


NCJRS

This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.



Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531**

Date filmed

1/23/76

3/22/76

EVALUATION REPORT

Investigation and Warrant Service Unit
Philadelphia Common Pleas and Municipal Court
(PH-164-73A)

Submitted to: Evaluation and Monitoring Unit
Governor's Justice Commission
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Prepared by: Robert A. Wilson

February 1, 1976

Project period Evaluated: July 1, 1973 - December 31, 1974

SECTION I. SUMMARY

The two major functions of the Warrant Service Unit are to serve failure to appear warrants and to notify hard-to-reach defendants regarding court appearances and other justice procedures. At this writing, the unit has been under the administration of the Philadelphia Pretrial services Unit for less than four months. The Warrant Service Unit has demonstrated that it is more efficient in performing its two principal tasks than the Police Warrant Unit which preceded it. The Warrant Service Unit now has the opportunity to develop a series of innovations in communicating with defendants regarding the workings of the criminal justice system.

Warrant Service operations, over the short period during which the unit has been fully operative have been satisfactory. The cost per cleared warrant is about \$30. This is a savings of about \$25 for each warrant, when compared to the former unit. Some of this savings, so far, has been due to the lower salaries of warrant service investigators as compared to those of police officers. Nevertheless, we are convinced that having the

19345
EVALUATION - LOAN

MAJOR EVALUATIONS UNDERWAY OR COMPLETED IN YOUR SPA

Project or Program being Evaluated:

Grant Title: (PH-164-73A) Investigation & Warrant Service Unit
(include grant number)

Grantee: City of Philadelphia

Brief Description: To assume the responsibility of serving warrants
(both project and evaluation effort)
on all defendants who have failed to appear for a scheduled
hearing.

Scheduled date of final Evaluation Report: 3/22/74

Person to contact concerning the Evaluation:

Christine A. Fossett, Chief, Evaluation & Monitoring Unit
(name)
Governor's Justice Commission, Department of Justice
(address)
Box 1167, Harrisburg, PA., 17120
717-787-1422
(telephone)

If completed, is Evaluation Report on file with NCJRS? yes no

Please mail completed form to:

~~Keith Miles~~
Office of Evaluation
LEAA-NILECJ
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

19345

EVALUATION LOAN

717871

Warrant Unit under the management of the Pretrial Services Division will not only provide better continuity between the courts' bail services (such as ROR and Ten Percent Cash Bail) and later court hearings, but will result in fewer defendants failing to appear for hearings. More important, the unit has the demonstrated capacity for a strong community service orientation, through which the defendant will be aided in understanding the operations of the court and the overall administration of justice, rather than being coerced into acquiescence to the courts' demands.

Refunding is recommended.

If the backlog of outstanding warrants is to be reduced, however, it will be necessary to provide the capacity for the unit to classify these outstanding warrants in order of priority. Since this backlog goes back over a decade and many of the defendants are deceased, incarcerated on another charge, or long absent from the Philadelphia area, substantial time and resources will have to be devoted to planning and classification.

It is also recommended that the unit seek new and innovative ways to communicate with defendants, many of whom are male, youthful, poverty-stricken members of minority groups. The recently established Conditional Release program, operated by the Pretrial Services Division, appears to have excellent potential for service to this group. In addition, it may be possible to employ some techniques which utilize agencies from inner-city neighborhoods for this purpose.

SECTION II. PROJECT ACTIVITIES

1. Goals and Objectives

The basic function of the Warrant Service Unit is to serve failure-to-appear warrants to defendants who did not attend court hearings. Other objectives of the unit are articulated in the subgrant application.

In addition to serving failure-to-appear warrants, the unit will assume the responsibility of providing personal notification to those defendants who have failed to call in after receipt of a warning card and who cannot be reached by telephone. This personal notification system will provide the defendant with an additional reminder to appear in court and allow the Pretrial Services Division to secure a new address if the defendant has moved so that future court notification letters will be received. Therefore, failures to appear caused by misunderstanding concerning court date and location will be prevented. In addition, the unit will have a favorable image in the city due to its positive community service. Also, when defendants do fail to appear for a hearing, they will not be afraid to surrender themselves to the Warrant Unit. Thus, as a result of this personal notification system, we should witness a decrease in the number of new warrants issued and an increase in the number of persons who surrender themselves.

Results Anticipated:

1. A greater number of defendants will be returned to the criminal justice system.
2. The Pretrial Services Division Investigation and Warrant Service Unit will be able to serve more warrants than are issued.
3. The Warrant Unit will make some progress towards decreasing the present backlog of warrants.
4. The Unit will continue to close more cases per employee than the Police Warrant Unit did.
5. The length of time from failure to appear to apprehension will decrease, and therefore the total time from arrest to disposition will decrease.
6. The number of new warrants issued will decrease with the utilization of the personal notification system.
7. More defendants will surrender after failing to appear due to the increased understanding and acceptance of the Warrant Unit and the knowledge that otherwise they will be apprehended.

All of these anticipated results will benefit the criminal justice system by improving the administration of justice: The court backlog will be decreased and cases can be disposed of in a shorter time. The community will, as a result, have more confidence in the criminal justice system.

2. Project Activities

The Warrant Service Unit is comprised of eight teams of plain clothes investigators, a chief field investigator and two supervisors, and clerical support staff. Prior to this project, the field force was administered through the Philadelphia Police Department, although some record keeping and responsibility for administration was vested in the Pretrial Services Division.

Beginning in June, 1973, the Pretrial Services Unit began to phase in its own field force of investigators, while the police warrant unit was phased out. Between June and October, 1973, the functions of the Police Warrant Service Unit were gradually assumed by the Pretrial Services Division.

