions. Obviously, it would be political suicide to hand over to Richard Nixon such opportunities. Thus, property damage will be avoided; broken windows will not ultimately serve our political purpose of humiliating and defeating Richard Nixon. As active-duty GI organizing has proven, physical confrontation with the enforcers of the ruling class does not properly define either the nature or target of our political struggle. We cannot afford to obscure the contradictions through attacking or provoking police, National Guard or GI’s. Our aim is not to try and tactically defeat the policing forces, but to fight and defeat Richard Nixon.

As daily newspapers and weekly magazines go to press, they mistakenly raise what they believe to be the ultimate question: "Will there be violence in Miami Beach?" The answer is no. As you leaf through this manual, you’ll begin to see that Miami Beach is a time period and a state of mind, which says we will not engage in violence. Let those who criticize be well instructed to observe our manner and good will displayed during a previous political convention in Miami Beach only weeks ago. For the real question on the lips of everyone is: "Will Richard Nixon continue his terror and destruction in IndoChina...and Miami Beach? And, will the American people allow him to continue to do so?"
PART II:

EXCERPTS FROM
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
August 9, 1972

A letter to the Miami Beach City Council from RENNIE DAVIS of the REPUBLICAN COALITION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE (PCPJ) states the Movement's projection of non-delegates is 5,000 to 10,000 persons. This gives credence to previous intelligence estimates of 5,000.

Militant action should be expected at the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION with the possibility that non-delegates will provoke police action against them. In addition, there is a greater potential for violence at the REPUBLICAN CONVENTION than there was at the DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION. Publicly, non-delegate leaders of the main groups emphasize that their actions will be non-violent; however, intelligence indicates that unofficially they appear to expect some violence. There has been a trend among left-wing publications across the country to publicize the possibility of violence at the Convention and urge persons to come prepared for such confrontation.

A "Manual for the Republican Convention," prepared jointly by five groups, establishes definite targets for confrontation. However, it is expected that revisions of tactics and targets will be made at the last moment to confuse law enforcement efforts and increase the militancy of the non-delegate actions.

Employment of tactics used during the massive May Day demonstrations in 1971 - of which RENNIE DAVIS was a principal organizer - can be anticipated at the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION. A May Day tactic, obstruction of traffic, may be used in an attempt to prevent delegates from reaching the Convention Center.

For this Convention, non-delegate groups seem more organized and are working together more closely than they did for the DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION. An informal alliance has been made by the YIPPIES (YIP), MIAMI CONVENTION'S COALITION (MCC), AND PCPJ. The goal for this Convention is to present a serious "political" action.

It appears a major target of groups, such as the STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS) and the PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY (PLP), prior to the Convention is the Republican Convention Gala. Participants at the Gala, which will be held August 20 at the Fontainebleau Hotel, will be the influential and wealth benefactors of the Republican Party. Spontaneous support from other Movement groups is to be expected.
The third day of the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION, August 23rd, will be the most active of the Convention week. Non-delegates of the main left-wing organizations have definite plans for massive civil disobedience.

Cubans reportedly are planning a pro President NIXON demonstration during the Convention week. This march will be similar to the Cuban march which drew 500 persons at the DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION. However, there is a strong possibility that the number of participants may be larger.

The possibility of greater non-delegate participation by conservative and right-wing organizations at the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION exists with the REV. CARL MCINTYRE and the YOUNG AMERICANS FOR FREEDOM planning demonstrations.

The NATIONAL SOCIALIST WHITE PEOPLE'S PARTY (NSWPP) has announced plans to be active during the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION. Although out-of-state support is expected to be small, a number of followers reside in Florida and may add their numbers to the national contingent. However, groups with the philosophy espoused by the NSWPP do not need a large following to cause problems.

Still no interest in the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION is apparent in local black communities. It appears that if black activity is instigated, this will occur just prior to the Convention.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

August 16, 1972

It is currently anticipated that the number of non-delegates at the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION will be approximately 3,500 to 5,000. Although this represents an increase over the numbers which attended the DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, it is of greater importance to consider the mood of this contingent of non-delegates. Non-delegates appear to be very militant and emotional in their feelings toward President NIXON and the REPUBLICAN PARTY. Because of their attitudes, no matter what the numbers are, trouble may be anticipated.

From their contact with law enforcement many non-delegates apparently have interpreted leniency shown by police as a sign of laxity. This may encourage activities and influence the extent of confrontation between law enforcement and non-delegates who feel they can go beyond legal limitations.

The SDS will be agitators during non-delegate Convention activities and will attempt to take over the leadership of various Movement events.
Arrest situations are expected, and may be sought, by non-delegates on August 23, the day President NIXON accepts the REPUBLICAN PARTY nomination. The MIAMI CONVENTION COALITION (MCC) and the YIPPIES are determined to block the entrance of delegates to the Convention Center on Wednesday. Arrest situations will be avoided during activities scheduled for the preceding days (August 20-22).

Because of the indictments of six leaders and much publicity, the majority of the VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW) will probably avoid massive civil disobedience or violent situations. However, because the VAW has been given another "issue," more veterans from across the nation are expected at the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION. Based on recent estimates, the number of VVAW members at this Convention may exceed 500.

The possibility of right-wing activity and left-right confrontation has been reduced with the cancellation of CARL McINTYRE'S "Win in Vietnam" march, originally scheduled for August 21. However, left-right confrontation is still possible with the scheduled demonstrations of the Cubans and YOUNG AMERICANS FOR FREEDOM (YAF) which coincide with some left-wing group demonstrations.

To date there has been no positive indication of major trouble within the black community even though both the SDS and the MCC have been soliciting support for black community participation in demonstrations at the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION.

DAILY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

August 19, 1972

Today will be virtually uneventful as most non-delegates are planning workshops and holding organizational meetings. Possible revisions to the MCC Tactical Manual may also be made today.

Based on current intelligence estimates, approximately 1,200 left-wing non-delegates are in Miami as of August 18. This non-delegate number may increase to 3,000 during the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION. Right-wing non-delegates (Cubans, NSWPP, YAF) may increase this total number by 1,000.

The population of non-delegates in the area will increase over the weekend as a large influx of out-of-state demonstrators begins today. Approximately 400 VVAW members and sympathizers will be arriving by caravan from across the nation. These will join the approximately 100 members who have been active in the Dade-Broward area for the Conventions.
Other left-wing groups reportedly expected are the VIETNAM SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN (also known as the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BOSTON-CAMBRIDGE) with 300-400 persons, the ATTICA BRIGADE with 30 New York members, and some SDS members.

Members of the right-wing NSWPP (AMERICAN NAZI PARTY) were observed enroute to Miami. They are to begin their activities today. About 350 "storm troopers" left Melbourne, Florida, yesterday by bus. This is an extremely antagonistic group, which would not fear confrontation with left-wing delegates, and should be kept under surveillance.

Presently, there is much dissension between the organized coalition (MCC) and independent non-delegate groups (primarily ZIPPIES, SDS and unaffiliated persons) over tactical plans.

Apparently the MCC is organizing well defined actions to make a "political statement." (These will include actions which may result in large numbers of arrests.) Independents believe that the MCC plans are foolish and advocate more disruptive and unannounced actions, such as trashimg, crashing hotels.

This seems to indicate that there will be two main forces of non-delegates with which to deal. The more violence-prone will be those generally not affiliated with the MCC. An exception might be the ATTICA BRIGADE which is currently working with the MCC.

Several initial events are scheduled by non-delegates for August 20, which should be of concern to law enforcement authorities: 1) SDS plans for demonstrations at the FOUNTAINEBLEAU HOTEL during the Republican Gala; 2) Plans by ZIP/SDS factions for a "Dishonor America Day", coinciding with scheduled plans of YAF and Cubans for a "Honor America Day"; 3) Presence of the NSWPP, continuing their "Operation Beachhead"; 4) Arrival of JANE FONDA, to speak at a Vietnamese cultural event.
ANTICIPATIONS:
AUGUST 20, 1972
PART I:

EXCERPTS FROM
THE MANUAL FOR THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

WOMEN IN REVOLT: AUGUST 20-21

A day of women's activities and protest at the Republican Convention. Our freedom will be the reward of our struggle.

Women will assemble in Miami Beach to show Nixon that we cannot be pacified. We will come to protest every bomb dropped over Viet Nam, every family living in sub-standard housing, every women jailed, forced into prostitution or ripped off by back-alley abortionists. We will come to demand the freedom to determine our own lives.

All women arriving on the campsite can come to the Women's area on the land, where we will camp together and plan our actions for the coming days. The Miami Womens Coalition will provide for all women a loving welcome and a free space.

We invite women to join in our activities on the land - silkscreening, women's theater and music, Expose '72, organizing into women's affinity groups, and the Women's Anti-Rape Squad - a group of us who patrol the campsite at night to deal with harassment of women.

On Monday, August 21, groups of women will be assembling at the hotels for women's guerrilla theatre actions. We will appear at the Americana, where the California delegation is staying, to protest the presence of Ronald Reagan, the murderer of George Jackson. We will appear at the Deauville, where the New York delegation is staying, to protest the presence of Nelson Rockefeller, the murderer of Attica. We will especially appear at the Doral, where Richard Nixon, the murderer of the peoples of Indochina, is headquartered.

In the late afternoon we will assemble and march together militantly and musically to the Convention Hall. We want to carry in the march objects of our oppression - from pots and pans to the American flag, from welfare cards to pieces of the electronic battlefield.

When we arrive at the Convention Site, we will hold a rally, the first major rally of the Republican Convention, commemorating Women in Revolt. Groups of women, singers, poetesses, actresses, and older women from the Miami community will participate, and put forward their lives in revolution.
Our women's activities will not end on August 21st. We will continue guerilla theater actions at specified targets. We urge women to come with other women, and to form into women's affinity groups for all three days of activities.
PART II:

EXCERPTS FROM
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

DAILY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

August 20, 1972

Militant activities by SDS will take place at Republican functions scheduled for today. These actions will pose the greatest problem for law enforcement.

The SDS plans disruptive tactics tonight (7 PM) at the FONTAINEBLEAU where the REPUBLICAN GALA will be held. Unless a strong presence is shown by law enforcement, the SDS will resort to very disorderly actions in an attempt to "take over the FONTAINEBLEAU." The SDS will probably have support from independent non-delegates, such as the ZIPPIES and numbers may reach as high as 500.

Other potential targets for the SDS demonstrators today are the DORAL (where the COMMITTEE TO RE-ELECT THE PRESIDENT is located) and the HOLIDAY INN (where a reception honoring Senator ROBERT DOLE reportedly will take place).

Special attention should be devoted to learning the planned activities of the NATIONAL SOCIALIST WHITE PEOPLE'S PARTY (formerly the AMERICAN NAZI PARTY). Their tactics are covert but can be expected to at least be provocative. Approximately 30 members dressed in full uniform bearing Nazi insignia are to meet today at noon to commence their "Operation Beachhead" on Miami Beach.

Notice should be made that members of the VVAW march and caravans will also meet at noon (at Biscayne Boulevard and 95th Street) to move to Miami Beach.

The ZIPPIES may also take disruptive actions although no plans have been verified. Unconfirmed reports have mentioned that the ZIPPIES may "storm the fence" of the Convention Center. No time or exact location is known.

Dissension may occur within the Flamingo Park campsite among non-delegates. Today at 1 PM, the PEOPLE'S PARTY has scheduled a rock concert the same time TOM FORCADE of the ZIPPIES had planned a speech, possibly for the purpose of announcing ZIP plans. It has been suggested by sources that FORCADE may take retaliatory actions.
Law enforcement should be aware that potential problems exist for August 21 when both left and right-wing non-delegates have scheduled demonstrations at the Convention Center at approximately 7 PM.
NAZI DEMONSTRATION AT
FLAMINGO PARK

AUGUST 20, 1972
NAZI DEMONSTRATION AT FLAMINGO PARK, AUGUST 20, 1972

RCLC SUMMARY

Accompanied by hecklers' shouts of "reds" and "Nazis," approximately 25 men, "very straight" in appearance, entered the South gate of the park about 3:25 p.m. and marched to the Espadr stage. Although the sound system was removed, the group took the stage and identified themselves as American Nazis by their repeated salutes and speeches. Response of the onlookers was varied from attempts and pleas to ignore them and "don't give the fools a stage," to the throwing of watermelon rinds and 2 firebombs. None of this action caused serious injury.

A group of VVAW's arrived in the park at the same time as the Nazis, formed a circle around the stage, and eventually removed some of them physically to the street. Other Nazis reluctantly walked out with them. Some shirts were torn and one of the Nazis said that his nose had been broken. One was reportedly treated by the medics. Although park police called for reinforcements, they apparently did not enter the scene until the Nazis began their retreat down the street from the park. Members of the Nazi group commented that the action was initiated by the "non-violent" campers, not by the Nazis. The Nazis also shouted "white power" and similar phrases. Later in response to a policeman's inquiry, they claimed no need of protection and said that anyone who tried to mess with them would be killed. An RCLC observer noted the

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF EVENTS

At 3:35 P.M., about 20 members of the National Socialist White Peoples Party (formerly the American Nazi Party), entered the campsite and attempted to take over the stage. They were forcefully evicted from the park by VVAW members who injured several to the degree that they needed medical treatment. The Nazis vowed to return to the park later that night with 150 storm troopers. At this time nightsticks were passed out by VVAW to S.D.S. members; and guards were posted throughout Flamingo Park.
coolness of the police as they followed
the Nazis to their cars.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
NAZI DEMONSTRATION AT FLAMINGO PARK, AUGUST 20, 1972

1. The appearance of the NSWPP was not really a surprise. Law enforcement officials and some non-delegates knew in advance that NSWPP might go to Flamingo Park on Sunday. In fact, the weekly intelligence estimate for August 9 contained a specific warning about this group. The NSWPP was also mentioned in the daily intelligence estimate for August 19th. The daily estimate for August 20 clearly warned that approximately 30 members were to meet at noon to begin their "Operation Beachhead" on Miami Beach. By 12:00 noon on the 20th, at least the DCPSD Command Post in the County Courthouse and the YMCA Miami Outreach Program had reliable information that NSWPP members would arrive in Flamingo Park between 2 and 3 p.m.

2. According to Lemberg Center observers, the Nazi takeover of the Flamingo Park sound stage was carried out by 19 men who demanded 30 minutes of speaking time. They were immediately surrounded by a group of non-delegates of which the most hostile members began to arm themselves with tent poles, etc. Camp marshals -- particularly VVAW members -- quickly intervened to form a protective circle between the Nazis and the crowd. Much argument ensued among the non-delegates who had gathered around the stage. Some felt that the Nazis should be given an opportunity to speak; others felt that such a concession would be intolerable. Miami Outreach, ACLU observers, a RNC Ombudsman, DeWayne Little of the County Manager's Office (the County Manager's liaison stationed in a trailer at Flamingo Park), VVAW members and others in the crowd around the Nazis attempted to mediate
the confrontation to a peaceful conclusion. The Nazis rejected all such overtures, maintaining this was a public place and they had a right to speak. In addition, the leader of the Nazis insisted the group would only depart if so instructed by the police. Nick Valeriani, a Community Relations officer of the Miami Beach Police Department, was present but stated he did not have the authority to issue such a command.

Given this standoff, a chaotic meeting was held by the non-delegates with the result that they voted the Nazis should be removed from the stage. Before the formal removal action could begin, however, a young black wearing a VVAW button charged upon the stage and fighting broke out. The end result was that some of the Nazis were forcefully removed during the fight. Others were left standing terrified on the stage and permitted themselves to be escorted from the stage without an exchange of punches. After the Nazis were gone from the Park, VVAW members watched the Park entrances to prevent the Nazis from re-entering the Park.

3. This action was one of a number of Park situations which drew the VVAW into playing a type of "peace keeping" role among the non-delegates. Although law enforcement intelligence reports both before and during the Republican National Convention indicate great apprehension that the VVAW would engage in violent demonstration activities, this "peace keeping" role of the VVAW was actually a moderating influence among non-delegates. Even though fighting did break out here, the VVAW restraining line prevented an instant rush of the stage by angry non-delegates and permitted some time for discussion. Subsequent to this action, many non-delegates including a large number of VVAW themselves expressed uneasiness
over the VVAW being drawn into such a "police" role. VVAW members expressed to Lemberg Center observers their feelings that the VVAW should be present during the Republican Convention to peacefully make their protest message heard but should avoid situations which would draw them into using even defensive force.

4. With the exception of the activities of the fundamentalist preachers and the July 11 Cuban Anti-Castro March, the Democratic National Convention had been devoid of counter-demonstration activity. This August 20 Nazi take-over of the Flamingo Park stage was acutely indicative of an intensely vocal and at times disruptive counter-demonstration presence during the Republican Convention. Several groups ideologically opposed to the non-delegates residing in Flamingo Park were present in Miami in addition to the Nazis. These included the recently-formed Vietnam Veterans for a Just Peace, and the Young Voters for the President, a black pro-Nixon group called NEGRO engaged in counter-protest activity. Moreover, an August 21 Cuban march far larger than the July 11 Cuban march was being planned among Miami's Cuban residents. As we had avoided investigating finances and personnel of leftist political organizations, we similarly avoided investigating rightist political organizations to determine the source of their funding or the nature of their leaders and membership. It has since become public knowledge, however, that Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President, was involved in the formation of the VVJP and its successor, Concerned Vietnam Veterans for Nixon.
5. Among the counter-protest groups present during the Republican National Convention, the National Socialist White People’s Party and NEGRO were the most antagonistic. At several times during the Republican Convention, NEGRO representatives would enter Flamingo Park and begin arguments with non-delegates. NEGRO demanded the right to sleep in Flamingo Park. Members of both groups appeared at several locations of leftist protest and staged their own counter-protests. Both the National Socialist White People’s Party and NEGRO were small (neither group seemed to have a membership present numbering more than 30). By and large, leftist non-delegates seemed to ignore their counter-protest activity. The August 20 Nazi take-over of the Flamingo Park stage was the only forceful disruption of leftist non-delegate protest arrangements by a counter-protest group.

6. On August 23, the final day of the RNC, NSWPP leader Matt Koehl was arrested in a Nazi demonstration near the Convention Complex. Koehl was wearing a red armband bearing a swastika in violation of a Miami Beach City Ordinance forbidding public display of any Nazi insignia. Although the case was eventually thrown out of court on First Amendment grounds, it is interesting to speculate what might have happened had officials chosen to make such arrests during the Sunday Nazi demonstration in Flamingo Park. By leaving the issue on Sunday to the various non-delegates to resolve among themselves, law enforcement officials avoided entering on one side or the other. Had the Nazis been able to draw police into the Park they would have established the principle of police intervention in campsite politics. Had the Nazis been able to draw the police into removing them from the Park,
some could argue that officials were keeping the Park open only to one point of view. Although the removal of the Nazis from the Park was forceful, had police entered (either to preserve a Nazi right to speak or to remove the Nazis for whatever reason), more violence conceivably could have resulted. A police/non-delegate clash within the Park could well have prompted public pressure to close the Park altogether.
DEMONSTRATION AT
THE FONTAINEBLEAU HOTEL

AUGUST 20, 1972
DEMONSTRATION AT THE FONTAINEBLEAU HOTEL, AUGUST 20, 1972

RCLC SUMMARY

An early-evening SDS-initiated demonstration at the Fontainebleau Hotel to protest an expensive Republican gala inside involved some 300 demonstrators and an estimated 400 police; a number of new personnel were present. Demonstrators marched from Flamingo Park at 6:05 p.m.; others moved north by car. At approximately 6:30 p.m. Dade County police and state troopers arrived at the hotel; about 100 went inside. The demonstration began at 6:35 p.m. with about 50 protesters present, and a few minutes later some 20 troopers exited from the hotel to face the growing picket line, which soon expanded to block half of the south entrance; a number of persons attempting to enter the hotel were nearly blocked; police continued to deploy around hotel.

Shortly after 7:00 p.m. about 150 more demonstrators arrived. Some 100 police rushed from the hotel to deploy near the demonstrators; some protestors moved north to block auto exit. The burning of an American flag caused little visible disturbance among Republican spectators. Protesters marched in a large circle, blocking north gate and chanting, "Keep the rich out!" Tossed eggs hit a man in a black tuxedo and a member of a camera crew. A man from inside broke through the north gate to dash at

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF EVENTS

Between 6:00 P.M. and 6:10 P.M., three different groups totaling about 600 non-delegates left Flamingo Park, all reportedly bound for the Fontainebleau Hotel, 4441 Collins Avenue, to demonstrate against a $500 per plate Republican Dinner taking place inside the hotel. Florida Highway Patrol Platoons 21, 22 and 23 were asked by 905 to go to the Fontainebleau Hotel and F.H.P. platoons 24, 25 and 26 were sent to the 46th Street Municipal Lot to stand-by.

As the non-delegates approached the Complex, two squads from Miami platoons 12 and 13 were stationed inside the 17th Street side of the perimeter on Washington Avenue and P.S.D. platoons 6, 7, 8 and 9 were positioned along 17th Street, behind the fence. The non-delegates marched past the Complex and continued north toward the Fontainebleau Hotel; and at 7 P.M., the units along the fence were secured and returned to their staging area.

At 6:54 P.M., the first group of about 300 demonstrators reached 41st Street and Collins Avenue. Moving to the front of the Fontainebleau Hotel, they began to block traffic and harass delegates trying to enter the hotel. They completely blocked northbound lanes on Collins Avenue, pelted the delegates with eggs, and were forming human fences across the hotel's entrances restricting pedestrian and vehicular movements. 905 ordered that traffic on Collins Avenue be detoured at 63 Street and 41 Street; and at 7:45 P.M. requested that F.H.P. troopers clear the front of the hotel. The troopers moved the demonstrators across Collins Avenue to the west side of the street. 905 requested that F.H.P. platoons 19 and 20 be sent from the Complex to the Front of the Fontainebleau Hotel where they were to assist in containing the demonstrators and making arrests. Two prisoner vans were also requested, and P.S.D. platoons 6 and 7 were sent to assist.

At 8 P.M., some of the demonstrators started walking south on Collins Avenue and soon the entire group was moving away from the hotel. They were allowed to continue leaving the area of the
DEMONSTRATION AT THE FONTAINEBLEAU HOTEL, AUGUST 20, 1972 (continued)

RCLC SUMMARY (continued)

demonstrators but was restrained by police at 7:35 p.m. Several policemen shoved demonstrators aside to allow a few persons to enter amidst taunts of protestors.

At about 7:40 p.m. a man was knocked down at the center gate. At the south gate, some persons broke through the line. Demonstrators also hassled Senator Strom Thurmond. A paddy wagon arrived from the north on Collins at 7:49 p.m. and several demonstrators broke from the line as police moved out. When a Cadillac pulled out of the center gate at 7:50 p.m., some demonstrators stamped and climbed on it. Police quickly moved to free the car. Shortly a troop of police (4-6 lines deep) moved around the north end of demonstrators, forcing them south on Collins (while spectators cheered) and clearing the hotel driveway completely.

At 7:58 p.m. police moved south again; and demonstrators were forced to intersection of Collins and Indian Creek. About 8:00 p.m. protestors began to urge return to park. An RCLC observer noted 3 harbor patrol boats in the river. At 8:15 Dade County police moved north on Indian Creek Drive and cleared intersection. Protesters were nearly all dispersed from hotel area. RCLC observers noted no arrests. Police discipline was appropriate.

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG (continued)

Fontainebleau Hotel; and P.S.D. platoons 6 and 7 and F.H.P. platoons 19 and 20 were returned to the Convention Complex. The prisoner vans returned to their staging area. At 8:30 P.M., Collins Avenue was clear and the detours were removed from 63 Street and 41 Street.

By 8:40 P.M., the demonstrators were stretched out along Collins Avenue between 25 and 20 Streets; and 905 requested that the F.H.P. cars patrol in that area to present the group from reorganizing and reversing direction. As they approached the Convention Complex, Miami platoons 12, 13, 14 and 18 were moved out to their positions on the perimeter, but the group continued south toward Flamingo Park.

By 9:06 P.M., most of the group was in the park and all F.H.P. platoons had returned to their staging areas. The Miami platoons secured from their fence positions at 9:15 P.M.

At 9:20 P.M., 15 of the Nazis arrived at the Fontainebleau Hotel carrying a sign reading 'Flush Integration'. They were in uniform but were not wearing swastikas. They peacefully demonstrated there until 10:40 P.M., when they left marching south to 41 Street and Pine Tree Drive where they had left their cars.
At approximately 6:00 p.m., a large group (approximately 500) left the park prepared to walk to Collins Avenue where SDS had promised buses would pick them up and drive them to the Fontainebleau. FHP was dispatched to the Fontainebleau to stand by. No buses appeared and the demonstrators reduced in size. Approximately fifty (50) persons arrived in front of the Fontainebleau. It was a combination of SDS, ZIPS, Progressive Labor Party, VVAV's and Attica Brigade. This number grew to approximately 300 by 7:00 p.m. when they were joined by the Gay Liberation. Civil disobedience was present, i.e., blocking traffic, sitting down in the streets, human chains blocking entrances, etc. FHP moved the demonstrators across the street and south one block. Collins Avenue was blocked off (at 7:55 p.m.), and reinforcements were called for when FHP became the object of harassment. Eggs were thrown at people entering the RNC gala at the Fontainbleau Ballroom.

Marty Reife was seen in the crowd (SDS) and was encouraging others to storm the service entrances.

Collins Avenue was blocked off between 41 and 63 Streets (Fontainebleau located on 45th Street) and PSD prison vans and troops were requested at 8:00 p.m. Non-delegates were estimated between 700 and 1,000 at 8:10 p.m. and a sweep was ordered after demonstrators refused to leave. The PSD helicopter was requested over the area at 8:22 p.m. to take movies of the anticipated sweep. At 8:33 p.m., the Intelligence Center was notified that demonstrators were leaving and Collins Avenue was reopened. No arrests were made.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
DEMONSTRATION AT THE FONTAINEBLEAU HOTEL, AUGUST 20, 1972

1. This was the first major demonstration of the many expected during the period of the Republican National Convention. Once again, most demonstrators seemed to confirm predictions that the protest reaction to the Republican Convention would be more threatening than that experienced during the Democratic Convention.

2. As with the July 9 demonstration at the Playboy Plaza, this demonstration occurred at a Party social event prior to the formal start of the convention. Once again, demonstrators did not want such an early confrontation to lead to arrests. Prior to the dispersement of the demonstrators from the Fontainebleau area, rumors had spread among the demonstrators to the effect that police were moving north along Collins Avenue to block them in front of the Fontainebleau where they could be arrested. When the FHP began moving demonstrators away from the entrances to the Fontainebleau and south along Collins, demonstration marshals (some with bullhorns) were observed by Lemberg Center personnel to be encouraging demonstrators to return to Flamingo Park.

3. As had been the case during July 9's demonstration at the Playboy Plaza, the law enforcement personnel on the scene adopted a defensive stance. No order was given to clear the street in front of the Fontainebleau until after people trying to enter the hotel were harassed and cars were attacked. The police response once the order had been given to clear the street was firm but well disciplined.
ANTICIPATIONS:

AUGUST 21, 1972
PART I:

EXCERPTS FROM
THE MANUAL FOR THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

AUG. 21, 1972: MONDAY EVENING
VIETNAM FOR THE VIETNAMESE

As Republican war-makers prepare for their closed door debate, we will share an evening with the Vietnamese people. In a large stadium, Vietnamese living in the United States will present a pageantry of Vietnamese history. Through song, dance, theatre, and poetry, the indominable spirit of the Vietnamese people will be displayed.

The 4,000 year Vietnamese legacy of resistance and independence will be explained, demonstrating why Viet Nam is for the Vietnamese. From the Trung Sisters to Ho Chi Minh the evening will convey the roots of the Vietnamese Revolution and of why they have so successfully resisted and defeated American imperialism.

Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet Nam will address the assembly via transcontinental telephone to make a proposal to end the war to the American people.

To learn of a struggle can be entertaining and instructive. To understand a revolution, we must understand a people. August 20th is a night of understanding.

AUG. 21, 1972:
SENIOR CITIZENS INVESTIGATION

On the opening day of the Republican National Convention, the senior citizens will begin a two day investigation into the Policies of the Nixon Administration. A jury of senior citizens - citizens who have suffered many of America's injustices and who are constantly abused in this society - will hear testimony on the crimes of the Nixon Administration from Vietnam veterans, ex-prisoners, labor representatives, unemployed blacks, women, welfare recipients, Third World people, gays, and senior citizens.
AUG. 21, 1972:
GEORGE JACKSON MEMORIAL DAY

August 21st, the day the Republicans call their convention to order will also mark the first anniversary of the assassination of George Jackson. On that day we will rally together to reaffirm our commitment to the revolutionary struggle that George Jackson so well exemplified. We will not hold a funeral service, but a service of resistance. We will have speakers from prisons, such as Attica, from liberation movements within the U.S., and from liberation struggles in other countries. George Jackson’s continued influence on all of our lives proves the axiom: you can kill a revolutionary, but you can’t kill the revolution!

EXCERPTS FROM
THE REVISED MANUAL FOR THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1972
GEORGE JACKSON MEMORIAL EVENT
Time: 8:00 PM

Place: In front of Convention Hall. "After the killing is done, the ruling class goes on about the business of making the profits as usual."

-- George Jackson

August 21, 1972 the night the Republicans open their convention to renominate Richard Nixon, also marks the first anniversary of the assassination of Brother George Jackson. At 8 PM that night, thousands of people will rally outside Convention Hall to tell of our unacceptance with the police state terror of today.

The people speaking at the rally will include John Thorne, George Jackson’s friend and lawyer; spokespeople from the Republic of New Africa and the Malcolm X United Liberation Front; William Kunstler, defending attorney for H. Rap Brown, the Harlem Four and the Tombs Seven; the lawyer for Billy Dean Smith, a black active-duty GI accused of killing his superior officer; and a brother who survived Rockefeller’s massacre at Attica.

Sean Keane from the Irish Republican Army will speak on internment and resistance in Ireland and a Vietnamese spokesperson will talk of the political repression under the Nguyen van Thieu regime in Saigon. Bobby Seale, Chairman of the Black Panther Party is also expected to speak.

George Jackson, the ultimate Prisoner/Revolutionary continues to inspire us as do all our brothers and sisters behind bars today, growing, changing and proving Ho Chi Minh’s axiom that when the prison doors open the real dragon’s will emerge.
PART II:

EXCERPTS FROM
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

DAILY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
August 21, 1972

Convention activism should increase substantially this evening when most major activities are scheduled for both left and right-wing groups. Events for both groups will take place at the Convention complex during the latter part of the day.

Potential confrontation exists between movement non-delegates and the Cubans (as well as other right-wing groups). Cuban leaders have indicated they will not tolerate any provocative events. If left-wing non-delegates should attempt flag burnings, interference of delegates, or gate crashings, Cubans may feel compelled to "aid police." The number of pro-NIXON Cubans to be present during the demonstration may reach 1,000.

Well-known anti-war personalities (JANE FONDA and WILLIAM KUNSTLER) and black power and black separatists (BOBBY SEALE - BLACK PANTHER PARTY and EDWIN TALIFAERNO - REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA) and others will talk to non-delegates outside the complex tonight. These persons are popular and dynamic figures and could serve as catalysts to non-delegate action.

Organized left-wing non-delegate strength may reach 3,000 during activity at the complex this evening. The largest organized group present should be the VVAW, who now number approximately 600-700. Specific action to be taken by this group is unknown.

It should be noted that members of the VVAW tried to act as peace keepers yesterday when NSWPP "storm troopers" entered Flamingo Park and incited non-delegates.

Throughout the day SDS, ZIPS and other independent groups may take spontaneous actions at various hotels as well as at the Convention complex.

Retaliatory action by the NSWPP should be anticipated in response to the fight that occurred yesterday at Flamingo Park. Although no formal alliance is likely, the NSWPP may pickup sympathetic support from the UKA (UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA). (NOTE: There are several UKA members in the Dade County area. Both groups share similar philosophies.) Presently, NSWPP members number from 20 to 30.
Still no indication of discontent in the black community although well-known black speakers may draw young black participation at the last moment.

Attention should be given to protection of the communications system. Non-delegates know how to disrupt communication lines and have their own system to rely on.
AFTERNOON MARCHES; DEMONSTRATIONS AT
THE MIAMI BEACH SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL;
CUBAN MARCH; GEORGE JACKSON MEMORIAL RALLY

AUGUST 21, 1972
The first of a number of Monday demonstrations began at approximately 2:00 p.m. when the VVAW and other supporters (500-700) moved from Flamingo Park for the Miami Beach Senior High School. About the time the VVAW demonstration broke up shortly after 4:00 p.m., some 200 persons marched to Convention Hall in a Zippie demonstration. Around 4:30 p.m., a Miami Women's Coalition March (200-250) moved from the park to Convention Hall. SDS sponsored a support March Against Sexism, with some 150 participants. At the Hall, the various groups converged for the women's program. In the meantime some 600-800 persons in a Cuban March walked from 17th east of Burdine's to Convention Hall. Some minor incidents occurred when the Cuban March intersected the anti-war demonstrators. Shortly before 8:00 p.m. other marchers coming to the evening George Jackson Memorial Service reached the convention site demonstration area. There a crowd estimated at 1,500 to 2,500 participated in a rally, disrupted at times by rain, lasting until nearly 11:00 p.m.

VVAW MARCH TO MIAMI BEACH SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

The VVAW march moved from Flamingo Park to Washington Avenue, then slowly north to the high school. An ABC TV truck

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF EVENTS

At 2:15 P.M., a group of about 500 non-delegates left Flamingo Park and marched toward the Complex. The Convention Tactical Commander (905) requested that all police units be notified. Moving slowly, the marchers approached the Complex from the Washington Avenue side. All Miami and P.S.D. platoons were in position along the perimeter, but the group continued north on Washington Avenue. One male demonstrator removed all his clothing and executed several cartwheels in front of the Convention Complex. He was placed under arrest. About 20 elderly citizens were peacefully demonstrating near Gate 2X, holding signs urging victory in the war. One of the V.V.A.W. members took a sign from an elderly demonstrator and tore it up; but the rest of the marchers ignored the small group.

At 3:18 P.M., the opening session (of the RNC) was concluded and all of the delegates exited the Convention Complex.

The marching non-delegates crossed Dade Boulevard at Washington Avenue and arrived in front of Miami Beach High School, the staging area for approximately 700 National Guardsmen. The demonstrators called to the Guardsmen to come out and join them, and several non-delegates climbed onto the roof of the school and to the area housing communication aerials, etc. 905 requested that those persons on the roof be arrested and 7 demonstrators were taken into custody. At 3:39 P.M., 905 requested that F.H.P. platoons 21 through 26 come to the High School, but they were asked to come to the east side of the school and remain out of sight of the demonstrators unless needed.

At 3:48 P.M., a group of about 150 Zippies came out of Flamingo Park and made their way toward the Convention Complex, reportedly to join with the V.V.A.W. group at Miami Beach Senior High School. When they reached the North Demonstration Area, they stopped and grouped around several of their members who began making speeches against the war. Two women stripped to their waists and 3 men stripped completely as part of the demonstration.
drove at the head of the procession; NBC, CBS and numerous other media people were present. Coming up Washington, the chanting demonstrators formed a linkedarms chain around three crippled vets in wheel chairs. At one point, opposite the convention complex, they encountered some 20 counterdemonstrators (mainly elderly persons identified as International Council of Churches supporters) carrying signs urging victory in the war. Police lined up inside the fence of the convention complex. At the high school, the marchers moved close to the building (as a number of VWAW members urged persons not to trample the flowers). Spotted National Guardsmen in the building, the demonstrators gestured and cheered. Several of the protestors climbed to the school's roof. Guardsmen began to move in and out of the upper level of the building (several of them getting cheers as they gave the clenched fist sign). A blue police helicopter continuously buzzed overhead.

At 3:30 p.m., a dozen guardsmen moved to the roof; shortly others followed. At 3:40 p.m. guardsmen moved in on the 7 rooftop demonstrators; one struggled briefly then was escorted from the roof; the others left peaceably; the crowd jeered. A brief program included several speakers and guerilla theater.

At 4:08 P.M., some of the V.V.A.W. members left the school and drifted south on Washington Avenue. F.H.P. platoons 24, 25 and 26 remained at Miami Beach Senior High School with approximately 300 V.V.A.W. members still standing around in front of the school. Two hundred members of a women's liberation group left the Park at 4:38 P.M. They marched east on 14 Street to Collins Avenue and turned north.

At 4:47 P.M., the V.V.A.W. group at Miami Beach Senior High School moved south on Washington Avenue and joined in the North Demonstration Area. When the V.V.A.W. left the school, some of the Zippies left the demonstration area and marched to the high school. They remained there for about 30 minutes and returned to the demonstration area. The women's liberation group reached the demonstration area at 5:05 P.M. and set up a speakers platform at 19 Street and Washington Avenue. Soon all of the groups had merged and were sitting on the grass and in the roadway between 18 and 19 Streets, listening to speeches.

At 5:30 P.M., Cubans had started gathering in the Burdine's parking lot at 17 Street and Meridian Court, staging area for a parade scheduled to begin about 6:30 P.M. A similar group was gathering in Miami at the Orange Bowl Stadium and would rendezvous with the Miami Beach group shortly before parade time. At 6:44 P.M., approximately 250 Cubans from Miami had joined with the 150-200 waiting paraders behind Burdine's and were marching east on 17 Street. Late arrivals enlarged the group to about 700 marchers by the time the group reached Washington Avenue. To avoid a confrontation with the non-delegate group sitting at 18 - 19 Streets, the Cuban parade was prevented from going north on Washington Avenue by a line of officers stationed at the intersection. Instead, the marchers were routed to James Avenue and then north to 19 Street, thus, they arrived on Washington Avenue just north of the large group still listening to speeches in front of the Convention Complex. A line of P.S.D. deputies and a line of V.V.A.W. marshals
Reports that Guardsmen had their names covered with silver tape were confirmed by an RCLC observer conversing with one Guardsman who stated that an officer had distributed the tape. Names were visible, however, on the Guardsmen inside an office in the school. RCLC observers also noted that VWAWh seemed very careful about maintaining an orderly demonstration. Police throughout maintained low visibility. The demonstration broke up about 4:10 p.m. with the VWAW urging participants to go to the women's demonstration.

ZIPPIE MARCH!

The Zippie march reached Convention Hall about 4:30 p.m. where the participants demonstrated for some 20 minutes. During speeches on repression, several demonstrators stripped. At 4:55 p.m. about 100 of the Zippie group moved on to the high school to confront the National Guard. At 5:15 p.m. the marchers moved in the back entrance of the school; they shouted "free the National Guard." When four Zippies climbed to a lower section of the roof, Guards appeared and ordered them down; they complied. More National Guardsmen came out of the school; also a number of police in unmarked cars were in the parking lot. At 5:25 p.m. the kept the opposing groups separated. When the Cubans marched into the North Demonstration Area at 7:10 p.m., strangers at the rear of the Cuban parade came into contact with several non-delegates at 17th Street and Washington Avenue and an altercation resulted; but was quickly broken up by police and parade marshals.

It began to sprinkle at 7:15 P.M.; and by 7:30 P.M. it was raining. The Cuban demonstration came to an end and the leaders led the marchers back the way they had come. At 7:37 P.M., a group of 500 - 600 left the Flamingo Park campsite and headed for the South Demonstration Area to join the group already there for a mammoth George Jackson Memorial Rally. As the last of the Cuban members reached 17 Street and Washington Avenue on their way back to Burdine's parking lot, the large group from the Flamingo Park campsite approached the same intersection. A group of men with orange "Ombudsmen" armbands formed a line across the east side of Washington Avenue at 17 Street and held back the last portion of the Cuban marchers in order to avoid a conflict between the two groups. The marchers from the park crossed 17 Street and entered the South Demonstration Area. The Cubans then proceeded on 17 Street and disbanded at Meridian Avenue.

At 7:52 P.M., there were an estimated 2500 people in front of the Convention Complex for the planned rally. Because of rumors that the S.D.S. were going to try to incite the crowd to storm the fence, numerous precautions were taken by police inside the Complex. All gates were locked except Gates 2X, 6X, 9X, 11X and 12X. Pepper foggers were brought to the Mobile Command Post on Jackie Gleason Drive and issued to Miami Beach platoon #1 positioned there. Miami platoons 12, 13, 14 and 18 were along the east perimeter, and Miami platoons 15, 16 and 17 were called to the Complex from their Miami staging area. P.S.D. platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5 were positioned from Gate 11X to the Garden Center, platoons 8 and 9 were along the South perimeter and platoons 6 and 7 were on buses in front of the
demonstrators raised the Viet Cong and Zippie flags on the south pole. They left the school area at 5:35 p.m.

CUBAN MARCH

With a display of signs, banners, and flags of America and Cuba, participants began gathering in a light rain on the east side of Burdines at 17th Street shortly before 6:00 p.m. Signs read: "Cuba will not be a party to big World Powers," and "8 million Cubans have no self-determination." Forty Cuban marshals were present in uniform to accompany approximately 400-600 participants as they began moving east on 17th at about 6:40 p.m. By 6:50 the number of Cubans had grown to about 800. At the corner of Washington and 17th, the marshals and a line of WWAN's formed a line to prevent an encounter with the anti-sexism, anti-war rally, and no significant action occurred. The ABDALA groups at times chanted "We want war." Arrival at the Convention site came around 7:15 p.m. with about 1,000 persons present and the demonstration lasted only twenty minutes or so.

The return from the scene involved an incident at 17th and Washington when ABDALA persons began shouting at anti-war demonstrators who were coming.

auditorium. F.H.P. platoons 19 through 26 were placed on stand by, and Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel were called to the Complex from their off-duty hotel quarters and positioned along the west side of the complex. Prisoner control was alerted. Miami platoons 15, 16 and 17 arrived at the Complex at 8:30 P.M. and were positioned along the east perimeter.

At 8:32 P.M., the evening session of the Republican National Convention commenced. There were several incidents of delegates being harassed verbally as they entered the Complex, but most entered unmolested.

Numerous speakers addressed the non-delegates. Some of the more noteworthy were attorney William Kunsler, Black Panther Bobby Seale, actress Jane Fonda, George Jackson's former attorney John Thorne, attorney Luke Mckissick who represents an imprisoned G.I., and a member of the I.R.A., Sean Keane.

At 9:25 P.M., there were only about 800 people remaining in front of the Complex. Most of the crowd was drifting slowly back toward Flamingo Park. At 11:05 P.M., the rally ended and the crowd was asked by someone on the stage to clean up their litter. Most of non-delegates did pick up the trash in the area and then threw it over the fence at the officers. Some eggs were also thrown at officers near the South Demonstration Area.

At 11:17 P.M., 905 requested that the F.H.P. be assigned to patrol south of 17 Street to prevent damage to property as the non-delegates made their way back to the campsite. Some gates along 17 Street were blocked by non-delegates, but no overt attempts were made to storm the fence. As the area cleared of demonstrators, police units were returned to their staging areas. The convention session ended and the delegates left the Complex.
from Flamingo Park and moved into their group. Serious encounter was averted by action of some of the other Cubans, marshals, the police, Outreach, and mainly by those VVAM's who formed a "human chain" to prevent violence. At about 8:00 a youth was chased into a parking lot by some of the ABDALA group but was protected by various defenders and taken into protective custody by the police. The entire group dispersed shortly after with two or more observers hearing an agreement by some ABDALA to meet at 6:00 p.m. Tuesday at Washington and 19th Street.

WOMEN'S MARCH

Observers noted that the Women's March was well-organized, chanting and singing during the march which began at the park with speakers and a band at the stage set up in front of the Convention Hall. Shortly after 7:00 p.m. two men identified by observers as Nazis were taken out of the crowd by marshals. This rally merged with the George Jackson Rally which began at about 8:00 p.m.

GEORGE JACKSON MEMORIAL RALLY

In front of the Convention Hall demonstration area, all the groups gathered for the largest rally of the day that included major speakers,
some chanting and singing. The bunting on several lamp poles on Washington along the demonstration areas was torn down. Some of the bunting was burned (one while at the top of the pole) or torn into pieces as "souvenirs."

At the end of the rally (about 10:45 p.m.) speakers urged the demonstrators to pick up the trash. Most of the trash was picked up from the street and thrown over the fence towards the policemen on duty there.

After most of the demonstrators had proceeded to return as a group to the Land, a straggling group of some 15 persons sat down in the middle of 17th Street (across from the parking garage) for nearly 5 minutes, obstructing traffic. As motorcycle policemen arrived, the group moved on, turning south on Meridian to return to the Land. At Lincoln Road Mall and Meridian several Florida Highway Patrol cars were lined up and patrolmen had formed a line across Meridian with nightsticks held crosswise. An RCLC observer approached the commanding officer (11:20 p.m.) and heard him calling for instructions as to whether to stop the straggling group or let them pass on. The demonstrators asked if they could go through and were told they could not. While the commanding officer was waiting for
instructor, the demonstrators slipped around the end of the line and went on to the campus. After 10-15 minutes, the Highway Patrol dispersed from Lincoln Road.
V.V.A.W.

At 1:00 p.m. at Flamingo Park, the VVAW grouped for a meeting to decide their march action. At 2:15 p.m., the group, numbering 300 to 450, left the Flamingo Park enroute to the National Guard.

At 2:50 p.m., the Vets were enroute to Miami Beach High School. The National Guard is assuming a defensive posture. Plans were to stage a "guerilla theater" at the National Guard quarters.

The VVAW's were reportedly armed with nightsticks and knives.

At 3:35 p.m., National Guard advised there were 18 VVAW members on the roof of Miami Beach Senior High trying to destroy radio antennas, telephone cables and the flag. Several subjects were being held by the Guard for the Miami Beach Police Department. Seven were taken into custody.

Florida Highway Patrol was on the scene at 3:40 p.m. At the same time, some VVAW members were headed back toward the Convention Center. At 4:10 p.m. the demonstration involved 150 persons and Florida Highway Patrol had secured.

At 3:50 p.m., the VVAW remaining at Miami Beach High began moving toward front of the Convention Hall to meet with Zippies.