The underlying reasoning for this transfer of responsibility was that because most of the bail programs were administered through the Pretrial Services Division (ROR, Ten Percent Cash Bail, and the newly established Conditional Release Program), this was the best location to provide better continuity in service. Previously, some records had been lodged with the police, some with the District Attorney's Office, and some with the Pretrial Service Division. Administration was fragmented; the system was bewildering, not only to those involved in the administration, but led to frequent administrative errors and often resulted in persons being arrested who should not have been and others remaining unapprehended when they should have been.

Another problem was that the officers in the Police Warrant Unit were often removed from their warrant service duties and placed on other

assignments when the Police Department was shorthanded. Finally, there was the cost factor. Police officers are paid more than Warrant Service Unit investigators. The general rationale was that the Pretrial Services Unit could do the field work both more efficiently and more effectively.

Also underlying the transfer of Warrant Service responsibility was the fact that the new service would entail much more than apprehension of fugitives. A systematic notification was to be given to defendants with respect to when and where to show up for hearings. This was to be undertaken with phone calls, post cards, and field visits--all of which could be readily coordinated with the operations of the ROR program and other court bail programs. This new unit, however, was funded at half the level anticipated to be necessary to cut back on the bench warrant backlog. The new unit has only been in operation for a period of three months at this writing. Interpretations must be viewed as tentative and reflecting only initial operational trends.

SECTION III. EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

I. Evaluation Activities to Date

The Warrant Service Unit evaluation plan specifies a complex research design which entails data collection from police, courts, corrections, and TASC (drug treatment project). During the initial evaluation period (July 1, 1973 - January 15, 1974) the following tasks were completed:

a. Revision of research design as a result of discussions with Pre-trial Services Unit, Governor's Justice Commission, and other evaluation personnel employed on this project (July - September, 1973).

- b. Development of data collection format for evaluation data (July - November, 1973).
- c. Development of data analysis format for interim and final reports, including a detailed sampling plan (July - December, 1973).
- d. Selection of a sample of case records of persons who were granted ROR between April and June of 1973 (Sample frame emanates from data base created by TASC project), (December, 1973).
- e. Development of computer program to recode TASC data into a form which will permit the desired data treatment (January, 1974).
- f. Collection of failure to appear (FTA) in court information for cases falling into the sample and entering data onto unit record (July, 1973 - January, 1974).
- g. Monitoring of monthly operating statistics of Pre-trial Unit.
- h. Interviewed 15 ROR and Warrant Service Unit personnel, 2 Court administrators, 3 police personnel, 8 prisoners, and 5 persons from outside agencies regarding the evaluation (September, 1973 - January, 1974).
- i. Completed evaluation report (January, 1974).

Evaluation staff has also provided a design for ongoing revision of the Vera criteria, currently used to judge risk of flight. This plan has been enthusiastically received by staff. In addition, evaluators have provided project staff valuable inputs from prisoners, as well as the social service community, and police, which have helped in creating better communication with these groups. Also, suggestions for more effective techniques of

developing and interpreting monthly operating statistics have received a positive response from staff. The most valuable part of the evaluation will come in the form of revised procedure for granting ROR, involving a reweighting of the classification relative to risk of flight, which will be included in the final report. These criteria will include a number of inputs relating to Warrant Service Unit activity. Finally, one student project on female defendants has been completed and another student has begun a Ph.D. dissertation based on the project. Several more student projects are forthcoming.

2. Data and Information Employed in Evaluation

An important source of management information regarding the processing of ROR applicants is incorporated into the Pretrial Service Divisions monthly statistical report. Although there is sometimes a several month lag before information on previous months becomes available, these data are employed regularly, both as a management and as an evaluation tool. The other major source of statistical data for the ROR evaluation is now being entered on the 2,000 case sample mentioned in section I. ROR recipients were followed-up from April through December of 1973, with the aim of developing a predictive technique which will discriminate between those who fail to appear at hearings and those who appear (also recidivists vs. non-recidivists, etc.). Final information on this followup period was received by January 15, 1974. All data are now being coded prior to keypunching and entry onto computer tape. Subsequently, computer routines specified in the original research proposal will be carried out. The resulting model will be useful in gauging the impact of Warrant Service Unit activity on the FTA rate and on the fugitive rate.

The following data sources were used in the preparation of this report:¹

1. Number of defendants released on ROR per month (August, 1971 - July, 1973), from monthly statistical report.
2. Number of bench warrants issued per month (August, 1971 - July, 1973), from ROR monthly statistical report.
3. Failure to Appear Rates (August, 1971 - July, 1973): (a) for willful failures; (b) for non-willful failures, from ROR monthly statistical report.
4. Number and percentage of total arrested persons (August, 1971 - July, 1973), (those processed through the Police Administration Building):
 - (a) Interviewed by ROR personnel;
 - (b) Recommended for ROR;
 - (c) Granted ROR -- (ROR monthly report)
5. Fugitive Rates (percentage of those willfully missing a court appearance during a given month who have not yet been apprehended by investigator (August, 1971 - July, 1973) for those:
 - (a) Recommended for ROR,
 - (b) Not recommended for ROR -- (ROR monthly report)
6. Interview data from personnel indicated in Section III, item 1.
7. Data on "walk-ins" from Warrant Service Statistics and Police Warrant Unit.
8. Detention population for December, 1971, December, 1972, and January, 1973, supplied by the Philadelphia Detention Center.
9. Number of warrants cleared per month and number of fugitives apprehended--

¹Additional information bearing on the overall performance of the Pretrial Services Division are contained in EVALUATION REPORT (PH-166-73A). Release on Recognizance Program also submitted to the Governor's Justice Commission on February 1, 1974.

June, 1972 - December, 1973--from Police Department, District Attorney's Office, and Pretrial Services Division.