Demonstration in Front of Convention Hall

At approximately 5:15 p.m., the large group of demonstrators gathered for the M.W.C. (Miami Women's Coalition) and ZIPPIE demonstration and became a crowd composed of all groups from the park. Speeches were made by leaders, with Jane Fonda present and speaking at 5:35 p.m. The group numbered approximately 1,000 and remained relatively quiet until 7:00 p.m. when the Cuban demonstrators passed nearby. A confrontation between the Zippies and Abdal took place at 17th Street and Washington, but was quieted quickly. At 7:30 p.m. the demonstrators themselves. The majority of this group remained at the south demonstration area and took part in the George Jackson Memorial which began at 7:30 p.m.
Cubans

A conglomeration of Cuban groups began forming at SW 8th Street and 27th Avenue and the Orange Bowl at 5:00 p.m. All were meeting to demonstrate in front of Convention Hall on a Pro-Nixon -- Anti-Castro theme.

The Cubans threatened to use force "to assist police" if other demonstrators attempted to harass police. It was reported that some Cubans would be carrying Molotov cocktails to protect the police.

By 6:15 p.m., approximately 500 Cubans had formed outside Burdines (Miami Beach). Platoons were dispatched outside the Center to attempt to separate the Cubans from the demonstrators in front of Convention Hall.

The group was composed of men, women and children. They were carrying a casket and many were dressed in black. They began their march at 6:45 p.m. They were well organized and peaceful, being marshalled by the 2506 Brigade. At 7:00 p.m., a small group of demonstrators identified as Zippers, left the south demonstration area and confronted the Cubans at the intersection of 17th Street and Washington. Abdala was identified as the Cuban group involved in the scuffle. The VVAN's formed a chain and refrained any other demonstrators. The Cubans apparently were provoked by the Viet Cong flags carried by other demonstrators. Police then situated themselves between the northern and southern demonstration areas refraining either group from interfering with the other.

Ellis Rubin was observed marching with the Cubans. At 7:30 p.m., the Cubans began dispersing from the area. At 7:58 p.m., a second confrontation occurred between the Peoples Party and the departing Cubans.

George Jackson Memorial

At 7:30 p.m., 21 August 1972, approximately 450 persons left the park to join the 800 non-delegates already in front of the convention site.

Delegates entering the hall were harassed by protestors and it became necessary to activate platoons to escort delegates into the fenced-in area. The crowd was estimated to grow to 2,000 to 2,500.

Speakers for the non-delegates included George Jackson's attorney, John Thorne, Bobby Field (BPP), and Edwin Taliferro, the Minister of Justice in the NRA.

Two media members were apparently agitating the crowd and were identified as Ron Kantor (Community Reporter from North Miami Beach) and Cy Caplin (from Racist Life).
The mood of the crowd was high and was encouraged to remain so by Thorne who urged the non-delegates to take over the convention.

The Intelligence Center received information that SDS was planning to wait until the scheduled speeches were completed and then hoped to take over the crowd. A portable sound system was available to the SDS group, who also were seen carrying wrist rockets and/or sling shots.

In spite of a continual light rain, non-delegates remained. Luke McKissick, the attorney for Billie Gene Smith (an imprisoned G.I.) spoke to the crowd.

At 9:30 p.m., the SDS expressed their concern about being denied a speaker. They threatened to storm the fence and also threatened to remove their followers to another location and set up their own sound system.

A member of the Irish Republican Army (Sean Keane) spoke to the crowd. At approximately 9:30 p.m., reports of the crowd diminishing somewhat were received. This crowd had been the largest gathered at either convention to date.

Rubin and Hoffman were seen together inside the main convention hall at 9:45 p.m. Outside speakers continued, including William Kunstler, Erenit Ibrahim (BAMM of Miami) and Bobby Seale. Seale was the last scheduled speaker.

At 10:20 p.m., non-delegates began breaking wood into small sticks. The group began dispersing at 10:45 p.m., returning to the park.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
AFTERNOON MARCHES; DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE MIAMI BEACH SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL; CUBAN MARCH; GEORGE JACKSON MEMORIAL RALLY, AUGUST 21, 1972

1. While all of the marches and protest events described in the above narratives retained their identity and remained discrete from one another, there was considerable advance coordination of protest plans. The leftist non-delegate groups planning marches intended to converge in front of Convention Hall after the women's march and before the beginning of the George Jackson Memorial Rally. These plans had been formulated by leaders of the various non-delegate groups; DeWayne Little of the County Manager's Staff had also been involved in the finalization of plans. According to interviews conducted by the Lemberg Center staff with members of the Community Relations Service, U.S. Department of Justice, CRS officials worked with the Cubans to insure that their march would neither conflict in time nor location with the other protest activities. A mobile stage provided by the County was placed in Washington Avenue at 19th Street, thus marking off Washington Avenue from 17th Street for the George Jackson Rally. The Cubans were to be brought from 17th Street to a demonstration site on Washington Avenue north of the stage at 19th Street by taking a street east of and parallel to Washington Avenue.

2. The presence of National Guard and civilian law enforcement personnel at the Miami Beach Senior High School in the afternoon was considerable. However, only those who had gotten atop the School were arrested. One demonstrator with the VVAW group was observed by Lemberg Center staff to have climbed onto a ledge of the School where he could
place handbills under windows to Guardsmen visible in rooms of the School. Guardsmen originally began taking the handbills, but then stopped. Eventually the window blinds were pulled down so Guardsmen were no longer visible within the building. The individual who climbed the ledge was not arrested.

3. At both 17th Street (when the Cubans were marching to their demonstration area) and at 19th Street (when the Cubans were leaving their demonstration area) scuffles broke out between Cubans and a few leftist non-delegates. To minimize the risk of such fighting, lines of VVAW marshals and YMCA Outreach Workers had formed to keep the two groups apart. The fighting began when one or two individuals on both sides broke this line. The fighting was quickly brought to an end. When some of the Cubans were returning to 17th Street after their demonstration, an error in timing and arrangement led to the two groups nearly crossing paths. The group marching from Flamingo Park along Washington Avenue to the George Jackson Memorial Rally had been delayed until after the Cubans had marched down 17th Street. However, not all Cubans left on the buses which were brought around to 19th Street for their departure. Those returning to 17th Street arrived just as the Flamingo Park group was passing. The Cubans were held at 17th Street by a line formed by the Cubans. However, this did not prevent a minor scuffle which led to the Cubans chasing a single non-delegate into a parking lot attendant's booth where he had to be rescued by individuals from various third party groups and the police. Throughout the Cuban march, there was considerable exchange of verbal remarks, insults, etc. between the Cubans and other demonstrators.
ANTICIPATIONS:

AUGUST 22, 1972
PART I:

EXCERPTS FROM
THE MANUAL FOR THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

AUG. 22, 1972: TUESDAY AFTERNOON
"NOMINATION DAY"

From North Miami Beach down to the Convention Hall, the road the delegates plan to travel to nominate Richard Nixon is being re-named the "Street Without Joy." The "Street Without Joy" is a name borrowed from the imperialist nightmare of the French legacy. It was the name the disillusioned French soldiers assigned to Highway No. 1 during the Vietnamese resistance against the French.

The "Street Without Joy" will launch Nixon's renomination process under a gauntlet of shame and anger through which, as through the passage of hell, the war criminals have one last parade.

We're going to open the drawer in the National Morgue, pull back the sheet and reveal the product: Death by air, Death by water, Death by land, Death by Fire. In the lobbies of the major hotels, on the sidewalks, and in the streets, we will hold up to their eyes, death masks, limbs, weeping faces, posters of ravaged landscapes, bombed-out dikes, and of Attica.

Regional groups and organizations will plan actions and build exhibits for the streets, sidewalks, and hotels.

AUG. 22, 1972: TUESDAY EVENING
"MARCH AGAINST MURDER"

We will march as united Americans against the nomination of Richard Nixon. Led by unemployed Vietnam Vets, we will march this evening to the convention site and present the demands of the people assembled -- the Poor Peoples' Platform and the Seven Point Peace Proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. These demands are a minimum request for peace, social justice, and self-determination. We will demand that Nixon respond to them by the next morning.
EXCERPTS FROM
THE REVISED MANUAL FOR THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1972
STREET WITHOUT JOY - MARCH AGAINST MURDER
Time and Place: Eden Roc and
Fountainbleau Hotel: 6:30 - 7:30 PM

GAUNTLET OF SHAME --
Procession to Convention Hall: 7:30 - 8 PM

MARCH AGAINST MURDER --
Washington Avenue side of Convention Hall: 8:30 - 10 PM

While Richard Nixon becomes the nominee of his death machine of a Republican Party, we will make our indictment of him from the streets outside. We will present our evidence and show the delegates and the American people their crimes through the Street Without Joy and the March and Rally Against Murder that same evening. We should view the "second day" as a day very much linked to the "third day," our day of unacceptance.

STREET WITHOUT JOY

The Street Without Joy, followed by the March and Rally Against Murder, gives us our often missed opportunity to visually and verbally present our anti-imperialist and anti-war politics. As Dan Berrigan wrote in his letter of invitation to this day, "We will show them for their crimes. To make the Street Without Joy a GAUNTLET OF SHAME down which, as through the passage of hell, these absurd hirelings, parasites, war criminals camp followers, these slaves, hacks and drones, these uneasy unthinking wielders of rotten power, may see up close the price for which they have sold the flesh of the innocent, have sold their own souls. . . . Whose fingers, whose hands, whose shoulders, whose bodies, will stop the bombing of the dikes? We need a very flood, an outpouring of people, a new outcry, as the Red States assemble to approve ever new crimes; the destruction of dikes, the seeding of rain clouds -- and what more, and what worse, in 4 more years? Say NO with us, loud and clear."

Street Without Joy will occur simultaneously at two different locations from 6:30 PM - 8 PM at the Convention Hall. We will form a Gauntlet of Shame at the principle vehicular entrances on Meridian Street and Washington Avenue. We will hold up pictures, posters, artifacts of war and poverty. We will act out dramatically our rage and our love; we will show them their crimes.

On Collins Avenue, across from the Eden Roc and Fountainbleau Hotels - headquarters for the Republican National Committee -- we will stage a massive naval and air invasion of a Vietnamese village, "inhabited" by several thousand of us clothed to look as Vietnamese. This militant
and dramatic theatre action will culminate with a "die-in" to demonstrate to the delegates their complicity with the Death Machine, to show the American people that the winding down of the field combat troops does not mean an end to the war. That the killing continues.

Between 7:30 and 8 PM groups from the Convention Hall, the hotels on Collins Avenue, and those who remained at Flamingo Park will proceed to the Convention Hall for our March Against Murder around its 4 sides. There, we will present our evidence against the Death Machine - our signs, our constructions, our photographs - and lay it against the walls of the Convention Hall.

At 8:30 PM we will mass at Washington Avenue to conduct our rally as the coronation/nomination proceedings begin inside. Tentatively, speakers will be Jane Fonda, recently returned from a tour of North Viet Nam; Rennie Davis, Shari Whitehead, Dave Dellinger, Ngo Vinh Long, Delia Alvarez, sister of the first POW captured in the war and Daniel Ellsberg. There will also be entertainment.

It is anticipated that the rally will end at 10:30 PM to allow for people to return to Flamingo Park so as to continue discussions of Third Day Tactics and a Day of Unacceptance.
PART II:

EXCERPTS FROM
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

DAILY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
August 22, 1972

The moods and actions of non-delegates, both left and right-wing, continue to intensify. There is evidence that independent and splinter groups are planning disruptive and disorderly activities.

Particularly within the left-wing movement, the ATTICA BRIGADE and the SDS, two extremely militant groups, are planning to insert violence into what the MCC/PCPJ hope to be a peaceful demonstration tonight. Attention should be given to leaders and members of these groups as they will probably make open attempts at destruction and agitation. In addition, ATTICA BRIGADE members may possess sharpened wooden and steel stakes, which sources reported were being constructed. Between the two, about 300 core persons could be rallied to spearhead such actions.

MCC is sponsoring a "Street Without Joy" followed by a "March Against Murder" this evening. Non-delegates plan to form a "Gauntlet of Shame" at the vehicular entrance to the Convention Center on Meridian Street and Washington Avenue, while a guerilla theater is being presented at the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS (FONTAINEBLEAU). The non-delegates will unite in front of the Convention Center by 8 PM for a march around the Convention Center, followed by a non-delegate rally. The MCC/VVAN/PCPJ have announced that events are to remain peaceful. This anti-war action may gain the support of 2,000-2,500 non-delegates.

Hotels will continue to be targets of demonstrations today.

Some Cubans, identified as members of the militant ABDALA, apparently will seek confrontations with movement non-delegates -- and perhaps even police -- outside the Convention Center tonight. Their numbers will probably not exceed 20.

Although conclusions presently cannot be drawn, notice should be made that the BLACK PANTHER and REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA speakers present at last night's activities did not depart Miami today as originally planned. At least one now plans to remain until late tomorrow. Whether this indicates they feel they can add to already scheduled events or that they sense a growing potential for recruitment among blacks is not known.
MORNING/AFTERNOON DEMONSTRATIONS
AT THE FONTAINEBLEAU HOTEL;
ZIPPIE MARCH AND ARRESTS

AUGUST 22, 1972
RCLC SUMMARY

SDS MARCH/RALLY AT FONTAINEBLEAU HOTEL

Just before 10:00 a.m. some 200 demonstrators under the leadership of SDS left Flamingo Park to go to the Republican women's brunch at the Fontainebleau Hotel. Along the route, marchers chanted, distributed leaflets, and rapped with spectators. Miami Beach police gave escort. Some individual incidents along the way included stuffing a flag down a sewer, attempting to let out the air from a National Guard bus, and breaking a hotel window near 40th Street by a thrown stone. Someone threw a water balloon out the window from upper stories of the Barcelona Hotel.

The group arrived at the Fontainebleau at 11:00 a.m. where 20 additional demonstrators met them at the main entrance. Florida Highway Patrolmen blocked entrances at the driveway and lined up across the front of the hotel. Police rerouted some traffic. Highway patrolmen moved out from north entrance and formed a line across Collins. Some bunting was burned; several persons sat on a car, one stood, denting the roof; air was let out of all four tires. Holy Joe appeared at the south entrance, attracting media attention and some spectators. The demonstrators decided to proceed south on Collins to the Saxony Hotel to protest Gov. Ferre of.

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF EVENTS

A lot of planning had taken place during the night as the groups in Flamingo Park prepared for a major demonstration in front of the Fontainebleau Hotel this morning. The Republican National Committee had meetings scheduled for 9 A.M. Rules and Credentials, and the Republican women had a brunch scheduled for 10 A.M. S.D.S. members had reportedly obtained 12 tickets to the brunch and planned to demonstrate inside the hotel. At 9 A.M., the only non-delegates in front of the hotel were about 25 "Jesus Freaks". None of the major groups had left Flamingo Park.

At 9:15 A.M., about 40 members of a religious organization called the "20th Century Reformation Group" arrived in front of the Fontainebleau Hotel. Consisting of older people, their activity consisted of handing out literature to passersby.

P.S.D. platoon 11 arrived at the Fontainebleau at 9:45 A.M. to relieve platoon 10 stationed inside.

At 10:02 A.M., a group of about 200 led by S.D.S. marched out of Flamingo Park. They marched east on 14 Street to Collins Avenue and then north on Collins, picking up stragglers along the route. When they reached 17 Street there were an estimated 350 non-delegates in the group, marching in the middle of the street and blocking all 4 lanes of traffic. Smaller groups were gathering in the park, looking for transportation to the Fontainebleau. Some had cars and were already enroute to the hotel.

All F.H.P. platoons were in service by 10:30 A.M., but 50 F.H.P. troopers from the group staged in St. Patrick's Church were brought to the Fontainebleau at 10:27 A.M. and posted out front in the driveway. P.S.D. platoon 11 would maintain the hotel's internal security. The Police Tactical Commander (905) requested that two prisoner vans be sent to the hotel and parked on the west side of Collins Avenue opposite the hotel.
Puerto Rico and recent events there. One young woman came out of the Fontainebleau at this time (escorted by police) and announced to the demonstrators that she and two other women went inside the branch and spoke out about the conditions of women.

At 11:30 a.m. the group started marching to the Saxony along Collins. Air was also let out of the tire of a chartered bus. At the Saxony the group numbered about 175 persons. At 12:10, after some talks, some 20-30 persons left the area, moving north, apparently to cars for the return trip. The rest straggled south, many stopping to get liquid refreshments. About 15 went into the pool in front of the Bass Art Museum. At 12:35 p.m., windows at the Gayety Burlesque were smashed in front of the girlie posters. Air was let out of a tire of a telephone truck at 15th Street. A flag was removed from the Delano Hotel; at the St. Moritz Hotel 10 persons tried to take down the flag in front, but the flagpole broke, hitting a boy on the head. Medics attended him as demonstrators took the flag. The group then returned to the campsite.

**VVAV AT FONTAINEBLEAU**

The VVAV formed at Flamingo Park and moved out for the Fontainebleau at 1:15 p.m. They marched silently, four

At 10:30 a.m., the "20th Century Reformation Group" left the front of the Fontainebleau and moved to the front of the Doral Beach hotel, 4833 Collins Avenue.

P.S.D. platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5 arrived at the Complex at 10:50 a.m., and Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel were relieved on the perimeter gates by Miami Beach personnel.

The demonstrators arrived in front of the Fontainebleau Hotel at 10:45 A.M. and began marching back and forth carrying signs and shouting slogans. At first, hotel traffic was able to get through the line of non-delegates, but before long the driveways were blocked in addition to northbound traffic on Collins Avenue.

At 11:05 A.M., 905 requested F.H.P. platoons 21, 22 and 23 report to the Fontainebleau Hotel, and F.H.P. platoons 24, 25 and 26 positioned themselves at 44 Street and Collins Avenue. At 11:13 A.M., 905 asked the F.H.P. troopers to move the demonstrators back from the front of the hotel. F.H.P. troopers moved them south about half a block, opening up the north driveway of the hotel and one northbound lane on Collins Avenue. The demonstrators regrouped at their new location, and, after a short meeting, started moving south on Collins Avenue, reportedly bound for the Saxony Hotel at 3201 Collins Avenue, headquarters hotel for delegates from Puerto Rico, South Carolina and West Virginia.

At 11:08 A.M., Miami Beach platoon #1 reported in service at their staging area, and 11:50 A.M., Miami Platoons 12, 13 and 14 reported on Complex. Platoon 18 was still enroute and reported a few minutes later. There was no non-delegate activity evident around the Convention Complex other than two pickets carrying signs at Gate 12X.

After the non-delegates withdrew from the area of the Fontainebleau, 905 requested that the F.H.P. units move from the hotel to the Municipal Parking Lot at 46 Street to await further developments.
abreast, occupying one lane of the streets. Heckling coming from onlookers along the way was completely ignored and cheers or approval was recognized with raised arms and clenched fists but without sound. Approximately 800 were in the group as it left the park and approximately 1,200 were involved by the time the group arrived and sat down in the street in front of the Fontainebleau at 3:01 p.m. They were preceded by three persons carrying signs saying, "Liberate Hungary," "Liberate Cuba," etc. which were ignored by almost everyone. Instructions from leaders of the VVAW and the actions of the VVAW security indicated the total march and demonstration would be disciplined and likely without incident. This proved to be true almost without exception.

State Highway Patrolmen provided almost all of the police security. Over 500 were estimated to be present. Most of them were in lines at the street entrance, across the front of the hotel behind the fence, in a line blocking off Collins from the north, and at various other locations. Colonel Cotzin (MBPD), who was in charge, and other officers performed their duties in a professional manner.

Seven scheduled VVAW members spoke as onlookers continued to gather. The total number of persons present was

At 11:31 a.m. a group of demonstrators showed up at the Deauville Hotel, 6701 Collins Avenue, headquarters for the Michigan Delegation. They milled around in front of the hotel, shouting anti-war slogans and blocking delegates buses when they tried to leave. Members of Miami Beach's off-site crowd control contingent were sent to assist the delegates.

The S.D.S. demonstrators arrived at the Saxony Hotel at 11:48 a.m. and gathered in front on the Collins Avenue side. Some non-delegates walked around the outside of the hotel looking for another way in, and a rumor circulated through the crowd that there was an opening on the south side. 905 requested that several F.H.P. troopers be positioned inside the hotel to keep the demonstrators out. At 12:16 p.m., the demonstrators decided they were not getting anywhere and began to move south again, back to the park. At 12:17 p.m., 905 advised the F.H.P. units and the prisoner vans that they could return to their staging areas.

The S.D.S. marchers had ice-picked tires on several cars during their trip south from the Fontainebleau Hotel. They broke the windows in a bank at 2397 Collins Avenue and when they reached 22 Street and Collins Avenue, a few of them jumped into the decorative pool in front of the public library. Continuing south, the demonstrators smashed several windows at 2004 Collins Avenue and broke the flagpole in front of 1565 Collins Avenue while stealing the flag. At 1:04 p.m., 905 requested F.H.P. platoons 21 through 26 respond to 16 Street and Collins Avenue and make appropriate arrests. Four prisoner vans were also requested at that location. Shortly after these requests were made, the demonstrators discontinued vandalizing and marched straight back to Flamingo Park. At 1:08 p.m., 905 cancelled the requests for F.H.P. troopers and prisoner vans.

At 12:45 p.m., about 175 Zippies left Flamingo Park and marched north on Meridian Avenue. P.S.D. platoon 2 was deployed along the perimeter between Gates 9X and 10X and platoon 5 was moved onto its
estimated at 1,500 to 2,000. News media were much in evidence as were helicopters overhead. When a small group of demonstrators arrived from the north at 3:58, the VAW were not distracted nor were many of the onlookers or news media. (See further information below about this second demonstration.)

The veterans concluded their speeches at 4:28 and began to form for their return to the park. A large group left at 4:30 but a sizable security group remained while three disabled veterans went into the hotel and gave a letter to a person "who will see that it is delivered personally to the president." By 4:40 all VAW were peacefully on their way back and returned to the park at approximately 6:00 p.m. without particular incident.

NEGRO DEMONSTRATION AT FONTAINEBLEAU

The demonstrators (about thirty-two in number) who arrived north of the hotel, carried posters praising President Nixon and ridiculing Senator McGovern. Posters identified the group as "The National Self-Help Party: A Project of NEGRO." A white man, balding, distributed a limited number of mimeographed leaflets to the press and others concerning the identification of the group. Their demonstration was interrupted at 4:48 during a speech by their leader when he bus. The Zippies marched down the center of Meridian Avenue, blocking all traffic lanes. When they reached the Lincoln Road Mall, they turned east and marched over to Washington Avenue. Turning north on Washington Avenue, the group continued until they were in front of the Convention Complex. Miami platoon 12 had been deployed along the east perimeter adjacent to the North Demonstration Area, and P.S.D. platoons 2 and 5 were returned to their staging area since there was no activity along 17 Street at this time.

Meanwhile, demonstrators had been drifting back to the Fontainebleau Hotel. At 1:10 P. M., there were over 100 in front of the hotel who were beginning to interfere with Collins Avenue traffic and vehicles entering and exiting the hotel. At 1:12 P. M., 905 requested that 3 prisoner vans be dispatched to the front of the Fontainebleau, and a minute later requested that F.H.P. platoons 21 through 26 respond to the hotel and move the demonstrators back as they had done earlier. The crowd was moved without difficulty and no arrests were made. The F.H.P. platoons remained in the area of the hotel and did not return to their staging areas.

The afternoon convention session began at 1:13 P. M.

The 175 Zippies were all in the North Demonstration Area at 1:20 P. M. When they arrived in the area about half the group had gone into the Demonstration Area and the other half had continued north to 20 Street where they blocked traffic. After a short time, they moved back to join the first half of the group.

At 1:28 P. M., the entire group moved over to 20 Street and completely blocked Gate 2X. They again blocked traffic on Washington Avenue and several Zippies were seen vomiting on hoods of cars they had forced to slow down. They jumped on top of cars parked along Washington Avenue and rocked them back and forth. One female demonstrator removed her blouse and paraded around topless, her body painted several different colors. Miami platoon 14 was posted along the perimeter from Gate 1X to Gate 3X, and
After Action Report
prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation (continued)

During the attempt to clear the area, non-delegates were spotted slashing tires, and harassing the delegates attempting to enter the Convention site. Female delegates appeared to be badly shaken. Vehicles were attacked, with windows being smashed. A window in the Washington Federal Bank was also broken.

At 8:35 p.m., it was reported that approximately 300 delegates were unable to enter the hall without encountering the demonstrators. At this time, scout teams estimated crowds at 4,000 on Washington and Meridian. Seventeenth Street was cleared.

Reports of injuries began coming in after 8:15 p.m. An Andy Frain guard and a City of Miami Policeman received head injuries. Non-delegates were relying on their medics for minor first-aid service.

At 8:35 p.m., reports were received that wrist rockets with nuts and bolts were being used. Non-delegates were shouting "wait until tomorrow night."

At 8:40 p.m., a second sweep was begun. At 8:45 p.m., reports were received that the SDS and VVAW were going to attempt to try to take away a van from the ZIPPIES and crash the fence on the SE Corner of the complex. This did not occur.

At 8:50 p.m., the crowd between 17th and 20th Streets on Washington was estimated between 2,500 and 3,000.

At 9:00 p.m. rescue units were requested to aid a pedestrian hit by a vehicle. The pedestrian was a non-delegate harassing the driver. Several other reports of pedestrians being hit were received.

At 9:05 p.m., gate 5X was blocked by 1,500 non-delegates.

At 9:20 p.m., the crowd still gathered in front of Convention Hall estimated at 1,500 to 2,000.

At 9:40 p.m., the VVAW's reported they were leaving for the park and would not return tonight. At 10:00 p.m., the Cuban group began to disperse. At 10:10 p.m., the crowd was estimated at 1,000. They began drifting south away from the Convention Center at 10:25 p.m.
1. These demonstrations were at times the most chaotic and at times the most angry of the demonstrations which had been witnessed thus far. For the first time a number of cars somehow managed to drive through police lines into areas where demonstrations were occurring. The drivers seemed to panic and several non-delegates were injured. The demonstrators verbally harassed RNC delegates and guests attempting to enter the Convention Hall. Demonstrators clustered around closed fence gates; those attempting to enter the Hall had to wade through non-delegates before they could get to the fence; then security officers had to decide whether or not a gate could be opened, whether or not those attempting to get in the Hall could safely move on to another gate. At times, demonstrators themselves formed lines to open corridors around gates so that those trying to gain admission to the Hall could safely pass a "gauntlet of shame"; at other times, the police moved through a gate to rescue those trying to get into the Hall and/or to open up a temporary corridor of entry.

2. Lemberg Center observers noted contradictory instructions given by various non-delegates in an attempt to influence the course of the demonstration events. Some seemed to want the non-delegates to surround the Convention Complex so that all attempting to enter the Complex would be met by some demonstrators; others seemed to think clustering as a group around the available gates would be more effective for this purpose. On Washington Avenue, the ZIPPIES had set up their own stage and a rock band was playing music; some non-delegates felt this was a diversionary side-show
drawing attention from the political speakers attempting to speak seriously from the stage set up in Washington Avenue at 19th Street (the same stage used the evening before in the George Jackson Memorial Rally). Although some non-delegates had spoken of remaining around the Convention Complex to prevent Republican Convention attendees from leaving (in contrast to the next night when Convention attendees would be blocked from entering), few non-delegates seemed to attach any significance to remaining at the Convention Complex until the Republican National Convention session was over.

3. During the demonstrations of this evening, the patience of the law enforcement personnel behind the fence wore very thin. Lemberg Center observers noted several Miami Police Department officers throwing metal chairs and beating their riot batons against trees and posts in seeming frustration at being held within the Convention Complex while such intense protests and harassing of Republican Convention attendees were going on.

4. Some demonstration leaders felt they lost control of the "Street Without Joy" demonstration when the FHP swept Meridian Avenue and 17th Street clear of demonstrators. These leaders argued that the demonstration on Meridian was orderly, that there was no justification for the police action. Moreover, they argued that once non-delegates were pushed from these streets toward Washington Avenue there was no way for the more responsible members to maintain order within the group. This police-caused loss of control they argued was then used by officials to justify their claim that non-delegate leaders could no longer control the behavior of their followers. At least one non-delegate spokesman seriously raised the possibility that the action on Meridian Avenue was part of conscious plans to discredit non-delegate leadership.
Our own investigations have not revealed any serious support for this belief. All of the official accounts of this incident available to us seem to treat it as simply a tactical decision based on the desire to provide access to Convention Hall. The log of the Area Command Post notes at 1944 hours an order to begin this sweep for "a special reason." At 1943 hours there is an entry specifying that the sweep must be completed in 12 minutes. The Republican National Convention After-Action Report of the Florida Highway Patrol contains the following description of FHP involvement in this police action:

Three platoons were used to clear demonstrators from Michigan Avenue [sic] from Dade Boulevard to 17th Street so delegates could enter the convention hall. This sweep was at approximately 7:40 p.m. Several arrests were made during this time. However, most of the demonstrators moved when officers appeared and began marching down the street. (Florida Highway Patrol, Republican National Convention After-Action Report, September 30, 1972.)

Chief Rocky Pomerance has subsequently maintained that this sweep was necessary to clear Meridian Avenue for the Vice President to enter the Convention Complex as scheduled.

5. Overall, the demonstration events led law enforcement officials to conclude that non-delegate leaders could not be counted upon to control demonstration events. The anger, chaos, and intensity of this night of protest did not bode well for the next evening when non-delegate feelings could well be expected to be even more intense. Many Republican Convention attendees were insulted and furious at the abuse they had been subjected to; their outraged feelings that their rights had been compromised would be even more firm if they could not get into the Convention Complex the next evening on time for the scheduled Presidential and Vice Presidential acceptance speeches.
We must emphasize, however, that both law enforcement officials and many non-delegates had decided the last night of the Republican Convention would be serious long before the specific incidents which occurred on Tuesday the 22nd. Consider, for instance, this statement from the August 9 Weekly Intelligence Estimate:

The third day of the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION, August 23rd, will be the most active of the Convention week. Non-delegates of the main left-wing organizations have definite plans for massive civil disobedience. (Weekly Intelligence Estimate, August 9, 1972)

In fact, one could argue that such shared expectations for hostilities on the last night may have operated as a self-fulfilling prophecy and thus made the avoidance of violence that much more difficult to achieve.
ANTICIPATIONS:

AUGUST 23, 1972
PART I:

MANUAL FOR THE
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

AUGUST 23, 1972: "DAY OF UNACCEPTANCE"

In the morning of August 23rd, a delegation headed by local senior citizens will go to Nixon's headquarters at the Doral Hotel. They will be armed with the results of the panel investigation conducted by the senior citizens of Miami Beach. They will ask the Republican National Committee to respond to the two specific demands of the demonstration -- acceptance of the PRG Seven Point Peace Proposal and the Poor People's Platform.

Failure by the Republicans to respond favorably will signal the beginning of militant nonviolent confrontation. The political objective will be to demonstrate the American people's refusal to accept a war criminal as a Presidential candidate.

People have told us that they will be organizing along regional and community lines before they arrive in Miami Beach. At a minimum, it is expected that people will be organizing themselves into affinity groups from their collectives and from those they know and trust. Some people will organize themselves while they are on the land, although such affinity groups tend often to not be as well organized as those which originate in communities.

Those who have effectively organized themselves into affinity groups will begin the response to an unfavorable GOP reply by arriving at the hotels as the delegates prepare to leave for the convention site. We will engage the Republican warmakers with guerrilla theatre, sit ins, civil disobedience and mobile civil disobedience in the lobbies and driveways of the hotels, and at key intersections leading to the Convention Hall.

On the evening of the 37th U. S. President's acceptance speech, and in line with our resistance to that acceptance, we will non-violently occupy Washington Avenue in front of the Convention Hall (Site 1). A march from the campsite at Flamingo Park via 14th Street to Washington Avenue in front of the Convention Hall is being planned. It is expected that the city will grant this area which directly faces the convention hall to us, and an arrest situation on this block seems unlikely.
AUGUST 23rd, 1972: "Day Of Unacceptance"

In coincidence with the occupation of Washington Avenue, non-violent civil disobedience is visualized for three other key areas. Site 2, the vicinity of Meridian Avenue, west of the convention site, and between 17th and 18th Streets, is where non-violent sit-ins will begin.

Those who wish to avoid the risk of immediate arrest while committing civil disobedience and who prefer to extend their presence at the convention site throughout the evening should consider more fluid forms of direct action in two alternate areas. They will be the areas of Dade Avenue between Meridian Avenue and Alton Roads (Site 3) and Collins Avenue leading south from 24th Street (Site 4). The objective is to surround the convention with angry protests as a visible sign of America's refusal to accept a war criminal as a Presidential candidate.

Practical application of militant non-violent confrontation demands leadership skilled in situation analysis, non-violent training and a willingness to display flexibility and creativeness. The key element is ingenuity. The "less traditional" type of civil disobedience, called mobile civil disobedience, will put our creative powers and resourcefulness to the test, and will require that we learn to respect our collective strength and commitment to non-violence.

In the attempt to desanctify the President and his proceedings, it is anticipated that creative planning and intimate familiarity with the lay of the land will assist both mobil and stationary affinity groups in reaching the area of the selected targets.

The tactics put forward in this section have been thoroughly discussed here in Miami Beach, and we feel it represents a realistic way of achieving our objectives. We will be nonviolent -- we will not provoke or attack police, national guard or our brothers who are GI's. We will be confrontation, which means that we will continue to engage the Republican warmakers in the streets until we have achieved our political purpose.

Four more years of Nixon will be accepted on the inside of the convention hall, while outside troops ring the perimeter and thousands of us resist and say NO!

REVISED MANUAL FOR THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE THIRD DAY

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1972
Day of Unacceptance
Time: Delegation Arrives at Doral Hotel: 11 AM
       Rally at Flamingo Park: 4:30 PM
       March Encircles Convention: 5 - 6 PM
On August 23, we will begin a two and a half month campaign to confront Richard Nixon and his accomplices (Conally, Laird, Agnew, Dole, MacGregor) wherever they appear. We will let the people of the United States know that the re-election of Richard Nixon does not mean peace abroad, rather it means continuing genocide for the people of Indochina; Nixon's re-election does not mean peace at home; rather it means murdering and poverty for Third World people, frozen wages and lost jobs for workers, and disenchantment of America's youth. By our presence at the convention and in the city where Republican warmakers speak, we will show the people of the United States that we cannot and will not be silent as long as the criminal acts of Nixon continue. Wherever Nixon and his mouthpieces go, we will be there.

August 23, Day of Unacceptance

On the morning of the 23rd of August, a delegation headed by local senior citizens will arrive at the Doral Hotel, Headquarters for Nixon and the Republican National Committee. The delegation will present the findings of their panel investigation into the crimes of the Nixon administration. Central to their demands will be a GOP acceptance of the Seven-point peace proposal initiated by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Viet Nam and of the Poor People's Platform, put forward by the National Welfare Rights Organization. A Republican failure to respond positively to these two basic demands will signal the beginning of our response on the third day of the Republican Convention: A Day of Unacceptance.

Our response will be disciplined, angry and nonviolent. We will use three tactics:

1). Dike-building in front of the Convention Hall
2). Stationary Civil Disobedience; and
3). Mobile Civil Disobedience to encircle the Convention Hall. We hope to be able to maintain an angry presence around the convention complex while the delegates are inside.

All the participating organization feel that mass arrests will help convey our message to the American people. With large numbers of arrests of nonviolent people who surround the Convention Hall, our message of anger and militance will become clear.

Also, no prejudgment can be made as to which line of action is more revolutionary or effective. To be in Miami Beach at a time of unprecedented U.S. military aggression and genocide, to confront the warmakers, to say that there can be no peace at home while unjustified war is waged abroad, to
smash the myth of domestic pacification and not to allow the Republicans have their convention in peace and quiet is considered a revolutionary and effective act in itself.

DIKE-BUILDING

For those who wish to make their presence known without much risk of arrest, a march leaving Flamingo Park in the late afternoon will proceed across 14th Street toward Washington Avenue and on to the Eastern side of the Convention Hall. As during previous days, truckloads of sand from the beaches will arrive in front of the Convention site. We will then complete construction of the dike that will extend from 20th south along Washington Avenue to 17th Street. We invite everyone to participate reconstructing what America is destroying in Viet Nam.

At a minimum, our actions around the Convention Hall will make it clear that Richard Nixon is not a candidate of peace, that he has not cooled out the country, and that his re-election will mean more division and disruption at home. If we see even greater success, power to us. But we must maintain our cool in the heat of Miami Beach to accomplish our minimum objectives.

All Power to the People!

WHAT KIND OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE?

The kinds of mobile civil disobedience we will use are different than those employed during May-Day because of the large senior citizen population of Miami Beach. We are not going to spread out all over the city to disrupt traffic. Rather, we are limiting ourselves to very defined areas to encircle the convention hall.

Indiscriminate disruption, rock throwing, trashing and setting fires only plays into Nixon's hands -- it will allow him to harp on law and order issues -- it will allow him to play the role of "protecting" senior citizens. Therefore, we strongly encourage people to discipline themselves and observe the four tactical principles.

In both the mobile and stationary civil disobedience, people are expected to arrive at their targets through the organization of affinity groups. These are small groups of your friends, collectives or communes, numbering from 5 to 30. While on the land in Flamingo Park, affinity groups will join with each other, resulting in large, but manageable masses of people. You should arrive at your target during the time the convention is about to convene, by walking on the sidewalks and pathways leading to the convention area.
STATIONARY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

The object of stationary civil disobedience will be to encircle the Convention Hall of Meridian Avenue and 17th Street. This will be accomplished by people getting as near to the access roads and gates on these two avenues and sitting down and allowing themselves to be arrested (a process which is definitely obstructive and time consuming).

It is anticipated that people may encounter police lines which will prevent them from directly sitting down on Meridian or 17th Avenues. In that event, people should move to those points where the police lines end and place themselves in front of those police lines and attempt to deny access to the Convention Hall. The mobility needed in order to help people situate themselves in strategic locations should not be confused with the mobile civil disobedience that will be used above Dade Blvd. The people undertaking sit-ins on Meridian and 17th Avenues will allow themselves to be arrested or removed by police, thus obstructing those key access and gate entrances.

MOBILE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

People who engage in mobile civil disobedience complement the efforts of those engaged in the sit-down. While the sit-downs will be aimed at the streets West and South of the Convention Hall, mobile civil disobedience will occur only North and Northeast of the Convention.

The tactical objective of mobile civil disobedience is to flood the northern approaches to the Convention Hall. To make this happen, there are four general areas we will operate in and a key intersection in each area. Please refer to the map for each area:

AREA 4: 21st St. to Dade Blvd., looking north and south respectively. From east to west, from Bay Rd. to No. Michigan. Key Intersection: Dade and Alton Rds.

AREA 5: W. 23rd Street to Dade and from North Meridian to Prairie Drive. Key Intersection: North Meridian and Dade Blvd.

AREA 6: West 24th Street to 22nd Street and from Pine Tree Drive to Flamingo. Key Intersection: 23rd Street and Dade Blvd.

AREA 7: 26th Street to 24th Street and from Indian Creek Drive to Collins Avenue. Key Intersection: 26th Street and Indian Creek Drive and Collins Ave.

The basic idea is to flood each of the four areas with hundreds of people and by our very presence to disrupt the flow of delegate buses and vehicles. Of course, we will be moving around in the area but delegate traffic should not be allowed to pass through the key intersections. As a
last resort, we recommend that people sit down and not move to prevent buses from making it through any of the key intersections.

If our efforts in mobile civil disobedience are frustrated in one way or another, affinity groups should fall back to the area immediately around the Convention Hall and either join in the stationary sit-ins or the dike-building. Clusters of affinity groups organized into larger regional groups will be assigned to each of the four areas during the days of August 20 and 21.

In order to understand how the scenario for the third day was formulated, you must understand a few things about Miami Beach and of who the people are.

Miami Beach is a small part of a very long peninsula which stretches the entire length of Florida. It is bordered on the east by the Atlantic Ocean and on the west by an intercoastal waterway. Those who travel through Miami Beach cannot help but be impressed by the relative smallness of the area, by the conflict between the luxurious hotels in the North and the painted senior citizens ghetto on the South part of the beach.

One is immediately struck by the presence of large numbers of senior citizens - old folks. Although they represent a sizeable portion of Miami Beach's population, they are financially and politically disenfranchised. A cartel of Teamsters, Mafioso and Jewish businessmen, just to name a few, own and control Miami Beach through organized crime. The needs of land investors and corporations supercede the needs of the poor and the old.

The possible exception to the process of vacillation in city government is Rocky (Arnold) Pomerantz, Chief of Police of the Miami Beach Police Department. Liberal, sophisticated and politically ambitious within the police/law enforcement world, Pomerantz has followed the principle of restraint, reasonableness and communication with demonstration organizers in the hope of "cooling" anti-war, anti-imperialist militancy. He has required his entire department to attend sensitivity encounter sessions with radicals and has forced his men to read radical and Marxist literature.

Yet none of his men have had any practical experience. They are young, eager, scared and inexperienced. To augment that inexperience, well-trained Federal officials have been sent to Miami Beach in an advisory capacity. As of today, it can be expected that Rocky Pomerantz will be in full charge as the prime decision-maker up to an unknown and yet to be tested point. He says he and his men understand and recognize the difference between civil disobedience and a riot; it can be expected that both he and the Republicans hope to pacify us and keep us at a low profile during the Convention period.
Since the Republicans decided on Miami Beach, the senior citizen community has actively joined us in plans to confront and expose Richard Nixon. The senior citizens have been a primary force in allowing us to camp in their only recreational park -- Flamingo Park. They have agreed to convene a panel of inquiry to investigate the crimes that Nixon has committed against the American and Indochinese people in the last four years. It is now projected that they will be active throughout the Convention period and that they plan to head a delegation which will seek out and present to the Republican National Committee their panel findings on the morning of the third day ("Day of Unacceptance," August 23).

Miami Beach presents us with a strong and positive community base. The area is not a sprawling metropolis, but instead an area of very limited size. The area surrounding the convention site, moreover, is not endless, but rather restrictive in the context of "targets" or areas in which people can politically and tactically commit acts of civil disobedience. The police are well versed in our purpose here, but are anxious and edgy. We will be demonstrating in some areas where either large numbers of the poor, abused and exploited senior citizens reside or in areas close to where they live.

Therefore, recognizing these objective strategic and political conditions, all the groups and organizations planning activities in Miami Beach during the GOP Convention have pledged themselves to four operating principles. They are:

1. There will be no disruption of the senior citizens community. We are here to confront and politically defeat Nixon, not to disrupt the community.

2. We will not provoke or attack military or police. Our purpose is not to defeat the policing forces, but to achieve a lasting political victory in isolating Nixon from the people and in defeating him through active resistance.

3. We will not attack delegates, alternates or their families. We must engage the warmakers strongly but humanely.

4. We will not engage in trashing or in street violence. Breaking windows does not serve the ultimate purpose of defeating Richard Nixon; it serves as ammunition for Republicans in their attempt to isolate us from the people. Broken windows fail to present the contradictions between the Nixon ruling class and the people; it obscures our political message.

Power and Love
PART II:

EXCERPTS FROM
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

DAILY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

August 23, 1972

Tonight, there will be an unrestricted effort by non-delegates to delay -- or shut down -- the Convention by preventing delegates from entering the complex.

A large portion of the non-delegate group is anticipating large scale arrests to be used as another tactic in calling attention to their purpose of assembly. Furthermore, if non-delegates should resist arrest, much more police strength will be required.

From 3,000 to 3,500 left-wing non-delegates can be expected to participate in blocking hotels, disrupting traffic, trashing, and vandalism. An attempt to crash the complex gate may be made unless there is a convincing show of law enforcement strength.

If the non-delegates choose as few as four key locations to stage their sit-ins and mobile affinity group action, movement by delegates to the complex could be stopped. During the early part of the day -- just prior to 3:00 PM to 4:00 P.M., when actions will probably begin -- exact plans and target areas will be decided upon.

The mood of the non-delegates is very intense. This is the last chance they have to present a unified action to embarass President Nixon and confront the "establishment". In addition, incidents which occurred yesterday, may increase the fervor of non-delegates, i.e., non-delegates feelings of incidents or excessive force by law enforcement in some arrests and the hitting of non-delegates by a car.

The SDS and ATTICA BRIGADE, which have proven their ability to evoke non-delegate support, will probably be the principal instigators of trouble. These two groups have actions scheduled earlier in the day, the most significant possibly being the anti-Governor Rockefeller demonstration at 11:00 AM at the DEAUVILLE.

The VVAW will likely take part in civil disobedience tonight, but refrain from violence. While there are those among its membership who could be incited to violence, the organization as a unit should refrain from such action. The VVAW is a well disciplined group that has been instrumental in maintaining order in some past demonstrations.
Confrontation between left and right-wing non-delegates appears unlikely at this time, unless the Cubans or NSWPP can gain a substantial increase in support for this evening's events. However, there may be scattered incidents of attacks on a few left-wing non-delegates.

There has been a noticeable absence of blacks among movement non-delegates at the complex. While there has been no hard intelligence to indicate there will be problems within the black community tonight, the possibility of disorders erupting should not be discounted. If disorders should occur in the City of Miami, local police would have to be pulled from the Beach, lessening the police strength. This would give the non-delegates a definite tactical advantage.
DEMONSTRATION EVENTS
ON THE FINAL DAY OF THE RNC

AUGUST 23, 1972
A NIGHT OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND TEAR GAS

On the last night of the Republican Convention, many sporadic demonstrations occurred around Convention Hall and along the major hotel strip on Collins Avenue. About 4:00 p.m. demonstrators started to move out of Flamingo Park in many small groups, sometimes in twos and threes, as well as in two larger groups.

One crowd of nearly 300 persons went to Collins and proceeded north to 30th Street, where mass arrests began. Another sizeable group headed for Convention Hall.

The general mood of the evening was marked by confusion and chaos. It was hard to tell where the demonstrators would gather or how they would act at any particular time. It was also hard to determine why police chose to use so much tear gas.

At some times it seemed that police wanted to clear the streets around Convention Hall. At other times police seemed to be trying to force all the small groups back to the park.

The largest number of persons arrested were reported at the Doral Hotel on Collins, at 50th Street and at the intersection of Pine Tree and Sheridan. Many arrests took place in groups of 2-5, according to observer reports.

The third and final day of the Republican National Convention and the day the non-delegates had chosen to close down the Convention Hall.

A detailed scenario had been published in their "Revised Manual for the Republican Convention" and distributed throughout the Flamingo Park campsite. In it they called for demonstrators to fill key intersections around and north of the Convention Complex to prevent the arrival of delegates in time for President Nixon's acceptance speech. The object was to dramatize the strength of their movement by forcing the President to either delay the scheduled 9 P.M. start of his nationally televised speech, or deliver it in an armed camp surrounded by National Guard and military, or deliver it to a Convention Hall devoid of delegates. The scenario outlined 7 demonstration areas: 3 at the Convention Complex, and 4 in between the delegates hotels and the Convention Hall. It also suggested delaying techniques to be used by the demonstrators against the delegates and the police.