10. Working hours, staff, and costs from District Attorney's Office, Police Department, and Pretrial Services Division, June, 1972 through December, 1973.
11. Outstanding fugitive warrants, 1971, 1973, and 1974, from Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and Municipal Court computer system.

Analysis of Reliability and Validity of Data.

Monthly data appear to monitor accurately actions taken by the Pretrial Services Unit and dispositions made by the courts and actions taken by the police. Since no secondary data source is available to validate these data, however, it is impossible to estimate undercounts or overcounts of various data elements.

Some monthly operational data are not available in the form specified by the original research plan, but these additional data will be available in the near future and will be included in a subsequent report.

Some of the Courts' statistics on warrants served do not agree with similar data collected by the District Attorney's office. But again, by using the measure which is most conservative as a measure of program success, effectiveness can still be gauged. Perhaps the most serious difficulty with respect to data collection was encountered in interpreting the data describing the monthly detention population. If one accepts the premise that one of the fundamental goals of the program is to reduce this population, then it is necessary to have reliable data which explain why defendants remain in detention activities. The present data are inadequate for this purpose.

Another way of stating the problem is this: In order to reduce the detention population (and criminal justice system costs) it is necessary to have good information on how people get into these facilities, why they are remaining there, and why they are getting out. At the moment we have no comprehensive information available which accurately monitors this flow.

Two types of FTA rates originally calculated (June, 1971 - May, 1972) are no longer included on the Pretrial Divisions monthly statistical report, although the recently developed rates (for those recommended ROR and those not recommended for ROR) appear to serve this purpose as well as the FTA rates for these two groups.

Finally, the number of fugitive warrants derive from several listings: (1) The police, who have the largest and longest list, going back for over ten years; (2) A computer summary from the courts, which does not include many of the outstanding warrants; (3) A list of outstanding warrants maintained by the Pretrial Services Division. Many of these warrants are for persons incarcerated for various lengths of time who are being held in other jurisdictions. Additional outstanding warrants are for persons who are now deceased. Still other persons have simply disappeared. The net result is a great deal of misinformation and confusion concerning the number of warrants which should be classified as "active", as compared to those which should be retired, either temporarily or permanently. Since the performance of the entire criminal justice system is frequently judged by employing the number of outstanding warrants as a criterion, some more meaningful way of estimating the population at risk is essential.

The validity of the monthly statistics must be assessed on the basis of what they are used for. Now that the level of operation of the Pretrial

services appears to have stabilized (in the third year of operation) monthly reports appear to be used principally for two purposes: (a) As a management tool for assuring a reasonably even work flow; (b) As an indicator of relative program success, which can be used, in turn, to validate the program's impact on the criminal justice system. The data system serves these two purposes well.

The system does not operate well in several senses, however. Problems uncovered are as follows: (a) The time lag between input and output is substantial. At this writing (1-20-74) monthly statistics from September, 1973 through December, 1973 were not yet available. This makes the system of doubtful utility for troubleshooting; (b) Data for the monthly report emanate from several sources and are collected in aggregate form. If a problem area is uncovered, it is difficult to zero in on the case records of those specific defendants in order to determine where the specific trouble lies.

We have had few difficulties in implementing the evaluation plan. Minor staffing difficulties were caused by the failure to comply with the payment schedule contained in the contract, but this difficulty seems to have been remedied.

4. Recommendations for Future Evaluation Efforts

An important feature of the current evaluation is the reassessment of the ROR point system, which is employed primarily to gauge risk of flight. This task is scheduled to be completed on July 1, 1974.

Secondly, as noted in the previous section, the Warrant Service Unit's monthly reporting system requires a great deal of attention if it is to be used effectively for decision-making and quality control. To do this properly will require a systems analysis, one result of which should be a

capability for quicker and more detailed feedback regarding management problems.

Thirdly, linkages between other data systems, particularly those of corrections and the police are inadequate, making it impossible to effectively interrelate the workings of the Warrant Service Unit with other parts of the criminal justice system. The net result is that it is also impossible to explain the gains or losses in the detention population, particularly in light of the decreasing arrest rate.

Finally, in order to understand and evaluate the manner in which the Warrant Unit performs, it is essential to carefully monitor its performance firsthand--to actually begin there. Future evaluation efforts should implement a participant observation technique. This is of prime importance in assessing any unit which has police powers.

SECTION IV.: PROJECT RESULTS

The results of the project were monitored by a number of performance indicators. Because the Warrant Service Unit has been in full operation since only October of 1973 (under the management of the Pretrial Services Division) most comparisons are made with the old Police Warrant Unit, beginning in June, 1972.

One of the difficulties in any program evaluation is answering the question: How do we know when the program has been a success? We must also pose the question: Successful compared to what? These queries indirectly lead to the issue of standards, some sort of benchmarks against which to judge program effectiveness and efficiency. Few nationally recognized performance

standards exist for pretrial services. The dearth of comparative data from other programs is even more acute with respect to warrant services. As a consequence, results analyzed here are limited to Philadelphia program comparisons.

Central to any program which serves a large number of persons is the organization's capacity to dispense the service in an efficient manner. Efficiency, as employed here, infers a ratio of program inputs to program outputs. Being able to maintain as even a ratio as possible over a period of time is essential for any agency involved in the dispensation of justice. The first measurement which is considered is the ratio of warrants received per month by the Warrant Service Unit, as compared to the number of warrants cleared. Clearance suggests an apprehension or other procedure which results in an acceptable explanation of why the defendant could not appear at a hearing. Tables 1 and 2 show these ratios for two periods:

June, 1972 through August, 1973--when the Police Warrant Unit was in operation, and September, 1973 through December, 1973, the initial period of operation of the current Warrant Service Unit.

The percentage of warrants cleared by the Police Warrant fluctuated monthly, from 85 percent to 117 percent (the latter figure indicating that the Unit cleared other outstanding warrants than the ones which were received that month). In comparison, the current Warrant Service Unit, in four months of operation, cleared between 76 and 100 percent of its warrants monthly. The actual number of warrants disposed of per month by the current unit was similar to that disposed of by the Police Warrant Unit. During one month out of the four in which it operated, the current unit disposed of more warrants than it received. This suggests a potential for a sustained period

of high efficiency, during which some progress will be made in decreasing the backlog of warrants. (Objectives 1, 2, 3, and 5 of Project goals and objectives, Section II).

According to information received from the Pretrial Service Unit on January 30, 1974, the Police Department lists approximately 8,500 outstanding warrants. As explained in the previous section, many of these warrants date back over a decade. Another large number should also be reclassified as "inactive". The Court's computer system lists outstanding warrants beginning in 1971, by the month which they were issued (Table 5). The cumulative total for the three years is 3,982 outstanding warrants. Whatever the actual count of outstanding warrants is, and however they should be classified, the number which should be considered as "active" remains substantial. An examination of tables 1-3 suggests that little progress has been made in resolving this backlog. No doubt the reason for this trend is that priority is given to disposing of the more recently received warrants. There is serious question whether it is possible for the backlog to be reduced, especially since there is currently no way of estimating the resources which would be required to perform this task.

It is recommended that the various backlog lists first be consolidated. Following this, all warrants should be classified according to a priority. Once this is done and a decision is made as to the resources which might be appropriate to apply in disposing of warrants at each priority level, it will be possible to attack the problem. At the moment, however, no one seems to be sure just what the backlog problem actually means. All are agreed, however, that the very existence of the backlog is a thorn in the collective side of the criminal justice system. In short, the alleviation of this

problem appears beyond the capability of the Warrant Service Unit as it is presently staffed. With proper staffing, however, the Unit could probably tackle this problem.

Several cost efficiency measures were computed for the Warrant Service Unit. Table 4 indicates the man-hours spent by Warrant Service investigators when the unit was manned by police officers (June, 1972 - August, 1973). The number of warrants disposed per investigative man-hour fluctuates widely-- from .08 to 1.3. Comparative data for the current Warrant Service Unit are shown in Table 5. Over the four months studied, the ratio of warrants disposed per man-hour remain fairly constant, varying from .17 to .23. In short, these data indicate that it takes investigative staff about five man-hours to dispose of one warrant. A two-man team disposes of a warrant about every two and a half hours. These figures do not include clerical time and time spent by supervisors and administrators.

Cost figures for the Police Warrant Unit (also staffed with some detectives from the District Attorney's office) are shown in Table 6. The average cost for investigators between June of 1972 and August, 1973 was approximately \$45,000 per month. Using these monthly cost figures, divided by the number of disposed warrants for the same periods, produces the monthly investigative cost to dispose of a single warrant (Table 7). The cost per disposed warrant for the police investigator averaged \$55, not including clerical time, supervisory time, and overhead. The corresponding cost per warrant for the current Warrant Service Unit was \$30--a savings of \$25 per warrant. Although part of this savings may be attributed to the increased efficiency of having a unit the principal job of which is to dispose of warrants, an even larger part of the difference is explained in the salary

differential between police and investigators employed by the Pretrial Service Division.²

Also stated as an anticipated result of the project is that more defendants will surrender after failing to appear, due to a better understanding of the Warrant Service Unit. (Section II, 1, Objective 7). The number of fugitives surrendering voluntarily ("walk-ins") is shown in Table 8. Although the number of walk-ins averages about 225 per month, an increase is apparent during the last four months of 1973 when the new unit was phased in. Possibly, as defendants become more familiar with the unit, and as its workings become more widely known "on the street", the number of fugitives surrendering voluntarily will increase.

Another fundamental question relating to Warrant Service Unit and the entire Pretrial Services Division is its impact on the detention population. Since the greatest proportion of working time is devoted to serving FIA warrants, it can readily be understood that a consequence of this activity is frequently that more defendants are incarcerated. The broader philosophy of the Pretrial Services Division, including the Warrant Service Unit, however, is the prevention of incarceration, through an efficient communication process. By maintaining contact with defendants regarding court hearings and other procedures, the goal is to divert them from the costly, dehumanizing experience of detention.

A comparison of the Philadelphia detention population for three points in time is shown in Table 9. The latest count, January 29, 1974, shows a

²A comparison between the total staffing patterns and duties of the various warrant service units may be found in the appendix.

decrease of over 300 from the population of a year ago (December, 1972). This difference is accounted for mainly by the decrease in "detentioners"-- those detained temporarily for court proceedings, those under detainer for probation and parole violations, and some deferred sentence cases. Although this analysis does not identify the specific reason for the decline in detentioners, it does suggest guarded optimism regarding this overall problem. To be certain what is causing the decrease, and indeed whether it is a long-term decrease, will require a more detailed monitoring of population inputs and outputs at the detention center.

In summary, the indicators suggest that the cost per disposed warrant has been reduced as a result of placing the warrant service function under the administration of the Pretrial Services Division. Data from three full months of operation do not demonstrate, however, that the funds saved are a result of increased efficiency of field investigation staff, or the result of better communication with defendants. Rather, the principal cost savings are traced to the salary differential between the former staff of police officers and the present unit employed by the court.

On the positive side, some of the indicators, such as the percentage of warrants cleared per month, clearly indicate a gradual increase in efficiency, as routines become established in the new unit. The potential for even greater effectiveness is clearly revealed in the interviews conducted with staff. The need to innovate and to attempt different ways of communicating with defendants regarding court procedures is also clearly signaled by these interviews and by communication with administrative staff. The effect of the new mail notification system will be more accurately monitored when the

research on bail risk profiles is presented in the evaluation report scheduled for release on July 1, 1974.