Aware for several weeks that the non-delegates were going to attempt to close down the Convention with such tactics, plans had been made and partially implemented prior to the Convention to deal with that possibility. Rather than attempting to keep all gates open at all times, planners concentrated on maintaining two gates: 11X at 18 Street and Meridian Avenue and 12X at 10 Street and Meridian Avenue. To avoid physical confrontations at these points, it was decided to extend the existing perimeter to include all of Meridian Avenue from 17 Street to Dade Boulevard. Forty-five derelict buses had been rented prior to the Convention from as far away as Palm Beach, Florida, and stored on the north end of the Complex. Early this morning 33 of those buses had been towed into position, bumper to bumper along the west side of Meridian Avenue to close off Meridian Avenue from 17 Street to Dade Boulevard. Later 2 more buses would be used to close off Meridian Avenue at 17 Street, forming a solid barricade around Gates 11X and 12 X. To prevent non-delegates from going north of the Complex to interfere with delegates, buses were used to block northbound traffic at Dade Boulevard and Alton Road, Dade Boulevard and Washington Avenue, and Dade...
While several police expressed interest and appreciation for the RCLC observer role during the conventions, many stated open verbal hostility to the observer presence during the action on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings. A recounting of some specific Wednesday night actions at various locations follows.

5:25 p.m. - About 150 demonstrators built a sand dike (2 1/2' high) across Washington Avenue.

5:30 p.m. - An RCLC observer on Washington Avenue in front of the Hall noted the license plate of a black Cadillac which drove fast, going north on Washington, then it turned around and drove fast going south, turning west on 17th. At the 2nd gate in on 17th Street another observer noted this same car stopped and occupants got out and talked to Miami Police behind the gate. Very few demonstrators were in the immediate area. The car had a flat tire. The police opened the gate, admitted the people. The car was driven away towards Washington Avenue with comparative speed (for a disabled car). A few minutes later an ambulance arrived at the area where the car had been headed and demonstrators told an observer that car had run over some persons.

5:38-6:20 p.m. - Observers noted around 18th and Washington that some demonstrators Boulevard and 23 Street, leaving Collins Avenue unobstructed. Three platoons of Florida Highway Patrol Troopers were assigned to keep traffic arteries open between Dade Boulevard and 41 Street, especially along Pine Tree Drive and Prairie Avenue. Two other F.H.P. platoons were assigned to Collins Avenue north of 41 Street to make sure demonstrators could not delay the delegates by blocking hotel entrances and exits. The 3 remaining platoons of F.H.P. troopers were staged in the parking lot of the Miami Beach High School at Dade Boulevard and Prairie Avenue where they would be readily available.

In addition, the following adjustments in personnel assignments were made to compensate for the expected change in the tempo of the demonstrations. Twelve 4-man Miami units were assigned to the area designated in the non-delegate serenado as sector 4 to prevent trashing and to keep southbound Alton Road open for delegates trying to reach the Convention Complex from that direction. Fifty Dade County Public Safety Department Deputies in marked cars and 41 P.S.D. motormen were assigned to patrol the Lincoln Road Mall to prevent vandalism by demonstrators going to and from Flamingo Park. The Florida and Fresh Water Fish Commission personnel will be called in at 2 P.M. and divided up into 3 squads of about 20 men each. One squad will be assigned to man the bus barricades at each of three locations: Dade Boulevard and Alton Road, Dade Boulevard and Washington Avenue, and Dade Boulevard and 23 Street. Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel also secured the 3 pedestrian bridges into the area.

Responsibility for perimeter integrity was also changed somewhat. Miami P.D. was assigned to the fence from Gate 1X up to, but not including, Gate 9X. P.S.D. will take from Gate 9X to where the fence reaches Meridian Avenue, and Miami P.D. will pick up the length of Meridian Avenue, behind the bus barricade, to Collins Canal. Miami Beach P.D. retained responsibility for the north perimeter along Collins Canal.
DEMONSTRATION EVENTS ON THE FINAL DAY OF THE RNC, AUGUST 23, 1972 (continued)

RCLC SUMMARY (continued)

(not in any particularly organized group) threw beer cans, dirt, paper and stones over the fence. Police responded by spraying mace on the demonstrators.

6:20 p.m. At a gate at the corner of 17th and Washington, demonstrators sat down. One side of the gate was opened and a few delegates entered. The protestors did not move to block the opening. A city of Miami policeman inside the gate stepped out of line, went to the fence, sprayed mace onto the sitters and then moved back to the line. About two minutes later a bystander argued with a standing demonstrator about the use of vulgar language. Three or four policemen moved out of the gate and moved to clear the way for another delegate passing through the crowd. (The delegate wasn't being molested.) The police moved among the sitting protestors spraying mace directly on their heads. Nobody fought back. The call was then given to disperse, all while spraying mace. Many were trying to get up and run; some, disoriented by the mace, were grabbed. A policeman then pushed through 2 rows of protestors to spray mace on the face of the RCLC observer present there. Many, including the observer, ran through the parking garage, pursued by pepper gas.

6:25 p.m. At 18th and Washington (gates) approximately 200 demonstrators harassed

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG (continued)

Such was the police strategy for the last day of the Convention with continued emphasis on arbitration and flexibility.

At 6:45 A.M., 3 wreckers began to move the derelict buses into place along the west curb of Meridian Avenue. All 33 buses were in position at 8:15 A.M., and it was not long before news of this deployment made its way to the Flamingo Park campsites, causing great confusion and speculation. The non-delegates previous plans were now thwarted and new meetings would have to be held to discuss strategy. An 11 A.M. mass meeting was scheduled, but S.D.S. and Attica Brigade representatives suggested that new plans be made in secret because of possible police infiltrators.

Demonstrations had been unofficially scheduled for the front of New York Governor Rockefeller's headquarters hotel, the Deauville, 6701 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach. Consequently, at 10:30 A.M., Florida Highway Patrol platoon 23 was pre-positioned within the hotel. However, the demonstration failed to materialize as planned and at 12:15 P.M. the troopers returned to their staging area within the Complex.

Florida Highway Patrol platoons 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 26 were all within the Complex and ready by 10:40 A.M., and 5 minutes later Dade County P.S.D. platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5 reported ready for duty. Miami Beach P.D. personnel relieved Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel at the perimeter gates, and at 11:09 A.M., Miami Beach platoon #1 reported they were ready. Miami P.D. platoons 12, 13, 14 and 18 arrived on the Complex at 11:45 A.M. after rendezvousing in Miami.

A meeting was called in the Miami Beach Police Chief's Command Post office for ranking supervisors of all participating agencies. The aforementioned plan was discussed and accepted with one change, suggested by the officer in charge of the Miami police contingent. He suggested that the bus barricade at Dade Boulevard and Washington Avenue be moved down Washington Avenue to just south of
police and persons entering Convention Hall. All delegates were warned to go back inside and then tear gas was released on the demonstrators.

7:05 p.m. Tear gas and mace were used without warning at 17th and Washington, from behind a group of demonstrators, moving east on 17th. An announcement was made of a nonviolent sit-down to block the gates on 17th with about 30 persons responding. A policeman inside the gate sprayed mace on 2 non-delegates directly in the face. Medics removed them by stretchers. Police badges were covered by the protective vests.

Some non-delegates tried to bodily stop persons arriving on foot for the Convention, causing police to throw tear gas. Police formed lines to let authorized persons through the gate, then threw a lot of tear gas canisters into the street. Demonstrators scattered; some older residents (bystanders) were affected. Medics and Outreach workers assisted gassed persons.

7:10 p.m. A small group of demonstrators was gathered (some standing, some sitting) at Washington and 17th. A taxi approached, from behind the demonstrators (driving west) at approximately 30 MPH and an observer noted that one demonstrator appeared to have been hit by the left headlight. The demonstrators had not been hitting at the cab previously, but Gate 2X, and additional buses be used to block off 20 and 21 Streets and Washington Court at Washington Avenue. This would extend the perimeter and allow the Miami force in that area to keep Washington Avenue open from Dade Boulevard to Gate 2X, providing a third gate for the delegates. Several additional buses were obtained and this suggestion was incorporated into the overall plan. It was decided that all men and buses should be in position at 2 P.M.

At 11:35 A.M., 12 members of the National Socialist White People's Party (formerly the American Nazi Party) arrived at Complex Gate 8X on 17 Street and Euclid Avenue to demonstrate against a Miami Beach City Ordinance which forbade display of any Nazi insignia. They lined up outside the fence and stood quietly at parade rest. Although all twelve were in Nazi-type uniforms, only the unit commander wore a Nazi insignia; a red armband bearing a black swastika. A Miami Beach Police official approached the unit commander and advised him of the city ordinance; but the unit commander refused to remove the Nazi insignia. He was placed under arrest and transported to the police station for booking. After their commander was removed from the scene, the group unfurled a large banner reading "Flush Integration" and marched east on 17 Street to Washington Avenue, then north on Washington Avenue to the North Demonstration Area. While they were standing there, a black male apparently took exception to their banner. Wearing a long robe with no underclothing, he turned his back toward the Nazis, bent over and lifted the back of the robe to his waist, exposing his naked buttocks to them. He then lowered the robe and walked to the other end of the line of Nazis and repeated the exposure in the same manner. He then walked back to the first position and exposed his buttocks to them a third time. He was arrested by Miami Beach police officers. The Nazis rolled up their banner and left the demonstration area at 1 P.M. without further incident.
did so after the accident. The cab continued through intersection, then stopped. It appeared as though police were not going to take necessary information from the cab driver, nor arrest him, but then they did, as other police moved the demonstrators back on 17th to Drexel. An ambulance picked up one injured person by 7:25.

7:45 p.m. At 17th and Washington, Miami police fired tear gas canisters directly at the mobile hospital unit in spite of pleas to stop. One medic, clearly marked as such approached police and politely asked that this stop and an officer maced the medic at point blank range.

7:50-9:00 p.m. Tear gas was released repeatedly along Washington Avenue and 17th Street. Sometimes police formed lines to start dispersing groups before tear gas was used, other times it seemed to be released even after an area was cleared of demonstrators. From 9-9:30 tear gas was used frequently and Washington Avenue from 17th to 20th Streets was cleared completely. An observer could see no apparent provocation for this use of the gas. Some pepper gas was also used during this time at 17th and Washington.

9:30-9:45 p.m. Tear gas was used at 19th at Washington and James Avenue. An

Shortly after noon it was noticed that fire hydrants in the area of the Complex had been tampered with and many of the caps were loose. The Miami Beach Fire Department was notified and the area checked. Some 14 caps were found to have been loosened mostly on Washington and Meridian Avenues. They were tightened and 3 hydrant wrenches were borrowed from the Fire Department and issued to police supervisors patrolling in the area of the Complex.

As 2 P.M. approached, men and material began to assume their assigned positions. At 1:54 P.M., P.S.D. platoon 27 began their patrol of the Lincoln Road Mall. Two derelict buses were towed to 17 Street and Meridian Avenue and at 1:57 P.M. were in position, closing off Meridian Avenue to northbound traffic. At 2 P.M. Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel were roused at their hotel and called back to the Complex after only 3 hours rest.

By 2:15 P.M., F.H.P. troopers were in position. Platoons 19 and 20 had the assignment of keeping the hotel entrances clear, while platoons 21, 22, and 23 undertook to keep open the routes from hotel row to the Convention Complex. Platoons 24, 25 and 26 were held in reserve at the Miami Beach High School parking lot.

At 2:30 P.M., 3 derelict buses were towed into position across Washington Avenue at 20 Street and northbound traffic was detoured at 17 Street, leaving from 17 to 20 Streets clear of traffic for the non-delegates.

At 2:51 P.M., one of the scouts reported that about 100 non-delegates had straggled out of Flamingo Park in groups of two's and three's, some wearing back-packs. The other scouts were asked to watch for any build-up of non-delegates around intersections. Up to this time, the only officers on the perimeter were the Miami Beach officers assigned to each gate, but because the non-delegates were beginning to stir, Miami and P.S.D. each sent a small number of men out to the fence as a precaution.
observer noted there were no large groups of demonstrators present at this time, no unruly behavior; tear gas canisters were thrown at small groups of people.

9:30-10:25 p.m. Nine times during one hour observers noted tear gas canisters were thrown into street at 17th and 23rd and Washington, some near Lincoln and Washington. After the tear gas was thrown at 10:05 about 25-35 demonstrators were seen running south on Washington from 17th to Lincoln to get out of the gas. Many reclustered at James and Lincoln. At 10:25 City of Miami police drove south on Washington at 17th and threw gas from their cars toward the sidewalks at all groups in the area. Everyone moved out. Pepper gas was fired at a group receiving medical attention at the mobile clinic at 10:30.

COLLINS AVENUE

5:05 p.m. An observer noted trash in the street at 20th and Collins. A car had flat tires.

5:15 p.m. Some 300 demonstrators passed the South Seas Hotel. Several persons took the hotel's garbage dumpsters into the street. A green Mercury, with its front tire slit and its passengers irate, pulled into the hotel driveway. One garbage cart was spilled at 18th.

Miami P.D. platoons were assigned as follows: #18, from Dade Boulevard to Gate 2X in the street behind the buses; #14, inside the perimeter fence, from Gate 2X to Gate 3X; #13, from Gate 3X to Gate 5X; and platoon 12 from Gate 5X up to Gate 9X. Platoon 16 was on Meridian Avenue behind the bus barricade, platoon 15 was assigned to fluid patrol in section 4, and platoon 17 was used as reserve for platoons 12, 13 and 14. At 3 P.M., P.S.D. platoons 4 and 5 were reported in position along the perimeter between Gate 9X and Meridian Avenue. P.S.D. platoons 2 and 3 had assumed positions along the Lincoln Road Mall, platoon 2, east of Meridian Avenue and platoon 3 west of Meridian Avenue. (Platoons 2, 3, and 27 remained in position along the Mall, but it was up to the command officer of each agency with perimeter responsibility to determine how many of his men were deployed along the fence at any one time. The previously listen platoon responsibilities were for initial deployment.)

At 3:32 P.M., non-delegates were seen checking the buses along Meridian Avenue, and officers at Dade and Alton reported seeing a sizeable group of non-delegates in their area. About noon, a scout had seen V.V.A.W. members bringing 6 bundles of burlap bags into the park, and now several people were seen leaving the park with these bags apparently full of sand. Reports were also received that some of the non-delegates had bolt cutters, and officers on the Complex perimeter were alerted. Several scouts reported seeing non-delegates with a red panel wagon moving around between the park and the Complex, distributing nightsticks to other non-delegates.

Other demonstrators were seen walking toward the Complex carrying gas masks and wearing protective helmets.

Non-delegates were continuing to straggle out of Flamingo Park in small groups. A number of these groups were walking around on the Lincoln Road Mall while other groups were circling the Complex, some of their members taunting and cursing at officers on the
5:45 p.m. In front of the Atlantis Motel someone set the refuse in a dumpster on fire.

5:55 p.m. Some 75 highway patrolmen moved east on 27th and marched behind demonstrators moving north on Collins.

6:00 p.m. Some 85-100 persons staged a street sit-in at 30th and Collins; the group was led by Alan Ginsberg and Jeff Nightryd. The troopers circled the sitting demonstrators, as an Ombudsman advised them of arrest procedures. Tear gas had been used in the area. Shortly a Dearthick truck arrived and arrests began. Nightryd urged the protestors to go limp.

6:13 p.m. First truck was filled (with 30 males); the demonstrators chanted and sang; a female stood and talked about the Vietnamese.

6:37 p.m. Another Dearthick truck arrived and troopers roughly tossed more male protestors into it. Women demonstrators (25-30) were put in a third Dearthick van. Some women walked; others went limp. Police appeared to treat them more gently, but some women grimaced in pain with the night sticks under their arms.

6:40 p.m. Two of the trucks were closed; when a smaller paddy wagon, containing several previously arrested males, arrived, police put remaining males in it. The gates. There had also been a steady flow of non-delegates into the North Demonstration Area, where some of them were seen checking the tires on the buses blocking Washington Avenue. At 4:18 P.M., a group of 50 left Flamingo Park together and headed north toward the Complex. One scout walked through the park and estimated that there were only between 700 and 1000 non-delegates left in the campsite at this time.

Word was received at 4:30 P.M. that about 150 members of the V.V.A. were not going to participate in tonight's demonstrations, but were going to leave for Gainesville at 5:30 P.M. in order to support their indicted leaders who would be standing trial there.

Several small groups of non-delegates had gathered at 17 Street and Meridian Avenue until now there were about 50 people there. At 4:34 P.M. the group started moving north on Meridian Avenue, behind the buses, toward Dade Boulevard. One of the group tried to loosen the cap on the fire hydrant at 18 Street and Meridian Avenue. The group moved down 18 Street to Jefferson Avenue and then north on Jefferson Avenue to the canal. Several of the group entered the water and attempted to swim along the canal to the north fence of the Complex, but they were seen by officers as they reached the bridge at Dade Boulevard and Meridian Avenue and were dispersed from the area.

More non-delegates had gathered at 17 Street and Meridian Avenue, one appeared to be tripping out and was causing a disturbance, while several others were using paper soaked in gasoline in an attempt to set fire to the buses blocking the avenue until dispersed by officers. A fire unit responded, but damage was negligible.

Group leaders apparently still had not been able to formulate satisfactory new plans. Meetings had been going on all day and were still in progress at 4:42 P.M. Small groups carrying napsacks and wearing protective clothing continued to leave the park and drift toward the Convention Complex. Up to this time the
6:47 p.m. The police trucks left the area. Some 100 persons were arrested. At the same time arrests were going on at the Saxony Hotel, where demonstrators also staged a sit-in. An observer noted strong mace odor there. Police completed arrests at Saxony about 7:30 p.m.

6:50 p.m. Observers noted sporadic incidents along Collins from this time on through the evening. Police cars raced up and down the avenue. More littering occurred. Some demonstrators ran into hotels to escape police. A number of arrests occurred. At times traffic was blocked and car occupants harassed. Several street lights were out for a time. Street litter was removed by police, spectators and demonstrators.

7:15 p.m. Demonstrators dented a parked constable's auto.

8:20 p.m. Some 500 persons gathered at the intersection of Lincoln and Collins, blocking traffic. Someone set fire to spilled trash at 17th. About 100 state troopers moved down 17th, then went south on Collins to rout demonstrators. Spectators cheered. A young man on the corner was treated by medics for a minor head injury.

8:50 p.m. Zippies blocked the Lincoln-Collins intersection again, frightened auto occupants, and stopped a bus. A non-delegates had, for the most part, limited themselves to verbal abuse of the officers stationed on the Complex perimeter, but at 4:43 P.M. the tempo changed and incidents began to occur which required rapid police response. Many of these incidents were handled by a not previously mentioned contingent of Miami Beach officers assigned to off-site crowd control, and by officers on routine city patrol and not assigned to convention-related details. Several non-delegates had made their way to the roof of the hotel at 1975 Washington Avenue and were throwing things off into the street below. At 4:45 P.M., a hippie type individual wearing a V.V.A.W. shirt assaulted several people on 17 Street and ran north on Jefferson Avenue. Non-delegate pedestrian traffic had increased in the area of 23 Street and Collins Avenue and some of them were throwing rocks and trash between 23 and 24 Streets. Several non-delegates put a barricade out on 23 Street at Park Avenue, and 6 or 8 others pushed and pulled park benches into the street at 22 Street and Collins Avenue. Another group attempted to get around the bus blockade at Dade Boulevard and Alton Road by swimming across Collins Canal, but they were seen and dispersed from the water and area. At 23 Street and Collins Avenue, non-delegates approached cars stopped for the traffic light and let the air out of tires. At 4:52 P.M., a group that had been standing by Gate 2X moved over to Dade Boulevard and began to harass motorists. A large group of 300 to 400 left Flamingo Park and headed toward the Complex at this time. A group on 21 Street east of Washington Avenue tried to overturn an automobile, but failed. They then turned over a large "dumpster" garbage container in the middle of the street. Another group was seen letting air out of automobile tires at 22 Street and Park Avenue. At 4:54 P.M. a second group of from 250 to 300 people left the park and marched east on 14 Street. To discourage non-delegates from their continual attempts to get north of Dade Boulevard, the Miami Beach Tactical Commander requested that half of the F.H.P. troopers stationed at Miami Beach High School be put on foot patrol along Dade Boulevard from Alton Road to 23 Street. The other half of this F.H.P. task force was
single policeman appeared to free the bus and disperse the demonstrators.

10:00 p.m. Demonstrators placed yellow blockades across Collins at 19th. When a green Olds attempted to smash through, it hit a crippled VVAW member. Medics treated the vet until a rescue unit arrived, about 10:30. Police moved on the demonstrators and several arrests were made.

12:05 p.m. At the Shelbourne police made 3 arrests. Police also grabbed two males off the sidewalk in front of the South Seas Hotel and placed them in a police car. One policeman grabbed an RCLC observer's pad, read the notes, and warned, "You'd better go somewhere else to observe."

DORAL HOTEL

9:00 p.m. Some 300 protestors left the Washington Avenue demonstration site and headed up Collins for the Doral Hotel. Around 10:00 p.m. demonstrators reached the hotel where they sat on the sidewalk and center island. Some 500-600 police lined the area.

10:20 p.m. A police officer advised the demonstrators of their unlawful assembly and pending arrest for disorderly conduct if they did not leave.

deployed into the area around 20 Street and Park Avenue to assist Miami Beach routine patrol officers with the rash of problems being caused by the non-delegates.

Various groups of them were using news stands, benches, garbage cans, etc., to obstruct traffic on Collins Avenue from 16 Street north to about 24 Street, and Intelligence reports indicated they intended to go as far north as the Doral Beach Hotel at 48 Street. Some had infiltrated over to Pine Tree Drive where disturbances were reported until P.H.P. was dispatched to alleviate them. Delegates were advised to traverse the Prairie Avenue route south from their hotels to the Complex.

At 5:03 P. M., 3 more large groups came out of the campsite. They stretched from Lincoln Road and Washington Avenue almost back to the park, which was now empty.

Although buses were used to block certain streets around the Complex, ordinary wooden barricades were used to block other streets such as those side streets leading into the North Demonstration Area. At 5:05 P. M., it was found that some non-delegates had removed the barricades at 19 Street and Washington Avenue and were directing unsuspecting motorists onto Washington Avenue where the cars would be surrounded and beat upon by other non-delegates. Groups continued to harass the officers assigned to the Complex fence, mostly with verbal abuse but several empty coke cans were thrown and several were seen picking up rocks at 17 Street and Meridian Avenue. Other groups kept up their disruptive tactics along Collins Avenue primarily from 16 to 23 Streets. Vandalizing cars and throwing objects into the street, they dispersed when a police car appeared only to reappear as soon as the car was sent elsewhere.

At 5:07 P. M., a P.S.D. motorcycle was pushed over on 20 Street near Park Avenue and two motormen were reported to be surrounded by demonstrators. A squad from Miami platoon 18 responded and
DEMOLITION EVENTS ON THE FINAL DAY OF THE RNC, AUGUST 23, 1972 (continued)

RCLC SUMMARY (continued)

10:45 p.m. The officer advised the demonstrators that they were under arrest. Police began to move them to waiting trucks where they were photographed and booked. Most demonstrators went limp and were carried four ways: (1) police clubs under the arms, (2) sticks crossed at the neck, (3) by one arm, (4) by arm around neck.

12:35 p.m. The arrests were completed and the area cleared. Doral security chief indicated from 300-500 persons arrested.

OTHER LOCATIONS

5:25 p.m. From this time until 6:55 p.m. a number of arrests occurred next to the Municipal Golf Course, at the Pine Tree and Sheridan intersection. Some arrested persons came to the area on foot; others came and parked cars in the intersection, attempting to block traffic. Some of the arresting patrolmen wore upside-down name tags; most wore none at all. One observer noted the arrested persons lying on the grass for frisking.

9:15 p.m. On 16th between Drexel and Pennsylvania, police took medics gas masks and I.D. cards and threw those on the ground. They then told medics and RCLC observers to get off the street.

Time unlisted. Older persons in the Washington-Lincoln area were affected

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG (continued)

assisted the officers. One motorman had been injured and was transported to the hospital for treatment.

At 21 Street and Collins Avenue, a Metro bus was given a flat and had to be assisted through traffic. A group of non-delegates made their way to the foot bridge at 24 Street and Collins Avenue leading over to Pine Tree Drive, only to find it had been guarded by Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel, as were all three foot bridges in the area.

As the non-delegates continued their tactics along James, Park and Collins Avenues from 19 to 23 Streets, a prisoner van was sent to that area to be at the disposal of the P.H.P. personnel patrolling there.

At 5:15 P. M., a large number of non-delegates were reported on the second deck of the Municipal Parking lot opposite the Complex on 17 Street. They were reportedly bothering the police scouts stationed there, and throwing things at the officers on the Complex. P.S.D. platoon 27 was dispatched to the parking lot and they "swept" the area clear of demonstrators. Demonstrators continued their disruptive tactics along Collins Avenue. At 5:20 P. M., the F.H.P. troopers on patrol along Dade Boulevard were put back in their cars and sent to assist the other half of that Task Force in clearing up Collins Avenue. The one prisoner van sent earlier was now full and 2 additional vans were sent to the area. Several prisoner vans were also sent to Pine Tree Drive around 28 Street where F.H.P. platoons 21, 22 and 23 had rounded up a number of the non-delegates who had been blocking traffic and harassing motorists along Pine Tree Drive.

The National Guard had been monitoring the police tactical frequency and because of the large number of trashing incidents and the wide area over which they were occurring, at 5:21 P. M. they placed infantry Unit 2/124 on "red" alert and their 1/116 and 2/116 Artillery units on "Yellow" alert. ("Red" alert indicating a
by tear gas and were critical of police. An 80-year-old man was cut when he stumbled from effects of gas.

JAIL CONTACTS

With the mass arrests on Wednesday evening, officers at both Miami City Jail and Dade County Jail had a very busy night. A total of 159 women were arrested and brought to Miami City Jail. 119 arrived before midnight, 40 after that. At 6:35 p.m. an observer reported officers well-organized for arrival of arrested women with 13 officials present in the booking area.

At the jail, women were sent 10 at a time up an elevator for frisking and placing in cell, where they received water and necessary medical attention. Within 30 minutes, they were taken to see the judge, released or sent back to the cell. Returning women received kool-ade and sandwiches. Observers reported good treatment of the women. One observer did report an instance of bad treatment by a City of Miami policeman, who also questioned observer's role. The Court clerk also expressed antagonism for the observer's presence. The presiding judge was reportedly very lenient, setting low bail and releasing many on their own recognizance.

At 5:24 P.M., the demonstrators erected their own blockage across Washington Avenue just south of 20 Street. The several hundred who had been gathered in the North Demonstration Area moved out onto the Avenue and lined up the burlap bags full of sand until they extended from curb to curb. The non-delegates then took up positions on the south side of their barricade. Many were throwing things at the police behind the fence.

At 5:26 P.M., 40 or 50 demonstrators entered the canal at Michigan Avenue and attempted to make their way up to the north perimeter fence, but they were discouraged by a couple of well-placed "baseball" teargas grenades. At 5:28 P.M., 2 more prisoner vans were sent to 20 Street and Park Avenue at the request of the F.H.P. troopers in that area. An estimated 300 to 500 demonstrators had moved out of this area and were going north on Collins Avenue to the Fontainebleau Hotel, vandalizing cars as they went. A helicopter was asked to go to 26 Street and Collins Avenue and report on the movements of this group as it had apparently split up, some going up Indian Creek Drive and some going up Collins Avenue. F.H.P. platoons 19 and 20 were sent to 36 and Collins to "sweep" these groups south. When the F.H.P. units arrived the smaller group of demonstrators on Indian Creek Drive ran over to Collins Avenue to join the larger group. Using gas and making arrests as they could, the F.H.P. troopers pushed the demonstrators back toward 23 and Collins. At 30 Street and Collins Avenue the mob of demonstrators broke up and many ran toward the beach and into hotels to try to evade the troopers, but a number were apprehended and a van was dispatched to pick up the prisoners. At 5:59 P.M. 3 more prisoner vans were sent as arrests continued. Two more vans were sent at 6:02 P.M., making six in all.
A similar "relaxed and at times even jovial" atmosphere was reported at the Dade County court. The bonds varied, some of the arrested men were released on their own recognizance, others received low bonds, still others had higher bonds set. From 8:15-8:45 p.m. one judge set bail for disorderly conduct at $500 (including that of Jeff Nightbyrd). Observers reported that police generally did a very good job, maintaining a low profile and efficiently handling the large number of men.

From 6:50 p.m. until 2:30 a.m. observers counted 578 men brought to the jail in a variety of vehicles, including orange county trucks, Deatrick trucks, white county buses and police vans. Observers outside the jail did report that one police officer was excessively hard on the arrested men as they exited from the trucks. But in the main, observers said, the process went smoothly. Arresting officers had mistakenly placed one woman in the men's van; at the jail she was taken to the women's jail. Several injured persons received prompt medical treatment. A few of the arrested received treatment for heat exhaustion while others complained of the long hot ride in the closed trucks. (Father James Groppi, arrested at the Doral, said his group was driven around for 1 1/2 hours).

At 5:39 P.M., a large group tried to crash Gate 6X. Gas was used and a squad from Miami platoon 12 was sent as reinforcement. Non-delegates, again on the second deck of the Municipal Parking Lot, bombarded the officers with stones and other objects. P.S.D. platoon 27 cleared the lot of demonstrators for the second time and at 5:51 P.M. the gate was reopened.

Finding themselves unable to go north to the hotel area, the demonstrators continued to set up road blocks and vandalize cars around 20 and 21 Streets and Park Avenue. Using ice picks and knives, they punctured and slashed tires on numerous cars. A delegate bus was stopped and its tires were flattened. Several demonstrators lifted the door to the engine compartment and tried to set fire to the engine after pulling out some of the wiring. Officers who attempted to aid the delegates were pelted with rocks and were compelled to use mace to disperse the demonstrators. One police motorcycle was temporally disabled when a demonstrator disconnected its spark plug wires, and a 6-year old child required medical attention after being struck by one of the rocks.

Demonstrators continued to harass delegates trying to enter the complex, shouting obscenities at them, throwing rocks, sticks, paper soaked in red dye, and physically restraining them. At 6:03 P.M., 2 squads of officers were sent outside Gate 4X to assist delegates through the non-delegates.

At 5:52 P.M., 6 non-delegates were arrested at 2142 N. Bay Road after being caught running through the area throwing rocks at homes. Other demonstrators at Dade and Alton were approaching cars stopped for the traffic lights and forcing potatoes up their exhaust pipes in an attempt to stall the cars and block traffic.

The non-delegates along Collins Avenue continued to be a problem and at 6:16 P.M., the Tactical Commander requested that all F.H.P. personnel not assisting with the arrests being made begin fluid patrol from 21 to 23 Streets in the area of Collins Avenue.
FLAMINGO PARK - DAYTIME

During mid-morning, Wednesday, some small groups held meetings throughout the campsite to work over plans, reviewing arrest procedures, etc. A mass meeting began near 11:30 a.m. at the Showmobile to discuss specific sites and types of presence. VVAV leaders announced that they would like the majority of their group to be ready to move on to Gainesville in late afternoon or early evening. Those staying on for demonstrations at the Convention Hall were expected to be orderly and not to participate in any trashing. The general feeling of the group gathered at the Showmobile was that nothing was to be trashed.

At 11:40 a.m. NEGRO, a group of about 50 black persons, entered the park at the main gate, gathered in a circle and displayed pro-Nixon signs. As they entered they hit some campers with sticks from their placards. Land security persons had tried to prohibit their entrance to the park, but they pushed through and were soon encircled by other campers. There were some tense moments as the leaders moved to the Exposé stage and spoke until around 1:00 p.m. Campers vocally disagreed with the group. As some campers filtered away, security persons monitored the continuing discussion and then the NEGRO group left.

Several prisoner vans were also requested. At 6:24 P.M., the Tactical Commander requested that Miami's mobile platoon 15 also patrol the area of 21 Street and Collins Avenue. The situation there was improving, but the demonstrators were trashing as they left the area and at 21 Street and Park Avenue had turned over a "dumpster" and set it on fire.

Still monitoring our tactical frequency, at 6:25 P.M., the National Guard had changed the status of their 1/116 and 2/116 Artillery units from "Yellow" to "red" alert.

By 6:38 P.M., the area of 23 through 21 Streets on Collins Avenue had been cleared of demonstrators, and an emergency vehicle which had been disabled and surrounded by non-delegates at 24 Street and Collins had been assisted. Most of the demonstrators had run south and west. Many had been arrested, but still the vandalizing and harassment continued. A group at 18 Street and Collins Avenue was apprehended trashing cars and they were arrested. While waiting for the prisoner van, reports were received that another group had traffic stopped at 17 Street near James Avenue and was trashing a car there. As the troopers moved down to take care of that problem the trashing began again between 23 and 25 Streets on Collins Avenue. And so it continued. The dozens of small groups with their hit and run techniques kept the officers on the move.

At Lincoln Road and Collins Avenue, a group of about 50 demonstrators were marching in the street and blocking traffic. Turning right, they marched west on Lincoln Road toward the Mall. When officers from P.S.D. platoon 2 moved forward to clear them out of the street, one of the non-delegates threw a gas grenade at the officers.

At 6:54 P.M., Collins Avenue was clear of demonstrators north of 18 Street and the Miami cars of platoon #16 were asked by the Tactical Commander to concentrate their patrol south of 18 Street.
The county set up a baggage handling system at the campsite to check personal belongings of campers for the time when they were away from the park for the evening's major demonstrations.

During the early afternoon, reports came back to the campsite that buses had been parked so as to block off Meridian Avenue between 17th Street and Dade Blvd. This was the site of a major demonstration, and there was some chaos evidenced through the park as groups tried to refigure plans for the evening. Some announcements were made that persons should start moving up to the Convention Hall area in small groups. They were told to get to their planned sites by any routes possible.

FLAMINGO PARK - EVENING AND OVERNIGHT

At the campsite all was quiet from 5:00 p.m. until nearly 6:45 when many SDS marchers returned to the park. Some leaders urged that the campers not go back to Convention Hall as it wasn't worth the effort.

Tear gas was thrown into the park at 8:30 p.m.; there were 500-600 persons in the park at that time. This action raised tension considerably. Gas was thrown into the park again at 8:55 by City of Miami police and some Dade County patrolmen. An observer saw trash by the police -- tires had been flattened on several motorcycles outside the camp entrance, as well headlights

F.H.P. continued to make arrests on Pine Tree Drive and prisoner vans were requested at 35 and 28 Streets.

As Collins Avenue was swept clear, problems increased in intensity around the Complex. About 500 demonstrators converged at 17 Street and James Avenue and marched down 17 Street, bringing traffic to a halt. At 7:05 P. M., the crowd completely surrounded 2 bus loads of delegates attempting to get into the Complex at Gate 9X.

P.S.D. platoon 4 was sent out into the street to surround the buses and assist the delegates into the Complex. They were pelted with rocks while helping the delegates and one officer had to be taken to the hospital for treatment. Two arrests were made. East of Gate 9X, about 150 demonstrators were sitting in front of Gate 6X and blocking it completely. A taxi, attempting to bring delegates to an open gate, slowly made its way through the crowd. The driver apparently became unnerved by the yelling of the demonstrators and their banging on his car, because he ran into several of them and injured them slightly. At 7:18 P. M., the Tactical Commander requested that half of P.S.D. platoon 27 sweep 17 Street to clear the gates.

Meanwhile, a large crowd estimated at about 1000 demonstrators had gathered on Collins Avenue between 19 and 21 Streets. A sound truck set up by the demonstrators in the North Demonstration Area had been urging the non-delegates to begin "direct action" now and telling them to go to Collins Avenue "where the action is". F.H.P. units 21, 22 and 23 were assigned to sweep the demonstrators south to 18 Street. Platoons 19 and 20 were still engaged in mass arrests procedures at 30 Street and Collins Avenue and requested 2 more prisoner vans.

At 7:42 P. M., smoke was seen coming from the direction of Dade Boulevard and Meridian Avenue. Someone had set fire to a shade-providing structure on the southwest corner of Bayshore Golf
and taillight smashed. A newsmen took pictures of this trashing. An RCLC observer found the Miami officer in charge, who stated that he was going to make sure that the non-delegates stayed in the park. Three representatives from the park came outside the entrance and pleaded with the officer, saying that they wanted peace. The officer reacted strongly and said they had better stay in or he'd see that they would. The officer left the scene and police were pulled back.

Near 11:00 about 100 persons left the back gate of the park to start a march northward. They returned soon. At 11:50, 100 persons left to go north on Meridian but were back again at 12:10.

At 12:20 a.m. 30 City of Miami police entered the park gate; one chased a youth down the street. The observer on duty saw no apparent provocation for the entire action. Police motorcycles and patrol cars continued to go by the park on Meridian in apparent harassment of the campers. After this some of the campers threw stones, oranges and sticks at the passing police. Most of the campers were quiet. At least one patrol car was hit by such items.

At approximately 3:00 a.m. tear gas was launched from the street into the area of the media tent. There was a rumor that it was thrown from a passing yellow Volkswagen.

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG (continued)

Course. The Fire Department was notified and the fire was quickly extinguished.

At 7:24 P. M., P.S.D. platoon 27 began its sweep of 17 Street. F.H.P. was notified and dispatched several units to 17 Street and Washington Avenue. As the non-delegates were swept into that intersection by the P.S.D. deputies, the troopers pushed the group south down Washington Avenue. When 17 Street had been cleared, a line of officers remained across it on the west side of Washington Avenue to keep the demonstrators from filling it up again. Some of the demonstrators climbed to the upper level of the Municipal Parking Lot and started damaging vehicles parked there. A gas launcher was used to fire tear gas projectiles onto the lot and the demonstrators were dispersed.

At 7:40 P. M., the final session of the Republican National Convention was called to order, only 10 minutes behind the posted schedule in spite of the non-delegates efforts to close it down.

Several hundred non-delegates were gathered around a sound truck in the North Demonstration Area, listening to speeches. A large group had attempted to turn over one of the buses at 20 Street and had been repulsed through the use of mace. Now they listened to David Dellinger, one of the Chicago 7, as he tried to get them to join their fellow demonstrators at 20 Street and Collins Avenue.

Small bands of non-delegates were all along Washington Avenue from 17 to 19 Streets. Staying out of range of the Mark-7 mace canisters, they threw curses, rocks, sticks, potatoes, M-80 firecrackers, pieces of pipe and other assorted items at the police behind the perimeter fence. Occasionally a car would drive by and divert their attention to it for a few minutes. They would walk in
At 3:20 a.m. a red convertible, with the top down stopped just past the VVAV camp location. Four or 5 men were in the car, wearing white shirts, having short hair. They asked where Flamingo Park was. Then they questioned: Can we drive in? VVAV security suggested that they park and then come to check with security. The car then drove off and threw two pepper gas canisters into the park. Two RCLC observers on the scene got the gas full face.

The park was otherwise quiet till sunrise.

front of it, climb on it's hood, curse the driver and occupants, bang on it, and flatten or attempt to flatten its tires. When the car passed, their harassment of the officers would continue.

At 7:52 P.M., they began to fill 17 Street and Washington Avenue again, blocking traffic and throwing things at the officers on 17 Street and within the Complex. F.H.P. platoons 19 and 20 were requested by the Tactical Commander to sweep the intersection and push the demonstrators south on Washington Avenue, not letting them go east to Collins Avenue. The troopers pushed the demonstrators continued south from there.

The sound truck in the North Demonstration Area had been calling to the demonstrators, telling them to come into the area if they did not want to be gassed or arrested, and reminding them that these areas were put there for them to demonstrate in. At 8 P.M., there were about 300 people there, and the sound truck was attracting more. Father Groppi addressed the assembly, telling them that they were in charge, not the police, and they would call the shots tonight.

A build-up of non-delegates was reported at 17 Street and Meridian Avenue, and reports were received of cars being trashed and delegates being harassed. Also, Collins Avenue was again experiencing problems. Lincoln Road and Collins Avenue were reportedly completely blocked with people and vehicles, and demonstrators were causing a disturbance in a hotel at 20 Street and Collins Avenue. F.H.P. platoons 21, 22 and 23 were asked to respond to the Collins Avenue problems, and P.S.D. platoons 8 and 9, which had been standing by at Miami International Airport in case of problems there, were asked to come to the Convention Complex to assist here.
At 8:07 P. M., a report was received by the F. B. I. that there was a white Ford parked in the rear of the Convention Complex with a bomb in it set to go off at 8:15 P. M. Another call was received at 8:20 P. M. by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement that there was a bomb in the north end of the Convention site set to go off at 9:15 P. M. Extensive searches were conducted, but both calls were apparently false alarms.

Prior to the arrival of P. S. D. platoons 8 and 9, a contingent of police partially cleared the intersection of 17 Street and Meridian Avenue, freeing the delegates being detained there and pushing the demonstrators south and west. The demonstrators pushed to the west regrouped at 17 Street and Washington Avenue and headed for the Lincoln Road Mall. When they reached the Mall, they were confronted by P. S. D. deputies stationed there and prevented from entering. Deputies reported that this group had tear gas equipment which they used against the officers as they passed through the Mall going south on Jefferson Avenue. Turning right on 16 Street, they went to Lenox Avenue where they broke the windows of the Southern Bell Telephone Company office and then ran south toward 15 Street.

The Flamingo Park campsite was quiet. There were about 200 non-delegates inside, listening to various speakers.

Once on Collins Avenue, the group blocking its intersection with Lincoln Road had been dispersed. The F. H. P. troopers had started their sweep at 17 Street and pushed the demonstrators south to 16 Street. There, the Miami P. D. units picked up the sweep and moved the group down to 15 Street and off Collins Avenue, hoping the non-delegates would return to Flamingo Park.

Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel had arrested 4 persons: Two at the footbridge on 27 Street and two at the 24 Street footbridge, and a prisoner van was dispatched to pick up the prisoners.
P.S.D. Platoons 8 and 9 had arrived on the Beach at 8:30 P.M., and were now engaged in clearing 17 Street and Meridian Avenue. Some of the demonstrators went up 17 Street into the Municipal Parking Lot where they threw objects at the officers and let air out of tires of cars parked there. Tear gas was used to clear the lot. Several arrests were made at Lincoln Road and Meridian Avenue and at 18 Street and Meridian Avenue. Prisoner vans were dispatched to pick up those prisoners.

At 8:40 P.M., another group of 50 or 60 demonstrators left Flamingo Park and started harassing motorists on Meridian Avenue. Several in this group carried long sticks tied in bundles. They would use the sticks to beat on cars. Several other smaller groups also left the park and Miami Squad 153 was sent to survey the situation. When the group saw the officers, several retreated back into the park.

Between 17 Street and Lincoln Road on Collins Avenue, a group of about 50 demonstrators disabled a bus by pulling some wires loose in its engine compartment. They beat on the bus and were attempting to turn it over when on-duty patrol units responded to the call for help. The demonstrators surrounded the patrol units and F.H.P. troopers had to be called to disperse the crowd.

At 8:48 P.M., there were about 500 non-delegates in the North Demonstration Area. Dave Dellinger had been addressing them from the sound truck, urging a march to the Doral Beach Hotel, 4833 Collins Avenue. He proposed a peaceful march, without trashing and on the sidewalk so as not to interfere with traffic. They would march 4 abreast up Collins Avenue to the hotel and assemble in front of it on the sidewalk. At 9:02 P.M., the group now estimated at about 800 began to move east on 20 Street led by Dave Dellinger and Father Groppi. The Police Tactical Commander requested that certain task force units drop what they were doing and take the following positions: F.H.P. Platoons 24, 25 and 26 were to patrol Collins Avenue from 23 to 44 Streets to prevent trashing and Miami Platoon 15 was to patrol Collins Avenue from 15 to 23 Streets, also to prevent trashing.
F.H.P. platoons 19 and 20 had been using tear gas in their efforts to clear Collins Avenue and the Miami units on the perimeter fence between 17 and 18 Streets had also been using tear gas to chase away rock throwing demonstrators. An easterly breeze had carried some of the gas up to the Convention Hall itself and at 8:55 P.M., the Interior Security Commander ordered that all doors on the east side of the Hall be closed. At 9:06 P.M., more gas had to be used to disperse a large crowd trying to crash Gate 6X and this necessitated keeping the doors closed a while longer.

The marchers enroute to the Doral were at 26 Street and Collins Avenue by 9:20 P.M., moving in an orderly fashion as they had promised. Vandalism continued at other locations, however, with groups at 20 Street and Park Avenue, the 1600 block of Collins Avenue, the 300 block of Lincoln Road, the 1600 through 1900 blocks of Washington Avenue, along 17 Street from Collins Avenue to Washington Avenue, Dade Boulevard and Alton Road, and 1500 Bay Road causing the major police problems at this time. Also, at 14 Street and Meridian Avenue, scouts reported about 200 non-delegates in the street, completely blocking Meridian Avenue, and on 18 Street just east of Washington Avenue, demonstrators had pulled a high pressure fire hose out of a hotel and were turning it off and on in the street. These and other problems were being handled by F.H.P. platoons 19 and 20, Miami platoon 15, P.S.D. platoons 8, 9 and 27, and the Miami Beach off-site crowd control contingent. At 9:40 P.M., roughly 800 marching demonstrators enroute to the Doral Beach Hotel were approaching 30 Street and Collins Avenue. The Police Tactical Commander had been in touch with the leaders of the march and certain agreements had been reached. The leaders agreed not to permit trashing or other disruptive conduct, and to keep the marchers on the sidewalk where they would not interfere with traffic. The police agreed not to use gas and to permit the march to continue as long as it remained non-violent. The leaders also stated that most of the marchers wished to be arrested as part of their demonstration, but stressed their intention to be completely non-violent and to submit peacefully to the arrests. The Tactical Commander acknowledged
this and said that an order to disperse would be given and anyone who wished to avoid being arrested would be allowed to leave the area. With this understanding the march continued toward the Doral Beach Hotel.

Anticipating having to arrest over 800 people, the Tactical Commander requested that all 8 platoons of F.H.P. troopers go to the Doral Beach Hotel and stand-by. At 9:45 P. M., he requested that 5 prisoner vans be dispatched to Collins Avenue south of the Doral Beach Hotel, later changing the number to 10 vans.