2. Other Factors Impacting Project Results.

a. Administrative Structure.

The capacity of the present administrative structure is more than adequate to manage the project. Administrative efficiency appears excellent. Moreover, the Director of the Pretrial Services Division is recognized nationally for his leadership and innovations in the bail reform movement. This quality has spilled over to staff, resulting in a high performance climate and good esprit de corps.

b. Operation and Management.

When the Pretrial Services Division has assumed the warrant service function, both the number of investigators and the number of man-hours worked per month declined substantially. This is the direct result of the unit's being staffed at about half the level that was called for in the original plan. If the number of outstanding warrants is to be reduced, an increase in staff will be required.

Several situations in which defendants were apprehended by investigators and brought to the Police Administration Building when they should not have been were noted. These errors resulted from warrants being listed as active, when the defendants had actually appeared at the scheduled hearings. The unit needs a "fail-safe" warrant verification system to insure that this does not occur in the future.

Many of the unit's records have recently been transferred from the District Attorney's office. Although all of the records are physically present at the Warrant Service office, retrieval is sometimes difficult because of the way they are filed and catalogued. Moreover, linkage between various sets of files is frequently a cumbersome procedure. These difficulties will probably be resolved as recording and filing routines become more clearly established.

Interviews with court administrators and assistant district attorneys involved with the Warrant Service Unit indicate that attitude and efficiency of the unit has improved enormously since the function was transferred to Pretrial Services. In their opinion, the serving of warrants was considered "drudge work" by most police officers--much less interesting and prestigious than most normal police duties. The service of warrants also received a low administrative priority from the police administration. The officers assigned to the unit were frequently reassigned to augment operational units during periods of union-management conflicts and during periods of civil unrest. In contrast, the youthfulness and enthusiasm of the new unit, coupled with its high priority for court business, has greatly impressed outside observers.

Although most of the unit's activity involves contact with defendants, the Court also employs the investigators to subpoena and transport witnesses (and sometimes brings witnesses to hearings against their will). Investigators are not only armed, but also have some police powers. There may be a tendency among some judges to employ them in a manner which is not in keeping with the spirit of separation of judicial powers from those of the executive. In one instance, a judge ordered investigators to arrest and bring to court a physician who was needed as a witness in a rape case. There is a potential

for the misuse of the unit's police powers.³

In addition to its dedication to tracking down defendants and witnesses, the unit must develop a public service orientation. Again, a sensitive balance between a professional police philosophy and a community service ethic is called for. Not only is it necessary for warrant service officers to retain respect, but it is fundamental that they develop a reputation of trust and credibility in the community which they serve. This posture is particularly difficult to maintain, when one considers the fact that most of the defendants the unit comes into contact with are youthful, poverty-stricken, members of minority groups.

c. Personnel.

Staff appears to be well-qualified for warrant service work.

d. The Evaluation Process.

All staff members interviewed were cooperative with evaluation staff and showed no hesitation in discussing the strength and weaknesses of the project.

e. Planning.

Planning appears adequate. The fundamental problem is that the staff level is not the one specified in the original plan. Additional planning,

³ Philadelphia Inquirer, January 19, 1974.

encompassing more systematic efforts (described in Section IV, 1) must occur if the number of outstanding warrants is to be markedly reduced.

f. Method.

The basic method employed appears adequate to meet the project objectives.

g. Funding.

As indicated previously, funding is inadequate. Additional investigators are required. Additional clerical and research personnel will also be required if warrants are reclassified employing the priority system mentioned in Section IV, 1.

h. Allocation of Resources.

Allocation of resources by the Pretrial Service Unit administration appears satisfactory.

3. Project Impact.

The project has impacted all of the problems described in the proposal except the number of outstanding warrants left over from previous years. General performance, given the limited resources employed, has been good, and continues to improve. The Unit is serving a vital function from the perspective of the overall criminal justice system.

4. Project Success or Failure.

The project has been successful in achieving its goals. Now that effectiveness has been demonstrated, new, refined objectives having a time and numerical success dimension relating to project efficiency should be formulated. It is highly recommended that these new efficiency goals be specified both in benefit-cost terms and in human terms.

5. Comparison with Other Projects of this Type.

The Philadelphia Pretrial Services Unit, including RCR, Conditional Release, and the Warrant Service Unit, is able to provide a broader scope of services than most similar projects throughout the country. The Philadelphia project is unique with respect to its systematic application of point criteria. Most have failed to apply modern management techniques as effectively as is done in Philadelphia. FTA rates in other jurisdictions varied from 28% in Cleveland,⁴ 7% in Washington, D.C.,⁵ to 9.9% in New York City.⁶ Philadelphia's 7.6% FTA rate appears to be relatively low, as compared to these other cities, suggesting that the project's efficiency is better than average.

6. Did the Results Justify the Cost of the Project?

Based on the average detention cost of \$14.05 per day, assuming conservatively that the defendants released annually would spend a week in jail if there were no Pretrial Services Unit, costs alone would be \$1,150,000.00 per year. This does not, of course, take into account the other costs to the criminal justice system, let alone the lost wages, lost taxes, welfare costs, and other social costs, such as divorce and mental illness which are linked with incarceration. Moreover, without the Pretrial Services Program detention facilities would be required, the current cost of which is estimated to be over \$30,000 per detainee.⁷

⁴Predicting Defendant Appearance, Thomas J. Larkin. Court Management Project Cleveland, Ohio. November, 1973.

⁵District of Columbia Bail Agency, Philadelphia Court Bail Program, Pretrial Release Program Comparative Study, Bruce D. Beaudin, et al., 1973, p. 178.

⁶City of New York, Pretrial Services Agency Operations Report, December, 1973, Table 1.