Meanwhile, problems continued at the Complex. Demonstrators at 19 Street and Washington Avenue were blocking cars and shooting objects at police with slingshots. Four squads were called out of the Complex to sweep the area.

At 9:55 P. M., the marchers had reached 42 Street and Collins Avenue. Picking up stragglers as it moved, there were now estimated between 800 and 1000 people in the crowd. A motorcycle officer was sent to 63 Street and Indian Creek Drive to block off southbound traffic leading to Collins Avenue.

Also at 9:55 P. M., President Nixon arrived at the Convention Complex. To limit the necessity of using any further gas, Miami's entire task force "C", platoons 12, 13, 14 and 18 were moved out onto the west side of Washington Avenue. Some demonstrators were still causing problems and throwing rocks at officers on Washington Avenue at 17 Street, and these people were pushed south on Washington Avenue by Miami platoon 15, away from the Complex.

By 10:04 P. M., the large group marching to the Doral Beach Hotel had passed 44 Street and Collins Avenue and motorcycle units were posted on 41 Street at Collins Avenue and Indian Creek Drive to divert northbound traffic. Identification equipment and personnel to process 900 to 1000 arrestees were requested at the Doral Beach Hotel by the Tactical Commander.
At 10:10 P. M., a black male fired several shots with a hand gun at Miami police officers and fled north on James Avenue from 17 Street in a Chevrolet convertible. Described as being 6 feet tall, early 20's, afro haircut, long-sleeved khaki shirt and dark pants, a man matching his description was seen later at Lincoln Road and Washington Avenue. He ran south on Washington Avenue when approached by P. D. deputies and 2 Miami Beach officers. When the chase, he pulled a chrome plated revolver and pointed it at the officers chasing him. Although he avoided capture, this gun was recovered by police after the subject dropped it while fleeing.

At 10:12 P. M., a group of about 150 demonstrators blocked Collins Avenue between 19 and 20 Streets and were throwing trash and vandalism. Miami police platoon 15 had finished its sweep of 17 Street and Washington and was asked by the Police Tactical Commander to go to 19 Street and Collins Avenue in the process. Another group was trashing cars along Lincoln Road. Members of the P. D. platoon 2 and several Miami Beach officers pushed the demonstrators out of Collins and James Avenues. Members of the P. D. platoon 27 had to be sent to assist them.

At 10:27 P. M., a group of about 200 non-delegates left Flamingo Park. Reportedly carrying clubs and in an angry mood, the demonstrators consisted of the rest going north on Collins Avenue and 18 Street and Collins Avenue, and continued north, picking up stragglers along the way. At the Doral Beach Hotel, Collins Avenue was completely blocked by the demonstrators, and an order to disperse was given. About 250 of the demonstrators elected to leave. About 250 chose to be arrested.
the rest moved south on Collins Avenue toward the park. The F.H.P. crowd control vehicle was called for and positioned on the bridge between Indian Creek Drive and Pine Tree Drive on 41 Street to prevent the demonstrators from crossing the bridge and being in a position to either trash the 41 Street business district or, block the delegates return traffic routes from the Complex to the major hotels.

At 11:05 P. M. the other referred to angry mob heading north for the Doral Beach Hotel had reached 23 Street and Collins Avenue. In as much as all of the F.H.P. platoons were involved in the arrests taking place in front of the Doral Beach Hotel, the Police Tactical Commander inquired of the commanders of the P.S.D. and Miami platoons what units they had available to deal with this impending problem. P.S.D. platoons 8 and 9, from within the Complex, and Miami platoon 15 were volunteered by their respective commanders and the Police Tactical Commander requested they meet at 44 Street and Collins Avenue to intercept the group before it reached the Doral Beach Hotel.

At 11:10 P. M., the convention session concluded and the delegates prepared to leave the Complex. Those with cars were able to; however the charter bus drivers were reluctant to drive their buses in fear of being trapped by demonstrators once outside the Complex and risking damage to their buses and possible injury to themselves and their passengers. Because of this situation and the President and Vice President personally greeting and shaking hands with numerous delegates, few persons left the Convention Complex on time.

At 11:11 P. M., Collins Avenue was still closed to traffic from 41 Street to 63 Street as the arrests continued in front of the Doral Beach Hotel. The 500 to 600 demonstrators who had chosen not to be arrested were moving slowly south at about 46 Street. When the demonstrators reached 41 Street and Indian Creek Drive, they were disturbed to find the F.H.P. Crowd Control vehicle and its motorcycle escort blocking the bridge. They milled around in the intersection throwing rocks and bottles at the officers,
and one officer was struck by a 9/11th wrench thrown at him. At about 11:30 P. M., the group coming north reached 41 Street and the 2 groups merged and together unsuccessfully tried to force their way over the bridge.

By 11:32 P. M., delegates in cars were leaving the Convention Complex. The Police Tactical Commander advised that Collins Avenue was still blocked off and the delegates should be north on Alton Road or Pine Tree Drive to 63 Street and come south on Collins Avenue from there, if their hotels were in that area.

At 11:35 P. M., P.S.D. platoons 8 and 9 and Miami platoon 15 began to clear 41 Street and Indian Creek Drive by pushing the demonstrators south on Indian Creek Drive, and slowly the group began to move. Some arrests were made there and a van was sent to pick up the prisoners. Arrests were still being made at the Doral Beach Hotel, but some F.H.P. troopers were released from that scene and sent to 41 Street and Collins Avenue to help push the group south. Some trash began as the group headed south and rocks and bottles were thrown at the troopers.

The group continued moving south with little urging from officers. At 35 Street, the group stopped for a short time then continued again, small groups began breaking off the main body of demonstrators and spreading out.

At 11:46 P. M., a group of about 75 demonstrators, reportedly members of the Attica Brigade, left the park and marched north on Meridian Avenue, shouting "Kill the pigs." Thirty P.S.D. motormen were sent to check the group and when the demonstrators saw the motors coming, they ran back inside Flamingo Park.

At a few minutes to midnight the charter bus drivers agreed to man their buses and began to shuttle delegates back to their hotels. Most of the non-delegates had left the area of the Complex although Gate 6X had to be closed for a short time at 11:46 P. M., when 20 demonstrators attempted to break into the Complex and were harassing delegates attempting to leave.
DEMONSTRATION EVENTS ON THE FINAL DAY OF THE RNC, AUGUST 23, 1972 (continued)

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG (continued)

At midnight, Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel at 24 Street and Collins Avenue made an arrest and a prisoner van was dispatched to them. Also, reports of a group trashing on the west end of the Lincoln Road Mall were received and P.S.D. platoon 3 was asked to investigate.

At 12:03 A. M., the last prisoner was removed from in front of the Doral Beach Hotel and Collins Avenue was opened to northbound traffic. The Police Tactical Commander requested that F.H.P. platoons 24, 25 and 26 patrol Collins Avenue in the area of 25 Street and requested that F.H.P. platoons 21, 22, and 23 assist with demonstrators on Collins Avenue between 18 and 20 Streets. All units were directed to use tear gas as a last resort only.

At 12:07 A. M., Miami units requested a prisoner van at 1611 Meridian Avenue. Arrests were also being made at 18 Street and Collins Avenue and a prisoner van was requested there. Small groups of 10 or 15 non-delegates were seen in various areas, most headed back to Flamingo Park.

At 12:13 A. M., about 10 demonstrators attempted to block the driveway of the Doral Beach Hotel. Miami Beach Police headquarters was contacted and 2 zone cars were sent to investigate. Arrests were made and prisoner control sent a van to pick up the prisoners.

By 12:13 A. M., 18 Street and Collins Avenue had been cleared and F.H.P. platoons 19 and 20 were sent back to their staging area. The Police Tactical Commander asked F.H.P. platoons 21 through 26 to assume fluid patrol along Collins Avenue and Indian Creek Drive to prevent the demonstrators from regrouping.

At 12:16 A. M., P.S.D. platoon 3 requested 2 prisoner vans: one to Lincoln Road and Washington Avenue and another to Lincoln Road and Pennsylvania Avenue.
By 12:19 A. M., P.S.D. had cleared all non-delegates off Lincoln Road, and Collins Avenue from 21 Street to 41 Street was also clear of demonstrators.

At 12:25 A.M., operator 22 at the Fontainebleau Hotel received a call that there was a bomb in the hotel set to go off at 12:40 A. M. F.B.I. and Secret Service were notified and a search was conducted with negative results. The call was classified as a false alarm.

At 12:30 A.M., F.H.P. platoons 24, 25 and 26 were returned to their staging area, and 5 minutes later, F.H.P. platoons 21, 22 and 23 returned to their staging area.

By 12:35 A. M. there was no non-delegate activity in the area of the Complex. Almost all non-delegates were back in the park and police units were asked to stay away from the campsite anticipating that it would settle down. Many of the campers had already packed up and left and more continued to do the same.

At 12:37 A. M., Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel were relieved from their positions and asked to return to their staging area.

At 12:45 A. M., P.S.D. platoons 4 and 5 were relieved from their positions along the fence and staged in the auditorium.

At 1 A. M., all gates were locked except Gates 2X and 11X. Personnel assigned to the gates were told to remain there until relieved. P.S.D. platoons 2 and 3 reported no activity on the Mall, and were advised to return to their staging area. P.S.D. platoon 27 returned to its staging area in Miami.

At 1:45 A. M., Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel were relieving Miami Beach personnel on their perimeter positions.

At 2:05 A. M., P.S.D. platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5 were secured and they returned to Miami.
At 2:15 A.M., Miami Beach platoon #1 was secured.

At 2:30 A.M., platoons 8 and 9 of P.S.D. which had been held over in case of activity in the park were secured and left the Convention Complex.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
DEMONSTRATION EVENTS ON THE FINAL DAY OF THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION,
AUGUST 23, 1972

1. As had been the case with most of the law enforcement strategy adopted during both Conventions, the tactic of ringing the Convention Complex with a wall of abandoned buses was borrowed from tactics developed by the Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Department. The clear intent of this tactic was to prevent non-delegates the opportunity to delay Republican Convention attendees from being in the Hall to hear on time the scheduled Presidential and Vice Presidential acceptance speeches. From the beginning of the Democratic Convention, officials had made it clear they would not allow interference with convention activities. Given the announced and published demonstration plans, the apprehension communicated through intelligence estimates, and the conclusions drawn from the demonstrations of the previous evening (i.e., that the demonstrations had reach an angry intensity and that demonstration leaders could not be counted upon to control demonstrations), law enforcement planners felt it would be unwise to let the demonstrations of August 23 proceed as anticipated.

2. The buses were placed around the Convention Complex in the early morning hours. Non-delegates were not informed in advance that such a tactic would be employed; nor were they even formally notified by authorities that it had been employed. As most non-delegate leaders became aware of the buses, they felt betrayed. In their opinion, they had seriously negotiated demonstration plans in good faith with officials. They had openly announced their plans -- without official objections they argued -- and
now they were being "tricked" by the very officials with whom they had been negotiating. As a result, they felt that the fait accompli character of the bus strategy realized only hours before demonstrations were to begin not only left them no time to reorganize their plans but also helped destroy their credibility as leaders. Various non-delegate leaders openly placed the blame for the chaos of the evening upon the manner in which this surprise tactic was implemented. These individuals argued that the trashing engaged in by non-delegates was a direct reaction to their frustration at not being able to demonstrate as planned and their anger at being deprived from making a meaningful protest statement at the Convention Complex on this night of acceptance speeches.

3. After the Conventions, non-delegate leaders reflecting upon the reaction of law enforcement officials felt they would be faced with a dilemma in the future. If Miami Beach were to be an example, then they must openly announce their demonstration plans in order to properly prepare, organize, and control demonstrators in peaceful protest events; however, once they have so openly announced their plans, they have provided law enforcement planners the opportunity to take surprise counter-moves which could preclude the possibility of an effective peaceful protest as planned.

4. Once demonstrators in Flamingo Park began to receive word that the buses were around the Convention Complex, confusion prevailed. Non-delegate "scouts" went out from the Park to examine the situation. Hurried meetings were called all day in the Park. Non-delegates argued about what type of demonstration events would now make sense. Disputes which had previously existed within the Park as to the desirability of mobile tactics
vis-a-vis stationary sit-in tactics became intensified. Late in the afternoon, rumors began spreading through the Park that Republican Convention attendees were being brought to the Hall early to leave no chance they could be delayed from entering the Hall. Protest groups began moving from the Park with demonstrators unsure of where they were going or what they would do.

5. Early in the day, the VVAV made a decision not to be present to protest as an organization during the evening. Rather, VVAV members decided to go to Gainesville where seven of their numbers had been indicated. The lack of moral and physical muscle which the VVAV had exerted throughout both Conventions was missed by non-delegate leaders. This group had shown itself capable of restraining, gathering, organizing, and directing non-delegates throughout the Republican National Convention protests. No other group or set of individuals were able to step into such a vacuum and exert a similar influence.

6. The primary objective of the bus tactic must be seen as preserving access to the Convention Complex for the Republican Convention attendees. In this respect, it was successful. It must be stressed, however, that access of delegates to the Convention Hall also had to be controlled in order for the bus tactic to work.

Demonstrators were denied all northward access even to the hotels where the majority of Republican Convention attendees were staying. Only Collins Avenue south of 35th Street and those streets south of the Convention Complex were open for protest events. When early in the evening non-delegates attempted to march north on Collins Avenue to reach major
Miami Beach hotels, they were met by FHP troopers, gassed and dispersed with some arrested. Officials were willing to risk disorganized groups or perhaps riots in the streets rather than even a peaceful blockade of the Convention Complex.

Some non-delegates have suggested that the march north was blocked in order to prevent access to the big hotels on Collins Avenue. They cynically point out that the primary residents of the south end of Miami Beach are old and/or poor, that few exclusive business establishments were located in this section of the Beach. We also recognize the influence of wealth. But in fairness to officials we must emphasize that they did allow access to the Gold Coast areas prior to Wednesday and even after the final session of the Republican National Convention had begun.

When Lemberg Center staff put this problem directly to Deputy Chief Zanders, we received two main responses:

(1) protest plans called for mobile disruption tactics and protest leaders could not control demonstrators or insure demonstrations would be peaceful;

(2) police were sufficiently prepared both in tactics and numbers to round up and arrest demonstrators should breaking of windows, looting, or other acts of violence occur.

Deputy Chief Zanders also noted that given the numbers of non-delegates, even if they were to all peacefully sit around the Convention Complex, the time involved in effecting mass arrest procedures would have significantly delayed the start of the Republican National Convention session. To refine the law enforcement conclusions, we are left with:
(1) to let demonstration plans proceed would have intolerably interfered with the opening of the Republican National Convention session even if all demonstrations were peaceful, something which could not be counted upon;
(2) acts of violence up to the magnitude of a riot could be handled by available law enforcement personnel especially if such violence could be contained on the south end of the Beach.

7. Much of the evening was taken up with skirmishes at intersections at the south end of the Beach. Demonstrators would throw things into the middle of an intersection to block the streets; police would arrive and disperse and/or arrest demonstrators; those demonstrators who got away would move to another intersection where the pattern would be repeated.

8. At times during the evening, law enforcement tactics seemed confused and contradictory. For instance, sometimes police seemed to be trying to collect non-delegates onto Washington Avenue; at other times, police gassed Washington Avenue to clear it of non-delegates. There were a few isolated instances of police units acting without orders or failing to utilize communications to notify commanders of their location and/or activities. The most severe infractions involved those Miami Police Department units which harassed Flamingo Park on their own initiative.

9. Confusion reigned as well among the various third party groups with personnel on the streets. Street medics did not receive gas masks until late in the evening. According to reports from those in the medical program, there had been law enforcement reluctance to see the gas masks
distributed; evidently some law enforcement officials were concerned that the
gas masks would fall into the hands of non-delegates, thus giving them
protection against police crowd-dispersal tactics.

10. While the evening saw virtually no breaking of windows and did
not include looting activity, CS gas pervaded the south end of the Beach,
filtering into a great number of hotels and private residences in the area.
The effect of the gas was not limited to demonstrators. Many residents,
most critically the elderly residents, suffered the ill-effects of skin
contact with and inhalation of this chemical crowd control agent.

11. Throughout the evening abuses on both sides were observed.
Demonstrators on various marches trashed by throwing garbage containers,
newspaper street-sale containers, benches, etc. into the street. Various
non-delegates interfered with traffic by letting air out of tires,
attempting to disable bus motors, pounding on cars, etc. Law enforcement
contingents used gas frequently. Lemberg Center staff observed Miami
Police Department officers gassing the medical unit stationed on Washington
Avenue and gassing Flamingo Park. We observed several cars of police (some
plainclothes) macing those standing on the street as the police drove by;
some officers were seen breaking formation to mace a group of demonstrators
standing or sitting nearby.

The Republican National Convention After-Action Report of DeWayne
Little, Director of the Dade County Citizens Information and Service Program,
who was acting as Park Manager under authorization of County Manager Goode,
contains the following log notations regarding the Wednesday evening action
of Miami Police units in and near Flamingo Park:
7:00 p.m.: Police units from the City of Miami and the Dade County P.S.D. chased groups of demonstrators back to Flamingo Park. After demonstrators returned to park [sic], police stood outside and hurled tear gas cannisters into the park. In addition to the tear gas, police also smashed three motorcycles that were standing at the park entrance. City of Miami police returned to the park and charged into the area. The Park Manager, along with another County employee, separated the two groups. The Manager then instructed the police to leave the area immediately which they did after several minutes of argument. In the process of entering the park, the police smashed at Channel 7 television cameras with their clubs. According to the M. B. policeman stationed at the park site, police units were not authorized to be anywhere in the vicinity of Flamingo Park. He theorize [sic] that this police unit was probably just released from duty and had decided to move on the park without the appropriate authorization.

August 24

2:00 a.m. - on: Two City of Miami Police motorcycle units were observed hurling tear gas cannisters into the park. License plates on both vehicles were folded in so that the number was hidden. Two of the tear gas cannisters landed directly in the Minor Medical tent. After passing the park, the motorcycle units were observed bending open their license tags.
12. The final march of non-delegates to the Doral was the result of demonstrator/law enforcement negotiation on the scene. Chief Pomerance personally participated in facilitating this march and the peaceful arrests which ensued. However, despite this level of negotiation there were still some incidents of these marchers being gassed as they left the Washington Avenue area.
referred to the group's ownership of a chemical company that contributed to the moon shot. A young man took several steps toward the group and shouted, "You go to the moon when your own people are starving here on earth." A young woman in the group immediately attacked the young man. She hit him with her fists and attempted repeatedly to kick him. Members of her group pulled her away and she returned to the center of the demonstration.

A report that Jerry Rubin was nearby was brought to the leader, and he immediately dispatched three persons to challenge Rubin to a debate at Flamingo Park at 11:00 Wednesday. The messengers came back quickly reporting that Rubin had accepted. Rubin was then seen attempting to enter the Fontainebleau but was refused entrance and was escorted to the sidewalk. He offered no resistance and disappeared.) The group boarded their bus at 5:12.

ZIPPIES AT CONVENTION HALL

A Zippie-sponsored march of some 150-200 persons left Flamingo Park at 12:50 p.m., proceeded north on Meridian to the Mall, then east to Washington. At Drexel Street the marchers walked through a mall fountain. A half dozen police cars and two police cycles accompanied the demonstrators on Washington. Reaching platoon 18 was put on its bus and sent to Gate 2X to stand-by. At 1:30 P.M., 905 requested that platoons 19 and 20 be sent to the Fontainebleau to relieve F.H.P. platoons 24, 25 and 26 at their positions. F.H.P. platoons 24, 25, and 26 were asked to come to 23 Street and Dade Boulevard to meet with 905. Two prisoner vans were also requested to 23 Street and Dade Boulevard.

At 1:35 P.M., the Zippie demonstrators had left 20 Street and Washington Avenue and were back in the North Demonstration Area where they were climbing the light poles, pulling off the decorative red, white and blue bunting and setting fire to it. At 1:37 P.M., a line of F.H.P. squad cars pulled alongside the Demonstration Area. The troopers exited from their cars and formed a solid line around the demonstrators, sealing off the area. The troopers closed in around the demonstrators until they were in a compact group surrounded by a 3-deep layer of troopers. The prisoner vans were moved up along side the squad cars, about 20 troopers were formed into arrest teams, and arrest procedures were initiated. The demonstrators did not resist and in an hour and five minutes, the entire group of 212 demonstrators had been processed and loaded aboard 6 prisoner vans.

At 1:25 P.M., about 500 V.V.A.W. had left Flamingo Park bound for the Fontainebleau Hotel, and arrests were still being made in front of the Complex when they came marching up 17 Street and turned onto Washington Avenue. P.S.D. platoons 3 and 4 were moved out onto Washington Avenue just north of 19 Street because it was not known what reaction the V.V.A.W. marchers might have when they saw the arrests being made. The V.V.A.W. group remained orderly and marched east on 19 Street to Collins Avenue and continued toward the Fontainebleau Hotel. At 2:08 P.M., P.S.D. platoons 3 and 4 returned to their staging area.

The demonstrators who had been moved from in front of the Fontainebleau Hotel at 1:13 P.M. by F.H.P. troopers had continued a slow southward movement. Encountering a beer truck at 44 Street, they surrounded it and helped themselves to some of its contents.
the Convention Hall demonstration area, about half the group moved onto the grass while the others continued to 20th Street where they blocked traffic. One girl with a painted body paraded nude. Television cameramen and other news persons were present.

After the group at 20th Street moved back to the demonstration area, the Zippers held a brief rally. Then the entire group moved to 20th again and began to rock and jump on cars at 1:35 p.m. Three motorcycle police arrived. The protestors then went back toward the demonstration area, where a semi-nude woman climbed a light pole to get at the bunting. After a time she and several other women lit the bunting which burned quickly. They also burned a small American flag with a swastika on it.

Suddenly at 1:40 p.m. a line of about 30 police cars (highway patrol and state marine patrol) arrived to form a semi-circle blockade at the demonstration area. The approximately 125 patrolmen exited their cars and surrounded the demonstrators. Miami Beach police directed traffic. Two paddy wagons and two Deatrick rental trucks parked in the center of the street and patrolmen began to move the demonstrators, one at a time, to the street for arrest procedures. The protestors were booked, fingerprinted, and photographed on the scene, then

They also let air out of the tires of some cars in the same vicinity. At 36 Street and Collins Avenue, they met the V.V.A.W. group enroute to the Fontainebleau and joined with them.

At 2:55 P.M., the V.V.A.W. group reached the Fontainebleau Hotel and were met by about 100 demonstrators waiting for them. Estimated at slightly over 800 people, part of the group blocked off the hotel's main entrance driveway and the rest sat down in the street. A source within the group stated they planned on being arrested here and that is why they avoided a confrontation with police in front of the Convention Complex. 905 ordered Collins Avenue traffic be detoured at 41 Street and 63 Street; and requested 5 prisoner vans to the Fontainebleau Hotel.

At 3:21 P.M., 905 advised that the main driveway to the hotel had been cleared. F.H.P. troopers were posted at the driveways and along the front of the hotel on the sidewalk, but the demonstrators were orderly.

At 4 P.M., a group of about 40 blacks arrived at the Fontainebleau Hotel carrying pro-Nixon and anti-McGovern signs. They assembled about 50 yards north of the V.V.A.W. sit-in, passed out literature and listened to speeches. The V.V.A.W. group ignored them for the most part.