⁷Conditional Release for the City of Philadelphia, pp. 12-115.

SECTION IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Warrant Services Unit program appears to have met its objectives for its initial period of operation--July, 1973 - June, 1974. Retending is recommended.

The Warrant Service Unit is successful by internal management standards, judged principally by the volume of Warrants processed, the cost per warrant, and the number of defendants apprehended.

Judged by external criteria, mainly the large number of outstanding warrants, the unit has made a substantial impact on this problem, although the problem remains severe.

The Warrant Service project not only appears to address an important need in helping to provide a viable alternative to money bail: the criminal justice system could probably not survive in its present basic form without the project.

The following recommendations apply to the entire Pretrial Services Division, including the Warrant Service Unit.

Short-Term Recommendations.

1. The FTA rate could probably be cut down by discussing ROR and court procedures in greater detail with defendants.
2. The Warrant Service Unit needs a "fail-safe" system to insure that it does not apprehend defendants who should not be apprehended.
3. The Warrant Service files, recently transferred from the Police Warrant Unit and District Attorney's office, need better organization.

4. Going back 15 years to check the defendant's prior record for the purpose of determining eligibility for ROR may be an unnecessarily long period.
5. No distinction in ROR points is made in assessing felonies committed recently from those committed a long time ago.
6. No one seems to have responsibility for assuring that information is immediately placed on the police computer. This results in some defendants being unnecessarily detained and some defendants being released prematurely.
7. Individual case records for defendants are not generally concise. Information is often strewn throughout the folders, making it difficult to dig it out.
8. Subpoenas are often received in duplicate (or triplicate) from several different sources. It would be helpful if they all came from only one source.
9. Defendants interviewed by ROR often have no identifying papers, since these have often been confiscated at the time of arrest by police. An arrangement should be worked out with the police to remedy this situation.
10. Defendants are often unaware of exactly what they are charged with. Since interviewers do not have the time and are not instructed to go into the specifics of the charge, the defendant is often hostile and belligerent at the time of the ROR interview. More systematic direction needs to be given to interviewers.

11. The points assigned through the ROR criteria apparently can be juggled, depending upon what questions are asked and how they are asked. More clarification needs to be given as to interview procedures.

12. It is presently difficult to ascertain if those who were recommended for ROR or Ten Percent Cash Bail actually ever received it. The computer indicates only whether a defendant was recommended for ROR. Defendants who refuse the interview can still receive ROR or Ten Percent Bail without this fact showing on the computer. This additional information should be made readily accessible through the computer.

13. Information on prior arrests frequently fails to indicate that a charge was reduced. These data should be entered onto comprehensive records.

14. Information received from the Probation Department is sometimes impossible to understand due to cryptic codes and incompleteness. A new format needs to be developed.

15. Interviewers often are unaware of and do not understand all of the many criminal justice and related social service programs in Philadelphia. A written, updated outline of these programs is needed.

Long Term Recommendations.

1a. If bail is a small amount (\$1,000 or less) ROR might be granted immediately, rather than employing lengthy interviews and detailed procedures of ROR or Ten Percent Cash Bail.

1b. Or alternately, defendants who require only a small amount of bail might be released conditionally for short periods while they secure the necessary amount.

2. The ROR point criteria should be updated at least annually, with systematic procedures for making policy changes incorporated into the research design.

3. The Pretrial Services Division should undertake a complete systems analysis, focussing on paper and information flow. The resulting management information system should be linked with other segments of the overall criminal justice system, in order to detect bottlenecks and trouble spots within the system.

4. The Pretrial Services Division should develop its own research and evaluation capacity. The tasks of this unit would include preparation of monthly operational reports, quality control studies, updating of the ROR criteria, maintenance of liaison with other data sources within the criminal justice system, and other special studies.

5. The Pretrial Services Unit should undertake regularly scheduled sessions with all members of the judiciary in order to discuss the administration of ROR, and to develop more effective means of employing ROR in the administration of justice.

6. Pretrial Services should consider implementing a merit system (or civil service system) of personnel administration.

7. Finally, remembering that a large proportion of failures to appear at hearings (FTA's) are concentrated among highly mobile young males from inner-city poverty areas, Warrant Services should consider developing further relationships with neighborhood social service institutions such as settlement houses and neighborhood centers. These institutions are in an excellent position to maintain contact, to provide advice, support, and counseling, and to assure that defendants appear at scheduled hearings. This arrangement would augment the current Warrant Service Unit.

APPENDIX

DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S WARRANT UNIT

June 1971

Personnel:

- 1 Lieutenant -
- 1 Sergeant -
- 10 District Attorney's Detectives -
- 4 Clerks -

Functions:

- 1.) Custodial responsibility for bench warrants.
- 2.) Maintained back-up card file for bench warrants.
- 3.) Handled all lodging.
- 4.) Sent warning letters to all fugitives.
- 5.) Handled all administrative withdrawals of warrants.
- 6.) Handled all extraditions and out-of-county pickups on bench warrants.
- 7.) Prepared bench warrant disposition sheets for Detention Center and City Hall bench warrant hearings.
- 8.) Handled all police calls concerning bench warrants - 12 midnight to 8:00 A.M. on weekdays and 24 hours a day on weekends.
- 9.) Notified PCIC of open bench warrant cases.

September 1973

Personnel:

- 1 Lieutenant
- 1 Sergeant
- 5 District Attorney's Detectives
- 2 Clerks

Functions:

- 2.) Above
- 5.) Above
- 7.) Above

January 1974

Personnel:

- 1 Lieutenant
- 1 Sergeant
- 3 District Attorney's Detectives
- 2 Clerks

Functions:

- 2.) Above
- 5.) Above

POLICE WARRANT UNIT

June 1971

Personnel:

30

Functions:

- 1.) Responsible for disposition of all criminal bench warrants including forthwith witness warrants.
- 2.) Maintained office in City Hall for the processing of fugitives who were surrendering themselves for the disposition of a bench warrant.
- 3.) Handled all police calls concerning bench warrants - 8:00 A.M. to 12 midnight on weekdays.
- 4.) Notified PCIC of cancellations of bench warrants.