Conditions were relatively quiet around the Complex. Thirty Seminole Indians arrived at Gate 11X at 2:15 P.M. Carrying signs and marching to the beat of a drum, they made their way to Washington Avenue and assembled in the North Demonstration Area. They remained there for approximately an hour and a half and then returned to Gate 11X and their waiting vehicles.

At 4:30 P.M., about half of the V.V.A.W. group sitting on Collins Avenue in front of the Fontainebleau Hotel got up and started walking back to Flamingo Park. A few minutes later, 3 V.V.A.W. members in wheelchairs were assisted into the hotel lobby by police.
placed in the paddy wagons. Two female RCLC observers were apprehended in the arrest sweep; one was released by an officer on the scene; another was taken to jail and released there. The arrest procedure, which took approximately an hour, went calmly. Demonstrators did not resist; police acted with restraint. Women were placed in one paddy wagon, men in the other and the two rental trucks.

At 1:45 p.m. a VVAV march of about 800 persons moved north on Washington toward the arrest scene. At 19th a line of 30 Miami Beach police blocked Washington; 30 highway troopers formed a back-up line. The VVAV marchers turned east on 19th and reportedly moved on north via Collins.

Meanwhile, arrested demonstrators chanted and pounded on truck sides while police processed others. Newsmen and spectators crowded around the paddy wagons. Several police officers queried could not or would not give an accurate arrest count. An RCLC observer estimated over 150. Charged with disorderly conduct, arrested men were taken to Dade County Jail, the women to City Jail. At 2:40 p.m. the vans with arrested persons left with a motorcycle escort. The arrested RCLC observer reported that the women's bus was stifling before it pulled out; one girl fainted. A number of spectators

A report of a bomb in the lobby men's restroom had been received at 4:30 P. M. and most of the lobby was cordoned off, but the veterans delivered a letter to a man who promised to deliver it to the President in person. The veterans then left the hotel and rejoined the group out front. At this time, 905 announced to the group that they had 3 minutes to leave the area or they would be arrested for disorderly conduct. The group arose and started back toward Flamingo Park. The bomb threat in the Fontainebleau men's restroom was a false alarm. A cylinder was found taped to a door, but examination revealed it was not a bomb.

At 4:47 P. M., 905 advised the prisoner vans to return to their staging area. F.H.P. platoons 19 through 23 were also returned to their staging areas and Collins Avenue was opened to traffic.
expressed concern and consternation over the use of the completely closed rental trucks to carry some 30 men in the heat of the day. At 2:50 p.m. patrolmen left the scene. Across the street, newsmen interviewed Chief Pomerance. Workmen cleaned up the litter from the polaroid camera used by the police photographer.
S.D.S. (Fontainebleau Demonstration)

At approximately 10:00 a.m., 400 SDS members and associates marched from Flamingo Park to the front of the Fontainebleau Hotel where Mrs. Nixon is staying with her daughters.

At 11:00 a.m., two prison vans and several FHP platoons were on the scene at the Fontainebleau and the FHP moved the demonstrators away from the front of the hotel.

Attica Brigade

At the same time, approximately 1,000 VVAW members and sympathizers at Flamingo voted to join the Fontainebleau demonstration. They also spoke of taking over the lobby and "trashing it".

At approximately 11:45 a.m., the group began to leave the Fontainebleau to go to the Saxony. The FHP was pulled out. The group arrived at the Saxony at 11:50 a.m.

At 12:15 p.m., the FHP was requested to the lobby of the Saxony. Several non-delegates were attempting to get in the south side of the hotel. They were pulled out at 12:17 p.m.

Plans were for the VVAW and ZIPPIE groups to leave Flamingo Park at 12:45 p.m. for the Saxony to join the other groups.

A window was broken at the Pan American Bank at 24th Street and Collins. The group reportedly was heading toward the Southern Bell Office, 16th Street and Lenox Avenue, for trashing activity. Most returned to the park at 1:00 p.m.

A small group remained at 16th Street and Collins and were breaking windows at the St. Moritz Hotel and Gayety Club. The group returned to the park, puncturing tires on the way. One police van's tires were punctured.

At 1:30 p.m., the status of various groups was as follows:

VVAW - 400 to 500 Meridian and Lincoln Road
VVAW/SDS - 50 to 60 at 19th and Alton Road, eating lunch
McIntire's Group - 30 to 40 south demonstration area
ZIPPIES - 200 to 250 in the north demonstration area at Gate 2. At 1:40 p.m., the FHP moved in for a mass arrest.
MORNING/AFTERNOON DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE FONTAINEBLEAU HOTEL; ZIPPIE MARCH AND ARRESTS, AUGUST 22, 1972 (continued)

After Action Report
prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation (continued)

ZIPPIES

A group of 50, identified as ZIPPIES, left the Park for the Convention Hall at 12:50 p.m. They proceeded to the north demonstration area and were blocking Gate 2.

At 1:45 p.m., FHP instituted mass arrest procedures for the group. In one hour and five minutes, the Troopers methodically and efficiently arrested the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult Males</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Males</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Females</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Females</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Arrests</strong></td>
<td><strong>212</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All were charged with disorderly conduct.

Dr. McIntire's Group

A Pro-Nixon group demonstrated at the Fontainebleau Hotel on 22 August 1972 at 10:20 a.m. There were 30 to 40 older people in this group, and they were present during the SDS demonstration. The group's theme is "20th Century Reformation". After completing their demonstration at the Fontainebleau, they continued on to the Doral. Demonstrators remained peaceful at both locations.

V.V.A.W.

After an early morning meeting, approximately 1,000 VVAW's were to leave Flamingo Park at 1:15 p.m. for the Fontainebleau. The group numbered 400 to 500.

Rumors were they would demonstrate in front of the hotel and then storm the lobby.

A smaller group (50 to 60) VVAW's (and SDS) were at Alton Road and 19th having lunch at the same time. larger
As the/group (1000) moved north on Washington a police line separated their march from the ZIPPIES being placed under arrest.
The smaller group of VVAW's moved south on Alton.

Evidently, the VWAWS did not desire to confront the FHP and detoured around the group and reportedly were proceeding to the Fontainebleau where they intended to be arrested. At approximately 2:15 p.m., approximately 50 VVAW and SDS were at the Fontainebleau. The number enlarged gradually, reaching 125 at 2:30 p.m. There were attempts to block driveways; were thwarted by FHP on the scene.

Reports of a group of VWAWS (500) being enroute to the Fontainebleau were received, along with information that they intended to take over the Fontainebleau lobby. Demonstrators congregated at the south end (numbering 250 at 3:00 p.m.) while FHP entered the hotel from the north end. At this time, the large group of VVAW marchers approached the small group situated there. Total numbers were estimated at 1,000.

Troops were increased and all available prison vans were called for. Collins Avenue was closed off at 46th Street by police. At 3:15 p.m., demonstrators made speeches and sat orderly in the street.

A small group of Pro-Nixon blacks (approximately 40) demonstrated simultaneously with the VWAWS.

The mood of the crowd was quiet and orderly. The feeling was that no more arrests should occur today (August 22nd) so that all non-delegates will be available for tomorrow's demonstration to be held while Nixon is making his acceptance speech. Scott Camil was seen in the group at 4:20 p.m.

At 4:30 p.m., the group began breaking up preparing to return to the Park in time to participate in the Street Without Joy. At 4:40 p.m., one-half of the crowd was gone. The other half was told to move on within three minutes or face possible arrest. By 4:50 p.m., the group was all moving south on Collins.

At 8:15 p.m., reports of thirty-eight (38) blacks marching south on Collins from 60th Street (just south of Playboy Plaza). They were identified as quiet and pro-Nixon. They arrived at the north end of the Fontainebleau at 3:30 p.m. They were carrying an American Flag. At 4:10 p.m., this group was permitted to demonstrate inside the hotel. At 4:45 p.m., they began marching back and forth in front of the hotel.
DISCUSSION COMMENTS
MORNING/AFTERNOON DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE FONTAINEBLEAU HOTEL;
ZIPPIE MARCH AND ARRESTS, AUGUST 22, 1972

1. Both the SDS demonstration/march and the Zippie activity in front of Convention Hall marked the first major destructive acts committed by the non-delegates. The mass arrest procedures were first used in the afternoon arrests. The procedures seemed to work smoothly although there was no threatening non-delegate resistance. The VVAW group which saw the arrests being made marched by with no attempt to interfere with the orderly procedure of the mass arrest.

2. Vehicles for use in the mass arrest procedures were in evidence at various points in all the protest activity of this day. Both non-delegates and police seemed to anticipate that arrests were only a matter of time.

3. The VVAW protest at the Fontainebleau remained peaceful. Members of the group seemed largely to ignore the NEGRO demonstrators, however, the reverse seemed hardly the case. Despite the peaceful character of this VVAW protest, it seemed to generate a great deal of apprehension on the part of law enforcement officials. It was our impression that such feelings were exacerbated by the fact that VVAW demonstrators remained silent throughout the event. Such a demonstration of discipline certainly could have been viewed as a serious omen on the part of a group with the lethal experience of Vietnam Veterans.
EVENING DEMONSTRATIONS
AT CONVENTION HALL;
"STREET WITHOUT JOY"

AUGUST 22, 1972
EVENING DEMONSTRATIONS AT CONVENTION HALL; "STREET WITHOUT JOY," AUGUST 22, 1972

RCLC SUMMARY

Multiple demonstrations, much chaos, some disorderly activity by protestors and forceful police action characterized the evening. It began when marchers left Flamingo Park at 6:00 p.m. They moved silently, many of them costumed and painted, to the Convention Hall area, where Washington Avenue from 17th to Dade Blvd, was blocked off. In that area various groups engaged in guerilla theater and other protest activities. At one gate VFWA protestors, carrying on a number of orderly activities, worked hard at security. At other gates, protestors taunted police and spectators inside. Observers reported considerable verbal harassment of delegates by demonstrators; police escorted some delegates through demonstrators. A number of things were tossed over the fence. The guerilla theater included simulation of bombers attacking Vietnamese people, leaving bodies on street and pavement. Considerable media was present throughout the evening at most events.

Swift police action began around 7:40 p.m. and continued for approximately an hour. Action began at 18th and Meridian where SDS and Attica Brigade demonstrators disrupted traffic, kicking and hitting some of the cars. At 7:50 p.m. four lines of state highway patrolmen moved from Dade Blvd. to push demonstrators

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF EVENTS

At 5:45 P.M., an estimated 1500 to 2000 demonstrators left Flamingo Park headed for the Convention Complex. This large group was composed of smaller groups representing the various organizations in the campsite; but all were marching together to symbolize their united desire to end the war. The evening's demonstration had been entitled "Street Without Joy." Many of the non-delegates wore costumes and had their faces painted to resemble death masks; and their parade contained several floats and was led by a live elephant pulling a coffin. When the group reached 16 Street and Meridian Avenue, they met and were joined by the V.V.A.W. demonstrators returning from the Fontainebleau Hotel.

At 5:57 P.M., P.S.D. platoons 3 and 4 were loaded on their buses and positioned by Gate 11X; and Miami platoons 12, 13 and 14 were positioned along the east perimeter. At 6:04 P.M., P.S.D. platoon 2 was positioned between Gates 9X and 10X; and at 6:10 P.M., Miami platoon 18 was in stand-by position behind the east perimeter forces. P.S.D. platoon 5 was ordered to assemble at its bus at 6:17 P.M.

The afternoon session of the Republican National Convention ended at 6:20 P.M. as the demonstrators began to encircle the Complex. It was drizzling outside and a motion was made to stay in the Hall for supper rather than leave the Complex. Many delegates voted to remain.

About 1000 demonstrators continued north on Meridian Avenue past 17 Street while the remaining marchers proceeded east on 17 Street to Washington Avenue. As the groups moved around the perimeter, they left a solid line of demonstrators behind them standing silently along the curb, shoulder to shoulder. At each gate demonstrators announced to the officers that they intended to block the gate if any tried to exit.
south on Meridian. One observer reported use of gas. Walking at a very fast pace, police forced demonstrators ahead of them. One man was pushed down, beaten and taken behind police lines. (Other police were observed hurrying east on 17th where demonstrators harassed traffic at 17th and Meridian Court.) Observers heard Metro officers inside the fence encouraging the highway patrolmen's actions; some shouted "kill, kill." Shoving hard and jabbing with nightsticks the some 200 patrolmen pushed demonstrators to the intersection of 17th and Meridian where Chief Pomerance was seen directing the action. Patrolmen were lined up several lines deep at the intersection and demonstrators verbally taunted the police before moving east along 17th Street toward Washington.

Shortly after 8:00 p.m., a Cadillac was hit with sticks at 17th and Pennsylvania, and some delegates were surrounded by demonstrators who were milling around. Patrolmen ran from their cars to confront demonstrators and there was considerable tension reported on the scene. The police lines surrounded the demonstrators, then opened up to allow them to move east to Washington Avenue. At 8:35 p.m., the patrolmen blocked off both 17th St. and Washington, keeping protestors in front of Convention Hall on Washington. The line across Washington was later moved

At 6:30 P. M., 905 requested F.H.P. platoons 21, 22 and 23 position themselves in the 46 Street and Collins Avenue Municipal Parking Lot after reports were received that members of the militant Attica Brigade planned to separate from the rest of the marchers and go to the Eden Roc Hotel, 4525 Collins Avenue. Washington Avenue, from 17 to 20 Streets had been closed to vehicular traffic to give the non-delegates a large area in which to demonstrate. When the Complex perimeter had been lined on the east, south and west sides, most of the remaining protestors gathered on Washington Avenue near Gate 2X. At 6:45 P. M., Miami platoon 18 was positioned in support of the police units already at Gate 2X, and Miami Beach platoon #1, with pepper foggers, was positioned on Jackie Gleason Drive by the Mobile Command Post.

At 6:46 P. M., a group of about 50 Cubans was seen marching up 17 Street to Washington Avenue. They marched around for about 2 hours before returning to their cars, but did not cause any great problems with the other demonstrators. They appeared to be ready and looking for trouble, but other groups were not interested.

At 6:47 P. M., the National Guard placed its 2/124 Infantry Battalion, staged in the Miami Beach High School, on "red" alert and its 2/116 Task Force, staged in Miami, on "Yellow" alert.

The main demonstration took place in front of Gate 2X in the form of Guerilla theatre. Several groups took part and acted out different scenes using home-made props. The high point came about 7:30 P. M., when the papier mache models of bombs and airplanes used in their skits were set on fire and thrown over the fence into the compound. The coffin which the elephant had been pulling was also thrown into the Complex. Harassment of delegates continued. Mostly verbal at first, as time went by, it intensified.

At 7:13 P. M., 905 requested that Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel be alerted at their hotel and asked to come to the Complex. At 7:16 P. M., 905 requested that F.H.P. platoons 21, 22 and 23
and patrolmen secured all intersections
along Washington for the line of march
back to Flamingo Park. The
demonstrators made the return trip
around 11:00 p.m.

Throughout the night of demonstration,
observers reported a number of
incidents. Among them were these:

Near Gate #4 at about 8:00 p.m., a
large group of demonstrators hassled
delegates trying to enter. When
pounding was started on a car, the car
made a u-turn and drove through the
demonstrators, injuring several. An
ambulance arrived at 8:05 p.m. and
picked up one demonstrator who had been
seriously injured. A second ambulance
arrived at 8:15 p.m.

At about 7:30 p.m. along 17 Street a
Miami News photographer, according to
his word, was hit on the head by a police
billy club. He reported the attacking
officer fled after seeing press
credentials. The photographer suffered
minor cuts over his right eye.

At Gate # 1 around 7:30 p.m. a black
coffin was thrown from the street
over the gate, along with papier-mache
bombs and planes, in flames. A CO₂
cannister was used by police to extinguish
the flames. Other materials were also

come from the 46 Street Municipal Parking Lot to the parking lot
of Miami Beach High School. F.H.P. platoons 19 and 20 were sent
assist P.S.D. platoons on Gates 11X and 12X as demonstrators blocked
vehicular traffic from entering the gates by laying down in the
street.

At 7:38 P. M., the tri-agency communications tie-in failed and
P.S.D., Miami and Miami Beach switched to their alternate channels.

At 7:39 P. M., demonstrators had all gates blocked except for 11X,
and demonstrators were beginning to lay down in front of that gate
again. The evening session of the convention was scheduled to
begin at 8:30 P. M., and delegates were starting to arrive. At
7:43 P. M., 905 requested F.H.P. platoons 21, 22 and 23 report
to Dade Boulevard and Meridian Avenue and sweep Meridian Avenue
clear of demonstrators to 17 Street. They were told it had to
be completed in 12 minutes. Three prisoner vans were sent to
Dade Boulevard and Meridian Avenue to back up the F.H.P. sweep.
F.H.P. platoons 24, 25 and 26 were placed on alert in their
staging area. Traffic escorts for delegates buses were advised to
bring them through Gate 11X, which would be open by the time the
buses arrived.

When F.H.P. troopers began their sweep of Meridian Avenue, one of
the demonstrators threw a tear gas grenade at them, but the troopers
continued their sweep without responding until Meridian Avenue was
cleared up to 17 Street. Gates 11X and 12X were opened to
delegate traffic and F.H.P. troopers remained there to keep the
gates opened.

The demonstrators who were cleared from Meridian Avenue joined the
demonstrators on 17 Street and assisted in the harassment of
delegates attempting to enter the Complex through Gate 9X. At 8
P. M. a large number of non-delegates on Washington Avenue began to
move south toward 17 Street and gather in the intersection. Miami
platoons 15, 16 and 17 had just arrived at the Complex after being

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threw over the gates, but police were not provoked to action.

Observers reported several arrests by police inside the Convention Hall fence. Police dashed out to grab and handcuff one demonstrator. Another was apprehended when he climbed up on the fence.

called from their staging area in Miami. They were asked by 905 to go out through Gates 8X and 9X and clear the non-delegates from those areas. Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel had arrived at the Complex and were assigned to the area of Gate 10X to do the same. The demonstrators were moved away from the gates, but they went into the street and began harassing vehicular traffic by breaking windows and letting air out of tires. Some Miami officers were sent to assist, but at 8:08 P. M., 905 requested that F.H.P. platoons 24, 25, and 26 come to 17 Street and Meridian Avenue and push the demonstrators east onto Washington Avenue.

At 8:16 P. M., the tri-agency tie-in was back in service and P.S.D., Miami and Miami Beach switched back to the common frequency.

A number of demonstrators had gone to Dade Boulevard and Washington Avenue to block delegate traffic enroute to Gates 11X and 12X. F.H.P. troopers had cleared the non-delegates from Gate 10X so at 8:26 P. M., 905 requested that Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel respond to Dade Boulevard and Washington Avenue to push the demonstrators back into the demonstration area. Traffic was flowing freely by 8:30 P. M.

At 8:34 P. M., there were an estimated 1000 demonstrators in the intersection of 17 Street and Washington Avenue and they were interfering with the operation of Gate 6X, primary exit for buses and taxis. Miami Beach platoon #1 was requested to come to Gate 6X with the pepper foggers.

The evening session of the convention began at 8:36 P. M.

At 8:38 P. M., F.H.P. troopers were clearing 17 Street at Washington Avenue, pushing the non-delegates north toward the demonstration area. Miami units were checking the double-decked parking-lot and clearing it out. Demonstrators had been hiding behind the upper level wall and throwing things at troopers, making the sweep and officers on the fence.
After 17 Street and Washington Avenue had been cleared, F.H.P. troopers remained across the entrance to 17 Street to keep the demonstrators on Washington Avenue in the demonstration area provided.

Demonstrators continued to harass delegates trying to get through the gates. At Gate 5X, demonstrators jumped on a car, broke several windows and were beating on the car when the driver apparently panicked and struck several of them with the vehicle in his efforts to get away. Several of the demonstrators required medical attention.

At 9:25 P. M., 905 requested Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel meet 905 at 17 Street and Washington Avenue. They relieved the troopers who were posted across the entrance to 17 Street and 905 requested that the F.H.P. units position themselves along the Lincoln Road Mall to prevent vandalism by demonstrators as they left the Complex to return to the Flamingo Park campsite.

There was still a lot of non-delegate movement on Washington Avenue near 17 Street and northbound traffic was detoured at Lincoln Road at 9:09 P. M. At 9:30 P. M., a Miami Police Lieutenant was struck with a rock and had to be taken to a hospital for suturing.

At 9:47 P. M., 200 or 300 demonstrators broke away from the people listening to music in the North Demonstration Area and walked south on Washington Avenue toward Flamingo Park. At 9:52 P. M., it was estimated that there were from 500 to 700 people singing and listening to rock music and speeches in the North Demonstration Area, another 100 to 150 by Gate 5X, and about 100 at 17 Street and Washington Avenue. People continued to drift away toward Flamingo Park.

At 9:59 P. M., F.H.P. platoons 24, 25 and 26 were positioned at Dade Boulevard and Washington Avenue in case some demonstrators
tried to interfere with delegate traffic as it left the complex after the session.

At 11:32 P. M., the speeches ended and the remaining non-delegates started walking back to the park. Perimeter security relaxed and prepared to secure for the evening.

At 11:42 P. M., the evening session of the convention adjourned.

By 11:44 P. M., the non-delegates were passing Lincoln Road, thus allowing F.H.P. platoons 24, 25 and 26 to return to their staging area, but the platoons were asked to stay in their cars until word was received that the non-delegates were all back in Flamingo Park.

P.S.D. platoons 2, 3, 4, and 5 were returned to their staging area at 11:49 P. M., and they secured for the night at 12:06 A. M. All of Miami's platoons also secured for the night at 12:13 A. M. and all F.H.P. platoons were secured. At about the same time, Miami Beach platoon #1 secured and Game and Fresh Water Fish personnel relieved Miami Beach personnel on the gate.
EVENING DEMONSTRATIONS AT CONVENTION HALL; "STREET WITHOUT JOY," AUGUST 22, 1972 (continued)

After Action Report
prepared by the Combined Intelligence Operation

Street Without Joy

At approximately 6:45 p.m., in heavy rain, approximately 1,000 non-delegates left Flamingo Park enroute to Convention Center with an elephant.

The VVAW group returning from the Fontainebleau was to meet up with the park people at 16th and Meridian. Estimates were from 2,600 to 3,000 persons, one live elephant pulling a casket and one float. The VVAW's dispersed as the crowd approached and were spectating. Approximately 100 Vets returned to the park. The remaining joined the tightly grouped march which proceeded to the front of Convention Hall.

Groups identified included VVAW, ZIPPIES, YIPPIES, Attica Brigade, SDS and GAA.

The VVAW group went to the front of the complex and seated themselves along the fence on Washington between 17th and 18th Street.

The other group of "death marchers" in costume with floats went north on Meridian toward Dade Blvd. The group lined the fence along Meridian.

The Attica Brigade joined the march with intentions to continue toward the Eden Roc with intentions of being arrested.

At 6:56 p.m. National Guard units at Miami Beach High and Central High School were put on alert.

By 7:15 p.m., a group of seventy-five (75) Abdala members, the White Power Bus with the NSZPP aboard and a small group of anti-abortion supporters were in the Convention area.

The non-delegates staged guerilla theater tactics in front of the hall, blocked traffic.

At 7:43 p.m., the FHP was requested to sweep Meridian from Dade to 17th Street.

At approximately 8:00 p.m., Sergeant Havens advised a white/male, 6'2", 160 lbs, dark complexion, in a green suit, was agitating demonstrators to storm the fence and "Kill the Fascist Pigs" subject possibly Dave Dellinger of Chicago Riots.