February 1972

Personnel:

60

Functions:

Same as June 1971

November 1972

Personnel:

30

Functions:

Same as June 1971

September - October 1973

Personnel:

7

Functions:

- 1.) Residual force of 6 Officers and 1 Sergeant was maintained to handle forthwith warrants until November 1973.

COURT BAIL PROGRAM'S EXPANSION

June 1971 - ROR

Personnel:

- 1 Chief Investigator
- 1 Administrative Investigator
- 5 Field Investigators

Functions:

- 1.) Responsible for serving bench warrants on fugitives who were released on their own recognizance prior to their court date.

February 1972 - ROR/10%

Personnel:

- 1 Managing Investigator
- 13 Field Investigators
- 1 Administrative Investigator
- 3 Clerks

Functions:

- 1.) Responsible for serving bench warrants on fugitives who were released on their own recognizance or who posted 10% Cash Bail prior to their court date.

August 1973 - Warrant Service Unit.

Personnel:

- 1 Managing Investigator
- 2 Shift Supervisors
- 4 Chief Field Investigators
- 1 Administrative Investigator
- 26 Field Investigators
- 4 Clerks

Functions:

- 1.) Responsible for service of all criminal bench warrants.
- 2.) Sent warning letters to all fugitives
- 3.) Maintained office at City Hall to handle all defendants who were surrendering themselves on bench warrants.
- 4.) Handled all police calls concerning bench warrants - 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
- 5.) Handled all lodging.
- 6.) Handled all extraditions and out-of-county pickups on bench warrants.
- 7.) Notified PCIC of additions to and deletions from outstanding fugitive list.

COURT BAIL PROGRAM'S EXPANSION (Cont.)

Warrant Service Unit (cont.)

September 1973

Personnel:

Same as August 1973

Functions:

- 8.) Custodial responsibility for all bench warrants.

November 1973

Personnel:

Same as August 1973

Functions:

- 9.) Assumed responsibility for disposition of all forthwith warrants including witness warrants.

January 1974

Personnel:

Same as August 1973

Functions:

- 10.) Responsible for preparation of bench warrant hearing sheets for Detention Center and City Hall hearings.

Table 1

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WARRANTS CLEARED BY WARRANT UNIT¹ PER MONTH - 6/72 to 9/73²

	6/72	7/72	8/72	9/72	10/72	11/72	12/72	1/73	2/73	3/73	4/73	5/73	6/73	7/73	8/73
Total Number of Warrants Disposed ³	1181	984	1172	987	1118	916	805	938	892	912	1005	895	736	773	835
Number of Warrants Received	1198	941	1114	1077	1121	925	1070	871	764	887	971	1012	823	889	978
Percentage of Warrants Cleared	98.6	104.6	105.2	91.6	99.7	99.0	75.2	107.7	116.7	102.8	103.5	88.4	89.4	86.9	85.4
Number of Fugitives Apprehended	1106	933	1109	944	1026	870	709	887	646	857	946	854	684	741	802

¹Warrant Unit consists of the Police Warrant Unit, District Attorney's Warrant Unit, and a small (app. 4) Warrant Service Unit operating through the Bail Bond Project.

²The data for this Table was gathered from the monthly figures provided by the District Attorney's Office.

³Total number of warrants disposed = total number of warrants disposed--rearrests.

Table 2

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WARRANTS CLEARED
BY WARRANT SERVICE UNIT PER MONTH
FROM 9/73-12/73¹

	9/73	10/73	11/73	12/73
Number of Warrants Disposed	<u>684</u>	<u>833</u>	<u>637</u>	<u>685</u>
Number of Warrants Received	897	1011	740	684
Percent of Warrants Disposed	76.2	82.4	86.1	100.1

Percent of warrants
cleared during period-
86.2

¹All numbers from Warrant Service Unit monthly statistics.

Table 3

OUTSTANDING FUGITIVE WARRANTS,
LISTED BY COURT COMPUTER SYSTEM
(January 30, 1974)

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
January	104	62	92
February	81	83	89
March	89	73	91
April	84	91	126
May	76	123	127
June	84	103	126
July	90	104	163
August	41	114	204
September	48	125	174
October	40	135	240
November	77	89	214
December	<u>71</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>257</u>
Total	885	1,193	3,982

Table 4

MAN-HOURS FOR WARRANT SERVICE UNIT¹
 (June, 1972 - August, 1973)

6/72	7/72	8/72	9/72	10/72	11/72	12/72	1/73	2/73	3/73	4/73	5/73	6/73	7/73	8/73
9256	11684	9960	7728	9584	4416	5664	1512	680	4520	5592	5840	5684	5512	4480

¹The Warrant Service during this period consisted of men from the police department, D.A. detectives, and investigators from the Pre-Trial Services. For a complete breakdown of these figures, see Appendix.

PERCENT OF WARRANTS DISPOSED PER INVESTIGATIVE MAN HOUR

	6/72	7/72	8/72	9/72	10/72	11/72	12/72	1/73	2/73	3/73	4/73	5/73	6/73	7/73	8/73
Number of Warrants Disposed	1181	984	1172	987	1118	916	805	938	892	912	1005	895	736	773	835
Total Monthly Investigation Hours	9256	11684	9960	7728	9584	4416	5664	1512	680	4520	5592	5840	5684	5512	4480
Percent Disposed Per Man Hour	.127	.084	.118	.128	.117	.207	.142	.620	1.312	.202	.179	.153	.129	.140	.186

Table 5

WORKING DAYS AND MAN HOURS
FOR WARRANT SERVICE UNIT
(September, 1973 - December, 1973)

	September	October	November	December
<u>Supervisors* (2)</u>				
Days	44.7	38.6	51.5	40.3
Hours	335.25	289.5	311.25	307.25
<hr/>				
<u>Chief Field Inv. (4)</u>				
Days	81.1	85	82.3	78.6
Hours	608.25	637.5	617.25	588.5
Approx. 1/2 of hrs. is devoted to investigation; the rest is supervision.	152.1	159.4	154.3	147.4
<hr/>				
<u>Investigators</u>				
Days	448.6	452	478.45	442.4
Hours	3364.5	3390	3588.37	3318
<hr/>				
Total Investigative Hours	3516.6	3549.4	3742.7	3465.4

*Supervisors devote no time to investigations.

PERCENT OF WARRANTS DISPOSED PER INVESTIGATIVE MAN HOUR

	September	October	November	December
Number of Warrants Disposed	<u>684</u>	<u>833</u>	<u>637</u>	<u>685</u>
Total Monthly Investigative Hours	3516.6	3549.4	3742.7	3465.4
Percent Disposed	.194	.235	.170	.198

Table 6

THE NUMBER AND COST OF INVESTIGATORS BY MONTH
(June, 1972 - August, 1973)

Unit	6/72	7/72	8/72	9/72	10/72	11/72	12/72	1/73	2/73	3/73	4/73	5/73	6/73	7/73	8/73
1) D.A. of Inves. \$1	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	*	*	10	10	10	10	10	10
	9470	9470	9470	9470	9470	9470	9470	4735	4735	9470	9470	9470	9470	10,020	10,020
2) Police Dept. of Inves. \$2	57	57	57	57	57	26	26	*	*	26	26	26	26	26	26
	52,269	52,269	52,269	52,269	52,269	23,842	23,842	11,921		23,842	23,842	23,842	23,842	25,246	25,246
3) ROR of Inves. \$3	14	14	14	15	15	15	14	15	15	15	15	15	16	16	15
	9860	9860	9860	10,601	10,601	10,601	9859	10,601	10,601	10,601	10,601	10,601	11,343	11,343	10,601
Total \$ Expen- iture Per Month	71,598	71,598	71,598	72,340	72,340	43,913	43,171	27,257	15,336	43,913	43,913	43,913	44,655	46,609	45,867

The monthly salary of a D.A. detective from 6/72 to 7/73 was \$947 (yearly \$11,361). On 7/1/73 it became \$1,002 per month because of a 5.5% raise (\$12,032 per year).

From 6/72 to 7/73 a patrolman on the Warrant Unit earned approximately \$917 per month (\$11,007 per year). After 7/1/73 his pay increased to \$971 per month (\$11,648 per year) because of a 5.5% pay increase.

From 6/72 to 8/73 an investigator earned \$742 per month (\$8,900 per year). In addition there were three supervisors earning \$9,700 per year or \$308 per month who devoted 70% of their time to investigations. Seventy percent of their monthly salary (\$566) is included in this total.

Because of the school strike, the Police Warrant Unit did not work the last two weeks of January, and all of February, 1973. The D.A. detective only devoted one-half time to their warrant duties during this time.

Table 7

COST PER WARRANT RETIRED BY WARRANT SERVICE UNIT
(June, 1972 - August, 1973)

Measure	6/72	7/72	8/72	9/72	10/72	11/72	12/72	1/73	2/73	3/73	4/73	5/73	6/73	7/73	8/73
Costs of Investigators	<u>71,598</u>	<u>71,598</u>	<u>71,598</u>	<u>72,340</u>	<u>72,340</u>	<u>43,913</u>	<u>43,171</u>	<u>27,257</u>	<u>15,336</u>	<u>43,913</u>	<u>43,913</u>	<u>43,913</u>	<u>4,655</u>	<u>46,609</u>	<u>45,867</u>
Number of Warrants Disposed	1181	984	1172	937	1118	916	805	938	892	912	1005	895	736	773	835
Investigative Cost to Dispose of One Warrant	\$60.62	72.76	61.09	73.29	64.70	47.94	53.63	29.06	17.19	48.15	43.69	49.06	60.67	60.30	54.93

COST PER WARRANT RETIRED BY WARRANT SERVICE UNIT
(September, 1973 - December, 1973)

Measure	9/73	10/73	11/73	12/73
Costs of Investigators	<u>21,025</u>	<u>21,025</u>	<u>21,025</u>	<u>21,025</u>
Number of Warrants Disposed	684	833	637	685
Investigative Cost to Dispose of One Warrant	\$30.74	25.24	33.01	30.69

Table 8

NUMBER OF MOVING AVERAGE*
OF FUGITIVES SURRENDERING VOLUNTARILY (WALK-INS)
(May, 1972 - December, 1973)

1972		1973			
	Number	Moving Average		Number	Moving Average
May	243	234.3	May	217	238.3
June	200	225.7	June	264	232.7
July	260	230.7	July	217	252.3
August	217	205.7	August	276	242.7
September	215	216.7	September	235	257.7
October	185	224.7	October	262	240.3
November	250	242.7	November	224	228.0
December	239	242.3	December	198	--

*Mean of prior month, current month and subsequent month.

Table 9

PHILADELPHIA DETENTION POPULATION, 1971, 1972, 1973¹

Date	Category Under Sentence	Detentioners	Total
December, 1971	521	2,071	2,592
December, 1972	400	2,320	2,720
January, 1974	412	1,931	2,363

¹All information from Philadelphia Detention Center for a single day during the month indicated.